Under the Gun: Nationalist Military Service and Society in Wartime Sichuan, 1938-1945

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2j08g4sk

Author
Landdeck, Kevin Paul

Publication Date
2011

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
Under the Gun: Nationalist Military Service and Society in Wartime Sichuan, 1938-1945

By

Kevin Paul Landdeck

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Wen-hsin Yeh, Chair
Professor Margaret Anderson
Professor Kevin O’Brien
Professor R. Keith Schoppa (Loyola College, Maryland)

Spring 2011
Abstract

Under the Gun: Nationalist Military Service and Society in
Wartime Sichuan, 1938-1945

by

Kevin Paul Landdeck

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Wen-hsin Yeh, Chair

This dissertation examines the state-making and citizenship projects embedded within the Nationalist (KMT) government’s mobilization of men to serve in the army during World War Two. My project views wartime conscription as a fundamental break with earlier modes of recruitment, the gentry-led militarization of the late-Qing dynasty and the mercenary armies of the warlords. Nationalist authorities saw compulsory service as a tool for creating genuine citizen-soldiers and yet, while conscription was a strategic success, it proved to be a political failure.

Despite the expansion of the institutional structures to extract men from their villages, conscription work was always dependent on local community elites. The result was a persistent commercialization of conscription, as men were hired as substitute draftees or literally bought and sold. The draft became a stark lesson in political alienation from the government: individuals evaded; rural communities shielded their residents and preyed on outsiders; and Chongqing’s densely packed urban institutions defended, sometimes violently, their human resources from the state’s agents.

In contrast to this political debacle, the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement (1943-45) was a triumph. Deracinated refugee youth – students, teachers, petty professionals and civil servants – who were already dependent on the state and ravaged by inflation, volunteered to serve in the Intellectual Youth Army. An elite force that was ironically militarily irrelevant, the Youth Army had a political mission to legitimize the Nationalist state by embodying, and publicizing themselves as, model citizens and elite soldiers.

This study not only contributes to the history of the war in China, which remains only partially understood, but also to debates on Nationalist state-making and issues of political culture. It tackles the relatively neglected area of Nationalist-held interior society, rather than revolution in communist base areas or collaboration in Japanese occupied areas. It challenges the conventional narrative of wholesale disintegration in the KMT-held interior, a perspective which grew out of America’s involvement in China during the war and subsequent scholarship’s focus on the revolutionary growth of the Communist Party. And it offers new and nuanced perspectives on the in-
stitutional expansion of the Nationalist state, its connection to the war, and the responses (both rural and urban) to state demands. The picture that emerges is one of uneven state growth, combined with political alienation in the countryside. On the citizenship front, my project again shows a degree of vitality in the Nationalist state that has not previously been appreciated in the literature. The Youth Army and its prolific autobiographical propaganda are analyzed to uncover the socio-economic bases of volunteerism, the careful bargain struck between the state and the volunteers, and their complex self-identities as loyal citizen-soldiers. A close analysis of the political techniques to inculcate those identities and an excavation of the material object of the rifle, which stood at the center of the Youth Army’s political symbology, outline the nature of Nationalist citizenship, not as a position endowed with “rights” but as an affirmation of the fundamental myth of the Nationalist state itself: that the state was coterminous with the people.
# Table of Contents

Abbreviations ii  
Note on Citations iv  
Acknowledgements v  
Introduction 1  

Chapter One  Repertoires of Recruitment: Historical Precedents and Nationalist Ideals 19  
Chapter Two  The Politics of Conscription: State-Building, Commercialization, and Alienation 75  
Chapter Three  Of Redoubts and Hotpot: Geography and State-Making in Prewar Sichuan 136  
Chapter Four  Patterns of Conscription: Villages, the City, and Factories 187  
Chapter Five  Modes and Methods of Mobilization: The Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement and Youth Army, 1943-46 246  
Chapter Six  Of Pen and Gun: Political Practice, Culture, and Identity in the Youth Army 349  
Conclusion  Modern China as a Warfare State 431  
Epilogue  Postwar Youth Army: Promises Fulfilled, Loyal Services Rendered, 1946-49 447  
Bibliography  465  
Appendix  Early Repertoires Revisited 486
Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used throughout the dissertation, primarily in the footnotes and citations. A few common institutional ones are found in the main text as well, however.

3PPYC Three People’s Principles Youth Corps (Sanmin zhuyi qingnian tuan 三民主義青年團)
AD administrative oversight district (xingzheng ducha qu 行政督察區), usually preceded by a number; e.g., 3AD is the Third Administrative District
BYYK Bingyi yuekan (兵役月刊) (serial)
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CEC Central Executive Committee (zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui 中央執行委員會)
CEF China Expeditionary Force (Zhongguo yuanzheng jun 中國遠征軍)
CHoC The Cambridge History of China
CQ Chongqing (重慶) (in institutional names)
CQMA Chongqing Municipal Archives (Chongqingshi dang’anguan 重慶市檔案館)
CQMG Chongqing Municipal Government (Chongqing shi zhengfu 重慶市政府)
DD divisional district (shiguanqu 師管區)
GJZGSG Guojun zhenggong shigao (國軍政工史稿)
GMBT Citizen Militia (guomin bingtuan 國民兵團)
GMWX Geming wenxian (革命文獻)
HYQNJ Huoyue qingnian jun (活躍青年軍)
IEF Indian Expeditionary Force (Yindu yuanzhengjun 印度遠征軍)
IYVM Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement (Zhishi qingnian zhiyuan yundong 知識青年志願運動)
JAS Journal of Asian Studies
KMT Kuomintang (Guomindang 國民黨)
KRZZ Kangri zhanzheng (抗日战争)
KRZZYJ Kangri zhanzheng yanjiu (抗日戰爭研究) (serial)
MAC Military Affairs Commission (Junshi weiyuanhui 軍事委員會)
MP Military Police (junjing 軍警)
MSO Military Service Office (bingyi shu 兵役署)
NRA National Revolutionary Army (國民革命軍)
PD provincial (military) district (sheng junguanqu 省軍管區)
PRC People’s Republic of China
QNJS Qingnianjun shiliao (青年軍史料)
QNYZJJY Qingnian yuanzhengjun jianying (青年遠征軍剪影)
RD regimental district (tuanguanqu 團管區)
RR replacement regiment (buchongtuan 補充團)
RTO Replacement Training Office (buchongxunlian chu 補充訓練處)
WA War Area (zhanqu 戰區)
WSZLXY Wenshi ziliao xuanji (文史資料選輯)
XSCJ  Xuesheng congjun (學生從軍)
YA  Youth Army (Qingnianjun 青年軍)
YC  Youth Corps (see 3PPYC)
YZSL  Yizheng shiliao (役政史料)

A number followed by “AG”, “A”, “D”, or “R” is a military unit; army group, army, division, or regiment, respectively. E.g., 201D is the 201st division. Preceded by a capital “N”, it designates a “New” (or reorganized) division. A number followed by “AD” is a specific special administrative oversight district (xingzheng ducha qu 行政督察區) within a province.
Note on Citations for Archival Materials

All archival documents from CQMA follow a specific citation format: the document group (quanzong 全宗) number follows “qz”; the sub-group and folder number (mujuan 目卷), divided by a dash, follow “mj”, and finally a page number for the specific document. For example, in the citation “qz0041.mj1-26, pp. 2a-9b and 33a-36”, the document is found on pages 2a through 9b and 33a through 36a of document group (quanzong) 41, in sub-group (mu) 1, folder (juan) number 26. If a date is available, it is included after the citation, sometimes only the date the document was delivered to the receiving office is available (or legible) and this is noted by “(rec’d)” after the date. Some documents have an old and a new (re-numbered) sub-group and folder location (mujuan); in those cases both are included.

Printed or published documents accessed at CQMA are cited not only by regular publishing information, but also according to the archives’ classification scheme in which they have been sorted into topical categories and assigned a specific number within that group.
Acknowledgements

The many pleasures of writing history are all tinged with the fact that, at bottom, it is work. No such whiff of distaste appears as I sit down to write this page of thanks for the people who have aided and abetted my research; it is an unsullied pleasure to express my gratitude for those who have supported me during my long years in graduate school.

It is a fact of modern research that institutional support is almost always necessary. I have been fortunate to receive funding and assistance from several places. The History Department and the Institute for East Asian Studies at Berkeley provided me with a four-year fellowship. Special thanks are due to the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange for a generous dissertation research grant (2006-7) that allowed me to do my field research in Chongqing. Librarians at Stanford’s Hoover Institution were helpful, particularly in the beginning stages of the project, while Bruce Williams and Haneda Tomoko at Berkeley’s East Asian Library have given unselfishly of their time on more occasions than I can count. At the Chongqing Municipal Archives, head archivist Tang Changlun (唐昌伦), now vice-director of the Three Gorges Museum (三峽博物館), and his dedicated staff deserve medals for their service far and above the call.

Worthy of my thanks are my many teachers, who I am glad to finally be able to call my colleagues. As a group, these dedicated scholar-educators have been a constant source of inspiration and I hope that this dissertation would not disappoint them too much. In particular, I wish to thank Yeh Wen-hsin for teaching me how to think and for encouraging me to go bravely where my curiosity and interests were taking me; Frederic Wakeman, Jr. for his consummate storytelling and high standards; Lydia Liu for gracefully encouraging a determinedly historical approach to her literary-theoretical concerns and for her excitement at my initial exploration of the gun-object in the Youth Army; Peggy Anderson for being a sterling example of how to herd cats (teach a graduate seminar) and for reminding me to keep the non-specialist reader firmly in mind at all times; and Keith Schoppa for diverting me away from law school by dazzling me with the rich vistas of the human past, and for enriching both my scholarship and personal life with his intellectual rigor and his committed friendship. Finally, both Kevin O’Brien and Brett Sheehan deserve special thanks for their gracious involvement with my dissertation despite the lack of any obligation to do so. And, of course, I am indebted to all the scholars whose work I have drawn upon. Citations rarely adequately convey the degree to which scholars are indebted to other researchers. I particularly wish to thank those who have worked on the Chinese military, in years past a nearly sure-fire way to relegate one’s research to obscurity in the field of Chinese history.

If the academic debts behind a dissertation are the most obvious, the personal one are no less vital. I am grateful to my parents for consistently indulging my childhood curiosities. John and Kum Williams, Charles and Chou Tung, and Mike and Emily Limm all have my heartfelt thanks for friendship, camaraderie and providing balance to an academic life. A special thanks goes to Ye Li (叶梨) for being the first to befriend me when I arrived alone in Chongqing. Chen Bo (陈波) at Jiaotong University was not only a kindred spirit despite our very different academic fields, but also a fantastic guide who enthusiastically introduced me to many of the spicy gastronomical adventures in the city. Miranda Brown at the University of Michigan has been an unwavering friend, always ready with help, advice, and encouragement.

- v -
And finally, it is commonplace to credit one’s spouse, but I make no apologies for feeling that my acknowledgement transcends the cliché simply because it is mine: Paula, without you this dissertation would never have been written. I am grateful beyond words for all the uncounted ways you have supported me through the years, but above all for how you never gave up on me, even when I had given up on myself. I am awed by you.

- vi -
Introduction

Logistical Citizenship

This is a study of citizenship in a society that was “under the gun.” Citizenship is always a matter of both obligation and commitment, of coercion and consent. In wartime, these dualities become starker, more difficult to harness together even as the need to do so becomes yet more imperative. This dissertation examines both aspects of citizenship in one region in wartime China (1937-1945), as the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) attempted to square the circle of coercion and consent by creating a national army, an army that would be an instrument of state-making as much as a tool of national defense for a deeply divided country. Making a state is both an administrative and an ideological project.

Largely reliant on compulsory military service, the Nationalist army would resist Japan’s invasion for a full eight years. Despite sporadic policy statements after the Northern Expedition (1926-28), conscription preparations were undertaken only in the early 1930s, and finally pursued in desperate earnestness when the Japanese invaded north China at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao 蘆溝橋) on 7 July 1937. Japan initially wanted to localize the conflict, keeping it contained to north China, but Chiang Kaishek, after years of temporizing, deliberately expanded the war’s scope, opening a second theater in south China, near Shanghai. Full-scale war engulfed much of the country, with Shanghai falling in November. Nanjing, the KMT’s capital, fell just a month later in an orgy of bloodletting. The machinery of government along with hundreds of thousands of refugees moved inland to the tri-city area of Wuhan on the Yangzi River. When Wuhan fell to the Japanese in October 1938 after ten more months of fighting, the government moved up the river again, behind the mountain walls of Sichuan, to Chongqing at the juncture of the Yangzi and Jialing Rivers. And there, on the craggy peninsula, the Nationalists literally dug in, building hundreds of air raid shelters and tunnels to defend against the Japanese bombings. The war ground on for nearly three more years before Pearl Harbor, and another three and a half after that.

In the broadest sense, the significance of our story is suggested by the fact that during the war much of society and culture was militarized, thus the most direct form of that militarization – the extraction of men from their communities to serve as soldiers – should be examined in close detail. As Arthur Waldron has remarked about the Zhili-Fengtian wars of 1924-5, “military modernization has been perhaps the single most important engine of change in China since the nineteenth century. Certainly it was during the period we are considering [mid-1920s], and it has rarely yielded that role since.”1 This military modernization was not just concerned with technicalities of upgrading armaments and military education, but was also intensely political. The Nationalist army would make a clear break with earlier modes of mobilization, leaving behind the Qing dynasty’s (1644-1911) reliance on community and hereditary recruitment and the warlord’s (1910s-30s) mercenary practices in favor of a studiously modern emphasis on the compulsory service of individual citizens. Suspicious of the energies of the social order and of market motives, the Nationalists sought to forge a direct relationship between the state and individual citizens through the obligation of military service.

1. Arthur Waldron, From War to Nationalism: China’s Turning Point, 1924-1925, p. 56.
Map I-1: Japanese Occupied Territory 1937-1945

note: dates indicate when the Japanese occupied the city or area.
The KMT fundamentally changed modes of military mobilization, undeniably moving away from mercenary and socially-based recruitment. Philip Kuhn, in his study of late-Qing mobilization, astutely commented that “in shaping the characteristics of militarization and conflict in recent Chinese history, social forms have taken primacy over political orientation.” The Nationalist authorities broke decisively with the imperial and warlord period patterns. Conscription ran into real problems in both Chongqing and the countryside, bumping up against social limits on its efficiency and fairness, but the change from imperial and warlord modes of mobilization was clear: the political was now dominant over the social. Patriotic rhetoric aside, armed resistance to Japan was not spontaneous, but had to be manufactured – even compelled – by the Nationalist state. Under a dispassionate historical eye, the War against Japan puts the lie to the myth of China’s spontaneous, righteous resistance to foreign aggression, a cherished Shibboleth since the Sanyuanli skirmish in the Opium War era. Current historiography within the PRC and Taiwan still attributes the victory to the unmatched power of the united Chinese people. This story is untenable, except within the bounds of “national myth.” Numerous studies of “traitors” (hanjian 汉奸), collaboration, various regional regimes under control of Japan, and the various “peace movements” make this point again and again. There was no spontaneous unity in resisting the invaders. As in everything else, China was fractured and divided.

Resistance was a product of a state extracting resources of men and material out of a war-torn interior. That this extraction was often violent, undemocratic, levied unequally on the population, does not detract from seeing it as the primary factor behind the Nationalists’ stubborn resistance. After decades of following the CCP’s claims that its People’s Army – a stand-in for the righteous ire of the “whole people” (quanguo renmin 全国人民) – was the primary fighting force opposing the Japanese, scholars are now revising their position. The Nationalist state and its National Army are being acknowledged as having borne the brunt of the Japanese assault. The gradual deterioration of that army, along with its slide into a very passive battle stance, do not in the final tally detract from this new assessment either. That the army managed to survive, to continue to face the enemy, and occupy his attention, was all that was needed for victory. The army created by the Nationalist government would resist Japan for a full eight years, despite a nearly uninterrupted string of defeats, retreats, and massive losses.

The war was a watershed event that changed the trajectory of modern China; the crucible of war forged the revolutionary tools that the communists would use in the Civil War and beyond.


3. China’s long history with its repeated returns to “unity” has created the impression that modern nationalism / patriotism is natural in China. Political rhetoric and scholarly studies have long over-emphasized the unified eras, which implicitly naturalize loyalty to the nation by treating it as a given. More recently, periods of disunity have received more attention, reminding us that unity even in China is created – usually at the point of a spear or the barrel of a gun. This is a necessary corrective to paradigms of “natural” or inevitable unity that were smuggled inside ideas such as the dynastic cycle. Still, Wakeman’s study of the Qing conquest reminds us, conquering is not enough: the state must elicit sacrifice loyalty. For the Qing this meant nourishing a dynastic loyalty among a scholarly and military elite. For the Nationalist regime – and the Communist one which followed it – it meant a modern incorporation of “the common man” as a citizen, bound by both obligation and loyalty to the government. This is loyalty not merely to an imagined community of a nation, but the practical sense of obligation rendered to a specific government or state.
Yet, in many ways, despite the presence of Western military advisors and a body of foreign journalists, the story of the Nationalist (KMT) controlled interior is less well-known today. This story is not one of “making revolution” (to borrow Chen Yung-fa’s characterization of the CCP’s activities during the war), but of war-making, and more specifically the political projects embedded within the war’s fundamental task of mobilizing men for the army.

The War against Japan was a curious example of the genre; thoroughly modern in many ways, it defied any road to military victory by either of the antagonists. China could never realistically expect to expel the Japanese invader on its own. Yet, in one of the most startling examples of the ironies that warfare so regularly exhibits, an army that barely won a handful of engagements against its enemy managed to win the war – or perhaps, more accurately, to survive and, thus, not lose it. This was clearly not victory in the conventional sense of military defeat of the enemy. Instead it was a political achievement: the demonstration of the bankruptcy of Japan’s “adventure” in China rested on mere survival. Military defeat of the enemy was not strictly necessary. Just months before the war broke out, a Russian observer predicted the nature of Chinese “victory”: “Thrown to the ground, she [China] will rise up again till her enemy is exhausted.”

In short, “victory” rested on the politico-administrative mobilization of manpower that kept at bay the complete collapse of the Nationalist military and government despite the loss of most of its major population centers, almost all of its industrial base, huge swaths of productive agricultural land, virtually all international trade routes and ports, and millions of casualties.

During the war, China absorbed shocking losses on the front-lines. Official numbers put China's military casualties at 3,211,419. If even close to being accurate, this number indicates a casualty rate of nearly 25% of the 14 million men conscripted. Securing the replacements for those millions of dead and wounded soldiers, as well as the millions more who deserted on the way to the front, was the most central task for the Nationalist government from late 1937 right through early 1945. Official tallies indicate that China drafted a total of 14,053,988 men between 1937 and 1945, for an average of 1.5 million men annually. In the words of F. F. Liu, it was “barely sufficient to enable her troops to meet the demands of modern war.”

---

6. Ibid., p. 137.
Table I-1: China’s Official Military Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>wounded</th>
<th>killed</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>242,232</td>
<td>125,130</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>367,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>485,804</td>
<td>249,213</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>735,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>176,891</td>
<td>169,652</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>346,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>333,838</td>
<td>339,530</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>673,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>137,254</td>
<td>144,915</td>
<td>17,314</td>
<td>299,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>114,180</td>
<td>87,917</td>
<td>45,070</td>
<td>247,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>81,957</td>
<td>43,223</td>
<td>37,715</td>
<td>162,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>103,596</td>
<td>102,719</td>
<td>4,419</td>
<td>210,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>85,583</td>
<td>57,659</td>
<td>25,608</td>
<td>168,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,761,335</td>
<td>1,319,958</td>
<td>130,126</td>
<td>3,211,419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: He Yingqin, Banian kangzhan, np (second chart in supplemental section)

Nationalist recruitment for the army would exhibit both state building and citizenship projects. State-making’s dual dimensions of administrative enmeshment (coercion) and loyal identification with the state (consent) are encompassed in the idea of “logistical citizenship.” Wartime mobilization of manpower involved sustained administrative initiatives, on the central and local levels, in order to extract men from their villages and communities. In this extractive sense, military service was akin to taxation: levies were imposed, had to be “paid” and then moved to the front. This was a logistical concern – a literal disposition of bodies – and the machinery of government to carry out this extraction had to be created more or less from whole cloth. Underpinning this administrative expansion was the fundamental myth of the Nationalist state, that it was coterminous with the nation. This myth meshed tightly with authorities’ suspicion of social energies and market motives for mobilizing society, finding symbolic expression in an ideology of military service in which the Nationalist state ascribed to itself the functions of market and society, becoming the symbolic conduit (exchange mechanism) for honor, political capital, and economic benefits. Nationalist authorities endowed military service, and particularly the compulsory draft, with hopes for genuine political commitment among the draftees and interior society more generally. Conscription was, Nationalist authorities hoped, a way to inculcate genuine loyalty among a new breed of citizen-soldiers. At its heart, this hoped-for identification of the citizen with the state was also logistical: a willing acceptance of the state’s direction, and a rejection of earlier modes of mobilization that relied on social resources and market forces. In short, logistical citizenship entailed the construction of an ideological edifice around military service that construed the Nationalist state as the proper mechanism of exchange for political capital and economic goods within China and as coterminous with the people itself. This was a symbolic “logistical state” that was to be reaffirmed in the loyal service of citizen-soldiers. Ironically, the illegitimate commercialization of compulsory service would undermine the hope of achieving this within the conscription administration.

Much to the chagrin of Chiang and his generals, this ideological construction was never
successfully rooted in, nor experienced by, the conscripted draftees, who remained alienated and aloof from the regime – their propensity to desert on the way to the front was legendary. Instead, identification with the state would be achieved only in an elite force of volunteers in the last years of the war: affirmation of the state and its logistical role was eventually found in voluntary service. It was only with the Youth Army volunteers that the Nationalists’ “logistical citizenship” was successfully encoded. There, the densely packed symbology of the gun itself, would finally affirm the Nationalist state in terms it desperately sought. Embedded within the identification with the state that the KMT hoped to inculcate among its citizen-soldiers was not only a new configuring of the state-individual relationship, but a vision of the state as coterminous with the people and as the (logistical) mechanism of exchange that would supplant social and market forces. My neologism of logistical citizenship is meant to unite the two halves of wartime military service: its practical administrative aspects and the idealized ideological aggrandizement of the state, as identification of citizens with the state that the Nationalist state hoped to inculcate in its rank and file soldiers and as the “logistical” mechanism of mobilization, extraction, and exchange. This term, while unusual, encompasses the coercive and consensual, administrative and ideological aspects of military service under the Nationalists during the War against Japan.

While the concept of citizenship is most often used in scholarly circles to link to concepts of rights, here I am using it differently. First, it is the way in which people are embedded in a state’s administrative system, on an individual basis. Second, it indicates the individual’s identification with the state. In the scholarly literature, these two dimensions are most commonly tied to rights, following T. H. Marshall’s classic formulation. Marshall put (Western) citizenship into a rubric of expanding circles of rights: civil citizenship pertained to individual rights (to property, liberty, justice); political citizenship covered the rights to exercise political power (voting and other participations in governance); and social citizenship involved economic rights (to livelihood and social welfare). But there is no reason why the notion of citizenship has to be dominated by language and notions of rights, when it is clearly just as imbricated in systems of obligation. In short, other arenas of state-society interaction can be viewed through the prism of citizenship, as Elizabeth Perry has recently done by looking at worker militias in China from 1921 through the 1980s. In this same vein, the editors of a recent conference volume have noted, the category of citizenship – particularly political citizenship – “spotlights the specific interconnections between” state and society without any presuppositions about the autonomy of either one, which is not the case for dialogues around the concepts of civil society, for example. Thus, recent discussions of citizenship in modern China have demonstrated a broad approach to the topic covering gender, minority or ethnic issues, labor, village elections, protest movements, private entrepreneurship, and law. Instead of rights, this dissertation focuses on the obligational (coercive) and identification (consensual) aspects of citizenship as seen

7. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1950 and Class, Citizenship, and Social Development, New York, Doubleday, 1964. Marshall’s categories are also temporal, each successive circle of citizenship rights gets added to the previous as citizenship is extended over time. In China, of course, things look very different: some social citizenship policies have existed for millennia, but political citizenship rights are still almost non-existent.

through the prism of wartime military service and its complicated relationship to citizenship, as administratively constructed by the nation-state of Nationalist China during the Second World War. It is an exploration of one nation-state as it went about trying to create the administrative unity underneath it, namely the realization or mobilization of the national ideal of the citizen-soldier, amidst some of the most trying conditions possible.

As will become clear, neither half of the logistical citizenship project within Nationalist military service was fully achieved. Despite policymakers’ intense suspicion of voluntary service for its mercenary associations, they were unable to rid the draft system of commercial aspects, as men were hired or literally bought and sold into service. This not only contradicted deeply held convictions within Nationalist circles, but it rankled as a political failure to leave behind the mercenary recruitment of the warlord period that had invited foreign aggression by fostering domestic division and national weakness. Efforts at village-level institution building in the years just prior to the war installed a system of local administration, but the lowest administrators remained enmeshed in their communities and thus were not wholly reliable state agents. Commercialized and corrupt, the draft administration succeeded in securing the manpower to continue fighting the war, but politically it was a failure and a festering sore spot.

In 1944, when the Japanese Ichigo Offensive carved through Nationalist territory, Chiang Kaishek turned in a new direction: voluntary recruitment among educated youth to form an elite force. Although the resulting Youth Army was a modest force of some 100,000 men and it never saw action against the Japanese, it was significant in that it was carried out primarily by civilian agencies, rather than the formal conscription administration. Although militarily marginal during the last months of the war, the Youth Army soldiers embodied the ideal citizen-soldier that the Nationalists had been attempting to create. Consistent with the Nationalists’ suspicion of both market and socially determined mobilization, the Youth Army and the army’s material object of the gun put forward a vision of the state in which it symbolically assumed the role of exchange mechanism. The volunteers and their propaganda carefully constructed a visage of a politically committed citizen-soldiery that reaffirmed the Nationalist state’s most fundamental myth, that the state itself was coterminous with the Chinese people. Their identification with the state validated the Nationalist regime as a substitute for social and economic forms of recruitment, extraction, and allocation: the state became the exchange mechanism for political and economic distributions. Yet, the KMT state was never able to achieve this except in the ideological hall of mirrors surrounding the Youth Army and their guns. Thus, the ideal of a politically committed soldiery was impossible to extend beyond the narrow, elite social base that had enlisted as volunteers in the movement. Despite the achievements of the political projects embedded within Nationalist military service, logistical citizenship remained only partially realized: administrative (coercion) and loyal identification (consent) remained separated by an unbridgeable gulf.

Geographies of the State

It is important to state explicitly what this dissertation means by “state-making”, and just as important to answer the question of “which state is being made?” State-making involves the administrative expansion of state structures and powers. This refers primarily to institutional growth, but it does not require that these be functioning completely as intended. It is clear that conscription was deeply dysfunctional throughout the war; yet, just as clearly, it was a part of the Nationalist state’s increased responsibilities and capabilities: its reach remained constrained by social realities and even by itself, but it reached further into the villages and city neighborhoods than ever before. A related dimension of state-making is the normative change, particularly the
enlargement of legitimate or expected state activity (this is the subject of Chapter One). In terms of compulsory service, this normative change was already underway – often spearheaded by non-governmental actors, such as intellectuals, modernizers, and National Salvation activists – before the war.

In this study, the frequent invocation of “the state” has some boundaries. In fact, no such single entity existed. There was a multiplicity of states even within Nationalist-held territory. In Yunnan, for example, the provincial strongman, Long Yun, successfully limited the influence and authority of Chiang and the central government for most of the war. Llyod Eastman correctly reminds us that even during the dire days of the Second Sino-Japanese war, Chiang never held full control over a significant portion of his political and military machinery:

Even in the provinces most obviously subject to Nationalist authority, the lower levels of administration were customarily dominated by local elites over whom the central government had little control. Nearly half of the army was officered by generals who could not be trusted to obey the orders of the central authorities. Many of the provinces during the entire decade of the 1940's were ruled by 'chairmen' who felt little loyalty to Chiang and who had autonomous sources of political and military power.9

Thus, we must not essentialize what was an incredibly complex set of institutions that were often working at cross-purposes. The KMT government was even more complicated than most in this regard: competing and overlapping agencies were the norm, not the exception. A unitary term (“the state”) has trouble adequately describing such situations and yet, it seems necessary to describe the normative dimension (what the authorities believed they were creating) and the experiential dimension (how people perceived the power and authority to which they were subject). It is an indispensable shorthand.

This project is largely concerned with the central government, but the discussion of how the central institutions interacted with more local ones, as well as with local communities, provides a multi-level perspective that goes beyond the central government. As the discussion of Chongqing’s honeycombed society makes clear, even within the capital, the state was divided against itself, often pulling in different directions.

This study is also tightly bounded geographically. Of necessity, the discussion of prewar developments (chapter one) and the description of the draft system as a whole (chapter two) cover larger swaths of Nationalist China, but the analysis of conscription on the ground (in chapters three and four) is narrowly constrained to the city of Chongqing and the ten counties that ringed the city. These counties were part of the Third Administrative District (3AD), a government tier between the province and the counties. As a point of reference, Sichuan province during the war had some 150 counties; thus, the description of rural conscription is based on the police and administrative records from less than ten per cent of the province – and it was the province that was most completely under Nationalist control. Sichuan, Chongqing, and the 3AD were not entirely representative of unoccupied China, nor even of Nationalist-held areas, but to get down to the lowest level in a meaningful way required a tight geographical focus. I felt that a ground-level look was more valuable than trying to expand the geographical scope of the study.10 “The Nationalist state” in Sichuan was not identical with “the Nationalist

10. While doing field research in China, I had the opportunity to go to Chengdu to use the Sichuan provincial archives. I chose to stay at the Chongqing Municipal Archives, because the mass of
system, which are intimately connected with violence. This aspect, as well as information live in are the result, as well as the constitutive reality, of our nation-states and the nation-state dialectical materialism, Anthony Giddens points out that the administratively unified societies we start. In the introduction to The Nation-State and Violence, the second volume of his trilogy on dialectical materialism, Anthony Giddens points out that the administratively unified societies we live in are the result, as well as the constitutive reality, of our nation-states and the nation-state system, which are intimately connected with violence. This aspect, as well as information control, has been almost systematically ignored in Marxist analyses of the nation-state.11 As

materials, particularly police files on conscription in the city of Chongqing and the counties of the 3AD, was so large.

11. Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, pp. 18-20. The reason I look to Giddens as opposed to more conventional social theorists (Marxist and Weberian) is that he is one of the few to take serious consideration of the role of violence, and the means of violence, in the formation and development of the nation-state. Marxist analyses tend to marginalize these aspects, while Weber's definition of the state as a territorially bounded entity that monopolizes the means of violence maps a recent (modern) and ideal state back onto all states, completely missing what Giddens rightly divines: that the means of violence is an important element in the coagulation of modern nation-states. Durkheim sees the state as the concrete form of “social thought,” an embodiment of society except in certain ‘pathological’ cases, and thus, he underestimates the degree to which the state apparatus can exist as an organizational power base, detached from a strong social base, a situation which characterized almost all Chinese states after 1911 all the way through the Nationalist era. Furthermore, other theorists of the nation, such as Ernest Gellner, leave us with an analysis of the nation that applies virtually equally well to dynastic China as to modern nations. Giddens, on the other hand, is cognizant of the ways in which violence intersects with various factors such as surveillance (knowledge-based power) and industrial organization, as well as the international
Giddens may lead us to suspect, looking to the war period to elucidate the fundamentals of the KMT – or even the modern Chinese – state is thoroughly reasonable. The war pushed government policies further in the direction of social involvement and administrative penetration of society: its exigencies and necessities – the severity of circumstances – led to heavy hands, insistent administration and thick political rhetoric, all of which laid bare the logical ‘structure’ of the government’s policies and ideology.

True enough, the Nationalist state-building efforts were fitful, uneven, and erratic, but they were genuine attempts to build a viable and modern state. It was perfectly understandable that the communist opposition would build from the bottom up, precisely because it was not saddled with the demands of administering a central government, defending a vast territory, building a national military, or conducting complicated and multi-vectored foreign policy. Enjoying the advantages as well as the burdens of those tasks, the KMT chose to build at the center as a prerequisite for local administration. Revolutionary rhetoric aside, this was a reasonable approach. In one sense, the fact that Nationalist state-making was not successful was accidental and not systemic at all: the demands of war put almost impossible pressure on the regime, provided an important period of respite and growth to its domestic challenger, and left the regime amid postwar waters filled with dangerous political and military shoals that it failed to navigate well. The postwar collapse, however, should not completely dominate our understanding of the war, which must be taken on its own terms.

The fixation on a revolutionary paradigm is not found just on the Chinese mainland. Western, particularly American, scholarship on the War of Resistance has also largely effaced the Nationalist state and its prosaic war-making in favor of a revolutionary paradigm. In fact, this tendency goes all the way back to the war itself, with the intense disillusionment and criticism leveled against Chiang and his government by journalists and American military and intelligence advisors. These critical accounts, however, were not written in a vacuum but in the context of intense propaganda (in English) by pro-KMT writers throughout the war. Men like Lin Yutang did yeoman’s service for Chiang by writing for western audiences. And, in fact, the critical accounts went against official US policy which stood behind the Nationalists throughout the Civil War as well (though not in ways that satisfied anyone as it was motivated more from the desire to contain presumed Soviet influence rather than any real enthusiasm for Chiang), earning the CCP and Mao’s intense distrust as the Civil War drew to a close.¹² As if to offset the official boosterism of the American government and English language propagandists for Chiang’s government, progressive journalists and frustrated military advisors adopted a skeptical and bitter tone in their assessments of Chiang and the KMT government.¹³ This literature remains

¹². For a review of the growing tension in 1948–49 between the CCP and US, see Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation, pp. 33–62.

¹³. This attitude was often coupled with a naïve acceptance of CCP’s carefully constructed democratic face. Among many others, books that fall into this category include: John S. Service and Joseph W. Esherick, ed., Lost Chance in China; the World War II Despatches of John S. Service. (New York, 1974); Oliver J. Caldwell, A Secret War: Americans in China, 1944-1945. (Carbondale, IL, 1972); Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China. (New York, 1975); Agnes Smedley, China Correspondent, (London and Boston, 1984); and Lawrence K. Rosinger, China’s Wartime Politics, 1937-1944, (Princeton, 1945) and China’s Crisis (New York, 1945). Barbara Tuchman’s famous biography of Stilwell, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (1970) falls
important and useful in that it documented, often in moving and graphic terms, the harshness and inhumane treatment of conscripts and soldiers.

As just one example, White and Jacoby’s description captures some of the horrors of the draft:

Chinese recruiting had none of the trimmings of number-drawing, physical examination, or legal exemption. Chungking [Chongqing] decided how many men it wanted and assigned a certain quota to each province; the quota was subdivided for each county and village, and then the drafting began. In some areas it was relatively honest, but on the whole it was unspeakably corrupt. No one with money need fight; local officials, for a fat profit, sold exemptions to the rich at standard open prices. Any peasant who could scrape the money together brought his way out. The men who were finally seized were often those who could least afford to leave their families. When a district had been stripped of eligible men, passersby were waylaid or recruits bought from organized press gangs at so much a head. Men were killed or mutilated in the process; sometimes they starved to death before they reached a recruiting camp. Men in the Chinese army never had a furlough, never went home, rarely received mail.

Going into the army was usually a death sentence – and more men died on their way to the army, through the recruiting process, the barbarous training camps, and long route marches, than after getting into it.\(^4\)

This quote could be lengthened for several pages outlining the multitude of maladies – illness, supply, lack of training, poor officer corps – that plagued the Chinese army. White and Jacoby are even-handed enough to admit that many of these faults are not solely China’s: “A significant portion of all the ills and evils came from the siege conditions under which China existed, and for the shortages American policy was as much to blame as anything. No other country in modern times was ever blockaded as China was after the closing of the Burma Road.”\(^5\)

John S. Service, as a US State Department representative in China, took a similarly dim view: “a pernicious and corrupt conscription system works to ensure the selection and retention of the unfit – since the ablest and strongest can either evade conscription, buy their way out or desert. It starves and maltreats most of its troops to the degree that their military effectiveness is greatly impaired and military service is regarded in the minds of the people as a sentence of death.”\(^6\)

However, these thumbnail accounts predictably fall short on the causes and fundamental nature of the abuses. As the quote from White and Jacoby illustrates, they paint conscription with a very broad brush, suggesting the whole from top to bottom was chaos and naked force.

\(^4\) White and Jacoby, *Thunder out of China*, pp. 133.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 142.

\(^6\) John Service and Joseph Esherick, eds., *Lost Chance in China*, p. 143, included in a dispatch on 20 June 1944.
Content to label it “corruption,” there is no attempt to provide an analysis of the institutions or the nature of the malfunctions in the military service system. Instead, these writers use conscription abuses to make a political point about the shakiness or illegitimacy of the Nationalist government. The draft became a political talisman, a warning to US policymakers and politicians about their bed-mate or ally, and an indirect suggestion that the communists may have been a better, more democratic alternative. For example, John Service was convinced that only the communists’ form of guerrilla resistance offered any hope for China and that by mid-1944 large-scale uprisings to resist conscription were imminent and would undermine or even topple the KMT regime. His dire predictions of large-scale conscription uprisings never materialized and from recent scholarship, we now know that Service’s partisan dispatches to Washington were based on an idealized and very incomplete understanding of what was occurring in communist base areas (see the studies cited below). At a minimum, this contemporary diplomatic and journalistic accounts, in general, and descriptions of conscription in particular, were part of the foundations for the argument that the communist revolution was inevitable due to the Nationalist government’s abuse of the common people. In that sense, this literature contributed to the fascination with the revolutionary process that has dominated western scholarship since.

American disillusionment and disappointment with the KMT government intensified with the Nationalist defeat in the Civil War, which produced recriminations and attempts to find who was responsible for the “loss of China.” Over the years, a large body of scholarship has coalesced around the CCP’s expansion during the war years. Chalmers Johnson’s groundbreaking book, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford, 1962), was the first salvo in this debate. Johnson argued that communist growth was due to its commitment to the nationalism aroused among the peasantry as the Japanese burnt, looted, raped, and killed their way across the countryside. This theme, in modified form, was picked up by Mark Seldon, whose *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China* (Harvard, 1971) also saw a lack of divisive class struggle and an emphasis on a “mass line” that combined anti-Japanese unity and moderate reforms to alleviate rural distress as the engine behind the CCP’s expansion in northwestern China. A new generation of studies in the 1980s and 90s, however, examined the CCP’s growth in the middle-Yangzi region and Henan, finding that things were not so simple. Studies by Chung Yung-fa, *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937–1945* (Berkeley, 1986); Oderic Wou, *Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan* (Stanford, 1994); and Pauline Keating, *Two Revolutions: Village Reconstruction and the Cooperative Movement in Northern Shaanxi, 1934–1945* (Stanford, 1997) argue convincingly that the CCP’s expansion in rural areas was built on careful political maneuverings, including class struggle in the form of land reform, manipulating elections, co-optation of local strongmen and bandits, and even outright coercion. A whole range of political and military strategies all played their part in the CCP’s mobilization in rural China.¹⁷ Chang Hung-tai in *War and Popular Culture* (Berkeley, 1994) takes a different approach, examining forms of resistance propaganda produced and disseminated by the Nationalist government, leftists, and communists to make a larger point about the creation of a nation-wide popular culture. Chang argues that resistance propaganda was the vehicle by which forms of urban popular culture (cartoons, newspapers, and

¹⁷ A very clear statement of the outlines and evolution of the debate through the mid-1980s can be found in Chen Yung-fa’s introduction to *Making Revolution*, pp. 1-19.
drama, most notably) spread into the countryside. However, he too finds a partial explanation for the revolution in this story: the Nationalists could only produce narrowly patriotic appeals, while the communists were effective in forging a genuinely new national culture around the resistance war. The war in all these studies takes its significance from the fact that it was the context for the communists’ dramatic expansion.

A small subset of American academics continued to work on the Nationalist regime. Most prominent among them was Lloyd Eastman, whose two famous books on the KMT regime between 1927 and 1945, contained a common perspective, that from 1927 Chiang’s government underwent an almost uninterrupted decline. We shall have opportunity to return to Eastman later, but here the titles of his two books are sufficient to demonstrate his perspective that social revolution was the only appropriate avenue for development and that the Nationalist state was disintegrating: The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937 (Harvard, 1974) and Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937-1949 (Stanford, 1984). William Kirby, looking at the pre-war relationship between China and Germany, portrays a more balanced view of state growth and expansion, particularly in central economic institutions and reconstruction policies in his Germany and Republican China (Stanford, 1984). In some respects, this dissertation could be seen as a successor to Kirby’s work: an attempt to take seriously the Nationalist state’s growth and capabilities in a particular, and fundamental, area.

More recently, collaboration has been a trendy topic in scholarship about the war. This scholarship draws on John Boyle’s initial exploration of high-level politics and diplomacy in China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford, 1972). In a similar vein, studies have examined the difficult choices confronting intellectuals (Fu Poshek, Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937-1945; Stanford 1997), as well as common people and local elites, in occupied areas (David Barrett and Larry Shyu, eds., Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945, Stanford 2001; and Timothy Brook, Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China, Harvard 2007). These collaboration stories challenge the conventional notions of natural, total resistance to the Japanese, a perspective that Rana Mitter’s work on the constructed myth of resistance in Manchuria in the early 1930s shares (The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China, Berkeley, 2000). These studies underpin my dissertation in that they de-construct the myth of spontaneous resistance, though I want to take that point in a new direction: looking at the state mechanisms that administratively supported – even created and compelled – resistance.

Very recently, the next generation of studies has just begun to turn their attention to the KMT-held interior and the experience of the war there.\textsuperscript{18} In his Workers at War: Labor in China's Arsenals, 1937-1953 (Stanford, 2004), Joshua Howard focuses on workers in Chongqing’s many arsenals, exploring the KMT’s militarization of war labor and the radicalizing effect that had on worker consciousness. Stephen MacKinnon has explored the confluence of circumstances and influences that produced the Wuhan experience, a unique solidarity of

\textsuperscript{18} An important exception to this tardy look at interior society is inflation and monetary policy. The 1950s and 60s saw a series of studies of this aspect of the war: Kia-ngau, Chang, The Inflationary Spiral; the Experience in China, 1939-1950 (Cambridge, MA, 1958); Shun-hsin Chou, The Chinese Inflation, 1937-1949 (New York, 1963) and Arthur N. Young, China’s Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937-1945 (Cambridge, MA, 1965).
military, government and social forces in 1938 in *Wuhan, 1938: War, Refugees, and the Making of Modern China* (Berkeley, 2008). Despite this (re)turn to the interior war experience, no one has yet tackled the question of the mobilization of manpower for military service, which was the fundamental task facing the Nationalist government as it fought for national survival.

In fact, the mundane aspects of Nationalist governance and war-making seem to get lost in many discussions of the war and interior China. For example, in their famous book, White and Jacoby acknowledge the role the bombings played in cementing Chongqing’s greatness and resistance. The city “could oppose the strength of the Japanese with only three resources: the magnificent caves in the rock cliffs on which the city rested, the almost fantastic air-raid precaution system that Chinese ingenuity so quickly contrived, and the indomitable will of the people.”

But, their phrasing completely erases the government’s role. All three advantages that Chongqing possessed for White and Jacoby were innate in the place or the people. The caves are a purely natural resource; and the Chinese people’s “ingenuity” is responsible for the warning system, while their amorphous “will” motivates resistance. White and Jacoby neglect to mention that both the shelters and the warning system were the result of government organization, nor the fact that the will to resist was in large measure dependent on the government maintaining a minimum level of morale by continuously rebuilding in the wake of the bombings. More recently, Lee McIsaac has analyzed the political symbology of the government’s building of a ramshackle wartime capital – the intricacies of political “projections” – with barely a nod to the achievements that were secured in spite of immense pressures and limitations (financial and otherwise).

In essence, non-Chinese scholarship is still caught in the paradigm set by Barbara Tuchman in her famous biography of Stilwell, which claimed that by 1940 or so the “only” goal left for the Nationalists was the bald retention of power, a perspective that is intensely colored by Stilwell’s myopia and bitter assessment of Chiang. Achievements which would be lauded as incredible governmental successes for other regimes – a la London’s unbowed head under the Luftwaffe’s bombing – are attributed to natural geography and some amorphous indomitable “will of the people,” rather than governmental actions in China. Perhaps the cynicism is so entrenched in western scholarship because of the bitter and intense disillusionment with Chiang’s government that was setting in during the late war and Civil War years, but the consistent minimization of real accomplishments and portrayal of the Nationalist government as concerned only with its own legitimacy and authority is due for significant revision.

**Study Parameters**

In addition to the tight geographical boundaries discussed earlier, this study is confined to specific aspects of Nationalist military service. While it presents a multi-faceted look at conscription and the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement (IYVM) in 1943-45, it does not

---

22. Chapter Two includes aspects of conscription that pertained in some fashion to all of Nationalist territory, but is concerned primarily with Sichuan province. Chapters Three and Four narrow the focus even more, to just the city of Chongqing, which was the wartime capital, and the surrounding countryside, specifically the ten counties of the 3AD.
pretend to be a comprehensive history of wartime military service under the Nationalists. Writing such an account would require access to the unpublished archives, particularly internal documents, minutes, and personnel files, of the Military Service Office (hereafter, MSO, for Bingyishu 兵役署). (There are doubtless many nuances, corrections, and surprises waiting to be uncovered in those archives.) Mobilization of manpower for the military connects to a vast array of social, political, administrative, and financial topics and thus is far too broad a subject to cover adequately in one volume. Instead, the focus here is on the political aspects of military service: the Nationalist state-making attempts and citizenship (the construction of loyalty) among the would-be soldiers. Thus, only a few of the many possible avenues of inquiry are dealt with here.

Topically, several large areas fall outside my concerns. Militarily, this project sidesteps issues of the Japanese-Chinese balance of power, the influence of specific campaigns and the draft’s impact on battles. The domestic balance of power between Chiang’s central armies and those of (former) warlords is discussed, but only in general terms. It bears emphasizing that I will not discuss soldiers’ battlefield experience. (The displacement of the War of Resistance by the communist Liberation narrative has meant that until very recently first-hand accounts of the battlefield by soldiers have been few and far between, making recovering the battlefield experiences of soldiers a difficult task.) Guerrilla units and the CCP’s armies are not covered either. I am also not going to delve into the common forms of mistreatment of conscripts by officers or the units delivering the new soldiers to the front lines. This was one of the most conspicuous forms of abuse in conscription, and it drew an enormous amount of attention from observers, including Chiang Kaishek, Chinese critics and supporters of the regime, and even foreign intelligence agents and reporters. But it is a familiar story – more than adequately covered in the anecdotal literature (news reporting, memoirs, etc.) of the time. The training (or non-training) of conscripts too is not of prime concern.

Furthermore, the benefits supposedly due to soldiers and their dependents and families – while a topic of considerable importance – makes its appearance largely as a given: the Nationalist state had thorough regulations on the books concerning the benefits to be delivered to the families of its soldiers, but in nearly all cases, for virtually the entire war, such programs were a colossal failure, woefully underfunded and laxly pursued. The number of recipients and the amount of aid they received was abysmally small. At most, the benefits regulations demonstrated that the Nationalists were willing to pay lip service – and not much more – to the ideal that the service of citizen-soldiers was worthy of state recompense for the soldiers’ sacrifices. The ideal, if not the practice, was consistent with prewar rhetoric and planning (see Chapter One). Connected to the benefits issue, and likewise more or less excluded from this chapter, is the issue of funding. The financial aspect of governance, and particularly the military and local fiduciary records, are a morass which I simply have not dared to venture into. That area connects to issues of international trade, Allied war aid to Chiang’s government, and the overall wartime economy on a scale that is beyond the interest of this study.

Geographical and population ramifications also are given only cameo appearances, while legal issues, such as constitutional concerns and the demarcation between civil and military law, are not touched upon. Finally, I am not going to discuss the important and fertile issue of ethnicity. The war was an era of intense re-mapping of China’s internal composition, as intellectuals and the state “discovered” and penetrated ethnic enclaves for the purpose of wartime mobilization. This was connected to the regime’s eviction from the eastern seaboard and its desperate need to mobilize people in the ethnically diverse frontier areas of the west and southwest of the country. Conscription in far-flung border areas in China’s western and southern
regions was a strong irritant, but also brought about new penetration of ethnic enclaves by the central administration. Fighting to preserve national sovereignty against foreign invasion, the Kuomintang paid much attention to the status of peripheral areas, such as Xinjiang and Tibet; these areas were increasingly important both as resources for national survival and as symbolic reaffirmations of Nationalist sovereignty. Fascinating as this de-centering move to the extreme periphery is, it too lies outside the scope of this more prosaic look at wartime state-making.

**Justifying Asymmetry**

Astute readers will have already noted that there is an asymmetry in this project. I do not deal with the experiences of conscripts after their extraction from their communities, but remain focused on the mechanisms of mobilization: the state and community interface. In contrast, my treatment of the IYVM volunteers (Youth Army) not only discusses the mobilization process but their experiences as (non-fighting) soldiers. In short, my reason is mainly that the Youth Army was exceptional. Conscripts were mobilized by force (exercised by the conscription agency and community structures); volunteers were individuals who responded to direct appeals to enlist. From the state’s perspective, the conscripts were soft, mute bricks shoved into place in the “New Great Wall” (of bodies) that Chiang was building. In that sense, their primary significance was military: China survived the war because they were forced into service. While they left little in the way of written testimony as to their experiences, thoughts, and self-image as soldiers, they spoke clearly enough with their feet: they deserted on the way to the front—in the millions. The eloquent testimony of their flight cannot be mistaken for anything other than a deep sense of alienation from the state that was pressing them into service. This alienation was rooted in the endemic abuses and commercialization of the draft, which undermined any chance that serving in the army would be a positive experience in citizenship for the conscripts. From start to finish being drafted was a grim lesson in political estrangement. Thus, the conscription administration which dragooned them was a political failure, even while being a strategic military success. It was this political failure that was behind Chiang's bitter assessment of conscription, and his execution of Cheng Zerun (程澤潤), head of the MSO, in 1945.

The Youth Army was distinctly different in all these aspects. Except for the earliest volunteers in 1943 (who fought in regular units in the Second Burma Campaign), the main volunteer drive took place in the context of Japan’s Ichigo Offensive, but the Youth Army did not see action against the Japanese at all. As the high tide of Ichigo receded, the Youth Army was put into a propaganda role. Its “service” was political, not military: an elite force that showed the Nationalist state could create the modern army of citizen-soldiers that it had dreamt of doing since Sun Yat-sen’s days. By and large, it was a public relations success, though one with inherent social limits due to its elitism. This political difference between the conscripts and volunteers is behind my choice to treat the youth volunteers' experience as distinct and worthy of extended analysis, in order to unpack the Nationalists' ideal of military service and citizenship. A further practical reason for the asymmetry is, of course, the difference in the available source material. Regular conscripts left few first-hand writings of their experiences. Their mistreatment while in the military is covered well enough anecdotally by contemporary observers and I do not wish to regurgitate that literature without being able to get inside the

23. Before he was recalled, Stilwell reported that only 56% of Chinese conscripts made it to their units; Liu, *A Military History*, p. 136-8.
conscripts’ heads. Befitting their propaganda role, the Youth Army soldiers, on the other hand, wrote constantly about their days in the barracks, so understanding what it meant to them to be a soldier is easier.

Structure and Summary

The study is structured analytically, not strictly chronologically. Chapter One outlines the historical precedents of recruitment, most specifically the socially-based militarization of the late-Qing and the mercenary recruitment of the warlord era. It also covers the normative dimensions of compulsory military service, highlighting the hopes for remedying China’s weaknesses that cultural critics as well as Nationalist military leaders pinned on conscription. Both the historical past and contemporary ideals suggest that conscription was a fundamental break from previous mobilizations, as it was an attempt by the state to mobilize individuals, as citizens, without relying on social mediators or market incentives. And finally, it narrates the story of the build up to war in a fresh way, covering the Nationalist government’s gradual moves to put the military on a war footing by first experimenting with and then expanding conscription. Chapter Two deals with the rapidly expanding institutional structures and shifting procedures of the draft to argue that compulsory service contained embedded political and state-making projects that were seriously impeded by the persistent commercialization of conscription: men were hired as substitute draftees or literally bought and sold. Chapter Three tackles the concrete context – geographical, political, and historical – in Sichuan and the state-building efforts connected with the administrative reforms the Nationalists undertook in the province between 1934 and the outbreak of the war. Chapter Four moves into a close examination of the patterns of conscription in rural counties and villages, the city of Chongqing, and factories. Individuals evaded; community elites shielded their residents, preyed on outsiders whenever they could and on their neighbors whenever they had no choice; and the densely packed urban institutions in Chongqing defended their human resources from the state’s agents. Labor, in particular, was easily provoked to violence against the draft men, due to its special place in the war effort and Nationalist attempts to “militarize” factory work symbolically. Chapter Five moves away from the draft to deal with the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement (IYVM), 1943-45. In contrast to conscription’s political debacle, the IYVM was a triumph. The battlefield situation in Burma and China provided the impetus for recruiting educated youth who were exempt from the draft, but rather than going through the military apparatus, the brunt of the burden for mobilizing the youth volunteers was born by a civilian agency, the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps (YC). Using its many tentacles in educational and cultural (publishing) circles, the YC was able to mobilize well over 100,000 volunteers. Deracinated refugee youth – students, teachers, petty professionals and civil servants – who were already dependent on the state and ravaged by inflation, volunteered to serve in the Intellectual Youth Army (zhishi qingnianjun 知识青年军). This elite force had a political, not military, mission: to legitimize the Nationalist state by embodying the ideal of citizen-soldiers. The importance that Chiang placed on this political mission is reflected in the fact that he placed his son, Jiang Jingguo, in control of the Youth Army’s powerful political bureau. Chapter Six examines in detail the cultural practices within and the autobiographical propaganda produced by the Youth Army to argue that a set of political technologies were deployed to inculcate a complex identity as elite citizen-soldiers in the volunteers. An excavation of the material object of the rifle, which stood at the center of the Youth Army’s political symbology, suggests the nature of Nationalist citizenship, not primarily as a position endowed with rights but as an affirmation of the fundamental myth of the Nationalist
state itself: that the state was coterminous with the people.

This dissertation is an exploration of one state as it organized resistance against a foreign invader and simultaneously tried to create administrative and political unity underneath it, amidst some of the most trying conditions possible. The story we are about to embark on is one of a state administratively creating one of the conditions of its own existence, its own “nation-statehood.” This is not a linear story, nor is it one of unqualified success. Instead, it is a story of losses as well as gains, of partial success, of suffering and struggle, of men and communities, of pens and guns. It is a story of war.²⁴

²⁴ War stories can be some of the most unwieldy for historians, as Arthur Waldron so trenchantly reminds: “War is a powerful and capricious historical actor that regularly confounds historians who try to tame it. It refuses to accept dependent status and follow easily along the contours of the economic, social, or intellectual developments that are usually considered primary. Rather, it cuts across other lines of causation, intervening to overturn and transform human society in unexpected and inscrutable ways”; Arthur Waldron, From War to Nationalism: China’s Turning Point, 1924-1925, pp. 8-9.
Chapter One

Repertoires of Recruitment: Historical Precedents and Nationalist Ideals

[I, He] Yingqin believe that the crux of the disputes and civil wars of the past ten years is that there are too many soldiers and their quality is too poor. Now that the Northern Expedition is completed and the entire country united, if the central government does not set out in the direction of abolishing the present system of recruiting soldiers and replacing it with a conscription system, then it will certainly be difficult to achieve a positive result from reorganizing the military, and it is hard to know what sort of extraordinary difficulties [we] will run into on the road to establishing the country. For this reason, I present this proposal . . .

– General He Yingqin, Military Service Proposal, September 1928

“Quickly build a new Great Wall out of our flesh and blood!”

– Conscription Slogan

1937: Lei Haizong’s Non-Martial China

In the summer of 1937 China’s students and intellectuals organized protest marches, demanding that the Nationalist government resist Japanese aggression. The Chinese Communist Party made its usual calls for unity and resistance. Chiang Kai-shek and his generals, with aid from a corps of German military advisors, continued their semi-secret preparations for war. On the campus of Qinghai University, surrounding the old Summer Palace about eight km north of the center of Beijing in the Haidian (海淀区) district, Professor Lei Haizong (1902-1962) was busy writing and editing a series of historical essays which wrestled with the question of the underlying causes for China’s weakness and her nearly prostrate position. One week after the last essay was published, the sound of gunfire woke professor Lei in the middle of the night. It was July 7th, 1937, Japanese were firing on Chinese defenders around Lugouqiao (the Marco Polo Bridge); the invasion of north China had begun.

The incident began with a detachment of Japanese soldiers on night exercises, some unidentified shots (possibly even blanks fired by the Japanese themselves), and a missing Japanese soldier (possibly lost or enjoying himself at a brothel). Demands for a search of a nearby town, more sporadic firing between the two sides, and a fragile truce negotiated by local com-

---

1. YZSL, vol. 1, p. 3.
2. Bingyishu, Bingyi biaoyu huiji, p. 20.
3. Lei Haizong, Zhongguo wenhua yu Zhongguo de bing, preface, p. 1. It is debatable whether Lei actually heard the scattered shots of the skirmish on the night of the 7th. The Qinghai University campus is more than 15 km from Lugouqiao and the town of Wanping, which were the center of the fitful action on the 7th and the following few days.

- 19 -
manders spun out of control as the high commands on both sides rushed reinforcements to the Beiping-Tianjin area and Chiang issued his famous declaration that China had reached “the limit of our endurance.”

Professor Lei, like politically aware Chinese across the country, chafed under Japan’s encroachment in the 1930s and the central government’s repeated acquiescence at every turn (Manchuria, 1931; Shanghai, 1932; Rehe, 1933). Always attracted to large themes covering broad swaths of history, Lei turned to the question of what in China’s political culture and history had invited such relentless aggression. Going all the way back to pre-Qin (221-207 BCE) times, professor Lei found his answer in the history of China’s military and political systems. The resulting essays, written between 1934 and mid-1937, were Lei’s attempt to understand the roots of China’s desperate situation. Fleeing the Japanese armies as they overran north China, Lei made his way first to Hankou and then to Kunming to teach at Southwest United University (Lianda, 國立西南聯合大學) and it was there, in December 1938, that the essays were collected and published together as Zhongguo wenhua yu Zhongguo de bing [Chinese Culture and the Chinese Soldier; 中國文化與中國的兵], with an additional chapter “The Historical Status of This War of Resistance”, written during his brief tenure as a refugee intellectual in Hankou.

The volume’s keynote essay was titled “Non-military Culture” (wubing de wenhua). The question of how to understand (or translate) Lei’s use of the term wubing (無兵) is a thorny one. While it is tempting to understand it literally as “soldierless” or “a-military”, neither of these readings is satisfactory: the essay makes clear that Lei’s idea cannot be taken to mean literally a “soldierless” culture, nor does it suggest that China was without a military tradition or even effective armies. Lei was convinced that China desperately needed to return to a vigorous political culture based on the participation of the whole country in its political and military life, a resurrection of the Qin’s bone-deep strength. China’s early conflicts with northern nomads had posed no serious threat to China because of the nearly universal military service under the Warring States countries. This vigorous martial culture was precisely what China needed again as it

---

4. As befitting the spark that ignited the dynamite keg, the events surrounding the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and its expansion into full-scale war have been covered extensively, with detailed, nearly hour-by-hour coverage. Some more accessible accounts are: Zhang Xianwen, ed., Zhongguo kangri zhangzheng shi, pp. 229-58; Wilson, When Tigers Fight, pp. 13-29; Guo Rugui and Huang Yuzhang, eds., Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng zhengmian zhanchang zuozhan ji, pp. 304-62; Kangzhan shengli sishi zhounian lunwen ji, vol. 1, pp. 87-89, 94-96; and Fenby, Chiang Kai-shek, pp. 280-91. For an account of the complex political debates and interests in Japan that were behind the escalation of the war in the summer and fall of 1937, see Boyle, China and Japan at War, pp. 61-76.

5. Lei was originally a European specialist, having received his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago in 1927 with his thesis, “The Political Ideas of Turgot.” After accepting a position on the faculty at Qinghua in 1932, he focused his attention on China, teaching, lecturing and writing on many subjects from the Zhou onwards. See, Howard and Boorman, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, vol. 2, pp. 283-5.

6. The essay was written partially in response to friends and critics who asked Lei why an earlier analysis of China’s military had ended with the Three Kingdoms period (220-280 CE). While acknowledging the need to treat later developments more fully, professor Lei reiterated that in his view “the essence of [China’s] military had absolutely no change for two thousand years” and this essay was written to argue that position; Lei, Zhongguo wenhua yu Zhongguo de bing, p. 125.
faced the Japanese crisis, but it had lost this fundamental asset after the Qin dynasty, and it was completely gone by the end of the Han.

Before the Qin was a [time of] self-mastery and self-directed history. People were able to be soldiers, willingly were soldiers, responsible to their country. After the Qin, people were not soldiers, were unwilling to be soldiers, and were not responsible to their country. Thus, they were completely unable to be their own master, completely dominated by the natural environment (climate and famine, etc.) and social environment (population, exceptional men, and the strength and weakness of foreign nations). Pre-Qin’s active history [was such] that each historical period had political and social evolution and change. The stagnant history of post-Qin [eras] only had restless order and disorder, without any change in character. . . . The special characteristic of this kind of completely passive culture is that it has no true soldiers (bing 兵). That is to say, that it has no citizens (guomin 国民) and further that it has no political life. To simplify things, we can call it a ‘soldierless culture’ (wubing de wenhua).\(^7\)

Features of Han and pre-Han politics were lost as the imperial political and military system “congealed” into a script that played out again and again on China’s stage; though the actors names had changed with each performance, it was “an endless cycle of monotone drama.”\(^8\)

What had been powerful ministers were hamstrung by weak emperors who gave imperial relatives authority, in a pattern that turned positions of power into satellites of the emperor and his relatives, completely divorcing them from the people.\(^9\) The Han dynasty’s destruction of the aristocracy had thwarted any change based on class solidarities. After the end of class politics [in the Han], according to theory mass politics could appear, but in reality from ancient times to today there has not been any true politics of the whole people anywhere; furthermore, the elimination of classes only produced politics of the emperor’s individual despotism and a society without classes. No matter how complete it was in theory, in practice [China] is always a dish of loose sand. The centrifugal force of individual, family and clan, and locality is extremely strong, always threatening the country with disintegration. There was no centripetal force in society.\(^10\)

In times of peace, this disintegration of social power permitted two thousand years of uninterrupted concentration of central power. In times of imperial weakness, on the other hand, the centrifugal force regained ascendency as local, particularist interests dominated and established themselves as “unreasonable autocracies that substituted for the relatively reasonable autocracy of the emperor.”\(^11\) Civil officials were always under the thumb of warlords; it is only a question of whether they are put in service of a great warlord (the emperor) or a small warlord (independent military officials on the borders, despite their central appointment).\(^12\) The only two groups capable of any organization or concerted social action were the gentry (shidaifu 士大夫) and

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 126.
\(^8\) Ibid., p. 143.
\(^9\) Ibid., p. 132.
\(^10\) Ibid., p. 132.
\(^11\) Ibid., p. 133.
\(^12\) The myriad smaller warlords within China merely dared not defy the emperor’s wishes, but
hoodlums, but they were merely entrenched in the same dynastic cycle of order and disorder, with the gentry siding with imperial power when it was strong and with local ruffians when imperial power waned.\textsuperscript{13}

Lei saw two major (and controversial) effects of this laundry list of dysfunctional characteristics. First, that from the Song dynasty on foreign invasions or the threat of foreign invasions had prevented China’s entrenched particularism – what Lei repeatedly called society’s “centrifugal force” – from fracturing the country permanently into competing territories.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, China’s imperial unity, even though it was only nominal at times, was a result of foreign influences thwarting any possibility for military conflict to generate internal Chinese dynamism. (The contemporary parallel with the United Front between the KMT and the CCP was too obvious to mention.) Second, that China had never developed a genuine politics of the whole people, because it had never brought them into active service, militarily or politically. In short, from the fall of the Qin dynasty on, China lacked citizen-soldiers: truly involved, active, political and military participants in the survival of the country.

In a literal sense, Professor Lei’s characterization of China’s past was considerably off the mark, but his focus on the crucial aspect of military organization, specifically the interface between society and the military, or how China mobilized people for military service, was an astute one. The Japanese invasion, the fall of Beiping, the vicious fighting around Shanghai and fall of Nanjing (the Nationalist capital) all imparted a desperate urgency to Lei’s historical inquiries. These were not merely idle speculations and fanciful reconstructions of minor importance; they were matters of life and death.

After decades of scholarly neglect, China’s military history has begun to receive concentrated attention, with in depth studies of China’s military organization, culture, and campaigns; a richer understanding of the innovations and details of China’s military past, and the ways that past has interacted with and influenced the dominant narratives of political and social history, is now possible. The picture that emerges is varied. A quick review of this tapestry, highlighting the issue of the organization of and recruitment for military service, is worthwhile, not to criticize Professor Lei’s scholarship or rhetoric, but to understand better the historical context for what the Nationalist government was attempting to do in mobilizing for war in the mid-1930s.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{underneath all the civil dressing, the bottom line was still the emperor’s command of military force.}
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 140-6. Even population dynamics were cyclical and provided no road out of the impasse: China’s lineage system and emphasis on large families ensured that in times of peace and prosperity the most unhealthy, incapable, and least productive individuals would reproduce eventually growing to the point where the economy could not support the mass of population. The nadir of a dynasty was always accompanied by a bloodbath that would lay the foundation for economic recovery and prosperity, thus restarting the cycle anew. Recent scholars, particularly those that focus on the military dimensions of conquest and rule have presented strong critiques of the dynastic cycle as a fabrication of a persistent and pervasive imperial ideology that has denied the concrete political policy choices and military strategies that resulted in conquests. Peter Lorge concludes, flatly, “There was no dynastic cycle”; Lorge, \textit{War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900-1795}, p. 8, but see the entire introduction, pp. 1-14 for Lorge’s cogent argument.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Lei, \textit{Zhongguo wenhua yu Zhongguo de bing}, p. 134.
\end{itemize}
Traditions of Military Service: From Zhou (1046 BCE) to the Warlord Period (1928 CE)

As befitting his rhetorical purposes, Professor Lei’s assessment of China’s past military organization was painted with a broad brush, but it obscured more than it illuminated. Recent scholarship has started to flesh out in considerable detail the specifics and patterns of change in China’s military history. While there are many interesting discoveries in this emerging body of work, we shall focus on the modes of military recruitment. This will necessarily be a cursory look at a very large and complicated topic, but will provide the background to understanding the Nationalist state’s efforts immediately preceding and during the war. Following Professor Lei’s lead, we will go back to the beginning – or very nearly so.

We will look quickly at the Qin dynasty (221-207 BCE), as the paradigmatic example of conscription in China. Then we will skip lightly over some 1800 years to the Qing, noting only that the intervening dynasties (and would-be dynasties) repeatedly expanded and embellished the repertoire of mobilization techniques during those centuries. (A more detailed account – though still only thumbnail sketch of this massive topic and rapidly growing body of scholarship – can be found in the Appendix.) A somewhat longer look at Qing mobilization provides two opportunities. First, to take a glance at an instance of massive military mobilization by a traditional dynasty, the last such mobilization before self-consciously modernizing influences took hold in China. Fighting an internal enemy, the sectarian Taiping Rebels, the Qing dynasty mobilized military force on a large scale. Understanding how it did so is crucial for understanding the ideals and innovations of the Nationalist state during the next truly national-scale mobilization. Second, we will see that apart from developments in the very last years of its rule, the Qing’s military force was consistently raised on the basis of hereditary principles. It thus stands in stark contrast to the Nationalist conscription policies. After examining the anti-Taiping armies of the Qing dynasty, we will turn to the warlord armies, the immediate context for the Nationalist plans for national military mobilization and conscription.

The Qin dynasty, as the last and most successful Warring State (zhanguo 戰國), mastered a new style of warfare that depended upon mobilization of an ever expanding (geographically and socially) population to form the mass conscript armies necessary for territorial conquest. This was a fundamental break from the Zhou (1046-256 BCE) and Spring and Autumn period (722-481 BCE) in which loosely organized feudal lineages waged polite, limited warfare of honor and disgrace with small armies that consisted primarily of noble charioteers. In contrast, the Warring States should perhaps be called “the Warfare States” as they were not merely states at war, but states organized from the ground up for the purpose of waging war. As such, they all were involved in intense experimentation with mobilization methods. For example, Guan Zhong (管仲) of Qi invented the principle of “housing the army among the people” (yubing yu min 寓兵於民) in the early seventh-century BCE. 15 Guan Zhong, and his imitators in other Warring States, did not mean bivouacking soldiers in people’s homes, but that the state should draw its soldiery directly from the general population. During Guan Zhong’s time military service had already been extended from the feudal nobility, but was still restricted primarily to the people living in the capital city and its immediate environs. Other states, such as the Qin, would extend the obligation of subjects to serve as soldiers to the whole country’s population, throughout the

15. The same principle is sometimes phrased as “housing the army among the farmers or peasants”, (yubing yu nong 寓兵於農).
hinterland. This involved a whole suite of administrative innovations that brought organizational principles born in the army to the communities in the hinterland. It was, in effect, an entirely new form of state, organized for war, that embodied a new normative concept that would be further developed by the Han: the “ideal of a mass conscript army, with all adult males of the farming population trained to arms and capable of serving the state as soldiers whenever necessary” and returning to their primary occupation, agricultural production, whenever the crisis had passed.16

Despite professor Lei’s contention that post-Qin history was merely bland repetition, the next eighteen hundred years were chock full of experimentations and innovations in the realm of military recruitment. Conscripts continued to see regular use, often serving on rotating capital guard duty or along frontiers, in the Han periods (206 BCE - 220 CE) for example. The Han were not bound by this tradition, however; in its fight against the nomadic Xiongnu, the Han resorted to highly-trained “professional” cavalry who served lengthy terms on the frontier, as well as large-scale agricultural garrison-colonies manned by conscripted farmers. Later, some short-lived dynasties recruited volunteers from among refugees, criminals, released prisoners, and vagabonds. The Tang (618-907 CE) set up territorial garrisons, fubing (府兵), which recruited local farmers as soldiers to serve on a rotational basis: either one month per year in the capital or up to three years at a time at a frontier garrison. Such part-time soldiers were not suited to far flung campaigns of long duration and the Tang, like the Han, turned to permanent soldiery on the frontiers, despite the fact that their loyalty to the court was increasingly suspect. The garrison system would eventually give rise to the famous An Lushan (安祿山) rebellion (755-763). To defeat the rebels and counterbalance the peripheral garrisons, the Tang slid into a mercenary system in its interior, with a “privileged and parasitic” caste of soldiers for hire.17 Non-Han dynasties, such as the Jin (1115-1234) and the Yuan (1271-1368), relied on hereditary tribal military force: being nomadic cultures, the entire tribe often possessed martial skills of horseback riding and archery. Thus, in terms of methods for recruiting and mobilizing manpower for warfare, Professor Lei could not have been further off the mark. In his haste to make a strong rhetorical case about China’s weakness in the mid-1930s Professor Lei drastically over-simplified China’s native traditions of military service, painting the post-Han period with an ink wash that obscured the richness and variation of the Chinese repertoire of recruitment. There was no stagnation or endless repetition. Instead, by the time of the Qing (1644), China had a rich and vital tradition and a large repertoire of techniques for mobilizing manpower for war.18

As the last dynasty, the Qing (1644-1911) provides us with the clearest contrast between a traditional state and the modernizing regime of the Nationalists. Its methods of military mobilization will be treated at greater length, focusing on its early reliance on hereditary methods and its later desperate resort to elite-led, community-based mobilization. For the first two centuries after its conquest, the Qing relied on a pair of military institutions. The first of these, the Eight

17. Graff, *Medieval Chinese Warfare*, p. 239
18. The secondary sources for this summary of military service from the Han through Tang can be found in the notes in the Appendix, where the specifics are discussed in greater detail.
Banners (baqi 八旗), was a complex organization of hereditary soldiers that descended from Manchu tribally-based battle units. It was “an exclusive hereditary social group distinguished by a common occupation, soldiering,” though it was a heterogenous and hybrid institution made up of “soldiers, officers, servants, and slaves; Manchus, Mongols, acculturated frontier Chinese, and Koreans; men and women, young and old, able and infirm” and fulfilled a whole gamut of social, economic, and military functions. The Banners have received sustained scholarly attention in recent years as this Qing institution is at the crux of the complex and contentious issues of “sinicization” and ethnic identity of the Manchu Qing rulers. That fascinating debate, however, would serve to distract us from the practical matter of how the dynasty secured military manpower: by institutionally creating an ethnic identity that centered on hereditarily transmitted military service. The Qing dynasty remained committed to an “ethnic sovereignty” (differentiation between the rulers and the ruled) that was linked to a hereditary mobilization of a key military (and socio-political) support, institutionalized in the Banners.

The other major military force for the Qing was the Army of the Green Standard (lüying 綠營), which was a Han Chinese force. Patterned after the Ming militia duty of “civilian stalwarts” (minzhuang 民壯), the Green Standard consisted of a system of local garrisons sprinkled around the country and its duty was restricted primarily to maintaining order. The Green Standard also relied on an informal hereditary principle of “father-son soldiers” (fuzi bing 父子兵), in which sons took their fathers’ place when the fathers retired from service.

21. Persuasively argued and exhaustively researched, Elliot’s overarching thesis is that it was not imperial ideology or dictates but the institutional boundaries of the banner organization itself that created and sustained (re-created) Manchu ethnic identity during the Qing: Elliot, The Manchu Way, p. xviii. This is not to say that ethnic identity was a hereditary-given for Elliot. The Banners incorporated some groups of non-Manchus, most notably Mongols and some favored Han Chinese. Thus Elliot is really discussing the symbols of ethnicity or descent, and the ways in which they were institutionally created and sustained. Manchu ethnicity was malleable. See Elliot, The Manchu Way, pp. 39-88. For a discussion of Jurchen (Manchu) “clans”, see Crossley, The Manchus, pp. 26-33 and Orphan Warriors, 31-46. Crossley offers a discussion of banner origins in “Peace and Origins”, chapter one of Orphan Warriors, pp. 13-30, while the rest of the book is a rich description of banner garrisons, particularly at the end of the dynasty.
22. Lary, Warlord Soldiers, p. 24. Other references on the Green Standard recruitment: Shen Hualyu, “Jin qishi nian lai Zhongguo zhi bingyi zhidu”, Guoshiguan guankan, June 1990, p. 71; McCord, The Power of the Gun, pp. 19-21. There is no solid study of the Green Standard Army in English; most scholars still rely on the classic study by Luo Ergang, Lüying bingzhi, (1945). On the Green Standard’s Ming predecessor, the “civilian stalwarts”, see Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, pp. 22-3. These militiamen evolved over time into permanent forces in localities, with the wealthy frequently buying substitutes. Tied to local communities, the “civilian stalwarts” became local yamen attendants and forces employed by district magistrates as the strong-arm element of local
Like its Ming predecessor, the Manchu (Qing) dynasty attempted a clear separation of civilian and military, with the Yongzheng (r. 1722-1735) emperor taking this the farthest by expressing complete dissatisfaction with the Qin policy of making soldiers out of farmers: In Kuhn’s words, “He scorned accounts of the supposed merging of civil and military administration during the Zhou period as legends too remote to be authenticated and praised the basic efficiency of the system whereby ‘the people support the soldiers and the soldiers protect the people.’”\(^{23}\) This attitude was seen in the consistent use of non-conscripted soldiers: recruitment for both the Banners and the Green Standard were based on hereditary, family connections. Before the mid-nineteenth-century, the Qing’s hereditary armies were awe inspiring in the field; the dynasty was a continental power. The Kangxi (r. 1661-1722) and Qianlong (r. 1735-1796) emperors ordered a series of expeditions that greatly enlarged the empire, particularly in the northwest where operations nearly doubled the territory under Qing control.\(^{24}\) The challenges that would beset the Manchu dynasty in the nineteenth century would come from different geographical quarters, the British on the southwest coast and sectarian rebels in interior provinces. The Opium War is well-trodden ground and does not warrant re-telling here. The Qing land forces were simply not meant, nor equipped, to fight the British on the sea. By the 1830s the Eight Banners were more or less finished as an effective fighting force: banner garrisons were struggling, massively underfunded, and increasingly de-militarized.\(^{25}\) The Green Standard Army was no better. It had always been a scattered force of small garrisons whose purpose was to deal with internal rebellion, not a foreign invader. By the nineteenth century the Green Standard units were unreliable, having slid into mercenary recruiting. They were primarily recruited from unemployed drifters, mainly interested in securing food and lodging; often mistreated by superiors, underpaid and engaging in moonlighting occupations, they were uninterested in battle and quick to desert.\(^{26}\) After the Opium War, the British enjoyed their new treaty privileges by stationing troops in Canton and patrolling the surrounding countryside. A minor incident, a clash between a small detachment of British marines and a mob of enraged local “braves” (yong 勇), occurred at a village called Sanyuanli. The British were (temporarily) beaten back and had to retreat. Popular Chinese opinion inflated the victory and attributed it to the spontaneous ire of the Chinese people against a foreign invader, despite the fact that the villagers were militia forces, mobilized and led by local gentry.\(^{27}\)

---


24. Peter Lorge reminds us that several of Qianlong’s campaigns, cast as triumphs in the official dynastic record, were outright failures, however. The emperor’s rhetoric exceeded his – quite impressive – grasp; Peter Lorge, *War, Politics, and Society in Early Modern China 900-1795*, pp. 158-73.


27. The classic account in English of this skirmish remains Frederic Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate*, pp. 16-21. The connections between the economic and social dislocations touched off in the wake of the Opium War (and as a result of the opium trade) are also well documented and need little
Sanyuanli and the Guangdong militia left an indelible impression in the popular psyche about the effectiveness of the masses once roused against a foreign invader, but among Qing bureaucrats and the imperial court it also established a precedent of gentry-led military mobilization that would be pushed much further in the struggle against the Taiping Rebellion.

The scale and virulence of the Taiping Rebellion threw the dynasty into desperate reliance on unofficial social resources in order to survive. This was true in the area of technical expertise for the officials appointed by the court to suppress the rebels: key provincial officials hired staffs of technical advisors and assistants (mu fu 幕府) on the basis of personal relationships. The process of relying on informal social resources for mobilizing manpower had begun with earlier threats to Qing internal security, but fighting the Taipings required that it be carried much further. Zeng Guofan and the Hunan Army he organized and commanded was built up by deliberately mobilizing personal ties, from his own mu fu staff down to the foot soldiers. Each ech-

comment, but Sanyuanli carried an importance far beyond its military significance because more than any other event it demonstrated for the court and interested bureaucrats the viability of a new mode of mobilization to meet the challenges of internal sectarian rebellions if only it could be brought under official purview and direction. The gentry-led opposition to the British presence, especially the clash at Sanyuanli, impressed on the official mind the powerfulness of this hitherto suspect form of mobilization, but officials and the court felt they needed to try to bring it under civil bureaucratic control and not leave it unchecked and under gentry auspices. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, pp. 54-9 and 71-5. For the reverberations of Sanyuanli in the literati and court circles of Beijing see, James Polachek, The Inner Opium War, pp. 163-75.

28. Despite the fact that the Green Standard had been designed primarily as a force for internal peacekeeping, it was simply not up to the challenge that the spate of sectarian rebellions posed for the Qing. The lowest level of the Green Standard garrisons ran only down to the county or prefecture level, and thus had little ability to combat the types of rebellion that the Qing faced in the late eighteenth through mid-nineteenth centuries. It remained outside the village structure of China’s rural hinterland. This fact was not lost on astute observers at the time: Gong Jinghan (1747-1802) believed that “the very nature of popular rebellion made regular troops ineffective. The rebels’ intricate connections with local communities gave them an advantage impossible to meet with force of arms alone;” Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, p. 45.

29. These mu fu, or tent staffs, were drawn from the officials’ unofficial relationships: classmates (tong xue 同學), friends (zhiji 知己), those with shared hometowns (tong xiang 同鄉) or similar occupation (tong ye 同業). In contrast to impersonal bureaucratic relationships, these were marked with a deep sense of “human feelings” (ren qing 人情), even while being evaluated and re-evaluated on a performance or effectiveness basis. See, Kenneth Folsom’s classic work on the mu fu system: Friends, Guests, and Colleagues: The Mu-fu System in Late Ch’ing Period, UC Press, 1968, pp. 2-19.

30. Suppression of the White Lotus rebels (1796-1804) had made use of similar techniques, but the incident just outside Canton was a catalyst for the bureaucracy (or some of its most influential elements) to consider adopting certain mobilization techniques on a wider scale when the Taipings proved to be far beyond the ability of the Qing’s mainstay forces. Strategic hamlets and militia conscription had figured in the suppression of the millenarian White Lotus rebellion, and what began as efforts to defend Jiang Zhongyuan’s home district against mobile bandits grew into much broader mobilization to suppress ethnic rebellion and secret society triads in thirteen districts of three neighboring provinces; Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, pp. 42-3 and 112-6. For a classic account of a similar sectarian disturbance of the Eight Trigrams, see Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813, 1976.
elon of the pyramid personally recruited the next lower level, so that the entire structure was bound with personal loyalties. At the lowest level these loyalties were those of village and lineage, upon which local gentry organized militia (tuanlian 團練). As one of Zeng’s staffers put it,

The value of the Hsiang-chün [Xiangjun (湘軍) Hunan Army] lies in the fact that it is based on familial relationships, and, therefore the superiors and inferiors have a close bond. . . . If you follow the Hsiang-chün system, then the superiors and inferiors are personally connected with each other, the generals and soldiers have a personal friendship, and everyone protects his senior. If the general dies, then his army falls apart. If the general survives, then his army remains intact.\(^{31}\)

These personal loyalties were so intense that a battalion that lost its commander often had to be disbanded and completely re-recruited by a new leader.\(^{32}\)

Thus, in its most desperate hour, the Qing tied its survival to the social order, allowing military mobilization of its loyalist armies to be handled by local gentry. Zeng’s Hunan Army and Li Hongzhang’s Anhui Army were only the most prominent examples among such locally recruited forces. So successful was this form of mobilization and so effective were the armies that resulted from it that Li’s Anhui Army was not disbanded after the Taipings collapsed. Instead, Li and his army were put to use against the Nian and then against the Muslims rebels in Gansu. The worst of the Green Standard units were disbanded, the best downgraded to local patrol duties, while the militia-based Anhui Army under Li Hongzhang was given the task of national defense.\(^{33}\)

Although the Chinese past was littered with precedents for forms of impersonal, bureaucratic mobilization of the general (male) populace, the Qing dynasty relied on either hereditary transmission of soldier status (the Eight Banners and Green Standard) or community-based voluntary recruitment (anti-Taiping armies). In the case of the anti-Taiping armies, units were deliberately recruited using local, particularistic, personal ties. While upper levels of these units were bureaucratized, the lower levels were so personal in nature that the death of a lower officer meant that his unit was simply disbanded. At a time when the dynasty needed a desperate defense against a ruthless, fanatical opponent, it mobilized men by calling on local, personal ties and loyalties.

Surviving the internal challenges to its rule, the dynasty turned its attention to resisting foreign, European pressure by a policy of “self-strengthening.” Originally, military self-strength-

---


33. Folsom, Friends, Guests, and Colleagues, p. 91. Although the admission that old-style forces had almost no military effectiveness dictated that they be disbanded, the Qing dynasty (even after its 1907 decree that bannermen seek civilian occupations and the demobilization of the worst of the yongqing and Green Standard units) could not completely divest itself of these dependent soldiers. The banners remained intact – perhaps more or less as a social welfare measure for the impoverished bannermen – while the most effective Green Standard units were reconfigured into provincial Patrol and Defense Forces (巡防警) which carried out police functions during peacetime but were also intended to be trained in modern weaponry and thus serve as reserve for the New Armies; McCord, The Power of the Gun, p. 38.
ening was primarily concerned with acquiring Western nations’ military technology, both naval and land-based. The first Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95, demonstrated the utter failure of narrowly technological prescriptions to cure China’s military weakness and motivated the Qing to undertake a far more systemic approach to military strengthening. The new military policies, called the New Army reforms, involved a whole gamut of innovations designed to import Western military science virtually in toto to establish professional armed forces. Beginning in the 1880s with the military academies set up by Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong, and gathering steam after China’s humiliating defeat by Japan in 1894, this self-strengthening effort expanded to include Western military science more broadly, particularly as a human science or technology in the training of military officers, the introduction of modern training and drill for soldiers, and major reorganization of command and unit structure. Military primary schools were established with graduates sent to Chinese military academies, while the cream of the crop were funneled into Japanese military schools for training abroad.\footnote{34}

Rather than being a military bulwark for the Manchu dynasty, however, these modernized forces were actually the key actors in bringing about the fall of the imperial system in the 1911 Revolution, which began with and was carried forward by New Army units across the country. This revolutionary inclination was in large part due to the recruitment of elite, educated sons as officers and men in the New Army. With the demise of the exam system in 1905, the speed with which literate young men could rise in the New Armies made enlistment even as a rank and file soldier a viable alternative to civil service as a career path. From the mid-1890s on, military schools and New Army units were deluged with huge numbers of applicants for each opening, with significant percentages being lower gentry (even degree holders). This growing elite participation was part of a larger process of politicization among the growing managerial elite and it fed the fires of radical, revolutionary activism in both the civilian and military spheres.\footnote{35} These events, personalities, and institutions have received sustained scholarly attention and it would take us far afield to delve into them.\footnote{36} Of fatal importance for the Qing, however, was that these

\footnote{34. These reforms were not, however, applied to all the Qing military forces, but to a select group of units often collectively called the New Armies, the most famous of which was the Beiyang Army, led by Yuan Shikai (after Li Hongzhang’s death in 1901), but western-style “standing armies” (常備軍) were set up across the country, manned mostly by new recruitment (voluntary), in the early years of the century, as men were weeded out from older forces. These new units were to be the foundation of a country-wide New Army with 36 divisions, staffed by a Western-trained corps of professional officers. For a thumbnail sketch of the Qing New Armies see, Yoshihrio Hatano, “The New Armies”, in Mary C. Wright, ed., China in Revolution: the First Phase, 1900-1913, p. 365-382. See also, Edmund S. K. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution: The New Army and Its Role in the Revolution of 1911, Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 1980. The Commission for Army Reorganization was set up in 1903. In 1906 it unveiled a ten-year plan to establish a modern military for the whole country. By 1911, seventeen divisions and twenty brigades (infantry or mixed) had been set up; McCord, The Power of the Gun, p. 33-4.}


\footnote{36. Related debates, such as whether Qing anti-Taiping armies or modern New Army units were the
budding revolutionary soldiers were loyal to the nation of “China” and not to its particular state, the “foreign” Manchu dynasty; the social order which had provided a bulwark against the Taipings, now turned against the Qing. This was true even though the new forces, both the New Army officers and men, were recruited on a voluntary basis. Reform proposals toyed with the idea of a conscripted army, but the whole idea was scrapped as unworkable, and a recruitment drive was issued instead. Recruitment into the New Army remained firmly voluntary.

The military situation varied greatly with the specific constellation of power in each province and region. In provinces where the military uprising had been successful, the politicized units that sparked the revolution were often expanded by indiscriminate recruiting afterwards.

Institutional ancestors of the warlords, are also peripheral here, because our interest is confined to the more narrow question of how the dynasty mobilized manpower at different times. The question on the origins of modern Chinese warlordism has produced a prodigious body of writing. The most convincing analysis is Edward McCord’s *The Power of the Gun*, a nuanced study of the origins of warlordism in Hunan and Hubei. His careful examination of the process by which military power infiltrated and then dominated politics in the early decades of the twentieth-century is not likely to be bettered or substantially altered for a long time to come. An influential thesis, first put forward by Luo Ergang (羅爾剛) in the 1930s, is that warlord armies grew directly out of the anti-Taiping armies. McCord ably analyzes the Luo thesis as well as some of its opponents who argue that the Qing court’s appointment of commanders, such as Li and Zeng, to high provincial governor-generalships should not be read as the court’s acknowledgement of these men’s independence of the court but as rewards for loyal service and that despite their sources of independent revenue (the *lijin* tax), these commanders remained dependent on central funding. In short, there was only “limited autonomy” for the anti-Taiping armies; see McCord, *The Power of the Gun*, p. 24-30. Controversy in a similar vein has also dogged the discussion of the late Qing New Armies, specifically concerning their relationship to the central government and whether they were the antecedents of the warlords’ private armies. Stephen MacKinnon argues that Yuan Shikai and his Beiyang army were not nearly as independent from central control as some would suggest. MacKinnon calls the Beiyang army a “national” military, not a private army; MacKinnon, “The Peiyang Army, Yuan Shih-k’ai, and the Origins of Modern Chinese Warlordism”, *JAS*, 32 (May 1973), p. 422. Most importantly, Beijing held the power of the purse, with Yuan Shikai being dependent on the court to maintain his troops. Zhang Zhidong’s power over the Hunan-Hubei forces, was limited as well, with the court continuing to hold the power of appointment over even the most powerful governors-general, such as Zhang, and the lack of complete control Zhang had over the forces in Hunan and Hubei; McCord, *The Power of the Gun*, pp. 36-45.


38. “Considerable efforts were also made to improve the quality of common soldiers in the New Armies. … Whereas landless peasants, vagrants, or even petty criminals were often recruited to fill the vacancies in old-style forces, recruitment standards for the New Armies were generally higher and more strictly adhered to,” with tightened physical standards and background checks to ensure that soldiers came from good families; McCord, *The Power of the Gun*, p. 49.

39. Hunan reportedly recruited fifty to seventy thousand new troops in the weeks after the Changsha uprising. Much of this frenzy of recruitment was due to the fact that anyone who signed up men for the army was rewarded with command of those men, formed into an appropriately sized unit – command officer positions of newly created units thus became a reward for participation in the revolutionary-military recruitment.
This was clearly not far from a purely mercenary approach and irregular and semi-regular units abounded as the New Army units swelled with ill-disciplined, rowdy troops. 40

Motivated by the need to restore discipline, increase the quality of troops and cut the huge outlays required to maintain sub-standard units, republican officials in the provinces advocated disbandment of many New Army units, followed by a move to relying on conscripts. 41 Convinced that voluntary recruitment was unreliable, Sun Yatsen repeatedly advocated that China adopt conscription; his Provisional Constitution contained the stipulation that the people all had a duty to serve as soldiers. But this change was delayed in order to improve the education of the population and conduct the necessary census work. In a similar vein, the Tongmenghui (the KMT’s predecessor) actually opposed early conscription plans, believing that military consolidation of power on the provincial level was a precondition for real national unification under the Republic. 42 In any event, the political imperatives and conflicts that were brewing in the provinces and between Yuan Shikai and provincial military-governors prevented efforts to implement conscription. 43 In July 1913, the Ministry of the Army (Lujunbu 陆军部)，in concert with the General Staff, Cabinet, and Navy consulted the military service laws of various nations. The result was a Draft Conscription Law and Draft Regulations of Conscription Service, which were sent to the Guowuyuan (國務院)，but were never delivered to the assembly because of education, census, and funding difficulties. The result was that the Beijing government continued relying on provincial (voluntary) recruitment institutions, despite a small-scale experiment (summer of 1915) with conscription in northern China (Zhili, Henan, Shandong provinces) that produced a division and several smaller sized units. Central divisions retained a mix of formal and informal

40. This frenzied expansion was a fantastic drain on provincial finances and presented insurmountable problems of control and discipline for the newborn revolutionary government for the simple reasons that there was no time for adequate training and, even more significantly, that quality of the recruits had declined with the incorporation of so many unruly elements (in one observer’s words, “chair-bearers, riffraff, and beggars”) who had joined up for the pay or for the adventure; McCord, The Power of the Gun, p. 119-141; the quote is from p. 135. A significant element of the unruliness, however, was due to the troops’ egalitarianism, which was justified both in terms of revolutionary republican principle and on their concrete contribution to the revolution’s success. In short, politicization in the New Armies was found in the rank and file and junior officers, a far cry from the apolitical soldiery of the warlord years.

41. Ibid., pp. 143-59.

42. Ibid., pp. 110-3.

43. Li Yuanhong, the reluctant military governor of Hubei, despite his status as a military man was keenly aware of the deleterious effects that military rule, including excessive recruitment, had on the province’s politics and reform efforts. Conscription, as part of a multi-faceted package including the strict division of civilian and military governor’s powers, would help ameliorate some of the negative effects and put the province on a sounder political and social footing. Despite the culture of political rebelliousness in many units, the fact that the newest soldiers were mercenarily recruited meant that demobilization was easier than expected. As one of the authorities in Hunan remarked, “Originally these men were not conscripts but a mob collected on the spur of the moment. Their dutiful intentions were less than their thought of profit. By enlisting and then quickly retiring, they could easily acquire a sum of money [i.e., their disbandment pay]”; ibid., p. 148. Hubei, in contrast to Hunan, relied on voluntary demobilization instead of financial incentives; ibid., pp. 151-7.
enlistment practices, which were overwhelmingly based on voluntary recruitment for both officers and men.

The central government and its army continued to rely on such means, even as the country split up into warlord territories. The warlord era (however one periodizes it) was marked by the politicization of the military: military commanders held, or aspired to hold, political power. In desperate hope of reining in the provincial militarists, the central government in Beijing continued to propound conscription; central control and limits on recruitment would have brought the militarists to heel, if enforcement were possible. The military independence of warlords meant that they had a free hand in recruiting and developing their armies: other than financial considerations there were few restraints on them when it came to establishing, recruiting, and maintaining military forces. And in fact, their independence from central control and their influence with other militarists rested on their command of military power; hence maintaining and enhancing this power was always at the forefront of their designs. A warlord’s degree of powerfulness was generally equated with the size of his army, figured simply as the number of men he had at arms, and this simple equation was behind the dramatic rise in the number of armed men in China before 1937 as warlords tried to recruit more men than their rivals.

In the 1920s the Beijing government continued to float proposals to institute conscription, motivated in large part by the desire to rein in provincial warlords, but provincial militarists ignored them and continued recruiting widely. Warlords, with very few exceptions however, re-

44. Ibid., pp. 162-4, 267-8. Both the Second Revolution (1913) and the National Protection War (1915) were key moments on the road to warlordism because, despite the fact that neither side (Yuan Shikai nor the republican revolutionaries in the provinces) desired a military government, the constitutional dispute failed to be settled politically or civilly. And the military was invited into the political arena to settle what could not be settled otherwise. The political intricacies of Yuan Shikai’s reassertion of central control, his attempt at a monarchist restoration under nominally Republican auspices, the Anti-Monarchical War and the final descent into warlordism as military commanders on both sides were drawn into the political fray are all too far beyond the purview of this study to detain us any longer, however.

45. Warlord independence can be over-stressed; their political power was never completely independent of civil or central government structures, but imposed or overlaid on top of them, as warlords often took top political and administrative positions in central and provincial governments. As late as 1924-25, the central government had a formidable military force, financial resources, and foreign recognition – all of which were important and contested; Arthur Waldron, From War to Nationalism, p. 212. Additionally, the breakdown of civil politics in general had empowered men at all levels who controlled any military force. Hence, even within a warlord’s territory there were always competing elements, usually a plethora of central, provincial and local units with a range of loyalties and aspirations; McCord, The Power of the Gun, p. 277-84.

46. Despite massive increases between 1912 and 1937, the total numbers of soldiers (and armed men generally) were not unusually large given China’s population, but the warlord armies were incapable of providing genuine national defense. What they could (and did) do instead was “keep [China] in a permanent state of disruption”; Diana Lary, Warlord Soldiers, p. 2-5; the quotation is from page 4. See also, Elizabeth Perry’s figures on the explosion of soldiers in Henan after 1911, which was fueled by the conversion of bandits to soldiers; Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries, p. 160.

47. In the mid-1920s for example, president Duan Qirui (段祺瑞) issued prohibitions of independent voluntary recruitment. Even Beijing-appointed officials in the provinces turned to independent recruitment when they felt they needed to; Chen Shufan (陳樹藩) in Shaanxi opened a Recruiting
mained with the tried and true “on the spot recruitment” of hiring volunteers.\textsuperscript{48} For example, both sides in the Feng-Zhi contest – the Beijing-loyalist Wu Peifu and the Manchurian Marshal Zhang Zuolin – resorted to setting up hundreds of voluntary recruitment offices, marked with white flags, during their 1924-25 battles.\textsuperscript{49}

While there was variation over time and geography, in most places during the warlord period the jobless and near destitute were the most eager responders to such direct recruitment efforts. As one of Feng Yuxiang’s officers commented, “When a man came to join the army, the recruiter would ask him why he wanted to join, and that was about all.”\textsuperscript{50} Warlord armies, however, could also grow by incorporating the units of a defeated rival, by “silver bullets” (cash payments) inducing those units to switch allegiances, or by absorbing bandit gangs.

For both officers and men, the tenor of military service in warlord armies was mercenary, becoming a type of labor market during the warlord years. There are no definitive numbers available for warlord soldiers or of recruitment patterns during these years, largely because of the heterogeneity of such practices and almost total lack of army record-keeping or independent sociological studies, but there is little doubt that personal loyalty in warlord armies was fundamentally changed from Qing period. Officers and men were no longer linked by multiple avenues of social and personal ties. Loyalty was less and less over-determined by social bonds and more and more put on a purely market or monetary basis. Contemporary observers, Diana Lary’s excellent study of warlord soldiers, and the memoir literature of the period, all suggest that military service in warlord armies was a labor market.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{48} Some warlords, most notably Yan Xishan in Shaanxi, experimented with conscription in their territories. Convinced by his early experiences in Japan that only militarism offered any hope of national salvation, Yan implemented a conscription system in 1923 to build up a civilian reserve, who would undergo periodic group training even after being discharged from service: a rural militia to free him from having to fund and maintain a huge army. Peasants in Shaxi were suspicious of this program, opposing it often and resenting the loss of their sons from their fields. Additionally, sons who returned from their service units were often lazy, being unaccustomed to daily hard work in the fields. Still, Yan’s troops were better received by the rural population than many warlord armies who were made up of ill-disciplined mercenary troops. Despite this limited trial of conscription methods, ultimately military training efforts failed for Yan and a mercenary attitude remained among his army’s soldiers and officers; Donald Gillin, \textit{Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949}, pp. 25-7. Later Yan relied almost exclusively on the customary warlord methods of recruitment: voluntary enlistment of bandits, vagabonds, and the absorption of rivals’ defeated units to man his army. Bai Chongxi, the capable Muslim general from Guangxi who bitterly opposed Chiang Kaishek but would later head up military training for the Nationalist regime, was a strong advocate of conscription, arguing for a system of universal military training for men, who would serve in the provincial militia but be ready to be conscripted into full service in the regular army as needed; Lary, \textit{Warlord Soldiers}, p. 15-6.

\textsuperscript{49} Waldron, \textit{From War to Nationalism: China’s Turning Point, 1924-1925}, pp. 142-44. Pressing men into service was common, but usually only for logistical and coolie roles. See also, Lary, \textit{Warlord Soldiers}, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{50} Sheridan, \textit{Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang}, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{51} Sheridan’s biography of the burly “Christian General” Feng Yuxiang, who won fame for sharing hardship with and demanding high standards of his troops, puts this change down to the
Warlord armies employed several modes of recruitment, for both officers and men. Military expertise was a purchaseable (or hireable) commodity on a more or less open market of units competing for officers, who shopped around for the best salaries and advancement opportunities. Officers were quick to resign, move to the rear with other units, or search out better positions that offered more lucrative opportunities or quicker advancement. Rank and file recruits were found in several different ways. One was recycling men from the wider “armed world”: bandits, soldier stragglers, disbanded men, militiamen, or soldiers of defeated rivals were all sources for soldiers. Local governments (usually county yamen) sometimes supplied warlord units with men to avoid trouble. In a style somewhat reminiscent of anti-Taiping mobilization in the Qing, officers at times used their personal ties in their home districts and towns to recruit, though this method was usually practiced only by the best, most disciplined warlord armies.

The most prevalent avenues for securing recruits however were blatant entrepreneurial brokering and unit-based street recruiting. Military and civilian entrepreneurs undertook to supply armies with men. The military ones recruited men and then reported themselves and the men for kering and unit-based street recruiting. Military and civilian entrepreneurs undertook to supply this method was usually practiced only by the best, most disciplined warlord armies.

The most prevalent avenues for securing recruits however were blatant entrepreneurial brokering and unit-based street recruiting. Military and civilian entrepreneurs undertook to supply armies with men. The military ones recruited men and then reported themselves and the men for duty, supplying the army with an officer and subordinate men. The civilians, in contrast, were usually “self-appointed brokers who got hold of young men and sold them into the army. Their

“breakdown of traditional moral values.” While we may suspect that is overly vague and less than satisfactory as a statement of causality, Sheridan observes clearly that “hierarchies of loyalty came to be based less and less on ethical considerations and more and more on mercenary ones; service was increasingly conditioned upon expectation of reward. Defections became common as officers sought more profitable opportunities, either on their own or under a new and more promising master. Discipline in the ranks deteriorated, and payment by money or the right to pillage was sometimes necessary to exact obedience. In a word, loyalty – given with more and more conditions attached – became increasingly uncertain, and the warlord’s authority was correspondingly diminished;” James Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, p. 17. Sheridan’s overall point (as distinct from his idea of causation) is accurate and amply corroborated by contemporary testimony. Evans Carlson, a US observer in China, believed that the Northern Expedition in 1928 put an end to the “commerce” of militarism: “In the civil war days the practice of ‘selling out’ to an opponent was not regarded as dishonorable. War was a business conducted for personal gain by merchant-generals. No moral principle influenced soldiers of this type. Moreover, all were Chinese. If the material conditions of the leaders could be improved by changing sides, it was a good business deal, and even the troops so regarded it;” Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency, (1940), p. 15.

52. The status of officers was greatly improved from the mid-Qing due to the influence of military academies and gradual professionalization of segments of the officer corps, but for many warlord armies recruiting officers remained quite informal; Li Zongren, Li Zongren huiyilu, vol. 1, pp. 33-5, 54. Feng Yuxiang himself demonstrated this willingness to switch loyalties based on very personal calculations. Dissatisfied with the Anhui Army in 1901, he defected to Yuan Shikai’s Right Wing Guards because of its better conditions, quicker advancement opportunities, and better training program. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, pp. 34-5, 40.

53. Lary, Warlord Soldiers, pp. 32-3. As Lary notes there were several reasons why bandits and soldiers from other armies were attractive, most notably that they were already trained and experienced. Li Zongren in his memoirs admitted that ex-bandits made hardy soldiers as they were already accustomed to a tough, violent life; Li Zongren, Li Zongren huiyilu, vol. 1, p. 38.

54. Lary, Warlord Soldiers, p. 27.

55. Ibid., p. 25: “Recruits had the security of serving with a known officer, who in theory would take responsibility for the welfare of a fellow native. Officers got men who ‘belonged’ to them.”
incentive was the finder’s fee paid for each man delivered to the barracks.”

The most visible method of recruitment was “street recruiting.” Units dispatched officers to towns and cities on recruiting missions. They set up booths, often with white banners and large characters that read “Recruiting Soldiers” (zhaojing 招兵), in towns and cities. Likely looking men would be seduced with promises of money or adventure. The whole enterprise – whether carried out under military or civilian auspices – amounted to a traffic in men. Certain regions were so well-known for being easy pickings that they became known as “soldier-producing areas” (chanbingqu 產兵區).

Volunteers for the warlord armies came primarily from the lowest class of rural peasants. The dislocations of the rural economy produced a large mass of precarious men who were ready to take their chances by “leaving the village” (licun 離村), and their dismal economic prospects, behind. Looking for a “way out” (chulu 出路) of poverty and poorly-paid wage labor, these men detached themselves from their local communities to go to the towns and cities. They were the most marginal laborers in the economy. One contemporary foreigner observed that the warlord armies “never lacked recruits. They constituted a sort of reservoir which absorbed the hungry rural and industrial proletariat of China.”

Service in the warlord armies was attractive because its economic prospects were far above the opportunities in their villages. Poverty was the “strongest pressure pushing young men out of rural society. One of Feng Yuxiang’s recruits gave a succinct answer to a visiting foreigner (in 1923): ‘Asked why he wished to become a soldier, one of the rustic recruits said that he had nothing to do at home, at home there was nothing to eat, but here he would get some chow.’ For the most disadvantaged in rural society the army was an enticing and largely dependable rice bowl. Recruits in towns and cities came from among the rootless, vagabonds, ruffians, the destitute, those running from the law or their families – in short, men who had drifted into towns because they were already detached from their rural communities. These men were looking for a viable way of life and military service offered just that. Though there are few hard figures, it is almost certain that soldiers’ income was far above the lowest levels of wage earning in the civilian economy. That earning potential motivated enlistment is borne out by the fact that wage arrears were the primary cause of mutiny in warlord

56. The quotation continues, “the business was lucrative; in Chengdu in the early 1920s the fee per head was 6 yuan”; ibid., p. 26-7.

57. Ibid., p. 28-9.

58. Ibid., p. 6, 22.


60. Lary, Warlord Soldiers, p. 17. Lary observes that poverty in itself was not always a sufficient reason to enlist. Other push and pull factors were often necessary. A need for “security” (reliability of food and lodging); the impression that soldiering offered an easy life, or at least easier than farming or wage work; a desire for adventure; and the need to evade either the law or family punishment all were contributed their measure of inducement for young, destitute (or nearly so), rootless men to enlist; ibid., pp. 6, 17-8, 29.

61. Lary cites a 1930 study which found that the vast majority of rural wage laborers made between 20 and 30 yuan per year. (Lows were near a miserly 6 yuan per year in Shandong and highs near 50 yuan in areas near Shanghai.) Soldiers made far more than this; ibid., p. 46.
armies. In the best cases, the relationship between officers and men was a contractual one that resembled the relationship between employer and employee, requiring a certain amount of paternal care and conscientiousness on the officers’ part, or the soldier-employees would simply fail to perform adequately or would look for work elsewhere. Pushing the commercialization metaphor even further is the realization that at some levels armed forces were often run as a commercial enterprise, with plunder and loot as the profit for military adventuring and the soldiers’ pay as part of the enterprise’s operating costs.

The founding of the Whampoa (Huangpu 黃埔) Military Academy in 1924 by Sun Yatsen and the Nationalist Party marked a transition in recruitment. Under the direction of General Galen (Vasily K. Bluecher), Mikhail Borodin, and other Soviet advisors, Sun’s goal was to create a party-army (dangjun 黨軍) that would allow the KMT to compete with and survive in the hostile environment of warlord China. A politically committed military force, Whampoa cadets

62. Still, other means of remuneration helped keep soldiers content even for lengthy periods of time without pay: steady meals; battle bonuses; moonlighting in other occupations; booty and looting; and the fact that they simply did not pay for goods on the same basis as civilian purchasers – they simply took what they wanted from local establishments and residents; Lary, Warlord Soldiers, pp. 43-5. The looting and plundering of warlord armies was so endemic and habitual that even a conscientious leader like Li Zongren was unable to restrain the lawlessness of his own men at times. Li ends out “following” his men into the mountains on a looting expedition; the tail wagged the dog on this occasion; Li Zongren; Li Zongren huiyilu, vol. 1, p. 77.

63. Lary, Warlord Soldiers, p. 50. Sheridan characterizes the temporary nature of military service thus: “enlistment was not conceived of as a fixed ‘hitch,’ but rather as a less definite relationship whose duration depended on various fluctuating factors, ranging from a soldier’s personal situation to the current needs of the army. Most volunteers apparently had few home ties to bind them, and the inducements that led them to join served to keep them in. The army quickly became a home and a way of life”; Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, p. 75. The flip side of this “less definite relationship” however was that soldiers could end it with ease by deserting.

64. This was the case, Li Zongren’s memoirs suggest, of the Guangdong-Guangxi war of 1920; Li Zongren, Li Zongren huiyilu, vol. 1, p. 69. Reading military service recruitment under the warlords as a labor market opens up an avenue of criticism of militarism for its wasteful use of labor power, an analysis which Lary’s study indulges in and which echos contemporary critics. Still, her critique of “militarism” in this area is simple-minded. In her cry against militarism, Lary bemoans warlords armies’ “waste of the nation’s best man power in unproductive army service” (p. 5). But as we have seen, she herself admits that these soldiers were almost always driven to enlist by destitution and poverty. If they enlisted because they lacked any means of support, then they are not actually lost productive labor power: they would be unemployed, marginal, and unproductive anyway. The soldiers’ labor power was already being wasted by the dislocations of the civilian economy. According to her own findings, then, militarism does not waste labor power, it only thrives when the civilian economy has already wasted that labor power, having reduced its marginal utility to the point that even bare survival is uncertain. One could, in a Marxist vein, take warlords to task for their class oppression: as business enterprises, they were profiting off cheap, surplus labor. Additionally, the the armies’ frequent looting and expenditures on weapons instead of productive endeavors surely damaged the civilian economy and population, yet, these criticisms are a far cry from Lary’s point that soldiering was lost labor. Insofar as destitute men were able to make a living, the warlord armies were actually serving to redistribute wealth to the members of the civilian economy who were most disadvantaged and precarious.

65. Borodin, with Sun’s backing, initiated a whole host of military-related reforms, of which the
and the party-army would serve the interests of the revolutionary party, protecting it from counter-revolutionary forces that frequently attempted to put an end to the KMT and its revolutionary programs. In this sense – that it was politically motivated and dedicated to a political body – Whampoa was a step away from the purely mercenary motivations and recruitment methods of warlord armies.

As Lary points out, the goal for Whampoa was the creation of principled soldiers (zhuyibing 主義兵), a goal which it shared with the Nationalist army authorities from then on. Until 1928, when Soviet influence was replaced by German and ideological education de-emphasized, the Whampoa political curriculum was Leninist in its orientation. In stark contrast with mercenary soldiers, these Nationalist soldiers were to fight for the nation and their political beliefs. Even after the Nationalists had abandoned any genuine revolutionary commitment in favor of state-making efforts, they continued to paint government troops as politically principled soldiers, who were devoid of private concerns and were dedicated to the country. During the anti-communist campaigns of the early 1930s, Chiang stressed that the revolutionary cadres and soldiers had to have no concern for private life, even their own family.66 A politically committed soldier was contrasted with mercenary warlord soldiers in a Nationalist training manual of 1938:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>revolutionary army:</th>
<th>ordinary army:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>principled</td>
<td>fear death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disciplined</td>
<td>undisciplined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>courageous</td>
<td>self-interested, self-seeking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patriotic</td>
<td>money-grubbing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-sacrificing</td>
<td>careerist67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the years running up to the Northern Expedition, Nationalist military authorities realized that the key to creating politically aware and committed soldiers were the officers and thus Whampoa focused on training junior officers, as a key step in creating a politically dependable, non-mercenary army. Rank and file soldiers were not only mostly illiterate but they enlisted with whatever army would take them, and thus were decidedly apolitical, unless and until their officers imparted to them a political consciousness. The political commissars in the Nationalist military were part of the attempt to create principled soldiers; and it was successful, temporarily at least.68

Yet, the KMT’s party-army before 1937 was not a definitive break with the mercenary system in that admission to Whampoa was a voluntary recruitment procedure, with prospective cadets from around the country applying to enter. The first class of cadets in 1924 was selected from men recommended by delegates to the KMT’s first national congress, and thus were recruited on the basis of particularistic or personal ties (the delegates recommended young men

---


from their home provinces). Subsequent classes of applicants were recruited directly by Whampoa at secret offices in a few major cities (the secrecy was necessary to avoid warlord interference). But the officers that the Academy was training needed soldiers to lead, and these were recruited, primarily from the Lower Yangzi area (Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangsu, and particularly Shanghai), in more or less warlord fashion (though, again with some degree of secrecy) by Chen Guofu. The KMT’s military arm, the National Revolutionary Army (NRA, guomin gemingjun), grew quickly in the years 1924-26, from a beginning of just 960 officers and men in May 1924, it grew to 30,000 within 18 months. Another 18 months later, August 1926, it could field ten full army corps, numbering around 100,000 men. Such growth far exceeded Whampoa’s capacity to produce politicized junior officers. At a certain level Whampoa too was participating in the “labor market” for soldiers, though it was more discriminating than many other contemporary forces. In addition, the KMT army as it went about unifying the country in the Northern Expedition (1926-27) grew not by recruitment or conscription but by absorbing units of warlords who saw which way the wind was blowing and threw in with Chiang Kaishek and the Nationalists. Growing by absorption was a classic warlord technique and it meant that the Nationalist army was a hodge-podge of new, loyal (to the central government) units and older, less committed, mercenary-based warlord forces. These latter units – called the “miscellaneous forces” (zapai) – would be a thorny problem for Nanjing from then on. Still, the revolutionary commitment of the party-army that was trained at Whampoa was a precursor to the post-1927 ideals of a conscripted national army of citizen-soldiers.

He Yingqin’s 1928 Conscription Plan

Following the successful Northern Expedition, Nationalist military leaders met in July 1928 to discuss army reorganization and disbandment, and how to weld their disparate forces into a truly national army with standardized organization, training, supply and recruitment. The KMT itself made a direct call to “gradually implement conscription, in order to first bring about domestic pacification and then external defense, by smashing the old system and habit which relied on local [ties] for and took individual [interest] as the center of everything.” Following these post-Expedition meetings Chiang and the Nationalist military began preparation for the founding of the Junzhengbu (軍政部), under the Executive Yuan, in charge of the national military. In advance of an even wider Army Reorganization and Disbandment Conference, held early the next year, Chiang ordered General He Yingqin to submit a proposal to establish a conscription system under the new Nationalist government.


70. F.F. Liu, A Military History, p. 25.


72. General He’s draft plan, amendments, and subsequent documents can be found in YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 1-48. Except where noted, the following discussion and quotations are taken from this source. The Reorganization and Disbandment Conference failed utterly, because army commanders, even within the KMT’s National Revolutionary Army (NRA), could not agree on which units should be cut or reduced: no commander was willing to see his own forces reduced; Ch’ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, p. 103 and 181; F. F. Liu, A Military History, pp. 72-4; Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Nationalist China at War, pp. 9-11. Chiang’s troop reduction plans were highly unequal, hitting
General He had distinguished himself in the Northern Expedition’s campaign in Fujian, successfully negotiating the defection of several warlord divisions to the Nationalist side, a move that secured victory in the province even though the Nationalists were vastly outnumbered (roughly five to one) by the provincial forces. For this success, he was made commander of the Eastern Route Army, put on several high-level KMT and military bodies, made chief-of-staff for the combined revolutionary forces as they completed the unification of the country (early 1928), and put on the State Council (late 1928). At a top-level meeting just after the Northern Expedition, general He reported that the NRA had swollen to 300 divisions with 2.2 million troops during the course of the campaign. A top priority for Chiang and his staff was cutting this enormous number by nearly half (80 divisions and 1.2 million men), thereby reducing the proportion of the revolutionary forces that was under the control of provincial militarists. With the experience and lessons of the Northern Expedition fresh in his mind, in September 1928 He Yingqin put forward a plan for a Nationalist conscription system designed to put an end to the problems that were at the root of the warlord armies and to build up a truly national army.

General He envisioned military service as a universal obligation for all Chinese men in a graduated system: trained men who completed their term of service were to be routed into the reserves, free to be productive during peace and yet available for further service when necessary, and once that term was finished they would be put into the militia. His plan universalized military service to the entire (male) population: all men between the ages of 17 and 40 were eligible for service, and those not selected for active, reserve, or replacement service were to be incorporated into a national militia and given rudimentary training. Drawing on Japan's example, general He proposed to divide military service into four distinct categories: (1) standing service (常備役), (2) reserve service (後備役), (3) replacement service (補充役), (4) “citizen” (militia) service (國民兵役). Standing service was further divided into those on active service (現役) and those on “preparatory service” (預備役); and both the replacement and citizenry services were divided into two groups, First-line and Second-line. Active service (phase one of standing service) was to consist of three years in order to fully train the soldiers, but for infantry servicemen it would consist of two years of “in unit” (在營) training and the third on leave (歸休). Preparatory service (phase two of standing service) was for five years and four months following the end of active service. Reserve service, for a full ten years, followed standing service. First-line replacement service was for twelve years and four months, for those who had finished their standing service but still met eligibility requirements for conscription; and Second-
line was an additional twelve years and four months, but only for those who had not been called into standing service or First-line replacement service. The militia was to be a reservoir of trained and semi-trained men which would be mobilized only in times of war. First-line militia service was for those who had been trained and finished serving in the Reserves and Replacements; and Second-line militia was for all others, ages 17 to 40, who had not served in any other category. To prevent those who were not on active service from becoming too “distant” from military life, periodic training exercises and review training would be scheduled.76

The invocation of a universal duty to serve aside, He’s plan included postponements and exemptions. The disabled (maimed, crippled or deformed) were permanently exempt, while those seriously ill and physically too weak were given a postponement after a physical exam had verified their condition. Temporary postponements of one year were granted to those who were merely sick or who did not meet the height or weight minimums. (If after the year was up they still did not meet the requirements, they were to be routed into the militia service directly.) A similar provision covered those who could prove that their families would be destitute while the man served.77 Military service was to be restricted to upstanding citizens: petty criminals were to have their service postponed, while men with felonies were completely barred from “this holy right of military service.” Concessions were made to China’s lack of a broad educated stratum and the need to husband those human resources carefully to obtain maximum benefit from skilled workers and educated men. Teachers and staff, from the primary school level on up, were to be exempt or permitted to petition for exemption. Students in post-secondary schools were exempt as well, while students above middle-school level were allowed to postpone service until they were unenrolled or over the age of 28. Alternatively, they could reduce their term of service to a single year by testing voluntarily into the army and serving as officers in the reserves. Finally, in a measure designed to privilege or encourage public service (or, more cynically, protect those who were already powerful on the local and national levels), high-level officials were exempt because it was “impossible to replace them with other people.” Lower officials down to local self-government personnel were excused from periodic training exercises, allowed to postpone their service until they were over 28 years old, or just enrolled in the militia instead of having to serve actively or be subjected to the lottery system. All these special provisions required supporting documentation and verification, often certified letters from public officials. Such a requirement, of course, was most onerous for rural residents, particularly for those who were illiterate.78

A full array of conscription agencies were to be established running from the national down. He proposed a three-tier system: national administration, headed by the General Conscription Officer (zong zhengbing guan 總徵兵官); divisional districts (DDs); and regimental districts (RDs).

76. As reported by He, his plan differed from the Japanese conscription system primarily in the length of service required in the active service phase. Japanese active service, for example, consisted of only two years, reflecting the generally higher educational level of its citizens.

77. In this case the postponement was for three years, after which the situation would be reevaluated; if the situation was unchanged, then the man was routed directly into the militia service.

78. Somewhat ameliorating this was the fact that China had a long standing tradition of for-hire scribes that did brisk (and only partially disreputable) business helping illiterate people navigate the choppy waters of officially prescribed paperwork; see Melissa Macauley, Social Power and Legal Culture: Litigation Masters in Late Imperial China (1998).
At the central government level, the commander of the army or the minister of the interior were to serve as the Chief Conscription Officer, responsible for conscription for the entire country. From there on down, the administrative structure was more flexible. Although regimental districts could be independent, most were subordinate to divisional districts. They were to be in charge of conscription and exercises and mobilization, led by regimental district commanders (silingguan 司令官), district magistrates, and/or mayors. Regimental district chiefs were directly under the divisional commander, but also reported to and were nominally supervised by the regiment’s superior, the brigade commander. Since the regimental districts had to work closely with civilian administrative agencies, district boundaries must be aligned with civilian administrative units. (Most would contain several counties.) This meant that ideally each regimental district would draw on the same size pool of eligible recruits and be able to supply a standardized quota of conscripts. Each county would be assigned to a single “conscription ward” (zhengbingqu 徵兵區) that would facilitate the involvement of county government personnel in the conscription process, while below that conscription bureaus (zhengbingju 徵兵局) would conduct the actual lotteries and mobilize sub-county administrative resources, such as village heads.

Each year a national quota for conscripts would be set, and then parceled out to the regimental districts on the basis of population. Each district would sort the eligible males (zhuangding 壯丁) by physical condition, abilities and occupation in order to route them into infantry, cavalry, artillery, or engineer units. After dividing the men into classes of recruits and suitability for specialization, the regimental district was to conduct the lottery to determine the order of conscription. The actual lottery draw was held in each county or urban area. If the yearly quota of active service (xianyi 現役) men could not be met, the shortfall was to be made up from those in their first year of first-line replacement (buchong 補充) service. In cases where illness, death, or imprisonment meant that a conscript was not available for service, the unit was to take replacements from the lottery roster in the order of lottery selection.

