Can Using a Global Perspective Help Control Migration?  
Ecuador and Spain’s Proyecto Codesarrollo Cañar-Murcia

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for the degree of Master of Arts

in

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by

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2010
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<tr>
<td>ACRM</td>
<td>Autonomous Community of the Region of Murcia (Comunidad Autónoma de la Región de Murcia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOP</td>
<td>Annual Operating Plan (Plan Operativo Anual)</td>
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<td>BPC</td>
<td>Bilateral Program of Cooperation (Programa Bilateral de Cooperación)</td>
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<td>CMCP</td>
<td>Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project (Proyecto Codesarrollo Cañar-Murcia)</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions”</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FLACSO</td>
<td>Latin American School of Social Sciences (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INE</td>
<td>National Institute of Statistics, Spain (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCHEC</td>
<td>Mixed Commission of Hispanic-Ecuadorian Cooperation (Comisión Mixta de la Cooperación Hispana-Ecuatoriana)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Project Description Summary (Descripción Resumida del Proyecto)</td>
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<td>SAIC</td>
<td>Spanish Agency of International Cooperation (Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional)</td>
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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Can Using a Global Perspective Help Control Migration? Ecuador and Spain’s Proyecto Codesarrollo Cañar-Murcia

by

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Master of Arts in Latin American Studies (International Migration)

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Current trends in immigration policy suggest that international cooperation policies are becoming increasingly common as a means for nation-states to attain their immigration policy objectives. This thesis aims to analyze the impacts of these policies on the communities and individuals involved by examining the micro-level effects of
bilateral agreements and co-development projects between Ecuador and Spain through a study of the communities involved in the Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project (CMCP). The CMCP is a co-government funded pilot model designed to facilitate the economic and social development in the migrants’ community of origin and their community of residence. It is comprised of a large number of state and non-state actors – including the migrants themselves – at the national, provincial and local level of both countries.

The specific aim of this thesis is to determine the degree to which the CMCP has been implemented, present the obstacles it has faced, and to then analyze its effect on the members of the Cañari populations in both Cañar and Murcia. I then look at the impacts of the project on social networks, transnational activities, migration patterns, and integration. I find that the success of these types of projects depends largely on the existing political, social and cultural situations in both communities, as conflicts can be created or exacerbated with the power and money introduced by these projects.
Chapter 1 – Migration in Spain and Ecuador

As Spain goes through an “uneasy transition” (Cornelius 387) from a country of emigration to a country of immigration, it is constantly changing and experimenting with its immigration policies. While it has had mixed success with policy implementation and attainment of policy objectives, many scholars have identified the problematic aspects of the policies and their outcomes. Other literature has focused on providing suggestions or recommendations for future policy. In light of this research, this chapter looks at what measures Spain’s government has taken to address these issues and better attain its policy objectives, and how these measures compare to the policy recommendations coming out of migration studies. It focuses primarily on Spain’s response to Ecuadorian immigration and how Spain “uses” the European Union and the Ecuadorian state as mechanisms to help it achieve its policy objectives.

Introduction

In their two cross-national comparative studies on immigration policy effectiveness, *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* 1st and 2nd editions, Wayne Cornelius and his interdisciplinary group of immigration specialist colleagues found empirical evidence leading them to the consensus that in general, there exist significant and persistent gaps between policy and actual policy outcomes (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; Cornelius et al 2004). This theory, which they call the “gap hypothesis,” has since been substantiated by numerous scholars in both regional and country-specific case studies (Geddes 2002; Massey, Durand and Malone 2002; Solé 2004;
Papademetriou, 2005; Süssmuth and Weidenfeld 2005; Tsuda 2006), including Spain (Solé 1994; Cornelius 1994, 2004; Bonet Pérez 2003; Calavita 1998, 2005; Agrela and Dietz, 2006), and including cases in which contradictions were found not only in the outcomes but within the law itself (Calavita 1998, 2005; Benet Pérez 2003). The causal mechanisms Cornelius and Tsuda attribute to the policy gaps include inadequate implementation of policy, control measures that have no discernible deterrent effects, instruments with inherent flaws, demand for foreign workers, demographic of the receiving country, level of restrictiveness of the policy, public opinion, the party affiliation of the policymaking regime, and international political pressures (especially relevant in the case of EU member states).

According to the studies carried out on Spanish immigration policy, these factors are all present in the explanation of Spain’s policy gaps. Cornelius argues, and most of the other studies agree, that the most defining and problematic feature of Spanish immigration policy is that it is driven predominantly by its labor market needs rather than by political, cultural or diplomatic relations (Cornelius 390), leading to contradictory policies and a migrant’s back and forth state of regularity and irregularity. This chapter argues that while labor market needs still drive Spanish immigration policy, the recent methods Spain has used to meet its labor needs through immigration have changed due to its effort to reduce the gaps and unintended consequences resulting from their previous policies. As a result, Spain’s policies have also become more concerned with political and diplomatic relations. This will be discussed later in the chapter.

Cornelius and Tsuda addressed two principal questions in their discussion of policy gaps – how do we measure them and how do we explain them? – that ultimately
lead the reader to ask the question, “How do we fix them?” A consideration of the conclusions reached by these immigration scholars in their analysis of immigration policy is a good place to start. First, they found that the more restrictive the policy, the more migrants are going to find another way around the deterrent and the more “out-of-control” migration will then seem. More importantly, they found that while government interventions do have an effect and do produce some kind of outcome or results, they are not always the desired or intended results. What’s more, they argue that there are limits to what policies can do; policies alone cannot stop or deter immigration, nor are they the most important component in determining the international migration dynamics in the twenty-first century. Cornelius and Tsuda instead assert that the most powerful determinants of international migration will be market forces and demography (43). Other studies point to the importance of measures that involve the migrants’ countries of origin and deal with the factors that push people to migrate; in the case of the Ecuadorians, these factors are – at least initially - mostly economic.

These conclusions are also extremely pertinent to the case of Spain, as the years during the conservative party’s rule from 1996-2004 marked a considerably restrictive era in Spanish immigration law, yet the country still experienced a large and visible growth in its immigrant population. As most scholars have argued, the combination of restrictive policies and increased migration creates the image of an out-of-control problem, even when in reality the percentage of immigrants making up the country’s population was relatively small (Jokisch and Pribilsky 83). In addition, market forces and demographic factors play a major role in Spain’s immigration situation. The combination of a growing economy that has created an increased need for workers in the informal
sector and a deficit in the country’s demographic due to a low fertility rate and aging population necessitate a need for foreign workers. This situation is not expected to change in the near future (Oliver i Alonso 2006). Spain’s need for immigrant labor is a widely recognized and accepted fact, which makes its policy objectives somewhat well-defined: because Spain’s labor market demands immigrant labor, its goal is not to eliminate or stop immigration, but rather to regulate it while still meeting the country’s labor market needs. In order to accomplish this, Spain has undergone a comprehensive immigration reform aimed at managing its current immigrant population while providing the means for new migrants to enter legally. In order to achieve this, it has carried out a series of regularizations, widened the legal channels of entry and strengthened enforcement mechanisms. Another key component of the reform has been to work in conjunction with migrant-sending countries and their respective immigrant collectives. This following sections look at the strategies Spain has employed to transition from restrictive policies to ones that focus on regulating immigration, and in particular the roles that Ecuador and the European Union have in these strategies.

This will set the stage for an analysis of the impacts of these policies on the communities and individuals involved by examining the micro-level effects of bilateral agreements and co-development projects between Ecuador and Spain through a study of the communities involved in the Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project (CMCP). In Chapter 2, I will present the CMCP, a co-government funded pilot model designed to facilitate the economic and social development in the migrants’ community of origin and their community of residence. It is comprised of a large number of state and non-state
actors – including the migrants themselves – at the national, provincial and local level of both countries.

In Chapter 3 I will analyze the degree to which the CMCP has been implemented, how and by whom it is being carried out, what role the migrants have played, how connected are the two regions, and then analyze the project’s effect on the members of the Cañari populations in both Cañar and Murcia. In Chapter 4, I look at the impacts of the project on social networks, transnational activities, migration patterns, and integration; which I then compare to the migration policy objectives of both countries.

Global Partners

Both the EU and the Ecuadorian state have had, and will most likely continue to have, a presence in Spanish immigration policy development and implementation. While Spain has had a long-standing cultural and diplomatic tie to Ecuador, Spain’s more recent entry in the EU is taking on a growing importance as the EU also works towards a migration policy of its own. Recently, the collaboration process has been aided by the political and ideological alignment of the parties involved. In Spain, the socialist party took control of the government in 2004; in Ecuador, in 2007; and in the EU, “a pro-migration coalition in the European Parliament, comprising socialists, liberals, greens, and radical left MEPs, is likely to dominate the European Parliament for some time to come” (Hix and Noury 202). As the three actors stay on the same ideological path, it should make it easier to continue working together and to continue moving from the more restrictive ideology to the more liberal policies being enacted today.
In his article “International Migration and State Sovereignty in an Integrating Europe,” Andrew Geddes argues that the EU provides “new international venues for the pursuit of policy” of its member states (22). While his comment is specific to the way the European Union is used by its member states – and holds true in the case of Spain, as will be discussed below - this same line of thinking could also be applied to the “novel form of international cooperation” that exists between Spain and Ecuador. How the EU and Ecuador fit in to Spain’s pursuit of policy depends on which policy objective Spain is trying to achieve.

The underlying objective in Spanish policy, as stated earlier, is “access to cheap, flexible, disposable immigrant labor” (Cornelius 422) that can be regulated by the Spanish government. The “secondary” objectives addressed later in this chapter serve in one way or another to meet this underlying goal. They include facilitating legal migration, devising a way for workers to maintain legality, keeping migration temporary and circular, avoiding forced settlement, promoting family reunification in country of origin, integration, keeping interested parties informed of current migrant policies and laws, addressing the causes of emigration at its origin, and strengthening border enforcement. The following sections discuss the relations between Spain, Ecuador and the European Union and show how the cooperation between them has or will theoretically help Spain achieve these objectives.

**Fortress Europe or Foundation Europe?**

Most of the discourse surrounding the European Union’s influence on Spanish immigration policy centers around Spain’s location on the southern coast of Europe. The
“buffer state” position that it finds itself in makes it a point of focus for other EU member states as they try to prevent potential migrants from crossing not just into Spain but also into the protection of the EU, sometimes referred to as “Fortress Europe.” Due to the terms of the Schengen agreements, which eliminated internal border controls between the member states included in the Schengen area, more importance was placed on external border control measures, directly affecting those nations with external borders (Gelatt 2005). Entrance into Spain meant free movement throughout most of Europe, making Spain a starting point for many migrants working their way towards other European Union member states (Cornelius 1994; Huntoon 1998; Jokisch and Pribilsky 2002).

While the expectations and pressures associated with this position have played a role in Spanish immigration policy development, there has not been a lot of attention given to the other ways in which the EU has played a part in Spain’s immigration management strategies. This section aims to address the many forms in which the EU relates to Spanish policy, including the ways in which Spain uses the EU for its own policy attainment. First it will be discussed how the EU has used Spain to serve its migration interests, and then how Spain has used the EU for its own migration interests.

The EU has a direct correlation with Spain’s immigration policy history, as Spain’s first immigration policy in 1985 was “almost entirely a result of external pressure associated with Spain’s entry into the European Union on January 1, 1986, which required adherence to EU legislation limiting immigration from non-EU countries” (Cornelius 404). In reality, requiring that certain immigration measures be implemented before admitting a country into the Union is one of the only ways that the EU can
actually have a direct impact on a country’s policymaking, as it has very little judicial and executive power (Geddes 34).

Nevertheless, there have been other instances where pressure from the EU or its member states has led to new or newly implemented immigration policy in Spain, most relating to controlling the entry methods of migrants. A large increase in immigrants to Spain from a few countries caused alarm in Europe, resulting in increased demands for Spain to implement stricter control measures for citizens of those countries. This ultimately led Spain to exercise remote control by requiring visas for citizens of nations that did not previously need them. Latin American countries with long cultural and diplomatic ties to Spain were not immune, and in 2003 Ecuadorians were added to the list of those requiring a visa for entry. Similarly, an increased - or at least, increasingly visible – number of migrants arriving on Spain’s shores led to a concern about weak border enforcement. With the aid of the EU, through both financial and material support, Spain’s border patrol measures increased dramatically. One of the initiatives offered up by the EU to help Spain and other “buffer states” fulfill their border security expectations was FRONTEX, the European Border Agency, which was specifically created by the EU to aid member states in the securing of their national borders (Carbajosa 2007).

Having to conform to outside expectations like those the EU places on Spain can also work to Spain’s advantage. While in some cases it is the external pressure that the EU or its member states applies that cause changes in Spain’s immigration policy, in some cases it is merely its existence that justifies a change carried out by the Spanish government. The fact that Spain has been pressured to conform to EU expectations and trends in the past makes it a viable strategy for policy-makers who wish to justify or
rationalize the policies they are endorsing. For example, when the trend in Western European countries was to vote in favor of far-right, anti-immigrant parties, the conservative Spanish politicians cited this fact as a justification for more stringent immigration control measures (Cornelius 392).

It is also important to recognize that there have also been instances where the Spanish government has acted completely against the wishes of some of its fellow member states, as was the case in the fairly unpopular normalization carried out in 2005 by Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero Rodríguez. After the normalization – of which Zapatero Rodríguez informed no other member states before carrying it out – member states such as Germany and Holland complained about the amnesty, claiming that it was “un efecto llamada” that would impact their states as well (Carbajosa and Bárbulo 2007). Their concern was that the normalization would create the expectation that one could enter a country illegally and then easily gain legal residence through normalization, and as such have the undesired outcome of actually attracting more irregular immigrants. In 2007, both Germany and Holland, along with France, were forced to carry out similar normalizations. In this case, Spain acted independently and was not bound by any outside pressure or demands. It bears mentioning, however, that after this incident, the EU made it obligatory for any member state to inform the others if they were planning on carrying out a regularization; it also bears mentioning that the requirement is simply to inform the other members of the EU, not get their approval or permission. In the end, the policy-making decisions remain in the hands of each individual state.
Like Spain, the EU has also been adapting to the changing international migration patterns. In 1999, the European Council met in Tampere to move towards coordinating a common EU migration policy. An emphasis was placed on “partnership with countries of origin, comprehensive co-development policies which take into account migration management issues such as tackling the root causes of irregular flows and promoting the development-related aspects of migration” (Pellegrino 7). Spain’s commitment to this pledge was enacted in its December 2000 immigration policy reform, and ultimately led to the bilateral agreements Spain was to form with six of its major migrant-sending countries – including Ecuador – the first being implemented in early 2001 (Bonet Pérez 74).

The role that the EU has been playing since Tampere in 1999 is a contrast to the “Fortress Europe” term that it is often ascribed. As the EU continued in its efforts to develop a common migration policy, it did not take on the role of an all-powerful policy imposer or enforcer that one might expect it to. Neither has it developed a “blanket” policy to be applied uniformly to all EU member states. Instead it has focused on harmonizing policy interests, emphasizing binational partnerships, promoting proactive policies instead of defensive and control-centered policies, and providing financial support for member state initiatives that follow the framework set out by the European Commission, a supranatural institution that has taken on the responsibility of coordinating each nation’s plans of action (COM 248 2007). One of the latest communications from the Commission of the European Communities to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, entitled “On circular migration and mobility partnerships
between the European Union and third countries,” presents a policy framework designed
to “develop a balanced partnership with third countries adapted to specific EU Member
States’ labour market needs” and to explore “ways and means to facilitate circular and
temporary migration” (2). In order to attain these objectives, they propose creating
“mobility packages with a number of interested third countries which would enable their
citizens to have better access to the EU” (3). It outlines each actor’s role in the
partnership – such as the third country’s responsibility of facilitating reintegration of
returnees and providing returnees with employment opportunities - and, most
importantly, introduces the European Community’s and the Member State’s role of
providing technical and financial assistance to third countries committed to fulfilling said
role. The Communication reads very much like a foundation’s instructions to a grant
applicant, where it is a matter of finding a way to match your interests to their interests,
so that you could then “possibly benefit from specific financial and/or technical
assistance provided by the EC and/or participating Member States, for example to
facilitate the economic and social reintegration of returning migrants” (5). The Annex of
the Communication includes examples of “EC-funded projects to facilitate the
management of legal migration flows in third countries and circular migrations” (18-30),
describing projects similar to one initiated in 1995 between Spain, the EU and Morocco
called the “development aid to forestall immigration policy” (Hutton 440).

This self-described “EU’s Global Approach to migration” (COM 248 2) is a
perfect example for Geddes’ argument that rather than weakening its member states, the
EU’s approach to migration policy provides a venue through which “EU member states,
acting on their own selfish interests, have used the EU as a mechanism for restricting
those forms of migration that their policies define as unwanted” and that “novel forms of international cooperation provided by the EU still allow the pursuit of ‘selfish’ interests” (30). As Geddes argued, the EU member states’ move towards a common migration policy does not mean that the member states necessarily lose power to the EU (22). It could be argued that in the case of Spain, the migrant policy framework set up by the supranatural institution of the Commission of the European Communities has helped pave the way for Spain’s new immigration policy initiatives, while the financial support the EU provides for followers of that plan either has or will possibly help them implement their policies effectively. In addition, the Commission’s communication explicitly states that each member state has its own “power” (COM 248 3) when it comes to developing a country-specific approach to implementation. What’s more, the Commission’s communication makes it clear that not only does each state have that independence, but that it is essential they use it in order to create policies and partnerships “tailored to the specifics of each relevant third country, to the ambitions of the country concerned and of the EU” (COM 248 3) in order to avoid obtaining asymmetrical results that might occur from a blanket policy. Similar rhetoric is found throughout the communication.

