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Abstract


by

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This dissertation seeks to contribute to the history of internationalism through an examination of the early nineteenth century French peace movement. It argues that the French movement contributed to the international peace movement both in theory and practice, by drawing on the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment to make peace the subject of organized activism.

The early nineteenth century international peace movement is seen as the work of Dissenting sects in Britain and America, with the assistance of Free Traders like Richard Cobden. The French peace advocates’ ideological roots, in contrast, can be found in the Enlightenment – in the peace thinking of the philosophes, but also in debates on economy, culture, religion, politics, etc. They drew upon the work of particular authors like Jean-Baptiste Say, Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant, but above all continued general Enlightenment notions like historical progress and human perfectability. This intellectual heritage helped French peace advocates to imagine a distinct model of international cooperation, one in which political, cultural and economic borders remained in flux. It also gave them the tools to denounce colonialism – all while attempting to maintain forms of soft power for French ‘civilization’.

French peace advocates were more restricted than American and British pacifists in their forms of activism, but they also published a wide range of materials on peace, developed arguments for peace within associations, and participated in and promoted the international congresses. Through these practices, French peace advocates contributed to the development of civil society, nationally and internationally. A study of their movement shows how and why this transition from philosophy to organized action became possible.

Often dismissed as utopian, the history of the early peace movement can help us to better understand the development of French, European and international history. Like many groups in the early nineteenth century, French peace advocates were deeply optimistic about their program and their potential agency. However, this seemingly utopian program continues to have considerable resonance today, in contemporary international institutions as well as in ongoing debates about democracy and political change.
For my family
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This dissertation is dedicated to my family – most of all, my parents, brother and husband, who have shown unending support and patience throughout all these years of intellectual and geographical backs and forth. Without the love, understanding and encouragement of my family, I do not know where I would be today.
Introduction

“The changes which tend permanently to elevate and refine humanity must be brought about by gentler, quieter, and more invisible influences...They who were courageously wielding those influences, diffusing information, stimulating intelligence, attracting and refining the sympathies of men, were engaged in a more practical work than ever they would be in resorting to statesmen with their intrigues and their standing armies...This was the special business of the Congress – to lift up to such a conspicuous position as would attract towards it the attention of all nations the principle they sought to commend.”

- Émile de Girardin, speech to the Third General Peace Congress, Frankfurt, Germany, 1850

Aims of the Dissertation

In today’s globalizing world, the deep histories of transnational movements and mechanisms have attracted much interest. Scholars have examined processes of economic integration, the history of international institutions, the development of transnational social activism and many other elements of global integration. This dissertation reconstructs the history of French participation in one of the first internationalist movements – the international peace movement of the early nineteenth century. Arising in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, the movement came to unite a variety of figures throughout Europe and America – pastors and priests, lawyers, politicians, political economists, authors and journalists – in a series of highly-publicized international congresses to promote a concrete agenda for sustainable international peace. These ‘peace friends’ called for international arbitration, international law, a Congress of Nations, an international court, arms reduction, and education reform. Outside of the congresses, members of the movement promoted this agenda by publishing tracts, pamphlets, books, poetry, and journal articles; founding journals on the subject of peace; holding large public meetings; and forming committees and associations. It was one of the world’s first transnational and internationalist movements.

This dissertation pushes against conceptions of the early international peace movement as an “Anglo-American” phenomenon, demonstrating that French participants had a unique and important role to play in the movement and in the birth of internationalism more generally. It argues that the French movement contributed to the development of international society both in theory and practice. Like their British and American counterparts, French peace advocates published a wide range of materials on the question of peace, debated it in associations, and participated in and promoted the international congresses. Intellectually, the French movement added new dimensions. Drawing on Enlightenment thought and responding to the political and material conditions of the ‘Dual Revolutions’, the French peace movement offered a more secular, historically-minded and civilizational vision of perpetual peace. The dissertation identifies their movement as “reformist internationalism”, a position between contemporaneous conservative and revolutionary internationalisms that, I will argue, would have an essential legacy for the Europe of the future.

Contributions to Scholarship


International History and Internationalisms

International history has become a dynamic and innovative field in recent years. As Martin Geyer and Johannes Paulmann point out, although international history has traditionally concerned foreign policy, diplomacy and war, scholars are increasingly turning to subjects like non-governmental organizations and transnational civil society movements.\(^3\) Mark Mazower has written a masterful overview of the history of internationalism, which integrates an examination of power politics with new research on social movements, inter- and non-governmental organizations and international law.\(^4\)

This dissertation hopes to contribute to the scholarship on internationalism in a variety of ways. Firstly, it will propose a new rubric for early nineteenth century internationalisms – conservative, revolutionary and reformist. As a historian, I do not propose a fixed or timeless system of categorization, but only a lexicon more suited to the subject matter at hand. Secondly, I aim to show how the French peace movement played a crucial role in the development of internationalism through its reformist approach.

Scholars have largely categorized internationalisms according to political orientation or content. Carsten Holbraad’s *Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought*, for example, provides an account of European internationalisms in terms of political orientation. An international relations specialist, Holbraad distinguishes between three major forms of both internationalism and nationalism: conservative, socialist and liberal. He defines internationalism as the “ideology of international bonding” and nationalism as the “ideology of opposition to international bonding”.\(^5\) In his schema, conservative internationalism centers around security issues and hopes to maintain the established international order; liberal internationalism seeks to transpose liberal values for domestic politics – liberty, equality, democracy, human rights, etc – to the international realm; and socialist internationalism aims to promote socialist ideology and political structures abroad, through revolution or reform.\(^6\)

Historians have often taken another approach, examining internationalism according to the *content* motivating international cooperation. F. S. L. Lyons famous overview of nineteenth century internationalisms, *Internationalism in Europe, 1815-1914*, for example, divides internationalism in terms of economics, workers’ rights, humanitarianism and intellectual and cultural exchange.\(^7\) Similarly, Akira Iriye has written about cultural internationalism, or international cooperation surrounding art, music, cultural heritage and the like.\(^8\)

Finally, Martin Geyer and Johannes Paulmann have divided internationalisms as either movements or processes. They state in their co-edited volume *The Mechanics of Internationalism*: “In the nineteenth century, internationalism encompassed two different things, though in an increasingly uncomfortable way: political and social movements trying to create international identities and to reform society and politics by way of transnational co-operation, and the process of internationalizing cultural, political and economic practices.”\(^9\) Their book includes examples of both: chapters on international women’s organizations, the Second

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International and Freemasonry in the first place; chapters on trade policies, passports and the spread of the metric system in the second. This dual approach is a welcome addition to the expanding scholarship on internationalism.

This dissertation examines a movement dedicated to a particular cause: international peace. It sees the international peace movement as ‘internationalist’ both in its ideology – an “ideology of international cooperation”, following Carsten Holbraad’s definition – and in its practice of transnational activism. Pacifism and internationalism are, of course, not necessarily synonymous. Absolute pacifism is often defined as a refusal – a refusal to participate individually or collectively in warfare. This does not necessarily imply a call for international cooperation. However, the early international peace movement was internationalist. It called for active processes of international integration in matters of culture, technology, economics and politics.

In France, the peace movement defined itself against two, more powerful, forms of internationalism at the time: conservative and revolutionary. Conservative internationalists included monarchs and their agents attempting to maintain the international political order defined by the Concert of Europe in 1815. Revolutionary internationalists were radical republicans seeking to institute a new democratic order across Europe. They insisted on immediate political change through local insurrection and foreign military intervention. These two internationalisms defined themselves through their mutual opposition.

The peace movement, however, took another approach, advocating a transformation of international society through nonviolent processes of change. For peace advocates, nonviolence was both a principle for political change and an end in itself. Their movement was, above all, bound by a common preference for progressive reform – rather than conservatism or revolution – as the means of building international society.

While ‘reformist’ may seem to be code for ‘liberal’, I call peace advocates’ internationalism reformist rather than liberal for several reasons. Firstly, and most simply, not all French peace advocates were liberals. Politically, the French peace movement fell within the heterogeneous center. Between conservative and revolutionary internationalism, we can find a number of groups in this period, including moderate republicans, liberal constitutional monarchists and utopian socialists. Individuals from all of these groups joined the international peace movement.

Roughly speaking, the peace movement can be divided into religious, economic and political strands. French religious pacifists included the Société de la morale chrétienne, an ecumenical Christian philanthropic group composed of Bonapartists, constitutionalists and Saint-Simonians. Athanase Coquerel, another French religious pacifist, was a republican deputy. The abbé Deguerry, on the other hand, appeared more apolitical but accepted a lead position under Napoleon III. Most economic pacifists, however, can certainly be described as liberals. For political economists involved in the peace movement, such as Frédéric Bastiat, Joseph Garnier, Horace Say, Gustave Molinari and Gilbert Guillaumin, economic liberty was central to their program – they campaigned for the end of monopolies, corporatism, trade restrictions, etc. Nonetheless, Émile de Girardin, a key contributor to economic pacifist discourse, eschewed political affiliations. As for political pacifists, the three main advocates of international confederation in France in this period were Francisque Bouvet, a moderate republican; Victor Hugo, at that point also a moderate republican; and Constantin Pecqueur, a ‘utopian’ or romantic socialist influenced by the ideas of Henri de Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier. A movement including but not limited to liberals evidently needs a wider term to encompass them.
Moreover, the international peace movement shared certain aspects with what we would call liberal internationalism today, but also significant differences. They generally did not make arguments about how other states should organize politically on the domestic level, and certainly did not think that force should be used to impose a particular political system in other states.10 They refused armed intervention and did not aim to promote democracy abroad: these were part of the agenda of radical republicans, whom they opposed. Neither was their discourse one of human rights – the term ‘rights’, in fact, rarely appears in their writings. Many peace advocates were humanitarians, taking part in campaigns against slavery, poverty, etc.; however, they framed most of their activism in terms of duties, particularly the duties of states vis-à-vis citizens.

Finally, I would not unite the early French peace movement under the label of liberal internationalism because ‘liberty’ was not the connecting thread of the movement. Economic liberty formed an important part of economic pacifists’ projects for international peace, but this is not what united them with other parts of the peace movement. Yet for religious and political pacifists, liberty was not a central concept or concern.

What we can see as the connecting thread, however, is reform. All segments of the French peace movement were dedicated to the notion of reform – moral, political, economic, international. They called for a positive program of domestic and international peace to be achieved through progressive, nonviolent change. They wanted to reform contemporary society to privilege respect for human life; tolerate difference; foster material and intellectual exchange; and further economic, cultural and political integration. They were not absolute pacifists, but they believed that nonviolent reform was the most beneficial way for peoples to achieve a more prosperous society respectful of human life.11

This dissertation will show how early French peace movement represented reformist internationalism, firstly, in its practices. Previously, peace had been the object of philosophical debate. Writers like the abbé de Saint-Pierre, Voltaire and Emmanuel Kant had considered the question of ‘perpetual peace’ and proposed philosophical principles for its institution. The novelty of the international peace movement was that it went beyond philosophical discourse to make peace the object of organized activism. Peace movement activists promoted international peace through associations; pamphlets, articles and books; specialized newspapers; meetings; and international congresses. French peace advocates enthusiastically took up these practices. They were more restricted than American and British pacifists in their forms of activism, due to the tight regulations on speech and assembly in early nineteenth century France, but they, too, published a wide range of materials on peace, developed arguments for peace within

10 Take for example Michael Howard’s definition of liberal internationalism, which cannot be used to describe the international peace movement. In fact, it more aptly fits revolutionary internationalism: “By the end of the eighteenth century a complete liberal theory of international relations, of war and peace, had thus already developed…According to this doctrine, mankind would naturally live in a state of perfect harmony if it were not for the vested interests of governments…Break the power of the Establishment, introduce a political system in which popular interests were truly represented, demolish all artificial barriers to international intercourse, and the whole nightmare would quickly disappear…Peace was therefore fundamentally a question of the establishment of democratic institutions throughout the world.” Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (London: Hurst & Company, 2008), 23.

11 Martin Ceadel remarks on such peace advocates, or “pacificists”, as he terms them: “Pacificism has already been described as a reformist position. In other words it has been more than an expression of faith in the latent harmony of the international system: it has identified a practical reform by which that harmony can be actualized.” Martin Ceadel, The Origins of War Prevention: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1730-1854 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 38.
associations, and participated in and promoted the international congresses. Through these practices, French peace advocates contributed to the development of civil society, nationally and internationally.

Secondly, this dissertation will show how French peace advocates provided a unique intellectual contribution to the international movement. The early nineteenth century peace movement is seen as the work of Dissenting sects in Britain and America, with the assistance of Free Traders like Richard Cobden. The French peace advocates offered quite different intellectual dimensions. Their ideological roots could be found in the Enlightenment – not just in the peace thinking of the *philosophes*, but in debates on economy, culture, religion, politics, etc. They drew upon the work of particular authors like Jean-Baptiste Say, Adam Smith and Emmanuel Kant, but above all continued general Enlightenment notions like historical progress and human perfectability. However, the French peace advocates also developed a program for their own times. They worked within their particular political context, pushing against conservatives’ support for standing armies and revolutionaries’ calls to arms. They incorporated an enthusiasm for contemporary technological changes of their era – steamships, railroads, eventually, the telegraph – into their historical vision of peace. They acknowledged the growing force of nationalism, but developed their own notions of the role of nations, and states, in the reconfiguration of the international order.

Operating within this framework, the early French peace movement developed a comprehensive civilizational project for perpetual peace. Their notion of peace was historical – they acknowledged a role for war in the past, but thought that the peoples must work towards a nonviolent future. Peaceful international society was an objective that would unfold gradually in time; it would not arrive suddenly or become fixed after an explosive moment of change. French peace advocates were not millenarians, like absolute Christian pacifists or Marxists: for them, perpetual peace was not the end of all conflict as such, but the overcoming of violence as a means of resolving it. They accepted competition as an element of social relations on the local, national or international scale, as long as it was not accompanied by prejudice and hatred. Perpetual peace thus had a particular content, one that differed from the evangelical millenium or the legitimist vision of successful great-power diplomacy. Peace meant harmonious international relations marked by travel, trade, intellectual exchange and the cultivation of a culture of open-mindedness and cooperation.

The term ‘international society’ was not yet widely in use in the first half of the nineteenth century, but French peace advocates clearly had a strong project for its development. They hoped for increasing levels of international integration, believing that economic, political and sentimental boundaries should be expanded with time. They called for the protection and valorization of human life; a culture of peace based on tolerance and mutual respect across national and religious lines; free mobility of ideas, goods, and people to facilitate peace and understanding; states more financially committed to economic and human development than to war; and international institutions, laws and confederations to secure sustainable world peace.

Their deep optimism on all of these questions distances them from us, as we have over a century of real experience with measures like free trade and intergovernmental institutions and have a more practical look at their impact on peacekeeping. Nonetheless, the early peace movement is essential to our historical understanding of how we have arrived at today’s

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12 The term “international society” was mentioned several times at the international congresses. See, for example: 1850 Congress, 52.
international, or global, society. The movement furthered international society through its ideas and practices, laying the foundations for later forms of internationalism and serving as a crucial idea lab for many of the international institutions of today. Although some historians have located the origins of the idea of ‘international society’ in the 1920s, the first peace movement clearly articulated a consciousness of international society and a concern for its further integration. Its concern was not only the relations between states, but also between ‘peoples’. French actors contributed to the practice of international society as well as its intellectual construction.

**Peace Movement History**

The French peace movement’s role in the history of internationalism, however, has been overlooked. Even within the history of the international peace movement itself, French contributions have been little known or understood. Martin Ceadel, Peter Brock and many other scholars of the early international peace movement have concentrated almost entirely on the British role in the movement. Martin Ceadel’s 1996 *The Origins of War Prevention*, a major work in the history of pacifism, most explicitly places the development of peace activism in British hands. He describes the end of ‘fatalism’, or the belief that war was a natural and inevitable aspect of human life, and the rise of the ‘pacific theory of international relations’, according to which perpetual peace was a real historical possibility. Ceadel claimed that this idea was “more entrenched” in Britain than in any other country.  

Similarly, Alexander Tyrell and Christina Phelps have viewed the early peace movement as a fundamentally “Anglo-American” phenomenon. Phelps’ work provides a thoughtful analysis of the role of the early peace movement in laying the groundwork for future generations of pacifists and internationalists, but her conclusions fail to see the insights that French figures contributed to the movement. Building upon this earlier work (published in 1930), Alexander Tyrell accepts the view of the mid-nineteenth century peace movement as Anglo-American, but tries to demonstrate how the movement was driven in particular by British Nonconformists from the peace societies. This leads Tyrell to an analysis of the movement as fundamentally shaped by millenarianism.

Peter Brock’s focus on British – and also American – pacifism derives from the fact that he considers only absolute pacifists in his work. In *Freedom from War*, for example, Brock explains that his own definition of pacifism “is centered around the renunciation of war by the individual, at least implicitly. This attitude is sometimes referred to as ‘absolute’ or ‘integral pacifism’.” Given the fact that there were few absolute pacifists in France in this period, Brock logically does not touch much on the French case.

The place of the international peace movement in international history more broadly has been shaped by this focus on the British case. Looking only at Britain, we tend to see a sharp division between the peace societies, which were dominated by Quakers and other absolute

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pacifists, and Richard Cobden and like-minded free traders. The latter are considered as allies to the peace movement who fit somewhat uncomfortably with religious pacifists. However, Cobden himself made a distinction between the ‘Peace Congress Party’ and the peace societies, the former referring to all those who identified, for a wide range of reasons, with the cause of peace and decided to link up with the international movement. A study of the French case supports this more encompassing view of the peace movement. French figures who linked up with the international movement were a motley crew of free traders, politicians, journalists, priests, ministers, etc. There were few absolute pacifists to be found in their ranks, and even the religiously motivated participants furthered secular arguments. Their views sometimes clashed with the absolute pacifists of the London Peace Society, but they were enthusiastic participants in the peace congress movement nonetheless. If we look at the peace movement more widely and incorporate the French participants, a more holistic picture comes into view, a picture of a heterogeneous movement that gradually developed a concrete program for international peace rooted in a remarkably varied set of conceptions of how international society could be made workable.

Sandi Cooper’s *Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe, 1815-1914* and van der Linden’s *The International Peace Movement, 1815-1874* are notable exceptions to the general neglect of French peace advocates in the broader literature. However, Cooper’s comments fill just a portion of a chapter. Moreover, Cooper’s preoccupation is with the relationship between social justice and peace within the peace movement, rather than its role in the broader development of internationalism. Also relevant, but also limited in impact, is van der Linden’s *The International Peace Movement, 1815-1874*, which presents an impressive inquiry into peace thinking and activism in nineteenth century Europe, including France, but reads more as a reference work than a systematic study. As Martin Ceadel has commented, van der Linden: “adopts a consciously self-denying – indeed, almost antiquarian – approach, stating explicitly: ‘If this work should be furnished with a motto, it ought to be ‘No stories, no theories, no pictures, only history’.’” There is a need, therefore for a thorough social history of French involvement in the international peace movement as well as for an intellectual history of the ideas of peace elaborated by French activists in their various settings and dimensions.

Finally, it is important to situate the history of the French peace movement within wider political, social, economic and cultural debates of the time. Peace history is often separated out from broader historical narratives. This diminishes both. The goal should be to incorporate the history of peace activism into its full context rather than to relegate it to a specialized sub-field. In the end, we need to know how French peace advocates interacted with the larger array of groups interested in political, economic and cultural transformation in this period – socialists, radical republicans, conservatives, etc. if we are to fully comprehend the rich debate about the

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nature of international society that found many answers in this period and that still matters to France and to Europe today.

**French History**

Lastly, this dissertation hopes to contribute to the larger narrative of French history. The emphasis of much scholarship has been on the interplay between revolution and reaction in the nineteenth century, but there were other currents at play as well. There is a conception that the French peace movement was somehow alien to French history, a weak imitation of its British or American counterparts. This can largely be attributed to the fact that the French did not really organize into ‘peace societies’ like the Americans and British in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, or that those concerned with peace were not strict pacifists advocating nonresistance. However, if we dig deeper and examine the work of the French participants in the international peace movement, it becomes clear that there was a strong concern for international peace in France in this period and a commitment to a positive vision of peace from a variety of positions. French peace advocacy can be shown to be a significant phenomenon, and one centrally located in the major intellectual currents of the time.

Study of the peace movement revises our view of a second dominant theme in the political narrative of the French nineteenth century: the notion that imperialism found no intellectual opponents. The view that empire was universally embraced, most forcefully argued in Jennifer Pitts’ book *A Turn to Empire* and repeated in much of the historiography, will be challenged here, with qualifications. The peace advocates drew on the earlier Enlightenment tradition that Pitts sees as anti-imperialist, including the work of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham. They rejected violent expansion as a form of international engagement. At the same time, they differed from English peace advocates like Richard Cobden, who tended to be more politically isolationist. They advocated an active, though non-violent, foreign policy. Their focus was on forms of soft power such as diplomacy, education, missionary activity, trade and sometimes, private settlement. In this way they were similar to many other critics of empire before and after them, condemning the violence of imperialist conquest and rule, yet continuing to see a role for overseas settlement and missionary work. This dissertation will examine peace advocates’ stances towards colonialism in relation to questions of economic organization, international relations and foreign policy.

Through this discussion, the dissertation will analyze a variety of figures in a new light. The characters in the story of the French peace movement have been studied at times, but for different reasons. The Société de la morale chrétienne, for example, has been discussed on the literature on the anti-slavery movement. The French political economists have received some attention, but largely in work on French liberalism. This literature examines thinkers like Frédéric Bastiat in order to evaluate their contribution to liberalism in France and Europe, rather than to assess their ideas on international peace or political violence. Other figures, such as

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22 A notable exception to the focus on revolutionary or reactionary political currents in this period is the work of Pierre Rosanvallon, who worked to revive historical interest in French political liberalism in the early nineteenth century. See especially: Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le moment Guizot* (Paris: Gallimard, 1985).
25 See for example: Philippe Steiner, “Competition and knowledge: French political economy as a science of government” in Raf Geenens and Helena Rosenblatt, eds., *French Liberalism from Montesquieu to the Present Day*
Francisque Bouvet and Athanase Coquerel, are little known today, despite their prominence in their own times. This dissertation will thus also offer a new analysis of well-known individuals and a presentation of forgotten contributors to nineteenth-century French politics and intellectual life.

Finally, the study of the early French peace movement’s practice of internationalism will illuminate the development of civil society in France after Napoleon. The peace advocates contributed to the revival of a democratic public sphere, from their participation in the press, publications, and associational activism. The dissertation can be seen as following in the spirit of Phillip Nord’s The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France, which traced the “resurrection of civil society” in the later years of the Second Empire. The story is not quite the same: one cannot say that the peace advocates were central to the establishment of the Second Republic. A number supported the Republic once it had been instituted, but most eschewed revolutionary tactics of political change. However, they did see themselves as champions of popular interests. Their critique of war centered on the harm it did to society, through heavy taxes, lengthy military service, cultural biases and the physical destruction of war itself. Even when they rejected the violence of revolution, they hoped to see a long-term process of democratization in domestic politics, in the sense of supporting governments that put their constituents’ interests first. Similarly, they aimed to democratize international affairs, by making popular well being the central concern in the relations between states. Their definition of popular ‘well-being’ differed from that of radical republicans, but the basic principle was the same. In this sense, the dissertation also hopes to contribute to the conversation found in Nord’s Civil Society before Democracy, a collective volume examining the relationship between civil society and democratic politics in nineteenth-century Europe. The story of the early French peace movement demonstrates a civil society movement operating at multiple levels, working within domestic and international frameworks, and hoping to democratize both in the long run.

Methodology and Terminology

With the aim of contributing to both French and international history, the key actors examined in this dissertation will be those French peace advocates who participated in the international movement. An examination of the international peace congresses will thus be the last and culminating chapter. The bulk of the study reconstructs the earlier activities and intellectual development of those French figures who later became linked to the international congresses. The goal will be to show how a deeper understanding of the trajectories of these French participants can enrich our view of the international movement at large. Often viewed as insignificant or dependent on British initiatives, French peace activism in fact drew on a long intellectual tradition and deep concerns with the organization of the contemporary political, social and economic order.

The general time frame for this dissertation can be considered as 1815 to 1852 – or France between the two Napoleonic empires. However, I have used dates that correspond more


directly to the history of the French peace movement in the title above. 1821 can be seen as the starting point for the French peace movement because it is this year that the Société de la morale chrétienne was founded. The Société was the first French association to formally involve itself in the international peace movement. The end date of 1853 corresponds to the beginning of the Crimean War, which was a traumatic setback for the peace movement and put an end to the cycle of early international peace congresses.

Regarding terminology, I most often use the term ‘peace advocate’ rather than pacifist to describe these French activists, as they largely were not pacifists in the strict sense of the term. They promoted peace but did not call for non-resistance. On the other hand, this did not mean that they developed arguments for just war. Typical optimists of the early nineteenth century that they were, they called for measures in favor of peace without dwelling on the question of appropriate action in the event of war. While this fact has made French peace activists appear less easy to assimilate into the vast literature on pacifism, I would argue that their ideological heterogeneity and their unique and early promotion of transnational cooperation is precisely what make them so important to our historical understanding of the nineteenth century. The terms ‘peace activist’ and ‘peace friends’ – the latter corresponding to their own terminology, “amis de la paix” in French or “friends of peace” in English – will also be used. Where contextually appropriate, I occasionally use the term ‘pacifist’ in a less technical sense, but it should be understood as meaning ‘peace advocate’.28

Finally, as mentioned, I will divide my actors up into ‘religious’, ‘economic’ and ‘political’ peace advocates. This should not be taken to imply absolute divisions within these groups – as we will see, many ‘religious pacifists’ also made material arguments, ‘political pacifists’ made religious arguments, etc. This, indeed, is part of what makes the French peace movement interesting in particular. I have made the groupings according to the emphasis that the actors placed on certain issues, as well as according to the legacy that they had. Victor Hugo, for example, is most famous for his advocacy of a ‘United States of Europe’, so although he incorporated material and religious analyses into this program, I will examine his peace activism in the chapter on ‘political pacifism’. By grouping the peace advocates according to their primary motivations, we can draw a clearer pictures of their sources of inspiration as well as their solutions.

Outline of Chapters

With these broad objectives in mind, the dissertation begins with an in-depth discussion of conservative, revolutionary and reformist internationalism in the context of France between the Napoleons. This first chapter examines how three types of internationalism arose in the wake of the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars: conservative, revolutionary and reformist. The chapter discusses how reformist internationalists tried to carve out a position for themselves

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28 Both Brock and Ceadel prefer to use the term ‘pacifist’ only for absolute pacifists, and to describe those not preaching non-resistance as ‘peace advocates’ (in the case of Brock) or ‘pacificists’ (Ceadel). Brock, Freedom from War, vii. Ceadel, The Origins of War Prevention, 2. Other historians, such as Sandi Cooper and David Cortright, however, have no problem using the term ‘pacifist’ to describe a range of positions. Cooper doesso without theoretical justification. Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism. Cortright acknowledges Ceadel’s distinctions but follows Cooper’s more general use of the term. Cortright, David, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). See pages 8-11 on his use of the term ‘pacifism’. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on pacifism simply states that “pacifism is a commitment to peace and opposition to war”, allowing a range of different positions as encompassed within the term. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pacifism/ It is this general definition that I will use when speaking of French pacifists in this period.
between the forces of reaction on the one hand and revolution on the other. It examines how international cooperation was viewed across these positions in order to capture more fully the intellectual range of the peace advocates and their ambition to articulate and advocate a vision of nonviolent international cooperation based on policy reform and civil society initiatives. It shows how the French peace advocates drew upon the legacy of Enlightenment thinkers in a variety of domains, but developed new ideas and strategies for a world wrought by deep political divisions.

The second chapter turns to the Christian pacifists in France in this period, focusing on the major groups and figures in this camp: the Société de la morale chrétienne, Protestant pastors Athanase Coquerel père and fils and the Abbé Deguerry, curé of the Madeleine. Here I examine religious peace advocacy in the post-Revolutionary period, when the legacy of Enlightenment and Revolutionary anti-clericalism weighed heavily on religious politics. Peace advocates attempted to find a middle ground in which religion could be non-dogmatic and practically oriented, yet a critical element in the formation of a general political ethics. These religiously-motivated peace activists preached moral universalism but also focused on concrete political and cultural reforms carried out in the framework of domestic politics, weighing in on issues like the abolition of the death penalty, slavery, and dueling, the discouragement of militarism in the arts and the shaping of public opinion in favor of international peace. They hoped to promote international cooperation through religious, philosophical and material arguments, as well as through their own example of transnational activism.

The next chapter focuses on economic pacifists, and most particularly on a cohesive group of political economists and allied public intellectuals like Émile de Girardin. Through individual and collective publications, economic pacifists promoted the international peace congresses and advanced their own vision of international cooperation based on free exchange and toleration. They drew upon the tradition of Enlightenment political economy, but adapted it to contemporary circumstances and attempted to popularize their message through modern means like the press, associations and the international congresses. They were harsh critics of contemporary militarism, advocating limited state spending on the military and opposing activities of all kinds that fed public prejudices in favor of war. They desired a reduction in state involvement in the economy nationally and internationally, believing in the natural harmony of the peoples. They were clear advocates of international integration through processes of reform.

The fourth chapter examines political arguments for international integration, particularly the ideas of international confederation that arose during this period. The peace advocates examined in this chapter envisaged institutional solutions for peace at the international level. Acknowledging the institutional plans of Enlightenment-era figures like Kant – as well as more immediate successors such as Henri de Saint-Simon, they developed more detailed institutional plans and incorporated these into their larger views of historical progress. Their position was a sort of ‘temporal internationalism’, focusing on the cooperation of states but according to the idea that political units naturally shifted and expanded in time.²⁹ As they imagined the unfolding of history, both individual states and the international confederation itself were destined to become more and more inclusive as political formations evolved. The chapter thus brings into focus the geographical scope of French peace activists’ ambitions. Although British and American plans for a Congress of Nations were often explicitly restricted to the sphere of

²⁹Boas uses the term, but differently, to mean “a doctrine maintaining the opposite of spiritual internationalism, viz., that culture arises from consciousness of nationality. This seems to have been the doctrine of Mazzini and his group, and probably of Lamennais in his later years”. George Boas, “Types of Internationalism in Early Nineteenth-Century France” in International Journal of Ethics 38, no. 2 (1928): 152.
‘civilized nations,’ French thinkers hoped for progress towards a more global confederation. Their projects – including Victor Hugo’s famous United States of Europe – may have aimed at European unification in the shorter term they were universalist in their final aspirations. These peace advocates helped to lay the intellectual groundwork for such future institutions as the Institut de droit international, the International Court of Arbitration, the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the European Union, all examples of reformist internationalism in later periods.

The fifth chapter examines peace advocacy in action at the mid-century international peace congresses. International congresses were held in 1843 in London, 1848 in Brussels, 1849 in Paris, 1850 in Frankfurt, 1851 in London and 1853 in Manchester and Edinburgh. The goal of the congresses was to systematize peaceful co-existence, rather than allowing international politics to unfold through ad-hoc diplomacy on a case-by-case basis. They proposed education reform, political advocacy, international laws and institutions. While many have seen their proposals as utopian, the congresses set out an agenda that would progressively be realized throughout the next two centuries. Those involved aimed to overhaul the system of international relations, and although their hopes were dashed in the short-run, they established ideas and practices that have been essential to shaping the international order until today. Reexamining the congresses in light of a deeper understanding of the origins and multiple dimensions of French peace advocacy offers a clearer picture of the legacy and impact of the mid-nineteenth century peace movement for the transnational political movements that were its better known successors.
The Politics of Peace: The French Peace Movement and the Development of Nineteenth-Century Internationalisms

The peace movement, a prime arena in which new ideas and practices about nonviolent international cooperation were formed, was heterogeneous sociologically, politically, and intellectually. In Britain and America, the peace movement arose as one line of activism within a wide array of Evangelical reform causes. In France, the peace movement can also be linked to Christian activism, but was above all a transformation of Enlightenment-era questions in the new political context of the early nineteenth century. Their project for international cooperation arose in a tense political environment dominated by the forces of reaction and revolution. French peace advocates developed reformist internationalism as a third option in an adversarial political field, as an attempt to find alternative solutions for the international sphere. After introducing the early history of the international peace movement, this chapter will discuss the origins of French peace advocates’ reformist internationalism and analyze the political and intellectual context in which it arose. The French peace advocates brought their own objectives and set of concerns to the development of internationalism, ones that were fundamentally shaped by the legacy of the Enlightenment and the political fallout of the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars.

Building a Transnational Movement for Peace

Political, as opposed to intellectual, advocacy for peace did emerge from radical Dissenting groups in America and Britain. Quakers and Evangelicals played a critical role in the early transformation of peace advocacy into a modern civil society movement. On both sides of the Atlantic, peace societies were formed in the mid-1810s as part of a wide array of reform ‘causes’ advocated by Christian sects. America was at the height of the ‘Second Great Awakening’, a period of Protestant religious revival in the early decades of the century. In Britain, Evangelicals were also particularly active in this period, organizing in favor of such issues as prison reform, the abolition of slavery, the education of the poor and the establishment of Sunday schools. In a more immediate sense, peace activism arose in response to the War of 1812 and Napoleonic Wars.

In America, the first associations dedicated specifically to the cause of peace were the Massachusetts Peace Society and New York Peace Society, both founded in 1815. They were soon followed by peace societies throughout the country. The societies aimed to turn public opinion against the “custom” of war, particularly through the distribution of pacifist publications. The Massachusetts society was especially active in this respect, publishing 155,000 copies of various tracts, addresses, sermons and reports in its first eight years. From 1819 to 1828 the society also published its own journal, The Friend of Peace, edited and mostly written by founder, Unitarian clergyman Noah Worcester. In 1828, the local American societies were connected under an umbrella organization, the American Peace Society.

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32 Brock, Freedom from War, 38.
Across the Atlantic, British figures were also organizing around international peace as a distinct cause. The British peace movement began with the creation of the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace, often referred to as London Peace Society (LPS), which was inaugurated in June 1816. Quakers were central to the leadership of the LPS, but numerically speaking, most British pacifists were evangelicals, especially Congregationalists. The early members were middle-class churchgoers, mostly from southern England, who began meeting informally in June of 1814. Inaugural members included William Allen, a Quaker philanthropist; Joseph Tregelles Price, a wealthy South Wales industrialist; Thomas Clarkson, who would become one of the leaders of British abolitionism, and his brother, the publisher John Clarkson. The majority of this group were simultaneously involved in a number of reform causes, and particularly abolitionism. Quakers played the largest role in the founding of the society, but the society was open to all denominations and made an effort to include interested Anglicans like the Clarkson brothers. 

The Quaker insistence on nonresistance dominated the society in early years: from 1816-1848, all members of the LPS’s executive committee were required to be convinced nonresistants, and a distinction was made between ‘high’ pacifists, who absolutely condemned war and preached nonresistance, and ‘low’ pacifists, who accepted violence in self-defense. In order to increase their membership and influence, however, the LPS decided to allow ‘low’ pacifists to join the general membership of the London-based society, and importantly, to found auxiliary societies throughout England. By 1831 there were twenty-one auxiliary societies and correspondents in thirty-one towns.

The auxiliary societies turned out to be a major factor in the rapid expansion of the British peace movement. The LPS was designed as a “tract society”, an association aimed at propagating peace ideas through the publication and distribution of books, pamphlets, leaflets, and from 1819 onward, the society’s own journal, *The Herald of Peace*. They drew on historical texts like those of Erasmus as well as new publications by LPS members or American pacifists. The auxiliary societies acted as powerful motors of this mission, as the network of members distributed the tracts in their own regions.

As we will see in more detail below, the British and American peace societies would create a set of alliances in the 1840s, with anti-militarists as well as a group of Free Traders interested in the cause of international peace. The Free Traders were led by Richard Cobden, a Manchester industrialist-turned-liberal MP. Given the increasing size and diversity of the movement, the American Peace Society proposed an international peace congress to establish a unified program and give the movement further publicity. The first took place in London in 1843. International congresses followed in 1848 in Brussels, 1849 in Paris, 1850 in Frankfurt and 1851 in London (during the Universal Exhibition), with more locally based congresses in 1853 in Edinburgh and Manchester ending the mid-century congress cycle. The congresses were a moment of unity and momentum for a diverse movement, allowing the articulation of a common program for international cooperation achieved through peaceful means. The international movement as a whole can be seen as an expression of reformist internationalism, but one with various strains.

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The Roots of Reformist Internationalism in France

Although an organized peace movement arose first in Britain and America, peace campaigners soon arose in France as well. French peace advocates carried their own mindset and objectives to the movement. They drew on other sources of inspiration and carved out their position in a distinct political context.

The French peace movement demonstrates another set of roots for this approach to international cooperation: the Enlightenment. As we have seen, the American and British peace movements can be tied to the religious revivals of the early nineteenth century and the contemporaneous reform “causes” that these produced. The French peace advocates were influenced by the tactics and arguments that the British and American peace friends produced, but most saw the roots of their movement as lying within France itself, in the Enlightenment.

While the history of peace thinking can be traced back centuries, to ancient Rome, early Christianity, medieval scholarship, etc., historians have noted major shifts in peace thinking in eighteenth-century Europe, both in the realm of intellectual thought and popular beliefs. David Bell’s *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It* examines this phenomenon at the level of philosophy, describing the development and consequences of the *philosophes’* idea that: “In modern times, war would soon become an abhorrent, exceptional state of affairs, a grotesque remnant of mankind's violent infancy.”

*The First Total War* describes how the French *philosophes* began to see war as an abnormal condition of society, a diversion from the forward march of civilization that could be eradicated with the right dose of reason. Voltaire and d’Holbach described war as irrational and avoidable; Montesquieu claimed that commerce would lead to peace.

The French peace advocates were the inheritors of this intellectual opposition to war, but they also looked to the *philosophes* for their understanding of positive peace. French peace advocates drew upon several strands of Enlightenment thought to develop their own notions of what international society should look like. They touched upon the work of such figures as Kant, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and Jean-Baptiste Say, who offered insights into international relations and the political and economic organization of global society. Yet they above all carried on Enlightenment questions: religious dogmatism, toleration, economic organization, ethics, international political organization, etc. They were not mere conduits of Enlightenment texts.

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38 Martin Ceadel has focused on the latter, describing the decline of “fatalism” from the 1730s onwards: a “profound change in popular attitudes” from a belief that common people could “do nothing to limit the incidence of war” to a conviction that human beings could “bring international relations under at least partial control”. Once viewed as an indelible aspect of human life, war thus came to be considered an abnormal condition subject to human control. Ceadel describes how changes in the international system – in warfare, territorial divisions, diplomacy, etc – and transnational developments in intellectual life, social conditions and political organization contributed to this shift in popular perceptions of war. Ceadel, *The Origins of War Prevention*, 10-11. This is the subject of Part I of the book.


40 See, however, another article complicating the common idea that Montesquieu believed commerce would lead to peace: Robert Howse, “Montesquieu on Commerce, Conquest, War and Peace”, accessed October 30, 2013, [http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_060042.pdf](http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_060042.pdf)

41 Bell focuses on how this belief in the possibility of perpetual peace resulted in a call for ‘total war’ to secure it. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic governments used the argument that perpetual peace was within reach to justify ambitious military campaigns and vast increases in military spending. Bell, *The First Total War*. 
They acknowledged their forebears and engaged with their questions, but provided their own answers for a new world fraught with political divisions and uncertainties. In their participation in the peace movement, they used this set of questions to devise concrete solutions for the establishment of perpetual peace and the creation of a new international society marked by cooperation and interdependence.

Each of the three strands of the French peace movement – religious, economic, and political – self-consciously related back to the Enlightenment tradition, but also went beyond the realm of philosophical discourse to help build modern internationalism. The religious peace advocates primarily included the Société de la morale chrétienne and allied individuals like the pasters Athanase Coquerel, père et fils, and Abbé Deguerry, a prominent Catholic priest in Paris. The Société de la morale chrétienne most clearly made the link between Enlightenment reformism and reformist internationalism. The eldest of the early founders of the group, such as the Duc de Laroche-Soucoux-Liancourt, had come to maturity during the Enlightenment and identified with its moderate strands. Yet as we will see, the Société de la morale chrétienne went beyond philosophical debate, evolving into a modern civil society organization linked up to a dynamic international peace movement.

The economic pacifists, too, are often seen as merely imitating their British counterparts, the Free Traders, but in fact saw themselves as developing the tradition of Enlightenment political economy. Their forefathers were Quesnay, Turgot, and Jean-Baptiste Say (the latter being, in fact, the literal father of one of the French economic pacifists, Horace Say), as well as Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham. Other than the addition of a few allied individuals like Émile de Girardin, they were a tight-knit group. They founded a Société d’économie politique and published numerous books and pamphlets with their friend and ally Gilbert Guillaumin, including a Dictionnaire d’économie politique and a monthly journal, the Journal des économistes. They enthusiastically promoted and participated in the international peace movement. Frédéric Bastiat, Joseph Garnier, Gustave de Molinari, Michel Chevalier were the most active amongst them. Again, with the economic peace advocates, we see the transition from an eighteenth-century tradition of intellectual reformism to a nineteenth-century version of organized international political activism.

The political peace advocates were a loose group of individuals who advocated the creation of an international confederation. They, too, looked back to the federalist projects of the abbé de Saint-Pierre and Kant, but they presented the issue in more concrete political terms. They detailed the shape and scope of international institutions and connected their vision to larger arguments about historical progress and the nature of political affiliation. Moreover, their ideas were not only propagated in philosophical tracts, but within the framework of a dynamic and highly publicized international movement. Their projects laid the ground for the creation of the League of Nations and later, the European Union. The leading figures in this strand of the French peace movement were Victor Hugo, poet and politician; Constantin Pecqueur, socialist author; and Francisque Bouvet, politician, writer, and diplomat.

