Building Japan: Technology as a problem-space for Veridiction, Jurisdiction, and Subjectivation.

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By

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A dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Anthropology

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University of California, Berkeley

Committee in Charge:

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Abstract

Building Japan: Technology as a problem-space for Veridiction, Jurisdiction, and Subjectivation.

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This research is an attempt to examine elements in the classic relations of state actors to the agency of the individual through the medium of technology development and deployment. The chapters analyze discourses surrounding the notions of ‘the state’ and ‘technology’ as fields for exploration of the Foucaultian problematizations of veridiction, jurisdiction, and subjectivation. Specifically, how have these two poles interacted in practices of ‘truth telling’, governance, and the formation of citizen and ethnic identities.

In particular, the task at hand is to think about the deployment of technology in the configuration of affect in relation to an identity, ‘the Japanese’. Japan had started as a place of liminality in the research: the non-West modern, that didn’t quite fit the mold of so many classical narratives of modernity. But as my inquiry continued the questions turned more sharply towards an investigation of practices of affect and subjectivity. ‘What part did technology play in the development of a Japanese state identity?’ gradually transformed into a montage of narratives in which the technical simply met the subjective, and the questions emerged from this meeting. For example, what is the force exerted by a practice of memory of the atomic bomb upon an idea of peace? And, in the representation of a national disaster what narrative tropes are invoked and hazarded in the contest of the ‘national experience’?

I select a series of technological developments spanning three centuries of Japanese history and utilize the historical narrative as a space for raising these questions as they emerge and are articulated/argued about by the actors involved, as well as by the ‘second-order observers’: the historians and social philosophers that mark and delimit the field of ‘Japanese history’.
For Noriyo

Who has always been there
Introduction

I remember well when it all fell apart. It was in the winter of 2007, during one sultry evening in Bangkok. I was on the outskirts of the city, beyond the half-complete skeletons of skyscrapers abandoned after the real estate bubble, and the legion of concrete, cinder-block like, three story apartment/office/merchant structures, that in their ubiquity seem to signify the life-force qua urbanization of the modern, city-nation-polis-ethnic-state in Asia. Past the verdant green golf courses, rich in tropical flora and well-dressed visitors meandering about in cart or on foot, at one of those sprawling luxury compounds: part hotel, part administrative center, part Versailles’ thematic of opulence. I was there to attend a conference sponsored by an association of Japanese and Thai NGOs. The actual topic of the conference now eludes memory; though it was important – at least one ambassador was invited, and the audience hall was festooned with assorted levels of politicos and PhDs garnered from around the globe, all crowding the upholstery in a cross-cultural testimony to ‘business formal’. The academics and ministers listened politely (or resolutely) to a bevy of speakers as they clambered up on stage, stood behind the podium, and uttered about topics of interest to the ‘development community’.

As I was an invited member of this consortium, but one lacking in function other than ‘audience’, I gradually grew bored and began to wander. Outside the conference hall was a large entry foyer. It had been filled with canvas and plywood stalls decorated with descriptions of numerous projects. Many of the stalls were occupied by the participants of the projects; or at least a representative ‘sample’ of the participants, which turned out to be predominately female, at either end of the life arc, garnered from various ‘ethnic groups’ of the northern regions of Thailand. At the start of the talks the girls and matrons had been there to show (and sell) native craft, so each stall was somewhat burdened by a pile of baskets, textiles, and cases with jewelry. They had stood beside monitors demonstrating smiling Japanese and Bangkok youths eagerly teaching, building, and/or medicating the ‘people’ of the community, while either hocking their wares, or sitting, stoically, in the fabrication of same: a living performance of manufacture of the cultural craft, and one would assume, ‘tradition’. But now, as the prospective audience cum customers had relocated into the next room, they were at repose, sitting chatting, eating, drinking tea and sodas. A few of the younger ones fiddled with their cell phones.

I should have been in heaven. This. This was the ostensible reason for my presence here, so far from home and countrymen. As an anthropologist in larval form, I had been dispatched with minimal ceremony to the once ‘Far East’ to study ‘technology transfer’. And here it was! Those pre-teen ‘ethnics’ with their cell phones, or their grandmothers with their Tupperware, were a living embodiment of the capacity of the form and function that we denote as the technological, to get up and move, use and be used, in other milieus, worldviews, and ways of life. One of the stalls in particular had caught my attention earlier. It depicted a program by a Tokyo group to bring Internet service to one of the northern villages. In an array of
beautifully vivid photos, it showed Japanese carpenters building an ‘ergonomic’ school, and fitting it with wirelessly capable computers. And about the images, in Thai, Japanese, and English script, were accounts of the practice in passionate and imploring terms: the bringing of the computer and that thing beyond it - the world wide web - was more than a gift of a material, it was a gift of a world. A world of learning; a world of perspectives; a world in which that one little village of four hundred souls in the northern tropical hills, could join the global village in a capacity of speech (and again one would assume, though it was not stated, listening). The gift of the internet was expressed in no lesser terms than saying that it was a human right; and therefore, an abnegation of the gift act itself (Mauss be dammed!); instead the meeting of a need: without access to the internet, these people could not be fully human. They could not experience or express their rights to education. They could not participate in a global voice. They could not be made manifest in technique, nor engage in that which is ‘History’, a moving along in the exploration of form writ in a shared database.

This was rich stuff, and again, seemingly all that I had come here to engage in, and at needs be, ‘deconstruct’. For that was my task: as an aspiring ‘anthropologist of technology’ I had borrowed heavily from the extant literature of technology as a subject, turning to the various schools of thought of Science Technology Studies or historians of technology. I had been taught that technology was a thing, but also a substance, and a form! No less than Thomas Hughes had stated as such, and Langdon Winner had vouchsafed as much, while dithering on the terminology (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987; Hughes 2004; Winner 1977). It was a font that drew from the diluted well of Marx and materialism, after it had run the canyons panned by Heidegger’s search for essence in Being. And the result was an object (quite distinct from its investigating subject) that was chimeric in its manifestation and expression.

But I digress. For that night those ‘ethnic women’ being ‘developed’ had not (I presume) read Heidegger, and so were unaware of the potential alienation, or alienating of the human from aletheia by way of the ‘standing-reserve’ of the technical apparatus.¹ No, that was a concern of the literati. I, and my colleagues in the next room, partitioned off by education, class, and opportunity – the bevy of ‘life-chance’ so dutifully, and poignantly, noted by Weber – were the ones engaged with History. With the meaning of the ‘modern’, in all its epochal glory, under which an idea like ‘development’ can be accomplished...or failed. We had the busy task of representation of the human figure; that which was so eloquently and concisely labeled by Paul Rabinow as the anthropos. And we were serious in our earnestness, for nothing less than ‘salvation’ was at stake. Salvation of History. And salvation of its most peculiar subject, the human figure.

Somewhere in my ruminations a key-note speaker took the podium in the next room. He was a man of some familiarity to myself: a lecturer at one of Japan’s most prestigious universities, as well as a founder and director of an influential NGO. He had been instrumental in calling and organizing this conference. As he

¹ From the infinitely influential “The Question Concerning Technology” by Martin Heidegger (1977).
began to speak, the customary buzzing at the back of the hall ceased and a polite silence reigned in the other room (the chatting in my foyer continued unabated). His words echoed out: a call for the recognition of a pan-Buddhist ‘civilization’ to offset the looming clash, and conceptual hegemony, of the civilizations of Christianity and Islam. What this ‘recognition’ would do or impart was not expressed; but the speech itself was passionate, even if the resulting applause was closer to diffidence than endorsement.

Still, it was a peculiar moment. On the one hand it was simply a display of Machiavellian political expediency. I had learned in a half-year’s worth of interviews in Tokyo of the desperate need for a casus belli to the Japanese development community; which for the first time in the post-war period was under considerable financial strain, as the world’s once largest ODA saw its budget cut again and again. It was a search for a purpose to an existence that went beyond the possession of a reserve of technical and pecuniary capacities, neither of which distinguished the Japanese from their North American or Western European counterparts. No, there was a call, occasionally verging on a frenetic need, to find a localization, a stylization if you will, of the technical apparatus; to ‘Japanify’ it, and thus elevate by distinction. In this practice, the figuration of the ‘Buddhist civilization’ serviced the need, creating affinities and proximities to which the Europeans and North Americans were denied (Buddhist though they may be). For the un-expressed purpose of justifying the surfeit of Japanese development spending being done in South East Asia, and why the Europeans and North Americans should pack up shop and go home. In short, it was a cunning set of arguments, lacking in irony, that justified a territorialism to the development political sphere.

But on the other hand it was something else entirely. It was a reminder of how even half-baked ideas emerging from seats of higher learning in New England, were granted legs by the globalized Homo Academicus with which to walk, and discursive power in which to form, far beyond intention or design. A touch of Benjamin’s “The work is the death of the intention”. The Japan, gifted by Huntington as being a quasi civilization (unlike say, the Maori) (2011), were rejecting, or more aptly, adapting the ‘quasi’ status to transform the idea of themselves into one which once again had some latitude in shaping Asia. Having just spent a year studying the history of religious practices in modern Japan, and the various Buddhist ‘purges’ and ‘celebrations’ that resulted, the move seemed predictable, almost to the yawn of cliché.

Yet it was this juxtaposition - the polemical call for representation in one room; and the indifferent non-act of being represented in the next – that struck me at the time. And despite the difference in thematics and conceptual history, the moment reverberated onto my own project, as I forced myself to wonder about this act of ‘research’ and ‘representation’ I was now embarked upon. That night the

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2 Presumable encompassing Japan and South East Asia; China and India being quite optional to the Tokyo NGO mindset of the time, I had discovered in many interviews.  
3 The number I was most often provided in interviews was 70%. Seventy percent of Japanese development expenditure went to South East Asia.
arguments with myself were inchoate and confused – it was just a moment of visceral response. And yet it lingered in the coming days. And as time passed, more and more, I came to the conclusion that I had made a mistake; that my project was a failure before it started. That in effect, I was about to play a game, one in which the board was already set, the pieces arrayed, but that the outcome had already been determined. Sure there was ‘data’ to be collected and analyzed. Just as the game had yet to be commenced. Yet, the architecture was powerfully in presence; the moves were already circumscribed. I had choices and capacities for decisions, but they fell within familiar oppositions like ‘liberation’ and ‘oppression’, or ‘increasing agency’ and ‘inhibiting agency’. And that was all. And the more I considered the possibilities the more I realized that whatever else this game might be – representation; communication; explanation; construction; deconstruction; interpretation; description, thick or thin – it was not thinking.

And that had been the mistake.

What is the activity of ‘thinking’? (And it would be more poignant to add, ‘where’, ‘when’, ‘how’, and ‘why’ to the question as well.) And with more topical focus, what is the activity of thinking in relation to anthropos to technology?

Early in the classic tome, The Social Construction of Technological Systems, there is a striking graph. It depicts a simple polygonal shape labeled ‘artifact’, surrounded by a set of matching polygons all inscribed ‘social group’, bound together spoke-like by undistinguished lines. Here as an elegant visual representation is the project at hand: an assemblage of social actors, circling around the technology, forming it in a tug-of-war, giving shape and meaning through a set of demands, negotiations, and relationships. The descriptor ‘construction’ is key; it is a temporal act of builders; an architectural metaphor in which objects are taken up and given new form by labor and design. The actors themselves are malleable and interchangeable – they come and go at need (though what this ‘need’ may be is problematic) – what is important is that they are actors all, i.e. that they are capable of engaging in the ‘construction’ metaphor, and so can do ‘labor’. Can do ‘design’. The relationship denoted by the lines between artifact and social groups is left vague. We don’t know the power relationship, or even the flow of influence, as the accompanying text is one of give and take between various ‘needs’ of both the artifact and the social groups. As that is the case, it is one conceptual step to reverse the assemblage, and place ‘social group’ in the center, and surround it with polygons of ‘artifacts’. Now the effervescent construction/form-giving has a new emphasis as one can imagine a scholar analyzing the construction of a social form like ‘America’ through a bevy of technological relations: the Cadillac, crowned roads, microwaves, and nuclear power. Etc., etc. Two steps further, and – ‘we have never been modern’ – as the relationship amongst the fungible actors is no longer spoke-like, but becomes a web, one in which the ‘social groups’ and the ‘artifacts’ interpenetrate in an elaborate dance of constructive form-giving, each now an ‘actant’, capable still of ‘labor’ and ‘design’ (Latour 1993)…. And now at this point it should be added, ‘needs’ (at the bare minimum). Perhaps, ‘desire’. And possibly ‘politics’. What

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4 1987 Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, eds. Pp. 35.
doesn’t matter is the composition; except in the analysis. What does matter for the form of the analysis is that they all...act. They are subjects, ascribed a nebulous, unstated, array of faculties and qualities, all for the purpose of the construction drama to play out.

There are many eyebrow-raising issues with this description of research into technology. To choose one to start with is of course the nebulous picture of the actor. In a form of analysis priding itself on being temporal, and action-oriented, it is amazing that the building blocks of the construction – the actor/subjects – are so unremarked. Where and why do all these qualities accrue in our actors? Other then to fill the need of motion in the set of associations? The actor is given the barest of schematic qualities, and then asked to function. It is a figure taken up, and then having objects placed within it to give it a material presence (a social group, a technology, etc.), but the central properties for which it must be thought is those derived from its formal nature: an actor, with ‘labor’, ‘design’, and ‘needs’.

This is typological thought; a *logos* of *typos*, so a *logos* of form, and thus extremely platonic in its foundations. It is thinking to the world by way of the imperishable forms (in this case, the actor). That has all these qualities and abilities, despite time or place. The same as for Plato a ‘cat’ had all the qualities of ‘catness’ whether or not this particular cat was living or dead, blind, maim, or a kitten. Again it is surprising in this instance for a set of reasoning that prides itself on a temporal orientation – an act of construction – that the building blocks of this construction – the actors – are taken at prima facie value. For instance, returning to that evening in Bangkok, the proclamation of ‘civilization’ startled my reverie. Civilization is a problematic concept, much less a problematic thing. In ‘the West’, the idea has traveled from being a singular to a plural along a series of tensions and reoccupations regarding concerns of Christendom, Tartars, Islam, and then a global mercantilism in which people were governed – must be governed – under a set of relationships and rubrics. In Japan, civilization or *bunmei*, also had a complex history. In ancient China the *bunmei* was associated with a faculty of memory – knowledge of the ideographs that denoted the cosmos – and so ‘civilization’ was distributed topographically, between those who were ‘civilized’, i.e. had knowledge of the characters, and the barbarians beyond. But also, striated within a space by life chances of education and leisure: to be civilized is to have been taught and studied, and so was a domain of the elites. The impact was felt in Japan, which followed the reification and elevation of knowledge of letters, until the modern era, in which Fukuzawa Yukichi reinvented ‘civilization’ in his appropriately titled, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*. Here civilization had been meshed with a social Darwinism; now it was about a struggle of political nations towards a future. The civilization concept being neatly wedded to borders and boundaries between states. But only after a series of requisite concepts had been taken up, translated and propagated. Ideas like citizen, rights, tradition, modern, etc.

To take a form like ‘civilization’, an idea, and to assume its reality as being ‘out there’ in the world, without a history or a set of *fictio* acts, seems dangerously misguided for a form of analysis that is rooted in temporal practices of construction. To take the matter closer to the discussion, the question of an artifact re actor is an open one. ‘Technology’ has a storied history. Whether one traces it back to the
Greek tekton, the craftsman woodworker, until its merger with logos in the 19th century (Hughes 2004). Or one looks to the 'machine' as an emergence, first to designate siege weapons in Germany, until machina then began to serve other functions (Blumenberg 2010). The issue still remains that the objects being discussed – the artifact – is not something out there in the world, ready to be taken up, and assembled at whim, and unreflexively. The idea of the artifact has gone through a multitude of figurations in response to different problems and articulations, not the least being what is the role of nature to artifice in the history of Western thought. And how this relationship has been transformed over time: from a position of artifice being mimesis for Aristotle – the craftsman completes what nature would do on its own – to a later repudiation of the limits of nature, and how 'mankind' that ever illusive figure, finds its Being and expression through a capacity of creating beyond the boundaries of a finite and imperfect natural world (Blumenberg and Wertz 2000). All of these positions create different meanings for 'artifact' and 'technology'.

This is genealogical questioning, and so is not far from a basic understanding of Nietzsche. However, that is not to say that the answer is further construction – or deconstruction – of the objects involved, 'historical' or otherwise. The Social Construction of Technological Systems will work, as long as we extend the fabrication metaphor further back in time to include its constituent parts. No, the issue is that the fabrication metaphor itself is flawed. For the critical reason that it fails to recognize the relationship between the thinker and the object of thought.

In the beginning it was the latter, the object of thought, which preoccupied me. How these things – 'artifacts' and 'social groups' – took on properties, then functioned within analysis and explanations. What role is served by these accoutrements of thought? I was suspicious, because the force of their persuasiveness, i.e. the force of their truth was rooted in a simple assertion: that they exist. The existence of these things allowed for them to exert influence upon the world, to shape life and reality around them and therefore, were something that needed to be reckoned with by isolation, documentation, description, counting, etc. It is the force of an object through existence that grants its veracity in so many different schools of thought, ranging from pure, old fashioned positivism, to late post-Heideggerian Being. And yet this had always seemed problematic to me. Especially given the direction of science that since Bacon had concluded that existence was determined by measurement, while at the same time measurement is recognized more and more as a craft, and a technical one at that. Microscopes, sliding rules, telescopes, zero based math, all allow for the measurement of something. And then with its measurement, it is. It exists.

I came at this problem via a circuitous route, having been spending a great deal of time reading Spinoza. Admittedly a strange critic of Being and Heidegger, but for Spinoza the existence of a 'thing' is problematic, precisely because 'existence' is problematic. Existence for Spinoza is a marvelous and forceful act, and the fundamental basis for 'truth'. This quality is so important and distinctive to Spinoza, that existence in itself is identified with perfection, and from that is transformed into the premier quality of Substance. And granted to nothing else. Substance is Nature is God for Spinoza by way of the fact that existence is primary in the
establishment of truth. Everything else, from thought to table chairs, are simply matters of manifestation of substance for Spinoza: associations and relations brought about by force and convenience, sublimated to the more powerful and absolute Nature of existence. As such all of these secondary concepts for him were of lesser interest, and could not serve as proofs because they were recognized to be transitory; not only in the sense of corruptible (to pass away in time), but in the sense of convenience and conceit, that they existed from an appreciation of relationships, which was only one of a possible many.5

To grant the force of truth by way of existence to the configuration of objects seemed to me extremely dangerous and detrimental to thought. It transforms an assembly, a previously mentioned ‘accoutrement of thought’, into a thing with force potential on its own, and by doing so severs the relationship between the act of thought and the object-existence. Afterwards it is only a matter of measurement; but the force potential exists independently. I believe that this is part of what Lacan was referring to when noting that a process of division is repeated eternally by epistemology, without ever being ‘equal to the task’. And that the ramification for this is that a science of these ‘things’ cannot exist – that a knowledge of the objects is spurious, because of this very division from the knowing of the thought. That ‘there is no such thing as a science of man because science’s man does not exist, only its subject does’ (1989).

The critique of the object of thought fades away into a question of the knowing thinker. For example, returning to our Social Construction of Technology case, what is this ‘construction’ about? Is it construction along the lines of the Aristotelian telos: that the artifice of the construction only completes that which would naturally, and by force, occur on its own. The natura naturata of Being. If so, how is speaking this truth making it any more truthful? This of course is the appeal and the trap of materialism. And it makes Lenin’s remarks about the force of Marxism materialism being derived from its truth beyond ironic now. What more did the utterance have to grant the truth of the materialism if it was already evident in truth? Or again, following Lacan, the question of truth is constantly associated with speech. “I, the truth, am speaking....” No language exists outside of truth – no meta-language to hide behind – because the truth is grounded in the fact that it speaks, and that it has no other means with which to do so...then logos.

It is here that the strange nihilism of this form of ‘constructivist’ analysis comes to light. The problem is that the relationship between the speaking-knower of Social Construction Theory, Actor Network or otherwise, is one in which the nature of the construction – as telos, as something else, as accident, as design – is unknown, and unmarked. And because of this the meaning of the utterances are situated within a closed realm; the epistemological game of divide in which knowing and object shall never meet. And at the risk of redundancy, the consequences of this divide are numerous and pernicious. One of the easier to recognize is the pro forma manner in which epistemic thought approaches the figures as world-objects means that analysis takes place between and within the objects, and not through them. A

5 See Garrett (2003) for an interesting discussion of Spinoza’s approach toward substance.
case in point would be the invocation of the actor for the place of the artifact or social group. This is not simply a case of insidious transubstantiation (except in the way that it is a case of substantiation); yet also in creating these objects through the actor-framing a whole slew of issues are relegated to the unobserved and unknowable: these being the contingent aspects of the actor figure itself, and what role they play. Chakrabarty, looking to the question of ‘invented traditions’, once pointed out that not only did the concept thrive upon the ‘erection of polarities...between categories’ which then ignored the reasons and possibilities of the erection of this polarity, and what could be found outside it (hybridization, etc.), but also that in the pursuit of an argument for the fictio of tradition it was noteworthy in how fundamental affects were invoked as explanation, but given little attention in the question of what they were, and how they worked (Vlastos 1998). ‘Memory’, ‘regret’, ‘desire’, are all part of this ‘actor’ configuration of the social group, and are frequently deployed as explanans or explanandum, and yet they themselves are little investigated to see how they are formulated and configured...as practice.

Which brings us to the most pernicious aspect of this division of object and knowing-thinker: the abnegation of thinking as practice - localized, temporalized, structured. The epistemic divide of objects and thought means that reflection purely takes place trying to bridge this gap, and then trying to establish the boundaries of knowing to the objects themselves. This has been the issue for Kant and his three critiques, and for a great deal of philosophy following. The truth of the objects is however derived from this very existence, and so the question of the meaning and significance of that truth to the activity of thought is outside that activity, unbridgeable because of the previously articulated divide. The goal is to know the objects of thought as objects qua the real; not to examine the objects as artifacts in inquiry. And this is problematic. More so, it brings us back to my original question, what is this activity of thinking?

In 1918, at the twilight of his career, and after spending four years witnessing the application of industrial practice and technical reasoning to the production of warfare, Max Weber gave a talk about ‘Science as a Vocation’. The talk began quite modestly, even pedestrian, as it looked at the hiring and promotion processes for young academics in Germany and beyond. Weber quickly concluded that the system in place existed for something other than a love of learning or excellence; that ‘mediocrities’ were more than likely to climb the professional ladder, and that this seems to have been the ‘normal’ distribution for any bureaucratic human activity. So consequently, facing an audience of ardent young scholars, looking for if not reassurance, at least encouragement that an entry into the field of science would have some significance, Weber abruptly changed tack and said that of course the relevant aspects of a scientific profession (that at least the audience wanted to hear) are about the ‘inward calling’ of science as a vocation. The professional pride and pleasure one draws from puzzle solving and advancing the boundaries of knowledge. The monastic contemplation of a life spent in search of higher truths, and not direct pecuniary or egotistical self-aggrandizement. All of this was implied, and yet, once again Weber quickly backpedaled, and said that these
things were not enough. That ‘passion’ is not enough to do science – neither is studious hard work at the practice of it: “...a dilettante’s idea may have the very same or even a greater bearing for science than that of a specialist” (Weber 2007: 135). Moreover, the trials and tribulations of the profession, and its ‘hazards’ of career and life opportunities, are such to break the back of even the most dedicated of participants, despite the apparent balm offered by a higher ‘calling’. That the passion that one places into the conduct of science is such that the standard interpretation of passion as a manifestation of self, in the pursuit of the experience of life, is wrong in science: science is a sublimation of the self to the work. It is a losing of oneself in the passion of the work, knowing that there is no immortality. No *tropaion* to be built to one’s everlasting fame out of the fallen armor of the hero’s intellectual conquests. The pursuit of science means that the individual, professional, practitioners are sure to be out-shown and made irrelevant in a manner of decades. As Science, unlike Art, is bound to some notion of progress.

Why does one engage in doing something that in reality never comes, and never can come, to an end?...He maintains that he engages in ‘science for science’s sake and not merely because others, by exploiting science, bring about commercial or technical success and can better feed, dress, illuminate, and govern. But what does he who allows himself to be integrated into this specialized organization, running on endlessly, hope to accomplish that is significant in these productions that are always destined to be outdated? (2007: 138)

The answer is partly provided by the nature of progress, as a form of rationalization, such that the world becomes ‘disenchanted’. Science is conducted to grant a feeling of command; a sense that even if not all is known about the trappings and mechanisms surroundings one’s life, with time, it *could* be. And this feeling grants, if not great power to the practitioner, at least a sense of it, and an accomplishment to fashion a fate through the effort of his or her own hand. Yet once more Weber, provides an answer and then quickly circumscribes it. For this feeling of technical accomplishment he notes is only in relation to the technical knowledge of the vocation. It does not have *meaning* beyond that. As Leo Tolstoi discovered, that for the modern man, one death, and by implication, one life, has no meaning, for the march of progress is always ‘a further step’, one more leg in the journey, and ‘no person who comes to die stands upon the peak which lies in infinity’.

Abraham, or some peasant of the past, died ‘old and satiated with life’ because he stood in the organic cycle of life; because his life, in terms of its meaning and on the eve of his days, had given to him what life had to offer; because for him there remained no puzzles he might wish to solve; and therefore he could have had ‘enough’ of life’. (2007: 140)

Not so for ‘civilized man’. The very incompleteness of the progress idea robs him of this chance to answer all of life’s mysteries, to be ‘satiated’, and so his life and death
are ‘provisional and not definitive’. Abrupt, and seemingly, meaningless. A horrible conclusion, and perhaps some would say ‘unfair’– for science is about the value of knowledge, to some other subject than the individual. The ‘human race’. The ‘state’. The ‘people’. Each of these given an ashen taste after four years of mustard gas, and advanced parabolic arcs for artillery shells. But more importantly, what is this ‘value of science’? That is Weber’s ultimate question and goal.

We cannot turn to the Greeks – to philosophy – for our answer. For there the value of knowing was exactly tied up in the eternal of Nature. To know something was to know the absolute, the form that transcended the dissolution of being and time. This was the wisdom: that the knowledge of the peculiar gave a window on the whole, and granted an insight into a relation of life to thought to meaning. But for us nowadays, Weber claims, in the era following Goethe, who can say that science brings us closer to ‘Nature’? It is the opposite that one most often hears cried out in the halls of the Romantics: science alienates us from an experience of Nature; from a purity of ‘being’. 6 “Who – aside from certain big children who are indeed found in the natural sciences – still believes that the findings of astronomy, biology, physics, or chemistry could teach us anything about the meaning of the world?” (2007: 142).

Under these internal presuppositions, what is the meaning of science as a vocation, now after all these former illusions, the ‘way to true being,’ the ‘way to true art,’ the ‘way to true nature,’ the ‘way to true God,’ the ‘way to true happiness,’ have been dispelled? Tolstoi has given the simplest answer, with the words: ‘Science is meaningless because it gives no answer, the only question important for us: “what shall we do and how shall we live?”’ (2007: 143)

There is no ready answer to this for Weber. Instead Weber turns to the matter of ‘supposition’ in science. Weber takes the time to debunk the position that science is ‘presupposition-less’ by simply listing a group of sciences and underscoring the presuppositions at work: from the problematic relation of ‘alleviating suffering’ to medical reason, to precedence to jurisprudence. Each of these large academic enterprises, these ‘scientific practices’ cannot provide a justification for its being outside of tautologies of reason inclusive to its definition. That the ‘presupposition’ exists within the science’s species-being. The point being that the ‘value’ or meaning of the science is dependent upon the suppositions that form the core of its knowledge arrangements. To deny this, or to question this, is to confront an empty space of meaning.

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6 And I might add that here is the passage to Heidegger and Marx, materialism and Being, in that the ‘technical’ is the route of alienation from the ‘world’ or the ‘human’. And with some irony, we could also add the observation by Blumenberg (2000) that it is purely through the ‘ supra-natural’, as in above and separate from nature, quality of art as craft – techne as an expression of the human quality beyond nature – that is rooted in not only the Romantic’s adoration of the artistic expression as being ‘natural’ and ‘human’, but also in a life of technical achievement through invention.
In reaching this conclusion Weber echoes his earlier thought from ‘Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy’. For the problem of ‘presuppositions’ mirrors that of ‘objectivity’: a grounding of science as a pursuit of knowledge. ‘Science as a Vocation’ takes ‘Objectivity’ s earlier epistemic concern and questions it as a figure of life, *bios*, when it raises the question of value, or how shall a life be lived? The value of science as a practice to something more: the individual practitioner, or to the human subject. These two positions are interrelated for Weber – the question of what science is and can know, in the Kantian tradition, is intimately connected with science as a ‘vocation’, read as a ‘human practice’, and what is its value as such.

Both questions are haunted by Weber’s observation from ‘Objectivity’:

> It is not the ‘actual’ interconnections of ‘things’ but the *conceptual* interconnections of *problems* which define the scope of the various sciences. (1949: 68)

It is a remarkably simple statement, and one that carries a great deal of epistemic anguish. For here Weber has broken with a philosophical tradition of identifying, analyzing, and relating to ‘things’. Things are not what science is about. To describe and catalogue a thing and its relations is not a performance of thought. The testimony to this position perhaps no more eloquently being stated than in how Weber and his colleagues working on a journal for ‘Social knowledge and Social politics’ rejects the conceptual worth of ‘society’: saying that the object ‘society’ had no intellectual merit to it; providing no purchase from which to think.

If science, as both a form of knowledge as well as a limitation placed upon it in relation to meaning and value, is not bound to the analysis of ‘things’ or ‘objects’ – it is not about ‘society’, ‘civilization’, ‘technology’, etc. – what Weber puts in its place in this statement is intriguing: *problems*.

Unfortunately, Weber is spare in his explanation, and so we must leave him behind as we consider the matter. First and foremost, a problem is *relational*. Not in the sense of object qua object, or actor upon artifact. It is relational in the spirit of subject and milieu, each mutually constituting. A problem is relational in that it exists purely within the association of its elements; its meaning is derived from its localization, through emotion, affect, capacities, and limitations. The situation of a problem is such that the subjective possibilities must be taken in account: the institutions, methods, practices, etc., that allow for a problem to come into being, and likewise, be prosecuted and investigated, are part of its manifestation. A problem is also *goal-oriented*. It is determined in its focus upon a situation, such that the end point is one in which amelioration, mitigation, or further comprehension is reached. In this a problem is contradictory in that it is both circumscribed in its localized attributes, while simultaneously is open in its prosecution as new forms, new matters, and new objects are created and considered

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7 ‘It provides, when taken in its ‘general’ meaning, no specific point of view, from which the significance of given elements of culture can be analyzed’. (Rabinow 2003: 32)
in the movement to the goal. In short, a ‘problem’ is a relation of thought to the 
world.

In saying this we see a glimmer of Weber’s own problems of knowing and 
meaning, and a brief glimpse of his solution to it. Yet, unfortunately it is easier to 
write this than to think it. Instead, turning to another traveler, Michel Foucault, we 
find a parallel concept, ‘problematization’.

It is one of Foucault’s most striking thought-artifacts, and sadly, one of the 
least recognized in the wider scholarship. Foucault wrote:

[A problematization] does not mean the representation of a preexistent 
object nor the creation through discourse of an object that did not exist. It is 
the ensemble of discursive and nondiscursive practices that make something 
enter into the play of true and false and constitute it as an object of thought
(Whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political 
analysis, etc.).
(1966: 670)

Here we can clearly see the Spinozan caution to granting existence. A 
problematization does not exist ‘out in the world’; neither is it ‘brought into being’ 
by the analytic gaze and ‘discovered’ as being a force network imparting reality 
beyond the confines of the imagination. It has shades of Weber, in that a 
problematization like an ‘ideal type’ is a device for investigation, but Foucault goes 
further in underscoring the idea of a problematization being part of ‘practices’, that 
relegate the establishment of the true and the false. What he would later call 
‘veridictional modes’ (2005). The possibility of speaking ‘truly’. For Foucault, 
philosophy is not the form of thought that asks “…what is true and what is false, but 
what determines that there is and can be truth and falsehood and whether or not we 
can separate the true and the false” (2005: 15).

This is a striking move on Foucault’s part. For now the question is no longer 
the classic relation of mind to object/reality, but the light of inquiry is shone upon 
the aspects of thought as relational; as situated in time and space as a practice. With 
this move ‘subjectivity’, as an element in analysis is not a given; not ‘real’ and taken 
up, or ‘discovered’ by the thinker (like the ‘actor’ of actor network theory). Neither 
is the position of ‘thinker’ the remote observer with God’s eye view interpreting and 
organizing, representing and explaining, exempt from the analysis. No, it is situated 
in the possibilities of the analysis. Thought thinks itself through a situated bounded-
ness.

The problem for Foucault, as Dreyfuss and Rabinow observed, was to find an 
alternative to the two ‘poles’ then dominant in the human sciences. To move 
beyond:

...a version of structuralism in which human signifying practice is seen as 
generating object-like, rule-governed semiotic systems that produce subjects 
as a function of discourse; and various versions of hermeneutics that found 
subjects and cultures infused with deep meaning they themselves had spun, 
webs of signification requiring interpretation.
The problem is then a refinement of Lacan's; to find a possibility of investigating this knowledge figure – humanity – without assuming its existence. To view the problem as being an enduring one, in which a multitude of possibilities, of logoi, emerge in a field of contestation, and instead of situating the thinker in a life-and-death struggle of one over another, to look to the circumstances within and around the positions that allow for it to assert claims of true and false. To be extremely attentive to the role of thought; or again, to the modes of veridiction.

The question of 'enduring problems' turns us to a final fellow traveler that aided me in moving beyond the impasse of social representation, and towards my question of 'what is the activity of thinking', Hans Blumenberg. Blumenberg coined what I have often thought of as 'problem spaces'. In his 'Legitimacy of the Modern Age', the 'legitimacy' at stake is the child of Carl Schmitt's 'secularization thesis': the position that the modern world is a collection of secularized Christian attributes and institutions; the nation-state serves the eschatological functions of the medieval church, etc. Blumenberg, echoing an argument that should be familiar to the reader now, was extremely suspicious of this argument, noting how the 'legitimacy' is predicated on an act of transformation, which implied substance; a historical substance of continuity that was itself the basis for the evasive feeling of the 'legitimate'. "Such propositions define an unequivocal relation between whence and whither, an evolution, a change in the attributes of a substance" (1983: 4). But that taking a closer look at the intellectual processes involved opens up the door to realize that the intellectual conceit of this is that of a 'pseudomorph', an 'inauthentic manifestation...of its original reality" (1983: 18).

Something as seemingly obvious as the pair 'worldliness' and 'unworldliness' – a dyad that is critical to the core of the secularization thesis – Blumenberg notes served radically different roles, functions, and meanings within the metaphors of different times and places. For instance, the early church of the first few centuries advocated a worldview in which salvation had already taken place, and that consequently the worldliness was already present. That secularization had come to pass. A notion that runs counter to a secularization thesis predicated upon progress, in which the act of salvation is placed completely outside of any conception of historical time.

Instead of looking to historical substances Blumenberg advocates an attentiveness to the emergence of questions that demand answers in specific cosmological and metaphorological contexts. These formations, that I term 'problem spaces', have temporal legs: they are pressing within the worldview of a given time and space, ever-present in their demands and neediness to be addressed, and because of that they can endure beyond the context of their asking. Even to the point in which the original configuration of the questions being asked are no longer coherent or relevant, but the answers continue to be a pervasive need. That within a rupture of thinking that the modern world marked – the establishment of the notion of an 'epoch' – it inherited sets of problem spaces within itself and then reoccupied them with new configurations derived from disparate elements out of a sense of necessity. Necessity to answer; to be able to answer these lingering
metaphysical qualms. Thus the concept of ‘legitimacy’ for the modern age does not derive from the ‘accomplishments of reason’, but rather from the necessity of those accomplishments.

Blumenberg is also quick to caution that we must free ourselves from the idea that there is a canon of great questions that have always preoccupied human curiosity (1983: 65). That the ‘civilizations’, ‘societies’, ‘cultures’, etc., have always turned to the same list of perplexing problems that constitute the ubiquitous figure of man. Again, spurring a position that could lead to ideas of historical substance, and all of the epistemological hazards that that includes, Blumenberg is careful to call for the need of attentiveness to the time and place in which questions emerge, and to the symbolic lexicon, the metaphorology, from which they draw upon. And from this the question for a philosopher is to see how the problems are broken, taken apart, reemerge, or are ‘reoccupied’ in different time periods and circumstances.

Problems. Problematizations. Problem spaces. Strange bedfellows for me as I was fumbling around in the dark searching for a way around, or through, objectivity, to the ‘beyond’, and a question of the activity of thinking. In considering this I have repeatedly invoked the rather vague, even wooly-headed, notion of ‘relational’. I beg the reader’s indulgence in this as I am trying to recreate my own passage along the thought process as it happened; and it was vague, and wooly-headed. I felt a sense of discomfort with the way the social sciences had been approaching the representation of technology, science, and society, and the first life-line I had found was this sense of ‘relational’. But not in Latour’s sense; not as a set of actors upon actors, masquerading objects and subjects, engaged in the analyst’s dance. This method seemed to preclude a great deal of investigation and reflection in a bull-headed rush to explanation, remote and with certitude. The relation I was groping towards was more akin to the elements of John Dewey’s ‘situation’. Dewey claimed that it is within the boundaries of a situation, boundaries imposed and created by the irritation that led to the situation being recognized – the problem, if you will – that the activity of ‘inquiry’ takes place. That the elements of this activity of inquiry are taken up from the old, and the new, but are not imperishable and absolute; they are relevant only in how they are part of the ‘situation’. I paraphrase, but Dewey struck me at the time because of an enigmatic remark I had read in an interview with Foucault once: that the issue of problematization is not one of deconstruction (and “...any confusion between these two methods would be unwise”!) (1994: 24). That:

…it is a question of a movement of critical analysis in which one tries to see how the different solutions to a problem have been constructed; but also how these different solutions result from a specific form of problematization. And it then appears that any new solution which might be added to the others would arise from current problematization, modifying only several of the postulates or principles on which one bases the responses that one gives. The work of philosophical and historical reflection is put back into the field of
It was here that I finally found some liberation in the question of ‘relation’ to that of the ‘activity of thinking’. All of my searching and interrogating of the relation of objects to subjects had been building up to a question of the distinction between the arrangement of representations to a ‘work of thought’. It is within the latter, the practice of thinking, that my ‘relation’ dwelt. And the problem was precisely in that this ‘practice’ had been circumscribed and isolated from the questions concerning objects (and objectivity), subjects, and actors. That somehow the logos, the act of reason and investigation, had become pure and unadulterated from a myriad of other human forms. That ‘thinking’ was the elite and aloof to the messy and malleable hybridity of being human that all the other practices encapsulated; only to be bridged (seemingly posthumously) in the art of ‘representation’. No, the relation I was searching for was not just a critique of objects in epistemology but one in which the activity of thinking was linked with anthropos as a problem space of its own. And by doing so was joined with the panoply of other human concerns, as intrinsic, and necessary, natura naturata and natura naturans. In short that the practice of thinking is somehow related to Weber’s ‘value’; that there is a relation to knowledge and knowing to the question of ‘how shall I live’?

Foucault had already scouted the terrain. In his final years of life his thought had turned to the practices of antiquity in which ‘care of the self’ had once been carefully bound, even in supremacy, to the old Delphic axiom of ‘know thyself’ (2005). The practices of ‘care of the self’ had been both an enabler to the goal of self knowledge, but also an endpoint: knowledge existed not as an absolute good, but in relation to its capacity to promote the ‘care of the self’, a eudaimonia of the art of living. It was a genealogical study and thus was not laced with nostalgic longing: Foucault wasn’t trying to recreate a Hellenistic world in the present; he was trying to ask novel questions about the place of thinking within the modern. The study led him to differentiate different forms of practice of thinking, noting that there were several in the classical West alone. Memory, meditation, and method had emerged and had extremely diverse expressions of activity and reflection to the question of the activity of thinking. And it was the latter, method, in which Foucault had found that the final break had taken place between knowledge and ‘care of the self’. Method as it is known in the modern world is precisely the activity of thought in which the self has no standing. The qualities of life – chaotic and given to mistake – as well as concerned with ethos and pathos, are removed precisely from a field of knowing. The life is interchangeable as long as the method is precise. Knowledge will emerge. And yet, this knowledge, will have no impact, no consequences, in the knowing of it to these questions of ‘care of the self’. Returning to Weber, it is a knowledge which cannot give value, and cannot answer the question of ‘how shall I live’, precisely because it is a knowledge that is completely separated from the knowing subject. In contrast Foucault labeled the other pair in the trinity of thought practices (memory and meditation) under a rubric of ‘spirituality’: forms of practice of thought in which the ‘care of the self’, and the subject as an ethical being, were
paramount in the pursuit and possibility of knowledge. That each of these practices had at times involved careful consideration of the ‘equipment’ used in practices of the self in order to prepare one for the consequences of knowing truth. And there was no way around this.

Again if we are wise and not inclined to deploy a jaundiced eye, or a powerful affect of nostalgia, to our genealogical reflections we can see that Foucault’s project was, as it was always, an exploration of contingency. A way of thinking about today through the lens of the past in such a way that ‘today’ was not out of necessity, but could be something different...and maybe even ‘better’. A place in which flourishing and care of the self had a serious role in the practice of inquiry and thought. That the game of representation, whose metaphysical separations were so physically embodied in the partitions in that Bangkok hotel, between the lecture hall of the representers and the entry foyer of the chattering and indifferent represented, wasn’t the only game in town when it came to thinking. That maybe it matters that the din of indifference on display that night (on both sides).

