Migrant Employment and the Foundations of Integration: A Multimethod Approach

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by

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To

Bernhard Anker Larsen
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Migrant Employment and the Foundations of Integration: A Multimethod Approach

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This dissertation investigates a central concern of advanced democracies: How do migrants integrate into their host society? What role do states play in reducing disparities between immigrant and native communities? Can the direct causes of migrant incorporation be identified? Successful integration creates productive citizens and a vibrant civil society, while its absence perpetuates disconnected ethnic enclaves and cycles of underachievement that can last generations, and, in the worst case, lead to acts of terrorism. Using a variety of methodological techniques and data including cross-sectional, panel, and experimental across twenty-seven advanced democracies, my central finding is an ordinal and conditional presentation to the process of immigrant integration. Specifically, economic integration occurs first and is causal in enabling later political and civic incorporation. Further, state recruitment and settlement policies interact to affect this crucial element of immigrant integration. These findings improve our understanding of migrant behavior, the value of economic determinants, and the integration process in society writ large.
INTRODUCTION

Global political discourse is fixated on immigration. Fears of disconnected and dissatisfied migrant communities has bled into discussions of terrorism, economic stagnation, and the erosion of democracy. When migrants are integrated, by contrast, democracies enjoy economic prosperity, social cohesion, and a committed and active citizenry. Governments and political elites alike recognize the relationship between immigration and integration, which in turn has sparked an international debate on the optimal policies. Yet the question remains: how are immigrants integrated into their host societies? What role do states play in reducing disparities between immigrant and native communities, thereby ensuring the successful absorption of newcomers? Can the direct causes of migrant incorporation be identified? This dissertation is structured around these central questions, exploring how migrants integrate, the function of state policy, and the causal role of employment.

The immediate material rewards of employment are obvious—income for workers and revenue for states. Yet employment is even more valuable beyond what this basic calculus suggests. In addition to basic living expenses, wages grant the employed freedom to follow personal pursuits, yielding happier and healthier communities. Employment also brings increased socialization, which in turn fosters greater societal trust and tolerance. Conversely, unemployment cultivates dissatisfaction, social exclusion, and dependence on the welfare state. Unable to enjoy the material and symbolic benefits of employment, the unemployed can become frustrated and alienated, leading to violence and eroding social cohesion. Public solutions to these concerns often prize migrant exclusion or civic education to avoid such outcomes and
preserve democratic health. However, a richer understanding of the benefits of employment presents an alternate path: invest in migrant employment.

The central claim of this dissertation is that employment is not merely important but foundational to migrant civic and political attitudes. Political behaviorists typically address these questions of migrant incorporation by looking at origin, language, or societal tolerance. Specifically, this scholarship contends that the context of migrant arrival or settlement explain the relative successes – or failures – of migrant incorporation. However, I illustrate the goals of integration – namely adherence to host society values, national attachment, and political participation – are attained through employment in the receiving country. This project explores how employment contributes to civic and political incorporation and the role specific policies (namely, settlement and recruitment) play in providing employment for their migrant communities.

This dissertation is structured in three parts. The first paper, “From Migrant to Member,” argues migrants transform into active and committed societal members through employment. Specifically, I examine whether early employment alters migrant civic belonging and political behavior. This paper makes two central contributions to the field of migration studies. First, it provides evidence of the central role of employment on political and civic integration using cross-sectional (i.e., the European Social Survey) and panel data (i.e., GESIS Panel) across ten years and twenty-six European democracies. I find employment, rather than income, civic belonging, or political behavior, produces active, loyal members. GESIS Panel data additionally reveals unemployment critically obstructs a migrant’s future political behavior and feelings of belonging. These findings illuminate the interdependence of migrant experiences and improve our understanding of employment's unique contributions to democratic society. Second, and of
particular interest to migration scholars, it illustrates that economic migration is segmented, wherein employment secures downstream benefits (such as civic belonging and political behavior) while income equality does not. This compels migration scholars to critically re-assess the concept and measurement of economic integration.

In the second paper, “Be our (guest) worker: Recruitment, integration policy, and migrant unemployment,” I build upon the value of employment defined in the first paper to investigate where state policy facilitates migrant labor market access. Migrant policies are broadly categorized by two actions: bringing migrants (i.e., recruitment) and ensuring their success once they arrive (i.e., settlement). I specifically consider whether these two policies with respect to employment can improve actual migrant employment likelihood. Using post-Eurozone crisis data from eighteen European countries from the European Social Survey, Migration Integration Policy Index, and Ruhs’ (2013) immigration policy index, I find migrant employment varies by both the targeted skill-level of state recruitment policies (i.e., low-, medium-, or high-skilled) and the labor market access and support afforded to migrants by settlement policies. In particular, migrants in states with more comprehensive settlement policies are more likely to experience continued employment. Yet the efficacy of these settlement policies is constrained by labor recruitment policies. States preferring low-skill labor fail to improve migrant employment through settlement policies, regardless of relative generosity or accessibility. These conclusions hold across time and migrant populations, demonstrating preferred migrant skill-level consistently and reliably alters the role of economic settlement policy – as measured by labor market sector access, support, and rights – to shape employment outcomes for migrants overall and low-skill migrants in particular. Hence the perceived failures of migrant employment may
reflect state apathy toward genuine economic outcomes, perhaps treating migrants as de facto guest-workers as opposed to potential new members.

The third paper builds on insights from the previous two by using a novel experiment to establish a causal connection between employment and civic integration. This final paper, “The hidden effects of employment: Civic value integration in the United States,” drills down to one dimensions of belonging – value commitment – as a hard test for the effects of employment.\(^1\) Principally, work transforming civic beliefs might be among the more difficult of links to establish between employment and migrant integration. Therefore, I conduct two further tests of my employment argument by examining civic value achievement in the United States. The first study, using the General Social Survey (GSS) panel data, shows previous employment enables support for freedom of speech where pre-employment civic values and origin do not. The second study establishes a causal connection through a unique lab experiment to directly examine the causal role of employment. I find employment causally improves support for freedom of speech, providing crucial evidence that employment is a driving force for migrant value attainment. Social belonging and pride are similarly non-economic byproducts of employment and likely mechanisms for the relationship between employment and civic values. Their relationship with freedom of speech, however, remains unclear. Hence, I lay out the scaffolding for future research to probe for further mechanisms. What can be said as a function of this design, however, is that these civic byproducts of employment are not due to merely showing up, going out, or increasing contact with others. Instead employment itself specifically provides migrants with benefits resulting in increased support for freedom of speech. Further this effect is larger for migrants than natives, specifically with respect to group pride and personal economic optimism revealing the core value of employment in building migrant social belonging.

\(^1\) This differs from the dependent variable of the first paper, which looks at civic belonging.
In sum, these three papers demonstrate employment determines civic attitudes and political behavior across political economic arrangements and diverse migrant populations. While integration- and immigrant-related politics center on rhetoric of resource competition and restrictive policies, I find the very solution to these concerns is precisely the opposite: increase opportunities for migrant employment. As a result, these conclusions have significant consequences for society and democracy, especially where migrant employment is hindered. Overlooking the role of employment as a foundation for future migrant integration only makes dealing with consequences of disintegrated migrant communities that much harder to overcome.
From Migrant to Member: The Economic Route to Integration

Transforming migrants into members is a core task of advanced democracies. States that are successful in this process possess productive citizens, develop a vibrant civil society, and promote social solidarity. When states fail, however, they risk perpetuating disconnected ethnic enclaves, building cycles of exclusion lasting generations, and in the worst-case scenario, enabling radicalization and terrorism. To this end, immigrant integration can ease democratic strain, reducing native-migrant tension and populist support when these new members are viewed as reliable and committed to society. Further, political elites practice integration as a matter of policy. In justifying her focus on reducing ethnic ghettoization, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s alluded not only to the failures of the present but to the tragedy of the Weimar and Nazi eras noting, “we have learned from the past when we did not provide integration opportunities” (Merkel 2016). Former UK Prime Minister David Cameron similarly indicated British policy goals should focus on the “importance of building strong and integrated societies…to build a strong, common home together” (Cameron 2016). And, in assuaging American fears in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in France, President Obama pointed to the United States’ “incredible process of immigration and assimilation that is part of our tradition, that is probably our greatest strength” in combatting terrorism (Obama 2015).

Although this recognition underscores the importance democracies ascribe to the integration of migrant communities, the process of how migrants become active members of society is neither agreed upon nor readily understood. This leaves lawmakers with a plethora of competing policy choices amidst swelling pressure to achieve ‘holistic’ and persistent immigrant
integration. In this tenuous and contentious environment, states currently fixate on policy options targeting those migrants most at risk for societal marginalization. These perceived ‘failures of integration’ are particularly salient in terms of employment where nearly one out of every five foreign-born residents (i.e., 18.9%) in the European Union is excluded from the labor market (Eurostat 2016). In speaking specifically to the concern of this rising migrant unemployment, German President Joachim Gauck stressed, “we risk that frustration and boredom turn into violence and crime, or that political and religious extremism flourish” (Smale 2016). Similarly, in the Swedish Parliament, Green Party Member Maria Ferm argued the “role of the policy is to ensure that people can quickly establish themselves in the labor market … and in society at large” (Riksdag 2015). This preoccupation with economic outcomes, in particular within the current climate of populist exclusionism, leads to the question of whether unemployment – or rather economic exclusion – may bar migrants from becoming integrated into their adopted society.

Yet across subfields and disciplines, the scholarly literature frames the process of migrant incorporation without the possibility for early experiences to affect later attitudes and behavior. Perhaps the simplest explanation for this omission is that the concept of integration is multidimensional – including social, political, cultural, economic, and legal aspects – and thus identifying which early experiences influence later migrant outcomes may be cumbersome (Council of Europe 1997). Arguably the only macro-theory—T.H. Marshall’s theory of social citizenship—proved theoretically and empirically circumscribed by its European, pre-war context (Joppke 1998). Likewise, sociological theories such as classical assimilation or segmented integration, which are relatively overlooked by comparative political science, are

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2 Holistic or full integration refers to the process of integration across venues (e.g., civic, political, economic).
3 Integration here is discussed for voluntary migrants only as different processes, expectations, and factors affect refugee and asylum-seeking integration (Castles et al. 2002).
often over-determined, narrowly focused, and exclude possibilities for multiple avenues for integration (Waldinger and Catron 2016). Even so, as democratic governments increase their commitment to migrant incorporation over time as a means of producing ‘valuable’ new members (e.g., Migration Policy Index 2015), there is a clear and identifiable need for meso-theorizing to establish whether one form of integration, namely employment, augments others. Can employment transform migrants into members? Or, if employment is identified as critical but lacking, does it reduce the probability of attaining parity in the sense of commitment to democracy and political belonging with native-born citizens?

In what follows, I expand upon the citizenship, integration, and political economy literatures to put forth a new framework, in which later political and civic successes depend on early economic investments in employment. I maintain that employment is the key step toward migrant incorporation, unlocking psychological belonging, trust, and other crucial components for civic and political engagement. To empirically position employment as the foundation for this process, I use cross-sectional (i.e., European Social Survey) and panel data (i.e., GESIS panel) across ten years and twenty-six European democracies. I find evidence that economic integration precedes migrant civic belonging and political participation. Panel data from Germany reveals unemployment critically obstructs future civic and political integration thus providing further evidence that employment is critical for future migrant belonging and political behavior. Additionally, I explore multiple economic experiences to reveal a fragmented pattern whereby migrant employment is significant in shaping later civic and political integration while income equality is not. This result compels us to re-examine migrant economic assistance policies moving away from those providing mere income support and toward others fostering employment. Granger causal analyses confirm this direction of causality, from employment to
political behavior and civic belonging. Together these findings suggest employment is not merely theoretically important but empirically foundational, requiring states and policy with larger social goals to address these early employment experiences in achieving civic solidarity and political unity.

What is immigrant integration?

Broadly, immigrant integration is the process where immigrants become active and loyal residents of their new society. Integration, therefore, is multi-dimensional and is generally understood as such covering political behavior, civic belonging, and personal economics (Sobolewska et al. 2017). This provides democracies with a number of potential strategies to ease immigrants from their outsider status into full societal members. Political participation, both formal (e.g., voting) and informal (e.g., protesting or contacting a politician), is of interest to political parties as Europe’s ethnic demography shifts. In turn, many European states focus on providing political rights as a means of converting newcomers into committed and loyal residents. The United Kingdom and Ireland, for example, extend voting rights to certain classes of foreign citizens in national elections and, as long as certain residence conditions are met, all Scandinavian countries provide non-residents suffrage in local and regional elections.

A second strategy centers on skill transfer and acquisition, often defined in civic and cultural terms. In one of the best depictions of this approach, former United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair defined immigrant integration as “…not about culture or lifestyle. It is about values” (Blair, 2006). Blair was practically speaking of civic integration, which requires migrants acquire country knowledge, language skills, and cultural values to build strong ties to their adopted countries: an emphasis reaching far beyond the United Kingdom (Goodman 2014).
Third, state policy can target investments to accelerate economic incorporation, diminishing gaps in employment, income, and labor mobility between citizens and migrants (Dancygier & Laitin 2014). Portugal is a prime example of this strategy, providing immigrants with equal access to private and public labor markets, unemployment services, and vocational training. Additionally, several countries aim to provide all of these components simultaneously, primarily a strategy found in the Nordic states. Finally, others, such as Latvia and Lithuania, take a relatively laissez-faire approach to newcomers, leaving migrants to fend for themselves without much of any state assistance.

Yet wherever the state policy focus or on whom the onus of integration lies, all of the above characterizations assume steps toward integration begin immediately upon arrival. A growing number of states even require migrants take such steps prior to entry through immigration conditions such as language or civic knowledge tests (Goodman 2014). As a result, a certain dimension of integration may precede others. In these instances, migrants are compelled to tackle a specific sphere first, enabling the possibility for one component to alter later or higher-order integration. While some scholars contend analysis at this meso-level provides little value (Bean et al. 2012), I argue for a theory of early economic investment whereby “long term outcomes may be influenced by early experiences” (Castles et al. 2002, p. 126). In what follows, I outline previous explanations for migrant civic and political behavior and develop a specific approach whereby employment enables downstream political behavior and civic attitudes.

Determinants of Immigrant Integration

Theories of migrant civic attitudes and political behavior in democracies have long involved a developmental sequence or pattern, yet are often dismissed as lacking predictive capability.
Notably T.H. Marshall’s seminal work, *Citizenship and Social Class*, portrays citizenship rights as developing in sequence in the United Kingdom derived from transformations in the economic sector: first in establishing civil rights, followed by political, and finally social citizenship rights (Marshall 1950). Applying this theory to migrant behavior and attitudes, integration occurs through rights whereby civil rights matter first and foremost. Critics of T.H. Marshall’s paradigm, however, question the applicability to states beyond the United Kingdom, the role modern citizenship plays in truly achieving equality for the working class or women, as well the theory’s failure to address ethnic or cultural divisions (Turner 2009, Siim 2000). In brief, Marshall’s theory is strictly confined to both its case and place in time, providing little explanatory power to a broader context particularly in regards to immigrant civic and political behavior.

Outside Marshall’s macro-level theory, sociological and American literatures take a more individualistic approach while similarly presenting a process of citizenship and integration. For example, classical and segmented assimilationists argue migrant political and civic behavior depend on individual ties to and components of their origin: a factor often linked to later naturalization (Vink et al. 2013, Hainmueller & Hangartner 2013). Specifically, classical assimilation theory maintains that migrants uniformly adapt into the native mainstream over time (Park & Burgess 1921). This micro-level view stresses that migrants act rationally to “improve the material and social circumstances of their lives” (Alba et al., 2011, p.47). As a result, migrant political and civic behavior is chiefly determined by language adoption and cultural practices within their new society. Preservation of ethnic ties, therefore, hinders rather than enables migrant political and civic engagement. Conversely segmented assimilationists argue second-generation integration occurs through such origin identification either in the form of upward
integration, downward assimilation, or ethnic community preservation (Portes & Zhou 1993). Thus, in contrast to classical assimilationists, individual ties to one’s origin are not wholly negative to migrant societal integration. Rather ethnic identification can empower migrant civic and political behavior under certain circumstances, such as obtaining employment through ethnic networks.

In addition to one’s origin, another body of literature addresses the environment of one’s destination as a critical component to migrant behavior and attitudes. For these scholars, the context and tolerance of the receiving society is paramount to migrant success. In one example of this theory, another ‘variant’ of the assimilation model points to racial discrimination and structural constraints as cause for failures of migrant political and civic integration (Bean et al. 2012). Outside of the assimilation literature, discrimination is routinely shown to prevent migrants from fully participating within one’s adopted country. Specifically, attachment to and political engagement in a migrant’s host country declines precipitously as perceptions of discrimination grow (Schildkraut 2005, Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2012). Pervasive racial attitudes also push migrants to pursue alternative origin or ethic identities in lieu of embracing the identity of one’s destination (Masuoka & Junn 2013). Intolerance can even influence the formal recognition of societal membership, barring migrants from citizenship when citizens themselves are granted decision-making power over applications (Hainmueller & Hangartner 2013). Hence the relative success of migrant incorporation may be outside of the hands of the migrants themselves representing societal-specific roadblocks to civic and political participation.

Yet finally, another body of literature explains migrant attitudes and behavior are contingent upon individual social and human capital accrual. Social capital specifically is argued to increase societal and institutional trust, which in turn encourages political and civic
engagement (Togeby 2007). Research generally aligns with such expectations finding immigrants who belong to religious organizations or robust ethnic networks are more likely to participate politically within their newly adopted society (Tillie 2007, Just & Sandovici 2014). Similarly, where migrants possess greater human capital, such as language and cultural norms, societal participation grows. For one, political participation increases when individuals possess civic skills such as language and governmental knowledge (Brady et al. 1995). Migrants also report feeling closer to their host society when possessing greater language proficiency (Amit & Bar-Lev 2014). Even more, migrants enjoy greater resources when language and other destination-specific skills are obtained, which consequentially influence political and civil engagement (Chiswick & Miller 2012, Brady et al. 1995). As a result, investment in migrant social network expansion and learned skills may be a key component to increase migrant integration as a whole.

Despite the proliferation of these models spanning sociology, political science, and economic literature, research finds theoretically inconsistent patterns at best and incompatible outcomes at worst (Hirschman 2001). With respect to origin-specific theories, disconfirmed hypotheses, fleeting effects, or similarities among immigrants and native-born outcomes suggest classical assimilation and its variants may not appropriately depict the full range of integration processes (Waldinger & Catron 2016). Ethnic minorities in Britain and France, for example, appear less politically and economically integrated when incorporated socio-culturally (Maxwell 2012). Furthermore, racialized assimilation theories fail to provide “a clear specification showing how the various dimensions are related to one another” (Hirschman 2001, p. 318). Notwithstanding grand claims for validity, these theories are seldom examined outside of the American context and attempts at transporting them reveal theoretically incongruent outcomes
(Vermeulen 2010). In France, for example, Muslim North African migrants experience what segmented assimilationist models describe as ‘downward assimilation’ without the necessary assimilation as a ‘minority status’ (Alba 2005). Theories valuing human capital also fail to account for the encouraging function ethnic enclaves can play in integration outcomes despite lower language and human capital acquisition (Edin et al. 2003). Moreover, language acquisition does not appear to systematically improve integration outcomes, particularly among lower-skilled migrants (Berman et al. 2003).

