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Nanti Self-Quotation: Implications for the pragmatics of reported speech and evidentiality

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1 Introduction

One of the striking features of talk in the communities where Nanti is spoken is the sheer density of reported speech. Many aspects of Nanti communicative practice contribute to this density: speakers of Nanti show a strong preference for communicating knowledge they have acquired through talk with others as reported speech; they largely avoid directly imputing internal states (e.g. cognitive or emotional) in favor of reporting speech that indexes those states; and they exhibit an appreciation for the detailed recounting of interactions between individuals through turn-by-turn reporting of their utterances. In the wide repertoire of Nanti speech reporting practices responsible for the abundance of quotation in Nanti verbal life, one common form of quotation is particularly remarkable: the use of quotative constructions to frame as ‘reported speech’ utterances that are being expressed for the first time, rather than drawn from a previous speech event. Of particular interest, Nantis principally employ what I call concurrent quotative framing (CQF) in taking strong evaluative or epistemic stands in discourse, often in opposition to stances expressed by other participants. As such, the interactional functions of CQF contrast with the distancing and responsibility-diminishing functions often ascribed to reported speech.

This paper makes use of the interactional characteristics of CQF to shed light on two unresolved issues regarding the treatment of evidentiality in discourse: the relevance of grammaticalization to the analysis of evidential meanings in discourse; and the validity of the notional distinction between evidentiality and epistemic modality even in discourse. These issues are approached below in three steps. I first describe the structural and functional characteristics of CQF and compare them to those of several Nanti speech reporting practices that have more obvious counterparts in other languages. I then employ the structural and functional differences between Nanti reported speech constructions – specifically, the difference between the lexical quotative construction employed in CQF and the Nanti grammaticalized quotative evidential – to contribute to the current debate regarding the significance of the distinction between grammaticalized evidentials and other relatively ungrammaticalized ‘evidential strategies’, arguing that the differences between these two reported speech constructions support the validity of this separation. Finally, I show that the apparently contradictory responsibility- and commitment-augmenting properties of CQF and the responsibility-diminishing ones often attributed to reported speech both emerge from pragmatic reasoning based on the evidential semantics of quotative elements. I argue that this
analysis is based on maintaining the notional distinction between evidential and epistemic modal meanings, and thereby argues against conflating these two notional categories even in the case of the deployment of evidential strategies in discourse.

This paper is based on recordings of naturally-occurring communicative interactions among speakers of Nanti, a language of the Kampan sub-branch of the Arawak family (Michael 2008: 212-219). Nantis form a mainly monolingual group of some 450 individuals who live at the headwaters of the Camisea and Timpia Rivers in lowland southeastern Peru, and who rely on a combination of hunting, fishing, wild-gathering, and shifting manioc-based horticulture (see Michael (2008: 3-40) for an ethnographic and historical overview). The author carried out monolingual linguistic and ethnographic fieldwork in the Nanti communities between 1997 and 2005, primarily in Montetoni, the largest of the Nanti communities.

Nanti reported speech constructions are introduced in §2, where Nanti lexical and evidential quotatives are distinguished both structurally and functionally, with a focus on the difference between the two: lexical quotatives tend to introduce socially consequential utterances and indicate that the quotative party is an ‘illocutionary source’, while the evidential quotative introduces less socially consequential utterances, and only indicates that the quoted party is an ‘informational source’. The structural and functional properties of CQF are described in §3, focusing on its utility for expressing individual commitment to epistemically or morally contentious stances. A brief comparison with similar discursive practices in other languages is also provided in this section. In §4, I turn to a pragmatic account of CQF, showing that both the distancing functions often attributed to reported speech and the commitment-enhancing functions of CQF can be accounted for in terms of pragmatic reasoning regarding the identification of quoted parties as ‘illocutionary sources’. I also briefly discuss how other discursive effects such as authority-imbuing and objectivity-emphasizing properties of reported speech can be reconciled with this account. In the two remaining sections, I use the results of §§2-5 to shed light on two open questions regarding the relationship of evidential strategies to grammaticalized evidentials. In §5, I argue that the functional differentiation of Nanti lexical and evidential quotative constructions supports the distinction between evidential strategies and grammaticalized evidentials, and in §6 I contend that the polyfunctionality of lexical quotative constructions discussed in §4 argues for maintaining a clear notional distinction between evidentiality and epistemic modality, even in the domain of evidential strategies, and not only with respect to grammaticalized evidentials.

2 Overview of Nanti reported speech constructions

Nantis make use of three distinct constructions in reporting others’ or their own speech. These constructions include two quotative constructions and one reportive construction. Since usage of the terms ‘quotative’ and ‘reportive’ is somewhat inconsistent in the literature, for the purposes of this paper I define quotative constructions as reported speech constructions that provide information about the source of the reported speech but not the recipient of the report, while I identify reportive constructions as reported speech construc-
tions that provide information about the recipient, but not the source.\footnote{The distinction I draw here between 'quotative' and 'reportive' evidentials aligns roughly with Aikhenvald's (2004: 137-140) distinction between 'quotation' and 'reported evidentiality' (see also Lampert and Lampert 2010), since reported evidentials typically index the speaker as the default recipient of the report, although overt person marking on reportive evidentials indicating the recipient is cross-linguistically rare. The reader should be aware that there is some variation in the literature, however, with the term ‘quotative’ sometimes used to refer to reported speech constructions that do not indicate the source of the report in any way (see e.g. G"uldemann (2008), G³omez Rendon 2006).}

The two Nanti quotative constructions are in turn distinguished by the form of the quotative element: in one construction, the quotative element is a lexical verb of saying, while in the second, the quotative element is a grammaticalized quotative evidential. This section describes the basic structural and communicative functions of these Nanti reported speech constructions, focusing on the two quotative constructions.

**Lexical quotative construction** The Nanti lexical quotative\footnote{I use the term ‘lexical quotative’ here to emphasize the functional parallel with the evidential quotative discussed below, drawing on the functional similarity between reported speech constructions and their grammaticalized evidential counterparts noted by Aikhenvald (2004:132).} construction (LQC) employs inflected forms of the verb *kant* ‘say’, which can optionally take a reported speech complement, as in (1). The complement usually follows the verb of saying, but may also precede it, as in (13a).\footnote{The orthography is phonemic and largely self explanatory; coda nasals assimilate to the place of articulation of the following voiceless stop, and the i-class realis suffix -i surfaces as -e following the perfective -ak. The first line of interlinearized examples shows surface morphophonological changes; in this line, sans-serif t and a represent epenthetic segments; they are not segmented or glossed in other lines. Likewise, '=' indicates latching of one turn of talk to the previous one, '-' indicates a false start, typically involving a glottal closure; a caret indicates fast speech clipping, with the segments following this mark reconstructed from other prosodic and grammatical features of the utterance. The following morpheme abbreviations are used: 1S, 1st person subject; 1O, 1st person object; 2S, 2nd person subject; 2O, 2nd person object; 3mS, 3rd person masculine subject; 3mO, 3rd person masculine object; 3fS, 3rd person non-masculine subject; 3fO, 3rd person non-masculine object; 1P, 1st person possessor; 2P, 2nd person possessor; 3mP, 3rd person masculine possessor; 3fP, 3rd person non-masculine possessor; ABL, ablative; ADL, adative; APPL:PURP, purposive applicative; CAUS, causative; CL, classifier; CNTF, counterfactual; COND, conditional; DEONT, deontic; DIRREAL.I, doubly irrealis, i-class verb; DSTR, distributive; FRUS, frustrative; HAB, habitual; IMPF, imperfective; IRREAL.A, irrealis, A-class verb; IRREAL.I, irrealis, I-class verb; LOC, locative; MAL.REP, malefactive repetitive; NEG.IRREAL, irrealis negation; NEG.REAL, realis negation; PASS.IRREAL, irrealis passive; PASS.REAL, realis passive; PERF, perfective; PL, verbal plural; REAL.A, realis, A-class verb; REAL.I, realis, I-class verb; REG, regressive; SUB, subordinator.} The verb of speaking in lexical quotative constructions normally appears in the minimally inflected realis imperfective form, as in (1), but can also bear additional morphology, as in (2). Nanti only permits direct speech reports. Note that realis marking in Nanti is compatible with either past or present temporal reference interpretations, requiring that the temporal reference given in the English free translations be chosen on the basis of knowledge of the broader discourse context.

(1) Ikanti hara nokemi pariki.

\begin{verbatim}
3mS= say -IMPF -REAL.I NEG.IRREAL 1S= hear -REAL.I park.officials
\end{verbatim}

‘He said, ‘I will not listen to the park officials.”
(2) **Nokanttabakari** ha pantabageti, te inkeme.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{no= } & \text{kant -be -ak -a } =ri \text{ ha } \text{pi= antabaget} \\
1S= & \text{say -FRUST -PERF -REAL.A } =3mO \text{ NEG.IRREAL} \\
2S= & \text{cultivate} \\
-i & \text{te} \text{ } i= -n \text{ kem } -e \\
\text{-REAL.I } & \text{NEG.REAL} \text{ } 3mS= \text{IRREAL- hear -IRREAL.I}
\end{align*}
\]

‘Although I said to him, ‘Don’t cultivate!, he didn’t pay attention.’

**Quotative evidential construction** Nanti quotative evidentials are clausal proclitics that immediately precede the speech report they introduce, as in (3) and (4). They have grammaticalized from inflected forms of the verb of saying – *kant* ‘say’ – that appears in the lexical quotative construction. As is evident from the forms listed in Table 1, Nanti quotative evidentials consist of a disyllabic form that retains the person information borne by the inflected verb from which it grammaticalized. These frozen person markers provide person information about the source of quoted utterance, as in (3) and (4).

