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States within States: How Rebels Rule

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Jennifer Marie Keister

Committee in charge:

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2011
The Dissertation of Jennifer Marie Keister is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________ Chair

University of California, San Diego

2011
DEDICATION

To my parents, who believe I can do anything.
"Now now," he brightened up, "while I'm still confused and uncertain, it's on a much higher plane, d'you see, and at least I know I'm bewildered about the really fundamental and important facts of the universe."

Treatle nodded. "I hadn't looked at it like that," he said, but you're absolutely right. He's really pushed back the boundaries of ignorance. There's so much about the universe we don't know."

They both savored the strange warmth of being much more ignorant than ordinary people who were ignorant of only ordinary things.”

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Rebellion is more than a military contest. Though armed confrontation is often the most visible face of rebellion, rebels also face the challenge of accessing resources to maintain their existence and finance the fight. While rebels may
harness lootable resources for this purpose, such resources are not universally available, and rebels must then build support at home and/or abroad. rely on domestic civilians for support. This project models how rebels mix three governance tools to produce quasi-voluntary support: coercion, public goods provision, and ideological congruence. How rebels mix among these tools has a profound effect on the lives of the civilians they claim to represent.

This project develops a theoretical explanation for how and why rebel governance varies. In the model, much depends on rebels’ own ideological preferences, and on the fact that compromise can be costly for them. The governance mix rebels ultimately implement depends on the preferences of the population whose support they need, the technological and financial constraints they face, and the enabling behavior of foreign donors.

I test this theory’s observable implications by leveraging natural quasi-experiments in Mindanao (southern Philippines), comparing across the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), bringing to bear both qualitative and quantitative data. I also undertake longitudinal studies of the MNLF and ASG, using the cases to explore both the theory’s predictions and its underlying causal mechanisms.
Chapter 1: Introduction

My introduction to rural Mindanao was a drive from Davao to Cotabato City in a sedan manifestly unsuited for Mindanao’s dubious standards of road maintenance and with non-functional air conditioning in the tropical heat. The open windows whipped the hot air through the car, leaving my colleague unable to light his own cigarettes while driving. Between pepper ing him with questions, I struggled to light them for him, and tried to avoid setting my flapping hijab ablaze.

Adeptly skirting potholes and water buffalo, we proceeded through long stretches of electric green rice fields, and dusty strips of towns—usually little more than a collection of rough-wood structures, with carefully woven palm leaf walls and nipa [thatched palm leaf] roofs, all huddled close to the relative safety of the road.

A bevy of schoolgirls in matching black abayas and white hijab darted home after class. As we slowed down to pass them, they swirled around our car, laughing and chattering like a flock black and white tropical birds.

This dissertation is about them.

Over the next three years, I met their cousins in refugee camps, their brothers who carried guns, and their uncles who variously planned offensives, signed peace deals, or accepted government buyouts for personal gain.

Approximately one in three of these girls will herself become a victim of violence
from one or the other of the armed groups that populate Mindanao, or be close to such a victim.¹

Moro villagers have a challenging job as citizens. There is broad consensus within their community that the Moros represent a people apart from the Philippine state. Even so, no fewer than three separate groups lay claim to the banner of Moro self-determination—the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). All three groups claim roughly similar goals, and share the same cultural and historical background. Yet civilians’ experience with each is remarkably different.

These schoolgirls lived in an MILF area. The madrassa from which they had just come was likely MILF-run—part of a carefully constructed curriculum that encouraged them to take advantage of government education Monday through Friday, and devote their weekends to Islamic studies. The MILF may have provided their teacher; their fathers likely paid for their school clothes out of earnings from selling surplus crops through deals negotiated with local commodities dealers by the MILF. The MILF may have trained their mothers how to properly administer over-the-counter medication, and develop cottage industries.

¹ Results drawn from a field survey conducted in 2009-10. When asked if they themselves or someone to whom they were close had ever been a victim of violence by armed groups, 29% of respondents answered in the affirmative. For additional details on the survey and its methodology, see chapter 4 and its appendix.
If they lived one municipality over, they would have been born into an MNLF village, where they would likely attend only the government school. Ironically, if their parents wanted them to gain an Islamic education, they would probably have to seek out the nearest MILF madrassa. The girls would wear hijab only for special religious occasions. If they happened to have family members in the MNLF, their fathers may have increased the family livelihood through NGO development programs. If they were not MNLF members, the family would have to fend for themselves.

If they had been born into an ASG area, the girls might not have a school to go to—ASG may well have chased off teachers through harassment and extortion. Since ASG does not itself build madaris, Islamic education would only be available if one of the local elites built one. The girls would likely step warily to avoid ASG members, probably former classmates and neighbors whose automatic weapons gave them a bravado purchased with foreign funds, or the proceeds from extorting the schoolgirls’ parents or kidnapping ransoms.

Given that everyone—civilians, MILF, MNLF, and ASG—agree broadly on the need for self-determination for the Moro populace, it is puzzling that villagers’ experience is so varied. How is it that villagers born into the same indigenous population, and heirs to the same struggle for self-determination, have such different experiences with those who claim to represent that struggle?
1. Framing the question

The toll of all wars weighs heavily on civilian populations. Given that civil wars are an increasing proportion of all wars, how civilians fare in intrastate conflict is particularly pressing. There is little doubt that conflict leaves civilians worse off, at least in the short term. However, beyond this general statement, the civilian experience can be quite varied. In civil wars, civilians’ experience is often at least as much a function of rebels’ behavior as incumbents’. Civilians can be physically abused, extorted, and impressed into military service. They can also be offered education, health services, and dispute adjudication.

I argue civilians’ experience under rebels is as varied as it is under formally recognized states. We observe both governments we deem legitimate rulers and rebels who provide services to civilians. We observe both states and rebellions that turn their coercive apparatus against their own civilians. I argue the same questions we ask of formally recognized states can be put to rebel groups: Do they abuse

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civilians? Do they provide services to a range of citizens, club goods available only to a select few, or few services at all? Whose interests do they represent? Do they pursue an ideological/policy package attractive to most of its citizens, or maintain an unpopular line? Do they rule through fear, or through some more positive exchange? In other words, rebels may be good governors or bad—and we care which they are.

Intrastate conflict is traditionally viewed as a primarily military process. Conflict is clearly a defining feature of intrastate war, and an important area of study in its own right. However, military clashes themselves are part of the larger bargaining process between rebels and incumbents—they do not represent the entirety of the exchange between actors, nor the full panoply either side’s activities during the conflict.

Both practitioners and scholars increasingly recognize that rebels engage in behaviors outside of military activities. A naïve view proposes that winning civil war is about winning on the battlefield—that the contest is a strictly military one between rebel forces and the incumbent regime, albeit one that includes tactics that may differentially affect civilians. Earlier notions of force-based counterinsurgency
(COIN) argued of popular support, was vital to the rebels, but irrelevant for the state. This approach thus remains enemy-centric and force-based.⁴

The latest COIN approach argues for “population-centric” (or “hearts-and-minds” (HAM)) counterinsurgency, recognizing the population (rather than the rebel forces) as the center of gravity in civil wars. The HAM narrative relies on the idea that winning civil wars is about winning as a government. In this effort, states that provide better services can win civil wars by wooing civilians towards them and away from the rebels. However, this view is still often largely state-centric—HAM acknowledges COIN is about both fighting and behaviors other than fighting, but our understanding of what these behaviors are imperfect.⁵ Specifically, HAM suggests that victory is the prospect of “outgoverning” the rebel opponent—outbidding the rebellion's governance package. However, if the HAM narrative is to drive counterinsurgency policy, it is vital policymakers and practitioners understand better the mechanisms of rebel-civilian relations, since this is the governance package practitioners are supposedly trying to outbid.

It should be noted that simply because the population is an important component of rebels’ ability to exist and operate does not imply that all rebellions

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⁴ COIN scholar Roger Trinquier argues the need for incumbent forces to root out rebels’ ties to the population, and that all civilians who sympathize with and support the insurgency. See Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (London, UK: Pall Mall Press, 1964). This logic gives rise to policies like strategic hamlets, scorched-earth campaigns, and so on.
will be mass-based and popular. Demonstrably, not all insurgencies provide services to civilians, or pursue popular ideological positions—some rule through fear and implement ideologies with little popular resonance. Normatively, we may think of the former example as “governing” and the latter as “bandits or thugs.” In fact, all rebels are governing—it is simply that, like states, rebel rulers find coercion, service provision, and ideology all can enhance their authority, and chose to implement different mixes of these tools.

This question also has theoretical interest within the academy. Substantial literature is devoted to the emergence of states, and the origins of political authority. Civil war challenges existing authority. Rebel groups propose themselves as an alternative political order—either to fundamentally change the status quo, or as new managers of the existing system. Investigating how rebels rule civilians allows us to further explore how political actors structure authority, particularly in environments of extreme instability.

2. Thesis

This project does not address when or why civil wars begin or end. Rather, I focus how civilians fare under rebel groups. Specifically, I argue at least part of

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rebels’ behavior towards civilians is actually an effort to establish authority over them. Rebels’ grip on rule depends on both coercion and service provision, but the relative effectiveness of service provision depends on the ideological content of their policies, making ideology itself a tool of rule.

How far rebels compromise their ideological preferences for the imperative of power depends on the preferences of the population whose support they need, the technological and financial constraints they face, and the enabling behavior of foreign donors. In this model, ideology is not merely a preference, but is itself a tool of rule—shaping rebels’ relationships with both civilians and foreign donors. Furthermore, this model conceptualizes “rebel governance” as the relative mix of coercion, service provision, and ideological positioning. Intuitively and normatively, we intuitively think of as “good governance” as entailing large amounts of service provision, low levels of coercion, and rulers who provide ideological positions and policies in line with popular preferences. In turn, “poor governance” is generally conceptualized as relying heavily on coercion, providing few services, and/or pursuing ideological positions the population finds unattractive.

3. Methodology

This dissertation develops a theory of rebel governance and proceeds with three tests of this theory. All three tests rely heavily on fieldwork conducted between 2008 and 2011 in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao (southern Philippines). The data from this fieldwork comprises extensive archival research of
both secondary and primary printed materials, over 200 field interviews with a variety of stakeholders, and a civilian survey.

Some interviews were designed solely to help me build an intuition about the cases and the causal processes at work. However, many interview subjects were chosen for their knowledge about the independent or dependent variables of interest in specific cases. In coding and developing a qualitative understanding of the cases, I took care to conduct interviews with multiple sources, and particularly sources from different political and historical standpoints to triangulate these facts, and better ensure accuracy. I also selected interview subjects for their ability to comment on specific mechanisms hypothesized to link the independent and dependent variables. For most of these links, I was able to corroborate information with multiple sources—both interview and (in some cases) archival.

Such interviews also informed the design of the survey questionnaire itself, in an effort to produce locally appropriate and easily comprehensible questions. To the best of my knowledge, this survey represents the only survey of political questions of randomly selected civilians in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao. While the survey was conducted specifically for this project, it also offers data and analyses beyond those presented in these chapters. Survey methodologies and additional details are discussed in Chapter 4 and its Appendix.
4. Existing scholarship

In this book, I use the terms “rebels,” “rebel group,” “rebel organization,” “rebellion,” “insurgent,” “insurgent group,” “insurgent organization,” “insurgency,” and “revolutionary” interchangeably. I avoid terms like “guerrilla” and (more contentiously) “terrorist.” Such terms refer to tactics—tactics in which all armed actors (state or not) may engage. However, because this taxonomy has been used both more flexibly or more precisely than I do here, literatures that speak to the phenomenon of interest do address actors labeled in ways I specifically exclude, and are discussed here.

Until recently, studies of rebellion and civil war have tended to focus on issues of conflict onset Collier and Hoeffler (2004) or conclusion (Fearon 2004; Cunningham 2006; Walter 1997; Ross 2004). While invaluable studies in their own right, the fact remains that the reason we are interested in onset and termination is because the phenomenon of conflict itself concerns us—certainly, the bulk of civilians’ experience lies between onset and termination. Scholars have thus begun turning to studies of conflict processes. Many of these focus on rebels’ choice of military tactics (Fearon 2003; Kydd and Walter 2003; Berman 2005; Lapan and Sandler 1998). While choices among of these tactics can have different effects on

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7 I also separate those groups I study from phenomena of “warlords” and “militias.” For additional discussion of these taxonomic issues, see Michael Bhatia, “Fighting Words: Naming Terrorists, Bandits, Rebels and other Violent Actors,” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2005).
civilian welfare (Kydd and Walter 2002), such studies focus on these choices as an issue of rebel versus incumbent militaries. In reality, rebels undertake a host of activities outside of their military-to-military relations with the state that directly affect civilians.

Even so, rebels’ behavior vis-à-vis civilians can have a tactical military motivation. argues rebels’ need to manage intelligence about their own operations shapes their use of coercion against civilians. Specifically, rebels’ access to local information allows them to use carefully targeted violence against informants. If information is limited, rebels are forced to engage in indiscriminate violence against groups containing suspected informants. In Kalyvas’ model, indiscriminate violence against civilians is an inefficient solution to an information-control problem all rebels face. Azam and Hoeffler (2002) argue, however, that such actions may actually have direct military value. While they focus on incumbent strategies, Azam and Hoeffler explicitly bring rebels’ civilian population into the rebel-incumbent contest, arguing states’ use of terror against civilians can interdict rebels’ ability to draw support from the populace. Such studies offer compelling logics, but look exclusively at a coercive aspect of rebel behavior vis-à-vis civilians, leaving unexplained why some rebels invest in positive services and others do not.

Other studies have cut into the question from a strategic, rather than tactical, angle. In so doing, several have highlighted the role of resources, particularly
lootable resources, in shaping rebel behavior.\textsuperscript{8} Notably, Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) “greed or grievance” debate raises the issue of whether rebels are effectively glorified bandits. Particularly, whether rebels may seek wealth rather than political change, and whether in such a pursuit, lootable resources prolong conflict by giving combatants both the ability to finance their fight, and an prize over which to keep fighting (Ross 2006; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier 2000).

Such resources are provided by geographic happenstance, and which the rebels are able to access regardless of their behavior. Indeed, Weinstein (2006) argues such resources may actually allow rebels a “free pass” in terms of their behavior. Like the “resource curse” that strikes formally recognized states, Weinstein argues rebels’ access to lootable natural resources attracts opportunistic fighters who are subsequently poorly behaved vis-à-vis civilians. In his argument, coercion of civilians is not a deliberate choice, but rather an outcome of strategic restrictions that shape rebels’ recruiting choices. Azam (2002)’s state-centric model offers a similar logic, describing fighters who loot to augment their pay, and engage in “proper fighting” the rest of the time.

However, many areas are neither blessed (nor cursed) with natural resources. However, this does not mean the landscape is bereft of resources—

\textsuperscript{8} Lootable resources are defined as those like alluvial diamonds, timber, drugs, etc. that may be extracted and sold with minimal investment. See Michael Ross, "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?," \textit{Journal of Peace Research} 41, no. 3 (2004).
civilians themselves hold resources rebels find helpful. Some scholars have thus analogized rebels to bandits, explicating models in which armed actors extract from the civilian population. In some models, authority figures are little more than a protection racket, extracting surplus from the populace (Gambetta 1993; Konrad and Skaperdas 1998). Others note that competition over such rents can result in additional hardship for the public (Skaperdas 2002; Konrad 2005). These models offer a pleasing simplicity, but do not address behaviors outside of extortion—behaviors in which authority figures, state or non-state, demonstrably engage. Even authorities interested solely in extracting rents may have incentives to limit their extraction, and engage in investment. Olson’s (1993) stationary bandits find such behavior increases the size of the local resource pie from which they subsequently take a slice. In other words, resources may be endogenously created through investment.

Moselle and Polak (2001) argue that as proto-states emerge from banditry, offering civilians protection from proving bandits, civilians may actually be worse off. While such primitive kings may provide civilians some public goods, those goods on offer will be limited to those that increase state power, and tend to offer only limited improvements in public welfare. Berman (2008) argues service

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9 In these arguments rents can include foreign aid. Weinstein (2006) also discusses foreign aid, which he treats in a rent-like fashion. However, his theory does not address the issue of rebel competition over such assistance.
provision can have strategic value for non-state actors (armed or not), as they provide incentives to recruit members, who must thus be carefully screened to avoid freeriding. However, it is not clear why in Olson’s argument rebel groups with similar time horizons would engage in different levels of service provision, or (as per Moselle and Polak’s model) rebels would invest in services beyond the limited set they predict for would-be rulers.

A few scholars have directly tackled the topic of rebel governance. Seminal work on the subject specifically refers to both “guerrilla governance” and the rebel “counterstate” (Vega 1969; Wickham-Crowley 1987), and highlights a variety of rebel behaviors vis-à-vis civilians. Other authors have focused specifically on the degree to which some rebel groups form representative political bodies and consultative structures Kasfir (2002, 2005). These works provide much in the way of rich descriptive evidence from in-depth case studies.

Relying on several case studies, Mampilly (2011) offers inductive explanations for variations in rebels’ generation of governance systems, identifying factors as varied as rebels’ organizational structure, domestic coalition-building, state penetration into society, periods of peace or ceasefire, and challenges from humanitarian and other civil society organizations. Arjona (2010) offers a more deductive model of rebel governance, arguing rebels’ time horizons and villagers’ pre-existing institutions shape rebel governance in the community.

While Mampilly (2011) touches on the international community’s role in humanitarian or other civil society organizations that interface with rebels, most of
these arguments are domestic-centric. While intrastate wars are frequently
differentiated from interstate conflicts, many civil wars do have international
involvement on the rebel or incumbent side (Byman et al. 2000; Cunningham et al.
2009). Civil wars are a complex phenomenon, with multiple actors. While
intrastate wars are frequently differentiated from interstate conflicts, many civil
wars do have international involvement on the rebel or incumbent side (Byman et al
2000; Cunningham et al. 2009). A number of studies have focused in identifying the
motivations for states’ decision to back rebels abroad (Regan 1998, 2000; Byman et
al. 2000; Byman 2005). Among these, scholars have highlighted the role of diaspora
or other transnational populations (Salehyan et al. 2009; Saidman 1997, 2002).
However, these focus predicting foreign involvement, rather than how this
involvement shapes rebels’ behavior generally, or vis-à-vis civilians, specifically. A
few case studies have focused on some specific dynamics between diaspora
supporters and rebel groups (Radtke 2005; Dochartaigh 1995).

Weinstein (2006) treats rebels’ foreign backing in a rent-like fashion—
provided without preferences or other strings attached by donors who are not
discussed. In reality, states and other foreign actors chose to back rebels for very
particular reasons— out ethnic or religious affinity, or to further their own
geopolitical goals (Byman and Kreps 2010). Whatever their reason, states’
involvement in others’ internal conflicts is not without risks. Scholars have
increasingly investigated these risks through the lens of principal-agent analysis
(Byman and Kreps 2010). Sponsorship of rebels or terrorism abroad can provide
states another foreign policy tool (Bapat 2007), but this kind of involvement can increase the probability of drawing such sponsors into interstate disputes (Schultz 2010; Gleditsch 2008). Sponsors also run the risk that rebels will otherwise engage in activities counter to the sponsors’ interests (Salehyan 2010). However, most of these of these works do not address the outcome of such pairings on domestic civilians. Rather, they focus on the risks to state sponsors, and the ways in which these shape choices over rebel-state partnerships.

A few scholars offer notable exceptions. Hovil and Werker (2005) offer a case study in which rebels attempt to alleviate their sponsors’ information problems by engaging in widespread, anti-civilian violence (though they are uncertain if this was to prove commitment to the rebellion, undertake observable behaviors, or because sponsors actually preferred anti-civilian violence). Lidow (2011) argues donors with economic interests in the conflict, interests that benefit from stability, financially back particular leaders within a rebel organization, and provide them with funds to maintain well-paid troops. Donors without these interests back disorganized organizations, whose unpaid soldiers tend to loot and abuse the populace. In Hovil and Werker (2005), donors have no preferences over how the rebels treat civilians—they simply care that rebels look like they are “doing something” militarily. Lidow’s (2011) donors’ concerns are their own economic interests. It is not clear how donors would seek to shape rebel behavior towards civilians in the absence of such interests, which are demonstrably not shared by many rebels’ foreign supporters.
5. Outline of the dissertation

The next five chapters provide a study about how rebels structure their relationship with civilians, why rebels’ choices over this structure may vary, and the role of civilians and foreign sponsors in shaping this relationship. Chapter 2 outlines a new theory of rebel governance, and draws out several testable implications. I then offer three separate tests of the theory—each leveraging quasi-experimental variation within the three Moro liberation movements of Mindanao, in the Southern Philippines—the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Chapter 3 outlines the history and context of the case material used in the three tests. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 apply the theory to the case evidence from Mindanao—presenting both cross-sectional data (comparing all three groups), and longitudinal studies of two groups who experienced shifts over time. Analysis draws on both qualitative and quantitative data. Quantitative analysis rests on a new field survey I designed and ran in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao. By using in-depth studies of cases within Mindanao, this dissertation also represents one of the most comprehensive looks at the Moro liberation movements in recent scholarship.

The following paragraphs provide sketches of each of the chapters.

**Chapter 2: Theory**

Chapter 2 develops a new theory of rebel governance. I start from the assumption that rebels need resources to sustain themselves and improve their
chances of victory, or at least obtain a more favorable settlement from the incumbent. In the absence of lootable resources, rebels must build some form of support from politically motivated actors at home or abroad. I argue rebels' generation of support from the domestic population depends on both coercion and service provision, but the relative effectiveness of service provision depends on the ideological content of their policies—making ideology itself a tool of rule. How far rebels compromise their ideological preferences for the imperative of gaining compliance depends on the preferences of the population whose support they need, the technological and financial constraints they face, and the enabling behavior of foreign donors.

Chapter 3: The Cases

I provide three separate tests of the theory (Chapters 4, 5, 6), all leveraging quasi-experimental variation within the three Moro liberation movements of Mindanao, in the Southern Philippines —the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). All three groups share similar territory and claim self-determination for Mindanao’s Muslim Moro population but have different internal ideological preferences, and have made different choices from the available constellation of foreign and domestic supporters. This chapter provides a brief introduction to the history of Mindanao and roots of the conflict. The bulk of the chapter “codes” the cases on the independent variables of interest as identified in the theory chapter (Chapter 2). In
so doing, the discussion provides details on the history and origins of each of the three groups and their international backers (if any). Chapter 3 draws on extensive interview and other primary-source research, as well as secondary sources.

Chapter 4: Cross-group comparative statics (MNLF, MILF, ASG)

Chapter 4 reports results from a major field survey administered in 2009-2010 in Mindanao, providing cross-sectional data on civilian experience with the MNLF, MILF, and ASG. These data allow a cross-sectional test of the theory’s predictions. Specifically, theory predicts MILF will provide the greatest number (and best quality) services of the three rebel groups, followed by MNLF, and then ASG. Furthermore, theory suggests MILF will engage in the least amount of coercion vis-à-vis civilians, followed by MNLF, and then ASG. The chapter and its appendix describe the survey design and methodology. Qualitative interviews corroborate civilian impressions captured in the survey, and highlight key differences in the rebels’ perspectives on governance, and the role of both domestic and foreign interests.

Chapter 5: MNLF governance over time

What happens when a donor’s preferences shift over time? Chapter 5 leverages exogenous variation in MNLF donors’ preferences to explain the concomitant adaptation of MNLF governance. Responding to their own geopolitical concerns, the preferences of MNLF’s Libyan and OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) sponsors shifted between 1968 and the early 1990s. This longitudinal
test provides opportunities to falsify both the theory's comparative statics predictions and the causal mechanisms that underlie these expectations. The chapter draws heavily on qualitative interviews and other primary sources, and presents statistical evidence drawn from retrospective questions on the survey described in Chapter 4.

Interviews outline debates within the MNLF over the tradeoffs they were asked to make, and lend nuance and detail to the quantitative analyses, allowing tests of both the theory's hypothesized outcomes and causal mechanisms.

**Chapter 6: ASG governance over time**

What happens when a rebel group loses a sponsor completely? Chapter 6 leverages exogenous variation in the Abu Sayyaf Group’s (ASG) foreign donorship between 1991 and the present to explain changes in ASG’s behavior vis-à-vis civilians. ASG’s ties to its original Al Qaeda (AQ)-linked supporters were largely severed in the late 1990s—through exogenous crackdowns on AQ operations and personnel, and the sudden death of the founder (whose personal ties to AQ died with him). The group spent several years re-tooling, and emerged with a new partnership with Jemaah Islamiyya (JI), foreign radicals, and domestic criminals. Analysis draws on interviews and primary source data. Interviews provide insight into ASG’s inner workings reveal debates over the group’s ideological shift, and its decision-making over how to relate to civilians. The groups’ period of re-
equilibration offers a particularly informative test of the theory’s hypothesized causal mechanisms.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This dissertation offers a generalizable understanding of the formation and variation in rebel governance. The theory embraces a multiplicity of actors that frequently populate rebellions, and acknowledges a range of tools rebels can use to generate compliance. The cross-sectional quantitative test suggests the theory accurately captures how rebel behavior vis-à-vis civilians varies with rebels’ own ideological preferences, as well as their donor’s ideological position, humanitarian concerns, and form of support. The MNLF and ASG longitudinal studies indicate the theory is robust to variation over time.

In addition to its academic contributions, this study offers a number of policy-relevant insights. Within the “hearts and minds” paradigm, counterinsurgency policy focuses on “outbidding” rebel groups—on providing better governance than rebels. A better understanding of how rebels govern is thus a timely contribution. Furthermore, this study suggests rebel groups without significant foreign sponsorship may be difficult to defeat. Such groups will likely have already adapted their ideological position to closely match civilian preferences, and will provide services—quite possibly more effectively than does the incumbent. However, understanding how rebels generate civilian compliance can outline the terms that any sustainable peace agreement must address. Recognizing rebel
governance can also suggest ways in which extant authority structures could be
effectively integrated into a transparent post-conflict stabilization program.
Chapter 2: Theory

The village was clean, free of the detritus that often clogs the roads (and I use the term loosely) of rural Mindanao. Throughout Mindanao, particularly once off the main highway, I generally find the presence of litter roughly corresponds to the sense of community in a village—those with noticeable debris are frequently less harmonious than cleaner towns. This was a rare pocket of Moro farmers in this municipality—heavily populated by Christian settlers.

A few men sat having coffee under a nipa roof next to a small sari-sari store, their assault rifles slung across their backs. They were unconcerned, but not naively so—they were observant, and their weapons well maintained.

We sat on the imam’s front porch. The men who ran the village explained the state of the community some twenty years before—a wartorn collection of farmers with tiny plots of land barely adequate for subsistence farming and youths largely interested in leaving, all increasingly concerned about the encroaching settler population, and nominally helmed by traditional elites unable to solve any of their problems.

Over many months, the MILF had persuaded initial representatives of the traditional elites, youths, and farmers, to hear them out. Years later, I looked around at the lush farmlands. The political committee chair explained they had persuaded the farmers to join together. Farming practices had improved through lectures from
technocrats in the MILF network, and programs from NGOs an MILF-organized village committee had carefully vetted for local appropriateness. Farmers now sold their surplus to local branches of international agricultural conglomerates, again under the eyes of the MILF—which both ensured the farmers got a fair price for their copra (dried coconut) and mangoes, and reassured the corporation the farmers would deliver.

The MILF had largely built this village from scratch, and largely using resources recruited from the villagers themselves. One of the mosques, however, had been built by a sponsor from the Middle East, coordinated through the MILF’s religious network. This is not unusual. Some months earlier, a high-ranking MILF leader had explained many of the mosques were foreign-funded. However, it seems that while the village-level structure jostled with local interests, he had his hands full with well-intentioned sponsors:

“Sympathetic Muslims from abroad sometimes offer us support. For many of them, from places like Saudi Arabia, building a mosque is an act of religious devotion. But now... Look, the Qur’an tells us where we should put the mosque – how many members in the community, if they cannot hear the call to prayer from another mosque. But now, with all these donated mosques, there is hardly any room left where we can put a mosque! They are very much on building these mosques, but not so much on other, basic things. I have just had a meeting with some donors from the Middle East, and asked them about giving instead to some more ... practical projects.”

“At least,” he said, looking slightly exasperated, “at least give us something we can eat!” Rebels, it seems, share international NGOs’ frustration with earmarked donations.
1. Introduction

Rebellion is more than a military contest. While armed confrontation with the incumbent is often the most visible face of rebellion, rebels also have a varied relationship with the domestic civilians they purport to represent. Some rebels provide civilians a range of beneficial services, while others rely primarily on coercion and rule through fear. Some operate as faithful representatives of the popular political interest, while others pursue goals alien to civilian preferences. Why such variation? I argue that this relationship is shaped by rebels’ need to access resources to maintain their existence and finance their fight.

Rebels may harness lootable resources to sustain themselves, but such resources are not universally available—in their absence, rebels must access resources held by domestic or foreign actors. Whomever their supporters, I argue that rebels need to generate quasi-voluntary compliance from civilians: like states, they need domestic power. Civilian compliance facilitates rebel operations (at the very least by protecting intelligence about their movements), access to shelter, food, fighters, and financial or in-kind contributions (aka taxes). In short, rebels, like states, must govern. This is not to say that all such governance is positive for civilians. Just as there are brutal dictators, so too are there unpleasant rebel overlords.

What form this governance takes, and why it varies is important. Large portions of the world’s population lives under non-state authorities. In contested areas, governance, human rights, welfare, economic development, political
representation are local phenomena, under local authorities. Often, these authorities are rebel groups. How they shape and pattern this authority thus has a profound effect on the lives of those living in their areas. This study offers a systematic look at how and why rebels choose various governance packages—be they beneficial to civilians or not. Furthermore, this study models rebels’ choices in an environment populated with strategic domestic and foreign actors. Both play a role in many intrastate wars, but the literature is underdeveloped in explaining how these two spheres interact, and their consequences on the ground.

I argue that rebels have three tools with which to govern: ideology, coercion, and service provision. This chapter shows how rebels mix these three tools to generate civilian compliance. This theory is based on the literature on origins of the state and regime types, and draws from extant work on the political economy of regime type and rulers’ choices over policy instruments. I argue that rebel’s choices are shaped by their strategic interactions with civilians and any foreign donors they might have.

Unlike lootable resources, assets obtained from other actors come with preferences attached. Rebels’ relationships with domestic civilians and foreign

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10 Lootable resources are defined as resources like alluvial diamonds, timber, drugs, and so on that yield a high cash return on minimal technical or infrastructure investment. These resources are easily extracted and sold. Existing scholarship discusses how such resources affect rebels’ behavior towards civilians. See Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For additional work on the impact of lootable resources on the onset and duration of intrastate conflict, see Michael L. Ross, "A Closer Look at Oil,
actors (states, religious or ethnic diasporas, or other rebel or terrorist organizations, or foreign individuals) are interactions shaped by the interests and bargaining power of all strategic actors party to the relationship. These strategic interactions often comprise difficult political choices for rebel groups, and the terms of the relationships they forge shape patterns of rebel governance on the ground.

The theory offers several broad predictions. First, that ideology matters. Specifically, the further away the ideological policies that rebels enact are from civilians’ preferences, the more coercive rebels’ rule will be, and the fewer public services they will provide. Second, donors’ preferences matter in shaping rebel behavior. Donors may care how civilians fare under rebel rule, and they have means (namely the forms of support they offer the rebels) by which they can incentivize rebel behavior. The greater donors’ humanitarian concern, the more services rebels will provide, and the less coercive they will be towards civilians.

This chapter proceeds as follows. I first explicate the challenge rebels face, what they want out of their relationship with civilians, and why they need to generate compliance to obtain this. I then outline the tools rebels can use to generate compliance (which I also call support) from civilians. I then address how rebels optimize governance vis-à-vis civilians, when they lack foreign support. Finally, I turn to foreign sponsors’ interests and how these shape rebel behavior.

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2. The Rebels’ Challenge

Rebellion is fundamentally a form of bargaining between rebels and incumbent. Rebels use force to extract political and territorial concessions from the incumbent, which in turn uses its military to avoid such concessions and to re-establish its monopoly on the use of force. *Ceteris paribus*, whether the rebellion is settled on the battlefield or at the negotiating table, the more resources rebels bring to bear against the incumbent, the better the bargain they can extract from their opponent.\(^{11}\) Whatever their reasons for rebelling, all rebels want to maximize their chances of obtaining the best possible bargain from the state. Thus, all rebels want to maximize their resources, and the resources needed for rebellion are many.

Rebellion is a costly activity. Among rebels’ most obvious needs are fighters. Recruits are often largely domestic, but fighters can also be imported; the Afghan *mujahedeen* in the 1980s notably attracted a host of fighters from abroad. Domestic or foreign, producing recruits is not necessarily easy. Some may join if offered cash payments, others must be wooed with the promise of post-victory rewards. Even impressing civilians into military service is a problematic enterprise, as controlling involuntary troops may be difficult. Attracting or abducting recruits is one

\(^{11}\) Like intrastate wars, intrastate conflict can be short of total victory by one side or the other, if both sides converge on an assessment about which will ultimately win the contest—see Branislav L. Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations," *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (2003). However, successfully negotiated settlements in intrastate conflicts are relatively rare—see Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997); Stephen Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997).
challenge—identifying which of them will be good soldiers and contribute to the organization is another.12

Even once supplied with personnel, the operational logistics for any force are enormous.13 Active participation in rebels' military campaigns is often limited to a small portion of the population,14 but combatants comprise only a part of rebels' overall operations. Behind the combatants are a host of operations that support the front lines and sustain the organization. Such requirements are hardly limited to rebellions. The US military's Total Army Analysis 2003 estimates the ratio of support to combat personnel to be about 2.5 to 1.15 Even allowing generously for a less-sophisticated war machine, these figures suggest that rebels' challenges exceed their obvious need for combat personnel. Once recruited, fighters must be trained. Some rely on on-the-job training, but many groups attempt at least some rudimentary instruction. Such efforts require rebels to identify and recruit knowledgeable individuals as trainers, and take these skilled combatants off the front lines (where

they can aid in pressuring the incumbent) so that they may teach recruits. Training also requires rebels to find areas in which it is safe to train and house trainees, all under the threat of discovery by enemy forces.

Fighters must also be armed. War zones are often characterized as being awash in guns, but in fact weapons and (particularly) ammunition can be difficult to supply in a timely fashion to the troops that need them. Rebels’ access to the open market for weapons is often constrained by scrutiny, and they must either pay the premium smugglers and arms dealers demand, or devote resource to their own smuggling operations. Rebels may also invest in producing their own armaments, but this requires them to develop the skills necessary to do so, establish a secure location for fabrication, and acquire the necessary raw supplies.

Even moving fighters from one area to another can be costly. Should the rebels use mechanized transport, this is generally not free, but even pedestrian mobilization can be difficult. Fighters must be clothed, housed, and fed. The difficulties of supplying, clothing, housing and feeding armies on the move plagued European militaries for centuries.16 Logistical issues often spelled the difference

between victory and defeat, or, indeed, whether troops survived long enough to reach the battlefield.  

Mobilization also increases fighters’ exposure, and thus the need to control intelligence about such movements that civilians might share with the incumbent. Indeed, controlling intelligence is a major challenge for rebels. Berman et al. (2009) and Kalyvas (2006) highlight both the importance and ubiquity of intelligence—no matter how few material assets civilians may have, they invariably possess intelligence. Rebels need to gain intelligence for themselves and deny it to their enemies—a task for which, inevitably, they must generate some compliance from the population.

Broadly speaking, then, rebels need two types of resources. First are more fungible inputs (materiel, fighters, cash, etc.). Such resources can come from myriad sources—contributions from domestic civilians, donations from abroad, or lootable resources. Second, rebels need types of support that may only be obtained from the domestic population. At the very least, rebels need to gain intelligence about incumbent operations, and ensure civilians withhold information about their own. Civilians can also provide rebels with a number of other benefits, including contributions (which may be financial, or in-kind contributions like food, shelter,

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17 Among other examples, note the high casualty rates among many companies that set out to join the European foces fighting in the Crusades. While some were battle deaths, many are attributed to the Crusaders’ inabilities to adequately feed, shelter, and care for these forces en route between Europe and Jerusalem.
and fighters); observance of rebel-established rules/laws; staying on the land (and thus keeping resources within rebels’ reach) instead of fleeing; and shelter.

In short, rebels need to generate domestic support.

3. The Challenge of Governance

(Note: see Appendix for the formal version of rebel behavior)

Even in politics outside of intrastate conflict, “support” is a complex concept. Like rebels, states face the challenge of sustaining themselves, also often while simultaneously conducting a war. Such rulers have patterned authority over the ruled in myriad ways. I argue that both states and rebel groups need to generate quasi-voluntary compliance. In quasi-voluntary compliance, citizens elect to acquiesce, but the authority figure maintains the ability to sanction non-compliers. For both rebels and states, compliance (which I will also call support or power) facilitates operations, allowing them to stay in power and extract needed resources (voluntarily or not) from the civilian population. All rebels need it to survive.

The theory developed here builds on the logics of existing analyses that examine the evolution of Western states. These studies argue variations in

governance are shaped by an ongoing bargain between rulers and ruled; the former needing to extract resources (for personal gain, national defense, development, etc.) and the latter working to limit extraction and coercion, and to maximize the goods and services returned to them. Governance is a bargain, a process of give-and-take between strategic actors. These models of origins of the state focus on the interaction between rulers and a range of domestic actors.

However, many rebels occupy a multi-actor environment. Most models of state origins include only domestic actors (ruler and ruled), omitting international participation. Intrastate conflicts frequently attract international interest. Conflicts may involve foreign states, religious or ethnic diasporas, and individuals or other rebel or terrorist organizations abroad. Like domestic civilians, these actors also have preferences over the political and ideological outcomes of the struggle.

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20 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000).

Intrastate conflict outcomes can affect both domestic and foreign policy of the state in question. Both may be of interest to foreign actors.

While models of state origins traditionally omit foreign actors, their logic can be extended to include non-domestic actors. Indeed, historically, states have not always been supported on domestic resources alone. Early states on the Mediterranean and Adriatic sustained themselves for centuries through campaigns of piracy: extracting loot, ransom, and protection payments from their neighbors.22 More recently, aid from international financial institutions and bilateral assistance, have shored up multiple regimes. World-systems theorists argue Western capitalists used colonialism as a means to assuage economic needs by extracting value from weaker states.23

Furthermore, not only have states drawn support from abroad, but this support has shaped domestic governance. Foreign aid conditionality by definition places strictures on domestic governance, Bates (1981) argues aid dependence has enervated states’ provision of public goods, and (Gourevitch 1978) argues even broad international pressures shape domestic governance. Bringing foreign actors into the bargaining framework of governance is possible. The basic logic of competing preferences and bargaining positions still applies, and seems a

22 For examples, see the Barbary States, who primarily raided southern Europe from the 14th to the early 19th centuries, and the Uskoks of Senji who were active in the 16th century Adriatic.
reasonable conceptual framework within which to approach the question of rebel governance.

This chapter explicates such an approach. I first address how rebels optimize governance in situations in which they pursue their own preferences, but must take into account those of the civilian population. I then turn to how rebels' behavior is shaped by the introduction of foreign sponsors. Specifically, I propose a theory of rebel governance in which rebels make strategic choices over their use of three governance tools—coercion, service provision, and ideological positioning. Rebels' choice over these tools is shaped by the interests of other strategic actors in the system—namely civilians and foreign donors.

4. Civilians

How and why rebels' tools of governance work partially depends on civilians' own preferences—civilians are, after all, strategic actors in their own right. The theory of rebel actions outlined below embeds within it assumptions about civilians' utility. Civilians can comply with rebel rulers for a variety of different reasons. They may acquiesce out of fear of reprisal, out of genuine affinity for their rebel rulers, or because they find the rebel regime beneficial to them and their communities. These are very different governance experiences.
Civilians often have limited strategic choice in their interactions with rebels. Their choices are never free from coercion, and frequently tread a fine line between the combatants.\textsuperscript{24} They do, however, have preferences over how they are governed, and these preferences shape the effectiveness of rebels’ governance tools, and thus rebels’ choices over these tools. At a basic level, security concerns (at least physical and nutritional) overwhelm other interests.\textsuperscript{25} Above a certain minimal level of security, however, civilians are also political actors with preferences over outcomes. This is particularly observable in so-called “low intensity conflicts” and/or scenarios in which conflict is seemingly endemic and recurrent. In such circumstances, the threat of the gun, while never far, is not always imminent, and does not necessarily crowd out all other preferences.

While they often settle for far less, I assume civilians would like good public services, low levels of coercion, and governors who reflect their political and ideological interests. Civilians may have strong preferences over a range of political and ideological issues—the relationship between church and state, the ability to practice their own religious beliefs, land reform, political organization, development programming, and even foreign policy. They may also care about various identity

\textsuperscript{25} Kalyvas, "The Logic of Violence in Civil War," 7, 114.
issues (linguistic, ethnic, religious, and so on), though the degree to which these proxy for other concerns and the types of identity that matter are contentious. That being said, civilians may prefer governors who share their identity, or at least allow them to pursue their own. As noted, civilians do possess resources useful to rebel rulers—like all potential backers, civilians’ support can (ceteris paribus) improve rebels’ chance of victory. The more closely rebels governance matches civilians’ preferences, the more likely civilians are to offer these resources voluntarily.

5. Three Instruments of Rule

(For a formal version of this discussion, see Appendix, Sections 1 and 2)

“Quasi-voluntary compliance rests on norms but is backed by material incentives and by coercion.”

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28 Levi, Of Rule and Revenue: 68.
Rebels generate quasi-voluntary compliance with the use of three instruments of rule: coercion, service provision, and ideology. Variation in rebel governance can be thought of as different mixes among these tools. The question thus becomes why we observe such different governance packages. This section outlines the three tools of governance rebels have at their disposal.

1.1. Ideology

Ideology is the world view the rebels espouse—for example, Marxism, Islamism, etc. Ideological positions are indicators of how rebels would govern should they be victorious, since victory would allow the rebels/rulers to implement their ideological vision more freely. But rebels’ ideology will likely color their more immediate behavior as well. Indeed, a disconnect between rebels’ current behavior and their espoused ideological goals may eventually discredit the organization.

For civilians, ideology is a cue to how rebels would rule once in power. As Popkin (1991) argues about political parties, ideologies are “simple shortcuts and loosely integrated views about what parties [rebels] stand for in the minds of voters [civilians].”29 These cues are even more important as civilians cannot predict with certainty the would-be leaders’ future performance, which is frequently the case in

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The more these cues reflect identities and values held by civilians, the more appealing the populace will find them—as voters cast their votes, civilians offer support and compliance.

This theory is unusual among its rational choice cousins in that it takes ideology seriously. While many scholars concur ideology matters in shaping behavior, few actually incorporate it into their model. Many avoid ideological considerations: in discussing how states generate compliance from their citizens, both North (1985) and Levi (1988) acknowledge ideology as a political resource but treat it “as a residual category for those situations in which self-interest is clearly not explanatory.” Others treat ideology as a fig leaf used by careerists to cover their vested interests in redistributive benefits. For still others, ideology is instrumental. Like Downsian political parties who “formulate policies to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies,” de Mesquita’s (2008) terrorist leaders establish factions with ideological positions designed to maximize support. In such models, groups’ ideological positions are not inherent beliefs, but matters of political convenience.

33 Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, ”Terrorist Factions,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3(2008). He notes that, in reality, many terrorist leaders likely do have ideological preferences, and may be unwilling to adopt a new position dictated by political convenience.
positioning is successful is because these ideological positions resonate with civilians for whom ideology is not instrumental.

This theory assumes that both civilians and rebels have ideological positions. While rebels may compromise their own ideological position for political convenience, this action is a choice—and often a non-trivial one. Here, as I will argue, ideology affects rebels’ utility directly. It also affects the utility functions of the civilians and supporters with whom rebels interact.

Both North (1981) and Levi (1988) acknowledge ideologies can make it easier for rulers to extract compliance from the ruled, once in office. North argues ideologies are “designed to get people to conceive of justice as coextensive with the existing rules and, accordingly, obey them out of a sense of morality.”\textsuperscript{34} Assuming ideological agency on the part of civilians, however, North’s statement hinges on consanguinity between the ideologies of ruler and ruled. If these ideological positions are different, the civilians will not view existing rules as just, and not comply “out of a sense of morality.”

The key is not the rebels’ position itself, but how far it is from civilian preferences. This theory expresses ideology in terms of extremism, defined as the distance between the ideological preference of the median individual from the local population and the ideological content of the policies supplied by the rebels. For

\textsuperscript{34} North, \textit{Structure and Change in Economic History}: 54.
simplicity, the theory casts ideology as a one-dimensional variable and simply characterizes rebels’ own position and enacted policies as being closer or further away from civilian preferences. This definition of extremism is agnostic over what civilians’ ideological preferences and the policies supplied by rebels actually are. The theory’s predictions depend only on how far they are from each other. Note also that this definition of extremism is local, and that a global definition of extremism is actually unhelpful. By definition, governance is a local phenomenon—between a particular authority and a particular population. Positing a global definition of extremism would require positing global homogeneity of civilian preferences, which seems implausible and demonstrably untrue.

In practice, of course, ideology is often an imprecise subject. In discussing the American voter, Converse (1964) notes many survey respondents struggle to define either “liberalism” or “conservatism”—just as many Muslim civilians in conflict-affected Mindanao struggled to define the “sharia” their rebel representatives have fought to implement. However, reasoned choices do not require full information or even complete understanding. Green et al. (2002) argue persuasively that voters’ definitional inarticulateness does not impinge their ability to identify themselves as either “liberal” or “conservative,” and support the appropriate political party. Just as voters do not have to agree with party leaders on

every particular, neither do civilians need to agree with (or even fully understand) rebel leaders’ positions on all points to decide if the party (or rebellion) matches their own preferences. The same civilians who could not articulate a sophisticated definition of “sharia” identified nonetheless fiercely as Muslims and were convinced of sharia’s superiority over purely secular law. In other words, “sharia” was a cue. Most defined “sharia” simply as “Islam.” For them the term “sharia” represents an Islamic ideology that resonates with their own identification as Muslims.36

To be sure, ideology, like other cues may be used as referents to distributive benefits provided by one would-be leader versus another.37 Furthermore, virtually all ideologies have distributive consequences—these arguments are often integral to their definitions of justice and other normative values.38 I merely argue here that ideologies are not only about such things.39

Overall, I argue the more rebels’ ideological platform diverges from civilians’ the less likely civilians will comply. Civilians will offer less compliance because they feel little desire to contribute to a cause disparate from their own preferences and less attachment to a governance structure pursuing policies they dislike. Ideological

36 For survey results and further discussion, see Chapter 3, Section 2 Table 3.3 and Table 3.4.
37 Such is the argument for many studies of ethnic voting. See Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India; Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa.
38 This theory also does not comment on which of these distributive arrangements is preferable, I can only acknowledge that ideology does have an effect on such things, and focus on the relatively non-controversial assumption that ideological divergence from the popular preference will generate resistance.
39 Note that ideologies may well change actors’ preferences in the long term. Once enacted, an ideology may “prove itself” if it succeeds in benefitting would-be skeptics, and may socialize the next generation.
congruence produces support as civilians comply with a cause they see as morally justified and pursuing interests and values they themselves hold. Ideology is a separate component of the rebels’ social contract with civilians (e.g., pursuing Islamist or Marxist goals), but frequently entwines with the other tools (e.g., the ideological content of educational structures and other services).

1.2. Service Provision

Services comprise a range of actions beneficial to civilians. These activities include dispute adjudication, medical services, job placement or direct employment, observation (and enforcement) of human rights, establishment of schools, representative governance structures, and so on. Services produce compliance by helping generate loyalty for the rebel regime providing the goods. In cynical terms, services are a bribe for accepting rebels’ authority, and complying with their rule.

However, as with states, rebel rulers vary in how many services they provide, and to whom. Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) explicate regimes’ efforts to distribute the material benefits of rule to those on whose support their rule relies. At an extreme, systems in which rulers are kept in power by the collusion of a small number of elites generally provide such insiders with extensive private goods looted

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40 Note also that the counterpart to this logic is the “Hearts and Minds” approach of counterinsurgency, in which the incumbent rolls out a set of infrastructure improvements and other services to woo civilians support.
from the “public” coffers. In democratic regimes, where all votes are equally valuable, leaders produce public goods that may woo all who have a say in their continued tenure. Like states, rebels may also vary in which services they provide, and to whom—some provide benefits to wide swaths of the population, while others reward only a few known loyalists.

It is worth noting that rebels do, indeed, provide services. Hizballah is among the most commonly cited exemplars of rebel service provision, supplying civilians with hospitals, educational resources, and emergency food and water. Fully 64% of respondents in a 1993 survey in Lebanon indicated Hizballah as the largest contributor to Shiites’ educational, health, and social needs.41 Such services have engendered popular support for Hizballah,42 and when they ran for election, votes. Hizballah scholar Judith Palmer Harik recounts how one politician, soliciting a vote from an acquaintance, met with the response, "Where were you when we needed emergency snow removal and fuel? In this village, everyone is going to vote for Hizballah”—which had provided such assistance when needed.43


Note that Hizballah walks an interesting line between legitimate political party and rebel organization. 42 Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, *In the path of Hizballah* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004), especially 134.

43 Harik, "Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon’s Hizballah," 55. citing a personal interview.
Such operations are large-scale and large-budget—beyond the reach of many rebel organizations. However, rebels can offer many services on a smaller scale (and smaller budget) that have a meaningful impact on civilians’ wellbeing. Services may comprise both local public goods and representative bodies or other feedback mechanisms for popular preferences.44

Among the most common services rebels may provide is dispute adjudication. Without it, enforcement of contracts may be impossible (and result in lost economic activity), and social tensions can easily escalate into violence between civilians. Such problems are only exacerbated in conflict-affected areas. Ongoing war provides both a cover for local disputes,45 and may (through resultant scarcity and other tensions) make disputes more likely. While enforcement of decisions likely relies on coercion (see Section 1.3 below), the development of a system of justice and set of laws can benefit civilians and prevent inefficient anarchy. In the southern Philippines, where decades of conflict have largely conflated personal honor and personal safety and law-and-order is lax, local disagreements easily escalate into long-running blood feuds (ridos). The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) frequently adjudicates such disputes before they can escalate, carefully constructs task forces of its own men serve as a peacekeeping buffer between

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44 Wickham-Crowley, "The Rise (And Sometimes Fall) of Guerrilla Governments in Latin America."; Kasfir, "Guerrillas and Civilian Participation: the National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981-86."
warring families, and designs marriage contracts to avoid future entanglements between powerful clans.46

Rebels can also work to improve the economy in their areas, usually by assisting in agricultural production—a valuable contribution in the primarily agrarian societies of many revolutions. In the 1970s, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) worked to educate peasants on how to save their crops from the incumbent’s defoliant attacks, and later sent students for agricultural training abroad.47 The MILF works to establish collective farms that operate more efficiently than the dozens of small landholdings by subsistence farmers. Local education is also valuable to civilians, who are frequently underserved in this area, particularly once conflict breaks out. The MILF not only works to develop curriculum for its students, but also (unofficially) integrates this with government-offered education, and sends young men abroad for training in Islamic education, so that they can return to teach in its madaris.

Carrying both a rifle and a medical kit, Che Guevara is an iconic model of rebels’ provision of health services. Cuban revolutionaries later built their services to include a reasonably capable hospital and a range of medical personnel.48 Other

46 Author interview, (Local academic close to MILF’s local political committee: Maguindanao, Philippines, March 2011).
48 Wickham-Crowley, "The Rise (And Sometimes Fall) of Guerrilla Governments in Latin America," 484.
movements have followed suit. Early UNITA specifically recruited highly qualified nurses, and provided basic medical care for civilians in their camps and areas of operation.49

Even such smaller-scale services are still costly for rebels. In addition to any material costs, these activities entail opportunity costs—every loyalist assigned to oversee or provide services cannot be simultaneously present on the front lines of combat. Faced with their own financial and manpower restrictions, rebels can provide access by international NGOs and other humanitarian organizations to civilians in their areas. But this too is costly for rebellions. Such activities may lessen civilians’ grievance against the government (and thus their support for rebellion), and increase security and infiltration risks.50

Rebels can also work to limit the impact of conflict on civilians, who usually bear the brunt of most fighting. Rebels may warn civilians of impending conflict so they may safely evacuate (a risky move when guerrilla warfare depends on the element of surprise). They may also work to avoid civilian casualties (which may

50 Note that this observation is not about allegations that NGOs may channel funding to rebel movements, but solely about NGO’s service provision. See ReliefWeb, ”In the DRC, both sides accuse NGO workers of being spies,” http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MUMA-7V77CN?OpenDocument.; Moro Islamic Liberation Front, ”Development projects can be counter-insurgency tool, MILF says,” Moro Islamic Liberation Front.. MILF prefers aid be channeled through the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), a product of peace negotiations with the government, in which it shares the credit for any development assistance provided. In a few exceptions that prove the rule, some rebels (like the LTTE) have managed to re-brand INGO efforts as their own, countering the risk that aid might ameliorate grievances, and gaining support by labeling services as their own.
require rebels to forgo militarily-attractive targets in civilian areas), and human rights abuses by their fighters. Controlling troops, particularly in the “fog of war,” is difficult for any group, including traditional militaries of even developed states. Developing and maintaining a command and control structure, and using it to train and (crucially) enforce positive civilian treatment, is a costly proposition and thus a powerful signal of rebels’ commitment to good civilian treatment.

Finally, rebels’ service provision also includes efforts to provide political representation. Such efforts may comprise the construction of formal or semi-formal assemblies or representative fora. The National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda developed democratic systems of village management featuring elected village committees. More frequently, political representation includes less formal consultation at the grassroots and domestic alliance building, in which rebels bring various sectors (often ethnic or socioeconomic) into their body politic. Such alliances and consultations are costly for rebels, and speak to two dimensions of rebel governance: ideology and services. Ideologically, consultation and alliances frequently require compromise to make and maintain. Ceteris paribus, the more such compromises rebels make, the closer it brings them to the median preference of the domestic population. Formal or not, representative institutions are also fora for...
for bargaining over governance, including service provision\textsuperscript{52} and/or the redistribution of wealth.\textsuperscript{53}

Both the number of services offered and the manner in which they are provided matter in determining the level of rebel service provision. Obviously, more services on offer equate to a higher level of service provision. However, it is also worthwhile to ask if these benefits are provided as club goods—available only to a select few—or public goods (or local public goods) available to a larger number of civilians. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) highlight the differences between regimes that provide mostly private goods to a small number of well-connected insiders, and governments that provide public goods to large swaths of the populace.\textsuperscript{54} Among rebels, we may distinguish between those for whom the organization’s services are available only to a few leaders and their families, versus those whose efforts target a wider demographic. Thus, a rebellion that adjudicates disputes via an established code of justice and transparent process is considered to provide more services than one whose version of adjudication comprises serving as


\textsuperscript{53} Acemoglu and Robinson, \textit{Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy}; Bueno de Mesquita et al., \textit{The Logic of Political Survival}.

\textsuperscript{54} See also David A. Lake, "Power Pacifists: Democratic States and War," \textit{American Political Science Review} 86, no. 1 (1992).
a force multiplier for members and their families in settling disagreements through arms.

All of these services, I argue, help rebels build loyalty and compliance within the population. As for Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) rulers, distribution of benefits can increasingly bind civilians to the rebel group as loyal supporters. The provision of service increases support, although it does so with decreasing marginal effectiveness. This drop-off occurs as more and more service needs are met, and as civilians are subsequently (marginally) less impressed with successive services.

However, the function that converts services into loyalty is itself a function of ideological extremism (again, defined as divergence from the popular preference). While services are likely welcomed by the population, their enthusiasm for (and compliance with) the provider will be dampened by any skepticism of the rebels’ ideological position. Civilians are simply less happy receiving a given good from extreme rebels than they are receiving the same good from ideologically congruent ones. Furthermore, if ideological positions are cues as to how rebels would rule if victorious, civilians will naturally offer less support to worldviews they find less attractive. Put cynically, rebels whose position diverges widely from civilians’ are not easily able to “bribe” civilians into overlooking their ideological divergence. Since the population prefers moderate policies (i.e. ideological positions close to their own), an additional unit of service provision will produce more support under moderate policies than it will under extremist policies. Thus, the more extreme the ideological position rebels adopt, the less effective is service provision relative to
coercion. In sum, extremism acts as a discount on the effectiveness of service provision.\(^5^5\)

1.3. Coercion

“All states share certain characteristics as institutions that control sufficient force to tax, police, and defend the population of a specified territory”.\(^5^6\)

Rebels use coercion strategically not only against the incumbent regime, but against their own populations to build compliance. Coercion works both directly, by eliminating those who refuse to comply with the rebels, and indirectly—as a warning to those who may yet contemplate non-compliance. Thus, coercion need not always entail the direct application of violence. Instead, many rulers will find it efficient to retain a coercive apparatus in conjunction with a demonstrated willingness to use it. In an extreme example, mutilation by groups like Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) turns its victims into examples to the rest

\(^{5^5}\) It is worth noting that this “discount” is not confined to rebels. Residents in several Muslim areas in Mindanao told me they initially refused medical treatment from both Philippine and U.S. military missions. While their health needs were severely underserved, residents were concerned that treatments on offer were an effort to sterilize Muslims so that Christians could prevail. Because civilians viewed their ideological preferences as being different from the service provider’s, they were skeptical of the service itself. Ironically, civilians availed themselves of the medical treatments only once they had been reassured by rebel leaders and local Muslim elites that the programs were safe. In these areas, the degree of compliance “purchased” with medical services appears to have consisted of their willingness to accept the treatments offered, and a tolerance of the medical personnel’s presence. It is not clear whether such efforts have now “purchased” the military greater intelligence on rebel movements or other forms of compliance. Author interviews, Maguindanaon and Iranon villages 2008 and 2011.

of the population of the rebel’s power and willingness to use it against civilians.⁵⁷ Through both direct impact and deterrence, coercion helps rebels build compliance.

Wintrobe (1998) argues coercion (part of his broader concept of what he terms “repression”) builds loyalty to the regime by discouraging civilians from transferring their loyalty to a rival ruler. For rebels, disloyalty most obviously comprises informing on their operations and personnel to the incumbent. Kalyvas’ (2006) rebels use violence to silence government informants and discourage future betrayals. Coercion can also discourage civilians from creating or supporting rival claimants to the rebel banner. Rulers like Joseph Stalin and Ferdinand Marcos were notorious for expunging would-be rivals to retain their hold on power. Similarly, removal of rival rebel groups ensures an organization does not share power with anyone else. Historically, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was particularly adept at assassinating rival elites and their supporters in their effort to become and remain the preeminent representative of the Tamil rebellion and population.⁵⁸

Coercion also helps rebels with more material aspects of control and fuels their operations. Taxation, for example, is always backed by coercion—even in

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states viewed as non-extortive. In intrastate war, rebels may forcibly extract food, shelter, and recruits from the populace. Stories of armed men demanding livestock, grain, or even prepared meals are not uncommon in many conflict areas. Villagers in the Philippines have been forced at gunpoint to provide shelter for Abu Sayyaf rebels on the run from government forces. Personnel requirements, too, may be helped by coercion. About 88% of RUF fighters were abducted into military service. Coercion may also characterize a sort of rebel version of “tax farming,” in which leaders allow their troops to loot in lieu of providing them a salary for their continued service.

Finally, coercion can back the enforcement of a host of other laws about personal behavior. The specifics of these laws are likely to be idiosyncratic to rebel groups, and entwined with their ideological position—which will specify the norms and rules to be enforced. The American government’s coercive capability enforces its rules about freedom of speech; the so-called “religious police” of the Saudi

60 Author interview, (Long time NGO worker in Basilan, previously kidnapped by ASG for several months: Zamboanga City, Philippines, February 2010).
regime, the Taliban (both as a regime and rebel movement), and Hamas enforce their vision of appropriate personal appearance and deportment. Enforcing these rules can provide rebels with the satisfaction of enacting their ideological preferences, but do also put their “stamp” on communities, and integrate rebel control in everyday life.\textsuperscript{63}

Coercion may also be used in tandem with service provision—most dispute adjudication requires coercion to enforce its decisions. Indeed, no rebels rule without any coercion.\textsuperscript{64} Rational civilians, even presented with benevolent and ideologically congruent rebel overlords, would still shirk on their taxes if able to do so, and heterogeneous civilian populations will always contain some malcontents and the criminally inclined. Rebels must meet such behaviors with coercive force (direct or indirect) to maintain power. Even states generally viewed as legitimate rely on both the threat and/or exercise of coercion to extract taxes, prosecute criminals, and enforce compulsory military service.

As with service provision, as the overall level of coercion mounts, each additional unit of coercion is less effective in producing compliance than was its predecessor. At low levels of coercion, the populace complies because the set of

\textsuperscript{63} Arjona notes related phenomena among guerrillas and paramilitaries in Colombia, who enforced regulations on sexual conduct, personal appearance, and the use of alcohol as a form of “social cleansing,” see Ana A. M. Arjona, “Social Order in Civil War” (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 2010).

\textsuperscript{64} Kalyvas argues “fear alone does not suffice to sustain rule in the long term; however, it operates as a first-order condition that makes the production of loyalty possible.” Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War: 115.
proscribed activities is not too onerous, and sanctions are applied in a reasonably targeted way, such that the risk of wrongful punishment is low. At higher levels, civilians will comply with rebels out of fear. However, at some point, coercion becomes counter-productive.65 Too much coercion represses any local wealth from which rebels may draw taxes. Like Olson’s (1993) stationary bandit, rebels in this theory face the reality that extracting too much now limits future productivity, and thus the size of the pie from which any later extraction takes place.66 Excessive coercion will also eventually produce a civilian backlash, as locals begin backing the incumbent against the rebels, hiding resources, and/or sabotaging rebel operations. Wintrobe (1998) refers to this as the point at which the income effect overwhelms the substitution effect: over-heavy sanctioning reduces civilians’ incentives to invest in the regime more than the risks of disloyalty encourage continued compliance.67 Thus, in equilibrium, rebels would never choose to coerce beyond this point.

Unlike service provision, ideological extremism does not discount coercions’ effectiveness. As Hannah Arendt notes, “[o]ut of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience.”68 What

ideology is on the other side of the muzzle matters significantly less than the threat of the gun itself.

Operationally, lower levels of coercion will embrace elements of policing and law enforcement. Higher levels of coercion include direct applications of violence to steal and extort resources from civilians—including impressment into military service. There are also qualitative distinctions within some coercive behaviors. While institutions can simply regularize oppression, there is a qualitative difference between judicial systems in which judgment is meted out in an *ad hoc* fashion with little process, and one in which rules are enforced through a more transparent process. The former relies more on coercion, and its very arbitrariness generates compliance out of fear.

At any level, however, coercion is not free for rebels. At the very least, rebels will incur opportunity costs, as they must re-task personnel to police, steal and extort rather than fight the incumbent regime. Bluntly, every bullet used on a civilian cannot be used on an enemy soldier.

### 6. The Benefit of Rule: Rebels’ Utility Function and the Power-Ideology Tradeoff

(For a formal version of this discussion, see Appendix, Section 3)

I argue that rebels care about two things; generating domestic power (which I also refer to as consolidating their rule), and the ideological position they enact as part of this rule. I assume rebels have no inherent preferences over their mix of
coercion and service provision—they will enact whatever solution is the most effective. Rebels do, however, have preferences over which ideology they enact.

As rational actors, rebels understand that enacting any policy that diverges from the popular preference will lower their support—for any given investment in coercion and service provision. Therefore, if rebels were only interested in maximizing their power, they would appease civilians by supplying policies whose ideological content matches the popular preference.

However, rebels are not simply interested in power—they are not purely “office-motivated” as Downs (1957) assumes political parties are. Rather, rebels are also “policy-motivated” insofar as they care about the ideology of the policies they choose. Because rebels care about ideology, their utility declines the further away their enacted policy is from the group’s ideal point. Although they can always offer a political position different from their ideal point, doing so reduces the value of staying in power. In other words, if retaining power means severe ideological compromises, rebels might elect to maintain policies closer to their liking even though doing so might make rule more difficult. However, they are not blind to the fact that they need to maintain some support if they are to implement any policies at all. Thus, rebels face a delicate balancing act between satisfying their own ideological goals and supplying policies that will not engender too much resistance. To be sure, rebels vary both in how far their own ideal point is from civilians’, and in their willingness to compromise on these ideological goals.
Rebels’ utility increases with compliance—all else equal, all rebels prefer more compliance to less. However, rebels’ ideological position may force them to optimize, not maximize, power: rebels’ benefit from rule is decreasing in the distance between their own ideological preferences and those they publicly supply. That is, ideological compromise acts as a discount on whatever amount of compliance rebels obtain.

At an extreme, consider rebels whose own preferences are very far removed from civilians’. If they supply policies ideal for the population, they will win compliance and general support, but their payoff from ruling will be negligible, regardless of how much support they are able to generate. While such support will generate resources that make victory more likely, the fruits of such success are, under extreme compromise, utterly unappealing to the rebels. Conversely, whenever rebels supply policies at their ideal point, then their payoff is simply the amount of support they get, since their enjoyment of power is not discounted by ideological compromise.

Rebels can thus face a tradeoff between ideology and security of rule—the two components of their utility function. If rebels did not care about ideology, they would simply maximize compliance by enacting an ideological position identical to the popular preference.

