Background

In academic year 1998-99 the University of California launched an unprecedented campaign to enhance its outreach to the state’s K-12 public education system. While the University has long been involved in outreach programs that provide tutors, mentors and campus visits to middle and high school students, the current campaign added a new dimension to its educational outreach portfolio: partnerships between the University and educationally low performing high schools. The program aimed to improve the overall academic performance of targeted high schools and their feeder middle and elementary schools. Creation of these partnerships marked a significant expansion of the University’s mission, which had, at least throughout the course of the twentieth century, eschewed direct involvement in K-12 educational reform. What could account for what is generally regarded as fundamental change in the University’s role in the state’s public education system?

The general events that led to the University’s adoption of a large-scale, educational outreach strategy have been widely documented. In July of 1995, the University of California’s Board of Regents adopted SP-1, a policy ending affirmative action in student admissions. In so doing, the Regents simultaneously reaffirmed the University’s long-
standing policy commitment to ethnic, racial, gender, and geographic diversity among its student bodies. Specifically, the Regents called for strategies that would increase the eligibility rates of students who "suffered disadvantage economically or in terms of social environment..." (The Regents of the University of California, 1995, p. 1). The Regents’ impetus for the University to initiate and expand its outreach to public education resulted in an outreach strategy that diverged significantly from the University’s historic relationship to K-12 education. For that reason, it raises important questions. What were the institutional and political pressures that pushed UC to channel significant resources into a new and largely unknown endeavor? Reforming low-performing schools lay beyond both the mission and expertise of the University. Did this signal a deliberate policy shift, a new leadership role and re-engagement with K-12 education?

The larger arena in which these issues play out extends well beyond the walls of the University of California. Over the past 30 years, public perceptions of university admission policies have been shaped by highly charged words such as “merit,” “fairness,” “achievement,” “race-based,” and “preference” (Bowen & Bok, 1998). They raise sensitive, contentious, and polarizing issues. Framing centrist public policy responses to them even under the best of circumstances is a challenging undertaking. Other states, notably Florida, Texas, and Washington, have had to seek alternatives to affirmative action in their admissions policies. UC’s response, however, is unique, and for that reason important as a study of institutional decision making.

This paper first examines the political and institutional forces that shaped the University of California’s current outreach to K-12 public education. We then assess its significance to the University and the institutional framework for education in California generally. Specifically, the study describes the processes that led to the eventual four-pronged outreach plan. Second, it seeks to explain the various political and organization processes that shaped it. And, finally, it attempts to explain why these forces and processes produced the University’s outreach strategy and the state’s unprecedented financial support for its programs.

The study is based on data collected from two principal sources: documents and interviews. Documents related to events and policies contributing to development of UC’s outreach program. Based in part on a preliminary analysis of documentary sources, we developed an initial set of interviewees, who were identified as individuals who had been involved in events contributing to the University’s educational outreach strategy. Subsequently, a snowball strategy was employed to identify additional interviewees.

The Political and Policy Context of Outreach

University of California’s development of an educational outreach strategy during the late 1990’s occurred against a political backdrop that took shape more than thirty years earlier. Like many American universities, the University of California had long struggled to develop and maintain an ethnically and racially diverse student body. Since the early 1960’s the University committed itself to fairly aggressive affirmative action policies, often in spite of legal challenges to them, including the groundbreaking case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978). In response to these challenges, the University has continuously adapted its admissions practices (Ball, 2000; Bowen & Bok, 1998; Douglass, 1997; 1998; Post, 1998).
In the mid 1990s, the issue of racial and ethnic preferences took center stage when at the January 1995 meeting of the Board of Regents, Ward Connerly, an opponent of affirmative action admission policies, placed the issue on the Regent’s agenda. Subsequently, Connerly pressed Governor Wilson, a long-time supporter of affirmative action, to reverse his position. On June 1, 1995, Governor Wilson issued Executive Order W-124-95 to “End Preferential Treatment and to Promote Individual Opportunity Based on Merit,” which required the University of California “take all necessary actions to comply with the intent and requirements of this executive order” (Chavez, 1998).

The End of Affirmative Action and the Need for New Approaches to Diversity

In 1995, the Board of Regents of the University of California adopted SP-1, banning considerations of “race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin as criteria for admission to the University or any program of study.” However, in the final section (Section 9) of SP-1 the Regents affirmed the University’s commitment to the goal of a diverse student body through means other than affirmative action:

Believing California’s diversity to be an asset, we adopt this statement: Because individual members of all of California’s diverse races have the intelligence and capacity to succeed at the University of California, this policy will achieve a UC population that reflects this state’s diversity through the preparation and empowerment of all students in this state to succeed rather than through a system of artificial preferences (Regents of the University of California, 1995, p. 2).

