Debating “Democracy”: The International Union of Architects and the Cold War Politics of Expertise

In June, 1948, the International Union of Architects (Union internationale des architectes, UIA) met for its inaugural meeting in Lausanne, Switzerland. Based in Paris and still in existence today, the UIA was initially formed to bring architects together around the common issue of postwar reconstruction. Inspired by the open and democratic structure of new intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations, the founders of the UIA aimed to connect the architectural profession globally: all experts in the field were welcome, regardless of nationality, ideology, or architectural doctrine. After the organization’s first meeting in Lausanne, UIA congresses were convened in Rabat in 1951, Lisbon in 1953, The Hague in 1955, and Moscow in 1958. The sixth UIA congress was held in London and the seventh in Havana, as the UIA expanded its reach to the global south. As Pierre Vago, the UIA’s first Secretary General, stated in Lausanne in 1948, the UIA was to be inclusive “without exception.”

While the UIA created opportunities for sharing new research and idea in areas such as housing and town planning, the organization also facilitated in its founding years a lively exchange of ideas about the architect’s rightful role in politics and society. UIA leaders quickly found that while new building technologies served to unite the architects of their organization, differing ideas about architectural expertise worked to drive a wedge between members. In Lausanne in 1948, two opposing visions came head to head as architects debated the text of their new organization’s founding statutes. Architects from disparate parts of the globe argued about whether the word “democracy” had any place in the UIA’s constitution. On one side were seated those who were “for democracy.” On the other side were those “against” it. The pro-democracy camp included the Soviet

delegation and architects from Eastern Europe. The anti-democracy camp was composed of French, Swiss, Italian, and Belgian delegates. The UIA’s debate over “democracy,” which presented a serious challenge to the viability of this new institution, serves here as means through which to consider the different trajectories of architectural expertise that had formed by mid-century as a result of opposing notions of the rightful relationship between the architect and the state.

Creating the UIA

That Sir Patrick Abercrombie, the author of the postwar plan for London, would meet under the auspices of the UIA to discuss postwar reconstruction with Nikolai Baranov, chief architect of Leningrad, is a fact difficult to square with the conventional narratives of Cold War division and Soviet isolation. How did a group of architects that was clearly so divided come together in the first place?

The idea to form a new international architectural organization emerged initially in Paris in 1945 among members of the Réunions internationales des architectes (RIA), an organization founded in the interwar period and headed by Auguste Perret and his disciple, Pierre Vago. Searching for others to join them, Vago and RIA members attended a meeting in 1946 of the Royal Institute of British Architects in London. There, they were introduced to Patrick Abercrombie, author of the postwar plan for London who would soon agree to serve as the first President of the UIA. Vago also invited two other groups to merge with RIA in forming the new organization. The first was the Congrès internationaux d’architecture moderne (CIAM). This group, founded in 1928 and headed by Le Corbusier, decided not to join in, though many of members of CIAM would attend meetings and play active roles on their own. The second group invited by Vago was the Comité permanent international des architectes (CPIA). Founded in Paris in the 1860s, the CPIA was composed of architects who were on the whole more traditional and academic. The CPIA, led by Swiss architect Paul Vischer, enthusiastically agreed to join with RIA to create the UIA. And this they did in 1948 in Lausanne.2

By 1947, the UIA was taking shape. Yet, although a number of countries were now represented, the new organization was still only a Western European affair. In order to make this group a truly “international” union of architects, Vago, Vischer, and Abercrombie would have to reach out. The American Institute of Architects (AIA) quickly agreed to join and New York-based architect Ralph Walker, who would become AIA President in 1949, was the main figure involved in these early years. Expanding its reach across the Atlantic was an important first step, but for Vago, who was intent on Eastern European, and in particular Soviet, involvement in the UIA, it was not enough. Vago wrote to the Union of Soviet Architects with an invitation to participate. The Union
agreed and in 1947 and early 1948 Soviet architects attended, planning meetings for the new organization ahead of its first congress. With the participation of Soviet architects, the UIA’s internationalism would be undeniable.

