Increasing State Capacity Through Clans

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Increasing State Capacity Through Clans

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Thomas Martin Doyle

December 2009

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I give credit to all these amazing people for the positive elements of this work and accept responsibility for all its weaknesses.
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Increasing State Capacity Through Clans

by

Thomas Martin Doyle

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science
University of California, Riverside, December 2009
Dr. Shaun Bowler, Chairperson

State governance based on a clan system lacks definition in the early days of the twenty-first century. This dissertation seeks to explore the structures and functions of the clan system in the Republic of Azerbaijan. This requires examination of the formal and informal institutions using a cross-disciplinary mixed methods approach to capture the complexities present. Particular emphasis focuses on the local level clan ties to the Milli Majlis (National Assembly) as expression of citizens’ voice in the political decision-making process. Field interviews reveal a bottom-up system with horizontal rather than vertical structures resulting in a dynamic parochial political culture.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements............................................................................................iv
Abstract..................................................................................................................v
Table of Contents.................................................................................................vi
List of Tables..........................................................................................................vii
List of Figures.........................................................................................................viii

CHAPTER 1 Introduction.........................................................................................1

CHAPTER 2 The role of informal networks in increasing state capacity.................9

CHAPTER 3 Research Methods and Methodological Approach............................44

CHAPTER 4 Timeframe 1 October 1991 – June 1993...........................................59

CHAPTER 5 Timeframe 2 June 1993 – November 1995.......................................79

CONCLUSION......................................................................................................117

APPENDICES

Appendix 3A........................................................................................................120
Appendix 3B........................................................................................................124
Appendix 5A........................................................................................................126
Appendix 5B........................................................................................................129
Appendix 5C........................................................................................................130
Appendix 5D........................................................................................................133
List of Tables

Chapter 2
Table 2.1 Hypothesis.................................................................33
Table 2.2 Outcome of strong clan ties to state........................................37

Chapter 3
Table 3.4.1 Indicators of increasing state capacity in Azerbaijan present in T1........52

Chapter 4
Table 4.5 Indicators of increasing state capacity in Azerbaijan present in T2............75

Chapter 5
Table 5.6 Number of increasing state capacity indicators present in T1 and T2........112

Conclusion
Table 6.1 Number of increasing state capacity indicators present in T1 and T2........117
Table 6.2 Short-term outcomes of clan ties to the state.................................118
List of Figures

Chapter 5 Figure 5.1 Network graph of Azerbaijan National Assembly November 1995.................................................................101
Figure 5.2 Clan/political party representation map of Azerbaijan National Assembly November 1995.........................................................105
Figure 5.3 Google Earth map of Azerbaijan with gridlines..........................106
Figure 5.4 Azerbaijan voting district map November 1995........................108
Figure 5.5 Azerbaijan clan dispersion map November 1995......................109
Chapter 1: Preface

“...a state... is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life”.

Aristotle

Aristotle’s definition of a state aimed at a perfect life may seem overly ambitious or idealistic in the early years of the twenty-first century. Yet there can be little doubt that states are comprised of aggregations of families. The city-state of Aristotle’s time has given way, in large part, to nation states and families as later defined by Aristotle have changed in many aspects.

Numerous examples of “state” suggest that long-term family based states are given to elements of political patronage. Words like nepotism, cronyism or spoils system are often used in the same context. The word “corruption” is often associated with these governments. Short-term beneficial effects of family centric states are noticeably absent from mainstream studies of political behavior in nascent countries.

The story presented in this dissertation is one of short-term benefits of extended family ties benefiting a new state in a nascent country. In the absence of properly functioning formal political institutions and organizations there may be few options but for a state leader to call upon trusted family members to fill critical political roles to prevent failed state status.

Increasing state capacity through family ties is not a new concept. In the United States (U.S.) the Pendleton Act was a major step aimed at ending patronage by establishing the Civil Service Commission in 1883. Cronyism was common for the first 100 years of U.S. history. Joseph Stalin employed patronage in the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) in an effort to cement his position as leader of the USSR during the late 1920s.

Certainly, the logic of political patronage is an understood part of state behavior. There are negative connotations associated with nepotism and justifiably so. In limited circumstances, however, patronage may be a short cut to establishing some measure of short-term “breathing space” during which state capacity may be strengthened in socially and/or politically acceptable ways.

The study of newly formed countries receives wide attention within the discipline of political science. This academic quest for understanding often leads to shifts in foreign policy of other countries by those policy makers in political office. Analysis of state level formal structures and functions of governmental institutions and organizations makes any number of assumptions void of extensive research of informal sub national communities within the new countries.

Essential characteristics of national political behavior often begin at the local level. Whether rural or urban small communities within a new country can have great impact on a centralized state. In countries with existing informal social networks and the absence of adequately functioning centralized infrastructure these local communities become the de facto state. For short periods of time transition from one form of governance to another can be accelerated by proper utilization of these networks of social interaction.

The main body of existing literature in political science identifies reliance on these small communities of family members as some form of nepotism and as such
represents corruption. Little emphasis is placed on the possibility that extended family networks may actually be the norm in some new countries and increasing the capacity of the state to govern effectively may be a byproduct of these institutions.

What occurs in the short-term as a result of some form of patronage, nepotism, or cronyism has yet to receive much attention. What benefits are there in the short-term, if any? If a state leader does employ family members and their respective contacts is there benefit to the state and citizens of the country? Does state capacity increase or decrease in the short-term because of incorporating hundreds or thousands of kinship communities and their networks of interaction with other kinship groups? These and related questions become the focus of this dissertation.

This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic of increased state capacity through proper utilization of extended families (clans). Chapter 2 explores existing literature concerning state capacity and clans with a specific focus on operationalizing the argument at hand. Chapter 3 examines a cross disciplinary approach to the methodology required in presentation of qualitative and quantitative results. Two case studies are presented in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 scrutinizes decreasing state capacity void of clan involvement. Chapter 5 inspects increasing state capacity within the same country and offers one possible conclusion.

Chapter 1 introduces the concept of early state struggles in the immediate aftermath of colonial experience to cope with any number of challenges. Most important of these is increasing state capacity in order to provide the nascent country’s citizens with suitable goods and services.
Chapter 2 reviews existing literature regarding divergent goals of state and citizens but shifts emphasis toward convergence of common interests between centralized state organizations and highly decentralized kinship groups found even in remote villages. Chapter 2 also introduces the theoretical underpinnings of the argument and baseline definitions used throughout this project.

Chapter 3 explores the research design and methodological approaches necessary to capture certain portions of the complexity inherent with social networks. These mixed methods tools are used to argue that there are instances involving these highly decentralized kinship groups may be beneficial to increasing state capacity in the short-term. By mixing qualitative and quantitative methods, the rich description of the state and clan interactions is captured in a meaningful fashion suitable to formal network analysis.

Chapter 4 examines a brief timeframe in a new country where path dependency on the former system fails. The first two leaders of the new country failed to involve clans (extended family groups) with centralized state organization. Exclusion of these highly decentralized clans led to near-state failure. Six indicators of increasing state capacity are used to study the effects of weak clan ties to the state. In Chapter 4, five of the six indicators are absent.

Chapter 5 focuses on an equally brief timeframe immediately following the first period where a different approach is used. In this second timeframe, the same six indicators of increasing state capacity are used as found in Chapter 4. However, in Chapter 5 the reader sees a reversal of state capacity. The reader now sees the involvement of a large number of highly decentralized kinship groups in a complex
network of interactions, with the new state. In this chapter evidence is introduced to support the claim of increasing state capacity linked with extended families. Chapter 5 also finds that there are a limited number of cases in which the involvement of highly decentralized kinships can have beneficial impact on increasing state capacity in the short-term.

1.1 Brief history of Azerbaijan clans’ importance

The Republic of Azerbaijan is one of fifteen republics emerging from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as centralized control weakened in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Geographically located between Russia to the north and Iran to the south, Azerbaijan has long been viewed as a buffer zone by both of these larger countries. Abundant oil along Azerbaijan’s coastal areas is the prime natural resource making this small country subject to repeated conquests through recent years.

Mountainous terrain covers most of this country providing natural barriers to some forms of military domination but these same barriers also provide refuge to local citizens (Boehm, 1984, 1993). The refuge area warriors referred to by Boehm are a quiet simple people in the mountainous Azerbaijan given to rural agricultural enterprise focused on subsistence farming for economic survival.

For these rural farming communities, extended family is the focus of social life slowly replacing tribal and khanate values of centuries past. As the transhumance nomadic traditions of the conquering Mongols and Central Asian “Turks” slowly gave way to pastoral nomadic norms, complex networks evolved. These farming people used
these networks to reach local trade arrangements within the geographic space today known as Azerbaijan.

As power in Tehran weakened in the early nineteenth century, power in Moscow strengthened such that Azerbaijan became part of Russia in 1828. The social norms present remained as a network to reduce transactions cost for the rural mountain dwellers while the Russian viceroys appointed by the Tsar in far away St. Petersburg rushed to develop the petroleum industry along coastal areas.

These complex networks of social interaction remained in place during Soviet years despite Moscow’s efforts to weaken localized values in favor of the creation of the “Soviet man”. For almost seventy years, the central planned economy associated with centralized control in Moscow failed to replace local social, economic, and political norms of Azerbaijan’s rural parochial population.

When the Soviet structure failed in the early 1990s local rural Azerbaijanis gave little notice since their long-standing focus on extended family networks remained intact. War, secession, and a failing economic disaster in Moscow forced these peaceful people to insist on changes within their new state leaders to mitigate the effects of raid transition from one system of governance to another.

This dissertation explores the why and how of a brief transition in Azerbaijani history with an eye to political behavior of thousands of extended families (clans). In the early days of independence from Soviet rule, the absence of clan involvement with the state leads to near-state failure. This brief period is immediately followed by the presence of strong clan involvement with the state resulting in increased state capacity.
The project at hand does not extend over the entire eighteen years of recent Azerbaijan’s independence. It is narrowly focused on the four years from 1991 to 1995. It is during these four years of transition that clan influence becomes critical to the survival of this nascent country.

1.2 Note on transliteration and alphabet usage

The American version of the English 26 character alphabet is used throughout the body of this dissertation in an attempt to avoid difficulties with transliteration. A few words in italics are inserted from the Azeri language but have been converted to the same 26-character alphabet.¹ This dissertation has quotations from other writers using slightly different spellings of Azerbaijani names and places. Efforts have been made to footnote each of these alternate spellings.

¹ The Azeri Latin alphabet typically has 32 characters. Because of this, there are multiple spellings for the names of people and locales presented in this dissertation.
Bibliography


Chapter 2: Networks, informal systems, and their role in increasing state capacity

With the decline of central control in the waning days of the USSR, major assumptions evolved in post Soviet literature about its effects on various societies it had incorporated. These assumptions, often made in haste, tended to ignore distinctive characteristics of the specific societies present in the newly independent emerging countries. Assumptions considered here focus on state capacity and the associated discussions of state autonomy and state embeddedness elements of state capacity during the transition from one form of governance to another.

This chapter lays out some of the arguments in the existing literature and presents my theoretical framework to arrive at very different findings and conclusions from those already in print. This chapter seeks to address literature on state capacity in the context of political transition with the hypothesis based on an understanding that there are instances where the state and society are not neatly separated, but rather are embedded in one another and also serve as political agents. The chapter is organized in four sections.

Section 2.1 establishes baseline definitions of concepts that are relevant throughout the body of this dissertation. Section 2.2 reviews existing literature in four subsections (state capacity, Soviet legacy, clans, and alternative explanations) and places my theory within the existing framework. Section 2.2 also operationalizes the argument at hand. Section 2.3 concludes this chapter.
2.1 Definitions

*State capacity refers to the ability of the perceived legitimate organs of governance within a country to control that country*. This perception of legitimacy may vary. Citizens within the country may view the state as being representative of their interests while members of the international community may not share this observation. Likewise, one could expect to see variance within the new country as to which branches of government are lawful and which departments are not legal.

Country means the geophysical space within internationally recognized borders. The ability of the state to govern the country depends on the establishment of rules and regulations enforced by different departments, acceptance of these rules and regulations by the citizens of the state, and/or sufficient power to enforce them when the country’s citizens may not correspond to the same perception of rules and regulations.

Formal institutions are those generally associated with central state governance – executive, legislative, and judicial branches plus their associated bureaucracies. The rules of these institutions usually celebrate enumeration in some written format.

Informal institutions are norms accepted by the majority of the citizens of a country as necessary to constrain social, economic, political, and/or religious behavior. Like formal institutions, informal institutions evolve over time. The informal institutions may be perceived by the majority of the citizens as legitimate but lack transparency to those people outside this system. One should anticipate that these informal institutions

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may be highly decentralized and in need of centralization to facilitate common goals for a country to become legitimate in the eyes of the United Nations or other intergovernmental organizations. In a transition period, some or most formal state institutions may have fallen by the wayside leaving only informal institutions with which to constrain a state and govern a country (Collins, 2002, pg. 142).

The emphasis on transition period is central to this study. This author holds “transition period” to be a brief historical stage during which “transformation” may or may not take root. It is conceivable that this transition period could vary its long-term outcomes depending upon various preconditions, the activities of various agents, as well as available resources. For purposes here, “transition period” is a timeframe; “transformation” is a process of political and social change. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to adequately discuss these two terms, nor is it the focus.

Clans constitute an extended family community whose members are related by birth and/or marriage and whose unity is established by belief in one or more common core ancestors. Clans may or may not own land according to laws governing private ownership of land in their respective countries. Clans do exert some level of control over real property perceived as “belonging” to the clan over an extended timeframe. Some thus have significant resources (Popkin, 1980, pg. 411).
2.2 Literature

2.2.1 State capacity, state autonomy, and state embeddedness

The work presented here views state autonomy and state embeddedness as elements of state capacity. Presentation of literature is ordered accordingly. The arguments of these authors regarding state capacity thus envision some type of society-state interaction as significant to the study of state capacity and autonomy in new countries. The collective weakness of this set of studies is the failure to link any one of the mentioned societal communities to state success. Nor is there noteworthy evidence presented in the authors’ case studies as to the role of informal social networks in a transition period.

Migdal argues “…the organization of society, even in remote areas, may dictate the character and capabilities of politics at the center, as well as how the state (often in unintended ways) changes society” (Migdal, 1988, p.xvii). He foresees conflict between society and state to the degree that the state as such may be unable to establish autonomy from society. My view, though somewhat different, builds on Migdal and follows shortly. Migdal further notes:

“These struggles are over whether the state will be able to displace or harness other organizations – families, clans, multinational corporations, domestic enterprises, tribes, patron-client dyads – which make rules against the wishes of state leaders” (p.31).

To his credit, Migdal addresses an important challenge to new state leadership. However, what is missing from this work is a specified and clear appreciation for the difference in various forms of organizational structure and function. There are six types of organizations mentioned in the quote above yet there are no clearly defined statements of
the inherent differences or how they influence the state differently, or at different times, or at different levels.

Migdal later carries certain aspects of this thought process further. “In the contemporary Third World, significant state autonomy and state capacity – so glibly, perhaps teleologically, assumed and expected by some theorists – have not been assured outcomes at all” (Migdal, 1994, p. 11). In later work, Migdal expands this theme by challenging Weber’s definition of “state”:

“The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts” (Migdal, 2001, p. 15).

Migdal clarifies his criticism further by telling the reader that the image is about the perception of an “autonomous entity” (p.18) and that the relevant practices are those of the “…routine performance of state actors and agencies” (p.19). His goal is to emphasize actuality, as it operates through practice (p.19).

By expanding the definition and view of “state” Migdal opens the possibility that in the early days of state formation or in transitions, the state may not be some formal central authoritative constant but rather found somewhere on a continuum with non state forms of governance. In certain kinds of societies, other forms of structure may supplant or even replace state authority. Following that thought process; an informal network could form the basis of a nascent “state” to be slowly replaced by a formal institutional arrangement generally accepted in the international community of nations. This is the hypothesis explored here and is a key finding.
Migdal assumes that the state is at the center. Migdal further imagines conflict between state and society, which may not be in evidence. Hofstadter’s Platonia model is the example – conflict equals defection, which equals a “no win” outcome (Hofstadter, 1985). Migdal takes for granted that the state wishes to establish autonomy rather than being partly integrated with other powerful actors in society. One can visualize the opposite – wherein the state is largely dependent on society for survival, and often incorporates potentially powerful groups and agents.

Migdal’s study of postcolonial states in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa supports the assumptions in the preceding paragraph; particularly his 1988 work entitled *Strong Societies and Weak States*. His assumptions serve well in addressing postcolonial experiences under western European powers, specifically British postcolonial cases.

There are several areas where our respective research takes us down slightly different paths. The work presented in this dissertation addresses elements of postcolonialism in the near abroad – those new states emerging from central control of the USSR emanating from Moscow, Russia. Today several of these new polities share common borders with the former colonial power. Migdal’s work focuses on traditional forms of colonialism where the colonial center and the colonial territory are at some distance from one another.

Second, the majority of the new countries’ leaders in the first case were high-ranking officials in the former Soviet state structure. These officials were part of a highly centralized single political party system. Some of these leaders were integral actors
within the Politburo. Those countries under assessment by Migdal had a quite different experience. Indigenous leaders in the postcolonial countries examined by Migdal were trained by the previous colonial masters but were not part of the inner circle of colonial governance. Post-colonial development would reflect these critical differences in ways not addressed by Migdal.