Problems. Problematizations. Problem spaces. At the risk of repetition and hazarding the annoyance of the reader, here we stand. Our fellow travelers had pointed to these places as a space to escape this ‘game of representation’ through novel and approximate forms of ‘relation’, between thought, thinker, and subject of knowing. To whit, to anthropos. And if Foucault most clearly blazed the trail by asking how yesterday matters to today, the demands of the ‘problems’ in their contingency (of Dewey’s situation) are such that they are also always looking to a relevance to tomorrow. When we ask these questions; when we are posed with these pressing problems; we are bound by a field of contingency of thought-objects at hand, those that are pressing in upon our present. But they are oriented to the dissolution, or at least, ‘determination’ of the problem space at hand. Such that it is tomorrow to which the activity of thought is directed. This is the space that the activity of thinking is found within: a space in which the question of the human figure, the anthropos, is ever anew. And it is bound by the formulations of the concerns of the situation, the ‘contemporary’ of thought-objects at deploy as ‘ideal types’ in trying to orient this figure towards the resolution of the problems of the day, with the figure of the tomorrow as being the pole star.

Or what difference does today make to tomorrow?

This book is an attempt to address these issues. In particular, the task at hand is to think about the deployment of technology in the configuration of affect in relation to an identity, ‘the Japanese’. Japan had started as a place of liminality in the research: the non-West modern, that didn’t quite fit the mold of so many classical narratives of modernity; the non-West, non-Judeo-Christian colonial power, so avidly depicted by Marxist historians as ‘feudal’, so that a rushing into ‘capitalism’ could be accomplished. Likewise, the non-West technical developer and exporter, that once more because it didn’t fit the dominant models of technology narrative demanded explanation, oftentimes reflexively in the practitioners themselves. But as my inquiry continued the questions turned more sharply towards an investigation of practices of affect and subjectivity. ‘What part did technology play in the development of a Japanese state identity?’ gradually transformed into a montage of narratives in which the technical simply met the
subjective, and the questions emerged from this meeting. For example, what is the force exerted by a practice of memory of the atomic bomb upon an ideal type of peace? And, in the representation of a national disaster what narrative tropes are invoked and hazarded in the contest of the ‘national experience’? Etc.

The chapters that follow are a set of exercises exploring the above. Thematically, they are linked by a concern with ‘technology’. And if there is one modest claim to novelty in these writings, it is that this may be the first work ‘about technology’ that doesn’t proffer a definition of ‘technology’ within the first thirty pages. I make no theory of ‘technology’ here; in the succeeding chapters technology writ large is a problem space: an analytic for the exploration of questions and answers that linger, and occasionally surface, within the discursive realm made apparent by the invocation of the ‘technical’. Specific technologies are problematizations. And in the spirit of Foucault’s concept, I look at them as a place where the political is defined through contests of strength, in the capacity to govern, in the necessity to legitimate.

Likewise this is a book about ‘Japan’, and yet I have no ‘theory’ of Japan to offer. No subject to decode, demystify, bury into, unwrap, or any of the other metaphors for penetration, illumination, and meta-narrative of the core of a ‘phenomenon’. Japan is not fixed for me, or I believe any of the actors-subjects involved. It is precisely this ‘un-fixity’ that is interesting to me: how at different times, and at different places, the notion of Japan has moved from being a static and tacit concept, to an active figure for articulation and dispute. Establishing the ‘really real’ or the ‘essential’ or the ‘origins’ of the phenomenon are typical rhetorical and conceptual moves in these debates, but are only of interest to me as examples of discursive reflection within the problematization that ‘Japan’ presents. Who are we? And why are we?

Finally, as one of the challenges of an anthropology of the contemporary is to transform one’s practice into an object of inquiry, the greatest difficulty in the composition of these writings was to resist the urge to ‘totalize’ the writings as a finished object, representing a ‘truth’. Instead I attempted to reflect upon my own writings as a series of episodes in the contemplation of these problems and problem spaces concerning ‘technology’ and ‘Japan’. In doing this I resisted the urge to transform and reinterpret; the chapters remain by a large as they were written in diverse settings (Japan and the US) at different times (from 2007 to 2012), as a type of narrative in which the juxtaposition of the chapters themselves would present a form of ‘archaeology of practice’. In saying this I mean that the project was autodidactic, and these words of the introduction represent a type of ‘endpoint’ for it. Recognizing Genette’s critique of the deception of narration – that the greatest illusion of the narrative act is that narration erases the acting in its appreciation; and this is wrong headed. (It is not that ‘Lord Jim’ said this, but that there was a great deal of saying that went into ‘Lord Jim’.) There was a great deal of saying that went into this problem of technology and Japan. The orientation for the saying was what I have attempted to explicate here, but the actually thinking, writing, researching was convoluted, conflictual, and confrontational at points. To reflect this the writings are organized in a multidimensional chronology. On one level the writings are presented chronologically according to the appearance of a technology of interest. Yet they are not subsequent in the sense of a development of an argument about either technology or Japan. There is no move towards perfectibility that I see in these arguments; no making either ‘more real’ as time goes by. And on another level the chapters represent discrete
attempts at reflection upon these problems, chronologically listed as they occurred and were argued. For example, the first chapter ‘The Empire of Paper’ was written shortly after I began struggling with the conceptual problems that occurred to me in Bangkok. It is an early attempt in which strategies of representation conflict with social science norms: invocation of society, economy, history, etc., continue in an occasionally un-reflexive manner. Contrastingly is the next chapter, ‘The Imperial Engine’, confronts the development of trains with the emergence of the modern state. I read this as an attempt to create a problem space that doesn’t rely upon ‘society’ or ‘history’ in its explorations. The hope is that the reader can learn more from an observation of the practice and development of the inquiry practiced through a sort of ‘temporal transparency’, which reflected my own thinking – imperfect and confused – over time.

Perhaps it is needless to say that this book does not follow the classical anthropological tactic of establishing a place or a people and then describing the world either as endless reproduction, or an approaching event. Neither does it follow a more recent trend of starting from a conflict point and extending outwards into participant networks, and subsidiary dilemmas. By that I wish to place myself in the contemporary; even though I occasionally write about issues of the 17th century. It is the contemporary because the problems are assembled by what is available now – in the logos of history, social theory, and the concerns of the political and the anthropos. And it is the contemporary in that the assemblage itself is part of the problem space of the investigation. That here in the composition of a problem and finding its connection to other problems, being aware of this process and activity, of thinking in relation to these thought-objects, and its corresponding background of ethos, pathos, and (malleable) logoi, is where the real possibility for thought takes place. Here is if not the ‘final answer’ to my initial question of what is the activity of thinking to be discovered; it is the place for an exercise in it.
1 Empire of Paper

Benedict Anderson’s seminal work, *Imagined Communities*, puts forward a treatment of the “great sacral cultures”. Anderson states, “All the great classical communities conceived of themselves as cosmically central, through the medium of a sacred language linked to a superterrestrial order of power” (2006: 13). China, as the “Middle Kingdom”, was not imagined as a totality by way of a paradigm of ethnic nationalism, but as a “center” through the enormous symbolic significance of its writing. The fundamental indestructibility of its ideograms, as a metonymy for the natural world/ experience of being, ensured a dynamic continuity of the imaginary of the Middle Kingdom despite the fluid movements of peoples and tongues across its myriad jurisdictions (political-military-economic). The barbarian could be encouraged to learn the ideograms and hence be absorbed into the Middle Kingdom because the ideograms served as the imperishable carrier and resource of the episteme of Being Human. Therefore ‘being human’ was a question of degree of proximity to the imaginary, symbol-laden center: a zero-sum game of the possession – or absence – of “civilization”.

Anderson’s account of the “classical communities” is a totalizing model, which glosses over a great deal of potential striation in the composition of the figure of man – i.e. through more carefully nuanced examinations of classical discourses of identity and polity – in order to present us with a *typos* from which the epoch-rupturing event of the genesis of the nation-concept (the main theme of his work) can emerge. It is with the same Weberian, and hopefully, productive, spirit that I wish to extend his argument to the discourses of civilization found among the literate peoples of the Tokugawa polity. For our purpose of tracing transformations within the Japanese episteme of civilization, Anderson’s “sacral cultures” type provides a useful framework and horizon line to serve as a starting point in our investigation of the imaginary of the “figure of man” practiced among the people of the archipelago. Thus our baseline will be the assertion that as the early Tokugawa literati occupy a periphery of the Middle Kingdom symbolic order, they share its central tenets that mastery of its symbolic language corresponded with a perfectibility of being human, and that this composed the prime axis of measuring difference and similitude of a “people”. Perfunctory evidence for this position can be found in the extant writings about two of the alterities within the Tokugawa experience. One being the “near foreign” of the Ainu peoples, composed over millennia of conflict and settlement, they had gradually been pushed further and further into the northern stretches of the islands. In the Tokugawa, or Edo period8, we find the first systematic writings about the Ainu as a field of inquiry, written by map-makers and emissaries dispatched to the north by the shogunate. In their accounts, difference was rendered as absences of *bunmei* (“civilization”), most centrally, that of written language. Critically, the Ainu people were not seen as

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8 In reference to the Tokugawa ruling family moving the seat of government to the city of Edo, modern Tokyo.
intrinsically alien, only untutored\textsuperscript{9} (Shimizu and Van Bremens 2003). The other example being the presence of the “southern barbarians”\textsuperscript{10} from the distant exotica of Europe, they were gradually limited to one Dutch factory on an artificial island in the bay fronting the city of Nagasaki. Within the verbose world of the “neo-Confucian academies”, one point of debate in regards to the European was whether or not they qualified as human beings; absence of a knowledge of written Chinese being the stickler point (Keene 1969: 22).

The task before us then is to try to examine some of the transformations in this episteme over the long centuries of relative isolation under Tokugawa hegemony. The rapidity of the rise of a modern bureaucratic nation-state in the succeeding Meiji period has long been attributed to socio-economic and cultural developments in the Tokugawa era. Indeed, as the words “early modern” have nearly become a mandatory prefix for this time period among historians and social theorists, the common image of the static “closed country” of popular histories has been replaced with one of a society in crisis, riven by a host of conflicts/contradictions, that often erupted in violence, leaving us with a new image not of quiet, lethargic containment of the bucolic and anachronistic, but a bubbling cauldron of social and philosophical oppositions. For myself, following the work of Bellah, Maruyama, Najita (among others), the most fascinating transformations can be found within the conceptual lexicon of the period, chief among them, the contributions to a new model of \textit{anthropos}. As our launch point for this investigation is the ‘cyborg’, the ‘technical’ cum ‘the human’, (Haraway 1991), our problem, more specifically articulated, is to investigate these transformations through the medium of the bio-technical. How did technological transformations in the Tokugawa period alter the experience of being human to such an extent that a new imaginary of the same emerged?

\textbf{Tokugawa Publishing}

With little temerity we can hazard a generalization that the Tokugawa polity, despite the growing evidence of the porous nature of the so-called “closed country” (\textit{sakoku}) policy, was characterized by a remarkable degree of regulation concerning the movement of bodies within its domain. Movement within the country was painstakingly regulated: from the residency of the lowest outcaste to the semiannual mandated “visits” of the regional \textit{daimyo} to Edo. While efforts to circumvent these regulations occurred over the course of the era, and quickly became topics of popular legend and folklore, the ultimate boundary, the “national” boundary marking the extremity of Tokugawa rule, remained a towering obstacle to the free

\textsuperscript{9} And by late Tokugawa there were urgings of the moral responsibility of the shogunate to extend the light of civilization to these peoples. Arguments that would reappear again within a Meiji state framework.

\textsuperscript{10} Known so because their ships consistently arrived from Japan’s southern seas: the direction of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century colonies of Macao and the Philippines.
movement of people. This makes the preceding "long 16th century" all the more striking for the sheer dynamism in the movements of the people beyond the archipelago. While the embassy to China was ended in 1547, illegal trade continued, and Japanese piracy soon flourished up and down the coasts of the South China Sea (Nosco 1990: 47). Japanese traders operated in several kingdoms in South East Asia, and its mercenaries could be found in the employ of the rulers of Siam as well as the newly founded European colonies. Spanish, Portuguese, English traders and military advisors were similarly employed by the various Japanese warlords. In the following decades, Andes silver, by way of the Philippines, flooded the markets of China, and the Spanish Real coin soon replaced the Chinese bronze and copper coins as the premiere medium for trade. The resulting demand for silver was one that Japanese lords and traders would soon capitalize on with the rich silver deposits of the islands, and it is estimated that by the start of the 17th century 30% of the world’s silver production was emerging from Japanese mines (Miyamoto and Shikano 2003: 172). So far flung were the flows of communication and people in this era, that the dominant warlord of the time, Oda Nobunaga, briefly contemplated sending an expeditionary army to South America to aid his European allies.

Certainly the most prominent example of the “international” focus of the political elite of the era would be the pair of unsuccessful invasions of the mainland launched by Nobunaga’s successor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 1592 and 1594. Hideyoshi’s military adventures were noteworthy not only for the breadth of their ambition - nothing less than the conquest of the Middle Kingdom and beyond – but also for the technological changes of the social milieu that they so strikingly illuminated. Well known is that one of the key components to Hideyoshi’s military successes was his incorporation of disciplined use of mass firearms, first arriving to Japan in 1543, and initially innovatively deployed by Nobunaga (Perrin 1979). Not as widely known is that Hideyoshi himself was the innovator of a revolution in spatial governance. As part of his preparations for the invasion in 1591 Hideyoshi commanded that all lords serving him were to conduct cadastral surveys of their

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11 Notably the Satsuma domain conquest of the Ryukyu Kingdom fell before the official edicts of sakoku in 1633-1639. Following the edicts, travel beyond the main islands was limited to shogun emissaries, and fishermen tossed upon distant shores by the vagaries of ocean storms and currents. Several of which were in turn transported to St. Petersburg to establish the world's earliest foreign academy for the study of the Japanese language (Keene 1969).
12 This contrast to Europe’s long 16th century is made by Arnason (1997). Pointing to similar centrifugal and centripetal forces which allowed for the emergence of critical modern ‘rational’ forms.
13 Hideyoshi’s plan was specifically to conquer Korea, China, and the Philippines; the latter made under the (correct) impression that the Spanish garrison there was small and vulnerable. Hideyoshi’s ambition was taken seriously by contemporaries: before the invasion several of his vassals were discussing how to divide the Chinese provinces amongst themselves, and a letter survives in which one of them is addressed as Lord of Taishu (in Chekiang Province, China) (Perrin 1979: 101).
territories, with accompanying maps. The surveys and maps broke with convention in several critical ways. For example, the object of the maps wasn’t to be any explicit political unity: the lords were not ordered to survey their own domains, or even the particularity of villages within them, but were commanded to create maps based on ancient divisions into “counties” (gun). The selection of the county emphasized the arbitrariness of the dominal territories themselves, and instead stressed divisions which could become politically fungible, as through realpolitik, the feudal domains reduced or enlarged in size, or as increasingly became the case, lords were relocated at fiat from the new central authority. Furthermore, the cadastral surveys were deployed by Hideyoshi as an administrative touchstone for his planned invasions. No longer would troop conscription be based on negotiations between lords rooted in feudal contractual obligations or strategic proximities, neither would they be based on a logic of naive empiricism, via counting able bodies, instead all lords were directed to provide a number of men at a ratio of the respective gross rice harvest as reported in their surveys (Berry 2006: 81).

At first blush, Hideyoshi’s administration through abstraction of spatial territory and the creation of documented archives, would at least encourage reflections on Weber’s rationalization as historical force, and the resultant rise of modern bureaucracies. Yet these developments also foreshadow the thoroughly modern preoccupation with management of the “population” (Foucault 2008). Hideyoshi’s field of record making was still concerned only with a “problem of lack”: measurements were made to determine the availability of able-bodied men for the invasion force, which in itself is an ancient practice. But the manner in which Hideyoshi’s government went about organizing the information, and then deploying it as policy, betrays the creep of techniques of normalization, in which statistics – the “science of the state” – will become preoccupied with mapping predictability of bodies in life patterns onto similar spaces of territorial abstraction (Foucault 2008).

For now we will leave these arguments as tentative context for the milieu in which this late 16th century “internationalism” operates, and instead turn towards a pair of products which resulted from the unsuccessful invasion. The first is the windfall of captured Sino-Korean philosophical writings, chiefly of the “neo-Confucian” school, which were brought back to Japan by the returning armies, and would in a number of decades help to create a renaissance of literary and philosophical academies in the islands. The other, and more central to our argument at this time, was the return of printing technology based on moveable type.

To appreciate the long-term impacts of these developments, if we follow the retreating combatants with their stolen goods back to the Japanese islands, we find a land already in the midst of social and political turmoil. In 1598 Hideyoshi dies and the various warlords position themselves until the battle of Sekigahara in 1600 which resolved the situation decisively in favor of the Tokugawa clan under the

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14 Mary Elizabeth Berry notes that as this process continued it transformed the conceptual criterion of the daimyo from territorial lords, in which family, history, and place were closely interconnected, to “lords who could govern territory”. In effect, transforming lordship into an administrative role (2006: 81).
leadership of the charismatic Ieyasu. Ieyasu inherits Hideyoshi’s vast military juggernaut but abandons plans for mainland conquest. Instead he codifies a set of political and social reforms to demilitarize the country and ensure the ongoing supremacy of the Tokugawa line. Among these edicts, Ieyasu continues Hideyoshi’s policy of concentrating the technology of violence within the hands of a newly declared social class of samurai (“those who serve”) by continuing to prosecute the “sword hunt” among the villages of the countryside, confiscating weapons from peasants and commoners, and instilling a system of regulation to monitor the production of same (most notably a Tokugawa monopoly on the future production of firearms) (Perrin 1979). But Ieyasu goes further by marking the samurai as a hereditary status, thus creating a (more-or-less) secure biopolitical boundary for the class. The fluid mercenary world of the 15th and 16th centuries, in which anyone of ambition could arm themselves - or were armed by desperate lords - was ended and a world in which recorded genealogies justifying class, and its myriad social responsibilities and privileges, was initiated. Moreover, under Tokugawa hegemony the samurai were formally forbidden to own land, a privilege now reserved for the daimyo lords alone (who were carefully monitored by the central authority), thus commencing a very non-(European) feudal separation of the elite warrior class from an agrarian base. Instead the samurai, who constituted an estimated 7-8% of the total population, were offered a choice: surrender their swords and cease being samurai so they could stay on their farmlands, or move to the castle-towns of the daimyo and become economically dependent on the largesse of their lords, who would reward them stipends paid in koku (about 5.1 bushels) of rice. While a comparative few chose the former, retiring with their servants, wealth, and education to the countryside, and thus becoming something of a de facto local elite despite losing their titular privileges (Walthall 1986: 7), the majority opted to enter the new political and social topography of the castle town. As this new salaried class, now cut off from traditional supports of village agrarian society, migrated to urban centers, a market arose to satisfy their demands for the basic - and not-so-basic - necessities of life, creating a much larger ripple effect among the population at large; gradually sending more and more people in search of opportunity to the castle towns. Over the decades these towns swelled in size.

The urbanization of the Japanese islands in the 17th century is one of the most striking social developments of the era, and nearly unprecedented in world history. In the years from 1575 to 1700 the percentage of people living in towns of over 10,000 increased ten fold, constituting 10% of the total population by 1700 (Nosco 1990: 19). Over the course of the 17th century, twenty castle towns arose with populations over 70,000 each (Berry 2006: 28), among these were the three “mega cities” of Kyoto, Osaka, and Edo. By this time, Kyoto and Osaka had

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15 It is worth noting that though Hideyoshi implemented this program in 1588, it is estimated that 35 years was required for its completion (Walthall 1986: xiv).
16 E.g. Hideyoshi himself who hailed from peasant stock.
17 With some exceptions among the merchant and scholar classes. However, even some of these landowners were officially endowed with daimyo like privileges, such as the symbolic bearing of swords (see Najita 1974).
populations of 400,000 and 350,000 respectively, rivaling the European capitals of London and Paris. The Tokugawa capital city, Edo, had over a million urbanites walking its streets, making it the world’s largest city (Nosco 1990: 19).

To stress the European comparisons one more striking statistic is in order: by the end of the 17th century, Japan’s total population is estimated to be 30 million. Of this, 5-7% resided in cities of a 100,000 or more. Comparatively, in Europe just 2-3% did so; only England, and the Netherlands approached the urban drift of the Tokugawa polity (Nosco 1990: 20). Looking at the trends over the course of the Tokugawa era, Historian John W. Hall stated without exaggeration that it is “...hard to find a parallel period of urban construction in world history” (Hall 1955; quoted in Nosco 1990: 19).

This mass urban migration coincided with equally extensive infrastructure construction\(^\text{18}\) and the overall strengthening of trading networks within and outside the polity. Salaried labor spread throughout all strata of society – from the aforementioned samurai cum administrator-bureaucrats, to the poor day laborers that flocked to the cities from the countryside. In modern parlance, the silver production fed trade with China which in turn allowed for dramatic expansions of the economy, as well as brought a return in larger quantities of luxury items. Nascent businesses in the city also benefited from Hideyoshi’s dissolution of the medieval guild systems which had monopolized various trades and their associated craft knowledges (Berry 2006; Morris-Suzuki 1999). Entrepreneurial spirit led to competition for new markets and new customers. The result of this concoction of socio-economic conditions was an explosion in what Mary Elizabeth Berry calls “mid-market enterprises”: goods and services that existed between the poles of “necessity and extravagance” and were targeted to consumers beyond the traditional aristocracy (2006: 29).

Among these “mid-market enterprises” was the publishing industry. Its rapid growth appears to have been fueled by the captured technologies returned from the mainland. It is worth noting that the Japanese islanders had previously been aware of the existence of moveable type and yet had not adopted it on any wide scale. This fact would seem to give support to historian of print Elizabeth Eisenstein’s observation that, “It is instructive to look outside the boundaries of Western Christendom if only in order to learn that the mere introduction of a new technology tells us little about the uses to which it will be put. No doubt the difference between uneven development in Asia and rapid exploitation in the West has something to do with the difference between ideographic and alphabetic systems of writing” (2005: 335). Yet I disagree and believe that the Japanese historical circumstances discourage a quick, general conclusion based on the awkwardness of the Chinese ideographs (much of the leg work of the publishing was soon assumed by the “syllabic” kana systems), to one which interrogates the complexity inherent in any technology “introduction”. As has been documented

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\(^{18}\) The Tokugawa shogunate constructed five major roadways in the early years. German physician, Engelbert Kaempfer, a resident of the Dutch trading post in Nagasaki wrote, “on some days more crowded than the public streets in any of the most populous towns of Europe” (Nosco 1990: 28).
elsewhere, technological movement is not the movement of imperishable units of incorruptible character (De Laet 2002). It is a complex negotiation of multiple political, economic and ideological actors. In the Tokugawa case, the fact that scattered medieval temples were aware of the possibility of moveable print did not constitute an “introduction”. That had to wait until the relative stability of the Tokugawa era which provided the economic incentives for competition among publishers working outside the temples and guild systems to take advantage of the new technology that appeared before them in tangible potential in the form of the stolen devices returned by Hideyoshi’s armies.

What we can say with some certainty is that the confluence of the many previous mentioned social developments – urbanism, economic growth and deregulation, etc. – combined with the catalyst of working moveable type models, launched a new era of publishing in the isles which was on a quantitatively different scale than any preceding. The first secular work published in Japan, the Setsuyoshu dictionary, appeared at the advent of the Korean wars in 1591. The first commercial publications followed in 1609 (Nosco 1990: 26). Some 500 titles were printed in Japan from the years 1593 and 1625, and of these 80% were produced via the new moveable type method (Berry 2006: 31).

While the new technology was gradually abandoned in the following decades, due to the cost efficiency of utilizing older wood-block printing methods, the surge in popular publishing initiated by the novelty of the new technology continued unabated. Commercial publishing grew at a steady rate: by 1700 there were a 100 bookshops in Kyoto alone. By 1659 the amount of published literature was so vast that booksellers began printing catalogues to aid their customers (Berry 2006: 1). At the end of the century tens of thousands of pages were printed annually.

To feed the voracious demand of the publishing houses paper production boomed in the countryside. In many domains, paper production was a privileged monopoly of the daimyo. The planting of paper producing mulberry trees and the production of paper became a popular form of corvee labor (buyaku) for cash-strapped lords (Walthall 1986: 72). Economic innovators in the castles would loan to villages the seeds to plant the mulberry trees and the technical means for paper production. Certain domains (e.g. Tosa) became closely associated with paper production in the Tokugawa era.

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19 In modern contexts we have studies documenting technology transfer for development purposes that often have results far different from the intended donor. Machines break, are repurposed to suit different needs-ideas, or serve different functions within a cultural economy or imaginary (De Laet 2002).

20 Block printing proved to have several advantages over moveable type. One was the easy issuing of reprints by simply recovering stored blocks. The block themselves could also be traded among firms and proved to be an asset in themselves. They also allowed for an easier integration of illustrations and other visual elements into texts (Morris-Suzuki 1999).

21 In Tosa’s case, the industry had historical roots in a gift made by the domain lord of fine paper to Ieyasu, following the victory at Sekigahara (Walthall 1986: 74).
As the era progressed, publishing only expanded. In Edo alone the number of books published between 1730 and 1770 doubled. Popular titles produced in the closing decades of the 18th century could sell as many as 10,000 copies each. By the early 19th century there were 917 publishers in Edo, 494 in Kyoto, and 504 in Osaka (Burns 2003: 27).

Thus even a quick and superficial overview of the data available in general histories leads to the conclusion that the Tokugawa world was one increasingly inundated by the printed page. The next question then is, to quote historian Roger Chartier, “...how did increased circulation of printed matter transform forms of sociability, permit new modes of thought, and change people’s relationship with power?” (1992: 3).

A few tentative thoughts can be put forward. Firstly, with expanded access to printed material we find rapid expansion of record keeping at all levels of governance. From the Shogun courts to lowly merchant houses, the city of Edo was marked by an explosion in paper-based bureaucracy. Much of this has been attributed to the new complexity of the polity that the Tokugawa had crafted – encompassing a wide swathe of occasionally mutually unintelligible dialects and socio-political traditions - fashioning a field of legal authority required extensive written codes in order to establish an inclusive social architecture. One example of this being the extensive personnel rosters (the “military mirrors”) published throughout the Tokugawa period (Berry 2006). These were detailed accounts of lords, vassals, and servants from the various domains complete with descriptions of feudal incomes, associated family crests and colors, titles, historical genealogies, etc., that were organized into divisions based on profession (from musketeer to innkeeper). Though the material for the rosters was provided by the central authorities, they were published privately in a competitive commercial market, to meet the demand among the warrior class and those servicing them for accurate and timely information about their peers and superiors (recognition and etiquette being prime concerns). One roster published in 1683 included names of 1700 officials divided into 250 job categories (Berry 2006: 106). Tens of thousands of the “military mirrors” were published annually.

Reference to printed materials in administration led to standardization of practices. In the personnel rosters, categories for occupations emerged and stabilized along carefully constructed hierarchies of feudal income. Moreover, standardization was found in many practices of various organizations. Ordinances, decrees, and new laws were announced publicly throughout the country and posted in villages and towns. Laws were recorded and preserved in expanding libraries of the Shogun and domain governments. Even within the merchant houses we find a rapid standardization of practices and prices over large stretches of the country. By the beginning of the 18th century a market recorded and modulated on the printed page, began homogenizing prices throughout the Tokugawa polity to such an extent that the price of rice scarcely varied from region (Walthall 1986: 7).

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22 Lords were listed not geographically or by political association with the Tokugawa clan, but by the simple quantitative evaluation of gross domain productivity (Berry 2006: 112). This system survived for over two hundred years.
Secondly, in attempting to trace the transformations in peoples’ relationships to power, we should consider the form and content of the printed material. Unlike preceding eras which focused on religious tracts written in Chinese characters, publishing in Tokugawa was predominantly in the vernacular. Moreover, while Chinese characters continued to be utilized they were heavily supplemented by simplified scripts of kana to provide the reader with interpretive and pronunciation aid. This shift from the Chinese of the erudite literati and towards a simpler “folk script” targeted towards the less educated is paralleled in the broader penetration of the written word both via degree of “literacy”23, and through a risk-taking and expansionist publishing market. It is known that book peddlers in the Tokugawa era traveled throughout the rural world (Burns 2003: 27). Even remote villages were gifted with libraries in the homes of local elites, and village records attest to widespread circulation of printed matters relating to events of the day (Walthall 1986: 50). Moreover, the number of publishers operating outside the major urban centers increased ten fold between the 17th and 19th centuries (Burns 2003: 27). Within the cities, the commercial library first made its appearance, allowing for the borrowing of books at low cost, and thus bringing the printed page to ever more households (Morris-Suzuki 1999: 33).

Content diversified to suit new audiences. Topics ranging from politics and history to the burlesque and bawdy made their way into print. In 1682, *Life of an Amorous Man, (Koshoku Ichidai Otoko)* was published, and in its first printing sold over a thousand copies, marking the first time that an author of fiction could support himself through publication of his work24 (Nosco 1990: 27). From as early as the 1650s, connoisseurs could acquire detailed rosters of prostitutes and actors.25 And parodies of officials, nobles, greedy merchants, and stupid peasants were in common supply. One predominantly shared characteristic of the fiction of the age was an earnest preoccupation of economic woes, as faced by sundry protagonists hailing from diverse social classes (Nosco 1990: 23).

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23 To return to Chartier, his point concerning the division of “literate” from “illiterate” in early modern France as being a brute distinction that “…does not exhaust the full range of differences in the reader’s relation to writing” is well applied to the Japanese early modern case (1992: 4). Where signboards with simple Chinese characters were prominent in rural villages, and thus many peasants were at least familiar with limited sets of characters. One can imagine that even among the well educated merchant classes, familiarity with kana characters utilized in businesses practices would be stronger than scholarly Chinese. Early modern Japan, like France, had many different possible readers relationships to many different vernaculars, and written scripts.

24 It is interesting to note that a 1690 French dictionary had seven different meanings for the word “author”, and a writer of books is listed last. Chartier argues that the meaning of author as “one who has written a book” did not emerge in Europe until following the revolution in print which allowed for a broader circulation of one’s work to a reading public (1992: 41).

With words being put on page and distributed to more and more people of varying backgrounds we find that the figure of the reader becomes an object of experimentation. Elizabeth Berry notes that one of the more striking facts of literature in the Tokugawa period is the discovery of the figure of the “ordinary man” as reader. In her account of a travel guide written by Confucian scholar Kaibara Ekiken in 1706, what is remarkable is that the target of the authorial voice are not pilgrims, or travelers within a guild, professional, or otherwise, but merely “ordinary people”, often specified as “pleasure seekers” (yuujin) (2006: 191). In Ekiken’s voluminous suggestions for sightseers, social class or religious association does not enter, except with the occasional admissions that “ordinary people” could enter a site only on such and such a day or with certain contacts. This generalized reader was not unique, and Ekiken’s tone was becoming widespread throughout the extant literature. While some philosophers continued to target specific communities, more often authors were engaging in a grand imaginary experiment of creating a reader who did not possess the special characteristics of class or regional affiliation. In its place was this startling figure of the “ordinary man”, the “everyman” who, while notably gendered, was already assumed to have a set of shared characteristics: education to some extent in historical, Confucian, and Buddhist writings, disposable income and a willingness to use it in search of pleasure for the “self”, and thus an identity that somehow preceded, or at least could be detached from associations of family, local community, religious organization, and craft. The pleasure seeker, while still a subject within Tokugawa political realities, was surprisingly atomistic in the accounts of writers like Ekiken: an individual seeking their own education, and gratification.

That the writers of the time period were experimenting in creating associations within a broader swath of the new reading public should not surprise us. But what is noteworthy is the degree to which imitation and production within the printed world led to the distillation of this reader figure over just a few short decades. Writers and publishers were making an economic and political wager that this psychologically isolated individual existed, and that through the process of reading a printed page, this individual could be discovered – both by publisher and reader. It was a marvelous experiment in readers: a quest in search for a new figure, that was only in its most modest appraisals, a “search”, and could be more accurately depicted as a strategic fabrication. The reader was imperative for the publishing industry; however, he and she was also needed as a subject of the new literate political order. Therefore, the reader was created.

**Crisis**

Chartier tells us, “The book always aims at installing an order, whether it is the order in which it is deciphered, the order in which it is to be understood, or the order intended by the authority who commanded or permitted the work.” But also that, “Reader use infinite numbers of subterfuges to procure prohibited books, to

26 E.g. Nishikawa Joken, whose morale treatises were targeted at specific groups within the Confucian hierarchy (Berry 2006: 207).
read between the lines, and to subvert the lessons imposed on them” (1992: viii). In Tokugawa Japan, administrative standardization and experiments in reader uniformity were common, and yet as Chartier observed, one does not have to look far to see the socially and politically subversive impact of the spread of the printed page.

For the Tokugawa period, regardless of a popular image of being the “long peace”, is one marred by extraordinary acts of popular violence. Rural peasants, whom despite massive urbanization still comprised about 85% of the population (Walthall 1986: 3), rose into violent action against feudal and merchant authorities in expanding numbers and frequency. Peasant uprisings rose from an average of 4.9 a year throughout the Tokugawa domain in the 17th century, to an average of 14.4 a year in the latter half of the 18th century (Burns 2003: 23). The turbulent decade of the 1780s, marred by extreme famines27 and social unrest, witnessed an average of 22.9 protests a year (Walthall 1986: xi). These riots were not always local or small-scale events: the Edo riots of 1787 involved thousands, with almost one thousand homes in the Shogun’s capitol city destroyed. Accounts of this event spread as far afield as Nagasaki newprints (Walthall 1986: 120).

While it is tempting to interpret these events in the maturing Tokugawa polity as reflections of a rather strident social bifurcation: on one extreme, within the city confines dwelled an expanding proto-bourgeoisie with habits for conspicuous consumption and literacy, a group who savored la douceur de vivre (Nosco 1990: 16); beyond the walls, the unwashed and the unlettered. Thus concluding that publishing technology and the new expansion of the printed word had little import for the violent actions of the latter. However, closer examinations of the riots show that the “proletariat”, lumpen or otherwise, was closely engaged with the world of print.

In Anne Walthall’s account, Social Protest and Popular Culture in Eighteenth Century Japan, we find that peasant riots caused a great deal of ink to be spilled. Victims of attacks during riots submitted damage reports; officials, both warrior and commoner, sent urgent warnings and memos of all kinds to their superiors, before and after the event; prisoners held by the authorities, often within the villages where the protests occurred, were tortured and interrogated into confessions, which were in turn carefully recorded (Walthall 1986: 13). Ultimately all of these documents landed within official archives, leaving a broad and detailed account of many of these events. This only goes to underscore the importance of text to the rural community. Village notables, some who were descendents of the samurai that had forsaken the sword in Ieyasu’s day, others relatively nouveau riche brought on by the bustling trade under the Tokugawa regime, were by and large a literate group. The hereditary village leaders (honbyakusho or ononabyakuso) were responsible for organizing work groups to satisfy corvee labor demands of the lords, as well as accounting for and paying the taxes of the community.28 Literacy for

27 Kikuchi Isao estimates that approximately 300,000 died of starvation in the peak famine of 1783-1784 (Burns 2003: 24).

28 The village was treated as a collective legal unit: all taxes and work levies were targeted at the village level (Walthall 1986: 1).
these activities was an imperative: writing tax records and keeping rotating labor records were regularly a part of the village leaders duties (Walthall 1986: 1). Furthermore, the placard was a prime medium for communication between the castle authorities and rural village. New ordnances were posted regularly in town and it was the responsibility of the village leaders to read, understand, and explain the ordnances in order to ensure the obedience of the community.\textsuperscript{29} Regulations, in the form of ledgers explaining the express duties of village leaders were issued to the five-man groups (\textit{goningumi}) responsible for mutual surveillance and maintaining order in villages (Walthall 1986: 14).\textsuperscript{30}

As the Tokugawa period progressed we also find increasing evidence for literacy beyond the village headmen. By the 18\textsuperscript{th} century personal diaries had made an appearance among the educated in the village communities (Walthall 1986: 146). The diaries, along with official village records, often carried accounts of happenings, both local and distant. And records of riot damage attest to the spread of village libraries in the homes of wealthier members. Ronald Dore’s classic account of education in the Tokugawa period asserts that by the close of the era literacy rates reached 40-50\% of the male population, higher than anywhere except perhaps England and Holland (in Jansen 1965: 99). So it should not surprise us that far from being spontaneous uprisings of dissatisfied, illiterate peasants, social protests in the Tokugawa period were extremely literary events. Anne Walthall’s account tells us that the typical peasant protest event began with a flurry of writing. First there were written appeals to the lords, either in the form of requests for new tax appraisals,\textsuperscript{31} which typically began the negotiating process, to the direct petitions of lords for interventions in terms of administering aid or addressing perceived injustice (1986: 49). The response from the authorities in turn would typically be in the form of a written reprimand (rarely a concession), stating peasant “traditional” duties and responsibilities. This would be followed by a series of petitions exchanged within and beyond the village examining the conditions and the claims.

\textsuperscript{29} The 1741 prohibition of group efforts to make appeals was first required to be read to the community as a whole by the village headmen, then posted in public, and finally, copied and hung in every dwelling within the village (Walthall 1986: 20).

\textsuperscript{30} It should be observed, that the Tokugawa rural scene was a predominantly demilitarized one: the samurai had been relocated to castle towns, leaving the countryside relatively empty of a sword-bearing warrior presence. This meant that the feudal lords were highly dependent on the village communities themselves to maintain quotidian discipline. It also meant that when regular mechanisms for this discipline failed, police intervention was often days away. This resulted in the Tokugawa central authority passing an ordinance in 1740 which commanded lords of even neighboring territories to intervene in peasant uprisings if they were more proximate to the disturbance (Walthall 1986: 4).

\textsuperscript{31} In the 17\textsuperscript{th} century instead of annually assessing tax rates based on crop inspection, a system of fixed rates based on “averages” for a number of years was implemented. Needless to say this meant that vagaries of price markets, weather, pestilence, and public policy could severely affect yield and yet not alter tax rates (Walthall 1986: 9).
Before any protest began, clandestine meetings would often be held by villagers where “manifestos” outlining their grievances as well as their projected responsibilities and duties for the following protest would be written, and then signed by the participants\(^{32}\) (1986: 26).

Of this process, it is the series of written negotiations among the lord and various village parties that returns us to the impact of the world of publishing. A typical village petition began with the words, “Fearfully we offer up a written petition,” before moving to the details of the current crisis - and details were abundant. In petition after petition peasants referred to records of tax rates, transaction prices, administrative rules, etc. In short a broad canvas of written precedents were used to argue towards the injustice of their conditions. For example, one community, arguing over prices for sardines wrote, “originally around 1700, dried sardines cost twenty to twenty-five silver monme for one horse-load. Then in the 1750s, the price rose from seventy or eighty monme to one hundred monme. Now the price has been driven up from eighty to ninety monme to one hundred-fifty monme” (Walthall 1986: 79). This was not an isolated example: in 1788 province wide appeals from 160 villages in Kinai used historical records as a model to argue for market reforms in the trade of rapeseed and fertilizer (Walthall 1986: 78). Within communities as well we find that documents were utilized to press land disputes. And in several cases suits were brought against local village leaders for mismanagement of village finances, based upon analysis of records. The result of one of these cases was that the headman was forced to make village records public so that his accounting could be reviewed by other members of the community (Walthall 1986: 104).

The lords’ response was typically not to dispute the specifics of the arguments, but to resist entering into a discussion of historical particularities at all. Peasants and lords had a relationship that existed beyond the temporal realm of written history. The arguments were couched in language borrowed from Confucianism, Buddhism, and other doctrines, but fundamentally argued that the relationship of benevolent lord to obedient peasant was based in superhistorical, “natural” conditions. However, the rationality of these arguments was curtailed somewhat in Tokugawa society by the sheer prominence of justification of political and legal conditions by codification. Beginning with the thousands of annually published pages of the Military Mirrors, the lords sovereignty was based in painstakingly detailed accounts of genealogies, along with historical associations

\[^{32}\text{As the consequence to the protest would invariably be severe, it was important for the village to act as a unanimous group; support would be sought often with the threat of violence. But the act of moving beyond the “traditional” passive role of obedient vassals that the decision to resist was visibly detailed in these written documents with names displayed, thus ensuring a distribution of responsibility, and inevitable, punishment, within the community. The punishment went beyond corporal incarceration or execution, and included levying cost of any associated trials for the riot to the village community (Walthall 1986: 38). The result is that despite the thousands of protests during the Tokugawa era it is extremely unusual to find any particular village engaging in one more than once.}\]
with the definitive day of the Battle of Sekigahara. The feudal lords’ legitimacy was staked in these lengthy family rosters, which often made colorful connections with classical, and/or mythical, noble lines, as well as accounts of the realpolitik strategic posturing with the Tokugawa clan before Sekigahara. The Tokugawa themselves were not exempt from this posturing: central political sovereignty was based as well in genealogical associations with the Imperial line, as well as a historical narrative of effectiveness and success; Tokugawa rule was underwritten by its military and political success, which were referred to repeatedly in these documents. Beyond the Mirrors though we find that the bureaucratic world of Tokugawa era governance was one in which acts of sovereignty were dominated by codified precedents and legal statutes. The lords desired to, and did, state their sovereign actions in terms of natural law derived from the Confucian Way, but the specific actions of the feudal state were often dictated by weighty tomes describing obligations, duties, the permissible, and the not (Walthall 1986: 56). Regulations ruled acts of state within the polity, and reference to the written word served as justification.

