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THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AT UC BERKELEY:
Turning Points and Consequences*

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ABSTRACT
This white paper was prepared at the request of the Advisory Committee to the Athletic Study Center as a result of their concern over poor graduation rates in football as released by the NCAA in 2012. The paper received extensive review by the members of that committee as well as several other knowledgeable faculty and senior administrators before it was forwarded to the University Athletics Board in late May, 2013. It is based on a larger project being conducted with the Regional Oral History Office at the Bancroft Library. The purpose of the research is to explore the history of the management of Intercollegiate Athletics at UC Berkeley from the 1960s to the present. The project began in 2009 and will include, when completed, approximately 70 oral history interviews of individuals who played key roles in the management of intercollegiate athletics over that period of time – Chancellors, Athletic Directors, senior administrators, Faculty Athletic Representatives, other key faculty members, directors of the Recreational Sports Program, alumni/donors, administrators in the Athletic Study Center and others. The interviews were conducted by John Cummins, Associate Chancellor – Chief of Staff, Emeritus who worked under Chancellors Heyman, Tien, Berdahl and Birgeneau from 1984 – 2008. Intercollegiate Athletics reported to him from 2004 – 2006. A publication of the results is underway and will be co-authored by Cummins and Kirsten Hextrum, a PhD student in the Graduate School of Education, a member and two-time national champion of Cal Women's Crew from 2003 – 2007, and a tutor/adviser in the Athletic Study Center since 2009. This paper addresses administrative and management issues that typically concern those responsible for the conduct of a Division I-A intercollegiate athletics program. It assumes that such a program will continue for many years to come and that it provides important benefits for the Cal community. Its focus is principally with the market driven, multi-billion dollar phenomenon of the big-time sports of Men's football and basketball, their development over time and their intersection with the academic world. The Olympic or non-revenue sports at UC Berkeley more closely resemble the amateur intercollegiate ideal with high graduation rates and successful programs. Even these sports programs, however, are gradually being pulled into the more highly commercialized model.

Keywords: Intercollegiate Athletics, UC Berkeley, Graduation Rates, History of NCAA, Equity and Inclusion

A. INTRODUCTION
In November 2012 Athletic Director Sandy Barbour announced that then head football coach, Jeff Tedford, was fired, in part for poor athletic performance (a 3-9 football record) and for poor academic performance (48% graduation rate). The Cal Football program posted one of the lowest graduation rates in the nation, and the lowest in the Pac-12 conference.

A few weeks later, Barbour announced the hiring of Daniel “Sonny” Dykes as the new leader of Cal football, charged with the task of improving the team’s performance on the field and in the classroom. These coaching changes also came months before new UC Berkeley Chancellor Nicholas Dirks assumed his post on June 1, 2013. The new athletic and academic leadership signals another opportunity to reflect on and reevaluate the role of intercollegiate athletics at UC Berkeley. This paper offers a historical perspective of athletic governance of UC Berkeley from the 1960s to the present and suggests a new model for integrating intercollegiate athletics into the academic mission of the university. The historical analysis presented demonstrates

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that leadership changes alone will unlikely solve the poor football graduation rates. Instead, the authors argue there are systemic issues in governing intercollegiate athletics that unless addressed will continue to resurface each decade.

Despite the growth and achievements of UC Berkeley’s athletics program, the campus has never defined the role and purpose of sports for the campus community. Instead, periodic financial crises led to the formation of committees, task forces, or standing advisory committees to Chancellors, athletic directors, and the Athletic Study Center. These groups, each time, offered thoughtful analyses and recommendations. Yet all these well-meaning efforts were ad hoc and offered in the absence of any overriding set of principles and guidelines that placed sports, both intercollegiate and recreational, within an academic context. As a result, the intercollegiate athletics program, in particular, has been riddled with uncertainty; forced to operate under competing and conflicting objectives imposed on it by various administrations. On one side, sports are valued as a source of pride and school spirit for students, faculty, staff and alumni and an educational experience offering comprehensive excellence for student athletes. On the other, the program is forced to be “self-supporting” and as a result has become highly commercialized - a situation that can lead to recruiting and graduation problems, and that can lead to compromised academic standards. All the while, critics accuse intercollegiate athletics of either being too entertainment driven or not offering a better product. For instance, in the same year, the Cal campus community lambasted intercollegiate athletics for low graduation rates in the football program, yet also called for the firing of the head coach for fewer wins than expected in a newly renovated Memorial Stadium.

How did this happen, that a student extra-curricular activity mushroomed into a business enterprise that is largely controlled by external factors? While it might seem the highly commercialized wing of intercollegiate athletics belongs to the southern schools where football has long been king, UC Berkeley’s history also is tainted by the unbridled development of modern college sports.

Drawing on two frameworks, “the science of muddling through” coined by political scientist Charles’ Lindblom in 1959, and “normalization of deviance” a concept elucidated by Diane Vaughan (1998) in her analysis of NASA’s failed Challenger mission, the authors argue that UC Berkeley can no longer continue to operate athletics without a clear vision of integration. Lindblom’s concept describes decision-making in various organizational settings in which some variables in the process are unknown. This framework has various connotations such as “doing the best one can in dealing with complex problems”. The following history of athletic governance at UC Berkeley represents Lindblom’s theory and demonstrates how campus administrators either rationalized or ignored increasing fiscal deficits, cultural conflicts, and declining academic performance of student athletes. Vaughan’s (1998) normalization of deviance explains how individuals rationalize these decisions within a nexus of structure, culture, and action. In her analysis, Vaughan charts how individuals within a larger institution continue to act in accordance with their perception of appropriate standards for the organization. While an outsider might see these acts as inhumane, unconscionable, or deviant, the actions continue to become legitimated by the culture and structure of the institution. As this paper will show, the current state of college sports nationally and at UC Berkeley values profits, above all else, at times at the expense of the students and the academic mission of the University.

While many of the issues presented impact the revenue sports of football and men’s basketball, the remaining 27 of UC Berkeley’s varsity sports are also vulnerable to the current commercial pressures in college sports. For example, the Pac-12 television network will now offer coverage of Olympic sports. Thus, the recommendations presented in this paper apply directly to football and men’s basketball but will improve the experience of all student athletes. The national and UC Berkeley histories presented contextualize athletic administrative decisions for campus leadership to better understand the daily life of student athletes. Nearly 900 student athletes compete for UC Berkeley, and it is the intent of the authors to ensure the campus continues to live up to its mandate of providing a quality educational experience that includes earning a degree. This paper will examine the key themes in the national and local history of intercollegiate athletics that influence the current state of college sports on UC Berkeley’s campus. With particular attention paid to the limits of the NCAA governance, spending crises in college sports, and the experience of the student athlete on this campus, the authors argue that the University must develop a plan to integrate the intercollegiate athletics program into its academic mission or risk further financial, academic, and cultural consequences. The paper concludes with recommendations to improve the academic success of intercollegiate athletes and to integrate more fully the intercollegiate athletics program into the campus as a whole.

B. NATIONAL HISTORY OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: BROADER CONTEXT

1. The Early Years

Intercollegiate athletics always existed hand-in-hand with larger economic interests within and without the university, including their usefulness in boosting the local economy, recruiting students, selling newspapers, attracting large viewing audiences for movies and television, reinforcing national mythologies surrounding masculinity, virility and war efforts, maintaining campus

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esprit and visibility and thus improving the likelihood of extracting money for broader university purposes. They became a phenomenon that could not be controlled within the walls of academe despite repeated efforts on several fronts. Charles Eliot, the president of Harvard from 1869-1909 and the most important leader of higher education at that time, wanted football banned from college campuses following the public outcry in reaction to a number of deaths and serious injuries resulting from the sport. He lost this fight to alumnus, Teddy Roosevelt, who as President, preserved football through the creation of the National College Athletic Association. The NCAA had to curb the violence in football, a violence that was more visibly brutal than even today when long-term brain injury and impairment occupy our attention.

The crisis surrounding football highlighted the varying agendas and constituencies surrounding intercollegiate athletics. The students themselves could no longer lead sports at the college level, the tradition up until this point. Instead, the management of the university or college formally brought the governance of intercollegiate athletics under its wing. The creation of the NCAA in 1906 further expanded college sports oversight by establishing basic principles for eligibility and competition. The most fundamental principle was amateurism, an aristocratic concept better suited to a British university than an American culture that favored individual achievement and the survival of the fittest. Yet amateurism was very late in coming and the enterprise was already highly commercialized. For instance, the salary and expense account of William T. Reid, Harvard’s football coach, approached that of President Eliot at the turn of the 20th century. In 1905 Yale had an athletics reserve fund of $100,000 ($2.5 million in 2012 dollars) and revenues from athletics comprised one-eighth of its total revenue (Smith, 1988).

2. **NCAA: Limits to Governance and Intervention**

The history of the NCAA comprises a series of compromises of its basic principle of amateurism. The implementation of that principle meant no compensation, including athletic scholarships, no special admissions for athletic ability, freshmen ineligibility, the following of a regular course of study like other students, and no special benefits. The concept of student first and athlete second exemplified those principles. For a variety of reasons, the most important of which was the primacy of winning, the NCAA eliminated these rules over time. Coaches in the big-time sports exercised much greater control over the lives of student athletes than did the faculty. As John Thelin states in *Games Colleges Play*, a historical look at reform efforts in college sports: “The paradox of college sports reform from 1930-1990 has not been the corruption but, rather, what colleges and universities and the American public have come to accept as approved practices. The initial impulse in each era was to deplore the illegal and unethical activities in college sports, then to proceed to make them legal. If there is an epitaph for the demise of educationally sound athletic programs on the American campus, it will read, ‘The rules were unenforceable’” (202).

The NCAA existed as a voluntary member organization that could establish principles, guidelines and rules but could not enforce them. It had to rely on the good faith of its member institutions to follow the principles they endorsed, a fundamental organizational concept called “home rule.” Meaningful enforcement came much later, in fits and starts, as one scandal after another emerged. The NCAA hired its first enforcement officer in 1956 and today the department employs fifty-six enforcement personnel. In general, enforcement of NCAA regulation should occur at the campus level through the voluntary reporting of major and minor violations. Very recently, USC and Ohio State have greatly enlarged their compliance staff following recent scandals on those campuses.

3. **National Academic Reform Efforts**

Sperber (1990) and others have cited NCAA regulation and action as a “fox guarding a hen house” in that the governing body has no interest in curbing commercial efforts. While the NCAA has offered academic reforms and regulation aimed at maintaining the “student first” sentiment of amateurism, more often the league has taken action to increase the revenue generating power of college sports. It took the NCAA until 1965 to initiate minimum academic standards with the 1.600 rule—an admissions formula for athletes based on high school grades and ACT scores—and then to abolish that rule in 1973 (Smith, 2011). Academic scandals during the 1970s and 1980s, the most high profile of which occurred when Dexter Manley, a NFL football player, admitted that he never learned to read despite spending four years in college, led to the establishment of the “NCAA Qualifier” system in 1986. The NCAA still uses this system today. In addition to admission standards, the NCAA has implemented academic reforms including standardized rules for minimum credit load, degree progress benchmarks, and minimum grade point averages. Many argue these standards remain too low and can be manipulated by the institutions (Schulman & Bowen, 2001; Smith, 2011; Sperber, 2000). Further, sports scholars argue that the organization profits from huge television contracts such as those generated by March Madness that often compromise academic achievement of the student athletes (Eitzen, 2000; Sage, 2000; Sperber, 2000). As Eitzen (2000) explains, “The governing body of big-time college sports, the NCAA, is caught in a huge contradiction—trying to reconcile a multibillion-dollar industry while claiming it is really an amateur activity” (26).
Seeing the NCAA’s failure to enforce academic standards, members of the United States government periodically tried to reform the academic side of College Sports. Congress members, Tom McMillen, and Senator Bill Bradley, both formerly star basketball players at the college and NBA level and Rhodes Scholars, introduced a bill in 1989 requiring colleges and universities to report annually the graduation rates of student athletes and other data relevant to their programs. In 1991, McMillen also proposed legislation that would have given the NCAA an antitrust exemption enabling it to control the growth of spending on athletics. It also proposed that revenues from television and other sources be distributed based on the academic success of the athletes, and the opportunities to participate for men and women in a broad based program, not on winning. In his words, “The bill would have rewarded those schools promoting the values of higher education” (McMillen, 2011).

The NCAA, college and university presidents, and higher education associations successfully opposed these proposals on the basis of government infringement in educational matters and on the cost of producing the data. The NCAA, as a result of this pressure, instituted a voluntary reporting of these data that made any comparative, in-depth analysis impossible. In 1994, Senator Carol Moseley-Braun and Representative Cardiss Collins introduced legislation to ensure Title IX compliance, enacting the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA). It requires annual reporting of information from intercollegiate athletics departments whose institutions receive federal aid. These annual reports, although far from perfect, have provided a better database for analysis of intercollegiate athletic programs for prospective students and parents, researchers and the press.

In 2002, the NCAA instituted new rules to improve the graduation rates of student athletes. They included a certain GPA in core high school courses and certain ACT/SAT scores for admission. Once admitted, student athletes must demonstrate academic progress toward a degree. This is the APR or Academic Progress Rate. This measure and the Graduation Success Rate (GSR) are a team-based metric. Failing to meet certain national benchmarks can lead to lost athletic scholarships and being banned from participation in post-season tournaments. Graduation rates have improved in general as a result of these rule changes.

If one has any doubt about the role academics play in the management of the Big-Time sports, just reflect on how long it has taken to get any meaningful reform in this area – almost a full century since the creation of the NCAA, an organization that should be nothing more nor less than the collective voice of higher educational institutions.

4. “Minority” involvement in College Sports: Race and Gender in Intercollegiate Athletics

As was true for academic reform efforts, the NCAA did not lead the way in integrating college sports, which for decades remained the bastion of white masculinity. U.S. legislative and presidential action was necessary in order to integrate sports, an institution often portrayed as promoting fair values and equality. Resistance by coaches, universities, and governing leagues to the addition of women and minorities to college sports litters the history. It is this history of resistance to inclusion that informs one’s understanding of the current issues faced by student athletes today.

College and professional sports receive credit as one of the great vehicles for upward mobility for minorities in a white dominated society (Eitzen, 1999). This functionalist statement, however, disguises two darker sides of college sports: 1) a history of white-only participation and 2) the use of black males for economic gains by college sports institutions.

Historian Charles H. Martin (2010) in Benching Jim Crow, describes the opposition of leaders in college sports to integrate non-white athletes—particularly in football and basketball—even after Brown v. Board of Education ended segregation in the school systems in 1954. He describes a tension in the South to uphold a racial color line yet also maintain the ideal of sport culture in the US: an equal playing field. Sport was seen as a social event, and in states that still had anti-miscegenation laws, vehement opposition existed to allowing black and white athletes to sweat on the same athletic terrain.

Martin’s history of integration in college sports demonstrates how all other regions of the nation were complicit in maintaining Jim Crow segregation in southern athletics, often at a cost of winning a game. Southern universities maintained all white sports teams well into the 1970s and early 1980s. While Northern and West Coast Schools, including UC Berkeley, allowed a few non-white players early on in their history, they abided by “home rule” and benched these athletes when playing southern schools. This instance of placating southern racism was not confined to the Pre-Civil Rights Era. Gentlemen’s agreements of “No Negros” continued until the 1980s in college basketball.

Black athletes resisted these bars by trying out for all white teams, politically organizing against athletic department rules, and even filing federal lawsuits. As Martin (2010) writes, black students during this era “consistently stressed the principle of equal access, contending that the inclusion of African American males in the university’s most important public activity would permit black men to prove their masculinity while bestowing higher status on all minority students” (299). But, Martin argues, these
isolated efforts did not occur en masse like other integration efforts during the Civil Rights Era. Instead, college sports integrated quietly as black athletes trickled in from the “sidelines”.

The Big Ten began integrating in the 1940s and other Mid-West conferences in the 1950s. The Atlantic Coast Conference became the first Southern conference to allow black athletes in 1963. Even as the color-line crumbled, individual schools resisted. Wealthy segregationist donors put pressure on athletic departments to maintain white teams (Martin, 2010). Ultimately, it was a desire to win, and access the top athletic talent, that changed the last southern teams in the 1980s. As the North slowly gave up the gentlemen’s agreements, the South could no longer watch top southern black athletes be recruited to other parts of the country.

The NCAA finally entered the discussion of race and college sports in the 1980s around the topic of admission practices. As previously discussed, several black athletes in the 1970s and 1980s gained national attention for graduating from universities without being able to read. This forced the NCAA to re-examine its admission standards. The NCAA passed Proposition 48 in 1983 to require standard academic requirements for entering college freshman. This legislation included 11 core-courses, a minimum GPA of 2.0, and a combined SAT score of 700 (Smith, 2011). Thus began what became known as the NCAA Qualifier rule.

Proposition 48 angered all parties involved. The American Council on Education (ACE) felt the standards were too low. During the 1980s the SAT came under harsh criticism from Civil Rights Leaders for its racially biased nature (Smith, 2011). The SAT was accused of structuring the test's vocabulary and reading comprehension portions to advantage students from a white, middle to upper class background. The College Board, distributors of the SAT, admitted fault on this matter and made adjustments to the test (Krobin et al., 2007). Yet differences across race and parental income continue to persist in SAT and ACT results and the matter remains a controversial issue in higher education policy (Corbett, et al., 2008).

The NCAA compromised with black advocates by offering a “partial qualifier” rule in which potential student athletes only had to meet one of the requirements: the GPA or the SAT score. In just a few years, academic scandals in the Southern Schools involving “partial qualifiers” moved several schools to petition the NCAA to re-examine Proposition 48. As a result, Proposition 42 was passed which banned athletic aid for partial qualifiers. This once again ignited opposition from civil rights communities and eventually led to another academic compromise: Proposition 16. This act changed admissions by raising the number of core high school courses to 13, and creating a sliding scale for GPA and SAT scores. The minimum remained 2.0 and 700, but if someone had a higher GPA, they could earn a lower SAT score, and vice versa (Smith, 161, 2011).

Discrimination and under-representation permeate the history of minority, and particularly black athlete involvement. Recently, critics of college sports have accused colleges and universities of exploiting African Americans (Eitzen, 2000; Sage, 1998; McCormick & McCormick, 2010). The NCAA and universities point to the opportunities college sports provide to underrepresented minorities as a way to skirt these accusations. Yet as the implications section of this paper will uncover, often the most visible black athletes on football fields and basketball courts fail to receive their end of the student-athlete bargain: a college degree.

