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Activating Democracy: Political Participation and the Fate of Regime Change in Russia and Indonesia

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Activating Democracy:

Political Participation and the Fate of Regime Change in Russia and Indonesia

By

Danielle Lussier

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor M. Steven Fish, Chair
Professor Henry Brady
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Activating Democracy:

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By: Danielle Lussier
Abstract

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Danielle Lussier

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Berkeley

Professor M. Steven Fish, Chair

What contributes to democracy’s survival after initial elections? Scholarship on democratization and regime change suggests several factors conducive to democracy’s survival, including higher levels of socioeconomic development, stronger parliaments and weaker presidents, and a history of independent statehood. These factors, however, do not explain the political trajectories of two of the world’s largest countries—Russia and Indonesia. In both countries, democratizing systems replaced authoritarian regimes in the 1990s. Yet after almost a decade of reform, early democratic gains eroded in Russia, while they survived in Indonesia. According to existing theories of democratization, Russia’s levels of socioeconomic modernization and its long history of independent statehood would lead one to predict a much higher level of democracy than exists twenty years after the fall of communism. Indonesia deviates from democratization theory at the other end of the spectrum—it is more democratic than its low levels of socioeconomic modernization and short post-colonial history of independent statehood would have predicted.

This project analyzes the empirical puzzle presented by Russia’s and Indonesia’s experiences with democratization. Through a multi-level research design, I engage comparisons between the two countries, within each country over time, across sub-national units within each country, and between individuals. I find that these two cases’ deviation from the global norm and divergence from each other can be explained by patterns of political participation and popular involvement in new political institutions. While Russians retreated from civic and political participation and remain wary of political institutions, Indonesians became accustomed to applying pressure on political elites and learned to use new democratic institutions to manage conflict and channel public preferences for governance.

In particular, I find that variation in patterns of political participation in these two cases derives from engagement in civil society, a sense of political efficacy, and political trust. Individuals who engage in civil society, believe in their ability to influence political outcomes, and trust political institutions are more likely to become involved in non-voting forms of political participation, such as campaigning, political party development work, and protest activities. Sustained and ongoing political participation, particularly between electoral cycles, constrains elites in a manner that promotes clean and competitive elections and safeguards civil liberties, as has happened in post-Suharto Indonesia. In Russia, the absence of such engagement leaves political elites with more latitude to manipulate elections, constrict rights and freedoms, and repress real and imagined would-be oppositionists.
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Note about Referencing Interview Subjects

The forthcoming analysis is based largely on interviews I conducted with 100 citizens from Russia and Indonesia and about 140 expert interviews with scholars, journalists, and representatives of political parties, non-governmental organizations, and civic associations in these two countries. The interviews with ordinary citizens were conducted anonymously. Throughout the text, I refer to these subjects based on relevant demographic characteristics and do not disclose the date of the interview. Summary tables of these interview subjects can be found in Appendix 1.B.

My expert interviews involved varying degrees of confidentiality. In most instances, respondents were comfortable with full name attribution, while in other instances the degree of confidentiality they requested depended on the content being discussed. Yet, due to the current lack of protection for free speech in Russia, as well as the political sensitivity of the subject matter, I have decided to reduce the vulnerability of my expert respondents by not referencing them by name. In order to ensure balance in the text, I am treating my Indonesian expert respondents with the same level of confidentiality. Each expert interview is indicated by a specific number that corresponds to a description of the interview subject provided in a reference list at the end of the dissertation. The descriptions are specific enough to communicate the general source of the information being cited, yet do not provide sufficient detail to reveal the identity of the interview subject.
Notes on Russian and Indonesian Language

Transliteration
Throughout the dissertation I use a modified version of the Library of Congress transliteration system for the Russian language. In instances when a proper noun is commonly rendered in English with using an alternate transliteration, such as “Yeltsin” instead of “El’tsin” or “Chechnya” instead of “Chechnia,” I employ the more common form. When referencing secondary sources that employ a different transliteration system, I maintain the transliteration used in the specific source.

Acronyms
Throughout the text, I use acronyms for political parties and other organizations based on their formulation in the original language, with two exceptions. Western scholarship has long referred to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union using their English-language acronyms, USSR and CPSU, rather than the Russian-language acronyms SSSR and KPSS. In keeping with standard practice, I use USSR and CPSU.

Indonesian names
The use of surnames is not widespread in Indonesia. Most Indonesians use only one name, while others might have two or three names, one of which is usually a dominant name. Throughout the text, when only one name is used in reference to an Indonesian, the reader should infer that this is the prominent name of the respective individual.
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Acknowledgements

I could not have undertaken and completed this project without the assistance and support of numerous people on multiple continents. First and foremost, I wish to thank my dissertation committee, M. Steven Fish, Henry Brady, Jack Citrin, and Jeffrey Hadler, each of whom made unique and key contributions to this research. Steve provided unflagging stewardship on all aspects of the project, from its conceptual origins to the final text. I could not have asked for a more committed dissertation chair. Henry’s work on measurement, political participation, and the study of public opinion was a source of inspiration for my research, and I valued his constant feedback throughout the implementation of this project. The idea for this dissertation originated in Jack’s seminar on mass politics, and I consistently relied on Jack to direct me to literature and analyses that helped me bridge the sub-disciplines of political behavior and comparative politics. Jeff introduced me to the world of Southeast Asian studies, offered insightful critiques, and played a key role in bridging the gaps in my knowledge of Indonesian politics and history.

I am grateful to the more than 240 Russians and Indonesians who gave of their time in interviews and I am thankful for the many scholars and analysts in Russia and Indonesia who assisted me in the process of conducting fieldwork. In particular, I would like to thank the Faculty of World History at Siberian Federal University in Krasnoyarsk, Russia, which hosted me as a visiting scholar in October-November 2008. Unfortunately, given the current political climate in Russia and the sensitivity of this dissertation topic, I believe it would be imprudent to mention by name the many individuals who helped me over the course of my research in Moscow, Kazan, and Krasnoyarsk. This group includes several dedicated scholars, analysts, and former political activists, including two exceptional sociologists who took on the task of recruiting interview respondents for me in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk. The research on the pages before you would have been impossible without their selfless dedication to my work.

I am particularly grateful to LP3ES, which served as my research sponsor in Indonesia, especially to Muhammed Husain and Suhardi Suryadi, who arranged my visa invitation and access to the LP3ES library archives. In Surabaya, I was assisted by Wawan Kokotiasa, who tirelessly recruited interview respondents, made introductions, and helped with tasks large in small. I am also grateful for the discussions and introductions shared by several members of the faculty at the University of Airlangga in Surabaya, especially Haryadi and Kaung. In Medan, I benefited from the help of Henry Sitorus and his excellent team of undergraduate assistants, Eko J.T. Lase and Ade Rahma Ayu Siregar, who recruited respondents and shuttled me off to the far corners of Medan. Nina Karina Sitepu provided transcripts of Indonesian interviews with extraordinary speed. The Sunartos in Yogyakarta and the Nababans in Medan provided homes away from home and important insights into Javanese and Batak cultures.

I also wish to thank the numerous other scholars whose insights and advice strengthened the design and implementation of this project. David Collier and Diana Kapiszewski provided invaluable feedback on the research design and presentation. Timothy Colton and Henry Hale generously shared their survey data. Michael Buehler, Don Emmerson, Bauni Hamid, Marc Morjé Howard, Eunsook Jung, Cynthia Kaplan, and Matthew Winters provided valuable fieldwork advice. Celeste Arrington and Crystal Chang read multiple versions of most chapters and offered criticism that significantly improved their presentation. Neil Abrams, George Breslauer, Yoshiko Herrera, Jody LaPorte, Kelly McMann, Wendy Sinek, Laura Stoker, and Ned Walker all read and commented on sections of the text. Their feedback has strengthened this dissertation and any remaining flaws are my own.
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Finally, I owe an incredible debt of gratitude to my husband, John Grennan, whose commitment to this project took him first across the country and then across the globe. His encouragement and unwavering support fueled my perseverance and ensured that I saw this dissertation through to the end.
Chapter 1
Introduction: Activating Democracy’s Causal Chain

Following the collapse of communism across Eurasia at the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century, it appeared as though global tides had turned unambiguously in favor of democracy. Since the 1970s, more than 60 countries (almost one-third of the countries in the world) have made transitions to democracy (Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008). At the turn of the 21st century, 60 percent of the world’s countries were democratic (Diamond, 2008, p. 36). Democratic gains have occurred across all continents, and a significantly larger number of individuals live in free societies today than ever before.

Yet, as examples from Russia to Nigeria to Thailand demonstrate, the collapse of authoritarian governments and the introduction of competitive elections do not ensure that stable, democratic regimes will persist. When Huntington described the global expansion of open politics in the last quarter of the 20th century as the “Third Wave” of democratization, he noted that each previous wave was followed by a reverse wave of democratic breakdowns. According to Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World survey, as of 2009 global freedom had declined for four consecutive years—the longest continuous period of setbacks since the annual surveys were initiated in 1972 (Puddington, 2010). The most dramatic declines occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, yet there was also weakening in the Middle East and among the countries of the non-Baltic former Soviet Union. Yet, in countries ranging from Mexico to Mali to Indonesia, democracy has endured. Fair and free elections persist and are accompanied by expansive protections for civil liberties.

What explains these trends? Why do some democracies survive past initial elections while others revert back to more authoritarian regimes? What can the new range of cases where democracy failed to survive tell us about the factors that facilitate or hinder open political regimes?

This dissertation offers some answers to these questions through a comparative analysis of two deviant “Third Wave” cases of regime change: post-Soviet Russia and post-Suharto Indonesia. In both countries, democratizing systems replaced authoritarian regimes in the 1990s. Contrary to predominant global trends, however, their subsequent regime trajectories diverged in surprising ways. After almost a decade of reform, Russia retreated to authoritarianism. Indonesia, on the other hand, continues to deepen democracy more than a decade after its anti-authoritarianism breakthrough. What unites these countries to create an illuminating analysis is that most theories of democracy would predict the opposite outcomes: Russia’s significantly higher level of socioeconomic development and a long history of independent statehood should foster democracy, while Indonesia’s low level of socioeconomic development and short post-colonial history should hinder robust democratization. In contrast to studies that have looked at these two countries only in comparison with their immediate regional neighbors, this project seeks to analyze these crucial cases in a broader cross-regional perspective.

This dissertation argues that these two cases’ deviation from global trends in democratization and divergence from each other can be explained by patterns of political participation and popular involvement in new political institutions. By comparing two cases at opposite ends of theoretical expectations, this project uncovers patterns of political participation as an important and overlooked variable that plays a decisive role after a democratic transition has taken place. While Russians retreated from civic and political participation and remain wary
of political institutions, Indonesians quickly became accustomed to applying pressure on political elites and learned to use new democratic institutions to manage conflict and channel popular preferences for governance. These patterns of mass behavior made all the difference in trajectories of regime change.

I contend that society’s response to newly liberalized institutions is the crucial link that lies between structure and historical factors, on the one hand, and the outcome of democratic survival, on the other. The vital factor is whether the structures that are perceived as conducive to democratization facilitate mass political participation after a transition from authoritarianism is complete. Engagement in civil society, a sense of political efficacy, and trust in political institutions drive participation. Individuals who engage in civil society, believe in their ability to influence political outcomes, and trust political institutions are more likely to become involved in non-voting forms of political participation, such as campaigning, political party development work, and protest activities. Sustained and ongoing political participation, particularly between electoral cycles, in turn, constrains elites in a manner that promotes clean and competitive elections and safeguards civil liberties. The absence of such engagement leaves power holders much more latitude to manipulate elections, constrict rights and freedoms, and repress real and imagined would-be oppositionists.

In this introductory chapter, I will outline the main argument of this dissertation, which is that citizens’ beliefs, actions, and inactions following a democratic transition play a decisive role in determining further democratic deepening and, ultimately, democracy’s survival. Most accounts of democracy’s survival focus on macro-structural factors. In contrast, I concentrate on the microfoundations that affect how and even whether the macro-level factors identified by other scholars influence the process of democratic survival. After briefly describing the regime change experiences of Russia and Indonesia, I will provide an overview of the collective findings scholars have amassed about authoritarian breakdown and democratization in the late 20th century. I will then situate my analysis in these debates by offering an alternate framework to understand the democratization process—citizen participation as a constraint on elites’ use of powers. This approach differs from predominant explanations of democratization, which focus either on institutions or elite actors, leaving aside the role of the mass public. The final sections will explain the research design of this dissertation and outline the subsequent chapters.

Regime Change in Russia and Indonesia: A Brief History
In the 1990s, both Russia and Indonesia completed democratic transitions where governments were elected by fair and free elections that excluded no major social groups. Russia’s political liberalization followed seventy years of Communist Party rule as part of the Soviet Union, which was dissolved in 1991. After several years of democratic reform, Russia gradually moved back toward authoritarianism. In the context of democratic theory, this outcome was unlikely. Russia enjoys a relatively high level of socioeconomic development and long history of independent statehood, which typically lead to greater success in democratization.

Like Russia, Indonesia’s political history was largely authoritarian. After a protracted struggle following the country’s 1945 revolution for independence, Indonesia had a brief spell of open politics in the 1950s. President Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy,” introduced in 1957, curtailed democratic institutions, and severe restrictions on civil liberties were imposed under General (and subsequently President) Suharto’s New Order regime. This brutally repressive regime stayed in power for more than 30 years, until popular protests forced Suharto’s resignation in 1998, leading to immediate political liberalization and new elections in 1999. Over
the course of the next decade, Indonesia deepened democratic reforms and their implementation. It held direct elections for the presidency in 2004; bolstered regional autonomy and decentralized and democratized political and administrative authority; and eliminated a role for the military in the legislature. This result is as puzzling as was Russia’s backsliding. After all, Indonesia is a lower-middle income country that remains largely rural and only weakly industrialized. It also has a short history of independent statehood and a long shadow of colonial rule—structural conditions often deemed unfavorable for democratic consolidation (Fish & Wittenberg, 2009).

The political experiences of Russia and Indonesia—two of the world’s largest countries—cannot be accounted for by existing explanations. The record of countries that have undergone political regime change since the mid-1970s suggest several factors that may be conducive to democracy, including higher levels of socioeconomic development, stronger parliaments, weaker presidents, and a longer history of independent statehood (Bunce, 2000; Fish, 2005; Fish & Wittenberg, 2009). Pernicious factors include economic reliance on hydrocarbons, contested national borders, and low levels of socioeconomic development (Fish, 2005; Ross, 2001; Rustow, 1970).

If the factors listed above fully predicted the outcome of regime change, Russia, rather than Indonesia, would be a democracy today. Table 1.1 compares Russia and Indonesia along several factors that are believed to influence prospects for democracy. I have grouped these factors into three general categories: modernization, statehood, and socio-cultural variables. If we look at the modernization variables, Russia has a clear advantage over Indonesia, demonstrating higher levels of socioeconomic development, urbanization, and educational attainment. The substantial role played by hydrocarbons in the Russian economy is the only negative variable in this category. As of the year 2000, 51 percent of Russia’s export income was generated by oil and gas (World Bank, 2002). Nevertheless, hydrocarbons play a considerable role in the Indonesian economy as well, constituting 25 percent of its export income for the year 2000 (World Bank, 2002).

While Russia’s natural resource endowment may have hindered its democratic development, this factor alone cannot explain the variation we see between Russia and Indonesia, which also has an economy heavily dependent on natural resources. Moreover, if we think through the steps that link natural resources to democratic failure in Russia, the natural resource explanation is not inconsistent or incompatible with the argument I present here. As Fish argues in Democracy Derailed in Russia, natural resource wealth did not stymie modernization in Russia, but rather facilitated opportunities for state repression of opposition as well as corruption (2005, pp. 118-138). Corruption, in turn, enhances political elites’ interests in keeping the polity closed. In both Russia and Indonesia, natural resource endowments provided elites with resources to push back against democratization. Yet, while the Russian population did not resist elite moves to stymie democratization, Indonesians have pushed for more democracy.

Russia also has a better showing than Indonesia in the statehood variables. While both Russia and Indonesia confront secessionist struggles on their borders, Russia has a long history

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1 GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in 2007 was $3,712 for Indonesia and $14,690 for Russia (United Nations Development Program, 2009); the percentage of student-age population enrolled in tertiary education in 2007 was 18 percent in Indonesia and 75 percent in Russia (World Bank); and the percent of the population employed in agriculture in 2007 was 41 percent for Indonesia and 9 percent for Russia.

2 Much has been written about Indonesia’s extensive natural resources that extend beyond oil and gas to include minerals and timber. According to an analysis by Budy P. Resosudarmo, in the 1990s, oil and gas constituted about 30 percent of Indonesia’s total exports, minerals and related products accounted for 19 percent, and forest products accounted for 10 percent (2005, p. 3).
of independent statehood and has never been a former colony. Indonesia, on the other hand, declared independence only in 1945, and parts of the country’s current territory had been under colonial administration since the 17th century.

In the last category of factors, socio-cultural variables, Russia and Indonesia are on similar ground. Both countries have large, ethnically diverse populations, a structural feature that is frequently hypothesized as impeding democratic development. In addition to ethnic heterogeneity, the literature has suggested that particular value systems, such as religious traditions that emphasize obedience to authority, can be a cultural obstacle to democratization. In various time periods, Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Confucianism, and Islam have all been identified as belief systems that may undermine democracy. These arguments have held sway with many scholars out of a belief that culture changes at a slow rate and is generally impervious to short-term fluctuations in mass political attitudes. Yet, as the Third Wave of democratization has shown, numerous examples of countries with populations adhering to these religious beliefs have successfully built open political regimes. At present, the democratic deficit among predominantly Muslim countries has focused particular attention on a possible relationship between religious adherence to Islam and authoritarianism. Bearing this in mind, Russia might be slightly better positioned for democracy than Indonesia in that it is not a majority Muslim country.

Table 1.1: Values for Hypothesized Causes of Democracy in Russia and Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modernization variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic development</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational attainment</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reliance on hydrocarbons</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statehood variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of independent statehood</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former colony</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested national borders</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-Cultural variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic heterogeneity</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim majority population</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, if we compare Russia and Indonesia on the factors that are generally believed to foster democracy, the country with greater advantages for democratic survival is Russia. If not these factors, what then, explains Indonesia’s democratic success and Russia’s failure?

*Democracy and Democratization: Common Approaches to Understanding the “Third Wave”*

What causes an authoritarian political system to democratize? In answering this question, social scientists are confronted with obstacles that are both theoretical and practical, from how to define democracy to how to measure it. Countless books and articles have focused on the

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3 For examples of cross-national analysis that consider level of democracy between predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim countries, see Midlarsky (1998), Fish (2002), Donno and Russet (2004), and Fish (2011).
conceptualization of democracy, its definition, and measurement. The most minimalist definition of democracy is that posed by Przeworski, who claims that “Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections” (Przeworski, 1991, p. 10). As many scholars have pointed out (Karl, 1986; Lindberg, 2006; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Schmitter & Karl, 1991), defining democracy strictly in electoral terms can lead to the electoral fallacy of equating democracy with the presence of elections. In order to ensure that parties can indeed lose elections in a political system, additional safeguards must be in place.

Democracy is defined here as the procedures that ensure competition for leadership positions through free, fair, and frequent elections, and the assurance of open debate about candidates and policies through freedoms of speech, media, and association. This definition encompasses all of the characteristics that Dahl defines as the “procedural minimum” for polyarchy. Dahl’s characteristics can be roughly collapsed into two dimensions: institutions which guarantee that access to political power is determined by free elections and civil liberties which ensure the equality of access to these institutions. This is, indeed, a proceduralist definition of democracy that does not presume additional conditions, such as level of socioeconomic equality, which is frequently cited in definitions of democracy rooted in socialist and Marxist traditions (Barber, 1984; Marshall, 2000; Roemer, 1999). Yet, this definition is more robust than that offered by Przeworski.

Considerable theoretical and conceptual attention has been devoted to how to measure democracy and establish indicators for it (D. Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Schedler, 2001). Most social scientists concur that democracy is best thought of as a continuous variable that can be measured in terms of degrees of political openness. At one extreme is a fully consolidated democracy, while at the other extreme is a fully consolidated “monocracy,” or rule by a single individual or unified collective actor (Fish, 2005, pp. 19-20). Between these two extremes are political systems that are more or less democratic. This continuum includes meaningful thresholds that further categorize countries along an ordered scale. Some countries meet the procedural minimum outlined by Dahl to be considered a democracy, while other countries meet some, but not all conditions, and others fail to meet any. This leaves us with three groupings of countries: democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes.

What has Third Wave democratization—both its successes and failures—taught us about what causes authoritarian regimes to democratize? On the conceptual level, we have learned that democratization constitutes a multi-stage process that does not guarantee democratic survival over the long term. Huntington’s original articulation of the Third Wave described three stages of democratization: extrication from the authoritarian regime, transition to democratically elected government, and consolidation of democratic institutions (Huntington, 1991). A transition is complete once initial fair and free elections are held. Depending on the degree of pluralism and institutionalization of democratic rights and norms that follows the introduction of fair and free elections, the consolidation of democratic institutions and practices can occur, but the
stabilization of a hybrid system or a return to authoritarian practices is also a possibility. In short, as numerous scholars have articulated, the introduction of liberalized political institutions alone is not sufficient to ensure the consolidation of democratic practices or the survival of democracy over time. Moreover, it is possible for a regime to go through these stages in a manner that is more circuitous than linear—progress in democratic deepening might be followed by retrenchment that is then followed by another stage of democratic deepening. This prolonged democratization process is exemplified by the experience of Latin American regimes.

Much of the initial work analyzing Third Wave democratizing regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America sought to explain how patterns of political liberalization that precipitated a democratic transition resulted in democratic consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1991; Schmitter, 1995). Democratic consolidation is a challenging concept for analysis. Scholars have debated the concept’s definition extensively, and inconsistent usage of the term has made it susceptible to conceptual stretching. While initially employed by scholars of political transition to describe the process by which new democracies steel themselves from becoming vulnerable to a resurgence of authoritarianism, over time the concept of democratic consolidation came to take on other meanings as well. In a particularly useful discussion, Schedler identified several ways in which the term “democratic consolidation” is used that denote distinct and different processes (Schedler, 1998). He points to three general trends: 1) democratic consolidation as regime survival, including avoiding democracy’s “sudden death” or gradual erosion (Schedler, 1998, p. 96); 2) democratic consolidation as democratic deepening—moving along the continuum of political openness described above; and 3) democratic consolidation as institutionalizing democracy’s basic ground rules.

Diamond proposed a conceptualization of consolidation that focused more explicitly on the broad-based legitimacy of the democratic order. For Diamond consolidation is “the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine” (Diamond, 1999, p. 65). The outcome he describes requires a process of democratic deepening that takes place on attitudinal and behavioral dimensions and involves multiple categories of actors—elites, organizations, and mass society. In many respects, Diamond’s conceptualization of democratic consolidation is similar to that offered by Linz and Stepan, who describe consolidation as the political situation that obtains when democracy becomes accepted by all meaningful political groups as “the only game in town” (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 5). The process described by Diamond, Linz, and Stepan is one that can unfold over long time horizons. It may also stagnate at various stages along the way.

My project engages the literature on democratic consolidation by linking institutionalization and democratic deepening to a clear and measurable outcome: democratic survival following initial elections. In most countries, initial democratic elections are not the endpoint that determines democracy’s subsequent survival, but rather constitute a new benchmark of political competition that must be repeated over and over again for democracy to endure with time. To that end, institutions that ensure political competition and the protection of civil liberties—the two dimensions of democracy outlined by Dahl—usually require further deepening and institutionalization after the first election. If democracy exists along a continuum with clearly defined thresholds that demonstrate when a regime can be categorized as meeting the minimal criteria for a democracy, then it is possible for a country to make progress in deepening and extending the institutions and practices of democracy to move further along on
this continuum. Ensuring the survival of democracy involves institutionalizing democratic rules of political competition and access to political power and sanctioning those who behave in ways that go against the spirit as well as the letter of these rules. When democratic rules and practices are institutionalized to become “the only game in town,” democracy’s chances of survival are much greater. By contrast, without the institutionalization and deepening of democratic rules and practices, it is easier for political elites to roll back democratic gains, threatening democracy’s survival. In short, a country that has introduced political liberalization might deepen or restrict democracy. Some scholars would indeed call this process democratic consolidation. For simplicity and clarity’s sake, however, I believe it is more accurate to label it democratic survival.

How should we measure democratic survival? There are numerous indices that seek to measure democracy, but only Freedom House provides annual rankings for political openness. Freedom House’s annual scores are determined by averaging two separate ratings for political rights and civil liberties. The scores range from a high score of “1” for complete political openness to a low score of “7” for a completely closed system, and these scores are further divided into groups that are labeled as “free” (1-2.5), “partly free” (3-5), and “not free” (5.5-7).

As discussed above, in this project democracy is conceptualized as a continuous variable with a fully consolidated democracy at one extreme and a fully consolidated monocracy on the other. Between these two extremes are political systems that are more or less democratic. Some may have democratic political institutions, but fail to protect civil liberties. Others may do a better job at protecting civil rights, but lack competitive political institutions. The level of political openness can rise and fall on either or both dimensions, thereby affecting a regime’s overall level of democracy. Additionally, along this continuum, there are clear and meaningful cut-points or thresholds that constitute the empirical minimum at which a regime can be said to be a democracy, as well as the empirical minimum at which a regime can be said to be part of the hybrid area, that is, more politically open than a monocracy, but not open enough to be a democracy.

Figure 1.1 provides a visual representation of the two dimensions of political rights and civil liberties. For illustrative purposes, I have plotted all of the countries with a population of over 100 million that have undergone some form of political liberalization since the 1970s. The values on the graph correspond to Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World rankings for the year 2009, which are also listed in Table 1.2. Freedom House provides two separate scores for political rights and civil liberties. As Figure 1.1 demonstrates, countries located in the upper right-hand quadrant meet the minimum qualifications of political rights and civil liberties to be considered democracies. Among the eight countries plotted here, four earn this distinction: Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Mexico. Countries located in the lower left-hand quadrant do not even meet standards of partial freedom in political rights and civil liberties and are best thought

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7 Other indices include the Polity project developed by Monty G. Marshall and Kenneth Jaggers (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), the Voice and Accountability indicators created by Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp), and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf). All of these indices provide similar rankings of countries.

8 For more specific details on how these scores are developed, please consult the “Methodology” section of Freedom House, Freedom in the World, available at www.freedomhouse.org (site consulted February 26, 2010).

9 Available at www.freedomhouse.org. The results are from the 2010 survey report, which provides scores for the year 2009.
of as hard authoritarian regimes. The only case that fits this category is Russia. Countries clustered around the intersection of the two axes are those cases that Freedom House deems “partly free.” Figure 1.1 displays three cases in this category: Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Bangladesh is slightly closer to democracy than the other two cases. While Pakistan and Nigeria have the same overall Freedom House score (4.5), Nigeria ranks higher on political rights and Pakistan has a higher score for civil liberties.

Table 1.2: Freedom House Scores for the Eight Largest Transition Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Categorization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Not free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 1.1: Democracy’s Dimensions: Political Rights and Civil Liberties

For the purposes of this study, I am arguing that a country can be said to have embarked on a period of substantial democratization if it achieved a score of “4” or better (the mid-way point for “partly free” countries) for at least five consecutive years after climbing from a score of “5” or below. I am measuring democracy’s survival as having achieved a score of “2.5” or better for five consecutive years. A country can be said to have deviated on the path from democratization to democratic survival if it dropped a full two points on the Freedom House scale and stayed in this position for at least five consecutive years.

As Figure 1.1 demonstrates, the two cases under investigation in this dissertation, Russia and Indonesia, demonstrate opposite outcomes of democratic survival. Figure 1.2 plots their
combined Freedom House score over the past 20 years. After Indonesia introduced liberalizing political reforms in 1998, it embarked on a process of democratic deepening that has remained consistent over the following decade. Indonesia has entered Freedom House’s “free” category for five consecutive years, and its democracy has survived over the course of three national election cycles. Russia’s level of democracy, by contrast, peaked at the period of political liberalization in 1991, and these gains stagnated and then gradually eroded over the course of the next decade. Its nascent democracy did not survive, and Russia has been placed in the Freedom House category of “not free” for the past six years.

**Figure 1.2: Freedom House Scores in Russia and Indonesia, 1989-2009**

As numerous scholars have noted, the factors that facilitate an initial democratic transition are not necessarily the same as those that foster democracy’s survival over time. In his seminal article that pre-dates the Third Wave of democratization, Rustow makes precisely this point (Rustow, 1970, pp. 345-346). He argues that the factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the same ones that brought it into existence, and that different factors may become crucial during successive phases of democratic deepening. In other words, Rustow supports the view that the multi-stage nature of democratization opens up the possibility of different causes and causal mechanisms at different stages of regime development. A democratic transition in which initial fair and free elections occur is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for democratic survival over time.

Building on the contributions of Rustow, Schmitter, Diamond, and countless others, this dissertation takes seriously the view that democracy’s presumed causes must be viewed in the context of the relevant stages of democratization. This project is concerned with the period following a democratic transition. The forces that beget initial political liberalization may not necessarily engender continuous and enduring democratic reform. Specifically, what happens after initial elections that facilitates or stymies democratic deepening?

In this dissertation, I take democratic transition as my starting point, looking at the trajectories of two countries following the introduction of reforms that dramatically liberalized political institutions, established meaningful protections for civil liberties, and fostered political competition. Less than a decade into their respective post-transition eras, these countries were embarking down divergent paths: Indonesia was deepening democratic institutions and practices while Russia had begun rolling back early democratic reforms. In the subsequent years the variation in these trajectories proved enduring—Indonesia has established one of the most robust
democracies in the developing world while Russia has successfully reconstituted a stable authoritarian regime. In the forthcoming analysis, I will present an explanation for how these outcomes occurred, arguing that the variation in these countries’ trajectories is a consequence of patterns of mass political attitudes and behaviors. My explanation can potentially be tested in any polity in the world.

Assumptions about the Macro- and Micro-foundations of Democracy’s Causes

Our theories about democracy and democratization rely on numerous simplifying assumptions about the behavior of elites and masses, as well as the social groups that connect them. Simplifying assumptions are indeed necessary for social inquiry; the social world is too complex to measure every possible interaction. In a particularly valuable discussion on comparative historical analysis, Katznelson writes, “Microbehavior, we must continue to remember, requires historical macrofoundations. Yet, equally, large-scale comparative analysis is underspecified and incomplete when its microfoundations are left implicit, ad hoc, or undertheorized” (2003, p. 272). When considering the intersection of macro- and microfoundations of democracy, it would behoove us to be more explicit about our assumptions and the theory driving them. This project focuses attention on the microfoundations of democratic deepening in two diverse countries that defy our conventional expectations about the macro-level relationships between structural variables and democratic survival. In particular, I focus on the aggregation of individual-level attitudes and behaviors that ultimately determine the role of the mass public in democratization.

For example, one of the most common assumptions about the development of democracy that resulted from the study of the first wave of democratization is the necessity of certain socioeconomic foundations. Lipset (1960; 1994) argued that economic growth engenders a culture of democracy that in turn provides the foundations for democratic political institutions. Prosperity reduces class conflict and promotes compromise, making democracy viable. Lipset was generally correct: socioeconomic development remains the foremost predictor of democratic survival as evidenced by numerous studies of Third Wave democratization.10 The perspective described by Lipset and adopted by many others is an indirect relationship positing that capitalist growth is a prerequisite for democracy. In this story, the mechanism for engendering democracy is the attitudes and behaviors of an emerging middle class. The middle class becomes important for democracy because it serves as a counterbalance to political and economic power concentrated in the hands of the wealthy. Additionally, the middle class can finance the political opposition. Yet, whether other actors can replace the middle class in creating alternative power sources and financing the opposition remains an open question. Both Russia and Indonesia lack a category of individuals that fit traditional notions of what constitute a “middle class.”

Dahl likewise believed that certain socioeconomic foundations facilitated democracy (1971). He argued that market capitalism helps to create a substantial middle class, which in turn generates support for the rule of law, subordinating the military and police to civilian control. Capitalism—indirectly through greater industrialization and urbanization—also facilitates high levels of literacy and education, a plurality of relatively independent organizations, and free access to fairly reliable information, all factors that are conducive to developing mass-level engagement and participation in political life. Indonesia has a long history of capitalism, but weak outcomes on education and the development of a middle class that holds the particular attitudes described above. Russia’s modernization evolved not out of capitalism, but as a

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consequence of a command economy. High levels of literacy and education resulted, but no property owners or independent organizations emerged.

In the articulations of a causal relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy described above, there are numerous stages of action in which a particular human response—by both the masses and elites—is implicit but not clearly articulated. The general logic can be summarized as follows. If individuals become empowered economically, they will then want to protect their economic gains from arbitrary seizure by the state or other individuals. The desire to protect economic gains will engender a set of attitudes that are supportive of transparency and the rule of law. This attitudinal preference for transparency and the rule of law will foster behavior on the part of the newly-advantaged individuals to demand greater participation in the government. These individuals will demonstrate their behavioral demand for greater participation through the financing of and participation in independent organizations which seek to influence the ruling political elite. Likewise, as education, literacy, and urbanization increase, knowledge of and support for the new, independent organizations will spread to a larger part of the masses. Finally, elites will view public demands for greater participation as credible threats to their power and will choose to liberalize or deepen a liberalized system in order to maintain political authority.

Indeed, Russia’s and Indonesia’s political trajectories have diverged from the theoretical paths outlined by Lipset, Dahl, and others. This divergence is a consequence of meaningful deviations in the micro-level steps that lead to the ultimate outcome of democracy. The proposed relationship between economic development and democracy rests on a web of micro-level relationships that may fundamentally alter the power relations between political elites and those under their control. More specifically, economic development promotes urbanization and a shift in the occupational structure away from agrarian production towards an urban working class. Higher levels of literacy and education are also common consequences of economic growth, and widespread education helps individuals generate the skills necessary to form viable trade unions, political parties, and civic associations.

The economic growth that promotes rising levels of urbanization and education, however, does not necessarily need to emanate from a market economy. State-led growth, like that experienced in the Soviet Union, pre-reform China, and in economies with large state sectors found throughout the developing world, can foster urbanization and advancement in human development without necessarily creating privately-held capital and a middle class. Alternatively, as one has observed over the past three decades in China, it is possible to create a middle class that does not apply public pressure for democratization (Gallagher, 2002; Tsai, 2007). Distinguishing between economic growth that fosters independent and autonomous entrepreneurship and that which does not is important. The former creates bases for alternative sources of power, the latter does not. The classical argument about the importance of the middle class stems from the idea that this social stratum will acquire meaningful assets from economic growth and will want to protect them, therefore demanding a say in the system that makes the rules.

Post-Soviet Russia is a case in which high levels of economic development facilitated urbanization and extremely high levels of education and skill development, but did not create a propertied middle class. Even though the Communist Party relinquished its hold of the productive assets of the economy, an entrepreneurial, propertied middle class did not emerge. Russia’s transition to a market economy was marked by hyperinflation that wiped out the savings of most Russians. A dramatically flawed privatization scheme created a new economic oligarchy
that concentrated much of the country’s productive assets in the hands of a few. Even attempts to create a mortgage market to assist in spawning a class of homeowners has been slow to emerge. As a result, although there was great potential to build a broad-based propertied middle class in Russia, it did not develop. Consequently, economic development did not serve to foster the development of alternate sources of power throughout the society. The only group that could demand protection of its assets and meaningfully present itself as a counterweight to the state’s political power is the small, insider oligarchy.

Indonesia has a much lower level of economic development than Russia. According to the 2009 Human Development Report, GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in 2007 was $3,712 for Indonesia and $14,690 for Russia. While urbanization, literacy, and educational attainment expanded rapidly in Indonesia in the second half of the twentieth century, the levels still lag in cross-national comparisons. Even though Indonesia has always had a market economy, the state sector looms large and the government controls prices on several basic goods, including fuel, rice, and electricity (United States Department of State, 2010). These features have limited the development of an independent bourgeoisie in Indonesia.

In the micro-level steps that link socioeconomic development to democracy, democratization happens at the final stage. Yet, this is several stages removed from the initial input of increased economic prosperity. In each of these stages, outcomes other than the prescribed sequence are possible. For example, perhaps individuals do not seek to protect their assets by demanding greater participation in government, but rather by forming private militias. There is evidence of this outcome in both Russia and Indonesia. Perhaps independent associations develop without middle-class financing, as we see in Indonesia. Maybe, as education, literacy, and urbanization increase, it is not support for democratic values that develops, but rather an attraction to a ready ideology. Individuals might be attracted to liberalism as an ideology, and subsequently develop support for democratic values, which is the model we observed in Western Europe. Yet, as global experiences in the twentieth century have shown, communism, fascism, and radical theocracy might prove as viable contenders for mass support. The multi-stage process connecting economic prosperity to democratic survival offers numerous opportunities for the results to diverge from the predicted pattern we assume will hold.

In this dissertation, I challenge several of the above assumptions about how macro-level structures promote or hinder democracy’s survival. I do so by focusing on the microfoundational variables of individual-level attitudes and behaviors. These factors, when aggregated, influence the process of democratic survival in ways that may deviate from theoretic predictions. My approach engages the middle range of theory that connects macro-level structures to individual-level attitudes and behaviors. I argue that citizens’ ability to take the micro-level steps that set up alternate sources of power is the key factor that determines whether elites are compelled to provide democracy. Citizen attitudes and participation operate as a constraint on elite behavior and can also serve as a resource for aspirants to political office aiming to extend democracy.

**An Alternate Approach: Citizen Participation as a Constraint on Elite Action**

Most scholars of democratization do not contend that the effect of macro-level factors on regime type is direct. Rather, variables such as the degree of liberalness of the antecedent regime, a history of independent statehood, level of socioeconomic development, and level of societal inequality influence regime type through the actions taken by political actors. Essentially, structural theories make an implicit assumption that a history of open politics and independent

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11 Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) estimate that in 2003, 22 individuals owned 40 percent of Russian industry.
statehood will increase both the popular demand for democratic institutions and practices, and elite incentives to provide them. Likewise, higher degrees of socioeconomic development and low levels of social inequality are assumed to increase popular demand for public accountability of the government via electoral institutions. Instead of basing our understanding of how structural factors and institutional design influence regime trajectories by assuming that citizens and elites respond in uniform and predictable ways, I propose a focus on the more proximate means by which structures and institutions can shape the prospects of democratic survival.

Let us start with the ultimate dependent variable—democratic survival. As discussed above, democratic deepening is a step towards democratic survival for countries that have recently completed a democratic transition. In working backwards from the dependent variable, the first step I propose is to acknowledge that the decision to strengthen or rescind democratic institutions (free and fair elections, checks and balances among different branches of power, public accountability of elite access to power, protection of minority rights) is in the hands of the political elite. A population can be fully and deeply committed to the desire for these institutions, but this desire will not produce a democratic outcome if elites do not take the steps necessary to prioritize democratic versus autocratic institutions. Similarly, as many Third Wave transitions have shown, democratic institutions can exist on paper but fail to translate into democracy in practice. This failure is often due to an absence of behavioral norms and other ancillary support structures (free media, open civil society, legal protection of human rights) that reduce the likelihood of democratic institutions being manipulated by political elites. Ultimately, the decisions of political elites are the last step in a causal chain that explains the deepening or rescinding of democracy.

Attention to the behavior of political elites is a hallmark of many of the studies that looked at Third-Wave democratization, particularly in Latin America and the former communist world (Anderson, 2001; Fish, 2001; Huntington, 1991; O'Donnell, 1989; O'Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986). The common view in the 1990s was that democratic transitions happened through elite bargaining and that different patterns of elite interaction have an impact on the prospects for democratization as well as the types of institutions and the stability of the democracy that emerges. Less attention, however, has been devoted to understanding the role of elites in contributing to democracy’s survival after a democratic transition is complete.

Political elites operating in all types of political systems make decisions under the influence of mass opinion. This is true of dictatorships and democracies. The decision-making environments of all governing elites are conditioned by the desires, demands, and behaviors of the mass public. While it is true that citizens have a more direct impact on elite decisions in established democracies—and that the structure of competitive elections imposes meaningful constraints on elite actions—it would be incorrect to presume that public preferences are irrelevant to an authoritarian leader trying to maintain power. Although the mass public does not exercise its will directly in authoritarian systems, a dictator must mind the general public mood in order to ensure enough quiescence to stay in power.

While the decision to maintain or rescind democratic institutions rests with elites, the process of democratic survival involves a dynamic relationship between elites and the masses. Governing elites supply a certain degree of democracy through the decisions they make and practices they employ. The mass public also demands a certain degree through their own behaviors—by voting for certain types of candidates and responding with outrage or acceptance at elite-led decisions to roll back or entrench democratic institutions. In extreme instances, the public might engage in a revolution to express its desire for more democracy.
While the elite-mass dynamic is not uniform across all polities, we can safely make a few, simplifying assumptions about the general incentives that govern elite and citizen behaviors. It is relatively safe to assume that the population as a whole has an interest in maintaining a certain degree of peace and prosperity—and that government policies may play an important role in determining peace and prosperity. Likewise, we can assume that governing elites have an interest in maintaining political power, if not for themselves personally, at the very least for their political allies. For the purposes of this study, I assume that—left unchecked—most governing elites would choose a monopoly on political power. Not all leaders would use this monopoly on power to engage in violent repression. Some would undoubtedly use the monopoly simply the engage in more efficient redistributive policies that are in accordance with the popular will. Though it may not be politically correct to liken oneself to a dictator, few political leaders, even in a democracy, would voluntarily choose to reduce the levels of power that are at their disposal, if for no other reason than a concentration of power can lead to greater governing efficiency. It is for this reason that citizens in new democracies must engage in political participation to constrain elite attempts to act on the impulse to hold and maintain a greater share of political power.

In order to prevent elites from acting in their own self-interests, citizens must invest some of their own resources to constrain them. Citizens generally work to limit elite excesses through political participation. For the purposes of this project, I am employing Joan Nelson’s definition of political participation as “action by private citizens intended to influence the actions or the composition of national or local governments” (1979, p. 8). As I will elaborate more fully in chapter 4, political participation is distinct from engagement in civil society. While joining a civic or politically-oriented group is an example of engagement in civil society, membership alone is not a form of political participation. Belonging to an association, consuming political information, or talking about political issues with other members are not specific actions directed at influencing political outcomes, which is the necessary criterion for an act to be considered political participation (Brady, 1999, p. 737).

At a minimum, political participation involves parting with the resource of one’s free time. For most individuals living in longstanding democracies, the allocation of time for participation is not substantial: approximately the amount of time it takes to stand in line and vote in regular elections. Yet, for other individuals who become involved in non-voting forms of political participation, the investment of time can be much greater. In countries in which democratic institutions are new, even the simple act of voting can involve a greater investment of resources. Voters do not have the heuristic device of tried and true party labels to help simplify their decision-making calculus. They might find the need to invest more time to simply learn who is running for election and what the new offices stand for. In more authoritarian regimes, constraining elites is even more costly. Participating in any sort of activity that threatens the existing order could make individuals vulnerable to violence and repression.

Thus, there is always an investment on the part of the citizens for constraining elites, though the price one has to pay varies with the level of political openness. The question is: what price are people willing to pay? Once political liberalization has begun and the minimum procedural features of a democracy are in place, there are greater possibilities for citizens to hold elites accountable without threatening their own livelihood. The most obvious mechanism is regular elections. Yet, the periods between elections offer plenty of opportunities for newly-elected elites to engage in actions that could undermine the civil liberties and procedures that are meant to ensure that subsequent elections will be fair and free. In other words, until competitive
elections and the norms and institutions that support them are accepted by all stakeholders as “the only game in town,” democracy is particularly vulnerable to elite abuse, and authoritarian backsliding remains a constant threat. Under these circumstances, the process of political liberalization creates a functional need for ongoing citizen oversight between elections to hold elites accountable and constrain them from manipulating the process to suit their own interests. Throwing the rascals out during elections is not enough to keep democracy in place—the rascals need to be held in check at more regular intervals. While it is true that public demands for democracy can be met or ignored, and elites can behave democratically or not regardless of public opinion, ongoing political participation by citizens provides an important constraint on the array of options available to elites, thereby compelling elites to deepen democracy. Sustaining democratic institutions and practices over time requires that citizens credibly threaten to oust leaders who do not seek to abide by and extend democratic practices.

Political participation can operate as a mechanism for facilitating democratic survival in several ways. At a basic level, mass actors might vote out elected officials who do not push for deeper democratization and replace them for those who will. There is evidence of this outcome in Indonesia. Alternatively, the mass public might elect representatives and executives who do not adhere to democratic norms and institutions and roll back democratic gains. This result accurately describes Putin’s Russia. Yet, there are several ways in which non-voting political participation can influence democratic deepening by placing constraints on elites between elections.

For example, participation in political party development can facilitate greater competition among would-be elites. A more competitive environment might find political aspirants competing for public support on the supply of democratic institutions and practices, such as expanding elections, strengthening civil liberties, or increasing transparency. Additionally, acts of civil disobedience, if widespread, can become a political liability to elites, compelling them to abide by democratic institutions and practices to quell unrest and maintain public support. Post-Suharto Indonesia offers several examples of democratic deepening as a response to public pressure—from the initial reforms that guaranteed protections of speech and assembly to the adoption of a system of direct presidential elections and elections for regional and local executives.

While the above examples involve behavioral displays of public demand via political participation, there are several studies demonstrating that the political elite can be motivated by public opinion, which offers indications of how the public might behave (Brady & Kaplan, 2008; Lee, 2002; Risse-Kappen, 1991). The credible threat of being unseated—often predicated by low levels of public support for a specific incumbent or his policies—may be sufficient for an incumbent to enact policy that deepens democracy. Similarly, elites who see little indication that the mass public would object to rollbacks of certain democratic institutions or freedoms are more likely to make these moves without fear of losing their positions. We see this dynamic at work in the numerous reforms adopted during Vladimir Putin’s presidency in Russia: greater restrictions were placed on political parties, elections for regional executives were canceled, and state control over media increased—all without widespread popular objection. Putin behaved as we would expect an unconstrained leader to behave—by expanding his power as far as he could without unsettling the public.

Until nascent democratic institutions and norms are accepted by all stakeholders as “the only game in town,” they are particularly vulnerable to elite abuse, and the threat of authoritarian backsliding looms large. If a democratic transition fails to spur an expansion of political
participation that can constrain elites through the development of opposition parties and citizen oversight of elite actions, it is unlikely that any country will deepen democracy to such an extent that it can survive past the first several years.

My analysis uncovers a meaningful dissimilarity in the patterns of political participation in post-Soviet Russia and post-Suharto Indonesia and connects these patterns to the countries’ different outcomes in democratic survival following transition. By constraining elite excesses, citizens propelled democratic survival in Indonesia. In contrast, Russians failure to constrain political elites made it easier for Russian leaders to roll back democratic gains with impunity.

Factors Influencing Political Participation
Why did political participation fail to constrain elites in Russia yet succeed at doing so in Indonesia? I argue that this variation has three general causes: 1) the robustness of a country’s civil society, 2) the level of political efficacy felt by the population, and 3) the level of trust individuals have in political institutions. High levels of engagement in civil society, political efficacy, and trust foster conditions that inspire an expansion of political participation among the mass public. This participation is the primary mechanism by which citizens can prevent elites from encroaching upon nascent democratic institutions and practices. As such, political participation intervenes between the individual-level variables of engagement in civil society, sense of efficacy, and trust in institutions and the macro-level variable of regime type. The causal sequence that connects these variables is illustrated in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3: The Causal Chain of Democracy’s Survival

Engagement in civil society, which is defined here as the autonomous, intermediary stratum of society that exists between one’s home and the state, leads to an expansion of political participation by providing individuals with the resources they need to engage effectively in political life. Moreover, individuals who participate in civil society at higher rates have broader,
overlapping social networks through which they can be recruited to participate in new political opportunities, including political party development and acts of contentious politics. As chapter 5 of this dissertation will show, I find that Russians have extremely low levels of engagement in civic and social life while Indonesians have unusually high rates. As a result, Russians never activated their reserves of civic skills to sustain demand for democratic institutions and practices over time. In contrast, Indonesians—in spite of their overall low levels of educational attainment and economic resources—used their involvement in civil society to develop meaningful civic skills that they then deployed to establish and support effective opposition parties and engage in ongoing acts of citizen oversight of elite actions.

Political efficacy, defined as the beliefs about the impact an individual and others like him can have on the political process (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954), influences the forms and levels of political and civic participation individuals engage in. When individuals believe that a particular form of political or community participation will yield meaningful results, they are more likely to take part. I observed this relationship between efficacy and participation in both Indonesia and Russia. As I will show in chapter 6, individuals in both countries who felt that their vote or activism might influence a political outcome participated relatively frequently. But, I found that the percentage of individuals who express high levels of efficacy is much greater in Indonesia than Russia. This variation further contributes to these countries’ differences in participation levels.

Lastly, trust in political institutions influences both levels of participation and levels of support for the regime and specific incumbents. When trust in political institutions is high, individuals are more likely to accept the decisions—the uncertain outcomes—generated by these institutions, which helps the new regime develop legitimacy. When individuals trust political institutions—such as elections, the legislature, and political parties—they are more likely to participate in them. I observed this outcome in Indonesia, where the population exhibits levels of trust in political institutions that is generally higher than the global average. Russians’ trust in institutions, by contrast, is below the global average, and Russian engagement in these institutions is weak. Alternatively, when trust is placed in specific individuals rather than impersonal institutions, democratic deepening or retrenchment could result. If a specific leader takes steps to strengthen democratic institutions and practices, democratic deepening results. Again, we see evidence of this outcome in the policies of each of the presidents that have taken office in post-Suharto Indonesia. Yet, high levels of trust in a person who enacts policy that limits political openness and civil liberties—such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin—stifle democratic deepening.

Higher levels of engagement in civil society, political efficacy, and trust translate into democratic deepening primarily through an expansion in non-voting political participation. Political participation facilitates democratic deepening by constraining elites from behaving in ways that undermine democratic institutions and practices. As I will elaborate in chapter 4, the process of political liberalization creates a paradox for mass political participation. Having been socialized in an authoritarian political system, the population is likely to approach participation in both conventional and contentious acts with caution and suspicion. Yet, in order for political elites to be held accountable to newly democratized institutions, high levels of voluntary participation in the newly-established institutions are necessary. Both Russia and Indonesia experienced an expansion of possible forms of political participation following liberalization, yet the countries’ diverged in the extent to which citizens took part in activities that effectively constrain elites.
Advantages of Cross-Regional Paired Comparison

The approach proposed in this dissertation necessarily focuses attention on the microfoundations of democracy’s causes. As such, it is a fundamentally different approach than that taken by most scholars of democratization, and therefore requires a particular research design. The research design employed in this project offers several advantages for gaining inferential leverage.

First, this project employs the deviant case method of analysis. Deviant-case selection involves the comparison of “outlier” cases—in this project, Russia and Indonesia—that perform much differently than a particular theory or model would predict. According to existing theories of democratization, Russia’s advantages in modernization, statehood, and socio-cultural variables would predict a much higher level of democracy than had occurred as of 2009.\(^\text{12}\) Indonesia, meanwhile, deviates from democratization theory on the other end of the spectrum. Indonesia is more democratic than its levels of modernization and statehood would predict. The goal of deviant case analysis is to uncover the factors that contribute to the particular cases’ inability to conform to expected models. Deviant case analysis is used to generate hypotheses that lead to new explanations of an outcome of interest, in this case, democracy’s survival (Gerring, 2007, p. 89, pp. 105-107).

The cases of Russia and Indonesia are not only deviant cases, they are crucial cases for study. Indonesia is the fourth most populated country in the world, and Russia is the eighth. Collectively, more than 5 percent of the world’s population lives in these two countries. Russia is the biggest country in the world, has the largest volume of combined oil and natural gas reserves in the world, and is the heir of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal. Indonesia is the largest country in the world with a predominantly Muslim population, making Indonesia also the largest Muslim democracy. More Muslims live in Indonesia than in all of the Middle East. These countries are not outliers we should dismiss. If our democratic theories fail to account for these two crucial cases, we should seek to understand why.

Second, the paired comparison research design in this project presents a fresh approach to comparative studies of democratization. Most of what we have learned about the causes of democracy comes from findings yielded by two standard research designs: cross-national statistical analysis and regionally-focused case studies. Large, cross-national statistical analysis has focused primarily on hypothesis testing of possible macro-structural factors leading to democracy using large sample sizes that often approximate the world’s population of political regimes (Boix & Stokes, 2003; Fish & Wittenberg, 2009; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). These studies rely on correlations between variables for inferential leverage. The relationship that has received the most scrutiny through such large-N statistical studies is that between economic development and democracy. While this research design has yielded interesting information about the role of modernization in democracy’s survival, it is of limited utility in helping us understand the dynamics of outlier cases.\(^\text{13}\) Additionally, it tells us nothing about the microfoundations that connect economic development to open politics, and whether these obtain in the cases under investigation.

The second standard research design looks at cases of democratization in single countries or in a smaller, purposive sample of countries of the same geographic region in order to engage

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\(^{12}\) For a detailed analysis of Russia’s outlier status in a cross-national context see Fish (2005) and Fish and Wittenberg (2009).

\(^{13}\) For a particularly useful discussion of the theory building and hypothesis testing in studies of democratization, see Coppedge (2007).
in theory building through the identification of new variables or causal mechanisms (R. B. Collier & Collier, 1991; Compton, 2000; McLaren, 2008; McMann, 2006). The logic of cross-country comparisons within the same region regularly relies on the “most similar systems” design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). Because countries from the same geographic region often share important structural similarities, including level of modernization, history of statehood, and ethnic or religious composition, numerous structural factors that may correlate with democratization are considered to be held “constant” in the research design. One limitation of this approach, however, is that it parameterizes potentially important independent variables by not allowing them to vary. Consequently, it leaves unexplored many theoretically interesting comparisons (Tarrow, 2010). As Bunce (2000) noted, several of the findings from studies of Third Wave democratizations are regionally bounded. That is, there are some explanations that seem contained to specific geographic regions. Thus, in order to test whether the potential causal variables that drive these explanations are part of a more generalizeable theory, we need to look at cases from different regions.

The research design implemented in this project seeks to combine many of the positive attributes of the cross-national large-N analysis with the structured small-N analysis. In a recent article, Tarrow highlights several of the advantages of the paired comparison research design (Tarrow, 2010). In particular, he notes that choosing cases with substantial differences can offer several benefits that often elude similar case analysis, including that: 1) drawing attention to similar processes in a wide variety of cases can expand or limit the scope conditions of established research findings; and 2) examining outliers within a large-N population of cases can help to identify the variables responsible for general outcomes of interest in core cases when these are reversed in the case of the outlier (Tarrow, 2010, p. 235).

When similar patterns are observed in dissimilar environments—such as countries in different geographic regions with no shared history, like Russia and Indonesia—we become more persuaded that a particular phenomenon may indeed be generalizeable. Alternatively, when a factor that is viewed as a dominant explanatory variable in one set of cases—such as the importance of a middle class for democracy’s emergence in Western Europe—fails to adequately account for the emergence of democracy in another global region or time period, we become less convinced of its overall theoretical importance.

Tarrow also points out that paired comparisons allow for “dual process-tracing,” which “reduces the possibility that a supposed determining variable is as critical as it might seem from a single-case study alone” (2010, p. 244). Moreover, process tracing in two cases creates an intermediate step in theory building. For example, we cannot truly determine if a middle class is necessary for democracy unless we study cases in which there is no middle class. Similarly, we cannot test whether the particularly repressive and pervasive quality of the Soviet Union’s communist regime explains failed democratizations in former Soviet countries if we look only at post-communist cases and hold the communist legacy constant. Rather, we benefit from comparing post-Soviet cases to countries with a repressive authoritarian legacy that is non-communist. As Tarrow writes, “A productive use of paired comparison is as an intermediate step between a single-case study, which suggests a general relationship, and a multicase analysis that tests or refines a theory,” (2010, p. 245). Careful, theoretically-driven paired comparisons allow us to turn case-specific explanations into hypotheses for general theory-testing.

Expanding the set of cases from which we draw comparisons to countries from different regions allows us to test the implicit assumptions about the relationship between the slow-moving structures that are often viewed as fixed historical or regional causes and the agents...
viewed as responsible for the more proximate actions that set in motion political liberalization and democratic deepening. Explanations that center on a specific country’s or region’s exceptionalism frequently identify factors that might have been overlooked or underappreciated in other contexts. For example, Fish’s analysis of Russia’s failed democracy brought new evidence to bear on the pernicious effects of hydrocarbons and a concentration of power in the executive (Fish, 2005). As this study will seek to demonstrate, Indonesia’s success at building democracy has hinged on a robust associational and social life—factors identified by Alexis de Tocqueville almost two hundred years ago as essential to the success of American democracy, yet rarely discussed in contemporary debates on democratization. Cross-case analysis offers an opportunity to generate a new hypothesis, validate it with a cross-test case, and uncover causal mechanisms (George & Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007).

**Multi-level Research Design**

In demonstrating how engagement in civil society, feelings of political efficacy, and trust in institutions have contributed to patterns of political participation that subsequently influenced the survival of democracy in Russia and Indonesia, this dissertation draws on several levels of comparison and multiple data sources to maximize causal leverage. By framing democratization as a dynamic interaction between the masses and elites, this project necessarily recasts the question ‘what causes an authoritarian regime to democratize’ into the following query: how do citizens constrain elite actions to deepen democracy after initial elections? This is not a question that asks for the causes of a particular effect, but rather one that looks at the effects of a particular cause. What is the effect of political participation on democracy’s survival?

In answering this question, I engage four levels of analysis. The first and most macro-level is the cross-national comparison of two outlier cases, Russia and Indonesia. By comparing Russia and Indonesia at one particular point in time—more than a decade after political liberalization began in each country—I uncover several differences in indicators of mass political attitudes and behaviors between the two countries. Building on these cross-national findings, I employ a longitudinal study of variation within each country as a second level of analysis. By examining the same indicators used in the cross-national analysis over time, I am able to identify patterns in political attitudes and behaviors and democratic deepening in both Russia and Indonesia. The combination of longitudinal and cross-case analysis allows me to focus on several key variables that exhibit stability both across country cases and over time.

The third level of analysis involves sub-national comparisons within each country. Both Russia and Indonesia are large, multi-ethnic countries that cover a broad geographic expanse. Russia sits upon the largest land mass in the world—more than 17 million square kilometers that straddle two continents. Indonesia’s territory covers an area of over 17,000 islands (6,000 inhabited) that reaches over 5,000 kilometers from east to west and nearly 2,000 kilometers from north to south (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011). When we evaluate macro-level indicators for these countries, whether they measure socioeconomic development, political attitudes or behaviors, or the level of democracy, we must bear in mind that these indicators are actually aggregate summaries of outcomes that might vary considerably across the sub-national units of each country. In order to account for the diversity of experiences one might expect to find in Russia and Indonesia, I selected two provincial capitals in each country for closer analysis.¹⁴

¹⁴ The level of urbanization is significantly higher in Russia than in Indonesia. According to the CIA World Factbook, as of 2008, 52 percent of the Indonesian population was urban, compared to 73 percent of the Russian population. Both countries, however, are organized into provinces that are similarly structured. In both cases,
I used four criteria to select provincial capitals: size, geographic diversity, ethnic composition, and historically-important cleavages. In Russia, I aimed to pick one capital west and one east of the Urals Mountains. I also sought to select one city situated in a region with a sizeable non-Russian ethnic minority and one city with a predominantly Russian population. I selected Kazan and Krasnoyarsk. Kazan is the capital of the ethnic republic Tatarstan, which is located on the Volga River in European Russia.\footnote{Tatarstan has the second-largest population among all provinces in the Volga Federal District, registered at 3.8 million following the 2002 census. Only the population of Bashkortostan is higher.} The population of Kazan is split between ethnic Russians and ethnic Tatars. Tatards are a Turkic Muslim ethnic group and constitute the second largest ethnic group in Russia (3.8 percent according to the 2002 census). The city of Krasnoyarsk is the capital of Krasnoyarsk Krai, located in central Siberia. Krasnoyarsk Krai is the second largest region in Russia (comprising more than 2.3 million square kilometers) and is the most populated region within the Siberian Federal District.\footnote{Russian provinces are grouped into seven federal districts—Central, Northwest, Volga, South, Ural, Siberian, and Far East.} The demographic picture of Krasnoyarsk is similar to Russia as a whole, and the region is known among political analysts as the “Russian” New Hampshire—for most of post-Soviet Russia’s electoral history, the voting results in Krasnoyarsk have closely mirrored the national-level outcome.

In Indonesia, I sought one provincial capital on the island of Java and one on a different island. Additionally, I wanted one city from a region with a predominantly Javanese population and one with more ethnic heterogeneity. I selected Surabaya and Medan. Surabaya is the capital of East Java, the second most populated province in Indonesia and the region with the largest Javanese population. With a population of more than three million, Surabaya is also the second largest city in Indonesia (after Jakarta), and is the closest major metropolis to the country’s eastern islands. Medan is the capital of North Sumatra, the most populated province located on an island other than Java.\footnote{Sumatra is the second most populated island in Indonesia after Java.} The population of Medan is ethnically heterogeneous, including groups indigenous to the island of Sumatra, as well as migrants from other regions. The two largest ethnic groups are the predominantly Christian Batak\footnote{Following the Malay, the Batak are the second largest ethnic group in Indonesia that is not concentrated on the island of Java. It is the largest ethnic group that is predominantly Christian.} and the predominantly Muslim Javanese. Medan is known among Indonesian social scientists as a microcosm of Indonesia as a whole—encompassing the full range of diversity one sees across the country.

The sub-national level of analysis allows me to test hypotheses that relate to potentially meaningful ethnic, historical, and geographic factors while holding national-level factors constant. Sub-national analysis also provides me with an opportunity to examine whether cross-national patterns hold across different regions within the same country. I do not claim that the results of my analysis of two provincial capitals in each country can be generalized to apply to all regions in Russia and Indonesia. Yet, I believe that the purposive sampling of these four cities yields findings that provide a useful corrective on analyses that focus primarily on national capitals or national-level indicators.

My final and most micro level of analysis is the individual level. Ultimately, my examination of how political participation influences democratic deepening relies on the aggregation of individual-level attitudes and behaviors. Using both large-N surveys and medium-N interview samples, I look at how individual Indonesians and Russians have responded to
democratic transition and the factors that motivate the behaviors and attitudes that have further shaped democratic survival in each country. By building my analysis up from the individual level, I am able to determine whether the variation observed between Russian and Indonesian attitudes and behaviors is the consequence of fundamentally different processes or rather a difference in the total sum of particular factors that one finds more of in one country than the other.

Data: Public Opinion Surveys, Open-Ended Interviews, and Event History
The findings of this dissertation are based on the use of multiple methods and data sources, including analysis of key historical events, quantitative analysis of survey data, and qualitative analysis of interview data and archival material. The forthcoming chapters include scrutiny of indicators culled from several cross-national and national-level public opinion surveys in Russia and Indonesia. The surveys used in this project include the Survey of Soviet Values (1990), the World Values Survey (1991, 1995, 1999-2001, 2005-2008), the Russian Election Study (1995-1996, 1999-2000, 2003-2004), and the Asian Barometer Indonesian Survey (2005). In addition to using country-specific surveys to map within-country trends over time, the World Values Survey, which administered a similar questionnaire in both countries, allows me to compare attitudes and behaviors across these two countries. These data make it possible for me to establish correlations between mass attitudes and behaviors at certain points of time with the political debates and reforms of those periods.

I validate the trends observed in the survey data with original interview data I gathered in Russia and Indonesia in 2007-2009. The first population I examined was political and social elites. In each country I conducted approximately 70 open-ended interviews in Russian and Indonesian languages with scholars, analysts, journalists, representatives of political parties and representatives of mass voluntary organizations. I conducted elite interviews in Russia in 2008 in the cities of Moscow, Kazan, and Krasnoyarsk, and interviewed Indonesian elites in 2007 and 2009 in the cities of Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Medan. The purpose of these interviews was to help me evaluate the extent to which elites had deepened or rescinded democracy, as well as to gauge the elites’ sense of public support for democratic deepening.

The second population I investigated was voting-age citizens. I interviewed a quota sample of individuals in each country who corresponded to specific pre-determined demographic categories. In 2008, I interviewed 25 citizens in both Kazan and Krasnoyarsk (50 total) using a semi-structured questionnaire. I adapted the same semi-structured questionnaire to Indonesia and interviewed 25 individuals in both Surabaya and Medan in 2009 (50 total). These interviews provide me with invaluable information about political attitudes and behaviors. By asking

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19 The data files and documentation for the Survey of Soviet Values and the 1995-1996 Russian National Election Study are both available for download from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research digital files (available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/). The data files and documentation for the World Values Survey are available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. The Asian Barometer data were provided to me from the Asian Barometer Survey team upon request. Timothy Colton and Henry Hale generously provided the data files and documentation from the 1999-2000 and 2003-2004 Russian National Election Study.

20 My training in Russian language extends back to my undergraduate major in Russian and East European studies and several years living in Russia prior to this project. My training in Indonesian language began in graduate school and included intensive, in-country private lessons prior to embarking on my interviews.

21 While scholars of survey research have noted that quota samples are inferior to random sampling for establishing a group that is representative of the population, in the case of small samples, quota sampling is an appropriate tool for generating a group that captures a diverse cross-section of the population. For a sample size of 25, random sampling would not ensure that respondents from key demographic groups would be included.
extensive questions about individuals’ opinions and activities and how these have evolved and changed over time, I have been able to create a unique data set that chronicles the attitudinal and behavioral patterns of Indonesian and Russian citizens since political liberalization. These data have helped me to trace the mechanisms through which political participation contributes to democracy’s survival. More detailed information about the recruitment of citizen respondents and their demographic profiles can be found in the appendices to this chapter.

This project’s design and the use of multiple types of data provide many opportunities for analytical leverage. First, with the use of historical data and longitudinal surveys, I can analyze both democratization and political participation over time in each country. Second, the use of sub-national cases allows me to compare different hypotheses within a single country context. Lastly, the cross-national analysis allows me to consider which factors appear to apply to general theory versus those that may be nationally (or regionally) specific. The use of historical, survey, and qualitative interview data provide unique opportunities to triangulate information, thereby helping me to uncover causal mechanisms to explain how a society’s response to democratization at a particular moment can influence further regime development.

Overview of the Dissertation
The analysis of my findings will unfold over the following seven chapters. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the post-regime change political experiences in Russia and Indonesia. I show how treating democratization as a dynamic interaction between citizens and elites provides a fruitful basis for understanding variation in the level of democracy over time in both cases. Chapter 2 foreshadows the overall empirical arguments for each country that will be elaborated in subsequent chapters. I find that in Russia, the absence of a robust civil society impeded the expansion of political participation, thereby reducing the quality of public engagement, making it easier for elites to manipulate political institutions. Public demand for democracy in Russia has also been hampered by citizens’ low sense of efficacy, which has impeded participation and, together with low levels of trust in institutions, prevented Russia from constraining elites. In Indonesia, by contrast, strong civil society has helped generate meaningful civic and political activism and provided important constraints on potential elite abuse of power. Indonesians’ sense of efficacy and trust in new political institutions further contributed to their ongoing political participation, which facilitated democratic survival. Each of these factors—political participation, civil society, political efficacy, and trust in institutions will be analyzed in separate chapters.

Chapter 3 raises the possible negative and positive legacies Russia and Indonesia inherited from their previous regimes and analyzes which of these legacies carried forward. I argue that much of the contemporary debate about the relationship between legacies and democratization leads to an over-determination of the importance of historical factors without fully considering the mechanisms by which legacies are transmitted into the process of democratization. Additionally, there is a tendency among scholars to emphasize negative inheritances from an authoritarian system without consideration of possible positive legacies.

Chapter 4 analyzes political participation as the mechanism through which civil society, political efficacy, and trust in institutions contribute to democratic deepening. I suggest that rather than focusing on the overall volume of participation, there is much analytic leverage to be gained by looking more closely at forms of non-voting participation. In particular, I find that participation in party development work and acts of contentious politics—because it is more costly to citizens—facilitates democracy’s survival to a greater extent than does voting and
contacting public officials. Party development work enhances political competition and contentious political acts focus attention on elite actions, thereby providing a form of citizen oversight. While Indonesians and Russians on the whole engage in non-voting political acts at similar rates, the variation in the types of activities they engage in has yielded different regime-level outcomes. Indonesians are more involved in party development work and citizen oversight activities than Russians, who prefer to participate by contacting public officials. Through the paired comparison of participation in Russia and Indonesia, I find that whether a polity can vote elites out over time depends on holding them accountable to democratic institutions and norms between elections.

Chapter 5 revisits Alexis de Tocqueville’s concept of civil society and its relationship to democracy. I employ the civic voluntarism model of political participation advanced by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady in *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* to demonstrate how Indonesia’s high levels of social interaction and participation in civil society have fostered the transmission of meaningful civic skills—the capability to write letters, make presentations, mobilize supporters, and organize activities—to the population. These skills have subsequently been deployed to organize opposition in the forms of political parties and contentious politics. The absence of an analogous transfer of civic skills in Russia made it much harder for an expansion of political participation to take root in that country.

Chapter 6 analyzes the role of political efficacy. I find that political efficacy influences participation in both electoral and non-electoral forms of political and civic life. My argument about political efficacy is twofold. First, I argue that low levels of political efficacy deter participation in non-electoral forms of political life, including watchdog groups. It also contributes to cynicism about elections, thus depressing voter turnout and participation in political parties. Second, I argue that the experience of effectively removing an incumbent through the ballot box or otherwise influencing an elite transfer of power serves to reinforce individuals’ sense of efficacy in the early years of democratization. Indonesians’ sense of efficacy has been bolstered by the experiences of President Abdurrahman Wahid’s resignation under popular pressure in 2001 and incumbent President Megawati’s defeat in the first direct presidential election in 2004. In contrast, Russians have voted for the status quo in every post-Soviet presidential election, never unseating an incumbent. I find that Indonesians’ high levels of political efficacy have facilitated purposive participation in electoral and non-electoral forms of political and civic life, which have restrained elite abuses of power. This dynamic has allowed Indonesia to develop a practice of engaging in political participation to constrain elites and force them to compete in abidance with democratic institutions, thereby contributing to democracy’s survival. Russians’ low levels of efficacy have inhibited participation and made it easier for political elites to manipulate and roll back democratic institutions, thus contributing to democracy’s demise.

The role of trust in political institutions is analyzed in chapter 7. In order for nascent political institutions to develop legitimacy and become the primary mechanism for managing conflict, the population must both trust these institutions and use them. I argue that Indonesians’ high levels of trust, together with their willingness to seek solutions to their problems through formal institutions, have assisted democratization by legitimizing nascent political institutions, thereby making it harder for elites to roll back democratic gains. In contrast, low levels of trust in political institutions in Russia inhibited the development of the democratizing regime’s legitimacy. For this reason, Russian governing elites were able to slowly dismember democratic institutions without encountering public resistance.
Chapter 8 summarizes the empirical findings of the Russian and Indonesian cases, showing that engagement in civil society, a sense of efficacy, and trust in institutions allowed Indonesia to overcome perceived structural disadvantages for democratization by fostering political participation that successfully constrained elites. Meanwhile, Russia’s inability to activate the individual-level attributes that are favorable to democratization contributed to its return to authoritarianism. In this conclusion I consider which factors might explain such diverging levels of engagement in civil society in Russia and Indonesia.

Conclusion
The contribution this dissertation makes to the study of democratization is to identify an important set of “causers” and demonstrate how they activate the macro-structural factors we have traditionally viewed as the forces behind democratization. The approach I propose here is agent-centric. It puts actors—elites, citizens, and organizations—at the center of the story.

The post-transition trajectories of Russia and Indonesia call for such an approach. These outliers defy our expectations of the standard factors that account for regime type in most instances. Indonesia is an example of democratic survival amidst scarcity, while Russia provides an illustration of democratic failure amidst wealth. This dissertation does not scrutinize the relative importance of socioeconomic development, a history of independent statehood (or colonialism or communism), the repressiveness of the antecedent regime, or other macro-structural variables hypothesized to be at the heart of democratization. These factors have not proven decisive in the trajectories taken by Russia or Indonesia, or in explaining how these two cases diverge from the rest of the world. It is for this reason that one must look elsewhere to explain Russia’s and Indonesia’s deviation from the norm.

My dissertation breaks new ground in the following four ways. First, I offer a new approach to democratic survival as the product of successfully constraining elite actions. This approach can push forward our thinking about both successful and failed cases of democratic transition. Second, I re-focus our attention on the microfoundations that shape the process of democratic survival rather than examining the macro-level structural variables that dominate democratization discussions in the literature. Third, I investigate a specific time period in democratization—the period after a democratic transition has taken place. My analysis of this particular period identifies the crucial roles played by elite and citizen actors once new democratic institutions are in place, demonstrating that considerable room for variation exists in this stage of democratization. Lastly, I provide a rich, thorough account of the unexpected regime trajectories taken by two of the largest countries in the world.

This project focuses on the role of mechanisms—how the work of democratic survival is accomplished, who carries out that work, and which factors facilitate it. Yet, my approach also provides room to consider the structures and historical contingencies that are hypothesized to influence democratization, such as the timing of crises (economic collapse, war, natural disaster) that create particular challenges to governing. I emphasize how specific agents activate perceived structural advantages and obstacles to deepen or stymie democracy.

I believe that conceiving of democratization as a dynamic interaction between citizens and elites helps us to develop a more precise understanding of the process of democratic survival after an initial democratic transition. By developing a clearer understanding of how macro-structural variables connect to the specific agents that make the ultimate decisions to deepen or rescind democracy, we may learn whether these structural variables are indeed necessary conditions for building democracy. Perhaps these perceived “causes” of democracy are
themselves important only because they tend to foster a separate set of intermediary conditions—conditions that might be able to obtain even in the absence of certain macro-level factors.

Through a close tracing of attitudes and behaviors in two democratization outliers—Russia and Indonesia—this project develops a theory about the crucial role of mass-level participation in the early years following political liberalization to ensure that elites are compelled to continue to deliver democracy. Without citizen constraint on elite action through mass non-voting political participation, political leaders can more easily roll back democratic gains. Ultimately, elite decisions are the most proximate cause of authoritarian backsliding. Over the course of the next several chapters, however, I will examine the ways in which citizen action shapes the constraints elites face in making these decisions.
Chapter 2: Extending Democratization Theory

Extending Democratization Theory: The Cases of Russia and Indonesia

Authoritarian governments of different stripes have ruled Russia and Indonesia for most of their histories. Russia was governed by dynastic monarchies for over a millennium before revolutions ushered in a Communist regime that lasted more than 70 years. The territory comprising contemporary Indonesia has been governed by several kingdoms, Dutch colonial rulers, and post-independent modern authoritarian regimes. While both of these countries can point to specific experiences of democracy in small, village-level settings, their national-level encounters with democratic governance were sporadic before the 1990s. Yet both countries embarked on transitions to democracy. They successfully liberalized political institutions, strengthened civil liberties, and held fair and free elections. Opportunities for continuing along a democratic path existed in both countries. Nevertheless, democracy survived in Indonesia while it failed in Russia.

This chapter will examine the post-transition political trajectories in Russia and Indonesia in closer detail. I look at the specific policies, actions, and inactions that collectively determine the level of political openness, or degree of democracy, in each of these countries. In particular, I focus attention on whether the mass public, through their attitudes or behaviors, could have operated as a constraint on elite action. While most studies of democratization look at the interplay between elites during moments of decision-making, I aim to consider the dynamic interaction between masses and elites. It is not my goal to scrutinize every decision in the transition and post-transition period. Such a mammoth undertaking would be a separate study unto itself. Rather, my objective is to measure the pulse of the public at key democratization inflection points to understand if real or threatened mass participation presented a meaningful constraint on elite action. I find that while mass attitudes and behaviors played a role in the collapse of both the Soviet and New Order regimes, the constraint these attitudes and behaviors played in Russia and Indonesia diverged considerably once democratic transitions had been completed. Indonesians have continued to express strong support for democratic procedures and norms, through large-scale political participation, including ongoing acts of contentious politics. Russians, in contrast, have not sought to defend democratic institutions from elite manipulation. Over time, Russian leaders reversed the country’s democratization gains without public interference.

This chapter will be divided into five parts. First, I will briefly discuss how mass political attitudes and behavior can constrain political leaders, particularly during periods of political transformation. In the second section, I will provide an overview of the authoritarian political periods in Russia and Indonesia and the events that led to the collapse of authoritarianism in these countries. This section will be followed by an analysis of the transitions to democracy that took place in each country. In the final two sections I will look specifically at the subsequent divergence in regime trajectories that led to a rollback of democracy in Russia and democratic deepening in Indonesia.

MASS POLITICS AS A CONSTRAINT ON ELITE ACTIONS

The Parameters of Democracy

Before examining the relationship between elites and masses in Russia and Indonesia, it is helpful to revisit the concept of democracy employed in this study. As discussed in chapter 1,
this project defines democracy as the procedures that ensure competition for leadership positions through free, fair, and frequent elections, and the assurance of open debate about candidates and policies through freedoms of speech, media, and association. This definition can be disaggregated along two dimensions: 1) the institutions guaranteeing that access to political power is determined by free elections; and 2) the civil liberties ensuring equality of access to these institutions. Democracy is a form of political regime. Democracy is not analogous with good governance, the equality of outcomes, widespread socioeconomic prosperity, or even majority rule. As Schmitter and Karl note, democracies are not necessarily more efficient; they are not likely to appear more orderly or stable than the autocracies that previously governed a country; and they do not necessarily have more open economies (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). While popular conceptions of democracy in Indonesia, Russia, and other parts of the world might infuse any of these above characteristics together with political openness, the measure of democracy employed here does not.

It is important to distinguish between the presence of procedural democracy and good governance, in particular. The presence and survival of democracy in Indonesia is a separate issue from the quality of governance in the country. In stating that Indonesia has achieved a democratic transition and that its democracy has survived, I am making no claims about the quality of governance in Indonesia or about how Indonesian political leaders have performed under democracy. The same is true of Russia. Most close observers would agree that the highpoint of political openness in post-Soviet Russia took place in the early-mid 1990s, a period when the Russian state was at its weakest and the quality of government policy was extremely low. The presence of democracy and the quality of governance are two separate issues. This dissertation is concerned with the former, not the latter.

*Constraining Elites*

As described in chapter 1, elite decisions mark the final step in a causal chain of events that liberalize or restrict political action. The elites who make these decisions find themselves in positions of political authority, which inherently provides them with resources for exercising leadership. Breslauer defines leadership as “a process of stretching social constraints in the pursuit of social goals” (2002, p. 1). Elites’ resources include the instruments of formal authority, allies within and outside the relevant political structure, and favorable public opinion. Constraints on political elites can be formal, deriving from an institutional configuration, or informal, originating from public expectations. Both formal and informal constraints can play a role in the context of democratization.

