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Frontier Hybridization or Culture Clash?:
Trans-national Migrant Communities and Sub-national
Identity Politics in Andalusia, Spain

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INTRODUCTION

As part of a larger project on the role played by local civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the design and implementation of specific integration policies for migrant communities in the southern Spanish region of Andalusia \(^1\), in this paper the support activities the Andalusian voluntary associations and NGOs have been realizing for the last years in the domain of non-EU immigration are analyzed in the context of increasing xenophobic and muslimophobic tendencies observable inside Andalusian society. Currently, these recently emerging muslimophobic movements, which tend to combine narrowly localist and Spanish nationalist identity horizons with an emphasis on Catholicism as a decisive "ethnic marker" of Spanish-ness, are being countered by Andalusian regionalist strategies of muslimophilia, which claim that a "return of Islam" and/or the pluri-religious legacy of Al-Andalus will empower the region's ongoing search of a supra-local, but sub-national and non-Castilian common identity.

As a point of departure, in the following the dilemma of the currently predominant dualized identity theories is sketched and dimensions for a comparative analysis of processes of migrant as well as non-migrant identity construction are briefly presented. Building upon these dimensions, the specific context and problematics of migrant
community formation is illustrated for the Andalusian region, which is then contrasted with the "identity politics" of the non-migrant Andalusian host society and its struggle for increasing and stabilizing regional autonomy inside the Spanish state. The subsequent, contemporary ethnization of intercultural conflicts resulting from native versus migrant identity politics in Andalusia is illustrated with the emergence of muslimophobic and muslimophilic movements inside the region. Finally, the increasingly important role of Andalusian NGOs as intercultural mediators and spaces of cultural hybridization is analyzed with regard to its political and societal as well as theoretical consequences for the study of identity politics.

The "Top of Africa" or the "Bottom of Europe"?
A striking gap is perceivable in the contemporary academic as well as political debate on migration, identity and integration processes currently taking place inside the European Union. Both political decision-making and social science theorization seem to agree that two different phenomena are challenging the classical European nation-states: On the one hand, there are obvious trends towards a - mainly economically and technologically driven - supranational or transnational integration of the once nationally confined and defined societies. The social impact of this trend is not limited to the often nostalgically deplored loss of regional or national cultural peculiarities in the course of the "McDonaldization" of European societies; its is also international migration towards Europe which is interpreted as part and direct consequence of an ongoing process of

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1 Project supported by Fundació "la Caixa", Barcelona, and Junta de Andalucía, Seville (Spain).
transnational integration (King 2000). In this sense, willingly or not, the European national societies are "multiculturalizing" in the last decades as a result of non-European Union immigrant settlements. According to mainstream decision-makers throughout the continent and the political spectrum, this *de facto* multiculturalism challenges national as well as European identity policy "from the outside" (Sassen 1999).

On the other hand, a supposedly different phenomenon is simultaneously challenging the European Union and its member-states "from within": the rediscovery and/or creation of subnationally articulated identities which are currently emerging on a regional level in different parts of Europe (Hettlage 1996). A new wave of regionalism is defying the nation-state's monopoly on territorially bounded, exclusive identities and its insistence on constructing European-ness as a shared sum of national identities. The increasingly popular project of a "Europe of Regions", which may be complementing or even substituting the still hegemonic official insistence on a state-driven Europeanist project, is not only questioning the nation-state's legitimacy. With its renewed emphasis on the authochthonous character and the ethno-regional "rootedness" of subnational identities (Guiberneau 1999), regionalism is also challenging the very notion of an all-encompassing, not ethnic, but civic European citizenship.

Reflecting these political and societal distinctions of multiculturalist versus regionalist phenomena, which appear to question the nation-state as the pillar of European integration, several of the pioneer authors who have started to theorize national/regional and migrant identity have been insisting on the conceptual necessity of

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distinguishing two completely different forms of identity arguing that there is a fundamental difference between national/regional (indigenous or historical) ethnogenesis and migrant (minority) ethnogenesis. On the one hand, they claim the existence of an identity politics whose main axis remains territoriality and which accordingly creates "endogenous ethnicities" (Holton 1998). Similarly, in the conclusion of his comparative study on ethnogenesis, Leman (1998) holds that indigenous or historical identity emphasizes the claimed territorial and temporal continuity of the majority in a certain territory, which forms a "historical matrix" for the group involved. This matrix is expressed in a distinctive ideology, which combines and merges language and territoriality into a first kind of identity (Myhill 1999).

Following the argument of the same authors, this autochthonous type of identity is completely different from "migrant ethnicity" (Holton 1998), on the other hand, which is not rooted in the past, but future-oriented and which focuses first and foremost on the substantialization of the community; hence it is the community itself which becomes the core issue (Leman 1998). Territorialization and temporalization are of no fundamental importance or are simply absent, whereas the personal link between the group members' language and their notion of "community" is the core issue of migrant identity politics (Myhill 1999).

The distinction between autochthonous and migrant ethnogenesis made by these authors implicitly seems to revive the opposition developed by the historiography of the Late Middle Ages between a *Territorialverband* that spatializes its virtual existence and a non-territorial *Personenverband* that substantializes its identity around corporative and personalized symbols (Reynolds 1997). What is new and intriguing is that Holton, Leman
and Myhill refer to ethnicity theory in order to sustain this opposition. By stating a fundamental difference between autochthonous and migrant identity, "dual tracking" in identity policy is being legitimized scientifically.  

The following analysis of the intertwining of migrant and non-migrant identity politics for the Andalusian case and their impact on the mobilizibility of regional "civil society" (Cohen & Arato 1992) as well as on the development of new intercultural spaces and strategies will question this political-cum-academic tendency towards "dual tracking". Herself a product of multiple waves of immigration and emigration, alternatively serving throughout history as target and as origin of different conquests and re-conquests, the southern Spanish region of Andalusia seems particularly suited for studying this inter-relation between an identity project relying on territoriality and "aboriginality", on the one hand, and migration-based ethnogenesis and community formation, on the other hand. As will be analyzed in detail in the next sections, Andalusian identity has always been tempted to bridge the Mediterranean divide. Oscillating throughout different epochs between identifying itself as the "top" of the oriental world or the "bottom" of Occident, its still recent integration into the European Union and its subsequent role as European "gate keeper" at the margins of the continent is ambiguously re-defining the region's self-perception. As will be shown at least for the Andalusian case, multiculturalism and regionalism, migrant ethnogenesis and autochthonous ethnic movements are closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing phenomena.

Methodologically, such an integrative approach, which rejects focussing a priori only on either migrant or native identity politics, empirically relies on ethnography and its

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The broader theoretical and political implications of "dual tracking" in identity politics are analyzed and
holistic procedure. For the present study, since 1997 fieldwork has been conducted in several Andalusian cities through the participant observation of and through ethnographic interviews with a wide range of both migrant and non-migrant NGOs, public institutions and community representatives 4. The research process and the data analysis have been based on a three-dimensional model aimed at avoiding one-sided and thus biased accounts, which in contemporary ethnography frequently opt for either *emic* or *etic* research perspectives (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983, Werner & Schoepfle 1987). To overcome this reductionist tendency, data on intercultural relations in multicultural settings have been gathered and analyzed by distinguishing three different axes:

(a) a semantic dimension, which focuses on the diverse actors involved and which extensively uses semi-structured ethnographic interviews to compile these actors' discourses and to analyze them from a deliberately *emic* point of view;

(b) a pragmatic dimension, which focuses on the interaction patterns involving the different participating actors, which relies on participant observation for gathering data on the actors' practice and which applies a thoroughly *etic* perspective of analysis;

(c) and a syntactic dimension, which focuses on the institutional structures of the movements and organizations studied and which through "intercultural workshops" and other participative tools tries to elucidate the "epistemological windows" (Werner & Schoepfle 1987) which result from incongruencies that

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4 Details on the methods used and the organizations studied are included in Dietz (2000) and Dietz et al. (2001).
necessarily arise inside hierarchies, institutions and organizations between the
*emic*, actor-centered and the *etic*, interaction-centered perspectives of analysis \(^5\).

**Tariq's return? The formation of trans-national migrant communities**

In the last fifteen years, Spain has experienced a remarkable increase in its immigrant population (Izquierdo 1992, Cornelius 1994). Some authors have even claimed that Spain has changed from being a classical country of emigration to becoming a country of immigration \(^6\). The currently available data, however, do not support this affirmation, nor is - quantitatively speaking - the situation comparable to that of other European Union member states. Although there are already more than 800,000 foreigners living with a residence permit in Spain, there are still more than two million Spaniards living abroad (García Castaño 2001). Accordingly, the current migrant phenomenon is very heterogeneously patterned:

- Firstly, and despite their original migratory project, many Spanish emigrants living and working in western and northern Europe have been settling down definitively in their host countries. The second and even third generation of former emigrants, however, is not completely abandoning their parents' or grandparents' relation to their often mythized country of origin. By frequently travelling to Spain and maintaining kin and/or communal ties to their villages of "origin", this new generation of rather well integrated, but hyphenated Spanish-Germans, -French or -Swiss cultivates an identity which is characterized by a diasporic longing for their ancestors' Mediterranean roots (Ruiz Garzón 2000).