The elimination of affirmative action and the concomitant goal of diversity in its student body committed the Regents to a policy that would satisfy both agendas. This was not likely to be easy since feelings within the University community were quite strong either for or against affirmative action. For the Office of the President, it meant crafting a new policy that could simultaneously embody both positions. To that end, the Regents established the Outreach Task Force to identify strategies to assure that the University remains accessible to students of diverse backgrounds. Specifically, SP-1 directs the Task Force to develop proposals for new directions and increased funding for the Board of Regents to increase eligibility rates of those who are disadvantaged economically or in terms of their social environment. The task force was to be headed by co-chairs, one of whom was Judson King, the University’s Provost and Senior Vice President. The other was to be someone from the business community: Richard Clark, former Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Pacific Gas and Electric and an active alumnus of UC Berkeley.

The membership of the task force proved to be a difficult issue. Bringing together a mix of business, academic, and civic interests was complicated by the politics of the Regent’s SP1 decision. University faculty were strongly divided on the issue and faculty opponents of SP1 questioned whether the Regents could legally dismantle affirmative action. They argued that faculty, not the Regents, controlled student admissions and faculty appointments. Consequently, several prominent professors declined to serve on the task force, leaving the chair of the faculty senate to appoint himself to the task force.
Ultimately, the Outreach Task Force counted 36 members, representing a wide variety of university constituencies: the Regents, the California State University System, community colleges, K-12 public education, state government, business and individuals who held a range of positions in the University, including students, faculty and campus administrators (Chancellors, a Provost, an Executive Vice Chancellor, a Vice Chancellor of Academic Planning and Budget and Vice Chancellors of Student Affairs). The Task Force received principal support from eight members of the staff at UCOP, including a Chancellor Emeritus, the Assistant Vice President of Student Academic Services, the Director and Assistant Director of University Outreach and Student Affairs and Managers of Research and Planning and Early and Immediate Outreach.

The Task Force’s first meeting was at UC Berkeley. The meeting focused on the Task Force’s charge, discussion of key issues, definitions of key terms concerning UC admissions and outreach, descriptions of the University’s existing outreach programs, and reviews of those programs’ past performance. Despite the politically charged issues confronting the Task Force, the Outreach Task Force’s initial meeting was a staid affair. One staff recalled: “It was really lights, camera, action. But, of course, the action didn’t happen.” The long day was largely taken up with informational presentations and statements by individual members of the Task Force. The formal agenda included a series of presentations by UCOP staff, which briefed the Task Force on the nature and scope of the issues and described the University’s existing academic outreach programs. This was part of the necessary build-up to the Task Force’s work, as many members had no previous reason to be informed about UC admissions policies and statistics or about its outreach efforts. This was, according to one member, “brand new ground.” As might be expected, there was a ceremonial aspect to the meeting as well as individual Task Force members reiterated their positions on affirmative action and university outreach.

Subsequent OTF meetings followed similar formats, absent the ceremonial aspects of the initial meeting. Staffers, largely representing the University’s educational outreach programs, made presentations, and described existing programs to increase eligibility among traditionally under-represented students. Other presentations projected the impact on minority admissions if existing trends continued. Finally, representatives from universities in other states described their outreach programs.

These early meetings reflected the political struggle over affirmative action that was enacted by the Regents’ adoption of SP-1. The Regents remained steadfast in their commitment to the principles embodied in the new policy. Their position was supported by others on the Task Force. Yet others expressed their opposition to SP-1, arguing that relying on outreach programs to enhance diversity was tantamount to abandoning the goals of affirmative action. The fact that Proposition 209, a ballot initiative that if enacted would ban affirmative action in the state was pending before California voters, heightened political tensions on the Task Force. Political tensions representing divergent views on university admissions slowed the Task Force’s work in several ways. Opponents of SP-1 raised questions about the legality of the new policy. Attention focused on issues of legality and legitimacy, thus diverting attention from the OTS’s principal objective, to develop alternatives to affirmative action. Another impediment to progress was the reticence of most task force members to state their positions either for or against SP1. They seemed reluctant to commit themselves to particular strategies, because, as an Office of the President staff member noted, “any direction...even the tiniest little move in any direction was weighted with political significance.”
The Task Force was also burdened by the novelty and complexity of their charge. Task Force members knew little about existing programs to encourage diversity. The lack of a history of University involvement in K-12 education and the questions being raised about existing outreach programs provided the Task Force with little guidance on strategies or directions for action. Since adoption of the Master Plan for Higher Education in 1959, the university and K-12 systems had moved further apart, becoming institutionally more distinct. The relative institutional isolation was unaffected by the fact that many of the existing outreach programs focused relatively narrowly on providing services to students from under represented minority groups. Moreover, the Task Force raised concerns about the effectiveness of these programs, noting the absence of systematic program evaluations.

**Developing the Outreach Task Force Report: The Four-Pronged Strategy**

Three developments enabled the Task Force to break through the inertia of its early proceedings. First, in the Fall of 1996, California’s voters passed Proposition 209, ending affirmative action in the state. This reduced, if not entirely eliminated, questions regarding the legal status of SP-1. Task Force members now knew that, realistically, the University could not return to affirmative action. In its stead, the UC would employ K-12 educational outreach programs to increase eligibility rates among students from under represented groups. With the elimination of legal hurdles, the Task Force faced the challenge of charting a course that had little precedent in the University’s history: engaging in efforts to improve the academic performance of the state’s public education system.¹

At its meeting on April 15, 1996, the Task Force divided into five subcommittees: 1) pre-K through 16 outreach, 2) community college outreach, 3) graduate/professional school programs, 4) assessment and evaluation of outreach programs and 5) communication and technology in outreach. Each subcommittee was charged with submitting a report to the Task Force. The smaller groups facilitated greater interaction among members, which enabled them to begin developing positions on specific topics. This provided the Task Force with a sense of movement. The topics on which the subcommittees worked also foreshadowed some of the major prongs of the strategy that the Task Force eventually would recommend in its report. Thus, the subcommittees were instrumental in shaping the deliberations of the Task Force.