Third, a major shift occurred in the economic organization of the newly emerging former Soviet states – a shift from central planned economies to free market capitalist economies. Those case studies under examination by Migdal demonstrate new-state economic patterns following the colonial pattern, or some close approximation. Specifically, Migdal’s case studies tended to follow a path dependent trajectory for economic development. The former Soviet states were party to a near-complete failure of the former economic system dictating a completely new approach to economic goals.

Fourth, Migdal’s observations on strongmen (Migdal, 1988, p. 33) are nonspecific. Migdal envisions strongmen as occupying positions of control within some centralized state structure or outside the state configuration seeking various elements of localized agenda such as autonomy. However, in some societies and polities, strongmen may fall into multiple categories – some with coercive power and some without this element of control, all of whom have convergent goals for state and country. Migdal does not differentiate these in his case studies.

Some existing transition literature, like that of Nordlinger on state autonomy, links state capacity and autonomy (or the reverse “capture”). Autonomy here refers to the independence of the state, while capture refers to control of the state by those outside the
formal avenues of bureaucracy. Nordlinger visualizes three distinct types of state autonomy with hybrids crossing lines between the three. All three typologies assume the preferences of state and society are divergent. Type III State Autonomy is “…public officials translate their preferences into authoritative actions in the absence of divergent state-society preferences” (Nordlinger, 1981, p74). The assumption made here by Nordlinger is that the state has the capacity for authoritative action, i.e. that there is some mechanism for coercion. In new countries there may be, and often is, a noticeable lack of criminal code, civil code, and an effective policing force to enforce authoritative action.

Type II State Autonomy is when “… state and societal preferences diverge and public officials purposely bring about a shift in the societal parallelogram of resource-weighted preferences, then translating their non divergent preferences into authoritative action” (p. 99). This definition can be cumbersome. The underlying assumption here is that there are divergent preferences and non divergent preferences, both requiring some elements of state intervention, simultaneously. The question comes to mind – why would the state need to exert authoritative action when there are non divergent preferences?

Type I State Autonomy is defined as “…public officials translate their preferences into authoritative actions when state-society preferences are divergent” (p. 118). This becomes most noticeable in the case of the multiple newly formed republics emerging from the former USSR where some form of authoritative central government develops in the absence of local networks exhibiting some elements of control. Void of challenge to centralized control, new leadership can, and often does, assume authoritative control.

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3 Collins (2002) refers to this particular behavior as clan hegemony, wherein the clans capture the state.
These clear divisions imagine a democratic state-centered model instead of a society-centered model, which may or may not be democratic. This state centric model, envisioned by Nordlinger’s three typologies, assumes the need for coercion on the part of the state, to accomplish common goals within the new country. The study at hand suggests that new countries may not have a viable state, initially, so society becomes central in establishing the state. In essence, the state and society are the same system.

What Nordlinger assumes for states contrasts with Almond and Verba’s “parochial political culture”:

“In these societies there are no specialized political roles: headmanship, chieftanship, “shamanism” are diffuse political-economic-religious roles, and for members of these societies the political orientations to these roles are not separated from their religious and social orientations. A parochial orientation also implies the comparative absence of expectations of change initiated by the political system. The parochial expects nothing from the political system” (Almond and Verba, 1963, p.17).

Almond and Verba imply that the concepts of separate state and society are absent in parochial societies. Logically, members of these societies would encounter great difficulty with notions of divergence between state and society. Instead, convergence would be the norm. In the context of this discussion, the reader can envision long-term socialization void of the need for divided roles within these parochial societies described by Almond and Verba.

Hofstadter’s work on Platonia Dilemma serves to expand our understanding of convergence. The reason for the introduction of Hofstadter’s Platonia Dilemma to this discussion is to provide some possible contrast to Nordlinger’s three divergent typologies. Hofstadter implies a convergence rather than a divergence of state/society
goals based on the requirements of this single iteration game. It has interesting implications to the study of political science but I have been unable to locate any information regarding its application to the study of state capacity and the interaction with kinship networks. (Hofstadter, 1985, p. 746).

In this scenario, the only “winning” outcome for clans and state is for all the multiple players to cooperate. The only viable winning outcome is to increase state capacity to the degree that revolt is reduced simultaneous with increases in state services. Defection of any one player (clans or state) leads to the downward spiral mentioned in the preceding paragraph. All clans must cooperate with the state to “win” and the state must collaborate with all clans. Hofstadter’s model envisions this as a one-shot only game, i.e. there are no iterations and no second chances. Hofstadter informs the reader that in this game all the players know all the rules and they all have the same information, which he labels as superrationality4.

Evans argues that the state is a social actor (Evans, 1995, p.4). As such, the state cannot have complete autonomy from society. Instead, according to Evans, the state celebrates embedded autonomy. By definition, this entails “… the ability to formulate collective goals instead of allowing officeholders to pursue their individual interests…” (p.45). Embedded autonomy is “bureaucratic insulation [from society]5 with intense connection to the surrounding social structure” (p.50). Evans visualizes this arrangement, as “Internal cohesiveness and dense external ties should be seen as complimentary and

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4 Hofstadter envisions Platonia Dilemma as an alternative to Robert Axelrod’s arguments to the effect that cooperation can evolve out of noncooperation and Anatol Rapoport’s work on Tit-for-Tat game theory.

5 [from society] is my insert.
mutually reinforcing” (p.72). Evans ultimately concludes that “State and society are not just linked together: each helps constitute the other. Sometimes they reinforce each other” (p.228).

One can readily imagine that Evans’ vision of a country is different from that of Nordlinger and Migdal in that the state and society are interconnected. In the early days of a transition period, this is very important. Cohesiveness becomes critical to increasing state capacity. It is also possible to picture a political environment developing wherein society constrains behavior of state actors through the intense connections.

What follows is an attempt to place my position within (or apart from) arguments presented thus far. Nordlinger and Migdal both observe that the state and society may be separate from one another and have divergent goals for their country. This assumption negates the reverse possibility that goals for society and state are convergent. Migdal acknowledges Weber’s definition of state as perhaps being too limited thus leaving room for discussion as to what a state is and its role in society.

Evans’s consideration that a state may enjoy embeddedness in society serves to explain a possible lack of divergence in what Almond and Verba define as a parochial political society. This opens consideration for convergence of goals between state and society. Hofstadter’s Platonia Dilemma demonstrates there is a game wherein the only winning move is for all players to cooperate – there can be no defection.

What is missing in these discussions is the possibility that a scenario exists in which the state and society are so networked that divergence of goals is not a viable
alternative to country and state survival. My argument (presented in upcoming pages) seeks to fill this gap in these arguments.

2.22 Soviet legacy

While each of these three authors makes significant contributions to our understanding of state behavior in nascent countries, differences do exist between their respective case studies and the post Soviet experience of the former USSR republics.

Perhaps the best known of these differences is the Soviet concept of “democratic centralism” (Trotsky, 1937). Under this system emanating from Moscow, voting for central leadership was conducted at regular intervals across the fifteen republics comprising the USSR. The CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) was the dominant political party. In reality, political actors serving in any of the central organs of governance all belonged to this one party. In order to achieve any form of political advancement, a potential candidate needed to belong to this party. The legacy of this form of political participation would follow each of the new countries into their respective independence transition periods. After 1991 independence, there was a slow profusion of new viable political parties with highly divergent political interests in the different countries. No longer were preferences limited to a single political view. Citizen adjustment to this phenomenon was mixed. In major metropolitan areas, new political parties sprang forth and were greeted with some levels of excitement while in rural areas political parties were based on clan membership.
The second difference between the case studies of Migdal, Nordlinger, and Evans and the post Soviet experience was the construction of new constitutions. In earlier colonial experiences, new constitutions went hand-in-hand with independence. In the cases of the newly independent former Soviet countries, the formation of new constitutions would follow independence by several years. In several cases, there was a shift from democratic centralism to direct democracy. This move required local citizens to rethink political participation. This was a drastic change from the Soviet period 1917-1991. This change also represented a drastic step away from earlier experiences of the late Tsarist period prior to 1917. For many citizens in these newly independent countries, this was a first taste of local state-level governance.

A third difference between the existing case studies already under scrutiny by Migdal, Nordlinger, and Evans and the former USSR was the collapse of the economic system. Previous economic ties between the respective Soviet republics dissolved in the face of rampant inflation, the introduction of individual countries’ currencies\(^6\), and the increase of foreign trade outside to former confines of the Soviet sphere of influence. Additionally, there was difficulty in adjusting the value of new currencies between the new countries within the former Soviet system as well as acceptance of these new monetary currencies in the international marketplace.

A fourth difference relates to acceptance or rejection by other countries in the international community comprising the United Nations of agreements, treaties, conventions, and contracts struck within the USSR. A vast array of legal and extra legal

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\(^6\) The Russian ruble was no longer universally accepted.
questions arose regarding Soviet era establishment of autonomous regions, oblasts, and kolkhozes. For the first time, the international community was faced with the possibility of negotiating with a rather large number of those seeking independence within the geographic boundaries of the fifteen new countries being recognized by the international community. Examples of these would include Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Abkhazia, Talysh-Mugam Republic, Karabagh, and Lezghi Independent Republic just to mention a few. Under Soviet law, there were also a large number of ethnic groups having various levels of autonomy in the geographic space of now newly independent countries. These nascent countries faced significant challenges in granting the same levels of self-rule to these ethnic communities as experienced in Soviet days7.

Perhaps the greatest difference between the earlier case studies and the post Soviet case studies is the legacy of social amelioration. During the 1917-1991 timeframe, social networks (particularly kinship networks) served to mitigate adverse effects of an economically deficient system. It is a valid argument that some citizens of the Soviet system gained during this Soviet era. It is also true that great numbers of the population would recognize very little economic gain and some citizens suffered economic reversal.

Taagepera offers a unique opinion. In the annals of modern history, no empire has faced the triple threat of democratization, marketization, and de-colonization simultaneously. The newly independent countries emerging from the USSR were faced with a unique set of challenges. Those nascent countries in Eastern Europe faced democratization and marketization challenges but those in the South Caucasus and

7 There were some similarities with countries in North Africa and the Middle East following World War II.
Central Asia faced all three tribulations (Taagepera, 2000). The South Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia did have a brief period of independence in the 1918-1920 timeframe but were largely operating under the aegis of some exogenous power. The Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were all formed as partial products of the Stalin years in the USSR. Accordingly, these countries had never known independent political processes.

Most of the newly independent countries’ efforts aimed at establishing survival were accomplished through complex networks of family members and family contacts. While there is some limited evidence provided by Migdal, Nordlinger, and Evans that this was also the situation in their respective case studies, available information from the Soviet experience finds this to be nearly universal across the southern tier of the USSR (present day Central Asian republics), the South Caucasus, and the East European republics. This vast system of localized networks existed just below the “official” surface of Russian (and Soviet) political life (Goncharov, 1858; Tian-Shanskaia, 1993; Benet, 1970; Collins, 2002). In the period immediately following the weakening of central Soviet control, in the late 1980s – early 1990s, these social networks would prove critical to the economic and political survival of the multiple new republics and their citizens. In this time of great turmoil, kinship networks served to fill deficiencies in the existing power vacuum. A long-standing (though publicly covert) staple of the social fabric of this region of the world would come to the forefront in this transition period to affect political
and economic transformation. Family and extended kinship networks have been largely overlooked in the major works of Migdal, Nordlinger, and Evans.

2.2.3 Clans

A vast literature contributed by anthropologists, historians, and sociologists adds to our understanding of sub national communities at the level of clan and kinship. But mid twentieth century work on clans and their associated political systems focuses on local issues within and between clans rather than relationships involving clans and some central state authority (Schram, 1954, 1957, 1961; Leach, 1964; Tosh, 1978; Baker, 1979). Such works depict clan activities in Burma (Leach), China (Baker, Schram), Lango, and, of course, Africa (Tosh).

The early days of the twenty first century saw a shift in focus from social and economic issues to a broader range of political issues facing clans (Schatz, 2004; White and Johansen, 2005, Collins, 2006). The newest and most relevant works serve to enlighten the reader on clan activities in Turkey (White and Johansen), and Central Asia (Collins, Schatz).

The White and Johansen work, while elaborate in its examination of local political behavior does not seek to analyze links to the state governance of Turkey. However, chapter nine of this book analyzes the highly decentralized nature of clans, finding that cohesion between and within clans is not diminished due to a lack of political centrality. A major clue as to the nature of clan governance is found on the opening page of this chapter:
“These include societies with emergent leadership where leaders are neither routinely appointed nor elected nor selected according to overt prescribed criteria, and those in which leadership is not hierarchical, that is, in which the leader does not command but is regarded as a leading councilor among peers” (White and Johansen, 2005, p.321).

One might envision that this same behavior is possible in a nascent country at the state level. The cohesion between clans is, in part, the result of marriage ties with other clans, which transcends some elements of political diversity. In an earlier work, White defines clans as “A descent group or category whose members trace descent from a common putative ancestry, where genealogical links to a single apical ancestor are not known” (White, 2003).

Collins “explores the causes, dynamics, and implications of… informal identity networks commonly known as clans” (Collins, 2006, p.1). Her study extends through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan rather extensively with a brief period of study in Azerbaijan. By Collins’ reckoning, clans are the cause of state failure in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan due to their own short term self interest (p. 341). Collins also asserts that inter clan rivalries will likely lead to “intergroup conflict to defend their interests” (p. 341). However, the treatment of the clan system as if it were a top-down but ineffective system rather than a bottom-up system is deficient in basic understanding of clan systems. Collins’ definition of clan “…is thus an informal organization built on an extensive network of kin and fictive, or perceived and imagined kinship relations” (p.25)8. The latter portion of this definition “…and fictive, or perceived and imagined...

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8 Collins’ 2006 definition differs slightly from her 2002 definition where she states “A clan is an informal social institution in which actual or notional kinship based on blood or marriage forms the central bond among members”.
kinship relations” stands in contrast to White’s definition of consanguineal relationships, which are based on birth and marriage, which are non fictive.

By relaxing some of Weber’s assumptions, Schatz is able to hypothesize “If states and clans construct each other…then the two operate not according to essentially different, mutually exclusive logics, but rather share important potentialities” (Schatz, 2004, p. 164). Expanding his scope, “Before state structures emerged, societies where kinship divisions ran deep had nonstate institutions that governed the behavior of groups” (p. 167). It is here that we begin to see that informal institutions existed prior to the formation of new countries and their respective states in the post USSR transition.

Schatz’s definition of clan as a “...clublike affiliation” with “...strongly drawn blood relationships...” is vague and broad, closely akin to Collins’ definition (p.8-9).

However, understanding what a clan is and the importance of clan to its members and how they view its broader political function brings to light how these sub national/ sub ethnic communities perceive their role in a centralized state. Is the state viewed as having coercive power over clans? Or is the state viewed as another entity with power equal to a clan? Is the internal power dynamic of a clan extended to formal state institutions?

It is my position that a definition of clan from those under study is critical to understanding the transformation process. Second, state capture of the clans and clan capture of the state may be among the alternatives for new state and new country survival. Third, if so, then intensive and extensive grass roots study of this phenomenon may be the only realistic manner for gaining reasonable understanding of the
complexities and interactions involved. Fourth, it is the attention to political behavior that best informs us as to present day patterns of transitional state success or failure.

2.2.4 Alternative Explanations

Oksan Baylugen argues that limitations of institutional capacity are the result of the Soviet legacy and the magnitude of the task of ordinary state building. She notes that foreign capital penetration can impinge upon the growth of viable institutions within a state (Baylugen, 1999). According to Baylugen, the consortium of outside oil companies (British Petroleum, Exxon, et al) wields more economic power than the government of some new countries. The governments of newly independent states have been largely unsuccessful in organizing reliable political and legal infrastructure to deal with problems or opportunities associated with the influx and dispersal of income resulting from this oil windfall. This is part of the difficulty in projection of a trajectory for development.

While Baylugen makes the valid point that foreign direct investment can impinge upon the capacity of a state, this assumes that the investment and exploitation of resources exists. There may be cases where no such outside economic influence is present.

Counter arguments to Baylugen’s limitations of institutional capacity proposition just discussed include Johnson who writes, “Institutional legacies do not play a central, causal role in determining policy choice...” (Johnson, 2001, pg. 256). Stark and Bruszt characterize this “past dependency” theory as having “...explanatory limitations” (Stark...
and Bruszt, 1998, pg.7) and Thelen who finds the institutional approaches “...are not particularly helpful in talking about change” (Thelen, 1999, pg. 387).

John Schoeberlein carries the discussion to a new level by suggesting that deficient development in the former Soviet Union is the result of a reluctance to exit the communist system and the discrediting of Western models due to inequities of privatization and the deterioration of living standards (Schoeberlein, 2003). Theoretically, this may define expected behavior but most of the post Soviet population is unaware of the processes of privatization. It may be sufficient that citizens experience the effects of privatization without understanding all the processes. Only a select group of the intelligentsia and political rulers are in positions sufficient to understand the associated complexities. This serves to retard economic and political development within the former Soviet republics.

Schoeberlein’s argument is well taken, if incomplete. Progress of some new countries emerging from the influence of the USSR fits poorly with this argument. There is no evidence of such universal behavior. Privatization proceeds at different rates in different countries and at different times across different sectors of the economy – these four differences remain unaccounted for in Schoeberlein’s argument.

Both these arguments fail to address any of the critical state-society interactions important to the new states’ transformation. It is on some of these questions in the 1991-1996 timeframe that this dissertation is focused.

This dissertation argues that despite the weight of the just mentioned list of alternatives, increasing state capacity relies heavily on acceptance of the state by the
general population. Perceived legitimacy of the state is, in some cases and in many of the societies where clans play a major role, linked to norms found in informal social networks. In these cases of the list of factors affecting increases in state capacity, in countries where clans are the dominant social influence, clans matter! Here, without support of clans, the state is unable to address substantive political, economic, or social other issues.