What the texts surrounding the peasant protests then emphasize for us, is a society in which the field of the historical imaginary was being disputed. On the one hand, the feudal elites and associated scholars were arguing for the right to define social relations in transhistorical terms, rejecting any claims to specific dissent. On the other, existed a world of data-rich text that the publishing industry had enabled, in which the written word was increasingly fixed as a point for political and philosophical dispute. It was a field, if not democratic in intent, was populist in its inclusiveness, allowing for larger numbers of voices to engage in discourse of “facts” as found in the written word. It was a realm of knowledge based upon the articulation of history through text which was allowing for new interpretations and relations to power. As can be seen in the numerous peasant revolts, this realm was subversive to political homeostasis. And the relevance of this fact is not only in the purview of the modern historians, but was at least tacitly recognized by the Tokugawa elites, as ordnance after ordnance governing the content of publishing was passed (Burns 2003: 32). Both within the halls of government and beyond, the turbulent figure of the reader as fulcrum of a historical episteme, became the focus of intense debate. The universal “common man” that Ekiken’s travel logs were addressed to, the pleasure seeker who needed to know when he could gain access to certain compounds, was not always as well known as assumed. As the voices of protest in rural and urban communities attested to, the reader was oftentimes unknown and unknowable to the author, and to the authorities. Determining who this reader was, and his and her relationship to the field of history, became a major political and epistemic challenge of the Tokugawa era.

Confronting the Reader

David Hume wrote to his publisher, “The Power which Printing gives us of continually improving and correcting our Works in successive Editions appears to me the chief advantage of that art” (Eisenstein 2005: 86). Eisenstein argues that this seemingly offhand remark by Hume is actually indicative of a much broader series of developments happening in the Europe of his time. The publishing industry had
fostered new ways in which knowledge was organized, represented and produced. Citing Myron P. Gilmore, who stated that print created “...a great impetus to wide dissemination of accurate knowledge of the sources of Western thought, both classical and Christian” (Eisenstein 2005: 51), Eisenstein extends the argument that one crucial consequence of the printing press in Europe was that it allowed for heretofore impossible massive comparisons of texts, and a new concern with the possibility of errors in the same (Eisenstein 2005: 54). As Hume’s comments reveal, the individual author could now engage in a process of “editions”, reflecting upon published work, and incorporating criticisms from a larger community of interlocutors. The voice of the classical author, monolithic in its authority (and apparent permanence) is now moved into a receding historical background by the crank of the press and the autopoetic quill of the modern.

However, more importantly, knowledge as text enters into the imaginary of the community of thinkers and readers. The authority of tradition is now mapped onto pages, which has the additional consequence of creating a field for “misinterpretation” of tradition, or in other words, error in text. But textual error, mechanical or human in origin, was only one possibility among a plethora facing the reader. Translation of the foreign – and the past as a foreign country - becomes a perplexing problem for authoritative discourse. Reinhart Koselleck asserts in the early modern period the past ceased to be represented in aesthetics as an undifferentiated continuity; one in which the battles of Alexander could be seen as realizations of prophecies of the Book of Revelations, and the same trope could in turn be instantiated again in the defense of Vienna, millennia later (Koselleck 1985). Instead the early modern community of thinkers found a paradigmatic rupture between themselves and what came before, gradually engendering the epochal narrative of history – classical, medieval, renaissance – that is so familiar to the current pedagogue. In this delineating of difference in the thoughts and experiences of peoples separated by an unflinching and progressive timeline, we can only surmise the impact that the printing press had in its creation. Yet it seems safe to conclude that increased exposure to the writings of the ancients, along with a broader content of classical texts available to a heterogeneous readership played no small part. As did the resulting possibility for wider debate of interpretation of this

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33 To flesh out this assertion, Eisenstein points to several new artifacts developed by the world of print. She notes, for example, that indexical references appeared in texts at this time, e.g. John Rastell’s “Great Boke of Statutes 1530-1533”, which provided an introductory “tabula” with a “...chronological register by chapters of the statutes 1327 to 1523. Not merely provided a table of contents but also a systematic review of parliamentary history – the first many readers had ever seen” (Eisenstein 2005: 80). Furthermore, author, not as classical authority, but as contributor of information, emerged in the lists of contributors to geographies and astronomies of the time (2005: 85).

34 As attested to by one misprinting of the Bible, which resulted in mandatory adultery for the followers of Moses, with the unintended omission of a “not” in its print run of the commandments (Eisenstein 2005)
material. As did the new experience of *homo sapiens* surrounded in text: the social
and political was given a new solidity in the possibility of the printing of
government edicts. A permanence was created through the repeated publishing of
laws and sovereign acts of the political authorities.\(^{35}\)

Returning to Eisenstein, there were two further consequences of the press
for the European “commonwealth of learning” that she finds which I wish to
emphasize. The first is that the new criticism of the faulty authority of texts, in
various contexts, was serendipitous, if not symbiotic, with the emergence of the
empiricist episteme. “I learn more form the anatomy of an ant or a blade of grass.
Than from all the books which have been written since the beginning of time” writes
one early scientist (Eisenstein 2005: 218). In the early modern period we have the
rise of the community of observers, who establish fact through the “unmediated”
observations of nature. Or more accurately, the community establishes itself
through the experience of nature in the formal process of the lab experiment, which
is then legitimized through a continuous negotiation of authoritative observers
(Shapin and Schaffer 1985). The text as authority is rejected in favor of a new
approach to knowledge which favors a procedural and curiously, atemporal,
approach to awareness.

The second is that in the critique of the written word, the understanding of
text in and of themselves becomes a field of comprehesion. The struggles of
interpreters leads to the possibility of rules of grammar and syntax. Which in turn
grants even greater import to the understanding of the figure of man, as language
becomes a determining characteristic of the – now fragmented – human existence.

These points have been made by others: most eloquently, Foucault noted in
*The Order of Things* that these developments were epistemic models which emerged
in Europe in the waning decades of the 17th century and underwrote the
transformation to the modern (1994). What I would like to emphasize here is the
role of the printing press in making this possible, and a general outline and
historical direction to these developments. For what we are speaking of is nothing
less than a historical bifurcation of systems of knowledge in Europe. On the one
hand we have the emergence of the anti-historical, procedural practices of
positivism of empirical science. The other which would seem to most broadly be
fitted into the category of “linguistics”, but is actually a model for the myriad “arts
and letters” of the contemporary academic model. It is the field in which language
not only becomes a type of knowledge, but then rushes into any possibility of
knowledge itself, like the proverbial bull in the China shop. With language as a field
with its own genealogy, internal rules and orderings, the path is laid for a
progression towards a field of inquiry, best embodied in philology, and its many
children. For the field of philosophy in Europe, leads to the emergence of the “old
philologist”, willing to use the fluidity of the written word as a device to critique the
“cold monster” of the modern state.

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\(^{35}\) Eisenstein makes this argument in pointing out the annual publications of seminal acts
of state, such as the Magna Carta, which was ostensibly proclaimed/published twice a
year in every shire in this period (Eisenstein 2005: 93).
In Japan commercial publishing had similar effects upon the “commonwealth of learning.” In the 17th century we find the new institution of the financially self-sufficient “private academy”, bringing education opportunities to a broader cross-section of the population. While within the schools the focus of teaching remained a Sino-centric library, augmented by classics written within the Japanese archipelago, the return of the Neo-Confucian commentaries from Korea, along with the political fragmentation and economic independence of the schools, ensured that “orthodoxy” was challenged. The Neoconfucian commentaries not only brought into doubt a millenia’s worth of philosophical reflection, but also shifted the intellectual debate from Buddhist writings to Confucianism. Furthermore, the explosion of Confucian academies, fueled by an expanding wealthy clientele, was also driven by the lack of formalized criteria in establishing these centers of learning. The role of jusha, or Confucian scholar, could be claimed by anyone, regardless of class or pedagogical credentials (Najita 1987: 61).

Like Europe, this was a milieu in which the relationship between the present of human experience to the authority of the text was compared, contrasted, and critiqued. It is then of little surprise to find that many of the most acrimonious and well-known debates of the day were centered upon questions of interpretation through the act of reading. A few examples: Maruyama Masao’s treatise on the 18th century Confucian scholar, Ogyu Sorai, is well-known for the argument that Sorai had allowed for a “logic of invention” to enter into Japanese political-legal discourse (Maruyama 1974). Sorai, a scholar working for a high-level Tokugawa official, had argued that the universal Principle of Nature as imparted by leading Neoconfucian thinker Chu Hsi was unknowable to human reason, and thus that the “Way of the Sages” – the wisdom of the ancient Chinese chroniclers of the Confucian classics – was a collection of norms that were valid for the government of men, not the natural world. With this shift of Principle away from a moral identification with harmony in cosmological processes towards a clear distinction of a separate human field, Maruyama argues for an epochal rupture in Confucian discourse, one which allows for a methodology that is philological in nature, which delineates the field of

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36 In itself a radical departure from medieval institutions. The private academies of this era best represent a drift toward the presentation of knowledge in a “public” venue. Temple and guild education was dominated by a craft mentality which emphasized secrecy in the transmission of technique and knowledge - a not uncommon practice around the world - in which possession of restricted knowledge was sign of membership into an elite community, or a dangerous commodity. Within 3 years of the battle of Sekigahara though, in Japan we find the spectacle of public lectures (Nosco 1990: 31).

37 Arnason makes the valuable point that despite Tokugawa authorities repeated proclamations regarding printed material, the academies went largely unsupervised. Arnason lays the roots to this situation to the feudal political fragmentation of the era, in which political protection and sponsorship could be sought from various lords and other wealthy notables (1997: 257; 305-319).

38 A point made by the earlier Confucian scholar, Ito Jinsai, though to different ends.

39 Sorai wrote that “…apart from rites and music, law enforcement and political administration, the Way does not exist” (Maruyama 1974: 85).
Confucian classics as “words”, separate from the reality of unknowable nature. Most fundamentally it allows for “invention” in the political sphere: the classical Confucian thinkers were the primogenitors of practices of governance, but because their acts were that of men, this invention could be replicated and modified by succeeding generations (Maruyama 1974: 83).

Likewise, Japanese historian, Najita Tetsuo, argues that within the halls of the kaitokudo – a private Confucian academy in Osaka, established by merchants – philological approaches, coupled with a Western influenced natural empiricism, grew to dominate discussions of the Confucian classics. The kaitokudo is an interesting example of the pedagogical diversity in Tokugawa Japan: it was a private school founded by donations of a group of merchants from Osaka, but received official recognition by the Tokugawa government, in the form of a land grant that placed it legally on the same status as a baronial domain (and it was also decreed that the head of the school could carry the two swords despite not having samurai status). The school was organized along contractual lines: its rules and precepts for administration were recorded in a “constitution” (which also established in principle that the school would not be associated with one particular master or master’s family; succession would be conducted through competitive recruitment) (Najita 1987: 74). Among the headmasters of the kaitokudo, Nature became the ultimate epistemology. Yet as nature was absolute while the human mind limited, a historicity emerged in which knowledge acquired in one era/region could be seen relative to another. This allowed for studies of Confucian classics alongside “Dutch studies” into Copernicus and Galileo, astronomy and mathematics (Najita 1987: 11).

The best example of the extent of the philological movement within the kaitokudo was Tominaga Nakamoto (1715-1746). Tominaga advocated a method of analysis utilizing close readings of historical texts. This in itself is not radical; but Tominaga’s readings emphasized the distance of the historical writings, across geographic and temporal boundaries. Tominaga argued that all texts were written as polemics in response to specific historical circumstances, and that the words of ancient authors – Chinese or Japanese – could not accurately be translated into the words of modern contemporaries. “It is invariably the case that one who expounds on an ancient philosophy always founds his own school of philosophy...and seeks to improve on the positions of his predecessors. His own view in turn becomes part of tradition, and later generations follow this derivative philosophy without knowing its origin” (Najita 1987: 103). For Tominaga then, the history of ideas was not the unfolding of truth but merely struggles over orthodoxy that in their political exploitation as well as tautological structure rendered the conclusions utterly unreliable. Instead, in the Shutsujo Gogo, Tominaga outlined a theory of language

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40 It is an interesting historical fact that within five years of the publishing of The Starry Messenger in Europe, the principal arguments set forth by Galileo were published by a Jesuit missionary in China (Eisenstein 2005: 51).
based in “rhetorical patterns” which were rooted in certain logical possibilities.\textsuperscript{41} However, a central axiom remained that language possessed a “human dimension” which was never objective, and transient over time (Najita 1987: 107).

Therefore, in one facet of Tominaga’s work we would seem to be discovering a rupture on par with the one Koselleck witnessed in Europe: the past as a foreign country, saddled with the dilemma of transliteration and comprehension; no longer a continuity of a universal, normative, self-generative order, but beyond a divide from the words and thoughts of the present. In the adoption of critical readings of classics, and the raising of questions of interpretation of terms, we can see the rising concern with philology. The surge in “Dutch studies” schools in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, as well as ongoing experiments in mathematics and empirical observation, we find similarities in shifting epistemes to our broad outline of European developments. Yet the scholars of the Japanese archipelago faced a profoundly different intellectual environment than their European contemporaries: a discursive field that ultimately was curtailed by a single political hegemony. Leibniz could correspond with colleagues and kindred spirits in the nascent British Royal Society. Yet nothing similar could occur in Japan as active discourse with the outside world was restricted under Tokugawa. While scholars have emphasized the ready flow of information across the sakoku borders of the Tokugawa polity – as have I – it was a curiously one-sided phenomenon, with no major contributions made by Japanese intellectuals to an international discourse of the day. In fact, while some within Japan were rapidly assimilating knowledge of practices and ideas in Europe and on the Asian continent, it is surprising to realize how little was known about Japan beyond. With Perry’s arrival in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century, he was forced to use accounts of the country that were several centuries out of date (Adas 2006).

While it is true that political patronage was varied within the feudal polity, however, the reference of the ultimate political authority – the Tokugawa – as well as the ultimate symbolic authority – the Imperial household – remained static for the intellectual community. And with Tokugawa patronage of scholars being such a great fiscal and political incentive, reference to Tokugawa agendas kept the Tokugawa order as the baseline for an imaginary of human possibilities.\textsuperscript{42} These conditions, coupled with the restricted lines of trade and communication created by the sakoku policy meant that unlike their European counterparts, Japanese scholars could not operate across lines of sovereignty, nor radical linguistic and religious differences, but instead must return to the unity of the single political problematic.

This is a particularly pressing issue when taken in light of the crisis of the peasant revolts discussed earlier. The “crisis” was understood in terms of unity by the political intellectuals of the day – a marked unity of epistemic imaginary of the

\textsuperscript{41} E.g. pattern 2 was the assertion that the particular was defined by way of the abstract, and pattern 5 was the possibility of transformation of meaning into opposition (Najita 1987: 108).

\textsuperscript{42} As witnessed in the historicism of the Mito school, commissioned by the central authority to write exhaustive histories of the polity, as well as the repetitive publishing of the military mirrors, to emphasize and delineate political authority.
human condition – which, through the preoccupation with text and authority, led to a critical, and deliberate engagement, with the manufacturing of the reader. The unity of the reader was the goal; not in the assumed way of the authors of travel guides spoken of before, but as a strategic ends for the intelligentsia in order to resolve the political-intellectual heterodoxy presented by variegated claims to authority. Unity of reader was assumed a priori, and proved a posteriori.

These developments are exemplified in the emergence and influence of the “national learning schools” (kokugaku) in the 18th century. As the name implies, these schools of thought were linked by the radical premise of the “nation” as being an object of knowledge. The foundation for this assumption was a doubled movement in difference and similitude: difference was associated with territory and political spheres, while time – the threat of history’s recession to exotica – was ameliorated by the assertion of continuities. In effect differences of space were given primacy, creating a similitude of time.

Kokugaku operated from an axiom of language stability. Ignoring - or ignorant - of arguments set forward by thinkers like Tominaga, the kokugaku stressed the normativity of language within geographical space, while stressing the difference of language beyond borders. Giants within the movement such as Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) wrote of the invented nature of Chinese language and thought, its malleability over time, and its fundamental differences from the “Japanese experience”.

The reason why everyone has been so attracted to Chinese writings is because the clever people of ancient times, in thinking deeply about all kinds of things and seeking a reason for them, created the legends in such a way that all would assume that, indeed, things must have been so.

(Motoori Norinaga 1997: 36)

And yet:

Confucians believe that they have grasped the meaning of the universe through the creation of the Yijing and very profound words. But all that is only a deception to win people over and be masters over them.

(Motoori quoted in Harootunian 1988: 99)

Motoori’s criticism of Confucian and Buddhist thought was based in a skepticism towards universal reason. Motoori argued that human rationality was fundamentally limited, and the possibilities of the natural world far outstripped the mind’s capacity to imagine. However, the Chinese sages (for their own political purposes) had attempted to create a necessary order to which nature, and human society would be submitted. Furthermore, Motoori noted key differences in the Chinese experience: centrally, the political and ethnic inconstancy.

43 “Human knowledge, however, has limitations, and as the true underlying principle does not lie in something that can be measured and known, how can we know that such
In China, since the name of the country changes from generation to generation, if the name of the age is not included in the title, it will be difficult to understand. In our imperial country, however, the imperial throne has continued along with the universe throughout the ages, and since there is no change in the throne, there is no need to divide it into ages and speak of things in that way. 
(Motoori 1997: 34)

One key outcome of Motoori’s ideas was the enabling of an investigation into a “Japanese literature”. Motoori “rediscovered” an account of the early imperial era, the Kojiki-den, a well-known, but generally regarded “lesser” work of antiquity (in comparison to the Confucian and Buddhist classics), and promoted its study. Motoori’s students followed with investigations of poetry and religious writings of ancient Japanese authors. The unifying strand for these diverse readings were that they were all written in the Japanese archipelago, and arguably, in the Japanese language. \(^{45}\) As self-evident and readily accepted as this categorization appears to the modern, the determination of a “national literature”, as the eminent scholar of comparative literature, Naoki Sakai reminds us, is an astonishing claim, based on an equally astonishing idea of a restricted context of history: “Japanese history” (Motoori 1997: vii).

To make this argument, Motoori set forth contrasting models of Chinese and Japanese language. For Motoori the Chinese language “hardened nature”: Chinese thought was universal and abstract; its Confucianism was based in a normativity of human rationality that Motoori argued was reinforced by the nature of Chinese written language. The characters as ideograms were not responsive to the flexibility of the natural world, but were self-referential to a parallel plane of being, that of human rationality. Nature is “hardened” when it is mediated by this cultural lens (Harootunian 1988: 55).

The key conceptual shift that Motoori is emphasizing here is a transformation in the use of “Nature” as epistemic referent. Following developments in the philosophical discourse of the 18th century, Motoori is emphasizing the natural world as a primary source of truth. His quibbles with Chinese thought then become a questioning of the apprehension of nature; a question of empiricism. Language mediates the knowing of nature for Motoori. Case in point is the experience of “heaven”. Confucianism is rife with references to the “Way of Heaven”, a principle that guides all human and natural activities. Motoori rejoinders this with references to the Japanese classics that heaven as it things as the beginning of heaven and earth should have been due to some purported principle of logic?” (Motoori 1997: 36).

\(^{44}\) It is interesting to note that at this time in the searching for the enunciation of the national identity that the other of China is specifically racial-ized. The Tokugawa era was coeval with the conquest of China by the Manchu’s, which many Tokugawa writers regarded as non-Chinese and thus justified a new critical stance towards the continent. \(^{45}\) Arguable in that the works relied on Chinese characters with varying degrees of annotation to make them readable to Japanese pronunciations.
was known to his ancestors was not granted this extra-spatial quality, it was merely a place.

The heaven in these passages is something which lies in the upper reaches of the sky, and is nothing more than the country in which the deities of heaven reside; it is not something which possesses a mind or spirit. (Motoori 1997: 43)

This is not the empiricism of the modern positivists, but an interrogation of the knowing of the phenomenon through its use in language; a philological questioning of the meaning of the signified to the sign. Motoori holds that the Chinese fascination with the sign itself, wrapped in a world of ideograms that are self-referential, creates a distance between the ding an sich and the Word.

The Japanese language on the other hand is uniquely qualified to bridge this gap. Motoori argues that Japanese is a language in which sound and vocalization are preeminent. Furthermore as a form of knowledge the spoken voice is eminently more valuable than the written: it is immediate, imminent, and filled with the breath of life (Harootunian 1988: 37). Most importantly the Japanese words were filled with a similitude to the Being to which they referred. Motoori reminds us that the Japanese uttering for word (koto) and act (also koto) were identical because in pure, unmediated Japanese, as it was known to the ancients, words and acts were of the same substance (Harootunian 1987: 80). It was the coming of written Chinese to the archipelago which demolished the naïve beatific experience of life that the Japanese language had made possible for the ancients. Chinese with its reference to human reason as a field above and beyond nature had created a divide in the Japanese consciousness. The solution for Motoori was to return to the vocalization of Japanese, freed from Chinese ideograms, to enjoy a direct experience of the breadth of existence of the natural world.

Thus with Motoori and his followers in the kokugaku the discussion of the Japanese language shifted towards an emphasis of its phonetic qualities. The Japanese language was to be distinguished from Chinese by these qualities. The repercussions were widely felt: e.g. it is in the 18th and 19th centuries that the kana script – the reading aids to the Chinese characters customarily deployed by Japanese commentators – became increasingly a syllabary. Before this time the kana were merely referred to as a “makeshift” character; a simplified Chinese pictogram which could be used for aesthetic purposes, and often conveyed a meaning as ideogram (Motoori 1997: xii). Yet with the rise in the kokugaku’s fortunes and influence, kana were adapted to serve the role of phonetic aids to the vocalizations of Japanese. Likewise the reading of the Japanese classics becomes something which was to be vocalized. The Kojiki-den became a text to be recited for the qualities of its sounds were the path to a union with the natural divine. As such other possible

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46 Naoki Sakai notes, “That is to say that a hiragana character, for example, can be an ideographic kanji character drawn in grass style, a phonetic symbol indicating a specific phonetic unit and so forth, at the same time” (Motoori 1997: xiii).
relationships to the text – as calligraphy, etc. – were denigrated or eliminated. It was the spoken word in reading that was truly “Japanese” (Motoori 1997: xiv).

Vocalization – embodying the breath of the ancient deities through a replication of the sounds that the divine used in manufacturing nature – was a central element to the kokugaku belief in mono no aware: the direct, and unmediated experience of things. In creating this discourse of unmediated experience, the kokugaku thinkers also invented a body to do the experiencing: a rural commoner, continuing to exist and speak in unmodified ritual and rhythm since the ancient times of the Yamato founders, the aohitogusa, or “common man” (Harootunian 1988: 37). This figured emerged from the imaginary of Motoori as the subject for the vocalization of “pure Japanese”, and thus as the foundation for establishing an authentic Japanese experience. The idealized aohitogusa through his daily practices and remoteness from text and Chinese thought continued to maintain the connection to the authenticity of the apprehension of divine nature that Motoori argued was the quality of the ancient Japanese. In making this figure, Motoori shifted discourse of the human experience in two ways. One, it moved perfectibility of the human experience from the urban court to the now idyllic rural village. No longer a backwater of ignorance of Buddhist or Confucian teachings, the rural was to be admired and emulated. The problems plaguing the Tokugawa political order as evidenced by the many public disturbances were the consequences of history, a history of events and ideas that had arrived from a false consciousness of Chinese thought. The aohitogusa offered a return to a temporality that was before the historical drama of political decree and rationality of authority; a return to a single reading of authority, that of the ancestral deities now known through the “correct” reading of Japanese literature, but which were already present in contemporary Japanese society in the mono no aware of the rural people.

In conclusion, to address the crisis of readership and variegated authority, the kokugaku thinkers created a theory of praxis based on the internal life of an imagined, perfected reader, that was the “common man”. The truth of text, its political power in discourse, could be discovered and shared by all readers through correct vocalization and an elimination of Chinese rational elements. But to do this the reader was to turn inwards in a vivid self-critique in order to find that the thing appreciated wasn’t mediated. As the historian H.D. Harootunian notes that with the kokugaku a broad field of private experience, that of reading texts, of appreciating art or nature, became a forum for inquiry of public practice (1988: 407). A regime of the reader became an object of discursive power.

It is perhaps impossible to chronicle, or even make a sketchy enumeration, of the many impacts of the printing press upon European culture. Yet it is widely acknowledged that somehow this technology set the stage for new approaches to texts and thus new forms of articulation of knowledge and authority. In the Japanese context we find a different set of technologies creating a similar explosion in the publishing industry, with an equally dramatic series of transformations in questions of epistemology and political authority. Yet the Japanese context displayed a remarkable unity in its focus on the polity as a field of problematization, an imaginary limited by the international nature of European discourse. This meant
that the problem of the reader – as a figure for understanding, definition, and ultimately, modulation – arose as an epistemic and political necessity. The crisis of the political order was known through text, expressed through text, and finally, albeit imperfectly, addressed through text. The end result for the scholars of *kokugaku* was the figure of the “common man”, seemingly a very illiterate caricature, yet one which became the template for an understanding of language.

While it is true that the *kokugaku* was only one branch of learning among many in the Tokugawa era. However, given the lasting influence granted to the *kokugaku* through their elevation to ranks of academics and political policy advisers under the modern Meiji government, the influence of their ideas should not be dismissed. Fundamentally the *kokugaku* represent a move toward the nation as a field of knowledge. I argue that this move emerged through a crisis of text and philology. The consequences of this crisis and its solution was a new *anthropos*, in which spatiality created similitude. The nation became a field of investigation and a source of knowledge. The private practices of the “common man” became the test for equivalence at establishing an identity of membership in this new community of text consumers. The reader was doubly significant as marker of belonging, and as praxis in philosophical inquiry: the reader in its nationalized form became the vehicle for acquisition of truth.

For the *kokugaku* line of thought this meant that man across borders was a markedly distant creature. China and its universal rationality had been identified as the root of the political problems of the Tokugawa polity by Motoori and his followers. The solution was the return to a particular set of practices, and more importantly, a particularity in awareness of truth, that could be found only by members of a national community as epistemic subject. Culture, swelled to fill national borders, and emerged as a problematic. The solution, Nature, while universal in Being, was infinitely particular in knowability through the physicality of membership within the national community.

Like Weber I will not argue for causality or clear lines of social evolution, yet I do believe it is important to mark the contributions of the printing press and publishing industry to establishing a discourse of national literature, the problem of philology and textual authority, and a regime of readership, which ultimately creates the conditions for a rupture with the human imaginary of Anderson’s sacral civilizations and their simple similitude of Word and Being. The new appreciation for text that widespread publishing and distribution creates allows for a radical reevaluation of the role of the word in the fabrication of nature and the human subject. In Japan, at least, we have seen that it created a field of knowledge in which the space of culture evolves as preeminent. Difference, as a marker within the *anthropos* of knowledge, could now be found on lines on maps.
2 The Imperial Engine

It was my last night in Kawasaki, and my wife and I were returning from dinner on the Nambu line, one of the Kanto area’s near innumerable local rail services.47 We were heading north out of Kawasaki central station, and though it was just after 9 p.m., the train was cramped with weary Monday night commuters: ‘Office ladies’ in grey skirt-suits; young, and the not-so-young, ‘freeters’48 returning from shifts in Japan’s ever malleable service industry; and of course, the icon of post war Japanese economic miracles, the salary man, bedecked in grey or blue suits, finally allowed to loosen ties, were standing or sitting, slumped against metal poles, or reading faded print newsheets, mangas, or playing tetris-like games on their cell phones or portable gaming systems. The car would seemingly creep along the gravel-strewn line, windows opaque with the glare of worn neon signs and amber lights illuminating from the avenues among the block-concrete residential buildings that flickered by. Two or three minutes passed and the creep turned into a crawl when the car slowed into another pool of greenish fluorescent light, signaling the next station. The crowd within the car swelled. The process was repeated a few more times – another stop and the mass of bodies held within would grow, along with the smell of sweat, beer, and unfinished cigarettes. The stations were too close to the central hub to allow for more than a few to exit (real estate prices tend to make commuter times long in Kanto). People settled in for a long haul, for the most part, and the space within our car quickly filled. The seats were soon gone, and it was standing room only. Soon even finding a spot free to lounge was difficult, and people would jam themselves into whatever cranny was available, often times held up by the press of their neighbors.

But this was our last night after years of living in the great megalopolis that now stretches across Ieyasu’s once parochial, and boggy, Kanto plain. We were quite accustomed to it. This was the quotidian of riding rush hour trains, and by most perspectives, was inconsequential compared to the morning rush hour to be found further into the Tokyo core. Flextime is still alien to most Japanese businesses, and certainly to the school systems, so the nine-to-five work/study schedule exercises a pull upon the city’s biomass as certain as the moon upon the tides. A morning car in the core, jammed to capacity (occasionally with the help of some white-gloved station employees who push at the posteriors protruding from the automated car doorways) is hot and balmy with body heat. The air is stale with exhaled carbon dioxide and has a fetid taste. But much worse is the press of people around you. It is much more than a tactile sensation. It becomes a force pressing into the viscera: as the train slows or increases speed, the crowd

47 Knowledge of the ins-and-outs of the labyrinthian Tokyo subway routes often feature as questions of trivia or game shows.
48 A term coined in the late 80s from the English ‘free’ or ‘freelance’ to designate the legion of not fully employed Japanese (excluding housewives and students). The common conception is of the young and unskilled, but recent polls have shown the average age to be increasing (http://www.japanfocus.org/-Kosugi-Reiko/2022).
moves as one great mass, and lays an unconscionable weight upon those unlucky enough to be standing next to a metal pole or closed door, causing gasps of pain as air is forced out of lungs, and not unusually, tearful pleas. Exhaustion is guaranteed. And, occasionally, unconsciousness.

But this was merely a late evening commute, with nowhere near the same number of passengers, and one we had done many times before. Moreover, our stop was only a few more along the line: almost always a punctual 12 minutes from the time the doors closed in Kawasaki station.

Thus it was with a feeling of irritation and vague dread when the train reached one station, and the seconds lengthened, yet the automatic doors remained open. Slowly, one by one, the surrounding passengers looked up from their reading, gaming, or slumber, and cast anxious eyes about. The seconds turned to minutes then the station’s P.A. system crackled to life. The *ekichou* – the stationmaster – wearily announced that which had been dreaded: a ‘human incident’

A human incident. Tons of steel, aluminum, plastic, and glass had met the human body at speed with predictable, and grim, results. The euphemism serves multiple effects – for one, it is a necessary ploy as the work of creating agents and agency, motive and legality, along the tracks was still underway – but within our car, the affect was singular: wearied irritation.

Within the Kanto mega-polis, human incidents on train tracks (almost always afterwards inscribed in official documents as suicides) are a depressingly common occurrence. In 2007 suicides had topped 30,000 a year for the ninth straight year, and it was commonly held opinion that a train related suicide occurred at least once a week in Tokyo alone (New York Times, June 9 2007). It is a fact of urban life, and one which continues despite numerous acts of governance, and cunning applications of *techne*, seeking its termination. Its sheer frequency precludes newsworthiness. The television media will cover typhoons, parliamentarian melees, and, belatedly, near nuclear disasters,

It is also something with a long history. One foreigner, travelling the Japanese rails in 1880, observed:

…Entrance is made as in American cars, from either end of the carriage, but the platform is narrow. Semaphore signals are used on the block system, somewhat imperfectly carried out, it seemed to me. The intermediate stations are very well planned and built, and iron foot-bridges cross the track, which is fenced in all the way along. There have been very few railway casualties of any kind – omitting, of course, deliberate suicides, which are painfully common – and hardly one of those

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49 *Jinshin jikko*

50 The first I learned of the Tokaimura uranium leak in 1999 was through the foreign press, despite living only a few miles from the reactor. Japan has a history of delayed reporting of nuclear ‘incidents’ (http://www.thefreelibrary.com/JAPAN+APOLOGIZES+FOR+NOT+REPORTING+RADIATION+LEAK).
accidents shows any special tendency to carelessness or inefficiency on the part of the Japanese officials or workmen.

(Free 2008: 83)

Yet this was just historical curiosity, and for the passengers sharing our car, the question before them was strategic: how best to return home? A few, perhaps overly optimistically, elected to remain on the train, despite the preponderance of precedence that testified that the resolution of a human incident was not an affair of minutes, but hours. Most however opted to file out of the car along with us, and push and bustle down the stairs, and through the gated turnstiles. These were automated and equipped with sensors which received payment from various commuter cards, or even cell phones, with just a casual swipe, so passage here was brisk and efficient. Once outside, however, with a light drizzle starting to fall, movement ground to a halt as the few taxi stands in this usually sleepy station became jammed by the exodus. The famous Japanese public etiquette also began to collapse: as lines were cut and cabs were stolen, harsh words were uttered, and the occasional body was shoved violently.

Observing the whirlwind of far too many people competing for far too few cabs, others (my wife and I included) opted to walk down the road and try our luck at a further intersection. A quarter an hour later, after much hither and fro, and waving of hands, we climb inside a taxi. The driver, a stocky older man with close-cropped white hair, begins the cartographical negotiation with my wife. We want to go home, but a residential address is usually meaningless (most buildings and streets are unmarked in The Megalopolis), so instead my wife proposes a series of landmarks. Fortunately, our driver knows the discount clothing store near our apartment. He pulls off, talking about a ‘short cut’. We are not concerned; this is Kawasaki, not New York. The thought of a cabbie trying a scenic route just to inflate the fare is near inconceivable. Our driver is garrulous though and chit-chat ensues.

“Where are you going?”
“Un huh. Un huh. Back to America, huh? My cousin was there once.”
Soon the conversation shifts to the events of that evening.

“Yes, yes, this happens. Human incident, huh? Yeah we all got the call from dispatch. Yeah it will be a mess. See, it’s Monday, right. Nobody’s ready for this. If it was a Friday, we would be ready! We are used to it – have more drivers ready, see. But a Monday?! Who wants to kill themselves on a Monday?!”

If we could move our gaze through the jumble of buildings and chain link fences, and travel along the rails to the site of the incident, a complex tale would unfold. The site itself is most likely located close to the entrance end of a station platform: as the trains arrive regularly, and at greatest velocity at this extreme, it is the most prevalent spot for suicides or accidents. The statistical significance of this space was recognized in practice when the JR Yamanote line (the most traversed line in Tokyo), implemented a new ‘blue light’ strategy in its stations in 2009. The plan was the product of collusion between *techne* and

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51 The following information comes from series of interviews conducted with rescue team personnel in 2010.

52 The statistical significance of this space was recognized in practice when the JR Yamanote line (the most traversed line in Tokyo), implemented a new ‘blue light’ strategy in its stations in 2009. The plan was the product of collusion between *techne* and
into a hive of bureaucratic activity, and a nexus of jurisdiction dispute. Here governance merges with corporate responsibilities and activism, in a complex exchange of protocols and rights: a subjectivity will be crafted through the operations of a network of diverse actors and knowledge. In short, it is a place where Frankfurt dreams of clearly demarcated spheres of human activity, orbiting like heavenly bodies around a Helios of the Human Being, collapses into a black void of negotiation.

After the ‘victim’ took that final step, the first on the scene (literally) is the train driver. As soon as the collision occurs (ideally) a very specific routine takes place. First the driver must stop the train, shortly followed by a radio transmission to the line’s control center to inform them of the incident. Then the driver must inform his partner, the train conductor, of the incident, as well as the passengers. The conductor would then step outside to conduct a preliminary examination.

Somewhere further along the tracks, the control center is now busy organizing the incident. First, all ‘related’ trains (such as mine) are stopped indefinitely, and word of the incident is sent to all the stationmasters along the line. In addition, crews are dispatched from the nearest station, with instructions to wait. For the control center has also contacted emergency response services, and so at this point, government agencies intrude upon the incident in the form of a ‘rescue team’. These are a branch of the fire department, who share operations space but receive separate, specialized training. The rescue team’s task is seemingly straightforward: investigate the body, and determine the presence or absence of life. In practical terms, the senior officer of the team will make this determination on a simple set of requirements: if the body is intact, and only the heart is stopped, then ‘life’ is determined, and the rescue team must quickly remove the body to the nearest hospital. In the much more frequent event of obvious death – decapitation or brain removal – the rescue team immediately departs. Their act of governance is finished: they are concerned only with life.

The results of the investigation are relayed by the crew to the nearest station. Then another branch of government enters the scene, police services. Their task is to create an identity for the site through a narration of actors and motives. Is it an accident or a crime scene? However this investigation is hampered by a ticking clock – the trains are a private corporation, losing money by the second; and they are also a public service, trapping thousands, or tens of thousands, of commuters. Consequently, the investigation on site must be expeditious to the point of perfunctory: the driver and any other witnesses psychological expertise: flashing blue lights were installed at the remote corners of station platforms, under the conceptual framing that a blue light had a ‘soothing effect’, and thus would calm a turgid mind. Presumably installing single blue lamps had the added benefit of being cheaper than building some form of barrier between track and platform.

At this point, only in the sense in being deprived of life and/or limb.

This is an interesting case of miscommunication in governance. According to one set of instructions provided by an informant, the conductor is supposed to move the body, however according to other informants this act is strictly illegal until the police investigation is completed. Doing otherwise creates culpability in the event.

Japanese fire stations are required to maintain both a fire engine and ambulance, for their respective teams.
are interviewed; surveillance video (if available) is examined; the body is (hopefully) identified through documents. Thus in a matter of minutes a dramatic narration is created; the incident is now an event: suicide, accident, or crime. For a suicide (again, most cases) the police remove themselves, to create documentation of the newly framed event.

With the resolution of the police investigation the train is evacuated. The body is still upon the tracks though. The train company crew now has the responsibility of gathering the remains (by law it must be done by the company crew and not a third party). The now empty train is decommissioned and taken-away to be examined, and cleaned. The concerns are not singularly aesthetic or humanitarian; oil in the human body can damage the brake mechanism.

At some point following, the remainder of the line will return to operation, and for most of us (my wife and I included), life will return to normal. However, the narration put in place by a suicide event will continue to have repercussions for years to come. It will operate now within the field of civil law. The identified corpse is assigned to a next of kin, who is held responsible for the financial loss caused by stop of operation for the train company; an amount easily in the tens of thousands of dollars. The brutal truth of life and death in the Kanto megalopolis, is that the burden to the suicide’s family would have been much reduced if the ‘event’ had have been off the edge of a bridge, or in front of a bus.

If we move our gaze once more to hover above the earth in a cosmonaut’s privileged space, a view of totalities and environments will lay in front of us. One such would be that, considering the entire globe, more than half of human beings riding trains, both in number of passengers and in passenger kilometers, can be found in that one Pacific archipelago off the Asian coast (Kasai 2003: 4). Within Japan is the densest, most comprehensive, and technologically sophisticated rail-based network for human and cargo transport known to man. Its origins, development, and expansion have served over a century for the people of these islands both as a metric for progress and ‘civilization’.

The trains comprise a network. But it is not a Castells network – beyond place, and unmitigated by time (Castells 2000); it is a capillary network of relationships, in which power flows multi-directionally. Within the confines of the rails, logics of systems are exercised, and needs of man and machines are addressed. The rail allows for the creation of certain forms of rational calculations, and demands a human relationship according to these formations. It creates people to accommodate the new worldviews that are engendered.

It is this possibility of subject formation that interests me. How has the formation of Japan’s extensive rail systems interacted with the question of being Japanese? As I do not believe that the rail ever served as a totalizing agent in Japanese history, or ever necessarily created a single model of rationalization, the examinations that follow are by necessity, partial. Each one looks at a historical case of the rail system in relations to the question of governance, and tries to understand what subjectivities emerge. In each I believe the answers arrived at through the inspection of the rails are different. One

56 Sachs (1999) observed the significance of the Earth photos taken from space for conceptualizations within environmental discourse.
primary reason is because the questions asked of the rail over time have been so radically different. While the demands of the rail are predominantly the demands of coordination and efficiency, the nature in which these demands are integrated within an imaginary of the social needs are ever changing.

Building a Body

One of the iconic images of Meiji Japan, and of U.S.-Japanese relations, are the numerous ukiyoe and scroll drawings of the 1854 meeting between representatives of the bakufu government with the U.S. Navy’s Commodore Perry and his senior staff, in which the Americans had just gifted a model train to the “Japanese government”. It was a two foot gauge, fully functional model of a 4-4-0 Norris locomotive, with tender, passenger car, and one mile of track, that the American crew had set up in a circular fashion on the beach near the Uraga straits (Free 2008: 23). The images almost invariably depict a placid featured “mandarin” riding atop the roof of one of the child sized cars, as a mixed group of gawkers watch in varying states of awe or amusement. In the following days, Perry invites the Shogun representatives to tour his “Black Ships”, to further impress them with U.S. cannon and steam-engine technologies. In his writings Perry notes that he and his crew were astounded by the knowledge of steam principles that the Japanese “dignitaries” possessed. In fact, these particular dignitaries included metal smiths, and otherwise educated men, sent by the Shogun authorities to study the inner workings of the foreign vessels and divine their operation and construction. Again, almost invariably, the accompanying text to this image of the toy train running in circles on a beach in front of bemused American sailors, to be found in any remedial Japanese history text, is a proud observation that in less than two decades, the Japanese had designed and built a full-scale version, running along the shores of Yokohama, not far from where

57 The historical significance of this dyad is only remotely alluded to in the coinage of a noun for it in Japanese: nichibei.
58 Color illustrated woodblock prints. Commonly known in the West for the influence upon the French Impressionist school. It is hard to look at the swirling atmospherics of Van Gogh’s Starry Night, without thinking of Hokusai’s curling waves in his many representations of Fuji.
59 An anachronistic, or at least, culturally relative formation. Though Perry’s direction from the U.S. president was to enter into negotiations with the Japanese government, to whom this petition should be actually addressed was an issue of great confusion, not least to the Japanese dignitaries, in the complex power relations of late feudal Japan. In a few years the term “Tycoon” would be applied to the Shogun authority as the “government” of Japan for the purpose of international treaties; a term taken from British experiences in the post Opium War environment of China.
60 Perry had made it a point of being flanked by “burly” armed African-Americans when first meeting the Shogun’s dignitaries, in order to impress them with the “power” and “diversity” of the U.S. (Adas 2006).
61 One of history’s greatest lessons in “industrial espionage” since the Romans learned naval craft through the reverse engineering of a Carthaginian vessel shipwrecked upon Italian shores.
Perry’s toy had sat. It is a story of ingenuity and nationalistic triumph that is particularly compelling in its simplicity.