Additionally, the Task Force gathered data from several sources. It heard the testimony of directors of existing UC outreach programs, who described their programs’ goals, methods, evaluation results, areas of need, and areas for expansion. The Task Force commissioned four studies. As noted earlier, some Task Force members expressed concerns about the effectiveness of the University’s current early academic outreach programs. To answer these questions, the Task Force commissioned Policy Analysis for California Education (PACE), a research group associated with UC Berkeley, to synthesize evaluation research on UC’s early academic outreach programs. The Task Force also hired a consulting firm to examine the transmission of information regarding UC admissions to students, parents and school counselors. These reports focused the Task Force’s attention on problems and opportunities presented by student-centered

¹ The exception to this is the creation of a secondary school academy at Berkeley in order to insure a supply of students for the university.
outreach and informational outreach, which would become two of the four prongs of its overall outreach strategy (Hayward et al 1997). In addition, two Task Force Subcommittees completed studies of their own. The Community College Outreach Subcommittee compiled the views of community college officials regarding the transfer function and how it could be strengthened to better serve disadvantaged students. The Graduate/Professional School Subcommittee conducted a survey across UC campuses to identify outreach programs that were most effective for recruiting disadvantaged students to graduate and professional schools. While community college outreach and graduate and professional school outreach are not as prominent as other features of the outreach strategy adopted by the Task Force, the studies conducted by the Community College and Graduate/Professional Subcommittees helped to shape the Task Forces final report.

Support staff in the Office of the President did much to shape the outreach strategy adopted by the Task Force. As one might expect, key staff members with responsibility for oversight of the University’s student outreach programs were the ones most heavily involved in developing policy options for the task force. Initially, the staff shied away from advancing specific outreach strategies, bowing to the Task Force as the authorized source of such initiatives. However, the Task Force began to rely increasingly on UCOP staff as it became clear that they possessed the necessary expertise, information, and data to develop policy options.

Among the options on the table was a plan to develop school reform programs with partner schools. UC Irvine had developed a program that involved university faculty and staff in school-based projects. The model seemed sufficiently successful to warrant possible duplication. Most importantly this option placed on the table the possibility of school-centered programs as an alternative to student-centered programs.

In the Task Force’s deliberations, the shift toward school-centered programs, generally, and toward partnerships with low-performing schools, specifically, was gradual. It began with the Task Force’s questioning the effectiveness of existing, student-centered programs. In light of SP-1, Task Force members also raised concerns about the criteria employed by student-centered programs, which often targeted students from minority backgrounds. In the Task Force’s first meetings, the manager of research and planning sought to develop a position on race that the Task Force could endorse. However, the matter of race was avoided by the Task Force, which invoked euphemisms, such as “disadvantaged”. Members of the support staff drafted papers expressing a measured position on race that was to be included in the Task Force’s report. The paper was relegated to the appendices and, ultimately, dropped completely. Once it became clear to the staff that the Task Force would not adopt an outreach strategy that focused on race, they began to seek other solutions. Shifting the emphasis from students to schools, the staff settled on the notion of “low performing schools.”

Reinforcing the assistant vice president’s idea that school-centered programs could produce the results sought by the Task Force, the manager of early and intermediate outreach made the observation that schools were the one place where students were concentrated. The staff’s discussions gravitated increasingly toward school-centered outreach. They began to draw together materials to build enthusiasm on the Task Force for the school-centered approach because, according to one staff member, “It was the only horse in the barn.”
However, the polarization over affirmative action had not diminished among task force members. Consequently, some task force members did not greet the school-centered outreach strategy with unanimous enthusiasm, particularly those who had been associated with student-centered programs on campuses. In spite of resistance to a school-centered strategy, a compromise solution was eventually found: the task force agreed that university outreach would include both student-centered and school-centered approaches, forming the first two prongs of an emerging outreach strategy.

Initial Task Force discussions of school-centered outreach concentrated on using schools to target minority students, which begged the question of what criteria would be employed to select schools. Staff began examining schools' demographic characteristics, searching for a surrogate for ethnicity and race. Family income and percentage of students who would be the first in their families to attend college were considered then dismissed as possible criteria. In both cases, statewide data revealed that schools with high proportions of white or Asian students would also be targeted. Finally, staff landed on the solution: those schools would be chosen to participate whose students performed poorly on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). In a report to the Task Force, the manager of research explained that 80 percent of minority students (African-American and Hispanic) were concentrated in high schools ranking in the lowest two quintiles on the SAT. After some debate, the Task Force adopted the principle of targeting “low performing schools” for involvement in the University’s school-centered outreach programs. Members reasoned that selecting schools on the basis of academic performance was in keeping with the language of SP-1, which banned the consideration of race and ethnicity and called for outreach to students suffering “disadvantage economically or in terms of social environment.”