It is important to note that the trochaic stress pattern displayed by quotatives decisively distinguishes them from ‘clipped’ fast speech forms of full verbs of saying, which exhibit an iambic stress pattern, e.g. *iká*, the clipped form of *ikánti* ‘he says (realis imperfective)’ or *ikántake* ‘he said (realis perfective).’

**Table 1: Nanti quotatives and their lexical sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUOTATIVE</th>
<th>GLOSS</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>GLOSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nóka</td>
<td>QUOT.1</td>
<td>nokánti</td>
<td>‘I say’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>píka</td>
<td>QUOT.2</td>
<td>pikánti</td>
<td>‘you say’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>íka</td>
<td>QUOT.3m</td>
<td>ikánti</td>
<td>‘he says’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>óka</td>
<td>QUOT.3f</td>
<td>okánti</td>
<td>‘she says’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) **Óka nani, kametitake.**

\[
\text{oka } \text{nani kameti -ak -i} \\
\text{QUOT.3f fine be.good -PERF -REAL.I}
\]

‘She said, ‘Fine, good.’

(4) **Ika nagabehake nohatake.**

\[
\text{ika } \text{no= agabeh -ak -i} \text{ } \text{no= ha -ak -i} \\
\text{QUOT.3m 1S- be.able -PERF =REAL.I 1S= go -PERF -REAL.I}
\]

‘He said, ‘It is appropriate for me to go.’

The quotative evidential is also often employed in conjunction with other verbs of communication, many of which appear to be unable to take a reported speech complement without the use of the quotative, as in the case of *kenkitsa* ‘narrate’, exemplified in (5), or *kahem* ‘call out, yell’, exemplified in (6).
(5) Nokenkitsatake noka nogonkehata Shampinkihari.

\[
\text{no=} \text{kenkitsa} -ak -i \text{noka} \text{no=} \text{gonke} -ha -\emptyset -a \\
1S \text{tell.story} -\text{PERF} -\text{REAL.1} \text{QUOT.1} \text{IS=} \text{arrive} \text{CL:water} -\text{IMPF} \text{REAL.A}
\]

Shampinkihari

place.name

‘I narrated, ‘I arrived in Shampinkihari by river.’

(6) Ikahemake ika tahena aka.

\[
i=} \text{kahem} -ak -i \text{ika} \text{tahena aka} \\
3mS= \text{yell} -\text{PERF} -\text{REAL.1} \text{QUOT.3m} \text{come.IMP here}
\]

‘He yelled, ‘Come here!”

Reportive evidential construction  Like the Nanti quotative evidential, the reportive evidential is a clausal proclitic which immediately precedes a speech report, as in (7). The reportive is grammaticalized from inflected forms of the verb kem ‘hear, understand’, and like the quotative, is a disyllabic element that retains the person information carried by inflected forms of the verb. In the case of the reportive, the person information borne by the evidential provides information about the receiver of the report. We do not consider the reportive further in this paper.

Nanti reportive evidentials, like their quotative counterparts, exhibit trochaic stress, unlike the similar disyllabic forms that result from the fast speech clipping of inflected forms of kem ‘hear’, which display iambic stress (i.e noké, the clipped form of nokémi ‘I hear/heard’).

(7) Noke onti otomi timake.

\[
\text{noké} \text{onti} \text{o-} \text{tomí tim} -ak -i \\
\text{REPT.1} \text{PRED.FOC} \text{3fS-} \text{son exist} -\text{PERF} -\text{REAL.1}
\]

‘I hear that she is pregnant (lit. that her son exists).’

2.1 Functional differentiation of Nanti lexical and evidential quotative constructions

Although Nanti lexical and evidential quotative constructions have similar communicative functions, in that they both introduce reported speech, they exhibit several key information structural, syntactic, and communicative functional differences. First, lexical quotative elements (i.e. inflected forms of the verb kant ‘say’) are asserted, in the information structural sense, while their evidential quotative counterparts are not.

This difference in assertivity between these quotative elements is evident in their behavior with respect to the denial test for assertivity (Lambrecht 1996), which I now briefly review. This test serves to identify asserted and non-asserted portions of an utterance on the basis that denials target the asserted portion of an utterance. This can be seen in (8), in which a sentence with a relative clause is denied in (8b), which yields the interpretation that the
proposition in the matrix clause, and not the relative clause, is being denied. This result shows that the matrix clause is asserted, while the relative clause is presupposed. A similar result obtains in clauses with focused elements, as in (9), where it is the focused element that is asserted, while the remainder of the sentence is presupposed.

(8)  
   a. A: I saw the man who caught the fish.
   b. B: That’s not true!
      = It’s not true that the speaker saw the man in question.
      ≠ It’s not the true that the man caught the fish.

(9)  
   a. A: Who caught the fish?
   b. B: Bikotoro caught the fish.
   c. A: That’s not true!
      = It is not true that Bikotoro is the person who caught the fish.
      ≠ It is not true that a fish was caught by someone.

The assertivity of the lexical quotative and the non-assertivity of its evidential counterpart are apparent in Nanti interactional data, as in (10) and (11).

(10)  
       \begin{verbatim}
       i=  nih -ak -i =ro  chapi i=  kant -∅ -i
       3mS= speak -PERF -REAL.1 =3fO yesterday 3mS= say -IMPF -REAL.1
       pi=  n- tim -∅ -e aka, aka Montetoni -ku
       2S=  IRREAL- live -IMPF -IRREAL.1 here here place.name -LOC
       \end{verbatim}
   ‘He spoke to her yesterday, he said, ‘Live here, here in Montetoni.”
   b. B: Teratyo, tera oga. Onti ikanti birompa\textsuperscript{4}, chichata pipokake.
       \begin{verbatim}
       tera =tyo, tera o- oga onti i=  kant -∅
       NEG.REAL =AFFECT NEG.REAL 3f- that PRED.FOC 3mS= say -IMPF
       -i biro =mpa, chichata pi=  pok -ak -e.
       -REAL.1 2.FOC.PRO =ADVIR voluntarily 2S= come -PERF -REAL.1
       \end{verbatim}
   No, not that (i.e. he did not say that). Rather, he said, ‘It is your responsibility,
you came of your own volition.”

(11)  
   a. A: Oka kantani ipitake.
       \begin{verbatim}
       oka  kantani i=  pit -ak -i
       QUOT.1 remain 3mS= be.in.location -PERF -REAL.1
       \end{verbatim}
   ‘She said, ‘He was there.”

\textsuperscript{4}Pronouns bearing the adversative clitic =mpa are now conventionalized interjections that serve to indicate that the responsibility for some action lies with the addressee, and not with the speaker.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{tera} & \quad \text{no=} \quad \text{kamoso} \quad -u \quad -i \quad \text{hanta} \quad \text{none ma}^5 \\
\text{NEG.REAL} & \quad 1S= \quad \text{check.on} \quad -\text{RET} \quad -\text{REAL.I} \quad \text{there} \quad I.\text{didn't.see.person}
\end{align*}
\]

‘No (he wasn’t). I visited there briefly and I didn’t see him.’

Nanti evidential and lexical quotatives also differ in their scopal behavior. Like evidentials in many, but not all, languages (Aikhenvald 2004: 256), Nanti quotative evidentials cannot fall under the scope of clausal polarity markers. Furthermore, they cannot be focused on, or fall under the scope of, modal adverbs. As such, utterances like (12a) and (13a), which involve clausal negative and positive polarity elements that have scope over the respective quotative elements in each sentence, require lexical quotative constructions. Corresponding utterances in which the verb of saying is replaced by quotative evidentials, as in (12b) and (13b), are unattested. Similarly, the use of modal adverbs to qualify or describe the act of speaking require the use of the full lexical verb, as in (14a).

(12) a. Tera nonkante yoberahiga.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{tera} & \quad \text{no=} \quad n- \quad \text{kant} \quad -e \quad i= \quad \text{oberah} \quad -\text{hig} \quad -\emptyset \\
\text{NEG.REAL} & \quad 1S= \quad \text{IRREAL.-say} \quad -\text{IRREAL.I} \quad 3mS \quad \text{bother} \quad -\text{PL} \quad -\text{IMPF} \\
& \quad -a \\
& \quad -\text{REAL.A}
\end{align*}
\]

‘I would not say, “They bother (us).”’

b. *Tera noka yoberahiga.

(13) a. Paniro pigogine nokigaka, ari ikanti.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{paniro} & \quad \text{pi=} \quad \text{kogi} \quad -ne \quad \text{no=} \quad \text{kig} \quad -ak \quad -a \quad \text{ari} \\
\text{one.ANIM} & \quad 2S= \quad \text{barbasco} \quad -\text{ALIEN.POS} \quad 1S= \quad \text{dig} \quad -\text{PERF} \quad -\text{REAL.A} \quad \text{POS.POL} \\
& \quad i= \quad \text{kant} \quad -\emptyset \quad -i \\
3mS= & \quad \text{say} \quad -\text{IMPF} \quad -\text{REAL.I}
\end{align*}
\]

‘I dug up one of your barbasco plants,’ indeed he said.’

b. *Paniro pigogine nokigaka, ari ika.