Within comparative politics, elite behavior is largely viewed as derivative of the political institutions that structure and limit action. Institutions structure behavior in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. The institutions of democracy are generally thought to constrain elites by limiting their power, thereby preventing despotism. Yet, institutions serve a role in authoritarian regimes as well. Leaders of authoritarian regimes rarely rely exclusively on their own personal charisma for legitimacy—they derive some authority from constitutions and legal bases that facilitate monocracy. It is logical to expect officeholders of all stripes to seek a way to maximize their power, and thus push the institutional limits that exist. Authoritarians are generally able to do this with little resistance from the public. The nature of democracy, however, which combines certainty in the rules for accessing power with the uncertainty of outcomes, generally curbs the extent to which elites can manipulate institutions to suit their short-term interests.
The formal constraints that institutions provide on elite behavior are relatively straightforward and clear. The informal constraints, which generally come from the mass public, are harder to foresee and can vary in meaningful ways. Nevertheless, no political leader makes a decision that is fully independent of considerations of mass opinion. Elites expect that their decisions will be met with public support, criticism, or indifference, and the anticipated reaction acts as a form of constraint. While most decisions a political leader makes on a given day are likely met with indifference, several high-stakes decisions may indeed provoke meaningful support or criticism. As Heifetz points out, “Authority is a constraint because it is contingent on meeting the expectations of constituents. Deviating from those expectations is perilous” (1994, p. 88). The constraint of public expectations is particularly tricky for political elites, because these expectations can be both difficult to gauge and change rapidly as events unfold.

Decisions involving political transformation can have a potentially dramatic impact on the structure of politics and societies, and most political elites carefully consider how the mass public might react when deliberating these decisions. Writing about the specific context of democratic transitions, Shapiro notes that, “Elites who negotiate transitions are thus subject to constraints that arise both out of the negotiations and out of their relations with their own grassroots constituencies” (1996, pp. 187). In the context of democratization, both formal and informal constraints shape how elites will behave when in office. Moreover, the same citizen attitudes and behavior that constrain sitting incumbents can also serve as a resource for the political opposition.

For democracy to survive over time, citizens must mount a credible threat against leaders who do not adhere to democratic rules and practices. The mass public can communicate credible threats to political leaders in several ways, including supporting opposition parties and engaging in acts of contentious politics, as well as demanding adherence to the rules of democracy over the outcomes of governance. For elites to be constrained by their constituents, they must believe that deviating from citizens’ expressed preferences will be met with disapproval. As this chapter will show, Russian citizens have rarely attempted to constrain post-Soviet elites who rolled back democratic gains. In contrast, Indonesian mass behavior has limited the scope of acceptable actions that political elites could take and remain viable contenders for office.

FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION

Russia: Communism and the Soviet Union (1917-1985)

Russia’s inclusion in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which emerged in 1922 following the 1917 Russian revolutions and the Bolshevik victory in the Russian civil war, characterized its authoritarian rule in the 20th century. Officially, political power was in the hands of councils, or soviets. In practice, however, the soviets came under the control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which developed into an extensive bureaucracy that penetrated all aspects of life. Other organizations that developed following the revolution, such as trade unions, cooperatives, and other groups, were subordinated to party control. The CPSU was intolerant of old institutions and rival political parties, all of which were eliminated by the secret security forces.1 All independent spheres of economic activity were brought under

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1 The Cheka was established in 1917, and renamed the State Political Directorate (GPU) of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) in 1922. The NKVD served as the primary secret security force throughout Stalin’s rule. After Stalin’s death in 1953, the forces were further reorganized, and the Committee for State Security (KGB) emerged as the primary secret state security force until the collapse of the Soviet Union.
state control. Atheism was part of official party doctrine, which led to the confiscation of church property and the persecution of religious leaders. By the 1930s, the CPSU had succeeded in penetrating every aspect of Soviet life, including employment, education, and culture.

Like most authoritarian regimes, the Soviet Union was marked by a strong disjuncture between a broad set of political and civic rights guaranteed in theory, and their narrow implementation in practice. In theory, the 1,500-member Supreme Soviet was the highest governing body for most of Soviet history. Elections to the Supreme Soviet were held every four or five years. Yet, only a single CPSU-approved candidate would run in each district, and the Supreme Soviet convened only twice per year. Therefore, these legislators lacked any real power, but rather were called upon to ceremoniously approve legislation. A similar structure was in place for regional and local soviets, where membership was determined by uncontested elections among CPSU-approved candidates.

Although the Supreme Soviet and local soviets constituted the official political structure, the CPSU was the only party legally allowed to participate in Soviet politics and therefore determined the composition of all legislatures. CPSU hegemony meant that genuine political power was concentrated in internal party organs. The top authority of the CPSU was the Central Committee, which in turn voted for a Politburo, Secretariat, and General Secretary. The General Secretary of the Communist Party, in effect, was the highest political office in the USSR. The Supreme Soviet, which would meet for a brief annual session, essentially served as a rubber-stamp legislature for the Politburo’s decisions.

The balance of power between the CPSU and soviets varied over Soviet history. Over time authority moved further and further away from the soviets and became more concentrated in the Communist Party. The CPSU had reached the peak of its power under Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982). By the end of Brezhnev’s tenure as the General Secretary, the USSR bureaucracy had ballooned to include 160 all-Union ministries, and no state organizations were free from its control (Marples, 2011, p. 231). The Supreme Soviet had become a mostly symbolic institution (Marples, 2011).

The Soviet regime relied on coercion to ensure popular compliance. The CPSU, the army, and the secret security forces (KGB) were the main instruments of this coercion. Their primacy inhibited the development of any internal opposition in Russia. While repression decreased considerably after Stalin’s death in 1953, it remained a constant presence in Soviet life. Secret security services were active throughout Soviet history, and the regime was not afraid to resort to violence when it perceived internal threats. Most coercion, however, was subtle and related to individuals’ access to scarce and coveted resources, such as housing, educational opportunities, and desirable jobs. People who participated in CPSU politics had a much better chance to access these scarce resources. Consequently, mass participation in the Communist Party increased throughout the Soviet period.

The level of repression varied throughout Soviet history. The most repressive period occurred under the tenure of Josef Stalin, who ruled the Soviet Union from 1924 until his death in 1953. Under Stalin’s leadership, the Soviet Union transformed from an authoritarian to a totalitarian regime. A series of harsh state corrective labor camps, commonly known by their Russian acronym, *Gulag*, expanded across the country, populated by real and imagined enemies who provided cheap labor for Soviet industrialization and modernization projects. Starting in the late 1920s, purges of perceived internal enemies began. Stalin’s purges peaked in the second half of the 1930s, when peasants, old Bolshevik leaders, members of the military, and border populations were persecuted en masse. The terror subsided by the end of the 1930s and paused
during World War II. The number of victims who were killed under Stalin continues to be debated, but Soviet records attest to about 3 million registered deaths (Wheateroff, 1999).

Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev presided over a period of de-Stalinization known commonly as the “thaw.” Prisoners were released from the Gulag and victims of Stalin’s wartime deportations were allowed to return home. A greater degree of tolerance was permitted in arts, culture, and entertainment. While civil liberties undoubtedly improved under Khrushchev, political rights were still strictly repressed. In response to de-Stalinization and a relaxation in some areas of control, an underground dissident movement developed the 1960s and 1970s, but failed to take on any meaningful organizational forms. Protests erupted in parts of the Soviet Union, and were quieted with violence. The Soviet regime regularly repressed dissidents, often sentencing them to long prison terms, committing them to psychiatric hospitals, placing them under internal exile, or even deporting them.

The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev and the politics that resulted in the Soviet liberalization policies of glasnost’ (opening) and perestroika (reconstruction) have been analyzed extensively elsewhere (Breslauer, 2002; Dallin & Lapidus, 1995; McAuley, 1992; Melville & Lapidus, 1990; Remington, 1989) and do not require extensive discussion here. The relevant points for the purpose of this dissertation is that glasnost’ and perestroika constituted a significant step in political liberalization in the authoritarian Soviet Union, which ultimately paved the way for Russia’s democratic transition. Glasnost’ was introduced in 1986 in an effort to stimulate constructive policy debates about how best to reform the ailing aspects of the Soviet system. While the CPSU still controlled how much “openness” society would see in the media, substantial freedom of speech spread through the intelligentsia and organized elements of society. As a result, topics such as civil and political freedoms, the separation of powers, and discriminatory policies soon became part of genuine political debate.

Perestroika involved a restructuring of the Soviet economic and political systems, including democratization (demokratisatsiya). At a Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in January 1987, Gorbachev called for multi-candidate elections for posts within the party and for local soviets, which began in parts of the country by summer. During the Nineteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1988, Gorbachev pushed for dramatic, union-wide democratization reforms. He proposed the formation of a partially elected Congress of People’s Deputies, which would in turn elect the members of the Supreme Soviet from among its own members. The Supreme Soviet would become the permanent legislature that would govern when the full Congress was not in session. The CPSU agreed to hold competitive elections for the Congress of People’s Deputies within the following year. The Congress of People’s Deputies would serve as a serious legislature empowered with genuine political authority. The Conference took other measures to move political power from the hands of the CPSU into the hands of the state more directly. For example, a new position of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet was created as a state-level—as opposed to party-level—parliamentary speaker.

The Congress of People’s Deputies elections were held on March 26, 1989. One-third of all seats were reserved for candidates from “public organizations,” but a majority of the remaining two-thirds of the seats had two or more candidates contesting them. Among the 1,500 electoral districts, 399 had only one candidate on the ballot (Reddaway, 2010).
unopposed, he could still lose if more than 50 percent of the electorate voted against him. While not fully democratic, these elections offered voters genuine choice for the first time in Soviet history. The population seized on this opportunity to express their frustration with Soviet governance. In the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), one-sixth of those who voted chose to vote against all candidates on the ballot, while in Ukraine the number was almost one-quarter (Reddaway, 2010, p. 167).

Although members of the CPSU won about 88 percent of the seats in the Congress, the new deputies represented dramatically different views from within the party. For example, Boris Yeltsin—who had been removed from his position as Moscow party chief in 1987 for being too critical of the Politburo—won a seat in Moscow with 90 percent of the vote, running against a candidate who had the backing of the party apparatus (Brown, 2010). Not all elected deputies came from the CPSU, however. For example, “Popular Front” groups that had been allowed to develop outside of the CPSU as a way to mobilize broader support for perestroika fielded candidates, winning three-quarters of the seats in the Baltic states (Reddaway, 2010, p. 164).

The Congress provided a new forum to articulate grievances that did not have an outlet before, such as nationalist demands on the part of some union republics. In May, the initial session of the Congress was broadcast live for two weeks on television and radio, exposing the public to genuine political debates for the first time. A record 200 hundred million viewers from across the Soviet Union tuned in to watch (Miller, n.d.).

The opening of public debate to competing viewpoints raised political elites’ interest in public opinion. Brown argues that aside from contested elections, “nothing was more important for democratization than the publication of research on public opinion,” carried out by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), which was established in 1988 (Brown, 2010, p. 141). Political discourse in the Soviet Union was changed in fundamental ways once people could contrast the views expressed in surveys against statements made by the political elite. Public opinion polls subsequently became “part of the pressure from below” that pushed Soviet leaders to undertake greater steps toward democratization (Brown, 2010, p. 141). As Reddaway describes, the Kremlin lost control of its political liberalization reforms because these reforms had released popular discontent that was more widespread than the Soviet leadership had realized (2010, p. 154). Indeed, in an analysis of available public opinion surveys over the course of Soviet history, Bahry found that by the early 1980s, most people supported political liberalization (1993, p. 554).

These attitudes were expressed in behavior as well. As Fish (1995) describes, popular involvement in political life outside of the CPSU took off dramatically in 1989. In 1988, there was a surge of “informal” (неформальнь̆̆) groups, whose activities were not limited to discussion, but also began to include street demonstrations. By 1989, these groups evolved into more serious political actors who supported non-CPSU candidates in the March 1989 elections. Workers also became more openly confrontational with the regime, and in summer 1989 large-scale strikes erupted among coal miners in western Siberia, the far north, and eastern Ukraine. Eventually, almost 500,000 miners went on strike (Marples, 2011, p. 283).

Popular unrest also took on more sophisticated organizational forms. Between the March 1989 elections for the Congress of People’s Deputies and the March 1990 elections for republican, regional, and local councils, linkages between informal groups, as well as between

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3 For example, Yuriy Solovyov, the first secretary of the Leningrad regional party committee, was not elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies under these circumstances, leading to his removal from local and national Communist Party leadership (Brown, 2010, p. 144).
groups and reform factions in the Congress of People’s Deputies, became stronger. As opposition to the CPSU began to coalesce into more organized forms, it was able to mobilize public disaffection, often in the form of mass demonstrations. For example, hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated in Moscow in January and February 1990, which successfully forced the CPSU Central Committee to yield to the opposition’s demand that Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution be amended to end the CPSU’s monopoly on political power (Reddaway, 2010, p. 170). The amendment essentially permitted the formation of alternate parties.

Throughout the Soviet Union, support for Gorbachev and his reform agenda declined while support for populist leaders and their calls for sovereignty increased. Soon after the decision to amend Article 6, the Supreme Soviet sanctioned the establishment of a Soviet presidency, which would be elected by the Congress of People’s Deputies. The Soviet president would be head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but otherwise have less authority than the General Secretary. Gorbachev ran unopposed for this position, but a sizeable minority voted against him, and the delegates from the Baltic republics boycotted the procedure altogether.

Gorbachev responded to the increasing strength of pro-democracy and pro-sovereignty politics by tightening the reigns of control. In January 1991, Gorbachev received several special decree powers from the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. Political reporting became more cautious and several independent publications were shut down. Central government troops forcefully took control of the TV station in Vilnius, Lithuania. The public reacted negatively to these moves, and pro-democratic public demonstrations took place in many Russian cities.

In a forthcoming book, Brady and Kaplan analyze a large volume of VTsIOM and event data to demonstrate that Gorbachev enjoyed high support for perestroika early on, but as the country’s economy deteriorated, public support for perestroika declined, leading to a drop in public approval for Gorbachev. Meanwhile, liberal democratic reformers and conservative Russian nationalists tapped into public frustration with perestroika, and rallied around Yeltsin, significantly increasing his popularity. Within the context of the Congress of People’s Deputies, Yeltsin succeeded in articulating a vision of Russian interests as distinct from those of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin used his broad-based and diverse popular support to push for the adoption of Russian sovereignty from the Soviet Union in June 1990, which emboldened other Soviet republics to follow suit. After the failed coup attempt to re-establish central control in Moscow in August 1991, Soviet republics began to proclaim independence. The Soviet Union was officially dissolved on December 25, 1991.

Indonesia: Democracy, Guided Democracy, and the New Order (1945-1992)
Indonesia declared independence from the Netherlands on August 17, 1945, two days after Japan surrendered in the Pacific. The following day, the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP) proclaimed Sukarno the country’s first president. A four-year struggle ensued before the Dutch officially recognized Indonesia’s independence. Indonesia introduced a parliamentary system of government in 1950, with elections finally held in 1955. The pro-Sukarno Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) won the largest vote share in the 1955 elections (22 percent), followed by the Islamic Masyumi party (21 percent), the Islamic Nahdlatul Ulama (18 percent), and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) (16 percent). The remainder of the vote went to twenty-four

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4 Earlier versions of Brady and Kaplan’s analysis can be found in Brady and Kaplan (2007) and Brady and Kaplan (2008).
other parties who each held one to eight seats in the parliament. This diffuse distribution of power resulted in weak governing coalitions and considerable political infighting.

Indonesia’s brief experience with democracy was cut short in February 1957 when President Sukarno declared his policy of “guided democracy” (demokrasi terpimpin), in which the government would be guided by a blend of nationalism, religion, and communism, known popularly by its Indonesian acronym NasAKom. He declared martial law a month later, and in 1959 he dissolved the parliament and set up an appointed legislature and advisory council. In implementing guided democracy—essentially an authoritarian system with a strong executive—Sukarno relied on the PKI and its widespread grassroots support for some issues, and on the military and its coercive power for others. By 1963 the military became increasingly concerned that Sukarno was leaning too heavily to the left, and that these maneuvers, together with Indonesia’s rapidly deteriorating economic situation, made the country vulnerable to a Communist takeover.

On September 30, 1965 six senior army generals were assassinated in an apparent conspiracy to stage a coup. In the immediate hours after the coup attempt, General Suharto mobilized forces under his command and took control of Jakarta. Ultimately, Sukarno was forced to transfer most political and military powers to Suharto, who was named acting president in March 1967. Suharto’s New Order government blamed the PKI for the coup attempt. From 1965 to 1967, the government engaged in widespread repression of PKI members and alleged sympathizers, resulting in the death of more than half a million people. Another 100,000 alleged Communists were imprisoned for more than a decade. They did not have their political and civil rights restored until 2004, after Indonesia’s transition to democracy.

After Suharto was formally elected to the presidency in an unopposed election in 1968, he consolidated control over the country and further curtailed political rights and civil liberties. In exercising political and coercive power, Suharto relied on the military and his new political vehicle—the “functional groups” of civil servants, laborers, and other constituents more commonly known by their Indonesian acronym, Golkar. Suharto stressed that Golkar was not a political party, and therefore not subject to the laws and regulations that dramatically restricted the activities of other parties. In the heavily controlled elections of 1971, Golkar took nearly 63 percent of the vote. In 1973 Suharto forced Indonesia’s remaining political parties to merge into two large parties that represented nationalism and Islamism, the primary ideological alignments that remained after the decimation of communism. The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) was a fusion of three nationalist and two Christian parties, the largest of which was PNI. Four Islamic parties were forced together into the United Development Party (PPP).

Legislative elections were held every five years from 1971 to 1997, and Golkar never won less than 62 percent of the vote (Liddle, 2007). A few months after each legislative election, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which was comprised of both elected deputies and those appointed by the government and military, would elect the president and vice president in a contest in which Suharto was the only candidate. Under New Order, Golkar election campaigns had the outright support of all state agencies and the military. Most civil servants were required to sign an oath of loyalty to Golkar, preventing these individuals from voting with a free conscience. Additionally, Golkar’s status as “functional groups” allowed it to have a presence down to village and neighborhood levels, thereby penetrating Indonesian life in a way that was impossible for PDI or PPP.

A combination of threats, intimidation, and accommodation prevented the PDI or the PPP from ever becoming credible threats to Golkar dominance. They acted, at best, as semi-
opposition to the government, constrained by laws that restricted their ability to freely mobilize or promote party interests. At worst, however, these parties were tokens meant to create a façade of democracy. Government intervention in intra-party affairs was expected and continuous. For example, parties were largely dependent on government funding, candidates at all levels were screened by the government, and military officials regularly attended important party functions (Aspinall, 2005, pp. 146-147). Moreover, Suharto’s New Order perpetuated the position endorsed by Sukarno that political opposition was conceptually foreign to Indonesians, who expected harmonious and civil forms of consensus for decision making, what is regularly termed “Pancasila democracy.” In practice, however, professed adherence to harmony and consensus easily masked repression, fear, and coercion.

Suharto’s primary tool for coercion and repression was Indonesia’s armed forces, which adopted a policy of *dwifungsi*, or “twin functions.” The *dwifungsi* doctrine gave the military the responsibility to protect Indonesians against both external threats or aggression and perceived domestic threats to the country’s national security. The military’s territorial commands, which spread across the archipelago from the time of the revolution, provided the New Order regime with ongoing surveillance of the civilian bureaucracy and citizens in the provinces. The *dwifungsi* doctrine also allowed Suharto to create a variety of military institutions that were empowered to act as internal security forces, such as the Kopkamtib, which was not dissimilar to the Soviet KGB.

Together, Golkar and the military were effective at ensuring Suharto’s dominance over the New Order regime. In spite of the presence of multiple parties and the appearance of legislative and presidential elections, all political power was concentrated in Suharto’s hands. The public had no meaningful recourse to constrain Suharto or influence his decisions. Political parties and other mass organizations were either banned, co-opted by the state, or under close surveillance. In many areas of non-political social and civic life, the regime only permitted one association and forced this association to affiliate with Golkar. Liddle (2007) describes this attempt at regime control over social organization as similar in style to the Soviet Union. For example, only one labor union (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, SPSI) was permitted under New Order. The press was monitored closely and regularly sanctioned, fostering a culture of self-censorship as well as regular pressure by government officials to not publish certain stories. Individuals who chose to act in defiance of the regime were violently repressed. Throughout the 1970s through the 1990s, it was not uncommon for students, Muslims, and other dissidents to be arrested and jailed for extensive periods of time.


A curious historical parallel between the late authoritarian periods in the Soviet in New Order regimes can be traced back to 1989, when the outgoing U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, Paul Wolfowitz, called for greater openness in Indonesia’s political sphere. His farewell remarks inspired a debate about *keterbukaan*—“openness” in Indonesian—which newspapers and academics likened directly to Soviet *glasnost’* (Emmerson, 1991; Pereira, 1998; Schwarz, 1997; Uhlin, 1997). Curiously, the military faction of the legislature was the first to respond to the call

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5 Pancasila is the official ideology of the Indonesian state. Derived of two Sanskrit words “panca,” meaning five, and “sila,” meaning principles, Pancasila comprises five core ideological principles: 1) belief in one and only god; 2) a just and civilized humanity; 3) the unity of Indonesia; 4) democracy guided by the wisdom born of consultation, deliberation, and representation; and 5) social justice. “Pancasila democracy” often emphasizes the fourth principle and its focus on the need to reach consensus in making decisions.
of *keterbukaan*. It began to discuss possible political reforms and encouraged the press to report on topics considered controversial.

Suharto’s reaction to the military faction’s call for openness was twofold. He made veiled threats against challengers while simultaneously endorsing debate in an attempt to control it. There was some loosening of restrictions in the press, but Suharto’s primary response was to try and strengthen his alliances within the Islamic community as a counterweight to relying on the military (Aspinall, 2005, pp. 37-42). In response to the modest liberalization that accompanied *keterbukaan*, societal groups—especially students, farmers, and underground dissidents—began to test the boundaries of the regime’s tolerance for accommodation and dissent. When early protest attempts were not violently suppressed, citizens became more emboldened to engage openly in acts of contentious politics, which increased dramatically in the 1990s, further fanning elite conflicts within the regime.

In hindsight, the slow unraveling of Suharto’s New Order can be traced to 1993 when Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of the late President Sukarno, became the new chair of PDI. Megawati was an unassuming two-term member of the Indonesian House of Representatives, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), and her ascension to the leadership of PDI was an unprecedented, open act of defiance against Suharto, who had tried unsuccessfully to block her selection within the party. Megawati had emerged as an important symbol for pro-reform factions within the PDI in the late 1980s, attracting large crowds of grassroots supporters. There was tremendous public support for Megawati to ascend to the party’s leadership, owing largely to the symbolism she held for Indonesians as the daughter of their revolutionary hero. In describing the 1993 PDI party congress that was called to select a new leader, Aspinall writes:

> Crowds lined the streets when she [Megawati] arrived in town. Hundreds of enthusiastic supporters surrounded the conference site and demonstrated, prayed, ate, and slept on the streets outside. Whenever Megawati entered the hall where the congress was being held, or rose to speak, she was mobbed; whenever her party opponents tried to obstruct proceedings, they were jeered. (2005, pp. 145-146)

Megawati’s election to the chair of the PDI cannot be attributed to a softening of New Order intervention in party politics or a split within the military. Rather, a groundswell of grassroots support for Megawati, as well as supporters’ refusal to cave to standard forms of intimidation, created a fissure in the government’s apparatus for control (Aspinall, 2005).

Immediately after Megawati’s rise to the PDI leadership, Suharto loyalists began attacking her from all sides, preventing her from consolidating control over party structures and essentially paralyzing the party’s activity. Recognizing that the election of Megawati as chair of PDI in 1993 had exposed cracks in the New Order’s foundation, a wave of further repression ensued, including a government ban on the three largest weekly publications, *Tempo*, *DeTik*, and *Editor*.

The regime’s repressive tactics, together with Megawati’s personal popularity, galvanized opposition forces that generally remained outside of the non-competitive party system to coalesce around the PDI as a possible pro-democracy vehicle. While everyone understood that a combination of pressure on voters, manipulation of results, and the large number of appointed members of the MPR would prevent Megawati from mounting a credible campaign to unseat Suharto in the 1997 presidential election, the possibility that Suharto might have to face a contested election threatened to undermine the regime’s legitimacy. In response,

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6 For a detailed analysis of the tactics used to undermine Megawati’s leadership in 1994-1996, see Aspinall (2005), chapter 6.
Suharto resorted to openly crude tactics of suppression. His supporters called for an extraordinary PDI congress in Medan in June 1996 in which only pro-Suharto delegates were allowed to attend. Before and throughout the congress, mass demonstrations took place in almost all of the large towns and cities on the islands of Java, Bali, and Sumatra, as well as in other parts of the archipelago, condemning government intervention in PDI’s internal affairs (Aspinall, 2005).

At the congress, Megawati was removed as the party’s leader. Afterwards, it proved impossible to reconcile the two camps in PDI. Pro-Megawati supporters refused to leave PDI headquarters in Jakarta, while a free speech platform outside of the building became the site of demonstrations of support for Megawati and speeches criticizing the government. On July 27, 1996 several thousand uniformed police officers, soldiers, and thugs forcibly took control of the PDI headquarters. Widespread rioting broke out across the city, spawning further riots across Java over the next several months. Amidst this turmoil, in May 1997 Indonesia held its regular DPR elections, from which Golkar emerged with 75 percent of the vote. The campaign was arguably the most destructive in Indonesian history, with campaign rallies devolving into riots between PPP supporters and Golkar, or between pro-Megawati PDI supporters and the official PDI camp (Bird, 1998).

During this period, Indonesia’s economy teetered on the brink of collapse. By 1997, Indonesian companies had amassed $80 billion in foreign debt. The Asian financial crisis led to a dramatic weakening of the Indonesian rupiah, which experienced the largest devaluation in the world in 1997 (Bird, 1998). The Indonesian stock market plunged and inflation reached double digits. Consequently, hundreds of small factories were closed, workers lost jobs, and food prices soared. In order to prevent a major private sector debt default, in October 1997 Suharto agreed to a $43 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in return for a variety of liberalization reforms, the brunt of which were felt by poor and working class Indonesians (Pepinsky, 2009).

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

Russia: 1990-1993

Russia’s transition to democracy began while Russia was part of the Soviet Union. Russia held its first popular elections for the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian SFSR in March 1990. The 1990 republican legislative elections were freer than the Soviet Congress elections of the previous year. In the lead up to the elections, mass demonstrations were held in Moscow and other large Russian cities, largely without incident. Yeltsin was elected to the Russian Congress and became speaker of the newly-formed Russian Supreme Soviet. Under Yeltsin’s leadership, the Russian parliament became increasingly assertive. In June 1990 it adopted a declaration of sovereignty which stated that Russian parliamentary decisions superseded those of the Soviet Union as a whole. Related legislation placed natural resources, foreign trade, and budgetary control under Russian jurisdiction as well. While this legislation did not directly challenge the existence of the Soviet Union, it essentially transferred the USSR’s main levers of power from the union to the republican level, stripping the Union of significant political and economic authority.

Soon after the republican elections, a Democratic Russia group emerged in the legislature, and shortly thereafter a Democratic Russia Movement (DRM) evolved as an umbrella organization uniting various grassroots democratic voting associations and other
informal political organizations. At the inaugural conference, DRM estimated that their group comprised fewer than half a million members, a rather modest number for a country the size of Russia (Fish, 1995, p. 45).

In March 1991 the Soviet Union held a referendum regarding a new Union Treaty, to which Russia added a question about electing its own republic-level president. Seventy percent of voters voiced their approval for a Russian presidency. The Russian Supreme Soviet drafted the legal framework for the Russian presidency, which was approved by the Russian Congress. The new Russian president could hold up to two five-year terms. Nominations to the presidency could be made by political parties, trade unions, public organizations, or other groups that were able to collect 100,000 signatures in support.

Presidential elections were held in June. While Yeltsin was the clear front-runner, the electoral campaign and elections themselves were considered largely fair and free. Yeltsin’s primary opponent was the former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, a centrist favoring gradual economic transformation. Four other candidates also participated, representing a diverse set of constituencies, including Communists, nationalists, and the military. Yeltsin won with 57 percent of the vote, while Ryzhkov came in second with 17 percent. These elections constituted the first time that a national-level executive had been popularly elected on Russian territory. Yeltsin’s election and the collapse of the Soviet Union later in 1991 are regularly viewed as the events culminating in Russia’s democratic transition. Yet, as Fish has pointed out, Russia lacked a “founding election” that included multiparty competition for the national legislature (Fish, 1995). This type of an election would not happen for another two years.

Following the August coup and the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union, the democratization movement in Russia waned. Russian democrats had organized themselves to fight against Communist Party rule, not necessarily for a different type of political organization. Once it accomplished the job of extrication from Communism, the pro-democracy movement struggled to establish a coherent and unified program to take the democratization agenda forward. While DRM was successful at mobilizing for mass demonstrations in 1990 and 1991, it lacked the cohesive organizational structure of any of the successful pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe. Internal discord within the parties that comprised the Democratic Russia legislative group impaired efforts to expand membership. As Fish has pointed out, several pro-democratic parties actually shrank between the time of their founding and the August 1991 coup attempt (Fish, 1995, p. 50). Stagnation in party membership continued throughout the early post-Soviet years as well.

Moreover, no other mass movement or organization arose to fill the void left by DRM. Russia, in contrast to many of the non-Russian Soviet republics and their East European neighbors, lacked a large popular front or other movement organized around ethnic and national interests. Similarly, labor organizations did not succeed in uniting to establish a nationwide independent union movement that might serve to represent workers’ interests. As Fish writes, “the country entered the postcoup period with neither blueprints for an orderly, controlled transition on the table nor the broad, large-scale representative organizations necessary for negotiating such a transition” (Fish, 1995, p. 204). Consequently, no non-Communist mass movement succeeded in establishing effective party institutions for representing societal interests in democratic institutions. Society had failed to launch a credible threat to sitting political elites.

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was governed by a popularly elected president and a legislature that had been elected in relatively free elections. The legislature, however, was polarized and ultimately exhibited a pro-Yeltsin/anti-Yeltsin cleavage
(Remington, Smith, Kiewiet, & Haspel, 1994). The president and his government sought to enact a dramatic and necessary set of economic reforms, but faced substantial resistance from the Supreme Soviet, which saw a coalition of Communists and nationalists bent on blocking reform. President Yeltsin responded to this gridlock by ruling more and more by presidential decree. In March 1993, the Congress Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov called for Yeltsin’s impeachment. The Congress announced an April referendum that put four questions to the Russian population regarding its confidence in Yeltsin and his policies and its preference for early presidential and parliamentary elections. The results found that the majority of voters expressed confidence in Yeltsin and his policies, opposed early presidential elections, but favored early parliamentary elections.

Using the results of the April referendum to justify his actions, on September 21 Yeltsin dissolved the Congress—an action for which the existing constitution did not grant him authority. At this time, he also called for a new constitutional referendum and new elections to be held in December. Two days later the Congress declared Yeltsin’s decree null and void, dismissed Yeltsin from power, and appointed Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi as acting president. In the following days Yeltsin cut off the electricity and phones in the parliamentary building as members barricaded themselves inside.

This crisis provoked a strong reaction from citizens in Moscow. Tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in Moscow in support of the parliament. Parliamentary supporters under Rutskoi’s command collected arms in the parliament building. Pro-parliamentary forces occupied the Moscow mayor’s office and attacked a television station, resulting in 62 deaths. On October 2, Yeltsin signed a decree announcing a state of emergency in Moscow. On October 4, army tanks shelled the barricaded parliament, killing more than 150 people.

A nationwide public opinion poll of 1,600 respondents conducted by VTsIOM on October 12 showed a broad range of reactions to these events (VTsIOM online data archive). When asked to evaluate Yeltsin’s actions during the crisis, 41 percent of respondents said that Yeltsin should have used force earlier, 23 percent said that he used force at the appropriate time, 12 percent said that he should have waited to find a compromise with Rutskoi, and 23 percent were against the use of force altogether. The population appeared split in response to a question about who was the most responsible for the “violence and bloodshed” that ensued during the crisis. Twenty-eight percent blamed Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, 23 percent blamed Yeltsin together with Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, 15 percent blamed Yeltsin, and 12 percent the Supreme Soviet. In short, public opinion over the crisis did not side universally with either Yeltsin or the parliament.

On December 12, Russians approved a new constitution that gives the executive branch considerable powers. The 1993 Constitution restructured the parliament into a bicameral Federal Assembly. The lower house, the State Duma, includes 450 deputies and the upper chamber, the Federation Council, includes two deputies from each of the subjects of the Russian Federation. The Constitution eliminates the post of vice-president, and requires State Duma approval for appointing the prime minister. The president has the power to dismiss the State Duma if it rejects his nominee for prime minister three times. The Constitution also grants the president the power

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7 Until 2007, half of the members of the State Duma were elected from single-mandate districts, while the other half were elected from party lists. Initially, Federation Council members were elected. From 1995 to 2000, the governor and speaker of the legislature of each federation subject became their regions’ Federation Council members. Since 2000, members are appointed.
to issue decrees that have the same force as law, as long as these decrees do not contradict the Constitution or existing laws.

On the same day that Russians approved the new constitution, they also elected representatives to the new Federal Assembly. Having finally completed a fair and free legislative election to accompany the 1991 presidential election, Russia’s democratic transition was fully complete.

**Indonesia: 1998-1999**

Against the background of economic chaos from the Asian financial crisis and widespread citizen unrest, Suharto was elected by the MPR to his seventh term as president in March 1998. In early May, the government announced a fuel subsidy reduction that amounted to a 70 percent increase in gasoline prices (Bird, 1999). Student demonstrations erupted, and three days of rioting took place in Medan. The stand-off between Suharto and the people grew violent when four student protestors at Trisakti University were shot and killed by soldiers on May 12. This event triggered three days of urban riots across the archipelago, including attacks against the country’s ethnic Chinese minority. Over 2,000 individuals were killed or disappeared, and hundreds of Chinese women were raped (Primariantari, 1999). On May 19, thousands of students peacefully occupied the parliament building, which became the focal point of resistance as more students and non-student activists converged there. The military stood down and did not try to suppress the protesters. Having lost the support of the military, Muslim leaders, and most of Golkar, Suharto resigned two days later and Vice President B.J. Habibie—an engineer known for his loyalty to Suharto—was sworn in as president.

Habibie took several immediate steps to establish political legitimacy by meeting the public’s demands for reform and restoring calm to the country. He removed restrictions on the press, guaranteed political parties and other organizations the right to organize, released some political prisoners, and announced deadlines for the rewriting of political party and election laws that would facilitate greater democratization (Bird, 1999). By the end of 1998, the MPR had agreed on reforms that would result in a greatly-empowered legislature and weaker presidency, as well as an open, multi-party system. The distribution of power within the parliament was reformed to give greater weight to regional representation and reduce the influence of the military. These reforms constituted dramatic improvements to both dimensions of democracy: political rights and civil liberties.

Indonesia completed a transition to democracy with DPR elections in June and the election of the president by the MPR in October 1999. Forty-eight parties competed in the election, with 21 winning at least one of the 462 contested seats in the DPR. Eighteen seats were also held for the legislatures of the 26 provinces and more than 300 regencies and municipalities. The 1999 elections constituted the first free elections in Indonesia since 1955. Competition was fair and free, and no major group was barred from organizing and running candidates. Five parties collectively managed to win more than 90 percent of the seats in the DPR: Megawati’s branch of the PDI—renamed the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)—won a plurality of seats (153), followed by Golkar (120), and the PPP (58). Two new Islamic parties

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8 Thirty-eight seats were reserved for the military, which constituted a dramatic reduction from New Order levels. Prior to 1999, the military had the right to appoint 75 representatives to the DPR and additional representatives in the MPR.

9 East Timor, which passed a referendum in August 1999 rejecting autonomy within Indonesia and thus accepting independence, did not elect a provincial legislature or representatives to the MPR.
also won a large number of seats. The National Awakening Party (PKB), led by Abdurrahman Wahid, the longtime chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) won 51 seats. The National Mandate Party (PAN), headed by Amien Rais, the former chairman of Indonesia’s second largest Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, won 34 seats.

Throughout most of 1999, Habibie and Megawati were considered the two primary rivals for the presidency. Megawati was the favored candidate from the opposition forces that pushed for Suharto’s resignation. Habibie, however, represented the position of modernist Muslims, and his early steps in political liberalization and democratization made him a credible contender to carry out reform. Golkar was consumed by intra-party factionalism, which came to a head in the October MPR session when the party was unable to muster support for a single candidate. A divided Golkar left the Muslim factions concerned about the possibility of Megawati coming to power and pursuing secular strategies that would sideline their interests. This concern opened the way for a new third candidate: Aburrahman Wahid from the PKB, who garnered support from both Golkar and the Muslim parties to win the presidency.10

DEMOCRACY’S TRAJECTORY IN RUSSIA

Gradual Retreat to Authoritarian Reversal

Russia’s political trajectory following the 1993 constitutional crisis and the fair and free election of a multi-party parliament can be divided into roughly three periods. From 1994-1997, the country’s level of democracy stayed constant. Civil liberties and political rights were widespread, and there was great opportunity for Russians to strengthen and deepen democracy. Starting in about 1998, Yeltsin began to gradually retreat from democracy by restricting some political rights and civil liberties. This trend continued apace once Vladimir Putin came to office in 2000. The third period began with Putin’s reelection in 2004. The deepening of authoritarianism in this period is marked by further restrictions on political rights, which survived through the election of Putin’s anointed successor, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2008.

These three periods are apparent in the country’s Freedom House scores. Figure 2.1 provides political rights and civil liberties scores for Russia from the introduction of glasnost’ in 1986 through 2010.11 As Figure 2.1 shows, Russia’s highest scores for political rights and civil liberties occurred in 1991, during the year the Soviet Union was dissolved. For most of the 1990s, Russia’s scores for civil rights and political liberties were constant, before both dropped in the late 1990s. By 1999, Russia’s civil liberties score had fallen to the same level it was at during 1988-1989. In 2004, the score for political rights declined further, equaling the score the Soviet Union held in 1988-1989.

The changes in political rights and civil liberties over the course of these three periods will be discussed in the following three sections. While political rights and civil liberties constitute two separate dimensions of democracy, in many respects civil liberties are supporting actors to political rights. Without meaningful civil liberties, political rights cannot be actualized. Yet, the process of easing up repressions on civil liberties is less complicated than the process of building political institutions that operationalize political rights. For this reason, the following analysis will place heavier description on variation in political rights.

10 This event will be analyzed in greater detail in chapter 7.
11 Scores from 1986-1991 are for the USSR.
Democracy’s Apex: 1994-1997
The first period—the highpoint of democracy in post-Soviet Russia—did not witness major efforts aimed at deepening democracy beyond the adoption of the 1993 Constitution. One further democratic reform that occurred during this period was the introduction of gubernatorial elections in Russia’s 89 federation subjects. By the end of 1997, almost all regions had elected their executives. Reforms for local self-government and the introduction of elections for local executives also became more widespread.

In spite of the expansion of elections starting in 1993, party-building in Russia remained weak. Citizens who had Marched in the streets demanding the end of Communism were less interested in the work of building new organizations to promote their political interests. The lack of party organization was apparent in the 1993 election results. Independents and representatives from parties without a clear programmatic direction comprised the plurality of deputies, followed by reformers, left-leaning parties, and nationalists. The State Duma did not provide Yeltsin with the legislative mandate he had wanted to enact reform. The economy continued to deteriorate and the ruble plummeted. Coal miners went on strike again, and Yeltsin’s popularity dropped precipitously.

Russia held its second elections for the State Duma in 1995. The election results reflected people’s frustration with the government’s policies. Communists won a plurality of seats, followed by independents. The number of representatives from pro-democracy reform parties dropped from 116 to 64 seats (Belin & Orttung, 1997, p. 114). The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) emerged as the largest political party in the country and effectively controlled a legislative majority in the Duma. In the beginning of 1996, Yeltsin’s popularity was in the single digits and it seemed inevitable that a KPRF candidate would win the June 1996 presidential elections. Powerful allies in the media and other businesses came to Yeltsin’s aid, giving him an unfair advantage over other competitors. In the first round of voting, Yeltsin took 35 percent and KPRF candidate Gennady Zyuganov won 32 percent of the vote in a field of 11 candidates. Yeltsin emerged victorious in the second round, winning nearly 54 percent of the vote.

Yeltsin’s reelection was not a resounding call for greater democracy. The president’s second term was more lackluster than the first. Even though the 1993 Constitution placed considerable power in the hands of the executive, Yeltsin did not have total power over the executive branch or the regions, in part because of divisions among elites. Moreover, opposition parties gained meaningful representation in the legislature, and the Duma sometimes tried to serve as a counterweight to the president. Throughout Yeltsin’s presidency, the State Duma and Federation Council used their limited powers to place checks on the president’s power. While the
policy outcomes of this period fell far below public expectations and did little to advance political rights or civil liberties, the process was largely democratic.

Following the 1993 constitutional crisis and subsequent elections, mass political action faded into the background. The pro-democracy forces that had helped to bring down Communist rule did not evolve into political parties or mass movements that pushed to sustain democratization in Russia. The only form of visible participation was voting in elections. Electoral competition, as discussed above, did not appear to stimulate the development of robust political parties that could help structure citizen interests. The only formidable party was the KPRF. Elites—especially Yeltsin—were left relatively unconstrained during this period.

**Democracy’s Retreat: 1998-2003**

Like Indonesia, Russia also experienced an economic crisis in 1998. The stock market crashed, world oil prices dropped, and foreign investment left the country. In August, the government was forced to devalue the Russian ruble and default on international loans. This financial catastrophe came on the heels of months of protracted disputes between the Duma and the president, who had made reshuffling his cabinet a regular activity. Throughout this process, the Duma showed itself as a counterweight to the president. Following the financial crisis, Yeltsin dismissed his entire cabinet. The Duma refused to accept Yeltsin’s new choice for prime minister, forcing him to select a candidate more acceptable to the Duma.

In May 1999, the Duma voted to impeach Yeltsin, but failed to secure enough votes. In August, Vladimir Putin was appointed prime minister, and on December 31, 1999, Yeltsin resigned from the presidency, making Putin acting president. Yeltsin’s resignation forced early presidential elections, which took place in March 2000. Putin handily won a majority of the vote in the first round. After winning this mandate, Putin immediately embarked on a series of reforms aimed at recentralizing state authority. He spoke of the need for a “dictatorship of the law” through “guided democracy” (*upravlyaemaya demokratiya*).\(^{12}\) The use of the term “guided democracy,” was no coincidence, and appears to have been appropriated directly from Sukarno’s own system of government that combined strong executive rule with weak representative institutions as a way of ensuring a centralization of political power.\(^{13}\)

Many of Putin’s centralizing reforms reduced political rights and civil liberties. For example, Putin issued a presidential decree in May 2000 that created a new supra-federal structure that divided the country into seven federal districts, each of which is headed by a direct presidential representative. This reform diluted the political power of popularly-elected governors and put greater political power in the hands of appointed officials. Two additional reforms further curtailed the political power of regional executives. First, in 2000 Putin initiated a reform that removed regional governors and speakers of regional legislatures from the Federation Council, replacing them with appointed representatives. While allegedly intended to minimize governors’ lobbying abilities and strip them of the immunity from criminal prosecution to which all Federation Council members are entitled, this reform also dampened political rights by removing elected officials from office in place of appointees. Moreover, the Kremlin oversees the appointment of these regional representatives. Therefore, only individuals who are loyal to the president are selected, effectively giving the president control of the upper house of the Federal Assembly (Remington, 2010). Second, in 2001, the Duma passed amendments to federal law on intervention in regional power structures. As a result of these amendments, Putin gained

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\(^{12}\) This phrase is also frequently translated into English as “managed democracy.”

\(^{13}\) See, for example, Pribylovskii (2005), SOVA Center website (www.sova-center.ru) and “Mir i Strana (2007).
the authority to removed popularly elected regional governors from office and disband a regional legislature. Collectively, these reforms reinstated central authority over all matters relating to subjects of the federation and put more power in the hands of non-elected officials.

The year 2000 also marked Putin’s attack on the media. The offices of the Media-Most conglomerate, which owned the popular independent television station NTV as well as several newspapers, were raided in May. Shortly after, Media-Most’s head, Vladimir Gusinsky, was arrested and forced to turnover shares in NTV to the state-owned energy company Gazprom. In April 2001, Gazprom exercised its rights as a minority shareholder in NTV to install a new board of directors. NTV journalists refused to accept the new management, barricaded themselves inside the TV station, and ultimately left to work for a different network. Other Media-Most assets were also liquidated. Similar fates fell to the ORT television station and other independent newspapers that had been owned by financiers forced to sell their shares under state pressure. By the end of 2003, the state controlled all national television stations either directly or through control stakes held by state-owned companies.

The public reacted to the takeover of NTV by staging protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Twenty-thousand protestors turned out in Moscow, making these the largest pro-democracy demonstrations seen in Russia since 1991 (Baker & Glasser, 2001). Yet, the response outside of major cities was one of great indifference. Indeed, a national public opinion poll of 1,600 respondents conducted by VTsIOM on April 15, 2001 found that 41 percent of respondents had “no emotion” about the departure of the NTV journalists. Forty-nine percent of respondents viewed Gusinsky as the “main initiator of the scandal surrounding NTV,” while only 15 percent blamed Putin (VTsIOM online data archive). Another question on the survey asked respondents if they thought that the change in management in NTV, the closure of the newspaper Segodnya, and the firing of the collective at the magazine Itogi (all three media outlets belonged to Media-Most) signified a mass attack on freedom of speech. The majority—55 percent—said certainly or likely “no,” while 45 percent said certainly or likely “yes.”

In 2003, the pro-Putin United Russia party won 38 percent of the vote in the State Duma elections, while the Communists took less than 13 percent, and pro-democratic parties were left with a total of seven seats. Smaller parties and independents quickly joined the United Russia faction, giving it a legislative majority. The State Duma no longer posed a credible threat to curb executive power. In March 2004, Putin stood for reelection in a race that was boycotted by all other major political figures, winning 71 percent of the vote in the first round of balloting. With legislative power and popular opinion firmly on his side, Putin was easily able to push through further reforms that weakened Russia’s remaining democratic institutions.

*The Return of Authoritarianism: 2004-2010*

In Putin’s second term, the shift toward authoritarianism became more severe and more entrenched. Taking advantage of his enormous personal popularity and generally low levels of mass involvement in political life, Putin passed legislation that acts against both pluralism and accountability in democratic institutions. The move toward authoritarianism has regularly preyed on citizens’ fears about their physical security. In September 2004, a group of more than 30 Chechen and Ingush insurgents stormed a school in the North Caucasian town of Beslan, taking more than 1,000 students, teachers, and parents hostage. After three days Russian troops stormed the building with the aid of heavy artillery. The battle that ensued left more than 330 individuals dead, including 186 children.
After the hostage crisis, Putin proposed several pieces of legislation further curbing political rights, which the Duma dutifully accepted. The first replaced the popular election of regional executives with a system where the president nominates candidates and regional legislatures confirm them. The second legislative act eliminated single-mandate district seats from the Duma, requiring that all 450 seats be allocated by proportional representation. This reform reduced the representation of local interests in the State Duma, and reduced the Duma’s ability to draw on local support to check presidential power (Remington, 2010).

Changes introduced in 2005 to the Election Law and the Law on Political Parties have further emasculated democratic institutions. Amendments to these laws raise the barrier for election to the Duma from 5 to 7 percent, prevent the formation of electoral blocs by political parties, remove the “against all” option from the ballot, and prohibit election monitoring except by parties participating in the election or through invitation. The revisions also raise the requirements for registering political parties, demanding that a party have 50,000 members and branches with at least 500 members in at least half the regions of the country. Only registered parties are allowed to run candidates in elections.

These provisions have made it much harder for smaller parties to compete, and made it impossible for governors’ machines and financial industrial groups, which had served as formidable electoral vehicles in the 1990s and early 2000s (Hale, 2006), to participate in elections. Because Russian party-building has been historically weak, legislative reforms have benefited existing, large political party structures—namely, Putin’s United Russia. Regional political actors, whose standard bases of political support were severely hampered by these laws, were pressured to affiliate with United Russia. Stricter registration requirements have also given authorities more legal instruments to deny parties registration and access to political competition. As a result of the new rules, the number of registered political parties in Russia declined dramatically. In 2003 there were over 40 registered parties, but by September 2008, only fourteen remained (Remington, 2010, p. 48).

A variety of other techniques help to ensure high electoral victories for United Russia and pro-Putin candidates. The use of “administrative resources,” such as access to state-sponsored media, misuse of official offices to campaign on behalf of United Russia candidates, and pressure on state employees and other segments dependent on budgetary resources, is a regular fixture in electoral campaigns. Given the controlled environment that Putin successfully created, it is no surprise that United Russia won 64 percent of the votes in the December 2007 State Duma elections and that Putin’s anointed successor, Dmitry Medvedev, sailed to a first-round victory in the March 2008 presidential elections with 71 percent of the vote. Medvedev immediately appointed Putin as prime minister, and Putin is still believed to be the primary decision-maker in the Russian government. Neither the Duma nor presidential elections met international standards for fair and free balloting.

Putin used the incident in Beslan as a pretext for limiting civil liberties as well. A 2006 law on NGOs placed onerous administrative burdens on NGOs’ registration and accounting, thereby dramatically limiting their autonomy, particularly with regard to fundraising and managing foreign grants. In July 2008, Putin cancelled the tax-exempt status of most foreign foundations and NGOs, essentially starving any group critical of the government of sizeable financial resources. In 2009, Medvedev established a commission to monitor historical

\[14\] Amendments adopted in 2009 are gradually reducing these numbers, first to 45,000 members with branches of 450 members in half of the regions, and later to 40,000 members with branches of 400 members in at least half of the regions.
interpretations, which was tasked with exposing “falsifications” in historical analysis that could damage the country (Freedom House, 2010).

While Russians still have considerable freedom of movement and freedom of expression in arts and culture, freedoms of speech, media, association, and religion have all declined in the past several years. Citizens seeking to exercise their civil liberties are not protected by the state. Violence against non-Russian minorities has increased, and perpetrators are rarely brought to justice. Assassinations against journalists and human rights activists have captured international headlines. At least 19 journalists have been killed since Putin came to power (Freedom House, 2010).

Curiously, the Russian public has acquiesced to Russia’s return to authoritarian practices since 2006. Although the current level of authoritarianism in Russia undoubtedly checks popular resistance, before 2006 the regime showed considerable tolerance for protest and dissent. Russia’s current level of authoritarianism cannot explain Russian citizens’ failure to constrain elites from 1998 to 2006. In fact, during 2005, Russia witnessed massive protests in response to a government policy to monetize a series of social welfare benefits. In this instance, and in several smaller events since then, Russians have not been afraid to take to the streets to complain against policies with which they disagree. Yet, restrictions of political rights and civil liberties have not prompted this kind of protest.

The protests that accompanied the 2001 closure of NTV were the last large-scale acts of contentious politics Russians launched in defense of democratic principles. They have accepted further restrictions on political rights and civil liberties without resistance. In January 2010, 10,000 people demonstrated in Kaliningrad, demanding the resignation of the governor and Putin. This was the largest pro-democracy protest event to take place since the closure of NTV nearly a decade earlier, and was a singular event. On the whole, Russians have failed to constrain political elites in the post-Soviet era. Their lack of engagement in party-development work helped to facilitate a weak party system that was easily appropriated by a popular president to pass legislation that reduced political rights and civil liberties. Additionally, low levels of contentious political activity since 1993 have made it easy for political leaders to roll back democratic institutions without popular resistance.

DEMOCRACY’S TRAJECTORY IN INDONESIA

Democratic Deepening Part 1: 1999-2004
Indonesia’s political trajectory following its 1999 transition to democracy can be divided into two periods of democratic deepening. This section will describe the reforms from the first period, which lasted from late 1999 through 2004. These reforms focused primarily on amending the 1945 Indonesian Constitution to provide the legal architecture for guaranteeing democratic political rights and civil liberties. The next section will discuss the second period, from 2005-2010, when the emphasis shifted to implementing these constitutional amendments and strengthening their execution. Similar to the previous discussion of Russia, I will focus more attention on the development of political rights over civil liberties.

The demarcation of Indonesia’s post-transition trajectory into two periods is reflected in the country’s Freedom House scores since 1999. Figure 2.2 provides a graph of the political rights and civil liberties scores provided by Freedom House for Indonesia since the beginning of political liberalization under keterbukaan in the late 1980s. According to this graph, civil liberties were stronger than political rights during the late New Order period. The political
repression of the early 1990s affected both of these dimensions, resulting in a lowering of both scores. Following Indonesia’s democratic transition in 1999, scores for both civil liberties and political rights improved dramatically and were boosted again in 2004. In the post-transition period, Indonesia’s score for political rights has remained higher than its score for civil liberties. Both are higher than the scores Russia has earned at any point in its post-Soviet history.

Curiously, the extensive changes to Indonesia’s political framework in 1999-2001 took place during a period of intense political instability. From summer 2000 through summer 2001, the DPR became increasingly frustrated with President Abdurrahman Wahid’s approach to government. During the annual People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) session in August 2000, members raised concerns about several alleged financial improprieties involving the president. The members had decided in advance, however, not to push for the president’s dismissal, as they believed that this would provoke a negative reaction from the public (Liddle, 2001). In this instance, public pressure constrained parliamentary elites from acting hastily, encouraging them rather to seek a resolution through due process.

Over the course of the following year, the DPR investigated two alleged cases of corruption against the president and engaged in a lengthy official process tantamount to impeachment. As the MPR suspected, the public was not indifferent to the proceedings. Throughout the investigations and related hearings, the population took to the streets to both demand Wahid’s resignation and defend the corruption allegations against him. In November 2000, protestors stormed the parliament building demanding the president’s resignation. A public opinion poll published by Tempo magazine at the time found that 65 percent of Indonesians wanted the parliament to remove Wahid ("Parliament Stormed as Wahid Told to Resign", 2000). Protests gained momentum over the following months, and in January 2001, more than 10,000 protestors in opposition to Wahid took to the streets of Jakarta, in some cases clashing with police (Sims, 2001). Over the next several days, supporters of the president staged their own demonstrations across Java, particularly in the president’s stronghold in East Java. They attacked Golkar offices and blockaded a major highway in East Java ("President Warns Military Not to Harm Protestors", 2001). Following these events, Wahid made a public appeal to his supporters, asking them to renounce violence and trust in the democratic process.

As the DPR investigations and proceedings unfolded through spring 2001, the anti-presidential protests and the counter-protests by Wahid’s supporters continued across Indonesian cities, growing increasingly violent. During this period, Wahid warned security forces not to use “repressive actions” when dealing with protestors ("President Warns Military Not to Harm Protestors", 2001). When the rhetoric of his supporters became threateningly fierce, Wahid
appeared before a prayer rally of some 20,000 followers in Jakarta, appealing that they avoid violence and “go home in peace” (Murdoch, 2001). At the end of May 2001, the DPR voted to hold a special session of the MPR to consider impeachment proceedings. The military warned Wahid not to call a state of emergency before the MPR session (Agionby, 2001). Yet, on July 23, as the MPR set to begin the official impeachment proceedings, Wahid issued a presidential decree to dissolve parliament, ordering the military to prevent the MPR’s assembly. The army refused to implement the decree and by evening the MPR had removed Wahid and appointed the vice president, Megawati, as president.

The mass protests that accompanied these events were instrumental in constraining Wahid and empowering the MPR. Buoyed by popular support, the army was confident in refusing to obey the president’s demand of a state of emergency. Certain that the will of the people was behind them, MPR legislators were able to move quickly to remove Wahid and transfer power to Megawati.

Megawati’s ascent to the presidency brought political stability to Indonesia for the first time since mass protests began against Suharto in 1997. Yet, even as this drama dominated political attention, the MPR was quietly embarking on a series of broad-reaching constitutional reforms. In contrast to Russia, which adopted a new constitution by referendum following the constitutional crisis of October 1993, Indonesia opted to amend its deficient 1945 Constitution rather than create a new constitutional order. The 1945 Constitution was dramatically changed as a result of four constitutional amendments that passed in four years: 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. These amendments were adopted by the MPR, whose composition generally had broad-based public support. As a result of the four amendments, the 1945 Constitution grew from 37 to 73 articles, almost all of which have been amended in some way.15

Collectively, the four sets of amendments make dramatic changes to the organization of political power in Indonesia and ensure citizens both political rights and civil liberties. The reforms that ensured democratic deepening can generally be divided into five categories: 1) strengthening the balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches; 2) safeguarding popular rule through the introduction of term limits and the expansion of elections; 3) articulating a broader list of guaranteed civil liberties; 4) strengthening judicial independence; and 5) reducing the dwifungsi power of the armed forces. I will discuss each of these five areas in turn.

Regarding the balance of power, the amendments shifted considerable power from the president to the DPR, granting the DPR the power to make laws, while reducing the president’s power to only the submission of bills to the legislature (Indrayana, 2008). The amended Constitution stipulates that the DPR cannot be suspended or dissolved by the president—a direct response to Aburrahman Wahid’s attempt to dissolve the DPR on the eve of his impeachment in 2001. Further reforms changed the structure of the parliament to introduce a new Regional Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) that would serve as an upper chamber in the MPR. The new MPR includes the DPR and the DPD, thereby eliminating any appointed members of the parliament altogether. The amendments also limited the president’s judicial and diplomatic powers, giving the DPR more control in appointing ambassadors and consuls (Indrayana, 2008). Collectively, these changes reduced the strength of the executive and greatly empowered the legislature while also putting a significantly larger number of powers in the hands of elected legislators.

15 A thorough discussion of the reform process as well as the specifics of each of the amendments can be found in Indrayana (2008).
Amendments that strengthen the political rights of Indonesians further deepened the country’s democracy. Reforms to the electoral process stipulate that elections for the DPR, DPD, regional and local legislatures (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD), president and vice president are held every five years. Direct election was introduced for the offices of the president and vice president, a move widely supported by the mass public. The president is limited to two terms in office, and amendments clarified the procedure for impeachment.

The constitutional amendments incorporated new provisions to guarantee human rights, thereby strengthening Indonesian civil liberties. The specific provisions include freedom of religion, speech, information, and conscience, as well as a clause protecting individuals against prosecution under retroactive laws. Civil liberties, in particular freedom of religion, were enhanced by other legislative acts as well. In 2000, President Wahid repealed a 1967 ban on Chinese religion, beliefs, and traditions, making it possible for ethnic Chinese (over 3 percent of the Indonesian population) to openly engage in religious practices and traditions. In 2002, President Megawati announced Chinese New Year (Imlek in Indonesian) as a national holiday beginning in 2003.

Several aspects of the constitutional amendments strengthened the independence of the Indonesian judiciary. The power of the military court was reduced and armed forces have become subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the General Court. Perhaps most importantly, the Third Amendment established a Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court quickly developed a reputation for independence and attention to legal principles. In 2004, for example, it restored the political rights of those who were allegedly linked to the PKI, allowing them to vote in and contest elections. In the same year, the Constitutional Court ruled that the government’s attempt to apply new anti-terrorist laws retroactively was unconstitutional, violating the article guaranteeing protection against retroactive laws.

Several of the amendments discussed above have weakened the military’s influence in political life. The movement to a fully elected DPR and DPD eliminated military representation in the parliament. Changes to the jurisdiction of the military court should make it easier to hold officers accountable for abuses of power. Amendments also altered the mechanism for appointing and dismissing the commander of the armed forces and the chief of police, requiring DPR approval of the appointments. Collectively, these changes dramatically reduced the military’s ability to implement dwifungsi and act at the direct will of the president. The remaining pillar of Indonesian military influence is military-owned businesses, which provide two-thirds of the armed forces’ income (Liddle, 2007). Efforts to reform the military and turn its businesses over to the government have been slow and incomplete. These extra-budgetary revenue sources constitute a major hurdle for bringing the military fully under civilian control.

In addition to the constitutional amendments, the DPR passed two laws on decentralization in 1999 that contributed to Indonesia’s democratic deepening. These laws transferred considerable administrative and fiscal authority from the central government to local governments at the regency (kabupaten) and municipality (kota) levels. Among the numerous powers transferred to local governments, the most important change for democracy was the election of local executives, who would be chosen by popularly elected local legislatures rather than appointed by the capital. The implementation of these laws, which began after Wahid assumed the presidency, has been described as the world’s largest political decentralization project. Almost two million civil servants and more than 60 percent of the national development budget were transferred from central to local authorities (B. Smith, 2008).

Mass support for direct elections will be discussed in detail in chapter 7.
The first stage of Indonesian democratic deepening is also noteworthy for the proposed constitutional changes that were not accepted. In 2002, President Megawati proposed to revise the 1999 decentralization law, arguing that it threatened national unity. She was met with sharp resistance from the district-level governments that have been empowered by the law, as well as national legislators (Malley, 2003). Recognizing that she would not have the legislative or popular support to amend the law, Megawati retreated. Of greater importance, however, was the MPR’s rejection of a proposal to introduce language into the preamble of the Constitution requiring that Muslim adherents carry out *sharia* law.\(^\text{17}\) Both NU and Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations, spoke out publicly against this proposal, thereby providing important support to legislators of all religious and ideological backgrounds to oppose it (Malley, 2003).

At the end of this first stage of democratic deepening, Indonesia held its second post-Suharto elections for the DPR in April 2004 and its first direct elections for the presidency in July and September 2004. Eleven parties were elected into the DPR, and Megawati’s PDI-P saw its vote share decline from 34 percent in 1999 to less than 19 percent in 2004. After the first round of presidential elections, no candidate had secured 50 percent of the vote. The top two vote-winners—Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) from the Democratic Party (PD), who won 34 percent of the vote, and incumbent President Megawati, who took 27 percent—advanced to a second round in September. SBY emerged victorious with 61 percent of the vote. The turnover of power from Megawati to SBY was peaceful and uneventful. Indonesians had succeeded in constraining elites with the institutions of democracy by making use of parties and elections to remove an incumbent from power. The electoral removal of an incumbent president has never taken place in Russia. This topic will be addressed in greater detail in chapter 6.

*Democratic Deepening Part 2: 2005-2010*

The second phase of democratic deepening in Indonesia has focused less on reforming the political system and more on strengthening the implementation of reforms introduced in the first period. Democratic deepening has occurred in three general areas: 1) a further expansion of elections to provincial and local executives; 2) a strengthening of civil liberties that resulted from a peace settlement to the separatist conflict in Aceh; and 3) a strengthening in judicial independence, as evidenced by the work of the Constitutional Court.

A new law on regional autonomy was passed in 2004 that updated several aspects of the 1999 laws. In particular, the revised law called for the direct election of local and regional executives, taking this power away from regional legislatures, who had developed a reputation for engaging in predatory and rent-seeking activities, and placing it directly in the hands of the people. By carving out some institutional independence for executives, lawmakers hoped to increase the executives’ accountability to the people (Hadiz, 2010). In 2005, approximately 180 governors, district heads, and mayors were elected directly, constituting the first nationwide election of local government executives in the country’s history. According to Freedom House’s 2007 report on Indonesia, by June 2006, 40 percent of incumbent executives had been voted out of office in popular elections.

\(^\text{17}\) The specific language under discussion came from the 1945 Jakarta Charter, which included an alternate drafting of *pancasila*, in which the first principle is not only belief in one God, but “with the obligation for its Muslim adherents to carry out the shariah.” The proposed inclusion of this language was the center of a heated debate in the original 1945 Constitution.
The year 2005 also marked the beginning of a lasting peace in Aceh, which had been involved in a secessionist conflict with the central government dating back to the mid-1970s. Armed conflict between the central government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), as well as other repressive measures taken by the central government to try and weaken the secessionist cause, help explain why Indonesia’s Freedom House civil liberties score has not kept pace with its political rights score in the post-Suharto era. Peace in Aceh was further strengthened in 2006 when the DPR passed a law on governing in Aceh. In December 2006, Aceh held its first elections, bringing former GAM rebels Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammed Nazar to the posts of governor and deputy governor in a peaceful contest.

While judicial independence on the whole remains weak in Indonesia, in the second stage of democratic deepening the Indonesian Constitutional Court passed several decisions that demonstrate a commitment to procedure over outcome and directly strengthen political rights and civil liberties. For example, in 2006 the Constitutional Court ruled against three articles in the criminal code that prohibited insulting the president and vice president, and in 2007 it overturned two articles in the penal code that criminalized defamation, increasing protections of free speech. In 2008, the newly elected Constitutional Court chief justice, Mohammad Mahfud, spoke in defense of freedom of religion by stating that *sharia* laws adopted by various local governments are unconstitutional and a threat to national integrity (Osman, 2008).18

In addition to these examples of strengthening civil liberties, the Constitutional Court has also upheld political rights. For example, in 2007 it ruled to allow independent candidates to contest local elections starting in 2008 ("Indonesian Government, House Agree to Revise Regional Administration Law", 2007). This ruling advances political rights as it increases access to political competition for potential candidates. In 2008, the Constitutional Court overturned two articles in the 2008 Law on Legislative Elections that related to the distribution of legislative seats. The Court’s new provision gives priority to the candidates who receive the largest number of votes on a party’s list, regardless of their position on the list (Freedom House, 2009). This decision strengthens citizens’ political rights by ensuring that their preferred candidates are seated in the legislature rather than the party’s preferred candidates.

The progress that Indonesia has made in this second stage of democratic deepening has been accompanied by some notable areas of regress with regard to the protection of civil liberties. In particular, sectarian violence targeted against religious minorities has increased in recent years, and the Indonesian government has done little to try and stem these attacks or bring their perpetrators to justice. Politically motivated violence also continues in Papua, where security forces are regularly called to respond to a secessionist movement, yet are rarely held accountable for abuses of their power.

Throughout this second phase of democratic deepening, Indonesia proved to be remarkably stable, weathering the standard battles of governance without weakening the country’s new democratic institutions. This period also saw a great regularization of mass activities and elite responses to them, both through the use of electoral mechanisms and non-voting participation between elections. Change in the composition of the national legislature and presidential turnover since 1999 is also evidence that Indonesians are using their votes to punish and reward the performance of policymakers. For example, in April 2009, Indonesia held its third post-Suharto DPR elections, bringing nine parties into the legislature. SBY’s Democratic

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18 Most of these laws regulate Islamic knowledge and practices, such as Qu’ran reading ability for public servants, Muslim dress codes, and the collection of alms (*zakat*). Nevertheless, in spite of Mahfud’s statement, most laws remain in effect.
Party won the largest vote share with 21 percent of the vote (148 seats), while both Golkar and PDI-P saw their vote shares decline to just over 14 percent each. In July, SBY was elected to a second term in office, this time winning more than 60 percent of the vote in the first electoral round, in which he competed against former President Megawati and his vice president, Jusuf Kalla.

In between elections, Indonesians do not shy away from expressing their views through acts of contentious politics. When the legislature introduces a controversial topic for discussion, or the government takes an unpopular act, the public regularly responds with protests. Examples abound, from an increase in fuel prices in 2005, proposed labor law reforms in 2006, and the introduction of a controversial anti-pornography bill in 2008. Popular protest has caused some reforms to languish, such as the labor law (Freedom House, 2007). It has also compelled legislators to take society’s views into greater consideration, as in the case of the anti-pornography law (Asmarani, 2008).

In contrast to Russia, Indonesians have effectively used political participation to constrain political elites. In doing so, they facilitated democracy’s survival over time by compelling political elites to deepen political rights and civil liberties after the original transition to democracy was completed. Mass political participation emerges as perhaps the most significant variable in determining the success or failure of democracy following a transition.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have sought to describe the political trajectories of Russia and Indonesia both leading up to and following their democratic transitions, and the role of the mass public in the democratization process in both countries. The political trajectories of Russia and Indonesia share some important similarities as well as crucial differences. Authoritarian regimes, including highly repressive regimes in the 20th century, ruled both countries for most of their histories. In both cases, mass protest and calls for democratic reform helped bring about authoritarian collapse. With regard to mass participation and activities that constrain elite actions, Russia in 1991 and Indonesia in 1998 looked very similar.

Russia’s and Indonesia’s political trajectories diverged, however, following their respective democratic transitions. The level of mass behavior in constraining elites also varied in these two cases. Russia’s level of political openness peaked during its transition to democracy and remained stable for several years before gradually moving back towards authoritarianism. During the 1990s, Russia experienced meaningful political rights and civil liberties. Although the 1993 Constitution placed considerable power in the hands of the executive, the State Duma and regional executives constituted important loci of independent political power, and regularly held the president in check. During this period, Russians had ample opportunity to constrain elites and push for greater democracy by building opposition parties and engaging in contentious politics. Yet, they chose not to do so. When Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, he had little trouble introducing reforms that recentralized power and gradually used legislative mechanisms to reform political institutions until they no longer constituted a democratic system. All of these changes occurred without mass mobilization in defense of political rights and freedoms. As a result, democracy failed to survive in Russia.

Indonesia, by contrast, has deepened political rights and civil liberties since its 1999 transition to democracy. Mass political participation has played a key role in pushing democratization forward. Indonesians support a broad range of political parties, which has
ensured that multiple viewpoints are represented in the legislature, providing a constant check on the president. When political elites have behaved in ways that challenge democratic principles, Indonesians have not been afraid to take to the streets. This ongoing political participation has constrained elites and pushed democracy forward.

While it is clear that Indonesia and Russia have traveled down different paths following their respective democratic transitions, one might question whether their starting points were similar enough to merit a fruitful comparison. Chapter 3 tackles this question with an analysis of authoritarian legacies in the two countries and the relationship between antecedent regime type and democracy’s survival.
Chapter 3: The Opportunities and Constraints of Authoritarian Legacies

As chapter 2 has demonstrated, both Russia and Indonesia have undergone substantial changes since the collapse of the Soviet and New Order regimes. While Russian attempts at democratization did not result in democracy’s survival over time, Indonesian democratization has proved more lasting. As I will argue in chapters 4-7, Russia’s failure and Indonesia’s success at democratic survival have been facilitated by varying patterns in political participation that occurred in the two countries as a consequence of differences in engagement in civil society, trust in political institutions, and a sense of political efficacy. Before launching into this causal argument, however, it is necessary to first address a competing hypothesis: variation in antecedent regime type. Can the differences we see in democratic survival in Russia and Indonesia be reasonably explained by the fact that they emerged from different types of authoritarianism?

Chapters 1 and 2 have outlined several structural similarities that Russia and Indonesia share. Both countries are large, multi-ethnic states abundant in natural resources with a history of authoritarian governance. Yet, Russia initiated democratization on the remnants of 70 years of communist rule. In contrast, Indonesia democratized following the collapse of a nationalist authoritarian dictatorship that had been in power for over 30 years. One might argue that that this distinction in antecedent regime type—communist vs. non-communist—is a tidy and sufficient explanation for the variation we see in democracy’s survival between these two countries. In other words, the legacy of communism was too heavy for Russia to overcome, while Indonesia’s authoritarian legacy was not as burdensome, making for an easier democratic transition.

In this chapter, I analyze the ways in which antecedent regime type might have influenced the trajectories taken by Russia and Indonesia following initial democratization. Is the survival of Indonesian democracy over time simply a consequence of the fact that Suharto’s New Order was less repressive than the Soviet regime? Did Suharto’s New Order possess other attributes absent in the Soviet Union that facilitated democratization? In analyzing the potential effects of Russia’s and Indonesia’s pre-transition regimes, I conceptualize “antecedent regime” as a bundling of several specific variables that could conceivably exert force either directly on democracy’s survival, or on the independent variables I have identified as causally important for democracy’s survival: political participation, engagement in civil society, a sense of political efficacy, and trust in political institutions. Only if differences between Russia’s communist and Indonesia’s New Order legacies sufficiently explain variation in these variables can we consider antecedent regime type a satisfactory explanation for the divergence in democracy’s survival in these countries.

In conceptualizing the role of antecedent regime in democracy’s survival, this chapter engages several questions. First, does communism produce legacies that are distinct from those of other authoritarian regimes, namely Indonesia’s New Order regime? Second, did Russia’s communist history necessarily leave the country at a more disadvantaged position than Indonesia on the brink of democratization? Alternatively, did Indonesia’s New Order regime produce legacies that gave this country a distinct advantage over Russia in terms of democratization? Together, these questions consider the extent to which Russia’s and Indonesia’s authoritarian histories can be reasonably invoked as explanations for the failure and success of democracy in these countries. Studies pointing to Indonesia’s New Order regime as beneficial to democratization are indeed uncommon, yet the parallels between Russia’s authoritarian past and
present are frequently cited as evidence of a plausible causal link between its communist history and the country’s post-Soviet return to authoritarian governance. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to view a legacy explanation for Russia’s authoritarian reversal as over-determined. Communism itself varied dramatically across regimes, and within the Soviet Union’s republics. The success of many countries in the Balkans, such as Bulgaria and Romania, in building sustainable democracies after repressive communist regimes suggests that the relationship between a communist history and regime type is more complex than a simple legacy explanation permits.

In investigating the inheritances that Russia and Indonesia received from their respective antecedent regimes, this analysis presents a framework for evaluating the effect of communism on democracy. First, a structured comparison between a former communist and non-communist authoritarian regime allows us to differentiate between historical legacies that are identifiably communist versus those that might apply to repressive political regimes more broadly. Second, this comparison helps illuminate some of communism’s potentially positive legacies—factors that are frequently overlooked by scholars analyzing the post-communist region in isolation. This chapter aims to provide an alternative view to claims that overstate communist antecedents’ causal importance, thereby setting up the analysis for the primary independent variables that will be discussed in the remainder of this dissertation.

This chapter has three sections. In the first section, I introduce methodological and conceptual issues that must be considered when evaluating historical arguments. The second section identifies relevant positive and negative factors Russia and Indonesia inherited after the collapse of their respective authoritarian regimes. The final section of the chapter analyzes whether these positive and negative inheritances can be considered potential causes of regime outcomes in post-Soviet Russia and post-Suharto Indonesia.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGACIES AND REGIME CHANGE

**Legacies and Critical Antecedents: an Analytical Framework**

Since the collapse of communism across Eurasia, a variety of political regimes have emerged, from robust democracies in East-Central Europe, to mixed hybrid regimes in parts of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans, to reconstituted authoritarian systems in Belarus, Russia, and much of Central Asia. In seeking explanations to the variation in regime outcomes across the post-communist world, a growing body of literature finds that differences in communist-era institutions and norms shape the context in which decisions are made and helps determine which institutional choices are conducive to reform. Consequently, greater causal weight has been attributed to so-called “legacies” of communism in understanding post-communist outcomes.

While discussions of Indonesian democratization rarely include historical legacies as potential causal variables, the same logic that antecedent regime conditions may shape democratization outcomes applies to non-communist polities as well. Thus, in comparing post-Soviet Russia and post-Suharto Indonesia, we need to consider the extent to which their respective authoritarian histories may have had an immutable effect on their prospects for democratization.

Yet, as several scholars have argued (Kopstein, 2003, 2009; Minkenberg, 2009) the causal force of legacies is at times over-stated. In the case of Russia, broad parallels between the institutional configurations and patterns of societal behavior during the post-communist era and earlier historical periods are regularly invoked as evidence of the shadow communism casts over
contemporary politics. Scholars are at times remiss in their efforts to establish a causal relationship between history and the present. It is easy to identify broad continuities between eras, yet much harder to distinguish causal mechanisms. Large-N cross-national statistical analyses that include a dummy variable for “communist” or “Soviet” establish their inferential leverage precisely on such continuities. Determining whether these correlations are indeed a product of historical causes and not more proximate circumstances, however, is a much greater challenge.

Moreover, legacy arguments are also vulnerable to infinite causal regress. Once we identify a set of independent variables that may be responsible for variation in a post-communist outcome of interest, we are tempted to look at the next, earlier step in the causal chain that led to the variation in our causal variables. Doing so involves trekking up a slippery slope. Slater and Simmons wisely note, “Causal inference demands that we clearly differentiate causal from non-causal antecedents” (Slater & Simmons, 2010, p. 889). As several scholars have identified, a lack of shared standards in the literature that seeks to evaluate legacies in a comparative framework presents an obstacle to analyzing the role of historical antecedents in the study of post-communist politics.

Therefore, in order to rigorously assess the causal importance of antecedent regime type in explaining the difference in democratic survival observed in Russia and Indonesia, it is necessary to establish an analytical framework for comparing the effects of the Soviet and Suharto regimes. Several recent articles on historical legacies and critical antecedents provide a useful starting point for building this framework.

First, what is a legacy? Wittenberg suggests that for any phenomenon to qualify as a historical legacy, it must exist in two different periods, though it can be temporally discontinuous (Wittenberg, 2010). Thus, if we are concerned with communist legacies’ impact on Russia’s post-communist politics, the features of communism we hypothesize as influencing the post-communist outcome must be present in both the communist and post-communist periods. Similarly, if we are interested in understanding the impact of the New Order regime’s legacies on post-Suharto Indonesia, the potential independent variable that arose during New Order must be present in the post-Suharto era as well. The same logic applies to potential legacies of earlier periods, such as Russia’s pre-communist legacy or Indonesia’s colonial legacy. If the phenomenon does not exist in two time periods, it cannot be considered a legacy and therefore cannot be exerting causal force.

Additionally, Wittenberg draws attention to the concept of “potential legacies” that never materialize. In the field of post-communist studies, scholars pay relatively little attention to why some phenomena become legacies while others do not. One could make the same argument about postcolonial or post-authoritarian legacies. The idea that there are potential legacies that do not materialize after a critical juncture is important for considering antecedent regime as a competing hypothesis for the failure of Russian democracy to survive. When communism collapsed in the Soviet Union, it was not immediately apparent which legacies would emerge and which would disappear. It was possible to hypothesize that legacies hostile to democratization would persist and overwhelm democratization attempts. Yet, it was also a hypothetical possibility that legacies ancillary to democratization might persist and facilitate democratization. Determining which legacies did emerge is a task requiring empirical analysis. Only if we consider potential legacies that did not emerge is it possible to understand the overall effect of antecedent regime on democracy’s survival in Russia and Indonesia.
In a particularly useful discussion, Slater and Simmons categorize antecedent conditions into four logical types, two of which meet the criteria for Wittenberg’s “potential legacies.” The first are antecedent conditions that represent background similarities, i.e. “control” variables in a paired comparison. The second are critical antecedents, which the authors define as “factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine with causal forces during a critical juncture to produce long-term divergence in outcomes” (Slater & Simmons, 2010, p. 889). This categorization helps us to consider which potential legacies might be causally relevant. In the following two sections, I will examine which background similarities Russia and Indonesia share, as well as which antecedent regime conditions could be plausible critical antecedents.

Slater and Simmons note that critical antecedents interact with critical junctures in two possible ways to produce a causal force. In the first instance, critical antecedents are “successive causes.” That is, they have a direct effect on the causal process. In the specific context of democracy’s survival in post-communist Russia and post-Suharto Indonesia, however, I see few examples of these types of critical antecedents. The second possible interaction is that of “conditioning causes,” which “are conditions that vary before a critical juncture and predispose (but do not predestine) cases to diverge as they ultimately do” (Slater & Simmons, 2010, p. 891). Conditioning causes “help to determine the differential causal effect of the independent variable across cases when the critical juncture exogenously comes about” (Slater & Simmons, 2010, p. 891). I argue that most of the ways in which the antecedent regime could influence democracy’s survival is through these “conditioning causes,” where the critical juncture is regime change. Specific examples of conditioning causes in Russia and Indonesia will be elaborated on in the second part of this chapter.

A final consideration that needs to be addressed before launching into the empirical analysis of Soviet and New Order legacies is the issue of measurement. How do we measure legacies or critical antecedents? The answer to this question depends on the unit of analysis at which we expect a legacy to operate. More specifically, how do we measure “antecedent regime type” in a way that is more rigorous than “communist” and “non-communist?” As discussed above, “antecedent regime” is, in fact, shorthand for a bundling of variables that might operate at various units of analysis.

A forthcoming article by Pop-Eleches and Tucker offers one approach that helps in identifying the specific legacies bequeathed by an antecedent regime (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2011). The authors make a distinction between individual-level communist legacies and institutional-level legacies that operate on the broader political environment. The institutional approach, they note, views post-communist countries’ “peculiar institutions” as the most important behavior-shaping legacy of communism. Pop-Eleches and Tucker focus on individual-level legacies, which they argue are the consequence of having lived under communist rule and the collapse of communism.