The focus on school performance brought another shift in the Task Force’s focus. While the initial intent was to use academic performance solely as a means of targeting schools, that criterion clearly implied a purpose for university intervention: improving the academic performance of partner schools. Following this reasoning, the Task Force’s support staff began thinking seriously about school improvement and reform. The principal staff members had experience working only with traditional, student-centered outreach programs. Consequently, they sought the advice of others on the staff at UCOP, people who were involved in other types of outreach. They included administrators of programs that provided professional development for teachers, including the state’s Beginning Teacher Support and Assessment Program and the California Subject Matter Project. The staff uncovered “UC and the Schools” a report that had been compiled a year before the adoption of SP-1. It catalogued more than eight hundred programs across the UC system that linked the University to K-12 public education. This report provided substantial grist for the staff members seeking evidence of the University’s capacity to engage in school reform. It is worth noting that almost all of the work to develop a school-centered strategy was conducted by the staff at UCOP. Indeed, one staff member thought it ironic that they did not engage faculty from the UC system’s schools of education, some of whom are nationally recognized authorities on school reform and teacher professional development.

As they gathered information about school-centered outreach, University administration raised serious reservations about the strategy. When the Provost apprized the University’s President, Richard Atkinson, of the school-centered approach, he initially opposed it on grounds that school reform lay beyond the University’s mission. He also feared that the University would become mired in the failures of the K-12 school system.
Provost King voiced similar concerns, based on his belief that UC faculty would not engage in school improvement programs. Other Task Force members also expressed doubts about the success of school-centered reform strategies. They debated whether such programs could produce timely, measurable improvements in the academic performance of schools. Others doubted that the state would provide adequate resources to support school-centered programs, which are necessarily complex and, thus, costly.

Matters came to a head when staff members began preparing a presentation that outlined an outreach strategy comprising three strands—student-centered, school-centered and informational—to the Task Force. Sensing that the university’s top leadership might not support the inclusion of school-centered programs, staff members approached the task force’s co-chair, the Provost. He explained that he could not support including the school-centered component because the President continued to express strong reservations. The Provost directed staff to develop another approach. The Provost also indicated that if, after the Assistant Vice President made the presentation, the Task Force adopted the three prongs, including the school-centered approach, he would not oppose the plan.

Staff working on the outreach strategy believed that the meeting at which the Assistant Vice President would present the three-pronged outreach strategy was critical. The staff feared that if the Task Force did not approve the plan they would have to start over. They could see no alternative to the school-centered strategy and believed it was the only solution to the impasse on the task force over race-based preferential admissions. In this presentation to the task force, the assistant vice president emphasized that by improving the academic performance of low performing schools the University could increase the number and, thus, the proportion of students from disadvantaged—minority—backgrounds eligible for admission to the University of California. With little discussion about feasibility or specific programs and activities, the Outreach Task Force accepted the proposal. To staff members, the Task Force’s response was “flat,” not exhibiting enthusiastic support or vocal opposition. Some Task Force members recall only that the group’s response was “calm.” One noted that the “three-pronged approach was common sense,” because to do anything less would ignore important aspects of the problem. According to some sources, during the Task Force’s discussion of the proposal, the Provost introduced the need to include the evaluation of outreach programs as a fourth prong.

After the Task Force approved the three-pronged proposal, the staff engaged in a long process of writing and revising drafts of the final report. By all accounts, numerous drafts were circulated for feedback from the Task Force and UC administration. The strategy that was finally accepted proposed a strategy that included four components: 1) student-centered, 2) school-centered and 3) informational programs, and 4) evaluation.

While the Task Force worked with support staff to finalize its report, a sub-group on the Task Force generated a minority report. Led by the student representative, some members of the Task Force continued to take issue with SP-1 and called for a return to affirmative action. Echoing dissent expressed early in the Task Force’s deliberations, the minority report claimed that the proposed outreach strategy would never fill holes left by affirmative action and, therefore, was not a valid response to the pursuit of diversity in the University’s student body. Again reflecting sentiments expressed earlier by UC faculty and staff, the final report of the Outreach Task Force was greeted in some
corners of the University with hostility and claims that the document amounted to “treason.”

Controversy notwithstanding, the Outreach Task Force published its report in July 1997. In its original charge, which was issued as a section of SP-1 in July 1995, the Board of Regents had called for the Task Force to complete its work in six months. Confronted with challenges posed by the politically charged issue of affirmative action and the challenges posed by the University’s active engagement in K-12 reform, the Task Force’s work took almost two years to complete. Informed profoundly by the work of its support staff, the Task Force adopted an outreach strategy that broke new ground for the University of California system by committing to engage in partnerships with public schools.

Budget Negotiations

The Outreach Task Force presented its report to the Board of Regents. The Regents accepted the report, as one recalled, with “great enthusiasm.” The next step was to implement the recommendations contained in the report. To do that, the University needed legislative support to finance its proposed outreach program.