The Commission’s framework of the EU goals and objectives can also help analyze Spain’s recent partnership and individualized plan with Ecuador. As we will see, the migration policy objectives outlined by the Commission match up very closely with Spain’s policy objections in regards to Ecuadorian migrants: legal migration opportunities, adapted to specific EU Member States’ labor marker needs, ways and
means to facilitate circular and temporary migration through novel approaches, facilitate reintegration, and bilateral agreements to promote secure circular migration.

**A new hispano-ecuatoriano agreement**

Ecuadorian migration to Spain experienced a boom in the late 1990s. Three main factors are commonly cited as reasons for the surge: an economic crisis in Ecuador, a toughening of immigration policy and border control in the United States (previously the destination of most Ecuadorian emigrants), and the Hispano-Ecuadorian agreement dating back to 1963 between Ecuador and Spain that allowed Ecuadorians to legally enter Spain without a tourist visa for a period of 90 days. By 2002, an estimated 200,000 Ecuadorians were residing in Spain and by 2004 that number had doubled to 400,000; it was a reported 490,000 in 2005 (Jokisch and Pribilsky 82). The majority entered as tourists but overstayed the allowed time. In 2003, however, under pressure from its fellow EU member states, the Spanish government reversed the agreement and required Ecuadorians to obtain a visa for entry, putting an end to the long-standing Hispano-Ecuadorian agreement.

However, while the EU had a role in making Ecuadorian migration to Spain more difficult, it also played a role in assuring that Ecuador and Spain maintained their good diplomatic relations. As mentioned earlier, in 1999 the EU committed to working with migrant-sending communities, and encouraged the national governments to do the same. In 2000, as a result of the Tampere agreement, Spain passed legislation that required it to make bilateral agreements with the source countries of its migration. Together the Spanish and Ecuadorian administrations were to work towards the good of the
Ecuadorian migrant, the Ecuadorian State and the Spanish State by allowing Ecuadorians the opportunity to enter Spain legally and with a work permit.

In 2001, the first bilateral agreement between Spain and Ecuador was reached. The agreement, which came to be known as Operation Ecuador, involved a regularization of most Ecuadorians living illegally in Spain; in the end, some 25,000 people were legalized. It also offered work permits to Ecuadorians living illegally in Spain as well. In Spain, preferential treatment was then supposedly given to workers whose country held a bilateral agreement with Spain at the time, like Ecuador. Then, in 2005, Spain carried out the largest normalization in the European Union, normalizing between 600,000 – 800,000 migrants. All of the regularization and normalizations required that the migrant have lived in the country for a certain amount of time in order to be eligible, an important feature for a country determined to reduce “forced settlement.”

In recent years political instability in Ecuador had been making it difficult to maintain productive relations with the Spanish government. But in 2007, Socialist Rafael Correa took office as President of Ecuador. A self-declared “Government of the emigrants” (Calleja 2007), since taking office in January he has become active in the state of Ecuadorian emigration and in the Ecuadorian population living abroad, promising to “incorporate them into the economic and political life of Ecuador” (Jokisch 2007).

In August of 2007, Spain and Ecuador reached another bilateral agreement; this one was not just between the two governments but also involved the participation of public and private organizations from both countries. Part of a new “Hispanic-Ecuadorian forum” (foro hispano-ecuatoriano) the network was created to be dedicated to all things migration between the two countries. Then, in October, Correa introduced a Plan Retorno
to 50,000 Ecuadorian migrants living in Spain that encouraged them to return home by offering certain incentives that would aid the reintegration process in Ecuador. The objectives of these initiatives include reinforcing and facilitating the process of contracting Ecuadorians who want to emigrate and work legally in Spain, promoting programs of temporary and circular migration, financing the voluntary return of migrants, increased investment in development projects in Ecuador, and improving the integration process of current Ecuadorian migrants in Spain. An analysis of the objectives of these initiatives reveals the way in which Spain in particular can use them as an immigration control mechanism, many times either reducing the demands for them or by passing the State’s responsibility on to someone or something else.

One of the primary features of the bilateral agreements is the cooperation between the two governments to create a system of contracting workers in the migrant’s country of origin. These programs would provide migrants with a work permit that would allow them to enter and work in Spain legally, for a set time period. Recently, the Spanish and Ecuadorian governments have worked to improve this system. First, they are working towards opening a Labor Ministry in the Spanish Embassy in Quito that would serve as the base for contracting Ecuadorians to work in Spain, and granting their work permits before even leaving the country. This process would not only allow them to enter the country legally, but it would reduce the bureaucratic difficulties many migrants face as they attempt to obtain work permits after arriving in Spain – difficulties that many times lead to their constant state of illegality. Spain has also verbally committed to financing the training of the contracted workers before emigration in order to make their integration into the Spanish labor market as smooth as possible.
The bilateral agreements between the two governments have gone beyond regulating the flow of Ecuadorian migrants to Spain; in recent months there has also been an effort by the two governments to work together to facilitate and increase the flow of Ecuadorians back to Ecuador by providing incentives and aid for their voluntary return, and also by facilitating the family reunification process in Ecuador rather than in Spain. The initiative is a result of a petition by Correa to the Spanish government to provide a program that would facilitate family reunification in Spain. While the Spanish government did not give an outright “no,” their counter-proposal of a plan for family reunification in the migrants’ country of origin revealed their policy objective of discouraging settlement and family reunification in Spain. In order to achieve this goal, they offered to collaborate with the Ecuadorian government to offer incentives encouraging Ecuadorian migrants to return to Ecuador, such as payment of the migrant’s plane ticket home, exemption from paying taxes for the repatriation of goods and wealth, bonds and microcredits for their reinsertion, micro-credits to family members that stay in Ecuador, and financing towards a house. By assuring that the family stays rooted in their home community, theoretically the likelihood of future migration is reduced, and makes settlement in Spain even less likely.

Spain’s approach to discourage settlement and family reunification by providing extra incentives and services to the migrant family in their community of origin is a stark contrast to the approach taken by more restrictive policies, such as that taken by the State of California in 1994, when Proposition 187 passed the vote. It proposed to “deny public school children education, health care, and other public benefits to undocumented immigrants and their children” (Hondagneu-Sotelo 169). The unstated goal of the
Proposition was to discourage settlement by taking away services seen as necessary for a family’s survival. Spain, rather than encouraging return migration by taking similar restrictive measures, has instead done the opposite: offered to help provide those services in the home community. In 2005, the Spanish government reached an “Debt Conversion Program” with Ecuador, in which it agreed to forgive $50 million of the Ecuadorian debt and put the money instead towards social investments in programs such as health and education.

By working with the Ecuadorian government and other organizations, Spain can still achieve its policy objective, with less threat of making integration more difficult or violating rights; in other words, without being explicitly anti-immigrant. In addition, by collaborating with the Ecuadorian government on issues of development in Ecuador, Spain is also reducing the factors that push migrants in the first place; in a way then, they are addressing the causes of emigration at their origins, working to reduce and manage future migration in that respect as well.

Spain and Ecuador’s joint efforts to help keep Ecuadorian migrants’ presence in Spain temporary and encouraging family reunification in Ecuador could potentially affect its integration policy attainment as well. The need for new or improved integration policy and its implementation has been a widely-studied aspect of immigration policy in Europe. Spain’s government in particular has been the focus of scrutiny when it comes to the sufficiency and implementation of its integration policy, mostly leaving the responsibilities to local governments or NGOs. Even though the agreements reached by the Spanish and Ecuadorian governments may not specifically address the issue of
integration, it may prove to be a way for Spain to indirectly improve the integration situation of Ecuadorian migrants in Spain.

Circular migration implies that a migrant will not be settling, which means that because the migrant is in the receiving country for less time, there is likely a reduced need for integration and the receiving country’s responsibilities to provide it. The temporary nature of the migration also reduces the probability that family reunification will take place in the receiving country, regulating not only the number of immigrants who need to be accommodated but also who they are, as spouses and children have different integration needs that a country must meet. This is especially poignant in Spain’s case as their treatment and integration efforts - or lack of - aimed at children born to illegal-immigrant parents have been called “problematic” (Cornelius 416). Thinking in these terms, Spain’s cooperation with the Ecuadorian government in promoting and facilitating circular migration and family reunification in Ecuador rather than in Spain could potentially help Spain “fulfill” – or at least improve attainment of – this policy objective as well by relieving it of some of these responsibilities.

However, an emphasis on circular and temporary migration might also have implications for Spain’s integration policy attainment. As migrants whose sole purpose in Spain is to come and fulfill the country’s labor needs – needs that exist not for lack of Spanish workers but for lack of Spaniards willing to do the kinds of jobs available – their identity and image might also remain associated with their role in society: a temporary worker, doing jobs seen as inferior or undignified. This labor-dominated identity could contribute to their continued marginalization, similar to the “marginalized other” Calavita and others argue that the Spanish labor-focused law with temporary regularizations
creates (Calavita 1998, 2004; Solé 2004, Agrela and Dietz 2006). An identity that leads to marginalization would potentially then make the integration process more challenging. Thus, even though they have shed some of the causes of integration policy necessities by eliminating the settlement and family reunification factor and by placing more of the integration and reintegration responsibilities in the hands of Ecuador, they might also be making the integration policy objectives they are responsible for harder to achieve by defining the migrant’s place in society through his second class role in the economy.

At the same time, it would be worthwhile to consider that while the temporary worker policy would potentially lead to a job-defined identity, it would also give them another identity: regular, or legal. The temporary status of the migrant worker would refer to his or her physical presence in Spain rather than his or her legal status while in Spain. If Calavita’s marginalized other was a “direct consequence of Spanish immigration law…actively and regularly ‘irregularizing’ people” (“Notes” 531), then theoretically a move towards a policy that works to keep laborers regular would negate that consequence and eliminate the marginalized other.

In addition to the law’s effect in creating a marginalized other, Agrela and Dietz argue that discourse identifying immigration as a “problem” can also create a distinctive social category and a trend towards exclusion (212). They go on to identify three rhetorical elements used to advance this discourse: 1) the invasion threat, 2) destabilization of the labor market, and 3) difficulties arising from migrants’ integration and socio-cultural adaptation (214). Again, the temporary worker agreement and family reunification plan between Spain and Ecuador would ideally counteract or negate these three elements: 1) the idea of a threat of an “invasion” would be reduced because the
migrants are invited through the contract program, their stay would be temporary, and family reunification would take place in Ecuador, not Spain; 2) by definition, the guestworker program is a solution to an unstable labor market, not the cause of it; 3) as stated, the need for integration and adaptation would be reduced because the migrants’ stay in Spain would be temporary. By eliminating these three rhetorical elements, the view of immigration and immigrants as a “problem” would ideally be diminished, including in the view of the public, which could then in turn facilitate the process of integration because of the society’s tolerance.

With these policies, the political discourse about immigration focuses less on control and more on the importance of immigrants in Spain’s economic future, on the possible diplomatic solutions to the flaws of recent policies and on the positive relations between the sending and receiving nation-states. As stated earlier, more “liberal” policies such as these help alleviate the problem created by the restrictive polices of the Partido Popular’s time in office: rhetoric changed, expectations are not as inflated, xenophobia is reduced, which then leads to less demand for more restrictive policies. Ideally, this would counter the image of an immigrant as a threat or an invader.

The aspects involved in Spain’s partnership with Ecuador would seemingly then provide self-servicing solutions to aspects of its integration policies previously deemed problematic, while at the same time transferring some of the responsibilities to the Ecuadorian government. Depending on what the actual outcome is and how it is measured, their integration policy objectives could be considered as either an improvement or ineffective. Further research would be required to determine the impacts of the program. In any case, the changes show the government is working to modify the
structure that had led to policy gaps in the past and that they are using resources in Ecuador to implement the changes.

The existence of a forum to go along with the bilateral relations may provide Spain other opportunities to directly or indirectly ensure that their policies will achieve the best results possible. Spain has a long history of temporary regularizations – six in the past twenty years – with the most recent normalization affecting approximately 800,000 people in 2005. Studies as well as other European Union member state leaders have argued that these regularizations may possibly encourage and produce more illegal and irregular migration (Levinson 2005; Carbajosa and Bárbulo 2007). It may also contribute to irregular migrants already in Spain not returning home for fear of losing their eligibility for other regularizations, as many of them have minimum “time in country” requirements (Jokisch and Pribilsky 89).

Whether or not this is actually case, Spain is being proactive in its efforts to prevent these unintended results through their policies and by keeping the Ecuadorian community informed about them. The bilateral agreement to work with the Ecuadorian government to create a system through which Spain could train and contract workers in Ecuador provides another way to gain legal access to the country, lessening the need for potential migrants to migrate illegally. Irregular migrants who already live in Spain and want to return home but have not for fear of eliminating themselves from qualifying for regularization due to the time in country requirements, might be more likely to return to Ecuador knowing that there will still be a way to gain regularization – albeit through a different means – should they want to return to Spain. In regards to the latter situation, if they still were not convinced, Spanish officials have routinely been reassuring the public
that another regularization will not be taking place ("Caldera" 2007; "Sarkozy" 2007). The frequent meetings and communications between the two countries’ officials about their policy initiatives means there is ample press coverage, coverage that logically includes information about the policies agreed upon, therefore making it more probable that the Ecuadorian people know about these legal routes.

**Conclusion and Discussion**

In their 2002 analysis of Ecuadorian migration to Spain, Jokisch and Pribilsky pointed to three central areas of further study: the role of gender, the importance of transnational ties and connections, and the emerging roles of state and non-state actors in the formalization of migration (77). In my preliminary research and analysis of the roles of state and non-state actors, I have found that state and non-state actors have played an important role in Ecuadorian and Spanish migration politics and patterns, and I predict that they will continue to do so. I also predict that their continued importance will have a direct impact on the formation and expansion of transnational ties. Jokisch and Pribilisky have already observed a “rapid formation of incipient transnational community” of Ecuadorian migrants in Spain (88). I believe that should the policies founded on international cooperation and mobile partnerships that were presented in this chapter be implemented and maintained, they would most certainly foster a continued environment of transnational migration.

First, they facilitate and encourage temporary and circular migration. This would ensure that ties to the homeland and sending community are maintained as migrants themselves are constantly traveling back and forth between nations. Their sustained
physical ties to their home community also mean that they will probably be more likely to stay in contact with the community while abroad. I have already come across initiatives that provide ways for family members to keep in touch, such as the section in *El Comercio*, Ecuador’s daily newspaper, which prints pictures and messages sent by Ecuadorians abroad to their friends and family in Ecuador.

Second, the large number of migrants legalized through regularizations and normalizations will also be able to return home for visits more often, as they will no longer be worried about having to re-enter Spain illegally or disqualifying themselves for regularization consideration. Third, should the incentives provided for voluntary return and family reunification in Ecuador actually lead to more migrants returning home rather than settling in Spain, they would likely bring with them cultural, political, economical and social changes to their communities of origin. The Spanish government’s involvement through the funding and technical assistance they provide for reintegration would theoretically help them maintain ties to Spain as well. And for those migrants who stay abroad, they will still have the potential to remain involved in their home country, as the Ecuadorian government, in part of its commitment to its residents abroad, has “promised to incorporate them into the economic and political life of Ecuador” (Jokisch 2007).

It is not just the migrants who will occupy the transnational space but also the governments, as they maintain ties with each other by setting up agencies and collaborating with non-governmental organizations in both countries. An interesting and important trend in the binational governmental relations could have an even more direct impact on the migrant communities in both nations. Recently, bilateral agreements have
been reached between Ecuadorian and Spanish cities themselves, bypassing the national government and forming more direct relationships between the communities. In November of 2007, the mayors of Macará, Ecuador, and Leganés, Spain, reached an agreement to become “Sister Cities” with the objective of “fulfilling social objectives” in the Ecuadorian city (El comercio 2007). An even more significant project – and the study topic of this thesis – began developing in 2003 when the autonomous community of Murcia, Spain, and the province of Cañar, Ecuador, established the Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project (CMCP), funded principally by the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation (Jokisch 2007). While it is not uncommon for migrant communities to stay active in the development of their communities of origin, I do not believe that this involvement has typically been elevated to the governmental levels of both towns, or, as is the case of the CMCP, of both states.

This chapter has discussed the direction Spanish immigration policy has taken in recent years with respect to Ecuadorians and the potential implications of these policies. It does not claim to say that these results are certain or that there could not be other consequences not discussed here, as the actual outcomes cannot be analyzed through this type of policy analysis. Considering that much of the criticism towards Spanish policy relates to the empty or contradictory rhetoric and lack of policy implementation, micro-level research is needed to determine policy attainment and to see what is really happening on the ground: are these policies actually being implemented; how, where and by whom they are being implemented; and what are the actual results once they are put in practice.
Through my research on the CMCP, I analyze what these bilateral agreements, mobile partnerships and hispano-ecuatoriano network mean for the migrants, their communities, and the participating states by exploring the following questions: What effect does development have on potential migrants’ attitudes and decisions towards migration? Does helping immigrants maintain ties with members and organizations in their home community, when accompanied by economic development, allow social networks to work in reverse and stimulate return migration? How does this affect integration? Because potential outcomes depend on the activities, attitudes and social relations of actors in both Cañar and Murcia, I gauge the CMCP’s effects and progress in both communities. Through this analysis I will then be able to explore what these types of bilateral agreements and international cooperation projects may mean for immigration policy and immigration policy studies.
Chapter 2 – Introduction to Cañar, Ecuador and Murcia, Spain

In this chapter I will present the two communities involved in the Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project, give a brief overview of each community’s migration history and review the research findings on the economic, social and cultural impacts of migration on the two societies.