What ignited the transition from eighteenth-century philosophy to nineteenth-century political action were, of course, the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Both series of events fundamentally changed the European political landscape, introducing new questions, intellectual traditions and modes of political action. International relations appeared as a more volatile and comprehensive question than ever, because the very foundations of both domestic and international society became malleable and subject to conflict. It was in this new context that internationalism was born. As Mark Mazower comments in his Governing the World:
[A] ferocious and multifaceted debate thus started that drew in some of the foremost intellectuals of the age: it was about Europe in the first place, but it was also about the nature of international politics in general. Through it we can trace not only the germination of the idea that the ‘international’ constitutes a separate zone of political life with its own rules, norms, and institutions, but alongside it the idea that this zone of politics was in some sense governable, and governable not by God, nor through nature, but by men.  

By the mid-nineteenth century, legitimists, socialists, communists, liberals and nationalists all put forth new visions of an ‘international order’, but to very different ends.

In France, the peace movement arose in the context of the ongoing conflict over the legacy of the French Revolution for French and international politics. The movement’s objectives were fundamentally defined by its experiences in the distinct, and highly adversarial, political landscape of early nineteenth-century France. To advocate nonviolent reform was to assert a strong but minoritarian position vis-à-vis the major political currents of the time: reaction and revolution. Indeed, most of nineteenth-century French history is envisioned as the story of the struggle between these two forces. Both produced strong internationalist movements – the internationalism of the Concert of Europe on the one hand, and the internationalism of radical republicans, and later, revolutionary socialists, on the other. I would argue, however, that there is a third tradition to trace, one that, although minoritarian in the mid-nineteenth century, would become the dominant political culture in the twentieth century. This dissertation is the story of the origins of this third, reformist, internationalism in nineteenth-century France. Before we turn to this story, however, we need to more fully understand the political field in which the early French peace advocates operated.

Conservative Internationalism

The early nineteenth century is above all known as the heyday of conservative internationalism. The Concert of Europe, established in 1815 at the peace negotiations following Napoleon Bonaparte’s final defeat at Waterloo, aimed to coordinate Europe’s Great Powers in an effort to maintain peace in Europe. The Great Powers committed to convene on a periodic basis to discuss domestic and international security issues and ensure that a balance of power was upheld between them. They hoped to prevent a repeat of the preceding twenty-six years, wherein domestic political changes in one country had led to a total upheaval of European politics. The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars had brought back the old specter of universal monarchy to Europe and at the same time added the problem of popular sovereignty to the mix. Borders had been redrawn; new aspirations and rivalries had been created.

In response, conservatives attempted to build a system in which revolution would be precluded both domestically and internationally. The Concert of Europe can be seen as “conservative” in two senses: firstly, in that it supported pre-existing political regimes to the

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42 Mazower, Governing the World, 15.
detriment of new domestic political movements, and secondly, in that it aimed to maintain the status quo in the international order. It imagined international cooperation as a joint effort by European statesmen to avoid the resurgence of revolution at home – the overturning of existing regimes by the people – or of a revolution in the relations between states.

Henry Kissinger’s 1964 *A World Restored: Europe after Napoleon. The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age* provides a useful analysis of conservative internationalism’s goals at the level of international relations. Kissinger describes peace as “the avoidance of war” and the goal of diplomacy to achieve this end by constructing an international order accepted by all major powers. He calls the latter a “legitimate” international order, the legitimacy not arising from any essential characteristics of the regimes involved, but from the agreement of the statesmen involved. Kissinger details the Concert of Europe’s efforts to realize a consensus on the international order that would be firmly upheld by all of Europe’s Great Powers, as being in the general interest of Europe and as a result in the particular interests of each power. Kissinger’s recognition of the contingency of the new order created by the Concert of Europe runs against the impression that statesmen of the time hoped to foster, that they were restoring an old order, considered ‘Legitimate’ because it was rooted in tradition. In the area of international relations, the Concert was most concerned with maintaining the status quo established in 1815.

Conservative internationalism also meant upholding the objectives of the Concert of Europe domestically, as the past twenty-five years had demonstrated the potential interconnectedness of domestic and foreign politics. The governments of the Concert of Europe were thus expected to keep absolute order at home. This usually meant banning large public meetings, devising strict rules on the founding and conduct of clubs and associations, imposing tight censorship of the press, and locating and imprisoning revolutionary activists. Most of continental Europe was marked by this draconian political climate in the early nineteenth century.

If a government were unsuccessful in its efforts to uphold the conservative order domestically, the Concert would readily intervene by force. As Carsten Holbraad noted in his earlier work, *The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory, 1815-1914*, the leading advocates of the Concert of Europe – Metternich and the conservative publicist and diplomat Friedrich Gentz – believed that “sovereigns had both a right and a need to interfere in the affairs of a state afflicted with revolution...The so-called principle of non-intervention was merely a word devoid of meaning, a phrase without practical significance.” This ‘right’ was practiced to overturn a liberal constitutionalist revolution in Spain in 1822 and to suppress liberal, republican and nationalist movements throughout Europe in 1848-1849.

Conservative internationalism did not only involve armies, diplomats and heads of state. Increasing international coordination between national police forces, for example, was instituted in order to prevent alternate political groups from gaining influence beyond their countries of origin. This was especially the case among the German states. A Central Investigations

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45 Ibid, 145. “An order whose structure is accepted by all the major powers is ‘legitimate’. An order containing a power which considers its structure oppressive is ‘revolutionary’. “
Commission was established by the German confederation in 1819, to which seven states appointed members. The goal was to gather information on subversive political activity and then report findings to the states for prosecution there.\footnote{Hsi-Huey Liang, \textit{The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 19-20.} Even when efforts were more nationally focused, the overall goal fit into the objectives of the Concert of Europe, to extinguish political unrest before it became revolution. Indeed, Hsi-Huey Liang’s \textit{The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War} shows how focused national police forces across the continent were on upholding the political order. However, particularly during and after the revolutions of 1848, police also exchanged information and distributed “wanted” lists across Europe.\footnote{Ibid, see Chapter 1.}

In France, the Restoration government largely adhered to this vision of international cooperation as a transnational compact to maintain social order. The government worked hard to avert both domestic and international conflicts. The church reasserted its position in French society, although the regime initially opposed the extremist tactics that some clergy members used to expiate revolutionary memories and impose feelings of guilt and shame upon a sinful population.\footnote{Sheryl Kroen, \textit{Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration France, 1815-1830} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).} Revolutionary activity was monitored and persecuted at home. Tight restrictions were imposed upon the press and public activity.\footnote{For a precise account of the evolution of laws on the press during the Restoration, see: Claude Bellanger, Jacques Godechot, Pierre Guiral and Fernand Terrou, eds., \textit{Histoire générale de la presse française}, 2. \textit{De 1815 à 1871} (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1969), 6-7.} The preoccupation with security led to an expansion of the armed forces.\footnote{See Holbraad, \textit{Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought}, 17, where he defines conservative internationalism in terms of coordinated efforts to maintain “order and security” at the international level.}

The successive French Restoration governments also proved to be a reliable conservative force abroad. Louis XVIII sent troops to restore the absolute monarch King Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne after a liberal parliament had taken him captive.\footnote{Ibid, see Chapter 1.} In Portugal, Charles X was initially non-interventionist, allowing Britain to intervene and remaining neutral as the Spanish colonies declared their independence. However, he ultimately signed the Treaty of London with Britain and Russia assigning the three powers responsibility for the establishment of an independent Greek state through mediation with the Ottoman Empire. When the sultan refused diplomatic solutions, France, Britain and Russia sent expeditionary forces.\footnote{See André-Jean Tudesq and Elborg Forster (trans.), \textit{Restoration and Reaction: 1815-1848} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 61-63 for more information.} Overall, the Restoration governments acted in step with the Concert of Europe.

The July Monarchy, while the result of a popular revolution, ultimately conformed to the conservative internationalist program to maintain a ‘legitimate’ international order in Kissinger’s sense. Louis-Philippe therefore adopted a policy of non-intervention within Europe, refusing to aid national movements in Poland, Italy and Belgium. Though his Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1840, Adolphe Thiers, created friction with the Great Powers by supporting Egyptian ruler’s pretensions in Syria, Louis-Philippe soon replaced him with François Guizot, who aligned more closely with the goals of the Concert of Europe. Bucking public opinion, Guizot inaugurated an \textit{entente cordiale} with England to improve France’s relations with the Great
Powers. Guizot’s arrangement of a marriage between Louis-Philippe’s youngest son and the heiress to the Spanish throne caused tensions amongst the European powers, but overall Guizot seems to have wanted to avoid warfare on the continent.\textsuperscript{55} Louis-Philippe saw himself as the great orchestrator of peace in Europe, the main figure devoted to averting the outbreak of war.\textsuperscript{56} In the end, these policies largely meant peace as the maintenance of the conservative status quo in Europe. Large standing armies were maintained, the Concert of Europe basically continued, and revolutionary activity at home was repressed. Moreover, Louis-Philippe pursued militaristic policies outside of Europe, in Algeria, Mexico and the Côte d’Ivoire.\textsuperscript{57}

Conservative internationalism provoked widespread opposition throughout Europe. The continuation of dynastic politics, the suppression of domestic criticism, the active cooperation between monarchs to uphold their own vision of the international order regardless of popular sentiments, all appeared deeply outmoded and unjust in the post-Revolutionary era. The peoples, thought republicans and liberals of various stripes, should have a primary role in shaping both domestic and foreign politics. Yet while this vast group on the political ‘left’ and ‘center’ asserted the primacy of public opinion and popular agency, the group was divided on the means of political change. Whereas reformist internationalists advocated a gradualist approach based on moral, economic, and political reform, revolutionary internationalists called for violent change to institute a new order.

\textit{Revolutionary Internationalism}

Revolutionary internationalism in France first developed in the expansionist phase of the French Revolution. This mode of international solidarity, however, was achieved through conquest. Under the leadership of moderate republican deputy Jacques-Pierre Brissot, the French state invaded the Austrian Netherlands and the Rhineland in 1792, expecting local peoples to welcome the French as liberators. Concerned about the dangers of “republican empire” (in light of the example of ancient Rome), successive French Revolutionary governments also tried to establish “sister republics” through invasions in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Italy.\textsuperscript{58} After the defeat of the Napoleonic empire and the satellite states the Revolutionary governments had created, revolutionaries adjusted their vision of international politics, rejecting conquest and promoting material or military support for locally-led revolutions instead.\textsuperscript{59}

In the post-Revolutionary era, revolutionary internationalism defined itself primarily through opposition to the conservative internationalism of the Concert of Europe and its adherents in the Bourbon Restoration and the July Monarchy. The July Monarchy’s policy of non-intervention in Europe became known as “peace at any price” and was the object of intense

\textsuperscript{57} See Fortescue, \textit{France and 1848}, 55 on Algeria.
\textsuperscript{58} For more on “sister republics” and fears over republican empire, see: Andrew Jainchill, \textit{Reimagining Politics after the Terror: The Republican Origins of French Liberalism} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 162-195.
\textsuperscript{59} Both liberals and republicans came to agree with Benjamin Constant’s evaluation that military conquest had become an outdated and ineffective form of politics in the modern age. Constant’s 1814 \textit{De l’esprit de conquête} was widely influential in early nineteenth-century France, its view of conquest repeated even by Lamartine and the new revolutionary government in 1848. This will be mentioned more below. Benjamin Constant, \textit{De l’esprit de conquête et de l’usurpation dans leurs rapports avec la civilisation européenne}. Troisième Édition, revue et augmentée. (Paris: Le Normant, 1814).
criticism from democrats and liberals. Louis-Philippe’s refusal to aid foreign revolutionaries in the interests of peace was at the heart of these judgments.

Philippe Darriulat’s *Les Patriotes* has provided an in-depth exposition of French radical republicanism from 1830 to 1870 which demonstrates its dedication to transforming politics abroad as well as at home. Darriulat confirms that mid-nineteenth-century radical republicans did not aim to conquer foreign peoples, as the Girondins had done, but to provide them assistance in their own revolutions. They hoped that the French state would act as a protector of foreign revolutions, through diplomatic pressure or direct military intervention when necessary. “Pas de xénophobie dans ce patriotisme-là. Il n’est pas question de dominer militairement l’étranger, mais de l’aider à s’émanciper, d’exporter à la semelle de ses souliers les valeurs de la Révolution française. La France doit jouer son rôle, ceux qui la servent en tirent une légitime fierté, tel est le sens que les républicains donnent à leur patriotisme.”

Darriulat describes how radicals’ dedication to international fraternity shaped their ideas and actions throughout the mid-nineteenth century, from their stark opposition to Louis-Philippe’s foreign policy, to their calls for military intervention during the Revolutions of 1848, to their rejection of Napoleon III’s expansionism.

Radical republicans across Europe believed that democracy was an immediate necessity that must be realized through international solidarity and political violence. The ‘Alliance of the Peoples’ became a rallying cry during the Revolutions of 1848: a call for the peoples to unite against the ‘Alliance of the Princes’ with the aim to create a democratic, peaceful Europe for the future. This, however, usually entailed toppling one’s own national government, by violence if necessary, and pushing for military support to enable the success of foreign revolutions. In anticipation of the revolutionary communism of the twentieth century, radical republicans aimed at universal peace in the long term, but argued that violent action was necessary to bring about an acceptable socio-economic order.

Although, as Darriulat has shown, French radical republicans saw the Alliance of the Peoples as an essentially French project driven by the French state in accordance with French Revolutionary principles, European revolutionaryaries of all nationalities were involved in these calls for international solidarity. Paris was indeed a central location for the revolutionary internationalist movement in the 1830s and 1840s, but political refugees and emigrants from all over Europe participated. In the spring of 1848, refugee groups in Paris called for compatriots and sympathetic foreigners to help launch military missions in their home countries. The German and Polish democratic clubs, for example, gathered on March 27 and started towards the borders.

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of Germany in France and Switzerland. On March 30, a group of around 3,000 armed Belgian workers spilled across the Belgian border exclaiming ‘Vive la République’. They were accompanied by French students from the École polytechnique. The Parisian radical clubs supported these foreign legions for taking action for the spread of republicanism abroad.

Revolutionary internationalism can be tied to geopolitical concerns. A widening democratic zone, defending shared values, could deter invasions from outside, particularly from Russia. Brochures like “La Démocratie Européenne et la Question Polonaise”, written by an anonymous Polish immigrant, argued that without military intervention by France, Europe would be lost to despotism. Once this zone was established, democracies could coexist in peace and focus on domestic affairs.

Yet most fundamentally, revolutionary internationalists aimed to promote political and social justice. For radicals, lasting peace would never be possible in a non-democratic world. Only when all the states of Europe (their parameters of their shared ‘world’) were founded on the shared political values of liberty, equality and fraternity could domestic and international peace become possible. Until then, conflict was both inevitable and indispensable. They would fight until democracy had been established throughout Europe and the old order had been overthrown once and for all.

The non-interventionist stance of the 1848 Provisional Government thus provoked great anger amongst radicals. They were hostile to Lamartine, who was hesitant to assist the republican foreign legions mobilizing in France and foreign revolutions more generally. His Manifesto to Europe, issued on March 4, claimed that the France of 1848 was not the France of 1792 and in a nod to Constant, he described conquest as a thing of the past. The Manifesto remained vague on the question for military assistance for foreign revolutions, such that radicals initially kept their hopes for intervention alive, only to become increasingly frustrated by the lack of clear action.

65 One can trace these events in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The workers were ordered to disarm before entering the country and to proceed to their respective homes on an individual basis. Lamartine tried to diffuse the situation by claiming that the workers were sent home due to a lack of work, and were unarmed. While the French consul in Germany claimed that the government of Berne was giving 15,000 German and Polish revolutionaries free food and housing while they prepared for action, the consulate in Switzerland said that Berne would prevent any actions that would compromise Swiss neutrality. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance Politique, Allemagne, vol. 805, 82, 103, 108-109.; This story can also be followed in: Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance Politique, vol. 561, 118.

66 The workers seem to have received train tickets, and possibly arms, from the French government. Lamartine claimed that the government gave the workers train tickets to return home because they were unemployed, and denied any involvement in their procurement of weapons. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance Politique, Belgique, vol. 30, 19.


69 See, for example, La Liberté, March 7, 1848. The newspaper applauded Lamartine’s Manifesto but commented that it should have sent a clearer promise on military assistance: “M. de Lamartine a écrit: ‘que le génie martial de la France, son impatience d'action, sa force accumulée pendant tant d'années de paix la rendraient invincible chez elle, redoutable peut-être au delà de ses frontières.’ Peut-être est un mot bien modeste ; le premier magistrat, même provisoire de la République, pouvait se montrer plus fier. Il importe que les puissances absolutistes sachent bien que le premier coup de canon tiré sur notre territoire sera le signal d'une saint-alliance des peuples poussée jusqu'à l'entièere application de l'idée républicaine.”
However, as the research of James Chastain has shown, Lamartine simultaneously spoke words of peace and commissioned secret agents to foment revolution abroad. His *Liberation of the Sovereign Peoples* reveals this previously unknown covert program. It shows how Lamartine used this program to promote republicanism abroad without provoking a general war against the fledgling new French Republic. This strategy of covert action in support of foreign republican movements coupled with a public discourse of non-intervention and peace among powers was continued by his successor as foreign minister and former assistant, Jules Bastide.7071

Unaware of these tactics, however, radicals continued to pressure the new French government to intervene abroad. Radical campaigns for foreign intervention came to a head on May 15, 1848, during a major protest in favor of intervention in Poland. The protesters spontaneously decided to march to the National Assembly, where the Polish question was being debated. They broke through the doors yelling ‘Vive la Pologne’ and, after a period of chaos, proclaimed the dissolution of the government. Nonetheless, the government was able to secure control over the city and maintain its power, and participants were punished with exile or imprisonment.

With the successive crackdowns on radicals, Paris gradually ceased to be the center for revolutionary internationalism. By 1849, most of the French and European internationalists that had tried to pressure the French government to intervene abroad had been exiled to Belgium or England. This, however, provided an occasion for the development of international networks and projects. French radical Alexandre Ledru-Rollin, Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini, and Hungarian nationalist Kossuth met in London and established a new journal, *Le Proscrit*, and a European Central Democratic Committee. Mazzini promoted a truly internationalist model of republican revolutionary action based on the equal cooperation of nations.72 Politically, revolutionary internationalism would also diversify in the 1850s and 1860s, with the emergence of communist internationalism, which promoted state communism rather than social-democratic republicanism.73

The French peace advocates repeatedly denounced the ‘armed peace’ of the conservatives as wasteful and risky, but they also rejected radicals’ idea of a ‘war to end all wars’. Instead, they

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70 Chastain notes that from the time of the February Revolution, the French government had an “impossible task” – to placate Parisian radicals and prevent the formation of a coalition against France by Europe’s conservative powers. James Chastain, *The Liberation of the Sovereign Peoples: The French Foreign Policy of 1848* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1988), 16. Lamartine also wanted to avoid alienating foreign peoples with an interventionist policy that could remind them of the Napoleonic conquests. Ibid, 37.

71 This dual policy can perhaps help to explain the ambiguity in Lamartine’s behavior with respect to the international peace movement. See van der Linden, *The International Peace Movement*, 331. Moreover, while advocating for the promotion of peace in a general sense, Lamartine also supported the army as an institution, both in theory and in practice. He upheld a policy of imposing heavy penalties for deserters while serving on the Provisional Government, and opposed arms reductions in the National Assembly in May 1849. Ibid, 399. He favored a strong military even in times of peace, stating in 1846, “the means of preserving peace is to prepare for war”. Ibid, 239.


argued that regardless of political circumstances, all wars were immoral, costly and unable to achieve their stated goals. Thus although radical internationalists and peace advocates both hoped for a Europe led by the interests of the peoples rather than the princes, their conception of the means to this end differed significantly.

Completing the Picture: Saint-Simonians and Fourierists

Finally, the French peace movement overlapped somewhat with two other groups in the middle of reaction and revolution: the Saint-Simonians and Fourierists. Henri de Saint-Simon, who had written a plan for perpetual peace in Europe in 1814, was particularly influential to the movement. His idea was to begin with a European Parliament composed only of France and England, and then to progressively accept new member states who had accepted constitutional government. This project would be a standard reference point for political peace advocates in the future.

In the late 1820s and early 1830s, a group of self-described followers of Saint-Simon formed in Paris. The ‘Saint-Simonians’ were a tight-knit organization that adopted the hierarchical structure of a church: in 1828 there was a ‘collège’ of leaders and a ‘second degree’ of members; by 1829 leaders were given the title ‘père’, with two figures, Bazard and Prosper Enfantin, as ‘pères suprêmes’ of the church. They met regularly and often wore uniforms. They hoped for a female figure to complete the leadership of the church. The group was banned by the government in 1833, although the members remained connected to each other and loyal to group principles for several decades. Many wrote for the same newspapers (particularly Le Globe), published on similar topics, and collaborated on projects, from the construction of railroads to the administration of Algeria.

The Saint-Simonians fell somewhere between the peace friends and the radicals on the question of international peace. In his study, The International Peace Movement, 1815-1874, W. H. van der Linden describes the evolving position of the Saint-Simonians on peace issues from the 1820s to the 1860s. He shows that in the early years (late 1820s to early 1830s) the Saint-Simonians waivered between a radical position advocating a “last war” to create a Europe of independent nations, and the idea that war had become an outmoded political recourse, and that contemporary transformations must take place instead through organization, economic exchange and “peaceful intervention”. In the years around 1830, one could find articles in the Saint-Simonian journals Le Globe and L’Organisateur arguing for both strategies.

Van der Linden finds strong parallels between the Saint-Simonians and the friends of peace. Both groups advocated positive peace rather than peace as the status quo. They called for free trade, active international cooperation, the eclipse of ‘war institutions’ by ‘peace institutions’ and the promotion of a culture of peace. They saw industry, science and the arts as the agents of progress in the modern era, and war as contrary to their flourishing. The Saint-

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74 Henri de Saint-Simon and August Thierry, De la Réorganisation de société européenne, ou de la nécessité et des moyens de rassembler les peuples de l’Europe en un seul corps politique, en conservant à chacun son indépendance nationale (Paris: Adrien Égron, 1814).
75 van der Linden, The International Peace Movement, 94.
77 van der Linden, The International Peace Movement, 100-101.
Simonians, like the peace friends, were ‘structural optimists’ who believed that history was leading towards ever-greater prosperity, integration and peace.\textsuperscript{79}

However, differences can also be found between the Saint-Simonians and the peace friends. The issue of national independence was a major point of divergence between the groups from the 1840s. We can see this split at the peace congresses. Saint-Simonian journalist Adolphe Guérout, for example, used his opportunity to speak to voice the radical republican argument. He ended his speech: “No, gentlemen: I am anxious to have peace, but I do not want it at any price: I wish to have peace founded on justice and liberty.”\textsuperscript{80} This ran counter to the spirit of the peace congresses. Despite the fact that other delegates were sympathetic with national and democratic movements abroad, the consensus, reflected in congress regulations, was that peace friends should never speak out in favor of war, regardless of the particular case. Saint-Simonians’ acceptance of war in cases of national independence continued through the 1850s: during the wars of Italian unification, Saint-Simonians were some of the main advocates of French intervention in favor of Italian independence.\textsuperscript{81}

On other issues, the groups could converge on policy recommendations, but for different reasons. Both, for example, believed that free trade was a desirable policy and one conducive to peace. The Saint-Simonians, however, called for free trade as a way to break down the old system and pave the way for a new organization of the economy by the state. They supported “the destruction of all sorts of commercial monopolies, the complete freedom of trade and industry”, but ‘only as a means to arrive at a final organization of the industrial body’”.\textsuperscript{82} In contrast, the peace friends were far more divided on this question. Whereas Victor Hugo took a more Saint-Simonian position in his inaugural address to the 1849 peace congress, calling for an activist state that would engage in large-scale public works projects to facilitate transnational exchange, political economists like Joseph Garnier and Frédéric Bastiat advocated free trade as part of a more general goal of decreasing state intervention in economic and social affairs.

Both Saint-Simonians and French peace movement activists tended to dream of a non-violent form of imperialism or of “soft power”, to use a modern term. As will be discussed at greater length below, a number of French peace advocates accepted a strong role for France abroad and encouraged peaceful colonization and missionary activity. They viewed this as a natural extension of their advocacy of improved exchange of ideas, goods and people within Europe. Saint-Simonians adopted a similar mindset, extending the principle of ‘association’ beyond French and European borders. Yet again, their main goal was the construction of a new industrial society based on technology and organization from above.\textsuperscript{83} Moreover, a number of Saint-Simonians got involved in the actual work of colonization in Algeria and therein.

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\textsuperscript{79} “Evidently the expectations of the Saint-Simonians were structurally optimistic. In their vision, history developed inevitably towards the ultimate peace of the universal association.” Ibid, 111.

\textsuperscript{80} Report of the Proceedings of the Second General Peace Congress, Held in Paris, on the 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 23\textsuperscript{rd} and 24\textsuperscript{th} of August, 1849, Compiled from Authentic Documents, under the Superintendence of the Peace Congress Committee (London: Charles Gilpin, 1849), 28. Henceforth: 1849 Congress.

\textsuperscript{81} van der Linden, The International Peace Movement, 502.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, 108.

\textsuperscript{83} Osama Abi-Mershed’s \textit{Apostles of Modernity} gives the following quote from Saint-Simon: “‘All physical circumstances being equal, the best organized species or race civilizes itself first, and henceforth arrests the development of inferior races and species until general association is understood and accepted by all.’” Saint-Simon then spoke of the mission of this industrialized nation in “‘advancing the well-being of all peoples’ and ‘civilizing the world materially and morally’.” Osama Abi-Mershed, \textit{Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 30. On the question of organization from above, note that Ismaïl Urbain came to prefer reform in the colonies to come from below. Ibid, 124.
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compromised the pacifist element of their thinking on colonial settlement. By some tried to reconcile colonial administration with peaceful Saint-Simonianism. Thus Prosper Enfantin, working for the Bureau of Arab Affairs in Algeria, urged the end of military rule and a transition to a peaceful civilian society directed by industrialists and technocrats. By contrast, fellow Saint Simonian, Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de Lamorcière, became a prominent general and led violent confrontations with the indigenous population.

Given the fact that the Saint-Simonians shared many of the hopes and assumptions of the peace friends, and the fact that the peace movement accepted a diversity of motivations among its participants, a handful of Saint-Simonians became involved in the peace movement. However, their motivations and interests never fully converged with mainstream participants. By the time of the peace congresses, Michel Chevalier had become a friend and ally of the political economists, holding the chair in Political Economy at the Académie des sciences morales et politiques. From 1841 to 1848 he was writing regularly for their pro-peace movement journal, the Journal des économistes. He wrote a supportive letter to the 1849 peace congresses and travelled to England to the peace society meetings shortly thereafter. However, Saint-Simonians Gustave d’Eichtal and Adolphe de Guérout were met with considerable hostility at the international peace congresses, when the former praised the Concert of Europe, as Saint-Simon had done earlier, and the latter de Guérout also called for military support for foreign revolutions, as mentioned above. These views were anathema for the peace friends, who, despite their internal diversity, consistently opposed the ‘armed peace’ of the Concert of Europe as well as any call to war, for radical purposes or otherwise. The Saint-Simonians thus had a complex relationship with the friends of peace, and with the exception of Michel Chevalier, I would not consider the Saint-Simonians to be part of the international peace movement. Consequently, Chevalier will play the greatest role in the following pages of any of the Saint-Simonians. Yet it is significant that Saint-Simonians attended the 1849 peace congress, because it suggests the intellectual and ideological capaciousness of the movement and well as the importance of the congresses in the political landscape of the first half of the nineteenth-century.

Finally, Charles Fourier and his followers contributed to the French debate on peace at the local, national and international levels. Fourier himself famously advocated phalanstères, or small communities in which work was organized according to the ‘passions’ of the individuals involved. Examining Fourier’s body of work as a whole, it is clear that the phalanstères, a more local form of peace making, was Fourier’s primary concern.

Jonathan Beecher’s study of Fourier’s most active disciple, Victor Considérant, nonetheless reveals numerous parallels between Fourierist thinking and that of peace advocates.

84 For example, Abi-Mershed notes Saint-Simon’s “acceptance of a common human nature and fraternity” and the Saint-Simonian’s belief that “colonial association…brought mutual opportunities and rewards”. Ibid, 30-31
85 Ibid, 112.
86 Ibid, 11.
87 On Saint-Simon’s praise of the Concert of Europe for its success in bringing peace to Europe, see van der Linden, The International Peace Movement, 113. Saint-Simon, of course, had other objectives for the organization of Europe, but he nonetheless saluted the Concert of Europe in this respect, as Gustave d’Eichtal did at the 1849 Congress.
He comments that romantic socialists: “shared a belief in the peaceful transformation of society” and “had no desire to see their ideas imposed by terror or political revolution”. They believed they could rely on elites to carry out change without violence. Beecher calls the romantic socialists “social optimists” who saw “no fundamental or unbridgeable conflict of interests between the rich and the poor”.\(^90\) Considérant was above all concerned about the “morcellement”, or fragmentation, of society, and his sought to promote greater social unity.\(^91\) In this his views echoed the peace advocates’ and their promotion of increased economic and political integration. Beecher’s description of Considérant’s thinking highlights a parallel to many of the themes mentioned by peace advocates at the international congresses:

> Didn't the human race have another 'social destiny' than the violence and hatred of revolution? Were humans placed on earth and created social beings only to tear each other apart and devour each other like ferocious beasts?...Was it not possible for human beings to organize around their common interests and to consider as their goals 'the realization of the harmony of interests, the fusion of classes, the rallying of all human powers'?\(^92\)

The main difference, here, was that whereas Considérant focused primarily on peace between the classes within nations, peace advocates were more concerned with the “fusion” of peoples and the “hatreds” of international war.\(^93\) The peace movement included a number of individuals who were hostile to socialism, but we can see that Considérant shared many values and objectives with the peace movement as a whole.

Why, then, did Fourierists not get involved in the mid-century international peace movement? For one, many Fourierists fled France after May 1848, hoping to avoid arrest in the midst of the increasing conservatism of the Second Republic. There were, however, disagreements on a more fundamental level. An article in Considérant’s newspaper *La Démocratie pacifique* at the time of the Paris peace congress can help to clarify this divergence. While the paper sympathized with the goals of the peace congress, it opposed the means its participants proposed. Peace would only come about through a “general war of liberation” or “a gradual but complete transformation by creating agricultural and industrial associations in the bosom of the municipalities”.\(^94\) The peace movement was open to a range of viewpoints, but the eschewal of explicit calls to war was a fundamental prerequisite. Nonetheless, Considérant’s ideas on international confederation will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

More directly linked to the international peace movement was Constantin Pecqueur, another romantic socialist. Pecqueur wrote an extensive letter to the 1843 international peace congress in support of the movement, with numerous ideas on international institutions, law, trade, education, etc. Pecqueur, like many peace advocates, believed in the power of communications to bring about greater unity amongst the peoples. Given these many parallels,

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\(^{91}\) Ibid, 127.

\(^{92}\) Ibid, 133.

\(^{93}\) Beecher points out that Considérant wavered between arguing that the fusion of the classes should be realized through the creation of small, harmonious communities or through strong intervention by the state. Ibid, 143-144.

\(^{94}\) This is a paraphrasing of an article in *La Démocratie pacifique* on August 25, 1849. van der Linden, *The International Peace Movement*, 356.

\(^{95}\) In April of 1848, Considérant had also accepted that a general war could be possible to bring about democracy and peace. The article was entitled “The Last European War”, *La Démocratie pacifique*, April 16, 1848. See also van der Linden, *The International Peace Movement*, 384. Van der Linden also locates a few other articles in *La Phalange* and *La Démocratie pacifique* in favor of a ‘last war’.
Pecqueur will also be further discussed in Chapter 4, although he did not participate in the international peace movement as a delegate. Pecqueur presents a unique example within the French branch of the international peace movement, as his vision of international society converged with religious, economic and political peace advocates on a number of points, despite the fact that his projects for domestic economic transformation differed significantly from the views of other peace advocates.

Conclusion

In the ‘first nineteenth century’, then, the organization of sustainable international peace was a pressing question with many contradictory answers. Whereas British and American pacifists were acting in a more homogenous political field, comprised mostly of constitutional monarchists in the first case and republicans in the second, French peace advocates were working in a system marked by fundamental political divisions and a very recent and vivid history of swift, violent changes in forms of government. It was in France that the contest between conservative and revolutionary internationalisms was most strongly felt, making reformist internationalism a difficult position. The Restoration and Orleanist governments largely upheld the conservative internationalist agenda set up by the Concert of Europe in 1815. They marched in step with this effort towards the international cooperation of monarchs, diplomats and policemen to uphold the old order and suppress any signs of revolutionary unrest. At the same time, revolutionary internationalists pushed for another vision of international cooperation as a common project to bring democratic republicanism to domestic and international politics by any means necessary. European political refugees and radical Frenchmen joined together in this movement to transform the European political order. The French peace advocates critiqued these two models and proposed a variety of schemes for international cooperation as a process of progressive reforms to intensify international integration. They overlapped to a certain extent with other groups interested in gradual political reform within France – notably the Saint-Simonians and Fouriersts – but distinguished themselves by their global vision and common aversion to explicit calls to war.

The early nineteenth century French peace advocates were a diverse group with a variety of motivations; they were Christians, politicians, journalists and economists of different political stripes. All of these individuals linked up with the international peace movement out of an interest in nonviolent forms of international cooperation. Their program drew upon the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment – the belief in human perfectability, the opposition to the principle of monopoly, and/or the confidence in historical progress – but adapted these ideas to the particular conditions of their time. They hoped to eradicate war, but also to create an international society marked by the presence of such values as tolerance and cooperation and their manifestation in social relations, public policy and international relations. Their peace advocacy constituted a modern internationalist program based on progressive reform. How each strand of French peace advocacy carved out and developed this position will be the subject of the following chapters.
Chapter Two

From Christian Philanthropy to Reformist Internationalism: The Religious Peace Advocates

As mentioned above, we can see three broad strands to the international peace movement: religious, economic and political. Given the French peace advocates’ comprehensive, civilizational approach to international peace, it is difficult to strictly divide them into such groups. However, even French peace advocates tended to emphasize particular modes of argumentation. The actors in this chapter were particularly concerned with peace as a problem of ‘Christian morality’. The first to get involved in the international peace movement were a group of philanthropists organized around an effort to make public policies conform with Christian morality: the Société de la morale chrétienne. Their approach was decidedly not theological and they made few references to Biblical verse. They saw Christian morality as a question of principles for living in society: toleration, human dignity and respect for human life, in particular. They defined these as Christian values, but were also deeply influenced by Enlightenment-era notions of human perfectability, which could be applied to individuals and institutions alike. Moreover, the Society readily made use of material arguments to reinforce their general program. Yet the French peace movement also saw the participation of a few pastors and priests, who will also be discussed here.

These religiously-motivated peace advocates were central to the development of a reformist approach to internationalism in France. They were the first to create publicity for the international peace movement and to establish a venue for foreign peace ideas to be heard in France. They developed their own, distinctive program for peace. In their publications, they called for policy reforms that would valorize and protect human life. They envisioned achieving these goals not only by private acts, but also through the reform of national policies and the creation of institutional forms of interstate cooperation.

The Société de la morale chrétienne: Christian Peace Activism in France and the Beginnings of the International Peace Movement, 1822-1843

The Société de la morale chrétienne arose in philanthropic circles active during the early Restoration. The founders of the Société de la morale chrétienne (SMC) were involved in a wide range of reform issues and were interested in developments abroad. A number of the early members of the SMC first collaborated as members of the ‘Society for Elementary Education and for the Development of Mutual Instruction’, an education reform society influenced by British education reformist Joseph Lancaster. They were largely progressive aristocrats: the duke of Larochefoucald-Liancourt, prominent philanthropist; Victor Broglie, a duke and liberal representative in the Chamber of Peers; Charles-Philibert de Lasteyrie, a liberal count, industrialist and agronomist; Alexandre de Laborde, a count and archaeologist who had served under Lucien Bonaparte in Spain; and Baron Joseph-Marie de Gérando, a Napoleonic politician and literary journalist. The young François Guizot, a bourgeois Protestant later to become a lead Orleanist minister, also participated.96

After working together in more specialized reform associations like the education society and a Royal Society for the Improvement of Prisons, Broglie, Guizot, Lasteyrie, Laborde, de Gérand and Larochefoucald-Liancourt worked to found the Société de la morale chrétienne in

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96 Lasteyrie, Laborde and Larochefoucald-Liancourt founded the Society in 1815 in Paris, after the first two had traveled together to England to study the education system in 1814. Larochefoucald-Liancourt also translated one of Lancaster’s publications in this period. Van der Linden, The International Peace Movement, 67-69.
The Society addressed a wide range of issues, including prison reform, anti-slavery, and the abolition of the death penalty. It was the first organization to get involved in peace activism in France. The SMC collaborated with the British and American peace societies from its inception, and eventually created an internationally-oriented ‘peace committee’ in 1840.

The SMC, however, was not a mere imitation of the Anglo-American peace societies. It did not draw upon the same sources of inspiration or hold the same vision of peace. It combined an Enlightenment-era belief in human perfectability with a non-dogmatic form of Christianity. The Society had little interest in theology and relied on secular sources like philosophy, travel accounts and statistics more often than Biblical verse. To the disappointment of its British and American counterparts, the SMC did not advocate non-resistance. It saw peace not only as the refusal of war, but as the outcome of progressive public policy.

Composed of about 70% Catholics and 30% Protestants, the society sought to align policy with liberal Christian values like toleration and human dignity. They argued that religious conviction must reside not only in the realm of belief, but also in practical civic action, in legal reform and in national politics. The society worked through a central council as well as a number of committees working on specific issues: the Comité d’abolition de la traite des noirs, Comité des prisons, Comité des orphelins, Comité de l’abolition des jeux et des loteries and the Comité grec, founded at various points in 1822. In 1840, the year of a general war scare in Europe surrounding the above-mentioned issue of Egyptian advances into Syria, the SMC also founded a Comité de la paix, becoming the first organization in France dedicated to the cause of international peace. Through these committees, the Société de la Morale chrétienne hoped to provide relief for individuals (providing food, shelter or advice to men and women in poverty, orphaned children, refugees, etc.) and sought to align public policy more closely with Christian morality. It established a newspaper, the Journal de la Société de la Morale chrétienne (JSMC) in 1823 to publicize its views and activities as well as those of the American and British peace societies.

The founding of an ecumenical association in the early 1820s was itself a political statement. The Restoration period was rife with religious conflict, as elements of the Catholic clergy sought revenge against revolutionary anti-clericalism. Sheryl Kroen has described how cadres of domestic missionaries—les missionnaires de France—traveled throughout France and held massive public rallies and ceremonies of “expiation” aimed at inspiring fear in local populations and inculcating regret for disloyalty to the church during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic regimes. Although religiously-inspired violence decreased over the course of the century, conflict between conservative Catholics and anti-clerical republicans remained heated throughout the century. Tensions between anti-clericals and missionaries became particularly

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97 On the prison reform society, see van der Linden, The International Peace Movement, 68-69.
98 This still meant, however, that Protestants were over-represented with respect to their numbers in French society at large. Lawrence Jennings’s examination of fifty-one leading members of the society identified seventeen, or thirty-three percent, as Protestants, while only about two percent of the French population was Protestant in this period. Jennings, French Anti-Slavery, 9.
99 There is little internal evidence to explain why the SMC founded the peace committee in 1840 in particular, but it is very possible that the decision was a response to the “war scare” of 1840, when tensions over Egyptian expansion into Syria seemed to threaten war between the Great Powers.
101 Claude Langlois sees religious violence as decreasing over the course of the nineteenth century, whereas Caroline Ford sees religious violence as merely being displaced into another realm, namely, the conflicts between anti-clericals and observant Catholics. Claude Langlois, “La fin des guerres de Religion : La Disparition de la violence
explosive following Charles X’s coronation as a divine-right monarch in Reims in 1826.\textsuperscript{102} The July Monarchy and early Second Republic saw an attempt to reconcile democratic republicanism and Catholicism, but this peace broke down after the shooting of the archbishop of Paris during the June days of 1848.\textsuperscript{103}

The SMC’s first president, the duke Larochefoucauld-Liancourt, was no avid Revolutionary, having been the garde-corps for Louis XVI and having fled France early on in the Revolution. The duke was more a man of the moderate Enlightenment, voting for a constitutional monarchy in 1789 and engaging in numerous philanthropic projects after the Revolution.\textsuperscript{104} His founding of a practically-oriented, non-dogmatic society for ‘Christian morality’ can be seen as a product of his adherence to eighteenth-century ideas of toleration and coexistence and a reaction against radical politics from left or right.

The Société was a relatively small organization—membership ranged from 255 in 1823 to 388 in 1830.\textsuperscript{105} It nonetheless achieved considerable influence in early nineteenth century French society due to the high profile of many of its members. Benjamin Constant and François Guizot were both presidents of the society in the 1820s. Another prominent liberal of the early nineteenth century, Charles de Rémuusat, was the secretary of the group’s Comité pour l’abolition de la traite des noires in the 1820s. As Lawrence Jennings put it, the Société de la Morale chrétienne “constituted a veritable Who’s Who of the leaders of the liberal opposition in the 1820s and of the future governing elite of the July Monarchy that was to follow in 1830”\textsuperscript{106}. One should note, however, that the society did not promote constitutionalist politics, and included members with a variety of political leanings. SMC member Eugénie Niboyet, for example, was a Saint-Simonian who would later become a socialist and defender of women’s rights.\textsuperscript{107}

The group’s small size can be related to its membership requirements, hypothetically requiring nomination by two current members and approval by two-thirds of the group as well as membership fees. The amount of annual dues – 25 francs in an era when the average daily wage


\textsuperscript{72} Jacques-Olivier Boudon, Religion et politique en France depuis 1789 (Paris: Armand Colin, 2007), 51.


\textsuperscript{74} Van der Linden, The International Peace Movement, 68. Van der Linden also notes that La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt travelled to Great Britain and America as a Revolutionary emigrant and thereafter translated a publication from Lancaster. In terms of specific philanthropic activities, van der Linden mentions that the duke helped found the Philanthropic Society in 1780, served as the chairman of the Mendicity Committee set up by the National Assembly in 1790, and after his return to France in 1799, acted as a school inspector and experimented with economic and social reforms on his estate.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid, 10.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid, 10.