(14) a. Chichata okanti pinkige nosekane.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{chichata} & \quad o= \quad \text{kant} \quad -\emptyset \quad -i \quad \text{pi=} \quad n \quad \text{kig} \quad -e \quad \text{no-voluntarily} \\
3fS= & \quad \text{say} \quad -\text{IMPF} \quad -\text{REAL.I} \quad 2S= \quad \text{IRREAL} \quad \text{dig} \quad -\text{IRREAL.I} \quad 1P-\text{seka} \quad -\text{ne} \\
\text{manioc} & \quad -\text{ALIEN.POS}
\end{align*}
\]

‘Of her own volition she said, ‘Harvest (lit. dig) my manioc.”

b. *Chichata oka pinkige nosekane.

---

5The idiomatic expression none ma derives from noneake mameri ‘I saw nothing/no-one’. The expression is used to indicate that the speaker did not encounter a specific person that he or she expected to see upon visiting some location.
Most significantly for the purposes of this paper, however, lexical and evidential quotatives also differ functionally. The lexical quotative is frequently employed to report utterances that are not merely assertive in the informational structural sense discussed above, but are also interactionally assertive, whereas the evidential quotative is not. In particular, the lexical quotative is often used to report utterances with significant illocutionary force, such as commands, demands, prohibitions, invitations, and utterances that express a stance on matters that are epistemically or morally contentious in the broader discourse context in which the reported speech is produced. The evidential quotative, in contrast, is mainly employed to relate utterances that are informative but lack significant illocutionary force or do not express a contentious stance. We will return to these generalizations shortly after we consider some examples of the lexical quotative construction in use.

The following five brief strips of interaction illustrate the functional differences between evidential and lexical quotatives. Each of these interactions exhibits shifts in use between the lexical and evidential quotative; these shifts bring into relief their functional differences. The first strip of interaction we consider, (15), is drawn from a conversation between Migero (then the community leader of Montetoni) and the author. The conversation concerns a series of events beginning when Ankiri (a pseudonym), a young unmarried man, harvested manioc from his classificatory father, Barentin, without asking for permission, which constitutes a relatively serious breach of Nanti social norms. Migero learned of Ankiri’s transgression from his own wife Maira, and in his role as community leader, he investigated the incident (including talking to and ultimately chastising Ankiri), and then went to visit Santihago, Barentin’s step-son, to tell him what he had learned, since Barentin was away from the village on an extended fishing trip at the time. The strip of interaction in (15) follows immediately after my asking Migero if he had told Santihago about Ankiri’s actions.


\[\text{ari} -\text{ta} \quad \text{no=} \quad \text{kamant} \quad -\text{ak} \quad -\text{i} \quad =\text{ri}\]
\[\text{POS.PL} \quad -\text{CNGNT} \quad 1\text{S=} \quad \text{tell} \quad -\text{PERF} \quad -\text{REAL.}\text{I} \quad =\text{3mO}\]

‘Indeed, as you say, I told him (Santihago).’

b. Oga oka ikigake iriri Barentin.

\[\text{oga} \quad \text{oka} \quad =\text{i} \quad \text{ki=} \quad \text{ak} \quad -\text{i} \quad \text{ir-} \quad \text{iri} \quad \text{Barentin}\]
\[\text{that.fem} \quad \text{QUOT.}\text{3f} \quad 3\text{mS=} \quad \text{dig} \quad -\text{PERF} \quad -\text{REAL.}\text{I} \quad 3\text{mP-} \quad \text{father} \quad \text{personal.name}\]

‘That one (my wife) said, ‘He harvested (lit. dug) his father’s (manioc).”

c. Noka ikigake.

\[\text{noka} \quad =\text{i} \quad \text{ki=} \quad \text{ak} \quad -\text{i}\]
\[\text{QUOT.}\text{1} \quad 3\text{mS=} \quad \text{dig} \quad -\text{PERF} \quad -\text{REAL.}\text{I}\]

‘I said, ‘He harvested (it).”

d. Noka paniro ikigake.

\[\text{noka} \quad \text{paniro} \quad =\text{i} \quad \text{ki=} \quad \text{ak} \quad -\text{i}\]
\[\text{QUOT.}\text{1} \quad \text{one.}\text{ANIM} \quad 3\text{mS=} \quad \text{dig} \quad -\text{PERF} \quad -\text{REAL.}\text{I}\]

‘I said, ‘He harvested (it) by himself.”
e. **LDM**: Te inebite?

\[ te \quad i= \quad nebi \quad -e \]
\[ \text{NEG.REAL} \quad 3mS= \quad \text{ask.for} \quad \text{-IRREAL.1} \]
‘He didn’t ask for (it)? (= He didn’t ask for permission to harvest it?)’

f. M: Te inebite, onti ikigake kogapagera.

\[ te \quad i= \quad n- \quad nebit \quad -e \quad onti \quad i= \quad kig \]
\[ \text{NEG.REAL} \quad 3mS= \quad \text{IRREAL}- \quad \text{ask.for} \quad \text{-IRREAL.1} \quad \text{PRED.FOC} \quad 3mS= \quad \text{dig} \]
\[ -ak \quad -e \quad \text{kogapagera} \]
\[ \text{-PERF} \quad \text{-REAL.1} \quad \text{lacking} \]
‘He didn’t ask for (it), rather he harvested (it) lacking (permission).’

g. Ikanti paita nonkantaheri.

\[ i= \quad kant \quad -i \quad \text{paita} \quad no= \quad n- \quad kant \quad -ah \quad -e \quad =ri \]
\[ 3mS= \quad \text{say} \quad \text{-REAL.1} \quad \text{later} \quad 1S= \quad \text{IRREAL}- \quad \text{say} \quad \text{-REG} \quad \text{-IRREAL.1} \quad =3mS \]
‘He (Ankiri) said, ‘I will come back and tell him later.”

In the course of this brief strip of interaction, Migero uses evidential quotatives three times, in (15b, c, & d) and a lexical quotative once, in (15g). Migero uses evidential quotatives to report to the author the utterances with which he and Maira informed Santihago of Ankiri’s actions, but when Migero reports Ankiri’s response to Migero’s inquiry and subsequent chastisement (not explicitly mentioned at this point in the conversation), Migero shifts to a lexical quotative. Ankiri’s reported utterance, in contrast to Migero’s and Maira’s informative utterances, constitutes Ankiri making a commitment to tell Barentin about having harvested his manioc, an act with significant social consequences for Ankiri.

The second strip of interaction we consider, (16), is drawn from a conversation between Migero and his brother-in-law Anteres, in which Migero recounts for Anteres the visit of a couple who dropped by and drank manioc beer at Migero’s home.

(16) a. **Migero**: Okanti neroga.

\[ o= \quad kant \quad -∅ \quad -i \quad \text{neroga} \]
\[ 3fS \quad \text{say} \quad \text{-IMPF} \quad \text{-REAL.1} \quad \text{here.you.go} \]
‘She (my wife) said, ‘Here you go.” (i.e. she invited him to drink)

b. Ika nokahati.

\[ ika \quad no= \quad kahat \quad -∅ \quad -i \]
\[ \text{QUOT.3m} \quad 1S= \quad \text{bathe} \quad \text{-IMPF} \quad \text{-REAL.1} \]
‘He said, ‘I’m going to bathe.”

c. Oka tera samanita.

\[ oka \quad \text{tera} \quad \text{samani} \quad =ta \]
\[ \text{QUOT.3f} \quad \text{NEG.REAL} \quad \text{long} \quad =\text{CNGNT} \]
‘She (the visitor’s wife) said, ‘Not long (i.e. we’ll be back soon).”
Of the three instances of reported speech in (16), the only one that Migero reports using the lexical quotative construction is his wife’s utterance, in (16a), which constitutes a conventionalized invitation to enter the house and drink. In Nanti society, invitations to drink manioc beer are socially significant as affirmations of bonds of friendship and cooperation between households; the lack of such invitations can be taken as the denial of these bonds and often leads to bruised feelings, even when the lacking invitation is due to an oversight. Migero’s use of the lexical quotative construction in (16a) is thus consonant with the social consequentiality of his wife’s reported utterance. In contrast, the two subsequent reported utterances in (16b & c), attributed to the visitor and his wife respectively, simply serve to indicate that the visitor and his wife took a break from the long drinking session by taking a brief trip to the river, a very common and socially inconsequential part of drinking sessions.

The third strip of interaction we consider, (17), is drawn from a conversation between Migero and a group of Nantis who have gathered to hear about a controversy involving a young man, Erobakin, who had left the community in which he was living, Kuriha. This example is especially interesting because it exhibits a lexical quotative embedded as part of a speech report introduced by an evidential quotative, in (17b).


ika no= tim -be -ak -a kuri -ha -ku
QUOT.3m 1S= live -FRUS -PERF -REAL.A peach.palm -CL:fluid -LOC
‘He said, ‘I formerly lived at Peach Palm Creek.”

b. Ika ikanti hara ashinetiri.

ika i= kant -i hara a= shine
QUOT.3m 3mS= say -REAL.I NEG.IRREAL 1pl.incl.S= make.welcome
-∅ -i =ri
-IMPF -REAL.I =3mO
‘He said, ‘He (the leader there) said, ‘Let’s not make him welcome.”’

In (17a), Migero employs an evidential quotative to relay to his audience a simple declarative utterance with which Erobakin informed Migero that he no longer was living at Kuriha. Migero’s next utterance, however, consists of an embedded quotation, in which he quotes Erobakin quoting the community leader of Kuriha. The exterior quotative element is an evidential quotative, as we would expect from the fact that Migero is simply relating an informative utterance of Erobakin’s. The quotative element embedded in the reported speech introduced by the evidential quotative, however, is a lexical quotative introducing a reported speech complement that depicts the leader of Kuriha exhorting the other residents to shun Erobakin. This reported utterance is one that exhibits considerable illocutionary force, since as much as with these words, the leader seeks to affect a significant social change, in accord with the use of the lexical quotative.