Cañar, Ecuador

Cañar is a province in the southern Ecuadorian Andes. It is a region high in the Sierra, with altitudes reaching 4,500 meters. The land area spans 3,910 square kilometers and at the time of the last Census in 2001 the province had a total population of 212,050 (National Institute of Statistics and Census of Ecuador 2001). Agriculture is the main component of the Cañar economy. The main crops are wheat, potatoes, barley, vegetables, coffee, sugarcane, bananas, and tropical fruit. Livestock is comprised largely of cattle and the region produces beef and dairy products. Textiles, furniture and shoes make up the industry sector. The region is also known for producing Panama hats, which played a larger role in its economy at the beginning of the 20th century. The region is relatively poor; 50.7% of its population lives below the nation’s Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) index.

Cañar is known as the “Arqueological and Cultural Capital of Ecuador” due to its rich history of Incan and Cañari heritage and landmarks. The population is made up of a mix of mestizos (71%) and Cañari indigenous peoples (22%). Quichua is widely spoken in the province, along with Spanish. Cañar is also home to some of the most well-
preserved and valuable remnants of the Incan culture: the Castle of Ingapirca, Culebrillas Lake and the Incan Baths. The Castle of Ingapirca is arguably the most important of the three and was constructed in the 15th century on top of Cañari ruins as a temple to honor the Sun. While these landmarks are among the most well-known tourist destinations in Ecuador, they have not yet been truly incorporated into the national and international tourist market (ecuaworld.com.ec 2009).

The province of Cañar is divided into 7 cantons. Cañar Canton, the site of the Cañar-Murcia Co-development project, is the largest and most centrally located. It measures 1,802 square kilometers and according to the 2001 Census had 60,000 inhabitants. It is predominantly rural, as at that time 80% of the population resided in rural areas while 20% lived in urban zones. The projected 2010 population is 66,000 total residents with 26% residing in urban zones and 71% living in rural areas. Many of those living in rural areas practice subsistence farming and use bartering and labor exchange to acquire other necessary goods and services (Blankenship 2005).

Migration and Cañar

The first significant wave of emigration from Cañar can be traced back to the early 1960s, with the saturation and eventual collapse of the international market for Panama hats. The region’s already established trade contacts and networks with the United States facilitated its residents’ emigration north to cities such as New York and Chicago, and by the mid-1960s it is estimated that 400,000 Ecuadorians had emigrated to the United States, with 90% of those originating from the provinces of Cañar and neighboring Azuay (Borrero and Vega 1995; CONUEP 1995; Jokisch 1998; all quoted in}
Pribilsky 2001: 254). While it is believed that most of these migrants entered the United States illegally, the lax border control of the era allowed for easy entry and re-entry, which in turn led to circular migration patterns.

Based on evidence from my interviews, the principal U.S. destinations for migrants from Cañar are New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia, and more recently, Minnesota. The trip to enter the United States illegally costs between $12,000 and $14,000, with many families taking out loans or mortgaging their homes at high rates in order to pay the coyote fees. In some cases, the families eventually lose their land and homes because they cannot pay off the debt they have accrued. In addition to being costly, the trip is also known for being long and dangerous. Many people take boats to get from Ecuador to Mexico, and there have been a number of highly-publicized accidents in which Cañar residents were fatal victims. Once arriving in Mexico, most cross the Mexico-U.S. border through the desert, a route also known to be dangerous. The whole trip can sometimes take months, and many families recounted the stress and anxiety they experienced as they waited – sometimes up to seven months - to receive any word from their family members, the whole time not knowing if he or she was alive or dead.

In the late 1990s a national economic crisis caused another large wave of migration. The mass exodus was so great that at the beginning of the 1990s, the annual average of emigrants from Ecuador was approximately 30,000; by the end of the decade that number had nearly quadrupled to 117,000 (Albornoz Guarderas and Hidalgo Pallares 2007). Many Ecuadorians took advantage of existing, developed networks to migrate to the United States, and the already established migration patterns increased significantly with the economic crisis. However, for those lacking the funds and the U.S.
networks, and due to tighter U.S. immigration policy, a significant collective chose a new
destination and emigrated to Spain, where they could enter legally as tourists. In the case
of Cañar, these migrants were mostly indigenous from rural areas (Escobar García 2008).

Studies have pointed to multiple factors that made Cañar’s agricultural sector
especially vulnerable and that contributed to the added impact of the crisis on the farmers
of Cañar. Miles (1997) identified structural issues such as a poorly developed local
industry, insufficient and unequal distribution of land and a declining craft market.
Vaillant (2008) noted the relative poverty that the rural population experienced because
of their lack of access to public services like education, health care and water. He
attributed a drop in local buying power and the loss of competitiveness with neighboring
countries to the national economic crisis. Vaillant also pointed to political factors, such as
the absence of policies favoring farmers and a general distrust in government capabilities
and support for the agricultural communities. The combination of these issues created an
economy in which the traditional way of life for the farmers of Cañar – subsistence
farming, bartering, and labor exchange – was no longer enough to survive (Blankenship
2005). This in turn led to what the people of Cañar described as a mass exodus of
indigenous peoples from the rural areas to Spain between 1996 and 2003.

While a large group of Cañar migrants chose a new destination in Spain, it is
worth mentioning that because of Cañar’s relatively long history of migration to the
United States, the United States is still the principal destination for migrants from Cañar.
In 2006, 80% of those who had migrated lived in the United States, compared to 18.71%
of Cañar migrants who lived in Spain (INEC 2007). This is most likely a result of the
already-established networks, connections and access to coyotes. It is also a possible
consequence of the more rigid immigration policies Spain enacted in 2003 for Latin American entry into its country. In response to its growing Latin American immigrant population, Spain started requiring Latin Americans to obtain a tourist visa in their countries of origin in order to legally enter Spain. These visas are difficult to obtain, as one must show that they have a significant amount of savings in their bank account, a business, land, or family members that would indicate that they do not plan to stay in Spain. As I will discuss in later chapters, many people cited this restriction as a reason why it is now “too difficult” to enter Spain.

The most pertinent and recent data on migration in Cañar comes from a 2007 survey administered by various organizations involved in the Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project to a representative sample of homes in Cañar Canton in order to better measure the living conditions, migration patterns and impacts of migration on the Cañar Canton population. While the results have not yet been published, a preliminary report with findings from this survey was released in 2008 by Escobar García of the Observatory for the Rights of Children and Adolescents of Ecuador. The information and statistics contained in the following two paragraphs come from this report.

As of 2007, Canton Cañar was among the top ten Ecuadorian cantons with the most emigrants, and almost half of its total number of migrants emigrated around the year 2000. 41% of homes in Canton Cañar have at least one migrant member, and 80% of migrants are between the ages of 18 and 40. The rural population is the major source for out-migration, as 85% of homes with migrants are located in a rural area. This is reflected also with the differential between indigenous and non-indigenous homes, as 48% of indigenous homes have a migrant member compared to 35% of mestizo homes.
Migration in Cañar is also characterized by the family separation that it inevitably produces. Married migrants make up 60% of the total collective, and 64% of migrants have children living in Cañar. Half of the canton’s 60,000 inhabitants are children and adolescents, and 26% of them have at least one migrant parent. Of those, 47% have both parents abroad.

These numbers demonstrate very clearly that Cañar Canton is a community that has a history of migration with a significant wave of recent emigration, and that this phenomenon affects a large portion of its population. Because it is one of the more “veteran” migrant communities in Ecuador, several studies have addressed the economic, social and cultural impacts of migration on the province of Cañar and surrounding communities. Some were carried out before the 1999 crisis (Miles 1997; Pribilsky 2001), others after (Albornoz Guarderas and Hidalgo Pallares 2007; Escobar García 2008) and a few reflect on research carried out both before and after (Jokisch and Kyle 2005; Blankenship 2005).

The number of members of the Cañar community who receive remittances and the amount they receive make up an important part of its economy. According to 2006 figures from the Central Bank of Ecuador, the province of Cañar received a total of $304.4 million in remittances, making it the fourth highest amount in the country, and the first highest per capita (Albornoz Guarderas and Hidalgo Palleres 2007). As of 2006, remittances represented 70% of the province’s economic income (Albornoz Guarderas and Hidalgo Palleres 2007).

While remittances seem to play a significant role in the lives of many Cañar inhabitants, Albornoz Guarderas and Hidalgo Palleres (2007) and Vasco (2008) noted the
danger of this high percentage and pointed to its implication: a probable and dangerous
dependence on remittance income that is not sustainable. Upon examining the uses of
remittance income, they found most people made short-term investments that provided
little opportunity for long-term payouts. These expenditures included paying off the debt
and mortgages that migrants and their families take on in order to finance their trips
(which are especially costly in the case of U.S. migration); goods and basic services, such
as food, education and clothes; construction of relatively large homes; consumption of
“luxurious” goods such as electronics, cars and eating out; and in a few cases, starting
small businesses. They also noted that spending patterns tend to change relative to the
total number of years the migrant has been abroad. This change consists, over time, in
less being spent on housing, food, and education and more spent on cars, trips and
entertainment, among other things, indicating less money being saved and invested in
long-term projects and more being used on expendable products. In his study on
Ecuadorian migrants in Murcia, Vasco’s findings on reduced immigration flows, patterns
of settlement and relatively few plans for family reunification led him to hypothesize that
the amount and frequency of remittances sent from Spain would likely decrease
significantly in the near future.

Blankenship (2005) indirectly addresses a possible cause for the tendency to not
save through her observation of the lingering impact that the crisis of 1999 has had in
Cañar. During the crisis, all national banks closed, and the majority did not reopen. Those
that did declared bankruptcy, causing millions of Ecuadorians to lose their savings. In
addition, it was revealed that many bankers and politicians, sensing the upcoming market
collapse, withdrew their own savings and fled the country. During Blankenship’s time in
Cañar, she noted that because of this many people of Cañar – and in particular those from the rural areas – still do not trust banks and would often times carry large amounts of cash on their person because they did not want to deposit their money in banks (104). Given Vaillant’s similar observation of an existing distrust in government capabilities and support, it is logical that remittance recipients in Cañar are hesitant to allow government or privately-funded institutions manage their money.

Another remittances-related finding that is briefly mentioned in a few of the studies speaks to the cultural, social and racial tensions that will be explored in the following chapters. It deals with the view held by culturally white-mestizos that the indigenous Cañaris are the “symbol of their cultural and ancestral identity” (Burgos Guevara 2003: 9). Because “campesinos” or “gente del campo” – literally, people from the fields – are also commonly seen as less educated, a major perception held by urban mestizos is that they are not capable or prepared to handle remittance money and as such are mismanaging it (Miles 1997). As a result, many mestizos are of the opinion that the migration of the Cañari indigenous peoples ruins the economy, culture and heritage of Cañar; in other words, the romanticized view of tradition, culture, work and social roles are being challenged (Miles 1997). Carrillo’s finding that migrants from Cañar are many times the subject of criticism or jealousy adds to the tension between mestizos and indigenous Cañaris, and between migrants and non-migrants (2008:361). I will explore the effects of this tension more in my discussion of the impacts of the CMCP in Chapter 3.

As in many mature migrant communities, the migration phenomenon has come to be described by both researchers and community members as a contagious disease
transmitted from one neighbor to another through visual means; one neighbor sees what the other has and decides he wants it too. This chain of migration and the subsequent presence of remittance flows are also linked to the “materialization” and change in consumption practices of the communities (Miles 1997; Pribilsky 2001; Carrillo 2005). In addition to money, cultural practices and ideologies are also remitted. Pribilisky (2001) found that many young men dreamt of becoming an ‘ioni’, “a name derived from the expression ‘I ♥ NY’ that is used to describe returned migrants who have adopted American styles of speech, clothing and attitude” (255). He describes the journey to the United States as a “socially recognized benchmark” that many youth from Cañar aspire to reach.

With such a high percentage of separated families, it is not surprising that the most dominant themes, both in studies produced in the area and in my conversations with members of the Cañar community, were focused around the negative social impacts of migration. Miles (1997) found that many families, especially women and children left behind, spoke of the destruction of the home, loneliness and feelings of abandonment. In his Cañar case study on the changing child life in the Andes, Pribilsky (2001) explored what many community members call symptoms associated with children who have been abandoned or neglected by migrant parents: nervios. Nervios is a “depressive-like disorder” sometimes attributed to the separation of a child from his or her parents; symptoms include extreme sadness, explosive anger, malicious acts of violence, and a general refusal to carry out day-to-day activities (252). What I found to be most interesting about his study was that the nervios condition actually persisted or got worse
when the child was reunited with his absent family member. In Chapter 4 I will explore the implications that this symptom has on family reunification.

The changing economic structure due to remittances also contributed to what people commonly called “dolor de dólares,” literally, “pain of dollars” (268). Pribilsky concluded that separation and changing consumption practices added stress to the lives of youth in migrant families. Other researchers have found similar behavior among children of migrants. Herrera and Carrillo (2004) found that they are more prone to alcoholism, drug addiction, teen pregnancy and gangs; from which Carrillo (2005) then identified the paradox of the children of migrants: they are seen by society as victims, but at the same time as problems.

My findings and observations on the impacts of migration in Cañar and Murcia were, not surprisingly, in-line with the major findings of these studies. What I found especially interesting in my research, however, was how these impacts in turn influenced the migration decisions, family reunification and return migration plans of these same children and family members. I will explore this more in Chapter 4.

**Murcia, Spain**

The Autonomous Community of the Region of Murcia, Spain, is located on the Southeast coast of the Iberian Peninsula, making it an external border of both Spain and the European Union. The region covers 11,300 square kilometers and has a total of 1,446,520 inhabitants (INE 2009). The Region is known for being politically conservative, and the conservative People’s Party (PP) has held the majority of
governmental offices since 1995. In the 2008 elections, the PP in Murcia received the highest vote share of all Spain’s 52 electoral districts.

Murcia’s key sectors of economic activity are agriculture, service, construction and industry. It is known as the “Garden of Europe” due to its status as a major producer of fruit, vegetables and flowers. In recent years its tourist industry has also experienced a large growth as many English, Irish and noticeable that when I brought up the issue of immigration in Murcia, many locals assumed I was talking about the English and Irish seasonal migrants until I explained differently.

Migration and Murcia

The migration history of the Region of Murcia follows a similar timeline to that of the national trend; in recent years, it has transitioned from a region of emigration to one of immigration in a relatively short amount of time. Until 1970, the Civil War and a poor economy resulted in flows of out-migration. After Spain’s transition to a democracy and subsequent industrialization around 1976, this pattern reversed and internal migrants starting arriving to the Region. In the mid-1980s, two main events changed the economic landscape of the Region and contributed to attracting immigrants of foreign nationalities: Spain’s entrance into the European Union and an agrarian reform that greatly increased production in the Region of Murcia.

This new immigration phenomenon is commonly described as a huge demographic wave that was fast, big, and diverse. Since the mid-90s, the Region’s immigrant population has grown to reach remarkable numeric proportions and has contributed to a complete rejuvenation of the population (López Cutillas 2007). In 1998
the foreign-born population represented 1 out of every 100 residents of Murcia; by 2002 that ratio had jumped to 1 out of every 10 (Gómez Espín 2002). Between 1996 and 2004, the foreign-born population multiplied by six (Martínez Lucas and Romera Franco 2004).

Within the national context, the Region’s immigrant population represents a substantial proportion as well: as of 2002, 10% of Spain’s immigrant population lived in Murcia (Gómez Espín 2002). This figure takes on even greater significance when we take into account that Murcia makes up only 3% of the country’s population (Corkill 2005). By 2006, the percentage of migrants in Murcia constituted 13.34% of its total population, while the same statistic for the country of Spain as a whole was 8.75% (López Cutillas 2007).

In addition to gaining a large immigrant population in a short amount of time, the phenomenon had another important characteristic: heterogeneity. While the Ecuadorian and Moroccan immigrants represent the largest national collectives, the Region also has significant populations of Colombians, Ukrainians, British and French immigrants. As Fernández-Rufete Gómez and Rico Becerra noted, it is important to remember that in many cases, within each individual national collective exists a heterogeneous group of migrants with social, cultural and political differences, as is the case of the Ecuadorian migrant population.

The Region of Murcia is home to Spain’s third-largest Ecuadorian population. Between 1998 and 2001, the number of Ecuadorians living in Murcia increased by more than 200%, raising the percentage of Ecuadorians within the total immigrant population in Murcia from 12% to 40% in that same time period (Martínez Lucas and Romera Franco 2004). In 2003 the Ecuadorian collective surpassed the Moroccans as the largest
immigrant population in Spain (Martínez Lucas and Romera Franco 2004). Among the Murcian municipalities with the largest percentage of Ecuadorian immigrants are those that also house the largest percentage of migrants from Cañar: Torre Pacheco, San Javier, Totana and Lorca.

In addition to having the third largest Ecuadorian population and being the principal destination for Cañar migrants in Spain, the Region has also been the site of important recent events and social movements involving the Ecuadorian migrant population. On August 17, 1998, 17 Ecuadorians who were of irregular status were to be deported from Totana on orders from the mayor. The migrant community mobilized and protested, and in what might be considered an unexpected act considering Murcia’s conservative tendencies, many people in the town of Totana responded by showing support for the migrants through solidarity protests. Spanish companies responded by offering thousands of contracts to Ecuadorians in the region. This reaction has been explained by a variety of factors, among them being the overall recognition and acceptance of the need for immigrant labor in the region, the preference that many Murcians admit to having for Ecuadorians over Moroccans, and the historical memory of a region where many of its own members had been immigrants in the past and empathized with the plight of the Ecuadorians. The events attracted international press and drew attention to the problematic immigration policies that kept many migrants in irregular status.