\textsuperscript{77} Eugénie Niboyet was a member of the Société de la morale chrétienne but also an active Saint-Simonian. www.ohio.edu/chastain/ip/niboyet.htm, accessed September 4, 2013. She was the editor and founder of numerous newspapers throughout her career, including La Conseiller des femmes, La Mosaïque lyonnaise, L’Ami des familles and L’Avenir. In 1844, she established a newspaper entitled La Paix des deux mondes. The first few issues publicize the activities of foreign peace societies, but Niboyet soon shifted to topics such as workers and women’s rights. It seems that she never participated in the peace congresses. Yet as Riot-Sarcey has commented: “Pour elle, l’émancipation de la femme est étroitement associée au pacifisme social. Elle n’a cessé de dénoncer les violences engendrées par les guerres et les révolutions fomentées par les hommes, facteurs de misères dont les femmes étaient, le plus souvent, les premières victimes.” Michèle Riot-Sarcey, “Histoire et autobiographie : Le Vrai Livre des femmes d’Eugénie Niboyet” in Romantisme 17, no. 56: 59-68.
for workers was 2 francs – seems to have formed the greatest barrier to entry, however.\textsuperscript{108} Moreover, whereas British reform societies had the legal right to hold open meetings, both the Restoration and July Monarchy prohibited public gatherings, making the involvement of a wider public much more difficult.\textsuperscript{109,110}

Though the \textit{Société de la Morale chrétienne} did not build a mass movement, it sought to have a broad impact on public opinion through its journal.\textsuperscript{111} Most of its campaigns – from the abolition of the death penalty to anti-slavery – sought to transform public opinion and inspire the public to put pressure on the government to change its policies. That the society mainly sought to impact public opinion through its journal, rather than through large public meetings or demonstrations, should be seen more as a product of legal restrictions on assembly and publication than of limited ambition. In its charitable activities, the SMC did reach out to the working-class, albeit with the class prejudices present in most philanthropic ventures of the period on both sides of the channel.\textsuperscript{112} The society may have been elitist in terms of its membership, but it aimed to change the mores and values of the nation as a whole. The idea was to encourage policies that would have the power to change the public \textit{moeurs} and mentalities of all classes of citizens.

The \textit{Société de la Morale chrétienne} established relations with the London Peace Society early on. The founders had already been in contact with LPS member William Allen, who they had named ‘foreign associate’ of their education society in 1815.\textsuperscript{113} The partnership between the LPS and SMC seems to have begun through an SMC member named M. Wurtz, however, during a trip to England in 1823 to meet with the secretary of a prison reform society. At some point during his stay, M. Wurtz came into contact with the London Peace Society, which then expressed interest in subscribing to the \textit{Journal de la Société de la Morale chrétienne} and in maintaining correspondence between the two groups.\textsuperscript{114-115} For the next three and a half decades, the societies would remain in close contact, exchanging books, pamphlets, brochures and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{108} Jennings, \textit{French Anti-Slavery}, 9 on the SMC’s membership requirements, 54 on daily wages.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Ibid, 285.
\item \textsuperscript{110} The society has also been studied as the primary organization in France working for the abolition of slavery in the early part of the nineteenth century. Lawrence Jennings’s major book on the second French abolitionist movement, \textit{French Anti-Slavery: The Movement for the Abolition of Slavery in France, 1802-1848}, highlights the \textit{Société de la Morale chrétienne} as an important early player in anti-slavery activism between Napoleon’s reinstatement of slavery and its abolition by the Second Republic in 1848. Jennings sees the society as having played a key role in 1820s, after which it focused more on other issues and anti-slavery activism became centered around the \textit{Société française pour l’abolition de l’esclavage}, a group operating within parliament and including numerous former or current members of the SMC. Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Ibid, 10. “The organization…also had little popular support and deigned not appeal to public opinion because of its own elitist orientation.”
\item \textsuperscript{113} Van der Linden, 68.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Similarly, the SMC’s committee for the abolition of the slave trade was formed in April 1822 “at the instigation of a visiting English Quaker, Joseph Price”. The SMC’s connections with English philanthropic societies were generally very close in each of the reform areas. According to Jennings, this worked against the success of abolitionism in France, due to widespread Anglophobia in this period. He argues this more in the case of the \textit{Société française pour l’abolition de l’esclavage}, but it could be seen as hindering the SMC as well. See: Jennings, \textit{French Anti-Slavery}, 13 on the slave trade committee’s founding; Ibid, 287 on the question of Anglophobia and the British connection.
\item \textsuperscript{115} \textit{Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne} 2, no. 7 (Paris: Treuttel et Würtz, 1823), 3.
\end{itemize}
newspapers and sending delegates to attend each other’s meetings. The Société de la Morale chrétienne regularly published news from the London Peace Society from 1823 to 1859.\footnote{116} In 1841, the London Peace Society gave the SMC 1,250 francs for an essay competition on the topic “Traité sur les moyens d’avancer et d’obtenir le bienfait d’une paix universelle et permanente”. The Société de la Morale chrétienne was also in close contact with the peace societies of Boston, Geneva and Bath.\footnote{117}

There was a strong sense of identification between the groups: “[ces] sociétés, qui ont leurs journaux, qui correspondent, fraternisent entre elles, et travaillent dans un même empressement et dans un grand accord, à placer dans la paix universelle la clef de voûte de la civilisation”.\footnote{118} As mentioned, however, this did not mean that their views corresponded directly on all subjects. Most pointedly, historians of the British peace movement have noted the London Peace Society’s disappointment that the Société de la morale chrétienne never adopted an absolute pacifist position, condemning war but never developing an explicit critique of defensive war or advocating conscientious objection.\footnote{119} For its own part, the SMC perceived a different disjuncture between itself and the British and American peace societies: whereas the latter framed the problem of war in the Christian framework of sin and eternal damnation, the SMC were more concerned with the consequences of war for the living, including its costs for the wealth of states and the development of agriculture, letters and the arts.

‘Chez nous disait-il, l’amour de la paix est plus encore une pensée d’humanité qu’une pensée religieuse, tandis qu’à Londres, Manchester, Boston et Philadelphie la pensée religieuse est plus puissante encore que la pensée d’humanité : ainsi en France, on appelle crime ce qui sur les bords de la Tamise et de la Delaware est appelé péché. Dans la Grande-Bretagne, c’est la crainte de l’enfer qui est le premier mobile de l’amour de la paix, chez nous on hait la guerre parce qu’elle est pour le monde d’ici bas un véritable enfer où les générations vivantes se consument avec la richesse des Etats, les trésors de l'agriculture, l’éclat des lettres et des arts.’\footnote{120}

The SMC saw itself as occupied with the here-and-now; even its conception of religion was oriented towards the questions of daily life (“practical” religion rather than theology).\footnote{121} Nonetheless, it tried to find common ground with British and American pacifists in their efforts to cultivate international peace.

The groups collaborated closely from the early 1820s. Through its journal, the SMC sought to inform readers in France of peace activism abroad and to make foreign pacifist writings available in French. The goal was to make French readers aware of the main goals, arguments and activities of international pacifism and to win them over to the cause. Working under tighter censorship restrictions in France, the JSMC opted primarily to translate and re-

\footnote{116}{Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne 9, no. 5 (Paris: Typographie de Morris et Cie., 1859), 27.}
\footnote{117}{On Bath: Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne 7, no. 42, (1826), 329. On Geneva and Boston, see Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne 19, no. 1 (Paris: A. Henry, 1841), 72, 139. The SMC had contacts with Geneva from 1829, London from 1823 and Bath from 1826, and Boston from the early 1840s.}
\footnote{118}{Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne 19, no. 1 (1841), 72.}
\footnote{119}{Brock claims that the London Peace Society was “less successful” when it tried to carry its message to the European continent, noting its disappointment in learning that the SMC advocated a different brand of pacifism from themselves. He states: “In fact no continental peace society supported refusal of military service or advocated rejection of defensive war, ‘a position which made most English religious pacifists very uncomfortable’.” Brock, Freedom from War, 28.}
\footnote{120}{Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne 7, Troisième Série (Paris: Maulde et Renou, 1847), 133.}
\footnote{121}{As Charles Rémusat summed up at the SMC’s second assembly “la morale doit être religieuse et la religion applicable”. Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne 2, no. 11 (1923), 245.}
publish British or American articles, rather than presenting original French articles. This strategy allowed the Journal to conform to the regime’s ban on political journalism while still promoting the international peace movement.

Once the London Peace Society decided to hold an international peace congress in London in 1843, it sent out automatic invitations to members of the London Peace Society, to the peace committee of the SMC, and to delegates of American, Swiss and Belgian peace societies, as well as delegates named by clergy or philanthropic, literary or scientific societies.¹²² The Société de la Morale chrétienne, in turn, actively promoted this congress, and well as the subsequent peace congresses of 1848 and 1849. Coverage of the international Peace Congress was a main focus of the JSMC in 1849, and it included a history of the peace movement, complete Congress proceedings, letters to the SMC on the subject of the Congress and related articles. Before the 1849 Congress, members met at the SMC headquarters to discuss in closer quarters. The JSMC positioned itself as the main advocate of the Congress. It was one of the earliest French publications to give voice to the international peace movement in France, and it took an active part in promoting the Congresses in 1843, 1848 and 1849.

Nonviolence and Progressive Reform

The Société de la Morale chrétienne’s peace advocacy was not a mere importation from England, but a logical consequence of the society’s values and goals. In its participation in the peace movement as in its other activities, the SMC advanced a wide civilizational project to promote nonviolence and moral improvement. This project found inspiration both in Christianity and in the Enlightenment, particularly through ideas of toleration, perfectability and human dignity. Toleration was part of ‘love for one’s neighbor’, through which we again see the SMC’s sources of influence: “l’amour de ses semblables, cette loi fondamentale du christianisme, est devenu un besoin moral depuis que les progrès des lumières, propagées dans l’intérêt de tous, ont affaibli les préventions et les haines, tristes fruits de l’ignorance et de la superstition qui ont trop long-temps désolé le monde.”¹²³ To the SMC, the Enlightenment reinforced rather than undermined Christianity. Ignorance, prejudice and superstition, in this picture, were not the products of Christianity (à la Voltaire), but contrary to its precepts.

The SMC did not use the term ‘human dignity’, but frequently used the vocabulary of ‘les hommes’ and ‘l’humanité’. This was a deliberate choice informed by their combination of a Christian and Enlightenment perspective. Charles de Rémusat commented at the SMC’s second assembly: “Le christianisme a relevé l’humanité. Il a reconnu des hommes où le paganisme ne voyait que des citoyens ou des esclaves.”¹²⁴ At the same time, the group self-consciously identified as ‘modernes’ promoting “civilisation” and the spirit of association.¹²⁵ Again, they saw the Enlightenment as reinforcing Christianity, and clearly built off of the ‘siècle des lumières’ and its construction of the idea of modern (European) civilization.¹²⁶ Their intended defense of ‘humanity’ should be seen in this light.

¹²² Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne 23, no. 6 (Paris: Treuttel et Wurtz, 1843), 322.
¹²³ Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne 2, no. 11 (1823), 263.
¹²⁴ Ibid, 247.
¹²⁵ Rémusat describes the SMC as part of “l’esprit d’association”, which he calls a “découverte des modernes” – “les nations anciennes l’ont peu connu”. Ibid, 246-247.
¹²⁶ On the development of the idea of civilization, see for example: Larry Wolff and Marco Cipollini, eds., The Anthropology of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
The notion of perfectability is even more traceable to the Enlightenment. In general, the Enlightenment is seen as a turning away from Christian notions of original sin to emphasize men’s capacity to shape their world. This spirit is evident in the JSMC, which rarely made reference to original sin. Its work in anti-slavery activism, social assistance and the abolition of the death penalty, for example, all reflected its members’ conviction that human beings could ‘improve’ in their moral constitutions and that public policy could be reshaped to advance moral progress. They focused their attention on an effort to change French laws and policies but also hoped to develop arguments that could be applied in other national contexts and thereby alter international relations in the long run.

This belief in human perfectability led the SMC to campaign against various forms of violence. The SMC linked pacifism with an opposition to dueling, the death penalty and suicide, which they considered to be detrimental to individual and civilizational progress. As the marquis de Larocheoucauld-Liancourt (son of the SMC’s first president) stated in 1854: the Society wished to “abolir, au nom du Dieu créateur, les pratiques destructives de l’homme: la guerre, le duel, la peine de mort et le suicide.” Larocheoucauld-Liancourt introduced the SMC at the 1843 Congress by stating that it was “the only Society in France which has openly declared itself to be a Peace Society; the only one which has unceasingly given open expression to its horror of war; the only one which opposes itself, without reserve or hesitation, equally against dueling and revolts, as against conquest.”

We can see the link between human perfectability and nonviolence, for example, in the SMC’s opposition to the death penalty. The problem with the death penalty, the group claimed, was that rather than seeking to provoke repentance and change in the guilty party, it “destroyed” the person. They argued that the death penalty therefore flouted the principle of the inviolability of human life, the true character of natural law and the potential for human transformation.

The Société campaigned against the death penalty in its journal, but also engaged in more direct activities. Members attempted to remove the accused from ‘death row’ by coaching the defendant towards repentance and pressuring the justice system to grant a lesser sentence. To the Société de la Morale chrétienne, human perfectability was both a secular and religious value: it meant using one’s reason, but also called upon humans’ potential to recognize God’s grace, repent, and live according to His will. The group argued that murderers were just as capable of transformation as other criminals, if not more so. Murder arose out of spontaneous passion, and was not a habit like stealing or ‘vagabondage’. These activities paralleled the SMC’s work.

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129 Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne 4, no. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie de Mme Vve Dondey-Dupré, 1854), 27.


132 See, for example, Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne 17, no. 6 (1840), 323.

through the *Comité de bienfaisance* to provide orphans with education and former prostitutes with new vocations.\(^\text{134}\)

To the SMC, penal law should improve public morality, either through the prevention of crime or punishment aimed to ‘correct’ the wrongdoer. The Society argued that, contrary to popular belief, the death penalty did not prevent crime. They stated, for example, that “la peine de mort n’est pas un objet de terreur pour la plupart des brigands, et que, quand ils y sont condamnées, ils en parlent avec indifférence et légèreté”.\(^\text{135}\) The death penalty was therefore unable to promote moral improvement through preventative or corrective measures, taking away lives rather than transforming them and failing to cause reflection before the fact. This project to reform the criminal justice system along the lines of Christian ethics paralleled the Peace Congresses’ effort to make international law conform more closely to the precepts of the New Testament. The idea was that moral reform of institutions and individuals was possible and that these two levels of reform were mutually reinforcing.

Like their eighteenth-century predecessors, the JSMC often drew upon cross-cultural comparison to illustrate their point.\(^\text{136}\) In 1840, the journal ran an article on the death penalty in Buddhist countries. The author admitted that these countries had ‘barbarous’ customs, but above all highlighted the great respect for human life present in these cultures: “On respecte surtout la vie de l’homme ; on est hospitalier, charitable ; on a le plus grand soin des voyageurs, des malades et des indigents ; on se croit même obligé d’avoir un tendre intérêt pour la vie des animaux les plus vils. Voilà ce que nous trouvons dans la religion de Buddha.” Thus, for more than half of humanity (China alone having 300 million of the world’s 737 million inhabitants, according to the article), “la plus haute piété” was to “ne vouloir jamais condamner un homme à mort”.\(^\text{137}\) If peoples living in “idolatry” could be morally advanced enough to recognize this fact, Europe should be able to do the same. The recognition of Buddhists’ great respect for life should inspire Christians to remember that they held the same values. As was often the case in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the SMC therefore used intercultural comparisons to critique European society itself. The JSMC published numerous such articles to defamiliarize European perceptions of their just systems and inspire greater clemency in penal law.\(^\text{138}\)

\(^{134}\) *Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne* 17, no. 6 (1840), 321.

\(^{135}\) *Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne* 5 (1825), 27.


\(^{137}\) *Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne* 18 (Paris: Imprimerie de A. Henry, 1840), 275. Note that this quote mentions vegetarianism, highlighting the value of all sentient life for Buddhists. The JSMC ran a few other similar articles in the 1840s, including one mentioning vegetarianism in “Kalmouc” culture and animal rights activism in Germany and London. Ibid, 360; *Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne* 6, Troisième Série (Paris: Maulde et Renou, 1846), 132.

\(^{138}\) One article in 1847 also implied the ‘backwardness’ of European justice systems vis-à-vis the Chinese, stating that the Chinese government sought to prevent rather than punish crime, whereas Europeans “lais[ser] toute liberté de commettre pour avoir ensuite le plus grand zèle à punir”. *Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne* 8, Troisième série (Paris: Maulde et Renou, 1847), 269. Another related a story from a British missionary in which tribesmen in Tahiti voted to end the death penalty because they believed it conflicted with Christian morality. In the story, the ‘great priest’ states that banishment to a place of solitude could more effectively bring about repentance from a criminal and that “la piété de la loi est de tendre à convertir le coupable”. Thus, according to the *Société de la*
But again, the French peace advocates’ tactics went were those of modern activists. Beyond the Société de la morale chrétienne’s campaign to abolish the death penalty within the pages of the JSMC, peace advocates formed a common coalition to influence state policy. Victor Hugo (who would serve as the president of the 1849 Congress) and the Christian activist Athanase Coquere, père (delegate to the 1849 peace congress) were two of the major French representatives advocating for the inclusion of the abolition of the death penalty as an amendment to the constitution of the Second Republic. Hugo continued to lobby for the law even after its repeal. In 1849, L’Événement, a newspaper founded by Hugo the previous year, launched a petition in favor of the abolition of the death penalty, an act for which his son and collaborator, Charles Hugo, would pay for with fines and four months in prison in the more restrictive political climate of the Second Republic under Louis-Napoléon’s presidency.\(^\text{139}\)\(^\text{140}\) The cause appeared in Hugo’s fiction as well: his Les Misérables criticized disproportionate punishments in its depiction of the book’s hero, Jean Valjean, who was sentenced to twenty years in prison for stealing a loaf of bread, and in its sympathetic portrayal of the group of young law students who participated in the protests of 1832, who campaigned against the death penalty. The themes of Christian forgiveness and human perfectability also play a major role in the novel, even as the violent uprising of 1832 is portrayed as a noble act.\(^\text{141}\) For the members of the SMC as for other peace advocates like Victor Hugo, the principles of human perfectability and human dignity must be realized through a comprehensive policy reform program ranging from the abolition of the death penalty to the prevention of international war.

The Society was equally concerned about dueling, which it saw as a kind of war between individuals. Like war, dueling meant a resort to violence instead of mediation, flouting the principle of human life as a prized value in ‘civilized’ Christian society. In 1828, for example, the group criticized the continuing preference for dueling as a means of resolving private disputes and blamed the invention of firearms for perpetuating the practice. An article in the JSMC, entitled “Reflexions morales sur la découverte de la poudre,” lamented the role that gunpowder had played in war, suicide, and dueling. The author commented that those seeking vengeance most preferred to resort to using firearms; in fact, “l’usage des armes à feu qui a alimenté et perpetué en France le plus enraciné des préjugés : le duel”.\(^\text{142}\) However, the SMC also published numerous articles indicating the decreased popularity of dueling.\(^\text{143}\) Society, they believed, was gradually recognizing the value of human life and the necessity of nonviolent forms of justice. The journal continued to publish regular articles on dueling through the 1850s, arguing that it ran against the values of humanity, Christianity, and civilization.\(^\text{144}\)


\(^\text{143}\) See, for example, Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne 17, no. 1 (Paris: Treuttel et Wurtz, 1840), 43.

\(^\text{144}\) For example, in an article in the JSMC in 1851, one author commented that a brochure published in the 1830s by James Sega, “What is true civilization?”, had already proven that “dans l’état d’une société où la peine de mort est
Finally, the SMC’s campaign against slavery reflected its efforts to induce policy reforms according to an Enlightenment/Christian understanding of human dignity and respect for human life. The group insisted on the unity of the human race and the degrading nature of slavery to all those involved, and argued for legal protections against this ‘destructive practice’. We again see the language of ‘humanity’: “Pour maintenir l’esclavage dans notre civilisation moderne, il a fallu dégrader l’esclave de sa qualité d’homme. Le jour où il a été reconnu que le nègre est un homme, l’esclavage a été grappé à mort.”¹⁴⁵ The SMC sought to underline the humanity of slaves, the intrinsic value of their lives, their capacity for moral and intellectual improvement. It highlighted slaves’ rights to liberal values like justice, property and family.¹⁴⁶

The society initially took a gradualist approach to emancipation, advocating, in the 1820s, for education programs to prepare slaves for freedom. By the mid-1840s, however, the SMC moved towards insistence upon the immediate abolition of slavery, highlighting the frequency of suicide amongst slaves and the corrupting nature of absolute power for slave-owners.¹⁴⁷ In their move to immediatism, they transposed the Enlightenment critique of absolutism to the case of slavery, while also framing it as contrary to Christian notions of equality. Though the Société de la Morale chrétienne decreased its activities on the issue of slavery in the 1830s and 1840s, one can still see the commitment to ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’ understood through the Enlightenment and Christianity, which cut across all of its reform campaigns.¹⁴⁸

The society’s understanding of peace had its contradictions, however. In particular, the society denounced the violence associated with colonialism, but often overlooked the necessary connection between the two. Though not opposed to colonialism per se, from the 1830s through the 1850s, the society criticized violent methods of conversion and colonial control. In 1835, for example, the JSMC ran an article denouncing French management of the settlement in Algiers, saying that the government had “légitimé l’arbitraire, excusé la violence, justifié les barbaries et négliqué les intérêts, en méprisant les vertus morales”.¹⁴⁹ Like British pacifists, the Société de la Morale chrétienne objected to forcible conversion and to violent methods of asserting authority over natives.¹⁵⁰

However, the Société de la Morale chrétienne upheld the use of soft power in civilizing efforts abroad. In 1854, nearly twenty years after the occupation of Algiers, the JSMC published an article supporting religious missions as conducive to the moral improvement of humanity. The

prononcé, où l’esclavage est maintenu, et où le duel est en usage, là n’est pas la véritable civilisation”. *Journal de la société de la morale chrétienne* 1, no. 4 (Paris: Mme Ve Dondey-Dupré, 1851), 3.

¹⁴⁵ *Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne* 17, no. 6 (1840), 69-70.

¹⁴⁶ See, for example, *Journal de la société de la morale chrétienne* 3, no. 15 (1824), 159, 165.

¹⁴⁷ *Journal de la société de la morale chrétienne* 3, no. 15 (Paris: Crapelet, 1824), 159; *Journal de la société de la morale chrétienne* 6, Troisième série (Paris: Maulde et Renou, 1846), 110. “Non, non, les philanthropes ne se trompent pas en demandant l’abolition immédiate de l’esclavage. Les suicides d’esclaves l’attestent d’une manière terrible ; l’humanité fait un impérieux devoir d’anéantir enfin cette monstrueuse autorité dominicale dont il est impossible de corriger les excès, parce que les colons sont des hommes, et qu’il n’est pas donné à nos passion d’user sans excès du pouvoir absolu.”

¹⁴⁸ Jennings, *French Anti-Slavery*, 18-19 on the decrease in activities. On ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’, see this quote attributing liberty and equality to Christianity: “En étendant à chacun la loi, la liberté, la grâce, en appliquant à tous les mérites du Rédempteur, il a le premier proclamé l’égalité.” At the same time, the group used the language of the Enlightenment, speaking of “les peuples éclairés”, “civilisation”, etc. *Journal de la Société de la morale chrétienne* 2, no. 11 (1823), 247.


¹⁵⁰ 1843 Congress, 24.
article lamented the disorganization of colonial missions but emphasized the potential and importance of the *mission civilisatrice*. The greatest problem was that missionaries did not stay long enough in one place; instead, they should remain in a single location for several years in order to teach natives the ways of Christianity by example. The natives were capable of improvement, but could not do this alone – they needed the ‘guidance’ of a ‘more civilized people’. The same article added a ‘P.S’ to note the “bienfaits” that French civilization had brought to Algeria and cite the “établissements utiles et charitables” that had been founded there.\footnote{Journal de la société de la morale chrétienne 4, no. 1 (1854), 4-31. The article states that “les peuples africains peuvent aspirer à toutes nos perfections et atteindre les degrés les plus élevés de notre état social”; they were capable of becoming “bons soldats, d’excellents ouvriers, des bureaucrates très-expeditifs…des savants mathématiciens et des théologiens hors ligne”, as well as great musicians and poets.}

At issue was not the effort to ‘civilize’ a foreign people, but the means used to this end. In the 1835 on Algiers, the author stated: “il y a là un peuple à créer, et jusqu’à présent on a confié aux principes de l’absolutisme, aux doctrines de la force et aux exemples de la corruption le soin de le civiliser.”\footnote{Ibid, 75.} In another article in 1835, for example, the society celebrated missionary activities in southern Africa, the author stating that: “je ne sais rien de plus admirable que ce qui se passe actuellement dans l’Afrique meridionale”. Even “au milieu des peuples nomades les plus barbares, sanguinaires et même anthropophages”, missionaries were able to advance the progress of “civilisation et du christianisme.”\footnote{Journal de la société de la morale chrétienne 7, no. 1 (1835), 230.} Missionary activities were viewed as an essential aspect of expanding and enriching Christian civilization in the contemporary period, part of their universalist ambition of making Christian beliefs fundamental to social practices and institutions anywhere possible. At the core of this vision was a belief that individuals could be converted and brought to the ways of Christianity, and thereby – in the SMC’s opinion – ‘improving’ their moral character and behavior. The authors of such articles ignored the possibility of resistance from indigenous populations.

The group’s support of a religious civilizing mission was part and parcel of its general goal of spreading Christian ethics – an objective applicable just as much to far-away ‘savages’ as to those ‘ignorant’ of Christian morality at home. Yet the commitment to nonviolence and support for colonialism were clearly contradictory. While the society seemed to maintain the illusion that this mission could be consensual and free of violent confrontation, they must have known that this was not fully possible, at least in the case where it was protected by the colonial state.\footnote{See J.P. Daughton, *An Empire Divided: Religion, Republicanism and the Making of French Colonialism, 1880-1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) for a discussion of the tensions between Christian missionaries’ and the government’s visions of the civilizing mission later on in the century and the conflict – as well as compromises – this created in practice.}

Nonetheless, the SMC made a concerted effort to prove the benefits of peace and nonviolence. At the first of the international peace congresses in London in 1843, the one French figure to attend was the marquis de Larochefoucauld-Liancourt, president of the SMC and son of the Society’s founder.\footnote{Born in 1779, the marquis was a constitutional monarchist like many of his fellow SMC members, a deputy for the constitutional opposition under the Restoration and a multiple-term deputy in favor of Louis-Philippe’s government from 1831 to 1848. He also published numerous works of political and literary history, biography, poetry and theater, from the age of nineteen until his death in 1863. The marquis acted as a vice-chairman of the 1843 congress and a delegate to the 1849 congress, although he did not give a speech during the latter.} In his address to the Congress, the marquis tried to present arguments...
that could convince other governments of the benefits of peace at the local level. He argued that war increased crime and decreased the clemency of the criminal justice system, the availability of public credit and the quantity of deposits in savings banks. It caused the government to run steep budget deficits and to divert funding from infrastructure and other useful projects. He gave detailed statistics to back up all of these claims, and then quoted Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu on the “folly and disastrous nature of war”. He praised the entente cordiale between England and France as an example of international cooperation in favor of peace, but concluded on the idea that “the religion of Christ alone” was the only secure foundation for political treaties aimed at establishing international peace. The speech reflected the multifaceted approach of the SMC, using practical, philosophical and religious arguments for international peace, applicable as much domestically as abroad.

The SMC was critical to the founding of a French peace movement. The group exposed the French public to the activities of peace societies abroad, but also developed its own civilizational project in favor of toleration, nonviolence and the protection of ‘human’ dignity. The group carried on the optimism and historical confidence of eighteenth-century figures like Condorcet, believing in the perfectability of individuals and institutions alike. Despite its differences with the British and American peace societies, the SMC was drawn into the international peace movement as an expression of its own campaign against “destructive practices” and its goal of protecting human life through legal protections and adapted government policies.

**French Christian Pacifism and the International Peace Congresses, 1843-1853**

After the SMC, a number of figures in Parisian religious life linked up to the movement as the Congresses gained more visibility. The abbé Deguerry and Athanase Coquerel père were the most prominent of these, who served as delegates and officers to the 1849 Congress. Like the members of the SMC, Deguerry and Coquerel also emphasized the inviolability of human life and the potential for personal and institutional reform. They had a more exclusively religious outlook, but also developed civilizational and historical notions of peace and international cooperation.

Notably missing from the 1849 congress were evangelical Christians. A French Peace Congress Committee had been set up after the 1843 international peace congress and was charged with scouting new locations and participants for future congresses. The committee had hoped for a Paris congress for several years before successfully organizing one in August of 1849. In June/July of 1849, three main members of the committee, Elihu Burritt of the American Peace Society, Henry Richard of the London Peace Society and Auguste Visschers, president of the Brussels congress, went to Paris to secure French participation in the congress. They invited members of the SMC, including Larochefoucauld-Liancourt and Society administrator Renzi; the economists Frédéric Bastiat, Horace Say, Guillaumin, Michel Chevalier, Joseph Garnier and Louis Wolowski; and Saint-Simonian editor and journalist Charles Duveyrier. They approached evangelical Protestant ministers, but received a negative response. Laborde, a prominent evangelical minister in Paris, apparently told Richard that he preferred not to participate in a movement involving “mere politicians and men of the world” “devoid of all earnest religious convictions”. We see that the peace movement’s emphasis on the overcoming

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156 1843 Congress, 17-20.
158 Ibid, 334-335.
of religious, political and national differences was also an outcome of the self-selecting nature of the movement itself. To join the movement was to accept its heterogeneity and to commit to working with individuals with considerably different motivations than one’s own.

Athanase Coquerel and, at Coquerel’s suggestion, abbé Jean-Gaspard Deguerry, did decide to join. M.D.A. Sibour, archbishop of Paris, was asked to serve as president to the congress but was unable to for health reasons.\(^{159}\) Athanase Coquerel was the brother of a central figure in the Société de la Morale chrétienne, Charles Coquerel. Athanase was a well-known Protestant pastor, author and founder of the newspaper Le Protestant (which later became Le Libre examen). He was elected to the Assemblée constituante and the Assemblée législative and was a moderate republican, supporting Cavaignac and voting against the droiti au travail. Athanase and Charles had an international upbringing, raised abroad in Geneva and Montauban after the death of their French father and English mother at a young age.\(^{160}\) This made Athanase an ideal cultural intermediary between the French public and peace societies abroad. At the 1849 Congress, he acted as the main interpreter from English to French, allowing the audience to hear British and Americans’ messages from a person sympathetic to all sides.

Athanase combined a commitment to a gradual process of civilizational transformation with an emphasis on ethics and individual choice. At the 1849 congress, Coquerel highlighted the importance of individual faith for the long-term success of the cause of international peace. He praised the English and American participants for attending the congress and attributed their decision to make the long journey to their faith and strength of conviction. He claimed that the French lacked this quality but encouraged his compatriots to have the same perseverance in their beliefs.\(^{161}\)

Yet, like other French peace advocates, he also analyzed peace from a historical perspective. He called the establishment of standing armies the “first disarmament”, because before their invention, “every man was a soldier”. The task in the future would be to build on this ‘disarmament’ of society by “disar[ming] armies”. Governments could jointly agree on “progressive and simultaneous” steps to reduce the size of standing armies over time.\(^{162}\)

Coquerel also justified his approach by reference to history: “I defy you to cite me a single instance…in which a great social or religious amelioration was not called impossible when it first appeared.” Christianity was deemed unfit for the masses; slavery was seen as an indelible human practice; religious tolerance and liberty of conscience were once considered chimeras. Coquerel insisted that “everything that is true and good, everything that is Christian and divine is possible”.\(^{163}\) The reunion of hundreds of peace friends from multiple countries demonstrated the potential for the realization of international peace in the future; the peace friends just needed to remain firm in their beliefs and work to change the culture around them. Coquerel thus emphasized the potential for historical progress, but as the result of discrete ethical choices rather than a self-generating process of civilization.

It should be noted, however, that Coquerel père was even more adamant than some of his contemporaries in believing that political change was the work of men: he famously supported the decree in 1848 that shut all clubs to women, arguing that “the suitable and legitimate place for women is in private life and not in public life. Woman is always the loser when she departs

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\(^{159}\) Ibid, 334.
\(^{160}\) Roman d’Amat et. al., Dictionnaire de la biographie française, Tome 9 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1961), 574-575.
\(^{161}\) 1849 Congress, 34.
\(^{162}\) Ibid, 34-35.
\(^{163}\) Ibid, 36.
from the former for the latter”. The role that he believed that women could play in larger processes of cultural change is unclear. French peace advocates were most often silent on the potential contribution of women to international peace and, like most of their contemporaries across the political spectrum, saw politics as restricted to men. We know that the SMC included a handful of women, like Eugénie Niboyet, who started her own short-lived newspaper in favor of international peace in 1844; but otherwise, French peace advocacy was largely driven by men without particular consideration for women’s role in promoting international peace. As will be mentioned in Chapter 5, this can be held in comparison to the British and German peace movements, that at least included sizable numbers of women as observers and co-agitators. Athanase Coquerel senior, in contrast, was explicitly opposed to women’s activities outside of the home.

Athanase Coquerel’s son, a pastor of the same name, took a comparable general approach to peace, combining a historical analysis of war and an emphasis on ethical choices. Athanase Josué Coquerel had a similarly international upbringing as his father. Coquerel fils was born in Amsterdam in 1820 and moved to Paris 10 years later. Between 1839 and 1843, he studied in Geneva and Strasbourg and traveled to Jerusalem. In 1848 he became the chaplain of the prestigious secondary school Henri IV in Paris. Until his death, Athanase fils was an active pacifist and liberal Christian, attending the 1849 congress and engaging in pacifist activities in the late 1860s/early 1870s; becoming the head of the Union libérale, a society of liberal Protestants based in Geneva; and founding the Union suisse du christianisme libéral. He preached in England and Holland and organized Sunday schools in France. He published widely on questions of education and religious doctrine and was a dedicated member of the Société de l’histoire du protestantisme française.

A series of sermons by Athanase fils published in 1858 demonstrate his understanding of peace. In one series of sermons entitled “Les Bienheureux selon J.-C.”, Coquerel focused on “les pacifiques”. Athanase fils first presented a history of war going back to a Rousseauian state of nature: born alone and with no defense, self-defense was one of man’s first necessities. Necessity then became virtue: victory in personal combat became a primary source of glory. Military glory then continued to be a major value of societies as they developed. Coquerel lamented the persistence of this esteem for war and military values in contemporary French society and the “ridicule” cast on pacifists. Like his father, he then turned to an ethics of choice, calling on fellow Christians to find the courage to spread the Gospel’s message of love, even if it ran up against the dominant ideas. In the sermon, Athanase fils placed great emphasis on the idea that war was the result of individual choices, not only by governments, but also by all. While heads of state sent troops off to war, they were only able to do so through the willing and often enthusiastic participation of citizens or subjects. War was thus a cultural problem – one of creating an atmosphere of peaceful or antagonistic relations between peoples. Coquerel warned those poets and songwriters who praised war: “Dieu vous demandera compte du sang que vos chants de guerre feront répandre”. Yet his message was not only proscriptive; he also wanted

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165 See footnote 107 above on Eugénie Niboyet.
166 Amat, Dictionnaire de la biographie française, Tome 9, 574-575.
168 Ibid, 322
to show ordinary people that they had the capacity to end war, thus morally improving themselves and society at large.

This would require considerable courage – of another kind: “Ce qui manque parmi nous, c’est le courage civil, le courage moral et religieux, l’énergie du sacrifice accompli sans témoins, la fidélité au devoir sans gloire et sans éclat.” He called on them to replicate the “fermeté incomparable et si douce” of the first Christians and to find in Christianity a “source d’héroïsme et d’abnégation, de fraternité et de sainte poésie, plus pure, plus abondante que la guerre”. Christians needed to resist contemporary prejudices and work to restore “l’énergie morale” of society; God’s peace required “une guerre acharnée contre les passions égoïstes, orgueilleuses, haineuses”. This “guerre de la conscience contre le mal” took place internally and then externally. Christians needed to look inwards to find the moral force for a sustained fight for peace, and then work to spread their message to family, friends, compatriots and the world. Through the progressive participation of more and more Christians in this mission, God’s reign of peace would come. Coquerel ended his sermon confirming his belief that the spirit of Christianity could soften moeurs, enlighten minds and eventually make war impossible.

Athanase junior’s pacifism can be connected to his theology, to his idea of ‘the elected’ as those who ‘elect’ themselves through a deliberate choice to serve God and live according to a careful reading of the Bible. “Un élu c'est donc, non pas un bienheureux déjà glorifié, mais simplement un vrai chrétien, un chrétien sincère dans sa piété, sérieux dans sa vie, capable de souffrir pour sa conscience, et quand la tentation l'attaque, souffrant en effet pour Dieu et le devoir.” For Coquerel fils, Christianity was not an inherited identity but a deliberate act of faith and a mode of action. His focus was on individual choice, accountability and conscience. “Les pacifiques” were those who decided to live according to Christ’s model of love for humanity and to encourage this decision in others. Coquerel said that faith had “une force surnaturelle d’expansion et de développement”; it was “un feu qui se propage de lui-même”.

Put in religious terms, this meant that pacifists’ faith in Christian love would spread throughout society; in secular terms, that their advocacy could help to shape public opinion on a gradual basis.

Athanase Coquerel père and fils viewed peace as the consequence of a series of moral choices made throughout the generations. Their vision depended not so much on millenarianism as on an idea, again inspired by both Enlightenment thought and Christianity, of human perfectability through adherence to the Bible. In his Peace Congress speech, Athanase senior had indicated that their message might take generations to ‘bear fruit’. He dwelled at length on the contemporary obstacles facing pacifists in France and the importance of military glory to the nation’s self-perception and international reputation. Peace would be hard work in face of considerable adversity. Through moral courage and organization, however, Christians could help to build an international society based on reciprocity and respect rather than nationalist antagonisms. The Coquerels therefore converged with other French peace advocates on his idea of peace as an active process unfolding in time.

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169 Ibid, 327
170 Ibid, 326
171 Ibid, 328 “énergie morale”; 329 “guerre acharnée”; the rest can be found on pages 330-331.
172 Ibid, 137.
173 Ibid, 159.
174 1849 Congress, 34.
Abbé Deguerry, too, focused on the ‘un-Christian’ nature of war and the long-term potential for peace at the 1849 Peace Congress. Deguerry himself worked as a military chaplain for the royal guard as a young man, before becoming the curé of Sainte-Eustache in 1842, a church adjacent to the old central market of Paris and serving many working-class families, and then of the Madeleine in 1848, a high-profile church in an upscale neighborhood near the Louvre. Deguerry declined the position of bishop of Marseille in 1861, in order to stay with his parishioners, but later became the religious tutor of Napoleon III’s son. His closeness to the imperial regime led to his being taken hostage and shot during the Commune, after which he became a martyr figure for many Catholics.\textsuperscript{175} His connection to the international peace movement largely centered on the mid-century congresses. Deguerry became one of the most prominent and vocal delegates at the 1849 Congress and wrote in a letter of support to the 1850 Congress. As with Coquerel and the SMC, however, Deguerry’s participation in the congresses can be connected to the larger picture of his work throughout his life.

Like the SMC, Coquerel and peace activists abroad, Deguerry emphasized tolerance, the avoidance of doctrinal conflict (in the religious and political sense) and focus on practical philanthropy. Deguerry’s contemporary biographer, Imbert de Saint-Amand, painted Deguerry as a defender of the idea that: “La charité chrétienne n’appartient à aucune école, à aucune coterie, à aucune secte. Elle est de tous les pays, de tous les ages, universelle et immortelle comme le christianisme lui-même.”\textsuperscript{176} Imbert de Saint-Amand stated that Deguerry applied this spirit of Christian universalism in his work as the parish priest of the working-class Saint-Eustache during the Revolutions of 1848, trying to curb violence during the June Days (particularly in its anti-clerical form) by approaching rioters with an attitude of acceptance and Christian love. Imbert de Saint-Amand’s biography being more of a eulogy, his account should be treated with a certain degree of skepticism, but what remains of Deguerry’s speeches and sermons generally affirms the picture of him as a promoter of human cooperation in the name of Christianity.\textsuperscript{177}

In his sermons at the Madeleine church during the Second Empire, for example, Deguerry emphasized charity and love as solutions to a variety of world problems. Charity proscribed “base” passions like jealousy, cupidity, pride, hatred and desire; if individuals, families and nations loved each other reciprocally, there would be little pain left in the world. God’s punishment for original sin caused some suffering, but nothing in comparison to that provoked by humans in their treatment of each other.\textsuperscript{178} Of course, what distinguished the mid-nineteenth century peace movement from general pacifist tendencies within the Christian church.

\textsuperscript{175} Roman d’Amat et. al., \textit{Dictionnaire de la biographie française, Tome 10} (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1965), 555.
\textsuperscript{176} Imbert de Saint-Amand also commented: “Reconcilier les pauvres et les riches; faire en sorte que les mots liberté, égalité, fraternité, ne soient pas une vaine devise; travailler à l’établissement de l’harmonie sociale, qui, en dehors des principes de l’Évangile, ne saurait être qu’une utopie ; substituer à la haine l’affection, à l’egoisme le devoûment ; faire planer au-dessus de la poussière des guerres civiles le soleil de la miséricorde : tel était le but des efforts généreux et infatigables du curé de Saint-Eustache.” This was written in 1871, just after Deguerry’s death, and can be seen as a call to ‘social harmony’ during the Commune and a valorization of Deguerry’s life, posing him as a defender rather than an enemy of the people. However, such an assessment would fit in with Deguerry’s communications at the peace congresses. Arthur-Léon Imbert de Saint-Amand, \textit{L’abbé Deguerry, curé de la Madeleine} (Paris: F. Amyot, 1871), 20-21.
\textsuperscript{177} Other historians have painted him as a ‘prêtre socialisant’ concerned with the working class who then betrayed his values through his friendliness with the imperial regime. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, \textit{Les Débuts du Catholicisme sociale en France (1822-1870)} (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1951), 397-398.
\textsuperscript{178} Gaspard Deguerry, \textit{L’Oraison dominicale, Sermons préchés à la chapelle des Tuileries, en présence de LL. MM. L’Empereur et l’Impératrice, L’an de grace 1866} (Paris: Adrien Le Clerc et Cie, 1866), 107. Found in the sermon “La Volonté de Dieu”, a phrase used several times by Deguerry in the 1849 congress.
in the past was the emphasis on going beyond charity to reforming law and/or institutions. Deguerry took a more individual or institutional approach depending on the context.