It was Vago’s commitment to the principle of international inclusiveness that led to Soviet involvement in the UIA. Vago was an internationalist through and through. Internationalism was a position that he stuck to despite mounting criticism from colleagues and emerging Cold War tensions. Vago’s steadfast internationalism made him unique among his UIA colleagues, but beyond merely holding internationalist convictions, Vago’s own biography positioned him well to connect East with West. Vago was born in Budapest in 1910. He had moved to Paris at a young age, training with Auguste Perret and working as the publisher of *L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui*. Based in Paris, Vago maintained ties to Eastern Europe. In seeking Soviet involvement in the UIA, Vago enlisted the help of two intermediaries. The first was the Bulgarian architect Luben Tonev, author of the master plan for the reconstruction of Sofia, whom Vago referred to as his “*camarade d’école*” (“childhood friend”). The second was Polish architect Helena Syrkus who, as Vago described her, “had been transformed by recent events into an ardent communist.”


Postwar Internationalism

Apart from Vago’s critical role in uniting architects across East and West, Soviet involvement in the UIA was a natural outgrowth of the wartime period. With the turn toward Socialist Realism in the 1930s, Soviet architects were cut off from some of the international developments and organizations in which they had earlier participated. Most famously, relations were severed between Soviet architects and

5 This event was organized by the Architects’ Committee of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. See Richard Anderson, “USA/USSR: Architecture and War,” Grey Room 34: 80-103.


7 Premier Congrès, 17.

CIAM. Yet, isolation from international modernism did not mean isolation in toto. Soviet architects continued to travel abroad throughout the 1930s, participating in and forging networks beyond those of CIAM, and borrowing ideas and technologies, in particular from the US, for large-scale building projects of the interwar era.

Wartime alliances in the early 1940s further strengthened the international connections between Soviet architects and their colleagues in the US and Britain. As new building technologies developed during the wartime years in Anglo-American practice, Soviet urban experts took note. In May 1945, an American-Soviet Building Conference was held in New York. There, Soviet planners expressed their enthusiasm for prefabricated design, describing the extent of wartime destruction back home: “for restoring Stalingrad alone,” they stressed, “it is necessary to build forty-five million square feet of dwellings.”

The impetus for the creation of the UIA was tied to the same factors that had served to unite architects during the war. Wartime destruction brought architects together across issues of style, ideology, and political creed. Architects working around the world found that while wartime destruction presented serious challenges, it also offered unprecedented opportunities to plan on a city-wide scale. Whether to restore the urban fabric to its prewar shape or to construct entirely new cities more appropriate to the present and future was a question at the heart of architectural debates everywhere in this period, from London to Leningrad.

The universally-felt sense of urgency through which architects understood their work in the postwar years was expressed by Patrick Abercrombie, author of the postwar plan for London, in his opening address as UIA President at the 1948 Congress. Architecture, Abercrombie announced, had reached a moment of transition “comparable to the end of the Roman empire or the Middle Ages.” “What possibilities we have before us!” he exclaimed:
With the reconstruction of enormous cities—megalopolis monsters condemned to death but persistently escaping ultimate destruction—we face the challenge of blending the old and the new. The creation of entirely new communities for men and women provides us with the ideal opportunity to apply modern techniques for comfort, economy and decent social conditions. And finally, the creation of new capital cities suitable for our new politics gives the architect the chance to raise his craft to the pinnacle of monumentalism in which form succumbs to the needs of society… Let us hope that the UIA will be the instrument that allows architects across the globe to collaborate effectively to achieve the tasks we face.\(^8\)

Speaking in the optimistic tenor of the early postwar years, Abercrombie was, like his colleagues in UIA, besotted by the promise and allure of “planning.” He composed his address at the very moment that, in Western Europe and the US alike, planning was being elevated into a practice that extended beyond the drafting board and into the very politics of the postwar order itself.

In many countries in Western Europe, the state intervened after the war like never before with land-use legislation that ensured that blueprints would quickly become reality.\(^9\) And with the welfare state model emerging in Western Europe, “planning” was no longer the work of urban experts alone.\(^10\) The role of the architect became increasingly entrenched in the interventionist politics of the postwar period.\(^11\) But as the political power of urban planners increased, so too did their desire to forge ties in the international arena. As new state positions were created for architects in Western Europe, these same architects increasingly defended their autonomous status and sought to secure a space for creative discussion unfettered by politics.\(^12\) For many UIA members, the international arena provided just such an apolitical space. And it was precisely this idea that led to conflict between socialist and non-socialist members of the UIA right
from the start. That the UIA should exist “beyond politics” was the topic of heated debate within the organization, and it was this idea that triggered the controversy over “democracy” in 1948.