Within the story are, however, several interesting allusions and obfuscations. The first is the previous awareness of steam power among the Japanese intellectuals. This is again a reminder of the porous nature of the sakoku — closed country — experience of Tokugawa Japan. The flow of information and technologies coming through the small community of Dutch traders located at Dejima in Nagasaki harbor, and its exchange with native interlocutors over the following centuries, through the official recognition of various Shogun authorities, or failing that, through black markets and smuggling, meant that, among at least certain pockets of intelligentsia in the archipelago, the questions posed by Western *techné* and science were not new (Screech 2002: 11). Electricity was first artificially demonstrated in Japan in 1774 (Morris-Suzuki 1999: 25). The first pair of eyeglasses in Japan were presented to the founder of the Tokugawa line, Ieyasu, himself; microscopes and spy glasses soon followed, both as oddities for collectors, and curiosities at country fairs (Screech 2002: 181). Within three months of the first manned balloon flights in Paris in 1783, the Shogun had a full report of it (Screech 2002: 225). These experiences weren’t limited to a cursory appreciation of exotica, but were also found in the considered reflections of the intellectuals. A case in point would be the publication of “Explanations of Copernican Astronomy” in 1793 by a Japanese scholar. The principles of the steam engine were another example of this flow of information from the West. And in fact, the first working model of a steam locomotive in Japan had been built the year prior to Perry’s fateful meeting, in Kurume, on the Western island of Kyushu.

The other issue removed from the simplified narrative of national triumph in rail engineering is the prominent role played by foreign engineers and technicians in the building of the Yokohama line. Numerous foreign technical advisors were employed by the new Imperial government that followed the Shogun’s defeat, for the twin purposes of designing the rail, and to train their successors. The accounts of the building of the Yokohama rail over a period of two years in 1870-72 are a character study of colonial ambitions, greed, and the barriers of practice and communication across cultural boundaries.

Yet though the line nearly bankrupted the new government, and despite the many problems of construction, on October 14, 1872, the Yokohama line was officially opened for service. Charles Wirgman, a correspondent for the *Illustrated London News*, wrote the following first-hand account:

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62 Copernicanism became so widespread that even in parochial Hokkaido of 1811, officials meeting with Russian delegates knew of and agreed with Copernican theory. Reportedly even arguing for its Japanese origin (Keene 1952: 111).
63 It was based on a Russian toy, and was built by Tanaka Hisashige, who would later found the company that would transform into modern Toshiba (Free 2008: 22).
64 One curious example is the problems caused by samurai trained to act as surveyors. The twin swords which they wore as marks of their hereditary status, would interfere with the magnets involved in their survey instruments, creating false readings, and numerous conflicts with the foreign supervisors (Free 2008: 74).
On Monday morning I got up early (the weather was splendid) and went to the Sai-wai-bashi gate. Here troops were drawn up on each side of the street, from the gate to the railway station. They were dressed in blue tunics, gray trousers, and yellow leggings, had red kepis, with red and whit horsehair plumes, and wore knapsacks. Opposite the gate were the buglers. The people kept on moving towards the station, and the road was not kept clear. After waiting a long time near the gate, the sound of buglers was heard, announcing the approach of the Emperor. Presently two lancers in green tunics, with their lances pointing in front of them, appeared coming through the gate. They were followed by two men on horseback in (traditional) court dress; then a whole squadron of lancers. After these came the Imperial carriage, drawn by four horses. The Emperor and two high personages of his Court were inside. There were more carriages, and the court members of the government, all in court dress; but the coachman wore European clothes and felt hats. The carriages were followed by more lancers, and two of them brought up the rear, with their spears pointing behind the procession. The build of the carriages was diverse, but none were beautiful. The buglers blew a blast, and the soldiers presented arms; but the populace was not in the least awestruck. They had a good stare, and that was all. After the last two lancers, the crowd rushed in through the gate, following the Imperial procession. (Free 2008: 79)

Considering our London correspondent’s text as a window into a rapidly transforming world, a comfortable interpretation could focus on the transmission of Western goods and practices – the carriages, the bugles, the felt hats – and the resulting assimilation/metamorphosis of Japan. This, however, would be an error, based upon a historian’s presumption that the frame, ‘Japan’, is a continuity, and thus questions of metamorphosis unavoidably circle a debate of the malleable and the impervious. It assumes that ‘Japan’ existed before a world full of developing power networks, confronted it with new of demands of international treaties and military relationships, forcing a Nietzschean formation of an ethical (i.e. determinable, reliable, etc.) partner in this said network. To ignore this discursive operation, and to walk the path of ‘the cultural transformation of Japan’, is merely to return to a fragmented Hegel in which the Spirit of History is supplemented, as in a shell game, by the ‘Magical State’65: a presumption that is demanded by modernity, but unearned so far in analytical thought.

Instead let us turn our gaze to the young man (nearly a boy) seated inside the Imperial carriage that Monday morning. Emperor Mutsuhito, by custom posthumously titled Meiji (“Bright Government”66), assumed the throne at the age of 15 in 1867. His clambering forth from a royal carriage, surrounded by guards bedecked in Western military uniforms, to oversee the commissioning of a railway, was an act unimaginable by his forebears. For over half a millennia the Imperial family had lived a cloistered existence within the confines of a palace network in ancient Kyoto city. Invisible behind stone and wood walls, within which the Emperors were born and died, seldom having

66 The name shares characters with those of ‘civilization’, and carries the English connotation of Enlightenment, i.e. illumination through learning.
traveled more than a few kilometers from the room of their births. They were *invisible* in truth – not to be gazed upon by the populace – and most commonly known at large through symbolic representations of the Imperial regalia: the sword, mirror, and diamond of creation mythology. Political sovereignty was held by a series of “barbarian-conquering-generals” – the Shogun – most recently, and for nearly three centuries, by the potent Tokugawa clan. Ieyasu and his descendants had moved the seat of politics east to Edo (modern Tokyo) leaving the Imperial family under the watchful gaze of hereditary courtiers and armed Tokugawa vassals, to perform ‘customary rites’ (again behind closed doors of the compound, out of sight of all but a few Shogun representatives), while Edo shaped the contours of the land in wood, stone, and blood. A historian may argue that the political power lay with the Shogun, and the symbolic lay with the Emperor; a bifurcated system of governance akin to Western Europe of the late Middle Ages.\(^{67}\) However, there were no Imperial Edicts like Papal Bulls; no threats of excommunication; no Imperial centers of learning and scholarship. Consultation of the Emperor was voluntary, and formalized. And when Ieyasu was interred in a massive tomb complex in the mountains of Nikko, the Tokugawa clan declared him ‘demigod’, without the intercession, or supplication, of the Emperor.

The coming of Perry’s ships had proved to be a catalyst of change for the various elites disenfranchised within the Tokugawa system, and in the fighting that followed,\(^{68}\) the Emperor became a new symbol of legitimacy. ‘Revolution’ was ignored in favor of ‘restoration’: a government which would be a return to a halcyon dawn of Imperial rule not known on the islands for a thousand years.

Thus in a country formed literally in the name of his sovereignty, young Meiji was shipped east to the newly christened Tokyo (East Capital), by the successful rebel factions, the now de facto government, and asked to *govern*: to sit at the head of cabinet meetings and preside; and in the years to come, to proffer a constitution to *his people*; in short, to be a monarch. A role that no Emperor had served since the Byzantines were a force in Europe.

In the many, and sundry, narratives of this transformation of political rule (as well as of Meiji himself), the one that I am interested in is that glimpse of the boy-King, ascending a platform, to ride a train. For whatever else Meiji’s rule was, as practice, Meiji was about trains. For a man whose ancestors rarely left that 20 kilometer radius in Kyoto, Meiji traveled. In the ensuing decades scarcely was a new line completed, a new station built, without the Emperor in attendance. A special car bedecked with the Imperial iconography was constructed so that he and his family could be carried along the rails to the various corners of the ever expanding rail network, announcing their passing to onlookers with the wealth and pageantry of the car. And the rail system grew propitiously: such that by 1892 the national railway law set as its goal, service to every single one of the new prefectures created to replace the feudal domains as administrative zones by the Imperial government (Free 2008: 160). Financial institutions were established within Japan for the sole purpose of raising coin for the construction of new

\(^{67}\) For a detailed discussion of interpretations of frames of governance in pre- and early modern Japan, see Arnason (1997).

\(^{68}\) Fueled by cheap rifles purchased from the U.S., which had a surfeit of arms having recently just completed its own civil war.
rails; and money was borrowed from various international institutions. Though the rails were designed and implemented by the central government, in a short time private companies were established to fund and execute new railways. And up and down this burgeoning network Meiji went, to emerge onto a platform of some isolated mountain hamlet to recognize the completion of another intersection of the network, and the inclusion of the ‘people’ into the country.

Returning to that one October morning gives us another glimpse of Meiji’s participation through knowledge of a ‘first’ and ‘last’. The ‘last’ was, that moment in Yokohama represented the penultimate experience of Meiji dressing in traditional court wear in public. Hereafter he would always appear in Western attire, almost always a military uniform of Prussian influence (Free 2008: 83). The ‘first’ though was, besides this being the first ‘public appearance’ of an Emperor since time immemorial – a literal chance for a ‘public’ to gaze upon their ‘sovereign’ – it also was the first time a ‘commoner’ was allowed to address the Emperor: Hara Sensaburou presented a short address to the Emperor on behalf of the ‘Japanese merchants’ (Free 2008: 83). A historical leveling of the two poles of a Confucian caste system upon the edge of a station platform.

It is tempting to know this new presence of an Imperial sovereign as a strategy of government: the extension of the symbolic value of the Imperial system into the physical locales of a new country, desperate for a foundation of legitimacy. Yet the ‘symbolic value’ of the Emperor was questionable: as attested by the bored onlookers Mr. Wirgman describes. More significantly, the precedence in governance is lacking. Throughout Tokugawa the physical manifestation of government was eschewed. The quasi-panopticon gaze of tall towers with surveying authority figures were not built by the Shoguns. There closest equivalent, fire-alarm towers, were posts reserved for the most lowly in standing, whom were often parodied in popular entertainment as pitiable voyeur figures, unable to participate in the life (sexual or otherwise) that they could only observe (Screech 2002). For the Tokugawa, government was best known through its effects, with the author carefully removed. The image of a Sun King standing proudly beside a siege cannon, his hand upon the bore casting, his words upon its muzzle declaring the weapon’s voice as his own, his gaze upon the battered walls of a subjugated town, is not a Tokugawa concept of government. Except in one point: the battered walls. Perhaps the best example of this can be found in a juxtaposition. In Foucault’s classic Discipline and Punish we open upon the scene of a regicide being tortured and dismembered before a watching crowd. The threat to the King – to the body of the state – is physically annihilated as spectacle to underscore the potency of the sovereign (1995). In Tokugawa this scene would never happen. For example, a case of arson, the most heinous of crimes in wood-and-paper Edo, would proceed thusly: an arsonist would be convicted through questioning in the privacy of the “courtyards of white sand”, administrative fortresses

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69 Which included a curious policy – curious to the British and American advisors – of disallowing any competing lines to be established (Free 2008: 113).
70 With at least one interesting example of funding coming from Buddhist monks eager for a new line to speed pilgrims their way (Free 2008: 141).
71 The Emperor had made a review of military maneuvers two years prior, but this was the first opened to a general public (Free 2008: 79).
surrounded by stone and wood walls, and likewise the sentencing of death through (a sympathetic similitude) of being burned at the stake would likewise take place out of the public gaze. Only the effect – the burned and disfigured body – would then be taken to a public space, to be displayed as a message to the populace (Botsman 2005). The operations of power – the bloody hands of government – were rarely witnessed by the ‘people’.72

If the precedence for the new Imperial government actively manifesting the body of the boy-Emperor is not in their recent past, then a quick answer would be ‘imitation of Western practices’. But imitations of what? Or to ask a version of Kant, “What is Bright Government?” This is not just a philosopher’s dilemma. As early as 1868, the new government had dispatched ‘missionaries’ to the countryside to teach the meaning of a dissolution of the feudal order and a return to imperial rule. Of course, in a short time confusion and debate emerged over the meaning of the new order (Free 2008).

The dynamics of the problem can be glimpsed in the parallel discourses of Fukuzawa Yukichi. Fukuzawa is by far the best known, and loved, philosopher in modern Japan. He founded Keio University, the oldest and most prestigious university in the country; and his image is emblazoned upon the 10,000 yen bill.73 He first came to popular attention with the self-publication of Conditions in the West in 1866, an account of quotidian details of life in the West that he had gleaned through a trip as part of a bakufu envoy to the U.S. and Europe. The book was a massive success, selling 150,000 copies nearly immediately, in no small part due to the experimental writing style that Fukuzawa created (Blacker 1969: 7). An early example of his lifetime goal of ‘teaching’ the ‘people’,74 Fukuzawa had created a simplified lexicon and script style, breaking a long history of writing that was limited to particular strata of society divided by education.75 Accounts claim that as Fukuzawa wrote he would read his latest pages to his housemaid, altering his writing to make it comprehensible (Blacker 1969: 7).

The monumental task of ‘teaching’ a ‘people’ raises numerous philosophical conundrums. But remaining close to the historians’ narratives of Fukuzawa’s import (for the moment), a primary goal of his was to create a discourse of individual rights. Fukuzawa argued that the engine of history in the West was to be found in the ‘spirit of independence’, and individualized practice of inquiry and critique, and as such for the ‘Japanese’ to compete there must be more than a transformation of ‘surface’ – techniques, material, machinery, etc. – and instead the very ‘spirit’ must be transformed.

We can distinguish in civilization between its visible exterior and its inner spirit. It is easy enough to adopt the former, but difficult to pursue the latter. Now, when one aims at bringing civilization to a country, the difficult part must be done first

72 Even to the point that the manner of death was not important for the body. For example, if a suspect died under ‘questioning’ or committed suicide before the execution could take place, the body would still be burned and mutilated in private, then placed in public for display (Botsman 2005).
73 Roughly equivalent to the US $100 bill.
74 Blacker (1969) credits Fukuzawa with creating the first mode of public speaking in Japan.
75 E.g. with the Chinese script being reserved for the writings of the male intelligentsia.
and the easier left for later….In the first place, the externals of a civilization are empirical details, from food, clothing, shelter, implements, and so forth, to government decrees and laws….But what, then, is the spirit of civilization? It is a people’s spiritual makeup. This spirit can be neither bought nor sold. Nor again can it be readily created through use of manpower. It permeates the entire lifestream of a people and its manifest on a wide scale in the life of the nation. But since it has no one visible form, it is difficult to ascertain its existence. (2008: 21-22)

Within this framework Fukuzawa presented a series of arguments about individual rights and responsibilities, rejecting many customary norms as ‘backwards’, relegating others into a new realm of the ‘private’. Much of Fukuzawa’s seminal work, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*, is about creating a new ontology of human experience, one in which Knowledge and Virtue are bifurcated, and then further positioned into distinct fields of the private and public.

It is curious that much of the contemporary goodwill for Fukuzawa resides in this image of a proponent of the individual, and a leveler of caste/class distinctions. He is credited with literally fashioning a new vocabulary for Western concepts of liberty and individual rights. Yet the tension he established between the private and public always gave preference to the public. Private virtue was timeless; yet ‘one must choose the place to exercise it’ (2008). More significantly, knowledge as intelligence is to be valued by the fact of its public qualities:

Morality cannot be taught by means of the external; its truth or falsity cannot be checked by means of the external; it can affect others only when it is not visible. Intelligence can be taught by means of the external; its truth or falsity can be checked by means of the external; it can affect other even when it is not visible. (2008: 115)

Likewise, among his many arguments is a presentation of a concept of ‘progress’. In his representation it is driven by the spirit of the people; by a freedom of individualized reason, and yet it is measured, almost in a Machiavellian way, by the country. As Intelligence is fashioned through the external, and verified through the external, and effective in its presence (visible or otherwise), as Knowledge, it is manifested in the public of the *kokutai* – the national body – a race which maintains knowledge as a shared experience.

Thus “national polity” [kokutai] refers to the grouping together of a race of people of similar feelings, the creation of a distinction between fellow countrymen and foreigners, the fostering of more cordial and stronger bonds with one’s

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76 “The people of one nation, in their private relationships, may be able to befriend people of other countries far away and treat them as old friends, but when it comes to relations between one country and another only two things count: in times of peace, exchange goods and compete with one another for profit; in times of war, take up arms and kill each other” (2008: 234).
countrymen than with foreigners….Although reason may differ from country to
country, the most important factor is for a race of people to pass through a series
of social forms and share a common past.
(2008: 30)

Thus the rise of civilization is not only demonstrated by the creation of a ‘spirit of
liberty’, or a fabrication of a general structure to subsume the things of the universe
within (2008: 18), but also in the technical demonstrations of states in contest with one
another. Critically for Fukuzawa, progress was unknowable to reason. The only possible
knower of the success of a civilization would be the Japanese a thousand years in
posterity. This future would create a new burden on the people, an unconscionable
burden to transmit civilization to this future, with no knowledge of its content, or its

This cursory overview of Fukuzawa’s thoughts presents the crux of the dilemma
facing the Imperial regime as they try to set forth a practice of governance. On the one
hand there is this ghostly image of the ‘people’ – the engine of history and progress –
who, historically, have been absent from Japanese government, as recognized by
Fukuzawa himself (2008). The latest ‘restoration’ had been a struggle between military
elites, with the ‘people’ standing idly by, just as had happened in the civil wars of the
feudal ages. The problem of the new regime then was the same as Fukuzawa’s: to teach
the people to be ‘Japanese’ – to be a people, and an engine of history – while at the same
time withholding the jurisdiction of legitimacy, the possibility of measuring the
perfection of civilization, in itself, as the ‘country’. This problem differs from classical
political theory in the West in the sense of intentionality given to clearly defined actors –
the state must teach a people. An act of pedagogy – a moral and intellectual improvement
– is to be carried out by one trans-historical actor upon another. For the seemingly
pervasive goal of creating a possibility of history.

It is in this perversity of deliberate subject formation that the young Meiji riding
those trains plays a prominent role. First it is a curious fact that with a ‘country’ so
obviously preoccupied with the possibility of colonial domination and partition (with
China serving as a near example, though Fukuzawa had pointed out the fates of both the
Native Americans and Pacific Islanders under European subjugation), that so much
emphasis would be placed on building rails. The advantage may seem obvious to we
contemporaries, but the precedent upon European contact and trade, from the Ching to
Tecumseh, is the acquisition of weapons – ships and guns. Indeed China possessed a
more advanced navy (purchased from the West) until nearly the end of the Sino-Japanese
War (Free 2008). But despite the ongoing acquisitions of Western military technologies
the expenditures upon the creation of a national rail system dwarf those of direct military
acquisitions. In the early days preceding the Restoration, the rails had been seen as a
military asset, with both sides of the soon civil war proposing rails to Kyoto so that
troops could be rushed to control the Imperial palace. Yet the first rail created was in fact
that short line from Tokyo to the relatively backwater Yokohama - of dubious military
worth - at which Meiji presided.

The rails contained another factor. The role of government as pedagogue already
existed. The classic Confucian sage-King model, with the sovereign acting as a moral
barometer of the kingdom’s unity with ‘Nature’, included a teaching element in the responsibilities of the ruler to the ruled; at least in terms of serving as a moral exemplar of perfectibility. Even the late Tokugawa era philosopher, Ogyu Sorai, despite his separation of human activity from a natural order, maintained the pedagogical responsibilities of government in acts of law, again as a means of perfecting the morals of the commoners, the people (Najita 1987). But the rail network of Meiji’s time represented a new departure in the possibility of practices of government. Most specifically, a new modality of the embodiment of the state.

As stated earlier, the body-sign was a Tokugawa precedent. Most communities of significant size had a sign-board on which the latest government edicts could be read, representing the main form of communication between government and people. And the physical body of the criminal was deployed as a sign of Shogun power in practices of punishment. The rail network represented a new constellation of body-signs of government. The iron and wood, the carved stone, the steam locomotive, the sheer size and scale of the miles of laid track presented a potency of the new state. It served as a growing body, the literal capillaries of power of state authority, as the tracks created a possibility of time, information, and force of arms, heretofore inconceivable. As operation, the presence of the state’s power could now be experienced in the terrible presence of the rails – the carved mountains, the hurrying engine.

But this presence was more than metaphorical. It was a metonym of transubstantiation. The force of the state could be found in the military deployment along the rails, e.g. through the suppression of uprisings among the populace. The most notable being the original leading rebel province of Satsuma, under the leadership of one of the premier restoration Generals, Saigo Takamori, taking up arms against the new Imperial state. The rails were one of the main assets of the Imperial government against this threat, as almost all trains were subsumed to military command for the duration of the conflict. The newly formed brigades of the Imperial army rushed along the lines westward. The broken bodies of the wounded soldiers traveled eastward. The population thus was presented with a new view of conflict, and the potential violence of the state.

The rail system also presented a new milieu for experimentation in social order. It was one of the primary employers of both the young and women in Japan at that time. These new employees were situated in bureaucratic environments in which relations were purely determined by seniority, again determined by the state. Uniform repetition of operations, without the complex network of relations typified in a ‘traditional’ community, could be maintained in the parallel atmosphere of the station. At once supremely distant from the community it abuts, but through its mere physical proximity provided a ready window, and model, of the new world order for the witnessing ‘people’ (Free 2008). The icon under which this new world labored, in its new relations, clearly visible, the portrait of the Emperor, of course, but also the clock, another Meiji import that traveled up and down the rails, along which traveled government advisors explaining to the people the importance of the clock and efficiency (Free 2008).

The rail network composed a new world order in the form of a new body of the state and its practices. It was protected as such. An example: when early would-be saboteurs placed stones upon the tracks, the government responded by declaring an area alongside the tracks as an execution ground. The force of state violence could thus be
demonstrated in quite literal fashion – displayed in the broken bodies of the criminal – against a backdrop, and the spectacle, of the rail (Free 2008).

Young Meiji’s travel along the rail network, his numerous officiations of new lines and stations, was not just then a passing of some Imperial essence of authority and tradition upon the alien, it was a *collusion*, again, a *transubstantiation*, in which the new forces of time and destruction embodied in the rail network were relocated within the body of the state, but most clearly in an act of presentation repeated ad nauseam along the network, that of the young Emperor himself. Meiji’s travels upon the railroad were thus an act of *in-corporation*, in which the body of the state was extended into the communities encountered – the fragmented, isolated, or the thriving merchant community – were absorbed into the presence of the Imperial.77

This interpretation addresses a pair of historical curiosities. The first is how the young boy emperor was transformed from a rather pitiable figure, an all-too-human impotent administrator, largely ignored by the bored public that morning in Yokohama, into a divine descendant of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, whose funeral launched a period of near histrionic mourning amongst millions, including sympathetic suicides. The other is how the *kokutai*, the national body, was transformed from a quality of the human, that possessed by all communities, languages and peoples, became a uniquely ‘Japanese’ phenomenon by 1912. It was the sacred *kokutai*, along with the antiquity of the Imperial line that separated Japan from all nations of the Earth. And ultimately, placed it above them.

The rail was alchemy. It transformed the land and permeated it with new currents of power. But more importantly in an act of historical transubstantiation, the practice of government became an embodied Imperial system, manifest in miles of iron and wood track. This network became the presence of a new body of the Emperor in which a diverse array of government practices could emerge.

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77 Parallels exist with European state formations. The historian Linda Colley observed that developments in travel allowed for an increasingly mobile British royalty played a double role of personifying the royals as human beings, akin to their subjects, but also transforming them into something more: a representation of the intangible national body within a ‘common, physical, human body’ (from Jasanoff 2005: 124).
By the 1930s Japan was a colonial power, and the tentative days of building modest train lines under the guidance of yatoi Western engineers were a generation in the past. The train had become a Japanese icon, prevalent as a symbol, as well as a existential field of experience, in the thriving aesthetic production of commercial photography, government illustration, popular theater, and novels of life in the new Japan (Robertson 1995). Thousands of kilometers of train line crisscrossed the Japanese archipelago, and as a “colonial power” Japan was inserting its practices and technical skill into a “traditional Asia”, as a new form and discourse of modernization, and consequently, civilization. As early as 1895, with the close of the first Sino-Japanese war, Japanese engineers and laborers had come to the Asian mainland to build tracks. Likewise the Treaty of Portsmouth, which concluded hostilities with Russia, had three separate articles dedicated to the issue of railways in the territory of Manchuria (Free 2008: 238). The construction of rails on the mainland experienced such a boom that a new company, the South Manchurian Railway was chartered, following the model of the British East India Company (Van Bremen 1999: 250). It would serve as a primary actor in the administration and construction of rails throughout the Asian continent colonies for the next 30 years. The train as Japanese presence on Asia was further acted out by the “grand tour” of Korea, undertaken by then “Crown Prince” of Japan, the future Emperor Taisho, in 1907 utilizing a specially built imperial railcar, as a “goodwill tour” that preceded the annexation of the colony into the Empire in 1910 (Free 2008: 238).

However, this brief overview contains a significant gloss that must be considered before continuing. A textbook historian claim is that Japan was a colonial power, and an Empire, with a constitution/juridical framework ‘granted’ to the ‘people’ by the Imperial line. Yet, a critical issue, simply put, is that not all “empires” are the same. The ideology, rationalities, procedures, formations, and practices of “empire” differ in time and place. Most succinctly expressed by Hannah Arendt, in her seminal work, The Origins of Totalitarianism, as “Imperialism is not empire building and expansion is not conquest” (2000: 110).

Arendt makes this claim by proceeding from a pair of distinctions. The first is that the Imperial posture is primarily a juridical one: an act of conquest for it to be recognized as such, and more importantly, politically sustained, requires a legal framework in which the populace is integrated.

Conquest as well as empire building had fallen into disrepute for very good reasons. They had been carried out successfully only by governments which, like the Roman Republic, were based primarily on law, so that conquest could be

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78 Authors as diverse as Lafcadio Hearn and Natsume Soseki utilized the train as setting and/or plot device in their novels.
79 20,000 kilometers of new railway projects were proposed with the war’s closure, many of them in the newly acquired territories of Korea and Taiwan (Free 2008: 181).
followed by integration of the most heterogeneous peoples by imposing upon them a common law.
(2000: 106)

Arendt continues to argue that, however, the nation-state as it emerges in Europe to the late colonial period of the 19th century ran contrary to this juridical framing in the sense that at its most fundamental level the law existed through a recognition of an *ethnos* – particular, localized, and a subject through history. Absorption of the Other through conquest required a variety of legal and discursive mechanisms, most typically resulting in a legal schizophrenia in which *subjects* existed alongside *citizens*. A *mission civilisatrice* in which both the populace, and the legal system, were bifurcated.

…it is characteristic of imperialism that national institutions remain separate from the colonial administration although they are allowed to exercise control. The actual motivation for this separation was a curious mixture of arrogance and respect: the new arrogance of the administrators abroad who faced “backward populations” or “lower breeds” found its correlative in the respect of old-fashioned statesmen at home who felt that no nation had the right to impose its law upon a foreign people….But the colonial services never ceased to protest against the interference of the “inexperienced majority” – the nation – that tried to press the “experienced minority” – the imperialist administrators – “in the direction of imitation,” namely, of government in accordance with the general standards of justice and liberty at home. (2000: 111)

The bifurcated system created myriad opportunities for different expressions of pastoral power through governance. The more direct experiences of the colonial rule, could then be returned to the ‘institutionalized’ of the nation: the work-house, the asylum, the hospital, the military (Rabinow 1989). However, the rubric of framings for questions of ethics, responsibilities, rights, and justice, remained worlds apart. The most paradigmatic result of this system was that empire building by nation-states of the era invariably created nationalistic movements in the conquered peoples.

The second distinction marked by Arendt is that conquest exists separate from expansion. Arendt notes expansion is:

….a permanent and supreme aim of politics is the central political idea of imperialism. Since it implies neither temporary looting nor the more lasting assimilation of conquest, it is an entirely new concept in the long history of political thought and action.
(2000: 106)

Again, fundamentally, Arendt argues that the framing of expansion does not exist in a political realm, but finds its origin in “business speculation” (2000: 106). Expansion was about an increase in the production of goods and in their consumption, and this only tangentially related to the concept of territorial ambitions of Imperial antiquity. The roots of this “entirely new” idea lay in the historical emergence of the bourgeoisie as a class with power and influence on government. Arendt argues that over time the bourgeoisie
represented a set of approaches toward production in which sustaining profit and risk calculation acted as a new model towards the colonial projects of empire. A new rationality of calculation and predictability took root in the imperium of the colonial age, and one that would be alien to Roman gazes.

Maruyama Masao, easily one of the most influential social thinkers produced in postwar Japan, when reflecting upon the nature of Japanese imperialism noted several distinctions between it and its European counterparts. Drawing upon the work of Carl Schmidt, Maruyama argued that unlike European nationalism in which the state asserts its authority based upon a formal legal structure, separate from “internal values”, Imperial Japan never made this distinction. The citizenship was conceived purely as subjects. The rights and responsibilities (many more of the latter) were bequeathed to them by the state. As such, the state reserved an absolute right of pastoral power to shape all value discourses. In effect, the state “monopolized the right to determine values” (1963: 4).

Comparing the totalitarian government of Japan to those of Germany and Italy, Maruyama found many parallels: rejection of individualism, opposition to parliamentary politics, foreign expansion, racial mythologies, and the rejection of social class (1963: 34). However, the usurpation of the creation of value discourse was closely tied to a unique characteristic of the Japanese empire: that being a conceptualization of “society” as not being a binary distinction of the individual to the state (totalitarian and inclusive as it may be under a fascist government), but instead taking the basic unit of society to be the “family-system”, of which the state, and the Imperial line, are the most significant branch. This distinction “defines the social context of Japanese fascism” (1963: 37).

Maruyama cites the statements of Tsuda Kouzou, chief secretary of the Japan Village Government League, as exemplary:

In the family-system principle of Japan the keynote of society is not the demand for individual rights, as in the modern countries of the West, but service to the family as a whole. Socially each family is an independent animate body, a complete cell in itself. The individual is no more than a part or an element of this complete cell. Our nationalism should be the extension and enlargement of this family-system principle. This is perhaps because our nationalism is nothing but the union of these families at the national level. The Emperor is the sovereign, family head, centre, and general representative of the State as a united body.

(1963: 37)

Maruyama makes two other significant distinctions between Japanese fascism and European examples. The first is to note that as the individual and individual rights discourse was preempted in Japan, so was a juridical or ethical formation of individual responsibility. At a pervasive level, this meant that decision making within government was not situated within an administrative figure. Decisions were made by consensus, of often, unstated opinions. A rule of bureaucracy without an authoritarian hand (e.g. Hitler) to arbitrate differences, and set long term goals. Thus much of the Japanese war and colonial efforts were planned (occasionally at cross purposes) in different sections of government and industry (1963: 87). Maruyama noted that this radical difference of the individual as agent could be seen in the demeanor and affect of the defendants in the Nuremberg trial compared to the Tokyo ones. Goring, for example, was willing to take
“one hundred per cent responsibility” for decision making, and clearly outlined his opinions on various strategic policy. His Japanese counterparts were instead “slippery as eels, hazy as mist” (1963: 101). The absence of a discourse of an individual as ethical calculator created a situation in which the Nazi’s were capable of being aware of their acts as “crimes” or “evils”, but the Japanese saw no locus of agency upon which the blame could be fixed (1963: 94).

Maruyama argued the other distinction being that the Japanese fascist government firmly “believed its own propaganda” in that the war was motivated by a desire of inclusion of other Asian nations into an Imperial Way (1963: 94). If treated to an ethical examination by an individual interlocutor, then this could be deemed a positive. And furthermore, it was underscored by the fact that Japanese international consciousness had not historically been inter-national. In Europe, nationalism from its beginnings bore the marks of an awareness of international society (e.g. Grotius). Asia was different. It was characterized by self-sufficient “civilizations” with limited contact (1963: 138). “Asia” was created not through an awareness of international society, but was “dragged into it, through force, or threat of force, by ‘international society’” (1963: 138). The mission civilisatrice of Japan could thus proceed in a world of a singular national polity (at least within Asia).

The “nation” is the Gordian knot to understanding Japanese Imperialism. In relation to this topic, Prasenjit Duara presents a fascinating account of the complexities of nationalism and Japanese Imperialism in Sovereignty and Authenticity, his in depth study of Manchukuo (2003). Manchukuo is a particularly apropos example of this problem in that on the one hand it was a Japanese invention at the height of their colonial ambitions in the 1930s; a territory that would largely consume Japanese exports and “development funds” yet it was not absorbed within the Japanese Empire as Korea and many other East Asian holdings were, but retained its independence as a sovereign nation throughout the war, until the government was abolished by the victorious allies in 1945. Throughout that time it was a curious “puppet state”, undergirded by Japanese arms and material, but with a government based upon Manchu royalty, the final heir in the Chin Dynasty (made famous in the West through the movie The Last Emperor), who legitimated a fascist state, which however, contained a political rhetoric that was curiously multi-ethnic (Duara 2003: 63). In trying to understand this state of affairs, Duara begins with an observation that “nationalism” instead of being simply a discursive projection of Anderson’s “imagine community” is an “immanent conception of history” that draws upon a “symbolic regime of authenticity” (2003: 9). He then notes that for much of the 19th century nationalism in its modern understandings, did not exist in Europe. It was through the growth of the colonial empire system of Western Europe that nationalism emerged as a defense of the home populace, particularly in regards to the protection of domestic markets (2003: 12). The polishing of the nationalist posture came through the post-

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80 By 1945 Japanese investment there exceeded all other colonies combined (Duara 2003: 68).
81 This tension can also be observed, for example in the curious short lived United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves. In which the monarch favored retaining the seat of government in Brazil (having moved there following Napoleon’s advance) on equal terms with Portugal and its other possessions, but was faced with a new fervor of
Napoleonic inter-state system. In this, even the declaration of the rights of man laid out in the French revolution was coupled with the right to “national sovereignty”, as the new rights of man were protected and enforced through the arms of this new idea, the nation-state (2003: 14).

This meant that late arriving colonial powers like Japan found themselves forging imperial territories in a complex inter-state system in which nationality, rights, and race acted as cornerstones of power and relations. The base problem then being that “…the principle of belonging to a national territory was incommensurate with the historical principle of multiple affiliations and flexible incorporation into empire” (2003: 18). In addressing this Japanese intellectuals and government spokesmen were forced to experiment with new practices and discourses based in, also new, formulations of the supplement to race, ethnicity, and the supplement to nation, civilization.

The issue of ethnicity, the former, is a curious one as it co-emerges with the birth of anthropology as practice, institution, and inquiry. In Japan, anthropology had strictly been a physical one, based on classifications of race, until the advent of colonial possessions. Then anthropologists were distributed to the reaches of the Empire to study and understand the “peoples”. Anthropological departments were established in universities within the colonial possessions, such as the University of Seoul (Shimizu and Van Bremens 2003). Following a worldwide trend, the earlier discourse on racial classifications shifted to one which favored culture and ethnicity. For example, early 20th century studies of the Korean population argued that there was more racial variation within the “Japanese” than there was between the Japanese and Korean peoples (Shimizu and Van Bremens 2003). One ambitious scholar even traced the origins of the Imperial mythology to shamanistic practices in the Korean peninsula, thus illustrating a shared “genesis” of the two peoples (Shimizu and Van Bremens 2003).

The product of these, not uncontroversial arguments, was one that dovetailed well with internal Japanese political rhetoric of a state not simply being a binary relation between the individual and the social, but was in fact composed of an association of family units settled beneath the Imperial ‘family’ hierarchy. This formulation critically allowed for a discourse of proximity relatedness and not merely an absolute difference of self/other (as was exhibited in the racial classifications of Nazi Germany). The concept of relatedness allowed for a new formulation of civilization. Gone (or at least submerged) was the antiquity idea of civilization, bunmei, as a quality of education – a command of the shared symbols of culture (i.e. the Chinese ideography) that could elevate even the “barbarian” into the civilized. In its place emerged one in which ethnicity was coupled with, in a very Boas-ian fashion, relatedness in form and, more importantly, homology. Civilization – East Asian Civilization – could then be depicted as relationship based through a production of knowledge of the ethnos in determining these similarities on the aforementioned vectors.

Furthermore, civilization, then could be used to create new logics of relation and distinction (e.g. via the West) that could underscore colonial expansion and inter-state competition and alliance. Again, as in the case of Manchukuo, which while being completely militarily and economically subordinated to the Japanese Empire, did not
follow the typical colonial pattern not only in its sovereignty, but also in the massive industrial development underwritten by Japanese finances (qua the typical European practice of limited industrial development and massive agricultural/raw material extractions) (Duara 2003: 68). Or in the sudden emergence of varied configurations of civilizational distinctions, such as the contemporaneous development of discourses, like “Buddhist Modernism” (2003: 92).

Between the immobility of the inside and that of the outside a certain quid pro quo is introduced, a slender blade that inverts their stability. The chiasm is produced by the windowpane and the rail. These are two themes found in Jules Verne, the Victor Hugo of travel literature: the porthole of the *Nautilus*, a transparent caesura between the fluctuating feelings of the observer and the moving about of an oceanic reality; the iron rail whose straight line cuts through space and transforms the serene identities of the soil into the speed with which they slip away into the distance. The windowpane is what allows us to *see*, and the rail, what allows us to *move through*. These are two complementary modes of separation. The first creates the spectator’s distance: You shall not touch; the more you see, the less you hold – a dispossession of the hand in favor of a greater trajectory for the eye. The second inscribes, indefinitely, the injunction to pass on; it is its order written in a single but endless line: go, leave, this in not your country, and neither is that – an imperative of separation which obliges one to pay for an abstract ocular domination of space by leaving behind any proper place, by losing one’s footing.

(de Certeau 1989: 112)

Michel de Certeau’s prose is a useful rejoinder as we return to the trains. Not only is it a reminder that the train as experiential phenomenon was intertwined with rapid transformations in the European experience of space, through its birth and relations with the then burgeoning mass travel market, but also in the metamorphosis of space that ensued it created new systems of disruptions and adjacencies. New possibilities of “here” and “away”, as well as the inoculated experience of the “no space” that is the traveled beyond the carriage walls. Yet as useful as this rejoinder is moving it to the empire being built on the Asian mainland, as appropriate as the parallels are for the travelling Japanese, this train-gaze is still that of the privileged bourgeoisie – the affluent and educated traveler seeking pleasure or distraction. It must be complimented also by the gaze outside the train: the pastoral experience of the wide steppes of Manchuria, or the fertile deltas of the Korean peninsula. For in this view from the rice paddy, the train lines create other forms of disruptions and adjacencies. Imperial discourse of possession and dispossession, citizenship and alienation, are writ in the physical being, and force, of the passing cars, and the ever presence of the iron rails.

I state this because in our summary of the preceding political philosophers there is a constant danger to consider the political discourse – of nations, Empire, colonialism, sovereignty, etc. – as self-generating, an autopoiesis within a History of Ideas, that is in itself *Deus Sine Natura*. In its place I take Foucault’s observation as my starting point, “…that there are not first of all relations of production and then, in addition, alongside or on top these relations, mechanisms of power that modify or disturb them…” (2007: 2),
by asserting that the train-system exists not merely as forces of production to a superstructure of ideas, or is itself a power system overlaid on a history producing field of ideas, but is a system, which allowed for various emergences of rationalities and power structures to develop based upon systemic needs. I argue that within the colonial framework of Imperial Japan, the train-system was constitutive of a series of problems confronting governmental practice, as well as its existence shaping the form and logic of the solutions.

For example, taking Duara’s statement that nationalism represents a “symbolic regime of authenticity,” this presents itself within the Imperial context as a problem of legitimacy. The Japanese railway, as we have seen, had been tightly wound with questions of legitimacy of the sovereignty of the Emperor from its inception. Primarily, the embodied ‘modernity’, the new forms of relation to time, space, and violence, had supported a new set of government practices. In the colonial context of the rapid industrialization and railway building within Manchukuo, Korea, and elsewhere, the trains continued to serve this role as symbols of Japan’s legitimacy to lead through its privilege of being ‘modern’. As Jennifer Robertson noted, the train served in a series of aesthetic productions exported to the colonies as a backdrop and sign of the rationality of the progress that Japan had attained (1995). It was a “subordinated modernity”, as observed, in that Japan staked its legitimacy through a derivative experience of modernity qua the West. However, it was also situated within the new geisteswissenschaft of ethnos and civilization, in which Japan’s position could be further elevated by proximity: the most Asian of modernities, and therefore the most capable to lead. Fundamentally though, the legitimacy was fixed in a discourse of progress, technical progress, that Japan had lain in its rails.