5. The Integration of Women in College Sports

While the history of minority male athletic involvement in college sports hinged on the commercial potential of their athletic ability, integration of women came about through a forced government mandate. Women's sports traditionally existed in physical education programs. After congressional action to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to provide equal educational opportunities for women, Title IX in 1972 mandated that: “no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Even after President Nixon signed the bill into law, the NCAA fought the application of Title IX to college sports but eventually incorporated women's programs in 1984. The NCAA's acquiescence did not end the fight over providing females with equal access to intercollegiate athletics. The long history of female marginalization in intercollegiate athletics presents a unique set of challenges for universities.

Over the past forty years, it has taken all three branches of the federal government to ensure that women receive equal educational access in higher education. Title IX instructed all educational institutions and organizations receiving federal funds to provide adequate opportunities for both men and women. The most high profile impact of the law has been women's intercollegiate athletics. The guidelines for implementing the law became a hotly contested debate in congress because the law didn’t specify what it meant by “educational program or activity receiving federal funding.” Executive orders were needed to enforce it. The first of these orders placed the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) in charge of implementation and enforcement. Seven years later, in 1979, HEW issued another “interpretation” describing how to implement Title IX in athletic departments. The lagging nature of the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to investigate violations, and schools to add athletic
opportunities for women, resulted in numerous state and federal lawsuits. Each presidential administration since the passage of the law has issued additional interpretations and chosen to either retract (during republican administrations) or shore-up (during democratic administrations) the enforcement capabilities of the OCR and the letter of the law (Hogshead-Makar & Zimbalist, 2007).

Underlying the court briefs, congressional hearings, and interpretations issued regarding implementing Title IX, is an anxiety that offering athletic opportunities to women will compromise the earning potential of men’s football and basketball. In 1974 Senator John Tower of Texas introduced a bill to the U.S. Senate exempting “revenue producing” sports from Title IX. While the bill did not pass, the Javits Amendment and the 1979 HEW interpretations struck a compromise. “Equal opportunities” would mean “equal access” not equal dollar amounts. Therefore, the women’s athletic budgets would not mirror the men’s. Even with this compromise, President Reagan proceeded to dismantle the enforcement power of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as part of a presidential move to reduce government spending and oversight (Suggs, 2005). In addition, the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Grove City College vs. Bell limited the scope of Title IX to programs receiving direct federal funds such as financial aid departments. To restore power to this landmark legislation Senator Robert Dole introduced the “The Civil Rights Restoration Act”. President Reagan vetoed the bill but congress overrode the veto and it was passed in 1987. Many sports historians cite this period as a major distraction in the move towards equal athletic opportunities. In the following decade fights over Title IX within the court system set a new precedent in which individuals had standing to take legal action to force athletic departments to comply with the law.

Controversy continued to surround Title IX into the 21st century. In 2002, the Secretary of Education established a commission to gather information and make recommendations on ways to improve the effectiveness of Title IX thirty years after its enactment. Civil Rights leaders and feminists criticized information presented in public hearings of the commission and took issue with certain recommendations in the final report. In particular, the commission recommended using a simple survey to gauge student interest in participating in certain sports. A “non-response” to a survey could be counted as a lack of interest. This recommendation, implemented by the Bush administration, established a loophole for colleges to continue to offer more sports opportunities to male athletes, namely because of the large football rosters, without adding additional spots for female athletes. In 2010, the Obama administration eliminated the use of the survey as a measure of student interest.

The summer of 2012 marked the fortieth anniversary of Title IX, and anxiety surrounding its impact on revenue sports continues. Quinnipiac University eliminated its women’s volleyball team and petitioned the OCR to “count” its cheerleading squad as an athletic opportunity. The financial crisis of 2008 led to a number of universities, including the University of Maryland, eliminating sports. UC Berkeley eliminated, and then some months later, restored some sports. Title IX was at the center of these decisions. Athletic departments debated on how to best maintain their revenue sports while also eliminating millions of dollars from their budgets. “Olympic” or non-revenue sports were on the chopping block, and women’s sports were a casualty. In the Quinnipiac case, the U.S. District Court ruled against the use of cheerleading as a sport.

For the majority of college sport history, mainstream participation was not open to black athletes, and women. The budget crises faced by the nation’s colleges often pit underrepresented groups against one another, claiming that the opportunities offered to women will sacrifice the opportunities for male revenue athletes, many of which are African American. But this debate disguises the larger economic issues involved in college sports, namely, how an after-school educational activity transformed into a multi-billion dollar industry.


With all the controversy and conflict surrounding college sports, why do athletic departments continue to enjoy such a privileged yet problematic position in the academy? While college presidents cite the camaraderie sports bring to the campus, and the NCAA points to the educational experience offered to student athletes, many scholars and social critics rightly point to one reason: the money, or put more accurately, the potential to earn millions of dollars for the university, a potential rarely realized. It is within this highly commercialized context that administrators, coaches, campus leaders and alumni ultimately place undue pressure on student athletes to perform athletically at the expense of their academic work.

Radio and television helped college sports, like other facets of the entertainment industry, expand accessibility and, as a result, its markets and profits. To accommodate a growing fan base, colleges and universities across the country, including UC Berkeley, built coliseum-sized football stadiums in the economic-boom years of the 1920s (Smith, 2011). As exposure increased, so did profits. Thus began the long history of leagues, universities and the NCAA fighting over who gets what percentage of earnings.
Even the term “student athlete” came into existence through the commodification of college sports. The NCAA’s hyphenated term student-athlete emerged in Post-World War II debates over whether athletes should receive financial aid from the university. Opponents against such a system labeled this “pay for play” and charged universities engaging in such actions as professionalizing their students. American college sport prided itself on maintaining an amateur status, where athletes could be students. As Walter Byers (1995), the former President of the NCAA writes in his tell-all condemnation of big-time college sports, *Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploiting College Athletes*, he was part of a team that crafted the term “student-athlete” to appease alumni who wanted to provide athletic scholarships to athletes to lure the best recruits, and amateur enthusiasts who wanted to watch “clean” sport contests. Byers admits the term was not only used to appease alumni, but also to address a very real threat that if athletes were paid for their participation in sport they could claim employee status at University campuses. This would lead to severance packages if a player is cut, workers compensation if a player is injured or even result in major law suits for negligence on the part of coaches if their employee is harmed during working hours. Thus, Byers and the NCAA mandated the term “student-athlete” in all future publications and limited the amount of hours a student could participate in his or her sport. The exchange for participation would be a college education.

In 1984, the US Supreme Court ruled in *NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma* that the NCAA’s Television Football Plan violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by restricting the number of televised football games and thus economic competition among colleges. The NCAA feared that unrestricted televised games would affect attendance and create an uneven playing field where certain institutions would gain significant economic advantage. The Supreme Court decision coincided with cable television expansion and these factors led to the highly commercialized Big-Time college sports industry we know today. The sole, dissenting justice, Byron White, a star football player in the 1930s at the university of Colorado, saw this coming - the relegation of the educational value of college sports to one of profit where winning is critical (Porto, 2012).

While it is easy to blame the governing league, universities have also participated in furthering the culture of commercialism while limiting student athletes’ ability to excel in the classroom. This is particularly true for “revenue athletes” or those male students involved in football and basketball, the most watched of intercollegiate contests. Researchers for over thirty years have made the case that athletic departments use men’s basketball and football players to earn money for their schools, while in turn the academic performance of these athletes suffers (Adler & Adler, 1991; Maloney, 1993, Purdy & Hufnagel, 1982). Maloney (1993) argues that if revenue athletes did not have the pressure from the University to perform athletically they would have higher grades. Scholars (Sperber, 2000; Schulman & Bowen, 2002; Smith, 2011) assert that universities intentionally exploit athletes at the cost of academics by creating high-profit contests during exam season, allowing one-year renewable athletic scholarships, and not enforcing a twenty-hour per week practice rule. Adler & Adler (1991) produced one of the most comprehensive studies on the issue of revenue athletes by following a Division I college men’s basketball team for four years. They found that despite entering with a desire to do well academically, many of the college basketball players’ educational goals degraded over time in the predominantly athletically demanding environment. Former University of Michigan President, James Duderstadt, criticized the “over-commercialization” of college sports he observed at Michigan, which compromised academic priorities (Duderstadt, 6, 2003).

Yet Duderstadt only briefly mentions his own involvement in this process. College presidents have long served on committees within the NCAA and have time and again voted to uphold the “status quo” of commercialism in college sports. Most recently college presidents voted to move to a four-team college playoff system for football, which will extend the season for the student athletes, in the hopes of earning more television revenue for conferences and universities. This decision culminated in November 2011 when ESPN announced a 12-year contract with the Bowl Championship Series (BCS), for reportedly $5.64 billion (Richey, 2012). While the BCS uses NCAA football rankings to determine which teams play in what bowl, this franchise exists as an agreement between conferences and does not run through the NCAA. This is in contrast to the lucrative March Madness basketball tournament run by the NCAA, which in 2010 negotiated a 14-year contract with CBS for $10.4 billion (NCAA, 2010).

The unilateral decision made by West coast college presidents to expand from the Pac-10 to the Pac-12 is another indicator that campus leaders on the West coast will not lead the charge to reform college athletics. This conference expanded to increase campus leaders on the West coast will not lead the charge to reform college athletics. This conference expanded to increase
The above national history of intercollegiate athletics highlights key developments that demonstrate why the link between intercollegiate athletic programs and higher educational institutions, unique to the United States, abounds with fundamental value conflicts, controversy and scandal. As Murray Sperber has pointed out, it is the one institution in the United States that grows and thrives in spite of the scandals. History, tradition, the mania and religious fervor associated with sports explain the contradiction but cannot rationalize away the conflicts. They surface and resurface and, if anything, the public, surfeted with scandals of all kinds, has become inured to intercollegiate athletic scandals while enjoying more and more the entertainment value of the big-time sports. College and university leaders, while fully aware of these conflicts, minimize and compartmentalize them because they quite legitimately have many more pressing matters to address. UC Berkeley exemplifies this as the following history demonstrates. The intercollegiate athletics program has been buffeted by external forces, endured scandals, been privileged, praised, denigrated and allowed to function as an appendage of the University without a defined sense of what it is, what is expected of it and how it is meaningfully tied to the educational mission.

Vaughan's (1998) normalization of deviance can be applied to the history of college sports nationally. The culture of sports centers around commercial interests and therefore the day-to-day decisions must elevate profits over education. It is within this national context that UC Berkeley campus administrators must govern. The following section will describe the localized culture and structure of intercollegiate athletics at UC Berkeley. This history should provide further justification for why the campus must act to institutionalize its values and approach to athletic governance as an integral part of the academic mission of the University.

C. INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AT UC BERKELEY: THE UNARTICULATED ROLE OF THE CAL BEARS

The following history of intercollegiate athletics at UC Berkeley is told from a “top down” perspective, charting the administrative decisions made from 1960 to the present. This approach cannot capture the lived-experiences of student athletes who had to navigate the culture and structure created by the campus administrators and alumni. Yet this overview of administrative history is important in understanding the challenge student athletes faced and continue to struggle against in earning a degree from UC Berkeley. Further, this administrative lens will highlight the key points of friction that need to be addressed in order to improve the experiences for all student athletes at UC Berkeley.

1. Early Years of Athletic Governance

Until 1960, the Associated Students of the University of California, Berkeley (ASUC) managed the day-to-day operations of the intercollegiate athletics program, including the hiring and firing of coaches. The ASUC consulted the Chancellor and his faculty athletic representative on all major decisions. As Ron Fimrite describes in Golden Bears: A Celebration of Cal Football, there is a long, storied history to Cal athletics dating back to the first interclass rivalry in 1877 and the first game against Stanford in 1892. Concern over injuries and deaths on the gridiron led to the replacement of football with rugby from 1905-1915 at both Cal and Stanford. Benjamin Ide Wheeler, UC Berkeley’s president, had reservations then about the direction intercollegiate football was taking with highly paid coaches and increasing commercialization. Andy Smith, Cal’s new head coach, had no such reservations. His first year as head coach in 1915 marked the beginning of the Pacific Coast Intercollegiate Athletic Conference, later called the Pacific Coast Conference. Smith became a legend in an era that became known as the Golden Age of Sport. Smith’s “Wonder Teams” dominated the conference and achieved a win and a tie in two Rose Bowls. Nibs Price and Stub Allison continued the excitement with two more Rose Bowl appearances. The famous Pappy Waldorf added three more from 1948-50. Pete Eliot led Cal to one more appearance there in 1959. These were the glory years of Cal football. In that same year, 1959, Cal’s basketball team under Pete Newell captured the NCAA championship.

Following a major scandal in the Pacific Coast Conference (PCC), the ASUC lost control of intercollegiate athletics. The scandal involved booster organizations at UC Berkeley. University of Washington, UCLA and USC paying football players. UC Berkeley’s first chancellor (1952-1958) Clark Kerr, and his faculty athletic representative, Nobel Laureate Glenn Seaborg, spent a considerable amount of time over several years dealing with this public and controversial matter. As opponents to athletic grants-in-aid, Kerr and Robert Gordon Sproul, the long-time president of the University until 1958, believed in the amateur ideal for student athletes. The Pacific Coast Conference approved need based athletic grants-in-aid in 1950 but Sproul prohibited Cal and UCLA from offering them, believing that they were inconsistent with the principle of amateurism. Sproul acquiesced in 1956 in the aftermath of the major scandal.

A number of factors contributed to the collapse of the Pacific Coast Conference and its eventual reconfiguration as the Pac – 8. For starters, politics played a major role. UCLA and USC refused to cooperate with the investigation headed by PCC Commissioner Victor O. Schmidt, insisting that all member institutions cheated and had to be investigated as well. Robert S. (Skinny) Johnson, Sproul’s close adviser and confidant, wrote to Sproul:
No other institution, with the possible exception of USC, had departed so flagrantly from the Pacific Coast Conference code as has UCLA during the regime of Coach Sanders. Since the two institutions between them have won all but two or three games with other conference foes during the last five years, usually by humiliatingly large scores, they are setting a pattern of behavior which other institutions are willy-nilly being compelled to adopt.

UCLA, known then as the “Southern Branch” of the UC system, had long sought equal footing with UC Berkeley. Key Regents supported them, as did the Los Angeles press. Southern California media routinely scorned the faculty athletic representatives and UCLA students hanged Commissioner Schmidt in effigy. USC and UCLA pressed forward, urging the rewriting of a more “realistic” athletic code. In a letter of support written to Kerr and Seaborg by Professor Joel Hildebrand on behalf of the Representative Assembly of the Academic Senate, he stated:

The contribution that athletics, under favorable conditions, can make to character and sportsmanship is obviously not made in institutions whose officers, alumni and players condone the deliberate violation of rules that their own representatives have made. The proposal that these rules be relaxed as a concession to realism is itself unrealistic. So long as victory is regarded as so important as to be worth buying, the bidding will remain competitive and stop at no limit set. (Seaborg, 2000, p. 230)

Thus the stalemate between the North and South factions of the PCC continued.

UCLA supporters were convinced that PCC actions directed against it were part of Sproul’s and UC Berkeley’s efforts to maintain its second class status. By late November 1956, the UCLA Alumni Association and the Academic Senate had endorsed UCLA’s withdrawal from the Conference. As the pressure and contentiousness continued to grow among the PCC members, the UC Regents adopted the “Five Points” program for intercollegiate athletics in June 1957, including a 2.5 GPA requirement in college preparatory courses, need-based financial aid and the elimination of the round-robin scheduling requirement. The Regents stated for the first time that if the PCC did not adopt these standards, then the UC campuses would withdraw from the Conference. These recommendations guaranteed the dissolution of the PCC.

The Regents recommendations for change and reform of the PCC in retrospect seem like noble goals to maintain academic integrity. Oregon State president, A. L. Strand, a loser in the dissolution of the PCC, was more vehement in his reaction to UC’s withdrawal from the PCC. In a letter to Sproul, he stated:

When the paper rubbish of our lives is being examined by some future historian, I want him to find this reply attached to your telegram. The actual reasons for California (Berkeley) and UCLA dropping out of the PCC are as different as day and night. The latter’s part in the conference trouble, which began with the revelations of dishonesty on a wholesale basis at UCLA, USC, and Washington, nearly two years ago, has been despicable from start to finish. Pressure from within and without the Los Angeles institution brought about the action of the California Regents on December 13. The reasons for the parent institution (Berkeley) getting out are various – political to save unity in its organization and to protect UCLA from expulsion – athletic and academic because its officials, its faculty senate, and student leaders are out of sympathy with the seemingly inescapable practices of highly competitive intercollegiate athletics. [Emphasis added]

Scott Newhall, long-time editor of the San Francisco Chronicle, editorialized about the demise of the PCC at the beginning of the 1958 football season. He referred to the cultural gap between northern and southern California as a disease, “Losangelism,” that began at USC, spread to UCLA and eventually killed the PCC. His reference to UC Berkeley in the concluding section of the editorial brings a smile to the reader today while highlighting a cultural difference that has never disappeared:

California has joined with USC, UCLA, and Washington in forming a new football league. USC does not have the same admissions standards as California. Neither do most of the teams which have been suggested to fill empty spaces on California’s schedule for future nonconference years. Their common interest seems to be large, full stadiums and winning teams. Thus the erstwhile academic saint has turned up unexpectedly in the company of the pack of athletic rascals. Losangelist ‘realism’ has won. Good-by, Pacific Coast Conference. Good luck East Bay Packers! (Seaborg, 2000, pp. 353-354)

After the dissolution, the new conference, the Athletic Association of Western Universities formed. Its four members, UC Berkeley, UCLA, USC and University of Washington, ironically, were all on probation as a result of the very violations that eventually led to the dissolution of the PCC. Stanford did not join initially, principally because of its anger with UCLA over Chancellor Raymond Allen’s statement that Stanford cheated as well, but ultimately joined after a few months. By 1964,
Washington State, Oregon State and the University of Oregon were all back in the fold and in 1968 the conference was renamed the Pac-8. Glenn Seaborg departed for Washington to head up the Atomic Energy Commission for President John F. Kennedy in 1961. Edward Strong, a Cal philosophy professor, replaced him. Kerr remained president until 1967.

As administrators haggled over whether or not to provide athletic scholarships or offer exceptional admissions to future ball players, they failed to address the connection between intercollegiate athletics and the academic program. The lack of articulation of a concrete mission for college sports within the failing PCC and the future Pac-8, 10, and 12, will be a recurring issue throughout Cal's history.