2.3 Theory

Thesis: In the absence of viable formal state political institutions, functioning informal social institutions may aid in bringing about peaceful transformation from one political system to another system more suitable for the new political and social environment.

Newly emerging countries face numerous challenges. With a lack of strong central political leadership and accompanying formal institutions, a power vacuum occurs. The period immediately following World War II in Africa is one example of this vacuum. The timeframe of the late 1980s to early 1990s in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) is another. But there are others.

In the case of the USSR, the fifteen new states struggled to maintain some semblance of order while still operating under the constitution of the USSR dated 1978. Until 1995, most of these new states would continue to operate under this constitutional arrangement with little chance of escaping the former pattern of political behavior. By this date, 1995, it was evident to the leadership of the emerging countries that the path of
dependency on the institutions of a non-existent USSR would not be sufficient to meet the needs of their individual country’s citizens.

The central question driving this inquiry is why new countries and their respective governments experience a sudden shift in transitional trajectory. Consider that in the interlude immediately after the loss of central Soviet control, several of the fifteen new countries faced overwhelming financial and political uncertainty. Against this backdrop of potential disaster some were cast into lengthy civil war, some confronted secessionist movements, and most had to cope with declining economic woes. Yet several of these nascent republics weathered impending political storms with relative ease and in a very brief timeframe managed to reverse what appeared to be certain doom.

In this context, in such transitional periods increasing state capacity is reliant upon established informal social networks. In the turmoil of a post-colonial type arrangement, the range of social organizations upon which to rely may be limited. In some cases, reliance on long-standing extended “family” organizations and their associated norms may be the best solution to “buying time” for transformation to become rooted. If so, this transition period is more likely to lead to transformation.

These extended family organizations, hereafter referred to as clans, provide the social basis for new formal political institution formation and early economic development. In the absence of formal state institutions, informal institutions become the only reliable mechanism available for effective governance. Efficiency of governance may be achieved through use of the channels of communication inherent within the clans. Strength of the clans and their ties with other clans can help provide an imposing, if
complex, network for improved efficiency of the state. While the use of any patronage system may prove detrimental in the long-term, the short-term utilization of these networks of informal social interaction may be beneficial.

2.3.1 Hypothesis:

Following this line of thought, it is possible to derive the hypotheses linked to:

H\(_1\): If clans are incorporated into state building during a transition period, state capacity increases.

This hypothesis deals with short-term effects and runs contrary to Collins’ assertions that clans lead to state failure, in the long-term, due to inter clan rivalries. It may further expand Nordlinger’s typology by setting forth a Type IV State Autonomy where the state-society divide is less significant or divergence is settled through informal institutions that increase state capacity.\(^9\) It challenges Weber’s classic definition of “state” in favor of Aristotle’s definition.\(^10\)

The reverse hypothesis may also be true:

H\(_2\): If clans are not incorporated into state building during a transition period, state capacity decreases.

This partially supports Nordlinger’s definition of Type I State Autonomy. It also supports Evans’ notions of embeddedness, to a degree. If the state and society are one-and-the-same, as the state succeeds so does society, and the reverse. It does not counter

\(^9\) This follows Almond and Verba’s notions of parochial political culture found in *The Civic Culture*. 1963. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

his assertion that the state is embedded in society. This hypothesis also adds to Schatz’s claim that the state and clans share mutual interests. It further opens the door for discussion of Schatz’s “nonstate institutions” which might find importance in “parchment” (formal) institutions as the new state emerges after a transition period.

Consider Table 2.1 below. With strong clan ties to the state, there exists a successful transition period of increasing state capacity to some long-term state/societal transformation – a new way of administering or managing. New states already experiencing sudden shift in leadership style and ideological approach may be teetering on the verge of near-failure or near-success. Short-term success of the new state depends on the existence of strong clan ties to the state as well as knowledge or ability of their proper use. This only applies to countries with a well established clan system in place prior to independence.

With weak clan ties to the state, there is decreasing state capacity. Consider that in this transition period, state infrastructure is fragmented from one central authority into fifteen highly decentralized entities. Some of these new states have viable political or economic systems in place, while others do not. Each of these new governments is now responsible for satisfying the needs of their own citizens. Weak informal social systems combined with even weaker formal political organization, results in state failure.

Cells in Table 2.1 indicate different combinations of associations between strong clan ties to the state and increasing state capacity.
The implication is that successful increase in state capacity ONLY occurs with strong clan ties to the state. Weak clan ties to the state do not increase state capacity. It is important to remember that the discussion here focuses on short-term results only in newly independent countries where there is evidence of a strong clan system. Table 2.1 does not necessarily reflect long-term state development.

While the domestic legitimacy of the state may be limited in the early days of a nascent country, over time the capacity of the state grows or shrinks depending on the tools available and utilized. It is possible in specific cases that use of clans is a legitimate step in securing the country from revolt and increasing the capacity of the state to provide services. If social networks are viewed by the majority of the citizens of the new country as a major source of political power, the state may gain accelerated favor in increasing its perceived legitimacy among the citizens by the use of these networks. During this time of relative instability, there is a high degree of possibility that the citizens tentatively view the complex networks of clans and their respective interactions as the state. Once viable

Table 2.1
Strong clan ties to the state in a transition period increase state capacity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Clan Ties</th>
<th>Weak Clan Ties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Positive Association</td>
<td>C Negative Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Negative Association</td>
<td>D Positive Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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While the domestic legitimacy of the state may be limited in the early days of a nascent country, over time the capacity of the state grows or shrinks depending on the tools available and utilized. It is possible in specific cases that use of clans is a legitimate step in securing the country from revolt and increasing the capacity of the state to provide services. If social networks are viewed by the majority of the citizens of the new country as a major source of political power, the state may gain accelerated favor in increasing its perceived legitimacy among the citizens by the use of these networks. During this time of relative instability, there is a high degree of possibility that the citizens tentatively view the complex networks of clans and their respective interactions as the state. Once viable
central state authority begins to increase, this clan behavior can shift quickly in favor of a perceived legitimate central state organization.

The study at hand envisions the development of a new state in two distinct phases: Time 1 (T1) reflects the early days immediately after independence when clans ARE NOT employed to assist in building the new state and new country. This initial period of transition is followed by Time 2 (T2) immediately after Time 1 when clans ARE employed to assist in building the new state and new country.

This brief discussion assumes that the state has coercive power over the clans rather than the reverse – the clans have coercive power over the state. This second scenario is played out with the same results as reflected in T1 and T2 but the state has now become dependent on its links to the clans for increased capacity. In the short-term, this may cause no appreciable limits for the state and may serve to draw the state closer to the citizens of the country. Power sharing among clans and between clans and the state is critical to short-term success of the country.

There is danger, in the long-term that this behavior will restrict state autonomy from the clans. The lack of political autonomy could severely hamper development of formal political institutions within the country. The state could find itself providing services to only the more powerful clans causing disapproval among less powerful clans and revolt resurfaces.

The discussion to this point identifies two critical communities of actors – clans and state. There is a third, “associates”. Associates are those persons not related biologically (by blood or marriage) to clans but having significant loyalty to a particular
clan other than their own. This relationship of associates to clans may best be described as fictive kinship. The reasons for this association are numerous but suffice it to write that the relationship is such that the associates do have an influence on clan behavior. While loyal to their own clan, associates may be called upon by their associated clan to act as intermediaries when direct negotiations between clans and the state fail to bring about positive results in times of conflict. This informal institution of communication can be critical to establishing working relationships with other clans and the state.

The reason for introducing associates at this point is to demonstrate that clans are forward thinking. Clan elders are not leaders of their respective family units but rather act as advisors, consultants, and facilitators. Anticipating that the clan system will evolve into some other form of governance, these elders begin the process of formal incorporation into whatever format the state may eventually reach. Recruitment and training of associates begins early in this process.

In Table 2.2, we see a dynamic situation unfolding between T1 and T2. Associates become increasingly important to building bridges between the state and clans during this transition period. Associates are able to become “behind-the-door” channels for information, going back and forth between the state and clans until a satisfactory negotiation is complete. Regardless of the challenge, associates become part of this complex puzzle.

Over time, associates come to be respected by the state leaders and clan elders as indispensable to increasing state capacity. State leaders seek to employ associates in official capacity while clan elders look upon their associates as necessary links to the
state. It is possible that clan elders have direct links to the state but these links may be weak. Associates can serve to buttress weak links by becoming part of the formal political process provided they maintain strong ties to the informal kinship institutions. As the state and country move from T1 to T2, one would expect to see the indirect social influence of the clans diminish to be replaced by direct political involvement. This may take form in participation in one of the state’s bureaucracies and/or the election to the country’s legislature by either the clan representatives or an associate OR both.

Conceptually, clans, hundreds or thousands of them, band together for common good and undertake to establish some elements of an internationally recognized country. These informal kinship networks choose a central figure (such as a president or prime minister) through informal consensus to facilitate their mutual goals. Only later does this translate to formal elections.
In the early days following independence, the success or failure of a new state and its respective legitimate territorial claim may depend on strong ties to informal social institutions, clans. Clan networks buy time for the new state to establish fresh formal political organizations and institutions. In this brief transition period, little if any, transformation of clan political behavior is evident to those outside this system. One may expect to find that clans provide some elements of a “shadow government” long enough for formal state institutions to be constructed and implemented. This early stage in transition incorporates the clans as viable political entities. Only later do the clans give way to political parties, formal bureaucracy, and central state governance. Even when this occurs, the central state organs of governance are primarily products of clans.

Table 2.2
Indicators of State Capacity

State Capacity (on a continuum)

\[ T_1 = \text{before clan involvement} \]
\[ T_2 = \text{after clan involvement} \]

\[
\begin{array}{c c c}
\text{Decreases} & \text{State Capacity} & \text{Increases} \\
\end{array}
\]

T1

T2

Indicators absent

Indicators present

In the early days following independence, the success or failure of a new state and its respective legitimate territorial claim may depend on strong ties to informal social institutions, clans. Clan networks buy time for the new state to establish fresh formal political organizations and institutions. In this brief transition period, little if any, transformation of clan political behavior is evident to those outside this system. One may expect to find that clans provide some elements of a “shadow government” long enough for formal state institutions to be constructed and implemented. This early stage in transition incorporates the clans as viable political entities. Only later do the clans give way to political parties, formal bureaucracy, and central state governance. Even when this occurs, the central state organs of governance are primarily products of clans.
2.3 Conclusion

There may be countries in which clans (containing informal structures of governance) form the basis of a new country’s government. These long-standing social organizations provide some elements of stability in an uncertain environment to those living in the new country. These informal networks and their associated norms serve to inform the new formal institutions such as a constitution, which enumerate powers and responsibilities of the various branches of government deemed necessary for state control.

Migdal assumes clans make rules against the wishes of the state instead of considering the possibility that roles of the clans and its rules may form the basis of a new constitution, which in turn helps to establish the “state”. Implied within Migdal’s collective works is that there must be a highly centralized state with no address as to the highly decentralized nature of clans. As per White and Johansen, this does not preclude cohesion of common goals. During a transition period, increasing state capacity may rest on perceived legitimacy supported by the clans.

Migdal envisions strongmen as exhibiting coercive power over those being governed. My field research suggests political behavior quite different from this. Clan elders fall into two categories – headmen and big men. Neither of these has elevated power over other clan members. This final point becomes critical in understanding a fundamental within the clan system present in Azerbaijan – big men and headmen are not generally viewed by clan members as having some hierarchical pattern of power.
distribution. It is often the home at which people show up for political discussions that establishes who is the informal “leader”.

Nordlinger’s thoughts on state autonomy assume a neat division of state/society roles in a democratic state. Where there are no specialized roles in a nascent country, local clan elders may fill the roles of political leadership until such time as formal institutions can framed. It follows that, in the early days of a transition period, the clans are the state. Only as the transition period proceeds does transformation of this phenomenon occur to the end that the state emerges as an entity separate from the clans. As long as clans are part of this process, the capacity of the state will increase. The lack of specialization does not inhibit efficiency as clans and the state share a common cooperative goal.

Evans’ view on embeddedness does allow for the intermingling of clan and state as one. Indeed, clan perception of state support and state perception of clan support become mutually reinforcing. The establishment of a bureaucracy will no doubt be linked with clans (as clans occupy a dominant position in society).

The greatest deficiency in literature regarding state capacity regarding clan involvement is the lack of address of the structures of kinship (Levi-Strauss, 1969) and the associated issues of trust between central and local societal/political communities (Banfield, 1958). Levi-Strauss’s observations regarding dual organization of clans may prove helpful to enhanced understanding of the internal dynamics of kinship. Banfield’s documentation of “amoral familism” in Italy is particularly insightful as regards the lack of trust for those persons outside one’s own family, in rural areas. Migdal’s (1988)
thoughts on the impact of remote communities on the center can be reinforced by examining the findings of Karny (2000) to the effect that there is variation in political participation and power relative to topography (referencing the old adage that “altitude shapes attitude”, origin unknown).

It may be a valid argument that in the long-term, clans can be detrimental to establishment of democratic processes. One can envision elements of patronage, cronyism, and/or corporatism occurring in any country, as it did in the early days of the United States. In the long-term, informal social networks can have positive and negative effects to the political fabric of a newly independent country.

It is my contention that there are instances in which clans can be critical to the short-term transitional establishment of an environment suitable for sustainable transformation from one political system to another - democratic or otherwise. In this brief transition period, clans matter.

Chapter 3 focuses on a multi-stage approach to revealing how a nascent country might transition from a weak country with very limited state capacity to one in which the state is now in a position to increase state capacity. During this brief time of transition, there may be more than one example of success and/or failure in increasing state capacity. It is the reason for this difference in rate of success that this dissertation addresses.
Bibliography


Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodological Approach

As new countries emerge from some form of colonial past any number of trajectories for development may surface. A chosen path for political control over a territorial space and the citizens therein depends on resources available. A portion of the success of the state within the country rests on the legitimacy or perceived legitimacy of identified goals and those political actors in positions of authority. Consequently increasing state capacity to accomplish objectives is tied to willingness of citizens and the state to work together.

This chapter consists of three parts each sub sectioned for detail and clarity. Section 3.1 establishes the research design deemed necessary for this project. Section 3.2 defines the methodological approach for this venture. Section 3.3 is the conclusion.

3.1 Research design

The purpose of this non-experimental research inquiry is to demonstrate to the reader one possible trajectory for the early postcolonial development of a country when transitioning from one form of governance to another. The unit level of analysis for this project is the clan. The period for this project consists of two separate parts – the first timeframe demonstrating the noted absence of strong clan ties to the state and the second timeframe the noted presence of strong clan ties to the state. The reason for this two-part presentation is the apparent absence of strong clan ties to the state in timeframe 1 and the presence of strong clan ties to the state in timeframe 2.
There are three functions involved with this research project. The first is to explore the clan system (Rzaguliyev, 2003) as this system is relatively new in its study within the discipline of political science. The second function is to describe the clan system as it is linked to the state as this too has yet to receive significant study to date. The final function is to explain how this clan system increases state capacity.

Since reliable information on clan ties to the state is at an incipient stage, multiple approaches may best serve to illuminate this phenomenon. The exploratory phase of this study seeks to accomplish two points – to satisfy my inquisitiveness about the topic and to further research techniques. This latter point may lead to recommendations for future long-term grass roots research in remote areas of nascent countries. The descriptive phase of this research aims to portray events related to the near failure of a newly independent country and the reversal of that trajectory because of meaningful clan involvement with the state. The explanatory phase of this research project tackles why this clan/state phenomenon occurred in the newly independent state, which had earlier seemed doomed to failure (Deflem, 1998; Watt, 2002, ppg, 186-204). Since each of these three component phases suffers specific weaknesses and enjoys definite strengths, elements from each are deemed necessary in this dissertation to provide the reader with reasonable insight as to how strong clan ties to the state might increase state capacity.

3.1 Methodological Approach

Any number of authors provides guidance to one undertaking a research project. Establishing conventional designs and methodological approaches receives wide readership compliments of writers within social science disciplines. Noted scholars such
as King, Keohane, and Verba\textsuperscript{11}, Chalmers\textsuperscript{12}, Shively\textsuperscript{13}, and Brady and Collier\textsuperscript{14} all enlighten the prospective researcher. Lesser-known works by Lieberson\textsuperscript{15} and Dion\textsuperscript{16} may provide greater insight into unconventional or relatively new topics and the approaches required to bring light to these subjects.

Chapter 2 set forth the following theory: \textit{In the absence of viable formal state political institutions, functioning informal social institutions may aid in bringing about peaceful transformation from one political system to another system more suitable for the new political and social environment.}

The stated theory assumes contexts where there is some need to have a different system of political governance than existed under a former regime. The result may lead to any one of several state structures. The point to this discussion is that long-standing informal social institutions may form the basis for the new regime regardless of the regime type. This process may take several forms: the framing of a constitution based on well-established social norms; selection of a state leader by means of informal consensus; establishment of some type of centralized legislative body (like a parliament, congress, or


\textsuperscript{12} Chalmers, A. F. 1982. \textit{What is This Thing Called Science?} St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press.


national assembly) comprised primarily of clan members. The progression of events during transition to a new type of governance could include elements of control found at the local level within the country and/or those practices, serving the needs of the population over the course of history prior to a recent period of colonial control.

The interaction of remote village societies with legitimate state governance remains an under-studied area within political science discussions of decentralization. Yet these highly self-organizing social structures provide the basis for local level governance structures in states transitioning from Soviet control to some other form of polity. In some locales, the foundation of family social structures provides the only viable avenue for economic and political organization, in the early days of independent state formation.