Although the critiques of these determinants of migrant civic and political behavior are robust, each theory adds credence to the possibility of a venue-specific conditional integration structure. In other words, one aspect of a migrant’s experience in the host society can have profound effects on a migrant’s connection and contribution to their new society. For one, applying the Marshallian citizenship and sequence of state-level rights theory to individual integration suggests various domains may support and enable later sociopolitical integration. Segmented and racialized modifications of classical assimilationist theories along with scholars of public opinion and discrimination suggest these pathways may not always be positive, opening the potential for indirect courses and regressive turns. Third, segmented assimilation originated in theories of segmented labor markets, signifying economic indicators are crucial in determining the pathways toward civic and political (Waldinger & Catron 2016). Further where human capital is acquired for natives through years of childhood education, migrants may acquire these skills through nonpolitical environments such as one’s place of work suggesting economic indicators may be crucial for political and civic participation (Brady et al. 1995). Finally, discrimination may be particularly prevalent in one area of a migrant’s life such as gaining access to the labor market, allowing its effects to filter throughout a migrant’s social and
political life. These theories therefore provide a starting point to an alternative specification of integration where migrants may not necessarily move through one path but rather one where a specific early component of integration, namely employment, increases the likelihood of achievement in others.

The Unique Value of Work

Employment by itself is extremely valuable to state institutions and their populations leading to economic growth and improved native prosperity (Borjas 1994, Dancygier & Laitin 2014). Conversely unemployment brings severe immediate effects throughout the social, political, and economic landscape. Alienation grows through overall social exclusion (Dieckhoof & Gash 2015) while psychological well-being and life satisfaction decrease perceptually, even following an individual home and through retirement (Susanli 2017). And deteriorating economic power – including reductions in home ownership (Kauppinen & Vilkama 2010) and heightened reports of homelessness (Shlay & Rossi 1992) – culminate in prolonged dependence on state welfare provisions (Wunder & Riphahn 2013). And as the relative rate of unemployment is over two times more likely for foreign-born European Union citizens than native-born citizens (Eurostat 2016), these immediate associations with unemployment disproportionately affects migrants and present downstream hurdles to societal participation.

Aside from these clear benefits to the receiving society, employment provides a unique value to the lives of migrants beyond a mere paycheck. Employment grants migrants with greater social, political, and monetary resources to participate in and engage with society. Work, for one, provides opportunities for socialization, leading to greater social trust, group memberships, political participation, and tolerance (Rothstein & Uslaner 2005, Andersen & Fetner 2008). This
socialization through employment also brings increased opportunity to interact with diverse populations, learn new languages, and expand social networks in the host society (Ryan et al. 2008). Practically, employment also provides opportunities for migrants to obtain civic knowledge of their receiving society of taxes, insurance, and welfare. This knowledge acquired through years of education for natives is crucial for migrants, expanding opportunities for political participation and civic engagement (Brady et al. 1995). Participating in the labor market also provides psychological benefits of belonging and contributing to their host society. Conversely, unemployment is linked with depression and overall depreciated life satisfaction (Lelkes 2006). Hence when migrants are employed, they are likely happier, more trusting, and active members of their host societies.

Macro-level theories also provide support to the theory that employment is conditional to downstream societal integration. Modernization theory, for example, typically invoked to interpret institutional democratic development rather than individual behavior, posits socio-economics enable cultural and value change over time (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). These arguments trace to Marxist philosophy where economic conditions determine human conditions and relationships (Marx & Engels 1970). Thus prior to considering one’s identity, constructing societal relationships, or adopting personal values, economic preconditions may need to be met. Further aligned with this theoretical expectation at this macro-level, countries enjoying greater rates of migrant employment and prosperity similarly possess increases in citizenship applications (Yang 1994). These migrant communities further are more likely to take part in political action, and indicate cultural and political awareness (Bueker 2006). Thus, the earlier employment occurs, the sooner societies may see these benefits among their migrant communities.
Research at the individual level, additionally suggests employment itself benefits migrants beyond material expectations. For example, where naturalization is limited or prohibitive, employment may act as a form of participatory citizenship empowering migrants to make “citizenship-like claims on the state and others” (Bloemraad et al. 2008 p. 162). Participation in the employment sector also is related with feelings of belonging and larger community ties (Ehrkamp 2005). Massey and Sanchez (2010) stumble upon this unique value through the voice of a Venezuelan migrant connecting with the larger American identity only in terms of employment declaring, “I identify myself with [Americans] in the sense of work” (p.206). Thus as gaps between native and immigrant employment and income diminish, so too should barriers may other political and civic integration submitting employment as a crucial stepping stone toward future migrant civic and political attitudes and behavior.

Theoretical Framework

My core argument is employment enables the downstream civic and political integration of migrant communities. This framework addresses the above inconsistencies in the process literature in explaining both integration and dis-integration. Importantly, integration is not considered as an end state where migrants reside for the remainder of their tenure within a host state but rather as a continuous process where individuals may move toward (i.e., integration) or away from (i.e., dis-integration) natives at any point. In other words, while I argue early investments in employment holds influence on latter integration, I do not presume this component keeps migrants integrated within society indefinitely. Put another way, I contend that employment is necessary for migrant integration but insufficient to maintain integration. On these possibilities, I provide an alternative explanation for observed dis-integration. Where segmented assimilation theorists argue dis-integration occurs as a function of group factors such
as ethnic heritage, I argue dis-integration may be indicative of the importance of a specific early integration component (i.e., employment) in preventing future ‘backsliding’ across integration domains. Further this theory of early investments in employment may provide an explanation for the “cacophony of empirical findings” (Van der Meer & Tolsma 2014, p. 460) with respect to ethnic diversity whereby community employment is the key factor determining whether an enclave is populated with disconnected or connected denizens.

This conditional as opposed to linear understanding further captures varied velocities and circular integration. For example, naturalizing can benefit migrant employment opportunities by opening positions previously unavailable in the public sector or in providing employers cues to an individual’s level of integration (Vink et al. 2013). Conversely, naturalization or acquiring citizenship across Europe generally requires migrants demonstrate at minimum a modicum of economic integration through employment or income stability. In fact, the only European Union states without any employment or income conditions for citizenship are the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom (Migration Policy Index 2015). And while neither the United Kingdom nor the Netherlands possess official economic requirements, both contain some of the highest citizenship application fees across the globe at £906 for the United Kingdom and €829 in the Netherlands (Ibid). Hence in these instances, multiple dimensions of integration reinforce one another leading to a stronger and more robust base without necessarily requiring a single, linear path. Building upon these theoretical expectations of employment, I derive the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** Employment enables migrant civic belonging in the host society.

**Hypothesis 2:** Employment increases migrant political participation in the adopted country.
Analysis and Results

As immigrant integration is a global phenomenon, the data to test this theory must be comparative in nature. Unfortunately, there are few presently available data sources containing an abundance of migrants with ample demographic variability. Even fewer still include comparative international data over time. Due to this limitation, I use two databases independent of one another to assess various components of the presented hypotheses. I first draw upon two waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) to sequentially link immigrant responses across three integration domains: employment, civic belonging, and political action.\(^4\) Second, I include panel data from Germany to place early employment as causal to later civic and political attitudes and behavior over time.

Both demography and previous integration patterns present Germany as a crucial case in understanding immigrant integration. Germany is the largest immigrant receiving country inside the European Union with approximately 10.2 million foreign-born residents and 7.5 million non-nationals (Eurostat 2016). While other European countries possess higher relative proportions of non-national and foreign-born populations, Germany’s average migration growth of over 15% between 2009 and 2014 exceeds that of any other European state (OECD 2017). Germany’s continued importance in global migration and integration is further evident considering Austria, maintaining the second highest migration rate in the EU, is more than six points behind Germany (i.e., 9%). Accordingly, to appropriately examine the proposed conditional nature of employment, I turn to data from three panel waves of the German GESIS Panel Survey. The GESIS Panel is a unique data source containing three waves of post-Euro-zone crisis surveys across 2014 to 2016 including both migrants and native-born citizens in Germany (GESIS 2017).

\(^4\) I exclude legal status as unlike other forms of integration, it can only be ‘undone’ in instances of state revoke or individual denouncement.
While other sources may include larger percentages of migrants, the GESIS panel is exceptional as it surveys recent political, civic, and economic outcomes for non-citizen as well as citizen immigrants over time. The panel nature of this data allows for a direct examination of employment’s theorized role in civic and political engagement. Combined, the subsequent cross-sectional and panel analyses cover twenty-six countries over ten survey years (i.e., 2006-2016).

To measure employment, I code individual reported employment status. For the cross-sectional analysis, employment indicates those who are reported paid work as a main activity over the past week and for the panel analysis, employment indicates self-reported part or full-time employment. Those reporting marginal employment, one-Euro employment, occasional/irregular employment, or no employment were considered unemployed. Civic integration in the cross-sectional design is disaggregated as the social component of belonging (see Liebig & Von Haaren 2011). Hence civic belonging is coded as feeling close to people within the local area. In the panel analysis, civic integration at time one (i.e., 2014) indicates ones’ reported connection to Germany. While this item differs from the cross-sectional analysis, it provides a deeper portrait of the variety of components comprising migrant civic belonging. Specifically, panel participants were asked the extent to which they feel connected to Germany. Unfortunately, this exact survey item wording was not repeated in subsequent waves. Instead this item is compared to 2016 responses to the survey item: I have a strong sense of belonging to the German culture. While the survey wording change is not ideal, it still allows for meaningful comparisons of individual perceptions of belonging to Germany and German culture. Further,  

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5 Time one was counted as the demographic entry survey when possible (January 2014). When a variable was not asked on the entry survey, the first wave was used as time one (April 2014).
6 Responses for those permanently sick or disabled, retired, other, or community service were excluded from the analysis. Housework is also excluded as this may obfuscate undisclosed employment. Future work should examine how familial employment affects these individuals.
7 Positive responses indicate “Agree Strongly” or “Agree” to the item: I feel close to people in the local area.
8 Options include: very tight, tight, not so tight, or not at all.
9 Responses range between fully disagree, rather disagree, partly, rather agree, to fully agree.
these variables are significantly correlated both overall and individually for each subpopulation.\textsuperscript{10}

Last, political integration in the ESS reflects those who participated in at least one political action in the last year including contacting a politician, wearing a political badge, or signing a petition.\textsuperscript{11} Political integration for the GESIS panel is defined as the average participation in a series of political activities in the past year including contacting a politician, signing a petition, public demonstration, purchasing or boycotting certain products, discussing politics with friends or acquaintances, or sending a letter to a newspaper concerning social or political issues ($\alpha=.624$).\textsuperscript{12} Respondents were only included in the analysis if no missing data was present across all indicators. The following section is divided by data source (i.e., cross-sectional and panel) outlining analysis and results.

\textit{Cross-sectional Analysis}

For the purposes of European destinations and to demonstrate the fragmented process of integration, I first analyze the ESS dataset including two survey waves resulting in 3,423 immigrants residing within twenty-six countries over four years (i.e., 2006, 2007, 2012, and 2013).\textsuperscript{13} For each component, percentages reporting ‘integration’ were calculated for the immigrant population by reported length of time spent in the country. As depicted below, a relatively high proportion of the immigrant population in the sample report employment upon entry with over three-quarters (77\%) of immigrants reporting ‘integration’ (see Figure 1.1).

\textsuperscript{10} Overall: $r=.27, p<.001$; Natives: $r=.27, p<.001$; Citizen migrants: $r=.14, p<.05$; Non-citizen migrants: $r=.24, p<.05$.

\textsuperscript{11} Item: There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?

\textsuperscript{12} Participants responded to each action item indicating if they had not taken the action, took the action once, sometimes, or often in the past 12 months.

\textsuperscript{13} Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.
There are slight dips as would be expected as time within the country increases (83.42% between one and five years and 80.09% between five and ten years).

As a result, economic integration appears slightly U-shaped depicting higher levels of integration for migrants initially between one and five years (i.e., 83%) and after 21 years of residence within the country (i.e., 89%). Despite this slight and expected U-shape of employment (cf. Chiswick et al. 2005), the average proportion is higher than those civically and political integrated across all five time-points. Further, neither civic nor political integration ever surpass even the lowest level of reported economic integration (i.e., 77%). The closest either domain comes to reaching the proportion of immigrants economically integrated is civic integration for those residing between six and ten years in the host country at 46% (approximately 32% below those economically integrated). This preliminary evidence illustrates the segmented patterns of integration domains and warrants investigation into the theorized hypotheses given the order and scale of employment across a migrant’s life in the host country.

How do these migrants who are left out of the work force or are civically dis-integrated fair at reaching other forms of integration? Should the hypotheses be accurate, migrants in particular would be less likely to be integrated when compared to their employed migrant counterparts. Comparing civic belonging and political participation by employment status in Figure 1.2 below, unemployed migrants as a whole report the lowest level of civic and political integration. Yet employment status change from unemployed to employed significantly increases reported civic integration, $F(1, 3624) = 4.14, p<.05). Employed migrants on average also report
political integration more frequently than their unemployed counterparts, although this relationship is fails to reach significance.\textsuperscript{14} Further, this relationship between civic belonging and employment does not differ across crisis years indicating the relationship is not contingent upon the economic crisis but rather by the underlying conditions of employment itself.\textsuperscript{15} Similarly after controlling for employment, the main effect of the economic crisis neither affects civic belonging nor political participation.\textsuperscript{16} These findings are aligned with previous research

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{14} F(1, 3624)= 2.69, p=.10.  
\textsuperscript{15} F(3, 3622) = 1.21, p=0.27.  
\textsuperscript{16} F(1, 3622) = .01, p=.93 for political integration and F(1,3622) = 3.40, p=.07 for civic integration.}
indicating the Euro crisis did not alter migrant legal integration behavior (Alarian 2017a). Hence the relationships between the economic, civic, and politic components of a migrant’s life do not appear to be a product of the post-crisis era and therefore are expected to persist as the impact of the crisis slowly fades.

**Integration by Employment and Migrant Status**

![Civic and Political Integration by Employment and Migrant Status](image)

Figure 1.2. Rate of Civic and Political Integration by Employment and Migrant status

Perhaps, however, another integration domain is primary – specifically civic belonging. In this instance civically attached migrants would report higher levels of political participation than those without such civic attachments. Of the migrants arriving within the survey year identifying as unemployed or seeking work (n=13), only one reported taking a political action (i.e., 8%). In comparison 23% those who were employed (i.e., 10 out of 44) reported political integration. The likelihood of obtaining only one integrated unemployed migrant given the
distribution of employed migrants at random is nearly impossible (i.e., less than .000001%).\textsuperscript{17} As a result it is highly unlikely these patterns between employment and political integration would appear should no relationship exist. However civically integrated migrants arriving within the survey year (n=38) were slightly less politically integrated (18\%) than their non-civically integrated counterparts (n=56; 21\%). This provides collaborative evidence of employment enabling migrant political participation above and beyond civic belonging.

An omitted variable may, on the other hand, account for this relationship such as minority status or origin. For this to be the case, minority status would negatively influence integration, specifically for early migrants. Regarding political participation, recent self-identified minority migrants are more likely to report political action than non-minorities. Specifically, 31\% of minority migrants indicated taking at least one political action compared to 18\% of non-minority migrants. Additionally, migrants originating within Europe indicated similar political integration compared to those who originated outside of Europe (18\% compared to 23\%). Thus, while integration may certainly be constrained by origin effects, as discussed in the segmented assimilation models, the driving force across Europe appears to be employment.

\textit{Panel}

While the above results provide tentative support for hypotheses, the data is limited by its cross-sectional nature. To further probe the potential for a conditional process, I examine panel data of migrants to Germany. As a result, I conduct demographic analyses including 116 non-citizen migrants, 225 citizen migrants, and 3,257 native-born Germans. To first examine the trends of integration overtime, I compare migrant outcomes to native population civic belonging and political participation. These initial gaps between natives and migrant populations are

\textsuperscript{17} This is replicated when including all seven waves with two out of 36 unemployment migrants reporting at least one political action compared to 15\% of employed migrants (i.e., 19 of 136). The probability of reaching so few unemployed migrants with political integration is statistically improbable by chance alone.
calculated such that a score of one reflects parity with natives, above one indicates migrants outperforming natives, and values below one representing migrant dis- or un-integration (see Goodman and Wright 2015 for a similar technique). Figure 1.3 below depicts the average change in these ‘gaps’ between 2014 and 2016 by citizenship and employment status at time one. Here scores above zero indicate a population is moving closer to natives between 2014 and 2016 (i.e., becoming more integrated), scores on the axis reflect no change (i.e., same level of integration), and moving below the axis indicates moving further away from native-born Germans (i.e., becoming less integrated).

Looking first to civic belonging, non-citizen migrants who were unemployed in 2014 moved significantly further away from natives decreasing their attachment to Germany by a massive 24% between 2014 and 2016 (e.g., change from .901 to .684).\(^\text{18}\) Interestingly, citizen migrants similarly moved significantly away from natives becoming more dis-integrated in 2016, although this decline is half that of unemployed non-citizen migrants (e.g., 12%; 1.053 to .927).\(^\text{19}\) Conversely, migrants who were employed in 2014 became significantly more integrated in 2016, \(t(54) = 2.39, p = .01\); a change significantly differing from their unemployed and citizen counterparts.\(^\text{20}\) Yet astonishingly employed non-citizen migrants in 2014 decreased their gap in attachment relative to natives by approximately 70% reflecting a 17% change from 2014 to 2016 (e.g., .808 to .941). Consequently, while citizen and unemployed non-citizen migrants were less integrated, employment reversed this trend bringing non-citizen migrants closer to natives.

Moreover, differences among unemployed and employed migrants in absolute levels of integration in 2016 are significant whereby employed migrants report significantly stronger attachments to Germany than previously unemployed migrants, \(F(1, 74) = 8.37, p = .005\). This

\(^{18}\) \(t(25) = -2.23, p < .05\).

\(^{19}\) \(t(199) = -3.86, p < .001\).

\(^{20}\) \(F(1, 79) = 11.13, p = .001\) and \(F(1, 253) = 14.23, p < .001\) respectively.
difference is crucial in light of both groups indicating statistically identical levels civic integration in 2014, $F(1, 79) = 1.00, p=.32$. Similarly, migrants employed in 2014 report significantly higher levels of civic attachment than citizen migrants whereas employed migrants were significantly less integrated than citizen migrants in 2014.\(^{21}\) In other words by 2016, these previously employed non-citizen migrants were 19% closer to natives than citizen migrants in attachment to Germany despite being less significantly integrated in 2014. Thus, not only is employment itself a crucial element in civic attachment, early employment additionally appears to act as a substitute for citizenship, generating belonging above and beyond that of citizen migrants.

\(^{21}\) $F(1, 237) = 7.29, p<.01$ and $F(1, 393) = 6.39, p<.05$. 

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**Figure 1.3. Civic and Political Integration by Employment and Migrant Status**

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In regards to political participation, unemployed non-citizen migrants on average experience a 10% decline between 2014 and 2016. While this change is non-significant, the trend is in the hypothesized direction and noticeably different from participation change employed and citizen migrants experience over time. Those migrants who reported employment in 2014 increase reported political integration by 7% (e.g., .761 to .816) compared to the negligible .3% decrease for citizen migrants between 2014 and 2016 (e.g., .80 to .797). Although the rate of change between 2014 and 2016 does not significantly differ by group, there is significant variation among 2016 integration outcomes by citizenship and early employment status. Specifically, economically integrated migrants indicate higher levels of political integration than economically dis-integrated and citizen migrants.\(^{22}\) This reflects an average political participation by those migrants who were employed in 2014 is 31% higher in 2016 than those migrants who were unemployed in 2014 and 2% higher than citizen migrants. Moreover, the differences in rates of political participation among unemployed and employed migrants in 2014 are non-significant indicating these differences in downstream political integration are not due to apparent population differences in 2014, \(F(1, 74) = 1.07, p=.30\). Together these patterns add credence to the theory and hypotheses of migrant employment such that early economic experiences appear crucial in enabling future political and civic engagement in particular for non-citizen migrants.