Claim 1. The maximum quasi-voluntary support ideological rebels will be willing to generate is strictly smaller than the support non-ideological rebels will be willing to generate.
Quasi-voluntary support is generated through a mix of coercion and service provision, with the effect of the latter weighted by the degree of moderation of the policies supplied. As extremism increases, the weight shifts to coercion, reflecting the assumption that service provision becomes relatively ineffective in generating support when policies stray far from the public preferences. Because of this, for any mix of coercion and service provision, increasing extremism lowers support unconditionally. However, because there is a limit as to how much the rebels will be willing to compromise on their ideology in order to obtain more support, all else equal, this problem will bite harder for more extreme rebels.

This trade-off also has implications for donors who might be primarily interested in maximizing rebels’ domestic power, which will increase rebels’ bargaining capabilities against the government (for example, when they have an instrumental interest in keeping an active opposition to a government they do not like). Such donors may have trouble coming up with the appropriate incentives if they are dealing with highly ideological rebels (see section 9 below).

7. **The Budget Constraint**

(For a formal version of this discussion, see Appendix, Sections 4 and 5)
Rebels must operate within their budget,\(^{69}\) which comes from income they generate themselves (e.g., lootable resources like drugs or diamonds), and contributions from donors, and (as will be discussed below) resources from civilians. Since support is increasing with use of either of the two materially costly instruments (coercion and service provision), the budget constrains their ability to generate support.\(^{70}\) Because both coercion and service provision are materially costly to rebels, there is an inherent tradeoff between the two. For example, personnel teaching farmers to improve crop rotation cannot, at the same time, be out frightening shopowners into silence about the latest rebel movements. While rebels might wish to engage in more coercion and more services, they cannot do so unless their budget increases; they must trade off between the two. Thus, rebels’ actions also depend on the marginal costs of both coercion and service provision—that is, the costs of each additional unit of coercion and goods provision (respectively).

Part of domestic compliance is effectively taxation—fungible or in-kind transfers from civilians that facilitate rebel operations. Ostensibly, all rebels would

\(^{69}\) Note that this assumption sets this theory apart from Wintrobe’s (1998) model of dictatorial governance—Wintrobe assumes rulers may always increase their budget if needed. See Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*.

\(^{70}\) This theory does not consider that rebels may spend part of their budget on private consumption. In this, the theory differs from that offered by Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, whose rebels loot for profits that are at least partially privately consumed, and from Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*, whose tinpot dictator maximizes personal consumption.
like more power and larger budgets—in which case, folding the taxation function into the budget would be straightforward. However, rebels do not maximize domestic compliance—they optimize. Their maximization is constrained by how far their own ideological preferences are from the populace, and their willingness to compromise on this position. For a variety of reasons noted in the taxation literature, there is also a limit to how much rebels (like other rulers) can increase their budget through increasing domestic compliance. However, for this theory, it is sufficient to note both that greater power, *ceteris paribus*, produces more taxes, and that income from taxation does not increase monotonically.

However, the budget from taxation will be a binding constraint only in some cases. Specifically, for rebels whose optimization of the power-ideology tradeoff produces a level of domestic compliance below the required operational minimum, the resultant budget is not enough for survival. This problem is confined to groups whose internal ideological preference is sufficiently extreme, and their willingness to compromise sufficiently limited, that their optimized governance solution does not produce the support level necessary for survival.

In these cases, absent other sources of income (i.e. from foreign donors or lootable resources), rebels will have to compromise on their ideological convictions. Or, they may exist only as a “latent” rebel group—disgruntled with the *status quo*, but unable to function as a fully-fledged operation. Should lootable, or (more likely) foreign donor resources become available, the rebels may then be able to survive, and be spared disagreeable ideological compromises. Foreign donors may thus
allow extreme rebels to afford preferences that would not otherwise be sustainable in equilibrium.

For example, Che Guevara’s involvement in Bolivia is a classic example. The Ejército de Liberación Nacional de Bolivia (ELN) was led and trained by Che, and backed by the Cuban government, but failed to gain support from either local Communists (who were ideologically closer to Moscow than Havana), or from local populations, who largely refused to join the ELN, and ultimately began informing on the organization. Instead, the ELN represented the views of a very few local guerrillas. Without foreign support, the ELN and similarly extreme groups would have floundered, or never come into existence at all. Furthermore, because of the “extremist discount” on service provision, once formed, such groups will likely be extremely coercive. It is worth noting that Che found himself up against the “extremist discount” described above. Faced with peasants’ reluctance to help the ELN, Che himself proposed to force compliance “through planned terror” rather than his iconic medical kit.

In explaining why foreign sponsorship may produce coercive rebels, this theory differs from previous explanations of rebel behavior. Here, foreign-backed

73 Ibid., 151.
rebels may be extremely coercive towards civilians. However, this behavior is not
due, as in Weinstein (2006), to opportunism among the rebel cadre. In fact, these
rebels are extremely ideological. That they are “true believers” actually drives their
coercive behavior. Given their ideological distance from the population, it is simply
more efficient for them to coerce than provide services in their effort to generate
domestic compliance.

8. Comparative Statics of Quasi-Coercive Rule

(For a formal version of this discussion, see Appendix, Section 6)

To gain some intuition about the workings of this theory, note that of the
three instruments of rule, only coercion and service provision are bound by the
budget. Any ideological compromise with popular preferences may be costly for
rebels, but this cost is not material.

Theoretically, rebels could enact despotic rule, in which case they rely
exclusively on coercion. If so, rebels will also enact an ideological position identical
to their own internal preferences. They have nothing to lose by doing so, since their
non-existent service provision will not suffer from the extremist discount.

Alternatively, the only scenario in which rebels could rely exclusively on service
provision to generate civilian compliance would be if the rebels enact an ideological
position identical to the popular preference. Should the rebels’ enacted policy
deviate from the civilian ideal point, rebel power would drop precipitately because
services are discounted by ideological differences from popular opinion and service
are the sole basis of rebel power. In reality, most rebels govern with some mix of coercion and service provision. In other words, they generate quasi-voluntary compliance.

The question thus becomes how rebels mix coercion, service provision, and ideological positioning in response to variations in the exogenous parameters. Specifically, I am interested in how rebels’ mix of coercion and services changes with the their own internal ideological position, their budget constraint, and the marginal costs of service provision and coercion.

Let us first consider variation in how far rebels’ internal preferences are from the popular ideal point—that is, changes in extremism. Obviously, rebels vary in terms of their own internal ideological preferences. This theory is agnostic over the origins of such beliefs—predictions only depend upon these beliefs’ distance from the populations’. Intuitively, the theory suggests the following claim:

**Claim 2:** *The more extreme the preferences of the rebels, the more extreme the policies they choose, the more coercive their rule is, and the fewer services they will provide.*

The power-ideology tradeoff hits hardest for extremists. All else equal, such rebels lose the most compliance—as the populace heavily discounts their service provision because of their ideological dissimilarity. Such rebels thus stand to gain the most from compromising with the popular preference. The flip side of the coin, however, is that because extremists have further to move in any ideological compromise, it is also internally costly for them to do so. While such a move would
(ceteris paribus) increase their domestic power, the compromise would make the resultant rule unpalatable to the rebels. Extremists are thus less likely to compromise.

Without compromising, rebels’ more extreme position will make service provision less effective for them than their more moderate peers. Civilians will retain a healthy degree of skepticism about extreme rebels. While they will likely accept any services offered, they will offer extremists less compliance in return than they would more consanguine overlords. Thus, extremists will find it more efficient to invest in coercion rather than service provision in order to generate domestic power.

Let us now consider how rebels respond to changes in the marginal costs of the coercive and service provision tools of governance.

Claim 3: As their marginal cost of coercion increases, the more services the rebels provide, the less coercive their rule becomes, and the less extremist the policies they choose.

By the same token:

Claim 4: As their marginal cost of service provision increases, the fewer services the rebels provide, the more coercive their rule becomes, and the more extremist the policies they choose.

If production inputs are perfect substitutes, rational actors respond to an increase in the price of one input by purchasing more of another to maintain the same level of output. Here, this suggests rebels would respond to an increase in the
marginal cost of coercion or service provision by simply moving to rely more heavily on the other tool in their efforts to produce quasi-voluntary compliance. However, rebels’ behavior is not so straightforward. Coercion and service provision are not always perfect substitutes. Extremism shapes the marginal effectiveness of rebels’ coercion and service provision tools in producing compliance.

Let us take an extreme rebel group. In their initial equilibrium, they have enacted policies more moderate than they would prefer, but still more extreme than the population’s ideal point. These rebels thus suffer the “extremist discount” which skeptical civilians apply to rebels’ public goods provision. To make up for this loss, rebels invest more in coercion to generate compliance. When the marginal costs of coercion and service provision are relatively close, this substitution is easy for rebels. Rebels can simply substitute by increasing their level of coercion to make up the difference, and attain similar levels of support to those more moderate rebels operating under the same budget constraint would obtain.

Now, let us assume the marginal costs of coercion rise. The coercion in which rebels to make of for the “extremist discount” on service provision is now more expensive. If their enacted policies remain extreme, their tools to produce power are: coercion (which is now more expensive), and service provision (which is less effective, because of the rebels’ extremism). If they do not want to compromise ideologically, rebels will have no choice but to continue investing in coercion. However, because their budget has not changed, they are now able to afford less coercion than they did before. Their overall power drops.
Recall, however, that power and ideological compromise are the only two components of the rebels’ utility calculation. Thus, the only reason rebels would tolerate an erosion of power would be if they could bring the enacted policies closer to their own ideal point. In this scenario, however moving their enacted ideology closer to their own preferences would only exacerbate the problem—it is not an option. Instead, the only way rebels can avoid a decrease in power is to make some ideological compromise. Their governance will then re-equilibrate with an investment in more service provision and less coercion.

The more modest the ideological concession needed, the more likely it is rebels will compromise and provide policies close to the preferences of the citizens. However, for more extreme rebels this compromise is too costly: they will hit a breakpoint at which the compromise needed to generate domestic power is so distasteful that they would rather generate less support but retain more of their own ideology. They will thus implement policies closer to their ideal point even though doing so causes them to lose some of the compliance-generating benefit from service provision, which they compensate for by increasing coercion.

If the marginal costs of service provision increase, rebels will substitute for more coercion. This substitution is more straightforward then the substitution from coercion to services, since rebels are switching away from the factor affected by the “extremist discount.” Thus, if their own position is more extreme than civilians (and than their previously-implemented ideological position), an increase in the costs of service provision may also allow rebels to become more extreme. This is so because
less of their support function depends on the discounted factor (services). Coercion is now both relatively cheaper and its effectiveness untouched by any increase in the extremism of rebels’ enacted position.

Changes in the rebels’ available budget actually have limited impact on their behavior. Specifically,

**Claim 5:** *The larger the total budget available to rebels, the more coercive their rule is, and the more services they provide. The ideological content of the policies they choose does not depend on the total budget.*

Rebel’s choice over the coercion-service provision mix is determined by the relative marginal costs of both tools, and their marginal effectiveness (which is itself determined by the distance between the rebels’ enacted ideological position and civilian preferences). Simply increasing rebels’ budget changes none of these parameters. Rather, rebels will simply consolidate their rule by generating more compliance. They will engage in “more of the same,” enacting the same proportion of coercion and service provision, just at higher levels than before. They will use more coercion, provide more services, and benefit from increased domestic power—all while retaining their previous ideological position. That is, wealth solidifies the form of rule rather than leading to some sort of reform.

### 9. Foreign Donors

Many rebellions do not occur in a domestic vacuum. Foreign actors may also have an interest in the policies and outcomes at stake in intrastate conflict. While it
is certainly the case that most foreign actors opt to stay out of any given intrastate conflict, a large number of civil wars do have some foreign involvement. Foreign actors comprise states, religious and ethnic diasporas, and individuals or other rebel or terrorist organizations. Foreign governments are perhaps the most familiar face of foreign sponsorship. The Cold War spawned pairings between both the US and Soviet governments and a host of rebel groups worldwide. The Irish-American community has been perhaps the best-known Diaspora population from whom significant backing for rebellion has been drawn, in the form of some members’ support for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its variants. Finally, some rebels draw support from cross-border ties with other insurgencies or terrorist organizations, transnational entities like Al Qaeda and individuals like Osama bin Laden.

Unlike domestic civilians, international actors can simply opt not to become involved in an intrastate conflict. Such donors’ involvement is a deliberate choice, made to optimize donors’ own preferences. Specifically, foreign donors care about

74 See Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements; David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (2009).

75 Most studies have focused on states as sponsors—to the exclusion of other foreign backers. Byman et al’s (2001) dataset of 74 insurgencies (1991-2000) notes that 60% of these received state support. Cunningham et al’s (2009) dataset notes that more than 44% of the 331 non-state armed groups (1945-2003) received military aid from foreign states. For arguments specifically focusing on state’s use of terrorists and insurgents abroad as proxies, see Bapat, "The Strategy of the Weak: State Support for Terrorism and Bargaining Power."; Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict.; and Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism.
three things: ideological policy, rebels’ domestic power, and humanitarian concerns (i.e. rebels’ mix of coercion and service provision).⁷⁶

First, donors care about rebels’ domestic power. All else equal, donors know that greater domestic compliance can only help their rebel protégés and improve their ability to leverage better bargains from the incumbent regime.⁷⁷ Indeed, below some level of domestic power donors will assume a rebellion is a non-viable investment. I assume all donors care about how much domestic compliance their rebel partners generate, and ceteris paribus, prefer they produce more power rather than less.

Second, like domestic civilians and rebels themselves, foreign donors have political and ideological preferences. As with all other actors considered, donors’ extremism is defined in relationship to civilian preferences. Donors can be more moderate than rebels—their ideal point falling between the rebels’ and the civilians’. Donors can also be more extreme than rebels, in which case a donor’s ideal point is even further from civilians’ than is the rebels’.

Also like civilians, donors find congruent rebel policy positions more appealing. Furthermore, assuming donors support rebels because they believe rebel

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⁷⁶ This theory outlines a general-equilibrium, and thus excludes explicit temporal considerations. I therefore do not consider donors’ willingness to trade off between these concerns. This excludes cases in which, for example, donors might be willing to accept high levels of coercion in exchange for swift resolution of the conflict.

⁷⁷ For cases in which donors’ expectation of rebel victory varies, see Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.
activities can further their own interests, sponsors face the worrying prospect that their protégés may behave otherwise—they have a principal-agent problem. Ideological congruence may provide donors some assurance their rebel protégés will act as faithful agents, driven by and towards ideological preferences donors themselves espouse. Cold War era American support was reassured by rebels’ anti-Communist stance, or at least by rebels’ anti-regime stance in Communist countries. Like all other actors discussed here, foreign donors prefer partners whose preferences closely mirror their own, keeping in mind that rebels can chose to enact policies that compromise their own preference.

Third, donors have a humanitarian concern over rebels’ mix of coercion and services. Specifically, they may have a preference for low levels of coercion (or, alternatively, for higher levels of service provision. Effectively, donors attach a humanitarian weight to the policy preferences described above. The more humanitarian concerns a donor has, the less utility it gains from partnering with rebels whose governance package is heavily coercive. This is true regardless of how far rebels’ enacted policy diverges from the donor’s ideological preferences, or how much domestic power rebels generate.

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Foreign donors may prefer rebels to limit coercion for a variety of reasons. These reasons, and rebels’ resultant level of humanitarian concern, will vary from donor to donor. However, it is possible to make broad generalizations across some basic types of foreign actors. Given their global or regional geopolitical concerns, states are more likely than other types of foreign actors to value political/ideological outcomes over civilian treatment. However, states may face reputational costs that engender humanitarian concerns. Democracies particularly can face both international and domestic costs from affiliating with brutal rebellions or incumbents, making them more reluctant to trade civilian treatment for political or ideological ends. States may also run the risk that fueling a neighboring conflict might escalate the fighting and draw them in more extensively, or have negative spillover effects (refugee flows, trade routes, etc.).79 States with these concerns may be less likely to become involved on one side or the other, but if they do, will want a swift resolution and want to limit civilian abuse (simply because abuse increases the chances of spillover).

While all actors’ resources are limited, I argue budgetary considerations are not a driving factor in donors’ decision-making. First, donors will always choose the

most cost-effective strategy in pursuing their interests. Second, I assume the donor (for purposes of funding rebels) does not operate under a budget constraint.\textsuperscript{80}

Other than their own ideological and humanitarian thresholds, donors find it difficult to control directly any of the parameters to which rebels respond.\textsuperscript{81} However, donors can do so through the choices about the type of assistance they offer the rebels. In turn, the form of assistance affects rebels’ subsequent choices. Broadly speaking, donors can deliver three types of assistance, labeled (for convenience) as follows:

1. Military aid: any assistance that cannot be used directly (or easily converted) to produce services. Such assistance includes weapons and munitions shipments, military training, military advisers, and foreign fighters. This kind of support certainly increases rebels’ ability to carry out the fight against the incumbent, but it also reduces the marginal costs of coercion—in which rebels turn this military apparatus against civilians instead of elements of the state.\textsuperscript{82} Theoretically, military

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\textsuperscript{80}This is generally not a problem in the sense that foreign aid represents a minuscule portion of donor spending. However, it might become a real issue if there are legal constraints (e.g., the donor is not allowed to spend on certain kinds of assistance or cannot exceed a budgetary ceiling). It may be more of a problem with non-state donors who are more likely to face a hard budget constraint.

\textsuperscript{81}Obviously, the real world is significantly more complicated. Daniel Byman offers several case studies of the machinations between donors and rebel groups (though he limits his study to organizations deemed “terrorist” under his definition). See Byman, \textit{Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism}.

\textsuperscript{82}Note that donors may give rebels military assistance also for the reasons that they want them to fight. That this is not inconsistent with the results here. The theory simply suggests what the domestic “side effects” of this assistance will be—effects interested donors will consider in their interactions with the rebels. If donors give rebels military assistance, they will likely increase rebels’ ability to pressure the incumbent, but they will also reduce the marginal costs of coercion.
aid is equivalent to decreasing the marginal cost of coercion while holding the total budget constant.

2. Humanitarian aid: any assistance that cannot be used directly for coercion. Such support includes efforts to build schools or other services, educational training and/or teachers sent directly, agricultural assistance, gifts of textbooks, etc. This kind of assistance reduces the marginal costs of service provision for the rebels. In theory, humanitarian aid is equivalent to decreasing the marginal cost of service provision while holding the budget constant.

3. Financial aid: any fungible assistance (frequently cash) that could be used either for coercion or service provision. Such assistance simply increases rebels’ budget, without affecting the marginal costs of either coercion or service provision.

Let us consider the effects of each of these parameters in turn.

Consider the effect of military aid while holding the total size of the budget constant. This includes cases in which rebels generate some of their budget through in-kind and other donations from quasi-voluntary compliance, and their international sponsors send arms or other resources that cannot easily be converted into service provision. All else equal, this type of aid will induce more coercive behavior in rebels as such assistance lowers the marginal costs of coercion, and rebels substitute towards the now-cheaper tool of rule.

This effect can create a problem for donors with humanitarian concerns, who are also extremists, and who prefer their rebel partners not pursue domestic strategies that are too coercive. However, supplying military aid reduces rebels’
marginal costs of coercion. Claim 3 reminds us that, *ceteris paribus*, faced with lower costs of coercion, rebels will include more coercion in their governance mix and (should they themselves be extremists) move their policies further away from the civilian ideal point. This means that the ideology induced by the donor’s military aid matches his preferences only when the donor does not care at all about the resulting level of coercion. As soon as the donor has some humanitarian concerns, the rebels’ enacted ideology will be more moderate than the donor would otherwise prefer, because the rebels’ ability to take advantage of the now-cheaper coercion is constrained. Thus, the donor has to balance these preferences and the result is a compromise on ideology. A donor with humanitarian concerns may well consider sending a different form of aid.

Rebels cannot promise to implement more extreme policies without resorting to more coercion because such policies decrease the effectiveness of service provision, and the rebels must counter the resulting drop in quasi-voluntary support with increased coercion. Thus, the donor must accept this ideological-humanitarian trade-off even if simply supplying military aid.

How this trade-off works as the donor itself becomes more extremist depends on how much that donor cares about limiting rebels’ use of coercion. If an extremist donor cares little about how coercive the rebels are, then more extremist donors will supply more arms (decreasing rebels’ marginal cost of coercion), which will result in more extreme rebel-implemented policies. This is not surprising. However, this tradeoff also suggests that if an extremist donor cares enough about
how coercive the rebels are, it will supply fewer arms. As per Claim 3, doing so will increase the rebels’ marginal cost of coercion, which will cause the rebels to shift their governance mix to include more services. However, also as per Claim 3, this will cause rebels to moderate their policies—an unwelcome development for an extremist donor, who would find such moderation a shift away from its own ideals. Which side of this trade-off wins out depends on just how much the donor cares about limiting coercion. Should humanitarian interests win out, the donor will decrease military aid—the marginal detriment to donor utility due to wider policy divergence is offset by the marginal improvement due to the decrease in coercion.

More moderate donors might be willing to supply arms to rebels even if doing so would increase both coercion and the extremism of their policies. However, they would only do so if, without donor support, the rebels would enact policies even more moderate than the donor’s preferences. If this were not the case, then the donor would not send military aid.

If rebels are enacting a policy more extreme than the donors would like, a donor is better off sending no aid rather than military aid—since any military aid necessarily increases rebels’ enacted extremism. There is a limit, however, as to how much extremism a donor can induce. As with moderation, moving away from their own preferences is costly to rebels. Furthermore, extremism shapes rebels’ ability to generate domestic power—pushed too far towards extremism, some equilibria are not sustainable because they fail to produce the minimum level of compliance rebels need to survive.
In total, this suggests

Claim 6: *The greater donors’ humanitarian concerns, the more likely are their rebel protégés to rely on service provision rather than coercion in generating compliance. Because of the power-ideology tradeoff, this will also drive rebels to enact more moderate policies.*

And

Claim 7: *The lower donors’ humanitarian concerns, the more likely are their rebel protégés to rely on coercion than service provision in generating compliance. Because of the power-ideology tradeoff, this will also drive rebels to enact more radical policies.*

This is so for two reasons. First, donors with strong humanitarian concerns will not partner with rebels whose behavior exceeds this threshold of acceptable coercion (and will likely terminate existing support, should their rebel protégés exceed this threshold. Second, donors will likely manipulate the portfolio they provide rebels to incentivize more service provision. Donors with strong humanitarian concerns will provide rebels with more humanitarian (and less military) assistance—thus lowering the marginal costs of service provision relative to coercion. Conversely, donors with few humanitarian concerns will feel free to provide more military assistance to the rebels. Via Claims 3 and 4, this will drive rebels to invest more heavily in services and less in coercion.
10. Multiple Donors

Rebels want as much backing as possible—more donors are better, all else equal. However, all else is not usually equal. Donors may well have conflicting preferences over the policies they would like rebels to pursue and the form of rebel behavior they find acceptable. Since rebels must choose a single ideological position to enact and adopt a specific mix of coercion and service provision, they cannot be all things to all donors.

Rebels’ ability to combine donors into a funding portfolio will thus depend on the various donors’ ideological positions and humanitarian concerns. Just as with only one available donor, rebels will optimize between ideological compromise and obtaining resources they can use in their domestic endeavors. With multiple donors, the pertinent donor “offer” may represent a collective ideal point—the “sweet spot” of overlap among the multiple donors’ packages of optimized parameters. If none of the donors have overlapping preferences, all else equal, rebels will simply choose the one closest to their own ideological preferences. Indeed, all else equal, the greater the number of available donors, the less likely rebels will have to compromise in partnering with a supporter.

First, more donors generally translates into more positions represented, which in turn means rebels are more likely to find a consanguine partner. Furthermore, if heterogeneity rises with numbers, more donors may empower extremist rebels more than moderate ones. Extremists will likely struggle for survival (or exist only as a latent group) in the absence of a foreign backer. The
more foreign backers available, the more likely one of them is at least relatively extreme, and the more likely extremist rebels are to find a partner.

Second, if other, ideologically proximate donors are available, rebels can credibly threaten to defect to another partner should a donor try to extract compromises. Rebels’ ability to leverage this bargaining power will be constrained, however. The threat of defection is only credible if other donors are ideologically close to the rebels. Furthermore, there is a limit on how much donors are willing to compromise their ideological preferences in partnering with rebels since compromise is costly to donors, too—should rebels refuse to agree to a position within those bounds, the partnership will be non-viable.

**Claim 8: Ceteris paribus, the more donors available, the less any rebel group will have to compromise on its ideological position. In particular, the more likely we are to observe extremist rebel groups (which would not be able to generate sufficient domestic support to survive in the absence of foreign support).**

**11. Multiple Rebel Groups**

Since foreign donors have the option to remain uninvolved in a given conflict, it is unlikely they will intervene unless the issue is particularly salient for them, and they find a rebel partner willing and able to enact the kinds of policies they prefer. Should they find rebels unappealing, international actors can simply observe the situation and wait for a better opportunity. However, all else equal, the chances of
donors finding a consanguine partners rise as the number of rebel groups increases. This is so for two reasons.

First, assuming preference heterogeneity rises with the number of rebel groups, more rebel groups implies a greater choice among would-be donors, who are then better able to find an ideologically-congruent rebel group. Second, like all market equilibria, an actor with outside options finds his/her position improved. Donors with a choice of rebel partners may well have more leverage in extracting concessions from this partner than donors who cannot threaten to abandon a rebellion for a more attractive alternative.

This ability is, however, constrained by both rebels’ and donors’ utility functions. Donor’s alternative rebel groups must be viable options. The less attractive donors find the other rebel groups, the less leverage they have. Furthermore, rebels’ own utility considerations will limit how far donors can push any advantage. While donors might like to see ideological compromise, this is still costly to rebels. Even with the promise of support that will help rebels build domestic power, the requested compromises may exceed the point at which rebels find the fruits of such power unappealing. These factors will vary, both over time and across groups—some donors will have more leverage than others.

In all, we expect scenarios of multiple actors and multiple donors to produce relatively consanguine parings,

Claim 9: Ceteris paribus, the greater the number of rebel groups available in a given conflict, the less any donor will have to compromise on its preferred
ideology in partnering with a rebel group. In particular, extremist donors are more likely to find rebel partners.

12. Changes Over Time

One of the most obvious ways in which these parameters may be altered is through changes in the preferences and number of foreign donors. Comparatively, most domestic populations are relatively static. There are two possible alterations rebels may face: the loss of a current donor and the rise of a new one. Scenarios in which a donor’s preferences change are, effectively, the loss of an old donor and the simultaneous rise of a new one.

1.1. Loss of a Donor

Loss of a donor affects rebels’ behavior along the parameters that partnering in the first place shapes rebels’ optimization problem. Such a loss will almost always present rebels with a significant budgetary loss, and with it, erosion in rebels’ ability to produce power (through costly investments in coercion and services). However, loss of a donor may also affect how rebels produce power, not just how much of it they produce. If the donor had been supplying the rebels with

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83 This departure can happen for a variety of reasons, both endogenous (the foreign actor finds a more attractive rebel or incumbent partner), and exogenous (the foreign actor becomes embroiled in its own intra- or interstate crisis, economic shifts necessitate spending cutbacks, preference shifts make the foreign actor uninterested in the conduct or result of the rebel-incumbent struggle. Additionally, other actors may crack down on channels of support—an event that could be endogenous or exogenous.
primarily humanitarian aid, its loss will cause a relative increase in the marginal costs of service provision (the provision of humanitarian aid having previously reduced such costs). As per Claim 4, rebels will invest more in coercion and (assuming rebels are more extremist than the policies they have been enacting) implement more radical policies. By the same token, the loss of a military-aid-providing donor will cause a rise in the rebels’ marginal costs of coercion. As per Claim 4, rebels will then invest more in service provision, and moderate their enacted policies to more closely match civilian preferences.

Donors who offered primarily fungible aid have not reshaped rebels’ marginal costs, so their loss will similarly not affect rebels’ optimization over the service-coercion mix. However, even if their form of assistance did not affect the relative costs of coercion and service provision, such donors may have facilitated the existence of (particularly) extremist groups.

Without their donor, such rebels face three choices. First, they can seek to sustain themselves with domestic backing. However, such rebels may find that any sustainable equilibrium necessitates compromises they are unwilling to make. Those who do compromise with the domestic population will likely enact more moderate policies, and provide more services. Second, they may pursue a new foreign donor—but only a similarly extremist sponsor will allow such rebels to avoid unpleasant ideological compromises. Third, such rebels may pursue so-called "lootable" resources if they can be obtained—essentially becoming criminal gangs. This choice usually cannot be infinitely sustained on a large scale (given that most
areas are not blessed with the pertinent natural resources). Thus, many radical groups that refuse to compromise with domestic preferences will remain small gangs of bandits, or (more likely) go out of business entirely. Those who survive will be those that manage to access and retain control over natural resources.

1.2. Rise of a Donor

The international system can also generate new donors. Shifts in geopolitics and other interests may create new actors (or new interests for existing actors) interested in an intrastate conflict. New donors bring with them to the mix their own key preferences—humanitarian and ideological. Donors’ humanitarian preferences will likely drive their choice over how to provide assistance (which, in turn, affects the marginal costs of service provision and coercion, and thus shapes how much coercion rebels apply to civilians). New donors also bring with them a new ideal point—a new position with which rebels may consider compromising as part of a partnership.

As previously mentioned, an increase in the number of foreign supporters available will likely enfranchise extremist rebels. In an equilibrium populated only by moderate donors, extreme individual rebels will have made one of two choices—either they will have compromised on a personal level and joined a more moderate rebel group, or they will have professed disappointment with the rebels’ moderation, and remained a disgruntled but latent minority. Given this, the rise of a
more extreme donor will likely result in the formation of a more extreme rebel
group, with at least partial fragmentation of the moderate group.

Individual rebels with preferences closer to those of the new donor will see
the opportunity for a partnership more in line with their own preferences and a way
to defray the start-up costs of group formation. Other members may prefer the
terms of the existing bargain and have other vested interests in the status quo
arrangement. Both member types must decide whether to compromise their
preferences, but it is likely a split will occur, as the intra-group tension rises. The
original group may spin off smaller, more radical groups, who then adhere more
closely to the interests of the foreign extremists than civilians'. If the groups are
extremist in a manner that favors political and ideological goals over civilian welfare
(as seen in groups whose long-term utopian vision explicitly allows short-term
sacrifices of non-combatants), then foreign-partnered extremists also display less
concern for civilians. The remaining faction will subsequently remain more
dependent than ever on their original donors.84

However, whatever the cause of the split, splinter groups will only survive if
they can create a new base of support. Splinter groups represent "paths not taken"
by the rump group—the original movement ostensibly could have kept renegade

84 Bueno de Mesquita, "Terrorist Factions." models similar behavior. While his analysis is explicitly
about "terrorist" groups, the logic is not so restrictive, and applies here.
members by entertaining their demands (and indeed, many rebel groups make such compromises precisely to avoid a split).\textsuperscript{85}

1.3. Changes in Donor Preferences

Both foreign and domestic actors can undergo shifts in their ideological preferences. These may come from changes in preferences within their membership, or in response to systemic or other pressures and incentives outside the system theorized here.\textsuperscript{86} Should the ideal point preferences or salience of an existing contractual partner shift, the bargaining position, and resulting contracts, may also change. If the existing partner’s interests shift closer to the rebels’, this is a non-issue; rebels and their partner continue their increasingly consanguine contract. However, if existing partner’s interests shift away from the rebels’, rebels will have to choose to make the necessary compromises continue the partnership, or to seek another.

\textsuperscript{85} Again, as collective actors, rebels (like all political actors) often struggle to maintain internal unity and must often make compromises in order to do so—this is particularly so during the early stages of rebellion and during peace talks (for reasons already noted). On issues of rivalries resulting in “outbidding” see Mia Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,” \textit{Political Science Quarterly} 119, no. 1 (2004), and Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence,” \textit{International Organization} 56, no. 2 (2002). On the need for unity in the initial phases of rebellion and peace negotiation, see I. William Zartman, “Need, Creed, and Greed in Intrastate Conflict,” in \textit{Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed in Intrastate Conflict}, ed. Cynthia Arnson and I. William Zartman (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005).

\textsuperscript{86} For example, American preferences changed as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similarly, internal economic hardship or political unrest may also change the salience of a given conflict for foreign state.
13. The Role of the State

While the incumbent regime and its actions are not explicitly modeled here, we can easily incorporate its activities into the model’s parameters, and provide predict effects on rebel behavior vis-à-vis civilians.

Like rebels, most states use a mix of coercion and services in counterinsurgency (COIN). Let us take these counterinsurgency tools in turn. First, consider what happens when states use coercion against civilians in its counterinsurgency efforts. Use of force against civilians has been a traditional component of COIN. At an extreme, authors argue popular support is vital for insurgencies, but not the state, and propose extensive use of violence against civilians—thus “draining the sea” of rebels’ popular support. Such tactics include scorched earth policies, interrogations, arrests of suspected sympathizers and informants, collective punishment, and targeting civilians in retaliation for cooperation with rebels.

Within the model, these kinds of state tactics constitute an effective increase in rebels’ marginal costs of coercion. Should the government begin such a coercive strategy, this will likely repress support for the rebels, as civilians’ fear of

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government reprisals will reduce their compliance with the rebels. To generate the same level of support as before through coercion, rebels will quite simply have to be “scarier” than the government—the marginal benefit of each unit of coercion is lower, thus effectively increasing the marginal costs. Other moves by the state can also increase rebels’ marginal costs of coercion—arresting young men of fighting age, and/or moving to interdict rebels’ access to weapons, ammunition, and other materiel. In such cases, the model predicts rebels will shift to service provision—not, as one might intuitively think, to appear “nicer” than the government *per se*—but because this is now a cheaper way for rebels to gain compliance from the populace.

Now let us assume the state tries to woo civilians to its side using service provision. Such tactics are a mainstay of the so-called “hearts-and-minds” (HAM) approach to counterinsurgency. HAM strategies focus on winning civilians’ allegiance through “good governance,” largely characterized by the provision of public goods and services to the civilian population, and investing in organizational structures and behaviors within the military that protect civilians from violence. In other words, counterinsurgents engage in what US Field Manual

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89 Ibid.
3-24 terms “armed social work”\textsuperscript{92}—building schools, roads, and other development projects deemed socially beneficial. Far more common are more limited strategies like “buying off” elites—a tried-and-true strategy in innumerable counterinsurgencies.\textsuperscript{93} Such payoffs are, essentially club goods, of the type that rebels themselves may offer, if investing in service provision at a lower level than that of public goods provision.\textsuperscript{94} Whether mass-based or elite-focused, such state actions drive up rebels’ cost of service provision.

Intuitively, we might think increased service provision by the incumbent would drive rebels to “outbid” their rival for hearts and minds, and increase their own service provision, in a “race to the top.” This is not, in fact, what the model suggests will happen. Faced with a fixed budget, and an alternative means of generating compliance (i.e. coercion), rebels will seek to maintain their level of compliance by relying more heavily on coercion.

**Claim 10:** *Ceteris paribus, a greater investment in coercion by the incumbent regime will push rebels to rely more heavily on service provision in their own governance package, and likely enact more moderate policies.*

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\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 299.
\textsuperscript{93} For evidence that this tactic is far more common than public-goods oriented COIN campaigns, see case studies and discussion in Jaqueline L. Hazelton, "Compellence and Accommodation in Counterinsurgency Warfare" (Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University, 2011).
\textsuperscript{94} Indeed, Hazelton (2011) argues most counterinsurgents rely on paying off elites rather than providing public goods to the populace. Furthermore, incumbent regimes do so for the same reasons I argue rebel groups’ who rely on club goods provision have invested less in service provision than those who provide public goods—the latter is simply more expensive.
Similarly,

**Claim 11:** *Ceteris paribus, a greater investment in service provision by the incumbent regime will push rebels to rely more heavily on coercion in their own governance package, and likely enact more extreme policies.*

A few COIN tactics will reduce rebels’ domestic power overall. Actions like strategic hamletting increase both rebels’ marginal costs of coercion and service provision, by making it harder to access the population over which rebels are seeking to establish authority. Limited access means it is harder to either coerce or serve the population.

Moves to interdict rebels’ support from abroad will have the effects noted in Section 1.1 (Loss of a Donor). If incumbents are better able to interdict some forms of support than others, the model also suggests the resultant effect on rebel behavior. If, for example, the incumbent is able to block military aid, but not fungible assistance, the effect on rebels’ behavior will be (*ceteris paribus*) to reduce coercion and increase service provision.

**14. Conclusion**

Civilians’ experience with rebel authorities is as varied as theirs with formally recognized states. Furthermore, I argue this variation stems from rebels’ attempts to solve the same challenges states face—namely, the need to access resources to perpetuate their existence and improve their chances of victory and generate quasi-voluntary compliance from civilians.
This theory suggests that how rebels mix of governance tools (ideological positioning, coercion, and service provision) is shaped, not only by their own ideological position, but also by the ideological position, humanitarian preferences, and the form of assistance offered by any foreign sponsors.

The theory offers several key insights into how rebels rule, and how they do so in the context of international involvement. First, it takes ideology seriously, emphasizing that compromise is a choice for rebels, and a costly one. Furthermore, civilians’ own ideological position vis-à-vis that enacted by the rebels affects how they perceive and receive rebel governance—in turn, shaping rebels’ choice of how to mix governance tools. This dynamic ultimately offers an alternative explanation to why many groups who espouse ideological positions far from civilian preferences rely so heavily on coercion: such groups simply find it too costly to generate compliance using service provision.

Second, the theory takes seriously the preferences of any foreign donors rebels might have—over both the ideological position rebels enact, and their mix between coercion and service provision. Furthermore, the theory specifies how rebels’ sponsors shape their protégés’ behavior. Any threshold of humanitarian concern puts an upper bound on the level of coercion rebels can employ without scaring off foreign partners. Moreover, how rebels choose to finance rebel movements can affect the relative costs of coercion and service provision—in turn affected rebels’ mix between the two.
In sum, the theory explains how rebels balance their own internal preferences, with the need to extract support at home and abroad, and to generate quasi-voluntary compliance at home. Broadly speaking, the theory argues rebel governance is shaped by four factors: rebels’ internal ideological position, the ideological position and humanitarian preferences of any foreign donor, and the form of support any foreign sponsor offers. Shifts in any of these factors should alter rebel's mix of ideological positioning, coercion, and service provision.
Chapter 2: Appendix

Formal Model of Rebel Rule

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1. Three Instruments of Rule

Rebels work to produce quasi-voluntary compliance ($\pi$), also referred to here as support or power. In quasi-voluntary compliance, citizens elect to acquiesce, but the authority figure maintains the ability to sanction non-compliers. Rebels ($R$) generate quasi-voluntary compliance with the use of three instruments: coercion ($c$), public goods provision ($g$), and ideology ($x$). Variation in rebel governance can be thought of as different mixes among these tools—the question thus becomes why we observe such different governance packages.

2. A Model of Quasi-Coercive Rule

So, how do all of these tools actually work to produce compliance? We assume that the provision of public goods increases support, although it does so with decreasing marginal effectiveness: $\pi_g > 0$ and $\pi_{gg} < 0$. That is, providing schools and dispute adjudication build compliance for rebels, but does so at a decreasing rate. As more and more public goods needs are met, and as civilians are

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95 Levi, Of Rule and Revenue: 48-70.
subsequently (marginally) less impressed with successive services. Moreover, this marginal effectiveness is itself decreasing in the degree of extremism of the policies supplied: \( \pi_{gx} < 0 \). While public goods and services are likely welcomed by the population, their enthusiasm for (and compliance to) the provider will be dampened by any skepticism of the rebels’ ideological position. Civilians are simply less happy receiving a given good from extreme rebels than they are receiving the same good from ideologically congruent ones. Put cynically, rebels whose position diverges widely from civilians’ are not easily able to “bribe” civilians into overlooking their ideological divergence. Observant Muslim populations, for example, may well be happier with a rebel-backed madrassa than with secular school built by the fighters. In sum, extremism acts as a discount on the effectiveness of public goods provision.

As mentioned, while we assume that while it should be possible to generate some support without providing any public goods (through pure coercion), it should not be possible to generate any support without some coercion (e.g., at the very least compliance with extraction policies must be enforced). Thus, \( \pi(0, g, x) = 0 \) for any \( g \geq 0 \) but \( \pi(c, 0, x) > 0 \) for any \( c > 0 \). Coercion has an effect similar to that of public goods provision: \( \pi_c > 0 \) and \( \pi_{cc} < 0 \). Like public goods, coercion is effective in

\[ 96 \text{We considered also a variant in which coercion increased support up to a point, after which it became counter-productive. At lower levels of coercion, civilians will comply and support the rebels out of fear, and rebels can coerc e resources from civilians. Beyond a certain point, however, coercion produces backlash. Civilians begin backing the incumbent against the rebels, hiding resources, and/or sabotaging rebel operations. Wintrobe (1998) refers to this as the point at which the income effect overwhelms the substitution effect: the point at which sanctioning reduces civilians’ incentives} \]
producing compliance. However, as the overall level of coercion mounts, each additional unit of coercion is less effective in producing compliance than was its predecessor.

We assume that the more extremist the policies supplied by the rebels, the smaller the marginal effect of public goods provision relative to the marginal effect of coercion: $\pi_c / \pi_g$ is increasing in $x$. The intuition is as follows: since the population prefers moderate policies (i.e., a small value of $x$), a unit of additional public goods provision will produce more support under moderate policies than it will under extremist policies. That is, civilians simply prefer consanguine rebels; extremists will have to try to “buy off” civilians disgruntled with their less-appealing policies. Similarly, in order to return to the original level of support, moderate rebels would have to reduce coercion by more than extremists. If we define $S = -\pi_c / \pi_g < 0$ to be the marginal rate of technical substitution between the two instruments, this assumption requires that $S_x < 0$, or (recalling that $\pi_{gx} < 0$):

$$\frac{\pi_c x}{\pi_{gx}} < \frac{\pi_c}{\pi_g}$$


to invest in the regime outweighs the risks of disloyalty Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*: 60-1.

In equilibrium, rebels would never choose to coerce beyond this point. This implies that the optimum coercion level is either determined by the budget constraint or else is at that point. In other words, in any equilibrium, $\pi_c \geq 0$. We consider it very unlikely that rebels would have access to so many resources that the budget would not bind. Therefore, all plausible solutions will have $\pi_c > 0$ at the constrained optimum. This is why it is sufficient to consider a function that is monotonically increasing in coercion instead of using one that is concave but then examining only the domain over which it is strictly increasing.
Finally, for any mix of coercion and public goods, increasing extremism lowers support unconditionally: $\pi_x < 0$.

Figure 2.1: The power function and its isoquants

Since we assumed that staying in power requires at least some coercion, we shall use the following multiplicative functional form:
\[ \pi(c, g, x) = c^x(c + g)^{1-x} \]  

(1)

This simple specification satisfies all the assumptions made so far.  

Figure 2.1 illustrates graphically what this function looks like for moderate rebels and extremists. One way to think of this specification is that quasi-voluntary support is generated through a mix of coercion and public good provision, with the effect of the latter weighted by the degree of moderation of the policies supplied. As extremism increases, the weight shifts to pure coercion reflecting the assumption that public good provision becomes relatively ineffective in generating support when policies stray so far from what the preferences of the public.

3. The Benefit of Rule: Rebels’ Utility Function

We assume rebels have no inherent preferences over their mix of coercion and public goods—they will enact whatever solution is the most effective. Rebels do, however, have preferences over which ideology they enact. But, as rational actors, rebels understand that extremist policies lower their support for any given investment in coercion and public goods, which is reflected in our assumption that \( \pi_x < 0 \). If they were only interested in maximizing their power, then they would

\[ \pi_c = \frac{c+gx}{c^{1-x}(c+g)^x} > 0 \]

\[ \pi_c = c^x(c + g)^{1-x} \ln \left( \frac{c}{c+g} \right) < 0. \]

Also, since

\[ \pi_{gx} = \left( \frac{c}{c+g} \right)^x \left[ (1-x) \ln \left( \frac{c}{c+g} \right) - 1 \right] < 0, \]

We obtain:

\[ S = \frac{-\pi_c}{\pi_g} = \frac{c+gx}{c(1-x)} < 0 \Rightarrow S_x = -\frac{c+g}{c(1-x)^x} < 0. \]
appease the public by supplying policies whose ideological content matches its preferences. However, rebels are not entirely simply interested in power. In the common parlance, they are not purely “office-motivated” as Downs assumed. Instead, they are also “policy-motivated” in that they do care about the ideology of the policies they choose. Specifically, let \( r \in [0,1] \) denote their ideal point for the ideological content of the policies they supply. Then, \((r - x)^2 \geq 0\) is the (quadratic) distance between what the rebels would ideally like to implement, and what they actually do.98 Although they can always offer a political position different from their ideal point, doing so reduces the value of staying in power.

In other words, if retaining power means severe ideological compromises, rebels might elect to maintain policies closer to their liking even though doing so might make their rule more difficult. In this, they are not blind to the fact that they need to maintain some support if they are to implement any policies at all. Thus, rebels face a delicate balancing act between satisfying their own ideological goals and supplying policies that would not engender too much resistance. To be sure, rebels vary both in how far their own ideal point is from civilians’, and in their willingness to compromise on these ideological goals in exchange for increased popularity. To model rebels’ balancing act, we use a payoff function that

\[ \text{Payoff} = \begin{cases} r^2 & \text{if } r \leq x, \\ (r - x)^2 & \text{if } r > x. \end{cases} \]

98 We use the quadratic instead of the absolute value because the latter’s derivative is undefined at 0, which in our case would be where the rebels choose policies exactly congruent with their preferences.
incorporates quasi-voluntary support but that also assumes that the rebels’ benefit from rule is decreasing in the distance between their own ideological preferences and those they publicly supply:

\[ U(c, g, x) = [1 - (r - x)^2] \pi(c, g, x) \]

That is, ideological compromise \([1 - (r - x)^2]\) acts as a discount on whatever amount of compliance \(\pi\) rebels obtain. Observe, in particular, that if the rebels are at the furthest extreme in their preferences, \(r = 1\), but supply policies ideal for the population, \(x = 0\), then their payoff from ruling is zero regardless of how much support they are able to generate.

While such support would generate resources that make victory more likely, the fruits of such success are, under extreme compromise, utterly unappealing to rebels. This formulation thus captures the intuition that extensive compromises can be very unpalatable for rebels—precisely because they do care about their ideological position. Conversely, whenever they supply policies fully congruent with their own preferences, \(r = x\), then their payoff is simply the amount of support they get.

4. The Budget Constraint

Rebels must operate within their budget, which might come from income they generate themselves (e.g., lootable resources like drugs or diamonds), denoted by \(I\), and contributions from donors, denoted by \(Y\):

\[ B = I + Y. \]

Rebels’ actions also depend on the marginal costs of both coercion \((k_c)\) and
public goods \((k_g)\)—that is, the costs of each additional unit of coercion and goods provision (respectively). We assume linear costs for both coercion and public goods provision, so that for any policy mix \((c, g)\), it is necessary that \(k_c c + k_g g \leq B\), where \(k_c > 0\) and \(k_g > 0\). The budget is therefore only binding on the policy mix between coercion and public goods provision. This means that the budget is relevant only insofar as it constrains their ability to generate support (we assume there is no private consumption component). Since support is increasing in the policy instruments, the rebels will spend the entire budget in any equilibrium.

To make our model meaningful, we will assume that \(k_g < k_c\). If this were not the case, then rebels would never provide public goods. The reason is that whenever public goods play a role in generating support \((x < 1)\), their marginal contribution is the same as the marginal contribution of coercion to the second component, and since coercion also appears positively in the first component, its effect would be higher overall. Thus, if \(k_c \leq k_g\), then rebels would always use coercion. Since coercion and public goods provision are not directly comparable anyway, the condition on the marginal costs is just a technicality that ensures that our simple functional form has the substantively desirable properties we identified. As it turns out, we do not lose generality anyway because, as we shall see, even with this assumption the rebels will optimally coerce at the maximum without providing

\footnote{In this, we differ from models like Collier and Hoeffler (2004) whose rebels loot for profits that are at least partially privately consumed Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.”}
any public goods as long as $k_c$ is close enough to $k_p$.

It is worth noting that the budget $(B)$ includes the material components of $\pi$, which are (effectively) taxes in cash or in kind. That is:

$$B = t(\pi) + Y + I$$

Ostensibly, all rebels would like more power and larger budgets — in which case, folding the taxation function into $\pi$ would be straightforward. However, rebels do not maximize $\pi$—they optimize, contingent on their own ideological preferences ($r$) and their willingness to compromise. There is also a limit to how much rebels can increase their budget through increasing $\pi$. This is so for a variety of reasons noted in the taxation literature. However, for this model, it is sufficient to note that a) greater $\pi$, *ceteris paribus*, produces more taxes, and b) we acknowledge that income from taxation does not increase monotonically.

However, the only time the budget from taxation will be binding is in cases in which rebels’ optimization of the "power-ideology tradeoff" produces a value of $\pi$ that is below $\pi_{\text{min}}$ such that the resultant budget is not enough for survival. This problem is confined to groups whose internal ideological preference ($r$) is sufficiently extreme, and their willingness to compromise sufficiently limited, that their optimized governance solution does not produce the $\pi_{\text{min}}$ necessary for survival. In these cases, absent any other sources of income (i.e. from $Y$ or $I$), rebels will have to compromise on their ideological convictions or not exist only as a “latent” rebel group, disgruntled with the status quo, but unable to function as a fully-fledged operation. Should $I$ or, more likely, $Y$, become available, the group may
then be able to survive, and be spared disagreeable ideological compromises. Thus, the model suggests foreign donors may allow extreme rebels to afford preferences that would not otherwise be sustainable in equilibrium.

Once formed, such groups will likely be extremely coercive. In explaining why they are so, however, this model differs from previous explanations of rebel behavior. Here, donor-funded rebels will likely be extremely coercive towards civilians. However, this behavior is not due, as in Weinstein (2006), to opportunism among the rebel cadre. In fact, these rebels are extremely ideological, which actually drives their coercive behavior. Given their ideological distance from the population, it is simply more efficient for them to coerce than provide public goods in their effort to generate π.

5. Analysis

To gain some intuition about the workings of this model, note that of the three policy instruments, only coercion and public goods provision are bound by the budget. Since rebels will spend the entire budget in equilibrium, it follows that g can be defined as:

\[ G(c) = \frac{B - k_c c}{k_g} \]

The rebels therefore optimize

\[ \max_{c, x} \left\{ [1 - (r - x)^2] c^x (c + G(c))^{1-x} \right\} \]

There are two potential corner solutions, where either \( c = 0 \) (rebels rely only on
public goods) or \( G(c) = 0 \) (they rely only on coercion). For convenience, we will refer to these corner solutions as **voluntarist rule** (in which rebels rely solely on public goods provision) and **despotic rule** (in which rebels rely solely on coercion).

If rebels rely entirely on public good provision, then it must be the case that \( x = 0 \) or else their payoff would be zero (because support would be zero). Thus,

\[
U(0, g, 0) = (1 - r^2) \frac{B}{k_g} \equiv V^g
\]

is the payoff from voluntarist rule. The other possibility is that they rely entirely on coercion, so \( U(c, 0, x) = (1 - (r - x)^2)c \), which implies that any deviation from their own ideology is just a cost, so the optimal choice is \( x = r \). Thus, \( U(c, 0, r) = B / k_c \equiv V^c \) is the payoff from despotic rule.

Consider now the interior solution with \( c > 0 \) and \( G(c) > 0 \), which we call quasi-coercive rule in which rebels mix coercion and public goods in their governance. Letting \( a = (k_c - k_g) / B \), the FOC are:

\[
U_c = \frac{1 - (r - x)^2}{c^{1-x}(c + G(c))^x k_g} (x - ac)B = 0
\]

\[
U_x = c^x (c + G(c))^{1-x} \left[ 2(r - x) + [1 - (r - x)^2] \ln \left( \frac{c}{c + G(c)} \right) \right] = 0
\]

At an interior solution, the second condition can only be satisfied if the term in the square brackets is zero. Therefore, we must solve the quadratic:

\[
\lambda(c) x^2 + 2(1 - r \lambda(c))x - [2r + (1 - r^2) \lambda(c)] = 0
\]

where

\[
\lambda(c) = \ln \left( \frac{c}{c + G(c)} \right) = \ln \left( \frac{k_g c}{B(1 - ac)} \right) < 0
\]

with the inequality following from \( c + G(c) = (1 - ac) B / k_g > 0 \). This yields the
roots \( r - \left[1 \pm \sqrt{1 + \lambda(c)^2}\right]/\lambda(c) \). One of these is inadmissible because it exceeds 1.\(^{100}\) The admissible root, and therefore the point of inflection, is:

\[
x(c) = r - \frac{1 - \sqrt{1 + \lambda(c)^2}}{\lambda(c)}
\]  

(2)

where we note that \( r > x(c) \). Since \( x(c) > 0 \) at the interior solution, it follows that the first bracketed term in the FOC for \( U_c \) is positive, which in turn implies that the second one must be zero for the condition to be satisfied. We can write this as:

\[
x(c) = ac
\]

(3)

Since \( c > 0 \) implies that \( x(c) > 0 \) in (3), the solution occurs where both (2) and (3) hold, which can be written as:

\[
\lambda(c) = -\frac{2(r-ac)}{1-(r-ac)^2} \equiv y(c)
\]

(E)

This defines implicitly the optimal value for coercion, which in turn pins down the level of public goods provision and the ideology supplied. Depending on the configuration of exogenous parameters, (E) can have no solutions or several, of which some will be saddle points. We can distinguish among those by examining

\(^{100}\) To see that, observe that

\[
1 < r - \frac{1 + \sqrt{1 + \lambda(c)^2}}{\lambda(c)} \iff r > \frac{\lambda(c) + 1 + \sqrt{1 + \lambda(c)^2}}{\lambda(c)} + \lambda(c)
\]

\[
\iff r\lambda(c) > 1 + \lambda(c) < 1 + \lambda(c) + \sqrt{1 + \lambda(c)^2}
\]

But since \( \lambda(c) < 0 \), the left-hand side in the last inequality is decreasing in \( r \), so it would be sufficient to establish that inequality at the smallest value \( r \) can take, namely \( r = 0 \), so \( 0 < 1 + \lambda(c) + \sqrt{1 + \lambda(c)^2} \) is all we need. This will be satisfied whenever \( \sqrt{1 + \lambda(c)^2} + \lambda(c) > 0 \). The latter can be written as \( \sqrt{1 + \lambda(c)^2} + \lambda(c) > 0 \). The latter can be written as \( \sqrt{1 + \lambda(c)^2} > -\lambda(c) \), so we have positive numbers on both sides. Squaring both sides yields \( 1 + \lambda(c)^2 > \lambda(c)^2 \), which holds.
the Hessian. In particular, the following inequality must obtain at the interior maximum (but not at the saddle points):

\[ y_c - \lambda_c > 0 \]  

\text{(H)}

where

\[ \lambda_c = \frac{1}{c(1-ac)} > 0, \quad y_c = ac\zeta > 0, \quad \zeta = \frac{2[1+(r-ac)^2]}{[1-(r-ac)^2]^2} > 0 \]

To see this, observe that at the point where \( U_c = 0 \) and \( U_x = 0 \), we have:

\[ U_{cc} = -\frac{aB[1 - (r - x)^2]}{k_g c^{1-x}(c + G(c))^x} < 0 \]

\[ U_{xx} = -2c^x(c + G(c))^{1-x} [1 - (r - x)\lambda(c)] < 0 \]

\[ U_{cx} = \frac{B[1 - (r - x)^2]}{c^{1-x}(c + G(c))^x k_g} \]

The determinant of the Hessian is positive, \( U_{cc}U_{xx} - U_{cx}^2 > 0 \), if, and only if,

\[ 2a[1 - (r - x)\lambda(c)] > \frac{B[1 - (r - x)^2]}{c(c + G(c)) k_g} \]

or, since \( c(c + G(c)) = (1 - ac)cB/k_g \) and \( x = ac \), if, and only if,

\[ 2ac(1 - ac) > \frac{1 - (r - ac)^2}{1 - (r - ac)\lambda(c)} \]

Using the value of \( \lambda(c) \) given in (E), we can reduce this inequality to (H). In other words, this inequality must hold at a local maximum (if it is reversed, then \( U_{cc} < 0 \) and \( U_{xx} < 0 \) simply that the solution satisfying (E) is a saddle point).

Let \( V^i = U(c*, g*, x*) \) denote the payoff at the interior solution. To gain some intuition about how the payoff changes in ideology and coercion at the budget
constraint, refer to Figure 2.2. The parameters are \( B = 14, k_c = 4, k_g = 1, \) and \( r = 0.875, \) and the (interior) solution is \( c \approx 0.93, g \approx 10.29, \) and \( x \approx 0.20. \) The payoffs are \( V^i \approx 3.71, \) which is strictly better than \( V^c = 3.5 \) and \( V^g \approx 3.28. \)

![Figure 2.2: The rebels' payoff at the budget constraint](image)

6. **Comparative Statics of Quasi-Coercive Rule**

   We now want to know how the levels of coercion and public good provision as well as the type of policies supplied varies with the exogenous parameters. Specifically, we are interested in how rebels’ mix of coercion and public goods provision changes with the rebels’ own internal ideological position \( (r), \) their budget constraint \( (B), \) and the marginal costs of public goods and coercion \( (kg \) and \( k_c). \)

   Denote now an arbitrary parameter by \( \nu \) and let \( c(\nu) \) denote a solution to \( (E). \) By the implicit function theorem, totally differentiating both sides of that equation with respect to \( \nu \) and solving for the derivative yields:
\[
\frac{dc}{dv} = \frac{\lambda_v - y_c}{y_c - \lambda_c}
\]

where we recall that \(\lambda_v\) and \(y_v\) are the partial derivatives of the functions with respect to \(v\). Since \(y_c - \lambda_c > 0\) by (H), it follows that

\[
\text{sign} \left( \frac{dc}{dv} \right) = \text{sign}(\lambda_v - y_v)
\]

With this solution in hand, we can also find:

\[
\frac{dc}{dv} = G_v + G_c \cdot \frac{dc}{dv} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{dx}{dv} = a_v c + a \cdot \frac{dc}{dv}
\]

Let us begin with the effect of extremism: \(v = r\). The following results are intuitive, which we think provides some reassurance about the workings of the model.

**Claim 1.** The more extreme the preferences of the rebels, the more extreme the policies they choose, the more coercive their rule is, and the fewer public goods they provide.

**Proof.** Since \(\lambda_r = 0\) and \(y_r = -\zeta\), we have:

\[
\frac{dc}{dr} = \frac{\zeta}{y_c - \lambda_c} > 0
\]

Furthermore, since \(G_r = 0\), \(G_c = -k_c/k_g < 0\), and \(a_r = 0\), we further have:

\[
\frac{dG}{dr} = -\frac{k_c}{k_g} \cdot \frac{dc}{dr} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{dx}{dr} = a \cdot \frac{dc}{dr} > 0
\]

Consider now the effect of relaxing the budget constraint: \(v = B\). This is where we obtain some interesting, and perhaps counter-intuitive, results.

**Claim 2.** The larger the total budget available to rebels, the more coercive their
rule is, and the more public goods they provide. The ideological content of the policies they choose does not depend on the total budget.

Proof. Since
\[ \lambda_B - y_B = -\frac{1}{B(1 - ac)} + \frac{ac\zeta}{B} = \left(\frac{c}{B}\right)\left(a\zeta - \frac{1}{c(1 - ac)}\right) = \frac{c(y_c - \lambda_c)}{B} > 0 \]
where the inequality follows from (H), it follows that
\[ \frac{dc}{dB} = \frac{c(y_c - \lambda_c)}{B(y_c - \lambda_c)} = \frac{c}{B} > 0 \]

Since \( G_B = 1/k_g \) and \( G_c = -k_c/k_g \), we have:
\[ \frac{dG}{dB} = \frac{1}{k_g} - \frac{k_c}{k_g} \cdot \frac{dc}{dB} = \frac{1}{k_g} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{k_c c}{B}\right) = \frac{B - k_c c}{B k_g} > 0 \]
where the inequality follows that at an interior solution some part of the budget is spent on public goods, which means that \( B - k_c c > 0 \). Finally, since \( a_B = -a/B \), we get:
\[ \frac{dx}{dB} = -\frac{ac}{B} + \frac{ac}{B} = 0 \]
which means that changing the total budget has no effect on the policy's ideological content.

This is an important result because it suggests that if the rebels become richer, they will simply consolidate their rule without altering their ideology. This is so because with \( x \) constant, \( \pi(c, g, x) \) is strictly increasing in \( c \) and \( g \), both of which increase with \( B \). Thus, in our model wealth seems to solidify the form of rule rather than leading to some sort of reforms (a question to which we shall return). We now investigate the effect of changing the marginal cost of public goods provision: \( v = k_g \).
Claim 3. As their marginal cost of public goods provision increases, the fewer public goods the rebels provide, the more coercive their rule becomes, and the more extremist the policies they choose.

Proof. Since

$$\lambda_{k_g} - y_{k_g} = \frac{B - k_c c}{k_g B (1 - ac)} + \frac{c \zeta}{B} > 0$$

we conclude that

$$\frac{dc}{dk_g} = \frac{c (y_c + aG \lambda_c)}{aB (y_c - \lambda_c)} > 0$$

Since $Gk_g = -G/k_g$ and $G_c = -k_c/k_g$, we further obtain:

$$\frac{dG}{dk_g} = -\frac{G}{k_g} - \frac{k_c}{k_g} \cdot \frac{dc}{dB} < 0$$

Finally, since $a_{k_g} = -1/B$, we get:

$$\frac{dx}{dk_g} = -\frac{c}{B} + a \cdot \frac{dc}{dk_g} = \left(\frac{c}{B}\right) \left(\frac{y_c + aG \lambda_c}{y_c - \lambda_c} - 1\right) = \frac{c \lambda_c (1 + aG)}{B (y_c - \lambda_c)} > 0$$

Finally, we investigate the effect of changing the marginal cost of coercion: $v = k_c$.

Claim 4. As their marginal cost of coercion increases, the more public goods the rebels provide, the less coercive their rule becomes, and the less extremist the policies they choose.

Proof. Since

$$\lambda_{k_g} - y_{k_g} = -\left(\frac{y_c}{aB}\right) (y_c - ac \lambda_c) = -c \left(\frac{\zeta}{B} - \frac{1}{B - (k_c - k_g)c}\right) < 0$$

where the inequality follows from $ac < 1 \Rightarrow y_c - ac \lambda_c > 0$, it follows that
\[
\frac{dc}{dk_c} = -\frac{c(y_c - ac\lambda_c)}{aB(y_c - \lambda_c)} = -\left(\frac{c}{y_c - \lambda_c}\right)\left[\frac{\zeta}{B} - \frac{1}{B - (k_c - k_g)c}\right] < 0
\]

Moreover, since \(G_{k_c} = -c/k_g\), we obtain:

\[
\frac{dG}{dk_c} = -\frac{c}{k_g} + \frac{k_c c(y_c - ac\lambda_c)}{k_g aB(y_c - \lambda_c)} = \left(\frac{c}{k_c - k_g}\right)\left[1 + \frac{k_c}{k_g c(y_c - \lambda_c)}\right] > 0
\]

Finally, since \(a_{k_c} = 1/B\), we get:

\[
\frac{dx}{dk_c} = \frac{c - c(y_c - ac\lambda_c)}{B - c(y_c - \lambda_c)} = -\frac{1}{B(y_c - \lambda_c)} < 0
\]

This sounds intuitive but might not be. Consider, for instance, what an increase in the marginal costs of coercion does. Since coercion is now costlier, the rebels might choose to reduce the provision of public goods to free up more of the budget and keep coercion at its previous levels. Since this would make the contribution to support from public goods even smaller, there is less need to be nice to the population, so they might increase extremism in order to move the policies toward their ideal point. This all might sound plausible but the results show that it is not what’s going to happen. In fact, rebels will become more moderate and will increase their provision of public goods at the expense of coercion.

6.1. The Trade-off between Ideology and Security of Rule

How does ideology affect the staying power of the rebels? Observe first that if rebels did not care about ideology, they would simply maximize \(\pi\), as follows:

Claim 5. If rebels did not care about ideology, then they would supply policies
with the ideological content the population wants \((x = 0)\), and will spend their entire budget on public goods provision \((g = B/kg)\). In particular, the rebels will not coerce \((c = 0)\).

**Proof.** Suppose first that \(g = 0\) so the rebels are relying purely on coercion. In that case, \(\pi = c\), so they will spend their entire budget doing so, \(c = B/k_c\) regardless of the ideology they pick (because \(\pi_x = 0\)). The best payoff they can get is \(\pi = B/k_c\).

Suppose now that the rebels do provide some public goods, so \(g > 0\). In that case, \(\pi_x < 0\), so they would pick the most congruent ideology, \(x = 0\). But then \(\pi = c + g\), and the maximum depends on the marginal costs of the two instruments, so it is either \(B/k_c\) or \(B/k_g\). But since \(k_g < k_c\) it follows that \(B/k_c > B/k_g\), and so the rebels will spend their entire budget on public goods. This further implies that \(c = 0\) is strictly better than \(g = 0\), yielding the maximum in the claim.