Building further on the difference between individual-level and institutional-level legacies, we must ask how these legacies can have a causal impact on an outcome of interest, namely democratic survival. What are the mechanisms by which institutional legacies can influence whether democracy survives past a country’s initial transition or reverts back to authoritarianism? The first and most straightforward mechanism is what I will term “inheritance.” Generally speaking, “inheritance” applies to possible institutional-level legacies. Regimes undergoing political transition might choose to adopt new political institutions, or they might reform ones they inherited. The logic of building on institutions inherited by earlier regimes underpins the hypothesis that countries with a British colonial legacy are better
positioned to achieve democratic survival than former colonies of other empires. There is considerable room for agency in the process of adopting political institutions, however, and it would be unwise to classify institutional similarities between old and new regimes as exclusively the consequence of inheritance.

A second possible mechanism for a legacy to influence democratic survival is through what I will term “reproduction.” Indeed, institutions can be reproduced by political elites who use their agency to recreate systems similar to those that existed in the previous authoritarian regimes. In fact, various analysts view Vladimir Putin’s recentralization of federal power in Russia as a recreation of the Soviet administrative system. Reproduction, however, is more commonly the mechanism by which individual-level legacies are transmitted. Patterns of behavior that were commonplace under authoritarianism and are replicated after the destruction of the authoritarian regime that gave rise to them can be thought of as legacies transmitted by reproduction. For example, voting in highly restrictive elections was a common expectation of citizens of both the Soviet and New Order regimes. Choosing not to vote in these elections was viewed as a form of political resistance. If individuals continue to vote in elections because they believe not voting would be an act of resistance, this behavior can be thought of as an authoritarian legacy transmitted by reproduction. Incidentally, the high levels of voter turnout in post-Soviet Russia and post-Suharto Indonesia may be partially the effect of such a legacy.

Lastly, in the context of democratic survival, institutional and individual-level legacies may be related. Institutions—inherited or created—provide incentives for certain types of mass and elite behavior that shape the contours of government. When we think about the impact of former or inherited communist institutions on post-authoritarian democratization, these legacies are most likely transmitted through individual-level behavior, as described by Pop-Eleches and Tucker. Therefore, building on these authors’ insights, I argue that in evaluating the effect of historical antecedents on post-authoritarian regime development, it is necessary to consider how individual-level behavior is influenced by communist and non-communist authoritarian inheritances. Ultimately, the only extent to which authoritarian-era institutions matter for democratization is how they influence individuals, thereby engendering potential individual-level legacies. Both the Soviet and New Order regimes influenced individual-level attitudes and behaviors in a variety of ways, which I will explore in the second part of this chapter.

**Historical Legacies: an Incomplete Explanation of Democracy’s Survival**

What historical legacies were bequeathed to Russian and Indonesian citizens from the Soviet and New Order regimes? Were these legacies unique, or can aspects of the inheritances be thought of as functional equivalents? Within the field of post-communist studies, one argument frequently offered as an explanation for Russia’s failure to build a lasting democracy is its communist past, which purportedly obstructs the steps that link modernization to democracy. In his well-known articulation of the perils of the “Leninist legacy,” Jowitt highlights the “fragmented, mutually suspicious, societies with little religio-cultural support for tolerant and individually self-reliant behavior; and of a fragmented region made up of countries that view each other with animosity” (Jowitt, 1992, p. 304). Other scholars have bemoaned “authoritarian collectivism” (Meyer, 2003), “a culture of impersonal measured action” (Jowitt, 1992, p. 291), a “free-lunch mentality” (Porket, 1995), and numerous other ills associated with the structures, institutions, and norms that took shape during the communist period, all of which contribute to “an authoritarian, not a liberal democratic capitalist, way of life” (Jowitt, 1992, p. 293).
One shortcoming of explaining Russia’s post-Soviet return to authoritarianism by invoking the communist past is that it engages in a selective application of the evidence. In a review essay on post-communist democratization, Kopstein asks, “is it not possible that the Leninist legacy may be both bad and good?” (Kopstein, 2003, p. 233). He notes that an explanation about the impact of legacies on particular outcomes should specify whether a legacy was positive or negative. In fact, when we think in terms of democratization theory and the conditions that generally promote democratic survival, Russia at the end of the Soviet era actually was in possession of many attributes favorable to democratization, such as a highly educated and urbanized population and low levels of socioeconomic inequality.

Similarly, in what ways is a communist history a greater impediment to building democracy than a history of non-communist authoritarianism? The primary argument for the exceptional effects of a communist legacy rests on two interrelated pillars. The first pillar is the all-encompassing ideology of communism, which promoted a thorough transformation of public and private life not generally seen in non-communist authoritarian regimes. The second pillar is the pervasiveness of communist regimes in all aspects of people’s lives, which is thought to be more extensive than that demonstrated by other types of authoritarianism (Linz, 2000; Linz & Stepan, 1996). Yet, this argument raises two questions worthy of consideration. First, were all communist regimes identical in the level of transformation they accomplished and the degree of pervasiveness they exercised? Second, can non-communist regimes be transformative and pervasive in a way that has effects for society similar to those experienced in communist regimes? Scholars have identified considerable variation across communist regimes with regard to numerous aspects of their political, economic, bureaucratic, and social organization, as well as detected other non-communist, transformative regimes, such as Ataturk’s Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

When we return to the specific comparison of Russia’s and Indonesia’s post-authoritarian regime trajectories, the potential role of legacies becomes particularly intriguing. On the one hand, the presence of a communist history in Russia and its absence in Indonesia correlates with these countries’ regime outcomes in ways that a legacy theory would predict: Russia is less democratic than Indonesia. Yet, on the other hand, several of the features of the Soviet regime that are hypothesized to have engendered negative legacies for democracy in Russia have parallels in Indonesia’s New Order. Though non-communist, the New Order regime was ideologically grounded and penetrated Indonesian society with a high degree of pervasiveness. The pro-Suharto Golkar party, together with the military, successfully monitored society’s movements down to individual neighborhoods. While Soviet schoolchildren learned loyalty to communism through schools and participation in Pioneer scouts, Indonesian children were educated about the national ideology, *pancasila*, whose principles were reinforced in their own scouting organization, Gerakan Pramuka.¹

These are but a few examples of several meaningful similarities shared by the post-Stalin Soviet and New Order systems. First, both regimes had ideological underpinnings that were incorporated into regime principles, inscribed in the constitution, and drawn upon for mass mobilization. Second, the Soviet and New Order regimes regulated political relationships between state and society very closely, leading to a high degree of government penetration into private life. Both were “mobilizing regimes.” In contrast to voluntary forms of political participation, which are undertaken by citizens freely and willingly on their own initiative,

¹ The word “pramuka” is an abbreviation of three words, “praja muda karana.” Gerakan Pramuka can be translated as “Movement of Young People Willing to Work.”
mobilized participation refers to participation sponsored and guided by the government to enhance its welfare or legitimize its claim to power (Conge, 1988, p. 241). While voluntary participation, which I will elaborate on in greater detail in chapter 4, comes from below, mobilized participation is dictated by the government, which can exact a price for non-participation. In the Soviet Union and New Order Indonesia, citizens were mobilized by the regime to participate in social, civic, and political life in distinct ways or otherwise incur meaningful sanctions.

Mobilized participation took several forms. In both countries elections were highly orchestrated events devoid of meaningful competition, yet high levels of participation were expected. Consequently, choosing not to participate in elections was viewed as an act of defiance. Citizen participation was also mobilized for civic and social initiatives as well. In the Soviet Union, individuals were expected to show their loyalty to the regime by voting in elections, marching in May Day and Revolution Day parades, and fulfilling designated “social responsibilities” (общественная нагрузка) aimed at building communism. Under New Order, Indonesians were expected to vote in general elections and otherwise devote their energies in economic development. Civil servants were supposed to be active supporters or members of Golkar. Regime elites in both countries feared the potential of masses left to their own devices and sought to counter this perceived threat by marshalling people to carry out specific tasks and projects as a way of gauging support and identifying non-compliers who could be penalized. The repercussions of not participating were indeed pervasive. An individual or members of his/her family could be prevented from advancing professionally, gaining admission to competitive schools or universities, or receiving access to coveted consumer goods or other scarce resources.

Although the general contours of mobilized participation and their effects for Soviet and Indonesian citizens were similar, the Soviet and New Order regimes exhibited a difference with regard to the organization of the hegemonic parties that were the key transmitter for mobilization. The only political party allowed to exist in the Soviet Union was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), making the USSR a genuine single-party state. For most of its history, the New Order regime, in contrast, permitted three political parties. In addition to the pro-Suharto Golkar, two other political parties were allowed to exist, the Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI) and the United Development Party (PPP). The presence of multiple parties under New Order should not, however, be misconstrued as a sign of political pluralism. PDI and PPP were not allowed to have party branches at the local level; their leaders and candidates were screened by the government for acceptability; and party members were frequently corrupted or co-opted. Only Golkar could win elections and hold political control, making Indonesia effectively a single-party regime. As I will discuss later in this chapter, the presence of more than one party in the authoritarian era became meaningful for Indonesian democracy only after Suharto resigned. The presence of more than one party produced an unintended legacy effect: an organizational structure that reformists could capitalize on once democratic reforms were introduced.

In addition to their similarities in mobilizing participation, the Soviet and New Order regimes were also alike in their extensive political repression and the use of police forces to suppress perceived political threats, yet another example of the pervasiveness of the regimes in individuals’ lives. In the Soviet Union this took the form of the Committee for State Security (KGB), while in Indonesia the army was granted a “dual function” role where it served as protector against both external and internal enemies. The most brutal period of repression in Indonesia was in 1965-1966, in which at least half a million alleged sympathizers of the
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) were killed and thousands more were imprisoned for over a decade. Yet, throughout the following decades, Suharto’s regime engaged in less violent forms of repression that effectively served to prevent meaningful mass opposition from developing. In spite of the fact that the number of Soviet victims of political repression undoubtedly exceeded that of Indonesian victims, the level of repression under New Order had a similar effect on the political environment: making individuals fearful to express dissent and therefore deterring organized political opposition. Consequently, if we think about rigid political mobilization and repression as “conditioning causes” that might influence individual-level attitudes and behaviors, we should not necessarily expect dramatic differences between Russians and Indonesians at the onset of democratic transition. Both regimes succeeded in establishing an omnipresent role in their citizens’ lives.

In addition to these negative legacies, the Soviet and New Order regimes also share a similarity that could generate positive legacies for democratization: modernization. While the Soviets’ modernization project was grounded in the grand theory of building communism, Suharto’s modernization enterprise was aimed at more immediate practical considerations, such as increasing economic development, reducing poverty, and limiting population growth. Nevertheless, the outcomes of these two projects had relatively similar effects for their respective populations, engendering a dramatic transformation of society. My interview respondents, particularly older individuals with longer life experience, frequently credited the Soviet and New Order regimes for improving their quality of life, noting that they had lived much better than their parents’ generation.

The Soviet Union’s success in expanding literacy and education are well-known, and the regime had achieved nearly universal literacy by the 1970s. By 1990, 54 percent of the student-age population in Russia was enrolled in tertiary education, one of the highest levels in the world (World Bank). Although Indonesia’s overall level of modernization does not rival Russia’s, striking progress took place under New Order. By the time Suharto left power in 1998, Indonesia had recorded annual economic growth rates for nearly three decades, and access to education, health care, and the benefits of economic development had expanded dramatically across the country. According to UNESCO, in 1970, 1.8 percent of the adult population in Russia was illiterate, compared to 43.9 percent of the adult population in Indonesia. The Indonesian illiteracy rate was cut in half by 1990 (20.5 percent) and more than halved again by 2010 (8.3 percent) (UNESCO Institute for Statistics). This rapid increase in literacy occurred primarily as a consequence of major education programs launched in the mid-1970s and 1980s that significantly expanded Indonesians’ access to primary-school education (Jalal & Sardjunani, 2007). Thus, the increases in educational attainment under both the Soviet and New Order regimes contributed to the cultivation of societies in possession of broader skills and knowledge that could be applied to political participation.

Bearing in mind these similarities, we will now turn to an analysis of the specific positive and negative inheritances that Russia and Indonesia received from their previous authoritarian regimes.

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2 The PKI was a formidable political force in Indonesia prior to the purges. According to Liddle (1987, p. 128), the PKI once had nearly 24 million members. It won 16.4 percent of the vote in the 1955 parliamentary elections, the last elections held before 1971. The PKI was the largest non-ruling communist party in the world prior to the purges.
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SOVIET AND NEW ORDER LEGACIES

Identifying Potential Communist Legacies

In this section I will identify the potential positive and negative legacies of communism that could theoretically affect the outcome of democratic survival in Russia and articulate hypotheses for how these legacies could exert causal leverage. We can think of these potential legacies as possible conditioning causes that may have acted as critical antecedents at the time of regime change, thereby influencing the failure of Russian democracy. Starting with the negative inheritances, there are two political and two social antecedents that are relevant for our discussion.

The two political antecedents were discussed in the previous section: mobilized participation and political repression. Mobilized participation is hypothesized to depress citizens’ willingness to voluntarily participate in new forms of democratic politics as a consequence of their Soviet-era experiences of being compelled to participate in large-scale pro-regime activities. According to this hypothesis, voluntary participation is depressed in part because of participation fatigue and in part because individuals are skeptical about the efficacy or utility of participation. A similar hypothesis relates to the antecedent of a politically repressive state. According to this hypothesis, the communist experience of political repression has instilled in individuals a fear about participating in politics. Lack of participation, in turn, hinders democratic survival by failing to constrain elite excesses.

These two historical antecedents—mobilized participation and a politically repressive state—are not themselves legacies. Mobilized participation and political repression did not carry over from the Soviet to the post-Soviet Russian political regime. Rather, the individual-level experience of having lived in a political system where these two institutional factors dominated the relationship between individuals and the regime is a legacy, and may have shaped the attitudes and behaviors of post-Soviet Russians in ways that could stymie democracy by limiting voluntary political participation.

Two social antecedents may operate in a similar manner. The first is the highly structured organization of civic life in the Soviet Union. As numerous scholars have documented, Soviet civic life was very regimented, and the state coerced participation in unions, work collectives, and various other activities by imposing meaningful sanctions against those who did not “volunteer.” The regimentation of civic life died with the Soviet Union, but as Howard has argued, the lived experience of such regimentation depressed post-Soviet participation in voluntary organizations and increased mistrust about organizations, including political parties (Howard, 2003). Similarly, the Soviet state’s monopolization on organizational life has bred post-Soviet behavioral norms where individuals feel they cannot develop independent loci of power. In particular, as I will show in chapter 5, individuals are disinclined to allocate money or voluntary labor to community causes, including politics.

A second social antecedent that may influence post-Soviet democratization in Russia is the experience of state destruction of organized religious groups. As with the other political and social institutions described above, state repression of organized religion died with the Soviet Union. Indeed, one could argue that Russia has experienced a meaningful religious revival in the past two decades. Yet, state destruction of organized religious groups during the Soviet era

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3 While it is indeed arguable that the current Russian political regime has adopted methods of both repression and forced mobilization, these are not phenomena that carried over immediately following the collapse of communism, but rather emerged in post-Soviet Russia after a period of meaningful political freedom.
decimated religious communities and the social relationships that emanate from them. In effect, Soviet policy on religion, which was implemented more forcefully in Russia than other Soviet republics, incapacitated the one type of mass-based civic voluntary organization that existed prior to communism—worship groups.

When evaluating the potential negative legacies of communism on Russia’s post-Soviet democratic development, scholars have paid much more attention to the state monopolization of civic life than to the destruction of organized religious groups. This latter legacy, however, may exert an equally important influence. As Verba, Schlozman, and Brady argue, involvement in church organizations is often an important stepping stone for political participation in the United States (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Putnam and Campbell have found that Americans who attend religious services more regularly are more likely to volunteer for both religious and secular causes (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). The relationship between religious involvement and political participation is twofold. First, churches provide an important opportunity for individuals to build the civic skills that enable them to participate in politics effectively. Second, they are incorporated into a larger social network—including civic and secular networks—that provides them with greater opportunities to be recruited into political participation. By destroying organized religious groups and placing meaningful social sanctions on individuals who openly practiced their religion, the Soviet Union effectively closed a primary locus of independent interaction between individuals. Regardless of the denomination or content of the belief structure, religious practice brings people together, which is necessary for any form of collective action. Consequently, when Russia emerged from communism, it lacked a set of communities that had the basic experience of being brought together for the simple goal of collective worship—an experience that can often serve as a building block for other collective endeavors, including voluntary political participation.

Both the state monopolization of civic life and the destruction of organized religious groups, which are examples of social repression, are hypothesized to influence democratization in similar ways. Several scholars have hypothesized that low levels of engagement in social and civic life impair interest aggregation and voluntarism in the political process (Bunce, McFaul, & Stoner-Weiss, 2010; Diamond, 1999; Putnam, 2000). While the specific role of engagement in religious organizations has received significantly less attention, I would further hypothesize that low levels of participation in religious groups can also depress political participation in similar ways. As I will demonstrate in chapter 5, the practice of organized religion constitutes a primary form of community interaction through which individuals can be recruited to take part in civic and political acts. Although there is no consensus within the field of comparative politics about the necessity of civil society for democracy’s survival, those scholars who do see robust civic engagement as a factor that facilitates democratization view the Soviet legacies of state monopolization of civic life and destruction of religious communities as particular obstacles for Russian democracy.

While much of the literature connecting communist legacies to democratization has focused on the ways that inheritances from communism present obstacles to building democracy,
little attention has been paid to potential positive legacies. Yet, there are numerous aspects of the modernization that occurred during the Soviet period that may be useful in building democracy. As mentioned in chapter 1, Russia has high values on many of the traditional indicators of modernization, including relatively high levels of socioeconomic development, urbanization, industrialization, and educational attainment—all of which were a consequence of the Soviet Union’s ambitious social and economic policies. Consequently, at the end of the Soviet era, Russia had very high levels of educational attainment—a factor that many scholars believe can be important for the development of civic skills necessary for political participation. Additionally, by the time the Soviet Union collapsed, most Russians worked in the industrial or professional sphere and lived in cities. According to modernization theory, greater industrialization and urbanization further facilitate high levels of literacy and education. Individuals working in non-agrarian occupations often have more leisure time, which together with urban density facilitates opportunities for individuals to gather into groups and organizations where they spread information and are exposed to different perspectives. This sort of interaction is believed to facilitate mass-level engagement and participation in political life. Both educational attainment and a high volume of leisure time are legacies that operate on the individual level. For the most part, these two features were present at the end of the Soviet era and can be thought of as true legacies of communism.

Two other communist-era institutional inheritances in Russia might also be conducive to democratic survival. The first is a low level of socioeconomic inequality. Several pieces of scholarship have identified a positive relationship between low levels of socioeconomic inequality and democratic survival (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix & Stokes, 2003; P. H. Smith, 2005). In theory, Russia’s low levels of inequality at the outset of democratization should have contributed to a more diffuse playing field that would allow for the inclusion of a broad set of political actors. Additionally, low inequality is thought to act against public demands for redistributive policies that threaten the interests of the economically and politically powerful, who might seek authoritarian means to ensure that their property is protected.

The second positive artifact of communism is the leadership training structure that was part of climbing the Communist Party ladder. Almost all Soviet schoolchildren first joined the Pioneers (scouts organization) and then the Communist Youth League, which was more popularly known by its Russian acronym, the Komsomol. In the Komsomol, the CPSU identified young talent and sought to promote it. For this reason, there is a tendency to view the Komsomol as a political artifact associated with communist institutions offering no utility for the project of building democracy. Yet, for young adults, particularly university students and young professionals, active participation in the Komsomol proved an important training ground for developing organizational, management, and public speaking skills. Once political competition was open to a broader set of actors, former Komsomol activists were able to take their skills and talents in a multitude of directions. The collapse of the CPSU, however, meant the end of wide-reaching leadership training for young adults. Consequently, we must think of this legacy as being limited to only the portion of the Soviet population that had reached adulthood by the late 1980s. As such, there was a relatively short time horizon when this legacy could have exerted causal force.

In sum, when we think about the potential legacies of Soviet communism that could have influenced Russian democratization, we find four potential negative antecedents and four potential positive antecedents. Table 3.1 summarizes these factors and the mechanisms by which they could be transmitted to have an impact on democratic survival.
Table 3.1: Hypothesized Communist Inheritances in Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative Antecedents</th>
<th>Transmission Mechanism</th>
<th>Positive Antecedents</th>
<th>Transmission Mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobilized participation</td>
<td>Individuals’ lived experience contributes to a lack of interest in political participation and a belief that it is inefficacious.</td>
<td>High levels of education</td>
<td>Individuals’ lived experience leads to a highly educated society with substantial civic skills that could be deployed for political participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically repressive state</td>
<td>Individuals’ lived experience leads them to be distrustful of participating in politics.</td>
<td>High volume of leisure time</td>
<td>Free time could conceivably be employed for political and civic participation that supports the functioning of democracy over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State monopolization of civic life</td>
<td>Individuals’ lived experience contributes to a lack of interest in engaging in civic life and distrust in formal organizations.</td>
<td>Low levels of socio-economic inequality</td>
<td>At the outset of democratization, low levels of socioeconomic inequality among citizens reduce pressure for divisive redistribution policies, which can be politically destabilizing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State destruction of organized religious groups</td>
<td>Individuals’ lived experience did not include participation in worship communities, which are often the locus for political mobilization in democracies.</td>
<td>Leadership training system</td>
<td>Individuals’ experience in Komsomol generates a potential class of political and civic leaders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Identifying Potential New Order Legacies

Having discussed potential causal legacies from the communist era, I now turn to identifying which factors from Suharto’s New Order regime could potentially affect Indonesia’s democratic survival following the regime’s collapse in 1998. As with the case of Soviet legacies, we should question whether these factors can be thought of as critical antecedents that have played a causal role in Indonesia’s democracy. There are three negative inheritances from New Order. The first two are political features that are similar to those found in the Soviet Union: mobilized participation and a politically repressive state. In these cases, the hypotheses about Indonesia’s experience are the same as the hypotheses about post-Soviet Russia—the lived experience of mobilized participation and political repression should dampen voluntary participation after democratization.

Political participation under New Order was dictated by a strict code of mobilization and de-mobilization. De-mobilization was achieved by a policy that prevented political parties from organizing at the village level except to campaign the month before elections. Underpinning this concept was the idea that the low educational level of Indonesian peasants made it inappropriate for them to become involved in politics (Samson, 1973, pp. 32-33). This policy created a “floating mass” of rural dwellers that could be mobilized to vote for Golkar every five years. While technically Golkar was held to the same limits on organization, its “functional groups” could operate uninhibited. These groups comprised a broad set of organizations active among...
different constituencies, including youth, Muslims, and professional associations, which sought to orchestrate controlled civic engagement. Moreover, Golkar was essentially the mobilized civilian bureaucracy, organized down to village officials, and further supported by the local military. Forms of political participation other than voting were repressed, and protests were put down with force. The deep level of societal penetration and surveillance provided by the bureaucracy and military fostered a system in which participation was mobilized when desired by the regime, and otherwise repressed. Such a lived experience could conceivably depress voluntary political participation and contribute to skeptical attitudes toward participation. Likewise, having lived through political repression under New Order might make citizens fearful about participating in politics, thereby depressing political participation under democratization. Both of these potential inheritances could create legacies of low participation, which in turn could hinder democratic survival.

Indonesia’s third negative inheritance—high levels of poverty—differs from the Soviet experience. Establishing cross-national indicators of poverty is particularly challenging given dramatic variations in consumption, earning, and pricing practices both within and across countries. In recent years, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme have created several indicators that look at poverty and human development in a comprehensive way, but developing comparable measures from before 1990 is challenging. Nevertheless, regardless of which measure we look at, Indonesia’s levels of poverty outstrip what we see in Russia. For example, the average caloric intake per day—a rough measure of undernourishment and poverty—was 1,870 for Indonesians in the mid-1960s, compared to 3,180 for Soviet citizens (United Nations, 1971, p. 520, p. 523). If we consider the percentage of the population that is undernourished, in Indonesia the figure was 19 percent in 1990, 17 percent in 2000, and 16 percent in 2006. The analogous figure in Russia was less than five percent for the same periods (United Nations Development Program). Lastly, in 2005 the poverty gap at $2/day at purchasing power parity had a mean shortfall of 17.3 percent for Indonesia and 0.5 percent for Russia (World Bank). As discussed above, high levels of poverty and low levels of development can make it harder for democracy to survive over time, in part because basic socioeconomic vulnerability immobilizes a significant portion of the electorate. Additionally, high levels of poverty impedes the modernization that often leads to greater levels of education, dissemination of information, and, ultimately, political participation. It is worth noting, however, that high levels of poverty predated Suharto, making this feature a pre-New Order legacy. Most indicators show that human development improved under New Order, though we do not have good data to easily verify this claim.

What about possible positive legacies? As with the Soviet regime in Russia, New Order also bequeathed several attributes that could arguably have a positive impact on democratization in Indonesia. The first feature is a social institutional legacy that New Order shares with the Soviet regime: a broad expansion in education. This legacy had the important effect of increasing individual-level capacity among Indonesians. While Indonesians did not achieve the level of educational attainment found in Russia, the number of individuals receiving formal educational training has increased dramatically over the past forty years. More widespread educational attainment contributes to the spread of civic skills for political participation, making them more diffuse across the population. Consequently, as the literacy rates noted above demonstrate, the average educational level of Indonesians at the eve of democratization was dramatically higher than the level observed when Suharto came to power. The mean years of schooling for Indonesians aged fifteen and above had more than doubled from 1.83 in 1965 to 4.55 in 1995
(World Bank). In the case of Indonesia, however, the expansion of education has yielded another, separate effect: it provided the catalyst for the development and mobilization of powerful student movements. These student movements were an important factor in marshaling the mass protests that culminated in Suharto’s resignation.

Another positive political legacy from New Order is the presence of more than one political party. As discussed above, Indonesia’s authoritarian political institutions, though lacking in genuine competition, included more than one party. The presence of more than one party was an artifact of the pre-Suharto era when Indonesia had a few brief years of political openness. Suharto fused together the nine political parties that participated in the 1971 Indonesian elections, effectively marginalizing opposition without directly banning all political parties. While the pro-Suharto Golkar party was the only political party that was allowed to hold any power in Indonesia’s rubber-stamp legislature, PDI and PPP were allowed to exist and hold some seats. As Slater describes, Suharto artfully employed several moves “to bleed the existing parties of support and influence, without taking the potentially explosive step of banning well-established institutions outright” (Slater, 2010, p. 147). Even though PDI and PPP were barred from gaining meaningful political power under New Order, their presence was visible to Indonesian citizens. Over time they developed party organizations and networks, as well as names and symbols that were familiar to the Indonesian population. Consequently, when Suharto resigned and genuine multi-party competition was introduced, these parties inherited a structure and symbols that proved to be valuable resources for mobilizing the electorate and engaging in genuine political opposition. This stands in stark contrast to the Soviet Union, where the CPSU was the only political party allowed to exist. When multi-party competition became permissible in Russia, all parties and electoral blocs were starting from scratch in building a visible presence and rapport with the electorate, creating a steeper learning curve for voters.

Two other social antecedents that could be viewed as helpful to Indonesia’s democratization are the presence of independent civic activity and tolerance of religious practice. Both of these features, it should be noted, predate the New Order era and survived throughout it. In contrast to the Soviet Union, Indonesia’s New Order did not have a monopoly on all civic and associational life. The state did promote several types of organizations, including Women’s Family Welfare Groups (known commonly by their Indonesian acronym PKK) and neighborhood associations, yet some independent groups were allowed to exist as well—as long as they did not present a potential threat to Suharto’s rule. Even though Suharto sought to repress social organizations that were perceived as a menace to the New Order regime’s hegemony, the state did not seek to control all social life. Voluntary organizations existed and many flourished, including the country’s two largest Muslim charitable organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Similarly, with the exception of restrictions on non-monotheistic faith traditions, such as Confucianism, religious practice in Suharto’s Indonesia was largely free and not overly restrictive. Unlike in Russia, the Indonesian state never sought to destroy organized religious practice. Nevertheless, the dictator’s governing style emphasized Indonesian nationalism and more fundamentalist forms of Islam were not tolerated. Greater freedom to participate in independent voluntary organizations—including religious groups—is hypothesized

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6 Ten parties were allowed to contest the 1971 elections. Most of these parties had existed prior to Suharto’s take over in 1965. In 1973 Suharto forced smaller parties to merge with PDI and PPP, allowing only these two parties to contest general elections together with Golkar.

7 Both of these organizations were founded in the first quarter of the 20th century when Indonesia was still under colonial rule.
to contribute to a general norm of civic and social engagement that could be further mobilized in support of democracy and its survival over time. Table 3.2 provides a summary of Indonesia’s historical inheritances.

Table 3.2: Hypothesized New Order and Pre-New Order Inheritances in Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative Antecedents</th>
<th>Transmission Mechanism</th>
<th>Positive Antecedents</th>
<th>Transmission Mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobilized participation</td>
<td>Individuals’ lived experience contributes to a lack of interest in political participation and a belief that it is inefficacious.</td>
<td>Expansion of education</td>
<td>Individuals’ lived experience led to a society with increased educational attainment and civic skills that could be deployed for political participation. It also led to the creation of formidable student movements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repressive state</td>
<td>Individuals’ lived experience leads them to be distrustful of participating in politics.</td>
<td>Presence of more than one political party</td>
<td>Institutional legacy that could be mobilized for competition. Individuals’ lived experience contributed to identifying these party labels, which assisted with mobilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High levels of poverty</td>
<td>Decreases capacity for political participation and makes individuals vulnerable to populist, authoritarian appeals.</td>
<td>Presence of independent civic activity</td>
<td>Individuals’ lived experience participating in various organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tolerance of religious practice</td>
<td></td>
<td>Individuals’ experience participating in religious life and being part of a religious community.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we compare Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we see that post-Soviet Russia and post-Suharto Indonesia share some similar historical antecedents of potential importance for democratic survival. In the negative columns, both had a history of mobilized participation and political repression, which could theoretically depress interest in political participation in a democracy. In the positive columns, both countries entered their post-authoritarian period with a population that had experienced expanded educational opportunities and therefore might be in a better position to engage in new opportunities to participate in political and civic life. The remaining historical antecedents that might matter for democratic survival, however, are different in Russia and Indonesia. Russia emerged from communism with low levels of socioeconomic inequality, a dearth of independent civic life, and a population that possessed both formidable civic skills and considerable amounts of leisure time. In contrast, Indonesia came out of the New Order era with high levels of poverty, the presence of more than one political party, and some independent civic activity.

Evaluating the potential effects of these historical antecedents is challenging. First, they do not all operate on the same level of analysis. Some historical antecedents, such as a history of repression and mobilized participation, may shape individual-level attitudes and behaviors. Others, such as levels of socioeconomic inequality and the degree of organizational pluralism at the outset of transition, are structural conditions that are generally meaningful at the macro-level of society. Second, the strength of potential legacies is not uniform and different legacies are unlikely to influence prospects for democracy in equal portion. For example, while the lived
experience of mobilized participation likely influenced most adults who lived during the authoritarian era, the legacy of Komsomol leadership training in the Soviet Union is likely only relevant for a significantly smaller segment of the population who have greater inclination to become involved in politics. Third, investigation of potential effects generally involves presumptions about activities that can be difficult to measure, such as individual-level attitudes about specific practices, like joining voluntary organizations. As a first step in untangling these potential effects, however, we should ask which of the above potential legacies were indeed activated in the post-authoritarian era. The presence of a potential legacy in a particular context does not necessarily mean that it is activated to exert a potential causal force on an outcome of interest. In the next section, I will evaluate the extent to which the positive and negative inheritances of the Soviet and New Order regimes were activated in the context of Russian and Indonesian democratization. Once we are able to identify which potential legacies are activated, we can then grapple with the possible strength of their effects.

ACTIVATION OF HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS IN RUSSIA AND INDONESIA

Activation of Legacies in Post-Soviet Russia
How are legacies activated? Wittenberg argues that identification of a phenomenon in two time periods is not sufficient to establish a legacy. Rather, the persistence of a phenomenon in these two time periods must be a consequence of “survival”—that is, “phenomena that continue even after the conditions that originally produced them have disappeared” (Wittenberg, 2010, p. 15). Extending Wittenberg’s logic, I further argue that the presence of a legacy is not sufficient evidence that the respective historical antecedent has exerted causal force on an outcome of interest. In order for causality to be established, we need evidence that the legacy is present and determine that it had the predicted effect on the outcome. If both of these conditions are met, we can consider the legacy as a plausible causal variable. For example, if we consider the Soviet legacy of low levels of socioeconomic inequality, this inheritance could only plausibly influence Russian democratization if two conditions obtain. First, low levels of socioeconomic inequality must “survive” into the post-Soviet era even once the Soviet economic and redistributive policies that produced them have disappeared. Second, this factor must have had a positive influence on Russian democratization by facilitating a broad and inclusive political playing field. As I will argue below, both of these claims are dubious.

In this section, I will look at each of the negative and positive antecedents for post-Soviet Russia and post-Suharto Indonesia and evaluate them against the two criteria described above. First, do these potential legacies survive into the post-authoritarian era? Second, do they influence the democratization process in the manner predicted? I will first evaluate the Soviet inheritances and follow with an analysis of the potential New Order legacies. The forthcoming analysis is based on the findings of other scholars, secondary sources, and my own first-hand interviews with Russian and Indonesian citizens.

As discussed above, mobilized participation and political repression generally ended when the Soviet Union collapsed. Yet the memory of these experiences remained, at least in part, generating the potential for an attitudinal and behavioral legacy to operate at the individual level. Many scholars expressed concern that the history of regulated state-society relations would dampen citizen participation and ultimately stymie democracy in post-Soviet states (Eckstein, Fleron Jr., Hoffman, & Reisinger, 1998; Jowitt, 1992, 1996). Pop-Eleches and Tucker note that mobilized participation under communism was so high that it was logical to expect a decline in
mass voluntary participation following communism’s collapse. Indeed, as I will demonstrate in chapter 4, Russian mass voluntary political participation peaked in the late Soviet period and declined during the 1990s after democratic institutions were introduced. This decline in participation could be a consequence of other factors, however, such as public disillusionment with the early years of democratization or a lack of trust in political institutions as a result of their poor performance (Carnaghan, 2007; Fish, 2001; Rose, Munro, & Mishler, 2004a, 2004b). Information gathered in my citizen interviews does not support the idea that low levels of participation are a consequence of the legacy of mobilized participation. Rather, as I will demonstrate in the next several chapters, I find that Russians’ participation levels are shaped by their overall engagement in civil society, trust in institutions, and sense of political efficacy—all of which have remained low in the post-Soviet era.

Other scholars have also found greater evidence to support the hypothesis that post-Soviet Russians’ low levels of political participation result more from recent disillusionment than from the continuation of fear and exhaustion from Soviet-era politics. As Pop-Eleches and Tucker point out, voluntary political mobilization spiked in 1988-1992 and then declined, and the first post-communist elections generally showed turnout rates of 70 to 80 percent (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2011). These findings are inconsistent with a hypothesis that would attribute low degrees of voluntary mobilization to the legacy of mobilized participation, which is posited to dampen political interest due to the hangover of state-society relations under communism. Further confirmation of the alternative hypothesis is evident in an analysis by Mishler and Rose that uses survey data to test which effect is stronger in post-Soviet Russia: the experience of living under communism or the experience of interacting with new institutions. They conclude that:

Russians’ lifetime socialization into an authoritarian culture by an authoritarian regime is not in itself an insurmountable obstacle to the development of democracy in Russia. This is not to deny the reality of the communist legacy or of Russians’ authoritarian socialization. It is to emphasize that, however they are socialized, individuals have a great capacity to learn from experience the lessons needed to cope with a changing political world (2007, p. 832).

My interview results confirm this distinction as well. The overwhelming majority of my Russian respondents described feeling a sense of excitement and possibility during the period of perestroika and political liberalization. For them, disillusionment, cynicism, and frustration set in later, after they had gained some experience with the new political regime and its shortcomings.

If we apply the same test to the potential negative legacy of state monopolization of civic life in Russia during the Soviet period, we see that this feature of communism also disappeared with the Soviet Union. Independent voluntary organizations of all stripes emerged in the early post-Soviet period. In the 1990s, civil society groups encountered few barriers from the state to organizing their associations and engaging in fundraising and membership activities. Nevertheless, participation in voluntary organizations has lagged in the post-communist region as a whole, and is particularly pronounced in Russia (Howard, 2003; Rose, 2009). In his analysis of this dynamic, Howard finds two root causes: the persistence of Soviet-era friendship networks and low levels of trust in organizations, both of which are evidence of a legacy of state monopolization of civic life. Similarly, Rose, Mishler, and Munro found that in the post-Soviet era, “social capital was more often used to exploit the regime for a family’s benefit than to support it for the collective good” (2006, p. 81). In short, state monopolization of civic life
engendered a practice of inaction, and this legacy persisted and was activated in the post-Soviet era.

If we consider the legacy of state destruction of organized religious groups, we see a mixed picture. Similar to all of the other negative inheritances described above, this policy also died with communism. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russian citizens were granted freedom to believe in and practice their religion. The Russian Orthodox Church has returned as a celebrated national institution. Muslims, Jews, and Catholics have begun to rebuild their religious communities with the return and expansion of worship spaces. Even Protestant missionaries have made inroads among Russian citizens seeking to express long-suppressed religious beliefs. Yet the consequences of the Soviet state’s destruction of organized religious groups in Russia are still felt by those who lived their lives under this policy. In spite of a visible increase of religious symbols in public life and greater opportunities for individuals to attend services in places of worship in the post-Soviet era, only about 4 percent of the population attends religious services at least once per week and only 11 percent belong to a religious organization (World Values Survey 2005). Having not been socialized to participate in religious groups, Russians are slow to develop a habit of collective worship and the development of community that emanates from this practice. Thus, the legacy of state destruction of organized religious groups appears to have been partially activated in post-Soviet Russia as engagement in religious organizations remains significantly lower than what is observed in predominantly Christian countries with similar levels of socioeconomic development. Taken together, we see that the legacies of state monopolization of civic life and the state destruction of organized religious groups have likely dampened engagement in civil society, one of the key independent variables that I argue contributes to democracy’s survival.

What about the positive legacies of Soviet communism? First, high levels of educational attainment have indeed survived the collapse of communism. The Russian population has remained among the most educated in the world. According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 75 percent of the student-age population in Russia was enrolled in tertiary education in 2007 (World Bank). Yet, for high levels of educational attainment to exert a causal force on democratization, we would have to see high levels of mobilization and political participation from a large segment of the educated population. As I will elaborate on further in chapter 4, even though Russia’s average level of education is quite high, the overall level of political participation is low in Russia compared to Indonesia. Widespread education has not translated into broad political activism. In sum, this positive legacy has not been activated to spur ongoing political participation in Russia.

Another positive inheritance from Soviet communism that did not persist into the post-Soviet period was Russians’ high volume of leisure time. In response to a question in the 2005 Keio University Research Survey of Political Society about how respondents spend their free time, 15 percent of Russian respondents reported that they had no free time. Dramatic decreases in leisure time began in the early 1990s when Russia embarked on a transition to a market economy. During this period, the average Russian found that her wages did not keep pace with the cost of living and the social benefits she received as part of the Soviet welfare state were quickly evaporating. These circumstances created a new set of unmet household needs that cut into Russians’ free time. Throughout much of the 1990s—and in some cases to this day—many Russian citizens sought to meet their consumption needs by engaging in substantial home production (usually by growing food on family plots) or taking on jobs in the informal economy to supplement their primary income. According to the 1993 New Russia Barometer, 80 percent
of respondents reported that someone in their household grew food on a plot of land or helped friends or relatives grow food (Rose, 2009, p. 56). As this statistic and testimony from my citizen interviews suggest, Russians had less time to devote to civic and political causes just at the time when their participation was most needed. The feature of high levels of leisure time could not be activated in post-Soviet Russia since it did not survive the collapse of communism.

Similarly, the low levels of socioeconomic inequality found in Russia at the end of the Soviet period did not survive the country’s transition to a market economy. The liberalization of the Russian economy was marked by hyperinflation that wiped out the savings of most Russians. A dramatically flawed privatization scheme created a new economic oligarchy that concentrated much of the country’s productive assets in the hands of a few. According to the 1999 United Nations Human Development Report, Russia’s Gini coefficient deteriorated from 0.24 in 1989 to 0.48 in 1996, representing a significant increase in inequality (United Nations Development Program, 2009, p. 85). Thus, this historical antecedent could not be activated since it did not survive the end of communism long enough to have an impact on democratization. Nevertheless, in spite of this dramatic increase in income inequality, on the whole Russians still remained much wealthier, on average, than Indonesians. For example, during the period 1988-2007, the highest poverty gap at $2/day PPP Russia experienced was in 1996, when the mean shortfall was 3.2 percent. Indonesia has never achieved a poverty gap that low.

One positive inheritance from the communist era did survive into the post-Soviet period, albeit for a brief time: the legacy of leadership training. As mentioned above, the leadership training program of the Komsomol did not survive the collapse of communism, but the experience did live on at the individual level among those who had acquired the training. Indeed, there is ample evidence both from my interviews and the work of other scholars that highlight the importance of skills, networks, and access to infrastructure that participating in the former Communist Party or its auxiliary organizations presented (Fish, 1995; Grzymała-Busse, 2002; Hale, 2006). In political terms, the main beneficiary of these skills and networks was the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), which proved the most formidable opposition in Russia in the 1990s. In the past decade, however, as the political clout of the KPRF has declined, the pro-Kremlin United Russia party has found success in appropriating several of the organizational techniques of the former CPSU, including a leadership-training program (K-17, interview, March 13, 2008; Kr-20, interview, November 26, 2008). In the case of leadership training, we see that this positive legacy was activated in Russia, yet the scope was limited. Only those individuals who had acquired Komsomol leadership training could transmit it in the post-Soviet era. The disappearance of the Komsomol as a public institution after the collapse of CPSU hegemony meant that such skills were not being reproduced in younger generations, and thus were slowly degrading with time. Consequently, this legacy could exert a positive influence only in the first several yeas after the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Table 3.3 summarizes the above analysis. The table is divided into three columns. The first identifies the name of the historical antecedent inherited from the communist era. The second column asks the Wittenberg question—did this antecedent survive the collapse of communism to emerge as a possible legacy in the post-Soviet period? The third column asks whether surviving legacies were activated in the post-Soviet era. The above discussion notes that in some cases a legacy only partially survived or was only partially activated. For parsimony’s sake, any legacy with a partial survival or activation rate is marked as a “yes” in Table 3.3. Only legacies that receive a “yes” in the second and third columns can be thought of as potential

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8 Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) estimate that in 2003, 22 individuals owned 40 percent of Russian industry.
causal factors in explaining Russia’s failure to build a sustainable democracy. We can see from this summary chart that only three potential historical antecedents pass the survival and activation tests to be considered as possible causal variables for Russia’s democratic survival: state monopolization of civic life, state destruction of organized religious groups, and leadership training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical antecedent</th>
<th>Survives collapse of communism?</th>
<th>If survived, then activated in post-Soviet period?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobilized participation (−)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political repression (−)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State monopolization of civic life (−)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State destruction of organized religious groups (−)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High levels of education (+)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High volume of leisure time (+)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low level of socioeconomic inequality (+)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership training (+)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Activation of Legacies in Post-Suharto Indonesia**

Our next task is to conduct the survival and activation test on the seven historical antecedents from Indonesia’s New Order period that could potentially influence democratic survival in that country. Similar to the case in Russia, the mobilized participation and political repression of the New Order era did not survive Suharto’s resignation. Moreover, there is little evidence that individuals’ memories of living under these conditions have hampered their political participation. In fact, as chapters 4 and 6 will demonstrate, my interviews with Indonesian citizens and analysis of Indonesian survey data show that voluntary political participation has increased in the post-Suharto era and is generally met with considerable degrees of enthusiasm and efficacy. Thus, the historical antecedents of mobilized participation and political repression were not activated in Indonesia.

The other potential negative inheritance from the New Order era, high levels of poverty survived Suharto’s resignation. As discussed above, 17 percent of the Indonesian population was undernourished in the year 2000, and this figure had decreased to only 16 percent in 2006 (United Nations Development Program). As of 2007, the poverty gap at $2/day PPP had a mean shortfall of 21.8 percent—an increase over the previous two years. All of these figures are evidence of continued widespread poverty among Indonesians. Has this poverty been activated to stymie democratization? This second question is much more difficult to answer, in part because the relationship between poverty and democracy is not direct, but involves multiple intermediary steps. My citizen interviews suggest that high levels of poverty and vulnerability contribute to clientelism in political competition and a sense of disenfranchisement among the poor. Consequently, Indonesian parties and politicians compete on the basis of distributing selective goods rather than on programmatic appeals. In my interviews with party leaders, the pervasiveness of so-called “money politics” was cited as a threat to Indonesian democracy by politicians of almost all parties. Bearing this evidence in mind, we can tentatively consider the legacy of poverty as activated. The effect of this potential causal variable will be discussed in the following section.

What about possible positive legacies? As is the case with Russia, Indonesia’s achievements in educational attainment survived the collapse of New Order. While Indonesian
educational attainment rates are still much lower than those in advanced industrialized countries like Russia, they have expanded dramatically in the past four decades. According to the World Bank, gross enrollment rate in Russian secondary schools was 95.7 percent in 1981, dropping slightly to 94.8 percent in 1990. Although Indonesia has never enjoyed such a large secondary enrollment rate, the percentage of individuals attending secondary school in Indonesia more than tripled between 1970 (17.5 percent) and 1997 (56.7 percent) (World Bank), contributing to the development of a new generation of young professionals who have the capacity to become involved in politics.

The activation of this expanded educational capacity is evident in the strength of Indonesian student movements, which began organizing during the New Order era, were actively involved in mobilizing mass pressure for Suharto’s resignation, and have continued to remain critical of democratization efforts in the post-Suharto era (Aspinall, 2005; Uhlin, 1997). Indeed, as I will elaborate further in chapter 5, I found that student movements constitute the most important catalyst for linking education to political participation in Indonesia. It is not simply that individuals with more education are more likely to participate than those with less education. I found numerous examples of low-income and less educated citizens participating in Indonesian politics. Rather, students participate at abnormally high rates, thus the effects of their activism may outstrip their numbers. Additionally, students tend to engage in tactics that force greater public scrutiny over elite actions, such as protest and consciousness-raising activities. This form of activism serves to amplify the macro-level effects of individual acts of political participation.

Indonesia’s other potential positive inheritances from New Order—the presence of more than one political party, the presence of independent civic activity, and tolerance of religious practice—all survived the collapse of authoritarianism. Moreover, they were all activated in the post-Suharto era in a manner that provided positive resources for Indonesian democratization. The three political parties that were allowed to exist under New Order (Golkar, PDI, and PPP) capitalized on the party infrastructure and brand that they built in the authoritarian era to maintain a competitive presence as Indonesia democratized. This is particularly true of Golkar and PDI (renamed in the post-Suharto era to PDI-P). PDI-P won the largest number of votes in the first legislative elections held after Suharto’s resignation. Many of the activists in PPP left the party to form and join new Muslim parties, particularly the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN), which were established by members of Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, respectively. Perhaps more importantly, however, these parties and their general positions were easily recognizable to Indonesian citizens, which simplified the task of voting in the country’s new fair and free elections. While PDI and PPP were virtually powerless under New Order, their presence alongside Golkar created a structure by which parties could develop identities that were recognizable to citizens. Consequently, when elections were truly fair and free, citizens were able to more easily recognize parties that shared their interests. In contrast, Russians’ had no meaningful experience with a multi-party ballot. As a result, the process of initial democratic elections with meaningful choice was less disjointed for Indonesian citizens than for Russians. Moreover, perhaps the coherence that Indonesians’ found in their early elections helped them to avoid the disillusionment that Russians experienced in their early years of democratization.

Additionally, the legacies of independent civic activity and tolerance of religious practice were also activated in post-Suharto Indonesia. Similar to post-Soviet Russia, Indonesia experienced an expansion of voluntary organizations following the collapse of authoritarianism, particularly in areas relating to democracy promotion, human rights, legal aid, environmental
protection, and women’s rights. Yet in contrast to Russians, Indonesians engage in voluntary associational life on a large scale. According to data from the World Values Survey conducted in 2005-2006, more than 83 percent of Indonesians belong to at least one voluntary organization, as compared to 35 percent of Russians and 61 percent of citizens from all countries included in the survey. I found in my citizen interviews that this high level of voluntary participation is not a new, post-authoritarian trend, but is clearly linked to a history of voluntary practice during the Suharto era, which could only obtain in an environment with at least some independent civic activity.

Even though organized religious practice was generally allowed under Suharto, tolerance for religious expression expanded after his resignation. Indonesia’s first democratically elected president following Suharto, Abdurrahman Wahid (who himself had led NU before becoming president), lifted the ban on Confucianism and suggested making Chinese New Year an optional national holiday for the country’s Chinese minority. Expressions of Islam have also become more pronounced, continuing a trend towards greater religious expression that began in Indonesia in the late 1980s. Parts of Indonesia have adopted sharia law, and the number of Indonesians seeking to make the hajj to Mecca and engaging in pilgrimage to Islamic sites in East Java continues to rise (Quinn, 2008). In 2010, Indonesia’s hajj quota was raised to 221,000, yet more than 1.2 million Indonesians are on the waiting list, filling up the government quota for several years (Onishi, 2010). Additionally, numerous ethnographic researchers have chronicled an increase in Indonesian women’s practice of wearing headscarves and adopting Islamic dress (Collins, 2004; Rinaldo, 2008; Smith-Hefner, 2007; van Wichelen, 2009). At present, 35 percent of Indonesians report attending religious services once a week and 30 percent report attending more than once a week (World Values Survey 2005). Sixty-seven percent of Indonesians belong to a religious organization (World Values Survey 2005).

Table 3.4 summarizes the analysis of the survival and activation of possible antecedents from Indonesia’s New Order. This table follows the same organizational logic of Table 3.3: only variables that both survived the collapse of New Order and were activated in the post-Suharto period can be considered possible causal variables in analyzing Indonesia’s experience with democratization. We see that five variables—one negative and four positive—can be evaluated as possible causal variables. The negative variable that might have an impact on Indonesian democratization is the high level of poverty, while the positive variables include the expansion of education, the presence of more than one political party, the presence of independent civic activity, and tolerance of religious practice.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical antecedent</th>
<th>Survives collapse of New Order?</th>
<th>If yes, then activated in post-Suharto period?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobilized participation (–)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political repression (–)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level of poverty (–)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of education (+)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of more than one political party (+)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of independent civic activity (+)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance of religious practice (+)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 From 1982-1990 Indonesian girls were forbidden from wearing headscarves in public schools. Presumably, some of the increase observed since then is a consequence of this change in policy.
Evaluating the Strength of Legacy Arguments
To briefly summarize the results from the previous two sections, I found that not all aspects of the antecedent regime that could plausibly affect democracy’s survival were activated after regime change. In the case of Russia, only three plausible legacy variables emerged: state monopolization of civic life, state destruction of organized religious groups, and leadership training. As I will investigate in chapter 5, the first two legacies may have had a potential negative effect on Russia’s democratic survival by curbing voluntary activity in civil society, while the third may have had a positive effect by bestowing civic skills for political participation.

A larger number of potential legacies were transferred and activated in Indonesia. On the negative side, high levels of poverty may hinder broad political representation. On the positive side, continued expansion of education has buoyed political participation; the presence of independent civic activity and tolerance of religious practice have contributed to high levels of civic engagement; and the presence of more than one surviving political party brought some coherence to early democratic elections.

Thus, antecedent regime effects can be identified in both Russia and Indonesia. Moreover, in both cases we see examples of positive and negative legacies being transferred and activated. Are the effects of negative legacies stronger in Russia than in Indonesia? Alternatively, are the positive effects Indonesia inherited so great as to outweigh the negative effects? Answering these questions is difficult. As discussed in the second section of this chapter, one of the challenges to analyzing the causal effects of legacies is that the strength of potential legacies is not uniform. Consequently, we cannot simply add up the number of positive and negative legacies inherited and activated by Russians and Indonesians to ascertain the overall effect of antecedent regime type on prospects for democracy’s survival.

Ultimately, we are most interested in answering two questions: were Russia’s negative legacies so burdensome as to determine the failure of democracy in that country? Were Indonesia’s positive legacies so great as to ensure its democratic survival? In answering these questions, it is useful to return to the distinction between individual-level and institutional-level legacies, as well as the concept of conditioning causes.

The two negative legacies transmitted in Russia—the effects of state monopolization of civic life and state destruction of organized religious groups—are experienced at the individual level. Were these legacies sufficient to doom the survival of Russian democracy? These two legacies—which exemplify the social repression experienced by Soviet citizens—undoubtedly contributed to Russians’ low levels of engagement in civil society. They may also contribute, in part, to the low levels of trust Russians show in political institutions.

Yet, we must be cautious about imputing too much causal force into these negative legacies. First, as discussed above, the lived experience of political repression and mobilized participation have not demobilized Russians. In the years leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the introduction of democratic institutions, Russians were not fearful or weary of political participation. Their low levels of voluntary participation are a consequence of factors other than a history of mobilized participation. For this reason, it is difficult to comprehend that Russians who are not discouraged by the experience of political repression would be deterred from civic and social participation solely from their lived Soviet experience. Second, numerous other post-communist regimes, such as Albania, Macedonia, and Slovenia, have overcome their legacies of state monopolization of civic life to develop robust engagement in civil society.
Therefore, this legacy does not necessarily pre-determine that a weak civil society will persist in the post-communist era.

The question of state destruction of religious groups and its effects remain unexplored, however. According to the most recent wave of the World Values Survey, Russia has the lowest rate of weekly church attendance among the eight post-communist countries surveyed, while Poland has the highest. The potential relationship between the destruction of religious communities in Russia and the subsequent weakness of civil society engagement remains unexamined by scholars and—while beyond the scope of this dissertation—merits further investigation. Overall, perhaps the best way to think of the legacy of Soviet social repression is as a conditioning cause: it contributes to Russia’s low level of engagement in civil society, but does not independently and singularly hinder the survival of democracy.

What about Indonesia’s positive legacies? Did these effects overwhelm the negative legacies? Were they sufficient to guarantee democracy’s survival? One would not expect them to do so. The weight of Indonesia’s negative legacies was considerable, and there was little reason to believe that its positive legacies—which did not differ considerably from the inheritances of other post-colonial authoritarian regimes—would ensure democratic success. Three of Indonesia’s positive legacies—expanded educational access, independent civic activity, and tolerance of religious practice—operate through individuals’ lived experiences. As the next two chapters will show, the effects of education are visible in student political participation and engagement in civic life. Yet, student activism constitutes only part of the overall high levels of political and civic participation observed in Indonesia. With only a very small percentage of the voting age population enrolled in universities or having graduated from them, increases in education alone cannot account for Indonesians’ broad expansion of political participation.

The presence of independent civic activity and tolerance of religious practice can, in many respects, be thought of as the opposite of the legacy of social repression experienced in the Soviet Union. While the Soviet monopolization of civic life and state destruction of organized religious groups effectively quashed voluntary social and civic organization in Russia, the absence of these policies under the New Order preserved a sphere of independent, voluntary action in Indonesia that was separate from political life. The positive legacies of independent civic activity and tolerance of religious practice can be viewed as conditioning causes for Indonesia’s democratic success. They contributed to Indonesia’s overall high level of engagement in civil society, but are not directly responsible for the survival of democracy. Rather, high levels of engagement in civil society helped to facilitate an expansion of elite-constraining political participation that protected Indonesia’s nascent democratic institutions.

The positive institutional legacy of inheriting multiple political parties should be evaluated in a similar manner. The presence of a multi-party structure at the onset of Indonesia’s democratization was a conditioning cause that yielded a positive resource for channeling Indonesian political participation. The presence of this system alone is not what generated democratic survival. Rather, as I will argue further in the next chapter, people needed to participate in party development to make competition meaningful.

Thus, just as we must be careful not to overstate the causal importance of Russia’s negative legacies, we should not assign too much credit to Indonesia’s positive legacies. To be sure, several of these legacies may be conditioning causes that helped facilitate the patterns of sustained political participation that have constrained elites and furthered democracy in Indonesia. But the outcome of democratic survival was not predetermined by these legacies. Ultimately, Indonesia built on its positive legacies in favor of democratic survival. In contrast,
while Russia was hampered with a negative legacy of social repression, it was also in possession of positive legacies that were not activated. Differences in Russia’s and Indonesia’s antecedent regimes were not decisive in driving these countries’ variation in democratic survival, though antecedent regime differences likely influenced the starting points on a key independent variable: engagement in civil society.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have sought to analyze the potential effects of antecedent regime type on the survival of democracy in Russia and Indonesia. I systematically asked a series of questions and compared the answers: 1) which potential inheritances from an antecedent regime could theoretically influence democratic survival? 2) Does a given antecedent condition survive the collapse of the authoritarian regime? 3) What is the mechanism by which it is transmitted? and 4) Is there evidence to support a potential link between this inheritance and a post-authoritarian regime’s trajectory? The results of the cross-case analysis shed light on important differences and similarities between a communist and a non-communist authoritarian regime and offer a more nuanced way of understanding the potential impact of historical legacies on contemporary outcomes—namely democracy’s survival in Russia and Indonesia.

In comparing the potential negative inheritances from the Soviet and New Order eras, I come to two conclusions. First, the legacies of the Soviet and New Order regimes shared some similarities, yet also exhibited some meaningful differences. Most importantly, while both regimes engaged in mobilized participation and political repression, the Soviet regime was more pervasive in its grip over social life. As a consequence of the state monopolization of civic life and the state destruction of organized religious groups, Russians inherited a lived experience of social repression that differs from the experience of Indonesians, who enjoyed a partially independent civic sphere and religious tolerance under Suharto. The variation in levels of social control is perhaps the most profound difference between a communist and non-communist authoritarian regime.

Yet, in spite of these differences, I find that for the outcome of democratic survival, Russia’s communist history was not necessarily more disadvantaged than Indonesia’s authoritarian experience. This is my second conclusion. Even though Indonesia has a clear advantage over Russia in terms of civil society organization, it has also grappled with negative legacies that could have derailed democratization, such as poverty and low levels of socioeconomic development. These features have influenced the strategies of political parties and politicians in generating support among the Indonesian electorate. Parties rely on clientelism and the personal charisma of their leaders to garner public support rather than developing programmatic appeals, a trend that is common in countries with low levels of economic development and a politicized economy (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). While these factors have not prevented democracy from taking root in Indonesia, they constitute potential impediments to the quality of governance that Indonesia’s democracy can provide its citizens, which could, over time, make the regime itself vulnerable (Schmitter, 2001; Schmitter & Karl, 2001).

Ultimately, the potential role that legacies can play in explaining variation in democratic survival in Russia and Indonesia is determined by two factors: the types of legacies that are carried over from the previous authoritarian era and their activation in the political sphere. The presence of negative or positive legacies alone is not sufficient to have an impact on democratization. Rather, these legacies can only influence regime type if they are activated and
produce a visible result on factors that contribute to democratic survival. In the case of Russia, two considerable negative legacies persisted, yet their ultimate impact on Russia’s failure to build a sustainable democracy should not be overstated. In contrast, Indonesia inherited and activated a larger number of positive legacies.

The analysis presented here suggests that while communism indeed has the potential to produce distinct legacies that can exert influence on the outcome of democratic survival, the relationship is more complex than a simple historical parallel suggests. Communism’s legacies are not all negative, and it is indeed possible that positive inheritances could also be shaping post-communist outcomes. Second, it appears that several of the features that scholars have identified as particularly distinct about communism—its master ideology and the extent to which regimes controlled social and economic life—have affected post-Soviet attitudes and behaviors little or not at all. Consequently, the legacies of communism have not pre-determined Russia’s failure at democracy or disadvantaged it more so than most other countries breaking free from authoritarian institutions and the distinct patterns of behavior they fostered.

In conclusion, antecedent regime type alone is an insufficient explanation for the variation in democracy’s survival in post-Soviet Russia and post-Suharto Indonesia. Russia’s negative inheritances did not predestine it for a return to authoritarianism, nor did Indonesia’s positive legacies guarantee democracy’s success. Rather, the positive and negative inheritances found in either country are more accurately thought of as conditioning causes that could aid or impede the independent variables at work in influencing democratic survival. As the next chapter will show, variation in patterns in non-voting political participation is the mechanism that has ultimately led to the survival of democracy in Indonesia and its failure in Russia. Legacy explanations alone are insufficient to account for these patterns in participation, which are a consequence of differences in engagement in civil society, views of political efficacy, and trust in institutions.
Chapter 4
Varieties of Political Participation and their Regime-Level Consequences

As I have argued in the chapters 2 and 3, the failure of democracy in Russia and its success in Indonesia cannot easily be explained by the structural differences between these two countries or by variation in their historical legacies. In this chapter I will outline the primary mechanism that links engagement in civil society, a sense of political efficacy, and political trust to democracy’s survival: political participation. I find that patterns in mass political participation following political liberalization are the crucial link between structural and historical factors, on the one hand, and the survival of democracy, on the other. By analyzing trends in non-voting political participation since political liberalization in Russia and Indonesia, this chapter will demonstrate that Russian citizens failed to sustain the participatory behaviors that serve to constrain political elites, while Indonesians have been more successful at doing so. Consequently, the survival of democracy varied in these two regimes over time. In Russia, it became easier for political leaders to revoke the democratic gains the country had achieved in the early 1990s, leading ultimately to the development of a new authoritarian regime. In Indonesia, ongoing and sustained pressure constrained elites from rolling back democratic freedoms and compelled them to continue the process of democratization.

This chapter will proceed in four parts. First, I articulate a conceptualization of political participation and an analysis of the specific ways in which political participation can play a causal role in democracy’s survival. I then evaluate patterns in Russian non-voting political participation since the collapse of the Soviet Union using several public opinion surveys and firsthand interviews with a quota sample of the population in two Russian cities. The third section provides an analogous evaluation of non-voting political participation in Indonesia. I then introduce my explanation of the causes for variation in non-voting political participation with statistical hypothesis tests of my key independent variables.

The empirical analyses in this chapter point to several key findings. First, Russian political participation has declined over the past twenty years while Indonesian participation has remained steady. Second, Russians have preferred contacting public officials over party development and contentious political acts, while Indonesians engage in all three forms of non-voting political participation. Third, differences in Russian and Indonesian participation preferences have had system-level effects over time by failing to constrain political elites from rolling back democratic rights and institutions. Lastly, patterns of political participation in both countries are correlated with engagement in civil society, individuals’ sense of political efficacy, and trust in political institutions.

A key variable that has not been sufficiently examined in democracy’s survival is the specific role played by non-voting political participation. I find that Russians failed to take advantage of new opportunities for political participation following political liberalization, namely developing and supporting political parties and engaging in acts of contentious politics. In contrast, Indonesians embraced party development work and have remained involved in contentious acts. Russians’ low levels of participation in these acts have had the subsequent effect of leaving political elites relatively unconstrained. Without an active citizen base seeking to hold them accountable, governing elites were able to slowly chip away at newly liberalized institutions and roll back democratic gains to the point where elections were no longer fair or free enough to “throw the rascals out.” In Indonesia, however, elites have been constrained from over-stepping their mandates and greater competition has been introduced into the political
arena. Indonesians’ ongoing and sustained participation has helped elections remain free, fair, and competitive.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Conceptualizing Political Participation

On a basic level, political participation is a necessary condition for democracy. There is no consensus, however, about how much participation is necessary and which forms of participation facilitate the stability and survival of democracy in regimes that have recently experienced a democratic transition. In fact, the concept of political participation is rarely scrutinized in detail among scholars of comparative politics. For this analysis, I will employ Nelson’s definition of political participation as “action by private citizens intended to influence the actions or the composition of national or local governments” (Nelson, 1979, p. 8). This definition of participation is sufficiently general that it can be applied to polities that are not fully democratic, yet it is precise enough to establish the clear boundaries necessary for operationalization.

Studies of advanced democracies have generally divided political participation into two categories: conventional forms of political participation and contentious (or un-conventional) politics (Barnes et al., 1979; Brady, 1999; Harris & Gillion, 2010; Norris, 2007). Conventional activities include voting, organizing and developing political parties that nominate candidates for election, contacting elected officials to express concern about a problem or policy (henceforth “contacting”), expressing political criticism through media outlets, and political campaign activities. Contentious political activities are inherently disruptive, such as demonstrations, riots, and acts of civil disobedience.

As Norris has pointed out, dichotomizing between conventional and contentious activities in the discussion of activism in advanced democracies can seem dated since many modes of protest activism have become mainstream (Norris, 2007, p. 639). Yet, this distinction may be meaningful when we consider the particular context of political systems that have only recently introduced democratic political institutions. In these particular contexts, the risk associated with contentious political acts may be high, or at the very least, unknown to the population.

For example, scholars have generally categorized signing petitions as a form of contentious politics. Yet, the extent to which signing petitions is an act of contention depends significantly on the degree of political openness in a given regime. In more authoritarian contexts, signing a petition is indeed a risky act that could result in significant consequences for those involved, such as the Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. Yet, in most democracies, signing petitions does not involve an act of personal risk. Under these circumstances, signing petitions differs little from other forms of contacting with the exception that it generally demands less individual effort than what is required to write a personal letter or make a phone call.

In order to ensure that the distinction between political participation and other forms of social and civic activities is clear to readers, it is also useful to discuss what sorts of acts are not included in the conceptualization of political participation used in this analysis. There are four categories of activities that are closely related to political participation but are separate from it.1 These are:

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1 These issues are all discussed by Brady (1999), although they are not categorized as listed here.
1. Civic, social, and professional activities, including joining a neighborhood watch, recycling, creating or joining a group on a social-networking website oriented towards politics, and workplace strikes against a private sector employer;\textsuperscript{2}
2. Consuming political information, such as reading the newspaper, listening to the radio, watching television, or receiving uninitiated contact from a politician or candidate;
3. Talking about politics with other people;
4. Intentions to participate or expressed willingness to participate.

Each of these four categories of activities may ultimately shape an individual’s decision to participate in politics, but until a specific action is taken to influence a political outcome, the behavior cannot be classified as political participation. For example, belonging to an environmental organization is not a form of political participation. Yet, if as a member of the environmental organization, an individual circulates a petition demanding that the city government investigate pollution in a local river, the act of circulating the petition is a form of political participation. Similarly, discussing a local mayoral election with one’s friends is not a form of political participation, yet attending a support rally held by one of the candidates is. It is necessary to clarify these subtle distinctions in order to avoid possible conceptual slippage. The variable of interest in this analysis is political participation. If we consider political participation as an outcome to be explained, it is indeed possible that engagement in civic or social organizations, consuming political information, talking about politics, or expressing an intention to participate might indeed play a causal role in determining variation. Whether certain civic and social activities and interactions might increase the likelihood of an individual participating in politics is an empirical question that can be investigated.

Political participation in authoritarian regimes, though limited in scope compared to democracies, is not non-existent. Scholars of authoritarian and patrimonial political regimes have focused on mobilized participation, that is, participation sponsored and guided by the government to enhance its welfare or legitimize its claim to power (Conge, 1988, p. 241). Mobilized participation was the dominant form of political participation in the Soviet Union. Mobilized acts of participation included displays of mass support for the regime, such as attending May Day and October Revolution commemoration parades; voting in Soviet elections; and engaging in government-organized development projects, such as subbotnik clean-up days. In Suharto’s New Order, citizens were mobilized to participate in highly-controlled elections as a way of expressing regime loyalty. In addition to mobilized participation, authoritarian regimes also often allow and encourage some basic forms of contacting. Contacting lower level officials from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) regarding problems with the provision of public services was common in the Soviet Union as well.\textsuperscript{3}

Political Participation in the Context of Democratization
Studies of political participation have generally focused on either voluntary participation in stable democracies or mobilized participation in non-democratic contexts. Analysis of political participation in countries that have recently experienced a democratic transition is much less

\textsuperscript{2} Workplace strikes in Communist countries or in state-owned enterprises start to border on political participation in that the demands striking workers make are generally targeted to change government policy or otherwise influence a political outcome.
\textsuperscript{3} For more details on contacting and other forms of citizen participation in the Soviet Union, see Friedgut (1979), DiFranceisco and Gitelman (1984), Bahry and Silver (1990).
There are several good theoretical reasons to believe, however, that political participation—particularly non-voting participation—might play a crucial role in democracy’s survival after initial elections. In unpacking the relationship between political participation and democracy’s survival, there are three particular issues we should consider: 1) the expansion of opportunities for political participation under political liberalization; 2) the threat of authoritarian backsliding before democracy is consolidated; and 3) the socialization effect from authoritarianism on citizens’ likelihood to participate in politics.

Scholars often fail to fully appreciate a diagnostic feature of democratization: a broadening of opportunities for mass political participation. We have tended to focus on the institutional effects of political liberalization, paying less attention to the new possibilities for action that liberalization provides for citizens. While the expansion of possible forms of political participation varies across polities, at a minimum two new arenas for participation are opened. Political liberalization opens electoral competition to a broader range of actors, thereby making it possible for individuals to form, join, and support political parties that were not previously allowed. A relaxation of controls on speech and association also broadens opportunities for airing public criticism of elite actions, such as writing critical articles in the media and engaging in peaceful demonstrations. Many of these forms of political participation are prohibited under authoritarian regimes and present a new field of possible action for individuals living in countries that have undergone political liberalization. In the Soviet Union, glasnost’ reforms in 1988 dramatically increased protected speech. The Soviet Union’s first competitive elections for the all-union parliament were held in 1989, and in 1990 competitive elections were held for the legislature of the Russian union republic. Electoral competition and protections for freedom of expression were further expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The hallmark of a democratic transition is the completion of initial fair and free elections (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). For democracy to survive and endure after the first election, political elites must be committed to holding fair and free elections at regular intervals. Yet, the periods between elections offer plenty of opportunities for newly-elected elites to engage in actions that could undermine the civil liberties and procedures designed to ensure that subsequent elections will be fair and free. In other words, until competitive elections and the norms and institutions that support them are accepted by all stakeholders as “the only game in town” (Linz & Stepan, 1996), democracy is particularly vulnerable to elite abuse. Authoritarian backsliding remains a constant threat. Under these circumstances, the process of political liberalization creates a functional need for ongoing citizen oversight between elections to hold elites accountable and constrain them from manipulating the process to suit their own interests. Throwing the rascals out during elections is not enough to keep democracy in place—the rascals need to be held in check at more regular intervals.

Particular forms of non-voting participation occurring between elections become crucial to democratization because these behaviors promote elections that are fair, free, and competitive. Each major type of political participation can constrain the behavior of political elites between elections to encourage that they abide by democratic rules rather than revert to authoritarian practices.

First, participation in political party development work helps to foster political competition. Campaigning for a specific candidate or party, carrying out administrative tasks related to the party’s work, or attending a rally or other activity sponsored by the party are activities that spread information about potential governing elites, thereby making elections more
competitive. If a visible and feasible opposition is absent from the political scene, governing elites do not face a credible threat that they may be removed from political power.

Second, engaging in acts of contentious politics raises awareness about disagreements over policy and draws attention to elite misconduct. These acts are inherently public in nature and attract the attention of citizens and political elites alike. Increased public scrutiny constrains elites, who must consider the way in which acts of contentious politics influence their political livelihood and chances of reelection. Writing critical letters or articles for publication in mass media, though not a form of contentious politics, constrains elites in a similar way—by facilitating public awareness and scrutiny of their actions. Additionally, demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience, and other citizen oversight activities can send important signals to opposition leaders about their potential bases of support. Such signals help to foster an organized opposition, which is necessary if elections are to remain competitive.

Lastly, contacting public officials regarding constituent services provides important feedback to the government. In a democracy, elected officials are responsible for representing the interests of their constituents, both through policymaking and ensuring the provision of basic constituent services entitled to citizens in accordance with legislation. In theory, when elected officials do this work effectively, they are rewarded by their constituents with reelection. When they represent their constituents poorly, they are thrown out. In this respect, contacting representatives is a means by which the public can hold the government accountable and use participation between elections to better inform the choices they make during elections. Yet, the information exchange that is generated by constituents contacting public officials is not solely the domain of democratic governance. Political regimes of all stripes require some mechanism for soliciting feedback in order to diffuse social pressure and ensure popular compliance with regime commands. As mentioned above, the practice of contacting public officials with specific complaints and responding to such feedback were common in the Soviet Union (Bahry & Silver, 1990; Bittner, 2003; Friedgut, 1978).

Most forms of conventional and contentious political participation common in democracies were not permissible in the Soviet Union or in New Order Indonesia. Throughout most of Soviet history, individuals could vote in local council elections, but these elections were uncontested and amounted to validating the single CPSU-approved candidate (approval was 99 percent). Although New Order elections included multiple parties on the ballot, severe restrictions on party activity as well as coercion and intimidation ensured Golkar victories. Individuals in both regimes could also contact public officials about a limited range of problems. Thus, while voting and contacting are examples of political participation that were available under the authoritarian and democratizing regimes in Russia and Indonesia, activities involving the meaningful development of opposition parties and competitive campaigns, as well as acts of non-violent demonstration, are examples of new forms of political activism that became permissible only after political liberalization.

As the cases of post-Soviet Russia and post-Suharto Indonesia demonstrate, individuals living in a country undergoing democratization are not without meaningful experience in political participation. Yet, the forms of participation and citizens’ expectations of their usefulness are likely to be different from what we might see in an established democracy. It is necessary to consider this dynamic when thinking about political participation after a democratic transition, although most of our theories about participation in democracies do not account for

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4 For example, see discussion of filing complaints in China in O’Brien and Li (1995, pp. 756-783), Chen (2008), Thireau and Linshan (2003, pp. 83-103), and Dimitrov (2010).
the influence of prior regime type on participation in new democracies. In fact, citizens in new democracies do not approach political participation devoid of expectations. Rather, they have been socialized by the experience of living under authoritarianism and participating in the mobilized politics of the previous regime. There are several ways we might expect socialization under authoritarianism to influence citizens’ participation after a democratic transition.

First, past behavior frequently conditions future behavior. For example, if an individual voted in the past, she is more likely to vote in the future. Likewise, if an individual avoided political confrontation in the past, he is less likely to invite it in the future. We can envision how this behavioral axiom might unfold in voting. Classical democratic theory assumes people vote according to their preferences. Yet, if individuals are habituated to always voting in elections without choice, they might be more inclined to vote at random or vote out of a sense of patriotism or duty rather than vote to express their political preferences. Similarly, expectations of how the government will respond to citizen actions are also conditioned by past experiences. Public perceptions that certain acts—such as circulating petitions, writing letters to the media, or holding peaceful demonstrations—are dangerous or inefficacious do not change immediately. Thus, we have little reason to expect that these acts will be wholeheartedly embraced by the masses as regular, recurring forms of participation in the early years of a democratic regime.

In sum, the socializing effect of life under authoritarianism creates a paradox for political participation in democratizing regimes. Given the socializing experience of authoritarianism and mobilization politics, there are many reasons why individuals in new democracies might be cautious about engaging in expanded forms of political participation, such as supporting opposition parties and staging acts of contentious politics. Yet, if the level of voluntary participation in party development and citizen oversight work does not increase following the introduction of fair and free elections, new institutions fall vulnerable to elite abuse. Left unchecked, leaders of nascent democracies (most of whom themselves were socialized in an authoritarian regime) can undermine the electoral process in numerous ways, such as restricting the circulation of information that is critical about the government, blocking the creation and development of opposition parties, and misusing state resources to ensure popular support for the existing custodians of power (the so-called “administrative resource” in Russia).

High levels of participation in political party development, citizen oversight activities, and contentious politics constrain political elites’ anti-democratic behavior. These acts facilitate political competition and sustain democratization. Such an outcome is present in Indonesia. Indonesians embraced new opportunities for political participation, pouring energy into the development of a competitive political party system and a stable, consistent protest movement. These tasks placed considerable public scrutiny on political elites and constrained them from acting in such a way that would undermine newly acquired democratic institutions. Consequently, elections have remained competitive, contributing to democracy’s survival.

In contrast, if the only vigorous form of non-voting political participation remains contacting, it is more difficult for a competitive political opposition to develop, and public scrutiny of elite actions remains minimal. As a result, elites are not sufficiently constrained to uphold democratic institutions and practices. In fact, they are well-positioned to rescind democratic reforms. I argue that this mechanism explains how Russia’s fledgling democracy reverted back to authoritarianism a decade after political liberalization. Russian citizens failed to expand their political participation to actively engage in party development and contentious measures, relying instead on contacting to express their concerns. Left unconstrained, the Kremlin under Vladimir Putin successfully clamped down on freedom of speech and assembly,
raised barriers to political party development and civil society organization, and intimidated possible sponsors of the opposition. In rebuilding an authoritarian regime, President Putin faced little resistance from the population. The following sections use public opinion survey data and original interviews to demonstrate how trends in Russian non-voting participation failed to successfully constrain elites.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN RUSSIA

Evidence from Public Opinion Surveys

There are two obstacles to analyzing non-voting political participation over time. First, in contrast to voter turnout, which can be captured rather accurately in aggregate statistics, non-voting participation is not expressed through centralized and structured activities like elections. Therefore, the most accurate indicators for non-voting forms of political participation are self-reported activities captured by public opinion surveys. Fortunately for this study, there have been numerous, high quality public opinion surveys conducted in Russia dating back to the end of the Soviet period. Russians’ attitudes and behaviors have been documented and analyzed to a much greater extent compared to those of many other political communities that have undergone political transition in the past twenty years. Yet, the wording of questions about political participation has varied across surveys, making it very difficult to compare survey results over time.

Though non-voting political participation was rarely a focus of many of the surveys conducted in Russia, several included relevant questions. I draw on information from three sets of surveys, the World Values Survey (WVS), the Russian Election Study (RES), and the Survey of Soviet Values (SSV). The WVS allows us to look at changes in contentious politics from 1990-2006, the RES measures participation in conventional acts from 1995-2004, and the SSV gives us a baseline of conventional activity in 1990—at the end of the Soviet era. Collectively, the results of these surveys indicate that non-voting political activity—both contentious and conventional—peaked in the late Soviet period. Over time, as Russia gained more experience with elections and democracy, participation in party development work and acts of contentious politics actually decreased, rather than expanded.

Conventional Participation

The SSV, which was conducted in 1990, asks several questions that we can use to measure Russian political participation prior to democratization. The principal investigators of the study (James L. Gibson and Raymond M. Duch) used a four-stage stratified random sampling technique in order to establish a respondent pool that would be representative of the European territories of the USSR. Among the respondents, 59.8 percent (N=933) resided in Russia. While this sample cannot claim to be representative of the territory that currently comprises the Russian Federation, it is the best available survey sample for measuring political attitudes and behaviors in the late Soviet period.

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5 The data files and documentation for the Survey of Soviet Values and the 1995-1996 Russian National Election Study are both available for download from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research digital files (available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ICPSRweb/ICPSR/). The data files and documentation for the World Values Survey are available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. The data files and documentation from the 1999-2000 and 2003-2004 Russian Election Study were generously provided to me by Timothy Colton and Henry Hale.
The SSV provides us with three measures of non-voting conventional participation that can be used as a baseline for considering Russians’ level of participation during the late Soviet period after *glasnost*’. The first two questions involve contacting public officials. As Table 4.1 demonstrates, a sizeable percentage of the survey respondents answered “yes” to one or the other question. In sum, 31.3 percent of all respondents and 27.9 percent of respondents living in Russia had contacted a government authority.