*Raku Sei Rai Kou*, “Achievement Depends on Technology,” is etched at the entrance of the first rail tunnel cut out of the mountains of the Japanese archipelago (Free 2008: 105). It could also say that achievement depends upon a perception of time in which societies emerge as immortal actors within a field of History. Or in the words of the indomitable Fukuzawa Yukichi:

> These ideas of political legitimation originate, in the majority of cases, by dint of force of arms. But once established they no longer need to be maintained by force of arms. In fact, reference to the initial use of force of arms is usually considered taboo by those who later hold the reins of power. Justification of political authority is always grounded on some principle; that is, it is given a rational basis which is supposed to have lasting value.
> (2008: 32)

The train network served as a symbol of Empire for the colonized peoples. It also served as medium for the creation of systems and relations through the production of knowledge.

Japan was following a world-wide trend with the birth and deploy of the social sciences co-occurring with the political realities of Empire and colonialism. As stated earlier, the first decades of the 20th century saw the establishment of anthropology departments in universities throughout the colonies: Korea in 1924, Formosa 1927, a Manchurian National University in 1938 (Shimizu and Van Bremen 2003: 2). The
importance placed upon anthropological research by the Imperial government can be witnessed in the fact that during the cash-strapped years of World War II all research budgets were reduced, excepting anthropology, which actually was increased (Van Bremen 1997: 249). What isn’t as widely known is that the conduct of social science research was often connected with the colonial rail system. The South Manchurian Rail Company was the chief employer of social scientists throughout these decades (Shimizu and Van Bremen 2003). An overview of the research projects undertaken under its aegis shows a recurring concern with a doubled task of typifying ethnicities, and providing for rail security, in forms of labor and saboteur defense. The labor research was in a decidedly Malinowskian vein of understanding the ethnic other’s symbolic and political system in such a way as to best utilize the community as a work force. Security of the rails was also an act of understanding ethnic politics to utilize them as a juridical and enforcement mechanism. These efforts created schema for using certain groups as ‘enforcers’ versus other groups.

The writing of ethnos as types was thus sublimated in a political discourse of risk calculation. An understanding of an ethnic other was for an Imperial ambition of creating connection through homology of civilization. For example, ‘pan Asian shamanic practices’ allowed Japanese colonial officers to restructure the pantheons of local temples in Formosa and Korea to include Amaterasu, the Japanese Sun Goddess and primogenitor of the Imperial line, as the ‘true’ head of local divinities. But the resulting adjacency of the group also presented a threat. The affinities of the near-other created new possibilities for discordance and resistance. Ethnicity as notion could prove detrimental to Empire.

For the legitimacy of the modernity of the railway also creates a new relation to time-space. As early as the Satsuma rebellion Japanese military leaders realized that the railway created a new proximity of threat, through the simple compression of distance to the arms of the opposing forces. The recognition of the power and threat of the rails led to an ongoing effort to place the Imperial rail system directly under military control permanently, not just under times of war. This was ultimately successful in 1906, though not without controversy.  

On a larger scale, the speed at which force of arms could be deployed against the state created new anxieties of controlling potential avenues of risk. As early as 1885, Fukuzawa Yukichi had written that the inability of China to control the Formosa straits posed a security threat to Japan. The famed essay Datsu-a ron (‘the casting off of Asia’) resulted, in which Fukuzawa advocated an intellectual remove from Asia coupled with an aggressive policy of colonialism (Saaler 2007: 24). The railways’ importance to victory over the Czar’s forces in 1905, alongside their role as being popular targets for ethnic nationalists, further underscored its military significance. In short, the rails created a new grid for the exercise of power/control which also created a massive new framework for risk calculation. It was in these decades that the idea of Japan as a resource-poor country firmly emerged in political discourse, motivating a desperate drive for the material to maintain the system, much of it focused on the rail as transport and object. It was also in these decades that Korea, the Hermit Kingdom, was transformed into a “dagger pointed at the heart of Japan”.

82 The nationalization of the rails was the first time that a prime minister resigned his post in protest that wasn’t euphemistically labeled ‘for health reasons’ (Free 2008: 228).
These ideas are the products of a newly emerged system of the colonial Empire, which itself is in a direct relationship with a system of rails. Each exerts a force of contingency upon the other. In response Risk is produced as Knowledge. Two issues are of immediate importance to this model. First, following Niklas Luhmann (1995), the unity of the categories does not derive from a subject position – a state, nation, culture, or people – but from the forces within the system, e.g. the demands of the rail, the logic of the colonial relation, etc. Secondly, a system is a bricolage of information, which equates with extreme complexity, and thus forces a selection of contingent data, i.e. an evaluation of risk (1995: 25). In our case the time-space possibilities of the rail-system created new formations in the capacities of governance, which are transformed into a new field of risks. Luhmann notes that formulations such as time as a scarce resource can be traced to the new potentialities of the rail (1995: 187).

Play

The suicide with which we began our discussion occurred on the Nambu line just a few minutes before it intersected with the Denentoshi line. Both lines are well known; and both, like the majority of the regional lines, are plagued by the ‘problem of suicide’. Yet the differences between the two are noteworthy. The Nambu line is a Japan Rails line; its genealogy therefore can be traced back to the Meiji era Imperial Japan Railways, and their transformation by MacArthur fiat to a ‘public corporation’ following the war. The Denentoshi’s pedigree, while nearly as long, has consistently dwelt in the realm of private holdings and finance. Among my circle of Tokyo friends, the Nambu line had the reputation of being a bit ‘dirty’ - a euphemism for age and poverty – while the Denentoshi was ‘new’ and ‘vibrant’, a signifier of wealth. It is perhaps a remarkable distinction in notoriously class-conscious-less Japan, where national surveys asking for self-identification of social class repeatedly get responses of ‘middle class’ well in the high ninetieth percentiles. But in the extremely fashion conscious world of Tokyo of the 21st century, the Denentoshi is a mark of affluence: a sign of wealthy residence areas, upscale shopping centers, and easy commutes into the Tokyo city center. The train line itself is a status symbol. While one would not profess membership with the line unless actually employed by it, as in the standard professional greeting in Tokyo – “I am Sumitomo’s Tanaka” being a typical, if carefree translation of a common greeting, the corporate identity preceding the individual. However in the rail centered transport life of the Kanto megalopolis, just as standard of a getting-to-know-one inquiry is, “What line do you live on?” To respond “Denentoshi” implies status, affluence, and prestige, somewhat comparable to a southern Californian claiming residency in Malibu or Beverly Hills.

The Denentoshi’s allure is by design. The train company acts as more than a transportation service provider, it is the major landholder and developer along its length. Thus it owns and operates up-scale shopping centers filled with the latest French fashion

83 Again following Luhmann, these risks are marked either as “dependence” if they are derived from an environment as a resource (e.g. natural ‘resources’), or “uncertainty” if they are derived from an environment of information.
boutiques and cafes, recreational grounds and amusement centers, physical fitness centers, rows upon rows of high end condominium developments, and even leases space for medical offices and schools, all in the pursuit of providing a complete ‘life environment’ for its customers. The line was founded by Goto Keita who was forthright in his assertions that he was following the philosophy of Kobayashi Ichizo, who founded the Osaka Hankyu line in 1910 (Hara 2009). Kobayashi was well known for fashioning the Hankyu line as a fashionable, upper middle residence area on the outskirts of Osaka, but he also was a maverick of sorts who ran contrary to the conventional wisdom of the time in not designing the train services to run between existing large urban centers, but instead advocated designing the train environment such that ‘customers were created’ (Hara 2009). Reputedly Kobayashi followed studies of suburban community developments in Europe at the time, when he bought tracks of lightly occupied agricultural land for his trains to run through, and then designed integrated communities with shopping, educational, entertainment and living facilities all provided by the train company. To emphasize the connection between the train company and communities, Kobayashi was also the first to change station names to danchi (community) itself. Goto copied Kobayashi’s policy first in the IJR public holdings in Tokyo and then extended it to his own private enterprise with the Denentoshi. In the years following World War 2 the danchi system was altered to incorporate new inspirations: U.S. military facilities (Hara 2009). The U.S. military bases represented an island of affluence and service in the otherwise war-torn and poverty riven Japan. But moreover the military bases represented an icon of a lifestyle, a space of interconnected life services, of hospitals, schools, barbecue pits, playgrounds, work offices, and modular living units, that was adapted into the Denentoshi’s development plans. Even as the modular concrete condominium danchi design fell out of favor with the nouveau riche in the later decades of the surging Japanese economy, who were more interested in the possibilities of personalization and individualization that their wealth could provide, the Denentoshi retained its patina of an affluent, and selective, living experience.

There are several neoliberal narratives to be found here. A private company, like the Denentoshi, assuming to itself responsibilities for providing manifold social services, is a classic example of the shrinking of the welfare state. It also plays on a curious string in modern Japanese politics, that being the fear of dependence on government. Fukuzawa Yukichi saw this as a primary obstacle to the development of a responsible bourgeoisie (‘civil society’ in the contemporary parlance) and sought to lead by example: refusing the numerous entreaties of government service, he remained in various private fields (e.g. education, publishing, etc.) throughout his long career. Kobayashi was a staunch opponent to what came to be known as the amakudari system – the ‘descent from heaven’, or the policy of private firms hiring retired government ministers in order to take advantage of their political clout and extensive contacts. Kobayashi had a strict policy of not hiring ‘government men’ (Hara 2009).

With MacArthur’s breakup of the old IJR, the signifier par excellence of Meiji era centralized government control and planning, the following decades of the now JR ‘s history show a steady move toward privatization in transport services. As massive debt piled up, the 1980s proved to be the decisive decade when JR was officially reformed into seven public corporations with a shared private/public portfolio (Kasai 2003).
However, there was also a curious parallel story of socialism along the lines. Hara (2009) observes that the tight-knit *danchi* communities formed of individuals with similar economic and educational backgrounds proved fecund ground in the post war years for the development of numerous public organizations. As the salarymen trudged off to work, the housewives stayed behind…and organized. Traditions as varied as PTOs to book clubs emerged. But the *danchi* also acted as popular based for socialist political groups. Membership in the communist party was significantly higher in the *danchi* neighborhoods than anywhere else in greater Tokyo (Hara 2009). The train lines themselves were also confronted with powerful unions, including communist ones, that weren’t afraid to flex their political muscles in the latter decades of the 20th century with numerous strikes for workers’ rights (notoriously including the “strike for the right to strike” in the 1980s (Kasai 2003). Kasai Yoshiyuki, as a senior official for JR during the privatization years in the 80s, writes of how JR took it upon itself to ‘retrain’ the union workers to value what he deemed ‘economism’ (2003: 44).

Yet focusing upon the triumphs of private capital and administration as a simple narrative of the bankruptcy of the welfare state threatens to obscure the complex integration of powers and responsibilities that exist for the contemporary train. We began our discussion looking at the numerous agencies and actors involved in determining life and death (quality) with a ‘suicide’ on the line. With this seeming departure coupled with the, again, seeming, conclusion in narratives of privatization and socialism of subjects in relation to the rails it could be argued that this was a reflection of manifestations of Foucault’s governmentality, the administration of the political body by the bureau, the rational, the managerial. This was not intended. As worthy as this investigation would be in certain framings, I am concerned with entering into a discussion of the significance of design and strategy that such a position would entail. The more interesting narrative that I have tried to piece together here was not the goal of subject formation, but the potentiality of subject formation brought upon by adjacent *techne* and rationalities. While it is certainly plausible that Fukuzawa Yukichi or the advisors to Emperor Meiji had some conception of whom they wanted to shape this Japanese subjectivity into being, the resultant formations of Imperial Japanese subject, East Asian colonial other, or bourgeoisie housewife, I believe, to have far outstripped the modest objectives of design.

I have instead tried to treat the Japanese subject as a discursive formation, as articulated by Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), assuming and insisting upon an ephemeral ordering of a plurality of discourses around the non-object. Again, following Foucault, the idea was to investigate and allow for adjacencies and assemblages to emerge around certain discourse, while holding on to the train as the thread of inquiry, the unifying problematic. To this end I have endeavored to create a series of adjacencies – the rails, a dead body, a ‘politics’, a schedule – in order to see what ideas emerged. At this point, stepping back and demanding a unity to all the preceding hodgepodge of events and historical formations leads me to borrow from Nikolas Rose concept of the ‘bioeconomy’ (2007). This is an admittedly awkward fit. The bioeconomy was developed in reaction to emerging technological and conceptual formations of the possibilities of *bios* (following the double helix), and more importantly, was invoked by Rose in trying to understand the myriad ways that a rationality of commodification could be applied to the resulting discourses. Commodification of life is
as I stated an awkward fit to the preceding examples; though not necessarily entirely
inappropriate. The rails have provided ample means for marking bodies as money. The
Japanese body is calculated in financial terms as it lies broken on the rails: the cost in
Yen place on a simple curve in relation to time. Space is likewise commodified. The
communities along the Denentoshi lack the ‘traditional’ geographical values of soil,
view, climate, etc. Their value is derived strictly from a commute-time calculus, and the
coordinated ‘added value’ of the services the Denentoshi company deliberately added to
the communities (and of course, to the proximity of association with wealth and power).
On a larger scale much of the train system as transport has of course functioned in a
management of body throughput in relation to time as a money making endeavor.

Yet invoking bioeconomy in a larger framing, as a generalized concern with the
accounting and rational ordering of the bios-subject, is, I believe, more appropriate. If
the economics is allowed to include a posture to a discursive formation of the totality, a
holism via calculation, then it certainly encompasses much that went on alongside the
rails in our events. For example, beyond the pecuniary measurements of body and time,
there was the geometric organization of space and significance. The rails proved to be a
novel and powerful venue for organizing and dictating the significance of space. The
space alongside the rails could be constituted as a managerial norm, a special area of new
relations outside the village nexus, in the Meiji station with its imperial regalia and new
systems of organization below the clock. Likewise, the simple act of assuming the space
along the rail as a new theater for government power in the display of the executed
criminal, was a formation for political discourse in relation to a techne unknown to the
medieval. The accounts of the danchi movements are strictly a question of the political
possibilities/consequences of the political placed in relation of rail rationalities. But they
are far from the only one. The well known case of Vietnam War protesters targeting
Shinjuku station for weeks-long sit ins was a case of utilizing the broad ripple social
impacts of the rail network to amplify a political act. Likewise the JR and municipal
governments’ response to this event through the creating of spatial illegalities (e.g.
loitering zones) in stations, as well as the spatial and physical reconstitution of the
stations (e.g. the redesign of entrances and walkways to prevent easy areas of gathering
and encourage speedy passage, or the removal of gravel from alongside the rails
themselves to deny protesters stones as ammunition) are cases of negotiation the rail as a
space of political intervention.

The questions of rationality – demarking a ‘now’, anticipating a ‘future’ through a
risk discourse and analysis is one which Niklas Luhmann explored in depth, but here it is
the ramifications of constituting ‘risk’ in terms of a ‘bios’ (economy) that is of most
interest. Risk is a creative act. In this application, calculating the dangers posed to bios
in the rail space requires a determination of the powers, properties, and intent of the bios,
the Japanese subject. It creates a territory in which questions of what life should be, and
how it should be expressed, and moreover, how techne can be best utilized to maximize
the potential of the bios subject, or at least, implicitly, is implicated. It is in this sense
that these reflections on the discursive history of the Japanese rails that I wish it to be
taken. The technology created new areas for the inquiry into the significance of life and

84 I discuss this in my article, ‘Protesting Japan’ (unpublished). For additional discussion
subjectivity, as natures and extent of objects such as ‘culture’, ‘society’, ‘nation’, are negotiated. The placing of the rational calculation of the present and future in terms of anticipating a possibility of life expressions, as citizen, as subject, as consumer. Restated in a curiously anachronistic, but oddly appropriate, Aristotelian virtue term, the rails allowed and demanded reflections upon eudaimonia – the flourishing. The dilemma of the ‘good life’ was ever-present in a calculation of risk and bodies in the train system. Whether from ascribing the virtues of the orderly worker in the Meiji station, or teaching ‘economism’ to the union laborer in the 1980s, or in the political reflections of the housewife as a ‘community’, the rails allowed for a new formulation of the possible, in space, time, and movement. Life and death were to be ‘maximized’, the ultimate economic act. The good life, as a potentiality, was placed within a discourse of time and risk within a network system, and in myriad and sundry cases, new solutions to this old problem were found. Importantly, the locus of this questioning was malleable – shifting and sharing space in government, company management, the individual household, etc. – and thus not a simple tale of strategy and design. Instead it was a multiplicity of reactions to the transformations wrought by the techne, and the possibilities of thought that emerged with the formations of risk systems that the rail created. The placing of the present to the future alongside a concern for this networked subjectivity, demanded an attention to the question of how can the human element of the system be maximized. How can the subject – imperial, national, private – flourish.
4 The Hermeneutics of Annihilation

It is possible, with admittedly very broad brush strokes, to trace the conceptual transformations of ‘the artifact’ under modernity. With the coining of the term ‘technology’ in the early 19th century, the humble craftsman’s tool – knife, pick, shovel – assumed a veritable pantheon of new symbolic roles. The tool as icon was not new of course: representations abound, ranging from guild seals in the Middle Ages, to the doubled role of writing medium and pictographic representation of the chisel in antiquity. Yet with a logos of techne the tool began to serve the role as indicator and index of ‘civilization’. Firstly, in the uni-linear model of ‘progress’, familiar to museum-goers – stone, bronze, iron ages as historical frames marked by a shift in tool development and use, with the corresponding complexity of social institutions. This model was modified by Boas in the early twentieth century such that language and geography assumed primacy in museum representational structures, with tools loosing their primacy in classification, instead serving as one of several secondary fields of expressions of the ‘cultural complex’, now taking the role of one more chapter in the monograph.

As the modern gaze shifted from exotica and typos to an internal analysis of pathos of itself, the role of tool as techne was sublimated by inquiries of agency. The tool as cultural manifestation assumed a greater, more distanced, materiality, alienated and alienating from the ‘pure human’ creator. From Marx to Heidegger and beyond, the tool as manifestation of cultural systems, granted its materiality to the ‘systems’ element in that configuration, created a framework for structure of the human experience. To borrow from Spinoza, by way of Bourdieu, the physicality of the techne assumed the role of structure – structuring or structured – in an ongoing dialogue of human subjectivity and agency, which famously allowed for such questions of the politics of artifacts.

Dilemmas of index and structure (expression and sine qua non) linger in much of contemporary technology studies. These framings privilege a technology in a temporality of the longue durée, marking/constituting epochs, ages, and practices. However, parallel to this hermeneutics of techne as a sweeping historical time, is an examination of the artifact as an event. In this sense the technology acts as a moment of rupture, reflexively demanding an interpretation of a relation to temporality, a before and after, and thus a communicative monument creating possibilities of history. Following Foucault (1972), the technological event then serves as an object of the archaeology of knowledge, a hermeneutic focus from which disruptions in representations and systems of knowledge emerge (or can be delineated through). Within the relatively recent field of scientific studies, the event is usually reserved for the ‘scientific breakthrough’, i.e. an ‘unveiling’ of knowledge, adhering to nature; a discovery, through which an act of relation to nature

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85 The Oxford English Dictionary traces the English origins of technology to the seventeenth century, where it was used to designate industrial or practical arts. In 1831, a Harvard professor, Jacob Bigelow, used the word in the title of his book, Elements of Technology...on the Application of the Sciences to the Useful Arts, noting that the word was found in some “older dictionaries and was beginning to be used by practical men” (Hughes 2004:3)

86 Langdon Winner (1986) famously asked, “Do artifacts have politics?”
is established. It is typically a non-material formation; information in the form of numbers, metaphors, analogies tend to fill the pages of scientific histories, with the emphasis being on the intangibility of the knowledge-discovery as an idea. Examining technology as event/monument positions the artifact as a communicative medium, one in which hermeneutics of content and significance, in relation to questions of temporality, can be posed.

The particular case I wish to examine are the two atomic bombs which were dropped August 6th and 9th, 1945, from the skies over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These devices have been in themselves likened to a pinnacle in a science of the efficiency of death, and as such, the bombings are already widely recognized as an historical event, and the harbinger of a new epoch, the nuclear age, with its associated apocalyptic connotations. Within this broad framework however, many questions lie unasked. In the following pages I will examine two. Specifically, a doubled communication of the atomic bombs, as paired symbols of annihilation: of a civilization, and the human race.

**War**

By August 7th, 1945, interpretations of the meaning of the atomic bomb had begun in Japan. The *Enola Gay* had somehow survived carrying the extremely temperamental prototype, *Little Boy*, in the equally temperamental cargo bay of the modified B-29, and dropped its weapon using visual sightings of the Aioi Bridge in the heart of the city. The resulting explosive force was well beyond expected. The city was built on an alluvial plain, surrounded on three sides by mountains like a cul-de-sac, which amplified the explosive force by directing part of the shockwave inwards in a rebounding effect (Chun 2008). An unexpected ‘perk’ of the device was the immense heat released. First seen at the Trinity test only three weeks prior, *Little Boy* released heat on such a scale that those near the blast center were incinerated in an instant. Glass and iron melted, and structures pulverized by the ricocheting blast forces were then set ablaze, creating a massive conflagration across the city center, an instant firestorm, something that entire flights of B-29s had only been capable of producing earlier in Dresden and Tokyo with careful planning and a great deal of luck. And then, within twenty minutes of the bomb’s detonation, the *kuroame* (‘black rain’), rain gorged with radioactive matter dispersed through the dust created by the blast and fire, fell on the outskirts of the city, dousing those fleeing the heat and destruction.

Eyewitness accounts from a village thirty kilometers distant, sheltered from the city in the mountains to the east, share descriptions of the horrendous noise, the bright flash, and the lingering black plume that filled the sky that day. It’s a marvel of human

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87 Richard Rhodes, in “The Making of the Atomic Bomb” (1986) presents an elegant graph presenting ‘percentage killed’ in proportion to distance from epicenter. The slope dramatically approaches absolute efficiency – 100 percent – the closer one approaches the epicenter.

88 A senior engineer from the Los Alamos project accompanied the flight because of concerns of what the vibrations and radical changes in cargo bay temperature might do to the delicate electronics of the bomb (Reed and Stillman 2009).
courage the stories of those who bicycled, or walked across the gutted roads, to see the devastation with their own eyes.\textsuperscript{89}

Given the scale of the event - the tens of thousands of lives ended in matters of seconds - it is perhaps to be wondered why the official reaction to the bombing required the better part of twenty-four hours. Hiroshima had been a military logistics center for the Imperial army, and so a senior command center for the region had been consumed in the blast. However, the nearby city of Kure was a major naval center (the city had launched the Yamato, the Imperial Navy flagship, some years prior). Still the first response was dispatched from Tokyo; aircraft were sent to see why radio and telephone messages were not being responded to, many hours after the event. Most historian accredit the delay to the efficacy of the bomb itself; more than lives had been destroyed in the blast; infrastructure, communication arrays, institutions, an entire system of human cohabitation eradicated in the blink of the eye, to be replaced by smoke, and silence.

It was on the following day that the first official investigative team led by Lt. General Seizo Arisue arrived in the city. With him were the two heads of the Japanese atomic research projects: Professor Nishina from the N Project in Tokyo, and Professor Arakatsu from the F Project in Kyoto. The scientists were confronted by the event, and correctly identified it as a nuclear one; even to the point of assessing the yield of the bomb by noting the distance from the epicenter to power-line insulation burn-off. Furthermore, by examining bomb debris, they were able to identify the bomb’s core ingredient as U-235 (Reed and Stillman 2009: 23). Unfortunately both the heads of the research projects had just spent years trying to separate U-235 from uranium metal, and understood the massive infrastructure required to undertake such a feat, and thus concluded that the U.S. military could only have one of these weapons. Hiroshima was thus an isolated, one-shot event designed to intimidate the Japanese government, but the Empire as a whole should not take the threat too seriously (Reed and Stillman 2009: 23).

Arisue’s team’s official report was still being composed on the morning of August 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1945. The Tokyo newspapers ran stories of a new type of bomb being used against Hiroshima on August 8\textsuperscript{th}, but were understandably lacking in details. The report with its correct assessment of U.S. uranium capacities (the Americans did only have the one uranium bomb) was quickly rendered irrelevant as communication from Nagasaki was abruptly cut off. Here the information conveyed by the devastation told a tale of plutonium, a metal that can only be created artificially, which implied that if a reactor could make sufficient quantities for one such weapon, then it could, given the time, continue to make more indefinitely (Reed and Stillman 2009: 23). The threat level of nuclear weapons was completely reassessed in this light. The ‘unique crisis’ of Hiroshima, had been transformed by bits of plutonium dust at Nagasaki into a new message: cities all across the empire being engulfed in atomic flame, one after another. An annihilation of a civilization.

This message was underscored by the fact that Bockscar, the B-29 responsible for Nagasaki’s destruction, had dropped two objects over Japan that morning. One being Fat Man which devastated the city center. The other being a sealed canister which contained a letter addressed to Professor Ryokichi Sagane, a former researcher at the University of California, Berkeley, who had returned to Japan in 1940 to co-author one of the empire’s

\textsuperscript{89} From personal interviews in 1999 and 2007.
earliest atomic bomb research papers. The message was from several of his former colleagues at Berkeley. In the letter they urged Sagane to appeal to his government, “….as a reputable nuclear physicist, to convince the Japanese general staff of the terrible consequences which will be suffered by your people if you continue this war….Unless Japan surrenders at once, this rain of atomic bombs will increase manyfold [sic] in fury. With best regards…” (Reed and Stillman 2009: 24).

The bomb as a historical event, rife with meaning, was well recognized on the American side of the Pacific. It is an often-mouthed piece of historical trivia that Oppenheimer quoted the Bhagavad Gita upon the successful detonation of the prototype at Trinity; while nearby, several compatriots took wagers on the chances that device would destroy New Mexico, or the planet. Perhaps of a more curious nature, given the great secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project, was the fact that both Enola Gay and Bockscar included an officially sanctioned newspaper reporter among its passengers. And cameras were waiting at the airfields of Tinian to document the medal awards ceremonies given to the crews upon the successful completion of the missions (Chun 2008). A body of text surrounding and constituting ‘the event’ was thus being crafted in ‘real time’ by the American participants, for the express purpose of ‘posterity’.

Who this ‘posterity’ is, is an interesting question: to whom was this discourse and imagery being assembled for. ‘Posterity’ of course contains a temporal dimension; a reference point of the present as future-past. However the spatial reference as territory, or civilizational heirs, is left vague. Posterity of the nation? Posterity as information for a shared discourse of mankind remains an option. And one that was repeatedly invoked by those involved with the atomic bomb project.

However, the bomb as discourse was not just being held up as a dialogue to the unborn, it filled the important symbolic role of speech referent in war. The symbolic content of war has long been noted by historians and social scientists. The transformation of suicide from the philosophical testament of the agency of the individual, the final act of freedom, to an index of social economic forces to which the individual is subsumed, is tied to the genesis of the social scientific gaze. Yet Reinhardt Koselleck has observed that, ‘to kill’ has, as perverse as this may seem, always been a social act, requiring at least two (2002). As such there is a communicative element intrinsic in the act: an expression of purpose, of desire, of power relations. The act, again in its perversity, severs the master-slave dialectic of meaning through/from dominance, and yet through this severance and the possible emptiness to follow a message is conveyed, and identity is affirmed or annihilated.

90 Professors Luis Alvarez, Phillip Morrison, and Robert Serber.
91 The canister was turned over to the Japanese Naval Intelligence. The note wasn’t given to Professor Sagane until after the war. (Reed and Stillman 2009: 24).
92 “Now, I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.”
93 Both flights included photographers who were ordered to make records for ‘posterity’ by General Groves, who oversaw the logistics and administration of the Manhattan Project. More significantly, William Laurence, of The New York Times was on board the Enola Gay. He would later win a Pullitzer Prize for his reports.
To kill on scale; to kill for the sovereign or nation; in short, the activity of warfare, has long been recognized for its many symbolic, i.e. communicative elements. A survey of this is certainly not needed, but to underscore the prevalence a simple observation of the widespread ritual elements in warfare among ‘tribal peoples’, to the long held practice of creating monuments of abstract representations or text to commemorate battle, from Ramses II at Kadesh, to the many silent Neoclassical shapes that decorate small hamlets in western Europe in remembrance of the Somme, are just cases in point. Warfare in the twentieth century became an act of ‘total war’, a system’s structure for integrating all of these newly marked domains of the complex industrial society: a trial of the will as it were, between peoples. This integration of total war has often been marked as a logistical effort, a demography of death, for the production of men and materials to geometrically increase the capacity to kill on the fields of Europe, or in far flung colonies (Yamanouchi, Koschmann, Narita 1998). Yet it is also worth noting that total warfare includes an element of active advertisement/propaganda, and integration of news reporting, and official broadcasts, in short, a whole series of conversations between government, governments, and populations. Within this dialogue, reasons are articulated and critiqued; the casus belli is set forth and occasionally, lamented.

Internal to the state, this seemingly unending discourse of battle can easily be marked as an act of subjugation – of the will of the individual to the collective. A creation of significances of events, in which a collective will is articulated to which the goals of the individual can be submerged. However, the dialogue occasionally crosses borders. In these cases the functions multiply. On the one hand, the aforementioned ‘trial of the will’ between peoples becomes marked in the rhetoric. The significance of the deaths on the fields, the losses and victories, is articulated deliberately in an ethos of struggle that is tied to the assertions of a nation as political and material power, and thus is bound to the success of its activities in conflict. To use a metaphor, the significance of the press of bodies in the phalanx, the utter democratic leveler of warfare to which the aristocrats of Athens aspired to, leaving aside their horses and pastures, for the opportunity to be judged by the polis as equal competitors with their fellows in the serrated lines and the push on shield, was an entire cosmology of ethical and political symbols tied to a way of killing (Lendon 2005). The total war of the twentieth century was no different: meaning was demanded by the act of dying, the act of killing, and the manner in which it was conducted (i.e. the machine).

Thus it is interesting that in U.S. accounts of war, the preponderance of the Manichaean struggle dominates memorials (Koselleck 2002). The all or nothing conflict between good or evil demands a moral reflection on the qualities of the participants – a discourse in virtue. This in turn is tied to a series of values of the quality of the ‘every man’, the democratic ideal of the pastoral farmer-soldier, and his virtue character. This celebration of the quiet determination of this figure can be seen in every celebrated conflict in U.S. history from Washington to Lincoln, to Roosevelt and beyond. So in the light of the virtues of the farmer-soldier leading to triumph in the absolute struggle of good and evil, it seems odd that the U.S. was willing to end a war with the atomic bomb. Triumph through ‘the machine’ would seem to invalidate the moral quality of the men who bled under the flag. Yet this was not the case, because another virtue discourse was available: the ingenuity of the entrepreneur. This icon of Henry Fords and Edisons, was
soon to be that of an Einstein, and refashioned the conflict between peoples, the ‘trial of
the will’, upon a field of techne, in which technological ‘achievement’ was also a
testimony to virtue.

But warfare as discourse across borders is also a dialogue between governments
and nations, not only determining the meaning of the press and struggle, but also
articulating the relation of the powers, and their intent. In the fashioning and deploying
of the atomic bombs, the most clear example of this would be in the Potsdam
Declaration. Four of its thirteen points follow:

3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the
aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to
the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably
greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste
to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The
full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the
inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as
inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be
controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent
calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or
whether she will follow the path of reason.

10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as
a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those
who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall
remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies
among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as
well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

13. We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional
surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate
assurances of their good faith in such an action. The alternative for Japan is prompt
and utter destruction.

(The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo Narabini Shuyo Bunsho:
1840-1945”, vol. 2, 1966)

The Potsdam Declaration foreshadows many of the elements of the Nuremberg Code and
the various United Nations founding documents – an appeal to universal human reason; a
belief in a fundamental ‘human identity’, that precedes (?), predates (?), or is parallel to
(?), a social-historical one, and to which rights accrue. At the moment, keeping with our
theme, and in terms of the realpolitik of trans-border communication, the Declaration
encompassed a threat: do as we will or face annihilation. The quality of this threat can
best be framed by the words ‘unconditional surrender’.

Unconditional surrender is a curious co-development alongside ‘total warfare,’
and as such, is a modern form of practice and thought. It is widely recognized that much
of early modern European warfare was a practice of ‘conditional surrender’. Warfare was prosecuted to the extent of the sovereign’s coffers, or his/her ability to beg, borrow, or steal more. Mercenary armies were capricious – switching allegiances along with the flow of coin – and yet were more or less a permanent state of affairs, as the prospect of new warfare was equally reliable. This was due in no small part to the fact that ‘surrenders’ were conditional: settled in terms of indemnities, land, and shifting alliances. The rare case of the ‘unconditional surrender’, say in a siege, was a recognition of the surrender of life to the victor’s whim, and was consequently often a motive to fight to the bitter end.

Unconditional surrender would then seem to recognize a complete subjugation of the vanquished in terms of control of life. Yet, the modern form is not the same as an imperial conquest of antiquity. Neither Darius’ demand for earth and water, nor Caesar’s parading of Vercingetorix through the streets of Rome before being ritually strangled operated on the same subject focus. There the conquered was recognized as such – the conquered – by virtue of strength of arms. Annihilation, as in the case of Carthage, or integration, in the growing expanse of the Republic, was a tertiary act to the ethos of conquest itself. The subject was, conceptually, not at risk. A Gaul was a Gaul, conquered or free.

It is, again, a curious historical fact that unconditional surrender emerges in the 19th century, a product of the Enlightenment, alongside the Jacobins and Bonapartists. It is in Napoleon’s new Imperial conquests, with their deliberate, reflexive references to the symbols and trappings of Rome that ‘total war’, as an expression of the will of ‘the people’, liberated from the aristocracy and made equal under principles of the ‘rights of man’, first engage in a type of absolute conquest, in which surrender increasingly becomes ‘unconditional’. Conceptually, it is the new discourse of the leveled anthropos – ahistorical, and thus freed from spatial considerations – that undergirds a practice of conquest in which subject integration is the object. In this the nation-subject is curiously both recognized, and annulled. The people, the foreign will, is now the object of the conflict; breaking it is the goal; and yet the internal logic is the annihilation of the same as a rebuilding under new universal principles of man. In practical terms, it is a fashioning of social norms and values under a Napoleonic Code. In philosophical terms, it is Emile; perfectibilité is a demand that transcends the people, is driven by a freed, universal rationality, that is never ending, and thus supersedes the locality of the nation-subject. It is a harbinger of the social techniques of St. Simon, whose building projects are equally ambitious in France or North Africa, and retain the same goal: the improvement of the new ‘human subject’.

Another case would be across the Atlantic at Appomattox in 1865. Here again the war is prosecuted to an unconditional surrender. And again, the nation-subject of the vanquished is affirmed and rejected. The logic is a marking of the Confederacy as ‘illegal’: illegitimate as a national sovereign government and cannot be recognized. However, the problem of the people of the Confederacy; of integration, reform, and re-

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94 The classic meditation, equally significant in its fact as being a bridging element to the contemporary posture of total war, is Von Clausewitz’s “On War”.
95 After a six year captivity.
96 A policy that would be replicated by both Mussolini and Hitler.
education in light of their ‘peculiar institution’ demands a will and practice upon the collective subject of a people.

This then is the paradox of unconditional surrender: the nation-people is affirmed as a historical subject, drawing upon a lengthy set of concepts from Kant to Hegel; and yet the affirmation of the people is done for the purpose of annihilation as same to a baseline of ‘human subjectivity’ which can then be operated on in terms of perfectibilité. In this simultaneous creation of subject and its removal for purposes of techne, the possibility of a master-slave dialectic emerges, but with the role of circling consciousnesses not being played by biological individuals, but a fabrication by the new modern discursive field of the historical, and its equally fabricated people-subjects of the nation-state (Koselleck 2002).

In terms of the atomic bomb, the war against the people has become absolute. Sherman’s march to the sea was about ‘breaking the will’ of the Confederacy, and denying their capacity to support armies in the field. While Hiroshima as hosting a military logistics base, and may have been a ‘military target’, the bomb was designed to kill thousands; to devastate the earth in a much greater swathe than could be contained within the barbed wire of any ‘military installation’. The atomic bomb had removed the hyperbole from ‘annihilation’; it was a weapon designed for the nation-subject’s death. As was recognized in the Potsdam Declaration, which after a remark about the destruction of the Japanese military, then goes on to assure ‘the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland’.

Japan’s ‘utter devastation’ or ‘annihilation’ appears three times in the course of the document. The Declaration had been translated into stilted Japanese and delivered to the islands by way of the belly of the B-29. It is a curious platform of communication. What is being said? From the belly emerges an ever increasing yield of explosive ordnance, culminating in the world’s first fission reaction, and this, declaration that if not ‘unconditional surrender’, than annihilation. But again, annihilation of what? The destruction of Japan as sovereignty, governance, regional integrity, etc., etc. The threat of annihilation assumed that an equitable understanding of the significance of ‘Japan’ as a historical subject was shared by interlocutors; otherwise the violence remains vague and incoherent. Elsewhere the document says the Japanese ‘race’ is to be freed….or destroyed.

97 Hannah Arendt marks the fabrication of this human subjectivity in terms of human rights.

The whole question of human rights, therefore, was quickly and inextricably blended with the question of national emancipation; only the emancipated sovereignty of the people, of one’s own people, seemed to be able to insure them. As mankind, since the French Revolution, was conceived in the image of a family of nations, it gradually became self-evident that the people, and not the individual, was the image of man.

(2000: 32)

98 And prison in which a small group of allied POWs were held. The number of POWs held is still debated. The existence of US POWs in Hiroshima was not acknowledged by the US government until the 1970s (Lifton and Mitchell 2011).
This then is the target of the weapon, the subject of annihilation. The population. The biomass marked as “Japanese”. The extinction of a people; shortly to be coined as ‘genocide’ by Nuremberg lawyers. This association is not made in order to shock, but as an inquiry into the rationale of the threat embodied in the Declaration. The population - the people of Japan - are the target of the violence, embodied in the potential of the atomic bomb. The demands of the Potsdam Declaration are underwritten as a threat to the governing authority of Japan, in which the ‘people’ are held hostage. It is a particularly unusual development for two reasons. The first is that this is a case of ‘negative biopolitics’. Foucault famously traced the development of biopolitics as a focus of governmentality in European states from early modern periods. Over this course of time, the subject of sovereign power shifted from juridical and territorial, to administrative ameliorations of a population – a crafting of a biological citizen-subjectivity (2008). A famous example is the shift in the treatment of mental illness: the emergence of incarceration as a field of inquiry as well as an ethical set of practices. By extension the vast 19th and 20th century projects of population control referred to as ‘eugenics’ was a paradigmatic expression of a rationality of sovereign intervention into the population, as understood as a statistical phenomenon. World War II is noteworthy for occurring within this framework of eugenics reasoning, with its negative application, the elimination of undesirable traits through death and sterilization – so called ‘negative eugenics’ – being committed on an industrial scale in the Nazi ‘final solution’. However, the ‘negative biopolitics’ of the atomic bomb discourse is not an administration of life, i.e. a promotion of desired bios either through death or breeding. It is a discourse of destruction; the elimination of the possibility of government, as understood in its practice on a field of population, through the elimination of the said population. It is a meditation on the end of sovereignty, with sovereignty no longer embodied in the body of a King, or in the territory of his juridical force, but in its operations on the bodies of a population.

In other words, it is a pure and unadulterated meditation on death. Not for the purpose of life. But only for the purpose of death; an annihilation of the possibility of governing: of the Aristotelian human being – the ‘political animal’.

The other reason why this stance is so noteworthy is the close interconnection with the logic of the ‘unconditional surrender’. It is standard political historian fare to note that it was the demand for an unconditional surrender that ‘forced’ the allies into trying increasing measures of devastation upon the Japanese homeland. War Plan Orange, the Pentagon’s long before drafted outline for fighting a war with Japan, actually predicted much of the course of the Pacific conflict: early rapid advances by the Japanese Navy, followed by island to island occupation and retreat. The end game however, was to be a state of siege upon the Japanese home islands which would force the government through lack of resources to come to the bargaining table (Chun 2008). The Japanese government had been seeking a negotiated settlement for several years. The last great hope was destroyed when the Soviet Union entered the war in August 1945 (ending the neutrality treaty between the two powers). Fear of a Soviet invasion of the northern islands, and thus a resulting shared occupation, encouraged a speedy time-table for the U.S. occupation of the islands. Of course this rationale only holds if the idea of a ‘conditional surrender’ is abhorrent. There has been no shortage of explanations for this,

99 Various versions of this plan were formalized as early as 1906.
either among the contemporaries or from the historians’ gaze. Affective arguments are just as prevalent as geopolitical ones. The American people needed to give meaning to the lives lost, the sacrifice at home, etc. Or, the Western powers had learned from the ‘mistakes’ of WWI, and knew that a negotiated settlement would not create a ‘new order of peace’. It is in this demand of meaning in death, and new order of peace, that unconditional surrender as a rational framing truly emerges. Again the positioning of this is in a doubled affirmation-rejection of the nation-subject position. The vanquished, the conquered people, are recognized as an object of amelioration, but the positioning of this amelioration is through an abnegation of the distinctiveness of the nation historical subject in lieu of a trans-historical human figure. In policy terms, there are a pair of indicators for this approach. One was the demand for ‘re-education’. A survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Centre of the University of Denver at the end of 1944 and in January of 1955 concerning American attitudes towards Germany, found by and large ‘friendly feelings’ with a desire that the Germans be ‘re-educated’ (Tusa and Tusa 2010: 30). Reflecting on this, the historian Peter Macguire argued, “It was not enough for American leaders to simply defeat and destroy the Third Reich; they also insisted on reforming their vanquished foes” (quoted in Futamura 2008: 42). This is a political expression of the philosophy of perfectibilité. Reform and re-education both assume a digression/deviation from the norm, or the advance. And the techne of intervention is one of bildung, or askesis: a process of ‘training’, of ‘education’, upon the subject in moral qualities for the sake of improvement. The curious element then is this subject, that had so strongly been identified as the biological individual through techniques of Western governmentality, from the carceral, to the madhouse, to the heaven’s gaze of Adam Smith, is at this point merging with another distinct trend in Western thought, the lingering attitude of the significance of ‘culture’ as a ‘culture and personality’, such that ‘a people’ is now situated in a discourse of psyche, practices, and traits, which can be subject to education and reform.