The world’s attention was again drawn to Murcia when 12 Ecuadorian workers died after the van they were travelling to work in crashed with a train in Lorca. The incident raised awareness of the low-paying jobs, harsh working conditions, and
inadequate living situations that were made possible because of the irregular status of many immigrant laborers, as well as the exploitation of underage workers. The community mobilized again and demanded immigration reform. Due in part to this sequence of events, the government carried out a regularization later that year and implemented a new immigration law in 2003.

While sectors of the Murcian society have demonstrated support for the Ecuadorian migrant population, the speed and size with which the Region’s diverse immigrant population grew resulted in unavoidable – and not always desired – social, cultural and economic changes. In local opinion surveys, migration has consistently been among the most worrisome issues for residents of Murcia (Gómez Espín 2002).

In response to its growing and diverse immigrant population, the Region has implemented a number of policies and projects to address the needs of both the immigrant community and its receiving society. Many of these projects receive financial and developmental support from European organizations. One of the Region’s most important initiatives has been the “Plan for the Social Integration of the Immigrants of the Region of Murcia 2002-2004,” which is part of the “Strategic Development Plan for the Region of Murcia 2000-2006,” a politic instrument financed by the European Union with a budget of €25.5 million. The plan outlined various areas of intervention, including education, employment, health, housing and social relations, all of which were to be addressed through a “global” approach where integration was not defined as a unidirectional cultural adaptation but rather a multicultural growth rooted in respect and tolerance of personal, cultural and linguistic differences. Many of the integration
improvements acknowledged by the Cañar immigrants I interviewed in Murcia were a result of the government initiatives carried out because of this plan.

While no statistical data has been published on the Cañar population in Murcia, various studies (Fernández-Rufete Gómez and Rico Becerra 2005; Vasco 2008) have gathered information on collectives of Ecuadorian migrants in Murcian towns in or near the ones where the majority of the Cañar migrants live and work. I will present their findings in the areas of migration history, demographics, employment, legal status, family make-up and family reunification, remittances, return migration and integration. While the findings cannot be directly applied to the Cañar population, the numbers might provide some perspective on their social, cultural and economic situations.

Fernández-Rufete Gómez and Rico Becerra found that around 75% of its survey participants had financed their trip to Spain with help from family members, while around 20% had received support from banks. The majority entered Spain as tourists, overstayed the three month limit, and benefitted from the various regularizations enacted by the Spanish government. Both studies found that 99% of its survey participants had been in Spain for at least two years. This indicates that migration to Murcia from Ecuador has seemingly reached a plateau since Spain implemented its new visa requirement for Latin Americans. At the time of Fernández-Rufete Gómez and Rico Becerra’s study, 62% of those surveyed had permission of residence and/or work or were in the process of renewing them, while 36% had not regularized. Very few had the opportunity to migrate with a contract issued in the country of origin. Over 80% were employed, and 60% of those employed had formal contracts. Most of the migrants in both studies worked in
service, agriculture or industry. In the two studies, between 70-85% of those surveyed regularly sent remittances back to their homes in Ecuador.

Because of the newness of the migration flow, the population is neither very young nor very old; both studies found the 20-29 age group to be the most highly represented, followed by those aged 30-39. The ratio of men to women was almost 1:1. Their findings on family composition was significant, as both studies indicated that of the migrants that had children, most did not have them with them in Spain. Of those surveyed by Fernández-Rufete Gómez and Rico Becerra, 53.1% intended to bring their families to Spain, while 45.2% had no intention of doing so. Vasco’s participants expressed a similar outlook: either their spouses and/or children were already there, or they were not planning on bringing them. In addition, 63.8% of his respondents either had all of their immediate family already with them or simply did not have any spouses or children period. In terms of return migration, both studies found that over 50% of respondents planned to stay in Spain at least five more years, if not indefinitely.

With regards to community relations and integration, Fernández-Rufete Gómez and Rico Becerra determined that of their participants, only 6% were not happy with their neighborhood or community environment. At the same time, 26.5% did not want to make contact with other immigrant collectives, especially Moroccans. Perhaps their most surprising find, and most interesting within the context of my research, was that of the relations among the Ecuadorian collective: 70.7% of their respondents claimed to have not received any help or support from their non-family countrymen; within social networks, family was more important than the collective. I will explore this finding
further in my discussion of the CMCP’s administrators’ attempts to unify the migrant community in Cañar.

Migration Cañar-Murcia: My findings

Based on my findings, which were for the most part in-line with the existing literature on Ecuadorian emigration, the bulk of the “mass migration” from Cañar to Murcia occurred between 1996 and 2003. A seemingly large proportion of these migrants were indigenous farmers from the rural areas of Cañar, and most of them reside in the relatively rural Murcian towns of Lorca, Torre Pacheco, San Javier and Totana. Most worked in the agricultural sector, while others found contracts in the service sector. The economic crisis was the principal reason given for emigrating. Other factors involved in the decision were also economic in nature and included corruption (on the part of the governments of Ecuador and Cañar), favorable exchange rates and a lack of available jobs for those who had completed their education.

Although Cañar had an established history and network of migration to the United States, there were a few factors cited as reasons for which this flow of migrants chose Spain. At that time, Spain had “open borders” to Ecuadorians. In order to legally enter Spain, Ecuadorians simply needed to prove to the Spanish customs officials that they were coming as tourists. The most common method to accomplish this task was to take with them $2000 to $3000 in cash and show it to the customs officers in the airport. Once they had gained legal entry, they would then send this money back to another family member in Ecuador so that he or she could enter in the same way with the same money. According to testimonies of Cañar migrants, their family members, and the director of the
Cañar Canton post office, the cost of wiring money was too much, so it was not unusual for the migrants to put all the cash in one envelope and send it to their family members through regular mail. When community members started inquiring to the National Mail Company of Ecuador when they thought envelopes had been lost or stolen, INTERPOL became involved. In their investigations, they found envelopes with up to $8,000 cash in each one. The Cañar post office was forced to put up signs prohibiting the sending of cash by mail, but the practices continued.¹

Another draw to Spain versus the United States was the possibility for irregular immigrants to legalize their status through work contracts provided by employers. Of the migrants I interviewed, all had had positive experiences with their bosses or companies, although they knew of people who had been taken advantage of by people falsely claiming to be able to give them a contract or help them arrange their papers. As a result, migrants felt they had more freedom than they would have had in the United States, based on what they had heard about the experience of being an undocumented migrant in the United States. These messages were sent back to Cañar as well, where people heard that migrants who live in Spain do not live in fear, have good jobs and can live just like a Spaniard. A few migrants also mentioned the benefit of being able to travel to other parts of Europe once in Spain.

According to migrants in Murcia, many of them ended up there because of the connection they had to Murcian priests in Cañar. When the people started considering

¹ As other researchers noted, and as I discuss in the following chapters, the perception of the indigenous peoples as less educated, in both the academic and social sense, was reinforced through their newly acquired economic status and the way they were perceived to be unprepared to effectively manage it.
emigrating to Spain, the priests told them to go to Murcia because the economy there was growing and there was a need for agricultural laborers.

**Conclusion**

It is clear that migration has played and will continue to play an important role in the economic, political, social, and cultural structures of Cañar and Murcian societies. Both Spain and Ecuador have adopted policies, created programs and developed governmental agencies in their attempt to manage migration flows, maximize the benefits of migration and minimize the negative impacts. In the next chapter, I will present the Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project, one such program that began taking shape in 2005. First I will present the background of its creation as well as its original objectives and operating plan. I will then use my research findings to compare that to its actual implementation and current operating plan. I will also discuss the achievements and obstacles that it has faced since its inception in 2005.
Chapter 3 – The Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project: Rhetoric or Reality?

This chapter presents the Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project (CMCP) as it was originally designed. It outlines the operating plan and goals as they were stated in official CMCP documents at its inception (the rhetoric). It then explains my research methodology and uses the results of my fieldwork (participant-observation and interviews) to do a ground-level analysis of whether and/or how the project has actually been implemented, paying special attention to the features of the CMCP that make it unique among co-development projects. As the CMCP is a pilot program, this chapter also documents the achievements and obstacles it had faced at the time of my research. This will provide essential background information for my analysis on the CMCP’s impact on immigration policy objectives that I explore in Chapter 4. It will also inform the recommendations that I will offer with regards to the possible implementation of similar projects in the future in the Discussion section of Chapter 5.

Introduction to the CMCP: The Rhetoric

At the 11th Meeting of the Mixed Commission of Hispanic-Ecuadorian Cooperation (MCHEC) in 2005, the Ecuadorian Minister of Foreign Relations and the Spanish Secretary of State for International Cooperation (who also serves as the President of the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation (SAIC)) discussed programs to be carried out in accordance with the Bilateral Program of Cooperation (BPC) between the
years of 2005 and 2008. According to the minutes of the meeting, the BPC is a product of the Ecuadorian government’s commitment to providing better conditions for its neediest population and the Spanish government’s commitment to reducing world poverty by financially and logistically supporting policies and plans for development that have been created and led by the Ecuadorian government. At that time, the network had already supported Ecuadorian projects relating to education (schools, scholarships and workshops), health (hospitals and workshops), infrastructure, environment, micro-financing, cultural patrimony (restoration and workshops) and indigenous movements.

In the 2005 meeting it was determined that migrant flows should be seen as a source of opportunity for development for both sending and receiving countries, and that a co-development pilot project should be created in an attempt to maximize the economic, social and cultural benefits of migration. Due to the volume of migrants originating from Ecuador that resided in Spain, the Spanish government chose to work with Ecuador in developing this pilot project. In order to determine potential participation sites, the Spanish Delegation initiated a series of consultations in both Ecuador and Spain. This exercise, deemed “unprecedented” due to its “marked” participatory nature, emphasized the participation of national and local authorities, NGOs, immigrant associations in Spain, family members of Ecuadorian immigrants in Spain, private companies and the financial sector (Acta 23). As I will discuss later, the involvement and political power given to the migrants in this bi-national co-government

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2 It was at this same meeting that the Spanish and Ecuadorian governments reached their “Debt Conversion Agreement,” in which Spain agreed to turn $50 million of the money Ecuador owed it into investments for Ecuadorian social programs such as education and health.
funded project is unique, making it a significant factor that distinguishes the CMCP from other co-development projects.

As a result of these consultations, it was found that the participants coincided in their opinion that the most urgent and essential need of the communities was to reconstruct the social fabric through education. Once the social fabric was regenerated, it could serve as the starting point for future projects to effectively launch initiatives that would encourage, facilitate and stimulate the profitable investment of remittances, the channeling of wired remittances and favorable financial products (Acta 23). The projects would ideally promote local development, encourage entrepreneurship, stimulate the creation of productive businesses and companies actively linked to families of migrants, promote initiatives of fair markets and facilitate the investment of remittances. The principal economic objective then was to generate alternatives of sustainable development through a system of social-productive support that would take into consideration the environment, gender equality and cultural diversity (Acta 24). It was decided that the pilot program would be initiated in a province with a high rate of emigration to Spain, high indicators of poverty and development potential. Cañar, with its migration history and struggling economy, proved to be a strong candidate and was chosen to be the site of the pilot program. And thus was born the Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project.³

The CMCP’s stated objective is “to contribute to the development of the migrants’ sending and receiving communities.” It consists of a series of activities

³ In the preliminary phases of the project’s creation, it was decided that the focus would be placed on Cañar Canton and the Region of Murcia; for which from this point on, all discussions of Cañar refer to Cañar Canton and all mention of Murcia refers to the Region of Murcia unless otherwise specified.
developed in the social and institutional settings of Cañar and Murcia. The CMCP is based on a concept of co-development that considers migrants’ socio-economic integration in their receiving and sending communities to be equally important. The CMPC pilot program was also created to be a learning tool from which the entities involved and any other interested parties could identify effective and ineffective practices should they wish to replicate this kind of project in other regions or countries.

In late 2005, the planning process for the CMCP pilot program was initiated in Cañar and Murcia. The information in the following section is given as described in two official CMCP documents: the Project Description Summary of 2006 and the Annual Operating Plan 2007 signed in Cañar in March 2007. In line with the preliminary consultations conducted by the MCHEC, the project was to be designed by an “unprecedented” bi-national collaboration between national and local authorities, NGOs, immigrant associations in Spain, family members of Ecuadorian immigrants in Spain, private companies, the financial sector and academic institutions in both countries.

In addition to involving this unprecedented number and diversity of participants, the CMCP is also distinctive in two other aspects: the role that it would give the migrants and the ties that it would create between the two regions. The project specifies that the migrant is to be the main political actor and the most important authority in the decision-making process with regards to the main objectives and activities carried out in both communities. The CMCP also called for constant communication and visits between the regions, migrants, community members and participating institutions. While some receiving countries discourage migrants from maintaining ties to their societies of origin, Spain is not only actively encouraging it but also providing the institutional and financial
support for Cañari migrants to integrate themselves culturally, economically, socially, politically, and in some cases, physically, to their home communities.\textsuperscript{4}

So, is this project too good to be true? Through my research, I intended to go beyond the rhetoric to determine if, how and by whom the CMCP was actually designed and implemented. I paid special attention to the role of the migrants and the type and frequency of communication and contact taking place between the two regions. In the following section I will explain my research methodology, and then present my findings on the reality of the Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project.

**Methodology**

To collect my data, I used participant-observation and in-depth interviews. The interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions. I used a “snowball” sampling technique to gain as many respondents as possible.

I conducted field research in both Murcia and Cañar. First, I travelled to Murcia, where I spent five weeks conducting ethnographic research within the Ecuadorian immigrant community and the local Spanish community. During my time in Murcia I attended various immigrant events organized by both the Spanish government and by the immigrant organizations. In order to attend these events and conduct interviews I travelled to multiple towns throughout Murcia. I conducted a total of 10 official interviews; interviewees included leaders and members of local and national immigrant associations (some members of the CMCP and some not). Ecuadorian immigrants not

\textsuperscript{4} This is a significant feature not only in the development and implementation of the project, but also in the implications that it has for theories of transnationalism, membership, belonging and citizenship, as I will discuss in Chapter 5.
involved in an immigrant organization, Spaniards involved in the CMCP, and Spaniards not involved in the CMCP. In addition to the official interviews, I also conversed with Cañari migrants, non-Ecuadorian migrants, and Spaniards at various social and sporting events during my time in Murcia.

I faced a number of challenges to my fieldwork in Murcia that hindered my efforts to contact and interview migrants. It is worth mentioning some of these obstacles because they are similar to those that have stalled the progress of the CMCP in Murcia, as I will discuss in the next section. First, the geographical distribution and fragmentation of the Cañar migrant population in Murcia made it difficult and time-consuming to meet with many people in a limited amount of time. In addition, contacting the immigrant associations was more difficult than I had anticipated. While many of the associations have websites with contact information, I discovered that most of these pages were outdated and the location and contact information no longer accurate. I found this out after repeated attempts to contact the members by email, telephone, and in person using the information listed on their websites. Many days were lost travelling to the different towns in Murcia where the associations’ headquarters were supposedly based, only to find that the offices or apartments were no longer there.

When I was able to contact members of the migrant associations, it was difficult to set up meeting times due to their long work days and weeks. Most worked from early morning until early evening as well as Saturdays, leaving Sundays as their only free day to meet. When I was able to set up interviews, in many instances I would travel to the town for the day and time we had set up the meeting, but the other party would have to cancel or reschedule at the last minute.
The most unexpected obstacle I faced, however, were the social conflicts that existed among the Cañar migrant population. Some of my attempts to make new contacts by mentioning the names of other migrants or associations I had already spoken with backfired due to these conflicts among the migrants and associations. I will go into this point more in detail in my discussion of the obstacles faced by the CMCP.

From Murcia I travelled to Cañar, where I spent five weeks conducting participant-observation research and completing a total of 53 interviews. I interviewed every community member that granted his or her consent. My interviewees included participants and staff of the CMCP (both Ecuadorian and Spanish), Cañari residents not participating in the CMCP, return migrants who had lived in Spain, return migrants who had lived in the United States, family members of migrants, potential migrants, school administrators, and students. I also accompanied the CMCP workers on visits to some of the communities where they were developing projects, observed meeting proceedings and talked to community members there.

Interviews with members of the CMCP’s participating organizations and institutions helped me learn about the organizations: what they do; who they serve; who participates in their programs and activities; their relationships with other local, national and international CMCP participants; their involvement in the CMCP; and their opinions about the CMCP influence on Cañari migration and the Cañari migrant population. Interviews with Cañaris in their respective locations helped me explore the following issues: if they knew of or participated in the CMCP; what they identify as the needs of their community; the ways in which the CMCP is or is not meeting those needs; perceptions of economic opportunities before and after the Project’s initiation; social
connections to Cañaris residing in either country; and attitudes and plans in regards to migration and family reunification. For Cañaris residing in Murcia, questions were asked to better understand their reasons for emigrating and how their involvement in the CMCP had affected their integration in Murcia or plans to return to Cañar.

The following section details the implementation of the CMCP based on testimonies of migrants, community members and CMCP administration; my observations during my fieldwork; and information provided in official CMCP documents.