The sub-county civilian administration was to take the household registers and select those who came of age between 1 December of the previous year through 30 November of the current year, and make a name roster of the newly eligible able-bodied men. This list was to be sent to the next level of the sub-county administration, the ward head (quzhang 區長) before 10 February. The ward head then was to aggregate the lower levels’ name lists and submit them to the

79. The details are not particularly germane to the overall import of He Yingqin’s plan. For the sake of completeness, the administration below the central government level was to be as follows. In provinces with a single DD, the provincial government chairman or the military affairs department chief (junshiting tingzhang 軍事廳廳長) would serve as the DD commander. In provinces with more than one DD, the provincial government determined DD boundaries, while a provincial agency, the Military Affairs Department (junshiting), stood over the DDs to oversee conscription in the province and the DDs were led by divisional commanders.

80. Each division was to have two or three brigades, each of which had two or three regiments, thus militarily the regiment was directly subordinate to the brigade, though when it came to conscription, the brigade was largely ignored in favor of the regiment and division. For example, for major decisions the regimental district commander needed approval from the divisional commander, not the brigade commander. The regimental district medical staff and other temporary staff were drawn from the divisional district.

81. For unstated reasons, He suggested that December first fit best with the military calendar as the most suitable day for new soldiers to officially begin their service.
county magistrate before 15 February. The magistrate would wait until all the name rosters for
the entire conscription district, including the delays and postponements from earlier years, had
been collected and then was supposed to send those to the regimental district’s Conscription Of-
fice (團區徵兵署). The regimental district commander and the county magistrate then were to
cooperate in setting the opening date for the Conscription Office (these are thus only temporary
offices, opened each year only for the brief period when conscription work is actively being
done). The regimental district commander reported to the divisional district commander, while
the county magistrate reported to the provincial Civil Affairs Department (民政廳). (All regi-
mental district documents had to go through the divisional conscription officer for approval.) Fi-
nally, the county magistrate was to be responsible for publicizing the dates for the opening the
Conscription Office, the start of physical examinations, and the actual lotteries. The physical
examinations determined men’s suitability for service and thus were to be conducted in the pres-
ence of the conscription officer, with the local sub-county officials (ward, township and village
heads) in attendance. The county magistrate was charged with investigating postponements and
petitions for exemption, while the regimental conscription officer compares the exemptions and
postponements and petitions with the name lists, removing the approved exemptions from the
rolls.

The actual lottery was also conducted by the conscription officer, with the local officials
down to the sub-county level in attendance. A “general representative” (總代表) was to be chosen
from among the eligible able-bodied men. The general representative was the one who actu-
ally drew the lottery slips that determined each individual’s place on the roster of eligible men.
Two sets of the original name roster and the lottery name list were to be drawn up. One set filed
with the regimental district, and the other (along with lists of exemptions and the call up dates)
was to be filed with the county magistrate in the county public office. Based on the ordered lot-
ttery results, the regimental district commander then draws up a list of men to serve based on the
quotas determined by the provincial government for the division. In effect, the regimental dis-
trict was to count down the number of names (required by the quota) on the lottery list, begin-
ning from the first name drawn in the lottery, as the active service (現役) roster. This list was to
be filed at the county public office. The regimental district commander then hands over the ac-
tive service roster to the commander of the infantry regiment, and notifies the county magistrate,
along with any supporting documentation for exemptions and the like.82 After actual conscrip-
tion is over, the regimental district commander files a report and a conscript table with the di-
visional commander before 10 November. The administrative ladder then aggregates the con-
script lists and passed them up to the next rung.83

82. In cases where illness, death, imprisonment meant that a conscript was not available for service,
replacements were to be taken from the lottery roster in the order of lottery selection (i.e., take the
next name on the list).

83. The divisional district commander combined the regimental reports and tables and submitted a
report to the provincial government before 30 November. The provincial government then passed
the tables on to the central General Conscription Officer. Meanwhile, the new conscripts slated for
active service were to be inducted on 1 December. In cases of minor illness and short-term
incarceration, the induction date could be delayed until 31 December. Further delays of up to 20
days could be granted by the regimental district if the conscript’s parents were ill or had died,
though documentation was required.

He laid down guidelines for handling exemptions, including a process for processing appeals.
He Yingqin’s plan was quite comprehensive in its delineation of authority and responsibility, even navigating most of the tricky waters of the division between the military and civilian realms. An oversight that would haunt the Nationalists for much of the war was exactly how the hand-over of the conscripts would be handled. He Yingqin was only concerned with creating the administrative apparatus and the initial process of selection, and gave scant attention to the thorny issue of what happens after the conscripts have been identified.

General He’s plan is significant not because it was the final blueprint for an immediate and vigorous attempt to universalize military service, though many of his recommendations found their way into the wartime conscription system. Chiang, his generals, and his government were content to drift on this issue, letting things continue on much as they had, until events made it imperative to begin full-scale mobilization for war. Instead, He’s plan is important more for what it says about the ideals of service that the Nationalist leaders saw as modern and necessary. Once articulated in He’s plan, these ideals were not pursued, at least not until the Japanese threat was so imminent that it was almost too late.

In one sense, He Yingqin’s detailed plan is an extended commentary on the evils of voluntary or mercenary recruitment. Having just completed the exhausting Northern Expedition fighting a whole string of warlord armies, he and Nationalist military leaders generally were keenly aware of the troubles and travails that the wanton recruitment of rootless ruffians and the destitute had brought in its wake. To drive his points home, He Yingqin could not resist peppering his conscription proposal with commentary on the evils of mercenary recruitment. Speaking like the bureaucrat and logistics expert that he was (and would remain), He argued that, from a national mobilization perspective, voluntary recruits had three important defects. First, people were naturally reluctant to volunteer for military service during a war, when they are needed most. Thus, voluntary recruitment (mubing 募兵) was too slow to build up forces during a crisis; even Britain had to resort to the draft during World War One. To meet the needs of a future war with mercenary recruitment meant maintaining a crushingly large military even during peacetime. Second, demobilizing those who enlisted voluntarily was almost impossible. In times when they were not needed, such soldiers would cause trouble if demobilized since their prime motivation for enlisting was monetary: their livelihood was the army and thus they simply had no occupation to return to and would resist attempts to be moved back into civilian life.84 He Yingqin acknowledged that hiring mercenaries did make training soldiers easier. They were self-selected and thus

Tentative rulings on postponements and exemptions were, of course, to be handed out by the regimental district conscription officer. When people disagreed with the regimental conscription officer, they could appeal to the divisional conscription officer. If they still disagreed with his decision, they could appeal to the (central) Chief Conscription Officer. However, all appeals had to be filed within 20 days of the ruling. Even more distressing was the fact that appeals did not halt the enforcement of the decision while the appeals were being investigated and processed. This would have effectively limited the usefulness of the entire appeal process, especially in a time of war, when the conscript would already be “in unit” or shipped off, while the rulings were being appealed. He Yingqin recommended completely and strictly prohibiting appeals to any civilian administrative agencies. It should all be handled by the military administration in his view.

84. He was was right on the mark on the difficulties of demobilizing mercenary soldiers, as Diana Lary’s study shows; see Lary, Warlord Soldiers, pp. 97-9. The extreme ease of desertion meant that all who wanted out just left; those who remained in warlord armies wanted to be there.
motivated, whereas conscripts were compelled to serve and thus trained reluctantly. But the base motive of food or profit that mercenary troops held undermined this advantage.

The third problem, according to He, was that the warlord soldiers were ex-bandits, riff-raff, or just those who had nothing left to lose, men who had such entrenched habits of disregarding rules and authority that discipline in the military was inevitably lax and impossible to improve. As countless warlord engagements testified, motivating such voluntary recruits to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield was a difficult endeavor; they had a distressing tendency to desert or defect to the enemy if they felt their chance of victory was poor. For General He, it was as simple as “garbage in, garbage out.” The source material itself, not the tenor of the soldiers’ life in the barracks, was the cause of the discipline and disorder of the warlord armies. Not only did recruiting toughs and ruffians make for insoluble discipline problems, but the fundamental aspect of the warlord system in He’s eyes was the “privatization” of military power. The selfish, private motivations that marked every level of militarization and armed power during the warlord years had to be rooted out and denied even at the level of raw recruits. Most importantly, He argued that China’s warlord-style military recruitment, by its very logic, produced soldiers that were weak in their “concept of national survival.”

In the so-called hired-soldiers (yongbing 傭兵) of foreign countries, there is a fixed contract and a fixed term of service. China’s hired soldiers (mubing) have neither a contract, nor a limit, [thus] recruits enlist only to earn a livelihood. Yet those who recruit them demand that they risk their lives and be ready to die (pingming xiaosi). Because military units are thus made up of those who are having trouble making a living and have little education, their consciousness of individual life is extremely strong and their concept of national survival is extremely weak.

This corrosive individualizing impulse behind military service ran from the lowest privates to the top generals, resulting in the warlords’ “private armies” all dedicated to ensuring the “individual’s livelihood.” This illegitimate privatization of China’s military, in which armies were merely “tools for private individuals” (siren gongju 私人工具), was the root of China’s problems and disunity. He Yingqin believed that the whole system had thrived in the lack of regularity of military institutions and life. Re-regularizing military service meant instituting a national chain of command, a nested hierarchy of institutions from central through local levels, and fixed terms of training and service for conscripts and reserves. Once conscription was implemented, He recommended a quick process of forced demobilization for mercenary soldiers by retiring one-third of them each year. All these reforms would strengthen the central command (and Chiang Kaishek) vis-à-vis warlords and other provincial militarists. Instituting a comprehensive national conscription system was the most sure way of changing this privatized and selfish military sys-

85. He ignores the effects of in-army acculturation. Very likely habitual and indiscriminate violence toward civilians was acquired from life in the army; Lary, Warlord Soldiers, pp. 83-91.

86. See Lary, Warlord Soldiers, pp. 92-6 on the calculus of desertion.

tem into a “purely national military.”

As we have already seen He’s plan envisioned conscripts serving fixed terms, with a vast reserve force of men trained but not in arms until needed, and then only so long as needed. Establishing a non-professional, mass army for the rank and file would solve several debilitating defects in China’s military. One was that demobilization would be easier for conscripts instead of volunteers; conscripts have a settled livelihood and thus demobilization would be welcomed as a happy return to their original occupation.

Conscription also would solve the problem of the unproductivity of a large standing army. China's many soldiers, depending upon the military as their only occupation, constituted a large drain on the economy by virtue of their lack of economic productivity and the costs to maintain them. He Yingqin criticized the unproductivity of warlord armies. Yet in his proposal, he focuses on the issue from the state’s perspective: the cost of maintaining men in the army. One suspects that even his bewailing of lost productivity is motivated more from the lost tax revenues than any concern with civilian “productivity.” Even the costs of maintaining an army of two percent of the two hundred million eligible males (an army of four million men) was impossible for China.

The army’s strength must be set according to the country’s territory, population, economy, national affairs, military service system, and the international situation. Our country’s territory is expansive, so there is need for a large military. [Our] population is large, so there is the capability for a large military. What a pity that financial difficulties, that industry and business are not yet flourishing, put limits on the number of soldiers that can be maintained.

The solution, He argued, was to realize that the demands of peace and war were different and design a system that was flexible enough to retain only minimal strength during peacetime, but that could easily and cost efficiently expand during a crisis. He believed his conscription plan met both requirements: the ranks of those on active service could be kept low during peacetime, but wartime expansion would be both quick and cheap, as the combined reserves (yubei, houbei, and buchong) would hold a large pool of already trained and available men. The issue of their lack of productivity while in service was unavoidable, but the flexibility of a conscription system, in which the size of the active army was adjustable to the current need and circumstance, made it “far superior” to mercenary recruitment. Simply put, it would allow the government to “use a small amount of military funding to consolidate a large number of reserve troops” and to

88. He’s plan did not completely rule out the use of volunteers. Those wishing to enlist voluntarily had to have a volunteer document, signed by jointly by the volunteer and head of household or parental authority, with an attached CV and chopped by the local sub-county officials. They still had to pass physical inspection, and any travel expenses for physical examinations and to enter their units was to be paid by the volunteers themselves.

89. Zhu Weizhen (朱為鉉), vice-chief of the MSO for much of the War against Japan, reiterated many of He’s points in 1942. Warlord-style mercenary recruitment, he said, was responsible for China’s military weakness. The country had “an army of two million volunteers, but only those two million, with no replacement or reserve units;” YZSL, vol. 1, p. 357, “Bingyi zhidu zhi sanping yuanze,” originally in Junzhi yu zhengzhi, 31 May 1942.

90. YZSL, vol. 1, p. 21.
deploy those troops as situations dictate, easing the burden of calling up replacements during a war. The national army should consist of a mere 50 divisions, with assorted other specialized units, all directly under the central government. He recommended retaining a standing army of 800,000 men during peacetime, with the capability to expand to 2.8 million men at arms within ten years if war was anticipated, and 4 million within 20 years. During peacetime, the division would remain the highest strategic unit; armies and army groups would be formed only for large-scale field exercises or when real hostilities necessitated. Because the speed of full-scale mobilization depended mostly on how quickly the dispersed reserves could be activated, He argued that certain other considerations were also important, however. If reserves were needed at far flung places, far from their homes, this would add significant time and costs to the mobilization process. Hence efficiency demanded that reserves be collected and join units near their hometowns. This requirement was particularly important in outlying provinces where transportation was the most difficult. He's proposal went even further in recommending a country-wide deployment of standing units. He recommended deploying 10 divisions in the northeast region (Zhil, Shanxi, Hehe, Chahar, Suiyuan); 10 divisions in the north and northwest band (Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang); 8 divisions in the area around Shanghai (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui); 3 divisions in lower east region (Fujian and Jiangxi); 4 divisions in middle-Yangzi (Hunan and Hubei); 4 divisions around Canton (Guangdong and Guangxi); 4 divisions in the southwest (Yunnan and Guizhou); 3 divisions in Sichuan and its bordering regions; 6 divisions in Manchuria (Fengtian, Jilin, Heilongjiang); and some (as yet undetermined) presence in Xizang and Mongolia. Supposedly the plan was for 50 divisions, but He's math is suspect as this list is already at 52.

He could not resist the lure of tying the citizenry’s military service and training to the disciplined environment of the school. While students and teachers were granted exemptions and postponements, He Yingqin envisioned using students' “collective organizations, seen as recreation, to reward martial inclinations and advocate their patriotic expectations,” in order to inculcate a willingness for military service as the duty of citizens. “Those in education are the ones who can most easily lead student organizations and then from these organizations gradually spread out to localities.” The importance of students and schools in promoting a military culture had been amply demonstrated by the Northern Expedition and the heavy involvement of radical students during the 1920s. Students would remain staple elements in the Nationalist’s conscription propaganda plan throughout the war.

While the ideal of the citizen-soldier was the dominant one in He’s proposal, some contrary attitudes had snuck in by the back door as it were. One of these was a penal cast to military service. Even though felons were barred from service, in the section of the plan dealing with abuses and punishments, general He recommended that those who attempted to evade the draft were to be punished by being put directly on active service. And somewhat curiously, he also included...
a stipulation that those whose behavior, study, and service was exemplary were eligible to be put on leave a year early. This provision was obviously designed to encourage and reward excellence, but it would have had the result of reducing the number of top-notch soldiers on active duty and retaining the poorest ones for longer periods. This too tread the line of service as a penal tool, a contradictory principle for national military service, at odds with a vision of an army of citizen-soldiers.

A further disjuncture between the egalitarian bent of the ideal of citizen-soldiers is that He's conscription plan relied on a clear distinction between rank-and-file soldiers and the officer corps, an implicit acknowledgment and further hardening of this fundamental distinction within military service. From the founding of the Whampoa Academy (1924) on, Sun Yatsen and the KMT had taken seriously the task of creating an army led by officers who were both revolutionary and professional. Commissions were career positions and the gap between commissioned officers and rank and file soldiers grew wider after 1928 as a result of the system of military academies that trained Chiang’s officer corps in the years prior to the Japanese invasion. He’s plan continued this tradition of a fundamental break between the appeal to officer-grade citizens and the conscripts. He's plan omitted the former; they were completely outside the scope of the plan, simply because they would be brought into service and retained there permanently by completely different means. The officers were a national elite, voluntarily recruited and retained on an individual basis through a system of academies and professionalized structures.

In contrast, the conscription of rank and file in General He’s plan depends completely on the administrative transparency of local communities, as the military would not be responsible for independently identifying and selecting conscripts. Both military and civilian authorities require complete and accurate information about the population within each jurisdiction in order to put the plan into effect. This would require a close working relationship between the draft districts (DDs and RDs) and local government at the provincial, county, and sub-county levels. He Yingqin realized that conscription required an intimate connection with (civilian) administration, stating categorically that conscription “absolutely was not to be handled solely by the army agencies.” The close cooperation between local administration and military requires that someone with military experience be in charge of local military affairs offices. Local institutions not only had to supply the army with essential information, but also were to be involved in the inspection of the able-bodied men. The two sides had to work together. Leaders of local institutions had to take on roles and responsibilities in the conscription process, if they lacked military experience, they would have difficulties carrying out their duties. Conscripts would be trained at least partially in their home areas and retain strong ties with their native places. Conscripts should be placed in units based in their localities and those serving in preparatory service (yubei bingyuan) were to be called up and placed into the units closest to their homes. Thus, although it was to be national and centralized, military service in He's proposal was to be embedded in localities.

In fact, He felt that his plan was so dependent on a national census or accurate household registration that it could only be implemented roughly two years after a comprehensive house-

deliberately making oneself ill, temporarily fleeing their home areas, skipping the physical inspection process, or any use of “deception” to fool either the civil or military arms of the conscription administration. In a separate provision, the proposal also recommended that those who plotted and took action to to avoid service were to be imprisoned for up to three years and fined 30-300 yuan; exactly what the distinction was between this group and the former is not explained.
hold registration was thoroughly carried out in each province.\textsuperscript{94} Tying conscription to native-place meant additional complications as it required longer lines of communication and record-keeping (native place and current address were quite often not the same). The keystone prerequisite was a genuine census, which would be the administrative foundation for a conscription system, since everything depended on an accurate picture of the population.

The census would be essential as data-gathering for the state. Efficient conscription required accurate information on the age of every male; his occupation in order to make best use of his talents and abilities; his criminal record, if any; ethnicity, though what advantage this brought is not mentioned; and most importantly, his residence. This last is the basis for the entire conscription system, without up to date information on residency, it becomes all too easy for families to move to avoid being conscripted. Household registration would put the brakes on moving by requiring government approval. He Yingqin notes that this would curtail “people’s right to freedom” (人權之自由), but in an emergency situation it might be necessary to prevent citizens from trying to shirk their duty. This was a prescient assessment on He’s part, as mobility became a key strategy to avoid conscription during the war.

Civil administrations with their population registration were thus required to cooperate closely with the conscription apparatus. Census materials “were to be forwarded to the conscription institutions of the army units in the locales, and then those conscription agencies will conduct draft inspections and select [conscripts] to meet the need for soldiers of the army units in the area.” Tying conscription to units based in the area was a cost-cutting measure, to reduce the funding burden for army units, but it would have put local administrative agencies at the army’s beck and call. Individual citizens, too, were to be tied and accountable to the conscription administration: when eligible men change residences (to different jurisdictions) they were to be required to file documentation from the jurisdiction of their old residence with their new conscription district office within 15 days.

An interesting question is whether He Yingqin’s conscription plan amounts to a sort of domestic colonization plan? Most importantly, of course, the plan was primarily a national defense measure, but just below that veneer is the goal of unifying the country internally. First of all, it was a template for Chiang’s central government to achieve control and administrative uniformity over military units, from local militia up through the national army. By controlling the flow of men into military service (and by extension the available manpower for all armies), it was a plan

\textsuperscript{94} Despite its comprehensive nature, He Yingqin reiterated several times that his plan was only a preliminary general outline, requiring more detailed research and essential preparation measures, most importantly a detailed national household registration and census. He called for study into the issue of implementing conscription across the country, with special reference to be made to the experience of other modern countries; YZSL, vol. 1, p. 8. He outlined a road map of preparatory phases: investigation, preparation work, and then the actual implementation of nationwide conscription. The data gathering phase would begin the day that a comprehensive census law (\textit{hujifa} 户籍法) is announced and would last at least six months (and more likely a full year) to gather information on the general population that would identify all service age men. The divisional and regimental districts would be planned and set up, while local civilian agencies established links with them. Preparation work would begin with the official publication of the conscription law and notification of the relevant agencies of the regulations. He estimated that it would require one year of practical preparation, deciding on the selection of men, before the first lottery could be conducted.
for control over all the armed forces in China, a dramatic centralization of power. For Chiang – who would champion the policy of “internal pacification before external resistance” (攘外必先安内) from 1928 until the Xi’an Incident in late 1936 – this purpose was literally the foundation or prerequisite for effective resistance of external threats. The domestic context of He’s plan strengthens this impression as well. In 1928, the KMT and Nationalist government had just nominally reunified the country and was busy attempting to construct real political and administrative unity in China. He’s plan with its tight cooperation between the military and civil administration would have subordinated civilian agencies to military ones in the key areas of population registration and mobility. In effect, it would have made yet another aspect of China’s civil administration the handmaiden of the national military. The central and financial sectors of the Nationalist government were, and would continue to be, at the service of the military. The military played piper, and the central and revenue sectors of the Nationalist state marched to the budgetary tune that the generals and Chiang were playing throughout the Nanjing decade. In this sense, the conscription plan must be read as part of the Nationalist desire for a comprehensive remaking of China into a modern and thoroughly militarized nation-state. In essence, He Yingqin’s conscription plan was a program for a military colonization of China’s own interior and hinterland.

General He’s plan was primarily concerned with the practicalities of military recruitment, as one would expect from a master bureaucrat who would spend most of his career specializing in logistics and planning. Drawing clear lines of authority within the proposed system, outlining specific responsibilities of each officer and agency, deducing conscription’s effects on morale and fighting effectiveness, and anticipating the fiscal advantages under such a system occupied his attention. He largely refrained from rhetorical flights of fancy or invoking high-flown theory about the creation of citizens or bringing China’s people into the political sphere by engaging them as servants of the state. Those were the realms of professor Lei’s musings. And yet, even though it was pitched in the practical, common-sense terminology of a military bureaucrat it was He’s view that conscription would remove all the impurities of selfish desire from militarization and entrench a new ideal of committed or principled citizen-soldiers. The warlord era recruitment with its affirmation of private (livelihood) motives was antithetical to the revolutionary or genuinely national life for He. Revolutionaries sacrificed the present to secure the future, sacrificed themselves for the people: “The goal of revolution is to strive for future happiness and not to plan for selfish gain in the present. Revolutionaries prepare to sacrifice themselves to save the people, and absolutely do not try to take advantage for their own gain or attempt to fulfill their own needs.”

Consistent with his view that warlord armies were suspect because they recruited from the lowest, most violent, least moral segment of society, conscripts would make excellent soldiers, simply because they were “good men” (liangmin 良民); the key element in a conscription system

---

95. Between the years 1928-36, the percentage of central government expenditures for military purposes was never lower than 36%, a low reached in only one fiscal year (1935-36); all other years the figure was over 40%. See the chart on CHoC, vol. 12, pp. 106-7; relying on the Nationalist’s official central government tallies, these figures do not tell the whole tale by any means as most of the deficit spending during the Nanjing decade was financed by borrowing (foreign loans and bonds); ibid., pp. 112-3.

96. YZSL, vol. 1, p. 2.
was the nature of the citizenry. Good husbands and sons from the villages, conscripts would have an independent occupation and no selfish motives; they would learn easily and be intensely motivated by Sun Yatsen’s Three People’s Principles. Farmer-conscripts, taken from the up-standing members of communities, would be disciplined and earn the respect and affection of the people. Drawing men from every part of the country, the army would make use of the best qualities of every area. Experiments with conscription showed that China’s population could make fine conscripted soldiers: the men of the south (southwest and east coast) are said to be “long-suffering and good at fighting” and thus, with the proper training and modern weapons, they make fine soldiers, while those living in and near cities have relatively advanced thinking and would bring those qualities to the military.

Conscription itself was to be a vehicle for transforming society, bringing about a militarized discipline in the general population. Training would be carried out in units that were stationed in the localities from where the recruits were drawn, maintaining ties between conscripts and their families would enhance the new military’s educational role. Like a pinch of yeast in bread dough, the conscripted army, due to its discipline, would be “an example for the general citizenry. It would not only transform (jiaohua 教化) the people, change (ganhua 感化) localities, greatly benefit the nation, but it could also arouse people’s martial inclinations and patriotic ideas.”

Critical in He’s positive image of conscription is that military service was explicitly cast as the duty of all Chinese men, ages 17-40 (later amended to 20-40). This was not a new idea, of course. It had had been put forward in Republican China as early as 1912 with the 14th clause of the Provisional Constitution: “The people have a legal obligation to serve as soldiers.” But in He’s plan this obligation was an implicit contract between the state and individual citizens. In the very first paragraph, He carefully points out that a key advantage of foreign state’s armies is that military service is conducted on the basis of a contract. “In the so-called hired-soldiers (yongbing 僱兵) of foreign countries, there is a fixed contract and a fixed term of service. China's voluntary soldiers (mubing) have neither a contract, nor a limit, [thus] recruits enlist only to earn a livelihood.” With clearly stipulated terms, general He’s plan was to be a contract between the modern state that the Nationalists were building and individual citizens. It was an attempt to sever definitively the bandit-soldier connection in which soldiers and bandits moved back and forth fluidly. The noxious weeds of soldier-bandits grew in the soil of the voluntary recruitment of the warlord armies throughout the early Republican era. He’s plan would rectify China’s chaotic situation by instituting a national contract with its soldiers. Set off starkly from the selfish, undisciplined bandits and mercenaries, the specific content of the Kuomintang citizenship, as reflected in military service ideals, is an unselfish, sacrificial citizen.

Return of the Conscripts: The Modern Ideal

This ideal of a mass, conscripted army as a key element of a modern state was a persistent feature of rhetoric right through the war and among many quarters, suggesting that it was a genuine and deeply felt belief. Because we are living in an era when the mass, conscript army is vehemently out of favor in many “advanced” countries, it can be challenging to understand that

Conscription was seen as a hallmark of a progressive, modern nation. In reaction to the Vietnam debacle, the US shifted to an all-volunteer military, which has served to obscure the fact that for much of the modern era the purpose and meaning of a conscripted army was to be found in the sacrificial service (dying on the battlefield) of the nation’s men. (The all-volunteer army, in contrast, is touted as a vehicle for training citizens for post-service roles in the civilian sphere, a perspective that devalues, even de-legitimizes, battlefield sacrifices by construing the soldiers’ lives as too valuable to sacrifice: their real contribution is to be found after they have left the service.99) In Europe, as James Sheehan’s recent work shows, the disaffection and disillusionment with the mass army goes even deeper: not just conscription, but military action in general has been delegitimized as Europe has undergone a quiet, but radical transformation to “civilian states” that are “organized for peace,” and build their legitimacy by pursuing non-military goals (“material well-being, social stability, economic growth”).100 But across the globe during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, the attitude toward the conscripted mass army was quite different: rather than a negative necessity, for many contemporary intellectuals and theorists of the nation-state, compulsory military service was a positive sign demonstrating the vitality of the country’s citizenship: “the duty to fight and perhaps to die for the state was the (male) citizen’s sacred obligation; the right to impose this obligation was the main source and expression of the state’s legitimacy.”101

In China, men such as professor Lei Haizong lauded the sacrificial service of compulsory military service as the only chance for national survival. In literal terms, Lei’s arguments were almost ludicrous, but his essays imply the break between earlier modes of mobilization and the national military service deemed necessary to fight the war against Japan.

Lei did not, in fact, argue that China lacked any effective military men, nor in fact that military power was neglected in China. The concept of “wubing“ (無兵) for Lei did not mean literally “a-military” or “non-martial”, but something along the lines of non-vigorous, lacking (institutional, cultural, political) vitality, an inability to self-generate genuinely new options, approaches or avenues of development. It was an overall weakness, a moribund culture, society and government caught in cyclical rise and decline. It was the incorporation of commoners into the con-
scripted army of the Qin (227-207 BCE) that accounted for its dynamism in Lei’s view. Modern scholarship has confirmed that this expansion of the military was in fact behind the expansion of civilian bureaucratic administration for the Warring States, including the Qin. For Lei the post-Qin turn to recruiting from the lowest stratum of society, the dregs, was at the core of China’s problem for it indicated a political culture that was cut off from real participation by the people. From the Song onwards only foreign people’s invasions had prevented China’s disintegration. Only foreign pressure had slowed China’s tendency toward flabby privatization after 1911, and unity had remained mostly in name only.102 While it is easy to criticize Lei for his anachronistic portrayal of Qin conscripted armies as a vehicle for political participation, Lei had intuitively focused his critical attention on the aspect of military culture and recruitment that marks the break between traditional and modern, namely a genuine politics of the people, a perspective that is perhaps not unsurprising given his doctoral dissertation on Turgot and the political philosophy of the French Enlightenment. The litmus test of such a political culture and state, he suggested, was the presence of citizen-soldiers: the politicized incorporation of the nation’s entire people into the state at a fundamental level.

Unlike the other essays, which were originally published in various journals in the years prior to the war, the last essay in Lei’s book was penned in 1938 while he was at Hankou, just shortly after the battles at Shanghai where Chinese troops had enjoyed intense support from civilians and acquitted themselves far better than anticipated. Titled “The Historical Status of This War of Resistance,” the essay was Lei’s statement on the significance of and hope for the war. Here, he pointed fingers not at ancient emperors, but at those who had shirked their duty behind the lines. The armies who had fought so valiantly at Shanghai were model citizens and despite his negative assessment of China’s long history, Lei found an optimistic note and encouraging tone to strike at the course of the war thus far.

The bravery of our war of resistance is praised by the military observers of friendly nations. Even the military leaders of our enemy sometimes occasionally commend [us] despite themselves. Although we are ancient, our best armies can be compared with the armies, ancient or modern, of any powerful nation. This is worth elaborating on. Some of our forces perhaps are not fulfilling expectations, but anyone who has even a passing knowledge of military history knows that the military of any nation at any time can have some temporary frustrations and lax discipline, and reduced battle effectiveness due to a lack of experience. Furthermore, we cannot forget that China’s present army is not conscripted, but [voluntarily] recruited. Although it too has some drawbacks, only conscription [makes] a dependable, long-term army. We only have recruits, but already their effectiveness is nearly comparable to a conscripted army. This is a rare occurrence in human history. In the past half year, most of our armies can stand blameless in front of the country and nation. On the contrary, people behind the lines, especially those who spoke most resoundingly during peacetime, should hang their heads. Our front lines can be compared more or less with the wartime [WWI] front lines of the Great Powers in Europe. Behind the lines, those with responsibilities and posts fleeing in panic are a counter example to the calm and composed interior of European countries during the war. This is sufficient proof that many of those who have a high opinion of themselves during peace have not attained the level of conscript soldiers. That is to say,

102. Lei, Zhongguo wenhua yu Zhongguo de bing, pp. 135-6.
[they] have no qualifications as citizens (*guomin* 國民).

Lei continued on to stress that China was exceptional in that it had been able to revive itself when other ancient cultures had succumbed to the challenges of history. Even with his calls for a genuine politics of the people – all the people – Lei Haizong was no leftist critic of the regime. After his flight to the southwest, he and several other professors at Lianda organized a loose affiliation of like-minded thinkers. They published an independent journal, *The Warring States (Zhangguo ce 戰國策)*, which was eventually incorporated as a supplement to the influential daily *Dagongbao*. The Warring States group saw recent history as a replay of the Warring States period, but on a larger, global scale. Like the Warring States era, the times were perilous but held the possibility of a genuine revitalization and invigoration of Chinese politics and culture, much as had occurred with the Qin. Citing philosophers such as Fichte, members of the Warring States group had a certain fascination with the bloody process of inter-state struggle in which the stronger devour the weaker, a struggle that was without morality or justice, because it was merely a contest between national “life forces.” Survival required the state to harness the latent energies of the nation (*minzu* 民族) that would permit China to transcend the evils of divisive individualism and totalizing socialism. The result was to be a truly “new nationalism culture” (*xin minzuzhuyi wenhua* 新民族主義文化), led by men of power and vigor (*liren* 力人). Such men were exemplified by Sun Yatsen and Chiang, leaders who stood above the common people and without whom the nation would perish. Thus, many of the articles in *The Warring States* show deference toward the prerogatives of power and a somewhat statist perspective that fit well with Lei’s view of the autocratic Qin as a time of real vigor and innovation in China’s past.

Coupled with his essays in *Zhongguo wenhua yu Zhongguo de bing* (originally published in *Social Science (shehui kexue 社會科學)*, vol. 1, no. 4, in 1935). Xiao was generally positive, echoing many of the modernist perspectives on compulsory military service that underlay Lei’s essay. Most notably, Xiao took a page right out of European statemakers’ book when he stated that “Conscription work is fundamentally a kind of education” and that “military service is not just the people’s obligation, but also their right (*quanli* 權利).” Yet it was precisely these facts that led Xiao to part ways with Lei, by suggesting that the Nationalist authorities refrain from heavy-handed compulsion in a vain attempt to remake Chinese sensibilities and society quickly. Changing en-

103. Ibid., p. 207.

trenched attitudes and prejudices against military service would take time, Xiao argued, and demanded that the government “emphasize encouragements and rarely use rash methods.” Unlike corvée service, which could be compelled with naked force, if the state did not win the willing cooperation of its conscripts, it would only succeed in creating ineffective soldiers. Furthermore, Xiao took issue with Lei’s implication that only frontline soldiers were fulfilling their duty to serve. Modern warfare, Xiao noted, had wiped out the clean distinction between front line and rear areas, between soldiers and non-combatants. Everyone was at risk to bombing and chemical warfare, and everyone could contribute to the war effort. Still, only when conscription was conscientiously implemented and the people had taken its lessons to heart would China finally fulfill its potential as a strong country (qiangguo 强国), in which “fathers entreated their sons, elder brothers their younger brothers, husbands their wives, saying ‘If you are not victorious, do not return.’”

As we have already seen, Lei was not the first to suggest that universal military service was the way for China to proceed in state-building, but was rather part of a long-running discourse in Republican China. Already in the last years of the Qing, women’s textbooks had admonished women to impart to their sons the values of citizenship, particularly the willingness to serve as soldiers. In the 1910s and 20s, conscription was viewed as a remedy for the evils of bloated armies and warlord depredations. Many, and not just military planners such as General He, were crying for an end to the mercenary recruitment of militarists and the start of conscription of “good men.”

Where did this intense conviction come from? While Lei drew on China’s own domestic example of successful conscription, the Qin, it is important to remember that he was trained in European, specifically French, history. He was thus acutely aware of the tropes of modernity in the Euro-American setting, including the importance of real, literal conscription for modern nations and states. For others, the influences were subtler, but tied still to the assumed normative experience of modernity: European nation-states.

The modern practice and institution of general mobilization grew inside (some argue brought about) the modern nation-state, developing on a winding path through the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, to the levée en masse of the French Revolution, and finally to the Prussian army. By the early twentieth-century, this evolution resulted in an ideal of a nation-state’s entire population being mobilized for war by the conscription of citizen-soldiers – an ideal that lasted more or less intact for most of the modernized world until Vietnam. In the seventeenth-century the Dutch Republic’s army, with its regularized pay scales and emphasis on drilling to at-

105. Xiao Gongquan, under pseudonym of Jun Heng (君衡), “Jianshe youbing de wenhua” (Constructing a martial culture), in Duli pinglun (獨立評論), no. 220 (27 September 1936), pp. 2–4. The pithy quote is from the Shangjun shu (商君書), known in English as The Book of Lord Shang, which fittingly was an explication of the policies of Shang Yang (商鞅), one of the key Legalist innovators behind the rise of the Qin dynasty.


107. While China in 1928 was far from industrially modernized, there is no doubt it was modern in terms of the political ideals of its Nationalist leadership and that the models of European nation-states were deeply and genuinely held.
tain technical mastery of firearms, was the first professional (though still mercenary) army based on the novel idea that armies themselves were social bodies that were detached from any particular social base, and thus could be rationalized, adjusted, organized and managed for specific social and political ends.  

The French Revolution added the earth shattering levée en masse, terrifying France’s neighbors. The need to defend itself from states which viewed the revolution with hostility and the unreliability of the Old Regime’s military led the French revolutionaries to take drastic measures by inverting the old modes of military service: where once the aristocracy had been obliged to serve as officers and the rank and file were low-class volunteers, the new system made serving as an officer a result of personal choice and enlisted service, a civic duty for all citizens. The levée en masse also made the modern mass army one of “circumstance:” citizens had the duty to serve in times of emergency (imminent external threats) but were to be demobilized directly thereafter to return to their ordinary economic functions.  

In Prussia the constellation of social forces was different, with the result that the German mass army took on a decidedly different cast. The Landwehr, a militia force with middle-class officers, was incorporated into the Junkers-dominat-ed regular military as reserves, which citizens entered after three years of regular army duty. The Junkers was transformed into an elite military bureaucracy (the General Staff) with complete control over the state’s military resources, even as those resources expanded to include ordinary citizens. The Prussian victory in 1870-71 validated the Prussian system: it became a model to be imitated by every aspiring European national power. Mass armies based on universal military service and directed by a general staff became the fashion. . . . Universal military training meant that a war would be based on general mobilization, and general mobilization meant that a nation would fight a war according to a timetable which its general staff had worked out in great detail well in advance. It became a dogmatic conviction that without general mobilization the state could not go to war.  

In terms of the technology of military administration the stage was set for World War One and

---

108. Feld, The Structure of Violence, pp. 142-5 and 170-90. As Feld notes, in the Dutch Army firearms became the basis for the entire army’s organization and practices: in an interlocking way, the rifle determined how soldiers were drilled; that officers became drillers, evaluators, and managers of the men; and the battlefield tactics used (specifically the radical countermarch by which a ranks of riflemen could maintain a continuous volume of fire by having the front rank march to the back to reload, while the other ranks moved forward and fired and then took their turn at the back). Rifles were not just an individual’s weapon, but were deployed as a system that brought with it organizational principles and methods.


“total war.” The French Revolution – and its revolutionary army of the *levée en masse* – had un-leashed and harnessed (if only partially successfully) social energies and capacities that the abso-lutist state lacked, but Prussia demonstrated that the state could put all of society and its mem-bers at its own service, mobilizing all the resources of society in support of its needs, its wars.\(^{111}\) Politicians and generals were not the only ones to see the importance of new modes of mobiliza-tion. The specific ideals were dramatically different, of course, but military service figured prominently among European social thinkers – from Machiavelli to Weber – who were con-cerned with the creation of modern states as well. For Weber the professional soldier was the prototype of the state’s ideal bureaucratic functionary, while for Machiavelli it was the civic militi-aman who embodied the active citizen. Thinkers from all ends of the political spectrum saw the military as the schoolhouse of the nation.\(^{112}\) To summarize, I can do little better than to quote Maury Feld, whose astute and ground-breaking scholarship on the sociology of (Western) mili-taries is the basis for the preceding synopsis:

As a vehicle of social policy, the mass army is more than a military phenomenon. It is, in effect, *the expression of a collective myth*. The notion of the general strike was designed to produce a sentiment of solidarity among laborers, overcome fragmented outlooks, and create a unified working class. In the same way, the notion of general mobilization was designed to produce a similar sense of unity in society, erase individual differences, and make every inhabitant of the administered territory a citizen of the nation-state.\(^{113}\)

In a strictly military sense, some of the modernization efforts of the 1930s, including the desire to build a mass army around conscription, were an importation brought to China by the German military advisors who worked with Chiang after the 1927 purge of the communists and ejec-tion of the Soviet military advisors. Edward Dreyer has observed that the German advisors, beginning with Col. Dr. Max Bauer, “brought with them a set military doctrine that really could

---

111. Feld, *The Structure of Violence*, pp. 152-8; see also, Sheehan, *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?*, pp. 8-15. Despite its strategic success, there was domestic resistance to the draft in revolutionary and Napoleonic France, indicating that until Prussia’s victory over France in 1871, conscription had a mixed track record; Gregory Kasza, *The Conscription Society: Administered Mass Organizations*, p. 73.


113. Feld, *The Structure of Violence*, p. 145. The emphasis is mine. This quotation is important for it suggests that even if Feld’s factual claims of the interlocking changes in European military service and the appearance of nation-states are not entirely accurate, his general argument highlights the way that political elites viewed conscription, attitudes that were transmitted across the world, including China, where a translations of Jean Jaures’s *L’Armée nouvelle* (1910) was published in 1922 and where General Jiang Fangzhen argued for an army of peasant-conscripts to defend the nation; Arthur Waldron, “From Jaurès to Mao: The *levée en masse* in China,” in Moran and Waldron, eds., *The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution*, pp. 189-207. Feld’s research has been pushed analytically much further in a structural sense by the sociologist Anthony Giddens in *The Nation-State and Violence*. While the authors do not credit Feld, many of the essays in *The People in Arms* look at the legend of the *levée en masse* (in France and abroad) in precisely the mythic sense of its influence as a model for a new politically-based national mobilization.
not be transferred to the China of the 1930s. German military theory, as it had evolved by the 1870s, depended on a mass army mobilized from a well-educated and highly nationalistic population, rapidly deployed using efficient railway and telegraphic systems, winning the campaign through a battle of annihilation that in turn would permit an end to the war and a rapid demobilization of the soldiers to resume their civilian economic functions. In one sense, Dreyer is right on the mark about the source of and difficulties with the plans of the 1930s, but he misses the fact that He Yingqin’s plan was made when German influence was not yet at its strongest. Even more importantly, of course, is the fact that conscription as a norm or ideal of modern nation-states was not limited to Germany. Nor even in China was it limited to the military authorities working with the German advisors; as professor Lei’s outspoken advocacy attests, conscription had captured the imagination of even book-bound scholars. The fact is that a proposal such as He’s was motivated as much by the general vision of state-making and citizenship as it was any one national program.

In addition to the implicit modernist ideals behind Nationalist conscription, there were concrete differences between military mobilization by a modern nation-state and that of earlier dynasties. There is no denying that certain aspects of He’s plan (and the wartime conscription actually implemented by the Nationalist military) resemble those of Warring States or Qin era conscription. The creation of administrative units (artificially) mapped onto society for the purpose of conscripting men, and the universal claim of the regime on society’s manpower, are the two most prominent. If the records are accurate, the Qin was actually very much more efficient at mobilizing the men of its realm than the Nationalists ever would (or could) be. Yet, despite those similarities, the intent had shifted. The Qin used its conscription administration as a unified military mobilization, civil record-keeping, and police surveillance institution. The Qin too had mixed motives for its military mobilizations. Our earlier synopsis of the anti-Taiping forces over-simplified the picture in some ways. In particular, the tuanlian (community-based militia) which the anti-Taiping armies relied upon were not merely directed outwards against the rebels, but inwards as well. They meant not only to mobilize manpower to fight against the rebels, but as a means of simultaneously preserving order within villages. Connected to the Qin

---

114. Edward Dreyer, *China at War*, p. 182. Dreyer misses the very likely possibility that German “nationalism” was a result of service in the army, rather than its precondition.

115. Reportedly, the Qin was so successful at conscripting its population that it mobilized every man over the age of fifteen in its 260 BCE campaign against the state of Zhao; David Graff, *Medieval Chinese Warfare*, p. 22. Doubtless the difference in scale, both geographic and population, as well as the duration of warfare itself is behind this gap between Qin and Nationalist mobilization efficiency.

116. To push this dual role of military action back even further, Robin Yates has argued that Chinese criminal law in fact originated with laws designed to control military units: there was “no distinction between warfare and punishment” (bing and xìng 刑). The Xia and Zhou “oaths” (a form of military law declared by the ruler at the outset of a military campaign) did not have any of the Roman legionnaire’s sense of an oath of personal loyalty, but were really justifications for attacks. The justification was shot through with penal elements as it combined a pronouncement of sentence upon the opponent for contravening the will of Heaven and a “morale booster” in the form of a threat of punishment (execution) for his own troops should they desert; Robin D. S. Yates, “Law and the Military in Early China,” chapter in di Cosmo, ed., *Military Culture in Imperial China*, p. 25-6.
baojia (保甲, the mutual surveillance and population registration system), the militia were also a control mechanism that drew “clear dividing lines” within local society, marking off upstanding villagers from suspect ones, and thus preventing new people from being drawn into rebellion. Combining the dual roles of external defense and internal security is one of the key differences between traditional and modern military establishments. Traditional military forces exhibited this Janus-faced quality of being turned outward and inward, including both military and police functions, while the armies of modern nation-states usually have been strictly delineated from police work.

The modern state – and the Nationalists desperately aspired to this label – worked hard to carve boundaries between those roles, splitting the “military” function related to the state’s external conflicts with other states (i.e., contested within a context of an international system of nation-states) away from the police function of internal order. This modern distinction between internal pacification (police work) and external defense is only partially seen in general He’s plan, but it is clearly operating as the goal: any internal pacification role is an unfortunate and temporary expedient, not the military’s prime mission. Having just witnessed the (nominal and fragile) “unification” of the country, many people, not just Nationalists, were desperately hoping that the fractured days of warlords and bandits were over once and for all. Yet, the splintered nature of China’s political and military geography and persistent socio-economic dislocations meant a residual internal role for the central army in He’s view. Conscription was to be part of a comprehensive net designed for administrative unification and internal pacification, as well as external defense. In He’s own words, “In the future, widespread education, implementing household registration, and carrying out of conscription directives, will gradually reduce the worry of bandit disasters, but in the current situation, there is the necessity of deploying the army in order to suppress and mop up local bandits.” He overestimated the strength of the Nationalists’ unification (Northern Expedition), however, when he suggested that internal incidents, such as coups, attempted revolutions and revolts, were not likely to ever happen in China again (since the KMT as a revolutionary party-state is in charge), but that the state still needed to have military force in preparation to end such “incidents.” Be that as it may, general He and his KMT peers hoped fervently that the military would only have to shoulder one burden, that of external defense – just as soon as the interior was (forcibly) calmed, of course.

117. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, p. 49. On the Qing baojia, see Kung-Chuan Hsiao, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 43-83.
119. Unlike provincial defense forces, the national military (supplied with conscript forces) was mobile and could be deployed more freely, crossing provincial boundaries when necessary. This is not to deny conscription’s contribution to national defense. General He was keenly aware that the stationing of the standing divisions was of prime importance: “If the plan for national defense being warfare of holding defensive positions, then completing concentrating [military strength] to make the enemy not invade the country’s borders is the most important” mission. “This [mission requires] that in advance of mobilization a portion [of the military] be placed in strategically important positions, with the responsibility of providing a concentrated defense”; YZSL, vol. 1, p. 21. For offensive plans, the army had to be concentrated in ways that allows for advance into and occupation of key points in the enemy’s territory. The result is that deployment of changbei had to be in “central districts and strategically important areas.”
A second key element distinguishing He Yingqin’s proposed conscription from the mobilization techniques of earlier periods is that the modern mobilization was a new, direct relationship of the state to its soldiers, as citizens, a goal that Lei Haizong held dear. Conscription in the Qin and later dynasties often relied on social ties: mobilizing soldiers on the basis of their residency meant that military units were often made up of neighbors. Men fought side by side with others from their own community. This was not true for Nationalist armies. While some regionalism remained, motivated in part by the need to minimize linguistic barriers within units, the bonds between men in the modern army were to be formed within the units, not based on pre-existing social or community ties. Those social ties were to be severed, replaced by the duty of individual citizens to the state.

In one sense, this modern approach eliminated (in principle) all social status differences. Imperial regimes had rested on distinctions between strata of society that determined who served and who did not; and as we have seen many dynasties made military service a hereditary burden. The specific distinctions varied by dynasty and era, of course, but He’s modern plan did away with this. The only nods to social status remaining for He were the exemptions for education and public office: students and public officials both had other tasks in the total mobilization demanded by modern warfare. Aside from these limited exceptions, all China’s men were to be subject to the duty to serve the state militarily. Within the circle of national duty, status differences remained, of course: throughout the Nationalist era (1928-49) officers came from higher social origins and enjoyed significantly higher social prestige than enlisted men, and the professionalization of the officer corps in the decade before the war hastened and cemented this gap. But this was a distinction within the universal duty to serve the nation, which found expression in the mobilization of citizens as individuals. The Nationalists had long experience with ceremonial expressions of citizenship – public bowing to the flag, shouting “Long Live the Republic” – that were symbolic expressions of the citizen’s participation in the Republic. But such displays were detached from politics (the country being outside or above the messy world of politics) and had a very reduced sense of duty, obligation or compulsion to them. The conscripted citizen not only had a direct participatory relationship with the state, he was also enmeshed in an administrative net of compulsion in a way far more reminiscent of paying taxes than of walking in a parade.

Compulsory military service was given a legal basis in the Military Service Law (兵役法) promulgated in 1933. It was rudimentary and quite simplified in structure, with twelve general provisions. But behind it lay He Yingqin’s plan with its suspicion towards mercenary recruitment, refusal to rely on the social order for mobilization, and on its insistence of a direct relationship between state and citizen. The Military Service Law was not an isolated development, but actually part of a whole suite of Nationalist legal revisions that attempted to codify the modern Nationalist state and thereby remake the country. The separate legal arenas of the Civil Code (1928-30), Marriage Law (1931), and the Military Service Law (1933) shared some important attributes and motivations. The distrust toward market-based (mercenary) and society-based (local community recruitment) mobilization that were such hallmarks of He Yingqin’s 1928 plan and the 1933 Military Service Law resonated with the overall approach of Nationalist state-

120. See Henrietta Harrison, Republican Citizen, pp. 113 and 125, for just a few examples.

121. For the full text of the 1933 MSL, see Rong Jianguang, “Kangzhan zhong zhi bingli dongyuan,” pp. 821-2 or KRZZ, vol. 1, p. 965.
making in the legal arena. The Military Service Law followed directly on the heels of another
important legal reform in the years following the Northern Expedition. In 1929-30, the National-
ist government promulgated a revamped Civil Code in five parts, which was marked by the same
impetus to accord with modern (continental European) standards of the nation-state. Modeled
closely on the German Civil Code of 1900, the Chinese Republican Civil Code was imported
from Germany, much like the Prussian General Mobilization theory that underpinned the Con-
scription Law. But beyond that fact, the new Code betrayed a suspicion of individual-interest
and traditional influences of family on citizens’ actions. According to the drafting committee
members, the law (in terms of both rights and morals) had a “social character,” and thus was so-
cially constructed. Yet, this “social” element in the drafting of the Civil Code was in fact the
state itself, which subordinated individual to group (national) interest. The Preface to the En-
lish translation, written by Hu Hanmin, demonstrates the same logic as conscription at work:
“The personal activity of the citizen is directed by the Code so that it may be most advantageous
for the community to which the individual belongs.” At its broadest, that community was, of
course, the Chinese nation-state. Rather than marking off a territory of liberty or freedom for in-
dividual citizens, the Civil Code was “directing” the Chinese people on how to benefit the coun-
try itself. As Philip Huang has noted, Chinese law really has not acknowledged the distinction
or conflict between individual and state interest, as if there was no possibility of the two being in
conflict. The state does not recognize (inherent) rights, but grants them for the purpose of al-
lowing citizens to contribute to the state, not protect themselves from it. The guarantor of so-
cial interest was, of course, the state itself. Forces like the market were distrusted by Nationalist
authorities; even commercial law was not a separate arena from the Civil Code, but treated with-
in and thus subordinate to the “general welfare.” Natural social groups, such as families, were
explicitly cast as unreliable and un-modern. Fu Bingchang, chairman of the drafting committee
for the Civil Code, explicitly contrasted the old familial constraints on individual activities to the
modern situation in which the individual actions and interests were subordinate to “the general
welfare”: “The individual must seek his own gratification in such development of his own natur-
al abilities as is most likely to contribute to the general welfare.”

As Susan Glosser’s research has demonstrated, the Nationalists attempted to remake famil-

vol. 1, p. vi.
123. Philip C. C. Huang, Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing, p. 7:
“Chinese political discourse as a whole has difficulty conceptualizing an opposition between
state authority and individual rights, or state authority and civil society. ... It tends to insist on a
view of the essential harmony between the state and the individual or society.” Indeed, the
Constitution passed in May 1936 suggest that the Nationalists, much like the Meiji reformers in
Japan, assumed that the state would or could never encroach on or violate individual rights.
Each guaranteed liberty was phrased in such a way that it was protected only insofar as it was
not restricted or limited by law: “all citizens shall have freedom of ____ , such freedom shall not
be restricted except in accordance with law;” Tuan-sheng Ch’ien, Government and Politics, p.
304.
124. This point is made in Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy, p. 127 and Merle Goldman, “The
Reassertion of Political Citizenship in the Post-Mao Era,” in Merle Goldman and Elizabeth Perry,
Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China, p. 159.
125. Introduction written by Fu Bingchang (Foo Ping-Sheung 傅秉常), Introduction, in Ching-Lin Hsia,
ial life in similar ways. In 1931 the KMT promulgated a new Marriage Law that linked family reforms with state-strengthening, by promoting the conjugal family (xiaojiating 小家庭) and reforming wedding practices. The New Family Law attempted to choreograph wedding ceremonies and marriage practices in order to free individuals from “the joint family’s control . . . and thus encourage greater participation in the social and political sphere” and economize on wasteful expenditures. As with the Civil Code, Fu Bingchang, in his Introduction to the Marriage Law, wrote explicitly that, the “particular interest of the isolated groups had to yield to the general interest of the nation. To put into practice this new ideal and to enable the citizens to make use of their personal abilities to the best interest of their country, it was imperative that the excessive grip of the old family ties over the individuals should be loosened.”

Conceptually and symbolically, narrow social loyalties were to be redirected to the greater nation: officially prescribed wedding practices physically displaced parents and put symbols of the state at the head of ceremonial proceedings. Filial loyalty was transferred from parents to state, which was seen as validating one’s status as a citizen. Requiring registration and witnesses opened previously private social relations to state surveillance in new ways; the contractual relationship between individuals and state was reinforced by the new Nationalist ceremony in which couples had ratified their marriage by the state’s presence and participation. In Glosser’s reconstruction, during the 1930s the Nationalist state and its marriage laws “denied the validity of placing one’s ultimate loyalty in either family or self and made the nationalists the final arbiter of community good.”

Certainly, the Nationalists Marriage Law reaffirmed individual choice (in one’s marriage partner), but more importantly for our purposes it denied familial authority over sons and daughters. It was an attempt to end what were, in the eyes of reformers (both New Culture intellectuals and Nationalist authorities) commercialized transactions of brides and grooms, which undermined citizens’ loyalty to the state and wasted economic resources. Neither the market nor the social structure (families) could be trusted. This perspective was of a piece with He Yingqin’s criticism of the market motives in warlord mercenary recruitment. The early 1930s legal reforms shared a similar logic: the desire to economize wasteful expenditures to the benefit of the economy as a whole and an intense suspicion of market-based choices as not genuine, shaky, unreliable, morally suspect. Further, in family life as well as the military arena, the social order itself was no longer the state buttress it had been for the Qing, but an obstacle that had to be reformed by and for the benefit of the state itself.


126. Susan Glosser, Chinese Visions of Family and State, 1915-1953, pp. 25, 46-8, 84-95, and 129-31. In one sense this perspective was not new, but built on New Culture Movement whose advocates in the 1910s had railed against old style family-arranged marriages for putting the family’s interests above individual fulfillment and well being. For these New Culture advocates, however, individual fulfillment was primarily, a social good: promoting social progress, shoring up the whole economy, producing hard-working, content citizens. The Nationalists would go even further, by putting the state’s interests at the heart of general welfare.

127. Ibid., p. 83.

128. Ibid., pp. 86-91.

129. Ibid., p. 96.

130. Of course, Glosser’s research is far more nuanced than this synopsis, which I have bent to my
In line with the logic of these legal reforms, the Nationalist state abandoned the Qing practices of mobilizing its soldiers through hereditary military families or by calling upon communities. The modern Nationalist state desired a direct claim with each and every soldier, and each and every citizen. He Yingqin’s plan carried the impulse to establish a direct relationship between the state and its citizens through the duty to serve in the national military, subterraneanly as it were. But this ideal found explicit expression not only in Lei Haizong’s scholarly writings, but also among public officials, such as Xu Tingyao (徐庭瑤). Xu was a graduate of the third class at the Baoding Military Academy, who had participated in several major attacks during the Northern Expedition, and had served a stint as the commander of the 17A. In 1933 when Japan threatened Gubeikou (古北口), Chiang ordered Xu and the 17A to rush north to the rescue. In the ensuing fighting, Xu demonstrated leadership and poise and was honored for his actions. After seeing the mechanized might of Japan in action, he brought China’s out-dated weaponry to Chiang’s attention and in the spring of 1934, he was appointed to lead a delegation to Europe to investigate the state of European militaries. Returning to China he filed a report on the eleven countries (including Italy, German, Russia, England and the US) that the delegates had inspected. As an expert on modern warfare, he was put in charge of planning army transportation and communications schools and then given command of an armored regiment. Unsurprisingly given his career, Xu proposed to revamp the military service system and put into effect the June 1933 military service law, citing the prevalence of conscription in modern countries, such as Japan, Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. His 1935 proposal (see below), to begin conscription put into explicit terms the implicit principle that lay behind both He Yingqin’s plan and Lei’s essays:

The country (國家) wants to increase the people’s patriotic responsibility, make the people have a directly personal relationship with the country. A conscription system [means] that the people have a duty to contribute their lives to the country. Thus, patriotic hearts are essential and the people must also have a full realization of the importance of national defense.131

Everywhere the calls were the same: conscript the men and save the nation.

Pressure, Experiments and Preparation: 1932-1937

Despite the fact that He’s comprehensive plan was well thought out and touched at the heart of fundamental issues of modern state-making and citizenship, Chiang and the other top-level Nationalist generals simply put it aside, for nearly three and a half years. In large part this neglect was because the new central government simply lacked the means to enforce its decisions in the areas still controlled by provincial militarists, even when they were nominally under central control. For example, in August 1929, the central government issued a prohibition of voluntary recruitment, but it was opposed by top tier warlords such as Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang.132 Other factors doubtless contributed to the neglect; the most decisive being Chiang’s

---

131. YZSL, vol. 1, p. 53.
132. Shen Huaiyu, “Qishinian lai Zhongguo zhi bingyi zhidu,” p. 76. Further regulations on volunteers were put forward the next year, but these too were ignored and ineffectual.
preoccupation with using his existing forces to destroy the communists immediately. Additionally, other policy areas were perhaps more insistent in demanding attention; personal or factional in-fighting might have killed it; or perhaps bureaucrats felt it depended too heavily on administrative capabilities (such as the household registration) that the new government simply did not yet have. We do not yet know for sure the exact constellation of forces that put conscription on the back-burner. Perhaps all those factors played a role. In the event, He’s proposal lay dormant for four years. Chiang and his new government engaged in other state-making efforts: campaigns to crush the communist soviets, and preparations for the impending war against Japan dominated the minds and budgets of Nanjing’s ministries.

The bloody April 1927 purge of communists within the KMT and the break with leftist KMT elements were only the opening acts in Chiang’s drama of “internal pacification before external resistance” – embodied in his famous metaphorical aphorism that the communists were a fatally important “disease of the heart” (心腹之患). If there was any doubt about it, Chiang’s dogged insistence on forcibly eradicating the CCP as a precondition to resistance against Japanese aggression was demonstrated beyond doubt by the events of 1931-32.

In mid-September 1931, China reverberated in shock at the famous Mukden Incident in which Japanese officers manufactured an excuse for the invasion of Manchuria by blowing up some railroad tracks. The occupation of the northeast and the establishment of the Manchukuo as a Japanese-controlled state followed swiftly. Shanghai residents immediately organized boycotts and protests against Japan, including forming a Righteous and Brave Army of Resistance and National Salvation Committee (Kangri jiu guo yiyongjun weiyuanhui 抗日救國義勇軍委員會), which gained 17,000 volunteers and began paramilitary training in factory compounds. A clash between Japanese agents and a group of these volunteers set off the January 28 Incident, which prompted Japan to send marines into Shanghai, ostensibly to protect its nationals. The Japanese commander ordered the bombing of the Zhabei district, which burned in a “vast bonfire.” But the Chinese 19th Route Army, full of patriotic enthusiasm, took up positions in the city and held out against the Japanese assault for thirty-four days. It enjoyed the active support of the Chinese residents, who provided material provisions, logistical support, and even volunteers to fight alongside the 19th. The fighting went well enough for China that by May representatives from the League of Nations brought Japan to the negotiation table and secured a ceasefire.133 The valiant defense of the city imparted a healthy dose of pride for many people, who saw their poorly clothed, relatively under-equipped soldiers successfully turn back the might of one of the world’s elite armies. Student troupes publicized the struggle in slogans, pamphlets, and street corner speeches, while volunteers signed up to fight.134

The fighting in Shanghai was so vicious and the battleground so close to Nanjing, that Chiang moved the capital to Luoyang, making the ancient city his first Temporary Capital (peidu 陪都). The stint away from Nanjing convinced Chiang of two things that would have important ramifications for the later war years. The first was the unsuitability of the northwest as the main base area and capital location; it was too isolated, its transportation and communication links too


134. Boyle, China and Japan at War, pp. 28-9. For detailed coverage of student organizing in the wake of the Japanese take over of Manchuria and invasion of Shanghai, consult Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Student Protests, pp. 171-199.
undeveloped. Its agricultural and industrial production were insufficient, and perhaps most importantly, its meager population did not promise sufficient manpower resources to wage a long-term war. From 1933 on, Chiang looked toward the southwest, namely Sichuan, as the only area that could sustain a protracted war effort as a major base area with a wartime capital. With that goal in mind, he looked for ways to bring the Sichuan warlords to heel and allow the central government access. A second result of the sojourn was to motivate Chiang to take more seriously the calls for beginning conscription. In 1933 the basic Military Service Law was passed, based closely on He Yingqin’s original plan, though it was not slated for immediate implementation. From then on, however, there was incremental and intermittent progress toward conscription, until it was formally instituted as national policy on 30 August 1937.

However, in the court of public opinion, there was little doubt that Chiang was needlessly (even traitorously) dragging his feet and thus inviting Japanese aggression by continuing his domestic anti-communist campaigns and refusing to resist Japan openly. In response, a lively and angry National Salvation movement sprang up, agitating for a liberalized domestic political climate to unleash China’s social energies for resistance and for the government to take the lead in resisting Japan.135 Song Qingling (宋慶齡), Sun Yatsen’s widow, attacked Chiang directly in public statements: “Who is responsible for this traitorous activity? It is Chiang Kai-shek. Why? Chiang uses his power to fight the Chinese people, and appoints traitorous generals whom he refuses to dismiss. Also he is unwilling to arm the people, or to organize guerillas to fight Japanese imperialism.”

Despite the setback in Shanghai, Japan continued to gnaw off chunks of north China, particularly eastern Hebei and Mongolia. 1933 saw the vilified Tanggu Truce, signed by a local official in Beijing that created a demilitarized zone 30-40 miles wide in north China.137 In June 1935, after Japanese troops nearly occupied Beijing, He Yingqin, as Nanjing’s representative, accepted a further expansion of Japanese influence and agreed to onerous restrictions of Chinese sovereignty in north China.138

In this roiling context, the Japanese invasion of Shanghai provoked two separate calls within the KMT’s Central Executive Committee (CEC) to begin conscription immediately. The first was an open letter to the KMT CEC by He Xiangning (何香凝). He Xiangning’s position was unique. She was the wife of the famous revolutionary martyr, Liao Zhongkai (廖仲愷). An artist and a deeply committed women’s activist, she led the KMT’s Women’s Department in the years prior to the Northern Expedition, but resigned in protest and disgust after Chiang’s purge of the communists, which included a number of her women cadres as well. In late 1931 after she returned to Shanghai from Europe, she organized a National Salvation Book and Art Exhibit and

136. Boyle, China and Japan at War, p. 30.
138. In the He-Umezu Accord, Nanjing agreed to withdrawals of its troops from Hebei, the abolition of KMT party branches, the elimination of anti-Japanese organizations in Hebei, and the prohibition of anti-Japanese activities throughout China. Zhang Xianwen, Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shi, pp. 49-112; Boyle, China and Japan at War, pp. 36-7; Guo Rugui and Huang Yuzhang, eds., Zhongguo Kangri zhanzheng zhengmian zhanchang zuozhan ji vol. 1, p. 287.
was reinstated as a member of the KMT CEC, but remained aloof and uninvolved with KMT af-
fairs as she was still an implacable opponent of Chiang. On 2 January 1932 just weeks before
the fighting broke out in Shanghai, she penned a short open letter, which made a simple plea for
the immediate implementation of conscription:
The country (guo 国) is made up of the people (renmin 人民). If the country ceases to
exist, then what will the people rely on? In this time of national crisis, the people have
already begun preparing to save the nation on their own. [Thus,] the government
should implement conscription, calling up the strong and sturdy masses of the whole
country, giving them military training in order to resist foreign aggression.139

As soon as the Japanese marines landed in the city, He Xiangning would act on her convictions
and encourage popular mobilization in support of the 19th Route Army: she joined Song Qinq-
gling on a visit to front line troops as a morale booster and helped set up an aid station system for
wounded soldiers. She was so moved by the sight of Chinese soldiers fighting in thin cotton
uniforms that she organized a successful drive to provide the soldiers with warmer clothes.140

The same day that He filed her petition, Wang Qi (王祺) called for the government to move
“speedily” onto a conscription footing to restrain Japan. In contrast to He Xiangning’s emotion-
ally charged call, Wang buttressed his proposal with reasoned arguments and suggested amend-
ments to He Yingqin’s original plan. Wang stressed that the loss of Manchuria demonstrated the
precariousness of China’s border areas – they were difficult to reinforce in a timely manner – to
argue that voluntary recruitment is inevitably too little, too late when external threats arise. A na-
tive of Hengyang county in Hunan, Wang had a long and distinguished revolutionary pedigree
with the KMT and a growing record of service in the Nationalist government as well.141 Wang
proposed several concrete measures to mobilize all Chinese men by giving them military training
in their hometowns. Each sub-county ward would organize training classes, staffed by local
militia, police inspectors, or retired military officers. Each class would consist of six months of
training, two hours per day, in addition to their normal school or work loads. Every Chinese man
(20-40 years old) would thus be trained without having them abandon their regular, civilian oc-
cupations. Uniforms and weapons would be funded by donations from the general population.142
Reflecting the heightened patriotism in the wake of the Japanese takeover of Manchuria, Wang’s
amendments gave an exemption from military service to men who were already fighting in the
partisan units in the Northeast.143

Responding to the popular pressure, the KMT CEC approved the measure, and then sent it

139. YZSL, vol. 1, p. 49.
140. Zhang Xianwen, Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shi, pp. 100-1.
141. Wang participated in the Wuchang Uprising which set off the 1911 Revolution, opposed Yuan
Shikai’s monarchical aspirations, served as the secretary for the Sixth Army in the Northern
Expedition, sat in the Hubei government and concurrently headed up its Agriculture and Industry
Department, held the position of Water Works Bureau chief, served as an alternate member of
the KMT’s CEC and then a party inspector, and edited the first edition of Sun Yatsen’s Collected
Works (Sun Zhongshan quanjì 孫中山全集).
143. For a full discussion of the Righteous Armies of Resistance in the Northeast, see Rana Mitter,
The Manchurian Myth.
to the government for further planning and implementation. There was little else the party organs could have done; although both were headed by the same man, Chiang Kaishek, the Nationalist military had largely grown out of its subordinate position as a party-army and was responsive not to the party per se, nor the government, but primarily to Chiang as chairman of the MAC.\textsuperscript{145} In mid-June 1933, the government passed a national Military Service Law which set up a Military Service Office (bingyichu 兵役處), but it made the practical concession of temporarily pursuing both conscription and voluntary recruitment. A mission was dispatched to Japan to study conscription there and the government issued the order to establish a network of 60 divisional districts, with subordinate regimental districts.\textsuperscript{146} But as the immediate crisis with Japan had passed, conscription again languished, only partially implemented and mostly unloved while Chiang and his generals immediately returned to the next extermination campaigns against the communist soviet in Jiangxi.\textsuperscript{147}

Still, Nanjing pursued a range of strategic projects that were designed to lay the foundation for a modern military capable of determined and effective defense against external threats. As part of the shift from a revolutionary party-army to the standing army of a nation-state, the Whampoa Military Academy was reorganized and relocated to Nanjing as the Central Military Academy (Zhongyang lujun junguan guanxiao 中央陸軍軍官校) in 1928. In the 1930s Chiang oversaw the continual improvement of its curriculum. An Outline Plan for National Defense was drawn up in 1932 and a whole series of strategic fortifications, complete with anti-aircraft and artillery emplacements and minefields, were constructed along major rivers and in key cities. German advisors – Colonel-General Hans von Seeckt, Lieutenant-Colonel Kriebel, Lieutenant-General Wetzell, and then finally General Alexander von Falkenhausen – helped Chiang draft plans for modernizing the military by creating 60 divisions of elite troops, trained to German standards and equipped with German weapons, though nowhere near that number would be trained by the time Japan invaded. These crack divisions were stationed around Nanjing and known as “The Generalissimo’s Own.” The National Resource Commission oversaw a range of industrial reconstruction projects to improve the metallurgical, mining, and chemical industries.

\textsuperscript{144} The CEC resolution noted that it was “passing the principles. Implementation timing and methods to be handed over to the National Government for suitable planning”; YZSL, vol. 1, p. 49-51.

\textsuperscript{145} The institutional structures and their interrelations were complex and byzantine; see Ch’ien Tuan-sheng, \textit{The Government and Politics of China, 1912-1949}, pp. 179-184.

\textsuperscript{146} The 1933 Military Service Law differed somewhat from He Yingqin’s initial plan. Like He’s plan, it outlined two major divisions, each sub-divided, for service: active “military service” and reserves (changbei bingyi 常備兵役). They both had two periods: “in unit” (在營) and “at home” (在鄉) phases. The times for phases and the terminology was different from He Yingqin’s proposal five years earlier; Shen Huaiyu, “Qishinian lai Zhongguo zhi bingyi zhidu,” p. 76 and Wan Jinyu, “Kangzhan banian Sichuan,” pp. 340-1.

\textsuperscript{147} Conscription was not the only fundamental state-making measure to be relegated to the back burner during this period. The census law (hujifa 戶籍法) was passed in December 1931, but implementation was spotty and irregular at best, and completely ignored at worst, despite the fact that Sun Yatsen believed that the census was the \textit{first} preparatory measure during the political tutelage as the country moved toward democracy; Ch’ien Tuan-sheng, \textit{Government and Politics}, pp. 133-4.
that were the foundation of a domestic armament industry and a modern military-oriented economy. Highways, railways, factories, and arsenals were all begun or improved, with important aid from a growing Sino-German trade. The National Defense Council (guofang huiyi 國防會議) was set up, directly subordinate to the KMT Political Council, as a defense planning body. Chiang quickly by-passed it by establishing the National Defense Committee (guofang weiyuanhui 國防委員會), which answered to the KMT’s CEC and was empowered with the secret control over central government military and administrative organs.\(^{148}\) Von Seeckt, in 1933, observed that what China needed most was several years of internal and external peace before it could even attempt to build a large, truly national, military – it would not have that time.\(^{149}\)

Chiang’s semi-public preparations and the popular pressure to resist Japanese aggression both fueled a mounting pressure within the party, government, and military to begin full-scale conscription. In 1935 Chiang established an Army Reorganization Office (lujun zhenglichu 陸軍整理處), headed by Chen Cheng (陳誠), with the responsibility of enacting reforms, such as cutting bloated commands and building up smaller, better trained units.\(^{150}\) Taking a cue from Wang Qi’s proposal, the reforms included a system of paramilitary training for able-bodied men (zhuangding) – this training was specifically for the reserves and men who would be conscripted in the future.\(^{151}\) But the training efforts for zhuangding were poorly handled. In March 1937, the Training Oversight Division (xunlian zongjianbu 訓練總監部), which was responsible for the militarized training of the general population, was queried by the Executive Yuan on why training was not proceeding well. The Training Division sent a defensive and snippy response that went so far as to say that the “incompleteness of progress in the provinces is only because Your Ministry has delayed publishing the regulations.” The result was that the people were confused and suspicious of the training because they did not understand that it did not mean they were already conscripted, and the trainers were overly harsh, treating the civilian trainees as if they were already in the army. Despite these problems, the Training Division provided a pointed list of its trained civilian units’ accomplishments, which included construction projects and river dredging, as well as bandit suppression and all out assaults against communist units.\(^{152}\)


\(^{150}\) The reforms were designed to raise the effectiveness of units smaller than the division and the army, such as regiments and brigades, by building them up to full strength and reducing the ineffective and bloated rosters of divisions and armies. The reorganization efforts were based on three principles: (a) reduce large units, strengthen small units; (b) make every effort to strengthen units from the regiment down; and (c) strengthen specialized forces; *KRZZ*, vol. 1, pp. 951, 959.

\(^{151}\) The 1935-36 reorganization efforts were based on three principles: (a) reduce large units, strengthen small units; (b) make every effort to strengthen units from the regiment down; and (c) strengthen specialized forces; *KRZZ*, vol. 1, pp. 950-1.

\(^{152}\) *YZSL*, vol. 1, pp. 87-90. The Training Oversight Division was established in November 1928 as
On Christmas Eve 1935, two more proposals that built on the limited preparatory measures as part of the army reorganization efforts were delivered to the KMT’s CEC. Both proposals called for an immediate start on conscription. The first was drafted by Xu Tingyao (徐庭瑤) and signed by a group of primarily military men, consisting of top generals, political officers in the military, and some KMT party hacks. Xu argued that the First World War demonstrated conclusively that modern warfare demands huge reserves of manpower. The proposal recommended setting up experimental districts for a few divisions, which would conduct household registration and build barracks. A conscription department (兵役司) in the Junzhengbu should be established to collect military service laws from nations around the globe, study them carefully, call together officers in the experimental divisions for discussions and then begin implementation, including informational campaigns.153

On the same day as Xu’s proposal, another was issued to the CEC, this time from a group of 22 signees, led by Zhang Banghan (張邦翰). Zhang, a European-trained engineer who was involved in education and industry in Yunnan, organized a group of men to appeal for the “speedy” implementation of compulsory military service on a country-wide basis. The signees included Wang Qi and a few of the generals behind Xu’s petition, but it consisted primarily of civilian officials and educators from Yunnan. Zhang’s proposal is noteworthy because it tackled point by point many of the objections to conscription that must have been circulating in the hallways and offices of Nanjing’s government and military buildings. Those objections over-emphasized the difficulties involved; they were merely excuses based on “biased views, and one-sided reasons” that unnecessarily delayed putting the country on a conscription footing.154 Some argued that conscription would repeat the error of a bloated military, but this, said Zhang, is “merely superficially dazzling” because war with Japan was inevitable and the men would be needed soon. To those who felt the household registration system must be fully in place before putting hand to the conscription plow, Zhang replied that they ignore European history in which the census and conscription systems were developed together. “Where is the harm in doing them simultaneously? . . . The earlier we start, the earlier results will be obtained. Delay is the most harmful. We must not damage the fundamental principles of nation-building with census procedures.”155 Others object because they feel the direct state-to-individual relationship that is the foundation of modern conscription violates Chinese social customs and values, which emphasize clan or multi-generation family.

[Some] say that China inclines toward the clan system, that implementing conscription will have [families’] only sons and grandsons dying alone on battlefields and thus

---

154. Ibid., p. 56.
155. Ibid., pp. 56-7.
[Conscription] goes against the dictates of the country’s clan system. Since the life of the nation belongs to all, how can one believe that clans are [purely] private and that [they] are incapable of saving the nation from peril? After the country has been eliminated, if the nation (minzu 民族) still shamelessly exists, this only adds to the shame of the conquered country. How can we harm the good of the entire country just for one knot of private [interest]?\(^{156}\)

Chiang and his generals must not, Zhang continued, fear foreign interference, pre-war code terminology for avoiding angering or provoking Japan. China is not yet conquered and still has her sovereignty; there is no need to fear foreign reaction.\(^{157}\) And finally, like He Yingqin, Zhang and his co-signees were confident that universal military service would “forge the bodies of China’s people,” thus wiping away the long-entrenched habits of over-civility and weakness that invited foreign ridicule and aggression. Conscription would bring education, extirpating “unwholesome people,” thus wiping away the long-entrenched habits of over-civility and weakness that invited foreign ridicule and aggression. Conscription would bring education, extirpating “unwholesome habits” with discipline and clean living, and allow for the government to provide proper political and occupational training for citizens.\(^{158}\)

Bolstered by unabated Japanese pressure in north China and popular pressure of the National Salvation Movement, the arguments finally hit home: 1936 saw the the beginning of experimental conscription, an important war preparation measure that pre-dated the dramatic Xi’an Incident and the United Front that was born of it.\(^{159}\) Mid-1936 saw the expansion of the Junzhengbu’s Military Affairs Department (junwuke 軍務科) or Military Service Office (bingyichu 兵役處) into a Military Service Department (bingyisi 兵役司). As part of this expansion, the Nationalist military and Interior Ministry begin trials of conscription, with twelve divisional districts established in the lower Yangzi provinces and comprehensive regulations issued. The first registration of eligible men and then lottery drawings began in July. By December fifty thousand conscripts had been inducted into units. The trial areas were expanded

---

156. Ibid., p. 57.
157. Ibid., pp. 57-8. Interestingly, in all the prewar proposals advocating conscription, Zhang’s is the only one that mentions any special provisions for those of high socio-economic status. Along with the traditional exemption for only sons, Zhang’s Yunnan group suggests that families with substantial financial assets be allowed to substitute payment of an “army maintenance tax” (yangbing 養兵) for their son’s service. A graduated scale increased the amount of the tax for each exemption based on how wealthy the family was. This privilege was extended under some circumstances to families with more than one child as well.

158. Ibid., pp. 58-60. The conscription and training programs of 1936 were clearly intended as part of Chiang’s war preparations, which were picking up pace in the mid-1930s. There was no need to begin mobilization on this scale to deal with the communists: the Fifth Extermination Campaign had already evicted them from their Jiangxi Soviet base and they were being successfully harassed at every turn on the Long March by Nationalist forces. The communist incursion into Sichuan (a separate force from the Long Marchers) had been beaten and in fact had occasioned central government penetration of the stubborn Sichuan militarists’ bailiwicks. Chiang was on the verge of “curing” the “disease of the heart” that had dominated his planning – without resorting to any grander mobilization efforts. Implementing conscription was part of the German-inspired and supervised efforts to overhaul and reorganize the central army, designs that were clearly aimed at putting the country on a war footing so that it could resist Japan, not at continuing fighting the already-beaten communists.
significant in early 1937. The initial results were positive, though some adjustments were called for; most notably, the first round of conscription had shown that there was a shortage of personnel. Authorities were hopeful that this plan could be steadily expanded to cover the entire country within five years. The Japanese local commanders made sure that this leisurely timetable would be replaced by desperate urgency in 1937.

Summer, 1936. Bent over his desk, Professor Lei Haizong pondered China’s past and present and wrote of the revitalizing possibilities that conscription offered a threatened China. In the streets and press, National Salvation activists agitated for the immediate mobilization of the nation’s manpower for resistance. Ensconced in their offices and meeting halls, government and military leaders experimented, reported, and prepared for the day when war would demand that they compel the people to march to the front lines. And while some of the more naïve youth were eager to go to war, many more read the writing on the wall with apprehension, dreading being sent to fight a fearsome and well-armed enemy, and anxious to avoid the grasp of their government’s army recruiters. Among them were the monks of the China Buddhist Association. The CBA filed identical petitions requesting a special exemption for the monks with the Administrative Yuan and the General Training Oversight Division. Included in the scope of the citizens training programs run by the Training Division, Buddhist monks were worried and in an uproar at the prospect of being trained and then quite possibly sent to kill. The CBA’s petition acknowledged the monks’ citizenship and duty to aid the country in its time of need, but argued that the monks’ religious commitment had to be respected as well.

Mahayana [Buddhists] abandon themselves to benefit others, commit themselves to saving the world. Facing this time of national crisis, [we] should completely fulfill our duty to protect the nation. However, we find that the core of Buddhism is first of all the prohibition against killing. If [we] are ordered to do our utmost on the battlefield and join in the fighting, it would directly contradict the purpose that Buddhists hold to. Although monks claim to live beyond this world, they also belong to the [country’s] citizenry, and have a responsibility in [times of] national crisis, which they cannot ignore. Our association, in order to develop the Mahayana Buddhist spirit of saving the world, hoping to see and experience the central [government’s] intention on behalf of the country and the people, and looking to Buddhists’ maintaining their prohibitions, drafted this request that the government approve a clear measure that all the young, eligible monks of the country should be trained in rescue work. [We] plead that this

---

160. The DDs set up in 1936 were spread across Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei, the locations being: Huaiyang (淮陽), Xuhai (徐海), Wenchu (溫處), Jinling (金陵), Anlu (安陸), Wuhui (無徽), Huaisi (淮泗), Xunrao (渾饒), Yudong (豫東), Yuxi (豫西), Yunan (雲南), Xiangyang (襄陽). In 1937 the expansion added districts to completely blanket the original provinces, and then added districts and planning offices in Fujian, Hunan, Shandong, Guizhou, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Guangdong, Yunnan, and Ningxia as well; Shen Huaiyu, “Qishinian lai Zhongguo bingyi zhidu”, p. 76; KRZZ, p. 950; Dai Gaoxiang, Gaoxiang wencun, p. 69-73; Xu Naili, “Haonan ying dangbing”, pp. 6-8. F. F. Liu says that by the end of 1936 half a million men had already been “processed” by the fledgling conscription apparatus. In actuality, 500,000 men had completed the zhuangding training course, while another million were in the midst of the training programs. Both those numbers clearly include all those who were routed into reserves and militia service and not just those routed into active service; F. F. Liu, A Military History, p. 137 and Zhang Xianwen, Zhongguo kongri zhanzheng shi, pp. 206-7.
order be given to the whole country, that when able-bodied men [zhuan ding] are being trained, that [the monks] be organized separately, in order that [they] be trained according to their qualifications and thus attain timely and substantial results . . .

Repeated petitions to the Training Division were filed by Taixu (太虚), secretary of the Nanjing Buddhist Association as well. Tang Shengzhi (唐生智), head of the Training Division, in his replies reiterated that the zhuan ding training program was not equivalent to becoming a soldier, and he reassured the Buddhist leaders that monks could fulfill their duty to protect the country by “grasping the past spirit of temple self-protection.” They would be organized into all-monk units that were not only restricted to non-combat roles such as rescue work but also not attached to fighting units, and they were even to be allowed to train in their short yellow robes.

This is not to single out the Buddhist Association or its members as unpatriotic, but to highlight this petition as the first instance of what would become an entrenched and debilitating problem of wartime conscription: desperate people relying on institutional connections to protect them from the demands of conscription, while institutions were likewise anxious to protect and shield their human resources from the military.

The day the nation had been anxiously dreading and waiting for came in the heat and rain of early July 1937 – the shots that woke Lei in his Qinghai campus apartment marked the start of the Japanese invasion. By the end of July Beiping and Tianjin had fallen the Japanese began their push along railway lines, advancing almost at will in north China. What had been preparation and experimentation almost overnight became vital, pressing necessity. But time was short, too short for complicated administrative changes; it was time to make do with what was at hand. On the last day of July, He Yingqin, as minister of war, issued secret measures concerning the first batches of replacements for Chiang’s approval. They were ad hoc emergency measures permitting combat divisions to establish field replacement battalions to recruit directly from already trained militias, Peace Preservation Units, or directly from demobilized or retired soldiers in their hometowns. Conscription districts that were already functioning were to establish two rear replacement battalions to call up the replacements from the 1936 experimental draft as well as the 1937 conscripts and any volunteers that met the physical requirements. The soldiers were to be given a brief six-week course of training – and perhaps an additional six weeks for the rear battalions – and then rushed to the front. Even while moving the divisional districts into higher gear, He’s measures allowed units who were not receiving conscripted replacements in time for their needs to set up their own recruitment system in areas that did not yet have a divisional district in place. Specialized and technical units were to search out and recruit talent on their own.

161. Yuanying (圆瑛), the director general, and the standing committee of the CBA signed the petition; YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 76-8.

162. Ibid., pp. 78-9. In Buddhist circles there was considerable division of opinion around the problem of serving as soldiers. The heart of the problem was the legitimacy or illegitimacy of Buddhists’ identity as national citizens. See the online essay by He Ziwen (何子文), “Bingyi yu guomin shenfen: kangri shiqi sangha shenfen zhonggou” (Military Service and Citizen Identity: Reconstruction of the Sangha’s Identity during the War of Resistance), at http://news.fjnet.com/pty/xqsd/200806/t20080604_72838.htm.

163. The officers in these battalions were to be drawn from the field division in the former case and Central War College graduates or officers without a commission in the latter case; YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 96-109.

- 71 -
Japan hoped to limit the war to the north, where they could take advantage of the flat, open terrain and their superiority in air and mechanized power to slice off another chunk of the Chinese melon and force greater concessions from a chastened Chiang. The generalissimo took a gamble and ordered his military to open a second front at Shanghai – a grand gesture of defiance that knocked Japan’s strategy into a cocked hat, forcing them to engage in operations over an ever-expanding area. Both sides threw units into the fray with a fury. By the 20th of August there were fifteen Chinese divisions in the area, with one or two more arriving every day, until at the peak of the battle the Nationalists had nearly half a million men in the fight. Japan sent in force after force, as the front expanded more than twenty miles down the Huangpu River. The fighting was bitter, often house-to-house and hand-to-hand; the Sichuanese general Sun Yuan-ling’s “Lone Battalion” held out in a Zhabei warehouse for four days while the district burned around them. Chinese girl scouts ran supplies to the defenders after dark. The Chinese airforce ineptly bombed hotels and department stores; the Japanese bombed and shelled the Chinese defenders mercilessly.

Shanghai was a ravenous meat grinder. As the casualties mounted rapidly, the dead literally piled up in the streets. Estimates of Chinese casualties vary, but were certainly well over 100,000 in the two and a half months of fighting. Many units were decimated, with casualty rates well north of fifty per cent.

---

164. Chiang decided to make a stand in the strongholds of his power – his hometown, his best units, his largest financial support were all in the Lower Yangzi region. Strategically this sacrifice of his best units was suspect (they could have been husbanded for later use in the hinterland), but psychologically and symbolically it was an important demonstration of Chiang and China’s will to resist.

165. Detailed accounts of the battle can be found in Guo Rugui and Huang Yuzhang, eds., Zhongguo zhounian zuozhan zhengmian zhanchang zuo zai shi, pp. 511-611 and Zhang Xianwen, Zhongguo kangi zhungkin zhengmian shi, pp. 259-87. The most readable account I have encountered is Dick Wilson’s in When Tigers Fight, pp. 30-48. Others I have consulted include Fenby, Chiang Kai-Shek, pp. 295-303; Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Nationalist China at War, pp. 41-9; Dreyer, China at War, pp. 216-9; Kangzhan shengli sishi zhounian lwnwen ji, vol. 1, pp. 114-24; F. F. Liu, A Military History, pp. 147-9; Carlson, Twin Stars, pp. 1-29; and White and Jacoby, Thunder out of China, pp. 51-3. For the contributions of Sichuan units at Shanghai, see Wan Jinyu, “Wu Chuan buchong jun,” p. 196 and “Kangzhan banian zai Sichuan,” pp. 343-4. Any number of Chinese or foreign eyewitness accounts could be cited instead, as the Battle for Shanghai was a unique engagement fought out literally under the eyes of thousands of foreign observers and civilians. From the rooftops and balconies in their protected enclaves, men and women from around the world, with opera glasses and with cocktails in hand, watched the bombings, shellings, and firesights. For those not dying in the house-to-house fighting, it was a surreal drama: war and dinner parties side-by-side. “There was something depressing about the bright lights of the city . . . Back there men were plodding and sweating, suffering and dying; here people seemed so free of care, so oblivious of the pain and struggle which was little more than a stone’s throw away. Neon signs announced the latest cinema attractions. Speeding taxicabs bore gay dinner parties to night clubs,” Carlson, Twin Stars, p. 18.

166. Wan Jinyu states that Chinese armies lost 300,000 during the battle; Wan, “Wu Chuan buchong jun,” p. 196. F. F. Liu suggests that 60% of China’s 450,000 defenders were casualties, which would amount to 270,000 wounded, killed or missing; F. F. Liu, p. 198. Fenby in his biography of Chiang puts Nationalist casualties somewhere in the range between 180,000 and 300,000; Fenby, Chiang Kai-Shek, p. 302. Edward Dreyer reports a figure about half of Liu’s: 130,000
It seemed impossible that men could continue to live under such a deluge of death, but they did. The Chinese had dug bombproofs, and when the Japanese infantry attacked they were invariably met with vicious machine-gun and rifle-fire. The defenders refused to be budged . . . [O]ut behind the lines fresh troops continued to arrive. They were not the hand-picked veterans who had been trained in the German supervised training centers in Nanking, for these already constituted the backbone of the defense. They came from the provinces, men full of enthusiasm and fired with the spirit of national salvation, but lacking in experience and training. They came up to the front eager and vibrant; and in a few days they, too, lay still on the brown autumn soil.167

There was no likelihood that the fledgling conscription system with its limited number of districts could meet the need for replacements. As the battle around Shanghai ground its way through Chiang’s best men and their replacements, the government issued the formal order to expand conscription to the entire nation on 30 August.

In this time of emergency, all males who are of age for military service have a duty to answer the call and join the army and fulfill their military service. Now, particularly according to the regulations of the third clause of the Military Service Law, the Executive Yuan is to pass on the order to all the agencies concerned with military service to [begin] full-time conscription of citizen-soldiers [國民兵] in order to supply [them] for active duty and thus consolidate the national defense.168

All too belatedly for Lei Haizong and the National Salvation activists, and yet too early for Chiang and his generals, conscription was now a reality and the law of the land. The combined quota for the operating divisional districts was set at 60,000 men per month in the fall of 1937 as Chiang and his generals attempted to build a modern Great Wall out of the bodies of fallen men. Soon the columns of drab cotton garbed conscripts, “China’s doomed men,” would be snaking across the countryside, heading to Shanghai, to the front.169

---

169. The phrase “China’s doomed men” is taken from White and Jacoby’s famous chapter on the Nationalist soldiers; see Thunder out of China, pp. 132-44.
Figure 1-1: “Fortress of New China”

artist: Jiang Mi (江枚)
Chapter Two

The Politics of Conscription: State-Building, Commercialization, and Alienation

“Without Sichuan there is no army” (wu Chuan bucheng jun 無川不成軍)
– Popular Saying

Conscription’s Fall Guy, Cheng Zerun

On the 6th of July 1945, an unseasonable fog collaborated with the oppressive summer heat that covered Chongqing like a thick blanket, working together to stifle sound. At nine AM, in the Nan’an compound of the Military Courts, a single volley of shots was muffled by the heavy air. A tall man slumped over and lay in a widening pool of blood. China’s conscription service had claimed yet another “doomed man.” This time it was not a peasant conscript, but Lieutenant General Cheng Zerun, who had led the Nationalist conscription administration the past six years. Like many of China’s forlorn conscripts, Cheng was killed not by the Japanese, but by his own side, Nationalist soldiers: a platoon of MPs executed Cheng Zerun on the direct orders of Chiang Kaishek. The next day the Central Daily tersely reported: “The former head of the MSO and Conscription cadre training class chairman, Cheng Zerun, engaged in many corrupt practices. During June and July last year, he used his position to order engineering soldiers to build his private villa, saving construction costs for his own profit. Chairman Chiang investigated it. After turning him over to the Military Courts, which found [the allegations] to be true, he was sentenced to death and stripped of his civil rights for life. On the 5th of this month, at nine in the morning, execution by firing squad was carried out.”¹ That night, the military judge for the case, He Chengjun (何成濓), lamented in his diary that “it is a terrible shame that [a man] who graduated from college, worked for nearly thirty years, reached the rank of lieutenant-general, held the position of [MSO] chief, could not be upright and circumspect and was killed at the hands of the law.”²

The events leading to the Cheng’s execution, however, began nearly a full year earlier in the summer of 1944. A batch of conscripts stopped in central Chongqing at a small way-station. On Wednesday, 30 August, Dai Anguo (戴安國) or Jiang Weiguo (蔣衛國), Chiang’s other son, heard the cries of the men as they were beaten viciously by the officers in charge.³ Either Dai or

¹. Zhongyang ribao, 7 July 1945.

². By some accounts He Chengjun personally led the execution squad, but his diary makes no mention of that, saying only: “according to the trial section’s report, the execution was carried out at ten AM;” diary entry for 6 July 1945 in He Chengjun zhashi jiri, p. 630. Whether he just gave the final order and was not present, or elided his personal presence at the scene of the blood-letting is uncertain.

³. The sources are not in agreement on this point. Likely both men were involved: the Dai family villa was in the area and Jiang Weiguo was Dai Anguo’s good friend and half-brother: Anguo’s father, Dai
Jiang Weiguo went to investigate and discovered the miserable condition of the building and the conscripts inside. The barracks itself was dark and filthy, without any bedding. Some of the recruits were naked and some were over 50 years old, far above the legal age for soldiers. Forced to kneel, the men were bound, beaten, and cursed by the officers; they “suffered like they were in hell.”

Horrified, Jiang Weiguo went to tell his father of the squalid scene. During a summer filled with conferences and informal meetings at his villa to hammer out how to improve the treatment of soldiers, Chiang Kaishek was quick to act on his son’s report, motoring immediately to the barracks, with Weiguo and Yu Jishi (余濟時), head of his personal staff, in tow. As Chiang drove up, an officer was in the middle of another savage attack on his charges, though he stopped when he saw who had arrived. Chiang surveyed the dismal barracks, discovering men with open sores and one man so ravaged that he was abandoned in a corner and left to die. Chiang ordered that Cheng Zerun be summoned to the spot.

In one of those coincidences that make up the cruelest ironies (or the most carefully laid plans), the day was Cheng’s 50th birthday celebration, being held at his newly built mansion. The place was crowded with the staff of the Military Service Office (MSO), generals and officers of conscription districts and army units, and high-ranking government officials. Chiang’s summons – delivered by armed MPs – arrived just as the party reached its height, with rounds of toasts and heavy drinking beginning to dominate the festivities. Embarrassed, Cheng had little choice but to leave his own party and hurry off to see what was so urgent. Meeting the generalissimo, Cheng immediately came to attention and saluted his chief. Chiang was icy, and quietly asked Cheng to take a look at how his conscription administration was handling things. Cheng began to offer excuses, arguing that the MSO was not responsible for the unit stationed at this barracks, because it was a transportation department detachment and not under MSO jurisdiction. Chiang would have none of it and flew into a rage, cursing Cheng and hitting him with his cane. Cheng dared to reprove Chiang, albeit mildly, by suggesting that a beating was inappropriate and that if he had committed a crime that he should be punished according to the law. Outwardly this cooled Chiang’s temper, but to Cheng’s surprise, Chiang followed his suggestion, ordering the unit commanders to be arrested and Cheng to report to the Military Courts. Flight was unthinkable and confident that he would be vindicated, or at least sheltered from Chiang’s anger by his many supporters and friends, Cheng presented himself at the Military Courts the next day, where he was promptly incarcerated and transferred to a prison compound.

Military authorities launched an investigation, dispatching investigators to examine records, conduct interviews, and inspect financial statements at replacement training offices, divisional districts, and the MSO itself. The unit commanders were speedily found guilty of all sorts of abuses. The investigators recommended execution, a decision that He Chengjun heartily endorsed, writing in his diary that “this type of man is no different than a venomous snake or a snarling tiger, killing them is not worth a single regret.”

Information about abuses in the MSO

5. One account suggests that the commander was beating three escapees who had been chased down in the city; Zha Keen, “Guomindang fandong zhengfu de bingyi yu bingyishuzhang Cheng Zerun zhi si,” p. 169.
6. Chiang, through his bodyguard office, pushed the case through. He ordered that the case against
flowed in, including proof that Cheng Zerun had diverted funds and material from official construction projects to his own mansion. But quiet lobbying on Cheng’s behalf began almost immediately too. He Chengjun, the military judge who presided over the case, was keenly aware of the sensitivity the situation demanded. In late March 1945, He Chengjun held a conference with other ranking members of the military courts to discuss Cheng Zerun’s sentence. All were convinced of his obvious corruption and that Cheng could not escape some sort of punishment, but most felt his offenses were not atypical for high officials. After a day long meeting full of strenuous debate, the group decided to recommend a sentence of nine years imprisonment. Concerned with the ramifications of the case, He stayed at his office until late that night reviewing documents, but in the end sent the sentence recommendation to Chiang for approval.

As a high-ranking officer, Cheng enjoyed special treatment while in prison; he saw other prisoners in their cells and had a steady stream of visitors. Well aware that a whole slew of officials and generals were informally lobbying Chiang for leniency, he sent his friends letters and couplets, some of which invoked Han Boyu (韓伯俞). A Han dynasty (206 BCE - 220 CE) man, Han Boyu was enshrined in a four-character idiom: Boyu qizhang (伯俞泣杖), which means literally “Boyu weeps when caned.” Born to an exceptionally strict mother who caned him regularly, Han always bore his mother’s corporal punishment silently, until one day he wept as she beat him. Alarmed, she asked why the sudden change. His response earned him a place among the paragons of filiality. Han said that previously she had beaten him vigorously, but this time her strokes were greatly weakened. Realizing that she was already frail, he mourned her mortality. Invoking Han Boyu was an elegant maneuver. On one hand, it contained an implicit rebuke to Chiang: that Cheng had always been loyal and, should he be unduly punished, Chiang was rewarding his loyalty with undeserved harshness. Cheng’s record of loyal service to Chiang and the Nationalist cause was beyond reproach.

A Sichuan native hailing from Longchang (隆昌) county to the west of Chongqing, Cheng was a product of Sichuan’s Army Officers Academy (四川陸軍軍官學堂). He eventually graduated (the 5th class) from the Beijing Staff College (陸軍大學). After returning to Sichuan, he served a minor Sichuan militarist, Lai Xinhui (賴心輝), but once his patron was defeated, Cheng threw his lot in with Chiang Kaishek in 1927. His switch of loyalty was rewarded with posts in Hunan and Hubei as a divisional commander and concurrently a Special Inspector (行政

---

7. Another version of events is that Chen Cheng influenced Chiang's intelligence chief, Dai Li, to conduct an investigation into Cheng’s offenses, after which Chen Cheng turned the evidence against Cheng over to Chiang; see Longchang xianzhhi, p. 763.

8. He admitted in his diary that he was forced to be presiding judge because all the other ranking officers in the military courts flat out refused to sit on Cheng’s case; He Chengjun, He Chengjun jiangjun zhanshi jiri, p. 575.
until He Yingqin appointed him to the Military Affairs Department (軍務司) in the Junzhengbu. In 1934, he was dispatched by Chiang to help put down the invasion of northern Sichuan by communist elements and to soothe the warlord suspicions that were hampering efforts to eject the communists. After Sichuan’s unification, he was chief of staff on Liu Xiang’s administration, and in that capacity he helped bring about the central government’s rapprochement with Liu. Connected to General He Yingqin, Cheng was sometimes called one of He’s “nucleus elements” in the military or one of his “four warrior attendants” (四金剛之一; the term jingang refers to Buddha’s warrior attendants – the Buddha here, of course, being He Yingqin). As He’s struggle with Chen Cheng (陳誠) intensified in 1944, Cheng Zerun’s star waned along with his patron’s and the obvious abuses in conscription provided ammunition for Chen Cheng and his whisper campaign against He Yingqin. Given his long service to the Nationalist cause, Cheng’s invocation of Han Boyu was an unmistakable suggestion that he should not be repaid by imprisonment.

Yet, it was also a reassurance that Cheng remained loyal and would accept his punishment. If Cheng mourned, it was only because Chiang’s arm no longer had the strength it once did. Moved by his eloquent expression of his conflicted feelings, Cheng’s friends pressured Chiang. A string of Sichuan generals interceded on his behalf, as did Dai Jitao, Xu Siping, and Feng Yuxiang. He Yingqin, naturally enough, requested that Cheng be transferred to Guiyang as He’s chief of staff, technically a front-line post. Even Lu Zhonglin, the new head of the Ministry of Conscription, came to Cheng’s defense, arguing that he did not deserve execution.

Chiang Kaishek remained unmoved, letting Cheng stew in his cell for months. Finally, two events goaded Chiang into ordering Cheng’s immediate execution. First, a letter from Feng Yuxiang endorsed He Chengjun’s original sentence recommendation of nine years imprisonment. Although Feng held symbolic posts throughout the war and conducted many fund-raising drives for the war effort, his long-standing feud with and continued political needling of Chiang Kaishek meant that he was never trusted with any substantial power, despite his usefulness as a publicity figure. A thorn in Chiang’s side, Feng’s meddling letter angered Chiang.

The second event was Chen Cheng’s admonition that a light sentence was a travesty of justice. Motivated by his long-standing rivalry with He Yingqin, who was Cheng Zerun’s main patron, Chen Cheng accused He Chengjun of going soft on Cheng as a favor to He Yingqin. Even more suspicious, He Chengjun, the military judge in charge of the case, was also a protege of He Yingqin. Chen Cheng accused He Chengjun of trying to protect his patron, He Yingqin, by recommending such a light sentence. And in fact, such suspicions were not far off the mark. Though He Chengjun would follow Chiang’s orders when push came to shove, he had been con-

9. Zha Keen, “Guomindang fandong zhengfu de bingyi yu bingyishuhzhang Cheng Zerun zhi si,” p. 169. In the summer of 1944, just prior to his arrest, Cheng was transferred to the War Area Inspector Corps (戰地巡察團委員) and Sichuan Military District commander, demotions which foreshadowed his ultimate fall from grace.

10. Feng Yuxiang’s memoirs reinforce this antagonism. Both his books, Wo de kangri shenghuo (My Life During the War of Resistance) and Wo suorenshi de Jiang Jieshi (The Chiang Kaishek I Knew), are full of barbs and pointed anecdotes targeting Chiang and demonstrating the considerable tension between them. Written just before the 1949, some of these stories were doubtlessly embellished after the fact to reinforce Feng’s anti-Chiang credentials, but the long history of antagonism between the two was real and persistent.
tacted by Cheng’s friends looking for ways to convince Chiang to relent and spare Cheng’s life; some calling on He at his office and home to plead with him to delay the execution. After Chiang’s initial order for execution on 6 June, He Chengjun replied with a request to revise the military court’s initial sentence recommendation of nine years to life imprisonment. He did what he could, but confessed to his diary that he was “afraid in the end it will not be enough to save [him].”11 From both sides – pushed and pulled – Chiang was goaded into ordering Cheng’s execution. Arriving back in Chongqing from a trip to Xi’an on 4 July, Chiang inquired whether the sentence had been carried out. Even a last minute plea from Dai Jitao on Cheng Zerun’s behalf in the evening of the 5th left Chiang unmoved. Despite his personal reservations, He Chengjun had little choice but to carry out Chiang’s direct order. Cheng’s last letter to his wife were simple instructions on how to dispose of their property after the war and an admonition to make sure that their son never become an official. His final request to his executioners was that his head not be smashed after he was shot, so that he could be buried intact.12

11. See He Chengjun’s diary entries for 13 June and 28 June 1945; He Chengjun jiangjun zhanshi jiri, pp. 617-8 and 626.

12. There are numerous accounts of Cheng’s arrest and execution, but being somewhat gossipy they do not agree on many details. Dates are often vague or suspect in many, thus, wherever possible I have relied on He Chengjun’s diary. The most reliable accounts, written by Li Chengxun and Zha Keen, both staff in conscription agencies, are in general agreement. However, without access to the military court archives, some of the particulars remain uncertain. The location of the barracks is still unclear; the most likely seems to be a small alley in the neighborhood of the Erhat Temple (Luohansi, 羅漢寺), quite near today’s Liberation Monument in central Chongqing. A lack of agreement concerns what unit was involved. Some accounts paint it as a regular military, others as tax enforcement troops of the Finance Ministry, or some sort of transportation unit. But, two contemporary diarists who were in good position to know the particulars agree it was a transportation unit, and thus not subject to regular MSO jurisdiction. While they do not agree in every particular, the diaries of He Chengjun and Tang Zong, Chiang’s bodyguard and aide, agree on this point; He Chengjun jiangjun zhanshi jiri, p. 479 and Tang Zong, Zai Jiang Jiieshi shenbian banian, p. 456-7. He Chengjun’s diary records that it was the 29 transport regiment, but that after the military court’s decision was drawn up, He Yingqin visited He Chengjun to get the case documents changed to reflect the case that the transport regiment was not under Junzhengbu jurisdiction, having been transferred to the Rear Logistics Command (houfang qinwu bu 後方勤務部). He Chengjun dutifully made the change; He Chengjun, He Chengjun jiangjun zhanshi jiri, p. 479. The diary of Tang Zong, Chiang Kaishek’s bodyguard, agrees that it was an unspecified (military) transport unit under the military transportation department (運輸部). The question is important in that such units were independent of the regular military and conducted their own recruitment, and thus were not even under the authority of the Junzhengbu or MSO at all. Other discrepancies cluster around who actually first noticed the abusive conditions of the conscripts. Some accounts have Dai Jitao’s son, Dai Anguo hearing the screams and then calling it to the attention of Jiang Weigu. Other sources have Jiang Jinguo discovering the horrific conditions in the way station. It is entirely possible that the dramatic scene is a composite of more than one incident. Jay Taylor’s biography of Jiang Jinguo, which draws on private and unreleased family documents, mentions that Jiang informed his father of at least two separate incidents of violations and abuses of conscripts in Chongqing in the late war years, but does not connect these to Cheng Zerun’s arrest or execution; Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son, p. 118. This may indicate that it was indeed Dai Anguo and/or Jiang Weigu, and not Jinguo, who heard the screams. Some of the sources consulted for these events are: Li, Chengxun, “Zhongjiang Cheng Zerun Beisha Neiqing,” Minguo yaoan xunzong : Minguo chunqiu, 3 (1996): pp. 270-6; Zha Keen, “Guomindang fandong zhengfu de
From one perspective, Cheng was a victim of the factional knife-fighting that was endemic at the high-levels of the Nationalist regime. The bitter rivalries between Chen Cheng and He Yingqin and between Chiang and Feng Yuxiang played no small part in Cheng Zerun’s fate. Also at work was the continued tension between Chiang Kaishek’s new favorite, Chen Cheng and the Sichuan generals who were essential to the war effort. Hailing from Longchang county in Sichuan, Cheng Zerun had deep ties with provincial militarists and power-holders. In fact, most of the men Chiang tapped to lead the conscription administration were from the province, as was He Chengjun and the generals who petitioned on behalf of Cheng Zerun. Despite their in-dispensability, Chiang’s relationship with the Sichuan power elite remained tense even in 1944-45, in part because of their long-standing dislike for Chen Cheng.13

However, at another level, Cheng’s execution was a dramatic statement of Chiang’s dissatisfaction with the persistent problems in the conscription administration as a whole. Cheng Zerun was a scapegoat, to be sure, though a curious one. He had presided over what had to be measured as a strategic success: the conscription administration had managed to procure sufficient manpower to prevent total collapse, and had forced the Japanese to maintain an enormous army in China.14 Despite this, however, Chiang had reiterated almost ad nauseum that conscription faults began at the top, stressing that it was the administration authorities – beginning with the head of the administration – that were responsible for all the abuses. In his speech to a conscription conference at the Central Training Institute on 20 March 1940, Chiang told the audience of seeing a junior officer, bedecked with expensive gold rings, leading a column of new conscripts who were bound with rope. Beyond raising conscription cadres’ pay, the only real solution, Chiang argued, was more training and conscientious oversight by superiors: high-level administrators and conscription district officials needed to stop sitting in their yamen offices and get out where the real work is done.15 Again in early January 194, Chiang took another stab at Cheng, saying that draft abuses continued because “the MSO head” did not personally go around

13. The prewar process of nationalizing the Sichuan military had created some serious animosity between Chen Cheng and the Sichuan militarists. The officer training classes conducted at Emei in 1935 were symptomatic of this rift. Not only was Chen was in charge of training and the day-to-day operations of the training course, but he was also Chiang’s point man in charge of taking a hardline position against the localism of Liu Xiang and the Sichuan warlord forces. Although students found Chiang’s speeches interminably boring, they positively detested Chen Cheng and his lectures. Liu Xiang and other Sichuan warlords (Deng Xihou and Liu Wenhui) also gave a few speeches, but they (predictably) emphasized anti-Japanese themes, stressing the contribution that Sichuan forces could and would make. Liu Wenhui’s speech emphasized national heroes, all of whom were tragic figures, failing to protect the homeland from foreign invaders. The Central Military officers, led by Chen Cheng, disliked the anti-Japanese stance of the Sichuan generals, and were quick to pounce of Liu’s use of failures as heroes; Yang Xueduan, “Eshan junguan xunliantuan diyiqi de huixi,” pp. 715-7.

14. At the start of the Pacific War in December 1941, the China theater was tying down 35 divisions of Japanese troops, fully 69% of Japan’s 51 divisions; Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, p. 163.

15. YZSL, vol. 2, pp. 429-34.
to the divisional districts to see conditions on the ground. From now on, he blustered, “the MSO chief must go every month to several replacement training offices (RTOs) to personally inspect them and see what problems there are with how new soldiers are being treated.”16 Such pot shots at Cheng were frequent.17

Chiang’s ire at the persistent maladministration of military service was not a sudden development, but a frustration that had been building for years. He Yingqin’s eclipse by Chen Cheng in 1944-45 only provided an occasion, not the motivation, for scapegoating Cheng. And yet, the lack of publicity surrounding the execution reminds us that Chiang’s anger was primarily private in nature. There was no attempt to deflect criticism of conscription onto Cheng Zerun, and thus divert it away from Chiang and the Nationalist state more generally. Perhaps this was due to the fear that more public criticism of conscription would undermine it still further and thus scuttle all attempts to rectify it. Such attempts were continuing, even in 1945, testament to the regime’s commitment to finding a solution to the problems, as well as to the deep-seated nature of the problems themselves. Before turning to an examination of the intricacies of the system and the problems which plagued it, we must first take a broad, even strategic, look at conscription, so that the contours of the problem become clearer. An excursion into unreliable national statistics is unavoidable.

Mobilization Rates: Just A Numbers Game

F. F. Liu’s classic study, A Military History of Modern China (1956), highlighted China’s low rate of mobilization compared with the other major combatants.18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>population (in K)</th>
<th>manpower mobilized (in K)</th>
<th>mobilization index</th>
<th>total armed strength (in M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>14,054</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>77,045</td>
<td>8,040</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>141,700</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>unlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>156,687</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>170,467</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>79,530</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


16. Ibid., pp. 478, dated 5 January 1941.
There are serious problems with this comparison, however. One issue is that such calculations for China rest on unreliable population estimates. We can ignore this problem simply because it is unavoidable. China’s government lacked an accurate census and thus we must make do with estimates. More seriously, the military itself did not have accurate records: both the Junzhengbu and field units were often unsure of the extent of casualties, or even the actual number of men being sent to the front. Leaving aside such questions about the quality of the data, there are two crippling problems with these comparisons.

First, Liu is making an apples to oranges comparison. Most of the countries China is compared with (the US, Britain, Japan, and Germany) were industrialized economies, enjoyed stable governments, and suffered no foreign invasion during the war (or most of it in Germany’s case). Russia is the exception here and this comparison makes more sense, but it must be remembered that Russia had the distinct advantages of domestic stability for nearly 25 years before the German invasion in 1941 and a much larger industrial base. Furthermore, it enjoyed a level of material support from the US and Britain which Chinese leaders could only dream of in their wildest fantasies. China, in contrast, had less than 10 years of consolidated central control prior to 1937 and was almost completely cut off from international trade; it was economically and materially isolated in a way no other major combatant country was.

Second, computing a “national” mobilization index for the Chinese case depends on a ludicrous assumption: that the Nationalist government had access to the entire population of 450 million (or so). Unfettered access to their population was par for the course in the other states in Liu’s comparison, because they did not have foreign troops on their soil, but China enjoyed no such luxury. Not only were many of its major cities occupied by Japanese forces, but huge swaths of the densely populated eastern seaboard were as well. Puppet regimes in Nanjing and Beiping were another factor limiting KMT authorities’ access to population. In areas under their control, they conscripted manpower and in borderline areas they competed with KMT authorities. The communists too siphoned off bandits who were willing to fight the Japanese, as well as students, workers, and villagers. In short, the Nationalists simply did not have easy access to the whole population. Xu Nali has estimated that during the war, only 60% of the country’s population was under Nationalist jurisdiction. If we recompute F. F. Liu’s Mobilization Index based on that 60% figure, it comes to 0.6% of the population drafted per year. But even Xu’s reduced population figure obscures temporal changes: an area might be controlled, then occupied, then retaken. Organizing a draft in such areas was a tenuous endeavor at best. While there may have been some form of Nationalist administrative presence over 60% of the population, this raw number does not adequately reflect the difficulties of mobilizing in areas far from the centers of Nationalist power. Since Japanese occupation often ran in “points and lines” – concentrating in cities and along railway lines – many rural counties retained a Nationalist district magistrate or

19. Liu cites two contemporary estimates in his discussion: Chen Ta (Population in Modern China, 1946), based on the Kunming Lake region, arrived at a figure of 400 million, while George Cressey (Asia’s Lands and People, 1944) believed it closer to 473 million. Liu chose to use 450 million as a “compromise.”

20. He compiled his data from numerous sources, Chinese, Japanese, and Western. But see the discussion of how he arrives at his numbers – which he acknowledges in many cases are just “estimates”; pp. 131-6.

other local administration, but real control and command of such districts was far from easy as they were often far behind the Japanese lines. There were efforts to recruit guerrillas in such areas and these enjoyed some important degree of success, particularly since every man thusly recruited denied a body to the enemy as well. But, to figure a “national” mobilization rate without taking into account the restricted geographical area actually available to the Nationalists is almost absurd, obscuring far more than it illuminates. 22 (For a chart of quotas and actual numbers of conscripts delivered, nationally and by provinces, see Tables 2-2 and 2-3 below.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quota</th>
<th>Delivered</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1,008,310</td>
<td>1,008,310</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1,658,915</td>
<td>1,658,915</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,344,569</td>
<td>1,975,501</td>
<td>84.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2,073,043</td>
<td>1,908,839</td>
<td>92.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2,049,782</td>
<td>1,667,830</td>
<td>81.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1,949,834</td>
<td>1,711,132</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1,765,537</td>
<td>1,666,918</td>
<td>94.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1,722,096</td>
<td>1,512,352</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>813,062</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>totals</td>
<td>16,072,080</td>
<td>13,922,859</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


I do not wish to counter Liu’s national rate with revised numbers. Even if it were based on a redrawn population map that reflected the reach of Nationalist control, such an attempt would be nearly futile due to the shifting areas of influence and the fuzziness of the boundaries between the various competing regimes (direct Japanese occupation, puppet regimes, KMT, and the communist base areas). Instead, what needs to be understood is mobilization in the areas most solidly under Nationalist control. For example, the four provinces of Sichuan, Henan, Hunan, and Jiangxi provided nearly 7 million men, just under half of the total for the entire country. 23

22. As early as May 1938, the establishment of recruiting detachments for able-bodied men in occupied areas was motivated by the desire to deny human assets to the enemy. These reception units fed regular military units with recruits in a modified mubing (募兵) system in guerrilla areas. See, Shen Huaiyu, “Jin qishi nianlai Zhongguo zhi bingyi zhidu,” p. 87.

Table 2-3: Provincial Conscription Quotas and Deliveries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>province</th>
<th>quota assigned</th>
<th>men delivered</th>
<th>efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>3,193,807</td>
<td>2,578,810</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>2,210,473</td>
<td>1,898,356</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>1,816,410</td>
<td>1,570,172</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>1,135,575</td>
<td>888,363</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
<td>1,115,212</td>
<td>947,722</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td>1,070,540</td>
<td>925,873</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangxi</td>
<td>1,007,903</td>
<td>808,046</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>867,040</td>
<td>691,195</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guizhou</td>
<td>700,338</td>
<td>580,416</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>661,060</td>
<td>550,416</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>601,784</td>
<td>563,673</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>532,631</td>
<td>425,225</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>508,668</td>
<td>383,857</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>373,361</td>
<td>374,693</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>174,271</td>
<td>216,603</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xikang</td>
<td>39,081</td>
<td>30,938</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>38,859</td>
<td>38,859</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>33,455</td>
<td>32,922</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningxia</td>
<td>19,079</td>
<td>23,609</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinghai</td>
<td>12,009</td>
<td>18,009</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suiyuan</td>
<td>5,253</td>
<td>5,253</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>524,994</td>
<td>497,434</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “efficiency” is simply the percentage of the assigned quota delivered by the province.
Source: Hou Kunhong, “Kangzhan shiqi de zhengbing”, p. 158, based on He Yingqin, Banian kanzhan zhi jingguo, charts 9 and 10 (in supplemental section).

Officially, Sichuan’s wartime quota was 3,193,807 – a figure it failed to meet fully, although it did conscript 2,578,810 men. This number could be increased by the 30,938 men from Xikang and 10,000 more men of “unknown provincial origin” (20% of the total), for a total of 3,848,685 men.
2,618,810.²⁴ Best estimates of Sichuan’s population fall between 47 and 50 million inhabitants,²⁵ which mean that the province conscripted between 5.23% and 5.53% of its population. If the armies present at the start of the war are included (an additional 400-500,000 men), then the mobilization percentage stands between 6.03% and 6.63%.²⁶ These are not extravagant estimates, but fully in line with contemporary claims.²⁷


²⁵ There is a good deal of uncertainty about Sichuan’s total population, but the most reliable numbers put it around 50 million. While some contemporary estimates were as high as 61.4 million, most official and semi-official sources place the province’s total population in a narrow range of 46 to 52 million in 1937. Despite the influx of refugees, the war years saw a drop in population, with the provincial Civil Affairs Department reporting only 43.6 million by 1945. For the various numbers see, Li Shiping, Sichuan renkou shi, pp. 191-2, 204-6; Lu Pingdeng, Sichuan nongcun jingji, pp. 78; F. F. Liu, A Military History, p. 132 (Liu cites Zhen Youbei, Junshi zazhi (Chinese journal of military affairs), no. 116 (August 1939), pp. 120-30); Hu Huanyong, Sichuan dili, pp. 102-3; Lou Yunlin, ed., Sichuan, pp. 51-9.

²⁶ Dai Gaoxiang, chief of staff for the Sichuan Provincial District from 1938 to 1943, estimated that Sichuan had a total population of 47 million, and in eight years conscripted 2.6 million men. Dai’s numbers put the Sichuanese mobilization for the whole war at 5.53% of the province’s population. If the original armies that were present at the start of the war are included (an additional 400-500,000 men), then Sichuan mobilized 6.6% of the province’s total population; Dai Gaoxiang; YZSL, pp. 481-2; originally published in Sichuan wenxian yuekan (四川文獻月刊), combined issues 11 and 12, 1 July 1963. This is not far from a mobilization rate recently claimed by two mainland researchers from the Second Historical Archives; Ma Zhendu and Xi Xia, “Zhongguo dier lishi dang’anguan youguan Kangzhan shiqi Sichuan sheng dang’an de zongshe,” in Li Shigen, ed., Sichuan kanzhan dang’an yanjiu, p. 4. Dai was in a good position to have a clear handle on the wartime conscription generally, and Sichuan particularly. He was appointed chief of staff for Sichuan’s provincial district (PD) in July 1938, a post which he held until the fall of 1943, when he agreed to He Yingqin’s request that he transfer to the Junzhengbu. Xu Siping took over as Sichuan PD’s chief of staff, while Dai served in the officer placement section (junguan anzhi zu 軍官安置組) of the Junzhengbu. In November 1945, he was put in charge of a key department in the MSO; see Dai Gaoxiang, Gaoxiang wenqun, pp. 2, 31, and 59. Recently, professor Liu Yimin of Chengdu University, puts Sichuan’s mobilization rate much higher. Liu uses a population figure of “not more than 40 million” to calculate that one of every fourteen Sichuanese (or 7.1%) were mobilized. Liu includes volunteers in his figure of 3 million servicemen, but he does not indicate how he arrived at his very low population estimate; Liu Yimin, “Lun kanzhan shiqi Sichuan nongmin dui bingyuan he houqin de gongxian,” in Li Shigen, ed., Sichuan kanzhan dang’an yanjiu, p. 108.

²⁷ Zhang Qun, the provincial chairmen for the last years of the war, has similar totals for the province in his postwar statements. In his widely publicized “Statement of Thanks on the Day of Victory” (勝利日感言), he crowed that the province had mobilized more than 3 million men, though a month later, he revised the number down to 2.48 million in “Sichuan’s Great Enterprise of Founding and Building the State” (開國興建大業之四川), a figure that was close to the tallies from the Junzhengbu; Wan Jinyu, “Wu Chuan bucheng jun,” pp. 203-4 and “Kangzhan banian zai Sichuan,” pp. 359-60.
Table 2-4: Sichuan Yearly Conscription Deliveries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>conscripts</th>
<th>alternate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>103,837</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>174,145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>266,341</td>
<td>296,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>266,625</td>
<td>266,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>352,681</td>
<td>344,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>366,625</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>352,681</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>391,112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>283,086</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>totals</td>
<td>2,557,133</td>
<td>2,578,701</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sources: the main numbers are Dai Gaoxiang's as found in YZSL, pp. 481-2 (originally published in Sichuan wenxian yuekan, combined issues 11 and 12, 1 July 1963), while the alternate figures are given in Duan Yu, Kangzhan shiqi de Sichuan, p. 1-2.