The other marker for this doubled position of subjectivity can be found in the deliberate meditations, the reflexivity of practices, as a historical subject. Reinhart Koselleck, considering the contemporary prevalence of the term ‘crisis’ in media, noted that ‘crisis’, “…indicates insecurity, misfortune, and test, and refers to an unknown future whose conditions cannot be sufficiently elucidated” (2002: 236). As such the concept of crisis always included ‘a temporal dimension’ and an ‘implied theory of time’ (2002: 237). Considering the philology of the term, he concludes:

To this extent, “crisis” followed a career similar to that of “revolution” or “progress.” Both of the latter turned into temporal concepts, and their initial spatial or natural meaning dissipated with the Enlightenment as they became primarily historical concepts…..The concept moved toward a historico-philosophical dimension, and even more than this, it opened up this dimension and occupied it to an ever greater extent in the course of the eighteenth century. “Crisis” becomes a fundamental historico-philosophical concept on the basis of

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100 A version of this argument can be found underlying the formation of the Nuremberg Court (Tusa and Tusa 2010).
which the claim is made that the entire course of history can be interpreted out of its diagnosis of time.
(2002: 239)

The temporal aspect of crisis allows for several semantic models to emerge, yet they share a key aspect of reflexive mediation. Borrowing from Schiller, Koselleck notes that for modernity (\textit{neuzeit} – ‘new time’), “World history is the judgment of the world. It is, then, a question of a concept of trial…” (2002: 240).

This question of world history as a judge’s gaze was tied to another unusual historical fact: that the modern marking of times of crisis are always followed by a society’s increase in its productive capacity (2002: 243). In relation to this the figure of the historical crisis, while recognized as the moment of self-mediation, is also part and parcel with a doctrine of progress. In effect, it acts as the engine of progress’ imaginary. The crisis-events, successfully negotiated, lead to prosperity and ‘advancement’. In the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt, shortly before his death in 1945, “Out of every crisis mankind rises with some greater share of knowledge, higher decency, purer purpose” (quoted in Koselleck 2002: 243).

World history as judgment; crisis as opportunity: both play a part in the ‘dramatics’ of the atomic bombings. A B-29 is stripped of all the unnecessary parts and parcels in a desperate attempt to make space (and reduce weight) for an oversized mishmash of wires, explosives, and radioactive elements; and yet space is made for the journalist (and the anticipated Pulitzers). “Stars and Stripes” and photographers wait on the tarmac in tropical heat for the return of the flights, ready for the medal ceremonies. In the deserts of New Mexico, a product of the Ethical Culture Society School can utter the words, “I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds” with appropriate affect and gravitas, anticipating generations of puzzled students, and the emergence of a field dedicated to appropriate earnestness, bioethics.

The bomb was surrounded in panoply and performance. It was built, displayed, and killed upon a world stage marked as historical judgment. It was with this reflection that Eisenhower was vehemently opposed to its deployment (Rhodes 1986). Yet it was also on this reflection that the ethos of victory – the triumph of the will through force of arms and technical ingenuity – could, and must, be played out.

Returning then to the doubled posture towards historical subjectivity, Koselleck’s ‘semantic models’ of crisis interact in another paradoxical way. The Potsdam Declaration’s posture towards the people as hostage, its meditations on death of the populace as a means to end sovereignty, is also to be put in light of the absence of the destruction of Kyoto. As most students of the war can point out, through the interventions of the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, Kyoto was removed from the list of targets for the atomic bomb. Stimson a septuagenarian at this stage of his career, removed Kyoto for its ‘cultural worth’.\textsuperscript{101} It is an act, an event, a display on a stage of world history of compassion to the soon-to-be-vanquished, taking place in front of, or parallel to, the praxis of annihilation. The third atomic bomb was on the fields at Tinian being assembled at the time of the Japanese surrender; and historians note that come the

\textsuperscript{101} He knew the city from personal experience. He had honeymooned there as a young man.
Fall the U.S. facilities could have produced a plutonium bomb *per week* (Reed and Stillman 2009). The policy of annihilation, the threat of the Potsdam Declaration, was to incinerate a civilization, city by city with nuclear fire, unless immediate unconditional surrender was tendered.¹⁰² In this light, and to move beyond the personal experience of Stimson, is to wonder about the judging gaze of world history on this act of compassion: to save Kyoto because of its cultural worth...to whom. The Japanese civilization was faced with deliberate annihilation. As a subject it would, at best, be ‘reformed’. But culture, as human culture, as a shared marker of Hegel’s ‘world spirit’, of course is shared by all humanity, as known through a shared affect of this Judgment of History. Thus a nation-subject could be simultaneously annihilated as a biopolitical mass, and yet marked for preservation, as a cultural valued object. Because the value is delimited within a field that is removed from the particularities of the nation-subject.

*Bockscar* dropped *Fat Man* over Nagasaki on August 9th. The previous day Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, had informed Japan that the Soviet Union was now at a state of war with the Empire of Japan, and the invasion of Manchukuo began at midnight Trans-Baikal time. By August 14th, the Potsdam Declaration was delivered to the hands of Emperor Hirohito, the reigning Emperor Showa (‘Enlightened Peace/Harmony’).¹⁰³ Then on August 15th, the unprecedented occurred, for the first time the reigning Emperor of Japan used the new technology of radio to directly speak to “the people”. The *Gyokuon-Hoso*, the “Jewel Voice Broadcast”, began at noon, Japan Standard Time.

To Our Good and loyal subjects:

After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.

We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.

To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors, and which We lay close to heart. Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to secure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandisement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by every one -- the gallant fighting of military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the

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¹⁰² This is at the discursive level. The planned deployment of the later bombs is of course hypothetical. But it is believed they would have been used as “strategic support” for the invasion of Kyushu scheduled for that fall (Chun 2008).

¹⁰³ The title Showa serves two functions. During the Emperor’s life it refers to his reign. Posthumously it is used nearly exclusively to refer to the Emperor himself within Japan.
State and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people, the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects; or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.

We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to Our Allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the Empire towards the emancipation of East Asia. The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met with untimely death and all their bereaved families, pains Our heart night and day. The welfare of the wounded and the war-sufferers, and of those who have lost their home and livelihood, are the objects of Our profound solicitude. The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all ye, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictate of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable.

Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, We are always with ye, Our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity. Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may endanger needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strife which may create confusion, lead ye astray and cause ye to lose the confidence of the world. Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishableness of its divine land and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitudes; foster nobility of spirit; and work with resolution so as ye may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep place which the progress of the world.

(Translation by Hirakawa Tadaichi. Historical archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.)

Of all the many interpretive conundrums this speech presents – the significance of the content of “extraordinary measure”, the absence of reference to Soviet activities, the absence of the word “surrender”, and the simple difficulty of the use of the archaic imperial dialect for communication even within Japan – it is the sheer act itself, the voice of the sovereign to the people, that I find most astounding. In the many libraries filled with books about fascism of the 20th century, one of the common observations is that fascism, as Europe knew it, was an act of mob oration. Mussolini and Hitler rose to power as public speakers, capable of moving the sentiments and dispositions of the poor and disaffected workers within their countries, through the creation of a feeling of
sympathy and similitude, an identity of suffering between the inner voice of the man in the crowd, and that of the Great Leader. It was an artifact of Thucydides or Cicero; a building of affect through the creation of a shared mental world, and framing. But this was not the case in Japan. The sovereign had not spoken to “the people”. Emperor Meiji’s public performances had been silent galas, on the verge of ritual, garbed in courtly, or predominantly, military spectacle. The people observed. But they were certainly not active parts in the spectacle, and were certainly not directly addressed as interlocutors. In fact, ‘the people’ of Japan had only been symbolized in relief, as it were, since the Restoration. The people were known through ordinances, legislations, standardized Imperial education, enacted for their benefit, by the beneficence of the Imperial line itself (most notably being the Meiji Constitution itself). They were an invisible figure about which much discussion was made, but not to the extent that an interaction, a subject, could emerge. The first attempt at a direct address at ‘the people’ by an Emperor of Japan had actually been at the end of June 1944, when an Imperial order was issued commanding Japanese subjects to commit suicide rather than be taken captive by allied forces (Bergamini 1971). A classic example of a sovereign exercising power over life.

With the Gyokuon-Hoso the Japanese people are determined as an interlocutor. A voice appeals to them, asking for their forbearance and assistance. The spectacle of state power is replaced by a domestic dialogue between family members, arguing for a shared semblance of feeling and responsibility. In a word, a great act of metalepsis emerges, a transmutation of historical meaning, of the death, suffering of the war, compiled with the significance to a fraternity of mankind, as the enemy “has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb”. The façade of state and sovereign power has been erased, and in its place, a collective subject, ‘the Japanese people’, with all the accruing facets of subjectivity – responsibility, cohesion, historical identity – is embarked upon the field of World History. It is an appeal to the judging gaze of Hegel’s world spirit, to the crisis as a moment in arbitration, that the Japanese people are spoken to as such. The hermeneutics of annihilation then again step forth to transform the modality of the subject: the threat of annihilation of the civilization that the Potsdam Declaration has made is marked in the Gyokuon-Hoso, a first in terms of political acknowledgment, but also in terms of a joint appeal to responsibility of the listening subjectivity. Yet this is soon replaced by the greater threat of the annihilation of the transhistorical subjectivity of humanity itself. The surrender by another name is garbed in this appeal to the doubled subjectivity of annihilation.\(^{104}\)

On September 2\(^{nd}\), representatives of the Japanese Empire came aboard the USS Missouri, at station in Tokyo Harbor since August 29\(^{th}\), to sign the official surrender. Behind them flew another nod to historical drama: from the United States Naval Academy Museum, the 31 star flag flown by Commodore Perry’s “Black Ship”. The final act in the war drama though did not begin until May 3\(^{rd}\) of the following year, with

\(^{104}\) The event of the speech lingers. Even today an affective and emotive response can be seen in young and old alike referring, most prominently, to the injunction to “enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable”.
the start of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, more commonly referred to as the “Tokyo Trials”.

The Tokyo Trials are also commonly known as the “forgotten trials” (Futamura 2008). Whereas their counterpart in Europe, the Nuremberg Trials, have indelibly left its mark upon international law and institutions, ranging from the founding codes of the United Nations, to the International Criminal Courts established in the 1990s to prosecute war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Tokyo Trials have formed a cipher in the historical memory of the West: seldom mentioned politically, and even less seldom invoked in international jurisprudence as precedent. In Japan it has become increasingly common to discuss the “failure” of the Tokyo Trials – in terms of justice, as well as in terms of creating a “historical memory” (Futamura 2008).

The Tokyo Trials were, from the start, a product of the atomic bombs. The swift victory brought about by the use of the bombs allowed for unilateral U.S. occupation of the home islands, avoiding a costly land invasion, but one which would also have likely had included a Soviet element in the north, and thus, would have replicated the division seen in Germany and Korea. Yet, because of this American dominance the trials were institutionally structured a great deal differently than the Nuremberg counterparts. There, the code, judges, and prosecuting teams had been provided (more or less) equally by the four major Allied Powers (Tusa and Tusa 2010). In Tokyo, the premise of the trial had come from American hands in MacArthur’s office, the GHQ. Likewise, while the judges were chosen from a selection of “Japan’s victims” (with a notable absence of Asian representatives\(^{105}\), there was only a single chief prosecutor, an American.\(^{106}\) Of a more sinister presence to theories of the purity of juridical practices vis a vis political interference, MacArthur’s office crafted the trial procedural documents, and moreover, MacArthur’s office retained the right to overrule the judge’s decision. A power that was unheard of, and was deliberately insisted upon (i.e. the absence of a political interference with the judgment) in the Nuremberg Code (Tusa and Tusa 2010).

The bomb was known even more powerfully at the Trial in its absence. Before the trial commenced the GHQ had declared the use of the atomic bombs as not admissible under any form into the trial proceedings, despite the protestations of the defense (Futamura 2008). Yet the shadow cast by the atomic bombs, the use of science to create death on a massive and indiscriminate scale affected the shape of the trial proceedings. In Nuremberg, prosecution was divided along four major lines. “Conspiracy”, a new-fangled idea brought from North America where it had been first forged in dealing with Chicago mob violence of the 1930s, was the cornerstone of the American case (much to the consternation of continental lawyers). “Crimes against Peace” was to underscore breach of international treaty, and was furthered by the British team. And then near simultaneously, “War Crimes”, which followed breaches recognized in the various Geneva conventions, of treatment of prisoners, etc., and another new concept, first advocated in dealing with the Ottomans at the close of World War I, but abandoned for its vagueness, “Crimes against Humanity”, to look at the systematic

\(^{105}\) The notable exception perhaps being Justice Radhabinod Pal of India, who wrote a famed dissenting opinion. International legal scholar Onuma Yasuaki noted that what had been symbolically absent from the Tokyo Trial was “Asia” (1997: 55).

\(^{106}\) Unlike four at Nuremberg.
abuses by a state against a people in the court’s own neologism, “genocide”. These two were presented by the French and Soviet representatives, covering crimes “East” and “West” (Tusa and Tusa 2010). However in Tokyo, despite a perfunctory acknowledgement of “Crimes against Humanity”, violent acts by the Japanese Empire against civilian populations were largely glossed over, in favor of a focus on conspiracy charges to commit Crimes against Peace (almost exclusively a focus on Pearl Harbor, and the invasions of European colonial possessions), as well as breaches of Geneva convention protocols in the treatment of prisoners of war (Futamura 2008). The anticipated Japanese defense of presenting a tit for tat of comparisons of victimizations of populations, cumulating in the tens of thousands incinerated by the atomic bombs was preemptively annulled through a focus on international treaty, and questions of timing of military activities (i.e. the staging of an attack to its diplomatic declaration of war).

However, I believe the “failure” of the Tokyo Trials is just as much due to a pair of conceptual approaches demonstrated during the proceedings. The first, perhaps more insidious, was simply the unstated assertion that Japanese fascism, and by extension, modernity, was a derivative of European processes. The center stage of world history was being played out in the halls of Nuremberg, where “real” issues of the trial of Western Civilization, progress, and the Enlightenment, were being waged in the homeland of Kant, Goethe, Wagner, and Hegel. Quite simply put, the media coverage, expenses, and legal efforts put into the Nuremberg trial dwarfed their Tokyo counterpart. As did the professional stature of the participants. Politically, whereas several departments of the American federal government were actively involved in Nuremberg, not to mention their counterparts in the Allied governments, the Tokyo trials were almost completely subsumed under MacArthur’s new command as Supreme Commander Allied Powers in the Pacific. The uneven emphasis continues to the outcomes of the trial: the Nuremberg proceedings provided tens of thousands of pages of courtroom text and their analysis, and were soon published in multiple languages, the Tokyo Trial documents were boxed up and distributed to numerous US departments, and were not to be published as a collection until the early 1980s (Futamura 2008). The rationale was not complex, and was not hidden: modernity, Enlightenment, and progress were a European invention that “filtered” out to the far corners of the world (where the Japanese were the ‘exemplary student’). Thus the atrocious acts of the Nazi powers, coupled with their use of the hallmarks of the Enlightenment, bureaucracy and science, represented much more of a challenge to the very idea of modernity, literally at the core of its inception, then did the equally atrocious acts of a regional power in Asia.

The second is another verse in the “philosophy of evil”. Juridical rationality demands agency: the basic building blocks of a courtroom proceeding – accused, victim, judge – all demand a complex array of subjective and affective relations, further underscored by interweaving theories of anthropos, e.g. ‘adulthood’, ‘criminality’,

107 A brief discussion of Nanking.
108 And in the case of the biological experiments conducted upon prisoners in Manchuria by Unit 731, were deliberately excised from the Trial and its historical records by fiat of the GHQ, which had pardoned the researchers in exchange for their data (Harris 2002).
sanity’, ‘madness’, ‘competency’, ‘skill’, etc. Within this framework ‘the problem of evil’ is one of interpretive action, as Aquinas as casuistry, coupled with an overriding concern for ‘responsibility’; an otherwise innocuous term for a dynamic model of agency. The approach to the ‘evil’ of World War II by the Allies had heretofore run along Kantian paths: evil was in opposition to recto ratio, as such, it was a form of madness. Thus such diverse incidents as starvation in the Ukraine, to the gas chambers at Treblinka, could be attributed to an act of madness/irrationality, however, remote the cognitive failings were from the specificity of the event in the chain of command. This was one of the primary reasons why the U.S. seized Nuremberg as an opportunity for the ‘conspiracy’ case. The beauty of the Chicago ‘conspiracy’ precedent is that agency is not only removed from the finger on the trigger, but is placed in a domain of remote intentionality, the planning – however temporally removed – is culpable. The ethical framing for the Nuremberg trials was then a great act of deception, committed by a selection of individuals, mad not in a sense of impaired faculties, but in terms of impossibility of ‘correct reasoning’, perpetuated on the German nation. The nation itself, the people, were its victims, absent from the trial except as an object of reference (and, reverence): the ultimate goal of the ‘lesson’ of Nuremberg – the ‘re-education’ of the people; a passive, receptive historical agent, not an active juridical one. At his opening statement at the Nuremberg Trial, Robert Jackson, the US chief prosecutor had alluded as much with the assertion, that the idea that a nation can commit a crime, “is a fiction. Crimes are always committed only by persons.” Further elaborating that the state is a fictional being, “which cannot be produced for trial, cannot testify, and cannot be sentenced” (Tusa and Tusa 2010: 155).

What then for the masses? The triggermen? The silent observers? The legions of facilitators? They are twice excused. First, as victims of the deception perpetrated by the conspiracy of individuals. Second, as the anthropos subject: the specificity of the German people is replaced by a common humanity, ‘like us’, and this common humanity is required to possess a moral quality; a basic decency; a capacity for the good.  

One of the primary purposes of the Nuremberg Trials as a practice of history formation and veridiction of ‘historical facts’ for the German people, was of course recognized by the participants and included in the opening statements.

To the German people we owe a special responsibility in these proceedings. Under the leadership of the Nazis and their war lords, the German nation spread death and devastation throughout Europe. This the Germans now know. So, too, do they know the consequences to Germany: defeat, ruin, prostration, and utter demoralization. Most German children will never, as long as they live, see an undamaged German city.

To what cause will these children ascribe the defeat of the German nation and the devastation that surrounds them? Will they attribute it to the overwhelming weight of numbers and resources that was eventually leagued against them? Will they point to the ingenuity of the enemy scientists? Will they perhaps blame their plight on strategic and military blunders by their generals?
fundamental ideological assertion of the Enlightenment – virtue adheres to the human figure by nature of its human capacity for rationality. It is part of who we are, in our reflexive appraisal of being human, and thus is given as axiomatic. With this as the ground for evaluating the morality of warfare, ‘evil’ must be found in criminality, i.e. in the locatable individual, an agent that can be given a biography, a diagram of insanity, and a punishment.

The trappings of a similar case were made at Tokyo, but soon fell apart. A critical problem was the absence of a continuous body of conspirators. The Imperial high command had undergone numerous changes since the beginnings of the conflict, with the war being prosecuted seemingly ad hoc by different bureaucratic alliances in government. The one constant character over the course of the war, the sovereign, having been removed from the dock by GHQ fiat, the Allied prosecutors were left with trying Japanese ‘militarism’. Not a political party, or even an institution, but a pathos. It was a figuration that fed into a line of thinking, then and now, in which the criminality of individuals, the madness and biological individualization of evil, is replaced with the doubled figure of the *anthropos*, this time in its ‘culture and personality’ flavor: the character of the Japanese people now is assessed to be mad. “Fanatical” is the most popular term in textbooks of the pacific war: the banzai charge, the suicide cliffs, the fight to the last, the kamikaze. This fanaticism implies an irrationality of the participants. But it is a widespread, dispersed appraisal of madness, shared by a population. Not the clinical, isolated madness of the Nuremberg Trials.

To gloss over the Tokyo trials is perhaps not a disservice. They were hurried to their conclusion. Proportionately, many fewer acquittals were offered than in

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If the Germans embrace those reasons as the true cause of their disaster, it will be a sad and fatal thing for German and for the world……

This case, and others which will be tried in this building, offer a signal opportunity to lay before the German people the true cause of their present misery. The walls and towers and churches of Nuremberg were, indeed, reduced to rubble by Allied bombs, but in a deeper sense Nuremberg had been destroyed a decade earlier, when it became the seat of the annual Nazi Party rallies, a focal point for the moral disintegration in Germany, and the private domain of Julius Streicher.


Another problem presented the prosecution was the absence of Japanese government documents, most of which had been destroyed under orders before the arrival of the occupying forces. One of history’s ironies is that similar orders had gone out in Germany. In one case, the German Naval archives had been kept in a facility with a dried-out swimming pool filled with logs and petrol for the express purpose of burning the archives rather than allowing them to fall into Allied hands (Tusa and Tusa 2010: 98).
Nuremberg; many marched to the gallows.\textsuperscript{112} The fact of the matter was that the mechanism of the courtroom trial did not provide the purchase required for fashioning a new historical consciousness. The target wasn’t ‘the criminal’ conspiracy anymore, but a generalized ‘failure’ at modernity of a people. But the trial of a people was anathema to the West, politically and philosophically. Consequently, the \textit{bildung}, the \textit{askesis}, the moral formation of a post-war Japan was to be found in the emphasis placed by the GHQ in the fashioning of a new Constitution – an artifact in its conception that is spoken from, and directed to, the ‘people’.

There is a final point to be made. 1945 was noteworthy for the dramatic emergence of the ‘human’ in interstate discourse. ‘Human dignity’ was transformed from rhetorical flourish of the philosophes to a concept-object with serious gravitas within new assemblages of post-war ethics and institutions. Likewise, as previously stated the exercise of the new concept of ‘crimes against humanity’ had the significant repercussion of creating a milieu of discourse of its shadow effect: the quality and nature of ‘human rights’. Unstated, and certainly, under analyzed, is the emergence betwixt and between these developments of the ‘human’ itself. Another milestone in the natural philosophers obsession with establishing the qualities and character of being human was established that year.

This is far too broad a topic to cover with any significant depth in these pages. However, it is worth noting that just as within a dialectical framework of master-slave the state can discover itself as an apparent boundless subjectivity through its relations with other states\textsuperscript{113} (Krombach 1991: 242). This same relationship is contingent upon Fukuzawa’s ‘contest’ – whether trade, or war. The exercise and straining of state power proves to be the defining moment in the state’s reality. But it is from this contest that narratives of the significance of war emerge, but then breakdown in the possibility of nuclear armageddon. The state as ultimate subject of unknown powers faces destruction of self, but also of the possibility of even the act of relationship, in the hermeneutics of annihilation. From this epistemic and existential crisis though emerges that most heady of historical concept-configurations, the human. The state in its exercise of the subject formation is forced to find itself in a relationship not only with other states, but with history itself. History, as judge, as crisis, then takes upon the mask and garb of the human – past, present, and future. This human, this species being, then becomes the ultimate arbiter of subjectivity. “The states in-themselves are nothing unless they are for the history of mankind whose infinitude is life itself”(Krombach 1991: 244).

Thus ‘humanity’ in the hermeneutics of annihilation forms the bridge, and sine qua non, betwixt and between ‘war’ and ‘peace’. The Emperor is able to speak to the newly formed subjectivity of the ‘Japanese people’ in a dialogue of direct simplicity, and

\textsuperscript{112} Including Hirota Koki, the only civilian sentenced to death at the trial. A source of continuing controversy in Japan as he was one of the most vocal opponents to the war in government, and also upon his return to high office at the end of the war, had advocated surrender.

\textsuperscript{113} “A subject is subject only in and through the sublation of its objectification. This is to say, that the subject state recognizes itself as subject only in that it re-flects itself in another state subject which becomes for it the object of reflection.” (Krombach 1991: 242)
among equals, because it is framed within a background milieu of humanity. The call then is for this thing ‘peace’, which is also invoked as being the property and chief attribute of the same field: the human.
In the summer of 2007 I returned to the mountains of western Hiroshima to visit
the secondary school I had worked at before. It had been nearly ten years since I had last
been there, working under the aegis of the Japanese Ministry of Education as an assistant
language instructor. For two years I had lived in this small mountain hamlet, trudging
backwards and forwards along the rutted paths between rice fields and vegetable gardens,
proudly carrying the standard of “Internationalization”: the slogan of the Ministry at that
time. This was of course ignoring the South East Asians, Chinese, and Brazilians that
already lived in the village. But “Internationalization” through the Ministry initiatives
was an unabashedly Western oriented program at the time – a new riff on Fukuzawa’s
familiar datsu-a ron. China and the rest of Asia would shortly be rediscovered. But for a
brief time, I was a living emblem of a multi-hued world; or at least the Japanese
government’s ambivalence over what the inaka’s (“countryside”) relationship, could, and
should be to this chimera.

I had arrived that summer as a visiting researcher from a prestigious Japanese
university (credentials readily available in the form of a library card from same), for the
express purpose to conduct interviews with the faculty of my old “alma mater”. They
would all be strangers to me. The life of a secondary school teacher is one of rotation;
annual reviews by distant ministries mean that a teacher can expect new appointments to
new schools and towns every few years. But I had not come to see old faces, but to do
serious research on a serious topic. And I had that library card in my breast pocket to
prove my gravitas. First though I asked for a few minutes to wander the open-air halls of
the campus. As I stared at the views of the patchwork green and browns of the
surrounding countryside, and gazed at the empty classrooms where I once had worked, I
tried to reconnect the images before me with the helter-skelter memories of my past. I
had fragments of feelings and odd recollections of room corners and conversations; all
neatly fitting into a narrative of myself that was demanding touch ups and recalibrations.
I remember how this school had shocked me to the core. I had come of age in the US
during the 1980s, a time of looming Japanese economic dominance. Rockefeller Center
was lost, Hawaii seemed soon to follow, and my parents liked to frighten me with
Reader’s Digest stories predicting a future American dystopia, where all worked for
Japanese companies as lowly physical laborers, and the historical memory of a War
fought and won was lost to the realities of stock markets and “just in time” quality
control. “They’re kicking our ass in math and science!” had been my father’s favorite
refrain, echoing a legion of furrowed brows on the television. So my time at this
sprawling secondary school in inaka Japan, with its gang of slackers smoking behind the
gym, and that day when the school was nearly shut down by the water balloon ‘attack’ on
faculty…. Yes, the education system wasn’t quite the nightmare those fantasies in the
Digest were predicated upon.

Those few minutes that humid summer afternoon were a premeditated attempt at
creating an affect of nostalgia. I struggled to adjust to a historical narrative of myself –
the grand project of American “bios graphis” – and was found lacking. Years of education and distance had made the melodramas of that other life the performance of a stranger in the internal media of my head. Anecdotes from my life there were merged with those of friends; I wasn’t sure which were whose now. And I found myself caring less. I was quickly failing at a posture of historical seriousness. I returned to the teachers’ offices to engage in serious research instead.

The prior year, the Japanese government had passed the aikokushin law (“love of country” but generally translated as “patriotism” law). The youth of Japan, the shinjinrui, “new human beings”, had been an object of concern for the country’s own legion of televised furrowed brows for some years now. The 90s had become punctuated by wide-scale reporting of violent crimes committed by adolescents, as well as of accounts of a whole new host of “young people social problems”: hikikomori, the withdrawal into a locked room for months or years at a time; ijiwaru, “bullying”; drug-use and school drop outs, etc. More and more commentators were expressing the feeling that the nation’s youth were “just not like us”, or “not Japanese”, hence the moniker “new human beings”. The government’s response finally came in the form of the aikokushin law: henceforth, “patriotism” would be taught at school.

As a semi-minted anthropologist, I found this striking. It seemed to me that the efficacy of biopower was inversely correlated with its degree of being telegraphed. What a curriculum for the express purpose of teaching an affect – a love of country – might be, was hard to imagine. So I had contacted an old friend at the local Board of Education, who then had promptly ordered the shakaigaku (“society”) teachers of my old school to meet with me and address my puzzlement. The teachers of course dutifully - if showing a sense of confusion/bemusement - agreed to come be interviewed by me that afternoon one at a time.

For the most part, the confusion was shared. The law had been passed, but no curriculum had yet been assembled, and so many of the teachers were in a ‘wait and see’ position. A few also shared my concern. One, reflecting upon his multi-ethnic classroom, and his own children by a Chinese wife, was openly worried about what the content of ‘a love of country’ education would mean in terms of ethnic identity. Another struggled with thinking of how the ‘product’ of a patriotism education would be evaluated: how do you test for ‘love of country’ he asked? Another wondered why ‘patriotism’ should receive its own curriculum. “History” and “society” are already taught at school. “Shouldn’t patriotism be a natural outgrowth of these?” he observed.

To a greater or lesser extent, this question of overlapping curriculum was shared by all the teachers. A common refrain was, “We already have Peace education. This teaches students what it means to be Japanese.”

“Peace education” – this I remembered well. It was a summer course that all Japanese students had to participate in. It was timed to coincide with the anniversary of either the Hiroshima or Nagasaki bombings. Hours of classroom study of the history of the events and their aftermath, were coupled with readings of “Sadako and the Thousand

114 Another teacher when asked about the children of foreign ethnicities in her classroom commented that she wasn’t worried. The “patriotism” education would just be about “loving Japan as a choice”. “We won’t say that Japan is better than other countries. Just that it is our choice. They are free to love their own country.”
Cranes’, and other accounts of survivors. In the school auditorium we watched the anime “Hotaru no Haka”, the “Graveyard of the Fireflies”, about a boy and girl living hidden in a cave during the last days of the war, slowly starving to death. Schools around the countryside would plan trips to sites of “peace significance”: ground zero at Hiroshima and Nagasaki being the two most popular. During my tenure we had visited the Hiroshima “Peace Park”, and “Peace Museum”, which lay alongside the “Peace Boulevard”. And then the students, many score, had been taken en mass to the Okinawa islands. (The clout of the Ministry of Education, and that banner of “Internationalization” meant that I was assured a seat on the plane.) There we visited caves in which clusters of hiding civilians had killed themselves with grenades rather than be captured by the advancing American forces. The next day we climbed cliffs, at first I thought to appreciate the spectacular view of the Pacific on display, but no, these were the sites where young women, with children in arms, had tossed themselves into the raging cauldrons below, again, rather than being captured by the advancing Americans. Our last day we spent visiting the remains of a fortified bunker which once had hosted the local military command. The grey-green walls were dimpled with little pockmarks. Again the residue of a grenade used by the officers…. This purview of monuments to death and suffering, vivid in their tactile banality, was then what most of the teachers thought could teach the “new human beings” what it meant to be Japanese. The vague concern they expressed was how the “patriotism” curriculum could be differentiated from that. But as practiced participants in a vast bureaucracy, most weren’t that concerned: they would wait to see what the central authority put together, and would adapt from there.

Later that year, for the third time, I visited the Yasukuni Memorial Hall in the heart of Tokyo. It’s a museum by another name; or more specifically a discourse in words, images, and artifacts on the meaning of history to the nation-subject. It is a “museum by another name” in that the trappings of professionalization are carefully skirted; the curators are priests of the shrine to which the hall is attached, and so credentials and the associated legitimacy of “history” as a field/guild of skill sets and disciplined relationships is absent. But the atmosphere and affect is pure museum. A performance or replica of the ‘museum experience’ for the visitor with its corridors and plaques that walk the visitor down the decades; visuals and interpretive text side by side for easy framing; light directing the eye to the significant (reflexively created) artifact. The legitimacy of the historical representations is further bulwarked by the billions of yen on display in the building’s design, facilities, and construction.

As the visitor entered the building that day, he or she would pass through a small alcove bedecked with the yoroi, the baroque armor of the samurai (“those who serve” an eerily similar meaning to the etymology of the English “knight”). This, alongside a few displays of weapons and art, orient the visitor to the “deep history” of being Japanese before moving to the serious work of explaining the Modern. Yasukuni was created by imperial decree shortly after the “Restoration” as a place to commemorate and honor those who fell in battle for the Imperial cause. It is, symbolically speaking, a strange conglomeration. As a Shinto shrine, it was (and to a certain extent, “is”) associated with

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115 In 1879, chosen by Emperor Meiji.
the “imperial cult”, the belief in the divinity of the Imperial line, tracing its origin back to
the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu, and the rites surrounding the sacred memorabilia – the
jewel, mirror, and sword – of the Imperial House. And yet its province is the domain of
the dead, a field which has by custom become associated with Buddhist temples,
carefully delineated in practice and language.\textsuperscript{116}

After the brief foray into the pre-modern as aesthetics of weapons, the first site for
the visitor as he or she enters the remainder of the Hall is a map. It is a black and white
representation of a satellite’s view of northeast Asia, Japan centered. Korea, the coasts of
China and Manchuria, and the surrounding small islands are rendered in black silhouette
on a white field. The only splash of color to be seen, are the reds and blues associated
with events: here and there a colorful arrow marks a point of “Western incursion”. A
military expedition in the Boxer Rebellion; gunboat activity off the coasts of Korea; of
course, the “Black Ships” of Commodore Perry; even a fleet of whaling vessels from the
U.S., prowling ever closer to Japanese shores in search of whale oil and coaling stations.
The events, separated by years, sometimes decades and centuries, and obscured in their
representation by the equality of the red and blue arrows (regardless of era or state), in
composite create a striking portrait of a pure Japan, elegant black lines on a white
background, surrounded by a sea of color and turmoil, with the arrows inevitable pointing
inwards, seeming to creep closer to the eye of calm in the center. To one side, the
Korean peninsula is marred by a curious iconography: concentric circles, the same used
by modern geologists to mark the epicenter and expansion radius of an earthquake event,
are centered on the Korean peninsula. The ensuing ‘rings’ stretch outwards across the
Sea of Japan, brushing against the Western coasts of the home islands. The message is
clear: the political turbulence of Korea posed a threat to Japan. Like a natural disaster
waiting to happen, the turmoil of Korea could seed havoc across the seas!

Here in two dimensions then lies one of the competing narratives of the history of
the contemporary for Japan. Japan the victim, nobly struggling against the aggressions of
European powers. It is part of the complex of discursive struggles on the significance of
history, and the modern, to which Futamura attributed to the previously mentioned
“failure” of the Tokyo trials (2008). A failure in this sense that the trials were designed
not only to punish, but to educate; specifically to delegitimatize that which came before,
by establishing a dominant hermeneutics of the ‘historical world’ of Japan at war. This
idea of “Japan as victim” is often lamented by Western scholars and observers,\textsuperscript{118}
and stands in stark contrast to the German “success”. The “extremist” in Germany may
defend the Nazi regime or activities, and may challenge the historical claim of the
Holocaust, but in Japan, major political figures will voice similar opinions regarding the
war in Asia, alongside weighty tomes written by respected academics.\textsuperscript{119} A few days
before I wrote this the American news offered an account of the tomb of Rudolf Hess,
one time Deputy Fuhrer of the Third Reich. As the tomb had become a site of pilgrimage
by apologists and white supremacists, the local authorities had acted to exhume the

\textsuperscript{116} Even to translation – Buddhist sites are “temples” and Shinto ones are “shrines”
invariably in guides to Japan.
\textsuperscript{117} And if not clear in images, it was made clear in the accompanying prose.
\textsuperscript{118} See for example John Dower (2000) and Andrew Gordon (1993).
\textsuperscript{119} See for example Fujioka, N. and Yoshida, Y. (1997).
remains and raze the tomb in stead of allow the site to continue (http://news.discovery.com/history/nazi-remains-scattered-110721.html). This act of ‘voluntary self censorship’ in regards to such an emblematic figure from the war is rare in Japan, and shows the depth of ‘success’ of the post Nuremberg historical narrative: men to be excoriated – the criminal – not admired. But here at Yasukuni, with its defense of the war as justified due to Western Imperialism, and its deliberate gloss or erasure of crimes committed by the Imperial army, Japanese Prime Ministers come to pay their respects.

Not without controversy. The most noteworthy case was a few years prior with the posthumous release of the notes of Emperor Hirohito’s head of staff which revealed that Hirohito had refused to continue patronizing Yasukuni shrine following the shrine’s decision to include several of the Class A war criminals executed at the Tokyo Trials among their rosters of honored dead, receiving prayer and remembrances. What was particularly astonishing of this event was the torrent of soul-searching and historical reflection it launched. Not only among the public intellectuals on television and radio, but among my personal acquaintances. Everyone it seemed, academic to housewife, now felt a need/right to ponder the effects of the war and trial, through the lens of the controversy of Yasukuni Shrine. Whereas before the ‘controversy’ had typically been interpreted through a political economic lens – “China complains about it because they want X, Y, or Z from us” – with the Emperor’s alleged forbearance it now became a legitimate field of hermeneutical uncertainty.

Foucault once noted that the deification of the Emperor posed a series of conceptual problems for the Romans of the early empire (Foucault 2005: 381). Having inherited a model of the sovereign in which the moral qualities of the embodied ruler manifested themselves in the beneficence of both country and nature, the transformation of the man-Emperor into the God-Emperor created a host of dilemmas regarding the relation of knowledge and speech; both as fields of education, and the politics of courtiers, to the now metaphysically distant sovereign figure. Foucault summarized these developments as problems of parrhesia (speaking freely) and ‘flattery’: a pair of interconnected ethical practices of speech in relation to a political domain of truth telling – veridiction – and its ultimate goal, the morality of rule.

This is worthwhile to reflect upon because there is an argument that the sovereignty of the Japanese Empire followed a similar route. The ‘sudden’ deification of the Emperor Meiji, along with the greatly expanded political role of the Emperor-Sovereign, resulted in a political field that, at least for the first few decades of the 20th century, mirrored Roman ethical-epistemological concerns. The lengthy series of “young officer” coup d’état were invariably organized with the goal of removing the “deceitful”

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120 The criticism that visits by various Prime Ministers have received, both internationally and domestically, has been well documented in the press.
121 The diaries were kept by Tomohiko Tomita, former head of the Imperial Household Agency. The diaries record alleged conversations between Tomita and the Emperor. One of which references the Emperor’s claim that he stopped visiting Yasukuni after the shrine decided to admit 14 ‘Class A’ war criminals in 1978 (the Emperor’s final visit was in 1975). (Fackler 2006.)
advisors to the Emperor, and replacing them with the “honest” (themselves, one assumes). A pattern that was also reflected in the discourse of assassinations and attempted takeovers of the political right. The political-conceptual problem was not one of legitimacy of sovereignty, but a question of veridiction in the court: i.e., truth telling among the advisors was the dilemma. The sovereign, deified, could not be morally imperfect (again the problem for the early Roman Empire). The problem had to lie in the transit of information to the embodied, localized sovereign, and to an extent, in the possibility of education, perfectibilité, of the sovereign to his potential. In a very real sense the problem was conceptualized as a unilinear flow of information to the moral essence of the sovereign; the repercussions being that the moral perfection of the sovereign would equate with the prosperity and beneficence of the Empire.

Yet as Futamura observed in considering the new post-war practice of the ‘war trial’, in the search for ‘peace with/through justice’ one of the goals of creating a massive body of text regarding the criminal/historical of a state-subject is to “allow for the victims to grieve” – to speak of the experience of suffering to the historical record – in order for the nation to “move on” – and critically, an act of “demystification of sovereignty” (2008: 19). It is a ‘psychological’ language of pathos, voice, purging, and recovery, and thus another example of the modern trend for veridiction through buribunkens. It also, politically, serves the role of ‘moving on’ through the act of de-legitimization to the preceding nation-state-governance (2008: 40). The historical meanings of the past are rejected through the criminalization of the state-speaking subject. In Japan’s case, the GHQ, through the medium of the trial and the new Constitution, had first removed the Emperor as a political agent, and then in an act of supreme transubstantiation, erased the sovereign divinity, and recast him in logos and the iconography of the contemporary political science of nation-states as ‘the symbol of the state and the unity of the people. This act, while not necessarily one of bathos, deserves consideration. What this transformation to ‘symbol’ should or could mean, is debated. For the GHQ, one explicit goal was an enforced ‘secularism’ in state; a refrain of separation of ‘church and state’, that would dismantle ‘imperial cult’ apparatus. One result being that Shinto shrines such as Yasukuni are left in the ‘cold’ of private funding and management. The discourse of secularism however has led to a renewed renaissance on ‘culture’, with a series of previously ‘religious’ concerns simply being reclassified under a banner of ‘culture/nation’. One prominent case being the Imperial calendar, which was promptly done away with by the GHQ, forcing the Japanese nation to adopt to the Western, Anno Domini calendar. This was in turn promptly removed in favor of the restoration of

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122 The notable exception to this trend being political activities on the left. For example the Anarchist-Marxist conspiracy to assassinate the Emperor in 1910. Known as the Taigyaku Jiken (“High Treason Incident”), the immediate aftermath of this attempt was a trial and execution of 12 conspirators and associated intellectuals.