2. Into the Modern Era of College Sports: The California Master Plan, A Campus in Turmoil and the Expansion of Big-Time Athletics

Immediately following the dissolution of the PCC, the Master Plan for Higher Education became law in 1960. The key architect of that plan, Clark Kerr, created a system of higher education that became the envy of the world. One of its provisions increased the eligibility requirements for admission to the University of California. The press and many alumni viewed one likely outcome of this decision as a de-emphasis of intercollegiate athletics. The *San Francisco Chronicle* even ran a poll in 1961 titled: “Should Stanford and the University of California Abandon Intercollegiate Athletics?” The overwhelming response was “No.” The respondents rejected any form of de-emphasis, including the adoption of an Ivy League model (Seaborg, 2000, p. 388). That was not Seaborg’s successor, Chancellor Edward Strong’s view. In his oral history, he says:

As vice chancellor, at times when Glenn couldn't attend, I was sent as his representative to the PAC 8 football conference. I knew that compared to Glenn Seaborg, Adrian Kragen and other sports buffs didn’t think I was as ardently committed to big-time athletic prowess as Glenn, obviously, was committed. What I, indeed, had favored (and I had already expressed myself on this) was the kind of competition, the kind of situation, that had been established in the Ivy League.

Clark Kerr had similar views but exploratory discussions with the Ivy League led nowhere. Seaborg had also appointed Marv Levy as Cal’s new football coach. In his book, *Marv Levy: Where Else Would You Rather Be?* Levy writes about the very cold reception he received from the public and the press after being named head coach:

I was a pretty nice fellow, and so I couldn't understand why everyone there was so disturbed about my arrival. I then realized it wasn’t me with whom they were angry. Their ire was directed primarily at the Cal administration, which was perceived as wanting to de-emphasize what had once been an outstanding football program. Lynn “Pappy” Waldorf’s three consecutive Rose Bowl teams from 1948 – 1950 were distant memories. Pappy’s teams had gone downhill quickly after 1950 (Levy, 87, 2004).

Former basketball coach Pete Newell became Athletic Director in 1960 and encountered a campus in the throes of transformative change. Newell had already achieved legendary status as one of the great college basketball coaches. He led Cal to its 1959 NCAA basketball championship, and one year later coached the US Olympic basketball team to its gold medal victory. It was not the campus he knew as basketball coach in the 1950s and the job of athletic director was substantially different. It placed him in the middle of a political maelstrom soon to unfold in the form of the Free Speech Movement, a counter cultural revolution, protests surrounding the Vietnam war and racial injustice, and a student population hell bent on changing the world; alumni and donors yearning for a return to the glory years of Cal football; and a university administration buffeted by conflicting values and monumental societal change both within and without its walls.

In the ensuing years, Newell would contrast Seaborg, who appointed him, with campus administrators he viewed as “weak kneed” people who too readily gave in to student protest demands. When the department of intercollegiate athletics separated from the ASUC and reported directly to the central campus administration, money was harder to come by and Newell had to generate more revenue from alumni donors. A substantial number of those donors took out their anger with the campus administration on Newell. Newell became AD after the 1960 season and remained in that position until 1968. For anyone involved in athletics at that time, UC Berkeley could be sheer hell.

“We went through the most harrowing, difficult times that any Division I school ever went through,” Newell recalls. “The six o’clock news always featured Berkeley, and the other schools just jumped all over us. In recruiting they’d say, ‘You don’t want your son to go to Berkeley, he’ll become a Communist, he’ll be a drug addict.’ And the parents would think, 'I'm not going to send my kid up there and have him lose his religion or get in with that hippie culture.' It was almost disadvantageous to be a fraternity or sorority member, and any kind of clean-cut look was almost frowned upon.” (Bruce Jenkins, *A Good Man: the Pete Newell Story* pp. 208-209)
Newell went on to say, it was difficult enough to replace Seaborg on any front, but his departure left a massive void in Cal sports. By the mid-1960s, the key administrative figures were chancellor Roger Heyns, president Clark Kerr and vice president (sic) Earl Cheit (Cheit was executive vice chancellor), none of whom gave much credence to Cal athletics” (Jenkins, p.210). Jenkins failed to add that, considering the challenges Chancellor Heyns and others faced, intercollegiate athletics of necessity was a very small blip on the radar screen. Those challenges included seemingly endless protest and negative international news coverage, pushes to “reconstitute” the university, and a governor elected by attacking the UC Berkeley campus in particular and who, when elected, summarily led the charge to remove Kerr as president.

Newell stepped down in 1968 following a major contretemps in the basketball program under coach Rene Herreraias. The coach insisted on certain standards of comportment of his team, including their hairstyle, and star of the team, Bob Presley’s afro, did not meet requirements. Presley refused to cut his hair and was removed from the team. He was later reinstated and became a symbol of racial oppression by the Black Power movement. This was a major news story at the time and accusations of racism and concern over the academic qualifications of some of the players abounded. Paul Brechler, an Iowa AD and the first commissioner of the Western Athletic Conference replaced Newell.

Issac Curtis, an African American star athlete for Cal in both track and football, failed to take an SAT exam as required when admitted in 1969. The administration took responsibility for this bureaucratic error. The NCAA was not satisfied with that explanation and stated that Cal could no longer continue to play Curtis. Cal Track and Field had recently been crowned national champions under its new coach, Dave Maggard, a former Cal football player and shot putter who came in fifth in the 1968 Olympics. Curtis ran for Cal that year and had to forfeit the title. The Golden Bear Athletic Association, an independent booster organization, sued the NCAA.

By 1971, a new administrative team occupied California Hall, Albert Bowker as Chancellor and Robert Kerley as administrative Vice Chancellor. Bowker, a statistician, had been Dean of Graduate Studies at Stanford and the head of the City University of New York, before arriving at UC Berkeley. When asked during his UC Berkeley interview what his views were on intercollegiate athletics, he says in his oral history, “Bob Haas, who was on one of these committees, asked me about intercollegiate athletics, I remember. Up to that moment I had never in my life probably given it one moment's thought. [laughter] I gave the usual nonsense--character--building, competition, and so forth.”

Bowker and Kerley believed that Curtis should continue to play despite NCAA threats that any games he played in would be forfeited. Brechler and Maggard opposed taking on the NCAA. Walter Byers, the executive director of the NCAA, had initiated a stronger enforcement program, for the times, and could not allow Cal to so blithely ignore its ruling. Byers, Brechler and Maggard also knew that the Curtis matter was just the tip of the iceberg. There were other serious violations as well. Brechler never adjusted to UC Berkeley and resigned. Bowker and Kerley appointed Maggard in 1972 as the new AD. Maggard convinced Kerley that cooperation with the NCAA was the best route to take. He also got the Golden Bear Athletic Association to drop the lawsuit. Nevertheless, the NCAA imposed severe sanctions on Cal.

Maggard’s job was not easy. No fund raising operation was in place. Student fee money from the campus was declining. Cal's NCAA sanctions were severe, probation and no participation in bowl games for 4 years. Maggard did away with the Golden Bear Athletic Association by bringing it under the umbrella of intercollegiate athletics and naming the new organization Bear Backers. Thus began the formal fund raising effort for intercollegiate athletics, one aim of which was to endow the various sports. Kerley had fired Ray Wilsey as football coach as the NCAA uncovered violations beyond the Issac Curtis matter and Maggard replaced him with Mike White. White moved the program in a more positive direction but ended up being dismissed in 1977 in part over concerns raised by the faculty over the quality of students being admitted to play football at Cal. Maggard hired Roger Theder to replace him.

The 1970s also saw the emergence of women's intercollegiate sports through the passage of Title IX in 1972. Women's intercollegiate sports were part of the Department of Physical Education until 1976 when the first director of Women's Intercollegiate Athletics, Lue Lilly, was hired. The campus decided to keep the women's and men's program as separate departments, believing that this provided the most opportunity for the women's program to flourish. Lilly reported directly to Kerley. During the same time period, the campus created the Department of Recreational Sports under William Manning. Again, the Department of Physical Education had the responsibility for instruction in various sports and the management of a large intramural program. Coaches in the minor Olympic sports taught some of these courses and had appointments in the Physical Education Department. Manning was an associate professor in that department. The Department, however, had less and less interest in these programs, instead focusing on building up their research reputation. The Department of Recreational Sports reported to the Associate Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs.
Maintaining three separate departments, contrary to the practice at most other universities and colleges, with different reporting lines, limited resources and limited facilities inevitably led to intense competition among the programs, frequent unresolved conflicts and ill will just below the surface. The administration never emphasized the importance of all sports nor fostered a model of cooperation. Instead, the administration principally adjudicated conflict and supported the three programs independently of one another to the extent possible. The Men’s program had the lion’s share of the resources and viewed the other two programs as threats to that resource base.

Nevertheless, the Recreational Sports program flourished. Manning and others worked closely with the ASUC leadership to pass a student fee referendum, which enabled the construction of the Rec Sports building in the early 1980s. A state of the art facility at the time, it is heavily used to this day by many thousands of students, faculty, staff and members of the community. Creative programming, careful management and student referenda approved fees have enabled the program to serve the entire campus community with little central campus financial support in contrast with the millions of dollars it provides annually to the 900 intercollegiate student athletes. This raises a fundamental question of equity and fairness that has never been addressed.

The Women’s program required a substantial subsidy from the central campus. It had very little history, tradition, fan base, body of donors or even a publicity arm to generate revenues. While the campus administration was forthcoming in its funding for the program – in part because it had to be as a result of Title IX – the disparities between the Men’s and Women’s programs were glaring. Cramped office space, shared uniforms among some teams, minuscule salaries for coaches, few athletic scholarships, extreme difficulty in attracting publicity and a very rudimentary fund raising program characterized the early years of the program. It did not deter the enthusiasm of the bare bones staff and coaches. They and the women student athletes were thrilled to compete and to build the program.


In 1980, Albert Bowker stepped down as Chancellor and Ira Michael Heyman, Bowker’s executive vice chancellor and a professor in the Law School, replaced him. The campus was going through considerable change. Even then, the percentage of state funding coming to the campus was declining. Heyman knew that private fund raising was essential if the UC Berkeley campus was to maintain its preeminence. This was a hard sell at a time when the vast majority of the public believed they were already supporting public education through their taxes. Interestingly, Maggard established the first fund raising effort for athletic facilities and succeeded in securing Chancellor Roger Heyns and Walter Haas, long-time athletics supporter, owner of the Oakland A’s and head of Levi Strauss, to co-chair the effort. Heyman saw that athletics was raising more money at that time than any other unit on campus. He adopted Maggard’s model and brought over many of their donors for the larger campus fund raising program. Many of those individuals continue to be major supporters of Cal to this day.

The demographics of the state were rapidly changing with a growing percentage of Hispanics and Asians. Heyman believed strongly that the campus student body had to encompass the population of the state and was thus a very public advocate for affirmative action. Simultaneously, Heyman needed to raise funds from campus donors as part of an effort to restructure the biological sciences, a herculean task.

At times, these goals conflicted with one another. Heyman created the first major development office on the campus and appointed Curtis R. Simic the first vice chancellor of that unit. The competitive nature of admissions increased and some of the well-to-do alumni/donors, mostly white, did not appreciate what affirmative action was doing to the chances for their sons and daughters being admitted to UC Berkeley. A reorganization of the biological sciences required new buildings with modern laboratories. This was not high on the list of donor priorities so a great deal of convincing was necessary.

Heyman, as the Pac-10 representative to the President’s Commission of the NCAA, was also skeptical of the intercollegiate athletics enterprise and tried to reform it. Continuing scandals involving academic fraud, eligibility issues, under the table payments to athletes, the glorification of high school athletes in the media and the financial arms race drove Heyman to give a highly critical speech at the 1987 NCAA convention in Dallas. Heyman received considerable national attention and cemented his reputation as a critic of big-time athletics programs. As a member of the President’s Commission, Heyman tried to implement a mandatory freshmen redshirt for student athletes as a way of smoothing their transition to college life. This idea was blocked by intervention from ADs and coaches and signaled the end of Heyman’s reform efforts.

Despite his critical views, Heyman, was both a high school and college athlete, and regularly attended Cal football and basketball games until his death in 2012. He was also responsible for two significant developments in the athletic program during his term as Chancellor, the creation of the Athletic Study Center and the initiation of what came to be called “Blue Chip Admits”.

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During Heyman's tenure, the Men's and Women's athletic programs reported to the Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs, Mac Laetsch. In 1982 Joe Kapp, a highly successful quarterback at Cal and in the NFL, became Cal's football coach after Theder, who lost one too many games. Kapp developed a friendship with political science professor, Robert Price, the current Associate Vice Chancellor for Research. Kapp faced major challenges keeping some of his players eligible and sought Price's assistance. Price met some of these student athletes and was shocked at their lack of academic preparation. Price believed that UC Berkeley, once admitting these students, had an obligation to help them succeed. Ken Jowitt, another political science professor and then Dean of Undergraduate Studies, worked with Professor of Architecture Russ Ellis, a special assistant to Laetsch at the time and later his replacement as Vice Chancellor, to create the Athletic Study Center (ASC) in 1984. Two other political science professors, Jack Citrin and Aaron Wildavsky also helped the effort. Some in California Hall referred to this group as the “jock sniffers” but without them, the creation of the Athletic Study Center would have been put off to the distant future.

Letters and Science Advising and the Student Learning Center opposed the creation of the ASC believing that student athletes should be treated like any other students. In this same vein, Professor Robert Steidel, the Faculty Athletic Representative, questioned whether preferential enrollment in classes for athletes because of their practice schedules did not constitute a special benefit under NCAA rules, despite the existence of similar programs on several other campuses. The ASC ended up reporting directly to Vice Chancellor Laetsch with an initial budget of $50,000, later to be substantially increased when Price provided the figures on what UCLA and other institutions were spending on similar programs. Football and men's basketball players were almost exclusively the recipients of this service. That gradually changed over time. When Derek Van Rheenen took over the program in 2001, he emphasized expanding the program to include all student athletes who had need of this service.

The second major contribution to athletic governance made by Heyman was the “Blue Chip” admission program. Despite strong reservations, and at the urging of former Chancellor Heyns and Walter Haas, Chancellor Heyman approved the admission of 20 student athletes per year whose academic qualifications were marginal. This occurred at a time when the demand for admission to UC Berkeley was accelerating but was nowhere near what it is today. A careful process of evaluating these admits was put in place. Coaches had to show that each of the admits had the potential to succeed at the University, and the faculty had representatives on the committee to safeguard the process. The students admitted through this process were monitored and tracked with reports provided to the committee members. Heyman appointed Citrin as the new Faculty Athletic Representative in 1990, replacing Steidel. Citrin would also help oversee the blue chip admit process.

In 1990 Heyman stepped down and Chang-Lin Tien became Chancellor. Tien had heard the criticisms of Heyman for his lack of support of intercollegiate athletics and set up a Blue Ribbon Committee chaired by Professor Neil Smelser to review the role of sports at UC Berkeley, including the Rec Sports program and Men's and Women's Intercollegiate Athletics Programs. The committee report gave a nod to the importance of a Rec Sports program for students, faculty and staff, but its principal recommendations dealt with intercollegiate athletics. The report endorsed a broad based, highly competitive program that mirrored the excellence of the academic program at UC Berkeley; urged the Chancellor to endorse this aim unambiguously; recommended the merger of the Men's and Women's athletics programs with Rec Sports; and recommended the creation of a financial plan to meet these objectives.

Tien inherited a severe economic downturn in the early years of his chancellorship. An early retirement program was initiated to address it, and, as a result, the university lost over 450 tenured faculty. This was not an auspicious time to spend more money on athletics. Tien addressed the major financial downturn by setting up a joint Academic Senate/Administration board called the Academic Planning Board. John Heilbron, the Academic Vice Chancellor and former chair of the Senate chaired this group. It focused on strategic excellence, not broad based excellence, and the Associate Chancellor for Budget and Planning, Jim Hyatt, created what came to be known as Cal Profiles, an extensive data base for financial and academic planning that replaced a budget process of annual increments or decrements, depending on the overall budget situation in any given year. Tien may well have been wary of a program of broad based excellence for intercollegiate athletics at a time when the administration and Academic Senate were focused on retrenchment.

Tien, a detail oriented manager, never responded in writing to Smelser. Tien indicated in a press release that he intended to merge the programs, praised the committee for its work and indicated that he would consult widely on campus and off about the specific recommendations. No financial plan ensued.

The merger of men's and women's athletics and recreational sports led to Maggard's resignation after 19 years as athletic director. He had a lucrative offer from the University of Miami, believed that the Men's program was in the black and experiencing a successful run in football and basketball under coaches Bruce Snyder and Lou Campanelli respectively, and that
it was time for a change. Maggard knew that neither he nor Manning nor Lilly would be chosen for the new head of the merged department. The tension and conflict that existed among them for a long time precluded that. As Maggard departed, he urged Tien to hold on to Snyder and Campanelli to ensure the continued success of the program. Tien chose Bob Bockrath, Associate Athletic Director from the University of Arizona, as the new head of the merged departments in 1992.

Bockrath lasted two years. He succeeded in merging the departments but was described by many as simply not being a good fit for Cal. He did not have an outgoing personality, did not engage well with donors and, as one of his chief lieutenants stated, was a “square peg in a round hole.” He fired Lue Lilly and replaced her with Chris Dawson, a long-time assistant to Lilly and one of her first hires. Lilly had opposed the merger, believing that the women's program would have more power and a better chance of succeeding as a stand-alone operation. Bockrath bungled the firing because he had no stated reason for her release. Her buyout under her existing contract was delayed several months leading her to seek legal counsel to redress the issue. Bockrath would not permit her to even volunteer for the women's program as a fundraiser.

By 1993, both Snyder and Campanelli were gone. Campanelli's volatile personality led to his removal for verbally abusing his players and losing their confidence in him. Snyder, after a 10-2 season and a trip to the Citrus Bowl was a hot commodity. Cal paid Snyder $250,000 and Arizona State doubled that amount in its offer. Walter Haas made it known to Tien that he and others would make up the difference. Tien declined the offer stating that he could not have a football coach making more than the highest paid faculty member on the campus. Tien harkened back to old values built into the campus ethos going back to Sproul and Kerr and certainly echoed by Chancellors Strong and Heyman, among others. Despite the strong endorsement of the Smelser committee for a broad based, highly competitive intercollegiate program, and despite the relatively small amount of money involved in retaining Snyder, Tien declined to go down that path and Snyder left. Bockrath made no effort to dissuade either Tien or Snyder in their decisions. According to Earl (Budd) Cheit, the intermediary between Walter Haas and Tien: "And so I called Wally back and I told him, "Chang-Lin is all for a good football program, but he is operating under a sense of what the mission and the ideals of this campus are. And he feels that he can't justify paying him. . . (that amount)"

Bockrath left and Cheit replaced him on an interim basis for six months. At that point, he instructed Chris Dawson to undertake a Title IX review and authorized Bill Manning to initiate discussions on expanding Haas Pavilion rather than seeking a new site. Tien then hired John Kasser as the new AD. Kasser was the mirror opposite of Bockrath in many ways: tall, affable, outgoing, optimistic, inclusive, a good listener, a natural salesman and a strong believer in having Men's and Women's sports and Rec Sports under one roof. He personally welcomed Lue Lilly back into the program in a volunteer fund raising role. While Bockrath became more and more reclusive, Kasser seemed to be omnipresent. He was a good delegator and his senior staff meetings included representatives from all the relevant groups and morale improved.