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\(^5\) This model of analysis is presented and discussed with more detail in Dietz (2001).
Secondly, those Spanish "guest workers" who migrated to western and northern Europe and who did not succeed in definitively integrating into their host society tend to re-migrate to their regions of origin once they retire. Sometimes, this return migration splits up the migrant family, as the emigrants’ children often prefer to stay in the country where they grew up; in other cases, the whole family "returns", settling down in a country which the second generation only knows from short holiday trips. Their integration either into the Spanish school system or into its labor market is increasingly problematic 7.

Thirdly, retirement migration is not limited to Spanish "guest workers", but dominates the intra-European migration towards Spain, too. Although scarcely perceived as part of the overall immigration phenomenon, the European "transmigrants" (Smith & Guarnizo 1999, Pries 2000), many of whom spend half of the year in their country of origin and half of it on the Canary or Baleares Islands or on the southern Spanish Mediterranean shores, make up nearly half of the migrant population residing in Spain (Jurdao Arrones & Sánchez 1990, Fernández Cordón et al. 1993).

Finally, non-European immigrants are increasingly choosing Spain as transit or destination. On the one hand, the composition of this kind of immigration reflects the post-colonial links which still exist between the Spanish peninsula and its formerly dependant Latin American as well as north African territories. However,

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7 There are currently no systematic data available on the amount and extent of this "remigration" integration phenomenon; an exploratory case-study from north central Spain is offered by Hannken (1994).
on the other hand, immigration is currently starting to diversify; as a result of Spain's EU integration and its participation in the Schengen Treaty, the country's southern shores are also strategically chosen as "port of entrance" not only to Spain, but to the EU Schengen territory as such (Arango 2000).

Having in mind these heterogeneous migration patterns as well as the problems of accuracy and reliability which affect all official data on migration issued in Spain, an overall broad tendency towards becoming an immigration country is evident. In 1994, the official statistical sources have registered 461,364 foreigners residing in Spain, of whom 44,99% were EU citizens. In 1996, the number of foreign residents increased to reach 538,985, of whom 46,76% were EU citizens. And at the end of 1998, there were already 719,647 foreigners legally residing in Spain, of whom 44,2% are citizens of other EU countries. From these latest data from 1998, 20% were residing in Catalonia, another 20% in Madrid, 13% in Andalusia, 10% in the Valencia region, another 10% on the Canarias Islands, 8% on the Baleares Islands and the rest in the remaining autonomous communities.

Despite a lot of alarmist discourse, the statistically documented presence of foreigners makes it difficult to talk about "massive" immigration in relation to the autochthonous population - the immigrants are still less than 2% of the total population. The highest percentage of foreigners (nearly 4%) refers to the Canary and Baleares

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8 All of the following quantitative data and percentages are extracted from the monthly bulletins *Indicadores de la Inmigración y el Asilo en España*, published by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, as well as from the secondary analyses provided by Cazorla (1995), Izquierdo (1996) and Colectivo IOE (1999); a compilation and critical discussion of available immigration data on Spain is offered by García Castaño (2001).
Islands, were EU citizens, not Maghrébiens, make up the overwhelming majority of foreign residents.

The data on foreign workers confirm this even more. In 1994, the number of foreigners holding a work permit in Spain - a sample in which the EU citizens are not included - was of 121,780, of whom 46,29% were citizens from Maghreb or other African countries, mainly from Morocco. In 1996, there were 166,490 foreign workers, 47% of whom were from Maghrébien or other African nationalities. And at the end of 1998, there were 190,643 foreign workers in Spain, of whom 47,9% were of African or Maghreb origin.

This general tendency is also perceivable in the case of the southern Spanish region of Andalusia ⁹, where the number of legally residing non-Spaniards increased from 61,437 in 1994 to 70,725 in 1996, reaching 95,970 at the end of 1998, whereas the foreigners holding a work permit in the region comprised 9,553 (56% of whom are of African nationalities, mainly Moroccan) in 1994, 14,414 (67% of African nationalities) in 1996 and 19,193 in 1998. Due to the lasting importance of the Mediterranean Costa del Sol for EU retirement migration (O’Reilly 2000), Andalusia is one of the regions where Europeans still comprise more than 50% of the total immigrant population. Nevertheless, from the Andalusian host society’s perspective, intra-EU immigration is not perceived as part of the migratory phenomena at all, but as a by-product of the regionally decisive tourism industry. Moroccan immigrants, on the contrary, are often associated to a threatening scenario of Maghrébien "re-conquest", of the return of Tariq, the historical leader of the 711 "Muslim invasion" of the peninsula.

⁹ All quantitative data on immigrants in Andalusia are taken from García Castaño (2001).
The integration of non-European immigrants into the Andalusian economy and society broadly reflects the main characteristics of a distinctive "southern European model of immigration" (King 2000). Similar to other Spanish, Portuguese, Italian or Greek regions, throughout the last two decades, Andalusia’s role in immigration has been profoundly transformed: originally, the - mainly Moroccan - non-EU immigrants had been using Andalusia only as an entrance and transit route region in their journeys to the Spanish urban and industrial centers of Madrid or Catalonia or to their French, Belgian and Swiss final destinations. Nowadays, on the contrary, the region itself has been chosen as a possible temporary or permanent destination for immigrants. During the same period of time, the demographic profile of the immigrants has changed: above all the Moroccan, but also the Senegalese immigrants are increasingly younger, more formally educated and of urban origins in their home countries; although still male-dominated, the percentage of female migrants is also increasing (García Castaño 2001).

Another rather commonly "southern European" feature of immigration to Andalusia refers to the migrants’ integration into the labor market. Reflecting the predominance of the primary - above all, export agriculture - and tertiary - mainly tourism-related - economic sectors in the region, the large majority of non-EU immigrants is very precariously employed in agriculture - in the intensively cultivated vegetable plantations in the province of Almería as well as during the olive and strawberry harvest periods throughout the whole of Andalusia, but particularly in the provinces of Jaén and Huelva - and in tourism-related industries and service sectors such as construction work, hotels, restaurants and bars. Apart from the tourism sector, the most important source of
employment for immigrant women are domestic services delivered in urban Andalusian middle and upper class households.¹⁰

Both men and women share the same conditions of employment, which are extremely "flexible", "informal" and subject to profound seasonal variations; besides, an ethno-national segregation of particular economic activities is beginning to take place, for example in the - already Moroccan-dominated construction work - or on the informal urban markets, mainly controlled by Senegalese street vendors (Dietz & Peña García 1999). Thus, reflecting this trend towards ethnic segmentation, pluri-occupational strategies and internal migration cycles, which oscillate between plantation work in Almería, harvesting in Jaén or Huelva, informal street trading in Granada and/or periodical construction work in Málaga on the Costa del Sol, emerge as new forms of labor market integration. As comparative studies have shown, this new "model" of migrant labor is not exclusive for the situation in Andalusia:

"The model is based on a demand for cheap and flexible workers in the secondary and informal markets, where low wages are imposed on migrants because of their often illegal or semi-legal status and the lack of opportunities in their home countries. The workers are highly concentrated in certain segments or niches of the labor market, some of which are monopolized by migrants of one specific nationality and gender. Hence, migrants are responding to the specific needs and opportunities of the Southern European economy and society, based on tertiary activities, some primary activities (agriculture, fishing, quarrying) and a vibrant underground economy" (King 2000:18).

The parallel process of migrant community formation, which in the case of the mainly Moroccan immigrants in Andalusia has just begun, is deeply shaped by this highly precarious and seasonal nature of labor market integration. As shown throughout the

interviews conducted in the course of this project, the decision to definitively settle down in a particular town or village has to be continuously postponed. This instability in the settlement patterns reflects a corresponding instability in the social composition of the migrant population, still characterized by mostly young, male and unmarried persons or by married men whose women remain in the country of origin.

Family regrouping is not only made difficult by the economic precariousness of employment, but is also hindered by the legal status of many migrant workers living in Andalusia. In the course of their migrant histories, most of the interviewees experience frequent oscillations between "legal" and "illegal" phases of residence and/or labor circumstances (Calavita 1998). An ethnic Amazigh from northern Morocco remembers his permanent changes from being considered a "documented" versus an "undocumented" person:

"I have been working here in Spain for about twelve years now! First I was legal because I was studying here, then I started to work in a restaurant, which was not legal. Besides, sometimes I went to help in the harvest, to the olive recollection, to the strawberries, I don't know for sure if that was forbidden, nobody asked us for papers. Then I got this job in the tomatoes, and after some time these guys from the Moroccan workers' association told me I could present my papers to the regularization office, so finally I got a working permit, but only for that tomato job. I don't work there any more, I couldn't stand it, now I'm here in Granada working in a bar" (middle-aged Amazigh man from Nador, Morocco, 2000). 11

As non-EU immigration is still a recent phenomenon in the region, contrary to other European destinations of contemporary immigration, Andalusia cannot offer any previous, migration-related community infrastructure. Whereas Moroccans currently emigrating to industrial regions of Spain or to the former "guest worker" countries will always find some pre-established social, religious or trade union institutions on which
they may rely in the beginning of their integration process, in Andalusia this previous infrastructure does not exist at all. Thus, the - at least temporary - loss of family and kin ties, which is characteristic of any beginning migratory phase (Vertovec 1999), cannot be compensated by a weakly nit migrant community network, with its just emerging "religious infrastructure" of mosques, community meeting points, stores which offer halal food as well as products from the region of origin.

