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I. Introduction

In the latter stages of the 1996 Presidential campaign, the Republican party's candidate, Bob Dole, abandoned the accepted customs of recent American politics by endorsing and campaigning for a California state initiative measure, Proposition 209, that sought to end all state and local government preferences based on race and gender. At issue were a number of programs designed to ensure that women and minorities were more equally represented in public employment, public universities and business contracts with state and local governments. Resentment of these programs had been festering for some time among many White voters, most of whom either felt that affirmative action programs violated the basic premises of a color-blind society or feared that enhanced opportunities for historically disadvantaged groups meant diminished opportunities for others. The Republican strategy, as we shall demonstrate shortly, was to take political advantage of these resentments in order to win over White "swing voters" and to shore up Bob Dole's support among conservatives in the Republican party.

The significance of this ultimately futile strategy is not that race suddenly mattered in 1996—indeed, race has been a very important determinant of American politics since the 1960s. The realignment of southern states out of the Democratic and into the Republican ranks, the most significant political change in the postwar period, was caused by a reaction of southern Whites to the "liberal" racial policies of the Democratic party. Also, party cleavages throughout the US coincide with racial and ethnic divisions: a majority of African-Americans and Latinos perennially identify with and vote for the Democratic party while
the Republican vote is predominantly White. Thus, the significance of Dole's endorsement of California's Proposition 209 is not that it was a new political strategy, but rather, by openly appealing to White racial resentment for political gain, it revived a tactic which had been considered off-limits in American politics since the George Wallace Presidential campaigns in 1968.

The purpose of this piece is to examine the evolution, logic and impact of Dole's Proposition 209 tactic in order to illustrate the intermingling of race, immigration and politics in contemporary US politics. California is the most racially and ethnically complex state in the US. Using the mapping resources of the California Statewide Database, we will illustrate the racial and political divisions of California politics and highlight the critical "swing" areas of the state that Dole had hoped to capture with his anti-affirmative action appeal. We will then examine the electoral impact of Proposition 209 to assess the effectiveness of Dole's California racial strategy using a statewide survey of 1498 respondents completed on the eve of the November 1996 election. This survey uniquely over-sampled in racial and ethnic minority neighborhoods in order to provide the most complete picture to date of how the Proposition 209 vote divided California voters along racial and ethnic lines.

Race as a "Wedge" Issue.

It is important to begin with the distinction between using racial divisions as a political strategy on the one hand and as a political tactic on the other. In the parlance of American political consultants, a political strategy consists of three elements: identifying the characteristics of the voters who can be persuaded, figuring out which issues matter the most to them and crafting a message that favorably contrasts the candidate's positions on those issues with the opponent's. Thus, for instance, a Republican pollster might discover that older white males living in suburban and rural areas are more likely to harbor resentments towards immigrant groups and nonwhite minorities. If so, the preferred strategy might be to establish a politically favorable contrast by having the Republican candidate take a tougher position on the treatment of these groups than the Democrat.
The tactical problem is how to implement a racial strategy. Prior to 1996, the usual tactic of mainstream Republican candidates was to take a hard-line position on issues that indirectly related to race such as tougher sentences for criminals or the reimposition of the death penalty. In a famous television ad in the 1988 Presidential race between the Republican candidate George Bush and the Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis, the Republicans alluded to race by blaming Dukakis for the early prison release of a violent black man, Willie Horton, who subsequently committed a brutal murder. The image of the black criminal in the ad was sufficient to tap the racial fears of key "swing" Democrats and Independents.

But the fear of alienating moderately conservative swing voters by going too far caused Presidential candidates to avoid making any direct racial attacks and taking strong positions against remedial programs designed to help disadvantaged groups such as women and minorities. This reluctance was very much evident in the early stages of the Dole campaign. Under pressure from conservatives within his party, Dole had quietly endorsed Proposition 209, the so-called California Civil Rights Initiative, but refused to make it a focus of his campaign, even in California where early polls indicated that Proposition 209 would pass by a wide margin. As late as the end of September, Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Jack Kemp had told the press: "We are not going to campaign on a wedge issue. We have endorsed CCRI (i.e. Proposition 209), but as a transition to a new era...We are not going to let this issue tear up California" (Sipchen/Peterson, LA Times, 9/28).