F.F. Liu’s mobilization index, however, is computed on the basis of “the average number of men mobilized per year expressed as a percentage of the total population.”\(^{28}\) Using Dai Gaoxiang’s tallies for the province, we arrive at an average of 319,642 men mobilized per year for eight years. (This combines the two partial years, 1937 and 1945, into one year.) Expressed as Liu’s “mobilization index”, this is 0.68% (for a population of 47 million, or 0.6% if we use 50 million as the provincial population). While this was fully fifty per cent better than Liu’s national index, it still fell far behind the other powers in the war: just half of Japan’s 1.3%, and fully five or six times less than Russia and Germany. In terms of ability to mobilize its population Chiang’s regime, even in its most effectively administered territory, was far behind other major combatants.

Yet the numbers are far from the last word. What they fail to highlight is that on a strategic level China’s conscription was not a dismal failure, but actually a success. China’s ability to replace crushing front-line losses astonished Japanese generals.\(^{29}\) Replacement rates hit highs of 120 per cent annually, and never dipped below 60 per cent. Yet, it was equally true (and obvious to all parties) that the Nationalists could never hope to expel the Japanese on their own. But, the unique conditions of the war in China meant that doing so was not necessary. The bald fact of the armies continued existence, no matter how ragged and ill-equipped, was strategic victory: the

---

29. Ibid., pp. 135-6.
Nationalist regime demonstrated for a full eight years the bankruptcy of Japan’s adventure – no matter how much territory it took, no matter how many battles it won, no matter how many Chinese men it slaughtered, it could not win the war in China. That demonstration was victory and it rested not on industrial might, nor battlefield prowess, but simply on the ability of the state to put bodies – and bodies and more bodies – on the battlefield. Conscription was the war.

Acknowledging this overall success, which was engineered and conducted under Cheng Zerun’s leadership, heightens our incredulity at Chiang’s treatment of Cheng. Why execute one of the architects of strategic victory? Was Cheng, after all, merely a casualty of the vicious factional politics under Chiang? Or was something else going on? I have already suggested that Chiang’s anger at the persistent abuses surrounding conscription was deep and had been growing throughout the war. We will examine the specifics of those problems shortly, but a major element of Chiang’s bitter disappointment was that he shared the hope common to nineteenth and twentieth-century state-makers across the globe, that the army, specifically the mass reserve (conscripted) army would be a school house for training national citizens. This goal was seen in the persistent linking of training, propaganda, and conscription throughout the pre-war plans and wartime implementation of conscription. He Yingqin’s 1928 plan, discussed in chapter one, was shot through with this deep-seated hope. It was never abandoned by Chiang. The failure of the conscription administration to cultivate genuine citizen-soldiers was a bitter disappointment to him, the bedrock of his implacable anger toward Cheng Zerun.

The Nationalist regime, despite strenuous efforts, never managed to forge the sort of state-to-citizen relationship to which it aspired. This failure was rooted in the concrete problems of the draft; thus, we will stop short of seeing the soldiers finally fighting on the front line. In fact, our interest, for the purposes of this project, ends when the men are marched – commonly bound and dragged – off to rear bases for training. Like the local officials who watched them go, we will abandon them to their fate, whether it be at the hands of the Japanese or their own officers, when they leave our jurisdiction. To be sure, this is an artificial boundary, but the complexities of regulation and practice even in this narrow domain are more than enough to chew on. We turn now to the structures and procedures of the state-managed flow of bodies necessary for the war effort.

**Structural Overview**

The wartime Military Service Office (Bingyishu 兵役署, MSO) had two immediate predecessors as the Nationalist authorities moved forward with their conscription plans. The first was the Military Service Section (bingyike 兵役科, MSS) established in 1934-35 as the first central government institution concerned solely with military service and conscription. The MSS was

---

originally headed by Zhu Weizhen (朱為錦), a Guangxi man and graduate of the fourth class at the central Military Academy, but the whole section was staffed with just 30 people. It was responsible for the experiments and planning for conscription during the pre-war years. In 1937, it was expanded to a department (MSD, bingyisi 兵役司). Both agencies were subordinate bodies to the Junzhengbu, as was the MSO when it was finally established. Once the Japanese invasion began, the MSD handled expanding the conscription system and securing immediate replacements for front line units. During 1937 and 1938, the military pursued a dual replacement strategy: rapid expansion of the draft across the country and voluntary recruitment by rear area agencies and field units.31

In early 1939, the decision was made to expand the MSD into the MSO, enlarging its staff to more than 300 to handle three fundamental tasks: mobilization (under both conscription and voluntary enlistment, zhengmu 徵募); training and organization (bianlian 編練); and replacement (buchong 補充). Each task was parceled out to separate departments within the MSO. The MSO also ran training classes for conscription cadres, replacement unit commanders, and eventually for the corps of draft inspectors that would fan out to investigate conditions on the ground.

Reflecting the fact that Sichuan was the core base for resistance against Japan and bore the heaviest burden of conscription, Sichuan men dominated the top level of the MSO and the ministry of conscription. Cheng Zerun headed up the MSO, while Zhu Weizhen was promoted to deputy-chief of the expanded MSO.32 Reportedly, Chiang originally wanted He Guoguang (賀國光), then chief of staff for the Chongqing Field Headquarters, to be the MSO’s top man. But He Guoguang turned down the position and recommended Cheng Zerun instead.33 Cheng, as we have already seen, was from Sichuan and presided over the MSO for most of the war, until just prior to his arrest in mid-1944. Later that year, when the MSO was upgraded to the Ministry of Conscription (bingyibu 兵役部), Chiang tapped Lu Zhonglin (鹿鍾麟) to lead it. Unlike Cheng, Lu was not a Sichuan man, but hailed originally from Hebei and had been a long-time subordinate to the ex-warlord Feng Yuxiang. After his break with Feng in 1931, Lu had served on the KMT’s CEC, first as an alternate member and then as a full member in 1935. After hostilities broke out with Japan he held the governorship of Hebei, which was occupied by Japan, and he commanded the Nationalist guerrilla forces in that area.34

31. Two laws were passed in July and September 1937 that allowed for equal emphasis on recruitment and conscription to meet needs for replacements. Units that were not receiving conscripted replacements in time for their needs were permitted to recruit men directly in areas that did not yet have a divisional district in place. Specialized and technical units were allowed to host exams for recruiting the educated men they needed.


34. Lu, a Hebei native, had long-standing (going all the way back to 1910) ties with Feng Yuxiang, even joining him in revolt against Chiang in 1929. After a stint out of active service, he was made a lieutenant general in 1936 and was appointed to be one of the judges over Zhang Xueliang for the Xi’an Incident. Once the war began he served in high-level command posts in several War Areas, governorship of Hebei, and membership on the KMT CEC in mid-1945 before retiring from the military in mid-1946. Qin, a native of Shandong, was a graduate of Baoding and Luda, who served
ever, was handled by the vice-ministers, particularly the experienced and reliable Xu Siping (徐思平). Xu, like Cheng Zerun, was a native of Sichuan, hailing originally from Rong county (荣县), and was a product of Sichuan’s warlord-dominated garrison system, though he was drawn into it originally from the educational side.

Born to a poor family, Xu was raised by his widowed mother. In 1912, he traveled alone on foot from Rong county to Chengdu where he tested into the Sichuan Surveyors School. After graduation, he was accepted into the Beijing Advanced Surveyors School. In 1920, he followed up his scholastic achievements by taking the civil service examination, but in 1921 he returned to Sichuan to teach mathematics at his alma mater and Chengdu’s Advanced Teachers College. Four years later, he became principal of the Chongqing United Middle School and began splitting his time between Sichuan’s two major cities. He must have found the work either dull or unchallenging, for in a surprising change of direction, he “threw down the brush” and picked up the sword: testing into and then enrolling in a program for Chinese students in Japan’s renowned Shikan Gakko (士官学校), even though he was already 30 years old. While at the Japanese officer academy, Xu gained notoriety for penning alternate lyrics to the school’s anthem, which had offended his patriotic sensibilities by invoking Japan’s victory in the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-5). In 1930, he returned to Sichuan and received a commission as commander of an artillery regiment, and then rose to be artillery commander for the entire 24th Army. Four years later, he was promoted to lead the Military Affairs Office in the Sichuan-Xikang Pacification Office, which was created to repel the communist incursion into Sichuan. He won acclaim for his astute strategic recommendations in that role. In 1936, he was dispatched on a European fact-finding mission, doing further study at France’s Artillery Academy. He returned to China when the war broke out. He was given further study at Luda, and graduated in 1940 and given command first of the Kuisui (葵绥) and then the Longfu (隆富) divisional districts, before being promoted to chief of staff of the Sichuan provincial district in 1942. The following year, drawing on his background in education, he kicked off the first phase of the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement (see Chapter Five) at Northeastern University in Santai (三台), which was the springboard for his rise to be vice-minister of the Ministry of Conscription in 1944.35

Below the national level administration was a tiered structure of local conscription agencies. Some of the system features recounted below accreted over time during the war – this schematic outline collapses some of that process for the sake of brevity. By uniting the prepara-

under Wu Peifu before 1927. After 1927, he served with Lu Zhonglin and then Song Zheyuan. In the mid-1930s, Qin was Chahar provincial governor and mayor of Beiping, where he was responsible for ordering student protests dispersed with fire hoses. As the Marco Polo Bridge Incident exploded, Qin consistently advocated armed resistance and refusing Japanese demands. In 1939 he was appointed to head a committee on investigating military discipline and in 1940 he was vice-head of the general inspectorate of military courts (軍法執行總監部); Howard and Boorman, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, vol. 2, pp. 444-5. Brief biographical entries for Lu and Qin can be found in Hu Bilin and Fang Hao, eds., Minguo gaoji jiangling liezhuan, pp. 189-91 and 308-9, respectively.

35. Sources for Xu Siping’s biographical information are: Xu Siping, Xu Siping xiansheng wencun, passim; Zhou Kaiqing, Minguo Sichuan renwu zhuanyi, pp. 264-5, (originally published in Sichuan wenxian yuekan, no. 11 and 12 (combined issue), and the attached review of his writings, by Zheng Xiuqing (鄭秀卿) in Zhou Kaiqing, Minguo Sichuan renwu zhuanyi, pp. 266-7, which was originally published in Sichuan wenxian yuekan, no. 4.
tory provincial conscription offices with some of the military and paramilitary training committees (guominbing junshi xunlian weiyuanhui 國民兵軍事委員會), provinces set up Provincial Military Districts (PDs, shengjunguanqu 省軍管區), with the provincial governor (or chairman) as the nominal head. Underneath the provincial districts, according to their population, provinces established 5-10 divisional districts (shiguangu 省管區), each of which had two to four subordinate regimental districts (tuangkanqu 團管區). Divisional districts also organized replacement regiments (RRs, buchongtuan 補充團), which were responsible for receiving and inspecting soldiers, organizing and training, and dispatching them to field units at the front. In the counties that made up each regimental district, the county government was required to establish a military service section (bingyike 兵役科). Counties also set up Citizen Militias (guomin bingtuan 國民兵團), with the county magistrate nominally as commander, but with a vice-commander who handled practical matters and was dispatched by the local divisional district.

June and July 1938 saw the founding of the Sichuan provincial district, with a staff of around 100 men and six subordinate divisional districts: Chengmao (成茂), Shulu (欽瀘), Yuyou (渝酉), Jiannan (建南), Kuisui (夔緬), Chuanbei (川北). The acting provincial chairman, Wang Zuanxu (王綬緬), was the provincial district chief, with Dai Gaoxiang (戴高翔) as his chief of staff. Like Cheng Zerun and Xu Siping, Dai too was a direct product of Sichuan’s warlord garrison system; he was trained by and served in Liu Xiang’s 21st Army before graduating from the Military Academy. A product of the domestic Sichuan military establishment, Dai’s ties to the Sichuan commanders remained stronger than his integration into the national military structure: even as late as 1942, Dai ignored General He Yingqin’s call to be a Junzhengbu staff officer in favor of continuing to serve in Sichuan under Pan Wenhua. Not until fall 1943, when He dispatched a key aide to persuade him, did Dai respond and take the position at the Junzhengbu. When Chen Cheng took over the Junzhengbu, he temporarily assigned Dai to the Officers Placement Group, but Dai continued to hold key conscription posts throughout the Civil War and on Taiwan after 1949, where he was the architect of the KMT’s revised conscription system.

36. The DD commanders (in order) were: Long Jiesan (龍傑三), Zhou Jiantao (周建陶), Han Yiyuan (韓義源), Huang Hanxun (黃漢勳), Wang Jie (汪杰), Su Yun (蘇昞); Sichuan shengzhii: Junshi zhi, p. 545. Other sources, however, have slightly different men, reflecting the quick turn over in some positions; see Zhou Kaiqing, Sichuan yu dui Ri kangzhan, p. 241 for one list that differs.

37. Dai Gaoxiang was responsible for the KMT’s revamping of the conscription “yang bing yu min” (養兵於民) principle on Taiwan. Born in Renshou (仁壽) county, Sichuan, in 1906, Dai was from a rural family of moderate means. He was educated at home by his mother, who was from a better off family, while his father farmed and engaged in petty market-town trade. His scholastic talent won him the opportunity to study in the county seat schools, graduating from the middle school in 1927, and then testing into the Liu Xiang’s officer school (connected with the 21st Army, the official Nanjing-bestowed designation for Liu’s army). After graduation, Dai served in the First Division of the 21A, but went on to win a spot in the central government’s War College (Lujun Daxue) in 1931, graduating in April 1935. In January of 1937, Liu Xiang appointed Dai Staff Officer of the General Oversight Section of the Soldier Stations (bing zhan 兵站) of the Seventh War Zone. After Liu’s death, Dai was a staff officer for Pan Wenhua before joining the Junzhengbu. In 1946 Chiang set up the Defense Ministry, under advisement of General Albert Wedemeyer. The new ministry had a Conscription Bureau (bingyiju 兵役局), with Dai at the helm. See, Dai Gaoxiang, Gaoxiang wencun, pp. 2-13.
Although they were responsible for parcelling out quotas to the divisional districts under them, provincial districts functioned mostly as conduits for central directives to the divisional and regimental districts; they had “oversight” powers, but subordinate districts took orders directly from the MSO and Junzhengbu. Provincial draft conferences were called – Sichuan held several in the first years of the war – but the real power lay in the divisional districts where the actual work of conscription was carried out. As just one example of this emasculation of the provincial districts, the Fujian district in its 1939 work report to the Junzhengbu offered as one of its suggestions for urgent improvement that the provincial district be given control over both divisional and regimental district personnel. Not only did the provincial district lack real control over the lower units, but the divisional districts in particular were in constant direct communication with the Junzhengbu, completely bypassing the provincial district. The Junzhengbu handled the official placement of high-level staff throughout the conscription apparatus. Most draft district commanders, vice-commanders, chiefs of staff, and replacement regiment commanders were recommended by War Area commanders, central government ministries, or provincial governors. In fact, the MSO was somewhat hamstrung by its limited authority, but Cheng Zerun used the MSO’s power of recommendation (to the Junzhengbu) to good effect. Cheng and other top-level men in the MSO all managed to place their associates in key positions. In Sichuan, Cheng Zerun successfully recommended several district commanders with close ties to himself.

Planning bodies, once they had laid the foundation for permanent agencies, were abolished. The Sichuan Divisional District Planning Office and the Citizens’ Military Training Committee (國民軍事訓練委員會) closed when the Sichuan provincial district and its subordinate divisional districts were established (each divisional district had two to four subordinate regimental districts). The cadres in these pre-existing agencies were re-trained and sent to the replacement regiments, conscription districts, as well as positions in counties and municipalities. This was not nearly enough manpower, however. Thus, intensive short-course conscription training classes were held in Chongqing to build up the core cadres needed in the draft districts and counties. In all some 3,000 men (in eighteen batches) went through these courses, while other classes for were run by both the provincial and divisional districts.

Adjustments

The administrative apparatus of military service underwent frequent change throughout the war. For example, geographical adjustments were almost continuous throughout the war: ini-

38. For a general outline of the responsibilities of PDs, see Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, pp. 112-3; Zhou Kaiqing, Sichuan yu dui Ri kangzhan, pp. 240 and 340.
39. qz0041.mj-1-26, p. 2a-9b and 33a-6a dated 1940.
40. Wu Zhaojin (吳詔金), Ma Fuxiang (馬福祥), Guan Dingliang (官鼎良) were all Cheng’s students or friends. And Zhu Weizhen had his men, Zhang Shengtong (張聲桐) as DD commander in Guangdong, and another associate leading an RD in Guangxi; Zha Keen, “Guomindang fandong zhengfu de bingyi yu bingyishuzhang Cheng Zerun zhi si,” p. 163.
41. This was not unique to Sichuan. For the 1938 work report from the Guanzhong DD, in Shaanxi, see, qz0041.mj1-8, p. 2a-8a, 11b-12a, 24a-24b, n.d., but internal dating is Feb 1939.
tial expansion in 1937 and 1938 was followed by contraction as territory was lost, and then inter-

mittent re-expansion as areas were occasionally regained.43

The war did not, of course, wait for the Nationalist government to set up its draft or-

ganization, leaving Chiang’s government with little choice but to pursue conscription and volunteer
enlistment simultaneously for the first year or two. The battles of late 1937 and into 1938

brought devastating casualties for the Chinese. Thus, in late 1937, the central government

(through the Chongqing Field HQ) ordered a call up of volunteers to be sent to the front lines.

Provincial districts were ordered to aid these temporary recruitment efforts. Sichuan, however,
lacked a fully functioning provincial apparatus, so the Peace Preservation Office (保安處) was
ordered to aid in recruitment work. Replacement training offices (補訓處) and one examination
and screening office (驗編處) were set up. These short-lived bodies recruited men and sent them
to Wuhan where a “receiving unit” (jieshou budui 接受部隊) examined, received, and then trans-
ferred them to units at the front lines. By end of 1937, Sichuan had called up 103,837 men this
way.44 Beginning in January 1938, Sichuan was ordered to supply 30,000 men per month. Be-
tween the fall of Nanjing in December 1937 and the Xuzhou battle in May 1938, a further
556,411 men were put in uniform nationally. In the following six months (from Xuzhou to Octo-
ber 1938), another 789,991 men were mobilized. Staggering losses meant a voracious appetite
for new bodies: the fledgling conscription system was ordered to supply 164,000 men per month.
And even that was not enough; in areas close to the front lines additional recruit units filled re-
placements on an “as needed” basis, while guerrilla units set up special units to take in new men.
The need for bodies was so great that some field units continued their independent recruitment
efforts in the interior, though they were limited to specific areas and counties.45 In short, even
into 1939 the dual approach of voluntary recruitment and the draft continued, though increasing-
ly the volunteers were put into support and logistical roles rather than combat duty.46 While it is
conceivable that this dual pronged approach could have continued, the Nationalists began closing
off volunteer avenues to concentrate on compulsory service.

One significant change that took place in stages between 1941 and 1943 was tying field
units to specific conscription districts, which in effect linked the units to particular geographical
areas. At the 1940 Conscription Conference two major decisions were made. First, to disband
the RD tier entirely, leaving just the two levels of PDs and DDs. The DDs were increased (to
109) and their boundaries redrawn according to population, so that as far as possible they would
have a standard size pool of no more than 2.5 million people to drawn from. Second, the DDs
were assigned to front line field units.47 These decisions were put into effect in the fall of 1941.
Field armies were tied directly to one DD, with army commanders holding concurrent post as

43. These changes are of little interest here and will not be discussed further, but Rong Jianguang’s
article, “Kangzhan zhong zhi bingli dongyuan,” does an excellent job of presenting them in chronological order.
44. Wan Jinyu, “Wu Chuan bucheng jun,” p. 196 and “Kangzhan banian zai Sichuan,” pp. 343-5, and
qz0055.mj3-250, pp. 8a-b and 17-23 dated December 1937.
45. Local governments were ordered to aid these units, which were were situated away from Chongqing
and Chengdu to prevent confusion and competition with regular avenues of military service.
47. There were also three independent districts and ten conscription affairs office (微兵事務所), but
these were exceptional cases. Wan, Jinyu, “Wu Chuan bucheng jun,” pp. 201-2 and “Kangzhan
commander of the DD. For example, in Sichuan, the Chengrong divisional district and its subordinate regimental districts were disbanded and its place taken by a new Chengdu district, with various counties in western Sichuan under it. As the number of divisional districts increased, their individual geographical reach was reduced and they were directly responsible for taking delivery of batches of conscripts. Thus, the internal organization of the divisional districts was expanded and their personnel was increased as well.

Another aspect of this change was to have battered frontline units transferred to rear areas to receive replenishment and pick up replacements. After transferring rearward, these units would receive training and replacements. This process continued even further in 1943, when field armies (jiun 軍) were required to have two divisions on the front, and one in the rear being replenished, re-equipped, and re-trained at the divisional district. To make this easier, the commander of the rear division was given command over the district. (The vagaries of war sometimes made this ideal system impractical, of course, as battles interfered with planned transfers or as transportation lines were cut.)

It was hoped that this new system would prevent some of the most prevalent abuses, namely draftees being mistreated by conscription officers. The general consensus was that officers in the regimental training offices (RTOs) and replacement regiments (RRs) readily mistreated conscripts because the officers felt no responsibility to the men, who were destined for field units. Connecting conscription district units to field units was seen as a way of imparting a sense of responsibility for the conscripts’ well being to the conscription officers. Additionally, the conscription administration hoped that bringing field units into the process earlier would make coordinating the delivery between the conscription districts and front line units easier and minimize cultural and linguistic barriers within units, promoting solidarity and common feeling. Whatever subsidiary benefits the reorganization granted, the abuse of new soldiers remained as problematic as ever, with columns of men bound and guarded like prisoners being a common sight throughout the war.

In mid-March 1943, the Nationalist central government promulgated a new Military Service Law, revising the old which had been on the books since 1933. It was a major expansion:

---

48. In other areas of the province new districts were set up (e.g., at Longfu (隆富) in eastern Sichuan and Xulu (叙泸) in southern Sichuan). In Sichuan, divisional districts were expanded to twenty or more: Chengmao, Fulong (富隆), Tongpeng (潼蓬), Jianping (劍平), Wanzhong (萬忠), Kuiwu (龗巫), Shunying (順豊), Yujiang (渝江), Qiongda (邛大), Fuyou (涪右); see Sichuan shengzhi: junshi zhi, pp. 545-6 and YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 474-483, originally published in Sichuan wenxian yuekan (四川文獻月刊), combined issues 11 and 12, 1 July 1963.

49. Many of these DDs persisted until 1949, continuing to exist even through the postwar halt in conscription, though the RD tier was revived in 1946 in preparation for the looming civil war with the CCP; Zhang Zhaofu, “Sichuan kangzhan shiqi de renli gongxian yu bingyi jibi,” p. 92.

50. Sichuan provincial government order to the 3AD, qz0055.mj3-291, pp. 37a-b dated April 1942.


the old law had a mere twelve rather vague clauses, the new was much more comprehensive with 32 far more detailed articles.\textsuperscript{54} One of the major changes of the new law was officially jettisoning the “simultaneous conscription and voluntary recruitment” system (徵募並行) of the early war. Nationalist held territory was now to have only one avenue into military service: a uniform draft system. The revision took into account the years of experience with the “temporary measures” in order to put ad hoc innovations, such as paramilitary training of local men and cooperation between conscription districts and civilian institutions, on a firmer legal footing. More detailed regulations stipulated the rewards and rights of military service, in an attempt to encourage willingness among the people. More importantly, however, the new law attempted to reduce the scope of exemptions and postponements, to restrict the discretionary power of local administrators, particularly baojia heads, and to put an end to local corruption and abuses.\textsuperscript{55}

The new law failed to rectify many of the systemic problems connected with conscription; there was little incentive to change, as 1943 was largely a quiet year for the draft system. In absolute numbers, it was on par with even the most devastating years, but the battlefield situation in China was not seen as critical. This all changed with Japan’s famous Ichigo Offensive in 1944. Ichigo slashed through Nationalist lines, reducing the area from which replacements could be drawn. Only then, as Japan’s columns sliced into Nationalist territory, denying it both tax income and replacement conscripts, was Chiang finally motivated to make some broad changes, in order to meet the sudden need for manpower. Aside from demoting and then arresting Cheng Zerun in the summer of 1944, Chiang elevated the MSO to full ministry status, enhancing its authority over both civilian and military institutions, in order to raise the maximum number of men in the shortest amount of time. Chiang looked to Lu Zhonglin as minister, and Qin Dechun (秦德純) and Xu Siping as vice-ministers, while the ministry’s staffing was expanded to over 600 positions. Authority over military service personnel was finally transferred from the Junzhengbu to the new conscription ministry to centralize power (the ministry of conscription was directly subordinate to the Executive Yuan, but took its orders directly from the MAC).\textsuperscript{56} In conscription-related matters, it had the power to order and direct even the highest officials.\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{itemize}
\item[54.] For the full text of both laws, see Rong Jianguang, “Kangzhan zhong zhi bingli dongyuan,” pp. 821-2 (old) and 823-9 (new). KRZZ, vol. 1, p. 965 also gives the full text of the 1933 law.
\item[55.] 1943 also saw other revised regulations that set national quotas at 2 million. Conscription was also divided into three periods during the year: March, August, December and the city of Chongqing was made a “model district” for conscription.
\item[56.] For much of the war, until it was raised to ministry level, the MSO was in a difficult position institutionally in that it had only limited authority even over its own personnel. This kept it heavily dependent on its superior agency, the Junzhengbu and its chief, General He Yingqin. Its authority was so curtailed that it could not dismiss nor assign anyone without Junzhengbu approval. The MSO was allowed to evaluate, promote and demote internally, and submit opinions and recommendations to the Junzhengbu. Despite the partially hamstrung authority of the MSO, Cheng Zerun masterfully worked the recommendation system and placed his associates throughout the conscription administration.
\item[57.] See the Conscription Ministry Law (Bingyibu fa 兵役部法); YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 321-51 dated 25 October 1944. The original Conscription and Recruitment Section (徵募科) became the ministry’s First Section (第一科), in charge of handling distribution of quotas for the country, the conscription lottery, collection of recruits, the replacements from Sichuan and Guizhou, the Expeditionary Force, the IEF, replacements, and registration and statistics for recruits. Replacement Department became the
Just before the Japanese surrender, Lu Zhonglin felt that there was no more need for conscription and on his own initiative requested that Chiang end the ministry. As a result, the ministry was downgraded to “Office” (chu 處) status and its staff shrunk accordingly. It was put back under Junzhengbu auspices, with Xu Siping in charge. With the Japanese surrender, the conscription administration’s mission was at an end: a creature of war, it had expanded and contracted to meet the state’s mobilization needs. On a grand strategic level, it was a success, but underneath that success was a profound political failure. Both its success and failure had their roots in the specific procedures of the draft process.

Draft Procedures: Information Gathering

The draft procedures mapped out the zone of interaction between the military, civilian agencies, and local society. But it is important to keep in mind that irregular emergency call-ups, which did not follow procedural guidelines, were a regular feature throughout the war. Usually they were instigated by the military to meet the replacement needs of a particular unit, but there were also other government agencies which recruited to supply their armed units. These were supposed to follow overall procedure, but they were usually quite loosely conducted. Thus, from the perspective of local residents the procedures were often irrelevant: ad hoc, virtually unregulated levies were common.

The state needed some tally of the population in each locale, particularly the eligible men available for the draft. Gathering this information was critical for the conscription process. Lacking a national census, the Nationalists took to hand the only other tool that had any promise of being able to reach down to the household level to count the people: the baojia (保甲) system. Often called a “mutual responsibility” or “mutual surveillance” system, the baojia had a long history in imperial times; it was revived by the Nationalists in the years just prior to the war as a tool in its campaigns against the communist soviet in Jiangxi. We will look at the baojia in more detail in the next chapter; here, it is important only to note that the baojia system artificially divided local society into a nested hierarchy of decimal units in order to register the local population: ten households (hu 戶) were one jia (甲); ten jia (100 households) formed one bao (保); ten bao (1000 households) were a lianbao (“linked bao” 聯保) or a village (xiang 鄉). Each head of household was required to keep the registration of the household up to date (filing changes with the baojia office and updating door placards which were hung on the door frame with a list of all the members of the household) and to keep watch for any untoward activity and strangers in the neighborhood.

Second Section, in charge of replacements for military units; and training for replacements in Hunan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Fujian, Anhui, Guangdong, Guizhou, Yunnan, Kangxi; unified examination of replacements. The Organization and Training Section (編練科) became Soldier Registry Section (兵籍科) in mid-1942, and that was made the Third Section in the Ministry; it handled assigning numbers and demobilization, exemptions, delays, leaves, and some aspects of replacement unit training, and Shaanxi, Gansu, Suiyuan, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Shanxi, Henan, Shandong, Zhili, Chahaar. Fourth Section added, in charge of recruits (募兵), desertion prevention, replacements for special forces; Zha Keen, “Guomindang fandong zhengfu de bingyi yu bingyishuzhang Cheng Zerun zhi si,” p. 160.

58. Later, of course, it would be put under the newly created Defense Ministry, this time as a bureau (ju 局), with Dai Gaoxiang at the helm.
During the war, the baojia was given many – and increasing – responsibilities, one of the most important being registering men eligible for the draft. Under direction of the village or township (xiang 鄉 or zhen 鎮), the baojia heads investigated and reported on the eligible men in their unit. Once the baojia ladder counted the residents and compiled a list of eligible men, they passed this list on to the village or township head, who in turn passed it upwards. Each level – the sub-county ward (qu 公) public office, county government, regimental district, divisional district, provincial district, and finally to the national conscription office – aggregated the reported numbers from its subordinate tier.

The specifics of the process of identifying and registering men eligible for the draft changed frequently throughout the war. In March 1939 the Junzhengbu set down comprehensive regulations on how to register men and compile the necessary name lists at each level, from the household up through the province.\(^{59}\) Beginning in late 1939, the order was given to enroll resident men between the ages of 18 and 45 sui in Citizen Militia (guomin bingtuan 國民兵團) units. Below the county level, these units were organized in exact parallel to baojia structures and thus functioned as a means to keep track of and register eligible men for the draft. The men were divided up into geographical units (on the basis of the baojia tiers), but also according to yearly age brackets, which were used to generate age group rosters. Generating these two name lists was one of the central tasks of the baojia and its muscle, the Citizen Militia. In December 1941, the regulations were tightened again, by requiring all baojia units to call a general meeting of residents to register them. In addition, the county government was supposed to dispatch a county-level militia officer to conduct an on-the-spot review of the eligible men. The crucial place of the baojia in this was acknowledged in 1942 when responsibility for the accuracy of the rosters was placed squarely in the baojia’s lap: if there were too many errors or men who were not on the rolls, then the baojia head’s own exemption from the draft was cancelled and he was subject to immediate induction into a military unit. In 1944, loopholes were closed even further: all men between 18 and 45 sui were to be listed on the name rosters, even if they were registered residents elsewhere.\(^{60}\)

Even from the cursory review above, however, it should be clear that the baojia was an unreliable tool. Its artificiality meant that the messy irregularities of social geography were being crammed into a square box. Additionally, as the war put increasing stress on families, fragmenting and separating them, households were not suitable as a means of keeping track of the mobile interior population. Urban areas too with their exile and refugee populations were simply not amenable to being divided up on the basis of family or household. Refugees, sojourners, and temporary residents were too numerous and too fluid to be counted up neatly by the baojia.

Draft Lottery: From Resistance to Evasion

The official lottery procedures divided able-bodied men into two classes, which were supposed to have separate drawings: those 18 (or 20) to 30 sui and those 30 to 40 sui.\(^{61}\) The ba-

---

59. Earlier, the Temporary Regulations for Army Conscription and Recruitment, revised in April 1938, had less complete procedures; YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 195-6.


61. This division seems never to have been followed in practice. This is borne out by the resolution passed by the National Political Council’s resolution in February 1939 calling for a revision to the military service regulations: the council noted that, among other faults and missteps, the first and
sic units for the lottery were the village (xiang) or township (zhen), the sub-county ward (qu), or lianbao, but the county government was required to send an overseer to the proceedings. The public office of the jurisdiction conducting the drawing was to fabricate a set of numbered lottery slips equal to the number of eligible men. Each slip was required to have a unique number and the public office’s seal stamped on it. Prior to the lottery, the public office ordered subordinate bao to produce official name lists and send them to the county. The county government then determined a time and location for the drawing in each jurisdiction. On the appointed day, each bao head led all the eligible males in the bao to the designated place, usually a large public space like a market or square. The public office supplied men to act in several formal capacities: one name chanter, one lot opener, one recorder, and two overseers (usually the head of the jurisdiction and the bao head). The numbered lottery slips were checked by the county representative and then tossed into a box or basket to be mixed up. The name chanter called out the names of eligible men in order, from the name list. After his name was called, each man came forward and drew a lottery slip out of the container. He handed it to the lot opener, who then read aloud the number to the assembled people and handed it to the recorder. The recorder wrote the number next to the man’s name in the name list. And the process was repeated for the next man. Once all the men had finished drawing lots, then they were organized according to their lot number and a lottery roster was made up (i.e., names listed in their numerical order), which was the order in which they were to be taken in the draft.

After the ceremony was finished, the original record of names (with numbers drawn) and the draft roster (ordered according to lottery slip number) were then turned over to the county government to be kept on file, while a copy was made and deposited in the jurisdiction’s public office. Later in the year, when the county was ordered to send its quota, it apportioned an average burden to each jurisdiction. When the order to call up men was received by the jurisdiction, it took the men in accordance with their numerical order. Instead of sending the exact amount of the quota, jurisdictions were supposed to send “two to three times” the amount, along with the name list, to the county seat. There the men would be examined physically and selected.

This was the officially prescribed procedure for the lottery drawing in early 1938, but just a few months later there were already revisions and tightened procedures, with several added features such as community observers, more strictly regulated timing, and oversight by local military personnel. In early 1940, the Junzhengbu admitted internally that the demand for bodies had been so great that it had “been unable to hold proper conscription inspections or lotteries.”

---

62. This is a paraphrase of the Emergency Draft of Citizen Soldiers and Lottery Implementation Regulations (非常時期徵集國民兵及抽籤實施辦法), which was a supplementary provision to the Unified Draft and Replacement Plan (統一兵員徵募及補充方案), ordered by the Junzhengbu on 13 January, 1938; YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 147-50.

63. See the Temporary Regulations for Army Conscription and Recruitment, revised in April 1938; YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 188-92. Each county established a Conscription Committee to help and oversee the lottery and call-up of men. The county magistrate chaired the committee, but it usually included a range of other influential residents, such as the local KMT party secretary, the chairman of the local branch of the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps, the county assembly chairman, and local notables or gentry; Zhang Zhaofu, “Sichuan kangzhan shiqi de renli gongxian yu bingyi jibi,” p. 92.
and thus revisions were again in order. The Citizen Militia was now brought into the process, with a representative present for lotteries and physical examinations. As per the regulations, the drawings were conducted publicly in large gatherings, so while it was not clear exactly how, the fact that the lottery had been rigged by local officials was obvious in many communities: those selected were disproportionately from poor and powerless families. Few sons of the rich and powerful were chosen and when they were, the families had ample money to send their sons out of the jurisdiction. This was aided, of course, by the fact that there was a delay after the drawing before the lottery selectees were called up. The manipulation of the lottery process was so egregious that in some places a large proportion of the draftees fled, leaving no one around for the baojia heads to collect on the call up day. Minor protests were sprinkled around the province, with reports of lottery grounds being destroyed. Far more serious, however, were larger-scale revolts in Longchang (隆昌) county, Cheng Zerun’s home, and in Xindu (新都) and adjacent counties near Chengdu. These disturbances got the government’s attention.

While there were other revisions, such as instituting committees that brought local elite residents into the conscription process in an advisory role, the lottery was temporarily halted in many locales. For later lottery draws, the most important reform brought about by the anti-lottery disturbances was the change to an “indirect” method rather than the “direct” public lotteries: the drawings were conducted in secret by baojia heads and the list of those selected were kept tightly under wraps. The night before the call-up, the baojia head was to go around to the homes of the lottery “winners” and – more or less – arrest them. If the government’s purpose was to defuse or reduce resentment among the people, then this change was profoundly counterproductive. In fact, the goal was nothing of the kind. Instead, the change was motivated by the desire to prevent draftees from fleeing after the lottery. By conducting the lottery proceedings in secret and not immediately notifying those who were selected, the draftees had no time to flee and communities had no time to organize collective protests. While the change made evasion more difficult, the increased secrecy made the lottery even easier to manipulate. As a consequence, abuses continued unabated. Rather than address the fundamental antagonism between local residents and the conscription system, the government remained primarily suspicious of the individual draftees, precisely the men it was attempting to mobilize as citizen-soldiers.

The fact that there were no major disturbances due to the new procedures suggests that in many places the draft was being decided on the basis of informal, community-based standards:

64. See the revised lottery regulations, 26 February 1940, in YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 277-82.
65. Sources do not agree on the dates for this; I rely here on the Sichuan provincial gazetteer, Sichuan shengzhi: junshi zhi, pp. 547-8. It is also possible that many of the incidents of resistance were actually touched off by the slew of emergency levies that were a result of the heavy losses (some million men or more) during 1938 and thus, were not targeting the regular draft system; Xu Naili, “Haonan ying dangbing,” pp. 7-8.
66. Wan Jinyu, “Wu Chuan bucheng jun,” p. 199. The People’s Political Council inspectors reported that in the early 1938-9 lotteries only 10-20% of the selectees stayed around to be called up; Guomin canzhenghui Chuan-Kang jianshe shichatuan, ed., Guomin canzhenghui Chuan Kang jianshe shichatuan baogaoshu, p. 55.
that families with many sons should supply men first, and that no family should be put in dire
straits because of the draft. In some areas lottery drawings continued, but in Sichuan it was com-
mon practice for a while that the selection be more informal. The quota was divvied up accord-
ing to number of eligible males within a bao, and those families with more than one eligible male
were chosen to supply the quota, at the entreaty of the baojia heads. The official secretive “in-
direct lottery” was the camouflage under which local, informal practice, in accord with common-
sense ethics, could exist. For example, in 1939, Zhang Suineng (張遂能), the Dazu magistrate,
reported that he ordered the county to use modified conscription methods: baojia drew lots but
instead of it being for men (ding) as initially, it was for jia units. Each selected jia, then called
together heads of household to discuss and recommend men to be taken for service. When there
were disputes, the baojia head or the lianbao head would resolve them. Qijiang also used this
method, and reported that conscription was “going smoothly” in the county. The relative calm
in conscription – with no major flare ups or disturbances in the Sichuan countryside – until 1941
suggest that these informal arrangements existed underneath the official procedures. It is debat-
able, of course, whether such informal processes could have continued to function smoothly in
the Sichuan countryside.

In the event, as the pool of households with more than one eligible male dried up, the
MSO ordered the return to a uniform, direct, and public lottery in the summer of 1941. Not sur-
prisingly, this set off more incidents in Guanghan (廣漢), Zhongjiang, and Jintang (金堂)
counties around Chengdu. The Guanghan incident was quite large, with a mob of more than
5,000 people besieging the county yamen, cutting off communications by tearing down tele-
phone and electrical lines. Lianbao heads in particular were targeted and beaten by angry resi-
dents. The People’s Political Council in Chongqing took this seriously, organizing an inspec-
tion group to investigate the situation. They recommended that the government halt the lotteries
again, do pro-military service propaganda in the villages, and then conscientiously reward offi-
cials who were effective conscription administrators. The Junzhengbu took these recommenda-
tions to heart and went further by establishing its own investigation office. This new office to re-
cieve and investigate complaints of abuse had some success, but many systemic problems
remained unsolved, despite the fact that there were no more major instances of resistance to con-
scription in the province.

The overall result of the procedural changes was that the lottery was virtually a dead let-
ter. When it was applied, few people believed the results were impartial. Most just assumed that
lotteries were fixed by the baojia and local government offices. In the late war, selection of
draftees was greatly simplified: with the extinction of multi-man households, quotas were in-

68. Dai Gaoxiang, Gaoxiang wencun, p. 63; Zhou Kaiqing, Sichuan yu dui Ri kangzhan, p. 243; and Duan
Yu, Kangzhan shiqi de Sichuan, p. 25.
70. Duan Yu, Kangzhan shiqi de Sichuan, pp. 25-7. Duan, in one of many typos and errors, has his
dates wrong. He is drawing on Dai Gaoxiang’s Gaoxiang Wencun, but simply misreads the date in
Dai’s work.
71. Wan Jinyu, “Kangzhan banian Sichuan renmin zai zhengbing fuyi shang zhi gongxian,” pp. 348-9
and Dai Gaoxiang’s summary of the draft, in YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 474-83, originally published in Sichuan
wenxian yuekan, no. 11 and 12, 1 July 1963.
creasingly met by taking every man of a designated age or just a flat levy, say, of one man per jia (ten households). From 1941 conscription went more or less smoothly, but largely because by then the process in practice was so greatly simplified and the countryside was more or less resigned to the system’s inequalities. People’s attention and strategies were no longer centered on resistance, but on evasion. Cases winding between various agencies and military units often made a point of determining whether individuals were or were not selected in the lottery, but in the villages those bringing suit were convinced that the lottery was manipulated and not a reliable indicator of who should legally be serving.

Physical Examinations

Like all modern militaries, the Nationalist state tried to ensure that its soldiers met certain physical and health standards, but it was spectacularly unsuccessful in this. A proposal aired at a conference of Sichuan administrative district (AD) inspectors suggested that rejections of draftees for physical reasons be capped at five per cent, a massive reduction from the usual rate of about 45%. In fact, one special inspector reported that even with such high rejection rates, the inspection stations were passing men that should have been cut: the Chengdu inspection station had complained to the inspector that if it adhered strictly to the physical standards regulations only nine per cent of the men delivered by counties in the area would qualify. Part of the problem was that there was an almost total lack of qualified medical personnel in the villages; counties had few medical resources to allocate to inspection of draftees.

Another problem was that physical examinations were conducted at moments when the men were being transferred from one agency to another. These interstitial moments were excellent opportunities for corruption and thus, they were almost impossible for the state to regularize and control. For example, in May 1938 the Sichuan government forwarded orders from He Yingqin on irregularities in the examination of draftees. Each conscription district was to have a cadre present when county or sub-county officials delivered the draftees. A military doctor was to actually conduct the examinations, but the district representative was ordered to be an impartial referee, to make sure that neither the county, nor the ward, nor the field units themselves were deciding which men to accept or reject. The conscription district cadre himself was also prohibited from negotiating with the local conscription agencies, a prohibition that points to the possibilities of corruption and collusion that were common whenever the men were examined physically.

The physical examinations were carried out by representatives of the conscription districts in cooperation with the local county government. These examinations were supposed to be held prior to the lottery draw, but they were often ignored. In 1938, jurisdictions were required

72. Dating this change is difficult; in some places it seems to have been operating by 1942 or 1943. In July 1944, the Junzhengbu conference at Huangshan decided on an official policy of “one man from each jia”, so that each bao’s quota was equal to the number of its subordinate jia; Rong Jianguang, “Kangzhan zhong zhi bingli dongyuan,” p. 808 and F. F. Liu, A Military History, p. 135.

73. qz0055.m-j3-250, pp. 117-20 n.d., but most likely this 1938 or 1939.

74. qz0055.mj3-245, pp. 194-200 for 21 May 1938.

75. Even before conscription was officially launched in most of the country, the government’s Plan for Unifying Soldier Conscription, Recruitment, and Replacement in December 1937 set up 240 offices, each covering roughly two counties, to help conduct physical examinations of able-bodied men. Under the direction of the local DD or RD, they were to work in concert with county government
to send the draftees to the county seat and wait there for physical examination and final selection. In short, the lottery was to be conducted first, and only then followed by the health and physical examination of those selected. Those who were found to be “dull-witted” were to be routed into transport units, while those who failed the physical exam were rejected altogether.\(^\text{76}\)

Conducting physical examinations after the lottery avoided having to inspect every eligible male in a community. On the surface, postponing physical exams until after the lottery was beneficial for local governments as it decreased the administrative burden on the local baojia and militia and did not reduce the pool of potential draftees. The drawback was that conscription units took delivery of substandard men: physically weak, seriously ill, even many who were addicted to opium. As a result, conscription districts had to conduct their own inspections and their rejection rates were very high. Counties complained that districts were sending large numbers of draftees back, creating deficits that the counties had to make up. Particularly in opium-ridden Sichuan, the counties rankled at this as they were being asked to fill the deficit a second time: how, they asked, could they find enough non-addicts to fill their quotas?\(^\text{77}\) The problem was compounded once residents realized that an opium habit was a way out of the draft. Already in mid-1938, Nanchuan county complained that it was unable to fulfill its quota not because local cadres were lax, but because the inspection had overly high requirements and rejected too many men (over two-thirds) for being opium smokers. When the rejected men returned to their homes and talked about their release, it became widely known that obvious signs of opium use was a good way to avoid being sent to the front. Even strong young men were deliberately addicting themselves to the drug as a result.\(^\text{78}\)

Thus, the post-lottery inspection was supplemented by preliminary inspections conducted before the draft itself.\(^\text{79}\) In mid-1940, county governments were ordered to use country doctors to handle preliminary physical inspections in villages.\(^\text{80}\) Yet, this too failed to raise the quality of the men delivered to the conscription authorities. The problem was simply that when the health inspections were carried out at all, local officials and baojia men colluded with the medical examiners, who were paid off to reject specific individuals for (non-existent) medical reasons. These rejects were, of course, either people the local officials wished to protect or those from whom money had been extorted; the sick and weak continued to be approved.

**Delivering the Draftees**

There were two common systems for handing over men in Sichuan. First, a “pick-up unit” (jiebingdui 接兵隊) sent men to the county or city to take delivery of the conscripts and then would march them to the front. Second, the local regimental or divisional district would

---

\(^\text{76}\) Supplementary provision to the *Plan to Unify Recruitment and Replacement*, (統一兵員徵募及補充方案) Junzhengbu : 13 January 1938; YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 147-50. See the *Temporary Regulations for Army Conscription and Recruitment*, revised in April 1938; YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 197-8.

\(^\text{77}\) YZSL, vol. 2, pp. 399.

\(^\text{78}\) qz0053.mj1-224, pp. 13-6 dated September 1938.

\(^\text{79}\) See the revised lottery regulations, 26 February 1940, in YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 277-82.

\(^\text{80}\) qz0055.mj3-251, pp. 70a-b dated 3 April 1940.

- 101 -
send men to pick up the conscripts and then deliver them to the “pick-up unit.” In principle, the regimental regiments attached to conscription districts were supposed to receive draftees from localities, train them (in company-size units) and deliver them to front-line units. But, in fact, there was little uniformity in practice. The Junzhengbu in times of emergency authorized field units to send detachments into the interior to pick up conscripts directly from the districts. In addition, regimental regiments complained that the time and expense of traveling around to pick up conscripts was interfering with their training and delivery tasks. As a result, the Junzhengbu established Replacement Training Offices (RTOs, *buchongbing xunlianchu* 補充兵訓練處), which were to take the conscripts from the replacement regiments, provide additional training for the men, and then deliver them to the front, thus leaving the replacement regiments to specialize in dealing with the counties, accepting draftees from local governments.

It was not long before the RTOs too were complaining that the travel associated with delivering the men was onerous and hampering the training process. The 2nd RTO complained that the lack of boats and trucks and the blocked transportation lines in the interior meant that accepting the draftees had to be done on foot. Not only was the slow slogging across the countryside cutting into training time but the RTO cadres were being worn out by all the back and forth travel. The RTO proposed that the conscripting agencies send the men to the RTO’s base. After being picked up, the conscripts were to be given intensive training that included basic military drill, as well as political indoctrination. In cases of outstandingly successful training, RTO units were organized directly into reserve divisions and sent to the front. Likewise, when there was no pressing need for immediate reinforcements and there was more time for training the recruits, raising their fighting abilities, the RTOs would organize the men directly into reserve divisions (*houbeidui* 後備隊, also known as Newly Organized Divisions, *xinbian* 新編). More commonly, however, the draftees were marched straight to the front with no training whatsoever or kept in conditions more akin to outright incarceration than modern military training. Often abdicating their responsibility to provide genuine training to the new soldiers, the RTOs desire to shift the responsibility of picking up the conscripts to local communities was in part a cynical desire to reduce the time and expense of what was otherwise a lucrative position in the conscription process. The agency that trained the men stood to make significant sums of money. The training units were supposed to supply the conscripts with shoes, uniforms, blankets and rations. Procuring such items provided numerous opportunities for corruption, kick-backs, falsifying records, inflating rosters, and tricky book-keeping.

Time and again, reformers called for tying the process of picking up and training the draftees more closely to field units, because the RTO officers had no incentive to care for their

---

82. Chongqing’s Second Conscription Conference report: qz0055.mj3-266, p42a-43a dated 29 March 1940. The procedure outlined here is that replacement regiments are dispatched to the counties, to take delivery of men directly from the Citizen Militia Ever-Ready Units.
83. qz0041.mj1-1, pp. 22a-b nd.
charges: the men would be gone as soon as they were delivered to their field units. Supporting these proposals, some observers claimed that conscripts in the rear were treated far worse than soldiers on the front line. Lin Yutang, famous for his English language propaganda and publicity efforts on behalf of Chiang and the Nationalist government, observed:

What one sees of the conditions of the recruits at the rear, dusty and bedraggled and often sickly and half-starved in appearance, is not true of the soldiers at the front. Once a man is incorporated in a regimental unit and sent to the front, it is the commander’s job to keep him in good shape. In the front area, which extends from a hundred to a hundred and fifty miles in depth, life is organized primarily for the Army. There are better sanitation facilities and medical care; the whole roadless area is under the control of the Army; there is close co-operation between the farmers and soldiers in transportation and provisions, and soldiers even grow their own vegetables. They are better fed and better cared for; they have the best of everything, although that best may not be so much. Actually, on my visit to Changsha, I learned that the nearer the front, the better the conditions and the greater the sense of security.  

The way to ensure that the maltreated conscripts would be cared for and properly trained, the argument ran, was to bring field units into the interior to pick up and train new soldiers. Field officers would care for the new men since the conscripts were the unit’s future. These appeals were heeded in 1941 when the regimental districts were abolished and the divisional districts tied directly to field armies.

We have covered – all too briefly and schematically – the procedures that made up wartime conscription in Sichuan. As the structures and processes of conscription were set up, revised, tweaked, and reformed, they took on the character of a house that was repeatedly added on to with a hodgepodge of new rooms and wings, hallways and corridors, becoming ever more maze-like. The system was so complicated that it baffled even central cadres, not to mention local baojia officials in the countryside. One of the main causes for this byzantine accretion was that for Chiang and the Nationalist state conscription bore the weight of goals other than the mobilization of manpower for front line armies. The draft administration suffered from being an admixture of competing purposes and motivations, primarily state-making in nature.

State-Building through Conscription

As prewar plans anticipated, conscription was intimately connected to several important state-building initiatives and policies. First, it involved a sustained attempt to centralize military power in Chiang’s hands. This was, of course, a key element in He Yingqin’s 1928 plan; control over the flow of manpower into military units was a core component in the nationalization of China’s fragmented armies. It was both stick and carrot to bring fiercely independent generals to heel: replacements were distributed on time and in requested amounts to Chiang’s central units, meanwhile commanders of peripheral (previously warlord) units were discriminated against. Somehow it was often impossible to meet their requests for men, even when they were more effective on the battlefield than the units belonging to Chiang’s favorite generals. Or central personnel would be dispatched to investigate their request for troops; if the unit still had some fight-

87. Lin Yutang’s Vigil of a Nation, p. 184. This is a surprising observation that raises the possibility that conscription in the rear was mishandled so poorly that, at least during the stalemate or “lull” years (1941-1944), the frontline units were better off.
ing strength left it was denied or only a minimum number of replacements sent. If it was decimated, then it could be incorporated into another unit, thereby reducing the number of ex-warlord units. Chiang pursued this strategy as a means of weakening his domestic rivals and strengthening his own position as supreme leader.

To achieve real control, independent recruiting by units had to be curtailed. Even before the battles of Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan (1938-9) were over, all recruitment and replacements had to be authorized by the Junzhengbu. The Unified Recruitment and Replacement Plan of December 1937 laid down the foundation by abolishing, in principle, all the recruitment systems of individual units and placed all recruitment under the unified command of the Junzhengbu. January 1938 saw a succession of laws that cemented this policy and centralized the power to disperse replacements to all units in the hands of the Junzhengbu. In practice, unit-based recruitment continued as an emergency measure to meet the massive need for men. The Baxian regimental district forwarded a Junzhengbu order to the 3 Gorges Experimental District, reminding the head administrator, Lu Ziying, that it was illegal for army units to continue to station independent recruiting units in the interior. Still, the impetus to centralize and control was there from get go, as part and parcel of the centralization of power. So long as units could recruit or conscript on their own authority, the conscription administration would find itself hamstrung, forced to compete with units. Ensuring that conscription was part of national sovereignty was a goal that had deep roots in the KMT’s fight against warlordism.

Centralization involved not only the assertion of KMT control, but an overall trend away from voluntary service. Restricting volunteer drives was uneven (guerrilla units, for example, relied on volunteers throughout the war), but by and large the Nationalist state steadily strangled voluntary recruitment. The early months of the war saw a significant wave of volunteerism in joining the fight against Japan, but the destruction and viciousness of the battles of Shanghai and Wuhan, not to mention the terror that followed in the wake of the Nanjing Massacre, ensured that this mood was not sustainable. The violence and casualty rates were so far beyond the warlord wars of the previous decades that those earlier conflicts seemed like domestic spats in comparison. The sheer lethality of the fighting made volunteerism an unreliable tool: peasants and farmers just were not interested in serving in such violent battles. Nor, in fact, were the sons and brothers of party and government elites, which amounted to a significant break with the pattern of petit-elite volunteers (particularly for officer training) that had begun before 1911 and continued throughout much of the warlord period. No matter how often the plea was repeated for party

89. Shen Huaiyu “Jin qishi nianlai Zhongguo zhi bingyi zhidu,” p. 77. This move was initiated by cables from Hunan and Guizhou provincial governments which complained to the center about units recruiting directly within provincial boundaries and requested restrictions on the units actions.
90. qz0081.mj3-715, pp. 62-3 dated 23 May 1939.
91. In March 1938, the KMT Temporary National Congress passed a resolution on making military service “uniform across the country.” Among other provisions, this measure prohibited the formation of guerrilla forces everywhere, except in enemy held territory or under direct command of War Area headquarters; Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, p. 109 and Rong Jianguang, “Kangzhan zhong zhi bingli dongyuan,” p. 806.
and government leaders to be “models” for the people by volunteering to serve, the calls fell on
deaf ears until the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement in 1943-45.93

Not only was society reluctant to volunteer for duty on the new, more lethal battlefield of
international warfare, but, the Nationalist authorities increasingly took a dim view of volunteerist
activities. The famous educator, Tao Xingzhi (陶行知), was discouraged from activities that
linked orphan education and relief to voluntary military service. In addition to his activities in
Beibei, just north of Chongqing, Tao also sponsored a resolution in the People’s Political Council
calling for greatly expanded volunteer recruitment for the war effort.94 Such calls went com-
pletely ignored by the Nationalist military.

The Nationalist authorities’ suspicious attitude toward such proposals was based partly in
the fact that volunteer recruitment was often advocated by men who were seen as dangerously
leftist and thus associated with the communists who might be trying to subvert the Nationalist
military from the inside, but it also grew organically out of the long-standing Nationalist convic-
tion that volunteers were too close to the unreliable mercenary warlord soldiers. Conscription
was not only a war-making tool, but also a political one that (it was hoped) would create genuine
national citizens – but only if it could be properly brought under firm control of the central
government.

The dominant tendency toward centralization of power in the Nationalist state’s hands
was not a uniform trend. The desperate circumstances of the early war compelled a temporary
compromise on this score. Volunteers drummed up by social activists and field units conducting
recruitment in the interior were common at first, but a major trend thereafter was the elimination
of irregular avenues into service. Volunteerism was never completely eradicated, as it remained
an expedient tool when circumstances dictated, particularly for guerrilla units fighting behind en-
demy lines.95 Indeed, at times the center acknowledged that more flexibility was necessary; thus,
in such cases it granted some degree of freedom from its interference.96 But it was only in

93. For just one example of this, see the MAC order, forwarded by the Sichuan Provincial Government
to the 3AD, requiring that sons and brothers of party, government civil servants, and gentry be the
first to serve in the military; qz0055.mj3-274, pp. 76a-7b dated May 1943.


95. For example, see the minutes of the second Chongqing conscription conference which recorded
that beginning 1 April (1940) residual volunteer recruitment was to be ended in favor of a
standardized national system as put forward in the National Conscription Conference;
qz0055.mj3-266, pp. 42a-3a dated 29 March 1940. For a quick overview of volunteer recruitment
activities throughout the war, see Rong Jinguang, “Kangzhan zhong zhi bingli dongyuan,” pp.
809-10.

96. In October 1939, for example, inconsistencies in the implementation of training for county and sub-
county conscription cadres in various provinces, led He Yingqian and the head of the Interior
Ministry, Zhou Zhongyu, to propose to allow for more local military autonomy in this area: provincial
district commanders, in conjunction with provincial governments, were to establish, staff, and run
training classes for county and sub-county conscription cadres with a minimum of paperwork and
oversight by the central military command apparatus; YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 259-261. The training
committee of the KMT’s CEC only had minor suggestions to this proposal, namely that the provincial
districts should coordinate the training classes with local KMT party and local Youth Corps
branches, to facilitate shifting Party/Corps registration and mass inductions into the organizations;
1944 – during some of the darkest months of the war – that the Nationalists genuinely returned to volunteer recruitment with the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement (IYVM).

The Surveillance State

There were other state-building goals that were folded into the draft. Conscription implied administrative initiatives that amounted to a new level of intensive surveillance and penetration of society. As envisioned by He Yingqin and others during the pre-war years, one of these policies was a household registration system. Since a full and centrally administered census was beyond the capabilities of the Nationalist state, this vital information gathering task was entrusted to the baojia system. The mobility of the Chinese population posed serious and intractable problems for any attempt to use the baojia in this role. The baojia were so locally bounded and so disconnected from other baojia units (except their immediate neighbors and superiors) that it was nearly impossible to keep track of people who moved in or out. A new arrival in a village should have had his original hometown verified, but this was often impractical: documents had to go up the baojia ladder from the new location, across county and provincial governments, to his old county and then down the baojia ladder of his previous community – and then back again. Little wonder that the paperwork was slow, unreliable, and error-prone. Adding to the difficulties, a man was eligible to serve based on his original home, at least until he had lived for a full six months in his new location. This made mobility an effective draft evasion strategy: once he moved to a new hometown, his old community had no way to draft him, and the new community was not entitled to put him on the roster of eligible men for six months.

Faced with these intractable difficulties in keeping track of the mobile population in the countryside, Nationalist authorities hit upon a scheme to issue national military service identification papers (guominbing shenfenzheng 国民兵身分證). In August 1939, the Interior Ministry and the Junzhengbu floated a joint proposal to have conscription districts issue military service IDs for the Citizens’ Militia in counties and cities. The village and township (xiang and zhen) militia would then issue the certificates to their male residents, ages 18-45. Men were supposed to file either on an individual basis or by their bao head, and the documentation had to include their name, date of birth, family’s native place, physical description, distinguishing marks, fingerprint, and any special characteristics worthy of note. Social and economic organizations of all types (households, baojia, hospitals, hotels, schools, fatuan, etc.) were to supply the local militia with information on their male members. The system was a stop-gap measure, designed to get a handle on the movements and locations of soldiers, militia, and draft-eligible men while a more comprehensive National ID (guomin shenfenzheng 國民身分證) system was planned. It was a temporary military solution to the lack of civil administrative capabilities.

The military service IDs were slated to begin on 1 January 1940, with February as the deadline for party, government and military agencies to set up ID checkpoints along key roads, which would detain any eligible man not carrying his ID. Then beginning in April, men without IDs, no matter what their reason or excuse, were to be just put directly into service in the nearest conscription district. Any time a man left his hometown by more than forty Chinese miles (li; each li is about one half kilometer, and three li are roughly equivalent to an English mile), he was required to inform his baojia head and carry his ID and road pass; staying in a community be-

---

beyond two weeks required registration with the Citizen Militia. And when he left the new locale or returned home, he was required to get permission and a road pass again. Thus, the IDs would help local conscription authorities track and identify men from other communities in their jurisdiction and put an end to mistakes in who should serve and who should be exempt.

In some areas, counties distributed the ID cards in late 1940, but in many other areas there were delays into 1941 and beyond. The regulations were revised in 1943-44, in part because the system was still not functioning across Nationalist-held territory, with some areas still not onboard and others issuing an overabundance of auxiliary (or amended) IDs. Instead of resolving the mobility issue, the uneven implementation actually complicated the situation: when sojourners and travelers from a jurisdiction that had no IDs entered an area that was using the military IDs they were supposed to register at the first village or town they entered (or their destination if traveling by boat, plane, or railroad). But travelers did not always know which jurisdictions were following the rules and which were letting things slide. Local governments, for their part, were also at a loss when a new arrival did not have his papers: was he attempting to evade or was he from an area that was not issuing the IDs? It was often impossible to know.

It is not just fashionable scholarship to view this military service ID as a deliberate attempt to institute the sort of state surveillance that is a hallmark of modern states. In the Military Affairs Journal, published by the military, one He Naihuang (何迺黃) analyzed the system in precisely those terms. He’s article, titled “On Implementing the Military Service ID and Its Necessary Preconditions”, was a statement of purpose for the policy and a call for a conscientious implementation. He related the ID system to the expansion of modern state power. To enable real enforcement, the ID system required a country-wide system of guard posts, checkpoints and mobile inspection units along roads and in cities and towns. This sort of tight network materially

---


99. Sichuan provincial district, the office of Chiang Kaishek, to 3AD, qz0055.mj3-264, pp. 5a-8a dated 20 December 1939.


101. This is made clear in a MAC reply to an inquiry from the Executive Yuan on why the planning and order for the revised system bypassed the legislative process. According to the MAC, there were several reasons: “1. because a complete national identification papers are still not made and distributed, the dynamic state of guomin-bing (citizen-soldiers) is not easy to ascertain” 2. even though the earlier regulations on National Military Service Identification were already being put into practice, their contents were far from complete and so it was thought best to cancel them and promulgate new ones. “At that time, in order to meet the pressing needs of the war and to replace [casualties among our] soldiers without any delay, therefore it was implemented without going through the legislative process.” In short, because the revised Military ID was only a temporary measure, and the Interior Ministry hoped to deliver a National ID program in the near future, it was not necessary to put it through legislative channels; dated 24 July 1944, YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 320-1.

102. Sichuan provincial government to the 3AD, forwarding a Junzhengbu order based on a Hunan report concerning the military ID; qz0055.mj3-263, pp. 44a-b dated February 1942. The Hunan plan was to be the basis for Sichuan’s implementation as well; qz0055.mj3-264, p. 51a dated 8 June 1942 (rec’d).
expanded the state’s capabilities, allowing for the “tight regulation of people” enjoyed by modern
governments, where “the people’s actions, movements, births, and deaths all require reports.
People exiting the country, entering the borders all need visas.” The example that came to He’s
pen was French Indochina: where “people management is the strictest,” and where even foreign-
ers wishing to pass through needed visas. “With this sort of people management, not only would
military desertion be stopped, but traitorous activity would also be wiped out.” “In the past our
country’s politics has been loose and chaotic. The country’s geographical size and the number of
its population are all unknown. The land is not managed, and thus it is not fully exploited. The
people are not managed, and their talents are not fully used. . . . In the past, our country’s people
have not been controlled, and so we have become a dish of loose sand. Now, if the loose sand is
to come together to form a stone, we must add strict management.” Here the Chinese word is
“management” (guanli 管理), but the sense is clearly surveillance in the sense of regulation, tab-
ulation, record keeping, and administrative control. In this light, the ID system was far more
than an efficient a way to replace front-line losses. It also fundamentally increased the capacities
of the state, enhancing the ability to impose its will and bring about law-and-order in rear areas
as well. Traitors, spies, bandits, and robbers would find their movements restricted. “The people
of our country are accustomed to a loose freedom, especially the small merchants. Today they
go to one city, tomorrow to another; completely free and unrestrained, [they move] under the
broad sky without any restrictions. Now, finally implementing the military service ID, [when]
they travel more than 40 里 from their home they have to report it and pick up a travel pass. The
procedure is troublesome, and [their] freedom has been lost. If it is handled poorly, the people
will complain.”

The loss of accustomed freedom and the potential for popular resentment re-
quired careful handling of the ID system, which was precisely what proved difficult for the dis-
tressed wartime state.

Like all modern states, the Nationalist government not only aspired to watch society, but
to keep watch on itself as well. This self-surveillance began on an ad hoc basis, but by 1941 it
was regularized and made a permanent feature of the conscription administration. In early 1939
the People’s Political Council heard a proposal recommending that patrolling inspectors be dis-
patched to “go among the people” and report on real conditions. At least partially in response,
Chiang ordered the Council to conduct a fact-finding tour of Sichuan and Xikang. The 1939 ins-
pection tour was a continuation or extension of the Chinese Engineering Association’s 1934
Sichuan Survey mission in that it was designed to assess the concrete situation in the area, in-
cluding not only economic and geographical resources, but political and administrative aspects
as well. The two provinces were divided into five inspection routes, with more than 100 counties

103. All quotations in this paragraph are from: He Naihuang “Lun bingyizheng zhi shishi ji qi bixu jubei
zhi yaojian,” YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 541-51; originally in Junshi zazhi, published by the MAC Training
Bureau, 16 June 1940.

being visited by the inspectors.\textsuperscript{105} The members of the tour submitted a combined report that included their observations and recommendations.

The Political Council fact-finders concluded that the 1939 lottery revolts were “not accidents”, but an outgrowth of the system itself. First, the military service laws and regulations were too numerous with too many patchwork changes. These partial and unsystematic adjustments left many contradictions and ambiguities in the regulations. Second, people were generally not well-informed about the draft. Third, local administrators were working with poor information: household registers were incomplete and filled with errors. Fourth, quotas for men were set without any regard for other demands on communities, such as corvée labor. Fifth, \textit{baojia} and county cadres were poorly trained and poorly paid. And finally, field units were recruiting independently in the rear, competing directly with the draft lottery for young men.\textsuperscript{106}

At about this same time, the conscription administration began ad hoc measures to try and eliminate some of the deluge of abuses and complaints. The Junzhengbu, in mid-1939, admitted that oversight of military service work had originally relied on local agencies. But this had been a complete failure. Local investigators and authorities were not reliable. Some just went along with conscription personnel’s sensibilities; some colluded with the draft men against families who had been harmed and appealed to higher authorities; and some even refused to hear cases or when they did hear a case were not impartial. The conscientious ones found that their work was undermined by superiors who often ordered the agency under suspicion to conduct its own investigation, which amounted to the suspects being asked to investigate themselves. It mandated some immediate improvements. Central investigators must be dispatched to handle accusations in serious cases. Lower administrative levels must not be entrusted with these cases as they are too easily swayed by local bullies. When people bring complaints, they must be given an official receipt as proof that they have brought a case and it has been accepted for investigation.\textsuperscript{107} It is not stated explicitly, but it is likely the Junzhengbu’s assessment concerns inspectors sent out by the Sichuan provincial district to oversee conscription in early 1939. Each divisional district had a team of two men dispatched from the provincial government. These men were usually of military background. Procedurally, they were hampered in their duties and restricted to fact-finding since they had no power to actually decide cases.\textsuperscript{108}

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
  \bibitem{105} Chongqing and the 3AD were part of the East route. The members for this route were Zhu Fucheng (褚輔成), Guang Sheng (光昇), and Zhang Jianwu (張劍鳴). Deng Feihuang (鄧飛黃) and Hu Jingyi (胡景伊) were part of the team, but did not actually travel through the area. The east route group’s itinerary and diary of daily travel and activities in the counties around Chongqing can be found in \textit{Guomin cenzhenghui Chuan Kang jianshe shichatuan baogaoshu}, (1971 reprint of the 1939 report), pp. 33-56.
  \bibitem{106} \textit{Guomin cenzhenghui Chuan Kang jianshe shichatuan baogaoshu}, (1971 reprint of the 1939 report), \textit{passim}, but see also Zhou Kaiping’s summary and excerpts in \textit{Minguo Sichuan shishi xují}, pp. 239-61. Some of the inspectors delivered their own personal opinions to Chiang; Zhou Shuzhen, p. 82, citing Li Huang’s (李璜) memoirs, where he claims that he filed his own conclusions with Chiang.
  \bibitem{107} Sichuan provincial district, forwarding Junzhengbu order, to 3AD; qz0055.mj3-541, pp. 16a-b dated 31 July 1939.
  \bibitem{108} When on assignment, they were required to inform the counties, wards, and \textit{baojia} leaders of their arrival, which of course amounted to a tip-off that something was afoot. Forbidden to accept any gifts or even food from local officials and required to keep a detailed diary of their
\end{thebibliography}
What began as toothless inspections conducted by a politically peripheral advisory body or compromised internal investigators was regularized, and largely neutralized by the 2nd Conscription Conference (spring of 1941) when the Junzhengbu set up a national “military service inspection net” to identify and root out the abuses. The official purpose was “to encourage and reward those who follow orders and abide by the laws; to explain and guide those who don’t understand the regulations; help those who are making errors to rectify them; and investigate those who are breaking the law and committing abuses.”\textsuperscript{109} The MSO created a dedicated inspection office and held training sessions for inspectors. The 120 graduates were then dispatched to investigate cases in the divisional districts. Between December 1942 and October 1943 the new office handled 1,346 cases in Sichuan alone.

Despite the impressive case load, the inspection system was subverted from top down. Higher ups in the MSO cultivated associates among the inspectors, thus shielding themselves and their allies from unwanted attention. Cheng Zerun carefully invested his political capital in this manner. Many of the inspectors were his students, proteges, hometown boys, friends, or relatives. Inspections were often thin disguises for extortion or other forms of corruption. One inspector, nicknamed Camel Wang (王駱子) made the rounds of Yongchuan and Rongchang counties, extorting large sums of money from magistrates.\textsuperscript{110} According to Zhang Dengshang (張登上), an officer in the Rongwei (榮威) divisional district, the inspections of corrupt conscription cadres were nearly completely ineffectual: only those who lacked backers among higher ups were punished. Invariably, only low level staff – the small fry – were caught. The minority of genuine inspections and investigations were hampered by collusion between civilian and conscription officials; county magistrates gave the conscription district advance warning of an inspector’s arrival, which gave the draft officers time to clean up evidence of corruption.\textsuperscript{111}

Citizen Militia (GMBT): Local Penetration

Another aspect of state-building was the process of congealing local-level paramilitary organizations into national instruments for draft-related purposes, namely the delivery of batches of draftees to conscription units and the paramilitary (pre-draft) military training of local men. The institution that was entrusted with these tasks was the Citizen Militia (guomin bingtuan). As we have already seen, the Citizen Militia was involved in the information-gathering phase of the draft process, but it was also imbricated in several other aspects of conscription, and it inherited

activities and who they met with, they were supposed to be reliable central agents investigating conditions in the villages. But they were, ultimately, only a fact-finding tool, powerless to do more than send suggestions for improvements to the provincial district; qz0055.mj3-541, pp. 1a-2b dated 13 January 1939 (rec’d). Shortly after the Junzhengbu’s July order, the Baxian regimental district was ordering that inspectors dispatched on cases were not to give local authorities any notification of their activities to avoid local elites from manipulating the investigation; qz0061.mj15-4419A/B, pp. 3-4 dated 2 August 1939. Yet even in November, the Junzhengbu continued to emphasize that the inspectors main mission fact-finding: discovering corrupt personnel and ascertaining whether agencies are following regulations on the ground; qz0055.mj3-541, pp. 3a-b dated November 1939.


\textsuperscript{110} Zha Keen, “Guomindang fandong zhengfu de bingyi yu bingyishuzhang Cheng Zerun zhi si,” p. 164.

certain pre-war local functions as well. In Sichuan, the militia was integral to the draft in both urban and rural communities.\footnote{112}

In early March 1939 the central government issued a program for setting up Citizen Militia organizations, under the direction of military service administration agencies. These militia units were set up across the country by March the following year, though in practice they were often just renamed from pre-existing militias and peace-preservation (anti-bandit and local anti-communist) units. The new Citizen Militia was closely integrated with the \textit{baojia}. The \textit{bao} head was the leader of the basic militia unit, while \textit{jia} heads acted as squad leaders. The public office (\textit{gongsuo} 公所) of each tier – sub-county ward (\textit{qu}), village (\textit{xiang}) or township (\textit{zhen}) – was the headquarters for that level of the militia.\footnote{113} Local Citizen Militia units were responsible for inspection and initial organization of draftees, who were then sent up to the Ever-Ready Unit (\textit{changbeidui} 常備隊) at the ward (\textit{qu}) or county level, where they were picked up by RTOs. At times, however, local militias even delivered men directly to field units.\footnote{114} These functions were an extension of its information gathering role and reflected its intimate connection with local \textit{baojia}.\footnote{115}

In line with He Yingqin’s goal of making all men into soldiers, from 1939-40 onwards the Citizen Militia was given a more ambitious role: providing basic paramilitary and political training to all men, ages 18-45. This had not been the case during the early years (1938-40) when Sichuanese recruits were trained for two to three months in county-based units (these too were called “Ever-Ready Troops”), before being picked up by or delivered to the conscription districts.\footnote{116} This early war method required men to be away from their village homes for training. Beginning in 1939 and taking full shape in 1940, the system was adjusted to let men stay at home, and thus retain them in their productive occupations, for as long as possible by assigning this paramilitary training to the Citizen Militia.

To help it accomplish this paramilitary training task, the Citizen Militia was given an institutional foundation in the form of the two paramilitary training systems that had taken shape before the war. One of those was the school-based system designed mainly to appeal to educated

\footnote{112}{For two summaries of the Citizen Militia, see Rong Jianguang, “Kangzhan zhong zhi bingli dongyuan," p. 790 and 810-3; and Zhou Kaiqing, \textit{Sichuan yu dui Ri kangzhan}, p. 242-3.}

\footnote{113}{The MAC issued the \textit{Program for Implementing Organization, Management, and Education of Citizen Militia} (國民兵組織管理教育實施綱領); \textit{Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi}, p. 113. However, the exact dating of the Citizen Militia coalescence is difficult, as many different sources – even those written by key people involved – do not agree. For example, Cheng Zerun in his speech to the 1942 Sichuan Conscription Conference states that the militia was established in October 1939; \textit{Bingyi yuekan} (BYYK), no. 5 (March 1942). But other sources and documents, such as the measure cited above, put it earlier in the year. Similar problems exist for nearly every aspect of the Citizen Militia. Most likely this reflects the extreme unevenness of practice across both time and space.}

\footnote{114}{Second Temporary Conscription Conference in Chongqing; qz0055.mj3-266, p42a-3a dated 29 March 1940.}


\footnote{116}{YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 474-83, originally published in \textit{Sichuan wenxian yuekan}, combined issues 11 and 12, 1 July 1963, p. 479.}
youths who were deemed to be potential officer material. This system was originally administered by the MAC’s Political Bureau (zhengzhibu 政治部), and eventually the Military Training Bureau (軍訓部) led by Bai Chongxi, instead of the Junzhengbu. In the early war, this arm of paramilitary training (國民軍訓處) was under a county Military Training Officer (軍訓教官), who was appointed by and subordinate to the Political Bureau. As we saw in Chapter One, during the prewar experimental phase, “citizens military education” was delegated to the General Inspectorate of Training (訓練總署), Interior Ministry, and Education Ministry. This system was separated from the Junzhengbu’s conscription apparatus, a fact which elicited immediate protests from provincial districts.117 This split between the Political Bureau and the Junzhengbu in paramilitary training structure had its origins in high-level factional politics.118

In 1937, as part of the pre-war reforms instituted in Sichuan, counties were required to establish another, separate paramilitary training system, called the “Citizens Association Training Detachments” (guomin shexun zongdui 國民社訓總隊), designed to provide militarized training for a much wider segment of the population. The county magistrate commanded the county-level detachment, but each sub-county ward was also required to field a smaller, subordinate unit. This organization did not last long, as these units were soon renamed “Citizens Self-Protection Troops” (guomin ziweidui 國民自衛隊), though the vice-commander of each county’s unit was now to be appointed by the provincial conscription district. With three or four subordinate units (zhongdui 中隊), the Self-Protection Troops were responsible for maintaining order in the counties as well as basic paramilitary training for able-bodied men. With the advent of the regimental districts in Sichuan, the Self-Protection Units were “disbanded” (actually just renamed) to form the Citizen Militia, still with the county magistrate in charge, though now the vice-commander was appointed by the Junzhengbu. These were given some responsibility for training draftees and volunteers in the early part of the war, but were not tightly integrated with baojia and the draft process until they were reorganized in 1939-40.

Unifying these training agencies and bringing them under the same umbrella as the draft itself was one of the key motivations behind the Citizen Militia, particularly its reorganization and expansion of responsibilities in 1939-40.119 From the beginning then the militia was heir to

---

117. For example, the Fujian conscription authorities reported that paramilitary training (guomin junxun) was under the county’s military training officer, part of the Political Bureau system, and thus separate from the conscription. It requested that DDs and RDs be given control over this aspect of county-level training; Fujian provincial district 1939 work report, qz0041.mj-1-26, p. 2a-9b and 33a-6a dated 1940.


119. With the expansion of its roles in 1939, the GMBT often clashed with the county-level military affairs section (junshike 軍事科). Within county governments, the military affairs sections were supposed to handle military service information gathering, registration, and the lottery. But the GMBT units too claimed jurisdiction over military service work, particularly at the ward (qu) and lower levels. To help alleviate the tension, the Junzhengbu issued clarifying regulations, approved by the Executive Yuan and MAC, delineating the division of labor. Under these guidelines, the Military Affairs Sections were to handle conscription, demobilized and retired soldiers, peace preservation, air defense, benefits for soldiers, and aid for their dependents. The GMBT were to handle the militia organization, training, voluntary recruitment, and corvée service; Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, p. 114. In early May 1940 Regulations for Implementing National Military Service (國民兵役施行規則) was passed; it formalized and
efforts to train citizens who could then more easily be mobilized as soldiers. Toward this end, the county Citizen Militia covered all men 18-45 who were not already in the Ever-Ready Troop (changbeidui), destined for delivery to conscription units. Militia units below the county were sub-divided on basis of geography (qu, xiang, zhen, bao, jia) and age (in sui), as part of the bao-jia information-gathering procedures.

After 1940, the militia provided basic militarized training in local communities. The basic principle was that training was not to interfere with people’s farming activities. Hence, training was to consist of one two month stint, followed by five shorter training intervals per year, timed to coincide with agricultural slack periods. During training, men were to be instructed and drilled for three hours per day. In addition there was one month of intensive “in camp” (zaiying 在營) training per year. Training was considered complete after two years, but drills were a continuing feature: village and township units exercised once a month; sub-county ward (qu) units once every six months. Training was supposed to combine basic fighting skills and political education, turning the people into “citizens who are loyal to the party and love the nation.”


121. See the The General Outline for Reorganizing Wartime Citizens Military Organization and Training (戰時國民軍事組訓整備綱領), passed by the MAC in June 1938; YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 201-14 (the
Not all conscription officials supported the Citizen Militia in this role. Military service administrators often looked down on militia officers and refused to help them. Some claimed that the militia was not qualified to conduct training. This opinion was expressed most trenchantly by Dai Gaoxiang in 1942. In his “Overview Opinions on Improving Sichuan’s Conscription Administration”, Dai argued that the militia lacked the talent, knowledge, and experience to provide effective paramilitary training. Ideally, county and sub-county officials should hark back to the unity of civil and military (junzheng yiti 軍政一體) that was a hallmark of the Zhou and Qin eras, but, more realistically, Dai stated that under current circumstances militia units needed a greater infusion of experienced military personnel and central direction.

On top of its delivery and training roles, the militia was given other tasks as well. It never lost its connection to law and order; after 1941 its self-protection units functioned as an extended police force or were converted directly into police detachments. It was also supposed

---

122. This haughty attitude elicited orders from the MSO and Junzhengbu that conscription officials needed to review the regulations to refresh their understanding of the importance of the militia to the draft processqz0055.mj3-245, pp. 103a-b dated 10 September 1940.

123. Bingyi yuekan (BYYK), no. 5 (March 1942), p. 53.

124. Close links between local police and the GMBT were official policy, with police department chiefs holding leadership positions within local GMBT units; qz0055.mj3-293, pp. 55a-57a dated April 1940. Its conscript and paramilitary training units were also sometimes called “Reserve Detachments” (houbeidui 後備隊), but its law-and-order units at times retained the “self-protection troops” (ziweidui) moniker; the dual nomenclature reflected its dual roles; qz0053.mj11-59, pp. 11b-12b, 18b. Some of these GMBT Reserve Detachments were the
to help dispense aid and benefits to family members of servicemen. Militia leaders were also charged with apprehending deserters and investigating claims for exemption from service. Other functions harked back to the pre-war “self-protection” militias, but with a Nationalist bent: in times of emergency (and the war was nothing if not one extended emergency), the militia was charged with carrying out intelligence gathering, eradicating bandits and traitors, helping with air defense, interrogation and examination, communications work, transportation, military logistics, public works (*gongwu*), fire prevention, and rescue work. By late November 1939, Chiang instructed local governments that the Citizen Militia was a key link between the police, military, the KMT party, local government, and social organizations (*fatuan*): “Management of Citizen Militia education and service is the foundation of military service, and at the same time it also includes public security and the reform of [public] administration.” All those organizations had a duty to aid the militia in its many tasks.

In some localities, particularly the “model district” of Chongqing, the militia was well organized and conscientiously administered. For most of the rest of the province, however, the multitude of tasks assigned to the Citizen Militia severely diluted its effectiveness. Both Dai Gaoxiang, as chief of staff of the Sichuan PD, and Zhou Kaiqing, a district magistrate in Sichuan, suggest that after 1940 the militia was increasingly a dead institution, left with only the meager paramilitary training role, which it often failed to carry out conscientiously because of lack of funding. However, local archival documents suggest that it continued to play an important role as the “muscle” that *baojia* heads called upon when they wanted to display force in communities.

**Features of Wartime State-Building**

It should be clear by now that conscription involved complex processes of state-building. The war was both catalyst and context for these efforts. We have already covered (in admittedly schematic fashion) the administrative structures and procedural processes that constituted this wartime state-making. Another key feature of this project was the object of the mobilization itself. While the Nationalist state issued its draft quotas through and upon abstract administrative units (provinces, conscription districts, cities, counties, sub-county districts (*qu*), *lianbao*, villages, townships, *bao*, and finally *jia*), the target was individual men. Naturally, there were familial concerns and caveats that could not be completely ignored and which restricted the reach of the state. Nevertheless, it was the *individual* citizen that the state was trying so desperately to reach.

Unlike abstract units, however, individuals proved distressingly mobile. Not only did the war create millions of refugees, but millions more crisscrossed the country engaged in regular economic activity and the work of war. Without the capability of holding a national census, the Junzhengbu and Interior Ministry fell back on a military ID system as a stop-gap measure to help identify and track these mobile individuals. While not entirely successful, this was an unprece-
dent insertion of state power into the Chinese countryside: a conscious attempt to make local society and the movements of (male) citizens transparent to the state.

Reaching individuals who were not mobile required that the state reach into local communities in new and more intrusive ways. Political suspicion and a persistent commitment to compulsory service led Chiang and his government to reject volunteerism as a possible avenue for recruiting individual citizen-soldiers – at least for most of the war. Yet, extracting these individuals from their communities was a difficult task for the Nationalist state. Above local communities and county governments stood an administrative apparatus linking the military to interior society, but these institutions to compel service had to be created almost completely out of whole cloth. Made under duress, there were many policy choices that were rushed or made for expediency’s sake. The pace of the war and the desperate need for bodies on the front meant that leisurely experimentation and evaluation were not possible. The state needed to reach into local communities to extract men for the war effort. That extraction could not be accomplished without help from within the communities (this will form the subject of the next two chapters), but those communities remained suspect in the Nationalist thinking and policy. Officials were sensitive to the possibility that units could become tied too closely to a specific area and the communities within it. One policy statement averred that when “a unit has many soldiers from an area, it should not be assigned to that district in order to avoid cultivating feudal thinking” in the units.  

One strategy to help ameliorate some of the challenges facing conscription was to centralize and unite functions. This tactic was pursued at several levels. A centerpiece policy in this centralization was known variously as “uniting the draft and training” (zhengxun heyi 微训合一) or “uniting the draft, training, and replacement” (zhengxunbu heyi 微訓補合一). These phrases pointed to the coagulation of functions in the conscription districts. The policy not only centralized power, but also helped cut down on competition between agencies and on opportunities for corruption and collusion – or so it was hoped. These same hopes, in part, motivated the abolition of the regimental districts. Between 1941 and 1943 there was a gradual change that tied conscription districts to field units: every divisional district would be a rear area division attached to a front line army (jun 軍) or army group (jituanjun 集團軍); the district commander would be the vice-commander of the army. This too was an attempt to coalesce authority in one place, justified by the belief that only field units had a vested interest in the well-being of the new conscripts and thus were the only reliable agents in the chain upwards from local communities to the front. Every other agent in the chain was too easily seduced into the pernicious realm of profit. And again, a similar logic was behind the creation of the Citizen Militia as a central draft and paramilitary institution on the local level. Functions that had been split and authority


128. Not all conscription officials were convinced this centralization was the best strategy. Dai Gaoxiang, in 1942, advocated a diametrically opposed policy. Going directly against the unification policy, Dai argued that the draft, training, and replacement functions should be separated, each carried out by carefully segmented bodies: DDs, RTOs, and front line units, respectively; Bingyi yuekan, no. 5 (March 1942, p. 52-3.
that had been fragmented were gradually united in a single institution that was tied at the hip with the *baojia*, and the strings to it all were to meet in the offices of the MSO.\(^{129}\)

In fact, the Nationalist state was right to be worried about fragmentation, as it multiplied gray areas and interstitial moments where corruption could flourish. Although the Nationalists attempted to keep watch over itself and communities, both suffered from a pernicious and persistent commercialization of conscription. Many of the reforms and policies can be seen as desperate responses to this persistent marketization of the draft. In short, during the war, the Nationalist state experienced an institutional growth spurt. To be sure, it was fitful, uncomfortable growth, accompanied by sharp growing pains, but the overall trend of expansion of administrative structures and capabilities was unmistakable. It is to some of those growing pains – specifically the commercialization of conscription – that we turn now.

**Commerce of Conscription: A Traffic in Bodies**

Abuses such as press-ganging, stripping and binding conscripts to prevent their flight while being marched to the front lines, and the fixing of the lottery draws are all covered thoroughly in contemporary journalist accounts, scholarly literature on the war, or communist indictments of the Nationalist government as a class enemy. Even Nationalist partisans admitted the problems: the fact-finders of People’s Political Council inspection tour in 1939, reported that in Nanchuan “the able-bodied men conscripted in the county are bought and sold just like livestock.” And in his two hour meeting with the inspectors, the Jiangjin county magistrate acknowledged that a majority of the draftees in the county were press-ganged and their real place of residence unclear.\(^{130}\) Without belaboring these already widely known facts, it is necessary to provide a sense of the ways in which the system allowed both evasion by those it was supposed to net for service and the mis-applications or abuses by those who were supposed to be doing the netting.

It should be noted that this section is merely one tip of the iceberg. An exhaustive catalogue of abuses, corruption, and evasion methods is beyond the scope of this chapter. Even without access to the MSO’s investigation office records and military court documents, the Chongqing police files are stuffed with conscription cases of all sorts and at all levels – these form the backbone of evidence for Chapter Four. Doubtless some of these cases were filed maliciously or in error, but their sheer number is clear indication that there were fundamental flaws in the system. Here our focus is confined to outlining one salient vector of abuse, namely the persistent marketization of conscription. Despite the Nationalists’ attempts to root them out, irregular, illegal, and illegitimate exchanges of material and men grew up around the draft. All the administrative machinery cooked up in the MSO offices was ineffective in controlling the complexities of social life; as a result, markets (systems of exchanges) grew up inside the conscription system.

\(^{129}\) The split between the dual systems of paramilitary training (the MAC’s Zhengzhibu and the Junzhengbu) and the competition between counties’ military affairs section and local GMBT were both repaired by concentrating all the functions in the hands of the GMBT, which itself was under the national conscription administration’s authority. This was precisely what the Fujian PD had recommended and requested in its 1939 work report; qz0041.mj-1-26, p. 2a-9b and 33a-36a dated 1940.

\(^{130}\) *Guomin canzhenghui Chuan Kang jianshe shichatuan baogaoshu*, pp. 41 and 45.
Conscription’s material dimension offered prime opportunities for ordinary forms of corruption. At the MSO (central) level, financial power lay with the accounting office under the management office, both of which had the power to review and approve budgets and monetary disbursements to the conscription districts. This concentration of financial power led to all sorts of abuses. Cheng Zerun, naturally, ensured that the head of the management office was under his influence: the head of the office, Dai Jiuru (戴九如), was also from Longchang county (they shared a tongxiang or native place tie).\footnote{After 1945, Dai remained hostile towards Chiang Kaishek for executing his mentor; Zha Keen, “Guomindang fandong zhengfu de bingyi yu bingyishuzhang Cheng Zerun zhi si,” p. 164.} Cheng’s patronage ran down the conscription ladder, providing cover for embezzlement, such as reporting inflated figures (zhongbao fubao 中報浮報) for purchases and costs in order to line officers’ pockets. These schemes often involved the supply of uniforms or blankets for new conscripts, who ended up without adequate uniforms or means to keep warm.\footnote{Conscripts were supposed to be turned over to their RTOs or field units with uniforms and blankets, but this was often not the case: they could be delivered nearly freezing and naked; YZSL, vol. 2, p. 400.}

Many divisional district commanders could not resist the temptation to use funds for money-making ventures: smuggling, business investments, amassing huge savings, hoarding goods or black-market gold or US dollars, or even short-term lending at exorbitant rates. Only after making a profit would they pass a portion of the original funds along to pay for district expenses. As the money went down the command chain, each level repeated that process until there was nothing left. Both the military and civilian draft funds were depleted in this manner. With money being siphoned off, neither counties nor conscription units could care for the conscripts on their way to their units; the men were simply bound and marched off. When the columns stopped for the evening they were locked up in a dark room or even a jail, just like criminals; it was, the Baxian regimental district commander bemoaned, “a violation of humanity.”\footnote{Baxian RD commander, Zhou Shude, qz0061.mj15-4419A/B, pp. 36-8 dated July 1939.}

Supplies were another frequent opportunity for corruption. Divisional districts often contracted out to have blankets or uniforms manufactured, but this just increased opportunities for graft.\footnote{Zha Keen, “Guomindang fandong zhengfu de bingyi yu bingyishuzhang Cheng Zerun zhi si,” p. 165.} One example occurred in the wake of a 1939 Japanese bombing attack on Leshan. The local conscription district reported that several thousand sets of cotton blankets for the replacements, worth tens of thousands of yuan, were destroyed in the bombings, when in fact they had long been sold off for a profit. The commander not only got funds for replacing the blankets, but was able to squeeze even more out of the incident by demanding bribes just to be able to bid for the contract to re-supply the blankets.\footnote{Zhang Zhaofu, “Sichuan kangzhan shiqi de renli gongxian yu bingyi jibi,” p. 93.} Another common practice was to confiscate draftees’ civilian clothes and sell them on the second-hand market.\footnote{See the case against a company commander in the Yuyou divisional district’s second replacement regiment; qz0108.mj5-8, pp. 2-12 dated December 1940.} Embezzlement of funds or supplies
for rations was also common, leaving the draftees unfed or slowly wasting away on substandard rations.

Much of the time such corruption went undetected and uncorrected. On occasion, however, subordinates could turn in their superior officer and the military courts would get involved. In early 1939, for example, several company commanders in the 1st replacement regiment of the Jiannan divisional district sent a formal accusation to the Junzhengbu against their commander, Xie Lihu (谢力虎), claiming he was taking a cut of soldiers’ pay (kekoujunxiang 剋扣軍餉). The company officers accused Xie of abusing his authority to cover up his malfeasance. When his officers proposed that unit finances be handled openly, Xie refused, berated the officers, and dismissed one of them as a warning. The Junzhengbu notified the Military Law Section, which handed the case over to the Sichuan provincial district for investigation, which in turn, ordered the Jiannan commander, Huang Hanxun (黄漢勳), to investigate and report. Huang sent a man to the regiment to carry out a secret investigation. The investigator found that not all the charges were factual and that the accusers were guilty of inciting disloyalty. However, Xie was far from blameless: only half of funds for the soldiers’ grass shoes had been disbursed; the unit rolls were padded with many empty spots; and Xie had improperly dismissed some subordinates. Even more suspiciously, the unit’s logistics officer was murdered while traveling on a nearby road. Commander Huang felt that Xie was clearly corrupt and had lost control of his unit, an assessment that was confirmed when Xie suddenly wrote a letter of resignation, left his post and fled the area. The MSO was furious, ordering all the principles to be sent to the Sichuan provincial district for interrogation. Of course, by then, Xie was long gone with the money in his pocket.137 While in this case the conscription hierarchy pursued the case diligently, it does not take much imagination to see that if Xie had been in the good graces of higher ups the result would have been much different.

Generic financial corruption cases such as these could be multiplied nearly indefinitely. Wherever and whenever material or funds changed hands there was opportunity – usually taken – for graft: books were cooked, rosters padded, prices fixed, supplies sold for profit, personal effects and property confiscated, bribes demanded and paid, and public funds embezzled. These were the mundane, even routine, forms of corruption that played on the loopholes and intricacies of public finance and military supply. As such they are symptomatic of the uncontrolled exchanges and extortions that were endemic to the draft system. They contributed to the outrage many observers felt, eroding the system’s legitimacy, yet, they hold only passing interest here, because they were ancillary to the mobilization of men.

Far more serious than the embezzlement of public funds or padding of conscription logistics budgets was the persistent problem of buying and selling of men. In one sense, the trade in men during the war is hardly surprising: everything was bought and sold. Suffering under a scourge of rats, Chongqing sported a thriving market in cats, which were sold for astronomical prices or could be rented for short periods of time at more reasonable rates.138 Even the most intimate of family relations were eroded and commercialized by wartime pressures. The interior’s

---

137. The case correspondence can be found at: qz0108.mj5-49, pp. 28-35, 37a, 40a, and 41-47 dated 25 February through May 1939. The final disposition of the case in the military courts is not recorded.

138. Xu Wancheng, Kangzhan banian Chongqing huaxu, p. 36.
flood of refugees was primarily male and this meant a lack of women; consequently, desperate husbands selling their wives to other men was not unusual.  

The most common form of corruption was selling the release of draftees. In villages, the lottery process made this easy, especially when it was held in secret as the baojia and lottery officials alone were privy to the results. They approached selectees from wealthier families to negotiate a price for finding a replacement. Sometimes the deal would be a one-time payment; other times the family was kept on the hook, making yearly or even monthly payments to keep their son off the lottery rolls. The baojia head would use part of the bribe money to hire a substitute. Poor families might borrow to pay these exemption fees, often bankrupting themselves into destitution in the process. Another strategy was to collude with the medical inspectors at health inspections to have certain men disqualified from service on faked medical grounds. Conscription officers were on the take as well, accepting money from conscripts to let them go. Those who let too many go would be unable to deliver their quota and might even choose to desert along with the conscripts, sometimes even taking the guns and ammo with them to sell.

Releasing draftees created the need to fill the positions so that the jurisdiction could meet its quota. The easiest method to make good the deficit was to purchase substitutes. A lively trade sprung up. Individuals or gangs of men became “soldier-peddlers” (bingfanzi 兵販子). Setting up shop in teahouses and taverns, they contacted village and bao heads in rural areas and in larger towns and cities they were in contact with county government staff and conscription district officers. Their mode of operation was simple: they would sell their services as substitute draftees, often taking the name of a man legitimately selected in the lottery, and then rely on their skill to escape, either breaking out of the barracks or fading into the countryside while their unit was on the road. By repeating the cycle quickly they could earn substantial sums of money. Inspection station officials near Chengdu reported that these “soldier-peddlers are strong in body and secretive in word and action. Every time they enlist [lit. are hired, gu, 雇] they desert after just a few days. Even worse, they do not only desert as individuals, but incite many other men to go [with them] at the same time.” Some of these men were so adept that they had made multiple appearances at many different inspection stations.

142. Zha Keen, “Guomindang fandong zhengfu de bingyi yu bingyishuzhang Cheng Zerun zhi si,” p. 159. Less than six months after the start of the war this pattern was already established in Sichuan; see the directive from the Sichuan provincial government to the 3AD, forwarding Chiang’s Field HQ order to stop conscription evasion, qz0055.mj3-267, pp. 12a-b dated 21 January 1938 (rec’d): “According to reports from counties and qu, many local gentry are using the conscription lottery to oppress villagers. If the lottery selects [a man from] a rich family, they put forward money to buy a substitute. [There are cases] even of unreliable fellows who specialize in being substitutes, making a profit from it. As soon as the money is in their hands they look for an opportunity and desert. Again and again, many times over until they are doing it for a living.”
143. qz0055.mj3-256, pp. 61a-b dated 15 August 1938 (rec’d).
Another scheme for these “peddlers” was to wait till the unit they joined had a group of escapees and then volunteer to go catch the deserters. Issued a travel pass by the officer in charge, they would then melt into the countryside themselves, never to return. Some baojia heads specialized in finding substitutes, even becoming “the head substitute trader” (頂役之賣販長) themselves. Some even incited local soldiers and conscripts to desert – at times harboring the deserters from capture afterwards – just so they could sell replacements to the conscription authorities. The Junzhengbu and Sichuan provincial district were aware that conscription district units were accepting new men on the side, directly from communities. Repeated orders to stay within the regulations and accept only legitimate draftees at the designated hand-over locations and times were ineffectual, and the trade continued unabated.

At times the commercialized draft became a traffic in bodies that approached a slave trade. In July 1942, for example, Hu Fo (胡佛), the commander of the Yujiang divisional district, forwarded a Junzhengbu order to Tang Yi (唐毅), the chief of police in Chongqing, that the Junzhengbu had received credible reports that the buying and selling of conscripts was being conducted by organized businesses (gongsi 公司). These illegal organizations would approach baojia staff, draftees, and draftees’ families with offers to buy substitutes for prices that ranged from 700 to 1,000 yuan. In Cháng'an county, one such company was making tens of thousands of yuan of profit in this trade. Such cases were far from unusual, though the prices rose astronomically as inflation set in. In late 1944, for example, the Chongqing police were notified of a rash of cases in Sichuan and Shaanxi, where bandit gangs were openly selling conscripts to local conscription officials. The price was standardized at 20,000 to 30,000 yuan per man.

It is important to note that commercialized conscription went hand in hand with the most notorious aspect of Nationalist military service: press-ganging or dragooning men. Buying replacements could never fill the deficits created by those who deserted or purchased their release (some of whom were purchased substitutes to begin with). The desertion problem was immense. One postwar author who collected rumors and stories heard that a unit from 15th RTO had left Chongqing with 10,000 men to deliver to the front. By the time it reached Guiyang, forty percent had escaped, and by the time it reached its destination, it was reduced to just 3,000 men. No matter how many substitutes were purchased, it was never enough. To make up shortfalls local baojia and conscription districts both fell back on naked and arbitrary press-gang methods, the men tied together and marched off, usually at gunpoint. Described with horror by domestic critics and foreign journalists and diplomats, press-ganging was a source of constant discontent.

149. Xu Wancheng, Kangzhan banian Chongqing huaxu, p. 62.
150. The most matter of fact – one might even say unfeeling – description came from Evans Carlson, a US naval observer during the war. “Conscription is enforced by armed parties of soldiers,
concern for Chiang as well. Already in December 1938 a group of representatives from the counties around Chongqing sent a report on the common ways in which baojia entrapped men: during festivals or market days when the village was all gathered together, the lianbao sealed off the streets and dragged off the men; a stretch of road was guarded and all male travelers forced to enlist; and finally simply breaking into homes or snatching men right out of their own fields. 151

Press-ganging was a common practice among conscription districts’ units (the replacement regiments and RTOs) as well, though their mobility made it difficult to determine culpability for specific events. For example, in 1942 Hu Xianggui (胡湘圭), the commander of the 4th replacement regiment, was accused of a range of corrupt practices, including the sale of military supplies, press-ganging, and purchasing of substitutes. Reportedly under his orders, company commanders dragooned hundreds of men at a market to make up their quota shortfall. Terrorized, many residents for some 40 (Chinese) miles around the market refused to travel openly any longer. The official investigation, however, found the charges were unproven or unverifiable. The problem, the investigator admitted, was that dragooning men was common in the town, but the residents did not know which unit was responsible. 152 Since detachments engaged in illegal press-gang activities routinely removed unit insignia and moved outside their own conscription district boundaries, it was often impossible to determine which unit was responsible for any given incident.

The “Opportunity to Repay the Nation”: Lessons in Political Alienation

The effects of conscription and its abuses on the population of the interior are hard to over-estimate. Military service siphoned off agricultural manpower and many men fled their villages in fear of being drafted or press-ganged, which contributed to a shortage of rural labor. According to statistics gathered by the Central Experimental Agriculture Institute (中央農業試驗所) farm labor power was dangerously lacking. In places like Tongnan (潼南) county (Sichuan) fields were standing idle. 153 Whole families abandoned their homes, heading into the hills to take up banditry. 154 Conscription was a “push factor” for internal migration toward cities, where there was a better chance of being protected from military service. 155 By 1941 families with more than one son were depleted by each round of conscription and many areas were reporting a complete

much as it was in the United States during the Civil War. In China the practice of roping conscripts together when they are moving in a body through the streets enroute to the training depot is frequently employed. From the Occidental point of view this practice is objectionable, and it undoubtedly militates against the development of individual volition; but in China long usage has caused it to be accepted as more or less customary and without stigma”; Evans F. Carlson. The Chinese army: its organization and military efficiency, 1940. pp. 31-2.

151. The report went on to reiterate that such events were not limited just to the countryside. Chongqing had incidents of blatant press-ganging on 27 September 1938 at the Chuqimen (储奇門) and again on 3 October at Xiaochangba (軼場壩) too; qz0055.mj3-256, pp. 85a-b 12 December 1938 (rec’d).
152. qz0108.mj5-119, pp. 1-46 dated around November 1942.
154. qz0055.mj3-256, pp. 85a-b dated 12 December 1938 (rec’d).
155. Josh Howard, Workers at War, p. 89.
dearth of draft-eligible men. Beyond the socio-economic effects, there was significant psychological and political fallout, which was the root cause of conscription’s failure as a civic instrument, and thus the source of Chiang Kaishek’s bitter disappointment.

The sheer arbitrariness of conscription heightened the sense of terror among people. In mid-1939, the Ba county government commented in a letter to the Three Gorges Experimental Village District that “recently people are more afraid of [our own] soldiers than they are of the enemy.” The indeterminate threat of being snatched off a road, or being dragged out of home or field by armed men, was a heavy burden to live with. The lines of maltreated conscripts, bound and barefoot, trudging east were regular reminders of the fate that awaited anyone unwary or unlucky enough to get caught. In August 1942, the Chengdu Post (Chengdu kuaibao 成都快报) summarized the popular unease: “Those who should be drafted are not, while those who should not be are forced into service. Poor out of the way villages and the flourishing markets all have their streets blocked and their roads cut [by] press-ganging of men. Others take advantage of opportunity to extort money to line their own pockets, and some even mete out unauthorized punishment [to those who refuse]. There is no law, and no heaven. People are so terrified that they cannot make it to the end of the day. Social order is unbearably chaotic.”

The methods by which the Nationalist state promoted conscription only heightened the dissonance between the ideal of military service and its realities. Some observers faulted the state’s own propaganda for reinforcing the impression military service was a market transaction. One news editorial on draft resistance incidents faulted the state’s own propaganda, particularly the widely publicized slogan “those with money contribute money; those with strength, contribute strength.” This catchphrase promoted the war effort, but drew a distinction between the type of wartime service expected of the rich and poor. The editorial claimed that across the province this slogan was seen as tacit permission for purchasing substitutes, cementing the notion that military service was optional if one could buy one’s way out of it. “Contributions for exemptions” was rumored to be policy in some areas in Sichuan and Guangxi; some conscription officials found it attractive because it held out the possibility of ending the corruption of substi-

157. Significantly, this statement was made after the disastrous initial Japanese bombings of Chongqing in early May 1939; qz0081.mj3-785, pp. 35-6 dated 28 June 1939.
159. YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 464-73. This is a series of newspaper editorials that ran from 22 to 25 November 1939 in the Xinxin News (Xinxin xinwen 新新聞) and collected in the Xinxin News Weekly (新新聞旬刊), no. 18, 1 January 1939.
tute buying and selling. But ultimately, this slogan – and the rumors it generated – reinforced the belief that in Nationalist China there were first and second class citizens.

Official military service propaganda was directly at odds with this, of course. The conscription administration’s showpiece publicity concept was the “Three Equalities” (san ping 三平). The MSO continuously produced and disseminated materials pitching conscription as embodying the principles of the “Three Equalities”. One of the clearest explications was penned by Zhu Weizhen, vice-head of the MSO, and published in a military journal. Zhu tied the Three Equalities to the political principles behind modern, republican government: equality (pingdeng 平等), evenness (pingjun 平均), and equity or impartiality (pingyun 平允). It was only by abiding by these principles that China could realize the goal of “all men are soldiers” (min jie bing 民皆兵). The principle of equality was that of “no class difference,” and as such, it pointed to the reality that all men were citizens. The Military Service Law embodied “political equality”: “[because] the people legally enjoy the exact same rights, the Military Service Law makes clear at the outset in its first stipulation that all males of the Chinese Republic have a duty to serve as soldiers.” The principle of evenness applied to the burden of service levied on communities. (The Chinese word pingjun means the numerical “average” or “mean”.) The regime pledged that the quotas would be distributed on the basis of population, with the burden being distributed evenly across the country so that no region, province, locality, or community would be required to sacrifice more than its fair share of men. And finally, the principle of equity referred to the impartial application of the military service regulations:

[Regulations would be followed] without favoritism. What is commonly called ‘equitable’ has the meaning of proper or fair. . . . The impartial spirit of the Military Service Law is [seen in] the handling of conscription, relying on fair and proper actions to manage [the draft]. According to the stipulations of the Military Service Law, those

---

160. See Gaoqin divisional district 1938 work report: qz0041.mj1-33, pp. 2a-13a dated 30 January 1939, pp. 12a-b. I have yet to find a clear official order making “contributions for exemptions” policy, nor a clear statement of which areas were using it and for how long. The only indication that it may have, in fact, been more officially sanctioned comes from the 1939 report by the Sichuan-Xikang Reconstruction Inspection tour, conducted by the People’s Political Council. The inspectors’ report for eastern Sichuan notes that the “money for exemptions” was not used often and thus generating very little funding: in Hechuan only nine men, in Wanxian, only three, and in Fuling only one man bought their way out of service; Guomin canzhenghui Chuan-Kang jianshe shichatuan, ed., Guomin canzhenghui Chuan Kang jianshe shichatuan baogaoshu, p. 56. Despite this report, I suspect the “exemptions for contributions” was not widely implemented as a policy in Sichuan or Guangxi, but limited to informal practice in some areas. It is possible that it was, and remained, a widespread popular justification for illegally buying of substitutes, though it is not invoked in this manner in the local cases I have studied. In 1938 and 1939 the training of cadres and local baojia was still just getting off the ground. With an incomplete conscription district system, and lacking standardized training for draft cadres, many local communities were left to flounder on their own with little guidance, until the system began to be standardized under central auspices. The issue is, however, far from clear, as the central and provincial draft administrations continued pumping out orders to follow the standard procedures.

161. Zhu’s article, “Bingyi zhidu zhi san ping yuanze” (The Three Equality Principles of the Military Service System), was published originally in Junshi yu zhengzhi, 2:6 (31 May 1942), Chongqing, but can be found more readily collected in YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 351-60.
who should avoid service are given exemptions; those who should be allowed to delay service, are allowed a postponement; those who should have their service ended, have their service ended, making there no unfairness and leaving the people nothing to resent.\textsuperscript{162}

The Nationalist government made a conscientious effort to publicize conscription, including a whole range of publicity activities to inform the public of the draft regulations, as well as drum up support for the war effort in general. Drama troupes went out from cities into the countryside, putting on plays that were designed to whip up anger at Japan and support for the Nationalist armies.\textsuperscript{163} County governments set up committees to organize mass meetings and campaigns to educate residents about conscription. Catchy slogans were cooked up and painted on walls. Reversing the popular anti-soldier saying, a common service slogan was “Good iron is used to make nails; good men make good soldiers!” Others sought to link soldiering to family values: “Good sons hurry to enlist!” “Those who send their sons to enlist are good fathers and mothers!” Or to the misty heroism of the imperial past: “Since ancient times, national heroes have all made their appearance as soldiers!” Posters were printed and pasted up. Artists produced an avalanche of cartoons that portrayed military service in a positive, glorious light or portrayed the violence of the Japanese as vividly as possible. (For examples of such cartoons, see Figures 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4.) Newspapers ran advertisements for the conscription administration to bring the message to their literate readers. Counties were ordered to throw send off celebrations when batches of draftees were dispatched to conscription districts, though these were less and less frequent as the war went on. Holidays and anniversaries of important national dates, such as 18 September (the anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931), were occasions for meetings, rallies, speeches, and performances that showcased military service and emphasized the duty to serve.\textsuperscript{164}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{162} YZSL, vol. 1, p. 356. The eastern Sichuan section of People’s Political Council Sichuan-Xikang inspection tour reported, succinctly, that “none of the Three Equalities are in evidence” in the counties they studied; Guomin canzhenghui Chuan Kang jianshe shichatuan baogaoshu, p. 55.
  \item \textsuperscript{163} KRZZ, vol. 3.1, p. 290-304.
  \item \textsuperscript{164} Some materials from the Dazu county propaganda committee that demonstrate some of these features can be found at: qz0055.mj3-246, pp. 54/1b - 54/9, dated 28 September 1938. Other archival sources relating to conscription propaganda include: Yongchuan propaganda committee conference minutes, qz0055.mj3-246, pp. 49a-51b dated 7 October 1938; question-answer dialogue propaganda methods, qz0055.mj3-245, pp. 72a-b dated 29 March 1943 (rec’d); the Guanzhong DD report on send-offs, which were supposed to raise the troops and their families’ “self-confidence, self-respect, sense of glory, patriotism, and hatred of the enemy”; qz0041.mj1-8, pp. 2a-8a, 11b-2a, and 24a-b, n.d., but internal dating is Feb 1939; and a massive poster put out by the Yuyou DD for the 18 September anniversary, qz0053.mj11-34, pp. 40a-b 1938. Conscription slogans can be found in the Bingyi biaoyu huiji (Collected Military Service Slogans), Chongqing, 1942. Newspapers even took the initiative and approached conscription agencies requesting that the agencies take out advertisements in their pages; see the letter from the Shishi Xinbao (時事新報) advertising section to the (Sichuan) PD Student Winter Vacation Military Service Propaganda Committee touting the effectiveness of newspaper advertising for getting the message out; qz0041.mj1-5, pp. 35-6 dated 27 January 1939. For a book-length treatment of some of the issues surrounding wartime propaganda under both the Nationalists and communists, see Chang Hung-tai’s War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937-1945, University of California Press, 1994. Chang’s overall point is that the
\end{itemize}
The role of students in conscription propaganda is of particular interest, in part because of the later Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement. Literate and experienced in activities such as putting on plays and group singing, students were looked on as a ready propaganda tool. Schools organized student troupes to do draft propaganda during vacation periods. This prominent role for students was a consistent feature of military service publicity campaigns. Students were officially exempt from the draft, and, as valuable human assets, most could expect to find positions in government or industry that would extend that exemption after graduation. Those who orchestrated conscription publicity seem not to have realized the irony of using those who were exempt from front-line service as the mouthpiece for the state, reminding the common people of their “duty” to serve.

War was a critical moment in the spread of urban popular culture, particularly cartoons, spoken drama, and newspapers, from modern urban centers into rural villages. Patriotic intellectuals adopted these forms to carry the message of resistance to the interior population. It was effective, though in Chang’s analysis the KMT was limited to a “patriotic” rubric, while the communists went further and established a genuinely “new people’s culture.”

165. YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 150-2, which is a Junzhengbu directive from April 1938 on promoting military service. In fact, in 1938, students and teachers were used to provide stop-gap training for local officials in the laws and regulations of conscription; qz0055.mj3-267, pp. 12a-b dated 21 January 1938 (rec’d).

166. An emphasis among planning circles was the call for KMT party members and government employees to be “role models,” by either joining up or encouraging their sons or brothers to enlist. This too must have been laughable for vast segments of the population, as these groups
did their utmost to ensure that family members were kept out of the draft. For just one example, see the call from the central government to party and government workers to encourage their sons and brothers to serve: YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 356–67, dated 25 February 1939.
Grand political concepts of equality did not translate very well into practice on the ground, a fact which was obvious to all. Indeed, all the propaganda and publicity efforts only
made the situation worse: by publicizing the high-minded principles so widely, the regime actually raised expectations among the people, which of course only deepened their disaffection and disillusionment when the reality turned out to be so far from the ideal. Nationalist authorities, including Chiang, were keenly aware that the blatant buying of substitutes was undermining the image of equality in service that they were trying to project. This was one of the fundamental ways in which the draft failed to be a training ground for citizenship, and became instead a bitter irony, a lesson in political alienation.

The failure of the regime to live up to its promises to care for the families and dependents of soldiers was yet another hard lesson in disappointment. I have refrained from wandering into the financial intricacies of the dependents support system, however the secondary literature, anecdotal recollections, and scattered archival reports paint a clear picture of a chronic lack of funds, habitual maladministration and rampant corruption. Few families received the meager amounts of monetary or food support to which they were entitled. Counties set up Dependents Benefits Committees which were supposed to oversee the disbursement of funds to soldiers’ families. But often the committees were ineffectual or existed only on paper; many families never saw any of the promised aid. As the men serving in the army grew, the number of dependents and family members ballooned. Beginning in 1942 aid to dependents of servicemen was expanded to providing work for them in government-run co-ops and small scale, primarily handicraft, factories. Dai Gaoxiang, for one, hoped that this program would turn soldiers’ precarious families into a productive force and care for them at the same time. Co-ops and handicraft factories were both elements of the expanded social welfare role of the Nationalist state during the war, which was tied to the desire to mobilize every last ounce of manpower in productive roles that furthered the war effort. There were attempts to reform and fund the aid and benefit system more generously. Hu Ciwei (胡次威), Sichuan Civil Affairs Department head, was one of the earliest to advocate using counties’ grain stores to fund benefits for soldiers’ families, but benefits for servicemen and their families remained ad hoc and dependent on the good will of provincial officials.

Finally, in 1944-45, the central government put pressure on Sichuan, which responded with a massive infusion of money into the dependent support fund. Despite

---

167. In 1941, an inspector with the Sichuan Soldiers’ Dependents Management Committee concluded that the counties’ grain stores that were to fund aid for servicemen’s families were “mostly just numbers and not real;” qz0055.mj3-276, pp. 173-4 dated September 1941.

168. Dai Gaoxiang, Gaoxiang wencun, p. 3 and 64; Duan Yu, Kangzhan shiqi de Sichuan, pp. 27-8; Zhou Kaiqing, Sichuan dui Ri kangzhan, pp. 244-5; GMWX, vol. 96, p. 194-6; and Xu Naili, “Hao nan yingdang bing,” p. 9.

169. See Dai’s forward to Bingyi yuekan, no. 5 (March 1942), but in his postwar memoirs he admitted that results had been extremely meager; Gaoxiang wencun, p. 64. For a list of these factories, including the number of workers and capitalization, and a short description of some of the more important ones, see Sichuan Shengzhi: Minzheng zhi, 1996, pp. 334-6.

170. On the expanded social relief during the war and its intimate connection with war mobilization, see Landdeck, “Rhetorics of Relief,” unpublished paper, passim.

171. YZSL, vol. 1, p. 479, originally published in Sichuan wenxian yuekan, combined issues 11 and 12, 1 July 1963.

172. The total was close to 1 billion yuan, fully three-fifths of the provincial budget. Some sources claim this fund was on the order of one hundred million US dollars, but that figure is arrived at by
this last ditch reform effort, the overwhelming experience for soldiers’ families was one of disappointment and disillusionment.\footnote{173}{The Nationalists were not alone in this neglect of soldiers and their families; see Neil Diamant \textit{Between Martyrdom and Mischief: The Political and Social Predicament of CCP War Widows and Veterans}, 1949-66.}

Underneath the rhetoric of glorious duty, everyone knew that the reality of conscripted military service was harsh; heightening the dissonance between propaganda and reality, the draft system displayed clear penal overtones. As with He Yingqin’s 1928 plan, immediate and forcible induction was prescribed for various offenses. For example, the punishment for not complying with the military ID requirements was immediately enlistment.\footnote{174}{\texttt{qz0055.mj3-263}, pp. 44a-b dated February 1942.}\footnote{175}{Xu Wancheng, \textit{Kangzhan banian Chongqing huaxu}, p. 67.}

More obviously, the columns of men tied up and marched off, just like convicts or prisoners of war, were a persuasive statement that was difficult to erase with any amount of songs or cartoons.

One postwar rumor collector jotted down a story that must have been repeated hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of times. The author met a man from Neijiang who had been press-ganged into service. Sent to a reserve detachment, the man recalled that every day the routine was just

\begin{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item sing songs and eat (but not enough to be full).
\item We sang the “Big Knife” (\textit{Dadao 大刀}) song and the party anthem.
\item We ate (but not enough to be full) and sang, sang and ate (but not enough to be full), and did nothing else. Not even drills.
\item Every month our pay was 43.8 \textit{yuan}. At night we slept on the ground, covering ourselves with rice straw to keep warm.
\item Life was vile. After two months both my eyes and feet were swollen; sick men in our unit died. Our commander didn’t want us and kicked us out of the unit. . . .
\item The clothes on my back were worn out and I had no money for traveling expenses. I husked grain and begged, walking all the way from Kunming to Neijiang in Sichuan. I even pulled a rickshaw for a while to make ends meet. Rickshaw pulling paid better than soldiering and I had enough to eat.
\end{itemize}
\end{quote}

This was hardly an isolated impression. Feng Yuxiang wrote a scathing indictment of conscription in December 1944 after a trip through Longchang county. Feng was outraged at the daily sight of columns of conscripts being marched to the front wearing only the flimsiest of summer uniforms. While the officers were warm in their thick wool clothes and leather boots, the conscripts were walking barefoot through puddles and mud. Drenched and shivering from the cold winter rains, they were bound for serious illness. “Everyone seeing this considers it just like new nobility escorting convicts. How can this sort of behavior secure soldiers’ hearts? How can [they] do battle?” He went on to make his trademark call for mobilizing social energies (gentry and merchants, this time) to raise funds to provide every man with a padded uniform or

---

converting based on a laughably low exchange rate. (See, for example, Xu Naili, “Hao nan yingdang bing,” p. 9.) By December 1944 the effective (black market) exchange rate was 600 to 1, and in April 1945 it had climbed to 800 to 1; Mark Tennien, \textit{Chungking Listening Post}, p. 135. In fact, a major source of the Nationalist government’s foreign aid came in the form of requiring the US to pay for goods and services in China at the official exchange rate of 20:1 set in 1941, instead of the real (black market) rate. The Nationalist government pocketed the difference, of course.
vest (*beixin* 背心). From his experience conducting fundraising drives in rear areas, Feng was confident people would contribute money for this cause, but he was angry and skeptical at the cold indifference shown by people toward the conscripts as they were marched through on their way to the front. Local officials should treat conscripts as if they are sons and brothers, by preparing warm, comfortable housing and feeding them well. “Instead, people along the road still view the country’s heroes and champions as beggars. Those stalwarts who unselfishly give [xian 献] their bodies for the people are considered to be lower class men whose sufferings are unimportant. Such unfeeling hearts!”

Traipsing across the landscape of Sichuan, conscripts were a visual symbol of the realities of military service: they were abandoned by their government, mistreated by their officers, and forgotten by their communities. To the vast majority of farmers in the interior – not to mention the conscripts themselves – the government’s statement that “the able-bodied men chosen in the draft are the first to have the wonderfully glorious opportunity to repay the nation” could only have seemed incredibly, bitterly perverse.

Bitter Disappointment and Late War Reforms

Chiang felt keenly the political black eye that the failings of the MSO gave his government. Indeed, whatever other blind spots he had, Chiang demonstrated a concern for enlisted men throughout his career. By 1942, Chiang’s patience was wearing thin, as it was fed by articles on draft evasion and desertion that appeared in the army’s own *Military Service Monthly* (*Bingyi yuekan* 兵役月刊), acknowledging a whole range of problems, from cultural biases among the people, to unwise administration and problems within the military, inadequate food and other provisions, as well as mistreatment of soldiers by officers. Much of Chiang’s anger was directed at the MSO’s leader, Cheng Zerun.