Kasser had inherited Todd Bozeman as the Men's Basketball coach following Campanelli's departure. Bozeman was an immediate success in his first head-coaching job, leading Cal to the Sweet Sixteen at the NCAA tournament, but Kasser was already hearing rumors about possible recruiting problems. Those rumors turned out to be true. After a long string of investigations by the NCAA and the campus, and shortly before the hearing before the NCAA infractions committee, Bozeman admitted that he paid the parents of one of his star recruits, Jelani Gardner, to secure his commitment to UC Berkeley. Kasser fired Bozeman and hired Ben Braun in 1996. In football, Keith Gilbertson had replaced Joe Kapp under Bockrath's watch but was not successful. Kasser replaced him in 1996, first with Steve Mariucci whom the 49ers recruited away after one year, and then hired Tom Holmoe. The football program languished under his leadership.

Along with these challenges, Kasser had two more important issues to deal with: the completion of Haas Pavilion and reducing the athletic budget. When Tien stepped down in 1997, the cumulative deficit for the combined programs was over $8 million. By 1999, his replacement, Chancellor Robert Berdahl, forgave the total accumulated debt, which had reached more than $18 million. Increasing tuition as a result of the economic downturn during Tien's term added substantial cost to the several hundred athletic scholarships. The department also needed to address Title IX compliance by adding three new women's sports and improving facilities. Finally a central campus “tax” on all auxiliary programs called “full costing” and myriad problems associated with the completion of the Haas Pavilion all played some role in the generation of these deficits.

Donors were upset with Kasser and the campus administration. The Haas Pavilion, a budget approved by the Regents for $40 million ballooned to $62 million, and key donors began to lose faith in the ability of the administration to manage capital projects effectively. This boiled over into internal conflict between Kasser, Vice Chancellor for Business and Administrative Services Horace Mitchell to whom Kasser reported, Chancellor Berdahl and Vice Chancellor for Capital Projects Ed Denton. Berdahl hired Denton in mid-October, 1998, as the first vice chancellor whose exclusive responsibility was to manage capital projects for the campus. Haas Pavilion stands as a much-needed accomplishment for the campus but it regrettably came with considerable acrimony that took years to finally resolve.
Some of that acrimony involved Bill Manning, the person Kasser assigned as the point man from IA for the Haas Pavilion Project. He resigned in 2000 and now directs the Graduate Kinesiology and Sports Management Program at St. Mary's College. Maggard departed nine years earlier and Lilly was fired shortly after that. These three individuals, despite the tensions and conflicts among them, were the pioneers in the development of sports programs at Cal, and their accomplishments are substantial. Hundreds of thousands of members of the Cal family benefited, and continue to benefit, from the foundations they laid many years ago.

The new Chancellor following Tien's resignation, Robert Berdahl, chose to forgive the athletic debt to the campus but under certain conditions. Kasser proposed a student fee referendum as one way of generating more revenue to alleviate the continuing budget shortfalls. In a memorandum of understanding signed by Berdahl, Mitchell and Kasser, a minimum of three sports were to be cut if the student fee referendum failed. It did fail, but no sports were cut. Like Tien, and Heyman before him, Berdahl knew that donors to the campus were critical if UC Berkeley were to maintain its status as one of the best universities in the world. Tien had initiated the $1.4 billion New Century Campaign but stepped down before concluding it. Berdahl had to see it through to completion. As was pointed out previously, several key donors were strong supporters of intercollegiate athletics: The Haas family, Gary Rogers, Warren Hellman, Ned Spieker, Dwight Barker, Barclay Simpson, Bill Ausfahl, Richard Goldman, Donald Fisher to name a few. These were not isolated individuals. Some were former athletes and many served on the Berkeley Foundation Board. If one or more of them were upset, they all knew about it. It was not a propitious time to cut sports. Instead, Berdahl instructed Associate Vice Chancellor Ron Coley, Mitchell's second in command, to do a thorough financial analysis of intercollegiate athletics.

That report, known as the Coley report, was the most detailed analysis of the intercollegiate athletics program to date. It harkened back to the Smelser report of 1991, noting that while the Blue Ribbon Committee had recommended a broad based, highly competitive IA program, no mission statement was ever endorsed by Chancellor Tien nor was any financial plan developed to meet that objective. The poor financial climate during Tien's time in office combined with his unwillingness to spend resources to meet that objective, whether for coaches' salaries or for the true cost of the Haas Pavilion, meant the department was left to assume a goal with no plan to achieve it. In the spirit of "muddling through", IA continued to spend to stay afloat. The Coley report also provided guidelines for a cost-cutting measure, the elimination of sports. If this route was chosen by the administration to bring down costs, the report named baseball as an obvious target for elimination. The ability of that program to generate revenue was minimal, yet it cost the university several hundred thousand dollars a year.

The Coley report was such an eye-opener for the administration that Berdahl's head of public affairs, Matt Lyon, insisted the report remain confidential for fear of a negative faculty reaction. The Coley Report did provide a wealth of data for a small committee appointed by Berdahl of donors, faculty and senior administrators to review the current fiscal situation of IA and come forward with recommendations. Budd Chet chaired this committee and produced the Coley report, issued in 2000. This public report indicated that the campus had asked the Athletic Director to run a broad based, highly competitive program; to ensure equal treatment for women's sports as part of the campus's Title IX commitment; and to maintain a balanced budget. In their view, Kasser had met two of the three objectives but could not balance the budget. The Coley report details the financial difficulties athletics faced. For instance, the department never produced a financial plan. This fact was exacerbated by the designation of intercollegiate athletics as an auxiliary enterprise, or a revenue-generating unit expected to function on its own. As a result, the campus levied a tax, called "full costing" against IA to cover central campus administrative costs related to its operation. In addition, IA had insufficient funds provided to cover Title IX related costs, particularly related to the creation of three new sports. Making matters worse, the UC Berkeley campus's bureaucracy stifled revenue-generating possibilities through sponsorships and use of the campus logo on sports related apparel. Finally, it was unclear to athletics at the time that they were responsible to pay back the cost overruns associated with the Haas Pavilion. For these and other reasons, the report recommended that Berdahl commit an additional $3 million to athletics on a permanent basis. Berdahl agreed, bringing the total campus commitment, on a permanent basis, to $5 million annually, $2 million from registration fees and $3 million from Chancellor's discretionary money.

The Coley report also suggested re-examining the merger of intercollegiate athletics with recreational sports. Despite the Smelser's Committee's prediction, the merger did not lead to any substantial cost savings. The Coley Report also questioned why IA was considered an auxiliary enterprise. Certainly, women's athletics never generated revenue and thus should not be factored into the auxiliary enterprise designation. It urged a reexamination of the reporting line of athletics exclusively to the administrative side of the campus. Athletics is a student activity and, as such, should have a reporting line on the academic side of the campus. Leaving it in its current configuration only isolates it from the larger campus community. Most importantly, the Cheit committee once again adopted the Smelser recommendation of the importance of a broad based, highly competitive program and urged the administration to adopt an unambiguous mission statement clarifying this.
4. **Cal Athletics in the 21st Century**

Kasser resigned in 2000 and took a senior level position with the Pac-10, but not before enduring another scandal. In the spring of 1999, a Professor in Ethnic Studies provided passing grades to two football players who did little or no work for his course. The NCAA cited Cal for academic fraud and a lack of institutional control, and placed the department on probation for five years. These kinds of incidents exact an emotional toll on the AD and the senior administration. They are a major embarrassment for the campus and remain so. In the NCAA’s own accounting of schools by major violations in its history, Cal, along with a few other schools including UCLA, with 7, ranks just behind Oklahoma (8) and Arizona State and Southern Methodist University (9). Stanford has none. Future work by these authors will investigate the nature of these violations, the culture that led to them and suggest efforts to mitigate further infractions. This paper primarily addresses the academic issues.

Kasser did complete the Haas Pavilion during his watch despite the conflicts and difficulties associated with it, unquestionably a major accomplishment. He made great strides in addressing the inequities between the Men’s and Women’s programs. He upgraded the coaching in some of the Olympic Sports and appointed Ben Braun as the Men’s Basketball coach. Kasser brought an inclusive, team oriented approach to management and boosted the morale of the department. He valued the Rec Sports program as part of the merged department and was an excellent public ambassador for Cal.

Steve Gladstone, Cal’s nationally renowned Men’s Crew coach, took over as Athletic Director in 2001. His appointment was controversial and surprised many. Some felt last minute intervention by key donors with Berdahl vitiated the search process since Gladstone was not only a member of the search committee but had very little administrative experience. In these matters, the final decision always rests with the Chancellor and search committees are strictly advisory. Private fundraising became increasingly important to the University as a result of declining state support. Chancellor Berdhal still needed to finish Tien’s $1.4 billion capital campaign and deal with the funding for Memorial Stadium which required heavy reliance on donors. Finally, concern over the accumulating deficits in the intercollegiate athletics program, despite his initial forgiveness of over $18 million in 1999, would also require extensive donor commitments. Yet this reliance on donors came at a cost in the form of influence over key decisions and remains a challenge to this day.

Gladstone’s three year term as AD marked an unprecedented upheaval in the athletic program. He instituted a cultural shift that no longer tolerated Cal as mediocre which was symbolized through his hiring of Jeff Tedford as head football coach. This hire was also a financial necessity. If the monumental financial challenges facing the intercollegiate athletic program had a chance of succeeding, it could only come through a highly successful football program. Cal had to spend money to make money.

Berdahl understood this reality. He came to UC Berkeley from the University of Texas where as President he experienced firsthand the mania associated with football in that state. He also knew that Berkeley was not Texas. He saw the escalating debts for athletic programs as a ticking time bomb. But Berdahl’s time in Texas led to mixed-messages for intercollegiate athletics. He jawboned Gladstone to get the budget under control while simultaneously agreeing to higher athletic administrative and coaching salaries. This included Tedford’s bonus-laden contract making him the highest paid state employee for a period of time. Cal was not unique in this regard. Many university presidents with big-time sports programs had done the same thing. One could simply argue that Cal was late to the game.

Gladstone’s culture shift was also reflected in his oversight of the program. His contract permitted him to continue full time as Crew coach, a highly unusual arrangement for managers of big-time athletic programs. In his first day on the job, he fired two senior staff outside of normal university policy leading to settlements with them approaching $500,000. One of those individuals, Chris Dawson, had previously been his immediate supervisor. This raised concerns of retaliation and of how women would be treated under his leadership. Gladstone reduced the athletics budget through staff reductions including Karen Moe Humphreys, an Olympic Gold medalist, long-time, successful women’s swim coach and athletic administrator. Humphreys sued the University in federal district court alleging gender discrimination. The case received media attention and the University settled, agreeing to reinstate her and pay her legal fees and back pay totaling over $3 million. Consternation within the department led to Vice Chancellor Horace Mitchell bringing in a management consultant to assist Gladstone and the department. Progress made under Kasser in addressing Title IX inequities waned under Gladstone.

The combination of his coaching commitments and his responsibilities as AD precluded Gladstone from fulfilling one of his central obligations: attending Pac-10 and NCAA meetings. Gladstone did hire competent senior staff but they were thrust into a new, contentious environment where institutional memory had disappeared. Teresa Kuehn Gould remains in the athletic department today as Deputy AD and is highly regarded. Her assignment under Gladstone included the supervision of all 24 Olympic sports, an enormous job given to the sole woman on his staff. Gladstone hired Mark Stephens as his number two, the
person responsible for the day-to-day management of the program. Stephens was a star lineman and team captain for Cal football in the early 1980s and an exceptional student. He signed briefly with the Pittsburgh Steelers before a career-ending injury. He received his MBA from Stanford and worked in the financial industry and for Santa Anita Race Track before coming to Cal. One of Stephens' jobs was attending countless meetings with budget officials in California Hall attempting the impossible – a broad based, highly competitive program that mirrored the excellence of the academic program. That kind of mandate required money the campus could not spare. Instead, Chancellor Berdahl insisted on reducing the deficit but the AD would not cut sports or reduce the cost of escalating athletic scholarships, the coin of the realm of successful athletic programs.

Gladstone had little interest in the Rec Sports program and the responsibility for that moved to Horace Mitchell's Associate Vice Chancellor, Ron Coley. It remains there today and now runs in the black. In 2004 Gladstone stepped down as AD to return full time to coaching. The same year, Mitchell departed to become the President of Cal State Bakersfield, and Berdahl retired. The Regents appointed Robert Birgeneau Chancellor with a start date in the fall of 2004. Before leaving, Berdahl asked John Cummins to oversee the management of the intercollegiate athletics program with a mandate to control the budget, and to chair the search for a new AD.

The search process was put on a fast track, and a committee with substantial donor and faculty representation undertook the task with help from headhunter Bob Beaudine. Mark Stephens was the heir apparent. Donors advised Gladstone on Stephens' hiring and even then saw Stephens as the next AD. Some believed Berdahl had committed to that. Despite this donor influence, Birgeneau's first decision as incoming Chancellor, was the selection of Sandy Barbour, the deputy AD at Notre Dame and before that the AD at Tulane University, to run Cal Athletics. By any measure, she was the more experienced candidate. Certain donors found this extremely upsetting but Birgeneau held firm and Barbour remains AD today. During her tenure, the Simpson Student Athlete High Performance Center and the renovation of Memorial Stadium were completed and Cal has achieved its highest ranking ever, third, in the Sears Cup, the annual measure of the most successful intercollegiate athletics programs. Her reputation for hiring good, successful coaches continued at Cal, most notably in Men's and Women's basketball. As with other ADs, and perhaps even more so, her path to these achievements was filled with challenges and conflicts that remain to this day. Her major shortcoming, in line with her two predecessors, were matching revenues with expenditures, and having more effective financial controls in place with more transparency and accountability.

In taking over the responsibility for intercollegiate athletics, both Chancellors Berdahl and Birgeneau agreed with Cummins' suggestion to make major decisions affecting the budget of the program transparent and involve faculty. The chair and vice chair of the Academic Senate at that time, Robert Knapp and Alice Agogino respectively, were considering joining a new intercollegiate athletics reform effort called the Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics (COIA). This is an organization of faculty representatives from Academic Senates in FBS Division I programs whose principal objective is bridging the athletic/academic divide at many big-time schools. Knapp and Agogino also considered setting up a standing committee of the Academic Senate on intercollegiate athletics. A compromise evolved leading to the establishment of the University Athletics Board (UAB) co-chaired by the chair of the Academic Senate and a senior administrator. Membership included the Athletic Director, senior administrators, faculty members, student athletes and alumni/donors. This group continues to meet three times yearly and provides advice to the Chancellor on a range of matters including budgetary considerations, admissions, retention and graduation rates of student athletes, their personal well-being, Title IX and other compliance matters, and the emphasis placed on academic values within the intercollegiate athletics program. The board also submits annual reports to the Chancellor on these and other matters related to the athletics program.

A Chancellor's Advisory Committee on Athletics existed for many years. It met sporadically and was largely ineffectual. The UAB has devoted more attention to intercollegiate athletics but even it has failed to submit annual reports. For the UAB to be thorough, persistent and successful as an advisory body to the Chancellor, high level analytical staffing is required. Members of the UAB are all extremely busy and it is difficult to bring sustained attention to the matter of intercollegiate athletics without strong staff support.

In its early meetings, the most pressing item was dealing with the budget. Professor Calvin Moore was instrumental in establishing an agreed upon glide path with Vice Chancellor Nathan Brostrom to bring the campus contribution to the budget down to $5 million annually. Brostrom, the new Administrative Vice Chancellor had assumed responsibility for intercollegiate athletics from Cummins in 2006. A difference of opinion on whether the $5 million did or did not include the average annual $2 million contribution in student fees concluded in the administration's favor, thus leading to a $7 million annual campus contribution to intercollegiate athletics. An analysis by Mark Stephens preceding that decision indicated that reducing sports to 16, the minimum allowed under NCAA rules to participate at the Division IA level, would save $4 million. Chancellor Birgeneau decided that a savings of that amount was not worth the headache that cutting that number of sports would create.
By 2007, under Barbour’s leadership athletics reduced its dependence on campus funds to $7 million annually. In that year, Chancellor Birgeneau forgave athletics’ an accumulated deficit of $31.3 million, as his predecessor Berdahl did in 1999. From that year on, any deficit (that amount in excess of all revenues, including the annual $7 million campus contribution) was viewed as a loan to be repaid by intercollegiate athletics. Much skepticism followed this decision since previous “loans” over several years were solved through forgiveness of the debt.

The Great Recession hit in 2008 and, in the 2008-09 budget year, the athletics deficit jumped, requiring the campus to provide a loan of an additional $6 million on top of its $7 million annual contribution. This loan occurred as the campus faced the worst budget crisis in its history. Intercollegiate athletics budgets are based on revenue projections that attempt to account for variables, some outside their control. In this case, heavy rains affected ticket sales in football, and tuition increases tied to athletic scholarships continued to rise. The economic crisis also contributed. Those reasons meant little to a group of faculty who began to bore in with great intensity on every aspect of the intercollegiate athletics program. Their concerns were not without merit in light of a history of accumulating deficits over almost twenty years totaling some $170 million at a time when the campus faced substantial staff layoffs and furloughs. An Academic Senate resolution passed in November 2009, requesting that the Chancellor stop any further subsidy to intercollegiate athletics. The debate over this issue and the Senate resolution received considerable public attention.

The Senate resolution also led to the creation of an Academic Senate Task Force on Intercollegiate Athletics and, in March 2010, the Chancellor set up his own Advisory Council on Intercollegiate Athletics Financial Sustainability composed of four alumni/donors and four faculty members. Professor Calvin Moore chaired the Task Force and served on the Chancellor’s Advisory Council. He was the principal author of the Task Force report, and Professor Chris Kutz, the chair of the Academic Senate, was the principal author of the Chancellor's Advisory Council report. Only two of the 91 Senate members who voted in favor of the resolution served on either of these committees.

Over a period of 19 years, five substantial reports on the intercollegiate athletics program presented findings that focused principally on the financing of the program, including the previously mentioned Smelser, Coley and Cheit reports. The Task Force on Intercollegiate Athletics Report and the Chancellor’s Advisory Council on Intercollegiate Athletics Financial Sustainability Report have quite similar findings. They agree on the level of annual central campus support, $5 million, and a glide path to reach that number by 2014. Both groups commend the intercollegiate athletics program for demonstrating broad based excellence as demonstrated in the Sears Cup rankings and for the academic achievements of most student athletes. Whereas previous reports offered to bridge the divide between academics and athletics, these new iterations ignore the declining graduation rates in football and men’s basketball and offer no solution. They both fault the department and the administration for poor financial management and for tolerating a culture where expenditures exceeded revenues for many years. While external sources of revenue, including private fund raising, have increased substantially, both exhibit the belief that there is still considerable untapped potential there.