In a deeper examination of these proposed relationships, I conduct a series of OLS regressions among native-born Germans, citizen migrants, and non-citizen migrants (tables found in appendices A and B). As reflected in Figure 1.4, after controlling for previous political participation, no other integration experience significantly predicts future political participation for either natives or migrant citizens. For non-citizen migrants, however, employment and civic

\(^{22}\) \(F(1,74) = 3.89, p=.05\) and \(F(1, 234) = 5.11, p<.05\) respectively.
belonging at time one (e.g., 2014) significantly predicts political participation two years later even after controlling for previous reported political behavior. Regarding civic belonging, previous employment again significantly predicts civic attitudes after controlling for previous civic belonging: a pattern again only present among non-citizen migrants. The lack of significance of these factors for migrant citizens in particular allude to the unique role these early integration experiences play in enabling integration within the host society.
To further disentangle which of these early integration spheres (e.g., economic or civic) more strongly affects political integration, I compare Akaike parameter weights. While both economic and civic integration are plausible explanations for political integration, previous employment (\(w=0.941\)) is 1.10 times more likely than civic integration (\(w=0.857\)) in accounting for migrant political participation. Consequently, while both civic belonging and employment are significant, employment is the key to explaining migrant political participation. Additionally, comparing AIC scores for models including employment as opposed to those including only previous civic or political integration reveal the employment model is 1.5 times more likely to correctly identify political integration and 15.85 times more plausible for civic integration. Together this body of evidence adds strong support for hypotheses 1 & 2 in detailing the unique role early employment plays in enabling future political engagement and civic attachment.

While these results suggest employment augments political and civic outcomes, they do not speak to integration compared to native-born Germans. For example, it may be plausible that early employment increases raw political participation but does little to improve political participation relational to native participation. To examine this alternative hypothesis, I calculate two additional variables reflecting the degree of difference and change in migrant outcomes relative to natives. This ‘gap’ analysis allows for more astute measurement of integration outcomes relative to native-born survey participants in which I calculate integration as the rate of difference between foreign- and native-born survey respondents. Both variables are constructed such that a value of one indicates parity, below one reflects natives out-performing foreign populations, and above one signifying foreign-born out-performing their native counterparts (see Goodman and Wright 2015 for a similar technique).

\(^{23}\) For political integration, \(wAIC=0.401\) compared to \(wAIC=0.60\) including economic integration. Regarding civic integration, \(wAIC=0.0593\) while \(wAIC=0.9407\) when including economic integration.
As evidenced in Table 1.1 below, comparing migrant to native responses yields an identical pattern of results: employment promotes political and civic integration for non-citizen migrants and is the most plausible factor influencing such change. Citizen migrant civic and political integration, however, appears unaffected by previous employment as compared to natives. Further, the most likely model predicting civic integration for non-citizen migrants excludes political participation suggesting previous employment is unique in enhancing migrant civic outcomes relational to native-born Germans. Again, while previous civic integration, does affect political participation alongside previous economic conditions, employment appears as the most likely parameter shaping later political action.

Finally, to determine whether income rather than employment can explain the migrant civic and political integration, I replicate the above analyses including reported individual monthly income bracket. As evidenced in Table 1.2 below, neither civic nor political behavior is significantly affected by previous income for non-citizen migrants. Further, employment’s primary role is consistent across time spent within the country, country of origin, and age for both political and civic integration (e.g., Models 2, 3, and 4). Comparing across model fit statistics, the previous best fit model is 3.33 times more likely to correctly explain political integration than the next closest model (i.e., model 2) and 1.46 more likely for civic integration (i.e., model 2). In other words, including these demographic indicators neither significantly accounts for future migrant behavior nor improves our understanding of integration beyond employment. Finally, I compare outcomes across gender and education finding that neither these components nor an interaction between education and employment significantly predicts civic

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24 This variable is only available in the on-site version of this data and ranges from under 300 euros (1) to 10,000 euros or more (17).
and political outcomes (see Appendix A). Thus, the relationship between employment as a measure of economic integration and political and civic integration is robust.

Yet how do we know, however, that the relationship among employment and civic and political integration does not operate in the reverse? This alternative explanation would presume civic or political integration may lead to or generate employment possibilities. To test this possibility, I create a variable to assess the relative degree of civic belonging and political participation where integration reflects meeting or exceeding average native behavior at each time point. For example, migrants who indicated an average attachment to Germany at or above native average attachment at time one would be considered integrated. While this is a crude measurement, it does provide a simple binary cut for civic and political integration where migrants are compared to natives at each time-point. These migrant groups are consequently compared to employment outcomes of native-born respondents thus enabling a simple depiction of migrant patterns across integration avenues. Comparing these figures, later political participation appears nearly identical for those civically integrated (M=.158, SD=.114) and those civic dis-integrated (M=.158, SD=.136) at time one. Civic belonging is also seemingly unaffected by previous political integration status despite slight decreases in belonging when politically integrated (M=.63, SD=.206) compared to those without political integration (M=.538, SD=.247). Hence later political and civic integration appear unaffected by previous civic or political integration status.

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25 This calculation is similar to the ‘gap’ technique employed in the previous robust analyses.
26 $F(1, 75) = .17, p = .68$.
27 $F(1, 95) = 2.78, p = .10$. 
### Table 1.1. Robust ‘Gap’ Model Comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>'Gap' Political Integration</th>
<th>'Gap' Civic Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-citizen Migrants</td>
<td>Citizen Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic-2</td>
<td>0.289*</td>
<td>0.230*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political-2</td>
<td>2.288***</td>
<td>2.290***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.444)</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic-2</td>
<td>0.557**</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.554***</td>
<td>0.229*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>112.750</td>
<td>91.434</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors.  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.
# Table 1.2. Robust Model Comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th><strong>Political Integration</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Civic Integration</strong></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model</td>
<td></td>
<td>Model</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Integration</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment**2</td>
<td>0.077*** (0.025)</td>
<td>0.076** (0.024)</td>
<td>0.073** (0.027)</td>
<td>0.077** (0.027)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political**2</td>
<td>0.521*** (0.091)</td>
<td>0.520*** (0.094)</td>
<td>0.684*** (0.122)</td>
<td>0.531*** (0.094)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civic**2</td>
<td>0.108* (0.043)</td>
<td>0.107* (0.045)</td>
<td>0.112* (0.046)</td>
<td>0.112* (0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Robust Indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income**2</td>
<td>0.008 (0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.003 (0.009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time in Country</td>
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<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Origin</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.119*** (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.033 (0.037)</td>
<td>-0.033 (0.037)</td>
<td>-0.059 (0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>-213.284</td>
<td>-314.764</td>
<td>-312.357</td>
<td>-311.150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors.
* $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$. 
Changes in employment also do not vary significantly across either political or civic integration. Variation in employment between 2014 and 2016 is therefore occurs regardless of one’s previous political or civic integration. While politically dis-integrated migrants are employed at slightly higher levels (M=0.86, SD=0.35) than their politically integrated counterparts (M=0.77, SD=0.42), this between-group difference remains non-significant, $F(1, 75)= .20, p=.65$. This configuration replicates for civic integration with those previously integrated (M=0.83, SD=0.39) appearing statistically indistinguishable from those migrants who were not civically integrated with respect to employment status (M=0.79, SD=0.41) in 2016, $F(1, 81) = .12, p=.73$. As a result, rather than political and civic integration building opportunities for employment, it actually appears to slightly deter employment. As such, downstream employment is functionally constant across a migrant’s incoming civic and political attitudes and behavior. Combined with the results depicted here with those found in Europe overall, employment clearly emerges as a unique conditional element of civic belonging and political action such that it both precedes and enables integration.

**Conclusion**

How are migrants integrated within their destinations? Do early employment experiences increase the likelihood of achieving productive society members? Through an examination of migrant integration across Europe and within Germany, I find strong evidence that the process of integration is segmented and conditional whereby employment precedes and enables cross-venue civic and political integration. These conclusions hold across gender, age, education, origin, economic class, cohort, and the exogenous impact of the Euro Crisis. While I find civic

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28 $F(1, 70) = 1.01, p=.32$ and $F(1, 76) = 0.18, p=.67$ respectively.
belonging may enable political participation, these findings are weak and mixed warranting further inquiry. Employment, however, is consequently notable for the manner and consistency in which it leads to additional civic attitudes and political behavior. As a result, employment is part and parcel to accelerating the process of holistic integration within European democracies.

These conclusions offer a bleak view of the future integration of those who have increased barriers or are barred entirely from their host’s labor markets. Asylum seekers in particular are at risk, especially the longer they wait on a decision of their claim. Recently Hainmueller et al. (2016) find every additional year spent waiting on asylum claims in Switzerland increases unemployment between four and five percent. And as the Austrian interior minister calls European Union proposals to extend work permits to refugees “unthinkable” (Sobotka 2016), we can expect refugee populations will continue to experience the steepest climb to integration within their host societies. Similarly, expansive welfare states increasing migrant barriers to the labor market, such as restricting access to employment sectors or requiring additional training, may find larger disconnected migrant populations despite extending social benefits.

These conclusions also raise questions regarding labor mobility. Provided integration is a process, chronic under-employment or inconsistent work may erode the empowering role employment plays over time. While unfortunately disaggregation in the panel data by employment sector is impossible at this time due to German data protection regulations, preliminary comparisons find those marginal, one-euro, or irregular employed are both less active politically and civically ostracized than fellow full or part-time employed migrants. Rather remarkably, only 4.6% of these migrants report latter political engagement compared to 17.8% of employed and 13.5% of unemployed migrants. Despite half of the infrequently employed
indicating civic belonging, this population still underperforms compared to the 65% of employed migrants who felt as though they belong to Germany. As debates erupt across Europe over extending such one-euro jobs to asylum seekers, research including marginally employed populations is crucial to examine whether these positions differ from stable employment or perhaps even, as appears the case, increases frustration and disillusionment such that the ascent toward integration becomes insurmountable.

As more data becomes available, scholars should continue to disentangle the intersections of political, civic, and economic integration. Tracing individuals across additional advanced democratic states may reveal critical junctures wherein specific integration avenues facilitate holistic integration. For example, while civic belonging and political participation generally fail to promote downstream integration, these effects may be more apparent over time. Also despite the notable case of Germany for both its contribution to understanding integration overtime, it may not depict the causal integration experiences across Europe. The current case also may be affected by the migrant crisis where previous unemployed migrants may suffer increased segregation from the labor market or civil society contributing to the current pattern of results. Expanding cases beyond Germany, Europe, and time frame would account for this possibility and consequently expand our knowledge of the process of integration. Future research should also in turn examine the mechanisms through which employment affects migrant civic and political lives. There may be conditions in which employment is a ‘sturdier’ or more robust foundation or conditions in which employment is less important to migrant experiences in the host country. Another explanation may be a state’s institutional structures and processes. State recruitment policies, for example, generally improve employment and political environments
when migrants are selected by labor market needs (Castles 2006). Policies, therefore, may only be effective when matched with institutional incentives.

Beyond state institutions, these findings offer implications for policy overall. Notably these patterns in Germany in particular reveal employment succeeds where citizenship fails to bring migrants closer to their native-born counterparts. As such, a policy focusing on increasing early immigrant access to employment will lead to measurable pay-offs in the integration the state’s population. Finally, these patterns question the validity of voguish rhetoric of heftier civic integration requirements plaguing Europe. These civic policies thus may best serve native pacification rather than societal integration of new members. Instead employment is empirically catalytic to societal integration granting states new incentive to address early migrant employment to contribute to a productive, harmonious, and civil democratic society.
Be our (Guest) Worker: Recruitment, Integration Policy, and Migrant Unemployment

Europe is failing its migrants economically. Among its foreign-born population, labor market participation is at historic lows while unemployment rates continue to soar. This deteriorating climate differs from that of Europe’s native-born population, where activity rates are on the rise and unemployment is showing signs of decline. This culminates in a surging gap between these two communities, nearing differences of 12% in activity rates and 11% in unemployment (Eurostat 2016). Aside from the normative implications of such trends, migrants residing within such languished economic environments present prolonged societal impacts, increasing welfare dependency, isolation, marginalization, and cleavages between native and foreign-born communities. And as these divisions persist and grow, national economies depreciate, leading the International Monetary Fund to conclude Europe’s economic growth will “depend on the speed of newcomers’ [sic] integration in the labor market” (Dizioli et al. 2016, pp.12).

European states, for their part, appear neither disinterested nor passive to these societal, economic, and ethical concerns, responding through policies specifically aimed at the economic integration of their migrant populations. Through these labor-specific integration policies, states differ in their integration approach while remaining committed to the economic goal of incorporating newcomers on the labor market. Some states, for example, prioritize immediate access to various labor market sectors (e.g., Spain, Czechia), migrant-targeted support programs (e.g., Austria, Denmark) or rights (e.g., Ireland, France), while others take an omnibus approach, providing immigrants with as much early access and resources as possible (e.g., Portugal, Sweden).29 Countries also continuously look toward new and innovative means of achieving

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29 See Migration Policy Index 2015 for rankings of each of these economic integration objectives by country and year.
economic integration such as employment policy experiment schemes (e.g., Finland) and labor mobility online tools (Teivainen 2017, European Commission 2017).

Yet the role of these various integration policies remains unclear, with some scholars suggesting such policy is either ineffective (Goodman & Wright 2015) or even harmful when matched with general support (Koopmans 2010). Despite the potential failure of these programs and policy, politicians and institutions continue to stress the importance of migrant recruitment. Even at the brink of the financial crisis, European states remained committed to migrant recruitment, possessing on average more than two unique labor recruitment policies with varied skill-level specifications per country (Ruhs 2013). While these policies do little to aid the employment conditions of migrants already present, they do lead to questions of whether these state labor interests prescribe the relative efficacy of settlement policies on reducing economic inequities. Are labor-specific integration policies successful in improving migrant economic integration? Do state labor interests interfere with such policy, excluding some migrant workers over others to make incorporation only possible for those whose skill is directly recruited?

This paper is structured around these central questions exploring how migrants economically integrate in a receiving state’s labor market, outlining where state policies falter or succeed in economically incorporating migrants. I proceed by outlining the unique importance of employment with respect to economic incorporation, detailing how within-state labor-specific settlement and recruitment policies can enable or hinder migrant economic incorporation. Using post-Euro-crisis data from eighteen European countries, I find labor-recruitment policies affect migrant economic experiences regardless of skill-level whereby states with high-skill targeted immigration programs increase the likelihood of economic integration while those with low-skill policies hinder the probability of labor market success. These policies further interact with
economic settlement policies such that programs are effective in reducing economic disparities only when matched with high- or neutral-skill recruitment policies. Conversely states targeting low-skill labor distinctively are unable to affect migrant economic experiences regardless of their integration policy’s relative generosity or accessibility. These findings are robust across policy-adoption lags and migrant populations, demonstrating the targeted skill-level of recruitment policies consistently and reliably alters settlement policy’s efficacy.

Moreover, this interaction varies by migrant skill-level wherein low-skill migrants remain unaffected by labor settlement policies even when their labor is directly recruited. These migrants, who are generally more vulnerable, hence draw no benefit on the labor market from enriched economic settlement programs when residing in states actively recruiting their labor. Again, robustness checks confirm these patterns are present at one, three, and five years after policy adoption, across multiple migrant samples, are driven by skill-level targeting rather than relative recruitment policy openness, and are present despite controlling for a multitude of contextual and individual contributors to employment. I conclude states recruiting low-skill labor may only promote economic settlement policy to appease regulations of European institutions rather than to affect the employment integration of their migrant population, regardless of the perceived openness of such policy. These low-skill targeting states may de facto treat their migrant populations as transient or temporary guest-workers irrespective of de jure practices. European states with either high-skill or any skill recruitment, on the other hand, appear genuinely interested in promoting integration looking to transform these migrants into productive new societal members.


The Value and Determinants of Employment Integration

Economic integration as a whole requires diminishing the gaps between natives and migrants in employment, income, and labor mobility (Dancygier & Laitin 2014). Of these components, employment is arguably the core economic interest for both states and their migrant populations. Increases in employment of migrant communities advance economic growth and native prosperity (Borjas 1994, Dancygier & Laitin 2014) while its absence promotes welfare dependence and community marginization (Wunder & Riphahn 2013, Clark et al. 2001). In regards to civil solidarity, higher rates of unemployment are associated with sharp increases in violence (Falk et al. 2011, Dancygier 2010) that in turn can impact a country’s tax revenue (Matheson & Baade 2004, Collins & Margo 2007). And states needing to supplement graying populations with migrant labor, will in turn find lower migration rates as relative migrant unemployment grows (Borjas 1989).

Beyond these instrumental state concerns, economic integration through employment is crucial to promoting migrant societal incorporation. Specifically, as alienation and marginalization expand through unemployment, so may pathways to violent extremism and radical policies (Sobolewska 2010, Eatwell 2006). David Cameron’s statement in response to the 7/7 bombings that, “We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong” is further indication of the state’s pressing desire to decrease exclusion as a means to prevent radicalization (Cameron 2011). Regarding this form of civic inclusion, research reveals employment integration uniquely promotes downstream civic and political incorporation where unemployment critically obstructs later migrant societal incorporation (Alarian 2017b, Alarian 2017c). Hence early and quick state investments in promoting employment will enable not only
financial benefits to the state but will further promote societal cohesion, bringing new, productive members into their respective electorates.

In an effort to understand this crucial integration element, much of the literature discusses individual-level or environmental determinants asking who is more likely to integrate rather than what states can do to enable migrant labor market integration. For one, migrants with greater human capital in terms of language fluency, higher educational attainment, or high skill sets fair better on the destination’s labor market (Borjas 1989, Becker 1964). Migrant employment also varies by family compositions and gender where men and married migrants outperform female or single migrants (Maxwell 1988, Kofman et al. 2000). Regarding the receiving environments themselves, discrimination is also a determining factor for employment outcomes (Constant & Massey 2005). These discriminatory hiring and mobility trends additionally have little to do with actual labor market competition presenting a challenge to state policy (Dancygier & Laitin 2014, Hainmueller & Hiscox 2007). Others find contextual differences in immigrant community size compositions alter the likelihood of employment (Van Tubergen et al. 2004) while others conclude this impact is marginal at best (Urban 2009).

State policy options similarly reflect the importance of these individual-level components in both policy rhetoric and directives. With respect to the value of human capital, the German commissioner for immigration, refugees and integration stated the main priority for current economic integration policy is language training, differentiating from previous policies stressing early employment access arguing policymakers “don’t want to repeat that mistake” (Chazen 2017). Other states offer integration programs targeted directly at subsets of the population historically excluded from the labor market, including women (e.g., Norway) and lower educated migrants (e.g., Portugal). Others, however, approach migrant economic integration with
ambivalence, opting for more protectionist frame through comparatively exclusionist labor-market policies (e.g., Ireland) while others respond by providing migrants immediate access to labor markets, benefits, and services equivalent to that of native-born populations (e.g., Sweden).30

Variations across states in policy decisions suggest migrant economic outcomes would similarly differ as a function of these integration programs altering the accessibility of and aid on the labor market. Yet considerably less research examines the importance of these policy decisions across political institutions with regards to employment, enabling what some argue are underspecified and conflicting patterns (Dancygier & Laitin 2014).31 For example, Lewin-Epstein et al. (2003) finds Russian migrants in Canada experienced more successful economic outcomes than their counterparts in Israel, a difference attributed to Israel’s lack of economic migrant selection (Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003). However, Bevelander and Pendakur (2013) find similar immigrant experiences on the Canadian and Israeli labor markets suggesting a large piece of the economic puzzle is either omitted or misspecified. In what follows, I discuss the variety of host state policies in impacting migrant employment experiences focusing on two policy specific drivers: settlement and recruitment.