This implies the following trade-off between ideology and security of rule:

**Corollary 1.** The maximum quasi-voluntary support ideological rebels will be willing to generate is strictly smaller than the support non-ideological rebels will be willing to generate.

**Proof.** At an interior solution with ideological rebels, \(c^* > 0\). The proof of Claim 5 then immediately implies that \(\pi(c^*, g^*, x^*) < \pi(0, B/kg, 0)\)

In other words, rebels that care about ideology will not simply be more coercive than rebels that do not; their rule will generally enjoy far less support in
the population because there is a limit as to how much the rebels will be willing to compromise on their ideology in order to obtain more support. This trade-off has implications for donors who might be primarily interested in maximizing the staying power of the rebels (for example, because they have an instrumental interest in keeping an active opposition to a government they do not like). This result shows that such donors might have trouble coming up with the appropriate incentives if they are dealing with highly ideological rebels.

6.2. Existence of Interior Solution

Recall that \((E)\) and \((H)\) are necessary and jointly sufficient for an interior solution. Since \((2)\) only yields a feasible solution when \(r > x(c)\), satisfying \((E)\) requires that \(r > ac\) at the solution. This implies that the optimal \(c^*\) cannot be too large. We thus need to consider whether conditions \((E)\) and \((H)\) are satisfied for some \(c \in [0, \min \{\overline{c}, r/a\}]\).

We now investigate the conditions under which they are satisfied. Observe that:

\[
\gamma_{cc} = -\frac{4a^2(r-ac)[3+(r-ac)^2]}{[1-(r-ac)^2]^3}
\]

where the inequality follows the denominator being positive. To see this, define

\[
\overline{c} = \frac{B}{k_c} \quad \text{and} \quad K = \frac{k_c-k_B}{k_c} \in (0,1)
\]

so \(c \in [0, \overline{c})\). Since \(ac = K\), it follows that \(ac \in [0,1)\). In other words, \(ac < 1\) for all feasible values of \(c\). This now means that \(r - ac \in [r - 1, r]\), and so \((r - ac)^2 \leq \ldots\)
max \{r^2, (r - 1)^2\}. But this now means that \(1 - (r - ac)^2 \geq 1 - \max \{r^2, (r - 1)^2\} > 0\). Thus, \(y(c)\) is not just increasing but also concave for all feasible values, and

\[
y(0) = -\frac{2r}{1-r^2}, \quad y(\bar{c}) = -\frac{2(r-K)}{1-(r-K)^2}, \quad y(r/a) = 0
\]

Note that \(r - K \geq 0\) for all, \(c \leq r/a\), which means that \(y(\bar{c}) \leq 0\) if \(\bar{c} \leq r/a\). Turning now to the other term in (H), note that

\[
\lambda_{cc} = \frac{2ac - 1}{c^2(1 - ac)^2} = (2ac - 1)\lambda^2_c \leq 0 \iff c \leq \frac{1}{2a} = \frac{\bar{a}}{2K}
\]

In other words, \(\lambda(c)\) is increasing, but is concave for \(c < 1/(2a)\) and convex for \(c > 1/(2a)\) with

\[
\lim_{\lambda \to 0} \lambda(c) = -\infty \quad \lambda(\bar{c}) = 0
\]

\[
\lambda(r/a) = \ln \left(\frac{1-K}{K} \cdot \frac{r}{1-r}\right)
\]

Note that

\[
\frac{1-K}{K} \cdot \frac{r}{1-r} \geq 1 \iff r \geq K \iff \frac{r}{a} \geq \bar{c}
\]

In words, if \(\bar{c} < r/a\), then \(\lambda(r/a) > 0\), and if \(\bar{c} > r/a\), then \(\lambda(r/a) < 0\). Clearly, if \(K \leq 1/2, \bar{c} \leq \bar{c}/(2K)\), and so \(\lambda(c)\) is concave for all feasible values of \(c\).

Since we now know the behavior of these functions, we can plot them to examine the behavior of the intersection that satisfies (H) as well. Figure 3 shows these functions for three values of \(k_c\): Figure 3(a) is a case where the interior solution exists, and the other two are cases where it does not, either because \(k_c\) is
too small (Figure 3(b)) or because it is too large (Figure 3(c)).

We now show that for $K$ sufficiently low, (H) must be violated, and so the interior solution cannot exist.

Lemma 1. If $K \leq K_r$, where

$$K = \frac{(1 - r^2)^2}{3 + r^4}$$

then the interior solution cannot exist.

Proof (Lemma 1). Since $\lambda_c$ is minimized $\lambda_{cc} = 0$, or where $2ac = 1$, observe that $K \leq 1/2 \Rightarrow 2ac \leq 1$, and so $\lambda_c(c) \geq \lambda_c \geq (\bar{c})$. That is, if $K \leq 1/2$, then the smallest value that $\lambda_c$ can take occurs at the maximum feasible value for $c$:

$$K \leq \frac{1}{2} \Rightarrow \lambda_c \geq \frac{k_c^2}{Bk_g}$$
Figure 2.3: The existence of an interior solution

Assume now that $K \leq \frac{1}{2}$. Since $y_{cc} < 0$ over the domain of feasible values,

$y_c(c) < y_c(0)$ for any $c > 0$, or:
\[ y_c \leq \frac{2a(1 + r^2)}{(1 - r^2)^2} \]

Thus, (H) must be violated when:

\[ y_c \leq \frac{2ac(1 - r^2)}{(1 - r^2)^2} \leq \frac{k_c^2}{Bk_g} \]

which simplifies to:

\[ 2K \left[ \frac{1 - r^2}{(1 - r^2)^2} \right] \leq 1 - K, \]

which yields the condition in the lemma. It is obvious that \( K > 0 \) from inspection.

Note that \( K_r < 0 \), and so the largest value \( K \) can take occurs at \( r = 0 \), where it is \( 1/3 \).

Since this implies that \( K < 1/2 \), our assumption that \( K < 1/2 \) is automatically satisfied when \( K \leq K \). We conclude that \( K \leq K \Rightarrow y_c \leq \lambda_c \) for any \( c \in [0, \bar{c}] \), and so (H) cannot be satisfied. Since this is a necessary condition for the solution to (E) be a solution does not exist.
Chapter 3: Introduction to the Case

This chapter outlines the case in which I test the theoretical propositions generated in Chapter 2. This book offers three tests of the theory, all leveraging quasi-experimental variation among (and within) the three faces of the Moro liberation movement in Mindanao (southern Philippines): the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF, formed around 1968), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, 1977), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG, 1989). The Mindanao case offers three sources of variation in which to test the theory’s propositions: exogenous variation between the three groups (Chapter 4), and within MNLF (Chapter 5) and ASG (Chapter 6) over time.

This chapter provides a brief history of Mindanao and the context of the conflict. I then define the population’s ideological position, and outline the distance between the popular preferences and the status quo offered by the Philippine government—a gap which creates political space for rebellion. I then discuss the ideological positions of the three rebel groups and their sponsors relative to the domestic population, taking care to note the ways in which the donors’ preferences have been determined by geopolitical and other factors exogenous to the conflict itself. I also highlight the donors’ humanitarian preferences and forms of support they send their rebel partners—as these parameters shape the rebel behavior of interest.
Using these values, I then offer predictions about rebels groups’ relative behavior, based on the model outlined in Chapter 2. These predictions are then tested across the three rebel groups in Chapter 4. Because two of the cases include comparisons over time, this chapter briefly highlights the rebels’ origins and original partnerships, but leaves more in-depth discussion of these shifts for Chapter 5 (MNLF) and Chapter 6 (ASG).

1. Brief History and Roots of the Conflict

Modern Mindanao has been at war since 1968. The Moro struggle is one of the world’s longest-running conflicts, characterized by intermittent cycles of conflict. As is often the case, the total costs of the war are difficult to estimate, but the conflict claimed at least 120,000 lives between 1972 and 2005.¹ In addition to

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casualties, millions have been displaced periodically (and often repeatedly).\(^3\) Smaller numbers have fled internationally to neighboring Malaysia.\(^4\) Direct economic costs of the conflict (1970-2001) are estimated at $2 to $3 billion, and indirect costs of unrealized investment and agricultural productivity at more than $10 billion between 1975-2002.\(^5\)

The name "Moro" was originally applied by the Spanish colonizers to the Islamized peoples of what is now the Republic of the Philippines.\(^6\) Today, Moros comprise only about 5-10% of the Philippines’ predominantly Catholic population,

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\(^{3}\) The first two years of the conflict, made at least 25-33% of Moros homeless, Aijaz Ahmad, "Who is the Moro?," *Southeast Asia Chronicle*, no. 82 (1982): 3.; More recent displacements include more than 1 million in 2000’s “All Out War,” more than 400,000 in 2003, and in 2008, conflict displaced more than 600,000—the largest new displacement in the world for 2008, ibid.; Amnesty International, “Shattered Lives: Beyond the 2008-2009 Mindanao Armed Conflict,” (London, UK: Amnesty International, 2009); the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reports the 2008 displacement was "the biggest new displacement in the world" Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Cycle of conflict and neglect: Mindanao displacement and protection crisis (Special Country Report),” in *Special Country Reports* (Geneva, Switzerland: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2009).

\(^{4}\) This was particularly so in the 1970s, when the political leadership of the Malaysian state of Sabah supported the MNLF and developing Malaysia welcomed new workers. Subsequent changes in Malaysian policies have discouraged immigration, and even resulted in some deportations Rodney Tasker, "Slow Going on Sabah," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, CD-ROM, 12 May 1978.; Aijaz Ahmad, "The War Against the Muslims," *Southeast Asia Chronicle*, no. 82 (1982).


\(^{6}\) Originally pejorative, the name “Moro” derives from Spain’s then-recent experience with the Muslim Moors who held parts of the Iberian peninsula until 1492. As in many such struggles, the derogatory term was eventually reclaimed and transformed into a call for self-determination by 1962 Abdurasad Asani, "Moros, Not Filipinos," ed. Moro National Liberation Front (Manila, Philippines: AIP Printshop, 1980). 1.; Jose F. Lacaba, "The Bangsamoro Agenda, Midweek (December 10, 1986)," in *Referendum: peaceful, civilized, diplomatic and democratic means of solving the Mindanao conflict* ed. Nu'a'in bin Abdulhaqq (Camp Abubakre As-Siddique, Mindanao, Philippines: Agency for Youth Affairs, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 2002), 30-1.
but are geographically concentrated. Most live in the archipelago’s large southern island of Mindanao, and nearby islands (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: Maps of the Philippines and Mindanao

Origins of the Moro claim

The Moros’ is a “Sons of the Soil” struggle—of indigenous peoples minoritized by migration within colonially created borders. Though the Moros

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describe theirs as one of Moros against outsiders, Moros’ internal history is hardly harmonious. Like other cultures of Southeast Asia, Moro politics are built on a system of local hierarchies dominated by *datus*—leaders whose positions were often made (or at least underwritten) by military strength and their ability to project power. *Datus* frequently contested authority amongst themselves, but forged temporary alliances in response to mutual threats.  

Some degree of political change arrived via trade routes that tied the Moro islands to China, the Middle East, and elsewhere. It was via this exchange that missionaries from the Middle East arrived in 1210, and Islamized thirteen of Mindanao’s previously animist tribes. With Islam, came political innovation. By dint of clever politicking, intermarriage, and arrival of both Arab and Malay voyagers, some of the traditional *datus* were gathered under larger political

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10 While those who are and are not considered “Moros” has been the subject of some definitional flexibility, the name most commonly comprises the thirteen Islamized tribes. Other definitions include the non-Islamized indigenous tribes of the Mindanao island grouping (also called Lumads, or Indigenous Peoples (IPs)). Still others include all those born in Mindanao prior to Philippine independence from America in 1946 and those who self-identify as such. Some of these distinctions are pertinent to the political and ideological platforms of the three rebel groups, and will be discussed further in such context.
entities—the sultantes. At their most unified, four sultantes held sway in Mindanao: the Sultanates of Buayan, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Ranao. Even so, cross-tribal unity has been hard to achieve: most Moros’ political identity and loyalty was first to their datu, and then their ethnolinguistic tribal group—the collective “Moro” identity was a later invention.

For Moros, these Sultanates are the basis of their claim to ancestral domain, and what they describe as a 400 year-old resistance to a series of would-be occupiers: the Spanish colonists (who followed Magellan’s 1521 arrival), the Americans (who gained the Philippines in the Spanish-American War in 1898),11 the Japanese during World War II, and finally the Filipino state (which became a self-governing commonwealth in 1935, and gained full independence from the U.S. in 1946). While colonizers thwarted Islam’s northward expansion by Christianizing many of the northern tribes, Moros proudly claim they were never fully conquered nor Christianized by any of these aspiring overlords.

**Seeds of the modern conflict and goals of the Philippine state**

As in other Sons of the Soil conflicts, the Moro resistance was ignited by Philippine government policies that first encouraged migration of (predominantly Christian) northern Filipinos to traditional Moro lands, and subsequently backed

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these migrants against the indigenous population in the resultant unrest. As noted in Fearon and Laitin (2010), the Philippine state was triply motivated in pursuing such policies.

First, encouraging migration was one way to ensure the Northern-based government’s access to Mindanao’s wealth. The Mindanao island grouping boasts mineral resources, and millions of hectares of rich farmland sheltered from Southeast Asia’s typhoon belt. The islands also occupy a historically strategic position along trade routes linking Southeast Asia to the Middle East, Europe, and China.

Second, both Filipino and American colonial governors saw settlement and land law as instrumental in their efforts to build a Filipino nation out of a conglomerate of distinct peoples. The Philippine archipelago includes more than 7,100 islands, comprising ethnic groups speaking some 171 languages.12 Mindanao, never conquered by either Spain or America, was particularly problematic for the Philippine nationalist project.13 The Americans solidified their control in Mindanao using military rule, political payouts, and encouraging migration by northern tribes


13 The period preceding Philippine independence from the U.S. saw the rise of northern Filipino nationalists and Moro independence activists. Both brought their agendas to the American capital—the nationalists arguing the country should be ceded whole to Filipino control, the Moros arguing for the creation of a separate, Moro protectorate in the south. Indeed, New York Representative Robert Bacon proposed the US establish two indigenous governments—one in the north, and one in Mindanao *The Moro Problem in the Philippine Islands*, 1st, H. R. 1277.
with whom they had more stable relations. A series of American colonial laws made
it simultaneously easier for northern Filipinos to own land and more difficult for
Moros to establish legal ownership of lands they had historically occupied.14 Not
only is land titling (and individual ownership) not a traditionally Moro concept, but
after centuries of resistance, Moros were also largely inappropriately educated to
take advantage of the new legal system. This trend continued under the Philippine
Commonwealth,15 as the first Filipino President Manuel L. Quezon encouraged the
“Filipinization” of Mindanao as part of his vision for an independent Philippines.

Third, the Filipino state found internal migration as a way to ease population
pressures, and appease its political supporters. Booming population growth in the
northern islands strained agricultural lands traditionally divided among relatively
few wealthy plantation owners. The Hukbalahap (“Huk”) Rebellion (1946-1954)
drew stark attention to these pressures, drawing its momentum from

14 The Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, November 1902) required the registration of all lands
occupied by any person, group or corporation. Most Moros lost their communal lands in this way;
Public Land Act (Act No. 718, April 1903) decreed null and void all land grants made by Moro sultans,
datus, and chiefs without the authority of the state; Public Act No. 926 (October 1903) declared all
lands not registered under Act No. 496 (which included many traditionally Moro lands) were public
lands, and therefore available for homesteading, or for corporate or individual purchase or lease; The
Mining Law of 1905 declared all public lands as free to exploration, occupation and purchase (by
Filipinos and Americans); Philippine Commission Acts 2254 and 2280 (1913) created agricultural
colonies and encouraged Filipino migrants from the north to settle them (Act 2254 allocated sixteen
hectares to Filipino applicants, but limited Moros to eight hectares); Public Land Act 2874 (1919)
allocated twenty four hectares to Filipino applicants, but limited Moros to ten hectares.

15 Legislative Act 4197 (February 1935), known as the Quirino-Recto Colonization Act, declared
settlement the best and only lasting solution to its difficulties in the south; Commonwealth Act 141
(November 1936) declared all Moro ancestral lands public lands, and allowed Filipinos twenty four
hectares, fully non-Moro corporations 1,024 hectares, and individual Moro applicants four hectares;
Commonwealth Act No. 441 (June 1939) established the National Land Settlement Administration,
which in turn established three major settlements.
disenfranchised agrarian peasants of the northern islands. Land reform being a lengthy and politically costly process, President Magsaysay created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) to resettle dissidents and landless farmers, particularly in the rich farmland of Mindanao.\textsuperscript{16} Philippine policy also protected vast plantations in Mindanao, and gave mineral and logging concessions to investors—some from abroad, but many from the northern islands.\textsuperscript{17}

These programs had a dramatic effect on the Moro homelands. As shown in Figure 3.2, while the Moro population in Mindanao has increased over time, migration has dramatically decreased their population share.

\textsuperscript{16} It is not clear that all such settlers were actually Huk members or landless farmers—some resettlement benefits may have been distributed to Filipino government soldiers, as a reward for, and in an effort to ensure loyalty among the troops, who were usually underpaid.

\textsuperscript{17} On logging interests, see Misuari, "The Rise and Fall of Moro Statehood," 31; on American corporate interests, see Jubair, \textit{Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny}. 118; see also Aijaz Ahmad, "The Moro Peoples," \textit{Southeast Asia Chronicle}, no. 82 (1982); ———, "Who Profits from the Land? American corporations monopolize agribusiness for export in southern Philippines," \textit{Southeast Asia Chronicle}, no. 82 (1982).
Initially, Moros welcomed and assisted the migrants, many of whom were poor. By the late 1960s, however, the Moro-settler dynamic had shifted in ways

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18 "Moro population and population share in Mindanao (1903-1990);" Soliman M. Jr. Santos, The Moro Islamic Challenge: Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao Peace Process (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 2000), 208.; Wernstedt and Simpkins (1965) note: “Between 1948 and 1960 the percentage increase of the population of Mindanao (87 percent) was more than twice that of the nation as a whole (41 percent)-the latter in itself a very rapid gain by world standards. More people were added to Mindanao’s population during the 12 years following 1948 than had been added during the previous 45. (...) In 1960, approximately one of every four residents of Mindanao (1,241,566 persons) reported his birthplace as some area other than Mindanao.”

affecting both Moro masses and elites. The masses felt increasingly disenfranchised. Gradually, the government built roads and other infrastructure to facilitate settlement and service new communities—improvements disproportionately favoring Christian settlers.\textsuperscript{20} The influx of settlers also turned many Moro peasants into landless farmers. Settlers’ claims to land Moros had historically tilled were facilitated by often-discriminatory government policies, accompanied by legal paperwork Moro residents lacked, backed by courts Moros did not understand and were not sufficiently educated to access, and enforced by police and military forces of the northern Filipino government.

The demographic shifts pressured not only the newly landless Moro peasants, but also threatened the political grip of the Moro elite. Economically, elites had fared better than their followers. Better educated than the masses, many were able to title lands (sometimes at the expense of their own followers).\textsuperscript{21} Some initially did well translating their traditional authority into electoral victory.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} Even the Philippine Senate noted poor government service provision in Moro areas and land problems resulting from the massive influx of settlers Majul, \textit{The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines}: 37.; Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria \textit{Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao} (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, 2000); Jubair, \textit{Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny}: 118-9.

\textsuperscript{21} #71.2 described how some \textit{datus} leveraged their access to the Philippine legal system to title lands traditionally worked by their followers. Lands were often titled to \textit{datus} on behalf of their frequently illiterate followers. Whether these followers then had access to these lands was often an artifact of their \textit{datu}'s personal magnanimity.

\textsuperscript{22} For examples, see Patricio N. Abinales, \textit{Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State} (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000),
However, traditional and formal electoral authority under the Philippine Republic increasingly diverged as immigration shifted the numerical advantage to non-Moros.23

Increasingly contentious electoral competition between settler and Moro elites produced a constellation of private armies and militias—including the Christian Ilaga and the Moro Blackshirts, Barracudas, and Green Guards. Credited with widespread human rights violations and intimidation of Moro civilians, the Ilaga’s apparent collusion with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine Constabulary did little to convince Moros they had a place in the Philippine state.24 In short order, the combination of political maneuvering, disenfranchisement, and shifting demographics turned Mindanao into powder keg.

The Jabidah Massacre of March 18, 1968 provided the final spark. Allegedly, some twenty-eight Moro youths were killed by their AFP handlers when the recruits

23 It should be noted that electoral politics were not immediately sectarian. Early immigration brought Christian politicians, who often ran with Moro running-mates, and elections were as much (if not more) a Moro-vs-Moro contest than a Moro-vs-Christian one ——, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines:* 124.

refused to aid the Marcos regime in a secret plan to infiltrate, destabilize, and ultimately claim for the Philippines the Malaysian-held state of Sabah.\textsuperscript{25} While the reasons for the mutiny are contested,\textsuperscript{26} the incident and cover-up became a touchstone of Moros’ anti-Manila sentiment.

2. The Moros vs. the State

Like most Sons of the Soil conflicts, Mindanao is often described as “intractable,” and characterized by long-running intermittent conflict, punctuated by occasional (and often seemingly ineffectual) rebel-government agreements. The motivations behind many of the state’s original policies still hold. Over time, motivations and actions have compounded, creating new interests that coincide with the original fissure, and shaping the position of the Philippine state.

Government policies have created a gap between the Moro population and the Philippine state—a divide that has created space for the formation of the Moro liberation movements. This section defines the dimensions of ideology in the Mindanao context, and specifies the ideological positions of the population (and

\textsuperscript{25} Marcos claimed Sabah as part of the Philippine territories under international law. Ironically, the Philippine claim to Sabah relies on a preexisting Moro claim. The Sultan of Brunei ceded the territory now known as Sabah to the Sultan of Sulu in 1658. In 1761, the Sultan of Sulu leased the territory to the British East India Company. A series of business deals among the Europeans transferred rights to Sabah multiple times. Eventually, the territory was folded into the states first declared British protectorates, and then independent Malaysia.

\textsuperscript{26} While the sole survivor recalls the mutiny as being largely spawned by complaints against low and late payment and horrible living conditions, the mutiny is widely regarded as inspired by the recruits’ reluctance to combat fellow Muslims in Sabah. Jubin Arula, "Public Speech," (Maguindanao, Philippines2009).
their divergence from the incumbent’s). As specified in the model (Chapter 2), all other actors will be compared against the populations’ preferences.

This section notes Moros’ interests in historical context, but focuses on the 2009-2010 period during which the survey data presented in Chapter 4 were gathered. Since the cross-sectional analysis compares all three rebel groups, I also take care to note these popular preferences are similar across areas occupied by all three groups, and thus that while the rebel groups may occupy slightly different areas, they face a comparable domestic population.27

Making broad generalizations about a population as large and diverse as the Moros is difficult. However, in the Mindanao context, ideology has two primary dimensions: nationalism and Islamism. A tertiary element of social reform is also present, but is often largely synonymous with the actors’ approach to and interpretation of Islam.

First, the population desires some form of separation from the Philippine state. The nationalist sentiment of the Mindanao conflict is more than elite rhetoric—migration of northern Filipinos to Mindanao has brought ordinary Moros face-to-face with central government policy in a day-to-day manner more concrete than centuries of intermittent colonial conflict. Today, ordinary Christian settlers and large, non-Moro plantations are the face of landlessness for Moro farmers. The

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27 For an additional discussion on how the areas of rebel occupation were defined, see Chapter 4, Section 1.1.
government has made several attempts at land reform, but these have had limited impact throughout the archipelago (as in most states, such reform is politically costly), and made particularly little headway in Mindanao. Moro residents frequently blame Mindanao’s underdevelopment on Manila’s policies. It is likely the population would be willing to settle for autonomy, but the concept of independence, or at least some form of separation from the Filipino state has wide resonance.

These nationalist sentiments not only persist to this day, but are largely constant across civilians under all three rebel groups. Table 3.1 reports a measure of civilians’ nationalist sentiments, drawn from a survey run in 2009-2010. The table reports civilians’ willingness to endure continued conflict in exchange for independence from the Philippine state.²⁸

Table 3.1: Number of incidents per year civilians are willing to endure to obtain independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th># incidents per year to gain independence</th>
<th>p-values comparing</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>1.05 (±0.20)</td>
<td>0.3552</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>1.58 (±0.55)</td>
<td>0.8643</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>1.12 (±0.39)</td>
<td>0.4783</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁸ For full regression results and further description on how these figures were calculated, see Appendix. For additional details on the survey from which these results are drawn, see Chapter 4. For details on how the rebels areas of operation were specified, see Chapter 4, Section 1.1.
As shown, the average Bangsamoro is willing to endure between one to two violent incidents per year in order to obtain independence, and this willingness is not statistically different between areas occupied by the MNLF, MILF or ASG.

In this, the Moro populace has an obvious tension with the Philippine state. The government is still sensitive to its own nationalist project—building a still-young Republic out of a diverse archipelago. Like most states, the GRP has little interest in admitting it cannot control areas within its own borders, disarticulating its own territory, or ceding domestic control. Furthermore, in perhaps a measure of success of earlier policies in building the Filipino nation, nearly a century of migration has created millions of Christian residents who now view Mindanao as their home, and Manila as their government. Both these settlers and the central government are averse to “abandoning” these migrants to a separate country. Thus, in negotiations with both the MILF and MNLF, all administrations have insisted on adherence to the Philippine Constitution, and on (at best) autonomy. Not secession.

Furthermore, Mindanao remains a source of wealth. In addition to agricultural assets, the islands are now known to hold substantial mineral wealth, including untapped oil and natural gas reserves. Nearly a century of government policy later, much of this wealth has accrued to the Manila-based business elites—a circle synonymous with (or at least dependent on) a heavily oligarchic political elite. Those with mineral or land holdings are thus averse to land reform, and many oppose secession or even settlement with the Moros. While conflict is often less than ideal for business, many stand to lose in the event of political settlement—or at
least find arguments that they will not lose non-credible. Furthermore, some allegedly find conflict provides a convenient cover for acquiring additional lands through less-than-transparent means.

Northern Filipino ties to such wealth are spread throughout the areas occupied by the three rebel groups. MILF-dominated central Mindanao is home to a number of commercial farming interests, mineral wealth, and natural gas reserves. Western Mindanao and the island provinces, home to heavier concentrations of MNLF and ASG, have both oil and natural gas reserves, as well as access to rich fishing waters.

Additionally, the GRP is painfully aware that Mindanao is still geopolitically strategic, sitting at the northeast corner of the confluence planet’s four busiest shipping lanes, handling a combined 50 percent of the total tonnage of the world’s merchant fleet. Access to mineral and agricultural wealth, as well as Mindanao’s strategic position make the Philippine government reluctant to sign a political settlement ceding control to the indigenous population in any part of Mindanao.

Second, popular preferences also carry an Islamic ideological component. As Gowing (1969) points out, asking his titular question “How Muslim are the Muslim Filipinos [Moros]?” is something of a vain question—particularly for community

outsiders. However, it seems clear that Moro’s Islamic practice has traditionally been rather moderate, and continued some elements of *adat* (common law) and folk traditions from the pre-Islamic period. While Moro Islamic practice may be imperfectly orthodox, this does not mean the population identifies any less fiercely as Muslim—Islam is an integral part of the identity Moros strive to protect. It is also one of the most obvious ways in which the indigenous population differs from the predominantly Christian settlers, as well as Spanish and American colonizers. While Mindanao’s Moro tribes were often politically divided and rivalrous, they all shared a self-identification as Muslims, and have remained suspicious of assimilation into the Christian Filipino majority.

Furthermore, this identification is coupled with a general appreciation of, and desire for, greater Islamic education. Those with degrees in Islamic studies and/or jurisprudence are greatly respected. While there is some debate on the timing, post-American Mindanao saw an Islamic resurgence; accompanied by greater interest in Islamic education, and *Hajj* attendance, (though these were

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30 Even prior to the rebellion Moro elites found emblematic Islamic practice effective in enhancing their own reputations and winning votes. See McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*: 113-4, 29-30, 32-7.

31 Peter Gowing notes that "[m]any observers have commented on the fact that Muslims frequently regard ‘Christian’ and ‘Filipino’ as synonymous—and when asked if they are Filipinos, many will reply ‘No! We are Muslim!’" Peter G. Gowing, "How Muslim are the Muslim Filipinos?," *Solidarity* 4, no. 8 (1969): 26, see also 28.; Alunan C. Glang, *Muslim Secession or Integration* (Quezon City, Philippines: R. P. Garcia Publishing, Co., 1969), 6.; Antonio Isidro, "Education of the Muslim," *Solidarity* 4, no. 5 (1969): 6. citing Antonio Isidro and Mamitua Saber, *Muslim Philippines* (Marawi City, Philippines: University Research Center, Mindanao State University, 1968), 44.; Author interviews with multiple civilians throughout Mindanao, AFP personnel, and sources close to the MILF 2008-2011.
frequently limited to the elites in the early years). In more recent years, the popularity of the Tabligh movement (introduced by missionaries in the 1980s) highlights a popular interest in religious education, and more orthodox Islamic practice. However, while they respect orthodoxy in others, and many Moros view Islamic education as part of reclaiming their heritage, it is fair to say that the average Moro’s ideal enactment of sharia law is reasonably moderate.

Furthermore, Moro’s Islamic practice appears relatively consistent across areas occupied by the three rebel groups. As a rough test of personal religiosity, Table 3.2 reports civilians’ average daily prayer attendance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Average daily prayer attendance</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>p-values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>2.890 (±0.398)</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.1311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>2.293 (±0.065)</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.1047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>2.074 (±0.291)</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.4457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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32 Author interview, (Long-time revolutionary activist with experience in pre-MNLF, MNLF, MILF: Maharlika Village, Philippines, April 2009); Gowing, "How Muslim are the Muslim Filipinos?," 45. citing Isidro and Saber, Muslim Philippines: 12-22 and 53-6; Peter G. Gowing, "Christians and Moros: The Confrontation of Christianity and Islam in the Philippines," South East Asia Journal of Theology 10, no. 2-3 (1969); Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines: 33.; Thomas McKenna argues the early post-colonial period reflects ethnization of Islam rather than a popular resurgence. He estimates the Islamic resurgence in Mindanao began around 1980. See McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines: Chapter 6.

33 Highlighting tensions between the Philippine state and the Moro populace, some security analysts have expressed concern that the Tabligh are a front for terrorist recruitment—pointing to the early membership of some original ASG. In Mindanao, the Tabligh are widely viewed as apolitical, nonviolent, and pious.

34 For additional details, see Appendix.
Not only do nearly all Bangsamoro self-identify as Muslims, but, by this measure, civilians in MNLF, MILF, and ASG areas have statistically similar modes of personal religious practice.

Furthermore, it appears civilians across MNLF, MILF, and ASG areas also have similar perceptions on what Islamic governance (implementation of sharia law) means. Table 3.3 reports results from a survey question in which civilians were asked to define, in their own words, “what does sharia law” mean to you?” The table reports the percentage of the population offering the two most common answers: “I don’t know,” and some variant of simply “Islam” or “Islamic law.”

Table 3.3: Civilians’ definition of "sharia law"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>“Don’t know”</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>p-values</th>
<th>“Islam/ Islamic law”</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>p-values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>8.1% (±2.9)</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.3580</td>
<td>43.9% (±7.9)</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.8498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>5.0% (±1.7)</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.7267</td>
<td>50.4% (±1.7)</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.9459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>9.4% (±2.3)</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.1172</td>
<td>49.5% (±4.6)</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.8484</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results suggest Moro civilians are not statistically different in their personal conception of sharia (or professed ignorance thereof) across areas occupied by the

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35 Note that this measure may be subject to some endogenity. As will be discussed in Section 3, each rebel group has espoused a particular religious platform. For those which involve religious education, the rebel groups’ presence may actually affect civilians’ thoughts on sharia law and other religious matters. With that in mind, these descriptive statistics are simply intended as a broad cut at the issue of population comparability.
MNLF, MILF, and ASG. Asked to articulate their own definition, most simply equate *sharia* with their personal faith.

A following survey question asked respondents which of a list of definitions of *sharia* they agreed with (respondents were allowed to select as many of the statements as they agreed with, or opt for “none of the above”). The percentage of the population in all three rebel areas selecting each option is remarkably consistent (Table 3.4). The options offered respondents are arrayed down the side, with columns of descriptive statistics displayed for each rebel group’s area of operations. The table also shows the results of statistical tests comparing between populations under the different rebel groups.
Table 3.4: Choice of offered definitions of *sharia* law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sharia law means a government that...</th>
<th>MNLF Area</th>
<th>MILF Area</th>
<th>ASG Area</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...uses physical punishments to make people obey the law</td>
<td>0.180***</td>
<td>0.173***</td>
<td>0.378***</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.8888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.180***</td>
<td>0.173***</td>
<td>0.378***</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.6783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...provides services</td>
<td>0.345***</td>
<td>0.370***</td>
<td>0.422***</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.6346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.3980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.180***</td>
<td>0.173***</td>
<td>0.378***</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.6346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...does not have corruption</td>
<td>0.140***</td>
<td>0.175***</td>
<td>0.233*</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.2958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.4288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.140***</td>
<td>0.175***</td>
<td>0.233*</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.6436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...provides justice through functioning courts</td>
<td>0.444***</td>
<td>0.384***</td>
<td>0.444***</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.4596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.9966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.444***</td>
<td>0.384***</td>
<td>0.444***</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.5670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...provides personal security</td>
<td>0.168***</td>
<td>0.254***</td>
<td>0.269***</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.168***</td>
<td>0.254***</td>
<td>0.269***</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.5833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of the above</td>
<td>0.022***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.9020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.022***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.3483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>* p &lt; 0.10</td>
<td>** p &lt; 0.05</td>
<td>*** p &lt; 0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some differences between the populations in rebels’ areas are noticeable.

However, these differences may well be due to some endogeneity between popular perception and rebels’ behavior. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 6, ASG’s particularly brutal brand of justice (under their interpretation of Islam and *sharia*) may very well drive the higher percentage of the populace in their areas

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36 Differences between rebel groups in this category should be taken with care. Only 19 respondents selected this response option. Of those 13 are in MNLF areas. While this is consistent with points made later in this chapter on MNLF’s non-emphasis on Islamic education, the number of respondents in this category remains small enough that interpretation is problematic.
who agree that sharia is a “government that uses physical punishments to make people obey the law.”

The Philippine government is uninterested in implementing Islamic governance. In many ways, the GRP is still self-consciously aware of helming the only predominantly Catholic country in Asia. Not only do fully 92% of its constituents self-identify as Christian (more than 80% of which specify “Roman Catholic”), but Filipino politics often contain elements of incomplete separation of Church and State. Even instituting sharia law in an area limited to Mindanao is problematic for the GRP, as Christian settlers now constitute a majority (or sizable minority) in many areas. Many settlers are skeptical they would be treated fairly under sharia law, and, in some areas decades of conflict have increased suspicion between the religious backgrounds.

Finally, ordinary Moros have some interest in social reform. At the pinnacle of traditional Moro hierarchy, datu’s temporal and geographic omnipresence has made them a fixture of Moro politics. However, the arrival of Christian settlers, displacement of Moros from traditional lands, and the concomitant extension of the central government into Moro areas weakened datu’s traditional hold over the populace. While collaboration with the Filipino, American, and Spanish regimes was

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a relatively high-level game, everyday Moros eventually began to connect their increasing disenfranchisement to some of the datus, believing “they were the victims of government discrimination and of neglect by their own leaders.” By the eve of revolution, Moros’ views on their traditional hierarchy were ambivalent: suggestions to upend the system entirely would not necessarily resonate with the populace, but improvements in datus’ behavior would be welcome.

Continuing conflict has only solidified this sentiment. Various rebel groups have offered at least some an avenue to prominence outside of traditional bloodlines. Many datus have continued to fail to protect the populace or improve livelihoods. Widespread defection of elites from the struggle (primarily from the MNLF, for reasons explained by the theory—see Chapter 5), have met with mixed responses, but have disillusioned some that the datu class is worthy of preeminence. Indeed, Civilians’ growing support for social reform was demonstrated in the 1988 gubernatorial election, in which a populist platform, unblessed by traditional elites, won handily.

The GRP has little interest in social reform. In addition to being a supported by the archipelago’s status-quo hierarchy generally, the government follows a long

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39 Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines: 32.; see also McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines: Chapter 6. This general sentiment was confirmed in multiple interviews including: Author interview, (Former ASG member: Metro Manila, Philippines, December 2009); ———, (Former MNLF commander 1980s: Makati City, Philippines, January 2009); ———.

40 For description and analysis of this campaign and its social and political import, see McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines: 245-66.
tradition of ruling indirectly in Mindanao. Like its colonial predecessors, Manila’s hold on power in the South is largely contingent on its ability to rule by proxies anointed among Mindanao’s political dynasties. Upending or weakening a hierarchical social system that allows the GRP “buy out” individual elites rather than woo the entire populace would not be in Manila’s interest. Both historically and today, the GRP has struck deals with local elites throughout areas occupied by all three rebel groups.

3. The Rebel Groups

This section outlines the three rebel groups of interest, and their donors. I discuss both rebels’ and donors’ ideological positions along the three pertinent dimensions: nationalism and Islamism (with the element of social reform). I argue these donors’ ideological positions (and any changes therein) are exogenous to the Mindanao conflict itself—dictated by donors’ own geopolitical interests, and ideological trends in international Islam. I also describe these donors’ positions on the other two parameters of interest in the model: their level of humanitarian concern, and the forms of support they offer their rebel partners. This section provides a brief history of all three groups, but focuses on their position in the 2009-2010 period in which the survey data analyzed in Chapter 4 were collected. Both MNLF and ASG have undergone shifts over time, the nature of both groups before and after their shifts is outlined below, but are discussed and analysed in more detail in Chapter 5 (MNLF) and Chapter 6 (ASG).
3.1. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 1.0

(...) Mao gained his power and his support from the masses. Now here it is different because we gain more support from outside [other countries] than inside.\textsuperscript{41}

The MNLF proclaimed its goals as \textit{bangsa} (nation), \textit{hulah} (homeland), and \textit{agama} (religion)—largely emphasized in that order.\textsuperscript{42} The Front was, first and foremost, a nationalist organization—established (as per its 1974 Manifesto) to pursue “our people’s legitimate right to obtain their national freedom and independence.”\textsuperscript{43} As such, it clearly reflected the popular preference.

Both those inside and outside the MNLF seem comfortable describing the MNLF as a “nationalist rather than Islamist” organization. For the MNLF, Islam was an important component of the nationalist identity they pursued, but not necessarily the defining characteristic of this identity, the organization, or its political goals \textit{per se}. Unlike the MILF and ASG, the MNLF has not called specifically or exclusively for Islamic governance. Indeed, the ideological strand on which the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{41} Interview, unnamed MNLF fighter, Cotabato City, 27\textsuperscript{th} July 1983 cited in Ivan Molloy, “The Lost Revolution: Marcos vs. the Moros and the seeds of terrorism,” (2005), 38.
\textsuperscript{42} Author interview.
\end{flushright}
organization was founded had an inclusive bent, and the MNLF often tried to embrace non-Muslim members of the community.44

On issues of social reform, the early MNLF was shaped by what Molloy (2005) dubs the “contradictory alliance” between traditional Moro elites (datus) and what McKenna (1998) calls the first of two Moro “counterelites”—young, educated, politically-motivated firebrands, exasperated by elites’ stranglehold on formal (and informal) Moro politics.45 However, in forming the MNLF, the elites’ political experience, international connections, and private armies proved indispensable. This marriage, Molloy (1988) argues, effectively muzzled any talk of social reform, leaving this aspect of popular preferences unanswered.46

3.1.1. MNLF 1.0: Supporters

The MNLF soon attracted international support—from the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and member states. The OIC was founded in 1969, as an outgrowth of the exuberant new state-led Islamic nationalism of the post-colonial Middle East. The organization was founded to carve a place for Muslim states and peoples in the international community and promote solidarity throughout the

44 Similarly, the MIM, from which the MNLF drew inspiration and a founding cadre was originally named the Muslim Independence Movement. It was renamed July 24, 1970, “when the Central Committee of said Movement substituted the word Muslim to Mindanao to accommodate others.” See Alunan C. Glang, *Muslim Secession or Integration*, Revised Ed. ed. (Quezon City, Philippines: Cardinal Bookstore, 1971), 88 footnote 6.; Author interview.
*umma* (worldwide Muslim community). Indeed, the one thing the OIC’s heterogeneous membership has consistently agreed on is, broadly speaking, “Islamic solidarity.” Like most international organizations, the freshly formed OIC was eager to demonstrate its efficacy in the international arena.

The Moro cause joined that of many Muslim minorities on the OIC agenda. On the face of it, the OIC’s goal to “[t]o strengthen the struggle of all Moslem peoples with a view to safeguarding their dignity, independence, and national rights” would have meshed well with the nationalist sentiment of the MNLF and the Moro masses. However, the OIC shied away from supporting the MNLF’s original goal of full independence—perhaps constrained by international norms of sovereignty, or the political pragmatism of member states who risked their own minorities demanding similar settlements. In 1974, just a year after its first statement of support for the Moros, the OIC backed “a just solution [...] within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines (emphasis

47 The OIC has always staunchly supported the Palestinian cause as well as other Muslim minority groups. In addition to statements of support for the Moros, the 1973 conference also made statements in support of the Guinean, Palestine and Muslim Bengali people, and a combined statement in support of African peoples (including South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and in Zimbabwe) – all recognizing and supporting their struggles for self-determination and anti-colonialism. The OIC extended observer status (like that given to the MNLF) to the Turkish Muslim community of Cyprus in 1979, which it later upgraded to full membership for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 2004. The OIC has also encouraged its members to support minorities in Bulgaria, India, and Burma.

48 OIC Charter, Article II, paragraph 6; rephrased as “[t]o safeguard the rights, dignity and religious and cultural identity of Muslim communities and minorities in non-Member States” in the new OIC Charter of 2008 section Article I, paragraph 16.
added).” This position clearly diverges from the MNLF’s proclamation for “national freedom and independence” (also in 1974) and from the popular position.

While the OIC provided political support, the MNLF drew both political and material assistance from many of its member states, including Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. None, however, were as generous or prominently involved as Libya. The MNLF’s cause struck a chord with then-leader, Muammar Quaddafi, who shared the OIC’s concern for Muslim minorities, and was certainly known for his nationalist and anti-imperialist convictions. Quaddafi’s personal convictions on independence were likely more aligned with the MNLF and Moro populace than with the OIC, though (as in other areas), his preferences on this point were, held in check by the larger OIC.

On the Islamic issue, many of the OIC’s most notable founding leaders were largely secular nationalists, reflecting contemporary trends in transnational Islam.

51 Libya’s then-leader Muammar Quaddafi reportedly heard of the Moro struggle through a BBC announcement of the Manili Massacre in 1971, in which some 79 Moro men, women, and children were rounded up into a mosque in Carmen, North Cotabato, and allegedly killed by Philippine government forces. Vitug and Gloria Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao: 60.; Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines: 51. The massacre entered the popular history of the Bangsamoro as a touchstone of the early modern struggle.
For the OIC, that the Moros were Muslim appears to have been sufficient—they did not push for religious reform. Similarly, while Quaddhafi himself was a devout Muslim, neither Islamic beliefs nor goals appear to have been a prerequisite for his support.53

Issues of social reform have traditionally been a sharp dividing point within the OIC. The Libyan Prime Minister, in a speech at the 4th Islamic Summit in Casablanca (1984), noted “only one division existed between the Muslims countries, and that was between the progressive revolutionary and the conservative reactionary states.”54 While Quaddhafi definitely fell on the “progressive revolutionary” side of the divide, the OIC’s position (particularly during the Cold War), was heavily influenced by Saudi conservatism and anti-Soviet and anti-Communist stance. Radical social reform along elite-masses lines would not go over well. Thus, like the formative MNLF, the OIC as a whole did not reflect the Bangsamoro’s popular interest in social reforms.

53 Among others, Libya supported the Irish Republican Army and Germany’s Baader-Meinhof Group. While both were anti-colonial, neither was particularly Islamic. Furthermore, Quaddhafs’ own religious views were fairly populist—a trait which frequently garnering him trouble with domestic religious elites and the wider Muslim world. See George Joffé, "Qadhafi's Islam in Local Historical Perspective" in Qadhafi's Libya, 1969-1994, ed. Dirk Vandewalle (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 147-8, and 51-2.

MNLF 1.0: Donors’ humanitarian concerns

Overall, the MNLF’s OIC and Libyan supporters were more concerned with poor governance and abuse by the Filipino regime than they were with good governance by the MNLF. The OIC and Libya were vocal in their objection to Manila’s colonial overtones and physical excesses against the Moros. For both, extensive coercion by the MNLF against the very Muslim minority they were publicly striving to protect would be, at the very least, embarrassing. The MNLF’s Malaysian and Indonesian supporters were wary of destabilization along their archipelagic borders, and any excesses by the MNLF that would have exacerbated such destabilization. In short, for MNLF’s donors, good governance and service provision by the rebels was not required, and low-level, intermittent coercion and collateral damage would likely have been acceptable—widespread violations would not.

MNLF 1.0: Forms of support offered by donors

The MNLF’s donors gave a mix of support, but much of it was military—comprising arms, ammunition, and other materiel. Libya, as well as parts of Malaysia provided military training and camps. Some sponsors did send humanitarian assistance, though this was very limited. Significant fungible financial assistance flowed from Libya, Saudi Arabia, and other OIC member states. MNLF’s backers also supplied various forms of political pressure, including threats to embargo oil shipments to the Philippines should the state make

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57 A Correspondent, "PHILIPPINES: Who’s backing the Muslim rebels?.;; Dumia, "The Moro National Liberation Front and the Organization of the Islamic Conference: Its Implication to National Security." citing these as late as 1984

58#61; #86; see also notes on Iran’s “legitimate religious projects in the South”Richard Vokey, "Khomeini's hand in the Islamic glove: Marcos seeks secret talks with Muslim rebels and troops attack their island strongholds as Teheran takes a new interest," Far Eastern Economic Review, CD-ROM, 17 April 1980.; See Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines. on Libyan and OIC’s support for mosque repair and building.


60 Saudi support was estimated at $250 million, ———, "PHILIPPINES: Calling in the neighbours: Encouraged by Indonesian support, Manila seeks Kuala Lumpur’s help in the search for peace in Mindanao."
insufficient concessions to the MNLF. Political pressure functions effectively as a fungible assistance, increasing the rebels’ budget. Donor pressure on the incumbent augments (and partially substitutes for) rebels’ own efforts to compel the government—rebels can then use the resources they would have spent on such efforts to consolidate their domestic rule.

### 3.1.2. MNLF 1.0: Enacted Ideological Position

In partnership with Libya and the OIC, the MNLF remained nationalist, but its position was tempered by OIC demands that the Front pursue autonomy, not independence. While it is unlikely this distinction percolated immediately to the grassroots, the compromise did draw the MNLF further from popular preferences—a fact that became clearer as the war wore on. The partnership did not require the MNLF to adopt any platform of religious reform or plan to pursue orthopraxy. The organization thus left unanswered domestic interests in Islamic revival and increased Islamic education.

Similarly, the MNLF sidestepped ordinary Moros’ interest in some social reform. The organization was initially constrained from pursuing social reform by the elites that bolstered its original coalition. Fairly quickly, however, the *datus* were outmaneuvered by the young counterelites (primarily Nur Misuari). Ironically, Misuari achieved this coup by usurping *datus’* ties to the OIC—replacing elite support with similarly-conservative OIC backing. While the views of Misuari and fellow counterelites would have meshed well with Colonel Quaddhafi’s ideals of
social justice and Islamic socialism, the MNLF also needed to retain the backing of the wider OIC, whose collective position was fairly conservative. To be sure, various MNLF leaders still harboured a personal belief in the need for social reform, but as an organization, the MNLF largely adhered to the social status quo.

3.2. Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 2.0

3.2.1. MNLF 2.0: Supporters

By the 1990s, after years of limited success in resolving conflicts and pursuing self-determination for Muslim minorities, the OIC needed both internal and external credibility—particularly after its failures of unity and efficacy in the early-1990s’ Gulf and Bosnian Wars. For the organization, a resolution of the “Moro Problem” could provide the win they were looking for. At the same time, Libya found itself in a comparable position. Internationally, the country was squeezed by sanctions and direct military action. Domestically, Quaddhafi faced declining support for his international activism, exacerbated by a severe economic crisis.

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61 McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines: 204.
62 Iraq, the PLO, the Sudan refused to support the OIC resolution condemning Iraq in 1991, while Libya abstained from the motion. In Bosnia, the United States and NATO emerged as the relevant peacemakers, while the OIC failed to intervene successfully with fellow Muslims. OIC efforts to increase their influence in the conflict (Malaysia offered additional troops in February 1994) met with UN rejection. Malaysian offers to sell arms to Bosnian Muslims in 1995 was curbed by OIC efforts—likely to bring OIC behavior in line with international norms.
crisis in 1985-7, culminating in a 1993 attempted coup.\textsuperscript{64} Seeking a way out of its pariah status, Libya embarked on an international makeover campaign,\textsuperscript{65} and Quaddafi made a show of cutting his ties to terrorist organizations.\textsuperscript{66} Like the OIC, Quaddafi found the prospect of “delivering” a resolution to the Moro conflict an attractive one.

Both the OIC and Libya became more willing to compromise ideologically, in exchange for a signed agreement demonstrating efficacy and a commitment to peace—compromises that moved them further from the MNLF’s original goals, and the preferences of the wider Bangsamoro. As a result of this exogenous shift, in 1996, the OIC and Libya effectively pushed the MNLF to sign an agreement with the Philippine government. The 1996 Agreement anointed a new, tripartite, OIC-MNLF-GRP partnership.

\textsuperscript{64} Scholar Dirk Vandewalle comments ““[i]f the oil booms of the 1970s allowed Qaddafi to pursue his economic and political experiments without real difficulties, the 1980s would prove a more difficult test for the regime” ———, “The Libyan Jamahiriyaa since 1969,” 26. In contrast to earlier adulation, the population failed to rally behind Quaddafi’s responses to Rabita chemical factory incident, the Gulf of Sirte incident, and his refusal to extradite suspects in the Lockerbie bombing Burgat, "Qadhafi’s Ideological Framework," 54.

\textsuperscript{65} ———, "Qadhafi’s Ideological Framework," 55. For example, Quaddafi’s final attempt at direct regional influence in Chad ended unsuccessfully in 1994, and he signed a rapprochement in Egypt in 1989. See Niblock, \textit{Pariah States \& Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan}: 45.

MNLF 2.0: Donors' humanitarian concerns

The MNLF’s donors’ revised position had a similar, though possibly lower level of humanitarian concern than previously. The GRP itself is not particularly well known for its concern for human rights. On the face of it, it is thus unlikely the government would be particularly concerned with abuses by one of its affiliates. However, the GRP is constrained by two factors. First, abuse by the MNLF could fuel popular support for other faces of Moro resistance, particularly the MILF, as a “kinder, gentler” face of Moro liberation—exacerbating the challenge the MILF poses to the GRP.

Second, excessive MNLF coercion of the Moro population would embarrass the OIC, on whom the GRP has relied for financial assistance in Mindanao development projects, and continued goodwill in the markets for oil and foreign workers’ visas. While the OIC has stepped back from the day-to-day MNLF-GRP interaction, the MNLF retains observer status in the OIC, and the OIC retains the Committee of the Eight, which is tasked with monitoring implementation of the 1996 Agreement. These realities continually tie the OIC to MNLF and GRP reputations to MNLF behavior. The OIC itself has retained an interest in at least

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67 Both before and after 1996, the Philippine government has received consistently low scores on human rights indicators—including those relating to personal integrity issues like forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and political imprisonments David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, "The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset," (2001).
68 While no stranger to alleged or confirmed violence against Moro civilians (either directly or by proxy), it seems some degree of international scrutiny makes the difference in the GRP’s
the non-abuse of Moro civilians, and a reduced interest in ensuring their good governance. Such concerns seem to have been a victim of the OIC’s willingness to compromise in order to retain its “victory” of forging the 1996 Agreement.

**MNLF 2.0: Forms of support offered by donors**

Much of the MNLF’s post-1996 support has been humanitarian and fungible in nature. MNLF support has come from two sources: through government-sponsored structures created or handed to the MNLF by the 1996 Agreement, and direct government support for the post-Agreement transition. Second, from international aid—some channeled through these structures, some given directly to the MNLF communities. However, much aid and many programs have effectively provided fungible support—either because of extraordinarily poor monitoring, or because the bureaucratic structures the MNLF was handed turned were effectively designed to turn funds into personnel positions (i.e. patronage jobs) rather than services. International aid channeled directly to MNLF communities fared better, in responsiveness to atrocities. For example, the government has long offered the so-called “warlords”—local political clans who hold formal political offices in Mindanao—a high level of impunity in their frequent coercion of the populace. Such violence usually goes unnoticed by anyone outside the perpetrators and the victims, and is thus of acceptably low cost to the Philippine government. In the exception that proves the rule, the international outcry following the “Maguindanao Massacre” by the Ampatuan clan pushed Arroyo to oust and arrest senior family leaders, and withdraw support from the clan’s political ambitions. Without such scrutiny, it is doubtful the government would have arrested more than token individuals. Similarly, the GRP anxiously and adamantly distances itself from accusations that any of its political and military personnel have dealings with the Abu Sayyaf Group. The ASG is designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department, and thus subject to scrutiny by the American government that offers significant support to the Philippine government.
the sense that some of the funding directly reached the MNLF, and was perhaps more successfully earmarked for some form of service provision.

Perhaps surprisingly, the MNLF has continued to receive some military aid after 1996. In addition to any support that might be provided “under the table” formal integration of parts of the MNLF into the AFP and PNP did (effectively) provide some military aid to the Front—“integrees” received new firearms, and the legal right to carry them. While many remained on the job, others disappeared with their new weapons, or used AFP loans to purchase additional firearms.69 Among the bulk of the MNLF fighters who were not integrated, government-sponsored buy-back programs (ostensibly designed to demilitarize the MNLF) have actually facilitated the purchase of better weapons.70

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70 In part because these programs undervalued gun prices relative to the black market, fighters had incentives to turn in older guns, and invest the cash payment into new weapons Soliman M. Santos, Jr., "MNLF Integration into the AFP and PNP: Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation? (Case Study)," in Primed and Purposeful: armed groups and human security efforts in the Philippines, ed. Diana Rodriguez (Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2010), 177. citing Mirriam C. Ferrer, "Integration of the MNLF Forces into the PNP and AFP: Integration without Demobilization and Disarmament. UP Project on Assessment of the Implementation of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, Phase I," ed. Rufo C. Guiam (Quezon City, Philippines: UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1999).
3.2.2. MNLF 2.0: Enacted ideological position

Under its new partnership, the MNLF remained a nationalist organization, but compromised on this ideological position even further than previously. The OIC’s increased willingness to compromise cost the MNLF significantly at the negotiating table, as sponsors pushed the MNLF into several moves that burnished the OIC’s political success story, but meant that “[t]he settlement on the political issues became a foregone conclusion in favor of the GRP.”71 The Agreement was based in autonomy, not secession—continuing the compromise the MNLF had already made to its nationalist and self-determinationist goals to satisfy the OIC. These goals were further diluted as the Philippine President and legislature signed a substantially watered-down version of the Agreement into law72—dilutions the MNLF accepted insofar as it did not respond by abandoning the Agreement and returning to open war, and which moved the MNLF’s enacted ideological position farther from the Moro population’s.

The MNLF’s new partnership required less compromise on the Islamic front. Historically, the MNLF has often tried to include non-Muslims in their movement.

72 Eric Gutierrez, “The Politics of Transition,” http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/philippines-mindanao/transition-politics.php.; Six of the Philippines’ twenty-four Senators (including the Senate President) opposed a Senate resolution in support of the peace process. Opponents in the House of Representatives stymied funding for transitional structures—three representatives called the Très Marias were particularly outspoken, and managed to stir up local furor against the Agreement and managed to block substantial funding authority for the Consultative Assembly and SCPCD.
Following 1996, members often proudly emphasize the movement’s secularism and ecumenical inclusiveness. Senior sources close to Misuari emphasize that many attendees at his current rallies are Christian, and that the organization defines “Bangsamoro” to include all those “born [in Mindanao] before 1946, it doesn’t matter if you’re Christian, Muslim, ... you’re still Bangsamoro. It doesn’t matter – you don’t have a choice – you’re Bangsamoro. If you were born after this, you have a choice. You can decide to be Bangsamoro or not.”

The MNLF’s post-1996 partnership with its donors also forced the organization to compromise whatever remaining aspirations it had regarding social reforms. Even post-Cold War, the OIC remains a socially conservative institution, and the GRP benefits from existing hierarchies. Datus who abandoned the revolution often fled into the arms of Manila, who used some of them to rule by proxy. In exchange, such datus regained some of their former prestige via formal government offices, and accompanying sources of wealth. By partnering with the government, Misuari thus also partnered with some of the most recalcitrant and non-reformist datus. Social reform was out. Today, the MNLF is viewed with respect as the original face of the liberation movement. However, many find the group does not answer their interest in Islamic revival, and the MNLF’s willingness to compromise on nationalist ambitions unsatisfying. As one former MNLF fighter

73 Author interview.; ———.
(who left the organization for the MILF) commented, “The people see the 1996 Agreement, it is not their desire, their aspiration. (...) Whenever an organization does something that the people do not support, they will withdraw legitimacy from them – that is part of their social contract. The people were saying “we have no hope with the MNLF.”

The MNLF retains a presence as a political entity or social affiliation throughout many Moro areas of Mindanao. As described further in Chapter 5, its military wing and strongest political influence are now largely confined to western Mindanao—in Sulu, Basilan, and parts of the Zamboanga Peninsula.

3.3. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

The MILF was the second liberation movement to form in Mindanao, but is the closest to civilian preferences. The MILF grew out of the same nationalist goals of its MNLF predecessor, and has varied its demands over the years between autonomy and secession. In this, it was similar to MNLF in terms of its distance from the populace on the nationalist dimension.

When the MILF split from the MNLF in 1977, it dropped the “Nationalist” title in favor of “Islamist”—a change that was more than just rhetorical. In many ways,

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75 Salamat’s breakaway faction first claimed the title of “Moro National Liberation Front,” and issued documents and statements under that name. It was only in 1982 that the organization renamed itself the “Moro Islamic Liberation Front” when it became clear Salamat and his allies would not be able to take over the direction of the MNLF.
Misuari’s MNLF represented treads in immediately post-colonial political Islam, which was dominated by largely secular nationalists. In contrast, MILF founder Salamat was a member of what McKenna (1998) terms the “Islamic counterelite.” Salamat was educated at Al-Azhar in Egypt and widely respected for his Islamic credentials. He drew inspiration from the work of Syed Qutb and Syed Abdul A’la Mawdudi, in rejecting secular nationalism in favor of an Islamic focus as essential to the nationalist project. Unlike the MNLF, the MILF explicitly seeks an Islamic state in Mindanao. In separating the MILF from the MNLF, Salamat argued,

Some personalities in the Revolution . . . advocate the idea that the sole and singular objective of our struggle is simply to liberate our homeland, giving no importance to the system of government that shall be established . . . But in [our] Islamic revolution (Jihad in the way of Allah), the system of government is pre-determined by Qur’anic principles.

76 McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines: Chapter 7.
77 Abhoud Syed Mansur Lingga, "The Political Thought of Salamat Hashim" (Masters thesis, University of the Philippines, 1995), 27.
78 Hashim Salamat, "The Bangsamoro Mujahid: his objectives and responsibilities," ed. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Mindanao: Bangsamoro Publications, 1985), 5-6.; this sentiment appears to be articulated at the lower levels of the MILF, as well, "An MILF cadre emphasized: 'The use of 'Islamic' both in our front’s and our armed forces’ name is very significant. It was to distinguish it from Misuari’s movement, which was not really an Islamic jihad. All they wanted was to reclaim Mindanao, which was the Moros’ ancestral land before the Spanish and American colonizers." Rigoberto Tiglao, "PHILIPPINES C: Crescent Moon Rising: The MILF puts its Islamic credentials up front," Far Eastern Economic Review, CD-ROM, 23 February 1995.
MILF founding chairman Hashim Salamat shared his erstwhile colleague Misuari’s frustration with traditional datu elites. In a 1987 interview, an MILF loyalist commented “[y]ou know, the background of the struggle is such that it is also addressed against the traditional leaders as well as the government. While the Front was fighting the government, there was also an attempt to institute reforms within the social order of Muslim communities.” While the MILF did not have to make the same internal compromises on these issues as their MNLF cousins, Salamat’s particular Islamic vision had distinctly egalitarian themes.

3.3.1. MILF Supporters

The MILF has received very limited foreign support—it is not what keeps the organization afloat. When it split from the MNLF, the OIC and the original supporters of the Moro struggle opted to retain their allegiance to Misuari’s MNLF. The MILF may have garnered limited support at the time of its split from the MNLF from Egypt, Malaysia, and Pakistan (where founding chairman Hashim Salamat lived in exile for several years).

79 McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines: 208.
81 Indeed, the MILF first retained the MNLF name and sought to win OIC support for Salamat’s leadership ”MNLF Leader Informs Islamic Conference of Takeover,” Malolos International Service in English, 20 February 1978. While Salamat’s bid won some limited support, this effort ultimately failed, and the MILF confirmed itself as a separate organization ”Backer for Salamat,” Far Eastern Economic Review, CD-ROM, 14 April 1978. One founding MILF leader noted, ”it was very difficult” to set up the MILF without such resources, Author interview.
Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyya

In the post-9/11 era, much has been made of MILF’s ties to *Al Qaeda* (AQ) and *Jemaah Islamiyya*. It seems MILF’s AQ backing was extremely limited. The MILF also had a brief relationship with *Jemaah Islamiyya* (JI), an affiliation that was both narrowly defined and relatively short-lived. While the two groups’ goals (at least initially) seemed plausibly complementary, the MILF-JI arrangement rested heavily on its convenience for Indonesia-centric JI.

A number of features of the MILF-JI interaction indicate JI’s limited investment in the relationship. First, the liaison seems to have focused on smuggling JI personnel into Mindanao for training in one of JI’s own camps, and smuggling weapons and explosives out of the Philippines—all to support JI’s fight in Indonesia. Second, the “objective of the arrangement was to strengthen the military capacity of JI, not to help the MILF in its war against the Philippines

82 Nathan Quimpo cites an interview with Salamat in which the MILF leader acknowledges some support from bin Laden, but that this support had gone to funding mosques and madaris, and had lasted only until 1984, see Nathan Quimpo, “Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf: Who’s Afraid of an Islamic State,” *Public Policy* 3, no. 4 (1999): 46-7. Other authors dispute this point, arguing the relationship has been longer-lived and more robust—see Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: crucible of terror* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Maria A. Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia* (New York, NY: Free Press, 2003).

83 JI found it easier to obtain weapons and explosives in the Philippines than in Indonesia. The organization exploited the Philippines’ less-rigorous security network and more limited immigration and gun control scrutiny to support its fight in Indonesia Hastings, *No Man’s Land: Globalization, Territory, and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia*: 57 and 62.
military."\textsuperscript{84} To be sure, JI provided some limited funds and bombmaking training to select MILF personnel in exchange for shelter in MILF camps. However, JI camps offered full training only to JI members: Moros could take only the "short course."\textsuperscript{85} JI even preferred to have "its own operatives smuggle when possible," rather than use MILF personnel.\textsuperscript{86} Finally, JI did not make any Moros full JI members, nor did its personnel intermarry with Moros—an outcome common in JI's "organic institutional link[s]" with partner organizations at that time.\textsuperscript{87}

JI's involvement was also temporary. The original relationship began in the mid-1990s as JI's leadership took advantage of political apathy in Southeast Asia to expand their network and replace their deteriorating Afghan bases—all to support their increasingly active fight in Indonesia. However, the JI-MILF relationship lasted only until the early 2000s. The arrangement was constrained both by MILF's move to smaller, more mobile bases (after the government overran many of its camps in


\textsuperscript{86} Hastings, \textit{No Man's Land: Globalization, Territory, and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia}: 69.

2000), and by MILF’s own preferences. The MILF found its unacknowledged affiliation with *Jemaah Islamiyya* problematic for their anti-terrorist line (which the MILF had espoused prior to JI involvement, and which the Moro population widely supported), particularly in the context of renewed talks with the Philippine government. MILF chairman Al-Haj Murad finally made public statements condemning cooperation with extremists, specifically including JI. Following this, JI involvement in Mindanao increasingly focused on its growing relationship with ASG (see Section 3.5 and Chapter 6).

On the whole, the interaction appears to have been an attempted alliance that both parties found ultimately unsatisfying. For *Jemaah Islamiyya*, the MILF seems to have been geographically convenient, but unsatisfyingly moderate. For the MILF, JI proved too radical a houseguest.

