Title

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1sv0b6k0

Journal
UCLA Historical Journal, 7(0)

ISSN
0276-864X

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Publication Date
1986

Peer reviewed
thereby bringing the knowledge they produce more directly into the arena of utility.

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3Nicholas David, “Prehistory and Historical Linguistics in Central Africa: Points of Contact,” in ibid., pp. 78-95.


In Richelieu and Olivares, John Huxtable Elliott presents a compact, succinct, and fascinating comparison of the two rival statesmen, Phillippe de Champaigne, Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642) and Diego de Velasquez, Count-Duke Olivares (1587-1645). Elliott’s book is a perceptive and revealing analysis of two contemporaries, one well studied by historians and the other unjustifiably neglected. Images of Richelieu, the successful minister who navigated France during its ascent to power, and Olivares, the failure of a minister who presided over Spain’s decline, have been perpetuated by historiography. The need to reassess this historiographical imbalance motivated Elliott to write. The comparison of Richelieu and Olivares is not intended so much to redeem Olivares from defeat, but to portray a more complete reality of Spain and its leading minister during the first decades of the seventeenth century and into the Thirty Years War. It also attempts to provide a different background from which to understand Richelieu.

The results of abundant, recent research conducted on Richelieu and France during the early decades of the seventeenth century surface frequently in Elliott’s book. His footnotes cite new publications such as those by Wil-
liam Church, Richard Bonney, Robin Briggs, Pierre Chevallier, and Marc Fumaroli to cite a few, as well as older studies by scholars like Maximin Deloche, Carl Burckhardt, and Roland Mousnier. Similarly, studies which examine various aspects of Spanish policy at the beginning of the seventeenth century have been absorbed by the author who credits Michel Deveze, P. J. Brightwell, Manuel Fernandez Alvarez, and J. A. Fernandez-Santamaría, among many others. The Count-Duke Olivares, unlike his French rival, has not been the subject of many biographies with the exception of one which is a psychological analysis by Gregorio Maranon (1936, revised 1951). Elliott plans to fill the void with a biography.

The most interesting aspect of Richelieu and Olivares, consequently, is the author's revelation of the hitherto little understood character of Olivares, the man who was matched by fate—and by Elliott—against Richelieu. Elliott's research has led him to the conclusion that the two men shared many qualities and experiences in common, both contemporaries being intimately part of their epoch. Each man was born of a noble family employed in the state bureaucracy. Each received an ecclesiastical education, although Olivares never became a cleric, and each was a cultivated patron of literature and art, actively amassing an outstanding personal library and directing architectural projects.

The parallel of their personal lives extended to their political careers and even to their personal philosophies. Each was driven to rank and power by a tenacious, ambitious personality. The coincidence of their advance to their respective positions of first minister was surprisingly close. Each had to overcome accusations of manipulating or usurping royal power as had preceding favorites: Concini, Luynes, Lerma, and Uceda. Furthermore, each responded to self-imposed demands of inexhaustible service and unquestionable loyalty to his monarch. The philosophy of each maintained the existence of fundamental order that established the king as absolute authority in the realm, ordained by God to order and discipline the unruly world. Each minister strove to make his king an effective ruler, a ruler of great reputation.

The crux of Elliott's analysis lies in his investigation of how the two protagonists dealt with the problems and crises that faced the governments of France and Spain. Each man believed in the supremacy of reason to resolve disorder and conflict, yet prudence and necessity required each to be pragmatist. Elliott discovers the real differences of character between Richelieu and Olivares in the flexible remedies to which both resorted.

When Philip IV came to the throne in 1621, Olivares was not alone in thinking that Spain was in a state of decline, internationally as well as domestically. The treasury was in a precarious state and Olivares believed the Spaniards, themselves, were in need of moral regeneration. Olivares set out to restore Spain to its former glory and, during the 1620s, initiated major policies. The first measure was the publication of the Articles of Reforma-

tion of 1623 which attempted to regain the government's role as guarantor
of social harmony. Olivares then attacked the financial structure, reorganizing the tax system and endeavoring to promote economic recovery, particularly commerce, which was to follow the Dutch model. He was involved personally in the successful refinancing of the state’s loans. Furthermore, he strove to unify the dispersed regions of the Spanish monarchy. He envisioned a Union of Arms, based upon a reconstructed navy, which would protect and defend members of the scattered empire. Because these measures met with parliamentary resistance and failed, in the long term, Olivares has been condemned for his impracticality and for his inability to judge what reforms could be effected.