Following the issuing of these reports, Chancellor Birgeneau announced in September 2010, the elimination of four sports, baseball, men’s and women’s gymnastics, and women's lacrosse and the transitioning of rugby to a new designation as a varsity club sport. Approximately 160 student athletes were affected by these cuts. Roster adjustments to accommodate Title IX concerns could have increased that number. The anticipated savings amounted to $4 million. The pushback from alumni, donors and the public at large was considerable. While some in the athletic department and elsewhere viewed the decision as a needed step to more properly align the size of the program with existing facilities and financial exigencies, Birgeneau left an opening for the restoration of these sports. He cited a figure of $100 million as an endowment. Supporters of these sports worked very hard and raised $20 million in gifts and pledges, with a promise to do more. That was enough for the Chancellor to restore all the sports some months later.

5. Current Issues facing Cal Athletics

Before concluding the history of Cal Athletics governance, three other subjects require further comment: the completion of the Student Athlete High Performance Center and Memorial Stadium, the dramatic decline in graduation rates for football and men’s basketball players, and the dismissal of Coach Jeff Tedford.

The Student Athlete High Performance Center and Memorial Stadium opened in 2011 and 2012 respectively represent substantial architectural achievements and signify a boon to the intercollegiate athletics program. Serious planning for these buildings began in 1998. Unsurprisingly, both projects were full of controversy and conflict. Several lawsuits eventuated from neighborhood organizations and the City of Berkeley challenging various aspects of the Long Range Development Plan and related environmental impact reports. These created project delays, accommodations and added costs. A 21-month tree sitter
occupation consumed police and public affairs resources. A law passed the legislature exempting Memorial Stadium from a provision of the Alquist-Priolo Act that set valuation standards on renovation of buildings straddling an active fault. These and other challenges resolved after years of effort and at great expense.

Paying for these buildings presents the next challenge. A financial plan approved by the Regents involves bond financing totaling almost $500 million with intercollegiate athletics revenues pledged to pay off the bonds. The revenues include gifts, naming opportunities, the rental of the facility, a ticket surcharge, and, most importantly, the Endowed Seating Plan (ESP). Again, much controversy surrounds the level of risk involved in this financial model. The success of the model depends on consistently successful football teams. This model has proved difficult for most schools, has not been part of Cal's history for many decades, and can skew values fundamental to an educational institution.

Jeff Tedford, who became the most successful coach in Cal football history and resurrected the program, lost his job at the end of a dismal 2012 season. As is the case with many coaches, his early successes raised expectations that he could not meet in the latter part of his eleven-year career at Cal. Eight bowl appearances were not enough. A string of mediocre seasons and a graduation rate for his players that ranked last in the Pac-12 and 111th out of 120 in Division I Football Bowl Subdivision sealed his fate. The Stadium and High Performance Center, which his hiring propelled forward, made the decision inevitable. The failure to win led to declining ticket sales, and the sale of seat licenses languished due to the poor 3-9 season. The buyout of Tedford's contract totaled $5.5 million. The new coach, Sonny Dykes, recently appointed by AD Barbour, has hired new assistant coaches. Their salaries have not been released. Dykes' recently released salary is $1.94 million annually, tenth among Pac-12 coaches.

The national and local histories detailed in the first two sections of this paper unveil an American culture of commercial pressures that elevate the influence of prominent individuals and explains how good intentions can go awry. These findings demonstrate the “art of muddling through” and the “normalization of deviancy” in which the culture and structure of institutions shape the day-to-day decisions of administrators. In both the national and local history it is clear that no one person can be blamed for the current state of college sports. Therefore, personnel changes such as new coaches and chancellors will do little to change these systemic issues. The remainder of this report will present data on student athlete graduation rates that should serve as an impetus for immediate action to disrupt this current campus culture.

D. STUDENT ATHLETE GRADUATION RATES: METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION

Faculty since the inception of college sports have pointed out that the competition involved in intercollegiate athletics would compromise academic integrity. To test this claim, the authors examined the graduation rates for both the general student body and student athletes and compared trends across race, gender, and sport. The graduation rates of UC Berkeley's student athlete population illustrate a continuum. White female non-revenue athletes have the highest rates of retention and black male revenue athletes have the lowest rates whereas the remaining student athletes have varying graduation rates depending on sport, race, and gender.

1. Methodology and Explanation of Data

The data collected for this study is from the National Collegiate Athletic Association Graduation Rates Database. The NCAA tracks graduation rates of student athletes under the Federal Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act. According to the yearly report on graduation statistics the NCAA publishes, the figures include information from two groups on campus: "(1) all undergraduate students who were enrolled in a full-time program of studies for a degree, and (2) student-athletes who received athletics aid from the college or university for any period of time during their entering year" (NCAA, 2012). Two problems with these data are as follows. The students in each entering cohort are given six years to complete their college degree or are counted as not graduating. This time-period is based upon the amount allocated for athletic eligibility, or years allowed to participate in a varsity sport. After six years (four of which can be “active participation” in the sport) the student athlete has exhausted his/her eligibility and is no longer considered a member of the NCAA. That means if a student were to earn a degree after seven years, this report would still count them as deficient. Additionally, not all athletes receive aid upon entering the university. In the 2004 entering cohort, 129 student athletes received athletic aid, compared to the 297 number of student athletes admitted. These two points aside, this data still reflects those students who are engaged full time in their sport and are compensated for this participation. These students arguably represent those individuals who arguably feel the greatest level of tension between sport and school since their university provides monies for education based on athletic skill.
Further, the authors of this study chose to examine the Federal Graduation Rates, rather than the Graduation Success Rate. The Federal Graduation Rate (FGR) is calculated by the Department of Education and counts the number of students who graduated within a six-year time frame. The NCAA criticized the FGR because it counts any student who leaves the campus as failing to graduate (i.e. if a student transfers to another university they will be counted as failing to graduate) and so the NCAA in 2005 began its own calculation of graduation rates. This method, known as “Graduation Success Rate” does not penalize the university if a student leaves. Instead, the NCAA removes the student from the calculation if they leave the university in good academic standing. This means if a student transfers, or withdraws (i.e. to play professional sports) then they won’t be counted in the graduation rate calculation (NCAA, 2012). The downside to this method is it does not assess whether the students who left the university ever earn a degree. Both forms of calculation have been criticized for either deflating (FGR) or inflating (GSR) the graduation rates (Zhong, 2008). The authors in this study believe the GSR, which is only used and supported by the NCAA does not offer the same comparability and legitimacy to assess college retention rates as the federally supported FGR. Additionally, since a portion of this paper critiques the NCAA governance, the authors believe it would be hypocritical to use the league’s graduation rate for the analysis. The authors will include the GSR for a point of reference in the appendix.

2. Main Findings

The data reviewed includes several comparisons such as the graduation data of student athletes vs. the general student body; male vs. female student athletes and sport-to-sport comparisons. The data on graduation rates also include a four-year average of data compiled each year. In all categories, white females continue to outperform all other groups. From the entering cohorts of 1998-2005, female students had an average graduation rate of 91% compared to the white male average of 86%. This trend is also present in student athletes where white females graduated at an average of 83% compared to 67% of their male counterparts. Also these numbers demonstrate that white female athletes have retention rates that are much closer to the non-athlete population than white male athletes, suggesting this population successfully completes the demands of school and sports.

The majority of non-white student athletes are African American (the NCAA graduation rates report uses the term “black” so the authors use this to describe African Americans in the remainder of the paper). The average black male graduation rate from the 1998-2006 cohorts was 63%, far lower than the white males (86%). The black male student graduation rate was undoubtedly brought down by low black male athlete graduation rates which counted for a significant portion of the black males on the campus and who graduated at an average rate of 49%. In contrast the black females were the only student athlete group to outperform their non-athlete peers. The average graduation rate for black female athletes was 79% compared to 78% for black female students. Cal’s black female athletes also recorded the highest graduation rates in the study with 100% retention in 2000, 2002, and 2003.

The Olympic sport graduation rates confirm female athlete success and again, present the challenges faced by male athletes. In this area, men consistently underperform women sometimes by as much as twenty percentage points. The average graduation rate for the “other sports” category collected by the NCAA for males was 72% compared to 83% for females. The male Olympic athletes had a low of 65% compared to the females’ low of 80%.

The graduation rate for UC Berkeley’s revenue generating teams are the lowest in the department. Men’s basketball went four years with none of their scholarship student athletes graduating. This brought down their average to a 58% graduation rate over this eight year period. Football also has sub-par graduation rates. Over the past eight years, football graduation rates have ranged from a high of 72% to a low of 31%. Football has the lowest average team graduation rate with only 50% of their scholarship athletes graduating. The numbers are even more grim when broken down by race. In particular, the black scholarship football players, many of whom are special admits, have gone from a high of 80% to a low of 18%. The NCAA also tracks graduation rates by compiling four-year averages to even-out any anomalies. In this data set, the black graduation rates range from a high of 63% to a low of 30%. Three of the seven four-year averages mark the black graduation rate in the 30s.

3. Analysis of Results

On the whole, the student athlete graduation rates are commendable. These students face additional pressures, time commitments, and schedule conflicts that are in many ways unique to the student athlete subculture. Yet when the graduation rates are disaggregated by race, gender, and sport, a different picture emerges, particularly for black male revenue athletes. These abysmal retention rates for black male revenue athletes illustrate that the most visible students of the athletic department are failing to earn a degree from UC Berkeley.
One factor for the poor football graduation rates could be admissions. In conversations with individuals privy to the admission of student athletes, too many football admits received admission in what the policy categorizes as RED admits. These are students whose admissions credentials greatly deviate from the norm. The Athletic Study Center defines this group of students as “intensives,” or those students that require an exceptional amount of academic support. Twenty-five of the roughly one hundred and five members of the team fit that designation. However, another twenty-five come very close to that designation. That means that almost half the football team faces substantial academic challenges that go well beyond the normal student experience at Cal. They must deal with this at the same time they are spending many hours devoted to football, not only in season but out of season as well. One person, in referencing the decision making process of the Student Athlete Admissions Committee, said: “We were all complicit.”

In providing recommendations for athletic reform, it is important to keep in mind UC Berkeley’s intention in admitting students who do not meet the academic standards. After the passage of Proposition 209, the university was no longer able to use “quotas” in admissions. Yet the campus still has a mission to maintain diversity that encompasses the population of California. Black student athletes help to achieve this mission of diversity by increasing the number of black male students on the campus. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) criticized this practice at colleges across this country in Congressional hearings held in 1991 by Representative McMillen and Senator Bradley on the issue of reforming academics in intercollegiate athletics. The AAUP strongly opposed Presidential Admits (special admits) and instead wanted universities to hold all students, even under-represented minorities to a similar academic standard. “Athletic Programs never should be considered as a major way of supporting students [read African Americans] from disadvantaged backgrounds in institutions of higher learning” (Smith, 161, 2011). The authors support UC mission of diversity but believe the university should be held accountable as a major way of supporting students from disadvantaged backgrounds in institutions of higher education.

One other important factor also affects graduation rates for football in particular: the NFL. Those students admitted in the A and B categories with better academic preparation should have less difficulty graduating. Yet the aggregate graduation rate shows that some A and B admits do not successfully complete their academic requirements. There are a variety of reasons for this including the choice to pursue a career in the NFL. Even though a small number of Cal football players leave early for the NFL draft, the culture and pressure of the professional leagues permeates college revenue sports and can influence the academic performance of lesser skilled athletes. This can lead to a student losing interest in their academic performance, and get poor grades, or, even though in good academic standing, simply withdraw. The culture imposed by the coaches and enforced by the athletic director has much to do with successful or poor graduation rates. Clearly defined institutional rules set expectations and provide the foundation to ensure academic success for student athletes in all sports.

While the focus of this paper and the following recommendations center around improving the graduation rates for black male revenue athletes, it should once again be reiterated that this is not the only group of student athletes who could have higher retention rates. The data presented suggest to the authors that the commercialization of college sports might not be isolated to football and men’s basketball. The male student athletes in non-revenue sports do not face the same pressures as football players. They should share a similar athletic and academic experience to their female counterparts, but the data suggest this is not the case. The authors of this paper conclude that the experiences of student athletes at UC Berkeley compose a spectrum. While previous authors have asserted the academic difficulties for student athletes remain isolated in revenue sports, these numbers show that is not the case. Student athletes at UC Berkeley, one of the top universities in the world, face unique challenges and therefore need a campus committed to supporting and integrating their experience.

Two years ago, the campus began a concerted effort to address the poor graduation rates in football and men’s basketball. The plan included hiring five learning specialists to provide additional academic support for these teams. As a result, the men’s basketball graduation rates have incrementally increased. Following his hiring in December 2012, football’s new head coach Sonny Dykes, took public responsibility to ensure that the academic performance of his team would also improve. Graduation rates have fluctuated in these sports for years. The real question is whether the new plan will create long lasting, permanent change.

F. IMPLICATIONS & SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CURRENT CAMPUS LEADERSHIP

This national and local history contextualizes the current issues facing the Chancellor-designate, Nicholas Dirks. College sports remain an entrenched American institution both culturally and as a commercial commodity. Yet the longevity and popularity of an institution does not guarantee its success. The NCAA remains a lack-luster organization in regulating college sports. Conferences continue to expand reaching for multi-billion dollar television contracts in which games can take place any night of the week. To remain competitive in the Big Time, the culture of college athletics inexorably pushes Cal to engage in a spending...
race including ever-increasing its facilities and raising coaches' salaries, all in the hopes of luring the top athletic recruits. To fund this enterprise, Cal Athletics has taken on a financing model that now mimics the Losangelism that Newhall accurately predicted would spread North: the football team must win to finance the endeavor.

1. What happened to the “Student” in Student Athlete? Declining Graduation Rates

The pressure to win, without any checks-and-balances, creates a campus culture tolerant of athletic teams disobeying NCAA regulation. Cal has faced numerous NCAA violations beyond the major ones over the past 50 years. While coaches are reprimanded, or in extreme cases fired, the culture of the campus still permits this action. Practices go longer than planned, recruits are contacted outside of the appropriate window, and pressure from the coaching staff trickles down to the athletes.

It is within this laissez faire governance of college athletics from the campus administration and athletic department that has led to an educational crisis, particularly for the highly valued athletic admits. The growth of college sports over the past fifty years has led to a division of labor in supporting the student athlete. Athletic trainers manage the health aspects, the athletic department is split into ticketing, fundraising, marketing, event management, and operations, each with support staff; the coaches handle the sport related training and the Athletic Study Center has become the sole protector of the “student” in the student athlete.

As quoted from their website, the ASC’s mission is to help student athletes “achieve academic excellence.” By offering academic advising and tutorial support, the ASC’s mission is “to assist students in adjusting to life at Cal, establishing good study habits, and developing sound academic and career plans.” The ASC must also provide guidance to student athletes regarding the NCAA academic eligibility requirements. These rules include minimum enrollment in units, minimum units earned per semester and per year, percentage of degree progress achieved per year, and GPA minimums. In addition to providing major, career, and course counseling, the academic advisors monitor whether the students under their purview meet these NCAA rules. If a student fails to meet any of these requirements then they will be marked “academically ineligible” and unable to practice or compete. The ASC’s reporting line to the Provost instead of the Athletic Department is to guarantee that eligibility does not take precedence over academic achievement. But this line can be difficult to negotiate for advisors and for student athletes.

The ASC must manage both the NCAA and UC Berkeley’s academic bureaucracy. For instance, to be “Academically Eligible” the GPA requirements for the NCAA are as follows: “Student-athletes must achieve 90 percent of the institution’s minimum overall grade-point average necessary to graduate (for example, 1.8) by the beginning of year two, 95 percent of the minimum GPA (1.9) by year three and 100 percent (2.0) by year four.” This results in a student athlete remaining “academically eligible” per NCAA standards while simultaneously being placed on academic probation. At UC Berkeley if any student's cumulative GPA falls below a 2.0 they will be placed on academic probation and given only one semester to raise their GPA. Under this guideline, the student is in good standing athletically but not academically. These conflicting messages cause a headache for the advisers and the student athletes, often detracting from the real mission of the ASC.

The tutorial program aids in the development of educational skills and knowledge necessary to succeed at UC Berkeley. But often, as in the example just mentioned, the tutorial program can be used as a measure to “save” a student from academic probation or becoming ineligible. The mission of the ASC’s tutorial program is to help students “develop the self-reliance and independence” to become successful members of the academy. For the majority of student athletes, the tutorial program has achieved this mission, but for Cal’s biggest revenue sport, football, many athletes retain intensive tutorial support until they graduate or leave the campus. The tutors are mainly undergraduates from across disciplines, with about ten graduate students and three full-time learning specialists to provide support for those in need. As evidenced by the football graduation rates, it will come as no surprise that the majority of graduate students and learning specialists support football players. Stanford, as a comparison, has no learning specialists because they do not recruit student athletes who are so underprepared academically.

In sum, to guarantee that the ASC is able to achieve its mission of supporting the academic development and achievement of student athletes, the commercial pressures must be put in proper balance. In the current state, the drive for football to maintain a winning season each year can too easily compromise the educational program of the athletes. This paper concludes with recommendations for the University to ensure that student athletes are able to access and pursue the same educational opportunities as the rest of the campus community.

2. Clarification of the Role of Athletics at UC Berkeley

With a new Chancellor, a new football coach, a new stadium and high performance center, a larger and more monied conference, the present surely marks a transitional period for intercollegiate athletics at UC Berkeley. These changes all signal
Cal's continued escalation as a Big-Time sports program, and the difficult dilemmas campus administrators face. To fund an intercollegiate program of this magnitude they cannot alienate a substantial donor base. The recent blowback after the elimination, and subsequent reinstatement of five varsity sports, makes the possibility of cutting sports again as a cost saving measure extremely remote for years to come. Further, the athletic deficit places enormous pressures to win. This increases the temptation to gain an extra edge on the competition whether through newer facilities, higher-paid coaches, or longer practices. All this must be achieved on the backs of student athletes who are enrolled in a full-time course load at one of the most prestigious academic universities in the world. Rather than resolving the dilemma of how to maintain a nearly $70 million per year athletic enterprise while still providing a world-class education for the participants, campus administrators continue to muddle through.