This sense of loss is promoted by the surrounding social context. Members of the Spanish and Catholic majority society are frequently reported to show not just "mere" rejection, but complete ignorance and a lack of interest when interacting with Muslims. The absence of social networks created by former generations of immigrants deepens the precariousness characterizing their work-related living conditions. Those migrant women who settle down in Andalusia in the scarcely and slowly beginning process of family-regrouping are the most affected by these lacking community ties:

"I notice that the neighbors attend mass, they go to church, I have never entered a church. When I pass along a church and see how these women do something strange on their chest and face, I don't understand anything, it must be a habit they have here, I really don't know them. I would appreciate if somebody could explain that to me, but... As I can't speak, I can't ask them anything. I am living in this place, but I feel very much being a foreigner, being far away from my home country. Although I am adapting to this place, I am accepting my situation because I'm together with my husband. When I'm at home, I often feel a little bored, as I can't talk to people, so I just have a walk to breathe fresh air, and then I go back home" (23-year old Arabic woman from Sedat, Morocco, 2000).

As a consequence, the migrant populations recently appearing in Andalusia often do not integrate into the local, urban or rural settings of the host society neighborhoods, but into the ethno-national networks which enable them to survive in the unstable continuum of legal and illegal economic activities, related to both primary and secondary labor markets

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1 The translations of all quotations used on the following are mine.
and often still rooted in kinship or settlement patterns not of the host context, but of the context of origin. Migrant communities in Andalusia are thus increasingly established through ethnic segregation and trans-national networking. Although these communities still are locally very weak and only poorly visible by the Andalusian host society, they articulate community membership throughout a strong territorial dimension: from its very beginning, the "trans-Mediterranean migratory space" (Borchardt 1996) generates a "long-distance" type of migrant community.

The orientation towards trans-Mediterranean instead of local Andalusian issues, which sometimes is claimed to be characteristic of a first phase of integration (Casey 1996), is often perceived by the host society as an obstacle for integration. NGOs as well as public institutions frequently criticize the lack of stability, continuity and accountability shown in the daily work and the functioning of the few already existing migrant community associations. In their view, these associations "appear and disappear" constantly, often using "different names and different addresses" for the "same few people meeting each other" and "discussing their typically Moroccan mix of politics and kinship issues" (president of the local section of the Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado, 2000).

This criticism is often extended to the religious field. Frequently, public institutions issue calls for all Muslims, migrants as well as Spanish converts, to unite in a single association, which could be formally recognized and subsidized as their institutional counterpart. For example, in the Albayzín neighbourhood of Granada, one of Spain's most visible historically Arabic and currently recovered "Muslim" quarters, the social worker who is co-ordinating the neighborhood's Centro de Servicios Sociales...
Comunitarios complains about the Muslim communities' organizational diversity, which according to her prevents them from having a stronger impact on local issues:

"It's complicated, it's difficult because there are twelve different groups, and each of them with their own problems inside. There is no point of confluence among them. Well, yes, their only point of convergence is Allah, they say, but I tell them `What's Allah to do with this mess? Forget it!' That's why I know exactly, they will never be able to achieve anything until they choose..., yes, until they strategically choose a common path, in order to become real counterparts of... They have to forget about these folkloristic struggles and take seriously the question of being representatives of their communities, according to the characteristics of these communities. And these communities have to become flexible, to act together with others... It's not easy! And they go on without moving on anywhere, of course not, a few of them here, others there. As I told you, I am very honest with them, the other day I told Ibrahim, one of their leaders: `Now that I have read six or seven books about Islam and all that, I tell you that you are in the same mess than you were in Mohammed's times, it's unbelievable, you are killing each other, among yourselves you are your worst enemies!' And that's exactly why they never evolve" (director of the Centro de Servicios Sociales Comunitarios del Albayzín, 2000).

Nevertheless, the diversity of Muslim communities emerging in southern Spain is not simply reducible to internal divisions and sectarianism. The main distinction that still divides Muslims in Andalusia is that between migrants from Muslim societies of origin, on the one hand, and Muslim converts, on the other hand, who are of Christian background and who either are Spaniards or migrate from the North America or northern and central European countries to southern Spain "in search of Islam" and its legacy of tolerance, as symbolized by the "myth of Al-Andalus" 12. Thanks to their "orientalist" legacy (Said 1978), cities such as Granada and Córdoba and inside these cities above all their historically Muslim or Muslim-Jewish neighborhoods are becoming "poles of attraction" of conversion-related north-south migration.

Most interviewed converts implicitly distance themselves from the Maghrébien immigrants by distinguishing two kinds of Islam: the culturally rooted "traditional" Islam and the "universal belief system". A convert from Seville, however, states that the migrants themselves are the ones who tend to segregate from the converts and who only reluctantly accept people who lack the cultural and linguistic background they usually share as mainly Arabic Muslims:

"For them, Islam is part of a race, it's like a race, so if you are not Arabic... Of course, if you explain them your own reasons, they understand and accept you, no problem. But still they tell you that you aren't part of their race" (35-year old Muslim convert from Seville, 2000).

Whereas the migrant Muslims share the impression that they long for rich and intense community relations, the convert Muslim, on the contrary, have succeeded in building up strong and stable, although rather small communities. This difference seems to be related to the process of conversion itself, which takes place not only as a personal revelation, but parallelly as a "voyage" of initiation into the midst of a community of already initiated "fellow travelers". These convert communities may be locally rather small, but they are integrated into transnational networks of fellow converts who share the same belief, the same schools of interpretation and sometimes also the same religious "leaders" or "teachers".

Besides these transnational orientations, the strength of the convert communities is also a result of the necessity of compensating one's own experience of de-rooting. As the conversion process itself usually challenges the complete set of family, kin and social relations which existed before conversion, all interviewed converts describe the external reactions they were facing as a personally tough, but rather automatic revision
and selection of acquaintances. After finishing this process, the social relations maintained are fewer, but much closer.

As a consequence of this process of enclosure and community building, many migrant Muslims completely lack relations to converts. When asked about their relation to the local host society, in general, most of the migrants express a strong desire of deepening their interaction with the non-Muslim local population in the neighbourhood, at school, at the work place or during leisure activities. Only those who have to cope with serious Spanish language difficulties feel that they are completely isolated from their local surroundings. On the contrary, those young Moroccans who study at southern Spanish Universities - most of them choose the University of Granada, due to its historical ties to the educational system of the former Spanish protectorate of northern Morocco - are the ones who feel best integrated. They often enjoy the openness of the Spanish youth and try to participate in their leisure activities (González Barea 2000).

Whose Legacy? Andalusian sub-national identity politics

Paradoxically, the recent and precarious character of migrant community formation in Andalusia strangely parallels an apparently completely different phenomenon of identity formation: the struggle for "regaining", "maintaining" or "inventing" Andalusia’s own distinctive identity vis-à-vis the Spanish nation-state. Since the final accomplishment of the nationally mythicized *reconquista*, the "re-conquest" of Granada from the last Muslim dynasty in 1492, Andalusia has been subject to an intense pressure of "nationalizing nationalism" (Brubaker 1996) exerted by the central state in order to "castilianize" the
territory and to assimilate its ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse inhabitants to the Catholic, Castilian mainstream population. From the "ethnic cleansing" measures undertaken by the *Santa Inquisición* against the region’s Muslim and Jewish communities onward and until the ideology of "national Catholicism" officialized under Franco’s dictatorship, Andalusia was not allowed to develop any kind of distinctive, regional identity (Stallaert 1998).

This homogenization pressure is finally abolished in the course of the post-Franco process of "transition" and democratization. Since Franco’s death in 1975 and above throughout the elaboration and approval of a democratic Constitution in 1977/78, the country’s traditional centralism is gradually, but entirely transformed. The oldest European nation-state is redefined by the 1977 Constitution as a "state of autonomous communities", whose competencies are passed over through a slow process of administrative decentralization, which *de facto* ends up federalizing the state as a whole. Nevertheless, from its very beginning this federalization is not performed in equal terms, nor are inter-regional compensation or exchange mechanisms included. Instead, the Constitution distinguishes two kinds of regions: those shaped by "historical nationalisms" and their distinctive cultural and linguistic features, on the one hand, and those regions lacking their own cultural idiosyncrasies and/or ethno-nationalist identities, on the other hand (Constitución Española 1991). As a consequence, an asymmetrical and ethnically-biased process of devolution from Madrid to certain regions is initiated at the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties. Immediately, this official distinction between "fast-track" versus "slow-track" regions starts ethnicizing the sub-national conflicts and
negotiations on devolution and delimitation of competencies between the different levels of government.

Accordingly, not only in Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country, but also in the case of Andalusia, the newly emerging regional elites adopt a strategy of "pragmatic radicalism" in order to justify their claims-making. In the course of this process, Andalusia finally succeeds in obtaining recognition as a "historical" region of fast-track devolution, but its ruling elites remain trapped in a constant necessity of justifying the region's "historical singularity" in order to be able to expand their competencies in approximately the same pace and rhythm as their Basque and Catalan counterparts, already governed by regionalist-nationalist parties and not - as in the case of Andalusia - by the historically centralist Social Democrats (Geiselhardt 1985).