But by the end of October, the Dole campaign had changed tactics. During a four-day trip to California, Dole began to attack President Clinton for "failing to control the nation's borders" and to speak out forcefully on behalf of Proposition 209. Asked to account for the shifting emphasis on immigration and affirmative actions, it was reported that Dole has said candidly:

"They're wedge issues" (Trounstein/Ostrom, San Jose Mercury, 10/28).

The next day Bob Dole delivered "his first extensive endorsement" of Proposition 209, "acknowledging that he had changed his mind about the merits of affirmative action programs" and suggesting that President
Clinton "would undermine the initiative if re-elected." At the same time, the Dole campaign put a lot of money into TV and radio ads in support of Proposition 209.

The term "wedge issue" in American politics refers to issues used by candidates of one party to attract voters who usually support the other party—in effect, driving a wedge between the opposition and its normal supporters. The target groups for the Republicans in 1996 were white male Democrats and Independents. The plan was to criticize the President's immigration policies and to support Proposition 209 in order to drive California swing voters into the Republican camp. It was a risky strategy in the sense that by openly and directly taking on the issues of immigration and affirmative action, the Republicans risked alienating moderate Republicans, potential supporters in the Latino and Asian communities, and women. At the same time, by October, it had become clear that Dole would have to do something drastic if he had any hope of narrowing the double digit lead that Clinton held over him in the polls. California, with its 54 Electoral College Votes, was a critical state for Dole to win. To understand more about the interplay between wedge issues like affirmative action and Presidential fortunes, it is necessary to appreciate the geopolitics of California elections more fully.

II. Geopolitics, Race and Strategy

It is commonplace to say that the strategy of a national Presidential campaign is geopolitical. The ultimate winner is chosen by the electoral college and not by popular vote. A important part of a Presidential candidate's strategy is deciding which states he expects to win, which he expects to lose and which are "tossups. The "tossup" states are the ones that receive that most funds, the most visits by the candidate, and the most attention from the press. California has traditionally been a "tossup" state with high opportunity costs; that is to say, given California's size and diversity, it is a big gamble to try to win California when there are other smaller, less expensive states to go after instead. At several points in the 1996 campaign, Dole and his advisors had to decide whether it was better to sink a lot of money and effort into capturing
California's 54 electoral college vote (with 270 votes needed to win), or to diversify the risk over a number of medium sized states in the east and midwest such as Ohio (21 electoral college votes), Michigan (18 electoral college votes), or Pennsylvania (23 electoral college votes). Throughout the summer and early Fall, there was much speculation that Dole would pull out of California, as George Bush had done in 1992, because the lead that Clinton had over Dole did not seem to make the gamble worthwhile. Finally, in October, after a California poll showed a narrowing of Clinton's lead, Dole decided to invest in California and to develop a "wedge issue" tactic.

In addition to national geopolitical considerations, a Presidential campaign in California has a statewide geopolitical dimension. With 19 million eligible voters of very diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds and eight separate major media markets, California presents a formidable strategic challenge of its own: which areas and markets represent the best investments in order to get the most votes per dollar spent? Normally, this is determined by a process of several steps. First, campaigns routinely conduct focus groups and baseline polls to distinguish the swing voters from the loyalists and to identify their issue concerns. Then, they consult past election returns to identify the neighborhoods and sections of the state with the most swing voters. It is there that the campaign will target their tv and radio spots, political mailings, voter mobilization and grassroots efforts to contact voters. By focusing campaign resources where they are most likely to be effective, the campaign operates as efficiently as it can, given the limitations of time and money.