**Architectural Politics and the “Russian Constitution”**

Karo Alabian was among the first Soviet architects sent to the UIA. Alabian, a major figure in Moscow’s architectural establishment and Chief Architect in the reconstruction of Stalingrad, attended a planning meeting for the UIA in Brussels in April, 1947. When he returned to Moscow, Alabian published his thoughts on the UIA in the *New Times*, an English-language Soviet journal that promoted the USSR among leftist circles abroad. The UIA, Alabian wrote, would be valuable both as an international source of authority for the profession, and as an institution in “defense of the professional interests of architects.”

“It is a fact,” Alabian elaborated, goading his English-language readers, “that the conditions in which people in this field of art find themselves in capitalist countries are not conducive to creative work... Even in so wealthy a country as the United States, where, one would have thought architecture should enjoy extensive opportunities, we do not observe much progress in this sphere.”

Alabian’s article would soon make its way through Europe and across the Atlantic in correspondence between the other founding members of the UIA, spreading a distinct Cold War chill through these newly forming relations. The primary bone of contention was not, however, Alabian’s critique of Western architectural practice. Instead, it was what Alabian had written about the UIA’s constitution that was the main source of offense.

Alabian’s article provoked an especially angry response from Paul Vischer and Ralph Walker, both of whom carried on a private correspondence in the months leading up to the Lausanne congress of June 1948. From Basel, Switzerland to New York City, letters were sent back and forth as...
Vischer and Walker grew increasingly irate. Vischer wondered why Soviet architects had ever been invited to join the UIA in the first place. “In an international organization of architects,” he wrote, the “participation of the Russians is absolutely not essential, since our Russian colleagues have little or nothing to offer in our profession.” Far more important than the ostensibly retrogressive quality of Soviet architecture, however, was the issue of what Vischer and Walker dubbed the “Russian Constitution.”

The “Russian Constitution” was a series of clauses that Soviet architects wished to add to the UIA’s founding statutes. As Alabian explained in the New Times, the Soviet position was that the UIA should be defined as “an association of progressive, democratic organizations of workers in architecture [that] undertake to struggle for enduring peace, reinforcement of democracy and progress in culture.” “These are the watchwords,” Alabian wrote, “under which our organization should act, in contact with all other organizations of intellectual workers. Such a united front would make a valuable contribution to the advancement of democracy and culture.” In his 1948 article, Alabian made it sound as if this wording was certain to be adopted. Moreover, the Soviet architect claimed that although the Belgian and British contingent had opposed the motion, the French and Swiss had supported the Soviet view. This, according to Vischer was entirely false. As he wrote to Walker in May, 1948, “Mr. Alabian plumes himself on introducing at the meetings in Brussels in April 1947 the political articles in the statutes. His assertion that Switzerland was of his opinion is free invented.”

For Vischer and Walker, the Soviet wording deliberately contradicted the spirit of the UIA—an organization that, in their eyes, was to “pursue no political aims.” Vischer was keen to ensure that “no political tendency in the new international organisation...might prevent a free exchange of opinion and thoughts.” Alabian had countered this position in his New Times article, writing that


24 “The Russians” was a term used to refer to Eastern European architects in general. Karo Alabian was, in fact, Armenian.

25 Russian State Archive of Literature and Art (RGALI), f. 674, op. 2, ed. khr. 313, l. 86.

26 RGALI, f. 674, op. 2, ed. khr. 313, l. 86.

“it would ill become [the UIA] to take the line of narrow-minded specialists who abhor all politics.”21 Yet, while Vischer and Walker set out to purge the UIA statutes of any hint of politics, other UIA members set about adopting some of the wording proposed by Alabian. In January, 1948, a committee met in Paris to settle on the organization’s founding documents. Although Alabian’s words did not make it into the statutes in the exact form proposed, their political spirit lingered in ways alarming to both Vischer and Walker. One clause in particular, which stated that the UIA would carry out its work “on a democratic basis,” went too far. “These words are not only superfluous,” Vischer wrote, “but might also induce various and wrong interpretations.”22