**CMCP: The Reality**

Based on an analysis of official CMCP reports as well as my own fieldwork, I have found that in the initial stages of the CMCP, it was in fact planned and implemented following the guidelines described at its inception. In the beginning phases of the project, the involvement of the large and diverse number of binational participants was high, communication and visits between the regions were frequent, and the migrants played a central role in determining the objectives and methodology of the project. However, due to the obstacles that I have mentioned as well as others that I will discuss later in this chapter, the CMCP was not able to continue with that administrative structure and the operating plan was modified accordingly. Nevertheless, the CMCP has made significant accomplishments within its areas of focus.

In the early stages of the CMCP, the participatory and binational qualities that marked its creation were maintained. In order to create an operating plan that was consistent with these features, the project passed through three important phases: 1)
Research and Diagnosis in Ecuador; 2) Research and Diagnosis in Spain and 3) a Joint Identification workshop in Cañar involving participants from both countries. The first and second phases occurred, at some points, simultaneously.

In Ecuador, the Fundación Esquel, a non-profit organization specializing in community development, spent eight months doing research on the impacts of migration in Ecuador. From their findings, they identified potential areas of intervention and contacted prospective participants for the CMCP. They worked in conjunction with the SAIC to develop possible objectives and activities that would promote development in Cañar. In Spain the focus was on making contacts with the migrant associations and other possible non-governmental participants. They held workshops to discuss different methodologies for implementing the development projects and to determine in what areas the migrants believed the CMCP would be most beneficial to their sending and receiving communities. In addition, universities in Murcia began conducting sociological research to evaluate the reality and impacts of immigration in Murcia.

In culmination of this process, a three-day workshop was held in Cañar with over 100 participants from both Cañar and Murcia, including representatives of immigrant associations from Murcia. Through discussion and group-planning, they defined the principal objectives of the project, determined the main “departments of intervention”\(^5\) and designed the CMCP’s Annual Operating Plan for 2007. The project was given two fundamental lines of action: 1) co-development through the transfer of resources and

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\(^5\) The original terminology in Spanish for the different areas of focus (ejes) translates literally to “axis.” I have chosen to identify these areas as “departments.”
ideas between the two zones, and 2) support through projects that are designed to improve the quality of life conditions in the community of origin.

For Cañar, the participants decided to prioritize the management of natural resources, occupational development workshops, diversifying the economic system, strengthening the Hispanic and Bilingual/Intercultural education systems, community tourism, and the empowerment of women. Based on studies of the impacts of migration in Cañar discussed in Chapter 2, these areas seem to address many of the social, economic and cultural needs of the community. In Murcia, the priorities were given to strengthening immigrant associations, empowerment of women, facilitating migrants’ awareness and access to existing services and resources in the Region of Murcia, occupational formation, preservation and dissemination of the Cañari culture and identity, and spreading awareness of the CMCP in the Region of Murcia. The projects to be carried out in both regions would have the end goal of facilitating the implementation and success of the local initiatives. They included exchange events, psycho-social support to migrants and their families, local and bi-local agreements between participants, political advocacy, and communication about the treatment of migrants.

In order to navigate the two spaces of actors and societies, a Bi-local Management Committee was formed, one with headquarters in Cañar and the other in Murcia. Local Action Committees in Cañar and Murcia were also created to ensure that the projects were progressing and staying in line with the original objectives. On these committees were representatives of the provinces, municipalities, rural organizations and immigrant associations of Murcia. The various committees met anywhere from weekly to annually, with the Bi-local committee alternating between meeting in Cañar and Murcia.
The CMCP was officially implemented in November of 2006, with an expected duration of 40 months. The total estimated cost for the nearly four year project was $6.4 million, of which Spanish governments and agencies were to provide nearly $4.8 million (nearly 75%), leaving Ecuador to cover the remaining $1.6 million (25%). At the time of my research in July through September of 2008, the CMCP had been underway a little over a year and a half. In the next section I will discuss the CMPC’s impacts and setbacks mid-way through its projected duration.

**CMCP: Accomplishments, Obstacles and Unintended Consequences**

**Accomplishments**

Since the CMCP’s implementation, it has had a number of significant achievements acknowledged by community members, migrants and CMCP personnel. This progress can be seen in the areas of organization and programming. First and foremost, due to the nature of the program, many people commented that the project established a connection between the two communities, when there had not previously been a strong one. Community members in Cañar learned more about the migrant experience in Murcia, while migrants in Murcia became more aware of the impacts of migration on their communities of origin in Cañar.

This connection has facilitated academic studies and the collection of data in both Cañar and Murcia, which now provide the most accurate and up-to-date set of statistics in the region. Along with the information collected from the communities during the planning phases of the CMCP, a detailed and thorough questionnaire was administered to a representative sample of homes in Cañar by FLACSO and the CMCP. In addition, a
new department has been added to improve land usage and conservation. The “Territorial Zoning and Physical Planning” department created maps of Cañar detailing information such as land division, demographics, home occupancy distribution and migration rates. This information will be useful to a number of parties as decisions are made about economic, political, social, cultural and environmental policies and programs, among others.

In Cañar, the project has also served to organize the infrastructure of the departments and to connect the people and professionals involved with them. Each department has been organized and developed activities related to its objectives. Their presence has benefitted the extended community as well. According to CMCP personnel, the members of the departments have come to be seen by the community as resources that they can go to when they want information about topics relating to their respective areas of focus. In addition, a web page was created so that the directors of the departments could communicate with each other and maintain up-to-date information on activities and progress.

With regards to technology advances, the CMCP has opened a multimedia center in the main plaza of Cañar. The Center for Computer and Technology Services provides all community members free access to internet-equipped computers. The center also houses a large, technologically advanced space where workshops, conferences, meetings and courses have been held. Based on my observations, the majority of people who take advantage of this center are professionals and students.

Through the programming of the different departments in Cañar, the CMCP has supported education initiatives and worked directly with youth, women, farmers, and
migrants. It has created spaces and various programs dedicated to youth development. It renovated a building that would become the Center for Training and Development for Youth Development. As of 2008, in that space they had carried out various workshops, including Rural Business Administration, Tourism Administration, Artisan Weaving, and Cattle and Llama Management.

Another important service provided by the CMCP is psychological-social support to migrants and their families. According to the director of Psycho-Social and Migrant Support department, the program provides a certified psychologist who is available to families and return migrants. She also makes visits to schools, which also often refer students to her. School administrators, teachers and students all commented on the importance of this service. The department has also conducted community education workshops dealing with themes such as inter-family violence and recognition of changes in behavior patterns among youth. Based on studies and commentary of Cañaris, the social and psychological effects of migration on the youth of the community is one of the most serious and pressing issues facing them. As such, the support and attention given to youth through these two programs should be seen as a fundamental aspect of community development.

Through the Support for Local Economic Infrastructure department, the CMCP has also worked closely with area farmers. It provides support for agricultural associations and has been facilitating the organization of farmers so that they might work together to produce organic and high quality produce.\(^6\) There have also been a series of

\(^6\) This is also an important aspect to the Cañar culture, as many of the migrants I spoke with in Murcia complained more about the chemicals in Spanish food than they did about the treatment from Spanish
workshops and training with respect to cattle and alpaca management. Another significant initiative is that of increasing the quality and number of guinea pigs farms in the region.7 The CMCP has been working to provide technological training to existing farmers while also organizing training for new ones. The goal is to develop the farms into commercial productions in order to diversify families’ economic investments and income. As successful agricultural reform was one of the principal reasons for Murcia’s economic growth (and subsequent need for immigrant labor), the hopes are high that Cañar will experience similar results.

The CMCP also provides services to potential and return migrants in Cañar through its Migrant Support department. Originally, it was able to offer contracts to work in Spain for those who were considering migrating. However, due to the economic crisis in Spain, the number of contracts offered has decreased significantly. At the time of my research, they had to stop offering them completely. For return migrants, the CMCP provides counsel, training and financial support to those interested in starting a business. In addition, the Psycho-Social Support department has personnel available to help facilitate return migrants’ re-integration into their families, Cañari culture and economy.

As I observed in my fieldwork, the CMCP’s presence and progress in Cañar seemed much more advanced and concrete than they were in Murcia. This is due in large part to the obstacles and setbacks that I discuss in the following section.

**Obstacles and Unintended Consequences**

people. It also points to the fact that Cañar has a lot of potential for this area of agriculture if they already produce organic food.

7 Guinea pigs are a popular dish in Ecuador, and Cañar is an area rich in alfalfa grass, one staple of the guinea pig diet.
“As a project it’s really great, but they need to rethink the culture.”

- Administrator, Bilingual Education System

While the CMCP had made important progress in the short time after its implementation, the majority of people I spoke with – including CMCP administrators – seemed more aware of and ready to talk about the project’s setbacks than its achievements. As this administrator alluded, in theory the project was an innovative strategy to work towards improving the lives of Cañaris both in Cañar and abroad; however, due to existing political, social, economic and racial tensions in the society, the project has unintentionally brought many of them to the forefront, exacerbated them, and in some cases, created new ones. This has in turn reduced the level of participation of the migrants and community members, and shifted the focus of the project to Cañar.

In the following section I analyze in-depth the obstacles faced by the CMCP and their consequences, following a somewhat chronological history of the project. I will then analyze how these issues have affected the migrants’ role in the project and the subsequent changes in the project’s implementation.

**Geographical Fragmentation**

As I discussed in my methodology, the Cañari immigrants in Murcia reside in many different towns throughout Murcia, and many do not have easy access to technology. They typically work long days and 6-day weeks. This presented a challenge to CMCP administrators trying to communicate and meet with large groups of them on a regular basis. In the pre-stages of the project’s development, the authorities turned then to
their most accessible resource: existing immigrant associations. These were mostly indigenous associations due to the social and political history of Cañar (and Ecuador) in which indigenous peoples have more experience organizing and forming associations to gain representation in federal and local governments. As such, indigenous peoples comprised a large proportion of CMCP participants at its conception. This is significant as it had repercussions in both Cañar and Murcia, as I will discuss shortly.

**Distrust and Uncertainty**

In Chapter 2 I gave a brief profile of Cañar and the studies that have been done on it. One of the major findings was that the problem-ridden political histories of Ecuador and Cañar, combined with the economic crisis of 1999 that sparked the major emigration of Cañaris to Spain, has led to a general distrust in government and politicians on the part of Cañaris. This skepticism contributed to a somewhat slow start to the government-initiated CMCP, as potential participants in both Cañar and Murcia were skeptical about the project’s true objectives.

In Murcia, the migrant Cañaris’ tendency to distrust governments carried over to the Spanish government. According to one immigrant association leader, when they were approached by Spanish authorities to participate in the project, the members questioned their motives and fought over whether or not to accept. The members went to the workshops, where the main objective of the project and their potential position in it were explained. They were told that the project was being done in their name, and that they would have a major role in its development. Because the national and local Spanish governments had been relatively supportive of them in recent years through its
regularizations and integration initiatives, they determined, as one association leader put it, that “Spaniards don’t lie; what they say, they do.” In the end, they decided to trust the authorities and confirmed their participation in the project.

However, when the project director at that time expressed his desire to have a meeting with all of the Cañari immigrants in Murcia, he was informed by association members that it would be nearly impossible due to geographic and social limitations. One association leader commented that migrants from the urban center of Cañar have been the most resistant and least likely to participate. Many migrants, according to one of the program administrators, heard about the program but did not come to the meetings because they did not believe that the government truly cared about their interests. When speaking with some mestizo Cañari migrants at a soccer game, they said they were not interested in participating because they did not see how it would benefit them at all. Also factoring into their distrust and disinterest in the project was the misinformation that they received about it at first. Rumors were going around that the project was being funded through an extra tax placed on migrants’ bills (i.e. telephone and electricity). They were upset that they were not consulted on the matter and began to see the project as unfair and corrupt.

The general resistance by mestizos to join the project is another factor (along with my aforementioned finding that the indigenous migrant associations were the most accessible to the Spanish government and therefore the first to be contacted) that contributed to the disproportionate ratio of indigenous to non-indigenous participants. However, it is also possible that the indigenous migrants’ early participation in the
project was actually a cause for the mestizos disinterest in it, though I do not have any qualitative evidence that speaks to that possibility.

From interviews with residents of Cañar, I gathered that there was a general feeling of mistrust towards the government and projects carried out by government agencies, both on the local and national level. Many people expressed concern that just as with other projects involving money and power, this too would become corrupt, especially once the Spanish agencies eventually pass all responsibility on to the Ecuadorian and Cañari government. Fears of corruption and suspicion that local politicians were only looking out for their own interests and political ends caused some community members to write off the project before it started, while others remained skeptical about its true objectives. Some were of the idea that it should be Ecuadorians who provided the support and resources for local development, not “outsiders” such as the Spanish. The Cañari government itself was divided at first, with people recalling that about half of local authorities did not want to get involved in the bi-national project.

In addition to the overall sense of distrust, the rural communities in Cañar are known to be “closed and aggressive.”8 Outsiders do not have easy access to the communities, nor is it perceived to be easy to gain their trust. This proved to be a huge obstacle for Spanish members of the CMCP, who not only were outsiders but tried to gain access to the communities by working closely with local politicians.

At the project’s inception, another area of concern for community members in both locations was its uncertain future. Many people wondered what would happen when the Spanish participation and support ended: Would the projects continue? Who would

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8 These words came up frequently in my interviews.
fund them? And most importantly, who would have power? This last question is especially significant considering the power struggles that the project experienced in its early stages and that have contributed greatly to the setbacks and conflicts it has and currently faces.

**Tensions and Conflicts**

As we began to see in the previous section, the question of which migrants are represented and participating in the CMCP is one that deserves deeper analysis. Because the CMCP had the stated goal of prioritizing the migrants’ role and actively working to involve and empower immigrant organizations, I expected to find a strong and unified network of Cañari migrants in Murcia. However, through my fieldwork I found a disjointed and divided migrant community. While the CMCP emphasized the importance of migrant and community participation, this aspect also exacerbated existing problems and created new ones by introducing power, money and politics into the scenario, as I will illustrate below. As a result of the conflicts, the migrants’ role as a major political actor in the CMCP has been drastically reduced.

In addition to facing challenges due to the geographic fragmentation of the Cañari migrant population, the CMCP administrators also had to navigate its social fragmentation. One Spanish CMCP administrator described the Cañaris as a complicated, individualist population with no social cohesion, a complex cultural heritage and conflicting interests. She observed these traits in both Cañar and Murcia: “there they recreate what they have here. They don’t mix.” As we have already seen, the first groups of migrants to be approached by the project were immigrant associations, most of whom
were indigenous. Migrants I spoke with who were not involved in any immigrant associations knew of the project but chose not to participate in it; most were mestizos from the urban center of Cañar. They claimed that it was only going to help certain groups - referring to the indigenous associations - and therefore they saw little benefit or opportunity for themselves. This was an attitude held by many migrants I talked to, as the most common answer to the question of whether they participated in the project was, “Why would I? What am I going to get out of it?” While the CMCP administrators attempted to get more migrants involved, in the end their efforts to communicate with and unify the Cañari migrant community were not successful.

Unfortunately, the divisions were not limited to rural and urban migrants or indigenous and non-indigenous migrants. As I discovered through interviews and fieldwork, there were also power struggles between the participating immigrant associations. While some of the associations were already in existence at the time of the CMCP’s creation, others started forming and “appearing” in order to participate in the project, which caused their motives to be questioned by the other groups. A member of one association that is no longer participating in the project felt that other associations were just in it for the money; she claimed that they just came to the workshops, signed their names, took pictures, got their money and left, but never did anything related to the project with it. Another association pulled out after claiming that they were being robbed by the project. Other migrants felt that certain associations were trying to “own” or take over the project and that many meetings turned into power struggles as a result.

In my fieldwork I experienced the after-effects of these conflicts. As I was contacting associations, I discovered that the leaders of the various groups were not
always on speaking terms with each other. Mentioning the names of the leaders of one
group to another would sometimes cause notable looks of uneasiness. It was clear that
there were divisions and tensions between some of the associations, and there did not
appear to be much solidarity or trust among them. At the time of my fieldwork, only three
associations were actively participating in the project.

The conflicts of interest among migrants and the problems between associations
had significant consequences in Murcia, particularly for the migrants’ participation and
role in the project. When the extended community became aware of the conflicts, the
CMCP gained the reputation of being divisive and disorganized. As a result, some
migrants who had been participating in the project distanced themselves from it, while
others avoided getting involved altogether in order to avoid the problems. I spoke with
one migrant who had been involved with the project in Murcia when it first started. He
was in Cañar visiting family when we met up, and when I asked him if he was still
involved with it, he responded:

Well, at the beginning I was participating in the project but there were a
lot of problems. People tried to take over the project, it was very messy. I
don’t know what they’re doing here, I haven’t looked. But I asked a friend
who came back the other day, ‘Have you gone to the CMCP office?’ He
replied, ‘Why would I? If they can’t help me with anything, why would I
go?’ The people don’t know much about it, maybe because of how it
started. Since there had been so many problems they don’t trust it. There
are some people who don’t want anything to do with it. They said that the
people involved in the project wanted to order around everyone else, the
immigrants got mad; it was almost destroyed at the beginning because of
all the problems. The people that come back to Cañar haven’t gone near
the project and I haven’t either. That’s the issue, is that there were so
many problems. The people know about them and they don’t want to get
involved in another mess.
This tendency to avoid the problems could also be seen in return migrants’ participation – or lack thereof – in the CMCP in Cañar.