Since political behavior is a dynamic process one can foresee that a system of governance adopted in the early days after independence from a colonial past could fail to meet the needs of the citizens and be replaced by a more suitable system. One example of this behavior might be the failure of the Articles of Confederation and the construction of the Constitution in the United States in the early days of the new republic.

Measuring the level of social impact on the formal state institutions provides a significant challenge in most cases under examination. Questions such as “How do we capture the impact of highly decentralized communities on a new centralized government?” or “Why do central government actors in the new country make specific political decisions?” are but a sampling of the questions, which might arise when studying highly decentralized clans and their respective ties to a central government.
The first step is to determine the structure of local informal political and social governance. The assumption that the two are separate may be false in many newly emerging states, particularly in rural areas. Overt local electoral process may be completely lacking in some cases so the state relies heavily on social networks as the basis for a takeoff trajectory of political structure. Upon collection of data from the dominant families in the remote regions, a determination is possible as to the complexity of the formal and informal social networks and their respective place in the formal and informal political structures. Analyzing these political structures and social networks is feasible with computational software tools.

The second stage is to follow the functions of the local configuration, over time, to determine in what ways the community is operating and its links to the national government. The bridges may be quite strong, very weak, or covert. Tracking these dynamic associations may prove difficult in a formal centralized political system wanting transparency.

Additionally, there is the challenge of collecting information to demonstrate some understanding of this evolving process. Interviewing mainstream political actors in a metropolitan setting may give some sense of political activity in a country’s capital city but fail to account for political preferences of remote rural communities. Likewise, depending solely on rural inhabitants for information may eliminate central state actors from the complex state level political dynamics giving the researcher a skewed perception of overall political behavior in the new country.
The combination of both structural and functional stages listed above, pooled with computational mathematics software programs exposes the intimate details of the most complex political systems. By picturing the information and data in graphic representation to accompany textual explanation, greater appreciation occurs at an accelerated rate. Publication of the results of this study will lend new understanding to a complex and often misunderstood political phenomenon.

3.2.1 Two brief transition periods leading to transformation

The main body of political science argument to date tends to view transition as a somewhat bumpy road from one regime type to another replete with various elements of path dependency evident in the new state. This dissertation takes a very different approach aimed at capturing details of state level political behavior largely dependent on clans as significant local level actors. To best portray the significance of these local level social communities and their respective institutions the initial transition period is divided into two timeframes addressed as two case studies within the same nascent country.

The first timeframe displays the notable absence of clan political participation on a meaningful level. In this timeframe (referred to as T1) clan input is extremely limited, if present at all. The state struggles to exert control over the territory outside the capital city, infrastructure deteriorates, and there is widespread citizen discord. Simultaneously the state demonstrates limited capacity to substantially increase foreign direct investment, control inflation, establish agreements with other states, and/or redistribute state held resources.
The second timeframe exhibits the important inclusion of highly decentralized clans into mainstream political decision-making processes that facilitate the state’s goals. In this timeframe (referred to as T2) clan contribution to the political process of the central government is critical to the survivability of the state and the country. It is through power sharing and coalition building between the state and clans that the country recovers from its former colonial past and moves forward on the international stage. In T2 there is significant evidence of increased state capacity when coupled with significant clan participation.

The reader may wonder at this point, why there is a need to conduct such a comparison in this section. Collection of information in Azerbaijan extends over a long timeframe and initially was not geared to any scholarly effort. Consequently there may have been imagined observations particularly during the early days after independence. The computational tests confirm that existing field notes were not my imagination of people and events. To confirm or deny that field observations were imagined a Fisher’s Exact Test would be utilized.

3.2.2 Qualitative and quantitative information

As one might imagine there can be great social, economic, and political confusion in a new country in the immediate aftermath of independence from a former colonial experience. Collection of information is likely to be hampered by lack of infrastructure, local conflicts can pose formidable obstacles to safe research, and acquisition of accurate
and valid information can be encumbered by reluctance of citizens to trust outsiders. As state capacity increases these challenges may diminish significantly.

In this dissertation there is a heavy reliance on qualitative information during the T1 period due to the challenges just mentioned. The T2 period relies more on quantitative data as information becomes more readily available. Selection of variables depicting the differences in state capacity can be a daunting task given the lack of comparable circumstance, which one might be able to measure during both timeframes.

3.2.2 Definition of the two timeframes under comparison

This dissertation compares two different timeframes, in the early stages of post-Soviet transition, to determine if and/or when clan involvement has an impact on state capacity. The two timeframes receive attention in following two chapters. Chapter 4 (Timeframe 1 or T1) extends from October 1991 to June 1993, a period of 21 months and Chapter 5 (Timeframe 2 or T2) incorporates the period from July 1993 to November 1995, a period of 28 months. The timeframes reflect distinct changes or styles in central government leadership. In T1, the state made efforts to operate under the former USSR system replete with the existing Constitution and its associated federal branches of government. In T2, the state enacted plans to construct a new Constitution, a National Assembly, and a functional bureaucracy.

Tables of six carefully chosen indicators of state capacity appear in Chapters 4 and 5 with columns labeled to display the indicators and whether indicators are positive
or negative\textsuperscript{17}, in each of the respective timeframes, and a frequency tabulation constructed to reflect whether either timeframe is subject to increased state capacity.

These six indicators of increasing state capacity appear with which to compare T1 and T2 based on available resources. The indicators are land privatization, foreign direct investment (FDI), inflation rate, international and bilateral agreements, number of political parties, and revolt/secession. These indicators of increasing state capacity were chosen based on field observations and archival research. Field observations provided opportunity for input and inferences from local citizens while archival research confirmed or denied what local sources verbally expressed to me\textsuperscript{18}. Further elaboration of these indicators is found in Appendix 3A.

There is a tacit understanding that increases in state capacity may vary. Therefore state capacity may increase in one geographic part of a new country faster than in another area due to such factors as population density, topography, and development of existing services, just to name a few of the possible factors affecting uneven increases in state capacity across time and space.

One can also envision increased clan involvement resulting in peaceful (or more peaceful) behavior than with little clan participation. This assumes that clan ties to the state result in the delivery of tangible and intangible resources related to social, economic, and political capital. While the reasons for this may be myriad, the simplest

\\textsuperscript{17} The tables for these two timeframes are found later in this chapter. Table 3.2.2 is for T1 and Table 3.2.3 is for T2.

\textsuperscript{18} When collecting information in the field, I was constantly aware that respondents to my questions might have some ulterior motive for information provided. Additionally, I was aware that respondents had access to limited information relative to their specific geographic location often void of information in other parts of Azerbaijan.
explanation is that the multiple clans within the new country lend support to the nascent state and are thus less likely to be contentious with the state. The state is now in a position to expand state services because of the cooperation of the clans.

The reverse may be true when there are weak clan ties with the state and the state finds itself with decreasing capacity. The state, trying to operate without clan support, is under increasing pressure from dissatisfied communities within the country, which results in limited (if any) state services being offered. A decrease in state capacity may also result in growing unrest leading to revolt within the country. This behavior may be unevenly distributed across the country’s territorial space. One could conceive that the continuing spiral would ultimately result in catastrophe for the country and the state.

Each of the two preceding paragraphs alludes to a feedback loop. As state capacity involvement of clans increases thus expands state capacity OR as clan involvement decreases state capacity decreases thus decreasing clan involvement.

Regardless state capacity and clan ties to the state influence each other (Dion, 1998, pg. 128; Lieberson, 1991, pg. 309.).

3.2.3 Choice of a nascent country for study

“We have a clan system which is very strong in Azerbaijan…”19

Political analyst Rashad Rzaguliyev, an Azerbaijani, identifies the nascent Republic of Azerbaijan as a prime location for studying the relationship between clans.

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and the state. A former republic of the USSR, Azerbaijan formally declared its independence from the union in 1991. Azerbaijan has a long history as a colonial conquest dating back to the tenth century. A brief period of independence from 1918-1920 was overshadowed by powerful international intervention resulting in Azerbaijan’s incorporation into the USSR in 1921. The aftermath of the fall of the USSR left this new country in a near-failed state status. These factors made Azerbaijan a superb choice for the study of clans’ impact on state capacity in the post Soviet space.

Additionally, personal relationships with Azerbaijanis and a reasonable command of the dominant local language, Azeri, made Azerbaijan a logical choice for studying the effects of clans on the state. Access to multiple clans across the country was a multipart procedure utilizing personal contacts made through a complex system of kinship groups.

3.2.4 Fieldwork component

Collection of information for this project extended over a period of several decades. Initially, this process involved only informal curiosity about kinship communities exhibiting behavior similar to the present-day extended rural family community of my father and the influences of my mother’s rural family on late 17th century and early 18th century political development in Virginia. Vivid memories of stories passed along to me as a child by great-grandparents and their siblings, grandparents and their siblings, and my own parents’ generation contributed to my overall understanding of my family’s involvement in the founding and growth of my specific environment in the United States generally. I was steeped in the traditions and
beliefs of the earliest colonialists with respect for my family’s involvement in the social, economic, and political development of Virginia.

My integration with and exposure to agricultural producers over a fifty-two year span adds great depth of understanding to the social, economic, and political challenges facing remote rural dwellers. This background in agriculture serves well for casual initial or introductory conversation with villagers where agriculture provides the mainstay of a local economy.

Secondary education in the Commonwealth of Virginia as to early colonial development added value to the understanding of Starr’s assertion -

“...It might be objected that Central Asian parliaments are packed with notables from the regional groupings and clans, and with people representing the magnates who control both publicly and privately owned enterprises. But how different is this from the eighteenth-century Virginia House of Burgesses...” (Starr, 2006, pg.19).

Andreski likened political behavior in Turkey, a close neighbor of Azerbaijan, as being similar to Virginia to a feudal system shortly after the turn of the twentieth century:

“...Notwithstanding the exclusion of the Mughal and the Ottoman Empires, and of a number of other oriental states, the criterion of domination by owners of large estates would give “feudalism” a very wide denotation which would cover early Rome as well as medieval Hungary and Virginia on the eve of the American Civil War” (Andreski, 1965, pg. 151).

The flora and fauna of the Caucasus and Appalachian Mountains ranges provides similarity as well (Sankovski and Pridnia, 1995).

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20 Starr includes Azerbaijan in his study.

21 The Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia are part of the Appalachian Mountain range.
mountainous portions of Azerbaijan, in some ways, was much like traveling to the mountains I call home. Social, economic, and political organization of extended families in Azerbaijan functions much the same as my father’s extended family in Virginia.  

As I questioned citizens in rural Azerbaijan, the similarities and differences between rural life in Azerbaijan and rural life in the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia became obvious. Slowly the focus in Azerbaijan narrowed to specifics related to political preferences exhibited by rural dwellers, particularly those in remote mountain environs. Early on this was not an academic project but it was evident that locals were reluctant to converse with outsiders. A portion of this reluctance was due to experiences of the Soviet era. I subsequently created a system for numbering the people I spoke with and a separate numbering system for each of the villages or small towns visited so that no names of respondents or their respective villages might be identified by anyone other than me. Using this system I could later identify the year of the interviews, the town or village and gender of the respondent. Ultimately all seven major regions of the country would be visited over a period of several years.

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22 For an excellent account of the contributions made by the Virginia Scots-Irish clans’ contributions to U.S. development see Senator Jim Webb’s (D, VA) *Born Fighting*.

23 In Soviet days before 1991, these were casual conversations more than formal interviews.

24 Questioning females to whom I was not related was unacceptable social behavior so questions were posed through other females.
3.3 Conclusion

Chapter 4 will utilize qualitative information gathered from international\textsuperscript{25} and local field sources to demonstrate declining state capacity and the noticeable absence of clan ties to the state.

Chapter 5 will demonstrate the results of the network graph superimposed over a Google Earth map. If the graph depicts the anticipated network of clan activity properly, this should indicate graphic representation to correspond to field observations of clan and state behavior in 1995, i.e., that social networks of clans can result in political networks of deputies to the National Assembly that serve to increase state capacity. It is in this final chapter we see graphic representation of clan participation in the National Assembly. The complex networks of clan interaction translate to political involvement at the state level. This network analysis is the only known example showing the ties between highly decentralized sub national polities and a centralized state. Visual interpretation serves to help capture the rich description of events derived from Chapter 5 (Tufte, 1997).

\textsuperscript{25} See Appendix 3A for a detailed listing of the sources.
**Bibliography**


Chapter 4: Decreasing state capacity without clans  
Timeframe 1 (T1) 18 October 1991 – June 1993

As events unfolded in the USSR during the late 1980s and early 1990s, fifteen new countries emerged. New states would form to govern these new countries. This chapter begins as the Republic of Azerbaijan declared its independence from the USSR and follows events up to the presidential election in the fall of 1993. It was a tumultuous time for the new country with leadership changing frequently.

While clans were present across the geographic space called Azerbaijan they were not employed as a tool for increasing state capacity. Failure to utilize this most valuable social network led to near-state failure. The failure to recognize this importance requires explanation to those who may be unfamiliar with the uneven distribution of clan power across Azerbaijan prior to further discussion.

This chapter is organized into five sections. Section 4.1 explores the uneven distribution of clan influence across rural and urban settings. An understanding of this irregular allocation of clan power is critical to the reader’s consideration of both T1 and T2. Section 4.2 briefly looks at the short Mutalibov presidency’s lack of clan involvement. Section 4.3 examines the Elchibey presidency and its attempts to increase state capacity void of clan participation. Section 4.4 looks at the very early days of the Aliyev presidency which will result in strong clan ties to the state. Section 4.5 is the summary of this chapter.
4.1 The uneven distribution of clan power in Azerbaijan

The “opposition between urban and rural ways of life... is the most obvious gulf in Soviet Society today” Kerblay, 1983, pg. 221).

Clans exhibit less influence in metropolitan areas than in rural areas (Kerblay, 1983). There is a long-standing history of this behavior in the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku. Baku is the largest city in Azerbaijan with population estimates of approximately two million people\(^{26}\). Of this number, some are permanent residents, some are temporary residents, some are tourists and others are diplomats or business people. This list is far from complete but the point here is the city provides a rich environment for diverse cultural interaction.

Because of this dynamic interaction in the city, clan members are not limited to daily interaction with the same small number of people they might expect to see in their home village. As a consequence of constant interaction with those outside their own clan, the importance of clans diminishes relative to the small village community. Existing literature attributes a number of reasons for the breakdown of the power of clans in the greater Baku area.

First is the issue of ethnic diversity. Swietochowski and Altstadt both agree that ethnic differences may tend to reinforce segregation of individuals who have left their village clans seeking employment in the industrialized area around Baku (Swietochowski, 1995, ppg. 39-42; Altstadt, 1992, pg. 32). The relative isolation from clan identification serves to create greater individualism rather than communitarian values present in the village. Intermarriage with other ethnicities may serve to dilute clan

\(^{26}\) Estimates range from 1.8 million to 2.3 million but these are just estimates.
importance. Localized micro communities of ethnic groups may serve to isolate clan members thus precluding institutional norms for problem solving. Kerblay finds ethnic diversity stands “in contradiction to that of the country” which contributes to the erosion of “deeply rooted social integration” (Kerblay, 1983, pg.61).

The second reason cited as an element causing reduction in the power of clans in metropolitan areas is immigration. Altstadt, Suny, and van der Leeuw cite two types of immigration as having an impact on the reduction of clan power. One type, internal migration, consists of those persons from remote villages within Azerbaijan. The other type consists of immigration from Dagestan (just north of the border in Russia) and two groups from Iran – Iranian Azerbaijanis and Persians. According to the arguments presented by these three authors immigrants who would normally rely on clan ties to other clan members are now isolated as individuals rather than being part of an extended family (Altstadt, 1992, ppg. 22-29; Suny, 1972, ppg. 10-11; van der Leuw, pg. 104).

Suny provides three additional reasons for the decrease in clan power in the Baku metropolitan area. These reasons are class, nationality, and language. According to Suny, village clan members moving to Baku are often viewed as being “ignorant peasants” and as such are isolated as second-class citizens by permanent residents (Suny, 1972, pg. 7). Second, Azerbaijani and Dagestani clan members, who once lived in neighboring villages, find Baku city living a “stark contrast to village life” as these two groups are now made intensely aware of the nationality differences (ppg.14-15). This is accomplished through disparities in pay rates, according to Suny. Suny tells his readers that those laborers perceived as being from outside the geographic boundaries of
Azerbaijan are often paid lower wages. The third reason given by Suny is the multiple dialects within the Azerbaijani language. Each clan has a slightly different dialect (pg. 38)\textsuperscript{27}. The slightly different dialects serve to strengthen ties within any given region of the country but often serve to pit rural clan members against urban dwellers when living in Baku, by Suny’s estimate.

This brief section points to an important piece of the complexity of clan involvement with the state – those from rural clans are raised believing in certain norms, which may be absent in larger metropolitan areas. As the close ties within clans tend to breakdown in the face of diverse urban demands, the importance of the clan weakens. Those raised in metropolitan areas may not be aware of the significance of building common goals within and between clans to promote the wellbeing of all members. This coalition building becomes a critical element in increasing state capacity.

4.2 The Mutalibov Presidency – weak clan ties to the state

Soviet constitution and Soviet-style politics

October 18, 1991, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Azerbaijan adopted the Declaration of Independence\textsuperscript{28} making Azerbaijan the first of the Soviet republics to become independent from the USSR. Ayaz Mutalibov, formerly the President of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic\textsuperscript{29}, was elected as the first President of the newly independent Republic of Azerbaijan. He was the only candidate for the office of

\textsuperscript{27} My field research bears out this argument by Suny and is still valid in the post independence era.