A peculiar feature of California politics added another dimension to the quest for political efficiency in 1996. In 1991, the re-drawing of state and Congressional boundaries was done by a panel of three judges when the Governor and legislature failed to come to a compromise. Typically, there is little or no coordination of district boundaries for various offices. A Congressional district might contain one or many parts of state legislative districts. However, the court in 1991 deliberately sought to rationalize the overlap of districts so that each State Senate seat consisted of two Assembly districts, and that there was considerable correspondence between the Congressional and State Senate lines. In effect, this stacked the districts in such
a way that there was an incentive to coordinate the campaign efforts at the state legislative, Congressional and
Presidential level. From a European perspective, it may seem astounding that such a basic level of
cooperation is usually missing in California elections, but in a typical year, in addition to a separate state
Presidential campaign organization, there are 52 independent Congressional and 120 state legislative
campaign organizations for each party—all of them trying to mobilize and persuade voters virtually by
themselves. Organizational chaos, in essence, is the norm in California elections.

The stacking of district lines created "hot spots" throughout the state—i.e. areas where there were
close races at the Presidential, Congressional and state legislative level simultaneously. The Democrats, in
particular, took advantage of this feature by concentrating their money and effort efficiently in those areas.
The Republicans also had swing areas in mind when they devised their "wedge issue" approach. However, the
Republicans imposed their strategy only at the top and failed to coordinate a consistent message at all levels
of the ticket. As a consequence, as we shall see shortly, the wedge was less effective than it might have been
otherwise.

III. Race and Party in Four California Counties

A visual way to understand the interplay of race, partisanship and the identification of critical swing
areas is to map demographic and political distributions in a few specific regions of the state. A few facts
about California might help readers appreciate the maps more. California is divided for administrative
purposes into 58 counties that vary greatly in geographic and demographic size. For instance, San
Bernardino with 12.9 million acres is the largest county geographically and San Francisco with 58,000 acres
is the smallest (California Almanac, p. 59), and, in terms of population, Los Angeles, with 9.3 million
inhabitants is the largest and Alpine with a mere 1,170 is the smallest. For the purpose of our mapping
analysis, we have chosen four of the so-called “hotspot” areas in different parts of the state. As we said
before, these are defined as areas in which there were competitive races in 1996 at the Presidential,
Congressional and state legislative levels simultaneously. The four include two from the northern half of the state and two from the southern. The two from the northern half are: a cluster centered on the California State Senate District 7 located in the Bay area counties of Contra Costa and Alameda, and another centered on the State Senate District 15 in the central coastal area that includes parts of Santa Cruz, Monterey, San Benito and Santa Clara counties. The two clusters from the southern part of the state are that defined by the 27th State Senate District in the southern section of LA county and by State Senate District 39 in San Diego county near the Mexican border.

For each cluster, we produce two types of maps that together demonstrate the interplay of racial and political cleavages. The first map type displays the area’s ethnic and racial composition. As a consequence of immigration, California’s population is highly diverse and rapidly changing. According to the 1990 census, California’s population makeup is 57% White, 25% Latino and 7% Black and 9% Asian. Currently at 32 million residents, the state is projected by some to grow to over 60 million by the year 2040 (California Department of Finance, Population Research Unit, Report 93-P-1,1993), and soon, California will be the only majority nonwhite state on the mainland US. However, the translation of demographic size into political strength is not a simple one in US politics. There is a large and politically important discrepancy between the ethnic and racial composition of the population and the electorate. Exit polls suggest that the electorate in the 1996 Presidential election was 79% White, 10% Latino, 6% Black and 4% Asian. This huge gap is caused by a number of factors including high rates of noncitizenship among the Latinos and Asians, low rates of education and home ownership among Latinos and Blacks, a disproportionately young Latino population with many children who are not yet old enough to vote and a cultural reluctance among immigrants to give up their former citizenship. Hence, when viewing these maps, one should bear in mind that the minority areas tend to have smaller numbers of voters than the White areas.