In its report, the Outreach Task Force concluded that the University already spent sixty million dollars supporting educational outreach programs and activities and argued for doubling that figure. Others doubted the validity of those figures, estimating that the University actually spent about half the stated amount on outreach programs. The rest was derived from budgets of programs such as the Beginning Teacher Support and Assessment program and the Subject Matter Projects, which were not generally included in the University’s outreach portfolio.

Nonetheless, the Budget Office of UCOP used the $60 million figure and proposed doubling it in five years. After taking stock of the political landscape, the University requested that $5 million be included for educational outreach in its 1998-99 budget. With the Outreach Task Force’s report in hand, University representatives began a campaign to explain and sell the four-pronged, outreach strategy in the state capitol. They met with legislators, committee consultants in both the Assembly and Senate and staff in the Department of Finance.

From the outset, the University encountered difficulties in convincing policy makers in Sacramento of the value of school-centered outreach. Those familiar with student-centered outreach programs were generally quite supportive. Assembly Speaker Anthony Villaraigosa, for instance, emerged as the chief legislative sponsor of the University’s educational outreach package. As speaker, he championed it through the Assembly.

UC staff involved in budget negotiations marveled as their initial request for $5 million grew first to around $20 million then to over $30 million. Initially, however, only $4 million of the over $30 million for University outreach was slated for school-centered outreach. The bulk of the funds would support student-centered programs. However, one crucial step remained: the Speaker met with Governor Pete Wilson in the final negotiations over the funding package for UC’s educational outreach proposal. Here matters changed dramatically. According to reports, Ward Connerly, the UC Regent who had crafted SP-1, had spoken with the Governor and expressed his support for school-centered
outreach programs. Additionally, the University’s representatives had been more successful in convincing the Department of Finance of the importance of school-university partnerships. The result was that student-centered programs and school-centered partnerships would each receive $15 million during the next year.

Assessing the Significance of UC Outreach

The Task Force recommendations, their adoption by the Regents, and their financial support by policy makers in Sacramento form the cornerstone of a new policy direction for the university. While two dimensions of the outreach strategy—informal outreach and academic development—were to build on existing outreach efforts, the school-centered partnership signals a fairly dramatic, and, for the university, new policy and program development.

School-centered partnerships are potentially a significant policy shift for several reasons. First among them are the new responsibilities it assigns to UC—responsibilities that push beyond those defined in the 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education. Indeed, a central feature of the Master Plan was to move the state’s educational system toward greater functional separation and role specialization. UC’s institutional trajectory, particularly over the second half of the 20th century, has been to develop its own institutional identity, thereby carving for itself a unique institutional niche. In contrast to the pre-Master Plan years, contact between UC and pre-collegiate education has been increasingly pared to various signals UC sends to high schools regarding admissions—the accreditation of the “A through F” eligibility requirements, for instance. The second reason is that school-centered partnerships ideally require a much higher level and a more broadly based level of engagement by various elements of the UC community than the traditionally student-centered outreach programs that comprise UC’s outreach programs since the mid 1960s. Third, because school-centered partnerships are meant to reach more deeply into the core of the university’s activities, such activities are, potentially, more likely to disrupt the existing academic culture of the university.

UC’s response to the elimination of affirmative action is also significant within the national context. Over the past six years the states of Texas, Washington, and Florida have eliminated racial- and ethnic-based preferential admissions to their state universities. While those states, as California, have committed to maintaining racial and ethnic diversity in their university systems, their strategies differ markedly from California’s.

As noted earlier, subsequent policy events underscored the policy shift and placed it visibly into the state’s political arena. These include the allocation of $38.5 million from the 1998-99 state budget to UC to fund proposed outreach efforts. Although the initial budget allocation to school-university partnerships was only $15 million, it carried political visibility beyond its dollar value and pushed the university into K-12 reform. Since 1997-98, UC’s budget for systemwide outreach and K-14 improvement programs has increased by 912 percent, from just under $32.5 million in 1997-98 to just over $328 million in 2000-01. The dramatic budgetary growth is, of course, reflected in equally dramatic program and FTE growth, both within the Office of the President and on campuses.
If, indeed, the current structure of outreach programs represents a new direction in policy for UC, the policy shift raises some important questions. Does the role of UC in schools send an important, symbolic message about changes in UC’s mission? What is the capacity of the university to respond to this charge, and what is the inherent basis of expertise from which UC can draw as a way of supporting the policy objectives that drive these budget allocations?

The Historical Context for Outreach

UC’s engagement with K-12 is neither a new nor recent phenomenon. Its roots are anchored in admission policy established by the Regents soon after the university’s founding. That policy is guided by seven principles. The first four of them were established in the charter that created the university in 1868. They stated that admission should be non-sectarian, admission, and indeed all aspects of university management, should be free of political partisanship, the university should be tuition free to all residents of the state, and that the institution draw students from all parts of the state. A fifth principle, added in the early 1870s, stated that admission to the university should be selective, admitting students who have the ability to successfully complete a university degree. Also in 1870, the Regents adopted a sixth general principle, that women should be admitted on equal terms with men. (Douglass 1998, 1999; Clifford 1995) The final principle regarding university admissions was established in 1974 through legislative enactment and endorsed by the Regents. That principle stated that undergraduate admissions to the university should reflect the general ethnic, sexual, and economic composition of California high school graduates (Douglass 1998).