\textsuperscript{28} The document “On restoration of the state independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan” was introduced in the Supreme Council on August 30, 1991 but took until October 18, 1991 to adopt.

\textsuperscript{29} Mutalibov was elected in May 1990 by the Supreme Council.
President when the popular election was held September 8, 1991. In a popular referendum in December 1991, the citizens of Azerbaijan voted for the earlier adopted Declaration of Independence (Fairbanks, 2007, p. 48).

Mutalibov’s tenure in office began October 30, 1991, and continued uninterrupted until May 6, 1992. On this date, he was forced by the Supreme Soviet to step down, turning over the reins of governance to Yaqub Mammadov, Prime Minister, and leader of the Supreme Soviet (Swietochowski, 1995, pg. 219). On May 14, just 8 days later, Mutalibov would once again assume the mantel of leadership only to relinquish control four days later on May 18 to Isa Gambar. Gambar remained the acting President until new elections could be scheduled on June 17, 1992.

The Supreme Soviet consisted of 450 members, elected in 1990, which was prior to Azerbaijan’s independence (Badalov and Mehdi, 2005). Only 43 members were of parties other than the Communist Party. The Supreme Soviet was disbanded to be replaced by a new National Assembly on May 15, 1992, comprised of 50 members (Badalov and Mehdi, 2005).

Amidst all this apparent turmoil, Mutalibov tried to maintain a deteriorating state under the auspices of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), dated 1978. His general approach was to maintain strict ties to the former, now faltering, central control from Moscow. However, the Supreme Soviet quickly lost confidence in Mutalibov’s leadership skills and the promise that Azerbaijan would head into the future following the same path as that of the now defunct USSR.
Mutalibov had little time in office to devote to increasing state capacity as the entire Soviet sphere of influence was in the process of rapid disintegration. One might imagine that building coalitions within the informal clan system was secondary on the President’s agenda to stopping the social, economic, and political hemorrhage present as the Soviet empire collapsed.

Isa Gambar, Speaker of the newly formed National Assembly, assumed control as acting President May 16 (in the absence of Mutalibov) and would serve in that capacity until Abulfaz Elchibey assumed the role June 17, 1992 (following formal elections held on the June 6 in which Elchibey’s role as President was confirmed by the new National Assembly). Unlike Mutalibov, Gambar had either sufficient time with which to build clan networks nor any political aspirations to assume the role of President on a permanent basis.

Mutalibov was born and raised in Baku at a time when it was advisable to be as “Russified” as possible. Because of his upbringing in a large metropolitan area Mutalibov lacked detailed knowledge of the critical clan contacts necessary to increase state capacity quickly. Additionally, Mutalibov was not in daily contact with the clan elders occupying leadership positions in the rural population who represented the majority of his constituency. As a result of his lack of knowledge as to the significance of clans Mutalibov quickly lost the confidence of rural clans and was forced from office.

30 Persons whose families have long-standing residence and history in Baku are referred to by locals as “Bakunian”.

64
During the brief period from the fall of 1991 until the late spring of 1992 neither Mutilibov nor Gambar sought to capitalize on the strength of these extended kinship groups known as clans in any meaningful fashion. Only one indicator of increasing state capacity was realized during this time increasing number of political parties (see Appendix B, Chapter 5). Most of these political parties dissolved as fast as they were formed or they failed to meet necessary requirements for legitimate political party status under the existing constitution. Some of these “new” political parties in the Mutilibov presidency time advocated violent overthrow of the government and were outlawed. Ultimately, the growth in the number of viable political parties would decline under Mutilibov (Shaffer, 2004, ppg. 30-93)\(^31\).

The remaining five indicators of increased state capacity under examination were noticeably absent during this time. Under the Mutilibov presidency land privatization was not a serious consideration as Mutilibov sought to maintain state ownership of all property – a legacy of USSR policy where all property belonged to the state. Field notes reveal that foreign direct investment (FDI) was being discussed by urban and rural citizens with mixed reaction. While some political elites in Baku were intent on recruiting outside investors, most remote rural villagers were focused on reviving trade within the now deteriorating Soviet system of republics\(^32\). The inflation rate during the Mutilibov presidency was NOT an appreciable factor under consideration by most clan members.

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\(^31\) Shaffer provides a very detailed report documenting each viable political party’s starting and ending dates, the principle actors, the platform, and alliances between parties. She also documents those parties with very short life spans (in some cases these political parties lasted a few days) and few members.

\(^32\) These same field notes indicate great confusion as information was slow reaching remote locations. This same information was largely incomplete and viewed with great skepticism amid the continuing disintegration of the USSR.
What created greater concern was the change from the ruble, the common currency of the USSR, and to the manat, the new currency of the new Republic of Azerbaijan.

Participation in bilateral or multi lateral conventions was also absent during the Mutalibov administration with one exception – Azerbaijan was accepted into the United Nations (UN) on 2 March 1992. It would be more than two months later before Azerbaijan could establish a Permanent Mission to the UN (UN-Azerbaijan), which was after Mutalibov was forced from office. During this time the Mutalibov administration was not party to any multilateral agreements within the UN framework.

4.2.1 Information gathered during the Mutalibov presidency

Field notes and interviews among clan members during this time reveal considerable discontent with the system of governance as much as with Mutalibov. There was some difference in perception of the new government in Baku. Villagers in lowland areas, generally near the Kura or Aras rivers, viewed the Mutalibov administration as another extension of continued domination of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The concept of a state independent of Moscow had yet to have any real meaning for most of those interviewed. Clan members in mountains in the north of the country exhibited mixed feelings. Some clan elders expressed displeasure that they were not being consulted by the new state now in power. Other clan elders reported that they did
not care what government claimed to be in control as long as they (meaning the government) stayed out of the mountains.\textsuperscript{33}

Field notes taken during the Mutalibov presidency suggest that this researcher was overwhelmed by the decreasing power of the state to accomplish anything, outside Baku. Roads in outlying areas were in serious state of disrepair, electricity lines were being torn down and sold as scrap metal, stealing any items of value was common place, annual and perennial were in the worst shape in many years. Electricity service (when available at all) was for brief periods, clean water in the industrial city of Sumgait was at a premium, and gas for cooking or heating was limited to two hours per day (when there was gas). Food in the bazaars was scant although there was greater quantity and variety in smaller towns and villages.\textsuperscript{34}

These same notes indicate a lack of Azerbaijani military working on public projects. Most of the Azerbaijani military forces during this time consisted of construction units with very little combat training or weapons which was a legacy of the USSR system. In the extreme north and south along the frontiers there were bandits roving freely. Village clan elders organized their own defense forces to combat bandit groups because there was no effective internal police force.

In one rural area in the southern mountains, there was a military camp but the soldiers were not receiving regular pay so they preyed on the local villagers’ food caches.

\textsuperscript{33} The reader is reminded that collection of information during this time was informal, unstructured, and of personal interest only.

\textsuperscript{34} All information in this paragraph was derived from field notes. Wealthier residential sections in Baku are a notable exception to these observations.
Along coastal areas of the Caspian Sea, particularly around Neftchala fishermen were poaching sturgeon to eat\textsuperscript{35}. Some portions of the more devout Muslims were actually eating pork to survive.

My notes also tell the story, no matter which village, of people fearful of their country fragmenting and being absorbed by Russia or Iran. Repeatedly there were entries of rural villagers referring to the treaties of Gulistan and Turkmenchay\textsuperscript{36} in which their country was divided among greater powers during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The state was not stagnant in its capacity during this time it was literally decreasing in capacity.

4.2.2 Surviving “official” documents

Documents maintained by the current state provide little accurate or valid record of the Mutalibov presidency for several reasons. First is language/alphabet. As the USSR fell into disarray the use of Russian as the official language rapidly declined to be replaced with Azeri. Likewise the use of the Cyrillic alphabet was replaced with the Latin alphabet. A host of transliteration problems is obvious.

Second is the contest of who was to keep the records. The Russian technicians responsible for maintaining records during the Soviet years were exiting Azerbaijan in large numbers leaving untrained personnel in charge of this task.

\textsuperscript{35} Neftchala, on the southern cost of Azerbaijan, was the long-standing center for the harvesting of “Russian” caviar but now the fishermen were so poor they had to eat sturgeon to survive.

\textsuperscript{36} These two treaties were from the early nineteenth century and effectively transferred control of present day Azerbaijani territory from Iran to Russia.
The third challenge to accuracy during this time was a crumbling infrastructure for collecting data. As the transition from centralized Soviet collection to decentralized new-state collection began little thought was given to methodical collation of records. As a result there are conflicting dates, various names of personnel in positions of authority, and actions reflected in the records.

Finally, the politics of the Mutilibov administration stand in contradiction to the stated goals of later administrations. Because of this, records were modified after the fact to portray Mutilibov as perhaps less effective than he actually was at the time.

4.3 The Elchibey Presidency – weak clan ties to the state
Soviet constitution and radical shift to Westernization

Like Mutilibov, Elchibey’s government was operating under the Constitution of the ASSR dated 1978. This constraint would continue to provide an inhibition to incorporation of the clans as viable political actors as this constitution made no allowance for clan involvement. As the Presidency of Elchibey disintegrated, desperate measures were taken to save the state and country.

Abulfaz Elchibey37 (real name Abulfaz Aliyev) was elected President June 6, 1992, and began his tenure ten days later, serving uninterrupted until June 24, 1993. Elchibey’s approach differed greatly from Mutilibov in several distinct ways. First, Elchibey pulled away from the former USSR and Moscow’s control, favoring a move to the “West”, particularly Turkey. His “pan-Turkic” views contrasted markedly with the views of the majority of metropolitan dwellers in the capital, Baku.

37 Elchibey is an assumed title which translates to noble messenger.
Second, Elchibey managed to alienate many rural citizens as they viewed his performance as that of a soyyug ganli itlar (cold-blooded dog)\(^{38}\) or one who has turned his back on his own clan and village. Elchibey was born and raised in the rural Ordubad raion (district)\(^{39}\) of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, considered by most Azerbaijanis to be a part of their country. He moved to Baku as a young man and would not permanently return to his home village again\(^{40}\) until his ouster from office in June 1993. He should have been well acquainted with the constraints and benefits of the clan system in Azerbaijan. Even though Elchibey was not an only child he did not seek to base his administration on his or any other clan ties.

While personally popular in Baku (Ukudeeva, 2000), his personal charm did not translate to political prominence. He was viewed by many as trying to move the country politically too far to the West, too fast. In rural areas of the new republic, Elchibey was viewed (broadly speaking) as being too focused on international affairs while neglecting the internal challenges facing his new country and the citizens. Thus his personal popularity was overshadowed by his political unpopularity.

Third, Elchibey did make initial contacts with several states and corporate leaders from other countries during his brief tenure but no meaningful treaties or business arrangements were confirmed. A part of this deficiency was due to reluctance of potential investors to become involved with the failing Soviet legal structures and the questionable

\(^{38}\) This is a colloquial translation.

\(^{39}\) Elchibey’s village is Keleki.

\(^{40}\) Persons who move to the capital as a permanent residence are referred to by local rural dwellers as “Bakiinsky”, a somewhat derogatory name.
future of an unstable state. Even though Azerbaijan was admitted to the United Nations (UN) in March 1992, arguments persist in Azerbaijan as to which President gets credit for this political alliance – Mutalibov or Elchibey? Regardless, the Permanent Mission to the UN would remain a facade only until Aliyev took power.

During the Elchibey administration the incidents of revolt/secession continued to rise, the number of viable political parties stagnated, and the military failures related to the perceived seizure of Karabagh by neighboring Armenia led to ineffective leadership.

The remaining four indicators of increased state capacity under examination were noticeably absent during this time. Under the Elchibey presidency land privatization was given consideration in the form of state sponsored law. This new law was never effectively implemented due to lack of state funds and infrastructure. FDI managed to gain very little consideration due to far more serious events unfolding before President Elchibey. The inflation rate during the Elchibey era began to increase, but only slightly. A special note is needed here. Field notes indicate the increase in inflation rate was higher in Baku, Ganja, and Sumgayit than in most rural villages and towns. Elchibey initially turned to Turkey to begin a program of bilateral agreements but this soon lost traction with Turkish political and economic actors. Elchibey’s continual focus on “pan-Turkism” was viewed as politically untenable. His later attempts to create agreements with the new states in Central Asia met with similar reaction. President Elchibey had limited success in bringing Azerbaijan closer to multi lateral agreements as his efforts were viewed as desperate.
4.3.1 Information gathered during the Elchibey presidency

Interviews with clan members during this time reveal a slightly more focused interest in the political behavior of village residents in this new country emerging from the USSR. Some clan elders were still unhappy that they were not being included in discussions with the Elchibey administration now in power. This reference reflects long-standing distrust of researchers encountered during Soviet days. Many times information gathered during the time of the USSR was used by Russian Politburo officials to create discord and division within certain perceived ethnic, national, and religious communities.

A question appears in my notes during the Elchibey presidency – ‘Why doesn’t the government do something?” The political and economic situation was becoming worse than during the Mutalibov presidency, according to field notes. The Talysh in the southeast were threatening secession, Lezghis in the northeast were clamoring for autonomy from Azerbaijan and Russia, Avars in the north were publicly discussing autonomy, and sporadic fighting in Karabagh had turned into full-fledged war.

Field notes also tell another story. While the political and economic spheres of the country were decline, the social sphere was actually strengthening. Clan connections in the small towns and villages were invaluable during this time to mitigate some of the effects of continuing decline of the state to provide basic services to citizens.

It was during the waning days of the Elchibey administration that I started following the behavior of the formal state actors.
4.3.2 Surviving “official” documents

Documents maintained by the current state provide a slightly more accurate record of the Elchibey time as President than it did for the Mutalibov presidency. Examination of a limited number of these documents still provides challenge due to the language barriers already discussed. One does notice an increase in the use of Azeri Latin alphabet.

Collectively these records showed no increase in the use of clans in any formal or informal sense by the Elchibey state apparatus. There are records indicating growing discord among certain communities within the geographic boundaries of Azerbaijan – all of which are rural. Specific reference is made to groups along the border with Iran and Russia.

As the country edged closer to failed state status and fragmentation of the country loomed on the horizon (Taagepera, 2000) Elchibey called upon a former political adversary, Heydar Aliyev, for support, on June 15, 1993. Aliyev, formally retired from mainstream political life in Baku, had been quietly building a clan-centric coalition in his native Naxcivan41. It is interesting to note here that both men share the same last name and were raised quite close to one another (geographically) but had very different views on the relative importance and power of clan networks. Though these two men shared the same desire to bring some increased measure of stability to the state and the country they had very divergent political ideologies.

41 Naxcivan is an autonomous region (exclave) of Azerbaijan physically separated from the country.
4.4 The Heydar Aliyev Presidency leading to the election of 1993 – the beginnings of strong clan ties to the state.
Soviet constitution and return to Azerbaijani clan system

“We need an elder…” Bakhtiyar Vahabzade⁴²

Still operating under the 1978 Constitution,⁴³ Heydar Aliyev⁴⁴ assumed the role as acting Prime Minister (effectively the President) June 15, 1993 following a coup led by Col. Surat Husseinov against Elchibey. New elections were scheduled for October 3, 1993 and Aliyev easily won. Aliyev would remain in this role until new elections were held in November 1995.

In the three and half months from the middle of June 1993 to early October 1993 Aliyev would set the stage for full incorporation of the highly decentralized clans into a centralized state apparatus. By looking to past successes and failures within Azerbaijan Aliyev was able to move to a future with greater state capacity. Aliyev immediately began the process of incorporating close family members into a trusted inner circle of primary formal state political actors.

4.4.1 Information gathered during the early days of the Aliyev presidency

I made no trips to Azerbaijan during the first months of the Aliyev presidency. Travel within much of rural Azerbaijan during this time was deemed hazardous for me as a non-Azerbaijani.

⁴² Taken from Thomas Goltz’s Azerbaijan Diary, pg 380.
⁴³ The importance of a new constitution is addressed in Chapter 5.
⁴⁴ The spelling of this name appears in multiple forms, depending on the writer.
4.4.2 Surviving “official” documents

State documents preserved from this 1993 time are plentiful and filled with the names of Aliyev clan members and clan contacts. While still in its infancy the Aliyev administration struggled to save a fragmenting state using a new tactic, the incorporation of clans and clan contacts. This becomes the focus of Chapter 5.

4.5 Conclusion

Table 4.5 shows the six indicators and the notable absence of five of the six indicators of increasing state capacity. Only increasing number of political parties and increasing revolt/secession are present in T1 as depicted on the table.

Table 4.5
Indicators of increasing state capacity in Azerbaijan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator of increasing state capacity</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Absent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increasing land privatization</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing FDI</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreasing inflation rate</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral &amp; bilateral conventions</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing number of political parties</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreasing revolt/secession</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The + symbols demonstrate the presence of an indicator relative to increasing state capacity. The – symbols demonstrate the absence of an indicator relative to increasing state capacity.

While clans have great social, economic, and political significance in rural villages, the same may not be true in urban cities. Clan members leaving their village for
the city are likely to experience a weaker network of readily usable ties to urban society. In this context, the diverse interests present in metropolitan settings have a tendency to diminish the importance of clans. Long-term residents of cities or those born and raised in cities may not recognize the importance of clans to large geographic areas of the country, which may constitute the majority of a country’s population.