The second sort of map classifies areas by their propensity to vote for the Democratic or Republican ticket. Prior to 1996, there were six major statewide races in California, including two Gubernatorial (1990 and 1994), one Presidential (1992) and three US senate (1992, 1994). A very simple measure of their
comparative loyalty takes the sum of the number of times each precinct area voted for the Democratic or Republican candidate. Thus, if a given precinct cast more votes for the Democratic over the Republican candidate in five instances and the Republican over the Democratic candidate once, it would receive a score of five. By our calculations, thirty-two percent of all the precincts in the entire state preferred the Democratic candidate in all six races, and twenty-seven percent preferred the Republicans in all instances. That means that forty-one percent of the precincts swung to the other party’s candidate at least once and a quarter did so at least twice. Seven percent voted half of the time for the candidate of one party and half for the other. By comparing the first with the second map, the reader can infer the racial and ethnic composition of the loyal (i.e. areas that consistently voted for the candidates of one party) and swing areas (i.e. areas that vacillated back and forth between the two major parties).

[Insert Maps for SD 7 Here]

The first of our critical contested areas is the Contra Costa and Alameda area defined by State Senate District 7. This seat contains two marginal Assembly districts, the 11th and the 15th, and a marginal Congressional district, the 10th, which attracted a great deal of national publicity. Three of these races ended up in virtual ties, with the outcome in doubt for days as election officials counted and recounted the ballots. Both Presidential candidates visited the area, and there was a great deal of money invested in tv and radio buys. The area itself is predominantly White. There is a concentration of Latinos in the northern and eastern portions of the district (i.e. Pittsburg, Antioch and Brentwood), and scattered pockets of Blacks in Pittsburg to the north, Pinole to the west and Dublin to the south. As the loyalty map shows, the most Democratic areas are in the northern part of the district from Pinole to west to Pittsburg and Antioch to the east. The most Republican areas are in predominantly White, affluent southern portions of the district. The swing areas are also in predominantly White suburban neighborhoods, especially in the center and southwestern of
the district. The large numbers of swing voter tracts in the district clearly demonstrates why this area had so many close races at all levels.

[Insert Maps for SD15]

Since the late 1980's, California’s coastal areas have been quite competitive. In 1996, the congressional race in this region was safely Democratic, but all three state legislative races were competitive, and Dole needed to do well here if he was to have a chance of winning in California. Two major reasons for this area’s political moderation are that environmental issues tend to matter to voters on the coast (thereby uniting Democrats and Republicans against very conservative candidates), and also that the coastal Republicans are more secular than than their inland counterparts and hence less influenced by the religious right. There are a few small concentrations of Blacks (e.g. near Salinas in the district’s center and King city in the south), but the district is primarily Latino and White. The central section of the district is an important agricultural region called the Salinas Valley that attracts many Latino farm workers. The predominantly White areas run along the coast from Scotts Valley in the north to Carmel in the south, as well as the San Benito and Santa Clara county portions to the east. With the exception of a few highly affluent areas around Carmel Valley and Monterey, most of the liberal, pro-environmental, coastal regions have voted solidly Democratic in the nineties. The solidly Republican areas are predominantly White, but many of the swing areas, especially in the Salinas Valley portion, contain mixtures of Latinos and Whites, unlike the pattern we saw earlier in Contra Costa. Given that Latinos generally support the Democratic party in California by a two to one margin, the marginality of these areas may seem surprising. However, the reasons for this may be, first, that the White agribusiness vote in California is fairly conservative and thus serves to offset the liberal Latino vote in these areas, and second, that the large discrepancy between the Latino share of the population and its share of the electorate among farmworkers serves to dilute Latino influence.
Los Angeles county, with a population of 9,352,200, is California’s largest and politically most important county. It is also the most racially diverse county in the state with a 38% Latino, 10% Black and 10% Asian population. The inner core of LA city contains the largest share of Black and Latino voters, and given their high loyalty to the Democratic party, the outcome in those areas is never in question at any level in the November elections. But there were two highly competitive suburban areas in LA county during the 1996 election. One was a northern section of the county centered on the cities of Pasadena, Glendale and Burbank, and the other a southern portion ranging from Palos Verdes to Long Beach, Bellflower and Downey. This area includes Senate District 27, Assembly districts 54 and 56, and Congressional district 36, one of the most closely watched Congressional districts in the country.