Vago worked diligently to smooth over the controversy that had arisen from Soviet involvement in his new organization, but by 1948, the commonly held opinion of many in the UIA was that Vago had “engaged himself too much with the Russians.”23 Indeed, Vago was not unsympathetic to Alabian and the so-called “Russians.”24 In a letter of January 1948, Vago updated Alabian about the decisions made in Paris about UIA leadership. Vago had officially been made UIA Secretary General and was now in charge of filling the other positions. Patrick Abercrombie was set to be President, and there were to be three Vice-Presidency positions. One should be reserved for the Swiss, Vago wrote, and it would go to Vischer, since he had been so active in the planning process. A second should go to the Americans, for, as Vago put it “at the very least the post of Treasurer should be offered to these ‘bankers of the West’ [banquiers de l’Occident].”25 As “first” Vice-President, and “by implication the next President,” Vago put forth Alabian’s name. Stronger activity from the Soviets, and from the architects of Eastern Europe was necessary, Vago wrote to Alabian, lest the UIA “give justification to those who spread the Churchillian theory of the ‘iron curtain’.”26 Though the Cold War had barely begun, Vago could already sense the danger it posed to his vision of a broad internationalism.
In the end, Alabian, who was busy heading the USSR Academy of Architecture, would participate no more in the UIA. In a final letter to Vago, Alabian nominated Nikolai Baranov to take the post of “first” Vice-President. Baranov, then in charge of the reconstruction of Leningrad, had travelled with Alabian to Brussels in 1947 and knew the new organization and the stakes of the debate over “democracy” well.27

The Problem with Democracy

As a result of complaints waged by Vischer and Walker, the UIA statutes were taken up once more at the first UIA congress in Lausanne in June, 1948. The result was a bizarre caricature of Cold War power politics. The American and French architects began the deliberations by requesting that the statement that UIA activity would be carried out “on a democratic basis” be deleted. The Soviet delegation countered, saying that the UIA must become a “truly democratic union of progressive intellectuals.”28 Baranov, as head of the Soviet delegation, stressed that there was no better expert than the architect to take up the cause of “democratic peace,” given the architectural profession’s important work in postwar reconstruction. With both positions on the table, a vote was taken with each national delegation opting to stand either “for” or “against” democracy.29

Seeing that they were losing face, the American delegates along with the British abstained, while the French, Swiss, Italians and Belgians all voted “against democracy.” The problem with “democracy” was now front and center.

According to a Soviet report written by Baranov after his return from the Lausanne congress, the situation grew stranger still when, breaking for lunch, congress-goers were taken to a restaurant called the Café Démocratie. As they entered the restaurant, Polish architect Helena Syrkus reportedly quipped that “those who had earlier voted ‘against democracy’ would unfortunately not be dining that day.”30 The UIA’s intentionally

27 RGALI, f. 674, op. 2, ed. khr. 313, l. 42.


The only record I have of this debate is in this Soviet report. This is admittedly problematic.

29 RGALI, f. 674, op. 2, ed. khr. 313, l. 57. The result of the vote was that the wording (“on a democratic basis”) was maintained.

30 RGALI, f. 674, op. 2, ed. khr. 313, l. 57.
broad membership had opened the door to a pointed critique and open mockery of the apolitical ideal of architectural expertise espoused by the organization’s initial founders.

In later panel discussions at the Lausanne congress, many UIA members spoke candidly about what they saw as a loss of autonomy in their profession. The British section acknowledged that architecture was no longer as “independent as it had been before the war.” Yet, new regulations like the British Town and Country Planning Act, they argued, “should not be seen as a constraint or a tightening of [state] control, but as a step towards coordination and collaboration.” Luben Tonev of Bulgaria responded in turn. “Without wishing to speak about politics,” he began cautiously, it was necessary to note that the reconstruction of Europe required architects to “work side by side not only with technicians, engineers and specialists, but also with economists, sociologists and politicians.” It was hard to argue with Tonev’s statement, which made its way into the final resolution summing up the congress, with a small but significant exception. In the interest of compromise, perhaps, the word “politicians” was abbreviated: architects would collaborate, the report stated, with “the engineer, the economist, the sociologist, the jurist, etc.” Skirting the issue of politics that had arisen so frequently in discussion, the apolitical model of expertise was in the end maintained in the congress resolution. Refusing to yield, however, the Soviet section submitted its own congress resolution, which was printed in the official booklet as a counterpoint to the first. In it, the Soviet section made a pitch for the political, asserting that architects should take their rightful place as state actors.