President Mutalibov was born and raised in Baku and failed to recognize the importance of the rural clan system nor was he in a social position (as a non-clan member) to capitalize on clan contacts to increase state capacity. President Elchibey was born and raised in rural Azerbaijan but failed to keep in close contact with his own clan through his years in Baku. Aliyev was born and raised very close to Elchibey’s village but instead of turning his back on his clan, he sought their personal support (especially after the death of his wife Zarifa in 198545).

Clan members control their leaders through a process identified by Christopher Boehm as reverse dominance. “… an apparent absence of hierarchy was the result of followers’ dominating their leaders, rather than vice versa.” Boehm added that, “The ultimate egalitarian political rebuke is to terminate a person’s political role. The final solution is assassination…” records Boehm (1993). Evidence of this practice in Azerbaijan is the rapid rise and fall of both Ayaz Mutalibov and Abulfaz Elchibey during the early 1990s.

45 Zarifa was an Aliyev prior to her marriage to Heydar, born and raised close to the village where Heydar was born and raised. Her clan ties to Heydar’s clan would figure prominently in Heydar’s presidential successes even after her death.
All three men had histories of political involvement during the Soviet years. All three men were political notables. All three men had occasion to be politically forceful when necessary. Yet only one, Aliyev, called upon his clan members in time of state crisis. Where would this lead?
Bibliography


Chapter 5: Clans increase state capacity  
T2 June 1993 – November 1995

“...until the summer of 1993 clannishness in post-Soviet Azerbaijan did not play a dominant role, although it actually was in place” (Yusunov, 1997).

This chapter explores the period from June 1993 until October 1995. It is during this T2 transition period that we see the importance of clans become critical to increasing state capacity. The reader should take note that dates and names overlap during this time as the numbers of clans and clan associates working with the state increases to form the foundations of a viable functioning state apparatus with increased capacity.

The chapter is organized into six sections. Section 5.1 focuses on the ascension to the presidency by Heydar Aliyev, a former KGB operative and former Politiburo member during Soviet days. Section 5.2 focuses on Aliyev’s immediate reliance on his clan, after his popular election in the fall of 1993 with a rapidly expanding network of ties to other clans within the emerging republic in an effort to stem growing dissension in this nearly-failed country. During this second section there is notable reference to increases in state capacity as the Aliyev network extends foreign direct investment and bilateral negotiations with foreign governments. Section 5.3 discusses involvement of clans in the areas of expanding FDI and bilateral and multi lateral agreements. Section 5.4 concentrates on efforts of the state to frame a new constitution and hold meaningful popular elections for an expanded National Assembly replete with a plurality of political interests all with the aid of clans. Section 5.5 analyzes the collected data with maps and networks graph. Section 5.6 is a conclusion of this chapter.
5.1 Heydar Aliyev comes to power

Heydar Aliyev became Chairman of the National Assembly of Azerbaijan June 24, 1993 simultaneously assuming the role of acting President in the absence of the deposed Elchibey. In October 1993, formal elections were held, cementing Aliyev’s position as President, a spot he would hold until his re-election in October 1998.

President Aliyev had multiple “first” tasks to perform – his country was involved in a military conflict with neighboring Armenia, the Talysh-Mugham Republic formally seceded from the southern part of his country (June – August 1993), and the Lezghi Independence Movement (aka Sadval) petitioned the state for secession (October 1993 – April 1994). Trade networks in the former USSR collapsed, there was skyrocketing inflation, state employees were not being paid, most Russian technicians were leaving the country to return home leaving large portions of existing infrastructure idle, and farmers were no longer bringing food to metropolitan markets.

5.2 Heydar Aliyev takes charge

Aliyev had already begun the task of gathering close family members (gohun gardash) into the political inner circle. This initial phase was followed by incorporating distant family members (gohun agraba) into the state. Finally Aliyev completed his clan’s involvement by hiring even more distant relatives (varis) for important government posts. Vasif Talybov (a brother-in-law), Mahmud Eyyubov (a brother-in-

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46 Aliyev had a thirty-year long history of political service to the USSR culminating with his appointment to the Politburo in Moscow. He was dismissed in 1987 by Gorbachev from his post as First Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union (the third most politically powerful man in the Soviet Union). Aliyev had been noticeably absent from the political scene in Baku during the early years of independence.
law), Jalal Aliyev (a brother), Agil Aliyev (a brother), Ilham Aliyev (his son), Mahmud Mammadguliyev\(^47\) (his son-in-law) were all placed in strategic government posts. This group consisted of those Aliyev felt he could trust, within parameters of reason (Banfield, 1958). A more complete list of clan members and their respective high ranking government positions appears in Appendix A.

President Aliyev called upon his son, Ilham (from Garadag), his son-in-law, Mahmud Mammadguliyev (from Naxcivan city), two brothers, Agil (from Baku) and Jamal (from Saatlı). Next Aliyev incorporated three brothers-in-law, Vasif Talibov (from Naxcivan), Shirzad Eyyubov (from Agshu), and Javanshir Pashazade (from Lankoran), already associated members of the Aliyev clan, to begin the coalition building process. The senior Aliyev now had clan members allied with him and all the southern, southwestern, and central geographic areas linked to the capital, Baku.

Joseph Kechichian notes that “… Azeri families and clans chose geographical locations to launch their various platforms independent of, and sometimes counter to, each other” (Kechichian, 1995). Each of his brothers-in-law and son-in-law had additional clan ties to other clans, which together with his own clan formed the basis for his control of the new state. The reader can begin to visualize that issues of governance are now linked to geographic control over the new state’s growing state capacity. A portion of this was to play an important role in the peaceful settlement of revolt/secession.

\(^{47}\) There are multiple spellings for each of these names.
It is important to remember that under Azerbaigiani custom the Eyyubov, Pashayev, Talybov, and Mammadguliyev clans are not part of the Aliyev clan. The coalition of these five clans is cited as a small sampling of the manner in which the clans become engaged in power sharing in order to increase state capacity.

Power sharing between clans was a key element to the success of increasing state capacity. Rumer states “…the system of power-sharing remains an important institution” (Rumer, 1989). This institution (norm) was apparently evident elsewhere within the former sphere of Soviet influence at the time according to Luong. “Power-sharing between clans was a common feature…” (Luong, 2000). Luong’s work focused on political behavior in the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan but some aspects of political behavior in these three countries was similar to political behavior in Azerbaijan in the mid 1990s.

As the need for growing infrastructure grew rapidly to meet the challenges of saving the country from what appeared to be near failure, Aliyev began to seek members from other clans to fill bureaucratic posts within the state. This step had two immediate advantages. First it built multiple clan coalitions comprised of many clan interests across the geographic space of the country. Second it gave rural clan members more direct access to the new political processes and actors emerging in the aftermath of the fall of the USSR. By promoting the idea of plural clan participation Aliyev effectively used social networks to build political consensus aimed at improving overall social, economic, and political growth of the country.
An unexpected benefit of this effort on Aliyev’s part was an increase in the capacity of the newly centralized state to govern the highly decentralized clans without the need for a major coercive organization such as skilled and well-trained police or military forces. Simultaneously, the clans perceived that a clan elder was in charge of the country who represented all clans and thus these clans were anxious to participate in the political process in a significant fashion. The state and the clans were each responsible for creating a self-reinforcing feedback loop of growing state capacity.

“Because of their highly respected positions within the traditional institutions these individuals command the loyalty of the masses” (Fathi, 1980). While loyalty is an expectation of the leaders, the same is true of those clan members not in positions of leadership. This translates to a horizontal relationship between members and their leadership rather than a vertically hierarchical relationship.

5.2.1 End of Talysh-Mughan Republic

Just as Elchibey was about to exit the political stage in Baku, the Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic declared its secession from the Republic of Azerbaijan. The action occurred on June 21, 1993 in response to long-standing desires of the Talysh people to have an autonomous state of their own. This small territory in the southeast of Azerbaijan along the Caspian Sea and the border with Iran had occupied seven of Azerbaijan’s administrative loosely associated with the same geographic space as the Talysh khanate of the eighteenth century (Socor 2004, Shafee, 2008)

Heydar Aliyev assumed the mantel of leadership in Baku and immediately moved to quell the revolt using his clan members’ contacts to undermine the authority of
Gumbatov, the self-proclaimed leader of the Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic. By August 1993 the revolt was over and Gumbatov was in prison. Information gathered from field interviews revealed that members of the Mammadguliev (clan of Aliyev’s son-in-law) and Pashazade clans (clan with ties to his daughter’s-in-law clan) aided dissension within the Talysh community in the city of Lenkoran, which was the capital of this short-lived revolt. While small elements of the Azerbaijani military were employed to help quash this revolt the reader is reminded of the limited capacity of the military at the time.

5.2.2 The Lezghi Independence Movement (aka Sadval)

The Lezghin secession developed in a very different fashion in the northeast of Azerbaijan. This revolt/secession never came to fruition as Aliyev stemmed the tide early. Aliyev’s contacts through his late wife’s clan\(^{48}\) aided in this peaceful end. Field notes\(^{49}\) indicate that those interviewed had no serious intentions of pursuing any form of reunification with their Lezghi neighbors to the north in Russia. (Musayev, 2006; Krag and Funch, 1994, pg 16.; Dudwick, 2005). Efforts on the part of the Lezghis are ongoing but as of 1995 were limited to the formation of the Samur-Lezgi National Centre (see Appendix 5B).

The two examples of revolt/secession just cited are by no means the only examples in Azerbaijan that Aliyev had to deal with during these early years. To greater or lesser degree there were bids by Avars and Kurds to establish some form of

\(^{48}\) The contacts made by his wife’s father, Aziz, were made while Aziz was Secretary of the Dagestan Regional Committee, 1942-1948.

\(^{49}\) These notes were taken during the summer of 2006.
autonomous areas within the geographic space of this new country. What is remarkable about the incidents of revolt/secession in Azerbaijan in this timeframe is the generally peaceful nature of such efforts. “... one of the notable aspects of politics in Azerbaijan in the last decade of its existence has been the absence of violence between conflicting Azerbaijani groups” (Shaffer, 2004). The reader needs to keep in mind that other than the Talysh incident, no military force was required. Clan negotiations settled disputes without loss of life.

5.2.3 Karabagh War and “frozen conflict” with Armenia
December 10, 1991 – May 12, 1994

The single greatest event affecting the mindset of the Azerbaijani population was the loss of Karabagh territory to the Armenians during early days of the newly independent Azerbaijan. Unlike Elchibey, Aliyev approached this military disaster and its resulting loss of some 16% of perceived Azerbaijani soil with quick acting pragmatism. Aliyev was aware of the disparity between the military preparedness of Armenia’s military and that of Azerbaijan. He was also conscious of the perception that the new country’s leader must act in an aggressive manner to recover that which was just lost.

50 The reader should take note that the vast majority of Azerbaijanis see this as an act of overt aggression against the sovereign space of Azerbaijan. There are a number of conflicting documents alternately supporting the Azerbaijanis and Armenians in this ongoing debate of control over Karabagh.
Aliyev employed political rival Araz Alizade\(^{51}\) to facilitate initial contacts with the Armenian President, Levon Ter-Petrossian. Negotiations developed rapidly with a stalemate ultimately developing between the two countries, which remains in effect today. The resulting cease-fire was brokered by Russia 12 May 1994 (Zverev, 1996).

5.2.4 Solving problems without violence

With the country seemingly in a state of fragmentation Aliyev was fighting multiple battles simultaneously. He chose to utilize existing clan contacts to quell tests to his increasing state capacity.

“In the early 1990s, the main sources and bases of power in the Republic of Azerbaijan remained outside the parliament and formal organizations. Regional groupings and extended families remained through most of the decade the chief basis of power and a major source of support and mobilization” (Shaffer, 2004, pg. 24).

It is of particular interest that Aliyev sought to resolve portions of the challenges by non-violent means. The reader should keep in mind that during this time Aliyev had few formal coercive tools available such as a well trained and equipped military or police force. Again Shaffer provides insight “... one of the notable aspects of politics in Azerbaijan in the last decade of its existence has been the absence of violence between conflicting Azerbaijani groups” (pg. 30). Aliyev’s successes using nonviolent tools would later be remembered by clan members across Azerbaijan\(^{52}\).

\(^{51}\) The contentious political relationship between Alizade and Aliyev was well known. Less advertised locally is a “public secret” – these two were biological cousins. I have been unable to confirm that link.  
\(^{52}\) Field notes suggest that rural clan members hold Aliyev in high esteem six years after his death because he sought peaceful means to secure peaceful ends. This is common behavior among Azerbaijani clan elders.
5.2.5 Other known clan members asserting control

Vagif Talybov became chairman of Naxcivan Supreme Council and as such, the de facto ruler of Naxcivan. Ilham became the vice president of SOCAR (the state oil company) and later the Prime Minister. Under Ilham’s care, SOCAR, the state owned oil company, increased oil shipments, which led to the establishment of a state fund to preserve much of the profits. Ilham also began negotiations with companies in Russia and the United States to expand the number of Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs).

Jalal Aliyev, brother to Heydar, was appointed as Minister of Agriculture and implemented a land privatization program with stunning success. As the number of agricultural producers increased and the acreage increased, output of livestock and crops improved as well. In the 1993-1995 growing seasons, agricultural production was visibly greater than previous years. This was evidenced by field notes indicating increases in land mass planted in crops, reductions in numbers of people starving, and increases in numbers of livestock available to the population. With a vested interest in increased production farmers and livestock producers improved efficiency as well.

This privatization program had two effects; at the end of the second harvest season following initial implementation of the Privatization Act there was a surplus of food such that local producers could have disposable income thus expanding the tax base and the number of malnourished citizens in Azerbaijan began to slowly diminish. This brought about increased approval of the Aliyev administration and increased state capacity.

53 The privatization program had previously been passed by the National Assembly but lagged in implementation.
Appendix 5A includes a partial list of those clan members closely linked to Heydar in the early days of his administration. A cursory examination of this list reveals that not all the persons on this list are Aliyev clan members. By the time this list was published President Aliyev had already taken steps to expand the network of diverse clans to fill the growing bureaucracy of this nascent country. By incorporating a larger number of clans, Heydar was able to increase the capacity of the state.

5.3 Clan members involved in expanding foreign direct investment

5.3.1 Clan members increase FDI

Aliyev appointed his son-in-law Mahmud Mammadguliyev as Ambassador to the United Kingdom. As directed by Aliyev, Mammadguliyev immediately began initiating contact with British Petroleum (BP) with an eye to increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) through PSAs. BP’s interest in Azerbaijani oil that sparked the interest of other oil companies, in Russia and the U.S. President Aliyev signed the so-called Deal of the Century, 20 September 1994, with a consortium of 8 Western oil companies (Zverev, 1996). The nearly bankrupt Azerbaijani state received a $300 million signing bonus and $7.4 billion for development of the oil fields plus an estimated $81 billion profit over 30 years. This would be the first PSA signed in any former Soviet country after the fall of the USSR (Ibid).

Through the initial efforts of his son-in-law, Aliyev now had income for his new state. Other investors would follow suit. Companies seeking to build trade with the
former Soviet republics joined these investors. As investment and trade grew citizens of this new country began to feel confident in the new state – state capacity increased.

Field notes taken during this time revealed a noticeable increase in consumer goods even in remote villages. Consumer goods were available in greater quantities and variety in Baku and Sumgait. Reports from citizens indicated the same was true in Ganja. I made no trips to Ganja during the 1994 – 1995 period.

Several other observations were made during this time in rural villages, which serve to shed light on increasing state capacity. Increasing numbers of electric lines going to villages made out of copper wire rather than aluminum wire. This was important because it indicated the local population was no longer so poor that they were taking down the wire and selling it for cash. This also indicated that the state could justify the cost of copper wire, which was considerably higher that the aluminum used during Soviet days. Another piece of this particular observation is the increases in the number of villages being provided electricity – for some villages this was the first exposure to electric service from the state!

In the summer of 1995, flowers were being planted in town parks that had been abandoned by previous administrations. Repairs became obvious to sewer pipes and water lines in Baku, and increasing numbers of telephone lines became visible.

Conditions for the 800,000 refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) resulting from the Karabagh conflict were deplorable. In this country of almost 8 million people, the task of coping with this sudden mass of homeless people was overwhelming. The Aliyev administration was just beginning to organize efforts aimed at dealing with
the numerous “camps” that sprung up around rural areas of the country – Barda was the worst during the summer of 1995.

The Deal of Century was just beginning to have an appreciable effect on the lives of Azerbaijanis during this time. It would be another ten years before the state would have adequate financial resources to deal with most of the challenges faced by this new country in the 1993 – 1995 timeframe.

5.3.2 Clan members to increase bilateral and multi lateral agreements

Indirectly President Aliyev utilized contacts within the clans of the Jewish community to initiate contact with Dr. Efrayim Sne⁵⁴, a member of the Israeli Knesset with relatives living in Azerbaijan.

“By the end of 1993, Azerbaijan’s President Heydar Aliyev contacted the Israelis. Efryaim Sne, the Israeli Knesset member from the Labor Party visited Baku, where he met Aliyev and other Azerbaijani dignitaries” (Abadi, 2002).

Sne generated the first meetings with government sources in Israel which led to bilateral agreements between the two states. Friendly relations between these two countries would influence U.S. decisions to establish a warm working relationship between the U.S. and Azerbaijan (Abadi, 2002). Israel’s growing relations with the new Azerbaijani state led to the appointment of Hafiz Pashayev, uncle of Heydar’s daughter-in-law, as Azerbaijan’s first Ambassador to the United States.