In its attempts to justify the singularity of "Andalusian-ness" and to distinguish it from shared "Spanish-ness", regionalist identity politics has to face a particular challenge, which is completely absent from the Catalan, Basque or even Galician cases: the cultural features which are supposed to be distinctively Andalusian, first of all have to be "de-colonized" from their past appropriation by Spanish nationalism, in general, and from the dictatorship's culture and tourism policy, in particular. By deliberately exploiting stereotypes of Andalusian popular culture such as bull fights, flamenco music and religious festivities and by presenting them to mainly European mass tourism under the topic of "Spain is different", Andalusian culture had been successfully "nationalized" under the Franco regime.

Thus, Andalusian identity politics had to simultaneously combine political devolution with ideological decolonization from Madrid (Moreno Navarro 1993). Three different
sources have been used since the seventies by Andalusian regionalist actors in order to construct - or re-construct - the Andalusian-ness of regional culture:

- the "fiesta legacy" of mainstream Andalusian popular, rural as well as urban Catholicism, which is based on locally and regionally particular patron saints whose worship is channeled through membership in religious fraternities as well as through participation in annual processions and pilgrimages (Games García 1991);

- the "Gitano legacy" of Andalusian music heritage, symbolized through different originally gypsy flamenco styles and schools of guitar playing, dancing and singing and disseminated nationally as well as internationally since the nineteenth century in the course of a romanticized, non-gypsy interpretation of "gypsy way of life" (Quintana 1986);

- and finally and more recently, the Maghrébien or "moro legacy" of the region's supposedly multicultural past as Al Andalus, which historically denominates the Muslim dynasties residing north of the Street of Gibraltar, but which symbolically expresses the claimed common heritage of co-existence and tolerance between the three monotheist religions (Driessen 1992).

Although together these three sources of Andalusian-ness have been rather successfully used by the regional government for its claims vis-à-vis the central state as well as the other "historical nationalities" of Spain, internally all of them have been heavily contested by newly emerging, non-hegemonic regional actors. The "fiesta legacy" of supposedly Andalusian Catholicism is being called into question by ever more powerful localist religious and political movements, which reflect the traditionally parochial nature of
identity politics in the region and which use the mobilizing potentials of the local fraternities for intra-regional rivalries. Ever since the top-down political decision to choose Seville as the region's administrative capital was issued at the beginning of the eighties, inter-city rivalry, above all between Seville as the Andalusian "capital of bureaucrats", on the hand, and the informal "capitals of intellectuals" Granada and Córdoba as well as the "capitals of entrepreneurs" Málaga and Almería, has weakened any attempt at constructing and officially promoting an all-encompassing Andalusian identity.

Similarly, the officially claimed decolonization of the "gypsy legacy", formerly instrumentalized by the dictatorship, and its re-interpretation as an ethnically distinctive Andalusian gypsy culture is being questioned by the nascent, but discursively very influential Roma movement. According to their own identity politics, Andalusian gypsy culture and music forms part neither of Spanish nor of Andalusian heritage, but is an expression of a European-wide, pan-gypsy identity, which has to be reconstructed from five centuries of nationalist oppression, segregation or assimilation.

Finally, the "Moorish legacy" of Al Andalus, which in the last years has been rather successfully used by the regional government not only in educational policy - introducing a distinctively regionalist interpretation of officially taught history at school - , but also in tourism promotion, is by far the most controversial of all issues regarding Andalusian identity. By emphasizing the region's Muslim past and the historical Muslim rulers' tendency to tolerate Jews and Christians under their reigns, the Andalusian government has to face criticism by a large variety of actors. The Catholic Church and its lay organizations stress the region's pre-Muslim, Visigothic roots of Christianity, whereas the
Andalusian Muslim converts reject the instrumentalization of Islam by non-Muslim politicians, and the leaders of the emerging Moroccan immigrant communities as well as of associated Andalusian immigrant support NGOs, who claim official Andalusian government recognition of the "particular" historical ties which the region's natives and immigrants alike maintain with the southern shores of the western Mediterranean.

The singularity of Andalusia's "Moorish legacy" is also questioned by the three adjacent city-regions to which Andalusian regional elites maintain close, but often conflictive relations and who are also starting to identify themselves as "multi-border societies" (Oda-Ángel 2000): the British enclave of Gibraltar, on the one hand, and the northern Moroccan Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, on the other hand. Whereas Andalusian regionalism interprets Gibraltar as part of its ongoing struggle for "devolution-cum-decolonization", Ceuta and Melilla, equally claimed as remnants of colonialism by the Moroccan government, have only recently been constitutionally recognized as "autonomous cities" inside the federalizing Spanish state structure, after decades of being treated as mere "appendixes" either of the Spanish central state or of the Andalusian region. A Spanish Muslim from Melilla illustrates this experience of sub-national marginalization:

"It's because we're from Melilla, and they really forget about us, we are really forgotten. And I have often been asked by people here where I was from, and when I say `from Melilla` they go on asking if Melilla is in Spain or in Morocco, I can't believe it! Before coming here to Granada, I have always been living in Melilla, so I never noticed these things. But now that I am living here, I myself am not sure any more if Melilla is part of Spain or art of Morocco, as neither of them really cares about us" (Amazigh woman from Melilla, living in Granada, 2000).

**Towards a "Culture Clash"? Ethnicized conflicts in intercultural settings**
Often mutually reinforced, ethnicized conflicts are starting to appear in relation to these struggles over the region's "Moorish" or Muslim legacy. Compared to other cases of ethno-religious conflicts between migrant and non-migrant populations in Europe, in the Andalusian arena of "identity politics" the most striking feature of these conflicts is their ambiguously overlapping, religious, ethnic and racialized nature. Whereas in other European regions it is the divide between Western secularism versus non-Western, religiously integrated cosmologies which dominates the negotiations over the divide between the public and the private sphere (Modood 1997, Rex 1997), the complexity of the Andalusian case stems from a coinciding, but contradictory "double dichotomy" to which not only the Muslims, but also the regional society and its institutional framework are exposed:

- As above all the institutional representatives frequently state, the "return of Islam" to the Iberian peninsula challenges the process of secularization which the Spanish state and society are currently undergoing; in this perspective, a fundamental contradiction resides in the relation between an all-encompassing, comprehensive world view - formerly Catholicism, nowadays Islam -, on the one hand, and Western meta-religious laicism, on the other hand.

- This perspective, however, is constantly contradicted by an ancient rivalry which has been constitutive to the emergence and shaping of Spanish national identity (Stallaert 1998), but which persists until the present inside the Spanish and Andalusian majority society and culture: the supposed antagonism between Islam, on the one hand, perceived as "Arabic" or "Moorish", and Catholicism, on the other hand, identified with the predominantly Castilian ethnicity.
It is in this broader societal context in which the question of the "Moorish legacy" directly relates the specific phenomenon of Muslim migrant community building in Andalusia to the issue of regional identity politics. Through non-immigrant converts as well as through immigrants from Muslim countries of origin, Islam is perceived by the Spanish national and the Andalusian regional society as "returning" to the peninsula after five hundred years of religious, cultural and ethnic homogenization policies. As a consequence of the century-long tradition of conceiving Roman Catholicism as a quasi-official state religion, neither for the whole of Spain nor for Andalusia are there census data available on membership in religious communities. According to unofficial estimations, however, based on the predominant religion of certain immigrant populations, approximately 400,000 people, or around 1% of the total resident population of Spain, identify themselves as Muslims (Abumalham 1995).

As to their regional distribution and as a result of the above sketched main immigration areas of Moroccans, the Muslim population of Spain is concentrated in the urban centers of the Madrid and Catalonia autonomous communities (López García 1996). Nevertheless, Andalusia is emerging as a third focus of Muslim population. As a further key feature, only in the case of Andalusia and particularly of the cities of Córdoba and Granada, converts to Islam are an increasingly important sector of the overall Muslim population (Rosón Lorente 2000).

Two different factors, the above mentioned recent nature of immigration to Spain as well as the rather novel trend towards the religious pluralization of the country's majority society, determine the situation of Muslim communities in Spain. On the one hand, after the slow beginning of family regrouping, immigrant communities made up of
mainly Moroccan foreign workers are appearing in the last years, who do seldom identify themselves in public as distinctively Muslim communities, but as foreign workers’ associations in labor contexts and/or as parents’ associations in school environments. On the other hand, above all in cities such as Granada and Córdoba, Moroccan students as well as the growing group of Andalusian, Spanish or non-Spanish converts start to build up a tiny, but publicly rather present minority of Muslim intellectuals who are overtly challenging the implicitly Catholic common sense of the Andalusian host society.