The authors believe the campus can, and should, address the dilemmas presented by modern college sports. As universities across the nation continue to expand intercollegiate athletics so does the magnitude of criminal and ethical misconduct. Recent scandals of coaching abuse at Penn State University and Rutgers University and academic integrity violations at the University of North Carolina should serve as harsh warnings to UC Berkeley. After the firing of Rutgers’s coach Mike Rice, The Chronicle of Higher Education warned that college chancellors and athletic directors should stop waiting until a moment of crisis to articulate their institutions core values. Instead, universities must be proactive and re-focus efforts on educating students, or else they will continue to be plagued by scandals (Wolverton, 2013). This is precisely why UC Berkeley must stop muddling through and instead actively decide the following:

3. **What role do sports play writ large at a major public research university and how can they be more fully integrated into the academic program?**

Considering the current state of intercollegiate athletics at UC Berkeley, the campus is at a crucial turning point. External forces and internal decisions are pushing the program away from the central campus and making it function strictly as a business. The campus has a choice. It can allow that direction to continue or it can take action to integrate the program more fully into its central educational mission. Currently, a given Chancellor, athletic director or even a powerful football coach can exert major influence over the program. There is no current campus policy delineating the values of the intercollegiate program and how those values are to be interpreted and implemented. The laissez-faire, muddling through approach has resulted in a growing and successful program accompanied by scandals, NCAA violations, considerable deficits, internal conflict, ambiguity, poor graduation rates and isolation from the campus. Would it not be wise to clarify the campus position in more detail so Chancellors, athletic directors, coaches, student athletes and alumni/donors knew where they stood vis-à-vis campus values and priorities?

In the opinion of the authors, sports could play a substantial, beneficial role for the entire university community. Right now, there is no academic unit on the campus related to sports. Every student admitted under special action policy as a result of special talent, with the exception of athletes, has some related academic home such as theater, dance, music, etc. As this paper demonstrates, sports in this country and throughout the world have undergone enormous transformation in the past 35 years. Sports and its various manifestations are undoubtedly worthy of study. Several universities, including some of UC Berkeley's peers, have academic programs in sports management, sports law, and sports science. UC Berkeley does offer the Cultural Studies of Sport and Education (CSSE) program led by Derek Van Rheenen for a small number of graduate students which provides a sport-specific area of study. CSSE focuses on the intersection of sport and education with particular focus paid to “the philosophy of education; physical education and modern sport in the United States; pedagogical practices of coaches and teachers; issues related to urban education; the sociology of sport; and the academic and athletic identification of student athletes in relation to the social categories of (dis)ability, race, ethnicity, class, and gender.”¹ UC Berkeley eliminated its last sports related program for undergraduates, the Department of Human Biodynamics, in 1997.

One or two related courses in Integrative Biology continue to be taught and are extremely popular but there is no vision for an expansion of this kind of program. Meanwhile, the Student Athlete High Performance Center has a physiology laboratory for intercollegiate athletes as part of its high performance initiative that had no faculty involvement in its planning and is only now, after the fact, trying to solicit it. The Department of Recreational Sports is working with the Tang Center on nutritional programs, an extracurricular effort. It is possible to envision, for example, an undergraduate interdisciplinary major related to sports, nutrition, wellness and physiology/anatomy, if there is the will to do so. Is it not possible to imagine the concept of health and wellness built into the core mission of the University? If ever there was a time to do this, it is now, with so much national attention focused on it. UCLA has recently announced a Healthy Campus Initiative. “The Healthy Campus Initiative will support

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¹ Program description quoted from the Graduation School of Education Website. For more information on CSSE and affiliated faculty please see this link: [http://gse.berkeley.edu/language-literacy-society-culture/csse](http://gse.berkeley.edu/language-literacy-society-culture/csse)
the enhancement and expansion of current health and wellness efforts; offer new and interesting approaches to exercise, mental health and eating well; encourage the creation of new projects, programs and policies; foster synergies and coordination among the myriad groups and programs that support health and wellness at UCLA; and provide students, staff and faculty with fun and exciting ways to make it easy to be healthy and fit.²

4. **The long-standing, uneven, and inequitable relationship between the Intercollegiate Athletics program and the Department of Recreational Sports must be addressed.**

This inequity manifests itself in a number of ways. The most obvious is the underlying inequity in the cost per student for recreational sports as opposed to intercollegiate athletic competition – a $70 million budget for 900 student athletes vs. a $10 million budget for the entire campus community. In a student fee referendum now being voted on for a proposed 35,000 square foot building for the expansion of recreational sports facilities, some students have objected, stating that campus buildings should be paid for by the campus administration. Considering the fact that two Chancellors have forgiven Intercollegiate Athletics approximately $50 million in accumulated deficits, a $29 million dollar building benefiting the entire campus community does give one pause. Long term planning for intercollegiate athletics is another example. It should not be done in isolation but in conjunction with Recreational Sports. Recreational Sports had no say in the planning and execution of the high performance center or the stadium. Now, after the fact and for financial reasons, athletics is negotiating with recreational sports to use 5000 sq. ft. of space in the high performance center. The use of limited facilities, always a nagging issue, should be guided by a set of overarching campus principles that maximize the use of facilities for all students. As intercollegiate athletic programs nationally continue to demand and get exclusive practice facilities for various teams, UC Berkeley must address this issue or let the divide between intercollegiate athletics and the rest of the campus community grow.

5. **Immediate Policy Changes**

Addressing the above matters will require time, considerable effort and a commitment to change. There also are immediate issues that can be addressed as soon as the next academic year that will reinforce the academic commitment to UC Berkeley's student athletes.

a. **Enforcement of the NCAA’s Maximum 20-hour a Week Rule**

The NCAA mandates that during the season teams are only allowed to practice 20 hours per week. “Countable” towards these 20 hours include meetings with coaches present, reviewing film, or any physical activity in which a coach is present and offers suggestions or recommendations to a student athlete. Student athletes will candidly admit that this rule is the least of all followed by coaches. The “practice” time, including on the field/court/water training might be under the allotted time, but, counting in meetings, “optional” practice, and strategizing for competition, the hours can creep up to closer to 30 hours per week. This also does not include the time the student athlete needs to rest, recover, or visit the athletic trainers. In 2007 the NCAA conducted a survey of 21,000 student athletes across the nation and asked respondents to estimate the amount of time they spent on sports per week. “Football players at FBS institutions reported spending 44.8 hours a week practicing, playing, or training for their sport. One in five survey subjects reported that playing a sport prevented them from choosing the major they preferred” (Porto, 2012).

In this environment, how is it possible even for the best prepared student athletes to complete successfully their full time course work? While the majority do, which is a testament to the quality individuals Cal Athletics recruits and the academic support they receive, the graduation rates show that many football athletes are unable to balance their football and educational commitments. Thus, the campus must take a stand against coaches violating this rule. Current campus policy limits graduate students to working 49% time. There are ways to enforce this time restriction that are already in place. The same approach must be used for student athletes.

b. **Admission Standards**

In recounting the history of Cal athletics, it is clear there is a fundamental issue of whether Cal should be admitting student athletes who are so marginally qualified. The decision and policy to admit “Blue Chip” athletes is now more than 35 years old. Adjustments have been made to it over time, but the decision to admit non-UC eligible students has remained. The UC admissions requirements stipulate that students must earn a 3.0 high school GPA in 15 “A-G Core Course” including English, History, Science, Math, Visual or Performing Art, Foreign Language and a College Preparatory Elective. UC Admissions also requires students to take either the SAT or the Act. The UC system does not require a minimum test score for entry into the system, but they do require, if students fail to meet the GPA component, an average SAT score (of the three combined subject areas: math, writing and English) of 580. UC Davis, a new addition to Division I athletics, has held firm on only allowing athletes

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into the university that meet the minimum requirements of UC eligibility. Over the past 35 years admission into UC Berkeley has become increasingly difficult. In 2012 the campus met a historic benchmark with a record number 61,695 applications. The average weighted GPA of the incoming cohort was 4.36 (unweighted GPA 3.89) with the majority of students scoring in the high 700s in each subject area of the SAT. As the academic climate on the campus becomes increasingly competitive, we must ask, isn't it time to revise Cal's student athlete admission policy?

Until recently, the admissions policy for UC Berkeley was a four-tiered system of A, B, C, and D admits. Under the four-tiered system, students had to meet minimum GPA and SAT scores in the A, B, and C category. The A admits were considered UC Eligible, and the B admits had a slight deficiency in meeting the UC eligibility status. The C admits were far below UC Eligibility standards. Each category had to abide by minimum GPA and SAT scores, which were calculated on a sliding scale (i.e. the higher the GPA the lower the SAT score needed to be). The lowest requirement for a C admit was a 2.0 GPA and a 576 average SAT score. More common, students were admitted with slightly higher GPAs, such as a 2.30 but had a much lower SAT requirement, such as a 470. Many C admits were admitted year after year. More troubling under this admission policy were the D admits. These students were considered “Special Admits” and a limited number were brought to UC Berkeley. The D students were those who failed to meet the C status. The only floor established for these special admits was the NCAA Qualifier rule (See page 8 for an explanation of NCAA Qualifier Rule).

In 2011 the campus changed the admission policy to a three-tiered system of: Gold, Blue, and Red. This new policy still uses a sliding scale for GPA and SAT minimums, with one main difference: a new floor for athletic admits. Under this policy, a Red student must have a minimum of a 2.8 GPA and an average of 370 on the three subject areas of the SAT scores. While this minimum is higher than the NCAA qualifier, it is not much higher. This paper recommends a higher minimum for admission for freshmen student athletes. While the authors here don’t specifically address exceptional admission standards for transfer students—an equally murky and controversial set of practices—it is the authors’ intent that changes to the process should be made applicable to all student athletes.

The current sliding scale establishes a minimum SAT score of 370 and a 2.80 high school GPA. Instead, we believe the minimum should be an average of 500 on the SAT subject areas and a 2.5 high school GPA. Data provided by the Director of Student Athlete Development for Cal Football shows that 15 of the 23 most “at-risk” current football student athletes received at least one test score below 400. These students require significantly more academic support and it is unclear, based on the graduation rates provided in this study, whether the odds are in their favor to earn a degree. In addition, under the current policy, students can re-take core courses in which they receive a deficient grade. In other words, a student could receive D’s in five of the 15 core courses, and re-take these to raise their GPA to reach the minimum requirement. Instead, the admissions requirement should limit the number of deficient grades received. While test scores and grades are by no means the only way to measure whether a student will be able to succeed at UC Berkeley, it is worth considering if a student with a 370 average score and a 2.8 high school GPA would be better served at a different institution. Can a student with this profile truly maximize the UC Berkeley experience? It seems this question has not been taken seriously.

The campus offers a Summer Bridge Program for all students whom the admissions committee wants to admit but believes needs extra support before entering UC Berkeley. This program is an eight-week academic intensive “boot camp” for any students exceptionally admitted on the campus. For all 321 students in the 2012 Summer Bridge Program (including 22 student athletes) the average unweighted high school GPA was a 3.69 and the average of their three SAT scores was a 544. Under these criteria, these students would all be “Gold” admits for the athletic department, yet the campus believes they require special support. In contrast, the average student athlete high school GPA was a 3.1 and SAT score was 470. This average includes student athletes who voluntarily completed the Summer Bridge Program. For the student athletes who were mandated by the campus to complete the program as a condition of their admission the numbers were even lower. For the mandated student athletes the average high school GPA was 2.7 with an average SAT score of 427. This gap highlights that the student athletes in the Summer Bridge Program face even greater academic hurdles than other students exceptionally admitted to the University. All student athletes who participated in the Summer Bridge 2012 Program, either by mandate or by choice, were Men’s Basketball and football players. One student athlete from one other sport dropped out of the program during the first week. In order to maximize the student athlete experience at UC Berkeley, particularly for these men's revenue athletes, the campus must

3 When UC Davis transitioned to a Division I program, the University outlined principles to guide this transition. One of these principles was to maintain current academic standards for athletic admissions. For a complete list of these principles, please visit this link: http://www.news.ucdavis.edu/search/news_detail.lasso?id=8247
4 For more information on the current UC Berkeley cohort and admission statistics, please visit this link: http://admissions.berkeley.edu/studentprofile
first ensure the students who are admitted have the best opportunity to earn their degree. This current policy seems to do a
disservice by continuing to admit students who are well below any minimum standards held for students on this campus.

In addition, the authors recommend that the Academic Senate Committee on Admissions, Enrollment and Preparatory Education
(AEPE) routinely review graduation and probation rates for all admitted students who are most at risk academically. Graduation
and probation rates of student athletes could then be compared to other admitted students with similar at risk profiles. Because
all these students enter the University at some greater risk of graduating, AEPE may wish to consider establishing a suitable
graduation rate metric for this group as a whole.

The authors are aware of, and support, the recent changes adopted by AEPE to strengthen the likelihood of academic success
for admitted, at risk student athletes. The elevation of the minimum average SAT floor to 400 and the pre-approval of the
Student Athlete Admissions Committee before any coach can begin to recruit an at risk student athlete are positive steps. While
we believe the minimum SAT floor should be higher, the close monitoring of these students by AEPE should enable a quicker
adjustment to the policy should that be needed.

c. Restriction of Athletic Participation during Summer Bridge and Probation

There are two key moments in which sport participation must be reduced and the student athlete supported to fully engage in
academics: during the college transitional program, Summer Bridge, and if on academic probation. Currently, athletes who
participate in Summer Bridge are allowed to practice with their team. The Summer Bridge Program is a crucial time for the
campus to embed standards and expectations related to the academic program for student athletes. Instead, students are thrust
into taking classes up to four hours a day, practicing athletics full time, and attending evening tutoring. By requiring pre-
Freshmen to engage in a multitude of activities, it is hard to imagine that they can excel in all three. Student athletes participating
in fall sports and the Summer Bridge Program should be required to attend no more than three practices per week. This would
allow for these students to truly transition into the rigors of the student athlete experience.

In addition, student athletes who are placed on academic probation by the University are still expected to participate in their sport
full time. If a student's term GPA falls below a 1.5 or their cumulative GPA falls below a 2.0, the student is placed on academic
probation and has one semester to raise their academic performance or else be subject to dismissal. As previously mentioned,
the NCAA's academic eligibility rules have lower college GPA minimums than UC Berkeley's requirement to remain a student in
good academic standing (see discussion on pg. 37-38). This means a student athlete can be on probation and still participate
and compete in their sport full time.

The authors recommend that if the university places a student athlete on academic probation, then the student should be marked
as “academically ineligible” until they complete the terms of their probation. While “academically ineligible” the student athlete
would be unable to compete in intercollegiate competition and would only be able to practice with their team part time, for a total
of 10 hours per week. This will allow the student to dedicate sufficient time to work with academic support officials, meet the
requirements of their probation dictated by the University, and continue to develop the skills needed to be a successful academic
contributor to the campus. Just like Summer Bridge, probation is a crucial time for certain students to focus on their academic
commitments that should not be compromised by athletic pressures.

It should be noted here that in Fall 2013, student athletes will no longer be able to take the athletics participation courses, PE 11
(for men) and PE 12 (for women), for a letter grade and instead must enroll in these classes for “pass/no pass” credit. This
Academic Senate action could lead to higher rates of academic probation for student athletes. While the transition will be hard, it
is likely that this change alone could make student athletes more honestly students. They will have to earn more passing grades
in classes other than PE to survive.

d. Situate Athletics under the Provost's Purview of Campus

Currently Intercollegiate athletics functions as an auxiliary campus unit. To initiate overlap between athletics and academics it is
crucial to signal to the campus that athletics has an academic component. To facilitate the engagement with academic programs,
athletics should be incorporated into the academic reporting line. This will also open up the possibility for increased overlap
between intercollegiate athletics, recreational sports and academic courses related to health, wellness and sports science. A
joint reporting line to the Administrative Vice Chancellor should also be maintained because of the budgetary and debt related
issues facing intercollegiate athletics.

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5 For more information on UC Berkeley’s probation policies, please visit this link: http://ls-probation.berkeley.edu/definition.html

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The Athletic Director should have a broader participatory role in the campus as a whole. The Chancellor should include the Athletic Director on his cabinet and as a member of the Council of Deans. This serves two purposes. It gives the Athletic Director the opportunity to understand broad, campus-wide issues and how they may affect athletics; and it requires the Athletic Director to report annually or more often on the state of intercollegiate athletics (and recreational sports if reconfigured). In the case of the recent poor graduation rates in football, the Chancellor and other senior administrators would have seen this pattern developing and intervened accordingly. The athletic program is simply too high profile to not be on the radar screen regularly.

f. Coaches' Salaries should be limited. For athletics to be integrated into the campus community, it must be treated like the other campus units. Chancellor Tien took a stand against raising coaches' salaries because he felt it sent the wrong message to the academic constituents of the campus. Instead of continuing with the “Arms Race” of college coaches' salaries, where Cal already has failed to compete (as was evidenced with the failure to retain even assistant football coaches), the university should take a stand against this. UC Berkeley is able to recruit and retain top faculty without always paying the highest competing salary. The same approach and standard should be used for hiring and retaining athletic coaches. The demands of the market should not be assumed as the sole criterion for setting coaches' salaries. Stanford has a reputation for maintaining coaches' salaries at a more reasonable level. Their approach should be examined.

G. CONCLUSION

The local and national history of college sports over the past century demonstrates that this highly commercialized unit of higher education is ever growing. Social commentators, academics and politicians have all weighed in on the perils of college sports. Often lost in these criticisms of college sports is the discussion of how to do it better. Some offer a model of de-escalation, or a move towards an Ivy-League model of college sports. Others offer to eliminate sports all together. This paper advocates an integration model. By acknowledging that college sports are a flawed but enduring piece of American society, this model presents a platform for UC Berkeley to embrace intercollegiate athletics as part of the academic community.

The authors are aware that papers of this kind can be filed away and largely ignored. If the recommendations in this paper fall on deaf ears, then the authors suggest that the reality of the big-time sports of football and men's basketball as primarily a business enterprise must be acknowledged up front. If, as some suggest, super conferences within Division I FBS are the coming reality, then football and men's basketball in those conferences should be separated from the NCAA and any pretension of amateurism ended. Those sports could have their own rules and be run like farm clubs. They could maintain an arms-length tie with their respective institutions; contract for the use of the stadium and basketball arena; be expected to generate a profit and share some of it with their affiliated institution; and recruit and pay whomever they pleased. If some of those players were eligible for admission and wished to attend, they would be admitted. For those seeking remedial help with the intention of matriculating, the affiliated institution would provide assistance.

Regardless of what direction the campus adopts with regard to athletics, it is the hope of these authors that the administration keeps a student-centered approach. Too often in papers such as these, the individual student is lost in the discussion. Central to any institution of learning should be the mission of providing the most equitable, enriching, stimulating, and all around educational experience for all students. The most imminent concern presented by failing athletic graduation rates should be how to reform the processes and procedures within UC Berkeley so that the maximum amount of students can succeed. In the current climate, it is evident that this is not the case. This campus can and should do more to ensure that students who are admitted into this university—particularly those who are visible representatives of the “Cal Athletics Brand”—fully engage in the UC Berkeley experience and earn a degree.