**The Islamic Diaspora**

While limited, the most consistent international backing for the MILF has been from the global Islamic diaspora. The 1980s saw the rise of an active Muslim diaspora, increasingly exasperated with what they saw as the state-led (and secular) nationalists’ failure to deliver on the promise of the post-colonial age. Frustrated by lack of social and economic opportunities, the movement represented a new

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89 Ibid., 72-3.
generation “out of step with elites in government.”\textsuperscript{91} Ideologues like Qutb and Mawdudi pursued an egalitarian line, and recruited from a mix of socioeconomic backgrounds.\textsuperscript{92}

Such movements simultaneously espoused an Islamist ideology and ideas of social reform—ideas that meshed almost seamlessly with the MILF’s agenda. Indeed, Wadi (2003) comments “Moro movements found allies in Islamic movements abroad. The latter have axes to grind against their respective Arab/Muslim governments because of their failure to go beyond the platform of “Arab nationalism” and weed out the neo-colonial hand in the Muslim world.”\textsuperscript{93}

From this movement, support has flowed to MILF from both moderately well off individuals who supply donations (most commonly, posthumous bequests to build mosques and madaris) and communities of the faithful, whose assistance (knowingly or unknowingly) coordinated their local clerics. The MILF vice-president for political affairs confirmed that the rebels had “friends [among] the Islamic organizations; they are more or less permanent, unlike government leaders who are likely to leave their posts after a few years.”\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{91} Kepel, "Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam," 65 and 65-7.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 67.
The MILF has also received some assistance from the ethnic Moro diaspora, primarily from overseas foreign workers (OFWs) in the Middle East. Such individuals are predominantly of humble backgrounds, and would likely support the MILF’s agenda for social reform.

**MILF: Donors’ humanitarian concerns**

The MILF’s domestic supporters have, for obvious reasons, the utmost humanitarian concern over MILF behavior—civilians prefer not to be coerced. MILF’s diaspora supporters are similarly (though to a lesser degree) concerned with Moros welfare under MILF control. It would be surprising if either ethnic and religious diaspora members supported an organization known to exploit and extort fellow Muslims.

**MILF: Forms of support offered by donors**

MILF’s sponsors provide a mix of support, the bulk of which is humanitarian. JI’s limited support has already been discussed, but comprised mostly financial aid and limited military training. Support from the small Bangsamoro diaspora is primarily fungible; and aid from the wider Islamic diaspora comprises both fungible and humanitarian aid. Many individuals and small communities directly finance the construction of mosques and madaris and other social welfare services.96

95 Author interview.
96 Ibid.
Sympathetic institutions provide scholarships for MILF-sponsored students to study abroad, and NGOs sometimes provide development and other projects. Some cadres may have been trained abroad under MILF auspices, but many of the MILF’s “foreign trained” fighters were actually trained as members of the MNLF, and later joined the MILF.

3.3.2. MILF: Enacted Ideological Position

The MILF’s support both at home and abroad required no alteration of their nationalist agenda. While the organization has pursued both independence and autonomy, unlike the MNLF, MILF’s sponsors have not tied its hands to pursue only autonomy. Currently, the MILF stands for “meaningful autonomy,” and, failing GRP willingness to accede this point, complete secession. In this, the organization is closer to the popular preferences than today’s MNLF, whose sponsors pushed its 1996 compromise to limitd autonomy. As one local academic commented, “[the Bangsamoro people] look a the MNLF, and say “you have gotten us this far” but then look to the MILF, saying “they can get us what we want.”

The MILF has embraced Islam (and Islamic renewal through gradual education) as part of their identity and political program to a greater degree than

97 Ibid.; Author interviews with multiple villagers throughout Mindanao, 2010-2011; ———.
99 Author interview.
the MNLF. In this, the group is almost perfectly aligned with the broader movement for Islamic revival among the global Muslim diaspora. This position is also reasonably close to domestic preferences. The grassroots’ interest in Islamic revival is reflected in the popularity of the Tabligh (see Section 2). However, it is certainly the case that some members of the populace have resisted giving up traditional folk practices and other lifestyle choices frowned upon by MILF-affiliated imams. In general, however, the population has welcomed the MILF’s Islamist stance, and respects its personnel’s Islamic credentials.

It is worth noting that while the MILF views Moros’ traditionally Islamic practice as imperfectly orthodox, the organization has largely taken this as an opportunity for education (unlike the MNLF, which largely leaves domestic practice untouched—see Section 3.1, and not as a legitimate reason for targeting civilians (unlike the Abu Sayyaf Group—see Section 3.4 and Chapter 6). Differences between the MILF’s own view of orthopraxis and popular behavior are pragmatically negotiated, and the organization admits the process is “gradual.”100 Furthermore, the MILF has consistently tried to avoid an anti-Christian line. To be sure, there is some heterogeneity on this issue both within the MILF and the degree to which the

100 ———.; ———.; ———, (Mahad teacher in MILF-affiliated school: Maguindanao, Philippines, January 2010); ———; ibid.;
organization has emphasized this carefully inclusive line over the years. However, the MILF has never embraced sectarian conflict.\(^{101}\)

Along the social reform dimension, the MILF offers a sophisticated approach to Moro social hierarchy. As a nationalist organization, the MILF still relies on creating and emphasizing a sense of “Moroness” and thus shares the MNLF’s narrative of the value and valor of Moros’ indigenous governance structures (i.e. the datus). At the same time, however, the MILF embraces an interpretation of Islam that emphasized elements of egalitarianism and social reform. Datus as a class are welcome in the MILF’s domestic coalition, which yet avoids dependence on specific elites—unlike the MNLF, whose founding counterelites faced the difficult political realities of relying on datus’ arms, organization, and international connections.

To be fair, elites’ position on social reform has likely been softened by tensions between their class and the MNLF leadership, as well as the failure of separate, datu-lead attempts to co-opt the Moro struggle.\(^{102}\) However, the MILF still stands apart from the MNLF as the more socially progressive organization—it was able to avoid the status quo compromise on these issues that the MNLF was forced

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\(^{102}\) The Bangsamoro Liberation Organization (BMLO) was an elite-led faction of the original MNLF. The organization was an attempt by Moro elites to regain control of the rebellion. It failed to gain much support—either domestically or internationally. See Norodin Alonto Lucman, *Moro Archives: A History Of Armed Conflicts in Mindanao and East Asia* (Quezon City: FLC Press, Inc, 2000); Majul, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*: 86.
to take. The MILF has remained critical of the failings of the traditional elites. The MILF’s approach finds significant resonance at the grassroots, among Moros whose sense of local politics finds the datus ubiquitous, but welcome greater social, political, and economic opportunities, and the ability to voice their own opinions in matters of governance.

3.4. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 1.0

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is the most contested face of Mindanao’s Moro liberation movement—the organization has been labeled everything from holy warriors, to a CIA front, to apolitical thugs. While known locally for brutal acts, and internationally for its high-profile kidnappings, ASG was not founded as a mere criminal gang of violence entrepreneurs. ASG carries the same anti-colonial, self-determinationist genes as its MNLF and MILF forbearers. Furthermore, ASG was not a foreign organization, founded by AQ—the group was established as vehicle for radical Moro revolutionaries to pursue more extreme ideological goals. The group’s

103 Rasmia Alonto, “We assert our legitimate right to self-determination, that is, INDEPENDENCE!” in Referendum: peaceful, civilized, diplomatic and democratic means of solving the Mindanao conflict ed. Nu’ain bin Abdulhaqq (Camp Abubakre As-Siddique: Agency for Youth Affairs, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 2002).

104 Theories on ASG’s origins include that it is a creation of the Philippine military to discredit and divide the Moro liberation movement—see Vitug and Gloria Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao; Hashim Salamat, “We must win the struggle!” (Camp Abubakre As-Siddique: Agency for Youth Affairs, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 2004), 37, 42-3. Others argue it is a creation of the CIA, the MNLF or MILF to provide plausible deniability for actions otherwise disavowed under peace negotiations, or a pawn of Al Qaeda—see Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: crucible of terror; Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia; Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: global network of terror, 1st Berkley trade paperback ed. (New York, NY: Berkley Books, 2003).
brutality and turn to more criminal activities are, in fact, behaviors explicable within the theory (see Chapter 6 for an in-depth analysis).

ASG was founded by Abdurajak Janjalani (henceforth referred to as Abdurajak, following local convention). Abdurajak and many of ASG’s founding cohort were former MNLF members frustrated by that organization’s pursuit of OIC-backed autonomy, rather than outright secession. ASG is the only one of the three Moro groups that has never openly expressed a willingness to settle for autonomy, nor publicly pursued negotiations with the Philippine government.105 In this, the ASG was close to the popular preference for independence, though likely slightly more extreme given some popular support for political settlement short of independence.

Abdurajak was also frustrated with the MNLF’s secular nationalist bent, and vowed to establish a purely Islamic state.106 His own credentials resting on his qualification as an educated and committed Islamic orator, Abdurajak originally named his group *Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyya* (AHAI), or “Islamic movement.”107 ASG’s

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105 ASG has been critical of both MNLF and MILF negotiations. While some leaders reportedly were interested in negotiation with the GRP as recently as 2008, those backchannel efforts ended badly—see Santos and Dinampo, “Abu Sayyaf Reloaded: Rebels, Agents, Bandits, Terrorists (Case Study),” 133-4.
107 The groups’ name was allegedly changed when Filipino media were unable to remember the Arabic title, and resorted to the local convention of referring to armed bands by their leaders’ *nom de guerre*.
revolutionary project pursued an explicitly Islamic state, and emphasized the need for correct Islamic practice among the faithful. In this, he was ostensibly similar to the MILF, and the popular interest in an Islamic resurgence. However, the vision of Islam he pursued was closer to international trends in political Islam than to the Bangsamoro.

Abdurajak drew inspiration in the emerging salafi jihadist strand among fellow students during his studies in Saudi Arabia and Libya, and his time in Afghanistan, and ideologues like Said Saabiq, Afghan mujahid Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. These scholars extrapolated a more militant line from themes developed previously by scholars like Qutb and Mawdudi, whose work inspired MILF founder Salamat Hashim. Abdurajak took a harder line against fellow Muslims (including clerics) he deemed insufficiently Islamic. Furthermore,

108 Kepel (2002) notes the importance of distinguishing between salafist thought and the salafi jihadis: “the term salafism denotes a school of thought which surfaced in the second half of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas. It advocated a return to the traditions of the devout ancestors (salaf in Arabic) (...) [i]t sought to expose the roots of modernity within Muslim civilization—and in the process resorted to a somewhat freewheeling interpretation of the sacred texts. In the eyes of the militants, the definition of the term was quite different: salafists were those who understood the injunctions of the sacred texts in their most literal, traditional sense. (...) The salafists were the real fundamentalists of Islam; they were hostile to any and all innovation, which they condemned as mere human interpretation.” Kepel, "Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam," 219-20.

109 Local scholar Julkipli Wadi argues MILF founder Salamat Hashim was influenced by the works of Qutb and Mawudi, while Abdurajak Janajalani drew more from Said Saabiq. See Julkipli M. Wadi, "Philippine Political Islam and the Emerging Fundamentalist Strand," in Cooperation and Conflict in Global Society, ed. Carmencita T. Aguilar (Quezon City: International Federation of Social Science Organizations, 1996), 210-12.; Author interview.


111 Samuel K. Tan, Filipino Muslim perceptions of their history and culture as seen through indigenous written sources (Zamboanga City, Philippines: SKT Publications, 2003), 97.
while ASG’s original position on Christian settlers appears mixed, it seems clear the
group took a more sectarian approach to defining Islamic identity than either MNLF
or MILF.

ASG’s views on social reform were less clearly differentiable from its Islamic
ideology than for MILF and MNLF. Abdurajak’s own expertise was largely limited to
Islam and combat—not political and economic matters.¹¹² The ASG rejected
traditional Moro elites as incapable of enforcing an Islamic way of life as demanded
by the Qur’an,¹¹³ but also criticized the masses.¹¹⁴ In ASG, Abdurajak created a
vanguard organization, not a populist one—highly committed to Islamic resurgence,
but offering a religious hierarchy in lieu of traditional bloodlines. ASG thus left
unanswered the popular interest in social reform embraced by the masses.¹¹⁵

3.4.1. ASG 1.0: Supporters

While abroad, Abdurajak developed personal ties to Al Qaeda (AQ) and
affiliated personalities—ties he brought with him to ASG.¹¹⁶ These donors’

¹¹² Author interview, (MNLF loyalist and NGO worker in Sulu: Zamboanga City, Philippines, July
2010).
¹¹³ ———.
¹¹⁴ Ibid.
¹¹⁵ Charles O. Frake, “Abu Sayyaf: Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities
¹¹⁶ For discussions of these links, see Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: crucible of terror.;
Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast
Asia.; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qæda: global network of terror. However, ascertaining these links with
certainty is problematic, given the clandestine nature of the group and the possible biases in the
datasources commonly accessed in books on this topic Clive Williams M. G., "The Question of "Links"
Between Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia,” in After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, ed.
preferences were forged exogenously, shaped and spurred by the resistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and then to its Soviet backers in the 1980s. The mujahedeen's struggle formed a focal point and meeting ground for the new wave of international Islam—particularly attracting the salafi jihadists, and other visionaries who embraced a more orthodox and literal interpretation of the holy texts.  

Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Mindanao was but one of the areas to which these visionaries turned their attention, in what Giles Kepel terms the “proliferation of the Afghan jihad.” Mindanao's struggle attracted the attention of Al Qaeda and affiliates who also backed rebels in Bosnia, Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, and the horn of Africa.  

These movements rejected secular nationalism, focusing instead on founding explicitly Islamic states. These visionaries drew battle lines both around and

Kumar Ramakrishna (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2003).
118 Ibid., 217.
within the *ummah* (global Islamic community)—some incorporating both sectarian tendencies, and criticisms of fellow Muslims. While Qtub also influenced their ideological predecessors, these ideologues embraced the most radical interpretation of his work on the concepts of *jahiliyyah* (ignorance of god) and *takfir* (declaring a Muslim apostate), and a concomitant willingness to use coercion to purify society.¹²¹

The specifics of these movements' vision for social reform are not entirely clear. It seems, however, that construction of a purely Islamic society would necessitate both the removal of the current, too-secular elite, and the institution of a new elite of "true believers." In short, as Zawahiri himself noted, these men were the "jihad vanguard."¹²²

For these ideologues, Abdurajak offered an ideologically consistent entrée to a struggle consistent with their vision—as Abdullah Azzam argued "Muslim countries “usurped” by the ungodly had the duty to wage a holy war to recover their lost Islamic identity."¹²³ Had ASG been simply "thugs," it is doubtful they would have been appealing partners to AQ and its affiliates—particularly not in Southeast

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¹²¹ Specifically, "[I]f those who interpret Islamic law literally and rigorously, one who is impious to this extent can no longer benefit from the protection of law. According to the consecrated expression, 'his blood is forfeit,' and he is condemned to death," Kepel, "Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam," 31.

¹²² Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri, "Knights Under The Prophets Banner [in translation] [2001]," in *His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri*, ed. Laura Mansfield (TGL Publications, 2006), 79.

Asia, where the organization already had other footholds with similarly radical groups.

**ASG 1.0: Donor’s humanitarian concerns**

*Al Qaeda* and its affiliates often embraced both ideologies and tactics that blurred the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, permitting not only civilian targets generally, but also other Muslims—both as collateral damage and those deemed insufficiently religious. However, among the lessons it learned in Afghanistan, it seems AQ determined the value of providing at least some social services. Furthermore, this seems to be a tactic they pursued in many of their international adventures. Around the same time AQ forged ties with the nascent ASG, the organization’s operations in Somalia noted the need for "supervision of liberated areas and securing of lives, funds, and property of all members of the populace."\(^{124}\) The organization’s agenda for Somalia included service provision, specifically emphasizing “rebuilding of state institutions,” “establishment of domestic security,” and “economic reform and combating famine.”\(^{125}\) While AQ’s willingness to use coercion should not be ignored, it is worth noting that their organization did also use service provision as part of their operations with local partners.


\(^{125}\) Ibid.
ASG: 1.0: Forms of support offered by donors

AQ’s support to ASG was primarily financial and military, but included some humanitarian aid. Funds were channeled to ASG through personal intermediaries and allegedly skimmed from a network of charitable organizations including the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). While some funds earmarked for specific attacks, AQ also received guns and other materiel from abroad. AQ may also have sent affiliates to train ASG members, and paid for a few ASG members to be trained abroad. ASG also received some humanitarian assistance as AQ backed service projects through the IIRO in communities in ASG areas.

3.4.2. ASG 1.0: Enacted ideological position

The match between Abdurajak and his sponsors required little ideological compromise from either party. ASG’s ideological underpinnings were drawn from

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same stock as those of *Al Qaeda* and other individuals and organizations in the new wave of militant Islamism. While compatible abroad, Abdurajak’s particular Islamic vision had limited resonance at home. Civilians respected his Islamic credentials and personal passion, but found his Islamic vision relatively far removed from their own practice. Furthermore, both rebels and sponsors saw themselves as part of an Islamic vanguard—in terms of social reform, neither were populists. ASG 1.0 thus left unanswered popular interest in social reform.

Along the nationalist dimension, it is not clear that ASG’s self-determinationist streak fully embraced their sponsors’ pan-Islamic sentiment. However, ASG was certainly not alone in this—many other groups who became affiliated with Al Qaeda or its cohort were also built on local grievances. The formative ASG thus remained relatively close to the domestic nationalist position—desiring independence—though likely slightly more militant than civilians’ position in its refusal to accept anything less.

### 3.5. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 2.0

#### 3.5.1. ASG 2.0: Supporters

By the mid-to-late 1990s, an exogenous series of deaths and arrests first weakened, and then largely severed, ASG’s ties with its initial sponsors. Al Qaeda’s

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131 For example, see AQ partnerships with local combattants in Bosnia, Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, and the horn of Africa.
backing faltered with the arrests of Ramzi Yousef and Mohammed Jamal Khalifa—two of ASG’s closest links to AQ. The ASG-AQ connection was dealt a fatal (or near-fatal) blow in 1998, when Abdurajak was killed in a shootout with police. With him died his personal ties to AQ and affiliates, as well as his political and religious vision for ASG. Leadership passed to Khaddafy Janjalani, Abdurajak’s youngest brother, who shared power with Ghalib Andang (a.k.a Commander Robot) and Adam Tilao (a.k.a. Abu Sabaya), both former MNLF. All three lacked Abdurajak’s education, vision, and connections. They were interested in ASG’s survival, and attracted to the radical ideas and practice of violent jihad.133

ASG thus entered a period of re-equilibration. In an effort to survive, the group turned to kidnapping for ransom, and built ties with local criminal elements (usually with links to local political and military organs), who provided operational cover for these kidnapping operations.134 Targeting Western tourists brought large...

132 The Philippine government itself has vacillated on the ASG-AQ connection. A week after the 9/11 attacks, a Philippine Presidential spokesman declared the ties had been severed “as early as 1995.” Juliet Labog-Javellana, “Abu-Bin Laden link cut in ‘95-Palace,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 18 September 2001.; Later, the government has intimated the connections have been renewed.

133 Robot seems to have had experience as a henchman in the often-violent world of Sulu politics, while most accounts of Sabaya highlight a bombastic personality, whose possible experiences abroad exacerbated an attraction to international jihadists. See Santos and Dinampo, “Abu Sayyaf Reloaded: Rebels, Agents, Bandits, Terrorists (Case Study),” 127.; Dinampo, “A last extended interview with Janjalani.”; Mark Bowden, “Jihadists in Paradise,” The Atlantic 2007. Even three months before the 9/11 attacks, then-hostage Gracia Burnham quoted Abu Sabaya as wanting the hostages to identify the group as “the ‘Osama bin Laden group’” in media interviews, Gracia Burnham and Dean Merrill, In the presence of my enemies (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 2003), 17-8.

134 Allegations of ASG connections to state authorities have long surrounded ASG history, or retrospective versions thereof, though they have gained credence in the post-Abdurajak era. Gracia Burnham recounts how military forces suspiciously failed to prevent the ASG’s escape from an encircled position and on leader Abu Sabaya’s negotiations with AFP generals for a cut of the ransom
paydays for the group, but also increased its profile and signaled its increasingly radical ideological position. The tactic paid off—ASG caught the attention of Indonesian *Jemaah Islamiyya* (JI).

Founded in 1993, JI fits clearly into the global trend of movements inspired and supported by the Afghan experience. While many of JI’s founding members and affiliates trained and/or fought in Afghanistan, and the organization enjoys a link to *Al Qaeda*, JI has retained a consistently domestic goal of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia.\(^{135}\) Around the same time ASG lost its founder and tightest links to AQ, *Jemaah Islamiyyah* found its own increasing activity hampered by greater scrutiny that complicated logistics, cramped operations, and killed and arrested its personnel.\(^{136}\) Its organization under siege, JI found itself in need of allies to shore up its networks, regroup, and to stash personalities too hot to handle in Indonesia. While Mindanao was geographically convenient, and less well monitored, JI’s initial links to the MILF had proven unsatisfactory for both JI and the MILF.\(^{137}\) When JI

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\(^{135}\) International Crisis Group, "*Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous.*"; Hastings, *No Man’s Land: Globalization, Territory, and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia*.

\(^{136}\) On this see ———, *No Man’s Land: Globalization, Territory, and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia*.; Abuza, *Balik-terrorism: the return of the Abu Sayyaf*.; International Crisis Group, "*Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous.*"

\(^{137}\) Hastings, *No Man’s Land: Globalization, Territory, and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia: 72-3.* of ASG and JI.
began looking for new allies around the same time as ASG did, ASG’s new radicalism made the group an appealing ally.

JI explicitly seeks an Islamic state in Indonesia, recruits religiously dedicated members, and emphasizes religious purity in its own right and as the primary determinant of organizational success. The organization’s particular emphasis on religious purity, however, has also introduced the criticism of those deemed insufficiently Islamic (and thus possibly targetable). Furthermore JI’s struggle has always contained elements of communal violence, and the organization (particularly certain factions) has shown increasing interest in encouraging sectarian conflict, and taking an explicitly anti-Christian (and anti-Hindu) line.

JI’s position on social reform appears similar to ASG’s—viewing themselves as a religious vanguard, pursuing a more Islamic, but not necessarily less hierarchical, society. JI founder Abu Bakar Ba’asyir has declared that democracy is un-Islamic, and the organization advocates a core group of true believers (Qiy’adah Rosyidah) who will guide the organization and its adherents.

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141 Abuza, \textit{Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia}: 42.; Pavlova, “Jemaah Islamiah according to PUPJI,” 84.
142 “The democratic system is not the Islamic way,” Ba’asyir explained. “It is forbidden. Democracy is based on people, but the state must be based on God’s law—I call it Allahcracy.” See Zachary Abuza,
ASG has also established ties to individuals abroad. While determining the precise intentions and interests of such individuals are (for obvious reasons) difficult, interviews suggest these individuals have expressed strong preferences over ASG’s behavior—particularly emphasizing anti-Westernism and a radical Islamic line. As effectively criminal elements, ASG’s domestic supporters have few ideological tenants of their own or in their relationship with the rebels. They also have little interest in any reform—social, political, or otherwise—that would upset the status quo from which they currently profit.

However, both JI and ASG’s individual donors abroad have a profound interest in their protégés’ Islamic orientation. For them, ASG’s radicalism, commitment to ideological purity (and willingness to use violence to purge the impure), have all served as signals of their credibility as partners in jihad. Individual donors likely wanted a group that could militarily enact their vision of a purified Islam and expunge secular influence. JI wanted a credible partner in its increasingly active struggle. Obviously dissatisfied with the MILF’s relative moderation, “ASG’s more radical position has allayed JI’s suspicion that it is an unreliable partner.” As Khaddafy Janjalani himself commented to one of his


144 Author interview, (PNP personnel familiar with ASG: Manila, Philippines, November 2008); ——— ——— ———.

brothers’ erstwhile colleagues about the presence of JI in his ASG camps, “It is not so much that I do not have a problem with them as that they do not have a problem with us.”

**ASG 2.0: Donors’ humanitarian concerns**

None of these supporters have a strong humanitarian interest. JI’s network of social welfare organizations remains part of the organization’s domestic operations, and has not translated into its relationship with ASG. Furthermore, those components of JI with whom ASG has grown close are not those primarily involved in service provision; they are those on the run from Indonesian authorities and/or those most attracted to the opportunity to continue fighting in Mindanao during relative lulls in Indonesia.

Like JI, most individuals supporting ASG from abroad back the organization out of their own personal religious convictions, anti-colonial and -Western sentiments, and commitment to international jihad. While some may have humanitarian concerns, most have embraced the necessity of violence and terrorist

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146 Author interview.
tactics to obtain their ideological goals.\textsuperscript{148} ASG’s domestic criminal allies have little compunction about relying on sticks more than carrots to elicit popular compliance.

**ASG 2.0: Forms of support offered by donors**

JI’s support is both financial and military: in addition to fungible support, the organization has provided training for ASG operatives, and backed particular operations.\textsuperscript{149} Individuals abroad have primarily offered ASG financial support.\textsuperscript{150} Allies among domestic criminal elements offer ASG weapons and materiel, as well as shelter and operational cover.\textsuperscript{151} Such support means ASG spends fewer of its own resources on evasion and internal protection efforts, effectively increasing the rebels’ budget in a fungible manner.

**3.5.2. ASG 2.0: Enacted ideological position**

ASG’s spate of high profile kidnappings earned them a reputation as apolitical and violent criminals interested only in a lucrative payday. To be sure, the ransoms did sustain the group once it was cut off from its foreign sponsors, and the organization currently maintains links with domestic criminal elements. However, it seems clear that elements of the group’s core remained attracted to the ideology

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Kepel, "Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam."}
\footnote{Author interview, (Current MNLF insider, Misuari Faction: Davao City, Philippines, March 2009).}
\footnote{Interview with former ASG member Torres and Nery, \textit{Into the Mountain: hosted by the Abu Sayyaf}: 39-40.; Burnham and Merrill, \textit{In the presence of my enemies}: 150.; Author interview.}
\end{footnotes}
of militant Islamism, and at least saw themselves as Islamic warriors during this re-equilibration.152

Once the ASG successfully attracted JI and other radicals abroad, observers note a change in the group, and a more ideological bent to its character.153 Zachary Abuza commented in 2005 that “[t]he ASG is no longer devoid of ideology, and their newly rediscovered (or imposed) radical interpretation of Islam meshes with Al Qaeda’s”154 or, perhaps more accurately, Jemaah Islamiyya’s.

While ASG appears to use Islam loosely as a justification for kidnapping, targeting of both Muslim and Christian civilians, as well as anti-Western sentiment, Islam is not solely a window-dressing. Kidnap victims recount debates within the organization on correct religious practice, attempts to convert them to Islam, or (if the victims were already Muslim) accusations that they were insufficiently orthodox.155 While the leadership of ASG itself is loosely knit, key leaders are viewed as committed (if unattractively extreme) ideologues. Radullan Sahiron is likely the most senior and revered of the ASG leaders, and was allegedly hand-

152 Kidnap victims recount conversations with (as well as between) their captors on the subject of correct Islamic practice, and note their captor’s efforts in this regard.
155 Author interview; ibid.; ———.
picked by Abdurajak Janjalani “as someone who could realize [his ideological] vision.” 156

The existence of this ideological core is sometimes debated by observers, and frequently obscured by ASG’s non-hierarchical structure, and recruitment of individuals with violent pasts who are subsequently neither trained or reined in by their commanders. However, this behavior is explicable within the theory. Chapter 6 outlines how these recruitment practices and fighters’ brutality are in fact consistent with the ideological position ASG adopted post-Abdurajak.

Consideration of ASG is further complicated by the propensity for both observers and participants to label many acts of violence as “ASG,” whether or not this is so, and the concomitant benefit to purely criminal elements of claiming an ASG affiliation in order to enhance their reputation (again, whether or not this is so). The populace itself distinguishes between the ideological core and the periphery (including part-time members and those with criminal tendencies), using the labels of “True ASG”—those they see as clinging to the ideological vision of Abdurajak—and the “Government-owned ASG”—those they view as largely criminal elements. 157

157 The “government-owned” label derives from the popular local assessment that elements of the military and political organs are in league with the ASG and using the ASG to commit crime for personal and political gain.
The “True ASG” are respected for their Islamist convictions, though their versions of Islamic practice has limited resonance with the population. The population also objects to ASG’s criticisms of their own Islamic practice. The majority of the population also does not support ASG’s sectarian approach, though there is likely some sympathy for this among hard-hit communities.

Many civilians sympathize with ASG’s continued anti-government stance and refusal to negotiate, though most would also accept a favorable political settlement. Today, the group’s public statements vary between ideological calls, appeals for development assistance, and ransom demands. Any reference to social reforms beyond broad statements about instituting Islamic governance has disappeared from ASG’s public statements, and internal discussion (at least as recounted by those in a position to discuss the modern organization).

It is telling that the “true mujahedeen” seem to put almost no effort into differentiating themselves from the homophonous criminal element. This implies the group cares little about the impressions of more than a very local audience (i.e. not even into central/mainland Mindanao) and those few foreign supporters with whom they might be in contact. Similarly, among those who speak publicly, some increasingly reference the historical Sulu sultantes (rather than a Mindanao-wide Bangsamoro homeland)—a sign of shrinking territorial focus and aspirations.

\[158\] Author interview, (Sulu-based NGO worker: Zamboanga City, Philippines, June 2010).
4. Notes on the state

Philippine government policy vis-à-vis both population and rebels has remained relatively constant over time, and across rebel groups (and the territories they occupy). While all administrations may claim to put their own stamp on the government’s counterinsurgency policy, their behavior is marked more by continuity than by differences. The GRP has deployed what they call a “right-hand/left-hand” strategy against all three groups—heavy use of coercion, coupled with efforts to woo local elites to the government side and some development programming for the populace.

The AFP has a heavy presence in nearly all areas of Mindanao. Its forces are augmented by the militias of Manila-backed political elites, who allow the GRP some degree of rule-by-proxy in Mindanao, and serve as a military buffer and political counterweight against all three rebel groups. While the military presence was most notorious during Marcos’ Martial Law period (1972-1981), no part of Mindanao has demilitarized. Indeed, as one resident ruefully joked in the wake of the government’s declaration of more temporally and territorially limited Martial Law in 2009, “Why do they bother declaring it? We have always been under Martial Law!”

159 ———.
With all three groups, GRP-rebel interactions have run in cycles of sporadic fighting interspersed with lulls. With the MNLF and MILF, these lulls are sometimes punctuated with negotiations. The government has negotiated on and off with the MNLF since 1975, and signed three separate agreements (1976, 1986, and 1996). The government has negotiated with the MILF on and off since 1997, and has signed a series of smaller agreements since 2001. The GRP has yet to negotiate with ASG, for several reasons. First and foremost, ASG itself has maintained a stance of non-negotiation as part of its particularly extreme nationalist position. Furthermore, ASG has been formally labeled a terrorist organization by both the GRP and its American allies—a label that makes negotiation more difficult (though it may prove financially advantageous to the GRP in the post-9/11 American-financed “Global War on Terror”).

Both negotiations and actual signed deals have proven impermanent solutions to rebel-government clashes. Even during formal negotiations and under a formal ceasefire (with international monitors present) in the last three years alone, GRP-MILF interactions have included not only sporadic skirmishes but also and mid-scale military encounters, significant enough to displace more than 600,000 people in 2008. While the GRP inked an optimistically-named Final Peace Agreement with

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160 The GRP has always received significant bilateral assistance from the U.S. Much of this assistance has been military. In the post-9/11 era, this is even more true, as American assistance has been provided to shore up the armed forces of one of its few Southeast Asian allies, and specifically packaged as an effort to build Filipino capabilities against Southeast Asian “Islamic terrorism” (variously defined).
the MNLF in 1996, an uprising of Misuari loyalists in 2001 resulted in military action and the arrest of founding Chairman Nur Misuari on charges of rebellion.\textsuperscript{161} Periodic skirmishes between government forces and MNLF loyalists in the current MNLF territories of Sulu do occur, but are generally underreported due to poor information and/or political considerations.

All areas have also been targeted with the GRP’s “left-hand” counterinsurgency strategy. Like many counterinsurgents, the Philippine government has made extensive efforts to “buy out” Moro elites, wooing them away from the rebels and towards the government with political office, financial payouts, and business opportunities.\textsuperscript{162} The government has also channeled some funds to public works projects. Even more so than in most parts of the country, the degree to which these projects actually materialize on the ground is debatable. The AFP deploys Civil Military Operations (CMOs) in all areas of Mindanao, designed to bolster their position in the community by providing various services, including rudimentary medical care.

\textsuperscript{161} In 2001, MNLF forces entered into armed clashes with AFP forces in the island province of Sulu. The most common explanation for the outbreak is resistance to Misuari’s impending ouster from his positions in ARMM. Misuari loyalists argue the AFP provoked a fight in an already heavily militarized (and high-tension) area. Possibly attempting to escape via Malaysia, Misuari was arrested by Malaysian authorities, and extradited to Manila, where he remained under house arrest until April, 2008. These fighters have subsequently been dubbed the “MNLF-Misuari Breakaway Group” (MNLF-MBG) in a political effort to minimize the ramifications for the peace process and ongoing MNLF-GRP-OIC talks.

\textsuperscript{162} For further discussion of this tactic and other examples, see Hazelton, "Compellence and Accommodation in Counterinsurgency Warfare."
In the current period, the most noticeable difference in government behavior towards the three groups is its relationship with the MNLF versus the other two rebel groups. The 1996 Agreement brought the MNLF into an odd partnership with the GRP not shared by the MILF or ASG. While the details of this relationship are discussed further in Chapter 5, Section 3, the government’s relationship with the MNLF is complicated.

First, it is important to note that the MNLF has retained an identity distinct from the government. Both politically and militarily, the MNLF (as one recent observer notes) “has one foot inside government but has not yet fully shed its rebel persona.” Politically, the MNLF label still represents a certain ideological package, and individuals throughout Mindanao identify themselves as “MNLF”—both formal members and civilian adherents. There is a limit on how much civilians conflate the MNLF with organs of the Philippine government—even with the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the most notable structure handed to the MNLF in the 1996 Agreement. However, not only do many MNLF exist outside the ARMM, but the MNLF itself has not controlled ARMM since 2005.

163 Santos, "Moro National Liberation Front and its Bangsamoro Armed Forces (MNLF-BAF),” 327. 164 The terms of the 1996 Agreement did not give ARMM to the MNLF in perpetuity. Rather, the MNLF is simply allowed to field candidates for political office. Through much backroom dealing, the Ramos Administration delivered ARMM and other offices to the MNLF. Like many other offices in Mindanao, such posts are considered unwinnable without Manila’s approval. In 2005, the Arroyo Administration notably backed the Ampatuan political clan instead of an MNLF candidate for the ARMM election—this has been the source of significant tension and complaint among the MNLF ever since.
Militarily, the 1996 Agreement neither disarmed nor demobilized the MNLF. Only some 7,500 MNLF elements were integrated into the AFP and PNP. The GRP actually needs the MNLF to retain its identity. For the government, one of the advantages of the 1996 Agreement is a continuation of its traditional divide and conquer tactics—an identifiable MNLF can further divide Moros’ loyalties among the three rebel groups, and function as something of a buffer against the MILF and ASG.

Second, while the 1996 Agreement was called the “Final Peace Agreement (FPA),” this title may be misleading, or at least, overly optimistic. The Agreement itself contains provisions that facilitate ongoing negotiations to work out additional details and monitor implementation by the MNLF, GRP, and OIC. Furthermore, agreements signed with the MNLF before 1996 proved unsustainable, as have agreements signed with the MILF after 1996. Since 1996, the MNLF and AFP have clashed militarily on more than one occasion. While usually unreported, given the continued OIC scrutiny, these usually comprise small skirmishes, or harassments,

165 Furthermore, not all of those given slots in the reintegration were actual MNLF combatants under arms. Some slots went to relatives of actual combatants, members of the political corps, or (allegedly) to those willing to pay for the chance at a steady paycheck. The number of combatants integrated is thus likely less than 7,500. Santos, “MNLF Integration into the AFP and PNP: Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation? (Case Study),” 168-9.
166 Phase I under Joint Monitoring Committee (1996 Agreement, Section II “The Transitional Period (Phase I),” Paragraph 13);
and a larger flare-up in 2001, in which the GRP arrested the MNLF’s founding chairman Nur Misuari (who was jailed until 2008). Since then, MNLF loyalist Habir Malik’s troops have undertaken campaigns of harassment against the AFP, and notoriously took AFP hostages in 2007.¹⁶⁷ All of this suggests the GRP’s relationship with the MNLF is a continually negotiated one—and one between two separate entities with a complicated relationship. Like most political relationships in the Philippines (both in formal politics and in shadow dealings with any of the rebel groups) the GRP-MNLF interaction is also complicated by extensive backroom dealings, and efforts within Manila’s political elite and security apparatus to manipulate the organization and its behavior to benefit their own agendas.¹⁶⁸

The GRP’s post-1996 relationship with the MNLF is different than its relationship with the MILF and ASG. Particularly, it is probable that military pressure arrayed against MNLF is lower than that arrayed against MILF and ASG. As noted, the level of military pressure deployed against MILF is not necessarily significantly different than that deployed against the ASG, even though the MILF is currently negotiating with the government. The difference between the MNLF and the other two groups could affect the parameters specified in the model. Specifically,

¹⁶⁷ Loyalists took hostage AFP General Ben Dolorfino and Under Secretary of Defense Ramon Santos (along with 12 other officers) in 2007. The officials were allegedly trying to negotiate a cessation of such hostilities when they were taken. On his part, Malik tried to use the situation to leverage Misuari’s release from prison.
¹⁶⁸ This behavior is not noticeably different than Manila’s ongoing efforts vis-à-vis either the MILF or the ASG. Members of all organizations have often-complicated cloak-and-dagger relationships with members of the Filipino political and/or security apparatus.
lower military pressure, and the effective “legalization” of the MNLF would constitute an effective increase in its budget. The MNLF can devote more resources, and run lower risks, to its interactions with civilians. Since many government projects are ostensibly courséd through the MNLF, GRP investment in services will not have the effect of driving up the marginal costs of service provision (and driving MNLF rebels to more coercion) as one would expect from a rebel group not partially partnered with the incumbent. However, these expected effects would actually bias against finding support for the hypothesis that the MILF will provide more and better services than MNLF.

5. Predictions

Mindanao presents three separate rebel groups that share the same basic historical grievance, cultural background, domestic population, and, broadly speaking, the same basic goals. They do, however, also demonstrate significant variation on the independent variables of interest. Thus, each of these rebel groups stands as a proxy for a different bundle of the exogenous parameters outlined in the theory (Chapter 2). Specifically, rebels’ own ideological position, that of their donors, as well as their sponsors’ preferences over civilian welfare and form of support provided to the rebels. Together, these factors shape rebels’ cost-benefit analysis over the choice of coercion and service provision. In the Mindanao case, donors’ relative humanitarian interests and extremism happen to co-vary, and offer
the same predictions for resultant rebel behavior. I thus draw the following
comparative statics predictions from Chapter 2:

Claim 2: The more extreme the preferences of the rebels, the more extreme the
policies they choose, the more coercive their rule is, and the fewer services they
will provide.

And,

Claim 3: As their marginal cost of service provision increases, the fewer services
the rebels provide, the more coercive their rule becomes, and the more extremist
the policies they choose.

And,

Claim 4: As their marginal cost of coercion increases, the more services the
rebels provide, the less coercive their rule becomes, and the less extremist the
policies they choose.

The Moro liberation movements present three opportunities in which to falsify
these claims. First, a cross-sectional comparison of the MILF, MNLF, and ASG in the
current period (Chapter 4). Second, a longitudinal study of the MNLF (Chapter 5).
Third, a longitudinal study of the ASG (Chapter 6).

Cross-sectional comparison of the MILF, MNLF, and ASG (Chapter 4)

Cross-sectionally, the theory predicts the MILF will engage in the greatest
level of service provision and the lowest level of coercion. In contrast, ASG will rely
heavily on coercion, and provide few services. MNLF will have a middling mix of the
two—providing fewer and more club-like services than the MILF (but more than ASG), and engaging in more coercion than MILF, but less than ASG.

Both MILF’s internal ideal point and its enacted ideology are close to the popular preference. For the MILF, then service provision remains an effective tool of governance. To the degree that the organization obtains foreign support, the humanitarian focus of such aid also makes service provision cheaper than coercion. The MILF is thus likely to invest heavily in service provision, and engage in relatively little coercion—behavior which will also be consistent their donors’ high level of concern for the well-being of Bangsamoro under MILF control.

The MNLF’s enacted ideology is further from civilians—having compromised on its nationalist vision. The organization receives a mix of funding, much of it effectively fungible. While the MNLF is likely to invest in some services, these are more likely to be provided in a club-goods-like fashion than the MILF’s services, and the MNLF is also likely, at the margins, to engage in coercion—a governance mix that will not run afoul of backers who would prefer the MNLF avoid widespread atrocities, but are ambivalent about smaller-scale abuses.

ASG’s substantial ideological distance from civilians means the organization faces the “extremist discount,” and will find coercion a more effective means of generating compliance than service provision. This coercive emphasis will face little resistance from donors with few humanitarian concerns, and who provide largely fungible and military assistance.
**Longitudinal comparison of MNLF 1.0 and MNLF 2.0 (Chapter 5)**

MNLF’s original equilibrium entailed ideological preferences somewhat removed from the popular preference. Its donors held some humanitarian concern for the population, and provided the rebels with significant military aid, as well as some fungible assistance. Theory suggests this mix would produce an MNLF reliant on both coercion and service provision, with an enacted ideological position somewhat removed from the popular preference. Following a renegotiation with its donors in the early-to-mid-1990s, the MNLF has grown further from the popular preferences. Its backers are less concerned than previously with popular welfare, and provide the organization with a mix of aid. Theory suggests this shift will shape an MNLF that still relies on a mix of services and coercion, but provides fewer (and more club-like) services than previously.

**Longitudinal comparison of ASG 1.0 and ASG 2.0 (Chapter 6)**

ASG’s original sponsors allowed the rebels to afford an ideological position more extreme than that of the popular median. These sponsors had some limited humanitarian concern, and provided some aid along these lines. However, most aid was military and financial, and theory predicts the original ASG would enact relatively extreme policies, develop a coercive apparatus, and provide very limited services. Following the death of its founder and severance of ties to its original donors, ASG’s ideological position has moved further from that of Moro civilians. The organization has also taken on new donors that both allow it to afford its
increasingly radical position, and who care little for the welfare of the Bangsamoro. Over time, then, theory predicts ASG will find coercion to be increasingly the only effective means of gaining compliance, and its donors’ emphasis on fungible and military aid will only exacerbate this tendency.

In sum, the relative values of the independent variables across the cases, as well as the predicted outcome behaviors are shown in Figure 3.3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF</th>
<th>MNLF</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebels’ ideological distance from civilians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>Domestic population, diaspora</td>
<td>OIC, Libya</td>
<td>OIC, GRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors’ Humanitarian Concern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels’ enacted ideological distance from civilians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fungible Humanitarian Military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels’ predicted governance mix</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3.3: The cases**
Chapter 3: Appendix

Table 3.1: Number of incidents per year civilians are willing to endure to obtain independence

Civilians were asked if independence were possible, whether they thought it was worth continuing to bear the costs of the armed struggle. Three versions of the question were randomly distributed to respondents. The first version specified that the costs of conflict (defined as loss of life, livelihood, and continued evacuations) were to be the same as the current level. The second version specified these costs would be twice the current level, and the third version specified these costs would be four times the current level. Since the “current level” of conflict is not constant across all villages, a simple measure of whether respondents thought it worth continuing the conflict is not particularly informative. Rather, I calculate what I term a measure of “endurance,” which takes into account both the respondents’ recent experience with conflict, and the multiplication of those costs proposed in the survey question.

If the respondent answered, “yes, it is worth continuing the conflict [to obtain independence, given the specified costs],” then the endurance measure was calculated as follows:

\[
\text{Total \# incidents per year (2000-2007) } \times \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{(Costs are 1x current levels)} \\
2 & \text{(Costs are 2x current levels)} \\
4 & \text{(Costs are 4x current levels)}
\end{cases}
\]
Since Mindanao is a low-intensity conflict, the probability of a clash in any given village in any particular year is relatively low. However, the effects of conflict, particularly with regards to civilians’ calculations of “how much more of this am I willing to endure” are likely cumulative over the past 5 to 10 years. I use the 2000-2007 range because those are the data available on this measure.

Table 3.5 reports the results of simple regression analyses of the endurance measure—run separately in areas in which the MNLF, MILF, and ASG have significant presence. Effectively, this analysis gives us the sample-weighted average number of incidents per year the average endure is willing to endure in order to obtain independence from the Philippine state.

**Table 3.5: Average number of incidents the average civilian is willing to endure to obtain independence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF Areas</th>
<th>MNLF Areas</th>
<th>ASG Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.045***</td>
<td>1.584***</td>
<td>1.120***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* p &lt; 0.10</td>
<td>** p &lt; 0.05</td>
<td>*** p &lt; 0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6 reports the results of simple regression analyses of the average daily attendance at communal prayers—run separately in areas in which the MNLF, MILF, and ASG have significant presence.

---

1 See Chapter 4, Section 1.1 for definitions of these areas.
Table 3.6: Average daily attendance at communal prayers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF Areas</th>
<th>MNLF Areas</th>
<th>ASG Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.890***</td>
<td>2.293***</td>
<td>2.074***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>* p &lt; 0.10</td>
<td>** p &lt; 0.05</td>
<td>*** p &lt; 0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In answer to "how often do you attend communal prayers, civilians were given the following options:

A Never
B Twice a year (i.e. for the two Eid celebrations)
C Once a week (i.e. Friday prayers)
D Once a month
E Twice a month
F Once a day
G Five times a day
Chapter 4: Cross-sectional analysis of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

This chapter pursues a cross-sectional test of the theory’s comparative statics predictions. Analysis relies on results drawn from a random, stratified, population-weighted sample of civilians. Conducted in 2009-2010, the survey questionnaire comprised a battery of questions on the behavior of both rebels and government personnel as well as popular preferences. From among these questions, I present results from those that are a good test of the theory—regardless of whether or not they support the hypotheses.

1. Theoretical Predictions

In the Mindanao case, as outlined in Chapter 3, each of the three faces of the Moro liberation movement (the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)) all claim the same basic self-determinationist goals and purport to represent the same domestic Moro

1 Population weights were based on overall population, not Muslim population. While population density is likely a factor in both rebel-affectedness and rebels’ ability to deliver services (and thus useful to control for), weighting by Muslim population would have run the risk of not sampling Muslim-minority areas.
population. Each has, however, made different choices from the available constellation of domestic and international supporters—choices consistent with their own internal ideological preferences and those of their sponsors.

Each of these three rebel groups thus stands as a proxy for a different bundle of the exogenous parameters outlined in Chapter 2—rebels’ ideological position as well as donors’ preferences over civilian welfare and form of support for their rebel partners. Together, these factors shape rebels’ cost-benefit analysis over the choice of coercion and service provision. In the Mindanao case, donors’ relative humanitarian interests and extremism happen to co-vary, and offer the same predictions for resultant rebel behavior. I thus draw the following comparative statics predictions from Chapter 2:

*The more extreme the preferences of the rebels, the more extreme the policies they choose, the more coercive their rule is, and the fewer services they will provide.*

The MILF’s ideological position (and enacted ideological position) is roughly equivalent to the population that forms its major source of support. The MNLF’s current enacted ideological position is slightly removed from the popular preference—the organization does not address the popular interest in Islamic revival, and pursues a form of autonomy the population finds less than fulfilling. I argue this ideological distance reduces the effectiveness of public goods provision in producing compliance. ASG’s ideological position is much further removed from
civilians’. While the group pursues independence (which the populace finds attractive), the version of Islam the rebels pursue is far more stringent than that preferred by the population. ASG thus faces the “extremist discount” outlined in Chapter 2—enacting a radical ideological position engenders popular skepticism, and skeptical civilians offer the rebels less compliance in exchange for public goods. Neither MNLF nor ASG address the popular interest in limited social reform along class lines.

Furthermore, as Chapter 2 argues, donors’ preferences over rebels’ humanitarian behavior affects their rebel partners’ marginal costs:

*As their marginal cost of service provision increases, the fewer services the rebels provide, the more coercive their rule becomes, and the more extremist the policies they choose.*

And,

*As their marginal cost of coercion increases, the more services the rebels provide, the less coercive their rule becomes, and the less extremist the policies they choose.*

MILF’s domestic civilian backers have an obvious concern for their own treatment, and their supporters in the religious diaspora are interested in their co-religionists’ wellbeing. Foreign support is largely humanitarian, which reduces the costs of service provision. MNLF’s OIC and Philippine government sponsors would not countenance widespread atrocities, but are not overly concerned that the MNLF
provide good services. Their support is a mix of military, fungible, and humanitarian assistance. The MNLF’s support package does not explicitly facilitate coercion, but neither does it encourage good service provision. ASG’s backers have little concern over the group’s use of coercion. Coupled with their military and fungible assistance, such supporters make it easier for ASG to coerce than provide services.

In sum, I expect the MILF to be the best service provider, followed by the MNLF, and then the ASG. As groups become worse at providing services, we expect that the group will be less likely to provide any individual service, the quality of these services will also decline, and what services the group does provide will likely be weighted towards club rather than local public goods. Theory further predicts that MILF should be the least coercive towards civilians, again followed by the MNLF, and ASG should be the most coercive. This chapter offers a test of these comparative statics predictions, drawing from a cross-sectional survey of the civilian population all three groups claim to represent.

6. The Data

The appropriate population within which to analyze the model developed in Chapter 2 is Moro civilians in areas that have access to, or are otherwise affected by, the three rebel groups in question. Unfortunately, operationalizing “affectedness” is extraordinarily problematic. The reliability of such measures is affected both by the realities of war (and the uncertainties of information gathered therein) as well as
restrictions on academic access to intelligence data. This survey used records of rebel-government clashes (2000-2007) as a crude proxy for rebel affectedness in defining the sampling frame.\textsuperscript{2} Using violent events as a measure of affectedness has a number of shortcomings. First, such incidents may well be a measure of contestation rather than effectiveness \textit{per se}. Events are less likely to occur in villages deemed unstrategic by government forces or rebels, but which may be affected by rebels in other ways. Furthermore, events are (for similar reasons) less likely to occur in stronghold areas—be they strongholds for government forces (which is not likely to be a problem for this survey, since such areas are less likely to be Moro) or rebel forces.\textsuperscript{3} For these reasons, the survey included a stratum of villages which were otherwise eligible, but which did not record any rebel-military clashes. In all, violent events likely correlate highly with actual rebel presence, and the remaining “control” stratum allows us to guard against at least some of the flaws of this particular proxy in designing the sampling frame.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{2} The following provinces were eligible for inclusion in the sample: Sulu, Basilan, Maguindanao, Lanao Del Norte, Lanao Del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga Del Sur, Zamboanga Del Norte, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, and (North) Cotabato.

\textsuperscript{3} While rebels intent on serving civilian populations may well seek to ensure any clashes occur outside Moro villages (to limit collateral damage), government troops (for complementary reasons) may well seek to keep the fight out of settler-dominated areas.

\textsuperscript{4} The number of MILF-government incidents in a village correlates with the proportion the village that reports MILF presence at about 51\%. The number of ASG-government incidents correlates with the proportion the village that reports ASG presence at about 50\%. As discussed in the Appendix, the data on MNLF incidents are not recorded, so it is not possible to correlate the proportion of the village that reports MNLF presence with these incidents. The proportion the village that reports MNLF presence correlates with both MILF and ASG incidents at about 10\%. For additional discussion of reported presence, see Section 1.1.
The primary sampling unit was a barangay, the lowest level of political aggregation in the Philippine government system. Most barangays are rural towns or villages. In major metropolitan centers, they are akin to neighborhoods. In the analysis and discussion below, I use the terms barangay and village interchangeably.

While the MNLF, MILF, and ASG have some variation in the degree to which (at least rhetorically) they have defined Christian settler populations as part of their constituency, there can be little doubt that all three claim to represent the Muslim Moro population. This population is at the heart (and indeed defines) their basic self-determinationist goals and grievances. The survey aimed to collect approximately thirty responses per village (from thirty separate households). Villages with fewer than 60 Moro households listed in the 2000 Philippine National Census were excluded from the sampling frame. This minimum was established to allow for the possibility of errors within the census itself, population shifts in the time lapse between the 2000 census and the date of survey, and the possibility of non-responses.

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5 As of the date of writing, the 2000 Census is the latest Philippine national census to be fully encoded. A “Muslim household” was defined as one in which the 2000 Census reports the head of household identifies as Muslim. The number of households in which the head self-identifies as Muslim and other members report other religious identifications is negligibly small.

6 This is not to imply that Christian settlers in Mindanao are not an interesting population of study, or that their views do not merit investigation. They were largely excluded from this study for two reasons. First, as described, they do not comprise the claimed constituency base of the three rebel movements under consideration. Second, in a pilot study, Christian respondents did not respond well to Muslim Moro survey enumerators. While some agreed to the survey, they frequently refused to answer questions, and/or appeared genuinely confused by some of the questions (which were, after all, written to access the rebels’ constituencies).
Barangays meeting this 60 Muslim household threshold present wide demographic diversity. In some cases, the Muslim population represented a small minority of the overall barangay. Other villages were majority or completely Muslim. In mixed barangays, Muslims and Christians tend to occupy distinct territories—their houses cluster together by religious affiliation. In such communities, the survey further restricted the area of household selection to those clusters of Muslim homes. While a few Christian respondents were drawn in the random sample, they were thus effectively excluded from the survey population. Within villages, households were selected using a random walk method. Individual respondents were selected by simple raffle from those household residents over eighteen years of age.

Surveyors were recruited from experienced local NGOs and community organizers. Each ethnolinguistic area surveyed was visited by a team of the same background. Gaining access to sensitive communities, and engaging local civilians in the survey required surveyors of the same ethnolinguistic background, and at least a few members of the team familiar with the survey area. However, care was taken to

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7 Such clustering should not be universally taken as a sign of communal tension. Interview subjects note that such patterns may occur out of convenience, family ties, or lesser tensions such as “the Christians find the call to prayer disruptive” and “the Moros dislike being kept awake by the settler bars’ karaoke.” Author interviews with Moro civilians, February 2009.

8 It should be noted that the practice of intermarriage is not uncommon—particularly among Moro men taking Christian brides. These spouses generally convert (or “return”) to Islam for these marriages. The survey did not distinguish between Moros, and Muslim converts from other tribes (though self-reported tribal affiliation was recorded).
ensure surveyors were not assigned to villages in which they had close relatives, or in which they themselves were employed. Furthermore, while local authority figures were consulted on the conduct of the survey to ensure safety of both the personnel and respondents, none were given a copy of the questionnaire itself, nor were higher-level authorities given an advanced list of the villages selected within the sample.

The survey produced 1430 completed questionnaires, drawn from 51 villages in ten provinces.\(^9\) As shown in Table I, the non-response rate for this survey was relatively low—about 13%, of which 63% were male and 37% were female. The table reports the numbers of successful interviews, those interviews that terminated before the questionnaire was fully answered, and cases in which the selected respondent could not be interviewed, and had to be replaced. Interviews were unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. Table 4.1 reports figures for respondents who were too busy to take the survey, those who could not be located (often because they were at work or school), and those who refused the interview outright. For additional discussion of non-response rates and replacement strategy, see Appendix.

\(^9\) Note that not all provinces eligible for inclusion in the sample were home to the villages actually selected. Some provinces extremely low population numbers made their selection unlikely in a population-weighted sample, so this is not entirely surprising.
Table 4.1: Survey responses\(^{10}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Successful</th>
<th>Survey terminated early</th>
<th>Unsuccessful survey attempt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Busy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.1. Treatment variables in analysis

As part of the questionnaire, all respondents were asked to report the presence of any of a list of armed groups (including the rebel organizations of interest) in their area. These were not mutually exclusive categories—respondents could report the presence of multiple groups. Since rebel presence varies at the village rather than the individual level, reports of a given group’s presence were aggregated at the barangay level.

These data provide a more direct measure of rebel presence than the violent events data used to define the sampling frame. As discussed, violent events data are problematic indicators of rebel group presence (or “treatment”) in analysis. Group presence correlates with violence, but imperfectly. Rebels’ reported presence likely diverges from groups’ actual presence. Specifically, I suspect groups’ presence is under-reported. A respondent may not report a group as present for three reasons.

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\(^{10}\) Discrepancies between the total and the sum of men and women in each category are due to enumerator error in omitting the respondents’ gender on the questionnaire.
First, the group is actually not there. Second, the group is there, but the respondent is unaware of the group's presence. Third, the group is present, but the respondent does not want to admit this.

The first option implies no difference between reported presence and actual presence. The second option implies that the greater the proportion of a village that reports a group is present, the greater the presence that group has in the village. If only a handful of rebels are present in the village, it is feasible some villagers might not know. However, as their presence climbs, the number of villagers unaware of the rebels’ presence will decrease. This would mean actual and reported presence would track similar trends, but reports would likely lag behind actual levels. The amount of this lag would decrease as rebels’ presence increases.

The third option is the most problematic, and likely occurs because villagers fear reporting rebel presence will invite retaliation from either the rebels (for informing on them to outsiders) or by the military (whom villagers might assume have access to the survey results and use them to plan attacks against areas of rebel presence. If Kalyvas’ (2006) model of behavior holds, civilians will under-represent rebels’ presence fairly consistently—if rebels view answering survey questions as informing on them, their retaliation will be swift. The only difference between retaliation in a partially controlled village (Kalyvas’ zones two through four) and a fully controlled village (zone five) will be the degree of discrimination in their retaliation. However, it is possible that the fear-based underreporting bias is actually greatest at middling levels of rebel control. At lower levels, rebels’ ability to
retaliate is limited. At higher levels of control, rebels’ presence may be an open secret, and respondents less subject to retaliation since this information is already public knowledge. However, if, even at high levels of control rebels consider their presence sensitive intelligence, this suggests yet another functional form for reporting bias.

Thus, the degree to which the reports diverge from the truth likely vary with both the rebels’ presence (i.e. the error term is heteroskedastic), and some of the coercive behaviors of interest, since such actions will make civilians more afraid to admit rebels’ presence. Therefore, we can assume a greater percentage of the village sample reporting a groups’ presence indicates greater presence of that group in the area. We cannot, however assume this relationship is cleanly monotonic. Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2, and Figure 4.3 illustrate the rebel groups’ reported presence sample-wide.

Figure 4.1: Reported MNLF presence

Figure 4.2: Reported MILF presence
Figure 4.3: Reported ASG presence

MILF and MNLF vary between villages in which zero percent of residents report their presence, and those in which virtually all villagers agree the group is present. For ASG, on the other hand, a maximum of only fifty percent of the village reports their presence.

There are three reasons why ASG’s reported presence may be lower than that of both MILF or MNLF. First, something in ASG’s behavior (intentionally or unintentionally) could preclude a heavy presence in any village. That is, the group is never “fully present” in the way its MILF and MNLF cousins are. This is a debatable point. Some observers claim the ASG does not control territory in the same way as its MNLF and MILF cousins. However, the fact that Philippine military forces are often sufficiently concerned for their own safety from ASG attacks that they frequently remain in their camps and avoid many areas entirely (unless in the context of a significantly augmented military force) suggests otherwise.
Second, this distribution could suggest that this particular sample failed to capture villages in which ASG is present to a degree that 100% of the villagers would report their presence. Third, this may be an artifact of reporting bias. As mentioned, people’s willingness to report a group’s presence may co-vary with the group’s presence itself. With ASG, this is particularly likely, since we expect the group to have a particularly brutal relationship with civilians. Civilians largely ruled through fear may, out of this fear, be less likely to admit their coercers’ presence.

I believe that the last option is the most probable. ASG presence is likely more underreported than that of the MNLF and MILF, precisely because of the coercive nature theory suggests ASG will have. Unfortunately, the precise size and functional form of this measurement bias cannot be determined with the current data. Furthermore, we cannot assume that all villages in which rebels’ presence is not reported represent an artifact of reporting bias. Respondents’ non-indication of a rebel group’s presence will also include places in which rebels actually are not present.

Group presence is a continuous variable—villages may, conceivably, have varying levels of rebel control.¹ It is reasonable to assume that a greater reported percentage correlates somewhat with greater group presence. However, because of the threat of reporting bias, I cannot be sure that the continuous measure of

¹ See Kalyvas’ (2006) zones 1, 2, and 3, Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War.
reported presence accurately captures real rebel group presence. I therefore code for “significant presence” of all three rebel groups.

The MNLF and MILF are coded as significantly present if the percentage of a barangay reporting their presence is larger than that reporting either of the other two groups. The two villages in which the same proportion of the population reports both MNLF and MILF presence are coded as having significant presence of both groups. Given ASG’s distribution in a maximum of about fifty percent, its reported presence never exceeds that of the MNLF and MILF simultaneously. Therefore, I code ASG as significantly present if more than 10% of a village reports its presence. These coding rules mean areas of ASG presence can overlap with both MNLF and MILF. Figure 4.4 shows how this coding rule divides the sample into subpopulations.

Figure 4.4: Survey subpopulations (indicating number of villages in each)
Coding for “significant presence” allows me to be sure I am asking the right civilians the right questions. That is, I need to make sure I am assessing rebel groups’ performance in areas in which people actually have experience with the group in question. Since I could not be sure *ex ante* where groups were present, all questions were asked in all areas. This method ensures that civilians with exposure to a group were asked questions about that group, but it also means people who might not have direct experience with that group were also asked about its behavior. This is potentially problematic for analysis.

For example, when respondents were asked, “who do you turn to for help” with a given problem, a rebel group not being chosen can mean one of two things. First, that the group does not provide this service (which would be an informative test of the hypothesis). Second, it may be that the group does provide this service, but is not present in the area (in which case this answer would not be an informative test of the hypothesis). In this case, counting a respondent’s non-choice of a rebel group would bias results downward. While many people in areas unaffected by a specific rebel group may simply respond “don’t know” or refuse to answer to questions about it, many may answer based on hearsay. Such reputational answers are interesting in their own right, but not the focus of direct hypothesis testing here. Furthermore, it is certainly worthwhile asking how rebel groups behave in areas outside their areas of greater dominance. Again, however, that is not the best way to take a first cut at the questions posed here. Thus, I use the “significant presence” coding to define subpopulations in the survey data. Each
rebel group's behavior is then analyzed within its own area of significant presence. This is not to say that rebels’ behavior in areas in which they are not dominant does not matter. Rather, this coding rule is a useful rubric to begin slicing into the data.

1.2. Covariates

If rebel groups were randomly assigned to villages in Mindanao, simple descriptive statistics from a random sample would be a sufficient test of the theory's comparative statics predictions. However, because rebels (presumably) do not randomly select villages in which to operate, covariates are needed to reassure us that any findings are not due to this non-random assignment of the independent variables. That is, the rebel behaviors of interest—how many services a rebel group provides and how coercive it is towards civilians—should not themselves be an artifact of the same factors that drew the rebels to a village in the first place.

Covariates should thus include factors that could drive both the treatment variable (presence of various rebel groups) and the outcomes of interest (service provision and coercion). Testing the model’s comparative statics predictions requires only a correlation between rebel groups’ names (which again, serve as a proxy measure for a support package) and civilians’ experience with the groups. At this point, then, I am not interested in the effect of the covariates per se, but only their use as an indicator if our correlation between group name and civilian experience is spurious.

The number of control variables included in these models is limited for several reasons. First, careful selection of covariates avoids a degrees of freedom problem. Given some village-level random effects, the actual sample size of the
survey is somewhere between the 51 villages drawn as primary sampling units, and the 1,430 individual responses drawn from within these barangays.

Second, covariates must be carefully selected to avoid post-treatment bias. Analyses cannot include covariates that are themselves a result (or partial result) of the rebel groups’ presence. Controlling for such variables can bias results both upward and downward—in either case, producing erroneous conclusions. Including these variables as covariates induces post-treatment bias even if their values have been randomly assigned in the research design or experimental format.2

This precludes the use of covariates like conflict-affectedness, which likely affects both rebel presence in an area and how the rebels behave in that area. However, conflict affectedness is likely a direct outcome of rebels’ presence in an area. Including it as a covariate would thus lead to post-estimation bias. Instead, the sample is stratified by conflict affectedness—while I cannot appropriately control for conflict affectedness, this stratification technique means the data include a sufficient number of responses in strata with high levels of conflict affectedness to allow greater precision in understanding civilians’ experience in such areas.

Given the possibility that opinions and experience pool within villages and households, covariates include village-, household-, and individual-level characteristics.

Village-level covariates were taken from the 2000 Philippine Census, and include:

3) All variables drawn from the Philippine Census were drawn from the full census, comprising all citizens interviewed (i.e. not a sample of the census data). I then aggregated these to the village level. As of writing, the 2000 census was the most recent, fully-encoded Philippine National census available.

4) The 2000 Philippine Census defines an area as urban if:
   1) The area has a population density of at least 1,000 persons per square kilometer;
   2) The area is a central district (often locally termed a “Poblacion”) of a municipality or city, with a population density of at least 500 persons per square kilometer;
   3) The area is a central district not included in points (1) and (2) that, regardless of the population size that has the following:
      i) Street pattern (i.e., network of streets in either parallel or right angle orientation);
      ii) At least six establishments: commercial, manufacturing, recreational and/or personal services;
      iii) At least three of the following: A town hall, church or chapel with religious services at least once a month; A public plaza, park or cemetery; A market place or building where trading activities are carried out at least once a week; and A public building such as schools, hospitals, health center and library.
   4) The area has at least 1,000 inhabitants which meet the conditions set forth in (3) and where the occupation of the inhabitants is predominantly non-fishing.

personnel. In urban areas, higher population density increases this exposure even more, particularly if the government intelligence networks are denser in more populated areas. Additionally, the urban-rural measure correlates highly with accessibility measures like highway access. In Mindanao (as in many civil wars) highway access benefits the government and its surveillance measures more than rebels’. For these reasons, urban areas are less likely to be occupied by rebels. Furthermore, if such areas do have rebel presence, such groups are less likely to engage in service or coercion activities that further increase their exposure.