There is no way to establish a precise measure for party development work in the late Soviet period, especially since no party other than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had the right to compete in the 1989 elections for the Congress of People’s Deputies or the 1990 election for the Russian parliament (Hale, 2006, pp. 29-31). So-called “public organizations” were allowed to compete in the elections, but these groups are more accurately conceptualized as either organized aspects of civil society or political movements (see Fish, 1995). As Hale has argued, while the 1990 races for the Russian parliament were indeed competitive, they featured little political organization or coordinated activity outside of CPSU structures. He notes that “most observers were reluctant to even use the term ‘political party’ to describe those noncommunist associations that did exist between 1990-1993” (Hale, 2006, p. 37). Yet, many of these groups did engender acts of political participation, such as promoting candidacies, managing and volunteering for campaigns, and organizing supporters.

Although the SSV does not ask about campaign and party development work directly, the survey includes the following question, “Do you work with public groups formed to decide some or any city or region problems?” Responses to this question might consist of a variety of political acts, including contacting public officials or working within a public organization or movement to nominate candidates for newly-competitive legislative elections. Alternatively, it might also capture some forms of activity that are more appropriately defined as civic participation, such as working with a parents’ association. While I cannot say for certain that the activity captured in responses to this question is exclusively political participation, it is nonetheless reasonable to consider the responses a rough proxy for conventional political activity. In sum, 12.7 percent of all respondents and 11.9 percent of respondents in Russian territories answered that they had worked with public groups on a problem.

How did conventional political participation change after the collapse of the Soviet Union? The RES provides several measures for looking at participation in conventional political activities from 1995-2004. The RES was first initiated by Timothy Colton and other collaborators in 1995-1996. Modeled on the American National Election Study, the RES was initially conducted as a three-wave panel survey carried out in parallel with Russia’s national election cycle. I use data from the surveys conducted in 1995-1996, 1999-2000, and 2003-2004. The 1995-1996 survey includes a starting sample of 2,841 respondents, the 1999-2000 survey starts with 1,919 respondents, and the 2003-2004 sample starts with 1,648 respondents. The RES

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6 The survey asks, “Have you ever personally gone to see, or spoken to, or written to some member of the local authorities or some other person of influence in the community about some need or problem?” and “What about some representatives or government officials outside of the Raion area—on the city, regional, republic or all-union level? Have you ever contacted or written to such a person on some need or problem?”

7 A t-test comparing the percentages among respondents living in Russia versus those in other Union republics found that this lower level of contacting among Russian respondents was statistically significant at the level of p < .001. This was true of tests that assumed equal variances and unequal variances.

8 Respondents were interviewed before the December Duma (parliamentary) elections, after the Duma elections, and after the springtime presidential elections. The 2003-2004 RES included only two survey waves, eliminating the first pre-election survey due to budgetary constraints.
is a useful instrument for measuring political participation since the question wording is generally consistent between the multiple waves.

Table 4.1: Conventional Participation in the Survey of Soviet Values (1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>All Respondents (%)</th>
<th>Respondents in Russian territories (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you work with public groups formed to decide some or any city or region problems?</td>
<td>12.7 (N=1,544)</td>
<td>11.9 (N=926)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever personally gone to see, or spoken to, or written to some member of the local authorities or some other person of influence in the community about some need or problem?</td>
<td>27.2 (N=1,545)</td>
<td>24.2 (N=928)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What about some representatives or government officials outside of the Raion area—on the city, regional, republic or all-union level? Have you ever contacted or written to such a person on some need or problem?</td>
<td>15.1 (N=1,534)</td>
<td>13.7 (N=921)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of respondents who have contacted either local authorities or higher-level government representatives or officials</td>
<td>31.3 (N=1,534)</td>
<td>27.9 (N=924)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The RES provides measures for both contacting and party development work. First, the survey asks respondents four questions about participation in electoral campaigns for both the Duma and presidential elections. Respondents are asked if they participated in the collection of signatures, supported or organized an electoral campaign, attended an election rally or assembly, or donated money to a campaign. Table 4.2 reports the results for participation in the 1995-1996, 2000-2001, and 2003 election campaigns.9

Table 4.2: Participation in Campaign Work in Russian Election Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995 Duma Campaign (%)</th>
<th>1996 Presidential Campaign (%)</th>
<th>1999 Duma Campaign (%)</th>
<th>2000 Presidential Campaign (%)</th>
<th>2003 Duma Campaign (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participate in collection of signatures</td>
<td>2.8 (N=2,768)</td>
<td>4.0 (N=2,450)</td>
<td>2.6 (N=1,838)</td>
<td>2.0 (N=1,747)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agitate or otherwise help in the organization of an electoral campaign</td>
<td>2.9 (N=2,766)</td>
<td>3.3 (N=2,450)</td>
<td>2.1 (N=1,838)</td>
<td>1.7 (N=1,746)</td>
<td>4.0 (N=1,637)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend any election rallies or assemblies</td>
<td>4.1 (N=2,771)</td>
<td>4.5 (N=2,451)</td>
<td>5.6 (N=1,838)</td>
<td>3.7 (N=1,747)</td>
<td>5.5 (N=1,638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donate money to an election campaign</td>
<td>0.1 (N=2,771)</td>
<td>0 (N=2,453)</td>
<td>0.1 (N=1,838)</td>
<td>0.2 (N=1,747)</td>
<td>0.2 (N=1,639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in at least one of the above activities</td>
<td>7.9 (N=2,764)</td>
<td>7.9 (N=2,449)</td>
<td>7.8 (N=1,838)</td>
<td>5.8 (N=1,746)</td>
<td>7.6 (N=1,637)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†Includes agitating, attending rallies, and donating money

Table 4.2 shows several broad trends in campaign and party development work that are consistent across elections. The most common form of participation is attending election rallies or assemblies, followed by collecting signatures, agitating or organizing a campaign, and donating money. Overall, only a small number of respondents in each survey donated money to a campaign. Participation in other acts varies from a low of 1.7 percent for agitating or organizing a campaign for president in 2000 to a high of 5.6 percent for attending election rallies for the Duma in 1999. Another way to look at levels of participation is to consider the percentage of

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9 The 2003-2004 survey asks only about the Duma campaign and does not ask about the collection of signatures.
individuals who engaged in at least one of these activities. This percentage remains rather constant at 7.9 percent across elections until the presidential election of 2000, when there was a drop to 5.8 percent.\textsuperscript{10}

Activity levels return to over 7 percent in the 2003 Duma elections.\textsuperscript{11} The percentage of individuals agitating is highest for 2003, and the percentage of individuals attending rallies also returned to a level of over 5 percent. In fact, participation in these two activities is highly correlated for 2003 (r = .40). In probing this small resurgence of activism more closely, an interesting pattern emerges. If we look at the vote choice of those individuals who engaged in pre-election activities in 2003, we find that more than 50 percent of those who campaigned or rallied voted for the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, and almost 80 percent of those who engaged in one of these acts voted for Putin in the 2004 election. These patterns of activity suggest that most of those individuals who were engaging in party development work in the early years of the 2000s were not building opposition parties, but rather carrying out work in support of Putin’s regime.

Do the same people tend to participate in different types of activities or campaigns? Within each election, participation in different forms of campaign work is correlated, although the strength of the correlation varies from election to election. The acts that are most highly correlated across elections are collecting signatures and supporting or organizing a campaign. Curiously, the individuals who participate in pre-election activities for the Duma are not necessarily the same individuals who engage in presidential campaign activities. In 1995-1996, while 7.9 percent of respondents participated in the Duma and presidential campaigns, respectively, the percentage who participated in either is much higher at 14.5. In 1999-2000, 11.0 percent of respondents engaged in either the Duma or presidential campaigns.\textsuperscript{12}

What about contacting? Analyzing patterns in contacting over time is more challenging as the number of questions that gauge contacting, as well as their wording, has varied over successive waves of the RES. Table 4.3 shows which percentage of respondents engaged in some form of contacting over time based on the available indicators. The statistics in Table 4.3 suggest that contacting has declined considerably since the late Soviet era. Due to the variability in number of indicators and question wordings for each of these measures, we cannot view these statistics as precise measures, but rather as general proxies for contacting practices.\textsuperscript{13}

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\textsuperscript{10} One can speculate that this drop may be related to the unusual timing of this election, which took place three months ahead of the anticipated election schedule as a result of President Yeltsin’s surprise resignation on December 31, 1999.

\textsuperscript{11} Because the question about participating in the collection of signatures was not asked in the 2003 survey it is possible that the statistic of 7.6 percent underestimates the percentage of citizens who engaged in some pre-election participation.

\textsuperscript{12} A Welch’s two-sample T-test found the difference in percentages of the population participating in either campaign in 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 to be statistically significant at p < .001 (t = 3.98).

\textsuperscript{13} Generally speaking, we would expect that the greater the number of questions asked about contacting, the broader the cross-section of activities citizens will report engaging in. Consequently, when a survey includes only one question about contacting, such as the 1999-2000 RES, we cannot say with certainty that the increase in contacting levels in 2003-2004 is due exclusively to more people contacting and not to the fact that a broader number of activities is being captured by the survey measures. In order to get around the differences in number of indicators, we can look at the RES questions asking specifically about contacting one’s Duma representative, which show the following trend: 4.5 percent contacted in 1995-1996, 1.3 percent contacted in 1999-2000, and 4.5 percent contacted in 2003-2004. Thus, the number of individuals seeking out the specific aid of their Duma representatives did not increase from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s.
Table 4.3: Contacting Public Officials 1990-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>Respondents who have contacted either local authorities or higher-level government representatives or officials(^\text{14}) (composite of two questions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>Respondents who have contacted government officials “a minimum of several times a year” or have contacted their Duma representatives(^\text{15}) (composite of two questions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Respondents who contacted their Duma representative(^\text{16}) (one question)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>Respondents who contacted their Duma representative, a politician or government official, or a public reception office(^\text{17}) (composite of three questions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the RES measures for party development work and contacting, we see a mixed picture of conventional Russian political participation over the second half of the 1990s. Generally speaking, party development appears to have declined slightly between 1996 and 2003. We did not see an expansion of participation in political party or campaign involvement as Russians gained more experience with elections, but rather a contraction. Moreover, we have some evidence to suggest that by 2003, most Russians engaging in party development work were supporting the party in power, not seeking to broaden political competition. While we cannot compare change over time in precise terms, the percentage of Russians contacting public officials appears to have declined substantially since 1990.

The data from RES show no meaningful correlation between those who engage in party development work and those who contact public officials. These various forms of political participation are carried out by different individuals. In total, in 1995-1996, 26.1 percent of respondents participated in some form of non-voting conventional participation, dropping to 12.0 percent in 1999-2000 and 16.5 percent in 2003-2004. If we look back to our only solid measure of conventional participation from the 1990 SSV, contacting government representatives (27.9 percent of respondents living in Russian territories), it appears that participation in conventional activities declined between 1990 and 2004. In sum, even though political liberalization opened up opportunities for party development work, Russians did not embrace this on a large scale.

\(^{14}\) *Survey of Soviet Values* questions 11 and 12. Question wording is listed in footnote 7. Respondents who answered “yes” to either question are included in the statistic presented here.

\(^{15}\) *Russian Election Study 1995-1996*, post-Duma election questionnaire, questions 30 and 32. Question 30 asks, “How frequently do you contact government officials on problems that concern you and your family?” Respondents could answer, “a minimum of several times a year,” “less frequently,” or “never.” Question 32 asks, “Please tell me if you ever contacted the deputy to the preceding State Duma from your district on any matter,” to which respondents could answer “yes” or “no.” Respondents who answered “a minimum of several times a year” to question 30 or “yes” to question 32 are included in the statistic presented here.

\(^{16}\) *Russian Election Study 1999-2000*, post-Duma election questionnaire, question 134. Question 134 asks, “Did you ever file contact the deputy representing your single-mandate district in the last State Duma with a complaint or try to get his help to resolve some kind of problem?” Respondents answering “yes” are included in the statistic presented here.

\(^{17}\) *Russian Election Study 2003-2004*, post-Duma election questionnaire, question 132; post-presidential election questionnaire, questions 31(a) and 146. Question 132 asks, “Did you ever contact the deputy representing your single-mandate district in the last State Duma, or his representation in the district, with a complaint or try to get his help to resolve some kind of problem?” Question 31(a) asks, “Over the past five years or so, have you done any of the following things to express your views about something the government should or should not be doing? Contacted a politician or government official either in person, or in writing, or some other way?” Question 146 asks, “Did you ever contact the city, raion, oblast, krai, or republic public reception office of the envoy of the President of the Russian Federation in your federal district with a complaint or try to get his help to resolve some kind of problem?” Respondents who answered “yes” to any one of these questions are included in the statistic here.
Moreover, it appears that their engagement in the most prominent form of conventional participation—contacting—declined precisely at the time when access to political power was determined by elections.

**Contentious Politics**

What about participation in contentious politics? To answer this question, we can use data from the WVS, a large, cross-national survey that has been conducted in over 80 countries on all inhabited continents in five successive waves since 1981. Russia has been included in four iterations of the WVS: 1990 (N=1,961), 1995 (N=2,040), 1999 (N=2,500), and 2006 (N=2,033). The WVS asks several questions about contentious acts, including signing petitions, attending lawful demonstrations, joining in boycotts, and occupying buildings. Table 4.4 shows the percentage of Russian respondents who have engaged in these acts over time. Unfortunately, an imprecise translation of the word “demonstration” in the WVS Russian-language survey instrument reduces the validity of this question as a measure for evaluating contentious politics. The Russian-language questionnaire uses the term *demonstratsiya* for “demonstrations,” which is a word more commonly associated with the pro-regime demonstrations and parades held in the Soviet Union in commemoration of May Day and the October Revolution. Joining in these “demonstrations” is an example of the mobilized political participation that was common in the Soviet Union. It is probable that many respondents, when answering this question, were thinking about participation in these sorts of demonstrations, not in acts of peaceful political protest—which is usually rendered in Russian language with the word *miting*. Bearing this difference in mind, we must approach the WVS measure on demonstrations with caution. It seems very likely that this measure is capturing more recollections of the mobilized demonstrations of the Soviet era than genuine political protest. Nevertheless, it is interesting to take into account as an overall measure of political participation.

There are some interesting trends to consider from the WVS measure. First, leaving aside the question about attending demonstrations, petition signing is the most common form of contentious politics Russians engage in, and this holds across all four waves of the survey. This pattern is consistent with the results of the 1995-1996 RES questions on contentious politics. Yet, as discussed above, under some circumstances, particularly in democratic contexts, there is really a minimal distinction between signing a petition and writing a letter to a member of the political leadership. In some respects, we might consider petition signing as another form of contacting. Second, acts of contentious politics are only weakly correlated, suggesting that different individuals tend to participate in different forms of contentious action. The strongest

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18 Questions E025, E026, E027, and E029 from the World Values Survey Integrated Questionnaire. The question asks, “I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.”

19 Several questions from the 1995-1996 RES provide a useful measure to validate the WVS responses. The 1995-1996 RES asked if respondents had ever, “Signed a declaration, announcement, or petition,” “participated in a demonstration against the actions of the government,” or “joined a boycott.” In contrast to the WVS, the RES used the Russian word *miting* to articulate “demonstration.” The RES found that 7.7 percent of respondents signed a petition; 1.7 percent participated in an anti-government demonstration, and 0.3 percent joined a boycott. While the WVS found higher levels of participation for all three of these acts in 1995 than did the RES, the only instance in which the difference is dramatic is the question regarding demonstrations. The 2003-2004 RES asks respondents if they have “Taken part in a protest, march or demonstration?” in the last five years. Only 1.7 percent of respondents answered “yes” to this question.
correlation is between signing petitions and joining boycotts. Lastly, we see a gradual decline in acts of contentious politics. While in 1990, nearly 30 percent of Russians recalled having signed a petition, by 2006, only 8.2 percent did. If we consider signing petitions, joining boycotts, and occupying buildings collectively, in 1990, more than one-third of the Russian population recalled engaging in at least one of these acts, while by 2006 the number had dropped to fewer than one in ten individuals.

Table 4.4: Participation in Contentious Politics from the World Values Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990 (%)</th>
<th>1995 (%)</th>
<th>1999 (%)</th>
<th>2006 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signed petition</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=1,756)</td>
<td>(N=1,906)</td>
<td>(N=2,335)</td>
<td>(N=1,893)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended lawful</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demonstrations</td>
<td>(N=1,814)</td>
<td>(N=1,943)</td>
<td>(N=2,405)</td>
<td>(N=1,922)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined in boycotts</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=1,669)</td>
<td>(N=1,908)</td>
<td>(N=2,325)</td>
<td>(N=1,891)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied a building*</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=1,641)</td>
<td>(N=1,900)</td>
<td>(N=2,306)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in signing</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>9.7‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>petition, joining</td>
<td>(N=1,601)</td>
<td>(N=1,817)</td>
<td>(N=2,196)</td>
<td>(N=1,861)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boycotts, or occupying</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a building†</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This question was not asked in the Fifth Wave
† Attending demonstrations is excluded from this measure due to the questionable validity of the measure as a result of an inaccurate translation into Russian language.
‡ Includes only signing a petition or joining in boycotts

Who Participates?

Investigating trends in the overall volume of political participation raises questions about the individuals involved. Who participates in conventional and contentious acts in Russia? Are the individuals who participate in party development work or contacting also signing petitions and participating in boycotts? We can explore these questions with the 1995-1996 RES, which is the only survey that asks multiple questions about both conventional and contentious politics. According to these data, the correlation between acts of conventional and contentious politics is weak, suggesting that those who engage in conventional acts are not necessarily inclined to partake in contentious acts and vice versa.

The demographic profiles of those who engage in non-voting participation in Russia indicate higher levels of education than among those who do not engage in such activities. In all three RES survey waves, having either a high-school or university degree is a statistically-significant predictor of engaging in non-voting conventional participation. There are no apparent differences in age or sex between those who do and do not engage in non-voting conventional participation across any of the surveys. A similar dynamic emerges when we consider measures for contentious politics, either from the WVS or the RES. More highly educated individuals are more likely to engage in some form of contentious politics, but age and sex are not statistically

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20 r = .19 in 1990; r = .27 in 1995; r = .30 in 1999; and r = .23 in 2006.
21 The strongest correlations are between signing petitions and rallying for the Duma (r = .14) and demonstrating and rallying for the Duma (r = .13).
22 These conclusions were reached using logistic regression models in which the dependent variable was scored “0” for individuals who did not engage in any form of conventional participation and “1” for those that participated in at least one form. Educational attainment, age, and sex were the independent variables.
significant predictors of such behavior.\textsuperscript{23} In the surveys that include information on membership in civic and voluntary organizations (the 1995-1996 RES and the WVS), I found that belonging to at least one organization was a statistically-significant predictor of engaging in conventional or contentious participation.

Several tentative conclusions about trends in political participation following Russia’s democratization in the early 1990s emerge from analyzing these survey measures over time. First, participation in campaign and party development work peaked in the mid-1990s and failed to expand after the early years of elections. Second, the practice of contacting public officials, both through traditional channels and through petitioning, which were common at the end of the Soviet era, appears to have declined during Russia’s first post-Soviet decade. Third, participation in acts of contentious politics has dropped after peaking in the late Soviet era. Finally, it appears as though these various forms of participation are undertaken by different individuals. The people who engage in party development work are not the same people who contact public officials. Individuals who engage in contentious acts are yet a third group of participants. These trends largely mirror the findings of 50 in-depth interviews I conducted with a quota sample of Russian citizens in 2008.

\textit{Citizen Interviews in Russia: Conventional and Contentious Acts on the Decline}

The analysis in this section is based on ethnographic interviews I conducted in Russia in 2008. I interviewed approximately 70 scholars, analysts, journalists, and representatives of political parties and mass voluntary organizations. I also conducted anonymous open-ended interviews with a quota sample of 50 local residents in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk using a semi-structured questionnaire that gathered comparable data from all respondents. While no two citizen interviews were exactly the same, in each instance I tried to gather respondents’ life histories, information on their social and political activities, and opinions on several issues relating to their professional, civic, family, and political lives.

In order to measure citizens’ participation in political life, I asked directly about their voting frequency and participation in other political activities, such as writing a letter to a public official or the newspaper, visiting or calling an elected representative, campaigning for a candidate, participating in a political party, signing a petition, and demonstrating or protesting. The content of my citizen interviews provides biographical sketches of individuals’ political participation and its change over time. These sketches allow me to look more closely at motivations and factors that influence non-voting participation, and provide additional information that cannot be gathered from the surveys, such as frequency of participatory activity, changes over time in activity levels within the same individual, and the content of citizen appeals and petitions.

My interviews revealed several useful clues about the nature of non-voting political participation in Russia. First, citizens in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk are more likely to engage in contacting public officials than other forms of non-voting political participation. Second, individuals who contact are more likely to repeat this act than other forms of non-voting participation. Third, the overall volume of participation appears to have declined over time, particularly in Kazan. Lastly, individuals seem to choose non-voting forms of political participation.

\textsuperscript{23} These conclusions were reached using logistic regression models in which the dependent variable was scored “0” for individuals who did not participate in any form of contentious politics and “1” for those that participated in at least one form. Educational attainment, age, and sex were the independent variables. In the 1995-1996 RES measure, age was also statistically significant and negative.
participation based in part on the perceived efficacy of these actions, a point I will take up in greater detail in chapter 6.

Seven out of 25 respondents in Kazan and 12 out of 25 in Krasnoyarsk had engaged in at least one form of non-voting participation since 1991. In Kazan I found three respondents had campaigned, two had protested, and four had contacted public officials or signed petitions. Among my respondents in Krasnoyarsk, one had campaigned for pay, three had protested, and nine had contacted public officials or signed petitions. Consistent with the survey results presented earlier, participation in these different acts is not generally correlated. Two individuals in Kazan and one in Krasnoyarsk had engaged in more than one type of non-voting political participation. In both cities, most participation was fleeting—one campaign, one petition, or one demonstration. Nine respondents had taken part in a non-voting activity only once.

Frequency of participation also varied across different non-voting acts. All respondents who had engaged in a political campaign or protest since 1991 only participated in these activities once—they did not develop habits of participating in campaigns or contentious politics. The only non-voting political behavior that respondents repeated was contacting public officials and signing petitions. For example, all three individuals in Kazan who had signed a petition also engaged in some other form of personal contacting. I found that it was not uncommon for an individual who had organized a signature campaign to try multiple avenues of contacting: writing a personal letter, bringing collected signatures directly to the appropriate government office, etc. Additionally, once an individual had a positive response via contacting, s/he was more likely to repeat this approach. One 32-year old Tatar man in Kazan had written three different letters to various government representatives. A 39-year old Russian woman in Krasnoyarsk had also written three different letters to local officials. Both of these individuals said that they found contacting an effective way to address their specific problems. Among my respondents, individuals only engaged in protests when they felt a direct sense of personal loss. One respondent participated in protests against the 2005 reform to monetize social benefits, two had participated in one of the automobile drivers’ protests against police misconduct, and a third had attended a protest regarding the re-organization of her union.

Based on interviews from my quota sample, it appears that interest in non-voting political participation has declined in Russia over time as well. Russian respondents frequently spoke of activities that they had engaged in once or twice in the more distant past, often specifically during perestroika or the 1990s. For example, three of my respondents had campaigned and/or attended demonstrations in the late 1980s and 1990, but had not engaged in any non-voting political participation since 1991. The three instances I found of campaign-related work in Kazan since 1991 all occurred before 2000. One 39-year-old Russian woman had actively campaigned for a co-worker who competed in a regional election in 1993. The other two respondents, a 32-year-old Tatar man and a 39-year-old Tatar woman had once gathered signatures for parties seeking nomination for the State Duma. While I found examples of a more sustained commitment to activism among several leaders in youth branches of Russian political parties, such as the former head of Youth Yabloko Il’ya Yashin (Yashin, interview, February 19, 2008) and one of the leaders of Tatarstan’s Youth Communist Party wing (K-7, interview, March 7, 2008), the trend among my citizen respondents was to participate only once in party development or contentious acts.

I also observed considerable variation in respondents’ attitudes toward non-voting political participation and its utility. With regard to contentious politics, many respondents looked at protest activity negatively, believing that in most instances individuals were paid to
participate in protests and were not trying to express their own preferences. Several respondents who had once participated in a protest now considered this act ineffective and said that they would not participate again.

Attitudes towards campaign activity were less negative, yet individuals who had once campaigned showed no signs of repeating this participation. Of the seven individuals who had engaged in campaign work since the perestroika era, four had a personal connection to the person running for office, one was a paid signature collector, and one handed out leaflets for pay. Interest in campaign and party development work appears to be episodic and short-lived. Of all 50 citizens I interviewed, I did not find a single individual with an ongoing commitment, habit, or interest in helping like-minded candidates achieve public office. Moreover, this lack of interest in party-development work does not appear to be a consequence of the more recent decline in political openness in Russia, but dates back to the early 1990s when Russian democracy was at its peak.

In contrast to attitudes about protesting and campaigning, Russian respondents were generally more favorably disposed to contacting or signing petitions. This was particularly true of those individuals who had undertaken some form of contacting. Three individuals each in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk had engaged in contacting or petition-signing on more than one occasion, and several of these individuals said that they would consider contacting again.

The patterns of behavior observed among my respondents can engender important system-level outcomes over time. Russians’ non-voting participation—in which contacting plays a feature role—has fostered a system where political elites can respond to constituent needs while simultaneously inhibiting political competition and accountability to democratic institutions and practices. The absence of sustained engagement in party-development work and contentious politics has dramatically reduced mass pressure on political elites to “deliver” democracy.

Russians’ Preferred Participation: Contacting
Among my respondents, I find that most non-voting political activities—particularly those that were repeated—involved some form of contacting public officials. Based on information that I received in interviews regarding the specific examples of petition circulation and signing, petition signing in the post-Soviet Russian context is more aptly described as a form of contacting than as an act of contentious politics. Most respondents described signing petitions that had to do with public service provisions, such as problems with local bus services or utilities. These petitions were generally designed as a general appeal to the local authorities and signatories did not view them as controversial or adversarial in nature. If I combine petition-signing with contacting an official via a personalized letter or office visit, three-fourths of all my respondents’ non-voting political activities since 1991 involved contacting.

As discussed above, contacting public officials regarding constituent services is an important mechanism for providing citizen feedback between electoral cycles in any democracy. Elected officials are meant to serve the interests of their constituents by crafting legislation or otherwise ensuring that government offices provide public goods in accordance with legislation. In theory, when elected officials do this work effectively, they are rewarded by their constituents with reelection; if not, they are thrown out.

Yet, contacting public officials does not happen only in democracies. Authoritarian regimes regularly rely on information from citizens to ensure that public satisfaction is high enough to guarantee popular compliance. The practice of contacting public officials with specific
complaints was common in the Soviet Union, as seen in the SSV results. The CPSU was
decentralized down to the district level, and these lower levels of administration frequently
fielded complaints about public services or state-sponsored social benefits. Additionally, if these
lower levels of administrative authority failed to provide the requisite services, it was not
uncommon for individuals to seek redress at a higher level of jurisdiction, including direct
appeals to the General Secretary of the CPSU.24

Contrary to popular perception among Western observers, these appeals did not
necessarily fall on deaf ears or lead inevitably to repression. One colorful example of Soviet
responsiveness to direct appeals came from a respondent in Krasnoyarsk, who had written a
letter directly to then CPSU Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev in the early 1980s after her
husband, an officer in the Soviet army, had deployed to Afghanistan. This respondent was left
without housing after her husband was sent abroad. Forced to move with her two children into
the one-room apartment that her mother and grandmother shared, this respondent appealed to the
appropriate levels of the military bureaucracy with no success. She finally wrote directly to
Brezhnev about her situation, requesting that he either give her an apartment or return her
husband from Afghanistan so he could work and provide them with housing. Two weeks later,
the same military bureaucracy that had ignored her appeals provided her with a two-room
apartment.

The popular image of the national leader as the protector of Russians’ inherent rights and
the ultimate arbiter of perceived injustices was not an exclusively Soviet view; it was present in
the imperial era, when individuals looked to the tsar as their defender. This view persists in post-
Soviet Russia, as is evident in Vladimir Putin’s annual call-in show. This tradition began in 2001
when Putin was president, and has continued every year since, unchanged by Putin’s move from
president to prime minister in 2008. The call-in show, which allows individuals to send questions
to Putin via telephone or email, is usually held shortly before the New Year’s holiday. Pre-
screened questions are a mix of inquiries about particular policies and specific appeals to the
leader regarding lower-level injustices. For example, the December 2009 call-in show included a
live link-up with the industrial town of Pikalevo, an area that attracted headlines earlier in the
spring when residents blocked off a federal highway in protest against local officials that had
failed to deliver on promises of issuing back-pay from closed factories and returning public
services that had been disrupted.25 Putin personally traveled to Pikalevo in June 2009 to calm the
protest, chastising the owner of one of the bankrupt factories—oligarch Oleg Deripaska—in a
television meeting in which Deripaska was forced to sign an agreement to put his factory back
into operation. Putin’s role as the people’s savior was on display in the call-in show: Putin told
Pikalevo residents that he would return again to sort out the situation, if necessary (Whitmore,
2009).

Direct appeals to national leaders are extreme examples of Russians’ contacting public
officials to address specific concerns. Based on the results of my citizen interviews, contacting
an official via issuing a complaint or signing a petition remains the primary form of non-voting
feedback that Russian citizens provide to political leaders. Moreover, these complaints are
similar to the types of grievances individuals made to the CPSU in the Soviet era. For example,
more than half of the public appeals issued by my respondents in Krasnoyarsk involved housing
matters—a signature campaign to prevent the construction of a medical research facility next to
one’s apartment building, a petition regarding the heating system in an apartment building, and a

24 For a detailed case-study analysis of appeals in the 1950s and 1960s, see Bittner (2003).
25 For a summary of the Pikalevo events, see Zarakhovich (2009).
petition against installing a police station in an apartment building. Another pragmatic constituent appeal involved a group of university students who mounted a signature campaign requesting that the city government extend the number of bus lines that service the university campus. A common theme that unites several of these acts is that the individuals who carried them out did not view their activity as a form of political participation. For example, the respondent who had organized the signature campaign against the medical facility—a 52-year-old Russian woman who had previously belonged to the CPSU—was adamant that her appeals in this case involved a “private issue,” not a political one.

The view that political participation in Russia is not actually “political” extends to other forms of participation as well. In an interview with a scholar and democratic activist in Kazan, I asked his opinion about the small waves of localized protests visible across Russia. He noted that participants in these activities do not even think about their protest activities as “politics.” Rather, they are about “concrete demands” (K-5, interview, February 29, 2008).

While I found evidence of contacting in both Kazan and Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk respondents were more inclined to see contacting as an efficacious form of participation. Additionally, my interviews with regional political party leaders and legislators in both Kazan and Krasnoyarsk reinforced the position that citizen appeals occur at a higher rate in Krasnoyarsk, and are taken rather seriously by local and regional officials. Consequently, Krasnoyarsk’s slightly higher rate of activity compared to Kazan may be both a cause and effect of the regional and local governments’ responsiveness to constituent concerns.

Interviews with both residents and legislators in Krasnoyarsk suggest that the Krasnoyarsk regional government is attentive to constituents’ appeals, and citizens actually seek out regional deputies and party members to address their problems—phenomena I did not observe in Kazan. When asked if they knew how to contact their Duma and regional legislative representatives, most respondents in Krasnoyarsk offered that the representatives’ phone numbers are advertised and that they have monthly reception hours. One of the most organized forums for providing constituent feedback is “Putin’s public reception (priem Putina),” which is held in the headquarters of the regional branch of the United Russia party.26 The reception, which is open three days a week from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., is organized by a party staff member whose full-time job is to oversee appeals from constituents. This staff member consults with visitors to the reception, instructs them how to direct their appeals to the appropriate level of government, and then follows up on appeals until the issues are resolved. The Krasnoyarsk Putin public reception receives an average of twenty appeals per day. The regional branch analyzes the appeals and sends a monthly report to the central party organization. As one party analyst told me, even though United Russia is the party in power, it wants to stay in power, and this can only happen if it succeeds in addressing people’s problems and provides a loyal critique to executives and legislators (Kr-22, interview, November 27, 2008).

While the Krasnoyarsk Putin public reception constitutes a particularly coordinated and well-resourced effort at managing public appeals, representatives and staffs from other political parties also regularly receive phone calls, letters, and visits from citizens. For example, a member of the leadership of the Krasnoyarsk Krai branch of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) explained that the party has a reception space in downtown Krasnoyarsk that is open every weekday from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. (Kr-12, interview, November 10, 2008). The reception is staffed by a law student who keeps a register of every encounter (which my

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26 The following statements about the Krasnoyarsk Putin public reception are based on the reception’s organization at the time of my fieldwork in fall 2008.
The law student will often request that those who visit the reception write a letter because this documentation is a more effective way for the party to work on a problem. He noted that the party keeps a journal of all appeals and an accounting of the party’s follow-up. By law, the deputies to whom an appeal is issued must respond within one month. According to the LDPR leader, LDPR’s 24 deputies working at all levels of government in Krasnoyarsk Krai received a total of 1,500 appeals in 2007. Representatives from the Krasnoyarsk branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) described a similar process (Kr-13, interview, November 11, 2008). Party representatives in Kazan also received appeals from residents. For example, the Yabloko branch in Kazan reported receiving 20 to 30 phone calls per day after it had sent out a mailer about the party (K-21, interview, March 26, 2008).

Although the organization and follow-up of public appeals was significantly less pronounced in Kazan, I still encountered instances in which contacting was the preferred method of political activism. For example, interviews I conducted with activists from the Russian cultural movement in Kazan revealed that writing letters to officials and visiting them in their offices were considered the most effective ways to promote the movement’s interests (K-10, interview, March 13, 2008; K-18, interview, March 18, 2008). The letters movement leaders send tend to take one of two approaches, either asking an official to do something, or providing a statement documenting some form of government inaction or neglect. As one of my interlocutors pointed out, according to the law, if an official receives a letter requesting action on some issue and does not respond, this gives the letter writer the right to go to court or take the appeal to the next level of authority. The movement’s leaders use this legal right to continue to raise issues at higher levels of government, when necessary. At one point in 2002, inaction on their appeals gave the movement’s leaders cause to write to President Putin. This letter ultimately led to the opening of a Russian philological high school in Kazan. One of the movement’s leaders reported writing over 100 letters since 1991. After sending a letter, he usually follows up with a personal visit to the appropriate official, an act that, according to this individual, conveys the seriousness of the issue. This individual noted that he and his fellow activists are generally well-received and that about “99 percent of the time,” the officials they appeal to agree with them.

One of my interlocutors explained that contacting was the only way that the Russian cultural movement could promote its interests in the political process. He noted that party development and advancement within political parties are based on acquaintances, connections, and decisions made in Moscow, not on conviction to particular principles. Therefore, appealing to parties using the principles of the Russian cultural movement was not effective in Tatarstan. Additionally, this leader emphasized that the cultural movement wants to attract attention to its concerns “without a scandal,” which is why they avoided acts of contentious politics.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN INDONESIA

Evidence from Public Opinion Surveys

Studying non-voting political participation over time in Indonesia is, in fact, more problematic than studying it in Russia. While numerous public opinion surveys have been conducted in Russia over the past twenty years, survey research is still in its infancy in Indonesia. The difficulty in analyzing Russian political participation lies less in data availability, and more in variation in question wording and inopportune translations that make it difficult to compare
precise trends over time. In Indonesia, however, few surveys exist, and most of those that do are not publicly available for scholarly analysis.

There are only two surveys I can draw on to conduct an original analysis of non-voting political participation in Indonesia, the East Asian Barometer (EAB) and the WVS. The East Asian Barometer has been conducted over two stages in several Asian countries. Indonesia was included in the second wave in 2006.\textsuperscript{27} The EAB includes measures of conventional and contentious political participation. Indonesia was included in two waves of the WVS, in 2001 and 2005. The WVS includes measures of contentious politics. Collectively, these data show us that, on average, Indonesians participate in non-voting political participation at higher rates than Russians. We will also see that participation in contentious politics has actually increased over time in Indonesia during the post-Suharto era.

\textit{Conventional and Contentious Participation}

The absence of available public opinion data at the end of the New Order period prevents us from establishing a benchmark for Indonesian non-voting participation at the onset of democratization. Secondary scholarship, however, can help us fill some gaps.

To date, the most comprehensive analysis of political participation in Indonesia was conducted by Saiful Mujani at the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat, PPIM) at the State Islamic University (Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah) in Jakarta, Indonesia. Under Mujani’s leadership, PPIM conducted two large-scale surveys in 2001 and 2002 that are close to nationally-representative.\textsuperscript{28} The results of these surveys are analyzed in Mujani’s doctoral dissertation, \textit{Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia} (Mujani, 2003). Statistics published in Mujani’s dissertation provide us with the best baseline available for evaluating both conventional and contentious mass participation in the early years of Indonesian democratization. Yet, one caveat is in order: because Mujani’s research question was focused on the relationship between Islam and democracy, his analysis only includes respondents who self-identify as Muslim. While this group constitutes nearly 90 percent of Indonesians, it is possible that the inclusion of Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and other religious minorities might change these baseline figures.

Table 4.5 includes a summary of Mujani’s primary findings regarding non-voting political participation.\textsuperscript{29} Because these data are aggregate percentages, there is no way to ascertain whether the same individuals are participating in different types of activities. We should anticipate some overlap, for example, between individuals who wore party paraphernalia and those who attended campaign events, as well as those who signed and organized a petition. On the whole, we see that the type of activity that engages the largest percentage of Indonesians is campaign and party development work. According to the PPIM surveys, 30 percent of Indonesians attended campaign events and 13 percent distributed leaflets for candidates or

\textsuperscript{27} Information about the surveys and an online data analysis tool are available at http://www.jdsurvey.net/eab/eab.jsp. I received the raw Indonesian survey data file after submitting the application provided on the website.

\textsuperscript{28} Mujani writes that the 2001 survey represented 87 percent of the country’s national population, while the 2002 survey covers the full population with the exception of Maluku (Mujani, 2003, p. 51). The sample sizes of the two surveys are N=2,012 for the 2001 survey and N=2,321 for the 2002 survey.

\textsuperscript{29} Mujani also analyzes participation in community meetings and working to solve community problems in his measures of political participation. These are excluded here due to their potential overlap with indicators of civil society.
parties. Ten percent of Indonesians engaged in contacting a public official and 7 percent protested. In the first four years following Suharto’s resignation, a relatively vibrant participatory life appears to have taken root in Indonesia.

The EAB, which was conducted in Indonesia in 2006, allows us to investigate conventional and contentious political participation almost a decade after democratization began. The EAB asks several questions that can be used to construct measures for contacting, party development work, and contentious politics. The EAB asks three questions about contacting: whether individuals have ever contacted a “government employee,” “a government official who is higher up,” or “an elected official, such as a member of the DPR, DPRD, or president.”\(^\text{30}\) I will use the latter two questions to measure contacting. The wording of the question, which does not specify making a complaint or seeking specialized assistance, makes it impossible to determine whether individuals who answered “yes” to contacting a “government employee” (pegawai pemerintah) were engaging in political participation or rather trying to receive a standard service that requires interaction with the bureaucracy, such as obtaining an identification card, registering to vote, applying for a passport, etc. Indeed, 50 percent of respondents answered “yes,” to this question, which seems remarkably high for contacting officials about non-routine bureaucratic matters.

The EAB includes two questions about campaigning and party development work, asking whether individuals attended any campaign events and whether they helped or worked for a campaign or party in 2004, the year of the most recent national elections prior to the survey.\(^\text{31}\)

The survey asks two questions that provide measures of contentious politics. The first question asks whether individuals attended a demonstration or protest march. The second question asks whether they had ever used force or violence for a political cause. Unfortunately, the EAB does not have a clean indicator to measure petition-signing. The survey includes a question that asks whether individuals have ever, “gotten together with others to raise a public


\(^{31}\) Indonesia held elections for the national legislature (DPR) in April 2004 and the country’s first direct presidential elections in July and September 2004.
issue and sign a collective statement (petition),” yet this wording suggests a level of organization that is much more involved than signing a petition that may have been organized by others. The question wording is also ambiguous about the object of the collective action. It is conceivable that a person answering “yes” to this question could have in mind a simple non-political neighborhood or community service, such as establishing guidelines for holiday celebrations. Due to the lack of clarity over what this specific question is measuring, I am excluding it from analysis.

Table 4.6 displays the percentages of Indonesian EAB respondents who participated in each of these activities. The second column provides the percentages of individuals who participated in the specific acts listed, while the third column provides the overall percentages of individuals who engaged in the categories of contacting, party development work, and contentious politics. The category of activity with the largest percentage of respondents participating is party development work. Nearly 27 percent of survey respondents had participated in some sort of campaign or party work during the 2004 election season. In particular, nearly 24 percent of respondents had attended a campaign activity or rally held by a party or candidate. This specific act of participation was the modal form of non-voting participation found among Indonesian respondents.

The second most common form of participation was contacting, followed by contentious acts. Generally speaking, these numbers are similar to those reported in Mujani’s analysis of the 2001-2001 PPIM surveys. In both the PPIM and EAB surveys, party development work was the category that drew the largest percentage of Indonesians across the different types of non-voting participation. Due to differences in question wording and Mujani’s exclusion of non-Muslim respondents from his analysis, we cannot say whether the slightly lower percentages of participation found in the EAB constitute a genuine decline in activity or are a consequence of question-wording and sample factors.

In total, 41.8 percent of respondents in the EAB engaged in some form of non-voting participation. The average number of political acts undertaken by the 649 individuals who participated in at least one non-voting act is 1.59. Among respondents, 35.2 percent had only ever engaged in conventional participation, 1.9 percent had only ever engaged in a contentious act, and 4.6 percent reported participating in both. The EAB data suggest that Indonesians are engaging in channels of conventional democratic participation while continuing to protest policies with which they disagree. Protest politics in Indonesia do not outweigh conventional acts in the balance of non-voting participation. The percentage of individuals engaging in contentious politics is indeed smaller than those participating in some form of conventional participation (39.7 percent). In sum, we see strong levels of engagement in both contacting and party development work among Indonesians. We also observe a steady commitment to protest activity.

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32 In Indonesian language: “Bersama-sama warga lain mengangkat sebuah masalah yang menjadi kepentingan umum dan menandatangani sebuah pernyataan bersama (petisi).”
Table 4.6: Non-Voting Political Participation in Indonesia (EAB 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Percentage per subcategory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contacting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted officials at a higher level(^34)</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>20.2 (N=1,595)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=1,595)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted elected representatives in the DPR, DPRD, or the president(^34)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.1 (N=1,589)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=1,589)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Campaign and party development work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended a campaign activity held by a party or candidate in 2004(^35)</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>26.8 (N=1,585)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=1,585)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helped or worked for a candidate or party in 2004(^36)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.3 (N=1,598)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=1,598)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contentious politics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended a demonstration or protest march(^37)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.6 (N=1,594)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=1,594)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used force or violence for a political cause(^38)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3 (N=1,585)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=1,585)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>(N=1,575)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The WVS allows us to look at change in contentious political behavior over two time periods, from 2001 and 2006. These results are displayed in Table 4.7. Several trends are worth noting. First, on the whole, we see that a larger percentage of Indonesians report attending lawful demonstrations over signing petitions or other forms of contentious acts. Second, the percentages of Indonesians engaging in all different forms of contentious acts appear to have increased over time. In 2001, 16.4 percent of respondents engaged in at least one form of contentious politics, while in 2006 the figure had increased slightly to 18.8 percent. Lastly, the percentage reporting engaging in protest behavior is considerably higher than the percentages reported in the PPIM surveys and the EAB survey, which were conducted in the same years as the WVS. These differences may be due to variation in sample size (the WVS sample is smaller) or sampling frame (the WVS sample excluded several provinces included in the PPIM and EAB surveys). If

\(^33\) EAB question Q074, “In the past three years, have you never, once, or more than once contacted officials at a higher level because of personal, family, or neighborhood problems, or problems with government officials and policies?” Respondents who answered “once” or “more than once” are included in the statistic here.

\(^34\) EAB question Q075, “In the past three years, have you never, once, or more than once contacted elected representatives in the DPR, DPRD or the president because of personal, family, or neighborhood problems, or problems with government officials and policies?” Respondents who answered “once” or “more than once” are included in the statistic here.

\(^35\) EAB question Q029, “During the election campaigns in 2004, did you attend a campaign activity held by a party or candidate?” Respondents answering “yes” are included in this statistic.

\(^36\) EAB question Q031, “During the election campaigns in 2004, did you help or work for a candidate or party?” Respondents answering “yes” are included in this statistic.

\(^37\) EAB question QII88, “Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have never, once, or more than once done any of these things during the past three years.” Respondents reporting that they “attended a demonstration or protest march” are included in this statistic.

\(^38\) EAB question QII89, “Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have never, once, or more than once done any of these things during the past three years.” Respondents reporting that they “used force or violence for a political cause,” are included in this statistic.
we set aside the question of which survey provides the best measure of overall volume of protest activity, we can say that within the population that is sampled in the WVS, a slight increase in contentious political activity has occurred in the first eight years of democratization.

Table 4.7: Indonesian Participation in Contentious Politics (WVS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>2001 (%)</th>
<th>2006 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signed petition</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=866)</td>
<td>(N=1,758)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended lawful demonstrations</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=934)</td>
<td>(N=1,856)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined in boycotts</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=939)</td>
<td>(N=1,796)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied a building*</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=922)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in signing petition, demonstrating, boycotts, or occupying buildings</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>18.8†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=876)</td>
<td>(N=1,768)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This question was not asked in the Fifth Wave
† Includes only signing a petition, demonstrating, or boycotting

Who Participates?
Who participates in conventional and contentious political acts in Indonesia? Do the same types of people engage in both forms of participation, or do different types of activity attract different segments of the population? We can examine these questions with the EAB since it includes measures for both conventional and contentious politics. The correlation between conventional and contentious acts of participation in the EAB is weak, suggesting that different individuals tend to participate through conventional and contentious means. If we look at the correlations between specific acts, the strongest correlations are between activities within the same category of participation. For example, the strongest correlation among all acts is between contacting higher level officials and contacting elected officials (r = .44). Responses to the two party development questions are also positively correlated. Not surprisingly, 65.5 percent of the individuals who helped with a campaign also attended a rally or campaign event.

Demographically, according to the EAB data, age, sex, and education are all statistically significant predictors of engaging in any form of non-voting political participation in Indonesia. On the whole, having a high school degree is a positive predictor of political participation, while age is a negative predictor. Women are less likely to participate than men—being a female is a statistically significant negative predictor of participation. The same dynamic is true among the WVS data for contentious politics. If we look at the demographic profiles of those engaging specifically in the sub-categories of contacting, party development work, and contentious politics, a slightly different pattern emerges. While having a high school degree is a statistically significant and positive predictor of contacting and protesting, it is not a significant

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39 To test these variables I conducted logistic regression models in which the dependent variable was scored “0” for individuals who did not engage in any form of non-voting political participation and “1” for individuals who engaged in at least one form. I also conducted separate logistic models for contacting, party development work, and contentious politics in which the dependent variable was scored “0” for those who did not partake in these acts and “1” for those who did. Having a high school diploma, age, and sex were the independent variables.
predictor of engaging in party work. Age also cuts in different ways across sub-groups. While age is a negative predictor of party work and protesting, suggesting that younger individuals are more inclined to partake in these acts, it is a positive predictor of contacting. The mean age of those who have engaged in some form of contacting is 42, compared to 37 for party development work and 33 for contentious politics.

By analyzing the published statistics from the PPIM surveys together with the data from the EAB and WVS, we find that Indonesians are active participants in a broad range of non-voting political participation. Their primary forms of engagement appear to be party development work and contacting. While we cannot say for certain whether engagement in these activities has increased since democratization began in 1998, the available data suggest that the level of participation has not declined. We also see evidence that a stable minority of Indonesians engage in contentious political acts, namely peaceful protesting. The percentage of individuals engaging in such activities appears to have increased slightly in the post-Suharto era. Lastly, our analysis of the EAB suggests that different individuals are engaging in different forms of participation. Collectively, this pluralism in non-voting participation has resulted in a rather sizeable segment of the population taking part in political activities between elections. My 50 in-depth interviews with Indonesian citizens in Surabaya and Medan confirm these observations.

**Citizen Interviews in Indonesia: Ongoing Conventional and Contentious Acts**

In this section I will analyze the results of ethnographic interviews I conducted in Indonesia in 2007 and 2009. Generally speaking, I selected Indonesian respondents with the goal of creating a functionally equivalent sample to my Russian respondent group. I interviewed about 70 scholars, analysts, and representatives of political parties and mass voluntary organizations. In 2009 I conducted anonymous open-ended interviews with a quota sample of 25 local residents in Surabaya, East Java and 25 local residents of Medan, North Sumatra. I used a similar questionnaire to the one I used for the Russian interviews, allowing me to gather comparable data from the Indonesian respondents.

As the case in Russia, I aimed to measure Indonesian citizens’ participation in political life by asking questions about their voting frequency and engagement in other political activities, such as contacting public officials and elected representatives, campaigning for a candidate, participating in a political party, signing a petition, and demonstrating or protesting. Individuals’ responses provided me with biographical sketches of their specific level of political participation and its change over time. These participation biographies allow me to examine the frequency of participation and changes in activity levels within the same individual—information that cannot be gathered from existing survey data.

These interviews further illuminate several aspects of Indonesian non-voting participation observed in the survey analysis. First, generally speaking, participation in conventional and contentious political activities is not correlated. Rather, different activities attract the participation of different subsets of the population. While student organizations serve as important recruitment grounds for protest politics, Indonesians of a broader cross-section of society, in particular less-educated citizens, are frequently drawn into activities carried out in support of or by political parties. Second, Indonesians who have engaged in some form of non-voting political participation are likely to participate in this or another political activity on an ongoing basis. Third, although some individuals who had been active in non-voting participation

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40 Mujani also found that socioeconomic status (measured by education, income, and occupational sphere) did not correlate with campaign activity, but was a positive and significant predictor of other forms of participation.
in the first few years following regime change were no longer regular participants, a considerable number of respondents described sustained and ongoing conventional or contentious participation.

Five of my 25 respondents in Surabaya and nine out of 25 in Medan had engaged in at least one form of non-voting participation since Suharto’s resignation in 1998. In Surabaya, one had campaigned, four had protested, and two had contacted public officials and signed petitions. In Medan, six had participated in campaigns, three had protested, and three had engaged in some form of contacting. As these numbers suggest, several individuals had participated in more than one form of non-voting behavior, such as protesting and signing a petition, or campaigning for a political party and contacting a public official.

In contrast to the Russian sample, I found that a considerable number of Indonesian interview respondents had engaged in non-voting political participation more than once. Seven of the thirteen respondents who had engaged in any form of participation had repeated this activity more times than s/he could count. The frequency of participation varied across types of activities, with contactors and protestors repeating participation more than those who had engaged in campaign and party work.

Indonesian respondents who had contacted public officials generally repeated this participation more than once. All five of my respondents who had contacted a public official had done so multiple times—more than they could easily recall for me. In most instances they would prepare a letter on behalf of a specific group and then either deliver this letter in person, or follow it up with an in-person appeal at a later date. In contrast to the standard format for contacting in Russia, however, I found no examples of individual appeals among Indonesian respondents. Rather, in every instance in which a respondent described contacting a public official, this contact had been initiated by a specific association or group to which the respondent belonged, including a cultural group for ethnic Bataks, two different student organizations, a “youth group” affiliated with organized crime, and a group of labor activists. Bearing in mind these trends, in Surabaya and Medan contacting appears to be less about an interaction between a private citizen and a public official and more about relations between civil society groups and public officials.

Another notable difference between my Indonesian and Russian interview samples is that petition-signing is not a common activity among Indonesian respondents. Only two of my respondents, a student activist and former student activist in Surabaya, had ever signed petitions. Protest acts, however, attract many regular participants. Of the seven individuals who had protested, only two had done this activity only once, and one had participated in two labor protests. One first-year university student had just participated in her first political demonstration the day before our interview and speculated that this was an act she could see engaging in again in the future. Four respondents reported protesting on a regular basis. For example, a 22-year old university student in Medan estimated that he protested about five times a year. A 39-year old former activist in the labor movement in Medan recalled protesting about once per month in 1999. Ongoing participation was particularly pronounced among student activists, who tended to engage in a combination of protesting and contacting. For example, when I asked one 22-year

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41 One scholar in Indonesia noted that many Indonesians were skeptical about signing group documents because signature campaigns had been used during earlier periods as a way to seize land from less literate populations (NS-2, interview, July 2, 2009). None of my citizen respondents raised this point in our interviews, but the presence of such a historical memory may serve to steer some populations away from organizing signature campaigns as a form of political participation.
old Javanese student leader in Surabaya who had engaged in multiple forms of participation how often he participated, he responded, “Very often. I’m waiting at any moment. It could happen three times in one week.” These patterns of contentious political participation differ dramatically from those in Russia, where protesting is generally a singular event that participants show little interest in repeating.

My respondents exhibited greater variation in the frequency of their participation in party development work. Among the seven individuals who had engaged in some form of campaign or party work, four had done so only once. Two of these individuals once attended a campaign rally, one had handed out campaign materials for a party in exchange for cigarettes, and one had assisted in a campaign in 1999. The other three individuals described ongoing party work—a feature that was absent among my Russian respondents. One is a cadre of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) who is regularly involved in party development work. Another is a former PDI-P activist who had regularly assisted the party’s campaigns until President Megawati was defeated in her 2004 re-election bid. The third respondent has no party affiliation, but will regularly attend the rallies of different parties or carry out low-level campaign work for a small honorarium or gifts.

The demographic profiles of my Indonesian respondents who engaged in non-voting participation parallel the characteristics observed in the survey data. First, almost all of my respondents who engaged in non-voting forms of politics are men. Second, the average age of participants was generally four years younger than the average age of my overall respondent sample—and the difference was even greater if we look only at respondents who had been active in the past year. The relationship between education and participation also mirrored the findings in the survey data.

High levels of education were strongly correlated with participation in protesting and contacting, particularly among student activists. Of the four respondents who had participated in demonstrations related to topics other than the labor movement, all were students or former students who had engaged in political protest as an outgrowth of their participation in student organizations. Among those who had contacted public officials, all but one had at least some university education. Student groups—including those that do not have an explicitly or exclusively political purpose—frequently mobilized members to participate in demonstrations and letter-writing campaigns. The two current students I interviewed in Surabaya had been recruited into protest action through the Movement of Muslim Students of Indonesia (PMII). One of these students, who happened to be a leader in the organization, noted to me that PMII is a politically neutral organization. That is, it does not involve itself in party politics or support a specific party. Yet, many of the organization’s activities could certainly be described as political participation. PMII has one specific unit dedicated to writing letters to the media. Organizing demonstrations is another common activity. This respondent noted that when the government raised the price on fuel oil, students from PMII held up to three demonstrations in one week. As I will discuss further in chapter 5, Indonesian students participate in civil society at a high rate and are also highly social. Their networks appear to serve as highly successful avenues for political recruitment, particularly for acts of contentious politics and citizen oversight, such as letter-writing and contacting officials.

Participation in party work, however, does not correlate with education. Rather, people of all educational backgrounds are attracted to campaign and party work. Among the seven

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42 Historically, however, PMII is associated with the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama, which has a long history of political involvement in Indonesia.
respondents in my interview sample who had engaged in any campaign or party work, only one had a high school diploma. In fact, four of these individuals had less than an elementary school education. In contrast, none of the individuals with a university degree had participated in any campaign or party-building activities.

Non-voting political participation in Indonesia is diverse and cannot be summarized in a simple, linear trend. It is clear that highly-educated Indonesian citizens, particularly students, have taken advantage of political liberalization in order to engage in contentious politics. They focus on activities that grab headlines and aim to apply pressure on political elites while also influencing public opinion. Yet, highly-educated university students and alumni constitute only a small fraction of the Indonesian population. They are not the only active citizens. Others are drawn to traditional party work or engage in campaign activities such as distributing campaign materials for specific parties and candidates and attending pre-election events and rallies. These activities are also meaningful in a democratizing regime as they help to foster political competition among potential elites. New actors, including opposition candidates and parties, can seek to expand their support base and attract new volunteers and members through these traditional forms of interaction and participation. In turn, elections can become more competitive, making it harder for elites to avoid public scrutiny or ignore responding to critiques of their performance in office.

**Indonesians’ Pluralistic Participation: Parties, Protests, and Pressurized Contacting**

As in Russia, the patterns of non-voting political participation in Indonesia can engender system-level effects. First, non-voting political participation is diffuse among different segments of society. Individuals from a broad cross-section are attracted to campaign and party work. Contacting and protesting are more frequently undertaken by highly-educated individuals who become politically active through their involvement in student organizations. Student organizations in the post-Suharto era continue to serve as important recruitment grounds for protest politics. Even students attracted to civic, cultural, or religious organizations that are not expressly political may be drawn into contentious politics. The regular, ongoing activism of students leaves a strong imprint on Indonesian political life. While the university student population is small as a percentage of the overall population, the regularity of its protest activity translates into a situation in which political elites are pressured on an ongoing basis. Moreover, the cyclical nature of student life means that there is a constant influx of new students who take up the mantle of protesting as others retire or reduce their activism.

Second, while in general contacting appears to be less widespread among Indonesians compared to Russians, my Indonesian respondents who contacted public officials tend to repeat this activity on a regular basis, thereby ensuring a steady stream of constituent oversight. Additionally, there is an important difference in the dynamic of contacting between Russia and Indonesia. In contrast to the Russian model, where contacting was often viewed as a private matter, contacting among Indonesians is generally approached as a form of advocacy for larger societal groups. Consequently, when an Indonesian official chooses how to respond to a public appeal, he may be more constrained, realizing that a broader number of constituents are likely following the content of the appeal and the official’s response.

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43 According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, as of 2007 an estimated 17 percent of the Indonesian population of tertiary age is enrolled in higher education. According to data from the 2005 Inter-Census Survey in Indonesia (SUPAS), which does not make a clear distinction between students enrolled in university degree programs and those holding degrees, less than one percent of the Indonesian population aged 19 and above holds tertiary degrees.
While only a few of my citizen respondents reported contacting public officials, all Indonesian political party representatives who I interviewed said that they receive a large number of citizen appeals. These appeals cover a broad range of topics, but often involve requests for help in receiving some form of public assistance or benefits. When asked whether citizens approach the party for assistance, a representative of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Yogyakarta gave the following reply, “Yes, this happens often. Almost every day there are people who come to express their aspirations. For example, there is a citizen who is sick, but does not have a public health card (KMS) and PKS will facilitate getting them one. They come to the office or to our homes or find us another way,” (Y-2, interview, May 5, 2009). All political parties I interviewed shared similar stories. These sorts of exchanges, as well as the “social welfare” that parties occasionally provide to areas, generate possibilities for the maintenance of patron-client relationships between political parties and members of local communities. Curiously, none of my 50 citizen respondents talked about approaching a party or other official for such assistance. While it is possible that none of my respondents had contacted a party or official for direct aid, it is also possible that they did not view these interactions as a form of political participation and therefore did not think to tell me about it when asked. Whether these interactions are political or personal, however, is of little concern to the question at hand. Ultimately, the importance of contacting is that it allows Indonesian political parties the opportunity to compete with each other in winning public support, whether through particularistic or programmatic approaches (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007).

Third, contentious politics and contacting are distinct from participation in party development work and campaign activities. Individuals with less income and education are frequently drawn into campaign work in exchange for token gifts, including cigarettes or T-shirts. Others might attend a campaign rally not because they have decided to support a particular candidate, but rather because they hope to receive small souvenirs or because they are attracted to the social element (including possible entertainment). This was certainly the case for two of my respondents—one in Surabaya and one in Medan. The respondent in Surabaya was a pedicab driver with an elementary school education earning less than $100/month—circumstances placing him in a marginalized social category. To him, it was not important which party or candidate was holding a rally in the nearby field. All that mattered was whether he might receive some free food or a T-shirt. For him, these small tokens had more immediate material value than what he was likely to make in wages pedaling around his pedicab for a two-hour period. This respondent voted in all elections. Therefore, while this particular individual’s functional view of campaign rallies may indeed differ from our classical notion of political participation, the act of his attendance could nonetheless put him in contact with information or trigger a positive association with a candidate or party that might influence his vote choice. Regardless of one’s intentions going into a rally or campaign event, overall involvement in these activities—which is indeed widespread among Indonesians—draws individuals into the political process and strengthens the competitiveness of elections, thereby enhancing democracy’s survival.

The system-level effects of fluid and ongoing relationships between Indonesian political parties and the population are visible in the dynamism of the Indonesian party system. While party membership is not widespread in either country, the percentage of the population belonging to a political party is considerably higher in Indonesia than Russia. According to the 2005 WVS, 5.1 percent of Russian respondents reported membership in a political party compared to 16.4 percent of Indonesian respondents. A higher level of activism in Indonesian parties is also revealed in membership figures offered by party representatives in both countries. For example,
in Tatarstan, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), which is the most formidable opposition to the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party, had only 1,075 registered members in 2008 for a regional population of 3.8 million (roughly 0.03 percent of the population) (K-6, interview, March 1, 2008). In Krasnoyarsk, the KPRF and the LDPR each had about 4,800-5,000 members for a regional population of about 3 million (about 0.17 percent of the population for each party) (Kr-12, interview, November 10, 2008; Kr-13, interview, November 11, 2008). In contrast, in East Java (population 34 million), the PKS reported having 60,000 card-carrying members (0.18 percent of the population), PDI-P reported 2-3 million members (between 5 and 9 percent of the population), and the National Awakening Party (PKB) reported 7 million members (20.6 percent of the population) (EJ-8, interview, June 6, 2009; EJ-5, interview, June 4, 2009; EJ-11, interview, June 8, 2009).

The difference in the levels of activity of Russian and Indonesian parties is immediately visible when one visits party headquarters’ in the two countries. Indonesian party offices are bustling with people running in and out, even on Saturdays. It is possible to walk in off the street and find a person to talk to. In contrast, the offices of Russian parties other than United Russia are regularly empty or only lightly staffed. Calls to party headquarters are rarely answered and activists usually need to be located through personal connections. In short, while Russia’s lack of participation in party development work has impeded the development of a robust party system, in Indonesia, widespread and ongoing engagement in party work has helped make political parties the centerpiece of political competition.

A final way in which the patterns of non-voting political participation in Indonesia can produce system-level outcomes that affect democracy’s survival is through the repetition of behavior. In contrast to Russians, Indonesians show considerably more ongoing participation in both conventional and contentious acts. This is a distinction that is regularly overlooked, in part because our primary instrument for studying non-voting political participation—public opinion surveys—is not capable of easily capturing repetition. Most survey questions ask whether an individual has ever engaged in a task, or ask about participating during a particular time frame, like the last five years. While these questions help us to understand the overall percentage of a population that is participating, it tells us little about whether their engagement is singular or ongoing. Yet, the overall amount of participation in a polity will differ dramatically if 25 percent of the population engages in one act per year or half-a-dozen acts per year.

Take for example the simple act of contacting. A legislator receives five letters from an individual representing an organized group. He also receives one letter from a private citizen. Which of the two letter-writers does this legislator anticipate is following his actions more closely? Is he more likely to incur an electoral cost by ignoring the first or the second constituent? Repetitive contacting places greater constraint on a political leader than singular contacting. A similar example can be drawn from contentious politics. Which act constrains a leader more—a protest of 1,000 individuals lasting a single day or 10 days? Repetition of non-voting political acts draws greater public attention to political disagreements, thereby making it harder for legitimately-elected leaders to behave in illegitimate ways. Indonesians’ repetition of conventional and contentious acts has made it impossible for the presidents of post-Suharto Indonesia to act like Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

Comparing Russian and Indonesian Trends
Evidence from public opinion surveys and my in-depth citizen interviews point to considerable differences between Russian and Indonesian non-voting political participation, with regard to
both volume and types of participation. Table 4.8 includes measures from the SSV, RES, and EAB surveys comparing the percentages of the population in Russia and Indonesia who engaged in at least one form of non-voting participation in each survey, as well as the percentages that engaged in the specific categories of contacting, campaign and party development work, and contentious politics. We must be cautious in interpreting these statistics. As mentioned above, the question wording varied across different surveys, as did the number of questions asked about each type of activity. We would expect that a larger number of questions asking about specific activities would elicit a larger number of positive replies from survey respondents. The survey with the largest number of indicators is the 1995-1996 RES, while the survey with the smallest number of indicators is the 2003-2004 RES.

| Table 4.8: Comparisons of Russian and Indonesian Non-Voting Participation |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Participated in any non-voting participation (%) \(^a\) | 27.9 (N=924) | 32.5 (N=2,399) | 12.0 (N=1,725) | 17.2 (N=1,341) | 41.8 (N=1,575) |
| Contacted (%) \(^b\) | 27.9 (N=924) | 16.0 (N=2,101) | 1.3 (N=1,836) | 9.4 (N=1,321) | 20.2 (N=1,590) |
| Campaign and party work (%) \(^c\) | -- | 14.5 (N=2,442) | 11.0 (N=1,727) | 7.6 (N=1,637) | 26.8 (N=1,585) |
| Contentious politics (%) \(^d\) | -- | 1.9 (N=2,764) | -- | 1.7 (N=1,489) | 6.6 (N=1,586) |

\(^a\) Includes respondents who participated in any of the non-voting acts listed in the survey. See Tables 4.1-4.3 and Table 4.6 for indicator details.

\(^b\) Includes respondents who had answered “yes” to any of the contacting indicators listed in the survey. See Tables 4.3 and 4.6 for indicator details.

\(^c\) Includes respondents who engaged in any of the campaign or party-development indicators listed in the survey. See Tables 4.2 and 4.6 for indicator details.

\(^d\) Includes 1995-1996 RES respondents who had reported that they had “participated in a demonstration against the actions of the government” or “joined a boycott;” 2003-2004 RES respondents who had “taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration” in the last five years; and EAB respondents who had “attended a demonstration or protest march” or “used force or violence for a political cause.”

Bearing in mind the limitations mentioned above, Table 4.8 provides us with some useful comparative information. First, non-voting political participation is much more widespread in Indonesia than in Russia. More than 40 percent of Indonesians engaged in some form of non-voting participation in 2006, which is considerably higher than the percentage observed in any Russian survey, including the 1995-1996 RES, which asked a broad array of questions about participation. Second, party development work is much higher in Indonesia than in Russia. More than one in four Indonesians reported participating in party or campaign-related activity in 2006. This percentage is higher than the level of party development work observed at any point in post-Soviet Russian political history. Lastly, the percentage of the population that engages in contentious politics appears to be significantly higher in Indonesia than in Russia.

These same trends emerged in my citizen interviews. On the whole, I found that Russian citizens preferred contacting to other forms of non-voting participation. While some Indonesians do engage in contacting, this practice appears to be less widespread in Indonesia than in Russia. Indonesians from a broad cross-section of society are drawn into party and campaign work, and several have become regular participants in these activities. In contrast, Russians have not made a habit of participating in political campaigns. In the early years of democracy some people did
volunteer to help their acquaintances seek political office, but they did not become regular activists. By 2003, the small number of Russians engaging in party development work sought to support the pro-Kremlin United Russia party. Additionally, protest behavior has not become a habitual practice among Russians. Indonesian students, however, maintain a constant protest presence that continues to draw attention to public grievances.

LINKING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION TO DEMOCRATIC SURVIVAL

Participation and Elite Constraint
The failure of democracy in Russia and its success in Indonesia are not simply a result of higher levels of non-voting participation in Indonesia than in Russia. Rather, citizens’ higher levels of participation in activities that serve to constrain elites have aided democratization in Indonesia. Russians’ preference for contacting public officials over other forms of non-voting political participation influences the process of democratic survival by providing useful information to public officials without constraining their actions. Contacting officials, whether via a phone call, office visit, personal letter, or petition, is an inherently private act that involves a citizen and an elected official. How that official responds to constituent appeals does not directly influence the strength of political parties or political competition—factors that provide constraints on elite actions and engender greater elite accountability.

As discussed above, engagement in party development work helps infuse competition into the political arena, thus increasing the likelihood that the threat of removal from power will constrain elite abuse of power. Acts of contentious politics constrain elites through a different mechanism: by attracting citizens’ attention to elite activities. While a signature drive may indeed raise public awareness of a particular issue, it does not attract the same level of notice as do protests. The public nature of protests draws media attention, thereby increasing citizens’ scrutiny over elite actions. Additionally, when contentious political acts spill into public awareness, the aggrieved parties are the first to set the tone of the message—they make the accusations, leaving public officials to react.

When complaints are raised via direct contact with a public official, however, the official has the opportunity to respond at will to the criticism. He is not immediately placed on the defensive, but rather is given the opportunity to react in a manner favorable to the appealing constituents. This particular dynamic opens the door for several potential outcomes, all of which have different implications for democracy’s survival. If a public official responds favorably to constituents’ appeals, the constituents who issued the complaint may reward the official with electoral support in a future election. If the official does not resolve the complaint to the constituents’ satisfaction, he may lose votes. This is how democracy works in its most simple, theoretical form. Yet, two other factors influence whether these public officials will adhere to upholding the basic premises of democratic rights and freedoms based on constituents’ appeals.

First, regardless of how the official resolves the complaint, the entire process does not necessarily generate broad public attention to the official’s performance and action. Consequently, while ongoing acts of contentious politics, such as protests and acts of civil disobedience generate public scrutiny that can constrain elite abuse of power, contacting does not. Second, as the numerous cases of responsive authoritarian regimes demonstrate, it is possible for officials to be responsive to public demands without strengthening democratic institutions and practices. While one would expect that over time those officials who do a poor job of responding to constituent demands would lose votes (a process we are starting to see in
local Indonesian elections), it is also possible that public officials could resolve basic local and regional management problems, such as housing and transportation, in a way that voters deem as satisfactory without otherwise increasing political competition, transparency, or extending civil liberties. In other words, these individuals can be responsive without facilitating democracy’s survival.

The Factors that Influence Political Participation

Which factors contribute to the varying patterns in non-voting political participation observed in Russia and Indonesia? There are two separate ways of approaching this question. The first approach, which has received more attention by comparative scholars, considers institutional factors and the incentives they provide for political participation. The second approach, which is more common among scholars of political behavior, emphasizes the diffusion of individual attributes across society and the extent to which factors such as income, educational attainment, and other socioeconomic characteristics influence political participation. While the institutional approach can help us understand some of the trends in Russian and Indonesian political participation, we are left with a more complete picture when we incorporate insights from the behavioralist approach.

Scholars of Soviet and post-Soviet Russia will quickly identify two institutional factors that may go a long way in explaining Russians’ low levels of non-voting participation. The first factor is the Soviet legacy of mobilized participation, which was discussed in chapter 3. Since citizens are no longer required to participate in mobilized activity, they are thought to have little interest in engaging in overtly political acts. In other words, the over-politicized nature of Soviet life had left citizens particularly uninterested in the nuts and bolts of politics. Additionally, the Soviet experience left Russians distrustful of political institutions, including political parties, thereby making them less likely to engage in party development work.

While I do not dispute either of these observations, the patterns in political participation that I detected in both the national-level surveys and my citizen interview sample cast doubt on the power of the legacy of mobilized participation for explaining the overall trends we see in non-voting participation. If these two factors are sufficient to explain Russians’ low levels of political participation, we should see different patterns of behavior emerging. First, citizens with greater experience with Soviet-era mobilized participation should have lower rates of participation than those whose experience with participation occurred primarily in the post-Soviet era. Yet, both the survey data and my interview evidence suggest that the reverse is true. A lack of participation and cynicism is particularly pronounced among younger cohorts—those respondents who were socialized primarily (or exclusively) in the post-Soviet period and have no experience with Soviet mobilized participation or the CPSU. Second, the experience of mobilized participation does not appear to have dampened interest in voluntary participation uniformly. I encountered several respondents who did not feel forced to participate in pro-Soviet regime activities, but rather spoke fondly of their memories and the sense of community this participation created. Third, the legacy of mobilized participation cannot account for the peaks observed in Russian political participation. If a history of mobilized participation dampens engagement in a free polity, we should see an increase in participation over time as the population moves away from its Soviet history and younger individuals make up a larger segment of the politically-active population. Yet, both contentious political acts and voluntary forms of participation peaked in the early years of political liberalization and declined over time. Lastly, if negative views about participation inherited as Soviet attitudinal and behavioral
legacies guide their participation, why do Russians engage in contacting? The evidence I found from both longitudinal survey analysis and citizen interviews suggests that contacting was a common form of voluntary participation in the Soviet Union that has persisted, albeit in weakened form, to the present day.

The second institutional factor that may influence Russian patterns of political participation is the weakness of the Russian political party system. The post-Soviet Russian system of governance provided few incentives for building strong political parties (Hale, 2006). Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, refused to join a political party, arguing that the president should be above party politics. As Hale demonstrates, Russian electoral markets developed without a strong party system due to the presence of meaningful “party substitutes” in the forms of financial industrial groups and regional political machines (Hale, 2006, pp. 150-196). This system supplied candidates for political office with the administrative and ideational capital necessary to win competitive elections, thereby fulfilling an important function normally provided by parties. Yet, supporting electoral campaigns is not the sole function political parties fulfill in a democracy. Parties also aggregate citizen interests for representation and mobilize citizens to vote based on these interests. With electoral competition structured not by parties anchored with mass political support, but rather by elite-led networks with only weak patrimonial links to the public, there is minimal opportunity for the public to engage in party development work and voter mobilization that would enhance the competitiveness of elections. Over time, elections themselves become hollow, which is what we have observed in Russia.

If we look at Indonesia, we can also point to some potentially important institutional factors that may influence some aspects of non-voting political participation observed there. As discussed in chapter 3, Indonesians also experienced mobilized participation under New Order. This legacy, however, does not appear to have depressed participation in the post-Suharto era. A second, more relevant factor, however, is the presence of a coherent party system. From the perspective of governance, the Indonesian political system is indeed wrought with party fragmentation and failed coalitions. Yet, few observers would doubt that a system of coherent, identifiable parties exists, providing an important avenue for non-voting participation.

There are several factors that have contributed to the development of a coherent party system in Indonesia. As discussed in chapter 3, while no party other than Golkar was allowed to win in New Order elections, the presence of three parties at the onset of democratization provided the structure upon which a genuine opposition could be built. Indeed, two of the parties that existed under New Order, Golkar and PDI-P, still have the largest and most formidable party organizations in the country. Of greater importance to the development of its party system, however, have been the country’s electoral laws. Indonesia combines proportional representation in the national legislature (DPR) with a presidential system in which the president and vice-president candidate pair must be nominated by a party or coalition with at least 20 percent of seats in the DPR or that won at least 25 percent of votes in the most recent DPR election. These laws have made it impossible for elites seeking national office to fully sidestep party structures. The laws for party formation and nomination for president share a common logic in that they advantage parties with cross-regional support and put parties at the center of all levels of political competition.

The presence of a coherent party system in Indonesia has likely played a role in facilitating Indonesian participation in campaign and party development work. Yet, the presence of such a system cannot account for the full range of non-voting participation we observe in

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44 For greater discussion of party fragmentation in post-Suharto Indonesia, see Reilly (2007) and Sulistyo (2002).
Indonesia. First, the presence of parties is not a sufficient condition to ensure that Indonesians will engage in party development work at a high level. Rather, the presence of a coherent system and levels of mass participation in that system have a reciprocal effect on each other. Indeed, the robustness of Indonesia’s party system is, in part, a consequence of high levels of citizen engagement in party work. Additionally, while the presence of a coherent party system may help facilitate party-development work, this factor appears unrelated to Indonesians’ ongoing engagement in contentious political activities. Institutional factors alone cannot explain the patterns of political participation we see in Indonesia.

Similarly, the institutional importance of a weak party system in Russia should not be over-stated. The weakness of the party system may influence Russians’ preference for contacting over other forms of political participation. Seeing little utility in trying to influence political outcomes by working through political parties, citizens might view contacting officials as a more reliable method to effect change, as evidenced from the experience of the Russian cultural movement in Tatarstan. Yet, low levels of participation in party development work are not only a consequence of Russia’s weak party system, but also a cause of it. Although participation in party work has been restricted as a result of anti-democratic steps taken since Putin came to power in 2000, there were few constraints on political party work in the 1990s. Russians had opportunities to build and support political parties, but efforts to do so were minimal and had flagged by the end of the decade. Legacies of forced participation and low trust in institutions carried over from the Soviet period are not sufficient to explain the lack of mass interest and effort in party building in the early 1990s. Many former communist countries across Eurasia have overcome histories of mobilized participation and popular distrust to build more robust party systems. Why did similar forms of participation fail to take off in Russia?

Incorporating insights from the behavioral approach to studying political participation can help us answer this question more fully. These insights can also shed light on factors other than the coherence of Indonesia’s party system that influence Indonesian patterns of political participation. The behavioral approach considers individual-level characteristics that, when aggregated, present a picture of who is participating in politics. Numerous studies have found relatively stable trends among the advanced industrialized world with regard to the individual-level attributes that tend to facilitate greater participation. Generally speaking, individuals with higher levels of educational attainment and income tend to participate in politics more frequently than those with fewer resources. Given Russia’s higher level of industrialization, socioeconomic development, and rates of educational attainment, Russians should have greater resources to devote towards political participation than Indonesians do. Yet, in practice, we see the opposite—Indonesians are more politically active than Russians.

Based on the results of my citizen interviews, I find that several other individual-level factors contribute to the variation we see in patterns of political participation between Russians and Indonesians: levels of engagement in civil society, the sense of political efficacy found among citizens, and levels of trust in political institutions. The remaining chapters of this dissertation will describe in detail the differences in each of these variables and analyze the specific ways in which these three variables influence political participation and its constraint on elite actions. Yet, before moving on to the analysis of specific variables, it is useful to determine whether an empirical relationship exists between these variables and non-voting political participation.

Several of the surveys I used to establish measures of political participation also include questions about engagement in civil society, political efficacy, and trust in political institutions,
thereby allowing me to test for the presence of a correlation between these variables and non-voting participation. In the following two sections, I will test for a correlation in Russia using the 1995-1996 RES and in Indonesia using the EAB. The purpose of these analyses is not to provide a comprehensive analysis that explains all of the variation found in non-voting political participation in the two surveys. Rather, my goal is simply to test whether my hypotheses withstand statistical analysis that also controls for socioeconomic characteristics that are hypothesized to influence political participation.

**Hypothesis Testing: Russia**

In order to measure engagement in civil society in the 1995-1996 RES, I rely on questions about membership in voluntary associations. The survey asked respondents if they belong to one of 15 different organizations. I use this information to create a dummy variable “member,” which is scored “1” for anyone belonging to at least one organization and “0” for those respondents not belonging to any organizations. Just over 42 percent of respondents belonged to at least one organization.

I use two questions to measure one’s sense of political efficacy. Both questions are statements to which respondents may reply that they “fully agree,” “agree,” “waver,” “disagree,” or “fully disagree.” The first statement is: “People like me have no say in what the government does.” I recoded this variable on a five-point scale from 0 to 1 such that “1” equals “fully disagree” and “0” equals “fully agree.” The second statement is: “In my opinion, I am well prepared to participate in political activity.” I recoded this variable on a five-point scale from 0 to 1 such that “1” equals “fully agree” and “0” equals “fully disagree.” I then averaged answers to these two questions together to create an “efficacy” variable that ranges from 0 to 1, where “1” corresponds to the highest degree of efficacy. A person with a score of “1” “fully disagrees” with the first statement and “fully agrees” with the second statement.