REFERENCE LIST


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## APPENDIX A:

### Federal Graduation Rates for University of California, Berkeley

#### Data Set 1 – UC Berkeley Graduation Rates for the Entering Cohorts 1999-2005

**Table 1**

Graduation rates of all student athletes compared to all undergraduates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entering Year</th>
<th>All Female Students</th>
<th>Female Athletes</th>
<th>All Male Students</th>
<th>Male Athletes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>89% (1848)</td>
<td>74% (35)</td>
<td>84% (1897)</td>
<td>48% (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>90% (1932)</td>
<td>85% (53)</td>
<td>84% (1705)</td>
<td>52% (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>92% (2009)</td>
<td>84% (64)</td>
<td>85% (1737)</td>
<td>65% (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>90% (2114)</td>
<td>81% (53)</td>
<td>86% (1733)</td>
<td>57% (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>92% (1958)</td>
<td>85% (66)</td>
<td>87% (1703)</td>
<td>78% (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>92% (1979)</td>
<td>86% (50)</td>
<td>88% (1680)</td>
<td>61% (67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>93% (2075)</td>
<td>76% (74)</td>
<td>90% (1722)</td>
<td>53% (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>92% (2248)</td>
<td>80% (64)</td>
<td>88% (1854)</td>
<td>55% (55)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2**

Graduation Rates of UC Berkeley Male Students separated by race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entering Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Pacific Islander**</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>83% (595)</td>
<td>68% (53)</td>
<td>74% (142)</td>
<td>89% (748)</td>
<td>84% (1897)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>83% (544)</td>
<td>54% (50)</td>
<td>71% (146)</td>
<td>88% (722)</td>
<td>84% (1705)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>85% (590)</td>
<td>64% (53)</td>
<td>73% (136)</td>
<td>89% (691)</td>
<td>85% (1737)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>84% (562)</td>
<td>63% (49)</td>
<td>78% (166)</td>
<td>91% (707)</td>
<td>86% (1733)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>88% (529)</td>
<td>65% (49)</td>
<td>80% (172)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>87% (1703)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>89% (518)</td>
<td>55% (55)</td>
<td>81% (155)</td>
<td>75% (5)</td>
<td>88% (1680)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>89% (577)</td>
<td>70% (40)</td>
<td>83% (141)</td>
<td>75% (4)</td>
<td>90% (1722)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>90% (579)</td>
<td>62% (47)</td>
<td>73% (177)</td>
<td>100% (4)</td>
<td>88% (1854)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NCAA offered the actual numbers of students in each racial category. Total number is listed with the percent graduation rate for that racial group in parenthesis.

**Starting in 2002 the University created a Pacific Islander/Native Hawaiian Category. The years prior to that reflect an "Asian" Category – which is why the numbers are greater.

**Table 3**

Graduation Rates of UC Berkeley female students separated by race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entering Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Pacific Islander</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>89% (501)</td>
<td>75% (73)</td>
<td>83% (127)</td>
<td>93% (815)</td>
<td>89% (1848)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>90% (573)</td>
<td>80% (80)</td>
<td>81% (187)</td>
<td>93% (860)</td>
<td>90% (1932)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>91% (537)</td>
<td>78% (96)</td>
<td>86% (185)</td>
<td>94% (941)</td>
<td>92% (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>92% (572)</td>
<td>70% (94)</td>
<td>78% (224)</td>
<td>92% (983)</td>
<td>90% (2114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>91% (534)</td>
<td>83% (93)</td>
<td>83% (231)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>92% (1958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>90% (534)</td>
<td>84% (95)</td>
<td>87% (239)</td>
<td>91% (11)</td>
<td>92% (1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>92% (617)</td>
<td>80% (75)</td>
<td>88% (207)</td>
<td>100% (5)</td>
<td>93% (2075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>93% (712)</td>
<td>76% (88)</td>
<td>87% (249)</td>
<td>71% (7)</td>
<td>92% (2248)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

6 Source for the data: “NCAA Education and Research Data: APR, GSR, Federal Graduation Rates”. To access the database, please visit this link: http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/newmedia/public/rates/index.html
Table 4

Graduation Rates of UC Berkeley male student athletes separated by race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entering Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Pacific Islander</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>52% (21)</td>
<td>43% (14)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>48% (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>56% (27)</td>
<td>33% (15)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>71% (7)</td>
<td>52% (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>76% (25)</td>
<td>67% (9)</td>
<td>50% (4)</td>
<td>40% (5)</td>
<td>65% (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>59% (22)</td>
<td>43% (7)</td>
<td>70% (10)</td>
<td>100% (3)</td>
<td>57% (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>96% (25)</td>
<td>57% (14)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>78% (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>74% (42)</td>
<td>31% (16)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>61% (67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>56% (34)</td>
<td>27% (11)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>53% (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>65% (26)</td>
<td>41% (17)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>55% (55)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

Graduation Rates of UC Berkeley female student athletes separated by race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entering Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Pacific Islander</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>81% (21)</td>
<td>50% (6)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>74% (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>89% (35)</td>
<td>86% (7)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>74% (4)</td>
<td>85% (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>76% (42)</td>
<td>100% (8)</td>
<td>100% (3)</td>
<td>100% (7)</td>
<td>84% (64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>84% (37)</td>
<td>60% (5)</td>
<td>100% (3)</td>
<td>100% (5)</td>
<td>81% (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>82% (44)</td>
<td>100% (6)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>85% (66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>85% (35)</td>
<td>100% (4)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>86% (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>82% (51)</td>
<td>75% (12)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>76% (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>84% (43)</td>
<td>58% (12)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>80% (64)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Set 2 – Visual Representation of UC Berkeley graduation rates by race and gender

Table 1

Federal graduation rates for UC Berkeley, 1999-2003
Table 2
Average Graduation Rates by race and gender for 1999-2005 cohorts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Male</th>
<th>Black Male</th>
<th>White Female</th>
<th>Black Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Grad Rate</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Set 3 – Olympic vs. Revenue Sport Comparisons of Graduation Rates

Table 1
UC Berkeley Men's Athletic Teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseball</td>
<td>75-a</td>
<td>64-c</td>
<td>57-b</td>
<td>75-a</td>
<td>64-c</td>
<td>50-a</td>
<td>40-b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basketball</td>
<td>0-a</td>
<td>0-a</td>
<td>0-a</td>
<td>50-a</td>
<td>0-a</td>
<td>25-a</td>
<td>100-a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross Country/Track</td>
<td>25-a</td>
<td>67-b</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>80-a</td>
<td>79-c</td>
<td>33-b</td>
<td>86-b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>33-d</td>
<td>72-d</td>
<td>53-d</td>
<td>71-c</td>
<td>50-c</td>
<td>31-c</td>
<td>37-d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men's Other</td>
<td>67-e</td>
<td>68-e</td>
<td>67-e</td>
<td>76-e</td>
<td>65-d</td>
<td>100-e</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52-e</td>
<td>65-e</td>
<td>57-e</td>
<td>78-e</td>
<td>61-e</td>
<td>53-e</td>
<td>55-e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: values for N (i.e. the # in the cohort) a. 1-5, b. 6-10, c. 11-15, d. 16-20 e. > 20

*Men's Crew and Rugby are not included in this data set because they are not NCAA sports (though they maintain a “Varsity" athletic status on this campus)*

Table 2
UC Berkeley's Men's Athletic Teams 4-Year Averages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseball</td>
<td>55-d</td>
<td>59-e</td>
<td>64-e</td>
<td>65-e</td>
<td>64-e</td>
<td>62-e</td>
<td>55-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basketball</td>
<td>22-b</td>
<td>20-b</td>
<td>17-c</td>
<td>15-c</td>
<td>15-c</td>
<td>20-c</td>
<td>36-c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross Country/Track</td>
<td>40-b</td>
<td>53-c</td>
<td>58-c</td>
<td>60-c</td>
<td>76-e</td>
<td>64-e</td>
<td>69-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>37-e</td>
<td>44-e</td>
<td>45-e</td>
<td>57-e</td>
<td>62-e</td>
<td>52-e</td>
<td>47-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men's Other</td>
<td>72-e</td>
<td>68-e</td>
<td>68-e</td>
<td>76-e</td>
<td>73-e</td>
<td>74-e</td>
<td>74-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54-e</td>
<td>55-e</td>
<td>56-e</td>
<td>63-e</td>
<td>65-e</td>
<td>62-e</td>
<td>61-e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: values for N (i.e. the # in the cohort) a. 1-5, b. 6-10, c. 11-15, d. 16-20 e. > 20
Table 3
UC Berkeley’s Women’s Athletic Teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basketball</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>60-a</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>40-a</td>
<td>60-a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross Country/Track</td>
<td>75-a</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>33-a</td>
<td>100-b</td>
<td>83-b</td>
<td>70-b</td>
<td>80-a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Other</td>
<td>85-e</td>
<td>83-e</td>
<td>87-e</td>
<td>82-e</td>
<td>86-e</td>
<td>80-e</td>
<td>81-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85-e</td>
<td>84-e</td>
<td>81-e</td>
<td>85-e</td>
<td>86-e</td>
<td>76-e</td>
<td>80-e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: values for N (i.e. the # in the cohort) a. 1-5, b. 6-10, c. 11-15, d. 16-20 e. > 20

Table 4
UC Berkeley’s Women’s Athletic Teams 4-Year Averages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basketball</td>
<td>54-c</td>
<td>58-c</td>
<td>58-c</td>
<td>80-b</td>
<td>82-c</td>
<td>64-c</td>
<td>64-c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross Country/Track</td>
<td>82-d</td>
<td>84-d</td>
<td>79-c</td>
<td>83-b</td>
<td>85-d</td>
<td>77-e</td>
<td>82-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Other</td>
<td>84-e</td>
<td>81-e</td>
<td>84-e</td>
<td>84-e</td>
<td>83-e</td>
<td>82-e</td>
<td>82-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82-e</td>
<td>80-e</td>
<td>82-e</td>
<td>84-e</td>
<td>84-e</td>
<td>81-e</td>
<td>81-e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: values for N (i.e. the # in the cohort) a. 1-5, b. 6-10, c. 11-15, d. 16-20 e. > 20

Table 5
Sport-to-Sport Comparison of Federal Graduation Rates at UC Berkeley

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Women’s Basketball</th>
<th>Men’s Basketball</th>
<th>Women’s Track/CC</th>
<th>Men’s Track CC</th>
<th>Women’s Other</th>
<th>Men’s Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>0-a</td>
<td>75-a</td>
<td>25-a</td>
<td>85-e</td>
<td>76-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>0-a</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>67-b</td>
<td>83-e</td>
<td>67-c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>60-a</td>
<td>0-a</td>
<td>33-a</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>87-e</td>
<td>68-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>50-a</td>
<td>100-b</td>
<td>80-a</td>
<td>82-e</td>
<td>87-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>0-a</td>
<td>83-b</td>
<td>79-c</td>
<td>86-e</td>
<td>67-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>60-a</td>
<td>25-a</td>
<td>70-b</td>
<td>33-b</td>
<td>80-e</td>
<td>76-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>40-a</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>80-a</td>
<td>86-b</td>
<td>81-e</td>
<td>65-d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: values for N (i.e. the # in the cohort) a. 1-5, b. 6-10, c. 11-15, d. 16-20 e. > 20

Data Set 4 – Average Graduation Rate Comparison of Olympic vs. Revenue Sports

Table 1
Graph of average graduation rates for student athletes in the cohorts 1999-2005
Table 2
Data table for chart of average graduation rates for student athletes in the cohorts 1999-2005

Data Table for Chart: Average graduation rate per male and female sport. Note no equivalent female sport exists for football, so this category was left blank.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basketball</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track &amp; Field</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Sports</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Set 5 – Graduation Rates for UC Berkeley's Football Program

Table 1
Graduation rates for football by race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entering Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Pacific Islander</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>25-b</td>
<td>38-b</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50-a</td>
<td>33-d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>78-b</td>
<td>80-a</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>0-a</td>
<td>72-d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>43-b</td>
<td>75-a</td>
<td>33-a</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>53-c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>80-a</td>
<td>67-b</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>71-c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>33-a</td>
<td>44-b</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50-c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>25-a</td>
<td>29-b</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50-a</td>
<td>31-c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>60-a</td>
<td>18-c</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>37-d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: values for N (i.e. the # in the cohort) a. 1-5, b. 6-10, c. 11-15, d. 16-20 e. > 20

Table 2
Four-year average graduation rates for football by race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entering Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Pacific Islander**</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995-1999</td>
<td>38-e</td>
<td>30-e</td>
<td>30-a</td>
<td>33-a</td>
<td>37-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>50-e</td>
<td>39-e</td>
<td>50-a</td>
<td>20-a</td>
<td>44-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2001</td>
<td>45-e</td>
<td>44-e</td>
<td>40-a</td>
<td>40-a</td>
<td>45-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>63-e</td>
<td>63-e</td>
<td>50-a</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>62-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td>47-d</td>
<td>52-e</td>
<td>33-a</td>
<td>50-a</td>
<td>52-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2005</td>
<td>53-d</td>
<td>39-e</td>
<td>100-a</td>
<td>50-a</td>
<td>47-e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: values for N (i.e. the # in the cohort) a. 1-5, b. 6-10, c. 11-5, d. 16-20 e. > 20
Data Set 6 – Graduation Success Rate (GSR)

**Table 1**

Graduation Success Rate for Student Athletes by Gender and Race at UC Berkeley

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entering Year</th>
<th>Male SA*</th>
<th>Female SA</th>
<th>Black Male SA</th>
<th>White Male SA</th>
<th>Black Female SA</th>
<th>White Female SA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>60% (196)</td>
<td>88% (177)</td>
<td>47% (55)</td>
<td>65% (101)</td>
<td>64% (22)</td>
<td>97% (91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>59% (206)</td>
<td>89% (191)</td>
<td>47% (57)</td>
<td>63% (106)</td>
<td>68% (25)</td>
<td>92% (109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>61% (202)</td>
<td>89% (202)</td>
<td>52% (56)</td>
<td>66% (96)</td>
<td>64% (31)</td>
<td>89% (119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>63% (217)</td>
<td>89% (209)</td>
<td>52% (56)</td>
<td>69% (101)</td>
<td>78% (27)</td>
<td>90% (134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>69% (221)</td>
<td>90% (250)</td>
<td>53% (55)</td>
<td>77% (105)</td>
<td>93% (27)</td>
<td>90% (159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>72% (235)</td>
<td>90% (239)</td>
<td>53% (57)</td>
<td>82% (118)</td>
<td>92% (25)</td>
<td>90% (151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>69% (239)</td>
<td>89% (238)</td>
<td>43% (46)</td>
<td>78% (125)</td>
<td>89% (27)</td>
<td>92% (155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>70% (230)</td>
<td>90% (250)</td>
<td>44% (59)</td>
<td>79% (122)</td>
<td>82% (34)</td>
<td>94% (161)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* SA = Student Athlete

**Table 2**

Sport-to-Sport Comparison of Graduation Success Rates at UC Berkeley

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Football</th>
<th>Women's Basketball</th>
<th>Men's Basketball</th>
<th>Women's Track/CC</th>
<th>Men's Track CC</th>
<th>Women's Other</th>
<th>Men's Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>47-e</td>
<td>71-d</td>
<td>44-b</td>
<td>86-d</td>
<td>57-e</td>
<td>90-e</td>
<td>77-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>52-e</td>
<td>71-d</td>
<td>33-b</td>
<td>83-e</td>
<td>53-e</td>
<td>91-e</td>
<td>72-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>53-e</td>
<td>71-c</td>
<td>30-b</td>
<td>75-d</td>
<td>67-e</td>
<td>92-e</td>
<td>70-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>64-e</td>
<td>92-c</td>
<td>20-b</td>
<td>86-e</td>
<td>67-d</td>
<td>90-e</td>
<td>76-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>88-e</td>
<td>92-c</td>
<td>30-b</td>
<td>84-e</td>
<td>85-e</td>
<td>90-e</td>
<td>75-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>54-e</td>
<td>92-c</td>
<td>33-c</td>
<td>82-e</td>
<td>88-e</td>
<td>90-e</td>
<td>77-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>48-e</td>
<td>83-c</td>
<td>50-c</td>
<td>87-e</td>
<td>89-e</td>
<td>90-e</td>
<td>81-e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: values for N (i.e. the # in the cohort) a. 1-5, b. 6-10, c. 11-15, d. 16-20 e. > 20
APPENDIX B:
Timeline of the History of Intercollegiate Athletics

1852 First intercollegiate sporting event: Harvard vs. Yale. Lake Winnipesaukee. Harvard wins. Sponsored by the Boston, Concord and Montreal Railroad. While a commercial event, "There were no professional coaches, no abstentions from drinking and smoking, and no regimented training schedules. Those would exist by the next decade." Spots and Freedom, Ronald A. Smith. p. 28

1882 First effort at intercollegiate athletic reform. Charles Eliot, Harvard President, writes to his counterparts at other New England colleges on matters of professionalism and number of contests in baseball. There was no unified response. 1883: Conference called by Harvard athletic committee to seven other institutions agreed on the following: no professional athletes employed as coaches; no games against non-college teams; 4 year limit for athletic eligibility; each college should have a faculty athletic committee; competition permitted only against other institutions who adopted these rules. Could not get unified agreement from at least 5 institutions. Another effort at reform falters in 1886 when Yale refuses to participate, largely due to Walter Camp's opposition: "college athletic organizations, if left to themselves would soon work out their own salvation." Smith, p. 138 While regulation may have been within the control of athletic committees, the management of the sports programs resided with the students and continuing tension and conflict was inevitable.

Early 1900s: the utilization of pro coaches at the college level highly developed. Made the need to win all the more important when one's career depended on it. "The desire to win, and the freedom of students (and eventually alumni) to pursue that goal brought about the rise of the professional coach." Smith p. 148

1905 "season will produce a total of 18 deaths and 149 serious injuries attributable (or at least attributed) to football." Falla p.13 President Teddy Roosevelt calls meeting with several Universities including Harvard, Yale and Princeton to get situation under control. "In American intercollegiate history, no year has been as momentous as that beginning in 1905." Smith, p. 191 Beginnings of NCAA. Rules changes follow to reduce injuries/deaths.