Destination Settlement and Recruitment Policy

Receiving state policies involving immigration and integration are generally focused on two main actions: settling migrants already within their borders (e.g., integration) and attracting new migrants to their shores (e.g., recruitment). Settlement, broadly speaking, encompasses policies aimed at bridging gaps between citizens and migrants across a variety of dimensions. Specific to

30 See MIPEX 2015 for ranking of these policies with respect to different targeted policy options.
31 There are even fewer instances of institutional factors examined across a wide range of countries. See Hooijer & Picot (2015) for a notable exception of immigrant income across Western Europe.
economic settlement, these policies involve access to employment sectors, workers’ rights, training, labor market mobility, and employment services and benefits. These policies hence cover recognition, rights, and support specific to the economic advancement of one’s migrant population. Portugal, for example, is a prime example of expansive settlement policies providing migrants equal access to private and public employment sectors, career mobility, vocational training, and unemployment benefits, in addition to offering multiple migrant-specific support programs. Ireland on the other end of the spectrum, however, prohibits public employment, restricts certain education and vocational training to natives only, and can even exclude migrants from receiving social security benefits despite employment. Therefore, while maintaining the same settlement goal, countries can vary drastically in their policy approach.

Second, while clearly many migrants arrive without ‘invitation’ (Papademetriou & O’Neil 2004), state policies can take measurable steps to influence the skill-demographic of their migrant populations through recruitment policies. In doing such, states may select or directly target migrants in an effort to fulfill state needs or preferences (Facchini & Lodigiani 2014). Countries may also opt to take a more apathetic approach to recruitment, conceding power to domestic firms or to the organized interests of client politics (Freeman 1995). While these firm interests may differ from those of the state, their role in dictating recruitment policy may be mediated by active national interests, economic or cultural shifts, or corporatist arrangements (Ruhs 2013, Brubaker 1995, Boswell 2007). Thus, similar to settlement policy, European states are considered as purposeful actors with national objectives through which policy is crafted. In what follows, I discuss the sociological, economic, and political science literature outlining how these two policy sectors impact labor market integration individually, interactively, and across subsets of a country’s migrant population.
Settlement Policy

Given the state’s vested interest in immigrant integration a priori we would expect settlement policies in particular to directly affect immigrant employment outcomes. The literature studying settlement policy effectiveness, however, is divided in depicting its relative effect on immigrant outcomes. At worst, policies supporting migrants through enlarged welfare systems or multiculturalist principles exacerbate the gap between native and foreign-born employment outcomes (Koopmans 2010, Borjas 1999). Similarly, expansive shifts in Sweden’s settlement policy corresponded with reductions in immigrant economic and educational outcomes (Edin et al. 2004, Åsland et al. 2011). Further countries with more flexible labor laws after the Eurozone crisis appear to decrease immigrant labor market mobility, funneling migrants into manual or low-skilled employment (D’Amuri & Peri 2014). For others, these integration and settlement policies are relatively unrelated to economic integration outcomes (Goodman & Wright, 2015, Algan et al. 2010, Fleischmann & Dronkers 2010). Even in the most positive depiction, state policy is only tenuously related to economic integration (Büchel & Frick 2005).

Further demonstrating this division are demographic trends comparing unemployment data (OECD 2016) with various settlement oriented economic integration policies (Migration Policy Index 2015). Using policy sub-scores for state specific Labor Mobility and Labor Market Access policies derived from the 2014 version of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX; Migration Policy Index 2015), Figure 2.1 below demonstrates no apparent global relationship between the openness of a state’s labor market or labor mobility policy with actual

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32 Labor market mobility, one of the eight subscales within MIPEX, assesses the equality of rights and opportunities to access jobs and improve skills with respect to (1) labor market access, (2) access to general support, (3) access to targeted support, and (4) workers’ rights. Labor Market Access is one of the four dimensions making up Labor Market Mobility measuring access to employment sectors, self-employment, and equal access for migrant workers and their families.
employment differentials between native and migrant populations. As illustrated, the discrepancy between a country’s foreign- and native-born unemployment rate is indicated by the size of a country’s data point with larger points indicating higher immigrant unemployment (i.e., reduced employment integration) and smaller points reflecting more equivalent immigrant unemployment rates respective to the native population (i.e., improved employment integration). Should these economic integration policies predict economic outcomes, employment integration (e.g., smaller data points) would occur concurrently with inclusive economic settlement policy and worse employment integration outcomes (e.g., larger data points) with restrictive policy scores.

Figure 2.1. Comparing 2014 Economic Integration Policy with Foreign-Native Born Unemployment Rates

33 This non-significant relationship exists when lagged 1, 3, and 5 years in addition to the trend in the non-lagged data.
What we see instead is a smattering of economic integrative outcomes irrespective of a state’s settlement policy. For example, Sweden, whose economic policies rank as some of the most inclusive globally, holds the highest immigrant unemployment in contrast to native-born populations. Conversely, the United States, which maintains a nearly identical labor access policy score, reflects one of the lowest foreign-native born unemployment ratios. This seemingly null relationship between economic integration policy and immigrant integration is also found across a variety of settlement policies over time suggesting neither economic nor civic policies are effective in enabling migrant economic integration.\(^{34}\)

Still as immigrants face higher unemployment and lower wages than their native counterparts (Portes & Zhou 1993; Alba & Foner 2015) – a pattern spanning across immigrant generations and producing further costs in affecting overall labor force security and public attitudes (Bauer, Braun, & Kvasnicka 2013, Burgoon 2014) – it seems that state policies fail to advance immigrant integration. A reasonable explanation for these mixed policy evaluations may lie with the underlying state expectations and goals of such policy. Research on the welfare state, for example, reveals varied institutional settings fundamentally alter the construction of national identity thereby shifting public support for redistribution (Muñoz & Pardos-Prado 2017). As a result, policy may be effective when matched with national interests. In this line, much of public policy literature points to the social construction of a policy’s targeted population to explain why elites may advocate for policy-decisions that “distribute benefits at odds with their apparent self-interest” (Schneider and Ingram 1993, p. 346). Further economic conditions and political institutions such as a legislature’s composition explain variation in immigration policy even at the federal level indicating institutional preferences and design differences proliferate throughout all levels of government (Boushey & Luedtke 2011, Konnikov & Raijman 2016).

\(^{34}\) Additional time points include 2010 and 2012 and are available upon request from the author.
European states thus may not truly design economic settlement policies with the explicit aim of improving migrant outcomes, relying instead on interests and experiences already embedded within their institution’s framework. This is to say deriving policy intent is difficult where states may craft policy for goals of liberal principle preservation (Triadafilopoulos 2011, Joppke 2007) or to uphold historical traditions (Goodman 2015). This may be particularly relevant for states within the European Union, whereby supernatural authorities insist upon certain policies that may not necessarily comport with national preferences. Thus, European integration policy may be symbolic for purposes of signaling support for European ideals but actually reflect effectiveness to mirror state preferences. To explore this possibility, I turn to labor recruitment policies detailing its role in identifying state interest in shaping migrant economic experiences.

Recruitment Policies

One method for determining state interest in migrant economic integration is recruitment policy. These policies allow states some degree of control over the volume and type of migrant received, directly impacting the demographics of their future migrant populations (Aydemir 2011, Ruhs 2013). While states may recruit migrants on the basis of labor market needs or firm interest, these demand-specific pulls remain connected to state interests. For example, even when employment sectors appear to drive demand for specific skill-level or occupational migrants, ‘system effects’ from state institutional frameworks are often the cause for such recruitment (Ruhs & Anderson 2010). Other scholars similarly stress state’s interests are central to migration and recruitment policy, even in light of relatively strong firm interests (Boswell 2007). As a result, recruitment policies possess some ability to select migrants believed to be most likely to integrate, prescribe to national interests, or those who suit the needs of their respective economic
environments. Stated previously, it is neither the purpose nor the scope of this endeavor to untangle the underlying state motivations for such policy. Instead these findings merely afford European states agency through recruitment policy to shape components of migration inflow.

With respect to such state influence, recruitment policies can most directly affect the migration of labor on the basis of skill (e.g., low-skill, high-skill). Countries thus specify the desired skill level (or levels) of migrants through these policy schemes. Regardless of the program criteria exogenous to skill-level, these recruitment policies are useful for defining national labor-interest goals impacting all migrants regardless of status (e.g., family migrant) or skill-set.  

Specifically there is considerable variability among European countries with respect to this overall type and degree of labor targeted. As of 2009 both Switzerland and Sweden, for example, possess only one labor recruitment program. However, Switzerland’s policy targets only high-skill migrants while Sweden’s policy is open to migrants of any skill-level. On the other hand, France retained four labor recruitment policies, only one of which directly recruits high-skilled migrants. Thus states present policies depicting national labor interest through their relative openness to either one end of the skill-spectrum or to migrants as a whole.

The impact of recruitment policy direction on economic integration appears to indirectly influence migrant employment integration. For one, natives across OECD states report increased positive attitudes toward immigrants and immigration when migrants appear to be selected by labor market needs (Zimmerman, Bauer, & Lofstrom 2000). Economic scholars regularly attribute this phenomenon to a reduction in perceived labor market competition or concerns of

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35 Notably some of these policies require a firm job-offer prior to migration while others, including Denmark’s green card scheme, allow temporary labor migration without first securing a position. Throughout Europe, however, the majority of the recruitment programs across skill-levels require migrants to acquire employment prior to admission (Ruhs 2013, Facchini & Lodigiani 2014).

36 In Switzerland, this program is the Work permits ‘B’ scheme. Sweden’s policy is the General work permit program.

37 France’s Skills and Talent Program.
welfare reliance (Brochmann & Hagelund 2011, Facchini & Mayda 2012). Similarly, high skilled migrants experience less discrimination as a whole, partially due to their perceived benefits to and lower probability of competition on the labor market (Mayda 2006). Hence when recruitment policies are open to all or are directed specifically to high-skill migrants, the corresponding social and political environments through which migrants navigate are more welcoming than those with low-skill labor slants. These positive settings for high- and open-skill states consequently will increase the likelihood of migrant labor market success as rates of native-immigrant violence, prejudice, and discrimination decline.

Additionally, state labor recruitment strategies may interact with integration policy to play a significant role in employment outcomes. For instance, states targeting low-skill labor offer migrants with fewer rights, primarily due to the perception of fewer net benefits to providing such goods (Ruhs 2013). Investment in migrant integration in these low-skill targeting states may therefore be perceived as financially impractical, yielding ineffective or symbolic settlement policies resulting in the treatment of migrants as de facto guest-workers. Conversely high-skill targeting states may possess effective settlement policies overall as they identify greater value to capitalizing on the integration of their migrant populations. On the other hand, these configurations may create an unusual outcome where migrants are employed more often than natives in low-skill environments due to their net cost. In other words, migrants are more affordable to employers in low-skill-targeting states with less expansive settlement policies than natives, who are awarded such benefits. As a result, migrants may be employed at higher rates when low-skill states are coupled with restrictive rather than inclusive settlement policies. Moreover, expansive labor recruitment policies (e.g., open skill recruitment) correspond with
fewer migrant rights, suggesting recruitment policies without specific labor interests may also
differ with respect to the employment integration of their migrant populations.

Finally, this proposed interaction between settlement and recruitment policies opens up
the possibility that employment outcomes vary with respect to individual skill level. The mere
act of recruitment assumes these migrant populations will out-perform non-recruited migrants in
economic integration. Kogan (2006), for example, finds improved employment outcomes for
low-skilled migrants in receiving countries with a strong demand for low-skilled labor. Similarly
recruited high-skilled migrants over time retain superior employment outcomes compared to
their non-skilled counterparts (Mata & Pendakur 2016). Provided migrants also experience less
prejudice and discrimination by natives when selected by labor market needs (Zimmerman,
Bauer, & Lofstrom 2000), it seems reasonable migrants whose skill-level matches that of the
overall recruitment policy tilt – regardless of whether they were directly recruited themselves –
would on average possess higher labor market outcomes than those whose skill diverges from
national policy preferences. Put simply, low-skill migrants would likely be employed at higher
rates within a low-skill than in a high-skill targeting state.

Yet evidence suggests migrants may not universally perform better when their skill-sets
are recruited. Migrants struggle on the labor market when hurdles to human capital remain in
place (Aydemir 2011). Relatedly, purely skill-driven recruitment models appear to dampen
economic outcomes for migrants overall when compared to those with additional integration-
related components (Facchini & Lodigiani 2014). Hence settlement policy efficacy may not only
be constrained by recruitment interests of the state but also to the skill-level of the migrant
population in question. Take for example, a low-skill targeting state with restrictive settlement
policies. As stated previously, these states may perceive integration commitments too costly an
investment. Yet this may only be the case for the low-skill migrants they seek to attract, awarding high-skill migrants rights their low- or medium-skill counterparts are not afforded (Ruhs 2013). Hence settlement policies in low-skill recruiting states may be effective only for subset of the migrant population on the basis of skill. As a result, the relationship between integration and recruitment policies may vary across skill-level rather than impact migrants as a whole. Combining these literatures together, I derive the following hypotheses with respect to recruitment, settlement, and migrant skill:

**Hypothesis 1**: Employment integration declines when accompanied by low-skill targeting labor recruitment policies.

**Hypothesis 2**: Employment varies across both settlement and recruitment policy configurations.

**Hypothesis 3**: The relationship among employment and settlement and recruitment policies differs across migrant skill-level populations.

**Data and Analysis**

To test the above hypotheses, I use the 2014 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) including 2,914 immigrants residing in 18 countries across Europe. The dependent variable of interest, economic integration, is measured through employment. Specifically, participants are asked to indicate their experiences with prolonged unemployment (i.e., lasting over a period of three months). Hence economic integration is a dichotomous variable reflecting those who have *not* experienced prolonged unemployment. In addition to the study variable, many individual variables expected to impact economic integration are drawn from the ESS including gender,

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38 These countries include: Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

39 Survey item reads: Have you ever been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three months? Response options include Yes (0) and No (1).
age, urban residence, 40 marital status, citizenship, parental origin, 41 language fluency, 42 and years of formal education. 43 Skill level is estimated from occupation data, derived from the ISOC08 codes and collapsed into 24 unique clusters. 44 To disaggregate this occupational data into an appropriate skill-level, I code professional/technical and administrative/managerial as high skilled, clerical and sales as medium skilled, and agricultural and production as low skilled labor. 45

As it is improbable that settlement or recruitment policies instantaneously impact migrants, I include policies lagged five years to allow for policies to be fully implemented and reach their intended objectives. To measure state recruitment policies, I consider skill-specific labor programs derived from Ruhs (2013), which assesses 104 labor immigration programs across 46 countries for 2009. 46 Policies are accessed in their respective skill-level target (e.g., low, medium, or high). Notably, not all labor programs fit solely within one of the three skill categories, attracting migrants from a variety of skill levels. Thus, to reach an appropriate indicator of state preferences for skilled labor, I construct an estimate averaged across targeted-skill level by state. In doing such, I first score each policy by its intended recipient: high-skill, medium-skill, low-skill, or no target preference. Within high-skill targets, a second division is

40 Urban residence coding includes: A big city (1), suburbs or outskirts of a big city (.75), a town or a small city (.5), a country village (.25), and a farm or home in the countryside (0).
41 Parental origin is coded with a 1 for those with both parents originating outside the surveyed country, .5 for one parent, and 0 for those with both parents originating from within the country.
42 Language fluency is considered as listing one of the native country languages as at least one of the two indicated languages most spoken when at home.
43 Those who indicated formal education years at or exceeding their reported age were coded as missing.
44 These categories include: armed forces; management, science, engineering and design; medical and health; education; business, administration, and finance; information, technology and computer; legal, social, and cultural; associate technical; associate health; associate legal, social, and religious; information and technicians; clerical, banking, and secretary; personal service; sales; personal care; protective service; skilled agricultural; forestry and fishing; craft and trades; plant and machine operators and assemblers; domestic cleaners and helpers; agricultural and manufacturing laborers; and service, street, sales and other elementary.
45 Employment via the armed forces is excluded as this form of employment often requires citizenship and includes very few migrants (i.e., less than 1% [n=4] of the total foreign-born population in this sample).
46 This data frame therefore is ideal as it focuses on recruitment specific policies as opposed to immigration policy (e.g., IMPALA, IMPIC) and expands beyond reduced country samples (e.g., Peters Immigration Policy Index).
made between high-skill (i.e., HS1) and very high-skill (i.e., HS2) migrants to achieve greater precision of the direction of a country’s labor preferences. For those targeting only very high skilled workers (i.e., HS2), policies were given a score of 1 while those targeting only low-skilled workers were assigned a value of -1. As policies expanded to target a variety of skill-levels, the score correspondingly moved closer to 0 from either direction, indicating a policy with no skill-preference.

For example, Norway’s skilled workers policy targets all migrants who are not low-skill and therefore is scored 0.33 indicating a labor preference slightly skewed toward higher skill labor. The Netherlands’ general labor scheme, on the other hand, targets low- and medium-skilled migrants and therefore is given a value of -0.66 as it excludes both high-skill (i.e., HS1) and very high-skilled migrants (i.e., HS2). Once policies are scored, they are averaged across the total number of programs yielding an overall estimate by country where negative values indicate a stronger overall preference for low-skilled labor and positive scores represent a preference for higher-skilled migrant labor. These estimates along with the total number of recruitment policies by country are presented in Table 2.1 below.

Measurement of receiving state settlement policy is obtained from the 2009 iteration of MIPEX (Migration Policy Index 2015). MIPEX, produced in a joint collaboration with the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and the Migration Policy Group (MPG), measures settlement (i.e., integration) policies over 167 indicators across thirty-eight countries. These policy indicators divided among eight policy areas including Labor Market Mobility, Education, Political Participation, Access to Nationality, Family Reunion, Health, Permanent Residence, and Anti-discrimination. A panel of experts scores each policy indicator where higher

47 See Ruhs 2013 Appendix 1, Tables A.1-A.10 for policy breakdown by state and skill-level.
48 These values are also graphically represented in Appendix B.
scores (e.g., 100) reflect standards for equal treatment and lower scores (e.g., 0) indicate policies as discriminatory culminating in an average policy score for each subscale and the country as a whole. As the independent variable of interest is employment integration, the Labor Market Mobility subscale is used to reflect labor settlement policy. This subscale includes assessment of a country’s (1) access to the labor market, (2) access to general support, (3) access to targeted support, and (4) worker’s rights.

Table 2.1. Countries by Labor Recruitment Programs and Average Policy Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th># of Labor Recruitment Programs</th>
<th>Average Skill-Level Recruitment a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ranges from -1 (low-skill) to 1 (high-skill) targets

Finally, several contextual control variables are incorporated in the subsequent analyses to account for additional variation. First, integration adjacent policies are expected to signal

49 The health policy area was added in 2014 and therefore will not be included in the subsequent analysis.
national trajectories of citizenship (c.f. Goodman 2015). As a result, all other MIPEX subscales are included as control variables to account for the relative prohibitive or accessibility of a country’s cultural climate and citizenship traditions. Provided the analysis spans the crisis years and research suggests migrant economic behavior varied as a result of the crisis (D’Amuri & Peri 2014), I also include a dummy variable for the countries periphery states which arguably were most economically impacted by the Eurozone crisis: Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.50 A second dummy variable for post-Communist states is also included covering Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Last, the unemployment rate (as the total percent of the labor force) is incorporated from the OECD Labour market statistics (OECD 2017). All country unemployment indicators reflect 2009 rates, except Switzerland whose indicators are unavailable prior to 2010.51

Analysis

To examine the efficacy and interaction of these recruitment and settlement policies, I conduct a series of pooled logistic regressions weighed by post-stratification and population size weights with robust standard errors clustered by country (Table 2.2 below). Model 1, the control model, includes relevant individual and contextual control variables. This model, as expected, demonstrates employment integration is more likely for men, older migrants, the high skilled, and is negatively impacted by a state’s previous unemployment rate. Surprisingly, migrants who do not speak the native language are more likely to be integrated than those who are fluent, although comparing this variable across models suggests this may likely be due to chance.