⁵⁴ Sne, a long time member of the Labour party was Deputy Defense Minister within the Israeli state.
Ambassador Pashayev was the driving state official behind the establishment of the Azerbaijan-American Chamber of Commerce. This organization became the dominant portal for dissemination of information to U.S. businesses anxious to gain access to Azerbaijani markets.

5.4 Preparation for 1995 National Assembly election and viable political parties

“Political institutions are closely linked to clan structures and the ruling elite.”

ICG

Azerbaijan operated under the existing constitution of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic dated 1978. In January 1995 a Constitutional Committee was appointed by Aliyev. This committee would work on the draft of the new constitution. This commission of thirty-five carefully selected Azerbaijani scholars, representing multiple dominant clans convened to form a Constitution, which would serve the needs of the citizens of Azerbaijan (Amrahgizi, 1995). One third of this membership was lawyers (Amrahgizi, 1995). Etibar Mamedov\textsuperscript{55} was the only notable member from a political opposition party (Amrahgizi, 1995). By this time Aliyev managed to create sufficient coalitions among the clans so that there were no Aliyev clan members on this committee, other than Aliyev. On November 12, 1995, the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan was adopted by public referendum. On the same day, voters also publicly elected deputies to the new National Assembly of the Republic of Azerbaijan

\textsuperscript{55} See Appendix 5B.
The new Constitution was very different from any previous version (Amrahgizi, 1995). “The Azerbaijan people shall be the sole source of state power in the Azerbaijan Republic” (Azerbaijan, 1995). Section 1. Article 1 of the new Constitution makes very clear the intent of the framers – popular sovereignty. This Article is an outgrowth of Article 1 of the Azerbaijani Declaration of Independence56 (from tsarist Russia) dated May 28, 1918 (Mamedova, 1998), which states “Azerbaijan is a fully sovereign state; it consists of the southern and eastern parts of Transcaucasia under the authority of the Azerbaijani people” (Swietochowski, 1995, p. 68). In fact, the first 71 of 158 total articles deal with the power possessed by the people of the Azerbaijan including the mandate to amend the Constitution by public referendum in Article 3. Reinforcement of this power is repeated in Article 152 “Changes in the text of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic shall be adopted only via referendum” (Azerbaijan, 1995). Additional support for the power of the people appears in Article 153 “The Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic cannot give a conclusion on the changes in the text of the Azerbaijan Republic Constitution which are approved via referendum”. In short, the Constitutional Court, the highest court in the land, may not alter through interpretation the changes made by public referendum.

One final article regarding power of the people bears special mention; Article 17 states, “The family as the foundation of society shall be under special protection of the State” (Azerbaijan, 1995). Clan leaders interviewed to date cite

56 Sometimes referred to as the National Charter.
this Article as evidence that clans are under special protection of the state. Of the remaining articles, twenty-six articles deal with the establishment of executive power, eighteen set forth limits to legislative authority, nine establish citizen obligations to the state, and nine establish the various courts within the judicial branch. The remaining thirty-four articles deal with the establishment of the autonomous territory of Naxcivan. This element of popular sovereignty is central to Azerbaijani understanding of their country, according to field research.

The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, approved by public referendum, embodies the President with the majority of political power within the central government. “The institutionalization of Presidential authority is reinforced by a network of regional and family ties” (NDI, 1995, pg.8). This differs from the Constitution of the United States wherein Article 1 dictates that the legislature is dominant. Citizens of Azerbaijan elect the President for five-year terms on a schedule separate from election schedules of the National Assembly. This follows the U.S. pattern of holding Presidential elections separate from midterm elections for Congress. The President of Azerbaijan chooses his own Council of Ministers (loosely equivalent to the U.S. Presidential Cabinet) and they serve at his pleasure. Size and composition of the Council is dependent (in part) on the need of the President to build coalitions across clan’s geographic locations.
The new Constitution of Azerbaijan also contained “Transition Provisions”, following Article 158, providing for a codified plan to transition from the former USSR system to a very different system for this new republic.

5.4.1 Growth of viable political parties

“...political parties often revolve around strong political leaders or clans rather than coherent political platforms...” (Garagezli, 2003).

The growth of viable political parties leading up to the election and constitutional referendum in November 1995 was robust. Despite the number of political parties rural concepts of the nature and functions of political parties was limited, i.e. there was little significance attached to the process of political participation within a new plurality system.

Excerpts from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs’ Pre-election Report “The November 1995 Parliamentary Elections Republic of Azerbaijan” provides several clues as to the relative lack of preparedness of citizens to participate in this new electoral system. “The parties represent a broad spectrum of political orientation and organizational strength” (NDI, 1995, pg.13). “The opposition is a diverse and fluid set of parties” (Ibid, pg.14) “Many of these parties are tiny organizations with limited resources and organizational strength” (Ibid). “Most of the opposition parties have offices and produce newspapers in the capital, but share grave doubts about their ability to extend their campaigns to the regions57” (Ibid).

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57 The word “region” is synonymous with district or raion.
These brief excerpts allude to two important but little understood aspects of clan behavior: formal political participation in the capital city developed at a different rate than in rural districts and there was a plurality of political interests present in the period leading up to the November 1995 election. This plurality of interests deserves special mention in the following paragraph. The same NDI report states “The republic is currently governed as a highly centralized state in which power and authority flow from the office and person of the president down to the executive authorities at the local level” (pg.8).

It is critical for the reader to understand that the clan system present in Azerbaijan during this critical time of transition precluded the notion of a highly centralized state. This was a leading factor in the near-state failure – the state lacked centralization sufficient to exert power or authority. The state (meaning the administration of Heydar Aliyev) knew of this constraint and actively sought participation from the thousands of clan elders spread across the Azerbaijani landscape to build coalitions and share power. The centralized state receives a large part of its legitimacy or perceived legitimacy from the decentralized clans. “The bottom-up approach aims to provide channels and civic groups to give feedback to local government, voice their concerns or request particular information” (Garagezli, 2003, pg. 25) The governance of the state flows from the bottom up, not the top down!

The new National Assembly elected November 12, 1995 consisted of 125 deputies. One hundred deputies were elected by single member district suffrage and 25 were party list deputies. Political parties represented in the National Assembly serve only
as proxy for clan political preferences and should not be confused as having the same meaning or purpose as political parties in the United States. “In practice, the Milli Majlis (National Assembly) plays little role in politics” (EIU, 2006, p.10).

Scholars of the Azerbaijani National Assembly generally consider Shaffer’s documentation of political parties in Azerbaijan during the early year’s studies to be the seminal work (Shaffer, 2004). The complete list of viable political parties is used in upcoming analysis.

5.5 Analysis

“When Aliyev loses his support, his rule will end, only to be replaced by that of another clan leader”. (Kechichian and Karasik, 1995)

For a new country the question of whether the state functions in a meaningful fashion or not is largely dependent on the resources available. The state’s capacity to provide for the welfare and protection of the new country’s citizens may depend on unconventional approaches in the absence of adequately functioning centralized infrastructure. The information presented in this dissertation points to state focus on centralized institutions in T1 as inadequate to facilitate changes fast enough to meet the needs of the rapidly changing political environment in a new post colonial country. Having been a witness to the failings experienced in T1 the new state shifts its approach in T2 to a more decentralized system, which includes highly decentralized clan networks.

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58 The Milli Majlis is the proper Azerbaijani name for National Assembly.

59 I have taken the liberty of condensing her work in Appendix 5C.

60 Previously spelled Aliyev.
This chapter draws the conclusion that clans under limited circumstances can provide a major source of support for increasing state capacity when formal constitutional documents, governmental organizations, and political institutions are otherwise absent in the short-term. Reliance on existing informal kinship networks by centralized political leadership can lead to convergence of social, economic, and political goals across the newly formed country to the advantage of the general population and the state.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 6.1 explores the results of clans setting the stage for increased state capacity. Section 6.2 discusses the convergence of common goals of the state and clans in much the same fashion as the two major political parties in the UK immediately after World War II. Section 6.3 calls for increased study of sub national communities of political actors within the context of clan and/or tribal dominant countries.

5.5.1 A new reality in state capacity?

“...we can conclude that the laws of independent Azerbaijan are in many important aspects different from those of Soviet Azerbaijan...” (Badalov and Mehdi, 2005, pg.6)

The new Constitution of Azerbaijan was approved by popular referendum on 12 November 1995. This Constitution was framed to preserve most of the power of the state in the presidency with a significantly lesser quantity of political constraint placed with the National Assembly.

On the same date in November 1995, the first popular elections were held for deputies to the new National Assembly. The National Assembly was a consultative body
The new Constitution dictates that there are 125 deputies to this unicameral body (see Appendix 6A). The initial election consisted of 99 deputies elected from single member districts with 25 deputies elected by proportional representation. One single member district did not elect representation because there was ongoing military conflict in the district. In the first popular election of National Assembly deputies, nine political parties successfully seated deputies. Additionally, there were a number of Independent deputies elected. This diversification of political interests in a centralized state organization was a first for the new country. Aliyev’s plan for involvement of many clans across the geographic space of Azerbaijan was successful.

The newly formed national judiciary was also weak in November 1995, as the courts were just established by the popular ratification of the new Constitution. It would be several years before criminal and civil codes began to take shape and have impact on appreciable state capacity in this area of governance. These judicial constitutional constructs were in keeping with the clan system present in Azerbaijan as it had evolved over time.

“The only law that defined the framework of mutual relations within the society was the so-called "adat" (customary) law. Its observance was supervised by the free mountain communities and individual clans. This situation constitutes an interesting phenomenon: in defiance of Hobbes' theory of state and state power, the societies of the Caucasus Mountains were able to form - without laws or the executive in their traditional sense - a clearly defined code of standards and rules that prevented chaos in relations between individual community members” (Souleimanov, 2003).
Reliance on adat served rural village environments adequately but did little to address many of the legal challenges faced by citizens in major metropolitan areas, such as Baku. As codified criminal and civil code expanded to meet the needs of the new country, the federal court system would grow in size and scope.

Field notes indicate that political parties were based on clans in the 1995 period. A word of caution is required here. This does not translate to each clan having separate representation by a party but rather clans can form coalitions for formal political party purposes. The numbers of clans is staggering in this small country. Each clan has one “head man” and one or more “big men”. Typically, each small village has one clan but larger villages and small towns may have several clans represented. In November 1995, deputies elected to the National Assembly had highly significant roles in their respective clans. Some of these deputies were big men at the village level but most were not. Several deputies were female, not all of whom had metropolitan constituencies.

5.5.2 Displaying the results of data collected

To assist the reader in visualizing the complex nature of clan ties to the state in November 1995, a series of steps is necessary. First, a network graph is composed depicting existing ties between deputies in the immediate aftermath of the National Assembly election. Figure 6.1 depicts individual deputies as small spheres on the graph and the ties between the deputies are shown as straight lines. Numbers adjacent to the

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61 While no accurate data exists as to the total number of yashlı aksaks (“head men” in clans), the number most often bantered about is approximately 2,000. There are an additional 10,000 aksaks (“big men”) in Azerbaijani clans, according to the best estimates offered by the local population.

62 It is also possible for a clan to have an agbirchek (female clan elder).
spheres on the graph correspond to Excel spreadsheets with deputies’ names, voting
district numbers assigned in accordance with the new Constitution by the Central
Election Commission (CEC), and political party membership, if any membership is
expressed. Some deputies are “independent” of specific party affiliation. These
independent deputies are displayed as a column of spheres along the right side of the
graph. In the election of November 1995, independent deputies would come to represent
clans not yet allied with the major clan/political party coalitions. The importance of this
graph will become more evident in later figures within this chapter.

This dissertation concerns itself with complex behavioral issues related to
increasing state capacity rather than network analysis. However, some elements of
network analysis create a visual image thus enhancing understanding.
Figure 5.1
Clan/political party dispersion in the Azerbaijan National Assembly
November 1995

This graph is the product of data entered into Pajek 1.24, which is a computational software product. The Pajek software was chosen for the visual impact of the graphs displayed as well as its mathematical precision. Appendix 6A consists of all deputies elected to the National Assembly in November 1995. Appendix 6B is the code worksheet required for coding available data pertinent to this specific National Assembly election. Since there were multiple political parties represented in the National Assembly and
political parties are based on clans, the concept that one clan controlled the political environment of Azerbaijan seems unlikely.

This dispersion graph (Figure 5.1) shows two interconnected major clusters within the network of deputies in the National Assembly of Azerbaijan immediately after the popular election in November 1995. This graph indicates that there are two separate clans with powerful networks in the National Assembly. Since these two clusters are connected at many points (meaning by many deputies) the viewer of this graph may assume there are many clan ties with each other, now involved as part of the new state.

In the center of the graph, one sees a configuration similar to a multi-pointed star. The center node (deputy) of the star shaped configuration is Jalal Aliyev, brother of President Heydar Aliyev. In the lower left of this graph there is a minor cluster (adjacent to node 08) centered on Vasif Talybov, another relative of Heydar. In the lower right, the reader can see another cluster (adjacent to node number 28), this one centers on Javanshir Pashazade, and brother-in-law of Heydar. The final small cluster of nodes in the upper left of the graph (weakly defined and adjacent to node number 12) is that of Shirzad Eyyubov, brother-in-law of Heydar. By utilizing clan contacts of his brothers-in-law Heydar spread his network of clan control over most of the country thus increasing state capacity through both family and geography.

The second major cluster displayed in Figure 6.1, to the center right in this graph, represents the Pashayev clan (that of Heydar’s daughter-in-law, Mehriban). The Pashayev clan was arguably the second most powerful clan in Azerbaijan in November 1995. This
clan has significant ties to the northeast in Azerbaijan, which is partially due to links with the Leghiz previously discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

This depiction shows multiple interacting clans with appreciable political power in the National Assembly. This finding is significant because news articles generated by several international press releases and election observer groups present for the November 1995 elections cast the Aliyev clan as the only clan with power.

The rather large “grouping” of nodes to the extreme right of the graph represents two different communities of deputies elected in November 1995. This is not a cluster of nodes as defined in Chapter 3 but rather deputies representing a large population of constituents in a demographically dense area. The first set was those deputies elected from Baku, which represented nearly one-fourth of all deputies in the National Assembly. These deputies were elected by voting districts in Baku, which represented nearly one-fourth of all the population of Azerbaijan. The second set of nodes within this grouping represents those deputies elected by proportional representation. According to the new Constitution ratified the same day as the National Assembly election these proportional representation deputies. This proportional representation portion of Azerbaijan’s electoral process would by replaced by full single member district elections starting in 200563.

While this graph is an interesting display of the ties within and across political parties in the National Assembly of Azerbaijan in November 1995, it fails to capture the full meaning of geographic dispersion of clan involvement in increasing state capacity in Azerbaijan as of November 1995. This point is important because it demonstrates how

President Aliyev and clan elders from around the new country developed a consensus of common goals aimed at reversing the near catastrophe of previous administrations.

5.5.3 Mapping political geography of clans in Azerbaijan for visual clarity

The second stage in this visual presentation involves superimposing the dispersion graph over a geophysical map of the new country for greater clarity. Capturing the complexity present in the networks of clan ties to the state for purposes of increasing state capacity requires greater explanation. A Google Earth interactive map of Azerbaijan was located as one of several software packages needed to give greater visual impact to this study. Google Earth was chosen because access is readily available and data entry, while tedious, provided images of great clarity while allowing for a wide variety of constant updates to the project.

A grid option within the Google Earth software package was inserted over the existing map of Azerbaijan with numeric values assigned based on the grid lines (at 375 mile altitude) and labeled appropriate to the voting districts of the country. This grid was used to code geographic location of deputies elected in November 1995 for the express purpose of generating an overlay of the network graph when complete. Figure 5.2 displays the Google Earth image with grid and the appropriate grid coordinates which were used in construction of the final image (Figure 5.5). The grid’s numeric values were specifically structured to cover the entire geographic space of Azerbaijan. Thus, each elected single member district deputy can be located within the 15 X 12 grid overlay of the country.
Figure 5.2
Google Earth map of Azerbaijan with gridlines

Figure 5.3 depicts a map of all voting districts utilized in November 1995 National Assembly election was located and overlaid on the same Google Earth 5.0 image. The original color-coded map used in the early stages of this step proved quite useful for public presentations but required black and white adjustment using Dell’s Paint Shop Photo and Paint Shop Pro Studio software for use in black and white print format. Scaling the overlay map to fit the Google Earth 2.0 software image is sufficiently precise to match internal and external borders of both images. It is not exact, as the multiple
software packages were scaled separately. Repeated attempts to scale the two images in a more precise fashion have proven illusive to date.

Figure 5.3
1995 Azerbaijan Voting Districts

The third step in this process was to place color-coded icons on the map in each of the voting districts representing each of the elected deputies so that each political party with deputies elected would have different colors. White flag icons represented all “Independent” deputies as an indicator that they had no political party affiliation. At this point it is readily apparent that there is plurality in the representation within the National Assembly following the election in November 1995.
Multiple presentations using this map at universities in southern California during 2007-2009 sparked great interest and enthusiasm for research related to centralized and decentralized communities of political actors. However, for purposes of printing the results under black and white dissertation constraints, all color-coded icons were changed to white only icons seen in Figure 5.4. Various icon shapes were substituted for the original color-coding – each political party with deputies elected to the National Assembly in November 1995 has its own icon. The icons representing the deputies were positioned within each respective voting district as close as possible to the village, town, or city of residence for the particular deputy. The visual impact of the image was diminished relative to the color-coded version. The Figure 5.4 Legend of icons and political party association is immediately adjacent to figure.
Figure 5.4 Legend

Flags = Independent Deputies (no party affiliation)
Inverted tear drops = New Azerbaijan Party
Stars = Independence Party
Circles = Azerbaijan National Independence Party
Triangles = Motherland Party
Squares = Democratic Party of Azerbaijan
Hexagons = Azerbaijan Popular Front Party
Diamonds = Democratic Azerbaijan World Party
Small squares = Azerbaijan Democratic Entrepreneurs Party

The original format was changed for the current black and white print version using Dell’s Paint Shop Photo and Paint Shop Pro Studio software.