While UC’s commitment to the dual goals of diversity and selectivity has shaped admissions policies almost from its beginnings, both the underlying rationale and specific policy strategies to realize those ends have varied. To maintain its existence in the early years, the university had to establish its own preparatory school in order to develop an elite teaching corps and build a secondary school system that would, in the future, supply the university with students. Geraldine Clifford argues that UC’s policy of gender equity, while serving a broader public interest, also served the interests of the university in supplying well qualified women to teach in the state’s developing secondary school system (1995). A secondary school system that could produce qualified graduates for UC was, in turn, essential to realization of UC’s commitment to selectivity and to its mission of advanced training, research, and public service. In 1893, California becomes the first state to require college graduation as a condition for a high school teacher’s certificate (Clifford 1995, pg. xix).

Throughout its history, UC’s capacity to realize its mission as a selective, yet public, land-grant, institution has been closely connected to the quality of graduates coming from the state’s high schools. Prior to the Master Plan for Higher Education, that connection was a fairly close one, relying on both formal and informal standards of

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2 Douglas (1998) notes that UC’s policy contrasted with those of other land grant universities who, bowing to populist demands, were open to virtually anyone who applied.

3 Geraldine Clifford states that “all early California institutions competed for the same tiny supply of academy and high school graduates and the privately tutored, and all enrolled more preparatory than college students. She points out that institutional differentiation was undeveloped in the 19th century in California colleges. Santa Clara, for instance, one of the Jesuit colleges, took students as young as six years old. (1995, p. 27)
professionalism. In the early years, admission was based upon faculty examination of candidates. Later, university faculty accredited schools and certified teachers. From 1919 to 1931 admission to UC was based entirely upon high school principals' recommendations. Thereafter, admissions standard began to shift more toward administrative standardization. After 1931, admission was based on a student's academic record—overall grade-point average, fulfillment of the “a to f” requirements—with the latter being subject to UC accreditation. Relations between the university and high schools were also formalized through the Association of Secondary School Principals, which met regularly with university officials.

What might be called an institutionally integrated and professionally oriented model of school-university relations began to fracture and eventually crumble after the enactment of the Master Plan for Higher Education. The Master Plan moved the state's educational system towards greater functional separation and increased institutional specialization. Increasingly, contact with schools regarded admissions—the accreditation of “A through F” requirements. The adoption of admissions criteria based on a combination of SAT scores and grades in 1968 was a step to further standardize admissions to UC, but had the effect of fundamentally altering the nature of UC’s relations with schools. It was at this time that university “outreach” shifted from an organizational to an individual focus. Admissions were no longer defined by professional norms—professional judgment, but by bureaucratic norms—grades and test scores.

Prior to 1960, the university played an important leadership role for education in the state. But, beginning with the 1970's, K-12 and university relations began to take on a more bureaucratic and more formal character as their institutional identities became more distinct. As others have pointed out, the university had created “a policy framework in which eligibility for admission was based primarily on school-specific criteria: grades in a specific set of courses. The SAT provided a comparative and non-site specified tool—largely an alternative path for eligibility” (Douglass 1999, p. 399). This shift was also manifested in UC-school relations which shifted focus from schools to students and was visible in the growth of programs like MESA, PUENTE, and EAOP (Gandara et al 1998).

The critical question here is whether current outreach efforts, particularly school-university partnerships, reverse the trend of the past 30 years by moving once again toward a school-based model. While current, student-centered outreach efforts simply expand existing programs, school-university partnerships move outreach in a very different direction. The most notable change in that direction is that it places the university squarely in the midst of K-12 school reform.

From an institutional perspective, this is a dramatic change from past practice and is difficult, at this stage of implementation, to assess its institutional significance. Based on the budget and FTE growth within the Office of the President, one can glimpse a nascent version of a parallel state department of education—one that is organized along similar principles as the state education department before the 1970s. Under the Vice President for Outreach, there is a burgeoning division that is responsible for K-12 outreach programs. This comprises specialists in subject matter areas—science, mathematics, language arts—coordinators to work with the other higher education segments, and large numbers of individuals to work with schools. The budget in this area has increased by just over $164 million since 1997-98. As noted earlier, funding for K-14 outreach has increased nine-fold since 1997-98. While some of that money has gone to augment existing programs, the bulk of the money funds new programs. And though the main
share of new resources has gone to K-12 professional development, it may well be on
the basis of the school-university partnerships (representing just over 9 percent of the
budget) that the success or failure of all outreach efforts will ultimately be judged by the
legislature.