As Stallaert (1998) shows in detail, since in 1492 the process of the *reconquista* was accomplished with the final fall of the city of Granada, the Spanish nation-state project has been founded on a mixture of ethnically based "arabophobia" and religiously motivated "muslimophobia". The mentioned construction and imposition of a common Spanish-Castilian hegemonic identity has always relied on measures of inquisitorial religious persecution as well as of "ethnic cleansing", implemented since 1492 through "laws of blood purity" which constantly blur biological, ethnic and religious terminology. The confusion and/or mixing up of ethnic, religious and phenotypic differentiation persists and is particularly striking in the case of the Muslim converts. All of them can tell curious anecdotes which show how stereotyped and historically-rooted the dominant perception of the West's paradigmatic "other" still is. An Andalusian convert describes how ridiculous her daily inter-religious dialogues with non-Muslims may result:

"The problem gets even worse when your skin happens to be a little darker, so they immediately react in a strange way. But imagine how they react if you’re not dark enough, as in my case! I have often been congratulated: `For a Muslim, your Spanish is rather good´ And I tell them that of course I can speak Spanish, as I’m from Seville! For them Islam is Morocco and it should never, never come back to Spain" (35-year old Andalusian Muslim convert, 2000).
Despite the important efforts not only of democratizing, but also of decentralizing and federalizing the Spanish nation-state, this long-lasting "identity politics" of the centralized Spanish state is still observable in the ethnographic present. Generalized "anti-moro" attitudes which reflect the combination of ethnic, religious and national dimensions of discrimination prevail in large sectors of the majority society. The Catalan novelist Juan Goytisolo recalls how these xenophobic topoi are reinforced by the Spanish colonial heritage as well as by the use Franco made of Moroccan mercenary troops in order to fight the Second Republic:

"The instinctive aversion towards the 'Moor', fed throughout decades by the bad memories of our hateful and stupid colonial endeavors and by the use the Franquistas made during the Civil War of 1936-39 of miserable mercenaries from the Rif, is an illness which is rather extended even among those who declare themselves as leftists" (Goytisolo 1978: 123) 13.

Data are not only scarce on the presence of Muslims in Spain or Andalusia, but also on attitudes and ideologies of muslimophobia, as expressed by the autochthonous host society. A recent major quantitative study, conducted under the auspices of the Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (ASEP 1998), for the first time tries to break down the diverse elements which make up anti-immigration attitudes in Spain. On the basis of these statistical data, collected through scalings of "positive", "negative" and "indifferent" opinions about certain minorities - using different nationalities, ethnic minorities such as gitanos, racialized terms such as negros and religious classifications such as judíos and musulmanes -, it is possible to detect elements of deeply-rooted and historically transmitted stigmatizations of "the other".

13 The translation is mine.
Despite the variations observed in the study according to the educational level of the Spanish interviewees, the degree of contact they maintain with minority populations, among other indicators, these stigmatization processes reflect a shared, implicit ethno-religious hierarchy of common "others". In this hierarchy, the lowest position is still ascribed to the Spanish Roma community, followed by a generalized negative attitude towards people of Arabic origin and/or Muslims, a label which is ranked worse than the opinion about "immigrants" in general. The comparison of attitudes towards "others" prevailing in "high-immigration" versus "low-immigration" regions of Spain shows that this persistent arabophobia and muslimophobia is historically shaped and does not merely reflect recent immigration trends (ASEP 1998): the native population of regions with nearly no immigration show a "index of xenophobia" which is similar to that of regions affected by immigration (2.47 versus 2.32 index points, respectively), whereas the main attitudinal differences are perceivable between urban and industrial "high-immigration" regions such as Madrid, on the one hand (1.98 index points), and rural and agricultural "high-immigration" regions such as Andalusia, on the other hand (2.33 index points).

Accordingly, the intercultural relations which are rather recently being established between native Andalusians and mostly Muslim immigrants in the neighborhoods, on the labor market, at school and inside other public institutions, are still shaped and determined by these deeply-rooted images, attitudes and stereotypes if the "historical other". The stereotypes guiding the perceptions and interactions of the local majority

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14 Unfortunately, the mentioned study fails to adequately distinguish ethnic and religious classifications, i.e. by asking the interviewees to rank árabes y musulmanes as one minority group (ASEP 1998:23).

15 The latest opinion polls, published through monthly demoscopic barometers by the governmental Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, show a dramatic increase in anti-immigrant attitudes, but unfortunately do not split up the data regionally (CIS 2001).
society are constantly feeding discriminatory attitudes and confrontations towards people perceived as Muslims and/or Arabs. Sometimes it seems difficult to distinguish between real ignorance, "mere" joking and actual, explicit stigmatization, when Muslims in Andalusia are permanently asked about their "Sahara way of life", about "how many camels their fathers own", about their childhood growing up "among tents and bedouins" etc. When looking for a flat or applying for a job, above all the Moroccan immigrants face stereotypes about the "hideousness" of Arabic or Moroccan men and the "lascivty and eroticism of Arabic belly-dancers", about supposed customs of "Arabic revenge", "Arabs cutting each others' heads in blood-feuds" and about the risk of employing Moroccans because of their high percentage of "criminals" and "child kidnappers". An Amazigh woman from north eastern Morocco, who cleans private homes and does child-caring in Catholic Spanish families, recalls a whole complex of stereotypes that where used against her when she was employed for the first time for child care and when she told her employer that she was of Moroccan origin:

"Some here are very racist, just by telling them you're Moroccan they start staring at you, and even if you're well-dressed and always tidy, they think that's strange, it can't be. For them, a Moroccan can never be on their same level, but I have always dressed like this, before coming here, but they think I'm hiding my chillabā! They ask me about my camels and tents... Yes, I'm proud of being Muslim and Moroccan, my roots are there, my blood, but they are scared. When I got this job, everybody told the lady whose child I'm caring now `Be careful, she may rob it, they are so mean, so envious! Incredible, and the same happens if you live together with somebody. When Spanish men and women live together without being married, it's o.k., but if I do it, they look at me as if I was a whore! I'm always telling myself `I have to be strong here´, I have to show them that we're not like that, to give them an example of a true Moroccan" (40-year old Amazigh woman from the Rif region, Morocco, 2000).

Another stereotype which most Muslim immigrants or Andalusian converts to Islam frequently have to face when interacting with Catholic Andalusians is the topos of the
supposedly huge quantity of children born by Muslim women. As part of the above mentioned generalized and historical muslimophobia and arabophobia, a rumor is being cultivated, according to which "the Arabs" are trying to reconquest the "Spanish shores" by sending their pregnant women illegally to the peninsula. The old topos and fear of the *moros en la costa*, the "Moors who are back at our coast", seems to be combined with a sexist variant of "Trojan horse" metaphor, according to which the supposedly high fertility rate of Muslim-cum-Arab-women would be consciously exploited and promoted for a strange kind of geostrategical "invasion". Several immigrants as well as converts remember situations when - "in strict confidence" - they were asked by local Catholic neighbors "how much they would be paid" by these strange forces for giving birth to "so many *moritos*". A convert from Seville describes this gossip:

"This rumor has been spreading around so quickly, the other day a woman came to our mosque with her two kids asking us `What do I have to do to get those two million *pesetas* they are telling about?´ It's funny, you go to the grocery's and the shop assistant whispers at your ear `Well, who are the ones who are paying you these millions for giving birth to *moros* right here?’ It's not just ignorance, its really destructive..." (35-year old Muslim convert from Seville, 2000).

The only interviewees who directly perceive not only personal, but also institutional and structural forms of discrimination are the Spanish converts to Islam. In their view, the dominant Spanish and Andalusian mass media nowadays reproduce old phobias and stereotypes such as the mentioned "rumor" about being paid for having lots of children, which are then acknowledged and perpetuated on a personal level. The converts perceive these generalized discriminatory attitudes not as a mere expression of stereotypes, but as a new form of reproducing the structurally rooted historical phobias. For them, the military terminology of "invasion", for example, a remnant of the so-called *reconquista* jargon, is re-signified in the course of Spain's official migration policy. The
continuity which is connoted between the Arab-Muslim "invasion" of 711 and the contemporary "Muslim-illegal-immigrant invasion" serves as a supposedly fixed ethnic boundary, which generates a bipolarity which enables a clear-cut distinction between "us" and "them". From a structural and historical point of view, conversion to Islam is thus perceived as "disloyalty" and "betrayal".\(^{16}\)

On the empirical ground of the personal experiences with stereotyping and ethno-religious discrimination shown by the local host society towards converts, Maghrébiens and sub-Saharan Africans, at least five dimensions of distinction, inequality and supposed superiority emerge, which are combined and thematized in the generalized stereotypes against Muslims\(^{17}\):

(a) the supposed religious and/or "civilizational" division (Huntington 1996) between Muslims and Christians/Catholics, i.e. between "Orient" and "Occident";

(b) the ethnic distinction between "Arabs" and "Castilians", which reflects historical connotations of "them" and "us" (Stallaert 1998);

(c) the racialized perception of a supposed phenotypic bipolarity between "non-whites" - either "Semitic" or "blacks" - and "whites";

(d) the national and citizenship-based distinction between "aliens" or "non-Spaniards" and "Spaniards" or "nationals", which is already materialized in the Spanish Constitution; and

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\(^{16}\) For an example of a literary treatment given in the Spanish transition period to the topos of "national betrayal" through religious conversion to Islam, cf. Goytisolo (1985).

\(^{17}\) For complete empirical details on these dimensions, cf. Dietz et al. (2001).
(e) the dividing line drawn by the public opinion between "immigrant" minority communities, who are supposed to be problematic *per se*, and the "non-migrant" or "sedentary" host majority society, who is in charge of solving these migration-related problems.