The greatest concentrations of Black and Latino population are in the San Pedro and LA Harbor areas in the southern portion of the district, the west side of Long Beach City and the communities of Bellflower, Lakewood and Downey to the north. These are also the areas of highest Democratic loyalty, as we might expect. The affluent, predominantly White communities of Palos Verdes, Rolling Hills, and Rancho Palos Verdes at the western end of the seat have consistently voted Republican in the nineties. Most of the swing areas coincide with the less affluent, majority White areas of Long Beach and the northern communities. Given the history of racial turmoil in LA county and the dramatic impact that immigration has had on the whole area, there was reason to believe that if a wedge issue strategy was going to work anywhere, it would work here.

The last of our hotspot areas is in San Diego county. Like LA, San Diego is a large and racially diverse county. Because of its proximity to Mexico, it has been heavily affected by undocumented
immigration during the last decade, and therefore, sentiments on immigration and race here are quite strong. Like LA, the heaviest concentrations of Latinos and Blacks are found in the downtown areas of San Diego city while the suburbs are predominantly White. Also, as we have seen in the other parts of the state, the most loyally Democratic areas correspond to the densest minority population census tracts whereas the swing and loyal Republican areas are majority White. The largest cluster of swing tracts can be found in the La Jolla/University of California area. This part of San Diego has a tradition of electing independent candidates and not voting along traditional party lines. Democrats, for instance, have been able to win in districts in which Republicans have a decided advantage in registrations in San Diego, but nowhere else in the state.

In sum, a perusal of four critical areas of California shows that in general: 1. nonwhite areas have consistently voted for the Democratic party; 2. loyal Republican areas and swing areas are typically majority White; 3. And thus, a racial strategy aimed at White voters in competitive areas could have reaped rewards at the Presidential, congressional and state legislative levels in 1996.

IV. The Effect of the Wedge Issue Strategy.

In order for a wedge issue to succeed, three conditions must obtain: contrast, agreement and salience. The first condition, contrast, is met when there is a difference between the opposing candidates on a given issue. Sometimes contrast is based on the stated positions of the candidates, but in other instances, the important contrast is not what the candidates say, but what they have done in the past, or their credibility with respect to promises about future actions. The second condition, agreement, requires that one of the contrasting positions on a given issue be closer to the preferred viewpoint of the swing voting group. Being closer on an issue implies that it is in the swing group's interest to support your candidacy. The third condition, salience, is defined as the issue's importance to voters. Contrast and agreement serve no electoral purpose if voters care little about the matter in dispute. Hence, a wedge issue strategy can only succeed if it is sufficiently important to cause voters to deviate from their normal party choice.
In the end, Proposition 209 failed to help Bob Dole win California's 54 electoral college votes. Why? Based on the analysis in the previous section of this paper, an issue that contrasted the positions of the Democratic and Republican candidates, that appealed to the interests of the White voters in the swing areas of the state, and that was salient enough for them to put aside other issues and concerns should have succeeded. In this section of the paper, we use data from several pre and post-election polls to analyze what happened.

In particular, we will rely most heavily on a survey we designed and administered during the week just prior to November 4. This study of 1498 registered California voters was uniquely designed to over-sample minority respondents and to collect information about the ethnic and racial composition of the neighborhoods they live in. The logic behind over-sampling racial and ethnic minorities is that a truly random survey of California voters will typically contain too few minority respondents to allow generalizations about them with statistical confidence. By purposely interviewing more of them than a random sample would dictate (i.e. over-sampling), we are able to look more closely at the behavior and attitudes of California's Black, Latino and Asian voters. This is particularly relevant in 1996, as we shall demonstrate shortly, because both the Presidential and Prop 209 contests were strongly polarized along racial and ethnic lines.