Richelieu, on the other hand, has been described as the more moderate reformer and the more astute pragmatic. Richelieu seemed to have a greater innate sense of the extent to which reorganization could be carried. Although the difficulties which faced the French monarchy when Richelieu came to the council of Louis XIII in 1624—religious strife, aristocratic revolt, proliferation of venal offices—were different from those facing the Spanish crown, both situations required a reassertion of royal authority and the use of similar methods to implement reform. The remedies adopted by each minister reflected their common beliefs and many reforms were similar in nature. Elliott argues further that Richelieu even borrowed from the policies of Olivares. The author finds Spanish precedents in Richelieu’s means of forming and maintaining the royal army, of reorganizing taxes, and of prodding commercial and economic recovery. But, eventually, Richelieu’s programs were also eroded, sacrificed for reputation in war. The disparity of the two ministers’ abilities seems less than has been thought.

Elliott’s analysis of the war over Mantuan succession (1628-1631) goes a great deal further in contrasting the personages of Richelieu and Olivares. The author’s assessment exposes a confused Spanish minister not fully cognizant of the repercussions of his order to besiege Casale. Elliott is unable to explain this tactic fully given that, in 1628, France was in alliance with Spain. The author suggests that Olivares was trying to silence his domestic critics by a military success. Olivares certainly thought that the Spanish offensive would be a fait accompli before the French would be free to maneuver away from La Rochelle. But Olivares’s concept of time frequently was inaccurate and it was Richelieu who capitalized on the domestic front from a victory in Italy. Olivares’s reputation never recovered from this disaster.

Elliott, however, fails to consider the defense of the Spanish empire as a motive for Spain’s involvement in the Mantuan succession. Olivares may have believed that intervention was required to protect Spanish interests by excluding a French presence in northern Italy. It could be argued that the siege of Casale was undertaken as a defensive measure, albeit a bellicose one. This explanation would account for the lack of Spanish opposition to the minister’s recourse to war.

The success of the French and the failure of the Spanish involvement in
the Mantuan War summarizes in an abstract way the success of Richelieu and the failure of Olivares. The former was consistently quick to maneuver to the advantage, while the latter tended to bide his time, realizing that unexpected circumstances upset even the best laid plans. Yet Elliott agrees with Olivares himself that, in the end, chance favored his rival.

Richelieu and Olivares by John Huxtable Elliott is a work of clarity and insight. The author masterfully compares the two men and manages to minimize the distance by which history has separated them. His analysis is excellent and succinct, yet far-reaching. Although some of the parallels of the two lives, thoughts, and policies may seem stretched, the points nevertheless validate the author’s thesis. Frequent use of appropriate quotations from both ministers further substantiates the author’s arguments.

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As the debate rages over the United States’ intervention in Central America, the appearance of Richard E. Welch’s book, Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, could not be more timely. An historian of American diplomacy, Welch reminds us that United States policy towards Latin America has often been grounded on ignorance and ideological premises that bear little relation to the Western Hemisphere. When the United States has intervened in the internal affairs of its southern neighbors, the author warns, the results have usually been tragic for all concerned.

Welch’s work is a welcome departure from the traditional historiography on Cuban-American relations. American historians who have treated the United States response to Castro’s revolution usually concentrated on the impact that the “loss” of Cuba had on American-Soviet relations. With few exceptions, American policy towards Cuba since 1959 has been analyzed through the prism of Cold War ideology. Policy-makers active in the Kennedy administration, such as Arthur Schlesinger and Roger Hilsman, concede that American neglect of Cuba’s internal problems prior to 1959 contributed to Batista’s downfall. If the United States had shown greater interest in promoting democracy and economic development in Cuba, both authors argue, it would have been difficult for a radical leader like Castro to take power. Other historians from the intellectual left, such as Maurice Zeitlin and Richard Walton, have argued that United States hostility towards Castro resulted from the expropriation of American property in Cuba. In their view, the