Oct. 24, 1929 Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching Report, American College Athletics: "...many instances of the recruitment and subsidization of athletes...many instances where intercollegiate sport is not under faculty control but is rather unduly influenced by overzealous alumni and coaches." Foundation was headed by Henry S. Pritchett, former President of MIT. The study team was headed by Howard J Savage. On coaches: "The data were revealing, for coaches at both small and large colleges were paid more than the full professors. Surprisingly, coaches at small colleges were paid more relative to full professor salaries than were coaches at the larger schools, though the disparity was only slight. The highest-paid football coach of small colleges ($8,000) was paid $2,000 more than the highest-paid professor. The average small college coach made $4,163. At the large colleges, the highest-paid coach ($14,000) was also paid $2,000 more than the highest-paid professor, while the average coach made $6,926. Footnote 45. Thus at both small and large colleges, the head coaches were considered more valuable from a salary standpoint than full professors. The law of supply and demand, the report noted, favored the football coach." Pay for Play, Smith, p. 69

1930-40 Various reports from NCAA committees citing concerns: recruitment and subsidization; gambling and fixing of games; influence of growing air travel on scheduling of inter-conference games and attendant recruiting; bowl games and increased pressure on competition.

1939 "... NCAA convention for the first time, passed a constitutional amendment providing a section on financial aid. It stipulated that all aid to athletes would be based on financial need, athletic participation could not be a condition of aid, and aid must be channeled to the athlete only through a regular university agency, not by alumni or an outside group." Smith, Pay for Play, p.90 This was a movement away from Home Rule and a halting move toward the NCAA becoming a regulatory body.

1945 Ivy Group Presidents' Agreement: "The new Ivy League stood for amateur athletics, requiring financial aid coming coming only from personal or family resources or scholarships awarded through regular academic channels." Smith, Pay for Play, p.104

1946 Midsummer Conference of Conferences develops "The Sanity Code" - set of principles in the form of a questionnaire endorsed by most member institutions, "this name arising because of a prevailing belief that adherence to such principles is necessary to restore sanity to the conduct of intercollegiate athletics." Falla, p.132-33 A Constitutional Compliance Committee is also set up to field complaints and only enforcement mechanism is expulsion, but requires two-thirds vote of all members. Schools begin to lobby against code.

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1948  Sanity Code adopted: "The NCAA's 1948 Sanity Code included a uniform, national financial aid rule. Under the Sanity Code, a student-athlete could receive tuition and fees if he showed financial need and met the school's ordinary entrance requirements; this amounted to an merit award for athletic ability. He could receive a scholarship exceeding tuition and fees regardless of need if he ranked in the upper 25 percent of his high school graduating class or maintain ed a B average in college. In either case the money could not be withdrawn if the student decided not to play. Athletes frequently worked on campus or at local jobs in town to pay for their room and board. The Sanity Code failed in January 1950, however, when supporting member colleges failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority to expel seven admitted violators. This left the NCAA with an unenforceable rule and no effective influence on the colleges' compensation practices." Byers, Unsportsmanlike Conduct, p.67

1951  Sanity code repealed. The Southern, Southeastern and Southwest conferences opposed it and the Ivies and the Big Ten supported it. The winning argument was that allowing full rides would end boosterism payments. That obviously did not happen. "So the battle was joined between those who believed athletes should meet scholarship standards similar to those of other students, and those who believed athletes should get their education free, including room and board and incidental expenses (a full ride) regardless of their academic skills or financial need." Byers, p.68 “one of the three or four most important decisions in the history of intercollegiate sports.” This was labeled “pay for play” but then there was major concern that the athletes would be considered employees. Student athlete comes into being.

1951  NCAA votes to restrict television contracts for football out of fear that it will lead to poor attendance at games.

1952  First NBC/NCAA contract for $1,440,000 Game of the Week 12 nationally televised games, one for each of the eight conferences. U. Penn and Notre Dame opposed this but lost. Attendance at college games initially dipped but then picked up significantly 17.3 million at 621 four-year colleges in 1955 to 20.4 million in 1960 to 29.5 million in 1970 Byers, p.84

1953  NCAA votes to go back to one platoon football as a cost saving measure and as a pr effort to return the sport to its original tradition. Unlimited substitutions was too confusing for the fans and broadcasters. Several schools had dropped football because of cost, including Georgetown and St. Mary's.

1950s  Major scandals erupt on the East Coast in basketball programs: point shaving, gambling interests. Army cheating scandal in football with tests provided by tutors who reported to famed football coach Red Blaik. On the West Coast, paying players at Cal, Washington, USC and UCLA.

1959  PCC dissolves and the Association of Western Universities is formed. Enforcement by the commissioner is replaced by the "mutual trust and confidence" of the participating institutions. Violations flourished according to Byers, p. 117.

1960  UC President Clark Kerr transfers authority for intercollegiate athletics from ASUC and ASUCLA to the University.

1960  Passage of the Master Plan for Higher Education in California and its possible impact on big-time athletics. Could Cal compete with such high academic standards?

1960s  Kerr and others raise concern about overall direction of intercollegiate athletics. Should Cal join the Ivy League. FSM, counter-cultural revolution, protests over race and war in Vietnam affect Cal's ability to recruit.

1960-1968  Pete Newell, Cal's famed basketball coach, named AD by Chancellor Seaborg. Fund raising becomes major part of his portfolio. Major frustration with administration over giving in to protesters. Refers to Chancellor Heyns and Vice Chancellor Cheit as "weak kneed" administrators. Racial issues erupt in basketball program over afros worn by certain players. Bob Presley, star player, becomes cause celeb.

1965  The two-platoon, free substitution system of college football approved by NCAA. Number of coaches, grant-in-aid, and number of players all increase substantially. Specialists need specialists.

1965  1.6 GPA rule put in place for recruiting. Mostly sought because of level playing field argument, not for academic purposes. Princeton opposed it on the grounds of home rule.
1968  The Year of Awakening; 1969  The Year of Reckoning  In Oriard, pp. 42-43 rebellion of black athletes at several institutions. At Cal, racial issues erupt in basketball program over afros worn by certain players. Bob Presley, star player, becomes cause celeb.

1969  January NCAA convention: authorizes rescinding scholarships for deviant behavior.


1971  Chancellor Albert Bowker appointed. Remains Chancellor until 1980. Has very little knowledge or interest in intercollegiate athletics. Day to day responsibility assigned to Business and Administrative Service Vice Chancellor Kerley. Inherits an NCAA violation against Cal for failing to administer SAT exam to football and track star Issac Curtis. Major confrontation ensues between campus and NCAA.

1972  Dave Maggard, Olympic shot putter and star at Cal, named AD. Calms the tempest with the NCAA but Cal still placed on probation for several years as a result of a plethora of violations uncovered as part of Issac Curtis problem. Maggard remains AD until 1991.


1972  Title IX of the 1972 Omnibus Education Act: "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

1972  After six decades of freshmen ineligibility as a rule, it was voted down at the NCAA convention in Hollywood, Florida. It had helped the marginal freshmen athlete succeed academically and keep down the quick fix recruiting for coaches.

1973  Financial aid offered one year at a time - essentially a year to evaluate players and remove their scholarships if they were not good enough. A cost saving.


1976  Lue Lilly appointed first director of Women's Intercollegiate Athletics. Adrian Kragen report recommends keeping the Men's and Women's programs separate. Previously, women's programs administered through Dept. of Physical Education. That department, which ran instructional sports programs and intramural competitions for years, often under the direction of intercollegiate coaches (not football and basketball) who had joint appointments, became increasingly research oriented and had no desire to keep the women's sports or work jointly with the now independent Rec Sports program. Considerable conflict and tension characterized the relationship among the three programs, Men's, Women's and Rec Sports, over limited facilities and resources.

1977  NBC TV rights to March Madness $4 million; 1987 $36.6 million. Today, $11.1 billion Byers, p.92

1978  "Sonny" Vaccaro convinces Nike to give shoes to colleges and contracts to coaches. The first two are Tarkanian at UNLV and Lefty Driesel at Maryland.

1980  NCAA puts in place a governance structure for women's sports.

1980  Maggard inaugurates Cal Sports Eighties, a fund raising effort for Men's athletics facilities, co-chaired by former Chancellor Heyns and Walter Haas. This becomes model for campus fund raising effort under Chancellor Heyman. Key donors to athletics move over and assume key role in the newly created Berkeley Foundation.

1980  Michael Heyman appointed Chancellor. Critic of big-time college sports. Famous 1987 NCAA speech. Believed opportunity to compete more important than winning. Satisfied to be in the middle of the pack.
1981  NBC loses out on NCAA Basketball Tournament to CBS.  CBS and ABC are in with Turner Broadcasting on football games.  The College Football Association could not have possibly gotten a better deal.  Byers, p. 264 on.  However, CFA persists and NBC, to save face, offers $180 million for four years of college football.  It wasn't clear whether the CFA or the NCAA could hold their various teams.  NCAA says CFA members were members of the NCAA and would be in violation of the rules if they negotiated a separate contract outside the NCAA.  NCAA holds special convention in December and addresses the fact that there were too many teams competing for the TV revenue.  That's when Division I split into Division IA and Division IAA.  Division IA went from 180 to 105.  When that happened, the CFA could not hold their member institutions and the NCAA contracts went into effect.

1983  Prop 48 passes reestablishing a grade point average and test score requirement for recruited athletes.  2.0 and 700 combined SAT.  Before that, only 2.0 was required.  Goes into effect in 1986.

1984-1985  Creation of Athletic Study Center under Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs Mac Laetsch.  Poli Sci faculty instrumental in pushing this through.  Would not have happened without Heyman's support.  Heyman also approves the Blue Chip athlete admit program – 20 athletes not normally admissible.

1984  US Supreme Court rules in favor of Georgia and Oklahoma in their suit against the NCAA's monopoly over television broadcasts.  Conferences now can set up own contracts.

1984  Vaccaro and Nike sign Michael Jordan to a contract deal, a North Carolina sophomore.

1985  All four teams in the Final Four are wearing Nikes.

1985  SMU receives the death penalty.  Violations at TCU also come to light.

1985  The now disbanded NCAA Presidents' Commission institutes death penalty for institutions with history of major violations.

July, 1987  Bruce Snyder appointed Cal football coach.  $85,000 base + $20,000/year for five years for housing + $60,000 talent fee.

Late 1980s/ early 1990s  A tipping point for coaches' salaries.  The million dollar salary was 3X higher than a decade earlier.

1990  Chang-Lin Tien appointed Chancellor.  Visible public booster but facing major budget crisis.  Appoints Blue Ribbon Committee chaired by Professor Neil Smelser.  1991 report endorses broad based, highly competitive program, merger of all three programs (Men's and Women's Intercollegiate Athletics and Dept. of Recreational Sports) for cost savings.

1991  Maggard departs and is replaced by Bob Bockrath as AD.  Tensions among the three departments precluded any of the directors from being selected to run the newly merged departments.

1992  Bockrath fires Lue Lilly.  Successful basketball coach Campanelli fired for verbal abuse of players.  Successful football coach Bruce Snyder leaves for Arizona State at double the salary, $500,000.  Tien, though donor money was available to cover the difference, did not believe a football coach should be making more than the highest paid faculty member.

1992  Supreme Court ruling saying that plaintiffs in Title IX suits could sue institutions.  Title IX now has real teeth.


1994 – 2000  Kasser has three football coaches during his term – Gilbertson, Mariucci, Holmoe.  None are particularly successful.  Ticket revenues fall.  Kasser also addresses lack of equity in women's sports, creates three new sports, provides additional financing for programs.  Tien does not provide sufficient resources for this.  Deficits, never allowed previously, mount after the merge.  Cumulative deficit $8 million in 1996, $18 million by 1999.

Kasser completes Haas Pavilion renovation in 1999.  Massive cost overruns and delays plague the renovation.  Donor upset with capital projects management.  Kasser had to deal with two major NCAA violations.  Campanelli's replacement, Todd Bozeman, paid the parents of Jelani Gardner to get him to play at Cal.  Bozeman fired and banned from college coaching for 8 years.
Academic fraud involving two football players who received grades for work never performed. Cited for lack of institutional control.


1999 Berdahl forgives $18 million deficit, with conditions. Student fee referendum fails but no sports cut.

2000 Cheit report issued. Committee, including donors and faculty, recommends additional commitment of $3 million from administration to address Title IX concerns. Addresses auxiliary enterprise designation, the full costing tax, lack of follow through on strong mission statement for athletics.

2001 Berdahl appoints Steve Gladstone as new AD; continues to coach men’s crew. Unusual level of donor involvement in his selection. Carte blanche reorganization and cuts of some personnel lead to lawsuits. Credited with changing the culture: Cal can win across the board, no excuses. Tedford hire as football coach exemplifies. The need to spend money to make money. Tedford contract tied to Memorial Stadium renovation. Tedford turns program around; deficits continue.

2003 Berdahl appoints super committee to address stadium issues chaired by Karl Pister. Extremely complex assignment: seismic plus renovation; community concerns and lawsuits; tree sitters, fund raising, finance model.


2005 University Athletics Board created. Joint administration-academic senate committee with broad student, donor/alumni, athletic dept. representation. First time budget information on athletics shared with the faculty. Glide path agreed upon where campus total contribution, including student fee money, is $7 million. Initially successful in moving deficit toward that number.

2008 Great Recession hits. Athletics deficit balloons again at worst possible time.

2009 Academic Senate resolution urging no more central campus subsidy for athletics.

2009-2010 Two major reports issued, one by the Academic Senate and one by a Chancellor’s committee composed of four faculty and four donors/alums.

Fall, 2010 Chancellor announces the cutting of four sports and the reduction of Rugby to club status. Huge pushback from alums and others leads to restoration of these sports after funding commitments to support them are made to the tune of $20 million with a promise of more to follow.

Fall, 2011 Student Athlete High Performance Center completed.

Fall, 2012 Renovated Memorial Stadium ready for first Cal home game.

November, 2012 Tedford fired after poor season.

December, 2012 Sonny Dykes hired as new football coach.

Current challenges: A shaky financial model to pay for stadium and high performance center; the need to win at football; poor graduation rates in football and basketball.
APPENDIX C

Executive Summary

This paper, is one in a series of white papers, prepared by members of the advisory committee to the Athletic Study Center at UC Berkeley, addressing the poor graduation rates in the football and men's basketball programs in recent years. This paper addresses potential causes for low student athlete graduation rates and offers recommendations to minimize its recurrence. The other Olympic or non-revenue sports traditionally have had higher graduation rates and more closely fit the ideal of amateur intercollegiate sports. Even these sports are gradually being pulled toward the highly commercialized model and thus also are a cause of concern.

This paper examines the key themes in the national and local history of intercollegiate athletics that influence the current state of college sports on UC Berkeley's campus. It contends that various campus administrations from the 1960s to the present never fully defined the role and purpose of recreational and intercollegiate sports and their connection to the academic program. These administrations, not unlike many colleges and universities, adopted a laissez-faire, muddling through approach in their management of intercollegiate athletics. Currently, a given Chancellor, athletic director or even a powerful football coach can exert major influence over the program. There is no campus policy delineating the values of the intercollegiate program and how those values are to be interpreted and implemented. This has resulted in a growing and successful program accompanied at various points in time by scandals, NCAA violations, considerable deficits, internal conflict, ambiguity, poor graduation rates and isolation from the campus.

Since 1991, five committees have issued reports on the intercollegiate athletics program. Their principal focus is financial. In that period of time, the intercollegiate athletics operating budget has increased from $16 million to $68 million annually, a reflection of the commercialization of the big-time sports of men's basketball and football. This required the campus to cover accumulated deficits over that period of time totaling $170 million. A contribution of this size to an auxiliary campus program was unheard of in any preceding eras. These reports all suggest the campus maintain a commitment to a broad based, highly competitive intercollegiate athletics program that mirrors UC Berkeley's academic excellence. Chancellors proclaim the importance of such a program but expect it to be self-supporting, thus forcing intercollegiate athletics to become even more commercialized. The impact of this contradictory stance by the campus administration on the student athletes, particularly in the big-time sports, is largely unexplored and left to the Athletic Study Center.

The completion of the Student Athlete High Performance Center and the renovation of Memorial Stadium, while necessary and significant architectural and programmatic achievements for the campus, has created the need for the football program to produce highly successful winning seasons, year in and year out. Losing teams do not sell tickets, let alone seat licenses. The pressure this places on coaches and players to win can lead to cutting corners on academic values fundamental to the campus unless clear principles and implementing guidelines are in place.

A new Chancellor, a new football coach, a new stadium and high performance center and their attendant cost, a newly reconfigured, larger and more monied Pac-12 conference all indicate a transitional period for intercollegiate athletics at UC Berkeley. At the same time, Chancellors use their bully pulpit to praise the values of intercollegiate athletics, knowing at least to some degree that they are speaking half-truths. They give lip service to the values and skills that intercollegiate athletic competition provides and remain silent on how the time commitments affect academic performance. They know full well that, if UC Berkeley were to start from scratch in the creation of an intercollegiate athletic program, it would never resemble the huge business enterprise it has become. All the while Chancellors cannot alienate a substantial donor base by limiting their involvement in campus decisions. This is particularly true in light of the substantial debt facing the campus with the new athletics facilities. The recent blowback after the elimination, and subsequent reinstatement of five varsity sports, makes the possibility of cutting sports again as a cost saving measure remote for years to come. Chancellors understand that the enormous pressures to win create great temptation to cheat, thus exposing the campus to public embarrassment. Is there nothing the institution can do except continue to muddle through?

We think not. Certain matters are a given. There is no question that UC Berkeley will have a major intercollegiate athletics program for the long term. Besides the often-espoused values that such a program brings—and we believe those values are demonstrably true—the campus cannot afford to back away from the financial commitments it has encumbered. It also cannot afford to back away from the underlying value conflicts embedded in its management of intercollegiate athletics. University administrators must examine carefully, decide, and explain the following: The role and purpose of sports writ large in a major research university and how sports can be integrated more fully into the academic program. This should include addressing the
long-standing, uneven and inequitable relationship between the Intercollegiate Athletics program and the Department of Recreational Sports.

In addition, we suggest the following immediate policy changes:

1. Enforcement of the NCAA’s maximum 20-hour a week rule.
2. A change in the admission policy for student athletes requiring a minimum average SAT score of 500 across the three subject areas.
3. Restriction of athletic participation for student athletes in the Summer Bridge Program and when on academic probation.
4. A joint reporting line for intercollegiate athletics to the Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost to further integrate the program into the academic community, and to the Administrative Vice Chancellor.
5. Placing the Athletic Director on the Chancellor’s Cabinet and on the Council of Deans.
6. Limiting the salaries of coaches.

Regardless of what direction the campus adopts with regard to athletics, it is the hope of the authors that the administration keeps a student-centered approach. Too often in papers such as these, the individual student is lost in the discussion. Central to any institution of learning should be the mission of providing the most equitable, enriching, stimulating, and all around educational experience for all students. The most imminent concern presented by failing athletic graduation rates should be how to reform the processes and procedures within UC Berkeley so that the maximum amount of students can succeed. In the current climate, it is evident that this is not the case. This campus can and should do more to ensure that students who are admitted into this university—particularly those who are visible representatives of the “Cal Athletics Brand”—fully engage in the UC Berkeley experience and earn a degree.