Deguerry believed that Christian moral principles should be universally applicable, calling for generosity, openness and love for all human beings. However, Deguerry also embraced an institutionalization of peace. Beyond his stated support for international arbitration, simultaneous disarmament and the eventual creation of a Congress of Nations at the 1849 congress, Deguerry later called for an international federation of states. In a speech on Polish independence nearly twenty years later in 1868, Deguerry suggested that the Polish regain their international position not through war, but through participation in a “holy federation” in which nations could protect and assist one another. Such a federation would allow nations to keep their own identities – which in this speech Deguerry paints as a spiritual and historical good – all while realizing a spirit of “amour international préscri
d par l’Évangile”.179 Depending on the context, then, Deguerry could emphasize a more individualized model of ethics or a system of international cooperation.

At the 1849 Congress, Deguerry focused on the idea of God’s plan as leading to peace. The “thought of God”, he said, was in no way to see his children slaughter each other on a battlefield. Christians did the work of God by working towards peace, which civil society could do through associations and the government could do by encouraging the latter’s work and promoting policies of peace. Deguerry supported arbitration, disarmament and a Congress of Nations, but believed that an international congress would take longer to realize. He stated that perpetual peace would be the work of generations, but that Christians should rejoice in the opportunity to lay the foundations for a future good.180

This statement echoed Victor Hugo’s opening speech to the Congress, pointing to the importance of a long-term perspective and a belief in steady historical progress according to God’s will. Often read in purely secular terms, Hugo’s speech in fact highlighted Providence as the underlying motor of historical change.181 Deguerry’s remarks at the congress similarly place faith in God’s plan. However, both Deguerry and Hugo seem to combine religious faith with a secular faith in the progress of history, placing agency in the hands of men as much as God. They called for active collaboration between individuals, associations, nations and states by each generation.

The collaboration of Coquerel and Deguerry at the 1849 congress would become emblematic of the movement’s emphasis on toleration and cooperation across ‘borders’ of various kinds. Victor Hugo recalled in his speech to the 1869 peace congress in Lausanne:

179 Gaspard Deguerry, Sermon prononcé dans l’église de la Madeleine par M. l’Abbé Deguerry, curé de la Madeleine, à l’occasion du centième anniversaire de la confédération de bar (Paris: Librairie du Luxembourg, 1868), 12. On the value of national identity, Deguerry says: “Les nations ont, comme les individus, leur mémoire ; elles gardent la tradition de leur origine et des événements qui composent leur existence ; elles ont leurs souvenirs de joie et de tristesse, qui se transmettent de siècle en siècle, de génération en génération. Ces souvenirs ne doivent pas se perdre, il faut qu’ils restent vivants dans l’esprit de tous les enfants de la patrie.” Such a pronouncement was of course fitting for a sermon related to Polish independence, in contrast to the previously cited sermons on theology and everyday Christian ethics.


181 See Victor Hugo’s inaugural address to the 1849 Congress: “Gentlemen, this sacred idea, universal peace, all nations bound together in a common bond, the Gospel for their supreme law, mediation substituted for war – this holy sentiment, I ask you, is it practicable?...I do not merely say it is capable of being put into practice, but I add that it is inevitable, and that its execution is only a question of time, and may be hastened or retarded. The law which rules the world is not, cannot be different from the law of God. But the divine law is not one of war – it is peace.” 1849 Congress, 10.
Il y a vingt ans, en 1849, il y avait à Paris ce qu’il y a aujourd’hui à Lausanne, un congrès de la paix. C’était le 24 août, date sanglante, anniversaire de la Saint-Barthélémy. Deux prêtres, représentant les deux formes du christianisme, étaient là ; le pasteur Coquerel et l’abbé Deguerry. Le président du congrès, celui qui a l’honneur de vous parler en ce moment, évoqua le souvenir néfaste de 1572, et, s’adressant aux deux prêtres, leur dit :

« Embrassez-vous ! ». En présence de cette date sinistre, aux acclamations de l’assemblée, le catholicisme et le protestantisme s’embrassèrent.182

On the day of the congress in 1849, the embrace of Deguerry and Coquerel won great applause from the audience. French peace advocates thus saw international cooperation as a project to be realized at multiple levels. They promoted respect and openness between individuals across the lines of identity politics, but also more formal modes of interstate cooperation. While an effort to cooperate across denominations was not nearly as significant in the mid-nineteenth century than it would have been in previous centuries, it was meant to demonstrate their conception of toleration as central to peace, locally and internationally.183

Conclusion

The international peace movement thus drew in the most ecumenical elements of French religious life, who advocated cooperation across borders and commitment to moral universalism. The religious hardliners of the day – be they evangelicals or ultramontanes – did not seek out participation in the peace congress movement. Peace activists’ opinions and motivations varied, but the common thread was a belief that lasting peace could only issue from toleration and active cooperation across confessional and national lines. Although pacifism has been an element of Christianity across centuries and national contexts, French Christian pacifists from 1815 to 1852 helped to build a modern internationalist movement around the question of peace. The Société de la Morale chrétienne was the prime agent in this phenomenon, maintaining close contacts with foreign pacifists, publicizing their activities in its journal, and participating in the peace congresses. Intellectually, their approach was often more secular than their British and American counterparts, drawing upon Enlightenment ideas of perfectability and historical progress as well as notions of Christian ethics. Athanase Coquerel père et fils and the Abbey Deguerry were also motivated to participate in the peace congresses and to promote peace in their own activities. They had a more strongly religious conception of civilizational progress, and emphasized individual ethics more than policy reform. Nonetheless, we see that the French Christian pacifists drew upon the tools of modern political activism, including journalism, lobbying and highly-publicized international congresses to promote their cause. They worked to translate their values, inspired by both the Enlightenment and ecumenical Christianity, into the object of policy reform for national governments and international society more generally.


Alongside religious arguments for peace, a variety of peace activists critiqued war from a material perspective and put forward an alternative model of transnational economic cooperation in favor of peace. Economic peace advocates drew upon the ideas of eighteenth-century figures like Jean-Baptiste Say, Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Jeremy Bentham, and worked to integrate economic ideas into an agenda for international peace. Like their forebears, they opposed ‘monopolies’ of all kinds, advocating cultural, religious and economic pluralism. Their program surrounded military reductions and international economic interdependence, which they saw as the most likely measures to secure peace in the long run.

Like many of their contemporaries in France, French economic pacifists were highly optimistic about the potential for free exchange – understood at its widest definition – to lead to international peace. They argued that free trade would demonstrate the advantages that nations could offer each other through peaceful trade relationships, lessening the probability of war. It would also help to cultivate understanding between nations and end the prejudices that fueled international war. An essential counterpart to free trade, however, was the reduction of standing armies and the halting of the arms race, or ‘disarmament’. Economic pacifists blamed standing armies for political instability. They argued that standing armies led to unjustly high taxes, especially for the poor, provoking resentment, revolt, revolution, and war. In contrast to the political peace advocates that we will see in the next chapter, they focused on policy reform more than institution-building. They called for sharply reduced military spending, the elimination of tariffs, an international division of labor, and trade associations to create wide free trade zones. They used this program to critique colonialism, but as we will see, attempted to leave a place for soft power and settlement abroad. They used the language of interest rather than sin to argue denounce war and propose a new international system.184

A variety of different actors advanced economic pacifism in mid-nineteenth century France, including political economists, politicians, journalists, and other professionals. Here as well, we see one major group of activists alongside a number of allied individuals: the political economists of the Société de l’économie politique and Émile de Girardin in particular. All of these figures hoped to demonstrate the costliness of the current system of standing armies and to argue for an international society based on free exchange. They represented reformist internationalism through their advocacy of global integration through processes of progressive reform. They made use of associations, publication, journalism and the international congresses to propagate their message.

The Development of Economic Peace Advocacy in France

Economic peace advocacy, or peace advocacy based on economic principles and objectives, was developed within a close circle of political economists in France, particularly Frédéric Bastiat, Horace Say, Joseph Garnier, Gustave de Molinari, Émile de Girardin and Michel Chevalier.185 These figures were deeply influenced by Enlightenment thinking; the first four in particular seeing themselves as the successors of Quesnay, Adam Smith and Jean-

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185 Molinari was Belgian but lived and worked in France for a large part of his career.
Baptiste Say. Economic peace advocates were largely liberal reformists, opposing political reaction and economic protectionism on the one side, and socialism and violent revolution on the other.\footnote{For more on political economy and its status in early nineteenth-century France, see Elizabeth Sage, \textit{A Dubious Science: Political Economy and the Social Question in Nineteenth-Century France} (New York: Peter Lang, 2009). Sage also comments on early nineteenth-century political economists strong sense of continuing the eighteenth-century political economic tradition: “Economists were aware of – and relied upon – their history; they were resolutely committed to the laws of their science; and thus any discussion of nineteenth-century French political economy needs to begin with that science, that history, and those masters.” Ibibd, 11.}

Most were great admirers of Richard Cobden (1804-1865), both his political action in favor of free trade and his role in the international peace movement. Starting as a commercial trader and then building his fortune in the calico printing industry, Cobden became involved in journalism in the 1830s, joined the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and helped to found the Anti-Corn Law League to remove restrictions on the grain trade. His role in leading the League won him international fame and a seat in Parliament. Following the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, Cobden became more active in peace advocacy, speaking out in favor of international peace and helping organize and run the 1849, 1850 and 1851 congresses. Internationally, Cobden was representative of the material critique of war; although he worked alongside more religiously-motivated peace friends in London, he sought to demonstrate the more ‘practical’ arguments against war, particularly in the realm of state finance and economics. Some historians believe that Cobden took a political risk in publically supporting the London Peace Society, given the predominance of absolute pacifists therein, but overall the alliance proved the coherence of Cobden’s political world-view. With the Anti-Corn Law League as well, Cobden resisted aristocratic support of protectionism, militarism and overseas conquest. ‘Non-interference’ was at the heart of most of these political endeavors: his advocacy of free trade, opposition to colonialism and partnering with the peace societies.\footnote{See Wendy Hinde, \textit{Richard Cobden: A Victorian Outsider} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 189 on the question of political risk. For more on Cobden’s peace activism, see: Martin Ceadel, “Cobden and Peace” in Anthony Howe and Simon Morgan, eds., \textit{Rethinking Nineteenth-Century Liberalism}; J. A. Hobson, \textit{Richard Cobden: The International Man}; Nicholas Edsall, \textit{Richard Cobden, Independent Radical} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).}

French economic pacifists were often intellectually or personally connected to Cobden – economist Frédéric Bastiat was Cobden’s translator in France as well as a close correspondent and friend, for example.\footnote{On Bastiat’s correspondence with Cobden, see: \textit{Journal des économistes}, February 15, 1851, 186.} Say and Garnier met Cobden on numerous occasions as lead French political economists – Say being the son of the famous Enlightenment/Revolutionary French economist Jean-Baptiste Say and Garnier being the editor-in-chief of the \textit{Journal des économistes}, the main organ of political economy in France in this period.\footnote{Elizabeth Sage has called it “the most influential economic journal in France throughout the nineteenth century”. Sage, \textit{A Dubious Science}, 11.} Girardin was not a ‘political economist’ per se (but a prominent journalist and newspaper owner), but he became one of the most active advocates of economic pacifism at the peace congresses, in conjunction with Cobden. Chevalier, chair of political economy at the Collège de France before the suppression of his post in 1848, negotiated a free trade treaty with Cobden in 1860 in his later role as Napoleonic senator. However, as we will see, French economic pacifists differed from Cobden in their stronger support for soft power, rather than non-interference.

Economic pacifists became involved in the international peace movement in a variety of different ways. Frédéric Bastiat became central to the movement through his publications and
journalism. A bourgeois economist who largely remained an outsider in Paris circles, Bastiat was born in 1801 to a merchant family in Bayonne.\footnote{Regarding the involvement of the Bastiat family in Freemasonry, see: Jean Crouzet, "F. Bastiat et le Cercle maçonnique Bayonnais" in Frédéric Bastiat et le libéralisme. Actes du congrès de Bayonne des 13 et 14 octobre 1995, organisé par la Société des sciences, lettres et arts de Bayonne, sous le patronage de la ville de Bayonne (Bayonne: Ville de Bayonne, 1995).} After working for his family’s merchant company, Bastiat gained international experience through personal travels to Spain, Portugal and England in the early 1840s.\footnote{Bastiat studied in Spain and Portugal and unsuccessfully attempted to found an insurance company. Roman d’Amat et al, Dictionnaire de Biographie Française, Tome V (Paris: Letouzy et Ané, 1951), 786-787.} It was during this time that he discovered the Anti-Corn Law League, attending many of their meetings. Bastiat then decided to move to Paris to begin a writing career promoting political economy. He befriended the liberal publisher Guillaumin, with whose help Bastiat’s first article was published in the Journal des économistes: “De l’influence des tarifs anglais et français sur l’avenir des deux peuples”\footnote{In the Journal des économistes, we find out that Bastiat also went to England during these years and attended meetings of the Anti-Corn Law League. Journal des économistes, February 15, 1851.} Bastiat soon became a regular at the Journal des économistes, writing a series entitled ‘Sophismes économiques’. He joined the Société d’économie politique and for a while served as the editor-in-chief of their newspaper Libre-Échange. He began to translate Cobden’s work into French, publishing Cobden et la ligue, ou l’agitation anglaise en faveur de la liberté de commerce in 1845 to counter the “vaste conspiration du silence” against the League in the French press.\footnote{Cobden et la ligue, ou l’agitation anglaise en faveur de la liberté de commerce. http://bastiat.org/fr/guillaumin.html} The work helped his nomination as correspondent to the Académie des sciences morales et politiques.\footnote{Amat, Dictionnaire de Biographie Française, Tome V, 786-787.} Bastiat developed arguments for peace in his publications in the 1840s and first joined the congress movement in 1849 as a delegate. He was an active participant in the following congresses, traveled to England to attend peace society meetings in London, Birmingham and Manchester in 1849, and wrote a number of articles in favor of peace.\footnote{On the meetings in London, Birmingham and Manchester, see: 1849 Congress, 426-436.} For Bastiat as well, peace was good economics, meaning lower taxes and less waste of resources.

Joseph Garnier, also a major political economist of this period, was important to economic pacifism as the editor of the Journal des économistes, which espoused liberal economic theory and international pacifism. A student and eventually professor of political economy of the École spéciale du commerce and the École des Ponts et Chaussées, Garnier began his career in journalism with the moderate republican newspaper Le National in 1835. Hoping to further promote political economy in France, Garnier founded the Société d’économie politique in 1842 along with Charles Dunoyer, Hippolyte Passy, Charles Renouard and Gilbert Guillaumin. Garnier remained its secretary for the next thirty-nine years, until his death. In 1846, Garnier also founded the Association pour la liberté des échanges in collaboration with Bastiat. Garnier remained the editor-in-chief and active contributor to the Journal des économistes throughout the Second Republic, Empire and Commune.\footnote{All of this biographical information can be found in Gustave de Molinari, Notice sur Joseph Garnier, par M. G. de Molinari, membre correspondant de l’Institut (Paris: Guillaumin, 1881), 6-13.} Garnier dedicated himself to the peace movement from 1849, becoming a secretary of the 1849 and 1850 congresses and the
editor of the 1849 congress proceedings in France.\footnote{Joseph Garnier, ed., \textit{Congrès des Amis de la Paix Universelle, Réuni à Paris en 1849. Compte-Rendu, Séances des 22, 23, 24 août; Résolutions adoptées...Précédé d’une Note historique sur le mouvement en faveur de la paix, par Joseph Garnier} (Paris: Guillaumin, 1850). On Garnier as secretary of the 1849 and 1850 congresses, see: 1849 Congress, 9; 1850 Congress, 3.} Once the peace movement picked up again in France after the Franco-Prussian war, Garnier joined the \textit{Société française des Amis de la paix} and was its vice-president for a number of years.\footnote{Molinari, \textit{Notice sur Joseph Garnier}, 20. This is a speech by Ad. Franck, member of the Institute of France and president of the \textit{Société française des Amis de la paix}, during Garnier’s funeral.} Garnier also ensured that his \textit{Journal des économistes} be a major supporter of the movement, publishing long articles on the congresses, exchanges between peace activists in different countries, and the benefits of peace. Under his guidance, the paper became an “organ” of the international peace movement in France.

Horace Say, Gustave de Molinari and Gilbert Guillaumin, all prominent individuals linked to French political economy in this period, participated in the international peace movement through travel, letter-writing, journal articles and publishing.\footnote{Horace Émile Say, the son of economist Jean-Baptiste Say, was one of the founders of the \textit{Journal des économistes} and the \textit{Société de l’économie politique}, member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques from 1857, and a contributor to Guillaumin’s \textit{Dictionnaire de l’économie politique} and \textit{Dictionnaire du commerce et des marchandises}, in addition to being the main editor of his father’s work. He was elected to the Académie des sciences morales et politiques in 1857. Needless to say, he was a friend and collaborator of both Bastiat and Garnier.} Say, son of the famous economist Jean-Baptiste Say, traveled to England after the 1849 congress to act as a French representative to peace meetings in London, Birmingham and Manchester and wrote in a letter of support to the 1850 congress in Frankfurt.\footnote{Molinari was a member of the \textit{Société de l’économie politique}, adjunct secretary for Bastiat’s \textit{Association pour la liberté des échanges} and regular contributor to \textit{Libre Échange} and the \textit{Journal des économistes}.} Belgian liberal economist Gustave de Molinari, who ran in the same circles as Say, Garnier and Bastiat, wrote numerous articles for the \textit{Journal des économistes} and the \textit{Dictionnaire de l’économie politique} in favor of free trade and the peace congress movement.\footnote{On can also think of the \textit{Dictionnaire politique} of 1842 edited by many of the key figures of the mid-nineteenth century, including Jules Bastide, Louis Blanc, Lamennais, Félix Pyat, and Cormenin. \textit{Dictionnaire politique encyclopédique du langage et de la science politiques, rédigé par une réunion de députés, de publicistes et de journalistes, avec une introduction par Garnier-Pagès, publié par E. Duclerc et Pagnerre.} (Paris: Pagnerre, 1842).} His short biography of Garnier was published separately, including speeches by Garnier’s colleagues and friends at his funeral, which highlighted his roles as a teacher, journalist and pacifist alike.\footnote{Joseph Garnier, ed., \textit{Congrès des Amis de la Paix Universelle, Réuni à Paris en 1849}.} As will be seen below, Molinari wrote a great number of the articles in the \textit{Dictionnaire de l’économie politique} on questions relating to peace, making him a major player in the movement in this fashion. Dictionaries of this sort were a popular means of promoting political or intellectual agendas in the early and mid-nineteenth century, as they allowed pointed commentary within a seemingly neutral framework.\footnote{Finally, Gilbert Guillaumin was a more behind-the-scenes figure in the peace movement, although an essential one. He was the editor of the \textit{Dictionnaire de l’économie politique} and published Garnier’s French version of the 1849 peace congress proceedings as well as other works in favor of peace. While there is no record of him speaking at the peace congresses, we know that he also traveled to England in 1849 for the peace meetings, along with Say, Garnier and Bastiat.} Finally, while there is no record of him speaking at the peace congresses, we know that he also traveled to England in 1849 for the peace meetings, along with Say, Garnier and Bastiat.

Michel Chevalier, Saint-Simonian journalist turned liberal political economist, Chair of Political Economy at the Collège de France, and senator for Napoleon III, was a clear friend of...
the movement without being one of its most vocal actors. Chevalier was not able to attend the 1849 peace congress, being ‘outside of Paris’, but he sent in a letter supporting “a consolidated peace” against the “ruinous armed peace” that had existed in Europe since 1815. He denounced the ‘evils’ of large standing armies, including heavy taxes on food and other necessities, the capturing of industrial capital and unbalanced military influence on politics. The greatest interest of Chevalier to the history of peace advocacy in France, however, lies in Chevalier’s publications and journalism. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, his writings supported the link between free trade and peace, arguing that travel would lead to understanding and peaceful relations between peoples.

Émile de Girardin did not write for the *Journal des économistes* and cannot be termed a ‘political economist’ per se, but he emerged as one of the most vocal advocates of economic pacifism in France. In his own work, Girardin concentrated more on liberty of the press than freedom of trade, but he joined forces with economists to make many of the same arguments for the economic injustices of war and the necessity of peaceful exchange between nations. Although he proved somewhat inconsistent in these principles in later years, he nonetheless acted as a major figure in mid-nineteenth century economic pacifism.

Like Bastiat, Girardin was born to a wealthy family but grew up without his parents, never received higher education. He was the illegitimate son of count Alexandre de Girardin, a Napoleonic general. Émile began his career in journalism by founding *Le Voleur* in 1828, followed by a number of other papers, including *La Mode*, *Le Journal des connaissances utiles* and *Le Musée des familles*. He founded *La Presse* in 1836, which would be the major engagement of his career. Girardin was able to significantly decrease the price of his newspaper by including more pages for advertisements, giving him the frequent title of editor of the first cheap daily newspaper in France. Girardin fought a fatal duel with one of the founders of rival newspaper *Le National* later in 1836, Armand Carrel, thereafter swearing never to engage in a

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205 Chevalier began his intellectual career as a Saint-Simonian and an editor of *Le Globe*. While many Saint-Simonians were converted to the socialist doctrines of Charles Fourier before or after their interest in Saint-Simonianism (Victor Considérant, for example), Chevalier went the opposite route and became a strong supporter of economic and political liberalism. Chevalier was named Chair of Political Economy at the *Collège de France* in 1841 and a member of the *Académie des sciences morales et politiques* in 1851 and elected senator in 1860. The suppression of his chair at the *Collège de France* in 1848 rallied liberal economists in his favor.

206 For example, while he was unable to attend the trip that a number of French pacifists made to London, Birminghan and Manchester a few months after the 1849 peace congress, he wrote a letter of support to hand on to the English peace societies, stating: "C'est aussi chez moi une conviction profonde que la paix du monde, la liberté des nations civilisées et l'amélioration du sort de la classe la plus nombreuse dépendent en ce moment de la bonne harmonie entre la France et l'Angleterre, et j'aurais été bien heureux de pouvoir l'exprimer de vive voix au Congrès."

207 *Journal des économistes*, November 15, 1849, 434-435.

208 Michel Chevalier, *Les Chemins de fer* (Paris: Guillaumin, 1852). This will be discussed further in the next chapter.

209 His inclusion of *romans-feuilletons* by popular authors such as Balzac, Lamartine and Alexandre Dumas helped increase the popularity of the paper with readers and advertisers in its early days. For more on Girardin’s career in the press, see for example: Pierre Pellissier, *Émile de Girardin: Prince de la Presse* (Paris: Denoël, 1985). Pellissier does not, however, take Girardin’s peace activism seriously. He only considers Girardin’s involvement in the congresses, and sees this as essentially a farce and a cheap bid to gain attention. Ibid, 274-275.
Girardin nonetheless became one of the most vocal opponents of political violence (revolt, revolution, war, etc) in France and abroad in this period.\footnote{On dueling, see: 1850 Congress, 58, wherein Girardin proclaims his continuing regret for having taken part in a duel. To add to this biographical sketch, it should be noted that Girardin was a main figure in the liberal opposition to Napoleon III during the Second Empire, the editor-in-chief of La Liberté and owner of Le Petit Journal. He was also a deputy during the July Monarchy, Second Republic and Third Republic. For precise details on his political career, see: “Base de données des députés français depuis 1789”, Assemblée nationale, accessed August 23, 2013, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/fiche.asp?num_dept=8489. For a few more biographies, see: Odysse Barot, Histoire des idées au XIXe siècle: Émile de Girardin, sa vie, ses idées, son oeuvre, son influence (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1866); Maurice Reclus, Émile de Girardin, le créateur de la presse moderne (Paris: Hachette, 1934); Eugène de Mirecourt, Les Contemporains : Émile de Girardin (Paris: Havard, 1855).} He expressed this stance on nonviolence in La Presse articles, longer publications and through his active involvement in the peace movement from 1849. Girardin was one of the most frequent speakers at both the Paris and Frankfurt congresses and acted as a vice-president of the latter. In conjunction with Cobden, he argued the most forcefully for the economic pacifist standpoint on both occasions. At these congresses, Girardin detailed the statistics on the costs of standing armies across Europe and denounced the wastefulness of this spending. Like other economic peace advocates, Girardin argued that peace was part and parcel of true democracy. Heavy taxes and military spending were detrimental to the well-being of the people. Rather than preventing wars, standing armies provoked them by causing misery and unhappiness amongst the people, causing them to revolt. In these endeavors, he mirrored Cobden’s belief that a more scientific approach to pacifism would win over publics and governments to their cause. Indeed, Cobden and Girardin acted as a prominent duo at the congresses advocating pacifism from the economic point of view.

Girardin also published a number of books and pamphlets on both peace and international relations, including La politique universelle, La Paix, La Révolution Espagnole, Le désarmement européen and L’Empereur Napoléon III et l’Europe. In these works, Girardin took an absolute stance against war, offensive or defensive.\footnote{Émile de Girardin, Le Désarmement européen (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1859), 2. Girardin called it a “capitulation de conscience” to distinguish between offensive and defensive war in order to condemn the first and excuse the second.} He repeatedly stated that revolution – in the sense of a sudden, violent change of government – could not produce sustainable reform of society and would provoke more harm than good.\footnote{In Révolution d’Espagne Girardin republished his 1854 articles on the Spanish revolution, as a reflection on how Europeans could get out of the cycle of revolutions. Émile de Girardin, Révolution d’Espagne, 1854. L’Ornière des révolutions (Paris: Librairie Nouvelle, 1856); In L’Empereur Napoléon III et l’Europe, Girardin argued that wars, like revolutions, were costly, ineffective, and contrary to political progress. He similarly asked how the French can end the series of “avortements” that began in 1789 and was still going in 1859. Émile de Girardin, L’Empereur Napoléon III et l’Europe (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1859), 5-6.} He deemed the ‘spirit of conquest’ a relic of the past, emphasizing the need for new policies promoting exchange of goods, ideas and people. His statement in La Paix sums up a main message of most of these works: "Il y a une autre politique à suivre que la politique de l'agrandissement du territoire par la rivalité, la guerre, la conquête, la domination, c'est la politique de l'agrandissement de l'homme par la reciprocité, la paix, le progrès, la circulation."\footnote{Émile de Girardin, La Paix (Paris: Librairie Nouvelle, 1855), 21; In Le Désarmement européen, Girardin states: “La politique territoriale, celle qui subordonne l'homme au sol, a fait son temps”. Girardin, Le Désarmement européen, 3.} While historians have doubted the sincerity of Girardin’s peace advocacy because of his support for armed resistance to Bonaparte’s coup d’état and for war.
with Prussia in 1870, it is undeniable that Girardin acted as a main proponent of economic pacifism in his books, articles, and peace congress participation from the 1840s to the 1860s.  

The Journal des économistes: Organ of the International Peace Movement in France  
Under the guidance of Joseph Garnier, the Journal des économistes came to take on the role of unofficial mouthpiece of the international peace movement. Founded by Guillaumin in 1841, the monthly journal acted as one of the major economic periodicals of the time and a central outlet for economic and political liberalism. Economists Adolphe Blanqui and Hippolyte Dussard were its first chief editors, followed by Garnier in 1845. From the time of the 1849 peace congress, the journal routinely announced upcoming congresses, published the congress proceedings, detailed peace activists’ activities outside of the congresses and promoted pacifist values in its articles.

The first article relating to the peace movement was in September 1849, a few days before the Paris congress. The article first introduced the history of the movement and recounted information on the 1848 peace congress in Brussels. It then relayed the program for the Paris congress and explained the main talking points to be discussed. The idea was to introduce the public to the congress and to convince them of its value and importance. The article announced a new tactic in organized pacifism, transitioning from moral to interest-based argumentation. The author commented:

Nous félicitons le Comité d'avoir compris qu'après avoir établi, par les prescriptions de la religion, de la philosophie, de la morale, de la raison, de l'humanité, que la guerre est un abominable et absurde moyen, il faut attaquer l'esprit de ceux qui sont imbus du préjugé guerrier par un raisonnement auquel tous les hommes sont sensibles, le raisonnement de l'intérêt.  

Whereas the 1843 congress had especially sought to show the immorality of war, the 1849 congress would demonstrate why war was against the interests of peoples and governments. The causes of conflict were embedded in the organization of law, militaries, diplomacy and domestic politics. The goal was to alter the organization of these systems to prevent conflict to the greatest extent possible, rather than resolving conflict once it had led to violence.  

From the time of the Paris peace congress in September 1849, therefore, the Journal des économistes acted as a publicist and defender of the peace movement in France. Garnier published his compte-rendu of the congress and a brief history of the movement in a later article of the paper the next week. A few weeks later, the Journal des économistes published a detailed account of a journey to England by French peace activists to attend peace movement meetings in London, Birmingham and Manchester soon after the Paris congress.

214 Richard Cobden looked upon these inconsistencies in Girardin’s positions as a character flaw: “his inconsistency will surprise nobody that knows him”, Cobden stated in June of 1851. J. A. Hobson, Richard Cobden: The International Man, 76.
216 Journal des économistes, August 15, 1849, 103.
217 Ibid, 103.
This support for the international peace movement continued throughout Garnier’s editorship, in the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s. Garnier published articles on the Universal Exposition of 1851 and its contribution to peace, on the potential for peace despite the invasion fears in England after Louis-Napoleon’s 1852 coup d’état, on peace congress essay competitions on the question of standing armies, and on the last mid-century peace congress in Edinburgh in 1853. Gustave de Molinari added an article recounting the peace congress in 1851 in London, at the time of the Universal Exposition. Thereafter, Garnier joined the next wave of pacifism starting in the late 1860s around the time of the German wars of unification. He became a member of the new Société des amis de la paix and published a number of articles in the Journal des économistes by the society’s president, Henri Bellaire, as well as pieces on questions of peace and international politics in general.

Not all its readers and writers approved of the journal’s open support for the international peace movement, however. One of the contributors, M. Cherbuliez, commented in October 1851 that he and numerous readers had noted that: "notre journal se posait comme organe de cette agitation pacifique, ou tout au moins comme l'approuvant et l'appuyant sans réserve ; d'où resultait, pour tous les collaborateurs du journal, une espèce de solidarité tacite devant le tribunal de l'opinion publique". He stated that through discussions with readers, he had found that although some supported the paper’s peace activism, others “regretted” it. Cherbuliez himself disagreed with the Journal des économistes’s advocacy of the peace movement as was writing in to contest this alliance. He argued:

Je commence par reconnaître que l'économiste, aussi bien que le philanthrope, ne peut pas ne point préférer la paix à la guerre....Mais je pense qu'on peut être fort bon économiste et fort ami de la paix, sans vouloir s'associer, ni participer, même indirectement et tacitement, à des demonstrations qui, étant à la fois collectives et publiques, ont nécessairement une tout autre portée que la simple manifestation individuelle d'une préférence raisonnée en faveur de la paix.

He declared his shock at the participation of political economists in a congress calling for the suppression of standing armies, comparing the peace congresses to public demonstrations to abolish the police. He credited standing armies with the maintenance of order in recent years

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222 Journal des économistes, October 15, 1851, 145.

223 Ibid, 145.

224 On the analogy with anti-police demonstrations: Ibid, 145; on Cherbuliez’s surprise at participation in an event that wants to abolish the army: Ibid, 147.
and deemed international arbitration a “chimera”. Garnier published this article, but could not but help include his own response refuting Cherbuliez’s points immediately thereafter.

Garnier first defended his open support for the peace movement, seeing it as a prime example of international cooperation:

*Lorsque ce fait, ce grand fait, d'une association générale, internationale, universelle des Amis de la paix s'est produit, et que nous y avons vu des efforts en parfait harmonie avec les conclusions de l'économie politique, d'accord en cela avec la philosophie et la morale, pouvions-nous le laisser passer sans le signaler ? pouvions-nous le signaler, sans l'approver dans son expression la plus générale ? Assurément non.*

He highlighted the diversity of opinion within the movement, particularly with regard to the question of the means of securing peace; there were “plusieurs catégories d’amis de la paix” reunited under the umbrella of the congresses. He enumerated these means, from education to preaching, free trade, the standardization of weights and measures, arms reduction, an international code, etc. One could be a true friend of peace and not approve of one or another of these means. Pacifist economists believed in the importance of order and had no intention to weaken the forces of justice. Their goal was to halt the arms race, leading to excessive military expenses beyond the needs of order. Any diminution in arms would be simultaneous and reciprocal, not weakening one state more than another. In any case, he argued, regardless of the disapproval of their contemporaries, the Anti-Corn Law League, the peace congresses and the Universal Expositions were some of the great achievements of the century.

Garnier continued to support the peace movement in his newspaper throughout his term as editor-in-chief.

**Critiquing the Fiscal-Military State**

Having a better understanding of economic peace advocates’ engagement in the international peace movement, we should go into more detail on the ideas behind this commitment, which had both critical and creative dimensions. Firstly, economic pacifists developed a critique of standing armies and their economic and political consequences. They claimed that standing armies were unnecessary within Europe. If allowed to freely travel and exchange ideas and goods, the peoples would let go of their prejudices and have friendly relations. Like most republicans in this period, economic pacifists sincerely believed in the natural harmony between peoples; it was only the work of governments to spike rivalries and maintain mutual ignorance that allowed prejudices and hatreds to continue. Standing armies should not be raised for far-off conquests, either: these possessions added no real economic value to the home countries and were only sources of conflict with unwilling natives and jealous European powers.

They argued that war was too costly, sapping the nation’s resources and saddling the country with a heavy public debt. The “armed truce” that Europe had maintained for the past decades provoked “extravagant budgets” that were paid for largely by taxes on consumer products. To prove this point, economic pacifists made use of the growing field of statistics. For example, Girardin cited statistics for military expenses across Europe (from England to

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225 Ibid, 148.
228 The reference to “extravagent budgets” is a quote by Girardin: 1850 Congress, 24; “armed truce” is a quote by Cobden: Ibid, 51 “armed truce.”
Russia and Turkey) in his 1849 peace congress speech, comparing general state budgets to military budgets to show the proportional dedication of resources in each country. The entry for ‘Armées permanentes’ in Guillaumin and co.’s 1853 *Dictionnaire de l’économie politique* also specified figures for both French and international military expenditures. For France, the article showed an annual average for spending on the army for the Empire, Restoration and July Monarchy respectively, showing a vast drop in spending from the Empire to the Restoration but then a progressive rise in expenditures from 1818 to 1838, despite this being a period of peace within Europe. Economic pacifists believed that facts and figures on military spending must be made transparent to the public, because once the general population knew the truth about the costs of standing armies, public opinion would turn against the institution.

Frédéric Bastiat in particular emphasized the injustice of this system, as the poor were forced to take on a disproportionate burden, in terms of their time as well as their budgets. Consumption taxes are inherently regressive, Bastiat pointed out, so the proportional contribution was actually the highest for those who could afford it the least. A similar effect could be found with military service: while the wealthy could pay others to fulfill their military service, those of lesser means had to give up some of the best years of their lives.

Economic pacifists were keen to point out not only the money governments spent on equipment, clothing, food, etc., but also the opportunity cost of having so many able-bodied men leave their regular areas of work to serve in the army. At the 1849 Congress, both Victor Hugo and Émile de Girardin pointed out that this amounted to a considerable opportunity cost for the state, as those young, healthy men could be working and contributing to the national economy rather than living at its expense.

The issue of the opportunity cost of war was also a major issue for Constantin Pecqueur, who, as a proponent of state collectivism, otherwise clashed with liberal political economists on the role of government in the economy. On the question of permanent armies, however, Pecqueur and the political economists converged. In his 1842 essay for a contest for the *Société de la morale chrétienne*, “Des armées dans leurs rapports avec l’industrie, la morale et la liberté, ou des devoirs civiques des militaires”, Pecqueur attacked permanent armies as contrary to religion and economic growth. He stated that standing armies encouraged ignorance and hatred of other peoples, cost taxpayers huge sums and prevented healthy workers from contributing to economic growth. He suggested a small militia alongside a large group of reserves and the use of this restricted army for industrial and infrastructure projects in peacetime. He even saw the army as a potential institution for job training and worker reorientation. As questions of employment, productivity, economic development and ‘the right to work’ were central to public

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229 Coquelin and Guillaumin, *Dictionnaire de l’économie politique*, Tome Premier, 71-73. He cites 477,569,000 francs in annual spending from 1802-1811; 263,258,190 from 1818 to 1827; and 454,861,021 from 1830 to 1838.

230 The article’s goal here was to point out that the July Monarchy, a peacetime government excluding the case of Algeria, approached the same level of spending as that of Napoleon’s imperial government, which had been engaged in war or occupation across the continent.; The Girardin reference can be found in: 1849 Congress, 44.

231 1849 Congress, 50.


debates in France around 1848, peace advocates seized on the issue of opportunity cost to further demonstrate the costs of maintaining standing armies.

Economic pacifists also repeatedly emphasized the fact that the system of large standing armies paid for by regressive taxation actually provoked violent conflict rather than preventing it. Heavy taxes produced misery, and misery a sense of injustice and a desire to revolt. Frédéric Bastiat commented at the 1849 peace congress:

That the maintenance of large military and naval forces requires heavy taxes, is a self-evident fact. But I make this additional remark: these heavy taxes, notwithstanding the best intentions on the part of the legislator, are necessarily most unfairly distributed; whence it follows that great armaments present two causes of revolution – misery in the first place, and secondly, the deep feeling that this misery is the result of injustice. Economic pacifists thus preferred a material rather than a political reading of revolutionary movements, seeing them as caused by poverty rather than a claim to political rights. They used this analysis to further their critique of military spending and the distribution of resources.

As Girardin commented, the only real way to prevent revolutions was to use tax-payers’ money to benefit the people and improve their well-being, rather than to harm it. The diminution of taxes and just distribution of resources would increase well-being amongst all classes, thus leading to social stability. Economic pacifists thus preferred a material rather than a political reading of revolutionary movements, seeing them as caused by poverty rather than a claim to political rights. They used this analysis to further their critique of military spending and the distribution of resources.

In the *Dictionnaire de l’économie politique*, A. Clément, another political economist linked to Garnier, Bastiat and co., made an institutional argument against standing armies. Foreshadowing contemporary arguments about institutional logic, Clément stated that large militaries facilitated unwise interventions and initiatives that would not be carried out if there were a smaller military apparatus. His article quotes J.-B. Say, stating that England would not have gotten itself mixed up in the “intrigues de toute l’Europe” if it didn’t have a large navy to send out in all directions and that Napoleon would have focused on improving French domestic affairs if he hadn’t had a great and disciplined army. It was therefore the existence of standing armies itself that pushed governments into war and led to difficult consequences for their peoples. Once again, the economic pacifists wanted to show that standing armies were not a source of protection for populations, but instigators of war, destruction and misery.

This argument that standing armies produced rather than mitigated social conflict ran against mainstream loyalty to the military as a source of stability and national pride. The peace advocates themselves acknowledged the culture of military glory in contemporary society, represented most poignantly in the Arc de Triomphe. That men of considerable social status would so openly attack the military status quo is remarkable, and did not cease to shock contemporaries. Part of what so surprised M. Cherbuliez, the *Journal des économistes* contributor mentioned above, is precisely the fact that the dismantling of the current military

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234 1849 Congress, 50.
235 Ibid, 50.
236 Ibid, 46.
237 “To organise peace, to systematize it, to make it fruitful, to confirm it, to render it inviolable – I know of no other means to put an end to revolutions, and to render them unnecessary and unjust.” 1850 Congress, 14.; “By this senseless expenditure, the Governments have exhausted the sources of national well-being, and yet they are astonished that revolutions should follow.” Ibid, 31.
239 See for example Coquerel’s speech: 1849 Congress, 34.
system was not being advocated by marginal figures in society, but established professors, journalists, Academicians, etc.²⁴⁰

Economic pacifists believed, however, that large militaries were a relic of a feudal system whose spirit was bankrupt and outmoded in the current context. Girardin insisted at the 1849 peace congress: “Again, are armies necessary to preserve our influence over other nations? Does France wish to conquer Europe? Has she not given up the idea of conquest? If our government does not aim at the conquest of the world, what is the use of 560,000 men? It is nonsense – it is an anachronism!”²⁴¹ Such a statement harkened back to Benjamin Constant’s 1814 *De l’esprit de conquête*, but also to the foreign policy of the early Second Republic. Lamartine had made the ‘antiquated’ nature of conquest one of his first points in his March 3, 1848 *Manifeste à l’Europe*, to convince European powers that the Second French Republic would not attempt a ‘liberation of the peoples’ through armed conquest.²⁴²

Economic pacifists put the blame for costly military policies on governments, but also singled out the aristocracy as a driving force behind the perpetuation of ‘the spirit of conquest’, particularly in England. Richard Cobden repeatedly denounced the aristocracy as the main force behind protectionist trade policies and costly foreign politics: as he stated in letter in 1852, “by and by… the aristocracy ha[d] converted the combativeness of the English race to its own sinister ends.”²⁴³ Bastiat framed this problem as a contest between “two Englands”, one feudal, the other democratic. Both coexisted for the moment, forced to battle for predominance. The repeal of the Corn Laws stood as a victory for democratic England and a source of hope for future social and political transformation.²⁴⁴

While this was often a criticism aimed at England in particular, class-based analyses were sometimes applied to France as well. In this vein, Michel Chevalier commented in his letter to the 1849 Congress:

> Aristocracies, of which the war-spirit was the soul, and the power of which Europe has at length overturned, could not but approve of great armies, national rivalries, and separations of all kinds among nations. This was, in reality, the secret of their existence. The peoples, emancipated, and belonging to no one but themselves, could not, on the contrary, do less than energetically disapprove of large armies, of national rivalries, and of factitious separations and divisions amongst nations. This can be done without at all abjuring our nationality, which gives to each man his distinction and his glory.”²⁴⁵

This notion of the natural fraternity of peoples was a frequent theme in republican and constitutionalist circles around 1848, and will be further discussed in Chapter Four. Yet even in September 1849, when many of the hopes of spring 1848 had been dashed, Chevalier persisted in linking modernity, democracy and friendly international relations. Demilitarization would thus

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²⁴⁰ *Journal des économistes*, October 15, 1851, 147.
²⁴¹ Benjamin Constant, *De l’esprit de conquête*.; Girardin: 1849 Congress, 47.
²⁴³ J. A. Hobson, *Richard Cobden: The International Man*, 89-90. Letter of September 29, 1852 to Henry Richard. Therein he also states that a map of British battles since 1688 would prove England to be “the most warlike and aggressive people that ever existed”. The above quote blaming the English aristocracy for this aggressiveness abroad follows.
²⁴⁵ 1849 Peace Congress, 100.
be a sign of the democratization of both society and the state and a testament to the peoples’ ability to act in their own interests.