We now examine an instance in which the lexical quotative is employed to express a strong evaluative stance. This fourth strip of interaction is drawn from a conversation between Tekori, the operator of the community radio, and the author, in which Tekori related a conversation between Migero and the leader of another community in which a
young Nanti man had stayed for many months after accompanying an older man who had family in that community. The older man subsequently returned to his own community, but the young Nanti man remained, becoming a de facto resident of the community, something which displeased the leader of that community.

(18)

a. **Tekori**: Ika samani ipitate.

\[
\text{i} \text{ka} \quad \text{samani} \quad \text{i=} \quad \text{pit} \quad \text{-ak} \quad \text{-i}
\]

QUOT.3m long.time 3mS= be.in.place -PERF -REAL.I

‘He said, ‘He was here for a long time.”

b. **Ikanti** tera onkameti imperate intimera aka.

\[
i= \quad \text{kant} \quad \text{-∅} \quad \text{-i} \quad \text{tera} \quad o= \quad \text{n-} \quad \text{kameti} \quad \text{-e}
\]

3mS= say -IMPF -REAL.I NEG.REAL 3fS= IRREAL- be.good -IRREAL.I

\[
i= \quad \text{n-} \quad \text{pera} \quad \text{-e} \quad i= \quad \text{n-} \quad \text{tim} \quad \text{-∅} \quad \text{-e}
\]

3mS= IRREAL- be.lazy -IRREAL.I 3mS= IRREAL- live -IMPF -IRREAL.I

\[=\text{ra} \quad \text{aka} \]

=SUB here

‘He said, ‘It is not good that he was lazy (i.e. that he was too lazy to return to his home), living here.”

In (18a), we see that Tekori uses the evidential quotative to report the statement of fact, uncontested by Migero or anyone else, that the young man had stayed in the other community for a long time. When Tekori shifts to quoting the leader’s strongly negative evaluation of the young man’s behavior in (18a), however, we see him shift to using the lexical quotative as expected from the strong stance he takes with the utterance.

The final example we consider is drawn from a conversation in which Hirero, my immediate neighbor, informed me of an argument surrounding the malfunction of the community’s sole CD player at the time. At this point in the conversation, Hirero relates how the young man who many suspected of breaking the CD player is accused by his sister of doing so, and how the young man responded.

(19) a. **Hirero**: Okanti biro tinkarahakero.

\[
o= \quad \text{kant} \quad \text{-∅} \quad \text{-i} \quad \text{biro} \quad \text{otin-} \quad \text{karah} \quad \text{-ak} \quad \text{-i}
\]

3fS= say -IMPF -REAL.I 2.FOC.PRO CAUS:DSTR- break -PERF -REAL.I

\[=\text{ro} \]

\[=3fO\]

‘She said, ‘You broke it.”

b. **Ikanti** te nontinkaraherero.
c. Ika nonehapahi te onihe.

>'He said, ‘I saw when I arrived that it did not work (lit. speak).”

The interaction that Hirero reports in this sequence is a highly socially charged one, in which the young man and his sister are arguing over the attribution of blame for the possible loss of a highly valued possession. The stakes are high, and the utterances attributed to each quoted party are not disinterested observations about agreed-upon facts in the world, but rather represent efforts by each party to assert a highly socially consequential and epistemically contested claim in the face of active opposition by their interlocutor. Note that when Hirero shifts from reporting the young man’s forceful expression of his contested epistemic stance in (19b) to his supporting factual claim (19c), Hirero shifts from using the lexical quotative to the evidential quotative.

As exemplified above, the majority of utterances reported using lexical quotatives share the property of being significantly socially consequential in the contexts of their use. This characteristic manifests itself in a number of ways: the utterances either commit the quoted speaker to some future course of action with respect to others; they constitute the means by which the quoted speaker hopes to affect or bring about the actions of others, or they express the quoted party’s commitment to a stance that renders them vulnerable to criticism or opposition from others. These types of utterances can be characterized as ones that carry significant illocutionary force, as indicated by the fact that the lexical quotative can be felicitously glossed with English speech act verbs in terms of ‘promising’ (14), ‘inviting’ (15), ‘exhorting’ (16), ‘declaring’ (17), and ‘asserting’ (18). In contrast, most utterances reported with evidential quotatives are less socially consequential and usually lack significant illocutionary force, being more felicitously glossed with English ‘say’. In short, lexical quotatives typically introduce illocutionary forceful speech, while evidential quotatives do not.

These observations suggest that the functional difference between Nanti lexical and evidential quotatives can be characterized in terms of the distinction made by Levinson (1988: 186) between the ‘informational source’ and ‘illocutionary source’ of reported speech constructions. While Levinson observes that there is a close and intrinsic connection between the status of a source as an informational source and an illocutionary source, and ultimately

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6 As useful as glossing with speech act verbs may be as a heuristic, the validity of glossing utterances that lack explicit performatives with speech act verbs is a questionable substitute for an analysis of the utterances in terms of their social indexicality, as Silverstein (2009: 343-344) observes.
seems to conclude that in practice, a quoted party cannot be an illocutionary source without also being an informational source, it is exactly this distinction between these two kinds of sources that appears to be relevant to Nanti quotative constructions. Although for any given reported utterance, informational and illocutionary sources are extensionally identical (Levinson’s point), the two Nanti quotative constructions differ intensionally, in that the lexical quotative characterizes the quoted party as an illocutionary source (as well as an informational source), while the evidential quotative characterizes the quoted party as only an informational source.

I conclude this section by raising an interesting empirical matter to which the close examination of CQF in the following section will help resolve. Although Nanti’s preference for reporting socially consequential utterances with lexical quotatives is clear, as is the preference for relatively socially inconsequential ones to be reported with quotative evidentials, one finds examples in naturally-occurring discourse where the proposed correlation does not obviously hold. There are cases where an utterance which appears to be quite socially consequential is reported with an evidential quotative, as in (20), and there are others in which utterances which are not obviously socially assertive are reported using a lexical quotative construction, as in (21).

(20) Noka kantanaka pagerora, hara pihoki.

(21) Ikanti aiño ige.

That this kind of post hoc ambiguity should present itself to the analyst is not entirely surprising, given that indexicals (of which quotative elements are an example) are not only presupposing, but also creative (Silverstein 1976). There is no reason to believe that Nantis’ use of quotative strategies is governed by mechanical subcategorization, based on whether an utterance has significant illocutionary force or not. Rather, we would expect the choice between these two speech reporting strategies to be influenced by whether or not the speaker wishes to present the utterance as socially consequential or not. In the case of English, for example, a speaker can choose to report a directive either as a complement to a speech act verb such as ‘demand’ and ‘order’, which does characterize the utterance as illocutionary forceful, or as a complement to ‘say’, which does not. Because Nanti exhibits very few explicit speech act verbs, however, we cannot rely on the suitability of speech act verb paraphrases as a test for illocutionary force, but as I show in §3, the distribution of lexical and evidential quotatives in instances of concurrent quotative framing lends strong empirical support to the proposal that lexical quotatives characterize quoted parties as illocutionary sources, while evidential quotatives do not.
3 Structural characteristics and interactional functions of concurrent quotative framing (CQF)

By embedding speech from some other communicative context into an ongoing interaction, reported speech constructions typically link two distinct speech events: the speech event in which the reported speech construction is employed, and another speech event to which the reported utterance is attributed (potentially including earlier stages of the same ongoing social interaction). In the prototypical case, reported speech is construed as having been drawn from some past speech event and reproduced in the ongoing one (Güldeman and Von Roncador 2002), although as Tannen (1989) and others have observed, the ways in which reported utterances can be linked to other speech events can go well beyond faithful replication of past utterances, and include ‘reports’ from possible and counterfactual worlds and verbal representations of thought or affective stances (e.g. Clark and Gerrig 1990, Koven 2001, Mayes 1990, Sakita 2002). That said, even in the diverse forms of reported speech discussed by critics of the naive replicationist view of reported speech, the two speech events from which speech is drawn are generally held to be distinct (see also Hanks 1990: 205-217; Mushin 2001: 70).

Nanti CQF differs from typical instances of reported speech in that the speech event to which the reported speech is attributed and the ongoing speech event are one and the same. In other words, CQF consists of the use of quotative resources to frame utterances that arise at a particular moment in the ongoing interaction as ‘reported speech’, despite the fact that the speech so ‘reported’ is not attributed to previous or otherwise distinct communicative interactions. Consider the brief strip of interaction given in (22), drawn from a conversation between two community leaders, Migero of Montetoni, and Hoha of Marankehari, regarding the appropriateness of men from one community taking women from the other community as wives. In (22a) Hoha concludes an extended turn in which he expresses his stance that it is not appropriate for men from Montetoni to come to Marankehari to take wives, and that as the leader of the community, it is appropriate for him to take women who have gone to Montetoni, back to Marankehari. Migero begins his response in (22b), in which he expresses his contending stance that as long as the women in question do not already have husbands, men from either community are free to propose that they form a couple. Migero expresses his oppositional stance by employing a reported speech construction, and it is clear from the broader interactional context that he is not quoting one of his own past utterances, but rather is employing concurrent quotative framing.