The fourth National Military Service Conference, held in Chongqing in early October 1942, laid the foundation for a new Military Service Law (1943), which added numerous provisions to clarify ambiguities and close loopholes in the old law. The opening speech was delivered by Chiang, who gave a particularly brutal assessment of the MSO’s faults to the more than five hundred attendees, which included top MSO officials, commanders and staff officers from the conscription districts, draft cadre training classes, as well as ministry-level government offi-

---

176. Sichuan Provincial Government to the 3AD, forwarding Feng’s letter to the Ministry of Conscription, qz0055.mj3-245, pp. 218-19b dated 13 December 1944 (rec’d).

177. The quote is from Cheng Zerun’s speech in *Bingyi yuekan* (BYYK), no. 5 (March 1942), p. 5.

178. In 1925, he was “enraged by the corruption and sadism of ‘most military officers,’ as he saw it, and tried to put a stop to the more sadistic practices. But his efforts were largely wasted. In November 1925, Chiang noted that in spite of his instruction, officers were still siphoning off pay intended for their men, ‘stuffing soldiers’ mouths with shit, dealing out brutal lashings and cursing them mercilessly. One finds, even more often, that they could not care whether their men are starving or freezing.” To solve this problem, on the eve of the Northern Expedition Chiang instituted on the spot shootings of officers whose men deserted during the Northen Expedition – a drastic but effective rule; Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, p. 293.

179. *Bingyi yuekan*, 4:6 (June 1942), pp. 15-22. The journal ran numerous articles on how to combat desertion, draft evasion and other problems in military service administration. For an example that tackles the problems faced by baojia heads in fulfilling conscription quotas, see 2:7-8 (September 1940), pp. 29-31.
cials. Stating that the MSO’s central task was “to improve the life of soldiers, properly handle exemptions and postponements, and fully implement the Three Equalities principles and the aid for dependents,” Chiang cataloged a laundry list of serious problems. The real impediment to accomplishing these fundamental tasks was, Chiang felt, the inability of conscription officials to follow the laws and regulations. If they knew and followed the regulations conscientiously, all would be well. They needed to realize that the regulations are not about filing proper paperwork, but about conscientiously fulfilling real responsibilities, leading subordinates, correcting problems, and completely eradicating the “kidnapping” of new soldiers. Chiang prescribed for each and every military service official, from the conscription chief to sub-county personnel, “line by line examination and research” into the laws on the books and whether each is being fulfilled.  

Everyone should know that presently our military service work is really worsening day by day. Deserting soldiers increase day after day. Buying substitutes has become an open secret, and conscription personnel see it as natural, and impossible to change. If that is the case, then what use is setting up conscription agencies and staff? Why promulgate military service regulations and issue orders? [We] can just tell county magistrates and baojia heads to grab men and force them [into service]. It’s no matter if they buy a substitute or not, no matter if they are physically healthy or not, [we] will just drive them in to fill the quotas. Wouldn’t that save effort?! So, our draft administration has now become this corrupt and [thus] our leaders at every level must carefully self-reflect! What, really, is the cause? Where is the crux of the problem? We must do self-criticism, but the most important point is that from the head of the MSO down to ground-level personnel in the counties, everyone must look at the current conscription situation and critically examine themselves through a line by line reading of the conscription laws, identifying which regulations have already been met and which have not. . . . The greatest reason [why conscription has failed to advance] is because we have not been able to follow the laws, regulations and orders. We can say that currently the methods used and the work done by leaders and cadres at all levels are completely at odds with the regulations. Some people don’t even read the regulations; everything is just temporary expedients, perfunctorily handled. . . . What I mean by ‘implementing’ [the regulations] is not sitting in our offices shuttling items from superiors down to subordinates and thinking that it’s all ‘okay.’ . . . [Instead, responsibility is] supervising subordinate staff, making sure they do their jobs according to the regulations. It is ceaselessly examining, ceaselessly investigating, to make sure that our staff workers never slack in their duties and that all the mistakes and abuses never happen. Only this is truly ‘implementing.’

His harangue gaining steam, Chiang condemned the acts of many draft officials as crimes that should be punished. Chiang again berated “the MSO head” yet again for failing to lead adequately by personally visiting the divisional districts, implying that the situation was Cheng’s fault. This sort of statement, which Chiang made on numerous occasions, struck at the heart of one of the conscription administration’s key myths: that its problems were due to the inadequa-

---

180. Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, pp. 125-46; the quotations are from pp. 136-8.

181. Chiang’s speech to the Fourth Conscription Conference, YZSL, vol. 2, pp. 538-50, the quotes are from pages 540-1, dated 6 October 1942.
cies of China’s rural society and its uneducated, unpatriotic, backward population. From one perspective, Chiang’s was a refreshingly frank assessment. Rather than find fault with society or “the people”, he put the blame on the conscription administration itself, beginning right at the top, with Cheng Zerun. While his speech did not mention Cheng by name, he publicly called out the “Office Chief” as culpable for a lack of understanding and conscientious application of the laws. Chiang’s was an unusual stance, as conscription authorities had a strong tendency to blame the failings of the draft on the “complexity” of rural social life, the secret societies such as the Robed Brotherhood (paogeohui 袍哥會), and the lack of “public spirit” or education among farmers.182

However, it is hard to know exactly what to make of Chiang’s insistence that lack of knowledge of the regulations was the key issue. On the one hand, of course, it was patently obvious that a lack of conscientious attention to the laws and regulations was at fault: many of the abuses were simple violations that were either born of ignorance or willful greed. And indeed the conference did address the issue of revising the regulations, which formed the groundwork for a new, more comprehensive Military Service Law passed just a few months later. On the other hand, Chiang’s unimaginative invocation of the regulations as the answer to the systemic abuses was nothing new at all. Confronted by problems or abuses, the standard response from the Junzhengbu and MSO on down was “follow the regulations,” a mantra that substituted for real problem-solving. Conscription officials consistently believed that more regulations, better regulations, more conscientious attention to the regulations, would miraculously fix the things that were broken in the draft system. With the benefit of hindsight, it is hard to see how more application of the porous regulations which failed to control the interface between the military administration and society would have solved anything. In fact, the sheer weight and complexity of the regulations was already a significant problem, contributing to confusion and thus, by extension, to the abuses as well. As the conscription apparatus grew during the war it took on a maze-like quality. At times of candor, even high administration officials acknowledged this fact; Cheng Zerun’s speech at the 1942 conscription conference admitted that “orders outstrip

---
182 This attitude continued among Nationalist draft officials even after 1949. Dai Gaoxiang in the early 1960s put forward an assessment of wartime conscription that is largely in accord with this view of the administrative adjustments. China’s huge population, he noted, should have meant a light conscription burden. But the “the spirit of upholding the law had not yet deeply entered people’s hearts” and thus they were still under the sway of popular views of soldiering being disreputable, the occupation of hoodlums. Additionally, Sichuan society was incredibly complex. The Elder Brother secret society (gelahui 哥老會) – usually known in the province as the Robed Brotherhood – was everywhere and local administration was in the hands of the powerful few. Thus, the lottery system was impossible to implement conscientiously. More trenchantly, Dai felt that, except for a few local notables who would do anything to escape service, the vast majority of Sichuan people were simple and honest and would have served without much trouble. The only condition for their acquiescence was that drafting a man should not throw his entire family into dire straits. This condition was harder and harder to meet after 1941, when every man taken was taking a household’s main provider. Unable to gain further acquiescence through informal standards or by appeals, officials increasingly resorted to press-gang methods. Yet, despite his acknowledgement that Sichuan society was “complex,” Dai left largely unexamined the mundane and quite open realities of rural society that torpedoed the lottery system, preventing it from ever approaching impartiality; Dai Gaoxiang; YZSL, pp. 481-2; originally published in Sichuan wenxian yuekan, combined issues 11 and 12, 1 July 1963.
facts.”  Perhaps officials – not to mention the lowly baojia heads – can be forgiven for not having a complete understanding of the maze of regulations.

For a year after enacting the new Military Service Law no significant changes were made, presumably to see if the tighter regulations would work; there was little improvement. In mid-1944, Japan unexpectedly mounted a massive attack, the Ichigo Offensive, to establish an interior north-south corridor and to knock out US airfields that were launching bombing raids on Japan. The Nationalist armies inability to mount any real resistance to the Ichigo Offensive in 1944 pained Chiang, not least because he was keenly aware of Ichigo’s damage to China’s standing with its allies: “Our nation’s status and reputation of our army, especially that of our high-ranking officers, has already been swept into the dust. In the eyes of foreigners our army is already not even an army, our soldiers are not soldiers.” Right at this critical juncture – in the summer of 1944 – Chiang was summoned to see the mistreated conscripts in the back alley way-station. Already unnerved by the Japanese knife thrust into the soft underbelly of Nationalist territory and desperate to restore the Allies’ faith in him and China’s importance for the war, his anger at the man who had led the conscription administration for six years boiled over and he had Cheng Zerun arrested. The terrifying prospect of the Japanese offensive penetrating the Sichuan redoubt and China’s fallen international prestige pushed Chiang to undertake much more drastic reforms of the military and conscription. Part of Chiang’s motivation was to help restore international, particularly US, faith in him and make the allies re-realize that China still had an important role to play in the war.

As Chiang contemplated what to do with Cheng, he decided to initiate some important military changes. Beginning in July 1944, several conferences (one in July to assess the army’s performance in the Changsha campaign and another in the fall to examine the conscription system) led to a series of military and draft reforms. By November and December at Chiang’s insistence, the military began reductions in the number of ineffective units, a process which continued into 1945. The establishment of the ministry of conscription and renewed attention to the support of servicemen’s families were accompanied by other reforms designed to improve the lot of draftees: barracks and rest stations were finally constructed along major transportation routes between the rear area and the front; a system of hospitals and clinics were set up and staffed to care for conscripts before they reached their units; the US began air lifting US-trained troops to their

184. July 1944: Chiang’s speech at the July 1944 conference at Huangshan, Nan’an, in Chongqing; Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, p. 103. One-third of the 60,000 men Chiang sent to General Wedemeyer for training by US advisors were rejected for medical reasons, and fully two-thirds of the recruits for the US training program in India were rejected because of poor physical condition; Dick Wilson, When Tigers Fight, p. 244.
185. The army high command reduced and reorganized its administration; abolished two war area commands, one border area command, nine army group commands, nine army commands, and 19 divisional commands. In 1945 the reduction efforts would continue, reducing the military from 124 armies, with 354 divisions, and miscellaneous independent units, to 89 infantry armies, 2 cavalry armies, with a total of 253 divisions (a figure which included the nine Youth Army divisions); Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, pp. 103-7.
positions; and the number of levies in communities was set at one per year. By all accounts, these changes brought about a significant improvement in how troops were treated in 1945.\(^{186}\)

Despite these reforms, the ground-level problems in the draft itself remained. In fact, in the last year of the war, between November 1944 and September 1945, the ministry of conscription received a flood of more than 2,500 reported cases of abuse and illegal activities connected with conscription.\(^{187}\) Reforming how new soldiers were treated after induction did nothing to resolve the fact that the regime’s compulsory military service was ultimately dependent for its supply of bodies on the lowest level of administration, the *baojia* men, which was still entangled in local communities. The reforms failed to change the draft within communities simply because much of the problem lay below the reach of the MSO and the military authorities, in the rural villages and urban neighborhoods. It is to those ground-level issues of state-making that we turn now.


Chapter Three

Of Redoubts and Hotpot: Geography and State-Making in Prewar Sichuan

Introduction

The previous chapter argued that from a strictly war mobilization standpoint conscription was a strategic success, and yet Chiang was profoundly disappointed with its political failure. At the level presented in chapter two, this disappointment was rooted in the corruption of military procurement and the alienation that resulted from the obvious contradictions between the state’s high-minded principles and the realities of conscription. This perspective is illuminating, but it remains at a high level of abstraction and generalization. We still need an analysis of the nitty gritty of the draft “on the ground” in order to see up close the ways in which conscription remained entangled in messy social life of rural communities and the fluid and densely institutionalized life of cities: the conscription administration with all its tentacles and powers was held hostage, so to speak, by the social and intra-agency powers in local society. Thus, a geographical boundary informs this study.

To set up the ground level examination the draft in the following chapter, we will first look at the geography of Chongqing and its immediate hinterland, exploring the geography and recent socio-political history of the region. The materials for these two chapters are drawn from the city of Chongqing and the ten counties around it, which made up the Third Administrative District (hereafter 3AD) in Sichuan. This geographical restriction is partially for the sake of convenience (the materials are concentrated and easily accessible in the Chongqing Municipal Archives), but also a deliberate choice to look at the center of the Nationalist state’s power during the war. I make no claim of representativeness here. Chongqing and the 3AD were not “average.” This was the region of the greatest concentration and density of Nationalist institutions of power. As we have already seen (in Chapter Two), the result was that Sichuan in general bore the greatest burden – by far – of the war. This was true in terms of conscription, taxes, and corvée labor levies. There is no denying the exceptional place of Chongqing and its environs.1 However, this is precisely what makes the area suitable for this examination of wartime state-making: it was the “best case scenario,” officially a “model” city and conscription district. This is where the Nationalist state had its way most completely. Because of the strong administrative presence, the state’s capacity to extract and to quell discontent when it flared up was at its highest in this region. Consequently, demands and extractions here were generally higher than anywhere else and this engendered subtle yet determined resistance in communities

1. As a municipality (shi 市), Chongqing was first directly under the provincial government and then (May 1939) directly under the national Executive Yuan. It was thus not included in the 3AD, and yet its presence dominated the region. The Third Administrative District was caught in its gravitational pull. Rural communities were caught in the orbit of the city that stood at the heart of the 3AD: like a star at the center of a planetary accretion disk, Chongqing dominated the area.
and institutions. The problems and their persistence in this area, then, show most clearly the failure of conscription that ate so bitterly at Chiang’s stomach. We turn first to the physical and historical terrain of Chongqing and the counties around it.

The Strategic Setting: Sichuan Redoubt

On the second of March 1935 Chiang Kaishek flew from Hankou to Chongqing. It was his first visit to the province. Despite nominal allegiance to his government, Sichuan had remained stubbornly resistant to any central government interference in its internal affairs, affairs that for more than a decade had consisted mostly of a dreary succession of wars between shifting alliances of warlords, each jockeying for position in the province. Looking toward the inevitable clash with Japan, Chiang was determined to change that and establish the province as a base for his national government. His visit was to cement Sichuan’s position as a key strategic base area for the future war.

Sichuan’s attraction for and alienation from the Nationalist regime were both based on geography. That same geography was what made the province so important for Chiang’s preparation for war, because it meant Sichuan was “the most self-sufficient region of China”, “an empire within an empire.”

The province held out the promise of an immense tract of spectacularly productive land and a burgeoning population. At its heart was the huge agricultural powerhouse of the Sichuan Basin (including the Chengdu Plan), often called the “Red Basin” for its reddish soils. The basin is an enormous area (roughly 146,482 square km) bounded by high mountain ranges, crisscrossed by a myriad rivers and streams, dotted with moderate sized hills (most less than 100 meters higher than the surrounding land) and an overall downward slope from the edges toward the basin in the middle.

At the western side of the basin began Chengdu Plain, a flatter expanse of land – roughly 160 by 120 km (6,500 square km) – that was watered by the famous irrigation system (Dujiangyan 都江堰) engineered by Li Bing in the Qin era (221-201 BCE). The Chengdu Plain, the only genuinely flat land in the basin, is immensely fertile. Other areas, enjoying moderately rich soil, practice intensive hill terracing and fertilization. Everything grows in Sichuan. The basin enjoys short mild winters and hot, humid summers that allow some areas to have two, three or even four crops per year, and the rich soil thus yields enormous quantities of rice, wheat, beans, grains, melons, and fruits. Huge bamboo forests provide building materials; tung trees yield a huge quantity of tung oil. Mulberry groves and cotton supply the raw materials for weaving and spinning. Coaxed by diligent, back-breaking labor, the land gave up huge quantities of essential salt and provided coal to fuel factories and fire cooking stoves.

For good reason Sichuan had long been known as “Heaven’s

---

3. Ibid., p. 13. Geographers and others have debated the size and borders of the Sichuan Basin. This number is taken from Charles Hu’s dissertation, for its consistency and simplicity in taking the 700 meter contour line as the boundary for the Basin.
4. The province was also a significant producer of opium, which had long been tapped by warlords to sustain their regimes. Liu Wenhui, for example, controlled the New China Enterprise Company (新華事業公司), which had four steamers and monopolized the transportation of opium from Yibin to Chongqing. Liu Xiang, once entrenched in Chongqing, set up the Minsheng Enterprise Company (民生事業公司), which carried one-half of the 500 tons of opium shipped to Yichang each month; Slack, Opium, state, and society, pp. 21-2. After entry into the province, the Nationalists too would waste no time in inserting themselves into this lucrative industry and trade.
Storehouse” (tianfu zhi guo 天府之國). And on that abundantly productive land lived a population of some 50 million people in 1939 – a generous supply of bodies that could be put to use working in factories, tilling and harvesting the fields, building roads and airfields, and manning the front lines.

These magnificent riches are guarded by equally impressive natural defenses that were partly responsible for Sichuan’s unique position in China. Geographical barriers to the outside were the natural bedrock for Sichuan’s independence from the central government from 1927 to the mid-1930s. The province was ringed with formidable mountains that permitted only a handful of entry points. Only a few treacherous routes crossed the Daba mountains to connect Sichuan to the Wei valley and the north China plain (Shaanxi and Henan). Easy access to the southern provinces of Guizhou and Yunnan was restricted mainly to waterways, as mountains blocked the way. The same was true of east China: mountains stood between Sichuan and its eastern neighbors of Hubei and Hunan, a barrier pierced only by the treacherous Yangzi. As an added bonus, much of Sichuan’s basin is covered by low clouds or, in Chongqing’s case, dense fog during the winter – a natural feature that offered an important measure of protection from aerial attack. The ease of defending such a redoubt was without doubt one of the main attractions for Chiang: he could imagine holding out in Sichuan against almost impossible odds.5

The Wartime Capital Setting: Chongqing Hotpot

Wartime Chongqing was swollen with hordes of newly arrived refugees and exiles from occupied areas who crowded and jostled with the original residents. Outside the city on the river at Chaotianmen (朝天門), a “great roaring voice, continuous, unvarying, emanated from that human hive, thousands on thousands of voices blended into an enormous murmur.”6 But inside, on the streets, the indistinct buzz broke into unique voices speaking in a myriad of dialects, each with its distinct cadences, tones, and pronunciations: “a weird, happy cacophony of snarls, burrs, drawls, and staccatos.”7 It was a heady mixture that calls to mind the city’s signature food, Chongqing hotpot, a boiling broth of oil and blisteringly spicy red peppers into which is thrown ingredients of every variety imaginable that cook in the broth and are then plucked out – largely by luck of the draw, as chopsticks grab unseen items in the stew – and eaten. To push the metaphor further, one could suggest that the shared experience of national resistance and trauma delivered by the intensive Japanese bombings during the summers of 1939-41 were the red peppers and hot oil that “cooked” the city’s residents and sojourners into a “national stew.”8

If the province of Sichuan was Chiang’s wartime castle, its formidable mountains were

---

5. Sources on Sichuan geography include: Charles (Chiao-yu) Hu, “The Agricultural and Forestry Land-Use of Szechuan Basin,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago (1946); Hu Huanyong, Sichuan dili (1938); Guo Hanming and Meng Guangyu, Sichuan zudian wenti (1944); Isabella Bird, The Yangtze Valley and Beyond (1899); You Yunli, Sichuan (1941); and Sichuan sheng zhi: dili zhi (1996).

6. Han Suyin, Destination Chungking, p. 207.


8. I cannot recall encountering this metaphor before, but it possible that I have forgotten seeing it in a source or analysis, and retained it subconsciously. As an aside, the oil and red pepper mixture is far and away the most important ingredient in Chongqing hotpot as its flavor penetrates everything; the unique characteristics of each restaurant’s mixture is a hot topic whenever Chongqing people eat this addictive food.
the walls – and Chongqing was the drawbridge and gatekeeper. Set on the eastern edge of the Sichuan basin, it guarded access to the province’s interior on the only usable thoroughfare for an invader: the Yangzi. The city stands on a rocky promontory that juts out, carving a deep V into the water where the Yangzi and the Jialing rivers meet. During the war, a few privileged elites and foreigners flew in to nearby airfields, but the vast majority got their first glimpse of Chongqing from the water as they sailed up the Yangzi. Approached this way, Chongqing resembles the prow of a ship cleaving the two rivers apart: the muddy, brown-yellow Yangzi on the left and the blue-green Jialing on the right. Set on cliffs that run down both sides of the peninsula, Chongqing rises on hilly ground, up and away from the roiling water. In summer, the gray city stood out from the green hills and the water which surrounded it on three sides. In winter, the dense fog that habitually shrouded it lent a more otherworldly atmosphere as the city’s grayness blended into the fog. From a distance, it was a floating apparition: “Gray in the evening mists, Chungking is like the pointed prow of a ship, thrusting downstream between the Kialing and Yangtze Rivers. Tall buildings rise, tier on tier, above the cliffs. Smoke hovers over the city, dimming all detail, but the outline is etched with delicate precision, gray upon gray sky. Seen thus across the water, it seems insubstantial, floating in a haze, a mirage. Distance lends the illusion of silence. It is impossible to conceive of the din of packed multitudes rising in clamor above its faint gray towers. It is a shadow city, empty of all life. It is a city of our own imagination, silent above the gray waste of water and mist.”9 As one neared, the city solidified,

---


- 139 -
taking on an imposing aspect. Its cliff sides were covered in ranks of gray shacks and structures; with limited room for horizontal expansion, the city “had chosen to go skyward endlessly on streets of stairs.”\textsuperscript{10} From a distance, the overall scene evoked the battlements of a strong fortress – an impression no doubt strengthened by the circumstances of war which led so many to hope the city would prove to be a safe refuge from the Japanese.\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{steps_into_chongqing_from_the_docks.jpg}
\caption{Steps into Chongqing from the Docks}
\end{figure}


11. In the mid-1890s, on her extensive travels in Sichuan, Isabella Bird described the Chongqing’s exterior rather favorably: it was a “noble-looking grey city . . . with towers, pavilions, and temples rising above its massive, irregular, crenelated grey wall, with broad, steep, and crowded flights of stone stairs, twenty feet broad, leading up from the river to the gates, with an amphitheater of wooded and richly cultivated hills rising steeply 1600 feet from the water for its background”; Bird, \textit{The Yangtze Valley and Beyond}, p. 482.
On the either side the two rivers were thick with riverine traffic. Wooden junks of all sizes crowded the city’s wharves and docks. Small family-sized sampans, mat-roofed, slipped between and nestled up to the large, shallow draft, tall-masted cargo junks that carried the bulk of the trade on the river. Set off from the traditional craft and enjoying pride of place at the city’s docks were the more modern steamers, especially those operated by the local shipping magnate, Lu Zuofu (盧作夫), and his Minsheng Shipping Company. Disembarking at Chao-tianmen or one of the other busy wharves on the Yangzi side of the city, steep steps crawling with activity confronted new arrivals. With only a few scattered wells, the city’s water was hand-carried up these steps from the river by a small army of water-carriers, with their sloshing burdens hanging from sturdy shoulder poles. The oppressive summer sun would burn off the inevitable spillages, but in winter the steps – deeply worn from numberless footfalls – were slick with persistent moisture. Even in 1939 there was little motor transport into the city; it was all foot traffic: one’s own for most people, or a sedan chair for those wealthy enough to afford it. Passing through the city wall’s narrow gates, the way into the city continued to rise up the canted hill-sides on narrow lanes.

The Lower City consisted of the lowest sections of town, along the Yangzi River in particular, where the poorest residents lived. There, the hillsides were lined with rows of “hanging foot houses” (diaojiaolou 吊腳樓), ramshackle structures that hung off the hillside on stilts that braced them against gravity and the incline. Built of bamboo slats, scraps of lumber, and bamboo matting tied together, the tiers of shanties proliferated in crazy quilt fashion, with the stilts added as needed and in whatever position would balance the new constructions. Even seemingly more permanent structures were often so flimsy that a well-placed kick could punch
through walls. The roads in these lower neighborhoods were no more than alleyways linked by long flights of steps, and were so narrow that the sky was barely visible from the overhanging eaves. Even narrower side lanes split off, and ran laterally along ridges, to provide access to the row of diaojiaolou at that elevation. The Lower City was bewildering with its “labyrinthine catacombs.”12 The lack of space was so acute that the city spilled out onto the dry river bed during the winter months, and retreated back inside the city when the rivers swelled in summer.13

12. Lin Yutang, *The Vigil of a Nation*, p. 32.
13. When snows melt in the Tibetan highlands, the two rivers surge; rises of ninety feet are not uncommon.
As a “mountain city” (shancheng 山城), Chongqing’s extremely hilly terrain and ring of high mountains made modernization difficult and contributed to its stratification – geographical, social, and temporal. A high ridge that curved westward down the spine of the peninsula roughly marked off the Lower from the Upper City, where almost all the modernizing reforms during the late 1920s and war years were confined. The Upper City, at the top of the ridge and beyond, outside the Tongyuan Gate (通遠門), were modern concrete buildings, that included a new business district, theaters and wider motor roads that permitted wheeled traffic. This modern enclave enjoyed amenities and infrastructure that were initially put in place by local commercial and political elites, under the sponsorship of the warlord Liu Xiang: the first rickshaws arrived in 1927, public telephones added in 1931, a water system was begun in 1932, and twenty-four hour electricity became available only in 1935. A moderate program of street widening created a small network of motor roads that permitted wheeled traffic, even some buses. Ironically the Japanese bombings would make this process of road building easier by demolishing huge portions of the city. Still, throughout the war, the city’s modernization was extremely uneven and refugees from the coast often complained: “Chongqing’s phones don’t ring; the streetlights don’t shine; and the roads aren’t level.” A popular mantra for expressing frustration with the city’s conditions was that its backwardness “hurts the brain.”

The coarse American adage “shit rolls downhill” was quite literally true in Chongqing. The steep, rocky foundation of the city prevented the extension of underground (modern) plumbing to much of the city, with the result that waste ran down the steep hillside gutters and into the lower class neighborhoods. Baked by the summer sun and heat, it collected in noxious piles during the dry months. Combined with regular refuse, the accumulated filth washed down the hillsides, a black torrent of sludge that slid down in gutters and over steps to the rivers when the torrential rains of winter finally arrived. The sanitary conditions were so poor that a vigorous

14. Xu Wancheng, *Kangzhan banian Chongqing huaxu*, p. 34.

15. This description of Chongqing’s geography, physical appearance, and basic infrastructure is drawn from a large number of sources, textual, cartographic, and photographic. Some of these are: Huang Jiren, *Lao Chongqing* (1999); Isabella Bird, *The Yangtze Valley and Beyond* (1899); White and Jacoby, *Thunder out of China*, (1975); Lee McIsaac, “The City as Nation” (1999); Mark Tennien, *Chungking Listening Post* (1945); Zhang Jin, *Quanli, chongtu yu biange* (2003); Basil Lewis, *Test Tubes and Dragon Scales* (1940); Zhou Yong, *Chongqing tongshi* vol. 1 and 2 (2002); Lin Yutang, *The Vigil of a Nation* (1944); Han Suyn, *Destination Chungking* (1953); Daniel Nelson, *Journey to Chungking* (1945); J. E. Spencer, “Changing Chungking: The Rebuilding of an Old Chinese City” (1939); Wu Jisheng *Xindu jianwenlu* (1940); and Lu Sihong, *Xin Chongqing* (1939).
market in renting and buying cats sprang up as people were desperate to thin out the city’s prodigious population of rats. Westerners and Chinese from eastern cities like Shanghai were convinced such conditions were responsible for the poor health of many Chongqing residents and for the periodic outbreaks of dysentery. But the adage was true in its usual, metaphoric sense as well: a flood of orders and regulations cascaded down the city’s government offices. A huge number of central civilian and military institutions took up offices in and around the city and overlaid the usual municipal bodies. The situation was summed up in a popular and playful rhyming street ditty of the kind that Chinese is famous for: “The high executives scold the mid-level officials. The mid-level officials scold the minor functionaries. The minor functionaries scold their orderlies. The orderlies return [home] and scold their wives. The wives scold their kids. The kids beat puppies and kittens. The puppies and kittens just howl.”

A similar meaning, though with an important twist, was captured in the story of a bao head who hung a sign in his office that read “Hall of the Final Request” (yangzhi tang 仰止堂), because each time an order was sent down from the county government the final phrase was “Request [order] that it be handled immediately” (yangji zunzhao banli 仰即遵照辦理) in order to devolve responsibility for the order by shunting it (completely unchanged) to the next lower office, the township. The township then passed on the order word for word, including the same final phrase, on to the village, who passed it on to the lianbao office. The lianbao head, just as afraid of responsibility as the higher ups, could only pass it on to the bao head, again with the same phrase. But the bao head had no one else to pass it on to, so the line of “requests” (really, orders) ended with him. Linguistically, the pun rests on the fact that yang (仰) literally means “to look up”, as well as “request,” thus, the sign literally reads, “The hall where looking up ends”: the bao had no one below him to look up at him (i.e., receive his request/order): the people are simply absent – the orders end with him and are not passed on to anyone else. The story – likely apocryphal – points to what city residents instinctually understood: the wartime proliferation of government offices meant that officials were at times just passing paperwork among themselves and not accomplishing anything beyond pushing papers across their desks.

The massive influx of government, education, and private institutions during the war fundamentally altered the social and political landscape in the city. Many of the changes were, of course, temporary, lasting only until the outsiders abandoned the city when Chiang’s government moved back to Nanjing in 1946. During the second half of 1938, while the battle for Wuhan was playing out as the prelude to the government’s move to Chongqing, the central government took control of the municipal government in Chongqing. In late July, Jiang Zhide

16. Xu Wancheng, Kangzhan bahan Chongqing huaxu, p. 36.
17. Ibid., p. 8.
18. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
19. This dense clustering of governmental agencies were staffed mainly by “downriver people” (xiajiangren 下江人) from other provinces who looked down on Chongqing’s native residents, both socially and in terms of their connections to the institutions of power. The war exacerbated the tension between the “downriver people” and native Chongqing residents, but it was not an entirely new dynamic. Zhang Jin in her study of Chongqing’s prewar modernization under the warlord, Liu Xiang, has ably analyzed the tensions and fractures between, on the one hand, outsiders and the model of modernity offered by Shanghai and, on the other hand, local Sichuan men such as Lu Zuofu and a domestic (Sichuanese) model of modernity; Zhang Jin, Quanli, chongtu yu biange, p. 20.
(蔣志澄), a KMT man from Zhejiang who had graduated from Beijing and Berlin Universities, took up duties as mayor. The reorganization of the city government began at once, with the essential bureaus and positions being staffed almost entirely with downriver men appointed by the KMT. Agencies were reshuffled, and non-Sichuanese were appointed to lead every important municipal agency. By October 1939, a mere 446 of the 1,038 employees in the city government were from Sichuan, and most of these were in the Police Bureau (310 out of 623 employees) and Treasury Bureau (80 more Sichuan men). Despite the fact that the local power holders had effected important modernizations during the years preceding the arrival of the Nationalists, they were shunted into advisory positions. Local elites were shut out mostly and given ineffectual positions in the Temporary Assembly (linshi canyihui 靈時參議會), led by Kang Xinru, though the non-Sichuanese mayor met with the Assembly and its members regularly, showing that it held a degree of informal power. From 1939, the municipal government was firmly in Chiang’s grasp.

The arrival of the central government after the fall of Wuhan took this process of central domination to a whole new level. The Chongqing municipality was made directly subordinate to the Executive Yuan on 5 May 1939 and on 6 September 1940 it was designated as the Temporary Capital. Agencies and staff from all over China flooded into the city. Refugees in the hundreds of thousands followed in their wake. From all over occupied China, students, teachers, professors, professionals, businessmen, workers, children, and everyday farmers inundated the city. In 1936, the city’s population was roughly 330,000 people. By 1945 it had swollen to 1.25 million, nearly a threefold increase.

Under the pressure of the burgeoning population and the need to find space for both the industries of war and the government’s administration buildings, the city expanded far beyond its ancient walled core. To the north, along the Jialing River in Jiangbei was an industrial area. Southwards, across the Yangzi, was Nan’an, filled with residences and more industry. East, across the Yangzi, were docks and warehouses. West in Shapingba (沙坪壩) and Ciqikou (磁器口), schools and cultural organs concentrated. Chiang and many top-level officials in the military and civilian government had villas and private air raid shelters across the Yangzi, high in the wooden hills of Nanshan, where they were safer and enjoyed magnificent views of the city when the fog permitted.

20. The new staff began work in early January 1939; “Sichuanese accounted for less than half of the officials in the new municipal administration, which was structurally and numerically dominated by refugees from central and eastern China;” Lee McIsaac, “The City as Nation,” p. 182.
22. Zhou Yong, Xinan kangzhan shi, p.5 and Duan Yu, Kangzhan shiqi de Sichuan, p. 76. Almost every source provides a different set of numbers reflecting the fact that even the city’s own census was not reliable. White and Jacoby, for example, say that the city’s population of 200,000 doubled in a matter of months and by mid-1939, nearly a million people in the city; White and Jacoby, Thunder out of China, p. 8. The city’s police bureau official census reported 473,904 residents in 1937, which largely reflected a change in area canvassed that began in 1936, when the numbers jumped by 90,000 due to including areas north, across the Jialing River, and south, across the Yangzi; Liu Shihong, Xin Chongqing, p. 36. J. E. Spencer, who worked for the Inspectorate of Salt Revenue, reported that according to the mayor’s office, the official city census had counted 477,395 residents in 1937; “Changing Chungking,” p. 60.
As Lee McIsaac has reconstructed it, the city’s diversity and the shared wartime experience had an important role in bolstering the Nationalist regime’s wartime legitimacy. Instead of building a typical capital city with its monuments and modern trappings of industry and political power, Chiang’s government constructed a symbolic Chongqing identity. As a wartime capital, it had to be temporary or the regime would forfeit its claim to national legitimacy over occupied territories. But, more importantly, the city’s significance as a symbol of national resistance rested ultimately on the dichotomy between the outsider “downriver people” (xiajiangren 下江人), which became shorthand for non-locals) and Sichuanese “natives” (bendiren 本地人). The downriver people were consistently cast as urban, urbane, modern, technologically advanced, and learned. The Sichuan locals were lower class, rural, benighted, poor, and backward. Together the two were typological embodiments of the Chinese nation itself. And the city’s stratification, geographical and institutional, thus encoded a vision of the nation in which the two halves were united against the Japanese – under the firm hand of Nationalist leadership. While I agree that such cynical symbolic maneuvers were part of the Nationalist political arsenal, my problem with McIsaac’s analysis is that it underemphasizes (to the point of eliding) the real practical issues of the war itself.

The expansion of governmental authority and legitimacy and the infiltration of its administrative sinews into previously off-limits areas was a necessity for dealing with the exigencies of the war. As just one, albeit very important, example: the government undertook a whole gamut of important measures to deal with relentless Japanese bombing during 1939-41. While shielded during the winter months by a shroud of dense fog, Chongqing was a wooden city. When the Japanese began their large-scale bombing of the city in May 1939, the result was predictable enough: massive conflagrations engulfed the city. After a trial sortie the previous day, on 4 May 1939 a line of Japanese bombers flew in tight formation, wing to wing, toward Chongqing. Untouched by the city’s antiquated AA guns, they dropped their payload on the city to devastating effect. More than 4,400 died and a further 3,100 were wounded. One Chinese witness climbed to a high vantage point and watched the city burn:

It was a scene of appalling beauty. Fire streamed up in long pennons and banners, bending a little in the slight draft of night breeze. Flames whipped from their roots, soaring into the whirling columns of smoke like flapping wings. . . . [Toward Linjiangmen 臨江門] a lake of fire, its troubled surface flinging up a fiery surf. On the Yangtze side, farther away, from a gasoline depot shot up leaping bright yellow flames, higher than the hills across the river. In every direction fires. We could hear the dull, distant roar. The air smelled of smoke; cinders and ash rained upon us. . . . even while I was gazing down on the sea of fire, hundreds had been burning to death, their cries drowned in the roar of the fire.

The bombings continued regularly from May through September, often occurring daily and sometimes twice daily. During the worst of the raids, it was said that the Jialing River ran black with the blood of the dead.

26. Xu Wancheng, Kangzhan banian Chongqing huaxu, p. 62. Han Suyin’s multiple descriptions of the
The bombings began again the following two years, as soon as the winter fogs dispersed, though nighttime raids were more common in some years. By 1942, the Flying Tigers under Chennault had brought respite, but Chongqing was one of the most heavily bombed cities in the world. The bombing was so intense that unexploded bombs are still being found today.\(^{27}\) The Nationalist government quickly set up a warning system with thousands of two-man observation teams that kept Japanese airfields and flyways under observation. In the city itself, a red balloon hoisted on a tall pole meant bombers were in the air; two balloons meant that they had been sighted inside Sichuan and that it was time to take shelter. (At night, red lamps substituted for the red balloons.) The government excavated a whole system of air raid shelters, dug into the rocky peninsula itself. To be sure, the caves were far from luxurious – except for the highest officials and elites, who enjoyed facilities that were much better equipped. Mismanagement, over-crowding, and a mishap with installing ventilation fans at one shelter contributed to a

27. In 2006-7, while I was in Chongqing doing my archival research, unexploded bombs were found and made the local TV news on at least two occasions.
tragedy in which nearly a thousand people died of suffocation and trampling. Still, the bomb shelters provided safety for hundreds of thousands of Chongqing’s residents. The government too was behind the rapid rebuilding that occurred, sometimes on a daily basis, after each raid. In one sense, the devastation was an opportunity: many streets were widened easily simply because the Japanese bombers had done the demolition job and the municipal government just reclaimed the land to make modern, wider roads. But, generally, the destruction required intensive efforts to reconstruct the city and restore services. This was the “daily grind” of government and bureaucracy in the city. Again, and again, and again:

Everything is organized. Shell holes in the street are filled up within an hour. Rescue squads are at work amid the wreckage of demolition bombs, taking out the dead and injured . . . Blue-overalled electric repair men clear the tangle of wires, erect poles again. People return to their homes. . . . Shops reopen. Motorcars return. . . . Up on the poles, silhouetted against the amethyst evening sky, electricians work feverishly, twisting and splicing the wires, cutting out the bombed areas, connecting up the circuit. And suddenly the miracle happens – all the lights of the city go on together. ‘Ah-h-h!’ from the crowds.  

It was war, in the modern sense of “total war.” The rear area was not spared. And once the euphoria of united resistance faded, there was little time for the niceties of continuous consensus building – there was work, urgent work, to be done. This was the “routine of endurance,” and it was bureaucratized, authoritarian, grumbling, petty, joyless, and grim. Like service in the Nationalist army, it was not a triumphant experience, but merely continuing to exist on the rocky peninsula was victory, albeit a drab and joyless one. 

Ba Jin’s novel, Ward Four, could be read as a metaphor for rear society. The protagonist, wounded and recovering in a hospital, remarked on the odd isolation from the front: “Few people in the ward ever asked about the war. It was like a different world in here, and even I didn’t care much about what was going on in the outside world.” And in some areas this was true. But it was far from the case in Chongqing and its environs, particularly in 1939 to 1942. There the war was part of the everyday experience, a fully realized collapsing of the line between military front and civilian rear that was the hallmark of modern warfare in World War Two. The bombings were part of this, of course, but the war touched everyone’s lives in many day to day ways, most notably the rising inflation that was a result of China’s international isolation and lack of foreign trade routes and the massive mobilization of manpower for labor and military service.

By 1943, the American Flying Tigers had extended a significant measure of protection to Chongqing’s skies. In 1944, Lin Yutang commented on the “air of placidity” on faces in the rear. “Life in Chungking, capital of a warring nation, was not all war. Free China alone is half a continent, and without daily bombings, the front seemed far away. The bad aspect was the business-as-usual attitude. But it is just this ability to carry on, war or no war, that gives one

29. The quoted phrase is Han Suyin’s.
31. Taking a peaceful, relaxing trip to visit relatives in western Sichuan, Han Suyin felt that Chengdu “was almost unaware of the war. . . . No one gave any thought to the war”; Destination Chungking, p. 235.
confidence that China can endure, and that morale will not break.”

The war years in Chongqing, then, were in large measure discontinuous with its prewar situation: the massive influx of institutions and refugees, the concentration of power in non-local hands, the extraordinary pressure of Japan’s aerial bombings combined to produce a disconnection from the city’s immediate past. It was an extraordinary moment. The countryside around the city, however, bore deeper traces of its recent past and that past’s uneasy truce with wartime exigencies.

The Rural Setting: The Third Administrative District

The rivers which embraced Chongqing on three sides were the keys to the whole area as they collected tributaries (and tributaries of their tributaries) which spread their fingers across the Sichuan landscape. The mighty Yangzi was known locally as “Sichuan’s River” (Chuanjiang 川江) or the “Big River.” Its seven major streams provide some 4,000 km of navigable waterways within Sichuan, while subsidiary branches add nearly 8,000 more. Sichuan boasts more than 90 navigable rivers, and almost all of them drain into the Yangzi at some point. The “Little River” – the Jialing – meets up with the Big River at Chongqing, and is the mightiest of the waterways that pay homage to the mighty Yangzi. But it too offers up rich fiefdoms of territory to the north.

As with the rest of the Sichuan Basin, the countryside around Chongqing was traced with rivers, which provided the transportation arteries for the rural economy. The ring of mountains that hemmed the city in rippled outward into the countryside as steep hills and mountains, cut with riverine valleys. The city itself was in Baxian (巴縣), a county that straddled the Yangzi, covering the city’s peninsula and its backland as well as the land across the Yangzi to the south and east. To the north, lay Jiangbei (江北), literally “north of the river”, an apt name since it sat directly across from Chongqing on the north banks of the Jialing (west) and Yangzi (east) rivers. South of Baxian was Qijiang (綦江), which was bisected by the Qi river and bordered on Guizhou province. To Qijiang’s west was Jianjinq (江津), a sprawling T-shaped county bounded by mountains on the south and southwest. The Yangzi ran through the northern area of Jianjinq (the crossbar of its T). Directly to the north was Yongchuan (永川) county. Its boundaries ran mostly along the spines of the mountains that divided it from its neighbors. With only one decent tributary to the Yangzi, its transportation was carried primarily on the east-west road that bisected the county and linked it to Chongqing (east) and to the salt fields at Zigong and eventually Chengdu (west and northwest). North of Yongchuan were three poor counties, Rongchang (榮昌), Dazu (大足), and Tongliang (銅梁), ranging from west to east. Less mountainous than the counties to the east, these three counties were linked with Hechuan (合川) to the northeast by a tributary that ran into the Jialing River. A spur of the Chongqing-Chengdu road ran off from Tongliang’s county seat to Dazu, in part to make the famous Tang dynasty buddhist carvings there more accessible. Directly to the east of Tongliang, interposed between it and Ba county, was the oblong, valley county of Bishan (璧山), entirely ringed with high mountains that shut it in. The Chongqing-Chengdu road entered and exited in the middle of the

32. Lin Yutang, The Vigil of a Nation, p. 35.
Map 3-1: Sichuan’s 3AD

Third Administrative District, Sichuan Province, 1930s-40s

source: Shen Peng, ed., Sichuan sheng disan xingzheng duchaqu xiangzheng gaikuang zongtongji tubiao, np. 1938. CQMA materials, governmental affairs (zhengwu 务) section, #212.
county, while a spur road connected it to Yongchuan in the south. To the north lay Hechuan (合川), a less mountainous area that was trisected by the Jialing river and two of its major tributaries. This ten county region, according to the report of inspectors sent out into Sichuan and Xikang provinces in 1939, covered 20,200 square kilometers in which lived a population of some 5.3 million. The major crops were rice, sorghum (gaoliang), beans and corn. Coal was the primary mining product, with lime and iron as secondary industries. Produced goods included silk thread, paper, tong and vegetable oil, and sorghum wine.  

This ring of ten counties, with its limited roads, numerous spines of mountains running north and south, and riverine veins was Chongqing’s immediate hinterland. Hechuan aside, it grouped itself into three sub-areas. Jiangbei and Baxian, situated along the banks of the two rivers, were the city and its “suburbs” in a manner of speaking. Qijiang and Jiangjin, to the south, were the major thoroughfares (riverine and road) for traffic heading to Guizhou province. And the five counties to the west of Chongqing (Yongchuan, Rongchang, Tongliang, Dazu, and Bishan) were saddled with a persistent bandit problem due to the mountainous terrain which afforded bandits excellent opportunities for inaccessible lairs and the stereotypical strategy of crossing jurisdictional boundaries to avoid local law enforcement.

In October 1932 several of these counties played host to a series of battles between two Sichuan warlords. These engagements would result in the penetration of the province by Chiang and the central government, and ultimately, the setting up of the Third Administrative District. The battles were the opening act of the Sichuan Pacification War (Anchuanzhan 安川戰) fought between the two heavyweight militarists in the province: Liu Wenhui (劉文輝) and Liu Xiang (劉湘). Although they were related (Liu Wenhui was Liu Xiang’s uncle), they were bitter rivals; the war would move the younger man into a dominant position in the province and pave the way for an uneasy partnership with Chiang and Nanjing. Liu Wenhui, with his base in the west and southwest of the province, enjoyed the prestige of being the provincial governor, a largely symbolic post as Sichuan had long been divided up into a group of nearly independent garrisons, each controlled by a separate warlord. For his part, Liu Xiang enjoyed the prize of occupying Chongqing, the commercial heart of Sichuan and the vital link to the wider domestic and international markets that supplied not only wealth but also the munitions and arms every warlord needed. Urged on by smaller warlords who hoped to gain an advantage while the two dominant powers were distracted by each other, the two went to war in 1932, though once it was clear that Liu Xiang would push his uncle out of the province, a coalition of many of these same smaller warlords would request that Chiang sack Liu Wenhui from his provincial post and install Liu Xiang as Pacification Commander for Sichuan and Xikang. This was the beginning of the end of Sichuan’s infamous garrison system (fangqu 防區), which had dominated the military,


35. These battles were also known as the Two Liu War (er Liu zhan 二劉戰), or the Uncle-Nephew War, (shuxi zhan 叔侄戰).

36. Zhou Kaiqing’s summary of the 1932-33 war, in Minguo Sichuan shishi xuji, pp. 199-213, which contains the complete text of several circular telegraphs issued by the various warlords and warlord coalitions. See also the analysis of Tajiri (田尻), the Japanese consul at Hankou, in a secret brief to his government on the Two-Liu War; “Sichuan dongluan gaiguan” (四川動亂概觀), translated by Yang Fan, in Minguo yilai Sichuan Dongluan shiliao huiji, Zhou Kangxie, ed., pp. 116-34.

- 151 -
political, and economic life of the province for the previous decade and a half at least.

There is no firm date marking the beginning of the garrison system, as the carving up of the province and formation of the garrisons as a system of governance was a process that began when the Yunnan armies entered Sichuan after the 1911 Revolution. At least one contemporary dated the real start of garrisons from 1916 with the independence of local militarists from the provincial government and the military governor, but a recent historian uses the term only to the post-1927 situation when the territories of the five or six major warlords were more or less stabilized. Disputes over the exact periodization aside, each garrison supported a warlord and his army, and was the territorial basis for tax collection. The garrison boundaries, however, were not based on geography or “natural” socio-economic areas, but reflected only the military situation, the balance of military power, at any given moment. Each garrison territory, then, provided a base of operations for the warlord’s troops and a financial base to be milked to finance his military machine. The result was a relentless rhythm of battles and wars between competing warlords and shifting alliances.

Another dismal result was an escalating burden of taxes and informal levies on farmers and economic activity in general. The militarists gobbled up the resources of the province by levying taxes for years (and often decades) into the future, by taxing a host of miscellaneous items and trade, and by setting up impressive numbers of duty stations for transporting various trade goods. Within the garrison areas “tax officials” were often retired officers in the warlord armies. Local elites were co-opted into the system as bureaucrats, experts, and advisors on “gentry councils” that were responsible for setting and levying the bewildering array of taxes. A popular aphorism in Sichuan was “Soldiers are a hairbrush, bandits a fine-toothed comb, but the warlords are just like a shaving razor!”

As Liu Wenhui’s defeat at the hands of his nephew was playing out, an incursion of a relatively small band of communists in the northeast of the province would touch off the dismantling of the garrison system, by bringing Chiang and the national government into the

37. Lu Pingdeng, p. 11. Other historians more or less concur with this periodization. Zhou Kaiqing marks the garrison system’s origin to 1918, when Xiong Kewu (熊克武) was installed as military governor and other militarists began ignoring provincial orders, preferring to collect and retain tax levies for their own use; Zhou Kaiqing, Minguo Sichuan shishi xuji, pp. 180-1. A recent Chinese historian follows suit, though he dates this change a few years later, in 1919-20; Duan Yu, Kangzhan shiqi de Sichuan, p. 4.

38. Kapp, Szechwan, p. 35.


40. Zhou Kaiqing uses Xindu county, and its gazetteer, as an example of the sort of financial depredations inflicted on the countryside by the fangqu administrations, which included assessing and collecting taxes years, sometimes even decades, ahead; Minguo Sichuan shishi xuji, pp. 179-82. See Lu Pingdeng, Sichuan nongcun jingji, pp. 492-8 for a shockingly long list of miscellaneous taxes levied by various counties. See also pp. 457-530 for Lu’s discussion and data on the tax burden of Sichuan farmers. Resources of all kinds were plundered, however. Copper, for example, was melted down at such an alarming rate that a copper buddhist statue in Chengdu’s Shaocheng Park was adorned with a sign: “Bodhisattva, please take care of yourself. Beware that tomorrow you may become copper coins!” Chen Shunong, “Sichuan fangquzhi de houguo,”, pp. 555-8; the quote is from p. 559.
province for good. The communist force, escaping from their smashed soviet in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui border area, was the Fourth Front Red Army, led by Xu Xiangqian (徐向前) and Zhang Guotao (張國燾); pursued by Nationalist forces, it entered Sichuan’s Daba mountains and occupied the Tongjiang (通江) county seat in late December 1932. The neighboring counties had been left almost undefended by the dominant warlord in the area, Tian Songyao (田頤堯), and the communists linked up with a nascent resistance movement born of Tian’s overtaxation of the area and formed a new soviet. Despite a series of successful socio-economic reforms and rapid rebuilding of their military strength, however, the Sichuan communist forces were not able to defeat the provincial powers or secure their safety and they were expelled from the province in April 1933, only to return just a few months later when Tian was again engaged in maneuvers in the south. This time the communists expanded further south, occupying all or part of fourteen counties and securing a cache of important military and economic supplies at Suining (綏定) in October. This finally got the full attention of all the provincial warlords, including Liu Xiang, as the communists were within striking distance of Wanxian (萬縣), a vital Yangzi port downriver of Chongqing, which would cut off all trade with the outside. Public opinion and the provincial warlords were rocked by an intense fear that Sichuan would become “a second Jiangxi” if the communists were able to settle in and establish a viable soviet in the province. Appointed Bandit Suppression Commander by Nanjing, Liu Xiang quickly united the other warlords to oppose the communists with a coordinated attack. Liu’s offensive failed, falling victim to bickering and the warlords’ natural tendency to protect and preserve their own forces at all costs, and the communists counterattacked. To make matters worse, the constant, large-scale fighting touched off a severe financial crisis for the province. In Chongqing, Liu Xiang had no money to pay the workers at the electrical plant and a strike ensued. Executions were carried out for those who refused the extra levies to fund the war and for anyone caught transporting money out of the province. The situation was out of control, and Liu Xiang knew it. The threat of a second communist incursion – the forces on the Long March, under Mao and Zhu De, that had been expelled from Jiangxi were moving toward Sichuan, threatening to head north into Sichuan from Guizhou to the southeast – was the final straw; Liu broke down and approached Chiang Kaishek for help from the central government in November 1934. He arrived in Nanjing on 20 November.

The Jiangxi communists were determined to find a way to link up with Xu Xiangqian and Zhang Guotao in northern Sichuan. Fearful of such a prospect, Chiang and the Sichuan militarists cooperated in a range of necessary measures to shore up the province’s political, economic and military resources. Liu Xiang, naturally, was tapped by Nanjing to head up the provincial government after he returned to Chongqing in December. To aid him, however, Chiang sent his field HQ’s staff corps (xingyingcanmoutuan 行營參謀團), led by He Guoguang, to the province. He arrived on 12 January 1935, less than two months before Chiang’s own


42. It was reportedly the first time Liu had ever left the province. The above account is based on Kapp, Szechwan, pp. 87-97; Zhou Kaiping, Sichuan yu dui Ri kangzhan, pp. 5-19; and the August 1933 report on the situation to the provincial KMT party branch in Zhou Kaqing, Minguo Sichuan shishi xuj. pp. 214-24.

43. The full institutional name was the National Government Military Affairs Committee’s Nanchang Field Headquarters Staff Corps (guominzhengfu junshi weiyuanhui Nanchang xingying canmoutuan 国民政
tour of Sichuan. The staff corps’ mission was to aid Liu Xiang in suppressing the CCP, by planning and directing campaigns against the communist forces in Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan. The significance of the sudden sea change in Sichuan was driven home by Chiang’s long tour of the southwest, most of which was spent in Sichuan. Chiang arrived in the province in early March and promptly meted out punishment for Sichuan warlords for their lackadaisical efforts in the failed anti-communist campaigns.44

He Guoguang was instrumental in achieving consolidation of central in Sichuan and in nationalizing the military in Sichuan and Xikang, in part by relying on his prior relationship as a former classmate of Liu’s. In the summer of 1935, He and the staff corps put forward a plan for the reorganization of the Sichuan military, which involved drastic reductions in numbers of troops, central oversight of weaponry and units, and training classes at Mount Emei (峨眉山) for officers in the Sichuan armies. Nanjing gained an unprecedented level of influence and control, while Liu’s forces were strengthened vis-a-vis the remaining militarists’ units.45

Liu Xiang and the Sichuan warlords were ready to give some ground to Nanjing in return for central assistance against the communists, but Chiang’s designs went far beyond mere aid and coordination. Chiang pushed for wide-ranging reforms to establish a genuine provincial government that would not only put an end to the province’s divisiveness that had opened the door to the communists, but would cement central control of the province. Strategically, he was convinced that Sichuan was the only suitable base for the looming conflict against Japan. Tactically, the resources of the province were important to the national government and it needed unfettered access to those rich reserves of land and man that had been so long denied to all outsiders. The fundamental difference in the motivations of Liu and Chiang would play out in a variety of simmering conflicts. There were strong tensions in late 1935-1936 with Liu Xiang because of the military reorganization in particular, but the tensions would linger, even coloring the execution of Cheng Zerun ten years later, long after Liu’s death in 1938.46 This process of gaining control of the Sichuanese forces was not complete until the eve of the war: another crisis flared up in June 1937 over the transfer of all command, finances, and training for Sichuan armies to Chiang’s Military Affairs Commission. A showdown with Liu Xiang was narrowly averted.47 Despite the increasing presence of central agencies and the growing power of Chiang’s staff corps, the local militarists retained a significant degree of influence. Chiang’s first

府軍事委員會長南昌行營參謀團). The Field HQ was reorganized and moved to Chongqing in October, and it dropped the Nanchang designation at that time.

44. He cashiered Tian Songyao, ordered demerits for Liu Wenhui and another minor warlord, had another minor militarist arrested, and cancelled the military posts of Wang Jialie (王家烈), the provincial chair of Guizhou; Zhou Kaiqing, Sichuan yu dui Ri kangzhan, pp. 10-1.

45. Kapp, Szechwan, pp. 99-101 and 107-8. He also convinced Liu to move the newly reorganized provincial capital to Chengdu and transfer his units out of Chongqing; Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, pp. 6-7 and 43.

46. For example, Nanjing attached Special Action Troops (biedongdui 別動隊) to provincial units. Ostensibly to facilitate liaison with central agencies, these Troops were under the control of Kang Ze (康澤) and they aggressively propagated against Liu Xiang among farmers, provincial soldiers, and local governments. An open clash with Liu was only averted by He Guoguang who persuaded Chiang to rein in Kang, who resigned shortly thereafter; Kapp, Szechwan, p. 127.

47. Kapp, Szechwan, p. 132.
and second choices (Zhang Qun (張群) and He Guoguang) for provincial governor had to be dropped because opposition from Liu and his proteges was so strong that Chiang had to rescind his orders. In the end, only Wang Zuanxu (王瓒绪) was acceptable to the local warlords.48

In order to deal with the crisis in Sichuan, the field HQ had to be massively expanded, with more personnel and much broader powers and responsibilities. Its primary goals were to reform finance, improve communications and transportation, centralize administration, and nationalize the Sichuan military.49 In the summer of 1935 several measures designed to end the warlords’ financial independence were issued. All military supplies were to be distributed to units by the provincial government. Local military forces were forbidden to collect taxes at all—the intricate miscellaneous taxes were summarily abolished. All provincial taxes, particularly the land tax (tianfu 天賦), were to be collected by the provincial government itself. Backed by Nanjing, Liu Xiang’s government declared that starting 1 March 1935 all monthly military supplies to be collected and dispersed from the Sichuan Rehabilitation Office (四川善後督辦公署), establishing a unified system of income and disbursements for the once proudly independent warlords. Other, smaller warlords followed Liu’s example by turning their financial apparatus and supply disbursement methods over to the provincial government. Liu made sure that the disbursement to his forces was nearly equal to the combined disbursements of all the other warlords.50 Central financial institutions, such as enforced use of the National currency and branches of the Central Bank, were established in the province. They helped to stabilize a chaotic currency situation and floated huge bonds to fund reconstruction policies in Sichuan.51 A crash program of strategic roads was planned and constructed at breakneck pace. Designed mainly for military purposes, the roads were built by a massive mobilization of corvée labor; they linked Sichuan to its neighbors and allowed for faster troop deployments within and to the borders of the province.52

Liu Xiang and the newly arrived Nationalist authorities had divergent goals for their


49. This was not the first attempt that Chiang and the KMT had made to bring about changes in Sichuan. Two earlier attempts, one in 1926 even before the Northern Expedition and one in early 1931, had both met with abject failure; Zhou Kaiqing, Sichuan yu dui Ri kangzhan, pp. 3-5.


51. The Rehabilitation Office’s yearly disbursements were set at 56 million yuan, which was far above the province’s financial capacity, most likely indicating Liu’s government’s heavy dependence on Nanjing aid; Zhou Kaiqing, Sichuan yu dui Ri kangzhan, pp. 21-3. In September, Chiang declared that the use of local currencies was prohibited for all public and private transactions. Local bills were exchanged for central bank notes (at a 10:8 ratio). A portion of Nanjing’s aid came in the form of revenues generated by Chiang’s Opium Suppression Supervision Bureau, which was essentially an opium monopoly that generated significant income for the Military Affairs Commission. Much of its revenues were returned to provincial governments as subsidies. The rest was put into a special military fund in Chongqing for use by He Guoguang, as head of the field HQ; Slack, Opium, state, and society, p. 147.

52. Chiang’s Military Affairs Commission set up special agencies to handle road building projects. The roads included trunk roads south to Guizhou, north to Shaanxi, west to Hunan, and south from the Chongqing-Chengdu road to Yunnan; Zhou Kaiqing, Sichuan yu dui Ri kangzhan, pp. 14 and 24-5, Chongqing tongshi, pp. 1089-91.
alliance of convenience. Nanjing, naturally enough, was determined to cement central control over a province that it had been unable to bring to heel for nearly ten years. Liu Xiang had his own agenda as well, which involved making sure he retained a dominant position in the new provincial order and limiting central control to a reasonable degree. The two sides could agree, however, that they needed to cooperate to defeat the communist incursion as quickly as possible and that creating a provincial infrastructure was imperative. A major renovation of the provincial situation was in order. The years spent under the garrison system had wreaked havoc with Sichuan’s economy and society and a host of difficult, interrelated problems confronted Liu and his new, nationalist masters.

By the mid-1930s the situation was generally recognized as being desperate. A KMT party report on the communist threat to the province in 1933 acknowledged that the problems went far beyond the CCP’s immediate incursion in the north of the province.

“The military men’s limitless squeeze is the main cause of the destruction of the village economy. Now, some garrisons in Sichuan have collected the grain tax all the way to 1970 or 1980. Whenever there’s the slightest exigency it is almost one levy [of a year’s worth of taxes] per month. And then there’s still the bandit-extermination fees, temporary military fees, militia funds, field taxes, lanjuan [懶捐]53 . . . etc., which are beyond number. On top of those, there are repeated natural disasters and chaotic wars,

53. I have been unable to determine what this term refers to; literally it means “lazy tax” or “slothful contribution.”
so that the village economy collapses even quicker. Farmers work bitterly tilling fields for the whole year and never eat their fill. At times they are pressed so urgently to pay taxes that they sell their sons and daughters, or are pushed to commit suicide. Such news is heard regularly. While most landlords just give up on [finding out] where [their tenants] who have fled are. The commercial taxes [lishui 納稅] are extremely numerous. Every five [Chinese] miles, there is a [tax] station and every ten [Chinese] miles there is a customs barrier. If there is more than one army stationed in an area, then the customs stations are without number. In this way, of course, industrial and commercial development are extremely restricted. Men who undertake industrial and commercial enterprises feel extremely oppressed. As for most intellectuals, after graduating from university or technical schools, they return to their home economies, which have already been peeled layer after layer to the point of bordering on bankruptcy, so they naturally look to society for a way out. But taking stock of society’s situation they are greatly disappointed. … At present, the people of Sichuan, both property owners and the propertyless, those who work with their minds and those who work with their bodies, are all panicked for their lives. They feel that there is no guarantee of their own survival. And no one can avoid feeling insecure in the morning and full of panic and misgivings at night. Because of this, people’s hearts are unstable.\(^{54}\)

During the 1920s and early 30s, the militarists and their officials concentrated wealth and land in their own hands. This amounted to the rise of a new landlord class in Sichuan that relied on control of the taxation apparatus to consolidate wealth in their own hands, by taxing tenants and old landlords heavily while protecting their own holdings.\(^{55}\) These new landowners quickly expanded their activities into commercial enterprises, public works, native-style banks, pawnshops, and usurious lending. The writer Fan Changjiang described a garrison town north of Chengdu by highlighting this new Sichuan elite: “Aside from the regular soldiers, all the other people in the town were obviously in plain clothes. All the small traders were disbanded aides, staff officers, junior officers or soldiers of the Sichuan army. After they left the army, they had no livelihood, so had to start a small business. Because of their special connections, they managed not to pay taxes, to ‘borrow’ by force from civilians, to take over civilian houses, so most of them had a useful line they could pursue. It had become standard for disbanded officers and men to go into business.”\(^{56}\) The educated stratum (graduates from middle school up to university) lacked opportunities within the province to put their skills and knowledge to use and thus they were easily drawn into the only job avenues readily available: bureaucratic work in the warlords’ armies and garrison administrations.

The brutal over-taxation of their garrison territories by the warlords pushed many farmers into selling their land and tenancy, while the continued commercialization of the rural economy made Sichuanese peasants ever more susceptible to market trends, even those outside of China. When the bottom fell out of rice prices between 1930 and 1934, for example, the result was considerable distress among tenant farmers who were dependent on selling their rice crop to pay

their rents. As a result, the number of farmers in the province plummeted: from a base of more than 30 million, it had dropped to under 26 million by 1934. The drop, however, was not distributed evenly in rural society. The middle of the rural class spectrum was decimated. Small and middle landlords, owner-cultivators, and the wealthier of tenant farmers were all gutted, leaving a simplified class structure of large landlords and poor tenants across much of the province. Around Chongqing, for example, landlords were a mere two per cent of the population, but they held fully 95% of the cultivated land. Tenants accounted for 92% of the population, and they worked 60% of the land. Qijiang, Jiangjin, and Yongchuan were not quite so heavily unbalanced, but in each case landlords were 8% or less of the population and they owned 85% or more of the land. Owner-cultivators and those who partially owned and partially rented land made up very small proportions, the rest being tenants. The commercialized economy meant these tenants were producing cash crops for sale, not subsistence. Without middle or rich farmers, the poor tenants and the landlords faced each other in a tense and hostile relationship: the simplified social structure strained rural society.57

**Remaking Administrative Geography, 1934-1936**

The deep-seated problems in the Sichuan countryside were born of the warlords rapacious influence over local (county) administration under the garrison system, a phenomenon which was referred to as “military men handling administration” (junren ganzheng 軍人干政).58 Chiang and his Field HQ set about making local administrative structures responsive to central direction, severing permanently the local military bureaucracy’s independence and control over local administration. A whole suite of initiatives were brought to the Sichuan countryside in order to effect this change.

One of the most fundamental reform measures put into place was a system of 18 Administrative Oversight Districts (xingzheng ducha zhuanyuan qu 行政督察專員區). Yang Yongtai (楊永泰) designed the special administrative districts (ADs) as a bandit suppression measure, first applying them in Hubei, Henan, and Anhui. Yang was a member of the Political Science Clique, a loose affiliation of pre-1928 Beijing officials whom Chiang trusted. He would be assassinated in 1936 while serving as governor of Hubei. As secretary of the Field HQ when it moved to Chongqing, he brought his reform policies with him. Sichuan was divided into 18 of these districts, each comprising 6-12 counties, led by a special inspector (zhuanyuan 專員). The main office for each AD was located in one of the subordinate counties, where the special inspector held the concurrent posts of county magistrate and commander of the Peace Preservation Corps. His role was to supervise, direct, and investigate other counties and

---

57. Lu Pingdeng, *Sichuan nongcun jingji*, pp. 95-6, 144, 157, 171-3, 175, 177-82, 184-91, and 344; Kapp *Szechwan*, pp. 46-7, 56, and 60; and Richard Gunde, “Land Tax and Social Change,” pp. 43-5. Renting land was at times a commercial proposition: large warlord landowners rented out large tracts of land to middle-men who sublet it out in small parcels to individual tenants. In some cases, this layering of subletting was carried out even further, with the second tier of renters again dividing and subletting plots out to the final cultivators. In Baxian, 80% of the farmers in the county were tenants; *Baxian xianzhi*, p. 1820.

58. For an extended discussion of this phenomenon in Chongqing, which was exceptional in that Liu Xiang and his 21st army sponsored a whole host of modernization reforms in the city in the 1920s and 1930s, see chapter three in Zhang Jin, *Quanli, chongtu, yu biange: 1926-1937 nian Chongqing chengshi xiandaihua yanjiu*, pp. 118-72.
magistrates in the AD, to coordinate multi-district efforts, and to suppress bandits by consolidating and coordinating the local militias, which were now incorporated into the Peace Preservation Corps. Chiang appointed 13 inspectors in early May 1935 and they took up their posts officially on the first of June. All the inspectors were personally chosen and appointed by Chiang Kaishek, and almost all of them were non-Sichuanese – most from Jiangxi, Anhui, and Hubei – a clear indication that the ADs were an instrument of central control. The inspectors were charged with assuring that local administrations were responsive to central directives. They had first to bring county magistrates to heel, and then implement several reforms. County governments had long been saddled with semi-independent bureaus (ju 局), which were to be abolished in favor of departments (ke 科) that were directly subordinate to county magistrates. This concentrated power in the magistrates’ hands and was enhanced by giving him expanded responsibilities and the power to choose men to serve at the sub-county level. Each county was divided into several wards, each with its own chief (quzhang 区长) who drew his salary from the Sichuan government and handled many of the functions of local administration. Another reform element was putting a reworked version of the traditional mutual surveillance (baojia 保甲) system in place. This involved adding an administrative level above the traditional bao and jia tiers: townships (xiang and zhen 鄉鎮) were to be converted into “linked bao” (lianbao 聯保). Under these new lianbao, the ADs were to organize a full mutual surveillance (baojia) system: 10 households as a jia (甲), and ten jia as a bao (保). Most county magistrates and local tax collection officials were retained, but they were reshuffled and transferred. AD inspectors ran a whole gamut of classes to train personnel for county and sub-county posts.

The national government’s attempt to assert real control over county and sub-county administration was immediately contested by Liu Xiang and the local Sichuanese elite. In early 1935, for example, the County Administration Personnel Training Institute was set up in Chongqing. Chiang tapped another political science clique man, Wang Youyong (王又庸), to be chief of education. It was hoped that all Sichuan’s county magistrates, county department heads, and sub-county ward heads would eventually be graduates of this institute. Liu Xiang, for his part, felt that as provincial chairman, if he did not have control over county administration that the province would never be truly settled or effective. Thus, even during the first session, Liu had the class moved to Chengdu, away from the growing central government presence in Chongqing, and he sent Deng Hanxiang (鄧漢祥) to represent him and secure the loyalty of the

59. Zhang Jin, Quanli, chongtu, yu biange, pp. 112-3; Duan Yu, Kangzhan shiqi de Sichuan, p. 10; and Kapp, Szechwan, pp. 110-1.

60. “Yang’s scheme relied on a clearly defined vertical chain of command which drew its effectiveness from the concentration of power in the fewest possible hands at any one level. This effort to extend the arm of higher political authority down into the mass of the population was an innovation. Under the imperial system, whose patterns had been weakened but not wholly destroyed, formal bureaucratic power extended no lower than the district ... Smaller quasi-political social units had generally handled their own affairs according to established custom;” Kapp, Szechwan, pp. 110 and 112. On the origins of the ADs, see Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Nationalist China at War, pp. 34-5.

61. The lianbao tier, organized by villages and townships inserted between the sub-county ward and the bao, was an innovation; Kapp, Szechwan, p. 112 and Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, p. 123.

62. Duan Yu, Kangzhan shiqi de Sichuan, pp. 3-20.
trainees. Three sessions ran for three months each; between May 1935 and May 1936, 1,017 men graduated from this program. (The trainees were generally either men who had entered via an exam or had already been working in some administrative capacity in the years prior. The first class of 220 began in May 1935 and graduated in October; the second and third classes, each numbering 400 trainees, ran from October 1935 to January 1936 and January 1936 to May 1936, respectively.) As the provincial government was still officially in charge of appointing magistrates and ward heads, Deng’s work went smoothly, and most of the trainees responded favorably to his overtures. Almost immediately upon their graduation, Liu installed the training class graduates across the province: they held more than one-half of all the county magistrate positions and even higher proportions of county department and ward head offices. But that was not enough, Liu wanted this cadre of men to be a coordinated body, loyal to him and capable of resisting central pressure; to achieve this, Liu set up an alumni association (tongxuehui) through which the graduates worked together to support Liu. Chiang was worried enough to counter by sending the trainees to yet another special training corps, located first at Lushan and then at Emei mountain, for more militarized training. In addition, Kang Ze and the Renaissance Society tried to make contact with the graduates and erode Liu’s grip on the county administration, but Liu shrewdly relied on Deng Hanxiang’s connection with the students (as their teacher) and drew them into a secret organization, the New Administration Society (新政社), that combined the civil administrators with graduates of Liu’s military school. The group significantly extended Liu’s shaky influence in the counties and sub-counties.63

Liu Xiang’s death in 1938 put a quick end to the activities of his loyalist magistrates; without their leader the alumni association and the New Administration Society both lost their reason to exist and the graduates ceased to keep in regular contact with each other. While the simmering conflict between Chiang and Liu posed some difficulties, in fact both sides were training men not only in loyalty but in the importance of administrative procedures and chain of command, both prerequisites for the wartime policies that would follow.64

---

63. Militarists such as Liu had not enjoyed very secure holds over the counties in their “garrisons.” County governments were generally well controlled, particularly tax offices, but local militias were a persistent problem and the friction between them and warlord armies were often significant. Warlord armies were outsiders and often brought in their wake socio-economic changes that angered local residents: “impoverishment of former landholding families, the enrichment of military officers and their bureaucratic retainers, and the emergence of a cycle of increasing rural usury, spreading tenancy, and agrarian unemployment.” In addition, warlord armies frequently had a cozy relationship with bandits, who preyed on local communities. Warlord forces often sheltered the bandit gangs and recruited among them when they needed to replenish their numbers. During the unstable 1920s and 30s, local militias came to wield enormous power in their communities, often conducting revenue collection as well as organizing community defense, running customs barriers, and various lucrative commercial activities like opium transport and trade; Kapp, Szechwan, pp. 50-4, the quotation is from page 52.

64. In 1940, as part of the New County System reforms, roughly one-third of Sichuan magistrates would be cashiered and replaced by Whampoa graduates, a move that was almost certainly motivated in part by the desire to root out any lingering Sichuanese-loyalties and make magistrates even more responsive to central control; Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 152-3. The above account is based on Huang Baishu, “Sichuan sheng ‘xian xun’ he ‘bao xun’ de gaikuang” in Jiangbei wenshiziliao, vol. 2, pp. 43-51. Huang was a graduate of the class in January 1936, and then subsequently posted around Chengdu where he was heavily involved with the baojia cadre training.
In this context of low-temperature struggle between Chiang and Liu, the ten counties around Chongqing were placed under the Third Administrative Oversight District (3AD) of the Sichuan provincial government. In 1936 the 3 Gorges Experimental Village District (三峡郷村建設実験区), located on the banks of the Jialing River in the west of Baxian, was added as a special district within the 3AD. The 3AD main office was placed in Yongchuan county, right on the main Chongqing-Chengdu road. The first special inspector was Shen Peng (沈鵬), an Anhui man and a graduate of Whampoa (5th class). Shen projected an urbane and modern impression, with his wire-rimmed glasses, bald head, and neatly trimmed mustache. But it was not all image, he was a conscientious and thorough administrator, printing numerous statistical reports and writing detailed manuals for sub-county personnel, both of which he often embellished with art deco elements and fonts. This was quite likely not just the vagaries of personal taste, but a strategy to enhance his authority and credentials as an eastern, coastal modernist among the local, backward Sichuan personnel he had to manage.

In late 1935 and early 1936 this region of ten counties had an area of roughly 16,000 square kilometers (64,000 square Chinese li (里)) and a population of nearly 5.6 million.

---

class run by Deng Hanxiang (on behalf of Liu Xiang, see below. Mi Qingyun's account agrees substantially with Huang's: Mi Qingyun, “Zhongyangjun ru Chuan ji,” pp. 156-7. Mi was first a ward head and later a county magistrate in Sichuan. In 1935 he worked in the Mianyang AD office, under special inspector Xian Ying (鲜英), as departmental staff and then as head of the first department (科) in Mianyang county. He subsequently served as head of the 4th ward, and personally handled setting up baojia in the jurisdiction. See also, Kapp, Szechwan, pp. 124-5.
residents. The 3AD’s taxable land was estimated by Shen Peng at 7,790,000 mu (just under 5,200 square kilometers).\textsuperscript{65}

Once Shen took up his post in June, the first order of business was setting up the offices and getting various measures and reforms ready for implementation, a process which lasted until the fall. On 10 September, Shen began a tour of the 3AD counties, spending a week in each one.\textsuperscript{66} Throughout the fall of 1935, the counties within the 3AD were busy with implementing the whole gamut of centrally mandated reforms and new programs for rural society. The majority of the work, however, was concentrated on putting in place the administrative sinews that would carry out the center’s reform initiatives from the county level down into the villages. As the seat of the 3AD and where Shen Peng himself was appointed as the county magistrate, Yongchuan led the way, setting up ward offices (\textit{qushu} 齐署) in August and moving ahead with practical matters such as household registration, \textit{baojia} divisions, and making and posting of household door placards. Other counties were slower to organize.\textsuperscript{67} All the counties moved ahead with training classes for sub-county and \textit{baojia} personnel, using materials from the provincial government as well as a pamphlet, titled \textit{Essential Knowledge for Baojia Heads} (保甲長須知), written in plain language by Shen Peng himself. The quality of the training and subsequent organizing varied considerably. Yongchuan, enjoying Shen Peng’s personal guidance over every aspect of the work, was the most efficient, but the situation in Jiangjin was quite good, despite its late start. Training there included fieldwork exercises as well as evening discussion groups about practical problems encountered during the day. When Shen Peng inspected Jiangjin he was quite pleased with the progress, noting that the only major shortcoming was that not all the personnel positions were filled and thus the coverage was spotty in the mountainous county. Other counties, such as Baxian, Dazu, and Jiangbei, suffered from a neglect of practical matters, a lack of appropriate flexibility in application, and thus exhibited an overly mechanical application of the \textit{baojia} system’s decimal principle. In Dazu’s more inaccessible mountainous villages, for example, the \textit{baojia} divisions were often completely

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{65} Shen Peng, \textit{Sichuan disanqu xingzheng ducha zhuanyuan xunshi xiaqu gexian shicha baogaoshu}, p. 15a (of the finance section of the report), gives a population of 5.4 million, but a 1938 provincial report puts the population of these counties as 5,675,243; see Yang Yulin, p. 119, citing \textit{Sichuansheng jianshe tongji tiyao} (四川省建設統計提要). The discrepancy reflects two realities: the first trickle of war refugees and the overall imprecision of population statistics for this period. Other sources are in this ballpark. The ten counties have a combined population of 5,611,245, according to Hu Huanyong; \textit{Sichuan dili}, pp. 106-9. Lou Yunlin, writing in 1941, put the combined population at 6,566,314, derived from an unspecified survey conducted by the Sichuan Provincial Government Civil Administration Department; given the large increase, this is almost certainly after 1939 with the influx of war refugees and exiles.

\textsuperscript{66} After seeing Bishan and Rongchang counties, just two weeks into the tour, Shen’s itinerary was interrupted by an order from the provincial government to attend a conference for special inspectors. He resumed his tour in mid-November, visiting Tongliang, Hechuan, Baxian, Jiangbei and Dazu. He did not visit Jiangjin and Qijiang, the counties bording on Guizhou in the south, until January of 1936; Shen Peng, \textit{Sichuan disan xingzheng ducha zhuanyuan xunshi xiaqu gexian shicha baogao shu}, pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{67} For example, Bishan did not set up its qu offices until September. Ba county, Jiangjin, Rongchang, Dazu, Hechuan, and Tongliang did so only in October, while Qijiang and Jiangbei were a month later even.
\end{flushleft}
artificial, taking no account of the natural social and physical geography. As a result, communities were splintered and *jia* heads competed for power over contested households.\(^6\)

Exactly thirteen months after the founding of the 3AD, Shen Peng called together the Second Administrative Conference to evaluate progress and set the agenda for the coming year. Held in the blistering heat of summer, with temperatures approaching 100 degrees Fahrenheit in their meeting room, the 3AD county magistrates, ward chiefs, and other delegates examined their collective effort over the past year and looked ahead to the tasks of revamping local society. Shen in his opening address summarized the current situation by looking at the four main missions of the 3AD: management, education, defense, and nourishment (*guan, jiao, wei, and yang* 管教衛養). He was pleased, overall, with the accomplishments: after a year of hard work the mechanisms of policy implementation were in place, as counties had established the necessary departments and wards, added the “linked bao” (*lianbao*) tier, and trained *baojia* heads. Now, the task was to ensure that these mechanisms were fully controlled and following proper procedures. In the area of education, he was pleased at the lack of funding problems and

---

\(^6\) Shen Peng, *Sichuan disanqu xingzheng ducha zhuanyuan xunshi xiaqu gexian shicha baogaoshu*, pp. 4a-21b.
with the number of local schools, but worried that the village primary schools enrolled too few students and that their curriculum was poor. Local defense too had made great strides in that localities were on a firmer footing with regards to available police forces and anti-bandit measures. Where the 3AD had fallen far short was in terms of “nourishment,” which meant improving the rural economy and safeguarding people’s livelihood. Cooperatives were only just beginning and the rural economy continued to be weak and suffer from the negative effects of commercialization. The hilly terrain and lack of irrigation in the counties of the 3AD made it extremely susceptible to the serious drought which hit Sichuan in 1936-37. Shen outlined nine areas where the Sichuan Special Inspectors Conference felt serious work was necessary. The rest of the three day conference was taken up with discussion and voting on numerous proposals to deal with practical difficulties.

Despite its shortcomings, on the eve of the war the Third Administrative District was a functioning administrative tool for the area around Chongqing. During much of its first year it focused on establishing the administrative foundation. From mid-1936 on, it would turn its attention to the programs and initiatives mandated by the central and provincial governments, primarily constructing physical and social infrastructure: building roads, setting up telephone lines, establishing local schools, founding farmers cooperatives, reforming rural police measures, pursuing anti-bandit policies, and registering and branding private firearms. Many of these initiatives left ample room for improvement, as the conference proceedings suggested. Once the war began in 1937, however, the prime mission for all the Administrative Districts became mobilizing the resources of the Sichuan hinterland, supplying grain and men for the war effort. In this task, the 3AD did more than its fair share.

The 3AD possessed just 8.7% of Sichuan’s cultivated land and 11.26% of the province’s total population. Yet the 3AD supplied 14.7% of the province’s conscripted soldiers. Taking Sichuan’s higher overall burden into account, this was an increase of 6.43% over the

69. This drought was one of the most severe in Sichuan during the entire twentieth century, fully 75% of the province was affected; see Li Shigen, Sichuan kangzhan dang’an yanjiu, p. 21.

70. These nine areas were: baojia, including adjustments to various procedures and measures such as the form and content of household door placards; peace preservation; county finances, especially ensuring unified revenue collection and disbursement, ending miscellaneous levies, and using budgets for every level of administration; cadre training for police patrols, primary school principals, cooperative chairmen, and militia; mass education; improving local production, particularly opening up new land, flood and drought measures, insect and pest control, establishing more branches of the Farmers Bank, and preserving handicraft industries; continued improvement of county and ward government; road construction; and suppression of opium.

71. Sichuan sheng disanqu xingzheng ducha zhuanyuan gongshu, Di er ci xingzheng huiyi huibian, np, 1936, passim, but particularly pp. 3-10 for Shen’s review of the current situation within the 3AD.

72. As we have already seen, there is some dispute over the actual population in the province, and the 3AD as well. The percentage calculated here is based on totals of 50,406,854 and 5,675,243, respectively, as cited in Yang Yulin, “Bingli yu liangshi: Sichuan sheng disan xingzheng duchaqu renmin zai kangzhang zhong de zhyuao gongxian,” in Li Shigen, Sichuan kangzhan dang’an yanjiu, p. 119.
Table 3-1: 3AD’s Conscription Burden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>Sichuan</th>
<th>3AD</th>
<th>3AD as percentage of Sichuan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937-41</td>
<td>1,096,460</td>
<td>~190,000</td>
<td>~17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>366,624</td>
<td>~50,000</td>
<td>~13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>352,681</td>
<td>41,403</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>391,112</td>
<td>47,591</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>283,086</td>
<td>37,216</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>totals</td>
<td>2,489,964</td>
<td>~365,000</td>
<td>~14.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Yang Yulin, “Bingyi yu liangshi: Sichuansheng disan xingzheng duchaqu renmin zai kanzhan zhong de zhuyao gongxian”, in Li Shigen, Sichuan kanzhan dang’an yanjiu, p. 121. For the provincial figures, Yang cites Sichuan sheng renmin zhengfu canshishi (四川省人民政府参事室), Sichuansheng wenshi yanjiu guan (四川省文史研究馆), eds., Kangri zhanzheng shiqi Sichuan dashiji (抗日战争时期四川大事记), Huaxia chubanshe, 1987. The 3AD numbers are drawn from Yang’s own archival research at the Chongqing Municipal Archives. As Yang notes, there are no complete figures available for the 3AD, as there are gaps for certain periods and certain counties.

countrywide average for its population. In addition, the 3AD was responsible for mobilizing manpower for numerous road and airfield building projects. In April 1941, Shen Peng complained of this extra imposition on the people in the 3AD: “It is on record that from 1938 this district has been ordered to construct national defense projects. Projects already completed include: the Baishiyi (白市驛) airfield and the Sichuan-Guizhou Road. Currently under-construction are: the Zhu-Chongqing (竹渝段) section of the Hankou-Chongqing road, riverbank works, the Dazhongba (大中壩) airfield, and repairs to the Baishiyi airfield. Future projects include the Dazu Yunqiao (雲橋) airfield. The counties in my district have levied laborers for the last three years without a moment’s rest. . . . In terms of conscription, it is not behind any other district, and the burden of requisitioning corvée labor has been especially heavy.” The dual burdens made fulfilling both tasks simultaneously impossible, and Shen Peng requested a six month reprieve from conscription. The provincial district’s response is not on file, but there is no indication that conscription quotas were relaxed at all.

73. These numbers are from Yang Yulin, “Bingli yu liangshi,” p. 121. While some of the specific numbers are far from exact, the general picture is doubtless accurate.

Table 3-2: 3AD Counties Conscription, 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>county</th>
<th>quota</th>
<th>delivered</th>
<th>over / under</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yongchuan</td>
<td>3,716</td>
<td>3,758</td>
<td>+42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongliang</td>
<td>4,050</td>
<td>4,206</td>
<td>+152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangjin</td>
<td>5,627</td>
<td>5,267</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beibei *</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rongchang</td>
<td>3,143</td>
<td>3,090</td>
<td>-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishan</td>
<td>3,143</td>
<td>3,072</td>
<td>-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dazu</td>
<td>3,597</td>
<td>3,314</td>
<td>-283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qijiang</td>
<td>3,294</td>
<td>3,209</td>
<td>-85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangbei</td>
<td>5,033</td>
<td>4,753</td>
<td>-280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>7,776</td>
<td>6,426</td>
<td>-1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hechuan</td>
<td>7,024</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>-3,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>46,751</td>
<td>41,403</td>
<td>-5,348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: qz0055.mj3-274, pp. 20a-b
* Beibei was not a county, but a special management district to the northwest of Chongqing.

On the Ground State-Making: The Revival of the Baojia

Below the administrative districts (ADs) and counties, the Nationalist government attempted to establish a genuine administrative presence in ever lower levels of local society. This state-making initiative took the form of reviving an imperial era institution, the baojia system, though it was significantly altered in purpose and responsibilities. At the most basic level, the state’s extraction of material and manpower for the war effort depended on its local agents, the baojia heads. Conscription’s success in securing the bodies to fight the Japanese rested, ultimately, on the men who served as bao and jia heads in rural villages and townships. It is to these men, their place in Nationalist wartime state-making and their unique position in local society that we turn first, only then will be able to unpack their actions in the context of the draft.

Before we proceed to a close look at Sichuan baojia before and during the war, it is important to understand its imperial antecedent. As noted earlier, the baojia was an administrative system that carved local communities into decimal units. The Qing dynasty baojia was one of two sub-county administrative divisions inherited from the Ming (1368-1644), though its earliest incarnation was found in Wang Anshi’s Song dynasty reforms (1070 CE), where it had the sole function of identifying and reporting criminals. Within a year it was extended to the entire empire and given an additional military function of mobilizing local militia. In the early sixteenth-century the requirement was added that every ten households had

75. The attempt to trace the baojia back into the Qin era (221 – 206 BCE) as some scholars have done

- 166 -
to report all its members on a card or placard and to report to the authorities any strangers who appeared in the local community or any suspicious activities, but this innovation remained confined to Jiangxi and narrowly restricted to catching thieves and robbers, with the rotating duty of headman having no jurisdiction over any other aspect of the jia households. During the Qing, however, the baojia was given this responsibility across the land. A seventeenth-century magistrate’s handbook stressed repeatedly that magistrates’ duty to preserve local peace and order depended on the baojia effectively handling “police surveillance duties” and training community residents in the military arts.76 Door placards, with an official seal, were required to list the names and ages of all adult male household members. And hostels, inns, temples, shrines also required to keep (paper) registers of guests. The second sub-county administrative system inherited from the Ming was the lijia (里甲), designed to levy corvée and grain taxes.77 The two shared a common task of registering households and population, though for different purposes: tax collection for the lijia and police control for the baojia. The duplication led quite quickly to the lijia system handing off the registration of the population to the baojia. By the Jiaqing era (1760-1820) the functions of the lijia were more or less transferred wholesale to the baojia. The Qing baojia thus, had two functions. As a system to count, register, and track population, it was charged with detecting and catching suspicious persons and reporting criminal behavior within communities. Because it relied on local residents informing on themselves, locally it was placed under the county’s Crimes Division (xingfang 刑房). During the mid-nineteenth century rebellions, this police function was expanded to local defense in some areas where it made strong connections with the local militia (tuanlian). The other function was revenue collection, and thus at the imperial level it was placed under the Board of Revenue.78

Socially, the Qing era baojia was awkwardly placed. Recruiting the right men to serve as

recently (see Ran Mianhui and Liu Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 1-21) seems to me to be misplaced, mistaking the need for every government to have some form of presence beyond the capital city for nonexistent continuity with later innovations. That some terms from the Song and later eras were used earlier does not indicate genuine institutional continuity. While it was far from uniform, the Qing nomenclature was different than the modern version used by the Nationalists. Under the Qing every ten households were a pai (牌), with a pai head (paizhang 牌長 or paitou 牌頭) chosen to lead it; every ten pai were a jia (甲), and every ten jia were a bao. Villages, as a “natural” socio-economic unit, were not officially incorporated into the Qing baojia decimal system, but in practice village boundaries were respected. At times the xiang (鄉), which could incorporate one or more whole villages plus surrounding homesteads or farms in the countryside, were used as a higher-level division, over the bao (or over villages if they were sufficient to be coextensive with the bao). At other times the xiang was equivalent to the bao itself: the baozhang being the head of the xiang – thus, the terminology was somewhat variable, but the decimal system of organization remained the same.


77. While it too took the household as the basic unit, the lijia had a slightly different structure from the baojia, specifically, there were 110 households, rather than 100, in the equivalent tier of the lijia system.

78. In 1775, Qianlong abolished the lijia entirely, leaving the baojia as the only instrument for population registration, which led quickly to its use as a tax collection tool.

- 167 -
baojia administrators was difficult for county magistrates. As imperial subjects, local gentry (specifically, holders of imperial degrees and their families) were subject to baojia control, but they were relieved of the obligation (and opportunity) to serve as baojia heads in order to prevent them amassing an even greater (perhaps harmful) degree of power in local society. This was a nice theory, but it led to other problems instead. Their permanent exemption not only increased their symbolic prestige by virtue of instituting a lasting difference with commoners, but also added to the gentry’s reluctance to submit to the authority of baojia heads who were the gentry’s social inferiors. Gentry often boycotted baojia work, refusing to follow legitimate orders from baojia heads, except of course when it served their interests (such as anti-Taiping mobilization), when they asserted its usefulness and their own (only partially disguised) leadership of it. The Qing, thus, had real problems finding the right personnel to fill baojia positions. By excluding the gentry, who had the education, prestige, leisure and motivation, officials had to try and find farmers to fill the positions instead. But they were illiterate, busy, and lacked the necessary social prestige and standing to be truly influential in their communities.80

Sichuan Baojia: ‘The Main Thread of Many Matters”

After the 1911 Revolution which overthrew the Manchu Qing dynasty, the baojia system was allowed to lapse by warlord and central governments alike. The nominal unification of the country by the KMT’s Northern Expedition was followed by limited trials of baojia that preceded large-scale adoption of the system in the early 1930s as part of the extermination campaigns against the CCP soviet in Jiangxi. The main task of the KMT’s revived baojia was to organize local militia columns of able-bodied men. Its effectiveness in those campaigns is debatable, but Chiang and the Nationalist authorities were convinced that it had made a valuable contribution, by organizing local residents in ways that restricted the freedom of action of communist activists and other suspected bad elements.81 Because of this conviction, it was expanded to other areas of Nationalist-held territory, particularly areas that had communist soviets or base areas and with varying degrees of success and completeness.82

The Sichuan militarists’ inability to eject the communists from their toehold in the province spurred the Nationalists to bring the baojia into the province; in the summer of 1935, He Guooguang ordered its adoption in Sichuan as part of the comprehensive program to reform the province. Underneath the provincial government, local administration was reorganized on a five tier system: counties, wards, lianbao, bao, and jia. By mid-1936, He reported that at least 80 (of 152) counties in Sichuan had set up baojia, though results were not sufficient to satisfy


80. This two paragraph summary relies on Hsiao, Kung-Chuan, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 12, 25-35, and 43-83.

81. In the summer of 1931, Xiushui (修水) and 42 other counties in Jiangxi re-instituted the baojia system. By April 1933, 69 counties in Jiangxi had organized 435 wards, 20,674 bao, and 209,570 jia. Having ejected the main communist forces from the province, by April 1938 there were 2,350 lianbao, 24,329 bao, and 248,335 jia in Jiangxi; Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 74-5. See also, Zhu Dexin, Ershi shiji sansi shiniandai Henan Jidong baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 21-2.

82. For a cursory province by province summary of baojia organizing across the country see Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 73-121.

- 168 -
Beginning in 1935, the Nationalist authorities influenced Sichuan provincial government to cut county government bureaus, combine county level departments (裁局併科), and establish sub-county ward offices. Provincially-controlled bureaus were cut, such as the education, reconstruction, and police (gongan) departments, and their functions returned to county governments, where they were put under the direction of the county magistrate’s office. This was a clear concentration of power and authority at the county level and it was extended to military affairs as well, with the magistrate slated to be the commander of all militia, police, and training detachments in the county. Administrative powers were supplemented with judicial ones, as magistrates were given the power to investigate and adjudicate criminal cases. Each county was divided into 3-6 wards (qu) depending on population. The ward office was minimally staffed, with a ward head, 2-4 subordinate officials, one patrol officer, one secretary, one assistant secretary, and one or two clerks. The ward chief was recommended by the county magistrate and appointed by the provincial government, hence they were responsible only to the next administrative level (county) not to the ward residents. The ward office subordinates were locals, but the ward head was always a non-resident. Ward-level officers received salaries: a ward head received 70-90 yuan a month; staff 40 yuan; secretary 35 yuan, assistant secretary 20 yuan; and clerks 12 yuan. And each level could look forward to promotion after 2-3 years of service. The ward head was the commander of the ward’s militia detachment.

These sub-county positions were considered to be of critical importance to both the central authorities and Liu Xiang. Kang Ze’s Special Action Corps (beidongdui 別動隊) fanned out across the province, promoting the central government, building fortresses and organizing militia. As we have already seen, irritated by these initiatives, Liu tried to stem the central tide by training a body of county and ward administrators who would be loyal to him. In similar fashion, Liu attempted to contest the growing central influence in the baojia system. Liu ordered Deng Hanxiang to organize a baojia cadre training class. This class built directly on Liu’s county-level power base: graduates of the county training class were recycled as trainers for the baojia class. Between October 1936 and July 1937, the baojia cadre class, located in the western

---

83. The initial round of organizing was explicitly based on the 1932 “bandit extermination” (i.e., anti-communist) regulations from Jiangxi. The 1936 reorganization stressed that there would be no more tolerance of baojia units that existed only paper. By December 1936 fully 128 counties had completed their organizing – the laggard 21 counties were all located in peripheral areas and thus, were hampered by geography and low population densities. With their lianbao sprawling over wide areas, these peripheral counties were unable to control the far-flung bao; Ran Mianhui and Li Hulyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 123-5.

84. The only powers not incorporated into the magistrate’s office were land and commercial tax collection, because the provincial government feared that if the counties gained control of these functions that money would not be turned over to the province in full or on time.

suburbs of Chengdu, trained some 4,000 men. Mostly heads or vice-heads of lianbao, the trainees were split between political and paramilitary sections. Liu’s primary goal was to instill administrative discipline, emphasizing to the trainees the importance of the chain of command and respect for authority, which it was carefully pointed out was located in the provincial government; the trainees were explicitly taught to reject the authority of the Renaissance Society and Kang Ze’s agents.86 Liu Xiang’s death naturally removed the threat of the new baojia men offering coordinated resistance to the central government, but the power struggle between Liu and Chiang had trained a body of new local administrators and thus contributed directly to the prewar consolidation under Nationalist auspices. Even before Liu Xiang’s death, central authorities were working hard to establish a firm foothold in local administration as well. Much of the responsibility for the implementation of the reorganization schemes was placed on the administrative districts (ADs), which oversaw setting up baojia structures in the countryside. This work occupied much of the special inspectors’ attention in 1935-37.

The traditional baojia principle of one courtyard gate, one household (yimen yihu 一门一户) was changed to be one cooking fire as one household (yiyan yihu 一烟一户) to make it easier to count households: those who ate together were a household for baojia purposes, regardless of any blood relationship (or its absence). The nested decimal system was used, but with a simple concession to natural social geography: if a unit was the only sub-unit for the superior tier, then the unit was not constrained to the decimal limit. (In other words, if a bao contained only one jia, then that jia could exceed the ten household limit; similarly, if a lianao contained only one bao, then that bao could have more than ten jia.)87 By 1942, Sichuan had 62,904 bao and 673,274 jia, while the country as a whole had 379,039 bao and 4,115,942 jia. Thus, Sichuan had one-sixth to one-fifth of all the baojia units in the country and they were integral to Sichuan’s disproportionate contribution to the war effort in terms of drafted soldiers, taxed grain, and labor service.88

The character of the new baojia system in Sichuan was significantly changed from that of the imperial era; it was no longer mainly tax-related. And it expanded far beyond the anti-communist and community defense roles of its Jiangxi predecessor. Instead, it combined a multitude of roles and tasks. Naturally, the Nationalists were reticent to abandon the baojia’s earlier community surveillance role, choosing to marry those functions to political impulses.

86. Huang Baishu, “Sichuan sheng ‘xianxun’ he ‘baoxun’ de gaikuang,” in Jiangbei wenshiziliao, vol. 2, pp. 48-51. Huang was a graduate of Liu Xiang’s county administrators class. In addition to his post in a county near Chengdu, Huang was heavily involved with the baojia training class in 1936-7.
88. Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, p. 122. These numbers are not definitive and the numbers fluctuated up and down with the periodic reorganization initiatives. According to a recent demographer, Li Shiping, under the administrative districts between 1935-37, Sichuan was divvied up into 848,842 jia, 85,796 bao, and 5,163 lianbao; Li Shiping, Sichuan renkou shi, p. 199. In 1936, Baxian had 81 lianbao; 1,557 bao; and 15,405 jia; Baxian xianzhi, pp. 2125-6. Zhou Kaiqing, in Minguo Chuan shi jiyao, has Sichuan with 62,843 bao and 723,372 jia in March 1943. Ran and Liu cite government reports that in the spring of 1937, Sichuan already had 4,622 lianbao, 87,556 bao, and 873,562 jia; Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 127, citing Sichuansheng zhengfu tongji renyuan xunlianban tongxuehui (四川省政府統計人員訓練班同學會), Sichuan Tongji (四川統計), 1:1, February 1939, pp. 126-30.
Every five households (i.e., two groups per jia) had to sign a written pledge of mutual responsibility: if one of their number committed an offense and the others did not report it to the authorities, then they were to be punished exactly the same as the offender. And special “surveillance households” (jianshihu 監視戶) were recruited: those who refused or failed to sign the pledge of mutual responsibility were placed on a list for the rest of bao to keep watch over. At the first hint of suspicion, the head of household would be detained while an investigation was conducted.\(^9^9\) One AD in Sichuan stressed to trainees that baojia was the “village police system.” Although it lacked the uniforms, hats, guardposts, nightsticks, and publicly provided salary of city police, the rural baojia’s main task was “maintaining the peaceful social order of the village.”\(^9^0\)

But the revived baojia was burdened with a host of other functions as well. Hu Ciwei, the head of Sichuan’s provincial Civil Affairs Department, emphasized the baojia’s importance to population registration, publicizing complete registration procedures ahead of the central authorities which had not issued any comprehensive regulations even by 1940. And under his leadership, Sichuan’s baojia provided the province’s most accurate tabulation of its people since before the 1911 revolution, though authorities remained far from satisfied and undertook repeated reorganization schemes to fix irregularities.\(^9^1\) Baojia was also charged with local famine relief, anti-bandit actions, and road and fort construction, which were all predicated on mobilizing columns of able-bodied males between 18 and 45. These detachments were led by the bao head, but usually attached to the police or military whenever actively pursuing bandits or engaged in law and order duty. The baojia detachments were assigned patrol duties, communications roles such as document delivery, protection of roads and communications infrastructure, transport of military supplies, building fortifications and roads, and organizing fire brigades.\(^9^2\) The famine in 1936-37 saw an explosion of banditry and in response the provincial government ordered magistrates to extend baojia duties by having ward heads lead detachments of lianbao troops on regular patrols. To support this expanded role, baojia began providing paramilitary and militia training for adult males. In fact, the 3AD was ahead of the provincial curve in this regard; it was an early adopter, having begun using baojia for regular training for men as early as November 1935, while much of the province did not begin doing so until so ordered by central authorities in 1939. By early 1938, Baxian had trained more than 64,000 men (out of a total available pool of 114,000) and turned them over to the Baxian regimental district for further training as army replacements. In the rest of the province, the transition to providing paramilitary training for conscription authorities was lengthier and messier,\(^9^3\) but it marked the

90. Shen Peng, Baojia xuzhi, pp. 5-6, CQMA materials, government affairs (政务) section, #121.
91. Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 139-46.
93. Before the Citizen Militia was established and charged with providing providing paramilitary training for village men the situation in rural Sichuan was messy and complicated. Beginning in 1937 the Executive Yuan ordered the Social Military Training (社會軍事訓練) as a first step in a “Citizens Military Education” (國民兵教育) program that would feed into the new national military service system. But training situation in Sichuan was so poor that the first order of business was information gathering by lianbao as to how many able-bodied men were in each jurisdiction. Then, taking the bao as the base unit, columns of able-bodied men were aggregated and trained at the
transition from local self-defense roles to national mobilization.

The wide range of local and regional differences make it tough to generalize or assess the Nationalist government’s *baojia* on anything other than a local level. As Zhu Dexin notes in his study of the *baojia* in Henan and eastern Hebei during the 1930s and 1940s, the official *baojia* structures and nomenclature masked major differences in the uses and effects of the system, which varied greatly across time and place. In the region studied by Zhu, for example, the *baojia* initially established under KMT auspices was taken over and co-opted by the Japanese; it was tied to the New Peoples Society (*Xinminhui* 新民會) as part of the suite of occupation policies designed to pacify and control the Chinese population.  

The massive expansion of *baojia* responsibilities in Sichuan from 1935 on was directly connected to the war and preparing for war. In addition to the usual “mutual surveillance”

---

village, township or *liangbao* levels. Counties and municipalities also organized their own training units, which were under command of the province. Training started officially in January 1938, with each cohort to undergo 120-150 hours of training by the end of the year. The curriculum gave equal weight to politics and military drill. This social training was ineffective, so much so that a department chief, Liu Renyan (劉仁奄), in the 3AD commented that such social training “which mostly inclines toward the military aspects, and political training work existed only in name (虛有其名). The thinking of able-bodied men is .... just as before, the national concept is extremely shallow and weak.” Liu recommended routing such training through the *baojia*, with units conducting drills at least once a month and intensifying right before lottery draws; qz0055.mj3-291, pp. 40a-41b, n.d. but the reference to “social training” (*shehui xunlian*) indicates that it was before the concentration of training functions in the hands of the Citizens Militia. After training the men were organized into “Brave Companies” (*yiyou zhuanmingdui* 義勇壯丁隊), which were one of the sources for manpower while conscription had not yet been officially begun. *Baojia* heads were part of this, as officers/cadres training the men. Between 1936 and May 1938, the county of Xindu trained 1,300 cadres (from baojia) in model units and squad commanders, and a total of 8000 men were organized into such units, which were put to use in maintaining local peace, suppressing bandits, and patrol duties in areas where needed, as well as supplying some reserves and replacements for Sichuan military units fighting at the front. Once the Junzhengbu set up RDs in the province, the social military training programs were folded into the national military service structure, though they remained available for local peacekeeping duty. The National Military Service training program began originally in 1929 as military drill in schools, and was expanded to all of society after the promulgation of the Military Service Law (1933). In 1939 all counties and municipalities were ordered to establish Citizen Militia units, directly under the command of the nearest divisional and regional districts. Once the national draft was implemented in Sichuan in 1939, these various programs were consolidated under Citizen Militia auspices: the “Brave Companies” (ostensibly organized under the Social Military Training program of the Political Bureau, *Zhengzhibu*) were renamed as Citizen Militia. All men 18-45 years old who were not already in standing units were incorporated into the militia. As indicated in chapter two, they were organized in two ways, by age (year of birth) and by geography. The geographically-based units were, in fact, tied directly to the *baojia*. Each *jia* organized its eligible men into a squad (*jiaban* 甲班); each *bao* organized a company (*baodui* 保隊). The head of each *bao* head made up eligible men rosters and submitted them to the county or municipal militia commander. *Bao* troops were called up for training and to handle rear area service work; Jin Shizhong, “Kangzhan shiqi Sichuan sheng baojiazhang zhiquan yu xingzhi de zhuhanbian”, pp. 5-8. Thus, wartime mobilization demanded folding conscription, social military drill, and the local peacekeeping detachments (i.e., the *baojia* *zhuanmingdui*) into one system, as the foundation for the reserves and replacements for the national military.

measures, the baojia was charged with mobilizing massive amounts of corvée labor for road and airfield construction; tax and grain collection; opium suppression; war propaganda, usually called “spiritual mobilization”; and the protection of communications equipment and infrastructure in the countryside.95

The New County System (xin xianzhi 新縣制), which reorganized county and sub-county administration beginning in 1940, formally acknowledged that the goals for the baojia system had shifted. Its role as an anti-communist tool and in support of police and military forces in maintaining law and order was replaced by a dual emphasis on self-protection (ziwei 自衛) and self-government (zizhi 自治) that was intended to “manage, educate, nourish, and protect” (guan, jiao, yang, wei 管教養衛) local communities. Baojia units were incorporated into villages and townships (xiang and zhen), making them directly subordinate to the community public offices, as a way of injecting a dose of self-government into local administration. Limited assemblies and elections of officers and baojia heads were mandated. However, these self-government aspects – particularly meetings of households, bao and jia heads, and representatives to village assemblies – declined precipitously after 1940. Yet, the baojia organizing, particularly under the New County System, was a qualified success. Despite uneven implementation and a general neglect of economic reconstruction work to improve the livelihood of rural residents, by end of 1941, 944 counties country-wide had implemented the reforms, setting up 25,069 village/township public offices, 318,367 bao, and 163,901 primary or citizens schools. By the end of the following year, these numbers were up to 1,119 counties, 1,853 ward offices, 30,470 village/township public offices, 379,681 bao offices, and 4,118,413 jia. Given the hard conditions of the time, some KMT authorities considered the New County System to be a significant success.96

The success was not only found in numerical expansion, but also the nationalization of the baojia as it became subordinated to national policy and a tool for the war effort. As outlined in chapter two, the baojia was connected up to the Citizen Militia, the umbrella for converting disparate local self-protection forces into feeder branches for the conscription administration. Serving as commanders of Citizen Militia units, baojia heads were brought into the draft system to handle information-gathering on residents, paramilitary training for local men, pre-induction training for draft selectees, conduct physical examinations of draftees, and deliver conscripts to military units. The local self-protection role remained, but it was pursued half-heartedly at best – the nationalization of the baojia was complete. Still, that did not mean that the paramilitary training (for eventual conscription) was good, as it too was rudimentary and often fell far short of the prescribed curriculum.97 In effect, baojia was bent into shape as primarily an administrative tool, designed to be the lowest administrative level of the state and a conduit for a wide-range of central directives down into communities. This function supplanted any theoretical plans and


96. Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, p. 69, citing a 1943 report by the Interior Ministry and published in a journal on county administration by the Civil Affairs department of the Sichuan provincial government, and pp. 69-73. Historians have not always been so sanguine, noting that it was “a failure”; Hsi-sheng Ch‘i, Nationalist China at War, pp. 132-53

ideas for it as an instrument of genuine self-government in rural society. Despite its disappointing performance in the self-government realm, it was this expanded administrative capacity of the Sichuan baojia that permitted its indispensable contribution to the war effort: extracting resources (grain and taxes) and manpower (corvée laborers and conscript soldiers).

In the military realm, the baojia moved from primarily a community self-defense role to one of national mobilization, a fact which was reflected in Shen Peng’s training materials for new baojia heads:

What is the baojia system? ‘Baojia system is an effective system of the people’s self-organized armed force, that cooperates with the government to protect the law and order of a locality and to promote the government orders.’ Before the Tang dynasty here in China, it was always a conscription system, so soldiers were the people, and the people were soldiers. There was no difference between soldiers and the people. So it was said, ‘when there is a crisis, [they] are soldiers, when there is no crisis, they are [just] people.’ It was only after the Tang when this was changed to a mercenary system, meaning people put forward money to recruit soldiers, so at that time people and soldiers were separated: soldiers were soldiers, people were people. Now we are handling the baojia because we want the people to organize their own military strength, want the people to be their own soldiers, to protect themselves. Because [of all this], we say that baojia is the people’s self-organized armed force. However, this military strength must cooperate with the government, and obey the government’s orders, to protect law and order with the government.

During his five year stint as a ward head in Mianyang county, downriver from Chongqing, Mi Qingyun oversaw daily training for local paramilitary units and their nightly guard duty, as well as forced labor to build roads and forts. These aspects of baojia work were a serious imposition on the farmers’ time. The system was primarily a conduit for implementing the policies of the central government; as Shen Peng averred, central orders reach the people quickly, because the baojia is the people.

The 3AD, under Shen Peng’s leadership, worked hard at implementing the new system in the mid-1930s. In mid-April 1938, the AD received orders for another round of reorganizing the baojia — Chiang’s Field HQ gave both Sichuan and Guizhou provinces a three month deadline to get their baojia ducks in a row — and the planning phase continued until the end of May. Shen Peng admitted candidly that the 3AD’s baojia were failing in several regards. Door placards in many communities were not standardized and often lacked the proper notation for things like household members’ occupations. Issues connected with population mobility were particularly troublesome and they were exacerbated by lax paperwork (e.g., many areas were not keeping men and women separate in their records of entries and exits). Shen Peng had to remind the

---

98. Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 161-85.


101. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

102. For an outline of the detailed procedures and processes for organizing baojia at various times during 1935 and 1949, see Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 163-74.
counties that inns, teahouses, and bathhouses were within the purview of baojia, despite their status as businesses. The 3AD’s geography added its own challenges. Both the Yangzi and Jialing rivers have extreme low water periods in the winter, which expose portions of the banks, sand bars, and riverbed. Every year a seasonal “crop” of tents sprouted on the newly exposed land. These temporary communities posed serious problems and required seasonal baojia units to keep track of the squatters. The changes of the late 1930s were to proceed from county cities to the markets and townships, and then to villages. Selecting the new coterie of baojia cadres was the responsibility of superiors: the ward heads selected lianbao chiefs, who then selected bao heads, who in turn chose jia heads. The 3AD brought in a village reformer from north China to consult and oversee the renewed efforts, which aimed at extending baojia’s role in local society as part of the war effort. As Shen Peng remarked,

The baojia system is the only organization for unifying the masses and developing [their] self-protection capabilities. It also the only path for training the masses, setting the foundation for self-government. Previously during the bandit extermination period, promoting the baojia system brought about the greatest results. Presently with the long-term war of resistance, it is even more necessary to expand the scope of self-protection, by strengthening self-protection organization, and increasing self-protection power. If our baojia organization is not speedily tightened up, then the ‘unity of the masses’ is just empty talk and there will be no way to pacify the interior or aid one another in this time of national crisis.

The counties’ best and most conscientious effort was needed because “baojia work is the main thread of many matters (頭緒萬端)” and thus vital to the war effort.103

The Problem of Recruitment: Who Were These Men?

Like the Qing, the most problematic aspect of the Nationalist regime’s baojia was recruitment of qualified men to serve as heads of the bao and jia levels in particular. So far there is no satisfactory sociological analysis of these men; historians have generally had to make do with contemporary stereotypes that get endlessly repeated. With nearly 850,000 jia units in Sichuan alone, getting a firm grasp of even a single province has proven impossible; the physical, social and political geography varied so greatly across the province that compiling a composite image of the baojia heads is far from an easy task.

Contemporaries, however, confidently and thoroughly castigated the baojia heads, tarring them with very broad brushes. Authorities, from conscription districts to county governments to central agencies, often averred that it was just the same old men – bad gentry and local bullies – serving as baojia heads.104 And indeed, it was hard to recruit good men. In many areas, the upright gentry and the educated were not willing to serve. The low-class and uneducated men

103. Shen Peng, Yongchuan xian ershiqi nian zhengli baojia gaikuang, n.p., 1938; the long quote is from p. 32, the short from p. 73, other pages relevant for this summary are pp. 1-4, 6, 11, 27-8, 32-3, 48-9, and 65-9. This war effort focus was emphasized by one baojia administrator who put down his thoughts on his experiences. Zhou Lianrong’s (周連榮) short piece betrayed an intense focus on “bad elements” (不良分子) who were trying to derail the baojia’s main task, war mobilization; qz0061.mj15-23 (tonghao: 25), p. 126 n.d.

104. In 1944, Sun Fo in a speech as vice chairman of the Executive Yuan called the baojia heads “bad elements”, “rascals and oppressive gentry”; Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Nationalist China at War, p. 140.
who did were generally accused of lacking public consciousness and being easily manipulated by unscrupulous elements within the community. The situation was often summarized in a popular cliché: “Good men will not [be baojia heads], and those who will are not good” (賢者不為，為者不賢).105

Chiang’s criticisms of Cheng Zerun and the MSO notwithstanding, Nationalist authorities were fixated on the baojia as the root of the draft problems. The conscription bureaucracy consistently attributed almost all problems to the baojia. In mid-1944, when fear and extra levies were at their height due to the Ichigo Offensive, the MSO circulated an order to the conscription districts around Chongqing, demanding that the chaos in the area be swiftly ended by investigating the baojia and village office personnel who were causing all the problems.106 Every tier blamed the one below: the 12th bao in Renhe complained to the village office that draft work was very difficult because the jia heads and Citizen Militia leaders were illiterate.107

This rhetoric of blame was so entrenched that even materials destined for foreign audiences adopted this perspective. Lin Yutang, perhaps the most eloquent of the KMT’s mouthpieces to the English-speaking world, again provides an excellent quotation that neatly parroted bureaucratic orthodoxy, which is unsurprising in that his views were based in large part upon his conversations and contacts with the highest echelons of Nationalist elites and bureaucrats.

[T]he problem of the replacement of soldiers is a grave one, not because of shortage of manpower, but because of abuses in the selection and care of the selectees. This is the darkest aspect of the whole China war. The draft system completely breaks down in the hands of the village heads (paochang, or chiefs of pao units); they have arrested villagers at night without notice and held it as a weapon over people who offend or defy them, although official draft rules provide for regular periods of selection and notification; they have often accepted bribes for substitutes and connived at returning deserters; they have not followed the regulations and have turned in required numbers of selectees with false names and without regard to the health and age limitations. A magistrate told me that he believes a high percentage of the draftees came under false names. The draftees are marched, ill-clad, ill-fed, and without proper medical care, across mountains to a different province, and many fall sick on the way. Such hardships encourage desertion, which in turn causes some sergeants responsible for delivery at the camp to treat recruits like prisoners while on the way. These conditions discourage enlistment, which in turn encourages the selling of substitutes by the village heads. Such are the terrible abuses of the conscription system. . . . [A] thorough reform is required, and I suggested to President Chiang Kai-shek that the first step is to take the matter out of the hands of the village gentry. Periodic drawings under the joint supervision of the Army Draft Stations, the local magistrate, and representatives of the People’s Political Council, protected by a system of fingerprint identification, would make such abuses impossible. In the absence of transportation facilities, selectees should be trained, organized, and shaped into some sort of physical fitness before they

105. Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 177 and 185-6.
106. Baxian to Renhe, forwarding MSO order; qz0059.mj2-50, p. 199 dated July 1944.
107. qz0059.mj2-49, p. 188 dated April 1943.
are sent out of the province, thus shortening the hardships in the period between selection and induction into a regular unit.\textsuperscript{108}

Lin’s characterization of the abuses is not wrong per se, but his proposed reforms, despite requiring a completely unrealistic level of state surveillance (i.e., the fingerprint ID), amounted to completely de-localizing the draft, removing local communities and elites from the process altogether. It was a tidy concept, but Lin did not seem to grasp that community resistance and collective action – led by elites – were distinct possibilities if the draft lacked any real community “insider” authority. In short, not only was such a plan an administrative impossibility, but it could easily have made it harder to extract men from villages.

Internally, the MSO was just as convinced of the baojia’s place as the weak link in the system, but insider commentators were also aware that there was no reasonable way to completely bypass community elites. Instead, astute administrators called for reforms that would have turned baojia men into genuine state agents. In February 1941, a publication commemorating the second anniversary of the founding of the MSO reprinted an article from the Military Service Monthly (BYYK) on “How To Make Citizens Serve Willingly.” The author, one Yan Kuan (嚴寬) argued that the baojia abuses gum up the system. Yan initially followed the orthodox interpretation of the day that it was the baojia men’s low education level that was at the root of their unreliability: they just do not “understand” the military service laws and regulations. Not understanding the regulations, these men were susceptible to the influence of the wealthy who “use money to escape and evade military service.” The only solution was to recruit competent and incorrupt baojia heads so that local administration did not have to rely on “local bullies and evil gentry who do nothing in these positions.” The crux of the matter, Yan argues, was to pay baojia heads on a par with other civil servants and teachers so that educated and upright men would be brought into service on the local level and would remain responsive to the government. Providing promotion opportunities would help attract conscientious men too.\textsuperscript{109} For Yan, the problem was in large part a moral one, but he put a twist on the classic “rule by good men” principle by suggesting that the necessary “good men” would serve only if they were remunerated sufficiently. As far as Sichuan was concerned, Yan was still off the mark, however. As we will see, the prewar years had in fact installed a younger, more educated, more responsive stratum of men into the lower baojia levels and, it is doubtful that even paying them better would have made any substantial difference simply because they were inevitably embedded in their communities and subject to important pressures from their residents and neighbors.

These broad-brush critical assessments are somewhat suspect in that they were proffered by agencies who were anxious to deflect blame for failures in local administration (and particularly conscription) away from themselves or the system in general and on to other actors. The criticisms, thus, tend to be overly general, making blanket statements about the qualifications, motives, and national “consciousness” of the whole body of baojia men. However, if we restrict our view to the 3AD, and carefully acknowledge the fragmentary nature of the evidence, some tentative patterns do emerge that suggest the baojia was not as direly bankrupt as higher state agents wished to believe. It is important to note, however, that the

\begin{footnotesize}
\item[108.] Lin Yutang, \textit{Vigil of a Nation}, p. 248.
\item[109.] \textit{Junzhengbu bingyishu chengli er zhounian jinian tekan}, February 1941, reprinting of Bingyi yuekan (BYYK) vol. 2, nos. 10, 11, and 12; the quotations are from page 84.
\end{footnotesize}
discussion below is based on fragmentary evidence. It is meant to be suggestive, but it should not be taken as definitive. In addition, the situation in Chongqing and its environs was possibly somewhat exceptional. As the Nationalist government’s key “stronghold” it was blanketed with a state presence and attention that was not always seen in other areas. Despite those caveats, the baojia was so critical to the war effort that it needs to be re-evaluated as closely as possible, rather than uncritically repeating the clichés and platitudes of higher authorities.

The first point to note is that while traditionally jia leaders had been selected informally by the residents and bao heads by the group of jia heads themselves, the 1930s reforms in Sichuan took a different approach. Each level was appointed by the next level up the ladder. The county magistrate appointed the ward heads, who selected the lianbao chiefs, who chose the bao heads, who picked the jia heads.110 The official requirements for a bao head was that he be a local resident over 20 sui; have no bad habits; must not have been punished for harming national policy or for acts of a “local bully, evil gentry”; must not have been stripped of his civil rights for felonies nor have been an accomplice of the communists in their incursion into the province. In short, he must be a “citizen” (gongmin 公民) in good standing, but with some added social and political requirements. And, most interestingly, just like compulsory military service, men tapped to serve as a baojia head by the ward chief were not allowed to refuse. Localities were desperate for “good men”, so good men were to be compelled to serve if they were unwilling.111

There are some official reports that contradict the dominant critical rhetoric. An internal conscription analysis averred that the majority of currently serving village baojia heads were elderly gentlemen (qishen chushen 億紳出身), who enjoyed fairly deep respect among the people. These men, “who bend the law only when promoting conscription,” should be trained in central government classes in rotational groups while a new stratum of younger men, drawn from the mass of educated but unemployed youth, be trained and appointed as deputy baojia heads. Village-level baojia personnel must be given living expenses to keep them diligent and “nourish honest and pure attitudes” and reduce corrupt abuses.112 It is difficult from the scanty records available to adduce whether the writers’ assessment of baojia heads’ social standing is accurate, but there are indications that it was not far off the mark in the 3AD at least. Liu Rong (劉蓉), the head of the 21st bao in Renhe township (人和鎮) in Baxian, for example, claimed that he was entrusted with his position because of his social standing, and thus was able to call a meeting of “all the gentry, jia heads, and heads of households for a bao business meeting for [community] defense.” Seeking contributions from the township elite, Liu raised money to buy firearms for the local patrol forces.113

110. Kapp, Szechwan, p. 112. In the 3AD, there seems to have been a variation on the provincial pattern: the ward chief selected the bao heads, who then selected the lianbao head from among their number; Shen Peng, Baojia xuzhi, p. 29. Shen Peng’s book, however, is not a record of actual events, but a statement of policy written to educate baojia heads, and thus, it is not certain to what extent practice in Yongchuan and the 3AD really differed from the provincial pattern.