In these arguments, then, economic pacifists positioned themselves as the ‘true’ voice of democracy. As in their advocacy of free trade, they urged that they were the ones who had the interests of the greater proportion of the populace in mind. Like protectionists, defenders of large standing armies were most often either acting on false prejudices or guarding particular interests at the expense of the general good. The ‘military spirit’ blinded common people from realizing the fact that they suffered most, and unnecessarily, at the hands of the ‘fiscal-military’ state.246

In a number of ways, pacifism fit in logically with political economists’ overall views of economics, politics and society. Mid-nineteenth-century economists argued for free trade and considerable reductions in taxes and state expenditures, and war was a key case-study for these arguments. They argued that states unnecessarily raised heavy taxes on the people in order to spend millions in the maintenance of standing armies, for nothing other than their own vanity. The protectionist, militarized governments of the day unnecessarily wasted resources, burdened an already impoverished populace and provoked the national hatreds that falsely justified the system in the first place. The peoples needed smaller governments that would adopt economic and foreign policies conducive to international peace.

International Society
Economic pacifists did not stop at a negative discussion of war, however; they also developed distinct notions of transnational cooperation. They utilized the concepts of political economy to argue for an international society based on economic integration, cultural pluralism and tolerance (understood in more secular terms). They largely eschewed international institutions, but called for tariff reform and the creation of free trade zones. Like many of their contemporaries, they were wholly optimistic about their program.

At the heart of economic pacifists’ internationalist program was free trade. They claimed that if ‘Providence’ wanted men to stay isolated, it would have made the elements of production accessible to all and given all the same aptitudes.247 They embraced Ricardo’s theory of competitive advantage, calling for an international system in which each country specialized in what it could produce best and most cheaply, and then all countries traded freely with each other to procure all the goods that they needed. Consumers and taxpayers would win out in this system: goods would be cheap and taxes would be lower, as commercial wars would cease and standing armies could be reduced.248 Free trade could thus increase the peoples’ wealth and help to prevent war, therein furthering the progress of civilization.

Political economists’ saw their promotion of free trade as a battle on two fronts: against protectionists on one side and socialists on the other. Their collective and individual writings sought to demonstrate the ‘errors’ of both schools and to counter their enemies’ criticisms of

246 For more on the creation of the fiscal-military state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially in Britain, see: John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
248 See the *Dictionnaire de l’économie politique* article on peace: Coquelin and Guillaumin, *Dictionnaire de l’économie politique*, Tome Second, 313. See also the article “Liberté de commerce”, which emphasizes the idea that competition leads to cheaper products and states that to enlarge the market is to boost industry, as industries develop in accordance to the scope of the markets available to them. Coquelin and Guillaumin, *Dictionnaire de l’économie politique*, Tome Premier, 60.
economic liberalism.\textsuperscript{249} Just as socialism attempted to restrain economic liberty at home by establishing state control of the economy, they said, protectionists impeded international economic liberty through high tariffs, tolls, and other barriers to trade. Their prime goal was to show how liberty of commerce at all levels – regional, national and international – would contribute to the well-being of the peoples, by increasing their knowledge and material prosperity and cultivating a culture of tolerance.\textsuperscript{250} Of the three economic camps, however, protectionism held by far the strongest position in early nineteenth-century France: both socialism and economic liberalism remained minority positions.\textsuperscript{251}

In contrast to many British and American peace advocates, French economic pacifists tended to prefer the long-term route of international economic exchange rather than institutional solutions like an International Court of Arbitration. Molinari’s article in the \textit{Dictionnaire de l’économie politique} on peace refers to arbitration as a proposed solution for peace, but states that “nous ne croyons pas, pour notre part, que la permanence de la paix puisse surgir d’une organisation artificielle, et nous n’avons qu’une bien faible confiance dans l’efficacité des justices de paix internationales”. Molinari expressed doubt that a tribunal would be able to prevent the outbreak of war once public opinion was inflamed in its favor. Moreover, even if the tribunal was endowed with supranational power so as to give it more authority, it could become a dangerous instrument itself, declaring war whenever a given party resisted its decisions.\textsuperscript{252} As with many other questions, French economic pacifists preferred to minimize governmental action.\textsuperscript{253} Like their predecessors, they used the language of ‘nature’ versus ‘artifice’ to promote free exchange over “artificial organization”.\textsuperscript{254}

Economic pacifists’ prescriptions for international society could be linked, in a negative fashion, through the concept of monopoly. In his article on peace in the \textit{Dictionnaire de l’économie politique}, Gustave de Molinari argued that all wars – religious, commercial, political and civil – were caused by the spirit of monopoly. Religious wars stemmed from this – the


\textsuperscript{250} See especially the \textit{Dictionnaire de l’économie politique} article “Liberté de commerce”: Coquelin and Guillaume, \textit{Dictionnaire de l’économie politique, Tome Second}, 49-63. However, as noted, the theme of liberty of international commerce runs throughout all of the liberal political economists’ works.


\textsuperscript{252} Coquelin and Guillaumin, \textit{Dictionnaire de l’économie politique, Tome Second}, 311. He starts this paragraph: “Des esprits pressés d’arriver au bien ont cru à la possibilité d’établir la paix perpétuelle en organisant des tribunaux d’arbitrage qui rempliraient en quelque sorte l’office de justices de paix internationales.” Molinari mentions Sully and the abbé de Saint-Pierre as examples, as well as contemporary socialist plans, although he does not specify which.

\textsuperscript{253} Ibid, 311.

\textsuperscript{254} Elizabeth Sage notes the early nineteenth-century political economists’ emphasis on the ‘natural order’, drawing from eighteenth-century economic thought. See: Elizabeth Sage, \textit{A Dubious Science}, 12. “Artificial organization” is from the quote referenced in footnote 69.
refusal to allow other religions to coexist with one’s own. Religious wars arose when one religious group attempted to convert the minority group, and when this didn’t work, resorted to force, provoking a violent reaction from the minority and a spiral of violence. Commercial wars, too, arose from governments’ desire to control markets exclusively rather than to tolerate free access and competition. Finally, Molinari saw political and civil wars as the products of the spirit of monopoly in the political realm. All of these conflicts then delayed moral and material progress.\(^{255}\)

Economic pacifists thus expanded the eighteenth-century critique of monopoly to explain the persistence of violence in society – but also to advance their own model of international society as pluralist, tolerant, and interdependent. Free trade would diminish violent forms of conflict and lead the way to peaceful forms of competition, and in turn, innovation and economic growth.\(^{256}\) They recommended a transnational division of labor leading to economic interdependence between nations.\(^{257,258}\) Interdependence should not be seen as a source of vulnerability, but a natural arrangement representing the essence of society itself. As Bastiat put it: “On ne prend pas garde à une chose ; c'est que cette sorte de dépendance qui résulte des échanges, des transactions commerciales, est une dépendance réciproque. Nous ne pouvons dépendre de l'étranger sans que l'étranger dépende de nous. Or c'est là l'essence même de la société. Rompre des relations naturelles, ce n'est pas se placer dans un état d'indépendance, mais dans un état d'isolement.”\(^{259}\)

For the political economists, international economic integration need not imply cultural homogenization. They stated their acceptance of cultural diversity and blamed ‘humanitarian socialists’, instead, for aiming to erase cultural difference.\(^{260}\) They argued that the existence of particular societies was beneficial to economic development, as collective ‘amour-propre’ could be used to productive ends, inspiring competition and creativity. If there was only one society, there could be no exchange, and thus no progress.\(^{261}\)

Economic pacifists therefore rejected the Friedrich List’s criticism that they ignored the value of nations in the economic system. Garnier saw a false dichotomy in List’s opposition of “cosmopolitan” – or liberal – political economy, which List saw as centering around the individual, and national political economy, which took the nation as the central agent of economic improvement. On the contrary, political economists’ promotion of an international division of labor relied on the existence of distinct nations. Moreover, Garnier tried to claim that although protectionists used List’s writings to promote their agenda, a close look at List’s work revealed that the famous ‘protectionist’ recognized the value of free trade.\(^{262}\)

\(^{255}\) Ibid, 311-313.

\(^{256}\) See article “Nations”, Ibid, 259, to be discussed more in the next paragraphs.

\(^{257}\) Curiously, given the fact that they make so much use of Ricardo’s theory of an international division of labor, the Dictionnaire de l’économie politique article on Ricardo does not highlight this idea in particular, primarily discussing Ricardo’s ideas on money and rent. Ibid, 531.

\(^{258}\) As noted above, Girardin also considered freedom of speech to be of central importance, an outlet for differences that did not involve violence.


\(^{260}\) “Les économistes ne partagent point les illusions des socialistes humanitaires qui voudraient réunir toutes les nations en un seul troupeau gouverné par un berger omnicaral…ils ne pensent point qu’il y ait utilité à effacer, d’une manière artificielle, les différences caractéristiques des nationalités”. Coquelin and Guillaumin, Dictionnaire de l’économie politique, Tome Second, 261.

\(^{261}\) Ibid, 259-262. The article is by Molinari.

\(^{262}\) Ibid, 80-81.
Political economists understanding of the term ‘nation’, however, must be put in perspective. They primarily used the term to mean ‘culture’ rather than state. They saw a continuing role for states in the international system, but were not attached to particular political configurations. Contemporaneous nationalists’ commitment to the creation of ‘Italy’, ‘Germany’, etc, held little import with them. In the *Dictionnaire de l’économie politique* article on nations, the term is basically used to mean cultural groups; it starts: “Dès les premiers âges historiques, l’humanité apparait fractionnée en une multitude de nations dissemblables par les moeurs, par les aptitudes, par le langage, et soumises à des institutions différentes. Chacune de ces nations a sa physionomie particulière et son existence propre, son autonomie.”\(^{263}\) The article, written by Gustave Molinari, then goes on to recognize economists’ recognition of the utility of ‘nations’ for the reasons stated above, but only in the sense of discrete cultural entities.

Moreover, economic pacifists insisted that cultural and economic groups need not coincide. The article in the *Dictionnaire de l’économie politique* on customs unions, the author called attention to Léon Faucher’s plan for a customs union in his work *L’Union du Midi*, in which he predicted that “L’Europe sera infailliblement partagée entre plusieurs groupes commerciaux, grandes et puissantes confédérations qui remplaceront les divisions par races.” England, Sweden and Russia may retain their own zones; the Slavs would join together in an economic association; and the Zollverein would progressively enlarge. He even suggested that the Zollverein could be extended throughout Europe, first to Denmark and the Hanseatic states, then to Lombardy, Holland, Belgium and even to Spain.\(^{264}\) Economic pacifists wanted free trade zones extended as widely as possible, rather than being restricted to cultural or political borders. Molinari ended his article commented on the necessity for governments to “conclure des unions douanières qui substituent ce qu’on pourrait appeler des frontières économiques aux anciennes frontières politiques des nations.”\(^{265}\) They wanted to eliminate barriers between the peoples and encourage them to exchange their ideas and goods freely, which, they argued, would be to the mutual benefit of all.\(^{266}\) Confining economic borders to current political configurations would stifle this movement; trade agreements should be extended progressively and without limits.\(^{267}\) The role of the ‘nation-state’, then, should primarily be in lowering tariffs and working with other governments to create larger free trade zones.

As Garnier would later put it in his 1860 *Traité d’économie politique*: “Les nations peuvent être diverses; mais la nature des choses montre qu’au point de vue économique, pour le Commerce, pour l’Échange, il n’y a pas de nationalités, ou que tous les peuples font qu’un, comme un point de vue moral, religieux et humanitaire.”\(^{268}\) The French economic pacifists, like the political pacifists to be discussed in the next chapter, therefore had an historically-flexible model of international cooperation in which political configurations may shift and enlarge with time. Their internationalism differed from that of the twentieth century, which was more focused on cooperation between fixed cultural-political units. They advocated cooperation between states.

\(^{263}\) Ibid, 259.
\(^{264}\) Ibid, 789.
\(^{265}\) Ibid, 789.
\(^{266}\) See again the article “Nations”, Ibid, 259-262.
\(^{267}\) See also the *Dictionnaire d’économie politique* article “Liberté du commerce”, which states that nationality should not be taken as the basis for the system of exchanges. Ibid, 58.
to coordinate policies on armaments and economic policy, but they had a wide historical vision in which the forms of international cooperation would change with time.

Peace and Colonial Politics

Political economists’ discussions of colonialism can serve to further elucidate their vision for the international system. In the realm of colonial politics, we most clearly see their internal contradictions as well as the differences between French and British economic pacifism. Whereas British economic pacifists took an explicit stance condemning colonialism, their French counterparts maintained a more ambiguous position against heavy state spending for colonial ventures but in favor of settlement abroad.²⁶⁹ We can trace these positions back to Jeremy Bentham in the first case, and Jean-Baptiste Say in the second. French economic pacifists did not focus on colonialism nearly as much as their British counterparts, but the comments they did make reveal their interest in shifting to soft power rather than withdrawing from political influence abroad.

There are clear historical reasons for the unequal attention given to colonial politics between British and French peace friends. In Britain, there was a real sense that British imperial policy held the prime responsibility for the expansion of the military apparatus and the large associated costs. Britain had been embroiled in a variety of costly military conflicts for the sake of imperial control or expansion in recent years: the American War of Independence, the Opium Wars, intervention in Afghanistan and modern-day Pakistan, etc. In contrast, as France had lost or sold off most of its colonial possessions in the fifty years before 1815, colonial expansion was not the major source driving the rises in French military spending. The conquest of Algeria in 1830 did provide a drain on public spending, and indeed it was Algerian colonization that would draw most of French economic pacifists’ attention in terms of France’s colonial policies. However, there was less of a direct correlation between the military system and the colonial system in the French case, leading to less of an insistence on decolonization.

The main critique that French economic pacifists did maintain against colonialism concerned colonial trade monopolies. Like Adam Smith, they argued that trade monopolies restricted the quantity of goods in the metropolitan and colonial markets and kept prices high for both.²⁷⁰ They took Smith’s argument against trade monopolies farther, however, to more explicitly highlight the obstacles that colonial trade monopolies posed for international peace.²⁷¹ They argued that the desire to hold exclusive control of markets provoked conflict amongst

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²⁶⁹ We can note that the pro-colonial movement also highlighted settlement as an alternative to the disintegrating colonial system based on slavery and trade monopolies during the July Monarchy. See: Jennifer E. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), especially 177-207. However, the political economists studied here were far more critical of the Algerian colonial project as a waste of public funds. This is discussed below.
²⁷⁰ On the question of Smith’s ethical opposition to trading companies, see: Sankar Muthu, “Adam Smith’s Critique of International Trading Companies: Theorizing ‘Globalization’ in the Age of Enlightenment” in *Political Theory* 36, no. 2 (2008): 185-212. However, I take a position similar to Madeleine Dobie, rather than Sankar Muthu, in finding that economists’ critique of colonialism did not amount to a wholesale rejection of imperialism per se. Dobie and Muthu are concerned with eighteenth-century thinkers, but their accounts of economic critiques of colonialism demonstrate the longer history of political economic commentary on colonialism in France. See Madeleine Dobie, *Trading Places: Colonization and Slavery in Eighteenth-Century French Culture* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 199-251.
²⁷¹ French economic pacifists nonetheless looked at Smith as “un des meilleurs défenseurs de la paix”, a precursor in economic as well as peace thinking. The quote pertains to a speech Bastiat and Say made at the peace meetings in England in 1849. *Journal des économistes*, November 15, 1849, 429.
colonial powers, and between colonizers and natives. These confrontations wasted public funds and cost taxpayers more money unnecessarily. Economic pacifists’ call for free trade and competition would not allow a colonial system based on trade restrictions. As Garnier wrote in his 1860 *Traité d’économie politique*, the “old procedures of conquest, colonization and forced annexation” needed to be replaced with a policy of free trade, which had “real advantages” and “no disastrous inconveniences” for the nations involved.

In addition, French economic pacifists rejected the large state subsidies to keep colonies viable. Algeria was a prime target here. Frédéric Bastiat provided the strongest position on this question, denouncing the heavy taxes levied to finance Algerian development and the opportunity cost of sending workers outside of the metropole. Bastiat devoted a chapter of his 1850 pamphlet *Ce qu’on voit et ce qu’on ne voit pas* to Algeria and the costs of French policies there. *Ce qu’on voit* in Algeria – what we see easily from a distance – was the construction of buildings and ports and the migrations of workers: seeming signs of progress and productivity. However, he says, what ‘we don’t see’ is that all of these activities took place in lieu of economic development in the metropole. Rather than giving up considerable sums in taxes to pay for development in Algeria, workers could be using this money to invest in their own businesses. Taxes devoted to maintaining Algerian settlements disempowered work elsewhere in France, because workers had less resources and less ability to increase their own capital and production. Bastiat repeatedly refers to the efforts of ‘hard-working taxpayers’ and the injustice of their not being able to fully profit from their own labor – a discourse familiar today, in a very different context. Bastiat argued that the government must have ‘good’ (and infrequent) reasons to take away this hard-earned money, and for him, Algeria did not qualify as one of these. For Bastiat, as for Cobden, the state needed to scale back its operations, reduce taxes, and allow citizens to invest in their own projects rather than being obliged to finance the unnecessary schemes of misguided foreign policies.

Under Garnier’s editorship of the *Journal des économistes*, a number of critiques were made of the Algerian conquest from an economic point of view. One article in 1847 claimed that the French colonization of Algeria was an “impossible” venture that wasted taxpayer money. Life in Algeria resulted in “l’abaissement du physique, l’abaissement du moral et l’oubli de la patrie”. European crops would simply not grow well; all attempts were futile and unproductive. Another article in 1853 pointed out that although France earned four million more in taxes from Algerians, it spent 73-93 million on keeping the colony. The costliness of the venture was clear. The *Journal des économistes* included a small number of pro-colonial articles on peace, liberty of commerce, and colonies, cited above.

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272 These ideas can be found in numerous texts, not least the *Dictionnaire de l’économie politique* articles on peace, liberty of commerce, and colonies, cited above.
273 See, for example pages 405-410 on the benefits of free trade and the errors of mercantilism and protectionism. Garnier, *Traité d’économie politique, Quatrième édition*. Garnier’s main targets in the book, however, were mercantilism on the one hand and protectionism on the other. He sought to mitigate fears about the consequences of free trade and demonstrate the errors of trying to maintain a strict balance of trade or to keep foreign products out altogether.
articles in the 1860s and 1870s, but in this period, the paper focused on the negative economic aspects of colonialism in general, and Algeria in particular.\textsuperscript{277}

French economic pacifists’ rejection of the costliness of colonialism can be traced back to Jean-Baptiste Say, a primary (literal and figurative) predecessor to the mid-nineteenth century economic pacifists. Say focused less on colonialism’s provocation of conflict than on its public cost. In his 1824 ‘Essay on the origin and probable progress of the British sovereignty in India’, Say emphasized that the East India Company’s conquest of India had been paid for by loans from the British government, thus absorbing large amounts of public funds.\textsuperscript{278} If the British had simply established a trading relationship with India, he said, it would have been more beneficial and less costly. Similarly, in his own \textit{Traité d’économie politique}, Say pointed out that trade monopolies resulted in increased prices for consumers.\textsuperscript{279} Say, and after him, Bastiat, generally tried to shift more focus to consumers, emphasizing the consequences of economic policies on purchasing power and taxpayers’ capacity for investment in light of their consumer expenses. Say also remarked that Britain had wasted three hundred and thirty five million on its war against American independence, while it could have just let the colonies go and shifted to a trade relationship.\textsuperscript{280} Say therefore linked colonialism with heavy public spending and consumption taxes and advocated a system of free trade in its place.

However, at the same time that Say rejected trade monopolies and colonial subsidies, he approved settlement abroad and the creation of trading posts. Say started his chapter of the \textit{Treatise on Political Economy} with this possibility: he defined colonies as “settlements formed in distant countries by an elder nation, called the mother country” and stated that when one country wants to settle in an “already populous and civilized” area, it simply set up “a factory or mercantile residence”, as with Europeans in China or Japan.\textsuperscript{281} He then distinguished between the ‘ancient’ system of colonialism as settlement, under which he included the more recent example of the British in North America, and the ‘modern’ system, wherein adventurers travel abroad to extract resources to send home, as with the Spanish in Peru. The greed of modern colonists drove them to establish slavery in an effort to maximize their gains.\textsuperscript{282} Say concluded

\textsuperscript{277} In 1863, for example, the \textit{Journal des économistes} published an article stating that there was ‘a lot one could say against the chances of success’ of Algerian colonization, but that, ‘as they had repeatedly said’, if Algeria were to work, it would be through liberty and the protection of private property, as well as through the progressive assimilation of Algeria with France. Henri Baudrillart, “Chronique économique...Lettre de l'empereur sur l'Algérie”, \textit{Journal des économistes}, February 1863, 361. Another article in 1873 encouraged French citizens to settle in Indochina, claiming that the voyage was safe, the climate conducive to good health, and the land plentiful and productive. The article called for the formation of a society to facilitate migration. Such articles, however, were very rare under Garnier’s editorship from 1847 to 1881. “Essai sur la colonisation en Cochinchine et au Cambodge, par M. de Chessé, capitaine d'infanterie de marine”, \textit{Ibid}, November 1873, 239-252.


\textsuperscript{279} See particularly Say’s chapter “Of privileged trading companies”. Say states that “trading companies not only extort exorbitant profits from the consumer, but moreover saddle him with all the fraud and mismanagement inseparable from the conduct of these unwieldy bodies”. Jean-Baptiste Say and C. R. Prinsep (trans.), \textit{A Treatise on Political Economy; or the Production, Distribution, and Consumption of Wealth}, by Jean-Baptiste Say. Translated from the Fourth Edition of the French, by C. R. Prinsep, M. A., with notes by the translator. New American Edition, containing a translation of the introduction, and additional notes, by Clement C. Biddle, LL. D., member of the \textit{American Philosophical Society} (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, 1880), 78.

\textsuperscript{280} \textit{Ibid}, 88.

\textsuperscript{281} \textit{Ibid}, 85.

\textsuperscript{282} \textit{Ibid}, 85 on the ancient system, 86 on the modern.
that: “The ancients, by their system of colonization, made themselves friends all over the known world; the moderns have sought to make subjects, and therefore have made enemies.”

The mid-century French economic pacifists also accepted overseas settlement while rejecting colonialism based on military conquest and trade monopolies. Molinari’s *Dictionnaire de l’économie politique* article on colonies established a slightly different framework from that of Say, however, evaluating colonialism in terms of the degree of economic and political liberty permitted. Molinari first provided a comparison of different models of colonialism throughout history in these terms. The Greeks had the ‘best’ model of colonialism, as this was basically just settlement abroad by the initiative of private individuals, with no trade restrictions to follow. The Romans, however, subjected their colonies to the metropole. Centuries later, the Spanish went so far as to categorize business relations with foreigners as a capital crime, in order to secure the metropole’s trade monopoly. Molinari said that Britain was more liberal on imports to its colonies, but reproached its spending vast sums on subsidies, colonial conflicts and military maintenance. Until recently, the French only had a few small outposts of its former colonial system, but then undertook the costly conquest of Algeria. Molinari stated that economists recognized the utility of establishing colonies: it provided a population valve and access to fertile new lands. However, there should be no government interference in colonization. People and goods should be able to circulate wherever supply and demand would dictate. The state should not waste resources on trying to make an unprofitable venture stay afloat. Molinari offered California as the best example of successful ‘colonization’ and Algeria as the counterexample: the American government did not dictate the terms of California colonization, and the area’s economy was developing rapidly; the French government heavily subsidized Algeria, and yet it developed very slowly. The key for Molinari, as for Say, was to allow settlements but not to impose trade restrictions or involve the military in the process.

The British peace friends seem to have accepted missionary activity and emigration, but they were even more avidly against colonial interventions. For Cobden and many British pacifists, colonial policy was the main instigator behind the modern military system, particularly of Great Britain. To call for non-intervention and reductions in the military, for British peace friends, was necessarily to denounce colonialism. At the 1843 peace congress in London, for example, delegates openly condemned the Opium Wars and British military action in Afghanistan and the Scinde. They dwelled at length on the ills of the opium trade and the ineffectiveness of religious conversion by force.

Richard Cobden, too, was a strong opponent of colonialism, as of any state intervention abroad. Cobden’s letters can provide insight into his position. J.A. Hobson’s book on Cobden, *Richard Cobden, The International Man*, compiles a variety of letters on the question of British imperial politics. A look at Hobson’s epilogue reveals his own interest in presenting a history of liberal internationalist opposition to colonialism in 1919, in the wake of a disastrous war and at the height of European colonial reach. However, beyond Hobson’s own agenda, *The International Man* reveals Cobden’s firm commitment to the principle of non-interventionism and its implications for colonial policy. It includes numerous letters by Cobden opposing the Opium Wars, the suppression of the Indian Mutiny and British East India Company policies, in

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283 Ibid, 89.
addition to his condemnation of the Crimean War and Palmerstonian foreign policy in general. For Cobden, the principles that applied to a pacifist foreign policy in Europe had to apply equally farther afield. Regarding East India Company employee James Brooke’s brutal suppression of a local rebellion in exchange for territory in Borneo, Cobden wrote to London Peace Society secretary Henry Richard: "There must be a public and solemn protest against this wholesale massacre. The Peace Society and the Aborigines Society are shams, if such deeds go unrebuked. We cannot go before the world with clean hands on any other question if we are silent spectators of such atrocities." For Cobden, colonialism was unethical and ineffective vis-à-vis native populations and costly and unjust vis-à-vis domestic taxpayers, whose money was unfairly co-opted to support an unnecessarily large military establishment. Military stations only provoked conflict with local populations and bloated the size of the military and thus state budgets. In sum, Cobden considered colonialism as a main perpetrator of the military system that he and other peace advocates so despised.

For the British peace friends in particular, a clear precursor was Jeremy Bentham, who had urged the dismantling of the colonial system to reduce public expenses and ensure international peace. Critiques of colonialism were not unheard of in the eighteenth century, as recent scholarship has shown. Yet Bentham not only critiqued colonialism, but explicitly called for the dismantling of the system at large. In his fourth essay to The Principles of International Law, entitled “A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace”, Bentham recommends “three grand objects: simplicity of government, national frugality, and peace”. Quite remarkably, Bentham insisted that it was “not in the interest” of Great Britain or France “to have any foreign dependencies whatsoever”. He considered colonialism an affront to all three of his “grand objects”. Firstly, colonialism was contrary to peace: it created new conflicts, which, being difficult to verify, were most often ‘solved’ by war. Given that “me[n] car[ed] less about wars when the scene is remote, than when it is nearer home”, violence was allowed to erupt and

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287 On the Crimean War, see Chapter 4; on the Opium Wars and the Indian Mutiny, see Chapter 8; on Palmerstonian foreign policy, see Chapter 5; on the East India Trading Company, see, for example, the following quote from a letter on August 10, 1852 on East India company employee James Brooke: “There is little doubt but you are right as to the letter about our bloody work at Rangoon, etc. It is upon a par with the doings of our forefathers in the East. I was told by an East India Director that the war was totally unnecessary, that it grew out of the violence of the naval envoy; that if a civilian had been employed hostilities would not have begun at all; and that Lord Dalhousie disapproved of the conduct of the Admiral in seizing the ship-of-war. But nobody of any authority will publicly disavow the acts of these fighting men. Esprit de corps, the spirit of nationality, and the great social sway of the military class, all tend to sweep us more and more into the martial vortex. If God really rules this earth (as I solemnly believe He does) upon the principles of a self-acting retributive justice, then British doings in India and China involve a serious reckoning with us or our children. And assuredly the day of reckoning will come.” Ibid, 86-7.


289 See Cobden’s speech at the 1850 Peace Congress on the costliness of the current military system: 1850 Congress, 51-55.; See Hobson’s chapter on the Opium Wars on the cost of military establishments in China, for example: Hobson, Richard Cobden: The International Man, 192-233.

reap destruction. These wars were costly and did not earn any benefits for the ‘mother country’. Peaceful, free trade between independent nations was far more profitable. The renunciation of all colonies could serve the last goal of simplifying the government, making it more effective and less corrupt.\textsuperscript{291} Bentham thus served as a clear precursor to mid-nineteenth century economic pacifism in his rejection of colonialism as an instigator of war and a drain on public resources.\textsuperscript{292,293} Yet it was above all the British Free Traders who most strongly shared Bentham’s isolationist stance; the French economic pacifists echoed his analyses of colonialism but refrained for explicit calls to end colonialism entirely.

In sum, French economic pacifists’ civilizational project allowed room for settlement abroad, but not a full colonial regime with state subsidies or military protection. At its most extensive, this could be considered analogous to the twentieth-century ‘protectorate’ system; at its least, to emigration. The French economic pacifists were not isolationists. They wanted to see their compatriots travel, trade, and settle abroad, but refused any colonial system directed and paid for by the state. In part this can be seen as reflecting the distinct historical vision of colonialism that early nineteenth century actors held, in contrast to our own. Their points of reference were Greek, Roman, and early modern colonialism, whereas our understanding of colonialism is fundamentally marked by the vast European effort at world domination at the end of the nineteenth century.

Yet the French economic pacifists’ acceptance of peaceful settlement abroad can also be seen as a characteristic product of their historical optimism. One could trace this back to Enlightenment forebearers, particularly Condorcet, who also imagined colonialism as a process of peaceful settlement, but was more insistent on notions of European superiority and a European responsibility to civilize ‘savage’ tribes.\textsuperscript{294} We will see the strength of French peace advocates’ historical optimism in the next chapter as well; it is a key characteristic of the movement in general. Through an examination of their ideas on colonialism, we see how this optimism could also be the movement’s greatest fault. In the case of colonialism, the myth of peaceful settlement helped perpetrate French domination in Algeria; it allowed administrators to keep a blind eye to the inherent violence of the colonial system.\textsuperscript{295} While French peace advocates’ ability to imagine a better future was essential to sustaining and upholding their project, it could also lead them to ignore the potential sources of conflict and inequality.\textsuperscript{296}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{292} We can note, however, that many of Bentham’s utilitarian followers were themselves avid imperialists. See: Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 103. See Pitt’s chapter on Bentham as well for a rich analysis of anti-colonialism across Bentham’s writings: pages 103-122. Pitts here tries to demonstrate Bentham’s anti-colonialism despite some scholars’ readings to the contrary. I would agree with her assessment here.
\item \textsuperscript{293} The Dictionnaire de l’économie politique article on Bentham calls his utility principle as “inattaquable” and lists numerous works by Bentham, although The Principles of International Law does not appear on the list. This does not necessarily mean, however, that none of the economic pacifists read this work. At the least, the article shows that Bentham was highly regarded by the economic pacifists and served as a source of influence. Coquelin and Guillaumin, Dictionnaire de l’économie politique, Tome Premier, 158.
\item \textsuperscript{294} See: Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire, 172-173. Pitts notes a “disdain” of European cultures with Condorcet; I would not attribute such an attitude to the French economic pacifists.
\item \textsuperscript{295} Consider the case of the Saint-Simonian administrators who believed that peaceful settlement was possible. Osama Abi-Mershed, Apostles of Modernity.
\item \textsuperscript{296} On the history of violence in nineteenth-century colonial Algeria, see: Benjamin Claude Brower, A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France’s Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
\end{itemize}
Conclusion: Undoing the Fiscal-Military State

Although pacifism has a history stretching back millenia, a primarily economic rejection of war was a novelty of the nineteenth century. Cobden, Bastiat, Garnier, and co. appreciated the moral and religious arguments against war by their contemporaries in the peace societies, but they wanted to present more ‘practical’ reasons for peace. Instead, economic pacifists utilized the concerns of the new discipline of political economy to attack the policies of the fiscal-military state and propose an alternative model of international cooperation.

They wanted firstly to demonstrate the total economic costs of war – including opportunity costs – and to advise a vast reduction in military spending. In an era when tax revenues went primarily to the military establishment rather than to social services, such cuts would mean the beginning of a different kind of state, one that facilitated commerce through free trade policies but otherwise kept taxes and public expenditures very low. This insistence on reduced state expenditures carried over to their writings on colonialism, wherein they rejected military intervention and state subsidies for colonies.

Their vision of peaceful international cooperation was founded on the principles of free trade, the international division of labor and tolerance for political, religious and cultural differences. They highlighted cooperation between states but were not attached to the nation-state form, and urged that economic boundaries be extended beyond political ones. With the economic pacifists, we see a distinct argument for transnational cooperation characterized by anti-statism and historical optimism. Their discourse contributed to the early development of reformist internationalism by making disarmament and international economic interdependence central to the movement’s agenda. A closer look at their writings reveals a unique set of assumptions and aspirations, which drew on the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment but was also situated in the historical and intellectual context of their own day.
One of the most notable aspects of the early peace movement to the history of internationalism is the fact that peace advocates foresaw a variety of international institutions that exist today. They called for an International Court of Arbitration, International Tribunal, and Congress of Nations (like the future League of Nations and United Nations). Here we can see the role of the early international peace movement as an idea lab for the international institutions of the future.

Ideas of international or European confederation had a long history before the nineteenth century, going back to Kant, abbé de Saint-Pierre, William Penn, Henry IV and even the ancient Greeks. Yet the early nineteenth century is notable for the scope and variety of institutional plans for perpetual peace, ranging from visions of universal association to detailed proposals for international law and institutions. In France, these projects arose within a variety of different intellectual trends, above all, Saint-Simonianism, Fourierism, radical republicanism and the international peace movement hoped to intervene in this larger contemporary conversation on the ‘right’ organization of the international order.

Once again, French peace advocates’ institutional plans cannot be separated out from their larger visions of historical progress. They did not see international confederation as a timeless institutional solution, but a product of deep and complex processes of historical change. To study ideas of international confederation in mid-nineteenth century France, then, is also to examine notions of history. The French peace advocates often saw international confederation as the long-term product of changes in technology; economic, cultural and intellectual exchange;

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Many of these works take the ‘great men’ approach to the subject: Hodé, Merle, Mikkeli, Mioche’s books are compilations or analyses of prominent men’s ideas on peace and international confederation. I agree most with Renouvin’s suggested methodology, which tries to look at a variety of sources – including newspapers, books, pamphlets, essays, etc – and consider lesser-known figures as well. In terms of content, I find Wilson and van der Dussen’s approach most compelling: for the nineteenth century, they see Europe as defined both historically and politically. They aptly distinguish between visions of Europe amongst different political groups (‘liberals’, democrats, the Holy Alliance, etc). I have found it necessary to break down these divisions further, but agree with the premise. Unfortunately, however, their volume is a vast overview that describes this period in just a few pages.
human mobility; diplomacy; and education. Moreover, their notion of international confederation was itself historical – the confederation was understood as an entity that would evolve and expand along with the political and cultural transformations of the future.\textsuperscript{299} The influence of Enlightenment thought on the peace advocates was here more general, in their historical conception of ‘civilization’. Yet again, they developed ideas for their own time. They were deeply marked by the technological, social and political transformations of their own era, from railroads to nationalism.

The three main French peace advocates to promote international political union were Constantin Pecqueur, Francisque Bouvet and Victor Hugo, who will all be introduced in further detail below. Each contributed to the development of internationalism through their ideas and practices alike. Constantin Pecqueur advocated a superstate, first European, then global. While never specified, Pecqueur was the likely target of liberal political economists’ frequent denunciations of socialist ‘systems’, including their alleged penchant for supranational institutional arrangements or a world state. He promoted these ideas in a series of essays for contests set up by the Société de la morale chrétienne and the Académie des sciences morales et politiques. He did not attend the peace congresses, but he wrote a long letter to 1843 congress detailing his institutional plans, which was republished in the congress proceedings. Francisque Bouvet took a position closer to the American peace advocates, calling for a confederation of nations that would maintain state sovereignty to a higher degree. He promoted this confederation through multiple forms of activism. He acted as a major figure in the international congresses of 1848 and 1849, formed a peace society, campaigned the National Assembly for an international confederation, and published several books related to international peace. Victor Hugo, famously, called for a ‘United States of Europe’ in his inaugural speech as president of the 1849 peace congress. The speech allowed Hugo to popularize contemporary notions of international confederation, found across the liberal and republican press. Hugo also discussed the possibility of international union in his political writings.

The projects of Pecqueur, Bouvet and Hugo clearly demonstrate the peace advocates’ dedication to a positive vision of international society, in this case represented in their commitment to an institutional model of international union. It allows us to see how the French peace friends viewed peace as an active process realized through progressive historical change. And once again, we see the historical flexibility of French peace advocates’ reformist internationalism: they were not attached to the nation-state in the long run but were willing to work with them in the more immediate future. For Pecqueur and Hugo in particular, the nation was a passing political category that would some day be bypassed by larger political units. All three aimed primarily at the union of humanity, but thought that international union was a progressive, step-by-step process to be realized through technological and social progress combined with concrete political action. In this chapter, I hope to examine Pecqueur, Bouvet and

\textsuperscript{299} Wilson and van der Dussen also note a historical quality to the idea of Europe in this period: “The concept of European culture has indeed arisen in the eighteenth century, but the history of European culture as an idea in itself originated only in the nineteenth. The concept of Europe became a dynamic one. This historical vision of Europe was closely connected with contemporary political, social and religious ideals and ideas of what the future should bring. The concept of Europe was therefore not only historicized, but also politicized; in other words, it was seen more and more in historical terms, with contemporary political debate forming the frame of reference. Roughly speaking, the division was one between the supporters and the opponents of the ideals of the Revolution, but within both parties there were considerable differences of emphasis with regard to the vision of Europe.” Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, eds., \textit{The History of the Idea of Europe (What is Europe?)}, 69-70.
Hugo’s projects in relation to the wider landscape of thinking on international union in this period.

Confederation Mania

One of the most notable aspects of mid-nineteenth century French intellectual and political life, as many historians have noted, is the contemporaneous preoccupation with ‘association’. This ideal was essential to socialists, radical republicans and liberals alike, and applied as much to the organization of work as to international relations.\textsuperscript{300} In keeping with this interest in association, many French authors predicted closer interrelations between the peoples of Europe and the world, a diminishing of prejudices and the emergence of a pan-European and/or global society.

The idea of confederation, then, was very much in the Zeitgeist of the mid-nineteenth century. Federalism was a hot topic and pressing political question all over the world in this period. In Latin America, federalists opposed centralists, a conflict that would dominate much of the nineteenth century in new republics like Argentina.\textsuperscript{301} The examples of the French and American revolutions loomed large, the first representing more radical, centralized nation-state-building and the second representing a compromise between local rights and national unity through federal institutions. In France, revolutionary debates on a federation of France and ‘sister republics’ were adapted to new political realities.\textsuperscript{302} Political arrangements seemed highly fungible; groups across the continent devised novel schemes for organizing states and the international realm – federations of states, federal states, republics, federal empires, etc. The total reconstruction of political units seemed and proved to be possible, though often through conflict (as with Germany or Italy).

In Europe, federation was presented as an option for both domestic politics and international relations. In the longer perspective, the enthusiasm for federations can be seen as a legacy of the Enlightenment idea that science could be applied to all realms of the human experience for men’s common improvement. In a more immediate sense, federation was highly related to the identity politics of the day. Across the continent, nationalists revived folk traditions and argued for the alignment of cultural communities and political boundaries at the local and national levels. In Italy and Germany, nationalists struggled to create unified but federal nation-states that would account for regional differences but bring the Nation into a coherent whole. National movements in eastern Europe engendered a debate about the future of the Austrian empire, as a centralized or federal empire, confederation of nation-states, or region of independent republics.\textsuperscript{303} At the international level, many dreamt of western, eastern or Europe-wide confederations. The traces of regional federalism that we see in newspapers like \textit{La

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\item \textsuperscript{300} Related to this, see again Marcel David’s excellent study on fraternity in this period, with he sees as an ideal motivating citizens to action. Marcel David, \textit{Le Printemps de la Fraternité}. David examines the ideal of fraternity in popular, official and intellectual circles alike, across political lines.
\item \textsuperscript{301} See for example: Gabriel Negretto and José Antonio Anguilar-Rivera, “Rethinking the Legacy of the Liberal State in Latin America: The Cases of Argentina (1853-1916) and Mexico (1857-1910)” in \textit{Journal of Latin American Studies} 32, no. 2 (May 2000): 361-397.
\item \textsuperscript{303} See Hans Kohn, \textit{Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology} (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953).
\end{itemize}
Réforme around 1848 relate to this goal. Calls for a meeting to discuss an Iberian republican federation and a Slavic republic related to proto-national concerns for independence and republican government, with federation seen as a desirable solution. Monarchical and imperial politics had forced peoples into ‘unnatural’ configurations; political organization by national and/or ethnic identity would be preferable.