(22)  
a. **Hoha**: ... nagabehi nagaatiro.

   \[ \begin{align*}
   no= & \text{ agabeh } -e \\
   1S= & \text{ be.able } -\text{REAL.1} \\
   & 1S= \text{ get } -\text{TRANSLOC} -\text{REAL.1} \\
   & =3mO \\
   \end{align*} \]

   ‘... it is appropriate for me to take her back (to Marankehari).’

b. **Migero**: Irompa, irompa, pinka nokanti terira ainyo iro okoritiri, iriniake inkante tsame, biro nontsipatakempa.

   \[ \begin{align*}
   iro & \quad -mpa \\
   & 3f.PRO -ADVR \\
   iro & \quad -mpa \\
   & 3f.PRO -ADVR \\
   pinka & \quad no= \\
   & \text{ say } -\text{IMPF} -\text{REAL.1} \\
   \end{align*} \]
The above example of CQF illustrates that this interactional strategy relies on the lexical quotative construction, with a minimally inflected form of the verb *kant* ‘say’ that bears only subject person marking, null-marked imperfective aspect, and realis reality status. Instances of CQF typically involve first person subject marking on the lexical quotative element, but as we shall see below, there are dialogical uses of CQF that involve second person subject marking. Note that the temporal reference for inflected forms of *kant* ‘say’ in CQF is, strictly speaking, ambiguous between present and past reference, since realis marking is compatible with both interpretations, meaning that knowledge of the discourse context is necessary to assign an accurate gloss.

The preceding example of CQF also illustrates that the main communicative function of CQF in Nanti interactions is to indicate a speaker’s individuated commitment to a stance expressed by the framed utterance. By ‘commitment’, I here refer to the speakers’ explicit claim of a particular stance as his or her own, which thereby makes that speaker socially responsible, or accountable, for holding that stance. In other words, use of CQF constitutes a commitment event in the terminology of Kockelman (2004), by which the speaker clarifies his or her role as a principal, rather than as an animator of the concurrently quotatively framed utterance and the stance it expresses (Goffman 1981).

The following strip of interaction, (23), illustrates one of the major interactional factors conditioning the use of CQF: the presence of stances contending or contrasting with the speaker’s own in the interaction in which the CQF-bearing utterance was produced. It is drawn from a conversation in which two men, Bikotoro and Anteres, are discussing the circumstances surrounding a dispute between Bikotoro’s daughter and her husband, Anteres’ son. Several weeks prior, certain events at a manioc beer feast in Marankehari, where the two young adults lived together, had led to an argument between them, subsequent to which Bikotoro’s daughter returned to her parents’ household in Montetoni. Soon thereafter, efforts ensured by her husband and his political allies, including Anteres, to get her to come back to Marankehari.

Bikotoro’s daughter’s return to Montetoni and the subsequent demands that she come back to Marankehari put Bikotoro in a difficult position. Although Bikotoro appeared quite happy to have his daughter living with him again, several politically powerful individuals from Marankehari insisted that his daughter return to Marankehari, and they furthermore accused Bikotoro of encouraging his daughter to stay in Montetoni. Bikotoro was clearly stung by these accusations, and we see that in this conversation, one of Bikotoro’s principal discursive concerns is to present his and his daughter’s actions as reasonable and morally defensible. To this end, Bikotoro argues that his daughter’s return to his household was
an unpremeditated but appropriate response to being offended by the behavior of certain men in Marankehari during the manioc beer feast in question, and that he himself played no role in her decision. He characterizes his daughter’s actions as reasonable under the circumstances, but not as indicative of any decision to permanently relocate to Montetoni. In this interaction, then, Bikotoro works to present particular framings of his own actions and those of his daughter which contradict other framings of the same events that were already circulating at that time in the Nanti discursive sphere. As we shall see, Bikotoro’s interactional contributions are dense with CQF, as he commits to the contested stances that he takes.

(23) a. **Bikotoro**: Pine maika okantaka hanta naro, hanta,

\[
\text{Pine maika o= kant -ak -a hanta naro hanta} \]

you see now 3fS= happen -PERF -REAL.A there 1PRO there

‘You see what happened there, I, there,’

b. nokanti irobenti, onti pishinkitarar.

\[
\text{no= kant -i irobenti o- nti pi= shinki -∅} \\
\text{1S say -REAL.I because.of.that 3fS= COP 2S be.intoxicated -IMPF} \\
\text{-a =ra} \\
\text{-REAL.A =DEP} \\
\]

‘I said, ‘It’s because of that, because you (the participants in the Marankehari manioc beer feast) were intoxicated.’

c. **Anteres**: Kantira aryo.

\[
\text{kant -i -ra aryo} \\
\text{say -REAL.I =DEP indeed} \\
\]

‘Uh-huh.’

d. **Bikotoro**: Iro arisano paita opintsata=ke ohatahe.

\[
\text{iro arisano paita o= pintsa -ak -i o= ha -ah} \\
\text{3f.PRO indeed later 3fS= decide -PERF -REAL.I 3fS= go -REG} \\
\text{-e -IRREAL.I} \\
\]

‘Because of that, she subsequently decided to return (to Montetoni).’

e. Iro pinka ari nokanti.

\[
\text{iro pinka ari no= kant -∅ -i} \\
\text{3f.PRO actually truly 1S= say -IMPF -REAL.I} \\
\]

‘Yeah, actually, that’s what I say.’

f. **Anteres**: =Ari pikanti.

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7The expression *kantira* and related ones such as *kantira aryo* are employed as continuers (Schegloff 1982).
Truly you say.

That (my daughter’s return to Montetoni) happened for no reason (i.e. lacking forethought).

It’s not as if she decided, that she said, ‘I’m going back there (to Montetoni to live),’ and came back here.’

What could I have said?’ (i.e. there was nothing I could/should say, because my daughter’s actions were reasonable.)

What happened was due to the manioc beer (i.e. the events at the manioc beer feast).

It was appropriate for her to say, ‘I’m going back there to my mother’s (to Montetoni).”

Yeah, that’s what I say.’
This strip of interaction exhibits eight lexical quotative constructions that are deployed for purposes of CQF, which are uniformly associated with the articulation of contested stances. Bikotoro’s first use of CQF in (23) is in line e, where it follows on his claims in lines a-d that his daughter returned to Montetoni because of her disagreeable experiences at the Marankehari manioc beer feast, a starkly different interpretation of events than that of his interlocutor, Anteres. Bikotoro’s next use of CQF is line l, following his assertion in lines g and h that his daughter’s return to Montetoni was an impulsive reaction to the (offensive) events at aforementioned feast, and not a premeditated return to Montetoni in order to live there, and the added evaluation in lines j and k that her return to her mother’s home was an appropriate and reasonable action under the circumstances. These uses of CQF are thus associated with the Bikotoro’s expression of contested epistemic and moral stances.

The contested nature of the evaluations under discussion is signaled by Anteres’ response in line o, where he responds to Bikotoro’s articulation of his position – and perhaps specifically to the final point in the segment concerning the appropriateness of his daughter’s actions – with the utterance *ari pinka inkahara nokanti pikema?* ‘Indeed I said earlier, did you hear?’ This utterance exhibits two discourse particles associated with disagreement and incompatible evaluative stances. The first of these, *pinka*, grammaticalized from the inflected verb *pinkante* ‘you will say’, is employed when a speaker expresses a proposition that either directly contradicts one expressed by an interlocutor, or contradicts a supposition or presupposition held by the interlocutor, as in (24).

\begin{align*}
\text{(24) a. LDM: Tyani shintaro oka inkenishiku?}
\end{align*}
tyani shint -∅ -a =ro oka inkenishiku
who own -IMPF -REAL.A =3fO this forest.
‘Who owns this (part of the) forest?’

b. Bikotoro: Teratya, pinka teratya.

tera =tya pinka tera =tya
NEG.REAL =STILL actually NEG.REAL =STILL
‘Nobody yet, actually, nobody yet.’

The second discourse particle, pikema ‘you hear’, is grammaticalized from the inflected verb form pikemake ‘you heard’, and serves as a sentence-final tag to project an affirmative continuer response to the assertion to which it is appended. This particle is especially common in interactions in which recipients exhibit skepticism about a speaker’s assertions, or resistance to his or her demands. In any event, it is relevant that Bikotoro’s articulation of his stance, and his use of CQF in lines l and n, motivates Anteres to index his own stance, which is framed (through the use of the discourse particles pinka and pikema) as contesting Bikotoro’s.

CQF also centrally involves the individuated attribution of stances to the speaker, whereby utterances and their social consequences are strongly identified with the speaker. This is perhaps clearest in interactions in which Nantis ‘agree to disagree’, setting out their differing personal positions on an issue of mutual concern. Consider the strip of interaction in (25), drawn from the coda of the same conversation between Bikotoro and Anteres, in which Bikotoro states his ultimate evaluation of the messy state of affairs, subsequent to which Bikotoro and Anteres discursively collaborate to unambiguously attribute Bikotoro’s stance to Bikotoro alone.


i= n- kant -∅ -e =me paita onkuta, no=
3mS= IRREAL- say -IMPF -IRREAL.1 =CNTF later morning 1S=
 n- no= n- no= pintsa -∅ -i noka tota no= IRREAL- 1S= IRREAL- 1S= decide -IMPF -REAL.1 QUOT.1 hold.on 1S= ag -ah -e
take -REG -IRREAL.1
‘He should say tomorrow morning, unintelligible , ‘I will-, I will-, I have decided to take (her) back.”

b. Inkanteme.

i= n- kant -∅ -e =me
3mS= IRREAL- say -IMPF -IRREAL.1 =CNTF
‘He should say (that).’

c. Aryo pinka aryo nokanti.
indeed actually indeed 1S= say  -IMPF -REAL.1
‘Indeed, actually, indeed I say.’

d. **Anteres**: [Aryoro pikanti?]