112. Unfortunately, this is a fragmentary document: not only is it undated, but the author and agency responsible are not included; qz0041.mj1-6, pp. 33a-4a n.d.

113. qz0059.mj2-34, pp. 4a-b dated 24 January 1942. Local elites were clearly dominant at the lianbao level, while it lasted; the lianbao office was chaired by gentry and community notables,
While the suggestion to provide living-wage salaries for most baojia heads was not implemented, there was a concerted effort to recruit and train a younger, more educated cadre of ground-level administrators. Training classes were held in Chongqing and at the Emei Mountain Training Corps for county and ward administrators. Meanwhile, baojia training was pushed through the AD system. In late 1935, each AD organized “able-bodied cadre training classes” (壯丁幹部訓練班), which were headed by the special inspectors, but really controlled by a team of specialists from Kang Ze’s Special Action Corps. Liu Xiang’s provincial government, not to be outdone, opened training classes for lianbao in Chengdu and the graduates returned to their counties to organize baojia training institutes there. Many ADs dispatched training troupes to townships and villages to educate baojia personnel.

Reliable statistics for specific communities are difficult to come by, but do exist for one township near Chongqing. Renhe township in Baxian’s second ward, was located south of Chongqing, east of Baishiyi and west of the Yangzi. It contained four bao within the town itself, and a further thirty-three in the surrounding countryside, for roughly 3,300 households. (Not all the bao had their full complement of jia, as the total in 1939 was 324 jia units.)

appointed by the ward head or county magistrate, and this fact raised the prestige of the office. That increased influence allowed for some oversight of bao heads, whereas earlier the lianbao head had been chosen from among those already serving as bao head, a situation which led to the lianbao being ignored by the other bao chiefs who considered the lianbao head to be a peer, not a superior. The lianbao man enjoyed a relatively high salary of 16-20 yuan and the support of a “mediation committee” which functioned to give the lianbao head powers of an (unofficial) local court; see Mi Qingyun, “Zhongyangjun ru Chuan ji,” in Zhou Kangxie, ed., Minguo yilai Sichuan Dongluan shiliao huiji, pp. 156-7.

Some areas did provide nominal salaries of a few yuan per month for baojia men; Mi Qingyun, “Zhongyangjun ru Chuan ji,” in Zhou Kangxie, ed., Minguo yilai Sichuan Dongluan shiliao huiji, pp. 156.

Before the war, training programs for county and sub-county personnel was an area of tension and low-temperature struggle between Chiang Kaishek’s central agencies and the local power elites under Liu Xiang. In early 1935 a training class was held in Chongqing for county administrations. The plan was to require all magistrates, ward heads, and department heads to be graduates of this institute. Chiang dispatched a political science clique man, Wang Youyong (王又庸) to be head of education. Liu Xiang, for his part, felt that as provincial chairman, if he did not have control over county administration that the province would never be truly settled or effective. So he sent Deng Hanxiang (鄧漢祥) to represent him and secure the loyalty of the trainees. As the provincial government was in charge of appointing the magistrates and ward heads, Deng’s work went smoothly and most of the trainees responded favorably to his overtures. Chiang in turn sent all the magistrates and a good portion of the department heads to the Emei Mountain for additional training. By the next round of training in February 1940, the center was dominant and the simmering conflict was over between the central government and Liu’s Sichuan elite. Instead, however, factions within the KMT came to the fore as the CC Clique and the Revival Society (fuxingshe, under Kang Ze) began struggling for influence in the province; Mi Qingyun, “Zhongyangjun ru Chuan ji,” pp. 156-61. See also the documents on baojia training in Chongqing, which included lecture series and conferences conducted under municipal police bureau auspices on proper handling of baojia work, qz0063.mj1-136 (renumbered mj1-140), pp. 8-10 dated 3 August 1939 and qz0063.mj1-136 (renumbered mj1-140), pp. 17-18 dated 2 August 1939.

Basic facts on Renhe are found in qz0059.mj2-45, pp. 162a-b, n.d. but internally dated to
lianbao office report on the thirty-seven bao heads and the men serving in its military service section is on file in the Chongqing Municipal Archives. The numbers make clear that there were some community elders serving, but that many of the baojia men were young, semi-educated, and usually had gone through official training classes. The oldest bao head was 56 sui, the youngest was merely 22. The ages averaged just under 37 and a half sui, but the age distribution is revealing, showing a close to even split between those forty sui and up and those in their 20s and 30s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-3: Age Distribution of Renhe Bao Heads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>source: qz0059.mj1-24, pp. 32-3, n.d. (internally dated to before 1940)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even more interesting is the tabulation of the “qualifications” or experience of these men, showing that the baojia drew on men who were experienced in either the baojia itself or the Citizen Militia and those who had been trained in special classes.117

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-4: Qualifications of Renhe Bao Heads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>previously held bao head position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previously held jia head position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>held Citizens Militia commander or deputy commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trained in special baojia class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previously held village head or vice-head position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>educator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>source: qz0059.mj1-24, pp. 32-3, n.d. (internally dated to before 1940)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In fact, this table undoubtedly underestimates the number of men who had received training in county or AD classes, as it was usually noted only when the man had not held a position previ-

mid-1939 and qz0059.mj2-45, pp. 201-4, dated March 1939.

117. The Citizen Militia was likewise relying on current baojia men and graduates from military service training classes. Baxian ran military service training classes that qualified its students, primarily jia heads, to serve as deputy commanders of their militia units; qz0059.mj2-60, pp. 261-262 dated 5 June 1940.
ously. Fully 21 of these men held a current position, usually as vice-commander, in *baojia* squads or companies.\(^{118}\)

The local *baojia* in Renhe was clearly being recruited from a young to early middle-age stratum of men who were semi-educated and a good portion of which had undergone at least some rudimentary state-sponsored training in their responsibilities.\(^{119}\) This group was self-perpetuating in that men who had experience tended to remain working within the ladder in some capacity. Unfortunately, there is no reliable indicator of the educational qualifications of these men, so it is difficult to judge whether the common critique that they were illiterate was accurate or based on an outdated stereotype. What is clear, however, is the fact that when they re-instituted the *baojia* in Sichuan in the mid-1930s, the Nationalists attempted to fix the social impasse that had plagued the Qing period system, by installing a trained and more responsive stratum of administrators within villages.

This attempt to remake sub-county administrators was a less intensive version of what was going on within county governments, as there was an increased focus – particularly with regard to conscription work – to train the petit-educated stratum in the counties’ Military Service Department or Section (*bingyi ke* or *gu* 役科／股). We have much better records for these men, as opposed to the very thin materials for the lowest tiers of the *baojia* ladder: counties filed

\(^{118}\) Tables above and in the following footnote are taken from qz0059.mj1-24, pp. 32-3, n.d. As this report was filed by the *lianbao* office it must be before the 1940 reorganization which abolished the *lianbao* tier and set up township offices in its place.

\(^{119}\) The twenty-seven men who were the township’s staff in the military service section show similar trends, but tended to be markedly younger; the oldest was only 37 years old, the youngest 18, with an average age of only 24.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-5: Ages of Renhe Military Service Department Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age Range</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

qz0059.mj1-24, pp. 32-3, n.d. (internally dated to before 1940)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-6: Qualifications of Renhe Military Service Department Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qualification</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>principal of county primary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graduate of 20A officer training class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graduate of county “model unit”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graduate of <em>baojia</em> training class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graduate of primary, middle, or high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unrecorded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

qz0059.mj1-24, pp. 32-3, n.d. (internally dated to before 1940)
regular assessments of their performance and qualifications. These men were almost universally educated at least to middle school level and often beyond. Many of them served in minor county government positions prior to being appointed to counties’ Military Service Sections or Military Affairs Bureaus (junshike 軍事科). Unlike the baojia men, who were neighborhood residents, many of the county-level staff were mobile petit-elite, administrative journeymen who filled several posts before settling into their positions in the county’s military service department.\(^{120}\)

This is not to say that efforts to fashion a responsive body of local state agents were wholly successful. In early 1939, the Baxian county magistrate, Wang Yu (王煜) and head of the military section chief, Duan Zhenhuan (段震寰), admitted that many baojia were “not fulfilling their responsibilities fully, but sitting by idly doing their jobs perfunctorily. Baojia heads do not dare to involve families with money or power.”\(^{121}\) Even county magistrates were at times unable to really control the staffing of their governments. The former Jiangbei magistrate Huang Yongwei (黄永偉), complained that his public image suffered greatly in the early months of his tenure. Hewas “surrounded” by unruly subordinates, secretary He Weiwen (何蔚文), Fang Benwu (方本吾) who was head of the civil affairs department, and Shi Qingsong (師慶崧) who was head of the grain administration department. These men controlled almost everything. Fang Benwu routinely sold posts as village and township heads to the highest bidders and there were several other cases of men bribing their way to official appointments. “The county government had almost become a marketplace, with negotiations being carried on openly in teahouses and wineshops.”\(^{122}\)

The province continued to explore ways to ensure the qualifications of sub-county staff. The Sichuan provincial government ordered counties to establish committees to review the qualifications of staff in wards, townships, and villages.\(^{123}\) Counties could not be entirely trusted and thus in mid-1940 the Sichuan provincial district had to insist that appointees involved with

---

120. Fragmentary reports from county governments on military service personnel for Rongchang, Dazu, Bishan, and Yongchuan, can be found at: qz0055.mj3-243, pp. 8a-b, 12-1 through 12-6, 16/1 through 16/4, and 19/1 through 19/5, dated 31 January, 28 April, 8 May, and 9 June 1939; qz0055.mj3-243, pp. 30 through 30/5, dated 8 June 1939; qz0055.mj3-243, pp. 46/1 through 46/5 dated in July 1939: qz0055.mj3-243, pp. 100a-b; qz0055.mj3-243, pp. 35b through 35/2 dated 9 July 1939; qz0055.mj3-243, pp. 116, 125a-6, 149-50b, 156a-b, dated December 1940; qz0055.mj3-243, pp. 72a-4b, 76a79b October 1939; qz0055.mj3-243, pp. 107a-13b, reports dated January, April, June, July 1942; and qz0055.mj 3-243, pp. 49a-57b forms filed January, February, April, May, June, July, March, August, 1940.

121. qz0055.mj3-243, pp. 75a dated 2 January 1939.

122. qz0055.mj3-354, pp. 140-142 dated 13 October 1944 (rec’d).

123. From the surviving documentation, the committee work seems to be rather pro forma, despite the frequent invocation of specific regulations and grading candidates into first- and second- grades; see the Jiangjin county response to the 3D, qz0055.mj3-295, pp. 134-7 dated 10 January 1945 and one from Hechuan, qz0055.mj3-295, pp. 93-4 and 109-10 dated May and June 1945). This lends some support to a 1941-42 report that found few bao and jia heads even in Sichuan were truly qualified for their jobs; Hsi-sheng Ch‘i, Nationalist China at War, p. 140, citing Dangzheng gongzuo kaoche weiyuanhui sanshi nian sanshiyi niandu gesheng zhengwu kaocha baogao zongping (黨政工作考核委員會三十年三十一年度各省政務考察報告總評), n.p., 1942.
any aspect of conscription be trained and then individually approved by provincial authorities.  

The situation in Chongqing held some similarities to that in the rural countryside, in large part because Chongqing society was structured in a honeycomb fashion that itself was reminiscent of insular village life. We will look at this in more detail shortly, but here it is important to note that most local administrators – the baojia, ward, and township (zhen) heads – in Chongqing shared some characteristics with rural ones. The baojia records in Chongqing are voluminous and largely complete. An exhaustive study of them is beyond the scope of this project, but even a cursory look through the files is enough to demonstrate that the municipal baojia were not the illiterate bumpkins so often decried by conscription authorities. Many of these men were graduates of middle school who originally had hopes of continuing their education but were forced – by war or family financial difficulties – to move into teaching and public service as a way of making ends meet. The wards and the Citizens’ Militia in Chongqing were tightly integrated with the police bureau and recruited many men with police or military training. In the eighth ward’s Huangshaxi township (黄沙溪镇, pop. 4,526 adults in 808 registered households), the personnel file of one completely unremarkable baojia staffer in the township office, Liu Peize (刘培澤), exhibits fairly common qualities. Thirty-one sui, Liu was from Nanchong county, about 145 km north of Chongqing. He was a graduate from upper middle school and although he was neither a KMT nor Youth Corps member, he had worked for five years first at a middle-level post in the Nanchong tax bureau and then at the Sichuan Provincial Business Tax Bureau. His application to work in the office was supported by two local men, and like most local administrators, he was required to file a short “autobiography.” Other low-level baojia and ward staff were similar. One Sun Wenbin (孫文彬), a middle-school graduate, came from a petty merchant family from Neijiang. The disruptions of Sichuan’s many civil wars put an end to his studies and Sun turned to teaching in a primary school and working in his township’s public office before moving to Chongqing to work in an arsenal and then the Mawang township (马王镇) public office in Chongqing’s first ward.  

Chen Haishan (陳海山), from Hubei, was only 28 sui in 1943. Like Sun, he too was a middle-school graduate who was forced to stop his studies because his family lacked the funds. He tested into a local police bureau and by 1938 was working in the Hubei provincial police force and then took a logistical position in the Sixth War Area food purchasing committee. Trained in Hubei for local administration work, he held positions in a county Civil Affairs department, before leaving for

124. Zhou Shude, commander of the Baxian regimental district forwarded a Sichuan provincial district order to Tang Yi, head of the Chongqing police bureau: “Because military service is currently an essential policy and is a specialized task, all personnel handling the draft must in principle go through training and be dispatched from here [the PD], so that they are adept in the regulations.” Orders to that effect were on file, but the Sichuan provincial district discovered that counties were installing military service staff that had not been approved by, or even reported to, the conscription administration at all. Some counties even went so far as to suppress superior agencies’ orders and send out their own men secretly. Many of these were holdovers from local organizations, either baojia subordinates or public security forces. This practice was now strictly prohibited: military service personnel must first secure approval and official appointment from the provincial district before taking up their post; qz0061.mj15-4549, pp. 21-22 dated 2 July 1940.


Chongqing.\textsuperscript{127}

To reiterate, the significance of this digression into local administration is that the wartime Nationalist government was attempting to set up a new, responsive stratum of local functionaries. While we will soon look at specific cases, it is important to note that the \textit{baojia} and ward staff were transitionally different than the imperial era. They were clearly not the dominant community elite (gentry) of the imperial era, but neither were they common farmers, but instead the under-employed educated petit-elite of both countryside and city. As such, they were not as socially isolated as the \textit{baojia} heads had been. They were still not always able to rely on their social prestige to elicit compliance, but they were no longer the lowest residents of community. The ward and township heads and vice-heads in Chongqing, for example, were often regarded highly enough to enjoy community support.\textsuperscript{128} It was not uncommon for residents to petition higher ups when a respected township or ward head was cashiered. In early 1941 in Danzishi township (彈子石鎮), the township head, Kuang Xicheng (況錫成) was dismissed, but the residents, \textit{baojia} staff, Citizens’ Militia officers, and gentry representatives signed a petition which pleaded that he be retained, because “all the residents of the township rely on [his] protection to go about their daily business” – if he was dismissed “the whole township will be fearful.” The outcome is not recorded, but the impetus is noteworthy.\textsuperscript{129} Such cases were found down even to the \textit{bao} level as well.

In late 1940, the 5th ward police office forwarded to Tang Yi, chief of the Chongqing police bureau, a lengthy petition on behalf of Zhou Wenbin (周文彬), head of the 2nd \textit{bao} and a cadre in the Citizen Militia in Shibanpo township (石板坡鎮). Zhou was investigated for lining his pockets under guise of official business and dismissed from his post, which he had held for four years. The \textit{bao} was ordered to cashier Zhou and the residents to select a suitable man as a replacement, though their choice would have to be approved by higher-ups. However, the township public office defended Zhou to the 5th ward police, stating that he was committed to his work and had been cited for merit by his superiors. In fact, he had originally been a \textit{jia} head, and only after the \textit{jia} residents had seen his uprightness was he tapped for a promotion to the \textit{bao} level. The police sent an investigator who questioned the township head and other residents, finding that the case against Zhou was not exactly as it appeared. As part of his militia duties, he was charged with maintaining order at the local rice shop, which was jointly run by ten merchants. He was cashiered for selling rice, but the police found that his actions, instead of being for private gain, were taken to supply rice to the Citizens’ Militia unit and residents in Shibanpo by buying a fixed amount from the shop and selling it to militia members on a rotational basis. The police report included a petition, with pages of signatures from every \textit{jia} head in the \textit{bao} as well as general Shibanpo residents, and a second petition, with identical

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{127} qz0061.mj15-25 (tonghao: 27), pp. 121-4 dated April 1943. Other examples can be found in Chongqing police files, such as: qz0061.mj15-25 (tonghao: 27), pp. 116-20 dated April 1943, pp. 176-7 dated May 1943, pp. 181 dated April 1943 and qz0061.mj15-23 (tonghao: 25), p. 118 dated 9 December 1940, p. 123b dated 7 December 1940; pp. 150-1 dated 13 December 1940.
\item \textsuperscript{128} See the example of the vice-heads of the 15th ward, Li Zhaian (李宅安) and Xie Yongruo (謝頌若), who were recommended by “gentry and elders” in the neighborhood. Both graduates of middle-schools, they also had experience as township heads in other communities and as militia or police bureaus; qz0061.mj15-29 (tonghao: 31), pp. 86a-b dated 26 December 1940.
\item \textsuperscript{129} qz0061.mj15-29 (tonghao: 31), pp. 93-4 dated January 1941.
\end{itemize}
wording, but an entirely new list of supporters. By all appearances, this was a well-orchestrated public relations campaign in support of Zhou.130

Conclusion

Tightly restricted geographically, this chapter has nevertheless covered a lot of ground. Sichuan’s geographical isolation was the foundation for its political independence after 1911, as well as its attraction for Chiang as an impregnable base with rich storehouses of material and bodily reserves from which to fight the inevitable war for national survival. The geography of Chongqing made it irresistible as Chiang’s wartime capital, and thus helped shape the city’s experience of the war, as a place of refuge for exiles and displaced people and as a redoubt for the national government. The crowding together of so many people from across the country and the dense clustering of government agencies and economic enterprises produced a unique situation in the city in which locals were systematically marginalized from most positions of power. In Chongqing, the massive influx of war exiles and refugees and its new status as the Temporary Capital, with the concentration of national institutions that came along with that status, marked the war as a clear disjuncture from prewar conditions. Particularly in the years from 1939 to 1941, the intensive bombings and the grim and repetitive rebuilding in their wake, only heightened that sense of disconnection from the prewar years.

In contrast, for the countryside around the city the immediate prewar history was far more influential and the war experience was more one of continuity than marked change. The communist incursions into the province in the early 1930s finally motivated local militarists to open the castle doors to the east-coast Nationalists; the uneasy alliance between them set about remaking the political landscape in the province. While the reconstruction initiatives covered an impressive range of policy areas, particularly infrastructure development, the reforms connected with rural administration – the Administrative Districts and the baojia – had the most impact on the fundamental task of the war effort, conscription.

In the years just prior to the Japanese invasion, the Nationalist regime’s program of low-level state-building involved greatly expanding the responsibilities of the revived baojia system, as well as a sustained effort to staff the sub-county administrations with a cadre of newly trained, more responsive agents. These initiatives were carried into the war years with the New County System, and other reorganizations of the baojia, such as establishing the Citizen Militia and tying it to the baojia. Despite the proliferation of tasks assigned to it, mobilizing manpower for the army remained the baojia’s core task to which all other functions were subordinate. Thus, in the counties and rural villages of the 3AD, conscription rested on prewar trends in low level state-building.

Nationalist authorities attempted to make the baojia into a dependable tool for implementing national policy and a repository of reliable local agents. In this sense, it was reminiscent of the type of institutions that Gregory Kasza has identified as “Administered Mass Organizations” (AMOs). AMOs are civilian institutions for the political mobilization of populations, but being designed and sponsored (if not out-right controlled) by regimes they are distinct from interest groups and political parties. Instead, they are patterned on the mass conscript army for the purpose of implementing official regime policy.131 Inspired by the lessons

130. qz0061.mj15-29A (tonghao: 31), pp. 1-3 dated 22 December 1940.
131. In its most simple terms, Kasza’s definition is that an AMO “is a mass civilian organization
of World War One, which demonstrated that regimes had to fully mobilize their populations even in peacetime, AMOs were first seen in fascist Italy, the Soviet Union, and Japan, but have since become a regular part of the political toolkit for single-party and military-dominated states, such as Nazi Germany, Peru, Nasser’s Egypt, Yugoslavia, and communist China. In Kasza’s words, the AMO is a “direct spillover of military-style organization into the civilian domain.” AMOs share some general features, which gel nicely with the KMT’s baojia system. Their goals are usually dominated by three state concerns: to curb political opposition, to mobilize for war, and to effect socio-economic change. Originating in the campaigns to exterminate the communists and playing such a prominent role in the war effort, only the third goal of socio-economic restructuring is not prominent in the KMT baojia. Finally, Kasza’s AMOs are “mass” organizations, meaning that the “targeted membership ordinarily includes all or most people of a particular place of residence, industry, workplace, age, or gender; most members are not regime officials, that is, they do not hold office in the governing party, the military, or the state bureaucracy.” Here too the Sichuan baojia fits well with the Kasza’s model: people were enrolled in its decimal groups en masse, based on their residence. The baojia, thus, was a sustained state-making attempt by a military-bureaucratic regime that was desperately organizing and mobilizing for war. Far from being a backward, feudal regime, the KMT was fully in line with the political strategies of contemporary regimes across the globe.

This is not meant to argue that the baojia were completely reliable state agents. Significant problems remained, most particularly the fact that although they were state agents, the baojia heads were embedded in their hometown villages. This embeddedness deeply influenced the patterns of rural conscription. The patterns of conscription in Chongqing’s urban environment were distinctly different, but here too, the state’s own instruments were the main source of abuses and limits on the extraction of manpower for the war at the front.

created and managed by a political regime to implement public policy;” The Conscription Society: Administered Mass Organizations, p. 7.

133. Ibid., pp. 5 and 74-5.
134. Ibid., p. 7.
Chapter Four

Patterns of Conscription: Villages, the City, and Factories

Alas! Unless [these conscription abuses] are investigated and dealt with according to the law, the weak and frail Chinese nation does not have to sacrifice itself resisting at the front, but can just wait in terror in its villages.
– Jiangbei widow on the illegal drafting of her son in 1942

Introduction

There was a distinct muddiness to the Nationalist conscription system as a whole. Despite the creation of a new military-bureaucratic infrastructure to mobilize manpower – the MSO, the provincial, divisional, and regimental districts; the RTOs; and replacement regiments – conscription was still rooted in the civilian administration of county governments and community-level baojia. The institutional edifice of the military draft rested on a civilian foundation.

The draft was not delocalized in the sense of removing all dependency on local communities, nor by placing it completely in the hands of military agencies. Such an approach was not possible as it would have amounted to an occupation of the state’s own hinterland: the military was not up to that task, it would have been swallowed whole in the countryside. Civilian and local participation was indispensable, and so conscription took place at the intersection of the civil and military realms. Both halves were integral to any functioning system. The divisional and regimental districts had one foot in the military world and one foot in the civilian political sphere: they were inundated by requests, recommendations, letters, petitions, cables, and orders from all directions. County and sub-county civilian society could not be bypassed; it was indispensable in mobilizing for war. This realization motivated the sustained initiatives to construct a new administrative presence at the lowest levels of rural society that was the focus of the previous chapter.

During the ten years from 1938-1948, a slew of agencies within the Nationalist state issued more than 200 laws and regulations concerning military service. The constant tinkering and reorganizations, however, came at a high price, namely a great degree of confusion. Lines of authority were a mess. The pace of change itself allowed much room for abuse, as the regulations were confusing and contradictory, and thus difficult or even impossible to enforce uniformly. One conscription bureaucrat summarized the situation by saying, “the laws were [beyond counting] like [dense animal] hair. Issued in the morning, they were revised by nightfall . . . And policies came from many quarters.” Who answered to whom and for what was muddled and required the bureaucratic equivalent of a divining rod so far as local authorities were concerned.

1. qz0055.mj3-273, pp. 42a-3b dated 30 November 1938.

- 187 -
Even full-time central cadres were castigated by Chiang for not understanding current regulations. Local authorities, from county magistrates on down through the Citizen Militia and baojia, were naturally often completely baffled. Once egos, status insecurities, jurisdictional sensitivities, naked self-interest, and plain old avarice were thrown into the complicated mix, there is little wonder that responsibility for any given incident of abuse was nearly impossible to pinpoint, and that opportunities for private gain abounded.

The close cooperation and administrative transparency between the civilian and military administrations envisioned in He Yingqin’s 1928 plan was never achieved. Conscription remained a sort of “no man’s land” between the civilian and military realms. After our extended look at the draft from the top-down perspective of the state (chapter two) and the reforms made to local administration during the prewar years (chapter three), this chapter is a bottom-level inquiry: an exploration of the particular ways in which conscription was held hostage to and limited by the specific social environments of rural villages, urban Chongqing, and factory floors. This chapter is an exploration of the ways that the draft was caught between the centralized administration of the militarized state and the sinews of civilian society that inevitably (and indispensably) infiltrated the local civilian administration. At its lowest level, Nationalist military service was intricately enmeshed in the specifics of local communities, which shaped the contours of conscription in rural villages and urban Chongqing.
The conscription administrators, ensconced in their offices, and the Sichuan farmers, toiling in their fields, were separated by a yawning social and political gulf, but there was one thing they could agree on: the baojia heads were at the root of the problems that plagued the draft. One chief of an inspection station outlined the pernicious influence of the baojia in hiring illegal substitutes, which turned the inspection stations of conscription districts into marketplaces:

the men [zhuangding 壮丁] sent from every county are mostly hired by baojia [heads]. As soon as they have gone through inspection [and are accepted] the zhuangding demand that the baojia immediately hand over the money that they had agreed upon earlier or they haggle over the price. Right then the inspection station courtyard suddenly become a trading grounds. Observers only see people exchanging money, and so rumors constantly arise. I have seen this type of thing firsthand day after day, [but] can only treat the symptoms with stopgap measures. I have ordered that after inspection, the men are taken away directly by the company and not allowed to talk with anyone on the side. But this merely stops the exchange of money there [at the station]. As for a remedy that gets to the heart of the problem, because of the [close] relationship between the baojia and the men, I have no way to solve things [i.e., the
deals will be made beforehand]. Furthermore, every county has this type of situation.³

With few exceptions, government administrators from the central MSO on down to the divisional and regimental districts consistently pinned responsibility for draft abuses on local baojia personnel. In early 1943, Huang Maohe (黄懋和), head of the conscription department in the Sichuan provincial district, submitted a report from an inspection tour of divisional districts in northern Sichuan, which put the blame squarely on baojia shoulders. Although there had been some reduction in illegalities from years prior, everywhere he went, in every bao, there were still obvious abuses.⁴ As early as December 1937, the Sichuan provincial district forwarded to the Sichuan ADs a Junzhengbu cable decrying the fact that lianbao heads were extorting 40-50 yuan from each family or requiring households to pony up money to hire substitutes for their sons, substitutes who promptly deserted once they were on the road. The Junzhengbu warned that it had received reports from some ADs that residents were preparing for armed resistance to the draft.⁵ Four years later, a ward branch of the Chongqing police reported that the going rate for substitutes was “about 400 yuan.” Baojia heads offered to buy substitutes for conscripted men, with the neighbors guaranteeing the transaction. The money was often paid in installments.⁶ This commerce was lucrative. In late 1944, an otherwise unremarkable petition in Tongliang county called for a baojia head in Shitang village (十塘鄉) to be investigated for amassing more than 150,000 yuan just months after taking office.⁷ As long as the required number of bodies were delivered, county magistrates and ward heads did not much care.⁸ This extortion racket run by many baojia heads was part of the commercialization of conscription discussed in chapter two, and as noted earlier, it was directly connected with the arbitrary press-ganging of men, famously known as “grabbing able-bodied men” (zhua zhuan ding 抓壯丁). This phrase captured the predatory aspect in that the word “grab” (zhua 抓) contains the homonymic word for “claw” or “talon” (zhua 爪). Able-bodied men were prey, a fact which both government terminology and popular parlance acknowledged. Men who fled to avoid service were said to have “sniffed the wind” (wenfeng 聞風), a metaphor that indirectly

³ qz0055.mj3-256, pp. 75a-b dated 28 September 1938 (rec’d).
⁴ qz0061.mj15-4549, pp. 71-2 dated February 1943.
⁵ qz0055.mj3-256, pp. 33a-b dated 24 December 1937. Tensions were highest in the 4AD and 5AD, south of Chengdu and west of Chongqing respectively. A provincial report in August 1938 makes no mention of the impending violence that would soon rock Xindu and Zhongjiang, but it too outlines a thriving market in men, with prices ranging from 5 to 50 yuan. Most men actually drafted were found to be under false names, either press-ganged men, purchased substitutes, or men who were planning on deserting and did not want authorities knowing who they really were. In some areas, a majority of the conscripts were secured illegally; qz0055.mj3-256, pp. 56a-8a dated 11 August 1938 (rec’d).
⁷ qz0055.mj3-274, pp. 104-5 dated December 1944.
⁸ One inspector in 1938 reported that he had heard of cases in which baojia personnel “have struck it rich from conscripts, making thousands or tens of thousands,” meanwhile their superiors turn a blind eye. “As long as the baojia sends the men, they do not ask where they came from. I have asked ward heads and district magistrates if they have have seen with their own eyes the faces of the conscripts. Most just send someone else to handle [the men] and never ask about it;” qz0055.mj3-256, pp. 51a-2b dated 16 July 1938 (rec’d).
invoked their position as prey threatened with imminent capture by the *baojia* heads, either
trapped into paying extortion for their freedom or press-ganged into service. Without access to
publishing opportunities, there are few direct statements by farmers on their perception of the
conscription administration, but a village ditty from western Sichuan vividly captures the pain
and powerlessness many felt, while postwar woodcuts by critics of the regime visually
represented scenes that must have played out countless times during the war.

“Conscripts, conscripts,
Swallow our tears . . .
The township head decides our fate,
Village chiefs are chicken-footed gods;
The oil of the poor is boiled away,
The king of hell lights the lamps of heaven”

---

9. Both the township (*zhēn*) and village (*xiāng*) heads were positions within the *baojia* structure (the
nomenclature changed at various points during the war). Stephen Endicott recorded this song in a
Shifang county (*什邡縣*) village in the 1980s; *Red Earth*, pp. 25-6. Elderly villagers recalled that the
song originated during the Civil War (1947-49), but given the prevalence of press-ganging methods
during the War of Resistance, its sentiments apply equally well for the earlier time frame.
More prosaically, rural residents left ample evidence of their dim view of baojia, as well as county and other sub-county administrators, in the huge numbers of petitions and accusations filed by them against the local administrators in charge of the draft. Predictably, as it was the one area of agreement between the farmers and the bureaucrats, the archives are littered with cases that illustrate and give weight to this negative assessment of baojia.

Draping themselves in the mantle of “citizens” (gongmin 公民), the angry residents of one Jiangjin bao accused their bao head of numerous crimes. Not only was he running a network of opium dens, but he was extorting money from residents to keep men off the rolls and to protect hired hands from other communities from being press-ganged. The fees for such services were running 100 to 200 yuan per month, per man.\(^\text{10}\)

Men from Jiasi village (賈嗣郷), again in Jiangjin county, filed a formal complaint against the whole 8th bao in the village. The bao head, the vice-head, the bao unit commander, and virtually all its subordinate jia heads had formed a “clique” (dang 黨). Once the first had gotten into power, he smoothed the way for the others to take up positions as well. Together they were “a horde of thieves upon the people.” They ran a coordinated racket to extort grain from village families. Any family with more than one son was legally required to send one son to meet the bao’s quota. The clique would demand a quantity of grain from such families. In the summer of 1944, things got much worse when the bao head issued a demand for a lump sum of 14,000 yuan in “conscription fees.” When the villagers paid up, he demanded a further 30,000 yuan just two months later. When one of the subordinate jia heads refused the second exaction, the bao chief had him hauled off and conscripted.\(^\text{11}\)

Cases such as these form the backbone of this chapter, though unlike the conscription authorities and village residents we will avoid moralizing language and content ourselves with analysis that locates the patterns of conscription. The patterns that emerge are less clear cut and far more interesting than the simple black and white picture implied by accounts that simply decry the moral turpitude of baojia heads. As indicated in chapter three, there is no complete tabulation of men conscripted in the Third Administrative District (3AD), neither is there any full sequence of conscription numbers for any single county in the 3AD. In any case, aggregate numbers would still leave unanswered questions about how men were called up; thus, both out of necessity and the desire to understand the patterns of interaction on the local level this analysis will be pursued in a mosaic fashion, with no attempt to justify conclusions quantitatively.

Patterns of Rural Conscription I: Intra-Community Predation

The first pattern is intra-community predation, in which baojia and other sub-county administrators preyed on residents and neighbors. Many contemporary observers and later historical summaries have focused on the predatory aspect almost exclusively, and indeed it has already been discussed in general terms in chapter two and in anecdotal form in the prior section. Here a few more evocative incidents will serve to outline the opportunities for petty intimidation, abuse, and extortion that conscription offered to baojia men.

At the lowest level, the draft was a threat that baojia heads could use to intimidate

---

10. qz0055.mj3-356, pp. 50a-b dated 13 November 1942.

11. Reportedly, the embezzlement schemes went even further, extending to the charcoal, feed, oil, and ration funds earmarked for military purposes. In all more than 100,000 yuan was siphoned into baojia pockets; qz0055.mj3-356, pp. 113-8 dated 27 June 1945.
neighbors and extort petty favors or small sums of money from them. Just outside the Yongchuan county seat, one Liu Jilun (劉季倫) and his wife were targeted by the jia head, Xiao Lin (蕭林) for this type of petty extortion. The Lius had once been close neighbors with Xiao, living in the same courtyard within the county seat when Xiao, who was reportedly an opium smoker and dealer, was made head of the local jia. He grew accustomed to borrowing money from them, and even after they moved outside the city walls to open a butcher shop, he continued to pester them for money. When they finally refused, he threatened them openly, “If you don’t have money, then I’m afraid you will have to be soldier for a while.” And when they did not cave in, he made good on his threat, bringing the lianbao militia to Liu’s house and dragging him off. Sick himself, and supporting an elderly mother, Liu Jilun was supposed to be exempt from the draft and his petition to the Third Administration District stressed this fact. The ward investigator concurred but in his report noted that Liu had not filed the proper paperwork requesting to be exempted from the lottery and thus was technically eligible. Still, despite Liu’s oversight and the fact that he had already been inducted, the local regimental district command ordered that the local baojia head should be sent to retrieve him. In Dazu’s Dabao village (大堡鄉), a feud between a man and his uncle deteriorated to the point that the man hired village policemen as bodyguards, but the uncle made secret arrangements and the bodyguards suddenly seized the man and delivered him to the local Citizen Militia as a forced conscript. Fortunately, the vice-commander of the militia cared enough about his neighbors to let the man go. The draft, thus, was a bludgeon for baojia heads and it often became entangled with disputes within the community.

Beyond such petty intimidation, baojia officials often sold releases to local residents. By the end of the war, these illegal exemptions could be exorbitant due to inflation, particularly for farmers who often had food to eat but little currency. The head of the fifth bao in Dazu’s Shiwan village (十萬鄉), Wang Huanzhang (王焕章), got rich off of this practice. In July 1943 Wen Shucheng (文樹成) and his wife moved to the community. Upon arrival, Wang Huanzhang demanded 500 yuan as a “processing fee” for Wen’s change of residence certificate, claiming this was government regulations and if it was not paid, they would not be permitted to reside there. Then, just a month later, Wen Shucheng was forcibly conscripted. Immediately, Wang approached Wen saying that if he handed over 1,000 yuan, Wang would issue a postponement certificate good for 5 years, while 2,000 yuan would secure a certificate good for ten years and 3,000 yuan would buy a lifetime exemption. Otherwise, Shucheng would be shipped out immediately. Shucheng, not quite understanding the rapaciousness of Wang, nor the fact that Wang lacked the authority to issue any binding exemptions, “pawned everything he owned to buy a slip of paper,” the worthless lifetime exemption for 3,000 yuan. As in any market, the savvy baojia bought substitutes low and sold releases high. The substitutes when they were not

12. The case documentation was sent from the Yongchuan county magistrate, Mou Lianxian (牟練先), to Shen Peng at the 3AD; qz0055.mj3-273, 60a-1a dated February 1939 and pp. 62-3 dated March 1939.
14. Not knowing where else to turn, Wen’s wife, nee Wang (王), an illiterate farm woman (her signature is just the traditional “X” on the petition), sent a short, but desperate petition to the Junzhengbu’s military courts, the MAC investigation office, the Sichuan provincial government, the Dazu county government, and the 3AD; qz0055.mj3-354, pp. 2-4 dated May 1944.
purchased from “soldier peddlers”, were often gullible, poor farm boys from the local community. One family complained that a village head “used sweet words to urge my son to be a substitute, but my son declined because our family is poor. Whereupon the village head lectured him repeatedly,” until the son was convinced and agreed to serve under someone else’s name.15

Press-ganging local men was common, often combined with extortion by selling the release of the men afterwards. In mid-1938 Yongchuan’s second ward, one village company commander was investigated for press-ganging and extorting local residents. The second training regiment of the 1st RTO investigated the situation, reporting all the way to the provincial government (via the 3AD). The investigation found that a “majority” of the recruits received had been illegally press-ganged. Wang Guilin (王桂林) and the bao chief, Li Dianzhang (李典章), among others, had agreed to release the men if they were paid small sums – often under ten yuan. Residents’ appeals to the baojia heads were answered only with repeated statements that the government had decreed “those with money contribute money, those with strength contribute strength.” The RTO investigator concluded that each bao was pulling in several hundred to a thousand yuan from these schemes.16 Bao staffers often inflated the draft quota, telling residents that more men were required than was actually the case. The motive was simply to be able to threaten and extort money from more families. According to one anonymous conscription staffer in Dazu, the village and bao heads were often in cahoots in this scheme. Such manipulations were easy, the whistleblower continued, because the administrators could take advantage of the fact that “common people only know how to farm. They work hard in production and dare not inquire about anything else. Baojia heads use the fact that they do not ask about [the baojia heads’] actions.”17

Finally, the support for soldiers’ dependents was a prime target for embezzlement by all levels of local administration from the county right on down to the jia. In 1945, Bishan residents petitioned the 3AD to have Fang Jingsi (方靖四), the magistrate installed less than a year earlier, investigated and prosecuted for massive corruption. The residents claimed that he was routinely over-charging military units for costs associated with their passage and stationing inside county borders to the tune of some 600,000 yuan, assessing collection fees for conscripts (another 150,000 yuan), and levying excessive contract tax fees (four million yuan) and embezzling grain purchase funds (another four million yuan). His monetary appetite extended, naturally enough, to the support for soldiers’ dependents from which he reportedly bilked some 4.8 million yuan.

15. qz0055.mj3-348, pp. 104-7 dated April 1944.
16. qz0055.mj3-273, p. 18a-22b ; 31 July 1938.
17. The author of the report is unnamed, but almost certainly was involved with conscription. He wrote a petition to the 3AD on behalf of the residents of the second bao in Shuangxi village (雙溪鄉). The petition cites violations involving the timing of call ups as a major abuse; baojia were not respecting the regulations about avoiding busy agricultural months. And indeed, the rhetoric of the petition could be taken almost verbatim from government sources or even Chiang Kaishek’s speeches: Conscription, the author notes, “is the only essential factor” for the salvation of the country and that “if the laws are implemented the result will be excellent, but the results have been meager for the past four or five years ... and the people do not love the county, all because the personnel handling conscription violate the laws and regulations, cheating and mistreating the masses;” qz0055.mj3-416, pp. 182-4 dated 25 July 1941.
A tragic case from April 1945 in Batang village (八塘鄉) implicated not only the local baojia, but the village chief, and Fang Jingsi himself. In late 1944 or early 1945, despite the fact that the recruitment for the new Intellectual Youth Army (see chapters five and six) was supposed to be voluntary, the local baojia men in Batang compelled Zhang Shaoquan (張紹全) to join up. When Zhang’s father and mother went to the village head, Liu Zhenghuan (劉爭環) to collect the support money that they were legally entitled to, Liu ordered them to demand the money from the bao head, Zhao Rongchao (趙榮超), who in turn sent them to the jia head, Gan Yinliang (甘銀良) to collect. The family members made the rounds trying to get the money they were due, but to no avail. It was clearly a well rehearsed runaround. The family kept pestering for the money, which was almost certainly already long gone—indeed, it is possible that the neither the village, the bao, nor the jia had ever received any of this money, though if such were the case, it seems they would have sent the family up the chain rather than down. The fact that they never referred the family to Fang Jingsi or the county military affairs department suggests that they were protecting their patron, Magistrate Fang, just as he would soon protect them. Finally, in anger, the jia heads Gan and Li turned to physical bullying, pushing the aged parents to the ground. Whereupon the mother began yelling for someone to save them. The baojia unit began firing live ammunition into the air, a signal to nearby units that a bandit attack was underway. The neighboring village Qitang (七壩) heard the shots and thought there was a bandit attack in Batang. To intimidate the family, Liu Zhenghuan first ordered the mother to be locked up for three days, but fearing that the father’s efforts to plead the case in the county would bring to light his abuses, Liu concocted a more drastic measure to frighten the family into silence. He ordered the jia head, Gan Yinliang, to smash the door and windows of his house and make false accusations against the father, Zhang Quanshan (張全山). On his way home from the county seat one afternoon, the Batang Citizen Militia unit—commanded, of course, by the baojia men—apprehended Zhang Quanshan. Liu Zhenghuan cast Zhang Quanshan as a bandit chief and the elderly Zhang was locked up in the militia quarters and sent to the county seat the next day. Once in the county and under Fang Jingsi’s jurisdiction, he came to a sad end. Magistrate Fang ordered Zhang Quanshan locked up for involvement in a vague “conscription incident,” a reference to the signal shots that were fired in the earlier fracas. Thrown in prison, Zhang senior was not interrogated or prosecuted, but just left to rot. The other prisoners even pleaded on his behalf because of his age: “What could be worse than this for an execution?” Quickly falling ill, his family made at least two formal requests to have him released to see a doctor, but both were refused. He died a month later, still locked up in prison. The fact that magistrate Fang never investigated and never turned the case over to the courts for investigation implicated him as actively covering up Liu Zhenghuan’s abuse of power. The family petitioned multiple times requesting that Fang Jingsi be removed from office for harming a soldier’s family, abusing his power and callously disregarding human life. His collusion with the corrupt and abusive baojia

18. In this case, the 3AD seems to have been uncharacteristically lax. Nearly a year after the original petition, and a full ten months after the Sichuan provincial government ordered an investigation of Fang, the 3AD still had taken no action; qz0055.mj3-342, pp. 81a-2, n.d. and May 1946.
men should be punished, the family pleaded, “in order to give weight to human rights” (yizhong renquan 以重人權). They implored the authorities, “If dependents of soldiers are treated thusly, one can only imagine how those who aren’t families of soldiers are treated.”

It is a sobering – and telling – fact that even without plumbing county-level archives, these cases from the 3AD files (now housed in the Chongqing Municipal Archives) could be multiplied and catalogued literally *ad nauseum.* Yet, it must also be remembered that the sheer number of cases on file suggest an important facet to understanding conscription on the ground in the countryside, namely, that residents of the 3AD were actively availing themselves of administrative resources when they felt aggrieved or abused.

Patterns of Rural Conscription II: Beyond the Weapons of the Weak

While late 1938 saw some serious incidents of anti-conscription revolts (see chapter two) around Chengdu, the rural residents of the 3AD generally contented themselves with milder forms of resistance. The docility in the counties around Chongqing should not be seen as total passivity, however. Evasion and flight were, of course, the most common ways in which villagers registered their protest against conscription and its administrators, but not the most noteworthy for grasping the patterns of conscription.

James Scott’s analysis of everyday peasant resistance, the “weapons of the weak,” sensitized scholars to the anonymous, silent, and surreptitious methods by which those with the least power register their dissatisfaction with the powers that be. Draftees’ evasion and flight fit well with Scott’s rubric in that those who fled were hoping to avoid the attention of local administrators; they were methods that attempted to fly beneath the radar of the state and its local agents. There were, however, forms of conscription resistance that went beyond this mode, that sought attention from state authorities and thus were directly connected to conscription as a state-building institution.

In fact, the villagers of the 3AD availed themselves of methods that reaffirmed and relied on the new administrative structures put in place in the 1930s. The volume of accusations, suits, and petitions filed against local administrators from the jia up through the county itself, must be seen as decisive acts of rural residents to right the wrongs heaped upon them. Such acts of righteous indignation were not always ignored by the Nationalist authorities, suggesting that these “weapons of the weak” were not entirely ineffective. Thus far, historians have followed contemporary observers in completely ignoring this aspect of rural agency in relation to wartime conscription.

For those being preyed upon by sub-county administrators the accusatory petition sent to a superior office was one of the few options available. By sending appeals up the rungs of the administrative ladder, residents hoped to bring in authority from outside the community, bypassing the concentration of power that sub-county officials held. Toward this end, residents often combined their complaints into group petitions in which the situation inside the community was almost always painted in dramatically dark terms, enumerating as many different types of abuses as possible. A petition from sixteen residents in Pulian village (普蓮鄉) in Yongchuan is at the low end in this regard. The residents requested that the 3AD investigate and dismiss the

19. qz0055.mj3-342, pp. 82, 88-9, 95-7 dated 8 April 1945.

20. See, for example, the litany of charges against Cheng Zeguang (陳澤光), head of Wangu township (萬古鎮) in Dazu county in 1941; qz0055.mj3-416, pp. 189-91 dated 31 July 1941.
village head, Zhang Tingyun (張庭筠), for four different abuses. Zhang, according to the
signees, harbored opium and gambling; seized a traveling merchant, Du Guoliang (杜國良),
from Dazu to fill up his conscription quota; overstepped his legal authority by selling the village
grain stores and pocketing the money; and completely undermined the conscription system. He
was simply “selling men, like the press-ganged Yang Shulin (楊樹林), who had Zeng Deliang
(曾德良) hand over 10,000 (silver) dollars [to secure Yang’s release].”21 Such group petitions,
however, had to walk a tightrope between listing completely empty charges and those with real
specifics behind them. Exceedingly general accusations gave investigators nothing concrete to
inquire about, while overly specific ones could often be undermined by simple deflections and
denials, the most common being, “There is no such person.”22

Accusations made by an individual or a single family were dominated by the specifics of
person, place, and event. The Zhang family tragedy recounted above is a good example of this
type. The problem, however, was that denials and cover-ups were all too easy when these cases
were investigated by complete outsiders, such as a 3AD staffer sent to a county. A case from just
downriver from Chongqing, in Yunyang (雲陽) county illustrates this well. In July 1940, Xiong
Zhengyi (熊正逸), a graduate of the Central Military Academy, was posted as the logistics
officer at the 20th RTO. A resident of the 1st ward of Yunyang, he returned home for a short
leave and was alarmed at the situation in the county. Xiong requested that the military courts
dispatch men to investigate the head of the first ward, Xiao Mingyuan (蕭明遠). His complaint
detailed numerous specific instances of Xiao’s misconduct, including extorting money from one
of the township’s rich elders, whose son had been selected in the lottery. Even the sons of jia
heads were not safe. The head of the fourth jia (in the first bao) was fairly well off. With two
sons, one twenty sui and the younger seven, the eldest should have been exempt as the only adult
son in the household, but ward head Xiao head sent soldiers in the middle of the night to grab the
eldest son up in order to extort 800 silver dollars – the jia head, according to Xiong, paid 570.
The ward office was also involved in the lucrative opium trade, with Xiao charging protection
fees (twenty yuan per liang of the drug) and dispatching armed plainclothes soldiers to protect
shipments. Xiong complained that he had told all this to the county magistrate, but had been
ignored. Forbidden by law to interfere in local affairs because he was a military man, he decided
to write directly to general He Yingqin at the Junzhengbu. He’s office ordered the Yunyang
magnistrate to investigate. Nearly seven months later, the magistrate replied, informing the
Junzhengbu that the ward head Xiao has already left office and a new head installed. The
magistrate reported that he had police officers make secret inquiries and tried to contact the

21. qz0055.mj3-338, pp. 119-21 dated March 1944. The result of the case is not on file. Another
example, also from Yongchuan, is the petition from thirteen residents of Shuangfeng village (雙鳳鄉)
against the village chief, Tang Yuanxue (唐遠學), who was accused of running opium houses,
strangling conscripts, sharing his ill-gotten gains with ruffians (liumang 流氓), collecting illegal
tax levies (tanpai 攤派), and releasing conscripts for hefty fees of 50 to 60,000 yuan; qz0055.mj3-338, pp. 123-5 dated 1 June 1944.

22. Many group petitions were filed on behalf of non-signatories, often community-outsiders. Doubtless
some of these were motivated by genuine concern for others, but the fact that the accusations
concerned non-residents suggests a degree of fictionalizing or embellishment. In either case,
dismissing the charges was often a foregone conclusion: inevitably the investigator would not find
any supporting evidence or witnesses. The accusations were likely written in the hope that scrutiny
from outside authorities would unearth some genuine malfeasance by the accused.
individuals mentioned in Xiong’s missive, but they could locate no one and after interviewing local gentry concluded that the charges were “imaginary” (xugou 虛構). Hitting this dead end, the investigation was concluded.

Many investigations were dropped or simply faded away due to indifference by higher authorities. The Renhe Township Residents Association complained to the township’s public office that on occasions when cases were not iron-clad, that the county backed baojia personnel primarily out of a desire to support them and avoid making conscription an even more onerous task for them. The Renhe residents’ complaint hit on the truth that higher ups were often skeptical of these petitions for redress of grievances. This skeptical attitude began at the top. As early as mid-1939, the Baxian Regimenal District passed on to the Renhe lianbao a warning from the Junzhengbu. Based on intelligence from military spies in Shanghai, General He Yingqin was concerned that accusations of abuses in conscription were part of a concerted effort by Japan to “disrupt [China’s] draft” by creating false accusations against local administrators and draft agencies. Whether this intelligence was genuine, or whether the warning was merely an underhanded way of dismissing reports of abuses, which were already flooding the system and influencing public opinion, remains uncertain, but it is indisputable that China’s draft was disrupted and disrupting on its own merits, even without any Japanese interference.

Concerns about the accusations and petitions were not all groundless, however. Unscrupulous characters could and did use charges of conscription abuses as a weapon in local community disputes that had absolutely nothing to do with the draft itself. In one case in Dazu county, a village resident accused a recently appointed village head of massive corruption in order to discredit him. The county delegated investigator concluded that the accusation was just a “trumped up charge over a power struggle” within the village, an attempt by one faction of villagers to discredit their opponents. The case was a tangled mess, and perhaps most ironically, the men who the initial complainant backed to fill the position of village chief were guilty of buying and selling men in the draft and thus, ineligible, which confirmed the magistrates choice for the position. The fact that accusations could become entangled with local power struggles justified a level of skepticism towards petitions among higher ups, though the sheer avalanche of them throughout the war clearly indicated that there was persistent, systemic problems in how the most local administrators were handling the draft.

Still, the petitions were not routinely disregarded; thus, despite the frequency of stonewalling and indifference by higher ups, petitions could and did result in real investigations. In Jiangjin’s Banqiao village (板橋), the village head, a bao head, and one of their henchmen were all all sentenced to five years in prison by the county court for harming conscription by dragooning an illegible man. The village administrators filed their own petition to the 3AD from jail, claiming that they had been wrongly convicted. The man in question, they claimed, had moved into Banqiao two years previously and thus, under the 1942 regulations, was subject to the draft in the village. According to their brief, the man and his family had failed to register

23. qz0108.mj5-1, pp. 28-32 original petition, dated July 1940.
25. qz0059.mj2-59, p. 33 dated July 1939.
26. qz0055.mj3354, pp. 57-61 dated April 1944.
with the village as being draft-eligible residents. They were, thus, considered as “omitted” (yilou 逃漏) men, who were presumed to be deliberately evading conscription by not registering with the baojia. As such, they were to be taken first – before any lottery selectees – in the draft. The baojia men felt certain the man was evading conscription: if he was genuinely from Guizhou, he should have been able to produce his Military Service ID, but he could not do so. Additionally, the man’s father filed suit only after the village authorities had denied his request for money under the provisions of the servicemen’s dependents aid provisions. (The village head denied the request because evaders who were drafted punitively were not entitled to any benefits or aid.)

After receiving the convicted men’s petition, the 3AD forwarded it to Jiangjin county whose investigators sided with the village chief, finding his report factual. They, in turn requested that the 3AD have the verdict reversed, though the final disposition is not recorded.

Thus, residents’ accusations and appeals to higher authorities resulted in dismissals from office, and even prison sentences. This made filing accusations a powerful weapon against baojia who angered their residents.

This weapon could be used offensively, falsely accusing baojia men of wrongdoing, as in the Banqiao case above. In another example, from Chongqing’s 9th ward, a legally drafted man deserted, fleeing from serving from his designated unit, which requested help from the township office. When the man returned to his home, the township’s baojia apparatus arrested him and turned him over to the township to be returned to his unit. His wife, however, was angry and began filing accusations that the bao heads had taken bribes and violated the military service laws. Before the township office could even investigate the charges, a locally stationed unit of MPs picked up two of the bao heads for disciplinary action. The remaining bao heads filed a lengthy appeal in support of their colleagues. Locking up the two bao heads without any investigation was damaging to the future of conscription work: if just doing their jobs conscientiously exposed them to such unjustified and unsupported punishment, then “who would be willing to take on [this] responsibility?” Not only was there no proof behind the charges of bribery, but the actions of the bao heads in apprehending the deserter was not consistent with any malfeasance: capturing a man they had taken bribes from would have only invited scrutiny. They had captured him precisely because their consciences were clear; they were being “innocently dragged into a mess.”

And, of course, accusations could be filed defensively, as an attempt to regain what had been lost to predatory heads who had abused their authority. One Dazu county resident, Deng Wei (邓威) of Shiwan village (十萬鄉) leveled a litany of charges against Wang Ying (王英), the village head, in late July 1941. As with so many of these accusations, the list of charges was long, as if the whistleblower threw in every stereotypical malfeasance in hopes that at least one of them would stick. Wang was supposedly taking pay for empty positions in the village school; extorting money from residents; gambling; stealing military supplies; aiding bandits; running opium dens; engaging in press-gang conscription; and was guilty of “activities for other parties,” which was a euphemistic way of saying he was a communist. The investigation was not swift, by any means, but by February 1942, Dazu county had completed its inquiries. The county magistrate, Peng Xinmin (彭心明), reported to the 3AD that the accusations were

27. qz0055.mj3-356, pp. 6-19 dated August 1943.
unsubstantiated, except for the one concerning “improper conscription.” For this one charge there were clear witnesses and evidence. The county and the AD agreed that Wang Ying should be punished and cashiered. Similarly, an elderly Jiangbei widow from Wubao township (五寶鎮) filed one such petition against the lianbao chief, Yin Xianyi (殷咸宜). The widow’s son, Zhang Chunrong (張春榮), at 42 years old, was too old for the draft, but had been forced into the lottery draft as a “substitute.” Yin ordered his subordinates, the lower tiers of the baojia, to drag Zhang and other men off illegally. The widow tried repeatedly to see her son, even appealing to township authorities, but they were all blood relatives of Yin and they ignored her. In fact, no family members were permitted to see where the new “draftees” were held; “it was no different than if he was a prisoner of war,” she complained. Without her son, the widow had no way to support herself. Completely denied access to her son by the local administrators, the widow finally sought help in reading the Military Service Law and relevant regulations, which ironically were available as posters put up by the county’s conscription propaganda teams. She verified her son’s legal ineligibility for the draft, due to his age and his status as an only son, and the procedural violations of the lottery in which men who had drawn lower numbers than her son were skipped over when he was selected. Illiterate, the widow hired a scribe, to file her heart-rending petition for redress. She found it especially galling that the lianbao head, Yin Xianyi was supposedly “an exemplar, and further that he was a member of the intellectual class, who was willfully committing offenses and recklessly violating the vital policy of conscription. At the first lottery drawing, the ward chief, Zhang, was present and still this sort of illegal [methods] were used. What other actions were committed can be [easily] imagined. Alas! Unless [these conscription abuses] are investigated and dealt with according to the law, the weak and frail Chinese nation does not have to sacrifice itself resisting at the front, but can just wait in terror in its villages.”

The fact that residents felt the need to go over their local administrators heads is strong evidence of the rapaciousness of those administrators. This is the point that many contemporary observers and later historians have harped upon. But what remains unnoticed is that these petitions and accusations relied upon the fact that local baojia heads were part of a hierarchy of administration, that appeals to superior levels of the administration could and did bring pressure on abusive baojia and other community heads. If the community administrators were unrestrained by the administrative hierarchy, appeals by local residents would have been futile, completely ineffective, and unattractive as a weapon to use against foes and neighbors. The fact that so many rural Sichuanese resorted to formal accusations and petitions suggests that the administrative hierarchy was an important constraint on baojia and village leaders’ ability to prey on their neighbors.

It is precisely on this point that Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li’s analysis of “rightful resistance” in post-Mao China is useful. O’Brien and Li have identified a mode of resistance in 1990s rural areas that goes beyond the quiet and anonymous “everyday resistance” that James Scott focused on in his famous “weapons of the weak” analysis. Instead of avoiding official attention, O’Brien and Li’s “rightful resisters” actively sought attention from higher ups and mobilized the central government’s principles and rhetoric to fight the misconduct of local

29. qz0055.mj3-416, pp. 1-14 dated 11 February 1942.
30. qz0055.mj3-273, pp. 42a-3b dated 30 November 1938.
officials. The discontented and aggrieved, by relying on the “authorized channels,” actually exploited divisions within the state, and their appeals to higher ups were consistently couched in the rhetoric, principles, and policy ideals of the center. Rightful resisters, like the villagers of the 3AD during the war, avoid direct confrontation with their local opponents, but appeal to non-community patrons within the state itself to bring pressure and right wrongs. By seeking out the attention of the state apparatus to rein in local misconduct and abuses, “[r]ightful resistance is thus a product of state building.”

O’Brien and Li conclude that when resisters appeal to the center’s promises and principles, “they are acting like citizens before they are citizens.” While protesting local abuses, rightful resistance affirms state authority and simultaneously stakes a claim within it by subjecting local administrators to scrutiny from higher ups. This present-day pattern is intriguingly similar to the draft resistance of Sichuan’s villagers.

Patterns of Rural Conscription III: Extra-Community Predation

The readiness of community residents to appeal to outside authorities was undoubtedly a pressure on baojia, village, and township heads to focus their predatory attentions on outsiders, who could not command such local support. This extra-community predation took two major forms. The first of these was illegally conscripting outsiders who were temporarily working or living in the community. Rural villages and townships were rarely cordoned off from neighboring communities. In fact, the pre-war changes in the economy had created a large pool of rural laborers who quite often worked – many times temporarily residing – in other, nearby, communities. These men were more vulnerable in that they were administratively unprotected: if they (or their families) petitioned their original jurisdiction, they were appealing to administrators who were in no position of authority to rectify the abuse, while if they petitioned the jurisdiction where the press-ganging took place, the administrators there had no incentive to help the outsider. A jia head in Bingshui village (冰水鄉) illegally conscripted a man from a nearby village who was working for the jia head tilling fields. Short on his conscription quota, the jia head grabbed the laborer and shipped him off as soon as the planting season was over. The young man’s father wrote the Bingshui village public office, pleading that they do something to help his son who was not in another community to evade conscription, but to find work to help his family survive. Predictably, Bingshui authorities seem to have done nothing.

The other type of extra-community predation was grabbing men passing through a community. Crossing jurisdictional boundaries was dangerous in wartime Sichuan. Those most at risk were men whose jobs required repeated trips through numerous jurisdictions on major transportation routes, namely roads and rivers. While they were not sojourner residents of another community, the regular trips through other places put them at real risk. Some men, like

31. Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, p. 4, but see also all of chapter one (pp. 1-24) and pp. 32-3, 42-3, 68-9, and 120-1. There are, of course, differences between present rural resistance in the PRC and resistance to the draft in Nationalist-held China in the 1940s. The most important being the group nature of rightful resistance: it often seeks group solidarity and its tactics can escalate. Resistance to the draft during the war exhibits much less group action and remained less public, at least in the cases handled by the police and the 3AD.

32. Ibid., p. 121.

33. qz0059.mj2-49, p. 78 dated 4 July 1944.

- 201 -
the salt carriers in the area, were picked up and had to buy their freedom multiple times.\textsuperscript{34} Government transportation agencies, such as the Sichuan River Transportation Affairs Management Bureau (川江航務管理局), pressured the conscription administration and provincial government to prohibit baojia from grabbing sailors and boat pullers along the rivers, reminding them that frequent press-ganging of river workers harmed both private and government shipping.\textsuperscript{35} Merchants too were at great risk. In mid-1941, the Dazu county magistrate, Peng Xinming, wrote to Shen Peng, the 3AD’s special inspector, that the situation in the county has “gotten to the point where merchants feet are tied and the roads are cut [because] there is no one on them.”\textsuperscript{36}

Already in 1938 problems with press-ganging travelers were dividing communities and causing headaches for local authorities.\textsuperscript{37} The head of the Yongchuan county’s first ward, Pan Yaoqing (潘瑞青), wrote to Shen Peng for help in dealing with Jiangjin county authorities. The head of Puan village’s lianbao (普安鄉) reported that hired laborers working for a local winemaker had been press-ganged by baojia authorities in Wutanchang (吳灘場) within the Jiangjin county city. The winemaker sent nine men to sell wine in Jiangjin. The men were returning late and stayed overnight in a storehouse halfway home. The next morning, they continued on their way but had only gone a short distance when Tian Chunru (田春如), the bao chief from the 77th bao Wutanchang (吳灘場) (in Jiangjin city) and the bao unit’s deputy commander, Tang (唐), led 8 or 9 armed men to arrest the laborers, under the pretense that they were collecting “brave and righteous men.” The workers were taken to a nearby temple where the Jiangjin baojia demanded all the money from the sale of the wine – some 110 silver dollars – and confiscated the nine poles of wine jars that the men were carrying. Two of the workers managed to escape, but the others were forced into military service. When the local Yongchuan authorities contacted their counterparts in Jiangjin, the Wutanchang baojia heads feigned ignorance and did not even bother to reply. Once the ward head, Pan Yaoqing, got involved, the Jiangjin authorities simply dismissed the case as outside their jurisdiction. The 3AD ordered the Jiangjin county government to investigate and handle the matter according to the law.\textsuperscript{38} But the matter did not end there. The Jiangjin magistrate, Huang Pengji (黃鵬基), wrote to the 3AD strongly refuting Pan’s version of events. According to Huang, the Jiangjin county had already conducted its own investigation, which had begun as soon as the lateral communication from the Yongchuan baojia head had been received. The Jiangjin investigator concluded that there was

---

34. See the story recounted by several salt carriers in a petition to the 3AD. The men made trips to Dazu and Tongliang with salt and returned to their homes with kindling paper. They were press-ganged twice within a period of ten weeks, and had to buy their freedom each time. The men warned the AD office that if this practice continued coolies would soon refuse to transport goods in the area. In response, the 3AD sent a toothless order to subordinate counties to put an end to this practice.; qz0055.mj3-273, pp. 65a-6b dated May 1940.

35. qz0055.mj3-255, pp. 60a-b dated 15 June 1939 (rec’d).


37. See minor cases at: qz0055.mj3-273, pp. 47a-8a dated 12 January 1939 (rec’d) and 51a-2b dated 26 January 1939; and qz0055.mj3-273, pp. 54a-5b dated January 1939.

38. qz0055.mj3-273, pp. 27a-9a dated 6 August 1938 and qz0055.mj3-273, pp. 38b-9b dated 25 October 1938.
no stash of wine jars, nor any trace of the wine money. The press-gang accusation was also groundless, according to the Wutanchang lianhao. While there were some irregularities in the most recent call up (a few men were not residents of the locality they said they were from), no one had been dragooned. The men from Yongchuan had overheard the Jiangjin baojia men complaining about the draft quota and had indicated that they were “willing to join up,” but demanded some compensation for doing so. When the Jiangjin baojia told them that because they were not from Jiangjin the ward public office would not accept them, the Yongchuan workers replied, “because we have heard speeches, we know that the Japanese have killed too many of our countrymen. If we do not become soldiers, we cannot kill Japanese. [We want to join up] because we really want to kill Japanese, and not only for money. Since you say that our county residence is not correct, we will just say that we are Jiangjin men when the public office interviews us. Shouldn’t that work alright?” Instead of being press-ganged, the Yongchuan men were simply paid to pass themselves off as draftees. They were, in effect, purchased substitutes. The Wutanchang baojia continued its findings by saying that the wine sellers had, in fact, been seen completing their sale, which included delivery of the wine jars. Furthermore, usual business practices contradicted the original petition: Yongchuan wine sellers relied on special agents in Jiangjin and no money changed hands upon delivery, as it was handled separately through the special agent. It was inconceivable that the workers were carrying more than one hundred silver dollars. The Wutanchang administrators concluded that the Yongchuan story was “completely fabricated,” merely an obvious attempt to swindle money from the Jiangjin baojia. In light of this counter-evidence, the Jiangjin magistrate asked the 3AD for instructions on how to handle the case. The 3AD’s response is not on file.39 The truth of the case is lost between competing versions of events; both versions are plausible. Whichever party was falsely testifying was certainly counting on this plausibility, and just like the higher level administrators, we too are unsure which to believe.

Preying on outsiders sometimes led to open conflict between neighboring communities. By 1942, after years of experience with conscription-related conflict between communities, authorities had learned to take quick action.40 Again Yongchuan county provides an excellent example, though it was defused by timely and coordinated action by two county governments and a representative from the local divisional district. Residents of Jiulong village (九龍鄉) had to pass through Danfeng (丹鳳鄉), in Bishan county, on their way to Chongqing for work or to conduct business. In order to meet its yearly quota of conscripts, the Danfeng village public office blocked the road and dragooned twenty men from Jiulong. Angry, the Jiulong residents retaliated by dragging thirteen Danfeng men off. Both sides began preparing for a violent clash. The Jiulong public office reported the dispute to the Yongchuan county magistrate, who, fearing that it would spin further out of control, telephoned his Bishan counterpart. The two magistrates decided to report the problem to the divisional district, requesting that mediators be sent to help find a peaceful resolution. Yongchuan county government also sent the county government’s Civil Affairs Department head, Ye Chunjie (葉春杰), to the scene to work with the divisional district representative. At a village meeting called by local elites and the village head, Ye heard

39. qz0055.mj3-273, p. 32a-5a dated 12 December 1938.

40. As early as January 1938, Chiang’s field HQ acknowledged that “feuds” (xiedou 搗鬥) between communities were being set off by conscription disputes; qz0055.mj2-53, pp. 39a-b dated 15 January 1938.
the Jiulong version of events. Ye feared that the people’s “righteous anger” was going to spill over into pitched fighting, so he reassured the residents that the county government was genuinely concerned for their well being. Then he urged the people to return to their homes and jobs and not to make trouble because the government would find a reasonable resolution to the conflict. In his turn, the divisional representative from Yongchuan, Yan Yu (嚴玉), explained that the two counties and the divisional district would resolve the situation according to the military service regulations. After hearing the two speeches, a gentry representative, Zhuan Lieguang (傳烈光), declared that everyone would obey the government’s order to wait quietly for a resolution. For his next move, Ye sent a letter to the Bishan county government’s military affairs section head, Liu Zonglian (劉宗濂), and the two men agreed to meet the following day at a neutral village. To prepare for the negotiations with the Bishan representative, Ye Chunjie and Yan Yu visited the Danfeng men dragooned by Jiulong, and drew up a list of their names. Armed with this list and the list of the Jiulong men originally press-ganged by Danfeng, Ye and Yan, along with the Jiulong representative met with the Bishan representatives. The Bishan side was conciliatory and it was quickly agreed that both townships would return the men and make restitution for losses. By evening, Ye Chunjie was leading the Yongchuan men back to Jiulong, arriving around midnight. The next morning the Jiulong town head was ordered to send the Danfeng men home. After a short meeting to explain the resolution, Ye Chunjie was on his way back to Yongchuan. Quick action and the willingness of both county representatives to compromise had averted an all out feud between the two villages. Not all such disputes were handled so judiciously, often the original offender simply denied that any abuses had occurred; without strong evidence, such cases died quietly.

Taking a page from military units that marauded for men in areas outside their jurisdiction, local communities desperate for bodies to make their draft quota sometimes raided across boundaries. A Dazu village head crossed into Rongchang to grab up men for the draft. Sending them back to his village bound hand and foot, the village head told his prey that there was no use in protesting because they were being conscripted, and formally listed on the rolls, as bandits who were subject to the draft as a penal measure. The 3AD ordered an investigation, though again the results are not recorded.

Despite efforts to restrain extra-community predation, it remained a problem throughout the war. In late 1944, the conscription districts continued passing on orders from higher ups that noted that in many areas village and township baojia not only continued to dragoon travelers, but were even taking the opportunity to rob the men of their property and money, just like bandits. The provincial authorities thundered that if this type of situation happened again, the perpetrators would be dealt with strictly according to statute. Such blustering was ineffective.

41. qz0055.mj3-273, pp. 67-99 dated April 1942.
42. In autumn 1938, the Tongliang county magistrate was ordered by the 3AD to investigate charges that his county was press-ganging men from Dazu. The magistrate tersely replied that all the ward heads had assured him that no such incidents had occurred; qz0055.mj3-256, p. 27 dated 19 October 1938.
43. qz0055.mj3-416, pp. 16-7 dated December 1940.
44. The Baxian Citizen Militia order to the Renhe lianbao militia commander, which was a forwarded order from the Yujiang divisional district, which itself came down from the Sichuan provincial district and, ultimately, from the Sichuan-Xikang Pacification Office; qz0059.mj1-24, pp. 111a-b dated 22
actions were hard to control; communities and military units conducting such raids on neighboring villages were common enough that it became a cover for highway robbery, in its literal form. Unidentified platoons of armed men occupied roads, often straddling jurisdictions, and either dragooned men or robbed them outright. Rongchang county’s Anfu township (安富镇) sat on the western edge of the county, right off the main road, and bordered on Longchang county. Here, in May 1944 a group of nine men in plainclothes occupied the road. They “inspected” all the traveling merchants, confiscating opium, money and any worthwhile goods. The platoon told travelers that they were the Yongchuan county Peace Preservation Special Inspection Unit (Yongchuanxian baoan techadui 永川县保安特查隊), but no such unit existed. The local baojia apparently knew nothing of it either. The men “seemed like soldiers and bandits, but were neither soldiers nor bandits” (似兵非兵似匪非匪). After the unit dispersed or moved on, there was little the authorities could do.45

Patterns of Rural Conscription IV: Community Protection

It is important to note that while the previous section has used language of predation, it takes only a slight shift in perspective to recognize that press-ganging sojourners within the community or men from another community was a way of protecting one’s own community and its residents from the draft. As Vivienne Shue remarked about local cadres under the communist regime: “Petty local despotism and petty local protectionism are two sides of the same coin.”46

For village baojia men, every outsider taken was one less neighbor that was drafted. From the perspective of the national community, and the Nationalist state itself, extra-community predation was just as dangerous and loathsome as intra-community abuses. The state and its spokesmen bemoaned the persistence of attitudes that placed private concerns above national need. Lin Yutang, for example, put the problem down to an incomplete change in the mindset of the lowest state functionaries:

I studied the working of the paochia [baojia] system of village government, and learned how futile it is to introduce any kind of change in democratic administrative machinery without a change of mind. The conscription system, even with the best rules promulgated by the government, breaks down completely under the weight of abuses in the hands of some heads of the village paochia [baojia] system. The opening of the mind will make a difference. Once conscious of its new freedom, it will demand the stopping of abuses which directly hurt the villagers’ own interests, and feel a new sense

November 1944.


46. Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic, p. 113. My observation of the double-face to the rural draft and the baojia men who administered it is also inspired by Elizabeth Perry’s classic study of Huaibei, which makes the distinction between predatory banditry and protective strategies. But Perry is careful to note not only that the two sets of strategies helped define and limit each other, but that the boundary between them was permeable. Militias, organized to protect their communities, could and did shift into predatory gear, organizing raids or mobilizing for feuds against neighboring communities; Elizabeth, Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945, pp. 48-95. The conscription administration was at least subliminally aware of this dual-edged nature of the predatory-protective dynamic: baojia heads were accused of protecting their relatives, which would have necessitated preying on someone else; qz0061.mj15-4419A/B, p. 28 dated 3 July 1940.
of responsibility.\(^{47}\)

Painting all the illegalities in the conscription with the same broad brush, as Lin and virtually all the conscription authorities were wont to do, only demonstrated just how far they misunderstood the nature of rural power and community: the state’s theorists and commentators assumed that conscription abuses were antithetical to village residents’ self-interest. Residents and neighbors of \textit{baojia}, village, township, and ward heads, however would have had a very different point of view, one which highlights the subterranean protective facet to preying on outsiders. Even paying the “fees” to buy a son’s release from the draft was tolerable in this sense: a monetary loss was still preferable to the son’s absence, even if buying his release meant an outsider would be grabbed up on the road. There was little hope of reforming the systemic abuses as long as the government continued to ignore the mixture of motives, personal and communal, that produced and sustained the illegal practices. Press-ganging outsiders was not solvable without taking into account that it actually fulfilled an important protective function for interior communities.

Local administrators acted protectively on behalf of residents in other ways as well. From counties on down, there was a constant stream of requests to reduce draft quotas. Local governments funneled these requests up to the Sichuan provincial district, the MSO, and the Junzhengbu. Such requests naturally betrayed a degree of self-interest; a reduced quota lessened the workload of local officials. If the draft was primarily an opportunity for extortion and graft by \textit{baojia} and other local administrators, then these petitions to reduce quotas do not make much sense. They are understandable only by acknowledging that they carried a protective impulse: to lessen the burden on the community.

Local \textit{baojia} and Citizen Militia units were often the upward funnel for these requests, which were forwarded by county governments to the 3AD, which in turn, passed the requests on to the local draft district.\(^{48}\) In early 1939, the Dazu magistrate, Zhang Suineng (張遂能) complained to Shen Peng that the recent increase in quota – from one man from every two \textit{bao} to two men from every three \textit{bao} – was unfair to the county residents. Just a few years after the initial implementation of \textit{baojia} in the county, it had been reorganized and brought more fully into line with official regulations in mid-1938. Dazu had carried out this reorganization conscientiously, but the result was that the county and its residents were being punished, Zhang asserted. Apportioning quotas on the basis of \textit{bao} seems “fair” but really it is not, because Dazu had organized its \textit{bao} conscientiously and according to regulations, while other counties deliberately reduced their \textit{baojia} units so as to lessen the conscription quota on their population. “In some cases, a single \textit{bao} can number 300 or 400 households! . . . [While] counties that organize \textit{[baojia]} conscientiously cannot avoid extreme suffering.” He pleaded with Shen Peng to reassess the \textit{baojia} figures in other counties to make sure they were not protecting their population by overstuffing the \textit{bao} with too many households.\(^{49}\) Just six weeks later, Zhang was

\(^{47}\) Lin Yutang, \textit{Vigil of a Nation}, p. 196.

\(^{48}\) For just one example, see qz0055.mj3-285, pp. 32a-3a dated 29 April 1941.

\(^{49}\) qz0055.mj3-285, pp. 22-4 dated 10 February 1939. In 1941, the new Dazu magistrate, Peng Xinming (彭明心), would again make the exact same argument to the 3AD. Dazu was exceptional in that it had followed the \textit{baojia} regulations, while other counties had been lax and much of their population was not registered in \textit{bao} units. The draft quota for such counties was thus too light. By tying quotas to the number of \textit{bao} in a county, the government had created a strong incentive for
tilting at the windmill again. The sudden increase in draft levies in early 1939 had set off an uproar in the county’s lianbao. From September 1937 through February 1939, the county had supplied less than one man per bao per month for service. But suddenly the demand had ballooned to two men per month per bao; additionally, the bao were smaller before due to the restructuring in mid-1938. If this demand, which Zhang claimed was higher than surrounding counties, continued, within six months the bao would supply the same number of men that they had given in the whole previous 18 months. Already some bao were reporting that no eligible men were available. In a few more months, these bao would increase considerably and a vicious cycle of drawing men from an ever-decreasing number of bao would ensue. The lianbao heads begged Zhang to request special permission to forgive all deficits and decrease the levy for those bao which were denuded of manpower. Zhang heartily agreed and passed the request on to the 3AD, which seems to have had little choice but to reject the proposal. County governments often argued for reductions when local elites, particularly public servants and educators, pressured them to do so. In some cases, baojia heads, local elites, and organizations petitioned the 3AD directly. A group of bao heads and local gentry appealed to the 3AD, arguing that depopulation had so gutted baojia units that they needed to be consolidated. Such consolidation reduced the number of bao and would lighten the conscription burden; it was better to abolish some bao or even some village public offices, combining their households with others, than to call on the staff to meet the quotas forcibly. These requests were approved on occasion. Earlier that year, as a heavy corvée levy was added to the draft, an impassioned plea from Tongliang went out to the 3AD: “Fathers weep for their sons, wives weep for their husbands. It’s unbearable to hear. Spring planting is hindered; able-bodied men flee, and the fields lie in waste.” The petition to reduce or at least stagger the deadlines for mobilizing manpower, was signed from an impressive list of public, political, and private organizations. Some of these local petitions put the matter

[50] The 3AD’s decision is scrawled on the original, but it is unreadable. I have not been able to find a record of an official reply to Dazu, but there is little likelihood that the 3AD would have summarily lowered the quota, as it would have had to increase it for another jurisdiction; qz0055.mj3-285, pp. 26-8 dated 26 March 1939. The local draft districts too were under pressure to fill their quotas and they were not always supportive of the 3AD when it backed counties’ requests for reductions. See the Yongrong DD’s rejection of Tongliang county’s request, backed by the 3AD; qz0055.mj3-248 70a-b dated 29 April 1942.

[51] See the petition from Dazu notables to the magistrate in June 1941, which marshaled several arguments in support of an immediate reprieve for the county; qz0055.mj3-285, pp. 36-9 dated mid-June 1941.

[52] qz0055.mj3-414, pp. 8-9b dated December 1942.

[53] The signees included the Tongliang KMT Party Affairs Guidance committee secretary, Liu Daiqin (劉代芹); the county Youth Corps secretary, Ye Daen (葉大恩); the county finance committee, the chamber of commerce; the education committee; the agricultural union; the general labor secretary; the relief institute; the public health organization; the county middle-school; a private middle-school; the vocational school; the local Agricultural Promotion Institute; and individual “gentry”; qz0055.mj3-248, pp. 58-61 dated April 1942.
very starkly, reminding the government that it could take its pick of two rather unpleasant alternatives. Yongchuan county residents pressured the magistrate, Peng Shancheng (彭善承), to intercede on their behalf. Despite the best efforts of the whole county, barely one-third of the 4,000 man quota for 1942 had passed inspection, leaving the county with a huge shortfall. Making up the deficit would do irreparable harm to the spring planting, and thus to the fall harvest, and would risk serious social dislocation. The county was so far behind its quota precisely because the baojia men were unwilling to resort to wanton press-ganging just to fill up the numbers, but if higher-ups decided not to forgive the deficit, then there would be little choice but to begin dragooning men. This would, the petitioners argued, actually do more harm to the war effort than good: “It’s near spring sowing, and agricultural work is really busy. . . . If the spring planting is late then farming will imperceptibly grind to a halt, commerce and industry will [have no way] to move forward, which will impact the rear areas’ production . . . If spring planting is ruined, the harvest will hopelessly impact the entire situation of the war of resistance.” The magistrate fully concurred with his constituents.  

In addition to their part in such general requests for overall quota reductions, baojia heads frequently showed more direct support for residents as well. The archival records for Renhe township are littered with cases of baojia heads writing or forwarding petitions on behalf of residents who felt the draft system had miscarried in conscripting them or their loved ones. This was true as early as 1939, with a baojia head supporting a resident and his son who had just recently moved from Chongqing to the township. The father had not filled out the required form and door placard, not out of a desire to “deliberately conceal” his son, but because the son had already served in the municipal defense troop, and thus had already “fulfilled his city resident’s duty.” It is possible that the baojia head was just protecting a friend, but if so there was little need to write to the public office justifying the father’s failure to register, as merely continuing to hide the son off the draft rolls would have been sufficient. Baojia heads also filed affidavits on behalf of residents, verifying that neighbors were sick or otherwise qualified for exemptions. In Renhe, the father of a man who had been drafted appealed to the baojia for help. His son had left the township and taken a job at the Xinshubao (新蜀報) newspaper in Chongqing. Since the newspaper refused to turn him over, the father requested the bao head file a request to have the son officially placed on the exemption list. The bao in turn prevailed upon the lianbao head to pass the request to the county. The baojia men were clearly on the father’s side in this, though the county chose to appeal to the Chongqing police bureau to put pressure on the paper to turn over the son.  

Baojia heads often appealed on behalf of resident families who had their sons press-ganged in another jurisdiction. Such families had few other recourses and while their local 

54. qz0055.mj3-248, pp. 67-9 dated 19 April 1942.
55. If the case had already been brought to the attention of higher ups, and the report was a sophisticated defense of his own (in)action, then we must take note of the fact that there was stronger pressure to follow the regulations to the letter than is usually suggested; the baojia heads were under more scrutiny by their superiors and were not as free to do as they pleased as is usually assumed; qz0059.mj2-59, p. 29 dated 31 July 1939.
56. One example, qz0059.mj2-80, p. 51 dated 20 April 1943.
57. qz0061.mj15-4436A/B, pp. 42-3 dated March 1940.
baojia had no formal power to resolve the situation, they could at least register a moral objection with higher ups in an attempt to bring unwanted outside attention into the other community. (Baojia did not often cooperate with each other. Delays, excuses, even outright refusals were common between baojia, especially when they were located in different counties, but even sometimes when they were neighbors.58) See, for example, the petition filed by Wu Laiyong (吳來雍), lianbao head of Yongjia township (永嘉鄉) in Tongliang county. Wu went to bat for a Yongjia resident, writing to Shen Peng at the 3AD asking for an investigation of a Baxian baojia official who had illegally conscripted a Yongjia man. Shen Peng immediately ordered the Baxian county government to investigate, though the outcome is not recorded.59

In some cases, against expectations, baojia heads even filed petitions to defend community outsiders, but this was usually done in cooperation with, and on behalf of, the local employers of hired hands. The baojia heads in such instances were doing favors for the wealthier and more powerful members of their community.60 This points to another aspect of the wartime baojia consistently overlooked by observers, namely that these men were in a difficult position, caught between state and community pressures. They were, in essence, trying to navigate twin shoals of insistent state demands and the requirements of living within the community they were responsible for administering. Contemporary critics, state agents, and later historians have all bemoaned the lack of national consciousness among these baojia heads, seeing in this “cultural” defect a one-size-fits-all explanation for conscription abuses, but the fact was that community pressure and a sense of responsibility to their neighbors were not negligible influences on baojia behavior. Recalcitrant residents could and did defy baojia heads, who had to call on upper tiers, such as village or township chiefs, to resolve issues.61 And residents could unite to threaten open resistance against baojia heads, though higher levels were often able to defuse such situations without them degenerating into open violence.62

The incidents of conscription revolts in late 1938 discussed briefly last chapter display precisely these same dynamics: the social dissatisfaction on lower levels of the baojia system created a pressure-cooker situation that concentrated popular discontent on the lianbao level. The incidents in Xindu and Zhongjiang in November and December 1938 elicited an astute analysis by the Xinxin News (Xinxin xinwen 新新聞). As analyzed by the newspaper’s editorial staff, the immediate cause of the Zhongjiang flare up was not confined to conscription grievances, but also included resentment at the grain tax policies as well. This was ironic since

58. qz0059.mj2-49, pp. 169-74 dated 8 December 1944.
59. qz0055.mj3-273, pp. 57a-8b dated 26 January 1939. Other petitions by baojia on behalf of residents: qz0059.mj2-49, p. 27 dated 16 September 1944; pp. 35-7 dated 31 May 1944; and pp. 39 dated 19 September 1944. In many of the petitions the writers (or their ghost writers) seem to be groping their way through the regulations and what they mean. They do not always turn on a literal interpretation, but try to express general principles of what should be, a way to marry the uniform, arbitrary administrative imperatives with a morality that would respect the specificities of personal and community circumstances.
60. See, qz0059.mj2-50, p. 61 dated 28 February 1944 and qz0059.mj2-80, p. 49 dated 22 May 1943.
61. qz0059.mj2-50, pp. 34-44 dated 21 January 1944.
62. See Zhang Suineng’s report to the 3AD on one such case in March 1940; qz0055.mj3-285, pp. 29a-b dated 1 March 1940.
grain taxes had been substantially decreased since the central government had regularized taxes and put an end to the rapacious advance collection that was so common under the warlords. Thus, the absolute burden of the grain tax could not have been the fundamental cause either. Instead, the editorial writer concluded that both conscription and the tax collection shared a similar, and fatal, flaw that aroused resistance on both counts: structurally, county governments were “separated from the people.” Contrary to conscription authorities who lamented the interference of “bullies and evil gentry,” the root cause of this separation was that gentry participation had been curtailed and thus the mediating function they normally played between officials and people had been lost. The Qing, even with its “extremely corrupt” county administration, avoided incidents precisely because of this, according to the editorial, because the county government could rely on them to report social conditions and help keep society pacified. They had continued to play this role even through the years of unspeakable depredations visited on the countryside by the warlord garrison system. Everything changed with the 1930s reforms; the new county government section heads, the sub-county wards, and lianbao public offices were all now staffed with outsiders, non-residents of the county. Gentry and their organizations (fatuan) had been cut out of power, except for the finance committee. Resentment among gentry over this increased the grumbling against county governments. This social separation showed up, tragically, in how disputes with conscription (and taxes) were dealt with. Zhongjiang people ransacked granaries, smashed up the township lianbao offices, and beat the lianbao chief. The Xinxin News editor asked pointedly why Zhongjiang residents did not target the jia and bao heads, but only went after the lianbao. The reason was simply that disputes were generally decided at the lianbao level. Each jia was supposed to supply one man for the draft. But in some cases this simply was not possible: all the males were either only sons, not physically up to standard, or exempt because of occupation. The jia and bao heads could not think of any way around the matter so they just passed it up to the lianbao head. Unsure what to do, lianbao heads requested instructions from their superiors, the ward heads, yet these men often refused to make substantive decisions based on local conditions; they preferred to place the burden of making such hard choices on their subordinate lianbao heads. Lacking direction from the ward office, the lianbao heads made decisions arbitrarily, assigning extra levies from other bao to make up the shortfall. The result was that resentment was concentrated at the lianbao office. In Zhongjiang, community pressure on the baojia system turned violent – and melted away in the face of armed government response – but across Sichuan, subtler forms of community pressure remained an important influence on the actions of baojia heads.63

To summarize, the lower levels of the baojia were under pressure from their communities and took both active and passive steps to protect their residents and neighbors. The authorities, of course, were not pleased when those community entanglements led to illegal press-ganging or

63. The unrest was quelled when the government removed the county magistrates and sent in armed troops; provincial Peace Preservation (baoan) units were dispatched to restore order. The county magistrates and the Special Inspectors all had demerits recorded on their dossiers. The people were largely just angry mobs, so they melted away in the face of force, but this, of course, was not a reliable long-term solution. YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 464-73. This is a series of newspaper editorials that ran from 22 to 25 November 1938 in the Xinxin News (Xinxin xinwen) and collected in the Xinxin News Weekly (Xinxin xinwen), no. 18, 1 January 1939. See also, Zhou Kaiqing, Minguo Chuan shi jiyao, pp. 59-61; and Sichuan shengzhi: junshi zhi, p. 549.
even releasing or sheltering neighbors. But in other ways too baojia heads acted on behalf of their neighbors, funneling petitions and requests upwards. For all the “nationalization” of the baojia and its increased responsiveness to national policy initiatives, the heads remained embedded in their communities. They could not, of course, completely ignore orders from higher ups – the quotas had to be filled one way or another – but at least in some minor ways they were able to soften some of the blows and represent their residents to higher ups. In important ways, then, wartime baojia heads resemble the local cadres in the PRC period, as analyzed by Vivienne Shue. Despite collectivization, the cellular structure of rural society remained resilient. Cadres in production teams, brigades, and communes played dual roles, as state agents and as “defenders” of their communities, resisting state demands whenever possible in ways that “limited central state penetration and control.” Shue relates this to the function of the gentry under the Qing dynasty, but overlooks the fact that during the war the Nationalist state too was caught in the same dilemma, even though it had pushed the administrative membrane down to the village level.64 Shue’s summary of communist-era cadres could easily have been penned to describe the Nationalist baojia:

It was not uncommon for commune cadres to represent the views of ‘their’ peasants to higher levels, to defend their localities against unpopular state rulings, and even to fail to execute prescribed policy to the letter in order to maintain the goodwill and cooperation of commune members. . . . [L]ocal cadres, like local gentry, could frequently make a difference at the margins for their people and their communities. It was not in their power to evade the greater part of the state’s exactions, to be sure. But they could work to minimize local losses and to secure for their villages whatever small benefits the state had to offer.

Rural Conscription: State and Village

What, then, do we conclude from this extended examination of conscription “on the ground” in the rural countryside of the 3AD? First, from the mid-1930s on, the Nationalists had begun the process of installing a new stratum of administrators in rural communities and undertook efforts to train and inculcate some measure of discipline in this group. Despite the holdover of imperial era terminology and the decimal principle of organization in the baojia system, this was a break from traditional rural governance.

William Skinner’s famous article, “Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case,” outlines the dual modes of village interaction with the wider social and political world during the late imperial era. (The modes were also temporal phases in a cycle.65)

64. Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic, pp. 17-9, 45-57, 67-70, and 79-121. The quote is from page 105 and 111.

65. The transitions went as follows: “As the dynasty [any dynasty] wore on, developments external to the rural community led first to constricted political opportunities, then to constricted economic opportunities, and finally to endemic disorder. In response, local communities began to close up, and in a specific sequence: normative closure first, then economic closure, and finally what might be termed coercive closure. Then, with the establishment of the next dynasty external developments were reversed. First peace and order were restored; then a commercial revival recreated the structure of economic opportunity; and finally, as the intricate bureaucratic system . . . [was] brought to optimal working order, the structure of political opportunity was rebuilt. In response, local communities opened up again, relaxing first the coercive aspects of their closure, then the economic, and finally the normative;” Skinner, “Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community,” p.
In times of peace and prosperity, villages were open, both socio-economically to other communities and areas of the empire, but also politically to the (dynastic) state, while during times of unrest or economic distress, they shut themselves, hardened boundaries, and often proved a tough nut for outsiders and (dynastic) states to crack. When shut, outsiders were expelled, local communities armed themselves, taxes went unpaid and men stayed home instead of serving in government posts; in times of disorder and crisis rural communities “closed” themselves in a defensive posture, denying the state – and everyone else – access. Skinner’s model might lead us to suspect that villages in the interior would have been “closed” to the Nationalists, as the war was nothing if not an intense period of unrest and distress. Yet, despite the very real forces of disorder (bandits, plainclothes army units, and so on.) villages and counties around Chongqing were not shuttered tightly. From conscription itself, we can see clearly that the modern state broke out of the old mold and was able to keep the villages “open” to its demands. The presence of the state and the new administrative sinews were too strong: communities were not able to close themselves off. The conscription administration, one way or another, would not be denied its quota of men. In other words, the rural countryside was no longer caught in the old (dynastic) duality. While the villages would never be completely transparent or open (not to the KMT, nor to the communists later), they were more porous than the Skinner model would suggest. Kicking and screaming, the villages were being brought into the modern age when the state would get its pounds of flesh (literally in this case) one way or another.

This conclusion is shared by Prasenjit Duara’s study of north China village tax brokers in the early decades of the twentieth-century. Duara’s study argues that after the 1911 Revolution, the prewar modernizing state in North China was held hostage by predatory (tax) brokers. As the “cultural nexus of power” (a shorthand for the moral legitimacy or authority wielded by village leaders) eroded due to the insistent demands of the Republican state, the only agents left for the state to rely on were rapacious brokers who had no moral standing in the communities. These men were happy to fill the state’s coffers, but extracted their own pound of flesh: the state turned a blind eye to the brokers’ corrupt and illegal taxes on residents. The result was “involution”: revenues went up, but the actual efficiency of the tax system went down (i.e., more was being lost, siphoned off, into private pockets of the brokers who were morally illegitimate in the eyes of villagers).66

Duara’s general picture of predatory tax brokers fits well with what we know of taxation in the Sichuan warlords’ “garrisons,” but wartime conscription was considerably more complicated. The mid-1930s baojia reforms had altered the situation. The Nationalists’ baojia leaders for all their infamous extortion and abuse of residents, were not the unchecked “brokers” of Duara’s study. Underneath the rhetoric of blame that Nationalist authorities, communist critics, contemporary (foreign) observers, and later historians have leveled at the baojia, there are important indications that baojia and village (or township) heads, even county magistrates, tried as best they could to shelter their residents from conscription. They did this in several ways: preying on travelers who crossed jurisdictional boundaries, drafting first outsider sojourners

66. Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and The State: Rural North China, 1900-1942, passim, but the conclusion on pages 245-57 summarizes Duara’s argument succinctly.
living or working in the community, and by purchasing substitutes who were not residents. To be sure, the conscription authorities were more or less dependent on the baojia as local agents, and in that respect the baojia heads do resemble Duara’s predatory tax brokers (this dependency was the foundation for the persistent commercialization of the draft, much like it is the bedrock for Duara’s “involution”). Yet, at least intermittently and on the margins, the baojia heads performed a protective function for their neighbors, shielding residents and acting as a conduit for complaints and accusations when residents felt they or their sons had been illegally conscripted (naturally such cases were usually in other jurisdictions). Neither were baojia heads given carte blanche in local communities: residents filed accusations against them at a good clip, appealing to the state against them whenever they felt they could.

In short, the baojia system had two faces: predatory and protective, though both faces were distressing to and proscribed by state authorities. The baojia heads had to satisfy the state’s demands by supplying the mandated quota of bodies for the war effort, but they could not act with impunity in their own communities. Unlike Duara’s predatory tax brokers, the wartime baojia men were embedded and enmeshed in their communities. This fact is a good indication of the Nationalists’ incomplete state-making. Baojia administrators were not the reliable state agents that conscription authorities wished them to be: they were still embedded in their local communities and attempted, when it was possible, to shelter their neighbors from the state. Unlike the Qing-era mobilization against the Taipings, the social order was not entirely compliant, nor a willing support to the state. On the other hand, the modern state had broken through the insularity of imperial-era villages: unlike Skinner’s “shut” paradigm, the villages were pried open in very real, and often painful, ways. The result was that both the ills that the Nationalist authorities were dead set against – the market forces of commercialization and the informal social ties of community – continued to operate and exert a powerful influence on conscription in rural villages.

If the draft in rural Sichuan villages was caught up in the social and market entanglements of the baojia heads, the situation in Chongqing was something else altogether. There, the institutions of the war effort and the state’s own agencies were the source of the problem. It was the the distinctive character of the wartime urban environment in the temporary capital that made this possible.

Urban Conscription: Committees, Urban Militia, and Police

Chongqing was unique. The city’s status as the temporary capital, with its swollen population of refugees and dense clustering of government agencies and war industries, required special handling when it came to conscription. The city enjoyed the attentions of a special committee that oversaw conscription. The Chongqing Municipal Conscription Guidance Committee was staffed with representatives from the Interior Ministry, the city government, the Chongqing Garrison Command, and the Military Police Command. The committee disbanded in 1945 when Chongqing was granted a complete reprieve from the draft.67

In the autumn of 1935, Chongqing was swiftly divided into 12 wards (qu 區), with a hierarchy of subordinate police branches, local police stations, bao, and jia. The wards, which encompassed neighborhoods and townships (zhen 鎮), remained an important administrative unit late in 1944: the police branches were coterminous with their boundaries and became the de

facto ward offices. The bao offices were located within them as well. The bao and jia units were organized by the municipal police bureau, with jia heads selecting one of their number to serve as their superior bao head. In late 1939 the system was revised by acknowledging the place of townships (zhen), which were inserted in between the police branches (wards) and the bao. In mid-July, the city had 12 wards, 46 townships, 463 bao, and 5,129 jia. In early 1941 five wards were added to the city from areas in Baxian and Jiangbei and in 1943 an extra ward covering river residents was added as well, bringing the total to 18 wards, 78 townships, 659 bao, and 7,438 jia.68 Then in late 1944, the city finally implemented an earlier (May 1943) decision to abolish the township level and wards took over the responsibilities of the township public offices, directly overseeing the bao and jia.69

These local administrative units were staffed by a large number of men. In 1938, the heads of wards, lianbao, bao, and jia numbered 3,684, while by 1943, the heads and vice-heads of the wards, townships, and baojia units numbered 9,026 men, with an uncounted body of cadres, guidance officers, secretaries, recorders, and department staff.70 The wards and townships were led by local Sichuan men who were in their thirties and forties. Almost all had some formal education, though very few were college graduates. Most were from Baxian and Jiangbei, but roughly one-third were from wider Sichuan and several were not from the province at all. Many had experience or training as police patrolmen or officers, while a smaller group had a military background. Most had some previous experience in public service, as baojia heads, bao squad leaders, as municipal government departmental staffers, or other semi-public committees, such as lower posts in the Chamber of Commerce organizations. A few had mercantile backgrounds.71

Although regulations required local administrators to be police or community residents of high reputation, in fact, there were instances of substandard applicants: illiterate men and even some sedan chair carriers were baojia heads. Although they were not willing to take on the hassle of serving themselves, city elites felt strongly enough to complain to the municipal government about the situation. Outsiders were avoiding serving in baojia and militia troops; baojia heads were looked down upon by people and high official alike; and elections of baojia heads were difficult as men with solid education were not enthusiastic about participating either. The result was that baojia work was nearly impossible at times, as city residents often just ignored orders issued through the baojia apparatus. The solution, they argued, was government-sponsored training courses for the baojia men, though it is hard to see how this would have changed any of the social attitudes toward the system.72 A few months later, the police bureau

---

68. The added wards were: the 13th, from Baxian’s Xinfeng (新豐) and Gaodian (高店) villages; the 14th, from Baxian’s Longyin village (龍隱鄉); the 15th, from Baxian’s Chongwen (崇文) and Daxing (大興) villages; the 16th, from parts of Jiangbei’s Huilong (回龍), Hengxing (恆興) and Shiping (石坪) villages; and the 17th from Baxian’s Shiqiao village (石橋鄉).

69. In October 1944, the city had 18 wards, 408 bao, and 7,177 jia. This summary is taken from Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 187-96.

70. Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 191 and 193.

71. 重慶市現任各區長副區長姓名綱要; qz0063.mj1-136 (renumbered mj1-140), pp. 89-95 dated 10 April 1940 and qz0063.mj1-136 (renumbered mj1-140), pp. 98-101 dated 27 April 1940.

72. Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 193, citing “Shizhang shicha jiyao” (市長視察紀要) in Chongqing shi zhengfu gongbao (重慶市政府公報), no. 4 and 5 combined issue,
summarized the situation:

Although this city is the temporary wartime capital and a place where [people of high] culture have assembled together, intellectuals often consider themselves as having high social status and despise baojia responsibilities. Those in military circles are particularly contemptuous of baojia personnel, while outstanding youth and upright elder gentry are unwilling to be [baojia heads]. At present, baojia personnel are generally of poor quality, [and thus] it is hard for them to be valued by society. Ordinarily, administrative and military agencies often [use them] for the agencies’ convenience, viewing them as runners [or office boys, chaiyi 差役], to be ordered about as the agencies wish.\(^73\)

The police authorities began requiring that men appointed to baojia posts have at least primary school education. A year later further regulations were issued to improve the quality of men from the wards down and after 1942 the police conducted oral and written men of up for positions in the city’s lower administration.\(^74\)

Of course, even recruiting men from the petit-educated stratum did not guarantee that baojia administrators would be conscientious or honest. One Zhang Zhiguo (張治國) was a ticket taker at a local theater and then worked as an officer in an arrest unit (偵緝隊) of the police department before becoming bao head of the 16th bao in the second ward. He was involved in the illegal use and sale of morphine and opium, extorting money from draftees, and embezzling money earmarked for the dependents of servicemen. Even further, after his dismissal he failed to turn many of the files and paperwork to his successor. He kept name lists of draft-eligible men, air raid shelter registrations, account books, even the keys to the bao’s air raid shelter.\(^75\)

The police and the Citizen Militia were tied closely to the wards. The Citizen Militia’s ward detachments were led by either the ward or the police branch heads and it was these same ward militia units that were responsible for many of the duties of conscription in the city. Thus, the Citizen Militia, the ward public offices, and the police were tightly linked in Chongqing. As noted earlier in the chapter, when the Nationalist central government moved to Chongqing, the city government was revamped with most departments being dominated by non-locals, the “downriver people.” The police bureau was the one major exception to this rule; it remained heavily seeded with, if not entirely controlled by, local men. Given the confusing geography, both physical and social, of the city, this was perhaps not surprising, but it meant that some of the social disregard for and defiance of baojia men carried within them the tension between locals and the self-assured “downriver people,” who felt themselves to be more modern than, and thus

---

February 1940.

73. Ibid., p. 194, citing “Benshi baojia gongzuoyuan xianzhuang yu gaijin yijian” (本市保甲工作現狀與改進意見), in Chongqing shi zhengfu gongbao (重慶市政府公報), no. 8 and 9 combined issue, June 1940.

74. The regulations of September 1941 required staff of ward and townships to have at least one of the following qualifications: have undergone official government training; have worked for at least a year in a KMT party or government post; have worked in a ward office; have graduated from lower middle school; or have taught at the primary school level. The requirements for bao heads were similar but slightly lower; Ran Mianhui and Li Huiyu, Minguo shiqi baojia zhidu yanjiu, pp. 194-5.

75. See the Chongqing police and Conscription Ministry reports on the case; qz0061.mj15-4433A, pp. 149-50 dated 5 March 1945 and qz0061.mj15-4433B, pp. 152-3 dated 23 March 1945.
justified in ignoring, the “backward” locals serving as baojia heads.

The Chongqing military service administration worked under the Baxian regimental district until the regimental tier was abolished in 1940, after which it was subordinate to the Yujiang (渝江) divisional district.\(^\text{76}\) The military service staffers in Chongqing were also overwhelmingly local Sichuan men. Of the 72 men on a 1939 personnel report from the Baxian regimental district at least 62 were Sichuanese, and 49 of these were from Baxian itself or neighboring counties in the 3AD. A good portion were either police-connected (21) or had a military background (9), but those from a commercial background were also well-represented (17 men). Most were educated, either in old-style private (household) schools or in more modern middle-schools. Fully 58 of these men held some sort of administrative position in the city’s baojia structure, most of them as head, vice-head, or secretary of a lianbao.\(^\text{77}\)

If the Citizen Militia was an important part of conscription in the countryside, in Chongqing it was the dominant institution responsible for the draft; in many ways the city’s baojia seems subordinate to the militia. In mid-1941 when the city was placed under the Administrative Yuan (of the central government), the militia likewise began taking orders directly from the Junzhengbu, though its staffing was still the municipal government’s jurisdiction. The city’s militia was often the first to implement policies and the city was officially a “national model” for the militia and conscription more generally. Because of the many responsibilities put on its shoulders and the heavy work load, the Citizen Militia inside the city had beefed up staffing levels.\(^\text{78}\)

Officially founded on 1 September 1939, the Chongqing Citizen Militia was given a whole panoply of functions within the city. Chiang, as chairman of the MAC, appointed the Chongqing police chief to lead the militia, while the deputy-head was appointed by the Junzhengbu. A chief training officer was supported by a staff of eight full-time trainers, while an additional political tutor (zhengzhi zhidaoyuan 政治指導員) was sent from the MAC’s political bureau. The city wards each had a militia unit, commanded by the chief of the ward police branch or the ward head himself. In early 1943, below the wards were nearly 80 township units, some 661 bao units and 7,431 jia squads. The township tier of militia was abolished in September 1944, and the bao units consolidated down to a total of 408 bao units, with 7,116 jia-level squads, while ward level staff was increased.

The Citizen Militia in Chongqing fielded several different types of units. Law and order functions were handled by “self-protection” (ziweidui 自衛隊), but these were forbidden from accepting any lottery selectees and were perennially underfunded and thus lacked the full complement of units. Two units were created for training purposes. They rotated to different wards providing short-term “in unit” (zaiying 在營) training for ward militia men.\(^\text{79}\) The reservist militia units (yubeidui 預備隊) took already trained militiamen in the townships, conducted additional training as needed, and organized sub-units for local service functions such

---

76. Yu (渝) is the classical name for Chongqing.

77. qz0061.mj15-4438, pp. 16-89 dated 1939.

78. Chongqing GMBT work report from March 1942 to February 1943, qz0062.mj1-13, pp. 3-9 dated March 1943.

79. There was a hiatus in this from March 1942 to February 1943, when the Junzhengbu ordered it resumed.

- 216 -
as intelligence work, communications, transportation, fire fighting, and rescue work. When the
township tier was abolished, their reservist units were given to the wards, and their number more
than doubled from 34 to 72 (and later 80) units. One of the duties for these units was
maintaining order both inside and outside air raid shelters in Chongqing. In November 1944,
they were also called upon to do nighttime patrols and man guard posts around the city – a task it
held until February 1945. Other specialized subsidiary units included an anti-chemical warfare
unit, an air raid service troop, a labor service unit, and a special bank detachment. The labor
service unit helped with street cleaning, garbage collection, and urban beautification. On any
given day, some four hundred Citizen Militia men were serving one week hitches in such duty.
Citizen Militia training was supposed to provide an experience in “militarized life” that would
“concentrate stricter discipline and nourish habits of healthy collective life” through daily three
hour collective sessions and drill. The Junzhengbu reminded the organization in early 1944 that
the Citizen Militia was responsible for the “fundamental work of military service and to
effectively promote local self-government” and that “military service was for the ultimate goal of
militarizing (junshihua 軍事化) social organizations.”

The main complaint militia officials had in their 1943 work report was that lower cadres
were paid so poorly that they were unwilling to work full time and as a result the work suffered.
Funded from municipal coffers, the Chongqing Citizen Militia drew up a budget each year (in
1944 it was a paltry 490,000 yuan), which had to be approved by the municipal government.
Repeated calls to provide salaries for militia cadres on a par with other public servants went
unheeded, though the top-level officers and ward-level commanders received supplemental
living allowances. Similar funding difficulties were behind the fact that the Citizen Militia in the
city were not able to fully follow the Military Service ID system. Although it managed to issue
around 50,000 Military Service IDs, the Chongqing militia ran out of funds and had to rely on
the Chongqing municipal ID cards, which itself was unevenly implemented.

After several years of multiple lotteries per year (1939-1942), the lottery procedures were
simplified in 1943 to a single draft lottery per year. By 1944, the system was streamlined. The
Citizen Militia conducted information gathering for the draft and paramilitary mobilization of

80. There is some confusion in the sources here. Either these wards, which numbered 80 according to
one Citizen Militia report, included outlying areas – most likely in Baxian and Jiangbei – or these
“wards” (qu 区) are smaller areas than the city’s larger 18 wards. A report on the third review of the
Chongqing Citizen Militia reports that there were 80 qu in the city, a number which fits with the
increase in reservist units, but does not gel with the number of wards (qu); qz0063.mj1-563, pp.
29-32 nd. The possibility that these units include Baxian and Jiangbei is suggested by a secondary
source, which claims that Chongqing municipal efforts for information-gathering on able-bodied men
in 1944-45 was extended into the two neighboring counties and placed directly under the
supervision of the Ministry of Conscription and Interior Ministry; Rong Jianguang, “Kangzhan zhong
zhi bingli dongyuan,” pp. 801-5. I have not found independent confirmation of this move in the
CQMA, but given the volume of documents concerning conscription scattered in the CQMA files this
is not too surprising.

81. Junzhengbu to Chongqing Citizen Militia; qz0063.mj1-567, pp. 29-35 dated March 1944.

82. qz0063.mj1-689, pp. 4-10, covers March 1942 to February 1943; qz0063.mj1-580, pp. 6-8 dated
November 1944; qz0063.mj1-750, pp. 80-3 (report covers January to December 1944); and
Chongqing Citizen Militia to the 12th ward office on investigation of able-bodied men,
qz0063.mj1-718, pp. 128-31 and 135-6 dated 6 June 1944.
men in the city, usually during the months of April through June. The Chongqing police bureau worked in conjunction with the Citizen Militia, starting in April, on this. Cadres who would be doing the canvassing on the ground were given preparatory classes. In 1944, for example, the police held conferences held in each ward between the 20th and 31st of May, and the information gathering began on 1 June. The township was the basic unit for creating registers of able-bodied men. These were used to create militia rosters (guominbing mingbu 國民兵名簿) of men 19-45 years old; the rosters were organized by year of birth. The Militia shared responsibility for registering men by going through the institutions of employment and education in the city: men were to be registered in cooperation with their schools, agencies or organizations, and factories. As we will see shortly, this was of fundamental importance for the draft in the city. Once the survey and registers were complete, the lottery was held in late summer (July) and men called up. In the early years of the war, inspection of Chongqing recruits was carried out similarly to other areas: the selectees were collected and put in tents in Caiyuanba (菜園壠), with its large flat area, or other stations in public squares. In later years, the city’s conscription committee mandated that each ward and its Citizen Militia unit conduct these inspections. Beginning in the summer (in some years it was June, others as late as August) and continuing through the late summer and early fall, the municipal police dispatched overseers to each ward and township to help with the inspection of selectees and reservists. Inspection completed, the men were dispatched in batches, while reservists were assembled, mobilized, and began training in the fall.

Much of this process depended heavily on accurate and timely record keeping, often an unrealized goal. Errors and shoddy data entry were not uncommon and plagued the system. In addition, the draft was complicated by the fact that extra levies and recruitment by specialized units (such as MPs and logistics units) in addition to the normal quotas and lotteries were frequent.

83. qz0063.mj1-718, pp. 216-25 covers 1944.
84. After the township level of the militia was abolished in September 1944, the rosters were handled by the bao under the wards; qz0063.mj1-580, pp. 6-8 dated November 1944.
85. The KMT party dispatched personnel to oversee the lotteries too. See the list of ward overseers for the third lottery in 1942; qz0061.mj15-4430A/B, pp. 81-2 dated 25 April 1942.
86. The Militia shared responsibility for registering men by going through the institutions of employment and education in the city: men were to be registered in cooperation with their schools, agencies or organizations, and factories.
87. Chongqing Military Affairs Section chief, Ye Yuanhuai (葉原淮) to Chongqing Police chief, Xu Zhongqi; qz0061.mj15-4433B, pp. 52-61 covers August 1943 through August 1944. In 1944, the process began in August and was finished at the end of October.
88. See the record-keeping errors listed in qz0063.mj1-718, p. 293 n.d.
89. See the record-keeping errors listed in qz0063.mj1-718, pp. 216-25 covers 1944.
Chiang himself dictated some of the activities of the Citizen Militia in Chongqing. In 1943 he issued a handwritten order that the three year training of jia level squads was to be finished. The militia was ordered to call up two year groups (men born in 1923 and 1924) for collective “in unit” (zaiying) training; nearly 8,100 men were mobilized as a result. The Citizen Militia conducted training for other men, in township units, as well, but these were not as rigorous as they were not “in unit” training periods. Then in 1944, the militia was ordered to mobilize four year groups, for the men born in 1918, 1919, 1921, and 1922. This was a much larger batch, fully 22,000 men, for “in unit” training, though funding limited the effectiveness of the increase and in the end only 14,000 men were assembled and trained. Even more tellingly, instead of “in unit” intensive training, they were given only the lesser three hours per day of instruction and drill.

The Chongqing Citizen Militia put on a yearly city-wide review, usually on Christmas Day, to assess the militiamen’s level of training. The review, in which the militia lined both sides of a winding route along key roads in the city and along the waterfront, was led by the commanding officer, Xu Zhongqi, who was also the city’s police chief. The wards and townships held smaller versions of the city-wide review. Such public displays were a demonstration of the centrality of military service to the wartime capital, but they were a difficult imposition on the lower levels institution. The Longwangmiao township (龍王廟鎮), for example, complained to the police bureau that the financial outlays were excessive: each of the 3,000 men in the township needed a lapel badge at a cost of 10 yuan per badge and each of the twenty-seven yearly age groups of the militia needed a sign at a cost of 300 yuan per sign. Neither the central militia branch, nor the city government were helping with this: the township was independently responsible for collecting the money from residents, which inevitably caused tension and misunderstandings.

The reviews – particularly the city-wide event in which high officials toured the streets of Chongqing lined with thousands of militiamen – were symbolic expressions of the unity of the city in the common endeavor of the war effort. As a visible manifestation of national unity, they were significant publicity events, but actually they were unsuccessful in papering over the deep fractures of Chongqing society. These social fractures in the wartime capital were the decisive influence on how conscription was carried out and experienced in the city.

Urban Conscription: The Honeycombed City

Wartime Chongqing, as Lee McIsaac’s research has shown, enjoyed a carefully cultivated image as a “unified” national city. The Nationalists deliberately crafted the city as an embodiment of the symbolic unity of the Chinese nation in the face of a foreign invader. This

---

90. qz0063.mj1-580, pp. 6-8 dated November 1944 and qz0063.mj1-750, pp. 80-3.
91. qz0063.mj1-557, pp. 77-9 dated 7 December 1943. Some of the Citizen Militia conferences were dominated by preparations for the yearly review; see the fifth and eighth conferences in December 1944; qz0061.mj15-4447, pp. 24-32 dated 1 December, 12 December 1944.
92. Chongqing 1st ward office document listing the times and places for review in various townships; qz0063.mj1-718, pp. 91a-b dated 12 July 1944.
symbolic unity both papered over and played upon the social and political geography of the city. This fact, however, has obscured the fact that underneath the image of a unified national capital Chongqing was a very divided society. Scholars have noted the key division as the chasm between the locals and the “downriver people,” a social as well as topographical dichotomy within the Chinese nation: the progressive, modern “downriver” people – embodied most clearly in the coastal city of Shanghai – and the backward and poor population of the interior. The two halves were united under the KMT. Chiang’s regime cemented its symbolic dominance by painting itself as a modern “downriver” government, governing and directing the fractured nation.\(^4\) It is important to note, however, that the distinction and friction between the native Sichuanese and the “downriver people” was not purely a product of the war; as Zhang Jin’s impeccably researched study of Chongqing under Liu Xiang’s rule in the pre-war decade shows, there was a tradition of tension between the Shanghai model of modernity and the native paths of development right through the late 1920s and into the 1930s.\(^5\) The influx of war refugees and exiles exacerbated this tension, but also provided an opportunity for Nationalist authorities to assert symbolically their leadership over the fragmented parts of the Chinese nation.

Yet, this division was not the only one at work in the city, and in fact, the city was so divided along other lines that it might best be characterized as insular, more akin to a honeycomb than anything else. The social division between the upper and lower stratum found expression in a geographical split between the upper and lower halves of the city. But this divided social geography went further, as whole neighborhoods (townships or even wards) were dominated by one social group or another. The general uniformity of neighborhoods formed the basis of requests for draft reductions from lower level administrators. The police branch of the third ward forwarded a request from Xia Junchen, the head of Wangyemiao township, Xia contended that the township was a poor area. Its residents were all petty traders and coolies and thus, it was in severe economic distress because of rising prices. In addition, the neighborhood had suffered numerous casualties and significant destruction from the Japanese bombings. Other than bao heads and transportation workers (i.e., coolies) there were no able-bodied men in the township: the others had all left for the suburbs after the bombings. It was simply impossible to come up with the three men per bao that the quota required.\(^6\) The 12th ward made a similar request in mid-1942. The ward head, Li Deyang, claimed it was proving impossible to make up a shortfall from the previous year because the ward was dominated by factories, except for two of its townships (Nanping and Haitangxi), which were made up of extremely poor farming families with few eligible men.\(^7\) The 16th ward filed similar requests, backed by the signatures from community residents and every bao chief and vice-chief, along with municipal police chief Tang Yi. One of the ward’s townships, Gailanxi, was transferred from the 9th ward to the 16th in January 1941. A substantial portion of its 1,300 households were “backstreet bao” with poor households that

---

95. Zhang Jin, Quanli, chongtu, yu biange, p. 20. Lu Zuofu and the reforms he initiated in Beibei embodied the native Sichuan development path, and it was brought into the city of Chongqing by Liu Xiang’s sponsorship in the years before the central government’s intrusion into the province.
96. qz0061.mj15-4443, p. 30 dated 11 December 1940.
consisted exclusively of one man and one woman. Occupationallly, they were all manual laborers, mostly workers in a charcoal factory or collectors of medicinal ingredients. Residents of four of its subordinate bao, clustered tightly together, were split evenly between charcoal workers and employees of the Junzhengbu’s horse feed factory, with the remainder of draft-eligible men being police officers or other draft-exempt workers. Other neighborhoods could be dominated completely by workers in a major enterprise. The men in the 2nd bao in Chenjiaguan (陳家館) in the 10th ward, for example, were virtually without exception skilled workers at the 21st Arsenal, and thus exempt from the draft. The 2nd bao was simply unable to supply the required two soldiers for the December 1941 draft. Neighborhoods were often defined occupationally, or at least in broad socio-economic groups.

The most extreme examples of this insularity were the various governmental agencies and large-scale enterprises in the city. In Chongqing, both governmental and work institutions frequently formed nearly self-contained socio-economic units. Han Suyin’s memoir vividly evokes the communal mode of life, as she describes the bank where she worked:

For the employees all lived at the bank, one big family, with cooks, water carriers, and washwomen provided, the sixty-odd men clerks living together in large dormitories, the thirteen girls in a smaller dormitory on the roof and a few married couples given rooms to themselves. Every large organization, government or private, is run upon this system, partly co-operative, partly paternalistic. The employees elected from their number dormitory heads, appointed persons to supervise the kitchen, to keep accounts and purchase supplies. A doctor who had his office in the building was engaged to give medical care. Behind the correct and businesslike front offices flourished this teeming communal life. One walked through lofty halls where business was methodically transacted, typewriters clicking, telephones ringing – and stepped through the back door into a commotion of family life on an extensive scale, with courtyards crisscrossed with clothesline, amahs quarreling, children shouting and playing.

This was far from an isolated example in wartime Chongqing. Government agencies adopted a similar approach. The Social Bureau (Shehuiju 社會局), a central government agency that coordinated relief efforts and social policy during the war, is a good example of this. Minutes of its meetings show clearly that the staff of the agency maintained a communal lifestyle in the Bureau’s dormitories: alongside discussions of relief policy and aid measures, the agency’s bureaucrats discussed a rash of thefts in the compound, a search for a caterer for the agency cafeteria, whether to let staff bring their children to their offices, and how to support the non-professional workers who kept the compound functioning in the most menial ways. The

100. Han Suyin, Destination Chungking, pp. 271-2.
101. GMWX, v. 96, pp. 419-21 and 425-7; and Landdeck, “Rhetorics of Relief,” pp. 43-4. The Social Bureau was eventually made the Ministry of Social Affairs (shehuibu 社會部). In both incarnations, it was charged with two responsibilities: administering social legislation, including relief and social welfare programs; and supervising and control over social groups, particularly occupational organizations. This latter role was a form of social policing and quite likely involved the Social Bureau in certain intelligence activities; Tuan-sheng Ch’ien, Government and Politics, p. 218.

- 221 -
communal life of the bureaucrats and the workers was a given and the nitty gritty of that shared day-to-day life took its place right alongside national policy.

Han Suyin’s description evokes later, PRC, developments. After liberation (1949) until well into the Deng reform era, China was known for its “work unit” (danwei 单位) system in which one’s workplace formed a conduit for nearly all of one’s material and political needs. It is less widely known that this innovation had Nationalist-era antecedents. Even before the war, banks in Shanghai had instituted a proto-“work unit” type of organization that was designed to socialize entry-level white-collar professionals into their new roles and urban life. This “corporate home” of “self-contained residential compounds” took on novel roles in training and providing services for the banks’ white collar workers.