In comparison with other European regions shaped by a Christian majority religion and nowadays ruled by secularized institutions and public opinion, in Andalusia so far there have not been any major public conflicts around the issue of the headscarf. Nevertheless, the first conflicts involving ethnicized religious differences in Andalusian cities such as Córdoba or Granada are appearing - not in relation to Moroccan immigrant communities, but with regard to the increasing visibility of Islam, in general, and conversion to Islam, in particular. In several cases, these conflicts arise from the officially secular, but implicitly Catholic orientation of the region's public school system. This "false secularism" is criticized above all by Muslim converts, who claim either a *de facto* confessionally neutral education, where Catholic instruction is pluralized towards a comprehensive inter-religious education, or a "pillar model" inspired by Dutch experiences, where each confession would have the right to maintain its own, governmentally sponsored faith-specific educational system (Dietz 2001).

In the interviews conducted with Muslims, on the one hand, and institutional representatives dealing with education and training issues, on the other hand, a wide gap is perceivable between both points of view. In the first place, school authorities tend to equate and confuse the presence or absence of migrant children in their classrooms with the necessity or lack of necessity of adopting specific measures broadly defined as

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18 For a sketch of this conflict as it has been appearing in different European countries, cf. Verlot (1996).
"intercultural education". In this sense, only very few schools, located in neighborhoods with a certain "visibility" of migrant communities, include any particular activity supposedly targeted at the minority of migrant pupils. The intercultural character of these activities is highly dubious. For example, the headmaster of a public primary school in the Albayzín quarter of Granada claims that his school does have an "intercultural curriculum" because it exceptionally includes other religions when commemorating festivities such as Christmas, which according to him "promotes mutual tolerance and inter-religious understanding" (headmaster of the Colegio Público "Gómez Moreno" 2000). According to the same headmaster, no further activities of adapting the official curriculum to the migrant and/or convert Muslim pupils are required at his school because - in contrast to other neighborhoods with high percentages of "problematic sectors, such as gypsies or Moors" (same interview) - the Albayzín quarter has always been a transit place as well as a "melting pot" of different cultures.

Apart from the issue of schooling and inter-religious education, it is above all the public presence of Islam in local contexts which crystallises ethnicized conflicts. In the course of the process of community-building, immigrants as well as local converts start concentrating in inner-city historical neighborhoods which formerly have been depopulated by the suburbanization of the native middle classes, but which since the beginning of the nineties are regaining attraction through trends towards gentrification and exploitation by city tourism (Latiesa Rodríguez 2000). As these historical neighborhoods still are characterized by their formerly Arabic architecture and their morisco - Muslim to Christian convert - urbanistic heritage of the final reconquista period, their above mentioned "orientalist" flair is consciously beginning to be re-discovered and
re-appropriated by an emergent elite of Moroccan immigrant as well as Muslim convert community leaders, activists and intellectuals.

Paradoxically, the already analyzed traditional, deeply-rooted muslimophobia as well as new muslimophilic coalitions appear and arise inside these gentrifying historical neighborhoods. This is due to the fact that the search for similarities and commonalties between mostly Catholic Andalusians and Muslim migrants frequently is focussed on this "orientalist" legacy. Thus, neighborhoods such as the Albayzín in Granada are becoming highly heterogeneous meeting points for Maghrébien migrant communities, Spanish and European Muslim converts and muslimophilic Spaniards and foreigners claiming to search for the common roots of *Al-Andalus* (Rosón Lorente 2000).

This particular kind of urban development is perceived rather ambiguously by the Muslims themselves. Whereas the converts and some of the migrant community leaders and intellectuals welcome this encounter as a long-awaited opportunity for concentrating the still weak community infrastructure of mosques, religious schools, *halal* food shops etc. in a single urban quarter, others feel somehow "instrumentalized" by orientalist tourism policies. A Muslim immigrant sums up the "pros" and "cons" of living in such a neighborhood:

"Where I'm living right now, in Elvira in the Albayzín, with its teashops, its mosques, its students and hippies, it is nice, I feel more at home than anywhere in Spain. You are just one more stranger among strangers, the world doesn't have to be uniform, we don't have to be the same. But... it still is funny anyway, the same people who don't like Muslims, who reject you in other places, when they show up in this neighborhood they just say 'How exotic, look at their headscarf, here they really fit into the picture!' It's a little bit like living inside a store front-window and being observed from the outside" (23 year-old woman from Pakistan, 2000).
The muslimophobic sectors in these neighborhoods, however, tend to perceive the "return of Islam" as a potential threat not only to their own religious identity, but to their neighborhood's "quality of life". Again, in the case of the Muslim-Arabic Albayzín of Granada, local resistance focuses on the project of constructing an architecturally well-adapted mosque near the neighborhood's central and most touristically attractive plaza (Rosón Lorente 2000). Throughout the last decade, representatives of local Catholic parish churches, religious fraternities, cultural heritage foundations as well as "associations of consumers and housewives" have been successfully lobbying local politicians in order to block the creation of the mosque. The construction work has been interrupted for years, officially because archaeological findings had been made in the future building's basement; unofficially, however, the anti-mosque activists claim that a Muslim community center in the middle of their neighborhood would "attract lots of criminals, illegal immigrants, homeless people and all these hippies hanging around here" (Catholic Albayzín resident, 2000).

Islam, either in its Moroccan-migrant or its "Europeanizing", convert variant, increasingly serves as a dividing line which separates arabophobic and muslimophobic sectors of the local population, on the one hand, and Muslims as well as muslimophilic and pro-immigrant activists, on the other hand (Rosón Lorente 2000). These divisions are originated and employed first on a rather localized, neighborhood terrain of contested space in the context of urbanistic speculation, gentrification and a shift in the region's tourism policy towards "internal" and/or "cultural tourism".

Nevertheless, as the same case of Granada illustrates, they quickly go beyond the limits of one particular neighborhood. Already more than a decade ago, a group of non-
Muslim, but muslimophilic "local celebrities" from academia, the arts and a few politicians issued an "Occupation Day Manifesto" (Colectivo Manifiesto 2 de Enero 1988). In this document, they demanded a substantial reform of the city's main festivity, January 2nd, the "Occupation Day" or Día de la Toma, which commemorates the definitive 1492 conquest of Granada by the "Catholic Kings" of Castile and Aragón. Since their public appearance, an increasingly heterogeneous local movement is proposing changes to demilitarize, secularize and "multiculturalize" the strangely political-religious reminiscences of Franco's "national Catholicism" which still shape this festivity. In order to institutionally channel the debates between Granada's localist and nationalist sectors, on the one hand, who defend the "immutable nature of our commemoration of this epic historical achievement", and their mainly Andalusian regionalist and multiculturalist opponents, on the other hand, who struggle for substituting "Occupation Day" by an inclusive Fiesta de la Tolerancia\(^\text{19}\), the municipal authorities of Granada have created a consultative council which assembles representative of all involved associations, NGOs, institutions, parties and - Catholic as well as Muslim - religious entities. Although rejected by the most traditionalist and nationalist sectors of the local civil society, this so-called Foro de las Culturas step by step has been slowly, but successfully integrating the adversaries into a common discussion on local and regional identity politics and its manifestation through civic public rituals (García Castaño, ed., 2000). Besides its programmatic shift towards concrete suggestions for modifying the localist and regionalist identity markers, the main achievement of this consultative body resides in its decisive contribution to publicly acknowledging the matter-of-fact presence of Islam in Andalusia. In the course of the

\(^{19}\) Colectivo Manifiesto 2 de Enero (1996) presents the Andalusianist and muslimophilic position, whereas Garrido Atienza (1998) summarizes the Catholic traditionalist and localist points of view.
debate between muslimophobic and muslimophilic sectors, the local Muslim communities saw themselves forced to at least strategically unite in a still weak and not thoroughly representative *Consejo Islámico de Granada*, created *ad hoc*, but which in the near future may evolve towards becoming an officially recognized counterpart and intermediary of the public institutions.

**Civil Society Beyond the Nation-State? Non-governmental actors as new intercultural intermediaries**

Muslimophilia is becoming a strategic meeting-point of a highly heterogeneous alliance of regionalist politicians, pro-immigrant NGO activists, Moroccan migrant community leaders and Andalusianist converts to Islam. Despite their discursive similarities, the main difference between the explicitly muslimophilic activists and the NGOs is related to their practice. In the course of their struggle for generating their own Andalusian identity politics, the Muslim convert and the muslimophilic sectors of the local civil society stress the religious divide, thus implicitly acknowledging the muslimophobic Islam-versus-Catholicism topos. The non-governmental immigrant support activities, on the contrary, although politically similar to the muslimophilic discourse, in practice are clearly evidencing a bridging character between the native host society and the migrant population.

In order to adequately judge the causes and consequences of this bridging function performed by mainly non-migrant Andalusian NGO activists and volunteers, the particularities of the non-government movement in Spain are briefly to be sketched. As in many other parts of the world, in the course of the last ten to fifteen years a remarkable
"boom" of NGOs and voluntary action associations has been characterizing Andalusian civil society. Whereas throughout many decades these voluntary associations and NGOs had always been considered as merely "peripheral" and "subsidiary" actors in the politics of social integration as well as of development cooperation, in the last decade these actors are gaining a completely new protagonism. As many scholars state, the NGO boom coincides with the "crisis of the welfare state" and with the gradual withdrawal of government agencies from domains of social politics which are thus handed over to non-governmental entities (Korten 1991). In this international context, the NGOs and their shared horizontal networks are currently focussed upon by representatives of the increasingly transnational political and economic establishment as well as of their multilateral agencies, who discover the NGOs as their future ally in their projects and politics not only of "slimming" public expenditure, but also of maintaining and strengthening the highly fragile framework of regional security in North-South relations (NGLS 1996).