123 Reviewing the Nuremberg Trial, Geoffrey Robertson argues that the war trial became “…the key to unlocking the closed door of state sovereignty….” (2002: xiii).

124 This is of course related to the scholarship that engages ‘secularism’ itself as a genealogical phenomenon. See for example Asad (2003).

125 Secularized irony.
Imperial time once the GHQ left. The Emperor’s reign continues to be the dominant orientation to history in Japan.

The transubstantiation to symbol however has transformed the politics of veridiction. The flow of information to the Emperor is no longer an ethical-political concern. The sovereign-symbol role allows for the politics of the representation of the ‘people’. In that sense it can be argued that Imperial utterances can be used as an index to Rousseau’s ‘general will’. The bedlam of sudden discussion following Hirohito’s opinion on Yasukuni would seem to indicate at least an allowance for discourse on the matter. More importantly it indicates a very modern ‘politics of the people’, in which determining the voice of the volk, and the assorted speakers, interpreters, and detractors, assumes the center stage in the discourse of legitimacy of governance.

Political legitimacy of the state, now subtracted a sovereign, but further monumentalized as a speaking, subject ‘people’, continues to hazard that very legitimacy through a relation to History. In this way, Foucault’s problem of parrhesia, ‘speaking freely’, lingers. Taking as a starting point is once again the ‘failure’ of the Tokyo Trials. The ‘success’ in the German case lauded in the West is not only a normalization of relations between the victors and vanquished, but an agreement in historical hegemony: an affect of regret in German education and interpretation of the “deception” of the Nazi years. This experience of the event of the fascist atrocities and deceit, is underscored through a marking of the contemporary by the same. As Reinhardt Koselleck observes, Germany’s ‘contemporary’ (zeitgeschichte) begins with the Nazi state (Koselleck 2002: 155).

The mechanism of the calendar in marking epochs is a powerful techne to the ‘encoding’ of history with meaning: of creating frameworks of interpretation such as ‘progress’ or ‘revolution’. In Japan, while an era is marked as the ‘postwar’ (sengo), the calendar remains the Imperial, an innocuous and reassuring continuation in the march of time, following in the footsteps of the Meiji Restoration. A certain liberty may now be assumed in the search for parrhesia. If the ‘success’ of the Nuremberg Trials was a ‘re-education’ towards history which instilled a dominant affect of ‘regret’, the ‘failure’ of the Tokyo Trials could be summarized by an absence of ‘regret’, and a prevalence of ‘remorse’. The distinction can be lost in modern English. ‘Regret’, from the Old French regreter, “long after, bewail, lament someone’s death”,127 is a temporal orientation, with its focus upon the historical event, and thus its contextual interpretation. ‘Remorse’, is from the Middle Latin remorsum, “to vex, disturb”, or literally, “to bite back”.128 Its focus is upon the subject-positioned gaze towards History, and the correlating emotional state. Juxtaposed, the terms express different emphasis in the experience of the historical event, brought about by different framings of the bildung (education/self formation) of the event and subject. In the former, history is the field of inquiry; the agency of the subject is the link to the associated interpretations, but the subject as such, goes unremarked. In the latter, it is the subject itself that is under the inquirer’s gaze; a self-reflection that interrogates the emotive states of the subject, with the relationship towards

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126 In 1952. See Garon (1997).
127 From the Online Etymology Dictionary (www.etymonline.com). Definition “regret”.
128 From the Online Etymology Dictionary (www.etymonline.com). Definition “remorse”.
the historical being causal, but removed. To borrow again from Foucault, if the former is an education in the framing and orientation of a historical narrative, with repercussions to the subjectivity, the latter is an exercise in *askesis*, the formulation of the ethical self, with repercussions to the historical narrative.

To be more specific, Foucault defines *askesis* as,

...a work of the self on the self, an elaboration of the self by the self, a progressive transformation of the self by the self for which one takes responsibility in a long labor of asceticism (*askesis*). *Eros* and *askesis* are, I think, the two major forms in Western spirituality for conceptualizing the modalities by which the subject must be transformed in order to finally become capable of truth. (2005: 16)

*Askesis* then is a set of practices oriented at the self-subject as a domain of investigation, and reform, in order to create a possibility for truth. Foucault traces the practice through a series of Hellenistic and Roman philosophers of the ‘Stoic school’ in an attempt to better understand disappearances and emergences of ‘the spiritual’ as an approach (precursor) to fields of knowledge, and its removal in modern forms of inquiry. ‘Remorse’ is a byproduct (or product) of an *askesis* practice regarding the interrogation of the identity of the self through an inquiry into the gaze as it is shifted towards a domain of historical experience.

Before continuing, an objection can be raised: the historical subject of the *askesis* practices with which Foucault was concerned were biological individuals, e.g. Marcus Aurelius practice of organizing the events of the day into ethical categories through a practice of journal and letter writing (2005: 158-161; 293-295). The self-formation that I refer to here is the subjectivity of the nation. I argue however that comparisons can be made through the *techne* of ‘public education’, which expressly in the Japanese case, has had the direction of the moral perfectibility of ‘the people’ as one of its goals.

Ruth Benedict’s, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, is one of the icons of the anthropological movement retrospectively named “the culture and personality school” for its approach to creating a ‘psychological character’, a subject personality, that is an ideal type for an assortment of cultural traits (Benedict 1946). The book also happens to be the best selling anthropological text of all time; due in no small part to its skyrocketing sales in a postwar Japan hungry for narratives of itself. I can say with only the minimum of hyperbole, that one can walk into almost any small bookshop in rural and suburban Japan, and find a copy of Benedict’s tome lying in some nook in the corner. And while the history of the book’s creation – the interviews through interpreters in the relocation camps in the American west – is now the stuff of legends at U.S. introduction to anthropology courses, as well as fodder for anthropology methods classes, what isn’t

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129 As represented in countless ‘introduction’ to anthropology textbooks, or histories of the discipline as ‘schools’. See for example McGee and Warms 2000.
130 E.g. mastery of language as a prerequisite, or ‘direct access’, to a hermeneutics of culture. Also its use of Japanese-Americans in camps as a ‘similitude’ for the culture of the Japanese empire. And the ethics of anthropology as a wartime activity, in service to the goals of the state and its Department of War, etc.
as well discussed is the fact that Benedict also based significant sections of her book on another tome, Nitobe Inazo’s, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan.*

*Bushido* (“the way of the warrior”) is an early lionization of the samurai class; once widely denigrated within Japan as being a backward element of a feudal time, and a chief obstacle to the modernization of the country.\(^{131}\) The book was written in the U.S. while Nitobe was a student there, and was a response to a challenge placed before him by one of the American faculty regarding the source of ‘moral education’ in the absence of ‘religious instruction’ (2002: 19). Nitobe’s response was the samurai class and *Bushido.* The book was first published in 1900 and went on to immediate wide acclaim in Japan, the US and Europe. Its popularity was such that, by the reign of Emperor Showa, young officers were often given a copy alongside their commission in the Imperial army (2002: 15). Following the war, the book fell into disfavor due to its association with ‘militarism’, but has again become a popular reference point for the ‘Japanese spirit’ among academics and popular speakers alike (2002: 16).

In *Bushido,* Nitobe outlines a series of Aesopian virtues – courage, loyalty, politeness, etc. – and illustrates them through an assortment of literary fables, historical exemplars, and archetypes. The framing for this instruction is in two parts. One is an appeal to commonality (‘everyone knows’). The other is a series of inward gazes, in the presented moral figures, and across the bounds of the page to the reader. Embodied in this gaze is the Delphic injunction: “Know thyself”. However, it lacks the political ends of the Socratic version of the command. It is not knowledge of the self for the perfectibility of the individual as a ruling figure. It is a command to explore the self to find evidence or traces of the veracity of moral feeling. The virtues that are described in succeeding chapters in *Bushido* are not discoverable in the exterior world; they are not presented as a series of case studies in which cause and effect for a moral casuistry can be delineated. The virtues are known only through an inward gaze on the self and its practice. It is through this appeal to the inner gaze that the moral individual can then emerge from the particularities of the self to the generalized episteme of ‘everyone knows’.

Foucault briefly noted the uniqueness of a Japanese *askesis* in terms of the practice found in *Kyudo* (“Japanese archery”) (2005: 222). *Kyudo,* as my instructor was want to repeat ad nauseam, is not about hitting the target.\(^{132}\) *Kyudo,* however, as Foucault noticed, is rife with *teche* of the self: carefully circumscribed motions of the body. Posture and breathing are regulated. A shift in weight and even the flow of blood to the shoulders is a concern. What isn’t a concern are externalities: the archer doesn’t account for rain, sun, or wind; all of which would be important if the goal was to ensure

\(^{131}\) In the late 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century. The dissolution of the class prerogatives was regarded as a prerequisite for the ‘modernization’ of the state. Resulting in Japan’s only ‘modern civil war’ with Saigo Takamori’s rebellion in Kyushu in an effort to retain the class distinction. Ironically, while in contemporary Japan (and Hollywood) Saigo is a romantic figure, preserving custom against inroads of the modern machine, in Japan of his day he was excoriated as a traitor to the Imperial cause, and as such is a noteworthy absentee figure in the rosters at Yasukuni (his death is not commemorated because he fought against the Imperial cause).

\(^{132}\) I received my instructor’s rating in Tokyo in 2010.
an accurate hit on the target. But the goal of these elaborate techniques of body conditioning is purely that – body conditioning. The self is articulated as a series of interconnecting motions and postures, affects and emotions, for the purpose of knowledge of the self. With parallels to a later Stoic practice of aske
cisis, the knowledge of the self is not paramount over knowledge of the cosmic; it is not a microcosm of the same; it is knowledge of the totality as embodied in the self (2005: 290-292). The proof is the perfectibility of the technique of the self will allow one to hit the target, regardless of the external conditions (wind, rain, etc.). But that is not important: the aske
cisis act does not demand or look towards proof. Knowledge of the self is Knowledge. In this parallel, Nitobe locates the ‘moral education’ of Japan. The virtues of the moral character are known through the inner gaze. This inner gaze, coupled with practices of self-
knowledge, will then lead to a perfection of the self that is directly linked to the realization of both the moral qualities of the behavior, but also the qualities of life and existence. The knowledge of the self is Knowledge; and the perfection of the self is reality. It is the path towards Wa (“harmony”).

This returns us to peace education. ‘Peace’ is heiwa: the ‘level’, ‘unchanging’, ‘expansive’ wa. As such ‘peace’ is not primarily an indicator of political or social context, instead, it is affective and experiential. The great state sponsored mechanisms for teaching ‘peace education’ therefore is a massive institutional attempt at moderating an internal life world of experience. The nation-wide, annual pilgrimages to sites instilled with memories and representations of misery and suffering, alongside the recitation of the experiences of deprivation and pain in text and other media, are a foray into the ‘sacral memory of suffering’ (Burleigh 2011: 99). It is an attempt to act out, or transmit, an emotive state that serves as a marker for identity. The understanding of peace by way of affective suffering is an act of veridiction; an affirmation of the truth of being ‘Japanese’. This, when considered by the oft noted absence of an importance given to ‘history’ as education – body of knowledges, systems of interpretations, etc.\textsuperscript{133} – in contemporary Japan, shows a riven episteme, one in which the historical imaginary is founded in an experiential knowledge of the suffering-wa dichotomy. It is an access to the truth of ‘Being Japanese’ that supersedes the framing of information. It is a grand act of aske
cisis: knowledge of the self brought about by a similitude of suffering.

The most potent path to this is provided by the atomic bomb. The message of annihilation is read on the tortured and twisted bodies of the hibakusha (“atomic bomb victims”). Peace education invariably includes personal as well as photographic and statistical accounts of the immediate experience of the atomic bombings, as well as the lengthy, horrific suffering of the radiation victims. This is the choice of a history in which the human body is identified with a status of being a ‘victim’.\textsuperscript{134} It is transformed from a political social context, into an emphatic, and neutral symbol of suffering, in which the similitude with the reading student – the contemporary – is underscored, and then contrasted with the absolute horror of the subject-object victim’s plight. The immediate effect is to create an internalized experience of the contemporary gaze that is shared, and is marked as a knowledge of ‘being Japanese’ (as my society teachers

\textsuperscript{133} Futamura (2008) for instance notes the absence of history in college entrance exams.

\textsuperscript{134} ‘Sadako and the Thousand Cranes’ being the premier example.
The experience of the suffering body has the capacity to shift into the broader spectrum of *anthropos*, what I referred to before as the doubled *anthropos*, in the hermeneutics of annihilation. The body of the *hibakusha* becomes the second *anthropos*, the raw human figure of a world imagination. The act of *askesis* shifts to a universalizing gaze and knowledge. The annihilation embodied in the bomb is no longer associated with the coercion of empire in 1945, but becomes the Manichaean Armageddon of the post nuclear age. The contemporary fear of the end of history marked in *techne* and human practices first appeared in the horror of the atomic weapons. The suffering of the *hibakusha* becomes the marker of this annihilation of the *anthropos*.

As one wanders the various ‘peace monuments’ of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, one is struck by the de-politization of the spectacle. Symbols of Japan, the state, nation, even the Emperor, are rare and subdued. Images of neutral geometric shapes, reflective pools, gardens, memorial flames, or the bodies of children, abound. Identification of the sufferer as of a particular identity are rare, and deliberately excluded. There is an odd parallel to what Koselleck observed in a history of war memorials in the West. A gradual shift from the use of religious iconography to ‘secular’ icons of state, or neutral civilizational forms, such as the obelisk (‘classicism’) (2002: 285-326). The bodies of the dead have gone from mass graves shared by victor and vanquish, to a celebration of expatriated remains returned to their home soil. Likewise the anonymity of the dead soldier has both been rejected – in the decrease of identification of the army through the officer and the corresponding increase in the celebration of the actions and experiences of the lower ranks – and affirmed in the monuments in which the soldier as archetype – duty, loyalty, service, sacrifice – are celebrated as such. Within this domain remains a capacity for leaping across state boundaries and purposes. As the imagery becomes focused more on the suffering body of the figure, the possibility of its purpose shifting to an *anthropos* of suffering heightens. The victimization of the particular can then be appropriated to the victimization of the historical ‘needs of the moment’.

*Metalepsis* is fundamentally transformative and experiential. A point in the narrative flow, the interconnection of a field of meaning, redresses the very act of observation of the ‘reader’, repositioning their experience inside and outside of the meaning structure of the narrative. It is a subversion of the ‘fourth wall’; the reader, like

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135 A monument to the Korean ‘forced laborers’ that perished in the bombing of Hiroshima was contested for many years, and was forced to be built outside of the confines of the ‘Peace Park’. Interviews with park volunteers and local government representatives emphasized that the inclusion of the memorial was thought to create the ‘wrong feeling’ or ‘atmosphere’.

136 In my hometown there is a monument to ‘war’. It is a remarkable place. A set of reflecting pools, and a grove of white birches, dominate. Stone pathways are adorned with quotes by famous Americans lauding the feelings of service and sacrifice. But no dates are shown. It is a monument not to a war – the ‘Great War’ of 1914, or some such. But to ‘War’ itself. It is perfectly fungible in utility. The icons of sentiment honoring the death of the young in service of the state can be utilized for any historical or future imaginary.
Sartre looking through a keyhole, is suddenly aware of a voyeur-esque experience of the meaning-play, and in this awareness, new meditations on the self and its relationship to the play become possible, and necessary. The \textit{askesis} of the peace education is a nation-state project of \textit{bildung} upon the population. It is a transformative act upon the self through a field of experience – the suffering – in order to fashion a shared identity. However, the narrative – of nation, state, history, identity - has the constant uncertainty of drifting through alternative readings of a hermeneutics of annihilation, and consequently, of competing ideals of \textit{anthropos} within the modern framing. In this sense, Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” is a poor aperture for investigating the nation-state experience. The \textit{askesis} of ‘being Japanese’ is not only a shared affect in regards to a historical field, it is also a possibility of veridiction of that field through affect. A knowledge of truth through a knowledge of self. Both of these factors – truth and self – are subjectivity and uncertainty, and shift with discursive reflection across differing figures of man.

The bombs fell in August 1945. This was the event; historical fact; the point of interpretation. But as Koselleck observed, history is a multi-temporal orientation. History is not of ‘events’; neither is it of ‘structures’. The meaning of the field of history is determined through an interplay between numerous variations of the two (2002: 115-130). In this case, the ‘event’ of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was oriented by the ‘structure’ of the modern narrative of a nation-state (progress, growth, future). The narrative though was challenged by the act of the war trial, which is a deliberate attempt at creating de-legitimation of the ‘ideology’ of the proceeding state power (read, ‘historical mediations’). The de-legitimation of Japan, as ‘Imperial’, ‘Shinto’, ‘the leader of Asia’, etc., allowed for multiple convergences of needs of identity. ‘Peace’ as affect allowed one address to this dilemma. It was affective, and thus was able to avoid the questions of specificity of historical narrative (the context of a political realm, etc.) and in its place granted an access to ‘the truth’ of history through a turn to an ascetic experience of the self as Truth. And Identity. However, the hermeneutics of annihilation remains open to alternative narratives of structure as historical meditations. The \textit{anthropos} of the human figure in its raw, world encompassing state, and the question of nuclear weapons as the millenarian end of times, allowed for a different identification beyond national subjectivity. That is ‘Life’. An affirmation (i.e. a truth veridiction) of the status of the living human body as being the ultimate ‘good’, as well as, the final ‘truth’. The suffering of the bomb’s victims, contrasted with the vulnerability of the contemporary viewer of the historical field, is a \textit{metalepsis} in which the value of the human body, its life, becomes a narrative of absolute worth and virtue.

In domestic and international politics this then allows for a Japan as ‘the only country to suffer the horrors of nuclear attack’. A special status that is related to the post war doctrines of human rights and ‘arms control’. Both attempts at creating a temporally frozen model of Nietzsche’s cold state in an international arena. Here ‘life’ becomes the final arbiter, in its valuation and celebration. Versions of the specificity of life – culture, history, economics – become secondary adornments in this new virtue-based episteme. The new \textit{techne} of the “human rights intervention” is coupled with the \textit{techne} of the “war trial” in order to reinforce the same episteme of a singular life value. The results are a
calculus of living bodies by simple arithmetic: atrocities are measured in volume. As are humanitarian triumphs.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{137} See for example, Rieff (2003), for a critique of Humanitarianism.
“Ah, if only it had been an earthquake! A good bad shock, and there you are! You count the dead and the living, and that’s the end of it.”
- Albert Camus’ ‘The Plague’

In 2011 I was asked to give a visiting lecture to a UC Berkeley ‘bioethics’ class on the topic of atomic power in Japan. The lecture began with the events of 1945 and then gradually ended at the state of affairs of (then) contemporary Japan. As I concluded I openly admitted a puzzlement with these affairs: that while nuclear weapons were one of the few issues that was able to motivate the notoriously moribund Japanese world of protest and activist politics, yet I had always been amazed that the fact that Japan was one of the most nuclear-powered countries on earth, with some 30% of its energy derived from several dozen reactors scattered about the archipelago, many of which were situated close to major urban centers, and all of which provided issues for the disposal of radioactive waste, was not itself a protest-worthy issue of contention among the populace. A little under two days after this talk, I was awakened at home in the early hours of the morning by a text message on my phone from Hiroshima, Japan. An old friend was contacting me with the grim news of the earthquake shattering life throughout much of northeastern Japan. Over the next few days I was glued to the media as events deteriorated, with the tsunami erasing entire towns from existence, ending thousands of lives, and irrevocably altering others many times more. And events just grew worse. It was revealed that the force of the sea had disrupted several nuclear reactors in the Fukushima province. Text blurbs across NHK news, and a series of daily speeches by ministry and corporate officials - invariably no longer dressed in grey three piece suits, but now in the khaki or white coveralls of ‘workers’ - tracked a situation that further deteriorated in fits and spurts, from something that was not to be ‘any cause for alarm’ to the ‘worse nuclear incident since Chernobyl’. In the following weeks as the immediate terror subsided, a political uproar of rare passion and breadth arose demanding change and accountability in the nuclear power industry, and the government regulation of same. All coupled with questions about the future of Japanese power, industry, economic standing in a global economy, etc. Poignant questions directed towards the future course of the ship at state, that were all ultimately wrestling with the problem, ‘what does it mean to be Japan?’

138 A large percentage of Japanese reactors being of the type that produce more plutonium than they use. This being a strategic answer to the perennial problem of establishing ‘energy independence’. The production of plutonium of course presents its own set of problems of storage and containment, further compounded by a country with few uninhabited regions (Morris-Suzuki 1994).
139 This is a question I had asked many Japanese about over the years. The majority of respondents had given an answer that was a variation of ‘They are different. Weapons are bad. Energy is good.’
These are all interesting questions. And yet while I was experiencing these developments as they were mediated through American and Japanese TV news, or via ‘journalistic’ and ‘opinion’ pieces posted in print and online media, I was also the recipient of a barrage of text updates from my friend in Hiroshima. ‘Updates’ is probably the most appropriate word: a series of descriptions, assurances, notices, reflections; these were not conversation in the sense of communication or dialogue, but the actions and reactions of someone before spectacle and life, desiring to be shared to an interlocutor, without the voice of the interlocutor. In short I was a distant audience to my friend’s suffering and concern, a fact to which I very slowly arrived. For I had assumed that my friend had acted so promptly in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake in order to assuage the fears and concerns of his acquaintances overseas. On the world map, Japan as a series of island is just a little spilled ink in the vastness of the Pacific Ocean; distance is terribly relative, and a catastrophe to ‘Japan’ must endanger the ‘Japanese’, or so the impression might be. Yet I quickly ascertained that the events were mostly situated in the Tohoku region of Honshu, many hundreds of miles from my friends in western Japan where I had lived for so long, and so my friend was experiencing these events primarily the same way I was: as images and text on TV or computer screens, practically as distant (or proximate) to the immediacy of the event as I was across the globe. However, as the days passed and the texts continued there was none of this remoteness: the events of Fukushima were happening to ‘we Japanese’ with an immediacy and affective urgency to which I could not relate. My friend, despite being physically remote, was emotionally engaged and drained, and spent a great deal of his time thinking, relating, and prioritizing goals and ambitions to the new-found worldview post-Fukushima.

This again presents an interesting set of questions for contemplation, and yet once more ‘the event’ in its relationship to me was not yet spent. Several months afterwards I was once again invited to speak at a UC Berkeley bioethics class, this time to reflect on my knowledge of Japanese atomic history through the lens of a ‘sociotechnical imaginary’, a concept put forth in an article by Jasanoff and Kim (2009). The talk was extremely frustrating; at least for myself. I went into it uncomfortable with the concept at hand, wondering what the possible outside to a ‘socio-technical imaginary’ may consist of? (One imagines either the ‘natural’ or the ‘Kantian unknown’, but that brought little comfort.) It seemed the explanatory strength of the term was founded in its breathtaking generality. However even worse was the realization of the multiple subject positions that the concept offered as its form of analytic: the social, the technical, the imaginary; all behaved as agents within its rationality. Each one capable of being an ‘actant’, to use Latour’s nomenclature, within a field of both causes and effects. And unreflexive ones at that: without the benefit of a questioning of the emergence or constitution of the subject, a problem that has so often been put forward eloquently, and yet forcibly, by Michel Foucault (2005). In tandem this led me to wonder about the use of this type of analytic within the ‘social sciences’; what were the costs of framing, or even more importantly, ‘knowing’, of an event like Fukushima through this aperture? How to interpret the experience of the suffering that my friend obviously felt, in light of the mediated experience of the catastrophes plaguing the Tohoku, in effect with another degree of mediation, another degree of difference, the ‘social scientific’, in which the significance of the events were to be ascertained through something like a concept-object-subject of a ‘sociotechnical imaginary’? I fully recognized that these positions (my friend’s suffering,
and the social scientific) were both derived, or at least emergent from, the form of mediation – for example, the limitations of the twenty page journal article. But that in itself raised a further question in lines with the classical Foucaultian triad of the modes of subjectivation, veridiction, and jurisdiction:

What did it mean to narrate disaster?

I ask this as a way to approach a question of the experience and meaning of shared suffering that is not based in a tactic of identification or definition; no question of an episteme or ontology of ‘experience’. This would force us to take a path well tread by Western philosophy, and one in which ‘experience’ is closely linked with ‘causality’ either as a temporal problem (for Kant) or a question of measurement (for Heisenberg) (Heidegger 1977). Instead, keeping close to Foucault’s problem of truth-telling as an activity and role, my interest is to focus upon the forms and possibilities related to the act of ‘narration’ itself.

In this I have a pair of additional guides. One is Gerard Genette, who in his seminal piece Narrative Discourse (1980) identified a trio of basic ‘determinations’ to the act of narration:

…those dealing with temporal relations between narrative and story, which I will arrange under the heading of tense; those dealing with modalities (forms and degrees) of narrative “representation,” and thus with the mood of the narrative; and finally, those dealing with the way in which the narrating itself is implicated in the narrative, narrating in the sense in which I have defined it, that is, the narrative situation or its instance, and along with that its two protagonists: the narrator and his audience, real or implied.

(1980: 31)

*Narrative Discourse* is subtitled *An Essay in Method* which rightfully denotes its approach as being a question of describing form. However, as I am interested in the specific manifestation of a narrative event (the mediated experience of the suffering in the Fukushima disaster) I desire an additional milieu in which to focus and delimit the formal into experiential. For this, the second guide I turn to is Hans Blumenberg and his analysis of ‘history’ as a problem space. In particular, history as a realm of competing claims of truth and meaning as being one of the primary problematics inherited by the modern conceptual apparatus. That ‘meaning’ is relegated into a sphere of the ungovernable by the modern state, except in terms of a pedagogy of history. History as a field of emergence of the state itself, or as the continuity of the ethnos, is the touchstone for establishing a possible discourse of meaning, a situation which allows meaning to be

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141 See also Liu (2005) for further reflections on the relation of temporality to possibilities of experience.

142 “My intention was not to deal with the problem of truth, but with the problem of truth-teller or truth-telling as an activity. By this I mean that, for me, it was not a question of analyzing the internal or external criteria that would enable the Greeks and Romans, or anyone else, to recognize whether a statement or proposition is true or not. At issue for me was rather the attempt to consider truth-telling as a specific activity, or as a role” (Discourse and Truth 1983: 64).
addressed as a problem (1983). Or focusing upon a narrative of progress, Blumenberg notes that the idea of progress is impossible except alongside a metaphorology that includes the notion of an ‘incomplete universe’ that mankind finds itself within (2010).

What the possible relation of the subject to the incomplete within the problem spaces inherited by the modern is one which Blumenberg spent considerable time pondering. More specifically to the problem at hand, the narration of disaster, in terms of history and the incomplete universe that for addressing this problem of meaning within experience, Blumenberg noted: “The modern age came up with two solutions to this problem: the idea of method and the idea of collective” (2010: 59).

Method, The Narrating Act

Genette warns us that perhaps the most “powerful fiction” of narration is that the narrative act is somehow atemporal: “…that the narrating act involves an instantaneous action, without a temporal dimension. Sometimes it is dated, but it is never measured….” (1980: 222). Conversely, narration is an activity and practice like any other that involves time, space, as well as effort. The literary conceit is a ‘writerly one’ Genette notes, that focuses on the productive genius of the auteur and by doing so may give more-or-less recognition to the time-effort involved in the production of a narration-text, and yet by doing so also ignores the ‘readerly’ reception of the same as an activity. The text demands time. It dictates linearity through the arrangement of characters on page, and the physical motions of reading. It is an embodied effort to achieve the goal of narration, and one in which “…the time needed for ‘consuming’ it is the time needed for crossing or traversing it, like a road or field. The narrative text, like every other text, has no other temporality than what it borrows, metonymically, from its own reading” (1980: 34). One of the key elements of narration then is an attempt to match multiple orders of temporality with each other: a temporality of a narrative – the event or sequence of events being described - to another temporality, that of narration, the experience of narrating as an activity.

Which brings us to medium. “The medium is the message” we have been admonished for nearly a half-century. It is an axiom for thinkers of technology and discourse, and by its very brevity, extremely frustrating. What is implied is that the medium constitutes an object, of varying degrees of knowability. And in knowing this object, the ‘message’ is either deciphered or decoded; or a praxis of power to alter the message located in the semiotics of discourse to be uncovered. The object is everything from televisions to lightbulbs, a near infinite array of techne (1994). It is the identification, and the ‘knowing’ of the specificity of the object-medium that is particularly galling. What is the practice of identification of a medium? As method, how can it be known such that the message (exhaustive, or appropriate) can be known? For instance, in our case we are confronted with a narrative-act in which the message is something to the effect of the meaning of a national disaster. The elements are suffering writ large; the pathos and ethos of a people, in this case, associated with the institutions of a nation-state. The most obvious culprit for the ‘medium’ to this message would seem to be ‘mass media’. A more curiously named, or vague phenomena, would be hard to

143 In the classic work of Marshall McLuhan 1994 [1964].
identify. The ‘mass’ of mass media is the distinctive element, and it refers not to artifice, object-design, location in space or time, but to a proportionality of consumption: mass media is the media by which the ‘masses’ consume. It is an identifier by aggregation of the (fictive) mass. Its antonym would presumably be something akin to ‘minor’ (intimate?) media, signified by its scarcity. Mass media has traditionally been applied to phenomena and practices ranging from broadsheets to television, and yet in its own definition it contains no formal or substantive qualities to discern. Its popularity is rooted purely in the applicability of the concept of ‘mass’: as a property of the concept of society, to whit population, for mediation, amelioration, or in short, governance.\textsuperscript{144} Mass media then is a way of trying to build a connection between some disparate techne of narration and ‘the society’, or more frequently, the state apparatuses.

This is far too vague to serve as either a problem space or an analytic for narration of an event. Instead I propose an alternative: to the issue of narrating Fukushima I wish to propose the techne of ‘virtual-anthropos’. Virtual-anthropos is a subset of Deleuze’s ‘movement-image’, and thus is a problem of representation oriented towards time and motion (1986). However, as signified by ‘virtual’; a term that I wish to separate from the vernacular interpretations. Virtual, from the Latin \textit{virtus} was a recognition by Roman thought to an application of strength: that which was real was made known through its potency. ‘Virtue’ is thus the individual’s capacities made manifest through demonstrations of strength/effect. It is furthermore related to the concept of \textit{veritas}, the Roman ‘to know’: a translation of the Greek \textit{alethia}, a knowing through revealing, but distinctive as the Roman term carried a connotation of partitioning, subdivision, and enframing in its act of knowing (Heidegger 1977). As such the ‘virtual’ is that which is known through its strength/effects as circumscribed through some device of framing; or with more brevity, it is the active encapsulated. Anthropos is invoked as, quite literally, ‘the figuration of man(kind)’. A representation of the human figure. The techne of virtual-anthropos then would include devices for the projection of the human figure in motion such that it is known through its effective strength. As a subset of the movement-image it carries the limits and possibilities of the use of motion in imagery/representation, further circumscribed by its use of the human figure and the creation of affect through the enframing of the figure’s motion.\textsuperscript{145}

In Japan there is a deep chronology for techne of virtual-anthropos. One noteworthy early example is the \textit{bunraku} puppet theater. Developed in Osaka in the early 17\textsuperscript{th} century, \textit{bunraku} quickly spread throughout Japan as a form of popular entertainment; a ‘street’ affair for festivals and other broad venue arenas. Appropriate to this appeal was a subject matter drawn from history and folk melodramas, such as the tale

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{144}] The problem of the modern state that Foucault traces from ‘governmentality’ to ‘securite’. See for example \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics} (2004).
\item[\textsuperscript{145}] Deleuze in particular argued that the movement-image presented a contrast to classical conceptions of motion as being composed of discrete sequences of separate elements, e.g. Zeno’s arrow. Instead the movement image is one in which the figure is not depicted through motion, but that the activity of motion allows for the figuration. Deleuze describes this as a new capacity of “the thinking the production of the new” in which elements of accident and chance are allowed into the execution of motion and thus into the possibility of meaning of the figure (1986).
\end{itemize}

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of the ‘47 Ronin’ or numerous romantic accounts of lover’s suicides. The puppets ranged in size from two-and-a-half to four feet tall, with highly articulated parts, including faces (mouths, eyes, eyebrows, etc.). What is most often noted by the casual observer of the theater is the disposition of the puppeteers themselves: not hidden behind curtain or stage as in many European forms, the puppeteers, typically three or more, are out in plain view of the audience seated and performing upon the stage. They are however garbed entirely in black, often with faces veiled as well. That coupled with slow and circumspect movements gives attention to the colorful, and exaggerated, often rapid movements, of the dolls being controlled.

Consideration of the role of the puppeteers in bunraku – as both a presence and non-presence to the spectacle of the narrative being instantiated through virtual-anthropos – provides an interesting segue into what one scholar calls the “passive” and “synaptic” characteristics of vision in “traditional Japan” (Screech 2002: 2). The author argues that the faculty of sight had been imagined in much of Japanese history as a “discursive” process. For the Japanese, sight was relatively unguided and unresponsive to will or intention, instead was a submersion in experience in which the perceived intruded upon the gaze and was organized along paths of the “seen and unseen by passing along links that were historic, artistic, or poetic, but not coordinated by logic” (2002: 2). Along these divergent pathways would form assemblages of significance that would then accrue to an object within the gaze as a form of “ring of association”. The author goes on the contrast this to the “Western scientific gaze”, or more aptly for us, the ‘veritas sight’, in which compartmentalization and penetration of discrete objects is paramount. Again, to know in veritas is to render partitions for isolated consideration; an unveiling through the carceral.

Yet this distinction is not absolute. The “Western gaze” was also an embodied practice from a relatively early time in the Japanese archipelago. Ran, the designation for all things Western, scientific, military, or just having a certain pastiche, was an extremely popular import throughout much of the 18th century. Telescopes, microscopes, spectacles, prisms, kaleidoscopes, static-electricity generators, glassware, projectors, peepshow boxes, etc. were imported and widely distributed amongst not only the intelligentsia and affluent, but put on display for cheap at town festivals and fairs, all under a generic title of kiki, “strange devices” (2002: 8).

In the history of virtual-anthropos, none of these though is more important than the massive influx of clockwork mechanisms. These led to one Japanese observer, Shiba Kokan, to claim that both East and South-East Asia were awash with clockwork toys made in England. Of even greater interest is that while Jean-Frédérique Jacquet-Droz was working on his self-motivating dolls in Switzerland in 1776, under the neologism of “androids”, Japan was already inundated in the domestic production of human figure automata under the title of karakuri (2002: 67). The karakuri was a secretive art that mostly fell outside the traditional apprenticeship guild system of the time with each inventor jealously guarding his techniques, and oftentimes carrying his secrets with him to his grave, and yet the spectacle was so common, so prevalent, that street theater developed around performances of karakuri dolls, of which by far the most popular were the human figure. It is said that one performance of a karakuri device depicting a famous adventure Benkei in the Boat was on stage in Edo for over 40 years (2002: 77).
The spectacle of the static-electricity generators at roadside fairs gave way in the modern age to the electricity driven imagery of the virtual-anthropos. Japan was quickly, and with varying degrees of efficiency, a wired and cabled country under the development projects of the Meiji state. Alongside the rails being put into place with such speed and alacrity went telegraph lines and telegraph offices in the 1870s, only a few short decades after their appearance in North America and Europe (Morris-Suzuki 1994). The next major development for the history of a *techne* of virtual-anthropos though was undoubtedly the development of the electronic image. The first of which was the television, which made its initial appearance on the last day of the Taisho era, December 25, 1926, when a researcher at the Hamamatsu Technical College was able to transmit a single written character to a receiver in his laboratory (Morris-Suzuki 1994: 113). Ambitious plans for a national broadcasting service (coined ‘NHK’) to begin widespread television service that would be inaugurated at the 1940 Tokyo Olympics, were delayed by the political developments at the onset of World War 2. However, following the war some fifty-five companies applied to the Japanese government to begin importing and further developing television technology. The following decades, under a strong government support, saw a whirlwind of activity, first from import and assembly, then to new developments in color imagery and smaller transistors, that meant that by the early 1980s there averaged 150 television sets per 100 households in Japan (Morris-Suzuki 1994: 195).

One of the most distinctive forms for virtual-anthropos in this new technology became the broadcast journalism experience. The original presentation forms were copied from western standards – anchors behind desks with occasional reporter oriented stories, etc. – however they differed from experiences in typical US practices in a number of ways. One of which was the strong centralized element of government sponsorship. The original flagship broadcasting company, NHK, had continued into the post war world and became a juggernaut in popular television media, easily commanding a lion’s share of viewership into the 21st century under the byzantine funding of being a ‘national corporation’ which meant it received largesse not only from a government budget but was also supported by mandatory fees levied on all television owners. Of more interest is the depiction of the virtual-anthropos figure, especially as a tool for depicting abstract institutions. One anthropological study of NHK notes that there is a “collective” and “active” set of imageries that are associated with manifestations of government: the state is often depicted on screen through a demonstration of uniformed actors at work, literally, a depiction of them ‘doing something’ (Krauss 2000: 34). In keeping with the dramatic tension of motion and mobility, news stories about state issues are often accompanied by images of uniformed figures moving to and fro, depicting raw activity. For example, crime is often not depicted as imagery of victims or statistics, but is broached by images of prosecutors raiding offices. The sum of these techniques is to create an image of the state as being salient and omnipresent, an impersonal administrator chiefly involved in conflict dispute (2000: 38).

Another unique development is the role of the commentator as visual. Japanese broadcast television follows western practices in utilizing anchors for reading news, a
(diminished) role for reporters commenting on events,\textsuperscript{146} but also a wide array of ‘color commentators’ and ‘experts’ for on-screen discussions of issues and topics. What is different is the degree of overlap among commentators: a relatively small pool of recognized figures are used across many different programs, chiefly for the role they provide in creating familiarity and identification with an audience. But also, faces. The role of faces and their animation is given a special place in Japanese television in the widely practiced use of portrait-insets. A story, an event, a narration, etc. will often be accompanied by a tiny inset box in one corner of a screen which is filled with the individual face of a commentator (one at a time), not speaking, simply reacting and emoting (actively or passively) to the event being depicted. The unfamiliar or threatening, entertaining or vile, is thus transformed through an association with the familiar visage of a long-viewed popular figure, and is readily interpreted within a familiar array of emotive expressions.

The ‘virtual’, and virtual imagery, is in the vernacular of the popular imagination most commonly associated with computers and monitor technology adapted from television advances. Japan missed the initial wave of development that led to computers during World War 2. Yet following the war academic and government demand for the new device was effervescent, and once again a strategy of imports of North American and European devices was gradually displaced by domestic production and innovation, such that by the 1970s the majority of computers used in Japan were made in Japan.

The philosopher Andrew Feenberg once noted that computers were not designed for communication but for sharing data (Gehring 2004). This transformation of a language based on machine code to one rooted in human expression faced particular challenges in Japan. The complexity of the Japanese writing system, which combines several systems of syllabaries with ideographic characters adapted from Chinese, meant that the typewriter was a ‘passed over’ technology. With wordprocessing however, a keyboard layout based on the Roman alphabet was implemented which would then make multiple levels of translation first from the phonetics of the roman letter combinations into the syllabary system, and once more would then offer the user an array of choices of ideographic characters that matched that sound set. This brought the world of type and print into the business and government bureaucracy, which had for over a century been heavily dependent on handwritten forms certified with ink seals.\textsuperscript{147} Alongside the text based communication though developed myriad forms of visual representations, among these most prominently numerous variations of the virtual-anthropos. These representations are now so ubiquitous that just about any situation in Tokyo in which a monitor is combined with a CPU will include a human figure representation: from construction signs with automated human ‘robots’ waving light sticks to direct traffic, to ATM machines with tiny inset monitors in which a female figure in office attire will bow to the customer on completion of the transaction.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{146} Krauss comments that according to one survey, only 8% of news stories have journalist commentary (2000: 35).
\textsuperscript{147} The system is still slower than most type-based inputs. Surveys show that Japanese is one of the few languages that it is actually quicker to write than type (Ducke 2007).
\textsuperscript{148} As a young man I worked at the Freer-Sackler Gallery of East Asian Art in Washington D.C. One of our visiting displays was of a Japanese artist commenting on
Perhaps the best recognized milieu for the digital virtual-anthropos in recent decades has been the thriving Japanese gaming industry in which the human figure serves as a primary interface model. Adapted from the anime tradition of Japanese television and cinema animation, one in which the human form is rendered in streamlined, often minimalistic measures, with exaggerated features such as eyes for expressive purposes, yet the bulk of detailed rendition is spent in crafting the environments – natural and mechanical – for which the spare figures find themselves traversing. These conceits have been applied to the digital representations of the game world, and as computing power has grown the modeling of the environment has proportionally increased, such that much greater levels of responsiveness of emersion are now possible between the ‘avatar’ representation and the ‘world’ within the machine. Liu, observing life at the Japanese gamelands, noted that this relationship modifies possibilities of narration such that traditional orientations of past and future are submerged within an ever present ‘becoming’ of the activity of interaction within the closed system of the game (2005). Degrees of difference and shifts in epochal relations then become solely dependent on external factors of ‘hardware’ as new versions of devices or new editions to game series are released. It is the possibility of networked machines through the internet which has caused the greatest surge in both the forms of virtual-anthropos as well as the scholarly reflection on the same. If we follow Niklas Luhmann’s advice (1995) and move from a position of observing objects to one in which the role of the anthropologist is also to observe observers observing, it becomes readily apparent that the ‘internet’ as a concept is tied to the contemporary. In saying this I mean that the significance of the internet device is not in line with customary historical framings say of a teleology of state-society in which the techne played a part in the bildung; instead the device is subjected to different demands of meaning which as the techne is placed within the unveiling potentiality of the contemporary, it correspondingly places the device in a metric in which meaning is rendered as prognostic, even prophetic. As such it is not surprising that much of the scholarship of the internet in Japan has fixated the device into a relationship within an imagined society: the association of ‘networked computers’ to ‘information society’ is beyond ubiquitous, nearly mandatory. Assessments of the technology’s ability, or lack thereof, to usher in realms of human equality, non-hierarchical information exchange, democratic reform, etc., are embarrassing in their ever presence. In political connotations, from a then President Bush ruminating on the possibility of the internet to ‘transform’ China, to a list of scholarly texts that lament the fact that the internet has ‘not been used to its full potential’ in creating a civil society within Japan (Ducke 2007). What is known is that hyperbole within this discourse is unknown; one commentator linked the transformative capacities of the internet in Japan to the arrival of moveable print in the 17th century (Aiba 2004). The internet and its capacities are so commonly

the penetration of digital technology in modern life. His visual imagery had adapted the iconic erotica of the Ukiyo-e movement, of women engaged in sexual acts with a variety of sea creatures, and replaced these creatures with computers and computer devices. 149 See for example Ducke (2007), Coates and Holroyd (2003), Gehring (2004), Gottliebe and Mcelleland (2003), Schwartz and Pharr (2003).
rendered as a fundamental ‘good’ that the export of the technologies has been 
equivocated to the spread of ‘human rights’.