The risk to the university is that it takes on responsibility for something that lies beyond
its mission, capacity, and expertise, but for which it will be held accountable. Unlike the
state education department which has statutory and administrative authority over
schools, the university has no such formal authority. The success of outreach efforts
relies entirely on the incentives they can offer to schools. But, what makes the
undertaking a high risk venture is the fact that the university has taken on the
responsibility of improving schools that have the lowest rates of student achievement in
the state. Many of these schools have been unable to show improvement in spite of a
history of state and federal carrots and sticks to do so.

**UC’s Response in the National Context**

California is not alone, of course, in its struggle to find alternatives to affirmative action.
Texas eliminated affirmative action in higher education admissions in its response to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in *Hopwood v. State of Texas* in 1994. The state’s response is
embodied in *Texas House Bill 588*, 1977, which required the top ten percent of public
and private high school graduates to be admitted to the public university of their choice
without regard to standardized test scores or other criteria (Healy, 1977). The plan
addressed the challenges presented by the *Hopwood* decision by creating a means for
increasing minority representation while maintaining race-neutral admissions. It
accomplished this by focusing on de facto segregation in Texas school districts and
shifting the focus from standardized test scores to grade-point averages. Furthermore,
for those students falling into the top 25 percent of high school graduates, they could be
considered for admission based on specific socio-economic indicators. The only
requirement imposed by the bill on students enrolled through the ten-percent plan is that
they be evaluated for purposes of referral to preparatory or remedial programs (Holley &
Spencer, 1999).

On November 9, 1999, Florida Governor Jeb Bush announced that, as part of his Florida
One Initiative, the ten universities in the State University System (SUS) would no longer
consider race as a factor in undergraduate admissions. Under the Governor’s proposal,
institutions in the SUS would admit the top 20 percent of the graduating class of each
Florida public high school beginning with the class of 2000. While students are
guaranteed admission to one of the SUS schools, their first choice is not guaranteed.
Eligibility requirements for the program are that the student be enrolled as a senior in a
Florida public high school; the student rank in the top 20 percent of his or her graduating
class as based upon ranking by cumulative GPA; completion of 19 college preparatory
credits; submission of SAT or ACT scores, though no minimum test score is required for
inclusion in the Talented 20 Program. These scores are used to determine whether
students are in need of remedial instruction in English and mathematics. Schools are
responsible for determining student ranking.

In addition to guaranteed admission to the top 20 percent of high school graduates, SUS
offers a third path to admission, the “Profile Assessment.” Admission under this program
is capped at 10 percent for first-time students. Each institution within the state university
system is responsible for developing the criteria. However, an implementation task force
Timar, Ogawa, and Orillion, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT OUTREACH

has recommended a list which includes student’s family education background, geographic location, student’s socio-economic status, student’s school achievement status. Beyond these, the task force has an additional 25 criteria. They provide SUS considerable latitude and discretion in admissions (Rosenberg 1999).

In November 1998, voters in Washington approved a measure, I-200, which, like California’s Proposition 209, abolishes affirmative action policies by all public agencies in the state. In issuing the state directive to implement the measure, Washington’s governor proposed that state institutions of higher learning intensify their outreach efforts to maintain diversity in the system. University of Washington’s president also affirmed the university’s commitment to diversity. However, the institutional response to the elimination of affirmative action in Washington has focused principally on the expansion of outreach programs. These, as those in other states, focus on student counseling, family information, and various programs to increase the eligibility pool of minority applicants.

Clearly, there is considerable similarity among the four states—California, Florida, Texas, and Washington—in their responses to the elimination of affirmative action policies. California developed a 4 percent plan while Florida and Texas developed their respective 10 and 20 percent plans. In addition, each state increased funding for scholarships and other forms of student aid and intensified and broadened their outreach activities. However, California stands alone in its adoption of a professional development, school improvement strategy. These other states have taken a safer, administrative-bureaucratic route to increasing the minority student eligibility pool. And their strategies are much more consistent and fit more comfortably within the institutional envelope of university-school relations. While the strategies of the other states can be characterized as marginal adjustments, UC’s strategy is more aptly characterized as a broadening of its institutional mission. The combination of a professional development and school improvement strategy require the university not only to do more, but—more importantly—to do things differently.

**UC Outreach within the State’s Education Policy Context**

In addition to the historical and organizational issues that UC’s outreach strategies raise, there loom the larger policy implications of UC’s role in school reform. One characterization of these events is that the university is once again reasserting its former leadership role for education in the state. While it could be argued that school-university partnerships and professional development activities are solely oriented toward influencing practice and not policy, one may also wonder how long it will be before questions of practice metamorphose into initiatives for policy. Alternatively, it could be argued that outreach activities do no more than intensify and expand existing programs. Professional development activities, for instance build on the existing Subject Matter projects that have been housed in the Office of the President for some 20 years. Similarly, student academic development programs have been in the university’s portfolio for nearly 30 years. Indeed, the task force responsible for forging UC’s new outreach policies, identified some 800 school-university programs scattered throughout the state.

Another possible signal for a shift in the university’s role is in the policy and program convergence that new outreach policies have promulgated. Prior to 1997-98, various programs related to schools tended to exist within their own spheres. The Subject Matter
Projects, MESA, PUENTE, EAOP, and others scattered among campuses and within UCOP tended to be disparate programs that existed within their own spheres of influence, with their own constituencies and connected to schools and one another through a rather loose professional network. Over the past 4 years, these programs have converged under a new umbrella of university outreach within an entirely new bureaucratic structure in the Office of the President.