In the Andalusian context, however, and particularly in the case of pro-migrant and/or pro-minorities activism, there are certain features which distinguish these movements from the general international panorama:

- The societal origin of the current NGO boom, which is closely related to a phase of "institutionalization" and "professionalization" undergone by the post-1968 "new social movements" 20, in the Spanish and Andalusian case appears with a certain delay in comparison to other European scenarios. As in Spain the generational 68-rupture coincides with a still clandestine, but strengthening anti-

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Franco political dissidence, articulated at the margins of, but often sheltered by such institutions as the - post-Vatican II Council - Catholic Church, still clandestine trade unions such as *Comisiones Obreras* and the public universities (Pérez-Díaz 1993).

Accordingly, the currently existing NGOs still maintain close links both to the omnipresent network of Catholic associations, fraternities and religious orders and to the political parties which appeared or reappeared in the transition process and whose elites are closely related to trade union leaders as well as to academic representatives (Watts 2000).

Whereas in other European regions NGOs often feel instrumentalized in order to justify a neoliberal retreat of the old, Keynesian-style welfare state, in Andalusia this all-encompassing kind of welfare state has never existed. Thus, NGOs do not substitute, but grow side-by-side the still relatively weak and poorly developed system of social service provision.

As stated above, in the whole of Spain democratization coincides with devolution and "pragmatic" regionalism. In order to legitimize their still precarious symbolic capital in the eyes of their local voters, the recently emerged new regional elites of Andalusian politicians tend to embrace non-governmental actors as "trustworthy" and "authentic" representatives of local civil society through consultative councils, often populist *ombudsman* positions and quasi-governmental foundations.

Although this governmental strategy together with the close links to church-sponsored agencies in the short run stabilizes and empowers NGOs, in the long
run their lack of an independent "room to maneuver" may transform them into merely sub-contracted service-deliverers for inefficient regional or local governmental agencies, i.e. into "prisoners of the state" (Tarrow 1994). As the graphic illustrates, according to different constituencies and counterparts, Andalusian NGO activities are highly specializing on development cooperation, migrant support activities, social work for gypsy communities and integration measures focussed on other marginalized groups inside regional society. However, even this process of specialization undergone by the Andalusian NGOs reflects their lasting dependence on governmental resources and policy priorities, which themselves have been splitting up into the mentioned "preferential target groups".

As a consequence of these, briefly sketched particularities of Andalusian NGOs\(^\text{21}\), their own activists and volunteers perceive and suffer an increasing gap between highly specialized service-delivery, on the one hand, which in the field of immigration is much more developed and professionalized than any public institutional practices, and the need of maintaining and promoting advocacy activities as a distinctive, political agenda, on the other hand. In their daily practice, immigrant-support NGOs - ranging from highly institutionalized actors such as the Catholic Cáritas and the Spanish Red Cross to the more grassroots-oriented pro-immigrant network Andalucía Acoge and local human rights associations - are dealing with all facets of legal, educational, social and health service provision aspects, which range from taking over from the migration authorities certain "contingents" of immigrants in order to temporarily accommodate them to special

\(^{21}\) A detailed analysis of this process of externally-dependant specialization is included in Dietz (2000).
projects of intercultural education and awareness-raising campaigns aimed at the host society, in general, and at its arabophobic or muslimophobic sectors, in particular.

Despite their political weakness and institutional dependence, however, in many local contexts these NGOs have been successfully bridging the divide between a nearly non-existing migrant community infrastructure and the host society’s ignorance, lack of interest and/or hostility. Whereas most of the recently appearing migrant associations still are more focussed on the context of origin as well as on the international migratory spaces of their transmigrant constituencies, the pioneer accomplishment of several local NGOs consists of offering intercultural spaces and of serving as meeting points where different religious, cultural and ethnic discourses and practices are being articulated, negotiated and projected to the outside context. Thus, the intercultural dimension is two-folded: firstly, on the level of day-to-day practice, intercultural conflict, learning, and exchange takes place inside the NGO among its native and migrant activists as well as its constituencies; secondly, on the level of discourse, throughout their campaigning, networking and mobilizations NGO members and constituencies start to share processes of delimitation against local arabophobic and muslimophobic movements.

All those immigrants who are currently participating in the establishment of their own associations and community institutions have already passed through a rather long process of working - on a contract-basis or as volunteers - in Andalusian NGOs specialized in supporting and counseling migrants. The president of the most important immigrant support NGO in Granada recognizes the challenge of opening up his organization for the migrants themselves:
"As a matter of fact, we work for the immigrants, but we are not immigrants ourselves. So, of course, the best would be if we didn't exist as... But it's really very difficult to work with immigrants, and it's not because they were strange or something, but their living conditions, they are moving around... They are not fixed, they are mobile, that's why it's so difficult to do a collective work with them. But in any case, it would be much better if at least part of us were immigrants, so we could gain and understand the immigrants' sense and their aspirations, which is also something rather difficult" (president of Granada Acoge, 2000).

In the course of their encounters and exchanges with volunteers from the host society, however, both sides tend to agree that in the long run the native-dominated associational spaces for encounters should be supplemented by the migrants' own associations. Despite these shortcomings in local immigrant representation and participation, in the last years' context of increasing tensions surrounding the issue of migration and identity politics, the combined NGO focus on service delivery and intercultural exchange is successfully beginning to transform their original status of being mere agencies of specialized migrant attention, which is currently restructuring to become a new collective social actor per se. Paradoxically, it is the weak character of the existing migrant community infrastructural facilities together with persistent, but increasingly explicitly anti-immigrant and/or muslimophobic sentiment and attitudes which forces the NGO to evolve towards an own, alternative and intercultural "community".

Both the lack of integration into the host society and the lack of possibilities for establishing strong and self-segregating "ethnic colonies" (Heckmann 1991), together create an institutional hybrid which tries to bridge the religious, ethnic and/or cultural migrant-native differences through a common, inclusive identity politics. It is through this shift towards complementing service-provision with multicultural activism through which the Andalusian NGOs currently enter the local debates between muslimophobic and
muslimophilic or Muslim convert sectors. Due to their excellent relations to both the
governing political elites and the local Catholic representatives, combined with their
extensively proved expertise on migration issues, in several Andalusian cities NGO
activists - natives and migrants - succeed in de-ethnicize the dangerously widening gap
in the essentialist debate about "us" and "them", a supposedly clear-cut distinction used
both in the localist-nationalist muslimophobic discourse, on the one hand, and in the
regionalist-Andalusianist muslimophilic discourse, on the other. There are two trends in
contemporary immigrant support activism which overtly urge NGOs to de-essentialize
sub-national identity politics:

- In the first place, the immigrants who fully integrate into the local NGOs as
  activists or volunteers and who thus successfully cross the divide between
  service-deliverer and recipient constituency, tend to share a rather "relaxed" and
  secularized vision of Islam, which is lived as routinized practice, not as an
  identity marker:

  "I really don't understand it - if you are a Muslim, then you are a Muslim, and
  that's it! You can feel that you are a Muslim or not, you can believe in God or not,
  you can practice your religion or not, you can even be a little bit of this and a little
  bit of that, can't you? Nothing to do with the headscarf! For example, I knew a
  Muslim student here in Granada who always went to have lunch at the University
  restaurant and always asked the waiter to take the pork out of the *paella* - but
  how can you just take it out of it if it was cooked in it? Eat it or leave the whole
  plate! How can you just take out the pork? That's why I say that people in
  northern Morocco understand religion like the pork, take it out and that's all! It's
  because they really don't bother, if you don't bother about something, it's o.k.,
  but if you are really interested in something, if you really identify with it..."
  (Amazigh woman from northern Morocco active in a Granada-based NGO, 2000).

- This trend is complemented by another tendency, which is not only evident in the
  case of migrant activists, but which is also present in the native NGO members.
Through their daily routine and their mediation practices, which interrelate the migrants themselves, their contexts of origin and their emerging communities in the host society with local, regional and national governmental institutions officially concerned with non-EU immigration, NGOs are gradually becoming "strategic" intermediaries not only on the domestic level. The unifying pressure exercised by the European Union through its harmonizing Schengen Treaty approach as well as the increasingly transnationalized migratory spaces established by the migrant population - between places of origin, transit countries, reception regions and kin or associative networks - necessarily promote the "internationalization" of the local voluntary activities carried out in support of the migrant population: contacts and relations are established not only with other European immigrant support initiatives, but also with domestic Moroccan NGOs, associations and community networks. Thus, the NGOs are beginning to form part of "transnational social movements" which from the organizational point of view start resembling the transnational communities they pretend to support (Cohen 1998).