To observe a concrete example of French thought on regional confederations, we can look to Cyprien Robert. Chair of Slavic languages at the Collège de France, member of the Société slave de Paris and founder of the journal L’Orient européen, Robert envisioned a series of ethnically-based regional federations within Europe. Robert advocated the formation of three federations: a Latin league with France, Switzerland, Spain and Italy; a German league in central Europe; and an Eastern league of Hungarians and Slavs. This new European system would allow the three ‘races’ of ‘civilized nations’ their own zone of liberty, yet unite them all in a “fraternal union” coordinating the federations. While one does not often find suggestions for an exclusively ‘Latin’ confederation otherwise, Robert’s project echoed the plans of German nationalists and pan-Slavists in this period within the goal of institutionalizing peace in Europe. In the shorter run, Robert saw the Austrian empire as an appropriate vehicle for the enfranchisement of the eastern European peoples, if it were to become a federation of independent nation-states. Presumably, Robert could also accept Austria remaining in the federation as an equal partner, or else joining a Großdeutschland configuration. Robert’s project was just one of countless other plans to reorganize Europe into a series of regional federations in this period.

Federalism arose across Europe and the Americas in this period as part of reformists’ and revolutionaries’ goal to re-organize local, national and international politics according to democratic principles, broadly understood. Confederations often applied to imagined ethnic groups, or were used to unite a variety of ethnic groups within a particular region: Europe, for example. In the most grandiose versions of this ‘confederation mania’, new institutions would be established for humanity at large.

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304 See: La Réforme, March 28, 1848 on an Iberian confederation; Ibid, May 16, 1848 on a Slavic republic.
305 This is of course the principle of nationalism. For a now-classic exposition of nationalism and its principles, see: Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Gellner comments: “Nationalism holds that [nations and states] were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy.” Ibid, pg. 6-7. We see this also in the pages of 1848-era newspapers like La Réforme: “La grande famille humaine, si violemment morcelée, va maintenant se recomposer suivant les lois éternelles d'affinités de races, de tribus, de nationalités; elle sera définitivement unie par le plus puissant des liens, la fraternité. C'est pour ce dégagement des nationalités qu'éclatera la foudre; mais elle éclatera sur la tête de ceux qui les ont le plus longtemps et le plus violemment comprimées.” La Réforme, March 20, 1848.
308 Ibid, 8. Hans Kohn also points out how Robert viewed an eastern European confederation as a potential mediator between Russia and western Europe. See Kohn, Pan-Slavism, 92.
309 Hans Kohn’s book discusses many of these plans both in France and eastern Europe. There were likely many others in newspapers across the continent. Pierre Renouvin was of the same opinion. See: Pierre Renouvin, L’Idée de fédération européenne, 3.
310 This was the case for Pecqueur: to be discussed below.
International association could also take more nebulous forms, particularly when attached to the idea of the potential for technology to unite the peoples. French writers in this period often commented that railroads, steamships, the telegraph and the expansion of the press seemed to be drawing peoples closer together into an international community. For many authors, peace seemed to be the natural outcome of contemporary historical processes, from the standardization of weights and measures to the invention of the steam engine. This optimism could be seen as part of the widespread utopianism found in mid-nineteenth century France in political and intellectual circles alike.\textsuperscript{311}

As mentioned in Chapter 1, some of the most notable believers in the connection between technology, science and historical progress in this period were Saint-Simon and his followers. The latter focused on both economic and political association, predicting the unification of mankind into a “Final State” through industrial exchange and bank cooperation. The Saint-Simonians were both personally involved in the development of railroads as investors and managers, and theorists of the impact of technology on the progress of civilization.\textsuperscript{312} The Saint-Simonians, like the friends of peace, believed that with the application of scientific principles to industry, politics and society, nineteenth-century actors could build a new, more peaceful and united world. Like many of their contemporaries, they also held considerable stake in the potential for railroads to promote international harmony.

Faith that technology would unify mankind was a common trope for a number of peace friends, including those linked to Saint-Simonianism. Michel Chevalier, in particular, connected technology and international association. As a journalist for \textit{Le Globe}, Chevalier wrote a series of articles promoting a pan-Mediterranean system based on communications and new infrastructure.\textsuperscript{313} Chevalier continued to develop these ideas throughout his career. In his 1852 \textit{Chemins de fer} (pulled from his contribution to the \textit{Dictionnaire de l’économie politique} entry on railroads), Chevalier argued that railroads could bring peace and unity, as they “tendent à égaliser la condition des hommes dans chaque état, et…[à pousser] à l’union des nations, à l’unité de civilisation”.\textsuperscript{314} Chevalier asserted that hate and prejudice was only a result of ignorance. Once peoples had the ability to exchange ideas, goods and practices, they would come to love and appreciate each other. Commerce would lead to mutual imitation and the unification of nations. While he admitted that railroads had the potential to increase the speed and effectiveness of war, he urged: "Mais ne mêlons pas trop les chemins de fer et la guerre. Les chemins de fer se recommandent surtout comme des auxiliaires de la paix.”\textsuperscript{315} Like many friends of peace, Chevalier urged that travel and exchange could promote peace and unity.

\textsuperscript{311} Here we could think of ‘utopian socialists’ like Charles Fourier and Victor Considérant, the Saint-Simonians, or the radical republicans, who all held optimistic or – some would say – utopian views of historical progress. Jonathan Beecher refers to a “broad social and political awakening” in the 1830s and 1840s in this vein: Beecher, \textit{Victor Considérant}, 43.


\textsuperscript{315} Ibid, 18.
Belief in the unifying power of technology was also manifest at the international congresses. At the 1850 congress, for example, Girardin commented: “By steam and by printing, those two pacific conquests, every day sees the exchange of ideas accelerated along with the exchange of produce. Men and things, peoples and territories approach each other and become united. Time and distance are now but feeble obstacles easily surmounted.” While this sort of statement could be expected from Girardin, given that his popular La Presse was the first– and highly successful – model of the cheap daily newspaper in France, this belief in the power of technology to transform the world was part of his general worldview. Girardin thought that the free exchange of goods and ideas would bring greater cultural unity across borders, resulting in mutual understanding and harmony. With the multiplication of the frequency and forms of exchange (telegraphs, newspapers, mathematics, music, a universal language, navigation science, etc), men would come to understand that they were “essentially one”. He claimed that exchange would lead to “Assimilation”, a non-violent (but potentially assymetrical) process of accepting whatever was deemed ‘best’ in each country, from law to technological innovation. Girardin posited this process as self-evidently beneficial, one of common improvement and harmonization. In a sense, Girardin’s vision was very similar to that of Pecqueur’s (examined below), seeing technology as leading to the standardization of culture, which was taken to imply peace. In essence, both predicted what we would call globalization, seeing the process as one of harmonization and equalization rather than of displacement or assymetry.

Faith in the potential for science and technology to transform global society was thus a shared belief between Saint-Simonians and friends of peace. Both contributed strongly to the utopian mood of the era, a sort of secular millenarianism in which the coming of universal peace and harmony seemed possible, even imminent. The more institutional projects for European union took place amidst these predictions of transnational exchange and unity.

French Peace Friends and European Confederation

Amongst the French actors most directly involved in the international peace movement, the three main supporters of a European confederation were Francisque Bouvet, Constantin Pecqueur and Victor Hugo. As mentioned, all three envisioned international governance as beginning with the creation of international institutions in Europe and then expanding to involve all of the nations of the world. Seeing more gradual processes of cultural standardization through technology, travel and education as prerequisite to global governance, these pacifists believed that the most effective way to create a new international order was to start with the cooperation of those nations already in favor of international institutions. With the peace movement picking up in Europe, it seemed that European publics would be able to convince their governments to take part in an international project designed for their collective safety and well-being.

One of the most vocal French advocates for international institutions was politician and author Francisque Bouvet. Bouvet worked tirelessly to advocate the friends of peace’s program before, during and after his stint as a representative to the Constitutive and Legislative Assemblies in 1848 and 1849. He campaigned at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a universal congress for perpetual peace, although his proposal was rejected due to ‘present circumstances’

\[316\] 1850 congress, 8-9.
\[317\] 1850 Congress, 9.
\[318\] A secular millenarianism – in contrast to the Christian millenarianism of the British Nonconformist peace friends. See again: Alexander Tyrell, “Making the Millenium”.
in March of 1849. After the coup d’état, Bouvet went on to become a diplomat, putting that older form of arbitration into practice while continuing to write extensively. With this experience in politics and international affairs, Bouvet became one of the French peace movement activists most in favor of international institutions.

Around the time of the 1849 peace congress in Paris, Bouvet founded the Société de la paix universelle, first named l’Union des Peuples: the first association dedicated exclusively to peace in France. Bouvet’s society seems to have been short-lived, but it reflected many of the major initiatives of the peace movement in the mid-nineteenth century and amounted to one of the most detailed plans for international governance at the time. The society envisioned a permanent universal congress that would proclaim universal peace and abolish the right to war. It would act as a legislative institution, writing a constitution and legal code, and an international court of arbitration, acting as the supreme judge in international disputes. These institutions would be backed up by force, by an army composed of soldiers from each state in the ‘universal confederation’. Supported by this military arm, the congress would maintain maritime neutrality and commercial liberty. It would also collect and redistribute funds for international public works. Finally, the congress would facilitate intellectual exchange in the arts, industry, agriculture and commerce. Bouvet’s society hoped to make progress towards this goal by working with other scientific and peace societies to convince the public of the utility of the universal congress. For the moment, these societies were presumably in Europe or America, but the implication is that the project would expand with time. The program of the Société de la paix universelle went beyond many contemporaneous plans for international confederation, as it called for an international peace-keeping force and a redistribution of wealth for international projects.

In his 1855 work Guerre et Civilisation, Bouvet encouraged the establishment of a Congress of Nations that would act as an arbiter between nations. Rather than resorting to war, nations would systematically have recourse to the congress, a permanent institution with established regulations. While previous international congresses had been helpful, their dissolution after finalizing treaties lead to instability in the international sphere. The international community needed a common code; it should no longer remain in its current “état d’isolement insocial”. The plan for the congress was essentially the same as that laid out by the Société de la paix universelle: it would establish an international code, revise treaties and ensure their execution, maintain the neutrality and safety of the seas, assure the liberty of commerce, manage international infrastructure projects, preside over the colonization process, facilitate peaceful exchange in the arts and industry. Finally, it would encourage the ‘unity’ (or standardization) of languages, weights, measures, statistics, arts, religion and morals. It would be “la loi vivante, le verbe officiel de l’esprit humain régnant enfin sur le monde affranchi et pacifié”.

319 “Le comité des affaires étrangères a entendu aujourd’hui la lecture du rapport sur la proposition de M. Francisque Bouvet, relative à un congrès de toutes les puissances du monde pour un traité de paix universelle. Le comité tout en reconnaissant son mérite, a conclu au rejet de cette proposition dans les circonstances actuelles.” La Tribune des Peuples, March 16, 1849.
322 Ibid, 227.
323 Ibid, 229-231.
The geographic scope of the congress Bouvet proposes in *Guerre et Civilisation* is left unclear, but he encourages the construction of railroads across Europe and Asia and mentions that members in the international confederation would secure the benefits of global trade.\(^{324}\) Writing at the height of the Crimean War, Bouvet appealed specifically to western powers to conclude a peace treaty and then submit themselves permanently to a common code and congress. He argued that such a confederation would protect western European powers from Russian ambitions and thus stabilize politics in the region.\(^{325}\) However, he left open the possibility of Russian involvement in the near future.\(^{326}\) It is implied that his plan aimed at universal involvement, although he may have anticipated it to begin as a European confederation.

Constantin Pecqueur, too, called for the eventual creation of a global confederation with supranational authority but took a progressive approach to international institutions. Pecqueur approached the question of international confederation from the standpoint of a one-time Saint-Simonian and Fourierist, a Christian and an independent author. In the years just before the 1843 peace congress, Pecqueur was actively considering questions of peace and international ethics, and his work won him recognition. His *Économie sociale : Des Améliorations matérielles dans leurs rapports avec la liberté* earned him the annual prize of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques in 1839, and his *De la Paix, de son principe et de sa réalisation* and *Des Armées dans leur rapports avec l’industrie, la morale et la liberté* won the essay contests set up by the Société de la Morale chrétienne in conjunction with the London Peace Society in 1842. Pecqueur advocated a model of state collectivism in which the government would control all aspects of the economy, including professional education, job placement, salary rates and tax redistribution. Despite political differences with some of the members, Pecqueur gained recognition from groups like the SMC and the Académie des sciences morales et politiques for his work on international relations.\(^{327}\)

Like Michel Chevalier, Pecqueur predicted that technology would play a considerable role in unifying humanity. Before writing several texts relating to peace and permanent armies, he wrote a prize-winning essay for the Académie des sciences morales et politiques outlining his views on political economy, including the idea that technology would unify and eventually blend together all of mankind.\(^{328}\) At various points in this 1837 oeuvre, *Économie sociale*, Pecqueur stated that railroads could fundamentally revolutionize ideas, moeurs and even demographics. He argued that train travel would create more homogeneity in mentalities, bringing social classes

\(^{324}\) Ibid, 233-234.  
\(^{325}\) Ibid, 258-259.  
\(^{326}\) Ibid, 240.  
\(^{327}\) In particular, see Pecqueur’s *Théorie nouvelle d’économie sociale et politique*, wherein he advocates state collectivism: Constantin Pecqueur, *Théorie nouvelle d’économie sociale et politique, ou Études sur l’organisation des sociétés* (Paris: Capelle, 1842).  
and nationalities closer together in levels of education and in outlook.\textsuperscript{329} Railroads would reveal the “universal truths and values of civilization and Christianity”: above all, liberty and equality.\textsuperscript{330} Education could also accelerate the acceptance of this message, so all villages should have primary and secondary schools, art academies and libraries.\textsuperscript{331} Moreover, once Europeans had become more peaceful and egalitarian, they would then assume their responsibility of “initiating inferior populations”.\textsuperscript{332} A similar process was involved as in Europe, relying on a combination of technology and the initiatives of church leaders, school teachers and elites.

In a sense, Pecqueur thus developed a typical model of an assymetrical ‘civilizing mission’ carried out by European elites both within and beyond the continent. In the long run, however, Pecqueur predicted that travel and exchange would increase to such an extent that all of the peoples of the world would mix and intermarry, making racial and cultural divisions fade. Global métissage would bring a unified, harmonious world of common understanding; “on sera alors citoyen du monde dans toute la rigueur de l'expression.”\textsuperscript{333} In Pecqueur’s long-term vision, nations would disappear through the spread of ideas as well as through travel and intermarriage. Like the Saint-Simonians, Pecqueur did not see cultural homogenization as a negative or coercive process, but one based on reciprocity and exchange. Pecqueur’s model of what we would call globalization – cultural, economic and political standardization and interdependence through increasing communications, mobility and investment – reflected the idealism of the times, shared by socialists and liberal economists alike.

The realization of a global community was to be a long, step-by-step process, however. In the shorter term, Pecqueur advocated a European confederation. Pecqueur believed that global peace was a more distant goal than the end of warfare on the European continent: “La paix perpétuelle est loin de nous; mais, en Europe, la fin de la guerre homicide, de la guerre de sang ne l'est point.”\textsuperscript{334} At the end of his Économie sociale, Pecqueur predicts a federation of European peoples under the “moral and political unity” of a general congress and leading to the creation of one “peuple européen”, similar to the United States of America.\textsuperscript{335} Pecqueur saw Europe as already close to a singular identity – a “ sphère chrétienne” that was beginning to have a common public opinion, interests and political strategy.\textsuperscript{336} Its academies and scientific societies in Europe were already in close correspondence, “en termes qui excluent toute étroite préoccupation de...

\textsuperscript{329} Pecqueur, Économie sociale, Tome II, 290-291. “Les voyages à l'intérieur élèveront les classes inférieures au degré de civilisation, au niveau intellectuel et moral de l'élite de la société. Les voyages à l'extérieur élèveront cette même élite à une nouvelle supériorité relative, à une plus haute moralité, à des moeurs extranationales, à des sentiments et à une vue cosmopolite de jour en jour plus compréhensifs et plus humains.”

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid, 294. “Ce seront les voyages, enfin, les voyages sur les rails glissants, et à la remorque des impétueuses locomotives, qui achèveront cette universalité; qui mettront, de nouveau, en regard, toutes les croyances, toutes les institutions, tous les mécanismes industriels, et qui décideront, hateront le règne de la liberté et des vertus chrétiennes, et propageront éternellement sur le globe le vrai, le beau, et le bon, à mésure qu'ils se développeront dans les inspirations du génie et des grands coeurs.”

\textsuperscript{331} Pecqueur, Économie sociale, Tome I, 334.

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid, 345. “Or, tout prouve plus que jamais que la morale évangélique, c'est-à-dire la civilisation européenne dans sa base et dans sa lumière vivifiante, fera le tour du monde; et nous verrons bientôt qu'il suffit que cette égalité règne en Europe, pour qu'un jour elle gagne toute la terre, car c'est à l'Europe qu'est dévolu le soin d'initier les civilisations inférieures.”

\textsuperscript{333} Pecqueur, Économie sociale, Tome II, 327-350. Quote on page 350.

\textsuperscript{334} Ibid, 363.

\textsuperscript{335} Ibid, 401-402.

\textsuperscript{336} Ibid, 414-415. Pecqueur also states on page 433: “il y a, en un mot, une morale européenne, c’est celle de l’Évangile; elle astreint les gouvernements comme les individus, et pour elle, il n’y a plus de douanes”.
Pecqueur predicted that the nations with roughly the same level of industrial development would choose to join in an economic union governed by international commercial law, a free trade zone similar to the German Zollverein. A great step forward would be to establish two large customs unions in northern and southern Europe, to replace the multitude of small economic units of his day. Gradually, a single pan-European capital would begin to form. Finally, there would be a “union fédérative des États d’Europe” with a common tribunal and congress. Pecqueur recommended a single language, currency and system of weights and measures to facilitate the union. In effect, Pecqueur was advocating a European superstate. Despite numerous references to Immanuel Kant as his predecessor, Pecqueur therefore went beyond Kant’s ‘[Con]federation of Free States’ to call for a federal state endowed with executive, legislative and judiciary powers.

Pecqueur continued to develop his ideas for international union in the following years. His 1842 *De la paix, de son principe et de sa réalisation* called for a progressively-expanding confederation. He encouraged the rapid creation of a European customs union but, like Saint-Simon, stated that a political union should only include constitutional states, and thus must be built more gradually. As in *Économie sociale*, Pecqueur suggested concentrating on European union in the shorter run, emphasizing the feasibility of the project due to the common religious, political, cultural and economic conditions throughout Europe.

Perhaps through his connections to the SMC, Pecqueur caught wind of the 1843 international peace congress and decided to write in a letter of support detailing his own suggestions for perpetual peace. It is here that we most clearly see his institutional vision for international confederation. In the letter, Pecqueur suggested a “permanent congress of ambassadors of peace” from each nation. The congress would institute a High Court and International Tribunal. Pecqueur positioned himself as the main advocate of an international court: “This ‘Jury of Nations’, as proposed by me in France, and as proposed by Mr. Ladd in the United States, should be established, at first, as a kind of spiritual or arbitrating power, to which the nations might voluntarily submit their differences.” Like Bouvet, Pecqueur suggested the founding of a cosmopolitan army or police force to enforce international law. Pecqueur also had a variety of other suggestions for the congress, including ‘missionary’ activity on pacifism in Europe, Asia and worldwide; a pacifist newspaper; free pacifist pamphlets; and letters to clergy, universities, scientific associations, Freemasons, journals, governments and armies. Pecqueur’s perspective was imperialist but non-violent: through “special embassies” in the parts of the world

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337 Ibid, 413.  
338 Ibid, 419-420.  
341 Ibid, 434. Here, Pecqueur again makes the comparison to the United States of America.  
342 Ibid, 435.  
343 Kant calls his plan a ‘Federation of Free States’, but states: “This would be a league of nations, but it would not have to be a state consisting of nations.” Kant, Immanuel, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, 1795, accessed September 14, 2013, [http://www.constitution.org/kant/perpeace.htm](http://www.constitution.org/kant/perpeace.htm). On Pecqueur’s many references to Kant as his predecessor, see Pecqueur, *De la paix*, 235, 264, 294, 366, 405, 430.  
344 Ibid, 335, 338 on constitutional states and political union.; Ibid, 211 on simultaneous economic union.  
345 This is a point that I have developed in a recent talk, “Between Global Governance and European Union: The Writings of Constantin Pecqueur”, which was presented at the Université de Luxembourg in May 2013. The talk was a contribution to the *Eurespro* workshop “Pour une Europe unie après le Premier Empire napoléonien”, organized by the Université du Luxembourg and the Institut de Recherches Historiques du Septentrion (Université de Lille III), and may be published in article form in the near future.
that were “behind hand in civilization”, Europeans could “initiate [other peoples] in the pacific politics of the great Christian power, and in the ways and means of the economy and prosperity of Europe; and at length lead them to form a part of the European concert.”

Again, the idea that other peoples would accept the value of European moeurs was self-evident to Pecqueur.

Victor Hugo also called for a European confederation that could be progressively expanded to all of humanity. Like Pecqueur and Bouvet, Hugo was drawn into the peace movement as an independent figure. He is remarkable, however, for the considerable political evolution that he underwent throughout his life, from constitutional monarchist to democratic republican. The son of a Napoleonic general, Hugo served in the aristocratic Chamber of Peers during the July Monarchy. In 1848, Hugo announced the Regency after the abdication of Louis-Philippe, rather than siding immediately with the Republic. The experience of Louis-Napoleon’s coup-d’état in 1852, however, served as a radicalizing experience that led to decades in exile and some of his most famous pro-republican fiction and nonfiction writings, including Napoléon Le Petit, Histoire d’un Crime, and Les Misérables. Around 1849, Hugo could be described as a moderate republican who favored gradual reforms and held confidence in the progress of civilization, giving him an intellectual affinity with peace movement activists in France and abroad. Hugo famously became the president of the 1849 peace congress and delivered an inaugural address that called for the eventual creation of a ‘United States of Europe’.

Like Chevalier and Pecqueur, Hugo believed that technology could play a strong role in the advance of peace and unity. In his inaugural address to the 1849 peace congress, he described how the peaceful law of God had made gradual steps in the past, but in their “rapid period”, it could make quick, decisive progress. “Thanks to railroads, Europe will soon be no larger than France was in the middle ages. Thanks to steam-ships, we now traverse the mighty ocean more easily than the Mediterranean was formerly crossed. Before long, men will traverse the earth, as the gods of Homer did the sky, in three paces!” The result of this technological progress was the beginnings of a global community: “How distances become less and less; and this rapid approach, what is it but the commencement of fraternity?” Hugo posited historical progress in a religious framework – peace was the will of God, pacification was the realization of God’s will – all the while placing considerable stock in the role of technological advance in pushing this progress forward. Like Pecqueur and other French peace advocates, Hugo developed extensive and complex visions of historical progress and its relation to peace, informed by both religious and secular analyses.

Hugo’s institutional vision was also similar to that of Pecqueur and Bouvet. The goal of confederation was not to be an end in itself, but a stepping stone to an eventual world federation. Describing the advance of peace in European history in his 1849 inaugural address, Hugo predicted the creation of a ‘United States of Europe’ through international confederation and the cultivation of a supranational European identity. Just as the regions of Picardy, Normandy, Burgundy, etc had gradually ceded political and cultural supremacy to that of France, the nations of Europe would one day be subsumed into a European political and cultural unit. This ‘United States of Europe’ would then ally with the United States of America to help transform

346 All of these quotes can be found in: 1843 Congress, 92-93.
347 1849 Congress, 11-12.
348 “A day will come when war will appear as absurd, and be as impossible, between Paris and London, between St. Petersburg and Berlin, between Vienna and Turin, as it would be now between Rouen and Amiens, between Boston and Philadelphia. A day will come when you, France – you, Russia – you, Italy – you, England – you, Germany – all of you, nations of the Continent, will, without losing your distinctive qualities and your glorious individuality, be blended into a superior unity, and constitute an European fraternity.” 1849 Congress, 11.
the world. These confederations would work to ‘civilize’ other peoples, to teach them the value of arbitration and peace and gradually absorb them within the international community. The sphere of international politics would grow accordingly, leading to a universal confederation of nations in the distant future. In 1848, Hugo commented on the creation of an international ‘nation’: “Elle s’appellera l’Europe au vingtième siècle, et, aux siècles suivants, plus transfigurée encore, elle s’appellera l’Humanité.” For Hugo, European union was not a geopolitical strategy or a permanent expression of a bounded identity, but one stage in the gradual pacification of mankind and the extension of its sphere of affection and belonging. Hugo’s predictions of a United States of Europe was thus above all an expression of his idea of history.

This description of Hugo, Pecqueur and Bouvet’s international confederation projects may remind some readers of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century internationalism, which often restricted itself to relations between ‘civilized’ nations but allowed for the possibility that the circle of civilization would expand in the future (provided future members could attain the Eurocentric “standard of civilization”). Late-nineteenth century international law, in particular, has been cited as demonstrative of European chauvinism, as it was restricted to ‘civilized’ nations only. However, while one can see a foreshadowing of such notions in the work of the early French peace advocates, I would caution against any easy equation between theirs and later internationalists’ views of international society. The early French peace advocates had their own distinct notions of historical progress and the role of the nation-state that distinguish them from their diverse successors.

Like economic pacifists, Hugo, Pecqueur and Bouvet were notable for their belief that the units of human organization progressively expanded over time. They had plans for a European confederation of nation-states, but this was only to be a passing stage in the evolution of history. This fact distinguishes the French peace advocates from twentieth-century internationalists, as well as from a number of their counterparts abroad. Numerous American pacifists who concerned with the creation of an international congress and court in the early nineteenth century emphasized that the nation would remain an important political actor and point of affection. Similarly, Mr. Alvin, Belgian education minister, emphasized at the 1848 congress in Brussels

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349 Garnier, Congrès des Amis de la Paix Universelle, Réuni à Paris en 1849, 4. “Un jour viendra ou l'on verra ces deux groupes immenses, les États-Unis d'Amérique, les États-Unis d'Europe, placés en face l'un de l'autre, se tendant la main par-dessus les mers, échangeant leurs produits, leur commerce, leur industrie, leurs arts, leurs génies, défrichant le globe, colonisant les déserts, améliorant la création sous le regard du Créateur, et combinant ensemble, pour en tirer le bien-être de tous, ces deux forces infinies, la fraternité des hommes et la puissance de Dieu.”
350 Ibid, 5.
352 Here I disagree with Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia’s analysis: “Defended by Victor Hugo and Richard Cobden, the two principal figures at the Congress of Peace organized in 1849 in Paris, the project of the United States of Europe was a response more to the conscious desire to adapt the European states to the demands of a new international environment than to an innate desire to unify them.” Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia, “European Nationalism and European Union” in Anthony Pagden, ed., The Idea of Europe (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2002).
354 William Ladd, An Essay on a Congress of Nations, For the Adjustment of International Disputes Without Resort to Arms. Containing the Substance of the Rejected Essays on that Subject, with Original Thoughts and a Copious Appendix (Boston: Whipple and Damrell, 1840), 16.
that the nation would actually be valorized through the Congress of Nations, given that representation was permanently organized on the basis of nationality. In the case of the French peace advocates, however, concern for the status of the nation-state seems to have played a relatively minimal role. Whereas Ladd and Alvin tried to assert the continuation of state sovereignty within an international confederation, Hugo and Pecqueur (in particular) saw the nation as a passing political category that would decline with the progress of history. They recognized the nation as an important contemporary category, but also predicted that political affiliations would expand and shift with the passing of time. Pecqueur believed that Europe would one day have its one identity and institutions, and would, eventually, the world. For Victor Hugo as well, the result of historical progress was the diminishing of national identity and autonomy and the rise of larger identities and jurisdictions. In this prediction, Hugo represented French peace advocacy as a typical example wherein the decline of the nation-state was seen as a neutral product of inevitable historical transformations. French peace advocates were not anti-national, but they largely saw the nation-state, like they saw a European union, as a stepping-stone to wider affinities. The ultimate ending point was global identity and institutions.

American Projects for International Union: Transatlantic Comparisons

The French peace advocates’ projects for international confederation can be contrasted with a variety of different plans at the time. Firstly, we can look at American pacifists’ international institutional projects. The project for a ‘universal’ congress of nations was often considered to be an American initiative, promoted enthusiastically by Elihu Burritt, the premier American pacifist at the mid-century congresses. Burritt himself was inspired by William Ladd, the first president of the American Peace Society and an ardent supporter of pacifism as well as abolitionism. Ladd deceased in 1841, but his project for a Congress of Nations and Court of Nations remained the central touchpoint for all such plans in this period. Under Ladd’s leadership, the American Peace Society presented numerous petitions to the United States Congress and Senate of Massachusetts between 1835 and 1840 in support of the creation of these international institutions. The scope was of course not ‘Europe’ in the geographical sense or in the cultural sense meant today, but concerned the ‘civilized’ nations of the West.

Ladd’s Essay on a Congress of Nations detailed his proposal for a Congress of Nations and a Court of Nations. His plan was essentially to apply the federal model of the young United States of America and apply it to the international sphere. Ladd imagined the Court of Nations as a permanent institution similar to the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Congress of Nations as a periodic institution with rotating members, like the United States’ Congress or Senate, thus retaining the separation of legislative and judiciary powers. The Congress and Court were to remain distinct bodies, although they would be most effective if coordinated and constructed as part of a single plan for a new international order. The Congress of Nations would attempt to regulate both war and peace, defining the rights of belligerents and neutrals,

355 Congrès des Amis de la Paix Universelle, Réuni à Bruxelles, en 1848, Séances des 20, 21 et 22 septembre (Bruxelles: Imprimerie de Th. Lesigne, 1849), 68. Henceforth: 1848 Congress.

356 Can see the petitions in Ladd, An Essay on a Congress of Nations, 133-189. American pacifists’ solicitation of the Massachusetts legislature convinced the Commonwealth to issue a petition in favor of a Congress of Nations, stating: “That the institution of a Congress or Court of Nations appears to be, at present, the best practical method by which the disputes between nations can be adjusted, and the appeal to arms avoided”, and “That it be recommended to the Executive of the United States, to open a negotiation with such other governments as, in its wisdom, it may deem proper, with a view to effect so important an arrangement”. Ibid, 151.

357 Ibid, 13.
promoting peacetime policies beneficial to the international community at large, and organizing the Court of Nations. Ladd’s plan thus fell within the Just War tradition to a certain extent, in its regulation of war itself. His Essay can in many ways be seen as a precursor to the Geneva Conventions a few decades later, going into detail about potential regulations on war to limit suffering. In principle, he stated “there is no good reason why nations should not mutually agree to frown on all the cruelties of war which are unnecessary to the ostensible object of it”. He discussed such issues as poisoning, assassination, the definition of combatants and the status of enemy property. His plan afforded the Congress of Nations a considerable degree of power on international questions but upheld state sovereignty on domestic issues: “The Congress of Nations is to have nothing to do with the internal affairs of nations, or with insurrections, revolutions, or contending factions… but solely to concern themselves with the intercourse of nations in peace and war.”

Besides the question of the long-term status of the nation-state, a major difference between Ladd’s plan and those of French peace advocates concerns the question of geographic scope. In contrast to French plans, Ladd’s view of this international community was decidedly not universalist. He stated clearly that only the “most civilized, enlightened, and Christian nations” would form a part of the Congress of Nations, and amongst these, only the nations that agreed with the majority’s project for the new international system would be permitted. New or desisting parties from the “Christian or civilized nations” could later be re-admitted if they were to subscribe to the Congress’s laws. This was not necessarily restricted to the United States and European countries, but seemed to preclude the involvement of Asian or African nations. In a petition to the United States Congress of 1839-40, the American Peace Society suggested that the Congress of Nations be initiated by the United States, Great Britain and France, after which “most of the other powers of Europe and the South American republics would follow”. As a result of this union, “wars, in a great measure, would cease in Christendom”. French peace advocates also suggested that the Congress of Nations begin in the Christian or “civilized” world, but specifically advocated the expansion of this sphere through a civilizing, Christianizing mission that would then bring other nations into the new norms of the international community. American pacifists, on the other hand, seem to have seen the latter as a permanently bounded entity.

*The Alliance of the Peoples: War, Democracy and International Republican Confederation*

French peace advocates’ confederation projects can be compared not only with those of their American counterparts, but also with the international model conceived by French radical republicans. Although we have seen the differences between the peace movement’s reformist internationalism and radicals’ revolutionary internationalism in the first chapter, it is worth comparing the forms of international cooperation that they advanced in further detail. We know that a number of peace movement activists supported international institutions; did radicals do the same?

The question of political prerequisites to membership in a Congress of Nations was often sidestepped by peace advocates. American and British pacifists largely pushed international confederation without consideration of political form; it seems that a union would have been

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358 Ibid, 17.
360 Ibid, 10, 14.
361 Ibid, 187.
composed of absolutist, constitutional monarchist, and republican states alike. This reflected their larger argument that international peace could be secured regardless of political differences within and between states, evident in the peace congress project itself. French political pacifists were more ambiguous on this question. Bouvet clearly preferred the republican form of government, but seems to have been willing to see an international confederation composed of states with a variety of political forms. Hugo would later explicitly call for a Europe of republics, but in the 1840s, he seems to have been amenable to international cooperation between a politically-heterogeneous body of states. It was Pecqueur who was clearest on the question, as we have seen: he specifically stated that any political confederation must be composed of constitutional (though not republican) states.

For radical republicans, however, there could be no Congress of Nations unless it was comprised of republican nation-states. Their goal for the immediate term, in this case, was to assure the creation of such states. They occasionally mentioned a formal union of republican states through a Congress of Nations in the future, but for the short run, they focused on popular forms of international cooperation to further republicanism on the European continent.

Firstly, radicals promoted an ‘Alliance of the Peoples’. As an alliance, this amounted less to a plan for European institutions as a military pact in the face of common enemies. The concept was meant to rally the peoples for war against ‘the alliance of the princes’: all conservative governments who supported the treaties of 1815 and did not recognize the nationality principle. The journal *Les Droits de l’Homme*, for example, tried to convince the peoples to use kings and princes’ strategy of alliances against them, because one day soon, “l’alliance parricide des cours viendra se briser contre la fraternelle alliance des peuples.” It was a call to war as much as a preparation for perpetual peace.

Again, there was a geopolitical element to this alliance. With Napoleon’s prediction that fifty years after his reign Europe would become ‘cosaque ou républicain’ ringing in their ears, republicans warned that if European nations did not band together, the continent would fall to Russian domination. Despite being a decades-old prediction, this phrase was not without some basis in contemporary politics: the arrival of Russian troops in Poland and Hungary spelled the end of the springtime of the peoples in those regions. Republican internationalists thus emphasized solidarity amongst European republicans for the sake of the security of republicanism on the continent.

In addition to this military alliance, radicals envisioned a sort of associational confederation to precede a union of republican nation-states in the future. This is the case, for example, of Mazzini’s Young Europe, founded in 1834. It drew together revolutionaries from Young Italy, Young Germany and Young Poland – parallel associations working towards national independence – in an expression of solidarity for each nation’s fight for unity and independence. Firstly, Young Europe’s goal was to form an alliance between the three ‘nations’ obliging them to mutual support. They hoped that the dream of a united Europe of

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362 Or take, for example, this quote from the newspaper *La Réforme*: “Quels sont les amis et les ennemies de la République française à l’étranger? La réponse est facile. Les peuples sont nos amis et les rois nos ennemis.” *La Réforme*, March 13, 1848.
365 Ibid, 232: From the constitution of Young Europe: “La ligne d’attaque et de défense solidaire des peuples qui se reconnaissent, est constituée par les trois associations. Toutes les trois travailleront d’accord à s’émanciper. Chacune
republics could motivate revolutionaries in all three countries and give them a reason to support each other’s efforts. In order to reinforce this unity, Mazzini suggested a common congress, symbol and slogan that all three nations would share.\textsuperscript{366} The idea was to rebuff a French-dominated model of European unity, as during the French Revolution and Napoleonic era.\textsuperscript{367} Italian, German and Polish republicans wished to band together on their own terms and offer an alternative view of voluntary unity between nations struggling to realize political form.

In the aftermath of the revolutions of 1848, Mazzini and other radicals continued to promote associational cooperation as a precursor to state-driven internationalism. They set up the European Democratic Central Committee in London, which famously advocated a European union of democratic nation-states. Mazzini, Ledru-Rollin and other radical exiles also founded and contributed to a number of journals, including \textit{Le Proscrit}.\textsuperscript{368} In one article, Mazzini stated that the “nation of the proscribed” formed a precursor to Europe’s eventual “congress of free and equal nations”. In a jointly-written article by the committee for the paper, Ledru-Rollin, Albert Darasz, Mazzini and Arnold Ruge also called for an immediate congress of nations (i.e. peoples) in order to “serrer la sainte alliance des Peuples et de formuler le droit et le devoir communs…de fonder le budget, la caisse des Peuples…[et] d’organiser l’armée des initiateurs.” The emancipated peoples would then take the initiative to end despotism in Europe.\textsuperscript{369}

Radical republican projects for European union thus differed from those of peace movement activists in a variety of significant ways. Firstly, while they occasionally referenced the idea of a state-driven Congress of Nations in Europe, they focused on military or associational alliances of revolutionaries to institute republicanism in the more immediate future.\textsuperscript{370} Secondly, radicals’ end-goal was not peace per se, but the establishment of republican government in as wide a zone as possible; peace was a secondary effect of his objective. Thirdly, in contrast to the French peace advocates for whom the nation was a passing historical category, radicals saw the nation as a natural and final political endpoint. Although they were concerned with the unity of Humanity at large, they hoped for a world of nation-states that would cooperate in the name of the general interest. French radical republicans converged with other radicals abroad on these points, such as Kossak and Mazzini, but were more insistent on the special role of France and its revolutionary tradition.\textsuperscript{371} For Mazzini, the French Revolution closed a chapter

\textsuperscript{366} Ibid, 233.
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid, 217.
\textsuperscript{369} \textit{Le Proscrit}, no. 2, July 22, 1850.
\textsuperscript{370} An example of one of the few more immediate calls for international confederation can be found in the newspaper \textit{La Liberté}. One article in April of 1848 stated that Switzerland was in the process of realizing the model for Europe in the future: a confederation of republics. Once more European states had been republicanized, they would band together in a European republican confederation. The author went so far as to oppose France’s “funeste centralisation administrative” and take the Swiss confederation as the model for both domestic and foreign politics: a move that few French republicans made in this period. \textit{La Liberté}, April 12, 1848.
\textsuperscript{371} See footnote 62.
of history, rather than opening a new one.\footnote{Mazzini wrote: “The great French Revolution was not, philosophically speaking, a programme; it has a résumé. It did not initiate, it closed an epoch...it came to place upon a practical ground, in the sphere of the political organisation of society, a formula comprehending all the conquests of twenty-four centuries, all the great ideas morally elaborated by two historical worlds – the Pagan and the Christian – of which, if I may allow myself the expression, it has summed up the balance.” “We must not, then – and this is the practical result which I am desirous of reaching – judge of the agitation, the aspirations, the tendencies of Europe, by France. France does not lead; she is only a member of the European commonwealth; simply one link in the chain.” Giuseppi Mazzini and William Clarke (ed.), Essays: Selected from the Writings, Literary, Political and Religious, of Joseph Mazzini (London: Walter Scott, 1880), 275, 277.} Mazzini hoped for an international alliance based on greater equality between nations rather than the extension of French ideas abroad.

In sum, while institutional projects for European unity could be found in Mazzinian circles and periodically in the press, radicals’ more immediate goal was an associational and/or military Alliance of the Peoples. Realizing that 1848 was a moment that could transform all of Europe, radicals emphasized the importance of transnational solidarity to institute republicanism across the continent. They occasionally described an international confederation of states in the future, but the more immediate goal was to create the republican nation-states that would comprise such a union in the first place.

\textit{Victor Considérant and La Démocratie pacifique: Between Radicals and Peace Advocates}

An intermediary example between French peace activists’ confederation projects and those of radical republicans can be found with Victor Considérant. The major Fourier disciple of the 1830s and 1840s, Victor Considérant preached peace, fraternity and the application of social science as much for the international sphere as for local and national politics.\footnote{See Beecher’s chapter on social science: Ibid, 124-144; and Ibid, 127-129 on the problem of ‘morcellement’.} In the spring of 1848, Considérant developed plans for a European confederation in his newspaper, \textit{La Démocratie pacifique}.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, an international confederation was a logical conclusion of Fourier and Considérant’s ideas. Fourier preached association according to the passions: a value he and his disciples applied to novel communities called ‘phalanstères’, but which could easily be enlarged to encompass the relations between peoples, seen as naturally harmonious by most progressive thinkers at the time. Moreover, Considérant’s special concern for overcoming social and political divisions through ‘social science’ could be seen as predisposing him to international institutional schemes. Just as he denounced the “morcellement” of contemporary French society, politics and ideas, he urged that divisions between nations had to be overcome for the sake of humanity at large.\footnote{See for example this quote from \textit{La Démocratie pacifique} from March 1848: “France, Espagne, Italie, nobles filles du soleil, aujourd'hui régénérées par le bapteme de la Liberté, donnez-vous la main, et montrez-vous à l'Europe dans tout l'éclat de votre radieuse beauté. Italiens, Espagnoles et Français, vous êtes trois nations, mais vous ne formez déjà plus qu'un seul Peuple, le nouveau Peuple de Dieu ! Vous avez pour chef spirituel un autre Moise, le pape souverain des ames, avec lequel vous vaincrez, non plus par la violence, mais par l'amour. France, Espagne, Italie, chastes soeurs que ne souillera plus l'attouchement du despotisme, donnez-vous la main, marchez en avant,}

Soon after the revolution of February 1848, Considérant articulated detailed plans for European confederation in line with his previous writings. In the spirit of the “optimism” of romantic socialism, he remained confident that processes of national liberation would be spontaneous, short-lived and largely non-violent, and would be immediately followed by universal fraternity between the peoples.\footnote{Again, for an extensive account, see: Beecher, \textit{Victor Considérant.}} Once the peoples had thus liberated themselves from...
foreign control or despotism, they would form a European confederation guided by a central, permanent congress and united by common currency, measures, typography, railroads and canals.\textsuperscript{376} As for many republicans in this period, Considérant hoped that a new Europe would be based on French Revolutionary principles. He saw France as having a leading role in the unification of Europe in this manner, though not through conquest: “La France n'appellera pas la conquête, pas même de ses voeux, mais elle peut, elle doit désirer que ses institutions politiques et sociales se généralisent.”\textsuperscript{377}

Like many of the authors discussed above, Considérant proposed a specifically European congress but spoke often of the ultimate goal of universal fraternity for ‘humanity’ at large.\textsuperscript{378} He also seems to have predicted the expansion of an initially European congress: a few weeks after his article in \textit{Démocratie pacifique} advocating a European union, Considérant wrote a piece entitled “La Constituante de l’Humanité” proposing an “assemblée constituante de l’humanité”. He suggested that the congress begin with France and Germany but soon expand to include the “Orient” and America, and presumably in the longer term, other nations of the world. He stated that the international community had too many common concerns not to form a congress: commercial liberty, colonization, population control, transportation and communications infrastructure, literary and artistic property, sanitation, units of measurement, etc. He also proposed an international maritime police force and an international arbitration tribunal.\textsuperscript{379} Considérant thus dovetailed with the French peace movement activists on a number of points, including a strong vision of a European congress that could be progressively universalized. His approval of military support for revolutions distanced him from the peace movement, but his convergence with Pecqueur, Bouvet and Hugo helps to show a French trend in conceiving international cooperation as a historical process.