As a result of the fragmented migrant community and because of the difficulties in communicating with them, the participating institutions and organizations took on more power and the role of the migrants decreased. In Murcia, the Monitoring Committee went from having migrant representatives and meeting once a week went to having no migrant representation and infrequent meetings. As a result of this diminished migrant participation, efforts to gather the migrants or keep them informed of the project’s activities also faded. While at the beginning there was an emphasis on maintaining communication between the regions, at the time of my research the efforts had been reduced significantly. The project webpage was designed to connect the two regions, but the Murcia section has not been updated since 2008. Projects and programming directed at the migrant population have also consequentially decreased in number.

The focus of the projects has definitively shifted to Cañar, and due to lack of communication most migrants – including those involved in participating associations – were not completely sure of what was going on there with regards to the CMCP. From the little they did hear, they felt that the project was becoming too focused on the pueblo of Cañar and not enough on the rural areas or with migrant families. The association leaders expressed concern that their opinions were no longer being listened to or valued and that the promises that were made about their involvement and the projects they suggested were not being kept. One leader even stated that the project should have at least a few migrants working directly in Cañar in order to ensure that their objectives were being achieved. However, taking into account the power struggles that had already
occurred at this point in the project, it seems very likely that trying to choose who those migrants would be could lead to more conflicts.

While it is impossible to say whether the migrants would actually have continued to have an active role in the CMCP had there not been so many internal conflicts, it is clear that since the initial stages of the project they have not been as involved as everyone (with the possible exception of the community members against the power they were given in the first place) had hoped they would be. The number of those that were participating in the CMCP as well as the number of activities created for them has decreased significantly. While the association leaders seemed very disappointed, they still remained optimistic that with the new CMCP leadership (which I discuss next) the migrants could once again have a more important role in the project’s development.

Along with affecting the migrants’ participation in the project, the problems between migrants also led to the diminished participation of a very central figure: the CMCP’s project director. As I understood it, the original project director from the SAIC unintentionally and unknowingly got caught in the middle of political issues and between groups with conflicting interests, simply by collaborating or communicating with a certain community leader. He then became associated with something negative and had to remove himself from the project in order to calm the tensions and ensure that its progress was not put in jeopardy. The change in leadership caused a major setback, as the transition to the new director took time. She had to get to know the communities all over, and regain their trust. The project got behind schedule and the projected duration was extended to account for the lost time. Many people began to lose hope and interest in the
project, while community members directly involved in it waited anxiously to see if the pending projects would ever be carried out.

These problems that the CMCP experienced early on had significant repercussions and consequences for its reputation, community acceptance and effectiveness in Cañar. As we’ve seen, the majority of migrants who did end up participating and were therefore represented in the project were indigenous. This contributed to the perception that the project was only working with and for that population. The mestizo community members began to resent what they classified as preferential treatment and as such expressed dissatisfaction with the CMCP:

The thing is, the CMCP only focuses on the indigenous area. My sister lives [in Murcia] and she told me that they only work with indigenous peoples, that [the mestizos] can’t work with them, just the indigenous peoples. And when the indigenous migrant leaders came to Cañar to visit with the people from CMCP, it was the same thing, all with TUCAYTA. It’s only indigenous peoples. For that reason I said to Susana Alvarado, ‘And where are our mestizos? Why are the projects only for them, if here there are so many people that at the very least need a psychologist because they’ve been abandoned?’ She told me, ‘We invited them and no one from the pueblo came.’ And I said, ‘But how? On the radio they talk about it, but it’s all projects about [the indigenous], so why would we go?’ When an indigenous person dies in Spain, everybody, all the media make a big deal. When people from the pueblo die in Spain, it doesn’t matter. I mean, the project is good, but it doesn’t focus on everything.

- Female resident of Cañar pueblo

These sentiments were echoed often in the interviews that I carried out both in the town of Cañar as well as with mestizo migrants in Murcia. Because of the apparent focus on the indigenous, rural populations, they felt the project did not necessarily represent the

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9 TUCAYTA is an indigenous association in Cañar
needs of the whole Cañari population. As a result, many community members were not interested in participating or supporting the CMCP.

Aside from the issue of which migrants had power, another significant complaint of Cañar residents was actually a criticism of the project’s defining feature: many were unhappy with the very fact that it gave the migrants so much power. As I discussed in Chapter 2, studies of sending communities in the Cañar region found that migrants were often seen as egotistical, in that they abandoned their families in order to gain more money and adopt a new lifestyle. Many of the community’s social problems were attributed to the negative impacts of migration. I found similar attitudes in Cañar towards migrants and the impacts of migration, and as such, many community members questioned why those that have abandoned the community and caused the majority of its problems were the same ones who were given the power to decide what to do with it. Attitudes such as these could have serious implications for other co-development projects rooted in migrant participation for communities where a negative view of migration exists, or where there is tension between migrants and non-migrants.

**Funding**

In addition to the administrative and social problems that the CMCP has faced, another major obstacle to its progress has been the loss of financial support. In 2008, the project was not granted the proposal that it needed in order to fully fund all the existing and pending projects that it had planned. In Ventura, a community working with the Tourism Development department, the cutback in funding has threatened to leave some communities’ projects half-done, while other communities will have to take on
unexpected costs in order to complete theirs. The indirect effects of the funding issues have affected not only the CMCP’s progress but also community morale. A comment I often heard was, “It was supposed to be for three years, but the money has already run out. The project is just starting, and it is already dying.” As the number of problems the CMCP faces continue to grow, migrants and community members continue to lose hope and faith in the project.

**Misinformation and Lack of Awareness**

Misinformation and a lack of awareness of the CMCP’s objectives have also contributed to the negative perception community members in both Cañar and Murcia had of it. In Murcia, the communication difficulties resulting from the population’s geographic and social fragmentation have impeded the flow of accurate information about the CMCP’s objectives and administration. As I mentioned earlier, all of the migrants that I spoke to in Murcia had heard of the project, but very few of them knew specific details about it. Much of the information the community had received was through word-of-mouth, and was untrue. As such, they judged the project only on what they had seen and heard informally; and unfortunately, the majority of that was negative.

One thing they had heard was that the project’s objectives were to stop immigration from Cañar to Murcia and to get current immigrants to go home. As a result, they felt that the project was there to serve Spain’s interests and not theirs. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, the general sentiment held by almost everyone I talked to – including migrants and non-migrants – is that most of the migrants in Spain have grown accustomed to the lifestyle and do not plan on returning. For that reason, a migrant who
understood the project to have this objective would not be at all interested in participating, and might possibly be made to feel unwanted because of it. It is understandable then why some resented the project and resisted participating in it.

Another piece of inaccurate information that some migrants received was that they were paying for the project through taxes being added to their phone, electricity and other bills. They felt that this was unfair and that it reflected the continued corruption of Ecuadorian and Spanish governments. Again, the misinformation prevented their participation in and support of the project.

While the conflict among migrants and associations inhibited the flow of official and accurate CMCP information to the migrants and community members, it actually increased the flow of damaging information about the CMCP: news about the conflicts themselves. The problems and controversies associated with the project were the only thing many people knew about it. As we’ve seen, many people distanced themselves from the project after hearing about these issues.

In Cañar, only about half of the people I spoke with had heard of the project. Of those that had, very few knew what its objectives were or what it was actually doing. As in Murcia, most people believed that the project’s goal was to stop migration to Spain and to get immigrants in Spain to return to Ecuador; and as in Murcia, the majority of information that they saw and heard about the project had to do with the conflicts among migrants and the problems with the administration.

*High Expectations, Big Disappointments*
Another reason the CMCP’s reputation in Murcia and Cañar was so low is that many people felt the expectations created at the beginning of the project, had not been met. Perhaps the group with the highest expectations was the migrants, who had been promised administrative and decision-making power. However, as I previously discussed, their role in the project has decreased significantly, and the projects they hoped to see have not been carried out to their satisfaction. Institutions and organizations who were involved in the project’s planning process also had high hopes for the project because of the ambitious initiatives and promises made. They too were also becoming disillusioned with the slow start-up time, the controversies surrounding migrant participation, and the administrative and financial setbacks.

For the extended Cañar community, who was less involved in the planning process, the expectations of the CMCP were not very well defined. At the beginning, the CMCP made a big effort to communicate with and inform the community about its goals and activities. According to the Communications department director, they would either write press releases, hold press conferences, distribute flyers, put up posters and engage in other activities on a daily basis in order to diffuse information. However, after the problems among participants and the administrative change, these efforts were reduced significantly. Now, the administration works more behind-the-scenes. As a result, the community members who had grown accustomed to hearing about the project on a regular basis now think that the project did not carry out what it said it was going to and that it is no longer doing anything. The attempts to involve and/or inform community members about the bold initiatives of the project created high expectations that led to disappointment when they experienced setbacks or reduced publicity.
For the community members who had not received any official information about the project, expectations were not based on its actual goals or activities. These people were not aware of the kind of programming and infrastructure developments the project was working on, and therefore did not realize that they needed time to be planned, implemented, and developed. Because community members didn’t know what they were looking for, they did not see anything being done. Many were expecting to see immediate results in economic activity, and within a year of the project’s implementation most of the people I spoke with thought that it had not achieved anything. Adding to the dilemma was the fact that the immediate results they did see were the aforementioned problems and conflicts.

Trying to manage expectations and disappointment among migrants and community members has created a catch-22 situation for an ambitious initiative like the CMCP. If it involved and informed community members in the planning process, it created great expectations among them. If they did not or were not able to keep the community informed, it led to misinformation and misguided expectations that they could not meet. In all cases, at the time of my fieldwork the Cañaris I spoke with were overwhelmingly frustrated or disappointed in the project, and very few remained optimistic about its future.

**Conclusion**

The Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project was created as a program with the specific goal of supporting development in Ecuador, and of using migrants as a resource in that development. This is somewhat surprising given that my understanding of it, as
well as that of everyone I talked to in both Cañar and Murcia, was that it was designed to reduce Ecuadorian migration to Spain and to encourage return migration of those who were already there. However, upon inspection of official SAIC documents, it is clear that the project was initiated within the context of Spanish foreign aid for development and not immigration policy.

The CMCP as a co-development project is unique in its proposed emphasis on bi-national, multi-level participation that prioritizes the role of migrants in its design and implementation. Through my fieldwork, I was able to analyze the extent to which the CMCP was carrying out this objective within in its first year, paying special attention to the migrant’s role as a principal political actor, and analyze the social and political impacts it had had in the sending and receiving communities.

I found that in reality, the CMCP did in fact attempt to involve the large number of actors in the project’s design and implementation: planning and consultation was carried out in both Cañar and Murcia, migrants did play a key role in defining the project’s objectives, participants did visit both regions, important infrastructural changes were made, the different departments were created and related activities were carried out. However, the project faced a series of challenges that hindered its ability to continue with that particular administrative structure, and the project has since changed course.

In its attempt to include and empower migrants, the CMCP also unintentionally added to and fostered an environment of conflict and distrust. At the project’s inception, they encountered a geographically and socially fragmented migrant community that was reflective of the situation in Cañar. The population was described by project administrators and community members as a complicated, individualistic society lacking
social coherence or a shared cultural heritage, that also had a tendency to distrust governments and politicians due to problems they had in the past. This combination of factors frustrated administrators’ efforts to unify the Cañari migrant collective, and along with the power struggle among migrant association leaders, contributed to a series of conflicts that has had very significant negative impacts on the project’s progress, and in particular the migrants’ participation in the project. As a result, the migrants have had less active of a role in the project’s administration and planning, programming and development initiatives have been centered in Cañar, and the reputation of the project within both the Murcian and Cañari communities has been tarnished.
Chapter 4 – The Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project and Migration Policy Objectives

In Chapter 2, I introduced the communities of Cañar and Murcia, their migration histories, and the impacts that migration has had in the two societies. In Chapter 3, I analyzed the results and effects of the Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project on these same communities. In this chapter, I look at how all of these factors have - or have not - affected the outcomes related to Spain and Ecuador’s migration policy objectives that I discussed in Chapter 1. I will start by presenting the different objectives and then I will analyze my findings with respect to each one in Cañar and Murcia, paying particular attention to the ways in which the CMCP has possibly had an impact.

It is important to note that while my analysis of the CMCP is framed within the context of migration and integration policy, I have shown that its creation was not directly related to immigration policy; rather, migration was seen as a tool with which to attain already-established Ecuadorian development objectives. As such, the CMCP is not to be seen as a co-development project intended to serve as a replacement for immigration policy, as they have been shown to not have dramatic effects on migration patterns (Weil 1997; de Hass 2007). With its emphasis on migrant participation and integration, however, I do consider the CMCP to be a part of the comprehensive immigration policy reform that Spain has undergone in the past decade. In addition, many of the CMCP’s objectives overlap with those outlined in migration and integration

10 However, as I mentioned in Chapter 3, almost everyone that I spoke with was under the impression that the project was created and designed to reduce emigration to Spain and to promote return migration. They believed that it was only because of the obstacles faced in the project’s implementation that the focus was shifted to social and economic development.
policies, and as such it is worthwhile to analyze the impacts of the CMCP with respect to them.

As a receiving country, Spain’s immigration policy objectives include integration; facilitating the legal, circular and temporary migration of potential migrants; stimulating the return migration of current immigrants to their countries of origin by providing economic incentives; promoting family reunification in countries of origin; and addressing the root causes of economic emigration through co-development projects between the sending and receiving communities. Ecuador, like other governments of migrant-sending countries, hopes to maximize development by increasing the economic and social capital remitted by their emigrants; promote sustainable investments with those remittances; prevent “brain drain” by attracting emigrants back to their country; and encouraging family reunification in countries of origin in order to alleviate the negative effects of family separation on Ecuadorian youth.

*Integration: “Juntos pero no revueltos”*\(^{(1)}\)

One of the main objectives of the CMCP is to facilitate the integration of the Cañari migrants in Murcia. The definition of the term “integration” is one that is somewhat open and debated, and as I discussed in Chapter 1, is an objective that many European countries are constantly redefining and working to attain. Because the objectives of the CMCP were designed by and for the migrants, I asked them their

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\(^{(1)}\) This phrase literally means, “Together but not scrambled.” It is one I heard often from Spaniards and Ecuadorian migrants in Murcia.
definition of integration and will use that as my framework for analyzing the level of its attainment.

According to the association leaders involved in the CMCP, integration consisted in peaceful co-existence, mutual respect, equal access to resources and freedom of cultural expression; it did not necessarily mean interacting with Spaniards or incorporating themselves into the Spanish culture; in other words, to be together, but not necessarily mixed. The migrants I spoke with felt that these objectives had been attained. For the most part, they feel that they have been treated well by Spaniards, including employers. Their requests to use public spaces for meetings, festivals and sporting events have all been granted, and the local authorities have been very helpful and supportive. The Murcian municipality also organizes multiple festivals throughout the year for the different collectives to express their cultural identity and heritage.

However, the association leaders said that this progress is not directly related to the CMCP. As we saw in Chapter 3, the involvement of and number of projects aimed at the Cañari migrant population in Murcia have decreased significantly since the CMCP began. They instead attributed the integration attainment to their own initiatives, to the EU-supported “Plan for the Social Integration of the Immigrants of the Region of Murcia 2002-2004” outlined in Chapter 2, and to their regularized legal statuses.

Another factor that contributed to the attainment of peaceful co-existence is the Spaniard’s historical memory. The older generations of Spaniards remember the years when Spain was a country of emigration, and have empathy for the plight of migrants as they or their families were migrants once too. There was, however, a notable hierarchy of preference towards the different immigrant collectives in Murcia, and the Ecuadorians
had the advantage of being one of the top groups. Of the Spaniards I interviewed and conversed with, almost all openly expressed preference for the Ecuadorians over other immigrant groups, especially North Africans. My Spanish flatmate demonstrated this attitude very clearly while dropping me off at a weekly soccer game of a league organized by the Ecuadorian migrants. He stated, “See? Now this is how we like them.” He went on to explain his view that the Ecuadorians knew how to gather positively and productively, as their soccer league illustrated. On the other hand, he said, the Moroccans only gather to cause trouble and rob people. For whatever the reason, the Ecuadorian migrants in Murcia seem to share this dislike for Moroccans. As we saw in Chapter 2, Fernández-Rufete Gómez and Rico Becerra’s study on Ecuadorian migrants in Murcia showed that of all the other immigrant groups, they were least likely to make contact with Moroccans.

This hierarchy and preference for Ecuadorians seemingly added to the tension between the immigrant collectives. Of the few Moroccans that I spoke with, all of them felt that Ecuadorians now have more rights than Spaniards do. This sentiment was also shared by many of the Spaniards with whom I conversed on a regular basis as well as a few gitanos that I encountered. Through my interviews I also discovered that many people held the belief that employers also preferred Latin American migrants to North Africans because of language and religious similarities. This job displacement also added to the tension between groups.

Because the CMCP focused on Ecuadorian migrants and encouraged them to maintain ties to their homeland, I had wondered if this might actually negatively affect their relations with the Spanish community and other immigrant groups. I thought maybe
the Spanish population might see it as an unwillingness to “assimilate” to Spanish culture, while other collectives might be jealous about the attention and resources provided to the Ecuadorians. However, I found that in Murcia, no one but Cañari migrants knew about the CMCP, so any tension or conflict was pre-existing and not directly related to the CMCP.

**Return Migration**

“When I left I said to myself, ‘5 years, no longer.’ My dream was to get here, invest in things there and then go back. But no, we get used to it here. You pick up the customs and the culture, and now I want to stay here. I don’t plan on going back. Another friend planned on staying only one year, but now he’s been here nine. Same thing with him, he got used to it and now he doesn’t want to go back. I’ve talked with a lot of the people here, and we’re almost all the same way.”

- *Cañari migrant in Murcia*

“Sure, there have been people that have come back, after many years. They come, buy a car, and see that it is not like what they are used to. So they leave their car and home abandoned, and leave again. So many people have returned and then left. Most stay there, but those that return come and then leave again.”