The other important feature of this study was its attention to neighborhood context. As our maps illustrated, the racial mixture in California is highly localized. In many portions of the state, Whites live in virtually all-White neighborhoods (e.g. the rural mountainous counties, or affluent White suburbs in southern California). In certain urban areas, such as Los Angeles, Oakland and San Diego, there are densely settled and varying mixtures of different racial and ethnic groups. We identified and sampled in nine of the most frequent configurations. Hence, we can distinguish between Blacks who live in majority Black areas from Blacks in nonmajority Blacks areas, Latinos in majority Latino areas from Latinos in nonmajority Latino areas, etc. (footnote all the categories). If political attitudes, including those having to do with the 1996 Presidential race and the Proposition 209 vote, are at least partially determined by the racial and ethnic context that one resides in, it should be measurable with our study design.
There are ample indications that the wedge issue strategy did not help Bob Dole very much. To begin with, of course, Clinton beat Dole in California by 51%-38%. But, there are two other reasons to believe that while the issue was visible to voters, it did not change their Presidential votes. The first is evidence from an exit poll conducted the day after the election that asked respondents, "Which one issue mattered the most in deciding your vote for president?" There was a considerable difference between the responses of the Clinton, Dole and Perot supporters, but in no case was affirmative action mentioned as one of the top seven issues. Those who voted for Clinton mentioned in order of importance the state of the economy (26%), Medicare (19%) and education (17%) as their top three issues, and the Dole voters put taxes (28%), the state of the economy (18%) and the federal deficit (13%) at the top of their list. These responses are very much consistent with the conventional wisdom about US Presidential elections; namely, that they are won and lost on economic conditions primarily, and that other issues are usually less important. Incumbent Presidents who run for reelection when economic conditions are favorable are rewarded by voters and those who run when conditions are bad or deteriorating are punished. This was clearly the case in 1996. Affirmative action was less important to California voters than the improvement of the California economy during Bill Clinton's term of office.

Another reason to believe that Dole's Proposition 209 endorsement did not make much of a difference to the outcome of the Presidential race comes from a question we asked in our poll about whether respondents thought that they would change their vote for President based on whether that candidate had endorsed or opposed Proposition 209. Less than a quarter of any racial group said that they would change their vote based on where the candidate stood on Proposition 209, and of all the groups, the White voters were the least likely to base their vote on Proposition 209 (i.e. 12%). Blacks were the most likely to say that it would affect their vote (i.e. 23%), and they overwhelmingly opposed Proposition 209 by a 4 to 1 margin. In other words, instead of being more important to the White voters the Republicans hoped to win over, Proposition 209 mattered more to minority voters in their thinking about the Presidential vote.
Why then did Proposition 209 fail as a wedge issue? Which of the various conditions did not exist? Lack of contrast between the candidates’ positions was certainly not the problem. Early in the campaign, the incumbent Democratic President announced that while some affirmative action programs might need review and fixing, he would not renounce them categorically. Hence, Clinton opposed any measures such as Proposition 209 that ruled out all programs that gave preferences and benefits based on race and gender. Dole, on the other hand, clearly supported Proposition 209 and, as we discussed earlier, chose to devote resources in October to making this a centerpiece of his campaign in California. By any reasonable definition, there was sufficient contrast between the Democratic and Republican candidate for it to have mattered.

Assuming then that there was sufficient contrast between the two candidates, the next condition is that of agreement: did Proposition 209 appeal to the interest and preferences of the predominantly White swing voters in California. Our pre-election data suggests that it did. When voters were asked whether they planned to support Proposition 209, the intended vote was sharply divided by racial grouping. Whites favored Proposition 209 by 51% in favor versus 36% opposed with 13% undecided. By comparison, the Latinos in our sample were 27% in favor, 57% opposed and 16% undecided; Blacks were 18% in favor, 66% opposed and 16% undecided; and Asians were 31% in favor, 53% opposed and 16% undecided. There was some modest difference in the level of White support between areas where Whites were a minority in the neighborhood and those where they were in the majority: Whites in the latter situation favored Proposition 209 54%-34% and those in the former favored it by the narrower margin of 46%-37%.