2) Percentage of the village that is Muslim

All three rebel groups purport to represent the Muslim Moro minority. Areas with a higher proportion of Moro residents may be specifically targeted for rebel operations because they are home to a greater proportion of the population the rebels represent. Logistically, such locations may be chosen because they are easier to penetrate—assuming that a higher proportion of Christian settlers gives an intelligence advantage to the incumbent. If so, rebels will find it easier to operate in more heavily Moro areas, and will have a freer hand in engaging in both coercion and service provision in such areas.

3) Percentage of the village that has dwellings featuring strong roofs: that is, those made from clay tiles, asbestos, galvanized iron or aluminum, or concrete. This measure is a proxy for the level of village development.
A village's level of development may affect rebels' access to the village—more developed areas have (presumably) more to lose if they are attacked by the military for harboring rebels and these areas' level of grievance with the status quo may be lower. Furthermore, the marginal costs of service provision in more developed areas will be higher for rebels. Rebels will find they have to invest more to get the same compliance as they would from lower investment in less-developed areas. More developed areas may also have better state surveillance, which will make it more difficult for rebels to either access the area or to engage in either coercion or service provision vis-à-vis civilians.

Household measures were drawn from the survey data, and include:

4) Family income

Family income is a microcosm of development. Individuals' income and wealth holdings may affect their willingness to support insurgency, and thus rebels' access to them and their area. It may also affect their choice of service provider. If they have more to lose from affiliating with rebels than do less-well-off neighbors, wealthier individuals may turn more to government than rebels, regardless of rebels' actually service provision levels. Furthermore, even if rebels do provide basic services, wealthier individuals may need these services less, and thus not seek them from rebels—even if rebels provide them and the individuals support the rebellion.
Income is notably difficult to measure in most developing areas. Measuring income at an individual level in Mindanao is virtually impossible. Private property is a mixed notion in Moro areas, particularly given that most civilians live in multi-generational households, and resources and assets are largely pooled under a single roof. Furthermore, most civilians in these areas do not necessarily think about their income in numerical terms—or, at least, not in numerical terms aggregated in consistent time periods. Instead, the income measure used here asked respondents which of the following bundles of goods best described their situation:

a. It’s hard for us to even buy simple food products
b. We can buy food, but it’s hard for us to buy new clothes or pay for social obligations
c. We can buy food, clothes, and pay for social obligations, but we cannot afford such things as, for example, a new TV or refrigerator
d. We can buy food, clothes, pay for social obligations, and buy such things as, for example, a new TV or refrigerator
e. We can buy almost everything we want

Individual-level covariates were drawn from the survey data, and include:

5) Age

Civilians’ experience with various rebel groups may have varied over time as rebels’ control of their area has shifted. Furthermore, persons of
different ages may need different services, and/or access them differently, and be more or less likely targets of coercion

6) Gender

Rebel groups may seek to access men and women differently—those targeted for recruitment will likely be predominantly male. Furthermore, men and women may experience coercion differently, or be preferentially targeted with coercion. Within a household’s division of labor, certain roles (and thus need for and access to specific services) may be gendered.

Table 4.2 displays the distribution of rebel presence, the subpopulations defined by this presence, and the values of the covariates. The values displayed are constants from simple regressions with each of the variables (run without any covariates)—that is, they are averages. Stars indicate significant difference of these averages from zero, and the table also reports standard errors on these averages, to indicate the variance within each metric.
Table 4.2: Covariates by full and subpopulation samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariate</th>
<th>Full population</th>
<th>MNLF Areas</th>
<th>MILF Areas</th>
<th>ASG Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village reporting MILF presence</td>
<td>0.106 (0.067)</td>
<td>0.032 (0.023)</td>
<td>0.555***</td>
<td>0.235**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village reporting MNLF presence</td>
<td>0.282*** (0.039)</td>
<td>0.267*** (0.034)</td>
<td>0.357***</td>
<td>0.644***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village reporting ASG presence</td>
<td>0.044*** (0.012)</td>
<td>0.050*** (0.017)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.341***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>0.810*** (0.121)</td>
<td>0.889*** (0.082)</td>
<td>0.215 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income (on a scale of 0-4)</td>
<td>1.540*** (0.055)</td>
<td>1.572*** (0.046)</td>
<td>1.315***</td>
<td>1.409***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village's homes with roofs of strong material</td>
<td>0.587*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.588*** (0.021)</td>
<td>0.621***</td>
<td>0.639***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village that is Muslim</td>
<td>0.883*** (0.053)</td>
<td>0.903*** (0.048)</td>
<td>0.731***</td>
<td>0.969***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (proportion male respondents)</td>
<td>0.410*** (0.015)</td>
<td>0.411*** (0.017)</td>
<td>0.398***</td>
<td>0.440***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>37.642*** (0.272)</td>
<td>37.418*** (0.183)</td>
<td>38.603***</td>
<td>39.933***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 The MNLF’s reported presence in its areas of dominance is, ironically, lower than its reported presence in either MILF or ASG areas. This is so for two reasons. First, in areas in which the MNLF’s reported percentage is larger than either MILF or ASG, the MILF and ASG reported percentages are quite low (an average of 3% for MILF and 5% for ASG). This means MNLF can “win out” in the coding rule for significant presence at much lower numbers. Second, the areas in which more than 10% of the population report ASG as present heavily overlap with MNLF presence. So, while the MNLF wins out at a lower percentage in many of its areas, areas of greater reported presence coincide with ASG’s.
1.3. Question format

Survey questions were (largely) of two basic types. First, respondents were asked to consider different challenges they could face in everyday life. They were then given a list of possible authority figures (ranging from the rebel groups in question, to local village elders and religious figures, to the national government), and asked to which they would turn for assistance with these difficulties. Civilians were allowed to pick one, and only one, response from the list of possible providers.

This format means these questions are a demanding test of rebels’ service provision. If respondents do turn to rebel groups for the service described, the question format requires them to clearly vocalize this choice to their surveyor—a potentially risky and sensitive move in contested areas where such a response might be taken as support for and/or complicity with rebellion and thus grounds for government retaliation.

Second, other questions asked respondents to rate the behavior of a variety of actors (again, including rebel groups and organs of the state) on an ordinal scale. Questions about both service provision and coercive behaviors were asked in this format. Respondents were asked the same rating-style question for each of the actors of interest. Unlike the first question format, these answers are not mutually

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6 For a list of options provided on the questionnaire see Appendix "Categorical responses."
exclusive. Responses were recorded for respondents’ experience with all actors of interest.

1.4. Response bias

While all efforts were made to elicit honest responses, the survey questionnaire remained politically sensitive, and was conducted in areas traditionally suspicious of outsiders and unfamiliar with being surveyed. Specifically, response bias resulted in overly positive reports of barangay captains and local government units (LGUs). Barangay captains occupy an often-ambiguous position between rebels and the government of which they are officially a part. For civilians caught between armed combatants, this ambiguity makes “barangay captain” a safe answer—no one will blame them for this choice, or view its selection with suspicion.7

Respondents may select “barangay captain” as a preferred service provider, or give them high performance ratings for a variety of contradictory reasons. First, it is possible that the barangay captain actually provides the service in question. However, respondents could answer “barangay captain” even if they actually seek

7 Statistics bear out this assumption. Of those who answered “barangay captain” on the question about dispute adjudication, 47% of them also refused to answer, or replied “I don’t know” to the later question “How much do you feel the MILF cares about how you are doing in your place?” The latter is an opinion-based question on which they should have had some view, regardless of personal experience or situation, but which is sensitive, given that it asks respondents to opine on the illegal MILF. In contrast, of respondents who gave any answer other than “barangay captain” on the dispute adjudication question, only 5% did not answer the later opinion question. In sum, the “barangay captain” response on these service provision questions correlates highly with sensitivity-related reticence.
assistance from another provider—particularly rebels. Some barangays are effectively in the hands of the rebels—in which case the barangay captain is often an all-but-member of the rebel organization itself. Thus, a respondent seeking rebel assistance may actually pursue this request through the barangay captain.⁸

In other areas, relations between the rebels and the local government are combative. In such areas, respondents wishing to access rebel-provided services may answer “barangay captain” for several, fear-related reasons. Even if a villager ends up using the rebel-provided service, a captain (personally, or through his intelligence network) may discover the problem, and take the villager’s failure to inform him as an affront to his authority. Thus the villager will likely inform the barangay captain first, regardless of their ultimate preferences or course of action taken. Furthermore, tensions between the barangay government and rebel forces will likely increase villagers’ reluctance to answer such pointed survey questions and lead them to be evasive and offer “barangay captain” as a safe answer.

Together, these phenomena will likely suppress the frequency with which villagers report their propensity to seek service provision from rebel groups.

Within questions in which the respondent was asked to rate authority figures on an ordinal scale, these same concerns may well have contributed to overly

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⁸ This “dual-hatting” was discussed among the survey team prior to the survey run and after the pilot. The consensus was the respondents would likely identify such persons by their rebel affiliation rather than their official title, but there is no way of measuring this.
positive ratings of the barangay captain and local government unit. Because these questions were asked for each authority figure separately, however, we are also able to determine respondents’ ratings of more-sensitive choices.

1.5. Analysis

Testing the hypotheses requires estimations of how likely, on average, rebel groups are likely to engage in any of the coercive or service-oriented activities. Because the hypotheses make predictions about the relative probabilities of coercion and service provision across the three rebel groups, comparing these predicted probabilities allows a test of the hypotheses. Furthermore, as mentioned, each groups’ behavior is analyzed within its own area of significant presence. This allows me to test the hypotheses through the following formulation “given a civilians is exposed to a rebel group, how well/poorly does that rebel group behave?”

Unless otherwise indicated, all results in this chapter report probabilities drawn from simple regression analyses. In analyses without covariates (i.e. simply the dependent variable and no regressors), the constant quite straightforwardly indicates the predicted probability of rebels engaging in the behavior that is the dependent variable.

In regressions with covariates, these covariates are all mean-centered for the pertinent subpopulation. Thus, predicted probabilities drawn from the constant reflect analyses for a hypothetical respondent of mean age, with mean income, in a
village of mean development level and a mean proportion of Muslim residents.

Gender and urban/rural are binary variables, but the mean of these is used to reflect the subpopulation averages. Full regression results, including the coefficients on these covariates, are reported in the Appendix.

7. Enacted Ideological Position

Theory predicts the MILF will implement an ideological position closest to the popular preference, followed by the MNLF, and then the ASG. As shown in Chapter 3 (see Table 3.2 for Moros’ attendance at communal prayers, and Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 for Moros’ definition of sharia law itself), Moros throughout Mindanao largely equate “sharia” with their own personal Islamic faith, and have comparable views on what sharia law is (and is not). This provides a constant baseline against which we can compare civilians’ assessment of the three rebels’ implemented ideological position.

Figure 4.5 reports the degree to which civilians, given access to the rebel group, feel the rebels are implementing sharia law. Specifically, respondents were asked, “how well do you think each of these actors is implementing sharia law?”. Results are reported without and with subpopulation-centered covariates (respectively). The height of each bar represents the rebels’ score (on a scale of 0 (“Not at all”) to 2 (“A good deal”)) on how much they are perceived to be implementing sharia. The pattern of the bar, in conjunction with the legend at the right-hand side of the graph, indicates to which rebel group the bar refers. The
figures also indicate a 90% confidence interval around the point estimates for these predicted probabilities. These confidence intervals should be read only as an indication of the variance within a single predicted probability (and whether or not the value is significantly different from zero). To see the difference between the probabilities for the rebel groups, Table 4.3 reports the p-values of comparisons between the groups.³

Figure 4.5: Rebel groups’ implementation of *sharia* law

³ It is always the case that when confidence intervals do not overlap, the difference in means will be significant. However, the converse is not always true. The t-statistic for the individual confidence interval is calculated using the standard error of each mean individually. However, the t-statistic for the difference in means (comparing between the two individual means) is calculated using the square root of the sum of squares of standard errors drawn from both individual calculations. See Cornell Statistical Consulting Unit, "Overlapping Confidence Intervals and Statistical Significance," Cornell University, Cornell Statistical Consulting Unit, http://www.cscu.cornell.edu/news/statnews/Stnews73insert.pdf.
Table 4.3: Differences between the rebel groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebel groups' implementation of sharia law</th>
<th>Without covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
<th>With covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0051</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0024</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results support the hypothesis, and in models run both with and without covariates, the differences between all three groups are highly statistically significant. In fact, the addition of covariates actually strengthen the findings, rather than confounding them. These results suggest the MILF has indeed implemented an ideological position closer to the populations’ preferences—among a population of self-identified Muslims, who define *sharia* in similar ways (and many of whom define many of whom equate *sharia* law with their personal faith. MILF is rated as implementing *sharia* “a good deal,” followed by MNLF, which is rated as implementing *sharia* at a level between “somewhat” and “a good deal,” and ASG, which is rated as implementing *sharia* “somewhat.”

8. Service Provision

Service provision is a broad concept. Survey questions were designed to capture civilians’ access to (and rebels’ performance on) a range of services that would be useful to civilians from a wide range of socioeconomic backgrounds, geographic areas, and tribal affiliations. I conceptualized services as “solutions to common problems.” Indeed, this is ostensibly one of the benefits of living under a
traditional state, as a centralized authority helps citizens with difficulties they cannot easily resolve themselves, or resolves these issues more quickly, efficiently, or better than civilians alone. Survey questions addressed both local public goods, whose benefits may reach large swaths of the population, and club-like goods, whose benefits are more exclusionary.

The theory’s comparative statics predictions are that the MILF will provide the greatest number and most publicly accessible services to civilians, followed by the MNLF (which will likely provide more club goods than local public services), and ASG providing the fewest services (and those that they do provide will likely be club goods).

1.6. Adjudication

Adjudication is one of the most fundamental public goods. In all societies, the inability to adjudicate disputes and criminal matters deters investment and may drive civilians to vigilantism (with attendant collateral damage and loss of investment). The likelihood of such escalation is only exacerbated in conflict-affected areas, where ongoing war provides both a cover for local disputes, and may (through resultant scarcity and other tensions) make disputes more likely. In
Mindanao, even petty arguments can escalate to violent and long-running blood feuds (called ridos in the vernacular).  

1.6.1. Choice of adjudicator

The questionnaire asked respondents to whom they turned for assistance in resolving disputes. Surveyors clarified to respondents that the disputes in question were those that had not yet escalated to the stage of being blood feuds. Such disputes include debates over land ownership, courtship difficulties, and arguments over sporting events.

Respondents were also asked whom they would choose to adjudicate cases of theft. The question was phrased to emphasize that the item stolen would be one of significant value and/or importance in the respondents’ livelihood. Thefts present two problems to their victims and the community in which they occur. For the individuals involved, any loss of livelihood is immediate, and most civilians do not have cash reserves to fall back on. For the community, theft can cause rido. In the absence of adjudication or, victims may seek to regain the lost item on their own or

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10 For additional discussion on the subject of clan warfare in Mindanao, see Wilfredo Magno III Torres, ed. Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao (Makati City, Philippines: The Asia Foundation, 2007). Teschke discusses feudal Europe’s “culture of war,” driven by zero-sum territorial accumulation. Feuds meant public peace was always fragile, but this system was a form of legal redress. See Benno Teschke, “Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and Theory,” International Organization 42(1998).
undertake other forms of vigilante justice. Cattle rustling is a particular problem, and has been noted in several cases of *rido*.11

Finally, the survey asked respondents to whom they turn in cases of murder. In any community, murder is a serious crime. In Mindanao, such incidents frequently spark blood feuds, as families call upon even remote personal connections to well-armed individuals or groups to help them handle an unsettled score. In all cases, *ridos* are destructive enough their own right, but they can also escalate, dragging in both rebel and government personnel. Fighters may be targeted directly because of their blood ties to one side of the feud, or may be called in by personal connections once local actors run out of firepower.

Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 report predicted probabilities of a civilian, given access to a rebel group, turning to that group for assistance in cases of dispute, theft, and murder. Results are reported without and with subpopulation-centered covariates (respectively). For the predicted probabilities of all other authority figures, including organs of the Philippine government, see Appendix. Table 4.4 reports the p-values of comparisons between the groups.

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Figure 4.6: Adjudication services (without covariates)

Confidence bar indicates 90% confidence interval

Figure 4.7: Adjudication services (with covariates)

Confidence bar indicates 90% confidence interval
Table 4.4: Differences between the groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Without covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
<th>With covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dispute</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0429</td>
<td></td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.2150</td>
<td></td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0263</td>
<td></td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0358</td>
<td></td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.1216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.2057</td>
<td></td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0131</td>
<td></td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Murder</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0594</td>
<td></td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0150</td>
<td></td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results support the hypothesis. For civilians seeking dispute resolution, the MILF is the most-frequently chosen—selected by about 22% of the population with access to the group. The MNLF is chosen about 5% of the time, and ASG is never chosen (thus its bars have a height of zero, and do not appear in the figures). In models run with covariates, the predicted probabilities for all three groups are statistically different from one another. Given access to the rebel group, MILF is the service provider of choice for about 15% of the population faced with theft, and MNLF for about 6%, though this difference is not statistically significant when modeled with covariates. ASG, again, is never chosen. The decision patterns of civilians dealing with incidents of murder are similar, 26% turn to the MILF 26%, 8% to the MNLF, and none to ASG. It is worth noting that these numbers are
actually quite large, given the expected downward reporting bias on choices of rebel adjudicators.

In models run both with and without covariates, the differences between all three groups are statistically significant. Reassuringly, the results are robust to the inclusion of covariates. The values of the predicted probabilities change, but the comparative statics (the essence of the hypothesis test) do not. Indeed, the addition of covariates does not confound the initial findings, but strengthens them.

1.6.2. Performance of rebel court systems

As discussed in Chapter 2, an assessment of any group’s level of service provision takes into account not only the number of services provided, but also the quality of those services, and the number of persons to whom these services are available. Fairness in judicial systems is a universally desirable trait.

In Mindanao, common complaints against the government’s court system were favoritism, nepotism, and openness to bribery. That is, in addition to any other problems (such as cost and accessibility) they found the decision itself unfair, and “justice” to be provided largely as a preferentially available club good. Dispute adjudication services can be provided in a club-like or less-public goods fashion. This is so in adjudicative systems that heavily weight their decisions in favor of a select group, or function primarily as force multipliers for this groups’ interests in disputes. Such distinctions are difficult to measure, but are likely to show up in the community as a whole as assessments that adjudicators are less fair.
Developing a reputation for justice and impartiality is difficult for any organization—rebel or otherwise. While those in whose favor the court did not decide may often accuse the system of bias, each decision also has a demonstrative effect, in addition to directly affecting the parties involved. This is the basis of most judicial systems—direct punishment of offenders also communicates the rules and deters others who would violate them. Civilians can thus gauge whether the group’s rules match their own conceptions of justice. Even if the adjudicative process itself is not open, decisions are generally known in the community. Verdicts deemed unfair by the community will likely discredit the group, and make civilians reluctant to seek its adjudication.

The survey asked civilians to rate the performance of the adjudicative mechanisms (here called courts) of the MILF, MNLF, and ASG. Civilians were asked to rate how often these courts “resolve conflicts in a just and impartial manner” on an ordinal scale, ranging from 0 (“Never”) to 3 (“Always”). Figure 4.8 reports civilians’ qualitative experience with rebel courts. Table 4.5 reports the p-values comparing between rebel groups.
Figure 4.8: Frequency with which rebel courts return a just and fair verdict

Table 4.5: Differences between the rebel groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebels' court systems</th>
<th>Without covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
<th>With covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, the addition of covariates does not confound the comparative statics. At sub-population centered means for all covariates, the MILF rates 2.528 (out of 3), the MNLF 1.816, and ASG 0.914. That is, the MILF rates between “sometimes” and “always” just and impartial. The MNLF is rated almost exactly as “sometimes” just and impartial. The ASG rates almost exactly as “rarely” just and impartial in its adjudication.
Civilians’ ratings of the rebel courts’ fairness are consistent with the hypothesis that the MILF will perform better than MNLF, and both will perform better than ASG. Furthermore, civilians’ qualitative experience with the MNLF, MILF, and ASG adjudicative system mirrors their initial selection of these authority figures (section 1.6.1: Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7, and Table 4.4). Quite logically, civilians appear to more frequently choose adjudicators they think are fair.

The MILF’s high rating reflects its substantial investment in this service. MILF courts handle both civil and criminal matters, and follow a specific judicial process—the courts gather facts, sit down with both parties to attempt an amicable settlement of the issue, and trials as a final option. Both plaintiffs and defendants can appeal decisions to a higher court, reluctant defendants face formal warrants of arrest, and the MILF maintains detention facilities for the offenders whose sentence includes incarceration. The MILF has developed a reputation (though not universally unassailable) for breaking the local tradition in which punitive fines primarily line adjudicators’ pockets. The MILF has also worked to standardize interpretation of sharia law across its courts—an effort concomitant with its work to standardize Islamic education and Quranic preaching in mosques.12

The MNLF has historically provided adjudicative services, but these have not been an organizational focus. Indeed, one long-time MNLF insider commented that

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12 Multiple author interviews with both civilians and adjudicators in MILF-controlled areas, 2009-2011.
the commanders in Sulu stepped in to serve as adjudicators during the height of the conflict in the 1970s, but noted they were “relieved to be relieved” when they could hand off such tasks to barangay captains during a break in the fighting.13 Today, MNLF judges still handle both civil and criminal cases, but the system is far less organized than that of their MILF cousins. Such judges usually rule based on a traditional mixture of adat (common) and sharia law—a mix whose interpretation is frequently varied, and the MNLF has made few efforts to standardize this practice. Prior to 1996, local commanders referred some cases to the MNLF central committee, but this has grown less common. The MNLF is likely rated lower than the MILF both because its less-institutionalized system may make miscarriages of justice more probable and less consistent, and because (as some villagers have complained), this system leaves the door open to favoritism and misuse of punitive fines.

A Maguindanaoan farmer explained to me the difference between the MNLF and MILF from his personal experience. His village had first been under the MNLF, but then switched to MILF control in the 1980s. He commented, “under the MNLF, if I was here talking to you, and then, later, our village was attacked [by the government], I would be killed as an informant. Under the MILF, they would not make this assumption—they would investigate, and I would get a trial.” Both rebel

13Author interview.
groups face the same incentive to ensure organizational security (and run the same risk that *ad hoc* or mistaken liquidations can alienate the population). However, in his experience, only the MILF was willing to build an expensive trial apparatus and undertake information gathering.

While the populace respects the Islamic credentials of ASG’s founder Abdurajak Janajalani, his successors do not largely share his reputation. ASG failed to institute even a system like MNLF’s more *ad hoc* adjudication. One of the founding members lamented, “[w]e [had] almost imitated the structure of the MILF, *sharia*, courts, punishment against criminals. We almost had this, but we failed. We failed because Abdurajak was alone. He was the only scholar. No others came to assist him. Unlike the MILF, which has a whole roster of *ulamas* with degrees. We didn’t have this, we lacked the older, the educated. The ASG has only young people without degrees.”¹⁴ Today, few ASG members possess the technical skills to adjudicate. For most civilians, ASG adjudication is synonymous with assassinations of those suspected of intelligence, who are frequently killed along with their families.

¹⁴ ———.
1.7. Local public welfare services

Respondents were also asked about several more material local public goods. These goods are less exclusionary than the club goods described below in Section 1.8.

Respondents were asked about village-level improvement projects—activities like clearing a blocked inlet in the river that might cause flooding or inconvenience fishermen, road or bridge repair, and so on. Such projects can make a significant difference in the quality of life and economic development of communities in which they are undertaken.

While not heavily capital-intensive, these efforts are costly for rebels. Such activities require the ability and willingness to organize the community for the task, identify (or provide) personnel with the necessary technical skills, and loan manpower from among the fighters if needed. Coordinating such efforts is non-trivial. After decades of repeated evacuations, and (in many cases) increased minoritization and landlessness from the influx of non-Moro settlers, many villagers sadly describe the social fabric of the community as inadequate to support much collective improvement at all. In such areas, the grassroots are often unable to organize themselves, and those at some little distance above the grassroots not infrequently squabble over the implementation (or, more importantly, credit-claiming) for such activities. Any organization wishing to undertake such efforts must navigate grassroots organizing on the one hand, and delicate politicking with local bigwigs on the other.
Respondents were asked “If there is a big project in your village that needs to be done for the benefit of everyone, say something like digging a ditch or fixing an irrigation system, who would organize and provide manpower for this?” Figure 4.9 reports the predicted probabilities of rebel groups being chosen. Table 4.6 reports the p-values of comparisons between the groups.

Figure 4.9: Rebel groups’ assistance with communal projects

Table 4.6: Differences between the rebel groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Without covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
<th>With covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communal Projects</td>
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<td>0.0767</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.2275</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0183</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data support the hypothesis that the MILF will be the most likely of the three rebel groups to provide assistance with communal projects, followed by the
MNLF and then ASG. The MILF is chosen 8% of the time, while MNLF is chosen 2% of the time. ASG appears to be entirely unhelpful to civilians in this regard. Again, the addition of covariates only strengthens these findings.

Anecdotal evidence supports these statistical findings. The MILF invests heavily in community organizing. It is thus consistent that MILF base commands lend additional manpower to help with village projects. In at least one village, local fighters lent their culinary talents to preparing lunch for the combined labor force of villagers and fellow fighters.\textsuperscript{15} In contrast, much of the MNLF’s village programming revolves around projects leveraged through the so-called Peace and Development Communities (PDCs), through which support from the OIC and elsewhere is specifically funneled to MNLF members and their families. On average, the MNLF invests community organizing and coalition building needed for projects like these. That no respondents suggested ASG assisted them with communal projects is unsurprising, and is consistent with a lack of anecdotal evidence of the modern ASG engaging in community organizing or service provision were generally.

Civilians were also asked whether individual rebel groups had helped to improve their local infrastructure—including things like roads, schools, and other more specifically capital-intensive features than the village improvement projects

\textsuperscript{15}———.

\textsuperscript{15}———.
described above. Precisely because they are capital-intensive, such projects are
difficult for any rebel group to provide.

This particular service may actually favor the MNLF. Because of the MNLF’s
post-1996 move to Philippine government sponsorship, the organization can claim
credit for the few government infrastructure projects that make it to the grassroots.
Furthermore, the MNLF is credited for funding channeled from abroad into the
PDCs, which specifically target programming to MNLF members and their families.
While theory suggests the MILF will invest more heavily in service provision than
will the MNLF, in this particular type of service provision we might expect MNLF to
have an advantage. Figure 4.9 reports the rebel groups rating on this contribution to
their communities. Table 4.7 reports p-values for the comparisons between groups.

Figure 4.10: Rebel groups’ effect on infrastructure improvement
Table 4.7: Differences between the rebel groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Without covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
<th>With covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.2837</td>
<td></td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.2256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This analysis provides limited support for the hypothesis. As suspected, none of the rebel groups do well in providing such costly services. Furthermore, the particularities of the MNLF case mean the group fares better in this type of service than theory would otherwise predict. However, as Table VI indicates, the difference between MNLF and MILF is not statistically significant—either with or without covariates. Fully consistent with the theory, the difference between both groups and ASG is stark. That the population so clearly disagrees that ASG has improved infrastructure is consistent with the prediction that the group will provide few services.

Villagers were also asked about their access to schools, mosques, and madaris. Respondents who indicated their access to these services had improved since about 1996 were asked which organization was responsible for this improvement. Schools, madaris, and mosques are all local public goods, benefiting entire communities. Access to education of any type is difficult in conflict-affected areas. Many villages have difficulty attracting and keeping teachers. Under qualification among both clergy and educators is an endemic problem.
Furthermore, schools, mosques, and madaris are (not infrequently) used as temporary shelters for military operations.

We may expect neither MNLF nor MILF to do particularly well in providing secular (colloquially referred to as “English”) education—such schools are clearly a function of the Philippine government (or the Catholic church). However, rebels might be credited with improving access to such schools if they broker local ceasefires that allow teachers and students to return, and/or cut other deals with local officials to guarantee educational provision. Because of the government tie-in, we may expect MNLF to have a slight edge over MILF. Since the MNLF’s post-1996 link to the Philippine government, it may be accorded credit for any increase in schools’ availability. Indeed, a long time MNLF loyalist commented that prior to 1996, the “MNLF was not able to provide education for the combatants, but now, for their sons and daughters we can. They can avail of the government schools. We won that.”16

However, we might also expect the MILF to lead MNLF in the provision of mosques and madaris. Not only does the theory predict MILF will be more likely than MNLF to provide local public goods, but both mosques and madaris fit MILF’s ideological emphasis on improved Islamic education and practice among the Bangsamoro. MNLF’s more nationalist focus does not devalue such improvements,

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16———.
but places less emphasis on them. ASG’s Islamist ideology also argues for improved Islamic practice—which might suggest the group would favor mosques and madaris as these could be used in proselytization efforts. However, establishing such services is weighed heavily against the theory’s prediction that ASG will do little in the way of local public goods.

Figure 4.11: Local public welfare services (without covariates)
These results support the hypothesis that MILF will outperform MNLF in service provision, and ASG will perform least well. Again, none of the respondents credited ASG with any local improvements in mosques, schools, or madaris.
Notably, for all three services, the addition of covariates does not change the relative results for MNLF and MILF.

Unsurprisingly, the overall percentage of the population according credit for improvements in secular education to any rebel group is low. It is surprising that the MILF appears to outperform MNLF in this regard. However, when modeled with covariates, the difference between the two groups is not significant. Given the MNLF’s tie to the Philippine government, the rate at which the organization is credited with improved access to schools is surprisingly low (without covariates it is not statistically different from zero, and only 1% with covariates). Interestingly, the MILF performs better, though the percentage crediting the organization with improved access to English schools is low (about 3-4%), and not statistically different from the MNLF when modeled with covariates.

While the MILF’s ideology is indubitably Islamist, the organization is not opposed to the state-run schools. In fact, the MILF has integrated the government-run schools into its own internal educational system. Students are actively encouraged to attend secular schools Monday through Friday, and an MILF-affiliated madrassa on Saturday and Sunday. The MILF has designed its curriculum to add religious studies and other subjects to complement the state school curriculum.

It is unsurprising that the ASG is not credited with improvements in any of these areas. ASG’s views on secular education appear dim at best, and government schoolteachers have proven a popular target for ASG harassment and extortion. For all the group’s insistence on improved orthopraxis, ASG has invested little effort in
bringing imams into its body politic or in coordinating either **khutba** across mosques or curriculum across **madaris**. Furthermore, ASG’s donors do not provide support in the form of such programming.

That being said, many mosques and some **madaris** in Mindanao are actually built with foreign money. In many cases, members of the Islamic diaspora (often in the Middle East) bequeath part of their estate to building mosques or **madaris** elsewhere in the Muslim world. Often, the donors themselves have no personal connections to these places. Instead, such donations are filtered through their local imams, who in turn reach out to their personal networks to place the funding. Historically, some such investments were facilitated by traditional Moro elites. Today, some elites still facilitate such investment, as does, to some degree, the MNLF.

However, the MILF has made significant contributions on this front, and much of their foreign assistance is directly targeted to aiding mosques and **madaris**. The MILF is often able to match donations with communities in need through their network of Islamic scholars, many of whom have personal ties to clerics and scholars abroad through their own education. This network has been strengthened over the years as the MILF has worked to procure scholarships abroad for young Moros in Islamic studies and jurisprudence. These scholars have then returned to Mindanao to serve as imams and teachers in MILF-sponsored **madaris**. Indeed, the lack of qualified teachers and imams has traditionally been as stumbling block for Islamic education in Mindanao, and the MILF has pursued scholarships largely to
help alleviate this problem. Villages without an imam, or in need of a teacher, can appeal to the MILF, who can often sponsor such personnel.

It is also possible that the degree to which civilians credit the MILF with mosque and madaris provision is underreported. This is so not only because of the general underreporting expected for all rebel groups, but because credit may be ascribed to the local imam who is, in fact, part of the MILF’s network. It is possible also that while many see the local imam as responsible for directly coordinating the building of a mosque or madaris, they also recognize the imam as being affiliated with the MILF or another rebel group. If so, this secondary accreditation is not captured in this question. Underreporting for this reason is also possible with the MNLF and ASG. However, it is less likely because both the MNLF and ASG have invested less than the MILF in building a network of Islamic clerics into its body politic.

Finally, as mentioned in Chapter 2, rebel groups can augment their own service provision by allowing local and international non-government organizations (NGOs) to provide programs in rebel-influenced communities. 17 NGO projects may provide services at no material cost to the rebel organization, but this move can be costly in other ways. First, allowing access to their communities can increase rebels’

17 This observation is not about allegations that NGOs may channel funding to rebel movements, but solely about NGO’s service provision.
security and infiltration risks. Second, NGO programs may lessen civilians’ grievance against the government. If this improvement is not tied to the rebel group, this may diminish civilians’ support for the rebellion. Indeed, this risk has been debated within the MILF. Rebels have two solutions to this risk. First, they may “re-brand” such services under their own banner. Second, they may claim credit indirectly, through an open understanding that the NGOs are present at the behest of the rebel organization and operate only with the rebels’ facilitation.

Theory suggests that MILF will do best in providing services generally, including facilitation of NGO projects. However, we may expect the MILF-MNLF comparison to be tighter on this facet of service provision than theory would otherwise suggest simply because much of MNLF’s current support comes in the form of NGO-provided aid programs.

18 For example, see ReliefWeb, "In the DRC, both sides accuse NGO workers of being spies".
19 Author interview with founding MILF member, December 2009.
The results are roughly consistent with our expectations in this case. It seems that, on average, civilians in MILF areas credit the group with facilitating NGO work more than do MNLF-affected civilians. However, this difference is not statistically significant—with or without covariates. This is broadly consistent with

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20 Note that the NGO projects discussed in this question do not include the efforts of the MILF-affiliated Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), which is an outgrowth of the MILF-government peace process. The survey asked separate questions about the work of the BDA.
the understanding that, while we expect MILF to perform better on service provision overall, the fact that MNLF has channeled some post-1996 sponsorship through NGOs affects the comparative statics on this analysis.

1.8. Club-like welfare services

Finally, the survey asked about three forms of assistance that are more club-like goods, as their primarily serve the immediate recipient and close family members. To be sure, provision of such services need not always be club-like. An egalitarian provider could offer these services to everyone. This analysis merely highlights the fact that, unlike the wider impact of dispute adjudication and village-level projects, these services can be limited to a smaller circle of beneficiaries.

Respondents were asked to whom they turn when they have a business transaction arrangement or contract with someone outside their village. Information networks are generally tighter between residents of the same village than between residents and village outsiders. Transactions outside the village are thus riskier endeavors insofar as information about trading partners and recourse in the case of contractual breach may be more limited. Such information and enforcement problems are hardly new to trade,21 but are both a serious issue, and are likely to be exacerbated in conflict-affected areas.

In Mindanao, a large number of farmers and village businessmen exist on the cusp between subsistence and occasional surplus—surplus they may then wish to sell outside their village, but which is not yet so frequent that they have invested in regularized business ties through which to do so. These farmers thus face a challenge. They wish to sell their surplus to commodity dealers or large agricultural conglomerates, but, as small players, risk being taken advantage of in business dealings with outsiders.

Like Milgrom et al.’s (1990) medieval traders, such farmers and businessmen would benefit from some form of third party enforcement, that minimizes the risks of such transactions, and does not require them to become contractual experts in their own right. Local authority figures would be a good choice for such a service, since they occupy positions of power, with better access to information, and could advise supplicants on contractual terms, and possibly enforce these terms. The survey asked civilians to whom they would turn to ensure that the contract was fair and properly enacted.

Respondents were also asked to whom they would turn for help in looking for a job—not necessarily as direct employment, but for information on jobs that might be available. Local authority figures are often a useful source of such knowledge. Conceivably, rebel groups could use their networks to acquire information about job opportunities, and leverage their third-party status to serve as a clearinghouse for such information. This can be a valuable assistance to areas like Mindanao, where unemployment is endemic.
Both help finding a job and assistance with contracts represent club goods. These services can be provided to a large number of people, but their benefits primarily accrue to the recipient and his/her immediate family. Theory predicts that the MILF will provide more services than the MNLF, and ASG will provide few, if any. However, part of the theory’s predictions that MILF will rely more heavily on service provision than MNLF or ASG also entails a reliance on public, rather than club, goods. The expectation that MILF will outperform MNLF in providing services is thus somewhat mitigated by the fact that both jobs and business assistance are more club-style goods. Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15 report predicted probabilities of the three rebel groups being chosen as providers of both these services. Table 4.10 reports the p-values comparing between the groups.

Figure 4.14: Rebel groups’ provision of club-like welfare services (without covariates)
Figure 4.15: Rebel groups’ provision of club-like welfare services (with covariates)

Table 4.10: Differences between the rebel groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Without covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
<th>With covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Job</strong></td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.2237</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.3393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
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<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0414</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business</strong></td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
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<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
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<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0140</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data suggest people in MILF areas are more likely to turn to the MILF for these forms of assistance than are MNLF residents to turn to the MNLF. However, for assistance in finding a job, this difference is not statistically significant (with or without covariates). For help with business transactions, the MILF’s advantage over the MNLF is significant without covariates, but this difference becomes insignificant.
once the covariates are added. The ASG is, notably, never chosen as a provider of either form of assistance. This is consistent with the theory’s predictions that the MILF would outperform the MNLF. Interestingly, the MILF appears to outperform the MNLF even given its greater predicted reliance on club goods.

Respondents were also asked whether or not they agreed that rebel groups had improved their agricultural production.22 Agricultural assistance can be provided both as a club good and a local public good—depending on whether it is provided to individual farmers, or as part of a collective farming apparatus. For purposes of this analysis, I consider it a club good, since the benefits most clearly accrue to the recipient farmer and his immediate family. Again, however, because of the MNLF’s post-1996 move to Philippine government sponsorship, we may expect MNLF to do particularly well in this category. Many livelihood programs coursed through its Peace and Development Communities (PDCs) focus on agricultural production (since many Bangsamoro are farmers). The MNLF can claim credit for these services and often decides both the type of service provided and who will have access to the assistance. Figure 4.16 reports the rebel groups rating on this contribution to their communities. Table 4.11 reports p-values for the comparisons between groups.

22 In coastal areas, “agricultural production” was clarified to include aquaculture.
These data provide mixed results. ASG’s low performance matches expectations. The MNLF, however, outperforms MILF in this service—more so than in either of the other club goods considered. While this is not consistent with my overall expectations that MILF will be a superior service provider, it does reflect the particular circumstances under which MNLF currently operates.

Furthermore, the quantitative analysis on this question in these subpopulations does not capture a qualitative difference. As mentioned, much MNLF agricultural assistance is likely a product of projects coursed through the PDCs. Interview evidence suggests such benefits are provided in an extremely club-
like fashion—Moros who are MNLF and their families have access to these programs, and other local Moros likely do not.

The MILF’s agricultural programming relies more heavily on organizing small local farmers (who often own too little land to do much more than subsistence agriculture) into cooperative farms, and in providing occasional training sessions on crop improvement and farming techniques by technically-skilled members of their network. The MILF has also served as a negotiating buffer between farmers and corporate conglomerates in cases of more than occasional farming surplus. In such cases, the rebels bargain for a fairer price for the farmers, while assuring the business that the farmers will deliver the goods as promised.

Local MILF cadres charged with coordinating farmers in one area inadvertently commented on one difference between their own organization and the MNLF. One complained that the difficulty was “the farmers here, they are too… ‘MNLF.’ I have to explain to them, no, it is not a handout. It is a program in which we all work together. For ourselves. Their experience with the MNLF under the PDCs led them to expect just a payout.”

1.9. **Comparison of club goods to local public goods**

There is a noticeable difference between the MNLF and MILF in their relative provision of club goods versus local public goods. For both groups, the rate at which

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23 Author interviews in mixed MILF-MNLF village, March 2011.
they provide these club goods is lower than the rate at which they provide local public goods.

We can easily compare the rebel groups’ performance across questions asking civilians to pick one (and only one) provider.\textsuperscript{24} Since ASG is never chosen for either club or local public goods provision, they are clearly bad at both. Anecdotal evidence suggests ASG provides some club goods, but these often take the form of serving as a force multiplier and cash payouts, and are extremely \textit{ad hoc} (see Chapter 6). It is thus unsurprising that the group is never chosen as a provider among any of the questions asked on the survey. Among the other rebel groups, MILF is chosen an average of 13\% of the time among civilians asked about local public goods provision, while MNLF is chosen 4\% of the time. Across club goods, MILF is chosen about 8\% of the time, and MNLF about 5\% of the time.

The MILF more often provides well-rated adjudicative services and public projects than it does assistance with business contracts and job assistance. The MNLF, on the other hand, provides both categories of services about equally, and at (generally) lower rates than the MILF. This result is consistent with the prediction that the MILF will do well in providing services that reach a large number of people,

\textsuperscript{24} Local public goods with this question format include: adjudication of theft, disputes, and murder, facilitating NGO projects, schools, mosques, and \textit{madaris}. Club goods with this question format include: assistance with employment and business matters.
while the MNLF will provide services, but be more prone to club-goods provision, and limit its investment in public-style goods.

Many MNLF-affiliated NGOs work effectively, and, indeed, some serve areas where no other organizations will willingly venture. Other local NGOs, however, have noted a difference. Organizations who have partnered with both MILF and MNLF communities have noted that the MNLF’s often club-centric approach has complicated their own work in these areas. While they implemented MILF-approved projects in ways accessible to all community members, one commented on MNLF assistance, saying “it is already a club. If you are in it, you get these benefits. If you are not, you don’t.”

9. **Coercion**

The model predicts that the MILF will engage in the least coercion of Moro civilians, followed by the MNLF, and that ASG will be the most coercive. Rebels’ coercion of civilians takes many forms, and nearly all are sensitive questions to ask respondents—particularly in a survey format in which civilians are asked to discuss these issues with strangers.

1.10. **Security**

Security is often the single most-desired improvement in conflict zones, and Mindanao is no exception. Rebel groups can have a profound impact (positive or

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25 Author interview.
negative) on the security of the villages in which they operate. Many of the service behaviors discussed above also affect security. Adjudicating disputes and resolving *ridos* (blood feuds) can improve security, since festering tensions can easily erupt into bloodshed. However, rebels can themselves become involved in *ridos*, as their members can have their own disputes with members of the community. Groups who do not actively discourage members from feuds or take other stunts that thus allow fighters to take advantage of their armed status to push points of disagreement with locals. Rebel can also intervene as a force multiplier for one side or the other. As compared to adjudication, such actions will likely decrease village security. If rebels undertake acts of violence against civilians (or allow their fighters to do so unpunished), security will decrease. For all these reasons, the concept of security overlaps with elements of both service provision and coercion. Specifically, an increase in coercion will lead civilians to report that security has decreased in their area.

Respondents were asked what effect, if any, each rebel group had had on their community’s security over the past year. In this question, groups were rated from “Decreased Security” (-1), “No Effect” (0), to “Increased Security” (+1). Results are reported in Figure 4.17, and p-values comparing across the groups are reported in Table 4.12.
The MNLF and MILF are quite close in the degree to which they provide a positive impact on local security. Indeed, without covariates, the two groups have statistically identical ratings. With covariates, the MILF’s positive contribution to security in its communities is greater than that provided by the MNLF. Both MNLF and MILF are (obviously) more highly rated than ASG, which decreases security in their village. ASG’s coercive behavior is clearly indicated in the strongly negative views civilians have of their effect on security.
ASG’s deleterious effect on security takes multiple forms. Its personnel are not infrequently involved in rape and various forms of extortion. Such actions clearly reduce the security of the victims, and (by demonstration) that of their neighbors and other observers. Furthermore, in the absence of recourse or adjudication, direct attacks on villagers may have longer-term consequences should the victims and their families seek revenge. This problem is exacerbated by ASG’s now-deliberate recruitment of those already embroiled in blood feuds or accused of criminality (see Chapter 6). This strategy may impart some organizational advantages, but means ASG is frequently drawn into local fights—destabilizing communities.

1.11. **Fighters’ behavior towards civilians**

One of the most basic forms of coercion is the use of force against civilians—either deliberately as part of an extortive apparatus, non-enforcement of good behavior among troops, or non-avoidance of collateral damage during combat. Sanctioned extortion is clearly part of the governance package of some rebel groups, and avoided by those whose governance is more heavily weighted towards service provision. Avoiding unsanctioned extortion by fighters is a costly enterprise. It requires careful screening and selection of troops, good training, and/or the ability and willingness to monitor and punish such actions. Avoiding collateral damage is also costly for rebels. Like unsanctioned extortion, this requires careful training,
monitoring and enforcement within the cadre. It may also require rebels to avoid militarily attractive targets that happen to be too close to civilian areas.

Respondents were asked to rate the fighters of all three rebel groups based on their experience. Fighters were rated on a scale from “always avoid civilians” (0), to “sometimes hurt civilians” (1), to “deliberately hurt civilians” (2). The experiences on which civilians formulate these ratings could be direct personal victimization, but likely also includes their observations about how rebels target (or do not target) their friends, family, and neighbors. Figure 4.18 reports how well rebel groups behave towards civilians—with and without subpopulation mean-centered covariates. Table 4.13 reports the p-values for the comparison between the groups.

![Figure 4.18: Rebel fighters’ propensity to target civilians](image)

**Figure 4.18: Rebel fighters’ propensity to target civilians**
Table 4.13: Differences between the rebel groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Without covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
<th>With covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebels' propensity to target civilians</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results support the hypothesis that, of the three rebel groups, the MILF will coerce civilians the least, followed by the MNLF, and then ASG. These results are robust to the addition of covariates—indeed, the addition of covariates only strengthens the findings' consistency with my hypothesis. Both with and without covariates the differences between the groups are significant.

To be sure, all three groups have been accused (and are probably guilty) of some human rights violations or other civilian targeting. Both MNLF and MILF personnel have been accused of extracurricular violence, including kidnapping for ransom, but these incidents are far fewer and further between than those instigated by ASG. In its modern incarnation, ASG has increasingly targeted ordinary civilians within their orb of violence (see Chapter 6). Incidents of kidnapping, extortion related violence, or rape (to name a few) are not uncommon in ASG areas. Unfortunately, most such incidents go unreported by the victims, and even if reported, are not generally recorded or considered sufficiently newsworthy to warrant documentation.
As a robustness check for these results, the survey also specifically asked respondents if they themselves, or a member of their family or friends been a victim of violence by any of the armed groups in Mindanao. This question focuses on direct experience with violence, while the analysis presented above might be subject to hearsay or more indirect experience with rebel coercion.

In asking about direct experience with violence, the question asked about a wider group than the respondent alone for several reasons. First, the question is a sensitive one, and embracing a respondent’s inner circle is less pointed than limiting the question to the respondent alone. Second, such violence does not occur in a vacuum—such incidents affect those in the victim’s immediate circle, and likely beyond. Indeed, the demonstration effects of violence are one of the reasons coercion is effective in eliciting compliance.

This test should be viewed as a robustness check for the previous analysis. Fortunately for the population, the number of rebel victims drawn in the survey sample is relatively low: 14 MILF victims in MILF areas, eight MNLF victims in MNLF areas, and 11 ASG victims in ASG areas. Overall, 28% of civilians report that they themselves (or those close to them) have been victims of human rights violations, but most of these attacks are attributed to the Philippine military, not rebel forces. Figure 4.19 reports the estimated probability of a member of the population being a victim of violence by each of the three rebel groups. Table 4.14 reports the p-values comparing between the rebel groups.
Figure 4.19: Proportion of population that are (or are close to) victims of violence by armed groups: by rebel group perpetrator

Table 4.14: Differences between the rebel groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Without covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
<th>With covariates</th>
<th>p-value of comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of human</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rights victims</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.1903</td>
<td>MNLF vs. MILF</td>
<td>0.2684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.0939</td>
<td>MNLF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.7346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.1784</td>
<td>MILF vs. ASG</td>
<td>0.2900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fortunately for the population, the percentage victimized by any of the rebels is relatively low. Modeled with covariates, the probability of being attacked by the MILF is not statistically different from zero. The probability of being attacked by either MNLF or ASG is about the same: 2-3%. Unfortunately for theory testing, once modeled with covariates, none of the groups are statistically different from one another. However, these results do lend some credibility to the civilians’
assessment of rebel troops’ propensity to target non-combatants (see Figure 4.18
and Table 4.13).

10. Conclusion

A cross-sectional comparison of the three faces of the Moro liberation
movement—MNLF, MILF, and ASG—supports the comparative predictions. As
hypothesized, the MILF provides the greatest number and quality of services,
followed by the MNLF, and ASG. Indeed, for many services, ASG is never chosen as a
service provider. Comparing MNLF and MILF, MILF clearly provides more and
greater quality services. Furthermore, while both groups provide club-type goods
more than they do local public goods, the MILF does significantly better in
producing public goods rather than club goods than does the MNLF.

The MILF more often provides well-rated adjudicative services and public
projects than it does assistance with business contracts and job assistance. The
MNLF, on the other hand, provides both categories of services about equally, and at
(generally) lower rates than the MILF. This result is consistent with the prediction
that the MILF will do well in providing services that reach a large number of people,
while the MNLF will provide services, but be more prone to club-goods provision,
and limit its investment in more public-style goods. Similarly, the ASG is far more
coercive towards civilians than the MNLF, while the MILF is the least coercive.
Each of these rebel groups claims the same domestic population and basic set of
grievances but has made different choices over the available constellation of foreign
and domestic backers. This cross-group comparison, then, lends support to the comparative statics predictions generated in Chapter 2. Specifically,

The more extreme the preferences of the rebels, the more extreme the policies they choose, the more coercive their rule is, and the fewer services they will provide.

Survey data suggest that the MILF’s ideological proximity to the domestic population, followed by the MNLF’s slight divergence, and the ASG’s far more radical position correlate with a progressively coercive-heavy rule.

Similarly, theory suggests,

As their marginal cost of service provision increases, the fewer services the rebels provide, the more coercive their rule becomes, and the more extremist the policies they choose.

And,

As their marginal cost of coercion increases, the more services the rebels provide, the less coercive their rule becomes, and the less extremist the policies they choose.

In Mindanao, this suggests that MILF’s humanitarian-heavy support package will reduce the costs of service provision; underwriting governance more reliant on service provision. Consistent with its donor’s lower humanitarian concerns, the MNLF’s mixed support package places the organization somewhere in the middle of a coercion-service mix. Finally, ASG’s donors’ very low humanitarian concerns and militarily-focused aid lower the cost of coercion, and place few strictures on the
rebels’ use of force against civilians. An analysis of the survey data supports these predictions.
Chapter 4: Appendix

1. The survey team

In conducting the survey, I specifically chose not to use one of the several established survey firms. Such firms do reputable work, but are based in Manila. Northerners are frequently viewed with some distrust or skepticism by Mindanao residents, and their access to conflict-affected areas is often restricted—either by their own rules of operation, or because of popular distrust. Instead, I built a team from local NGO and other community workers—all from the conflict-affected areas themselves, and with considerable experience working directly with the grassroots. These team members were trained and closely managed, with daily quality control checks.

The English version of the questionnaire was translated into four local languages in advance (Tagalog, Tausug, Maguindanoan, and Maranao). The translations were vetted and discussed as a team in each location to make sure all were familiar with the questions, their meanings, and possible ways to explain the question to respondents who might ask for further clarification. The team discussion also allowed for clarifications and other changes in the translation to the final version of the questionnaire. In practice, it was not uncommon for surveys to be administered in a mix of languages, as many Moros are multi-lingual, or live in areas in which the vernacular has adapted to comprise elements from diverse ethnolinguistic backgrounds.
2. **Additional notes on sampling and oversamples**

The sample comprises ten strata, all defined by conflict experience. Four strata represent the quartiles of MILF-government clashes (between one and eight clashes per barangay). Another four strata are defined by the quartiles of ASG-government clashes (between one and ten clashes per barangay). A ninth stratum comprised the (very few) villages in which both MNLF and ASG incidents were recorded. The tenth stratum comprised barangay in which no clashes were recorded. For political reasons, the Philippine government does not record clashes between its troops and the MNLF, so it was not possible to generate strata based on this metric.

The survey also includes one out-of-sample oversample (Maguindanao) and one in-sample oversample (Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur). Maguindanao province was placed under Martial Law a few weeks prior to the initial run of this survey. Given the increased risk posed to participants in the survey under these conditions, Maguindanao was not included in the initial sampling. Following the lifting of Martial Law, and the acquisition of additional funds, we were able to draw an over-sample from Maguindanao Province to be surveyed. The oversample was drawn from the four conflict-affected quartiles/strata as described above. Due to idiosyncratic errors by the survey team, one of these quartiles was not sampled, and one was sampled twice.

Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur were included in the original sampling. However, by pure random chance, all Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur areas were
delegated to the list of “alternate” barangays, and thus were not sampled. However, the population of these areas represents an important subsection of the Bangsamoro—specifically, several culturally-distinct ethnic groups of Bangsamoro. To account for this statistical fluke, four villages from the original samples’ list of alternates were surveyed. These villages were “promoted” randomly. As not all strata of the original sample included Lanao areas, Lanao villages surveyed do not reflect all strata.

11. Non-responses

Surveyors made two attempts to contact unavailable respondents, but many of those unavailable were out of town for several days, or at work. In most areas, work schedules occupy employees during most of the daylight hours. For security reasons, survey teams were often scheduled to withdraw from the field by mid-afternoon. Respondents with work schedules that left them available only in the evening often could not be interviewed safely. Teams were scheduled for early-morning arrival in an attempt to ameliorate this problem by locating respondents prior to their workday departure.

Occupational unavailability tends to affect men more than women, since men are often the primary fishermen and farmers in many families. However, it is worth noting that some areas’ populations are disproportionately male. In Mindanao, as in many economically underdeveloped parts of the Philippines, residents will often move abroad for several years as Overseas Foreign Workers (OFWs), sending
money back home to support their families. Some 8.5 million Filipinos (about 11% of the Philippines’ total population) currently lives and works abroad on a temporary basis.\(^1\) Remittances from OFWs represent about 9% of the country’s GDP in 2010 (about $18.76 billion).\(^2\) OFWs serve in a variety of professions worldwide. In Mindanao, many serve as menial laborers or domestic helpers in the Middle East. Many of these are women. Because these OFWs women live abroad, they were not counted as eligible for the survey questionnaire, but this also meant the eligible population was disproportionately male in these few villages.

12. Categorical responses

For those questions with mutually exclusive response categories, the categories analyzed are fewer than those offered to respondents. Many categories received very few responses, and have thus been combined with similar categories into a coarser measure. The original and collapsed categories are shown in Table 4.15.


Table 4.15: Original ordinal responses and collapsed categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original response categories</th>
<th>Collapsed categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National government</td>
<td>Government above barangay captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU)³</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO)⁴</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay captain</td>
<td>Barangay captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>MNLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>MILF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>ASG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>PNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam/priest</td>
<td>Local elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village elder not in any of the above positions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would handle this on own/with family</td>
<td>I would handle this on own/with family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These are concerned groups/actors acting on their own</td>
<td>These are concerned groups/actors acting on their own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs or foreign donors</td>
<td>NGOs or foreign donors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Figures

The pages that follow show fuller results from analyses displayed in the chapter’s figures. Each set of results is identified by a header corresponding to the figure number and title in the main body of Chapter 4.

³ Militia force, armed at Philippine government expense, and technically answerable to the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
⁴ Militia force, ostensibly unarmed (though in practice this is not often the case), and technically answerable to the municipal mayor.
Figure 4.6: Adjudication services (without covariates)

Table 4.16 displays respondents' choice of adjudicator in cases of dispute, theft, and murder. The choices of service provider are given down the vertical axis of the chart. The type of adjudication (dispute, theft, murder) is shown along the top. Results are shown for each of the three subpopulations defined—areas of significant presence of MILF, MNLF, and ASG. This table displays the constants from a set of simple regressions without covariates (i.e. simply the dependent variable and no regressors). These constants indicate the predicted probability of the various actors indicated along the left-hand side providing the services arrayed along the top. Please note that these probabilities are given in decimal form, not percentages.
Table 4.16: Full categorical responses on adjudication services (without covariates), reference Figure 4.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF Areas</th>
<th>MNLF Areas</th>
<th>ASG Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dispute</td>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>Murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.488***</td>
<td>0.535***</td>
<td>0.280***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.008*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.138**</td>
<td>0.122**</td>
<td>0.153**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.030***</td>
<td>0.046***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>0.108***</td>
<td>0.157***</td>
<td>0.235***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.153***</td>
<td>0.071***</td>
<td>0.085***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se  * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05  *** p < 0.01
Figure 4.7: Adjudication services (with covariates)

Table 4.17 displays respondents’ choice of adjudicator in cases of dispute, theft, and murder. The choices of service provider are given down the vertical axis of the chart. The type of adjudication (dispute, theft, murder) is shown along the top. Results are shown for each of the three subpopulations defined—areas of significant presence of MILF, MNLF, and ASG. This table displays the constants from a set of regressions with subpopulation mean-centered covariates. The covariates include an urban/rural indicator, household income, proportion of village homes with strong roofs, proportion of village that is Muslim, and respondent’s gender and age. These constants indicate the predicted probability of the various actors indicated along the left-hand side providing the services arrayed along the top. The choices of service provider are given down the vertical axis of the chart. The type of adjudication (dispute, theft, murder) is shown along the top. Results are shown for each of the three subpopulations defined—areas of significant presence of MILF, MNLF, and ASG. Results are thus reported for each rebel group (and other available options) for all subpopulations.
Table 4.17: Full categorical responses on adjudication services (with covariates), reference Figure 4.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF Areas</th>
<th>MNLF Areas</th>
<th>ASG Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dispute</td>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>Murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.505***</td>
<td>0.594***</td>
<td>0.334***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.216***</td>
<td>0.150***</td>
<td>0.257***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0.003*</td>
<td>0.034***</td>
<td>0.053***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>0.091***</td>
<td>0.133***</td>
<td>0.210***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.118***</td>
<td>0.063***</td>
<td>0.033**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05  *** p < 0.01
Table 4.18 shows the full regression results for respondents' choice of each rebel group in that group's own area of significant presence. The covariates are centered to the subpopulation mean for each subpopulation.

**Table 4.18: Full regression results (by subpopulation) on adjudication services, reference Figure 4.7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Choice of MILF in MILF Areas</th>
<th>Choice of MNLF in MNLF Areas</th>
<th>Choice of ASG in ASG Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dispute Theft Murder</td>
<td>Dispute Theft Murder</td>
<td>Dispute Theft Murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>-0.063 0.032 -0.193</td>
<td>-0.072 -0.058* -0.062*</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>-0.075* 0.053** -0.049**</td>
<td>0.001 -0.004 -0.046***</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village</td>
<td>-0.419** -0.093 -0.567***</td>
<td>-0.017 -0.079 -0.005</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homes with strong roofs</td>
<td>0.189 0.155 0.183</td>
<td>0.094 0.117 0.073</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village</td>
<td>-0.061 -0.032 0.017</td>
<td>0.037 0.001 0.100**</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that is Muslim</td>
<td>0.196 0.182 0.243</td>
<td>0.051 0.056 0.041</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.084** 0.067* 0.075**</td>
<td>0.002 0.01 0.046***</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.001 0.001 0.001</td>
<td>0 0 -0.001***</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.216*** 0.150*** 0.257***</td>
<td>0.048** 0.057*** 0.075***</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se  * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05  *** p < 0.01
Figure 4.8: Frequency with which rebel courts return a just and fair verdict

Table 4.19 displays respondents’ ratings of rebel courts’ performance, modeled without covariates. Performance is rated as 0 “Never,” 1 “Rarely,” 2 “Sometimes,” 3 “Always.” Each rebel groups’ performance is rated in its own area of significant presence (i.e. the pertinent subpopulation).

**Table 4.19: Full regression results on rebel court systems (without covariates), reference Figure 4.8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF</th>
<th>MNLF</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>2.325***</td>
<td>1.692***</td>
<td>1.057***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*b* **p** < 0.10  **p** <0.05  ***p** < 0.01
Table 4.20 displays respondents’ ratings of rebel courts’ performance. Performance is rated as 0 “Never,” 1 “Rarely,” 2 “Sometimes,” 3 “Always.” Each rebel groups’ performance is rated in its own area of significant presence (i.e. the pertinent subpopulation). Again, the covariates are all mean-centered for each of the three subpopulations.

Table 4.20: Full regression results (by subpopulation) on rebel court systems (with covariates), reference Figure 4.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF in MILF areas</th>
<th>MNLF in MNLF areas</th>
<th>ASG in ASG areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>-0.249***</td>
<td>-0.763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>-0.166**</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village homes with strong roofs</td>
<td>-1.286***</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>-0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village that is Muslim</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>4.671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>2.908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.510***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.012**</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.528***</td>
<td>1.816***</td>
<td>0.914***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se * p < 0.10  ** p <0.05  *** p < 0.01
Figure 4.9: Rebel groups’ assistance with communal projects

Table 4.21 displays respondents’ reports of authority figures that help the community to organize village-level improvement projects. The various authority figures that were available as options to provide communal project assistance are given down the vertical axis of the chart.

This table displays the constants from regressions both with and without covariates. These constants indicate the predicted probability of the various actors indicated along the left-hand side providing communal project assistance. For those run with covariates, the covariates are subpopulation mean-centered. The covariates include an urban/rural indicator, household income, proportion of village homes with strong roofs, proportion of village that is Muslim, and respondent’s gender and age. These constants indicate the predicted probability of the various actors indicated along the left-hand side providing the services arrayed along the top. The choices of service provider are given down the vertical axis of the chart. Results are shown for each of the three subpopulations defined—areas of significant presence of MILF, MNLF, and ASG. Results are thus reported for each rebel group (and other available options) for all subpopulations.
Table 4.21: Full categorical responses (by subpopulation) on rebel groups’ assistance with communal projects, reference Figure 4.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subpopulation</th>
<th>No Covariates</th>
<th>With Covariates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MILF Areas</td>
<td>MNLF Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.493*** 0.025</td>
<td>0.625*** 0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.019** 0.009</td>
<td>0.008 0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.037** 0.015</td>
<td>0.001 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>0.131*** 0.04</td>
<td>0.112*** 0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.177*** 0.028</td>
<td>0.044*** 0.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se  * p < 0.10  ** p <0.05  *** p < 0.01
Table 4.22 displays the full regression results for respondents' choice of each rebel group in that group's own area of significant presence. The covariates are centered to the subpopulation mean for each subpopulation.

Table 4.22: Full regression results (by subpopulation) of rebel groups’ assistance with communal projects, reference Figure 4.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Choice of MILF in MILF Areas</th>
<th>Choice of MNLF in MNLF Areas</th>
<th>Choice of ASG in ASG Areas&lt;sup&gt;309&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>-0.088*** 0.029</td>
<td>-0.024 0.017</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>-0.003 0.007</td>
<td>-0.003 0.004</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village homes with strong roofs</td>
<td>-0.245*** 0.045</td>
<td>0.024 0.065</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village that is Muslim</td>
<td>-0.079 0.093</td>
<td>0.026 0.031</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.052** 0.02</td>
<td>0.007 0.008</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.080*** 0.018</td>
<td>0.018* 0.009</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>309</sup> Because ASG was never chosen, even in the subpopulation defined by ASG’s significant presence, these are all zeros.
Figure 4.10: Rebel groups’ effect on infrastructure improvement

Table 4.23 displays respondents’ ratings of rebel groups’ performance in improving infrastructure in their area, modeled without covariates. Respondents were asked to what degree they agreed with the statement that a given group had “improved infrastructure in your area.” Responses range from 0 “Fully Disagree,” 1 “Somewhat Disagree,” 2 “Somewhat Agree,” 3 “Fully Agree.” Each rebel groups’ performance is rated in its own area of significant presence (i.e. the pertinent subpopulation). This table displays the constants from a set of simple regressions without covariates (i.e. simply the dependent variable and no regressors). These constants indicate the predicted probability of the various actors indicated along the left-hand side facilitating NGO projects.

Table 4.23: Full regression results (by subpopulation, without covariates) of rebels’ effect on infrastructure improvement, reference Figure 4.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF</th>
<th>MNLF</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.482***</td>
<td>-1.108***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05  *** p < 0.01
Table 4.24 displays respondents’ ratings of rebel groups’ performance in improving infrastructure in their area. Respondents were asked to what degree they agreed with the statement that a given group had “improved infrastructure in your area.” Responses range from 0 “Fully Disagree,” 1 “Somewhat Disagree,” 2 “Somewhat Agree,” 3 “Fully Agree.” Each rebel groups’ performance is rated in its own area of significant presence (i.e. the pertinent subpopulation). Again, covariates are all mean-centered for each of the three subpopulations.