In order to measure trust, I use five different questions asking about trust in political institutions. In particular, the survey asks, “Tell me if you fully trust, trust, mistrust, or completely mistrust,” and then lists several institutions, including the president of Russia, the government of Russia, the State Duma (national legislature), the regional administration, and local administration. I recoded each of these variables on a four-point scale from 0 to 1 so that “0” equals “completely mistrust” and “1” equals “fully trust.” I also created a composite measure ranging from 0 to 1 that averages responses across the five questions.

Tables 4.9-4.11 display the results of logistic regression models that test these three independent variables on the three groups of non-voting political participation explored in this chapter: contacting, campaign and party development work, and contentious politics. The dependent variable in each of these cases is coded “1” for individuals who engaged in an activity that falls under one of the three categories and “0” for those who did not. In preliminary analyses I discovered that trust in political institutions was rather difficult to fully capture in a composite measure. While trust in different types of political institutions is positively correlated, the strength of the correlation is not high. For this reason, I am displaying models that use the trust

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45 Russian Election Study 1995-1996, post-Duma election questionnaire, question 11. Question 11 states, “I am going to list various kinds of public organizations and associations. Please tell me if you are a member of any of these organizations or associations and, if you are, how actively you participate.”
47 Russian Election Study 1995-1996, post-Duma election questionnaire, question 21(8).
composite indicator as well as models that show trust in specific institutions. In addition to the three test variables, I am including controls for age, sex, and having completed a high school degree.

The models analyzing contacting behavior are displayed in Table 4.9. We see that age and education are not statistically significant variables, but female is. Being a female has a statistically significant and positive correlation on contacting. In Russia, all else being equal, women are more likely to contact than men. Among my independent variables, being a member of an organization is not a statistically significant predictor of contacting, but efficacy is. The relationship between trust and contacting depends on the specific measure of trust being used. As model 3 shows, trust in the president has a statistically significant and positive effect on contacting, while other indicators of trust bear no significant correlations.

Table 4.9: Logistic Regression Models for Contacting in 1995-1996 RES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in president</td>
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<td>Trust in State Duma</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Trust in regional administration</td>
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Since logistic regression coefficients are not easily amenable to substantive interpretation, it is useful to look at the predicted probabilities of contacting based on the models in Table 4.9. According to model 3, ceteris paribus, a person with an efficacy score of “1” has a predicted probability of contacting that is 0.18 higher than a person with an efficacy score of “0.” Similarly, a person who has the highest possible trust in the president has a predicted probability of contacting that is also 0.18 higher than a person who completely mistrusts the president. For example, if we hold all other variables at their means and vary only sex, efficacy, and trust, we

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49 In the interest of space I am excluding a model with trust in local administrations. This measure of trust behaves similarly to trust in regional administrations.
find that a woman with an efficacy score of “1” who “trusts” the president has a predicted probability of contacting of 0.62, while a woman with an efficacy score of “0” who “trusts” the president has a predicted probability of contacting of 0.44. A male with an efficacy score of “0” who “completely mistrusts” the president has a predicted probability of contacting of only 0.26.

Table 4.10 shows that different dynamics are at hand when we consider participation in campaign and party development work as the dependent variable. In contrast to the models for contacting, sex is not statistically significant, while education is. Having a high school degree is a statistically significant and positive predictor of engaging in party work across all model specifications. The three independent variables under investigation are also all significant and positive. Belonging to at least one organization, feeling higher levels of efficacy, and higher levels of trust all correlate with engaging in campaign and party development work. While trust in the president is not a statistically significant predictor of party development work, trust in all other institutions is.

Table 4.10: Logistic Regression Models for Campaigning and Party Work in 1995-1996 RES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>-0.01</td>
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<td>0.60***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.79***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in government</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.65*</td>
<td>0.37</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in president</td>
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<td>0.37</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.72*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in State Duma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.72*</td>
<td>0.79*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in regional administration</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McFadden’s R-squared</td>
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<td>.044</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.045</td>
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<td>.841</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Once again, in order to understand the magnitude of these effects it is useful to consider some predicted probabilities. If we look at model 1, holding the control variables at their means and varying only the three independent variables, we find that a person belonging to at least one organization who has an efficacy score of “1” and “trusts” the five political institutions in the composite measure has a predicted probability of 0.51 of engaging in some sort of party work. By contrast, an individual who does not belong to any organizations, has an efficacy score of “0,” and “mistrusts” the five political institutions in the composite trust measure has a predicted probability of only 0.06 of engaging in party work. Thus, the predictive power of the three
independent variables on participation in party activity is considerable. If we look at the first differences in predicted probabilities of the independent variables, that is, the difference in moving from the minimum to the maximum of the variables while holding other variables in the model at their means, we see that efficacy has the largest first difference of 0.27, followed by the composite trust measure’s difference of 0.12 and membership with a first difference of 0.08. It appears that efficacy has the strongest effect on party efforts, followed by trust and engagement in civil society.

Table 4.11 displays the logistic regression models for participation in contentious politics. Similar to the models for party work exhibited in Table 4.10, age and sex are not statistically significant, while having a high school degree correlates positively with contentious political participation. Likewise, organizational membership and efficacy are statistically significant and positive predictors of contentious action. Trust, by contrast, is not statistically significant, regardless of the indicator used to measure it. All of the trust measures, however, are negative, suggesting that lower levels of trust may be correlated with contentious political activity. According to model 1, the predicted probability of participating in contentious politics for an individual with a high school diploma who belongs to at least one organization and has an efficacy score of “1” is 0.34. An analogous person who does not belong to any organizations and has an efficacy score of “0” has a predicted probability of 0.05 of participating in a contentious act. The difference in these two predicted probabilities is driven largely by efficacy—the first difference in predicted probabilities for efficacy is 0.19, while the first difference in predicted probabilities for membership is only 0.04.

Table 4.11: Logistic Regression Models for Contentious Politics in 1995-1996 RES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.22***</td>
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<td>-3.22***</td>
<td>-3.28***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>0.69**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.42)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in government</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
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<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.32)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in president</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in State Duma</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in regional administration</td>
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<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>McFadden’s R-squared</td>
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<td>.891</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50 The dependent variable is scored “1” for any individuals who have signed a petition, participated in a demonstration, or participated in a boycott.
In sum, the statistical analyses of contacting, party work, and contentious politics in the 1995-1996 RES showed that an empirical correlation indeed exists between non-voting political participation and engagement in civil society, a sense of political efficacy, and trust in institutions. Among these three variables, political efficacy is a statistically-significant and positive predictor for all three categories of participation. Engagement in civil society is a significant predictor for party work and contentious politics, but not contacting. Trust in institutions is the variable that showed the greatest divergence across categories of behavior. Trust in the president correlates positively with contacting, trust in other institutions correlates positively with party work, and trust is not a statistically-significant predictor of contentious politics.

**Hypothesis Testing: Indonesia**

Do similar trends exist across non-voting political participation in Indonesia? The EAB allows me to examine whether engagement in civil society, trust in political institutions, and efficacy correspond with contacting, party work, and contentious politics in Indonesia. To measure engagement in civil society, I rely on information about membership in voluntary associations. The EAB asks respondents if they are a member of any organizations. Respondents who answered “yes,” are coded as “1” and those who answered “no” are coded as “0” on the “member” variable. A total of 30.9 percent of survey respondents answered “yes” to this question.

The EAB asks two questions that can be used to measure one’s political efficacy. Both questions are read as statements to which respondents can “strongly agree,” “somewhat agree,” “somewhat disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” The first statement is, “People have the power to change a government they don’t like,” and the second is “I think I have the ability to participate in politics.” Responses to these statements were recoded to fall along a four-point scale between 0 and 1 in which “0” equals “strongly disagree” and “1” equals “strongly agree.” I averaged responses to the two questions to create an “efficacy” variable.

Similar to the RES, the EAB asks a question about trust in several different political institutions. The question is worded as follows: “I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or none at all?” Respondents were asked about the presidency, the national government, the DPR (national legislature), and the regional government. I coded each response to fall between 0 and 1 on a four-point scale in which “0” equals “none at all” and “1” equals “a great deal of trust.” I also averaged responses to the four questions to create a composite measure of trust in political institutions.

In addition to the three independent variables I am also including control variables for age, sex, and having completed a high school degree. Tables 4.12-4.14 display logistic regression analyses in which the dependent variables are having contacted a higher level or elected official, participated in campaign or party development work, or having participated in a contentious politics.

---

51 EAB Question Q019.
52 EAB Question QII103.
53 EAB Question Q126.
54 EAB Questions QII07, Q008, Q010, and Q014.
political act. Similar to the RES analyses, I am including models that look at trust as a composite measure as well as those that look at trust in specific institutions.

The models in Table 4.12 are logistic regression analyses for contacting. All three of the demographic variables are statistically significant. Age and education correlate positively with contacting, while being a female correlates negatively. In contrast to Russia, women in Indonesia are less likely to engage in contacting than men. Membership in a voluntary organization and efficacy are both statistically significant and positive. Trust in institutions, however, is negative, though not statistically significant.

Table 4.12: Logistic Regression Models for Contacting in EAB

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 5</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>.135</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.135</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count R-squared</td>
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<td>.796</td>
<td>.793</td>
<td>.796</td>
<td>.792</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

N = 1,341
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Since logistic regression coefficients are difficult to interpret, it is useful to consider predicted probabilities to help grasp the substantive effect of these correlations. According to model 1, the predicted probability of contacting for an Indonesian male of average age with a high school degree who belongs to at least one organization and has an efficacy score of “1” is 0.74. In this model, the effect of efficacy is greater than that of civil society membership. If the same individual described above had an efficacy score of “0,” his predicted probability of contacting would drop to 0.35. Yet, a highly efficacious high school graduate who does not belong to any groups has a predicted probability of contacting of 0.55.

The models for campaigning and party development work (Table 4.13) suggest that a different demographic is involved in party work than that engaged in contacting. In these models, age is statistically significant, but negative. As one increases in age, he is less likely to become involved in campaign or party activities. Additionally, having a high school degree is not a statistically significant predictor of party work. This result confirms my interview findings that
individuals of all different educational backgrounds become involved in party work. Similar to the models for contacting, however, we see that organizational membership and efficacy are positively correlated with party work. Trust in institutions, however, is not statistically significant. If we look at the various indicators of trust, we notice that there is a negative correlation between trust for the national government or president and party work and a positive correlation between trust for the DPR or the regional government and party work. These findings suggest that the relationship between trust in institutions and party work is perhaps more complex than can be gauged from a simple statistical model.

Once again, in order to evaluate the substantive effects of my independent variables, I calculated several predicted probabilities. According to model 1, a man of average age, education, and trust who belongs to at least one organization and has an efficacy score of “1” has a predicted probability of 0.70 of becoming involved in party or campaign activity. If I change the efficacy score to “0,” this man’s predicted probability drops to 0.23. In contrast, a man of average age, education, and trust who has an efficacy score of “1” but does not belong to any organizations has a predicted probability of 0.56 of participating in campaign or party activities. As in the models for contacting, the effect of efficacy is greater than the effect of organizational membership.

The final set of statistical models (Table 4.14) looks at the relationship between my independent variables and acts of contentious politics. As in the models for party work, we see statistically significant and negative correlations between age, sex, and the dependent variable. In contrast, however, having a high school education is a statistically significant and positive

Table 4.13: Logistic Regression Models for Campaigning and Party Work in EAB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-0.89*</td>
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<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
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N = 1,332
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
predictor of contentious political activity. As the case with my interview respondents, protestors are more likely to be young men with at least a high school education. Similar to the models for both contacting and party work, engagement in civil society and efficacy are positively correlated with participation in contentious political acts. Unlike the previous two sets of models, however, we find a statistically significant and negative relationship between trust in political institutions and contentious political activities. Individuals who are less trusting of political institutions are more likely to engage in contentious acts. This relationship holds regardless of which measure of trust we employ.

In order to consider the substantive effects of the three independent variables in Table 4.14, it is useful to think about the first differences in their predicted probabilities. For example, according to model 1, a man of average age with a high school diploma, who belongs to an organization and has efficacy and trust scores of “1,” has a predicted probability of 0.16 of engaging in a contentious act. Yet, if we change the trust score to “0,” the predicted probability jumps to 0.70. A similar individual with efficacy and trust scores both set to “0” has a predicted probability of only 0.16 of participating. Thus, both efficacy and trust appear to have a strong predictive effect on one’s likelihood to participate in contentious acts.

The statistical analyses of EAB data on contacting, party work, and contentious political acts found an empirical relationship between non-voting political participation and my three independent variables: engagement in civil society, political efficacy, and trust in political institutions. As with the analysis of the Russian data, engagement in civil society and political efficacy are positive predictors of non-voting political participation, even when controlling for

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N = 1,340
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
demographic variables. Also similar to the Russian case, the relationship between non-voting political participation and trust in political institutions is more complex than can be easily grasped from a statistical model. While a statistically significant relationship was not observed in the models for contacting or party work, trust is a statistically-significant negative predictor of contentious politics.

Overall, the statistical analyses presented in this section confirm that a basic empirical relationship exists among engagement in civil society, a sense of efficacy, and trust in political institutions in both Russia and Indonesia. These models also show that the three variables each have an independent effect on non-voting political participation, and that these effects persist when demographic factors such as age, sex, and education are controlled for. The mechanisms that connect these variables causally to different forms of political participation, as well as these variables’ relationships to each other, will be taken up in chapters 5, 6, and 7.

CONCLUSION
Through an examination of both public opinion surveys and in-depth interviews with a quota sample of the population in two Russian and two Indonesian cities, I have found considerable variation in patterns of non-voting political participation across Russia and Indonesia. First, it appears that the overall volume of non-voting political participation has declined in Russia over the past twenty years. Fewer Russians are engaged in either conventional or contentious political acts now than in 1990—before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In contrast, Indonesian non-voting participation levels have remained steady, and engagement in acts of contentious politics appears to be increasing. Second, Russians prefer contacting public officials over other forms of non-voting political participation, namely party development work and engaging in acts of contentious politics. Indonesians, however, actively participate in party work and ongoing acts of contentious politics. Third, while most Russians who engage in non-voting participation do so only episodically, Indonesians are more likely to participate on a regular basis.

These empirical trends have contributed to system-level differences in democratic survival in Russia and Indonesia. A lack of elite-constraining participation by the end of the 1990s left Russian ruling elites largely unimpeded by mass pressure. Russians’ preference for contacting over other forms of non-voting political participation made it possible for governing elites to be responsive to specific local needs without necessarily deepening democracy or maintaining fair and free elections. In the absence of meaningful mass-based opposition and ongoing acts of contentious politics to provide scrutiny on elite actions, Russia’s political leaders were able to gradually roll back democratic rights and practices. Consequently, by the mid-2000s, Russian elections were no longer fair and free.

In contrast, Indonesians’ ongoing engagement in party development work and contentious acts placed meaningful constraints on elites. High levels of participation in party development work helped enhance the competitiveness of elections, which in turn, helped ensure that they remained fair and free. Ongoing acts of protest attracted public attention to elite misconduct and popular dissatisfaction with governance outcomes, thereby raising public scrutiny over elite actions. As a result, the range of action for Indonesian elites on the national stage became more constrained—failing to uphold democratic procedures could jeopardize a political career. While political conflict remains, it is waged through democratic institutions.

Lastly, survey data from Russia and Indonesia show that an empirical relationship exists between engagement in civil society, individual-level attitudes about political efficacy, trust in political institutions, and non-voting political participation. In the next three chapters, I will
demonstrate how these three factors have influenced the patterns of non-voting political participation observed in Russia and Indonesia.
Chapter 5  
**Tocqueville Revisited: Civic Skills and Social Networks**

Why do Indonesians build parties and protest while Russians write letters of complaint? Having described and analyzed the patterns of non-voting political participation in Russia and Indonesia in chapter 4, I now turn to an analysis of the factors that contribute to the variation we see in participation patterns. As the previous chapter demonstrates, the patterns of political participation that developed in Indonesia and Russia after the collapse of authoritarian political regimes affected the extent to which the public used new civil liberties and political institutions to constrain elites. A high level of constraint on elites facilitated the deepening of democracy, while a low level of constraint on elites allowed elites to manipulate recently liberalized institutions with impunity. In this chapter, I will focus on the key independent variable, engagement in civil society. Chapters 6 and 7 will look at beliefs about political efficacy and trust in political institutions, respectively. Meaningful cross-national variation on these three factors explain why Indonesians were successful in expanding participation in political party development and acts of contentious politics, while Russians failed to boost their involvement in these activities.

This chapter revisits Alexis de Tocqueville’s concept of civil society and its relationship to democracy. I apply the civic voluntarism model developed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady in *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* to explain how Indonesia’s and Russia’s varying levels of engagement in civil society have influenced political participation following political liberalization. I argue that dense social interactions, measured by both sociability and participation in associational life, are key to stimulating non-voting political participation. This expanded participation places constraints on newly-elected political elites that pressure them to continue deepening democracy, thereby contributing to democracy’s survival. We observe this outcome in Indonesia, where high levels of social interaction and participation in civil society have fostered the transmission of meaningful civic skills to the population. These civic skills have subsequently been employed to organize opposition in the forms of political parties and groups that engage in contentious political action. The absence of an analogous application of civic skills in Russia made it much harder to constrain elites, who in turn used their freedom of action to emasculate nascent democratic institutions and practices in that country.

This chapter will proceed in four parts. First, I will introduce my conceptualization and measurement of civil society and analyze hypotheses for how civil society is thought to influence democracy. I will also outline civic voluntarism as an effective mechanism that links civil society to democratic deepening following political liberalization. The second section will place levels of civil society engagement and informal social interactions in Russia and Indonesia in a cross-national framework. This cross-national analysis reveals that Russian levels of engagement are below the global average while Indonesian levels are above it. We will also see that Russians and Indonesians tend to participate in different types of associations, and these differences have potentially weighty implications for recruitment into non-voting political participation. Analysis of my in-depth citizen interviews in each country confirms these findings. The final section of the chapter will analyze the structure and norms of Russian and Indonesian civil society. I find that Indonesians have succeeded in mobilizing the key resources of time, money, and civic skills to activate new forms of political participation following political liberalization, while Russians have not.
CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND CIVIC VOLUNTARISM

Linking Civil Society and Democracy through Civic Voluntarism

Civil society, defined here as the autonomous, intermediary stratum of society that exists between the household and the state, has long been thought by political theorists to be a potentially important force for supporting liberalized political institutions and deepening democracy. A robust civic life can limit the power of the state when autonomous organizations fulfill the role of pressure groups to inform political elites about societal demands and serve as “watchdogs” against elite abuse of power. It can improve and broaden the flow of information between citizens. Civil society can stimulate political participation both by recruiting new political leaders from the ranks of civic leaders and by mobilizing supporters. Alexis de Tocqueville viewed voluntary associations as “schools of democracy,” providing citizens with opportunities to learn the norms and skills necessary to take an active role in participating in government.

One model that links involvement in voluntary associations with political participation in longstanding democracies is the civic voluntarism model. Developed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady in *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*, the civic voluntarism model offers a comprehensive approach to understand how citizens come to be active in politics. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady find that individuals generally become active in politics when they have the resources to participate and are part of a network through which they can be recruited to participate. Involvement in civic and social organizations constitutes an important locus through which individuals acquire the resources that enable them to participate in politics and the social networks that often lead to being recruited to participate. The civic voluntarism model as originally devised by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady does not make any claims about the link between political participation and level of democracy. Thus, I first use the model to understand how individuals become active in political life. I then extend the model to help illuminate how the vigor of civil society affects the fate of democratization in polities that have recently undergone political opening.

Before linking the civic voluntarism model explicitly to the extent of democratization, it is useful briefly to review prevailing explanations about the connection between civil society and democracy. In spite of the many ways that civil society is hypothesized to be beneficial for democracy, scholars remain unclear about the precise mechanism by which civil society has a causal effect on either facilitating or sustaining democracy. On an aggregate level, it is true that advanced democracies generally have a more robust voluntary associational life than do authoritarian political systems. In politically repressive regimes, there are constraints on the types of organizations that can form and thrive. It is therefore unsurprising that we are likely to find a less vibrant associational life in countries with less open political regimes. This correlation is not evidence of causation.

If we consider causality within the specific context of democratizing regimes, most hypotheses about the role of civil society can be lumped into two broad approaches that emphasize different levels of analysis. The first approach focuses on individual-level attitudes and behaviors which, when aggregated, contribute to system-level effects. This approach builds on Tocqueville’s view of civil society as “schools of democracy.” Two of the most prominent scholars taking this approach in comparative politics are Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) and Ronald Inglehart (1997), both of whom emphasize the social and psychological benefits of civil
society for contributing to values and norms that engender trust and a sense of civic interest and engagement, which in turn can facilitate purposive political participation. The second approach focuses on institutions as the units of analysis—namely on voluntary associations as intermediary organizations that can aggregate and communicate popular interests. These associations provide an additional form of leverage beyond voting in elections to provide citizen feedback to policymakers.

These two approaches are not incompatible. Although they emphasize different levels of analysis and different foci of attention, it is clearly possible that both prescribed mechanisms might have a causal effect on democracy. One point that both of these approaches share is that the link between civil society and democracy is indirect. Individual-level benefits accrued from participating in civil society first affect an intervening variable—perhaps trust or a sense about the value of participating—which then influences how people interact with political institutions. Institution-level benefits accrued from numerous active voluntary associations communicating citizen interests also must translate into an intervening variable—either a resource or constraint on the actions of political elites—which then influences whether democratic institutions and practices are further deepened. A failure to acknowledge that these mechanisms are indirect can impede research on the link between civil society and democratization. If we look only at indicators positing a direct relationship between levels of civil society and democracy at a single point in time, we may conclude that civil society does not have an impact on deepening democracy when in fact a relationship exists, but is more complex than can be gleaned from a straightforward two-stage model that does not account for intermediate steps along the causal chain.

Civil society influences democracy via a process that iterates through multiple stages and involves linkages between individual-level and societal-level behavior. For this reason, it is possible that the relationship between civil society and democracy is more salient at certain periods of democratization than others. More specifically, perhaps engagement in civil society is most relevant in the early stages of political liberalization. It is precisely at this stage, while the rules of the game are up for renegotiation, when mobilized public pressure groups have the greatest likelihood of influencing the character of institutions and practices into the future.

Additionally, the relationships between civil society and democracy posited by both political philosophers and empirical researchers have generally emerged from observation of established democracies, not political systems that have recently shed an authoritarian past and liberalized their political institutions. In some respects, we can hypothesize that the role of civil society in a democratizing system might be similar to that in an established democracy, but there are several ways in which the particular context of newly-acquired political and civil liberties might be important.

As discussed in the previous chapter, until newly liberalized political institutions and norms are accepted by all stakeholders as “the only game in town” (Linz & Stepan, 1996), they are particularly vulnerable to elite abuse, and authoritarian backsliding remains a constant threat. Additionally, political liberalization inherently creates new opportunities for political participation that can be used to hold political elites accountable between elections and make elections more competitive. Under these circumstances, high levels of public engagement in civil society can help facilitate coordination and mobilization of citizens against attempts by elites to encroach upon political and civil freedoms. If civil society is not up to this challenge and is unable to coordinate efforts to apply constant pressure on elites, authoritarian backsliding can and often does occur. Moreover, the process of holding elites accountable is iterative. A
successful push for greater elite compliance with democratic norms and institutions is likely to bolster subsequent efforts on behalf of reform and accountability. This dynamic is observed in post-Suharto Indonesia, in which citizens’ organizations have established an auspicious pattern of using one successful effort to bolster popular control over the state to erect the basis for the next effort. Indonesians have established mechanisms and habits of building on and extending past successes. Likewise, individuals whose efforts do not meet with early success are less likely to exploit their newly won political freedoms and institutions to mobilize a second and third time. Without mass efforts to constrain political elites and curb abuses of power, elites may enjoy a free hand to roll back political freedoms. The post-communist Russian experience illustrates his latter, unfavorable dynamic.

By applying the civic voluntarism model to the context of democratization, it is possible to link the different levels of analysis at which civil society influences democracy, thereby providing a more coherent transmission mechanism for understanding the role of civil society in democratic survival. Even though the civic voluntarism model was theorized and tested in the United States, a political system with more than 200 years of experience in open politics, its primary causal logic is relevant for democratizing regimes as well. If we consider the civic voluntarism model together with the expansion of opportunities for political participation generated by political liberalization, we are presented with a clear mechanism by which we can trace the causal processes linking civil society’s vigor to democratic survival. First, individual-level involvement in civil society facilitates participation in political life. If individuals are involved in civil society at a high rate in a given country, then there is a higher probability that the level of participation in new domains of political activity will also be high. These trends in individual-level participation will aggregate into more broad-based support for political party pluralism and greater public oversight over elite actions. As a result, competition among elites will be greater and power holders’ scope for abuse of power will be circumscribed.

As elaborated in chapter 4, the crucial mechanism is engagement in non-voting forms of political participation, namely activities that help to provide mass support for political opposition and public exposure of elite actions and inactions. Indonesia’s dense civil society provided an active series of networks through which new citizen activists could be recruited for participation in party work and contentious political acts. Russia’s frail civil society, in contrast, inhibited the expansion of political participation in these areas. Moreover, the organization of Indonesian civil society provided numerous resources in the form of civic skills (and particularly experience in fundraising and training leaders) and norms of voluntary participation and charitable giving that could be channeled into political participation that helped to deepen democratization of newly liberalized political institutions.

Measuring Civil Society
Scholars have attempted to measure a given country’s civil society in many different ways. The first methodological consideration is how to assess the overall volume of civil society in a given country, region, or city. Until relatively recently, the most common measure relied on counting organizations, either by collecting information on the number registered or created in a given locale during a particular interval, or by looking at other signs of formal structure—the presence of an office, phone number, or website. This approach presents many problems for cross-national research. A focus on registration emphasizes the legal face of an organization without any thought to its actual level of activity. It overestimates associations that exist only on paper and fails to consider groups that are highly structured but not registered with an official body, thereby
creating a bias towards registered groups in measurement.\textsuperscript{1} Approaches aimed at gathering indicators of the formal attributes of organizations also make it nearly impossible to collect data that can be compared across societies because rules for the registration, publication, and distribution of relevant information vary greatly across countries.

An alternate approach for measuring the volume of civil society that has gained more ground in social science in recent years focuses not on the number of organizations but rather on individual-level participation in them. This method involves using public opinion surveys to ask individuals about their participation in organizational life. By focusing on the specific behavior of individuals rather than indicators of a formal organizational structure, this approach emphasizes the vitality of associational life and is likely to include participation in voluntary and social organizations that lack official offices, phone numbers, and registration papers.

Of course, measuring individual-level participation in associational life provides us with little information about the relationship between civil society and the state. Many scholars of civil society, particularly those concerned with questions related to development and the role of non-governmental organizations in contributing to development outcomes, might view individual-level participation in associational life as an insufficient measure. It tells us nothing about whether one type of organization might be more influential than another in society, or about whether civil society as a whole is efficacious in effecting particular outcomes.\textsuperscript{2} These issues, however, are not central to the analysis presented here. The central question in this chapter is how citizens’ engagement in civil society influences political participation. Therefore, individual-level engagement in associational life serves as a good measure of civil society for the purposes of my investigation.

A second methodological consideration is determining which types of activities fall under the rubric of civil society. While a full discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this chapter, two points of contention are particularly relevant to my treatment of civil society. The first is the level of formality and structure inherent in an activity. Most scholars draw a clear line. They hold that an activity must take place in a formal organizational or associational setting in order to be considered part of civil society. Informal gatherings of friends and spontaneous social movements are not counted as part of civil society. Yet, for individuals providing information about their associational memberships—the information I use to develop measures for civil society—this distinction between formal and informal can be blurry. For example, is a group of individuals that gathers every Saturday afternoon in the same place to play a game of football a formal association, even if the group has no name, appointed leader, or other structure, and is united only by the players’ agreement to meet and play together at an appointed time and place? The aspect of civil society that is of interest to us as a possible mechanism for fostering democratization is participation in group activities, not the formal structure of a group. The experiences that individuals have through participation in associational life are what matter, and there is little reason to believe that the experiences of the informal football group and a formal football club are vastly divergent.

Alternatively, is a closed-shop union an element of civil society? If all workers in a given enterprise must be members of a union, their participation may not be fully voluntary. As long as the union is autonomous from the state and maintains a formal structure and membership, however, it would be considered by most scholars as an element of civil society. Yet, it is

\textsuperscript{1} For a detailed discussion on the limitations of this approach, see Howard (2003, pp. 50-53).
\textsuperscript{2} The Civil Society Index created by Civicus (www.civicus.org) tries to consider these questions. It is difficult to ascertain, however, whether the data can be viewed as fully comparable across countries.
possible that a member of such a union who affirms his or her membership in such an association in a survey has never actively participated in the organization, other than perhaps paying dues. If we are measuring civil society based on the experiences of the informal football player and the formal union member, our results would not register the football player’s participation but would count the union member’s. The measure of civil society captured in this comparison is not an accurate reflection of Tocqueville’s conception of the voluntary organizational sociability that binds individuals into a community and fosters civic aims. By considering only formal membership as a proxy for participation in structured social and civic life, we may be overlooking what is most relevant about the indicator for our concept: voluntary interpersonal interaction in an organized setting.

The second point of contention involves the autonomy of associations from the state. While state-sponsored organizations can hardly be expected to play the role of watchdog or pressure groups, if civil society fosters democracy through an indirect process that encourages participation and the transfer of civic skills, the degree of autonomy from the state is less relevant. This is particularly true if the organization is non-political in nature. For example, youth recreational sports leagues are arguably elements of civil society, yet many such groups in many countries receive government funding. When the unit of measurement is individual-level participation and the link between civil society and democracy is indirect, it behooves us to consider civil society in terms that are more flexible with regard to the formality and autonomy of structures. This is particularly true when studying post-communist countries, most of which have a relatively short history of autonomous associational life coupled with extensive citizen experience in formal, state-sponsored (often non-political) associations.

Several scholars incorporate greater flexibility into the study of civil society by focusing on a different, yet related concept: social capital (Fukuyama, 2001; Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 2000). Like civil society, definitions of social capital are multiple and diverse. Generally speaking, social capital is about non-monetary forms of interaction that generate resources that can be used for exercising power and influence. The most commonly employed definition of social capital among political scientists is that introduced by Putnam, who writes that, “social capital refers to connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam, 2000, p. 19). According to Putnam, social capital has both an individual and collective aspect. Individuals benefit from extensive and broad social networks, yet there are also positive “externalities” that can benefit the wider community (Putnam, 2000, p. 20).

Some scholars view social capital as a concept that is broader than civil society since it encompasses both participation in formal associational life and informal social interaction (Howard, 2003). Others note that social capital is used more narrowly than civil society to emphasize particular features that facilitate working and cooperating together, such as friendship networks, norms, and social trust (Smidt, 2003, pp. 4-6). I agree with this perspective. While social capital indeed includes a broader range of social interactions, the definitional characteristics of this concept generally focus on two specific components: trustworthiness and norms of reciprocity. These two features are undoubtedly important to the study of civic and associational life, but they are not the only aspects of social interactions that may generate resources for democratization. For example, the acquisition of participatory skills and possible recruitment into political life through organizations may be as important as trust and reciprocity.3

3 Rose (2009) offers an important methodological critique of Putnam’s conceptualization of social capital. He writes that the approach taken by scholars working in Putnam’s tradition “assumes that people will have a general
It is necessary to consider the possible linkages between engagement in civil society and democratization that extend beyond trust and norms of reciprocity. Nevertheless, I agree that assessing informal social interactions may indeed help us gauge the vibrancy of civil society. One can hypothesize that individuals who socialize with greater regularity are more likely to form associations. Alternatively, perhaps belonging to a larger number of associations increases the frequency of informal social interactions by providing individuals access to a larger set of social networks. Untangling the causal arrow between formal and informal participation in social life is not possible with the use of observational data, and is not necessary for the purposes of this analysis.

In this chapter I provide information on both associational memberships and informal social interactions. I leave aside the question of whether my measure of informal social interactions can be conceived of as social capital. Given the challenges of measurement outlined above, attention to both formal associational life and informal social interactions helps us create a portrait of civil society that most closely resembles the autonomous, self-initiated sphere of activity described by Tocqueville.

CROSS-NATIONAL BENCHMARKS: RUSSIA AND INDONESIA AS OUTLIERS

Comparing Levels of Civic Engagement
In order to evaluate any public’s level of engagement in civil society, it is necessary to establish a comparative benchmark. The most comprehensive cross-national data set that includes measures for civil society is the World Values Survey (WVS).4 The WVS gathers data in a decentralized process, occasionally leading to differences in the quality of sampling and interviewing across countries.5 In spite of these flaws, the WVS provides us with some of the best data for measuring individual-level indicators of civil society.6

The WVS asks respondents about their participation in various formal organizations. The wording of this item, however, has changed over different waves of the survey. In the Second Wave (1989-1993) and Fourth Wave (1999-2004), respondents were given a list of thirteen different types of organizations and asked if they were a member of these different organizations. In the Third Wave (1994-1999) and the Fifth Wave (2005-2008), respondents were given a list of eight or nine different types of organizations and asked if they were an active member, an inactive member, or not a member of these organizations. Due to the variation in both the wording of the question and differences in the number and types of organizations provided in the survey, it is impossible to use the WVS precisely to analyze change in participation in civil

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4 Data files and questionnaires for the World Values Survey can be downloaded from www.worldvaluessurvey.org. The Fourth Wave data used in this chapter were downloaded in July 2008 and the Fifth Wave data were downloaded in February 2009.
5 For example, while most of the WVS is based on face-to-face interviews, in Japan the survey is administered through a postal questionnaire.
6 The Civil Society Index project organized by Civicus (www.civicus.org) also includes cross-national information on civil society, yet the indicators used in creating this index include measures of political participation, thereby conflating the measure of my outcome variable with my primary independent variable.
society over time. At best, we can compare the levels in different countries within the same survey wave.

The Fifth Wave of the WVS provides data from the largest cross-section of geographic locations and is the only WVS poll to include data on organizational membership in Indonesia. I created a variable of the average number of memberships for each country in the data set by summing the number of active and inactive memberships for each individual in each country’s survey. The end result is a variable that ranges from 0.15 in Jordan to 5.58 in India, with a mean among all respondents of 1.69. The average membership level for Indonesia is 2.55 and the average membership level for Russia is 0.77. Table 5.1 summarizes these findings.

Indonesia has the highest average membership rate among Southeast Asian cases, and only ten countries in the full WVS have higher average membership levels than Indonesia. According to the WVS, more than 80 percent of Indonesians belong to at least one organization. In contrast, only about 35 percent of Russians belong to at least one organization. While the percentage of Indonesians belonging to at least one organization is more than 20 percentage points higher than the WVS average, the percentage of Russians belonging to at least one organization is more than 25 percentage points below the global average. With regard to associational memberships, both Indonesia and Russia deviate from the global norm, but in opposite directions.

Table 5.1: Average Number of Associational Memberships (WVS 2005-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average membership rate</td>
<td>1.69 (N=67,955)</td>
<td>2.55 (N=1,867)</td>
<td>0.77 (N=1,964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent belonging to at least one organization</td>
<td>62.6 (N=70,795)</td>
<td>83.8 (N=1,980)</td>
<td>35.7 (N=2,033)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An alternate measure of participation in civil society comes from the Keio University Research Survey of Political Society, which was conducted in fifteen countries including Russia and Indonesia in 2004-2007. Respondents were asked how they spent their free time and were then asked to indicate which one of the following pursuits they considered most important: 1) civic or political activity; 2) activity of industry group or economic organization; 3) activity of other profit-making group; 4) charity, welfare activity; 5) religious activity; 6) activity of social

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7 The question is worded as follows: “I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?” This prompt is followed by a list of various organizations (question numbers V24-V33 in the World Values Survey 2005 Codebook).

8 Among these ten countries, only two—Rwanda and Zambia—have lower levels of political openness as measured by Freedom House scores.

9 Numerous studies have identified low levels of participation in associational life in the post-communist world (Howard, 2003; Rose, 2009). Among the eight post-communist cases included in the WVS, the average membership rate is 0.84, which is significantly below the average for all WVS respondents. There is considerable variation within this group however, which ranges from a low of 0.28 in Romania to a high of 1.43 in Slovenia. Only Romania and Bulgaria have lower average membership rates than Russia.

10 Marginal data from each of the country-level surveys is available through the Keio University Center for Civil Society with Comparative Perspective’s online Data Archive at http://www.coe-ccc.keio.ac.jp/data_archive_en/data_archive_en_csw_download.html (Site consulted April 7, 2010). Both Indonesia and Russia were surveyed in 2005.
circles/clubs; 7) hobby, sport; 8) cultural activity (reading, watching television, listening to radio, etc.); 9) travel; or 10) other activity. From this list, pursuits 1, 4, 5, and 6 roughly correspond to the concept of civil society—they are group activities that involve some degree of associational involvement and organization. The percentage of Indonesian respondents that selected one of these options is 34.2, which is more than double the 15.7 percent of Russians who selected one. These data offer further evidence of a level of civic engagement in Indonesia that is much higher than the level found in Russia.

**Variation in Types of Associations: Religious Organizations vs. Unions**

What are the predominant organizations to which Indonesians and Russians belong? Table 5.2 includes information on membership rates in the organization types listed in the Fifth Wave of the WVS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational type</th>
<th>WVS Sample</th>
<th>Indonesia (%)</th>
<th>Russia (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=70,633)</td>
<td>(N=1,987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organization</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport or recreational organization</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art, music, or educational organization</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor union</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental organization</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional association</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian or charitable organization</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer organization</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 5.2 demonstrates, Indonesians have high rates of membership across a variety of organizational types. The only two areas in which Indonesians have rates of membership below the global average are in recreational organizations and labor unions, the latter of which is certainly a product of the repression of labor organization in Indonesia following the purges of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) in the late 1960s. Indonesians exhibit especially high rates of participation in religious, environmental, professional, and charitable organizations. Russians differ starkly. They have low rates of participation in most types of organizations. Levels of participation are below the global average for every type of organization except labor unions. Yet, it would be misleading to view this statistic as evidence of a vibrant labor movement in Russia. High rates of participation in labor unions is an artifact of the Soviet era, when all workers were required to belong to unions and unions were the primary institution for allocating social benefits. Most Russians who belong to a labor union today are members of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), the successor of the Soviet-era...
trade union to which the vast majority of workers were required to belong. As of 2005, the FNPR still automatically withdrew dues from workers’ pay without members’ permission in many enterprises, just as it did during Soviet times (Davis, 2005, p. 202). If we break down the membership rate of WVS respondents into active versus inactive members, only 3.4 percent of Russians are active union members, compared to 14.2 percent who are inactive. We should bear this distinction in mind when considering the high levels of labor union membership in Russia.\footnote{Additionally, the Labor Code reform of 2000-2002—one of Putin’s first reforms that rolled back Russia’s democratic gains—severely curtailed the bargaining and organizational power of Russian trade unions. As a result, unions lost much of what potential they developed in the 1990s for demanding elite accountability. While trade unions have played an important role in democratization in several cases—most famously Poland—Russian trade unions are not robust, truly autonomous organizations.}

The differences in levels of participation in organizations between Indonesia and Russia are dramatic. In most cases, the percentage of Indonesians participating in an organization is more than double (and sometimes triple or quadruple) the percentage of Russians participating in the same type of organization.

It is also useful to consider variation in the types of organizations to which individuals belong in these two countries. As Table 5.2 demonstrates, the most common type of organization to which Indonesians belong is religious; 67 percent of Indonesians belong to a religious organization. Moreover, of the 1,659 individuals who belong to at least one organization in the Indonesian WVS sample, more than 80 percent belong to a religious organization. In contrast, only 11 percent of Russians belong to a religious organization. As discussed above, in Russia nominal union membership is the dominant form of participation in associational life. In the Russian WVS sample, 48 percent of the 725 individuals who reported belonging to at least one organization were members of a union. In fact, 24 percent of individuals belonging to at least one organization were only union members; they did not belong to any other type of association.

This variation in types of associations could have potentially important consequences for democratization. According to the civic voluntarism model, involvement in civil society facilitates political participation when individuals develop civic skills that can be transferred into political activism. Some types of associations, including religious groups, are better at generating civic skills than others (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).

Another indicator for evaluating the comparative levels of participation in civil society between Indonesians and Russians can be found in the Keio University survey. The survey asks, “Of all the organizations or groups to which you belong, which one do you consider the most important?” As the question wording suggests, respondents were only allowed to select one option. Several of the most popular responses are listed in Table 5.3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Type</th>
<th>Indonesia (2005) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (2005) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious group or organization</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic group or organization</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social organization or society/club</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor union</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t consider any of the groups/organizations important</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Keio University Research Survey of Political Society in a Multi-cultural and Pluri-generational World, Q23.
Table 5.3 reinforces the WVS findings: For Russians, membership in labor unions is the most frequently cited form of participation in civil society, while for Indonesians participation in religious and community organizations dominates. An interesting feature that we learn from the Keio data is that 66.1 percent of Russians do not consider any form of participation in civic or social organizations to be important. Only 12.8 percent of Indonesians shared this sentiment. This difference in the levels of importance that individuals attach to civic participation across the two polities is another piece of evidence proposing that civic engagement is much higher in Indonesia than it is in Russia. It also suggests that Russian society is highly atomized.

The high level of Russian disinterest in participation in associational life is thrown into even sharper relief when we compare the above question with the other countries included in the Keio University survey sample: the Philippines, Lebanon, Singapore, Australia, Turkey, Thailand, and Bangladesh. Across these countries, the percentage of respondents that considered none of the groups or organizations to be important ranged from a low of 7.0 percent in Lebanon to a high of 45.7 percent in Bangladesh, resulting in an overall average of 22.4 percent. Russian’s mean score on what might be considered a measure of organizational nihilism is three times the mean and over twenty points higher than the second highest score.

Change in Russian Civil Society over Time: 1990-2006
While the WVS provides only a single snapshot of participation in associations among Indonesians, it furnishes data on Russia dating back to 1990. Table 5.4 includes a comparison of Russians’ average membership rates and the percent belonging to at least one organization over time. While it would be desirable to compare these statistics according to the survey’s chronology, the differences in question wording discussed above make such a comparison vulnerable to various response biases. Rather, a more precise way to analyze trends in Russian civil society over time would be to compare the statistics from 1990 and 1999 together and those from 1995 and 2006 together since the question wording was identical for these specific pairs.

In the comparison of measures for 1990 and 1999, we see a considerable decline in both the average membership rate and the percentage of individuals belonging to at least one organization. While in 1990 nearly 71 percent of Russians belonged to at least one association, by 1999 less than half of the survey respondents were members. This decline was driven largely by a reduction in labor union membership, which dropped by two-thirds in the nine-year interval. Participation also fell in political parties, community organizations, youth organizations, and women’s organizations. Presumably the decline in participation in these groups is related to the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its myriad auxiliary organizations. Since participation in these organizations was not necessarily voluntary, it is difficult to assess whether participation in associational life in 1990 Russia captures the condition of civil society. Nevertheless, it is clear that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, once individuals were free to join or not join different types of organizations, engagement in associational life declined rather than expanded.

The comparison of measures for 1995 and 2006 is rather curious. First, average membership rate increased over this period from 0.66 to 0.77. Thus, it appears that Russian

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12 Although Japan was also included in the 2005 survey, I am excluding it from the present discussion because 50 percent of the respondents answered “don’t know” to the relevant question.

13 Tables including participation in different types of organizations are included in Appendix 5.B.

14 The average membership rate for data from the Third and Fifth waves includes the sum of active and inactive memberships.
participation in associational life increased between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. Yet, the percentage of individuals belonging to at least one organization has actually declined in the same interval. If we consider these two statistics together, it appears as though fewer individuals are participating in associational life, yet these same individuals are joining more organizations. Indeed, if we compare participation in different types of organizations, we see an increase between 1995 and 2006 in every associational type except labor unions. The percentage of individuals belonging to a labor union declined from 40 percent in 1995 to 18 percent in 2006.

Table 5.4: Average Number of Organizational Memberships in Russia (WVS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average membership rate</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent belonging to at least one organization</td>
<td>70.7% (N=1,961)</td>
<td>30.7% (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average membership rate</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent belonging to at least one organization</td>
<td>48.2% (N=2,040)</td>
<td>35.2% (N=1,964)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One interesting aspect of the change in associational membership rates between 1995 and 2006 is that the average membership rate increased after meaningful restrictions were placed on civil society activity and obstacles to independent, autonomous organization increased. In 1995 it was much easier to form and join associations than it was in 2006. Even though Russia’s 2006 measures of participation in civil society are below the global norm, the average membership rate is still higher than it was under a period of greater freedom in the country. Therefore, Russia’s low level of engagement in civil society is not likely a consequence of greater restrictions on civil liberties.

Even though meaningful differences in question wording prevent us from determining how engagement in civil society changed from 1995 to 1999 or from 1999 to 2006, the trends that we are able to observe provide us with some useful information. First, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, overall participation in associational life declined. Even if the associations that Russian respondents belonged to in 1990 were not autonomous, they did provide a structured forum for interpersonal interactions that in many instances disappeared with the associations. Second, in spite of increased authoritarianism, marked by greater restrictions on freedom of association, participation in associational life actually increased in Russia between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. Nevertheless, even taking this increase into consideration, overall Russian levels of engagement remain well below the global average.

Comparing Informal Social Interactions

How do Russians and Indonesians compare if we look at informal social interactions? Four questions in the WVS are particularly useful for measuring the frequency of social interaction. The questions ask how often people spend time with friends, colleagues from work, people from their religious organization, and people from sports, voluntary, or service groups. For each question respondents may answer “weekly,” “once or twice a month,” “only a few times a year,” or “not at all.” This battery of questions was not asked in the Fifth Wave (2005-2008) of the

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15 World Values Survey, Integrated Questionnaire numbers A058-A061: “How often do you [spend] time with friends/ socially with colleagues from your work or your profession/ with people at your mosque, church, or synagogue/ with people at sports clubs or voluntary or service organizations?” (possible answers are “weekly”; “once or twice a month”; “only a few times a year”; and “not at all”).
WVS, so the following analysis relies on data from the Fourth Wave (1999-2004) of the survey, which contains responses from 70,694 individuals in 64 countries.

I rescaled each item to fall between 0 and 1, with “0” equal to “not at all” and “1” equal to “weekly.” Out of the four items I construct a “sociability index,” which takes the average of individual scores across the four responses. The end result is a variable that ranges from 0 to 1 in which “0” corresponds to an individual who spends time “not at all” with anyone from any of the four realms of social life (1,202 people in the sample) and “1” corresponds to an individual who spends time weekly with people from all four realms (2,001 people in the sample). Between these two extremes is a distribution that roughly resembles a bell curve, with a mean of 0.49, which translates to spending time with individuals from three of the social realms approximately once per month. If we average across all of the individuals in each country’s sample, we can generate a measure for the average sociability level in a given country. In the WVS data set, the country with the lowest level of sociability is Russia, with a score of 0.30. A person with a sociability score of 0.30 might interact with friends once per month and individuals from two of the other realms a couple of times per year. The country with the highest score is Indonesia with 0.79. A person with a sociability score of 0.79 might spend time weekly with individuals from two of the social realms and time monthly with individuals from the two other realms. Similar to the trend we observed with participation in associational life, both Indonesia and Russia deviate from the global norm when it comes to social interaction. In fact, they constitute the endpoints of the empirical range for the most and least sociable populations.

Using measures of associational memberships and informal social interactions to look at civil society cross-nationally, it is clear that Indonesians are extremely sociable and are regular participants in associational life. They meet often with friends, colleagues, and other members of their communities. The average Indonesian belongs to more than two organizations, and the majority of Indonesians belong to a religious organization. In contrast, the average Russian belongs to less than one organization and is most likely to be an inactive member of a closed-shop union. As the next section will demonstrate, I observed similar patterns among the Indonesian and Russian citizens with whom I conducted in-depth interviews. Indonesia’s civil society is extraordinarily rich and dense. Russian communities lack analogous structures and patterns of behavior.

SOCIABILITY AND ASSOCIATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN RUSSIA AND INDONESIA

Citizen Interviews: Confirming Cross-National Trends
The patterns of participation in social and associational life among Indonesians and Russians captured in the WVS and the Keio University survey are evident in the findings from my in-depth citizen interviews as well. Based on the frequency with which respondents visited socially with individuals other than their immediate family members, I divided them into three categories of sociability: high, medium, and low. While I observed some small differences in sociability and organizational membership levels between cities in each country, the general patterns that emerged were similar enough to warrant pooling respondents from the same country into a single sample. I also asked individuals if they participated in any organizations or groups. Table 5.5

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16 Individuals coded as “high” socialized with friends or neighbors on a daily basis or socialized with them regularly and participated in at least one weekly organized activity. Individuals coded as “medium” socialized with friends or neighbors regularly or socialized with them rarely but participated in at least one weekly organized activity. Individuals coded as “low” do not socialize regularly with friends or neighbors.
provides a summary of the cross-national patterns in sociability and organizational membership.17

Table 5.5: Sociability and Organizational Memberships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sociability level</th>
<th>Average number of organizational memberships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures represent the pooled results for respondents of both cities in Indonesia (Surabaya and Medan) and Russia (Kazan and Krasnoyarsk).

Table 5.5 provides us with three important pieces of information about social interactions and associational memberships in Indonesia and Russia. First, on the whole, Indonesians are more sociable than Russians. Almost half of my Indonesian respondents fell into the category of “high” sociability. Russian respondents demonstrated lower levels of sociability. Less than one-third of Russian respondents were categorized as having “high” sociability and nearly another third have “low” sociability. Most Russian respondents fell into the “medium” category.18

Second, on average, individuals with higher levels of sociability tend to belong to more clubs and associations. This is true among both Indonesians and Russians. Other similarities were found between the Indonesian and Russian samples as well. Overall, sociability did not vary by sex in either sample.19 Sociability increased slightly with education level in Medan and Kazan, but not in Surabaya or Krasnoyarsk.20 Sociability levels were about the same for Muslims and Christians in both countries.21

17 Bearing in mind the important role of closed-shop union membership for providing social benefits in Russia, together with evidence from interview respondents that testifies to union membership as generally a formality, I have excluded union membership from the data on Russian organizational memberships gathered from my interviews. I believe that this exclusion provides a more accurate measure of rates of Russian participation of associational life.

18 Sociability levels were higher in Krasnoyarsk than in Kazan. Nine of my 25 respondents in Kazan were categorized as having “low” sociability, compared to 4 out of 25 in Krasnoyarsk. At the other end of the spectrum, 4 respondents in Kazan were found to have “high” sociability levels, compared to 9 in Krasnoyarsk. Small sample sizes prevent me from saying with certainty that these differences cannot be attributed to random error—a two-sample z-test of proportions with a 90 percent confidence interval did not find these differences to be statistically significant. No meaningful differences in sociability levels were found between men and women or between different nationalities in either city.

19 The small size of the sample limits the extent to which we can investigate demographic variables. A t-test comparison of group means on the sociability index in the WVS found a small, statistically-significant difference (p < .001) in sociability levels between men and women in both Russia and Indonesia. In both instances, men were slightly more sociable than women (difference of .04 in Russia and .08 in Indonesia). Within my citizen sample, if one looks at individuals with low levels of sociability, however, in Surabaya these were much more likely to be women than men. There was no gender distinction among individuals with low sociability in Medan or in the two Russian cities.

20 In the WVS, education is only weakly correlated with sociability in both Russia (.13) and Indonesia (.14).

21 The WVS data confirmed this finding—there are no statistically-significant differences in sociability levels between Christians and Muslims in either country. In my Medan citizen sample, however, sociability levels were
The third important piece of information found in Table 5.5 is that while the correlation between sociability and higher rates of associational membership is consistent in both Indonesia and Russia, the overall rates of membership are higher in Indonesia than in Russia. The mean level of organizational membership for Indonesian respondents was 1.05, and individuals with “high” sociability levels belong to an average 1.54 groups. The mean level of organizational memberships for Russian respondents was lower—0.35. The overwhelming majority of Russian respondents did not belong to any organizations. Russians who belong to the “high” sociability level in both cities participated in an average of one group.

The sparseness of civil society in Russia observed in my sample is consistent with the research of several other scholars (Howard, 2003; Rose, 2009). Both Howard and Rose have noted the persistence of informal friendship networks in the post-communist region in general, and in Russia specifically. While Howard identifies these friendship networks as one of the factors that has led to Russia’s weak civil society, Rose has framed these networks as an alternative to formal organizations—personal relations that are more reliable and efficacious in addressing a particular problem. The sociability index I developed from the WVS presented above is not intended as a proxy for the informal networks described by Howard and Rose. The sociability index measures only frequency of social interactions, not reliance on particular relationships for acquiring or accessing needed resources, which is a concept requiring different measures. Thus, I would not interpret Russia’s low sociability index score as contrasting evidence to the findings presented by Howard and Rose.

My interview questions did not seek to determine the presence or strength of informal friendship networks. In general, though, I found that the Soviet-era social and economic structures that gave rise to these networks—such as employment practices that allowed for considerable free time, a shortage economy of consumer goods, and the absence of a private housing market that limited one’s ability to change housing—have changed in potentially meaningful ways.

First, Russian respondents over the age of 35 frequently volunteered that they did not have as much free time as they used to and that they were unable to meet with their friends and former classmates as frequently as they had before. Indeed, when I asked a 39-year old female police administrator in Kazan if she belonged to any organizations, she replied, “I don’t have enough time.” Few individuals regularly visited friends in their homes—the most common form of social interaction during the Soviet era. Second, individuals are changing their housing more regularly and rental markets have developed, increasing residential mobility. As a result, individuals are not developing the close ties with their neighbors that were common in Soviet

higher among the ethnic Batak—70 percent of the Batak in the sample had “high” sociability levels. In a sample of this size, however, it is not possible to separate out the effects of ethnic group compared to education since the Batak are overrepresented among the highly educated. All of the Batak respondents in the sample had at least a junior high school education, and all three college graduates interviewed in Medan were Batak. In contrast, almost one-third of the Javanese in the Medan sample had less than an elementary school education. This is true to life in Medan where Batak have higher educational attainment rates than other ethnic groups. Most Javanese in North Sumatra descend from transmigrants and continue to be overrepresented in lower socioeconomic classes.

The mean level of organizational membership was higher in Medan (1.4) than in Surabaya (0.6), but this difference was not statistically significant in a two-sample t-test. While half of the respondents in Surabaya did not belong to any groups, only 6 of my 25 respondents in Medan did not participate in any organized groups.

The Soviet command economy had an underdeveloped service sector, offering fewer options for recreation in cafes, restaurants, etc. than the current Russian service sector. Additionally, the limits on free speech meant that many individuals preferred to meet with friends in the privacy of homes.
times. A 58-year old Russian homemaker in Krasnoyarsk reflected on these points when I asked whether she paid visits to friends or socialized with her neighbors:

I practically never go for visits. It seems to me that few people now make visits, except for young people...Before, it was a given that neighbors were very close. Now, many people rent apartments. Before, we didn’t have this—people waited in line [to receive an apartment]. Now people come and go, come and go.

Lastly, increasing levels of income inequality appear to make some individuals more self-conscious about their economic position and influence the extent to which they feel comfortable maintaining contacts with former classmates and colleagues who have achieved a higher (or lower) income. The same respondent who noted that she does not have the time to join any organizations expressed the challenges of trying to socialize with her friends:

It was easier to visit people [during the Soviet era]. You just went to their houses. Now, you need to think about it, because if you go for a visit, they will lay out a table. And, maybe they won’t have anything to put on it. Before, everyone had some jam, would boil potatoes, and then there would be tea. What would you have with tea? Well, we all had cookies because they were rather cheap. We didn’t buy expensive cookies! Specifically these interactions were much easier...So there is some nostalgia, specifically regarding personal relations. Then, it seems to me, I had more free time. Work was a little bit different, and there was more free time. Now, everything is so busy, you don’t make visits because there is no time.

Limited free time, greater residential mobility, and consciousness about income differences were cited by my interview respondents as contributing to a decline in their overall levels of social interaction. These factors may be eroding previously robust informal networks as well.

Cross-National Differences in Associational Life
Consistent with the cross-national survey data presented above, I found that Indonesians and Russians tended to belong to different types of organizations. The primary types of organizations fall roughly into four categories: religious, community, recreational/sports, and student.

Religious organizations. The most common type of organization to which Indonesians belong is religious. Muslim respondents are frequently members of prayer groups (pengajian). Most Muslim prayer groups are organized in the immediate locality; neighbors on the same street and block usually participated in the same pengajian group. In accordance with Muslim religious tradition, pengajian groups are segregated by sex. Men’s groups usually meet once or twice per week, at either a mosque or rotating among individual homes. There is greater variation in the frequency of meetings among women’s groups. In one district in Medan, I encountered a women’s pengajian group that meets three times per week. Other respondents belong to groups that meet once per week or once per month. Monthly pengajian groups usually meet for worship in a mosque, while the groups that met weekly or more frequently tend to rotate meetings among members’ homes. The size of pengajian groups varies, most ranging anywhere from 30 to 60 participants.

Pengajian groups serve as more than a form of organized worship. In addition to coming together to pray and study the Qur’an, participants—who are also neighbors—visit with each other and share news about their families. Guest speakers—usually scholars of Islam—

24 According to the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, Russia’s gini score at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union was 29 (2008). According to the UNDP’s 2009 Human Development Report, the gini score for Russia in 2009 was 37.5, indicating a rise in income inequality.
frequently come to *pengajian* meetings, providing opportunities for information sharing on religious and family life.

Christian respondents in Indonesia, particularly Protestants, often belong to Bible study groups, song/praise groups, and prayer groups. Participants attend meetings of these groups in addition to organized religious services held at their parishes on Sundays. Christian religious groups are generally organized by specific denomination, though members usually attend a group that is in close proximity to their home. Participants in Christian religious groups typically meet two or three times per week, sometimes at the homes of different parishioners and other times at their parishes. In many instances, these groups are integrated by sex, although there might be specific groups for young people and students that are separate from family groups.

Like *pengajian* groups, Christian religious groups are also highly social in nature. In addition to participating in religious activities, members visit with each other and share news about their families. The size of Christian religious groups also varies. Groups meeting at parishes could easily number 50 or more participants, while groups gathering at members’ homes are generally smaller.

Indonesians who participate in religious organizations also regularly volunteer their time for acts of charity or service to members of their religious community. When asked how he spends his free time, one 32-year old Batak Protestant man in Medan replied, “I am a servant of God in my church, therefore I carry out many social activities at the church.” He is a church elder, a responsibility that involves two meetings a week on top of his regular participation in worship and prayer groups.

Participation in religious groups is largely absent in Russia. Only 1 of my 50 respondents participates in a religious group—a young Orthodox Christian man who belongs to a Bible study group. Low levels of participation in religious groups are undoubtedly linked to the Soviet policy of forced atheism, which effectively destroyed religious communities and the maintenance of worship practices. Throughout the Soviet era, religious institutions were severely repressed and worshippers risked blacklisting from the Communist Party. As a result, very few parents passed on traditions of public worship to their children. A common response I heard when I asked respondents if their parents observed religious practices during the respondent’s childhood was that, “This was not done. It was forbidden.” Yet, several respondents recalled clandestine religious practice within their homes, usually instigated by grandparents from the pre-revolutionary era. One 48-year old Tatar woman employed in a university recalled that her parents “read the Muslim prayer (namaz). When my grandmother was alive, she taught us how to read the Muslim prayer. It was a secret. Each person in his/her home.” After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Russian citizens were granted freedom to believe in and practice their religion. As discussed in chapter 3, organized religion has been revived in post-Soviet Russia, yet fewer than 5 percent of Russian citizens attend religious services at least once per week (World Values Survey 2005). Four of my 50 Russian respondents attend religious services weekly (two Russian Orthodox women, one Russian Orthodox man, and one Muslim man).

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25 There is considerable variation within Medan regarding ethnic and confessional heterogeneity within neighborhoods. Some neighborhoods are predominantly Javanese, Chinese, or Tamil, but many working and middle class neighborhoods are quite diverse. The district of Polonia is one example. In Polonia I interviewed a Javanese Muslim, a Tamil Buddhist, a Batak Karo Catholic, and a Minahasan Protestant—all of whom lived within a short motorbike ride from each other.

26 Nevertheless several older respondents, particularly Tatar Muslims, recalled stories of parents or grandparents who would pray quietly and privately in back rooms in the home.
As elaborated in chapter 3, Indonesia’s experience under authoritarianism was markedly different. Religious practice in Suharto’s Indonesia was much freer. Unlike Russia, Indonesia never experienced a period of forced atheism. In this respect, participation in mainstream Muslim and Christian religious services and the auxiliary religious groups that meet outside of formal worship has changed little in the post-Suharto era. According to the most recent WVS, 35 percent of Indonesians report attending religious services once a week and 30 percent report attending more than once per week. Among my citizen respondents, 32 out of 49 attend religious practice at least once per week.

Community organizations. Other common forms of associational membership mentioned by Indonesian respondents included women’s Family Welfare Groups (PKK) and neighborhood associations (RT/RW). The PKK was started in the 1970s under Suharto’s New Order regime as a way to promote health and education in Indonesian families. It is structured from the top of the government all the way down to the neighborhood level. PKK volunteers have historically carried out a wide range of activities including promoting literacy, teaching classes on how to cook nutritional meals, connecting residents to prenatal and preventative health care for children, and implementing Indonesia’s family planning program. When asked to describe the PKK’s activities, a 41-year old Batak member in Medan replied, “PKK activities, for example, include sewing and arranging flowers, once each month.” While the PKK is not autonomous from the state, the women who join PKK and carry out its programs are all volunteers who see their role as providing important services to their neighbors and communities. The system of neighborhood associations (RT/RW) was also structured to provide the government with a link down to the neighborhood level. During the Suharto period, the neighborhood association system was used to monitor citizens and mobilize them for elections in addition to organizing and providing important administrative and municipal services (Dwianto, 2003; Kurasawa, 2009). In the post-Suharto era, neighborhood associations have transitioned to operating as meaningful community organizations that have provided participants with security and social services and allowed members to participate in bottom-up decision-making (Kurasawa, 2009). Similar to pengajian groups, PKK groups and neighborhood associations are comprised of individuals living in the same locale. It is not uncommon that the same groups of neighbors participate in several of these organizations, thereby developing community relationships that are reinforced in multiple settings.

While all of the organizations noted above were mentioned in my interviews in both Indonesian cities, two other types of organizations are also common among ethnic Batak residents in Medan. The first are mutual assistance associations (serikat tolong-menolong, or STM), which provide a form of collective insurance among members. STM members are committed to helping out individuals in their neighborhoods, particularly with regard to organizing traditional Batak ceremonies for weddings and funerals.27 The second organization, the marga, refers specifically to the patrilineal descent group, or clan, to which the Batak associate themselves. In urban settings like Medan, the marga is an association that brings together people who belong to the same clan. According to Frederick and Worden (1992), the marga has evolved into “a flexible social unit” among contemporary Batak. They note that “Batak who resettle in urban areas, such as Medan and Jakarta, draw on marga affiliations for financial support and political alliances.” In response to my question about participation in

27 Relatively little has been written about serikat tolong-menolong. Based on my interviews and Medan, it appears that these organizations are prevalent among Christian Bataks and are based on place of residence. I found no evidence of STM organizations existing among Muslim Batak communities.
formal associations, several of my Batak respondents in Medan described attending monthly meetings of their *marga*. They see their *marga* associations not as extended family networks, but rather as a formalized social unit that brings together individuals with a shared cultural interest. All but one of the respondents participating in a *marga* had high levels of sociability.

One unifying feature of all the community associations described above is that they are not new organizations that have arisen since the collapse of the Suharto regime. Most of these types of associations have evolved out of grassroots organizing that has existed in Indonesia for generations. In the case of the PKK and RT/RW, Suharto’s New Order regime provided an important institutional structure, but these associations have survived the Suharto era and have adapted to conditions of greater autonomy and independence. Repressive though the New Order was, it did provide meaningful space for civic organization around non-political aims, and this legacy has served as an important resource for Indonesians in the post-Suharto era.

Analogous community organizations are absent in Russia. The dearth of grassroots community organizing in Russia is in part a consequence of the way in which Soviet social organizations failed to transfer to the post-Soviet context. In Soviet Russia, there were no civic organizations independent of the Communist Party. Civic organizations existed in all realms of life, from scouts to unions to professional associations and hobby clubs. Yet they were all established, licensed, and supervised by the CPSU. When the CPSU was dissolved and the Soviet Union collapsed, virtually the entire structure of societal organization, such as it was, folded as well. In several instances, motivated activists formed independent organizations on the remnants of the former Soviet groups, but the central premise by which civil society had been organized, from recruitment to financing, had disappeared. Russians were left to re-group almost from scratch.

In addition to the formal associations that are prevalent in Indonesia, urban life in both Surabaya and Medan continues to exhibit other forms of structured community cooperation that reflect practices common in regional villages, namely *arisan* and *gotong-royong* activities. *Arisan*, the Indonesian term used to describe rotating credit associations, are present in many neighborhoods in Surabaya and Medan. The *arisan* serve not only an economic function, but also a social one, bringing together neighbors for an evening of socializing and sharing news. Six respondents in Surabaya and five in Medan belonged to *arisan*. Most *arisan* participants are women; only one male respondent from either city participated in an *arisan*. Several men in each city also noted that their wives belonged to women-only *arisan*. The gendered aspect of *arisan* participation is largely a consequence of *arisan* organization; the PKK is one of the primary organizers of women-only *arisan*. Yet, many individuals noted that there were also family *arisan* in their communities open to both men and women. Most *arisan* meet on a monthly basis. As one might expect, participation in an *arisan* correlates positively with associational memberships and sociability in both cities.

*Gotong-royong*, the Indonesian term frequently translated into English as “reciprocity” or “mutual aid,” takes on a very concrete meaning in urban neighborhood life, as it typically involves cleaning and maintenance of common property and shared space. Neighborhood associations generally plan *gotong-royong* activities at regular intervals, and social pressure to participate is high among residents. The frequency of *gotong-royong* activities varied considerably across the neighborhoods in which my respondents resided. Some individuals participated in *gotong-royong* every weekend while others reported that *gotong-royong* activities took place only a few times per year in their neighborhoods.
Curiously, one might find a Soviet-era analogy to gotong-royong activities in the subbotnik—regular Saturday clean-up and beautification projects carried out in Soviet neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces, usually before major holidays. Many of my Russian respondents old enough to remember subbotnik activities recalled them fondly for the socializing opportunities they provided. Several respondents remembered that after the work was done, they would have picnics with friends, or perhaps there would be a disco or other social activity that everyone attended together. Based on my interview findings, the subbotnik appeared to have died with Communism in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk. Additionally, I found no post-Soviet examples of other structured community activities among Russian respondents I interviewed in these cities.

Recreational/sports organizations. Only a few Indonesian respondents participated in recreational, cultural, or sports organizations. These types of organizations, however, were most common among Russian respondents. Most of my Russian respondents who belonged to an organization participated in cultural or sports groups, including choirs, martial arts clubs, and dance groups. Most of these cultural and athletic groups meet weekly or bi-weekly to engage in their respective pursuits. In some instances, the groups met more frequently. In several instances the “groups” to which respondents belonged were not associations per se, but rather regular involvement in collective dance or sports lessons at the same facility with the same group of participants with whom they have come to be acquainted.

Student organizations. While associations comprised principally of one’s neighbors constitute the primary form of organization to which most Indonesians belong, Indonesians with higher levels of education and employment in the formal sector participate in a broader set of social networks, including student organizations and professional associations. Having grown up in neighborhoods with vibrant associational lives and dense social interactions, young Indonesians enter university having witnessed their parents engage in building social and civic organizations. Once at university, young people reproduce their parents’ patterns of engagement.

Indeed, student activism has a long and illustrious history in Indonesia, harking back to the anti-colonial movement that gave birth to the 1928 “Youth Pledge,” which proclaimed the ideals of one motherland, one nation, and one language. Student organizations in Indonesia have a history of independence from both the state and university life. After a crackdown on campus-based student activities in the late 1970s, many students formed study groups that allowed them to keep previous student networks alive. During the mid-1980s, study groups from different cities in Java began networking between themselves. After keterbukaan (openness) began in the early 1990s, students became more active and more political. New organizations emerged, coordination between groups in different cities intensified, and involvement became more widespread.

In the 1990s, student activism evolved into a formidable anti-Suharto force. Some students, such as those who belonged to the People’s Democratic Union (Persatuan Rakyat Demokratik, PRD), promoted revolutionary radicalism. The PRD, as well as other student groups, began organizing the rural and urban poor, generally with the goal of raising the issues of land disputes and labor conditions as a basis for criticizing the New Order regime. Other student organizations were based on religious identification, and while not explicitly political, their ranks could be mobilized for political ends. The largest of these groups, the Islamic Students Association (HMI), which had an estimated membership of 150,000 in 1986 (as cited in Aspinall, 2005, p. 133), had close relations with the New Order regime. Other groups, which had acted primarily as religious and social groups in the 1980s, began to take a critical stance against

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28 The information in this paragraph draws heavily from details in Aspinall (2005), chapter 5.
the regime. These various groups played an important role in mobilizing discontent across different social spheres and organizing the protests that ultimately brought Suharto down.

Indeed, one 30-year old former student activist in Surabaya who had been involved in the anti-Suharto protests viewed student activism as the key factor behind Indonesia’s democratization. When describing Suharto’s resignation, he said,

The reaction at this time was euphoric—there was joy because he fell. For 32 years the people of Indonesia did not feel comfortable with Suharto’s power. This all was a blessing for students; therefore there was a feeling of satisfaction when Suharto stepped down. The students of PRD triggered democracy by criticizing Suharto.

In the years since Suharto’s resignation, Indonesian student organizations have maintained a high level of organization and activity. The three university students in my interview sample all belonged to student organizations. The two Javanese students belonged to the Movement of Muslim Students of Indonesia (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, PMII) and the one Batak student belonged to a student organization as well as a regional Batak organization. The 22-year old Javanese student leader of PMII in Surabaya described the organization’s regular activities, which include a mix of discussion, political activism, and community service:

About 20-25 people twice a week have a discussion. On Monday it is about Islam, and on Thursday about current political events or the government’s actions. But we are also able to discuss political theory. Now, group members are discussing the eviction of residents at Stren Kali. There is housing for [those evicted] on the Bantaran Kali, and members help there. There are children who have lost their homes, and members help out there.

In contrast to the religious, social, and neighborhood associations that are centered on one’s place of residence, student organizations introduce participants to a broader range of social networks which persist following graduation. Aspinall writes:

In the same way that university prepares students for entry to the professions, student activism is an apprenticeship for middle-class political activism of all stripes. Student activists were integrated into wider oppositional circles once leaders of student groups established in the 1980s graduated and moved to NGOs and other organizations while maintaining links with their old campus networks. (2005, p. 129)

Like neighborhood-based social networks, student and professional networks also provide important arenas for recruitment in political life.

A similar dynamic is largely absent in contemporary Russia. Although the average level of educational attainment in Russia is much higher than in Indonesia, and 22 of my 50 Russian respondents had a university education, student organizations do not appear to play a meaningful role in the general spectrum of associational life. The Russian students I interviewed had levels of participation in associational life that were higher than the non-student population, yet they did not necessarily belong to student organizations or to groups that mirror the well-organized, active, mass organizations one sees in Indonesia. For example, one Russian student belonged to a choir, another to a weekly discussion club, and a third to an English-language club. Two of these three groups were not affiliated with a university. While student organizations constitute a vibrant part of university culture in Indonesia, they are generally absent in Russia.

In the Soviet era, all student activity was supervised by the Communist Youth League (the Komsomol). Under glasnost’ the Komsomol became an important training ground for pro-democracy activists. As I learned from multiple interviews in Kazan, several grassroots
movements that emerged in Tatarstan in the late 1980s, including the Russian cultural movement and the pro-democracy organization, Equal Rights and Lawfulness (Ravnopravie i Zakonnost’, RiZ), evolved from discussions among students at Kazan State University (especially in the Physics department) and student activism in the Komsomol. Indeed, there is evidence of student activism facilitating political participation in Russia in the early years of democratization, but the scale of activity was much smaller than what we see in Indonesia. The student activism of the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, appears to have died with the Komsomol. No other institutions have emerged to fill the void left by the Komsomol as a student organization. Some clubs can be found in Russian universities, yet there is nothing like the panorama of energetic student organizations found in Indonesia.

LINKING PATTERNS OF CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT TO CIVIC VOLUNTARISM

Variation in the Structures and Norms of Civil Society
The different types of associations to which Indonesians and Russians belong, as well as the greater levels of participation evident in Indonesia, have potentially important implications for the civic voluntarism model. In Indonesia, the overlapping social networks of religious services, women’s groups, neighborhood associations, cultural groups, student organizations, and structured cooperative activities like arisan and gotong-royong form the basis of a dense civil society both within and across Indonesian neighborhoods. These frequent face-to-face interactions between individuals who live in close proximity, as well as those who live further apart yet share a common religious, cultural, or civic practice that brings them into contact at regular intervals, provides a basis for participation in both civic and political life.

Indonesians’ informal social interactions and participation in formal associational life contribute to democratization by offering opportunities for political recruitment and fostering political engagement. Networks of recruitment are one of the key pillars of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady’s civic voluntarism model. The authors find that Americans who are active in non-political civic institutions, such as churches and unions, are especially inclined to accept invitations to participate in political activities. I found a similar dynamic among Indonesians. For example, one female Minang respondent with only two years of elementary education from Medan participates in a weekly pengajian group that is affiliated with the Islamic organization Muhammadiyah. Many members of Muhammadiyah also belong to the National Mandate Party (PAN). Indeed, when asked if there was a political party that she affiliated with, this woman named PAN. She had consistently voted for PAN and PAN-endorsed candidates in all national elections over the past decade. Even if the aims of formal organizations and the content of informal interactions are not directly political, the density of social networks and their importance in neighborhood life facilitate mobilization for participation in political life. Moreover, the information sharing that comes with the frequent interactions and cooperation in shared goals can help expose individuals to political information, stimuli, and contrasting opinions. This is particularly important in the context of political liberalization, when voters are being asked to evaluate different perspectives and select representatives in an environment that has only recently become politically competitive.

In Russia, overlapping social networks that evolve as a result of one’s participation in religious, neighborhood, civic, student, and professional life are lacking on a large scale. This is not to say that some Russians do not resemble Indonesians in their levels of social interaction and frequency of participation in social and civic life. I found examples of these individuals in
Kazan and Krasnoyarsk. Yet, while a visible segment of Russian society, they do not constitute the majority of Russian citizens. Russians who do participate more actively in civic and social life tend to engage in groups that reflect their hobbies and personal interests, which are not necessarily (or usually) located near their residences. There are simply fewer opportunities for individuals to develop overlapping social relations in Russia. As a result, social networks are not as dense and cannot be employed as easily to mobilize for political or civic causes.

Explaining this variation between civil society engagement in Indonesia and Russia is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Yet, it is worth noting that the level of participation in civic and social life found in a given country is not static, but can change over time. Just as political liberalization increases new opportunities for political participation, it also fosters conditions that may be conducive to non-political associational life. The collapse of authoritarianism and the subsequent relaxation of controls over speech and association in both Indonesia and Russia created opportunities for the emergence of new types of organizations, including human rights and environmental organizations, student groups, and religious associations. Yet the collapse of authoritarianism influenced the landscape of organizational life in Indonesia and Russia differently.

In Indonesia, the structure of religious, community, and student organizations was largely autonomous from the New Order regime (even if the regime did limit the activities these groups could safely engage in). There was no rupture in the overall structure of these organizations or opportunities to engage in them as the country began democratization. In the post-Suharto era, membership in organizations that existed under New Order, including religious groups and neighborhood associations, has remained high. Additionally, it appears that Indonesian activity expanded in some areas, such as engagement in organizations that would have been prohibited under Suharto, including human rights, environmental protection, and democracy-promotion groups.

In contrast, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about the disintegration of many of the types of organizations that Soviet Russians had previously engaged in, such as the Komsomol, women’s councils, and official professional groups. Scholars of post-communist civil society frequently neglect this fact. We tend to emphasize the non-voluntary nature of many forms of associational activity in the Soviet Union to such an extent that we presume that individuals would not have opted to join these associations if given a real choice. Although there is no possible way to measure voluntary versus coerced membership in Soviet associational life, it would be incorrect to assume that all members joined only out of pressure or duress. My citizen respondents included several individuals who valued their activity in the Komsomol, trade unions, and other Soviet-era organizations and felt a void when these structures failed to transfer to the post-communist era. For a considerable segment of the population, the associational life it had known largely disappeared, leaving those individuals who had enjoyed participating in these state-sponsored organizations (and did not view their activity as forced or formal) without a ready alternative. These individuals—though not the majority of the population—experienced a sense of loss and were not prepared to create new, autonomous associations. The concept was completely foreign to them, and in some instances, appeared to them as subversive.

At the same time, greater opportunities for engagement in civil society opened up in Russia in the early 1990s. Russians were free to form any type of association they pleased, and while the numbers of registered non-governmental organizations mushroomed in the 1990s (Sundstrom, 2006, p. 14), Russians did not develop a habit of participating. Engagement in
associational life—though higher by the mid-2000s than in the mid-1990s, remains low compared to other countries. It is clear that a relaxation of control over rights to form associations is not sufficient to generate high levels of citizen involvement in associational life.

Resources and Networks for Political Participation

The previous sections of this chapter establish several empirical trends regarding Indonesia and Russia. First, when analyzed in a cross-national context, Indonesians exhibit high rates of involvement in civil society and engage in informal social interactions at a high level. In contrast, Russians participate in associational life at rates below the global average and have very low levels of social interaction. Similar patterns of engagement in civic and social life were displayed by respondents in my open-ended citizen interviews in both countries.

How do the differences in civil society observed in Indonesia and Russia contribute to the differences in political participation discussed in chapter 4? The civic voluntarism model provides an analytical framework to understand the mechanism by which high rates of engagement in civic and social life make citizens more equipped to take advantage of expanded opportunities for political participation in a system undergoing political liberalization. The model emphasizes three interconnected features: motivation, capacity, and connectedness. Specifically, a citizen must be motivated to participate, capable of participating, and part of a network through which s/he can be recruited (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, pp. 3-6). Russians and Indonesians differ on all of these dimensions. Russians exhibit low levels of interest in participating in civic life, and many of my respondents demonstrated no motivation to engage in political activism or viewed such participation as dangerous. As the data on social interactions show, Indonesians are plugged into a larger number of active social networks than are Russians. This provides them with greater opportunities to be recruited into political participation.

While the differences between Indonesians’ and Russians’ levels of motivation and density of social networks are more straightforward, the issue of participation capacity needs to be analyzed in greater detail. In explaining capacity, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady focus attention on the need for individuals to have access to resources in the forms of time, money, and civic skills to facilitate participation in political life. The organization of Indonesian civil society equips individuals to activate these resources through both the norms of participation and the structure of associations. Participation in associational life in Indonesia is marked in particular by two resources that are useful to political life: volunteer labor and charitable giving. In other words, Indonesians are used to giving both time and money to civic causes. This norm has helped to facilitate mass support for opposition parties, thereby contributing to political competition in Indonesia. Additionally, the structure of Indonesian associations prioritizes leadership training and community organizing—two features that allow for the development and transfer of civic skills from one domain to another. All of these factors served as resources for Indonesians to expand political participation under democratization.