Despite their different origins, both internal NGO trends, their interpretation of Islam as just one more "matter-of-fact" customary religious practice, comparable to most contemporary Andalusians' secularized attitude towards Catholicism, on the one hand, and their integration into transnational, EU-wide as well as trans-Mediterranean organizational networks, coincide in one important aspect: they contribute to de-essentialize the alleged "culture clash" between mutually exclusive identity discourses and to hybridize the Andalusians' as well as the non-Andalusians' cultural practices.
Conclusion: towards trans-Mediterranean frontier hybridization

The theoretical and empirical relevance of these new localized, but increasingly transnationally integrated non-governmental coalitions and spaces arises from their intercultural potential: the Andalusian host society's NGOs and muslimophilic movements as well as the Muslim and/or migrant communities themselves are facing the challenge of promoting innovative intercultural and cross-religious encounters, contacts and/or conflict negotiation mechanisms between actors bearing culturally diverse heritages and ethnically heterogeneous identities.

In order to assess the future role and impact of these new actors, it is decisive to finally elucidate the intercultural processes taking place in the studied region. As the analysis has shown, the Andalusian struggle for inventing or reappropriating a distinctive identity occurs in a highly contested terrain. Apart from the parallel debates on the particularly Andalusian versus universally pan-Roma features of the region’s "gitano legacy" and on the question of the localist versus regionalist identity horizon of popular Catholicism, the supposedly Muslim legacy of *Al Andalus* has proven to be by far the most polemical aspect of contemporary identity politics in the region. Thus, the intercultural potential of NGOs does definitively not derive from any nostalgically invoked and retrospectively projected Andalusian "heritage of tolerance". Nor does the slow and still reluctant, immigration driven, step by step "multiculturalization" of public entities such as schools, municipal authorities and their officialized discourses of identity necessarily result from any particular "Andalusian-ness".
On the contrary, the detected trends towards hybridizing and transnationalizing organizational spaces inside local civil society are mainly provoked and promoted by the challenge of overcoming the increasingly conflictive ethnization of "us-versus-them"-dichotomies. The implicitly perceivable and often even explicitly stated historical continuity of muslimophobic and arabophobic attitudes inside the mainstream Catholic sectors of Andalusian society force both the migrant minority groups and the muslimophilic and Andalusian regionalist sectors to develop common strategies not only in their daily cultural, social and political confrontation with discrimination, but also in the arena of the region’s identity discourses.

In this arena, it is the young and innovative pro-immigrant NGO spectrum of activities, coalitions and platforms which transforms the potentially ethnicized and exclusive discourse of muslimophilia into concrete, gradually routinized intercultural "modes of interaction" (Soenen 1998). It is this day-to-day practice, not the ethnogenetic discourse of Al Andalus, which is starting to integrate migrant and non-migrant political activists, mainly Catholic volunteers and mostly Muslim constituencies of non-governmental entities into a new, culturally "hybrid" collective actor. Compared to other necessarily hybrid cultures arising from diverse forms of colonial or postcolonial trans-border exchanges (García Canclini 1989, Bhabha 1994), its distinctive hybridity stems from the deliberate combination of two different levels of intercultural modes of interaction (Dietz 2001):

- On the one hand, in order to articulate a coherent self-image as a specific collective actor, the internal organizational spaces of NGO activism have to integrate culturally diverse traditions and forms of habitualized practice into an
internally shared "intra-culture", spatially confined to the face-to-face interaction of its heterogeneous, but mutually "communalized" members, who share a "concrete utopia" beyond each of its particular idiosyncrasies. This "intimate culture" (Lomnitz Adler 1992), resulting from an inward orientation, consciously retains and cultivates its hybrid origins as distinctive markers of an emerging identity.

- On the other hand, and at the same time, through mutual processes of delimitation and ethnization, the NGO develops and expresses an outwardly oriented "inter-culture", i.e. a "culture of social relations" (Lomnitz Adler 1992) directed towards other - often muslimophobic or muslimophilic - local or regional actors, most of whom focus on exclusively ethno-religious markers for identity purposes.

By contrasting and combining a hybrid intra-culture, which is frequently conceived as a commonly constructed "imagined community" (Anderson 1988) of native as well as migrant trans-border "nomads", with an actively promoted inter-culture of negotiations, which pretends to bridge the divisions subdividing and thus dis-empowering Andalusian civil society, the analyzed pro-migrant associations and organizations are protagonizing a complex and necessarily conflictive re-definition of the host society's underlying syntax of inclusion and exclusion, of identifying the sub-national logics of "us" and "them" in an increasingly trans-national context of migration. As Todd (1994) postulates in his comparative analysis of institutional policy "reactions" to immigration in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, it is this underlying syntactical dimension which determines the "failure" or "success" of integration:
“L'analyse comparative révèle la capacité de chacune des sociétés développées à imposer, indépendamment du contenu objectif de la culture immigrée, sa propre vision du rapport interethnique, et la solution d'assimilation ou de ségrégation qui lui convient, au point que l'on doit faire l'hypothèse d'un principe d'omnipotence de la société d'accueil. L'anthropologie met en évidence l'existence dans chacune des grandes nations postindustrielles d'une matrice inconsciente spécifique, qui décide de la vision de l'étranger et, finalement, de son destin” (Todd 1994:12).

However, it is not - as Todd seems to suggest - just a binary alternative of segregationism versus integrationism from which a host society somehow unconsciously chooses its own "solution". As the Andalusian case has shown, the intra-societal and frequently sub-national struggles over the power of defining "us" and "them", of discursively distinguishing natives and non-natives, are closely related to migration-induced transnational processes. The two-folded NGO actors' strategy of empowering pro-migrant associations through the development of distinctive intra-cultures, on the one hand, as well as of explicitly and inter-culturally participating in the non-migration related debates on Andalusian-ness and regionalism, on the other hand, offers the empirically proven possibility of going beyond the quasi-"ontological" distinction offered by Todd between "universalist" and "differentialist" host societies (Todd 1994).

In conclusion, ethnogenesis, nationalism and transnational migrant community formation are not conceptually different phenomena. The Andalusian case reveals that the initially analyzed and criticized dual tracking of supposedly opposite processes of native versus migrant ethnogenesis and identity politics is in itself the result of a solely 

em

ic and thus biased academic perception, which remains limited to the involved actors' own distinction between "insiders" and "outsider". In both phenomena analyzed above, in the subnational struggle for constructing Andalusian-ness by re-essentializing and re-rooting a common past, as well as in the transnational struggle for inventing and
defending a new community of de-rooted "nomads", the same syntactically and thus implicitly operating strategies of identity formation are employed (Dietz 2001):

- Firstly, time is transformed into "our past" through the temporalization of a supposedly shared common "legacy", be it Castilian-Catholic, localist-nationalist and muslimophobic and/or arabophobic or, on the contrary, Andalusian-regionalist, "gypsy" or "Moorish" and/or muslimophilic.

- Secondly, space is transformed into "our soil" through the symbolical territorialization and "aboriginalization" of the involved actors, be they Andalusian "natives" - i.e. descendants of either Castilian (re-) conquerors, Muslim or Jewish forced converts to Catholicism or nearly simultaneously "immigrated" gypsies - or Maghrébien migrants - i.e. the "returning" former "owners"/"invaders" of Al Andalus. Thus, territorialization is always part of any kind of community formation process.

- Thirdly, the combination of temporalizing and territorializing strategies continuously generates a symbolical invocation of an "imagined community" through which the in-group - all Andalusians, all granadinos, the Muslim umma, the converts of a particular faith or the migrants from a specific place of "origin" - is substantialized.

Migrant as well as non-migrant groups, majority host societies as well as its autochthonous or allochthonous minorities use the same strategies of temporalization, territorialization and substantialization in order to legitimize their particular claims-

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22 The persistance of this territorial dimension even in cases of overtly extra-territorial community building is analyzed by Fitzgerald (2000).
making. It is precisely the syntactical, structural coincidence of these shared strategies of identity politics which generates or at least deepens the conflictive potential of ethnogenesis. As there is no structural difference between migrant and native ethnicity, the internal and external, organizational and political features of the involved groups have to be included in the analysis and explanation of contemporary identity politics.

As part of this task, finally, the consciously hybrid, Andalusian pro-immigrant and/or muslimophilic non-governmental organizations, coalitions and movements promise to open new paths not only to ethnicity and migration theory, but also to the policy and practice of minority integration. The intercultural encounter between migrants and natives, originally borne out of the mutually suffered lack of strong intracultural organizational alternatives, generates new kinds of "imagined communities" which at least potentially challenge the essentializing mechanisms which traditionally dominate both autochthonous and migrant ethnogenesis. By stressing its double function not only as a "hinge between the system and the life-world" (Habermas 1981:581), but also as a hinge between the micro-level, communal intra-culture and the macro-level, societal inter-culture, the analyzed NGOs decisively contribute to the integration of minorities not just into the host society as such, but into the local and regional civil society, which they simultaneously strengthen and empower through this hybrid integration process.

The future success or failure of this alternative, "bottom-up" integration approach will depend on the participating actors' ability to transcend not only national and geostrategic borders, but also their inter-related, but cross-cutting religious, cultural and ethnic frontiers. The successful result of the ongoing frontier hydridization of Andalusian civil society would consist in a localized, but transnationally bridging identity politics
which could integrate the until now mutually opposed sub-national protagonists of ethnogenesis, of ethnicized regional actors, into a common space of "regio-genesis", into a plural arena of ethnic discourses and cultural practices whose regionally shared inter-culture would always be more than the mere sum of its mutually contesting, but also overlapping and cross-hybridizing intra-cultures.
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