Table 4.24: Full regression results (by subpopulation, with covariates) on rebels’ effect on infrastructure improvement, reference Figure 4.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF</th>
<th>MNLF</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban/Rural</strong></td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Income</strong></td>
<td>-0.361***</td>
<td>-0.342***</td>
<td>0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of village homes with strong roofs</strong></td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.614</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of village that is Muslim</strong></td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.944***</td>
<td>5.538*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>3.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>0.530*</td>
<td>0.739***</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.012**</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.423***</td>
<td>-1.067***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se   * p < 0.10   ** p < 0.05   *** p < 0.01
Figure 4.11: Local public welfare services (without covariates)

Table 4.25 displays the predicted probabilities with which respondents’ credit various authorities with improving their access to (and available number of) mosques, schools, and madaris. The choices of service provider are given down the vertical axis of the chart. The type of service (improved access to mosques, schools, madaris) is shown along the top. Results are shown for each of the three subpopulations defined—areas of significant presence of MILF, MNLF, and ASG. This table displays the constants from a set of simple regressions without covariates (i.e. simply the dependent variable and no regressors). These constants indicate the predicted probability of the various actors indicated along the left-hand side providing the services arrayed along the top.
Table 4.25: Full categorical responses on local public welfare services (by subpopulation, without covariates), reference Figure 4.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subpopulation</th>
<th>MILF Areas</th>
<th></th>
<th>MNLF Areas</th>
<th></th>
<th>ASG Areas</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mosques</td>
<td>Madaris</td>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>Mosques</td>
<td>Madaris</td>
<td>Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.051***</td>
<td>0.070**</td>
<td>0.118***</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
<td>0.050***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.070**</td>
<td>0.058**</td>
<td>0.029**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>PNP</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations acting on their own</td>
<td>0.054***</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>0.170***</td>
<td>0.204***</td>
<td>0.420***</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.173***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.311***</td>
<td>0.215***</td>
<td>0.023**</td>
<td>0.103***</td>
<td>0.119***</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se * p < 0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p < 0.01
Figure 4.12: Local public welfare services (with covariates)

Table 4.26 displays the predicted probabilities with which respondents' credit various authorities with improving their access to (and available number of) mosques, schools, and madaris. The choices of service provider are given down the vertical axis of the chart. The type of service (improved access to mosques, schools, madaris) is shown along the top. Results are shown for each of the three subpopulations defined—areas of significant presence of MILF, MNLF, and ASG. This table displays the constants from a set of regressions with subpopulation mean-centered covariates. The covariates include an urban/rural indicator, household income, proportion of village homes with strong roofs, proportion of village that is Muslim, and respondent’s gender and age. These constants indicate the predicted probability of the various actors indicated along the left-hand side providing the services arrayed along the top. The choices of service provider are given down the vertical axis of the chart.
Table 4.26: Full categorical responses on local public welfare services (by subpopulation, with covariates), reference Figure 4.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MilF Areas</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>MilF Areas</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>ASG Areas</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mosques</td>
<td>Madaris</td>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>Mosques</td>
<td>Madaris</td>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>Mosques</td>
<td>Madaris</td>
<td>Schools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.051***</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
<td>0.150***</td>
<td>0.015**</td>
<td>0.034**</td>
<td>0.085***</td>
<td>0.023*</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.046***</td>
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<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.012</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.032***</td>
<td>0.016***</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.007</td>
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<td>0.004</td>
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<td>0.017</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.009</td>
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<td>.</td>
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<td>.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations acting on their own</td>
<td>0.064***</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.038***</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>0.091***</td>
<td>0.174***</td>
<td>0.435***</td>
<td>0.074**</td>
<td>0.081***</td>
<td>0.243**</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.131***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.344***</td>
<td>0.288***</td>
<td>0.021***</td>
<td>0.154***</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td>0.041***</td>
<td>0.021***</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se  *p < 0.10  **p < 0.05  ***p < 0.01
Table 4.27 displays the full regression results for respondents’ choice of each rebel group in that group’s own area of significant presence. The covariates are centered to the subpopulation mean for each subpopulation.

Table 4.27: Full regression results on local public welfare services (by subpopulation, with covariates), reference Figure 4.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Choice of MILF in MILF Areas</th>
<th>Choice of MNLF in MNLF Areas</th>
<th>Choice of ASG in ASG Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mosques</td>
<td>Madaris</td>
<td>Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>0.151*</td>
<td>-0.129**</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village homes with strong roofs</td>
<td>-0.274***</td>
<td>-0.218***</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village that is Muslim</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>-0.091***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.117***</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
<td>0.038**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se * p < 0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p < 0.01
Figure 4.13: Rebel groups' facilitation of NGO projects

Table 4.28 displays the predicted probabilities with which respondents’ credit various authorities with facilitating NGO projects in their areas. The authority choices are given down the charts’ vertical axis. Results are shown for each of the three subpopulations—areas of significant presence of MILF, MNLF, and ASG. This table displays the constants from a set of simple regressions without covariates (i.e. simply the dependent variable without regressors). These constants indicate the predicted probability of the actors indicated along the left-hand side facilitating NGO projects.
Table 4.28: Full categorical responses on facilitation of NGO projects (by subpopulation), reference Figure 4.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Without covariates</th>
<th>With Covariates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MILF Areas</td>
<td>MNLF Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.155***</td>
<td>0.176***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG(^{310})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs acting on their own</td>
<td>0.060***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>0.287***</td>
<td>0.171***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.083***</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{310}\) Because ASG was never chosen, these are all zeros.
Table 4.29 displays the full regression results for respondents’ choice of each rebel group in that group’s own area of significant presence. The covariates are centered to the subpopulation mean for each subpopulation.

Table 4.29: Full regression results on rebel groups’ facilitation of NGO projects (by subpopulation), reference Figure 4.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Choice of MILF in MILF Areas</th>
<th>Choice of MNLF in MNLF Areas</th>
<th>Choice of ASG in ASG Areas$^{311}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>-0.035*</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village homes with strong roofs</td>
<td>-0.233**</td>
<td>-0.183</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village that is Muslim</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td>-0.141**</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.032*</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.093**</td>
<td>0.063***</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[b/se\] $^*$ p < 0.10 $^{**}$ p <0.05 $^{***}$ p < 0.01

$^{311}$ Because ASG was never chosen, even in the subpopulation defined by ASG’s significant presence, these are all zeros.
Figure 4.14: Rebel groups’ provision of club-like welfare services (without covariates)

This table displays respondents’ choice of service provider for help in finding a job and in managing business contracts outside their village. The choices available for service provider are given down the vertical axis of the chart. The type of service (job, business) is shown along the top. Results are shown for each of the three subpopulations defined—areas of significant presence of MILF, MNLF, and ASG. This table displays the constants from a set of simple regressions without covariates (i.e. simply the dependent variable and no regressors). These constants indicate the predicted probability of the various actors indicated along the left-hand side providing the services arrayed along the top.
Table 4.30: Full categorical responses on provision of club-like welfare services (by subpopulation, without covariates), reference Figure 4.14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF Areas</th>
<th>MNLF Areas</th>
<th>ASG Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Job</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.508***</td>
<td>0.386***</td>
<td>0.425***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.009*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.047**</td>
<td>0.039**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG\textsuperscript{312}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.189***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myself/Family</td>
<td>0.040***</td>
<td>0.087***</td>
<td>0.123***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>0.152***</td>
<td>0.327***</td>
<td>0.055**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.118***</td>
<td>0.048***</td>
<td>0.073***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{b/se} \quad * p < 0.10 \quad ** p < 0.05 \quad *** p < 0.01

\textsuperscript{312} Because ASG was never chosen, even in the subpopulation defined by ASG’s significant presence, these are all zeros.
Figure 4.15: Rebel groups' provision of club-like welfare services (with covariates)

This table displays respondents’ choice of service provider for help in finding a job and in managing business contracts outside their village. The choices available for service provider are given down the vertical axis of the chart. The type of service (job, business) is shown along the top. Results are shown for each of the three subpopulations defined—areas of significant presence of MILF, MNLF, and ASG. This table displays the constants from a set of regressions with subpopulation mean-centered covariates. The covariates include an urban/rural indicator, household income, proportion of village homes with strong roofs, proportion of village that is Muslim, and respondent’s gender and age. These constants indicate the predicted probability of the various actors indicated along the left-hand side providing the services arrayed along the top. The choices of service provider are given down the vertical axis of the chart. The type of service (job, business) is shown along the top. Results are shown for each of the three subpopulations defined—areas of significant presence of MILF, MNLF, and ASG. Results are thus reported for each rebel group (and other available options) for all subpopulations.
Table 4.31: Full categorical responses on provision of club-like welfare services (by subpopulation, with covariates), reference Figure 4.15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF Areas</th>
<th></th>
<th>MNLF Areas</th>
<th></th>
<th>ASG Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Job</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Job</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.568***</td>
<td>0.447***</td>
<td>0.383***</td>
<td>0.409***</td>
<td>0.475***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.075***</td>
<td>0.046***</td>
<td>0.086***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.085***</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>0.024*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.169***</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.033***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myself/Family</td>
<td>0.034***</td>
<td>0.114***</td>
<td>0.135***</td>
<td>0.087***</td>
<td>0.104***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>0.116***</td>
<td>0.289***</td>
<td>0.082***</td>
<td>0.376***</td>
<td>0.128***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.111***</td>
<td>0.042***</td>
<td>0.485***</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
<td>0.118***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se * p < 0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p < 0.01

Table 4.32 displays the full regression results for respondents’ choice of each rebel group in that group’s own area of significant presence. The covariates are centered to the subpopulation mean for each subpopulation.

---

313 Because ASG was never chosen, even in the subpopulation defined by ASG’s significant presence, these are all zeros.
Table 4.32: Full regression results on rebels’ provision of club-like welfare services (by subpopulation, with covariates), reference Figure 4.15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Choice of MILF in MILF Areas</th>
<th>Choice of MNLF in MNLF Areas</th>
<th>Choice of ASG in ASG Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Job</td>
<td>Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>-0.083**</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.033*</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village homes with strong roofs</td>
<td>-0.208***</td>
<td>-0.193***</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village that is Muslim</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.062***</td>
<td>0.039*</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.085***</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>0.018*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se  * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05  *** p < 0.01
Figure 4.16: Rebel groups’ improvement of agricultural production

Table 4.33 displays respondents’ ratings of rebel groups’ performance in improving agricultural productivity in their area, modeled with covariates. Respondents were asked to what degree they agreed with the statement that a given group had “improved infrastructure in your area.” Responses range from 0 “Fully Disagree,” 1 “Somewhat Disagree,” 2 “Somewhat Agree,” 3 “Fully Agree.” Each rebel groups’ performance is rated in its own area of significant presence (i.e. the pertinent subpopulation). This table displays the constants from a set of simple regressions without covariates (i.e. simply the dependent variable and no regressors). These constants indicate the predicted probability of the various actors indicated along the top improving agricultural productivity.

Table 4.33: Full regression results on rebels’ effect on agricultural production (by subpopulation, without covariates), reference Figure 4.16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF</th>
<th>MNLF</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.686***</td>
<td>-0.969***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05  *** p < 0.01
Table 4.34 displays respondents’ ratings of rebel groups’ performance in improving agricultural productivity in their area, modeled with covariates. Respondents were asked to what degree they agreed with the statement that a given group had “improved infrastructure in your area.” Responses range from 0 “Fully Disagree,” 1 “Somewhat Disagree,” 2 “Somewhat Agree,” 3 “Fully Agree.” Each rebel groups’ performance is rated in its own area of significant presence (i.e. the pertinent subpopulation). Again, covariates are all mean-centered for each of the three subpopulations.

### Table 4.34: Full regression results on rebel groups’ effect on agricultural production (by subpopulation, with covariates), reference Figure 4.16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF</th>
<th>MNLF</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban/Rural</strong></td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>-0.865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Income</strong></td>
<td>-0.628***</td>
<td>-0.298***</td>
<td>0.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of village homes with strong roofs</strong></td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>1.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of village that is Muslim</strong></td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.794**</td>
<td>9.055**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>3.907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.417***</td>
<td>-0.941***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se  * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05  *** p < 0.01
Figure 4.17: Rebel groups’ effect on security in their communities

Table 4.35 displays respondents’ ratings of rebel groups’ effect on security in their areas, modeled without covariates. Responses range from -1 “Decreased Security,” 0 “Made No Difference,” 1 “Increased Security.” Each rebel groups’ performance is rated in its own area of significant presence (i.e. the pertinent subpopulation). This table displays the constants from a set of simple regressions without covariates (i.e. simply the dependent variable and no regressors).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF</th>
<th>MNLF</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>0.570***</td>
<td>0.524***</td>
<td>-0.202***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se  * p < 0.10  ** p <0.05  *** p < 0.01
Table 4.36 displays respondents’ ratings of rebel groups’ effect on security in their areas, modeled with covariates. Responses range from -1 “Decreased Security,” 0 “Made No Difference,” 1 “Increased Security.” Each rebel groups’ performance is rated in its own area of significant presence (i.e. the pertinent subpopulation). The covariates are subpopulation mean-centered.

Table 4.36: Full regression results on rebel groups’ effect on security (by subpopulation, with covariates), reference Figure 4.17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF</th>
<th>MNLF</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban/Rural</strong></td>
<td>0.184*</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Income</strong></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of village homes with strong roofs</strong></td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.294*</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of village that is Muslim</strong></td>
<td>-0.464**</td>
<td>0.709***</td>
<td>1.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>1.653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.093**</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>0.545***</td>
<td>0.397***</td>
<td>-0.205***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se   * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05  *** p < 0.01
Figure 4.18: Rebel fighters' propensity to target civilians

Table 4.37 displays respondents' ratings of how their fighters behave vis-à-vis civilians, modeled without covariates. Responses range from 0 "Fighters deliberately target civilians," 1 “Fighters sometimes hurt civilians,” 2 “Fighters always avoid civilians.” Each rebel groups’ performance is rated in its own area of significant presence (i.e. the pertinent subpopulation). This table displays the constants from a set of simple regressions without covariates (i.e. simply the dependent variable and no regressors).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF</th>
<th>MNLF</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.095***</td>
<td>0.352***</td>
<td>0.700***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.10   ** p <0.05   *** p < 0.01
Table 4.38 displays respondents’ ratings of how their fighters behave vis-à-vis civilians, modeled with covariates. Responses range from 0 “Fighters deliberately target civilians,” 1 “Fighters sometimes hurt civilians,” 2 “Fighters always avoid civilians.” Each rebel groups’ performance is rated in its own area of significant presence (i.e. the pertinent subpopulation). Covariates are subpopulation mean-centered.

Table 4.38: Full regression results on rebel fighters’ propensity to target civilians (by subpopulation, with covariates), reference Figure 4.18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF</th>
<th>MNLF</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.176***</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village</td>
<td>0.193**</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homes with strong roofs</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of village</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>-0.505***</td>
<td>-2.940*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that is Muslim</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>1.565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.131**</td>
<td>-0.213*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.004***</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.048**</td>
<td>0.327***</td>
<td>0.812***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se  * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05  *** p < 0.01
Figure 4.19: Proportion of population that are (or are close to) victims of violence by armed groups: by rebel group perpetrator

Table 4.39 displays the predicted probability of a civilian or someone close to them being a victim of violence by one of the three rebel groups. This table displays the constants from a set of simple regressions without covariates (i.e. simply the dependent variable and no regressors).

### Table 4.39: Full regression results of civilian victimization (by subpopulation, without covariates), reference Figure 4.19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF</th>
<th>MNLF</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.031*</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.128*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se  * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Table 4.40 displays the predicted probability of a civilian or someone close to them being a victim of a human rights violation by one of the three rebel groups. The covariates are subpopulation mean-centered.

Table 4.40: Full regression results of civilian victimization (by subpopulation, with covariates), reference Figure 4.19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILF</th>
<th>MNLF</th>
<th>ASG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban/Rural</strong></td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Income</strong></td>
<td>-0.009***</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of village homes with strong roofs</strong></td>
<td>0.183**</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>-0.175***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of village that is Muslim</strong></td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>-0.103***</td>
<td>0.611***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
<td>0.029*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/se * p < 0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p < 0.01
Chapter 5: Longitudinal analysis of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

In approximately the middle of nowhere, North Cotabato, a large metal sign sprouted along the side of the highway, announcing “MNLF Engineering Brigade.” There was no visible activity in the area, nor had there been for quite some time. The sign is emblematic of Moro frustration with the MNLF. The original face of Moro rebellion in the 20th century, the MNLF has carried the banner for many, but developed an unfortunate reputation first for internal favoritism, and exclusivity in distributing benefits.

Founding Chairman Nur Misuari is both “Maas”—the Elder revolutionary, the passionate face of Moro rebellion to the world—and the man who vowed to channel MNLF resources into a six-lane superhighway around his hometown of Jolo—an island city of some 58 square miles, inhabited by approximately 90,000 people.

MNLF troops are often well behaved, but have been known to engage in kidnap-for-ransom, and for the collection of “revolutionary taxes” implicitly backed by arms. The MNLF’s struggle has won some benefits for the Bangsamoro, with which they are rightly credited. On its own, the organization has delivered services to its communities, but these have often been sporadic, and increasingly available primarily to MNLF personnel and their families. One community organizer with experience in both MNLF and non-MNLF communities sighed, “with the MNLF, the
projects go only to the MNLF. Those who are members or their families, they get the benefit. But not usually for anyone else. It is their club.”

For many Moros, this is the frustration of the MNLF.

This chapter begins with a brief summary of the theoretical propositions I will test in the MNLF case that lie beyond the cross-sectional study offered in Chapter 4. First, I will explore the MNLF at the time of its origin, which preceded the recent time of the cross-sectional study by several decades, comparing the historical record to both the theory’s predicted outcomes and causal mechanisms. I then discuss how exogenous events shifted the ideological position of the MNLF’s donors, and how this led to a new equilibrium. I then compare the MNLF’s behavior in this new equilibrium to its pre-shift operations and to the theoretical predictions.

1. Theoretical Predictions

Among the three Moro rebel groups, the MILF is the “middle case”—with ideological preferences further from the populations’ than the MILF’s, but closer than ASG’s. The MNLF’s original partnership with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and member states like Libya supported a platform fairly close to the popular preferences. Its donors were concerned or popular welfare, but supplied the rebels heavily with military aid.

1 Author interview.
Theory predicts the original MNLF would enact a relatively moderate position, though likely one closer to its donors’ than the popular preference. Furthermore, we expect that high levels of military assistance would reduce the costs of coercion for the MNLF leading the rebels to add more coercion to their governance mix. However, because the group’s ideological position was relatively moderate, the rebels did not suffer the “extremist discount,” in which skeptical civilians provide limited compliance in return for social services and which thus encourages rebels to invest more in coercion.

Furthermore, the MNLF’s donors had relatively high humanitarian preferences. While not as concerned over civilian welfare as the civilians themselves, the MNLF’s backers were concerned that their co-religionists not be abused. However, donors were more concerned about avoiding abuse than they were about ensuring positive rebel governance. Taken together, these factors suggest the group would underinvest in service provision, but not necessarily use coercion directly or frequently against civilians.

World events exogenously shifted the MNLF’s donor’s preferences. By the early 1990s, both the OIC and Libya found an MNLF-GRP agreement a politically expedient means of redeeming their international reputations: the OIC for ineffectualness, and Libya for funding terrorism. The MNLF’s donors were more interested in a signed agreement than in ensuring the terms of the agreement (and MNLF’s subsequent partnership and behavior) matched the interests of the

Theory suggests that if the preferences of rebels’ donors shift, the rebels face the challenge of re-equilibration. They can accept the donors’ new preferences, and adapt their behavior accordingly, or they can refuse to shift their position, and try instead to replace the donors’ support—either by accessing lootable resources or by building more extensive local support. While the former is not usually an option in areas that do not happen to be blessed with such resources, the latter can be costly also, as it may require rebels to adapt their ideological position to domestic preferences, and adjust their coercion-service mix.

The post-1996 MNLF re-equilibrated even further from its ideological roots, and civilians’ ideological preferences. The MNLF’s post-1996 partnership was characterized by lower humanitarian concern than before, and greater ideological distance from the populace. The MNLF received a mix of aid, much of which was effectively fungible. We thus expect the post-1996 MNLF to have adopted an ideological position slightly further from civilian preferences than before, and provide poorer services, while still not relying on extensive coercion.

2. **The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 1.0 (1968-1996)**

Some Middle Eastern countries do not care what happens. They give full support, [saying] ‘okay, do your best!’ They don’t care if our rebel government helps or hurts.

- Senior MNLF leader, Cotabato City 2009
The original Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was an amalgamation of Moro dissent, including what Molloy (2005) dubs a contradictory alliance between traditional Moro elites and a growing counterelite. These young, educated Moro firebrands were opposed to repression not only by the Filipino state, but also by the traditional datu class. For their part, the datus were frustrated with their increasing marginalization under Filipino rule. Though awkward, this partnership proved sufficient to form a nascent rebellion. Both young intellectuals and respected elites generated popular support. Elites also contributed their private armies and connections to the wider Muslim world. Ideologically, the emerging organization’s reliance on the datus effectively muzzled the counterelites’ social reform ambitions. The MNLF could hardly propose a platform of social reform that would challenge the hierarchy of which much of their founding core was a part. McKenna (1998) notes,

“Although both Misuari and Salamat, in their pre-MNFL days, had held as a top priority the reform or elimination of datu leadership, the

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2 McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*: 138-44. identifies two intellectual counterelites within the young Moro cadre. First, those like Nur Misuari with secular educations, usually from scholarship positions at Manila universities. Second, scholars like Salamat Hashim (eventual founder of the MILF), who drew degrees from scholarship programs at Islamic educational institutions abroad. This is consistent with Salamat’s own characterization of the MNLF’s formation in later interviews, in which he differentiates between traditional elites, “the group of Misuari,” and “the group of Moro students in the Arab world” (i.e. himself and his colleagues) Lacaba, "The Bangsamoro Agenda, Midweek (December 10, 1986)," 41.; For discussion at length on this contradictory alliance see Molloy, "The Decline of the Moro National Liberation Front in the Southern Philippines."; ———, "The Lost Revolution: Marcos vs. the Moros and the seeds of terrorism."
official ideology of the MNLF hardly addressed issues of internal social transformation."³

Instead, the MNLF proclaimed its goals as bangsa (nation), hulah (homeland), and agama (religion)—largely emphasized in that order.⁴ Both those inside and outside the MNLF seem comfortable describing the MNLF as a “nationalist rather than Islamist” organization. Islam was part of the nationalist identity the MNLF pursued (indeed, it was one of the few traits shared across the Moro tribes), and part of the rebels’ founding ideology.⁵ However, it was so largely in the context of coinciding cleavages—the oppressed Muslim minority versus the colonial Christian majority. The MNLF’s manifesto articulated in 1974 mentions Islam only three times: first to highlight Muslims as targets of Marcos’ aggression, second to indicate the MNLF was “committed to the preservation and growth of Islamic culture among our people, without prejudice to the development and growth of other religious and indigenous cultures in our homeland,” and third to recognize that the Bangsamoro “are a part of the Islamic World as well as of the Third World and the oppressed colonized humanity everywhere in the world.”⁶

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³ McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines: 165.
⁴ Author interview.
While many of the MNLF founders were religious men, and its cadre included ulama, the MNLF did not specifically pursue an “Islamic state,” a platform of religious reform and/or renewal, or spend significant effort in integrating Moro religious elites into its body politic. Furthermore, the MNLF at least verbally welcomed non-Muslims, and “recognize[d] the fact that not all the people in Mindanao and in the other islands are Muslims.” As one long-time (Christian) NGO worker noted, “with the MNLF, there was no obvious imposition of religion. They were fighting for independence, but when it came to religion, the approach was ‘you’re on your own’.”

2.1. MNLF 1.0: Donors

One of the key assets traditional elites brought with them to the revolution were ties to the wider Islamic world, including the Middle East, and the newly-formed Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC was an outgrowth of the state-led Islamic nationalism of the post-colonial Middle East. In the Moro cause, the OIC found an opportunity to pursue its founding principles, which called the organization to promote solidarity throughout the ummah (global Islamic community), and “[t]o strengthen the struggle of all Moslem peoples with a view to

8 ———.
9 For discussion of these links, from the perspective of a member of the Bangsamoro traditional elite, see Lucman, Moro Archives: A History Of Armed Conflicts in Mindanao and East Asia.
safeguarding their dignity, independence, and national rights.” 10 The MNLF became one of many Muslim minorities the OIC supported. 11

The OIC does not provide material backing directly to any of the various Muslim populations and groups it supports. Rather, the organization provides publicity, political clout, and a legitimizing umbrella for bilateral aid from its member states. The MNLF drew support from many OIC members. Indonesia shared not only a religious tie, but also may have seen involvement in the conflict as crucial to its ambitions for regional hegemony in Southeast Asia. 12 Malaysia sympathized with their Moro co-religionists, but may have backed the Moros in retaliation against the GRP as part of a territorial dispute over the state of Sabah. 13

10 OIC Charter, Article II, paragraph 6; rephrased as “[t]o safeguard the rights, dignity and religious and cultural identity of Muslim communities and minorities in non-Member States” in the OIC Charter of 2008 section Article I, paragraph 16.
11 The OIC has always supported the Palestinian cause. It has also encouraged its members to support minorities in Bulgaria, India, and Burma. The 1973 conference that produced statements of support for the Moros, also made statements in support the Guinean, Palestinian and Muslim Benghali people, and a combined statement in support of African peoples (including South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and in Zimbabwe) – all recognizing and supporting their struggles for self-determination and anti-colonialism. The OIC extended observer status (like that given to the MNLF in 1977) to the Turkish Muslim community of Cyprus in 1979, which it later upgraded to full membership for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 2004.
13 Prescillano D. Campado, “The MNLF-OIC Dyad and the Philippine Government’s Policy Response to Moro Struggle for Self-Determination” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of the Philippines, 1996), 74.; Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines: 47.; T. J. S. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford University Press, 1980), 234-38 and 64.; Marcos claimed Sabah as part of the Philippine territories under international law. Ironically, the Philippine claim to Sabah relies on a preexisting Moro claim. The sultan of Brunei ceded the territory now known as Sabah to the Sultan of Sulu in 1658. In 1761, the Sultan of Sulu leased the territory to the British East India Company. A series of business deals among the Europeans transferred rights to Sabah multiple times. Eventually, the territory was folded into the states first declared British protectorates, and then independent Malaysia.
The MNLF also drew support bilaterally from a number of Middle Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia. None, however, was as generous or prominently involved as Libya. Quaddhafi not only took up the Moro cause bilaterally, but also served as an outspoken advocate for the MNLF in the OIC. Libya shared the OIC’s concern for Muslim minorities, and Quaddhafi was known for supporting nationalist and anti-imperialist movements worldwide.

While supporting self-determinationist goals for Muslim minorities, there were limits to how far the OIC was willing to push the issue. The organization quickly shifted to supporting autonomy, not secession for the Bangsamoro. The OIC’s reticence was doubly motivated. First, eager to establish itself among other international organizations, the OIC may have felt pressure to conform to international norms of sovereignty. Furthermore, many OIC member states faced

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14 Libya’s then-leader Muammar Quaddahfi reportedly heard of the Moro struggle through a BBC announcement of the Manili Massacre in 1971. In the incident, some 79 Moro men, women, and children were rounded up into a Mosque in Carmen, North Cotabato, and allegedly killed by Philippine government forces. Vitug and Gloria Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao: 60.; Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines: 51. The massacre entered the popular history of the Bangsamoro as a touchstone of the early modern struggle.


16 In 1974, just a year after its first statement of support for the Moros, the OIC publicly backed "a just solution (...) within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines (emphasis added)" Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, "Resolution Np. 18/5-P." Prior to OIC’s public statement, a representative from a 1973 delegation from the Muslim World League to observe the Moros’ situation "stated both in private and in public that Muslims should stop threatening secession. He said it was better that they remain a strong religious community within the Philippine nation." Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines: 82-3.
their own restive minorities at home, making it problematic for them to back Moro independence outright.

On the Islamic ideological front, while the MNLF’s bilateral and OIC support were predicated on a shared bond between fellow Muslims, the post-colonial Islamic nationalism of which the OIC was representative was led by largely secular nationalist states. For these actors, that the minorities they supported were Muslim seems to have been sufficient—they did not push for religious reform. Similarly, while Quaddafi himself was a devout Muslim, neither Islamic beliefs nor goals appear to have been a prerequisite for his support for anti-colonialist struggles. The MNLF’s other bilateral donors seem to have partially been concerned with the Moros’ fate because of their religious tie, but not worried about their Islamic practice per se.

Finally, in terms of social reform, the OIC mirrored the MNLF’s awkward elite-counterelite pairing. In 1984, the Libyan Prime Minister noted to his OIC colleagues that “only one division existed between the Muslims countries, and that was between the progressive revolutionary and the conservative reactionary states.” While Libya was certainly on the “progressive” side of this divide, the organization as a whole was heavily shaped by Saudi conservatism and anti-Soviet

17 Among others, Libya supported the Irish Republican Army and Germany’s Baader-Meinhof Group. While both were anti-colonial and/or anti-imperialist, neither was particularly Islamic.
18 Quoted in Khan, Reasserting International Islam: A Focus on the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Other Islamic Institutions: 184.; see also Kepel, "Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam," 46. for a similar analysis.
and anti-Communist stance. While is it not clear that, as an organization the OIC had specific governance structures in mind for its protégés, radical social reform along class lines would not be welcomed.

**MNLF 1.0: Donors’ humanitarian concern**

In addition to their anti-colonial, pro-Muslim stand, support from both the OIC and Libya was framed as protection of the Moro minority against abuse by the Philippine government. It would thus have been embarrassing if their MNLF protégés proceeded to undertake abuse similar to that they decried. While in the 1970s and 80s, Quaddhafi clearly accepted being linked to mass-casualty activities, even he might have had difficulty—both internally and externally—supporting activities in which these casualties were fellow Muslims. Both Malaysia and Indonesia were wary of destabilization along their archipelagic borders—a concern excessive coercion by the MNLF against its own citizens would have exacerbated. Overall, the MNLF’s supporters were more concerned with poor governance and abuse by the Filipino regime than they were with good governance by the MNLF—

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19 Indeed, the frequency with which progressive views like those of Libyan Muammar Al-Quaddhafi caused contention within the OIC illustrates the organization’s conservatism on this issue. See Lillian Craig Harris, *Libya: Qadhafi’s revolution and the modern state* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 86.

20 Member states were concerned both by the allegations of genocide leveled against Marcos by Misuari’s missive to the Ministers, and by the other allegations of cultural and political repression “Misuari: Marcos Committing Genocide.”; Villanueva, Ocampo, and Pastor, “MNLF Charges Government of Genocide Plans.”; Pillai, “Razak: The Peacemaker.”
low-level, intermittent excesses and collateral damage would likely have been acceptable, but widespread violations would not.\textsuperscript{21}

**MNLF 1.0: Forms of support offered by donors**

The MNLF’s donors’ interest in MNLF making a strong showing of Muslim nationalism shows in their choice of support. While some member states did give humanitarian assistance—largely in the form of several mosques and madaris—but this was very limited.\textsuperscript{22} Most of their aid was military. The MNLF received arms, ammunition, and other materiel from its backers.\textsuperscript{23} Libya, as well as Sabah and other parts of Malaysia provided military training and camps.\textsuperscript{24} The rebels also received fungible assistance from Libya,\textsuperscript{25} Saudi Arabia,\textsuperscript{26} Indonesia,\textsuperscript{27} and others.\textsuperscript{28}

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\textsuperscript{21} It should be noted that any such transgressions by the MNLF would not likely have remained hidden: given Marcos’ political acumen, his regime would have lost little time in publicizing any such abuses.

\textsuperscript{22} Majul, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*: 83., these were delivered in 1978; Sabah provided work permits for some 25,000 refugees from Mindanao, see A Correspondent, "PHILIPPINES: Who’s backing the Muslim rebels?.”; Author interview.; ---. Notes of Iran’s “legitimate religious projects in the South” Vokey, "Khomeini’s hand in the Islamic glove: Marcos seeks secret talks with Muslim rebels and troops attack their island strongholds as Teheran takes a new interest.”; on Libyan and OIC’s support for mosque repair and building, see Majul, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*; Author interview.

\textsuperscript{23} A Correspondent, "PHILIPPINES: Who’s backing the Muslim rebels?.”; Ocampo, "PHILIPPINES: Calling in the neighbours: Encouraged by Indonesian support, Manila seeks Kuala Lumpur’s help in the search for peace in Mindanao.”; Morella, "Interview with MNLF Officer on Arms, Aid.”; "Foreign vessels unloading arms for MNLF," *Manila FEBC in English*, 15 May 1981.; "PHILIPPINES: THE MORO REBELLION: Who calls the shots?.”; Interviews, December 2009 Current residents of the Western Sarangani coast recount the early decades of the revolution when shipments of arms and trainees were a frequent occurrence; "Muslim leader on Arab funding of separatists’ arms," *Hong Kong AFP in English*, 25 June 1981.

\textsuperscript{24} A Correspondent, "PHILIPPINES: Who’s backing the Muslim rebels?.”; Dumia, "The Moro National Liberation Front and the Organization of the Islamic Conference: Its Implication to National Security," 104 fn #85. lists trainings, citing these as late as 1984; Claimed by MNLF as late as 1988 Morella,
The OIC and its member states also provided political support. Donor pressure on the incumbent augments (and partially substitutes for) rebels’ own efforts to compel the government—rebels can then use the resources they would have spent on such efforts to consolidate their domestic rule. Oil-rich donors threatened to embargo oil shipments to the Philippines should the state make insufficient concessions to the MNLF. Similarly, the MNLF’s foreign backers provided asylum for many in its leadership. While this move had multiple causes and consequences, it is worth noting that this assistance obviated the MNLF’s need to undertake the expenses needed to protect its own leadership.

"Interview with MNLF Officer on Arms, Aid."; on Malaysia Pillai, "Razak: The Peacemaker."; "Arms said sent to Moslem rebels via Malaysia," *Hong Kong AFP in English*, 6 August 1987.


26 The amount estimated at $250 million, ———, "PHILIPPINES: Calling in the neighbours: Encouraged by Indonesian support, Manila seeks Kuala Lumpur's help in the search for peace in Mindanao."


29 Majul, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*: 89-90. OPEC countries lifted the 1973 embargo against the Philippines conditional on their willingness to negotiate with the MNLF and OIC. The threat of a second embargo pushed Marcos to the negotiating table in 1976, Author interview. In response to Marcos’ failure to implement the resultant agreement, Saudi Arabia cancelled a 10,000 barrel per day contract to the Philippines, and Iran instituted its own embargo of the archipelago, and that year’s ICFM statement seemed to back any embargo seen fitting by OIC member states. The contract was reinstated following Imelda Marcos’ diplomatic mission to Riyadh. For statistics on Philippine dependence on Arab oil See "PHILIPPINES: THE MORO REBELLION: Who calls the shots?" and Campado, "The MNLF-OIC Dyad and the Philippine Government’s Policy Response to Moro Struggle for Self-Determination," 88.
2.2. MNLF 1.0: Producing Quasi-Voluntary Compliance

**MNLF 1.0: Enacted ideological position**

The MNLF’s resultant behavior is not only consistent with theoretical predcinations, but the details of negotiations between the MNLF and its foreign sponsors suggest rebels and donors make decision in a fashion consistent with the underlying assumptions and causal mechanisms of the theory. Negotiations between the MNLF and OIC suggest ideological congruence was a prerequisite for their partnership. In partnering with the OIC, the MNLF core was pushed to compromise both its preference for social reform, and its nationalist ambitions.

On social reform, Molloy (2005) notes, “[a]ttempts by the [MNLF] to generate external Islamic support also diluted the movement’s radicalism. The revolution became hostage to the conservative, if not ultra-reactionary, states of the Middle East.”30 By usurping access to sponsors abroad, Misuari successfully muscled the conservative elites out of the MNLF leadership. With such traditionalists out of the way, the MNLF might have been able to pursue the social reforms the MNLF’s young counterelite (like Misuari) thought Moro society needed, and which the Moro populace would likely have welcomed. Ironically, the MNLF’s new sponsors were also socially conservative. The anti-Soviet Saudis were adamantly opposed to signs

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30 Molloy, "The Lost Revolution: Marcos vs. the Moros and the seeds of terrorism," 68. A local observer commented, “there was a more egalitarian plank in the original MNLF platform. But that got watered down, possibly as an issue of practicality” Author interview.
of socialism in the MNLF, and even demanded Misuari appear before the Rabitat to publicly deny accusations of Communist leanings. When “Islamic socialist” Quaddafi encouraged a militarily advantageous alliance between the MNLF and the Communists’ front in Mindanao, Misuari refused, on the grounds that it would weaken his OIC ties.

Furthermore, the MNLF’s partnership with its foreign backers required the rebels to pursue autonomy, rather than secession—the OIC’s 1974 statement of support for the Moros publicly backed a solution within the territorial and constitutional bounds of the Philippines. While secessionist movements often settle for autonomy, having to concede this point even before making it to the negotiating table was a blow to the MNLF’s ideological goals, which could be less-fully implemented under autonomy than under independence.

That the Agreement was signed on terms the MNLF sponsors found appealing (rather than the MNLF’s domestic constituency) is suggested by the fact that Quaddafi effectively negotiated the MNLF’s behalf. In a series of telegrams to and

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31 Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines: 85-6. The Marcos political machine heavily played up allegations that the MNLF was a Communist organization, leveraging Misuari’s previous ties to a Communist youth organization while a student at the University of the Philippines. 32 “INTERVIEW: A religious war of attrition.” 33 The statement backed “a just solution (...) within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines” Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, “Resolution Np. 18/5-P.” Prior to OIC’s public statement, a representative from a 1973 delegation from the Muslim World League to observe the Moros’ situation “stated both in private and in public that Muslims should stop threatening secession. He said it was better that they remain a strong religious community within the Philippine nation.” Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines: 82-3.
from Marcos, Quaddhafi vetted the exact phrasing of the Agreement, including Paragraph 16, which makes implementation of the agreement subject to the Philippine Constitutional process, enshrining autonomy (and limited autonomy at that) as the Agreement’s bottom line. While these terms were not popular within the MNLF, let alone their wider domestic constituency, Quaddhafi was privately convinced in communication with Marcos, and exerted pressure on Misuari whenever he attempted to walk out on negotiations.34 Following Marcos’ failure to implement the Agreement, the OIC resisted the MNLF’s renewed calls for independence. In spite of a flurry of international diplomacy on this point by the MNLF, the OIC stuck to its guns.35 While critical of Marcos and supportive of the MNLF, the OIC did not back Misuari’s move for independence, and some admitted concerns over his renewed “radicalism” on this issue.36

34 Author interview, (Local journalist: Quezon City, Philippines, June 2008).
36 Vitug and Gloria Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao: 35. James Clad, "PHILIPPINES: Moros raise the stakes: Muslim insurgents seek to join the Islamic world group," Far Eastern Economic Review, CD-ROM, 18 February 1988.; "Forum: Guiamel Alim Secretary General Alyansang Moro na Makabangsa (AMMA)," Moro Kurier 1987, 6-7. The OIC also did not grant the MNLF full membership, which the rebels saw as a step on its way to approval, backing, and achievement of full independence
Both contemporary debates within the MNLF and later public statements suggest that the OIC-backed compromise cost the rebels domestically, and they knew it. One senior commander commented that, after the agreement had already been signed by Misuari,

The 1978 Central Committee meeting questioned Tripoli, but [Misuari] said it was the call of time, cannot ignore the advices, the pressure of the OIC to accept the Philippine government’s offer. To abandon our position for independence for autonomy, it seemed the better part of wisdom. Otherwise, we would be left alone. Because we cannot isolate ourselves from the rest of the world.37

Both privately and publicly, Misuari never let the OIC forget that it was at their insistence that the MNLF accepted autonomy.38 While Moro civilians backed secession, many would likely have settled for autonomy that provided political and economic improvements. In reality, many Moros likely had a limited understanding of the nuances of the MNLF’s agreement for autonomy—not for any lack of political savvy on their part, but because they were not privy to details of the negotiation. However, as the decades wore on, this position became clearer, and did cost the MNLF domestic credibility.

37 Author interview.
38 Nur Misuari, 20 May 1977; ———, "An MNLF Official Position Vis-A-Vis The Question of GRP Application for Observer Status in the OIC before the 36th OIC-CFM in Damascus, Syria," in MNLF Position Paper (Damascus, Syria: Moro National Liberation Front, 2009); Privately, Misuari commented in subsequent interviews "It was a bitter pill for us to swallow – the position of the OIC"; Author interview.; ———.
Following its partnership with the OIC, the MNLF remained a nationalist, rather than Islamist, organization, and often (at least publicly) took a line inclusive of non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{39} The rebels largely left domestic Islamic practice untouched. In so doing, the MNLF also left unanswered an increasing interest in Islamic revival.\textsuperscript{40} Says one long time observer, “the focus was more on ‘Bangsa’ [nation] and ‘hulah’ [homeland] than on ‘Agama’ [religion].”\textsuperscript{41}

In sum, the MNLF’s ideological position would not have engendered too much skepticism from the public. The organization was somewhat removed from popular preferences on all three dimensions, but not hugely so. Thus, the organization would not have suffered from a large “extremist discount”—service provision would have been a reasonably effective way to generate compliance. The MNLF’s sponsors thus did not face a sharp tradeoff between the ideological position they insisted the MNLF adopt, and their level of humanitarian concern. They could ship the MNLF military aid without worrying that the rebels’ limited ideological compromise would push the MNLF to turn their guns against civilians on a large scale.

\textsuperscript{39} “INTERVIEW: A religious war of attrition.”
\textsuperscript{40} While there is some debate about the date of the Islamic resurgence in Mindanao, McKenna (1998) puts it at around 1980 McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines: 205.
\textsuperscript{41}Author interview.; Iribani, Give Peace A Chance: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks: 72.
**MNLF 1.0: Coercion and service provision**

Even so, the MNLF’s mix of coercion and service provision was shaped by their donors’ preferences, and the forms of aid they supplied. First and foremost, it is clear the MNLF’s donors wanted a military organization that could make a show of force (and, by proxy, a show of OIC and bilateral donors’ efficacy) against the Philippine state. They wanted this more than an effective Moro government providing services to Moro civilians. To this end, they provided the rebels with extensive military training, weapons and ammunition shipments. While such aid clearly helped the MNLF fight the war, they also improved the organization’s coercive capabilities, while doing nothing to build its service provision. Furthermore, MNLF donors’ humanitarian threshold consisted of avoidance of bad behavior, with limited concern over good behavior. However, because services remained a viable way to generate compliance, the rebels had limited incentives to turn this coercive apparatus against their own civilians. Together, these factors produced an MNLF whose service provision structures existed, but remained underdeveloped.

The MNLF’s limited investment in service provision is evidenced in anemic domestic coalition building and underdeveloped service provision. There should be no question that the original MNLF was a mass-based and popular rebellion. However, one of the hallmarks of service-intensive governance is representative, or at least consultative, institutions (be they formal or informal). Here, the MNLF suffered. Misuari rarely convened the MNLF’s Central Committee, the Central
Committee had relatively poor communication with the ground commanders, and consultation by any of these with the grassroots was *ad hoc* at best.

This lack of consultation affected the MNLF in several ways. First, it both emphasized and ensured distance between the organizations’ ideological position and civilians’. Second, consultation provides a forum in which to debate and determine how rebels will govern, including distributional benefits like service provision. Misuari’s core group could have been more consultative, likely increasing satisfaction with the organization, but it would have taken time, effort, and compromise to satisfy the constituent parts of the Bangsamoro. Instead, he focused on keeping the MNLF’s foreign coalition intact. As one MNLF commander, who later transferred his loyalties to the MILF, commented:

“*In every movement, there is a difference between the internal and the external. The MNLF had the external, that was what they cultivated.*”

In contrast to the extensive negotiations between Misuari and the MNLF’s sponsors surrounding the 1976 Agreement, Misuari did not convene the Central Committee, nor involve other MNLF leaders co-located in the Middle East before signing the agreement. This unilateralism was one of the complaints cited in the formation of both the New MNLF (renamed the MILF in 1981) and the MNLF-

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42 Author interview.
43 Cojuangco, "The Role of the MILF in the Mindanao Problem," 37-9.; Author interview.; ———.
Reformist Group. Below the Central Committee, the field commanders were also rarely consulted, an omission that damaged the leadership’s ability to read the political pulse of the domestic population or (as will be discussed) ensure control of its commanders and troops.

At the grassroots level, MNLF consultation was often sporadic. No grassroots consultations were held before the 1976 Agreement, though well-publicized (and sometimes dubious) public fora were held before the 1986 and 1996 Agreements. On a more daily basis, some consultative “Congresses” were set up, but seem unclear in their assembly schedule and jurisdiction. No civilians interviewed for this research mentioned them as a mechanism through which they felt connected to the movement. The movement apparently had longer-term ambitions of public consultation; frequently arguing the final form of government a victorious MNLF would enact would be up to the “consensus of the people.” While likely at least a partial smokescreen for its underdeveloped political and social program, these

44 Cojuangco, “The Role of the MILF in the Mindanao Problem,” 38-9.; ibid., 37-9.; one senior MNLF member commented in exasperation, “I have given the best years of my life to this movement, and for what?” Author interview.
statements are worth noting—particularly in contrast to the ideological elitism of the ASG’s current incarnation (see Chapter 6).47

Similarly, the MNLF struggled to build domestic coalitions—making limited investments to recruit qualified personnel (itself a form of support from the domestic population) and bridge tribal divides. While at the outset Misuari brokered savvy deals between his own reformists and traditional elites, retained members from most (if not all) of the Moro tribes, the movement remained mass-based, but the MNLF’s coalition building evidenced two particular faults. First, the rebels struggled to maintain organizational ties across ethnic divides within the Bangsamoro. As the sultans had discovered centuries before the MNLF, building the Moros into a broad-based coalition is a difficult enterprise.48 In a society in which loyalty is often flows along bloodlines, complaints soon surfaced that Misuari’s MNLF favored his Tausug co-ethnics at the expense of other tribal groups for leadership positions and receipt of money and materiel from abroad.49 While


48 The MNLF was certainly aware of both the need for cross-ethnic coalition-building, and the costs of doing so. The first issue of *Maharlika*, an MNLF publication: "From this very moment there shall be no stressing the fact that one is a Tausug, a Samal, a Yakan, a Sub anon, a Kalagan, a Maguindanao, a Maranao, or a Badjao. He is only Moro." Noble, "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines," 418. citing Gowing “Moros and Khaek”

49 Author interview.; Lucman, *Moro Archives: A History Of Armed Conflicts in Mindanao and East Asia: 162. cites allegations of the “re-routing” of various materiel and funds; sometime MILF-sympathizer Zacaria Candao commented in a 1988 interview to Margarita Cojuancgo that “[t]he field commanders received reports that Libya and other sympathetic benefactors among the Muslim countries
certainly the original MNLF was not, as some later claimed, a “Tausug-only” organization, the frequency of these complaints suggest the Front struggled with cross-ethnic unity.\(^{50}\)

Brokering these ties might have necessitated ideological compromise by the MNLF, and (if favoritism was indeed the case) a wider distribution of foreign largesse. Instead, as the revolution entered the 1980s, MNLF dominance shifted to primarily Western Mindanao and Sulu—Misuari’s birthplace and home to the Tausug ethnic group.\(^{51}\) Underinvestment in inter-ethnic ties took an operational, as well as geographic toll: Molloy (2005) notes that over time, within the MNLF, “the ethnic differences and elite rivalries within the Moro people finally overrode the cohesion which effective military command requires.”\(^{52}\)

The MNLF’s struggles with internal coherence are something of an open secret, and the subject of frequent commentary by observers and rueful admissions contributed huge amounts to be spent for the purchase of arms and the operations of field commanders. According to them, they received only trickles of these funds. According to the three commanders, they verified the fact that funds were really received by Misuari but that he kept these funds for himself” Cojuangco, "The Role of the MILF in the Mindanao Problem," 38-9.; Norodin Lucman cites Rashid Lucman as writing “Misuari sold to Malaysia the new arms which were intended as a share to the Lanao command of the BMA. The arms were sold for P700,000 pesos in 1973. In 1974, Aly Terekky went to Sabah with money intended for the Moro rebels, but which never came. According to Camid Kamilian, Terekky with Captain Bashi Saad of Libya, Misuari, and some Malaysian officers divided the money among themselves. (emphasis original)" Lucman, Moro Archives: A History Of Armed Conflicts in Mindanao and East Asia: 162.

\(^{50}\) Interview with Assemblyman and former MNLF Commander Conte Mangelen, Office of the Regional Chairman, Autonomous Region 12, Cotabato City, 27 July 1983 quoted in Molloy, "The Lost Revolution: Marcos vs. the Moros and the seeds of terrorism," 57.; Author interview.

\(^{51}\) Western Mindanao areas include the Zamboanga peninsula, as well as the islands of Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Sulu—home to Misuari and fellow Tausugs.

\(^{52}\) Molloy, "The Lost Revolution: Marcos vs. the Moros and the seeds of terrorism," 40; Author interview.
from within. Eventually, the “Provincial Committees acted on their own initiatives. The Central Committee contented itself with setting broad policy outlines and pursuing external support. Leaving local leaders to make their own decisions.”

Second, within the organization itself, sponsors’ primarily military assistance contributed to an MNLF that thought of itself as a military operation first, and a political organization second. Indeed, a Communist political officer commented in 1980 that MNLF faced difficulties in political organization, and that the organization was “geared mainly to fight and not to politicise the people. The NPA, on the other hand, organises mass bases first; at this stage fighting is done only when necessary.” Even senior commanders admit the excesses of the Marcos regime may have been a better recruiter for MNLF support than they were. At the time, observer and journalist Aijaz Ahmad commented “the MNLF never was much of a political organization.”

The MNLF’s recruitment of technocrats capable of good service provision was hampered both by the rebels’ ideological line and by its military focus. As an

57 Ahmad, "The War Against the Muslims," 17.
artifact of its alliance structure (and concomitant ideological positioning), the MNLF found itself in an unenviable position of having alienated many elites (who resented being muscled from the leadership) but maintaining a status quo position on social issues, which satisfied the OIC, but frustrated many educated professionals at home.58

Even without extensive technocratic recruitment, the MNLF did develop a political and social service apparatus.59 However, at the margins, foreign sponsors’ military focus made it easier for the MNLF to invest in a military and coercive apparatus than in service provision. A high-ranking MNLF member commented the political organization came some five years after the MNLF’s formation.60 To be fair, the AFP’s military offensives during the MNLF’s formative years in the 1970s made military focus something of a necessity.61 However, even during negotiations and ceasefires (which alleviated military pressure on the rebels), the MNLF could have

58 McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*: 140. on CNI graduates. McKenna (1998) argues the educated professional class was often more attracted to the MILF—both out of frustration with the Philippine regime and those traditional elites who collaborated with Marcos, but also because of the efforts of Zacaria Candao, who undertook extensive recruitment efforts on behalf of the MILF during the 1980s ibid., 213-4.


60 Author interview.

61 Indeed, today, many civilians note that their relationship with the MILF changes from peace time (during with the movement helps the communities more) and war time (during which the communities help the movement more).
built up its political and service provision structures. Instead, the MNLF floundered, not developing its service arms, and failing to mend political rifts with multiple factions within the MNLF, and focused more on trying to leverage international support for renewed calls for independence.

Anemic development of the rebels’ service wing meant those who did provide services on behalf of the MNLF struggled to do so, and service provision was often at local commanders’ discretion. Certainly, many commanders worked to provide services to their communities. However, this effort was not universally shared among their cohort, nor was it provided more than limited organizational support—fiscal, institutional, or otherwise. An MNLF commander confessed he made “some efforts to help, but these were ad hoc.” A former colleague (who later joined the MILF) comments that service provision was part of his training in the MILF cadre, but not the MNLF. Tellingly, one very senior MNLF commander noted the original heads of the MNLF’s social service committees had defected to the MILF

62 Molloy, “The Lost Revolution: Marcos vs. the Moros and the seeds of terrorism,” 30. cites a 1983 interview with Commander Amir, a political officer of the MNLF’s Northern Mindanao Revolutionary Command, in which he commented the MNLF was looking forward “consolidat[ing] politically and ideologically ... [and] retrain[ing militarily]” during the respite.
63 ———, “The Conflicts in Mindanao. Whilst The Revolution Rolls On, The Jihad Falters,” (Queensland: University of Queensland, 1983); ———, ”The Decline of the Moro National Liberation Front in the Southern Philippines.”; Author interview.; ———. In contrast, during the relative lull of the late 1990s, the MILF invested heavily in developing its service provision apparatus. ———; ———
64 ———.; ———.; ———.  
65 ———.  
66 ———.
during the 1980s.  They may have switched allegiance specifically to an organization that provided them with more resources and institutional support to pursue these activities.

Effectively delegating service provision to commanders may have contributed to provision of services in a club-goods fashion. Initially, many services were geared towards fighters, not civilians—including medical services, schools, and daycare. While open to civilians, the impetus behind these services (and their primary recipients) were the MNLF fighters, perpetuating an in/out distinction in the provision of services in a club-like fashion—particularly aken in conjunction with the MNLF’s increasing reliance on family ties in recruitment and promotion within the organization (discussed further below).

That being said, the MNLF did develop some services accessible to the Moro public. MNLF affiliates formed several NGOs in the 1980s, and their proponents specifically saw themselves as filling in for the MNLF’s underdeveloped service arm. However, these groups recall this period as a lean one, and did not take hold until after the 1996 Agreement.

The rebels won over some clerics heading existing madaris and add these schools to their roster of services. However, the MNLF’s limited investment in

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67 ———.
68 Ibid.; ibid.
69 ———.; ———.
service provision meant many ulama and madaris remained outside the MNLF network, and the organization did not develop or coordinate curriculum among the madaris it did control. In the 1980s, this underinvestment was revealed more sharply—many ulama found both the MILF’s specifically Islamic ideology attractive, as well as the MILF’s explicit efforts to recruit and integrate Islamic clerics into their body politic.

The MNLF also invested in public safety and law-and-order. The rebels military wing undertook operations against kidnappers, and the MNLF developed a system of sharia courts. Adjudication was one of their most widely available services, sometimes the position of judge overlapping (as is the case with the MILF) with base command positions. MNLF sharia courts handled largely civil concerns, such as encouraging marriage between unwed partners or other courtship difficulties. The courts also handled some cases of cattle rustling, and mitigated some clan feuds. The MNLF did not seek to extend sharia law over the non-Islamized tribes (Lumads) or settler populations. They did, however, provide

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70 ———.; ibid.; ibid.
71 Peter G. Gowing, "We are constantly asked..." Dansalan Quarterly 2, no. 4 (1981): 262.
73 ———.; ———.;
74 ———.;
75 ———.; ———.
rulings to such populations if they were sought, as they sometimes were if an incident involved a Moro civilian.76

Consistent with the MNLF’s ideological position, the rebels’ application of sharia was largely a reflection of contemporary Islamic practice—comprising combination of Islamic law and adat, or common, law. MNLF commanders admit their MILF cousins were (and are) “more strict” (in the religious sense) in the implementation of sharia, and the MNLF did not attempt to institute a regularized set of rules.77 Codification of rules and punishment provide clarification and assurance to those going about daily life. While governors can certainly institutionalize corrupt rulings and injustice, a degree of regularity in rulings is a one of the benefits of rule-of-law.

Moreover, the MNLF’s implementation of law and order revealed its underinvestment in services and some coercive elements of its apparatus. Civilians recount that, particularly in matters of intelligence and defection, the MNLF often executed those suspected of being informants without a trial.78 Such actions may betray a preference for military security over public welfare—and ran the risk that they would target an innocent man.79 Such mistakes would have damaged MNLF’s

76 ———.; ———.; Catarata, "Kumander Narra."
77 Author interview.
78 ———., confirmed in interview with a Maguindanaoan NGO worker, whose uncle served as in MNLF “enforcer” during the 1970s and 1980s, frequently beheading suspected informants.
79 Such targeting could occur if rebels simply made a mistake, or if community members used the rebel apparatus to satisfy their own grudges by making false accusations against their own rivals
local reputation. A more expensive, but less coercive option would be to invest in a trial. However, at least some in the MNLF found adjudication to be a distraction from their military focus. In Sulu, the rebels had been the only viable political and social authority, providing at least dispute adjudication services to the population. With the return to normalcy, barangay captains at least returned to their areas, and the MNLF ceded their adjudicative services to these figures. Indeed, one insider recalls they “were relieved to be relieved. Then they could focus on their military activities. After all, they are a military organization.”

While the MNLF focused on building its military apparatus more than its service provision structures, it is not the case that the rebels turned this apparatus extensively against civilians. The MNLF did not engage in widespread atrocities or extensive coercion. MNLF’s coercive behaviors were largely side effects of its (and its sponsors’) military focus, and on the resultantly anemic domestic coalition building and command and control problems.

The MNLF did try to screen and train its recruits—an investment that went some way to ensuring good behavior towards civilians. Fighters were trained,

Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. The civilians interviewed contrasted their MNLF experience with that under the MILF, which provided a trial in such cases, including a period of fact finding.

Author interview.; a commander during the 1980s comments, “We were happy to have the government provide a service. We are seeking to fill up the gaps. Where they do not provide, that is where we seek to fill up the gap.”

Interview with Commander Ulangutan,” quoted in Noble (1976, 412); “INTERVIEW: A religious war of attrition.”; Omar, “The Bangsamoro Question: Autonomy, Federalism or Independence?,” 44;
sometimes more than once, and given instruction on military and political matters.\textsuperscript{82} Still, some fighters received instruction on how to treat civilians while others did not.\textsuperscript{83} As the conflict wore on, the MNLF’s predilection to “clubbiness” began to show in its recruitment strategies. Molloy (2005) notes “Kinship support systems increasingly determined the appointment of [MNLF] commanders. A promotion system based on bloodline, financial, ethnic, intra-ethnic and patronage support largely replaced one based on training, experience and merit.”\textsuperscript{84}

Careful merit-based recruiting and command and control are themselves costly investments by any rebel group—investments that recruit personnel with good service provision skills, and can punish behavioral lapses. Ramifications in MNLF troop behavior for any poor recruiting choices were exacerbated by the organization’s limited investment in command and control. The organization had a limited ability to sanction footsoldiers, or even commanders, who misbehaved—in ways that damaged military operations or that harmed civilians. At least by the mid-1980s, the MNLF had tried to develop a manual for its commanders, and their


\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 184.; Author interview.

\textsuperscript{84} Molloy, ”The Lost Revolution: Marcos vs. the Moros and the seeds of terrorism,” 40. citing field interviews with MNLF commander “Arafat” and an unnamed fighter in 1983.
training included civil-military relations. One such commander, however, admits—“[while] there is a manual of instruction, on what to do and what not to do... [but] some commanders do not follow instructions.” Officially, the MNLF did provide recourse for victims of human rights violations by its personnel. However, this was provided in a manner consistent with its overall pattern of consultation—i.e. ad hoc, and largely at the discretion of the local commanders and political personnel. While one commander noted the Central Committee “generally hears all these cases itself,” it is unclear how effective this was, given the Central Committee’s limited command and control, and that its members were frequently abroad.

The MNLF’s limited investment in controlling its troops eventually took a toll. Early observer Lela Noble notes, “[t]here have also been limits to the Front’s effectiveness in instilling the kind of discipline that would avoid alienation of Muslim and Christian noncombatants. (...) The behavior of individual leaders has

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85 McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*; 184.; #78
86 Author interview.
87 Omar, "The Bangsamoro Question: Autonomy, Federalism or Independence?," 44.
88 Author interview.
also caused problems. Some commanders have been accused of corruption, [and] abusing authority (...).”90 In other words, coercing civilians.

Particularly in conjunction with favoritism within the MNLF, some members allegedly became involved in kidnapping schemes or other acts of banditry. Limited investment in the organization’s ability to control commanders also, as the decades wore on, contributed to “ongoing rivalries breaking out into small, but bloody conflicts between some of these groupings [around local commanders].”91 Such blood feuds frequently pull in civilians, drive many to evacuate, and generate extensive collateral damage.92

MNLF sponsors’ extensive military aid not only fostered a focus on military over political and social service investment, but may also have shaped its choice of military tactics. As some tactics put civilians more at risk than others, rebels’ choice can speak to their concern for civilian welfare: while many factors drive the choice of military tactics, rebels concerned with service provision can avoid military actions that might cause collateral damage. As MNLF’s sponsors enhanced the MNLF’s capabilities, they did so in ways that, at least initially, increased collateral damage. The early MNLF engaged in positional warfare, and creating and holding

90 Noble, ”The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines,” 415.
91 Molloy, ”The Lost Revolution: Marcos vs. the Moros and the seeds of terrorism,” 40.; Molloy cites multiple interviews in which commanders in the 1980s recount incidents between other commanders, or between commanders and their troops ibid., 39-41.
92 Torres, Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao.
fixed bases. Molloy (2005) argues this tactical choice was due to foreign trainers, perhaps unfamiliar with the realities of insurgency. This tactic limited the organization’s ability to steer conflict away from populated areas, or limit the scope of the encounters.

MNLF’s sponsors wanted a military organization, and provided the rebels with the necessary support. It is possible the MNLF felt pressured to undertake military activities designed to draw attention to the Bangsamoro struggle and reassure foreign sponsors that their money and training were well spent—even if such actions would increase collateral damage. While ill-advised conventional warfare (with high domestic costs) may have be a result of MNLF’s trainers' unfamiliarity with the realities of Philippine insurgency, such battles were much more likely to produce noticeable headlines. Communist fighters criticized the MNLF as having a “taste for dramatic displays in engaging government forces, [which] sometimes squanders both men and weapons.”


95 Author interview.; ———.; Ahmad, “The War Against the Muslims,” 16-7.; See also Abat, The Day We Nearly Lost Mindanao: The CEMCOM Story for a description of engagements between the MNLF and AFP.

96 Hovil and Werker, “Portrait of a Failed Rebellion: An account of rational, sub-optimal violence in Western Uganda.”

97 Richard Vokey, “Cooperation is the password for the rebels,” Far Eastern Economic Review, CD-ROM, 8/14 May 1981.; Another journalist contrasted the NPA’s “hit-and-run affair” to “the MNLF’s better-known large-scale campaigns” Sheilah Ocampo, PHILIPPINES: Hearts, minds and guns: As
have helped the MNLF satisfy its backers abroad, whatever the collateral damage at home. Anecdotal evidence suggests reports of rebel-government encounters reached the OIC and were the subject of interest. Indeed, such anecdotes comprise complaints from the MILF that Nur Misuari burnished the MNLF's reputation to its OIC sponsors by claiming credit for all military exploits against government troops reported—whether the forces were MILF or MNLF.98

The Battle of Jolo in 1974 marked the high (or perhaps the low) point of this strategy. The encounter burned Jolo city to the ground, killing some 2,000 civilians and creating 60,000 refugees in a single night.99 A contentious incident in the history of the Bangsamoro struggle, the battle's unclear military value and sheer destruction were unpopular among the MNLF's domestic constituency.100 According to Sali Wadi, a founding member of the MNLF, “Jolo was attacked without the consent of the Central Committee and Misuari himself was asked to explain. Accordingly, Misuari was not worried even though Jolo was put to ashes and many died. He said in his own words ‘I don’t care how many died, provided our struggles are known to the whole world.’”101 Even accounting for the accusatory recollections of government forces battling rebels in Mindanao, the village people are as often victims as victors,” Far Eastern Economic Review, CD-ROM, 30 April 1981.

99 Ahmad, “The War Against the Muslims,” 17.
100 Author interview.
of a commander who had, at the time of this quotation, surrendered to the government, the comment shows concern over how the command was processed, and suggests a lack of collateral consideration. However, Jolo marked the end of this phase of MNLF operations.\textsuperscript{102} The fighters subsequently adapted to guerrilla-style tactics that limited collateral damage\textsuperscript{103}—only coming into villages only if those villages were being attacked by the military, and specifically moved their fighters out of populated areas when a military offensive was eminent.\textsuperscript{104} In other words, making some investment in civilian safety.

While the move to guerrilla warfare might have limited some collateral damage, the MNLF also gave up much of its ability to defend villages (which would require them to hold a fixed position). One commander commented that during the 1970s, he could protect civilian settlements, but was subsequently unable to do so, and civilians instead fled “to the municipality, to the town, to escape.”\textsuperscript{105} Though MNLF leaders claimed to have local militia defense forces, and trained many Bangsamoro women to handle firearms and defend themselves, direct protection of

\textsuperscript{102} Molloy, "The Lost Revolution: Marcos vs. the Moros and the seeds of terrorism," 34-5. “This was claimed by the Attorney, The Fiscal Panda, The Chief Government Prosecutor of MNLF guerrillas in Cotabato in an interview in Cotabato City, 4\textsuperscript{th} August 1983.”

\textsuperscript{103} McKenna, \textit{Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines}: 158.; Molloy, "The Lost Revolution: Marcos vs. the Moros and the seeds of terrorism," 35-6 footnote #6. It should be noted that this change also limited military casualties as well as civilian ones.


\textsuperscript{105} Author interview.
civilians was not usually viable (as is the case for most militaries). Still, fighters can choose to warn civilians of coming clashes, so that they can evacuate out of the crossfire. However, such warnings are costly for guerillas, who rely on the element of surprise. The MNLF offered some such warnings, but these were frequently distributed more as a club good than a widespread public service, as commanders often focused on moving their families out of harms’ way.