The organization of civil society in Russia, in contrast, does not exhibit the characteristics that help to generate individual capacity for political participation. Volunteer labor and charitable giving are not standard social practices among Russians. The absence of these resources has inhibited the growth of opposition parties. Russia also lacks strong mass-based civil society associations. The organizations that do exist are generally small and centered on a handful of enthusiastic activists. Although the CPSU had a system in place for training leaders, this system did not survive the collapse of communism. While indeed there are examples of Russian respondents who have acquired civic skills through participation in civic and educational life, the
number that applies these skills to political participation is too small to engender system-level effects.

I will outline each of these resources, time, money, and civic skills, separately and analyze how they have affected political participation and democratic institutions in Indonesia and Russia.

**Time: Volunteer Work**

The first resource Indonesians develop through participation in civil society is the norm of giving time and unpaid labor. Indonesians’ participation in women’s groups, neighborhood associations, charitable organizations and mass religious societies is evidence of their high rates of voluntarism. Examples abound in my citizen interviews. One respondent, a Javanese woman in Surabaya nearing age fifty with an elementary school education, runs a free after school program for neighborhood children out of her house. The children come to a room on the second floor of the building that she and her daughter have prepared for them and practice reading, writing, and other basic tasks as well as fun activities. According to the respondent, the children who come are from poor families—many cannot provide them with a complete education. She and her daughter try to impart some basic skills to help them succeed. Another respondent, a thirty-five-year-old Javanese woman in Medan with a high school degree and part-time low level administrative job, spends an average of ten hours a week participating in volunteer work and voluntary associations. She is the head of her local neighborhood association, the head of the local volunteer health services program (Posyandu), and is the deputy head of the local chapter of the PKK. The volunteer tasks she carries out through these various groups range from preparing the local polling station before election day to coordinating the bulk purchase of rice for neighborhood women. Another example was the forty-nine-year-old Malay factor worker in Medan with only five years of elementary school education who voluntarily coaches three different youth soccer teams, heading out to the neighborhood athletic fields almost every day after work. What is remarkable about these three examples is just how unremarkable they are among Indonesians. These individuals, who give freely and frequently of their time, are typical of their peers and neighbors and showed no indication during the interviews that they regarded their own efforts as out of the ordinary.

Active volunteers were present among my Russian respondents as well, but in much smaller numbers. One 69-year-old Russian woman from Kazan who is a retired factory worker described several volunteer tasks she has taken on over the years, including organizing the clean-up of her apartment-block yard and previously serving as the “building monitor” (a position that essentially comprises the tasks of a building co-op manager and liaison to city services). A 39-year-old midwife voluntarily gave talks on sex education and other health topics in local schools. The one Russian respondent who belongs to a Bible study group is also trying to start up a charitable organization among his fellow parishioners, but noted that this was difficult to accomplish due to an absence of a practice of voluntarism. These examples, however, were exceptional among my Russian respondents.

In Indonesia, norms of voluntarism are not limited to neighborhood-level initiatives, but can be found in higher levels of organization as well. One example is the Chamber of the City of Surabaya (Dewan Kota Surabaya). The Chamber was originally started in 2003 by a group of Surabaya artists and professionals, including the lawyers’ association, accounting association, public notaries, and economic associations, with the goal of improving a city that had fallen upon hard times. More than 160 professional associations were involved in the Chamber, which never
registered as a formal non-governmental association. The Chamber runs its activities out of donated office space and all activities are carried out on a volunteer basis.

The Chamber has engaged in a variety of projects, most of which involve using members’ professional skills, contacts, and expertise to advocate on behalf of more vulnerable citizens. An example of one of the Chamber’s projects is to try and hold the government accountable to its policy that 20 percent of the state budget be earmarked for education. Chamber members work with families and students who are not receiving the educational benefits to which they are entitled to draft letters of complaint. Chamber members then arrange to deliver these letters to the appropriate authorities. The Chamber has also worked together with marginalized social groups, such as the Association of Residents of the Surabaya Stren Kali (Paguyuban Warga Strenkali Surabaya, PWS) in their battle over riverside development and with villagers who were displaced as a result of the mud volcanoes in Sidoarjo, East Java.

In Russia, examples of volunteer labor propelling more organized forms of civic engagement are less common. Even prominent human rights organizations like the Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia (henceforth Soldiers’ Mothers) and Memorial have a difficult time recruiting volunteers. The work of these two organizations, which are arguably the two most visible and well-known civic organizations in Russia, is carried out almost exclusively by small groups of dedicated volunteers. The Soldiers’ Mothers, who first organized in 1989, provide a critical view of Russian military policy, attempt to ensure that human rights are maintained in the armed forces, and directly assist families of conscript soldiers to understand their rights and intervene on their behalf if these rights are violated. According to a member of the Soldiers’ Mothers’ leadership, there are about 300 Soldiers’ Mothers committees with an estimated 2,500 volunteers throughout Russia (M-14, interview, February 21, 2008). Most of the volunteers are themselves the mothers of current or former conscript soldiers. My interlocutor noted that it is difficult to maintain volunteers, and that the organization tries to recruit volunteers from among the families that attend meetings the Soldiers’ Mothers hold for draftees.

Memorial, a historical and human rights organization, was also founded in 1989. Like the Soldiers’ Mothers, many of the volunteers attracted to Memorial have a close personal connection to the primary work of the organization. One of the leaders of the Memorial branch in Krasnoyarsk said that all of the individuals working for Memorial in Krasnoyarsk were volunteers. He described the volunteers as comprising three generations: dissidents of the Soviet type, who do not have repressed family members; volunteers ranging in age from 40-60, many of whom had family members who were victims of political repression; and a few young volunteers up to age 30. The Memorial leader said that it is difficult to attract young people to the organization and that youth are not very interested in questions of political repression and rehabilitation (Kr-11, interview, November 10, 2008).

The examples of the Soldiers’ Mothers and Memorial provide further testimony to the lack of a norm of widespread voluntarism among Russians. These two organizations, which are well-known among Russians and rely extensively on volunteers, have difficulty attracting and maintaining a volunteer base. The volunteers that do participate are generally linked to the organization’s mission in a very personal way. One would expect that smaller and less well-known organizations must have an even greater difficulty attracting and maintaining volunteers. The absence of a norm of volunteering in Russia stands in sharp contrast to the picture in Indonesia, where individuals view voluntary activity as a natural extension of being part of a community.
The most visible effect of the difference in norms of voluntary labor between Indonesia and Russia involves the resources available to political parties. In Indonesia, political parties are beneficiaries of voluntarism. Most lower-level party organizational work, such as recruitment, campaign work, and social outreach, is carried out by volunteers, not paid administrators. For example, a representative from the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), which boasts 60,000 members in East Java, noted that the party has about 100 paid administrators for the region, relying on volunteer labor for most of its activities (EJ-8, interview, June 6, 2009). Most Indonesian norms of voluntary labor for carrying out charitable and social acts, like those engaged in by PKK and the two predominant Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, are fluidly and easily appropriated into voluntary commitments of time to political causes. This is one reason why Indonesia has developed a broad range of organized and competitive political opposition parties. In contrast, Russian political parties have failed to develop strong voluntary reserves, inhibiting the development of a competitive party system.

**Money: Autonomous Self-Financing**

The second resource in the civic voluntarism model exhibited by norms in Indonesian civil society is autonomous self-financing. Indonesia’s two largest mass organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, are self-financed. Although active members of both organizations are expected to pay dues, the ability to collect these sums appears to vary across locales. As a result, dues do not constitute the primary stream of revenue for these organizations’ activities. Rather, their financing comes primarily in the forms of donations and revenue-generating activities. In-kind transfers for development projects are common. Leaders I interviewed in both NU and Muhammadiyah noted that they had received donations in land that can be used to build facilities or sold for profit (EJ-3, interview, June 2, 2009; EJ-10, interview, June 8, 2009).

Examples of autonomous self-financing are evident in smaller scale initiatives as well. For example, the Chamber of the City of Surabaya operates in office space donated by one of the founders. Members of PWS began a recycling and trash collecting program that they used to raise money to cover the costs of renovating their homes to bring them into accordance with government regulations. In another example, one of my citizen respondents in Surabaya, a 30-year-old food stall vendor who slept on a bench behind his wok, described the merchant association he belonged to: the vendors in the neighborhood contribute 10-15,000 rupiah per month (about $1-1.50), and this money is available as an insurance or loan for other vendors. It can be used to improve one’s stall or purchase a new piece of equipment. According to the respondent, whose monthly income was less than $50, “This has indeed become an association that is serious. Without it, we [small traders] could not get by.”

While Indonesian associations large and small have managed to develop strategies to finance their activities, Russian associations struggle to support themselves. For example, the Krasnoyarsk branch of Memorial does not have any steady revenue stream, relying primarily on in-kind resources. A local firm provides the group with an office in its building, a computer, and internet access. The organization receives occasional grants for projects, but this support is sporadic and unreliable. The representative I interviewed from the Soldiers’ Mothers described the financial situation of that organization in similar terms. The Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia has no general finances. Sometimes specific committees receive grants for individual projects, usually from human rights NGOs, or occasionally from funds relating to veterans affairs. In some cases, the committees might operate out of donated office
space. In the case of Moscow, though, my interlocutor noted that the city government wanted to remove the Soldiers’ Mothers from their centrally-located office. She said that the city’s desire to relocate the Soldiers’ Mothers was likely politically motivated. The Soldiers’ Mothers has been a thorn in the side of state authorities, who frequently seek to hush up abuses in the armed forces and underestimate casualties in Russia’s ongoing civil conflicts.

The apparent struggles of two of Russia’s most prominent examples of civil society are somewhat surprising given the country’s level of economic development. In 2005, Russia’s GDP at purchasing power parity neared $11,000, while Indonesia’s was less than $4,000 (United Nations Development Program, 2008). Indonesia is a much poorer country, yet none of the organizations I interviewed complained about financial struggles. How can this be? In contemporary Russia, the level of repression is clearly one factor. In April 2006 a new law regulating the activities of non-governmental organizations went into effect. In practice, the new regulations dramatically increased the bureaucratic obstacles to register a nongovernmental organization and made it much more difficult for Russian associations to operate with financial backing from foreign foundations. Moreover, other aspects of the Russian Civil Code and taxation law place heavy burdens on NGOs, thereby decreasing the incentives for both donors and recipients to establish a system of charitable giving. In order to reduce reliance on foreign grant-making agencies, starting in 2006 Russia’s Public Chamber established annual grant competitions for Russian associations. These grant competitions transfer up to 1.5 billion rubles (approximately $50 million) of state money into Russian civil society each year, making the Russian government the largest financial backer of associational life (Human Rights Watch, 2009; Richter, 2008). The structure of these grant competitions has raised concerns of bias against organizations that have taken a critical view towards Kremlin policy (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

The perception that any charitable giving or financing of associational life has political implications can be seen in smaller scale ventures as well. One former candidate for local office in Krasnoyarsk described a failed attempt to organize an outing at local cinemas and theaters for children residing in the city’s orphanages. Several of the local businesses he approached for sponsorship of this strictly charitable act favored the idea, but said that they could not support it since the activity was not being organized with the explicit approval of city officials. These business owners did not want their donations to a worthwhile humanitarian cause to be perceived as hostile to local officials. According to this individual, Russian businesses do not necessarily lack a spirit of charity, yet they cannot exercise it openly. Rather, they wait for the government to request their participation or assistance in particular tasks, such as providing resources for a New Year’s celebration or donating goods to schools and orphanages. In these instances, of course, businesses are compelled to give, fearing negative repercussions if they do not oblige the government’s requests.

While the political coloring that charitable giving and financing for associational life has taken on in recent years is undoubtedly linked to the increased repression of civil society during the same period, the fundraising struggles of Russian organizations precede the 2006 reforms. Many analyses of Russia’s burgeoning civil society in the 1990s note the difficulties associations

29 For good overviews of the regulations and their impact on NGOs, see Human Rights Watch (2009), Richter (2008), and International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2006).
31 The Public Chamber was founded in 2005. It is a consultative committee comprised of 126 members, one-third of which are appointed by the president. These members in turn elect representatives from public associations.
encountered in financing their activities.\textsuperscript{32} In particular, organizations had a hard time obtaining support from private, domestic sources. Large, professionalized NGOs relied on foreign grants, while smaller, local organizations depended on state assistance, including in-kind transfers, such as meeting space.\textsuperscript{33}

The difficulty Russian civil society has encountered in financing its activities speaks to the persistence of several attitudinal and behavioral legacies from the Soviet era. The first is an attitudinal legacy on the part of citizens that the state should be the main source of financial support for civic initiatives. The second is a concurrent behavioral legacy—because individuals expect state provision they are not in the habit of providing funds to larger initiatives, whether on the small scale of the individual or household, or on the larger scale of the business sector. The third legacy is also attitudinal on the part of both political elites and business owners, who do not view the civic realm as a sphere of truly autonomous activity. The state can continue to dictate how associational life is financed—either by large-scale Public Chamber grants or small-scale donations by local businesses—and thereby influences which organizations flourish and survive. In the absence of a norm of individual- and household-level giving, the state controls most of the purse strings for civic life.

How do norms for self-financing of civil society affect resources for political participation? In Indonesia, the practice of self-financing for civic associations contributes to a norm in which individuals are willing to part with fixed sums of money for a collective benefit. This increases an individual’s willingness to pay dues to a more structured organization, such as a political party. Most of the representatives I interviewed from Indonesian political parties describe a system of dues-paying that is used to finance the party’s work. In addition to the assistance parties receive from the government for each seat their members hold in the national legislature, most parties require that each legislative representative elected by the party donate a fixed portion of his/her salaries to the party. The same is true for representatives of regional legislatures. Parties will frequently redistribute money across provinces in order to invest in party development in areas where their representation is weaker. A representative of PDI-P in Surabaya explained that each active member is expected to make a contribution to the party for presidential campaigns. The level of the expected donation is decided in a meeting at the city or regional level (EJ-5, interview, June 4, 2009). These forms of self-financing are an important augmentation to donations by business elites, and has aided in building a competitive political party system in Indonesia.

Russian political parties, in contrast, share a similar fundraising fate as their brethren in non-political civic and social organizations. Throughout the 1990s, they failed to develop an independent base of small and medium-sized donors.\textsuperscript{34} During this period, people could freely

\textsuperscript{32} See, for example, Sperling (1999), Sundstrom (2006), and Lussier and McCullaugh (2009).

\textsuperscript{33} Consequently, many associations that were started in the 1990s were already struggling to exist when regulations became more restrictive. One such example was a women’s crisis center in the city of Naberezhny Chelny, the second-largest city in Tatarstan. The center, which was founded in the mid-1990s, provided services to 1,500 women per year (K-19, interview, March 25, 2008). Approximately 20 volunteers carried out services, including counseling, legal aid, and a crisis hotline. In its short history, the crisis center never received any assistance from the municipal or regional government. It won a few foreign grants and some money from federal competitions, but this latter source was exhausted after former presidential representative to the Volga region, Sergei Kirienko, was transferred to a different position in 2005. By 2008, the crisis center had exhausted all avenues of financial support and closed its doors.

\textsuperscript{34} For a detailed account of the role of financial industrial groups in Russian political competition and the effect that this has had on the Russian political party system, see Hale (2006).
donate to parties, but political parties were either incapable or uninterested in establishing serious resource bases. Able to draw campaign resources from non-party sources, candidates for office were less interested in seeking stable donations for ongoing party organizations. As Stoner-Weiss (2002) points out, the politically and economically powerful in Russia have demonstrated no interest in party building. Consequently, only parties that received backing from the Kremlin had the monetary resources to launch effective campaigns. At the regional level, political competition was financed by competing industrial groups outside of the party structure (Hale, 2006). In the absence of a mass-based party system in which members’ dues might provide some basic financing, or in which active volunteers might seek to cultivate outside donors, Russian opposition parties are left to flounder.

My interviews with representatives from the regional leadership of all of Russia’s major political parties in both Krasnoyarsk Krai and Tatarstan found that a party’s level of financial support was directly correlated to its representation in the State Duma. As the party of power, United Russia receives both the most assistance from federal support for political parties in office as well as the Kremlin’s blessing for donations by the business community. The party’s relative wealth is evident in the vibrancy of its regional offices, which are much larger and more modern than those of the other parties, and boast of significantly larger staffs. Other parties rely heavily on the transfers they receive from federal support. State Duma deputies are provided with three paid assistants and an official reception space in their home district, complete with a phone line and internet connection. Political parties in the regions will often pool the resources of their deputies to aid in party-development work. These resources can be instrumental for parties other than United Russia.

Even though at first glance we would expect Russians to be better equipped with a resource of money for political participation, I find, in fact, that Indonesians are better positioned to use this resource. Russia’s greater wealth does not translate into philanthropy for civic or political causes. Moreover, the persistence of attitudinal and behavioral legacies from the Soviet era perpetuate a view that the state should provide the financial resources for civic life—and that it has a right to intervene in the financing of associational life and charitable initiatives. This norm has had negative consequences for the development and support of opposition parties and, by extension, political competition in Russia. Indonesia’s relative poverty, however, has not hindered the self-financing of associational life. Despite their relative poverty, Indonesians are accustomed to contributing finances to social and civic initiatives on small and larger scales.

It is possible that the widespread giving found among the Indonesian population may be related to the Islamic tradition of alms-giving (zakat). While none of my interlocutors mentioned this specifically, it is indeed likely that this particular tenet of Islamic faith has become internalized and habituated such that it influences broader-scale giving as well. This norm has played a role in political parties’ successful strategies at autonomous self-financing, which in turn has been a key factor in developing the party system as a viable institution for political competition.

*Civic Skills: Leadership Training and Community Organizing*

The third resource posited by the civic voluntarism model as a key resource for political participation is civic skills. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady define civic skills as “the communications and organizational abilities that allow citizens to use time and money

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35 For an interesting discussion on alms-giving as a possible explanation for cross-national differences in social inequality, see Fish (2011), chapter 6.
effectively in politics” (1995, p. 304). They argue that individuals who possess civic skills are likely to be more effective when they become involved in politics and should find political activity less daunting and costly. Similarly, civic skills allow individuals to use the resources of time and money more effectively.

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady note that civic skills are acquired throughout one’s life experiences, and are particularly honed through educational and workplace experiences. Given Russia’s significantly higher rate of educational attainment and level of workforce professionalization, it is reasonable to expect that civic skills would be much more extensive among Russians than among Indonesians. Yet, other forums for acquiring civic skills include participation in voluntary associations and religious groups, which is much more widespread in Indonesia than Russia. Indeed, I have found that the structure of Indonesian associations facilitates the development of civic skills by virtue of associations’ commitment to leadership development and regular community organizing. An analogous dynamic is absent in Russia.

Many of the local-level organizations to which Indonesians belong—women’s groups, pengajian, and church groups—are part of larger organizational structures that include a system of leadership training. For example, many of the pengajian groups to which respondents belonged in Surabaya were affiliated with NU, the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, which has its stronghold in East Java. NU estimates that about 25 million individuals in East Java (70 percent of the region’s population) belong to NU (EJ-4, interview, June 3, 2009; EJ-10, interview, June 8, 2009), and independent sources back this claim. While not all pengajian participants discussed how their prayer groups were organized, many of the practices and structures they described were consistent with NU worship practices, which incorporate some traditionalist customs that differ from those practiced by modernist Muslims, who are more commonly associated with Muhammadiyah. Five of my 25 interview respondents in Surabaya volunteered that they or their families participated in NU. One Javanese respondent from Medan noted that she participated in Muhammadiyah—the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia—and belonged to a Muhammadiyah pengajian.

NU and Muhammadiyah are large, hierarchically-organized mass organizations that are involved in a wide range of social, educational, and religious activities. Although NU and Muhammadiyah differ in their ideological views and religious practices, both organizations are Islamic groups which engage in social welfare provision through the sponsorship of schools, hospitals, and opportunities for religious teaching and devotion. While there are specific differences in how these two mass associations are organized, both have a hierarchical structure that links village-level organizations up to a national coordinating body, and both have a system for leadership development.

According to interviews I conducted with regional-level leaders of NU in East Java, anyone can become a member of NU, but members cannot advance in the organization without first receiving education in NU ideology and training in organizational management. After this training, a member becomes a “cadre” (kader) and is permitted to take on leadership responsibilities within NU. If a cadre remains in the NU structure and continues to take on an

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36 While East Java is the stronghold for NU, Muhammadiyah is more prominent in Central Java. Both organizations were founded in Java and are more active there than on the outer islands.

37 There is an extensive literature describing significant differences between these two organizations. For more detail see Doorn-Harder (2006) and Asyari (2009).

38 The organizations employ different models of sponsorship. NU’s relationship to schools and hospitals is more indirect and carried out through the specific activities of NU members rather than a central board.
active role, he/she can become a “caretaker” (*pengurus*) of the organization. A similar structure of leadership training is employed in Muhammadiyah and in the PKK.

Officially, both NU and Muhammadiyah are non-political and do not support any specific political party.\(^3^9\) Yet, following the collapse of Suharto’s New Order, members of both organizations became the basis of new political parties. After much deliberation about whether to convert NU into a political party, some members followed their long-time leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, to form the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), allowing NU to continue strictly as a social organization. Muhammadiyah members formed the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) under the leadership of former Muhammadiyah Chairman Amien Rais. More than a decade after the founding of these parties, their primary members and supporters still come from the ranks of NU and Muhammadiyah members, even as the mass organizations self-consciously maintained a clear organizational distinction between themselves and the political parties to which their members gravitated.

According to one of the top party “caretakers” for PKB in East Java, 80 percent of the party’s members belong to NU (EJ-11, interview, June 8, 2009). Moreover, all of the party’s caretakers are NU members who had undergone leadership training in NU. Because of the close informal relations between NU and PKB, PKB did not develop its own leadership training program. The experience of NU and PKB is a clear example of civic skills being transferred directly to political participation—PKB activists rose through the party’s ranks based on their experiences in non-political participation in NU.\(^4^0\) Additionally, activists’ participation in NU led to an invitation to participate politically in PKB.

A similar dynamic is evident in smaller scale civic organization in Indonesia as well. For example, it is common for *pengajian* groups to invite guest speakers to participate at their meetings. It is not unusual for candidates from political parties to seek this platform before an election as an opportunity to meet with potential voters. Half of the Muslim women in my Medan citizen sample said that candidates from different parties had visited their *pengajian* groups prior to the 2009 legislative election. Thus, arranging for speakers from parties to address their *pengajian* was a regular part of the *pengajian* leaders’ tasks. Coordinating a speaker for one’s local prayer group is an example of a non-political civic skill that could easily be parlayed into gathering an audience for a small-scale campaign event.

Similarly, local neighborhood association leaders who succeed in motivating their neighbors to participate in a monthly *gotong-royong* activity could apply those same skills to mobilize their neighbors to issue a complaint about an inadequate public service. A clear example of this is the marginalized residents from Surabaya’s Stren Kali riverbank community,\(^4^1\) who have been in a protracted battle with the state about their right to land use. With help from

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\(^3^9\) NU has a long history of political involvement in Indonesia. It was a political party from 1952-1973, when it was forced along with other Islamic parties to form the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP). In 1984, NU withdrew from PPP and adopted the official non-political position it maintains to this day.

\(^4^0\) Starting in late 2008, PKB became embroiled in internal party conflicts, the result of which meant a sharp decline in the party’s vote share in national and regional elections in 2009. According to my PKB informant in East Java, the absence of a cadre-development program specifically for the party contributed to these conflicts. Going forward, PKB aimed to create its own leadership training program that would include indoctrination of the party’s values. This would also ensure that promotion within the party would be based on performance in goals and activities specific to the party’s development.

\(^4^1\) The information from this paragraph comes primarily from the author’s meeting with Stren Kali activists in Surabaya on June 9, 2009 and an interview with a volunteer from the Chamber of the City of Surabaya who had assisted with their case, June 5, 2009. See also Some, Hafidz, and Sauter (2009).
students and human rights NGOs, residents facing forced relocation organized under the name the Association of Residents of the Surabaya Stren Kali (PWS). The association boasts 1,500 members, and was successful in convincing the provincial government to change its relocation policy to one of community redevelopment. The provincial government approved proposals submitted by PWS for developing sustainable and ecologically-friendly riverside communities.42

PWS was helped in its political activism by the Chamber of the City of Surabaya. The Chamber’s involvement is another example of how one’s civic skills, particularly the more advanced professional skills belonging to lawyers and the business elite, can be deployed to engage in non-voting political activity, such as writing letters, contacting elected officials, and in organizing forums for public discussion. Moreover, the volunteer efforts of Chamber members have led to greater political participation on the part of citizens with lower income and less education—precisely the population which is less likely to acquire civic skills through school and professional opportunities.

The skills of leadership development and community organizing are also cultivated in student organizations. The Surabaya student who holds a leadership position in the inter-university PMII—which is associated with NU—described a process of leadership training within the organization:

Students who are not yet members of PMII are given training and are then able to become members of PMII. There are stages that one has to go through to become a new member of PMII. A basic member must then go through another process to become a cadre of PMII. Anyone may become a member of PMII, but not everyone can become a PMII cadre, because to become a cadre requires loyalty toward the organization. [Among about 60 members] only about 15 will become cadre. You must always be ready for the organization.

Leaders of student organizations develop important skills, and with this acumen they can persuasively convince their peers—who tend to join organizations not to become political activists, but to acquire a sense of community—to write letters, sign petitions, and demonstrate in the streets. They can also use these skills to help train and organize other populations who have had less exposure to non-voting political activity, such as the residents of the Stren Kali river who formed PWS.

In contrast to the structure of civic life in Indonesia, Russian civil society lacks a system of leadership training and community organizing. This situation stands in stark contrast to the Soviet experience, in which the CPSU had an extensive leadership training program (which was, of course, highly politicized) that began from the elementary-school Young Pioneer scouts and continued through workplace leadership training programs. This investment in cadre-development was precisely what provided former Communist Party activists with portable skills that could be employed in post-communist party building (Grzymała-Busse, 2002). Many of the representatives of political parties who I interviewed in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk volunteered that the lack of leadership training in contemporary Russia was a significant obstacle to developing their parties. In general, parties lack committed, reliable, and competent members that can work on outreach and other tasks. This was an attitude expressed by representatives of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Rossiiskii Federatsii, KPRF), the

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42 In spite of the agreement reached with the provincial government, in May 2009 the city of Surabaya ordered the destruction of 385 riverside homes, displacing more than 1,000 residents. At the time of this writing, the future of the riverside communities remains unresolved.
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (Liberalnaia Demokraticheskaia Partiia Rossii, LDPR), as well as sympathizers of United Russia.

Thus, while Russian citizens may possess civic skills acquired from educational and workplace experiences, these skills are activated into political participation in a very limited way. Namely, Russians are confident enough in their letter-writing and conversation skills to engage in contacting public officials. The ease with which Russians contact is not found in Indonesia. Yet, Russians are not transferring the civic skills they developed in school and the workplace to other forms of non-voting political participation. In contrast, the structure of Indonesian civil society, which emphasizes leadership training and community organizing, facilitates the acquisition of civic skills among the population and creates opportunities for these skills to be applied to political activities.

### Networks of Recruitment: Religious Society, Civil Society, and Political Society

The preceding discussion has argued that the norms and structures of Indonesian civil society have helped to equip Indonesians with the three resources that facilitate political participation: time, money, and civic skills. In contrast, the structure of Russian civil society and norms of participation, which include low levels of voluntarism and the absence of a habit of autonomous fundraising, hinder the activation of civic skills and their application to political participation. The final component of the civic voluntarism model of political participation posits that political activity is mediated through networks of recruitment. Once again, we see a clear Indonesian advantage.

In the case of Indonesia, as the previous sections have already shown, some examples of possible recruitment networks are very straightforward: members of NU and Muhammadiyah fall into the direct lines of recruitment for participation in PKB and PAN party activities and members of student organizations are frequently recruited to participate in acts of contentious politics. Other associations, such as the Chamber of the City of Surabaya, take on advocacy work as part of their raison d’être. This frequently produces an increased level of non-voting political participation among the communities receiving advocacy. Such linkages are largely absent in Russia, where the levels of participation in associational life and informal social interaction are considerably lower. Potential networks of recruitment are smaller and are not generally activated for non-voting political participation.

In both Indonesia and Russia, political parties themselves conduct social outreach programs that they hope will serve to recruit new supporters. One important difference, however, is that in Indonesia this patronage is more widespread and comprises parties of all political persuasion. Where the state has failed to provide public goods, political parties step in as service providers with the hopes of winning public support. For example, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) in East Java and the Golkar party in Yogyakarta both have ambulances that residents can call upon to receive emergency transport to the hospital. PKS and PAN in East Java have distributed food, clothing, and other aid to needy residents in their regions.

In contemporary Russia, however, only the United Russia party, with its intimate ties to the Kremlin, has sufficient resources to provide social services. For example, the Tatarstan branch of United Russia has its own charitable fund in support of “economic, cultural, and social programs that correspond with the goals and tasks” of the party (Tatarstan Regional Branch Website). This foundation has financed popular initiatives like the Naberezhnyi Chelny City

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43 A public ambulance service was only recently established in Indonesia and remains underdeveloped.
Center for Children’s Creative Works—a twenty-first century version of the Soviet Pioneer Palace. Such displays of patronage reinforce the image of United Russia as intertwined with the regional executive and legislative powers and with central political organs.

While political parties’ direct provision of goods and services constitutes an obvious attempt to win popular support, other forms of service provision linked to political recruitment in both countries are more subtle. For example, in East Java many local executives belong to NU and they may attract NU’s attention to their community’s specific needs, resulting in NU assistance to provide for some community good. Alternatively, NU may try to use the connection to its advantage in promoting certain programs in a particular region. This can result in NU-sponsored programs that are similar to government programs (EJ-10, interview, June 8, 2009). Local government, for example, might help support pesantran (Islamic schools) by providing the salary for a teacher of aji (how to read the Qur’an). When a leader’s political and civic identities overlap, it can be difficult for citizens to discern the source of his authority in any given situation, and possible conflicts of interest may be unclear. Under these circumstances, individuals active in civic and social life could be recruited into participating in political acts by trusted civic leaders.

In Russia, however, the recruitment into political activism is more narrow and constrained, focused almost exclusively on joining the United Russia party. The spread of membership in United Russia over the past several years closely parallels Soviet recruitment into the CPSU; enterprise directors joined, and then strongly encouraged their subordinates to join as well. These employees see job security as contingent on party membership. A United Russia party insider noted that this is a view shared by youth as well, who see party membership as a way to promote their careers.

Indonesia and Russia also exhibit meaningful differences with regard to recruitment in non-voting participation. Namely, Indonesians’ extensive participation in civic life and overlapping social networks provide more frequent opportunities to be recruited into acts of contentious politics or ongoing party work. Russians, by contrast, are limited in this regard.

CONCLUSION

By applying the civic voluntarism model to Indonesian and Russian civil society, we can see how Indonesia’s dense social networks and extensive participation in civic life can be channeled into participation that can constrain elites and thereby improve the chances of democracy’s survival, while an analogous pattern failed to take hold in Russia. Leadership development and community organizing experience convey useful civic skills to participants in civil society. These skills constitute a resource that can be deployed in the non-voting forms of political participation that expanded following the collapse of Suharto. Additionally, norms of volunteer labor and charitable giving provide additional resources of time and money to civic skills. These three resources have facilitated Indonesians’ participation in formal party politics, watchdog and oversight activities, and contentious political acts.

The low levels of engagement in civic and social life in Russia, however, limited the extent to which individuals could be recruited to participate in the political activities that had opened up as a result of political liberalization. Moreover, the structure of Russian civil society and the norms of participation did not provide Russians with the same resources that could be applied to political life. While Indonesians could be called upon to devote volunteer labor and money to both civic and political causes, Russians failed to muster these resources on a large
scale. As a result, Russian political parties and watchdog groups lack the resources to support meaningful political competition. Additionally, while the structure of associational life in Indonesia facilitates the acquisition and transfer of civic skills through leadership training and community organizing, Russian civic life is unstructured and atomized. Consequently, Russians’ civic skills are not activated in the political process beyond the narrow scope of contacting.

As the next two chapters will show, disparities in levels of engagement and the structures and norms of civil society that exist in Russia and Indonesia are not the only factors that contribute to variation in patterns of political participation. Beliefs about political efficacy and political trust also align in way that benefits Indonesians and encourages more public forms of political participation.
Chapter 6
Political Efficacy and “Throwing the Rascals Out”

Chapter 5 showed that Russians’ and Indonesians’ engagement in civil society varies both in terms of volume and in the types of organizations that citizens tend to join. Consequently, Indonesians’ numerically greater and broader-ranging experiences with formal associational life and informal social interactions increase the chances that they will acquire and apply civic skills to political participation to a greater extent than Russians. Moreover, Indonesians are more likely to be recruited into the types of political participation that are effective at constraining elites and promoting democracy’s survival. Engagement in civil society, however, is not the only factor that facilitates elite-constraining political participation. As shown in the statistical models presented in chapter 4, an individual’s sense of political efficacy is a strong predictor of his/her engagement in non-voting political participation. The statistical relationship is consistent across almost all model specifications, even when other control variables are included.

This chapter will explore the relationship between one’s sense of political efficacy and democratic survival in greater detail. Through a comparative analysis of survey data and citizen interviews, I highlight three primary findings. First, on the whole, Indonesians feel more efficacious about their ability to influence political outcomes than do Russians. Second, attitudes about the perceived efficacy of both voting and non-voting forms of political participation influence individuals’ choice of participatory activities. Third, the relationship between efficacy attitudes and participation is reciprocal. Individuals choose to participate in part because they believe the act of participation to be influential. When this belief is confirmed by specific outcomes, one’s sense of efficacy is likely to increase. Conversely, when a participatory act does not yield the desired outcome, one’s sense of efficacy can decline, making it less likely that s/he would participate again.

I find that attitudes about political efficacy influence democratic survival in two ways. First, a low sense of political efficacy among the population dampens participation in elite-constraining, non-voting political activities. Russians’ perception of contentious political acts and participation in party work as inefficacious depresses their engagement in these activities. In contrast, Indonesians’ view that these activities may be influential contributes to their higher levels of participation in acts that constrain elites. A low sense of political efficacy may also influence how individuals approach voting in elections and whether they perceive voting and elections as viable mechanisms for effecting political change. While both Russians and Indonesians vote in elections at high levels, Indonesians are more inclined to perceive their elections as fair and influential in determining political outcomes.

The second way that attitudes about political efficacy influence democratic survival is through the impact that events in the first years of democratization can have on the population’s perception of its efficacy in subsequent years. The reciprocal nature of the relationship between efficacy attitudes and participation places a spotlight on the early experiences a population has with democratic institutions and practices. Populations that effectively “throw the rascals out”

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1 This phrase, which is commonly used to talk about removing incumbents from power, originated from a campaign slogan used by Horace Greeley in 1872, “turn the rascals out.” Greeley was running against incumbent Ulysses S. Grant for the presidency of the United States, and his campaign emphasized the need to reform the federal administration, which was known for numerous scandals under Grant. According to American Sayings: Famous Sayings, Slogans, and Aphorisms by Henry F. Woods, the phrase originated from Charles A. Dana, an editor from the New York Sun who became a fierce critic of Grant after breaking with him in 1869 (Woods, 1945, 1949).
can see first hand the efficacy of their votes. Those who confirm the status quo—even if the
reigning government has high levels of public support—are less inclined to perceive meaningful
differences between authoritarian and democratic elections. Likewise, populations that remove a
government through peaceful protest are more likely to understand the power of their numbers
than those who have not. Indonesia and Russia are examples of these two different outcomes.

This chapter will be divided into four parts. First, I will briefly discuss the concept of
political efficacy, its relationship to political participation, and the particular relationship
between attitudes about political efficacy and democratization. I will then present comparative
information on political efficacy attitudes in Russia and Indonesia based on available survey data
and the interviews I conducted with Russian and Indonesian citizens. The third section of the
chapter will look specifically at Russian and Indonesian attitudes towards elections and their
efficacy. In the final section, I will explore the reciprocal relationship between perceptions of
efficacy and participation by examining how experiences with elections in the early years of
democratization have shaped attitudes in Russia and Indonesia.

POLITICAL EFFICACY, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Linking Political Efficacy and Democracy’s Survival
Political efficacy is a variable that is measured at the individual level and, in contrast to
participation and civil society, is rarely thought of in aggregate terms. Yet, the diffusion of
specific attitudes about political efficacy within society can play an important role in
democracy’s survival by helping to facilitate engagement in the types of political participation
that succeed in constraining elites from rolling back nascent democratic gains and proceeding
with democratic norms and institutions. The variation in diffusion in efficacy attitudes between
Indonesians and Russians helps to explain why Indonesians have been more effective at
constraining elites than have Russians.

I define political efficacy as the beliefs about the impact an individual and others like him
can have on the political process (Campbell et al., 1954). This definition is similar to Campbell
et al.’s famous definition, but removes language about the importance of performing one’s “civic
duties.” A similar concept to political efficacy made famous by Almond and Verba in The Civic
Culture (1963) is “subjective competence.” According to Almond and Verba, an individual is
“subjectively competent” if he believes he can exert influence on government officials (Almond
& Verba, 1963, p. 136-137). Lane and numerous other scholars disaggregate the concept of
political efficacy into two components, internal and external efficacy (Lane, 1959). Internal
efficacy refers to individuals’ perception that they can understand and participate in politics,
while external efficacy is the belief that political activities can influence government actions.

Studies of political participation have long emphasized political efficacy as a resource
that increases the likelihood of political participation. While education provides a resource of
enhancing one’s skills for processing information and easing the cognitive challenges of
participation, a sense of political efficacy serves as a psychological resource that can motivate
individuals to take political action (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1964; Rosenstone &
Hansen, 1993). As Rosenstone and Hansen colorfully explain, “People who believe, for
instance, that a petition is a silly exercise that is not likely to be taken seriously are not inclined
to stop and sign one. A psychological sense of political efficacy helps to overcome the very
natural suspicion that nothing one can do could possibly make very much difference” (1993, p.
79).
Political efficacy is one of the most studied attitudes in the field of political behavior. The correlation between one’s sense of political efficacy and voter turnout and other forms of non-voting political participation has been well established in the study of American politics (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1964; Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). An individual with a sense of political efficacy is more likely to take an active part in politics than someone without this belief. Similarly, an individual who has participated in politics is more likely to feel efficacious. The reciprocal nature of the relationship between attitudes about efficacy and participation have been found in several studies (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1964; Finkel, 1985; Pateman, 1970).

Another robust correlation documented across empirical studies is between political efficacy attitudes and socio-economic status, in particular, educational attainment. Individuals with higher levels of education feel more efficacious. Assuming that the relationship between education and one’s sense of efficacy holds as more and more people in a society become educated, we would expect that people in countries with higher levels of overall educational attainment will have higher levels of efficacy attitudes as well. If we apply this logic to the cases of Russia and Indonesia, we would expect Russians to have higher levels of political efficacy. Yet, as I will show in this chapter, the percentage of individuals who express high levels of efficacy attitudes is much greater in Indonesia than Russia.

**Political Efficacy in the Context of Democratization**

Most studies of political efficacy examine this attitude in long-standing democracies. As the case with political participation, studies of political efficacy in countries that have only recently undergone a democratic transition are not very common. Yet, given the robustness of the relationship between a sense of efficacy and political participation in longstanding democracies, scholars of democratization should be interested in perceptions of efficacy. Moreover, based on what we know about the reciprocal relationship between efficacy attitudes and participation, we have good theoretical reasons to believe that early experiences under democracy may indeed influence subsequent efficacy attitudes in democratizing regimes. In considering political efficacy and its relationship to democracy’s survival, there are three issues we should consider: 1) the role of political participation in bringing about the collapse of the previous authoritarian regime; 2) the outcomes of initial democratic elections and subsequent elections in the early years following a transition; and 3) the socialization effect from authoritarianism on perceptions of efficacy.

Much of the literature analyzing political transitions in the Third Wave of democratization has focused on the role of elite bargaining in ushering in a democratic transition, a model that may do a better job of explaining political transitions in southern Europe and Latin America than in other regions (Bunce, 2003). In both the Soviet Union and New Order Indonesia, mass mobilization in favor of change played a key role in extricating the existing authoritarian regimes. Bratton and van de Walle similarly show that democratic transitions in Africa are more often initiated via mass protest rather than by elite pacting (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). Public pressure for democratization led to the introduction of competitive elections in the Soviet Union and, ultimately, to the USSR’s dissolution. Widespread mass protest in Indonesia forced Suharto’s resignation and the introduction of fair and free elections. Thus, the Russian and Indonesian populations were not simply handed an opportunity for democratic governance—they pushed for it. One might expect that these experiences would, at least initially,
engender a sense of efficacy among the population. Having emerged from a system where their impact on political outcomes was minimal, these citizens had experienced first-hand the efficacy of mass action.

A sense of efficacy from ushering authoritarian collapse can be tapered, however, by early experiences with democratic elections. The outcomes of early democratic elections are featured in the literature as forecasting democracy’s survival over time. Both Fish (1998) and McFaul (2002) contend that the outcome of initial elections in the post-communist region is a strong predictor of democratic consolidation at later stages. When the opposition emerged initially victorious and was able to use their mandate to push for more widespread reform, democracy was more likely to endure into the future. The importance of early elections for democracy’s survival is frequently articulated in terms of Huntington’s “two turnover” test (Huntington, 1991, pp. 266-267). According to Huntington, for an “emergent” democracy to become a “stable” democracy, it must undergo two peaceful and democratic turnovers of ruling parties. A single turnover is not sufficient: after one change in power it is not uncommon for a new administration to reintroduce authoritarian rule. While this study measures democracy’s survival as having achieved a Freedom House score of 2.5 or better for five consecutive years, some scholars accept Huntington’s two turnover test as an indicator of democracy’s survival. Yet, even if we apply this test to Russia and Indonesia, Russia fails and Indonesia passes.

Scholarly emphasis on initial elections and early transfers of power to the opposition is concerned with democracy’s survival, and the very direct ways that regular transfers of power make political elites invested in elections to determine access to political power. Yet, for voters, the experiences of these elections can shape attitudes about efficacy. Similar to when protests bring down an autocrat, elections that bring in the opposition serve as meaningful examples of how citizens’ acts of participation effect political change. Alternately, when early democratic elections do nothing more than validate the status quo—a striking similarity to elections under authoritarianism—they do not elevate citizens’ perceptions of efficacy. While initial elections regularly bring opposition to power, the outcome of subsequent second and third elections may be of greater importance for one’s sense of efficacy. The inability to bring about a transfer of power via elections early on in a democratic regime is likely to contribute to a decline in voting participation and reduce trust in elections as a meaningful political institution. While Russia’s first presidential elections of June 1991 brought opposition to power with the victory of Boris Yeltsin, subsequent executive elections have failed to produce a transfer of power. For these reasons, I hypothesize that Indonesians’ experience in observing peaceful turnovers of power through elections has made them more likely than Russians to view voting and elections as efficacious. The final section of this chapter elaborates this comparison in detail.

Finally, the socializing experience of voting under authoritarian elections will likely influence the sense of political efficacy felt by citizens in democratizing regimes. As noted in chapter 4, past behavior is a strong predictor of future behavior. Individuals who are habituated into voting generally vote in most elections, regardless of their overall interest in the specific election or its outcome. In the cases of both the Soviet Union and New Order Indonesia, individuals were expected to vote in authoritarian elections that were not fair, free, or truly competitive. While voter turnout has gradually declined in these two countries in the post-Soviet and post-Suharto eras, it remains much higher than what we generally see in advanced democracies that lack compulsory voting rules. According to Russia’s Central Electoral Commission’s website, voter turnout was 63.7 percent for the December 2007 State Duma election and 69.7 percent for the March 2008 presidential election. Calculations based on
information from the Indonesian Central Electoral Commission put voter turnout at 71.0 percent for the April 2009 DPR election and 72.5 percent for the July 2009 presidential election.\(^2\)

Even though both Russians and Indonesians vote at high rates, we cannot infer from this behavior that individuals who vote believe that voting is important or influences political decision-making. Indeed, as Downs (1957) pointed out, voting in most political contests is a highly irrational act since a single vote will rarely decide an election outcome. Scholars have argued that individuals vote for a variety of reasons, including a sense of civic duty (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968), to show allegiance to a specific party (Fiorina, 1976), and to support specific moral ideals (Gutmann, 1993). While each of these explanations was offered as justifications for voting in democratic elections, the same factors can apply to voting in authoritarian elections as well. Elections are frequently held in authoritarian regimes in an attempt to legitimate dictatorial or military rule both to the international community and domestic constituents. Some citizens vote in these elections out of sheer fear of regime custodians and the consequences for their lives and livelihoods if they do not return to their work or home with the requisite voting receipt or ink-stained finger. Yet, citizens participating in these elections may also come to believe that they are voting out of a sense of civic obligation, patriotism, or to show their allegiance to the ruling regime. These same attitudes may persist under the context of democratization. Thus, we need to explore how individuals view voting and elections to understand whether they see these actions as efficacious.

**Measuring Political Efficacy**

In contrast to voting and civil society, where it is possible to establish some measures based on indicators other than self-reported behavior, political efficacy can only be measured by public opinion surveys and conversations with citizens. The most frequently used measures of political efficacy in American politics come from the four-measure efficacy scale used in the Michigan Election Studies. The efficacy scale is based on agreement and disagreement with the following four questions: “People like me don’t have any say in what the government does;” “Voting is the only way people like me can have any say about how the government runs things;” “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what is going on,” and “I don’t think public officials care much about what people like me think.” As Lipset and Schneider note, the key phrase that is repeated in these statements is “people like me,” which emphasizes the subjective content of attitudes about efficacy (Lipset & Schneider, 1983, pp. 383-384).

Another popular set of measures places emphasis on specific types of interactions between an individual citizen and institutions of political power. Almond and Verba’s subjective competence scale is the most famous example of this measurement approach (Almond & Verba, 1963). Almond and Verba asked citizens several questions about local politics. In particular, they asked if respondents felt that they could understand local politics, whether they could act to

\(^2\) According to the Central Electoral Commission, 171,226,124 Indonesian citizens were included on the list of registered voters for the April 9, 2009 national elections. A total of 121,588,366 ballots were cast in this election, of which 17,448,581 were deemed invalid. For the July 8, 2009 presidential election, 176,411,434 Indonesian citizens were included on the list of registered voters. A total of 127,983,655 ballots were cast in the election, of which 6,479,174 were deemed invalid. I gathered these figures from the following documents on the Central Electoral Commission’s website: “58 Buku Saku Pemilu 2009 E. Jumlah Pemilih Pemilu Presiden dan Wakil Presiden di Setiap Propinsi,” “Hasil Penghitungan Suara Sah Partai Politik Peserta Pemilu Dalam Pemilu Anggota DPR, DPD dan DPRD Tahun 2009,” and “Rekapitulasi Nasional Perolehan Suara Pilpres 2009.” All documents were retrieved on March 23, 2011.
influence local government, whether they had any expectations of success in influencing local government, and whether they had attempted to do so. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady adopted a similar approach to measure political efficacy in *Voice and Equality*, asking respondents how they felt they would be treated if they brought a complaint about a local or national political activity to a member of the local government council and how much influence they felt that “someone like you” can have on local and national government decisions.

While the Michigan Election Studies political efficacy scale and Almond and Verba’s subjective competence scale have been adopted by empirical researchers with the greatest frequency in studies of political efficacy, numerous other measures can also be found across public opinion surveys. One measure of efficacy asks respondents how well prepared they feel to participate in politics. Yet another approach asks respondents how they could influence the political system and codes open-ended responses based on whether respondents could name a strategy.

In the forthcoming analysis, I use a combination of indicators to measure and compare levels of political efficacy among Russians and Indonesians. In analyzing survey data, I must rely on the efficacy measures that are available in each of the specific surveys. Readers will notice that many of these questions are worded identically to those found in the Michigan Election Studies and in Almond and Verba’s surveys, which is further testimony to the influence of these early studies. For my quota-sample interviews with Russian and Indonesian citizens, I asked open-ended questions that I thought would elicit the clearest responses for ascertaining an individual’s sense of political efficacy. I also asked specific questions about how respondents’ perceived the fairness of elections and their influence in the electoral process. The questions I asked evolved and improved over time. Consequently, I have more full measures of political efficacy for respondents in some cities than others.

**POLITICAL EFFICACY IN RUSSIA AND INDONESIA**

*Cross-Case Survey Analysis*

How do Russians and Indonesians compare on measures of political efficacy? As in the previous two chapters, I will answer this question first with an analysis of available survey data, followed by an analysis of information gathered from my interviews with the quota sample of the population in two Russian and two Indonesian cities.

Unfortunately, the World Values Survey does not include any questions measuring respondents’ beliefs about political efficacy, so I am unable to analyze how Russians and Indonesians compare to other countries with regard to efficacy attitudes. The Keio University Research Survey of Political Society provides the only available data we have to directly compare political efficacy attitudes in Russia and Indonesia. Most countries in the survey were polled only once, but Japan, South Korea, and Russia were surveyed more than once. Russia was surveyed in February-March 2005 (hereafter 2005A) and August-September 2005 (hereafter 2005B), while Indonesia was surveyed in February-March 2006. Because there are some

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3 Marginal data from each of the country-level surveys is available through the Keio University Center for Civil Society with Comparative Perspective’s online Data Archive at [http://www.coe-ccc.keio.ac.jp/data_archive_en/data_archive_en_csw_download.html](http://www.coe-ccc.keio.ac.jp/data_archive_en/data_archive_en_csw_download.html) (Site consulted April 7, 2010).

4 The size of the survey samples varies considerably. The 2005A Russian survey has 505 respondents and the 2005B survey has 1,002. The Indonesian survey has 500 respondents.
differences in the results in the two Russian surveys, I am including data from both here in order to provide the most comprehensive picture of Russian efficacy attitudes.

The Keio University Research Survey asks four questions that directly measure political efficacy. The first question asks respondents, “Suppose the central government is debating a decision that could be very disadvantageous to you. Do you think that you could do anything to influence this debate or decision?” Respondents who said that they could be influential to even a small extent were then asked what they could do to influence the debate or decision. This second question offers a list of over ten possible responses. The third and fourth questions are identical to the first two, but ask respondents how they could influence a debate or decision taken by the regional government. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 display the results of the first two questions for the Indonesian and Russian surveys.¹

Table 6.1: Could you do anything to influence a debate or decision taken by the central government? (Keio University Research Survey of Political Society)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indonesia (2006) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (2005A) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (2005B) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I could do something</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is nothing I could do</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I could be influential</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I could be influential to some extent</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I could be influential just a little</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I could hardly be influential</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures in Table 6.1 show that the majority of both Russian and Indonesian respondents do not believe that they could do anything to influence the central government’s debate or decision. Sixty-eight percent of Indonesians and 60 percent of Russians responded that they could “hardly be influential” in this context. If we look at the responses indicating some sense of efficacy, “I could be influential” or “I could be influential to some extent,” 18 percent of Indonesians responded affirmatively, compared to 11 percent of Russians.

I have grouped the responses to in Table 6.2 into categories based on the type of action described. Three questions address seeking solutions through a group, five questions involve different forms of contacting, and two questions each address legal solutions or direct action. If we compare the Russian and Indonesian responses across the different groups of activity, we see some interesting parallels between the responses and the information on the patterns in political participation described in chapter 4. The responses also reflect variation in Russian and Indonesian engagement in civil society discussed in chapter 5. First, Indonesians exhibit considerably higher levels of propensity to work through a group to solve a problem than do Russians. As we learned in chapter 5, Indonesians are involved in voluntary organizations and structured community life to a much greater extent than Russians are. It appears as though this experience has contributed to Indonesians’ sense of efficacy about collective action.

Second, in general, Russians are much more likely than Indonesians to view contacting public officials as an efficacious way of influencing a central government debate or decision. This observation is consistent with the findings from chapter 4 that Russians prefer contacting over other forms of political participation in part because they believe contacting yields more

¹Tables including the results for the final two questions, which are very similar to those presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 can be found in Appendix 6.
positive results over other political acts. In Table 6.2, the one item in the contacting group that attracts considerable support from Indonesians is contacting “the leaders of or those in positions of influence in all sectors of society.” More than 26 percent of Indonesians selected this item, compared to 15-18 percent of Russians. The high percentage of Indonesians selecting this contacting item compared to others speaks to the visibility of societal leaders in Indonesia who are indeed separate from the state. In contrast, few such individuals exist in Russia. A final interesting observation is that Russians are much more likely to view legal solutions an efficacious way of influencing a central government debate or decision.

Table 6.2 What could you do to influence the debate or decision taken by the central government? (Keio University Research Survey of Political Society)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indonesia (2006) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (2005A) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (2005B) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work through groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form a group or organization</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take action through a political party</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take action through an organization (labor union, industry cooperative, religious organization) to which I belong</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contacting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask friends and acquaintances to write letters of protest or to sign a petition</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make direct contact with a politician/politicians or the mass media</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write a letter to a politician/politicians</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call to see the leaders of or those in positions of influence in all sectors of society</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make direct contact with a government official/bureaucrat</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal channels</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consult a lawyer</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal to the court</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct action</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take some kind of direct action</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just protest/complain</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do nothing</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we compare the two Russian surveys, we see a decline in the percentages of respondents who perceive a specific act as influential in most response categories. The only responses in which the percentages increased from the first to the second survey are making direct contact with politicians or the mass media, making direct contact with a government official/bureaucrat, and appealing to the court. It is impossible to tell from the marginal results if these differences reflect a genuine decline in the perceived efficacy of other activities or can be attributed to other differences between the two survey samples, including sample size.

The comparisons in Table 6.2 suggest that Indonesians see a greater opportunity for political efficacy through group organization. Russians, by contrast, view contacting and legal routes as more efficacious. If we look at the items in each of the surveys that have the three highest percentages of respondents, in Indonesia the first two involve working through organizations and the third involves contacting leaders in all segments of society. In the Russian
surveys, the most common response is consulting a lawyer, followed by either appealing to the court or engaging in some form of contacting.

**Political Efficacy in Russian and Indonesian National Surveys**

As noted in chapter 4, the Russian Election Study (RES) and the East Asia Barometer (EAB) contain measures of political efficacy. The Survey of Soviet Values (SSV) also includes questions that can be used to assess efficacy attitudes at the end of the Soviet period. The wording of questions varies across these three surveys, however, as well as across different iterations of the RES. These differences in question wording prevent us from comparing levels of perceived efficacy between countries or over time within Russia in a precise way, but can nevertheless help provide a general view about Indonesians’ and Russians’ views about political efficacy.

The SSV asks two questions that measure political efficacy in the late Soviet period. The first asks, “How much influence do you think people like you can have over local government?” to which respondents could answer, “a lot,” “a moderate amount,” “a little,” or “none at all.” The percentages of respondents who selected each of these answers are displayed in Table 6.3. I have included the percentages for the entire survey, which comprised European territories of the USSR, as well as the percentages for respondents residing in territories that are currently within the boundaries of the Russian Federation. The majority of respondents in both the entire survey and the Russian territories included in the SSV replied that they had no influence at all over local government. A test of the group proportions between the full survey sample and the Russian sub-sample found these differences to be statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level, suggesting that Russians actually felt as though they could have less influence over local government than did residents of other Soviet republics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All respondents (%)</th>
<th>Russian territories only (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A moderate amount</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second survey question asks about agreement with the following statement: “People like me don’t have any say about what the authorities do.” Among all respondents, 13.1 percent strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement, 10.1 percent were uncertain, and 76.9 agreed or strongly agreed. The percentages for respondents in Russian territories differed from the overall percentages by less than one percentage point. In short, in the late Soviet period, it appears as though three out of four Russians felt that they were incapable of influencing political authorities.

Did these attitudes change after political liberalization expanded Russians’ opportunities for political influence? This question confronts the reciprocal relationship between one’s sense of efficacy and political participation. With the disappearance of the Communist Party’s monopoly

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6 For explanation of the survey sample, see chapter 4, p. 86.
on all forms of political competition and the introduction of civil liberties that protected freedoms of speech, press, and assembly in the early 1990s, individuals’ opportunities to participate in the political process and have this participation influence outcomes increased dramatically. Boris Yeltsin’s victory in the Russian presidential election in 1991 is evidence of this change, as is the success of independents and pro-democracy parties in the 1993 State Duma elections. Did Russians’ sense of political efficacy increase as people’s overall ability to influence political outcomes also increased?

We can examine this question with the 1995-1996 RES, which includes two questions that provide a good measure of respondents’ perceptions of efficacy. These are the same two questions that I used to construct an efficacy scale for the statistical models in chapter 4. Respondents are asked if they “fully agree,” “agree,” “waver,” “disagree,” or “fully disagree” with two statements. The first statement is, “People like me have no say in what the government does.” Notice that the wording of this statement is almost identical to the statement used in the 1990 SSV, allowing us to compare responses across these two surveys. The second statement is, “In my opinion, I am well prepared to participate in political activity.” Table 6.4 shows the range of agreement with these statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fully agree (%)</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Waver (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>Fully disagree (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People like me have no say in the government does</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In my opinion, I am well prepared to participate in political activity</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>2,494</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fifty-two percent of respondents fully agreed or agreed with the first statement, which is nearly 25 percentage points lower than the number who agreed with the same statement in the 1990 SSV. While in 1990 only 13.1 percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that people have no say in what the authorities do, by 1995-1996 the number had more than doubled to 31.7 percent. It appears that Russians’ perception of their efficacy increased after the onset of democratization. Yet, nevertheless, the majority of citizens still agreed or strongly agreed that they had no say over what political authorities do.

The second statement further confirms that most Russians did not view themselves as efficacious by the mid-1990s. Eighty-five percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that they were well prepared to participate in political activity. Taken together, these two statements paint a picture of political efficacy in Russia in the first half of the 1990s where citizens perceive that they have greater political influence than under the Soviet period, yet nevertheless feel incapable of exercising this influence.

How do Russians’ perceptions of efficacy compare to Indonesians’? The EAB also includes two questions that measure political efficacy, which I used to create the efficacy scale for the statistical models in chapter 4. Respondents are asked if they “strongly agree,” “somewhat agree,” “somewhat disagree,” or “strongly disagree” with two statements. The first statement is “People have the power to change a government they don’t like.” The second is “I think I have the ability to participate in politics.” Agreement with these statements is displayed in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Indonesian Political Efficacy Measures from EAB (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat agree (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree (%)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People have the power to change a government they don’t like</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think I have the ability to participate in politics.</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than 71 percent of respondents strongly or somewhat agree that people have the power to change the government, which suggests a high level of perceived efficacy among the Indonesian population. The second statement, “I think I have the ability to participate in politics,” is similar in wording to the RES statement, “I am well prepared to participate in political activity.” The majority of Indonesian respondents—68.6 percent—somewhat or strongly disagreed with this statement. As high as this number is, it is still 16 percentage points lower than the number responding to the analogous Russian statement.

If we take the two EAB measures together, we see that Indonesians have a high estimation of the population’s ability to influence political outcomes, but a rather low estimation of their own individual abilities. Thus, they differ from Russians in their overall perceptions of the efficacy of mass actions, yet share a similar sense of inability to make this efficacy their own. Using Lane’s distinction between internal and external efficacy, Indonesians have a high sense of external efficacy and a low sense of internal efficacy. Russians, in contrast, express low levels of both internal and external efficacy.

As discussed in chapter 4, I used the two measures in the RES and the two measures in the EAB to create ordinal efficacy scales. For the RES measure, I recoded the first statement, “People like me have no say in what the government does,” such that “0” equals “fully agree” and “1” equals “fully disagree.” I recoded the second statement, “In my opinion, I am well prepared to participate in political activity” such that “0” equals “fully agree” and “1” equals “fully disagree.” I then averaged these two variables together to create a scale from 0 to 1 where “0” translates to having the lowest sense of efficacy possible and “1” translates to having the highest possible sense of efficacy. For the EAB measure, I combined the two statements together to create a similar scale that ranges from 0 to 1, where “0” is equal to answering “strongly disagree” to both items and “1” is equal to answering “strongly agree” on both items.

These two scales essentially serve as functionally equivalent measures of efficacy attitudes, respectively, for Russia in 1995-1996 and Indonesia in 2006. As such, we can compare the two mean levels to see which country’s population has a higher average level of efficacy perceptions. The mean score on the efficacy scale for Russia is 0.32, compared to 0.51 for Indonesia. Indonesian citizens’ perceived efficacy in the first several years of democratization was higher than Russian citizens’ perceived efficacy. Explaining the variation in these two countries’ efficacy scores is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Yet, one likely cause may be their differing experiences in elections in the first several years of democratization. This topic will be addressed further in the third section of this chapter.

**Citizen Interviews: Evolving Attitudes of Political Efficacy**

Having analyzed available survey measures of political efficacy, I now turn to an evaluation of political efficacy measures gathered from citizen interviews conducted in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk, Russia in 2008 and Surabaya and Medan, Indonesia in 2009. As discussed in earlier chapters, my conversations with a quota sample of citizens in each city were based on a
A semi-structured questionnaire that I adapted to each country’s and city’s specific political context. Over the course of my 100 citizen interviews, I improved my questionnaire by adding new questions and dropping those that were not fruitful at eliciting responses. The questions I asked about political efficacy evolved to a greater extent than questions that addressed other topics. The importance of efficacy attitudes became increasingly apparent as I conducted more interviews, compelling me to include additional questions to draw out citizens’ thoughts about their potential political influence. Consequently, my measures of efficacy attitudes are leanest for Kazan and richest for Medan.

The first question I use to gauge one’s sense of political efficacy is to ask how an individual thought that s/he could influence the political system or what s/he could do if s/he wanted to try to influence politics. This question is a helpful measure of efficacy in two ways. First, it connects the abstract notion of influence to concrete acts. Individuals who are able to suggest a specific action have a higher sense of efficacy than those who are unable to link influence in the abstract to their own specific capabilities. Second, I found that this question is rarely answered without emotion. Individuals who do not perceive that they can be efficacious often respond with frustration. Those who are able to suggest concrete actions often do so with a voice that is calm and steady. Individuals’ responses to this question also often inspire a voluntary elaboration of their views about the political system in their country. Over time, I also began to ask respondents for their opinions about non-voting political participation as well. In particular, I asked if they viewed other forms of participation as potentially effective.

**Efficacy in Russia: Varied Perceptions between Regions**

The low levels of political efficacy attitudes observed in the Russian survey data are found in my citizen samples as well. Yet, even in the small samples of 25 individuals each in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk, I noticed a considerable difference in perceived efficacy levels between respondents of the two cities. On the whole, residents of Krasnoyarsk appear to have a higher sense of political efficacy than those in Kazan. As I will elaborate on in the final section of this chapter, I believe that these differences are due in part to the two regions’ varied experiences in post-Soviet elections.

When asked what they could do if they wanted to influence politics, 10 individuals in Kazan felt that there was no way to influence the political system, compared to only four in Krasnoyarsk. Among the Kazan group who said they could do nothing, one respondent felt that it had previously been possible to influence politics until the Yeltsin era and another felt that it had been possible to influence during the Soviet era. In these instances, individuals believed that their efficacy had actually declined over time. Both of these individuals—a 59-year old Tatar man with a graduate degree and a 48-year old Tatar woman with an undergraduate degree—had engaged in some form of non-voting political participation in the late Soviet period.

When I asked how people could be influential in the Soviet era, the Tatar woman replied, “They listened to us. They respected us.” The view that the Soviet government listened to its citizens more and thus public opinion had greater influence on policy outcomes was expressed by several respondents. This attitude was also shared by participants in a series of focus group discussions that White conducted in locations in central Russia in December 2003 and March 2004 (White, 2005). Participants in White’s study noted that acts such as strikes or letters to the newspaper were viewed as major events in the Soviet era, and consequently the government paid attention and corrected policies. In the post-Soviet era, however, such acts are so common that the government rarely listens to people’s demands.
Not only were a larger number of individuals in Krasnoyarsk able to suggest a concrete strategy to influence politics than their counterparts in Kazan; the respondents in Krasnoyarsk also offered a broader range of specific ways that they perceived one could be efficacious. Respondents suggested contacting public officials (three respondents), voting in elections (three respondents), and joining political parties (two respondents)—all of which are examples of political participation. Three respondents in Kazan offered similar responses for influencing politics: through fair elections, working with the mass media, or through collective action, but all three quickly added that while these options are efficacious in theory, present circumstances in Russia stymied the genuine influence of such acts.

As discussed in chapter 4, I found that respondents’ perceptions about the efficacy of a particular form of non-voting political participation factor into their decisions about engaging in a specific act. The perception that contacting a public official is more likely to yield a favorable response to a problem than other forms of activity was a reason volunteered by many respondents who had engaged in this action as an explanation for their behavior. The experience of engaging in non-voting participation also makes respondents more aware at others’ attempts to be influential. A 52-year old woman in Krasnoyarsk who had recently organized a signature campaign relating to a housing issue expressed how her views about protesting had changed as a result of becoming active to defend her own rights:

I understand now that when something affects you personally, such as if you personally don’t receive your money or your factory closes…When people have nothing else…I understand these people. But at the time [of earlier protests], I wasn’t in those factories, I wasn’t in that situation. Then, I didn’t need to support anyone.

In both cities, attitudes about political efficacy generally correlate with an individual’s specific experience in political participation—particularly non-voting participation. Of the seven individuals in Kazan who had engaged in some form of non-voting political participation, all but one suggested a strategy that a person like him/herself might be able to engage in to influence politics. Among the 13 individuals in Krasnoyarsk who have engaged in some form of non-voting political participation, most suggested some way that they could influence the political process.

Efficacy in Indonesia: Closely Tied to Participation
If we compare the responses to efficacy questions offered by my Russian and Indonesian respondents numerically, Indonesia does not appear to hold a strong advantage in perceived efficacy. Among the 19 respondents in Surabaya and 12 respondents in Medan who were asked about what they could do to influence politics if they wanted to change something, 15 offered a concrete suggestion, eight said that they did not know, and eight replied that they could not influence politics. Yet, if we examine the content of their replies more closely, we see that Indonesians feel efficacious precisely about the acts that have been successful at constraining elites and propelling democracy forward in their country.

The specific acts that respondents offered in response to the question of how they could influence politics echoed forms of political participation and civic engagement observed throughout Indonesia and discussed in chapters 4 and 5. Suggestions included discussions and consultations with others (four respondents), acting through an organization (two respondents), participating in elections (two respondents), joining a political party, writing to the newspaper, going to a demonstration, issuing a complaint, and trying to work for social change (two
respondents). Many of these acts, such as acting through an organization, joining a political party, going to a demonstration, writing to the media, and participating in elections, are precisely the type of actions that help constrain elites.

Similar to what I observed in my interviews with Russian citizens, perceptions of efficacy and individual experience in non-voting political participation are connected among Indonesian respondents as well. All but one of the Surabaya respondents and two of the Medan respondents who had engaged in some form of non-voting participation and who were asked how they could influence politics were able to list a specific act that they believed could be influential. The more involved an individual has been in non-voting participation, the more strategies of influence he tended to name. For example, a 22-year old Javanese student activist who regularly engaged in non-voting participation in Surabaya volunteered, “You can demonstrate, write to the media, or sign a petition to signify the actualization of your opinion.” In contrast to my Russian respondents, Indonesian respondents have more direct and ongoing experience with acts of contentious politics and political party organizing. For this reason, it is logical that Indonesians may have a higher opinion of the potential efficacy of these actions compared to their Russian counterparts.

Among the three individuals who had engaged in non-voting participation but said that there was nothing that they could do to influence politics, the relationship between their specific experiences and attitudes is illustrative of the reciprocal relationship between participation and efficacy attitudes. One respondent is a PDI-P sympathizer who had once attended a campaign event in Medan, an act that takes minimal initiative and is as much informative as influential. The other two respondents—a 36-year old Javanese janitor in Surabaya and a 38-year old Minang woman who was a former factory worker in Medan—had previously participated in labor protests that did not improve their situations. For example, the Surabaya janitor was part of a protest that failed to achieve the goal of raising minimum wages. His failed participation might have dampened his sense of efficacy. Had the protest resulted in a favorable outcome, this respondent might have suggested that protesting could be influential.

Similar to Russian respondents, Indonesians evaluated forms of non-voting political participation in part based on the perceived efficacy of such actions. The connection between attitudes about political participation and efficacy is further evidence of the reciprocal relationship between practicing politics and developing a sense of political efficacy. Indonesian respondents expressed a broad range of attitudes about political participation, from complete disdain to full support. As detailed in chapter 4, Indonesians prefer to engage in acts of non-voting participation that constrain elites, such as party development work for building political opposition and acts of contentious politics, while Russians prefer contacting public officials. Moreover, in further contrast to Russian respondents, many Indonesians who had been active in non-voting participation viewed their work as efficacious, which was one of the factors that contributed to their continued participation. This view was also shared by those who had been active in the first years of democratization but whose activity has tapered off in more recent years. Because Indonesians are repeat participants in non-voting political acts more frequently than Russians, there is greater opportunity for their experiences in participation to influence their sense of efficacy over time. Thus, while overall levels of efficacy attitudes at one point in time do not demonstrate much variation between my Russian and Indonesian respondents, on the whole, the reciprocal effects of efficacy have facilitated stronger efficacy attitudes among Indonesians than Russians.
Furthermore, Indonesian respondents who had not engaged in non-voting participation could point to the influence of others’ activism for political outcomes. For example, several Indonesians connected protests to Suharto’s downfall, and viewed these demonstrations as efficacious. As one 38-year old Javanese woman in Medan noted, “If there hadn’t been the demonstrations he [Suharto] would still be in power.” When talking about her memories of the New Order era, a 42-year old Batak woman who had never engaged in any non-voting participation noted how demonstrations brought about Suharto’s resignation. When I asked her later in the interview what could be done if an elected representative failed to uphold his campaign promises, she replied, “Demonstrate—isn’t that all we can do?”

While repeat protesters are more common in Indonesia than in Russia, leading to a stable and ongoing presence of contentious politics in Indonesia, on the whole, my Indonesian respondents expressed mixed views about protesting. Those who were regular protestors noted that this form of participation was the only method they could employ to attract the attention of public officials. According to the Surabaya student leader of PMII, “You need to communicate with [legislative] representatives. But, because they are difficult to find, we have demonstrations.” A similar view was expressed by a 33-year old Tamil construction worker in Medan whose non-voting political participation was limited to once attending a PDI-P rally: “It is very difficult to meet a [legislative] representative. That is why they carry out demonstrations—just to be met by representatives.” There appears to be a kernel of truth in this perception. When discussing his interactions with constituents, a regional legislator in East Java noted that meetings are regularly based on demonstrations (EJ-5, interview, June 4, 2009).

Yet, several respondents expressed disapproval of contentious politics. Some critics associate demonstrations with violence. Indeed, given the violence that accompanied many protests in recent Indonesian history, particularly the riots and pogroms that spread throughout the country during Suharto’s last days in power, Indonesians have good reason for viewing contentious politics with caution. A 46-year old Javanese fruit merchant in Surabaya expressed this sentiment well: “If I see a demonstration, I do not agree if contains violence…It is unreasonable if a demonstration reaches violence, destruction, and results in death.” Other respondents distinguished between individuals who protest voluntarily and those who are paid, viewing this latter group negatively. The appearance of paid protest activity has made people feel confused about demonstrations. For example, when asked if non-voting forms of political participation could be influential, a 41-year old Batak woman who works in the lower-level civil service gave the following response: “They can be influential, but I don’t join demonstrations because I feel that they are senseless. I know someone who joined a demonstration and received 20,000 rupiah [about $2] for demonstrating.”

Respondents also expressed mixed views about contacting. Some view contacting as a more peaceful way to express oneself compared to protesting. Others expressed skepticism that a letter would “make it to the top.” Some respondents, particularly poorer and more socially marginalized individuals, felt that contacting a public official would be too burdensome given their limited resources. For example, while one 29-year old Javanese woman in Surabaya with an elementary school education said that she thought non-voting forms of political participation could be effective, she herself would never join a protest or visit a public official:

I wouldn’t go to a demonstration. It would be too hot and I’d get tired. Representatives’ offices are far away. I’d have to find time to travel there, and pay the fare for the bus. Then, if I went, the representative would not listen to me. It would be a waste.
After offering this explanation, my respondent paused and then added, “We are little people (rakyat kecil). We do not climb to the top.” Even those individuals who are somewhat better prepared to engage in political participation express reservations about contacting. A 32-year old Batak construction worker with a high school education in Medan noted, “I feel that I would not go directly to an office because the procedures are rather difficult.” This individual is an elder in his Protestant church, the head of the mutual aid society to which he belongs, and is a leader in his marga (ethnic Batak tribe network), experiences from which he has acquired considerable civic skills, yet even he viewed contacting public officials as complicated.

On the whole, while a considerable number of Indonesian respondents could not offer an example of how they could influence politics, many suggested several acts of political influence that help constrain elites. Like Russians, Indonesians’ individual experiences with non-voting political participation appear to influence their efficacy attitudes. In contrast to Russians, however, more Indonesians have had positive experiences with non-voting political participation, including contentious politics and party-building work. As a result of their successful participation, these individuals are more likely to engage in elite-constraining activities in the future. This connection between efficacy attitudes and participation has important consequences for democracy’s survival as Indonesians are more frequent participants in non-voting acts than are Russians.

ELECTIONS AND EFFICACY: POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RECIPROCAL EFFECTS

The Efficacy of Elections

For most scholars, fair and free elections are the primary mechanism by which regimes achieve democracy. As discussed above, elections are also regularly held in authoritarian regimes to present the façade of democracy and help establish the legitimacy of the regime. Consequently, in regimes undergoing democratization, it is rarely the case that adults have no prior experience with elections. Rather, they have no prior experience with elections that are fair, free, and competitive.

Competitive elections were gradually introduced on the Russian territories of the Soviet Union starting with the 1989 elections for the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union, the 1990 elections for the Congress of People’s Deputies for the Russian SFSR, and the 1991 election for the presidency of the Russian SFSR. These early elections, as well as the 1993 and 1995 Russian State Duma elections, are generally believed to have been free and fair elections. Indonesia’s first competitive election since 1955 was held in 1999, about one year after Suharto’s resignation. This election and subsequent national elections in 2004 and 2009 are generally believed to have been fair and free.

How do Russians and Indonesians perceive the efficacy of these fair, free, and competitive elections? In order to fully answer this question we would need identical survey data asking about these elections from both countries several years after initial democratic elections. Unfortunately, such data do not exist. Nevertheless, the Keio University Research Survey on Political Society includes two questions that look at attitudes about elections and electoral campaigns. These are not questions directly about the efficacy of elections, yet we can use them as a proxy for perceptions about electoral efficacy. If an individual is ill-disposed toward voting and electoral campaigns, it is logical to think that this person is less likely to view participating in elections as efficacious. Similarly, if an individual expresses positive views about voting and electoral campaigns, this person is more likely to view participating in elections as beneficial.
In the first question, respondents were given two statements about electoral campaigns and asked which more closely reflected their opinion:

A. Election campaign is necessary for the general public to judge candidates or issues.
B. Election campaign is not reliable and in fact the country would be better off without it.

Respondents were then asked if their opinion was “close to A,” “closer to A than to B,” “closer to B than to A,” or “close to B.” Nearly 53 percent of Indonesians responded “close to A” and another 28 percent responded “closer to A than B.” In contrast, 59 percent of Russians in the 2005A survey and 53 percent in the 2005B survey responded “close to B” or “closer to B than A.” The overwhelming majority—some 81 percent—of Indonesian respondents are more inclined to evaluate electoral campaigns as beneficial, while more than 50 percent of Russians would be content to do away with campaigns altogether.

The second question asks, “In general how do you regard voting or election campaigns?” and offers five rather unusual responses that do not seem to capture a clear attitudinal dimension. Even though the wording of the responses is odd, they constitute a roughly ordinal scale of how much one enjoys voting and campaigns. At one end is the response, “I feel satisfied in voting,” and at the other end is a response suggestive of contempt: “Sometimes election campaigns appear totally ridiculous to me.” Russian and Indonesian responses to this question are displayed in Table 6.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indonesia (2006) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (2005A) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (2005B) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I feel satisfied in voting.</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes find election campaigns interesting and fun.</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have never found election campaigns interesting or fun, nor have they ever caused me to feel annoyed, nor have I ever disdained them.</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes feel annoyed during election campaigns.</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes election campaigns appear totally ridiculous to me.</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of the above</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 6.6 shows, the modal response for both Indonesians and Russians to this question is indifference (“I have never found election campaigns interesting or fun, nor have they ever caused me to feel annoyed, nor have I ever disdained them”). Forty percent of Indonesians and about 30 percent of Russians responded indifferently to voting and election campaigns. If we look at the other responses, however, it appears as though, on the whole, Indonesians have more positive views of campaigns than Russians. Nearly 23 percent of Indonesians “find election campaigns interesting and fun,” compared to 11-14 percent of Russians. The percentage of Indonesians who find voting satisfying is also higher than the percentage of Russians. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 28-32 percent of Russians express negative views of electoral campaigns compared to 17 percent of Indonesians.

Taken together, the two Keio University Research Survey questions suggest that Indonesians tend to view voting and electoral campaigns more positively than Russians. Yet, by 2005 and 2006 (the years in which the survey was conducted), these two countries had amassed varied election experiences. Indonesians had experienced two fair and free national electoral cycles, including their first direct elections for the presidency. Russia, by contrast, had over a
decade of post-Soviet electoral experience in which each national election was accompanied by a narrowing of competition and the outcomes became less and less uncertain. One would logically expect that the disdain Russians expressed for electoral campaigns and voting in the Keio University Research Survey is a consequence of more recent election disappointments.

Luckily, the RES has asked a question about the efficacy of voting or elections in each of its surveys, although the wording has varied across the different years. By looking at responses to these questions, we can try to determine whether Russians’ views about the efficacy of elections have declined over time. In 1995, RES respondents were asked if they “fully agree,” “agree,” “waver,” “disagree,” or “fully disagree” with the statement “Nothing will change in this country as a result of how people vote.” In total, 36.4 percent of respondents disagreed or fully disagreed with the statement, compared to 46.5 of respondents who agreed or fully agreed. As of 1995—at the highpoint of Russian democracy—a larger number of Russians viewed elections as an ineffective mechanism for improving or changing their lives than the number who viewed elections as an efficacious mechanism.

In the 1999-2000 RES, respondents were asked to place themselves on a 5-point scale where “1” translates to “voting does not make a difference to the country,” and “5” translates to “voting does make a difference to the country.” Respondents were asked a similar question in the 2003-2004 and 2008 RES. They were asked to place themselves on a 5-point scale where “1” translates to “who people vote for won’t make a difference,” and “5” translates to “who people vote for can make a difference.” Thus, the higher one’s self-placement on either of these scales, the greater his/her perception of elections’ efficacy. The mean rate of responses to these questions in each survey is included in Table 6.7. These mean response rates suggest that Russians’ perceptions of the efficacy of voting declined slightly between 1999 and 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.7: Mean Response Rates to 5-Point Voting Scale in Russia (RES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting does not make a difference = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting does not make a difference = 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who people vote for won’t make a difference = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who people vote for can make a difference = 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who people vote for won’t make a difference = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who people vote for can make a difference = 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is illuminating to consider these RES responses in light of a 1990 SSV question about elections. At the time of the SSV survey, the only competitive election that Soviet respondents had experienced was the 1989 Congress of People’s Deputies election, in which multiple candidates were allowed to compete. Respondents were asked, “How much do you feel that having a government elected instead of appointed makes it pay attention to what the people want?” Among all respondents, 12 percent replied, “not much,” while 48 percent replied “some” and 39 percent answered “a good deal.” The percentages for respondents on Russian territories are almost the same. In 2008, the New Russia Barometer (NRB) asked a similar question, “Do you think having regular elections makes politicians do what people want?” Table 6.8 compares the 1990 SSV and the 2008 NRB responses. Only 8 percent of NRB respondents replied “to a large extent” and 35 percent answered “to some extent,” while 56 percent of respondents replied “not very much” or “none at all” (Rose, 2008, p. 11). Russian citizens in the late Soviet era
viewed elections as a potential mechanism for attracting the government’s attention to their needs. Yet, as the RES and NRB data show, Russians’ belief in the efficacy of elections declined over time. Once they experienced more elections, Russian citizens became less convinced that the ballot box could make a difference in their lives.