The final stage in this process was to overlay the dispersion graph (Figure 5.1) onto the map of Azerbaijan found in Google Earth 2.0. The process is quite simple.
relative to the other steps described above with one notable exception; the scale of the
Google Earth 2.0 map and the dispersion graph are on different scales as a consequence,
there are some icons (representing deputies) from the northeast of the country displayed
in the Caspian Sea. The reader should be aware that the citizens of Azerbaijan did NOT
elect deputies from the Caspian Sea; this is a problem of scaling the two images!

Figure 5.5
Azerbaijan clan dispersion 1995

This image was produced using Google Earth 2.0, Dell Paint Shop Photo and Dell
Paint Shop Pro Studio, and Pajek 1.24 software packages.

As the viewer can discern from Figure 5.5, the geographic location of deputies (as
proxy for clans) elected to the National Assembly November 12, 1995 constitute ties to
nearly every part of the country. By involving clans in the overall process of governing President Aliyev in concert with multiple clan elders created a vast and complex network of clan ties to the state. Likewise, the clans sought ties to the state to gain such benefit as might be necessary for the needs of the clan members. This mutually beneficial arrangement between the state and multiple clans across the territorial space of Azerbaijan would serve to increase state capacity in the timeframe under examination in this dissertation.

This network served to increase land privatization, foreign direct investment, and multilateral and bilateral conventions while decreasing inflation and revolts/secession. In doing so, this increased the capacity of the state to accomplish convergent goals of the state and clans. These convergent goals were aimed at preventing the dissolution of the country as well as promoting the general welfare of the majority of the population of Azerbaijan.

5.5.4 How to better account for sub national behavior of kinship communities

Mainstream debates regarding involvement of family members in positions of political power will likely continue. The suggestion that state capacity may be increased though clans seem likely to be contested as well. Evidence in this dissertation suggests that there is at least one case, the Republic of Azerbaijan, where extended family communities can have beneficial effects in the short-term advancement of goals for a new country and a new state. Whether some elements of patronage demonstrate detrimental effects or not in the long-term are yet to be determined in this emerging country!
Involvement of kinship groups to augment the capacity of the state can, under limited circumstances, aid successful transformation from one system of governance to another system in a brief period of transition. The complex networks of human interactions and institutions (norms) associated with kinship organizations such as clans may serve as short-term efficient channels for reduced information and transaction costs. States recognizing the distinct advantages of involving these networks in the absence of adequately functioning infrastructure can benefit greatly in the short-term.

Thomas P. (Tip) O’Neill, Jr. late Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, was noted as saying that “All politics is local” (O’Neill, 1994). In the case of newly emerging countries, Mr. O’Neill’s assertion may be more accurate than previously thought. One fact is readily apparent: greater attention is required to informal sub national social, economic, and political communities.

This dissertation began with a quote from one of Aristotle’s works. Much has changed since Aristotle’s time but it is possible that his definition of a state as “an aggregation of families” still has saliency in the early days of the twenty-first century.

5.6 Conclusion

Table 5.6 shows the six indicators and the presence of all six of the indicators of increasing state capacity in T2. It is during this T2 period that there is significant evidence of clan involvement with the state.
Table 5.6
Indicators of increasing state capacity in Azerbaijan present in T2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator of increasing state capacity</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Absent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increasing land privatization</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing FDI</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreasing inflation rate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral &amp; bilateral conventions</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing number of political parties</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreasing revolt/secession</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The + symbols demonstrate the presence of an indicator relative to increasing state capacity.

Efforts by Aliyev to incorporate multiple clans for exerting state control over the territory of the newly independent Azerbaijan were successful in the early days for several reasons. First, trusted clan members were obliged to remain loyal to clan ties or risk being viewed as cold blooded dogs by other clan members as well as the general population of the country. Second, by sharing power with multiple clans across the geographic space of Azerbaijan Aliyev reduced the chances of revolt/secession.

State capacity was further extended by increasing the privatization of land, which increased food for citizens thus reducing dissatisfaction with the state. Increasing foreign direct investment added funds to the country’s budget, which could then be distributed for schools, roads, electric service, and dozens of other state projects promised to the citizens by the state.
Since political parties are based on clans\textsuperscript{64} and there was gathering involvement of clans, there were increases in viable political parties. This resulted in greater political plurality in the National Assembly. Finally, the state was able to negotiate meaningful multilateral and bilateral agreements with a growing number of other states and intergovernmental organizations.

As citizens of Azerbaijan began to witness successes of the state abroad they were also witness to improvements at home. New schools were being opened, closed polyclinics reopened; the currency was being revalued,\textsuperscript{65} and the war with Armenia was at a stalemate.

Whether clan elders and clan members were directly or indirectly involved in the noticeable increases in the capacity of the state to affect change is open to debate.

\textsuperscript{64} This information was gathered in field research in multiple locations across the country after 1993.

\textsuperscript{65} This step was painful and the process would be incomplete at the time of the 1995 election.
Bibliography


IPU (Inter Parliamentary Union). Azerbaijan. Milli Mejlis.  


Conclusion

Table 4.5 indicates the absence of strong clan ties to the state result in the absence of increasing state capacity. Table 5.6 indicates the presence of strong clan ties to the state result in the presence of increasing state capacity. By comparing these two tables one can test the premise that the indicators presented confirm the statistical significance of strong clan ties to the state having a positive impact on increasing state capacity in the short-term.

Table 6.1 represents the total number of increasing state capacity indicators present or absent (as derived from Tables 4.5 and 5.6). This information can then be entered into one of several available online computational applets for closer examination.

### Table 6.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>T1</th>
<th>T2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The observable $p$ value for this test: $p<.015151515151515$. This $p$ value is statistically significant indicating that the null hypothesis can be rejected; i.e. there is a statistically significant difference in T1/T2 ratio between present and absent differences.
In other words, the differences observed during field research are supported by the Fisher’s Exact Test. For a more complete explanation, the reader should refer to Appendix 3A.

Table 6.2 utilizes only one of the six indicators of increasing state capacity as an example to display the short-term outcomes of clan ties to the state. The reader can readily deduce that substitution of any other indicator would yield similar results using the same tabular template.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increasing State capacity</th>
<th>Strong clan ties</th>
<th>Weak clan ties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Decreasing Revolt/Secession</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Negative Association</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While there is a deficiency in comparative studies with which to compare with the results found in Azerbaijan, the final conclusion in this one case is that clans can have an impact on the short-term success of a state increasing its capacity to govern.

Much work remains on this topic of clan ties to the state. Any numbers of questions have yet to be answered as to long-term effects of clan ties to the state.
Additionally there are questions regarding nascent countries where strong clan ties to the state did not yield increasing state capacity. Further the variables particular to individual nascent countries as regards available resources need exploration.

This dissertation used an exploratory non-experimental approach to gain greater insight into the political behavior of a nascent country and its state. This approach is subject to strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps the greatest strength is exposing the behavior of the state in the Republic of Azerbaijan to continuing study.
Appendices

Appendix 3A
Six Indicators of Increasing State Capacity

Information used in this dissertation came from various sources within the government of Azerbaijan including the Central Election Commission (CEC), the State Statistical Committee, Bureau of Computer Science & Statistics, and the Ministry of Health. Additional sources of information and data sets were derived from the National Democracy Institute in Washington, D.C., International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) in Baku, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Eurasianet.org (a subsidiary of the Soros Foundation), United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), CIA Factbook, numerous United States Department of State briefings and reports, and field interviews with Azerbaijani citizens.

The privatization of land (particularly farmland) is significant in new countries where all property had previously belonged to the state. In the case of new countries emerging from the USSR private ownership of real property was largely a novel concept. According to norms of state control in the USSR, all property was owned by the state.

“For neighboring farming communities in valleys, these alpine or steppe pastures, not suited for cultivation, were lands used by certain groups of pastoralists for centuries and so in some way belonging to them. Both by local state authorities predating Russian rule and by the Russian empire itself, these pastures were officially considered to be state-owned lands, traditionally rented by certain pastoral ethnic groups (“tribes” or “clans”) which normally—without open war—could not be denied access to them (Yamskov, 1993).
By privatizing farmland, the state provided citizens with a stake in production of crops and livestock. Self-help is a critical element of social behavior in most nascent countries.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) can be a major source of revenue for the new country to utilize for its growth and development. If there were a limited number of investors under the former system, there can be hesitancy to become involved with a new state. Careful expansion of FDI by the new state leads to increased state capacity by offering the state revenue with which to improve infrastructure and thus citizen approval of the state.

Inflation rate can be a measure of consumer confidence in the state. There are a great number of factors contributing to inflation rates but this study links published inflation rate data to state capacity in a very broad sense. Average citizens of newly formed countries may not have access to information regarding the nuances of national and international level economic behavior. The driving consideration of many citizens of a nascent country is the relative value of the new currency versus the relative value of the old currency as it applies to purchasing power.

International recognition of a new country is critical to its acceptance in the international community. Along with recognition by other states comes opportunity for a vast array of potential agreements between regional and/or international political actors. These agreements may take the form of participation in organizations such as the United Nations but agreements may also constitute bilateral trade arrangements, accords, covenants, treaties, or pacts. The perception on the part of citizens that the central
government of the new country is establishing ties with existing powerful countries can be a potent tool for increasing state capacity.\textsuperscript{66}

The number of political parties in a new country is generally indicative of the representation of plural political interests. Citizens in a new country witnessing the state’s willingness to entertain varied political perspectives are more inclined to support the state if they perceive their own political goals may be included in this process during transition. Limiting the number of political parties may alienate citizens to the degree that they will not lend support to increasing state capacity.\textsuperscript{67} The increasing number of political parties seating deputies in the National Assembly of the Republic of Azerbaijan during this brief period of transition stands in drastic contrast to the single-party focus found during Soviet years.

Revolt/secession is an indication that the state lacks coercive power to control a country’s territory. In the context of this dissertation, revolt/secession is indicative of organized military and/or political efforts to overthrow a state or secede a specific portion of a country. Simply put, there is little or no state capacity to control certain communities within specific geographic space. For purposes here, increases in revolt/secession indicate


a lack of state capacity. Decreases in revolt/secession indicate increasing state capacity to establish coercive control in some measure.

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Appendix 3B
Brief Network Analysis Explanation

“Network analysis focuses on the relations among actors, and not individual actors and their attributes.” (Hanneman, 1998, pg. 4)\textsuperscript{69}

For purposes of this dissertation, a network is a group of people and their respective relationships. Relationships exist between clan elders as well as between clan elders and members of the formal organizations of the state. These relationships known as links or ties in network analysis can be measured mathematically but the visualization of the networks presented in graphic format is perhaps of greater interest to the reader of this current project.

Graphically, nodes and ties represent a network. The individual units of analysis or nodes appear on a graph as dots while the ties appear as straight lines. By graphing these relationships, one is able to determine the strength and numbers of the interactions as well as the number of individuals comprising the network based on the type of network analysis presented. In the case at hand, individual deputies to the National Assembly of Azerbaijan (serving as proxy for clans) will be the nodes on multiple graphs and the relationship (political party affiliation) between these deputies are the lines connecting the nodes. Since deputies are members of political parties or they are independent from political party affiliation one can readily visualize the ties between

\textsuperscript{69} All italicized inserts in this Appendix are taken from the online text entitled Introduction to Network Methods by Dr. Robert A. Hanneman, Professor of Sociology at University of California Riverside. This text is an excellent primer for understanding networks. For more advanced information and instruction on network analysis, see the website of Dr. Douglas R. White Professor Emeritus in Anthropology at University of California Irvine at <http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/>.
deputies as expressing some form of political preference within the National Assembly\textsuperscript{70}. Political parties in Azerbaijan, as of the election of the National Assembly in November 1995, are based on clans\textsuperscript{71}. Thus, the deputies serve as proxy for clans’ representation in the National Assembly\textsuperscript{72}. This serves to increase state capacity, as the National Assembly is part of the state.

Network analysis is a multi-stage process beginning with acquisition of information that may be utilized to construct simple binary datasets. Construction of matrices to correspond to the datasets will be the next step in this process, followed by coding to correspond to the matrices. Coded data will then be entered into Pajek computational software package. Pajek will generate a map\textsuperscript{9} the network of National Assembly deputies elected in November 1995.

Google Earth maps will be marked in grids using tools available in this software package. A digital map of the voting districts will be overlaid on the Google Earth map to accurately represent the multiple constituencies of the respective deputies. An icon will represent each deputy (from the selection offered by Google Earth).

\textsuperscript{70} “Network studies are much more likely to include all of the actors who occur within some (usually naturally occurring) boundary”\(\textsuperscript{(pg. 4)}\).

\textsuperscript{71} This information is based on field interviews conducted across Azerbaijan.

\textsuperscript{72} “...social network studies often draw the boundaries around a population that is known, a priori, to be a network” \(\textsuperscript{(pg. 5)}\). “Often network data sets describe the nodes and relations among nodes for a single bounded population” \(\textsuperscript{(pg. 6)}\).

\textsuperscript{9} “The ability of network methods to map such multi-modal relations is, at least potentially, a step forward in rigor” \(\textsuperscript{(pg. 6)}\).
Appendix 5A

“Heydar”\textsuperscript{73} Aliyev's high-ranking relatives:

1. Heydar Aliyev Alirza oglu - President.

2. Ilham Aliyev Heydar oglu - president's son - Member of Parliament, deputy chairman of SOCAR [State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Company], chairman of the National Olympic Committee and head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Council of Europe.

3. Jalal Aliyev Alirza oglu - president's brother - Member of Parliament and head of the laboratory of the Academy of Sciences' Agriculture Institute [Jalal Aliyev is believed to have considerable authority in the Academy of Sciences].

4. Aqil Aliyev Alirza oglu - president's brother - head of department of the Azerbaijani Medical Academy.


7. Rafiqa Aliyeva Alirza qizi - president's sister - lecturer at Baku State University.

8. Rafiq Xalafov - president's brother-in-law, deceased. He was deputy prime minister. Before that, he was appointed motor-road transport minister on his birthday, later head of concern of goods for population.


\textsuperscript{73} Also spelled Heidar or Geidar in some publications.


15. Rafiq Mahmudov - president's son's brother-in-law - former head of the republican pharmacy department.


17. Adalat Aliyev - president's brother, Hasan Aliyev's grandson - head of a department of the State Customs Committee.


20. Rauf Haciyev - president's distant relative [president's niece's husband] - the head of fish-breeding department of the Ecology and Natural Resources Ministry.

21. Tahir Aliyev - president's relative, hails from Sisian District's [Vardenis District of Armenia] Comardli village. He is currently the head of the executive authorities of Baku's Nasimi district.


27. Vasif Talibov Yusif oglu - president's niece's son-in-law - chairman of the Naxcivan Supreme Council and Member of Parliament.


30. Siyavus Qarayev - Camil Aliyev's brother-in-law - rector of the Azerbaijani Oil Academy.

This is not the whole list of Heydar Aliyev's relatives who are in high-ranking positions.” (Hurryyiat, 2002, pg. 7).
Appendix 5B


(I have taken the liberty of condensing and reformatting Shaffer’s work on one page).
### Appendix 5C

#### National Assembly Deputies elected in November 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Deputy Name</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Talybov, Vasif Yousif oglu</td>
<td>New Azerbaijan Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khudiyev, Nizami Manaf oglu</td>
<td>New Azerbaijan Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mammadguliyev, Mahmud Akhmed oglu</td>
<td>New Azerbaijan Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ibadov, Rza Aidyn oglu</td>
<td>New Azerbaijan Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Magsudov, Faramaz Ganzanfar oglu</td>
<td>New Azerbaijan Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gurbanov, Mubariz Gahraman oglu</td>
<td>New Azerbaijan Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Abdullzadeh, Fatma Hussein gizy</td>
<td>New Azerbaijan Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Gurbanova, Gulnara Shychali gizy</td>
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Party List Deputies elected November 1995

The New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) - 19 seats

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Asadov, Ali Hidayat oglu
Askarov, Shahlar Gachay oglu
Askerov, Agabey Mammed oglu
Bunyadov, Ziya Musa oglu
Dunyamaliyeva, Zamina Dunyamali gizy
Garalov, Zahid Ibrahim oglu
Gojayev, Kheiraddin Sayyaddin oglu
Guliyev, Faud Khalil oglu
Huseinov, Mazdak Memish oglu
Ibrahimov, Eldar Rza oglu
Imamverdiyev, Sudeif Bashir oglu
Insanov, Ali Binnat oglu
Ismalov, Fikret Ismail oglu
Kerimov, Kerim Hajikhan oglu
Manafova, Asya Khudat gizy
Nagiyev, Ali Yeymur oglu
Safarov, Eldar Sabir oglu
Zabelin, Mikhail Yuryevich

Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (APFP)

Aliyev, Gilanshussein Surkhay oglu
Fattyev, Mirrahmaud Mirali oglu
Kerimov, Ali Amirhussein oglu

Azerbaijan National Independence Party

Husseinov, Shadman Bahlu oglu
Imanov, Nazim Muzaffar oglu
Mamedov, Etibar Salidar oglu
## Appendix 5D
Code sheet for 1995 Azerbaijan National Assembly deputies

### DATE CODES TO LEFT

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D7-1994