Soviet involvement at the UIA challenged the very framework of internationalism on which this new organization was formed. The two camps standing “for” and “against” democracy in Lausanne in 1948 held vastly different definitions of architectural expertise, but they also harbored separate beliefs about the role of the international arena in the
postwar world. For Soviet architects, who conceived of themselves quite accurately as “state actors,” the international sphere was a political space for provocation and debate. Alternatively, architects like Visher and Walker held on to the promise of an apolitical creative realm in the face of encroaching statism. The impetus for creating the UIA came from Western European architects seeking to carve out a space free from politics in the international arena. Yet, in a bid to be truly internationalist, the UIA opened itself up to a different realm in which everything was political, especially internationalism.

Conclusion

In 1958, one decade after the organization was founded, architects gathered for the UIA’s fifth congress in Moscow. The year of the fifth congress had initially been set for 1957, but as the Hungarian revolution and the Suez Crisis erupted in October 1956, politics threatened to unravel the UIA’s fragile internationalism. Unsure
how to proceed, Vago solicited opinions in November 1956 from each national section on the appropriate role of the UIA in the international conflict. The answers that Vago received showed a membership increasingly divided along Cold War lines. Some UIA members believed that “whatever the regrettable events of a political nature may be which have recently deteriorated the international situation, the U.I.A., by reason of its apolitical and professional nature, should not be influenced by these events but should continue its constructive activity and its international collaboration.”36 Others wrote that the recent events did “not permit them to accept an invitation to the U.S.S.R.,” that a congress held in Moscow “would menace the unity of the Union,” and that a new site should be chosen.37 And others still expressed “feelings of fellowship towards the Soviet architects” but recommended that the fifth congress be postponed. In the end, this third road was taken.38

36 Transcript of meeting on December 7-9, 1956 in Prague between Pavel Abrosimov (President/organizer of the 5th Congress of the UIA), Jean Tschumi (President of the UIA), Pierre Vago (Secretary General of the UIA), Ralph T. Walker Papers, Box 29, Syracuse University Library.

37 Transcript, Ralph T. Walker Papers, Box 29, Syracuse University Library.

38 Transcript, Ralph T. Walker Papers, Box 29, Syracuse University Library.

Figure 3 UIA Executive Committee meeting with Nikita Khrushchev, 1958
The UIA’s fifth congress, held in Moscow from July 21-26, 1958, was well attended by some 1,400 architects from 44 different countries, including North Korea, the US, Chile, Israel, Sweden, and Tunisia. The congress theme in 1958 was “The Construction and Reconstruction of Towns, 1945-1957,” offering architects an opportunity to reflect on the initial circumstances that had brought them together in the postwar years in the first place, and on how far architecture and building technologies had advanced in the intervening decade.³⁹ UIA congress-goers went on excursions of the Soviet capital’s historic landmarks and participated in tours of the city’s newly-built prefabricated Chermushki neighborhood. The UIA’s executive committee met with Nikita Khrushchev, with whom they discussed prefabricated building techniques in a specially scheduled 90-minute meeting.⁴⁰ And two rival exhibits were set up for the duration of the congress: one on Soviet architecture and construction, the other on American architecture.

By 1958, the American architects involved in the UIA increasingly coordinated their activities with US government agencies. Their exhibit of American architecture for the UIA congress in Moscow was assembled with support and funding from the United States Information Agency. And the exhibit’s large panels showing American housing and “urban rehabilitation” would later be passed to the State Department for future use in other parts of Europe.⁴¹ By the late 1950s, it was clear that the dream for an apolitical internationalism once espoused by the UIA’s American and Western European contingents had been absorbed into the US government’s own internationalist ambitions. The cultural arena had, by 1958, become a key battleground in the Cold War.

³⁹ The congress proceedings are printed in V Kongress Mezhdunarodnogo soiuza arkhitektorov, (Moscow: Gos. izdat. literatury po stroitel’stvu, arkhitekture i stroitel’nym materialam, 1959).

⁴⁰ Glendinning, “Cold-War conciliation,” 200.

⁴¹ “Conference with USIA regarding Moscow Exhibit,” January 22, 1958, Folder 36, Box 1, Henry S. Churchill Papers, Cornell University Library.