- *Taxi driver in Cañar*

“I’ve heard of the voluntary return migration programs, but I don’t think they’re working. There’s too much bureaucratic mess that we have to go through, so it’s more costly to us than it is beneficial. Same thing if we accept the loan offer. If I go and sign up for a loan, and then go back to Cañar and can’t find a job, how am I supposed to pay it off?”

- *Cañari migrant in Murcia*

Another goal of migration policy and the CMCP is to encourage and facilitate return migration through financial and entrepreneur support. As is the case with many migrants, most of the Cañaris in Murcia migrated with the intent of returning after a few years. This was evident in the number of large, new homes that could be seen throughout
the province. However, according to my interviews, few actually have returned, and those that did many times ended up returning to Murcia after several few months. In this section I will explore the reasons given by Cañari migrants as to what would motivate them to return as well as reasons why they would not.

Among the factors that motivate the Cañari migrants to return to Cañar are family reunification and to live in the houses they have constructed there. Surprisingly these two categories were not mentioned nearly as much as the economic crisis. Spain currently holds the highest unemployment rate in the EU, and as of April 30, 2010, the unemployment rate for Spaniards was 18.01%, and that for foreign nationals was 30.79% (INE 2010). At the time of my fieldwork, many migrants cited the reduced number of contracts being offered by employers as the main reason they were considering returning to Cañar. In addition, aftereffects of economic crises sometimes include xenophobia and more restrictive immigration policy, for which we could see a shift in the treatment, employment availability and legal migration options for migrants.

For some migrants, the economic crisis in Spain has forced them to think about leaving. However, instead of considering going back to Cañar, many plan to try to use their Spanish residency or nationality to go the United States. Although they recognize that the economy there is also experiencing a recession, they still prefer to try to find a job there than in Cañar. Many also have family there, who they believe can help them with the cultural and employment transition. Most had not yet thought out the logistics of how they were going to obtain U.S. visas or work permits, but they were determined to figure out a way to get there.
While many of the Cañari migrants I spoke with would consider returning to Cañar, they did not see it as a real option; some because they wanted to but could not, and others because they had no real desire to at that time. For those that did want to return, various factors contributed to their not being able to. For some, the debt they had accumulated in Ecuador in order to finance their migration was keeping them in Murcia, either because they needed to continue working to save money to pay it off or because staying in Murcia meant they could avoid dealing with it.

For others who wanted to return, the financial and business incentives included in Spain and Ecuador’s plans to encourage and aid return migration were not appealing. At the time of my fieldwork, Spain had a voluntary return program that provided immigrants with a ticket home and a small travel stipend. However, it came with the stipulation that you had to forfeit your Spanish papers, which the migrants I spoke with were not willing to give up. Some had heard of others who were interested, but when they went to the respective government offices to ask about it, the administrators were unorganized and no one knew exactly what they needed to do or how much they needed to pay to file the paperwork. As such, the program was seen as a bureaucratic mess whose costs outweighed its benefits.

Since then, the unemployment situation in Spain has gotten even worse, and at the end of 2008 they enacted a new program that offered immigrants a lump sum of €10,000 in order to return home. However, it has a similar stipulation that requires the immigrants to give up their Spanish documents and prohibits them from returning for 3 years. As of June 2009, six months into the program, a total of 1,789 Ecuadorian immigrants had participated in it (McKabe, Lin and Tanaka 2009). That figure represents 0.4% of the
total Ecuadorian immigrant population. I am not aware if any Cañari immigrants have participated in the program, though the added financial support might be enough for those who did not return because of their debt.

Ecuador’s voluntary return program, which used to be called Plan Retorno, has since changed its name to the more friendly Bienvenid@s a casa, meaning “Welcome Home.” It provides business subsidies, custom breaks and low-interest loans to help return migrants start businesses. It also allows for migrants to keep their Spanish papers. The CMCP complements this program by offering management training and counsel to help them set up the business. Like Spain’s program, it too did not appeal to the migrants I spoke with. Some were simply not interested in starting a business, while others claimed the market was already saturated with the types of products they would be producing. A few were also wary of taking out loans to start a business, either because they already had outstanding loans that they were trying to pay off, or because they had seen what had happened to fellow Cañaris who took out loans to finance their migration journey and ended up losing their homes or land.

The majority of the migrants I conversed with did not have any plans or desire to return to Cañar. Some already had their whole families with them in Spain, while others had formed new families there. The most common reason cited by both migrants and members of the Cañar community was that the migrants had become accustomed to a new lifestyle, one that was not believed to be possible to achieve in Cañar. When asked if development might change their perspective, many responded that they had been in Spain for long enough that the economic situation of Cañar no longer mattered; they were too used to the lifestyle in Spain and considered it home.
This “homeland dissimilation”\textsuperscript{12} is also the main reason why most migrants who do return to Cañar end up staying less than a year before deciding to emigrate again. Even though they had completed building new homes and bought new vehicles, they did not conform to the style of life in Cañar, such as the work, salaries, customs and culture. Another reason some return migrants no longer felt at home in Cañar was because part of this culture included the tension between migrants and non-migrants. One young migrant, who returned from Murcia to take care of his mother, decided not to stay because he felt people were treating him differently because they were jealous of him. Still other return migrants became frustrated with the corrupt political, economic and social structures.

As part of its objectives, the CMCP aims to provide counseling to return migrants to help with their social, psychological and economic re-integration into the Cañar culture. I heard of very few cases in which return migrants had utilized these services. Those who did used them principally for family counseling after having been separated from their families for so long or for technical assistance in opening a business.

In the majority of cases, however, the return migrants were not involved in the CMCP. As we saw in Chapter 3, many were aware of the problems that surrounded its implementation and wanted to stay out of them. For the same reasons, others knew very little about what the CMCP actually did, or what services it offered. Those that did know about the services were not interested in them. For others, it was not a matter of distancing themselves from the CMCP but rather distancing themselves from the

\textsuperscript{12} Jiménez and Fitzgerald (2007) describe the process in which emigrants become different from their counterparts in their ethnic homeland.
migration experience altogether. They wanted to be with family and friends rather than spend their time thinking about issues faced by migrants and their families.

**Social Networks in Reverse?**

When we read about social networks and migration, the literature overwhelming speaks to the strategic benefits and opportunities that these networks provide as migrants plan their journeys and settle into their new communities. In my research with the CMCP, I was expecting to see this, and did. However, with the strong emphasis placed on return migration by both the Ecuadorian and Spanish governments and the CMCP, I also expected to see social networks formed and used by return migrants trying to pass along support and information about the CMCP and job opportunities as they re-integrated themselves into the Cañar community. The CMCP infrastructure would also have seemingly provided a space for migrants to gather as they searched for and used resources available to them. Within the group of migrants that I spoke to, however, I found that they neither communicated much with other return migrants nor did they have much awareness of or interest in the CMCP’s resources, for many of the reasons I have already discussed.

**Remittances**

Remittances play one of the most important roles in development for migrant-sending countries. As we saw in Chapter 2, remittances make up 70% of Cañar’s economy, and the province of Cañar has the 4th highest percentage of remittances in the nation. Sending countries that hope to maximize development opportunities involving
remittances aim to encourage and provide the infrastructure for migrants and their family members to invest remittances in savings, business development and micromanagement.

Due to currency changes and the recent economic recessions, Cañari migrants have been able to save less money and therefore the amount and frequency with which they have been sending remittances has decreased. Before the Ecuadorian government dollarized its economy, migrants who sent home U.S. dollars and Spanish pesetas had a much more generous exchange rate than they do now, post-dollarization. When Spain changed its currency from the peseta to the Euro, the exchange rate was still very favorable to the migrants. However, the cost of living in Spain went up and as a result the migrants were unable to save or remit as much as they had in the past. Now, with the economic crisis, many of them are making and remitting even less, and they believe that what they do remit is used mostly for their families’ basic costs, such as food and education. They do not feel that the current situations are favorable to invest in a business, nor do they have the extra funds to do so at the time.

Based on my interview findings, remittances sent to Cañar are sent primarily through banks and wiring services and go directly to family members. They are used to pay off debts accrued from financing the migration trip, fund basic needs such as food and education, build houses, and buy cars. According to many community members, the children of migrants are those who are managing the remittances. Most people believe that the children, for lack of supervision and guidance, spend the money irresponsibly on things like games, alcohol, parties, drugs, or whatever else they want, instead of saving it or making sustainable investments for their families or futures.
Indigenous migrants and their family members were also criticized – both by indigenous and non-indigenous community members – for their perceived lack of money management abilities. The mestizos pointed to their inadequate education and experience in handling finances, citing the way they sent large amounts of cash through the mail at the time of the mass migration to Spain. The indigenous peoples in Cañar criticized the migrants for building large houses on fertile land instead of investing in it. One of the administrators of the bilingual education system has tried to orient the parents and students about sustainable investments; if they are not going to work the land, he encourages them to build houses in Cuenca, a nearby city, so that their children can benefit from a sound education and get ahead that way.

Also impeding investments in long-term and community-building projects is the social make-up of Cañar. As we have seen, there is not really a sense of unity among the Cañari population, and it is a self-described individualistic community. This most likely contributes to the growing materialism that both studies and community members identified as a problem. Competition and relative wealth have become issues that not only affect migration decisions but also consumption practices and remittance investments.

**Family Reunification**

“It is very painful because they say ‘migration’ and all they think of is getting on a boat. They don’t think of the destroyed families. Good-bye families, good-bye children. They make their homes there; that’s why you see so many women in the fields who lost their husbands. And back here it’s the same, everything is lost. The women make new lives, they all get new partners. Good-bye families. They’re destroyed. More than anything, migration destroys the family and the society.”

-35-year-old woman, Cañar
“Most of us don’t want to move with our parents. My little cousins at first cried for their uncle too, but they were left when they were three years old and now it’s been eight years, so not anymore. Each one moves on with their life.”

- 17-year-old daughter of a Cañari migrant in Spain

“Almost all of the immigrants have children that live with their grandparents. Most of the time the children suffer. For example, in my case, I am married and my daughter was left at 8 months with her grandma, so she grew up without the love of her mom and dad. Many children live alone, and have lots of difficulties because they’re not with their parents, or they’re with their grandparents and they can’t give them enough attention. I come back to visit and they say, ‘Hi Dad, how are you?’, but it’s not the same. It’s a serious problem. They call their grandparents ‘Mom’ and ‘Dad’ too, and we have to explain to them that no, that’s not right, that they’re not their parents, that we are their mom and dad, and that causes problems. I’ve tried to get them to come to Spain. I’ve said, ‘Come, you’ll like it there,’ but they don’t want to. They say ‘No, I don’t want to go, I live with my grandparents.’ The grandparents are practically their parents, more than those of us who are abroad.”

- 35-year-old male Cañari migrant living in Murcia

Family reunification in countries of origin is another policy objective of both Spain and Ecuador. Spain hopes to avoid the increase in residency applications for family members that can sometimes occur after regularizations, to in some way avoid taking on the financial responsibility for providing services to children of migrants, and to discourage settlement. In Ecuador, family reunification alleviates brain drain, family separation, and the negative impacts that it has had on Ecuadorian communities, in particular its youth.

I expected to find that the CMCP had created an environment that increased communication between migrants and their families, provided more opportunities for them to stay involved in each others’ lives, and strengthened family unity. I also expected the legal status of the Cañari migrants in Murcia to allow for more frequent visits to
family they had left behind, which would also serve to lessen the effects of family separation. As a result, I predicted that Cañari migrants in Murcia would be more likely to initiate family reunification in Cañar, and that Cañari migrants in Spain would be more likely to consider family reunification at all over Cañari migrants in the United States.

As it has become quite clear, the CMCP has not really increased communication or ties between migrants and their home communities or families. The legal status of Cañari migrants in Spain did seem to provide more opportunities for them to come home and visit their families, but they still expressed feelings of disconnect and detachment with those they had left behind. Overall, I did not see a big difference between attitudes of family members of migrants who lived in the United States and those who lived in Spain.

The general consensus among all community members was that it was not common for U.S. migrants to initiate a process of family reunification. This was due in part to the large number of migrants who did not have legal status in the United States and therefore could not apply for their families to join them. The more frequent responses, however, pointed to social factors rather than legal ones. For marriages that were separated geographically because of migration, it was apparently not unusual for one or both of the partners to form a new family in their communities of residence. Stories of abandonment that ended in separations and divorces were plenty. There were not as many families left to unify.

From the evidence of my fieldwork, it seems that it was much more common for Cañari migrants in Spain to have brought their spouses and children with them at the time of initial migration than migrants to the United States. The possibility of family
reunification was also greater, as the regularized status of the majority of the migrants allowed them to request family reunification after one year of residing in Spain legally. Of the migrants and family members I spoke with, however, there did not seem to be many who planned to initiate a family reunification process neither in the country of origin nor the country of residence.

One of the principal reasons given for this choice was because the family had grown apart due to the amount of time they had lived in different countries. Many of the people I talked with had either left their children when they were very young, or were children who had been left at a very young age, sometimes when they were only months old. By the time the migrants had residency and qualified for family reunification privileges, they had been gone for so long that neither the parents nor the children really knew each other. Although some migrants return home to visit several months every few years, many did not feel a strong bond with their children or vice-versa. In some cases, they came home to hear their children calling their caregivers “mom” or “dad.” Their attempts to try to explain to them that they were actually the mom or dad did not always go over well. In some cases, this was even a point of contention with the caregivers, who felt that they deserved the title more than the biological mothers or fathers who had left their children behind.

The students I spoke with expressed similar sentiments. Many grew up without their parents and therefore did not feel any attachment to them. They were closer with their caregivers in Cañar, and did not express any desire to move to a new country to be with their biological parents. In addition, many of those that had younger siblings had taken on the responsibility of caring for them. If they did go to Spain, they said it would
only be to visit. They had learned to live independently and did not feel the need for the connection, support or guidance of their biological parents. If the family did not migrate together at the beginning, it was more common for the children to want to stay in Cañar, live in the houses they had built and manage the remittance money.

In response to these and other issues, the CMCP Psycho-Social Support department has contracted a psychologist to provide services to migrants and their families. She worked mostly with children of migrants and served as the only source of support for them. She saw the biggest issues for families to be abuse and abandonment. Her goals were to try to help children and their parents keep in touch, to encourage migrant parents to stay involved in their children’s education, and to provide counseling to return migrants to help them re-integrate themselves into their families. According to her, these were not easy tasks to accomplish. As I found in my interviews, she observed that many times children don’t know where their parents are, and are not interested in keeping in touch with them. When parents return, in many cases the children do not listen to them because they do not consider them to be an important figure in their lives, even after intervention from her department.

**Migration Decisions**

“I want to go because I want to have the things I want. Fulfill my dream. Have my own big house. People whose families send money live better, have more things.”

- 17-year-old male high school student in Cañar

“I had the option of going, and I thought, ‘I don’t have anywhere to work, how nice it would be to build a house, educate my children, live by myself.’ But then I got home and saw my mother, who was already getting old, and I said to myself, ‘And what about my children? I have to raise
them well.’ Money isn’t everything, so I’ve been here for the past 14 years. And now I have one child who is an engineer, one who has a degree in tourism, and another in the university. For me you can’t put a price on that. That’s what I told my sister, ‘You two there and your kids here, the poor things, lost, without the love and support of their parents.’ They left, and what happened? Everything came undone. Her kids dropped out of school, the toddler was traumatized. They sent money to try to fill the void. I told her, ‘What right do you have to change the lives of your children? You are going to have to pay for what you are doing to them.’ I am never going to forgive her for that.”

-45 year-old Cañari woman

“I live here now. Poor, but with my children.”

- 30-year-old female return migrant from Murcia

Another goal of Spanish immigration policy was to address the root causes of economic migration by promoting development in migrants’ countries of origin. One of the desired outcomes of this strategy would be to reduce the number of potential emigrants. In order to find out if development was indeed seen as an alternative to migration for the community members of Cañar, I asked everyone I spoke with in Cañar what they knew about migration, if they were intending to migrate, and why or why not.

It is important to mention first and foremost that Cañari emigration to Spain has decreased dramatically since Spain issued the visa requirement to Ecuadorian citizens. With the exception of return migrants, no one that I spoke with was considering emigrating to Spain. The phrase I heard most often in relation to migrating to Spain was that it was “too difficult.” I found this to be somewhat surprising given that those who did declare intent to migrate were planning on going to the United States by crossing the border without documents, in the manner that I described in Chapter 2. Everyone who I spoke with described the trip to the United States as being expensive, long and dangerous, and almost all knew of someone who had died in their attempt to reach it. Yet,
Spain’s visa requirement was perceived to make entry more difficult than entry into the United States. I believe that this demonstrates the influence of the U.S. culture, or el sueño americano (the American dream), as well as the history and accessibility of networks and resources connecting migrants to the United States.

Apart from acknowledging that the journey to the United States was expensive and dangerous, everyone also acknowledged that the life of a migrant without documents in the United States was difficult, especially if you did not have a job. Even still, I did find people who hoped to migrate there sometime in the near future. I will first present the reasons for migrating given by them as well as actual migrants before presenting reasons people gave for not wanting to migrate.

For current migrants, the main factor contributing to their decision to leave Cañar was economic: they wanted to provide more for their families. Others migrated because of the perceived lack of educational opportunities, especially for people who want to study at colleges or universities. For those who had completed higher education, they did not feel that the Cañar economy provided enough opportunities to find work that utilized their education. Fear of losing husbands or wives was another reason some people migrated. As I explained in the family reunification section, the prevalence of separations and divorces that occur as a result of migration has caused many people to believe that if you want to stay married, either both partners must migrate together or not at all.