Wartime Chongqing drew on this tradition, importing it into the river city from Shanghai along with the exiled white-collar workers who managed and staffed the relocated factories, enterprises, banks, and government agencies from coastal China. But it was not limited to white-collar workplaces. Chongqing’s arsenals, which employed one-third to one-half of the city’s industrial workforce of 100,000 to 150,000, housed workers together in dormitories and increasingly provided a range of communal welfare benefits, such as rice subsidies, mess halls, free medical care at clinics, entertainment, consumer cooperatives, and schools. The extension of this “work unit” practice to a greatly expanded range of private and government institutions was a wartime development, pushed upon the Nationalist agencies due to the limited space of Chongqing and the flood of refugees. Conscription may very well have played a part in this as well. There are no readily available figures as to how many banks and government agencies adopted this sort of communal organization, but it was common enough that Han Suyin believed it was used by “every large organization, government or private.” Physically, the measures taken to limit the damage that Japanese bombing inflicted on the city heightened this honeycomb insularity. After the initial bombings in April 1939, the government began constructing fire lanes (huoxiang 火巷) to limit the spread of fires in the wooden city and thus protect essential political and economic institutions. Widening lanes and leaving fire breaks around compounds isolated them physically, reinforcing their social and institutional insularity.

---

102. In her study of these compounds, Wen-hsin Yeh is interested in suggesting a new continuity – that of urban communal life under corporate sponsorship – within Chinese socialism: the danwei are commonly painted as a communist innovation that grew out of their long years of rural revolution-making and thus take on a significance as the triumph of the countryside over the cities in the literature on the Chinese revolution. Yeh’s look at the Shanghai Bank of China suggests a more vital role for urban corporate culture and institutions in the formation of China’s socialist system; Wen-hsin Yeh, “Corporate Space, Communal Time: Everyday Life in Shanghai’s Bank of China,” American Historical Review, February 1995, pp. 97-122.

103. In 1944, Chongqing was home to 14 of the Nationalists’ 27 major arsenals. Combined, they employed some 60,000 workers, staff, and guards and supported an additional 40,000 employee dependents; Howard, Workers at War, pp. 9, 64, 118-9, and 149-53.

104. I have not done an exhaustive search, but thus far I have found no mention of this “work unit” practice among government bodies in Nanjing during the prewar years.

105. Zhou Kaiqing, Minguo Chuan shi jiyao, p. 70. The ninth ward in the city reported that the creation of the fire lanes in 1940 had driven all the rich families out of the neighborhood, leaving only the poorer residents. Presumably the wealthier families moved out to the suburbs, where it was safer, when the neighborhood buildings were razed for the fire lanes; qz0061.mj15-4430A/
In a sense, it is not far afield to think of these public and private institutions as urban 
“villages.” This honeycombed insularity of Chongqing society has been overlooked by the 
historical literature, but it is more than just an interesting sideline observation. In fact, it was 
vitally significant for conscription. Public and private institutions were just as desperate to 
protect their human resources from the demands of the draft as individuals were desperate to 
seek out protection from conscription.

Conscription drew upon a longstanding Nationalist tradition of routing political 
participation through occupational and work institutions. This fact gave Chongqing’s social 
insularity teeth, allowing institutions to protect their members (and individuals to evade service) 
from the state’s levies. During the late 1920s, the Nationalists had consistently relied on 
occupational and work institutions to mobilize people: participation in political events were 
organized through “circles” or jie (界), which were often occupationally defined. On the eve of 
the war, the Organic Law of National Assembly and Electoral Law betrayed this same tendency 
to route political engagement and civic duty through such institutions: those who had taken the 
Citizenship Oath in preparation for voting were to vote in their geographical area, but if they 
were a member of a vocational or professional association, then they were to vote with that body 
instead. Thus even voting rights were shunted through organizations of occupational groups (jie 
界). In these cases, the Nationalists were interested in firming up control; occupational and 
vocational groups were often KMT-sponsored, which allowed the government and party to direct 
and control their activities, thus structuring the political participation of the members. 
Conscription policies bent to this same tendency, but the effect was greatly altered as the war had 
changed the calculus of duty and participation: institutional imperatives to protect members and 
husband manpower overrode any larger commitments.

The insular organization of wartime Chongqing was exacerbated by the draft policies 
themselves, which reinforced the honeycombed nature of the city’s socio-economic life. Like 
the Nationalist voting procedure, the information gathering to identify draft-eligible men was 
carried out through “institutions” (jiguan 機關), not by residences in the baojia sense. The 
mayor’s office issued repeated calls that all agencies, organizations, businesses, and schools 
middle-school and up needed to follow the procedure of filling out name lists of draft-eligible 
males and submit them to the Citizen Militia.108 

This reliance on institutional cooperation to register potential draftees put the Citizen 
Militia and baojia personnel in an awkward spot and made it almost trivially easy for institutions 
to protect their human resources from the conscription administration’s grasp. Many 
institutions – both public and private – aggressively petitioned conscription agencies, pitching 
themselves as essential to the war effort in order to secure exemptions for their staff and workers. 
But beyond this, the most troublesome and persistent issue facing the draft in the city was that 
literally hundreds of institutions routinely denied the Citizen Militia access, often refusing to turn

---

108. As just one example, see the order from mayor He Yaozu, which itself was forwarded jointly 
from the Junzhengbu and the Education Ministry, which in turn got the order from the 
Administrative Yuan; qz0063.mj1-563, pp. 105-6 dated 21 October 1943.
over name lists or even barring the doors against inspection. This problem persisted throughout the war. A Chongqing Citizen Militia conference, most likely in mid-1944, admitted that every ward in the city, except for the fifth, was late in submitting their name rosters (mingbu 名簿). An internal opinion drafted on how to improve the city’s Citizen Militia acknowledged frankly that the sheer number of governmental agencies – both central and local – meant that most of the draft-eligible males in the city were able to evade service. The city was home to a staggering 872 agencies, most of which were not registering their staff or workers and were refusing the militia access to gather information on potential draftees. In 1943, a total of 162 work units refused to allow the militia access, but by 1944 that number had skyrocketed to 431. Chongqing’s institutions were simply ignoring the toothless requests of the Citizen Militia.

Urban Conscription: War Effort Exemptions

Having looked in general terms at the social and institutional landscape that confronted the draft in the urban environment of Chongqing, it is time to look at the specifics of such attempts in more detail. It is important to note that some of the features discussed below apply to certain areas (usually county cities) in the 3AD as well. Particularly after the bombings began in 1939, many government and economic institutions were dispersed into the countryside to lessen their vulnerability to air attack. This dispersal meant that the institutional resistance encountered by draft authorities in the city was experienced in outlying areas as well. It was not wholly unique to the capital city. However, Chongqing remained incredibly densely populated with government agencies and essential war effort enterprises and industries and thus this discussion of institutional protection from conscription is discussed here as a feature of the urban draft.

Underlying the Nationalist state’s deference to institutions was the imperative to protect a whole range of industries, agencies, and enterprises that were central to the war effort. This was a very real concern throughout the war and both public and private enterprises were quick to invoke their indispensable contributions to the war effort as justification for requests to make their workers and staff exempt from the draft. In mid-1939, for example, the Junzhengbu issued orders (through the Sichuan provincial district) to the 3AD on the salt industry: salt transporters and well workers were to be protected, because the loss of salt producing areas along the eastern coast made protecting Sichuan’s salt industry vitally important for the war effort. As “direct producers” of a daily necessity essential for the physical health of the people, salt workers needed to be protected so that they could go about their work with a “settled mind” (安心).

For the next two years many industries were subject to draft lotteries, but in mid-1941, the Junzhengbu and the Economic Ministry agreed that requisitions of miners and factories had “seriously impacted production” in key wartime industries. Thus, the two ministries mutually decided that “skilled workers in national defense factories and mines” should be exempt from the draft. This was doubtless an attempt to soothe the tensions that had been endemic between

109. qz0062.mj1-2, pp. 37-46 n.d. This document is undated, but it is filed in sequence with conferences from 1944.

110. qz0063.mj1-722 (renumbered: 1-755), pp. 2-6 n.d. This document, titled “Opinions on How to Improve the Work of the Chongqing Municipal Citizen Militia” (重慶市國民兵團工作改進意見), is also undated, but it must be from late 1944 or early 1945. The author(s) are also anonymous.

111. qz0055.mj3-260, pp. 40-2a dated 12 and 16 June 1939 (rec’d).

112. qz0055.mj3-251, pp. 141a-b dated May 1941.
government defense industries and the conscription authorities: both sides were suspicious of the other for siphoning off much needed manpower. This decision cemented the privileged position of workers in certain defense-related industries.

As part of this more conscientious effort to protect war effort industries, special committees were set up. In 1942, the municipal police bureau’s military affairs section and the Social Bureau cooperated to form a special committee to handle the exemptions and postponements of skilled factory and mine workers. A verification office handled the paperwork and in 1942, the Sichuan provincial district sent an inspector to oversee the investigation and verification of the 1942 exemptions for skilled workers, but the police bureau complained that the “complexity” and the “excessive number” of the city’s political and military institutions made things extremely difficult. The Yujiang divisional district was not pleased with the delegation of exemption processing to civilian agencies and it complained that it was supposed to be the issuing body for exemption certificates. Even after sending a representative to the verification office, it held that there was no need for any separate committee to handle these matters: the Chongqing police should be generating the name lists and photographs of potentially exempt skilled workers and forwarding them to the divisional district which would approve and issue the appropriate documentation. Initially, the Junzhengbu seemed to side with the divisional district, telling the municipal government that there was no need for a special committee. The Chongqing police bureau’s military affairs department head, He Fumin (賀撫民), argued in response that the municipal police had taken over much of the exemption work, however, precisely because the divisional district had not been doing its job, leaving the police and its committee to issue the exemptions. He Fumin requested more staff to deal with the increased workload.

The pleas must have hit home, for by 1943, the civilian committee was in charge enough that the Chongqing police bureau was concerned about lower level staff not filing exemption petitions and paperwork. Inexcusable delays or even outright denials by ward offices worried some higher ups. A report of the Chongqing Police Bureau’s military affairs department covering August 1943 through 1944 outlined the work of the municipal committee in reviewing applications for exemptions under the skilled factory and mine workers provisions. Over the year, the committee reviewed 468 factory and mine applications, which covered 26,631 workers and staff. Exemptions were granted for 15,189 men, while 11,442 were denied, either for not meeting the requirements or because the paperwork was not filed on time. Clearly, institutions were aggressively petitioning for exemptions and postponements for their workers. Individuals too were anxious to apply: some 16,606 men applied on an individual basis, and

113. qz0061.mj15-4421, pp. 69-72 dated 4 February 1942.
114. qz0061.mj15-4421, pp. 94-7 April 1942; qz0061.mj15-4421, pp. 92-3 dated 27 April 1942.
115. qz0057.mj7-121, p. 128 dated 2 June 1943. Military men were placed on the committee; see the CVs of two new members, qz0061.mj15-4549, p. 103 dated 8 October 1943. The CQMA holds an undated charter for a committee to investigate exemptions, which suggests that this committee (or a replacement) was revised to include a wider range of agencies, including the provincial reconstruction and civil affairs departments, the municipal Social and Police Bureaus, the Yujiang divisional district, and the Sichuan provincial district. Except for salt workers, all other applications for exemptions had to be accompanied by an affidavit from the Economic Ministry that the applicant was registered as a skilled industrial or mining worker; qz0019.mj1-1575, pp. 12a-3 n.d.
exemptions were approved for 14,587 men (only 2,019 were denied). Including all the militia, rescue detachments, and sundry paramilitary units, the police and the Yujiang divisional district printed some 82,000 service exemption or postponement certificates for the year.\textsuperscript{116}

Patterns of Urban Conscription I: Institutional Resistance

Even before the war organizations such as the China Buddhist Association petitioned the nascent conscription bureaucracy to grant exemptions to their members. Pressures of this sort only increased as the war progressed, in part because individual interest in evading the draft and institutional interests in protecting human resources coincided. From the early days of the war, conscription authorities were painfully aware of the problem. During the heady days of the Wuhuan campaign when volunteerism was highest among many segments of the population, but particularly youth and students, conscription authorities in Sichuan passed down a report from a military police regiment in the Wuhan garrison command that many eligible youth were joining rescue organizations in order to avoid the draft. This same war effort volunteerism would help motivate Chiang Kai-shek and other Nationalist leaders to organize the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps (see chapter five), but the conscription administration took a dim view of it, believing the youths were cynically motivated by the desire to put themselves under the protection of non-military institutions.\textsuperscript{117} Such fears were, of course, given teeth, by the pressure being put on the government’s various arms to protect a range of war-related groups. This was a common strategy for both public and private institutions: petition the conscription administration and other high government ministries or agencies for exemption status. As a form of resistance this was somewhat hit or miss for institutions, but it was pursued vigorously by a wide range of organizations.\textsuperscript{118}

Organizations such as the Chongqing Municipal Coal Industry Union regularly tried to extend their exemption privileges to include more of their staff and labor force. The coal union chairman, Tan Caichen (谭采臣), for example, argued that exemption from the draft should be extended not only to coal miners, but also to the transport workers. Although the member enterprises pledged to avoid hiring draft-eligible men and hire only those under 18 or over 35 years of age, he argued that both the skilled drivers and the lowly coolies were essential to the coal industry and ought to be protected from conscription.\textsuperscript{119} Even national enterprises were not safe. The China Merchants Steamship Company, a famous shipping company that was heavily

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Most of these were time-limited to the end of the year only; qz0061.mj15-4433B, pp. 52-61 covers August 1943 through August 1944.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} qz0053.mj1-224, np dated October 1938.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} In mid-1938, local branches of the Chinese Red Cross pushed the chairman, Wang Zhengting (王正廷) to petition the Interior Ministry for exemptions from military service and paramilitary training for Red Cross staff and rescue corps. Other petitions were filed with all sorts of government bodies, including several provincial governments and provincial district commands. The Training Oversight Division weighed in on the issue in a lateral communication to the Interior Ministry, arguing that paramilitary training would only increase the effectiveness of rescue corps members. The Interior Ministry reiterated its earlier decision: that if the Red Cross staff were truly specialist professionals, then they were exempt, but all others – including the rescue corps, fire brigades, and burial squads – were not; qz0055.mj3-260, pp. 3a-b dated 28 June 1938 and qz0055.mj3-260, pp. 6a-b dated 8 October 1938 (rec’d).
  \item \textsuperscript{119} qz055.mj3-260, pp. 43-4 dated 6 June 1939 (rec’d).
\end{itemize}
involved with transportation work during the war, was nationalized as part of the war effort. In July 1939, its Ningbo branch petitioned for its staff to be exempt, as it was a public enterprise. The Junzhengbu replied that its full-time, long-term professional staff in all branches were protected under the same terms as national bank employees: only the temporary workforce was still subject to the draft. Yet, four years later in late May 1943, the company’s conference was forced to address the problem again, as employees were agitated over the prospect of being conscripted. Concern over the draft was so strong that the company adopted an official policy of supervisors “admonishing” workers and staff to work with a peaceful heart whenever there was any hint of uncertainty about the future. In addition, company executives collected materials on the regulations and the current situation of the workers in preparation for filing more exemption petitions with the Junzhengbu.121 Such appeals continued regularly throughout the war.122 The Chongqing Chamber of Commerce filed a petition requesting that its member businesses be treated with kid gloves when it came to conscription. Zhou Maozhi (周楷值), the chamber’s secretary, reported that the member businesses, especially the financial enterprises, were concerned that the city’s status as a model conscription district would lead to an overzealous draft that would net shop workers and financial professionals. The chamber wanted workers and staff to be drafted in their hometowns, not in Chongqing. This would have accomplished two goals. First, it would have ended the Citizen Militia’s attempts to intrude into institutions to gather information on their draft-eligible men. Second, it would have effectively put many workers out of reach of the conscription authorities. Because many workers were refugees, the Chongqing draft authorities would not have jurisdiction over the members’ workers and their hometowns would have had little chance of exercising their legal jurisdiction over men who were residing far away in Chongqing. The Chamber’s position was even supported by the head of the MSO, Cheng Zerun, but the city government refused to be moved. It reiterated official policy that if the workers and staff had lived in the city for more than six months, then they were subject to the city’s regulations and draft procedures.123 Two institutional constellations specific to Chongqing were a source of many exemptions, namely the air raid defense agencies and the police itself. After the Japanese bombings of the city began, requests to exempt air raid defense groups or rescue squads rolled into conscription authorities who responded by stressing that the sheer number of these men made granting them all exemptions impossible, as it would injure military service too greatly and would complicate the lottery system needlessly. Fire brigades and rescue squads were exceptions to this; as more highly trained groups they were exempt but other men were denied.124 The police too were a key avenue of exemption and thus a very attractive route out of service.

120. qz0055.mj3-260, pp. 46-7 dated 14 July 1939.
121. qz0326.mj2-15, pp. 36-7 company conference minutes, dated 26 May 1943.
122. See the petition to a divisional district concerning air transport loaders and off-loaders, arguing that they were a key war effort occupation; qz0326.mj2-4B, pp. 172a-b dated 30 October 1944.
123. qz0061.mj15-4430A/B, pp. 198-200 dated 13 July and 13 August 1943. Similar concerns and requests were filed with the police from the Chongqing Banking Union, but in all cases the Chongqing municipal government or the MSO stood firm; qz0061.mj15-4430A/B, p. 212 dated 3 August 1943 and qz0061.mj15-4430A/B, pp. 215-6 dated 7 August 1943.
124. qz0055.mj3-260, pp. 37b-9 dated 11 and 29 May 1939. The Junzhengbu occasionally granted one-time exemptions for air raid defense troops. Six hundred men were given a pass from the
particularly for the Sichuan locals who were not qualified as skilled labor and not attached to the refugee institutions that had flooded the interior from the coastal occupied territories in the early years of the war. The Interior Ministry and the Junzhengbu issued warnings to the Chongqing mayor’s office and the Police Bureau that the city police were not to recruit or accept any men already selected in military service lottery, because doing so would lead to abuses of the police exemptions from military service. Reports from Fujian indicated that there was intense competition between police forces and military service authorities for healthy able-bodied men between 20 and 30 years old. Hence, police departments were required to submit detailed information on policemen and recent trainees to the local conscription district to avoid their being included in the draft. Most importantly, however, police agencies were restricted to a limited quota of men within draft age and police recruits had to be taken from second-class draft eligible men.125

Predictably, the conscription districts were irritated by the many petitions and exemptions that were reducing the availability of bodies and increasing the paperwork burden dealing with special cases. The Fuling regimental district, in the Yuyou divisional district, complained to the Junzhengbu and MAC that defense-related enterprises, such as mines and river engineering projects, were harboring eligible men who flocked by the thousands into these enterprises to avoid service. The regulations, the regimental district reminded, stipulated that in private enterprises only workers already employed in July 1937 were exempt and it warned that if public enterprises were not limited or restrained somehow that in its counties (which included Qijiang in the 3AD) all the eligible males would soon end out working in the mines and conscription would grind to a halt completely.126

In addition to the prophylactic approach, institutions in Chongqing also resisted conscription in more proactive ways. The military affairs department within the Chongqing police frankly admitted these difficulties. “Generally, city residents do not understand the military service regulations, and are not enthusiastic about being drafted and entering their units. Some ‘sniff the wind and flee’ (wenfeng taobi 聞風逃避); some find an excuse to delay; some ask an influential person to speak on their behalf; some find a reason to openly resist; some block it secretly.” Particularly troubling was that “after factory workers and public servants and teachers had been drafted in the lottery, their bosses often assert on their behalf that they should be exempt, sometimes even deliberately inciting the workers and causing much trouble for conscription personnel.”127

The problem was noted in the Chongqing Conscript Conference in August 1944. “The public servants of our city’s agencies and organizations after being selected in the lottery, repeatedly send a succession of letters from the agency involved. Some [of the letters say] ‘transferred to serve in another office;’ some ‘not of eligible age;’ some ‘left office and moved away;’ some ‘should be given an exemption;’ some ‘there is no such person,’ to refuse the being called up. Sometimes even lottery selectees or those eligible for conscription are seized on the road, making it impossible for them to be sent to their units. How should [this situation] be

lottery in early 1942; qz0063.mj1-579, p. 20 n.d.
126. qz0055.mj3-260, pp. 45a-b dated 23 June 1939.
127. qz0061.mj15-4433B, pp. 52-61 covers August 1943 through August 1944.
handled?” The conference had no solution, except to recommend prosecution according to the laws on obstructing military service and appealing to the Junzhengbu for help. Similarly, the conscription authorities complained that high officials were meddlesome; they protected their subordinates by sending numerous letters, usually claiming the person had been press-ganged and asking for them to be released. The conscription administrators were, of course, not sure of the facts in each case, so high officials could easily manipulate the situation. Again, the only recourse was to report such cases to Junzhengbu. Baojia and militia heads had a hard time dealing with such people, particularly as the petitions were going far over the local administrators’ heads. Agencies were quick to level accusations of corruption on baojia and Citizen Militia heads when their staff or employees were called up. The prevalence of press-ganging and corruption made such charges believable, but they were not always accurate and in some cases were nothing more than cynical attempts to free legitimate draftees by smearing low level administrators. In other cases, higher ups filed petitions on behalf of individuals who were deemed to be indispensable. For example, when men with specialized training were selected in the draft, air raid agencies were quick to petition for special dispensation. The vice-chief of the First Air Raid Shelter, one Lan Tianyu (藍田玉), was drafted in early 1942. Noting that there was still no official regulation exempting public servants, Lan’s chief and the Chongqing Air Raid Shelter Management Authority, which were nominally headed by Wu Guozhen and Tang Yi, argued that Lan’s knowledge of western medicine and anti-chemical warfare techniques were desperately needed skills. The municipal government sent the petition to the Junzhengbu for approval along with a request to clarify the status of the shelters’ cleaning crews. The Junzhengbu approved temporary exemption for all the air raid shelter workers in Chongqing.

Threats for more open resistance were not uncommon. The air raid service unit organized by the 5th KMT party branch caused serious problems in the Longmenhao township (龍門浩鎮). The township head, Xu Jiuan (徐久安) reported that after the first lottery of the year, the unit members went around asking for information on who had been selected (i.e., before the names were released). But they went even further, planning that if any of their members were to be called up that they would resist openly, using force and weapons if necessary. They had already refused to join any militia training sessions. The KMT cell “under the guise of organizing a service unit had set up a separate organization, and was under suspicion for harboring able-bodied men.” And in fact, the membership list for the air raid service unit shows that these men were primarily young (late 20s to early 30s) and came from commercial or labor backgrounds. The fact that there is no follow up documentation in the archives suggests that the unit did not cause any trouble, but the potential was there and their pressure to find out the

128. qz0053.mj14-22, pp. 82a-b.

129. See the case of workers in the Transportation Ministry’s Wartime Service Troop (戰時服務大隊) who claimed they had been fleeced by their local baojia head, but under investigation it was discovered that they had instigated the affair by approaching the baojia men to buy substitutes for them. Ironically, the investigation had been instigated by a report from a Transportation Ministry official on behalf of the workers; qz0061.mj15-4560, pp. 61-70 dated 7 January 1942.

130. qz0063.mj1-579, pp. 31-2, 35-6 and 47-8 dated 19 and 28 March, 21 June 1942.

names of lottery selectees before the call up date complicated the draft in the township.

By far the most common forms of institutional resistance were to refuse the Citizen Militia access or simply not file the required paperwork on staff and employees. Delaying tactics abounded. The China Farmers Bank wrote to the Citizen Militia with a polite refusal in response to orders to prepare name lists and be available for a bank-wide review of personnel. The bank managers contended that “all the men who are of [draft] age in our office have already been granted exemptions.” Having a militia inspector come to review the personnel on location was impractical: as a national bank with work relating to foreign countries, having all the staff meet in one place would be a hardship that would entail costs in transportation time and money to assemble the staff on the review ground and cause delays in work.¹³²

Many institutions did not even bother with the niceties of filing excuses, but simply ignored the militia’s orders for paperwork or to inspect the workforce. This was a massive problem for the Citizen Militia as it went about collecting information on draft-eligible men.¹³³ An August 1944 by the militia report listed literally hundreds of institutions from nearly every ward in the city which had neglected to supply at least one of the two name lists as required by the regulations. There was no shortage of schools and private companies, but the worst offenders were in fact state-run institutions. These ranged from factories, to police branches, government ministries, banks, trade unions, religious associations, consumer cooperatives, charities, schools, fire brigades, wireless radio stations, tax offices, and granaries. The Transportation and Communications Ministry and Finance Ministry were responsible for literally dozens of agencies and offices that refused to send the required paperwork to the Citizen Militia. The militia was virtually powerless to handle these intractable institutions. The central Chongqing branch appealed to the police chief, Xu Zhongqi, when the 2nd ward unit chief, Li Deyang (李德洋), was stymied in his attempts to help out bao chiefs gain access to the United Press (Lianhe chubanshe 聯合出版社). According to household registers, the publisher almost certainly had eligible men working for it, but it had strenuously refused all attempts to gain access.¹³⁴

In fact, it was the state’s own institutions that were the most stubborn when it came to the draft. This stubbornness was a direct result of their status as state institutions: the connections to politically powerful patrons and the limited authority of the MSO meant that the military service administration was hamstrung in dealing with recalcitrant public agencies. The problem escalated between 1942 and 1944, and doubtless was a key motivation behind Chiang’s creation of the Ministry of Conscription in late 1944, with its enhanced authority over virtually all other branches and government institutions.

¹³². qz0063.mj1-718, pp. 142-3 dated 16 May 1944.

¹³³. The 18th bao in Chongqing’s 2nd ward reported in August 1945 that three organizations were refusing to report on their workforce: the Central Printing Bureau (中央印製局), the Cooperative Assembly Hall (合作大會堂), and the Chinese National Christian Aid Association (中華全國基督教協進會); qz0063.mj1-573 (renumbered as mj1-587), pp. 60-1 dated 6 August 1945.

Table 4-1: Institutional Resistance in Chongqing to the Citizen Militia and Draft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward (qu 区)</th>
<th>agencies, organizations, schools, factories</th>
<th>all name rosters submitted to Militia</th>
<th>all men included in rosters</th>
<th>number of institutions not reporting to Militia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ward</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Ward</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Ward</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Ward</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Ward</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Ward</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Ward</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Ward</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Ward</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Ward</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Ward</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Ward</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Ward</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Ward</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Ward</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Ward</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Ward</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Ward</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: qz0063.mj1-572, pp. 2-56, dated 10 August 1944.

Patterns of Urban Conscription II: Prey on the Institutionally Unconnected

The corollary to the institutional barriers to effective conscription was the draft bureaucracy’s tendency to pick up urban residents who were most vulnerable, particularly those who were institutionally unprotected. Press-ganging in the urban environment, then, was not only predation on community outsiders – though that happened regularly, of course – but involved preying on those who lacked institutional guardians. As with village press-ganging, temporary sojourners were at risk. Hired hands working for independent, small-scale businessmen were especially vulnerable as they were easily identified as outsiders and their employers were not protected by any larger organization.135

---

135. See the case of Jiang Shaoqing (蔣紹卿) and Luo Fuhe (羅福和) who were temporary workers for a vegetable seller, Wang Zesan (王澤三), in the Shangqingsi market. The two men came from the seller’s hometown in Zizhong county (資中縣). In late March 1939, the bao head and militia
In the most extreme example of this trend, both military service as well as corvée authorities resorted to siphoning off the fittest of the city’s beggars. During 1939, the Beggars Receiving Station sent 22,050 indigents on to other agencies; those deemed healthy enough for service almost certainly went into the conscription and labor systems. While it deteriorated greatly after 1941, with alarming death rates among those it took in, during the initial years of operation the Beggars Station was clearly feeding bodies into the maw of the war effort.\textsuperscript{136} In a similar vein, in February 1942 the city passed a measure to conserve of human labor, targeting sedan bearers and other non-essential laborers. First, sedan chairs and rickshaws were prohibited in the city and then the bearers routed into conscription or war-related industries. Fully 7,614 bearers and pullers were reallocated into more essential roles, and in 1944 the provisions were extended to service workers in hotels and restaurants. During the war more than 13,000 men were put into the war effort this way.\textsuperscript{137} What made beggars, sedan chair bearers, and rickshaw pullers attractive to the conscription administration was precisely that these men were unprotected by powerful institutions. A similar calculus, though it backfired in this case, was behind the attempt in Haitangxi township (海棠溪镇) to conscript overseas Chinese who had returned to work for the war effort. If the baojia head had hoped returned overseas Chinese were easy prey, he had miscalculated badly. The general manager of Haitangxi’s Zhongnan Resin Factory (中南樹膠廠) wrote a pleading letter to the Returned Overseas Chinese Industrial Guidance Committee to intercede on its behalf, which it did, filing a grievance with the municipal government. The manager claimed that not only did regulations grant overseas returnees a full two-year exemption from the draft, but the baojia head and township militia had never notified the factory prior to their nighttime raid. Even further, the factory was an essential national defense industry and as such its skilled workers were protected from conscription.\textsuperscript{138} The conscription administration and its lowest level of urban functionaries were constantly on the lookout for vulnerable, institutionally unprotected, men.

Conscription in Chongqing was bounded by the many social and institutional barriers that honeycombed the city. Institutions jealously protected their human resources from the draft.

\textsuperscript{136} Sichuan sheng zhi, v. 28 (minzheng (civil administration) volume), pp. 320 and 344-5.

\textsuperscript{137} GMWX, vol. 96, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{138} The police in their investigation found that indeed at least one man had been improperly drafted, but that this was not a case of naked press-ganging; qz0063.mj1-579, pp. 17-27 dated 20 November 1941.
Individuals, of course, soon picked up on this trend and flocked to the city precisely to try to insert themselves under the protective umbrella of some factory, business, or government agency. Two factors reinforced this form of institutional resistance to conscription.

First, the unique nature of Chongqing’s wartime society made such attempts particularly effective. Despite its incredible fluidity and mobility during the war, Chongqing’s society was “honeycombed.” Not only was it divided by linguistic and geographical rifts that were a result of the influx of refugees, but both public and private institutions adopted a proto-“work unit” approach to their workers and staff. This, of course, had pre-war antecedents, but in Chongqing many government agencies and factories adopted a similar style: workers living together, or in a tightly clustered neighborhood, dependent on the institution for far more than just wages. These could be seen as “urban villages” in one sense, eager to protect themselves and their residents.

In short, the Nationalist state’s own organizations and agencies were a source of resistance to conscription. Many of them, along with other non-state institutions, were able to successfully paint themselves as necessary for the war effort and thus earn de facto exemptions which they defended, usually passively, by denying conscription authorities access to their human resources.

Second, the genuine need for the government to prioritize and protect human resources that were essential for vital war-related tasks undercut the draft’s claim to primacy. Technical workers, educated white-collar workers and the like were indispensable and had to be husbanded carefully. The result was that the city attracted both urbane educated youth and local Sichuanese rural laborers who were anxious to avoid the draft men. Although famous for its beggars and poor underclass, by the final years of the war, the city was actually awash in urbane, well-dressed white-collar and idle youth. Arriving in Chongqing to administer relief funds to missions, Dr. Daniel Nelson was shocked at “the thousands and thousands of young men who roam the streets – their black hair slicked back on their heads, wearing silk shirts, smoking cigarettes, and to all appearances living a soft and carefree life. In the United states there is a dearth of young men. They have all volunteered or been conscripted for the armed forces. In Chungking thousands of young men roam the streets, work in offices, and attend the crowded cinemas.” Nelson believed that because China already had enough soldiers, the rich bribed their way out of service, producing the glut of privileged youth in the capital. Yet, this was wide of the mark. The educated youths in Chongqing were so numerous because as technical and professional talents they were ostensibly worth more to the war effort working in offices than on the front lines, and because they were able to avail themselves of the protective umbrella that state institutions and war-related enterprises were eager to put over their heads.

The counterpart to these urbane educated youth was industrial labor, which was the source of the most active and virulent resistance to conscription. We turn now to the militant workers and their fiercely antagonistic relationship with the draft.

“All Men Are Soldiers”: Workers, Conscription, and Modern Warfare

If the agencies and enterprises in Chongqing were desperate to attract and protect educated white-collar men to staff their offices, war-related industries were just as anxious to attract and hold onto able-bodied men of the laboring classes, precisely the same men that the

139. Nelson was the official representative of the Lutheran World Convention, sent to Chongqing to oversee the disbursement of donations collected in the US for the help of missionaries and their converts in China; Daniel Nelson, Journey to Chungking, pp. 134-5.
conscription administration was after. Arsenals were appealing to draft-eligible men as they were favored with a broad exemption policy. Men from throughout Sichuan flooded the city looking for work, particularly jobs that would protect them from military service. The result was that there was considerable tension between defense industries and the military:

“Competing demands for manpower created considerable friction between the army and arsenals. Press gangs frequently seized arsenal workers off the streets of Chongqing and permitted their return to the arsenals only after the latter had lodged a formal petition. Conversely, army brigade leaders accused local industries of enticing soldiers to join their workforce, leading the Ministry of Military Affairs [Junzhengbu] to prohibit arsenals from accepting ‘fugitive soldiers and enticing draftees, to avoid weakening the forces of resistance.’ Not until a series of labor recruitment laws [in 1943] staggered conscription and recruitment times were both administrations satisfied that they would have ample recruits.”

But it was not just military commanders who were worried at the competition between industries and conscription administration for able-bodied men and it was not just arsenals that proved to be serious obstacles to the draft. In November 1938, Yang Zhuxun (楊卓勳), the acting magistrate of Jiangbei (just across the river from Chongqing proper), complained to the 3AD that all sorts of factories and businesses, but especially the charcoal factories, were actively recruiting workers by promising that “once you enter our factory, you are exempt from military service.” The baojia were unable to gain any entry into or traction with these factories. Just a few months later, the Sichuan provincial district command forwarded a report from Chongqing area conscription districts that mines and arsenals in Bishan county were giving exemptions to regular (non-skilled) workers. The original report came from the Bishan magistrate on behalf of ward and bao heads who had reported that workers were so desperate to evade being conscripted that they were willing to forego wages so long as the companies would feed them and protect them from conscription. The situation was so serious that in some villages almost all the eligible men had fled into mines or defense industries.

These offers to protect laborers were not empty promises. Factories and arsenals did all they could to shield their workers from the draft men. Enterprises within the defense industry complex aggressively petitioned for exemptions and postponements, attempting to shield as many of their workers (and white-collar staff) as possible. The First Blanket Factory, for example, successfully encouraged the Military Logistics Office to secure protection for its full-time factory workers, including both skilled and general laborers. By September 1943, the decision of the Junzhengbu to grant broad exemptions to the military-industrial complex had trickled down to the wards in Chongqing: the staff and workers of all military agencies, military schools, factories and arsenals under the Military Logistics’ Office, military hospitals, and

140. Joshua Howard, *Workers at War*, pp. 171-2. See also, note #9, p. 396: “By January 1943 ... the Conscription Department (Bingyi Shu) prohibited arsenals from recruiting workers in a county within two months of when conscription was to occur.”

141. qz0055.mj3-260, pp. 9a-b dated 9 November 1938.

142. qz0055.mj3-260, pp. 50-1 dated 14 July 1939.

143. Even temporary workers over 36 years of age were exempt while employed, but those under 36 were still eligible to be drafted by local authorities. Any increases in protected white-collar staff still had to be approved by the Junzhengbu; qz0055.mj3-260, pp. 82-4 dated 4 May 1940.
military grain storehouses were all to be considered as being on “active service” for conscription purposes, though temporarily hired workers were not included.

Legally, even defense industry factories were required to “speedily create rosters, send a request for the [local] divisional district to send an officer to do an inspection” of the workers.\(^{144}\) Likewise, the institutions in the broad exemption category (previous paragraph) were required to send name rosters to the local conscription districts.\(^ {145}\) Whenever requests for rosters or a review of an enterprise’s workforce were issued, however, the excuses began immediately. The Caiyuana Rice Hulling Factory (owned by the China Foodstuffs Company) received a letter in early July requiring the factory to present all men 19-45 years old for review by the Citizen Militia. The factory manager fired off an urgent letter full of excuses: “because [we] supply army rations and food for the people our work is arduous. Thus the staff at our factory work night and day, and [character unreadable] there is no free time” for a review. Processing the grain, the manager continued, was just as vital for the war effort as conscription.\(^ {146}\) The Citizen Militia units in Chongqing complained bitterly of their powerlessness in the face of these refusals and delays. The head of the Gailanxi township (澱瀾溪鎮), in the city’s 16th ward, was supposed to file name lists and conduct reviews of the factories in the area. The head reported that a “minority of factories” had outright refused. Both public and private factories were notified by the township public office to prepare for review by putting together name rosters. The township sent a man to negotiate and many of the private factories followed the orders and prepared the rosters, but the Cloth Weaving Factory (紡織布廠) and the Ship Repair Yard (船舶修造廠) – both operating under the Junzhengbu’s Munitions Office (兵工署) – refused to fill out the required paperwork. The weaving factory sent a letter to the township office claiming that its workers were all skilled and negotiations conducted by the main factory had granted all of them exemption from service. The shipyard claimed that it was rear area military transport unit and thus its workers were already legally considered to be “on active service.” After an exchange of letters, it flatly refused to fill out the forms. The township head requested that the factory be ordered to fill out and deliver the forms as both institutions were clearly illegally hindering conscription. The municipal police chief, Xu Zhongqi, got involved and a couple months later sent a respectful letter to the shipyard, which itself had appealed to the Junzhengbu’s transport department in an attempt to get the MSO to order the township and Citizen Militia to desist. Xu reminded the factory that even if the workers were exempt, the shipyard must still send accurate rosters and that the end run appeal to the transport department was a violation of conscription regulations. Whether the shipyard ever complied is not recorded, but one suspects that it did not as repeated orders to submit information were routinely ignored all over Chongqing and the surrounding area.\(^ {147}\) It was not just large-scale enterprises that engaged in this non-compliance. In the 9th ward, the Huashang blanket factory (華商被服廠) also refused, for at least two full months, to fill out the required paperwork. Eventually police investigators found out that the

---


\(^ {145}\) Ostensibly the head of any enterprise found to be harboring draft eligible men or men already selected for the draft was to be prosecuted according to the law for hindering conscription; qz0061.mj12-38, pp. 7-12 dated 2 September 1943.

\(^ {146}\) qz0063.mj1-718, pp. 74-5 dated 10 July 1944.

\(^ {147}\) qz0063.mj1-718, pp. 41 and 43-4 dated 27 July 1944.
factory employed at least 26 draft-eligible men, out of a total workforce of 44 men and women.\textsuperscript{148} Even county governments were unable to compel compliance, despite repeated attempts to gain access for Citizen Militia inspectors.\textsuperscript{149}

Simple non-compliance, however, was not the most serious form of draft-resistance among Chongqing factories. More strenuous forms were common. The Chongqing Conscription Conference in early August 1944 highlighted that factory workers were a serious problem. When they were selected in the lottery, baojia heads would try to call them up, but the workers would be sheltered by their supervisors, cloistered behind the factory gates. Supervisors were even organizing the rest of the workforce to beat Citizen Militia and baojia men and create disturbances on neighborhood streets in order to help workers evade service or desert after being drafted. The conference discussion generated no solutions, concluding the only thing to do in such cases was to appeal to the Junzhengbu.\textsuperscript{150} The conference’s statement of the problem was far from administrative hyperbole. In fact, in some cases, worker resistance to the draft was violent and even armed. Skirmishes with the exchange of gunfire between workers and conscription personnel were far from rare.

Workers at arsenals when selected in the draft were quick to retreat inside their compounds and incite their coworkers to bar the gates against the conscription officials. Worker solidarity was not to be undermined by the toothless threats of baojia or Citizen Militia heads. Even township authorities could do little except appeal to higher ups, usually the Chongqing police bureau.\textsuperscript{151} An incident occurred in the summer of 1939 at the First Blanket Factory in Nan’an, a working class and factory-heavy area just across the Yangzi river from Chongqing proper. The factory exclusively manufactured blankets for the military and the disturbance was serious enough that it was investigated by the 3AD, which sent the Jiangjin county conscription department chief to the factory several times to negotiate a settlement. The negotiator was ignored as the factory management preferred to protect the workers who, in the words of the 3AD, had “openly organized to resist [the draft], beaten and detained baojia staff, and wrecked military service policy.” The negotiator found that one of the factory’s workers had seen his name, as well as several of his co-workers, on the posted notification of lottery selectees. Angry, he took the sign down and destroyed it. Realizing his rash move, he gathered up a group of at least thirty factory workers who went to the baojia offices, where they stole some of the militia’s weapons, including three rifles and three sabers. In the fracas, three of the baojia militiamen were lacerated with the sabers. In retaliation, the baojia head took the main instigator’s father into custody and sent a jia head to negotiate. The workers promptly took the jia head hostage. With this escalation, the county attempted to reach the factory management who chose to harbor the workers behind the factory gates. The workers eventually released the kidnapped jia head and returned most of the weapons, but there is no mention that the drafted worker was put into

\textsuperscript{148} qz0063.mj1-573 (renumbered: 1-587), pp. 6-9 dated 7 September 1945.

\textsuperscript{149} Baxian to Renhe township, qz0059.mj2-48, p. 1 dated January 1945. See also the case of the Renhe metalworks refusing to file documentation on its workforce with the Citizen Militia; qz0059.mj1-26, pp. 92-3 dated January 1945.

\textsuperscript{150} qz0053.mj14-22, pp. 82a-b.

\textsuperscript{151} See the case of the Number 30 Arsenal in Gailanxi township; qz0061.mj14-4430A/B, pp. 158-60 dated 30 September 1941.
the army, thus, almost certainly the local conscription agents gave up trying to draft him or his co-workers.\textsuperscript{152}

As the Japanese carved through nationalist territory with the Ichigo Offensive, the summer of 1944 saw a spate of clashes between workers and local draft workers in Chongqing. In Maoershi township (貓兒石鎮) in Chongqing’s 10th ward (halfway from the central city to Shapingba and just across the Jialing River), a police patrolman was ordered to begin calling up men selected for service. As the \textit{baojia} men made their rounds the workers at the Central Paper Factory (中央造紙廠) were restive. The paper factory’s management had been non-cooperative, refusing to fill out the forms on its workforce, denying the Citizen Militia legal access for determining draft-eligibility. But this time it would be the workers themselves who would resist. Early in the morning, more than one hundred manual laborers (\textit{xiaogong} 小工)\textsuperscript{153} from the factory kidnapped the \textit{bao} head, Ou Shupin (歐樹品), dragging him into the factory compound. Armed with heavy sticks, the workers beat and severely injured Ou. The township patrol officer arrived and went into the factory to try to negotiate an end to the crisis. Shortly after, the township’s Citizen Militia commanders arrived, but they were swarmed by the workers, still toting sticks and cudgels. Even worse, the area outside the factory gates was strafed from inside the factory. One of the militia commanders was hit by the gunfire and pulled into the factory to join the kidnapped Ou. Two workers and a policeman were wounded, and a worker outside the Tianyuan (天原廠) factory, directly across from the paper factory, were also hit by stray bullets. After the failed negotiations and gun play, the patrol officer returned to the factory to try to talk some sense into the resisters. But instead of relenting and ending the standoff, the factory management called the Chongqing garrison command to send a detachment to the scene. The resolution to the crisis is not recorded in the case file, but the patrol officer was convinced that the whole drama had been stage-managed from the beginning to make conscription work impossible and dangerous. He asked his superiors, what \textit{baojia} or even policeman would dare attempt to draft any of the factory’s workers now?\textsuperscript{154}

Such violent clashes were not always defensive. Like the Central Paper Factory, the Yongxin Soap Factory (永新肥皂廠), also in Maoershi township, was guilty of prolonged non-cooperation with draft authorities, but in July 1944 it too was the scene of draft resistance violence. This time it was a series of offensive attacks by factory workers and guards. In late July, the local \textit{bao} men began household registration in cooperation with an officer from the ID inspection office (身分證檢查所). The head of the Youxin Soap Factory, manager Xu (徐主人), led the factory’s guards, numbering about ten men, to the \textit{bao} head’s house, claiming that the local draft men had press-ganged workers from the factory. Unsatisfied with the \textit{bao} head’s answers to their concerns, factory workers and the guards swarmed the \textit{bao} head’s house again around midnight, forcing their way in and manhandling his wife, beating her, and ordering her to produce the men. They ransacked the house and made off with cash and large amounts of cloth. On the same night, the factory workers and guards launched an attack on the neighboring

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{152} This case was reported all the way up to the chairman of the Sichuan provincial government; qz0055.mj3-266, pp. 2-8b dated 12 August 1939.
\item \textsuperscript{153} As Joshua Howard notes, this term was used in arsenals to distinguish regular workers from skilled laborers; \textit{Workers at War}, p. 97.
\item \textsuperscript{154} qz0053.mj12-22, pp. 17a-b dated 19 July 1944.
\end{itemize}
township. The soap workers and guards bullied their way into the township public office, smashed it up, set free the men already called up for service, and stole both funds and weapons. Even the city’s police chief was unsure how to proceed. Though he recommended prosecution to the fullest extent of the law for the instigators, he “dared not handle it without authorization” and thus, requested guidance from the mayor, the MSO, and the Chongqing Garrison Command.¹⁵⁵

Chongqing was not the only area to have open clashes with factory workers, however, which suggests that the key dynamics at work were not specifically urban so much as concerned with the culture and politics of wartime labor. In some cases, factories and their workers seem to have been spoiling for a fight, willing to harbor draft selectees who were not even employed at the factory, knowing that such action would provoke local authorities into acting and thus would form a pretext for violent resistance. Armed workers and factory guards could pose serious threats to local law and order, often requiring outside intervention from the city or the county governments.¹⁵⁶

The key question, of course, is why was labor so uniquely and violently resistant to the draft? Petty workers, unemployed and even small farmers resisted, sometimes even violently too. But, as these were the actions of desperate individuals the scale was not anything like the resistance workers and factories put up.¹⁵⁷ Workers were uniquely willing to take up arms against the draft authorities for two reasons: first, the nature of twentieth-century warfare; and second, the special position of workers, both historically and in the war effort.

It has become almost a cliché to observe that modern war collapsed the front lines and rear areas; if the First World War smudged the line, the Second erased it almost completely. The arrival of air warfare in the form of bombers made the front lines almost irrelevant in terms of vulnerability of a country’s general population to sudden and unforeseeable enemy attack. Nowhere was truly safe; everyone was at risk; the front was everywhere. Not only were the dangers of the front lines geographically extended to include vast populations in the rear areas, but war-making sucked into its maw the entire population of combatant countries in the form of

---

¹⁵⁵. qz0053.mj14-22, pp. 78a-9b dated 23 July 1944, report filed the township head and vice-head, Jiang Zhongqi (蒋鍾麒) and Hou Chengzhong (侯誠中), with the Chongqing Citizen Militia asking that their request for extra funding to support the baojia and maintain law and order in the township be forwarded to the MSO and the report of police chief Xu Zhongqi to the mayor’s office, qz0053.mj12-22, pp. 18a-9a dated 10 August 1944.

¹⁵⁶. See the complicated case of the Fuchang Ironworks (福昌鐵廠) in Dazu county; qz0055.mj3-414, pp. 73-90 dated 2 July 1944. Some pages of the original paperwork are missing and the draft copy of the 3AD’s official reply to the reports on file in the CQMA is illegible, which makes a complete recounting of this incident difficult. What is clear, however, is that it was instigated by a draft selectee who was not employed at the ironworks. Nevertheless, the workers there gave him refuge and were willing to take up arms against the draft authorities: with support from management, the workers and guards defended the compound and launched raids against local village and baojia officials.

¹⁵⁷. See, as one example, the lottery selectee Chen Shiquan (陳世全), a resident of the 10th qu. After being selected in the lottery, he sought work in a protected enterprise and when the baojia heads came to collect him, he used his new boss’s handgun to threaten and then beat the policemen. But the incident was limited to an individual, despite the fact that the police wanted to haul the bosses in for obstructing conscription. qz0061.mj15-4430A/B, pp. 149-50 dated 27 August 1941.
war economies that were necessary to fight industrial warfare. All segments of society had to be mobilized as war became as much an industrio-economic undertaking as a military one. The war effort was a total effort, extended geographically to the entire territory of the country and socially to its entire population. In modern warfare, factory workers were already citizen-soldiers on the front lines – a fact that workers tended not to forget when the draft man came calling.158

As we have already seen, the Nationalist state itself had validated claims of privilege for various categories of workers who were considered vital to the war effort. Ad hoc allowances for the privileged place of (skilled) labor continued throughout the war, as enterprises and agencies pressured the MSO and Junzhengbu for exemptions or postponements. Workers, particularly those in defense industries, “perceived their work as a patriotic act” and were “[f]ully aware that labor was essential to war production and to the cause of national resistance.”159

The tension between war industry and military service was actually the very basis for recruiting workers for the regime’s arsenals. Local Sichuan men, who by the early 1940s made up a majority of even the skilled labor in the arsenals, signed up to work in defense factories primarily to escape conscription in their home villages. Many of these men, at least until arsenal authorities found ways to deal with worker mobility, returned home as soon as the yearly draft was finished in their hometown. A common attitude was captured in a popular saying in Sichuan: “To feed oneself in the rear [i.e., working in Nationalist-controlled territory] is better than to starve in the army."160 “Wartime production was a source of pride and patriotism for many arsenal workers, but improving their material conditions and avoiding conscription was of more lasting importance.”161 Escaping the draft was the key carrot that defense industry authorities depended on to attract and secure the supply of labor throughout the war; as Howard concluded, arsenal “managers continued to bank on draft deferment to secure workers’ compliance.”162 Laborers’ violent resistance to the draft authorities in Chongqing was just the logical extension of their choice to flee conscription in the first place; having fled (at least) once before, they were quick to resort to violence when cornered in what they had believed was a safe haven from the draft.

Yet, worker resistance rested on other foundations too, namely the militarization of war effort labor. Modern warfare’s dependence on industrio-economic factors found symbolic expression in the militarization of rear area labor, particularly the defense industry, which had “a

158. For a classic overview of World War Two’s broadened arena of conflict, including the idea of “economic warfare” in which the enemy’s economic infrastructure was deliberately and systematically targeted, see Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945, pp. 44-65.
159. Howard, Workers at War, pp. 10, 130, and 12.
160. Ibid., p. 172.
161. Ibid, p. 171. Unlike conscription which was a move away from mobilization based on social ties, however, arsenals deliberately recruited through kinship ties, in the hopes that it would secure a docile, steady workforce. Conversely, Sichuanese men who by the early 1940s made up the majority of skilled workers in the defense industry, were anxious to avoid the draft often relied on their brothers, uncles, or fathers to secure introductions into the arsenals; Howard, Workers at War, pp. 94-5 and 86.
162. Ibid., pp. 204-5.
distinctly military ambiance.”\textsuperscript{163} In fact, arsenal workers were actually given (or saddled with) the legal status of soldiers on active military duty and in April 1942, Yu Dawei, the head of the Ordinance Department, declared that they were subject to military law. Desertion was thenceforth to be prosecuted as military desertion.\textsuperscript{164}

This legal status was reinforced symbolically. Arsenal workers were issued uniforms and some workers reveled in their military status by going to watch movies in honor of wounded veterans while dressed up in their military uniforms on their days off. Factories divided workers into squads of ten, which then made up larger military units of platoons, detachments, and regiments. Authorities experimented with sending these units on short-term training exercises in the countryside, but this measure was soon abandoned by managers as it threatened recruitment of new workers who began to see little difference between arsenal jobs and enlisting in the army. Militarization was, thus, mainly a tool to increase discipline: offenses by arsenal workers were handled under military law, exercised by military tribunals. While militarization was often experienced as a repressive measure, it also supported the workers’ attitude of being fully the equal of soldiers on the front lines. A common slogan, promoted by the Nationalists but popular among workers, was that “One more drop of sweat exerted on the shop floor means one less drop of blood on the battlefield.”\textsuperscript{165} Symbolically, the factories were battlefields, manned by militarized workers. This was an attempt to inculcate docility in the labor force critical to the war, and as Howard has demonstrated it was far from an unqualified success.

The militarization of arsenals extended further, however and, Howard argues, was at the heart of the coalescing of genuine class consciousness among workers. Workers, as the industrial equivalent of infantry grunts, were led by a rapidly expanding stratum of white-collar professionals, known in Chinese as zhiyuan (職員), which included “engineers, technicians, clerks, and managers.” Not only did these white-collar professionals enjoy higher social status and better benefits, but they were given military rank as officers. Some of these men even wore American military uniforms. This militarization of the arsenal bureaucracy was such a key development that Howard argues that within the arsenal context the term zhiyuan should be translated as “staff-officer” instead of “white-collar staff.”\textsuperscript{166} The social and economic gulf between the arsenal professionals and workers underlay the growing class awareness among arsenal workers, a “gradual alienation from factory officials” and politicization that “contributed to the general collapse of [Nationalist] state legitimacy.”\textsuperscript{167}

And yet, curiously, violent incidents – such as those recounted above – occurred frequently in factories whose management had refused to comply with the legal obligation to file rosters and name lists with the Citizen Militia and the draft resisting workers were often actively supported and sheltered by factory managers. This suggests that the interest and attitudes of the workforce and management coincided closely when it came to the draft. The growing class antagonism did not undermine this deep cooperation, which in part was based on managers’ need

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 205.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Ibid., p. 172.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Ibid., p. 203.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Ibid., pp. 69-71, 11-2, 52, and 157.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Ibid., p. 7.
\end{itemize}
to secure their workers against the greedy arm of the military and in part by the “uncertainties and fear of their [own] workforce.” If they did not support the workers against the Citizen Militia and baojia, managers would have lost whatever residual support that workers still had for their bosses and would have made recruitment of new workers impossible. Thus, while factories were militarized and workers experienced alienating military discipline from their bosses, when it came to the draft the workers’ acts of resistance were tolerated and even supported by their “staff-officers.”

Reinforcing the concrete interests of the wartime labor market – for both worker and management (or state) – was the tradition of militarizing workers for political purposes, a tradition shared by the KMT and the CCP. Howard is intent on placing the wartime militarization of arsenal workers within the immediate context of the war, finding that it was born of Nationalist authorities fear of class struggle and factory manager’s desperate desire to discipline their workforce into submission. This perspective is valuable and worthwhile, but it overlooks the fact that the KMT (along with the CCP) had a tradition of militarizing workers, that tied worker militarization to a politicized self-image as citizens. Elizabeth Perry has recently argued that worker militias had been (and would continue to be) a mobilization tactic and repository for visions of citizenship. After the CCP’s founding in 1921, workers were mobilized and armed by both Leninist parties. Taking inspiration from the Paris Commune, Marx, and the Bolsheviks under Lenin, Chinese communists organized worker militias as a means of mobilizing a revolutionary vanguard. True to those inspirational models, CCP worker militias combined class-based versions of citizenship with competing elements of community membership: manifestos and demands often mixed calls for proletarian improvements with defense of national sovereignty in the face of foreign imperialism. Yet, these instruments originally intended for state-breaking would soon be transformed into tools for state-making with the 1927 purge of communists and worker militias in Shanghai: the KMT adopted the form of labor militias to entrench state power. (The communists, after 1945, would repeat this pattern, of course, putting an end to revolutionary mobilization in favor of using worker militias as institutions of state power.) The war, as Howard ably analyzes, pushed this process much further, but it was built upon the prewar patterns of mobilization and citizenship, not as class-based radicalism but community (national) identity. Militarizing workers was extended to an expanded circle of workers, not to break state power, but as a vision of citizenship under enhanced state discipline and control.

During the war, industrial labor and particularly arsenal workers, were directly militarized as state-mobilized soldiers. Both the earlier revolutionary and wartime state-making rubrics adopted the language of citizenship, of course, but the militarization of labor backfired on

168. Ibid., p. 217.
169. As Perry notes, even Marx and Lenin mixed both elements into their analyses of the Paris Commune, indicating that ideals of citizenship were never completely uniform even in the minds of the communist visionaries; Perry Patrolling the Revolution: Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State, pp. 4-7.
170. Ibid., pp. 1-151. For Perry the workers militias were barometers of the revolutionary parties’ shift from revolutionary conflict (tearing down the established regime of power) to state-making (rebuilding new regimes of power); they are a window into the “process of institutional transformation” at the heart of revolutionary consolidation; p. 2.
Nationalist authorities who hoped it would make for docile workers. Instead it posed a serious problem for the state, most notably the conscription authorities: workers were symbolically validated as upright citizens with the status of soldiers on active duty, fighting the national war on their factory floors and they were armed and commanded by managers who were given military ranks.\footnote{Despite attempts to teach them about their place in the national effort, workers were not always satisfactorily aware of their political identities, however. According to political training cadres: workers in the interior not clear on relationship between their work and the soldiers at the front: “I asked them about the relationship between the soldiers fighting the enemy at the front and us, and no one answered. I then asked a worker where he was from. He answered ‘Anju.’ I asked him who administered Anju. After thinking about it, he answered, ‘Tongliang.’ I asked who administered Tongliang. He answered, ‘Sichuan.’ Who administered Sichuan? He didn’t know. He didn’t know what other provinces existed besides Sichuan, and he wasn’t the only one at this level. I asked them to raise their hand if they had graduated from elementary school. Only one did. From this one can see they really do not know what the country is and what the relationship is between the country and themselves. Of course they don’t understand patriotism. Isn’t explaining to them about the party and isms like playing the lute to cows?”; Howard, \textit{Workers at War}, p. 212.} When the \textit{baojia} or Citizen Militia draft men came calling, their calls to fulfill the duty to serve on the front lines were met consistently with derision, and often with a hail of blows, stones, and bullets. The realities of modern warfare which erased the clean distinction between front lines and rear, and the symbolic validation of workers as citizen-soldiers congealed into an implacable and often violent resistance to conscription and its agents.

Thus, the policy of militarizing the workforce backfired completely when it came to military service in its most literal form: symbolic militarization undermined the task of putting able-bodied men in arms. Workers and their bosses were the most stubborn and violent in their resistance to conscription in Chongqing. Workers, their managers, and factory owners were all quick to raise the banner of factory labor as military service in order to shield themselves from the grasp of the conscription administration. Most often this resistance took the form of non-compliance with orders from the Citizen Militia and other conscription agencies for filing name lists of eligible men or other paperwork. But it could – and often did – turn violent as well.

Conclusion

The mosaic patterns of conscription in the 3AD and Chongqing presented in this chapter lead to conclusions beyond the stereotypical image of press-gangs and extortion. That image is not wholly wrong, of course, but, the blanket statements of wartime journalists, military advisors, and later historians about the horrors of the draft system are simply inadequate to capture the varied nature of conscription in Sichuan. This is not to deny the predatory nature of press-gang, nor the terror and extortion that were common in both villages and the city, but only to argue that the complexity and range of experience was much greater than has previously been acknowledged. By placing the draft into specific geographical contexts – the villages of the Third Administrative District and the city of Chongqing – certain features are highlighted, specifically the social limits on Nationalist wartime state-building.

First, it is obvious that conscription was experienced in dramatically different ways in rural and urban environments. Of course both villagers and urbanites experienced the terror and desperation of the press-gang and extortion, but the socio-administrative context was quite disparate. In the counties and villages of the 3AD, conscription rested on prewar trends in low
level state-building. The Nationalist penetration of Sichuan in the early 1930s had carried in its wake an array of reforms and innovations in rural administration that were the foundation for the wartime draft. In the prewar years, the Nationalist regime revived the baojia and worked to staff it with newly trained men. During the war, the rural baojia was entrusted with a greatly expanded range of tasks, and indeed mobilizing manpower for the army remained the core task to which all other functions were subordinated, but its ability to shoulder those tasks – however clumsily – was founded on the prewar state-building in Sichuan.

In contrast, the massive influx of war exiles and refugees into Chongqing and its new status as the Temporary Capital, with the concentration of national institutions that came along with that status, marked the war as a clear disjuncture from prewar conditions. The influx of national agencies and the domination of municipal government by “downriver people” left the social and administrative landscape of the city fundamentally altered. These were temporary sojourners and by and large they left Chongqing in 1946 when the capital was moved back to Nanjing. Likewise, the Citizen Militia with its myriad war-related tasks and special troops was a new phenomenon: the city was physically, socially, and politically transformed by the war. Most dramatically, it was honeycombed in all sorts of ways, linguistically, occupationally, institutionally, and by neighborhood. In the face of this “downriver” invasion, Sichuan locals maintained prominence only in the Police Bureau and Citizen Militia, the two institutions most concerned with the draft. But the dominant patterns in the urban draft were decided not by those local men, but by the sojourners and their powerful institutions.172

Second, the social limits on conscription were markedly different in the two environments. In rural villages, not only did predatory practices undermine the smooth extraction of men, but community pressure in the form of accusations and petitions added a further dimension to the unreliability of the baojia heads. Unlike Duara’s predatory tax brokers, who were motivated only by their avarice, the Sichuan baojia heads were state agents, but they were embedded in their communities to the point that they were somewhat vulnerable to retaliation by their neighbors and residents. This fundamental fact of wartime baojia in the villages has been hitherto ignored and it drove rural conscription into specific patterns in which baojia attempted to protect their communities as much as possible. Such protection could never completely shelter the villages from the state’s demands, but preying on outsiders (temporary residents and those passing through), funneling petitions and requests of residents upwards, and advocating on behalf of neighbors were important protective strategies that made a difference – at least on the margin. From the state’s perspective, of course, these marginal protective patterns were suspect, further demonstration of the baojia men’s lack of national consciousness.

Residents, of course, would have had an entirely different appreciation. In short, the social embeddedness of the baojia was the primary obstacle to the rural draft.

172. Acknowledging the important differences between military service in the villages of the 3AD and Chongqing should not lead us to overlook the important link between the countryside and the city, namely the men who fled their villages and congregated in the city to avoid being drafted (or press-ganged). There was no absolute guarantee of safety in Chongqing, of course, but the greater likelihood of finding refuge under some institutional umbrella was an almost irresistible attraction for large numbers of rural men. The possibility that they could return to their villages was one of the motivations for factory management to work so hard to secure the workers’ exemption from the draft and to support workers when they resisted, even when such resistance was violent.
In Chongqing, conscription was hampered by the honeycombed structure of urban society. Draft policies reinforced the urban insularity by routing information-gathering on eligible men through men’s place of employment. The local police, *baojia* men, and Citizen Militia discovered that the outsider agencies and enterprises were far from docile, but rather found ways to stymie attempts to extract manpower from them: avalanches of appeals to the MSO, delays in filing required paperwork, and outright refusals to allow the draft men access. The local administrators found themselves hamstrung in dealing with the dense institutional landscape.

Third, although the forms of resistance to – or social limits on – the state’s easy extraction of manpower from Sichuan society came from very different quarters in rural villages and the city of Chongqing, both were indicative of incomplete state-building. The village *baojia* while functioning as state agents in rural society were undermining state policy by their predatory and protective strategies. They contributed to the war effort, by mobilizing the required quotas of bodies, but they were far from reliable agents of the state. The prewar rural state-making remained incomplete. Chongqing’s dominant pattern of institutional resistance to the draft demonstrated that the state itself was divided: agency self-interest – the need to protect human resources – trumped state policy. Even the war effort was secondary to their institutional imperatives, though agencies were invariably careful to paint themselves as invaluable to national survival.

Labor, and particularly defense industry workers, were the most extreme form of the urban patterns of resistance: reliance on institutional protection. Workers propensity to resist conscription violently rested not only on the symbiotic relationship between workers who wanted to avoid the draft and the employers who needed to attract a labor force, but also on the symbolic militarization of factories and the tradition of worker militias that validated armed workers as vanguard national citizens. Just as important, however, was the nature of modern warfare as an industrial enterprise and its erasure of the line between the deadly battlefront and the safe rear. Contributing vital labor to the war effort, these men felt validated as fully equal to front-line soldiers and with Japanese bombers regularly raining destruction upon the city, they felt only slightly less exposed to danger.

This chapter has presented a large number of anecdotes to form a composite picture that highlights the patterns of conscription. Like all mosaics, however, it is a static image. In some ways, this approach is necessary in order to cut through the frequent, almost endless, changes in procedure and institutions which serve only to confuse the important features of the wartime draft. These features were not static, *per se*, but they were remarkably consistent once the conscription system was fully operational around 1939: almost all the illustrative anecdotes in this chapter could be substituted with equally evocative ones from other years and locations, which suggests that the fundamental problems with conscription were both consistent and likely not entirely solvable by administrative means – at least not those built upon the prewar ideals. Those encrusted presumptions of military service would finally be questioned, and an alternative mode of recruitment tried, in 1944.

By mid-1944, Chiang was growing frustrated with the persistent problems in the conscription administration, but till that point he had had little incentive to make serious changes. After the start of the Pacific War, the military situation in China more or less stabilized, falling into an uneasy stalemate, for nearly three years. Few large Japanese offensive threatened the status quo and despite his rising ire at Cheng Zerun, Chiang was content to let things ride. Confident the United States would eventually defeat Japan decisively, he hoped the MSO’s draft
system would muddle through and allow China to hang on until rescue came from across the Pacific. Japan’s sudden attack in the summer of 1944, the Ichigo Offensive, threw Chiang’s hopes into serious question. As the Japanese armies advanced through province after province and Chinese losses in territory and men skyrocketed, Chiang and the public knew that it was time for desperate measures. At the 12th meeting of the 5th KMT Party Congress on 20 May 1944, after He Yingqin delivered his lengthy report reviewing the military and logistical situation, the party delegates passed a resolution that called encouraging “citizens to join the army [i.e., volunteer] as a common practice.” Abandoning the traditional desire to preserve educated youth from front-line service and dropping the long-standing Nationalist suspicion towards volunteers, Chiang issued the order to begin the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement (IYVM), to build an elite army of modern, educated, citizen-soldiers.

Chapter Five

Modes and Methods of Mobilization: The Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement and Youth Army, 1943-46

In order to cherish talented persons and preserve the country’s vitality, so far the government has not mobilized intellectual youths on a large scale by conscripting them.
– Chongqing Youth Volunteers Recruiting Committee Report, 1945

Purpose [of IYVM]: improve the quality of the military, increase our counter-attacking strength, strive for final victory, and carry out our goals for the War of Resistance.
– National Measures for the Recruitment of Intellectual Youth Volunteers

Introduction

As seen in the previous chapters, the wartime mobilization efforts remained trapped in the nitty gritty social and economic life of interior society; conscription was embedded in the entangling sinews of towns and villages and mired in the institutional resistance of the cities. The Nationalist military and government took steps to try to disentangle conscription from the grip of local society, but was only partially successful. In late 1943 key KMT military leaders began to discuss how they might establish an elite army, by mobilizing a hitherto untapped social stratum: educated youth. The “Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement” (IYVM) of 1944 and 1945 and the nine divisions of the Youth Army (YA) that were organized from these volunteers were the culmination of attempts to reform the draft; it was both the logical end point of those efforts to fix wartime military service and thus, also a break from conscription methods.

The educated stratum – students, teachers, civil servants, in particular – had been exempt from military service because of the pressing need for their talents in other areas of the war effort. As the Sichuan provincial government put it in an order to the administrative districts: “Actually, it’s not that this type of intellectual has no duty to serve as soldiers, [but] that they are really a national treasure [lit. a pagoda of the country], cultivating them is not easy, and the talent for [national] reconstruction is deeply cherished.” Their wartime service to this point had been largely confined to the academic and technical realms, but that was to change with the IYVM and the YA. 

1. qz0055.mj3-245, p. 70a-b dated January 1944.

2. If one is inclined toward skepticism of the Nationalists’ dire need for educated and technical personnel as the motivation for exempting students and professionals from military service, then one would see the exemption as just a continuation of the imperial era privileges of gentry degree holders. During imperial times, in addition to tax privileges the gentry was exempt from corvée service. In this sense, the exemption of students for military service during the War of Resistance was not only justified in terms of the war effort, but also by historical precedent in which the elite
Let me be clear from the outset, this is not a story of heroism or glorious, sacrificial patriotism. It is, instead, a political and administrative story. (The social and identity meanings laying underneath this story will be tackled in the next chapter.) As the story unfolds, one of the fundamental contentions of this chapter is that the conscription and military apparatuses played a minor role; the IYVM and the Youth Army were dominated by a different collection of institutions than the conscription system. Instead of divisional districts and the MSO, the KMT and, even more prominently, the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps (YC) were at the center of the Nationalist state’s efforts to recruit educated youth. The Youth Army, as the final form of the volunteer movement, was a political creature, bypassing the usual avenues of military power. A second important point is the change that occurs when recruitment is voluntary instead of conscripted; it marks a tectonic shift in the state-individual relationship. In contrast with the conscription sources, the IYVM and YA materials are markedly more geographically diffuse and were published by the central government or its own media houses, rather than in the routine documents of the military and local governments. This suggests that the IYVM and the YA involved a far more direct individual-state relationship, and rather than looking for the ways in which the movement was locally embedded, its significance will be found in the bargain struck between individual volunteers and the Nationalist state.

Overview and Chronology

There is confusion both about when the intellectual youth volunteer movement (IYVM) began and the numbers that responded, which is not too surprising since during the war the pace of governance and administration was ratcheted upwards. There is no consensus on the total number of recruits, let alone reliable figures on the exact composition of the YA. If we split the highest (150,000) and lowest (60,000) estimates, it is likely that somewhere in the vicinity of 100,000 youths were inducted into service, and with these as the main backbone a full nine divisions of the Youth Army were formed, though some YA divisions had a significant complement of regular conscripts attached to them as well.\(^3\) Whatever the exact number was, what is unquestionable is that they were not obligated to put their bodily life and limb in service to the state; Shue, *The Reach of the State*, p. 99.

3. The figure given most often is 125,000 youths passing the physical examinations; see Zhang Ruide, *Kangzhan shiqi di guojun renshi*, p. 164. Zhang draws on some sources not yet available to me. On the high side, one first-hand observer and historian of wartime Sichuan reckons that the national total of volunteers was around 150,000 recruits, with Sichuan's contribution above 40,000. Zhou Kaiqing, as the county head of Daxian (達縣) in Sichuan, was actively involved in local recruiting efforts in 1944-5; Zhou Kaiqing, *Sichuan yu dui Ri kangzhan*, pp. 250-3. Near to Zhou’s estimate, an official Nationalist military account places the total number of volunteers at 125,500, with a final number of 107,380 actually meeting the requirements to enlist; GJZGSG, vol. 2, pp. 924-5. These high numbers may be a result of not taking into account the volunteers who were rejected because they did not meet requirements, or failed the physical examination. However, much lower estimates exist as well. Other scholars claim that after the physical exams, only 86,000 recruits were actually inducted; see Jiang Yongjing, *Guomindang xingshuai shi*, pp. 46-8 and Hu Pu-yu, p. 70. And some official publications, like the *Geming wenxian* collectanea, report significantly lower numbers too: Sichuan, including the city of Chongqing, supplied only 33,901 enlistees, and in the Chinese hinterland as a whole (perhaps excluding Sichuan, though this is not explicitly stated), 50,865 youths actually entered the youth armies; a further 19,912 were rejected because they did not meet physical standards and yet another 11,065 were unable to join the army for “other reasons", for a total of 53,789 soldiers actually serving; GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 209 and 224. For an account of the numbers of
that, as one military historian has concluded, the surge of educated youth volunteers for the Youth Army in 1944 meant “China had for the first time summoned her social elite – the educated class – to bear arms in the nation's service.”

But who were these men? The IYVM recruited specifically between the ages of 18 and 35 sui, but the volunteers were predominantly in their late teens and early twenties. Fully 85% of the 209D recruits were between the ages of 18 and 25, with 11% in their late twenties, and only 4% being 31-35 years old. The volunteers in Chongqing showed a similar age distribution: 73.2% were between 18 and 22; another 23.7% were between 23 and 29 years old, and a mere 3.1% ages thirty to thirty-five. While these official numbers add to our sociological sketch of

recruits from each province see GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 199-226. This passage often gives information on the districts and/or cities as well as specific schools from which the student volunteers came. Some of the discrepancy here is explained by the fact that the Geming wenxian statistics do not include recruits that signed up after January 1945. Even the Youth Army Veterans Association’s official numbers are incomplete, sketchy, and contradictory. The veterans association, in one source, claims the total number of volunteers (after 12 November 1944 when registration began) was 151,516. After the selection process (by the recruiting committees and the military), over 71,000 were inducted into the nine YA divisions; Hu Guotai, p. 54, citing Chen Cungong (陳存恭), “Qingnianjun de zhengji yu bianzu” (青年軍的徵集與編組), in Qingnianjun shihua (青年軍史話), Taipei, Qingnianjun lianyihui zonghui, 1986, pp. 420-2. However, another publication by the Veterans Association, the comprehensive two-volume Qingnianjun shi, has still different numbers, which are perhaps the best available thus far, although there are many unresolved questions about the data. By combining the numbers of intellectual youth soldiers from each division, the official Veterans Association history gives a total of 91,153 youth soldiers actually inducted into the YA divisions. (The breakdown is as follows: 201D, 8000; 202D, 7189; 203D, 5863; 204D, 14,000; 205D, 9000; 206D, 10641; 207D, 10300; 208D, 13650; 209D, 12510.) However, these figures should not be regarded as definitive. The quality of the data in the Veterans Association volumes is uneven, with some divisions able to report quite detailed occupational, educational, and age breakdowns for its men, while others have almost no concrete figures at all and report in very round numbers. It is impossible to know if this is due to destruction of records, or if the writers of each division’s chapter had limited access to classified official materials. In addition, this total of 91,153 includes some divisions reporting well over 10,000 intellectual youth volunteers. While such numbers are not impossible, it would mean that those divisions were significantly over-manned, as the total base manpower (including support troops, special battalions, and officers) was supposed to be 12,000 men per division; QNJS, vol. 1, pp. 99-258. The full-strength complement for a Youth Army division was 732 officers and 11,214 men, for a total of 11,946; QNJS, vol. 2, p. 465. The 201D took soldiers from the 94D; the 202D was bolstered with 5,062 regular soldiers, most from divisional districts, but some from the Qijiang militia, and more than fourteen hundred from the 34D; the 203D received conscrits from the N5D; the 203D from the N56D; the 205D from the N23D; the 207D from the 48D; the 208D from the 144D and conscrits directly from the Gannan and Jitai (吉泰) divisional districts; and the 209D nearly 2000 soldiers from the 75D and nearly three thousand conscrits directly from divisional districts, including Gannan and Jitai again. QNJS, vol. 1, pp. 102, 117, 139, 153, 165, 216, and 244.


5. 18-20 years old was 43% and 21-25 was 42%; QNJS, vol. 1, p. 248.

6. QNJS, vol. 2, p. 377. The IYVM and Youth Army administration adopted a rather loose definition of “youth” that followed Youth Corps practice. For a description and justification of the Youth Corps' age requirements, see Eastman, Seeds, p. 93. But, this same age bracket, 18-35 sui, was also the conscription age bracket for much of the war. See, for example, the special telegram (dated 25
the volunteers, they obscure some aspects. The age of the volunteers is one area where governmental and regimental statistics are extremely suspect. Numerous references suggest that the Nationalist youth armies were not immune from the usual difficulty of admitting underage recruits. 7 (See chart above for the complete age breakdown for the 202D.)

Table 5-1: Age (in sui) of the 202D Volunteers

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>5,963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: QNJS, vol. 1, p. 124

September 1938) from the Sichuan Provincial Government to Shen Peng at the 3AD in Yongchuan, reiterating that the standards for conscripts were all flexible, except for minimum weight (47.5 kg), minimum height (158 cm), and age (18-35 sui); qz0055-mj3-274, p. 49.

7. One journalist, writing for the Xinshu Bao (新蜀報), noted that within the 204th division there were “not a few 15 and 16 year old children, but when we asked them, they all without exception said they were 18. Because of the army's age restriction was 18 or above, they greatly feared telling the truth that they should not have joined the army”; HYQNJ, p. 136. The age problem was so pronounced that the IYVM Guidance Committee in a stern order to respect the age restrictions on
As far as occupation of the volunteers goes, again firm figures are elusive, but there are some general occupational breakdowns available for some of the YA divisions that demonstrate students made up the clear majority of volunteers, though teachers and civil servants (broadly defined) made up a significant proportion as well. Thus, the volunteers were not intellectuals in the Euro-American sense, nor even mostly college graduates, but they came primarily from the lower-end of the educated stratum in Chinese society. The educational background of the student recruits was heavily weighted toward middle-school students, with most divisions reporting 15% or less of the volunteers as having any post-secondary education. Zhang Ruide's data for the recruits was heavily weighted toward middle-school students, with most divisions reporting 15% lower-end of the educated stratum in Chinese society. The educational background of the student volunteers was that only 10% of the recruits were graduates of post-secondary schools (junior colleges, teacher's colleges, universities, and technical schools); high school graduates stood at 23%; a majority of 60% were lower middle school students, while primary schoolers made up only 7%.

8. In the 202D, fully 44% of the volunteers were currently students when they signed up, another 24.7% were white collar workers (lit. "administrative workers"). Industrial workers made up a mere 6%; commercial occupations were 5.4%, military men another 11%, and 22% were farmers. In the 204D, of the men demobilized in 1946, 71% were students and 29% were "professionals" or from other "circles" (階級). The 208D reported similar figures, with students in the strong majority, followed by teachers and civil servants, and then youths from industry and commerce; QNJS, vol. 1, p. 116, 122-123, 125, 155, 213, 218. These figures seem representative of the YA as a whole, but the information from other divisions is either non-existent or very sketchy. The Chongqing recruitment committee reported similar figures, though with a very small showing of farmers: 4,218 students (60.9%); 1,984 (28.6%) teachers and civil servants; 450 (6.6%) workers; 248 (3.6%) merchants or retail workers; 22 (0.3%) farmers; QNJS, vol. 2, p. 377.

9. Zhang Ruide, Kangzhan shiqi di guojun renshi, p. 164 and Jiang Yongjing, Guomin dang xingshuai shi, pp 46-8. The 205D was an exceptional unit in the YA in that it reported an incredible 40% of its volunteers as having post-secondary education. Most of its higher educated recruits were from Hunan University; QNJS, vol. 1, p. 165. Chongqing was somewhat exceptional in that middle school students made up over 70% of the volunteers from the city; GMWX, vol. 63, p. 320 and QNJS, vol. 2, p. 377. Anecdotal evidence confirms this point time and again. For example, one reporter noted that in a company of over 100 men that he visited, 55 percent were middle school students, 30 percent public servants, and only about 5 percent were students of technical schools or universities; HYQNJ, p. 91.

There are some more detailed, albeit less comprehensive, numbers available from the 639th regiment, under the 209th division and subordinate to the southeast branch of the General Inspectorate. The 639R published a commemorative volume after the unit was demobilized in 1946, which includes some fairly detailed breakdowns of the composition of the men in the regiment. A very slim majority of the soldiers who made up the 639th regiment were students, 51.2%. Educators and those with government jobs made up 12% and 15.1% respectively. Those who had previously held positions within the military and police made up a further 9.3% of the regiment's strength. Clearly from these numbers, students, teachers, and those already working within the lower levels of the state apparatus made up the vast majority of the regiment (87.6%). Full-time (paid) KMT party
The genesis moment for the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement is usually identified as November 1943, in Santai (三台), Sichuan. Some confusion over the origin stems from the different names used to designate the various phases of the movement – earlier names were not uniformly dropped from usage when the movement’s direction was altered – as well as from uncertainty whether the early drive (1943-44) to find “educated youths” for the Indian Expeditionary Force (IEF, 駐印軍, under Stilwell’s leadership) and the CEF (Chinese Expeditionary Force, under general Chen Cheng 陳誠 in Yunnan) are part of the IYVM or the Youth Army. Contemporary sources use a whole array of similar and overlapping names: Student Volunteer Movement, Youth Expeditionary Army, Intellectual Youth Volunteers, and Youth Army.

In late 1943 the intention of Nationalist leaders was far more modest than launching a country-wide campaign for educated volunteers. Early efforts focused on recruiting a limited number of students to be used as reinforcements or support troops organized into truck transport units for the IEF. In most places, this effort was only partially separate from conscription quotas and administration. In fact, Xu Siping, the chief of staff for the Sichuan Provincial Military District, was worried about possible competition and interference between student recruiting and regular army conscription work. All told, by the end of the war, at least 9,100 student-soldiers had served in India and Burma under US command. The IEF found itself without a real mission after the opening of the Burma Road in April 1945 and was recalled to China. With the opening of the China-India road in early 1945, the oil route reached Kunming, changing the strategic situation so that there was no need to send youth volunteers to India. The IEF’s mission was over, and concurrently (in January 1945) the Training Regiments to handle the IEF and CEF’s youth volunteers – three of which were located in Sichuan – were also disbanded. The initial batch of volunteers was almost completely recruited from students within Sichuan. Expansion to other

and Youth Corps cadres were negligible, accounting for a mere 0.8% and 1.1% of the regiment’s numbers. Even fewer of the soldiers had been merchants, farmers, and workers. Following the age requirements of the youth army guidelines, all but one of the 1,885 soldiers are listed as being between 18 and 35 sui. (The one exception is listed as 17 sui.) 1,325 (or 70.3%) of the soldiers were between the ages of 18 and 22. As far as educational background is concerned, the 639th bore out the national trend: fully 46% of the regiment’s soldiers were either still in middle school or had graduated from it. Students in or graduating from high school made up another 26%. 16.1% of the soldiers however were studying in or had graduated from Normal Schools. Only 54 individuals were college students or graduates, and only a handful (12) had come from military academies. (While it is impossible to say for sure, these numbers most likely do not include the regiment’s higher officers or political cadres, because the distribution of party members and those with previous military experience suggests that officers are not included in the charts.) In terms of place of origin, the numbers for the 639th regiment show marked difference from the national trends, but not only are the statistics on place of origin suspect (see below), but this is expected given the location of the regiment. Stationed first at the extreme western edge of Jiangxi, and then later transferred to Fujian and Zhejiang, the 639th (part of the 209th which was based in Shanghang, Fujian, under General Wen Mingjian) drew its soldiers from the southeastern coastal provinces. Fujian and Zhejiang, 642 and 571 soldiers respectively, combined for nearly 64.4% of the regiment’s strength. Jiangxi (247), Jiangsu (116), and Anhui (184), added another 29%; Wu Guoyuan, pp. 1 and 104-7.

10. XSCJ, pp. 15-6.
areas and social groups, especially teachers and educated personnel in government employ, did not occur until late 1944.13

Table 5-2: Volunteers and Inductees for the IEF/CEF (First Phase of the IYVM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>country-wide</th>
<th>Sichuan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>volunteers</td>
<td>50,865</td>
<td>22,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>passed inspections</td>
<td>30,953</td>
<td>14,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inducted</td>
<td>19,048</td>
<td>7,160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From autumn 1944 onwards, the Nationalist state began a second concentrated push to recruit a large number of educated youth, broadening the movement with a nation-wide call for “intellectual youth” to volunteer for service. Although the central government published the “Student Volunteer Service Measures” on 19 December 1943, which stipulated that the training period for students was set at three months and that female volunteers were to be transferred to the Auxiliary Service Department (軍事補助勤務部), the movement was not expanded materially until later in 1944 with the fall of Guizhou.14 At the National Political Consultative Conference held on 27 August 1944, Chiang issued a direct call for youth to enlist. In October, he called together relevant ministries and bureaus, provincial and municipal government and party sections, and various levels of working personnel and educational circles for a three-day conference. The conference's most important measure was to establish the National Intellectual Youth Volunteer Army Guidance Committee (全國智識青年從軍指導委員會). The standing committee of this new agency was made up of several KMT factions: the army (Whampoa), the Renaissance Society (fuxingshe 復興社), and CC clique elements, as well as a strong contingent of Youth Corps members. It held a conference in the first half of October 1944 and set down recruiting measures, training plans, and regulations for local organizations and called for the creation of nine divisions of troops, all under the direct command of the Military Affairs Commission.15

On 4 November 1944, under the national committee, which played mainly an oversight role, Chiang set up the General Inspectorate of the Organization and Training of Intellectual Youth Volunteers and the Youth Army (知識青年從軍青年軍編練總監部) with Luo Zhuoying (羅卓英), as director and Huang Wei (黃維) as vice-director. The General Inspectorate was originally the MAC's Training Oversight Office, a training unit which used US weapons and methods, along with US advisors; Luo Zhuoying served under Stilwell in both the First Burma Campaign (1942) and in the IEF. Japanese counterattacks put a quick end to the Training Office, but Chiang moved quickly to reorganize it into the Youth Army's General Inspectorate. The General Inspectorate set up a national administrative infrastructure to recruit the volunteers. In light of the Japanese occupation of many southeastern areas, a separate branch had to be established away

from Chongqing. Based in Jiangxi and headed by Huang Wei, the southeastern branch's area of operations included Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, and Guangdong. It relied heavily, according to Huang Wei's memoirs, on American trainers and weapons. The political bureau for the Youth Army took shape in December 1944 with Jiang Jingguo, Chiang Kaishek's son, in charge.  

Underneath these national and regional organs, each province established an instruction committee, with the chairman of the provincial government, the Chief of Staff of the Military District, the head of the provincial education department, and the leader of the local Youth Corps branch on the standing committee. Provisions for training recruits, including setting up of preliminary training battalions, were handled by the *provincial* military affairs bureaus. After their induction into training battalions, Youth Army units were under the formal jurisdiction of the military.

Compared with conscripted divisions, the Youth Army units were fully-manned and well equipped. While there were shortages in equipment at times, the Youth Army was at full strength and enjoyed a level of equipage unheard of in other Nationalist units. From early 1945 until the Japanese surrender in August, the Youth Army divisions accepted and trained volunteers. The strategic plan was for these units to complete their training by August of 1945 and enter the general counterattack against Japan in September. Japan’s surrender, of course, cut these plans short, but during the postwar years, the YA was actively involved in securing previously occupied areas and anti-communist pacification campaigns, and in fact, formed the backbone of the Nationalist military’s reserve system after the war.

**Phase Differential**

From the preceding thumbnail sketch it should be clear that the IYVM had two phases. The first, more modest, phase recruited and trained educated youths for the IEF and the remnants of the CEF which had escaped to western Yunnan, and were placed under Chen Cheng in Kunming. The IEF had been established at Ramgarh (India) as a regrouping area after most of the surviving CEF, under Stilwell, had retreated following the disastrous First Burma Campaign, an ill-advised and planned operation that resulted in the Japanese cutting the Yunnan-Burma Road, China’s chief international supply line. The surviving units from the campaign were stationed there to receive new weapons and new training, under American-British auspices and to be brought back to full strength. The first phase of educated volunteers in 1943 were part of this effort to revive the IEF and rebuild the CEF. Both units were to make use of American military hardware and supplies, and thus needed technically capable men to handle transport and communications work. The lull between the first phase (late 1943) and the second, much larger IYVM related to the in-
ternational politics surrounding the joint campaigns of the Allies in Asia and China’s hesitation to participate in another campaign in Burma. In mid-1942 Stilwell was already proposing a two-prong attack (from India and Yunnan) to retake Burma, but after the fiasco of the First Burma Campaign, Chiang and his generals were very hesitant to participate in another Burma action. Chiang felt betrayed by Stilwell, particularly his ordering the remnants of the force in Burma to India without consulting with Chiang, and was skeptical of Britain’s ability and willingness to support the campaign with sufficient sea and airpower. Finally in 1944, by playing on fears that the British were going to abscond with China’s portion of the Lend-Lease goods if China did not participate, Stilwell convinced Chiang to take another go at re-opening the Yunnan-Burma Road. The Nationalists threw key units (N22D and N38D) into northern Burma, and then in mid-1944, sixteen more divisions from Yunnan were committed. The two groups met up in late January 1945, opening the China-India Road.19 The second phase of the IYVM was a much larger drive with significantly larger numbers; instead of reinforcing already existing divisions, it resulted in the formal establishment of the nine divisions of the “Youth Army” in the autumn of 1944. The Youth Army had nine divisions, in three armies (6th, 9th, 31st).20

The two phases are distinct in that the first (1943) recruitment efforts were still partially within the military administration, while the second (1944-45) bypassed it almost completely. In the later IYVM, the military administration and conscription apparatus were relegated to minor, supporting roles, while the bulk of the work and authority were handled by civilian political and administrative agencies. Thus, the YA epitomized the efforts to reform military service in the later years of the war and establish the idealized state-soldier relationship put forward by He Yingqin and other military authorities in the years before the war. The earlier and later volunteer periods are also distinguished by their distinctly different purposes. In 1943, replenishing the IEF and CEF to permit coordinated action with the US and Britain was a clear military goal behind the first recruitment efforts; but the motivations for the second period are murkier, and distinctly more political in nature. Despite these differences, however, certain key features (volunteerism, recruiting from the educated stratum, heavy involvement of non-military organizations

19. Hsiung and Levine, pp. 158-62. Yang Tianshi’s excellent account of the growing tension and mutual antipathy between Stillwell and Chiang Kaishhek surrounding the Burma campaigns draws on both leaders’ diaries, demonstrating Stillwell’s almost pathological concern with asserting his authority over Chinese generals and forces, as well as his complete insensitivity toward the sensitive issue of Chinese sovereignty, and Chiang’s agonizing over both China’s reputation and slights – real and perceived – to his own status; Yang Tianshi, Kangzhan, pp. 382-431. A standard mainland Chinese account of Stillwell and his wartime tenure in China can be found in Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, pp. 167-95. Edward Dreyer relies exclusively on English language sources and thus provides a one-sided account that is heavily slanted in favor of Stilwell; China at War, pp. 267-85. For an older, but far more balanced assessment in English, see F. F. Liu, A Military History, pp. 178-93, 210-9. For an account of the First Burma Campaign and the IEF that focuses on military actions and reorganizations, see Zhongguo Kangrizhanzheng zhengmian zhanchang zuozhanji, vol. 2, pp. 1264-89. He Yingqin’s short synopses is in his Banian kangzhan, pp. 172-4 and 205-6. He makes no mention of Chiang’s suspicion of the British, but states that Chiang was anxious to go along with a more limited British plan instead of Stilwell’s full-scale operation. But his account is taken almost completely from Gen. Chenault, who would not have been privy to Chiang’s real motivations; p 119.

and agencies) unite them analytically and they will be treated thusly in this chapter, though the bulk of my materials relate to the later movement and units.

**Purposeful Disputes**

In contrast to the early phase of the recruitment for the IEF and CEF, which had clear military goals in cooperation with the US and British forces operating in the India-Burma theater, the prime motivation and goal of the later Youth Army beginning in autumn 1944 is still under dispute. It is hard to disentangle completely the competing purposes and inclinations of a complex administrative and social phenomenon. What is less difficult is coming to an understanding of the significance of the Youth Army, which is to be found in it as a culminating move in the attempt to build an ideal form of military service. As such, the IYVM and the YA were an ambitious attempt to establish the direct state-individual relationship envisioned years before in He Yingqin’s modern ideal of citizen-soldiers. Nonetheless, to trace the issue out we need first to have some idea of the terrain of dispute.

Some accounts of the war have interpreted the IYVM and the Youth Army mainly in international terms, putting the impetus squarely on US shoulders and de-emphasizing domestic Chinese factors. According to this view, after the retreat to the east bank of the Salween River (怒江) in Burma in the summer of 1942, Stilwell proposed to expel Japanese forces from northern Burma and southern Yunnan using a force of “soldiers with scientific knowledge” who would be American-trained and equipped under the Lend Lease and China-Aid programs. Marshall backed the plan in 1943 and took it to Chiang Kai-shek, who then passed it on to He Yingqin and the order was issued to call up youth volunteers and send them in batches to India to be trained by the Americans there.²¹ The IEF and the Second Burma Campaign, thus, becomes the immediate cause of the IYVM and YA. There is undoubtedly a measure of truth to this. The first phase of the IYVM in late 1943 was indeed designed to secure educated replacements for the IEF. Furthermore, the success of the IEF and the performance of youth soldiers fighting in the Second Burma Campaign (early 1944 to early 1945) were encouraging to Nationalist military authorities. Stilwell’s leadership and the well-trained and well-equipped Chinese soldiers scored a string of impressive victories against the Japanese in Burma. The IEF model was immediately copied to the forces within China, at Kunming and Jiangxi, which joined in launching a pincer attack from inside China.²² These successful actions helped expand the range of possibilities, opening the door to plans of training a larger elite force of educated soldiers. Additionally, at the height of Japan’s Ichigo Offensive, General Wedemeyer replaced Stilwell, bringing a new attitude of cooperation that was in marked contrast with the entrenched skepticism and despair of Stilwell and most US staff officers in China. General Wedemeyer proposed that the joint Sino-American command focus its effort on maintaining and equipping just forty divisions in preparation for a counterattack to retake Canton in 1945.²³ But, the impetus for the later IYVM and the completely

---


22. The CEF offensive was led by General Wei Lihuang, one of China’s most acclaimed generals of the war. F. F. Liu, A Military History, pp. 183-91 and 214-9.

23. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 293-301. For an account of the ALPHA force and the CARBONADO plans, see Krause, China Offensive, passim and Wedemeyer, pp. 326-41.
new YA was not found in American proposals, and in fact, American advisors advised Luo Zhuoying against the plan in 1944-45, arguing that it was a waste of human resources.  

Jay Taylor, in contrast, paints the IYVM and YA as Jiang Jingguo’s idea:

What China desperately required, Ching-kuo frequently told his father, was a new sort of military force composed of literate and patriotic youth led by officers of high quality and dedication. The Youth Corps, which was ‘in but not of’ the Kuomintang, would be an obvious choice of recruitment for such an elite army.

Even though Jiang Jingguo was heavily involved on several levels with the YA, particularly its political cadre system and in selecting its commanders, it is hard to evaluate this claim. One suspects Taylor is guessing here, as Zhang Zhizhong admitted in his memoirs that even though he and Wu Tiecheng had received the hand-written order from Chiang Kaishek in the fall of 1944 to start calling up 100,000 volunteers, he did not know who had prompted the generalissimo to initiate the second round of the IYVM.

In contrast to these reading of events, a common communist take has stressed that the Youth Army units were an anti-communist ploy: first, to seduce interior youth away from the CCP and Yan'an, and second, to carry out reactionary activities both during and after the war. From this perspective, the Youth Army becomes yet another one of Chiang’s secret plots aimed at preparing for civil war against the Red Army. Similar claims are made in some scholarly works, which insist on projecting the imminent end of the war back into the calculation of Chiang (and other Nationalist leaders). For example, one recent scholar, points out that the official plan was for the divisions of YA to join the fight on the front lines after completing its three month training, which began in January 1945. If followed, this plan would have had the YA divisions in action by April or May of 1945, but in fact none of them saw action during the war itself. Zhou Shuzhen argues that this is definitive proof that the YA divisions were intended and reserved for the Civil War all along.

This conspiratorial take on the Youth Army is reinforced by some of the IYVM’s own materials. An undated directive from the National IYVM Guidance Committee to various levels of

24. Huang Wei, p. 68. He Yingqin’s postwar summary account of US-China cooperation makes no mention of the Youth Army as part of US aid to China, nor as part of a cooperative venture. It is possible, though unlikely, that this was an “oversight” motivated by He’s suspicion of Chen Cheng and his involvement with the YA; Banian kangzhan, pp. 205-6 and supplement #2 (A Record of China-US military cooperation in the Second World War, 第二次世界大戰中美軍事合作紀要), pp. 34-5. There is a variation on this general theme of US inspiration for the IYVM. During the Ichigo Offensive the US requested that Chiang’s government organize some 50,000 rear area workers for missions overseas. Chiang, his pride offended by the request to supply merely non-combatant manpower, came up with an alternate plan to raise an elite force for deployment overseas under American leadership. See Hu Guotai, “Jiang Jingguo,” p. 50.


27. Rong Bida, p. 52.


the KMT party and the Three People’s Principle’s Youth Corps outlined threats to the IYVM, mainly from the CCP: the infiltration of the movement by CCP cadres as a way to shake confidence in the national military; the CCP criticism of the IYVM as a “Nazi Party Army” exclusively for use against domestic enemies; the communist Xinhua Ribao refusal to run news items on the Youth Army, giving the impression that the KMT had abandoned China’s youth completely; and that the CCP was using student protests to block recruitment of youths.  

Throughout the war, Nationalist authorities were highly sensitive – even hyper-sensitive – to CCP activism in schools, frequently expressing the desire to turn schools into KMT “fortresses.” Official statements like this directive are far from rare and lend support to the contention that a key purpose of the IYVM was to make a concerted effort to fight the CCP on its own ground, educated youth. Strengthening this impression is the deep involvement of the YA with anti-communist actions, both political and military, during the Civil War. The Youth Army’s commitment to the Nationalist state was thoroughly tested during the Civil War. The fact that it stayed firmly loyal to the government can be seen as a successful outcome of the attempt by the Nationalist government to cultivate a dedicated and committed citizen-soldiery. (For a sketch of the Youth Army’s demobilization, the eventual remobilization of its veterans as civilian agitators in schools, and renewed recruitment of youth soldiers during the Civil War, see Epilogue.) Still, seeing its later role as an anti-communist force as the only, or even main, motivation for the IYVM as far back as 1943-44 is an anachronism in that it maps later actions back onto the intentions of a far murkier past.

If one follows the administrative and political convolutions that gave birth to the Youth Army, however, the picture is more complicated than either of these two readings of the IYVM. Chiang was, of course, continually looking forward to the ultimate struggle with the “disease of the heart,” the communists. But, he had quite willingly sacrificed his very best units and almost ten years of training a corps of competent junior officers in the battles around Shanghai and almost the last of China’s crack troops were decimated in the disastrous First Burma Campaign in 1942. Balanced assessments, like those of Huang Wei who was in charge of YA operations in the southeast, acknowledge that Chiang Kaishek had several motivations for the launching the 1944 IYVM, the most important of which were to calm fears of surrender in the face of the Ichi-go Offensive and to replace battlefield losses without going through the dysfunctional conscription system.

Furthermore, without knowledge of the American nuclear program, Chinese leaders expected Normandy-like landings on the Japanese islands would be necessary. Despite the strategic certainty of Allied victory over Japan, as late as May 1945 the KMT party Assembly delegates and military experts were still anticipating strenuous efforts to drive the Japanese out of China. Chiang and the Nationalist military repeatedly claimed that the Youth Army would participate in the final counterattack on the Japanese home islands in cooperation with Allied forces; the Amer-

30. qz0051.mj2-397 pp. 203a-b n.d.
31. As just one example: the KMT January 1939 resolution, Measures Preventing the Activities of Other Parties (防止異黨活動辦法), cited in Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 78-9.
32. Huang Wei, p. 66. Huang does, of course, indicate that Chiang could see the political potential of the IYVM-YA, particularly as a counterweight to the CCP’s influence among youth.
ian proposal (the ALPHA Plan) to train and equip 36 divisions of crack Chinese troops to retake Canton and Hong Kong only fueled this expectation in China.

In a telegram to his commanders on February 1, 1945, he [Chiang Kaishek] argued that China must aggressively prosecute the war in order to elevate its status in the postwar international order. He therefore urged his commanders to make every effort to train and prepare their troops for a massive counteroffensive against the Japanese within a short period of time.\footnote{Hsiung and Levine, pp. 165-6. This was a long-standing dream of Chiang’s. His diary entry for 17 December 1943 reads: “If China’s military is insufficient, if there is no crack troops to participate in the decisive battle [of the Pacific War], then our country will have no [international] status”; quoted in Yang Tiangshi, Kangzhan yu zhanhou, p. 416.}

The high command formulated two counteroffensive plans, with the code names Iceman (冰人) and White Tower (白塔).\footnote{One of the plans was a dummy, designed to throw off Japanese intelligence; Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers, pp. 764.} The fruits – both international and domestic – of participating in the Allies’ victory depended on China doing its utmost in the final stages of the war and Chiang was keenly aware of this fact. In this sense, the YA was motivated by international concerns, in the same way that Chiang pursued the Battle for Shanghai and the First Burma Campaign as a demonstration for foreign eyes that China was doing all it could, committing all its resources, to fight Japan. International relations were not a second-order priority for the KMT. Foreign policy was a key part of the rubric of the legitimate state and the Nationalists were highly (perhaps overly) sensitive to how foreign opinion painted China and the Nationalist government. Relations with the US, Great Britain, and the USSR were essential: it was imperative to receive foreign recognition, cancel the unequal treaties, and fulfill the role of “major power.” Such steps were highly prized tokens of legitimacy and yet, putting it this way, understates their importance: these were the very \textit{basis} of legitimacy in an international conflict.\footnote{In some ways, this reminds us of the picture Wakeman presents in \textit{Policing Shanghai}. While domestically important, the efforts to modernize the Shanghai police force, to control the opium trade, and other policies were directly tied to the attempt to re-claim Chinese sovereignty on the international stage by the KMT state. It should be noted that there is, as yet, no comprehensive account of the Nationalist government’s foreign policy during the war in English. Given the breadth and depth of the sources – encompassing complicated and multi-stranded relations with US, Britain, Japan, and the USSR just for starters – this is not surprising.}

For these reasons, the desire to have elite units of Chinese troops present at the triumphant end was palpable at times in the Youth Army propaganda.\footnote{\textit{qz0051.mj2}-397 p. 164a.} Speeches to recruits by Luo Zhuoying, head of the Youth Army training, and other generals hammered on this point, encouraging the volunteers with visions of invading Japan and taking Tokyo.\footnote{HYQNJ, pp. 66 and 88; and QNYZJJY, p. 121.} Writings by the youth soldiers themselves often fervently expressed that they were prepared, even anxious, to join an assault on Japan’s capital.\footnote{Lai Zheming, p. 54.} One memoir, written well into the communist era, even suggests that the soldiers’ happiness at hearing of Japan’s surrender was tinged with disappointment that they were not to have the chance to partic-
ipate in the final drama. In light of these facts, Zhou Shuzhen’s claim that the lack of action by the YA divisions is a clear indication that Chiang had no intention of committing the YA to the war seems hasty: if they were put into action in May of 1945, they would have been unavailable for any combined action with the US against Japan. There is little doubt that Chiang was anxious for the prestige that would result from such a turn of events.

In addition to these international concerns, Chiang had motives for the Youth Army that involved cementing his command over the Nationalist military. Chiang was careful to ensure that he personally approved all Youth Army officers from regimental commanders on up. In a similar fashion, the officer corps of the army as a whole was “Whampoa-ized” during the course of the war, as one way for Chiang to extend his power. The success of this strategy was virtually total in the case of the Youth Army. In addition, the highest levels of the political apparatus associated with the Youth Army was tied to his son, Jiang Jingguo. To make sure there was as little interference as possible even from lower levels of the military administration, the Youth Army divisions were directly subordinate to the Military Affairs Commission and the YA leadership underwent an intensive training camp, which ended with an individual audience with Chiang at his Cengjiayan (曾家岩) villa, followed by the official announcement of appointments to the YA division and regimental commands. This close connection between the Generalissimo and the Youth Army meant that YA officers enjoyed increased status and prestige vis-à-vis their counterparts of equivalent rank in regular army units. YA officers enjoyed status and authority roughly two grades higher than those in the regular army; this meant that regimental officers were treated more or less equivalent to divisional commanders in the regular army. Regimental level officers from the Youth Army were permitted to attend a November 1945 conference, chaired by Bai Chongxi at Futuguan. Apart from the Youth Army officers and political cadres no other regimental level officers were permitted to attend. Despite the fact that many Youth Army commanders actually took a step down in rank when they were appointed, the competition for the command positions was intense and often involved political horse-trading.

41. Luo Chang’an, writing from an oral account from Tan Yizhi, commander of the 204D, says that general Chen Cheng and Hu Zongnan selected the divisional commanders, but that Chiang Kaishek personally approved each one; Luo Chang’an, p. 79.
42. The shift could also be analyzed in geographical ways: the old officers were northerners and had gone through “old-style” military training at Baoding, while the newer officers were younger and increasingly tended to be southerners trained at Huangpu; Zhang Ruide, Kangzhan shiqi di guojun renshi, pp. 145-9.
44. Wu Zhirong, p. 32 and Li Zhongshu, p. 106.
45. According to Huang Wei, Chiang selected senior commanders for the regimental level and above. Dai Zhiqi, who had been the vice-commander of the 18th Army prior to being assigned as the divisional commander of the 201st division, is a good example. As is Luo Zekai, who went from being the Chief of Staff for the First War Area to commander of the 202nd division. Zhong Bin had been the commander of the 71st Army before the 203rd division became his unit of command. Liu Anqi, 205th, had been head of the 57th Army. Huang asserts that there was intense competition for these youth army command positions – and with three exceptions, all those actually appointed by Chiang to divisional commander positions had “very strong backstage supporters.” In at least one
Thus, for all these reasons, it is the contention of this chapter that the Youth Army’s significance is as the culmination of the Nationalists attempts to reform military service and cement a reliable and committed citizen-soldiery for the KMT regime, rather than seeing it primarily as a long-range domestic plot aimed at the communists. This is not meant as a categorical denial of Chiang’s anti-communist hopes for the IYVM and the Youth Army, but to argue that painting it mainly (or only) in such terms is to miss the broader point: that the IYVM and the Youth Army were meant to resolve or bypass the political problems that plagued conscription and establish a new model of voluntary military service by citizen-soldiers. Accomplishing this task meant drawing on domestic examples of citizen activism and combining those with a call to a specific segment of the wartime population, a segment that was already heavily dependent on the state itself. (Naturally once it had been called into being, this army of loyal, volunteer citizen-soldiers was available for deployment against internal enemies.)

This view acknowledges the Youth Army as both a continuity of conscription trends and as a break with those trends. One small indication of continuity is that in some of the early documents, especially at the local level, the volunteers are referred to by the same term, zhuangding (壯丁), used for conscripts.46 This usage did not last, however, as the Youth Army soldiers and the state they served quickly re-branded them as elite citizen-soldiers. The volunteers were largely loyal, even becoming one of the core military forces after 1949 on Taiwan. (In the next chapter we shall unpack the heart of this connection between soldier-citizens and the state as seen in the propaganda accounts and self-stories of the soldiers themselves.) The YA, however, was in most ways a departure from the methods of mobilization used in conscription. The volunteer movement which recruited for the YA was carried out by a very different set of institutions using very different methods.

Although they assuredly contained some degree of anti-communist motivation, it is the contention of this chapter that the significance of the IYVM and the Youth Army is best understood in terms of the Nationalist state’s war mobilization efforts. As such, they should be examined in relation to other mobilization efforts, primarily conscription and the Youth Corps to see the ways in which the IYVM and YA were both extensions of and diversions from established modes of mobilization.

The IYVM began with the military administration in late 1943 but shifted decisively toward civilian agencies in 1944 with the second phase, demonstrating a less military-dominated mode of mobilization. Both phases, were an attempt to forge a more direct state to individual relationship, bypassing the entangling influences of local society that dominated the conscription service. In fact, the IYVM and the Youth army had a direct institutional heritage with volunteerist trends in the early war. In terms of top-level leadership, certain organizational apparatuses, and political technologies, the IYVM and the Youth Army inherited the Youth Corps’ tradition of ac-

---

46. A Jiangbei county magistrate in his report to the 3AD on the late 1943 recruitment drive in the county referred to the youth volunteers for the IEF as zhuangding (壯丁); qz0055.mj3-279, pp. 15-7 dated 8 January 1944.
tivism and mobilization. (Leadership ties will be covered later in this chapter, while the shared techniques of political identity formation are the subject of the following chapter.) The key institution on the ground for recruiting intellectual youth was the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps, which was born out of the volunteerism and mobilization of the Wuhan campaign in 1938. The Youth Corps was born in 1938 during the heady days of the Wuhan campaign.

Youth Corps: A Nationalist Octopus, A Creature of War

At the highest levels the YC and the IYVM/YA overlapped significantly in personnel. Some of the YC’s leading lights, namely Kang Ze, Zhang Zhizhong, and Jiang Jingguo, were heavily involved in the Youth Army on several levels. And in fact, the YC, the IYVM, and the YA were battlegrounds for the factional struggles between the CC Clique, the Whampoa-based Renaissance Society (fuxingshe), Chen Cheng, and Jiang Jingguo as he rose to positions of national prominence.

Since the 1943 phase of the IYVM began with the government, more specifically the military, the YC was initially behind a step. To catch-up, the central YC held a meeting of educational, military training, and political cadres in mid-January 1944, which established a Student Volunteer for Military Service Guidance Committee (キンedralበ እሶ ከንግንጆታ) to coordinate with military authorities in promoting the movement among students. The committee was staffed mainly by the YC’s Central Executive Committee. Each provincial branch of the YC also set up a committee for student volunteers.

However, the YC’s dominant position in the IYVM did not take shape until the fall of 1944, with the widening of the IYVM and marginalization of the conscription administration for the 100,000 volunteer drive. Once Chiang began making public calls for a renewed push to recruit intellectual youth, the YC was the first to respond, immediately dispatching high level cadres out into the hinterland to prepare the way. The YC was a key participant in the October 1944 conference on the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement, which founded the National Intellectual Youth Volunteer Guidance Committee (全国智識青年志願從軍指導委員會). This body of 25 national leaders was run by a standing committee of nine members, including Zhang Boling (張伯苓) and He Yingqin who were key YC leaders in addition to their important governmental and military positions. Kang Ze, heading up the central YC’s organization section at this time, and Jiang Jingguo, who was on the YC’s central standing committee, were able to use their positions in the IYVM Guidance Committee and control over YC branches to ensure that local IYVM recruitment committees were well stocked with YC members.

47. The Chief Secretary was Kang Ze. Other secretaries were Yu Jizhong (余紀忠) and Zhang Heng (張恒), the vice-heads of Propaganda and Training Offices in the Central Executive Committee, respectively. The Service Group head was Gu Yuxiu (顧毓琇), with Cheng Siyuan as the vice-head. The Propaganda Group chief was Zheng Yanfen (鄭彥棻). The committee members included many top YC leaders, including Zhang Zhizhong, Chen Lifu, Liang Hancao (the minister of information), Ceng Yangfu, Cheng Zerun (head of the Conscription Office); for the full roster and other organizational details, see GMWX, vol. 62, p. 239 and following.

48. The cadres went out from Chongqing along three routes: along the Yangzi to Wushan (巫山); along the Han-Yi Road (漢宜公路) to counties in north Sichuan; and along the Sichuan-Guizhou Road to Xiushan (秀山) Youyang (酉陽); Tang Running, Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, p. 226-8 and Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 131.

To understand the relationship of the YC and the IYVM and YA we need to look closely at the YC itself. Due to the intense antipathy between its leadership and segments of the KMT, there was a decided lack of open information and scholarship on the Youth Corps until quite recently.\footnote{The following account of the Youth Corps is heavily indebted to two recent studies: Zhou Shuzhen, \textit{Sanqingtuan shimo} (1996) and Ma Lie, \textit{Jiangjia fuzi yu Sanqingtuan} (2007). Both are well-researched and draw on materials not readily available to me, primarily documents held in the Second Historical Archives in Nanjing. Ma’s book, in particular, is not likely to be surpassed any time soon; it is quite comprehensive and generally even-handed. Where I differ from both of these mainland accounts it is in terms of emphasis and significance. Both Ma and Zhou give greater weight of analysis and interpretation to the statements of the Youth Corps’ central leadership, and thus are highly sensitive to factional and high level political nuances. In contrast, I am more interested in it as a product of the war and its role as a means of mobilization, and hence I focus more on the “mundane” activities of local branches and cadres than on the political in-fighting at the central level.}

The Three People’s Principles Youth Corps was officially founded on 9 July 1938; its charter, in five sections with 71 articles, was published nearly a month earlier on 16 June 1938. It lasted merely ten years, ending on 12 September 1947 when it was formally merged with the KMT; of its ten years of existence, fully seven were during wartime. The Youth Corps was a creature of war.

The organization’s prime purpose as stated by Chiang (as simultaneous head of the YC and leader of KMT) in his “Letter to All the Nation’s Youth” was “to strive for the War of Resistance and national construction,” while the “concentration of revolutionary strength” was only its secondary purpose.\footnote{Jiang Yongjing, \textit{Guomindang xingshuai shi}, pp. 29-32.} Eastman, in the only extended English language analysis of the Youth Corps, underestimated this fact in his negative assessment of the YC and its activities. He examines the YC from the perspective of its revolutionary potential. For example, Eastman states that Chiang’s purpose in founding the Youth Corps in 1937-8 “was to form a new revolutionary organization that, by eliminating the divisive quarrels of the past and by attracting the nation's youth, would take up the revolutionary tasks the Kuomintang had forsaken.” This, he concludes, it did not do, and hence he judges it to be a colossal failure.\footnote{Eastman, \textit{Seeds of Destruction}, p. 92.} What he fails to examine and notice is the YC’s role in mobilization for the war effort, which it maintained throughout the war years. Aside from mobilization efforts in the interior (which will be discussed in greater length below), it carried out a range of guerilla, paramilitary, and propaganda efforts in enemy territory as well.\footnote{In occupied areas Youth Corps branches carried out underground spy work, clandestine agitation, assassinations of traitors, publicity and propaganda, and outright guerilla attacks. Captured YC leaders starved themselves to death in Japanese prisons; Ma Lie, \textit{Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan}, p. 126.}

While Zhou Shuzhen and Ma Lie are more attuned to this important aspect of the YC than Eastman, they too minimize it by focusing so much attention and analysis on the byzantine internal politics of the YC and its anti-communist activities.

The intimate connection between war and revolution in China is not to be dismissed, of course. Taking a page right out of Chiang’s ubiquitous and infamous \textit{China’s Destiny}, the YC in its corporate self-image stressed the revolutionary potential of unified and awakened youth pow-
er. It cast itself as the third “great unity” of Chinese youth, each time producing a major political rejuvenation for the entire country. First, the Tongmenghui around 1911; second, under the KMT right before the Northern Expedition in 1919-1924; and third, under the YC in 1940s. Significantly all three revolutionary moments were touched off by the occupation of China by a foreign force and domestic collusion with that foreign intrusion: the occupation of Beijing by western powers after the Boxer Uprising and the collusion of the Qing court in imperial China’s denouement; the incursions of western imperialists with Chinese warlords colluding; and the Japanese invasion sparking the collusion of puppet governments and politicians. However, what YC propaganda elided was that War of Resistance was markedly different than that of the first two periods of “Great Unity” among youth. The war against Japan was protracted warfare carried out by a central government determined to mobilize the entire population for the war effort. From this perspective, the YC played an essential role, not as a major political rejuvenation, but as a multi-faceted organization that was (at least partially) successful in mobilizing the population – even those who were not yet old enough to be combatants on the frontline – for a very new type of war, protracted warfare that required long-term planning and thorough mobilization of the country’s population.

Chiang was serious in his goal of having the YC be an important institution in the full mobilization for the war effort. To focus exclusively on the YC as a revolutionary tool or as a cynical weapon for eliminating other political parties is to miss the importance of the Corps as a wartime phenomenon. Such one-sided interpretations are based solely on the statements and political stances of the central officials and overlook the mass of members who participated on the local level. Recovering these people and their activities is much harder of course, because the records are spotty and fragmented, but to ignore them completely reduces a vast and sprawling set of institutions to the words of its top leaders.

The immediate context for the YC’s founding was the high tide of volunteerism and United Front participation of the Wuhan campaign. It was born in the heady days of the Wuhan campaign, before the Nationalist government had moved to Chongqing. The months leading up to the defense of the Tri-City area were ones in which voluntary public involvement in the war effort was at high tide. Independent groups were organizing to support frontline troops and to carry out various roles behind the lines. Youth activism and independent organization efforts were particularly pronounced in the Wuhan area, as the streets teemed with more than one hundred thousand student refugees who came through the city in early 1938. Mobilizing the energy of these elite youths was a prime issue for leaders across the political spectrum. Calls for the government to provide leadership by providing training, organization, and logistical support to help

54. This periodization of history was put forward in the announcement of the Chongqing YC’s formal establishment in 1944: each stage of the revolution was marked by an emerging unity of youth (青年結合). The Xingzhonghui and Tongmenghui gave birth to the Xinhai Revolution (1911). The KMT reorganization and formation of the KMT’s party-army at Whampoa resulted in the Northern Expedition (1927). And now, the War of Resistance required accepting the mantle of history to bring about true National Reconstruction; qz0052.mj1-9, p. 1 and qz0052.mj1-18, p. 22.

55. Qian Junrui (錢俊瑞), for example, established the independent Youth National Salvation Corps (青年救國團) for volunteers in the Wuhan campaign. He selected 200-300 strong volunteers who entered the military, and a further 7-8,000 that were assigned to the 5WA guerrillas for battlefield hospital duty and other support roles, like letter writing for soldiers; Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 39-40, 54-8, and 75-6.
in the defense of the Wuhan even came from youth groups themselves. Chiang and the Nationalists were aware of this public upswell of activism in support of the war and sought to direct and control it, to bring it under government auspices. This entailed a certain amount of “democratization” of the Nationalist regime. Even Mao and other CCP leaders were cautiously optimistic that the KMT was becoming more “progressive.” The Wuhan campaign and the founding of the People’s Political Council was the high-water mark of popular enthusiasm for resistance and the KMT’s democratic impulses.

With support for the war, the KMT and Chiang Kaishek highest at the time of the defense of Wuhan, there was an opportunity to use this to advantage to bring disparate elements into the regime’s fold. The YC was a component of this plan: Chiang hoped it would harness the potential power of the youth on the streets of Wuhan, silence the KMT’s internal factions, unify external political groups under a new umbrella organization free from the partisan taint of the KMT, and extend his own personal influence and control over a segment of the population that was full of energy and potentially easily recruited by the CCP. Stephen MacKinnon argues that the founding of the YC was concerned with “party rebuilding” more than mobilizing the student movement, mainly because the YC failed to integrate student organizations into its leadership and its efforts to reach youth were delayed for a year. He has a point, but in his rush to ascribe all genuine mobilization during the Wuhan campaign to civilian activists and a coterie of tolerant generals, MacKinnon overlooks important state-backed Youth Corps activities, such as the battlefield service corps. Japanese authorities, however, were under no such illusions. From the outset, they saw clearly that the Youth Corps was worth targeting: as early as July 1938, Japanese-controlled newspapers were running a smear campaign against the Corps, crowing that China’s youth had lost confidence in Chiang and that organizing efforts for the Corps were failing.

During the battle for Wuhan (1938), Youth Corps members were a frequent sight leading patriotic marches and disseminating resistance propaganda in the city’s streets. From 1939 on, YC members in Chongqing were some of the most visible people on the streets helping with clean-

58. Ibid., pp. 39-40, 54-8, and 75-6.
60. As one example of this wartime mobilization role, the Youth Battlefield Service Corps (青年戰地服務隊) began as the Youth Wartime Service Unit (青年戰時服務總隊), established on 28 August 1938 in Wuhan. The Central YC branch selected 1,500 members to serve under the direction of the Wuhan YC branch, most of these were graduates of the first class from the MAC’s War Cadre Training Corps (戰幹團). They were split into three detachments, one sent to the frontlines and two working in Wuhan itself. The units in Wuhan helped with household registration efforts in the Tri-City area and helped organize 80,000 able-bodied men to do firefighting, intelligence gathering, rescue work for orphans and wounded soldiers, and propaganda efforts, as well as provide labor for military construction projects. Other areas followed the example and set up similar units to help the military with intelligence reports and aid for wounded soldiers. By 1944, there were 117 such youth service units in unoccupied China, with a total of 94,494 members; see Jiang Yongjing, *Guomindang xingshuai shi*, pp. 43-4 and Zhou Shuzhen, *Sanqingtuan shimo*, pp. 7-8 and 75.
61. See, for example, *Xinshibao*, 30 July 1938, p. 7.
up and aid efforts following Japanese bombings of the city. With hopes of expanding this wartime mobilization role, Chiang actively courted participation and interest in the YC from all over the political spectrum. Naturally, there was an element of a power play here, an attempt to co-opt dissent into a more easily controlled or influenced form, but the YC was not intended as an intelligence organization. While in the late and post-war periods, it took on an increasingly active role in anti-CCP activities, it continued to operate in a more open mobilization mode too, reflecting its origin.

Clouding the issue somewhat was the fact that Chiang saw the YC as a way to repair the KMT’s own internal factional rivalries which were so divisive; even he was not entirely uniform in his own desires for the YC. He had begun toying with the idea of a new organization in early 1937, and began concrete planning for it in May that same year, charging Tan Pingshan, Chen Lifu, and Kang Ze to write up the draft charter, assisted by Ren Juewu and others. Chiang and these original planners wanted to “make one party out of many,” unifying the KMT itself by unifying the many competing groups within it: the Chen brother’s CC Clique, which dominated the KMT party structure and educational institutions; the Renaissance Society and Society for Vigorous Practice (these groups can be lumped together as a Whampoa Academy based faction); Chen Cheng’s informal network of supporters; the Political Science Clique; and Wang Jingwei’s Reorganization Group.

