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equal to that of other industrial powers the authors recommend more government intervention in the economy through a corporatist arrangement in which government and business work in tandem to coordinate production, introduce and promote new products, ease out declining businesses and support growing ones, while providing solutions to socially destructive labor problems. With business and government operating hand in hand, different strategies which would anticipate problems or upswings in the economy and adjust measures accordingly are possible. Corporatism provides for a structured economic organization in which the private and public sectors strive for a common goal and as a consequence, both parties equally benefit.

*Minding America’s Business* is another in a long line of recent prescriptive books which attempt to find a solution to the United States’ declining economic power. The authors’ opinions are helpful and valid, but Magaziner and Reich conclude their book long before offering any concrete answers to the problems. Instead of suggesting institutional arrangements, the authors fall back on “the U.S. is not a nation of planners” (p. 378), and criticize the present structure. Thus, the reader is left hanging as to constructive measures to help America’s economy.

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William O’Neill’s book is a richly-detailed and thoroughly-researched account of the intellectual left in America between the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the end of the Cold War. O’Neill has taken great pains to draw three dimensional characters, capturing the complicated political, ideological and personal debates which separated those he calls ‘‘fellow-travelers,’’ ‘‘progressives’’ and ‘‘anti-Stalinists.’’ He demonstrates that Stalin’s Russia was the issue which divided these three groups, tracing the subtle shifts in each’s opinions from progressive ascendancy during World War II to anti-Stalinism in the post-war years. In doing so, he raises some interesting questions about the impact of Stalinism on foreign policy as well as intellectual integrity. Yet this is only half of his story. He also tries to step beyond the moral framework he feels glorifies the progressives and villifies the anti-Stalinists, and winds up moralizing from the opposite point of view.
O’Neill attributes the anti-Stalinists’ bad press to those who fret over the past with tiresome rightousness, but his own work conveys a similarly smug sense of right and wrong. terms he uses with great regularity. He confines himself to an occasional editorial comment throughout most of his book, tracing the decline of progressivism and the simultaneous rise of anti-Stalinism in a fairly even-handed way through the war years, post-war problems in Eastern Europe, the fall of McCarthy, and Korea. In his conclusions, however, he throws caution to the winds, and comes out swinging at Lillian Hellman, Christopher Lasch and Victor Navasky, all of whom have written what O’Neill calls "apologies for Stalinists." (p. 374) He, on the other hand, contends that while progressives met the challenges of fascism, McCarthyism and the Vietnam War, they "failed to identify Stalinism as the principal enemy of freedom and culture after World War II, while the anti-Stalinists were on target every time." (p. 351) This polemic becomes all the more contradictory in light of what he tells us elsewhere; on the subject of Asia, for example, progressives were "right" (p. 199), while anti-Stalinists "sometimes went too far" (p. 377) in their desire to contain communism. The only way O’Neill can extricate himself from this contradiction is to fall back on the same sort of double standard he deplores in American Stalinists. Perhaps he is actually delivering them a compliment by expecting more of them than the anti-Stalinists, but certainly his contention that those called before HUAC might put aside their "schoolyard code of ethics" (p. 327) and name names in order "to reassure the public" (p. 326) is asking quite a lot of individuals he believes were intellectually dishonest.

An equally troubling issue is the matter of precisely who O’Neill’s anti-Stalinist heroes are. He clearly distinguishes progressives from fellow-travelers, but is more disingenuous about their opponents. What about Eugene Lyons, James Burnham and Max Eastman, all virulent anti-Stalinists who shifted from the left to the far right, and hardly merit the honors O’Neill heaps on his anti-Stalinists? The alert reader will learn in a footnote to the conclusion that the more rightwing anti-Stalinists were anti-Communists, "who were often as bad as American Communists, even if in a better cause." (p. 377) Not only is this distinction misleading, it is perhaps only on account of it that O’Neill is able to reach the conclusions he does.

A Better World adds a tremendous amount of information to our knowledge of the intellectual left after the "Red Decade" of the 1930s, bringing the story begun by Frank Warren, Daniel Aaron and others to its conclusion. However, it should come with a caveat reader label to remind
us that O’Neill has not avoided the moralizing of earlier historians, but only recast their heroes and villains.

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In the years immediately following the death of John F. Kennedy, his reputation reached almost legendary proportions, aided in part by flattering accounts of his presidency written by administration insiders. In more recent years critics have subjected his term in office to stinging analysis, accusing him of raising national expectations but failing to deliver concrete results. Now, twenty years after his assassination in Dallas on November 22, 1963, Herbert S. Parmet has written the first balanced, scholarly treatment of the Kennedy administration. In *JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy*, a sequel to his 1980 book, *Jack: The Struggles of John F. Kennedy*, the author forever does away with the Camelot mythology while remaining sympathetic with what Kennedy was trying to do.

Parmet cites an impressive array of sources, including materials at the John F. Kennedy Library and nearly all relevant secondary works. He does a fine job of exposing some of the government’s inner workings, of revealing the sometimes tenuous control a president has even within his own administration, and in explaining how political factors can subtly influence presidential decisions. The author also delves into Kennedy’s personal life: his relationship with his brother Bobby, the continual struggle with physical problems, his ability to remain cool in the midst of crisis, and his marital infidelity.

Parmet observes that Kennedy was not always politically astute. He had a tendency, particularly on domestic issues, to remain aloof from Congress and to leave the essential legwork to others. Kennedy particularly received much credit for the advances in civil rights during his administration, yet much of the movement’s strength grew from the belief that Kennedy would support it with the full weight of the federal government. Initially, Kennedy was not aggressive in supporting civil rights. For several months he delayed issuing an executive order for open housing, did not push for legislation fearing that it would keep Congress from acting on other issues, and frequently waited for violence to erupt