\textit{Napoleon’s Specter}

Behind most of these various plans for international or European confederation, across the political spectrum, was the specter of Napoleon Bonaparte. As mentioned above, Napoleon’s prediction that in fifty years Europe would be ‘cosaque ou républicain’ served as a rallying cry for the Alliance of the Peoples.\textsuperscript{380} Napoleon’s legacy could take a wide variety of forms, however, providing an argument for peaceful union or for a call to arms.

\textsuperscript{376} \textit{La Démocratie pacifique}, March 4, 1848.; Beecher comments on romantic socialists’ optimism: Romantic socialists “also shared a belief in the peaceful transformation of society; thus, with few exceptions they rejected violence and coercion. They had no desire to see their ideas imposed by terror or political revolution. In any case, they believed that this would not be necessary. For they counted on support from members of the privileged classes. In that respect they were social optimists, and their optimism was rooted, ultimately, in their belief in the existence of a common good - their belief that there was no fundamental or unbridgeable conflict of interests between the rich and the poor.” Beecher, \textit{Victor Considérant}, 2.  

\textsuperscript{377} \textit{La Démocratie pacifique}, March 5, 1848.  

\textsuperscript{378} In the same issue that Considérant suggested a European congress and currency, he wrote: “Peuples de la vieille Europe et de la jeune Amérique, peuples de l’Afrique, de l’Asie, de l’Océanie, prenez la main fraternelle que nous vous tendons !” \textit{La Démocratie pacifique}, March 5, 1848.  

\textsuperscript{379} \textit{La Démocratie pacifique}, March 27, 1848.  

\textsuperscript{380} One can find references to the prediction that Europe would be ‘cosaque ou républicaine’ in fifty years all over the press. For just three examples, see: \textit{Le Travail affranchi}, March 25, 1849.; \textit{La Tribune des peuples}, March 15, 1849.; \textit{La Réforme}, March 13, 1848.
In many ways, Napoleon’s empire was used as a counter-point for internationalists in the mid-nineteenth century. As mentioned above, reformist, conservative and revolutionary internationalists alike eschewed conquest as a means to international unity. This was the essence of Lamartine’s *Manifeste à l’Europe* on March 4 of 1848 – to reassure foreign powers that the new republic would not take an aggressive stance.\(^{381}\)

For some French friends of peace, however, Napoleon stood as a model. They concentrated not on his revolutionary imperialism, but on his Saint-Helena-era writings on a European federation. Francisque Bouvet often mentioned Napoleon’s late project as a source of inspiration, regardless of the coercion and violence associated with his empire. In his 1856 work *Droit public européen*, Bouvet stated that all “hautes intelligences” had thought of the idea of European federation, but especially admired Napoleon’s projects for a “sainte-alliance des nations” in Europe, his desire to replace “l’état de nature par l’état sociale” between European states and to “rappeler aux nations civilisées de l’Europe qu'elles ne sont qu'une seule famille”. Bouvet also reiterated Napoleon’s statement that all wars in Europe were civil wars.\(^{382}\) In his *Guerre et Civilisation*, he also praised Napoleon’s plans for a congress of ‘the family of European nations’ and stated that all great minds since Henry IV had thought of the idea.\(^{383}\) The one challenge, he said, would be to convince England and Russia to be involved. Nonetheless, he seemed to believe that if Europeans could recognize Napoleon’s project, they would finally be able to benefit from a sustained peace within the European ‘family’.

For Émile de Girardin, Napoleon Bonaparte’s late projects for a European union served as a juxtaposition to the foreign policy of Napoleon III. In 1855, Girardin wrote a pamphlet entitled *La Paix* denouncing the Crimean War, with an appendix recalling Napoleon I’s project to form a European confederation with a European Institute, legal code, high court and system of money, weights and measures.\(^{384}\) Girardin’s evocation of Bonaparte closely resembled that of Bouvet: Napoleon I’s goal had only been to remove nations from the state of nature and found “une association européenne solide” that would assure a permanent peace.\(^{385}\) The Holy Alliance had stolen Bonaparte’s idea and put it to use for monarchs’ interests; Napoleon had wanted a holy alliance of the *peuples*.\(^{386}\) Napoleon had seen Europeans as one big family, such that any conflict between them would amount to civil war.\(^{387}\) Within the pamphlet itself, Girardin critiqued the politics of the Crimean War, reiterating the views he had put forward in the peace congresses: “Il y a une autre politique à suivre que la politique de l’agrandissement du territoire par la rivalité, la guerre, la conquête, la domination, c’est la politique de l’agrandissement de l’homme par la réciprocité, la paix, le progrès, la circulation.”\(^{388}\) While his praise glossed over the force involved in the Europe that Bonaparte constructed in reality – rather than in his late writings – the reference to the first Napoleon allowed Girardin to critique the new emperor’s involvement in more foreign wars.


\(^{384}\) Girardin, *La Paix*, 38.

\(^{385}\) Ibid, 36.

\(^{386}\) Girardin quotes Napoleon on this and adds his own celebratory addendum: “‘La sainte-alliance est une idée qu’on m’a volée’, c’est-à-dire la sainte-alliance des peuples et non celle des rois contre les peuples; là est l’immense différence entre son idée et la manière dont on l’a réalisée.” Ibid, 37.

\(^{387}\) Ibid, 37.

\(^{388}\) Ibid, 21.
Outside of pacifist circles, Napoléon’s imperial techniques could be overtly praised and called for renewal. In an article in the radical newspaper *La Liberté* in March 1848, a journalist called for a European federation uniting large ethnic groups, particularly German and Italian confederations and the French republic. The author promoted a level of coercion in the formation of these large nation states: “Tout ce qui parle notre langue, tout ce qui reconnaît nos codes, tout ce qui vit de nos travaux, de nos idées est Français. Le bonheur de l’humanité dépend de la formation de grandes nationalités bien distinctes.” The author thus claimed that Napoleon’s project of claiming the left bank of the Rhine should thus be renewed. In not more than six months, Europe could organize a ‘European National Congress’ that would unite these great nation-states.\(^{389}\) The article thus linked Napoleon’s late-life writings on European institutions with his imperial conquests, accepting a necessary connection between the two.

Napoleon’s shadow was thus cast across the political spectrum, a model to be accepted or rejected in a variety of ways. The surprising thing to note, however, is that the emperor received the most attention in pacifist circles not for his strategy of conquest, but for his idyllic late-life writings on a European union built through international cooperation. As for the question of colonialism, we again see French peace activists’ idealism and their frequent choice to turn a blind eye to violent political realities.

**Conclusion**

Taking stock of the rich landscape of ideas relating to international institutions in this period, we see that the main distinguishing points of French pacifist projects for international confederation are their universalism and historical flexibility. French peace advocates often took European union as a practical starting point, but ultimately aimed at global governance. They differed from American pacifists – who saw nation-states as permanent units in international relations and viewed international confederation as limited to ‘civilized’ nations even in the long run – and radical republicans across Europe, who insisted that international solidarity should first be realized through military action in favor of republicanism. French peace advocates had a wide historical and civilizational vision, believing that international institutions would arise as the result of technological progress, cultural exchange and mobility. They advanced their ideas as modern activists, through essays and publications, associations, political lobbying, and participation in the international congresses. Their ultimate goal was not so much a European Union as a United Nations: government for the world. Their projects combined Enlightenment-era projects for international confederation with its faith in historical progress, but adapted these to the distinct historical circumstances of the ‘Age of Revolution’.\(^{390}\) Their movement created an important idea lab for experiments that we are still attempting today.

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\(^{389}\) *La Liberté*, March 23, 1848.

Chapter Five
The International Peace Congresses: Organizing International Pacifism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century

Knowing the development of the French peace movement in more detail, we can now turn to the international peace congresses. The goal of the congresses was to collectively condemn war and to come to an agreement on means of furthering peace. The friends of peace saw themselves as popularizers: their stated aim was to bring the question of peace down from “the seventh heaven of philosophers and moralists” and “to compel it to take up its abode upon more accessible elevations”. Through the congresses themselves and the resolutions they would make therein, they could make peoples and governments more aware of the complex issues surrounding war and peace and lead both to more beneficial solutions for all.

At the congresses we see a great diversity of actors, motivations and projects, but also a variety of convergences across national or professional lines. A closer look at the congresses can demonstrate the sites of convergence and help to show the specificity of the debate on perpetual peace in France. Overall, we will note that delegates across the international peace movement asserted a reformist internationalist stance. Peace appeared not as the maintenance of the political status quo, but as an active project of international cooperation to be carried out within civil society and through state reform.

The British and American Peace Movements Prior to the Congresses

By the time of the first international peace congress in 1843, the British and American movements had developed significantly. The British peace movement by then included the peace societies, anti-militarist societies and economic peace advocates. Since the London Peace Society’s founding earlier in the century, the LPS had diversified and developed a new approach. A number of Chartists joined the LPS between 1838 and 1843, such as Thomas Cooper, William Lovett, Robert Lowery and Henry Vincent, adding new energy, diversity and ideas to the society. In 1848, the LPS named a new secretary, Henry Richard, who personally held an absolute pacifist position, but hoped to build new partnerships and focus on a concrete agenda for promoting peace. The radically-leaning Welsh Congregationalist minister would remain Secretary of the Peace Society for 37 years. The group’s outlook changed as well: from the 1840s, the LPS became increasingly concerned with the practical work of war prevention, rather than simply condemning war or calling for nonresistance. In this vein, they devised a program including arms reductions, a potential Congress of Nations, and most especially, international arbitration. Outside of the LPS, two new forces in British peace advocacy had arisen: a radical-Chartist antimilitarist movement that had sprung up in the industrial midlands and north in the mid-1840s to oppose army recruitment, and peace advocacy by free trade businessmen, politicians and economists, who had turned their attention to peace issues after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. The international congresses served as a key platform for all of these groups to collaborate and develop a specific set of proposals for ensuring international peace.

On the American side, actors largely included members of the peace societies, which had been united under the American Peace Society (APS) in May 1828, and Elihu Burritt’s League

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391 1850 Congress, 23. This is a quote from Louis de Cormenin, French publicist, politician and philanthropist.
392 Brock, Freedom from War, 30. The new Chartists members were largely working class, increasing the social diversity of the previously middle-class LPS.
393 Ibid, 34-35.
Burritt, an autodidact known as “the learned blacksmith”, founded the league during a trip to England in 1846, during which time he traveled the country by foot and created a pledge for conscientious objection and transnational peace advocacy. After returning to the United States, Burritt had 50,000 signatures from Britain, America and continental Europe by 1850. The League called for international friendship, but did not yet develop a concrete program. It nonetheless involved around 15,000 Americans and Brits by 1847, with about 130 branches. Burritt was instrumental in raising enthusiasm for the cause of peace on both sides of the Atlantic. The APS, however, played a larger role in developing the movement’s array of plans. APS founder William Ladd was one of the first figures in America to develop a detailed plan for a Congress of Nations. Ladd had deceased in 1841, but his publication on the Congress of Nations was frequently cited at the international congresses and his followers helped to make the issue a major item on the agenda of the congresses. The APS was ideologically diverse, surviving a number of debates and power struggles between absolute pacifists and peace advocates in the 1830s and ‘40s. On both the American and British sides, the peace movement had gained strength and content in the past thirty years; conditions had become favorable to new means of solidifying the international peace movement and its reformist internationalist agenda.

The International Peace Congresses: Developing Transnational Peace Activism

The idea for an international conference was first proposed in a peace society meeting in Boston in 1841. English pacifist Joseph Sturge was at the meeting in Boston and volunteered to act as an intermediary to propose the idea of an international conference to the London Peace Society. After several months of transatlantic correspondence, a smaller conference of peace activists, clergymen and MPs met in London in 1842 to decide the details of the congress. They decided that the latter would be held in 1843 immediately following the Anti-Slavery Society convention. We will come back to this close connection between the peace movement and other humanitarian efforts of the time.

The congresses were organized as many others at the time, with an organizing committee that sent out letters to potentially interested figures, notified newspapers and printed pamphlets and books in support of the cause. This process became progressively institutionalized. Before the 1848 congress, a Peace Congress Committee was drawn together amongst active members of the American and British peace societies. The Committee Secretaries Elihu Burritt and the LPS’s Henry Richard then worked to recruit local organizers in the host country of the subsequent

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394 Ibid, 44.  
395 Brock, Freedom from War, 113.  
396 See page 105: the League’s statement of purpose was the following: “to employ all legitimate and moral means for the abolition of all war, and all the spirit and all the manifestations of war, throughout the world; for the abolition of all restrictions upon international correspondence and friendly intercourse, and of whatever else tends to make enemies of nations, or prevents their fusion into one peaceful brotherhood; for the abolition of all institutions and customs which do not recognize and respect the image of God and a human brother in every man, of whatever clime, color, or condition of humanity.” Ibid, 105.  
399 1850 Congress, 4-5.
congresses. A president, national representatives, vice-presidents and secretaries were named for each congress.

At the first congress, participants were mostly British and included many pastors and attorneys. Of 334 delegates, 292 were from the United Kingdom, 26 from the United States, and 6 from the continent; 109 had the title ‘Esquire’ and 76 were reverends.\(^\text{400}\) By their own estimations, only about 150 delegates were able to attend the meetings. The congress’s goal was to demonstrate how war was “inconsistent with the spirit of Christianity, and the true interests of mankind” – the stated objective of the APS and LPS since their founding – and then to “deliberate upon the best means, under the Divine blessing, to show the world the inexpediency of the spirit and practice of war, and to promote permanent and universal peace”.\(^\text{401}\)

From 1848, the congresses diversified in terms of national membership, constituency and argumentation. Deliberately organizing the congresses on the continent, the friends of peace were able to draw more local supporters of the cause, be it in Brussels, Paris or Frankfort. In terms of actual membership, the British remained by far in the majority, the peace movement being more widespread in the UK than on the continent and the journey being much less long and costly from England than from America. At the 1849 Paris congress, there were 23 American delegates, 19 Belgian members, 310 British delegates, about 100 French members and roughly 30 German and other European members. There were also 364 British visitors, including 153 women. We do not have the exact numbers, but we know that tickets were also sold for locals to be able to sit in on the congresses.\(^\text{402}\) We are told that numerous German ladies attended the 1850 Frankfurt congress as well.\(^\text{403}\) While American women were involved in the movement at home, it seems that few or even none were able to make the transatlantic journey. On the French and Belgian sides, there do not seem to have been women involved in the peace congresses.\(^\text{404}\)

The delegates had a range of backgrounds, although most were upper-middle class clergymen or liberal professionals: professors, lawyers, doctors, ministers, writers and journalists. At the 1848 Brussels congress, for example, the Belgian members included a member of the Académie royale des sciences et belles-lettres de Belgique, professors from the Universities of Brussels and Gand, a director of public instruction, and the Bibliothécaire du roi in Brussels. From 1849, Richard Cobden was a prominent figure at the congresses, as well as his French political economy friends, including Frédéric Bastiat, Joseph Garnier and Francisque Bouvet.

Religious opposition to war remained fundamental to the raison d’être of the movement. This could be seen not only in the arguments made or the professional background of the delegates, but in the locations and meeting procedures. The Frankfurt meeting, for example, was held in a church. The 1843 congress began with a moment of silent prayer.\(^\text{405}\) A number of delegates attended church services together the day after the 1849 and 1850 congresses. At a group dinner following the 1850 Congress, the Peace Congress committee presented a German-

\(^{400}\) 1843 Congress, 43-45.
\(^{401}\) Ibid, 6.
\(^{402}\) 1850 Congress, xi.
\(^{403}\) Ibid, 1.
\(^{404}\) Eugénie Niboyet, as we’ve noted, was involved for a short period in promoting the peace movement through her newspaper La paix des deux mondes, but she quickly turned to other questions (women’s rights, socialism, domestic politics, etc.) and does not seem to have ever attended the peace congresses.
\(^{405}\) 1843 Congress, 3.
language Bible to the Americans as a special thanks for making the long journey. The congresses were increasingly diverse in religious terms, however, including Nonconformist, Anglican and Catholic clergymen and at least one Jewish rabbi. In 1850, the organizers boasted that a “representative of every religious party” was present at the congress. A local French Reformed Church minister, president of the Jewish Industrial College, Lutheran minister and Catholic school inspector/senator/physician had all helped the foreign delegates organize the conference in Frankfurt. Previous congresses included only Protestant and Catholic representatives, but made a special effort to reference ‘Christian’ morality rather than ‘Protestant’ or ‘Catholic’.

The congresses were part of the larger humanitarian and reform movements of the early and mid-nineteenth century. Pacifism drew on the success of other movements for inspiration and confidence, and the efforts included many of the same individuals. For example, Elihu Burritt’s League of Universal Brotherhood sought to be “the moral successor to the Anti-Corn Law League, which ‘would be to Slavery, War, Intemperance, Ignorance, Political and Social Inequalities’ what the League had been to ‘Monopoly.’” For the League, then, peace was part and parcel of a larger program of social reform pursued in the middle of the century. As we have seen, France’s Société de la morale chrétienne dealt with a wide variety of social issues other than peace, including prison reform, slavery, gambling, religious liberty, temperance, torture and the death penalty. Delegates tended to be involved in multiple reformist causes in conjunction with the peace movement itself.

The congress agenda does not seem to have elicited much suspicion from the governments of the time. In 1849 and 1850, for example, the English group was able to have their passport and luggage inspection procedures waived. Before the Frankfurt congress, a deputation from the English, American and Belgian committees did a tour of German cities to meet with men of high positions in universities, politics, religion, journalism and literature in support of the cause. On the way home, the group took a steamship along the Rhine and was spontaneously invited to take a special visit of the Cologne cathedral. The congresses do not seem to have been put under surveillance by the police of the host countries.

Consensus-Building

The Peace Congress Committee hoped to unify the diverse strands of the peace movement into a coherent whole through the establishment of a common agenda. To control this process, the Committee drew up a strict set of regulations for the meeting procedures. At the 1849 congress, for example, all propositions had to be submitted in writing to the organizing committee, and only the secretaries could propose the business for the day. Speakers had 15 minutes each and could not speak more than once on any proposition. The resolutions were to be decided by a majority vote and signed by the president and secretaries. The most notable rule, however, concerned references to contemporary politics:

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406 1849 Congress, 89 on church services; 1850 Congress, 63 on church services and 66 on the Bible donation.
407 For the Rabbi Stein’s speech at the Frankfurt congress, see: 1850 Congress, pg. 24-26.; On Archbishop Whately attending the 1843 congress: 1843 Congress, 45.; For the speech of Reverend Thomas Pyne, Anglican minister, see: 1849 Congress, 81-82.
408 1850 Congress, ix.
410 1850 Congress, xii; 1849 Congress, 8.
411 1850 Congress, x.
412 Ibid, 67.
The object of the Congress being one of general and permanent interest, no speaker can be allowed to make any direct allusion to the political events of the day, or to discuss any questions of local interest. In case of any infraction of this rule, the speaker will be called to order, and should he persist, the president will withdraw from him the right to speak.\textsuperscript{413}

The regulations remained more or less the same for the 1850 congress.\textsuperscript{414}

The 1843 congress, on the other hand, contained no specific rules on references to contemporary politics. The only content-based rule was the following:

The Convention having been properly constituted, no discussion of the fundamental principle to be allowed, but the attention of the members to be exclusively directed to the consideration and adoption of such means, consistently with this principle, as may most speedily and certainly effect the great object in view.\textsuperscript{415}

At following congresses, the central committee seem to have felt less anxiety about the discussion remaining practically-oriented and more concern about politics’ potential to disrupt consensus. Never having met before in a general congress, the 1843 committee hoped that their meeting would lead to concrete measures that members could implement at home. Once the revolutions of 1848 had started, however, the organizers became highly concerned with the impact that contemporary politics could have on the congress. One likely explanation is that they feared causing rifts between the various nationalities represented; although most delegates could be classified as liberals, some were constitutional monarchists and others were moderate republicans.

A common misconception about the early international peace movement is thus that it was entirely apolitical. As mentioned above, in 1843 the delegates openly condemned the Opium Wars, British interventions in Afghanistan and the Sindh Province of modern-day Pakistan, and the notion that military intervention could reinforce the potential for the religious conversion of native populations.\textsuperscript{416} For many delegates, it was the duty of the congress to pronounce itself on the wrongfulness of contemporary politics. One member even suggested that they appoint a “Committee of Vigilance” to watch over governments’ actions and to “use every Christian motive and argument in order to prevent the shedding of human blood.”\textsuperscript{417}

It is not so much that the members of the congress became apolitical in the wake of 1848 as that it became more difficult to express political views at the congresses. The delegates hoped to impact both public opinion and government policy, regardless of whether or not they discussed specific political events at the time. The peace societies in particular wanted to show that international cooperation was possible regardless of political affiliations. Yet most peace activists were not silent on contemporary political questions outside of the conference halls. Richard Cobden, for example, wrote numerous newspaper articles condemning British imperial policy, and urged the peace societies to do the same.\textsuperscript{418}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[413] 1849 Congress, 14.
\item[414] 1850 Congress, 4.
\item[415] 1843 Congress, 7-8.
\item[416] Ibid, 12-13, 23-26, 39, 61-62.
\item[417] 1843 Congress, 26.
\item[418] In a letter to fellow pacifist Henry Richard on the British East India Company’s attack on Borneo, Cobden wrote: “See the Manchester Examiner of Saturday next for an article which I have sent upon this Borneo affair...There must be a public and solemn protest against this wholesale massacre. The Peace Society and the Aborigines Society are shams, if such deeds go unrebuked.” Hobson, Richard Cobden: The International Man, 61. The attack on Borneo was carried out by a naval ship belonging to the East India Company and funded by the British government.
\end{footnotes}
As Sandi Cooper has emphasized in her work *Patriotic Pacifism*, political differences nonetheless emerged at the congresses as delegates flouted the regulation on political references. Fourier disciple Jean Journet made a long speech at the 1849 congress with numerous political references, for which he was asked to return to his seat. A German liberal spoke unannounced at the 1850 congress on the necessity of condemning the war in Schleswig-Holstein, and was asked to end his speech. Cobden remarked that if the speaker had proposed arbitration as a solution to the said conflict the congress would have supported his request to speak beforehand. Although he was not called to order for it (perhaps given his prominence at the congress), Émile de Girardin made references to the June days as “a terrible war” and the Army of the Alps and Army of the Rhine as a “disastrous mistake” and “unpardonable anachronism.” Francisque Bouvet said that maintaining a rule against political references was like “requiring a physician to heal a wound without ever seeing or touching it”. Speaking with regret of the likely fate of Hungary, Venice and the Roman Republic, Bouvet asserted that “peace cannot exist where a nation is enslaved.”

Sandi Cooper sees the surfacing of political differences as a sign of the congresses’ failure at consensus-building. Yet we can also highlight the fact that the delegates were able to pass a comprehensive set of resolutions through majority vote. Consensus sometimes meant silencing contrary voices in the course of congress discussions, but agreement was achieved through the establishment of resolutions. Moreover, what should be seen as most remarkable is the congress delegates’ efforts to overcome political, religious and ideological boundaries and form a unified international movement. Most of the actors who made the choice to attend the congresses had this ‘cosmopolitan’ mentality; it was a self-selecting group of those in favor of toleration and cooperation across lines of division. The hardliners – like the French evangelicals – for the large part stayed home.

Finally, the dividing lines that delegates hoped to overcome were not just political, as Cooper suggests. As we saw in the French case, peace advocates came to the congresses with distinctly different visions of the content of perpetual peace and the means to achieving it. As in

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420 1849 Congress, 30-31. In a comment revealing political tensions at the congress, the editors of the 1849 proceedings wrote: “M. Jean Journet, a disciple of Fourier, delivered a speech marked by occasional bursts of eloquence, but which, as a whole, was so rambling and unconnected with the question under consideration, that it is not worthy of reproduction here. In consequence of the numerous political allusions made by this speaker, the president was frequently obliged to call him to order, and eventually to withdraw from him the right of speaking any longer.” One could also see this passage as a sign of national tensions, of delegates’ occasional inability to understand each other’s mindset across national lines, despite their efforts to the contrary.
421 1850 Congress, 44.
422 Ibid, 33.
423 1849 Congress, 37-38.
424 Examples silencing those support defensive war or war national liberation. See for example 1849 Congress, 80. Adrien Féline was ‘called to order’ for saying that while he didn’t support wars of conquest, he supported defensive wars. Féline considered this an attack on liberty of speech at the congress, while the president argued that he was only asking Féline to stick to the order of the day (the issue of condemning loans and taxes for war). However, one can note that apolitical digressions were often permitted.
425 Here I use the term ‘cosmopolitan’ in the sense established by Margaret Jacob: “the ability to experience people of different nations, creeds and colors with pleasure, curiosity and interest, and not with suspicion, disdain, or simply a disinterest that could occasionally turn into loathing”. Margaret Jacob, *Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in the Early Modern World* (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 1.
France, we see religious, economic, and political contingent, roughly correlating to professional background, although many delegates combined a variety of arguments.

In terms of national differences, a number of points of divergence can be noted again. Outside of the context of the congresses, the French peace advocates were not so concerned with the question of nonresistance or with developing a theory of just war, like American and British peace advocates. French peace advocates largely sidelined this problematic, for better or worse. Their view of political violence did not surround ethical absolutes, but an evolutionary idea of history as progressing towards greater levels of peace. At the congresses, French peace advocates did not always share the same agenda items, either: few proposed international arbitration, which was a central initiative in Britain and America. The French delegates focused more on disarmament, the facilitation of international communications and restrictions on war loans. In this early period, the French remained less legalistic than their British and American counterparts. Finally, French religious peace advocates were more comprehensive in their approach, combining material and religious analyses. Apart from these areas of divergence, however, we can see a coherent set of critiques and policy proposals that congealed at the congresses, even across national lines.

Objections to War: Religion, Economics and Politics

‘Blessed are the Peacemakers’

As we have seen with the development of peace advocacy in France, delegates made three main lines of objections against war, regarding religion, economics and international politics. Firstly, the religiously-motivated delegates argued that war was incompatible with Christianity. These conversations were largely led by the American and British delegates and included detailed Biblical analyses. Whereas French religious pacifists like the members of the Société de la moral chrétienne often used cross-cultural comparisons, statistics, and other secular argumentation tactics, the American, British and German religious peace friends often made specific reference to both the Old and New Testaments. The primary focus was on the latter, on the example of Jesus Christ, his life and lessons, following religious trends in mid-nineteenth century Europe.426 The ‘prince of peace’ taught his disciples a message of peace and love for all, including one’s enemies.427 He exhorted his followers to ‘turn the other cheek’ rather than resort to revenge and to uphold the values of mercy and meekness.428 An honest look at these lessons, these pacifists said, proved the inadmissability of war for Christians. The Reverend James

426 Gérard Cholvy and Yves-Marie Hilaire see a renewed emphasis on Christ in both bourgeois and democratic circles in mid-nineteenth century France: “Alors que le courant dominant des croyances était nettement théocentrique au début du 19e siècle, au milieu du siècle le Christ est invoqué de tout côté. Volonté de rétablir un équilibre entre les deux pôles du christianisme, la foi en Dieu, la foi au Christ ? Ceci ne fait pas de doute, mais on ne saurait négliger l’influence d’un ‘populisme chrétien’ qui s’est manifesté en dehors des Églises.” Gérard Cholvy and Yves-Marie Hilaire, Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine. 1800/1880 (Toulouse: Bibliothèque historique Privat, 1990), 167; Geoffrey Nuttall points to the influence of David Strauss’s The Life of Jesus Critically Examined in stimulating focus on Christ’s example in Germany and Europe, regardless of the secular implications of the work. Geoffrey Nuttall, Christian Pacifism in History (Berkeley, CA: Basil, Blackwell & Mott, 1971), 70.
427 For references to ‘the prince of peace’, see 1843 Congress, 10; 1843 Congress, 103; 1848 Congress, 69.
428 Mr. Hargreaves commented: “I have sometimes been amused in my own mind, at thinking what kind of a regiment, a regiment of soldiers would be who possessed all the characteristics there mentioned. ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit.’ ‘Blessed are the meek.’ ‘Blessed are the merciful.’ If soldiers had these qualifications, could their officers make them take swords and bayonets in their hands, or make them discharge cannons?”1843 Congress, 10. For an example of the reference to “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God”, see: 1843 Congress, 9.
Hargreaves, secretary of the London Peace Society, commented: “‘We are told in Scripture to ‘love our enemies’, and religion is love. But what evidence can there be of that principle in a person who would take away the life of his fellow man in battle?’” Above all, the friends of peace argued that war was contrary to the message of love that they saw as the hallmark of the New Testament and Christianity in general.

To a lesser extent, religiously-motivated delegates also made use of the Old Testament as proof of the ‘sinfulness’ of war. They referenced prescriptions like “thou shalt not kill”, emphasizing the “inviolability of human life” and the idea that only God should have the power to take away the lives of men. They also pointed out that war engendered sins beyond murder, breaking many other commandments as well. Rabbi Stein, one of the few known Jewish delegates to the mid-nineteenth century congresses, emphasized that brotherhood was equally a message found in the Old Testament, evoking “this ancient faith that gave humanity the idea of the oneness of the human family, which unites all under one God”.

The friends of peace often highlighted the Biblical idea of the ‘brotherhood of man’. Although brotherhood could also be interpreted as a secular (and especially republican) value, a number of delegates defined this as a religious dictum. The State Peace Society of Pennsylvania, for example, wrote in an address to the Frankfurt congress that the brotherhood of man was a “holy doctrine” whose establishment was the “mission of [their] age”. Delegates argued that the importance of brotherhood and peace could be found in God-given faculties like reason and compassion, which were to be used to these ends. Brotherhood was linked with Christian universalism, to the fact that all individuals and groups were seen as part of its message. Christian pacifists saw their own work as universal: in the words of Reverend John

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429 1843 Congress, 10. To give another example, at the 1848 congress M. Scheler of Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha, *bibliothécaire du Roi* in Brussels, stated “que la guerre n’entre pas dans les desseins de Dieu, que Dieu a crée les hommes pour s’aider et non pour s’entr’égorter.” 1848 Congress, 52.

430 See, for example: 1843 Congress, 26; 1843 Congress, 32; 1850 Congress, 8. The quote “on earth peace, good will toward men” is from the King James translation of the Bible; other editions speak of peace on earth for those in God’s favor alone. It is the King James version that they chose to cite. Regarding the ‘inviolability of human life’: Reverend Roaf of Toronto, writing in to the 1843 congress, stated his “aversion” to war because of his views on the “sacredness of human life”, emphasizing “divine reservation of all power over its termination”. 1843 Congress, 96.

431 Reverend Howard Malcom, President of George Town College, Kentucky, wrote in a letter to the congress “War is the grand monster which breeds every imaginable form of evil; and destroys, so far as it ravages, every vestige of good.” 1843 Congress, 101. At the 1849 congress, Reverend Thomas Pyne remarked, “What is war, I would ask, but the name of all crimes and evils in one.” 1849 Congress, 81.

432 1850 Congress, 18.


434 M. D. Auguste, Archbishop of Paris, stated: “But above all, by the development of this Christian spirit among men of Peace, when it shall be solidly established on the earth, when humanity shall form only one family, when men shall look upon one another as brothers...there shall be Peace on earth and good will among men. We shall, in vain, Monsieur le Président, seek for combinations founded on reason and material interests of men. They are impotent. It is the heart of the people which must be changed.” 1850 Congress, 22-23. Republican ideas of brotherhood in this period, however, were not necessarily strictly secular. See: Marcel David, *Le Printemps de la Fraternité*.

435 1850 Congress, 18.

436 In his essay, “On the Essential Sinfulness of War”, Reverend Burnet argues that God gave man perceptive, reasoning, sympathetic and social capacities. He says that the last two show that men were “intended for fellowship and brotherhood”, and the first two show they were made to be “inquiring and reasoning being[s]”. 1843 Congress, 48.
Burnet of England, “their mission was related to humanity, to the one great family of man, and not to any one branch of that great family to the prejudice of any other branch.”

Some religious pacifists emphasized an individual adherence to Christian ethics as the means to international peace, but most emphasized the need for legal, political, and institutional measures as well. The State Peace Society of Pennsylvania also wrote: “The time has come when Christianity is to be something more than what a mighty man of war once termed it, ‘a devout imagination’. It is to become the practical law of the nations. The law of God, which is the law of love, may and must become the law, not only of this or that land, but of universal humanity.” Just as the Société de la morale chrétienne had aimed to reform French laws in light of Christian morality, religious delegates suggested that international relations should be reorganized according to the example of Christ’s love.

Waste and Warfare

Alongside the arguments of religiously-motivated pacifists, another group of peace advocates added a materialist logic. British Free Traders, French political economists and a number of other peace advocates argued that the state had a responsibility to distribute resources in a fair and efficient way. War, they argued, violated both of these principles. Richard Cobden, Emile de Girardin and Frédéric Bastiat led the conversation, pointing out the “extravagant budgets” that maintaining large standing armies and keeping up with an arms race required. This “armed truce” meant that countries were spending exorbitant amounts on the military even in peacetime, far exceeding the public accounts and racking up debt and interest payments. As mentioned in Chapter 3, economic pacifists were quick to point out that the burden of war fell on the people themselves, deepening their poverty and eventually causing unrest or revolution. These delegates argued that standing armies created rather than prevented conflict.

Despite the coherence in this material critique of war, the implied solutions could vary. Political economists and Free Traders continued to emphasize a reduction in state budgets. Other peace friends, particularly French peace advocates outside of political economy circles, instead made an argument about the distribution of public funds. Victor Hugo claimed that if the 128 million spent by European powers in the past 32 years on military expenses had been dedicated to peace, they could have built channels, tunnels, railroads, ports and cities; supported agriculture, science and the arts. At the 1843 congress, SMC president Larochefoucauld-Liancourt stated that if war had been declared in 1840 between the European powers, the French government would not have been able to devote resources to “successive improvements” like the

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437 1850 Congress, 5.
438 This position centering on individual ethics was sometimes advanced by absolutist pacifists, and can be seen in such statements as: “Let the Christian men declare that they are Christians, and must not and dare not fight, and there would be an end to war.” 1850 Congress, 35. This is a comment by Rev. E. B. Hall of Code Island, America. Other delegates, however, stated that until the (distant, or by implication, impossible) day when all Christians adhered totally to Christian morality, practical measures were necessary to secure international peace: 1843 Congress, 21.
439 1850 Congress, 17.
440 Ibid, 8 on “extravagant budgets”: this is a quote by Girardin; Ibid, 35 on “armed truce”: this is a quote by Cobden. A few other comments on the costliness of military spending can be found at: 1849 Congress, 53; 1849 Congress, 78; 1850 Congress, 39; 1843 Congress, 89.
441 Emile de Girardin went so far as to say that governments were the true revolutionaries, because their large standing armies provoked revolution directly. Garnier, ed., Congrès des Amis de la Paix Universelle, Réuni à Paris en 1849, 24.
442 1849 Congress, 12.
the construction of railways. “In order that we might appear before Europe strong and powerful, we should have lost all the means which peace gives us of becoming truly and in all respects strong and powerful”.

Like political economists, Émile de Girardin called for reduced public spending overall, citing the United States as a positive counter-example to European countries on several occasions. “Such a state of things, which imposes on industrial Europe an expense so large, while the American Union is almost exempt from all fiscal charges and all public debt, such a state of things cannot long subsist. It is an edifice which is visibly crumbling.” The young country had a standing army of only 8,000 men, leaving public funds available for railroads and other amenities and allowing lower taxes for all. Europe should follow the fledgling nation’s example by sharply reducing its standing army, lowering taxes and devoting resources to industry and public works. Girardin thus had an intermediary approach between Hugo and the political economists, advocating an overall reduction in expenditures but also a redistribution of funds to other areas. He suggested using tax revenues on public works and credit institutions, providing workers with more capital and creating additional jobs. French delegates thus had a multi-faceted contribution to the congress discussions on the material dimensions of war.

International Relations

Finally, delegates challenged war as a means of conflict resolution, arguing that they should establish a more predictable, effective system. Francisque Bouvet led the conversation by invoking the classic starting point of justifications of international law: states were currently in a ‘barbaric’ state of nature in relation to each other, not being subjected to a fixed code of international law or another type of higher authority. Like families, tribes, and provinces before them, states should unite under a common jurisdiction to ensure their collective security. Delegates attempted to counter an idea of their project as impractical, stressing that there were ample precedents and obvious justifications for their propositions. Abbé Deguerry joined Bouvet on this point: it was widely accepted that legal codes and institutions were the best means of conflict prevention and resolution at the local and national levels, so why would the public not realize that the same system could regulate international relations? If states could construct local, regional and national tribunals, they could certainly institute an international one as well.

443 1843 Congress, 19.
444 1850 Congress, 32.
445 See, for example: 1849 Congress, 46; 1850 Congress, 31-32.
447 “Les nations restent vis-à-vis l’une de l’autre à l’état de barbarie, sans loi positive, sans juridiction commune, sans lien d’association, livrées aux éventualité de la discorde et de la guerre….N’en fut-il pas de même des familles, des tribus, des provinces, tant qu’elles n’avaient pas accepté la juridiction d’unité qui leur donna la paix en les constituant en nation? Former aujourd’hui, élever au-dessus des nations, une loi d’association, une juridiction représentative qui soient pour elles ce que sont pour les familles et les circonscriptions territoriales des divers empires, leurs constitutions nationales, c’est en quoi consiste uniquement ce moyen. Oui, messieurs, il faut qu’une autorité supérieure, une juridiction unitaire s’élève sur les nations du monde. L’unité est une loi absolue de la nature des sociétés.” 1848 Congress, 10-11.
448 “Means have been found for the establishment of this arbitration between citizens of the same nation by the institution of tribunals of justice; and war between individuals has entirely ceased. It has also been established between provinces, by means of national assemblies, in which the general interests of the same state are guarded and promoted. We have only to take a third step in advance, and to obtain for states that which has already been obtained for individuals and provinces. Why should we not take this third step?” 1849 Congress, 65.
Additionally, delegates argued that war rarely achieved its desired results. “War seldom decides disputes”, H.T.J. Macnamara stated in his paper for the 1843 congress, “but either leaves them open, or plunges the contending parties into still greater difficulties.” Being based on force and passion rather than deliberation and discussion, war could only produce irrational results. Instead, states could submit to an international law code and/or treaties of arbitration that would both prevent conflict and manage it in a peaceful manner in the case that disputes occurred. From a historical point of view, arbitration had been shown to work, so they should use it.

*States as Moral Actors*

At the basis of all these arguments was the idea that states should act like individuals: they should be held to the same moral standards and should be submitted to legal constraints. Richard Cobden stated this quite explicitly at the 1850 congress: “never let it be forgotten that the intercourse of nations is the intercourse of individuals, that the interests of nations are the interests of individuals in the aggregate, and you cannot find a better plan in dealing with nations than that which is found successful in the intercourse of individuals.” This was not an unusual statement in this period. William Ladd stated in his 1840 “Essay on a Congress of Nations”: “By consent of all writers on international law, nations are considered as individual, moral persons, perfectly equal and independent of one another. Therefore, the same moral laws which ought to govern individuals, ought to govern nations. What is wrong for an individual, is wrong for a nation.” It was this logic that led to frequent comparisons between dueling and war at the congresses, as had been made within the *Société de la morale chrétienne*: if parliaments agreed that dueling was an inappropriate way to settle private disputes, why should they admit war as the best way to solve conflict between nations? The systems governing the actions of individuals – moeurs, religion and legal constraints – should also apply to the interaction of nations.

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449 “Mr. M[acnamara] shows, by a number of facts in history, that war does not decide national disputes, and that arbitration, on the contrary, does decide such disputes.” 1843 Congress, 22.; See also 1843 Congress, 39-40: Reverend Pennington commented: “wars were only proofs of miscalculations and failures resulting from the adoption of unchristian warfare”.

450 “We may clear the way for a discussion of this point by first observing, that these objectors would imply, what by no means can be allowed, that war is a practical mode of deciding international disputes, while the truth is, that no plan could possibly be devised more impracticable or more unsatisfactory…War seldom decides disputes, but either leaves them open, or plunges the contending parties into still greater difficulties.” 1843 Congress, 61. The paper was entitled: “On the best Practical Means of carrying out Pacific Principles”.

451 This will be discussed further below, but see for example 1848 Congress, 58: “c’est parce qu’on a essayé ce système, qui a parfaitement réussi, que nous proposons le désarmement général et la médiation. Pourquoi conserver une force armée dont nous pouvons nous passer, puisque dans la médiation nous trouvons un moyen plus sûr, plus juste que la force? Les différends entre la Belgique et la Hollande ont été soumis à la médiation de l’Angleterre et de la France. La Grande-Bretagne et l’Amérique ont eu recours à l’intervention de la Russie et de la Hollande. Les États-Unis et le Mexique en ont appelé à l’arbitrage de la Prusse. En ce moment même nous espérons que l’intervention de l’Angleterre terminera les hostilités de la Prusse et du Danemark. En Italie on a déposé les armes à la voix pacifique de la France et de l’Angleterre. Puisque nous avons devant les yeux la preuve que les disputes internationales peuvent être réglées sans recourir aux armes, pourquoi la médiation ne deviendrait-elle pas une loi pour les nations?”