Many civilians provided voluntary support to the MNLF, both through zakat and other, outright donations in kind or cash. In 1987, the MNLF Vice Chairman admitted, “[w]e have a system of taxation suitable to our constituents.” Local residents today recall supporting the fighters: some dividing their daily food between their family and the rebels, and tying food to branches along known rebel footpaths, and/or often providing shelter for MNLF fighters, whom some civilians affectionately called “the children.” Much support may have been voluntary, but others (mainly government and media sources) allege the rebels used their military

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107 ———. 108 Abubakar, "Forum: Interview with Al Fatah, chairman of the Ranao Sur Revolutionary Command, Moro National Liberation Front."); #12 notes that the Moro populace "do not have a lot, but they will give food and things." The MNLF/MILF are careful not to ask for too much.”
strength to extract payments from fishermen, smugglers, big businesses, and others. While government sources likely had incentives to suggest abuse by MNLF fighters, such allegations may have had a kernel of truth. Excesses in this area were exacerbated by the MNLF’s underinvestment in its own domestic coalition. Molloy (2005) describes some commanders as taxing ethnic groups outside their home base (Maranao fighters taxing Maguindanaoan civilians, and vice versa) to avoid backlash from kinsmen.

3. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 2.0 (1996-Present)

3.1. MNLF 2.0: Donors’ Transition

For a variety of exogenous reasons, by the 1990s, the MNLF’s donors’ preferences had shifted closer to the GRP—away from the MNLF and the Moro population. After years of limited success in resolving conflicts and pursuing self-determination for Muslim minorities, the OIC needed credibility. The end of the Cold War ameliorated one of the larger schisms among the members. That the organization remained fractious and frequently accused of ineffectualness was embarrassing. In the early 1990s, OIC efforts surrounding events like the Gulf War

112 Khan, Reasserting International Islam: A Focus on the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Other Islamic Institutions: 184-5.
and Bosnia left many members and Muslims worldwide dissatisfied with its efficacy and performance.\footnote{Iraq, the PLO, the Sudan refused to support the OIC resolution condemning Iraq, while Libya abstained from the motion. In Bosnia, the United States and NATO emerged as the relevant peacemakers. OIC efforts to increase their influence in the conflict (Malaysia offered additional troops in February 1994) met with UN rejection. Malaysian offers to sell arms to Bosnian Muslims in 1995 was curbed by OIC efforts—likely to bring OIC behavior in line with international norms.} A documented settlement on the “Philippine issue” could provide the win they were looking for.

Like the OIC, Libya also needed a win by the 1990s. Increasingly ostracized, Quaddafi also faced declining domestic support for his international activism, exacerbated by a severe economic crisis (1985-7).\footnote{Niblock, \textit{Pariah States & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan}: 23.; Vandewa\l{}le, “The Libyan Jamahiriyya since 1969,” 26-7, 30. Libya faced both sanctions, and direct bombing attacks by the U.S. in 1986. In contrast to earlier adulation, the population failed to rally behind Quaddafi’s responses to Rabita chemical factory incident, the Gulf of Sirte incident, and his refusal to extradite suspects in the Lockerbie bombing Burgat, “Qad\d{h}afi’s Ideological Framework,” 54.} By the time he faced a coup attempt in 1993, the regime had begun reevaluating its position, launching an international image makeover campaign.\footnote{———, “Qad\d{h}afi’s Ideological Framework,” 55.; for example, Quaddafi’s final attempt at direct regional influence in Chad ended unsuccessfully in 1994, and he signed a rapprochement in Egypt in 1989 Niblock, \textit{Pariah States & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan}: 45.} As part of this effort, Quaddafi ended his support for various armed groups, going so far as to offer British authorities intelligence on his past support for the IRA.\footnote{Norton-Taylor, “British intelligence assesses information from Col. Gada\f{f}y on weapons shipped to IRA by Libyaana.”; “Libya hands over details of IRA links.”} Being able to cast himself as a peacemaker in Mindanao would certainly help Quaddafi’s image rehabilitation.

The MNLF’s regional backers’ interests also shifted over time. Both Indonesia and Malaysia had shifted to greater involvement in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—a commitment inconsistent with backing open rebellion against a fellow member’s government.\textsuperscript{117} Indonesia saw participating in a Mindanao resolution as a bonus for its aspirations of regional hegemony.\textsuperscript{118} Thus, both backed settlement, and (crucially) extensive compromise by the MNLF.

To obtain a Mindanao resolution convenient to their international political interests, MNLF supporters became more willing to compromise their ideological position in exchange for a signed agreement that demonstrated efficacy. This willingness to compromise effectively diluted the ideological goals in their pairing with the MNLF—moving these goals even further from the MNLF’s domestic median. Discussion within the MNLF both noted and resented these shifts.\textsuperscript{119}

Fresh off their own difficulties in the early 1990s, the MNLF’s donors enthusiastically pursued peace talks with the GRP—over some resistance by the MNLF. Indicative of both the OIC’s and Libya’s willingness to compromise to obtain a signed agreement, both made or accepted moves to regionalize the conflict—a move the MNLF had always strenuously rejected in its effort to retain a global profile. At its 1993 ICFM, the OIC added Southeast Asian Indonesia and Bangladesh

\textsuperscript{117} Pica\textsuperscript{tori,} \textit{International Relations of the Asian Muslim States.} 9.
\textsuperscript{118} ibid.; Local rumors also suggest Indonesian President Suharto cut a deal with Ramos behind closed doors to terminate support for the MNLF in exchange for Filipino support for his position in his own internal struggles vis-à-vis East Timor.
\textsuperscript{119} A senior member who was originally MNLF, but later became MILF commented that by 1996, “[Quaddhafi] wanted to project the image that unlike before, they were pacifist. Of necessity he became political, rather than ideological.” Author interview.; Other MNLF loyalists have offered similar criticisms of Malaysia, ———.
to the Quadripartite Committee (Libya, Senegal, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia), making it the Committee of the Six. The Indonesian representative served as the point person for OIC involvement in the process, pushing higher-profile Libya to a secondary role. Emblematic of this shift from the days of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, the OIC and Libya pushed the MNLF into signing the 1996 Agreement, which created the odd OIC-MNLF-GRP partnership—in Manila.

**MNLF 2.0: Donors’ humanitarian concern**

The OIC’s humanitarian preferences remain unchanged from the pre-1996 period: occasional coercive excesses may be acceptable, but widespread abuse would not. The MNLF’s new partner, the GRP, has a similar position. While bad governance (and even coercive behavior) would be nothing new for the GRP, excessive MNLF abuse of the Moro population would have a number of negative repercussions for the government.

First it would alienate the OIC. The Philippine government has drawn heavily on the OIC and its member states to fund projects in Mindanao, international oil markets, and foreign workers’ visas. The GRP would certainly not wish to

120 The MNLF has both noted and resented this regionalization; ———.; ———.
121 Both before and after 1996, the Philippine government has received consistently low scores on human rights indicators—including both political rights and issues like forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and political imprisonments Cingranelli and Richards, "The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset."
122 The Philippine government itself is no stranger to accusations and actions of violence against Moro civilians—both directly and by alleged or actual proxies. It seems some degree of international
appear too unconcerned for Moros’ welfare. The MNLF itself retains observer status in the OIC, and the OIC formally monitors implementation of the 1996 agreement. These realities continually tie the OIC to the MNLF and GRP reputations to MNLF behavior. Indeed, the GRP is concerned enough for continued OIC goodwill that the organization’s opinion of political candidates in Mindanao weighs in the government calculus of whom to back, and the GRP itself has renewed its bid for membership or observer status in the OIC.\(^{123}\) Second, abuse by the MNLF would possibly drive popular support to the MILF, as a better-behaved standard-bearer for the Moro cause—an eventuality the government would find unpalatable, given the challenge the MILF already poses to the GRP.

**MNLF 2.0: Forms of support offered by donors**

While the Agreement ostensibly “legitimized” MNLF’s funding sources, this has not made accounting easier. What has been gained in clarity by bringing them scrutiny makes the difference in the GRP’s responsiveness to atrocities. For example, the government has long offered the so-called “warlords”—local political clans who hold formal political offices in Mindanao—a high level of impunity in their frequent coercion of the populace. Such violence usually goes unnoticed by anyone outside the perpetrators and the victims, and is thus of acceptably low cost to the Philippine government. Similarly, the GRP anxiously and adamantly distances itself from accusations that any of its political and military personnel have dealings with the Abu Sayyaf Group. The ASG is designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department, and thus subject to scrutiny by the American government that offers significant support to the Philippine government. On November 23, 2009, the Ampatuan clan killed and buried 58 people. In the exception that proves the rule, the international outcry that followed pushed Arroyo to oust and arrest senior family leaders, and withdraw support from the clan’s political ambitions. Without such scrutiny, it is doubtful the government would have arrested more than token individuals.

above board has been obfuscated by layers of bureaucracy, incompetence, and corruption. This analysis is not intended to be an audit of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) or other post-1996 assistance. Such work has been done elsewhere. Suffice to say that the ARMM and other post-1996 support programs are little short of a financial nightmare. How much of the money went to the MNLF itself, or to organs whose behavior we might judge as indicators of MNLF performance, is unclear. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, we may be better served by approaching the financial calculus with only slightly more information than in the pre-1996 period.

The 1996 Agreement preserved the MNLF’s tie to its original OIC sponsors, but also opened the door to significant funding from the Philippine government and other international sources. The bulk of the MNLF’s post-1996 support flows through two avenues. First, though MNLF control of ARMM and attendant

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bureaucracies, which are part of the Philippine government, and which the MNLF controlled from 1996 until 2005.\textsuperscript{125} Second, through development and transition assistance programs, backed by OIC and other international donors.\textsuperscript{126}

The budget funneled through the ARMM and attendant bureaucracies is ostensibly humanitarian—designed to produce a range of public goods, services, and political representation for the masses.\textsuperscript{127} However, much of this aid has effectively been fungible. Spending has been poorly monitored, and the structures the MNLF was handed effectively turned these funds into personnel positions (i.e. patronage jobs) rather than services. The MNLF largely lost access to funds in 2005, when the GRP did not back its candidates’ bid for ARMM office. Support channeled to the MNLF through other government-sponsored structures has also declined.

\textsuperscript{125} The terms of the 1996 Agreement did not hand the ARMM to the MNLF in perpetuity. Rather, the MNLF was allowed to run for existing ARMM offices. The Ramos administration ensured MNLF victory early on, but electoral victory in ARMM (and much of Mindanao) remains heavily contingent on GRP backing. Indeed, many Moros comment ironically that ARMM in fact stands for the “Autonomous Region for Metro Manila.” In 2005, the Philippine government largely handed the election to the Ampatuan political clan; see Bacani, “MNLF Loses the ARMM: A Setback for Peace?.”

\textsuperscript{126} These include those areas formally designated within the Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and Peace and Development Communities (PDCs), as well as projects run independent of either designation. For a partial list of funders, see Rasul, \textit{Broken Peace? Assessing the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement}: 71-78.

\textsuperscript{127} ARMM is completely financially dependent on the Philippine government. ARMM has the legal power to raise taxes and retains 60\% of them. However, between 2001-5, ARMM collected about four one-hundredths of one percent of its overall budget INCITEGov and Local Government Support Program in ARMM (LGSPA), ”Towards Strengthening the Fiscal Capabilities of ARMM: A Policy Paper,” in \textit{INCITEGov Policy Paper} ed. INCITEGov (Pasig City, Philippines: International Center for Innovation, Transformation and Excellence in Governance (INCITEGov), 2007), 37. Subsequent debate has focused on whether this woeful performance is due to the poverty of the areas in which the government is supposed to tax, incompetence in ARMM, or the poor incentive structure of Filipino governance generally. All local governments in the Philippines receive an Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) from Manila. They are paid regardless of their governance successes, and developmental improvements—they are, effectively, \textit{rentier} states.
Today, the bulk of the MNLF’s support is channeled to MNLF communities. Again ostensibly humanitarian, these funds, too, have been subject to dubious handling that turns many of them into fungible assets. In sum, whatever support has actually made it to the MNLF has effectively been a mix of humanitarian and fungible aid.

The MNLF has also continued to receive some military aid following 1996. A very low level of military support may be provided “under the table,” but formal integration of parts of the MNLF into the AFP and PNP did (effectively) provide some military aid to the Front. MNLF “integrees” received new firearms, and the legal right to carry them. While many remained on the job, others disappeared with their new weapons.128 The vast majority of MNLF fighters, however, were not integrated. They were also not disarmed, joining Mindanao’s legions of unregistered gun owners. Ironically, government-sponsored buy-back programs may have facilitated a re-arming of the MNLF, rather than a disarming, as they enabled the purchase of better weapons.129 Those MNLF commanders who successfully parlayed their wartime roles into political positions simultaneously legalized their followers as private armies, and continued access to firearms and ammunition.

128 “MNLF integrees, firearms missing.”; “Front members flee camps after getting guns from military.”
129 In part because these programs undervalued gun prices relative to the black market, fighters had incentives to turn in older guns, and invest the cash payment into new weapons Santos, “MNLF Integration into the AFP and PNP: Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation? (Case Study),” 177. citing Ferrer, “Integration of the MNLF Forces into the PNP and AFP: Integration without Demobilization and Disarmament. UP Project on Assessment of the Implementation of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, Phase I.”
3.2. MNLF’s Transition

“The MNLF therefore has one foot inside government but has not yet fully shed its rebel persona.” ¹³⁰

The 1996 Agreement did not signal the end of the MNLF, nor its assimilation into the GRP. First, the MNLF retains its own identity—the brand “MNLF” still stands for a certain ideological package. Individuals still identify themselves as “MNLF” throughout Mindanao. Second, while the 1996 Agreement was called the “Final Peace Agreement (FPA),” the agreement contains provisions that facilitate ongoing negotiations to work out additional details and monitor implementation by the MNLF, GRP, and OIC.¹³¹

Third, demobilization and disarmament were not part of the agreement—the MNLF remains a politically-active and at least partially-armed non-state group.¹³² Any demobilization that has occurred has been due to decisions by individual MNLF commanders, or defacto mobilization due to organizational atrophy. The MNLF has intermittently taken up arms against the Philippine government. Only some 7,500 MNLF personnel were integrated into the AFP and PNP—far less than the estimated

¹³⁰ Santos, "Moro National Liberation Front and its Bangsamoro Armed Forces (MNLF-BAF),” 327.
¹³¹ Phase I under Joint Monitoring Committee (1996 Agreement, Section II “The Transitional Period (Phase I),” Paragraph 13);
¹³² DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) is a hallmark of much post-agreement discussion—both theoretically and in practice worldwide—precisely because its three tenants limit the ability and incentives of non-state armed groups to return to the battlefield, and thus limit recidivism.
17,000-50,000 MNLF combatants at the time of the Agreement. Many more retained their arms and status outside GRP structures. The MNLF retains recognizable camps and military leaders—some in Central Mindanao, but heavily in Western Mindanao and Sulu (as will be discussed below). Furthermore, several scholars have argued post-Agreement policies (including integration) actually increased MNLF’s access to arms. Misuari loyalists have engaged in intermittent skirmishes with the AFP, and in 2001, an uprising in Sulu led to Misuari’s arrest on charges of rebellion. Indeed, Sulu political insiders note that the MNLF in Sulu

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133 Furthermore, not all of those given slots in the reintegration were actual MNLF combatants under arms. Some slots went to (usually younger) relatives of actual combatants, members of the political corps, or (allegedly) to those willing to pay for the chance at a steady paycheck. Thus, the number of combatants integrated is actually less than 7,500. Santos, “MNLF Integration into the AFP and PNP: Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation? (Case Study),” 168-9.


135 In 2001, MNLF forces entered into armed clashes with AFP forces in the island province of Sulu. The most common explanation for the outbreak is resistance to Misuari’s impending ouster from his positions in ARMM. Misuari loyalists argue the AFP provoked a fight in an already heavily-militarized (and high-tension) area. Possibly attempting to escape via Malaysia, Misuari was arrested by Malaysian authorities, and extradited to Manila, where he remained under house arrest until April, 2008. These fighters have subsequently been dubbed the “MNLF-Misuari Breakaway Group” (MNLF-MBG) in a political effort to minimize the ramifications for the peace process and ongoing MNLF-GRP-OIC talks. In retaliation for Misuari’s arrest, loyalists began a series of attacks on the AFP. When officials arrived (allegedly to try to negotiate a ceasefire) the rebels took hostage AFP General Ben Dolorfino and Under Secretary of Defense Ramon Santos (along with 12 other officers), and reportedly demanded the government release Misuari from prison. The AFP has not generally reported skirmishes with the MNLF, given the 1996 Agreement presupposes a cease-fire between the MNLF and the Philippine government.
remains powerful enough (politically and militarily) that the government
maneuvers to balance against MNLF influence in the area.\textsuperscript{136}

Furthermore, and most importantly for the model, the MNLF’s new donor,
the GRP, retains an interest in the MNLF’s ability to generate compliance from Moro
civilians. First, the government wants the MNLF to retain sufficient domestic power
to act as a bulwark against the MILF and ASG. Furthermore, the government’s
partnership with the MNLF facilitates access to development assistance from the
OIC (as well as other international sources). Like most governments, the GRP (like
most governments) is happy to see additional funds flow through its coffers, and
development programming may also improve the government's counterinsurgency
position (in which case, the GRP is happy to have someone else pick up the tab).
Additionally, the GRP’s agreement with the MNLF is key to the GRP's own bid for
OIC membership (a move itself designed to undercut further rebellion from the
MNLF, MILF, ASG, and any successors). All of these are contingent on the MNLF
retaining some grassroots support.

3.3. MNLF 2.0: Producing Quasi-Voluntary Compliance

**MNLF 2.0: Enacted ideological position**

MNLF 2.0 reflects the ideological compromises needed to match its sponsors’
preferences. As in previous years, the rebels faced a choice—adopt the

\textsuperscript{136} Author interview.; ———.
compromises demanded by its backers, or retain their ideological position, and find alternative support. Again, the MNLF compromised. Analysis of the 1996 negotiation period affords insights on bargaining and compromises made between rebels and their sponsors, and debates within the MNLF itself suggest support for hypothesized mechanisms underlying the theory’s predicted outcomes.

There is little question that the MNLF’s ideological compromises were foreign-sponsored. The MNLF was initially skeptical of the GRP’s offer to talk peace.\footnote{In fact, the MNLF had been steeling itself for renewed hostilities under a Ramos presidency—after all, Ramos had been one of the architects of Marcos’ hated Martial Law, #71.2. See also Misuari’s public statements, reproduced in Campado, "The MNLF-OIC Dyad and the Philippine Government’s Policy Response to Moro Struggle for Self-Determination," 232.} The Libyan Ambassador admitted his countrymen “took it upon [themselves] to convince [MNLF] Chairman Misuari to negotiate for the new formula offered by the GRP.”\footnote{Iribani, 	extit{Give Peace A Chance: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks}: 297 footnote 26.: Atty Soliman Santos, Jr. conducted an interview with Ambassador Rajab in Makati on December 22, 1998 which he quoted in his research paper in International Dispute Resolution in the Master of Laws Program at the University of Melbourne, Australia, “The Philippines-Muslim Dispute: From Origins to Resolution”, The Role of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in the Peace Negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) January 1999. This point also echoed by Salem M. Adam, "The Role of OIC Diplomacy in the Muslim struggle in the Southern Philippines" (Masters thesis, University of the Philippines, Diliman, 2002), 85.} The Libyan ambassador noted the precise balancing act the theory postulates rebels walk between foreign sponsors and domestic popularity:

“Nur [Misuari] was trying to balance his act in front of other member-states, particularly Libya, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia (…) Nur was always very cautious and careful to keep the Saudis well informed on the progress of the talks. To me, it was his way to recompense the
Saudis for his long stay in their country (...) he has not lost his command of options in playing the member-states against each other while simultaneously demonstrating his clout with the government and his own people that he personally is well-entrenched in the OIC.”

That the MNLF’s backers valued a signed agreement above the MNLF’s ideological position is best exemplified by the issue of Misuari’s gubernatorial candidacy. All parties agreed Misuari would run for governor of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) after an agreement was signed. For the OIC, the MNLF leader in an elected position would be a tangible symbol of successful negotiation. So eager were MNLF’s sponsors to obtain this plum that they pushed Misuari to register as a candidate before the terms of the Agreement were finalized. The MNLF was concerned this move would sacrifice political leverage over remaining issues—in a meeting of MNLF leaders, only about a third of them supported the move (many reluctantly), and the meeting ended without decision. Misuari registered anyway. In so doing, he bought his foreign sponsors’ view of the peace pact as inevitable, regardless of terms, and forfeited leverage that might have

139 Vitug and Gloria Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao: 69.; Philippine President Fidel V. Ramos similarly noted, “[Misuari] was apparently trying very hard to perform a balancing act in front of three audiences: his internal constituency within the MNLF, the whole Mindanao community and the member-states of the OIC.” Fidel V. Ramos, Break Not the Peace: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Negotiations 1992-1996 (Quezon City, Philippines: Friends of Steady Eddie, 1996), 65.
140 The OIC indicated its pleasure with the decision through a press statement issued from Jeddah on July 18, 1996 Iribani, Give Peace A Chance: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks: 316 footnote 42.
141 At a later date, a separate meeting, in Misuari’s home base of Jolo (of which there is not a direct account) apparently produced unanimous approval of his candidacy. Ibid., 312-3.
been used to correct some of the institutional inadequacies of the ultimate agreement.\footnote{Aware of the political coup this action provided them, the GRP worked hard to facilitate Misuari’s registration: allowing him to register in his own headquarters in Sulu, after the official close of the registration booths on the last day of registration.} A Misuari aide admits, “[t]he settlement on the political issues became a foregone conclusion in favor of the GRP.”\footnote{Iribani, \textit{Give Peace A Chance: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks:} 315.}

That the MNLF felt the weight of ideological compromise in the terms of the 1996 Agreement is further evidenced in that internal debate went all the way up to the formal signing. By several accounts, Misuari was inclined not to sign the agreement, under his own convictions and those of the MNLF Central Committee. Allegedly, a visit the night before the signing by an Indonesian representative, behind closed doors, persuaded Misuari otherwise.

On the ground, there can be little question that the MNLF has moved further from the popular nationalist preferences. While many interviewed express sympathy with the MNLF’s formative goals, they comment ruefully that the organization has strayed from the aim of independence, or even as they put it, “meaningful autonomy.” Many are not shy about fingerling the OIC and Libya for forcing the compromise, but hold the MNLF accountable for accepting it. In a pointed comment, MILF founder Salamat Hashim, notes the rebels’ tension between foreign and domestic popularity in choosing their ideological position:

\textit{We [the MILF] respect the OIC but we did not want to allow them to impose their ideas on us. If we are solving the problem of our people}
here in Mindanao, instead of asking the OIC, instead of listening to the OIC, we should listen to our people, ask our people what they want.144

A local historian noted, “once the MNLF agreed to autonomy with the government [in 1996], the MNLF had lost authority with the people.”145 A number of interviewees commented that the MNLF’s agreements have “turned ‘Autonomy’ into a dirty word” among the Moro public.146 That is, while many Bangsamoro would accept a negotiated settlement (i.e. short of independence), and/or autonomy, the MNLF’s current vision of nationalism has moved further from the popular preference.

Always more secular nationalists than Islamist ones, the post-1996 MNLF shows an increasingly secular, and more inclusive, approach—in line with the addition of its GRP partners.147 The organization now defines “Bangsamoro” as is “anyone born in Mindanao prior to 1945, and then anyone born after that time who chooses to call him or herself a Bangsamoro.”148 Leaders brag about the heavy Christian attendance at MNLF rallies in 2009, and tell stories of Christian residents’

144 Hashim Salamat, quoted in Lucman, Moro Archives: A History Of Armed Conflicts in Mindanao and East Asia: 115.
145 Author interview.
146 ———.; ———.
147 As before 1996, this is not to say that many MNLF are not themselves devout Muslims. In 1992, Misuari himself articulated the view that nationalism was at least as important as Islam in the ideological basis of the MNLF revolution, see Misuari, ”The Rise and Fall of Moro Statehood,” 38-9.
148 Author interview.; ———.; ———.
eagerness to join the MNLF. Symbolically, Misuari welcomed to the MNLF former Norberto Manero, a former commander in the Ilaga, a Christian militia accused of killing many Moros in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By the time of the 1996 Agreement, the MNLF had developed a committee on da’wah (“Islamic call”), but this group does not appear to have undertaken significant operations, nor is the MNLF as a whole making efforts at Islamic reform. Unlike their MILF cousins, the MNLF has not developed a system of madaris—residents in MNLF areas rely on Philippine government schools (with whose provision some credit the MNLF). Parents who want their children to receive an Islamic education, sometimes (ironically) send them to the nearest MILF or private madrassa. To be fair, the MNLF also faces substantial competition from MILF and ASG in the “Islamist” section of the Moro political marketplace. However, this shift does represent an endogenous choice by the MNLF.

The MNLF’s new partnership has also sacrificed whatever remained of its social reform ambitions. By partnering with the government, Misuari also partnered with some of the most recalcitrant and non-reformist datus—elites he

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149 ———.; ———.
150 This move has been highly contentious in Moro communities—both inside and outside the MNLF.
151 Author interview.; ———.
152 MNLF head Misuari has been notoriously resistant to any attempt to merge with the MILF, and has made public statements decrying both MILF and ASG. With ASG, Misuari has attempted to exert authority over the group (usually in an effort to get them to return kidnapping victims), supposedly by virtue of his moral legitimacy as the original Bangsamoro revolutionary. These efforts have been largely unsuccessful, see Roberto N. Aventajado and Teodoro Y. Montelibano, 140 Days of Terror: in the Clutches of the Abu Sayyaf (Pasig City, Philippines: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2004); and Dela Cruz, A Lifetime of Freedom.
had ousted from the MNLF’s cadre decades earlier, or who had otherwise defected to the government. The MNLF must now coordinate policy and rule with their preferences. Misuari’s attempts to reach out to traditional elites have been mixed, but while criticism of traditional leaders was rare for the MNLF previously, it is now exceedingly so. On the ground, the MNLF’s previous reputation for status quo affiliation has solidified.

**MNLF 2.0: Coercion and service provision**

The MNLF’s post-1996 governance has not been marked by extensive coercion against civilians. Rather, on the whole, their package includes about the same level of coercion as before, and “clubbier” service provision. Analysis of MNLF service provision post-1996 should not be limited to ARMM—MNLF communities and personnel exist outside ARMM. However, that ARMM service provision has underperformed is largely uncontested. All sides now concentrate on allocating blame away from themselves for this failure.

The post-1996 MNLF continues its pre-1996 underinvestment in popular consultation and domestic coalition building. While many MNLF did run for government office post-1996, it is not clear to what degree elections or campaigning in Mindanao (in ARMM or otherwise) is actually a reasonable measure of public

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consultation or representativeness. Elections are often a function of Philippine government support, and mitigated by high degrees of both pre- and post-poll irregularities.

Outside of elections, the MNLF has undertaken a number of high-profile public consultations, but these are intermittent, and it is not clear that they provide a forum for grassroots opinions and preferences post-1996. The negotiation of the 1996 Agreement included some domestic consultation, at least among MNLF elites. However, as discussed above, concerns from ground commanders and the Central Committee were frequently overridden by donors' preferences. Populations were consulted in public fora, though locals express some doubts over whom these fora actually served, and who actually attended. A 1997 study and some interviews conducted for this research found a large number of civilians unaware of the Peace Agreement itself. As of 1999, there was still surprisingly little effort to explain the 1996 Agreement on the ground—the agreement was not even translated into local languages for distribution.

MNLF's investment in coalition building has also declined. To be sure, the organization retains loyalists throughout Mindanao, from a variety of tribal affiliations. However, the organization's locus of power has largely shrunk to areas

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155 Multiple author interviews with civilians throughout Mindanao (2009-2010); Vitug and Gloria Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao: 79.
156 Gutierrez, „The Politics of Transition”. 
of Western Mindanao, and particularly the island of Sulu (home to Misuari’s co-ethnic Tausugs). This has been exacerbated by continuing allegations of top-down decision-making and favoritism. While some such complaints may be a cover for commanders’ judgment that they have not received what they deem a sufficient share of MNLF resources, the frequency of such criticisms suggests the MNLF still struggles to build domestic unity. As these complaints fostered splinter groups before 1996, post-Agreement complaints came to a head in 2001, with the formation of the “Executive Council of 15” (EC-15). A group of fifteen MNLF leaders declared Misuari incompetent, and elected a new head. Today, MNLF loyalists are broadly divided between those still loyal to Sulu-born Misuari, and those who follow the EC-15 (currently headed by Muslimin Sema, based in Maguindanao). As early Moro empire builders discovered, the costs of building and maintaining inter-ethnic allegiances are non-trivial. Thus, given the MNLF’s continued underinvestment in these ties, one long-time Misuari loyalist sighed “Now, it is again like the sultanates of Sulu versus Maguindanao.”

Both inside and outside ARMM, the MNLF’s predilection for club goods, rather than public goods, provision has continued. The post-1996 shortcomings in consultation and coalition-building are mirrored in the MNLF’s production of

157 Rumors also abound that the split off of the EC-15 was due to machinations within the Philippine government cabinet, insofar as Manila insiders encouraged the defection of the EC-15 by promising their support to the MNLF’s new leadership.

158 Author interview.
material services, which the MNLF has demonstrated a tendency to provide this in a
club-like rather than public goods fashion.

The MNLF has continued to under-recruit technocrats capable of good
service provision—a “2000 study showed the MNLF to be organized primarily as a
military organization.”\textsuperscript{159} To be fair, the ARMM the MNLF inherited was already a
patronage-heavy structure, noted for its bureaucratic inefficiencies, and many
ARMM positions and budgets used more for patronage than actual service
provision.\textsuperscript{160} Assuming some institutional momentum, the MNLF could have
resigned itself to using a certain percentage of the ARMM positions as patronage,
but still worked to hire competent individuals for other seats. Consistent with its
pre-1996 underinvestment in technocratic recruitment, this does not appear to be
what they did. The MNLF had traditionally underinvested in recruiting technocrats,
and this has continued to be the case.

\textsuperscript{159} Santos, “Moro National Liberation Front and its Bangsamoro Armed Forces (MNLF-BAF),” 334.
citing Ferrer, “Integration of the MNLF Forces into the PNP and AFP: Integration without
Demobilization and Disarmament. UP Project on Assessment of the Implementation of the GRP-MNLF
Peace Agreement, Phase I.”
\textsuperscript{160} A 1993 (i.e. before MNLF takeover) survey study found 36% of Moro/Muslim respondents blamed
graft and corruption for slow implementation of development programs and projects in ARMM, 29%
viewed the ARMM as responding to “government leaders, officials, and employees,” 42% as ARMM
decisions being primarily influenced by “government political leaders and officials,” see Efren Len-
Aurelio and Tirso Garampiel, “An excerpt of the Preliminary Study on the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao: An assessment of its 3 year performance,” Moro Kurier 7, no. 4 (1993), especially
10-11. See also analysis of the “bloated bureaucracy” in Gutierrez and Danguilan-Vitug, “ARMM after
the peace agreement: an assessment of local capability in the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao.”
Reports that MNLF insiders jockeyed for these positions as patronage echo pre-1996 stories of commanders vying for cuts of foreign donors’ support. One Moro constituency noted that it seemed to him the “MNLF leaders see ARMM was created for the MNLF, not for the Muslim community. They couldn’t deliver.” By tending to treat these positions as club goods, and continuing to underinvest in recruiting technocrats, the MNLF made it unlikely that any service funding that made it through the bureaucracy would be well spent. A Misuari loyalist sadly notes, “A lot of people Nur [Misuari] put there were not the best and the brightest. But MNLF people demanded that they be given these dividends. (...) If there were technical [i.e. technically competent] people, they were not MNLF.”

Even outside of ARMM, the MNLF demonstrated a tendency towards “clubbiness.” Much support iscoursed through areas designated within the Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD) or the Peace and Development Communities (PDCs). The 1996 Agreement gave the MNLF the reins of both SZOPAD and its advisory body, the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). While GRP legislation significantly weakened the SPCPD, one Mindanao analyst referred to the organization as an “exclusive club of the MNLF” where members spend their time ‘quarreling over the division of spoils of the

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161 Author interview.
162 ———.; confirmed in ———.
163 On the bureaucratic hamstringing of both the SPCPD and the SZOPAD, see Mercado, "Peace and Development: The MNLF and SPCPD Experience."; Mercado, "A bureaucratic nightmare".; Rasul, Broken Peace? Assessing the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement.
peace agreement.”164 On the disbursement end, MNLF sympathizers themselves point out that SZOPAD funding was largely absorbed by the MNLF inner political elite, leaving some commanders and many in the rank-and-file disgruntled—to say nothing of those Bangsamoro without MNLF affiliation.165

PDCs have also evidenced the MNLF’s propensity for club-goods provision. PDCs can be designated under a number of criteria, but the presence of MNLF loyalists is their most predominant feature.166 While some projects have done well, and some operatives have done excellent development work, many have expressed frustration. Those with experience in these areas note that funds usually go to the MNLF leaders within the community, who then decide “who gets what” from the aid.167 Again, by preferring existing members rather than technocrats it has underinvested in recruiting, the MNLF has made it less likely these funds will be used effectively. Analysts, observers, and even some within the MNLF admit programs often suffer from a lack of consultation with the population, and an

165 ———.
167 Author interview.; Journalist Eric Gutierrez noted in 1999 that if the international community did not alter its approach, aid programs like the UN’s development Program would likely become little more than a “deodorized version Marcos’s policy of attraction” in which he effectively bought out MNLF commanders to surrender Gutierrez, “The Politics of Transition”; Author interview.; ———.; ironically, some funders made efforts to circumvent the faulty bureaucracies of ARMM and its transition mechanisms and go directly to the MNLF state (i.e. regional) commanders, who subsequently identified recipients and projects.
appropriate assessment of civilian needs.\textsuperscript{168} As before 1996, the MNLF has underinvested in the consultation and personnel needed to determine and meet these needs.

In some cases, the PDCs have done well in choosing appropriate projects, usually for MNLF farming or multi-purpose cooperatives.\textsuperscript{169} However, the degree to which programs distinguish between MNLF members as recipients and non-MNLF members as non-recipients is noticeable. NGO workers who implement programs Mindanao-wide comment that PDCs are “like a club—if you are in it, you get some programs. If you are not, you don’t”—a trait they contrast with their experience in MILF communities, where they find programs are more accessible, regardless of civilians’ institutional affiliation. These MNLF policies have caused friction at the grassroots, within communities the MNLF claims to serve. In some cases, people “generally understood PDCs as an exclusive reward for the MNLF (...). This perception just aggravated biases and created further divide [sic] in the communities.”\textsuperscript{170}

Survey data support these qualitative findings. Respondents were asked about several basic services—both in the current period, and retrospectively about

\textsuperscript{168} Nash B. Maulana, \textit{Kadtabanga: The Struggle Continues} (Cotabato City, Philippines: GoP-UN ACT for Peace Programme, 2009). 58-9, 62 and 65
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{170} Suleik, "Promoting Human Security in Western Mindanao," 95.; In Sulu, one resident notes that, in his opinion, this phenomenon has contributed to the rise of the ASG, as those disgruntled by the MNLF’s partisan behavior seek an alternative representative, Author interview.
their experience pre-1996. This format allows a statistical comparison of any pre-
and post-1996 changes in MNLF governance. Retrospective questions on surveys
are problematic—recall may be imperfect, or clouded by subsequent judgments
about the questions’ substance.\textsuperscript{171} However, these statistical data suggest trends
consistent with the qualitative analysis, and further bolster these findings.

Civilians were asked to whom they would turn to for help in finding
employment, negotiating business contracts, and if a project needed to be
completed in the village for the benefit of all residents.\textsuperscript{172} Respondents were asked
to pick one, and only one, response from a list of possible authority figures.\textsuperscript{173}
Figure 5.1 reports the predicted probabilities of MNLF’s selection as a provider of
each of these three types of service. All three types of service show a drop in MNLF
provision post-1996. For all three, the decline is statistically significant at at least
the 0.1 level (Table 5.2).\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{171} To mitigate against some of these problems, all analyses presented in this chapter were conducted
using only respondents who were 29 or older at the time of the 2009/2010 survey. This coding rule
omits those who were ostensibly too young before 1996 to have direct personal experience with
such service provision. Some younger respondents did opt to answer the retrospective questions
rather than demure that they were too young in the pre-1996 period (which was also a response
option).
\textsuperscript{172} For additional discussions of these particular services, and why they are of help to the population,
see Chapter 4, sections 1.7 and 1.8.
\textsuperscript{173} For additional discussion of the options provided on the questionnaire see Chapter 4 Appendix
“Categorical responses” and Table 5.3 in this chapter.
\textsuperscript{174} For the results of analyses run without covariates, see Appendix.
Figure 5.1: Predicted proportion of civilians accessing MNLF services pre- and post-1996 in MNLF areas (with covariates)

Table 5.1: Predicted proportion of civilians' choice of service provider pre- and post-1996 in MNLF areas (with covariates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Job</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Village Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Past</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.347***</td>
<td>0.435***</td>
<td>0.395***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.111***</td>
<td>0.051**</td>
<td>0.095**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.005*</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.012**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.033***</td>
<td>0.046***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myself/ family</td>
<td>0.142***</td>
<td>0.086***</td>
<td>0.129***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>0.257***</td>
<td>0.322***</td>
<td>0.067***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.055***</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
<td>0.119***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2: p-values comparing pre- and post-1996 predicted proportions (with covariates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Village Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.0087</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.0185</td>
<td>0.0606</td>
<td>0.0233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.6550</td>
<td>0.5971</td>
<td>0.1888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.0255</td>
<td>0.1374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myself/Family</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.9446</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government above Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.0051</td>
<td>0.5187</td>
<td>0.2874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.2047</td>
<td>0.4602</td>
<td>0.0651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the MNLF’s increased access to humanitarian assistance from donors, and affiliation with NGO projects, it is somewhat surprising that the group does not score better on organizing village improvement projects. However, the overall decline is consistent with MNLF’s increasing “clubbiness” in providing services. By limiting those who have access to these benefits, the organization makes it less likely that a random sample of civilians in their areas will report having received these services, or view the MNLF as a source of such benefits.

Rather, it seems civilians in these areas are relying increasingly on their barangay captains for assistance (Table 5.1 and Table 5.2).\(^\text{175}\) It may be that many

\(^{175}\) See Chapter 4, section 1.4 “Response Bias” for a discussion of why I think the “barangay captain” is a misleading and unhelpful category for cross-sectional analysis. While this is so, shifts over time may be instructive, though still mitigated by the biased reporting discussed further in Chapter 4, section 1.4.
MNLF have simply become barangay captains (this is a variant of one of the confounding factors in considering the “Barangay Captain” response category noted in Chapter 4, section 1.4). However, in such cases, many individuals are still considered “MNLF” by the populace, above and beyond their current elected position. Respondents who turned to local officials who were also MNLF members would thus have likely answered “MNLF.”

The MNLF continues to provide MNLF commanders and *sharia* judges remain respected adjudicators in many communities, though some suggest the MNLF has been happy to pass these duties to official barangay captains. Those who do continue to adjudicate do so on much the same terms as their pre-1996 predecessors—handling mostly civil cases of disagreement, and implementing a mixture of *sharia* and *adat* law (i.e. less orthodoxy than their MILF and ASG cousins). When asked about his handling of personal and family law, one MNLF judge pithily commented “So? Two guys fucked each other—who cares?!" 

Survey data support these qualitative findings – MNLF is less frequently chosen now than it was pre-1996 for issues that would be handled through the MNLF’s adjudicative mechanisms. Respondents were asked about three forms of adjudication both in the present and retrospectively (for the pre-1996 period).

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176 This assessment of the “dual hatting” concern, and how civilians would weigh authorities multiple affiliations is based on extensive discussions with local field coordinators and other local survey staff.
177 Author interview.; ———.; ibid.
178 ———.. This response would not have come from an MILF or ASG judge.
Respondents were asked to whom they would turn for assistance in cases of disputes with their neighbors, thefts of valuables, and cases of murder against one of their family members. Again, they were asked to pick one, and only one, response from a list of possible authority figures. Figure 5.2 reports the predicted probabilities of MNLF’s selection as an adjudicator in each of these three incident types. All three types of adjudication show a drop in MNLF provision post-1996, and for all, the drop is statistically significant at at least the 0.1 level (Table 5.4).179

Table 5.3 shows the predicted probabilities for all options respondents were given. It appears that in lieu of the MNLF, civilians are turning increasingly to their 179 For the results of analyses run without covariates, see Appendix.
Barangay Captains, and (less so, and for cases of theft and murder only) to the Philippine National Police (PNP). This is consistent with the previously referenced comment from a long-time MNLF insider that MNLF commanders in Sulu were “relieved to be relieved” when barangay captains began resuming their duties as adjudicators, and the MNLF re-focused on military activities.180

Table 5.3: Predicted proportions of civilians' choice of adjudicator pre- and post-1996 in MNLF areas (with covariates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dispute</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Murder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Past</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.460***</td>
<td>0.561***</td>
<td>0.465***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.111***</td>
<td>0.064**</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0.035**</td>
<td>0.019**</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>0.159***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.130***</td>
<td>0.163***</td>
<td>0.071***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

180 Author interview.
Table 5.4: p-values comparing pre- and post-1996 predicted proportions (with covariates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dispute</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Murder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.0068</td>
<td>0.0640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.1218</td>
<td>0.0376</td>
<td>0.4996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0.1298</td>
<td>0.0310</td>
<td>0.0310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government above Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.2535</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.8679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.1430</td>
<td>0.3651</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outside of ARMM and the PDCs, a few MNLF members, mostly women, have emerged as formidable and effective forces in the Moro NGO community. Effectively interfacing between international NGOs and the fractious local NGO community and MNLF commanders (particularly in the MNLF bailiwick of Sulu), these NGOs have often proven effective. Their successes, moreover, accrue to the MNLF’s reputation for service provision. Many of these have emphasized in interviews the need for services to be available to “all” (i.e. not just MNLF). Unfortunately for the MNLF, they appear to be a capable minority, and one that has its own frustrations in recognizing the organizational shortcomings of a movement to which they are ideologically committed.181

181 Ibid.; ———.
The MNLF has retained some efforts to protect communities, primarily by trying to mitigate some of the excesses of the ASG. Early on, the MNLF recognized the risk that its failure to do anything about ASG would leave civilians to face the ASG-AFP crossfire. Even so, the MNLF's performance on this front has been spotty. The MNLF has undertaken joint operations with the AFP against ASG, primarily as a confidence-building measures at the time of the 1996 Agreement, but intermittently since then. Misuari himself has offered to negotiate for the release of ASG hostages. Unfortunately, Misuari's leadership has often been rejected by the ASG (many of whom defected from the MNLF precisely because they disagreed with the ideological direction in which he was taking the organization). Some in the Sulu community, while sympathetic to the MNLF, have expressed frustration that the organization has not taken a harder line against the ASG.

That being said, the MNLF's post-1996 governance has not been marked by extensive coercion against civilians. Rather, much coercion attributed to the MNLF appears to result from its traditional organizational weakness—poor command and control. MNLF commanders have been accused of joining or supporting the efforts

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185 See Aventajado and Montelibano, *140 Days of Terror: in the Clutches of the Abu Sayyaf*; Dela Cruz, *A Lifetime of Freedom*.
186 Author interview.
of Abu Sayyaf, which has caused both direct and collateral damage to civilians, and of participating in kidnappings for ransom on their own. As before 1996, the MNLF has struggled to rein in personnel involved in clan warfare (ridos). As theory suggests, the MNLF has underinvested in services, and, at the margins, engaged in coercion. Failure to discipline troops is both a non-investment in service to civilians (physical security), and leaves the door open for personnel to coerce civilians to extract what they need.

4. Conclusion

The MNLF is the original face of the modern Moro liberation movement, established to give voice to local grievances. The early organization demonstrated some ideological distance from the Bangsamoro (both by leaving unanswered any grassroots interest in Islamic revival, and its acceptance of its donors’ insistence on autonomy (rather than secession)). Partnered with the OIC and its member states (particularly Libya), the MNLF faced donors who provided heavy military assistance, and would accept some collateral damage, but not widespread atrocities.

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187 Iribani, *Give Peace A Chance: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks*: 72 and 94. The MNLF is sometimes accused of using the term “lost commands” to gain deniability for activities the organization endorses, but cannot officially undertake in its post-Agreement capacity. Filipino reporter Arlyn Dela Cruz, who for a time enjoyed unique access to the Abu Sayyaf Group and its Western hostages, was kidnapped in 2002. Finally writing about her experience in 2010, Dela Cruz fingers the MNLF as her captors—allegedly in retaliation for less-than-complementary comments about Misuari, see Dela Cruz, *A Lifetime of Freedom*. 
Theory suggests MNLF 1.0 would provide some services, but not many, and engage in coercion at the margins.

A series of exogenous geopolitical events shifted the MNLF’s donors’ interests. The MNLF was placed in the awkward position of complying with its sponsors’ altered humanitarian and ideological preferences, or find another way to sustain itself. The MNLF accepted the compromise. Theory suggests that the MNLF’s service provision will decline—given the groups’ ideological shift away from the domestic population, and move to a partnership with lower humanitarian concerns. The historical record supports these suppositions.

More so than the ASG (see Chapter 6) the MNLF case exemplifies some of the pitfalls for rebel groups accepting foreign largesse. The historical record reveals tensions within the group itself in balancing its domestic and foreign constituencies.

Additionally, in the larger context of the Mindanao struggle, the MNLF case suggests some of the drawbacks of relying on rebels’ foreign ties to bring the fighters to the negotiating table. While exogenous events pushed MNLF donors to back a signed agreement, the case suggests that pressure could be deliberately applied to rebels’ international ties to produce the same effect. However, the MNLF case provides a word of caution on this point. To be sure, the MNLF’s sponsors’ eagerness to compromise in exchange for a signed deal allowed the government to

188 Other tensions between rebels and their sponsors are noted in Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism.
extract an agreement closer to its own preferences. However, the deal has failed to quell conflict in Mindanao. This very move away from the populace has left the ideological preferences of the Bangsamoro sufficiently unsatisfied that there is space at least for the MILF to retain popular support. Frustration with the MNLF’s shift has fed support for both the MILF and the ASG (at least initially, and still among some of those who actually join the group as fighters).

If the MNLF experience is to be instructive, it suggests that peace deals do not always impart “legitimacy” to either rebel or incumbent signatories. The post-1996 experience has not shone favorably on either the MNLF or the GRP from the perspective of the grassroots. However, this chapter also suggests that the model can be used to examine odd “Frankenstein” cases, in which peace deals fail to fully subsume rebels into the political mainstream—producing instead hybrid partnerships between rebels and the incumbent regime.
Chapter 5: Appendix

Statistical analyses in this chapter are show modeled with covariates, held at the subpopulation mean for MNLF areas (see Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1). The Appendix reports results of the same analyses, run without covariates.

Figure 5.3 reports the predicted probabilities with which civilians in MNLF areas receive help finding employment, arranging business contracts, and organizing village improvement projects from the MNLF (for the same analysis with covariates, see Figure 5.1). Table 5.5 reports the predicted proportions for all possible authority figures providing such services (including the MNLF)—for the same analysis with covariates, see Table 5.1). Table 5.6 reports the p-values comparing the pre-1996 and post-1996 predicted proportions for all authority figures, including the MNLF (for the same analysis with covariates, see Table 5.2).
Figure 5.3: Predicted probabilities of civilians accessing MNLF services pre- and post-1996 in MNLF areas (without covariates)

Table 5.5: Predicted proportion of civilians’ choice of service provider pre-and post-1996 in MNLF areas (without covariates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Provider</th>
<th>Job Past</th>
<th>Job Present</th>
<th>Business Past</th>
<th>Business Present</th>
<th>Village Project Past</th>
<th>Village Project Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.249***</td>
<td>0.322***</td>
<td>0.413***</td>
<td>0.411***</td>
<td>0.477***</td>
<td>0.611***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.053***</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.045***</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myself/Family</td>
<td>0.093***</td>
<td>0.062***</td>
<td>0.134***</td>
<td>0.132***</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.031***</td>
<td>0.041***</td>
<td>0.132***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>0.402***</td>
<td>0.441***</td>
<td>0.074***</td>
<td>0.068***</td>
<td>0.147***</td>
<td>0.110***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.042***</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.116***</td>
<td>0.094***</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.6: p-values comparing pre-and post-1996 predicted proportions (without covariates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Without covariates</th>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Village Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.9463</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.2816</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.5525</td>
<td>0.6034</td>
<td>0.3174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.3974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government above Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0.7240</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
<td>0.1358</td>
<td>0.2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.4 reports the predicted probabilities with which civilians in MNLF areas turn to the MNLF to adjudicate disputes, cases of theft, or incidents of murder (for the same analysis with covariates, see Figure 5.2). Table 5.6 reports the predicted proportions for all possible authority figures providing such services (including the MNLF)—for the same analysis with covariates, see Table 5.3). Table 5.8 reports the p-values comparing the pre-1996 and post-1996 predicted proportions for all authority figures, including the MNLF (for the same analysis with covariates, see Table 5.4).
Figure 5.4: Predicted probabilities of civilians accessing MNLF adjudication services pre- and post-1996 in MNLF areas (without covariates)

Table 5.7: Predicted proportion of civilians; choice of adjudicator pre- and post-1996 in MNLF areas (without covariates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dispute</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Murder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Past</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.530***</td>
<td>0.674***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.145***</td>
<td>0.071***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.8: p-values comparing pre- and post-1996 proportions (without covariates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dispute</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Murder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.4594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>0.1942</td>
<td>0.2094</td>
<td>0.6016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0.2765</td>
<td>0.2886</td>
<td>0.5619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>0.3282</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>0.2388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government above Barangay Captain</td>
<td>0.3619</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.1163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>0.0476</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6: Longitudinal analysis of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Amir had been expecting this visit. They had already approached many other barangay captains in his municipality.

The men needed no introduction. In the small Sulu community, everyone knew everyone, anyway. Still, they introduced themselves. With the typical local obliqueness that passes for courtesy, they described who they worked for. They were Abu Sayyaf.

“Brother,” the first one asked, “won’t you contribute to the cause? We are all Muslims—we are fighting for Islam! Five thousand pesos only, brother.” The politeness of the request was pointed, but in notable contrast to the ease with which the men held their nearly-new armalite rifles.

Technically, Amir could afford the request. His monthly allotment for the village was usually about 75 thousand pesos—that is, when the municipal government officials pocketed less of the allocation into their own “savings.” The money was supposed support village development and basic services. Still, five thousand was not a lot to pay for peace of mind. Mostly, Amir was tired of ASG’s antics in his village. Even as an elected official, Amir had something to say about the national government’s treatment of the Bangsamoro. But, outside of that, he saw
little appeal in their “cause,” as they put it. Privately, he was ashamed these men claimed the same religion he himself practiced. He refused.

For all his effort to convey this refusal politely, the group left clearly disappointed.

Three nights later, the rebels burned the local elementary school to the ground. The town had had difficulty enough in keeping even local teachers, whom ASG also often bullied and extorted. Without a school building, it would be virtually impossible. The villagers were furious. There were murmurs in the town that some thought they should inform the military of the ASG’s locations, but no one wanted to take the risk—if their betrayal were discovered, and managed to survive, they would have to move—leaving their homes, their land—and start over.

This is hardly the first time ASG has targeted both Moros and their basic quality of life. Kidnap-for-ransom victims now include ordinary Moros.¹ NGO workers and schoolteachers are frequent targets. In at least one case, ASG kidnappers left the head of an abducted school principal in a local gas station as a warning to others.² Ironically, the ASG claims to represent the very people their actions so negatively affect. Why would they risk popular alienation?

¹ Author interview with Sulu-based NGO worker, Zamboanga City, July 2010; Andreo C. Calonzo, "2 kidnap victims released in Sulu; ransom paid," GMA News Online, 8 August 2011.
Abu Sayyaf is an extreme ideological group. While its origins are sometimes debated, ASG’s founders and members were (and are) Moros, and it carries the same, self-determinationist genes as its MNLF and MILF forbearers. ASG’s ideological preferences, however, are far more extreme than either MNLF’s or MILF’s. Though homegrown, the original movement enjoyed support from Al Qaeda affiliates, who appreciated the founder Abdurajak Janjalani’s more radical vision, but had limited concern for the welfare of Moros under ASG control. The original group struggled to provide some services, but relied heavily on coercion.

After Abdurajak’s death in 1998, his successors embraced even more radical ideas, and forged a partnership with Indonesian radicals Jemaah Islamiyya and individuals abroad, as well as domestic criminal elements. Such backers care little for ASG’s human rights record, and may even appreciate extreme violence as a signal of commitment to radicalism and efficacy. The modern ASG appears to have given up almost completely on service provision, and relies even more heavily on coercion than it did before 1998.

This chapter begins with a brief summary of the theoretical propositions I will test in the ASG case. Proceeding to the case study, I first explore ASG’s origins and initial behaviors—comparing the historical record to both the theory’s predicted outcomes and mechanisms behind these outcomes. I then discuss how exogenous shifts forced ASG to re-equilibrate and analyze the group’s transitional period. Finally, I examine ASG’s post-shift behavior with respect to the theory.
1. Theoretical predictions

The theory models rebels’ behavior vis-à-vis civilians, as an outcome of both the rebels’ internal ideological position and the preferences of their sponsors—preferences over both the rebels’ enacted ideological position and their mix of coercion and service provision. ASG’s original internal ideology was far more extreme than the popular preference. Theory suggests they thus faced a dilemma. Without compromising the group’s ideological preferences in its enacted position, a large ideological distance from the domestic median would leave civilians skeptical, and make them less likely to offer compliance. ASG would find service provision would buy them less compliance than it would more moderate rebels (like the MNLF and MILF). This is so because civilians will likely accept any available services, but remain dubious of overlords with ideologies different from their own. This problem only increases with ideological distance—the larger the distance, the less compliance civilians will offer.

For groups like ASG, this means that without ideological compromise, survival may be a challenge. Even if the rebels coerced up to the point of popular backlash, the group might not be able to extract sufficient personnel, intelligence, materiel, food, and shelter to survive. Extremists like ASG could opt to moderate, enacting policies closer to the domestic median. However, doing so is costly—while a more popular position would net them greater power, the bitterness of compromise might make the prospect unpalatable to ideological rebels.
Unlikely to compromise, and unable to survive on domestic support alone, extremist groups like ASG may be unable successfully to form in a domestic environment—existing instead as latent groups of disgruntled individuals. With the aid of a foreign donor, however, they may be freed from the need to compromise. Like civilians and rebels themselves, donors dislike ideological positions far from their own. But, if extremists find a foreign donor with preferences akin to their own, the partnership can be comfortable for both parties.

However, donors do not care only about ideological consanguinity. They may also care about how their rebel protégés govern. Donors influence rebels’ choice over the mix of service provision and coercion they employ in two ways. First, donors may have humanitarian preferences, preferring the rebels do not rely too heavily on coercion. Such preferences create a threshold for rebels’ coercive behavior—if rebels exceed this limit, their support may be terminated. Second, the form of support donors offer rebels shapes the relative costs of coercion and service provision. Specifically, humanitarian aid makes it cheaper for rebels to provide services and military aid makes it cheaper for rebels to coerce. Fungible aid does not affect the relative costs of services and coercion.

The ASG case provides an opportunity to test this model of rebel and donor behavior. Founded in or around 1989, the group’s initial sponsorship package was derailed in 1998 by a set of exogenous events. Forcing ASG to re-equilibrate with a new set of donors, this shift generates two separate periods in which to test the theory’s comparative static predictions. Furthermore, examination of the groups’
origins and the process of re-equilibration provide an opportunity to falsify the theory's causal mechanisms.

Under its initial partnership, ASG would have had few incentives to enact an ideological position close to the popular preference. The rebels' equally extreme foreign sponsors allowed the group to enact more extreme policies without worrying about domestic costs. ASG's divergence from the popular position would mean they would find service provision ineffective, and rely more heavily on coercion. A support portfolio comprising far more military assistance than humanitarian aid would further facilitate ASG's reliance on coercion. What services the organization did provide would tend towards the club goods end of the spectrum (benefitting only a chosen few), rather than local public goods available to all. ASG's use of coercion would be somewhat constrained by its initial sponsors' limited humanitarian concerns, but this threshold would have been quite high.

The death of ASG's original leader and arrests within its donor network severed its original backing. Theory suggests that if rebels lose a sponsor, they have three choices to avoid extinction: they can try to sustain themselves with domestic backing; they may pursue a new foreign donor; or they can pursue lootable resources, though this solution is not usually sustainable on a large scale unless the area is blessed with natural resources. Like most extreme groups, ASG would likely discover the first option requires ideological compromises they are unwilling to make. Rebels are more likely to pursue new sponsors, but only if they can find one sufficiently extremist that the rebels may avoid ideological compromise.
ASG’s new leaders brought with them a more extreme ideology, they successfully built new partnerships with sponsors for whom this position was attractive. In this new equilibrium, we expect ASG to enact an ideological position further from the popular preference than the original ASG. ASG 2.0 would also rely even more on coercion.

2. ASG 1.0 (1989-1998)

“In the early 1990s, the ASG didn’t try to recruit [popular] support. It was the Arab nations who wanted ASG, because they thought it would be like the mujahadeen. The reputation of the Tausogs as strong fighters, this is what they wanted. There was a higher organization in their minds, even before the ASG. The MILF was not enough what they wanted. They wanted [ASG].”

The ideological position of Abdurajak Janjalani (henceforth referred to as Abdurajak, following local convention) and those he ultimately drew with him into the ASG was more extreme than both the popular preference and either of the existing rebel fronts—MNLF and MILF. Abdurajak faced roughly the same population as his MNLF and MILF forbearers. Civilians retained their desire for self-determination, and Abdurajak’s anti-government stance certainly appealed to this popular sentiment.

However, civilians also retained their interest in social reforms. If anything, over the decades of conflict and concomitant social upheaval the qualifications of

3 Author interview.
many traditional leaders have been called into question—even as ongoing conflict pressured communities to identify more firmly as Moros, and the traditions that attend that identity. ASG’s vision for social reform was not particularly concrete or well articulated. Abdurajak envisioned a society based on the Qu’ran, but a former colleague noted political organization was outside of Abdurajak’s expertise—“it was one of the ustadz’s [Abdurajak’s] personal handicaps.”⁴ ASG criticized traditional Moro elites as incapable of enforcing an Islamic way of life as demanded by the Qur’an.⁵ However, like all vanguard organizations, ASG was highly ideological, with a view to changing society, but with an ideology that itself defined a new elite—a religious cadre practicing Abdurajak’s particular Islamic vision.⁶ In this, ASG didn’t answer popular interest in reform.

By the 1990s, Moro’s traditional identity as Muslims and respect for the religiously educated had coalesced into more popular interest in, and experience with, Islamic revival. The popularity of the Tabligh movement (introduced to the islands in the 1980s) suggests a growing popular interest in religious education, and more orthodox Islamic practice.⁷ While the average Moro’s Islamic practice has become slightly more orthodox over the decades, many retained their belief in folk

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⁴ ______.
⁵ ______.
⁷ Some original members of ASG (including Abdurajak) were allegedly followers of the movement, and much has been made of possible links between the Tabligh and ASG as well as Indonesian jemaah Islamiyya. In Mindanao, the Tabligh are widely viewed as apolitical, nonviolent, and pious.
traditions, engaged in a variety of less-orthodox practices, and are relatively moderate.

In most communities, Abdurajak’s personal Islamic credentials and passion were respected. While some viewed his extremism as a radically-necessary solution to the Moro struggle, his position indubitably differed from that of the population—a point that Abdurajak himself made clear in no uncertain terms. In concert with his international cohort, Abdurajak’s rhetoric was often critical of ordinary Moros’ Islamic practice. Tan (2003) notes that the eight available khutba (sermons) delivered by Abdurajak contain “criticisms and indictments of both Muslims and non-Muslims including the ulama who have superficial knowledge of the Qur’an and the Hadith,” and identifies among the enemies of the Qur’an “…the Muslims who do not read the Qur’an but other materials such as comics, books, magazines, etc.”—a category that would describe a large proportion of the Bangsamoro.

These khutba formed ASG’s ideological front lines. Abdurajak may have had aspirations to promulgate his ideology throughout Mindanao, but it seems he invested primarily in these public sermons which were subsequently played over the radio. His message thus reached quite a few Bangsamoro, but radio broadcasts

8 Author interview; ———.
9 Tan, Filipino Muslim perceptions of their history and culture as seen through indigenous written sources: 97.; Tan also mentions that Abdurajak delivered a separate khutba on “The Sickness of the Ulama,” in which he identifies his assessment of the clerics’ shortcomings and need for reform.
were primarily limited to areas around Abdurajak’s home province, and it was not accompanied or followed by any sort of organizational apparatus.10

ASG’s sectarianism would grow more extreme in later periods, but it seems the germs were planted under Abdurajak’s tenure. Though locals likely resented being dispossessed by predominantly Christian Filipinos, sectarianism was not widespread—both for ideological and pragmatic reasons. Most Moros, including those in ASG areas, may be frustrated but do not widely hold virulently anti-Christian views. Pragmatically, too, many civilians realize that deliberate attacks on Christian civilians could inspire retributive violence. This risk was not unknown to Abdurajak—a defector noted that the high-profile kidnappings of Christians during ASG’s transitional period would have been disallowed by Abdurajak because of the possibility for retaliation against Moros. Abdurajak’s own views on the subject seem to have been mixed. At different times, he espoused both tolerant and anti-Christian rhetoric. Whatever his personal views, colleagues note Abdurajak compromised internally in building ASG, and may have been “persuaded” by his recruits’ strong anti-settler sentiment.11

10 Scholar Julkipli Wadi argues the ASG’s strategy was “two-pronged: building a rural/communal and military base to serve as a network center for conducting da’wah (Islamic call) and military training; and creating an urban mobile force to be used in prozelitization, politicization and launching guerrilla warfare.” Wadi, “Philippine Political Islam and the Emerging Fundamentalist Strand,” 210-11.

11 Author interview.
Abdurajak’s position diverged not only from the popular ideological position, but also from those of the MNLF and MILF. In the absence of consanguine foreign donors, theory suggests such ideological extremists will exist primarily as a latent group, or as disgruntled members of a more mainstream rebel organization. Abdurajak and many of those who joined him in forming the ASG were first members of the MNLF. That they chafed under MNLF’s ideological direction was obvious to both those inside and outside the movement. Abdurajak’s criticism of Misuari’s position was allegedly one of the reasons he was encouraged to travel abroad for Islamic studies, giving the organization a reprieve from his complaints. Abdurajak was not alone. Others who joined him in the ASG were originally MNLF members “who felt sidelined or disagreed with Nur Misuari.”

These men’s ideological difference from the population would have made it difficult for them to set up an independent group—the next best thing was to try to reform a more moderate organization with existing support. Returning from abroad, armed with connections and even more conviction,

“[t]he young [Abdurjak Janjalani] was able to organized [sic] some young mujahideen to become daee’ inside the front. Their mission, is to reeducate the mujahideen about the right aqeedah [faith] of Islam about Jihad Fi Sabilillah and the purpose of it.”

12 Abuza, Balik-terrorism: the return of the Abu Sayyaf: 3.
Unsurprisingly, this attempt was unsuccessful:

“But, once [Abdurajak Janjalani] asked his students if there are changes inside the front [i.e. MNLF], his students answered no. (...) so he organized again all his students to set a group of Mukhlis (Sincere) Mujahideen in the Way of Allah (swt).”

For its founders, then, ASG was a chance to avoid the costs of ideological compromise inherent in remaining part of the MNLF—as theory suggests. To be fair, some may have transferred their loyalty to the ASG for personal reasons, or disapproval over Misuari’s willingness to compromise at the negotiating table. Still, Misuari’s willingness to compromise watered down his ideology even further, and ASG’s founders welcomed a chance to express their convictions through ASG.

Without outside support, it is unlikely ASG would have been much more than a local militia armed with whatever firearms its members could afford. Luckily for ASG, Al Qaeda (AQ) and other foreign sponsors saw in Abdurajak and his colleagues an opportunity to incorporate yet another ideologically similar local group into its global jihadist vision. The AQ-ASG connection allegedly formed based on

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15 Abdurajak also resisted initial overtures by the MILF, whom he also rejected as insufficiently radical. While the MILF has repeated disavowed support for ASG’s kidnappings and other activities, the group did make some initial overtures to Abdurajak, and even sent an envoy to learn more about the organization, its ideology and intentions, to see if Abdurajak and his cadre could be persuaded to the MILF’s own ideological line. This is consistent with MILF’s need to build and retain domestic alliances. In contrast, Misuari’s reaction to Abdurajak’s separation was reportedly “if he wants to go, let him go.”
Abdurajak’s personal connections from his studies abroad and brief time in Afghanistan.

As the theory suggests, donors do care about the ideology of their rebel protégés. In Abdurajak and the ASG, these supporters found something they had previously found missing among his revolutionary predecessors. One founding member comments, that “for a long time, the ASG did not have a name. (...) But there were pressures from other groups...overseas. They wanted him to name the group to separate it from the MNLF and the MILF. They were not happy [with the MNLF and MILF]. They liked the separate ASG.”16 That is, donors found the MILF and MNLF too moderate for their tastes—rather than backing existing groups, these donors went to the trouble of encouraging a new organization in line with their own ideological position.