50 Greece and Italy are also routinely included in this categorization but are unfortunately unavailable for the current analysis due exclusion from the ESS.
51 This one year delay should not inherently be a cause for concern. Further analyses excluding Switzerland do not change the ensuing results (available from author upon request).
Table 2.2 Predicting Three-month Unemployment by Settlement and Recruitment Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Employment Integration</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Labor Settlement</td>
<td>0.012*</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.017***</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Labor Recruitment</td>
<td>0.681***</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>3.372**</td>
<td>1.252</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Settlement</td>
<td>-0.038*</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Nationality Policy</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.035***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.024**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Family Reunification</td>
<td>0.041***</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.017*</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Political Participation</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Residence</td>
<td>0.041***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Anti-Discrimination</td>
<td>0.012**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.122**</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>-0.078*</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>-0.066**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>1.096*</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>1.226**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.354*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contextual Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.207*</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>-0.198*</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.015**</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-0.567</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Parents</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>-0.313*</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (in years)</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>0.535***</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.541***</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.178*</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>-0.727</td>
<td>0.729</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Individual Controls

| N                      | 2.835 | 2.835 | 2.835 | 2.835 |
| Pseudo R^2             | 0.05  | 0.06  | 0.07  | 0.07  |
| AIC                    | 4094.96 | 4041.88 | 4031.80 | 4027.10 |

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Log-odds and robust clustered standard errors (by country). Estimates are weighted using post-stratification and population size ESS weights.
Further aligned with previous citizenship acquisition research, residing within a crisis state does not appear to impact the likelihood of economic integration (Alarian 2017a). While other settlement policies (Model 2) also expectedly impact employment integration, the key policy of interest is labor settlement, the policy designed specifically for the integration of a country’s migrants. Adding in settlement policy, we see the odds of a migrant reporting economic integration increases by 1.3% when a country’s labor settlement policies become more equal by one unit. While this increase is significant, it is relatively small provided these policies are theoretically designed with the implicit goal of reducing unemployment and improving migrant economic outcomes. Moving to the recruitment policy model (Model 3), the odds of a migrant being economically integrated are 98% higher when recruitment policies move to target high-skill labor holding all other variables constant. This finding is particularly notable as the subjects include migrants of all skill-levels as well as those who were not economic migrants (e.g., family migrants). Hence this model provides evidence supporting Hypothesis 1 whereby low-skill labor recruitment decreases the likelihood of migrant employment integration as a whole.

Model 4 examines whether recruitment policy impacts the relationship between labor integration policies and actual employment outcomes (i.e., hypothesis 2), finding a significant and negative integration between the two policies. Figure 2.2 below displays the marginal effects of economic integration by both settlement and recruitment policies. In disaggregating among states with neutral-, strong high-, or low-skilled labor policy preferences, there are noticeable distinctive trends in labor settlement policy’s ability to positively impact a migrant’s economic

52 Models centering all variables to control for multi-collinearity reveal identical patterns and therefore un-centered estimates are presented for ease of interpretation. Centered models are available from the author upon request.
integration.\textsuperscript{53} Overall, states with recruitment preferences for high-skill labor are predicted to have higher likelihoods of migrant employment integration. Further, states with recruitment policies skewed toward high-skill labor also possess productive labor integration programs; significantly improving predicted migrant economic outcomes as the policy liberalizes. Specifically, a migrant in a similarly high skill recruited state is 20\% more likely to be economically integrated when the country has an equality-promoting labor settlement policy (i.e., 100) compared to a country with a neutral settlement policy (i.e., 50). Labor settlement policies are similarly effective in predicting positive economic outcomes when coupled with neutral-labor recruitment preferences (e.g., by 0.3\% per each one point increase in settlement).

\textit{Figure 2.2.} Settlement and Recruitment Policy Interaction

\textsuperscript{53} All predicted values are set at their logical expected limit. Neutral skill are predicted integration when recruitment policy = 0 (i.e., no skill preference), strong high when policy = 1, and strong low at policy = -1. Patterns are identical when set to the observed limits (e.g., .83 and -.5).
However, settlement policies among low skill labor recruitment preferences do not significantly improve predicted migrant employment outcomes (AME = 0.00, \( p=0.36 \)). Thus, where labor recruitment is interested in lower-skill sets, migrants are just as economically integrated in a restrictive state as they are in an equal policy state. Accordingly, only when states are not interested in primarily lower-skill labor, are policies effective in reducing prolonged unemployment. One implication of this finding is that states with low-skill labor preferences either do not design or fail to implement integration policy to actually aid immigrants in achieving economic integration. Perhaps these migrants are perceived as temporary and thus policy is relatively divorced from actual migrant impact. Conversely labor integration policy’s success in states with either universal or high-skill preferences infer these countries are interested in transforming their migrant populations into new, economically productive members.

Perhaps, however, states provide and design policies impacting only those migrants it directly targets (e.g., hypothesis 3). This is to say these policy configurations may depend upon migrant skill-level. To test this alternative hypothesis, I examine the marginal effects by skill level (e.g., low, medium, or high). As evidenced in Table 2.3 below, those whose occupation is neither high nor low skilled (i.e., medium skilled), labor settlement policies uniquely predict economic integration increasing a migrant’s odds by 2.4% for each one-point increase. For both high and low skilled migrants, however, recruitment policy positively impacts migrant economic integration increasing a high skill migrant’s odds of economic integration by 165% and a low skill migrant’s odds by 140% when policies move toward high-skilled labor recruitment. Yet only for low skilled migrants do the same patterns hold whereby low labor targeted recruitment

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54 This method is used rather than a three-way interaction for ease of interpretation. Models including the three-way interaction do reveal significance and are available upon request from the author upon request.
policies produce ineffectual settlement outcomes. In other words, low skill migrants are similarly unaffected by integration policies in low-skill targeted states despite being directly targeted for their labor. These low-skill migrants who are the most vulnerable are most impacted by these arrangements, providing additional hurdles for these migrants in their integration process. This provides additional evidence that low-skill recruitment states design or implement settlement policies for goals aside from integrative outcomes perhaps due to perceived lower net benefits to doing so while high-skill preferring countries address economic integration for migrants regardless of skill-level.

Robustness

It may be possible that the above pattern of results is merely an artifact of the five-year policy lag, or potentially an effect impacting all residents regardless of their immigrant background. Additionally, while research argues countries do not systematically vary in their admission policy restrictiveness (Beine et al. 2015), the relative openness of recruitment policies rather than the targeted skill-level may more accurately depicted economic integration. Thus, to check the robustness of these results, I conduct a series of analyses comparing outcomes at three and one year lags, an aggregated policy openness score, and a test for the native-born population across all countries. First, I use the 2010 and 2012 waves of the ESS, using identical coding and variable construction schemes to construct the one- and three-year lagged analysis. Last, I include an alternative measure of recruitment assessing a state’s average policy openness. Ruhs (2013) provides individual openness scores of each policy taking into account program qualifications and conditions such as quotas, exams, fees, and demographics (e.g., nationality,

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55 Low skill migrants: High-skill AME = 0.002; \( p<.01 \); No preference AME = 0.003; \( p<.01 \); Low-skill AME = 0.000, \( p=.45 \).
Table 2.3. Predicting Three-month Unemployment by Settlement and Recruitment Policies by Skill-level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Employment Integration</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>High Skill Migrants</th>
<th>Low Skill Migrants</th>
<th>Medium Skill Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>(s.e.)</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>(s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Labor Settlement Policy</td>
<td>0.017***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.016*</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Recruitment Policy</td>
<td>0.975***</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>2.920*</td>
<td>1.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Settlement</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.068**</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Recruitment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Nationality Policy</td>
<td>-0.044***</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Family Reunification</td>
<td>-0.028**</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Political Participation</td>
<td>0.012**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Residence</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Anti-Discrimination</td>
<td>0.037***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.033***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist</td>
<td>1.910***</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>2.156***</td>
<td>0.404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.351**</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>-0.349**</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Parents</td>
<td>0.845</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>-0.162</td>
<td>0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (in years)</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.427*</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>-0.420</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.600</td>
<td>0.643</td>
<td>-0.796</td>
<td>0.677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1282.16</td>
<td>1281.85</td>
<td>1571.84</td>
<td>1566.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Log-odds and robust clustered standard errors (by country). Estimates are weighted using post-stratification and population size ESS weights.
age, gender, marital status, language).\textsuperscript{56} I average these normalized policy scores where higher values indicate more open policies (e.g., ranging from 0 to 1) to reflect the relative openness of a given countries’ recruitment policies.\textsuperscript{57}

As found in Table 2.4 below, both the labor recruitment policy and interaction with settlement policy are significant and in the expected direction for both migrants in 2010 (Models 1 & 2) and migrants in 2012 (Models 3 & 4). A test of the marginal effects similarly depicts low-skill targeting states possessing relatively ineffective integration policy while predicted economic integration increases alongside settlement in high-skill and neutral-skill states.\textsuperscript{58} Additionally, policy openness fails to predict migrant economic integration (Model 5). This demonstrates that it is not merely how open a state’s recruitment policies are but rather the targeted skill-set of said policies which impact migrant employment. Finally, for natives (Model 6), neither labor settlement nor recruitment policy impact economic performance further demonstrating these relationships between settlement and recruitment are not merely ephemeral phenomenon impacting all residents uniformly but instead only influence a population’s migrants. As a side note, this also provides evidence greater migrant access to the labor market does not promote competition over labor market resources and hence does not hinder native labor-market attainment. Even more, this finding demonstrates these policies, while ineffective toward improving outcomes in certain cases, are designed to target migrants alone.

\textsuperscript{56} See Ruhs (2013) Appendix 2 for a scoring breakdown across categories for each policy.
\textsuperscript{57} See Appendix B for these openness averages by country.
\textsuperscript{58} 2012 (3 year lag): low-skill AME = 0.000, \( p = .16 \); neutral-skill AME = 0.003, \( p < .001 \); high-skill AME = 0.002, \( p < .001 \).
  2010 (1 year lag): low-skill AME = 0.000, \( p = .20 \); neutral-skill AME = 0.004, \( p < .001 \); high-skill AME = 0.002, \( p < .001 \).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Employment Integration</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Migrants = 1</th>
<th>Migrants = 3</th>
<th>Migrants = 5</th>
<th>Natives = 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$ (s.e.)</td>
<td>$\beta$ (s.e.)</td>
<td>$\beta$ (s.e.)</td>
<td>$\beta$ (s.e.)</td>
<td>$\beta$ (s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Labor Settlement Policy</td>
<td>0.024*** 0.004</td>
<td>0.024*** 0.005</td>
<td>0.019*** 0.004</td>
<td>0.0181*** 0.004</td>
<td>0.012 0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Recruitment Policy</td>
<td>1.452*** 0.177</td>
<td>4.280*** 0.963</td>
<td>0.533*** 0.135</td>
<td>3.648*** 0.892</td>
<td>0.307 0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Settlement</td>
<td>-0.040** 0.014</td>
<td>-0.044** 0.013</td>
<td>0.293 2.184</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Recruitment</td>
<td>0.009 0.012</td>
<td>-0.029** 0.011</td>
<td>0.009 0.009</td>
<td>-0.038*** 0.006</td>
<td>0.041*** 0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment Openness</td>
<td>0.028*** 0.006</td>
<td>0.023*** 0.006</td>
<td>0.178 0.005</td>
<td>0.010 0.005</td>
<td>0.111 0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Nationality Policy</td>
<td>-0.042*** 0.008</td>
<td>-0.037** 0.008</td>
<td>-0.027*** 0.005</td>
<td>-0.009 0.007</td>
<td>-0.016 0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Family Reunification</td>
<td>0.001 0.006</td>
<td>0.016 0.009</td>
<td>-0.001 0.007</td>
<td>0.015* 0.005</td>
<td>-0.041*** 0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Political Participation</td>
<td>-0.007 0.005</td>
<td>-0.005 0.004</td>
<td>-0.006 0.003</td>
<td>-0.004* 0.002</td>
<td>0.006 0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Residence</td>
<td>-0.008 0.009</td>
<td>-0.026** 0.011</td>
<td>-0.016 0.009</td>
<td>-0.038*** 0.006</td>
<td>0.041*** 0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX Anti-Discrimination</td>
<td>0.028*** 0.006</td>
<td>0.023*** 0.006</td>
<td>0.178 0.005</td>
<td>0.010 0.005</td>
<td>0.111 0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.021 0.022</td>
<td>-0.019 0.022</td>
<td>-0.080*** 0.015</td>
<td>-0.039* 0.016</td>
<td>-0.079* 0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist</td>
<td>1.049* 0.466</td>
<td>1.867*** 0.431</td>
<td>0.791*** 0.343</td>
<td>1.530*** 0.413</td>
<td>1.075** 0.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>0.448** 0.165</td>
<td>0.052 0.237</td>
<td>0.327* 0.150</td>
<td>-0.217 0.215</td>
<td>0.463 0.304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.368*** 0.100</td>
<td>0.372*** 0.100</td>
<td>0.162 0.106</td>
<td>0.165 0.106</td>
<td>-0.198* 0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.022*** 0.004</td>
<td>0.021*** 0.004</td>
<td>0.020* 0.010</td>
<td>0.020* 0.010</td>
<td>0.016** 0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-0.124 0.155</td>
<td>-0.123 0.156</td>
<td>-0.709*** 0.114</td>
<td>-0.711*** 0.114</td>
<td>-0.563 0.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Parents</td>
<td>-0.195 0.159</td>
<td>-0.202 0.158</td>
<td>-0.205 0.184</td>
<td>-0.207 0.185</td>
<td>0.037 0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>-0.452** 0.176</td>
<td>-0.441* 0.176</td>
<td>-0.604 0.324</td>
<td>-0.606 0.321</td>
<td>-0.047 0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>-0.077 0.178</td>
<td>-0.078 0.178</td>
<td>-0.039 0.154</td>
<td>-0.043 0.154</td>
<td>-0.095 0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (in years)</td>
<td>-0.005 0.011</td>
<td>-0.006 0.010</td>
<td>0.020 0.014</td>
<td>0.019 0.014</td>
<td>0.011 0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>0.515*** 0.064</td>
<td>0.502*** 0.065</td>
<td>0.297* 0.146</td>
<td>0.293* 0.146</td>
<td>0.540*** 0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.125 0.530</td>
<td>0.125 0.530</td>
<td>-0.369* 0.155</td>
<td>-0.376* 0.154</td>
<td>0.074 0.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.558 0.544</td>
<td>-1.165* 0.469</td>
<td>1.182** 0.452</td>
<td>0.585 0.366</td>
<td>-0.864 1.394</td>
</tr>
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</table>

N: 2,422 2,422 2,727 2,727 2,835 26,505
Pseudo $R^2$: 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
AIC: 3345.22 3341.19 3850.63 3847.00 4041.85 31753.27

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Log-odds and robust clustered standard errors (by country). Estimates are weighted using post-stratification and population size ESS weights.
Discussion and Implications

Eight years after Europe’s great economic recession, one senior European Union official confidently concluded “That’s the story: Europe is back. We’re back in business” (Herszenhorn 2017). And for the native-born community in Europe, this certainly appears to be the case: unemployment is on the decline and income is on the rise.\(^{59}\) Missing from this narrative, however, is that Europe is only ‘back’ for some. Despite improved native-born economic outcomes, long-term unemployment for those born outside of the European Union increased nearly 23% between 2009 and 2015 currently leaving approximately one out of every five foreign-born residents\(^{60}\) out of the labor force (Eurostat 2016). The need to integrate migrants is not lost on European institutions, enabling strategic refugee policies such as Merkel’s focus on refugee literacy and leading the Organisation for economic Co-operation and Development to warn a failure to integrate immigrants and refugees will decrease market competition and stressed economic growth “will depend on the success of labour market integration” (Escritt 2016).

Despite any national or international pressure to do so, the results of this analysis reveal states differ in across integration policy responses and efficacy. While settlement does appear to improve migrant outcomes wholesale, a closer look including state labor-preferences demonstrates recruitment policies is a core intervening factor in the relative ability to improve migrant economic outcomes. To wit, economic integration policies are effective only when disconnected from low-skill labor preferences. Hence European states targeting low-skill sets fail improve migrant experiences on the labor market despite any policy appearances. Moreover, these relationships for low-skill states hold even when skill-sets match destination preferences

\(^{59}\) See Eurostat 2016 for these trends in native- and foreign-born economic outcomes.
\(^{60}\) i.e., 18.9%
resulting economic outcomes divorced from even the most supportive and accessible integration policy.

Overall, these findings call into question scholarship maintaining liberal or inclusive integration policies indiscriminately do migrants harm (Koopmans 2010, Edin et al. 2004). Nowhere do open integration policies in these analyses correspond with negative economic outcomes. Instead, states with recruitment policies skewed away from low-skill labor are more successful in transforming migrants regardless of skill-level into productive economic contributors when coupled with more open integration policies, whether that be through granting access across labor sectors or providing targeted programs to aid migrants on the labor market. Yet at worst, low-skill recruiting states appear to be ambivalent or disinterested in integrating their migrant populations- even when directly recruited. As a result, this paper untangles the apparent contradiction between open policies and depreciated migrant outcomes, concluding states lie in the bed their recruitment interests make.

These conclusions also provide implications for the conditions of the welfare state. Settlement policies, for one, may not be the only policies that are deemed ineffectual when combined with low-skill recruitment states with respect to migrants. Rights and benefits awarded through these policies may also fail to impact actual change in migrant outcomes outside of the economic sphere. This would be of core interest, for example, to labor parties in the United Kingdom who may in fact rely on the political support of migrants for electoral success. Implications also arise for coordinated market economies and firms who are directly invested in shaping a state’s labor market. It may be, for instance, that these outcomes vary as the involvement of firms in the direct recruitment of migrants grows – removing labor preferences out of the hands of the state. Hence settlement policy in liberal market economies with less direct
state firm involvement may be more effective in producing measurable economic outcomes than those policies within coordinated market economies.

These conclusions also offer citizenship and integration scholars incentive to address conditions of entry in impacting migrant outcomes and policy efficacy. States with economic conditions for citizenship such as income requirements in Denmark or benefit independence in Germany, may filter citizenship acquisitions without appearing to do so simply by shifting their recruitment policies. Further this may be another venue through which the historical traditions of membership permeate integration requirements and policy (c.f. Goodman 2012). These low-skill attracting countries may hence identify migrants as permanent outsiders, despite skill level or labor market interests, restricting citizenship and providing solely symbolic policies to appease supranational organizations. And as policy matters more for naturalization of migrants from less developed states (Vink et al. 2013), these configurations may filter through to disproportionately impact the citizenship acquisition of migrants from these locations.

Economic migration is also impacted by these conclusions, indicating policy regimes are not enough for migrants to consider when making the decision to migrate for economic reasons. Combined with previous literature establishing migrants are rational actors valuing citizenship and rights (Alarian and Goodman 2017), these findings indicate the access of rights does not necessarily imply the dissemination of these ‘goods’ on the basis of policy openness. Subsequently migrants may be incorrectly weighing destinations by their relative policy openness rather than their effective policy via recruitment preferences. Even if migrants were aware of the relationship between recruitment and integration policies, low-skilled migrants would continue to be segmented from the labor market despite institutional recruitment. Hence in a migrant’s relative internal migration calculus, economic migrants should weigh more heavily
those states who, such as the German commissioner for immigration, refugees, and integration, stress the importance of not selecting individuals “according to their skills set,” rather than those states who actively recruit their talent (Chazan 2017).