Divided views on the purpose of the organization began almost immediately. Some high-ranking Nationalist leaders thought the whole exercise was unnecessary and that the YC should be recast as a youth “club.” Chen Lifu advocated making the YC directly subordinate to the KMT by adding KMT in front of the organization’s name, and using it as a substitute for the KMT’s probationary membership system. Kang Ze and other military men were opposed to this idea, because the Chen brothers already controlled so much of the KMT party apparatus and thus would be able to exercise a dominant position over the YC should it be subordinated to the party. They recommended that the organization be kept separate and be named simply “Youth Corps”

62. Han Suyin, Destination Chungking, pp. 76-7 and Xu Wancheng, Kangzhan banian Chongqing huaxu, p. 10.

63. These two organizations were the heart of the Whampoa-clique. The Renaissance Society (Fuxingshe) was a more public front group for the highly secretive Society of Vigorous Practice (Lixingshe 力行社), which was organized in 1931 by Whampoa graduates who wanted to unite elite military and civilian youth for political action and to resist Japan. Enamored with European fascists, this group took Chiang as its leader (lingxiu 領袖). It was never able to approach the level of control or influence of Italian or German fascists, but it secretly ran a nested hierarchy of front groups, such as the Renaissance Society, which recruited reliable cadres and tried to mobilize public opinion in support of Chiang. Wakeman analyzed the Society for Vigorous Practice in terms of “Confucian Fascism” to highlight its mixture of modern fascist elements and traditional personalism; Wakeman, “A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism,” The China Quarterly, no. 150, June 1997, pp. 395-432

64. Kang Ze was prime mover throughout the process of the YC’s birth. He was involved in virtually all the key meetings, even seeing Chiang alone at his villas on several occasions to discuss various aspects of this new (then unnamed) organization, and was even the author of the initial draft of the YC’s charter; Kang Ze “Sanminzhuyi qingniaintuan chengli de jingguo,” pp. 197-205; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, pp. 1-6; Jiang Yongjing, Guomindang xingshuai shi, p. 32-33 and Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtu shimo, pp. 43-7.
(Qingniantuan 青年團) and Chiang backed their proposal.\(^65\) Still, organizationally the KMT elements initially seemed to have managed to set the foundation for the YC to be within the KMT system.\(^66\) To pursue this mission, the YC was carefully composed to balance the KMT’s internal factions and groups. The planning group in the spring of 1938 had all the major factional players with their fingers in the pie: Chen Cheng, Chen Lifu, He Zhonghan, Gu Zhenggang, and Kang Ze. And the day the YC’s charter was finalized, Chiang announced the YC’s standing committee, displaying the same finely crafted balance. Further, at the KMT Temporary National Representative Congress (29 March - 1 April 1938), the KMT issued the formal decision to eliminate all factions, and ordered them to have members join the YC to promote unity. Shortly after this, the Renaissance Society held a meeting and issued a statement officially ending itself, though its members continued to act in concert.\(^67\) The lofty goal of unity behind the Youth Corps was symbolically affirmed by the very date chosen – at Kang Ze’s suggestion – for its founding: 9 July 1938 was the anniversary of the oath taken for the Northern Expedition.\(^68\)

The friction between the Chen brothers and Kang Ze dominated the early phases of the YC; a major bone of contention between them was the issue of whether YC members would join the KMT after they reached the age of 25, or whether they were to remain as YC members. Kang Ze and others persuaded Chiang to allow YC members to retain their YC allegiance, thus securing it as a separate organization with its own distinct powerbase. Chen Lifu opposed this move, fearing that the YC would cut off the influx of new blood into the KMT and give YC members a possible route to power outside the party.\(^69\) This set up an opposition between the Chen brother’s “KMT side” (黨方) and Kang Ze’s “Corps side” (團方) that has colored interpretations of the YC ever since: with the CC Clique trying, and failing, to make the YC a subordinate youth arm of the KMT and the Renaissance Society dominating the YC as a completely independent organization.\(^70\) Chen never forgave Kang Ze for convincing Chiang to make this decision, and as a

---

\(^{65}\) Kang Ze, pp. 197-8. Wu Dingchang (吳鼎昌), a member of the loose Political Science Clique and a finance expert in charge of the Ministry of Industry, proposed officially adding “Chiang Kaishek” to the front of the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps name, a suggestion which was so far beyond the pale that it met with awkward silence and nervous laughter even from Chiang himself. The simpler name was kept; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 33.

\(^{66}\) The Extraordinary National Congress of the KMT at Wuchang on 29 March 1938 contained a resolution: Our party founds the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps to train youth; [specific] measures will be set down separately”; Jiang Yongjing, Guomindang xingshuai shi, p. 34. And the 66th meeting of the KMT Central Standing Committee assigned the YC a key role: “Our party should abolish probationary membership, and set up a separate Youth Corps to seek the nation’s outstanding youth and train them, making each one a believer in the Three People’s Principles . . . using consistent training, concentrating them in a single organization and [thus] restraining them in the rules of New Life”; Liu Hong, Jiang Jieshi da zhu, vol. 2, p. 1051.

\(^{67}\) Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 47-54, 63-5, and 68-9. Wang Jingwei (and others) feared that this move was precursor to Chiang trying to use the YC to completely replace the KMT and its competing centers of power, uniting them all under his banner alone.

\(^{68}\) Kang Ze, p. 204.

\(^{69}\) Ch’en Li-fu, Storm Clouds, pp. 142-4.

\(^{70}\) Growing out of disappointment over the failure to direct the YC as he intended, Chen Lifu’s memoirs reinforced this picture, casting the YC as a direct successor to the Fuxingshe-Lixingshe...
result, the tension between the YC and the KMT grew fierce, even to the point of assassinations, despite the generalissimo’s frequent remonstrations that conflict between the two was pointless and counterproductive. Subsequent scholarship has focused on this YC-KMT tension. The fact of the matter, however, is that the YC never had a completely consistent mission, nor was its bloodline ever completely pure. From the very outset it had competing goals and was a repository of competing interests; it was only later (1944 and on), with the rise of Jiang Jingguo, that it became a more reliable power base for anyone.

Chiang also had other hopes for the YC beyond ending factions within the Nationalist power structures. It was not just unifying the KMT internally, but an instrument to pull youthful “talent” into government service as a way to co-opt external dissent. It was likely on this basis that he rejected the Chen Lifu’s proposal that the YC be a youth “club” subordinate to the KMT. Chiang soon dispatched representatives to request leaders of other, minor parties to participate in the YC. This incorporative impulse extended even to the CCP. Chiang sent feelers to Zhou Enlai about the CCP possibly participating in the YC. The CCP leadership responded positively, not only deciding to assist the YC but even proposing to open a North China branch. This accommodating stance was motivated by a desire for good public relations – showcasing the CCP’s good faith in the United Front – and in the hope that the YC, especially if it contained CCP or other progressive members, could be a positive influence on the Nationalist government and KMT, bringing them further left by influencing its satellite organizations. On this score, Mao and the

collective

71. Historians, such as Eastman, have continued to view the YC in much the same light. See also, Chen Jinjin, pp. 157-67. Zhang Zhizhong, secretary-general of the YC in September 1940, acknowledged that when he took over the position of secretary-general in September 1940, that the key tension within the YC was between the Whampoa men (i.e., the Fuxingshe and Lixingshe), specifically He Zhonghan (贺衷寒) and Kang Ze, and the CC Clique party based members; Zhang Zhizhong, Zhang Zhizhong huilvlu, pp. 336-7, cited in Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, p. 117. Zhang, however, does not claim that the YC was ever a stand-in for the Renaissance Society. On the other hand, Jay Taylor, has gone the opposite direction, attributing the founding of the YC to Jiang Jingguo’s influence on his father, convincing him that a separate YC could actually be a counterweight or alternative to the Renaissance Society, the Blue Shirts, and Dai Li; Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son, p. 85. While Taylor notices that the YC membership clause was a key source of irritation for the Chen brothers, placing Jingguo at the center of the founding of the YC misses the fact that in 1937-38 he was simply not in a position of such influence to be taking on both the CC Clique and the Whampoa factions simultaneously.

72. Chiang sent Chen Bulei (陈佈雷) on these errands. Li Huang (李璜) and Zuo Shunsheng (左舜生), of the Youth Party (青年黨) and Zhang Junli (張君勵) of the National Social Party were all courted actively during the early stages of the YC; Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 10-1. While Zhang Junli turned Chiang down when asked to be an advisor for the YC, most others did not refuse outright, but waited to see what sort of institution the YC would be. Ma Lie argues that these non-KMT elements were waiting to see the stance that the CCP would take toward the new organization.

73. During the Wuhan campaign, Mao and CCP recognized that the KMT had undertaken a certain degree of reform and democratization and they had high hopes for genuine cooperation: “we hope the 3PP YC will develop widely. Following the methods in the declaration on the 3PPYC put out by Mr. Chiang Kaishek, the YC will have a bright future. . . . 3PPYC should become a united organization for the nation’s broad youth masses to save the country. Assimilating the individual youth and organizations from every party, faction, and circle, to become a large collective for all the
CCP would be quickly and sorely disappointed; in December 1938 Chiang closed the door to
communist participation by rejecting the proposal that communists could join the YC and still re-
tain their CCP membership.74

While later historians have concluded that the YC was primarily an anti-communist instru-
ment, it is important to keep in mind that even as late as 1941, the communist party itself did not
share this assessment. In mid-1941, a YC branch in southern Jiangsu killed a number of CCP
members, but the central communist party directive on the case concluded that the YC “has al-
ready begun establishing a foundation,” and although “the top and mid-level cadres have many
spies among them,” “the spies are still a very small number of the total [YC] members, the vast
majority of them are neutral, having no prejudice or lacking prejudice towards our party.”75 In
short, the central CCP acknowledged that the YC was not a homogenous organization and that
local branches, influenced by the specific constellations of power in their areas, were free to pur-
sue their own agendas. Even though its anti-communist activities expanded after 1941, the YC’s
slide to the right should not obscure its significance as an instrument of war mobilization.76 The

---

74. Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 7-10 and 54-8. Ma Lie’s interpretation differs significantly
from this, which is based on Zhou Shuzhen’s analysis. Ma argues that as early as the summer of
1937, Chiang was looking to start a new organization that would allow him to swallow up the
communist party. Only when this goal failed, because the CCP flatly rejected his overtures to join
the nascent Youth Corps did he change his goals for the YC. In 1938 the new goal for the YC was
to unite the KMT’s own factions, then widen the circle to include other non-Nationalist elements, and
finally draw the communists into Chiang’s web where they could be controlled and neutralized.
He would be disappointed in this too, as the CCP astutely remained aloof and thwarted all of Chiang’s
plots; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, pp. 3-5 and 12. What Ma overlooks, however, is the
importance of internal CCP documents and the meetings between Zhou Enlai and Chiang’s
representatives during these months. These suggest that Zhou Shuzhen is closer to the mark: the
CCP seriously considered participating in the YC and that the breakdown in the negotiations was
due to inflexibility on both sides and not a simple outright rejection by the CCP leadership.
The substance behind this difference of interpretation is whether Chiang’s goal for the YC was to
swallow up and thus nullify the CCP or whether he was genuinely pursuing a policy of war
mobilization around the United Front. Ma Lie clearly believes that Chiang was cynically using the YC
as a tool to achieve total dominance of the Chinese political landscape. There is no doubt some
truth to this. And yet, it seems that in 1937 and 1938, particularly around the Wuhan campaign,
Chiang was ready to work much more openly with previous opponents than had ever been the case
before. It strikes me as overly cynical to write off the YC as a ploy to subvert the United Front as
early as 1937.

75. Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 96-7, citing Zhonggong zhongyang qingnian yundong
wenjianbian (中共中央青年运动文件选编), p. 560.

76. In the late war years, the case for the YC being more concentrated on an anti-communist role can be
made more easily. For example, in March 1945, Chiang in his opening address to a YC Central Cadre
meeting hinted that the YC would have a key role in the future conflict with the communists:
“In the future struggle between us and the communist party the main battlefield will be schools of all
levels. We must strive for people who have educational and academic appeal, especially student
youth who are superior, enthusiastic, active, and capable”; Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp.
160, citing Sanminzhuyi qingniantuan tuanshi ziliao diviji chugao (三民主義青年團團史資料第一輯初
key role the Youth Corps played in promoting the IYVM is an important part of this interpretation – in this aspect, its heterogeneity was an asset, not a hindrance.

Despite Chiang’s dream for forging unity, the factional friction between the CC Clique, the Renaissance Society, and Chen Cheng dominated the early years of the YC, particularly at the central level. These factional tensions were a key reason for the long delay in the formal founding of the YC: preliminary work begun in 1938, but the First National Representative Conference (of YC cadres) was not held until 29 March 1943 in Chongqing.\(^7\) Indicative of how murky these factional waters are is that Eastman, a consummate historian of Nationalist politics, incorrectly delineates the balance of power. He suggested that at the national level the CC Clique was dominant in the Youth Corps, while the “Blue Shirts” held sway at lower levels of membership. In fact, however, the Renaissance Society seems to have held the upper hand at the central as well as at the lower levels.\(^8\) Even though the Whampoa faction was dominant, the fact that Chiang Kaishek personally revised the YC Temporary Central Executive Committee roster six times indicates the degree to which the central YC was a delicate balancing act of factions and personalities, including a good proportion of non-KMT men.\(^9\)

---

\(^7\) Zhou Shuzhen, *Sanqingtuan shimo*, p. 125.

\(^8\) Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction*, pp. 100-1 and 95-6. The Blue Shirts is actually a misnomer, but here we can see it as a substitute for the Whampoa-based faction (primarily the Renaissance Society and the Society for Vigorous Practice). Temporally, there is a measure of truth to Eastman’s claim. Chen Lifu was most influential in the early planning phases and on the central level, but Kang Ze’s control of the organization office was an advantage that Chen could not compete with and the CC Clique influence declined steadily from mid-1938 on. According to Wang Shijie (王世杰), who had helped establish Wuhan University as a KMT-dominated flagship institution and held the posts of Minister of Education and secretary of the Oversight Committee of the YC in late 1939, the Whampoa men supplied most of the core cadres in the YC; Jiang Yongjing, *Guomin ding xingshuai shi*, p. 30 and 39. Kang Ze strategy was to rely on his post as acting head of the YC’s central organization office, which he used to ensure that the cadres dispatched to the provinces to organize local branches were all his men. While his Renaissance Society members were setting up local YC organizations across China, Kang routed cadres who were loyal to Chen Lifu into dead-end useless posts, primarily in the dead-end street of political work in military units. The result was that Kang Ze controlled both the central YC branch and many of the provincial, municipal, and local branches as well; Ma Lie, *Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan*, pp. 45, 48-9, and 92. In fact, Kang Ze’s aggressive moves to dominate the YC were sanctioned by Chiang. Once he became aware of Chiang’s intention to require that factions disband their organizations, Kang Ze made a deliberate effort to get Chiang’s explicit approval for the Renaissance Society to be the “core” (hexin 核心) of the YC. Kang even went so far as to write out his request and get Chiang to write “permitted” (ke 可) in his own hand on the slip of paper; Kang Ze, pp. 204-5. This special treatment for Kang and the Renaissance Society was at the heart of the tension between Kang and Chen Cheng, and it was exacerbated by the fact that Kang flaunted it by going over Chen’s head and taking issues directly to Chiang; Ma Lie, *Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan*, pp. 52-4.

\(^9\) The YC leadership was very carefully crafted by Chiang. He went out of his way to select highly educated, cultured men, many of whom were professionals, university educated, or had university teaching experience, men like Zhu Jiahua (朱家驊), Duan Xipeng (段錫朋), and Gan Naiguang.
Despite (or perhaps because of) the factional tensions, the YC took form at the center first, then the localities; it had cadres first and only later added members. As the war progressed, the top levels of the Youth Corps expanded repeatedly, leading to many positions being merely sinecures. The body of central YC leaders ballooned to well over 300 people, with many of them having just “hung their names” on offices while ignoring YC business. Wang Shijie wrote in his diary for 15 April 1943: “I have no real interest in Youth Corps affairs. In the two and a half years I’ve been secretary of the Corps’ oversight committee I’ve only dealt [lit. rectified] with one or two things.” And a few days later he remarked that he found the Corps’ numerous meetings a burden.

Others were outsiders from the KMT or had a record of opposing Chiang in the past and would appeal to a wide audience of politically aware Chinese, such as Tan Pingshan (譚平山), with his experience with the CCP and the Third Party, and Zhang Naqi, who was one of the “Seven Gentlemen” who had been jailed for their liberal activism. (Zhang refused to join the YC because he felt it was too undemocratic. Even though Chiang insisted on listing him on the Temporary Executive Committee, Zhang seems not to have participated at all.) Other men were academics or businessmen, such as He Lian (何廉) and Lu Zuofu (盧作夫) and even Yu Bin, a Catholic priest and head of the Nanjing diocese. Despite including these men with wider social appeal and status, Chiang made sure that the YC leadership was always dominated by the three core constituencies, with at least two-thirds of the central leadership coming from the CC Clique, the Fuxingshe, and Chen Cheng’s supporters; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, pp. 40-4, 50-2, 67, and 74-5.

80. Jiang Yongjing, Guomindang xingshuai shi, p. 34.

81. On 16 June 1938, Chiang announced the Temporary Executive Committee with 31 members, while nine members (including Kang Ze) were made the Standing Committee, and Chen Cheng the chief secretary. The Temporary Committee was made permanent and its number increased to 35 (with a further 15 probationary members) in September 1939, and an Oversight Committee established. A second major expansion occurred in November 1941 when the Executive Committee was enlarged to 49 members, with 19 probationaries and the Standing Committee increased to 11 men. On 1 March 1943, after the first YC national congress, the Executive Committee was increased again to 72, with 25 probationary members; the Standing committee upped to 15; and the Oversight Committee increased from 35 to 49 (with its probationary members going from 9 to 19). The Executive Committee was led by Chen Cheng until November 1941, with only a short period when Zhu Jiahua was acting chair. In November 1941 when Chiang became irritated at Chen Cheng’s ambitious placement of his men in the Wuhan YC branch, Chiang handed the secretaryship over to Zhang Zhizhong, while the Oversight Committee secretary was headed by Wang Shijie; see Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 55. The Organization Office was key to much of the real power in the YC, and it was led successively by Hu Zongnan, Kang Ze, and Ni Wenya (倪文亞). Hu, however, was just a figurehead appointed by Chiang because Chen Cheng had strenuously objected to his rival, Kang Ze, as full head of the organization office. Chiang made Kang “acting head” as a sop to Chen; Kang Ze, p. 203. The YC also had 25 advisors, who were national and party elders, such as Wu Zhihui (also known as Wu Jingheng (吳敬恒)), Dai Chuanxian (戴傳賢), Sun Ke (孫科), He Yingqin (何應欽), Bai Chongxi (白崇禧), Zhang Ji (張繼), Kong Xiangxi (孔祥熙), Feng Yuxiang (馮玉祥), Wang Longhui (王寵惠), Chen Guofu, and Li Zongren (李宗仁). Finally, there were 49 “advisory members” (顧問員), who were often leaders in their fields: Zhou Gengsheng (周鶴生), Fu Sinian (傅斯年), Gu Jiegang (顧頌剛), Wang Yunwu (王雲五), Yu Bin (于斌), Hu Zhengzhi (胡政之), Xie Bingxin (謝冰心), Qian Mu (錢穆), Chen Yinge (陳寅恪), Yu Dawei (俞大維), Zhu Xuefan (朱學範), Yang Chuoyan (楊綽庵).

The first challenge the YC faced was a lack of cadres and members. While Chiang had selected the top-level leaders, there was simply no one, as yet, to lead. The problem was so acute that on August 1, the entire 4,000+ members of the first graduating class from the MAC’s War Area Work Cadre Training Corps (戰地工作幹部訓練團) were inducted into the YC en masse as part of their graduation ceremony.\(^{83}\) Shortly thereafter, the YC’s first cadre training class was held at Luojia Mountain (珞珈山) in Wuchang, which prepared the trainees for the work of setting up YC branch organizations in the provinces and provided both political and basic military training as well.\(^{84}\) The training class curriculum was a three-part mixture of political instruction in the Three People’s Principles; practical corps work, including organization building techniques; and military training, which included physical toughening, study of the *Infantry Training Manual* (*Bubing caodian* 步兵操典), and lectures by high-level military figures. Chiang himself was heavily involved in the class, often taking time out from his busy schedule to come to Luojia to watch movies with the trainees.\(^{85}\)

The graduates from the class were sent out to organize provincial and local YC branches. Their efforts began to bear fruit as the Nationalist government moved to Chongqing in early 1939 and the YC began to attend to the practicalities of organizing local branches and attracting rank and file members. The initial recruitment of youth coincided with the move by government and industry from Wuhan to Chongqing and specifically targeted refugee youth fleeing into interior. These youths were contacted at hostels, where the YC dispensed aid and recruited members. Especially important was the hostel established at a middle school in Jiangbei (just across the river from central Chongqing), which provided food and shelter for nearly 1,000 youths.\(^{86}\)

Beginning in 1939, the YC made inroads into schools from the top down; one example was Sichuan University, led by Cheng Tianfang (程天放) a CC Clique member, who set up a YC branch in the school and induced 200 students to join, including 47 young monks from Emei Mountain (where Sichuan University was stationed for a time). This tendency to recruit in schools was strengthened in 1943, and laid a foundation for the IYVM.\(^{87}\)

---

83. Ibid., p. 35. Gan Naiguang, a member of the Political Science Clique who was part of the planning for the YC, had proposed that the YC begin its organizational growth from the bottom up, setting up a critical mass of local branches first and only then establishing a central branch to coordinate them. His suggestion was not even seriously entertained; Ma Lie, *Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan*, p. 17.

84. Here too the major Nationalist factions played politics as usual. Different groups struggled to get their members in the class, as instructors and as students. The CC Clique was well represented, with Chen Lifu and Zhang Daofan as lecturers, but Kang Ze succeeded in placing key a good number of Whampaoa faction men in the class. Gui Yongqing (桂永清), a Renaissance Society member who also enjoyed the backing of Chen Cheng, led the training class for 600 cadres, but other Renaissance Society members included Luo Cairong, Ni Zhicao (倪志操), and Peng Chaoyu (彭朝銓). The Guangxi generals and the Reorganization Group had their representatives there as well, Huang Jiliu (黃季陸) and Liang Hancao (梁寒操) respectively. And each of the major factions (CC Clique, Kang Ze’s Renaissance Society, and Chen Cheng’s loyalists) each had 200 students in the class; Ma Lie, *Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan*, p. 92 and Zhou Shuzhen, *Sanqingtuan shimo*, pp. 65-8.


87. Chiang in his speeches at the First Congress (March 1943) called for recruitment of primary school teachers and staff as a way of reaching the youngest students with the message that the CCP’s doctrines of class struggle and dialectical materialism were unfounded and wrong; Zhou Shuzhen.
Once the YC began to emphasize local recruitment it expanded, filling its lower organizational levels quickly. In 1938 there were only five provincial corps; eight district corps (qutuan 區團) corps, and 40 county corps (fentuan 分團), with only 36 district units (qudui 區隊) and 104 squads (fendui 分隊). By 1944, there were more than 40,000 squads with an estimated 500,000 members and significant YC presence in interior schools.

The central YC leadership was disappointed with the growth (and quality) of the YC membership. The pace of expansion meant that although it was in name a single institution, in fact the YC was a loose web of many local organizations. Having a consistent bias toward top-down unity, contemporary politicians consistently saw this as a negative thing, a perspective which later historians have adopted and shared.

However, this decentralization allowed the YC to be responsive to local conditions and power relations. Although the central and local YC leadership was weighted in favor of Kang Ze and the Whampa men, in many localities it could be a different story. In Guangxi, the generals Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, were in control. Bai sought to use the YC to keep the Renaissance Society out of the province as much as possible. His appointee, Cheng Siyuan (程思遠), was more progressive and under his leadership the Guangxi YC included some underground CCP members; the Guangxi Provincial YC organization office chief, Zhou Kezhuan (周可傳), was an underground communist, reporting to a communist mole Li Kenong (李克農) who was a close associate of Zhou Enlai and an intelligence expert. In Chengdu, Shaanxi, and Jiangxi (at least until Jiang Jingguo began to assert himself), the CC Clique held sway. And in Yunnan, Long Yun – always independent and mistrustful of Chiang – opposed the YC completely and worked hard to keep it out. In some areas, the YC turned to armed conflict against the CCP: in Hebei under Zhang Yinwu (張陰梧) and in Shandong under Qin Qirong (秦啓榮), YC branches harassed CCP guerrilla units behind Japanese lines. The relative free-

---

88. The structure of the YC ran (from top down): Central Corps (中央部), Provincial / Municipal Branch (支團部), District Branches (區團部), Sub-Branch (分團部), and Squads (分隊), but also included special branches for enterprises, occupations, specific agencies, schools, and military units; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 71 and Chen Jinjin, “Sanminzhuyi qingniantuan zai Hubei,” p. 153.

89. Squads (fendui) were local troops or cells: originally they consisted of eight members, but prior to the YC’s First National Congress in 1943 they were enlarged to fifteen.

90. By 1944 there were 25 provincial corps; 24 district corps, and 920 county branches, numbering an impressive 10,332 district units (qudui) and 40,836 squads. Inroads in schools were significant too: in 1939 there were only eighteen branch corps (fentuan 分團) and 26 district units (qudui 區隊) in junior-colleges or higher; but by 1944 there were one district corps (fentuan 區團), 78 branch corps (fentuan 分團), and 261 district units (qudui 區隊). Jiang Yongjing, Guomindang xingshuai shi, pp. 41-2. Ma Lie cites a central branch report for the yearly increases: 80,000 in 1939; 169,000 in 1940; 162,000 in 1941; 116,000 in 1942; 80,000 in 1943; and 267,000 in 1944, which was only 30-50% of the central leadership’s desired growth; Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 78.

91. “Virtually all executives in the Republican period ... conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive’s policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation”; Julia Strauss, “The Evolution of Republican Government,” The China Quarterly, no. 150, June 1997, p. 332.

92. Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, p. 79. Li Kenong, working as Chiang Kaishek’s personal encryption attache, passed the Nationalist codebooks to Zhou Enlai; Wakeman, Spymaster, p. 273. 

- 272 -
dom of local YC branches means that painting it as “fascist” or wholly anti-communist does violence to its multifaceted activities, approaches, and allegiances.

Sharing the biases of almost all Chinese politicians of the time, Zhang Zhizhong saw the YC’s lack of unity as disturbing, and he attributed it to a lack of information and control by the center, which did not even know exactly how many members it had. In many, especially government-run, schools anywhere from one-third to one-half of the student body had joined the Corps. In September 1940, Zhang took over the secretary-general position from Chen Cheng and immediately set about trying to clean up the organization; from 1941 to 1943 he launched an initiative to evaluate each and every member to help improve the cohesiveness of the YC by weeding out those who did not meet standards of excellence or who were inactive. In the campaign to verify and assess its membership, the aggregate total reported by local branches was 393,190 youths, but of those only 243,575 went through the process (i.e., were locatable). Of those, 79% (192,112 individuals) passed the stricter standards. The 5WA YC leadership frankly admitted in its 1943 work report that maintaining contact with a dispersed and often mobile membership was not an easy task. To make matters worse, even after this two year campaign to clean up the YC, Zhang admitted in an April 1943 report that he was still uncertain how many of the hundreds of thousands on the YC rosters actually had connections to and were under the control of the central YC.

Both Chen Cheng and Zhang Zhizhong were generally reformist in their YC leadership, but they approached it from opposite ends. Chen, having been heavily involved with the Jiangxi extermination campaigns in the mid-1930s and actions in the Shaanxi-Shanxi-Suiyuan-Ningxia border area against the Red Army, was largely anti-CCP, while Zhang was more amenable to cooperation with the communists and put an emphasis on war mobilization. Both men were known to be honest, incorruptible and thus had a degree of appeal to politically minded youth. Zhang’s efforts to improve the YC included his recommendation of Jiang Jingguo, a widely acknowledged reformer with an impressive array of recent achievements in southern Jiangxi, to central leadership positions at the First Congress in 1943. Overall during Zhang’s watch, the YC put the war effort in first place, emphasizing tasks relating to youth services and training. Other activi-

Despite repeated claims that Kang Ze controlled the YC provincial branches, Ma Lie notes the rather long list of exceptions where this control was limited, thwarted, or downright denied: Shanxi, Guangxi, Guangdong, Anhui, Qinghai, Ningxia, Yunnan, Xikang, and Xinjiang; Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, pp. 155-158. It should be noted that a good portion of these are what would be called “peripheral” areas, far from real Nationalist control.

93. Despite his later claims that he ignored his YC duties, Zhang was quite active at first; Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 109-21, citing Zhang’s memoirs, Zhang Zhizhong huiyilu, pp. 336-7.


95. The 5WA’s entire membership of 9,280 underwent examination. Only 5,101 passed, and of these 189 asked for leave, 61 did not participate, and 1,281 had lost contact with the corps, which left a total of 4,542 who passed the process completely; qz0094.mj7-1, pp. 1-16 dated January 1943.

96. Zhang’s ties with the communists and deep commitment to the United Front war effort led Chiang to keep tabs on Zhang: Zhang’s office was salted with Renaissance Society members and the YC’s central finance section sent regular reports to Chen Bulei (in Chiang’s private administration and speech writer) on Zhang’s use of YC funds to make sure he was not straying from the loyal path; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 55. Disingenuously, in his memoirs, Zhang claims that he was...
ties covered a wide range, however, which made the YC a valuable and important instrument for promoting the IYVM in 1944.

As an information-gathering organization, the YC was authorized to report directly to military and police authorities. YC members were charged with being “the government’s eyes and ears, the masses’ throat and tongue. [They should] go among the people silently and without trace, at all times collecting information on public sentiment.”97 The YC Central Executive Committee in May 1941 issued the (verbosely titled) “Order To All Corps Members To Investigate Local Political Conditions and the Peoples Troubles In Order To Reform Society’s Evil Practices and Advance the Common People’s Livelihood”, which directed members to “go deep among the people, getting information in wine shops and teahouses,” in order to investigate local finance, prices, and tax situations, probing local bullies and traitorous merchants that were behind hoarding and speculation.98 This role was taken seriously; thus, as early as December 1940, the YC was functioning as an information-gathering organization in Chongqing and the surrounding area. The Chongqing Garrison headquarters ordered the establishment of “planning offices” for grain purchasing to stabilize prices so that morale and the war effort was not compromised, a decision based on YC reports on the rapid rise of rice prices due to the influx of non-Sichuanese (“downriver people”) into the capital area.99 Such activities could, and did, slide into obviously anti-communist activities at times, particularly after the Southern Anhui Incident in early 1941. Behind Japanese lines the YC took on espionage roles and carried out assassinations of collaborators. In communist base areas, corps members were sent on sabotage, propaganda and even assassination missions.100 In early 1942 the YC center issued its “General Guidance for Members Actions”, which stated baldly the Corps’ anti-CCP mission in KMT and Japanese controlled areas:

When corps members discover traitorous parties [jiandang 奸黨, a common phrase for the CCP but it could refer to pro-Japanese groups as well] inciting students in schools or conspiracies that use youths, they should use the willpower and strength of student organizations to bitterly denounce them, and they must give timely reports to the school authorities so that they can punish [the offenders]. A way must be found to persuade and rehabilitate, according to our belief [3PP] and national policy, those who followed blindly out of naivete. … Among general youth, members should pay attention to refuting the various lies that traitorous parties disseminate.101

unaware of the YC’s intelligence work when he accepted the position of secretary. But there is little doubt that even before he took the reins that the YC was sliding towards anti-communist activities, and that these continued during Zhang’s tenure. Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, p. 117


98. Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, p. 171.

99. qz0061.mj15-2964, pp. 57-9; Chongqing Garrison document dated 13 December 1940. The initial reports were from local YC branches in Chongqing and Beibei and had been passed onto the Garrison from the YC Central Cadre Conference.

100. Eastman, Seeds of Destruction, pp. 96-7.

101. Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 90-1, citing Sanminzhuyi qingniantuan tuanshi ziliao diyi
Even worse were the rumblings and rumors that the YC was connected with the reeducation camps for “reactionary” students (primarily suspected communists and other politically progressive youths) that were run by Kang Ze. Students who were suspected of being communists or otherwise politically dangerous were “disappeared” into a system of camps in Lanzhou, Xi’an, Luoyang, Qijiang, and Qujiang (曲江). Activities and connections such as these seem to have driven many of the more moderate leaders of the YC into dormancy and are responsible for the Youth Corps’ long-standing reputation as primarily an anti-communist organization.

To be clear, the Youth Corps was heavily involved with anti-communist activities in various locales and these only intensified as the war progressed; however it is important to note that despite the popular view (then and among historians now) that it was primarily a spy organization, the YC was far from limited to clandestine or anti-communist roles. In one of his work reports, Zhang Zhizhong lamented that previously many in academic and educational circles had held a wrong opinion of the YC, but he hoped that its sponsorship of numerous summer camps and training sessions where youths “forged bodies and minds” was making people understand that under his leadership the YC was an “upright” group for realizing the Three People’s Principles. Even before its involvement with the IYVM in 1943, Youth Corps work maintained a core element of wartime mobilization.

In the area of social work, the YC’s Youth Service Association provided recreation, educational advancement and job placement services. By 1942 it boasted 140 branches, with 40,000 members. Its youth hostels spread out from university enclaves to provide cultural, recreational, and service activities for students. After the First National Congress (29 March - 12 April 1943), the YC put an even greater emphasis on social work and aid to youth, passing measures on “Enhancing Youth Social Welfare.” Just days after the congress, Chiang mandated that the YC concentrate on social welfare among youth, as the Nationalist alternative

---


102. Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, pp. 111-6 and Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 92-3. Organized in late 1941 and managed by the Wartime Youth Training Corps (戰時青年訓練團), a separate body from the Youth Corps, these were a system of “reeducation camps” for communists, suspected communists, and leftist students run by groups connected to Kang Ze and the CC Clique. It is not certain whether they were connected to connected to Dai Li’s Military Statistic Bureau (Junlong 軍統) prison system; see Frederic Wakeman, Spymaster, pp. 217-8.

103. Men, such as Tan Pingshan (譚平山), Zhang Naiqi (張乃器), He Lian (何廉), and Lu Zuofu all curtailed their involvement in the YC. Lin Yutang, one of the KMT’s chief propagandists for foreign audiences (he wrote several books in English for the US-British markets during the war) visited one of these “concentration camps” near Chongqing in late 1943 or early 1944. His description of the camp is sanitized and completely benign, painting it as a type of military academy, full of clean, happy, strong young people in various stages of “conversion” to faith in the Kuomintang and Chiang Kaishek; Lin Yutang, The Vigil of a Nation, pp. 136-40.

104. From 1939 to 1945, the YC sponsored 47 summer camps, which were attended by 23,285 students, teachers, and YC cadres; Jiang Yongjing, Guomin dang xingshuai shi, p. 42-3. These were some of its most successful ventures; Eastman, Seeds, p. 96-7. Ma Lie gives lower numbers of attendees, but describes the activities in the camps in greater detail; Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, pp. 106-8.
to the CCP’s divisive doctrine of class struggle, while Zhang Zhizhong’s report to the congress put forward the slogan that “Service Is Propaganda.”

The YC saw itself as putting into practice Sun Yatsen’s declaration that “the goal of [a genuine or revolutionary] human life is service.”

One of the YC’s main areas of activity was the production and dissemination of Nationalist propaganda in various forms. The YC ran the Youth Bookstore and the Youth Printing House (青年印刷所), which together published and sold a whole range of youth-oriented books and periodicals, including National Literature (Minzu wenxue 民族文學), Youth and Literature (Qingnian yu wenxue 青年與科學), New Youth (Xinshaonian 新少年), Three People’s Principles Bi-weekly (Sanminzhuyi banyuekan 三民主義半月刊), Chinese Youth Monthly (Zhongguo qingnian yuekan 中國青年月刊), Culture News (Wenhua xinwen 文化新聞), and The Practical Critic (Xianshi pinglun 現實評論). The Corps solicited donations to fund book printing and then distributed the volumes to its branches and subordinate institutions as a gift in the donor’s name. In total, the YC publishing apparatus put out over 345 different periodicals, journals and newspapers between 1939 and 1944. The Youth Collectanea (Qingnian congshu 青年叢書), covering philosophy, thought, politics, economics, culture, education, history, geography, was compiled and edited as well. The YC publishing arm also put out 41 different types of training materials, as well as the Training Collectanea (Xunlian congshu 訓練叢書). In addition, the YC held academic conferences, sponsored radio broadcasts, put on lectures, organized theater productions, filmed movies, published articles in the mainstream press, and held speech competitions.

The YC’s organizational development was rapid, and produced a second surge in membership growth in the last two years of the war, just prior to the launch of the IYVM. The first item in the 10 Year Development Plan was to “attract 3,000,000 members, made up as follows: intellectual youth in school 60%; farmers, workers and other social youth 40%; female youth should number 20% of the total, and attention should be given to attracting overseas and border area youths.” The goal of three million members remained far out of reach, but YC numbers went up dramatically after the First Congress: by June 1946 numbers had reached 1,338,507. Unsurprisingly, they were concentrated in the same age groups and educational status as the IYVM. In the YC 16-20 year olds accounted for 52.56% and 21-25 year olds for another 32.36%. In terms of numbers, students enrolled in school were the mainstay of the YC by this time, fully 46.21% of members. Another 9.9% were in the military, most engaged in cultural propaganda work. The cultural aspects of certain Youth Corps activities, will be addressed later, but here it is important to note the political and administrative apparatus the corps possessed and could mobilize.

On the ground, these different roles and involvements often interlocked. This was especial-

105. Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, p. 129.
107. Ibid., p. 123.
108. Ma Lie calculated that combined the YC put out 216 different periodical publications; ibid., p. 120.
109. Jiang Yongjing, Guomindang xingshurai shi, pp. 42-3. From day one the YC heavily emphasized school youth. Working class and rural (farm) youth were consistently and increasingly marginalized. From 1939 on the proportion of school youth would steadily increase: from 8.1%, to 13.7%, to 39.6%, to 46% in 1946; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, pp. 79-80.
ly true in far flung locales, where central government, KMT party, and YC discipline were all hard to enforce. A recent memoir written by one YC member describes in detail the activities of the local Youth Corps branch and members in Changle, Fujian. In addition to its literary activities, propaganda printing and distribution, sponsoring theater, singing, and martial arts troupes, organizing debates, giving speeches, and holding sports competitions, the Changle Youth Corps organization was involved in both paramilitary operations and profitable commercial enterprises. The most successful business was the Seafood Supply Stations, which consisted of a network of weigh stations that charged a three per cent surtax on all seafood sold in the Changle market. The majority of the branch's funds came from this enterprise, while the corps' military connections provided the enforcement mechanism. The Changle YC's Youth Service Association was involved in other, less successful commercial activities as well: peanuts, peanut oil, stocks or bonds, and a small printing house. It also ran a Battlefield Service Corps which provided military units with transport, rescue, stretcher bearing and sentry services. When the Japanese reoccupied the area in late 1944, the corps secured a cache of firearms and began guerrilla activities, which were later halted due to the commander's illness.110

A sixteen page report (covering August 1939 - December 1942) filed by the 5th War Area YC in early 1943 shows the range of activities that went on under YC auspices.111 The 5WA YC Preparatory Office began work in 1939 in Wuhan, but in August 1939 it moved north to Hubei, where it took up residence about 100 km from Nanyang, at Laohekou (老河口), alongside the party and administrative organs of the 5WA. The first order of business was to reach out to youths and recruit a core membership. Ostensibly such recruitment was based on the principle of “from quality to quantity”, but as the report makes clear, the 5WA YC faced the same problems of hasty expansion and inaccurate rosters as the rest of the YC. By late 1942, the branch listed around 9,000 members. The central YC entreated the branch to “clean up” the rosters and remove inactive members; thus, most of 1942 was given over to contacting members and making sure they met YC standards, with the result that just under fifty per cent of the membership was cut. Originally the 5WA YC established 56 branches in Army and Divisional Political Offices, but these were disbanded in 1940 and the focus put on setting up civilian-based branches in 15 counties in Hubei and Hunan. This redirection included establishing a youth reception center that, between January 1940 and March 1942, took in 1,348 youths, funneled 686 of them into training classes and another 662 into employment and small-scale service troupes in county cities and even some乡镇es. The local branches undertook “comfort work” among soldiers’ families, helped run local schools, set up vocational training and night classes, ran the local boy scouts, held sports competitions and organized “student self-rule associations” in schools – these latter two activities would figure prominently in YA units as well. Still, some of the satellite organizations, like the service troupes, were relatively unsupervised by the 5WA YC leadership.

Viewing “propaganda as one wing of the complementary pair of politics and armed conflict,” the 5WA YC carried out a wide variety of activities in society, especially on anniversaries and public holidays. It publishing its own small scale periodicals, broadcast lectures and news, sponsored music troops that sang resistance songs and drama troupes (35-300 members strong) that put on resistance plays, held public lectures in teahouses, distributed vernacular propaganda

111. The following paragraphs are based on this report; qz0094.mj7-1, pp. 1-16 dated January 1943.
in villages, published wall posters that were filled with resistance cartoons, exhibited photographs, conducted writing and art competitions for youth, and publicized in support of the government’s grain and conscription policies.

The picture was not all rosy, however. In the spirit of “self-criticism,” a whole range of faults were acknowledged. Funds were a major problem. Although funding went up every year (from a mere 700 yuan for the last half of 1939 to 5,830 yuan in 1942), money was always far short of needs due to inflation and the increasing complexity of the organization and its activities. The 5WA YC hemorrhaged money, overdrawing the available funding by more than 30,000 yuan and its businesses were not profitable enough to take up the slack. The relationship to the KMT was another sore spot. YC sub-units followed the army into “bandit districts” to carry out work among youth, but such work was often marred by a lack of cooperation between YC and KMT authorities, because local authorities were afraid of it operating in their area. The 5WA YC leadership also acknowledged that it was alienated from and had neglected pre-existing institutions, particularly youths in schools. And it had not always done a good job of selecting cadres, which led to numerous and complicated personnel changes.

YC leaders were not the only ones who saw the flaws in the organization. A favorite accusation leveled by critics, and some even within the YC admitted, was that the corps attracted just “opportunistic” youth, while the best and the brightest shunned and loathed it. Sun Fo criticized the corps for its overly rigid approach to political indoctrination: corps members learned the Three People’s Principles by rote and became “rather like puppets. … The first thing they learned to perfection is how to click heels at the mention of, or mere reference to, the Supreme Leader.” Even internal YC documents often treat the Three People’s Principles as a religious faith; claims of “baptizing” members with Sun’s tenets were not uncommon. The corruption and bureaucratism of many YC members further undercut the organization’s political purity; it was acknowledged that many youths joined just to be able to meet and make connections with high officials. As was his habit, Chiang frequently listed all the faults of the organization, and was usually not far off the mark in his assessment, though his pessimism could lead him to overstate the negatives. In his General Work Report delivered in late February 1944, he told his audience that the YC’s main failings were incomplete local organizations, inactivity of the general membership, lack of cooperation between YC and government, and a lack of real roots in schools and townships.

While YC leaders may have wished for even greater presence in schools and a more activist membership, the IYVM would demonstrate that the YC was able to mobilize a segment of educated youth, primarily students and teachers, effectively. The Youth Corps provided not only the

113. Ibid., p. 99.
114. 5WA YC work report: qz0094.mj7-1, p. 7 dated January 1943.
115. Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 68-9 and Jiang Yongjing, Guomindang xingshuai shi, p. 48. Chiang had foreseen this problem in the early days of the YC planning. It was the prime reason why he insisted – against Chen Lifu’s objections – on keeping the YC separate from the KMT: to prevent the KMT transmitting an atmosphere of “officialism” (guanliaozhuyi) to the YC; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 15.
high-level leadership for the the IYVM and some of the essential the ground-level institutional support for carrying out the IYVM, but from its early Wuhan days it also contained a model of volunteeristic youth mobilization. To be sure the socio-economic bases of volunteerism, not to mention the political circumstances surrounding it, had changed dramatically between 1938 and 1944. Not only was Wuhan’s heady atmosphere of hope long gone, but the five long years of war, the Nationalist government’s ham-fisted handling of politicized students, and the ravaging inflation had taken their toll on the easy optimism of early war volunteerism. Despite the fact that the political economy of volunteering had changed dramatically during the course of the war, the Youth Corps demonstrated that it still retained a sensitivity to the socio-economic situation that confronted the educated stratum in the latter stages of the war. This was seen most directly in its strong anti-corruption stance, which targeted KMT and government officials. Some of the vehemence that the YC directed at officials such as H. H. Kung and war profiteers, for example, was motivated from the intensifying KMT-YC rivalry, but it can also be seen as a result of the YC’s sensitivity to the economic plight of interior youth. The anti-corruption activities and statements demonstrated that the YC was in tune with and reflected the attitudes and mood of a segment of interior youth. Additionally, the Youth Corps and its organizational tendrils were situated in interior schools and in institutions of influence that allowed it to help mobilize the intellectual youth. Specifically, recruiting for the IYVM rested on the educational system and state policies surrounding it.

The Socio-Economics of Volunteering: Refugees, Destitute Students and Desperate Teachers

One difficulty with most of the IYVM-YA data is that it obscures the geographical origins of volunteers – it seems that anyone who volunteered at a recruiting office in Sichuan was counted as a Sichuan volunteer. The Youth Army Veterans Association’s commemorative volumes indicate that a large proportion of YA volunteers were, in fact, from other provinces. Not every division lists a breakdown of where its volunteers were from, but those that do indicate they drew from a cluster of provinces. Naturally, Sichuan contributed a dominant majority for several divisions. Despite the cloudiness of the data concerning geographical origin, anecdotal evi-

117. For a discussion of the anti-corruption activities of the YC, see Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, pp. 138-48.

118. How the statistics were compiled by the government is not entirely clear. The forms volunteers filled out at their local recruiting office (or at least the ones used by the Chongqing administration) have blanks for both “original address” and native place; GMWX, vol. 62, p. 229. Although the tables often report “native place”, it is not clear which item is being tabulated for the simple reason that these tables often do not report any numbers for locations which should have supplied at least a few refugee youth volunteers. For example, Jiangsu along with Hebei and all three provinces of Dongbei are completely missing from the table in GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 224-6. Lending support to my sense that the place of recruitment was the most important and most carefully recorded is that an order from the Sichuan Provincial IYVM Recruitment Committee to the 3AD explicitly stipulated that recruits who were personnel in central government institutions stationed in a locality were to registered, handled, examined, and recorded locally; qz0055.mj2-621, p. 12. This document is undated, but grouped with documents from November 1944.

119. The 201D received 5,000 volunteers from Chongqing alone and another 4,000 from Sichuan, primarily the eastern portion of the province surrounding Chongqing. The 202D had over 3,000 youths from Sichuan, with only a scattering from surrounding provinces (961 from Guizhou, 438
dence and administrative policies make it clear that many of the volunteers were displaced youth that had gone inland to avoid the war or Japanese occupation. In fact, the movement was launched among the students of Northeast University, a “refugee” institution, where appeals to the students were couched in terms of retaking their homes from the Japanese occupiers. Subsequently, a significant number of the personal accounts published in the government’s Central Daily, and collected in the Huoyue Qingnianjun (活躍青年軍) volume after the war, indicate that many recruits were refugees who had left friends and family behind in occupied areas when Japanese armies had threatened their native places.120

During the war, the Nationalist regime faced a very large population of displaced and mobile persons. And disastrous decisions by Chiang and other Nationalist leaders such as the blowing up of the Yellow River dikes (early June 1938) and the razing of Changsha (November 1938) contributed to the human flood. There is still no accurate number or social breakdown of displaced persons during the war, and in all likelihood there will never be. However, there is little doubt that the number of refugees was staggering. While there are some lowball estimates, recent scholarship has suggested that there were upwards of 95.5 million refugees and homeless people during the war.121 Also not in doubt is that refugees included people from all strata, educational and professional backgrounds. But more importantly for our story is that they were undeniably young. A government survey conducted in Sichuan in 1939 of refugees from Hunan

from Hunan, and 249 from Hubei). The 203D was almost completely manned by Sichuan volunteers, 9,000 of them, with only 900 men from Xikang to the west. The 204D, on the other hand, was made up of 6,000 men from Henan, 3,000 from Hunan, and 5,000 from Hubei. The 205D volunteers were primarily from Hunan, to the tune of 6,000 volunteers, with a further 2,000 from Guizhou and 1,000 from Guangxi. The 206D was heavily weighted toward the northeast, with 5,000 volunteers from Gansu, 400 from Ningxia, 600 from Shanxi and 400 from Suiyuan. (It had a smattering of men from other provinces, however: 600 from Shandong, 600 from Hebei, 200 from the Beijing-Tianjin area, 500 from Jiangsu and a full 2,000 from Anhui.) The provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, Hebei, and Shandong made up 8,000 of the 207D’s men, while Yunnan contributed another 2,000. The 208D and 209D were semi-detached from the main YA structure, being commanded by Huang Wei and the southeast YA headquarters; these divisions recruited rather heavily from among refugees fleeing from newly occupied areas after the Ichigo Offensive. The 208D volunteers were drawn primarily from the eastern seaboard provinces: 6,500 from Fujian; 3,000 from Zhejiang; 1,000 from Anhui; and 3,000 from northern Jiangxi. The 209D was similarly made up of southeastern coastal youths: Guangdong supplying 3438 volunteers, Fujian a further 3,317, and Jiangxi another 2,174; QNJS, vol. 1, pp. 102, 122-3, 141, 153, 165, 174, 188, 215, 218, and 242.

120. See for example the first-person account in HYQNJ in which the author states that he had left home and family 12 years earlier; HYQNJ, p. 46. Also important is the report of the Sichuan military district that many of the students who responded were refugees from Manchuria and Beijing; GMWX, vol. 62, p. 201. And a further example is an account of volunteer recruiting in Gansu, which shows the importance of extralocal bodies and schools in promoting the volunteer drive in the province; GMWX, vol. 62, p. 214. Zhang Wende agrees; in his memoir, he comments that a majority of the soldiers who joined the 206th division, stationed at Hanzhong, were from the northwest (Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia), but that “a portion were patriotic youths who had fled from homes in Japanese occupied areas,” Zhang Wende, p. 66.

found that those between the ages of 6 and 15 made up 34.1%. And the wide range of 16 to 40 year olds made up another 46.1%. The imprecision of the breakdown is unfortunate, but there is no doubt that a very high percentage of refugees were young people, often orphaned or separated from their families. The prevalence of children and youth among refugees is the key reason why orphan work (both public and private) was such a pressing issue during the war. While peasants certainly made up the largest number of refugees, educated people were clearly over-represented. In short, refugees had a large number of youth and educated persons among them.

The displaced population of refugees was both a social welfare nightmare for the regime as well as a pool of talent and manpower to be mobilized for the war effort; the clearest and most famous examples of this were the transfer of skilled labor and workers, along with the physical plant of their factories, the entire faculty and student body of many schools and the personnel of government ministries and organs to the interior in the early years of the war. The movement of schools, colleges and universities into the interior after the Japanese invasion left a reservoir of “floating youth” who were the most responsive to the 1943-44 call to join up. For example, the 209th division at Shanghang, Fujian, benefited from the displaced Xiamen University which had moved nearby. Teachers from Xiamen University even escorted their students to Shanghang to enlist in early 1945. Similar reports can be found for Fudan University, Zhongyang University, Nankai, and even the National Medical School during late 1943 and early 1944.

Chongqing was the “war's place of confluence,” and this no doubt contributed to its unusually high numbers of volunteers: the number of refugee youth there was large. As the main targets of, and responders to, the call for intellectual volunteers, the socio-economic situation of students and teachers during the war is of particular interest and merits a closer look.

The basic patriotism of Chinese students from the days of the May Fourth Movement onwards is well-known, well-documented and needs little comment, though the years following the Nationalist Revolution in 1927 had led to a general political alienation of academia, especially
students. Although the flight of schools and students into the interior as well as earlier waves of youth involvement in the National Salvation Movement, particularly during the Wuhan campaign in 1938, might be attributed to a more or less simple patriotic reflex action, the response to the IYVM in 1943-43 was not so unidimensional. Throughout the war intellectual young people were given exemptions from service as they were a strategic resource: educated talent was needed in other roles instead of on the front lines. Still political and social leaders at times lambasted them for shirking their duty to serve a desperate China. Chiang, in a 10 January 1944 speech, hammered home the point that many potential recruits for the army were using scholastic reasons to avoid military service, never mind that it was the Nationalist state itself that had granted students exemption in the first place. Why then was there such a noticeable change, with so many students volunteering?

One memoir characterizes four types of youth who registered: (a) “youths who were pure in thought, naive and lovable” – these were the patriotic ones; (b) those who were prevented (by the war or inflation) from continuing their education, the unemployed, and those whose families were in occupied territory and who had “drifted into the interior”; (c) those looking for a way to survive and who saw in the youth army an opportunity for an improved lifestyle materially; (d) “idlers with nothing to do” who “opportunistically” joined up for fun. As this contemporary comment suggests, for many student and teachers the motivation for volunteering was rooted in the material realities of refugee life in 1943-44.

The Nationalists’ wartime education policy was an extension of the regime’s mobilization of manpower, explicitly geared toward training specialized technical personnel for the war effort. The corollary to the nationalization of all heavy and much light industry was the government’s manpower, explicitly geared toward training specialized technical personnel for the war effort. The corollary to the nationalization of all heavy and much light industry was the government’s takeover of schools considered to be essential for the war effort. As the Japanese cut their way deeply into China’s eastern, most educated, areas, the first 18 months of the war saw a steep decline in both institutions and enrollment, especially in higher education. But with strong efforts

---

128. Some of the classic studies of this subject are: Chow Tse-Tsung, The May 4th Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China; Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai; and Wen-hsin Yeh, The Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China, 1919-1937.

129. For a quick account of the move to the interior by schools and teachers, see Song Dalu and Cheng Shiping, “Kangzhan shiqi qian Chuan xuejiao yu Sichuan wenjiao shiyi”. John Israel, Lianda: A Chinese University in War and Revolution, provides a detailed study of one of the key wartime universities. See chapter two, “Lianda’s Long March”, for an account of the (male) student and faculty’s foot trek to Yunnan and its influence on their awareness of the circumstances in the countryside. Of course the choice to flee into the interior or stay was never a simple one; for a nuanced account of the ramifications of this choice among intellectuals see, Poshek Fu, Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration.


131. It is not entirely clear what the difference between the second and third groups are; Zhang Kaixuan, p. 142.


133. As just one example, on 1 December 1937, the central government took over the Chongqing Advanced Industrial School (重慶高級工業學校); see Tang Runming, Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, p. 19.
by both the academic community, operating under nearly intolerable conditions, and the Nationalist government education rebounded, quickly surpassing pre-war education in numbers, if not in quality of research.  

Refugee students and schools made up a large segment of the wartime educational system in the interior. Large numbers of schools with their faculty and students in tow moved westward as the Japanese occupied China’s major cities. In Chongqing and its environs alone, more than twenty colleges and middle schools set up wartime campuses. The most influential of these were Fudan University, Central University (originally in Nanjing and led by Luo Jialun, a respected scholar and conscientious administrator who would serve on the planning committee for the Ya), and the Central Political School. In the early days after the fall of Wuhan, Wanxian county was a major destination for educational institutions, with over 50,000 students and teachers, four universities, and eight middle schools congregating in the county. In all, 105 schools (50 middle schools and 55 institutions of higher learning) moved to Sichuan, the vast majority of them returning to their place of origin after the war. Refugee students and teachers who had lost contact with their educational institutions were urged to register with the Sichuan provincial education department which aggressively placed them in suitable schools.

Educational expansion was not limited to higher realms, however. The Nationalist government undertook a program of establishing a national system of schools. A key element of the government’s New County System program, rolled out in 1939, was setting up a Central School in each county and smaller public schools in every bao. Many of these lowest level schools existed only on paper, but there was marked expansion of enrolled children. Prior to the war, all middle schools were either private or run by local governments, but in 1937 the Nationalist government began establishing National Middle Schools to deal with the enormous number of youths flooding the interior. By 1944, the government was running a network of 28 middle-schools in interior provinces and cities. The Nationalists had a long tradition of promoting youth activism. John Fitzgerald in his study of the Nationalist Revolution, has observed that in the mid-1920s, the “Nationalist admin-

---

134. In 1938, higher education enrolled some 20,000 persons (50%) less than in 1936; college faculty too, was down by 30%, or some 2,000 positions. And the number of colleges and universities had dropped from 110 (in 1934-35) to 91. From this nadir, however, higher education surged upwards. The number of institutions reached 113 in the early 1940s, and by the end of the war stood at 145, while student enrollment that year was up 50% over pre-war figures, with 73,669 students in classes. CHoC, vol. 13, pt. 2, pp. 394 and 413-4.  

135. Song Dalu and Cheng Shiping, pp. 53-60 and Xiao Xiaoqin and Zhong Xingjin, Kangri zhanzheng wenhua shi (1937-1945), p. 304. When Chengdu’s famous Shude Middle School (樹德中學) refused to take transfer students, the education department quickly dispatched a high official to negotiate with the principal to take students from occupied and frontline areas.  

136. This public education plan was implemented in nineteen provinces and municipalities, with a total of 26,414 villages or towns and 303,792 bao. The Education Ministry reported that 254,377 public schools were in operation as a result and that by 1946 this system had 17,220,000 school-age children enrolled, and a further 25 million who while not enrolled full-time had received “some compulsory education.” Ch’en Li-fu, Storm Clouds, 159.  

137. Sun Yankui, Kunan de renliu, p. 177.
istration looked upon middle-school students as a reserve force of party agitators.” Yet, for most of the war, despite the potential that the large pool of impoverished and desperate students held out to the regime, the Nationalist educational bureaucracy was ham-fisted in its attempts to lead and control students/educational circles politically.

In March 1939 at the Third National Education Conference Chiang declared that education was to be “party-fied” (黨化): the “paramount foundation” of Nationalist education was the Three People’s Principles, which all students must “sincerely and completely revere.” The four social bonds (the traditional virtues of propriety, justice, integrity, and honor), along with other traditional social ideals (i.e., loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, love, faithfulness, righteousness, harmony, and peace), were to be the guiding principles of every school. In addition, students were to be held accountable for following the infamous Twelve Principles of (KMT) Party Members. Schools were ordered to use tutors and mentors to keep tabs on students’ political thoughts and involvements. Schools also had to begin regular lectures on Chiang Kaishek’s unpopular *China’s Destiny*.139

The communists were not long in responding to these moves, and quickly developed an underground strategy for infiltrating educational institutions in KMT-controlled areas. In August 1939, the CCP’s Southern Bureau (南方局) held an Interior Youth Work Conference in Chongqing; by the end of the year, there were underground CCP branches in both the Central University and Chongqing University in Shapingba/Ciqikou district and 50-60 CCP members in Beibei (Fudan University), and at the Female Teachers College in Baisha (白沙) Jiangjin, and Chongqing Women’s Teachers College as well. From the summer of 1940 on, the CCP pursued a strategy of secret organizing of students in KMT areas, with special attention paid to the social welfare needs of students. Under Zhou Enlai’s direction, the CCP adopted a “stronghold” policy in educational institutions of all levels. Within the city, Chongqing University was the “stronghold” and the underground CCP members there linked up with other educational institutions in the cultural enclave in Shapingba and Ciqikou. In Beibei, CCP activists were concentrated at Fudan University, where the CCP student organization was able to dominate the student council and applied pressure on the YC by disrupting YC-sponsored conferences and meetings and eventually wresting control over student publications such as *The Student Guide* (學生導報) and *Shaping(ba) News* (沙坪新聞). Eventually, in the spring of 1945, the CCP’s underground organizations succeeded in establishing the New Democratic Youth Association (新民主主義青年社) at both Fudan and CU.

Seeing the success of communist appeals to youth and the impressive failure of their own clumsy attempts to politicize education in interior schools, Nationalist education authorities grew desperate and impatient. They began to resort to more forceful methods. In response to the communist activities, in October 1940, the KMT began a strong counter-attack in educational circles, dismissing suspect teachers and replacing them with party loyalists, regardless of their teaching

---

138. Fitzgerald, p. 269. Zou Lu, first head of Central Youth Bureau, directed the bureau’s activities towards youth in universities, colleges, schools and factories in and around Guangzhou. Among other activities, the bureau held outdoor scouting activities and some military training exercises under the All China General Union of Students and the Young Soldiers Association; Fitzgerald, p. 271 and 286.

qualifications, talent, or dedication. Other tactics were the strengthening of militarized training in schools and arrests of progressive students and teachers.

Indicating the degree to which schools had become armed battlegrounds, in late 1941 the famous educator working out of Beibei since 1939, Tao Xingzhi, proposed at the People’s Political Council that students and teachers be prohibited from acting as “secret police,” that they be restricted from carrying weapons, and that all associations be forbidden from coercing membership and participation. His proposal did not slow the KMT offensive in educational institutions. Youth Corps branches were set up in all schools from middle-schools on up. In May 1943, the Education Ministry ordered all schools (from middle-school on up) to expel all students who were not following school regulations or whose thinking was “not pure.” These suspect students were then to be handed over to the Youth Training Corps (靑年訓練團), not to be confused with the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps, for “training” and then turned over to military Replacement Offices to be dispatched to the army as new soldiers.\(^{140}\) (Indicative of the ironies and complexities of wartime military service, it should be noted that this type of military service is an exact mirror image of the IYVM in that serving as a soldier was a punishment for (suspected) disloyalty instead of honorable service by loyalists.)

That such uninspiring content and harsh repressive measures left most students unmoved is hardly surprising. But the overall educational strategy that Nationalist leaders, particularly Chen Lifu as Minister of Education, pursued was successful in that it accomplished two prerequisites for the IYVM success. First, it kept a large number of students from going to Yan’an.

The young men and women who could afford to attend middle schools or universities were usually from middle-class families . . . The young men and women who headed for free zones usually had high hopes and trusted the National Government. If they came to the free zones and received no assistance, they were easily enticed into becoming students at the communist-sponsored Resisting Japanese University [K’ang-jih ta-hsueh] in Yenan. Therefore, if we wanted to stop them from going to the area controlled by the Communists, we had to help them. The first thing we did was to bring into being a student loan system for basic needs: clothing, food, shelter, and transportation. Second, we set up underground schools in the enemy-controlled areas . . . In the ministry, we had a commission for recruiting and training unemployed youths.\(^{141}\)

The commission’s work focused on getting students from occupied areas into schools to continue their studies in the interior. Second, it created a pool of youths who were almost completely dependent on the state. The youths who were sixteen to twenty-two when they volunteered for the IYVM would have been 10 to 16 years old when the war broke out. Many of these refugee youths had been separated from their families since that time; disconnected from family life, they were dependent on their schools and the state. The educational apparatus and policies of supporting these students was a huge burden on the government, but the response to the IYVM was based on this prior dependency.

The importance of the state’s social welfare policies can be seen even in the process of ex-

---

140. Ibid., p. 304-16.

141. Ch’en Li-fu, Storm Clouds, pp. 168-9. The loan system alone benefited more than 128,000 students.
panding the national educational system. Establishing Central Schools in localities often resulted in conflict and tensions with established village and township teachers, who were often hanging on from the old imperial exam system days. These older teachers often resorted to shaming their former students who tried to pull other youths into modern schools; such actions could result in compromises that, temporarily, gave face to the teachers, but the trend toward government-run modern schools was not reversed because the government’s wartime policy of free tuition for students was a key drawing card in getting students to leave the old xiucai teacher and enroll in the state school.  

This brings us to a key aspect of the government’s education policy: it was intimately connected with social welfare for both students and teachers.

Refugee students, in particular, were in a tough spot. Edward Gulick, teaching in China during the war, saw firsthand the trials refugee students faced: they had grown up in the more cosmopolitan and more sophisticated eastern half of China, and . . . were now shifting into cramped temporary quarters in the west. These [students], hoping to escape the miseries of Japanese occupation, were headed into a swarm of physical, financial, and spiritual problems as their college relocated in Chengtu, where they expected to share the pre-existing campus of West China Union University with some other colleges. I later heard that many students couldn’t stand the strain of inadequate food, air-raid interruptions, increased incidence of TB, and inflation, and that there were numerous student deaths, often by suicide.

A contemporary study of college students’ diet conducted in Kunming, Chengdu, and Chongqing found that students averaged only 50-60 grams of protein per day (a mere 5-10 grams were animal protein). The rest of their diet consisted of rice, a few vegetables, and more rice.

Chiang himself was well aware of the difficulties students faced. In his “Overall Work Report” to the Youth Corps in February 1944, he acknowledged, students are generally extremely busy with their classes, [and] then suffer under the pressure of life too. Especially these last three years, they have endured much hardship in their daily lives, like studying at night with no lights; inadequate nutrition; poor facilities; even having to steal breakfast in the morning and lamp-light at night. Because of these things, students are dissatisfied with their schools; it’s enough to deepen their malaise. Since the Corps cannot eradicate their difficulties, nor relieve their depression, the students are indifferent to the corps activities and organization, a natural result of having to rely on themselves.

Such conditions were so commonplace that they were portrayed and even satirized in both cartoon and fiction.

---


143. Gulick, Teaching in Wartime China, p. 165. This quote is talking about female students, but applies equally well to both sexes.


However, it was not just the students that faced tough times in the interior schools. Educa-
tors were particularly hard hit by inflation, even as early as 1938: “As salaried middle-class teachers, all were feeling the pinch of inflation. Their Nationalist currency was being overprinted and poured into the economy without adequate backing, and with predictable results.”146 People’s clothes wore out and many simply could not replace them. Even in Chongqing, which was the most prosperous area for much of the war, professors still wore long gowns but they were made of coarse local cloth. Students had poor, dirty uniforms and even the girls’ clothes looked more like the dingy, grey old cotton coats worn by soldiers than crisp uniforms of better times.147 Many teachers and professors had to find alternate sources of income, distracting them from their teaching. Even famous scholars, such as Wen Yiduo (聞一多) found it extremely difficult to make ends meet by the end of the war.148 The pressures of work, the war, separation from family in occupied territory, and personal indiscretions made stories of professors going insane frighteningly believable.149 Thus, even the conventional safety net for students – becoming a teacher at the next lowest level – was not available or reliable for students during the war.

Chen Lifu, as education minister, instituted a suite of government programs for students and teachers, including a loan program and stipends, which allowed significant numbers of students and teachers to survive and continue their studies.150 One key program was to allow students, educational and public office workers (civil servants) to purchase staples, namely rice, at a fixed low price. Such programs, even though they aided many, were not always enough. At Lianda, in Kunming, the students were fond of saying that “you pawned your winter clothes to buy spring term books, then pawned your books in the autumn to redeem the winter clothes.” 151

A typical account of how refugee status, apart from any patriotic feelings, could lead to enlistment in the IYVM is given by Zhang Guchu in his short memoir. Zhang, born in January 1927, was only 17 when he enlisted in 1944. A high school student, but cut off from his parents who were in an occupied area, he faced increasingly stressful and difficult material hardship: “I really had no way to maintain my food or clothing needs.”152 The Youth Army offered “a way out” (出路), an expression used frequently by soldiers who volunteered for warlord armies in an earlier time. That winter Zhang, along with several others, trekked by foot to the county city's recruiting office where he was accepted by the area's Youth Corps director. The director sent the recruits off, on foot again, to Guiyang. Hitching rides and walking, the nearly destitute youths

148. Zhou Shuzhen, *Sanqingtuan shimo*, p. 143. It was impossible not to notice “the steady decline in the living standard of students and faculty members. As inflation worsened, a professor’s creative energies were often diverted to making ends meet”; CHoC, vol. 13, pt. 2, p. 415. The Youth Corps too was quite aware of the difficulties that faculty, staff, and civil servants faced, acknowledging this at its cadre meetings; Zhou Shuzhen, *Sanqingtuan shimo*, p. 177, citing reports from the fall 1943 conference of the YC’s Central Executive Committee.
150. More than 16,000 students had been aided by 1941 and the total by 1944 was over 100,000. CHoC, vol. 13, pt. 2, p. 416; GJZGSG, vol. 3, p. 2103 and *Minguo zhuming renwu zhuang*, vol. 2, pp. 245-6.
152. Zhang Guchu, p. 77.
reached their goal and joined the training regiment in February 1945. Teachers had nearly identical experiences: One Wu Zhirong was a teacher in a primary school in early 1944. He describes his life as a teacher as “hard, [with] low status.” School funds and teachers’ salaries were stolen by corrupt baojia heads and he often went without pay. In November 1944, he enlisted as a “way out” of the tough situation facing him. Thus, the very precariousness of refugee life, separated from home and family, left few options for these floating youths who had marched inland to follow their schools. Cut off, with money dwindling, it is hardly surprising that some would respond to the state's message of service and duty.

Despite the social welfare aspect and the overall war effort goals, the purpose of Nationalist educational policy was strongly anti-CCP. This led to ham-fisted political handling of education, but this should not blind us to the underlying reality that large numbers of students and teachers were dependent on the Nationalist state. The educational policies of subsidizing the living costs of both teachers and students had made a large proportion of educated persons dependent on the state. Rampaging inflation made them increasingly precarious, but this actually laid the groundwork for the IYVM in that it created a pool of desperate educated young men who were potential recruits and who were already accustomed to relying on the state for their subsidized living costs. When inflation rendered this state support insufficient, it was natural that many in education circles blame the government for economic mismanagement and corruption that exacerbated the inflation. Despite this backlash, however, there was still a reservoir of support for the government among those who had been relying on it for their daily subsistence since 1937. In short, many of the volunteers for the YA were refugee students and teachers, people who had followed their government inland as the Japanese invaded.

A third key group that responded to the calls were low-level civil servants, a group which had exploded in numbers during the war, a process that Julia Strauss has called the wartime “hyperexpansion” of the bureaucracy. The bloated bureaucracy did not result in a more efficient administration overall, but the hyperexpansion should itself be seen as a social welfare mechanism: providing employment and livelihood for a massive number of educated elites who had come inland and were more or less dependent on the state to provide both educational and material provisions, however meager. In this sense, their situation was essentially the same as students and teachers: increasingly precarious economically due to the massive inflation of the late war years, but reliant on the state for survival. It was this desperate educated stratum that would respond to the calls and incentives of a desperate Nationalist state in 1943 and 1944.

Difficult Times with No End in Sight, 1943-45
While the Chinese population in the interior suffered depredations and ravaging inflation, it is important to remember that from where Chiang and his generals stood the war seemed far

153. Wu Zhirong, p. 31.
156. Some mainland accounts argue that the IYVM attracted a large response among unemployed and un-enrolled youth; Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, p. 242. But in fact this was not the case until the Civil War during the renewed Youth Army recruitment drive.
from over in late 1943 and 1944. The Manhattan Project was a closely guarded US secret, and that meant that as far as the Nationalists could predict, the war in the Pacific required Allied landings along the Chinese coast followed by a full-scale invasion of the Japanese home islands. Looking back now, we must resist the urge to assume that any and all efforts and planning by the Nationalist regime in late 1944 and even into 1945 were made looking past the war to the impending civil war.\footnote{As late as mid-1945, US marines in the Pacific theater were convinced that they were slated for the invasion of the Japanese home islands, under MacArthur’s CORONET plan; see E. B. Sledge, \textit{China Marine: An Infantryman’s Life After World War II}, pp. xiv, 2, and 8.} Despite the overall strategic certainty of Allied victory, the war was still far from over and held the possibility (even likelihood) of continued struggle for years.

In fact, 1944 was in some ways China’s most desperate year: Chiang’s relationship with Stilwell had reached a nadir, to the point that Chiang was seriously contemplating the loss of all US support.\footnote{Yang Tianshi, \textit{Kangzhan yu zhanhou}, p. 425. Chiang’s diary entries in September testify that his irritation with Stilwell’s repeated tramplings of Chinese sovereignty and slights toward Chiang himself had reached a point that he was willing to face a complete break with the US if Roosevelt did not agree to recall Stilwell and send someone else. Roosevelt recalled Stilwell and General Wedemeyer was assigned to the China Theater in late October 1944.} Japan’s Ichigo Offensive, April to December 1944, carved through Nationalist forces and six provinces, capturing key rail lines and destroying American bomber bases in the south. In March 1944 the Japanese attacked Henan and instead of halting after modest initial gains as the Nationalists expected them to do, they continued right into Hunan. By December they took Dushan, Guizhou. In eight months the Nationalists lost 146 cities and towns, with a population of roughly sixty million; as city after city in southern China fell, public opinion was badly shaken in Chongqing. There was intense concern, and some outright panic.

Following the fall of Zhengzhou, Xuchang, and Luoyang, the KMT party assembly met in May 1944; after hearing He Yingqin’s report on the military situation and logistical issues, the delegates passed resolution that acknowledged the desperateness of the times in calling for the party and military to encourage “making citizens join the army [i.e., volunteer], as a common practice.”\footnote{\textit{Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi}, p. 87.} There was even concern by top level leaders that the capital might have to be moved to Chengdu or Xichang (西昌), in Xikang; General Wedemeyer, newly arrived in Chongqing, advised Chiang that defending Chongqing had to be of lesser importance than defending Kunming, the only remaining supply link to the outside world. With reports of Japan amassing gliders, Wedemeyer began secret preparations to move the military command structure and government to Chengdu, even while Chiang continued to make public statements that there would be no retreat from Chongqing.\footnote{Wedemeyer, \textit{Wedemeyer Reports}, pp. 292-3. Faced with the possibility of the loss of the capital, Chiang sent his son to Kangding to prepare to move the YC Central Cadre School there; Zhou Shuzhen, \textit{Sanqingtuan shimo}, p. 244.} The ease with which the Japanese armies decimated huge numbers of Nationalist units demonstrated that the war was not yet won: China had suffered enormous casualties (500,000 to 600,000 of the more than a million men who fought in Ichigo), including loses of many of the very last strategic reserves of troops and key source areas...
for food and conscripts (Henan, Hunan, Guangxi), severely impacting the Nationalist government’s ability to mobilize military manpower and to feed its civilian population.161

Most worrisome, Ichigo proved that the regular Nationalist armies were nearly incapable of putting up real resistance to Japanese actions. A whole litany of problems, such as desertion, draft evasion, malnutrition of soldiers, lack of training, abysmal leadership, and unacceptably high losses, plagued the Nationalist armies and rendered them ineffective against Japan in the field. Adding to these problems, the army suffered from a severe shortage of well-trained junior officers. Decimated in the fierce battles for Shanghai and the lower Yangzi in the first few months of the war, the lower officer corps never recovered. And both the conscription administration and officer training apparatuses were woefully inadequate to meet the need. John S. Service, one of America’s most assiduous wartime observers in China, predicted devastating fallout from harsher conscription demands on the population within the further reduced area under Nationalist control.162 Meanwhile, the IEF in Burma, where the Japanese were steadily giving ground to Chinese forces, was the one exception to the general rule and provided a model of an American-trained, elite force that could successfully resist and even counter-attack against Japan. In this desperate context, the Youth Army was an attempt by the Nationalist state to rectify the administrative, military, and social defects of the military.

Santai Spark: Launch of the IYVM, Late 1943

In this desperate situation, Chiang and his generals looked to a single bright spot: the successful volunteer efforts of late 1943 that had supplied better quality men for the Second Burma Campaign. This earlier volunteer drive among educated youth held out some promise as a model to tap a hitherto unused resource. In early November 1943, Chiang ordered He Yingqin, Minister of War, to raise educated youth volunteers for the IEF, specifically more specialized units, like truck supply units, that needed soldiers with a higher degree of educational qualifications and as replacements for the decimated CEF/IEF. He Yingqin in turn forwarded the orders to the provincial districts and divisional districts, and directed Zhang Dingfan (張定璠), vice chief of the Junzhengbu, and Cheng Zerun, chief of the MSO, to finalize concrete measures. Cheng and Zhang called a meeting to discuss starting the volunteer drive. Among other high ranking military staff, attendees at the meeting included: Wang Shijie (王世杰), Education minister (and later Foreign Minister); Zhang Zhizhong (張治中), Political Minister and Central Secretary of the Youth Corps; Bai Chongxi, vice-chief of the General Staff and head of Military Training Ministry (軍訓部); and Zhang Boling chairman of the People’s Political Council. The conference settled on a plan to start recruiting in schools. This approach required not only the Education Ministry’s involvement, but other agencies concerned with political training (Political Ministry) and youth (the Youth Corps). It was hoped that involving the People’s Political Council would extend the social influence and reach of the movement. The group set a three month deadline for getting things off the ground. Because each county was going to be saddled with a 300 man quota, the immediate reaction in divisional district commands was pessimistic. Some conscription administration officials contemplated resignation because it would be impossible to fulfill the

161. For some accounts of the Ichigo Offensive, see Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Nationalist China at War, pp. 68-81; Eastman, p. 139-42; Dreyer, pp. 284-9; GJZGSG, vol. 2, pp. 923-4; Hsiung and Levine, pp. 162-5; and Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, pp. 412-23.

quotas for educated volunteers. Despite a negative assessment of the plan, Zhang Qun, the Sichuan Provincial Government governor and Sichuan Provincial District commander, met with Xu Siping, Sichuan’s Provincial District chief of staff, several times to hammer out how to proceed. Although the specific content of those meetings remains uncertain, Xu set out for northern Sichuan on an “inspection tour” whose purpose was to kick off the recruitment drive.¹⁶³

The first public sign of a youth volunteer movement to garner national attention came among displaced students in Santai (三台) Sichuan, 220 km northwest from Chongqing and the temporary home of Northeast University (東北大學). As an opening act for the main event to follow, Xu Siping, a native of Rong county in Sichuan, set out from Chongqing for an inspection tour of northern Sichuan in late 1943, but his real purpose was to initiate the recruitment drive

for educated youth as reinforcements for the Indian Expeditionary Army. On 11 November 1943, Xu arrived in Mianyang (綿陽), northeast of Chengdu, and the following day, he held a meeting of local gentry, fatuan, administration, and students. That evening fifteen students came to Xu’s lodging, took an oath to enlist, and appealed to him to allow them to volunteer. Traveling southeast, toward Chongqing, Xu arrived in Santai two days later, where he met with Li Huajun (李華駿), deputy commander of the Tongpeng (潼蓬) divisional district. Together they decided that Xu should deliver a speech on “volunteering for the army” at Northeast University.

Initially moving through the military service apparatus, Xu had Li Huajun introduce him to the Military Education teacher at Northeast University, who in turn met with the chairman of the student union. The students, however, were not receptive to Xu and Li’s overtures, and refused to let Xu speak on campus, ostensibly because his position as a provincial Sichuan military official was out of place in a national school. Li stressed to the students Xu’s educational qualifications: he had been an overseas student in Japan, traveled in Europe, and led a teachers’ college. Further, several Northeast University teachers had been his students. Li proposed that the students allow Xu to deliver an “academic” lecture first; if it met with their approval, they could ask him to give another specialized (military) speech. This the students agreed to, perhaps as a test of his non-military erudition, however, they stipulated that Xu speak on the topic of “My Personal Philosophy” (Wo de rensheng guan 我的人生觀). Xu agreed to the proposed topic but said he needed some time, so he asked to schedule that lecture for the following evening and to be allowed to pick his own topic for a morning speech. The student union agreed to this. The next morning, Xu’s topic for his first speech was “The Duty of Military Service and the Unification of the Civil and Martial.” The speech stressed the needs of modern warfare for the total mobilization of a country’s population, invoking Ludendorff’s conclusion that Germany had lost World War One because the general population was not properly mobilized, had lost the stomach for the war effort, and undermined the front line troops. Xu’s speech also reiterated the need to “unify the civil and military” and reminded the students that only by taking to the battlefield could they ensure that they would be able to return to their homes in the northeast and rebuild their lives there. He stressed the responsibility of the students in retaking the Northeast after their long trek from Manchuria to Beiping to Xi’an to Sichuan: if the university and students do not truly support such efforts “then the Northeast University will have lost its raison d’etre.”

After the Northeast was lost, you all moved to Tongchuan [the district that contained Santai]. Although studies have continued and the Sichuan people have been accommodating, these are trivial [in comparison with the loss to China and yourselves].

Thus, Northeast University's single demand is to join in and aid the war of resistance on the battlefield, to retake the Northeast, and after the war to reconstruct the Northeast; the Northeast University cannot abandon this.164

That same evening at 7 pm, Xu went back to the school to give his formal lecture on his personal philosophy. Despite pouring rain, nearly three thousand people showed up, including students and teachers from the 18th National Middle School, Tongchuan Middle School, Santai county Middle School, and various notables from local fatuan and organizations. The listeners stayed past 10 pm.

164. GMWX, vol. 62, p. 193. The text of the speech is found in Xu Siping, Xu Siping xiansheng wencon, pp. 20-5.
This second address was disjointed and pretentious. Its main purpose seems to have been to establish Xu’s credentials as an erudite intellectual and to impress the students that a “military man” could have a rich and modern cultural life. Toward this end, Xu went out of his way to mention a whole panoply of thinkers and theories, both from China and abroad. Alongside the usual domestic luminaries such as Confucius, Mencius, Mozi, Wang Yangming, and Zhuangzi, Xu made sure to mention Plato, Socrates, Newton, Kant, Nietzsche, Darwin, Rousseau, Kropotkin, Marx, Bismark, George Washington, and Abraham Lincoln. He sprinkled his superficial romp through ethics, education, aesthetics, religion, political commentary, philosophy, and epistemology with poetic phrases of moonlight and fallen flowers on water. In one sense, despite the impressive breadth of the speech, it was an accurate reflection of the fragmentary nature of and disparate origins of influences on Xu’s inner life. Yet there were other currents; one in particular gave a larger importance and structure to the speech and was likely the source of its influence in inspiring students in the audience to enlist, despite the fact that the speech only mentioned military service briefly. Amidst the scientific and philosophical principles that Xu jauntily summarized for his young audience, Xu repeatedly invoked one theme that transcended such modern influences: motherly love and the filial devotion it inspired in return. Science and modern philosophy, he crowed, could not explain the motives and principles behind unselfish love, from Christ’s sacrificial crucifixion to the uncounted widows who give their all to raise and educate their children. Selfless motherly love, Xu argued, is the highest virtue of all and it engenders a natural response in filial devotion among children. All the other virtues grow out of this filiality, for Xu. Even social and national morality are directly connected to this pair of prime virtues. His validation of motherly love was a profoundly personal statement for Xu, as he was raised by his poor, widowed mother. But, more significantly, it fit well with his overall purpose in visiting Santai. His audience consisted not only of Sichuan natives, but of a significant number of refugee students who were understandably concerned with their families and parents left behind in occupied territories. Xu’s speech took advantage of this fact by tying filial duty directly to loyalty to state and country. He repeatedly invoked the fact that China has always “sought loyal ministers at the doors of filial sons, [because in China] loyalty to country has its origin in filiality.” And he recalled for his audience that a great number of China’s “great men” were raised by widowed mothers who planted a deep and abiding morality of self-sacrifice in their sons: men such as Fan Zhongyan, Ouyang Xiu, and of course Chiang Kaishek were all prime examples of this. Anxious to make sure his audience did not overlook his veiled meaning, he baldly reminded the students that their mothers were still alive and thus there was still time to “be filial and care for” them. If filiality towards one’s mother was the

165. The full speech can be found in Xu Siping, Xu Siping xiansheng wencun, pp. 25-52. This text has almost certainly been edited and revised for publication (in 1960) as it does not read like a spoken address, but I have been unable to locate a more contemporary version to make a comparison.

166. Ibid., pp. 41 and 47-50.

167. The opening essays in Xu’s collected works are all accounts of his debt to his widow mother; ibid., pp. 1-7.

168. Ibid., p. 50. To be fair, Xu did not laud China as the only cultural pattern for loyalty but admitted that other nations, particularly Europeans and America, have founded their love of country upon principles of individualism.
foundation for the Chinese polity, then how should a Chinese son act in time of war? Xu did not over-emphasize this point, but in the only section of the speech in which he touched on it, he took a page right out of He Yingqin’s book by pairing citizenship to military service. “If [one] is not able to serve society or repay one’s country, then one is not able to fulfill one’s duty as a citizen.”

A little later in the speech, Xu went on to stress that in China citizens had political rights that “anyone who is a citizen [gongmin 公民] could make use of directly. But, in addition, the constitution’s regulations state that all the people [renmin 人民] have the duty to serve as soldiers and the right [quanli 權利] to be officials. But, being a soldier is not just an obligation, but is also a right [quanli 權利]. As it turns out, criminals are barred from military service, and those who are not bodily whole or healthy are excused. In France, those who do not serve have no civil rights [gongquan 民權]; thus, being a soldier is not just an obligation. . . . Those who do not serve as soldiers do not fulfill their responsibility to protect the country, and thus are not able to be complete citizens [guomin 國民].”

Despite its interminable rambling, Xu’s speech must have hit home: there were 304 volunteers, including more than 30 girls. The volunteers were not all students, however. Most notably, Xiao Yishan (萧一山), the famous Qing historian then teaching at Northeast University, personally brought his own son to enlist, as did others. The Nationalist state immediately began publicizing the events at Santai. Xu’s speeches ran longer than 10,000 words and the entire

169. Here, Xu uses both words usually translated as “citizen,” gongmin (公民) and guomin (國民). The first has the connotation of “public” in the sense of wider society, while the second is specifically governmental or political; using both words preserves the parallelism of the dual obligation (toward society and country) in the first half of the proposition.

170. Ibid., p. 34.

171. The girl volunteers were turned away by Xu because of the regulations in the Military Service Law. Of the initial group of volunteers 213 passed the initial physical examination. The Mianguang divisional district contributed another 196.

172. Other parents motivated their sons to volunteer as well, including Zhong Tidao (鍾體道), the 13th Administrative District Inspector. Recent memoirs of Northeast University (NU) students allege that Xiao had already left NU by the time of the IVYM and that he was a key member of the university’s ultra-conservative administration, tightly connected to the CC Clique and that he was the handler for a group of Central Statistic Bureau (zhongtong 中統) agents. (The CSB was the Chen brother’s intelligence agency. It was involved in a whole range of information gathering and undercover operations and was often in competition – and sometimes violent fighting – with Dai Li’s Military Statistics Bureau (juntong 軍統), which was connected to Kang Ze and the military.) Among progressive students at NU he was suspected as being responsible for the murder of one of their number and was forced out of the university thereafter. See, Tang Hongyi, ed., Dongbei daxue zai Santai, pp. 3-4, 15-6, and 40. It is somewhat difficult to evaluate the validity of these claims as in some places Xiao is said to be a CSB agent and in others a MSB agent – since there was deep animosity and suspicion between the two, it is impossible that Xiao was working for both, throwing some doubt on the students’ assessment of his activities. According to the NU student memoirs, the CCP and progressive students discouraged middle-ground students, but encouraged the most conservative ones and YC members to enlist so as to be rid of them and secure a freer environment for their activities, which were by this time under direction of the CCP’s Southern Bureau (南方局). Three progressive students were “fooled” by the patriotic calls and enlisted for the YC, but soon regretted it and managed to quit to return to the university; Tang Hongyi, pp. 17 and 44-5.
texts were published in the *Northeast University Journal* (東北大學校刊). The first speech, being shorter and more directly military, was also reproduced by the Junzhengbu for distribution to Army and divisional districts, county and municipal governments, and various levels of the military service administration and schools. The Sichuan provincial district ran a lengthy article detailing the events and importance of Xu’s trip. The Youth Corps edited a news brief that was published in the *Central Daily* on 26 November 1943.

For the rest of November and into December, Xu tramped back and forth between Chengdu and localities in Sichuan holding meetings and delivering speeches to recruit for the CEF and IEF. By the 8th of December, he had drummed up 5,094 volunteers from schools, administrative organs, and social organizations, including 267 university students; 2,229 passed the initial examinations and entered the army. Xu’s tour gave Nationalist authorities new hope. Cheng Zerun, head of the MSO, in his New Year’s Day report for 1943 said, after November of this year, Sichuan conscription exhibited an amazing miracle, the launching of the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement. It commenced at Northeast University in Santai. Reports [of it] reached everywhere in Sichuan, with enthusiastic response. . . . Now the volunteers have spread from students, to teachers, to [Youth] Corps members, professionals, and the sons and brothers of [local] gentry. [The movement] has spread from Sichuan to Jiangxi, Hubei, Shaanxi, Henan and Guangxi. . . . The fruits of this movement will not only raise the quality of soldiers, but will transform the social practices [of military service].

Although the purpose of Xu’s 1943 recruitment tour was to reinforce the Indian Expeditionary Army and not yet to create new Youth Army divisions, the event at Santai was highlighted as the beginning of the intellectual youth volunteer movement. Politically speaking, the choice

---


174. CQMA materials (资料), politics section (政治类), #739, p. 5.

175. On 25 November 1943, Xu returned to Chengdu, only to set out again almost immediately to Chengmiao (成茂) divisional district for another recruiting and propaganda trip. By the 29th, he was back in Chengdu again holding meetings in movie theaters for students of the 30+ middle schools in the area.

176. Three training regiments for collecting and providing preliminary training were established in Sichuan in late 1943 and early 1944. Each regiment had a definite geographical scope, around the base area. The 1s Training Regiment, headed by the chief of the (regular) military’s 2nd RTO set up a reception station in Chongqing’s Jiangbei Park to handle recruits from eastern and southern Sichuan, as well a few from eastern provinces (Hubei, Hunan, and Anhui). The 2TR was based in Chengdu, originally under Xu’s personal direction, but due to his busy schedule, the regiment was handed over to the Central Military Academy. Its geographical reach was mainly in the Chengdu plain, with Santai and Mianyang supplying a significant portion of its recruits. The 3TR, managed by the 45th RTO. It too handled volunteers who had come to Chongqing. The three battalions, during their term of operation, trained a total of 11,350 men (and a handful of women), most of whom were sent on to units in India. The breakdown was 1TR: 3,144; 2TR 2,783; 3TR: 5,423. The above account of the events at Santai and the training regiments is based on Wen, Jinyu, “Zhishiqingnian congjun yundong zai Sichuan,” pp. 90-4 and “Kangzhan banian zai Sichuan,” pp. 356-9. Official accounts from January 1944 do not differ in any substantial way, however; see qz0055.mj3-245, pp. 70a-b.
of Northeast University was not entirely random, as it was heavily influenced, if not controlled, by the CC Clique and the communist influence among the student body was weak.\textsuperscript{177}

In another, broader sense, that the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement was inaugurated at Northeast University was fitting. Most significantly, it occurred among refugee students originally from occupied areas. As one refugee student from Manchuria expressed it, she already felt confident that she knew the reality of “the front line troops' daily life” because her home had been occupied for 13 years during which she had “drifted to various places.”\textsuperscript{178} Patriotic calls found fertile soil in the minds of youth displaced by the Japanese forces. The initiation of the movement among Manchurian youth was a homerun for the Nationalist state, a stand against Japanese incursions that connected the Youth Army with a powerful symbol of resistance that ran all the way back to 1931. As Rana Mitter’s work demonstrates in *The Manchurian Myth*, the Japanese occupation of the northeast, the establishment of Manchukuo, and Chinese resistance organizations there, were strategic locations and moments in the development of Chinese nationalism. Northeast University itself was founded in 1923 by Zhang Zuolin as part of a broader educational reform effort deliberately designed to inculcate nationalism as a counter to Japanese imperialism in the region.\textsuperscript{179} Although Chiang had taken a dim view of Manchurian resistance in the early 1930s, the Nationalist state made deliberate use of the symbolic value of Northeastern refugee student volunteers in the IYVM. Tying the volunteer drive to the constructed “myth” of unified Chinese resistance to the invader and mobilizing students around the goal of retaking their homes in the Northeast was a shrewd move.

Even more remarkably, the events at Northeast University entailed a *negotiation* between the students and the representative of the military administration, indicating a very different relationship between the soon-to-be citizen-soldier and the state that was “pressing” him into service. This relationship was not only direct, without any local powerholders standing in between, but

\textsuperscript{177} Originally from Shenyang, Northeast University came to Santai via Xi’an. After the war, most of the university returned to Shenyang, but a minority of students and faculty stayed behind to found Northern Sichuan University (川北大學); Song Dalu and Cheng Shiping, p. 58. See the essays in Tang Hongyi, *Dongbei daxue zai Santai*, passim, for in depth descriptions of the school, its political atmosphere, and the activities of progressive students. Recent NU memoirs are heavily slanted toward emphasizing the progressive and communist students, but this appropriation of a revolutionary mantle for the institution only serves to underline that as a whole NU was conservative and leaned decisively toward the Nationalists. Virtually all the administrators throughout the war were tied heavily to Chen Lifu and the CC Clique, with the result that the progressive students hounded and forced to be very secretive. They hid banned materials from Yan’an in the bamboo frame of mosquito nets, under benches and in walls and could not openly organize for most of the war, using a Reading Society as their cover. They organized a “Grass Hall Academy” (*Caotang shuyuan* 草堂書院) for their meetings which were often held out in the wooded hills, which was especially fitting since NU had appropriated Dufu’s Grass Hall (*Dufu caotang* 杜甫草堂) when it had arrived in Santai in March 1938. (The Santai Dufu Grass Hall is not the same as the primary one in Chengdu, but its less famous cousin.) On the conservative administration, see also Ch’en Li-fu, *Storm Clouds*, pp. 37-8, 58 and John S. Service, *Lost Chance in China*, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{178} GMWX, vol. 63, p. 341.

\textsuperscript{179} Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalist, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China*, p. 68. Mitter’s account of Manchurian resistance to Japan and the mythos that was deliberately cultivated around it by “Manchurian propagandists” is well-researched and nuanced.
the volition of the students was tacitly affirmed by the representative of the military administration. The students’ initial reason for declining was that the university was a national school and that Xu, as the chief of staff of the Sichuan Provincial Military District, was a provincial military official. While this was almost certainly a convenient excuse, it is significant that the students’ rejection of Xu was initially based upon their adoption of a national identity, casting him and his recruitment drive as a local initiative, embedded in local administration. It was only when Xu addressed them as national refugees that there was any room for a positive response.

Xu’s success with the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Campaign in late 1943 and early 1944 propelled him to the top of the conscription administration, serving as the vice-head of the ministry of conscription. Chiang was pleased with the impact of the campaign in recruiting for the IEF, especially with its favorable impression in domestic society and with the Allies. But if he had not decided to use the original efforts as a platform to found an entirely new force, the IYVM would have remained merely a minor footnote. In the event, the example set by Xu, Santai, and CEF/IEF recruitment among intellectual youth lay dormant until the next fall when the events of 1944, including the bitter rift between Chiang and Stilwell, the Ichigo Offensive, and the prospect of a US-led invasion of Japan, lent a sense of urgency to mobilizing the very last of China’s manpower and the creation of an elite domestic force. The success of the original efforts to recruit intellectual youths inspired a renewed effort. Chiang publicly called for a drive to recruit 100,000 intellectual youth volunteers at a MAC meeting on 9 September 1944. Many key leaders at the meeting, including He Yingqin, Bai Chongxi, and Zhang Zhizhong, raised objections to Chiang’s plan, but the generalissimo insisted that it be launched immediately. On the 16th of September, in his address to the People’s Political Council, he railed against students and intellectuals for their failure to fulfill their duty to serve the country. Their neglect left a stinging impact on China’s international prestige.

In the last few years, many foreigners often say, ‘Why can’t China make its educated youth volunteer to fight?’ But our government’s plan for the Resistance War continues to allow intellectual youth to continue to pursue their studies in order to prepare the foundation for the future reconstruction of the nation. In the minds of those foreigners this sort of plan will inevitably fail. But, because by adding one intellectual to a unit is as good as adding ten regular soldiers, the war will be over sooner and the end of the war will allow all the nation’s youth to pursue their studies with peace of mind. Isn’t this even better? For this reason, and even more because we want to establish a [national] army, counterattack [against Japan], save and establish the nation, our government wants to secure the earliest possible victory and raise the country’s [international] status; thus, we must arouse the determination of a large number of intellectual youth to volunteer for the army. These intellectuals are especially needed to fill the ranks of low ranking officers.

Chiang’s goal at this time was to funnel the intellectual volunteers into the lower ranks of the officer corps, making up for the devastation of war, though this aim would quickly be revised.

Xu knew that to reach Chiang’s goal of 100,000 new recruits would take a great deal more organizing and effort, so he called a conference on the IYVM movement for the first two weeks

---

in October 1944. The conference was attended by more than 150 people from central ministries, provincial and municipal party and administrative personnel, key figures in educational circles and the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps. Meetings focused on recruitment regulations, organization, cadre selection, and guidance at various levels within the movement, but the list of involved agencies suggests that this second incarnation of the IYVM would bypass the mainstream conscription apparatus almost completely.

In his address to the conference, Chiang stressed that the main aim of the IYVM was “first, to change the past attitude of general society toward military service, and thus [make them] respond eagerly to serve, in order to replenish our battle strength,” and only secondly to change people’s opinions of the government. Toward these ends, ranking KMT, government, and YC officials were admonished either to volunteer themselves or put pressure on their sons or youth relatives to sign up. Chiang Kaishek led in this himself: signing both his sons Jingguo and Weiguo up first. Zhang Zhizhong cabled his son in the US to return home and volunteer. Others took the symbolic act of signing up even though they were well past the “youth” age limit (18-35 sui) for volunteering, including Liang Hancao (梁寒操), the KMT’s Central Propaganda chief, and the vice-chief, Ma Chaojun (馬超俊), and the vice-secretary of the YC’s central executive committee (中央幹事會), Hu Shuhua (胡庶華).

Institutionally, the biggest fruit from the October conference was the founding of the National Intellectual Youth Volunteer Guidance Committee. The conference decided to call up 100,000 youth volunteers, train them and organize nine new divisions. Shortly after this conference, on the 24th, Chiang issued his national call to intellectual youth and the following day the provinces, municipalities, and counties were ordered to set up recruiting committees. The conference gave a good deal of emphasis to setting down clear and concrete measures for treatment of the youth volunteers. A small group began drafting the regulations concerning “rewards for party and corps members joining up” and a different group put together a propaganda plan.

The conference went for three consecutive, and very long (9 am to 7 pm or later), days. Although they were not top secret, the meetings were far from open. In order to prevent the friction between the KMT party and the YC members of the conference from becoming too public details of the discussions were never recorded in the meetings’ minutes, and the records sealed as well. Thus, the precise content of the discussions and the main proponents of various positions are still uncertain. The conference discussed important issues, including the official name of the movement and the resulting military units. There was debate during the conference on the issue of whether the IYVM should use force (conscription) or remain on a strictly volunteer basis. It was decided that the YA political administration would be staffed by committed and excellent

---


182. Ma Chaojun, Song Yishan (宋宜山), Pang Jingtang (龐鏡塘), Liu Yaozhang (劉瑤章), Xiang Dingrong (項定榮), Shangguan Yeyou (上官業佑) drafted the regulations for party and corps members, while the propaganda plan was drafted by Xu Xiaoyan (許孝炎), Zheng Yanfen (鄭顏楨), Zhang Yuanruo (章淵若), Wang Gongji (汪公紀), Ren Zhuoxuan (任卓宣 – Ye Qing 葉青), Yang Yuqing (楊玉清), Li Junlong (李俊龍); QNJS, vol. 2, pp. 343-50.

183. The name of the movement was disputed as well, with several candidates put forward as the official designation: “Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement”, “Youth Volunteer Movement”, “National Salvation Youth Enlistment [Joining the Military] Movement”. All three of these were in common usage in 1944 and 1945.
cadres, who were “able to understand the hearts of youth and who would be trusted by youth.” A short “spiritual and political” training period before the soldiers began active duty was planned.

Due to the lack of real involvement by conventional military service authorities, the role for civilian agencies was greatly enhanced. Thus, two of the most important items at the conference were the ones detailing the KMT and YC’s role. It was here that a somewhat more authoritarian, even semi-compulsory, tone crept into the IYVM planning. Despite the fact that the conference passed a resolution that dropped the designation as “Volunteer Army” (志願軍) in favor of “Expeditionary Army” (遠征軍), in the end, the conference affirmed the overall voluntary nature of military service, but gave a nod to more authoritarian tendencies by enacting a measure that required KMT branches to supply eligible youth members to the IYVM rosters via a lottery system, threatening those members who refused when their number was drawn with expulsion from the party or other punishment. KMT members who were already over-age were ordered to get their sons or younger brothers to volunteer, and if they had no sons or brothers, they were required to introduce one other young man into the YA. The conference set official goals for both the KMT and YC: local branches of both organizations were to get a minimum of five per cent of their members to participate, and aside from normal voluntary means were to use a lottery system to fulfill that quota. Despite this compulsory regulation, however, local KMT party branches proved to be an unreliable mobilization instrument for the IYVM.

On the face of it, this recruitment scheme seems to have worked: reportedly, 70-80% of the YA officers and men were YC or KMT party members. While this points to the fact that the core civilian institutions of the Nationalist regime, in particular the YC, were the key mobilizing avenue for the IYVM, we cannot draw grand conclusions from the high rates of KMT and YC membership in the YA because of the wild KMT and YC growth during the war. Both organizations were sprawling, diverse, and often inducted whole groups of people in a pro forma way.

By 1944 the KMT, in particular, was almost incapable of enforcing or inspiring the sort of discipline on the local level that the conference demanded. The KMT party during the war had become an unwieldy and uncontrollable institution. The ineffectiveness of the KMT had long been recognized, even by Chiang himself. At the closing ceremony for the Temporary Representative Congress (1 April 1938), he had remarked openly, “The most important fundamental reason our party has reached this degree of emptiness and weakness is that party discipline is so lax, with the result that its spirit is demoralized and everything is let go.”

Mass inductions had swollen the KMT to the point of absurdity: by 1945 the KMT had roughly 8,000,000 members, with 60 per cent (4,850,000) of them in the military. At the most local level, too, the KMT had

184. Hu Guotai, pp. 51-2, citing an additional, undated and unpublished document, Minutes of Launching the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Conference (發動知識青年從軍會議紀錄). The minimalist published conference minutes, which consist mainly of a list of attendees and the (very terse) motions passed, can be found at QNJS, vol. 2, pp. 343-50.

185. Hu Guotai, p. 54. The YA veterans association gives two different figures, 85% and 67.4%, though the dates for these are uncertain. QNJS vol. 1, p. 322-30 and vol. 2, p. 377.

186. Complicating things further is that in the postwar days, YA soldiers were often inducted en masse into the YC, so it is hard to know exactly whether the volunteers were YC members before or after volunteering; Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, p. 252.

grown greatly during the war years, indicating a much greater presence in local society and politics. The 546 district branches it had in 1939 had expanded to 9,397 in 1945; and the sub-districts from 13,188 to 78,681. But despite the growth, the party was simply unable to discipline its branches and members effectively: it had long been unable even to keep track of its members. In 1939 Zhang Lisheng (張廣生), head of the party’s organization bureau, complained,

The number of party members has become a confused number, as difficult to verify as the 25 [dynastic] histories. No one knows exactly how many comrades we are! If we ask any local party cadre how many comrades are really in his organization, he will just say, ‘Comrades? In 1928, there was such-and-such a number. ‘ If we ask him about the present, he will just stare and not know how to answer. Why doesn’t he know? He will say when comrades leave, they just don’t apply to him for a transfer of their [party] registration. And no one [when they arrive in his jurisdiction] comes to him to register. So there is just no way to have a clear picture. If a district sub-branch is like this, then there is no use in talking about municipal or provincial party branches.  

Zhu Jiahua (朱家騫), Zhang’s successor in the KMT’s organization bureau, expressed very similar assessments of the state of the party’s self-awareness. A lack of even basic information about its members was mirrored by party members not even knowing which sub-branch they belonged to, nor who their party secretary was. But even for those members who were accounted for and active, the KMT simply had no effective means of punishment, as neither demerits nor even outright expulsion from the party had any bite for them; party members could shrug those off with the thought that such punishment only “lessened [the member’s] hassle.”

For all these reasons, the KMT was not an effective instrument for promoting the IYVM and the reports from the lowest local party cells in Chongqing bear this out. This is not to say that they were completely ineffective, but the surviving records of district branches in Chongqing makes it clear that at the local level, the KMT was simply unable to elicit a strong, positive response to the call for volunteers. In the autumn of 1944, local (municipal) KMT branches were ordered to hold local conferences to drum up volunteers for the IEF. A few branches report high levels of attendance, ranging from 100-300 members and some instances where members stood up and gave moving statements about why they were volunteering. In one such case at the 5th ward, 17 party members signed up to serve, while at a meeting in which a high level KMT leader gave a speech some 30 party members volunteered in a storm of applause. But the response at other branches was very different. In some cases a solemn and tense atmosphere prevailed and in other cases there was only deep indifference, with very low numbers, even down to the single-


190. Zhang Lisheng, “Dangwu shishi shang zhi wenti” (Problems in implementing party work), Zhongyang xunlian tuan, 1939, p. 9, cited in Wang Qisheng, Dangyuan, dangquan yu dangzheng, p. 313. Reflecting this impotency, the figures for punishment of party members in such an enormous organization were quite low.
digit range, even bothering to show up.\textsuperscript{191} Some ward party branches met the demand for volunteers. The 19th ward was one of these, but most seem not to have done so.\textsuperscript{192} During the call up period, when party ward branches were registering volunteers, the party branches (both \textit{qu} and \textit{fenbu} levels) were ordered to temporarily halt processing members’ transfers, suggesting that KMT party members were willing to transfer, even move their residence, in order to side-step the pressure to volunteer for the Youth Army.\textsuperscript{193} Thus, these reports give a mixed picture of the KMT party role in the IYVM. Even in Chongqing the results were uneven, while the situation in areas further from the capital was even less positive.

A different tool was needed, and that tool was the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps. In a postwar report, the Youth Corps crowed about its role in promoting the IYVM, claiming that combined Youth Corps efforts accounted for 93,000 recruits.\textsuperscript{194} Although this number is almost certainly inflated, it nonetheless points to the general effectiveness of the YC as a mobilization tool. What made the Corps so influential was not the Conference’s measure requiring members to volunteer, but the YC’s organizational and cultural assets which were deeply connected in the capital’s educational systems and institutions. On the publicity front, the YC sponsored a series of regular radio broadcasts by YC, government, and military authorities promoting the IYVM.\textsuperscript{195} In addition, the top tier of the YC’s leadership provided a significant amount of the leadership for the IYVM and Youth Army in late 1944 and 1945. In fact, Kang Ze and Jiang Jingguo made sure that the YC dominated both the IYVM recruitment apparatus and the YA, particularly its political administration and military leadership.

After the October IYVM conference things moved very quickly and by the end of December somewhere in the neighborhood of 125,000 youths had volunteered. The induction of the volunteers began, with the new official designation of Youth Expeditionary Force (\textit{Qingnian yuanzheng jun} 青年遠征軍), often shortened to just “Youth Army” (\textit{Qingnianjun} 青年軍), on 20 December 1944.\textsuperscript{196} This conference marked the dividing point between the CEF/IEF phase of the IYVM and the YA phase, when the Nationalist military and state began working to establish the YA as a \textit{domestic} army, not a specialized more highly trained force under the direction of the Allies in the India-Burma theater. It was, in short, the point at which the Nationalist authorities began actively creating a citizen-army of educated youth volunteers. While conscription had al-

\textsuperscript{191} qz0051.mj2-314, pp. 9-51b reports dated in October 1944; see also, qz0051.mj2-397, pp. 32-5 dated 12 January 1945.

\textsuperscript{192} The CQ KMT Executive Committee issued a directive that the 19th District did not need to resend YA recruits: it had filled its quota of 30 volunteers and had sent a political cadre as well; qz0051.mj1-397, p. 171a dated 12 January 1945.

\textsuperscript{193} qz0051.mj2-397, pp. 79a-80s n.d. In fact, the order for party branches to cease processing transfer requests was superfluous, except as an expression of the center’s frustration with its membership, as the party had long been unable to keep track of the mobility of its members.

\textsuperscript{194} Ma Lie, \textit{Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan}, p. 132, citing two reports in the Second Historical Archives: \textit{Jiunianlai de Sanminzhuyi qingniantuan} (九年前的三民主義青年團) and \textit{Dangtuan tongyi zuzhi zhongyao wenxian} (黨團統一組織重要文獻).

\textsuperscript{195} Ma Lie, \textit{Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan}, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{196} Jiang Yongjing, \textit{Guomindang xingshuai shi}, pp. 46-8. It should be noted that Jiang Yongjing has his dates wrong, putting this conference in November, when it was really held in October, 1944.
allowed China to survive – if only just barely – the protracted warfare, the methods and techniques conscription relied upon were not up to the task of creating this new elite force of committed citizen-soldiers. Turning away from compulsory methods for this task, Chiang and his government took a new approach to recruitment and offered destitute refugee students and teachers a whole suite of concrete benefits as incentive to volunteer. A close look at the benefits that the Nationalist state instituted to attract volunteers is in order, keeping in mind that these amounted to a serious attempt at reforming some of the fundamentals of Nationalist military service, namely the state-soldier relationship.

Material Motivations: Benefits and Rights

Nationalist leaders going all the way back to Sun Yatsen recognized the importance of benefits for securing the loyalty and courage of soldiers. Drawing on examples from American and European militaries, which provide decent salaries and retirement pay to their soldiers, Sun’s speech on the spiritual education of soldiers asserted that when comprehensive material benefits are provided by the country to its armed forces, the soldiers will willingly defend the nation to their deaths. But Sun’s observation was not put into practice until 1943-44 with the IYVM-YA. We will explore some of the intricacies of Sun’s theory and YA practice in the next chapter, but for now we turn to a straightforward account of the Nationalist government’s material provisions and promises for the youth volunteers.

As we saw earlier, the YA volunteers came from the educated stratum of students, teachers, and public servants. Because of rampaging inflation and the fact that they were on fixed salaries or food allowances, these groups had grown progressively desperate throughout the war. The Nationalist state had raised their expectations by expanding its social welfare role toward educated persons throughout the war. Increasingly precarious due to the flagging wartime economy and already heavily dependent on the state, these groups were quicker to respond to the state’s calls for soldiers, especially when those appeals were packaged not just with the trappings of patriotic duty, but with promises of very tangible benefits. However ineffectual and modest the government’s subsidies for educational circles were and however much Nationalist corruption and economic mismanagement fanned the flames of inflation, the fact remains that a large proportion of educated elites had for several years already accepted and lived off the same logic that the government would employ in the IYVM-YA: that participation in the war effort was repaid by state care and social welfare. The Nationalist authorities would tailor-make the IYVM to appeal to these groups by crafting a comprehensive benefits package for volunteers.

As the IYVM moved into high gear, the central government, through its main youth army administrative apparatus, the Guidance Committee, published a thorough scheme of “special treatment” (youdai 優待) to be granted to Youth Army volunteers and their families. It is per-

197. Sun Zhongshan, Junren jingshen jiaoyu, p. 20.
198. See GMWX, vol. 63, pp. 328-37. Even during the initial stage of recruitment for the IEF in 1943, state authorities expressed a new level of concern for the well-being of the volunteers, one unseen in previous treatment of regular conscripts. The Sichuan Provincial Government informed the 3AD that the Provincial Army District Command required blankets to be sent to cities and counties along Xu Siping’s route through Ziyang, Tongnan, Mianyang, and Chengdu, so that volunteers would not be cold as they traveled. Those who did not fulfill the minimum requirements after traveling to Luxian were guaranteed that they could return to their original schools and positions; qz0055.mj3-245, pp. 66a-b; sent in December 1943, received on 10 Jan
haps overly cynical to attribute the strong response to the Youth Army call up solely to the hard-headed calculation of material benefits the state promised in its “special treatment” regulations. For one thing, by 1944-45 there was widespread skepticism about the ability of the KMT regime to live up to its promises. Although it is hard to imagine it was not present among them as well, this suspicion was perhaps least entrenched among youth, especially refugee student youths who had been dependent upon and enjoyed an unprecedented level of support from the regime for most of the war already.

While many youths volunteered in hopes of enjoying the material benefits the state offered, they were not blind. Whatever else these refugee student youth may have been, they were not politically naive – the wartime experiences of Japanese invasion, occupation, and refugee flight that students lived through had ensured that they were not starry-eyed youths. They accepted the state’s offer of benefits in return for service, but they and their families were quite ready to call the state to account and insist on their rights when the terms of the “bargain” were not met. In fact, the state’s own propaganda apparatus referred to the benefit provisions as “rights” granted in return for service. Educated and able to bend local authorities’ ears, they were close to the arteries of administrative power and they were quick to resort to these when they felt it was necessary to remind the authorities of their due obligations. Significantly, the Nationalist government fulfilled its concrete promises to the volunteers, even when large segments of the Youth Army were demobilized in 1946. By and large the Nationalist state did honor its bargain with these citizen-soldiers.

The Youth Army’s material provisions, notably a generous food ration and increased pay, attracted refugee youth and underpaid professionals nearing destitution and were a litmus test of the state’s commitment to military renewal. The state ensured that the youth divisions had a diet with more meat and other scarce ingredients than was the case in regular divisions. As the model for an entirely reformed military, the Youth Army was charged with proving to critics and skeptics that the regime was capable of taking care of its new soldiers, its educated sons. Fulfilling its promises to these elite enlistees was important for changing society’s perception of the military. Chiang Kaishek personally decreed that the Youth Army was to combat the negative impression of the military administration as corrupt and soldiers as ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-kept by adhering to the much higher standards of the Indian Expeditionary Force in the provision of material and creature comforts. This would “guarantee a fixed living standard for officers and men” in the nine youth divisions and this was a significant attraction for young men who were often nutritionally deprived. Any rumors that the Youth Army was poorly treated were vigor-
ously denied by the youth soldiers. One youth wrote to the *Central Daily* specifically refuting newspaper articles which suggested his unit was not enjoying ideal conditions.\(^202\) Another wrote attacking rumors that they were sleeping in the open, eating poorly, and had poor relations with local civilians.\(^203\) Thus, while there are few indications of an over-abundance of food in the youth divisions, there was, according to many first-person and journalistic accounts, no real want either – for the most part the youth soldiers accepted small sacrifices and were content with “mid-grade” rice and food.

The fact that YA units were not given cash to purchase provisions, but supplied with actual foodstuffs was an important factor in maintaining morale and military discipline as it protected the youth soldiers from the negative effects of inflation on their diet.\(^204\) The commander of the 207D, Luo Youlun (羅友倫) bemoaned the drastic change in morale that shook his unit when (in 1946) it was converted from the YA system of providing real goods for rations to the usual practice in regular divisions of dispensing the cash equivalent. He immediately requested that the 207D be put back on the more desirable YA system.\(^205\) As we will see later, one of the concessions that the Nationalist state and military made to the intellectual youth volunteers was a considerable degree of control over food purchasing and preparation. For refugee youth suffering through material deprivation, this improved food was a significant incentive. In the words of one soldier, the “rice is white … and it has no sand in it. [We] have vegetables, meat, and even soup, all of which is much better than the food in our original workplaces. We are grateful to the authorities that in this time lacking in pleasant surprises, they were able to manage things so completely and appropriately.”\(^206\)

The Nationalist regime was careful to extend benefits to the families of the volunteers as well. This was partially motivated by the fact that underneath the propaganda veneer of united families sending their sons to enlist, the volunteer drive had in fact encouraged delinquency among the youths. Volunteers who were not separated from their natal families often had to go against their sense of duty to their families, and at times the express wishes of their parents, to sign up at all. While the state never explicitly opposed the demands of family, the IVYM could not avoid putting many of the volunteers, and presumably many who ultimately did not sign up, on the horns of a dilemma: choose between duty to family or duty to country. Interestingly, neither the state's propaganda nor the youth-soldier writings shy away from portraying this internal dilemma; many of the letters and autobiographical accounts published in various forms portray this difficult choice in some detail, though the outcome is always a foregone conclusion. One would-be volunteer was “hindered” by his concern for an overworked mother, a naive younger brother, and an over-protective grandmother. But, as with all these propaganda writings, in the end he declares that “I remain forever in the throes of this contradiction. … [but I] must step out

---

203. Ibid., p. 52.
204. General Albert Wedemeyer claims that he introduced this measure as a key reform for the Chinese military, originally implemented for the troops fighting in Burma (1945) and the ALPHA force with a central supply organization at Kunming which purchased grain and distributed it to the units under American operational control; Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports*, pp. 335-6.
205. Hu Guotai, p. 61, note #56.
206. HYQNJ, pp. 30-1.
of the bitter sea of contradiction by making my contribution to our endangered country.”207 Addressing those who had family still in occupied territory, the IYVM appeals relied on the desire of the refugee youth to retake the areas where their family still resided. Far from objecting relatives and with only their own consciences to wrestle with, floating youth were among the most responsive groups to the call for volunteers, but they too felt the internal tug of war. One volunteer wrote that he hesitated in enlisting because his parents and grandmother were in occupied territory. By volunteering he realized he was committing the “most bitter and painful” offense: “I have family worries, the responsibility of a son! If there is a thing in the world that is most bitter and painful, I believe that it certainly must be leaving one's personal [i.e., family] responsibility unrepaired.”208

Implicitly, the regime acknowledged that volunteers were being asked to turn their backs on family members who were often in need due to the war. Nationalist propaganda trying to establish an historical tradition of revolutionary youth soldiers went even further than these underhanded anti-family suggestions. Propaganda speeches and lectures, as well as prefaces to post-war accounts of the youth armies, stressed a “tradition” of revolutionary youth who “abandoned families” to fight for the revolution. The Righteous and Brave Army established by Sun in 1924 was invoked in some of these writings, as was the 1911 revolutionaries. Another frequently mentioned precedent was Chiang’s own contribution: the Northern Expedition, which was characterized by calling it a “turning point of the intellectual youths enlisting in the army.”209

The wartime Nationalist regime, while trying to maintain the household as the basis for its conscription system, actively encouraged youths to abandon families to enlist in the Youth Army. The propaganda writings predictably elide the open opposition that many youth encountered from parents, siblings, and other family members; nevertheless, presumably many who either never volunteered or who signed up and then failed to report for duty, did so because of the objections of their families. In Chongqing, one district cell of the KMT reported that the lackluster response to the IYVM drive among its members was because volunteering would only increase the burden of female family members, who were already shouldering an almost crushing burden supporting their families.210 In one sense, encouraging such rebellion against familial wishes amounted to state-sponsored delinquency, or at least an erosion of family authority by the state.211

207. GMWX, vol. 63, p. 349. Another volunteer argued with his family many times before he received “satisfactory permission” to join up. He still wrote a poem to express his conflicted feelings; Fang Jingzun, p. 152.


209. Ibid., p. 288. Early revolutionaries, such as Liang Qichao and Sun, did in fact regard the family as one of the primeval communities that were barriers to national unity.

210. qz0051.mj2-314, pp. 9-51b dated in October 1944; see also, qz0051.mj2-397, pp. 32-5 dated 12 January 1945.

211. From 1931 on, the Nationalist government had pursued various policies, including the creation of state-authorized customs and rituals, which appropriated to the state the authority once held by the elder generation in families and which subjected the family to the monitoring of state agencies; see Susan Glosser, Chinese Visions of the Family, p. 83. In other wartime contexts, however, KMT authorities were quite ready to adopt the opposite approach and make use of familial pressures to retard leftist political activism among educated youth. In Guizhou, authorities appealed to parents to pressure students involved in student unions and other
To mitigate the retarding effect family opposition could have on the volunteer drive, the Nationalist authorities provided a set of benefits for the families of the volunteers during the soldiers’ term of service. The institution the volunteer had worked in prior to enlisting was required to keep providing benefits to the family as if the youth was still working there. Family members were exempt from labor service, which was an onerous and regularly fatal duty for interior farmers. Sons, daughters and younger siblings of the volunteers received free medical benefits and could attend public schools tuition free. Creditors were explicitly denied the right to force repayment of debts during the youth’s two-year term. And landlords were not permitted to evict their families nor rent to other tenants premises currently occupied by the volunteers’ families. Finally, in a regulation obviously designed to protect soldiers’ status as familied-men, volunteers’ wives and even fiancées were explicitly forbidden to divorce or leave their husbands or fiancées. Wives of Nationalist soldiers took out announcements in the Central Daily, many of which called on their husbands to get in touch with them or the wife would seek immediate divorce. This was a serious problem for Nationalist China, as it had been for all modern regimes fighting long-term wars.

That the Nationalist state and military, unencumbered by the socialist ideals of sexual equality of its Communist rival, should also be concerned with – at least making a pretense of – securing the family life and fidelity of its soldiers is not surprising. Nonetheless, this regulation indicates the state’s symbolic commitment to the interests of its elite soldiery in guaranteeing the material interests and sanctity of the soldiers’ family life.

The state also put forward, in very plain language, regulations that granted student and youth professionals benefits in the future after the term of service had been completed. These benefits went far beyond the almost non-existent benefits for regular veterans. The youth soldiers were guaranteed their position (if already working) or their student status after their service was over – the original institution/school was explicitly forbidden to refuse the volunteers when they returned to their party, government, or educational jobs. Furthermore, any scholarship they had held was retained and the state promised to cover the youth soldiers’ living expenses and tuition if they returned to school. They were also granted the right to participate in examinations for entry into higher schools and those who took various state exams, including exams to qualify for overseas study, were to receive priority over non-Youth Army applicants. Even while the

suspected anti-government groups. Such efforts in 1938 succeeded, at least temporarily, in diverting some student activists into more cultural activities and groups; KRZZ, vol. 3:1, pp. 344-5.

212. Lü Fangshang, p. 113. The Nationalist government had issued a similar prohibition in the anti-CCP suppression campaigns in Jiangxi in the early 1930s; Glosser, Chinese Visions of the Family, p. 118. Leonard Smith’s account of French citizen-soldiers in World War I and the massive mutinies after the Second Battle of Aisne (1917) suggests that one of the soldiers’ many concerns was their wives and women in the rear areas: the lack of home leaves to be able to maintain those relationships helped undermine the soldiers’ confidence in their commanders and their willingness to fight; Leonard V. Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience, pp. 175-93.