\textit{aryoro pi=}  
\textit{kant -∅ -i} 
\textit{truly 2S=}  
\textit{say -IMPF -REAL.1} 

‘Indeed you say?’

e. **Bikotoro**: Inkanteme maika.

\textit{3mS=}  
\textit{IRREAL- say -IMPF -IRREAL.1 =CNTF maika} 

‘He should say (that) now.’

f. Ari ontentanake, \textit{(unintelligible)}.

\textit{indeed 3fS=}  
\textit{IRREAL- accompany -ABL -PERF -IRREAL.1} 

‘Indeed she would accompany him away, \textit{(unintelligible).’}

g. Tyanpa nonkante?

\textit{tya =npa no=}  
\textit{N- kant -∅ -e} 
\textit{INTERROG =NCGNT 1S=}  
\textit{IRREAL- say -IMPF -IRREAL.1} 

‘What would I say?’ \textit{(i.e. I would not oppose him)}

h. **Anteres**: \textit{(unintelligible)}

i. **Bikotoro**: =Ari pinka aryo nokanti.

\textit{indeed actually indeed 1S=}  
\textit{say -IMPF -REAL.1} 

‘Indeed, actually, I say.’

j. **Anteres**: Ari pikanti?

\textit{ari pi=}  
\textit{kant -∅ -i} 
\textit{truly 2S=}  
\textit{say -IMPF -REAL.1} 

‘Indeed you say?’

k. **Bikotoro**: Ari nokanti.

\textit{ari no=}  
\textit{kant -∅ -i} 
\textit{truly 1S=}  
\textit{say -IMPF -REAL.1} 

‘Indeed I say.’

l. Intaga nokanti.

\textit{intaga no=}  
\textit{kant -∅ -i} 
\textit{that.is.all 1S=}  
\textit{say -IMPF -REAL.1} 

‘That’s all I say.’
m. **Anteres**: Intaga pikanti.

intaga  pi=  kant  -∅  -i
that.is.all  2S=  say  -IMPF  -REAL.1
‘That’s all you say.’

n. **Bikotoro**: Intaga nokanti.

intaga  no=  kant  -∅  -i
that.is.all  1S=  say  -IMPF  -REAL.1
‘That’s all I say.’

In lines a and b, Bikotoro expresses a strong evaluative stance with deontic illocutionary force, namely, that his son-in-law should make amends with Bikotoro’s daughter, followed by the use of CQF in line c. The course of action he advocates stands in stark contrast to how the social crisis has been dealt with thus far, and is based on an assessment of where the responsibility for resolving the situation lies that is very different from that made by Anteres. Rather than placing responsibility in the hands of the residents of Montetoni, and himself specifically, Bikotoro effectively asserts that the situation is his son-in-law’s to resolve. After Anteres responds with a continuer in line d, Bikotoro reiterates his deontic stance, and adds in line g that he would acquiesce to his daughters going back to Marankehari. Moreover, the manner in which he articulates the latter point, *Tyanpa nonkante? ‘What would I say?’*, is generally employed by Nantis to express that they consider the immediate topic of discussion to be one which they have no responsibility to resolve or have no right to interfere in. Bikotoro thus seeks to make clear that resolving the issue of his daughter’s place of residence is simply not his responsibility. Having done this, Bikotoro then deploys CQF again in line i, triggering an interleaved set of utterances in which both he and Anteres deploy CQF to unambiguously attribute the stance that Bikotoro has expressed to Bikotoro and Bikotoro alone. The coda to this topic thus amounts to a collaborative effort by both participants to attribute the expressed stances to Bikotoro in an individuated manner.

The two extended interactions that we have just examined both show that Bikotoro uses CQF to articulate contested stances, and that both he and Anteres employ CQF to unambiguously link these stances to Bikotoro alone. Significantly, just as CQF is dense in interactions in which individuals seek to individuate their stances, CQF is *absent* in the speech of individuals who seek to present their evaluative statements as general or collective truths, supporting the analysis of CQF as a discursive strategy for individuated stance commitment (Michael 2008: 178-186).

I close this section with a brief comparative discussion of self-quotation which, despite the considerable scholarly attention paid to reported speech, is a relatively neglected phenomenon (Golato 2002). The first focused examination of self-quotation was Maynard’s (1996) study of Japanese self-quotation of past utterances. Maynard concluded that self-reporting serves as a strategy by which the speaker can occupy multiple subject positions” by reporting voices indexing those positions. Like Nanti CQF, then, Japanese self-quotation serves to attribute to the speaker particular stances, although it does not appear to have the commitment-enhancing effects that Nanti CQF has. It is possible, of course, that such commitment-enhancing effects do exist in Japanese, but that they are not apparent in the case of past
There are indications, however, that in a variety of languages, self-quotation, and quotation more generally, exhibits the commitment-enhancing effects that I have noted for Nanti quotation, and for CQF in particular. For example, Kuipers (1993) notes that Weyewa quotatives individuate utterances and the stances they express by attributing them to specific individuals, rather than presenting them as widely-held stances; in doing so. Kuipers says, they have the effect of heightening the connotation of personal responsibility for discourse. (ibid.: xxx) Similarly, Gündemann (2008: 411-417) notes examples of self-quotation in Aguaruna, Kwaza, and Irish as well as in many African languages; he remarks that self-quotation has the effect of reinforcing the illocutionary force of an utterance in the way that the English ‘tell construction’ does, e.g. *I am telling you, don’t do that again*. It is unclear if any of these languages exhibit the functional differentiation in their quotative constructions with respect to the illocutionary force of reported speech that we find in Nanti, but they all demonstrate the cross-linguistic use of quotative constructions to either indicate or ‘reinforce’ the illocutionary force of utterances.

4 CQF and the pragmatics of quotation

I treat two related points in this section. First, I return to the question of the semantics of the lexical quotative construction (LQC) raised in §2.1, and argue that CQF shows that the LQC encodes that the source of the utterance is an illocutionary source. Second, I show how the apparent paradox posed by the responsibility-augmenting function of Nanti CQF, in light of the responsibility-diminishing function often attributed to reported speech, can be resolved by treating the illocutionary source semantics of the construction as basic, and by deriving the distancing or commitment-enhancing properties of the construction as stemming from pragmatic reasoning regarding the commitment event realized via CQF.

In §2.1, where I demonstrated that LQCs are frequently used to report utterances with significant illocutionary force, I closed with a brief discussion of cases in which the LQC is used to report utterances which, from the post hoc position of the analyst, are not obviously ones with considerable illocutionary force. Such cases raise the question of the nature of the association between LQCs and illocutionary forceful utterances: in particular, does the lexical quotative in some way encode that its reported speech complement carries significant illocutionary force, or does it merely attribute the utterance to its source, in a manner parallel to the that by which evidentials indicate information source? Or in Levinson’s (1988) terms, does the LQC characterize the quoted party as simply an ‘informational source’ or more specifically as an ‘illocutionary source’?

CQF allows us to distinguish the two possible analyses. Recall that Nantis principally employ CQF to commit to contested epistemic and evaluative stances, an interactional move with considerable illocutionary force. If neither the lexical nor evidential quotative denotes that the quoted party is an illocutionary source *per se*, then we would have no reason to expect a preference for one construction over the other in cases of CQF, since the relevant

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8 Two other works on self-quotation, likewise concerned with self-reports of past utterances, focus on other properties of this discursive strategy, such as the manipulation of social indexicality (Koven 2001), or its use to demonstrate or replay reasoning processes (Golato 2002).
illocutionary force meaning would arise via implicature from the information source meaning of the quotative constructions, and there is no \textit{a priori} reason to believe that one construction would preferentially yield that implicature. If, however, one of the two constructions \textit{does} denote that the quoted party is an illocutionary source, we would expect that construction to be vastly preferred in CQF, as it would be well suited for expressing commitment to contested epistemic and moral stances, while the other would not. The fact that CQF is consistently realized using lexical and not evidential quotatives thus indicates that the lexical quotative denotes that the quoted party is an illocutionary source, while the evidential quotative simply indicates that the quoted party is an information source.

With this result in hand, we now turn to the apparent paradox posed by the responsibility-enhancing effects of CQF in light of the responsibility-diminishing function often attributed to reported speech. At least since Chafe’s (1986: 268-269) seminal work on evidentiality, reported speech has been seen as closely related to issues of speakers’ responsibility regarding claims expressed in discourse. Much of the work on this topic, however, has focused on the responsibility-diminishing or ‘distancing’ properties of reported speech, such as when Hill and Irvine (1993:13) discuss how reported speech distribute[s] responsibility, thinning out and socializing its central force Similarly, Fox (2001: 174) observes that

by doing a message as ‘animator’ [i.e. by quoting] \ldots a participant can be seen to distribute responsibility to other (perhaps noncopresent) participants and thereby minimize the potentially negative consequences of their actions.

And Güldemann (2008: 103) appears to extend the distancing function even to instances of self-quotation:

...[A]nd perhaps most importantly, SP [i.e. the quoted party] is the mental source of the quote and represents the different center of consciousness, the alien ego (in self-quoting, of course, only pragmatically), from which the reporter seeks to distance her/himself in the ongoing discourse.