Table 6.8: Russian Attitudes about Elections as Constraint on Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“How much do you feel that having a government elected instead of appointed makes it pay attention to what the people want?”</th>
<th>1999 (SSV)</th>
<th>“Do you think having regular elections makes politicians do what people want?”</th>
<th>2008 (NRB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not much</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A good deal</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>To a large extent</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,354</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,601*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The total number of interviews conducted in the NRB was 1,601. The published data report does not include the number of valid responses for this specific question. It is likely that the actual number is lower.

Citizen Interviews: Connecting Perceptions and Experiences

The differences between Indonesian and Russian attitudes toward elections observed in the survey data are confirmed in my citizen interviews as well. As mentioned above, I increased the number of questions I asked about elections and their efficacy over the course of interviewing. About halfway through my interviews in Kazan I introduced the first question about elections, asking whether respondents’ thought that official election results correspond with the way that people actually vote. This question is aimed at understanding the extent to which Russians and Indonesians view their elections as fair and free. Starting in Krasnoyarsk, I began to ask respondents if it was important to vote in elections. If they answered affirmatively, I asked them why. I also asked if they believed that voting in elections could influence political decisions. All these questions were asked in Surabaya and Medan.

Before examining citizens’ responses to these questions, a short language note is in order. The nouns for “vote” in both Russian and Indonesian languages are the same as the respective languages’ nouns for “voice” (golos in Russian and suara in Indonesian). This parallel is not unique to either language: “Vote, in Latin votum from voveo to vow, is very probably derived from vox, a voice, signifying the voice that is raised in supplication to heaven” (Crabb, 1826, p. 582). Of course, neither the Russian nor Indonesian languages bear Latin roots, but one might suspect that the morphology of “vote” and “voice” are intimately tied in many languages. Indeed, their separation in English may cause Western analysts to forget how closely the concepts of vote and voice are intertwined in both Russia and Indonesia. The parallel that Russians and Indonesians share between “vote” and “voice” becomes striking when comparing analogous interviews with speakers of either tongue.

Russian Attitudes about Elections: A “Dirty Business”

Like most Russian citizens, the individuals that I interviewed in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk generally voted at a high rate. Sixteen of my 25 respondents in Kazan and 13 of 25 respondents in Krasnoyarsk have voted in most or all elections since 1991. Only three respondents total (two in Kazan and one in Krasnoyarsk) have never voted.

Twelve individuals in Kazan talked about the honesty of elections and the reliability of results. Of this group, only two expressed a belief that elections were honest and that the official
results correspond with how people actually vote. Most respondents were much more skeptical. In some cases, individuals feel that the overall outcomes are accurate but that the percentages are off. In other cases, individuals view elections as a “dirty business.” One respondent, a 32-year-old Tatar sociologist, expressed a sentiment shared by many, that he has an “absence of faith in honest elections.” The last federal election in which this individual had voted was in 2000, when he voted against acting President Vladimir Putin. “Elections will be falsified. I’ve turned cold towards elections,” he said. In contrast to Kazan, residents in Krasnoyarsk are split in their views about the honesty of elections. Ten respondents in Krasnoyarsk said official election results did not correspond with how people actually voted, while eleven said that they did. Three Krasnoyarsk respondents were unsure, noting that they had never thought about this issue before.

Although attitudes towards voting and elections were gathered from only 12 respondents in Kazan, the number of individuals in that city who said that they did not believe election results are honest was the same as the number in Krasnoyarsk, where the number of valid responses to the question is double. Although these numbers are small, it seems highly likely that, on the whole, respondents in Krasnoyarsk view their elections as more honest than respondents in Kazan. I believe this variation is related to these cities’ different experiences with regard to post-Soviet elections, a topic I will explore in the final section of this chapter.

Most of my respondents in Krasnoyarsk (17) believe it is important to vote in elections. A slightly smaller number (14) agreed that voting in elections can influence political decisions or the political process. Attitudes about the honesty of the official results and the influence of voting on political decisions are also correlated. Nine of the 11 individuals who believe that official election results are accurate also see voting as a way of influencing political outcomes.

Generally speaking, attitudes about the importance of voting in elections and the efficacy of voting are also correlated in Krasnoyarsk. If individuals believe voting can influence political decisions, they also view voting as important. Conversely, if they do not think voting can be influential, they do not see it as important. Five individuals, however, see voting as important, but do not see the act as influencing political outcomes. For example, two respondents noted that voting only confirmed decisions already made by others, creating an impression of democracy. Two others qualified their statements—in general voting is important, but here it makes no difference.

Respondents offered several explanations for why they view voting as important. Some see voting as a civic obligation. Others connect it directly to determining who is in power. A third group considers voting a way of expressing their opinions. In short, not all reasons respondents gave for why voting is important specifically involve electing leaders. In one example, a 59-year old Russian social worker noted that it was important to vote to make sure that one’s ballot is not used by someone else to commit electoral fraud.

My interviews show that in Krasnoyarsk, participation in non-voting political acts does not appear to correlate with attitudes about the honesty of elections, the importance of voting, or the efficacy of voting. There does appear to be a correlation between voting behavior and these attitudes, however. Among my respondents, voting frequency corresponds positively with individuals’ opinions about the accuracy of official election results. Likewise, my respondents who believe that voting is important or that it can affect political outcomes are regular voters, while those who do not share these views vote less often.

Russian attitudes about the efficacy of elections and voting exemplify the reciprocal nature of efficacy and participation. Russians who view voting as efficacious are more likely to engage in it, and they are also more likely to view election results as honest. In contrast, those
who question the accuracy of official election results are less likely to vote in elections and are also less likely to see voting as influential. Indeed, the absence of integrity in the electoral system is, in part, what makes them feel inefficacious. In this instance, we see how the reciprocal relationship between participation and efficacy attitudes can have a multiplicative effect on overall levels of political participation. A small dose of manipulation or elite interference can have a sizeable impact on citizens’ sense of efficacy and their subsequent political behavior.

**Indonesian Attitudes about Elections: “Now there is Freedom”**

Even though Russians and Indonesians both vote at high rates, they express considerably different views about elections. Russians are less likely than Indonesians to believe that voting is important or that it can influence political decisions. On the whole, Indonesians express a higher sense of efficacy about voting in elections than Russians do.

The citizens I interviewed in Indonesia, like most of their fellow compatriots, are ardent voters. Fourteen of my 25 respondents in Surabaya and 17 of the 25 respondents in Medan have voted in almost every election since 1999. Only three citizens in Surabaya and two in Medan had never voted—and these latter two had only recently reached voting age. Twenty-one out of 23 respondents in Surabaya and 23 out of 24 in Medan believe it is important to vote in elections. Most respondents who expressed this view also believe that voting in elections can influence political outcomes.

Considering how almost all respondents in my Indonesian sample view voting in elections as important, it is not surprising that this attitude does not necessarily correspond with voting practices. Respondents who never vote, or vote only occasionally, view voting as important, and two of the three individuals who do not consider voting as important vote in almost all elections. The same pattern exists for attitudes about the efficacy of voting. Even individuals who rarely or occasionally vote see voting as efficacious, and the one individual who does not share this view votes in most elections.

Residents of Surabaya and Medan did exhibit different opinions, however, about the accuracy of election results. About half of the respondents in Surabaya believe that official election results correspond with how people actually vote, compared to 19 out of 24 respondents in Medan. Among those who question the official tally, however, they rarely doubt the overall validity of the election results, which they see as generally reflecting the people’s will. Most individuals who doubt the honesty of official election results believe it is important to vote in elections and that voting can influence political outcomes. Thus, in spite of the imperfections they see in the electoral system, these individuals perceive the efficacy of elections to be rather high.

While the small size of my interview sample may account for the differences in attitudes about the honesty of elections observed between Surabaya and Medan, it is also possible that a 2008 election controversy in East Java contributed to increased skepticism among Surabayans. In 2008 East Java held its first direct election for governor. The first round of voting was held on July 23, 2008 and included five candidate pairs. The top two candidates, Soekarwo and Khofifah, competed in the second round on November 4, 2008. The election proved very close, with the official results displaying a difference of only about 60,000 votes among more than 15 million votes cast (Mawuntyas & Wibowo, 2008). Investigations into electoral fraud revealed widespread irregularities in three regencies on East Java’s Madura Island. In December 2008 the

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7 A regency (kabupaten in Indonesian) is an Indonesian administrative district below the level of the province. All territories in Indonesia are divided up into “cities” and “regencies.” A regency is comprised of several smaller towns
Constitutional Court annulled the official election results and called for the election to be rerun in the Bangkalan and Sampang regencies within 60 days, and for a recount of ballots in the Pamekasan regency within 30 days (Indra Harsaputra, 2008). The results from the rerun and recount were equally as close as the initial election results, and the electoral commission validated Soekarwo’s victory with 50.1 percent (Indra Harsaputra & Nugroho, 2009). Believing that the irregularities that had marred the first election had not been fixed by the second, the defeated Khofifah submitted a second lawsuit to the Constitutional Court, which rejected it (Maulia, 2009).

The drama of these elections played out in full view of the public and was widely covered in the Indonesian media. Even after Soekarwo was sworn in as governor in February 2009, allegations of fraud and mismanagement sullied the reputation of the regional electoral commission. In particular, there was widespread concern that the April 2009 DPR elections would be met with similar irregularities. These concerns were validated when the official voter list for the April 2009 DPR elections in Indonesia proved to be inaccurate and incomplete, leaving many voters off the list. An additional 5.2 million voters were added to the voting list by the July 2009 presidential election to correct for these inaccuracies (Komisi Pemilihan Umum website).

The citizens I interviewed in Surabaya made reference to these events when asked whether official election results accurately reflect how people vote. One 26-year old Javanese homemaker with a one-year professional degree expressed this view: “Many were not able to vote [in April] because their names were not listed; also candidates gave money so that you would vote for that candidate. I do not trust these elections.” Only three respondents intimated egregious forms of falsification, such as the buying and selling of votes or direct manipulation by political parties. Other respondents, however, seemed to believe that official results were not “100 percent” accurate. Some noted that the “differences are not big,” or that there was some playing with the numbers “at the top.”

Respondents in Surabaya and Medan offered a variety of views about why it is important to vote in elections. Most answers, however, emphasized that voting in elections determined the leadership of the country and who would be in government. The 22-year old Javanese student leader of PMII in Surabaya suggested that voting in elections supersedes any other activism he engages in: “In my opinion, yes, it is important [to vote]. Because in casting our votes we are also determining the fate of our nation. Therefore I think that voting is an act that is very important.” Several respondents linked their vote choice to their views about what they wanted for their country. Others noted that voting was their right, or their obligation. As 34-year old unemployed Batak man in Medan noted, “It is a waste of your vote if you don’t choose [a candidate].”

In fact, the most striking overall difference in efficacy attitudes between my Russian and Indonesian respondents is their views about elections and what is at stake in them. Even Russians who believe that official election results are honest and that it is important to vote in elections do not express much enthusiasm about them. Indonesians, by contrast, voice considerable pleasure in their freedom to “be political.” One 17-year old Batak man in Medan voted for the first time in Indonesia’s presidential elections a couple of weeks before our interview. When I asked what he thought of the experience, he replied, “The first time I participated in an election there was a feeling of great freedom, where I felt that democracy meant something to me.”

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and villages in a contiguous area. While each city has a mayor, each regency has an elected executive who is referred to as a *bupati*.
The freedom that Indonesians feel from elections comes, in part, from the fact that they are no longer required to support Golkar. This view was voiced by a broad cross-section of respondents, including those too young to have been politically active in the New Order era. The 22-year old Javanese student leader of PMII volunteered, “Before, I remember that I was forced to choose Golkar, even though I did not want to. However, now I have the freedom to choose whoever I want.” A 25-year old Javanese clerical worker with a junior-high school education in Surabaya offered, “Now there is freedom. Before, civil servants needed to vote for Golkar. Now it is no longer like that.” The perception of greater freedom and efficacy was voiced by individuals with less education as well. A 30-year old Javanese/Madurese man with an elementary school education who ran a small food stall in Surabaya noted, “My parents voted, but for Golkar. Before there was a lot of pressure and you had to vote for Golkar. Now you are free to choose.”

In sum, Indonesians’ and Russians’ attitudes about elections and the efficacy of voting share some differences and some similarities. On the whole, Indonesians are more likely than Russians to see voting in elections as important. Indonesians are also more likely to view their votes as directly determining the leadership of their country, which in turn establishes the policies that affect their day-to-day lives. Russians, by contrast, are less likely to view voting as politically determinative. Lastly, while I observed variation in attitudes between residents in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk and Surabaya and Medan regarding the honesty of official election results, on the whole my Indonesian respondents tend to trust their election results more than Russians do. Even when they do not trust election results, Indonesians are more likely to attribute inaccuracies to incompetence and mistakes than allege blatant falsification.

These different attitudes, to a certain degree, reflect variation in electoral practices. In Indonesia, there is evidence of mistakes being made in the course of elections, but little proof of organized fraud. In Russia, however, elections have become more orchestrated in the past several years, discouraging competition and raising public suspicion about outcomes. Yet, the possible impact of more recent developments on attitudes about the efficacy of elections should not be overstated. Until 2004, Russian elections exhibited considerable levels of competition. As I will demonstrate in the final section of this chapter, experiences with early democratic elections play an important role in shaping attitudes about elections and their efficacy.

HOW “THROWING THE RASCALS OUT” INCREASES EFFICACY

Mapping Citizen Responses to Election Experience

In the years following their initial transitions to democracy, the outcomes of national elections led to dramatically different outcomes in Russia and Indonesia. If we apply Huntington’s two turnover test to these cases, Russia fails and Indonesia passes. In Russia, most political power is concentrated in the presidency. Turnover in the party that holds a plurality in the State Duma does not signify a change in power. Opposition came to power in Russia in the form of Boris Yeltsin, who was elected Russian president in 1991 (although Russia was still part of the Soviet Union at this time and did not have full sovereignty). In 1996, the incumbent Yeltsin was reelected. He resigned in late 1999, forcing early presidential elections. Acting President Vladimir Putin was elected with nearly 53 percent of the vote in March 2000, and was reelected with 71 percent of the vote in March 2004. Prohibited from running for a third term by the Russian Constitution, in 2008 Putin endorsed First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev as
his successor. Medvedev handily took 71 percent of the vote in the March 2008 election. In sum, executive power has never turned over at the national level in post-Soviet Russia.

At the time of its democratic transition, Indonesia had a pseudo-parliamentary system in which the president was elected indirectly by members of the parliament. In this context, opposition came to power in Indonesia following the 1999 DPR elections. As discussed in chapter 2, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) won a plurality of seats, but a coalition of smaller parties propelled the head of the National Awakening Party (PKB), Abdurrahman Wahid, to the Indonesian presidency. Buoyed by public support and demonstrations demanding the president’s resignation, in July 2001 the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) voted to impeach Wahid and replace him with Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the head of PDI-P. In 2004 Megawati ran as the incumbent in the first direct elections for the Indonesian presidency. She lost to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and peacefully turned over power.

Indonesians’ success at forcing Abdurrahman Wahid’s removal from power in 2001 and unseating Megawati Sukarnoputri in the 2004 presidential elections helped strengthen their sense of political efficacy. Russians’ however, have never unseated an incumbent president or his anointed “successor.” Rather, Russian presidential elections after 1991 have validated the status quo, by either re-electing sitting presidents (1996 and 2004) or ushering in the incumbent’s preferred replacement candidate (2000 and 2008). I find that the overall differences in electoral and protest experiences in the early years of democratization have contributed to the variation we see between perceptions of efficacy among Russians and Indonesians.

In order to test my hypothesis about the importance of early election outcomes, I rely on Russian sub-national variation regarding gubernatorial elections, which were held in Russia from 1996-2005. While some gubernatorial elections validated incumbent governors who had been appointed by first Russian President Boris Yeltsin, others resulted in turnovers of power. Two such examples are Tatarstan (of which Kazan is the capital) and Krasnoyarsk Krai. While Tatarstan never removed a sitting governor or had competitive elections for the position, Krasnoyarsk held three competitive gubernatorial elections, one of which resulted in the removal of an incumbent.

As the previous two sections have shown, my citizen interviews in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk revealed differences in efficacy measures between these two cities. Respondents in Krasnoyarsk display a greater overall sense of efficacy than respondents in Kazan and are also more likely to trust official election results. These attitudinal differences cannot be explained by ethnicity, education, income, or other personal differences between respondents in the two cities. Yet, there is one striking difference between respondents in Krasnoyarsk and Kazan that aligns with these differences in efficacy attitudes: having removed an incumbent from office via elections.

**Kazan: Non-Competitive Authoritarian Elections**

Kazan is the capital of Tatarstan, one of 21 subjects of the Russian Federation categorized as national republics. In total, 24 million residents, or 16.6 percent of the population residing within Russia’s borders, live in a national republic. During the early years of post-Soviet Russian federalism, Tatarstan leveraged nationalist sentiment to garner more autonomy than any other region in the Russian Federation. Heeding former Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s 1990 statement to “take as much sovereignty as you can swallow,” Tatarstan used the force of a 1992 referendum in favor of independent statehood to negotiate the first (and most advantageous in all
Russia at this time) bilateral power-sharing treaty between the central government and a federation subject.

Tatarstan’s power-sharing treaty limited the extent to which Moscow could interfere in regional politics, including efforts at democratization. From 1989 to March 2010, Tatarstan’s regional politics were under the control of Mintimer Shaimiev. Shaimiev became the First Secretary of the Tatar regional committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1989. He successfully adapted the method of single-party political rule to the post-Soviet context, running unopposed as governor in 1991 and 1996—a violation of federal legislation that Moscow did not try to uphold until after Vladimir Putin became Russian President in 2000. In the 1996 contest, Shaimiev won 97 percent of the vote and voter turnout was nearly 78 percent (Orttung, Lussier, & Paretskaya, 2000, p. 539). During this same period, Tatarstan allowed the governor to appoint mayors and local officials, which was also a violation of federal law. Shaimiev changed the republican constitution to run for a third term in 2001, although this time he permitted token opposition in the form of four other contenders. Shaimiev handily won a third term with nearly 80 percent of the vote (Faroukshin, 2001).

After the cancellation of gubernatorial elections in 2004, Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Shaimiev to another term in March 2005. Shaimiev finally stepped down from office in early 2010, securing an appointment to the governorship for his trusted advisor, Rustem Minnikhanov.

My citizen interviews with residents of Kazan show that Shaimiev—like Putin—is wildly popular. An ethnic Tatar, Shaimiev enjoys great public support among both Russians and Tatars, and would have likely won multiple terms as governor under fair and free elections. Yet, Russia’s brief experiment with gubernatorial elections failed to bring competitive and free elections to Tatarstan. Consequently, the Soviet tradition of approving a candidate who had already been picked continued at the regional level throughout Shaimiev’s post-Soviet tenure in office. Residents of Kazan, therefore, have experienced no incumbent turnover at national or regional-level politics in the post-Soviet era. According to one opposition figure in Kazan, the biggest sin of Yeltsin, Shaimiev, and Putin is that people lost the belief of their own power. As a result, he argues, there is no difference between Soviet and contemporary elections (K-16, interview, March 11, 2008). For voters in Kazan, elections simply validate a leadership decision made by others. Their lack of experience in “throwing the rascal out” has contributed to my Kazan respondents’ low sense of efficacy in general, as well as their skepticism about the honesty of election results. Krasnoyarsk respondents expressed higher levels of efficacy attitudes, as well as greater trust in the honesty of election results.

**Krasnoyarsk: Incumbent Turnover**

Post-Soviet regional elections in Krasnoyarsk have proven significantly more competitive than their counterparts in Tatarstan. Krasnoyarsk held three gubernatorial elections between 1993 and 2002. All three of these elections included at least eight candidates in the first round and required two rounds of voting since no single candidate won a majority of the votes in the first round. Krasnoyarsk’s first popularly-elected governor, Valerii Zubov, stood for reelection in 1998. He was challenged by a popular national-level figure, former Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed.

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8 Information about the number of candidates and their vote share was taken from the Krasnoyarsk Krai Electoral Commission’s website http://iksrf.kgs.ru/ under the section “Arkhiv vyborov i referendumov.” The site was accessed on March 25, 2011.
After a decorated military career, Lebed entered Russian politics full time in 1995, heading the party-list for the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) in the 1995 State Duma elections and running for the Russian presidency in 1996, where he finished third with more than 14 percent of the vote. In the Krasnoyarsk gubernatorial race, Lebed led the first election round with 45 percent of the vote, while incumbent Zubov came in second with 35 percent. Lebed emerged victorious in the second round of voting with 57 percent of the votes. The voters of Krasnoyarsk Krai successfully used elections to vote out an incumbent.

Governor Lebed’s untimely death in a helicopter crash in 2002 necessitated a third gubernatorial election in the region—a contest that has earned a reputation in Russia as one of the most competitive regional elections in the country’s history. The notoriety of the 2002 Krasnoyarsk elections comes from both the explicit involvement of business interests, as well as the controversy that ensued over the results. The top two candidates to emerge from the first round of voting, Aleksandr Uss (27.6 percent) and Aleksandr Khloponin (25.3 percent), were prominent political figures in the region backed by major economic concerns.9 Uss was chair of the regional legislature, endorsed by Chairman of Russian Aluminum, the “oligarch” Oleg Deripaska. Khloponin was a former top executive at Norilsk Nickel, a major mining enterprise in the north of the region, who had been elected the head of the Taimyr Autonomous Okrug in 2000.10 The second round of voting proved very close, with Khloponin coming in first with 49 percent of the votes. A bitter battle over the validity of the results followed. The regional electoral commission declared the election invalid and set a date for new elections in March 2003 (Abdullaev, 2002). President Putin then intervened by tendering the resignation of the region’s acting governor, appointing Khloponin to the post, and prodding the Russian Central Electoral Commission to declare Khloponin’s victory final ("Ukroshchenie Stroptivykh", 2002).

The 1998 and 2002 gubernatorial elections in Krasnoyarsk cannot be held up as exemplars of democracy. There are many reasons to question the fairness of these elections, including the extensive involvement of financial-industrial groups and the use of so-called “administrative resources,” which was considered particularly prominent in the 2002 race (Hale, 2006; Orttung, 2004; Yorke, 2003). These elections may not have been entirely fair, but they were undoubtedly competitive and largely free. Potential candidates were not prevented from participating. In no instance was the outcome known before citizens cast their ballots. In both elections, the result was determined by how people voted.

In sum, over the course of nine years, residents of Krasnoyarsk experienced three competitive gubernatorial elections, all of which required two rounds of balloting. In one instance an incumbent was unseated, and in another the closeness of the victory margin invited high levels of scrutiny over the results. Even though Russian executive politics at the national level simply validated the status quo, Krasnoyarsk residents saw the efficacy of elections first hand in regional contests.

The influence of competitive gubernatorial elections on people’s attitudes about politics and elections is reflected in conversations with my respondents. While respondents in Kazan universally loved their governor, citizens of Krasnoyarsk expressed a much broader set of views about their regional leaders. Some, for example, believe that Lebed had dramatically improved conditions in the region. Others view him as an unsympathetic outsider, who they often refer to

9 For an analysis of the role of financial industrial groups in this election, see Hale (2006) and Orttung (2004).
10 Taimyr and Evenk autonomous okruks were simultaneously (and ambiguously) parts of Krasnoyarsk Krai and separate subjects of the Russian Federation. In January 2007 the Taimyr and Evenk autonomous okruks were officially merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai to form a single federation subject.
as a “soldafon,” a derogatory term for a person of the military who is perceived as rude, uncivilized, and limited in his abilities. A similar range of opinions were expressed about Khloponin. Some respondents like that he is young, energetic, and capable, while others view him as a transplant from the north who cares only about making a political career for himself. As a result of experiencing competitive elections and seeing the value of their votes, residents of Krasnoyarsk do not simply accept the leadership handed to them from above. Rather, they have begun to look at leaders in a critical light and are more confident in their capability to judge for themselves what kind of leadership they want.

By comparing cross-regional variation in incumbency turnover in gubernatorial elections in Tatarstan and Krasnoyarsk Krai, I have been able to test the effect of this phenomenon on efficacy attitudes. I find that my respondents in Krasnoyarsk, who successfully unseated an incumbent governor via elections, have a higher sense of efficacy than respondents in Kazan, who never saw a regional transfer in executive power. This cross-regional analysis validates my hypothesis about the differences in efficacy attitudes between Russians and Indonesians. As the data presented in this chapter have demonstrated, on the whole, Indonesians have a higher sense of efficacy than Russians. More specifically, Indonesians believe that elections can influence political outcomes at a higher rate than Russians. Indonesians have unseated an incumbent president via election, which I believe has strengthened their sense of efficacy and propelled further political participation over time. By analyzing the Indonesian and Russian experiences with incumbency turnover in early elections together with the cross-regional cases within Russia, my finding about the relationship between incumbency turnover and efficacy attitudes contributes to our theoretical knowledge about the importance of early elections for democracy’s survival.

CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have seen that Russians and Indonesians differ in their perceptions of political efficacy. On the whole, Indonesians feel a higher degree of efficacy than Russians. They are also more likely to view voting in elections as a way to influence political outcomes. These attitudinal differences have important implications for the patterns in political participation that take shape in Russia and Indonesia. In both countries, individuals are more likely to take part in activities that they perceive as efficacious. In Russia, however, contacting—an act that does little to constrain elite excess—is the form of political participation that is viewed as most efficacious. Indonesians, by contrast, view working through organizations, demonstrating, and participating in elections as potentially influential. Belief that these activities are efficacious contributes to Indonesian preferences for engaging in party work and contentious politics—acts that help to rein in elites.

The information from public opinion surveys and citizen interviews reviewed in this chapter also shows that Russian and Indonesian attitudes about elections and voting may be tied in to their own experiences. As post-Soviet Russians have gained more practice with elections, they have been less likely to view them as influential and more likely to feel that their vote does not matter. Yet, Russians and Indonesians have had varied experiences with elections. While Russian national elections have consistently validated the status-quo, Indonesians have successfully voted an incumbent out of national office.

Analysis of cross-regional differences in perceptions of efficacy in both Indonesia and Russia highlight the potential importance of early elections for strengthening or lowering attitudes about the efficacy of elections as a mechanism of political influence. In Indonesia,
respondents in Surabaya, who expressed concern about irregularities in East Java’s first gubernatorial election in 2008, are less likely than respondents in Medan to view official election results as honest. In Russia, Krasnoyarsk’s experience of three competitive gubernatorial elections, one of which led to an incumbent turnover, contributes to higher levels of overall efficacy attitudes among respondents as well as more positive views about elections than those expressed by respondents in Kazan. These examples show that the effect of political practice on efficacy attitudes can be substantial and lasting, fostering something akin to a multiplier effect across society.

Differences in perceptions of efficacy can have important consequences for democracy’s survival. First, if individuals view elite-constraining acts of participation as potentially influential, they are more likely to participate in them. Second, if voters believe that election results are fair, that the outcome of the election depends on their votes, and that these elections have meaningful political consequences, they are more likely to support the continuation of fair and free elections—a key feature of democracies.

Lastly, as the cross-national pairing of Russia and Indonesia and the cross-regional comparison between Kazan and Krasnoyarsk show, the competitiveness of early elections can influence how citizens in democratizing regimes view the efficacy of elections. When elections simply validate the choices made by others, citizens are less likely to view them as important or protest when their integrity is violated. In contrast, when elections are a respected mechanism for effecting change, individuals are more likely to defend them. Citizens become more invested in the process when they see that their votes can throw a rascal out.
Chapter 7
Trust and Democratic Legitimacy

In chapter 6 we saw that Indonesians, on the whole, have a higher sense of political efficacy than Russians, and that this difference influences both the volume of non-voting political participation that citizens engage in, as well as forms of participation they select. We also found that the experiences of early elections following a democratic transition can have important implications for a population’s efficacy depending on whether they succeed in establishing a turnover of incumbents. Political efficacy and participation are individual-level factors that have system-level consequences. Another individual-level attitude that influences the survival of democracy is political trust.

This chapter analyzes political trust and the impact it has had on strengthening democracy in Indonesia, while undermining it in Russia. Through an analysis of information from open-ended interviews with Indonesian and Russian citizens and comparable survey data, this chapter will emphasize four points about the importance of trust to democracy’s survival. First, on the whole, political trust is higher among Indonesians than Russians. Second, both Russians and Indonesians tend to trust specific individuals more than abstract institutions. Third, attitudes about trust are closely linked to evaluation of leaders’ performance. The similarity that Indonesians and Russians share on these points, however, has led to a bifurcation of opportunities for democracy’s survival in the two countries. Russians have placed considerable trust in political leaders that rolled back democratic gains, while Indonesians have trusted leaders who promote democracy. Lastly, trust judgments can influence political participation in ways that affect regime outcomes. When those who have lower levels of trust engage more regularly in non-voting participation, this can help constrain elites. Yet, when lower levels of trust keep people away from the polls, the voice of opposition can become more muted. Ultimately, much depends on the recipients of the population’s trust and whether they decide to use this trust in the interests of democratic norms and institutions. In Indonesia, democratic norms and practices have acquired legitimacy. While Russia’s current political regime may be considered legitimate in the eyes of its mass public—it is not democratic.

This chapter will proceed in four parts. I first provide a theoretical overview of the relationship between trust and democracy and consider the specific case of trust in the context of democratization. The second section examines my citizen interviews in Indonesia and Russia to establish a general sense of the contours of political trust in these countries. Bearing in mind the patterns that emerge from these qualitative data, I then investigate survey data that examine trust in political institutions in Indonesia and Russia. The final section demonstrates how differences in trust provided support to dramatically different policy changes with regard to elections: their expansion in Indonesia and cancellation in Russia.

TRUST AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Linking Trust and Democracy’s Survival

Trust is an attitude that is widely studied in the field of political behavior, yet is rarely defined in precise terms. As Levi and Stoker describe, “Trust is relational; it involves an individual making herself vulnerable to another individual, group, or institution that has the capacity to do her harm or to betray her. Trust is seldom unconditional; it is given to specific individuals or institutions over specific domains.” (Levi & Stoker, 2000, p. 476). Trust involves a belief that the trustee—
whether another person or an institution—will act on one’s behalf in a way that is predictable and in observance of expected norms. Thus, trust is a belief in the reliability of another individual or institution, as well as an expectation about the consistency of the respective individual’s or institution’s behavior. Like political efficacy, trust is an individual-level variable that, when aggregated, can reveal information about the prevalence of trusting attitudes in a given society.

How does trust relate to democracy and its survival? Most hypotheses about the relationship between trust and democracy hinge on trust as a micro-level factor that helps smooth the way for more intricate political configurations. Scholars from a variety of disciplines have noted that trust is necessary for social relations as it reduces the complexity of situations and makes transactions more efficient (Newton, 1999). For this reason, trust is generally considered a resource for all political interactions. Within the literature on comparative politics, there are two sets of hypotheses that connect trust to democracy’s survival. The first set emphasizes interpersonal trust, while the second considers trust as an indicator of political support.

Hypotheses emphasizing the importance of interpersonal trust hark back to Almond and Verba (1963), who viewed interpersonal trust as one of the attitudes that contributes to the development of a “civic culture” that can sustain democracy. Indeed, as Inglehart’s analysis of cross-national quantitative data from the early 1990s reveals, levels of interpersonal trust correlate with the survival of democratic institutions (Inglehart, 1997, pp. 173-174). Yet, the causal relationship between these two variables is unclear: do more trusting societies tend to build democratic regimes, or do democracies engender greater interpersonal trust?

The relationship between interpersonal trust and democracy has been further explored in Putnam’s work on social capital. Putnam argues that the trust inherent in social capital (which he argues is generated through participation in voluntary associations) is the underpinning of democracy (1993, 2000). The link that Putnam draws between trust and democracy is not uncontroversial, however. Critiques of Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (1993), for example, have emphasized the author’s lack of precision in defining trust, as well as unclear attention to the causal mechanisms that link trust to the political outcomes he uses as measures of governing success (Levi, 1996; Tarrow, 1996).

Yet, following the publication of Making Democracy Work, scholars began to differentiate between social trust, which binds interpersonal relationships and relates to the private sphere, and political trust, which involves political objects and relates to the public sphere. Building on Putnam’s tradition, scholars have examined the relationship between social trust and political trust (Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton, 2001). Empirical studies of both advanced democracies (Newton, 1999, 2001) and the post-communist region (Mishler & Rose, 2001) have generally found the link between social and political trust to be rather weak. Individuals’ perceptions about the performance of political institutions are a greater predictor of trust in institutions than is social trust.¹ These findings are consistent with a long tradition in the study of American politics, which has shown that trust levels are influenced by evaluations of the performance of the incumbent president or government and by evaluations of the incumbents’ personal qualities (Citrin, 1974; Citrin & Green, 1986; Hetherington, 1999). As Levi and Stoker summarize in their review of the scholarship on trust, “Whether citizens express trust or distrust is primarily a reflection of their political lives, not their personalities nor even their social characteristics” (Levi & Stoker, 2000, p. 481). Given the robust finding that social trust does not

¹ Levi and Stoker (2000) review another line of research that looks at the reverse relationship: trust in political institutions as a source of social trust. See, in particular, Fukuyama (1995) and Brehm and Rahn (1997).
appear to influence political trust, I have chosen not to pursue an examination of social trust, and rather am focusing my analysis on political trust.

An emphasis on political trust is present in the second set of hypotheses about trust and democracy, which link these two concepts together with a third concept—political support. In his classic essay on the topic, Easton defined political support as “the way in which a person evaluatively orients himself to some object through either his attitudes or his behavior” (Easton, 1975, p. 436). Easton described two kinds of political support: specific and diffuse. Specific support refers to the type of support that can be attached to particular authorities and “varies with perceived benefits or satisfactions” (Easton, 1975, p. 439). Diffuse support is aimed at political authorities and the regime, and is typically expressed through trust and beliefs about the legitimacy of political objects (Easton, 1975, p. 447).

Scholars working in the Eastonian tradition have sought to establish a link between trust in democratic institutions and the viability of democracy (Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri, & Tessler, 2008; Dalton, 2006; Norris, 1999; Rose, Mishler, & Munro, 2006). The dominant hypothesis is that higher levels of trust in democratic institutions will enhance the legitimacy of the political order, thereby encouraging participation in the political and civic activities that strengthen democratic values and institutions while also discouraging activities that undermine or threaten the democratic order. Similarly, a decline in trust makes democracy’s survival more vulnerable. In contrast to the first set of hypotheses mentioned above, scholarship that looks at political support tends to emphasize trust in political institutions, not interpersonal trust.

Empirical tests of the trust in institutions hypothesis, however, find that the link between trust and democracy’s survival may be more complex. In his analysis of mass politics in advanced industrial democracies, Dalton (2006) identifies a decline in trust in political institutions and incumbents that began in the last quarter of the 20th century. He attributes this decline to a shift in attitudes away from deference to authority towards public skepticism about elites. Dalton points out, though, that rising feelings of distrust do not appear to have affected overall support for democracy as a regime, but rather produce “dissatisfied democrats” (see also Klingemann, 1999).

While emphasizing different aspects of trust, the two sets of hypotheses discussed above share important similarities. First, both focus on how decreasing levels of trust (whether social or political) can threaten democracy. Studies tend to examine decline in trust over time within the same country, or compare trust levels between advanced democracies and other political regimes. I have yet to find an example of scholarship in which one looks at increasing levels of trust as possibly assisting democracy. Perhaps such a study has not been published because there is no real world example of a polity with increasing levels of trust. Nevertheless, it is natural to ask whether the relationship between trust and democracy’s survival is only negative (i.e., decline in trust dampens democracy’s survival) or might be positive as well (i.e., increase in trust strengthens democracy’s survival).

A second similarity shared by both approaches is that trust is connected to democracy via citizens’ behaviors, both civic and political. While some studies examine the relationship between trust and behavior empirically, in many instances the participation mechanism is implied. Trust is thought to help inculcate values that will foster participation and behavioral compliance with government commands, legitimating the democratic regime and strengthening its survival. There are three general hypotheses found in the literature about how trust can influence behaviors that subsequently affect democracy’s survival.
The first two hypotheses consider the effect of trust on political participation. Levi and Stoker (2000) point out that the literature contains two incompatible claims regarding this relationship. The first claim is that those with higher levels of trust should be expected to participate to a greater extent than those with lower levels of trust, particularly with regard to conventional activities. The second claim is that distrust, not trust, should stimulate political involvement among those who feel politically efficacious. This claim was put forth by Gamson, a political sociologist, who argued that “a combination of high political efficacy and low political trust is the optimum combination for mobilization—a belief that influence is both possible and necessary” (Gamson, 1968, p. 48). According to Levi and Stoker, these two incompatible claims have generated complex hypotheses. For example, over time Gamson’s hypothesis has been tested and refined to focus primarily on contentious political participation or conventional acts that require high levels of initiative, such as campaign and citizen-directed policy efforts. Others connect low levels of trust to a variety of other intervening variables, including interest in politics, education, and trust in the opposition. Levi and Stoker conclude that the proliferation of such complex hypotheses about the way in which trust might influence participation may explain why trust has not figured prominently in explanatory models of political participation (Levi & Stoker, 2000, p. 488).

The third hypothesis involves how trust influences non-political citizen behavior. Citizens who are skeptical of their regime and its custodians are likely to disengage from important non-political civic behaviors. Such individuals are more likely to cheat a little on their taxes, less likely to serve on a jury, and are less likely to perform other public activities (Dalton, 2006, p. 261).

The statistical analysis of trust as a predictor of political participation discussed in chapter 4 lends some support to the first two hypotheses. In the Russian Election Study (RES), trust in the president correlates positively with contacting, and trust in other institutions correlates positively with party work—both conventional forms of participation. While trust is not a statistically significant predictor of contentious political behavior in the RES, the sign of the variable is negative, suggesting that lower levels of trust may be correlated with contentious participation in Russia. The East Asian Barometer (EAB) surveys of Indonesia also show some support for a positive link between trust in the national legislature or the regional government and party work, yet there is also evidence of a negative correlation between trust in the national government or president and party work. The EAB data also demonstrate a statistically significant and negative relationship between trust in political institutions and contentious political activities in Indonesia, showing evidence of distrust promoting protest. In interpreting these findings, however, it would behoove us to consider what Russians and Indonesians have in mind when they answer survey questions about trust in specific political institutions.

Trust in the Context of Democratization

In contrast to studies of political participation and political efficacy, which have focused primarily on advanced democracies, scholarship on trust covers a variety of regime types, including democratizing regimes. Various studies have looked at interpersonal trust and trust in institutions, usually with the goal of trying to establish whether levels of trust in a given society are potential impediments to democracy’s survival.

Less attention, however, has been paid to how individuals living in democratizing regimes understand trust in specific political institutions. While work on established democracies finds that people generally make a clear distinction between the regime and incumbents (Citrin,
1974; Citrin & Green, 1986), we know little about whether or not a comparable division is made in regimes that have emerged following the collapse of authoritarianism, where most political institutions are new to the public. There are both empirical and theoretical reasons, however, to suspect that the distinction between specific political institutions and the individuals who occupy these offices is significantly less pronounced in new regimes. Empirically, evidence from several qualitative case analyses of democratization in specific countries suggests that attributes of the regime and attributes of the office holders can be conflated in the eyes of the public (Fish, 1995; McFaul, 2001). For the overwhelming majority of Russians and Indonesians who I interviewed, the sitting president is the regime and the regime is the sitting president. Citizens in these new regimes often perceive incumbents as the embodiment of both regime principles and regime performance. Even 17 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, I found in 2008 that most Russians were unable to distinguish political institutions, such as the executive and the legislature, from the people who occupy the offices.

Moreover, regimes in the abstract are not responsible for performance: governments and specific political elites determine policy that subsequently affects their performance. Public evaluation of this performance is the primary factor that influences trust in a regime’s institutions. In the early years of regime-building, trust in institutions will be highly dependent, if not perfectly correlated, with attitudes toward specific actors. This observation bears out in my citizen interviews in both Russia and Indonesia: individuals who positively view their political system almost universally trust the incumbents, while those who evaluate their political systems negatively are less trusting of the custodians of power. It is no coincidence, in my opinion, that my citizen samples in Russia show much greater trust in Vladimir Putin than in Boris Yeltsin, and that my citizen samples in Indonesia display greater trust in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) than in Megawati Sukarnoputri. Public opinion surveys in both countries have long showed much higher levels of popular support for Putin and SBY than their predecessors.

A second, more theoretical consideration is the influence of a longer-term perspective on public perceptions in stable political systems. One reason why citizens in advanced democracies can distinguish between regimes and governments is because they have experienced the succession of governments within a given regime. They therefore have a basis for comparing how regime principles are translated by elite rhetoric and how government performance can vary over time across different administrations, yielding a broader sense of regime performance. In more established political systems, the relevant comparison point for evaluating the performance of political institutions is between governments within the same regime. In new regimes, however, the comparison point is often between the old regime and the new regime. For the first several years following regime change, in particular, government performance and regime performance are essentially equivalent phenomena. Therefore, we would expect that over time, as citizens experience successive governments within a new regime, the distinction between the regime and the government will become clearer.

The very real overlap between regime and government performance in the early years of democratization, together with the popular understanding of political institutions as equivalent to their incumbents, creates particular implications for how political trust relates to democracy’s survival. Namely, the levels of trust in political institutions that citizens report in the years following an initial democratic transition are likely to reflect their feelings of trust for specific incumbents. Trust in specific incumbents, in turn, will be largely determined by citizens’ evaluation of these incumbents’ performance. Incidentally, prospective performance evaluation has been shown to be a strong predictor of vote choice in both Russia and Indonesia (Colton &
McFaul, 2003; Liddle & Mujani, 2007; Lussier, 2007; Mujani & Liddle, 2010). Under such conditions, citizens’ approval of officeholders comes to play an important role in establishing the trust and legitimacy of political institutions, regardless of whether these political institutions uphold in practice the democratic ideals they represent in principle. It is possible for citizens to place trust in political leaders and institutions that actually fail to uphold democratic norms and procedures. While citizens may support democratic ideals in principle, if they support politicians who behave undemocratically in practice, trust will not lead to democracy’s survival. Rather, under such circumstances, trust will enhance the legitimacy of authoritarian disregard for democratic institutions and norms. As I will describe throughout this chapter, such a scenario has played out in Putin’s Russia.

Measuring Trust
As the case with political efficacy, trust is generally measured via public opinion surveys. Most scholars view trust as occurring along a continuum, with complete trust at one end and complete mistrust at the other end. Yet, in most instances, closed-ended surveys offer ordinal categories of trust, such as “fully trust,” “trust,” “mistrust,” or “fully mistrust.” In some instances it might make logical sense to dichotomize attitudes into “trust” and “mistrust.” Indeed, as I learned when conducting open-ended interviews with Russian and Indonesian citizens, if you ask someone if they trust a specific institution or individual, they are more likely to say that they “trust” or “don’t trust,” without giving a gradation of their views.\(^2\)

For my analysis of public opinion data, I rely on the ordinal scales offered in the World Values Survey (WVS), the Russian Election Study (RES), and the East Asian Barometer (EAB). In my citizen interviews, I simply asked respondents if they trusted specific institutions. Most of their answers were provided dichotomously, which I use to categorize their different levels of political trust.

POLITICAL TRUST AMONG INDONESIANS AND RUSSIANS

Citizen Interviews: Trust Based on Incumbent Evaluations
How do Indonesians and Russians understand political trust? What objects do they call to mind when asked their opinion of trust? This section will investigate trust attitudes displayed by the citizens with whom I conducted open-ended interviews in Surabaya and Medan, Indonesia and Kazan and Krasnoyarsk, Russia. In each city, I asked respondents their opinions about the president, national legislature, governor, and regional and local councils as political institutions, and also asked specifically about present officeholders as well as previous presidents.\(^3\) After asking for a general opinion of these political objects, I would ask if respondents trusted these specific organs or individuals. In both Indonesia and Russia, I found that only a very small fraction of the population could offer an opinion or evaluation of trust on political institutions in the abstract. In general, only university students or select alumni who have given a great deal of thought to politics could make such discernments.

In many interviews, I simply asked respondents what they thought of the president or legislature, without specifying whether I was referring to these objects as political institutions or their specific incumbents. My goal in asking this question in a more general way was to ascertain

\(^2\) I found it was not uncommon, however, for Indonesians to discuss their sense of trust in terms of percentages, such as “I do not trust the president 100 percent,” or “I have 60 percent trust in the DPR.”

\(^3\) In Krasnoyarsk, I also asked about previous elected governors.
what image citizens tend to respond to when asked about “the president” or “the legislature.” Are they thinking about regime institutions or individuals? Respondents in both Russia and Indonesia tended to share a similar conceptualization: they thought of specific incumbents. For most respondents, “the presidency” is the sitting president and “the legislature” signifies the deputies currently holding office. In thinking about the politics in their countries, I found that Russians and Indonesians rarely distinguish between regime institutions and the incumbents in government. It was not uncommon for an Indonesian to respond, “Oh, SBY is good. I like him as president,” or for a Russian to respond, “I don’t know much about this new president [Medvedev] since he was just elected. I liked Putin as president, though.” Consequently, most of the information I gleaned from these interviews analyzes trust in specific incumbents. These results suggest to me that the responses to public opinion surveys asking about trust in specific institutions in Russia and Indonesia most likely capture respondents’ sense of trust in political authorities, not in abstract institutions.

Another question that I asked in most interviews captures trust in political and social institutions in an indirect way. I asked respondents, “If you had a complaint against a state service, or thought that your rights had been violated, where would you turn for help?” Responses to this question depict trust in political, state, and social institutions relative to other possible resources. Individuals are unlikely to turn for help to an institution they mistrust. Thus, if respondents mention a political institution, we can infer that these individuals exhibit some trust in that institution. Similarly, if individuals suggest turning to family members or friends, such a response is an indicator that these individuals do not have sufficient trust in an impersonal institution to apply to it without first conferring with others and gauging additional opinions about the trustworthiness of different institutions. Of course, this question is not a perfect measure of political trust. Individuals can (and do) offer responses that have nothing at all to do with politics, such as non-governmental organizations or lawyers. In such instances, respondents are communicating some trust in these non-political institutions, but this information tells us nothing about whether the same individual trusts or distrusts political institutions. Nevertheless, this open-ended conversation starter can help to gauge how respondents view more abstract political objects that are not intrinsically linked to visible political authorities.

Indonesia: High Trust in SBY and Other Executives

On the whole, respondents in Surabaya and Medan expressed a broad range of views about trust. Only one respondent in Surabaya expressed no trust in any political institutions or leaders. Most individuals expressed trust in at least one political object—usually Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono—more commonly known by his initials SBY. Overall, respondents in both cities more frequently expressed trust in specific political leaders than in political institutions. Another substantial group of individuals in each city expressed trust in specific leaders—mainly SBY, but also some trust for the previous president Megawati or their governor—and the national legislature, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR). Several of these individuals also trusted political parties.

Other respondents expressed mixed views of trust, in which they trusted some individuals or institutions, but not others. One constant across almost all respondents is trust in SBY. Some respondents trust SBY, but do not trust Megawati or her predecessor, Abdurrahman Wahid. Other respondents expressed trust in individuals, but no trust in the DPR or parties. One respondent in Surabaya, for example, trusts executive institutions, such as the presidency and governorship, but does not trust representative institutions, noting that the national and regional
legislatures need better people. A 22-year old Javanese law student in Surabaya expressed a similar view diplomatically, stating, “The people need members of the House, but I personally do not trust the people who are there.”

On the whole, attitudes about trust are aligned closely with respondents’ overall evaluation of the political system and their sense of satisfaction with political outcomes. High levels of trust in SBY, for example, tend to correspond with general satisfaction with his performance in office, particularly relative to Megawati. In several cases, discussion of this connection was explicit. One 59-year old Javanese man in Surabaya with an elementary school education noted that all of Indonesia’s presidents have been good. He reasoned, “If they are all good, why not trust them?”

The DPR is the institution that Indonesian respondents criticized most frequently, followed by political parties. Criticism in these institutions is reflected in views about trust. A 29-year old Javanese woman in Surabaya with only an elementary school education held attitudes toward trust typical of her age and educational status: she mostly trusts SBY, but has no trust in the DPR or political parties. She expressed the following critique of the DPR:

I don’t like that the salaries of the DPR are high. [DPR representatives] put more importance on their own needs compared to those of the people…The mission of the DPR is to oversee the welfare of the people. Yes, they need to pay attention to the people, not merely make promises and then not make any changes.

The same respondent showed a similar opinion of political parties. When asked if she trusted parties, she responded, “Why trust officials? They look for a position for themselves only; they do not look out for the people.” A 25-year old Javanese man in Surabaya with a junior high school education offered a more cynical view of the DPR deputies, stating, “They rarely fulfill their promises, but in general they use a lot of money to goad people into voting for them. I don’t have much trust in the DPR.”

Criticism of political parties, as well as mixed levels of trust in parties, is tied in part to the frustration that Indonesians feel about their multi-party system and the number of parties actively participating in elections. In the first post-Suharto DPR elections held in 1999, 48 political parties competed. This number was halved to 24 in 2004, but increased to 38 in 2009. Indonesians I interviewed of all levels of education and political sophistication found the sheer number of parties overwhelming, and trying to ascertain differences between them to be confusing. Nevertheless, some citizens expressed criticism in aspects of the political system while also recognizing that their political institutions were becoming more democratic. When discussing Indonesia’s large number of political parties, a 43-year old Javanese female university instructor in Surabaya noted, “I am confused as well [by the number of parties], but I am also solid in my choice, and this may be called democracy. We must trust in parties because they are the only vehicle for representing the voice of the people.”

Several respondents in Indonesia evaluated the post-Suharto regime positively, and also tended to evaluate SBY favorably compared to when Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati were presidents. This overall positive evaluation, however, is not devoid of criticism. Respondents articulated various shortcomings, including corruption, the development of the economy, and limited opportunities for social advancement. One 22-year old Javanese student in Surabaya articulated support for the regime simultaneously with criticism of the government:

I feel that the present system [of government] is the best compared to what we had before. All citizens are involved in the election of this president. But, a set of problems has resulted, bringing much disappointment,
much injustice, engineering of voting by the government, and the right of the people not to vote. In my opinion, this is the problem of the administration.

While overall patterns of trust and evaluation of incumbent performance are essentially the same in Surabaya and Medan, respondents in the two cities exhibited some differences in their answers to the question of where they would turn for help if their rights had been violated. Among the 23 responses I gathered to this question in Surabaya, the most common response (seven individuals) is that they did not know. The second most common response (six individuals) is that they would turn to members of their family or friends for help and advice about what to do. One respondent noted that she would seek help through an employer, two others would go to the police, and a third would go to the head of the village. Several respondents offered that they would seek solutions through the parameters of civil society: three would appeal to their neighborhood associations, one to an NGO, and one would specifically go to the legal aid society. Only one respondent in Surabaya said that there was nowhere she would turn for help. The importance of society and community as a source of help is emphasized in these responses. Political and state institutions—or individuals—do not figure prominently among the primary objects individuals trust in moments of crisis. Indeed, the suggestion that their rights could be violated was an idea that was foreign to many of my interlocutors. Among most respondents, solutions to life’s daily problems are sought among family, friends, and extensions of their community—neighborhood associations, employers, and NGOs.

In contrast to respondents in Surabaya, individuals in Medan are more likely to offer a specific institution when asked where they would go if their rights were violated. Only one individual did not know where he would go, and another said she would not go anywhere. The most common answer offered was the police—seven individuals said that they would approach the police if their rights were violated. Six others mentioned that they would go through the local government, usually starting with the bureaucracy at the sub-district or district level, known in Indonesian as the lurah and camat, respectively. Four other individuals said that they would seek help through legal bodies, including consulting lawyers or the legal defense group. Only one individual said that she would consult her neighbors about where to go.

The differences in responses between individuals in Medan and Surabaya suggest that Medan respondents may have a higher level of trust in the police, local bureaucracy, and the justice system than do respondents in Surabaya. With numbers as small as these, it is impossible to say with certainty that a meaningful difference in political trust exists between residents of Surabaya and Medan, particularly when responses to the other trust questions do not vary across cities. When viewed together, however, these responses suggest that trust is not monolithic in Indonesia. In some instances, Indonesians do not think immediately of an organization in which they have enough trust to appeal to help. In other instances, the object that comes to mind as reliable is one’s own family and friendship network. In even other cases, we see that individuals have enough trust in the police and local bureaucracy to turn to them for help.

Trust attitudes do not appear to heavily influence political participation in my citizen samples in Indonesia. Among my respondents in Surabaya, those who expressed trust in a greater number of political objects appear to vote with greater frequency than those whose trust is more mixed. Indeed, one 30-year old food-stall vendor in Surabaya who has never voted in an election described that, “I have not voted, because I don’t have trust [in the political system]. And now I still don’t vote.” A similar dynamic does not bear out in Medan, however, where trust levels among regular voters and those who vote with less frequency are the same. Individuals in both cities who engage in non-voting participation express a variety of views about trust, from full
trust to no trust. There is no indication that those with higher trust have higher rates of engagement in conventional acts or that distrust breeds contentious participation. Several of the individuals who have engaged in non-voting political participation, however, are able to identify aspects of the political system that they do not trust, whether the DPR or certain political leaders.

Establishing clear connections between trust and non-voting participation in Indonesia is difficult because trust in different political objects varies considerably within the same individual. The average Indonesian in my sample trusts the president, but might express less trust in other political objects. These complex interactions bear out in the statistical analyses that test trust as a predictor of non-voting participation in chapter 4.

Russia: Distrust in the State Duma, Trust in Putin

Similar to the diversity of views shared among Indonesians, attitudes about trust in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk, Russia are also mixed. One main difference between Russian and Indonesian respondents, however, is that several respondents in both Russian cities showed explicit distrust in specific institutions, such as the State Duma, regional legislature, and political parties. Indeed, on the whole, the State Duma is the political object that enjoys the least amount of trust among my Russian respondents. A 48-year old Tatar woman in Kazan considers the State Duma “empty space,” voicing a view of its deputies shared by many other respondents: “They speak and speak, but they don’t do their job. They are just talk.” A second category of citizens expressed trust specifically in Putin and/or their governor, as well as trust in some political institutions such as the State Duma. Another common trend among respondents in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk is to trust Putin, but not trust the State Duma or the regional legislature. A final pattern that was evident in Krasnoyarsk, but less so in Kazan, is to trust specific legislators in either the State Duma or the regional legislature, but not to trust political parties.

A couple of respondents expressed an entirely different view of trust. When asked if he trusted the State Duma, a 56-year old Russian man in Krasnoyarsk responded, “Trust them or not, they do what they want.” This remark reveals the disdain that many of my respondents feel for the State Duma, but also suggests that the speaker sees trust as irrelevant to how deputies govern. Another 41-year old woman who works as a university administrator expressed an almost opposite view noting, “I should trust my state.” In this instance, trust is not a trait that is earned, but granted by virtue of one’s position.

Some Russian respondents spoke about how their trust in the political system had evolved and changed over time. For some individuals, the 1993 shooting on the White House, in which the popularly-elected legislature had barricaded itself, was a turning point. A 64-year old Russian woman in Kazan recalled shock and awe at the “full destruction” Yeltsin had imposed. “Who gave them that right?” she asked, still in disbelief that violence had been ordered by one branch of government against another. Other individuals saw the 1996 reelection of Yeltsin—whose popularity rating in the winter before the election was in the single digits—as evidence that their political system was not governed by the fair and free elections promised at the onset of democratization.\(^4\) A 45-year old Russian man in Kazan recalled that he lost trust in elections at this time, noting that not a single person he knew had voted for Yeltsin, but Yeltsin still won. Once it became clear that the elections were deceitful, he lost trust in them.

Although the citizens I interviewed in both Kazan and Krasnoyarsk exhibit a wide range of views about political trust, there are several clear trends. First, similar to Indonesia, the institution that is least likely to earn respondents’ trust is the legislature, both the national and

\(^4\) An excellent table of presidential popularity ratings in Russia from 1991-2008 can be viewed in Treisman (2011).
regional. Second, people are more likely to place trust in specific individuals—usually executives, but also specific representatives—rather than in institutions. Former President Putin generally held a high place of trust among respondents. Citizens in Kazan also placed considerable trust in their governor, Mintimer Shaimiev. Lastly, similar to the dynamics observed among Indonesian respondents, trust levels among respondents in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk closely overlap with how these individuals evaluate the performance of specific incumbents. Other scholars have reported similar findings in Russia. A recent study of presidential evaluations by Treisman finds that presidential approval in Russia is closely linked to perceptions of economic performance (Treisman, 2011).

Respondents in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk did exhibit some differences with regard to the question about where they would turn to for help if their rights had been violated. In Kazan, six individuals out of 19 did not know where they would turn to for help, and two individuals said that there would be nowhere to go. Three responded that they would appeal to a political leader (the president or local officials), and three would seek the help of the justice system. One would appeal to specific state organs, another to the police, and a third to her family. Two mentioned that they would seek help from their employer. Using this measure, we see some support for trust in the political system or aspects of the state. Most surprisingly, perhaps, is that just as many individuals said that they would use the courts as would appeal to political leaders. Nevertheless, the most common response from Kazan respondents was that they did not know where they would turn if their rights were violated.

In contrast, residents in Krasnoyarsk were generally able to identify where they would turn for help. Among the 20 respondents who answered this question, only two said that there was nowhere they would go, and none said that they did not know where to turn. The most common response (six respondents) is turning to the justice system, either via the court, a lawyer, or the procurator. Three individuals said that they would apply to public officials, including the mayor and local deputies. Two would seek help from friends or family, and another two said that they would go to the police. Three other individuals said that they would appeal to a civic organization, and one said he would go to a TV station. These different responses do not necessarily indicate that Krasnoyarsk respondents have higher levels of political trust than those in Kazan—similar numbers in both cities expressed willingness to appeal to political authorities. Respondents in Krasnoyarsk, however, offer a larger number and broader range of trust objects, including non-state civic organizations. As stated elsewhere, with numbers as small as these, it is impossible to say that residents in Kazan are more alienated than their counterparts in Krasnoyarsk. Collectively, however, it appears as though Russians display only modest trust in political objects, but surprisingly higher trust in the judicial system.

Does political trust influence political participation among my Russian respondents? On the whole, respondents in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk who expressed trust in a larger number of political objects tended to vote in elections with greater frequency than those who exhibited lower levels of trust. Respondents who did not express trust in any part of the political system, in particular, appear to vote with less frequency than those who trust some individuals or offices. The relationship between trust and non-voting political participation is more opaque. Generally speaking, individuals who engaged in some form of non-voting participation express less trust in political objects than those who have not participated. Yet, curiously, there do not appear to be any clear patterns with regard to whether the type of participation is conventional or contentious. Individuals who show no trust in political objects have campaigned, signed petitions, demonstrated, and contacted public officials. My citizen samples do not provide evidence for the
view that low levels of trust lead only to contentious acts. They do, however, provide support for a broader counter-claim: more trusting individuals are less likely to participate in non-voting acts. It is important, though, to remember that participation and trust may be reciprocally related: individuals participate, are dissatisfied with the results, and consequently their trust in institutions declines.

My open-ended interviews with a quota sample of the population in two Indonesian and two Russian cities reveal several useful pieces of information about political trust in countries that have experienced a democratic transition. First, citizens in all four of the cities I examine attach trust to specific leaders, not abstract institutions. Second, their views about trust overlap almost entirely with their evaluations of the political system and their quality of life when specific presidents held office. Third, the political object that is subject to the highest amount of criticism—and the least amount of trust—in both countries is the national legislature. Lastly, attitudes about trust do not appear to affect political participation in clearly predictable ways. These dynamics are observed in both Russia and Indonesia. Yet, there is one difference in trust between these two countries revealed in my citizen samples: Indonesians, on the whole, are more trusting in political objects than Russians. Only one of my Indonesian respondents could be categorized as distrustful of most political leaders and institutions. In contrast, a sizeable group of Russians expressed no trust in any political objects—leaders or institutions. As the next section will demonstrate, this distinction bears out in the survey data as well.

**TRUST IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN INDONESIA AND RUSSIA**

*Cross-National Survey Analysis*

As the analysis of my open-ended interviews with Russian and Indonesian citizens shows, most individuals in these countries call to mind specific incumbents when asked about abstract institutions, such as the presidency or legislature. Nevertheless, most public opinion surveys ask about institutions, not individuals. Careful analysis of these questions can help us to gauge overall levels of trust in different political objects in both countries, compare levels of trust between the countries, examine change in trust over time, and also place Indonesian and Russian trust levels in a broader cross-national framework.

The World Values Survey (WVS) has asked questions about trust in several political institutions in both Russia and Indonesia in the two most recent survey waves (1999-2004 and 2005-2008). The question is worded as follows: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” Respondents are then read a list of several types of institutions, including societal, state, and political institutions. There are three types of institutions that clearly relate to the operation and organization of politics in a country: parliament, the government, and political parties. Table 7.1 compares responses from Russian and Indonesian respondents together with averages from all respondents in the respective WVS waves. The left-hand side of the table compares the Fifth

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5 While most studies in English use the word “trust,” in general “confidence” and “trust” are thought to be largely interchangeable with regard to political institutions.

6 World Values Survey, Integrated Questionnaire numbers E075, E079, and E080. Political parties can be thought of as both a form of civil society and a political institution. In the domain of civil society, political parties are based on voluntary membership and aggregate public interests. To the extent that political parties serve a role in fielding candidates for public office and organizing elected representatives in office, however, they are a political institution.
Wave data (2005-2008) and the right hand side of the table compares the Fourth Wave data (1999-2004). In each section of the table, the first column provides the percentages from all respondents, the second column looks at respondents from Russia, and the third column looks at respondents from Indonesia.

Table 7.1: Trust in Political Institutions (WVS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Percentages for all WVS respondents (Wave 5) (%)</th>
<th>Indonesia (2006) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (2006) (%)</th>
<th>Percentages for all WVS respondents (Wave 4) (%)</th>
<th>Indonesia (2001) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (1999) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N = 64,452</td>
<td></td>
<td>N = 1,880</td>
<td>N = 1,836</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N = 66,686</td>
<td></td>
<td>N = 1,934</td>
<td>N = 1,927</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N = 64,499</td>
<td></td>
<td>N = 1,900</td>
<td>N = 1,901</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1 allows us to make several comparisons. We can compare levels of trust between Indonesia, Russia, and all WVS respondents for a specific institution. We can compare levels of trust for different institutions, and we can compare change over time for levels of trust in the same country.

In Indonesia, Russia, and the WVS as a whole, the Fifth Wave survey results show that trust in government is higher than trust in parliament or in political parties. On the whole, 11 percent of Indonesians have “quite a lot” and almost 45 percent have “a great deal” of trust in government. If we take these two responses together, Indonesians’ trust in government is higher than the WVS average by about 8 percentage points. Among Russians, about 6 percent have “quite a lot” and 39 percent have “a great deal” of trust in the government, which is slightly lower than the WVS average.

What about other institutions? Trust in parliament is higher in Indonesia than in Russia, but both countries are below the WVS average. Trust in political parties is higher in Indonesia than in Russia. If we look at the two highest trust levels—“quite a lot” and “a great deal”—together, we see that Indonesians’ trust in political parties is a bit higher than the WVS average. Russians’ trust, by contrast, is quite a bit lower than the global average.

The following two sections will look at the WVS survey data together with trust indicators from the East Asian Barometer (EAB) and the Russian Election Study (RES) to establish a more comprehensive picture of political trust in Indonesia and Russia.
**Indonesia: High Trust in Political Institutions**

If we compare results between the Fourth and Fifth waves of the WVS (Table 7.1), Indonesian trust in parliament and political parties, on the whole, declined between 2001 and 2006, while trust in government increased. It is worth considering what was happening to these institutions during this interval. In the period between 2001 and 2006, Indonesians experienced parliamentary elections in April 2004, as well as the country’s first direct elections for the presidency in July and September 2004. As a result of the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)—lost 44 seats and its plurality in the DPR. Golkar became the party with the largest parliamentary representation. As discussed in the previous chapter, in the 2004 presidential election SBY emerged victorious over incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri. It would be imprudent to suggest that the WVS data imply a decline in Indonesian trust for regime institutions. Given the connection between incumbent evaluation and trust indicators observed in my citizen interviews, it is highly plausible that Indonesians were responding to their evaluation of the changes in government and the parliament that occurred between 2001 and 2006.

To establish a more complete picture of trust in political institutions in Indonesia, it is useful to also consider the questions on trust asked in the EAB. The EAB asks: “I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or none at all?” Respondents were asked about the presidency, the national government, the DPR, and the regional government. Results are displayed in Table 7.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Institution</th>
<th>Great deal of trust</th>
<th>Quite a lot of trust</th>
<th>Not very much trust</th>
<th>No trust at all</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National government</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Government</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1,563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The EAB was conducted in Indonesia in 2006, the same year as the WVS, yet the two countries show considerably different results with regard to trust in the national government and the parliament. The term “parliament” was translated differently in the two surveys, which may explain some differences in the results. Both surveys, however, translated “national government” identically (pemerintah pusat). The EAB reports significantly higher levels of trust than the WVS. For all four political objects mentioned, the majority of Indonesian respondents in the EAB expressed “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of trust. In the WVS (Table 7.1), a majority of Indonesians expressed “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of trust in the government, but not the parliament.

It is impossible to say which survey provides a more accurate reflection of Indonesians’ levels of political trust in 2006. We might want to consider the WVS results a lower bound and the EAB results an upper bound of actual opinion. If so, we can still say that Indonesian levels of trust in political institutions are generally higher than the WVS global average (with the

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7 EAB Questions QII07, Q008, Q010, and Q014.
8 While the EAB used the specific name of the Indonesian parliament, Dewan Perwakilan Pusat (DPR), the WVS simply translated this item as the more general parlamen.
exception of trust in parliament in 2006) and higher than the Russian average. It also appears that, on the whole, Indonesians are more inclined to trust than distrust political institutions.

Russia: Trust in Institutions Rebounds with Putin
Because the WVS has been conducted four times in Russia since 1990, a larger volume of data on trust in institutions exists for Russia than Indonesia. Table 7.3 provides comparisons of confidence in political institutions for all four waves of the WVS. Parliament is the only institution for which we have trust measures spanning all four waves. The data tell us that in 1990, just as the Soviet Union began its first steps at political liberalization, a larger percentage of the population had “not very much” or no trust at all in parliament than had “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of trust. Trust in parliament declined between 1990 and 1995, and dropped even further by 1999. In 1999, 41 percent of the Russian population had no trust at all in parliament, and nearly 39 percent had “not very much” trust in parliament, which is about 20 percentage points higher than the WVS average and the analogous mistrust levels in Indonesia. By 2006, however, Russian confidence in parliament had improved substantially even though levels were still below the WVS average.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990 (%)</th>
<th>1995 (%)</th>
<th>1999 (%)</th>
<th>2006 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parliament</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see a similar dynamic if we look at trends for trust in government and political parties. Levels of trust in the government improved between 1995 and 2006, even though almost 55 percent of Russians in 2006 expressed little or no trust in the government. Curiously, trust in Russian political parties was at its peak in 1990—when Russians’ practice with parties was limited primarily to their experience with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). By 2006, confidence in parties had increased over 1995 levels, but the majority of Russians continue to have little or no trust in political parties.

Taken together, what do these three measures tell us about trust in political institutions in Russia? On the whole, trust is low across the board. Variation over time tells us that trust was at its highest in the late Soviet period and lowest in the 1990s. By 2006, however, trust in all three institutions had improved over what we observed in the mid-late 1990s.
The 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 RES also asks several questions about trust in political objects.\footnote{Russian Election Study 1995-1996, post-Duma election questionnaire, question 25 and Russian Election Study 1999-2000, post-Duma election questionnaire, question 90.} The results are displayed in Table 7.4. Across all four objects repeated in both RES surveys—the government of Russia, the regional administration, the local administration, and the president of Russia—the percentage of respondents who “fully trust” or “trust” the object of interest increased between 1995-1996 and 1999-2000. Among these four objects, the most dramatic rise came from trust in the government. In 1995-1996, only 43 percent of respondents fully trusted or trusted the government, but by 1999-2000 this figure had jumped to 57 percent. If we look at differences in trust between the political objects offered in the RES, we see that Russians in 1995-1996 had the greatest levels of trust in their local administrations, and the lowest levels of trust in the president of Russia (at the time, Yeltsin). In 1999-2000, respondents displayed the highest level of trust in the government of Russia and the lowest level of trust in political parties.

Table 7.4: Trust in Political Institutions in Russia 1995-2000 (RES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fully Trust</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Mistrust</th>
<th>Completely Mistrust</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996 Government of Russia</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>2,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996 Regional administration</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000 Regional administration</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996 Local administration</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000 Local administration</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996 President of Russia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>2,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000 President of Russia</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>1,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996 Parliament of Russia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>2,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000 Political parties</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>1,478</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is useful to consider both the WVS and RES statistics in light of the political environment Russians were living through during the different survey periods. In particular, we should examine Russia’s experience with parliamentary elections and the types of parties that enjoyed public support, which ultimately determined the composition of the parliament. As discussed in chapter 2, in March 1990 Russian voters elected the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), which was a republican version of the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies elected in 1989. While independents could compete in these elections (in which they won 14 percent of seats), the only political party with the formal right to compete was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). After a long standoff, then President Yeltsin ordered military force to disband the Congress in October 1993. In December 1993 Russian voters elected a new parliament—the State Duma—and adopted a new Russian Constitution. According to the new Constitution, State Duma elections would be held in December 1995 and then occur at regular four-year intervals.

Thus, by 1995 the Russian population had experienced two rounds of competitive elections to parliament and one violent episode in which a popularly elected parliament was removed from office by force. By 2006, the population had witnessed three additional competitive elections to parliament that took place in 1995, 1999, and 2003.

The composition of the parliament changed dramatically between 1993 and 2003. In the 1993 State Duma, independents and representatives from parties who defy ideological
categorization comprised the plurality of deputies (41 percent), followed by representatives from reform parties (26 percent), communist-leaning parties (18 percent), and nationalist parties (14 percent). In 1995, representatives from communist-leaning parties had the plurality of seats (42 percent), followed by independents (17 percent), and small clusters of reformists, pro-government representatives, and nationalists (about 13-14 percent of seats each) (Belin & Orttung, 1997, pp. 114-118). By 1995 the Russian electorate had moved to the left and popular support for candidates from reformist parties had declined by half.

Both the WVS and the RES asked about trust in the government and parliament in 1995-1996. If we compare results specifically for these institutions (displayed in Tables 7.3 and 7.4), we find that the RES data tend to show higher levels of trust than the WVS data. These differences may, in part, be a consequence of the fact that Russia held parliamentary elections in December 1995 and thus the WVS respondents were evaluating a different parliament than the RES respondents were evaluating.

The 1999 and 2003 elections showed yet another shift in electoral support, away from left-leaning parties and towards representatives of pro-government parties and coalitions. By 2003, 62 percent of representatives belonged to a party that was part of a pro-government coalition, while only 12 percent of deputies were from communist-leaning parties, 8 percent from nationalist parties, and less than 2 percent from reform parties. If we consider changes in trust levels together with the composition of the State Duma, according to the WVS, Russians’ trust in parliament first declined when independents and reformists held the plurality, dropped further when left-leaning parties held greater sway, and finally rebounded once pro-government parties took a majority of seats in the parliament. Thus, it appears that Russians have been the most satisfied with the parliaments that are dominated by pro-government representatives. Such parliaments emerged in 1999 and have continued apace up to the present. The pro-government position such parliaments take, however, has not been favorable to democracy’s survival. Rather, as outlined in chapter 2, since the early 2000s, the State Duma has provided consistent support for rolling back democratic institutions under President Putin.

The relationship between levels of trust and sitting incumbents in Russia is also apparent when we evaluate responses to the RES question about trust in the president of Russia according to the officeholder. The trust questions in the 1999-2000 RES were asked in interviews administered between December 25, 1999 and January 25, 2000. Then Russian President Yeltsin announced his resignation on December 31, 1999. Of the 1,636 respondents for which we have valid responses on trust in the president of Russia, 121 were interviewed when Yeltsin was still president, and 1,515 were interviewed when Putin was acting president. Table 7.5 displays trust levels for these two groups.

The differences in trust measures depending on who is the sitting president are considerable. While not a single respondent interviewed when Yeltsin was president fully trusted the president, and only 22 percent trusted the president, once Putin took office, nearly 42 percent of respondents expressed trust or full trust in the president. Moreover, the percentage of

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10 These statistics are based on my own categorization of parties. “Pro-government” parties include United Russia, the Rodina coalition, the coalition of the Russian Pensioners’ Party and the Russian Social Justice Party, the coalition of the Party of Russia’s Rebirth and the Russian Party of Life, and the People’s Party of the Russian Federation. “Communist-leaning” parties include the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Agrarian Party. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia is the only “nationalist” party, and Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces are the two “reformist” parties.
respondents who completely mistrusted the president dropped by half once Putin became acting president.

Table 7.5: Trust in the Russian President by Incumbent (RES 1995-1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interviewed when Yeltsin was President (N = 121)</th>
<th>Interviewed when Putin was acting President (N = 1,515)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully Trust</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistrust</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely Mistrust</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken together, the measures of trust provided in the WVS and RES data point to two findings. First, trust in political institutions appears to have dropped considerably in the 1990s and rebounded by the end of the decade and into the 21st century. Second, when compared against historical events, it appears as though trust in institutions may reflect evaluations of incumbents presiding in those specific institutions. When we consider these two findings together with the content of Russian politics during the periods when surveys were conducted, a clear pattern emerges: Russians’ political trust increased once Putin and pro-Putin legislators came to power. These agents, and the policies they have produced, helped contribute to the demise of democracy in Russia.

On the whole, regardless of the surveys used to construct measures—the WVS, the EAB, or the RES, it appears as though Russians have lower levels of political trust than Indonesians. Moreover, Indonesian levels of political trust have not decreased dramatically over the course of democratization. In fact, as my citizen interviews testify, Indonesians have high levels of trust in the SBY—a political leader who has acted in accordance with democratic norms and has continued to uphold democratic institutions put in place before his election in 2004. Ultimately, the most significant way that political trust has influenced the survival of democracy in Russia and Indonesia has been through the trust that citizens in these respective countries have placed in specific political leaders. Namely, Russians have trusted political leaders who have stripped back democratic institutions, while Indonesians trust leaders who promote them. In this respect, trust in political leaders is perhaps a more random variable than the other independent variables investigated in this study. Is there any way to necessarily predict that Russians would trust the authoritarian Putin while Indonesians would trust the pro-democracy SBY? The final section of this chapter will trace out how trust in specific leaders and the policies they promote have contributed to democracy’s demise in Russia and its survival in Indonesia using an example at the core of democracy: the expansion and contraction of elections.

EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA AND RUSSIA

Elections as Indicators of Democracy’s Survival
As the first chapter of this dissertation describes in detail, the presence of elections alone is not sufficient to proclaim a political regime democratic. Yet, elections are a necessary condition of democracy and their expansion and contraction are clear benchmarks that we can look at for determining whether a regime is becoming more or less democratic. In the years since their initial democratic transitions, Indonesia and Russia have exhibited wildly different policies toward elections. Barriers to entry in Russian elections for the State Duma and presidency have increased, elections for gubernatorial offices have been cancelled, and elections for local
government have stagnated. In contrast, Indonesia has dramatically revised the electoral rules for entrance to the DPR, reformed the presidential election system to provide direct elections for the presidency, and has expanded elections to determine access to power for regional and local executives.

My open ended interviews show that, in abstract terms, both Russians and Indonesians are generally supportive of elections to determine access to power. Yet, the populations of these two countries have responded differently when presented with the threat of lost elections. As the following two sections will show, Russians accepted the cancellation of gubernatorial elections with indifference, while Indonesians responded to the 1999 presidential election controversy with a demand for direct elections.

What explains these differences? Are Russians simply less supportive of democracy than Indonesians? The WVS can help us investigate this hypothesis. The survey includes four items that aim to assess support for different forms of political regimes, asking: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?” Respondents are asked to evaluate: “a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”; “having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country”; “having the army rule”; and “having a democratic political system.”

In order to assess people’s orientation toward democracy in relation to other regime types, I created an index of the four response items that includes support for democracy together with rejection of non-democratic alternatives. The index reverses the direction of responses for the “democratic system” and averages across all responses, resulting in a measure ranging from 1-4, in which 1 indicates least support for democracy and most support for non-democratic alternatives and 4 represents highest support for democracy and lowest support for non-democratic alternatives. Table 7.6 shows scores on the democracy support index for all respondents in the WVS, Indonesia, and Russia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.6: Mean Scores on Democracy Support Index</th>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<td>Democracy support index</td>
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As Table 7.6 demonstrates, both Indonesia and Russia have scores on the democracy support index that are lower than the WVS average. It is worth bearing in mind that a significant number of individuals polled in the WVS come from advanced democracies that have had no real life experience with non-democratic regime types. If we compare only the Indonesian and Russian averages, we see that Russians have a slightly higher score of democracy support than

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11 The data set investigated in Table 7.6 merges cases from the Fourth Wave (1999-2004) and Fifth Wave (2005-2008) of the WVS. Thirty-three cases from the Fourth Wave survey were combined with fifty cases from the Fifth Wave for a total of 83 countries. The Fourth Wave data were downloaded in July 2008 and the Fifth Wave data were downloaded in February 2009. Question numbers E114-E117 from the WVS Integrated Questionnaire.

12 A person with a score of “1” views having a strong leader, experts decide, and military rule all as “very good” forms of government and having a democratic system as a “very bad” way of governing. A respondent with a score of “4” views these non-democratic alternatives as “very bad” and considers a democratic system as “very good.” Individuals with scores between these two endpoints offer mixed evaluations, some in a more pro-democratic direction and others in a more antidemocratic direction. Russell J. Dalton and Nhu-Ngoc T. Ong (2005) first used this index.
Indonesians. Conversations about democracy that emerged during citizen interviews confirm these observations. On the whole, I did not find that Russians were less supportive of democracy in principle than Indonesians. A majority of my citizen respondents in both Indonesia and Russia told me that they thought democracy was the best system of government for their countries.

Different levels of support for democratic principles cannot explain why Russians have been less supportive of defending elections than Indonesians. Rather, I argue, a key factor in these different responses is the behavior of trusted political leaders. Russians have placed considerable trust in political leaders who have emasculated democratic institutions, while Indonesians have tended to trust political leaders who adhere to democratic norms and practices.

**Indonesia: Supportive of Electoral Expansion**

Indonesians have shown strong support for the expansion of elections in their country. Moreover, the political leaders in whom Indonesians have placed considerable trust have undertaken and upheld the electoral reforms that are a central feature of Indonesia’s democratic survival. Reforms undertaken in 1999-2001 significantly increased the number of political offices allocated via election, as well as introduced direct, rather than two-tier voting for the presidency. The movement to direct elections was not an initial component of the country’s democratization. The first post-Suharto presidential elections, held in October 1999, followed the standard procedure of earlier elections, in which the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) elected the president from among its ranks. The 1999-2004 MPR was comprised of the 500 deputies elected to the DPR in the first fair and free elections since 1955, and 200 appointed members from the provinces and various social groups. The controversy that erupted during these elections, however, set the stage for public demands to directly elect the president.