Budgetary Politics and the University

As we noted earlier, the expansion of UC student and school-centered outreach programs has taken the University into new and unfamiliar territory. We have also noted some of the vulnerabilities that this creates for the university, namely the risk of assuming responsibility for something that the University is neither institutionally nor organizationally prepared to undertake. Moreover, it creates expectations, particularly within the legislature, for the university to show commitment and success for outcomes over which the university has only marginal control. Finally, the funding to support the programs is simply a line item in the Governor’s budget. The significance of this is that it is only an annual appropriation. It has no statutory guarantee as do the plethora of categorically funded programs in K-12 for instance.

The institutional culture of the university is a factor that complicates successful implementation of school-based university partnership programs. The legislature assumes program implementation by the mere fact that it has allocated funds to the Office of the President. Unlike other programs, however, the Office of the President cannot implement programs such as these, but has to rely on campuses to do so. But how campuses respond and how these programs connect to schools dependent upon a variety of factors over which the Office of the President has very little control. The Office of the President can provide incentives, encouragement, technical assistance, and can issue directives and mandates, but the fact remains that it has no line authority for program administration and only indirect effect on program quality. It is reasonable to assume, however, that even under the best of circumstances such programs take time—several years—to implement. Since campuses (often not even their schools of education) have little or no history in working directly with schools, new relationships must be developed between schools and campuses. This is not only a slow process, it is a difficult process fraught with many pitfalls. While campuses have money to leverage entrance to schools, entry is only a necessary, though hardly a sufficient condition. The problem is all the more difficult when one recalls that the schools that have been targeted for partnership are those that are the persistently lowest performing in the state. These are schools that have either resisted the onslaught of state policy palliatives over the past 15 years or simply do not know convert resources into high quality outcomes.

If the university’s school outreach programs can have in impact on teaching and learning in schools and if that impact translates into more students being eligible for UC admissions, it is not likely to happen over two or even three or four years. The notion that seemingly intractable problems of education, problems that have eluded policy makers for decades, can be solved in the short run by giving the university marginal resources for intervention programs tests credulity. Such programs may take years to show successful results. How the university and school cultures interact will have a great impact on their success. But, it is clear that such interactions must be nurtured over time. Over the past 30 years of school reform efforts, we know that school reform is a mediated process that takes time. This is particularly so when successful implementation
requires individuals to think and do things very differently, when it requires changes in
socialization and cognition. However, the culture of the legislature, particularly since
imposition of term limits, is for quick, demonstrable results. The legislative tendency over
the past decade especially has been to search for quick fixes to complex problems.

Given that continued state funding for outreach is vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the
budgetary process and given the unrealistic expectations of the legislature, it would be
natural to have legitimate doubts about the future of university outreach programs,
particularly school-based outreach. Indeed, there are indications that the university will
abandon that strategy—a strategy of professional engagement with K-12—in favor of a
bureaucratic or administrative strategy that relies on changing admissions criteria or
processes and testing requirements. Just recently, the Regents agreed to change to
percentage of admissions who will be admitted based on grades and test scores alone.
As an extension of exam in favor of the SAT II. Faced
with the largest revenue shortfall since the Second World War, the state will have to trim
as much as $14 billion from its budget next year. Where these cuts will fall may have
much to do with how programs are regarded by the legislature and the governor.

Conclusion

From the perspective of history, the university’s dilemma over admissions recalls prior
conflicts stemming from tensions inherent in the university’s efforts to balance access
and selectivity. Faced with similar pressures in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, a number of land grant universities sacrificed selectivity to open admissions.
The University of California’s response to pressures for increased access during the
early part of the 20th century was to abet creation of the community colleges. In the post-
World War II years, the university supported expansion and development of the normal
school system into the state college and, subsequently, state university system. The
strategy of creating a tiered institutional structure expanded access to higher education
while allowing the university to maintain its selectivity and elite academic status. Issues
related to admissions and the conflicts defining them took on a new shape in the 1970s.
Most importantly, the issue of access to higher education began to focus on access to
the University of California specifically. The University was able to accommodate these
pressures by a combination of outreach strategies—developing its relations with
schools—and adjustments in its admissions procedures.

Since the adoption of SP-1, the conversation among policy makers, particularly in
Sacramento, has shifted in some important ways. Most important among them is that the
University is being held accountable for the number of minority students eligible for
admission. In legislative hearings over the past two years, the University, not the K-12
system, has been routinely blamed for not doing more to increase the numbers
admissible minority students. One legislator voiced his expectation that there would be a
person from the University of California on every high school campus in the state.
Clearly, the University must have some responsibility in shaping the quality of K-12
education in the state, but reforming schools is probably not one of them. Just what the
University’s role ought to be is presently not clear. Whatever it is, it will require a long-
term institutional commitment. Whether that is possible in the current political climate is
matter of considerable uncertainty.
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