The fact that Nanti CQF realizes a commitment event, indicating or emphasizing speakers’ responsibility for utterances and the stances they express, presents a puzzle in light of analyses of reported speech as responsibility-diminishing. It is important to note that this discrepancy is not simply a question of differences between the communicative functions of quotative constructions in Nanti and those in other languages: quotative constructions in Nanti can also serve responsibility-diminishing functions similar to those observed in other societies, as evident in the strip of interaction we now consider.

This strip is drawn from a brief conversation between the author and the community leader, Migero, concerning a man, Barentin, whose garden was located within the borders of the Manu National Park, a reserve near the community of Montetoni. Some months prior to this conversation, officials from the park had visited Montetoni to inform the residents there that they were forbidden from hunting and farming in the park. However, since the loss of this territory would have meant that over half the families in the community would have been deprived of their hunting territories, most Montetoni Nantis simply ignored the \textit{pariki}, or park officials. In line with his default policy of mollifying government officials, Migero at
first attempted to convince community members to heed the park officials, but he eventually realized the futility of doing so, and instead settled on the rhetorical position that he and his kin had heeded the pariki, but others in the community, contrary to his wishes, failed to do so. In this conversation, Migero reports speech that he attributes to Barentin to animate a stance from which he explicitly distances himself.

   hee naro no= kem -∅ -i
   yes 1.FOC.PRO 1S= hear -IMPF -REAL.I

   ‘Yes, I paid attention (lit. heard).’

b. Te inkeme.
   te i= n- kem -e
   NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL- hear -IRREAL.I

   ‘He didn’t pay attention.’

[...]

d. Tera naro kanterime, tsamaite kamatitya.
   tera naro kant -e =ri =me tsamai -∅
   NEG.REAL 1.FOC.PRO say -IRREAL.I =3mO =CNTREXP farm -IMPF
   -e IRREAL.I downriver

   ‘I didn’t say to him, ‘Farm downriver.’

   e. Chichata yogotake intsamaite, ikanti nontsaga-te, nontsagabagete kamatitya.
   chichata i= ogo -ak -i i= n- tsamai -∅
   voluntarily 3mS= know -PERF -REAL.I 3mS= IRREAL- farm -IMPF
   -e i= kant -∅ -i no= n- tsaga -∅
   -IRREAL.I 3mS= say -IMPF -REAL.I 1S= IRREAL- fish -IMPF
   -e no= n- tsaga -bage -e kamatitya
   -IRREAL.I 1S= IRREAL- fish -DUR -IRREAL.I downriver

   ‘Of his own volition he thought to farm, he said, ‘I’m going to fish, I’m going to fish extensively downriver.’

   [...]

f. Ikanti hara nokemi pariki, oga aka nonsamaite.
   i= kant -∅ -i hara no= kem -i pariki
   3mS= say -IMPF -IRREAL NEG.IRREAL 1S= hear -REAL.I park.official
   oga aka no= n- tsamai -e
   this here 1S= irreal- farm -IRREAL.I

   ‘He said, ‘I will not pay attention to the park officials, I’m going to farm this land here.’

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This interaction shows Migero employing LQCs to set up a stance that he attributes to Barentin in line a and which he contrasts with his own in lines e and f, even going so far as to ‘negatively’ quote himself in line d, reporting what he didn’t say, in order to display his disalignment with Barentin’s stance. Migero’s use of LQCs in this interaction clearly illustrate that they can serve as a distancing strategy as well as, in the case of CQF, a commitment strategy. We now turn to a pragmatic account of this multifunctionality.

The analysis of the multifunctionality of LQCs is grounded in treating them as always encoding individuated attribution of an utterance and its associated illocutionary force to the quoted party, with distancing or commitment effects arising as pragmatic implicatures. Beginning with the case of third party quotation, we observe that this involves explicit attribution of an utterance, and of any stances that the utterance indexes, to a third party, without any explicit mention of whether the speaker or anyone else holds that stance. Distancing effects arise from the (defeasible) inference that while the quoted speaker holds a particular stance – and in the case of LQCs, holds it explicitly as an illocutionary source – the speaker does not. Inferences of this sort arise from the Maxim of Quantity, the communicative presumption that speakers are being optimally informative, as well as from derivative maxims such as the Rule of Strength, Make the strongest claim that you can legitimately defend” (Fogelin 1967: 20-22; cited in Horn 2004:15), and the Maxim of Quantity-Quality, Make the strongest relevant claim justifiable by your evidence” (Harnish 1976: 363; cited in Horn 2004:15). With respect to stances then, the fact that a speaker attributes a stance to a third party, but does not express that stance him- or herself, yields the inference that the speaker does not hold that stance, since the maxims lead the addressee to assume that the speaker has made the strongest claim legitimated by the situation. The result is a defeasible distancing from the stance expressed by the quoted utterance (see below for further discussion). The commitment-enhancing effects of CQF then follow straightforwardly: since LQC attributes stances to quoted individuals, CQF brings about the explicit attribution of a stance to the speaker, thereby rendering the use of CQF a commitment event (Kockelman 2004), with no distancing inferences.

Güldemann’s (2008) discussion of the pragmatics of ‘quotative indices’ in African languages suggests that the analysis of third-party quotation and self-quotation that I have outlined here is of broad applicability, since for the languages in his sample, third-party quotation is generally associated with distancing, self-quotation with ‘illocution reinforcement’. There are a number of important exceptions to be considered, however. First, reported speech has often been analyzed as sometimes having authority- and objectivity-enhancing effects in interaction (e.g. Clift 2007, Heritage and Raymond 2005, Vincent and Perrin 1999). I argue that such effects are, however, largely orthogonal to the relationship between speaker and quoted utterance that we are considering here. The ability of quoted utterances to confer authority for a given claim stems from the relationship between the source of the quoted utterance and the content of the quoted utterance. To the degree that the quoted party is recognized by the participants in an interaction as having authority with respect to the claim expressed in the quoted utterance, or to the degree to which the quoted utterance demonstrates authority by indexing the quoted party’s participation in a relevant

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9The garden in question was a ‘hunting garden’, intended to support fishing trips far from the community that could last for weeks at a time.
event (Clift 2006), the quoted utterance can function as an ‘authoritative’ means for the
speaker to introduce a relevant claim into the ongoing interaction. Given the analysis of
distancing as a conversational implicature, the fact that speakers can draw on the authority
associated with particular pairings of quoted parties and quoted utterances is not surprising,
as implicatures of non-commitment to the utterance are simply defeased by the authority of
the quoted utterance. Note that even here, however, ‘distance’ plays an important role. It
is precisely the fact that it is an authoritative other, distinct from the speaker, that serves
as the illocutionary or informational source of the utterance, that renders it authoritative
in cases of third-party quotation. Distancing of speaker from quoted source is central in
generating overtones of ‘objectivity’ in similar ways as is sometimes attributed to reported
speech (e.g. Álvarez-Cáccamo 1996, Holt 1996: 242).

Second, a different issue is posed by cases in which reported speech has been analyzed as
serving primarily evidential purposes, as in Matses (Fleck 2007:604), or the related goal of
explicitness in depicting communicative interactions, as in Kalapalo (Basso 1995). In these
cases, reported speech is analyzed neither as serving responsibility-diminishing or authority-
enhancing functions, but rather more properly evidential ones, which are distinct from epis-
temic concerns. It is helpful to compare such uses of reported speech with the Nanti case.
As mentioned in §1, Nantis make extensive use of reported speech to recount communicative
interactions in great detail, in a manner similar to what is described for these languages.
Crucially, when Nantis relate conversations in this way, they principally do so using the
evidential quotative, and not the lexical quotative. This leads me to conclude that Nanti
formally distinguishes reported speech constructions that serve to express speaker commit-
ment from those that serve narrowly evidential communicative goals. Evidential uses of
reported speech like those in Matses and Shipibo thus correspond to the Nanti evidential
quotative, suggesting that those reported speech constructions involve identification of in-
formational source, but not illocutionary source per se.

5 Distinguishing grammaticalized evidentials and evidential strategies

One of the major sources of disagreement that has emerged in the study of evidentiality in
recent years concerns the importance of grammaticalization as a criterion for distinguishing
evidentials proper from other ‘evidential-like’ phenomena. While early work on evidential-
ity tended to admit both lexical and grammaticalized expressions of information source as
forms of evidentiality (e.g. Chafe 1986), much recent work has followed Aikhenvald’s (2004)
critical stance towards treating lexical expressions of information source meanings as ‘ev-
dentials’. This stance stems from a position that evidentiality constitutes a grammatical
category, such that for an element to qualify as an evidential, it must be a grammaticalized
morpheme which has some information source specification as its primary meaning. This has
led advocates of this position to distinguish evidentials proper from ‘evidential strategies’,
including constructions in which lexical elements, such as verbs of perception, indicate the
source of information for an associated utterance.\textsuperscript{10}

However, because typology relies crucially on semantics to construct cross-linguistic categories (Haspelmath 2007), and because there is little agreement among typologists on explicit semantic or structural criteria for distinguishing grammatical categories (Boye 2010, Boye and Harder 2009), some linguists grant less importance to grammaticalization in identifying ‘evidentials’ (e.g. Boye and Harder 2009, Weimer and Stathi 2010: 276) than others. In short, there is no clear consensus regarding either the line that distinguishes evidentials from evidential strategies, or the significance of such a distinction.

Although these two issues can be treated as definitional ones grounded in broader theoretical questions, e.g. regarding the relationship between lexical items and grammaticalized morphemes (e.g. Boye and Harder 2009), in principle they admit an empirical resolution. In particular, if there exist systematic functional differences that distinguish grammaticalized evidentials from evidential strategies, this would support maintaining a strong analytical distinction between these two ways of expressing information source meanings.