One particularly interesting, and common, framing of the issue in Japan is known 
as the ‘Galapagos effect’ (garapagosu genshou). Unlike computers or television, the 
technologies associated with the internet in Japan did not advance under government 
sponsorship. In fact, many of the key advances came about in the space of attacks on 
government legitimacy. The Hanshin earthquake of 1995 has often been commented on 
by scholars as the birthplace of the modern NGO and civil society organizations in Japan, 
as the immediate effects of the earthquake were to demonstrate a government incapable 
or unwilling to respond to developing circumstances of such basic needs as power, food, 
and water distribution in the effected areas (Schwartz and Pharr 2003).\footnote{150} Yet the 
aftermath of the Hanshin earthquake also saw the doubling of internet usage in Japan as 
people sought different media for communication; proportionately, by far the greatest 
increase anywhere on earth (Coates and Holroyd 2003: 49). The government’s tepid 
engagements and encouragements for the new technologies are most commonly known 
for example by the 2000 Japan IT law, which is chiefly remembered for the scandal in 
which the then Prime Minister, Yoshiro Mori, admitted to having never used the 
technology he was advocating (2003: 51-52).

Within this recent history of the chaotic development of the internet is seen a 
series of emergences and reactions to isolated pressures, not standard bureaucratic or 
international norms. This is the conception of the Galapagos effect: that the technology 
‘evolves’ to the idiosyncratic and local in such ways that make it ‘unique’ to a Japanese 
context. One of the most commonly cited being the early emergence of mobile 
networking. Japan was the first country to develop mobile phone based internet service 
(Coates and Holroyd 2003). And this development co-occurred with a sluggish 
adaptation of PC based internet usage. The mobile phone as a platform for information 
and communication was given a higher advantage because of the nature of the Tokyo 
workforce, a dominant economic market: long commutes in crowded trains meant that 
people were set before their tiny screens on their cellphones (keitai) longer than could be 
expected to be seated in front of a PC at home (Coates and Holroyd 2003). The forms for 
this technology and associated webpages developed in relative isolation with a PC based 
system, leading to what some scholars have called parallel ‘internets’ in Japan, one which 
with the recent adoption of smart phones with greater capacities has only begun to merge 
(Ducke 2007).

A curious consequence of this brief history – of a rapid independent development 
of mobile networking, contrasted to a sluggish and sporadic government handling of a 
computer-based network system hampered by old rules and logistics for expensive 
television use-age, etc. – is that within the scholarship of the internet in Japan all kinds of 
extremes become legitimate statements. Japan has been both slow to adopt the internet. 
Especially compared to North America or its Asian neighbors (Ducke 2007). Or, if the 
mobile platforms are considered, Japan has become the most ‘wired’ place on earth,

\footnote{150} It is a common story in Japan that the organized criminal groups, the yakuza, were 
actually the first on the scene to distribute basic goods.  

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where private use of the internet is greater than any other country (Coates and Holroyd 2003).\footnote{151}

Returning to our central problem of narration as act and a method of experience, what we can safely say at this point is that at the time of the ‘Fukushima incident’ Japan was a country inundated in electronic eyes. And these eyes were, by and large, turning their focus to the virtual-anthropos in a non-stop kaleidoscope of motion and emotion, in order to create meaning and affect. Within these practices were multiple regimes of vision creating different possibilities of association, and by extension, signification. For example, to say the ‘Fukushima incident’ is to invite a contrast in gazes. For the Fukushima incident unto the veritas sight is a series of elements, ordered chronologically and thus causally in relation to one another. An earthquake. A tsunami. A reactor coolant failure. Sea water desperately being dumped by helicopter to prevent a full meltdown. Like the arrow released from Zeno’s bow each element in the series comprises a point of focus and knowledge - the stillness outside of motion\footnote{152} - or an entity and venue to experience Barthes’ ‘punctum’ (1981). Their meaning is self contained, and transmitted to other elements strictly through the relation of temporal causality. However, there is also the synaptic gaze in which the Fukushima incident is not a sequence but a montage: a contour of events that curve back into each other at a thought and thus lose their uniqueness within the totality of experience of the event ‘Fukushima’. Here elements of hubris percolate throughout - man against nature; a government to a people – and are shared with feelings of impotence: a failed state at protecting/serving a people; or an act of helplessness watching a rendered mass of bodies being swept away by a rising torrent.

Let us pause for a moment to ask again what is this narration? It is denied the privilege of being self-contained. To see movement-images on a twenty inch screen as lives crushed by a wave of water is not to speak of ‘story’, but of the ‘real’. As such this narration of the Fukushima incident is one that straddles and then shatters the metaleptic divide between characters ‘dramatis personae’ and ‘reader’. The point of the affective engagement is to dissolve the problem of representation of the ‘virtual’. The suffering, the death, is not facsimile or simulacra, but is a terrible present. And it must be so, for the incident to have an affective narration; otherwise it is just news, or history, a place of interpretation mediated by a sense of distance and determinations. This metaleptic shift is made possible through the deployment of truth-claims; or more precisely put into Foucault’s terminology, practices of modes of veridiction are at work to make the movement-images of virtual-anthropos take on the force of truth.

One of the most startling elements of the representations of the Fukushima incident is their ubiquity. Again, a country inundated in cameras, and one in which the professional news media is often dictated by the practical limitations of camera resources

\footnote{151} “‘Private use of the internet is now more commonplace in Japan than, by some standards, any place on earth.’ (Coates and Holroyd 2003: ix).
\footnote{152} “The third is…that the flying arrow is at rest, which result follows from the assumption that time is composed of moments...he says that if everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that which is in locomotion is always in a now, the flying arrow is therefore motionless.” (Aristotle Physics, 239b.30)
as to what and how stories are told, \(^{153}\) it will come as no surprise that the virtual representation of the incident were a mélange of images from numerous sources: cell-phone cameras, local and national networks, private video recorders, conversations cut short on phones, tourist snapshots. Within this literal ‘gestalt gaze’ fabricating the unity of the event, an array of veridictional modes emerge. One is aggregation. To aggregate is to “gather into a mass, sum, or whole”; the “constituting or amounting to a whole; total”. \(^{154}\) It is, in other words, a practice that combines two simple elements: counting, the most fundamental of mathematical acts; and an assumption of a totality or unity in which the counting is supposedly, and gradually, creating or indicating, as representation or presence. In the context of a ‘national experience’ like Fukushima, the aggregate is fundamental. For one, the nation cannot exist without it. Aggregation is the secret calculus of Rousseau’s ‘general will’, and it is through this calculus that the silhouette of Nietzsche’s ‘cold monster’, or to put it more charitably, the bureaucratic democratic state, emerge. To count is to be known; to add is to create totality.

In terms of the Fukushima incident, this was accomplished in practical terms via the classic ‘science of the state’, statistics. Charts were shown every night and day by the (predominantly) men-in-suits with the latest numbers of dead, missing, economic cost, etc., etc. However, with the new media for the distribution of virtual-anthropos came new possibilities of aggregation. For example, despite Japan’s unique history of the development of the internet, one noteworthy function has been adapted from mechanisms widely utilized in North America and Europe, that being to aggregate, to count. ‘Hits on a web-page’ are used to grant precedence in search engines\(^{155}\), and prestige or prominence through popularity. ‘Likes’, ‘Agrees’, etc. all appear in the Japanese context of social networking forums, creating arbitration in the melee of published opinion, which if not clearly distinguishing ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, are used to create ‘significance’. \(^{156}\) In this metric of the virtual-anthropos it is not only the repetition of the movement-image that portrays its meaning, but also the digital counter displayed alongside the image which depicts the shared community, the fellowship of participation in seeing, granting another dimension of poignancy. A number that constitutes the imaginary of the ‘population’ or ‘people’, and also a quantification to make comparison. This virtual-anthropos, this death, is more important/moving/meaningful/real than this one, by count of participation.

Another veridictional mode that we must consider is the work of the ‘author-function’ in the Fukushima representations. Foucault pointed out to us that the author, or ‘author-function’, far from being an issue of little consideration for a literary theory obsessed with ‘works’, was actually an activity and analytic that performed a great deal

\(^{153}\) Krauss (2000).


\(^{155}\) See Gehring (2004).

\(^{156}\) One interesting recent example was the promotion of the “One Voice” campaign by Japanese NGOs, an attempt to lift the legal bans on the use of the internet for campaign purposes. The attempt itself became newsworthy when the number of hits received in one night by the NGO’s website was reported. http://www.zasshi.news.yahoo.co.jp.alternat-soci&sa. Accessed June 1, 2012.
of work in the organization of meaning via discourse. Most obviously the author-function creates unity, ‘objects of approbation’ which allow for the classification of a work, or more tantalizingly, ‘discursive practices’, e.g. coherent systems of possible meaning and representation. In reference to these formations Foucault noted that the author function then diverges in several ways dependent on the media. For example, the act of the ‘return to’ – the examination of the original author’s works to gain new meaning and insight – can create new possibilities of understanding say for psychoanalysis through a consideration of Freud, but would only create meanings of history and biography, not new physics, with an examination of Galileo (Rabinow and Rose 1994).

For the virtual-anthropos of the Fukushima disaster a series of questions and dramatics emerge in relation to the author-function. Or more specifically, questions develop as to the author-function not only in its presence and absence, but in its emergence as well. A case of presence would be the presentation of the state, Japan, as an authority. The virtual-image of the activity of the state sponsored technicians and respondents busily battling radiation and disaster continues to follow the line of argument Krauss presented earlier: providing evidence of the omnipresence and responsiveness of the state to the needs of the people. Yet it is also a risky proposition, for here the stake of legitimacy is wagered; the raison d’etre of the state has been placed upon the table: unity leads to strength, support, comfort, defense, purpose. And yet a failure to provide these can play out in the virtual-anthropos, and be recognized as ‘a failure’. The author-function of the state expertise, the unity of experience as well as the technical power of response, can be marked as illegitimate. The obvious case is the aforementioned Hanshin earthquake aftermath in which the impotence of the state became common discourse and one of the most notable aftereffects was a major, unprecedented, insurgence of massive numbers of NGOs and civil society organizations to augment or counter the state (Schwartz and Pharr 2003). Yet also in the Fukushima incident in the days of the state combating the radiation with desperate seawater drops, a flood of protests on the heretofore inconceivable issues of nuclear power use and placement exploded across Japan. State legitimacy in decision-making, as well as meta views of the purpose and goals of Japan – Japan is to be energy self-sufficient so that it can be an economic world power – were challenged and derided as not being representative.

The absence of the author-function can be delineated in the performance of the anonymous. The anonymous video submitted to television media of tsunami carnage, or a posted youtube clip showing the suffering of victims away from demolished homes, etc. Anonymity would seem to denote an absence of any type of author-function. However, in the case of creating a shared feeling of a national catastrophe, anonymity also created space for similitude: the author function was relegated to being the eye perceiving suffering bodies. No biography. No history. No location. Other than the event of the suffering. To this the ‘writerly’ role of modern narrative discourse was supplanted by an active ‘readerly’ role of perception and interpretation. The context of the author-function was pushed to the side allowing for a more ‘direct’ form of apprehension, skirting issues of metalepsis, in favor for a verisimilitude of raw affective reaction and response.

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157 From “What is an Author?” in The Essential Foucault (1994).
Finally, there was the ‘emergence’ of author-function phenomenon in the days of the Fukushima incident. In this I refer to cases in which shared virtual-anthropos images created a response within viewers such that the identity of the author became an issue of the narration. An example would be the destruction of a northern town by tsunami forces and a lone woman, Miki Endo, who remained making announcements over a public broadcasting array. Her sacrifice became a story in the popular media, alongside arrays of images of the town – before full of life-images of walking shopping figures; after a ghost-town of water and emptiness. Her biography became a point of reflection on being Japanese, a question of virtues and sacrifice in the face of the community, a different array of characters to counter the ‘evils’ of ‘consumer culture’ that was associated with economic power. In short, the creation of the author function through biographies of Endo, interviews with her mother, etc., followed the elements of the hagiographic, or Christian exegesis that Foucault identified as being part of the literary turn to authors. A set of identities were created that were connected with her activities, her performances on that fateful day. And these activities were then transposed into questions of the significance of the disaster, and its media of narration and experience; the meaning of being Japanese.

Finally, there is the mode of veridiction that operates through similitude: an identification with the image by the viewing gaze such that affective empathy is aroused and a sense of identification is imparted. This is an incredibly complex phenomenon. What’s more, a century of anthropology of cinema has taught us that this phenomenon is both learned and historically situated; to see the human in tiny representations, two-dimensional or otherwise, is not something ‘natural’ in any sense of the term. It must be acquired and internalized through repetition and imitation (Gray 2010). As we have seen in Japan the practice has a long history as suicides and sacrifices have been emoted through the use of puppets and clockwork automata. So the potency and effectiveness of the media cannot be ignored, especially in its ‘mass media’ manifestations. However, another aspect to consider is that the movement-image creates a unique experience of similitude by taking a passive gaze of association and transferring active elements of selection to it through anticipation. A Chaplin performance is emotive through the audience’s anticipation of completion of movement: a fall, a stumble, a motion in the movement. Through this anticipation they place an element of themselves, a memory or a possibility, into the movement-image. This practice belies the supposed passivity of the traditional synaptic gaze, as we can see that the gaze actively (if subconsciously) makes selections for meaning associations: e.g. the actions of the bunraku puppet form an enclosed system of meaning, while the black clad puppeteers are removed from interpretation. Some of these selections then reflect back upon the subject as an entity, a gazing focus, itself.

There is much more to say about this process and its role in Japan in particular but that will have to wait until the next section. For now, suffice to say that in this projection of symbols and signs to create affective empathy, the virtual-anthropos is a media unparalleled.
7 Narrating Disaster

Genette tells us that when Proust was pressed to reflect upon his writing he justified it constantly through falling upon an ‘old tradition’ of ‘realism’: that the task at hand for narration is both to “…tell things as they were ‘lived’ at the time and the concern to tell them as they were recalled after the event” (1980: 157).

Thus, the anachronism of the narrative is now that of existence itself, now that of memory, which obeys other laws than those of time.
(1980: 158)

A narrative of an event is therefore an interplay between acts of signification that invoke a world organized as chronology and causality - the Kantian experience of things in space – but also the experience of things as memory, in which the demands of reflection and association break, or super-determine, the linearity of the chronological. Memory as an activity enters into events through a lens of meaning beyond the chronological, that at times can actually be the reverse of causal order. That the organization of the temporal – the tense158 - alternates through plays of mimesis of ‘the doing of life’ with shadow plays of ‘the work of memory, or rather of forgetfulness’ (1980: 158).

The key technique at hand for this is the application of mood. The “name given to the different forms of the verb that are used to affirm more or less the thing in question, and to express…the different points of view from which the life or the action is looked at” (1980: 161). Mood then is a faculty of characterization, not raw dramatization. For Genette, mood is not the vernacular notion of creating ‘atmosphere’ through setting or context. Instead it is an orientation of the dramatis personae, a ‘viewpoint’ of the character(s) through which the story is experienced, further mediated by the voice of the narrator. The performance of mood is therefore an architectonic transmission of experience: it creates a framework for engagement, disengagement, prioritization, and affect, of a story or event. The two key concepts by which mood undertakes this work are distance and perspective (1980: 162).

Which brings us back to Blumenberg and Fukushima. For following Blumenberg we can note that the problem space of modernity is a problem space of meaning; a not unique occurrence, but an inherited one given the conceptualizations of history, secularism, transcendence, objectivity, etc. Specifically, in this instance is the orientation towards history and event that is generally denoted as ‘progress’, but for Blumenberg was a subset or a possibility of a conception of the universe as being ‘incomplete’ to which ‘man’ had to find a position within. Progress, position, and meaning for the modern arrays of the nation-state that address this issue (education, public discourse, etc) are then

158 A set of forms taken by a verb to indicate the time (and sometimes also the continuance or completeness) of the action in relation to the time of the utterance. From the Latin tempus for time. (New Oxford American Dictionary).
under the ‘obligation’ to address this issue, to answer with meaning. However, these ‘arrays of the state’ are a turn towards the previous solution of the incomplete universe, method - methods of learning, teaching, calculation, etc. – and do not constitute substance nor subjectivity to which meaning is situated within. The nation itself is indeterminate; it is not a question of ethnos, geography, or history, but a narrative, i.e. a constant motion in relation to our previously mentioned problem of tenses, of life and memory. In acting out this narration, the manifestation of mood and voice is what Blumenberg called the ‘other solution’, ‘collectivity’. A substance of belonging, ‘known’ through affect. Fukushima then as an event-disaster, provides not only a forum, but also a focus, for the collectivity through a type of narration. Specifically it becomes a milieu for the ‘inscribing’ and ‘reading’ of suffering; shared, collective, and mediated.

This is far from a trivial or obvious assertion. Foucault once noted that over the long course of Western history freedom in the use of logos increasingly became freedom in the choice of bios (1983). Suffering and death do not simply negate this choice of bios, but provide a field for affirmation, rejection, contestation, and assertions of ‘truth possibilities’ through the demands and forum of ‘meaning’. For Foucault, the force of parrhesia, the truth speaking of classical Greece and later Hellenistic civilizations, was in part derived from an act of courage in bios; a type of ‘signing’ of the veracity of the logos through a hazard of life itself. Diogenes risked his life in confronting Alexander for no goal other than a chance to speak logos (1983). In Japan a parallel tradition could be noted in the ritual suicide of seppuku. For here it is not a point to contest the logos of a topic or statement through a very public death display, but to present an act of courage for the consuming gaze of an audience that will define the bios of the participant(s), and therefore a testimony to the truth of their life, their choices, their virtues, and their actions. The enduring popularity of stories such as the 47 Ronin, which detail the actions of a group of samurai that were undertaken for a ‘just cause’ despite knowing the end result would be mass ritual suicide, continue to show the weight and seriousness that meditations of death, and performative death at that, hold in Japan. In other words, and with other forms of emphasis, suffering and death are forms of veridiction; a possibility of finding truth in bios. Thus the Fukushima incident is one in which the problem space of meaning for the collective (the nation, the people) enters into a fragile, unstable narration.

To focus on the Fukushima incident via mechanisms of mood and tense in order to create this narration of collective suffering experience requires careful consideration. In order to do this I will borrow two more concepts from Genette, those being analepsis and prolepsis. Analipsis is narrating an event after it has occurred. Prolepsis is narrating in advance an event that will occur later (1980: 40). Both then represent two different relations of the temporality of the narrating act to the temporality of the ‘narrative world’. Both however also continue to be articulated within the enduring narrative tension between ‘life’ (the causal) and ‘memory’ (or forgetting).

The intersection of analepsis and mood that I wish to explore is ‘nostalgia’. Analipsis operates through a deep referencing of a contrast between the past and a recognition of the present as experienced through a narrative. Nostalgia is an emotion that distinguishes a particular form of this contrast: a wistful sense of loss. Though that is a simplistic statement, as emotions have histories. The experience of an emotion is
dependent upon its recognition public as well as private, and consequently has a symbolic and linguistic dimension. “For the critic, for the historian, an emotion exists only beyond the point at which it attains a linguistic status. No facet of an emotion can be traced before it is named, before it is designated and expressed” (Starobinski and Kemp 1966: 81). Or as La Rochefoucauld forcefully put it, “There are people who would never have been in love if they had never heard tell of love” (1966: 82).

‘Nostalgia’ was created in Europe for the express purpose of identifying an emotion and its expression into medical terminology. Its first appearance was in a dissertation by Johannes Hofer in 1688; the neologism being coined by combining the Greek for ‘return’ and ‘sorrow’ (1966: 85). The term was thus based in a psycho-somatic Greco-Roman tradition and was used to distinguish the feeling as an ‘abnormal condition’ versus a “disturbance within the normal course of life” (1966: 85). The social phenomena related to the neologism was the increased long-term absence of soldiers and sailors operating in greater numbers and duration in the service of the rising Western European nation-states. An early version of the concept/case was called ‘the Swiss disease’ as its appearance was most commonly associated with Swiss mercenaries (1966). Though this association also marks a change in the diagnostic; the Swiss disease was based on a model which saw physical influence on the body to impact the soul. A popular explanation then for early nostalgia was that the move from high altitude to low ones adversely effected blood flow and thus created the disturbance; which in turn led to a long tradition in Europe for recuperative trips to ‘light air’ regions such as the Alps (1966: 89).

Nostalgia the neologism was in effect a reverse diagnostic: an emotional upheaval triggered by some sensory experience would adversely effect the body; mortally so, it was feared. There were widespread stories of Swiss soldiers hearing a certain rustic tune from the homeland upon pipes or flutes which then led to desertion, a wasting death, or suicide. So great was the anxiety about this condition that military regimes enacted juridical disciplinary mechanisms to punish not only the desertion, but the playing of the bucolic tune itself (1966: 90).

With the diagnostic in place, next came a search for therapies. By the late 18th century it was believed that nostalgia could be cured by a return to one’s native land (and a practice of rotating leaves were enacted in Western European armies; a very un-Roman one). However, no lesser a personage than Immanuel Kant became interested in the phenomena and its treatment, and in his Anthropologie, Kant argued that a return to a homeland was insufficient; nostalgia was not about a place, but was actually a longing for a milieu of experiences, the youth of the subject. Still with the recognition of nostalgia reaching epidemic proportions – a killer, and a contagious one at that - the search for a

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159 A more modern example and the relation of emotion to the ‘mass media’ would be the one provided by Andre Gide who noticed that during the First World War that the language used by journalists who had never been close to combat “furnished the clichés which the soldiers returning from the front used to describe their feelings” (1966: 82).

160 "Back in his native land, he is still unhappy, for he finds that people and things no longer conform to his idea of what they used to be. His childhood is not given back to him. Before Rimbaud said, ‘one does not leave’, Kant had warned that there is no returning” (1966: 94).
treatment continued. Bleeding was recommended. And with the onset of the incarceration of the ‘mentally ill’ in clinic facilities, nostalgia became just cause for imprisonment and somatic interventions (binding, red-hot irons, etc.) (1966: 96). It was only with the rise of bacterium as being the nouveau episteme of communicable disease that nostalgia received widespread reevaluation. In the psychology of the 20th century nostalgia ceased to be a diagnostic but was instead subdivided into various effects and actions of the ‘victims’, which were in turn not marked as a disease but as ‘reactions’ indicative of a ‘failure to adapt’ (1966: 101).

In Japan ‘nostalgia’ is most commonly translated as natsukashii. This translation is not approximate by any stretch of the imagination. For one thing, natsukashii is ancient. It appears at least as early as the Manyoushu, the Ten Thousand Leaves, a collection of poems assembled in stages over a period ranging from 347 to 759 A.D. Natsukashii earliest recorded appearances were as the verb form natsuku, “to become familiar with”. The adjective form in ancient times carried this meaning to the object as having a desire or presence of intimacy, closeness, fondness, understanding, etc. (oftentimes loosely translated into English as ‘dear’ or ‘adore’). The familiarity between object and subject also carried with it an anxiety of loss: natsukashii could also mean “don’t want to lose (something)”. By the middle ages the adjective form had taken on its modern connotations. Natsukashii became an expression of a wistful longing, a regret, emotive and affective, for something, someone, or someplace that was distant either in time or space. Natsukashii had translated the familiarity of the object as an active recognition and possession, into a force or coloring of memory; the familiarity was poignant, but lost, its presence invoked a feeling of longing that was disrupted by circumstances. Natsukashii then in its most common contemporary translation is approximated with the rather awkward English phrase, “to bring back memories”.

161 Volume 17, Ootomono Kayamochi 大伴家持 ホトトギスの夜鳴く声が慕わしい。網を張って捕えておけば、花が散っても、途絶えることなく鳴いてくれるだろうか。(I adore little cuckoo's voice at the night. I wonder (the bird) will keep singing even after the flowers are gone if I keep it in the cage.)


163 From the Heike Monogatari (circa 1309)
花橘の咲く軒近くに風が吹き昔懐かしく香ったので (Because the wind blow when I was at near the house had mandarin orange which smell bring me back memory...)

164 A question worth noting, though one that is far beyond what I wish to accomplish here, is if this transformation of relation between the word and memory coincides with a similar one to the notion of ‘history’. Following, Reinhart Koselleck’s work, it is possible that the etymological shift parallels one in which history as a form of embodied narration, ever present in the dramatics of the present, was replaced by an alienated history to which the present could only refer to, but not equate with (2002).
It is interesting to note that the separation engendering the \textit{natsukashii} moment/feeling of memory can be both due to space and time. A \textit{natsukashii} event can be a scent, sight, or sound that brings forth a (pleasant) memory of one’s childhood or school days. However, it can also be a trigger for a feeling of geographical separation, say to a distant rural hometown (in the ever urbanized, and Tokyo-centered modern economy, this is a fairly typical expression). This is interesting because it brings up Kant’s critique of nostalgia: if whether the expression of distance as loss truly is about a loss through space, or is involved in an expression of loss of an idealized set of experiences of the remote location (e.g. a wistfulness to childhood). Given the contemporary configurations of communities in Tokyo, that have been urbanized for generations, forming \textit{furusato} (home town) relations with isolated \textit{inaka} (countryside) villages, it would seem that the \textit{natsukashii} feeling is more a narrative one than a reflection of true (i.e. ‘historical’) loss. The idealized, stereotypical countryside childhood – or the “Japanese Rockwellian smalltown”, to coin a phrase – that is widely broadcast in numerous media and consumed as a part of the “Japanese experience”, is sought in these negotiated exchanges for the virtual expression of intimacy and loss. And in this virtual expression, this calculated narration, the feelings of \textit{natsukashii} act both as an enabling affect, and as the desired endpoint.

Another point to be considered in the comparison of nostalgia to \textit{natsukashii} is that \textit{natsukashii} is much more affective than emotive. It is first, and arguably foremost, an utterance, an expressive experience. \textit{Natsukashii} is widely vocalized at a sight, smell, sound. This is done to acknowledge a shared moment with others who can relate, or as a solitary expression: to turn vocal in breath and body the feeling of the moment. It is a momentary utterance that is both ubiquitous and seemingly unregulated by etiquette of space; it can happen in a visit to a ‘national treasure’ temple filled with grandeur and solemnity, or in a convenience store while picking up a child’s plastic toy. At either event the feeling need not be voiced, but if it is, it is not strange, and more than likely to result in nods, grunts, or repetitions of \textit{natsukashii} (gleeful or sad) amongst one’s compatriots.

Turning to prolepsis, the art of ‘foreshadowing’, a mood to our tense that immediately stands out is \textit{gaman}. \textit{Gaman} is patience; perseverance in the face of adversity; or most eloquently, enduring the seemingly unbearable with patience and dignity. In the popular press it has been called a law, a virtue, or an ethos.\footnote{A survey is presented in the wikipedia entry for \textit{gaman}. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaman\_(term) \ . Accessed June 12, 2012.} It’s influence and origins are associated with Zen Buddhism, and thus has been elevated to being a ‘key’, a prima facie inscription of the coda of ‘being Japanese’.\footnote{See Boye De Ment’s \textit{Japan’s Cultural Code Words: 233 Key Terms that Explain the Attitudes and Behavior of the Japanese} (2004) for one example.} Most notably and with the greatest sophistication in Ruth Benedict’s classic \textit{Chrysanthemum and the Sword}, \textit{gaman} plays one of the poles of the qualities of the culture and personality profile for the ‘Japanese’; a pattern for life and behavior. These are suspicious assertions that should not be taken at face value without ceding a lengthy slew of ontic associations. However, it can be said that \textit{gaman} in practice and speech is prevalent in its pervasiveness. Practically the first colloquial Japanese I learned when I first moved to
Japan in the mid 1990s were the set expressions *shou ga nai* ("There is nothing to be done about it"), to the implied *gaman shinasai* ("You must endure with grace!"). Teaching at the secondary schools presented many opportunities to witness *gaman* as a practice, and more interestingly, a part of the pedagogy. There is an infamous practice of standardized uniforms in the Japanese schools in which the summer to winter outfits are mandated from a central office only to be changed on a set date each year, regardless of the weather. Thus it is quite common to see young boys and girls trudging to schools in light summer shirts and jackets with snow up to their ankles (or knees, on very unfortunate days), forbidden to use their heavier coats and so heavily muffled in scarfs and ear muffs with chemical ‘heat packets’ jammed into their pockets. It is a practice of standardization, a teaching of norms and thus a transference of a shared sense of experience with Japanese students throughout the country, yet the teachers would often comment to me that it was a practice of teaching the value of *gaman*, something that they would need to master for the remainder of their lives.

*Gaman* then is a widely recognized aspect of being a complete Japanese; a capacity for dealing with the ‘slings and arrows’ of calamities in such a way that the duress caused to those associated is minimized. It is active; not a patience of inactivity, but a willful endurance while keeping to the task at hand, minimizing the ‘useless’ expressions of suffering or victimization (because one assumes that those around you are beset by the same, or even greater, suffering and would only be compounded by the utterance of one’s own). Successful acts of *gaman* are considered a mark of maturity, a distinction to the childish wailing of adolescence, etc. Though this is not to say that *gaman* is not contested. One memorable incident at my first secondary school was oriented around the opening day ceremony and the performance of the *kimigayo* (the “Imperial anthem” that is contested as the “national anthem”). When half the teachers refused to stand for the ceremony while all the students and the remaining teachers did I realized that something curious was afoot. The following week I was witness to one of the few open outbursts of emotion as the *kocho sensei* – the school principal - raged at the teachers who had refused to participate. Sweating and screaming in front of the three score teacher in one large open office, he hissed and spat and claimed that their participation was beyond any political beliefs, that they had a responsibility to do *gaman*. Another time in the early 2000s I was meeting with a zen priest who ran ‘temple workshops’ for the busy salarymen and office ladies of the Tokyo corporations. The thought was to have weekend retreats where they would leave the urban setting and three-piece suits behind and come to the countryside temples to meditate and learn. The priest however lamented that that was not what was happening; that all the businessmen did was *gaman* in their meditation, a skill that they had all known since childhood (and by extension were not participating in the more serious work of meditation as reflection on self and world).

The theme of *gaman* is of course pervasive in multiple media, most notably in the virtual-anthropos. From the puppets of *bunraku* biting on a sleeve to show suppressed emotion, to the widely recognized masterpieces of twentieth century film. For example,

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167 Later I learned that this outburst was underscored by a similar incident at a nearby town where the school principal had committed suicide in response to the teachers actions.
Late Spring one of the most influential of the early post-war productions in Japanese cinema (it was actually produced while still under the censorship regime of MacArthur’s GHQ). The famous scene of the aged father returning into his empty home after seeing off his daughter to a marriage that he had arranged against her will, this is also correlated with a nearly as famous argument between the actor Chishu Ryu and the director Yasujio Ozu, in which the director wanted the old man to be break down and weep at this moment, to display the depths of pathos and agony. The actor refused. Arguing simply, it ‘would not be seemly’. It would not be *gaman*.\(^{168}\) Or in Akira Kurosawa’s classic *Ikiru* (‘Life’) the last scene of the dying bureaucrat is one in which his agony can not be shared, he sits alone, in a snow filled night, singing softly to himself upon the swing of the playground he was instrumental in building.

Tense and mood. Past and future. It seems almost cavalier to apply the literary to the visceral suffering of a national disaster like Fukushima. However, in the visceral there is a story here: the story of the ‘incident’, the sense to the suffering, a ‘national’ referent as well as a historical one. It is quite simply a transformation of an incident into a ‘truth’ known through ‘experience’.

To say this is to underscore the complexity of the problem before us. The ‘truth’ is fragmented and polyvocal; its ‘knowing’ through ‘experience’ equally so. Earlier we had discussed modes of veridiction and left off at a question of similitude. Similitude is the problem of identification, and there is nothing self-evident or naturalized about this. The conception of sameness, its power to move and engage, is sorely dependent on its circumscription; the curtailing and limitations placed upon the object and subject. For example, the human figure, starving and abandoned has the power similitude to move the gaze of the observer, especially now that it is situated in an age of human rights, where synthesis of the ‘human experience’ is reduced to bodies capable of happiness, pain, or death (Rieff 2002). Therein is the veridictional form of similitude: it is a modality of truth known through a modality of *bios*. How much more so then the complexity of similitude becomes and how much more powerful its affect when it is interlocked within narrative elements that are more carefully circumscribed as realities of history and subject? When the subject being followed is a primary historical character like the ‘nation’ or a ‘people’? And when the qualities of the similitude are determined through conditioned relations to time and sense?

Nostalgia to *natsukashii* is an interesting example. If we take a pair of cases of their use in representation of the ‘modern’, for example, the classical archetype of the modern in literature being Baudelaire’s *The Flowers of Evil*. Here Baudelaire’s gaze is an annihilation of nostalgia. Paris is denied a past. Instead a ruthlessly detailed present of black hats, and ugly suits, or noisy streets, and distracted engagements:

> Around me thundered the deafening noise of the street,  
> In mourning apparel, portraying majest distress,  
> With queenly fingers, just lifting the hem of her dress,  
> A stately woman passed by with hurrying feet.

\(^{168}\) This story was told to me several times by informants in Japan. Most memorably during a retrospective film festival honoring the work of Akira Kurosawa.
(from To a Passer-by, 2011)

The prose is in service to an affective engagement so well described by Foucault: “You have no right to despise the present”. For Baudelaire, the nostalgia of Goethe and the Romantics is now an escape; a search for essences, transcendental and historical, that act as a balm to the conflict of meaning in the lived present. A fiction and false balm; the origins are unknowable, and God is Dead, and with it the possibility of ethnos.

Compare this to one of Japan’s leading modern authors, Murakami Haruki, who wrote an anthology in the aftermath of the devastating 1995 Kobe earthquakes. In these stories characters exist in the present, alone, staring at televisions and the bedlam of virtual-anthropos depicted across screens; responding to biological needs like hunger or sexuality in a listless, sometimes, desperate fashion. The characters are not known to the readers through the author’s narration – description and background are spare to nonexistent. What’s more the characters don’t seem to know themselves. They lack engagement, they lack relation, and live in an anomic and passive witnessing of the world around them.

However, in the reader’s gaze the Kobe earthquake as an event, both is and isn’t. Many of the stories do not even mention the earthquake, and Kobe may only be mentioned one time in a throwaway recognition not of the event, but of the city. Yet the vacuum of the earthquake is implied by the collection of the anthology itself, titled After the Quake (2002). The reader takes this information into the stories and associates the listless anomie of the characters with the trauma of the disaster. Then, the points in the story when the characters will begin to liven, to feel, and emote, will occur strictly in reaction to memory. A natsukashii moment will intrude on their empty bios, ushering a wellspring of pain that orients and engages, disciplining the ‘synaptic’ gaze heretofore broken and disconnected, into one where fleeting, but poignant, associations of meaning become possible. In short, the moments in the gaze affirm for the briefest of times the act of living.

This is a curious distinction. Baudelaire’s gaze of the modern rejected the nostalgic as an escape from the raw and awesome present. Yet Murakami’s gaze finds the only solace of meaning through a deployment of natsukashii; otherwise the life and numerous (though numerable) deaths of the quake are rendered meaningless.

Besides this is gaman. Its role in the media surrounding the Fukushima incident was extremely prevalent. Newspaper after newspaper in the West spoke of the Japanese poise and courage, the communal spirit and absence of looting or rioting in the days

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169 From “What is Enlightenment?” In The Essential Foucault (1994).
170 And delivered a speech following being awarded the International Catalunya prize where he donated part of the winnings to the victims affected by the Fukushima incident. And stated that the Fukushima incident was “the second major nuclear disaster that the Japanese people have experienced…. However, this time it was not a bomb being dropped upon us, but a mistake committed by our very own hands” (Alison Flood. “Murakami laments Japan’s nuclear policy.” The Guardian (London). June 13, 2011).
following the incident and attributed these to the *gaman* spirit.\(^{171}\) (In a curiously short memory, by ignoring the similar stories written about the Americans following the 9/11 incidents, though without the *gaman* symbol). The Western press only echoed the Japanese press which, when positive news was few, repeated the *gaman* observation with a cheer and frenetic-ism that was startling. In this the event somehow had been transformed into a window into the ‘Japanese soul’, a point of evaluation and knowing, and one in which *gaman* was discovered once more to be the laudatory motif, or central thematic. And this was the note repeated to me so often by my friend in his texts: *gaman* was the similitude; it was the focus through which a *bios* was affirmed, and thus a truth was known.

Though not uncontested. In the weeks following the incident that perennial problem of *gaman* as being active or an obstacle to change, raised its head. Protests, the once lackluster and lukewarm social practice of contemporary Japan, occurred with renewed vigor. Their target was nuclear power. Yet an early government statement was that Japan’s future depended on the nuclear industry. Patience and care was required. *Gaman* was disputed in favor or against change. Protests continued and then a few weeks ago the Japanese news proudly announced that for the first time in decades all of Japan’s nuclear reactors had been shut down.\(^{172}\) In the West a media that had praised Japan for its *gaman* in the near aftermath of the catastrophe within a few months had begun to criticize Japan for ‘not learning the lesson’s of the quake’: of being too passive, to willing to continue as normal.\(^{173}\) To do *gaman*.

Collectively, the interaction of the moods and tenses perform a striking alchemy on the incident itself. It is transformed both into an event, and into an episode. The language surrounding, narrating the experience, easily slips into accounts of before and after; of a singular transformative act (the event) in which Japan will never be the same.\(^{174}\) Yet at the same time the demands of prolepsis and analepsis shift the gaze forward and backwards to create continuities in the story in which the enduring narration of the Japanese people becomes the character paramount. It is within story structure like this that the central government can propose a plan to create a ‘back-up’ capital city, just in case Tokyo is ever obliterated, and be welcomed with enthusiastic petitions from competing city applicants, as well as favor among citizens at large.

This has been an investigation into a type of production of knowledge, specifically, a ‘national experience’ surrounding a disaster. Shapin, Latour; and others have taught us to be attentive to the formal and productive aspects to experience – its disciplining, registers, and regulation – in the pursuit of objectivity as scientific knowledge. Unfortunately, this is only one small beginning; it leaves a great deal implied


\(^{174}\) Compare to 9/11 in the US.
or left beyond the analytical framework. Foucault pushes us harder; asking what is the practice of truth production through interrogating modes of subjectivization, governance, and veridiction. In the composite of an ‘experience’ the question that is immediately confronted is the role of affect in creating a possibility of knowledge, and in imparting this knowledge with ‘meaning, of to allude to Blumenberg, a property of a ‘force’ of truth (2010). To continue with Foucault, the investigation of experience that leads to questions of affect reinforces the relationships between the three modes of inquiry that he has taught us.

A national experience is an attempt to create both a milieu and a problem space for recognizing the interplay of these elements. To borrow a term (from Rabinow and Stavrianakis 2013), the national experience unveils practices of a ‘curation’ of the contemporary. It is a curation in that it is a broad attempt to assemble elements into an array of associations so that the truth verediction of the elements aggregates into something greater; a meaning via association. It bears the marks of the contemporary in that the temporal relations of this practice are such that linear causality of historical time is not sufficient as either an exploration or an explanation; demands are made to understand a ‘tomorrow’, to draw links between the near future and the event of the near past for the force of meaning.

Narration has served as one way of approaching the formal production of knowledge through affect. Questioning narration moves us beyond issues of expertise, coercing, or methodology – all hallmarks of classic ‘science studies’. While these continue to play a part in micropractices, they are in turn situated within their own distinctive narrative forms that must be interrogated, as well as being further situated within narrative forms that constitute the possibility of that mode of knowing, the ‘national experience’. The narration of the latter is purely concerned with the potentiality and manifestation of affect, to nation, to truth. And how these things are configured through practices of narrating as an act, a medium (technological and otherwise), to practices of representation of time, to characterization, the subject formation through which time and events are observed, or in this case more accurately, experienced.
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