The poll also gives us a glimpse into the reasons behind White support for this measure. White voters were on average more likely to think that other racial and ethnic groups did not need the protections affirmative action offered. For instance, whereas 91% of Blacks felt that Blacks needed the protections affirmative action programs provided, only 47% of the White respondents felt the same way. There was a similar gap with respect to the need for affirmative action programs that assist Latinos and Asians. Whites were also much more likely than nonwhites to claim to know of instances in which someone got a job or
promotion they did not deserve as a result of affirmative action: 35% of Whites as compared to 14% of Blacks, 26% of Latinos and 21% of Asians. In short, Whites were more likely to feel that affirmative action programs were unnecessary and that they unfairly advantaged protected groups over others.

The problem, however, for the Republicans was that the sentiment for Prop 209 was much stronger among white Republicans than white Democrats and Independents, the groups they needed to win over in order to carry the state. White Republicans favored Prop 209 68% to 19% but white Independents narrowly favored it 45% to 38% and white Democrats opposed it by 37% to 49%. White Democrats and Independents were also much more likely than white Republicans to think that affirmative action programs were still necessary and much less likely to claim to know of instances in which someone got a job or promotion they did not deserve. This means that instead of being an effective wedge issue, Prop 209 turned out to be most popular with the Republican rank and file.

To return then to why Prop 209 did not win California for Bob Dole, we can point to two factors. First, the issue was not as important to voters as the economy. Secondly, Prop 209 appealed more to ideologically conservative Republicans than to moderate independent and Democratic voters who make up the swing voters of the state. Nonetheless, the fact that the vote for Prop 209 split so cleanly along racial lines suggests that the fault lines of future political battles may increasingly be racial. For a state that has witnessed racial riots and heightened anti-immigrant tension, this is not a welcomed development.
Latino Citizen Voting Age Population
(CVAP) SD 07 - Alameda, Contra Costa Counties

CVAP in Percent by Tract
- 0% - 15%
- 16% - 30%
- 31% - 45%
- 46% - 60%
- 61% - 100%

Data Source: Statewide Database
Institute of Gov. Studies 510.642.9086
01/21/97
Latino Citizen Voting Age Population
SD 15: Santa Cruz Monterey San Benito Santa Clara

CVAP in Percent by Tract

- 0% - 15%
- 16% - 30%
- 31% - 45%
- 46% - 60%
- 61% - 100%

Data Source: Statewide Database
Institute of Gov. Studies 510.642.9086
01/21/97
Black Citizen Voting Age Population
SD 15: Santa Cruz Monterey San Benito Santa Clara

CVAP in Percent by Tract
- 0% - 15%
- 16% - 30%
- 31% - 45%
- 46% - 60%
- 61% - 100%

Data Source: Statewide Database
Institute of Gov. Studies 510.642.9086
01/21/97
Loyalty by Tract - SD 15
Santa Cruz, Monterey, San Benito, Santa Clara

Data Source: Statewide Database
Institute of Gov. Studies 510.642.9086
01/21/97
Data Source: Statewide Database

Latino Citizen Voting Age Population - Los Angeles County

CVAP in Percent

- 61% - 100%
- 46% - 60%
- 31% - 45%
- 16% - 30%
- 0% - 15%

By Tract

CVAP SD 27 - Los Angeles County

1/21/97

Institute of Gov. Studies 510.642.9086
Loyalty by Tract - SD 39
San Diego County

Data Source: Statewide Database
Institute of Gov. Studies 510.642.9086
01/21/97
Loyalty by Tract - SD 39
San Diego County

Data Source: Statewide Database, UC BE Institute of Gov. Studies 510.642.9086
01/21/97
Loyalty by Tract - SD 07
Alameda and Contra Costa Counties

Data Source: Statewide Database
Institute of Gov. Studies 510.642.9086
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