Nanti lexical quotatives and evidential quotatives present an example of precisely this kind of functional difference, since lexical quotatives and their grammaticalized counterparts differ in their semantics, with the former indicating that the quoted party is an illocutionary source and the latter merely indicating that the quoted party is the informational source of the quoted utterance. The existence of functional contrasts like those in Nanti appears to be consistent with a cross-linguistic tendency for languages to functionally differentiate lexical quotatives from their grammaticalized evidential counterparts (Aikhenvald 2004: 137-140). Note that the precise nature of this functional differentiation appears to vary among languages. The Bulgarian lexical quotative construction, for example, lacks the distancing properties of its grammaticalized evidential counterpart, the reportive (Gvozdanović 1996: 63, cited in Aikhenvald 2004: 138); while the Tewa lexical quotative construction indicates that the speaker does not take responsibility for the veracity of the reported speech, a sense lacking when the reportive is used instead (Kroskrity 1993: 146, cited in Aikhenvald 2004: 139). Aikhenvald also reports similar effects for Papuan languages. The fact that Güldemann (2008: 411) identifies self-quotation as generally illocution-reinforcing in the sample of African languages he considers (he goes so far as to suggest that this effect is “universally available” (ibid: 412)), however, suggests that the distancing effects noted by Aikhenvald for lexical quotatives may constitute one side of the polyfunctionality exhibited by Nanti LQCs. If this is correct, then the functional differentiation we find in Nanti between lexical and evidential quotatives may not be unusual.

It is worth noting that the functional differentiation of the lexical and evidential quotatives in Nanti is in fact an even clearer case of functional differentiation than those cited earlier, since these other cases involve differentiation between lexical quotative and reportive evidential constructions, while in Nanti we are able to directly compare lexical quotatives with grammaticalized evidential quotatives. To the degree that this sort of functional differentiation in the quotative notional domain is characteristic of the notionally delimited in-

\textsuperscript{10}Aikhenvald (2004) employs the term ‘evidential strategy’ to refer to both, a) lexical expressions of information source meanings, which often consist of complement-taking verbs, and b) secondary meanings associated with non-evidential grammatical categories (e.g. tense, aspect, and mood) and construction types (e.g. passives). For the purposes of this paper, I restrict the term ‘evidential strategy’ to refer only to the former, lexical, realization of evidential meanings.
formation source domain more generally, an empirical answer to the question of the validity of distinguishing lexical from grammaticalized evidentiality may be forthcoming. The Nanti facts suggest that a comparative research program closely focused on the pragmatic differentiation of relatively grammaticalized versus relatively non-grammaticalized evidentials with similar notional content in particular languages will be helpful in resolving the question of the significance of grammaticalization in delimiting evidentiality as both a language-specific and cross-linguistic category.

6 Distinguishing epistemic modality and evidentiality in grammar and discourse

The question of whether evidentiality and epistemic modality are distinct grammatical categories or not has spawned intense debate in recent years. In this section I review this debate and show that the pragmatic arguments in the previous section support the importance of maintaining the distinction between evidential and epistemic modal meanings as much in the analysis and description of evidential strategies as in that of grammaticalized evidentials. Turning first to grammaticalized evidentiality, we find that in early functionalist and typological work on the topic, evidentiality and epistemic modality were largely conflated, with evidentials being seen as a means for qualifying the validity of a proposition (see e.g. Chafe and Nichols 1986; Frayzinger 1985; Givón 1982; Palmer 1986; Willett 1988). More recently, however, Aikhenvald (2004) and De Haan (1999, 2001), among others, have argued that evidentiality, narrowly defined as indicating the ‘source of information’ from which knowledge of some situation springs, must be distinguished from epistemic modality, narrowly defined as the expression of degrees of speaker certainty regarding the validity of a given proposition. Evidence in favor of this view can be drawn from languages in which the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality meanings does not follow the otherwise expected correlation between the directness of an evidential category and its associated epistemic modal strength (see e.g. Bybee et al. 1994: 180). Counterexamples to the expected correlation are found first in languages in which evidentials carry no epistemic modal entailments and where associated epistemic modal meanings, if they exist, are defeasible; and second, in languages where the epistemic modal meanings associated with various evidentials are invariant, such as when use of evidentials entails or implies certainty on the part of the speaker regarding the validity of the evidential-marked utterance, as in the case of Kashaya (Oswalt 1986: 43; see Michael 2008: 67-75 for further discussion).

Reactions to the efforts by typologists to distinguish epistemic modality and evidentiality have been diverse. Formally-oriented linguists have split on the issue (compare, e.g. Faller (2002) and Speas (2007) vs. Blain and Déchaîne (2007)), while most typologically- and functionally-oriented linguists have been sympathetic to Aikhenvald’s and De Haan’s arguments (e.g. Boye 2010, DeLancey 2001, Nuyts 2001, Plungian 2001; cf. Stenzel 2004). Students of language use in interaction, on the other hand, who are largely concerned with evidential strategies rather than grammaticalized evidentials as such, have tended to favor collapsing evidentiality and epistemic modality into a single notional category, essentially on the grounds that whatever the semantic grounding of evidential strategies in informa-
tion source meanings, the *interactional* purposes to which evidential strategies are put are epistemic in nature (e.g. Atkinson 1999, 2004, Ifantidou 2001, Fox 2001, Kärkkäinen 2003, Sakita 2002). There is no doubt, of course, that evidentials and evidential strategies are frequently associated cross-linguistically and cross-culturally with epistemic modal implications (see, e.g. Boye and Harder 2009: 27-28; Mushin 2001: 23-26, this issue; Speas 2008), and it is not surprising that such implications are especially relevant in societies in which the expression of interactants’ certainty regarding the truth of utterances looms large in local communicative practices, as it does in English (Chafe 1986). There are good reasons to believe, however, that when speakers use evidential strategies in interaction, they are often motivated by communicative goals other than those of an epistemic modal nature. As Phillips (1993: 255-256) has observed, the use of evidentials is mediated by culture-specific ideologies of language and knowledge, and considerations as diverse as local understandings about appropriate ways to talk about others’ internal states, or the relationship between wisdom and social hierarchy, may inform the use of evidentials to a greater degree than concerns about expressing speaker certainty. Likewise, I have argued that in certain contexts, Nantis’ use of evidentials and evidential strategies is motivated not by a desire to diminish epistemic responsibility, but rather by a desire to distance themselves from particular states of affairs (Michael 2008: 135-153). Even restricting our attention to evidential strategies in interaction, it appears that we must be careful about assuming that lexical expressions of information source are proxies for expressing epistemic modal meanings.

The analysis in §5 supports the conclusion that it is important to distinguish evidential and epistemic modal meanings when analyzing evidential strategies, since the capacity for Nanti lexical quotative constructions to serve both distancing and commitment-enhancing functions depends crucially on the semantics of their information source – or more precisely, their illocutionary source. At first glance, the fact that Nanti LQCs can either distance a speaker from a quoted utterance or indicate their commitment to it may seem like evidence in favor of treating evidential strategies like LQC as essentially epistemic modal in nature, being used for purposes of communicative interaction. Crucially, however, it is not possible to treat LQCs as having any *single* epistemic modal meaning, since they can yield both distancing and commitment-enhancing meanings. As discussed in §5, these multiple meanings are possible because they arise as conversational implicatures from pragmatic reasoning regarding the more basic evidential semantics of the reported speech construction that identify the (illocutionary) source of the quoted utterance.

7 Conclusion

This paper has described the structural and functional characteristics of Nanti concurrent quotative framing (CQF), a form of self-quotation, and has used the interactional and pragmatic properties of this discursive strategy to illuminate functional differences between lexical and evidential quotatives in Nanti, and to argue for maintaining the distinction between evidential strategies and grammaticalized evidentials, on the one hand, and for maintaining the distinction between evidentiality and epistemic modality in the analysis of evidential strategies, on the other.

In particular, I have shown that the Nanti lexical quotative construction (LQC), of which
CQF is a special case, characterizes the quoted party as an illocutionary source, and not just an utterance-informational source. This characteristic of LQCs distinguishes them from their grammaticalized counterparts, the evidential quotatives, which only specify that the quoted party is an informational source. Similar functional differences between lexical quotative constructions and their grammaticalized counterparts in other languages suggest that functional differentiation between evidential strategies and grammaticalized evidentials may be typical of the quotative/reportive notional domain. To the degree that further research confirms this functional differentiation cross-linguistically, typologists will have a compelling reason to maintain a theoretical distinction between lexical and grammaticalized expressions of evidential meanings.

This paper has also provided a detailed study of a form of self-quotation – a phenomenon that has received little attention to this point – and showed that CQF constitutes a ‘commitment event’ by which the speaker explicitly takes an epistemic or moral stand, typically in the face of oppositional stances of interlocutors or other stances already circulating in the broader discourse context. I also showed how this commitment-enhancing function is actually compatible with the distancing function often attributed to reported speech constructions, based on a pragmatic analysis that takes the notionally evidential speech-attributing function as semantically basic, and derives the distancing effect as a consequence of maxims that lead the listener to assume that the speaker presents the most compelling evidence possible when introducing claims in discourse. In turn, the success of this analysis in reconciling the distancing and commitment-enhancing characteristics of reported speech constructions serves as evidence in favor of maintaining the notional distinction between evidentiality and epistemic modality even in the domain of evidential strategies.

8 References


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