For potential migrants, family and cultural factors were cited as motives for emigrating. However, in a finding I will discuss more in-depth later, those who wanted to migrate to be with family did not have immediate family members abroad; rather, they were youth who planned on going to live with aunts, uncles or cousins. Many of these
same people also cited economic reasons for their decision, although they did not necessarily declare a dire economic need to migrate. As one 17-year-old male student said, they wanted to own things they saw others having, such as big houses and cars. As the studies I presented in Chapter 2 found, the migration history and impacts in Cañar have created a culture of migration in which materialism, competition and a “rite of passage” has created a chain of migration that depends less on economic opportunity in Cañar and more on the disparity in wealth and social status of migrants and their families in comparison to non-migrants.

This shift in migration from economic necessity to a product of relative deprivation also has implications for development’s effect on migration. Much like the migrants who had become so accustomed to the Spanish or U.S. lifestyle that they did not see themselves returning to Cañar even if there was substantial economic development, it is likely that there will still be a faction of Cañaris who have been exposed to that lifestyle who will want to migrate to achieve that social status even if economic opportunities were to increase or stabilize in Cañar.

What I found most interesting is that this same culture of migration and its negative social and psychological effects were often cited, very emotionally, as a reason why people did not want to migrate. After experiencing or seeing the negative effects of migration on families and communities, many people stated strongly that they rejected this culture and would always be committed to their families rather than money. Children of migrants were the most outspoken on this topic, affirming that providing for family does not necessarily mean making more money.
Not only did this rejection of the culture of migration lead many to refuse migration, but it also made them more prone to judge those who had not. Migrants have come to be seen as materialistic and greedy, always prioritizing money over family and community. School officials and others who are trying to deter youth from migrating have also portrayed migrants in this way through plays and stories about the migrant reality. One of the female migrants I spoke with in Cañar heard about the plays and was not happy about them:

I have many problems with my children that are there. We don’t get to talk much, and they live with their grandparents, who now think that my children are theirs and so they don’t give me the chance to talk to them as much as I want to, to tell them how I love them (chokes up). Sometimes people think that we’ve left because we don’t love our families, our children, but they are the reason why we left, to provide more for them. But sometimes in the schools they put on plays that hurt the feelings of our children, and the plays and teachers themselves say that we’ve put more importance on money and that’s why we’ve left them. The CMCP should stop that. Now our children think that’s really why we’ve left, because we value money more than them.

The plays and the messages they send have caused more problems between some migrants and their families, as some children have come to dislike their parents for seemingly choosing money over them, thus reinforcing their commitment to family over migration.

Some children of migrants are not interested in migrating because of the remittances they receive. They already have the money and home they want and therefore do not see the need to leave Cañar. For others who would consider migrating, the lack of
legal means to do so is the main deterrent. Still others fear losing their houses as a result of debt accumulation, as they have seen happen to some migrants.

Many community members I spoke with didn’t see the need to migrate at all. They believe that economic opportunities exist if one just looks for them. Some have hope that the “new” government and constitutional changes under Correa will lead to a more fair and equal society. Part of those expectations includes improved educational opportunities and a less corrupt system of employment that would allow them to compete for jobs fairly based on their education rather than on their connections.

Again, the CMCP seemed to have very little direct impact on intent to migrate or not migrate. People did express an interest in taking advantage of the contracts in origin, as it once offered, but due to the economic crisis, they are not currently being offered.

**Circular and Legal Migration**

One way in which Spain hopes to minimize its irregular immigrant population and manage its regular immigrant population is by widening the legal channels through which migrants can come live and work in Spain. As part of its comprehensive immigration reform, it started offering contracts for seasonal work in countries of origin. Ideally, this would lead to temporary, circular, and legal migration wherein the family can stay in the country of origin rather than move with the migrant to the country where he or she works. While history shows that temporary migration programs rarely lead to temporary migration, as with their regularization strategies Spain again hopes that through comprehensive immigration reform other aspects of the policies will discourage permanent settlement and family reunification in Spain.
Through the CMCP, the Spanish government had the intention of offering contracts to legally migrate and work in Spain. At the beginning they were able to do so, but due to the economic crisis and high unemployment rates in Spain, the services have been suspended. Even this aspect of the CMCP was not free from criticism, however, as some community members felt that the process was corrupt. They claimed that you could only get the contracts if you knew someone in the project, or if you had some political connection or influence. I was not able to determine what the requirements were to apply for a contract, so I cannot say if this was based on fact or on a general distrust in government operations.

One factor that did have a large impact on the “circular” migration patterns of Cañari migrants was legal status. Migrants who had benefitted from one of the regularization or normalization processes in Spain were much more likely to return home and visit family members than those who hadn’t, especially in comparison with the mostly undocumented migrants who were living in the United States. For migrants who had Spanish documents, it was common to return to Cañar for approximately 3 months out of every year, as I was told that was the maximum amount of time allowed to be out of Spain without losing your legal residency. The main motive for coming home was to visit family and check on the status of the construction of homes.

For return migrants with Spanish nationality, the process was reversed: their home base was in Cañar, but they returned to Spain as often and as long as needed in order to renew their papers to maintain their Spanish nationality. Of those that were in this

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13 I don’t know if this can really be considered circular because the motive was not to live in Cañar but rather to visit. Nor was it a regular, seasonal pattern of migration.
situation, some were doing it to keep the door open in case they ever wanted to return. Others were doing it more for their children so that they could also one day apply for it. They saw this as beneficial mainly in the realm of education rather than employment, should their children want to study in Spain some day.

Transnational Activities

The CMCP was designed to initiate and maintain a strong connection between the migrants in their communities of residence and origin. In the conclusion of Chapter 1, I predicted that should migration policies and programs founded on international cooperation and mobile partnerships be implemented and maintained, they would likely foster an environment of institutional and government-supported transnational activities by providing the infrastructure and resources for migrants to “forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994:7) through recurring political, economic and cultural activities that cross national borders and involve a significant number of people (Portes 1999).

As we have seen, the CMCP has not been sustained as originally designed and therefore was not as conducive to transnational activity as I had predicted. First, the Communication department of the CMCP has not been able to maintain communication between administrators, migrants or their bi-national communities. As I mentioned earlier, at the time of this paper the website designed to serve as the point of contact and information between the two regions had not been updated by the Murcia faction since 2008. In addition, the project has not produced as much circular or return migration as I
had expected, nor does it seem like it will anytime in the near future. As such, the flow and exchange of information, resources and people has not been as consistent or as frequent as I had predicted.

I also found that news of Cañar did not reach most migrants, or even the ones involved in the CMCP. Of the family members I spoke with in Cañar, none claimed to have increased communication with family members since the CMCP started; in fact, many of them did not even know where exactly in Spain their family members were or what they worked in. This could be partly attributed to the lack of access to technology of the migrants in Murcia, and their family members in rural Cañar, although many of the family members I talked to were youth who lived in the pueblo. Some migrants in Murcia cited plans for the implementation of a computer lab with internet where they could make phone calls or have videoconferences with people in Cañar, but at the time of my research that project had not been carried out. While the technology has improved in Cañar with the CMCP’s Center for Computer and Technology Services, based on my observations and conversations, those using the computer lab were mostly students and professionals, not return migrants or migrants’ family members. From what I saw throughout Cañar, there are still many more businesses and opportunities to connect to U.S. migrants than Spanish migrants. This too might be attributed to lack of access to technology in Murcia, in addition to the longer period of time that Cañar has sent migrants to the United States.

I had also expected to find more return migrants participating in the CMCP who would be planning and programming initiatives for both Cañar and Murcia, but this too did not seem to be the case. While those that I talked to did feel that they had experienced
homeland dissimilation and did not feel fully integrated into the Cañari society, they did not actively maintain ties to their Spanish communities. In short, it seemed that the majority of those who were most frequently and significantly involved in the activities of both countries were the Spanish CMCP administrators and entities, not Cañari migrants or community members.

Although the level of migrant participation has decreased since the project’s implementation, it is still significant that those that were involved at the beginning of the project played a role in the design of the objectives and projects that are still being carried out and will still have an important impact on the social and economic future of Cañar, whether the migrants do or do not know about them. In fact, it could possibly be argued that even the conflicts and their consequences on the Cañari communities in both countries mark the migrants’ presence and influence in the Cañari society. In all cases, should the project’s activity in Murcia pick up again, as many hope it will after the transition to the new administration is complete, it will be interesting to see if its focus turns back towards connecting the migrants to Cañar and to their families there. But for now, it remains to be seen what influence encouraging, facilitating and financially supporting migrants’ ties to their home societies will have on these areas of migration impacts and immigration policy objectives.

**Conclusion**

The economic, social and cultural impacts of migration are deeply embedded in the community of Cañar, and they have become so intertwined that efforts to reverse them will be challenging. As we have seen, this has serious implications for Ecuador and
Spain’s migration policy objectives and their attainment, as Cañari’s migration decisions were not always based solely on economic factors, but rather social, cultural and psychological ones as well. Thus far, it appears that the obstacles faced by the CMCP have led it to have little effect on these outcomes. While I still predict that increased connections and ties might impact communities with “newer” migrants, it appears that too much time has already past for any intervention to make a real difference or impact on Cañari migrants in Murcia with respect to some migration policy objectives, such as family reunification and return migration.
Conclusion, Discussion and Further Research

It is too early to determine the long-term results of the Cañar-Murcia Co-development Project, as it is still in progress, but in the previous chapters I was able to draw preliminary conclusions on its implementation, initial community-level impacts, and effect on immigration policy objectives of migrant sending and receiving countries. As the CMCP is a pilot project designed to serve as a learning tool from which the entities involved and any other interested parties can identify effective and ineffective practices should they wish to replicate this kind of project in other regions or countries, I will offer a few preliminary observations and recommendations based on my findings.

The concept and objectives of the CMCP are important. However, as one Cañari put it, we have to re-think the culture in order to reduce the unintended consequences. The effectiveness of these kinds of participatory-centered projects will depend greatly on existing political, economic, social and cultural situations in the target communities. As such, a deeper analysis of these contexts needs to be carried out in the site-selection and investigative phases by outside parties with no invested interest in the project.

When dealing with migrant communities it is also important to remember that we are not always speaking about one unified and homogenous group. As was the case with the Cañari population, many times social, cultural and political divisions that exist in the communities of origin also migrate across borders. As we have seen in the case of the Cañari migrants in Murcia, introducing power and money to the equation can exacerbate these divisions as well as create new ones. As such, migrant collectives should be seen as dynamic and heterogeneous. Otherwise, attempts to unify them could backfire and
actually produce a more divided community. If possible, efforts should be made in the investigative phase to find a leader or organization that has the greatest unifying potential. From what I observed in Murcia, the most frequent and least conflictive place of interaction among the migrants was in their soccer league. Perhaps starting with athletic associations or others not directly related to political interests would be a valuable option.

Another early objective of the projects should be to create and maintain reasonable expectations within the participating communities in order to avoid disillusionment and distrust. Development takes time. While this might seem like an obvious conclusion, it should be reiterated often because people (including this researcher!) get excited and impatient and expect to see immediate results. This project and others like it build great expectations that can in turn lead to disillusionment, frustration and distrust when immediate results are not visible. It needs to be made clear from the out-set that the project is only the beginning of a long-term effort that will produce various results at various stages of its development. It is essential to communicate accurate information to the community, but rather than focusing only on the ambitious, over-arching, and long-term objectives, the project should develop short and long-term goals that can be measured and publicized in order to keep the community informed and satisfied.

Along similar lines, sustainability issues should be also addressed and communicated at the project’s inception. Concern over what would happen and who would take over when the project reached the end of its official duration led to skepticism and distrust. A plan that takes into consideration the political, economic, social and
cultural contexts of the communities should be developed to address long-term participation and financial issues.

Finally, it was quite a task for the Spanish government to take on a project in a community with high rates of emigration to both Spain and the United States. The impacts and culture of migration were deeply embedded in the society, and many of the issues the project was trying to address were also affected by migration to the United States. It seems unlikely that the U.S. government would be willing to get involved in projects like the CMCP, and I am not aware of the dynamics of the Cañari migrants in the United States, but perhaps the project could find a way to work in conjunction with those migrants as well. Otherwise, it might be best to start with Ecuadorian communities who have a higher percentage of migrants in Spain than in the United States.

**Further Research**

The CMCP offers many opportunities for further research. This thesis might be used as the foundation for longitudinal or comparative studies in which the long-term effects of the CMCP are measured through an exploration of some of the following topics: is the development sustainable; who takes over and participates in the CMCP after it reaches its official conclusion; what kind of infrastructural changes have been made in Cañar; how many people have been directly affected; and how migrants’ involvement has changed throughout its duration. From a historical standpoint, one could analyze the social, political and cultural relations in the communities before and after the CMCP. Comparative studies might look at similar projects in regions where the proportion of migrants residing in Spain is larger than that of the United States; where the migrants
reside in urban settings rather than rural; or where national government agencies do not play a central role.
Appendix A – Qualitative Interview Questions

Cañari immigrants in Murcia – Sample Questions

1) When did you first emigrate to Spain? What were the principal reasons for emigrating?
2) How would you describe the economic opportunities in Cañar when you left? How would you describe them now? Where do you think there are more economic opportunities for you?
3) Have you ever lived in any other part of Spain? Where, for how long, and what did you do there? How does that experience compare to your experience in Murcia?
4) What jobs have you had in Spain, and for how long?
5) Were you a part of the naturalization processes that have taken place in Spain? If not, what is your immigration status?
6) Do you participate in the Cañar-Murcia Co-Development Project? If so, in what ways and how often? If not, why not, and what do you know about the Project?
7) What do you think are the Project’s strengths? And its weaknesses? How do you think it could be improved to better meet your needs, and the needs of the Cañari community in Murcia and Cañar?
8) How are relations with the local Spanish community? (If participating in the project) -Has anything changed since you began to participate in the Project? In what ways?
9) Have you considered returning to Ecuador? If so, when? Permanently or temporarily? What are your main reasons for returning/not returning?
10) Do you send remittances, or invest money in projects in Cañar? How often, and in what do you invest the money?
11) Where do your closest family members live? Do you have family members in Cañar? How often do you communicate with them? Do you plan on reuniting with them? When, and where? What are your main reasons for reuniting in that location?
12) Is there anything else you would like to talk about?

Cañari non-migrants in Cañar – Sample Questions

1) In your opinion, what is the principal reason Cañaris emigrate? Do you think that emigration is necessary in order for Cañaris to get ahead? What does the community need in order to have less need for emigration?
2) Do you think the emigration of the Cañari population to Spain has impacted the community? In what ways?
3) Have you considered emigrating? Do you plan to? What are the main reasons for emigrating/not emigrating?
4) Do you participate in the Cañar-Murcia Co-Development Project? If so, in what ways and how often? If not, why not, and what do you know about the Project?
5) What do you think are the Project’s strengths? And its weaknesses? How do you think it could be improved to better meet your needs, and the needs of the Cañari community in Murcia and Cañar?

6) How would you describe Cañar’s economic situation before the Project’s initiation? How would you describe it now? Where do you think there are more economic opportunities?

7) Do you have family members in Murcia? How many, and how often do you communicate with them?

8) Do you have plans to reunite with family members abroad? When, and where? What are the main reasons for choosing this location?

9) Is there anything else you would like to talk about?

Cañari return migrants in Cañar – Sample Questions
1) When did you first emigrate to Spain? What were the principal reasons for emigrating?

2) How would you describe the economic opportunities in Cañar when you left? How would you describe them now?

3) Where did you live in Spain? Where, for how long, and what did you do there?

4) Were you a part of the naturalization processes that have taken place in Spain? If not, what was your immigration status during your time in Spain?

5) While in Spain, did you send remittances or invest money in projects in Cañar? How often, and in what was the money invested?

6) While in Spain, where did your family members live? How and how often did you communicate with them?

7) Do you participate in the Cañar-Murcia Co-Development Project? If so, in what ways and how often? If not, why not, and what do you know about the Project?

8) What do you think are the Project’s strengths? And its weaknesses? How do you think it could be improved to better meet your needs, and the needs of the Cañari community in Murcia and Cañar?

9) When did you return to Cañar? Why did you decide to return?

10) How would you describe the reintegration process? Did you receive any help in the reintegration process? What kind, and from whom?

11) Is there anything else you would like to talk about?

Organizations and institutions participating in the Project– Sample Questions
1) What does your organization do?

2) How long has this organization existed? How did it develop?

3) What are the goals of this organization?

4) How would you characterize the population that you serve? What do you see as their principal needs and obstacles?
5) How do community members find out about the services your organization provides? For how long are they typically involved with the organization?

6) Are you affiliated with or do you cooperate with any other local organizations or international organizations? If so, which ones?

7) When did this organization begin participating in the Project? What kinds of activities does it carry out?

8) What do you think are the Project’s strengths? And its weaknesses? How do you think it could be improved to better the needs of the Cañari community in Murcia and Cañar?

9) In Murcia - How do you think the community members’ participation in the Project has affected their experience in Murcia?

10) Do you think the emigration/immigration of Cañaris has impacted the community of Cañar/Murcia? How so?

11) Is there a branch of your organization/institution in Cañar/Murcia, also? If so, how do the two branches differ? How are they alike?

12) Is there anything else you would like to talk about?
References


“Alcalde de Macará firmará acuerdo de hermanamiento con la ciudad española Leganés.” El Comercio 23 Nov. 2007.