Finally, these findings implore scholars of integration policy to take seriously the role of institutional incentives in impacting additional migrant integration outcomes. Altogether, the implications to migrant integration beyond employment are considerably bleak for countries with low-skill labor preferences. Recently, research locates employment as a gateway to cross-venue integration, specifically civic belonging and political participation (Alarian 2017b, Alarian 2017c). Concurrently, heightened migrant unemployment brings waves of dissatisfied, socially excluded, and welfare-dependent communities (Clark, Georgellis, & Sanfey 2001, Wunder & Riphahn 2013). These low-skill labor countries may also be the states to look toward in the future for increasing incidences of violence, alienation, and cycles of dependence lasting generations. Thus, the perceived failures of integration may more accurately reflect apathy toward migrants’ genuine integration, generating new populations of de facto guest-workers.
Immigrant civic integration is crucial to maintaining a well-functioning democracy. Civic integration through values in particular yields communities of productive citizens committed to the laws, principles, and institutions of the state. As a result, successful migrant incorporation furthers social solidarity, eases tension among native and immigrant populations, and strengthens democratic institutions. Moreover, where migrant civic values are absent, democracy can be undermined, furthering civic decline, enabling far-right parties, and establishing cycles of societal withdrawal and alienation. And where civic integration through national identification is prohibitive to migrants or treacherous to civil society, civic integration through values can provide a meaningful avenue through which migrants become upstanding and productive societal members. Such integration is even more imperative when natives stray from attachments to institutional norms, posing a significant threat to democratic norms, values, and civic culture (Voeten 2016, Bonikowski & DiMaggio 2016). Hence successful migrant civic integration can prevent these cracks from becoming cleavages throughout society, supplementing the population with new and active citizens dedicated to the state and its principles and institutions.

Equally, when migrants are excluded from civil society can exacerbate social fragmentation enabling alienation, violent extremism, and radical policies (Sobolewska 2010, Eatwell 2006). Elites are aware of this threat, leading David Cameron to conclude in the aftermath of the 7/7 London bombings, “We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong” (Cameron 2011). And a core component underscoring such societal marginalization is unemployment, which excludes migrants socially, psychologically, and economically. As a result, states with larger migrant unemployment risk greater alienation
and civic norm deterioration. New scholarship supports this alternative theory of migrant integration finding economic investments in employment enables political incorporation and civic belonging across Europe (Alarian 2017b). While this recent literature provides implications for immigrants, asylum seekers, and subsequent policy decisions, questions remain as to whether the same process exists with respect to civic values or within states with different political economic arrangements and migrant diversity, such as the United States. What causes civic value attainment in migrants to the United States? Does employment similarly empower downstream civic values and if so, is this a causal story or one of intervening variation?

In what follows, I outline the literature of immigrant civic integration broadly and in the multi-ethnic United States specifically. Second, I discuss how personal economic conditions may facilitate later value attainment, arguing employment causally promotes migrant support for a core civic value: freedom of speech. To investigate this claim, I conduct two studies covering immigrant civic value outcomes in the United States. The first study, using the General Social Survey (GSS) panel, reveals employment uniquely facilitates later alignment with American civic principles. This evidence, in addition to recent theories establishing employment as crucial for civic integration as belonging, demonstrates employment is vital for integration at large (Alarian 2017b). I build upon these conclusions in a second study to examine the causal role of employment in altering civic values across native- and migrant-born Americans using a unique lab experiment. This study finds employment causally empowers American civic value attainment, specifically among native-born participants. I further consider the potential underlying mechanisms for this effect revealing group pride and closeness are additional non-economic byproducts of employment. Their direct and interactive link to civic principles is not clear, however, suggesting the immediate impact of employment on civic values operates
through an alternative mechanism or such observed mechanisms require time to alter civic integration. An examination of the variation in the treatment effect (i.e., employment) indicates the value of employment is larger for migrants specifically with respect to group pride and economic optimism. These findings reveal employment is particularly crucial for migrants in establishing deeper in-group connections. I conclude American policy-makers fraught over the alienation and civic integration of their migrant communities and the state of their civil society for natives alike should invest in programs promoting employment, while critically re-examining those obstructing access to the labor market.

**Defining Civic Integration**

While civic integration does not comprise the whole of what it means to integrate, it is a significant component to migrants and their receiving states. Similar to other integration modalities (e.g., political, economic), civic integration is multi-dimensional and comprises a variety of attitudes and behaviors with respect to civic principles and national belonging (Sobolewska et al. 2017). Best depicting this amalgam, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair described civic integration into the United Kingdom as the “belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared heritage” (Blair 2006). In this understanding, a migrant’s values and identities are transformed to match that of the country of destination (Mouristen 2012). When the receiving state is democratic, civic integration hence allows migrants to become political community members through the adoption of liberal and social values, the practice of active citizenship, host-country knowledge, and language attainment. In doing such, the expectation is that migrants will more readily feel as though they...
belong, and earn the “right” to identify as a member rather than an outsider (Blair 2006) and thus promoting social solidarity and community cohesion.

Receiving states themselves are already heavily invested in promoting these civic components within their migrant communities. With respect to policy, the vast majority of advanced democratic states (i.e., approximately 80%) contain some level of civic integration requirement for migrants to secure citizenship, permanent residence, or as is the case with family reunification in the Netherlands, even migrate (Goodman 2012, Bech et al. 2017). While the efficacy of such policies is not entirely clear, civic integration remains incredibly valuable to migrants lives and the environments through which they navigate. Specifically, such civic integration may bridge the gap between state institutions and migrant populations while symbolically acting as a ‘gate-keeper’ for citizenship acquisition (Goodman & Wright 2015). Further civic integration provides measureable improvements in political incorporation (Bloemraad 2006) and socialization (Liebig & Von Haaren 2011) providing additional benefits to the destination’s civil society.

Yet all of these civic integration components may not equally provide states with a vibrant civil society and actively engaged communities. For instance, the civic integration component of belonging may not be as valuable to states with diverse, multi-ethnic populations, such as the United States. Civic integration through national identification appears to do very little in the way of fostering larger societal and institutional trust, even hindering its obtainment where discrimination is present (Schildkraut 2015). Further national identification may even decline societal capital and cohesion providing costs rather than benefits to the civil society especially when such identification is ethnically derived (Reeskens & Wright 2012). And while some find civic conceptions of belonging as opposed to ethnic definitions improves individual
well-being and cultural openness (Morrison et al. 2001, Wright et al. 2012), the vast literature in American national identity and group identification as a whole reports increased prejudice, welfare chauvinism, and discrimination when such identities are present, suggesting integration via identity may not effectively provide the cohesive and solidarity outcomes a state desires (Tajfel & Turner 2001, Pehrson et al. 2009, Wright & Reeskens 2013).\footnote{See Schildkraut 2014 for a review of a majority of this literature.}

In contrast to national identities, which vary in content and strength across population (Bonikowski & DiMaggio 2016, Schildkraut 2015), civic values allot both states with greater purchase from its commitments and migrants with relative ease of attainment. For one, emancipative values of freedom and liberty correspond with greater pro-social behavior and out-group trust (Kistler et al. 2017, Welzel & Delhey 2015). Democratic values also facilitate political activism, producing both a vibrant and cohesive civil society (Vecchione et al. 2014). In other words, where national identification may erode social capital, civic values instill societal and democratic cohesion. Further civic values provide migrants a more accessible venue of civic integration that national identification, especially where identification is tied to ethnicity or other ascriptive traits. With respect to the United States in particular, theorists further argue abandoning this emphasis on civic and liberal values would replicate historical abuses of citizenship, whereby membership is allotted to a privileged few (Smith 1997). Thus, civic integration as commitment to civic values and the rule of law is a more effective strategy in multi-ethnic states as a whole, providing the United States in particular its “best chance to incorporate migrants, sustain a robust American nationalism, and foster a meaningful, democratic form of citizenship” (Pickus 2009, pp.6).

Exactly what enables these migrants to obtain such civic values, however, remains unclear. And while state policy exemplifies this complicated process, taking on a variety of
approaches ranging from intensive civic integration programs (e.g., the Netherlands) to laissez-faire strategies (e.g., the United States), the best investment to promoting civic value attainment remains to be identified. Further despite the indirect focus of diminishing societal alienation, core producers of societal marginalization and employment in particular, is often overlooked. Consequently, the potential non-economic byproducts of employment in producing community values and social solidarity are left relatively unexamined by policy-makers and scholars. Provided identifying the cause to instilling civic values is vital to democracy and civil society as a whole and United States in particular, I explore employment’s potential in affecting migrant civic value attainment. In the following section, I outline the value of migrant employment and discuss several potential mechanisms that may operate through employment to promote civic gains in migrant integration.

**Hidden Effects of Employment**

Employment, one component of a migrant’s integration process, is both valuable for the economic benefits it provides as well as operating as an entryway to producing other, non-economic goods. Economically, the advantages of migrant employment are obvious for states and their populations. As employment rates increase, so too will a state’s economy (Borjas 1994, Dancygier & Laitin 2014). The benefit of heightened migrant employment may be significant among liberal market polities or those who grant domestic firms larger roles in employment and recruitment decisions. With respect to firms, increases in skilled migrant employment improve the overall employment of skilled workers, productivity, and relative profits (Kerr et al. 2015, Ghosh et al. 2014). Additionally, fears that migrant employment will hinder the income or employment of the native-born population are unfounded across advanced democracies.

Aside from these tangible economic benefits, employment also provides social and political benefits relevant to migrant integration. For one, interventions aimed at improving employment outcomes also concurrently reduce the likelihood of incarceration, early mortality, and high-risk behavior (Gelber et al. 2015). Employment similarly provides individuals with greater overall life satisfaction and happiness while unemployment can critically undermine its attainment, an effect persisting beyond those of other life-changes (Clark et al. 2008, Blanchflower & Oswald 2011). Further employment can increase contact with divergent populations and groups, which in turn may reduce intergroup bias and conflict (Gaertner & Dovidio 2014). Specific to migrants, employment also offers opportunities to expand upon one’s human capital and skills, increasing the likelihood of labor market success, psychologically well-being, and language attainment (Friedberg & Hunt 1995, Borjas 1994, Hamilton et al. 2016). Thus, while not directly tied to economic outcomes, employment can indirectly provide migrants and civil society with benefits to societal health, well-being, and overall cohesion.

In addition to these societal goods, employment may provide migrants specific tools to identify civically within their host society demonstrating employment as a necessary foundation for a functioning democracy and civil society. Research already suggests that where integration through naturalization is limited or prohibitive, labor market participation can act as a form of participatory citizenship empowering migrants to make “citizenship-like claims on the state and others” (Bloemraad et al. 2008, p.162). Similarly, employment can strengthen connections to the community (Ehrkamp 2005), prevent political abstinence (Bueker 2013), enable naturalization
(Yang 1994), and buffer against future unemployment (Munoz-Comet 2016). Building upon this literature, new scholarship finds migrant early employment experiences enable downstream civic belonging and political participation (Alarian 2017b). With respect to civic outcomes in particular, unemployment obstructs civic belonging across twenty-six European countries, origin, education, gender, time in country, age, and income. These findings uniquely position employment as the channel through which societal identification occurs, granting new interest to employment as an avenue to address civil democratic society.

However, these relationships only speak to the role of employment in channeling civic attachment rather than civic values. Further it is unclear whether the effect of employment in producing civic integration is present within the highly diverse United States, where civic values and principles are entrenched within its constitutional framing, rather than filtered through any global or post-national norms (Aleinikoff 2004). These patterns of employment also are mainly examined within the context of coordinated market economies, leaving questions of the differing market arrangements unanswered. In particular the liberal market economies of the United States, with diminished state-firm interaction and a higher degree of client politics (Freeman 1995, Soskice & Hall 2001), may consequently present different relationships between individual employment and civic value attainment. Further questions of immigration, integration, and employment take on special interest in the United States, which maintains one of the largest immigrant communities in the world with over 13% of the population as of 2015 (Eurostat 2016). And as Van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) conclude, the United States may be exception in the ways in which immigrants integrate. These characteristics of the United States grants further justification to examine whether employment is causal in fostering migrant civic values.

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62 The United States reported 1,016,518 foreign-born compared. The second largest population is Germany’s at 1,342,529: a difference of 326,011 migrants.
or if variation in the institutions, histories, or demographic compositions yields uniquely American mechanisms and processes. Hence the question remains: do the barriers to civic values among migrants to the United States diminish alongside unemployment? Can employment cause stronger connections with civic values?

Employment and Civic Values

There are multiple potential pathways through which employment may causally impact migrant civic values. Beginning with an application of the macro-level modernization theory to individual behavior, socio-economic advancements furnish individuals with freedom, choice, and emancipative values compatible to democratic societal arrangements (Welzel et al. 2003). Thus, as economic preconditions are met, individuals are able to adopt new civic ideals and values inherently valuable to civil society and democracy. Moving from this grand theory to more noticeable connections at the individual level, employment leads to greater life satisfaction, trust, and feelings of social and psychological belonging: all of which impact civic values. In other words, employed migrants are happier, more trusting, and feel as though they belong to a stronger degree than their unemployed counterparts.

These consequences of unemployment and benefits of employment subsequently impact the degree of civic value attainment. Regarding happiness in the United States, Rentfrom et al. (2009) find federal states with increased subjective well-being additionally reflected higher values of tolerance of individual differences: a core component of American civic norms. Globally, others find the link between happiness and freedom is more profound in wealthier states (Diener & Seligman 2004) signifying in democratic values are tied to through happiness and security to economic success. Employment further enables greater optimism for one’s future (Robb et al. 2009), facilitating greater societal trust and tolerance (Uslaner 1999). Thus, as
employment provides greater internal satisfaction and increases one’s outlook for the future, migrants may be more willing to practice civic norms and values. Participation in the employment sector also enables greater psychological belonging and expands community ties (Ehrkamp 2005). And while civic belonging may hinder civic values such as tolerance in multi-ethnic states, others argue such identification can ‘bridge’ social capital and foster social cohesion (Putnam 2000, Miller 1995) particularly when definitions are civic rather than ethnic (Reeskens & Wright 2012). Employment as a result of increasing social belonging and general optimism can therefore impact a migrant’s alignment to a state’s civic principles.

Moreover, trust is one of the most fundamental components of social capital – a key element with respect to civic values. This immense literature defines social capital as a system of norms and values that bond liberal societies (Uslaner 1999, Putnam 1993). And as employment increases social trust, it may additionally expand other civic norms and values attached to social capital. For example, Rothstein & Uslaner (2005) conclude reducing societal economic inequality translates to profound increases in trust in government and society. As migrants become more trusting, they in turn are more likely to support civic values, especially those which require migrants to trust the state and society to maintain social order. For example, a migrant may be more likely to support freedom of speech for an individual who one deems as reprehensible should they trust society or government to protect their autonomous right to speech or prevent the individual from infringing upon their own liberty. Higher trust also corresponds with higher quality democracies, civil societies, and economic growth suggesting trust may enable facilitate civic value attainment (Putnam 1993, Rothstein & Uslaner 2005). Other scholars in the generalized trust literature additionally argue heightened social trust increases associational memberships, political participation, and tolerance toward outgroups (Andersen & Fetner 2008,
Uslaner & Brown 2005), all of which reflect some degree of state-compatible civic values. Thus, societal trust through employment may clearly offer a profound step to both facilitating individual migrant civic integration and resolving general societal cleavages.

On the other hand, the link between employment and civic values may actually be a story of intervening variation rather than one of causality. For one, employment may be an instrument of contact whereby interaction with the larger community rather than employment itself drives civic value attainment. In this sense, employment may merely offer increased opportunity to interact with native populations, providing informal opportunities to obtain country and civic knowledge necessary for civic integration. An employed migrant will hence have a greater probability of interacting with diverse populations and expanding networks than a migrant outside the labor market (Ryan et al. 2008). As a practical point, these employed migrants will also increase their interaction with state and federal institutional norms through paying taxes and receiving benefits.

Similarly contact via employment may enable language acquisition, translating to knowledge of civic values. Research finds where language barriers grow probabilities of citizenship acquisition and civic engagement with the host society decline, potentially promoting cycles of marginalization and ethnic ghettoization (Stoll & Wong 2007). Hence where language acquisition is unlikely to occur naturally either due to resource scarcity or segregation, employment through contact can operate as a gateway to exposure and acquisition. Specifically, in the United States, Chiswick and Miller (2001) find English language acquisition by migrants in the United States occurs less frequently among older migrants, those with larger family-networks, and where their native language information is common, suggesting employment may be more valuable for these communities to promote civic integration in particular. To wit,
contact with natives and institutions, rather the job itself, may explain the potential pattern between migrant employment and civic value proliferation.

However, provided the other observed non-economic products of employment, I expect employment through facilitating trust, belonging, and optimism enables civic values. In building upon these sociological, economic, and integration literatures, I derive the following hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1:* Employment facilitates civic values.

*Hypothesis 2:* Employment causes heightened group belonging, pride, optimism, and trust, which in turn enables civic values.

*Hypothesis 3:* The effect of employment is stronger among migrants than natives in improving civic values.

**Data and Study Design**

To examine the above hypotheses, I conduct two studies in the United States with different data sources. In the first study, I analyze the United Stated General Social Survey: a unique data source containing three waves of panel surveys across 2006 to 2012 including both migrants and native-born citizens. While other sources may include larger percentages of migrants, the GSS is exceptional as it surveys non-citizen as well as citizen immigrants. As a result, this first study examines demographic trends in the civic principle of freedom of speech across 118 migrants and compared to 1,233 native-born citizens. This civic value is chosen for two reasons. First, freedom of speech is a relatively accessible American value, easily identifiable to survey participants and thus limiting the potential for variable misspecification or question ambiguity. Second, this civic value is deeply entrenched within American civic society; requiring new members to adopt ideational tolerance and autonomy compatible with democratic norms. As a

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63 For example, the American National Election Survey only surveys potential voters thereby excluding non-citizen migrants.
result, change in agreement with this value due simply to time alone is unlikely, particularly over the period studied. Thereby any observed changes are interpreted as reflecting shifts toward – or away from – American civic values as a function of employment.

Finally, in a second study I conduct a unique experiment to examine the causal role of employment on this core civic value. The strength of this design is in eliminating any potential intervening variation due to increased contact, language, education, or other correlated but non-causal components of employment. Employment, as a result, is isolated allowing for causal inquiry as to whether employment is indeed successful in instilling civic values compatible with American and democratic norms. Again, I examine civic integration as the value of freedom of speech. I further add in the potential mechanisms within employment including economic optimism, belonging, and trust to outline whether any of these components in fact interact with employment to produce greater civic value attainment. This experiment as a result analyses civic integration attitudes across artificially manipulated conditions of employment across a total of 211 participants: 147 native-born and 64 foreign-born.

**Measurement, Analysis, and Results**

**Study 1: GSS Panel**

To measure economic integration in this first study, I examine employment status across all panels (i.e., 2006, 2008, and 2012). Those who indicated part-time or full-time employment were coded as employed (i.e., 1) and those who reported temporarily not working or unemployed/laid off were considered unemployed (i.e., 0). A validity check excluded any participants who indicated being unemployed at time one and/or two but reported never having been unemployed
at time three. Subsequent analyses divide these migrants as either un-integrated at time one, integrated at time one, or always integrated (e.g., employed throughout each survey panel).\textsuperscript{64} The independent variable of interest in this study, as mentioned above, is the value component of civic integration. Here civic integration indicates the relative support for the American value, freedom of speech. Participants were asked whether a potentially controversial individual should be allowed to make a speech in one’s city, town, or community.\textsuperscript{65} These individuals include: 1) an opponent of religion and the church, 2) a supporter of white supremacy, 3) a communist, 4) an advocate for military rule, and 5) a homosexual. Both Cronbach’s alpha (\(\alpha = .81\)) and factor analysis reveal these items tap into the same underlying principle and are therefore combined to reflect an individual’s civic principle integration over time. As allowing individuals to speak is aligned with American principles, civic integration indicates agreement that individuals should be allowed to speak in public regardless of their potential for controversy. Consequently, the more hypothetical individuals a respondent indicates should be allowed to speak, the higher one’s degree of civic integration.