As discussed in previous chapters, the first post-Suharto national parliamentary election in 1999 gave the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDI-P), headed by Megawati, a plurality, but not a majority of seats. Since PDI-P had the largest vote share among competitors (34 percent), the party’s supporters expected that Megawati would be elected president by the MPR. Her primary rival for the election was incumbent President B.J. Habibie from Golkar. Yet, a coalition of smaller parties, spearheaded by leader of the National Mandate Party (PAN) Amien Rais, began to promote Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of the National Awakening Party (PKB) as an alternative to both Megawati’s and Habibie’s candidacies. When Habibie’s candidacy collapsed and Golkar was left without a suitable alternative candidate, the party’s representatives threw their support behind Wahid. Consequently, Wahid, whose PKB won only 13 percent of the vote in the DPR election, became president, while Megawati was subsequently elected vice president.

Public outrage over the election outcome erupted in violence in Jakarta, Solo, and Bali, as well as mass protests in Habibie’s home province of South Sulawesi (Thompson, 1999). Indonesian citizens were frustrated by the deal that brought Wahid to the presidency in place of Megawati, providing strong support for reforming the indirect system of presidential elections. A public opinion poll conducted in 1999 asked two questions directly related to the presidential controversy (Center for the Study of Development and Democracy, 1999, pp. 7-8). The first question asks, “Must the president come from the party that won the elections?” The majority of respondents, 51.7 percent, answered that the president should come from the winning party; 37.2 percent of respondents did not view this as necessary; and 11.1 percent of respondents did not know. The second question is, “Do you agree or disagree if the president is directly elected?”
The majority of respondents, 53.0 percent, agreed with direct elections for the presidency, while 30.4 percent disagreed and 16.6 percent did not know.

Support for direct elections to the presidency increased over time. In 2000, 67 percent of Indonesians supported direct elections for the presidency, and by 2002 this figure had climbed to nearly 80 percent (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2002; Konsorsium Lembaga Pengumpul Pendapat Umum, 2000; LP3ES, 2002 ). In August 2002, with Megawati as president, the MPR amended the Indonesian constitution to allow for direct presidential elections. At the time of the constitutional amendment, Megawati was expected to easily win re-election.

A public opinion poll in 2003 asked Indonesians’ to evaluate the importance of elections when compared against funding for development goals. The survey asks, “The upcoming 2004 elections are estimated to cost approximately four trillion [rupiah]. Do you agree or disagree if these funds are put towards development and the 2004 elections are cancelled?” Fifty percent of respondents disagreed with the proposition of canceling elections, while 25 percent agreed and 25 percent did not know or did not answer the question (Center for the Study of Development and Democracy, 2003, p. 8). For half of Indonesians, the importance of elections—in which the incumbent president was expected to win a second term—was greater than more immediate development needs.

Public support for direct elections to determine governors and local executives, who were appointed during Suharto’s New Order, has also been strong. In 2000, 66 percent of Indonesians wanted direct elections for district and regional executives (Konsorsium Lembaga Pengumpul Pendapat Umum, 2000). Laws planning for these elections were passed in 2001, the elections were gradually introduced starting in 2005, and by January 2009, 87.1 percent of Indonesians agreed or strongly agreed with direct elections for regional and local executives (LP3ES, 2009, p. 37). Polls conducted in Indonesia by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems between 2001 and 2005 show that an increasingly larger percent of Indonesians believe that residents of their local community have greater control over the actions taken by local government since the implementation of regional autonomy reforms, which include fiscal and administrative decentralization as well as direct elections for regional and local executives (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2005, p. 48).

My open-ended interviews with Indonesian citizens validate the trends observed in the survey data. In the 45 interviews in which we discussed the topic, 39 respondents favored direct election for executive and legislative offices. While critical of how regional autonomy reforms are being carried out, on the whole respondents support elections for local and regional executives and have come to view direct elections for the presidency as a fundamental political right. Moreover, I found that for most of my interlocutors, direct elections for political leaders are an integral component of their understanding of democracy.

Indonesians’ resolve to extend and preserve direct elections stands in stark contrast to Russians’ general indifference over the cancellation of gubernatorial elections in 2004. Yet, the public’s reaction to expand or abolish elections in these two countries shares a common relationship to trust in political leaders. As the section below will describe, Russians’ support of Putin’s policies and trust in his political decisions outstripped their own sense of preferences for democracy in the abstract. In the case of Indonesia, support for Megawati as a presidential candidate in 1999 propelled public demands for a more directly democratic system. Megawati then used that public trust to push for legislation that deepened democracy by extending direct elections. When she lost these direct elections in 2004, she peacefully left office. Her successor,
SBY, who continues to enjoy high levels of public trust, has implemented the reforms to expand local and regional elections.

**Russia: Supportive of Elections in Principle, Indifferent in Practice**

In September 2004 following a hostage crisis in a school in the town of Beslan, North Ossetia, then Russian President Putin announced a further restructuring of the political system, which he argued was necessary to strengthen regional development and ensure the safety of Russian citizens. One reform announced at this time was the abolition of gubernatorial elections in place of presidential appointments of regional executives, who would then be confirmed by regional legislatures. At the time, the Kremlin argued that it was necessary to have federally-appointed regional executives since corruption and greed had penetrated regional governments to such an extent that state security was at risk (Hill, 2005). Even if such a claim was indeed true, abolishing elections in favor of executive appointments is a clear example of democracy being reduced in Russia, rather than expanded.

Shortly after Putin announced the cancellation of gubernatorial elections, the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) asked the following question on a national public opinion survey, “Do you agree that in order to guarantee the unity of the state it is necessary to cancel the election of governors by popular vote?” Table 7.7 displays responses to this question.

| Table 7.7: Is it Necessary to Cancel Gubernatorial Elections? |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|
| Fully agree/mostly agree        | 38.0%              |
| Fully disagree/mostly disagree  | 48.7%              |
| Difficult to say                | 13.4%              |

N = 1,600
All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center, September 15, 2004

As Table 7.7 shows, nearly half of the Russian population disagreed with the decision to cancel gubernatorial elections. Less than 40 percent supported Putin’s decree. Yet, to my knowledge, not a single mass protest against the decision was carried out in any Russian regions. While supportive of gubernatorial elections in principle, in practice Russians have been hesitant to demand them.

This claim bears out in my interview data as well. In my interviews with Russian citizens in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk, I first asked individuals whether offices of executive and legislative power should be determined by appointment or election. After learning the respondent’s answer, I would then ask specifically for their opinion about Putin’s 2004 decision to cancel gubernatorial elections. Responses to these two questions proved illuminating.

On the whole, with only a few exceptions, respondents are supportive of popular elections for executive and legislative offices. Yet, only a few respondents thought it was wrong to cancel the gubernatorial elections. Among the 35 interviews in Kazan and Krasnoyarsk in which this topic was discussed, only 10 respondents (five in each city) were critical of Putin’s decision.

Eleven respondents, in contrast, supported the move. In several such instances, respondents suggested that perhaps the president was in a better position than the people to decide who should govern them. Some noted that Putin was more knowledgeable about potential candidates’ qualifications. For example, one 59-year old female Russian pensioner in Kazan first agreed that executives should be elected, but then expressed her support for the abolition of

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13 Survey results accessed from VTsIOM website (http://wciom.ru/) on April 10, 2011.
gubernatorial elections noting, “This was correct. Putin knows who to appoint.” A similar view was shared by a 75-year old retired Tatar Soviet military officer in Kazan, who suggested, “It is good if they [governors] are elected by the people, but people do not always know who is good to vote for.” A 59-year old female social worker in Krasnoyarsk thought it would be best if the president appointed the governor and the legislature approved the appointment, noting, “The people don’t know who to elect.” A 56-year old Russian laborer in Krasnoyarsk thought that appointing governors was better than electing them for reasons of accountability. If governors are appointed, he noted, they can be removed. For this respondent, elections do not appear to be a sufficient form of accountability for officials.

Other respondents expressed indifference about the cancellation of gubernatorial elections. They noted that the fact that the procedures for putting governors in office had changed was irrelevant for them since the outcome is the same—Putin had appointed the governor that was elected by popular vote. One 36-year old woman who works as a kiosk clerk in Krasnoyarsk summed up this position neatly when she asked rhetorically, “What is the difference?”

A final group of respondents had a harder time determining their opinion about the cancellation of gubernatorial elections. These individuals supported elections for political office in principle. Yet, their ideological convictions came into conflict with pragmatic considerations about the state of elections in Russia. For example, a 30-year old Russian man who owns his own auto repair business suggested that perhaps it makes sense to appoint representatives when the president has a clear sense of what the people want and need and who can fulfill these needs. When the qualities of different candidates are less apparent, or the preferences of the people are unclear, he reasoned, perhaps elections are necessary. Others were even more critical of elections as a mechanism for bringing good leaders to office. A 25-year old Russian repairman in Krasnoyarsk did not necessarily support Putin’s decision, but appeared to show greater trust in him than in the electoral process: “Elections cannot always be trusted. Let it be this way [with governors appointed]. People are bought off with commercials.” A 33-year old Russian male factory worker expressed similar cynicism about elections, noting, “The people never elect anything. They vote to receive a check mark.”

Not surprisingly, attitudes about the cancellation of gubernatorial elections correlate slightly with trust attitudes. Individuals who believe that it is wrong to cancel the elections tend to have low trust in institutions, or a mixed view about trusting individuals and institutions. Those expressing indifference to the cancellation also tend to have little trust in institutions. Respondents who were supportive of Putin’s decision to cancel elections or felt that there was nothing wrong with this decision tended to have a mixed view of trust—in some cases trusting individuals but not institutions, in other cases trusting some institutions, but not others. These correlations are not perfect, but suggest that perhaps Russian attitudes both about trust and the necessity of elections for determining access to regional executive power may be reactive: individuals’ responses are formed in part based on their own experiences as observers of the regime’s political evolution and the effect that political decisions have had—or not had—on their daily lives.

14 In the time since I conducted interviews in 2008, both Tatarstan and Krasnoyarsk Krai have received new governors. Tatarstan Governor Mintimer Shaimiev retired in 2010, and Rustem Minnikhanov was appointed as his replacement. In January 2010, Russian Prime Minister Putin appointed Krasnoyarsk Governor Aleksandr Khloponin to head the new North Caucasus Federal District. President Medvedev appointed Lev Kuznetsov as Khloponin’s replacement.
Taken as a whole, the conversations I had with Russians about whether elections should determine access to power in principle, and about the cancellation of gubernatorial elections in fact, reveal several clues about the nature of political trust among Russians. First, even though most individuals support elections in principle, there was no outcry or outrage over Putin’s decision to abolish gubernatorial elections. Reactions to this decision ranged from support to cynicism, but were largely marked by indifference. In several instances, individuals’ trust in the president’s judgment outweighed their trust in elections as a mechanism for representing the people’s interest. Moreover, even in cases when individuals were not uncritical about the decision, their lack of trust in the electoral process led them to the conclusion that there was little difference between electing and appointing. This reaction relates to the second clue: Russians’ evaluation of the electoral process is not high enough for them to view the abolition of gubernatorial elections as an infringement of their rights. Third, Russians’ thinking about the decision to cancel gubernatorial elections regularly reflects a relatively short-term view of the implications of the decision. Rather than expressing concern about a curtailing of democracy, several noted that it made no difference how the governor was empowered as long as the person was the same. Additionally, those who supported Putin’s decision tended to evaluate presidential appointments with the idea that Putin would be making the decisions, with little regard for what might happen when Putin left office.

Russians’ response to the cancellation of gubernatorial elections in 2004 is evidence of mass quiescence in the face of authoritarian reversal. Low levels of political trust did not bring people to the streets or cause them to rally behind opposition leaders to preserve gubernatorial elections. Rather, the high levels of trust that the public placed in Putin contributed to their calm acceptance of this decision.

In both the Indonesian and Russian contexts, trust in political leaders is a common theme. What these specific leaders did with public trust, however, led to variation in democracy’s survival. Putin drew on the public’s trust to slowly dismantle democratic institutions. In contrast, Indonesia’s Megawati extended direct elections in accordance with popular will. The high levels of trust in SBY are, in part, a likely consequence of his continuing to carry out this will.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that Indonesians and Russians share several important similarities with regard to political trust, as well as crucial differences. First, both Indonesians and Russians tend to view objects of political trust in terms of specific officeholders, not abstract institutions. Second, trust in specific authorities appears to be highly correlated with citizens’ evaluation of their performance in office. Third, the political object that receives the highest degree of criticism—and the lowest level of trust—from both Indonesians and Russians is the national legislature. Lastly, statistical analysis provides support for the view that trust in some individuals and institutions may increase conventional participation in both countries, while distrust might contribute to contentious politics. These relationships, however, are not robust and are only weakly visible in my small citizen samples.

The similarities that Indonesians and Russians display are generally consistent with theoretical expectations of what we should see in regimes that have undergone democratization. It is commonsensical that citizens in new regimes will trust individuals more than institutions, and that performance will play a strong role in determining trust. The differences that we see, however, are outside of the realm of our standard theories of trust and support. First, Indonesians, on the whole, have higher levels of trust than Russians. This bears out both in
public opinion surveys and in my open-ended citizen interviews. Second, political trust in Indonesia has remained relatively consistent in the post-Suharto era, while political trust in Russia has been more volatile. Analysis of trust indicators over time suggest that Russians’ political trust plummeted in the mid-1990s when Yeltsin was president and reformers and communists populated the legislature, but then rebounded once Putin and his pro-government legislators took the policy reins. Finally, and most importantly, Indonesian and Russian leaders have used the public’s trust to enact different reforms that are directly relevant to the survival of democracy. While the immensely popular and trusted Putin has dismantled democratic institutions in Russia, the trusted Megawati and SBY have continued to expand elections and implement democratic reforms in Indonesia.

Trust has been used as resource by holders of political power in both Russia and Indonesia, but to different policy ends. What does trust tell us about the legitimacy of the Russian and Indonesian regimes? In Russia, it appears as though the regime’s legitimacy is based on political elites’ ability to deliver greater economic development and security. Russians are willing to part with democratic institutions, such as gubernatorial elections and a free press, in return for safety and economic growth. In Indonesia, however, the president’s legitimacy is based on winning elections. Indonesians, it appears, will not tolerate a major violation of democratic procedure for the promise of economic development.

Admittedly, the Indonesian equivalent of a President Putin has not come to office. Yet, the history of post-Suharto politics in Indonesia suggests that the population has no interest in allocating political power to an individual who would not adhere to democratic procedures and norms. While Indonesians continue to identify economic development as their most important policy concern, SBY’s popularity is not a consequence of popular economic policy, but rather has come in large part due to his very public anti-corruption efforts. A public opinion survey conducted by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems in 2005 found that respondents who were satisfied with SBY’s performance in office regularly cited non-economic reasons for their satisfaction, including the president’s efforts to curb corruption (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2005).

In writing about the process of achieving democratic legitimacy, Diamond suggests that legitimation is more than a normative commitment to the ideals of democracy, but rather requires routinized, or habituated behavior on the part of all political actors (Diamond, 1999). What we see in Indonesia is that this routinization and habituation is taking place on both the elite and mass levels. Indonesian presidents have found that they need to adhere to democratic practices to remain popular. The Indonesian public has come to expect elections to determine access to power at all levels. While they are critical of elected officeholders and not always satisfied with the choices they are presented with for public office, they do not question the legitimacy of democratic elections for determining access to power. Diamond writes:

It is the deep, unquestioned, routinized commitment to democracy and its procedures at the elite and mass levels that produces a crucial element of consolidation, a reduction in the uncertainty of democracy, regarding not so much the outcomes as the rules and methods of political competition. (1999, p. 65)

In contrast, the rules and methods of competition appear to be less important to the Russian mass public. By prioritizing outcomes over rules and methods, Russians have allowed political elites to hollow out and emasculate political institutions that held the potential to be democratic. Moreover, the non-democratic political system in Russia, which is characterized by an elite-led
oligarchy that enjoys broad public support, appears to hold a considerable amount of legitimacy among the Russian population.
Chapter 8
Conclusion: Political Participation and the Future of Democracy

The previous pages have engaged a cross-case analysis of two “outliers” in democratic theory: post-Soviet Russia and post-Suharto Indonesia. Both of these countries introduced democratic systems of government during the so-called “Third Wave” of democratization. Yet, after several years, Russia reverted to authoritarianism while Indonesia continued to deepen democracy. Our dominant theories of democratization, which privilege structural conditions such as socioeconomic development and a history of independent statehood, would predict an opposite outcome for these two cases.

In focusing on democracy’s microfoundations, I suggest considering democracy’s survival as a product of dynamic interactions between political elites and the mass public. In order to ensure that democratic institutions and practices endure over time, citizens must credibly threaten to remove leaders who do not adhere to democratic norms and/or expand democratic practices. Non-voting political participation is a key factor in communicating such a credible threat.

My analysis shows that overall volumes of non-voting political participation do not simply rise and fall with a society’s level of socioeconomic development, but rather are heavily influenced by its levels of civic engagement, perceptions of political efficacy, and political trust. Collectively, these three variables determine whether citizen attitudes and behaviors operate as a constraint on elite actions, compelling political leaders to act in accordance with democratic institutions and norms as the best strategy for remaining in power. Differences along these three variables explain why Indonesians were able to establish alternate sources of power that constrained sitting elites, while Russians were not.

In this concluding chapter, I expand upon the preceding analysis to suggest several avenues of further inquiry. First, I summarize my empirical findings. I then consider the implications of these findings for democratization theory, elaborating on the ways in which my research design and analytical framework enhance opportunities for theory building. I discuss opportunities for future research based on these findings and offer a preliminary sketch of one possible extension. Lastly, I briefly speculate on the further trajectories of Russia’s and Indonesia’s political regimes.

FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Summary of Empirical Findings
My argument is based on a triangulation of multiple methods and data sources. I analyzed existing public opinion surveys, conducted 100 open-ended interviews with a quota sample of Russian and Indonesian citizens, over 140 interviews with scholars, journalists, and representatives of political parties and mass organizations in Russia and Indonesia, and gathered information on public opinion and behavior from secondary sources. These varied pieces of evidence allowed me to develop a comprehensive picture of how political participation in Russia and Indonesia has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet and Suharto regimes and the factors that determine its contours.

In chapter 4, I demonstrated that Russian non-voting political participation has declined over the last twenty years after peaking in the late Soviet era, while Indonesian participation has remained consistently high. Survey and interview sources reveal that Russians prefer contacting
public officials over other forms of participation, while Indonesians participate through party-
development work and acts of contentious politics. Statistical analysis of responses to public
opinion surveys in both Russia and Indonesia show that civic engagement, a sense of political
efficacy, and political trust are significant predictors of non-voting political participation, even
when demographic variables such as age and educational attainment are taken into consideration.
Thus, in both Russia and Indonesia, individuals who are more civically engaged, have higher
perceptions of their own political efficacy, and display particular trust orientations, are more
likely to engage in non-voting political participation than their co-nationals who are less
involved in civic life, feel less efficacious, and exhibit different trust attitudes. Russia and
Indonesia, however, vary on the overall dispersion of these attitudes among their respective
populations, which ultimately explains why patterns of participation emerged differently in the
two countries.

First, Indonesians are more civically engaged than their Russian counterparts. Chapter 5
illustrated that Indonesians display levels of civic and social engagement that are above the
global average, while Russians have below-average levels. Moreover, Russians and Indonesians
tend to participate in different types of organizations. Russians prefer sports and recreational
activities, which provide fewer opportunities for the development and application of civic skills.
In contrast, Indonesians are active in religious, neighborhood, and student organizations, all of
which provide important training grounds for skill development. Additionally, the overall high
levels of social connectivity among Indonesians translate into greater opportunities for people to
be invited to join political acts, thereby enhancing political mobilization. Lastly, the structure and
norms of Indonesian civil society, which emphasize giving of one’s time and money for the
collective good, has served as a resource for the development and maintenance of political
parties and other intermediary organizations that facilitate greater political competition come
election time. The absence of these norms is keenly felt in Russia, and is one factor that has
contributed to the country’s weak political party system. Ultimately, the structure and norms of
Indonesian civil society, as well as the sheer volume of popular engagement, have fostered an
expansion in political participation in the post-Suharto era. An analogous phenomenon is absent
in Russia.

Second, feelings of political efficacy are more widespread among Indonesians than
Russians, particularly with regard to voting in elections. While both populations vote at high
rates, Indonesians tend to believe that taking part in elections will bring positive outcomes more
so than their Russian counterparts. Moreover, while both Indonesians and Russians tend to
select non-voting acts of political participation based on their perceived effectiveness, they view
different acts as efficacious. Russians believe contacting public officials can be influential, while
Indonesians are more likely to turn toward acts of contentious politics. These differences in
attitudes have contributed to variation in the forms of non-voting political participation that
Indonesians and Russians choose.

Third, Indonesians display consistently higher levels of trust than Russians. Political trust
in Russia, by contrast, has been much more volatile, dropping considerably in the mid-1990s, but
rebounding once Putin came to office. On the whole, the influence that political trust has on
non-voting political participation varies depending on the type of participation in question. The
statistical analysis presented in chapter 4 provides support for the view that trust in some
individuals and institutions may increase conventional types of participation in both countries,
but distrust can foster contentious political acts. The scale of contentious activities, however, is
much higher in Indonesia than in Russia. Distrust in Indonesia has engendered participation, while in Russia it has fostered alienation.

These differences in levels of civic engagement, perceptions of political efficacy, and patterns of political trust have facilitated different models of non-voting political participation in Russia and Indonesia, which have affected these countries’ political regimes over time. Because the types of political participation that constrain elites—namely party-building work and acts of contentious politics—never became widespread in Russia, elites were gradually able to roll back democratic institutions. In fact, as chapter 7 shows, high levels of trust and public support for President Putin actually served as a resource to the president for using democratic institutions to weaken political rights and civil liberties. In contrast, Indonesians’ high levels of participation through party-building and contentious politics have constrained political elites to abide by democratic institutions and practices, or face the consequences at the ballot box.

The reciprocal relationship between political efficacy and participation contributes to regime-level outcomes in two ways. First, institutions that constrain elites, such as parties and social protest, are more likely to be built when people find participation in them to be worthwhile. Because Indonesians have been more likely to view their participatory experiences in party-building and acts of contentious politics as efficacious, they are also more likely to engage in these activities more than once. The Russians I interviewed, by contrast, were less likely to see past participation in campaign and protest activities as influential, and thus were not inclined to try these activities again. Second, early experiences with participation matter. The effect that previous participatory experiences can have on subsequent efficacy attitudes places a premium on individuals’ early experiences with democratic elections. As the Russian cross-regional analysis in chapter 6 shows, when post-authoritarian voters experience competitive elections that unseat an incumbent, they are more likely to see a meaningful distinction between authoritarian and democratic elections, thereby raising their sense of efficacy. In this respect, my findings shed new light on the importance of early electoral outcomes for shaping an electorate’s sense of efficacy.

**Contributions to Democratization Theory**

In this study, I have argued that democratic regimes survive when elites are prevented from becoming too powerful, and certain types of non-voting participation activities build institutions that constrain elites better than others. These findings contribute to the study of democratization in the following ways. First, my research adds to theory about the factors that determine regime trajectories after initial democratic elections. Our existing theories of democracy do not adequately account for the empirical variation we see in regime trajectories after a democratic transition has occurred. I offer such an explanation in this project. The findings presented here highlight how the period after a democratic transition serves as a crucial interlude that shapes democracy’s further survival. While much scholarly attention has been devoted to the outcomes of initial elections, I find that the intervals between subsequent elections constitute critical periods during which political elites have incentives to prevent the enactment of democratic reforms that could make it harder for them to retain power. Under such circumstances, there is a functional need for mass political participation to expand in ways that will compel elites to abide by democratic practices and enact further democratic reforms in order to maintain public support.

Moreover, these findings indicate a clear role for the mass public in the early years of regime-building. I expand our understanding of how political participation facilitates democratic survival by identifying key participatory behaviors that can constrain political elites in nascent
democratic regimes. My analysis shows that elites and citizens continue to play an essential role in guaranteeing democracy’s survival even after new democratic institutions have been established. Getting the institutions “right” is not necessarily sufficient to ensure that democracy will survive into the future—the population needs to prevent political elites from manipulating the institutions for short-term gains. While research on longstanding democracies emphasizes the importance of public support and civic engagement in maintaining these regimes over time (Easton, 1975; Lipset, 1960), variables involving the mass public do not figure significantly in existing theories of authoritarian backsliding or democratic survival. In introducing the role of the mass public into our discussion of democratization, I am helping to establish a dialogue between the factors that facilitate democracy’s survival in the early years after transition and those that help to maintain it once the regime has been secured as “the only game in town.”

I also introduce non-voting political participation as an omitted variable in our models of democratization. In particular, I find that specific forms of non-voting political participation, namely campaigning, political party development work, and acts of contentious politics, can constrain elites in a manner that promotes the perpetuation and expansion of fair and free elections and protects civil liberties. When sustained and ongoing non-voting political participation in such elite-constraining activities is absent, political leaders have greater leeway to manipulate democratic institutions and roll back political rights and liberties to such an extent that opposition can no longer conceivably launch a credible threat to the existing order. There is great potential for operationalizing non-voting political participation because it can easily be measured and compared across cases. The study of public opinion has dramatically increased in all corners of the world, rendering comparative analysis of non-voting political participation more feasible than ever before. Even when public opinion or interview data are not available for analysis, careful process tracing of media accounts, official documents, and elite speeches can help us to establish whether political elites were constrained at key junctures in the process of building, sustaining, or defending democracy. In any case, greater attention paid to non-voting political participation may enrich future democratization models.

In addition, I highlight the importance of microfoundations, namely the identification and measurement of the agent-based steps that link macro-structural variables. As the empirical analysis presented in this dissertation demonstrates, general theoretical assumptions about the steps connecting socioeconomic development and democracy did not hold true in the Russian and Indonesian experiences. Neither country has developed a propertied middle class. Relatively high levels of socioeconomic development in Russia did not trigger the chain of action that is presumed to link development to democracy, while relatively low levels of development did not inhibit democracy from taking root in Indonesia. These countries’ respective deviations along the micro-level steps that connect greater wealth to mass civic and political organization severed the presumed link between the macro-level variables of socioeconomic development and democracy.

In turn, this outcome suggests the need for an updated framework for conceptualizing the process of democratization. My research offers such a framework, illustrating that democratization is a dynamic interaction between elite and mass actors. By highlighting the relationship between political elites and the mass public, my approach to the study of democratization is agent-centric. Rather than assuming that citizens will respond to structural developments in uniform ways, the framework employed in this analysis emphasizes actors and their roles in facilitating or obstructing democracy’s survival. If we develop a clearer understanding of how macro-structural variables influence the behavior of the specific agents who decide whether to deepen or rescind democracy, we may learn more about whether
structural variables can ever be thought of as necessary conditions for democracy. The evidence presented here intimates that perhaps structures are important only to the extent that they foster certain intermediary conditions, which are the real “causes” of democracy’s survival.

Additionally, my research findings show how an important model in the politics of longstanding democracies extends to democratizing regimes as well. Specifically, I argue that the civic voluntarism model developed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady in *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* (1995) applies to political contexts other than advanced democracies. As such, I contribute to the longstanding debate about the role of civil society in democracy, demonstrating that the acquisition of civic skills and access to social networks through engagement in associational life can facilitate political participation in acts that foster greater political competition and attract public scrutiny of elite actions. This outcome may be relevant for all newly-democratizing countries, regardless of underlying socioeconomic conditions.

Lastly, my empirical analysis advances knowledge about the politics of Russia and Indonesia in two specific ways. First, my paired comparison of these two “outlier” cases has allowed me to move beyond regionally-specific explanations for these countries’ respective regime trajectories that are overly dependent on Russia’s and Indonesia’s unique historical experiences. Regional scholars assert that a communist legacy doomed democracy in Russia, and that the withdrawal of military support helped democracy in Indonesia, but I demonstrate that while these factors may be relevant, whether or not elites are constrained through political participation supersedes them both. Second, the preceding chapters offer a wealth of rich empirical detail on the attitudes and behaviors of ordinary citizens in the post-transition environments of two of the largest countries in the world. Independent of the causal analysis presented here, the description of attitudes and behaviors provided by both the survey evidence and open-ended interviews is valuable in its own right.

**Theoretical Contributions of Research Design and Analytical Framework**

The contributions to democratization theory and the study of Russian and Indonesian politics outlined above are a direct result of the research design employed, as well as the use of multiple methods and data sources for maximizing causal leverage. Careful, theoretically-driven paired comparisons, like the one employed in this study, play an important role in theory building by helping us to generate robust hypotheses for broader theory testing. The paired comparison between Russia and Indonesia introduces a new variable to our theories about democracy’s survival—non-voting participation. The paired comparison also generates three further hypotheses: that civic engagement, a sense of political efficacy, and political trust all drive non-voting political participation. A different research design might not have illuminated these variables. For example, a study aimed at explaining the failure of democracy in Russia would not have likely paid much attention to the country’s low levels of non-voting political participation. Similarly, a study investigating Indonesia’s democratic success might have overlooked the importance of mass political participation in constraining elites.

The patterns of political participation that failed to constrain elites in Russia but succeeded in Indonesia were not pre-determined before Russia and Indonesia completed their democratic transitions. Yet, single case studies of either country might have attributed considerable causal force to authoritarian legacies. For example, a common explanation for Russia’s failure to establish a lasting democracy is that the weight of its communist legacy was too great to overcome. In the context of a cross-case analysis, this hypothesis would be restated
to suggest that Indonesia’s authoritarian legacy was simply less burdensome than Russia’s. The paired comparison explored in this study has allowed me to approach the question of whether there is something specific about a communist legacy that is inauspicious for democracy’s survival.

In establishing such a comparison, my analysis puts the role of legacies as potential causal variables into sharper focus. As chapters 2 and 3 describe, the Soviet Union and New Order Indonesia share some important similarities with regard to the structure of their authoritarian regimes and the nature of these regimes’ collapse. Although Indonesia had an advantage over Russia in civil society development, other aspects of Russia’s communist legacy presented potential assets that could have been marshaled to aid democracy’s survival. In particular, Russia’s overall level of socioeconomic development and low levels of income inequality were important structural advantages for the country’s democratic prospects. Russians had high levels of individual capacity to become involved in political life, yet chose not to do so. Moreover, Indonesia did not present particularly fertile ground for building democracy. Rather, it took advantage of all of the small positive legacies at its disposal—expanded educational access, independent civic activity, tolerance of religious practice, and a multi-party structure—to expand and activate political participation that helped constrain political elites.

The conceptualization of democratization as a dynamic interaction between elites and masses can help advance democratization theory because it establishes boundaries for the introduction of causal variables while also maintaining the flexibility that is necessary for productive hypothesis testing. According to the interactive framework presented here, hypothesized independent variables, such as socioeconomic development or antecedent regime type, only pass the test to become potential causal variables if we can trace their impact on the behavior of masses or elites. Yet, because the behavior of masses and elites aimed at promoting or obstructing democracy can often be observed and measured, it is possible to investigate a wide array of potential independent variables. For example, one potential research question is whether state collapse influenced the attitudes and behaviors of former Soviet actors in a way that had a subsequent effect on democracy’s survival. Close and systematic analysis of contingent factors such as these is feasible within the dynamic interaction framework.

Additionally, the flexibility of this approach makes it possible to consider the importance of the sequencing of democratic reforms, as well as the causal impact of factors that are regularly thought of as “constants.” For example, one might argue that high levels of civic engagement in Indonesia cannot explain Indonesia’s democratization success since civic engagement was high during Indonesia’s authoritarian period as well. Yet, by looking at democratization as a dynamic interaction between elites and masses, we see that the introduction of new democratic institutions provided opportunities for civil society to mobilize politically in ways that were impossible before the transition to democracy. Thus, even if the level of civic engagement did not increase in the period after Suharto’s collapse, the expansion of political rights interacted with this civic engagement in such a way that spawned further political participation.

In sum, the innovative research design and analytical framework employed in this study made it possible to uncover trends that would have remained invisible in a large-N statistical analysis or a single country study. Moreover, the flexibility of the dynamic interaction framework makes it possible to easily extend this study in multiple useful ways.
EXTENSIONS AND EXPANSIONS

Avenues for Further Research
My findings open up several areas for further inquiry regarding democratization theory, political participation, and civil society, generating a broad range of potential research questions. First, how far does my argument travel? Can patterns of political participation predict democracy’s survival in a broader range of cases? I hope to address these questions by extending my analysis to a set of test cases. Ideally, these test cases should include examples of both democratic transition leading to democratic survival and democratic transition followed by a return to authoritarianism. As a starting point, I will examine cases from Eurasia and Southeast Asia that have undergone different post-transition regime trajectories than those experienced by Russia and Indonesia. Potentially good examples include the Baltic states and Ukraine in the post-Soviet world, which have proven to be more resilient democratically than has Russia; and the Philippines and Thailand, which are examples of democratization failure in Southeast Asia.

In order to further test my theory of political participation, I intend to build a cross-national dataset of indicators of non-voting political participation. Constructing such a dataset is a major undertaking as there is no cross-national survey that provides directly comparable measures of political participation in different countries. I therefore must rely on establishing functionally equivalent measures from other surveys, including the regional Barometer surveys (such as the Eurobarometer, the Latinobarometer, the Afrobarometer, and the Asian Barometer) and surveys conducted as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Ideally, I would like to build a dataset with time-sensitive variables that measure levels of participation in the first decade following a country’s transition to democracy in order to analyze its survival rate several years later. Thus, building this database will require that each country case be individually scrutinized. I plan to gather the relevant data for the post-Soviet region and Southeast Asia first, and then expand to other regions.

Longitudinal variation also presents a rich area for extension. Does the importance of non-voting political participation fade over time? Once a democratic regime survives for a certain length of time, can elite-constraining forms of participation decline without endangering democracy’s further survival? These questions could be explored by analyzing dynamics in some of the first countries to make democratic transitions in the Third Wave, such as Spain and Portugal, as well as some of the regimes that first became democratic after World War II, such as Japan. While early Third Wave democracies are still relatively new, they have existed as such for almost 40 years as of 2011, and thus present an arena through which comparisons over time could usefully be made.

A third set of research questions that build on my findings involves investigating the role of contingent events in shaping both political participation and the factors that facilitate it. For example, can Russia’s failure to expand political participation after its initial democratic transition be attributed to the economic shock citizens experienced concurrently with the transition to a market economy? The paired comparison with Indonesia, a country also under great economic stress at the time of its transition to democracy, would suggest that economic crises do not necessarily depress political participation. Nevertheless, the question of whether individual Russians’ relative sense of economic loss had a negative impact on their engagement in civil society, sense of efficacy, or political trust is one worthy of investigation.

Finally, another useful line of inquiry might explore factors that arguably play a decisive role earlier in the causal sequence, such as issues that predict cross-national variation in levels of
civic engagement, perceptions of political efficacy, and political trust. The following section discusses a preliminary investigation into the determinants of variation in civic engagement.

**Civic Engagement: The Influence of State Provision and Religious Attendance**

As I illustrate in chapter 3, differences in authoritarian legacies generally do not account for the variation exhibited by Russia and Indonesia on the explanatory variables in my model, with one exception: the Soviet regime more deeply penetrated Russian social life. The absence of any independent spheres of social and civic activity, together with the state destruction of organized religious groups, meant that building a post-Soviet Russian civil society was severely disadvantaged from the beginning. While the legacy of social repression cannot fully explain Russia’s perpetually low levels of civic engagement in the post-communist era, it does suggest that Russia probably had further terrain to travel than Indonesia in applying civic skills to political participation or working through social networks to mobilize for political causes. In comparing the legacies of communist and non-communist authoritarian antecedent regimes, variation in the degree of social control is perhaps the greatest difference.

Yet, when I analyzed levels of civic engagement in Russia and Indonesia against a larger cross-national sample in chapter 5, I found that not only was Russia’s level of civic engagement below the global average, but that Indonesia’s was well above it. This observation recasts the question from “why is civic engagement so low in Russia?” to “why is it so high in Indonesia?” I venture two tentative suggestions that could be explored in further research.

One potential explanatory factor involves the role of the state in shaping public life and the way that this role intersects with urban organization. Indonesia’s urban neighborhood architecture is modeled on the concept of the *kampung*, or village. Houses are usually only one or two stories high, and are packed tightly together on narrow alleyways. The close proximity in which individuals find themselves, together with the equatorial heat which is more comfortably managed outside of close quarters, facilitate frequent interactions between neighbors. Additionally, the Indonesian state’s record of providing public goods and institutional solutions is poor. Life in urban settings thus requires some forms of institutional arrangement, such as mutual aid societies, credit associations, and insurance pools for small merchants. In the absence of reliable state institutions, citizens have emerged to develop their own solutions—neighborhood security associations, rotating credit organizations, mutual aid—not to mention after school programs and sports teams. The picture is not very different from what Tocqueville found in the nineteenth-century United States.

Moreover, the structure of urban communities in Indonesia stands in stark contrast to the organization of public and private life in Russia. Urban Russians generally reside in large apartment buildings. While it was common in the Soviet era for families to live for decades in the same apartment and form close relations with their neighbors, my research shows that this model of interaction has declined sharply in recent years. With the exception of spring and summer (when most Russians find themselves on garden plots at their *dachas* on the outskirts of town), the weather in Russia is generally not conducive to spending time out of doors, transforming urban living into a more private existence. More significantly, however, municipal and social services, though far from efficient, became tightly organized, visible, and extensive during the Soviet era. There was no need for communities to organize themselves; indeed, the Communist Party sought to prevent self-organization of this nature. A legacy of state dependency for establishing and maintaining the institutions that structure urban life is profound in Russia. Thus, the contours of urban planning, state capacity, and community responses to
public service provision (or lack thereof) are all variables that could be investigated more closely as potential determinants of civic engagement.

A second, more compelling feature that likely contributes to Indonesians’ high level of civil society is their high rate of attendance at organized religious services. The practice of organized religion brings Indonesians into contact with others on a very regular basis, and thereby provides them with greater opportunities to develop norms of reciprocity. Indeed, among my citizen interview respondents, 20 of the 24 Indonesians with a high level of sociability attend religious services at least once per week.

The potential importance of attendance at religious services as a conduit for engendering civic engagement becomes more persuasive when we consider the low levels of religious practice in Russia. Table 8.1 provides data on religious service attendance for all countries included in the 1999-2004 World Values Survey that have undergone a democratic transition since the 1970s. Among the 33 countries for which we have data, Russia has the lowest rate of attendance at religious services at less than 4 percent. On the opposite end of the spectrum, only Tanzania and Nigeria have higher rates of attendance than Indonesia’s 64.7 percent.

When we look at the countries listed in Table 8.1 based on whether or not they were previously governed by communist regimes, the concentration of post-communist countries at the lower end of the attendance spectrum is striking. Indeed, rates of religious service attendance and having a communist history are highly and negatively correlated among these 33 countries (r = -.65). The repression of organized religion under communist regimes appears to have had a lasting legacy on church attendance in the region.

Table 8.1: Rates of Religious Service Attendance among Democratizing Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Attends religious services at least 1x/week (%)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Attends religious services at least 1x/week (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia*</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia*</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus*</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Croatia*</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia*</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia*</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic*</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria*</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>Slovakia*</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine*</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary*</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania*</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova*</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>Poland*</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia*</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania*</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia*</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>84.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania*</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*former Communist country

Source: 1999-2004 World Values Survey

1 Question F028 on the World Values Survey Integrated Questionnaire: “Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?” (possible answers in the fourth wave surveys are “more than once a week”; “once a week”; “once a month”; “only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter
The covariation between religious practice and civic engagement in Russia and Indonesia, together with the patterns of religious service attendance listed in Table 8.1, raise several questions for further investigation: What is the effect of religious service attendance on civic engagement? Are individuals who frequently attend religious services more likely to become involved in civic and political life? Is there variation in participation according to religious denomination? Fish and Lussier find that while Muslims are no more likely than Christians to attend religious services on a weekly basis, Orthodox Christians are significantly less likely to attend regularly than are Catholics or Protestants (Fish, 2011, ch. 2). This finding has particular resonance for the comparison of predominantly Muslim Indonesia and predominantly Orthodox Russia. Is Indonesia’s robust civil society a consequence of its high level of religiosity? Is the deficit in civil society observed in Russia linked to the forced atheism of the communist era? Is it possible that repression of organized religion under communism is another factor that has contributed to the lower levels of civil society Howard (2003) observed across the post-communist region? At present, there are more questions than answers regarding the relationship between religious attendance and civic engagement, but the preliminary speculations presented here suggest that further research on this topic would be fruitful.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIAN AND INDONESIAN POLITICS

Whither Russia and Indonesia?
The empirical findings presented in this dissertation also raise several questions about Russian and Indonesian politics and the further trajectories of their respective political regimes. If we examine Freedom House scores for political openness, there has been no movement in the level of political rights or civil liberties in either country for the past six years. In both cases, this stretch of regime stability constitutes the longest period of continuity in the levels of political openness since democratic transitions were completed. Russia has become a stable authoritarian regime, while Indonesia is proving to be a robust new democracy. The following two sections will discuss the prospects for further political openness in each country.

Russia: Authoritarian Stasis and the “No-Participation Pact”
My analysis shows that levels of elite-constraining non-voting political participation, civic engagement, perceptions of political efficacy, and trust in political institutions are low in Russia. The preceding chapters have made use of a wide variety of public opinion data to show that political participation peaked in the late Soviet period and subsequently declined. The data also show that civic engagement, perceptions of political efficacy, and trust in institutions all began to drop when Russia was at its highest level of democracy. While the authoritarian turn that Russia took over the past decade has undoubtedly depressed levels of these factors further, the evidence suggests that the initial and sharp declines observed are a cause—not an effect—of authoritarian backsliding.

days”; “other specific holy days”; “once a year”; “less often”; and “never/practically never.” The percentages in Table 8.1 reflect the number of respondents in each country who selected “more than once a week” or “once a week.” The 2005-2008 World Values Survey did not ask about attendance at weekly services uniformly across countries. In some predominantly Muslim countries, respondents were asked how often they prayed, while in others they were asked how frequently they attend religious services. The question, however, appears to have been asked consistently in the 1999-2004 survey.
Nevertheless, the current level of political openness in Russia is similar to that of the late Soviet period. In other words, Russia is more politically open than before glasnost’ and perestroika, but significantly less open than it was in the early to mid-1990s. Consequently, repression of political rights and civil liberties inhibits both an expansion of non-voting political participation, as well as the attitudinal and behavioral factors that tend to facilitate it.

For example, a belief that participating in politics may be unsafe depresses perceptions of political efficacy and political participation. In discussing Russia’s political environment in 2008, several of my citizen respondents said participation in any political act other than voting was risky. When I asked a 19-year-old female university student in Krasnoyarsk what she would do if any of her friends wanted to join a political party, she said that it was dangerous and she would try to talk them out of it. Several other respondents said that they might lose their jobs if they became more politically engaged. A 59-year-old Russian female social worker in Krasnoyarsk who had been a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and a union activist said economic dependence kept people from engaging in political acts or expressing political views that contrasted with those of their employers. A 25-year-old repairman articulated a similar view, saying that sharing political views at work was perilous and could lead to termination at any time. Another respondent even suggested that writing a letter to the editor of the newspaper could threaten one’s employment. These statements reflect a lack of economic autonomy in Russia, which inhibits political freedom and suppresses citizens’ political will. As a result, mass pressure for democratic accountability declines, and elites can more easily impinge on the few remaining democratic rights and practices.

Yet, at the same time, I found that some Russians believed that they could be efficacious if they mobilized a collective political effort. Some respondents in both Kazan and Krasnoyarsk suggested that it was impossible to influence politics individually, but that an act performed by a large group might be effective. For example, a 55-year old retired Russian police officer in Kazan noted that complaints about housing, garbage collection, or other municipal services could be influential if the complaints were issued by a group and clearly articulated the violation of the law. A similar view was expressed by a 23-year old secretary in Krasnoyarsk, who, when I asked how she thought she could influence the political process, replied that she would gather a group of likeminded people and write a letter to the appropriate official including all signatories’ passport information. Even the 25-year old Russian repairman in Krasnoyarsk who was wary of participation suggested that, “If the whole city comes out to protest, this will cause people to think.” While my research revealed several examples of community-organized contacting efforts, collective action that results in acts of contentious politics is much less common.

But such protest acts do take place. Small, localized protests continue to appear throughout Russia. In a 2008 conference paper on Russian civil society, Vorozheikina described three areas in which Russians have observed mass protest action in recent years: 1) the 2005 protests against monetization of benefits; 2) protests against construction projects; and 3) demonstrations by automobile drivers. Vorozheikina argues that these types of protest activities are limited, weakly organized, and people do not know much about them. Consequently, they do not serve as the basis for a mass pro-democracy movement, although they can be influential in achieving specific, concrete social goals. Vorozheikina’s analysis highlights two important considerations regarding the ability of these localized protest movements to evolve into a larger and more effective form of elite constraint. First, local protests tend to remain isolated because

\[^{2}\text{Kelly McMann (2006) argues that economic autonomy is a key variable that explains variation in levels of democracy at the subnational level.}\]
the resources for mass mobilization are not institutionalized. Russian citizens have only a weak idea of collective, independent action. Second, the people who are called to action face risks of losing their homes, jobs, etc. Because of these risks, existing movements tend to focus on defending existing laws and citizens’ legal rights to specific activities instead of engaging in broader, more contentious politics.

In several instances, specific protests like those Vorozheikina describes have attracted a large number of participants, provoking a response from political leaders. For example, protests over unemployment, unpaid wages, and disrupted municipal services in the company town of Pikalevo made international headlines when hundreds of residents blocked off a federal highway, prompting a dramatic helicopter arrival by Prime Minister Putin to sort out the mess (Barry, 2009). Regular caravans of protesting automobile drivers organized by the Federation of Car Owners and similar groups persuaded President Medvedev from blocking a bill that would have doubled taxes on car owners in November 2010 (Boudreaux, 2010). Perhaps most dramatically, a January 2010 demonstration of 10,000 people in Kaliningrad ultimately compelled President Medvedev to remove the region’s governor from office.

Yet, in just as many instances, protest activity is met with indifference or repression. When motorists staged protests over an increase on import duties for foreign cars in more than 30 cities in late 2008, Moscow sent riot police to Vladivostok to set an example for other regions. The 1,000-person protest was broken up using violent means, resulting in the arrest of some 200 demonstrators (Levy, 2008; "Two Hundred," 2008). More recently, in a May 2011 event, almost 200 environmentalists demonstrated against a proposed federal highway project that would destroy part of a centuries-old Moscow forest. The protest resulted in two dozen arrests and a hospitalization, with several individuals reporting physical abuse at the hands of riot police (Bratersky, 2011). Those who risk engaging in even small scale pro-democracy demonstrations regularly face incarceration. In perhaps the most high-profile set of arrests in recent years, on December 31, 2010, several prominent opposition activists were arrested as they were leaving a sanctioned demonstration in defense of Article 31 of the Russian Constitution, which ironically guarantees freedom of assembly. Four activists were given harsh sentences, including former First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, who served a 15-day jail sentence.

Thus, while select groups of Russians exhibit some attempts at collective action, on the whole Russians publicly express few signs of disapproval with the current regime. Carnegie Moscow Center Analyst Maria Lipman describes the current state of relations between Russian masses and the elite as a “no-participation pact” in which the state and society have decided not to interfere with each other (2011). Lipman writes, “The Kremlin may have monopolized decision-making, but it is largely non-intrusive and enables citizens to live their own lives and pursue their own interests – as long as they do not encroach on the government realm.” Most Russians are comfortable accepting this pact as long as the state delivers on its promise of rising standards of living and an acceptable level of security. Yet, as Lipman points out, the greater levels of personal freedom that Russians have enjoyed over the past 20 years have enabled some individuals to acquire meaningful organizational skills and exposed them to a much broader array of information than was available during the Soviet era. Access to information has spiraled, particularly in the age of the internet, which remains a venue of free expression in Russia. If the state is unable to maintain the status quo with regard to living standards, security, and other bread-and-butter issues, the citizens may well withdraw their support for the no-participation pact.
Indonesia: Corruption and Clientelism

Indonesia has achieved a stable level of political openness that is higher than that enjoyed by Russia at its democratic peak. Yet, the level of democracy in Indonesia is still lower than that of several other Third Wave democracies, such as Brazil, South Korea, Ghana, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, there has been little progress in deepening either political rights or civil liberties in the past several years. Among political scientists analyzing Indonesia, I consistently find myself holding the minority opinion regarding Indonesia’s prospects for democratic survival. Fellow scholars regularly point to the problems of corruption, clientelism, and popular discontent as evidence of a lack of democracy within Indonesia (Buehler, 2010; Hadiz, 2010; Webber, 2006). Indeed, these themes were repeated regularly in the interviews I conducted with Indonesian political scientists and analysts during the course of my fieldwork.

On the whole, I view several indicators that others perceive as symptoms of a democratic deficit, such as mass protests and clientelistic party relations, instead as signs that democracy is indeed working in Indonesia. As discussed in chapter 2, democracy is a form of political regime and is not analogous with good governance. It is natural for citizens in democracies to criticize the government. As I have argued in the preceding chapters, peaceful protest communicates useful information to political leaders and can act as a constraint on their actions. Moreover, as Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) illustrate, patronage-based, party-voter linkages exist in many countries, including some advanced industrial democracies. These factors alone do not prevent democracy from taking root. Particular circumstances, however, could create obstacles for further democratic deepening.

First, Indonesia faces meaningful problems with good governance, particularly regarding corruption. Indonesia ranks 110 out of 178 countries in Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index. As poor as this ranking is, it represents considerable improvement from the country’s ranking of 133 out of 146 countries in 2004, the year President Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono first came to office and initiated a widespread anti-corruption campaign. While corruption may exist in both open and closed regimes, it generally reduces transparency and enhances political elites’ interests in keeping the polity closed. Moreover, widespread corruption can create inducements for electoral fraud, which in turn hinders democracy.

The slipperiness of the relationship between corruption and political openness became apparent in public reactions to a high-profile corruption case in Medan, Indonesia. In 2008, Medan Mayor Abdillah and Deputy Mayor Ramli Lubis were arrested for graft, found guilty by the Anti-Corruption Court, and sentenced, respectively, to five and four years in prison. In 2009, I asked my citizen respondents in Medan if they heard about this case and if so, to give their opinion of it. Most had heard of it, but attitudes about the outcome were divided. Of the respondents who were aware of the verdict, half believed that if the mayor was guilty of corrupt practices, then he should be punished. The other half, however, expressed more conflicted views. On the whole, this latter group had a positive estimation of Abdillah as the city’s mayor, and found his conviction troublesome not because he proved to be corrupt, but rather because the city was left without capable leadership. Several people offered examples of the ways that he had provided for the people of Medan. Many were frustrated with the subsequent decline in municipal services following Abdillah’s and Ramli’s arrests, noting that their garbage had not been collected in months. A 17-year old Batak-Javanese high school student captured the sentiment well when she told me, “It is good to fight corruption, but when will we have a good mayor again?”
The attitudes expressed by respondents in Medan are testimony to the pervasiveness of corruption in Indonesian life, as well as the widely-held expectation that political leaders are likely to be corrupt. Indeed, few respondents viewed Abdillah’s conviction as evidence of a moral failing or a lack of commitment to democracy. Individuals who have more experience dealing with the bureaucracy, and thereby are more likely to be exposed to instances of bribery and corruption, tended to be the most forgiving of Abdillah’s transgressions. For example, a 38-year old Javanese woman who works in a regional district office said that Abdillah, “was mistaken, but he understands the people well. He was extraordinary as a mayor and paid attention to the people.” A similar view was expressed by a 43-year old Javanese woman who works as a low-level civil servant. She suggested that Abdillah and Ramli had been “looking out for the welfare of the people of Medan” when they engaged in corrupt practices, not enriching themselves. In a more extreme position, a 53-year old Minahasan respondent who belongs to a group known for its connection to organized crime called Abdillah a “victim” of the state.

These responses to a case in which the political regime adhered to the rule of law in fighting corruption—a topic that consistently rates high in Indonesian public opinion polls as one of the country’s greatest problems—suggest that Indonesians do not always prioritize democratic procedure over outcome. If citizens will not only tolerate corruption, but even pardon it when carried out by popular political leaders, they are less likely to use democratic institutions as a mechanism for curbing corruption and improving governance. Moreover, if individuals tolerate corruption in political administration, such corruption could interfere with the fairness and freeness of elections. This possibility relates to a second factor that is frequently cited as an obstacle to Indonesia’s further democratization: the pervasiveness of clientelism in electoral politics.

Clientelistic exchanges, in and of themselves, do not preclude democracy as long as they generate meaningful political competition. However, reliance on patron-client relationships for mobilizing the electorate creates conditions that are conducive to corruption, abuse of power, and fraud, as political aspirants find that they need access to ever greater resources in order to compete effectively for political office. Indeed, one of the main criticisms of Indonesia’s decentralization policies is that they put considerable resources in the hands of local officials who now have to compete for office, thereby facilitating the spread of so-called “money politics” (Hadiz, 2010; EJ-11, interview, June 8, 2009). Others have argued that the increase of direct clientelistic exchanges is not so much a result of decentralization, but rather simply a consequence of the fact that elections at all levels are genuinely competitive (EJ-1, interview, May 25, 2009; EJ-10, interview, June 8, 2009; EJ-15, interview, June 6, 2009).

My citizen respondents offered several examples of “money politics,” both in terms of direct payments or gifts of rice, headscarves, prayer rugs, or other items that might be donated to local prayer groups and neighborhood associations. In some instances, the presence of such exchanges contributed to negative feelings about the winners of elections. As a 22-year old Javanese student activist in Surabaya explained, “I feel that the governor of East Java, Sukarwo, is part of the status quo from East Java, by which I mean he was elected governor because he gave out the most money. Every person was given 50,000 rupiah [about $5] to vote for him.” A 30-year old Javanese-Madurese food-stall vendor in Surabaya described the exchanges that occurred before Indonesia’s April 2009 legislative elections:

There were many before this last election. For example, there was a party that came here and gave money. The “success team” of this party gave money to me and to others for voting for the party and the party’s
legislative candidate won. Now I see that SBY wants to be close to the people, and he is not very different from most other businessmen.

This particular individual has never voted in an election, and therefore was an opportunistic beneficiary in the patron-client exchange.

Not all exchanges that respondents discussed involved receiving a benefit with no monitoring for compliance. For example, a 38-year old Minang woman with only two years of elementary school education explained how representatives from Golkar tried to induce people in her neighborhood to vote for the party’s representative in the 2009 legislative elections by giving them some household items, “We received the name of the candidate who gave us [the items]. If he didn’t win, the items would be taken back.” An analyst in Medan described a common system for trying to increase the compliance of patron-client exchanges (NS-4, interview, July 29, 2009). Rather than provide money or goods upfront, parties give voters coupons for a specific candidate. If the candidate wins, the coupons can be redeemed for a payoff.

On the whole, however, I found that my citizen respondents in Surabaya and Medan were generally not influenced by the small sums and gifts common in pre-election “money politics.” Many viewed such practices as a way in which parties tried to encourage you to vote for them, rather than as a binding commitment of one’s vote. For example, the same 38-year old Javanese woman who expressed disappointment over Abdillah’s arrest described how two parties came to her pengajian prayer group before the legislative elections. They offered noodles and floor mats to the participants. Other parties came through the neighborhood offering food staples. She noted that after the elections, “many candidates were disappointed because they did not get votes [after having given people these items]. Stupid candidates.” When I asked the 53-year old Minahasan if it would be okay to vote for a candidate other than one he might have accepted money from, he responded, “When there are elections I have my own choice. Therefore I am not prejudiced by receiving money from another person.”

According to Kitschelt and Wilkinson, clientelism can persist only when “politicians have good reasons to expect that the target constituencies for clientelistic bargains will behave in predictable fashion and refrain from opportunism” (2007, p. 8). Absent these conditions, politicians must construct elaborate and expensive surveillance structures to ensure that constituents adhere without free-riding. For this reason, clientelism is more common and effective in smaller communities, where face-to-face interactions are the norm. In large urban centers like Surabaya and Medan, however, compliance is much harder to enforce. Moreover, many of my respondents did not feel constrained to vote a particular way by candidate’s pre-election inducements. In this context, it questionable whether parties will continue to raise the stakes of “money politics.” Programmatic party competition is simply less expensive. Regardless, however, patronage-based, party-voter linkages are only a threat to democracy if they erode meaningful competition. There is little evidence of this possibility in Indonesia.

Corruption and clientelism, while widespread, are not likely to induce democratic erosion in Indonesia, although they may create obstacles to further democratic deepening. Of greater concern, however, is increasing levels of intolerance for certain religious minorities, such as followers of Ahmadiyah Islam and Christians, who have been the victims of a growing number of violent attacks in recent years (Arnaz & Pawas, 2011; Freedom House, 2010). While technically the Indonesian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, the government has done little to protect religious minorities. Unless protections for these groups increase, we are unlikely to see substantial advances in civil liberties.
Ultimately, Indonesians will decide whether the country will strengthen political rights and civil liberties by addressing corruption, money politics, and intolerance. The country’s post-Suharto history provides ample evidence of citizens constraining elites to push for further democracy. Although the momentum for tackling these specific weaknesses, at present, is not strong, Indonesia’s civically engaged population is already endowed with the tools it needs to confront these issues when it chooses to do so.

CONCLUSION
Political regimes, whether democratic or authoritarian, are not the consequence of structures aligning in a particular way. Rather, they are the products of struggles between those who want to govern and those who are governed. Nascent democracies survive when citizens constrain the elites from becoming too powerful. They fail when citizens react with quiescence or indifference to elite decisions. Once a political regime closes, it is much harder to reopen.

Indonesia, a post-colonial, weakly-industrialized, predominantly-Muslim country with unresolved secessionist conflicts has built a surviving democracy. Russia, an oil-rich, industrialized, former empire and superpower, failed to see its democratic experience through to survival. After years of political and economic upheaval, Indonesians and Russians have reached a comfortable level equilibrium in their political regimes. How long this equilibrium will hold depends on the dynamic interaction of masses and elites. It is up to these agents to activate democracy.
List of Expert Interview Subjects

In total, approximately 140 scholars, analysts, journalists, and representatives of political parties and mass organizations were interviewed for this project. The list below is not comprehensive of all expert interviews conducted, but rather only includes those subjects cited specifically in the text.

RUSSIA

Moscow City special administrative district
M-14  Representative from the Leadership of the Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers  February 21, 2008
M-17  Representative from Youth Branch of Yabloko  February 19, 2008

Kazan, Tatarstan
K-5  Scholar and Democratic Activist  February 29, 2008
K-6  Representative from Communist Party of the Russian Federation Regional Leadership  March 1, 2008
K-7  Representatives from Regional Youth Branch of Communist Party of the Russian Federation  March 1, 2008
K-10  Member of Russian Cultural Movement  March 13, 2008
K-16  Opposition Activist  March 11, 2008
K-17  United Russia Political Party Analyst  March 13, 2008
K-18  Member of Russian Cultural Movement  March 18, 2008
K-19  Women’s Movement Activist, Naberezhnyi Chelny  March 25, 2008
K-21  Representatives from Yabloko Regional Leadership  March 26, 2008

Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai
Kr-11  Representative from Leadership of Krasnoyarsk Branch of Memorial  November 10, 2000
Kr-12  Representative from Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Regional Leadership  November 10, 2008
Kr-13  Representatives from Communist Party of the Russian Federation Regional Leadership  November 11, 2008
Kr-20  United Russia Political Party Activist  November 26, 2008
Kr-22  United Russia Political Party Analyst  November 27, 2008

INDONESIA

Yogyakarta special administrative region
Y-02  Representatives of the Prosperous Justice Party Regional Leadership  May 5, 2009
Surabaya, East Java
EJ-1 Political Scientist, Airlangga University May 25, 2009
EJ-3 Representative of Muhammadiyah Regional Leadership June 2, 2009
EJ-4 Representative of NU Women’s Organization Fatayat’s Regional Leadership June 3, 2009
EJ-5 Representative of Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle Regional Leadership June 4, 2009
EJ-8 Representative of Prosperous Justice Party Regional Leadership June 6, 2009
EJ-10 Caretaker in NU Regional Leadership June 8, 2009
EJ-11 Representative of National Awakening Party Regional Leadership June 8, 2009
EJ-15 Legal Scholar, University of Surabaya June 6, 2009

Medan, North Sumatra
NS-2 Legal Scholar, Institute Agama Islam Negeri Sumatera Utara July 2, 2009
NS-4 Analyst, Democracy-Promotion NGO July 29, 2009
References


United Nations Development Program. Human Development Indicators.


World Bank. World Development Indicators.


Appendix 1.A: Case Selection and Respondent Recruitment

In order to recruit respondents among the citizens of Russia and Indonesia, I first compiled a respondent frame using regional-level data from the most recent national census in each country, supplemented with relevant official statistics and information from local sociologists. The respondent frame established categories for twenty-five respondents in each city who corresponded to specific groups based on gender, age, ethnicity, education level, and sphere of employment. In each city I worked together with a local sociologist who conducted the recruiting to correspond with the graphic. In both Indonesian cities we chose to stratify the sample to include a higher number of individuals with a university degree (three in each city), off setting this by including a smaller number of individuals with only an elementary school education. We also aimed to include an accurate representation of the largest ethnic groups in the provinces of East Java and North Sumatra, while recognizing that in such a small sample it would be impossible to represent all ethnic groups.

In Kazan, Krasnoyarsk, and Surabaya, the local sociologist used established networks to recruit respondents across the full range of the city’s regions. I found this to be the standard recruitment practice for most Russian sociologists and pollsters, who note that the refusal rate for random selection is prohibitively high. In Medan, the local sociologist first selected eight kelurahan (municipal sub-districts) and searched for three or four respondents corresponding to specific categories in the kelurahan.

Interview locations varied by city. In Kazan, Surabaya, and Medan, most interviews took place in respondents’ homes or places of employment. Occasionally they took place at a convenient neutral location, such as a neighbor’s home or a university office or classroom. The decision to interview primarily in respondents’ homes came from the recommendation of the local sociologists with whom I worked. There were several benefits of holding the interviews in respondents’ homes. First, it generally provided a more comfortable atmosphere for respondents to converse, and the interview could take on the atmosphere of an informal and relaxed dialogue. Second, I was able to gather observational data about respondents’ living situation that could serve as a useful supplement for creating a measure of their socioeconomic characteristics. In Indonesia in particular, it was very clear that few of my respondents would have agreed to an interview in an off-sight location.\(^1\) A downside of interviewing in respondents’ homes, however, was that I could not always ensure the privacy of our conversation or that other family members would not try to interfere in the interview, thereby influencing the content of respondents’ answers. In Krasnoyarsk, the majority of interviews took place in a private classroom on a weekend when the school was not in session. The decision to interview at this neutral location was taken at the recommendation of the local sociologist with whom I worked, who noted that respondents were rarely comfortable receiving researchers in their homes. This format also ensured privacy and a lack of interruptions during the interviews.

Overall, interviews ranged in time from about 50 minutes to 3 hours, but generally averaged about 2 hours. Interviews were conducted in Kazan in March 2008, in Krasnoyarsk in October-November 2008, in Surabaya in May-June 2009, and in Medan in July-August 2009. All Russian interviews were conducted after the country’s March 2008 presidential election. In Indonesia, all interviews in Surabaya were conducted before the country’s July 2009 presidential election.

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1 This was particularly true of women who did not work outside of them home and of lower income individuals, who frequently worked in small trade and service sectors. I regularly conducted interviews in their food stands and cafes, pausing while they served customers.
election, and all interviews in Medan were conducted after the election. Since the focus of my
interview questions was long term trends in attitudes and behaviors and not short term attitudinal
shifts, I do not expect the findings from the Medan sample to be skewed as a result of the recent
election.

Interview dynamics varied somewhat between the two countries in ways that are
consistent with cultural norms for privacy and expectations regarding receiving visitors. In
Russia, most interviews took place one-on-one with limited interruption from other family
members. Refreshments of tea and cookies were served during most interviews, even when the
interview took place in an office or neutral location, which helped to create a relaxed,
conversational environment.

In Indonesia, where most interviews occurred in respondents’ homes, it was often
difficult to establish conditions for a private conversation. Though my research assistants and I
tried to communicate my preference that the interview take place in private, this preference was
often difficult to implement given the limitations on space in many Indonesian homes and the
expectation that family members would have the opportunity to greet their guest. In several
instances other family members or neighbors were present, although they generally did not
interfere in the conversation, and (barring a few exceptions) respondents did not seem daunted
by their presence. It became clear over the course of my interviews that my respondents
generally did not expect privacy for a conversation about their opinions and views. 2 Cold
beverages were served during most interviews in Indonesia as well.

In all but a few instances in Kazan, 3 respondents were recruited to participate in
interviews without any promise of compensation. Respondents were asked to volunteer their
time, but they usually were offered a small token of appreciation at the end of the interview. The
process of offering compensation also varied between the two countries. In a few instances in
Russia, I did not offer an honorarium as it was clear that the respondent would be greatly
offended. 4 Many Russian respondents who were offered an honorarium refused it. In total, 64
percent of Russian respondents received an honorarium of 300 rubles ($12). In Indonesia, all
respondents accepted the tokens of appreciation I offered. In Surabaya, respondents were offered
an honorarium equal to 100,000 rupiah ($10). At the recommendation of my local assistant in
Medan, respondents were given a gift equal in value to $10 rather than a cash honorarium. 5 At
the end of each interview, I invited my respondents to ask me any questions they would like.
Several respondents were interested in hearing my impressions of their country. Many of my
Indonesian respondents, in particular, were interested in learning more about the structure of

2 There is no word in the Indonesian language for “anonymous.” In order to convey to my interview subjects that our
conversation would be anonymous and strictly confidential I had to explain and show in great detail that I would not
use their names and would not write or record their names in the interview. The concept seemed difficult for some
respondents to comprehend. Privacy did not appear to be a paramount concern for most interview subjects in
Indonesia.

3 I found that Russian sociologists generally differed in their opinions about whether to announce that an honorarium
would be provided for participating in an interview. The local sociologist I worked with in Kazan found that it was
occasionally useful to let possible respondents know about a material incentive when recruiting among lower-
income respondents who have very limited free time due to working multiple jobs.

4 For example, if I conducted the interview at someone’s house and they refused to accept my offering of chocolate
for tea (which is standard Russian hospitality if you are a guest in someone’s house) I knew it would upset the
respondent to offer payment.

5 According to this sociologist, material gifts were the common form of appreciation offered by scholars in North
Sumatra. This scholar was deeply concerned that if I offered a cash honorarium, this form of payment could set a
negative precedent for future scholars wanting to conduct interview-based research in the region.
education and social services in the United States. A significant number of respondents in both
countries were happy to be interviewed and appeared honored that a foreign scholar wanted them
to participate in a research project.

The same basic interview guideline was used in each country, although adjustments were
made over the course of the project to improve question wording, remove questions that were not
eliciting useful responses, and add more precise questions. I first translated the questionnaire
from English to Russian and Indonesian and had it professionally translated by native speakers of
both languages. I then compared my translation and the official translation and worked with the
translators to arrive at the most precise question wording. Questions focused on respondents’
childhood memories and experiences, their reactions to specific historical events, their
participation in political, social, and religious activities, their opinions about different state
institutions, contacts they may have had with government officials, and their assessment of the
existing political system. I also included a small number of closed-ended questions that measured
satisfaction with the political and economic system and respondents’ understanding of
democracy.

In contrast to a closed-ended survey, semi-structured interviews offer greater
opportunities for individuals to speak about their lives and opinions in their own terms. While a
closed-form questionnaire is designed in such a way to only seek measures for specific concepts,
open-ended interviews provide a different perspective—respondents can explain their own
actions and opinions and how they have come to make certain decisions in their lives. They can
also speak honestly about whether they have no opinion on a particular topic. Through this type
of exchange it is possible to learn not only about the attitudes and behaviors of ordinary citizens,
but also about the scope of their interest in and understanding of political change. Another
advantage of open-ended ethnographic interviews is the ability to gather context information
about individuals and their families—their houses, neighborhoods, and patterns of speech—all of
which can assist us in developing a more nuanced understanding of how particular communities
and societies are affecting—and being affected by—democratization.
### Appendix 1.B: Summary of Citizen Samples in Russia and Indonesia

#### Russia

**Kazan, Tatarstan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group*</th>
<th>Description of Respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 17-29      | 1 female bank manager, Tatar (Muslim)  
            | 1 male automobile repair services, Tatar (Muslim)  
            | 1 female hairdresser, Russian (Orthodox Christian)  
            | 1 female homemaker, Russian (Orthodox Christian)  
            | 1 female student, Tatar (Muslim)  
            | 1 male student, Russian (Christian) |
| 30-39      | 1 male working in private enterprise, Russian (Protestant Christian)  
            | 1 male working in private enterprise, Russian (nonbeliever/atheist)  
            | 1 male public opinion analyst, Tatar (Muslim)  
            | 1 male chauffeur, Tatar (Muslim) |
| 40-49      | 1 female public sector management, Tatar (non-denominational/agnostic)  
            | 1 male bank employee, Russian (Orthodox Christian)  
            | 1 female retail employee, Tatar (Muslim)  
            | 1 female municipal police employee, Russian (Orthodox Christian) |
| 50-59      | 1 male security guard, Russian (Orthodox Christian)  
            | 1 female factory worker, Tatar (nonbeliever/atheist)  
            | 1 male public sector driver, Tatar (Christian)  
            | 1 female public sector lower clerical employee and cleaning woman, Tatar (Muslim)  
            | 1 female janitor, Tatar (nonbeliever/atheist) |
| 60-69      | 1 female retired engineer and social worker, Russian (Orthodox Christian)  
            | 1 female retired engineer, Tatar (Muslim)  
            | 1 male businessman, Tatar (non-denominational/agnostic)  
            | 1 female retired retail worker, Russian (Orthodox Christian) |
| 70+        | 1 male retired military officer, Tatar (Muslim)  
            | 1 female retired worker, Russian (Orthodox Christian) |

* Because years of birth and not exact birthdates were gathered, this table is arranged to ensure age as of December 31, 2008. In four instances, individuals were on the border of two age groups. Bordering ages, in part, explain the absence of some gender and nationality diversity in certain age groups as specific ages were not determined in pre-screening.

**Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group*</th>
<th>Description of Respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 17-29      | 1 male student working in IT, Ukrainian (nonbeliever/atheist)  
            | 1 male student working in marketing, Russian (Orthodox Christian)  
            | 1 female student, Russian (nonbeliever/atheist)  
            | 1 female clerical worker, Russian (Orthodox Christian)  
            | 1 male electrical technician, Russian (Orthodox Christian)  
            | 1 female retail employee, Russian (Orthodox Christian) |
| 30-39      | 1 male small business owner, Russian (non-denominational/agnostic)  
            | 1 male laborer, Russian (Orthodox Christian)  
            | 1 female midwife, Russian (Orthodox Christian)  
            | 1 female sales clerk, Russian (Orthodox Christian)  
            | 1 female bank employee, Ukrainian/Belorussian (Orthodox Christian)  
            | 1 male factory worker, Russian (Orthodox Christian) |
| 40-49      | 1 male construction worker, Russian (nonbeliever/atheist)  
<pre><code>        | 1 male recently laid off from private sector management, Russian (Orthodox Christian) |
</code></pre>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Description of respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 17-19     | 1 female university student, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 female commercial sex-worker, Javanese (Muslim) |
| 20-29     | 1 male university student, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 male civil servant, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 male unemployed, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 male laborer, Madurese (Muslim)  
            | 1 female homemaker, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 female domestic worker, Javanese (Muslim) |
| 30-39     | 1 male trader, Javanese/Madurese (Muslim)  
            | 1 male janitor, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 male non-profit employee, Nagekeo (Catholic)  
            | 1 female working in informal sector, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 unemployed female, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 female cleaning woman, Javanese (Muslim) |
| 40-49     | 1 female health clinic administrator, Madurese (Muslim)  
            | 1 male trader, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 female university lecturer, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 male pedicab driver, Madurese (Muslim)  
            | 1 female homemaker, Javanese (Muslim) |
| 50-59     | 1 female homemaker, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 retired male, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 male working in the informal sector, Javanese (Muslim) |
| 60-69     | 1 retired male, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 female trader, Javanese (Muslim)  
            | 1 female homemaker, Javanese (Muslim) |

*Because years of birth and not exact birthdates were gathered, this table is arranged to ensure age as of December 31, 2008.

**Indonesia**

**Surabaya, East Java**
### Medan, North Sumatra

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Description of respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 17-19     | 1 female recent high school graduate looking for work, Batak Toba (Protestant Christian)  
           | 1 male high school graduate about to enter college, Batak Toba (Protestant Christian)  
           | 1 female vocational high school graduate about to enter college, Javanese-Batak Mandailing (Muslim) |
| 20-29     | 1 male university student, Batak Pakpak (Protestant Christian)  
           | 1 unemployed male, Javanese (Muslim)  
           | 1 unemployed male, Malay (Muslim)  
           | 1 female homemaker, Javanese (Muslim)  
           | 1 female janitor, Javanese (Muslim) |
| 30-39     | 1 male kiosk vendor, Nias (Catholic)  
           | 1 male construction worker, Batak Simalungun (Protestant Christian)  
           | 1 male construction worker, Batak Maindailing (Protestant Christian)  
           | 1 laborer, Tamil (Buddhist)  
           | 1 unemployed male searching for work, Batak Karo (Catholic)  
           | 1 female public sector employee, Javanese (Muslim)  
           | 1 female service sector employee, Minang (Muslim) |
| 40-49     | 1 female homemaker, Batak Toba (Protestant Christian)  
           | 1 female corner café owner, Batak Karo (Catholic)  
           | 1 female public sector employee, Javanese (Muslim)  
           | 1 female public sector employee, Batak Mandailing (Muslim)  
           | 1 male laborer, Malay (Muslim) |
| 50-59     | 1 male businessman, Minahasan (Protestant Christian)  
           | 1 female homemaker, Minang (Muslim) |
| 60-69     | 1 male laborer, Batak Karo (Protestant Christian)  
           | 1 female homemaker, Javanese (Muslim)  
           | 1 female traditional healer, Chinese (Buddhist) |

### Comparative Summary of Citizen Samples in Russia and Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kazan</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>14 women; 11 men</td>
<td>13 women; 12 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>1 incomplete secondary</td>
<td>1 incomplete elementary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 secondary</td>
<td>4 secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 specialized secondary</td>
<td>11 specialized secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 tertiary degree</td>
<td>9 tertiary degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>8 Russian Orthodox</td>
<td>14 Russian Orthodox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Muslim</td>
<td>5 non-believers/atheists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 non-believers/atheists</td>
<td>5 agnostics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 agnostics</td>
<td>1 Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>14 Tatar</td>
<td>21 Russian*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 Russian</td>
<td>2 Russian/Ukrainian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Batak are comprised of five sub-ethnicities. Batak Toba, Karo, Simalungun, and Pakpak are primarily Christian. Batak Mandailing, who originate from the southern part of the province, are primarily Muslim.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language 1</th>
<th>Language 2</th>
<th>Language 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Belarusian/ Ukrainian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tatar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Javanese/Madurese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Nagekeo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Javanese/Batak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandailing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Malay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Minang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tamil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Nias</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Minahasan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes individuals who self-identified as “rossianin,” “rossiskii,” “slavyanin,” and Russian-speaking in addition to those who identified as “russkii.”
Appendix 5.A: Countries Included in World Values Survey

Argentina (2006); Australia (2005); Brazil (2006); Bulgaria (2006); Burkina Faso (2007); Chile (2006); China (2007); Colombia (2005); Cyprus (2006); Egypt (2008); Ethiopia (2007); Finland (2005); France (2006); Germany (2006); Ghana (2007); Great Britain (2006); India (2006); Indonesia (2006); Iran (2005); Italy (2005); Japan (2005); Jordan (2007); Malaysia (2006); Mali (2007); Mexico (2005); Moldova (2006); Morocco (2007); Netherlands (2006); New Zealand (2004); Peru (2006); Poland (2005); Romania (2005); Russia (2006); Rwanda (2007); Serbia (2006); Slovenia (2005); South Africa (2007); South Korea (2005); Spain (2007); Sweden (2006); Switzerland (2007); Taiwan (2006); Thailand (2007); Trinidad and Tobago (2006); Turkey (2007); Ukraine (2006); United States (2006); Vietnam (2006); Zambia (2007).
Appendix 5.B: Russian Participation in Associational Life over Time

### Organizational Membership in Russia: 1990 and 1999 (WVS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational type</th>
<th>1990 (%)</th>
<th>1999 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious organization</td>
<td>1.2 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>2.4 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport or recreational organization</td>
<td>5.2 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>3.5 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art, music, or educational organization</td>
<td>5.0 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>1.2 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor union</td>
<td>61.7 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>23.1 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>11.3 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>0.7 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental organization</td>
<td>-- (N=1,961)</td>
<td>0.7 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional association</td>
<td>1.8 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>0.8 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian or charitable organization</td>
<td>0.4 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>0.1 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community organization</td>
<td>2.5 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>0.8 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth organization</td>
<td>3.0 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>0.6 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s organization</td>
<td>2.2 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>0.5 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace organization</td>
<td>1.0 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>0.1 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health organization</td>
<td>1.0 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>0.7 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.2 (N=1,961)</td>
<td>1.1 (N=2,500)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: “Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organisations and activities and say...which, if any, do you belong to?” (A065-A079) in WVS Integrated Questionnaire

### Organizational Membership in Russia: 1995 and 2006 (WVS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational type</th>
<th>1995 (%)</th>
<th>2006 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious organization</td>
<td>5.6 (N=2,040)</td>
<td>11.1% (N=2,007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport or recreational organization</td>
<td>6.2 (N=2,040)</td>
<td>13.6% (N=2,015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art, music, or educational organization</td>
<td>5.6 (N=2,040)</td>
<td>10.4% (N=2,015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor union</td>
<td>39.9 (N=2,040)</td>
<td>17.6% (N=1,999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>1.9 (N=2,040)</td>
<td>5.1% (N=2,012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental organization</td>
<td>1.7 (N=2,040)</td>
<td>4.7% (N=2,013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Organization</td>
<td>Active Members</td>
<td>Inactive Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional association</td>
<td>2.3 (N=2,040)</td>
<td>7.7% (N=2,003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian or charitable organization</td>
<td>1.5 (N=2,040)</td>
<td>5.7% (N=2,013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: “I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?” (A098-A105) in WVS Integrated Questionnaire
Appendix 6

Could you do anything to influence a debate or decision taken by the regional government?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indonesia (2006) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (2005A) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (2005B) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I could do something</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is nothing I could do</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I could be influential</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I could be influential to some extent</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I could influential just a little</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I could hardly be influential</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specifically what could you do to influence local government debate?
(Keio University Research Survey on Political Society)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work through groups</th>
<th>Indonesia (2006) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (2005A) (%)</th>
<th>Russia (2005B) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form a group or organization</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take action through a political party</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take action through an organization (labor union, industry cooperative, religious organization) to which I belong</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask friends and acquaintances to write letters of protest or to sign a petition</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make direct contact with a politician/politicians or the mass media</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write a letter to a politician/politicians</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call to see the leaders of or those in positions of influence in all sectors of society</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make direct contact with a government official/bureaucrat</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal channels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consult a lawyer</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal to the court</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take some kind of direct action</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just protest/complain</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do nothing</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>