Al Qaeda did, however, have humanitarian concerns. Among the lessons it learned in Afghanistan, it seems Al Qaeda determined the value of providing at least some services. Around the same time AQ forged ties with ASG, correspondence between the Africa Corps and AQ leaders notes the need for "supervision of liberated areas and securing of lives, funds, and property of all members of the populace,"17 and that provision of security led local tribesmen to request Al Qaeda

16 Author interview.; See also International Peace Mission to Basilan, "Basilan: The Next Afghanistan?", (Quezon City, Philippines: Akbayan! Citizens Action Party/Institute for Popular Democracy/Focus on the Global South-Philippines Transnational Institute, 2002), 14.
17 Al Qaeda, "Five Letters to the Africa Corps," 3.
operatives "stay and govern, and secure the city." AQ's agenda for Somalia explicitly included establishing security, economic reform, and ameliorating famine. While AQ's willingness to use coercion should not be ignored, it is worth noting that their organization did also consider some minimal level of service as part of their operations and advocacy.

Information on AQ's clandestine support to ASG is, for obvious reasons, imperfect. However, it seems AQ's assistance was primarily financial, but included some military support, and a very small amount of humanitarian aid. Funds were channeled both through personal intermediaries and allegedly skimmed from a network of charitable organizations including the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). Some of the money may have been converted directly into guns and other materiel by AQ's Philippine based go-betweens before being handed over to ASG. Arms transfers were also handled directly—a 1995 interview with an ASG officer in charge of logistical support “revealed that they get their support from [abroad]. The support are entirely in arms,” and a later defector commented “[e]ven our uniforms came from abroad. We were even issued bulletproof vests,” he

20 Abuza (2005); including citing Christine Herrera, "Bin Laden Funds Abu Sayyaf Through Muslim Relief Group," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 9, 2000.
says. AQ may also have sent affiliates to train ASG members, and paid for a few ASG members to be trained abroad. Finally, through the IIRO, AQ also provided some service projects directly to communities in ASG areas.

3. **Equilibrium 1.0: Producing quasi-voluntary compliance**

"Upliftment of the people was one of our goals, the upliftment of their living conditions. But we failed to do this."

ASG entered the fray as an extremist rebel group, backed by equally extremist sponsors with limited humanitarian concerns. The model predicts ASG’s domestic rule would be characterized by limited service provision and heavy investment in coercion. This proved to be so. Moreover, debates within the organization itself offer support for the mechanisms that underlie the model’s predictions.

By several accounts, Abdurajak originally envisioned an organization "like the MILF—with departments on military, political, religion, and civilian and

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22 Torres and Nery, *Into the Mountain: hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf*; 41.
23 Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia*; 27.
24 Ibid., 26-7.; Tupas, "The boy who wants to be a rebel."
26 Author interview.;
women's issues.”

While his critics argue this was rhetorical deception, Abdurajak’s discussions with his young recruits mentioned goals to “to help those who are oppressed,” and of “upliftment” of economically and politically marginalized Moro communities. Whatever the intentions of its founder, it seems that larger systemic forces urged organizational choices away from service provision. Service provision for ASG was relatively expensive for both internal and external reasons.

First, ASG’s ideological position limited civilians’ adherence to ASG—even as many respected Abdurajak’s credentials, and sympathized with the group’s anti-government stance. ASG’s ideology made recruitment (a form of compliance) of qualified personnel difficult. Whatever his original vision of a multi-talented ASG, Abdurajak himself was a religious expert and a fighter, and those he brought with him from the MNLF were experienced combatants. Service provision and political affairs were outside their collective expertise.

However, ASG could have opted to woo qualified personnel, or train other recruits in these skills. For any rebel organization, such recruitment is a delicate operation, and training personnel in these skills is expensive. ASG’s extreme ideological position, and concomitant unwillingness to compromise, dramatically limited the pool of recruits from which it could draw. Finding those who were both

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
technically qualified and ideologically consanguine proved difficult. One early (and well-qualified) acquaintance “graciously declined” Abdurajak’s attempts to recruit him as a political and social officer, preferring, as he said, “to stay in the middle” ideologically.29

The same source notes Abdurajak made limited attempts to recruit other Islamic clerics (and their political, educational, and service efforts) to his cause—reaching out only through his recorded _khutba_, not personal recruitment efforts. The few clerics who did align with the movement appear to have done so out of their personal conviction.30 Those whose convictions were more moderate remained unwooed and unwon by ASG. Abdurajak’s criticism of “everyone except himself” likely did not endear him to fellow scholars, and he clearly refused to engage in any of the costly ideological and political bargaining necessary to build these ties.

Both the MNLF and MILF also struggled with the costs of recruiting local ideologues. The MNLF struck a series of difficult bargains, particularly at its inception, between traditional elites and young reformists. The MILF has invested heavily in coordinating Mindano’s often-fractious imams, and politicking with traditional elites. Had Abdurajak viewed service provision as vital for the

29 Ibid.; ———.
30 A former colleague notes that sympathy for Abdurajak among the local political elite was “divided, as always,” and largely based on which school of Islamic political thought the clerics had been educated within, ———.
organization, he would likely have invested—either in costly recruiting of qualified personnel, or in training existing cadres in these skills. His refusal to make this investment made service provision very difficult for ASG. Ironically, it seems ASG would have had a serious interest in Islamic education to correct the shortcomings of orthopraxis Abdurajak complained of among the Bangsamoro. However, their leaders’ very unwillingness to compromise and invest in coalition-building dramatically limited the organization’s ability to provide education to civilians.

Second, while ASG’s own ideological position made service provision costly, their foreign donors exacerbated the problem. Early debates between and among ASG and its original foreign sponsors indicate three things. First, everyone involved was aware that the freshly-minted ASG was not well-equipped to provide social services. Second, sponsors viewed ASG’s immediate existence as an armed (i.e. militarily-oriented) ideological vanguard to be more important than slowly forming a group capable of both coercion and service provision. Finally, sponsors did think some service provision was beneficial, and (in light of ASG’s own limitations) were willing to provide such services directly.

At the time of ASG’s founding, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, the head of the Philippine branch of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO, allegedly ASG’s initial conduit to/from Al Qaeda) expressed concern: “Khalifa was saying ASG shouldn’t think of struggling against the government, it was premature. He
wanted it to become like the MILF—well organized, services provision, etc...But the others [from the Middle East] wanted the ASG right away.”

Supporters were so anxious to establish an armed ideological vanguard in Mindanao that they were willing to overlook ASG’s shortcomings in providing services. Instead, ASG’s sponsors provided some compensation for this weakness by providing services directly, through affiliated NGOs like the IIRO operating throughout Muslim Mindanao, but heavily concentrated in ASG areas. Such services included a medical clinic and a few pharmacies, basic food and clothing for those displaced by fighting, construction of schools, and scholarships for Moro youths in Islamic studies. These services obviously benefitted civilian recipients, and the arrangement accrued compliance and sympathy for ASG. Having IIRO and others provide such services directly was certainly convenient for ASG. However, because this aid did not come directly through ASG (as humanitarian aid did through the MILF and to a lesser extent the MNLF) it did not actually contribute to

31 ———.
32 Note that the IIRO may well have taken funds from non-Al Qaeda affiliates, and not all of its projects may have been dictated by AQ. Note also that this analytical point is actually separate from the assessment that some portion of IIRO funds were allegedly siphoned off into supporting ASG through cash transfers and/or weapons purchases.
33 Author interview.; Abuza, Balik-terrorism: the return of the Abu Sayyaf. 5.; for more in-depth descriptions of IIRO’s services and humanitarian efforts, see Abdulhadi Bin Abdulkahar Tahir Daguit, "The role of Rabitatul 'Alam Al-Islamie (Muslim World League)—International Islamic Relief Organization of Saudi Arabia in the Philippines: 1985-2001" (Masters thesis, University of the Philippines, 2002).
34 Note that analyses by scholars like Abuza, the Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines that such services were used to recruit support and personnel for ASG are in fact totally consistent with the concept of generating quasi-voluntary compliance. Abuza, Balik-terrorismo: the return of the Abu Sayyaf.
ASG’s own internal service-provision capacity. This shortcoming proved problematic for ASG service provision outside those few areas with IIRO and affiliated programming, and was particularly challenging once AQ support was cut off.

On its own, ASG’s service provision efforts were extraordinarily ad hoc and intermittent. When asked about ASG’s service provision, the most commonly identified behavior is what is locally termed “Robin Hooding,” in which the group would sometimes distribute a cut of the take from its occasional kidnapping-for-ransom operations—a modern extension of a local tradition of “balloto,” in which a lottery winner shares some of his winnings with his or her neighbors.35 However, given that several early ASG commanders and their families complained to contemporaries that they received none of this largesse, it seems this phenomenon was both incredibly ad hoc, and likely limited to communities in a position to inform on ASG kidnappers.36 Even the early ASG bought silence. Cash payments were indubitably useful to their recipients, but they are hardly indicative of long-term investment by the ASG in institutional capabilities to serve the populace. Cash distributions of this type are the ultimate club (or even private) good.

These club goods and cash payouts (private goods) are in contrast to the more public/local public goods of community organizing by MILF (and to a lesser

35 Author interview.
36 ______. 
extent, MNLF). Both the MNLF and MILF have worked to provide community-wide projects that both benefit more than individual recipients. Ironically, for all its rhetoric, ASG lags seriously behind MILF in facilitating Moros’ access to Islamic education and proselytization.

The group’s non-cash assistance was also distributed on an *ad hoc* basis. A former member notes that in the early days, “people were supportive of us because when we got ransom money from the kidnappings, we gave them money. When they asked for pump boats [motorized outriggers], we gave them. We gave it to them for their livelihood.” ASG also gave some civilians goats and chickens to help them support themselves.37 There is no indication this was a widespread phenomenon or that ASG developed a system to regularly determine the needs and concerns of the grassroots. Furthermore, the basis of the distributions appears to have been personal contact with the ASG members—such services were a club good.

Abdurajak’s ASG also did not invest in one of the basic tools of service—popular consultation and domestic coalitions. A source close to Abdurajak at the founding of ASG notes there was an early “general assembly” to consult on the ongoing establishment of the group, and propose a large military operation. What else was discussed was unclear, and it is the only report of such an assembly.38

37 See story of former ASG member “Ahmad Sampang” in Torres and Nery, *Into the Mountain: hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf*; 36.
38 Author interview.
Given that he “disagreed with everyone other than himself” it is hardly surprising that Abdurajak’s ASG did not seek input from a population he viewed as insufficiently Islamic and undereducated. This lack of consultation, however, only perpetuated the distance between ASG’s ideological center and the views of the domestic population. Indeed, A. Janalani eventually defined as enemies not only the Philippine state and agents thereof, but also Moros who disagreed with his particular brand of violent jihad and/or were politically uninvolved.39

Unsurprisingly, Abdurajak also failed to build much of a domestic coalition. Instead, the new ASG incorporated only the two islands most geographically proximate to his own birthplace. The organization made some forays into mainland Mindanao, but these were largely unsuccessful. As previous Moro revolutionaries had discovered, building ties between Mindanao’s disparate tribal groups was a costly process—requiring time, patience, material and personnel costs, and (sometimes) ideological compromise through extensive and delicate politicking. Under Abdurajak, ASG’s efforts to expand outside its founders’ familiar territories seem to have relied heavily on the humanitarian work provided through its sponsors. Such operations provided some advertising for the group, and may have recruited a few youths to their cause, but were extremely limited in scope and commitment. In contrast, the MILF’s program of expansion entails patient

39 Wadi, "They’ve Come This Far: The Abu Sayyaf thrives on disenchantment. They’re tenacious, too.,” 18.
investments in community organizing, carefully-brokered political deals that enfranchise local powerbrokers within the rebel organization, and a policy of intermarriage between loyal cadres and members of new communities. These were investments Abdurajak chose to forgo.

Many other ASG behaviors highlighted by both observers and residents as "services" relied heavily on ASG’s coercive capability. To be sure, many aspects of rule combine both service and coercion. Judicial services always rely on a mix of the two, since reliable adjudication generally needs enforcement—ASG’s blend leaned towards the coercive. Though Abdurajak’s advice was sought personally on issues of sharia as well as Islam more generally, his expertise was not codified or institutionalized by the ASG. Mindanao’s clerics have traditionally been highly disorganized, and professed a vast heterogeneity of Islamic interpretation. Such diversity and disorganization means establishing and coordinating a network of adjudicators is a costly investment. While the MILF and MNLF have created such structures, ASG has failed to do so. One of Abdurajak’s early friends, and a founding member of ASG comments, “[w]e [had] almost imitated the structure of the MILF, sharia courts, punishment against criminals. We almost had this, but we failed.” He went on to explain that this effort fell short because ASG failed to attract and

40 Comments from survey team members deployed to ASG areas, July and August 2010; Author interview.; ———.
41 ———.
coordinate a sufficient number of educated *ulama* and other individuals capable of delivering judicial services.

Abdurajak’s extremism, unwillingness to compromise and/or invest in service provision training for his personnel had its price. While it seems some youths did receive scholarships in Islamic studies through the IIRO and other supporters, there is no evidence that, once trained, these individuals then rejoined the ASG as judges or teachers. This contrasts with the MILF, which also emphasizes the importance of Islam, and whose efforts to procure scholarships are explicitly part of a larger program to produce qualified educators for their *madaris*.

In ensuring compliance on the vital issue of intelligence, ASG seems to have relied on purchasing silence from some (in cash, but without developing services), and on inducing fear through an opaque system of assassinations. Cash payments are, as mentioned, an intermittent and club good—not a service likely to engender compliance on a large scale. None of the interviewees for this study report widespread attempts by ASG to intimidate Moro civilians during Abdurajak’s tenure. However, ASG’s non-transparent and often harsh brand of justice likely inspired fear more than an impression of justice. An early member commented, “[j]ust suspicion is enough, and they will kill you. They are known to kill without trial, once suspected of conniving...without bringing you to court.”

42Ibid.
Multiple sources suggest the ASG originally attempted to provide some law and order—both in response to civilian concerns and as outgrowths of its own ideological position. However, these efforts remained largely ad hoc. While institutionalized systems can certainly merely formalize poor justice or corrupt rulings, a degree of regularity in rulings and an establishment/clarification of laws or rules is a one of the benefits of rule-of-law. Codification of rules and punishment provide clarification and assurance to those going about daily life. Outside of voicing respect for Abdurajak’s Islamic credentials, none of those interviewed mentioned turning to either Abdurajak or the larger ASG for adjudication of interpersonal disputes between ordinary Moros. In contrast, the MILF, and to a lesser extent the MNLF, have invested in adjudication systems accessible and utilized by civilians to resolve a variety of disputes.

For the original ASG, most attempts to provide law and order consisted of efforts to protect civilians from coercion by other armed actors, including local criminal gangs and private armies of local political and economic powerbrokers. One founding member notes,

"[i]n the beginning, we considered ourselves as defenders of our people, and people would come to us and ask for assistance. For example, in [a given barangay, a commander] raided a community and started to loot there. And an ASG man was there. [The Commander] was killed, and his family declared revenge against his killers. So, these people came to us, they needed protection. They didn’t trust the
police or the military there to help them. So, five from [Abdurajak] Janjalani were sent to that area to protect the people.”

The civilian plaintiffs in this incident clearly sought out the ASG for assistance in a scenario in which suggests they were exploited by local strongmen. However, this anecdote also indicates two less-complementary features of ASG assistance. First, ASG distributed this type of protection on a club or private-good basis (since an “ASG man” being present was key in bringing in the larger group). Second, this intervention largely relied on ASG’s coercive capability. All three of the rebel groups (and, indeed, the Philippine military and police forces) are frequently petitioned for intervention in blood feuds between families—usually when one side finds itself outnumbered or outgunned. Though certainly costly for ASG (both in terms of re-tasking personnel to the area, and putting them directly at risk), intervening as a force multiplier is a less sophisticated, more coercive, and likely shorter-term solution than operating as an adjudicator. ASG appears to have responded similarly in other cases:

“There were other incidents in the early 1990s to seek protection. Especially with the proliferation of drugs and because the dealers used to roam around Isabella City [the largest city in Basilan island]. The [Philippine National] Police did nothing – they tolerated these people, [they may not have helped], but they didn’t do anything to stop it. So, people would come to the ASG, asking us to warn these people, to make them stop. So we did. We used threatening words. We had a mandate from the Qur’an to prevent breaking the law. ASG

43 Ibid.
members would have to throw grenades in their home. And they stopped. This is not covered in Philippine law. The group [ASG] has violated Philippine law, killed people.  

Another recruit notes that “[i]f a landlord would threaten tenants, we would kill the landlord [whether it was] day or night.” While indubitably providing some protection to the population and dissuasion for abusive landlords and drug-dealing criminals, ASG’s harsh response is a far less regularized judicial effort than more institutionalized sharia systems like the MNLF’s and MILF’s. The source of this quote did not outline a consistent judicial approach, or even indicate that this anti-drug effort was applied outside this particular incident.

ASG seems to have applied a similar approach to dealing with economic, as well as physical, exploitation of the Moro masses. Abdurajak directed his men to coerce local utility providers into reducing water and electricity rates: “We told them that the poor could not avail themselves of electricity and water because of the high rates. We warned the company that if they did not lower the rates, the Abu Sayyaf would sabotage their operations.”

Furthermore, Abdurajak failed to invest in one of the most basic sources of good civilian treatment—command and control. Well-disciplined troops can, of course, be used as an even-more effective coercive tool. However, without

44 Ibid.
45 Torres and Nery, Into the Mountain: hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf: 36.
46 Ibid.
command and control, disciplining the inevitable breaches by heavily armed youths becomes extremely problematic. Command and control is an expensive proposition for any organization—an expense ASG forewent. ASG invested little in efforts to limit coercion beyond that sanctioned by the group, and discipline their troops. This failing was coupled with recruitment choices that made both collateral damage and unsanctioned abuse more likely.

Abdurajak’s recorded *khutba* (sermons) failed to attract the technically skilled, but did have a strong affect on “military recruits”—those capable of coercion. Thus, his initial cadre of MNLF members was augmented by new recruits—predominantly young and un- (or under-) educated, attracted by the political and religious purity of the group, and the opportunity to avenge abuses by the Philippine military. In this, ASG is not necessarily unlike MNLF or MILF—most revolutionary movements attract disillusioned youth. However, the eagerness of ASG and its foreign sponsors to set out as an armed vanguard seems to have taken its toll in their ability to screen and train these youth. An erstwhile colleague notes ruefully that, in ASG’s position, “You cannot be choosy, you do not want to make unnecessary enemies. The problem was in recruitment. They recruited other people. They were all comrades, they didn’t have the luxury of time. In their hurry

47 Author interview.
to recruit, helped by finance, they had to be content with who was there.” 49 A later leader admitted ASG’s that early recruitment was not “choosy” and left the organization open to disciplinary problems. 50 A former colleague notes euphemistically that, at the time of his death in 1998, Abdurajak was “still pacifying his forces.” 51

With its lax investment in troop control and predilection towards club goods provision, ASG was prone both to actions that might endanger civilians, and failing to protect them from retaliation. One of Abdurajak’s original plans was to target large landowners as part of his anti-colonial stance, since most such landowners (who happened to be Christian) predominantly lived in Manila. However, his troops expanded the “hit list” to include more ordinary Christian farmers against whom they had more immediate resentments. 52 Both with and without Abdurajak’s direct approval, ASG targeted priests and (primarily Christian) businesspeople. 53 These acts had repercussions for ordinary Moros who were subject to suspicion by the military and/or collateral damage in retrieval operations, and to retaliatory violence from which ASG failed to protect them.

49 Author interview.
50 Dinampo, “A last extended interview with Janjalani.”
51 Author interview.
52 Ibid.; ———.
53 Abdurajak denied involvement in kidnappings, but “was not able to match his rhetoric with deeds” Torres and Nery, Into the Mountain: hostage by the Abu Sayyaf: 36.
A priest kidnapped in 1993 noted some local settlers formed the “Christian Lost Command,” and kidnapped Muslim civilians in retaliation—threatening to kill them unless the ASG released its hostages. The priest noted his captors were unconcerned for the fate of the Muslim hostages. ASG members explained their own indifference as arising “because they did not know those people [the kidnap victims] anyway.” All this suggests ASG was not willing to give up targets it found attractive in order to protect the communities it claimed to represent. Moreover, the rebels’ comment to the priest suggests that, as already noted, what protection they did provide was a club good—available to those they knew personally, but not necessarily the wider Bangsamoro population.

Under Abdurajak, ASG provided a limited number of services. Many of those they did provide were provided as club goods and/or were heavily mixed with ASG’s coercive apparatus. This mix proved sufficient to guarantee sufficient silence among villagers about ASG’s movements to allow the group to survive. The organization was clearly also able to gain enough intelligence about government troop movements to survive. However, the group’s areas of operation remained far smaller than either the MNLF’s or MILF’s, as ASG failed to make significant inroads in building domestic coalitions.

54 Tessa Cruz San Diego, Father Bernardo Blanco: Shoot! an adventure of faith (Quezon City, Philippines: Claretian Publications, 1993), 54 and 57. The priest recalls that “the men from [the group that kidnapped him] were not at all affected by [these threats], he said. ‘They told me that it doesn’t matter even if the Muslim hostages are killed because they did not know those people anyway.’
In sum, and consistent with the theory, ASG’s rule relying more on coercion than service capability. It is certainly not the case that the early ASG undertook a deliberate campaign of action or intimidation against Moro civilians. However, in spite of Abdurajak’s original vision, it is clear that the organization found it far easier to coerce than to serve. One original recruit comments “We were never thinking about that before, about upliftment [of the community]. Our focus was always on how to be independent, how to fight.” 55 In spite of Abdurajak’s original vision, the group failed to recruit personnel capable of service provision, and failed to even form a social service wing. 56 Abdurajak’s original vision of service provision did bear some fruit under his direction, but such efforts were not provided consistently, and were not provided in a way that required ASG to develop organizational capabilities outside coercion. On the whole, ASG’s behavior reflects the theory’s proposition that their ideological extremism and their sponsors’ primarily military support made coercion easier than service provision. While some of their donors’ support was in cash, as the model predicts, ASG did not (as the model predicts) spend these funds in developing or providing services. Instead, they bought guns. 57

55 Author interview.
57 Author interview.

By the late 1990s, a number of events largely severed ASG’s ties to its original international supporters. By 1996, Ramzi Yousef and Mohammed Jamal Khalifa of the Philippine branch of IIRO had been arrested and forced out of the Philippines respectively. ASG’s Al Qaeda backing faltered as its previous conduits were disrupted.\(^{58}\) The ASG-AQ connection was dealt a fatal (or near-fatal) blow in 1998—Abdurajak was killed in a shootout with police, taking with him his personal tie to AQ and its affiliates, as well as his political and religious vision for ASG.

Leadership passed to Khaddafy Janjalani (Abdurajak’s youngest brother, hereafter referred to as “Khaddafy”), Ghalib Andang (a.k.a Commander Robot), and Adam Tilao (a.k.a. Abu Sabaya).\(^{59}\) All three lacked Abdurajak’s education, vision, and connections—Robot seems to have had experience as a henchman in the often-violent world of Sulu politics, while most accounts of Sabaya highlight a bombastic personality, whose possible experiences abroad exacerbated his attraction to the ideals of international jihad.\(^{60}\) These leaders were interested in ASG’s continued survival, and attracted to more-radical ideas and practice of violent *jihad*.

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\(^{58}\) Whatever residual ties might have existed suffered additionally with the arrest of Fatur al-Ghozi, arrested in 2002 (followed by his escape and death in 2003—both under debatable circumstances).

\(^{59}\) Torres and Nery, *Into the Mountain: hosted by the Abu Sayyaf*.

\(^{60}\) Santos and Dinampo, “Abu Sayyaf Reloaded: Rebels, Agents, Bandits, Terrorists (Case Study),” 127.; Bowden, “Jihadists in Paradise.”; Justine Isola, “To Catch a Terrorist,” *The Atlantic* 2007.; even three months before the 9/11 attacks, Burnham and Merrill, *In the presence of my enemies*: 17-8. quotes Sabaya as wanting the hostages to identify the group as “the ‘Osama bin Laden group’” in media interviews; Dinampo, “A last extended interview with Janjalani.”
With new leadership willing to embrace even more radical ideas, ASG faced the challenge of survival. With its initial equilibrium facilitated by foreign sponsorship, the loss of these backers left ASG without sufficient domestic support to survive. The group faced the challenge of a) pursuing additional domestic support, b) replacing its donors, or c) looting. The first option would have required ASG to moderate its ideology to bring it more in line with civilian preferences, or to be subsumed into either the MNLF or MILF. Joining either group would have required distasteful compromise—as suggested by the criticism exchanged between ASG and both groups. Furthermore, MNLF’s own foreign donors remained unattractive allies for ASG—Libya had embarked on its international image makeover, and both the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and Libya had publicly embraced an anti-terrorism stance. Both became critics of ASG’s subsequent operations. The feeling was mutual. ASG’s new leaders were unlikely to make the compromises necessary to woo support from these sponsors. Indeed, these leaders made no secret of their differences with the OIC and Libya. That is, 

61 Libya even sent emissaries, including former Libyan Ambassador to the Philippines Rajab Azzarouq to broker ransom deals for ASG’s later kidnap victims, and condemned the group’s hostage-taking. That Libyan assistance (particularly in paying ransoms) was contingent on the released hostages paying their respects in person to leader Muammar Qaddafi suggests such efforts were designed to be emblematic of Qaddafi’s new image as a peacemaker. See particularly Aventajo and Montelibano, 140 Days of Terror: in the Clutches of the Abu Sayyyaf: 131-2. OIC also condemned kidnapping, and particularly responded to ASG’s high-profile hostage-taking during its re-equilibration.

62 Dinampo, "A last extended interview with Janjalani."; Burnham and Merrill, In the presence of my enemies: 152.
as theory suggests, both radical rebels and more-moderate existing sponsors found each other’s positions unpalatable.

Instead, ASG managed to kill two birds with one stone—creating a lootable resource, while advertising themselves to new donors. ASG embarked on a series of high-profile kidnappings. These kidnappings served several functions. First, they raised funds for the organization. The loss of their AQ connection had a direct impact on ASG’s bottom line. One member expressed this financial reality behind a typical local euphemism implying the shortfall was voluntary: “[t]here was a time when we didn’t depend anymore on foreign funding. We were ashamed to continue asking for money from our sponsors abroad.”63  Second, these kidnappings served to advertise ASG to potential donors. Specifically, ASG signaled commitment to an extreme ideology, a willingness to use extreme violence; and anti-Westernism (insofar as many of their high-profile victims were Western, and the group made a number of public statements to this effect)—a concept new to Mindanao’s ideological context.64

During its re-equilibration, ASG still needed to generate compliance among the population. During this period, ASG seems to have abandoned all pretense of building social service capability. Rather, the group expanded their use of coercion

63 Torres and Nery, Into the Mountain: hostage by the Abu Sayyaf: 42.
64 Other kidnappings did not include Western targets, most notably that of 52 students, teachers, and priests taken from the Claret School of Tumahubong, Basilan on March 20, 2000. For an account of this event, see ibid.
and their “Robin Hood” payouts. Hometowns and areas in which they stashed kidnap victims often got a small cut of ransom payouts, and ASG fighters deliberately overpaid villagers for food, ammunition, and other supplies in order to buy compliance. The group was also more than willing to use coercion (and build its reputation for doing so) to enforce silence and extract what they needed when cash was ineffective or unavailable.

Their new behavior exacted a higher toll on civilians—both as collateral damage in ASG activities and government interdiction efforts, and in terms of livelihood lost in conflict and displacement, as well as services lost as aid workers fled the area. Kidnap victims with an involuntary front-row seat to ASG-civilian interactions during this period describe individual rebels who were uneasy about collateral damage, but found the group as a whole as unconcerned. On their compulsory tour of ASG areas, kidnap victims describe both Moro villages that welcome ASG (or at least, their cash payments), and others in which uncontrolled ASG fighters’ indiscriminate violence inspired civilian retribution (including informing on the group to military authorities).

ASG emerged from its re-equilibration with new backing. First, ASG grew ties with local criminal elements. Though many local government officials and

65 Author interview.; ———.; Burnham and Merrill, *In the presence of my enemies*. especially 119
66 Torres and Nery, *Into the Mountain: hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf*; 38.; Burnham and Merrill, *In the presence of my enemies*. especially 163
67 ———., *In the presence of my enemies*: 100, 63 and 88.
personnel in the Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines discharge their duties admirably and operate as valued public servants, they serve within heterogeneous institutions. While allegations of ASG connections to state authorities have long surrounded ASG history, they have gained credence in the post-Abdurajak era. These backers provide ASG some degree of impunity from the legal and military reach of the Philippine state and access to materiel from government arsenals. In exchange, these (essentially criminal) elements gain a cut of ransom payments.\textsuperscript{68} ASG also provides such local powerbrokers with an excuse to maintain their own security forces and a convenient scapegoat (or outright contractor) for criminal activities with which such individuals would prefer not to be affiliated. These supporters have few, if any, preferences over ASG’s ideological position. They are also unlikely to support social reform, given that their current positions rest comfortably in the \textit{status quo}.

Second, ASG’s efforts to advertise itself internationally also paid off. The group has forged links to individuals abroad, likely through the vestiges of its Al

\textsuperscript{68} Numerous author interviews with civilians and NGO personnel based in Sulu and Basilan, including survivors of ASG kidnappings, Zamboanga City, Cotabato City and Metro Manila 2009-2011; journalist and surviving kidnap victim Arlyn Dela Cruz quotes email correspondence (2010, 87) recounts how some $1.25million in ransom for journalist Andreas Lorenz went missing between the ransom’s delivery to a Sulu politician and his delivery of the same to the Abu Sayyaf kidnappers Dela Cruz, \textit{A Lifetime of Freedom}: 87.; Gracia Burnham comments on leader Abu Sabaya’s negotiations with generals for a cut of the ransom payment (2003, 223); Gracia Burnham notoriously recounts how military forces suspiciously failed to prevent the ASG’s escape from an encircled position and on leader Abu Sabaya’s negotiations with generals for a cut of the ransom payment Burnham and Merrill, \textit{In the presence of my enemies}: 80 and 223.; survivors of the Claret school kidnapping make similar observations Torres and Nery, \textit{Into the Mountain: hostage by the Abu Sayyaf}: 99.;
 Qaeda connections and the personal contacts of those few ASG members with international experience. These sponsors appear to find ASG an attractive option through which to militarily enact their vision of a purified Islam and expunge secular influence, and (in some cases) espouse anti-Westernism. Interviews suggest these individuals have personal contact with the group, and have expressed preferences over ASG’s behavior.

ASG also attracted the attention of Indonesian *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI). Like ASG, JI was re-equilibrating. JI’s increased activities combined with the international fallout from the 9/11 attacks led to increased scrutiny that cramped operations and lead to deaths and arrests within its organization. Under siege, JI needed allies to shore up its networks and a place to stash personalities too hot to handle in Indonesia. Mindanao was geographically convenient, and JI had previously enjoyed a flirtation with the MILF. Ultimately, however, both sides of that relationship found the other ideologically dissatisfying. For JI, the MILF was too moderate. However, “ASG’s more radical position has allayed JI’s suspicion that it is an unreliable partner.” Like ASG’s individual donors, JI’s own ideological position

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70 Author interview.; ibid.; ———.
is fairly radical, and contains elements of both anti-Westernism and sectarianism.\textsuperscript{73} In short, JI wanted ideologically consanguine partners.

It is not clear any of these international backers had any preferences over social reform. Neither did any of ASG’s new backers have strong humanitarian preferences. Indeed, for domestic criminal elements, a fearsome reputation might be desirable. International sponsors valued ASG’s position as a radical vanguard above all else—their own ideological positions appear to have accepted collateral damage and casualties among fellow Muslims deemed insufficiently orthodox. While JI engaged in service provision at home, its relationship with ASG was contingent on ASG’s convenience as a hideout for JI personalities, extreme ideological position and concomitant willingness to use violence.

JI’s support is both financial and military.\textsuperscript{74} Militarily, JI has provided training for ASG operatives—one of their operatives, arrested in the Philippines, admitted “I’m JI, but I was told to work with the Abu Sayyaf, and we were all together, so my life is now Abu Sayyaf.”\textsuperscript{75} JI also provided money for training, some operations, and in payment for specific activities JI found helpful.\textsuperscript{76} Individuals

\textsuperscript{73} International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyyah Terrorist Network Operates."; ———, "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks," 14.
\textsuperscript{74} Abuza, \textit{Balik-terrorism: the return of the Abu Sayyaf}: 29-31.
\textsuperscript{75} Cited in ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{76} Hastings, \textit{No Man’s Land: Globalization, Territory, and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia}: 73; Abuza, \textit{Balik-terrorism: the return of the Abu Sayyaf}: 25-6 and footnotes 112-17.
abroad have primarily offered ASG financial support. Domestic allies offer ASG weapons, materiel, and occasional shelter from government interdiction. The latter effectively functions as fungible support since ASG then does not need to spend other resources on evasion and internal protection efforts.

Both domestic and international supporters, then, allowed ASG’s new (and newly-radical) leadership to avoid compromising with civilian preferences. By several accounts, Khaddafy Janjalani saw ASG’s partnership with JI as an opportunity to recapture the movement’s religious fervor. Abuza (2005) notes ASG came out of its re-equilibration “no longer devoid of ideology, and their newly rediscovered (or imposed) radical interpretation of Islam meshes with Al Qaeda’s” or, perhaps more accurately, Jemaah Islamiyya’s. ASG’s new leaders reduced their own costs of compromising with Abdurajak’s less-radical line by pursuing more-radical positions that appealed to them. This shift increased the ideological costs to members more aligned with Abdurajak’s original vision. Many of these individuals defected. Shedding these individuals drove the collective ideal point of the group even more towards the extreme—even farther from popular preferences.

77Author interview.
78 Torres and Nery, Into the Mountain: hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf; 39-40.; Burnham and Merrill, In the presence of my enemies; 150.; Author interview.
79 Abuza, Balik-terrorism: the return of the Abu Sayyaf; Author interview.
80 Abuza, Balik-terrorism: the return of the Abu Sayyaf; 24.
81 Torres and Nery, Into the Mountain: hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf; 33-42.; Author interview; ———.; ———.
5. **ASG 2.0 (2003-present)**

ASG’s new partnership allowed (and, indeed, encouraged) it to adopt an even more radical ideology than before. Many Moros still do not embrace violently anti-Christian views, and/or retain their concerns that deliberately targeting Christian non-combatants will lead to retaliatory violence. In ASG areas, 41% of Moros report that they have “always had” positive views of Christians, 24% report their view of Christians has improved. The new ASG, however, has taken an increasingly sectarian line, and increasingly targeted Christian non-combatants. Khaddafy himself admitted, “[w]e are mujahideen, albeit a bit brutal since we don’t distinguish oppressive soldiers from its public or citizenry—they are generally our enemies. (…) The enemy is not to be distinguished as to whether they are armed or not.”

His colleague Abu Sabaya advanced the rhetoric, actively advocating that Christians should be removed from Moro homelands.

The new ASG has also embraced a sporadically anti-Western line, in line with the more radical elements of international Islamic revivalism of its new sponsors. Abdurajak remained avowedly Mindanao-centric. The slight degree to which the new anti-Western position has any resonance on the ground is likely due to the joint Filipino-American “Balikatan” exercises held throughout Mindanao, but heavily

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82 These results do not differ significantly from the population outside ASG areas. For definition of “ASG areas,” additional details on the survey itself, and further survey analyses, see Chapter 4.
83 Dinampo, “A last extended interview with Janjalani.”
centered in ASG areas. The program is intended to provide counter-terrorism training for AFP forces combating ASG. Ironically, the exercises have given root to some tangible anti-Americanism, as US troops are now affiliated with a Filipino military widely resented in these communities for decades of human rights violations.

ASG 2.0 retains its criticism of popular Muslim practice. One recent defector noted that, in his opinion, “Islam is confused, especially in the mountains. They would resist [our teachings]. A lot of them are not Muslim, they are not anything. They’re just mountain people.”

While Abu Sabaya railed against women’s less-conservative modes of dress. NGO workers who interact frequently with local Islamic communities comment that civilians complain to them that ASG’s interpretation of Islam is alien from their own, and their rulings too stringent.

While Moros remain interested in reviving their Islamic faith and improving their own religious practice and education and retain a traditional respect for the Middle East as an origin of Islamic political thought, there remains a substantial gap between the more radical beliefs espoused by salafi jihadists and Moros’ indigenous faith.

85 Author interview.
86 Torres and Nery, Into the Mountain: hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf: 48.
87 Author interview. ; ——— ; ———.
Given the growing distance between the popular ideology and ASG’s more radical position, its partnership with extremist sponsors abroad, and these donors’ limited humanitarian concerns and military aid, the model predicts ASG 2.0 will engage in three observable behaviors. First, the group will enact a more extreme ideology than it did previously. Second, ASG will provide fewer services to civilians. Third, the group will rely more heavily on coercion to generate compliance from the population.

Furthermore, we may expect to observe these behaviors for the following reasons. First, ASG’s increasingly radical ideology will make service provision less effective in producing compliance as civilians accept services, but remain skeptical of the group whose ideology diverges so wildly from their own. ASG will thus find coercion is a cheaper option than service provision in generating compliance. Also, its sponsors’ military aid will not only enhance ASG’s military capabilities, but also make it cheaper for the group to coerce civilians. ASG’s sponsor’s financial aid will do little to affect the relative costs of coercion versus services—ASG simply spends this fungible aid to produce the same coercive-heavy mix it would otherwise produce. Since ASG’s donors care little about Moro civilians’ welfare, ASG is free to rely heavily on coercion without worrying that such behavior will cost them their sponsorship.
6. Equilibrium 2.0: Producing quasi-voluntary compliance

Most commentators note that ASG’s ideological position has become muddled, and much debate surrounds the degree to which the group still constitutes a rebel movement with an actual ideology, or is more a bandit or criminal organization. The answer is mixed. Many of those interviewed for this study—including NGO workers who interact with arms of the ASG on a daily basis, ordinary civilians, and long-time observers—outline a heterogeneity within the group, most differentiating between “true mujahedeen” and “criminal elements.”

Regardless of outside assessments, it seems that many within the group still see themselves as fighting for independence, and think of themselves as Islamic warriors. Nearly all kidnap victims, including those who have written memoirs on their experiences, recall their captors as practicing at least their own version of Islam. ASG members lecture their hostages on Islam, discuss correct religious practice amongst themselves, and perform prayers—even, perversely, rolling out their prayer mats next to victims they had just finished raping. Public statements, even local ones, by ASG are intermittent, and vary in substance between ransom

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88 Local civilians also often refer to the latter category as “government-owned ASG.” In this, they reference both the locally well-known alliance between ASG and criminal elements within the AFP and political elite, as well as the phenomenon of Deep Penetration Agents (DPAs). Allegedly, government intelligence and military personnel, eager to capture high-value ASG targets, recruit and field double agents (DPAs) to penetrate ASG operations. According to locals, such DPAs contribute to ASG criminality both out of these agents’ instructions to discredit the ASG organization through such actions, and their handlers’ inability to rein in their assets’ behavior.

89 Burnham and Merrill, In the presence of my enemies; Author interview; ibid.
demands, requests for development assistance, claims for independence, and support for a global jihad and/or the return of the caliphate. ASG’s ideological position has become muddled I argue, largely because of the recruiting practices leaders’ unwillingness to compromise and concomitant investment in coercion has necessitated.

This change has not gone unnoticed at the grassroots.Locals comment on the ideological difference between the “time of Abdurajak,” whose Islamic credentials they respected, and the current ASG whom they view as having been “led astray—by those in the Middle East.”90 In 2003 in Basilan, a young Moro girl reported the group’s attempt to impose its interpretation of Islam meant “[m]any were afraid of the Abu Sayyaf and girls started wearing turong [the traditional headscarf],” and some girls “only pretended to be conservative” while others were forced to wear the veil to avoid embarrassment.”91 Among locals in ASG areas, many dislike being criticized for their folk beliefs, while many women resent being harassed to cover their hair.92

The current ASG has chosen not to invest in improving service capabilities among their cadre or in recruiting qualified personnel. They have increasingly recruited those with no ideology at all, but who would be able to uphold ASG’s

90 Multiple author interviews with civilians from and NGO workers in ASG-affected areas, Zamboanga City, Cotabato City, Davao City, and Metro Manila 2008-2011.
92 Author interview.
reputation for coercion, and thus maintain its abilities to extract compliance. The
group's recruitment now contains a few “true believers,” but they also seek
individuals with warrants of arrest and/or who are involved in ongoing
bloodfeuds—that is, those with no other options in society. Many revolutionary
movements (including ASG’s MNLF and MILF cousins) attract applicants with
criminal backgrounds, a personal affinity for violence, and/or nowhere else to turn.
Instead of turning them away, or retraining them, however, ASG has increasingly
welcomed such individuals. These youths appear to receive some ideological
training, and (largely on-the-job) military training, but nothing in terms of service
provision—this is not a skill the group has inculcated or developed. By targeting for
recruitment young men with existing criminal histories and resultantly limited
social and geographic mobility, the group ensures a cadre capable of (and largely
relegated to) a life of violence and coercion.

As under Abdurajak, it remains expensive to educate organic ASG personnel
in service provision skills, and recruiting already educated individuals is a costly
undertaking (and might require some ideological compromise among fellow
intellectuals). While such recruitment is costly, it also has limited payoffs for ASG—
their ideological position reduces the effectiveness of service provision in producing

93 ———.; ———.; ibid.; Abuza, Balik-terrorism: the return of the Abu Sayyaf: 28. This phenomenon
is similar to those employed by various other rebel organizations who force recruits (often child
soldiers) to kill family members as a membership requirement.
compliance among an increasingly skeptical public. Furthermore their sponsors both value ASG’s coercive capabilities, and provide support that makes such behavior easier.

Indeed, ASG’s donors appear to award reward both extremism and military exploits. ASG, somewhat uniquely among Mindanao’s rebel movements, has videoed some of their operations and military training efforts. Subsequently posted on the Internet, these videos served as both advertising for ASG and confirmation of its activities. A former ASG member recalls an individual donor calling “from the Middle East, offering us additional money if we would behead one of our American [then-] hostages. We refused. We were not to be anyone’s pawns.” The donor cut off support. ASG later (successfully) begged to get it back. It is worth noting that the requested beheading was both a demonstration of military action, but (perhaps more so) of anti-Westernism—one of ASG 2.0’s new ideological contributions to the conflict. Furthermore, as opposed to Al Qaeda’s more direct provision of services under ASG 1.0, this donor intervention focuses on coercion.

ASG has also invested very little in efforts to restrain their fighter’s behavior vis-à-vis civilians. While such personnel have proven more than capable of exerting coercion on behalf of ASG, many of them also engage in extracurricular coercion for

94 Author interview.; ———.; for a theoretical look at this, see Hovil and Werker, "Portrait of a Failed Rebellion: An account of rational, sub-optimal violence in Western Uganda.”  
95 Author interview.; ———.
their own gain or to satisfy personal grudges. It may be that leaders allow such behavior both as a buyoff that retains troops loyalty, and because such activities may increase compliance by enhancing ASG’s coercive reputation. This behavior has certainly generated compliance among civilians. However, even among those who express sympathy for ASG’s anti-government position, and the fighters’ frustration, many view the group as a menace. Exacerbating this phenomenon, ASG has also increasingly outsourced small jobs to non-members. Hired on a per-task basis, such individuals participate in ASG operations, but are difficult for the organization to control.

ASG’s existing service provision is extremely minimal, and increasingly distributed as club goods. The group has invested even less in ties to local religious elites than under Abdurajak. While a few remain sympathetic to the movement, both insiders and observers note the group is openly scornful of religious elders offering different viewpoints, or intervening on behalf of kidnap victims.

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96 As suggested in Chapter 2, this approach is similar to tax farming, in which leaders allow their troops to loot in lieu of providing them a salary for their continued service. On tax farming by formal regimes, see Levi, Of Rule and Revenue: Chapter 4, on revenue production in the late Republican Roman empire. For rebel behavior see those described in Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, and Lidow, "Predators or Protectors? Analyzing Liberia’s Rebels Using Satellite Data.”.

97 Author interviews with multiple civilians and comments from survey team members in ASG areas, 2009-2010.

98 Abuza, Balik-terrorism: the return of the Abu Sayyaf; Author interview.; ———. Hired for cash on an as-needed basis, these personnel are an extreme example of Weinstein’s (2006) opportunists, which he argues can be very poorly behaved. See Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence.

99 Author interview.
Abdurajak’s one reported general assembly (to provide some dialogue between rebels and civilians) has not been repeated under his successors. The group’s dialogue appears to be limited to family members and other ASG members—consultation remains a club good.

The group occasionally adds development assistance as part of their ransom demands, but by targeting both local and international NGO workers has largely scared away such programming. International workers provide both lucrative kidnapping victims and credence to ASG’s newfound anti-Westernism. Furthermore, development programming traditionally carries both the risk of intelligence infiltration and of reducing local grievances that support rebellion. ASG’s response, however, shows their commitment to coercion over service provision in their rule.

In contrast, the MILF (which faces the same risks attendant on development programming) often works with NGOs—exchanging protection guarantees for NGO workers for consultation on projects, and the veto power of local village committees in determining programming appropriateness.\textsuperscript{100} ASG targets NGO workers over

\textsuperscript{100} Multiple civilian interviews in Maguindanao, July 2010 and February 2009. As an organization, the MILF also works through the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), an outgrowth of the GRP-MILF peace process, which coordinates development assistance from a variety of international NGOs.
the complaints of both grassroots and Moro community leaders, who realize the collateral costs of such behavior in terms of domestic welfare.101

Even Abdurajak’s model of using ASG coercive capabilities against “enemies of the people” (oppressive landlords, dangerous drug dealers and recalcitrant utilities companies) has been replaced with a more club-, or even private-goods version. No interview subjects relayed similar anecdotes from the current ASG—noting that such phenomenon were only “in the time of Abdurajak.” Rather, the organization has lent its coercive strength to intervening in blood feuds on behalf of members and their families—settling private or family grievances rather than (albeit violently) addressing more collective concerns. Furthermore, even advance warnings by ASG fighters of rebel operations that might allow the population to safely evacuate are provided almost exclusively to the close family members of ASG fighters.

It is thus unsurprising that the new ASG has also made no efforts to invest in popular consultation or domestic coalitions. Observers note increasing fragmentation within ASG, identifying multiple local commanders with eponymous bands of armed men. This problem is hardly new—both the MILF and MNLF have

101———.; a local aid worker who survived being kidnapped by ASG noted that during her experience, “the Muslim community leaders were ready to negotiate for us [the hostages]. They were afraid that services to their area would be suspended. Sometimes, the lower-level ASG, they don’t believe a service, an agreement is good for them. They don’t care about assistance to the people.” — ——.
also faced the challenge of knitting a coherent whole out of small armed groups loyal to a local Big Man. However, this is a challenge ASG has not done well solving.

Nor has the group successfully invested in expanding the geographic base of their constituency. Forays into coastal areas of central Mindanao focused on contact between ASG fighters and mainland rebels related by blood or similar ideological preferences. In contrast to the heavy and long-term investment of MILF in villages into which it wishes to expand, ASG fighters made few overtures to civilians. Indeed, so limited were ASG’s attempts to engage the population in any way that civilians were virtually ambivalent over MILF’s eventual decision to evict them.102

Today, ASG’s territorial influence is largely confined to areas in the island provinces Sulu and Basilan, and some parts of the Zamboanga peninsula. Among those who are not coerced into compliance, most loyalty relies on blood ties, and most services are distributed along these lines as well—as club, or even private, goods.

As predicted, rather than wooing popular support through ideological consanguinity or service provision, ASG has increasingly relied on coercion to extract compliance. Nearly every subject interviewed on the ASG commented that the group now “rules through fear.” Significantly more so than under Abdurajak, ASG’s limited cash payouts are not always sufficient to win silence from an increasingly skeptical public. A recent defector comments “now, people will

102 __________.
sometimes cooperate with the military. This changed because they do not like the
direction of the ASG. (...) people get payoffs [from the ASG], but this is not
enough.”

Instead, the group relies on coercion, both to extract intelligence on
government movements, and ensure silence as to their own. Recent kidnap victims
recall their captors hid them along the way in ordinary Moro homes—without pre-
arrangement, and under extreme threat. Hiding victims requires hosts
(voluntary or not) to remain silent about rebels’ presence, and exposes them to the
risks of military interdiction efforts—both as collateral damage, and the possibility
of being labeled a rebel sympathizer (and subsequent retributive violence). To be
sure, some members of the population do provide intelligence voluntarily, but this is
largely based on a) blood ties between those individuals and members of the ASG
(and concomitant access to club goods), and/or b) even greater fear or hatred of the
Philippine military.

ASG has also increasingly coerced resources from the population. While they
receive support from abroad, the group seemingly allows members to coerce for
both personal and organizational gain. Both direct military assistance from abroad
and the arms ASG has purchased using financial support greatly facilitate this

103 ———.
104 A kidnap survivor commented on her accommodations at one point: “it was just any house. The
woman was crying, actually, and I heard her begging the ASG commander that we would leave the
next day.” ———.
coercion. As one resident notes, “the ASG, they go around in a group of guys, all with high-powered firearms, sometimes even a 50-caliber [machine gun]! Who would dare to stop them?!”

Local NGO workers report cases in which ordinary Moros return home after evacuating in the face of AFP-ASG clashes to discover ASG personnel occupying their homes and farms—thus dispossessing them of both home and livelihood.

Personnel engage in organized extortion of jeepneys (public transport vehicles), “now, they’re charging 20,000PHP [400-500USD] for each jeepney that passes. It is an operation fee for a period. The men will ransack cellphones, wallets, of the passengers.” In some cases in which victims were targeted en masse (usually kidnappings and holdups), Christian victims note the ASG fighters released the Moros. The assessment is generally that this may be done out of religious sensibility, but like more out of a desire to avoid possible clan feuds.

The group has also increased kidnappings among locals—including Muslims. These kidnappings serve several functions. They remain a way to raise funds—primarily by group members acting of their own volition (a sort of tax farming, in which they are given some free rein in exchange for helping when the group needs them), as ways to settle scores (both personal grudges, and for ASG as a whole)

105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.; ———.; ———.
including against those who have stood up to or otherwise offended ASG (i.e. not been compliant). ASG personnel openly admit their group engages in kidnappings, and argues these are justified under their interpretation of Islam.\textsuperscript{109} While the original group's victims were primarily Christian (particularly businesspersons and priests), this is no longer the case.\textsuperscript{110} Kidnappings of ordinary local Muslims, some ransomed for as little as a few dollars, are also on the rise.\textsuperscript{111} Locals have expressed exasperation with this behavior, arguing most of the new victims are “ordinary, they are poor people—they have nothing!” and have little to offer by way of ransom.\textsuperscript{112} In justifying its actions, the group relies on ideological grounds, arguing collateral damage is be necessary to achieve victory, and/or that the Moro victims were not “true Muslims” in ASG’s assessment, and thus legitimate targets.\textsuperscript{113}

There is no institutionalized recourse for civilians coerced by ASG within the group itself. Civilians’ only option would be a similarly military response—taking up arms against their ASG offenders in a traditional blood feud—a course very few civilians undertake, given ASG’s heavy armaments and fierce reputation.

\textsuperscript{109}Dinampo, "A last extended interview with Janjalani."; Quimpo, "Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf: Who’s Afraid of an Islamic State."
\textsuperscript{110}International Peace Mission to Basilan, "Basilan: The Next Afghanistan?", 15.
\textsuperscript{111}Such kidnappings are extremely difficult to track. The vast majority go unreported, both by victims and their families, and even if they were reported, local media do not generally deem such matters newsworthy, and Mindanao’s disorganized human rights networks keep spotty records of such actions; Alipala, "Body of beheaded Jolo principal found."; Calonzo, "2 kidnap victims released in Sulu; ransom paid."; Author interview.;
\textsuperscript{112}———.
\textsuperscript{113}One Muslim victim reports his captors mocked him when he performed prayers, calling him a “kafir” – apostate. Author interview with ASG kidnapping survivor, Zamboanga City, July 2010.
While leadership has changed hands over the next few years, ASG’s evolution has largely followed the trend set in the initial post-Abdurajak era.\textsuperscript{114} The organization has retained both its post-Abdurajak extremism, and its mixed portfolio of donors—\textit{Jemaah Islamiyyah} contacts, individuals living abroad, and domestic criminal elements. Many civilians now differentiate between the “True ASG”—those they see as clinging to the ideological vision of Abdurajak—and the “Government-owned ASG”—those they view as largely criminal elements.\textsuperscript{115} As mentioned, the group’s public statements vary between ideological calls, appeals for development assistance, and ransom demands. However, it is telling that the “true mujahedeen” seem to put almost no effort into differentiating themselves from the homophonous criminal element. This implies the group cares little about the impressions of more than a very local audience (i.e. not even into central/mainland Mindanao) and those few foreign supporters with whom they might be in contact. Similarly, among those who speak publicly, some increasingly reference the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item while leadership positions seem to have a deleterious affect on lifespan. Of Abdurajak’s immediate successors, Commander Robot and Abu Sabaya barely outlived ASG’s period of re-equilibration. Abu Sabaya was killed June 21, 2002 Commander Robot was arrested December 8, 2003, and killed (along with several fellow ASG commanders) March 15, 2005 under suspicious circumstances at a Manila-area jail. Khaddafy Janjalani survived until September 4, 2006. His likely successor, Abu Sulaiman, was killed January 2007, leaving leadership to the widely-respected septuagenarian Radullan Sahiron, who is both an original member of the group, and reportedly married Abdurajak’s widow. International Crisis Group, "Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts,” 12.
\item The “government-owned” label derives from the popular local assessment that elements of the military and political organs are in league with the ASG.
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historical Sulu sultantes (rather than a Mindanao-wide Bangsamoro homeland)—a sign of shrinking territorial focus and aspirations.

It should be noted that while some of the service-provision questions on the survey (described in Chapter 4) were asked both in the present period and retrospectively (to the pre-1998 period), ASG was never chosen as a service provider in either period. This is consistent with ASG’s poor performance in both periods in providing the kinds of services asked on the survey, and their propensity to deliver club (or even private) goods in both periods. With limited distribution of such benefits, it is unlikely a random sample of civilian respondents would happen upon many such recipients.

7. Conclusion

ASG was established as a vehicle for radical Moro revolutionaries to pursue more extreme ideological goals. While the group’s position had some resonance with the population, this was limited. ASG’s initial sponsors from the Al Qaeda network supported the groups’ more radical position. Their backing allowed ASG’s founders to split from the more moderate MNLF whose position both ASG’s founders and sponsors found distasteful. Given this, and the fact that its supporters provided a mix of humanitarian and military aid, theory suggests ASG will enact an ideological position more radical than the popular preference, and provide few services.
A series of exogenous events severed ASG’s ties to its original sponsors, and replaced the group’s founder with leaders with an even more extreme ideological position. These men pursued new alliances—with similarly radical *Jemaah Islamiyyah*, individual extremists abroad, and domestic criminals. Theory suggests this ideological position, backed by heavily military aid, would support a more radical ASG 2.0 even less interested in service provision.

The historical record supports these suppositions. In spite of its founder’s intentions, ASG struggled to provide services in anything more than an *ad hoc* and club-goods fashion. Furthermore, debates within the group itself, and between ASG and its sponsors lend support to the causal mechanisms the model suggests underlie the predicted behaviors. The theory is also consistent with the process by which ASG re-equilibrated in the wake of its sponsors’ loss. The new ASG has consistently failed.

Though the organization still enjoys some sympathy for their anti-government views, the group is not popular. With the exception of a very few club goods (usually in the form of direct payoffs), the group relies heavily on coercion—often leveraging what they need from the domestic population through fear.

It is worth noting that, from the inside, the ASG case highlights one of the differences between this theory and Weinstein’s (2006). Weinstein argues coercion is largely an artifact of poorly controlled opportunists who join well-financed rebellions. Ideologues join the rebellion because it pursues goals in which they believe, and are thus committed to the fight in the promise of future rewards—such
rebels do not act opportunistically (with negative ramifications for civilian welfare) precisely because they are ideologues.

Here, however, extreme ideologues coerce the population precisely because they are extreme ideologues. Their ideological distance from the population means service provision is relatively ineffective—coercion proves the more efficient way for them to generate compliance from a skeptical public. The more the rebels believe in their ideological position, the less likely they are to compromise with civilians’ preferences, and thus the more likely they will continue to rule coercively. Indeed, such groups may actually encourage opportunism by individual rebels to strengthen the group’s reputation for violence.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Under the banner of Moro liberation, civilians’ experience runs the gamut from open abuse to provision of security and other services to coercion and extortion. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) all claim the same self-determinationist goals, and share a common cultural and political history. Still, civilians in their areas are treated quite differently.

I argue these varied experiences are three separate solutions to the rebels’ need to extract compliance from the domestic population. Mindanao’s Moro revolutionaries have taken different ideological stands on the liberation issue, and made different choices among the constellation of donors interested in backing the struggle. In so doing, each has shaped the way in which it extracts compliance from the populace.

Rebels’ grip on rule depends on both coercion and service provision, but the relative effectiveness of service provision depends on the ideological content of their policies, making ideology itself a tool of rule. How far rebels compromise their ideological preferences for the imperative of power depends on the preferences of the population whose support they need, the technological and financial constraints they face, and the enabling behavior of foreign donors.
This project suggests, first and foremost, that rebels do engage in a host of non-military activities. Not only do rebels vary in the degree to which they turn their coercive capabilities against civilians, but they may also develop formal or informal processes of consultation and political representation, as well as develop service provision apparatus. While we may make intuitive normative judgments that coercive rebels are thugs, while service-oriented rebels are governors, in truth, all rebels govern. The project suggests that rebels display such a variety of behaviors in an effort to solve a familiar problem—extracting compliance from a population.

Analysis of data from Mindanao's three Moro liberation movements (the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)) supports my theoretical propositions. Specifically, 

*As their marginal cost of service provision increases, the fewer services the rebels provide, the more coercive their rule becomes, and the more extremist the policies they choose.*

*And,*

*As their marginal cost of coercion increases, the more services the rebels provide, the less coercive their rule becomes, and the less extremist the policies they choose.*

Both comparative statics across the three rebel groups, and longitudinal examinations of MNLF and ASG shifts over time suggest support for these theoretical propositions.
Survey data suggest that the MILF provides the more and better-quality services to more civilians in its areas of influence than do either MNLF or ASG. MILF’s adjudicative services are more frequently sought, and generally viewed as fairer than those of the other two rebel groups. MILF’s use of coercion is also statistically lower than MNLF’s or ASG’s—civilians report that MILF fighters do not appear to target them, while villagers with experience with the MNLF and ASG report such rebels are more likely to target civilians.

Longitudinal case studies of the MNLF and ASG suggest not only that rebels respond to changes in donors’ funding packages, and ideological and humanitarian preferences as outlined in the model. A qualitative analysis of the historical record supports the theory’s comparative statics predictions, and interview data on rebels internal debates and dynamics support the causal mechanisms hypothesized.

**1. Implications for theory**

In all, this model offers a number of contributions to the literature. First, it explicates a range of rebel behaviors, explaining rebels’ use of coercion, service provision, and ideological positioning—offering a fuller picture of rebel behavior vis-à-vis civilians than focusing on one of these elements alone. This is but one way of conceptualizing ideology in rebellion, but it is worth considering. Here, ideology is not simply a preference of the rebels, but a “tool of rule” itself, and all actors—rebels, civilians, and foreign donors—have preferences over ideology. In so doing, the model provides a way to think about ideology as a serious causal variable, and outlines testable implications for ideological variation.
Among other predictions, the model offers a new explanation for why extremist rebel groups may be so coercive towards their own civilians. Weinstein’s (2006) ideologues are the well-behaved rebels—those who join the movement out of genuine conviction, and thus do not abuse civilians as opportunist rebels (who join for material gain) are wont to do. In the theory offered here, if ideologues hold convictions far removed from the popular preferences, they will coerce civilians precisely because they are extremists. Such rebels’ extremism makes service provision relatively ineffective. Coercion is thus a more efficient way for such rebels to generate compliance from a skeptical populace. Furthermore, the more ideological extremists are—that is, the more tightly they hold to their ideological position—the less likely they are to compromise and enact a more popular position, and the more likely they will rely on coercion to extract compliance. From a distance, such rebels may well look like Weinstein’s (2006) opportunists. Extremists not be able to generate sufficient domestic power without onerous compromise. They may thus only be able to exist as a viable rebel group with the patronage of outside donors. While such patronage can further facilitate coercion, it will do so only in addition to the effects of extremism.

Second, this theory embraces both foreign and domestic actors. The model offers a very well defined role for donors. Points on the principal-agent problems
between donors and rebels are well taken,¹ but this study suggests specific ways in which donors can try to shape rebel behavior, and highlights particular aspects of rebel behavior (namely ideology and civilian treatment) that may be of concern to donors. Future research may seek to wed intuitions from this project with work explicitly on the principal-agent problem between rebels and donors. Additional work may investigate other activities donors undertake that shape the parameters in this model, or suggest others that should be added.

Third, this project suggests a springboard to studying how multiple rebel groups may compete for donors. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita’s (2008) study of terrorist factions offers some insights into this, but the models could be combined—allowing both a domestic and foreign audience of supporters, but recognizing that political compromise is costly.

2. Implications for policy
   Both practitioners and academics have concluded that aid, development, and post-conflict stabilization efforts should take account of civilians’ wartime realities, and the realities of local authority structures—state sponsored or not—and that successful counterinsurgency (COIN) is about more than battlefield tactics.

Humanitarian and development efforts find themselves face-to-face with civilians’ interactions with both rebels and incumbents. Local authority patterns, state-sanctioned or not, present challenges of access, diplomacy, and security for these efforts. All rebel groups run risks in allowing humanitarian workers to access their areas of control, as these programs may provide cover for enemy operatives or other intelligence gathering. Beyond this, development and humanitarian aid may affect the balance of tools of rule, and thus shape rebel behavior—not always for the benefit of civilians for whom such aid is ostensibly meant.

Understanding how rebels themselves rule, as outlined within this model, can suggest likely effects of humanitarian assistance. If aid is provided clearly under government auspices, it may drive up the price of rebel service provision—causing rebels to engage in more coercion to retain their grip on power. This is less likely if the rebels in question are domestically dependent, and have enacted an ideological position close to the domestic median. In such cases, government-affiliated aid will make service provision more costly, but such well-adapted rebels will likely still find service provision to be an efficacious investment. However, aid communities could partner with local rebel groups—effectively allowing their services to be “rebranded” as rebel- rather than government-backed. Such an effort could limit the degree to which such investment drives rebels to additional coercion. Both cases raise a set of ethical questions for practitioners—and ones of which many are already aware. Humanitarian and development assistance is already often co-opted for credit by one side or another in conflicts. However, understanding better the
tradeoffs rebels face in addressing their governance challenge may allow practitioners to better navigate these difficult choices, and balance humanitarian concerns with political consequences and possible perverse side effects.

If COIN is about replacing the rebels’ authority with the states’, then it would likely behoove the practitioner to better understand the structure of rebel-civilian relations—since this is the authority structure they endeavor to replace. The “hearts and minds” approach to COIN accepts (explicitly or not) the logic of rebel governance, and tries to “outbid” the incumbent’s rebel rivals in providing better governance. This project offers a model to better understand rebel-civilian relations, or to predict the likely forms of such relationships in scenarios with limited direct intelligence.

Understanding rebel-civilian ties helps illuminate the extent of what government and COIN efforts must address. Specifically, domestically supported rebellions may be difficult to defeat militarily, and may possess rebel-civilian ties that are too costly for the incumbent to replace fully or outbid. As part of their domestic governance package, groups like the MILF will have already cut local political deals with a range of actors, and likely enacted a policy package close to the domestic interest.

This poses a challenge to several classic counterinsurgency tools. First, elite buyouts may be more difficult. Some will always be amenable to short-term and pecuniary inducements, but it will be more difficult for incumbents to engage in divide-and-conquer tactics if rebels have already spent significant effort integrating
such elites into their body politic. For example, the Philippine government’s “policy of attraction” proved far more effective among MNLF elites than MILF. Second, such rebels will prove difficult to dislodge through “hearts-and-minds” campaigns to woo the populace with state-provided goods and services. Groups like the MILF, with ideological positions close to the domestic median, will have a distinct advantage in service provision over incumbents who pursue political goals or seek to maintain a status quo more removed from popular preferences—and thus face more of an extremist discount than the rebels. Thus, states will find they obtain less compliance in exchange for investment in services than do their rebel rivals.

In such cases, political settlement may be the only viable way out of the conflict. Enforcement and credibility issues aside, the study of rebel governance can suggest the terms a successful agreement must incorporate to find resonance on the ground. Moreover, such research may suggest ways in which peaceful settlements might incorporate and make more transparent existing infrastructures making peace more likely to last. Identifying parallel forms of governance, how they work, what benefits they provide, and why they vary can allow more effective integration into post-conflict stabilization efforts.

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