**Analysis.** In analyzing these relationships in the GSS, the majority of unemployed migrants at time one became employed in time two (88%), and all previously unemployed migrants (n=8) became employed at time three. As a result, evidence support for hypothesis 1 would depict increases in civic integration over time (i.e., after securing employment). As reflected in Figure 3.1, natives on average, as expected, report higher support for the freedom of speech principle than migrants across all three years. Further, variation across time is rather constant, ranging on average from 4.07 to 4.22 persons allowed to speak.\textsuperscript{66} Regarding migrant

\textsuperscript{64}This distinction is made as migrants who reported employment at time 1 could become unemployed at time 2 or 3. 
\textsuperscript{65}Response options were coded as 1) Yes, allowed and 0) Not allowed. 
\textsuperscript{66}While these changes are not statistically significant, given the small number of participants in the migrant groups, significance tests are not appropriate and are therefore not reported here.
civic integration, hypothesis 1 predicts unemployed migrants at time one would report lower average integration than both natives and their employed migrant counterparts. This is precisely what occurs as unemployed migrants on average support only 2.6 individuals at time one; approximately one fewer individual than employed migrants (i.e., 3.5 persons). Even more, all migrants who were unemployed at time one reported similar attitudinal support for freedom of speech to fellow migrants at time two and time three. This indicates employment improved civic integration, where previously unemployed migrants were brought to degree of value agreement with their previously employed compatriots once employment was secured. Similarly supporting hypothesis 1, employed migrants at time one and migrants who never experienced unemployment across the three waves behave nearly identically in support for this civic value. This supports the notion that early employment experiences are valuable to enable civic integration and may buffer against potential backsliding effects of unemployment at a later point in time.
Robustness. How do we know the relationship between economic and civic integration does not run in the inverse? This alternative explanation indicates civic integration may lead to or generate employment possibilities. Should this be the case, one would expect to find discrepancies between employment outcomes as a function of support for civic principles. To test this hypothesis, I create a variable to assess the relative degree of civic integration where integration reflects meeting or exceeding average native support for freedom of speech (i.e., how many persons should be allowed to speak) at each time point. As a result, migrants who indicated on average 4.07 or more persons should be allowed to speak at time one would be considered integrated (i.e., the average native value agreement). While this is a crude measurement, it does provide a simple binary cut for civic integration where migrants are compared to natives at each time-point. These migrant groups are then compared to average

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67 This calculation is similar to the ‘gap’ technique employed by Goodman & Wright 2015 and Alarian 2017b.
employment outcomes of native-born respondents allowing for a simple depiction of migrant patterns across political integration and employment outcomes.

Unlike the patterns depicted by economic integration, Figure 3.2 demonstrates nearly identical rates of employment regardless of one’s civic integration status. In fact, at time one, natives and all migrant groups are nearly identical in their rate of employment (ranging from .92 to .94 across all groups). Further, natives experience the greatest change over time, decreasing in reported employment by 1.2% on average. Migrants thus do not appear to meaningfully differ on their rate of employment as a function of their civic integration status. Combined with the results depicted here with those found in Europe in previous research (Alarian 2017b), economic integration emerges as a foundational element of integration in the United States such that it both precedes and enables later integration.

![Employment by Freedom of Speech over Time](image)

*Figure 3.2. Employment Integration by Support for Freedom of Speech*

Another potential possibility for the observed patterns may be due to origin-specific factors outside of employment. In other words, are pre-employment values determined by employment or by components of the sending state? To examine this possibility, I first code for
reported region of origin: North America (n=23), Europe (n=29), Asia (n=18), and the Middle East and Africa (n=10). As the greatest change in civic values for migrants occurred between unemployment at time 1 and employment at time 2 (see Figure 1 above), the conclusion that employment causally increases civic values would be called into question should we observe significant increases by origin within this time period regardless of employment status. Figure 3.3 below, however reveals for migrants originating from North America or Asia experience declines, rather than increases, in civic value support during this time period representing roughly a 7% (i.e., 0.22 person) and 4% (i.e., 0.09 person) decrease in the average number of persons allowed to speak respectively. And while Middle Eastern/African migrants experience a slight increase between times one and two, this shift is relatively small (i.e., 0.2 persons) and generally aligned with the native-level rate of increase (i.e., 0.08 persons).

European migrants, however, report a slightly larger increase in civic values with approximately a 9% increase between time one and two. Excluding those who reported unemployment at time one (i.e., 2 migrants), reduces the change for European migrants slightly to 8%, indicating at least some portion of this regional-level change may be due to employment. Thus, while the possibility that sending country factors impact the civic values beyond employment, this effect may only be confined to those migrants who originate from Europe. This is particularly interesting given the relatively shared democratic and civic values between the United States and Europe. Employment thereby remains a crucial component to instilling civic values for the larger proportion of migrants to the United States, especially for those with potentially divergent sending state norms and values.

Unfortunately, the most compatible variable for this coding asked participants to list which countries or part of the world their ancestors came from. When more than one country was mentioned, respondents were asked to indicate to which country they felt closest. As I classify region only for foreign-born participants, this method best approximates migrant origin.
Study 2: Employment Experiment

Where the first study demonstrated the demographic and potentially causal role of employment in enabling civic value attainment, this second study uses experimental methodology to causally assess the empowering capabilities of employment in promoting civic values. This methodology thus rules out the possibility of intervening variation or omitted variable bias in the relationship between employment and civic value agreement. In doing such, all participants are recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a web-based survey system (MTurk). Participants drawn from MTurk’s opt-in panel compared to other in-persona and online participants are similarly employed, ethnically diverse, and are more geographically representative and attentive to survey questionnaires and instructions (Huff & Tungly 2015, Hauser & Schwarz 2016). As a result, MTurk is an ideal sample for this experiment as its

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69 Participants received a base payment of $0.20 for their time.
participants are generalizable to the general population.\textsuperscript{70} As mentioned above, I sample both foreign- and native-born individuals to compare both across ‘employment’ conditions for nativity and examine the possibility for heterogeneous treatment effects by country of birth as this variation may account for some degree of the variability as demonstrated in study one.

The independent variable of interest in this study replicates the civic values measurement of study one to similarly capture alignment with American civic principles and further tie the observed descriptive results causally to employment. Again, both Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha = 0.80$) and factor analyses present these items appropriate for scaling, providing further evidence the scale reliably assesses the principle component of civic integration. Additionally, the way in which employment impacts civic values is captured through a series of attitudes theorized through social capital, national identity, and the generalized trust literature to interact with employment to promote civic values: group closeness, group pride, trust, and economic optimism.

First, group closeness is measured as the degree to which an individual identifies feeling close participants feel to their group.\textsuperscript{71} Second, participants are asked to report how proud they are to be a part of their assigned group, ranging from not very proud (0) to extremely proud (1).\textsuperscript{72} Trust is measured through two measures: a scale of three survey items assessing group perceived fairness, helpfulness, and trust of one’s fellow group members and a survey item assessing trust in national government. Each scale item ranges from 0 to 10 with higher scores indicated more trusting and positive views of one’s group members.\textsuperscript{73}

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{70} It is important to note that MTurk participants do skew younger than other survey firms and therefore age will be included as a control for all analyses. See Huff & Tingley 2015.

\textsuperscript{71} Options include: 0) not at all close; .33) not close; .66) quite close; and 1) very close.

\textsuperscript{72} Other response options include .33) not close, and .66) quite close.

\textsuperscript{73} Items read: 1) Generally speaking, would you say that most people in your group can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?; 2) Do you think that most people in your group would try to take advantage
Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha = 0.80$) and factor analyses reveal these survey items measuring the same underlying factor and thus are considered appropriate as a combined scale. The last component of trust assesses whether respondents trust the national government to do what is right with higher values indicating greater trust. Finally optimism is measured through two items addressing an individual’s assessment of personal and national economic situations ranging from 0 (i.e., economic pessimism) to 1 (economic optimism).

To enable causal inference, I experimentally manipulate the dependent variable, employment, through the random assignment of participants to one of two conditions: unemployed or employed. The experimental process began by informing all participants that they are placed in a group (i.e., Group A) with other individuals with similar characteristics and whose overall performance across three tasks will be compared to that of other groups. Participants could not see, speak, or interact with other participants in any way thereby eliminating any potential confounding bias of contact to influence the results. Performance is determined by the efficacy and accuracy in three menial tasks: alphabetized strings, line spacing, and number selection. These tasks are designed as equivalent in their difficulty, interest, and required skill level to reduce the possibility of non-measured group differences. In the alphabetizing task, participants are asked to identify letter strings that are in alphabetical order of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? and 3) Would you say that most of the time people in your group would try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?

Options include: 0) almost never; .33) some of the time; .66) most of the time; and 1) almost always.

Items read: 1) Would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse? and; 2) Would you say that over the past year that you and your family living with you are better off, stayed the same, or worse off, financially?

Options include: 0) Gotten worse/Worse off; .5) Stayed the same and; 1) Gotten better/Better off.

As a manipulation check, participants are asked to indicate their conditional status (e.g., employed or unemployed) and group assignment (i.e., A) prior to proceeding. Those who incorrectly identify their assigned condition are omitted from the analysis.

These tasks are built on the vast literature in psychology and economics examining cognitive dissonance (Abrams & Hogg 2006), motivation (Benabou & Tirole 2003), and labor (Heyma & Ariely 2004).
The line spacing task presents a series of lines of equal length; each with a different number of spaces (e.g., --- -- -) in which participants identify the number of spaces present within each line. The final task, number selection, requires participants indicate the amount of times a single number (e.g., 5) exists across a series of numbers (e.g., 57632). These tasks appear in random order without duplication to ensure the results are not a function of task ordering.

While all participants complete these tasks, only employed group members were eligible to receive an income reward as a result of task completion, accuracy, and speed. Those randomly assigned to the unemployed condition as a result, are told they are ineligible for the income reward and instead will be ‘applying’ to earn income at a later date. Unemployed participants are told their application for this income will be judged by their performance on the tasks (i.e., completion, accuracy, and speed).\(^\text{80}\) All participants, however, were informed of the additional income employed group members may receive and the application for income unemployed group members complete. This ensures the subsequent results are due to the experimental manipulation rather than task completion. Participants were asked on three occasions to state their ‘employment’ status and ability to receive an ‘income’ reward.\(^\text{81}\) Additionally, participants did not receive any feedback with respect to their or their fellow group member scores, ensuring again the results are a function of the mere knowledge of group membership rather than perceived productivity. These tasks, equivalent in the required skill-level and enjoyment, were further randomized to reduce the probability of ordering effects. Hence this design mimics real

\(^{79}\) Strings of letters are used rather than words as to avoid the possibility of language advantages across migration status and between migrant groups.
\(^{80}\) Income rewards of 0.05 cents per task were awarded to employed participants whose performance was in the top 10% of all participants.
\(^{81}\) Only participants who answered these three intermediate questions correctly were included in the subsequent analysis.
world conditions whereby employed members work for ‘income’ and unemployed members are ‘income’ seeking.

Finally upon completion of all tasks, participants evaluated their strength of identification with their group through multiple survey items discussed above as well as reporting on a series of demographic questions including: age, urban residence, educational attainment, religious attendance, political affiliation, ideology, income, employment status, gender, ethnic minority status, marital status, previous voting behavior, and migrant status. All dependent and demographic variables were measured after completion of the experimental prime except for migrant status, which was asked prior to a participant’s awareness of their economic condition.

**Analysis.** Study two includes a sample of 213 United States residents across employment conditions. Of these participants, 148 (70%) were born inside the United States and 64 (30%) were born outside the country. Provided the proposed causal relationship of employment (i.e., hypothesis 1 and 2) is not dependent upon previous migration behavior, I opt to pool these two populations together. This is to say no participants in this simulation can possibly be ‘native’ to the arbitrary group A. Rather all groups are treated as ‘migrants’ with no theoretical ties to this group prior to their assignment. All participants, as stated earlier, were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: 99 participants (46%) assigned to the unemployed condition and 114 (53%) assigned to employment. While the most ideal situation is to have equivalent proportions of participants in both conditions, it is more important to ensure the variation and distribution of the two groups are equivalent. To establish that the unemployed and employed groups consist of random samples of equivalent population demographics, I assess the between-group balance across a variety of potential covariate means, standard deviations, and distributions. Table 3.1 below demonstrates these potential covariates do not significantly differ in their means or

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82 See Appendix C for this survey.
distributions across the unemployed and employed conditions. Further, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests suggest these covariates are well-balanced in terms of their distributions. In sum, the samples are equivalent in both the distribution and averages of these covariates, permitting causal inference from the random treatment assignment.

As these two groups are balanced, I use a series of OLS regressions to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of employment on freedom of speech (see Table 3.2 below). Regarding agreement with freedom of speech (i.e., civic principles), the ATE represents an increase of approximately 0.26 additional persons allowed to speak publically (i.e., Model 1). While this effect does not significantly differ from zero, its standard error (SE=0.25) and 95% confidence interval (0.24, 0.75) suggest the possibility the ATE is underpowered and hence requires a larger sample size to detect its effect. Further supporting this possibility is the significant increase in civic attitudes for employed individuals when constricting the sample to only native-born participants. In doing such, the ATE of employment increases reported civic values by 0.59 persons. While there do not appear to be any significant heterogeneous treatment effects by birth origin (i.e., foreign or native), this may be due to the lower percentage of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All Participants</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>38.20</td>
<td>12.51</td>
<td>37.23</td>
<td>12.08</td>
<td>39.06</td>
<td>12.88</td>
<td>[-5.27, 1.60]</td>
<td>-1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban residence</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>[-0.02, 0.13]</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (yrs)</td>
<td>14.47</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>14.41</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>14.53</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>[-0.76, 0.51]</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious attendance</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>[-0.10, 0.09]</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political affiliation (Republican)</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>[-0.05, 0.12]</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (conservative)</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>[-0.07, 0.09]</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>[-1.68, 0.04]</td>
<td>-1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Employed</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>[-0.09, 0.11]</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Female</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>[-0.18, 0.09]</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>[-0.63, 0.11]</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Married</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>[-0.26, 0.02]</td>
<td>-1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Ethnic minority</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>[-0.11, 0.16]</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Voted 2016</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>[-0.06, 0.19]</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Native-born</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>[-0.07, 0.18]</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
migrants within the current sample. Further neither across natives-only nor all participants do there appear to be any differences in this effect due to gender or actual employment status.

Table 3.2. Freedom of Speech by Employment Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>All Participants</th>
<th>Natives Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Condition</td>
<td>0.256 (0.251)</td>
<td>-0.393 (0.478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-born</td>
<td>0.283 (0.422)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.437 (0.382)</td>
<td>-0.023 (0.449)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>-0.348 (0.800)</td>
<td>0.441 (1.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native X Condition</td>
<td>0.963 (0.557)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female X Condition</td>
<td>-0.592 (0.519)</td>
<td>-0.199 (0.632)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed X Condition</td>
<td>-0.370 (1.01)</td>
<td>-1.158 (1.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.589*** (0.183)</td>
<td>3.353*** (0.369)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>588.595</td>
<td>573.715</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors.  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Next to connect the potential mechanisms of employment to the experimental prime, I first examine the average treatment effect of employment on each proposed mechanism: group belonging, trust, and optimism (see Table 3.3). Examining these ATEs across each proposed mechanism component, employment appears to only impact the subset of group belonging: group pride and closeness. With respect to social and government trust and governmental optimism, employment fails to significantly alter participant attitudes suggesting employment alone may not facilitate these particular non-economic benefits. Combining this finding with
those of the extant literature suggest the act of employment is not enough to engender larger societal trust and optimism. Rather it may be contact, education, or some other confounding variable coupled with employment enabling these social values. Alternatively, employment may not immediately provide such benefits, requiring time to foster such trust and optimism, which may later affect civic values.

Regarding the effect of employment on these potential mechanisms, when participants were ‘employed,’ group pride was significantly increased by 23% and closeness by 10% on average (see Figure 3.4). These patterns reveal when individuals were treated as employees, they felt prouder and closer to their arbitrary group than when individuals were treated as unemployed. In other words, the mere act of employment significantly improved one’s sense of belonging to and pride in one’s group. This is particularly astounding given individuals had no opportunity to speak to, see, or interact with any other members of their supposed group and the only indication of their group membership was a letter; A. The implications of this finding are enormous when directed to the more visible and interactive civic group identification. The results regarding personal optimism, however, were mixed. Specifically, the results revealed no significant main effect but heterogeneous treatment effects whereby the effect of employment on optimism is greater for migrants than for natives.\(^83\) Thus the relationship between the two may be hidden due to birth origin.

\(^{83}\) Marginal effect: 0.486, \(p<.001\).
### Table 3.3. Employment Condition and Proposed Belonging Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>DV: Group Closeness</th>
<th>VII: Group Pride</th>
<th>DV: Social Trust</th>
<th>VII: Governmental Trust</th>
<th>VII: Personal Optimism</th>
<th>VII: Governmental Optimism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>0.100*</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.261***</td>
<td>0.424***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-born</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>0.166*</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native X</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>-0.295**</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>0.166*</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.358***</td>
<td>0.395***</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.153*</td>
<td>0.875***</td>
<td>0.882***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors.

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.
To complete testing of hypothesis 2, I analyze additional OLS estimates, predicting civic values by these potential mechanisms and interacted with the employment condition. As evidenced in Table 3.4, there are no significant interactions between any of the proposed mechanisms and employment in producing civic values. These null findings suggest some other, non-measured component of employment is the driving force in the relationship between employment and civic values. What is interesting, however, is once controlling for group pride, employment significantly predicts civic value attainment across all migrants. This finding again implies the study may be underpowered therefore requiring a larger participant sample to uncover these relationships.

Figure 3.4. Group Attitudinal Mean Differences by Experimental Condition
Table 3.4. Freedom of Speech by Employment Condition and Proposed Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment Condition</td>
<td>0.634*</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.296)</td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group pride</td>
<td>-0.250</td>
<td>-0.240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.388)</td>
<td>(0.665)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group closeness</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.585</td>
<td>-0.700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.432)</td>
<td>(0.659)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Optimism</td>
<td>-0.577</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.078**</td>
<td>-1.016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.848)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.395)</td>
<td>(0.554)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride X Condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.795)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness X Condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.881)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimism X Condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.795)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.779***</td>
<td>3.373***</td>
<td>3.885***</td>
<td>3.403***</td>
<td>4.242***</td>
<td>3.579***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td>(0.225)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.215)</td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R^2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>502.178</td>
<td>500.543</td>
<td>520.779</td>
<td>522.403</td>
<td>552.792</td>
<td>555.778</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors. Interaction terms mean centered.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.000.

Finally, participants may react to the employment condition differently, producing heterogeneous treatment effects as predicted by hypothesis 3. I test for this possibility, running a series of interactive models including covariates theoretically most likely to produce varied treatment effects: nativity, gender, and employment status (shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 above). Neither the civic values (i.e., Table 3.2) nor the group closeness (i.e., Models 1-2 in Table 3.3) reveal any heterogeneous effects insinuating the effect of the employment condition is constant.

---

84 Each model includes only one interaction term to prevent uncertainty due to multi-collinearity. Further, only these three covariates are modeled here to avoid concerns of downwardly biased standard errors and uncertainty introduced when covariates are continuous (Green & Kern 2012).
across variation in birth origin, gender, and actual employment status. For group pride and personal economic optimism, however, the interaction between nativity and employment is significant suggesting the effect of the experimental prime varies by migrant status (Models 3-4 in Table 3.3). Put another way, we can reject the null hypothesis that the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) is identical for migrants and natives ($p<.01$). Figure 3.5 below represents these CATEs of employment across nativity and their respective 95% confidence intervals for both personal optimism and group pride. The solid red line indicates the null threshold or where employment would appear should it have no impact on reported group pride or optimism. As seen here, there appears to be some moderation of the employment treatment effect with slightly larger effect sizes for migrants ($p<.001$) than for native-born participants ($p<.05$) for group pride. Comparing across CATEs, employment for migrants increases group pride on average by 42% while the same treatment for natives only increase group pride by 13% on average- a change of nearly 30 percentage points. With respect to personal economic optimism, employment’s effect is only present for migrants. Hence while the effect of employment on facilitating civic value adoption does not vary by migrant status, other potential components valuable to civil society do, implying employment operates different for migrants than for natives.