452 1850 Congress, 20.


454 See for example: 1850 Congress, 58 for Cormenin’s comments on dueling as war, as well as Cobden’s speech on page 20.
states in the international arena. Like individuals, states should adhere to religious principles, spend their resources wisely, and conform to established legal codes.

**Explaining the Persistence of War**

As in French conversations on perpetual peace, international peace activists dwelled on the question of the persistence of war in an era otherwise marked by historical progress. The first, most prominent opinion expressed at the congresses tended to blame education – the wrong education or a lack thereof. ‘Education’ was the problem in the most general sense, located not just in schools, but in families, churches, newspapers, the arts and society at large. People had been trained to see war as a source of glory, as an event that brought out the most admirable characteristics in nations and individuals – courage, nobility, sacrifice, etc. They learned this viewpoint from a wide array of influences – art, architecture, literature, history books, etc - throughout their whole lives. As a result, they were kept ignorant of the evils of war, of the financial, spiritual, moral and material costs that it truly wrought.

Many delegates posited prejudice as the main cause of war. They believed that peoples were kept ignorant of the true characters of other nations, being taught to hold strong prejudices and ill thoughts against each other. The conclusion to this conception of war was that if people were educated to understand and appreciate each other, wars would cease. The question of nationalism was raised in this context. Many delegates supported patriotism and love of country, but most believed that these could be taken advantage of and used for malicious purposes. The American pacifist and former slave Reverend Pennington, for example, pointed out that the conflation of patriotism and military defense led many people to anticipate conflict with other nations and to forget that “it requires more moral courage to keep the peace, than it does of physical courage to break the peace and to fight battles.” Love of country should not be in a spirit of competition, jealousy or aggression, for French peace advocates as for their counterparts abroad. Peace friends may have diverged on the question of the role of nation-states in history, but all eschewed national chauvinism and prejudice.

A variety of other causes of the persistence of war were proposed at the congresses as well. Echoing the claims of the temperance movement, British pacifist Mr. Balfour claimed in the 1843 congress that 50 out of 100 soldiers signed up for the army “when intoxicated by strong drink”. Others saw a problem of institutional culture: Mr. Hitchcock, President of Amherst College, accorded the continuation of war to the fact that both soldiers and officers only saw themselves as “machines of state” unable to question the decisions of their superiors. The

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455 See, for example Coquerel’s speech at the Frankfurt congress: 1850 Congress, 56.; or Burnet’s essay “On the Essential Sinfulness of War”, submitted to the first London congress: 1843 Congress, 55.

456 On public ignorance about war, see, for example: 1848 Congress, 62. The introduction to the Frankfurt congress proceedings also comment: “None deny the infinite evils of war. Few will question that its perpetuation is owing in a main degree to the ignorance which prevails among men of their true interests – to the prevalence of old and pernicious traditionary prejudices – to international jealousies, which rest for the most part on falsehoods, misconceptions, and unfounded mutual suspicions.” 1850 Congress, viii.

457 For example, Herr Schuk of London stated at the Frankfurt Congress: “When these prejudices have once been overcome, then our cause will triumph.” 1850 Congress, 57.

458 For an example of support for national identity and independence, see the above-cited speech of M. Alvin, Director of Public Instruction in Belgium, at the Brussels congress: 1848 Congress, 61.

459 1849 Congress, 84.

460 1843 Congress, 23. Here we see the link with the temperance movement, active in America and England in this period. Again, many peace activists were also engaged in a number of other reform movements.

461 1850 Congress, 34.
decision to go to and carry out war thus seemed out of the control of the vast majority of people involved. Hitchcock thus evoked the Quaker insistence on conscience and individual morality as the solution to a wider institutional and societal problem.

Typically, the French contribution on the question of the persistence of war presented a historical and civilizational approach. Joseph Garnier attributed war to four main causes, all of which he saw as necessary diminishing in the modern era: “religious interests – the interests of reigning families – the economical, industrial, commercial interests of the nations and a narrow spirit of nationality, producing the great armaments.” In an age of “conciliation and brotherhood”, economic science and the ascendency of public opinion, the first three causes of war (religious, dynastic and commercial conflicts) were on the decline. Even the question of nationalities had been “prodigiously simplified” since “the extension of the means of communication, [the] rapidity of correspondences, [and] the study of languages” had produced a “constant blending together of men and of things” that had taken the bite out of nationalism.\(^{462}\) For French peace advocates especially, peace would come through a gradual historical process of cooperation and convergence, making war more and more obsolete.

**Solutions: Education, Policy and Institutions**

**Re-Educating the Public**

How, then, did the friends of peace propose to stop war? There were many solutions, some of which were supported by the majority of delegates, others of which seem to have remained the projects of particular groups or individuals. The first and most common solution, proposed by delegates across national lines, was to focus on education. The idea was to “enlighten” public opinion, to make the public understand the benefits of peace and the destructiveness of war.\(^{463}\) They hoped to reach a wide audience – people of all ages, classes, genders and nationalities. As mentioned above, they saw themselves as popularizers of an ancient message, which they hoped to situated in the contemporary world using modern techniques of publicity and institution-building.

Congress delegates proposed a myriad of means of impacting public opinion: public meetings and lectures; submitting articles to newspapers and creating their own journals; publishing books, pamphlets, circulars and “hand-bills”; preaching in churches; continuing with annual conferences; addresses to scientific, political, arts and educational institutions, Masonic lodges and national militaries; and giving addresses of recognition to prominent individuals who espouse peace (a precursor of the Nobel peace prize).\(^{464}\) Their strategies reflected both modern marketing techniques and an older model of missionization, including, for example, proposals to send peace society ‘agents’ into difference countries to spread their message.\(^{465}\) They aimed to

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\(^{462}\) Ibid, 27-28. This is part of Joseph Garnier’s speech to the Frankfurt congress.

\(^{463}\) See for example: 1848 Congress, 62: Suringar on needing to enlighten the people and to get them used to the benefits of peace; 1849 Congress, 42: Jules Avigdor on needing to make the public “detest” war before turning to institutional solutions; 1850 Congress, 56: Athanase Coquerel, junior on the importance of exposing the brutality of war.


\(^{465}\) 1843 Congress, 92-93. The tactics that appear on pages 91-94 of the 1843 congress proceedings are from Constantin Pecqueur; we can see the great variety of his suggestions.
impact not only adults, but children as well, by promoting peace in schools and in conversation, and by opposing military schools as well as games, books, parades, etc that would teach them militaristic values. They also hoped to impact the working classes in particular through the press public meetings, and the formation of working class peace societies, given the fact that they made up the bulk of the military apparatus. The ‘educated classes’ were thus seen as the primary agents in the initial stages, but the delegates hoped that peace activism would spread to a wider social demographic.

On the English and American sides, women were held as important agents in this mission, in their roles as mothers and thus educators. Amasa Walker, an American delegate, emphasized that Christian women had as deep an interest in peace as men and thus should also be involved. He argued that that women had considerable social power and were skilled at creating “public sentiment”, advantages that they could use to help advance the peace movement. Numerous British and German women attended the congresses, but none served as delegates.

There does not seem to be evidence, however, that women were barred from active participation, as with the 1840 World Anti-Slavery Convention, whose segregation of women and refusal to include them in the convention proceedings helped to spark the women’s rights movement in America.

Delegates’ focus on education was based on a belief that public opinion was a prime mover in the politics of the day. The introduction to the proceedings of the 1850 congress begins: “It is public opinion…which in the long run, governs the world.” While public opinion may evolve gradually on its own, it could also be turned rather quickly towards a cause due to the perseverance of a small group of activists. In turn, the public could put pressure on the government to effect a change in policy. Their conviction was not unfounded: the 1840s has been cited as a key moment of development of public opinion’s capacity to impact specific government policies. It seemed increasingly possible to change prevalent opinions within civil society and the government, and pacifists hoped to impact both. In addition to the above-mentioned means of re-educating children and adults, delegates hoped to influence governments through their publications, meetings and direct addresses to politicians and legislatures. The education initiative provided common ground amongst the friends of peace, appealing as it did to the religiously-, economically- and politically-motivated alike.

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466 On publications for children: 1843 Congress, 34; On school education being too “martial”: 1849 Congress, 82; On opposing other influences that provide military training for children, including games, books and parades supporting the spirit of war, as well as military schools: 1843 Congress, 29, 35.
467 On trying to reach the working classes through the press: 1843 Congress, 92; On public meetings: 1843 Congress, 59; On trying to encourage the formation of working class associations for peace: 1843 Congress, 34.
468 On the educated classes as the primary agents in the intitial stages: 1850 Congress, 50.
469 For Walker’s speech: 1843 Congress, 40. We also know that many English women came to the congresses, although they did not serve as delegates. British and American women were also active in other reform movements in this period, including anti-slavery. For more on the topic, see for example: Beth Salerno, *Sister Societies: Women’s Antislavery Organizations in Antebellum America* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005).; Julie Roy Jeffrey, *The Great Silent Army of Abolitionism: Ordinary Women in the Antislavery Movement* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
470 For more on this, see: Judith Wellman, *The Road to Seneca Falls: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the Woman’s Rights Convention* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 2004).
471 1850 Congress, vii.
473 On the suggestion of making addresses to governments and legislatures: 1849 Congress, 68; 1843 Congress, 60; 1843 Congress, 92; 1850 Congress, 38. The peace friends followed through with this idea, conducting an interview with Louis-Napoleon after the 1849 Congress, for example. 1849 Congress, 119-120.
Delegates hoped that this public education campaign could bring about a number of policies, the most important of them being: arbitration; disarmament or arms reduction, or at the least a halting of the arms race; a policy of non-intervention; the establishment of a congress of nations with the goal of instituting an international law code and often an international tribunal; and finally, free market economic policies that would enable communications.

Arbitration, peace activists argued, was both less costly and more effective. War rarely settled conflicts for good; arbitration, on the other hand, had been successful on numerous occasions.\(^474\) Given this fact, it seemed irrational and irresponsible not to replace war with arbitration.\(^475\) Arbitration could be introduced by treaty or international law, and could be carried out through neutral third parties or a permanent court of arbitration. What distinguished arbitration from simple diplomacy was this sort of systematization as the first and only means of conflict resolution through binding treaties or law.

This initiative was led by the American and British delegates – as we have seen, neither French religious pacifists, economic pacifists, or confederationists placed much emphasis on international arbitration. In contrast, arbitration was one of the central initiatives of the American and British peace movements. One of Cobden’s notable projects as an MP was the international arbitration proposal that he presented to the British Parliament in 1849, written in collaboration with the LPS. The idea was to include a clause in future treaties engaging the parties to resort to arbitration rather than war in the case of a dispute.\(^476\) Given the British and American delegates’ numerical dominance at the congresses, arbitration was consistently included in the congress resolutions.\(^477\)

Disarmament was also proposed as a priority, albeit one that would be harder for governments to accept. The initiative provided common ground for absolute pacifists and economic peace advocates, although their motivations varied. The main issue was the maintenance of standing armies, a relatively recent invention in human history, and one that many delegates saw as unsustainable. Disarmament does not seem to have meant a total abolition of the army, but a sharp reduction of forces. Peace activists allowed for the maintenance of minimal forces to ensure security in exceptional circumstances.\(^478\) Economic pacifists in particular sought to overturn their contemporaries’ idea that larger standing armies provided more security, asserting that the size of standing armies and political stability were, instead, inversely related. They argued that large standing armies were a major source of conflict, as arms races provoked international war and caused domestic instability due to the high taxes necessary for their maintenance.

\(^{474}\) 1848 Congress, 36, 58, 70; 1843 Congress, 22; 1850 Congress, 10-12.
\(^{475}\) One can see support for arbitration throughout the congress discussions: 1850 Congress, 10, 14, 19; 1843 Congress, 22, 32, 33, 41, 63, 103, 107; 1848 Congress, 28, 31, 36, 38, 40, 46, 70; 1849 Congress, 23-25, 26-27, 37.
\(^{477}\) 1843 Congress, 33; 1848 Congress, 27; 1849 Congress, 32; 1850 Congress, 10.
\(^{478}\) See for example the resolution on disarmament at the 1850 Congress: “‘That the standing armaments with which the governments of Europe menace one another, impose intolerable burdens and inflict grievous moral and social evils upon their respective communities; this Congress cannot therefore too earnestly call the attention of governments to the necessity of entering upon a system of international disarmament, without prejudices to such measures as may be considered necessary for the maintenance of the security of the citizens and the internal tranquility of each state.’” 1850 Congress, 24.
While the LPS and the British Free Traders were insistent on a policy of non-intervention in their own peace advocacy, this was not integrated into the congress resolutions. Although calls for intervention were taboo at the congresses, non-intervention was not a sufficiently absolute principle for some American, French and continental peace advocates for it to become a regular resolution. Again, the internal diversity of the congress movement implied a certain level of compromise, which the organizers appeared ready to accept.

**Doux Commerce**

The final policy-related solution proposed by the friends of peace – particularly, the political economist and business contingent – was freedom of ‘commerce’, understood in the wide sense of exchange. This could mean free trade – as discussed in Chapter 3 – or free mobility through communications technology. The potential for free trade to lead to peace was reiterated at the successive congresses. At the 1843 congress, for example, American Reverend Thomas Pyne said that if the English could receive the abundant produce of the American plains in exchange for their manufactures, for example, there would be less tension between the nations.479 “Commerce was the power to preserve peace”, the English M.P. Lawrence Heyworth said at the 1850 congress. “Let commerce prevail, and war must be at an end.”480 As many French economic pacifists had done in their own writings, Frankfurt congress delegate Herr Zachariah suggested that just as the Zollverein had brought the peoples of the German states into closer connection; a European or global economic zone could unify the peoples as well.481

The early peace activists’ version of ‘doux commerce’ was deeply rooted in the context of their own time; recent technological innovations played a large role in their optimism that intellectual, cultural, and economic exchange would lead to peace. Across professional and national lines, peace congress delegates placed great confidence in the power of communications. They believed that if nations only got to know each other better, they would let go of their prejudices and adopt friendly relations. The friends of peace supported the improvement of all means of communication with this conviction, issuing resolutions in support of the improvement of postal services; a standardization of measures, weights and coinage; and the spread of peace societies in close correspondence.482 When perceived in its historical context, this belief in the power of what we would call globalization to create mutual understanding was not so far-fetched: railroads, steamships, expanding publications industries and literacy levels were indeed connecting individuals beyond their regional spaces.

**Institutional Solutions**

Lastly, as we have seen, delegates proposed institutional solutions for perpetual peace. It is worth taking another look at the projects within the context of the congresses. Here, we see a variety of innovative and important ideas, but little agreement on details. Many proposed a Congress of Nations, High Court of Arbitration and/or International Tribunal, but it was unclear what the precise configuration and responsibilities of these institutions would be. For some, the Congress of Nations would be a permanent institution, convening regularly to settle matters of international affairs. Emile de Girardin, for example, imagined a “universal assembly, where all

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479 1843 Congress, 27.
480 1850 Congress, 56.
481 Ibid, 41. Herr Zachariah does not make specify the geographic scope of a larger economic confederation.
482 These were the measures included in the seventh resolution of the 1849 Congress. 1849 Congress, 54.
social questions shall be decided by a majority”, as with national parliamentary government.\footnote{483} For others, the Congress seemed to be a more temporary affair.\footnote{484} The perceived leader of the initiative, Elihu Burritt, wrote to the 1848 and 1849 congresses depicting the Congress of Nations as a convention to draw up an international code that would then be ratified by national legislatures and to name a supreme court that would “juger toutes les questions sérieuses, et…appliquer les lois adoptées en commun”.\footnote{485} Amasa Walker also saw the congress as essentially a committee to establish international law and a court of arbitration to settle differences in interpreting it.\footnote{486}

In other versions of the project, the Congress would itself act as an international tribunal. At the 1850 congress, Elihu Burritt gave this more robust idea of the institution:

a great International Senate, composed of a representative from every recognised kingdom or government in the world, a body which should not only serve as a perpetual court of equity and arbitration, but also as a standing convention or congress, to project and propose great international works of improvement, - such as the connexion of rivers, seas, and oceans, by ship canals and enterprises of a similar character.\footnote{487}

As mentioned, Constantin Pecqueur had envisioned a transitional process in his letter to the 1843 congress, in which a “permanent congress of ambassadors of peace” would bring disputes between nations before arbiters, and then eventually set up an “international judicial power, more or less coercive”. They would finally institute “a high court of international justice, in imitation of the Tribunal of Arbiters”.\footnote{488} Numerous other delegates supported an independent “High Court of Nations” that would operate on its own.\footnote{489} Thus, the delegates reached no conclusion on what specific institutions would be established or for what purposes.\footnote{490}

Taken in their nebulous form, however, to what extent would these institutions be supranational? Delegates emphasized the autonomous participation of nation-states in the creation of international law and the arbitration court, but clearly did want international regulations to be binding thereafter. Logically, the High Court of Arbitration and would have to have superior jurisdiction over nation-states, in order for it to definitively settle conflicts. Once states ratified an international legal code requiring arbitration, or at least signed a multi-lateral arbitration agreement, they would be bound to adhere to the arbiter’s decisions.\footnote{491}

\footnote{483} 1850 Congress, 15.
\footnote{484} 1848 Congress, 41; 1849 Congress, 59, 69.
\footnote{485} 1848 Congress, 41; 1849 Congress, 59-60.
\footnote{486} 1849 Congress, 69. Walker also describes the extent of the enthusiasm and action in the United States on the idea of a Congress of nations. The legislature of the State of Massachusetts had passed a series of resolutions to promote the project at the national congress, which then discussed the matter.
\footnote{487} 1850 Congress, 51.
\footnote{488} 1843 Congress, 93.
\footnote{489} 1843 Congress, 65-66; 1849 Congress, 61.
\footnote{490} Early American pacifist William Ladd’s project was perhaps the clearest in his plans for international institutions, but passed away before the congresses, in 1841. There would be two distinct bodies: a Court of Nations and a Congress of Nations. The Court of Nations would be similar to the Supreme Court, a judicial institution created to carry out the law that the legislative branch established. The Congress of Nations, similar to the American national Congress, would be the legislative body, meeting periodically and with rotating members. Each nation would have one vote at the Congress, regardless of the number of ambassadors sent. Membership in the Congress would be voluntary and require acceptance of the regulations as agreed to by the majority. Once unanimously voted, laws would be binding for all members. The code would relate only to interstate relations – war prevention and the rules of war, the rights of neutrals, peacetime policies and the Court of Nations – and not to domestic affairs or forms of government. William Ladd, \textit{An Essay on a Congress of Nations}, 521-524.
\footnote{491} 1843 Congress, 32; 1848 Congress, 28, 58.
be a separate High Court of Nations to enforce international law, it would also have to stand above the nation-state in order to be effective. Constantin Pecqueur and English M.P. Mr. Ewart actually suggested that there be an international police force to back up the resolutions of the Congress of Nations and Court of Arbitration. 492 Ewart also proposed a version of contemporary system of sanctions against states in conflict with the international community. 493 

However, delegates stressed that these constraints would not be perceived as unfairly imposed from above: having been created by national representatives and ratified in national legislatures, the international code would become “the law of nations in every popular, legislative, and moral sense”; “no law on earth c[ould] surpass this in the vital attributes of moral obligation”. 494 Most delegates also emphasized that national identities would remain intact in this system. As mentioned in the last chapter, M. Alvin, minister of public instruction in Brussels, commented at the 1848 congress that the new international system would create the conditions for even greater attachment to the nation: “Il est impossible d’admettre qu’un système qui donnerait à tous les États une règle pour terminer leurs différends…détruirait les nationalités…Est-ce que la paix m’empêchera d’aimer ma patrie, ma famille? Au contraire, la paix doit m’attacher de plus en plus à mon sol.” 495 Clearly, the mid-century peace advocates’ institutional solutions were still in the course of development. Looking at the array of proposed solutions overall, we see that delegates were most clear and united in their educational projects.

‘Causes’ for Confidence

As mentioned above, part of the delegates’ confidence in the potential success of their cause also came from the example of numerous other reform movements at the time. Cobden’s public campaign against the Corn Laws stood as an example to the friends of peace of the possibility of rallying public opinion and provoking a change in policy. 496 They highlighted the fact that the movements against torture, the death penalty and slavery had met the same criticisms as their own – that they concerned practices that had existed for all of history and would never be eradicated. And yet, slavery had been abolished in England in 1833 and in France in 1848, and the movements against torture and the death penalty seemed to be making inroads with governments across the western world. 497 Beccaria was “held in derision” for his
critique of the death penalty at the end of the last century, yet several German states had since abolished the death penalty for good. Torture, once routine, was rarely used as a regular part of the judicial process. If all of these “necessary evils” could be abolished, why not war?

The observation of historical improvements was a sign of optimism for the future, but also an argument about the superiority of contemporary European civilization over ages past. Councillor Jaup, president of the Frankfurt congress, for example, noted that war had been widespread in the Middle Ages, even seen as a ‘privilege’ of the nobility. With time, however, men came to understand “the propriety of arranging their disputes peaceably, and governing nations by law, instead of by brute force.” Similarly, Alexander von Humboldt wrote in his letter to the 1850 congress that the friends of peace were in line with the “increased culture of humanity” of the times and its “mildness of manners”. This had been made possible by strong institutions and sound legislation able to reduce outbreaks of violence and injustice. As we have seen, the French peace advocates were particularly interested in the deep history of practices of violence and the potential for further civilizational progress. Across the peace movement, the hope was that international war, along torture, slavery and the death penalty, would soon be eradicated from modern society.

The End of the Mid-Century Congress Cycle

Despite the overflowing of historical optimism at the mid-century congresses, the international movement began to fall apart just after the London congress of 1851. Louis Napoleon’s 1851 coup-d’état caused an ‘invasion panic’ in England, resulting in the revival of voluntary enlistment through the Militia Act of 1852. In this atmosphere, plans for the next international conference were cancelled. Instead, British peace activists met on their own at two 1853 congresses, in Manchester in January and Edinburgh in October. Thereafter, the rise of nationalist sentiments surrounding the outbreak of the Crimean War placed the peace movement on the sidelines. Even as public opinion began to turn against the war, objections were more against government ‘mismanagement’ than against war as such. The British peace movement remained in force throughout the war, waging a considerable anti-war publicity campaign, but was unable to have a real impact on events. Peace activism continued on at the local level, but would not again become an international movement until the end of the next decade. When considerable international cooperation resurfaced around the time of the German wars of unification, a new generation of actors was involved. The practice of regular, large-scale international peace congresses would then only be revived in the 1880s.

498 1843 Congress, 38: the marquis de la Rocchefoucauld-Liancourt states that the death penalty was in decline, now only used for cases of murder; Ibid, 90: M. Mollet remarks that the death penalty is rarely used in the Netherlands; 1850 Congress, 4: Councillor Jaup of Darmstadt pointed out that torture was once considered a “necessary evil” but was “longer employed”, that Beccaria was laughed at in the eighteenth century by his era the death penalty had been abolished in a number of German states, and that the end of slavery had been seen as a utopia in the English Parliament, which later abolished it; Ibid, 6: Mr. Bonnet makes the comparison between his age and that of Louis XIV, when torture was used by law courts and prisoners of war were “treated as slaves or put to death”.

499 1850 Congress, 4.

500 1850 Congress, 71.


504 See: Sandi Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism, 34-36.
Conclusion

Despite the internal diversity of the peace congress movement, it is thus possible to distinguish a number of lines of analyses and to make comparisons across national lines. Identifiable religious, economic and political positions surfaced, as did a set of policy solutions. Peace advocates were united in their support for pacifist education and arms reduction, but differed in their vision of the institutionalization of these values. Their arguments concerned not only peaceful interrelations on an individual level, but perhaps above all, the ethics of states. The religious, economic and political lines of mid-century pacifism all upheld ideas of just governance and sought to influence public opinion to help them pressure governments to live up to these values. The success of contemporaneous humanitarian movements only emboldened the friends of peace, along with the changes manifest in the technological and political innovations of the time – steamships, trains, the telegraph and industrial machinery on the one hand, and the founding of republics and constitutional governments on the other. The friends of peace were well aware of the contemporary perception of them as utopians, but they genuinely believed that their era was one in which everything was possible through the application of ‘right’ principles, be them social-scientific or religious. While the mid-nineteenth century peace congresses did not produce results overnight, their confidence, their methods and their arguments lived on in the more massive peace movement at the end of their century, and ultimately in many of the policies and institutions of today.

French peace advocates converged with their counterparts abroad on a number of viewpoints, but overall were more gradualist and polyvalent. French peace advocates were not marginal additions to the congress movement: while the congress organization was initially driven by the British and Americans, the French were highly active in promoting the congresses and in developing their own critique of war and set of solutions. The fact that they were not absolute pacifists – and thus did not view peace as the result of a timeless ethical choice between violence and nonresistance – does not mean that their story is less pivotal to the history of peace activism. French peace advocates developed a distinct vision of international cooperation, as a dynamic but gradual historical process brought about by legal reforms, international communications, and the evolution of political units and affiliations.
Conclusion

Early Nineteenth-Century Internationalisms and their Legacies

When we look at the legacies of the three major internationalisms of the early nineteenth century, we see that reformist internationalism would come to have a long-lasting and significant impact. As stated in the introduction, the goal of this dissertation is not to produce a timeless categorization for internationalisms. We can, nonetheless, question the legacy of the three approaches to international cooperation that emerged in the decades after the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. The conservative internationalism of 1815 would perhaps have the least long-term impact. The version of conservative internationalism conceived by the Concert of Europe would become increasingly dysfunctional and obsolete. By 1870, Europe was fundamentally different than it had been in 1815, and any question of maintaining the Concert of Europe’s initial status quo was moot. Italy and Germany had become modern nation-states; France was once again a republic.\footnote{505}

The reconfiguration of European politics around 1870 also meant that radical republican internationalism lost much of its raison d'être. However, the principle of mid-nineteenth century revolutionary internationalism – that the international order should be transformed through popular military cooperation across borders – would have numerous iterations in the next two centuries. In the 1860s, this approach to international political change was taken up by communists. Once Russia became the Soviet Union, communist internationalism became a major world player. The notion that the peoples must join together across borders to violently institute a new social/political order transformed the twentieth-century world.\footnote{506} Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen an ongoing conflict over such issues as military intervention for revolutions abroad and the appropriate means of provoking regime change domestically – questions which concerned early nineteenth-century reformist and revolutionary internationalists alike.

Overall, the early peace movement’s nonviolent, progressive agenda for international cooperation has been successful in historical terms. Looking at the peace movement alone, we see significant developments starting in the decades after the Crimean War. Despite the disappointments of the war and the hiatus in the international peace movement that ensued, peace activism continued throughout the nineteenth century. In the late 1860s, new peace associations arose in Europe, including the Paris-based Ligue international de la paix permenante. Actors in the earlier French peace movement were involved: the Ligue international de la paix permenante was founded by Michel Chevalier, Joseph Garnier and two other economists associated with the Journal des économistes, Frédéric Passy and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu.\footnote{507} In accordance with their previous views, the association promoted the gradual establishment of peace. The later organization was more legalistic and institutional, however, placing more emphasis on the potential role of international law in peace-keeping. After helping to found the Ligue international de la paix permenante in 1867, Passy went on to create the Société d’arbitrage entre les Nations in 1870 and l’Union interparlementaire in 1880. These

\footnote{505} Carsten Holbraad gives a more transhistorical definition of conservative internationalism and therefore sees it continuing past 1870 with such diverse figures as Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer and institutions like the United Nations Security Council. Holbraad, Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought, 11-37. He sees conservative internationalism as seeking to “deal with recurrent bids for domination in the states system”, or “respond collectively to intermittent doctrinal challenges in international society”. Ibid, 12.

\footnote{506} Here one can think of international socialism, Islamic fundamentalism or decolonization movements.

\footnote{507} Silberner, The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought, 103.
organizations helped to deepen the reformist internationalist program and make its agenda more legalistic and technical.\textsuperscript{508}

Hundreds of peace organizations existed by the turn of the century, which were finally coordinated by an umbrella organization, the Bern-based International Peace Bureau, in 1892 – much as had happened at the national level in the United States almost a century before. A series of international congresses were again held; twenty ‘Universal Peace Congresses’ took place in cities in Europe and America between 1889 and 1913, and thirteen more between 1921 and 1939.\textsuperscript{509} The creation of such a large-scale movement must be seen in relation to its predecessor. Christina Phelps’ 1930 book on the first peace movement aptly described its connection with the peace movement later in the century:

> The present degree of international organization might have been achieved eventually, but friends of peace…would still have had all the preparatory work to do for themselves. No peace movement could have omitted its first stage, its period of incubation, and that was undeniably what the earlier movement supplied…The earlier movement was the stepping-stone on which the later nineteenth-century movement for international cooperation rose to a height that it could never have reached had it dated its rise from 1867. One might also bear in mind that every noteworthy peace plan or suggestion which was made prior to 1855 still survives.\textsuperscript{510}

The first peace movement provided the intellectual and strategic foundations upon which its more famous successors would be built. It lived on not only in terms of ideas, but also in practices and modes of organization. The International Peace Bureau still exists today, including 300 member organizations in 70 countries. Its message echoes that of the early nineteenth-century peace advocates: “We believe that by reducing funding for the military sector, significant amounts of money would be available for social projects domestically or abroad and lead to the fulfilling of real human needs and general development.”\textsuperscript{511}

The later peace movement, in turn, was essential to the creation of a number of international institutions. Their institutional projects found their first application in the Interparliamentary Union, founded in 1889 as an organization for international cooperation between parliaments. The IPU was initially named the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for Arbitration, as the organization primarily focused on arbitration in its early years. The institution hoped to encourage arbitration treaties, which had gained ground in the 1880s with bi-lateral treaties between the American, British and French governments.\textsuperscript{512} It started as a voluntary association of lawyers and parliamentarians, but eventually evolved into an “international organization of the Parliaments of sovereign States”, as the early peace friends had envisioned in their Congress of Nations. The organization was also instrumental in establishing the Permanent

\textsuperscript{508} See article on the Société des amis pour le paix par le droit, for example. Cooper also discusses other French organizations focusing on international law in her second and third chapters.

\textsuperscript{509} These were in: Paris (1889); London (1890); Rome (1891); Bern (1892); Chicago (1893); Antwerp (1894); Budapest (1896); Hamburg (1897); Paris (1900); Glasgow (1901); Monaco (1902); Rouen (1903); Boston (1904); Luzern (1905); Milan (1906); Munich (1907); London (1908); Stockholm (1910); Geneva (1912); The Hague (1913); Luxembourg (1921); London (1922); Berlin (1924); Paris (1925); Geneva (1926); Warsaw (1928); Athens (1929); Brussels (1931); Vienna (1932); Luzern (1934); Cardiff (1936); Paris (1937); and Zürich (1939).


\textsuperscript{511} International Peace Bureau website, accessed September 25, 2013, \url{http://www.ipb.org/web/}

\textsuperscript{512} “William Randal Cremer”, Interparliamentary Union website, accessed September 22, 2013, \url{http://www.ipu.org/structure/cremer.htm}
Court of Arbitration in 1899, today based in The Hague.\textsuperscript{513} The union was founded by William Randal Cremer and Frédéric Passy, both participants in the late nineteenth-century international peace movement. As mentioned, Passy was personally connected to the early French economic pacifists. Today, the IPU has a particular focus on the promotion of democracy internationally, which, as we have seen, was not a goal of the international peace movement in its early days. However, the notion of bringing governments together for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and challenges is very much in the spirit of the early peace movement’s institutional plans. We can think of Constantin Pécqueur, who saw international political cooperation as the collaboration of parliamentary governments.

The League of Nations was the first full realization of the peace friends’ Congress of Nations. The League brought together 42 initial members, including 58 states at its most expansive. The League aimed to put many peace movement agenda items into practice, including disarmament and intergovernmental cooperation. World War I was the prime impetus for its realization, but the peace movement helped to create the ideas on which the institution was founded.\textsuperscript{514} Although it did not succeed in halting the tide of war in 1939, the League constituted a significant experiment in intergovernmental cooperation. Further, many of the League’s agencies and objectives lived on in its successor, the United Nations. The United Nations is of course far more technical and specialized than the Congress of Nations than the early peace friends envisioned, but it achieves the same objectives of convening governments worldwide for the resolution of collective concerns.\textsuperscript{515}

The peace friends’ interest in an international tribunal has also been realized, although differently. The early peace activists foresaw an International Tribunal as an institution to enforce international law. The goal was to resolve disputes and punish infractions against the international code. The United National International Court of Justice, founded in 1946, is primarily concerned with the resolution of legal disputes between states, rather than punishing them for infractions. Like the United Nations Security Council today, early peace advocates’ International Tribunal was meant to issue sanctions or revoke states’ membership in the Congress of Nations, according to the various plans. The International Criminal Court is even further from nineteenth-century plans, targeting prominent individuals who flout international law. Again, the political conditions created by World War II, the Holocaust and the Cold War were pivotal to the realization of the International Criminal Court, but we should not dismiss the intellectual and cultural work done by decades of peace advocates in such an institution’s favor.

We can also see the continuation of the early peace friends’ agenda in the European Union today. The French peace friends in particular called for a European union (to proceed a global Congress of Nations). Their aspirations towards a European congress, common currency,
legal code and court have been realized in recent years. The emergence of a pan-European identity, predicted by early French peace advocates like Victor Hugo and Constantin Pecqueur, is actively sought by the European Union. Hugo’s ‘United States of Europe’ in particular is referenced as justification for the EU project.\footnote{Hugo’s ‘United States of Europe’ is often referenced within the EU context today. Take, for example, this article published by the European Commission: “Why we need a United States of Europe Today”, accessed September 25, 2013, \url{http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-796_en.htm}}

Finally, we can see echoes of the early peace movement in contemporary conversations on cosmopolitanism. This literature takes the existence of global society as its starting point, and asks what sort of moral obligations membership in global society entails. Although scholars often emphasize the roots of cosmopolitanism in ancient Greeks or Enlightenment philosophy, the idea should be connected to nineteenth- and twentieth-century internationalism as well.\footnote{Scholars have particularly emphasized their connections with the Stoics and Emmanuel Kant. See for example: James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, eds., \textit{Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Martha Nussbaum, “The Worth of Human Dignity: Two Tensions in Stoic Cosmopolitanism” in Gillian Clark and Tessa Rajak, eds., \textit{Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).} As we have seen, internationalism, particularly in its early forms, did not only focus on the relations between states, but on a variety of forms of global integration involving individuals, ‘peoples’ and governments alike. Like today’s cosmopolitans, early reformist internationalists highlighted the role of technology, mobility and education in cultivating transnational identities and questioned the possibility of supranational government.\footnote{For more on such themes in contemporary cosmopolitanism, see: Thomas Pogge and Darrel Moellendorf, eds., \textit{Global Justice: Seminal Essays, Volume I} (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2008).} Some cosmopolitan philosophers, such as David Held, call for a supranational world government with greater powers than today’s UN, as peace advocates like Constantin Pecqueur had done.\footnote{For David Held’s ideas on supranational government, one can look to his essay in this volume: “Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?” ibid, 311-354.} Contemporary cosmopolitanism has arisen in the context of intensified globalization, but also in light of nearly a century of experimentation in organizing international society.\footnote{We can again take Held as an example: his plans for supranational government specifically respond to the UN Charter. Ibid, 332-344.}

Today’s internationalism and cosmopolitanism are of course the products of numerous historically contingent events and processes, but early reformist internationalism should be seen as helping to lay their foundations. The early peace movement performed crucial work in devising the initial ideas and practices upon which later peace movements, and eventually, international institutions, would draw. Events like the world wars and the Cold War of course played a large role in the process of institutionalizing internationalism, but the early peace movement helped to spark new ideas of international cooperation and modes of organizing in their favor.

Now, we may very well question the effectiveness of this agenda, then or today. As Mark Mazower has noted, we have increasing doubts on the effectiveness of international institutions’ ability to ‘govern the world’.\footnote{The expression is a reference to Mark Mazower’s book of the same title, referenced above, in which he comments: “We have moved from an era that had faith in the idea of international institutions to one that has lost it.” Mazower, \textit{Governing the World}, xiii.} We have over a century of experience with a ‘Congress of Nations’, international law, international arbitration, liberal economic policies, etc., and these measures have not always been as successful as the peace friends had hoped. After two World
Wars, wars of decolonization, the Cold War, the rise of international terrorism and numerous financial crises, we cannot be as optimistic about historical progress or the power of international institutions as the internationalists of the past two centuries.

Nonetheless, the early peace movement can help us to understand how we have arrived at today’s ‘global society’, both the consciousness of its existence and organized action to shape its development. It shows us the evolution of ideas on international cooperation, but also how internationalism emerged as a civil society movement. We can see how such famous project as Kant’s ‘Federation of Free States’ or the abbé de Saint-Pierre’s ‘European Union’ moved from the realm of philosophical discourse to political action.\(^{522}\) It is not enough to cite such sources as intellectual precursors to today’s institutions; we must look at how these ideas because the source of organized campaigns within particular historical contexts. Through this story, we see that ideas of global society are not novel products of a newly globalized world, but part of a long evolution of thinking on the nature of processes of integration across state borders.

**The French Peace Movement Revisited**

The story of the early French peace movement in particular can help to elucidate this long history of the idea and practices of global society in numerous ways. The French peace advocates were distinct in their comprehensive, civilizational approach to international cooperation. A few advocated international institutions, but most emphasized other factors in international integration: mobility, free trade, communications technology, scientific networks, etc. Their inter-nation-alism should be understood in the framework of their own view of the nation, as a cultural group first and foremost. They saw a role for states in setting policies conducive to international integration, but precisely because they believed the collaboration of non-state actors to be so important. States were to be facilitators, rather than the sole actors of international cooperation.

Questions of the long-term role of nation-states and of the agency of non-state actors in international integration can thus be shown to have a longer and richer history than often assumed. Scholars, journalists and politicians emphasize the undermining of the nation-state through processes of globalization.\(^ {523}\) Through an examination of the ideas of French peace advocates, we see that such doubts on the interplay between global processes and state sovereignty have a long history stretching back before the debates on globalization today.

Like its partners abroad, the French peace movement innovated in its actions as well as its ideas. In the French case, the movement seized upon diverse strands of Enlightenment thought and transformed these ideas into a concrete program to be achieved through collective action. This was a transition from philosophy to politics, inserted in the historical context of the day. French peace advocates pushed against the conservative and revolutionary internationalisms of their day to create an alternative model of international cooperation through progressive reform.

It was a heterogeneous movement intellectually and socially, but its members shared a common concern for nonviolence, toleration and international integration. They harnessed the tools of journalism and associational activism to critique war and offer a program of action. Given their intellectual roots in Enlightenment thought rather than religious revivalism, they examined war

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as a historical question, accepting the role of violence in the past but expressing confidence in its diminishing place in modern society. They saw peace as a civilizational project and advocated its realization through a wide-ranging set of economic, political and cultural reforms.

It is hoped that the story of the early French peace movement can find its place within international history, but also within French history itself. The early peace movement is little known within French historiography, the object only of occasional references (particularly to the congresses). Yet a look at peace activism can add additional dimensions to the history of French politics. We can trace the diverse impact of Enlightenment thought in nineteenth century France, not only in republican or liberal politics, but in several forms of peace activism. We see that this heritage contributed to a rich conversation on the future of international society, one that extended beyond the battles between conservatives and revolutionaries.

We can also gain a new perspective on a variety of important actors of the mid-nineteenth century. International peace was a central item of concern for a number of actors better known for their involvement in other causes, like the Société de la morale chrétienne or the Société d’économie politique. The history of their involvement in the peace movement can give a more complete picture of their thought and highlight their contribution to internationalism.

And despite the repressive political conditions under which they lived, we see that peace advocates were able to help build a vibrant civil society movement. The peace advocates’ acceptance of heterodoxy was central to the reach of their movement and emblematic of the nature of civil society itself. Their activism and nonviolent approach made them key contributors to the development of civil society in France.

Openings for Future Research

Although we known much about the long trajectory of reformist internationalism, a number of openings for future research can be pointed out. Firstly, peace activism around 1870 remains an area for further research. Was French pacifism around 1870 defensive, a product of French fears of losing their place in Europe? Could this also be said for smaller nations like Switzerland, who perhaps also feared a unified Germany? Could one therefore see confederation projects in this period as strategy to contain Germany? A thorough examination of newspapers and publications during this period could help to provide a deeper understanding of the more famous projects for European confederation in the 1860s, such as that of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.524

Secondly, the split between radical and reformist pacifism that Sandi Cooper mentions in Patriotic Pacifism could be further explored. Was there a class basis for the different viewpoints? What portion of the membership of the more radical Ligue international de la paix et de la liberté, for example, were working class, and was the reformist Ligue international de la paix permenante exclusively bourgeois? Lastly, concerning the Ligue international de la paix et de la liberté, did the organization advocate violence in some cases, like the earlier radical republicans? Did they develop a more extensive argument about just war?

Another research question that can be raised in connection with the history of the early nineteenth-century French peace movement concerns its legacy in the interwar period. Many of the sources that we find today on the early peace movement were written in the 1920s and 1930s. These works deserve to be examined as historical documents in their own right. How did historians of the interwar period use the example of early peace advocates to further their own

ideas and objectives within their particular historical context? More generally, how was the memory of early peace advocacy used to justify or reject interwar internationalism, and later, the European Coal and Steel Community and European Economic Community? To what ends were the nineteenth-century texts used, and what impact did they have in changed historical conditions? A closer examination of these questions could yield a better understanding of the legacy of the first peace movement in historical perspective.

Conclusion

An examination of the early French peace movement can contribute to international, European and French history alike. The story of the first international peace movement shows the deep roots of today’s international institutions and of the notion of international society more generally. An examination of French participation in particular reveals another legacy for the Enlightenment, not only in revolutionary politics, but in a diverse internationalist movement inspired by numerous strains of Enlightenment thought. Through this narrative, we can discover a greater richness to early nineteenth-century political thought and civil society activism.
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