**Robustness.** A skeptical eye may question whether the observed pattern of results for is actually a result of the random treatment or rather due to random chance. Further with respect to the null finding for all participants in civic value attainment, a closer look at the probability of obtaining such a sample by chance alone will help determine whether the effect of employment is in fact non-existent or whether its role may simply require a larger sample. To test for this

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85 With respect to civic values, however, it should be noted there is a significant relationship for natives but not for foreign-born participants. This again may indicate the study is underpowered specifically for migrants.
potential, I use the logic of Fisher’s exact test as used to examine the sharp null of no effect. This process requires several steps. First, I conduct a simulation reshuffling the treatment conditions (i.e., employed, unemployed) among participants at random, while maintaining their reported civic integration ratings. I then analyze the mean differences for each dependent variable between the newly randomly assigned groups for each randomization for a total of 100,000 replications. The resulting distributions indicate the null distribution, or the pattern of the data should the true mean differences between these populations be zero. Finally, I compare the observed mean difference and their respective statistics to these distributions to determine the likelihood of obtaining these figures should the true population represent the null distribution. Put simply, this randomization allows an indication of the probability the observed patterns between employment and civic integration is merely an artifact of random chance.

Looking first at group pride, the null distribution is clearly fairly tightly dispersed, with the bulk of the mean difference estimates lying between -4% and +4% (see Figure 3.6 below). Similarly, the density and frequency of the t statistics are relatively normally distributed around zero. In each distribution, the experimentally observed values are represented with the red line. Following these histograms, it is clear the observed estimates are extremely unlikely to be due to chance alone. First comparing the ATE, reflected by mean differences here, the original experiment observed an average 23% increase in reported group pride when participants were employed as opposed to unemployed. Even in the most extreme estimates of the randomized null distribution only reaches a 7% increase or a 6% decrease at the tails. Further matching the observed t statistic yields a nearly zero probability of obtaining an estimate at or above the observed level (i.e., \( t(175.49) = 4.61 \)) should there be no actual difference between the two
Figure 3.6. Randomization Distributions for Group Pride and the Experimental Condition conditions. Hence, we can reject the null hypothesis that the observed ATE is due to chance alone implying employment facilitated real improvements in reported group pride.

Much like the randomized null distributions for group pride, those for group closeness are both randomly distributed around zero with the vast majority of the ATE estimates occurring between -5% and 5% (Figure 3.7). Even despite a relatively smaller ATE on proximity as compared to pride (e.g., 10% compared to 23%), employment’s effect and respective t statistic ($t(173.04) = 2.07$) far exceed the grasp of the null distribution. Again, the probability of obtaining these values should the ATE be zero is nearly impossible (i.e., $p<.0000001$). Hence, we can be relatively confident these estimates are not due to random chance but instead reflect
employment’s empowering role in facilitating closeness to one’s group, an increase residing somewhere between five and 19% (i.e., 95% CI). And while the final component of civic integration, respect for civic principles, did not reach significance with the observed sample, randomization further suggests the ATE may be underpowered revealing a probability of 0.0003 of perceiving the observed estimates should there be no true differences between the two conditions.\(^86\) Taken as a whole, these results provide strong evidence employment is the core mechanism in producing measurable change in group belonging and may further impact civic values among a larger sample.\(^87\)

\[\text{Figure 3.7. Randomization Distributions for Group Closeness and the Experimental Condition}\]

\(^{86}\) See Appendix D for these distributions.
\(^{87}\) The current survey is still in the field to collect additional data in hopes to more acutely assess the ATE on these civic components.
Finally, I examine an alternative integration component as another possible element of the integration experience and hence potentially impacted by employment: political engagement. Although, previous research suggests political integration is also downstream from economic integration via employment (Alarian 2017b), its impact may be to a lesser degree than civic integration and hence may not necessarily represent measureable changes as a result of the employment manipulation. To test this alternative hypothesis, I compare the ATE for two political integration dependent variables: political participation and political discussion. The former is constructed as an additive scale of political activities an individual would consider taking to improve things in one’s group or to help prevent things from going wrong including: contacting a political, government, or local government official, working in a political party or action group, working in another organization or association, wearing or displaying a campaign badge/sticker, signing a petition, taking part in a lawful demonstration, or boycotting certain products. This scale hence ranges from zero to seven, reflecting the number of political activities a respondent indicated they would consider taking.\footnote{Response options included Yes (1) or No (0).} A second political indicator measured political discussion asking participants how often they spoke about political issues with family, friends, and co-workers with response options ranging from never (0) to very often (1).\footnote{Other response options included rarely (.25), sometimes (.5), and often (.75).}

Regarding this alternative hypothesis, neither political participation ($p=0.92$) nor political discussion ($p=0.17$) appears impacted by employment.\footnote{See Appendix A for these regression coefficients.} A check for the homogeneity of the treatment effect across migrant status, gender, and current employment similarly reveal no significant average treatment effects of employment or across these covariates. Similarly breaking up the political participation additive scale by each political action does not reveal any significant ATE of employment for any of the seven actions. The null finding in addition to the
civic belonging findings above supports previous research indicating employment is crucial civic belonging while its effects on political integration may operate through an alternative mechanism (Alarian 2017b).

Conclusion

Social cohesion and civil solidarity in the United States, and democracies globally, will largely depend on the civic incorporation of their migrant populations. While civic integration through identification may be one component to this goal, its fulfillment may invoke more costs than benefits, however, when these societies are ethnically diverse. To prevent widening societal cleavages, these democracies and the United States in particular thus must address civic integration as a matter of value and principles. Through two studies, I examine this value component of civic integration, finding evidence employment enhances support for a crucial American principle invoking values of autonomy and liberty. I find evidence employment enhances support for civic principles for migrants over time (study one), and causally for natives in the United States (study two). And while employment failed to significantly vary support for civic principles in this second study as a whole, employment did predict civic ideals for native-born populations and randomization simulations demonstrate the effect may require larger sample to reveal its impact.

Unfortunately, the precise mechanism through which employment establishes civic values remains hidden as neither trust throughout society, belonging, nor optimism could be linked by both the experimental condition of employment and civic values. While these mechanisms remain unseen, the evidence suggests employment through components of social belonging, group pride and closeness, may require time to blossom to alter individual civic
values. Further, comparison of employment’s role across birth origins indicates employment is particularly crucial for migrants in establishing deeper social connections and promoting personal economic optimism, providing additional avenues of research whereby employment may be more valuable to migrants than natives overall. Should these variables truly provide mechanisms through which employment affects civic values over time, the gains for migrants as opposed to native-born civic engagement may thus be larger when employment is obtained.

These findings also speak to new literature detailing the value of economic integration and employment in facilitating civic integration. This study demonstrates there may be similarities in the ways in which employment produces civic values, revealing employment as a unique and vital facet to holistic civic integration. These findings in the United States also show migrants behave similarly across a variety of political and market arrangements. The implications of these results provide immediate policy implications for practitioners and policymakers internationally, regardless of migration flow, ethnic-compositions, or political economic systems. Further, while arbitrary group membership is clearly not equivalent to the norms, attachments, and implications of belonging, findings from this study provide only conservative estimates of immigrant economic integration impact on civic engagement and belonging. Therefore, the effect of employment in promoting civic value attachments through social belonging is expected to be even larger when the method of employment and attachment are more visible.

This study also provides implications to scholars of civil society with respect to native populations and social solidarity in addition to migrant civic value incorporation. As observed in study two, natives in particular experienced significant uptakes in civic value attachment, implying a solution for deteriorating civic pride across the United States as one that addresses
labor market attainment of natives and migrants alike. The strength in the methodology further demonstrates this finding as a clear, causal link between employment and civic values integration, imploring states to seriously consider the non-economic byproducts to civil society provided by employment. Moreover, given the causal role of employment, states with depreciating economies may soon experience the greatest declines in civic values and hence overall social solidarity. The continued success of anti-democratic and far-right political parties may similarly occur more frequently in locations where employment is low, bringing with it a population with diminished civic and democratic values. Provided the impact of unemployment can persist throughout one’s life, if these trends persist states may soon find themselves in the midst of democratic and civil solidarity crisis, lasting generations. Thus, these findings require a renewed and invested interest in the early economic experiences to promote harmonious, active, and vibrant civil societies for natives, migrants, and democratic institutions.
REFERENCES


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Huff, Conner, & Tingley, Dustin. 2015. “Who are these people?” Evaluating the demographic characteristics and political preferences of MTurk survey respondents. Research & Politics, 2(3), 2053168015604648.


### Appendix A.1. Political Participation Model Comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Political Integration</th>
<th>Non-citizen Migrants</th>
<th>Citizen Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>0.065*</td>
<td>0.052*</td>
<td>0.069**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>0.513***</td>
<td>0.514***</td>
<td>0.605***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>0.125**</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.124***</td>
<td>0.051*</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔR²</td>
<td>+0.26</td>
<td>+0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors. All IVs measured at time 1.

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.
Appendix B. Countries by Labor Recruitment Programs and Average Skill Recruitment

![Plot of Skill-level Recruitment Policy by Number of Labor Recruitment Policies](image-url)
Appendix C. Experimental Survey

Q2.1 Are you a legal resident or citizen of the United States?
☐ Yes
☐ No

Q2.2 Are you at least 18 years or older?
☐ Yes
☐ No

Q2.3 Do you speak English?
☐ Yes
☐ No

Q2.4 Were you born in the United States?
☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Don't know

Q2.5 If no, in what country were you born?

Q2.6 Are you a citizen of the United States?
☐ Yes
☐ No

Q2.7 If no, what citizenship do you hold?

Q2.8 What year were you born?

Q3.1 You are assigned to group A with six other study participants. Within this group, there are unemployed and employed members. You are employed. Below you are presented three (3) different tasks. You will have three (3) minutes to complete each task. All employed group members will have the possibility to receive an additional income reward as a result of accuracy and speed of task completion overall. All unemployed group members will not be eligible for this income award. Instead, as a result of accuracy and speed of task completion overall, unemployed members may be asked back for an ability to earn an income award at a later date. At the conclusion of these tasks, your group will voice opinions on your group (group A) relative to other participant groups B, C, and D.

Q3.2 Are you eligible for the income award?
☐ Yes, I am an employed group member
☐ No, I am an unemployed group member
Q3.3 Which group are you assigned?
- A
- B
- C
- D

Q4.1 You are assigned to group A with six other study participants. Within this group, there are unemployed and employed members. You are unemployed. Below you are presented three (3) different tasks. You will have three (3) minutes to complete each task. All employed group members will have the possibility to receive an additional income reward as a result of accuracy and speed of task completion overall. All unemployed group members will not be eligible for this income award. Instead, as a result of accuracy and speed of task completion overall, unemployed members may be asked back for an ability to earn an income award at a later date. At the conclusion of these tasks, your group will voice opinions on your group (group A) relative to other participant groups B, C, and D.

Q4.2 Are you eligible for the income award?
- Yes, I am an employed group member
- No, I am an unemployed group member

Q4.3 Which group are you assigned?
- A
- B
- C
- D

Q5.1 You will now be presented three (3) different tasks. You will have three (3) minutes to complete each task. After three (3) minutes, you will automatically be sent to the next task. If you finish early, you may click the arrow to move to the next task. Click the arrow below when you are ready to begin the first task.
Q6.2 Identifier Task. Please identify the number of dashes and dots present within each string below. For example: .. -- .. contains 2 dashes and 4 dots.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>String</th>
<th>Dashes</th>
<th>Dots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.. --- ..</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. -- ..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. . .. .</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . . . . .</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . . . . . . .</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . . . . . . . . .</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
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</table>
Q7.2 Alphabetical Task. Please sort all letter strings that are in alphabetical order. For example: belpux

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alphabetical String</th>
<th>Non-Alphabetical String</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>_____ wfhudi</td>
<td>_____ wfhudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ degivz</td>
<td>_____ degivz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ tfdqwo</td>
<td>_____ tfdqwo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ flnqow</td>
<td>_____ flnqow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ amovuy</td>
<td>_____ amovuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ cfgjnt</td>
<td>_____ cfgjnt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ adbonx</td>
<td>_____ adbonx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q8.2 Number search Task. Please indicate the amount of times a given number exists across a number string. For example: Five appears once in 57632

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Times Present</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Two:</td>
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<tr>
<td>One:</td>
<td>237972</td>
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<td>Three:</td>
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<td>Seven:</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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Q9.1 Thank you for your work. As an employed group member, you are eligible for a bonus income based on your and your fellow employed group member performances. Unemployed group member performance will not impact your income reward. We would now like to ask you a few questions about your attitudes toward your group and society. The answers to these questions will not impact your or your fellow group members’ potential for an income award. Please answer the following questions as truthfully as possible.

Q9.2 Thank you for your work. As an unemployed group member, you are not eligible for a bonus income. Your performance will not impact the income reward of your fellow employed group
members. As a result of your performance, you may be asked back for a chance to earn an income reward at a later date. We would now like to ask you a few questions about your attitudes toward your group and society. The answers to these questions will not impact your fellow group members' potential for an income award. Please answer the following questions as truthfully as possible.

Q10.1 How close do you feel to your group? Do you feel that you are...
- Not at all close
- Not close
- Quite close
- Very close
- Don't know

Q10.2 How proud are you to be part of your group?
- Not very proud
- Somewhat proud
- Very proud
- Extremely proud
- Don't know

Q10.3 Generally speaking, would you say that most people in your group can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people in your group can be trusted.

______ Group Trust

Q10.4 Do you feel you can trust most your group members, some group members, or no group members?
- No group members
- Some group members
- Most group members
- Don’t know

Q10.5 Do you think that most people in your group would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?

______ Group fairness

Q10.6 Would you say that most of the time people in your group would try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?

______ Group helpful
Q10.7 There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion . . . If such a person wanted to make a speech to your (city/town/community) against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak, or not?
   ☐ Allowed
   ☐ Not allowed
   ☐ Don't know

Q10.8 Or consider a person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior... If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that Blacks are inferior, should he be allowed to speak, or not?
   ☐ Allowed
   ☐ Not allowed
   ☐ Don't know

Q10.9 Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?
   ☐ Allowed
   ☐ Not allowed
   ☐ Don't know

Q10.10 Consider a person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community, should he be allowed to speak, or not?
   ☐ Allowed
   ☐ Not allowed
   ☐ Don't know

Q10.11 And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual? Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?
   ☐ Allowed
   ☐ Not allowed
   ☐ Don't know

Q11.1 There are different ways of trying to improve things in your group or help prevent things from going wrong. Which of the following activities would you consider, if any, taking? Would you… Contact a politician, government or local government official?
   ☐ Yes
   ☐ No
   ☐ Don't know
Q11.2 Work in a political party or action group?
   ☐ Yes
   ☐ No
   ☐ Don't know

Q11.3 Work in another organization or association?
   ☐ Yes
   ☐ No
   ☐ Don't know

Q11.4 Wear or display a campaign badge/sticker?
   ☐ Yes
   ☐ No
   ☐ Don't know

Q11.5 Sign a petition?
   ☐ Yes
   ☐ No
   ☐ Don't know

Q11.6 Take part in a lawful demonstration?
   ☐ Yes
   ☐ No
   ☐ Don't know

Q11.7 Boycott certain products?
   ☐ Yes
   ☐ No
   ☐ Don't know

Q11.8 It is critical for our study to ensure that people are reading the questions carefully. To show that you have been reading the text, please check only the boxes “yellow” and “brown” in responding to the question below, no matter what your true answers would be. Which of the following are your favorite colors (check as many as apply)?
   ☐ Red
   ☐ Blue
   ☐ Yellow
   ☐ Brown
   ☐ Black
   ☐ Purple
   ☐ Green
Q12.1 Were either of your parents born in the United States?
- Both parents born in US
- Mother yes, father no
- Mother no, father yes
- Mother yes, father don’t know
- Mother no, father don’t know
- Mother don’t know, father yes
- Mother don’t know, father don’t know
- Neither born in US
- Don’t know either parent country of birth

Q12.2 Would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse?
- Gotten better
- Stayed the same
- Gotten worse
- Don't know

Q12.3 Would you say that over the past year that you and your family living with you are better off, stayed the same, or worse off, financially?
- Better off
- Stayed the same
- Worse off
- Don't know

Q12.4 How much do you trust the national government to do what is right?
- Almost never
- Some of the time
- Most of the time
- Almost always

Q13.1 Please select your sex
- Male
- Female

Q13.2 Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino(a)?
- Yes
- No
- Don't know
Q13.3 What is your race? Indicate one or more races that you consider yourself to be.
- White
- Black or African American
- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian Indian
- Chinese
- Filipino
- Japanese
- Korean
- Vietnamese
- Other Asian
- Native Hawaiian
- Guamanian or Chamorro
- Samoan
- Other Pacific Islander
- Some other race
- Don't know

Q13.4 You selected other. What race do you consider yourself to be?

Q13.5 Which of these descriptions comes closest to the type of place you are currently living?
- Open country but not on a farm
- Farm
- Small city or town (under 50,000)
- Medium-size city (50,000-250,000)
- Suburb near large city
- Large city (over 250,000)
- Don’t know

Q13.6 What is your marital status?
- Married
- Widowed
- Divorced
- Separated
- Never married
Q13.7 What is the highest grade you finished and received credit for?
- No formal schooling
- 1st grade
- 2nd grade
- 3rd grade
- 4th grade
- 5th grade
- 6th grade
- 7th grade
- 8th grade
- 9th grade
- 10th grade
- 11th grade
- 12th grade
- One year of college
- Two years of college
- Three years of college
- Four years of college
- Postgraduate study
- Don't know

Q13.8 What religion do you identify with?
- Protestant
- Catholic
- Jewish
- Islam
- No religion
- Other religion

Q13.9 How often do you attend religious services?
- Never
- Less than once a year
- About once or twice a year
- Several times a year
- About once a month
- Two to three times a month
- Nearly every week
- Every week
- Several times a week
- Don't know
Q13.10 In which of these groups did your total family incomes, from all sources, fall last year before taxes,
- Under $10,000
- $10,000 - $29,999
- $30,000 - $39,999
- $40,000 - $49,999
- $50,000 - $59,999
- $60,000 - $69,999
- $70,000 - $79,999
- $80,000 - $89,999
- $90,000 - $99,999
- $100,000 - $149,999
- $150,000 - $199,999
- $200,000 - $249,999
- $250,000 or over
- Don't know

Q13.11 Which of these descriptions best applies to what you have been doing for the last month?
- Working full-time
- Working part-time
- With a job, but not at work because of temporary illness, vacation, strike, etc.
- Unemployed, laid off, looking for work
- Retired
- In school
- Keeping house
- Other

Q13.12 What is your occupation/industry?

Q13.13 Do you belong to a minority ethnic group?
- Yes
- No
- Don't know

Q13.14 Which ethnic group?

Q13.15 How often do you talk about political issues with family, friends, and co-workers?
- Never
- Rarely
- Sometimes
- Often
- Very often
Q13.16 Did you vote in the last federal election in November 2016?
- Yes
- No
- Not eligible to vote
- Don't know

Q13.17 Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as ...
- Strongly Democrat
- Not very strong Democrat
- Independent close to Democrat
- Independent (neither)
- Independent, close to Republican
- Not very strong Republican
- Strong Republican

Q13.18 Next you will see a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
- Extremely Liberal
- Liberal
- Slightly Liberal
- Moderate, middle of the road
- Slightly Conservative
- Conservative
- Extremely Conservative
- Don't know
Appendix D. Political Integration by Employment Condition

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Unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors.
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.