213. See Judith Stacey, Patriarchy and socialist revolution in China, for a discussion of the CCP and Red Army’s commitment to preserving the patriarchal households of its male (peasant) soldiers. As Stacey notes, the CCP even encouraged wives, who had left their soldier-husbands and married other men to keep from starving, to return to their original husbands when they returned (sometimes after several years) from the war; pp. 133-4. It was not just the Youth Army that enjoyed this treatment.
youth was in the army however, their family members were to continue to enjoy whatever benefits they had received due to the youths' original position. In other words, the institution the youth volunteer had worked in prior to enlisting was required to keep providing benefits to the family as if the youth was still working there. A small subsidy was also to be paid out to the family by the state (exactly which level of government held this responsibility is not explicitly stated, my guess is local county/city units were saddled with this burden if it was ever implemented). In a more symbolic mode, once their service was over, the volunteers' original school or institution was ordered to erect a tablet or engraved monument with their names on it in honor of the volunteers.  

Not all of the benefits regulations were publicized openly however. The 269th meeting of the KMT Central Executive Committee deemed that some provisions were best kept secret. It decided that not only were the volunteers to be guaranteed their original positions after their term of service was concluded, but that they would continue to receive the full pay from their original job even while on active duty. The provision on benefits in case of death, disability, or injury from service was also extended, by adding a clause that their children were to be cared for by the state and the soldier’s original employer until they had reached adulthood, while those without children would have their spouses or closest relatives cared for until their death.  

There was intense social interest and concern over the publicized benefits for the Intellectual Youth Volunteers, seen most clearly in the requests for clarifications and rulings on specific cases. A key concern was what would happen when the volunteers’ original institution or school was abolished or reorganized. How did the volunteers, in such cases, retain or return to their original position? Another concern was for family members who get sick. Normally, they were dependent upon the volunteers, who would now be far from home and unable to care for their loved ones.  

The flip side of the issue concerned government agencies. Officially, government institutions were not to increase their staff when one of their number volunteered; the volunteers’ work was simply to be handled by other, already employed, staff members. If this measure had been enforced strictly government offices would have resisted the IYVM tooth and nail. Li Zemin (李澤民), the Ba county magistrate, complained to the 3AD that having to continue paying salaries of public servants, specifically the staff of the People’s Schools who had volunteered for the Youth Army, presented both a financial and staffing problem for the county. Teachers and staff were specialists, not easily replaced, and their specialized skills and knowledge meant that they were not interchangeable, which prevented shuffling their positions around or simply...
assigning the volunteers’ duties to someone else. The same was true for township Public Office personnel staff. His request to have the vacancies filled was approved, but his question about how the county was to manage to pay two people (the volunteer who had left and his replacement) for one position went unanswered.  

Responses to such concerns sometimes came through KMT party channels. A secret directive from the Central Executive Committee of the KMT went out to subordinate party branches in February 1945. The directive included a forwarded order from the national Guidance Committee on the service associations for volunteers in various socio-political institutions. Local party branches were to investigate whether the service associations were really reducing the youth volunteers’ worries about family members and dependents. The service associations’ main tasks were to help volunteers and their families by providing limited amounts of financial aid when family members encountered economic hardship due to illness or injury. In addition, service associations were given the responsibility of aiding family members secure the benefits they were entitled to: they were to help find job opportunities and make introductions to schools and employers when necessary. Such activities were explicitly couched in terms of “rights”: the service association was to assist volunteers’ families in securing their “rightful benefits” (各種優待權利). Such language, within the party and state apparatuses, indicates that these institutions were operating under a clear rubric of the dual nature of citizenship: rights and duties.

The government’s own language of “rights” created, reinforced, or reflected – exact causality is hard to pin down, and in the end perhaps irrelevant – an attitude of entitlement among the volunteers and their dependents, and thus, was at least partially behind the frequent petitions when volunteers or their families did not receive the expected and promised benefits. Quite often it was local officials – baojia heads were frequent offenders – who interfered with the disbursement of benefit money and aid. As educated people, the volunteers had both the literacy skills and familiarity with impersonal bureaucratic practices that made resorting to written petitions to various agencies possible.

When YA soldiers did not receive their due preferential treatment, their divisions could take the issue up with government institutions directly. Huang Xuanwei (黃宣威), a high divisional political cadre in the 201D, wrote several times demanding that Chongqing municipal authorities distribute preferential treatment to volunteers. One case involved one Yi Hualong (易化龍) and his dependents. When he was inducted, Yi’s wife had taken over his job to support the family. But the local baojia head knew there was no adult male in the house and so often made severe demands for money, to the point where Yi’s family had no way to make ends meet any longer. Yi requested the 201D’s political section to write the Chongqing municipal government to order the local baojia personnel to give the legally required dependents’ aid so that Yi “could serve with an easy heart.” This the political cadre did, issuing a missive to the city to get its baojia in line with the regulations. Another letter brought the case of Yu Dangchuan to the city’s attention.


220. qz0051.mj2-397 pp. 191a-b dated 1 February 1945. The service associations were not funded from state coffers, however. They had to secure contributions from non-volunteers and were ordered to organize traveling art exhibitions (遊藝會) to elicit donations from wider society. As was common in Nationalist organizations, the service associations were charged with an information gathering role: gathering statistical data on volunteers and keeping a close eye on any “unusual actions” (異動) or changes in their family members’ occupations or residence.
Yu’s case was similar to Yi’s: the baojia chief was simply not distributing the benefits that Yu’s family was entitled to. Although this second letter, written just days after Yi’s, uses much of the same language as the first, the tone is more rhetorical and exasperated, instead of outraged.221

The local baojia apparatus was not always predatory or obstructionist, however. Volunteers’ family members could and did turn to their local baojia heads to petition higher levels of government to fulfill the Youth Army benefits obligations. Zou Zheying 鄒哲瑩 volunteered for the IEF in India. He had graduated from middle school in November 1944, but like many volunteers, his family was in straitened circumstances, so after hearing Chiang’s national call to youth he went on his own to Chongqing to volunteer. Unusually, he was routed not into the Youth Army itself, but to the IEF in India. Still, according to law he and his dependent parents were supposed to receive both regular military family (known as “family peace funds”, anjia fei 安家費) and Youth Army “preferential treatment” benefits. But the payments were not being received. His request to have the family’s legally entitled support distributed went straight up through baojia channels: from jia head, to bao leader, and thence to the township chief.222

Significantly, there were people who saw the active support of the YA divisions and government agencies for the student soldiers and sought to extend this support into areas other than the strict benefit packages. A Jiangjin landlord whose son had volunteered and was in Bishan with the YA 201D petitioned the 3AD for help in dealing with a recalcitrant tenant. It was a straightforward case of a tenant not paying his rent, and had nothing to do with the YA or benefits, other than the son’s signature and status as a YA soldier prominently displayed. The 3AD scrawled on the petition that it was an issue for civil affairs court and it should not be handled by the administrative arms of the 3AD or county governments.223 What is interesting, of course, is that the appeal was made in the hope of linking civil disputes to the YA; clearly there was the impression that the YA would take care of its own.

Responding to these petitions and attitudes, the Youth Army administration actively solicited help from the national government in securing benefits for the volunteers, even after the war’s end. Luo Zhuoying, the head of the General Inspectorate of the Youth Army Organization and Training Bureau, reported to the Executive Yuan that some family members and dependents of volunteers had not yet received benefits after the volunteers had reported for duty. The office of Song Ziwen (head of the Executive Yuan) issued an order to the municipal government reiterating that YA soldiers and their families were to enjoy the benefits of soldiers as well as the special treatment provisions. We know that baojia units in Chongqing had denied benefits to non-local volunteers, because the order emphasized that benefits were to be distributed regardless of whether the volunteers were local boys or from other hometowns or provinces. The municipal government was ordered to ensure that its subordinate baojia units fulfilled the benefits provisions to the letter in order to “settle” the hearts and minds of the youth soldiers.224


222. qz0059.mj2-64, pp. 13-4b dated 12 April 1945. The petition included documentation that Zou Zheying’s proof of induction and school notification request were both on file, while certification of his present service in the IEF, from his company commander, was directly attached to the petition.

223. qz0055.mj3-388, pp. 32-3 dated 4 July 1945.

224. qz0053.mj13-47, pp. 48a-b dated 14 September 1945.
Selective State: The Examination of Volunteers

Given the well-publicized benefits that volunteers were to receive, the enthusiastic response to the volunteer drive is understandable and meant, in turn, that Nationalist military authorities could afford to be selective in who they let join. Selectivity fit nicely with the claim that the YA divisions were elite units. Despite statements by detractors that the Youth Army accepted anyone, in practice the selection process for the Youth Army was a new level of rigor in determining eligibility and suitability for military service.

The Nationalist state established standards in both academic and physical areas for the volunteers. The Military Administration Ministry’s “Student Volunteer Measures” (15 June 1944) set forward the procedures to be followed in the enlisting process and the requirements for volunteers, which were later revised and filled out by the national Guidance Committee. In order to be accepted into service the volunteer first had to pass an academic examination and then a physical inspection. Some post-1949 mainland accounts state that the youth army accepted anyone without regard to educational or physical standards, but the historical record is clear: the Nationalist regime turned away a sizeable number of willing volunteers, mainly for physical reasons. The Chengdu recruiting office, for example, reported a total of 5,094 recruits but just 2,229 of these men passed the physical examination; China-wide, a total of 19,912 volunteers were refused entry into the youth armies after the physical examination.

On the academic side, educational credentials and achievement were verified before the physical exam, with each recruit taking an oral examination. While we do not know the content of these oral tests, each volunteer was required to bring records of current or previous academic standing and/or work experience as proof of their educational level. Further, they were required to fill out application forms and write a short autobiographical account so that the local recruiting personnel could assess their education. The Chongqing recruiting committee required that all volunteers had to have both a “education” and (work) “qualifications” CV. Those without such documents were tested both in a written and oral exam. In areas away from the central government in Chongqing, academic standards were sometimes relaxed. One memoir account describes the registration process as involving an application, an examination (consisting of “a superficial essay”) and approval. The author confesses that he laid down a simple policy of approving all


226. A further example of the selectiveness in the process is found in the February 1944 campaign launched in the Santai area (in the Tongpeng Divisional District). The goal was for every village to supply ten men to the Expeditionary Army. The response was strong and over 1,000 men signed up, but from this pool of recruits a mere 166 passed the two-step examination process. GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 197, 224, and 199-200. Such examples are common in the archival record as well. In Dazu, only 65 volunteers were accepted out of 182; qz0055.mj3-279, p. 28 dated 16 February 1944. Later in the year, only 161 out of 320 volunteers passed the physical inspection in the county; qz0055.mj2-621, pp. 99a-b dated 18 December 1944. Rongchang county reported a similar experience; qz0055.mj3-276, p. 74 dated 26 July 1944.


- 311 -
applicants. Those who passed this examination process were given forms for a physical exam-ination which they were to take to to an assigned location for bodily inspection.

In Chongqing, where the density of modern medical institutions was highest, physical exams were conducted by doctors, health workers, or nurses at several different locations in and around the city. To prevent fraud, each recruit had to sign the physical exam form and this signature was compared with those on earlier forms to prevent substitutes from standing in for the physical exam. The National Training Committee's report stated that the examinations were "carried out completely in accordance with the regulations' standards, and therefore the recruits' physiques were all very healthy and strong." The content of the physical exam consisted of basic bodily measurements (height, weight, waist and chest circumference, and visual acuity) as well as inspections of air passages (nose, ears, lips, mouth, neck, abdomen glands, liver, sex organ, and anus.) Also included were small spaces for comments on the nervous system, "language," and "spirit." By 2 October 1944, Chongqing's local Youth Army administration had turned away 1,128 volunteers because they had failed the physical examination. The majority of those were due to serious trachoma (634 cases, or 56.21%).

---

228. Zhang Kaixuan, p. 142. The writing of an autobiography was a common device for evaluating candidates for KMT party membership and baoji personnel as well and we will return to its significance in the following chapter.

229. Municipal Health Bureau, Municipal Hospital, nurses at the Committee's Examination Office, Jiangsu Medical School’s Auxiliary Hospital at Beibei, Shanghai Medical School’s Auxiliaiy Hospital at Geleshan, Central Hospital at Gaotanyan, Health Bureau’s Qingmuguan Health Station at Qingmuguan, Shaci Hospital at Shapingba, Municipal Residents Hospital, the Red Cross Clinic at Fuzich, and the Renji Hospital in N’an.

230. GMWX, vol. 63, p. 305. As noted earlier in the discussion of age statistics however, this report is somewhat undercut by the new regulations issued just a couple months after the original (October 1944) ones. In late December, the committee issued a reminder and reiteration that those who failed the physical exam were not, under any circumstances, to be allowed to enlist; GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 196-7. This suggests that at least some local recruiting offices were not adhering to the physical requirements as closely as the national committee would have liked.

231. Copies of the (blank) forms used by the Chongqing recruiting office, along with statistical tables on the Chongqing recruits, can be found in GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 229-38. Using a system of points, this cursory exam divided volunteers into three passing grades. The original “Student Volunteer Measures” (issued 15 June 1944 by Junzhengbu) laid down the actual physical standards and some preliminary procedures for the enlistment process. The volunteer's school doctor or county/city public health organ was to do a preliminary physical exam. Minimum requirements for males were: height, 152 cm; weight, 46 kg; chest circumference, 76 cm; eyes, ears, lips, nose, tongue, four limbs, and lungs had to be normal; no serious trachoma, hemorrhoids, or nervous disorders; GMWX, v. 62, pp. 188-90 and Hu Guotai, p. 54. Of the 3,634 passing volunteers in Chongqing, the breakdown was: Grade A, receiving 80 points or above, 512 people (14.09%); Grade B with 70-79 points, 2,761 people, 76.02%; Grade C, qualifying with 60-69 points, 359 people, 9.85%; GMWX, vol. 62, p. 235. For another statement of both the physical and educational requirements see GMWX, vol. 63, p. 326.

232. GMWX, vol. 62, p. 236, table. However, this number is one off from the numbers given in the previous two pages: 4,671 volunteers with 3,634 passing, leaves 1,127 who did not pass inspection.
tation was hemorrhoids, reflecting the poor diet in wartime Sichuan (157 cases, or 13.92%).\textsuperscript{233}

Height and weight restrictions prevented another 159 volunteers from joining up (14.1% of those who did not qualify).\textsuperscript{234}

In Chongqing, the municipal administrative agency set up 32 registration offices in schools and various other suitable locations. After collecting the recruits, they were organized into eight large units for supervision. Reception stations were placed along routes to their barracks and the

\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{233.} Another regulation reiterated the importance of eyesight in the physical requirements for entry: colorblind or night-blind people were not accepted, but those who were near-sighted or had only mild cases of trachoma were not disqualified if they met all other criteria; GMWX, vol. 63, p. 337.

\textbf{234.} The central authorities decided that women volunteers would not be allowed to leave China’s borders to serve alongside the male youths in the IEF, but would be restricted to “aid work” inside the country; \textit{Dagongbao}, 8 January 1945. That decision was soon revised to allow the possibility of sending them to India, but the bureaucratic consternation at the response of female youths continued, and resulted in a conference in mid-January 1945, chaired by Cheng Zerun. The conference cited the US and UK examples of permitting women to “wage war” in auxiliary roles and decided that women should “not be limited due to their sex” and would be allocated roles on the basis of their skills, ability and strength, but only after “going through a rigorous examination and physical check-up, to ensure that they are of pure quality”; \textit{Dagongbao}, 12 January and 10 February 1945 and GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 255-6. Despite this progressive sounding statement and the fact that female volunteers did serve in auxiliary roles (most notably in nursing and communications), in fact in the bureaucratic “reality” set up by the Nationalist state, an “intellectual youth” was, by default, a male. In fact, there were female volunteers who were trained under Youth Army auspices, but their physical examinations were handled quite differently. Women were required to have the same age and educational standards as their male counterparts, and the physical standards for male recruits were, with one exception, to be applied to the female youths as well (the height requirement for women was set at 150 cm, two centimeters shorter than for males; GMWX, vol. 62, p. 227. Most often, however, officials avoided stressing the physical examination of female volunteers or that they were subject to any sort of physical requirements more stringent than require the women to “be healthy” or have a “strong and healthy physique.” (See for example, GMWX, vol. 62, p. 255 and vol. 63, p. 330.) In many localities physical inspections of female recruits were not carried out with the same degree of thoroughness as with male volunteers. Chengdu, while failing a large percentage of its male volunteers, did not administer any physical examination to female recruits “because of difficulty with [implementing] the regulations”; GMWX, vol. 62, p. 197. The reported numbers of volunteers from many locales often suggest that physicals were administered only to males – often the entire complement of female recruits from a district were sent on to assembly areas or training bases, as was the case in Dazu where in contrast with the 50% rejection rate for male recruits, all 35 of the female volunteers were accepted; qz0055.mj2-621, pp. 99a-b dated 18 December 1944. This suggests that authorities avoided inspecting female bodies. And at least in the few cases which make mention of the locations of barracks for female enlistees, they seem to have been kept well separate from the male units. For example, in Shanghang (Fujian), the 209th division under general Wen Mingjian, in addition to its usual compliment of infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering, and information/communications sections also had two units (of unspecified size) of Guangdong females attached to it. The divisional headquarters was located in a large building inside the county city’s walls. The (male) soldiers were bivouaced on the east side of the city, while the female student units were stationed in a primary school on the western side; Lai Zheming, p. 53.
\end{flushleft}
enlistees were then shipped off to start their military training. Much of the actual administration of the Youth Army recruitment and processing was carried out by specially organized agencies that mobilized local governmental resources and the Youth Corps, not the divisional or regimental districts, and thus almost completely bypassed the usual conscription administration.

Recruitment by Civilian: A New Mode

It was local governments, or rather specially created recruitment committees that drew on a range of agencies and social groups, that were responsible for implementing the recruitment drive, with four levels of recruiting administration: the central/national, the provincial/municipal, the county/municipal, and schools. The lack of real involvement by the military administration meant that the state relied on a different set of institutions which, while connected to local schools, were not embedded in local society in the same entangling ways that the baojia apparatus was. The movement required close cooperation from the local and provincial branches of the Three People's Principles Youth Corps, the KMT party itself, and other non-governmental groups. The official regulations for local Youth Army administration and institutions stipulated that local recruiting groups were to include representatives from “relevant schools, mass associations, and local gentry.” The local committees were selected by local official and met once a week.

Not surprisingly, the recruitment figures indicate that the south and southwest, being close to the central government, were the most active in recruitment and sent the largest numbers of enlistees to training bases. Sichuan far and away ranked first, supplying a total of 26,029 recruits. Then the municipality of Chongqing provided a total of 6,772 enlistees. Due to the Japanese occupation of intervening areas which restricted communication and travel to and from Chongqing, the southeastern provinces (including Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, and Guangdong) were under a special administrative branch. The southeastern branch, based in Jiangxi and under Huang Wei's leadership, was separate from the Chongqing based General Inspectorate, the central government's main administrative organ responsible for the Youth Army. Nevertheless, this semi-independent southeast branch had good results: Guangdong and Jiangxi ranked third and fourth in recruiting with totals of 4,018 and 2,495 volunteers respectively. Perhaps Jiangxi's close ties to Jiang Jinggou, one of the key players in the politics surrounding the Youth Army, is behind the strong showing of these provinces. Yunnan and Guizhou ranked fifth and sixth, signing up 1,938 and 1,461 individuals. Hubei was close behind Guizhou's total with 1,407 and Hunan fell in eighth place (1,184). Proximity (geographically, militarily, and politically) to the central government was key in determining the response of the local intellectual youths. Distant areas, with difficult communications and transportation routes to the central government, had little incentive to meet the quotas assigned to them, and naturally

236. Ibid., pp. 321 and 323. For the complete breakdown of local committees and their specific functions, see pp. 322-6.
237. Huang Wei, p. 67.
238. All figures here taken from the table in GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 224-6. These figures are much lower than other sources, and do not reflect substantial numbers that enlisted after January 1945.
occupied areas provided few recruits since propaganda and recruitment were nearly impossible there. \(^{239}\)

While the general direction, purpose, and overall drive behind the IYVM was controlled by the national state and its apparatuses, and thus reflected the high-level politics of the time, much of the hands-on administration was carried out by local units of government. This could lead to problems when limited central oversight combined with insistent demands for results. Zhang Kaixuan’s account of the Gansu provincial IYVM administration serves as an example of these kinds of problems. The geographical distance from Chongqing exacerbated the degree of local power in Gansu vis-à-vis the central government. The Gansu recruitment committee was headed by three men, each an important leader in the provincial government, the provincial KMT party structure, and the provincial branch of the Youth Corps. The committee made three demands that it felt were necessary to conduct its business and fulfill its mission. First, there were to be no restrictions on personnel – they were assured that anyone who they deemed necessary to work with them would be required to do so. Second, they demanded unlimited access to vehicles and transportation facilities, extremely precious commodities during the war. And finally, they felt entitled to unlimited funding. Making sure that all personnel positions were filled with Gansu natives, the head of the administration pocketed many of the funds earmarked for medicine and other supplies. When some provincial judges tried to avoid working for the recruitment committee, pressure was put on the provincial head to motivate the errant judges to make time for Youth Army business. With this sort of power and nearly limitless funds, the committee was only half-jokingly called the “United Office of Lanzhou’s agencies,” because it controlled the most important collection of powers and resources. Other institutions in Gansu, including the Northwest Road Authority, established their own recruitment committees – perhaps in competition for political and material resources – but the provincial organ in this instance remained overwhelmingly dominant. \(^{240}\) These problems were not surprising given the central government’s delegation of responsibility and authority to local governments; still the problems surrounding the Youth Army administration were not on the order of local embeddedness that we have seen in the regular conscription administration as these local governments were more responsive to central demands than was the case with conscription.

We know from the memoirs of a Shaanxi township head that after receiving orders in 1944 Fengxian county set up the required committee in accordance with the regulations: the county head, Liu Hanzhi was its chairman; the local KMT party-secretary and the Youth Corps branch secretary, Liang Weixia, held vice-chairmanships. \(^{241}\) Other members on these committees included local township heads, middle school principals, and chamber of commerce members. County

---

239. See for example, the account of Yihuang county (Jiangxi), roughly 100km south of Nanchang in the Jiangxi mountains; Wu Zhirong, p. 31. In February 1944, the county established the necessary local recruiting committee, staffing it with only five members. During 1944, the county raised only 47 volunteers. The addition of recruits from a provincial school brought the total to well over 100, but these added volunteers were not officially counted in the county’s total since they came from a provincial institution. The Yihuang recruits were incorporated into the 622 regiment of the 208th division. The province of Shaanxi was saddled with a quota of 8,000 recruits; it proved an impossibly high goal; Rong Bida, p. 53.

240. Zhang Kaixuan, pp. 141-2; Zhang was a member of the recruiting committee.

241. Rong Bida, pp. 52-3.
governments, via their Citizen Militia units, were responsible for the initial military provisions for the recruits. Because local governments were responsible for attracting the volunteers, there were many variations in the exact methods used. Commonly, however, local authorities relied on the Youth Corps, school authorities, and professional organizations (fatuan) to mobilize social and financial support. Professional associations and the Youth Corps, for example, were often responsible for putting together an enthusiastic send-off for the volunteers. Thus, while the precise constellations of people and organizations in most localities remains hidden from view, the role played by the Youth Corps at all levels (national, municipal, and local) is obvious.

Santai, shortly after Xu Siping’s late 1943 visit, was the first locality organized for intellectual youth volunteer recruitment. As this was the initial phase, Xu had met with both military conscription authorities as well as civilian elites of gentry and social associations in Santai and the surrounding areas. Shortly after his trip, local government and military authorities, including the Santai district head, Wu Yexiang (吳業祥), cabled the central government suggesting that the youth volunteers provided an opportunity to reform the conscription administration in general. After receiving general “encouragement,” Wu and the acting military commander in the area, Li Huajun (李華駿), involved local school authorities. By the end of the week, the district government had issued orders and made preparations for establishing a New Recruit Unit of the Expeditionary Army. By early December, Santai county had conducted physical exams on over 630 individuals, and approved 213 of them for service. Anticipating what would later become official regulations stipulating that funding for food and barracks (construction and maintenance, etc.) were the responsibility of the recruiting locality, the Santai county government prepared camp accommodations, clothing, bedding, and other items. On 25 December, the recruits were accepted into their military camps. In the first instance of what would become an important Youth Army ritual, each school “sent off” its students to join the army. Although some limited training (tactics classes and speeches by military superiors) was begun, the Santai recruits were not that separate from their community yet – visitations by fathers, elder brothers and wives all continued. For the recruits, nighttime was filled with military songs and general excitement. District head Wu went daily to the camp to eat meals with the student-soldiers, to talk with them “just like family, father and sons.”

Other localities were not far behind Santai, with a flurry of recruitment activity in the counties around the capital. The area that we know most about is Sichuan generally, and of course, specifically the 3AD and the Chongqing municipal committee. Jiangbei, Dazu, and Ba counties all carried out successful recruitment drives in the late autumn of 1943 and delivered quotas of volunteers for the IEF in early 1944. The Dazu county magistrate, Guo Honghou (郭鴻厚), in his report on the recruitment efforts in his county requested a citation of merit for those

242. Huang Wei, p. 67.
244. See GMWX, vol. 63, p. 328, for this regulation.
246. Ba county sent a contingent of 306 recruits, part to Luxian and part taken in by the divisional district; qz0055.mj3-279, pp. 9 and 28 dated 3 January 1944 and 29 February 1944. The unspecified number of recruits sent to the divisional district were almost certainly volunteers who failed the physical or scholastic exams and were deemed not fit for the IEF.
responsible, despite the fact that the county failed to meet the assigned quota. Recruiting efforts in the county were most successful in the schools, particularly the county-run middle school and its parent institution, Jianyi Normal College (簡易師範). Students and teachers, along with those who had held low-level administrative positions in local administration (such as ward heads) were the main respondents to the call up drive.\textsuperscript{247} Events in Jiangbei were similar, but recorded in more detail. The county magistrate, Huang Yongwei (黃永偉), in his report to the 3AD stressed that because the volunteer movement to man the IEF "relates to [China’s] international reputation, this office dare not be careless" in carrying out the order to "speedily select and deliver 300 men" to the Luxian inspection station as an "emergency replacement" drive for the IEF.\textsuperscript{248}

One feature of note in these short reports from 1943 and early 1944 is that counties received orders and quotas from divisional districts, as well as the provincial government. In Jiangbei, magistrate Huang Yongwei was under pressure from both sides. Another salient feature was the frequent involvement of the local Citizen Militia. In December 1943, the central government stipulated that intellectual youth volunteers were, "without exception" to be trained and organized by "training battalions" set up in localities and were to be treated (paid) as soldiers first class. As recounted above, Sichuan established the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Training Battalions (the 4th-8th were located in other provinces), which were in operation for military training of recruits destined for service in the India Expeditionary Force, under American auspices; the training battalions were disbanded in 1945 with the opening of the China-India road.\textsuperscript{249} However, counties still provided rudimentary organization and training through the Citizen Militia, the most prominent local repository of military expertise in county seats. A second development was the send-off celebrations for the recruits. Localities were supposed to organize these for regular conscripts, but that rarely occurred. Youth volunteers, however, were treated to elaborate celebrations and various "comfort measures": not only were the original counties required to organize these send offs, but towns and cities along the route to their base areas were ordered to provide provisions, treats, souvenirs, and streets lined with enthusiastically cheering crowds to welcome the volunteer detachments.\textsuperscript{250}

\textsuperscript{247} Led by the vice-commander of the county’s Citizen Militia, Yang Jianmin (楊建民), 182 volunteers left the county seat on 26 December 1943, but only 65 were accepted into the IEF. 98 were routed into regular military units; 15 were rejected completely; and 4 had fled along the way; qz0055.mj3-279, pp. 11-3 and 28 dated December 1943 and 16 February 1944.

\textsuperscript{248} Huang called an urgent conscription conference of institutions and dispatched delegates to each and every village and township in the county and himself toured various communities as well. In contrast to Dazu and Ba counties, Jiangbei met the quota: conducting the mandated physical exams and selecting 304 “robust and strong recruits,” organized into two companies (中隊), led by two militia training officers. The county notified the Yujiang DD and the Shipping Management Office of the Junzhengbu, which dispatched a steamer, the Minyu (民裕) to ferry the recruits to Chongqing. On 17 January 1944, the county organized a huge “send off” celebration for the new recruits, with “excited” participation and gift giving. It was an “unprecedented” event in the county; qz0055.mj3-279, pp. 15-7 and 34 dated 8 January 1944 and 14 February 1944.


\textsuperscript{250} qz0055.mj3-245, pp. 226a-6b dated January 1945: Sichuan Provincial chairman, Zhang Qun, to
Unfortunately, the progress of the second phase of the IYVM in 3AD counties remains murky. The reports on file in the Chongqing Municipal Archives from these counties are not only quite pro forma, often simple statements of numbers sent or quotas filled, but also spotty. Many locales reported exceeding their quota of volunteers, but no full account of the movement’s apparatus and trajectory and no adequate sequence of numbers of volunteers and recruits is extant. One consistent element from the earlier (IEF) phase, however, is the reliance on Citizen Militia to escort recruits to Chongqing for inspection and induction into the Youth Army.

There were reports of local officials attempting to interfere with the IYVM. The 3AD heard that in Bishan, for example, village heads were actually detaining parents of volunteers in order to get the recruits to return home, presumably so that the youths could continue to support their families and the local officials could pocket the “family comfort money.” The county was ordered to clamp down on such abuses, but there is no further indication of whether they continued.251

The county for which a sequence of reports is available is Yongchuan. In mid-1944, the county magistrate, Yang Zishou (楊子壽), reported that a series of small groups of volunteers had been sent to the military’s training regiments.252 Then in December, Yang filed a report with the 3AD summarizing the year’s IEF recruitment. There had been four periods of recruiting in the county and each period had resulted in 150 volunteers. But the county had not been strict about delineating these from the regular conscription quota and had sent the youth volunteers to the divisional district, which had officers that selected (from among the conscripts) those that met the requirements for service in the IEF. This was not exactly standard practice as IEF recruits were supposed to be recruited and handled separately from regular conscription. In contrast to its sloppy accounting of IEF recruits, Yongchuan kept the Youth Army volunteer efforts distinct: the quota of 200 intellectual youth volunteers was more than met, with two batches of nearly 130 volunteers sent to the training regiments and another batch of 140 still assembling in the county seat.253 Despite the strong showing in 1944, the county experienced unnamed difficulties in the following year and failed to meet its quota.254 What is notable about this admittedly scanty information is that the county, despite being so close to the capital, was still not following the regulations, but continued to select recruits for the IEF from the pool of regular “conscripts” (zhuangding 壯丁), while it was careful to follow the regulations for the Youth Army. Another county that filed a more substantive report with the 3AD was Dazu. In late 1943, the county formed its 15 member mobilization committee and borrowed the facilities of the Mass Education School (民眾教館), but the response at first was “not terribly enthusiastic.” So the committee called together various schools, government institutions, and local organs to hold a large rally at the KMT party county branch office to propagate the movement and distribute materials like Chiang’s “Call to Youth.” The meeting was a success and resulted in propaganda troupe...
sent out to every township. Within a few weeks, the county registered 53 male and 42 female youth volunteers. The committee was somewhat at a loss as to how to deal with the females and requested that they be included in the IYVM quota for the county.\textsuperscript{255} The recruitment efforts in the county continued with the help of local institutions. By mid-December, it had signed up 320 males and 35 females, with 161 men and all 35 of the women passing inspection. The county sent a further 201, exceeding its quota by 1, to the training regiments in early 1945.\textsuperscript{256} The progress of the IYVM during late 1944 and early 1945 in other counties remains largely unrecoverable, but the spotty reports available indicate that similar constellations of local government, schools, the KMT, county Citizen Militia, and social organizations were at work. Counties generally met their Youth Army quotas in 1944, but shortfalls were common in 1945.\textsuperscript{257} Whether this was caused by administrative factors, social resistance, or a simple dearth of remaining youths who were eligible is not clear.

The situation in Chongqing was more complicated than in the outlying counties of the 3AD, but we have the minutes from the Youth Volunteers Send-Off Committee’s induction ceremony planning meeting (late December 1943) and the minutes from the Capital All-Sectors Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement’s fourth planning conference in early 1944 (19 February) to flesh out the outlines of the IYVM in the city.

The Send-Off committee planned an elaborate event for the volunteers to mark their entry into military life. We will look closely at the significance and meanings of this ritual for the youth soldiers in the next chapter, but here want to touch on the administrative aspect of the Chongqing volunteer movement. The committee consisted of representatives from a broad range of Chongqing-based institutions, with each participating institution responsible for providing a quota of enthusiastic participants.\textsuperscript{258} The induction ceremony for these IEF-bound volunteers

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{255} qz0051.mj2-621, pp. 16a-7a dated 24 November 1943.
\item \textsuperscript{256} qz0055.mj2-621, pp. 21-2 dated November 1944; pp. 99a-b dated 18 December 1944; and pp. 76a-b dated 21 March 1945.
\item \textsuperscript{258} Representatives from the Central YC branch, Chongqing’s Conscription Bureau, the municipal KMT party branch; MAC’s Political Bureau; CQMG; CQ YC branch; CQ Garrison Command; CQ Social Bureau; CQ Education Bureau; CQ Police Bureau; China Movie Studio; Municipal Defense Corps; Workers Service Corps; All-Nation Comfort Committee; CQ Chamber of Commerce; CQ Recruitment Committee. The total was to be 1500 people, in addition to the volunteers. The CQ KMT party branch, and the CQ Youth Corps were each to mobilize 150 members; the CQ Education Bureau provided 150 students and 150 boy scouts; the CQMG 100 baqia personnel; the Workers Service Corps 100 workers; the CQ Chamber of Commerce 50 merchants; the CQ Farmers Association, 50 farmers; the CQ Women’s Association, 100 women; the CQ Citizen Militia 250 militia members; and the municipal Defense Troupe, 250 corpsmen.
was held on Christmas Day and at the Fuzichi New Life Square (夫子池新生活動），the same location where the celebration of the abrogation of the Unequal Treaties was held earlier in the year (on 5 February 1943). The meaning of the IEF and the youth volunteers could hardly have been stated in clearer terms; the symbolic overlay of the youth volunteers, as China’s contribution to an international mission, with the Allies renunciation of the imperialist treaties, was a clear statement of China’s new international status as a Great Power and an equal with Britain, the United States, and Russia. Short inspiring speeches by various local and national leaders were given. In contrast to much of the daily operations of recruitment apparatus, the funding for the send-off celebration was at least partially provided by government sources, as well as central and local party branches and the Youth Corps. A few months later in February, Chongqing’s fourth planning conference for the IYVM was held at the headquarters of the Chongqing Youth Corps, with representatives from YC branches, the city Education Bureau, the Social Bureau, Police Bureau, and the MSO present. Aside from the impressive list of participating institutions, what is most striking in both these documents is the prominence of the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps in the city. This level of Youth Corps involvement is just not present in the reports from the outlying counties.

These conferences in late 1943 and early 1944 suggest that the Chongqing YC was rapidly expanding its involvement in the IYVM. The YC would soon come to play key roles in nearly every facet of the youth volunteer movement, including fund raising efforts. The February conference noted that funding was falling short, and authorized the Youth Corps branches and the General Committee for Comfort Work to cast their nets widely and request additional funds from the Police, the Social Bureau, municipal government, Chamber of Commerce, Chongqing’s political council, the Bank Union, KMT party branch, the Factory Union, the Transportation Authority, and the Education Bureau. Ren Juewu (任覺伍) was chairman for this conference. A Sichuan native, from Duijiang (都江), Ren (1900-1994) was a Whampoa student, a member of the Society for Vigorous Practice, a KMT party elder and a major figure in the Youth Corps. He was part of the group that Chiang dispatched to Italy and Germany to study fascism in the fall of 1932 and he had been heavily involved with the consolidation of central control over Sichuan in the mid-1930s. He was also the author of an introductory book on Sun Yatsen’s world view and social philosophy (Wei sheng lung yu min sheng shiguan 唯生論與民生史觀, 1934), and a short 18 page pamphlet The Philosophical Foundations of the Three People’s Principles (三民主義的哲學基礎, 1941). In 1938 when the YC was established, he was made vice-head of the central organization office. Before long he was transferred to the post of chief of the Sichuan YC branch and then in 1945, appointed head of the Chongqing YC branch and concurrently chief of the municipal education bureau. In 1947, when the YC and KMT were combined, he was appointed to the central committee of the KMT and sent to Kangding to oversee the merging of the Xikang party and YC organizations.

While the YC began to ramp up for the second phase of the IYVM, the military administration’s already limited role was slowly drawing to a close. In the summer months of 1944, the Sichuan provincial district command issued orders for a new round of recruitment. Orders to the

259. The proportion of the 55,000 yuan budget provided from each source is not stated in the record of the meeting. qz0094.mj10-34, pp. 75-8 dated 19 February 1944.
260. qz0094.mj10-34, pp. 75-8 dated 19 February 1944.
3AD stressed that the First and Second training regiments of student volunteers in Sichuan had already trained 3,000 volunteers, and won praise by the Allies for their service in India. The youth volunteer detachments were performing an important dual role of helping to reform military service and raising China’s international stature. Now, the headquarters continued, as Allied victory was being forged and the moment when defeat was turning to victory was right at hand, the responsibility of Chinese was increased 100-fold: the key task was opening the China-India and China-Burma Roads to allow foreign aid to flood into China and increase its strength in anticipation of the impending Allied counter-attack. Such participation would establish firmly China’s “independence and freedom” in the international community. This kept the IEF aspect of recruitment active for a few months more, as the Sichuan provincial district forwarded orders and quotas from the Junzhengbu to the administrative districts and divisional districts in the summer of 1944. Each divisional district was given a minimum quota of 300 volunteers, and a deadline for August 1st to organize and induct them into units. The divisional districts in turn set the quotas for each county and municipality. But localities were not pleased with yet another military service quota. One method of trying to minimize the burden was to collapse the earlier IEF volunteers into the newer Youth Army quota. The Sichuan Provincial IYVM Recruiting Committee had to issue strict orders to the 3AD prohibiting such practices, stressing that the autumn 1944 requirement of volunteers were a new, and additional, quota on top of the one for the IEF.

Indications are that localities were not particularly responsive to these IEF quotas in 1944, treating them as only marginally important. The lax implementation of this summer recruiting initiative was quite possibly responsible for the change of direction initiated by Chiang for the fall during the October conference launching the second phase of the IYVM, which would be dominated by the Youth Corps. From this point on the purpose was decidedly different; no longer was it a drive to recruit for the American-dominated IEF, but to establish China’s own elite Youth Army. The statement of official motivation for this second phase was to “raise the level of quality of the armed forces, increase counterattack strength, and timely and effectively coordinate with the Allies converging attack [on Japan].” With this new purpose and reinvigorated by the Youth Corps’ heavy involvement, the second phase of the IYVM kicked into high gear. Following on the heels of the national conference in October, the central government passed the law requiring local governments to set up official Youth Army offices on 25 October 1944. From this point on, localities responded conscientiously; before a week was out, the Sichuan Provincial IYVM Recruitment Committee and Chongqing’s Municipal Intellectual Youth Volunteer Recruiting Committee had both formally begun operations. The Sichuan provincial committee held its first meeting on 1 November at the headquarters of the Sichuan Province Youth Corps Branch. Also holding its inaugural meeting on 1 November, the Chongqing committee was chaired by the mayor, He Yaozu. Its 35 members included representatives from a broad array of municipal institutions and included the Chongqing Youth

---

261. qz0055.mj3-259, pp. 43a-3b dated July 1944.

262. Partially compensating for this – though likely not a huge factor in outlying areas – volunteers from central government institutions stationed in a locale were to be counted as fulfilling the locality’s recruitment quota; qz0055.mj2-621, pp. 13-4b n.d.


264. qz0055.mj2-621, pagination unreadable; document received by 3AD on 21 November 1944.
Corps cadre, Ren Juewu; secretary of the city’s YC branch, Luo Cairong (羅才榮); and the Chongqing police chief, Tang Yi. The committee was not only responsible for the city of Chongqing, but for 40 counties in eastern Sichuan as well. Each locality was again assigned a quota of youths. Chongqing was allotted a total of 2,600 and the eastern counties were given a combined quota of 2,400.

Beginning in mid-November 1944, the Chongqing municipal committee targeted its propaganda work “mainly [at] school and professional youth.” The committee pressured reporters and school authorities to hold discussion assemblies to promote the movement. With the cooperation of school authorities, municipal KMT party organization, and branches of the Youth Corps, the committee organized lectures and other forms of information dissemination designed to explain the “significance of joining up” and to “inspire [the students’] conscience about serving the country and to encourage a mood of offering their service [to the nation].”

Dignitaries and party, government, and corps personnel lectured at schools. The committee organized three major propaganda meetings in cooperation with KMT and YC on 6, 7, and 8 December 1944. An administrative apparatus to handle and process volunteers was set up quickly, but thoroughly, with eight units for collecting basic information on the recruits as they volunteered. The KMT party and the YC cooperated in forming a registration network: a central Registration Office with 32 branches in the city and environs.

The result in the first two months far exceeded the predicted response. The new school-based recruiting was very effective, with more than 70% of the volunteers being students. Registration was supposed to be finished by end of November, but because the numbers were so strong, the committee decided to continue registration until the end of December. Three dormitories or camps where volunteers were processed and housed before being dispatched to their Youth Army units were located at Qingmuguan (青木關), Beibei, and Ciqikou. The recruits’ educational status was documented or verified by an oral exam. Only after these intellectual hurdles were passed were recruits given their health exams at various public health institutions and hospitals in and around the city.

Chongqing was a special situation as it had to deal with difficulties not faced by other localities: Chongqing Committee’s sphere of geographical responsibility included eastern Sichuan’s 40 counties, so recruits from distant locations flooded into the city to volunteer or to be processed before being shipped to their units. Between 15 November 1944 and 25 January 1945 (just 72 days), over 8,673 male youths came through Chongqing. Between 15 December 1944 and the end of April 1945 an additional 600 female youths were also received. Most of these re-

265. GMWX, vol. 63, p. 299; QNJS, vol. 2, p. 367. Ren Juewu we have already seen, but Luo Cairong was a Whampoa graduate, Renaissance Society member, and key Youth Corps man in both Chongqing and across the river in Beibei, where he had helped get the YC organization off the ground. He would later serve on the Youth Army demobilization committee.

266. GMWX, vol. 63, p. 302.

267. These were held at the Wartime capital Youth Hostel (陪都青年館); the Broadcast Building (廣播大廈); and the Tongren Studies Service Association (同仁進修服務社) in the financial sector of Chongqing; QNJS, vol. 2, p. 367.


269. Ibid., pp. 366-80.

- 322 -
recruits (of both sexes) were under the care of the Chongqing committee for about 2 months, but some for as little as 10 days. The highest number of recruits present under direction of the committee at one time was well over 4,000 individuals. The city had to process, collect, temporarily house, and then ship out the volunteers to their military bases; other locales simply did not have to deal with such issues and could dispense with any longterm collection/gathering phase altogether.270

As part of its comprehensive work plan, the Chongqing committee organized welcoming receptions for the volunteers: bright banners, firecrackers, and enthusiastic speeches greeted the recruits at the train station and docks when they arrived in the city. Recruits were concentrated into eight large units, roughly based on geographical origins, and housed in “reception centers”, which were a mix of public and private facilities commandeered for the purpose from mid-November 1944 through the end of January (for men) and April (for women) 1945.271 The city’s facilities were stretched to the limit, so much so that the Chongqing Recruiting Committee sent a request to the national Guidance Committee that volunteers in the city be sent immediately on to their units; the request was approved.272

Despite the rushed schedule, the city committee managed to organize city-wide “send-off” celebrations for the youth volunteers. Special trucks ferried the soon-to-be soldiers to their units – the sides of the trucks covered in banners and slogans and the streets lined with spectators setting off firecrackers and giving the volunteers gifts. Often the volunteers would sing songs in the trucks and the bystanders would sing back in refrain.273 Over the last week of 1944 and the first weeks of 1945, groups of recruits were sent first to Bishan, 40 km west of the city, to be organized into the 201st division, and then to the 202nd at Qijiang, about 60 km south of Chongqing.274

The IYVM in 1944 circumvented the military administration, relying instead on civilian in-

---


271. QNJS, vol. 2, p. 370. Reception centers were located at Xuantan Temple (玄壇廟), Liren Tang (禮仁堂), Daxigou (大溪溝), Longwang Temple (龍王廟), Guanyin yan (觀音岩), Dayanggou Central School (大陽溝中央學校), the private Bashu Primary school (巴蜀小學), and Dongwu University (東吳大學). It also occupied, for varying lengths of time, the Police Training Center, Linjiang Road (臨江路) #5 and #16, and Shenjia lane (江家巷) #15, using these places as collection points.

272. Tang Runming, Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, p. 237. Tang also provices a convenient table of temporary recruit units, their reception centers, and locations within Chongqing on page 235. The committee, in its 1946 report admitted that the burden of numbers meant that their efforts ran into financial constraints and thus, the “service [for the recruits] was not satisfactory, preparations were not complete.” But overall recruits' lives during their stay in Chongqing were “enjoyable, [with] enough to eat, and sufficient sleep”; GMWX, vol. 63, p. 306.


274. The first group left for Bishan on 25 December. The next two groups followed on 28 and 30 December. The fourth left on 2 January 1945. All four stayed one night at the Qingmuguan Lodging Station and then went on foot the next day to Bishan. Three more groups followed shortly after – all, except the seventh group, going to the 201st Division at Bishan. With the 201st division full, the seventh group was sent to Qijiang on 11 January 1945. Some groups of volunteers from outlying areas never came to Chongqing and went directly to their units in Yongchuan, Rongchang, Bishan, and Kaijiang counties; GMWX, vol. 63, pp. 311-2.
stitutions to mobilize the educated youth. Local governments, the KMT party, and the YC were the heart of this civilian-based recruitment. We have already seen, however, the general impotence of the KMT. The Three People’s Principles Youth Corps was a ready tool that worked closely and effectively with local governments. The Youth Corps, and its local branches, were at the very forefront of all levels and aspects of recruiting youths for the Youth Army. Not only was it prominent in promoting the IYVM and in providing top level leadership for the movement, but it was also an important model for training methods and activities. In Shaanxi, for example, the Youth Corps was more active and more effective than military authorities in promoting the IYVM.\footnote{275.\hspace{1em}Rong Bida, pp. 53-4; GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 212-3.} Organizing propaganda teams, sponsoring lectures by notable corps members, establishing volunteer registration offices, and publishing various pro-youth army materials all fell within the corps’ scope of activities.\footnote{276.\hspace{1em}For examples, see GMWX, vol. 62, p. 206; GMWX, vol. 63, pp. 302-3; Huang Wei, p. 67; and Li Zhongshu, p. 101.} This role was centrally mandated: “in order to ensure that the student volunteer movement went smoothly, and to aid the major conscription organs complete and establish supervision and training [procedures] … [It is] specially ordered that the Three People's Principles Youth Corps manage the arrangements of the student volunteer movement.”\footnote{277.\hspace{1em}GMWX, vol. 62, p. 239.} The Youth Corps was able to fill these duties because it possessed an infrastructure that was already in place and already targeted at youths. This organizational web, both secret and public, central and local, and its deep connections to political and military authorities aided the Youth Corps in promoting the intellectual youth volunteer movement and in establishing and administering the resulting divisions of the Youth Army.

Despite Chiang’s criticism that the YC was disconnected from local society and government, in Chongqing and the surrounding counties this was not the case. The Chongqing and Beibei Youth Corps branches, although formally established at very different times (Beibei most likely in 1941 and Chongqing, quite late, in 1944), shared key cadres and were closely imbricated in local administrative apparatuses; these connections were what made it a viable instrument for promoting the IYVM in 1944.

**The Youth Corps in Beibei and Chongqing**

The Beibei YC Planning Office was headed up by Lu Ziyi (盧子怡), the younger brother of Lu Zuofu the famous Chongqing shipping magnet and vice-head of the Nationalist government’s Transportation Ministry. Natives of Hechuan, just 70 km northwest of Chongqing, the two brothers played a dominant role in Beibei economy and politics from the mid-1920s on. Lu Ziyi had long been in charge of much of the day-to-day operations of his brother’s shipping company, Minsheng, and had been responsible for a whole series of political reforms in the Beibei area. Despite his close personal ties with leftists and communists from his Whampoa Academy days, his position at the helm of Beibei government and commerce made his participation in the local Youth Corps inevitable.

The Beibei Youth Corps continued Lu brothers’ tradition of intertwining business, governmental, and paramilitary institutions. In late 1940, the Beibei YC Planning Office began setting up the full array of YC units: a central office, district (qu) offices, squads (fendui), and small groups. Not only was Lu Ziyi the head of the Beibei Management Office (北碚管理局),
which was under the supervision of the 3AD, and leader of the Beibei YC, but lower cadres were tied to local businesses as well. Members were sorted into YC units on the basis of their occupation: the Planning Office directed the 1st squad (of the 6th District) that once it reached 16 members, it should be split in two, one unit for teachers and civil servants and one for members in business and commercial circles. Continuing the Lu brother’s longstanding tradition of connecting youth activism with paramilitary actions, the Beibei YC also drew on local police and paramilitary connections.

Though far from abundant, the Beibei membership was clearly heavily entrenched in the local administrative power structures of the Beibei Management Bureau and local township offices. In late 1940, the Beibei YC began stressing the need to extend its influence by attracting new members and improving discipline within its ranks. These efforts were concentrated in educational and local government circles, particularly the latter. The initial organizational drive targeted men who were (or would be) put into influential positions in local society, including baojia personnel. Applicants were required to have “correct views,” while workers and merchants were supposed to be “loyal and dependable,” though workers never appear in the limited documents and rosters available from Beibei. Work conference minutes from 1941 indicate that much effort was put into organizing and consolidating the top level of local cadres. Based on the membership roster for the 1st squad of Beibei’s 3rd ward (the only roster extant in the Chongqing Municipal Archives) filed sometime after 1943, these efforts were successful. The ten members of the squad were heavily concentrated in positions of local power, namely the police, tax, and household registration bureaus of the Dengjiang Township Public Office; local schools, and the Beibei Management Bureau itself. The members were mainly natives of Hechuan, the Lu brothers’ home county, and were recruited on a person-to-person basis. The township, then, was crisscrossed with YC connections, whose members enjoyed interlocking positions in local government and society and personal connections.

278. Chen Heping (陳和平) was transferred from Chongqing, specifically Majiauo’s (馬家沱) Guangli Soap Company (廣利肥皂公司), to the Beibei YC to take up duties as the 1st fendui chief; qz0052.mj1-4, p. 25 dated 17 November 1940. YC business was even conducted on private company stationary: a request from the chief of the 3rd squad (in 6th District Troop) to change conference times was written on office paper from Chongqing’s Yiji Guangli Enterprises Company (義記廣利事業股份有限公司); qz0052.mj(1-)4, p. 24 dated 11 June 1941.

279. qz0052.mj1-4, p. 25 dated 17 November 1940.

280. Several key cadres in the 6th District Troop joined the YC from the Citizen Militia Reserves (國民兵後備隊) with the express purpose of helping to organize the district unit; qz0052.mj1-4, p. 26 dated 13 February 1941.

281. qz0052.mj(1-)4, p. 25 dated 17 November 1940; see also a directive from the Planning Office emphasizing that recruitment should emphasize baojia, mining circles, workers and farmers; qz0052.mj(1-)4, pp. 106a-b dated 23 December 1940. A similar call to stress recruitment among farmers and workers appears in qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 55-6 n.d.

282. qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 6-9 dated 2 April 1941.

283. Ideally, each YC member was to introduce a new person to their YC unit each month. Recruitment never reached a feverish pace, but the direct personal connection through the recommendations or introductions was a consistent feature at the lower levels of the YC. For the Beibei YC membership composition and organization, see: qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 6-9, 19-20,
Measures to enhance discipline of its membership and initiate more effective activities proved modestly successful: the Beibei branch of the YC undertook a range of activities in the late war years. In contrast to the self-criticism of the 5WA YC, the Beibei YC had deep connections to local administration and police bureaus, and thus, was well placed to aid the government in “security” tasks and enforcement of food policy. The corps members acted as informants, passing on information to leaders on political activities in schools as well as the general social situation. There were repeated calls for them to investigate the treasonous activities of the CCP (cast as the “traitorous party” (奸黨)), contend for the hearts and minds of “neutral elements”, and even infiltrate the enemies of the state. Rather than functioning primarily as intelligence or anti-communist units, the Beibei YC served as a propaganda, cultural and educational vehicle. Squads set up sports teams which competed against each other. The Beibei YC published a wall newspaper to which squads were required to contribute at least one essay each month. External organizations were a priority, chief among these were art societies, youth associations, and service organizations. Local unit meetings were a vehicle for the regime to pass on the correct understanding of wartime events, especially international developments that might be completely opaque to rank and file members. The Japanese-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, signed in 1941, was one such instance. The Beibei YC ordered district units to hold discussion meetings on the Pact so that members would understand the treaty and its significance for China.

25. 32, 51-3, 55-6, 63a, 106a-b, and 153a-b dated variously from November 1940 through November 1944. A conference held at a local temple and chaired by You Xiangting, the Beibei YC branch secretary and frequent stand-in for Lu Zijing at YC meetings, indicates that the Beibei YC continued to have trouble enforcing routine discipline on its members, however. An undated (but almost certainly from 1940-1941) work meeting outlined several areas where Beibei YC units were failing: meetings, which were supposed to be held five times a month, were not being held on schedule; cadres were not “in command” of their members; the general membership had not yet been trained; rewards and punishments were not being implemented; recruitment of new members was lax; and ward units were still unable to carry out any propaganda and youth service tasks on their own. The meeting featured discussion of all these points, including how to handle unit leaders who failed to conduct regular meetings. The solution was greater accountability in the form of stricter punishments. First offense was met with a warning; the second offense got a permanent demerit placed on the leader’s record, while the third was met with the leader being being stripped of his title and position. See, qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 45-6 and 51-3, both undated. In 1942-43, when the central YC was interested in taking a census of the corps sprawling membership, the Beibei branch put a strong emphasis on organizational consolidation, specifically cadre training and cutting substandard members; qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 55-6 undated but almost certainly in 1942 or 1943.

284. qz0052.mj1-4, p. 45b and 55b n.d. There are no specific archival records detailing these activities in Beibei, however, which leads one to suspect that little effort was put into these areas, particularly as the Lu brothers were political moderates, with significant leftist ties.

285. Examples of these external public service organizations were the Gorges District Art Association (峽區文藝社), Gorges District Youth Association (峽區青年社), Youth Service Corps (青年服務隊), Youth Service Associations (青年服務社), and Township Youth Associations (鎮青年聯誼會); qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 13-6, 51-3, 55-6, and pp. 106a-b.

286. qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 98-9 n.d.: The official line stressed that Russia was trying to “reward” Japan for its aggression in the south Pacific, thus dividing the international anti-communist forces, while Japan wanted to secure its rear so it could concentrate all its strength on China. The real fruit, the YC leaders were to drive home to the members, was that the Pact would only widen the
By the time the Chongqing Youth Corps was officially set up in February 1944, it was already as a sprawling set of institutions that covered not just the city itself but forty county branches and three subordinate ward units, with a total of 35,299 members. The Planning Office was the essential youth organization in the area, made up of commercial employees, students, public servants, police officers,.baqiu personnel, and some workers. The 1st Youth Service Corps (青年服务总队) alone mobilized 10,000 youth for National Day celebrations. YC units carried out propaganda in the city and extended efforts into the villages around Chongqing. As the corps proudly claimed: “Service is propaganda. In the past five years, comrades have often dispersed widely into villages to guide the farmers, teaching them to read and assisting the government in handling key policies, while in urban areas they have participated in relief work and air raid service.”

The few extant registers of YC members from Chongqing indicate that its rank and file members were not as concentrated in local administrative institutions as the Dengjiang branch unit was; they were geographically spread farther into the Sichuan hinterland and carried many members from commercial and worker backgrounds. The city’s YC leadership, however, consisted of regional and national elites, especially in education and the military. The Chongqing YC was frequently able to make use of municipal facilities, including government offices and schools, for training classes and other activities, though its high-powered connections did not translate into flush coffers.

The Chongqing Youth Corps was deeply connected to the sinews of the regime’s mass mobilization administration. Bao Huaguo (包華國), the chairman of the city’s YC branch and chief

---

287. The factional fighting at the top tier of the YC did not just delay the YC’s First National Congress, but also hindered the formal establishment of local branches as well. The Chongqing branch was only officially founded on 10 February 1944, after a full five years of preparatory work by the Planning Office. During the years of preparation work, the CQ YC Planning Office held two training classes for cadres, six for district unit leaders, four large group training camps for rank and file members, and eight formal inspections, the most notable of which was the National Day (10 October) on 1942, which celebrated the abrogation of the Unequal Treaties with the US and Britain.

288. qz0052.mj1-4, p. 38 and qz0052.mj1-18, p. 22 dated 1944.

289. qz0052.mj1-9, p. 1 dated 1944.

290. See the undated rosters from the 9th, 14th, and 18th qu; qz0052.mj1-7, pp. 1-54. The 9th ward has what appears to be a complete roster on file, most likely from 1949. Given the spotty nature of both Beibei and Chongqing records, however, it is difficult to be certain if this is due to the vagaries of document survival or whether it reflects the actual situation in the 1940s.

291. qz0061.mj7-47, pp. 18-9 dated 5 August 1942 and qz0053.mj 14-97, pp. 8a-b dated 11-13 January 1943. Lack of funds caused plans to be scaled way back at times. The Central YC allocated a mere 10,000 yuan for the a training class, which was not nearly enough. The conference concluded that the only solution was to reduce the number of trainees to 50 members, ask trainees to supply half of their own travel expenses, request the food ministry to distribute price controlled rice, and get funding help from satellite youth agencies; qz0061.mj7-47, pp. 18-9 and 23-9 dated 5 August 1942.
of the central branch’s propaganda section, had held several positions concerned with mass mobilization in the Nationalist military administration in the early war. A graduate of Qinghua University, he had received a Master’s degree at Stanford in California and was teaching at Sichuan University before the war. Whampoa military men and police were also well represented, including Xu Zhongqi (徐中齊), chief of police for the city, who was in charge of the training programs for the Youth Corps.292 Even more important for the IYVM was the YC’s deep ties to educational circles. Not only was Chen Lifu, the Education Minister, at least nominally active in the YC, but several of the key Chongqing YC leaders held high positions in educational institutions and were directly involved in administering many of the middle schools in the city. Educational elites in the Chongqing YC included Yang Fangling (楊芳齡), Wang Shulin (王書林), and Long Wenzhi (龍文治). Yang Fangling had studied overseas at Birmingham University and during the war was head of education at Guangyi Middle School (廣益中學) in Chongqing’s Nan’an district.293 In line with his position, Yang Fangling was in charge of schools in the Nanping area, south of central Chongqing. Wang Shulin was a psychology professor at Central University. His university connections meant that he was assigned to be in charge of recruitment and guidance of YC members in the Shapingba area, which was a cultural enclave dotted with schools and universities northwest of central Chongqing. Long Wenzhi was a native of Fuling (Sichuan) and a Beida graduate (1920, with a major in French). He joined the KMT in 1924 and had been chairman of the city’s KMT branch as well as principal of the Chongqing’s United Middle School.294 Ties to education and culture were carefully cultivated, at least from late 1942 onwards. The First Cadre Conference in September 1942 was marked by a curious mixture of optimism and despair from the top leadership, but in concrete terms it signaled a shift to an emphasis on

292. Xu Zhongqi, along with Luo Cairong, was a Whampoa grad. Xu Zhongqi was the chief of police in Chongqing until 1944 when he was promoted to Sichuan Provincial Police Chief. He too was heavily involved in intelligence activities in the postwar period, including running a province-wide intelligence organization. Luo trained for political work at the Central Military Academy, then the Central Political School, and finally at the YC cadre training class organized by Jiang Jingguo before becoming the secretary of the Chongqing YC branch. In September 1946 he would be appointed as an alternate member of the YC Central Executive Committee (中央幹事會候補幹事) and in 1947, after the merger between the YC and the KMT, he was an alternate member of the KMT CEC. After the war he was involved in anti-CCP activities, to suppress the student movement in the city, and helping Xu Yuanju (徐遠華) smash the progressive Tingjinbao (挺進報). He fled to Taiwan and held a series of positions, eventually rising to the Central Committee of the KMT.

293. Although it was founded by British missionaries during the late Qing, Guangyi was closely connected to Lu Zuofu and the Minsheng Shipping Company. Guangyi’s attached primary school did not start classes until 1925; Baxian xianzhi, p. 1062. During the war, it was a preferred school for national elites, who sent their sons and daughters there to study. Elites such as Liu Xiang, Yang Sen, Du Yuesheng, Chen Lifu, He Yingqin, Dai Jitao, and Wang Zuanxu (Chongqing mayor) all sent their sons or daughters to study there. After the war, Lu Zuofu, Yang Fangling, and Li Gengu, a divisional commander under the Chongqing Garrison, were on the school’s board of directors.

294. In 1939, he served as chief secretary for the secretariat of the Temporary Consultative Council. He joined the YC in 1940, served on the National Political Council in 1942, was head of the Chongqing KMT branch in 1946, and was about to take his seat in the national Legislature in Guangzhou when he was assassinated in 1949.
cultural work for the YC. It formally established a “cultural planning committee” to strengthen cultural activities in Chongqing and foster connections with cultural elites. This committee focused on publishing, news, arts, and theater. The conference also desired coordination between the YC and municipal government wards in setting up a city-wide Service Association. This emphasis on culture and social welfare was strengthened further in 1943 when the Chongqing YC set up a Youth Service Association in response to Chiang’s directive that the Corps was to focus on service activities.

Areas where the city’s YC was most active were in war fundraising drives and in publishing and propaganda. In late 1943, the YC was the key vehicle for promoting a glider fundraising drive; local branches sought contributions from institutions, businesses, YC members, and add-on fees to ticket prices for the city’s theaters and music concerts.

From the center YC on down, publishing and propaganda were key activities for the YC. Local branches and small groups were venues for studying Chiang’s China’s Destiny. In addition, the Corp’s mission of recruiting youth to support the regime brought it into the publishing arena as well. Through its propaganda activities, the YC took its role of ensuring that “regular youth had the correct understanding of the Three People’s Principles” seriously. The first instance of an “organization-wide” movement launched by the YC was the One Million Volumes Movement for printing and distributing the Principles of the Three People’s Principles.

---

295. Bao Huaguos, as the conference chair, gave a report which frankly admitted that, because of the limited time and energy of its cadres, the committee had thus far only managed to build up its membership and thus had contributed little to the larger work of the YC. He suggested that an increase in cadre numbers was essential. He was also not optimistic about the ability of the YC to fulfill its more intelligence and law and order tasks, such as aiding the government stabilize prices and stamping out hoarding and speculation. Professor Wang Shulin, however, saw an opportunity for the YC to bring moral edification and character molding back into the schools, training youth in a suitable “group mentality” that would be the foundation for a profound love of country, nation, and humanity. Police Chief Xu was also more optimistic, observing that in difficult financial times, he was actually satisfied with the success of the YC; it had done much with meager funding. As the new crop of cadres were mainly from advanced educational circles, he was sure that much more progress was forthcoming. The conference minutes are found at: qz0061.mj7-47, pp. 18-9 and 23-9 dated 5 August 1942.

296. Not only were all YC members required to join the Association, but each local branch was to select two members to participate more in the Youth Service Corps. Due to limited funds and a lack of central YC aid, each sub-branch of the CQ YC was to set up an independent local Youth Service Association and then at a later date unify them in a coordinated system – the unification of the Chongqing Service Associations was accomplished the following year.) qz0052.mj1-18, pp. 14-5 dated 8 March 1943.

297. As early as 1940 YC cadres – including some from the Beibei branch – were active in Chongqing promoting the wartime savings drive; qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 106a-b dated 23 December 1940. See also qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 86-8 n.d.. And it continued to play important roles in later developments as well, including the city-wide reconstruction frugality and savings committee in 1942; Chongqing tongshi, v. 2, p. 1067.

298. This movement was likely intended to fund the purchase of twenty gliders for the YA to use in an airborne invasion of the Japanese homeland; qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 149a-b dated December 1943 and qz0052.mj1-18, p. 22 n.d.

299. qz0052.mj1-18, pp. 63a-b and qz0052.mj(1-)8, p. 87 n.d.
The YC organized a drive for donations, which were accepted at various bank branches in Chongqing. The YC was a frequent mouthpiece for anti-hoarding statements, a role given to it by Chiang Kaishek. Its materials and speeches stressed an economic ideology that was antithetical to the CCP’s dialectical materialism and class warfare. For example, the announcement of the formal establishment of the Chongqing YC (1944) provided an occasion to reiterate that China was still an agricultural country, the only important economic difference being between those who are “very poor” and those who are “a little bit poor” and not between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. YC members were reminded that they were “soldiers of the Three People’s Principles” and as such “must strive to establish national capital, in order to restrain the growth of private capital.”

Local branches published a variety of materials as well. Beibei’s YC branch published the *Youth Newsletter* (青年通讯), which ran news items of interest to youth. Other branches and sub-branches put out wall newspapers, a form of publicity that would be important to the YA later. These wall papers, edited by the YC district chief, were to be put out at least once per month. They covered in very brief form major national and international events, local news, short editorials, summaries of the generalissimo’s speeches, accounts of youth activities, and resistance art (poetry, fiction, drama, and cartoons).

It was these widespread tentacles – connections with youth and educational institutions and involvement with propaganda and publishing – that made the YC, despite its factional infighting at the top level, a useable instrument for promoting the IYVM. In the autumn of 1943 YC branches and small groups were ordered to hold discussion meetings on the IYVM. These discussions were partially scripted and designed to emphasize the preferential treatments and bene-

---

300. qz0055.mj2-618, n.p. dated 10 May 1944; qz0052.mj1-18, pp. 63a-b n.d. and qz0061.mj7-47, p. 36-7 dated 14 June 1944.

301. In September 1940, the Central Bureau of the YC edited and printed a pamphlet *Outline Plan for Corps Members to Aid Sichuan Province in Implementing Grain Management* (各地團員協助川省實施糧食管理宣傳大綱), which was full of anti-hoarding essays, support for the government’s promise that a fix for grain price inflation was coming, reassuring speeches from Chiang on grain policy, and explanations of government control of the grain market; qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 1-48 dated September 1940.

302. qz0052.mj1-18, p. 22, see also qz0052.mj1-9, p. 1 n.d. However, it should be noted that YC materials were not monolithic in this stance. Li Mangui (李曼瑰), in the slim volume *The Theory and Practice of Women Youth Work* (女青年工作之理論與實施), a volume in the *Women Youth Collectanea* series published and edited by the Youth Corps in 1944, used class language quite extensively while discussing economic development, though Li stopped short of mentioning class struggle. See CQMA materials (资料), politics section (政治类) #728, p. 2.

303. qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 121a-b and 125a-125b n.d.

304. qz0052.mj1-18, pp. 31-3 n.d.

305. These same qualities are also what motivated the YC’s involvement in publicizing local elections after the war. The 2nd Cadres’ Work Conference of Chongqing’s 6th District reported that it was mainly concerned with local “self-government elections” and mobilizing participation at the very lowest level: each squad was responsible for getting 30-50 men to participate in the elections. YC members were specifically ordered not to make an issue of whether candidates were party or YC members, but instead only to ask whether they were qualified and knowledgeable; qz0052.mj1-8, pp. 2-3, n.d. but internal evidence suggests late 1945.
fits of signing up; the duty of citizens to serve in a military role; Chiang’s own personal history as a 2nd-class private in Japan; and the idealized vision of the army as the best school for revolutionary youth. And the 1944 recruitment drive made extensive use of YC connections as it was centered in the schools and cultural institutions that had significant YC presence which was used to propagandize from the lectern and during extracurricular activities as well.

The YC was not merely a vehicle for mobilizing for the IYVM, however. Its involvement with the IYVM and the YA went far beyond promoting the movement and recruiting volunteers. The YC also served as a model for activities, political involvement, training methods, and what I call “technologies of the self” that were vital in the YA and in the self-identities of the intellectual volunteers, all of which will be dealt with at length in the following chapter. In addition, the YC also supported the Youth Army in its bases, namely through representation on the national and

306.  qz0052.mj1-18, pp. 83a-b dated December 1943.
local Comfort Committees. Each base committee had a key central or Chongqing YC cadre. These committees were responsible for performing a variety of quality of life tasks for the YA divisions. They collected gifts, especially writing instruments and paper; forwarded parcels from family and friends; and provided books, reading material, sports and recreational equipment for the youth soldiers. And finally, the YC was intimately connected with providing the top-level leadership of the YA, particularly its political administration.

Several key YC leaders played important roles in the Youth Army administration. Thus, the YC served as a repository of leadership, some of it with a decidedly reformist bent, for the Youth Army. Nowhere was this more important or obvious than in the political bureaus of the YA divisions. A pivotal figure was Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Jiang Jingguo, who masterfully threaded his way through the factional shoals to achieve a dominating position in the political administration of the Youth Army itself. His growing influence tied together all the important political elements, including the YC and the YA, in his rise to power. The main group that Chiang set up to run the YA, the YA Organization and Training General Oversight Section, was a diverse body, drawing members from all major factions, but it is the political role of the YA that interests us most, for two reasons. First, during the War of Resistance the YA never saw significant action against the Japanese. Hence its military significance is marginal — except in the minds of the Nationalist planners, which is important for understanding the motivation behind, and means of, its creation, but not necessarily for understanding it in terms of its political significance. Second, I am interested in the political identities of the volunteers, as citizens of a particular Chinese state, and for this the political work in the YA is a crucial area of inquiry, not least because the Nationalist state itself placed a high priority on this facet of the Youth Army and its soldiers. In fact, so essential was this political aspect that Chiang entrusted his son, Jiang Jingguo, with political administration for the whole Youth Army. We are interested in the Youth Army and the IYVM as a new mode of recruitment, bypassing the conscription administration with its local entanglements. The YA mode of military service, relying on the volunteerism of the youths, involved a more direct state-to-individual relationship. This relationship was the concrete fulfillment of the Nationalist ideal of citizen-soldiers and thus makes the political identities of the intellectual youth volunteers of paramount concern. To lay the foundation for the extended analysis of those identities in the following chapter, we need to examine the political administration and training apparatus of the Youth Army itself.

Jiang Jingguo and the Politics of Youth

Jiang Jingguo (1910-1988) was the son of Chiang Kai-shek, and ultimately would serve as both Premier (1972-1988) and President (1978-1988) of the Republic of China on Taiwan. The road to such lofty positions was far from straight for Jingguo; instead it wended its way through the heart of both the Youth Corps and Youth Army. Jiang Jingguo was only a teenager when his father was building his powerbase around the Wham-

308. qz0094.mj10-34, pp. 86-7 n.d.
309. qz0094.mj10-34, pp. 118-9 dated 18 February 1945.
310. The following paragraphs are drawn mostly from two biographies of Jiang Jingguo: Jiang Nan’s Jiang Jingguo zhuang and Jay Taylor’s The Generalissimo’s Son. At times Taylor’s study exhibits a subtle, but distinct, desire to rehabilitate Jiang, either by minimizing his controversial or negative actions or by placing him as a prime mover in situations where his influence or power was almost certainly not at work. However, in conjunction with Jiang Nan’s biography, it is
Jingguo attended the military academy in Guangzhou. In the era of cooperation with the Russian Communist Party (CPSU) before the Northern Expedition, Jingguo witnessed his father’s fascination with the CPSU’s youth policy. On the eve of the Northern Expedition, Chiang sent Jiang Jingguo to Beijing to attend the school run by Wu Zhihui, a scholar and an old friend of Chiang’s. While in Beijing, the younger Jiang found himself attracted to leftist ideas and in 1925 convinced his father to let him go to Russia for revolutionary training. In October 1925 he left for Moscow, where he enrolled in Moscow’s Sun Yatsen University (Sunovka) and deepened his commitment to Russian communism. In March 1926 he joined the Chinese Communist Youth Corps in Russia, a move that Chiang Kaishek supported. And only eighteen months later, he was one of only five Chinese selected for further study at the Central Tolmatchev Military and Political Institute, the Red Army’s best academy, in Leningrad, where the curriculum emphasized not only bread and butter Marxism-Leninism, but also political work within the military. He was named company commander of the cadets by the institute staff and became a full member of the Komsomol. Jiang graduated in 1930 with the highest GPA in his class. Despite this quick rise, however, Jiang’s Trotskyist connections earned him suspicion and fear from Wang Ming and other Stalinist Chinese students in Moscow. As a result he was assigned a series of trying posts (on a collective farm, the “grumpy industrial city” of Sverdlovsk, and then at the Uralmarsh factory). By 1937, most of his close friends had fallen victim to Stalin’s purges, but Jiang applied for full membership in the CPSU in November 1936, apparently convinced he would remain in Russia for the rest of his life. Events in China would thwart this. On the very day that his application was to be approved, Moscow cabled a rejection and ordered Jiang to come to Moscow: the Xi’an Incident had finally brought about the KMT-CCP United Front that Stalin had been hoping for, and Jiang was sent back to China to help cement this new alliance. He told his Russian friends, “The Central Committee [of the CPSU] is sending me to China so that I may win my father over to our side.”

Despite that grandiose mission statement, after arriving in Shanghai in mid-April 1937, Jiang spent several months being rehabilitated by his father. Thereafter, he was permitted to begin involving himself politically in China. In January 1938, he attended the formal founding ceremony of the communist New Fourth Army and gave a speech calling for “hand in hand” cooperation of KMT and CCP to defeat Japan. In the spring of that year, Xiong Shihui (熊式輝), Jiangxi provincial governor and once chief of the New Life Movement Promotion Association at

sufficient for the level of factual content that I am working with in this section.

311. Jiang’s graduation thesis was on guerrilla warfare; Taylor, *The Generalissimo’s Son*, pp. 34-45, 49, and 50-5; see also, Jiang Nan, pp. 38-48 for a lengthy discussion of the curriculum, classes, and student life Jiang experienced at Sunovka.

312. Taylor, pp. 61-3.

313. Ibid., pp. 70-5.

314. After his prodigal denunciation of his father after the 1927 purge of communists in the KMT, Jiang Jingguo had to write an apologetic letter and renounce his Marxism and communism in order to be received by Chiang. Significantly, he was received at the presidential residence in Hangzhou, and Jingguo had to *ketaou* (kowtow) 3 times in traditional manner at the audience; Jiang Nan, p. 72 and Taylor, p. 79.
Nanchang, asked for Jiang Jingguo to lead the Jiangxi provincial Peace Preservation Corps, which entailed a huge promotion.  

The founding of the YC by the KMT Extraordinary National Congress in April 1938 and his father’s decision to put him on the YC’s central committee brought Jiang Jingguo into the rarified air of high level Nationalist factional politics, with both the CC Clique and the Whampoa men taking notice of him as an important rival. The Chen brothers were fearful of the YC as a completely independent power center, while Kang Ze was determined to use his position as director of the YC’s organization department to bring the YC into the Whampoa and military intelligence apparatus orbit. Jiang Jingguo had an ally in the YC top leadership: general Chen Cheng, who Chiang had appointed as secretary-general of the YC. Both Chen Cheng and Jiang shared a reformist vision for the YC, a hope that it could be kept independent from both the KMT party structure (and the CC Clique which influenced it) and from the military-based Renaissance Society. However, in mid-1938, Chen’s duties as commander of the 9WA, dean of the Army’s Central Training Corps, and governor of Hubei left little time for the YC. Chen Cheng however did make the important move of installing Jiang in the Jiangxi Youth Corps Planning Office. Kang Ze, rightly fearing the rise of an independent Jiangxi YC branch, sent his man Peng Chaoyu (彭朝銓) to “help” Jiang Jingguo set up the YC in the province. In actuality, Peng’s mission was to sabotage Jiang by limiting his involvement with the Jiangxi YC. Jiang however was committed to his vision of establishing a model organization and had the resources of his provincial posts to back him up.

Jiang Jingguo threw himself into reform work in Jiangxi with a vigor and openness that would mark his political career thereafter. He stressed anti-bandit measures and had a zero-tolerance policy toward gambling and opium. He also made sure that he cut the ties between secret police (intelligence organizations) and criminal elements (triads, gangs, bandits) and he drastically reduced prostitution by combining a strict ban with a rehabilitation program to find ex-prostitutes jobs. Other programs included model farms and land to the tiller initiatives; Jiang even promoted group weddings as a wartime cost-cutting measure to end the social custom of bridegrooms’ families over-spending on weddings. He became famous for unannounced visits to inspect local officials, which generated complaints to Xiong Shihui that the younger Jiang’s “work style resembled that of the Communists.”

---

316. Zhou Shuzhen argues that the rise of Jiang Jingguo was a deliberate strategy on the part of his father, who wanted his son to finally end the factional struggles between the CC Clique and the Whampoa men in both YC and the KMT itself; Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, p. 135.
317. Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, p. 201. In May 1939, Jiang Jingguo participated in a one month training class at the Central Training Institute in Chongqing, during which he formally joined the corps and met the Chen brothers and Zhang Lisheng.
318. Jiang Nan, pp. 96-8; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 206; and Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son, pp. 74-95.
319. Taylor, pp. 87-93. For a more in depth look at Jiang’s reforms in Jiangxi, see He Youliang, “Jiang Jingguo ‘jianshe xin Gannan’ sixiang jianlun.” Jiang Nan is extremely pessimistic about Jiang’s achievements in Jiangxi, seeing them all as merely pie-in-the-sky plans that were never implemented; Jiang Nan, pp. 83-4.
and not galavanting around the province, Xiong created an institute for the paramilitary training of administrative personnel. But Jiang used this to extend his influence into new areas: youth, schools, and soldiers. Under the Peace Preservation Corps, for example, he set up the Jiangxi Youth Service Corps. Convinced that the open market for military service in Jiangxi meant that “backwards soldiers” were the chief source of violence in the countryside, Jiang went about reforming conscription, the training of new soldiers, and treatment of soldiers. In mid-March 1939 Jiang and the Peace Preservation HQ moved to Ganzhou to escape the Japanese threat to Nanchang. He was rewarded for his efforts by being appointed as the Special Inspector of Jiangxi’s 4AD, where he continued his reform efforts in both military service and tax areas.

Here Jiang Jingguo set up his famous “Southern Jiangxi” (Gannan 贛南) area, which would be a model of local administrative reform and one of the main pillars of the war effort (in both grain and manpower) until the Japanese attacks in 1944-45 brought it to an end.

Significantly, Jiang’s reform efforts were built on the foundation of a YC Cadre Training School that he established to secure the manpower to pursue his reform goals. Fond of quoting Stalin, he often said securing dedicated “cadres would decide everything” in the effort to build a “New Southern Jiangxi.” His reform projects needed a body of reliable cadres who would not be swayed by local ties and thus would be responsive to him alone. This need drove Jiang to run a series of Youth Corps summer camps in Jiangxi and, more significantly, to open the Youth Corps Cadre Training Class at Chizhuling (赤朱嶺) in southern Jiangxi. The first class of trainees consisted of 72 graduates from the Central Military Academy and 72 men who were selected via competitive exams.

Jiang Jingguo drew on his experiences in Russia and designed the class to make use of small group techniques designed to promote cohesiveness and group élan. In addition, he sought to establish a personal relationship and bond with the students. Much as he had personally participated in camping trips, speeches, and plays with the Jiangxi Boy Scouts, Jiang “regularly came...”

320. He Youliang, p. 152. Based on his education in Russia, he established the New Soldier Training Office and for the first time gave attention to the usefulness of recreation activities in building unit cohesiveness. He protected soldiers’ interests by “decreeing, for example, that new soldiers would have a three-year grace period before making payments on old loans and requiring landlords to continue leasing land to the families of soldiers”; Taylor, p. 87. See also, Jiang Nan, p. 77.

321. Jiang’s implementation of conscription and levies in Jiangxi was quite exceptional; conscripts were funneled in to county militia and police forces, while taxes were used to start commercial enterprises; Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 194-6.

322. He Youliang, p. 148.

323. He Youliang, pp. 154-5.

324. Jiang Jingguo established the YC Cadre Training School (幹部訓練班). in September 1939. After a short stint mourning his mother, Fumei, who was killed by Japanese bombers, he returned to Gannan determined to complete the administrative overhaul by using the school’s graduates as a major source of reform-minded and loyal activists. See, Taylor, p. 97; Taylor misunderstands the name of the training class. The abbreviated name translates to “Young” or “Youth” Cadre School (青年幹部訓練班), but the full Chinese name (青年幹部訓練班) makes it clear that it was set up under the auspices of the Jiangxi Youth Corps Planning Office, as part of the growing YC organization in the province.
to speak at the school, where some classes met in caves, and on occasion slept in the barracks with the students, rising at dawn and leading them in their oaths of allegiance to the Republic and the Generalissimo.325 The class self-consciously promoted “familyism,” building a close-knit group on the basis of an intense common experience of the training at Chizhuling. Its rallying cry became “The Spirit of Chizhuling” and as a counterpoint to the CCP’s famous slogan “Going to Yan’an,” Jiang put forward “Coming to Gannan.” This training class trained some 500 cadres in five classes, including some of his most loyal and longest-lasting supporters, including Wang Sheng (王升), who would later help Jiang in Shanghai and on Taiwan, and Kong Qiuquan (孔秋泉), who would serve under Jiang in the YA’s political bureau.326

Jiang was eclectic in both his ideology and personnel in Gannan. He drew on a wide variety of political thinkers, ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign, capitalist and socialist.327 His choice of personnel was similarly broad; he selected people who he thought had the drive, energy, and desire for real change, regardless of their factional or party affiliation, eventually collecting a diverse group of people into his orbit, such as Hu Gui, a Renaissance Society member; Li Weiguo (李惟果), secretary of Chiang Kaishek’s bodyguard and later member of the YC Central Executive Committee’s Standing Committee; Zheng Yanfen (鄭彥棻); and Yu Zhijun (余致浚), an underground communist and his personal secretary.328 Despite his own eclecticism and reformist inclinations, his loyalty to his father and instinct for political survival drew the younger Jiang toward the right in 1941.329

325. Taylor, p. 97 and 93. Jiang stopped short of a fascist-style cult of the leader. He reproved cadets for standing each time he said “Generalissimo Jiang” or even “the old man,” by saying “This is fascist. Let’s forget it!”

326. Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 202-10. Jiang also met his lover, Zhang Yaruo (章亞若) in this class; she would die under suspicious circumstances after giving birth to two sons.

327. He Youliang, pp. 162-3.

328. Hu Gui was one of Chiang Kaishek’s favorite Whampoa students. Chiang sent him to Jiangxi to support his son against the pressures from the CC Clique, the Renaissance Society, and creeping communist influence in the province. Jiang Jingguo lost no time in securing his personal loyalty by making him secretary of the Jiangxi YC. Zheng Yanfen had been selected by Chiang to sit on the YC’s CEC in 1938 and would serve as the propaganda section chief of the YC’s IYVM committees in 1943 and 1944 and on the national YA Guidance Committee established by the October 1944 conference.

329. Within the Jiangxi YC there was some communist influence. While the younger Jiang used the Peace Preservation Corps to attack CCP guerrilla units in the province, he was also sufficiently reformist that both the Chen brothers’ and Dai Li’s intelligence agencies marked him as a CCP-sympathetic element or at least as unaware of the underground agents in his administration. One or the other of these conservative factions informed the elder Chiang of the situation, warning him about his son’s leftist ties. Chiang Kaishek summoned Jingguo to Chongqing, and likely gave him an ultimatum to be very careful about his next political moves. Jingguo quickly threw himself behind his father completely: raids were conducted against CCP cadres in Gannan and Jiang appointed Wang Sheng, one of his favorite graduates from the training class, to handle intelligence and police work. In April 1941 with the announcement of the Russo-Japanese Five-Year Neutrality Pact, Jiang Jingguo’s anti-communism hardened further as he published two anti-communist articles in the Youth Daily; Taylor, pp. 99-103; Jiang Nan, p. 82; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, pp. 207-8; and also Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 189-200. This was not the first instance of his survival instincts overcoming his political
Despite this pragmatic move, Jiang Jingguo was frustrated with the obstacles preventing the YC from becoming a dynamic, rejuvenating force, a failure he characteristically attributed to its lack of a body of capable, honest cadres. Kang Ze too was feeling that the YC’s training classes were decidedly substandard, not at all able to compete with the CC Clique’s domination of the KMT Central Political School (國民黨中央政治學校), so he pushed to have the YC Central Cadre Class upgraded to a school. But his idea bore no fruit until Jiang backed the idea at the YC’s First National Congress in Chongqing. Jiang’s father approved and the Congress passed a resolution to establish the YC Central Cadre Training School in Chongqing.330 Fully expecting that his man Li Weigu (李惟果) would recommend him to head up the school, Kang Ze was bitterly disappointed when Li turned against his former patron and recommended to Chiang Kaishek that Jingguo be charged with establishing the school’s curriculum.331 Jiang was soon spending most of his time in Chongqing, instead of Jiangxi, overseeing planning for the school with help from Hu Gui and Zheng Yanfen.332 Jiang Jingguo took up his formal duties as dean of education for the school and moved to Chongqing.333 His move to the center of wartime power coincided almost perfectly with Xu Siping’s famous trip to Santai and the launch of the first phase of the IYVM.

The YC Central Cadre School would prove to be Jiang Jingguo’s springboard into the Youth Army political administration. And he left his mark on them both: both institutions shared the same leadership style and training techniques that he had mastered in Russia and Jiangxi. The school opened on 5 May 1944, about 10 miles outside of Chongqing, with its first class of 280 students selected by competitive examinations. The student body was filled with college graduates and cadres who were already experienced in youth work. Mostly from middle- or upper-class urban families, “[t]hey were educated, patriotic, idealistic youth people, and in their eyes

330. Jiang began consolidating his position during this congress, placing Hu Gui as the vice-chief of the organization department and transferring other of his supporters from Jiangxi to Chongqing; Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 212-3.

331. Jiang Nan, p. 97 and Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 99. Ma suggests that this was a deliberate first move in Chiang’s successful attempt to evict Kang Ze from the YC; pp. 211-2.

332. Taylor, pp. 112-3. For awhile he was splitting his time between Jiangxi and Chongqing, but his father pressured him with pointed reminders that the work in Jiangxi was “a minor job,” while his “main responsibilities were all in Chongqing.” Jiang Nan suggests that Chiang feared his son had become far too ruralized by his long years in the Soviet Union and Jiangxi and that this ruralization made Jiang susceptible to leftist errors. Calling him to return to Chongqing was thus an attempt to urbanize him; Jiang Nan, p. 82. Ma Lie, on the other hand, argues that it was fear of possible Japanese attacks into Jiangxi that motivated Chiang to recall his son to Chongqing; Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 210.

Ching-kuo embodied the fresh and dedicated leader they had so eagerly sought.”

Jiang enjoyed the academic role and from 1944 onwards his closest associates would continue to call him “principal” or “dean.” Completely independent of the Education Ministry, which was dominated by Chen Lifu and the CC Clique, the YC Cadre School adopted the moniker of the “Political Whampoa.” Jiang’s vision was for the school to train tens of thousands of cadres in two decades. The curriculum and atmosphere were semi-militarized. A school slogan was “training in the three abilities” (xunlian san neng 訓練三能): civil ability (neng wen 能文), martial ability (neng wu 能武), and the ability to drive an automobile (neng kai qiche 能開汽車).

The militarized education Jiang used at the Cadre School attempted to inculcate the sort of selfless ideal of revolutionary sacrifice that the Youth Corps desired in its members. From the very beginning the Youth Corps had been based on a nearly complete rejection not only of private interest, but of private life in general, instituting formal stipulations that straightjacketed individual members’ thoughts, words, and deeds. Chiang in a joint KMT-YC training speech baldly drove home the point: “When we entered the party or the Corps, each of us swore that we wanted to take our individual lives and all our freedoms and give it [gongxian 貢獻] to the party or the corps. . . . Thus, from now on, we as individuals have no freedom, but only have the freedom of the party or corps. We as individuals have no ‘little me’ [xiaowo 小我] life, but want to take the life of the party and corps to be our entire, new life.”

The revolutionary cadre (or soldier) ideal was a denial of the private self that subsumed the individual in the totality of the organization. This selfless ideal meshed well with the Nationalist goal of a “principled soldier” (zhuyibing 主義兵) discussed in chapter one – it is not stretching to see the curriculum and methods at the Central Cadre School as a trial run program for the creating the type of citizen-soldiers that Jiang and the Nationalist state so desperately desired.

Despite the repeated emphasis on selfless service, Jiang used the school’s military atmosphere to secure benefits for the students and staff. As he had done in Jiangxi, Jiang emphasized good treatment in order to raise the morale at the school. Staff received military commissions, enjoying both the salaries and benefit of military officers. The students, meanwhile, actually received two benefits packages: the material advantages of students in a military academy (uniforms, military issue blankets, military rations), as well as the nutritional benefits of regular students in government-run school. Jiang continued his tradition of personal involvement with the students and their activities. He often ate with them and joined them in their daily labor and morning roll call. Despite the school’s military atmosphere, Jiang supported the introduction of student government into the school, a development which would be duplicated in the Youth Army as well.

---

334. Taylor, p. 117. In fact, a year before the YC Central Cadre School opened, Jiang had sent five representatives to the Central YC’s summer camp at Nanyue (南岳), where they put on a short drama production that introduced Jiang Jingguo and his Gannan reform efforts to a national audience, which included not only the 500 youth from five provinces and more than 23 institutions of higher education, but also the national cadres organizing the camp; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, pp. 208-9.

335. Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 66; see also his thorough discussion of the YC’s charter and regulations and the restrictions they placed on members’ freedom, p. 76.

336. Jiang Nan, pp. 98-105; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, pp. 99-100; Zhou Shuzhen, pp. 210-28; and Taylor, p. 117. The Chen brothers who held a dominant position in the KMT’s Party Institute (i.e., Central School of KMT Affairs, 中央黨務學校) had never been happy with Jiang’s
His success in setting up the YC Central Cadre School (and defending its independence from both the CC Clique and the Renaissance Society) was undoubtedly one of the key reasons that Chiang Kaishek chose him to train and then lead the YA’s political administration. A second, and perhaps just as important factor, was Jingguo’s growing loyalty toward his father and deepening understanding of the problems with party and military factions that he faced. Renaissance Society members, with their military backgrounds, dominated military and political training agencies under the MAC. Their heavy involvement with the Youth Corps made it natural, for it to continue this role in the new military force that the YC had helped birth. But it was not to be; Chiang decided to chart a new, middle, route between the twin centers of Nationalist political power: the KMT party (represented by the CC Clique) and the military establishment. Thus, he took the unusual move of assigning the YA’s political administration not to the established organs of political training in the military, but to his son, who was granted an unusually high degree of freedom from the military’s political system.

The Youth Army political bureau was formally established in the spring of 1945. It was ostensibly subordinate to the Military Affairs Commission’s Political Bureau (政治部), headed by Zhang Zhizhong, but Jiang Jingguo was almost completely independent from any outside interference. While the military’s political system had enjoyed success and prestige during the

---

337. During Jiang’s stint in Jiangxi, “father and son had begun exchanging their diaries for each other to read – an indication of the closeness their relationship had attained.” Taylor, p. 115.

338. The implications of this move for both the Renaissance Society, which had its tentacles deep into the military training apparatus, and the CC Clique were obvious. “As the CC brothers had feared, it was evident that the Youth Corps (which now numbered about 500,000) as well as the Youth Army and youth in general were Chiang Ching-kuo’s turf”; Taylor, p. 120. For a detailed presentation of the organization, regulation, and activities of the Youth Army’s political bureaus, see GJZGSG, vol. 2, pp. 925-45.

339. Taylor in his biography of Jiang Jingguo misinterprets the significance of Chiang Kaishek’s decision to tap his son to lead the YA political bureau. Taylor states that the YA political administration was subordinated to the MAC’s Military Training Directorate (軍事訓練部), which was in charge of military training and officer education, and was not placed under the MAC Political Bureau in order to avoid being dominated by Kang Ze and the Renaissance Society; Taylor, p. 119. Though perhaps Taylor can be forgiven for getting lost in the byzantine labyrinth of military training organizations and factions, in actuality, the YA political administration was officially subordinate to the MAC Political Bureau. Within the Political Bureau Kang Ze was chief
Northern Expedition, it deteriorated quickly after the 1927 purge of the communists, who had provided much of the energy in the military’s political bureaus. 340 Much as he had done in Jiangxi, Jiang Jingguo set his sights on creating an active and responsive body of cadres as the foundation for real reform efforts, thus he was determined to revive the reputation of the political cadres, and return them to real effectiveness. Believing that the Youth Army political administration had to be free from the entanglements of the established military power structures, Jiang turned to his favorite powerbase, the Youth Corps with its organizational web and experience in political training to train and staff the YA’s political administration.

As he had done in Jiangxi, Jiang’s opening move was to organize a special school to train a corps of loyal cadres: he founded the Youth Army’s Political Work Personnel Training School (政工人員訓練班), separate from the training programs for regular officers. 341 To limit the influence of other Youth Army leaders and cement the link between the Youth Army political administration and his Youth Corps supporters, Jiang moved the political work classes onto the campus of the Youth Corps’ Cadre Training School at Fuxingguan (復興關). The offices of

of the Second Office, which was in charge of mass training organizations and another Fuxingshe member, He Zhonghan, was in charge of political training in the military. This could have posed problems for Jiang Jingguo’s plans for the Youth Army political administration, but Kang Ze’s influence had been restrained first by general Chen Cheng and then Zhang Zhizhong, as chiefs of the MAC’s Political Bureau, who distrusted Kang because of his intelligence activities and ties to the infamous spy chief, Dai Li. Taking over from Chen Cheng in September 1940, Zhang Zhizhong had tried to reform the Political Bureau, but apart from some restructuring of cadres in the upper levels of the military, little was accomplished; see Li Zhongshu, p. 105; Hu Bilin and Hao Fang, eds., p. 125; Wang Roude, “Guomindang junweihui zhengzhibu jianwen,” pp. 96-7; Xu Ping, et al., eds., pp. 95-8; and Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, pp. 119-24. While Jiang Jingguo’s relationship with the top level Renaissance Society leadership was indeed one of competition over control of the YC and YA, Jiang adopted a more accommodating stance toward its lower members. In fact, in order to extend his personal influence, he made extensive use of Society men, like Hu Gui, who was a loyal protege from the Jiangxi days and was made deputy chief of the Youth Army’s political bureau. In any event, the whole issue is somewhat academic, in that the Renaissance Society was not in control of the MAC Political Bureau at all. While Kang Ze and the Society were involved with certain aspects of the Youth Army’s political apparatus, they were carefully prevented from dominating it. Another example of this balancing act, was the Political Guidance Committee established for the Youth Army. This body of advisors included some members, such as Kang Ze, who were clearly antagonistic toward Jiang Jingguo at times, but by and large it was filled with Youth Corps members, his proteges and key supporters, including Bai Yu (白瑜), Li Weiguo, and Zheng Yanfen.

340. The KMT’s military political bureaus had played a key role in the National Revolution, especially in political organizing and setting up party branches as the revolutionary armies moved north; Fitzgerald, Awakening China, pp. 304-5.

341. GJZGSG, vol. 2, pp. 923-7 and QNJS, vol. 1, pp. 316-9. General Chen Cheng headed the Youth Army’s Organization and Training Oversight Bureau, which was responsible for organizing the YA units and for training the higher ranking officers. Chen’s longtime friend, Luo Zhuoying was chief of training. A separate Southeast branch of the YA was established, with Huang Wei in charge, for those who were too far removed geographically from Chongqing. It too ran a political personnel class at Lianhe (連荷), which supplied the 208th and 209th divisions with political cadres.
Youth Army’s Political Department, tellingly, soon followed suit. \(^{342}\) The school’s first class, which began on 1 November 1944, was made up almost exclusively of Youth Corps members. \(^{343}\) The political work school ran three sessions, training a total of 1,200 cadres. Lecturers at the school were not restricted to Jiang’s circle, but included key leaders from the CC Clique and the Whampoa organizations. \(^{344}\) Jiang Jingguo himself regularly gave talks to the trainees, often pointing out the flaws and corruption within the KMT and the Nationalist government. He was deeply involved in all aspects of the training process: “When Ching-kuo visited the training camps, he continued his practice of rising before reveille, greeting the trainees as they arrived for muster, and then inspecting kitchens and latrines.”\(^{345}\) He often initiated emergency nighttime assemblies, lecturing the trainees in the dark: “It is dark on all sides, revolutionaries must be vigilant at all times!” This level of personal involvement won Jiang the respect of the students and was a big draw for potential students. \(^{346}\)

Jiang Jingguo handled the staffing the Youth Army political administration with utmost care. The political system in the YA ran more or less in parallel with the military, with political cadres at virtually every level down to the level of individual squads or teams. Attached to the Political Section was a political work unit and the Youth Army Press (青年軍出版社). Each division and each regiment within a division had a political guidance office that trained company-level cadres. To secure independence from the rest of the military, Youth Army political cadres above the company level were supposed to have gone through (or taught in) Jiang Jingguo’s political cadre school. (Allowing the school’s teachers to be posted to Youth Army units was a convenient backdoor that allowed his YC cadres, who made up the vast majority of staff and instructors at the school, to serve in higher level political posts within the YA divisions.\(^ {347}\) ) When Jiang

---

342. Li Zhongshu, p. 104 and Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 245-6.

343. Recent graduates from the YC school made up one third or more of the enrollees in the first class of the Youth Army political training class; Lü Zhenhuan, p. 87. Taylor has a higher number, stating that “more that one hundred” of the graduates from the first class at the YC’s Cadre School, which was given an early graduation (one suspects deliberately), signed up for duty as political officers in the YA; Taylor, pp. 119-20. Regular cadres from the Youth Corps or KMT made up another third of the first class, while the last one-third of the trainees had been recommended by YC branches from their own membership or satellite organizations; Hu Guotai, pp. 55-6.

344. Among the guest lecturers were Chen Lifu, Zhang Daofan (a key man in the CC Clique), Deng Wenyi (a founding member of the Renaissance Society and a classmate of Jiang’s at Sunovka), Li Weiguo and others. Ye Qing (also known as Ren Zhuoxuan (任卓宜), a noted anti-communist expert) also came and lectured against Marxism-Leninism and the CCP.

345. Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son, p. 120.

346. The quotes and description of the class activities taken from an eye-witness account of a student at the class: Lü Zhenhuan, pp. 86-8.

347. Kang Ze resisted Jiang’s control over the political administration by advocating that political cadres be selected from the general body of volunteers and be sent directly to their units for basic military training before being trained as political cadres. This would have bypassed Jiang’s selections for cadres, rendering his training classes a subsidiary or even superfluous source for the political cadres. Jiang stood firm, however, and worked quickly to train and dispatch his cadres into units; Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, pp. 244-50 and Hu Guotai, p.
called for the cadre school students to volunteer for the IYVM about fifty percent of the student body did so immediately — the were all routed directly into the political work administration.  

In this way, Jiang Jingguo staffed the Youth Army’s political bureau and the political cadres in the Youth Army divisions with cadres loyal to himself, drawing heavily on his entrenched Youth Corps ties. In fact, the ties between the Youth Corps and the Youth Army’s political administration were so strong that one political cadre observed, “Working in the Youth Army was continuing working for the YC. I must carry out the Youth Army political work with the spirit of the Youth Corps, and thus I’ll certainly be successful.”  

Divisional level cadres were hand-picked by Jiang, many were close associates.  

Regimental commissars were drawn primarily from the first political work training class, while battalions were staffed with trainees from the later classes, reflecting Jiang Jingguo’s success at entrenching his own and Youth Corps influence in the political administration.  

The lowest levels were not as well connected as higher cadres, in part because most of them were not trained at the central training class. Drawn from the general recruit population of the YA (but only those having post-secondary education), many of these lowest political cadres were trained in the divisional political classes and then sent to serve at the company level. As the YA base areas and their support institutions were established, the political cadres were dispatched to their posts.

55.


349. Li Zhongshu, pp. 102-3. Indicating the high degree of interconnectedness of the YC and YA political instruction, Li had a college classmate who was serving in the Central YC write an introduction to the YC School’s Chief Instructor, Hu Gui. Hu in turn recommended Li to Jiang, who granted Li a teaching position in the second session of the YA political cadre class.

350. Li Zhongshu, pp. 105-6. According to Li all but one were civilians, despite serving at such a high level in a military unit. Ma Lie concurs with Li: all the divisional political officers were civilians, except Zhong Huanzhen (鐘煥臻) in the 205D; Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 134. However, at least one official source contains a list of divisional political cadres that differs significantly from Li’s; see GJZGSG, vol. 2, pp. 925-6. If this is accurate, it suggests that perhaps the Fuxingshe succeeded in placing its military men at the divisional level, while real power was wielded by Jiang Jingguo’s Youth Corps men who held the deputy-cadre posts – a common practice in Nationalist political offices – see, Lü Zhenhuan, p. 87 and Taylor, pp. 119-20. In either case, Jiang Jingguo seems to have picked up on this tactic from his father, who often relied on civilians (or insufficiently trained military men whose loyalty was sure) even in key military administrative posts; Zhang Ruide, Kangzhan shiqi di guojun renshi, p. 152.

351. Political posts in Youth Army units were consistently given to Youth Corps cadres; those who had not gone through the Youth Corps training academy were held in lesser esteem. As a result of this elitism, YA political officers were generally respected much more than their rank would have suggested. The regimental political officers were the only officers of that rank in attendance at the National Political Work Conference in November 1946. See Lü Zhenhuan, p. 89 and Li Zhongshu, pp. 106-7. Li rather resented the fact that even though he taught at the political work school the fact that he had not attended the Youth Corps cadre school meant that his advancement in the Youth Army was blocked.

Political Work in the Youth Army

Jiang Jingguo’s vision and approach to the YA political work was shaped by his years in Russia, his experiences in Jiangxi, and inspections of the Chinese troops training under Stilwell in 1942, all of which had convinced him of the importance of the common soldier, of treating him well, and of leaders sharing with their soldiers in an egalitarian way. But it was more than a desire for military efficiency or humanitarian concern for the well-being of the soldiers; Jiang was determined to revive the activist type of political commissar that had existed in the KMT’s army during the Northern Expedition. While preparing for the Expedition, political work in the army had inserted many leftists and communists into the military, which had engendered a lasting distrust of political administration in Chiang and many Nationalist generals. When Chiang purged the communists in 1927, the military commanders sided with Chiang, while the commissars and political officers went to the left and the communists. With his training in Soviet military and political techniques, Jiang Jingguo set out to build strong political commitment among the Youth Army soldiers.

Immediately after the YA soldier’s induction, the training curriculum was mostly political, but once formal military training began, political classes were reduced to just 15% of the training time. The list of mandated subjects, however, was broad, and included economics, law, historical geography, military reports, international relations, national mobilization procedures, and the history of national liberation movements, but classroom instruction had a strong dose of Sun Yat-sen thought and speeches by Chiang Kaishek.

Political work in the YA had several other important functions beside obvious political indoctrination. Internally, political work included information gathering on the soldiers themselves. Company-level cadres were required to know the men in their units, including family background, educational attainments and specialities, and occupational history. Such information was valuable in routing the men into areas of specialization that would be most suitable to them. Political cadres were also to take measures to help with unit management. Each compa-

353. An early indication of this proclivity was seen during Stilwell’s January 1942 visit to inspect the troops for the Burma front, accompanied by the generalissimo and his son. Jiang Jingguo “who went unnoticed by Stilwell, stayed behind for a week and visited almost every company in the Chinese Sixth Army. He rose every morning before the soldiers and waited for them when they turned out for their morning workout and drill. He visited their kitchens and latrines and encouraged officers to volunteer to write letters home for the soldiers, virtually all of whom were illiterate. In his talks with the officers, Ching-kuo stressed that troop morale was the key to victory. *It was essential that the common soldier know the reason he was fighting, and that there be unity between officers and men*”; Taylor, p. 104, emphasis mine.


355. After the Japanese surrender, training swung back to political classes. In the YA’s veterans association official history, this is referred to as the second phase of political work, when the YA divisions prepared for their anti-communist role, took up positions in recovered areas, and were assigned pacification missions. This and the following paragraph are taken from the YA Veterans Association’s official publication: QNJS, vol. 1, pp. 316-30.

356. The most pressing need was for truck drivers and wireless operators; five to ten thousand recruits would eventually be trained in these areas and farmed out to other units desperate for them.
had a “management committee,” chaired by the company’s political cadre, that was responsible for checking the unit’s budget, solving daily life problems, and preventing common forms of military corruption, namely the appropriation of ration monies by superior officers. Unit cohesiveness was also a key mission for the political cadres. Each platoon had a small group that met weekly for a discussion meeting. Weekly topics were assigned by the divisional political office and usually related to national reconstruction, political problems, army life, or current events. Minutes from these meetings were handed up to the regimental office, reviewed and then edited for publication by the divisional office. In the spirit of open self-examination and criticism, the unit was to be close-knit, leaving no need or room for divisiveness; both KMT and YC party cells were prohibited at all levels. Feeding that unit cohesiveness meant providing an enriching experience for the soldiers. Units had official clubs that undertook a whole array of cultural and recreation activities: speeches, art exhibitions, movies, drama productions, chess tournaments, debates, reading rooms, sport and marksmanship competitions, and concerts. Many of these activities were organized with the help of the Service Associations and Comfort Committees around the bases; thus, political work went beyond the barracks walls and connected the YA to wider society as well. On one hand it was a massive public relations campaign: one of the key missions of the political section was “to arouse interest in military life among all youth through cultural and artistic propaganda and expression.” But it was also designed to make society understand that the military has science as its foundation: “military techniques, life, discipline, all must be rooted in science and only then will these units be able to become a modernized army.” This task required a concerted effort at publicizing the life of the Youth Army soldiers (which we will return to in the next chapter). Political cadres were to enhance the war effort in the communities around the bases by promoting military-society cooperation; each unit was to set up a “military-population cooperation station” to carry out war propaganda work. And, to the extent that such activities did not distract from their in-unit responsibilities, political cadres and offices were to engage in wider social roles too: strengthening baojia organization by training baojia personnel, cultivating self-defense capabilities in local communities, conducting “social investigations” (in conjunction with local government, party, and corps branches), and providing labor services (aiding in agricultural work, relief efforts, and road-building).

Many of these techniques and roles had been part of Jiang’s political work classes; thus, the YA political cadres were dispensing to the youth volunteers the same training that they themselves had undergone. Political education was designed to arouse a high level of élan and group solidarity among the political cadres (training classes) and the volunteer-soldiers. Activities that would strengthen the bonds between themselves and the soldiers in their units are particularly notable, such as clubs, recreation rooms, and sport teams. These methods in both the training classes and in the YA units themselves were part of a cluster of techniques, that I call “technologies of the self,” employed by the Nationalist state to help inculcate the identity of citizen-soldiers among the volunteers.


358. Small group discussions, personal speeches and the like were a part of military academies under the MAC Political Bureau as well, but given the lack of conscientious application and real personal involvement of the instructors in the schools, they were simply not effective in building élan or group cohesiveness; see GJZGSG, vol. 2, pp. 858-76 for a discussion of political work in military schools.
Youth Army Shortcomings

The preceding discussion of political work by virtue of its focus on normative elements has left an overly sanguine impression of the Youth Army as a disciplined, smoothly functioning institution. A look at some of the miscues and areas of blatant failure is necessary as a corrective. The issue is somewhat difficult to examine thoroughly because the materials available are propagandistic and hence often elide areas of administrative and political lapses. Furthermore, many problems were rooted in the complications of wartime finances, and I have not ventured far into that morass of detail. Nevertheless, we can explore tentatively where the regime’s reach exceeded its grasp. Two areas of serious tension or failure of the Nationalist state, specifically discipline problems with the soldiers and the dearth of what the volunteers called “spiritual nourishment”, will be tackled in the next chapter because they are at the core of the real issue, the negotiation and eventual “bargain” struck between these intellectual youths and the state over the terms of their voluntary service.

Some of the most concrete problems were at root financial. The inflationary woes of China’s wartime government are well known and need little comment. The fact that much of the financial burden of the recruiting and initial processing of volunteers was placed on local governments created some unfortunate tendencies. Local recruiting offices and government organs were underfunded and not always able to obtain cooperation from other local governments and private bodies necessary to fulfill the obligations for benefits as required by the central government’s regulations. In some small counties (e.g., Daxian) when the youths went off to join the army there was no adults left in their homes and the land was often cheated away from the family by local bullies. Local officials themselves sometimes stole scholarship or award monies earmarked for youth recruits. One reporter, aware of these abuses, called for a centrally administered distribution of Youth Army identification cards for families of youth soldiers so that they could receive their benefits without trouble. Recruits were technically responsible for providing all their own items and funds until they were inducted, but local governments along transportation routes established receiving stations to handle the recruits passing through the area on their way to their training bases or assembly points. Many reports tell of volunteers walking long distances to central recruiting or training bases. For one example, Hubei volunteers were sent to Chongqing, but many of them lacked any other form of transportation and so were forced to go on foot, across the Japanese front lines, during the winter of 1944. Many localities were fearful of potential trouble such wandering, hungry, and tired youths might bring as they passed through. The central administration issued a special regulation urging local recruiting bodies to use boats, cars, or planes instead of allowing the recruits to hike to their bases. At receiving stations set up by provincial and local institutions, there were repeated reports of disturbances among the en-


360. HYQNJ, p. 145.

361. GMWX, vol. 62, p. 210 and vol. 63, p. 328. The explicit reasoning contained in this regulation, however, is that quicker mechanized transport was necessary given the urgency of the war situation.
listees, often attributed to the inability of local governments to provide shelter and adequate food for the larger than expected flow of recruits that these localities were asked to handle.  

Financial restrictions, combined of course with time constraints, were doubtless also at the heart of the delays in barracks construction, incomplete sanitation facilities, the lack of real weapons for training, the hodge-podge of weapon makes and models when they were finally issued to the soldiers, the poor stock of medical supplies, insufficient numbers of daily necessities (soap, towels, toothbrushes, etc.), and inadequate training materials for the youth soldiers. For example, one soldier complained that shower facilities were unfinished and there was no on-base hair-cutting and clothes washing facilities, which meant that trips to the barber and laundry were coming out of the soldiers' own pocket-money.  

One youth-soldier attributed the postponement of formal military training to the bald fact that weapons had not arrived at the base. In some localities, especially mountainous regions, local economies were hard-pressed to provide enough food for the youth soldiers. There were the occasional gripes, like the youth-soldier who complained that unable to shower, the volunteers had all “have become dirty to the point of indignity.” Yet, these material deprivations seem to have been borne patiently and with good humor by most enlistees.

There was some acrimony over certain unfulfilled promises by the government, however. One of these was the widespread feeling among the youth soldiers that the Nationalist state had promised that their units would all be thoroughly mechanized. When this turned out not to be the case, there was some resentment. Naturally, military authorities tried to minimize reports of

---

362. For a good example of this, see Huang Jiaqi, pp. 128-9.
363. HYQNJ, p. 92.
364. Ibid., p. 83. The desperate lack of medical supplies and daily use items are singled out as bothersome; ibid., 132. Sanitation, particularly the lack of working shower facilities, was a frequent negative point brought out by youth soldiers at Bishan. One reporter in the 7 March 1945 issue of *Saodang bao*, lamented that the 201st division at Bishan still had not received sufficient numbers of weapons or training manuals; ibid., p. 175. On the delays in base construction, see Wu Guoyuan, p. 1. Here we find that while the barracks and other base buildings for the 639th regiment were under construction, the unit used various buildings in Rujin and its surroundings as a temporary base for a fortnight. The newly constructed base, according this nostalgic memorial volume, was worth the wait. Once finished, it boasted of a lecture hall, dormitories, exercise yard, marching square, eating hall, kitchen and toilets – in short, as far as the base facilities were concerned “everything was ideal”. But this was in constrast to its weapons and training provisions. Initially, due to the lack of equipment, especially ammunition, weapons training for the entire 209th division “did not reach the anticipated level of progress.” As a result, the volume continues, the units' battlefield coordination was not up to snuff. The writers concluded that the division and regiment both needed more frequent exercises to sharpen command skills and “build up command capability;” Wu Guoyuan, p. 7.
365. HYQNJ, p. 175.
366. Ibid., p. 63.
367. On this issue, see the account in Zhang Kaixuan, pp. 146-7. A good deal of this resentment was caused by disappointment among volunteers when they discovered that the government had switched its goals for the Youth Army and that they were no longer going to go to India as reinforcements for the Expeditionary Army there. In March 1944, the Sichuan Army District
this discontent. For example, the commander of the 201st, Dai Zhiqi, explicitly told a reporter visiting Bishan, that he was sure that as long as they were training to kill the Japanese invaders the volunteers were fundamentally content, despite not being mechanized. Nevertheless, issues such as these were common enough that another reporter recommended that the government set up an office, under the General Inspectorate of Recruitment and Training in Chongqing, that would specialize in taking and dealing with the questions, problems, complaints, and suggestions of the youth soldiers.

Conclusion: Construction of Loyalty

Examined dispassionately, commander Dai’s contention that the youth volunteers were content serving their government was substantially correct. Despite the administrative lapses and inefficiencies, the moments ill-discipline and difficulties, the Nationalist state could justifiably count the IYVM and the Youth Army as a success. Even though the war’s victory was strategically assured, the rampant inflation, the worsening political tensions with the communists, dwindling supplies of manpower and grain, eroding confidence in the Nationalist state among many groups of China’s population and abroad with the Allies, and the nearly devastating blow of Japan’s Ichigo Offensive all combined to make the last years of the war the most desperate. Acknowledging this makes the success of the Youth Army even more remarkable, as it was achieved under the most difficult conditions of the war.

Befitting the importance of the IYVM and the Youth Army, the Nationalist regime was assiduous in fulfilling the assurances it had made to the volunteers. As it demobilized the Youth Army in 1946, Chiang’s government scrupulously met all the obligations it had promised to the youth soldiers. Jiang Jingguo carefully cultivated the Youth Army veterans, keeping them in contact with himself and the Youth Corps, as a reserve political force during the postwar years. And in turn, the volunteers rewarded the Nationalist state with a lasting loyalty: Youth Army veterans not only served as reliable shock troops in schools and in various pacification schemes in the countryside, but the Youth Army divisions were re-mobilized in 1947 and proved themselves on the battlefield against the communist armies during the Civil War. This loyalty lasted even after the Nationalist retreat to Taiwan, where the Youth Army became one of Jiang Jingguo’s key military-political power bases.

Given the state’s assiduous attention to the well-being of the youth soldiers and to fulfilling its promises to them, their loyalty is perhaps not surprising, but it was not total. This chapter, by focusing so intently on the administrative and political constellations of the IYVM and YA has presented a somewhat one-sided view that over-emphasizes the success of the Nationalist administration. It slides over the nuances of the multi-layered negotiation between the youth soldiers and the state which they volunteered to serve. As we will see in the following chapter when we unpack the propaganda of the IYVM-YA, the genuine success – as well as the areas of tension – were both connected to the layers of identity and meanings of volunteering for service as citizen-

command cabled the Junzhengbu indicating that the volunteers were set on going out of China to fight. If they were kept in-country, they very well might begin to “waver”. The cable asked if it was possible to send the training regiment to India anyway “as a means of encouraging and exhorting” the newer recruits; GMWX, vol. 62, p. 197.

368. HYQNJ, p. 149.
soldiers. Only by closely examining the emotional and conceptual underpinnings of the YA loyalty to the Nationalist state will we be able to understand the real nature, and limits, of that loyalty.
Chapter Six

Of Pen and Gun: Political Practice, Culture and Identity in the Youth Army

“[Youth Army] Enlistment Song” by Gong Junping (龚均平)

Young brothers!
Now is the time!
Our country is calling
The war horses are neighing
Still you don’t rise up. What are you waiting for?
Still you don’t rise up. What are you waiting for?
Quick, change into your fighting uniforms
Shoulder your tommy guns
Straddle your majestic steeds
Ride toward the battlefield
Sweep it clear of the enemy
Retake the land
Take our nation’s flag
And plant it on the peak of Mount Fuji!
Plant it on the peak of Mount Fuji!

Culture: Propaganda and Practices

Among academics the overall assessment of the Nationalist regime's wartime record has been far from favorable. Historians, while acknowledging the difficulties facing Chiang's government from 1937 onwards, have painted the late years of Nationalist rule on the mainland in consistently negative terms: politically corrupt, militarily ineffective, and culturally bankrupt. All real impetus for change has been located in the revolutionary communist movement. As a continuation of the previous chapter, this chapter hopes to examine ways in which an enervated government undertook – largely successfully – the fostering of a committed citizenship in the recruitment and military training of “intellectual youth” volunteers from late 1943 onwards. The Nationalist regime sponsored an intense and direct propaganda effort at stimulating the desire to volunteer for military duty among young educated males, a group not known for its inclination toward things martial. This chapter deals with the political culture in the Youth Army to unpack the values, or meanings, of military service and citizenship in these elite units. Central to understanding the rubrics of meanings clustered around the Youth Army are the propaganda and everyday practices of the youth soldiers. (Culture, here, is being used not as some immutable set of values, but in the sense of the practices of a group of people, and the meanings associated with and created by those practices.)

This chapter will explore several areas of the Youth Army culture and experience, specifically the system of practices that I call “technologies of the self.” These practices made up a loose constellation of common techniques for organizations to train and motivate political ac-

tivists in Nationalist China. None of these were original or unique to the Youth Army as they were all found in other institutions, such as the Boy Scouts, the Youth Corps, the KMT itself, and even the CCP and its satellite organizations. What made the Youth Army unique, especially for the Nationalists, was the density and intensity of these practices. From these institutionalized practices we will turn to the youth soldiers identities, specifically the way the volunteers constructed and construed themselves. This composite self-image was the concrete content of the Nationalist citizen-soldier and entailed specific forms of expression and practice. From self-identity we will move to a close reading of the key material object in the Youth Army, the gun itself, as an entry point to understanding the symbolic and ideological meanings of Nationalist military service and citizenship. By looking at the central embodiment of soldiering, the terms and internal logic of the bargain struck between the volunteers and the Nationalist state will be clearer. And finally, we will look at the fractures and fault lines in the Nationalist citizen-soldiers – the limits of citizenship – by looking at tensions, moments of ill-discipline, and the “meaningful gaps” in the ideological construction of the Youth Army’s citizen-soldiers.

A note on sources and their treatment is in order. My examination of the experience and meanings of joining the military in this chapter draws heavily upon materials that were produced as propaganda directed at wider Chinese society, including communist rivals and liberal critics of the regime. Much of the source material for this chapter comes from the enlistees’ own writings on their lives after joining the army, specifically the short autobiographical accounts published in the Central Daily (中央日报) and other government-backed papers, like the Saodang bao (掃蕩報), the longest running and most popular military paper. These materials were written as part of the youth soldiers’ political training and were disseminated to publicize the YA and its activities. Thus, it must be kept in mind that although the practices we are concerned with were the actions of volunteers, these acts of writing took place within a strongly disciplined institution, the military, and bore the deep marks of that discipline. These writings were institutionalized and enforced (prescriptive), and not necessarily “organic” nor wholly voluntary (ascriptive). Furthermore, because these are unverifiable autobiographical accounts, there is inevitably a degree of “fictionalizing” of the self taking place in these writings.

On the surface, this sort of propaganda poses a difficulty for the type of analysis this chapter proposes, but there are several reasons for taking these sources seriously. First, we must keep in mind that the Chinese word xuanchuan (propaganda, 宣傳) encompasses a much broader spectrum of materials intended to persuade and inform, and lacks the necessarily derogatory connotation of falsity or misinformation that the English word possesses. Second, it pays to remind ourselves that the war set off a process in which China’s cultural elite came to place great

2. The dividing line between the technologies of self and self-identity is not always distinct. Some practices, such as “self-government” (zizhi 自治), i.e., management committees run by the volunteers within their units, could easily be placed in either category.

3. For a discussion of the Saodang bao as an integral part of cultural work (a subdivision of political work) in the military, see GJZGSG, vol. 2, p. 890.

4. John Fitzgerald’s Awakening China has provided a measure of inspiration on the value of exploring writings that are propagandistic. Yet Fitzgerald is ultimately more concerned with the organization of propaganda (or what he calls “discipline”) than what propaganda can say about the thoughts and identities of groups of people.
importance on propaganda production. An earlier high point in this development was the campaign around Wuhan in 1938 when a critical mass of refugee intellectuals and students collected in the city. As Stephen MacKinnon has observed:

Many cultural leaders believed that propaganda was as important as weapons in fighting the war. Thus, in the production of a new mass-directed culture, Chinese intellectuals, especially the young students who flooded into Wuhan as refugees, considered themselves to be in the vanguard. A consensus formed that China’s chances for survival would improve if the cultural apparatus were reorganized and put on a wartime propaganda footing.

The Youth Army was connected directly to the Youth Corps which was born in the heady days of the Wuhan Spring and thus, unsurprisingly, it carried forward the tradition of propaganda production by intellectual refugee youth, though it was no longer carried on by a press that was indulged by tolerant military authorities as in Wuhan, but instead directly produced and disseminated by the military’s own cultural apparatus. (This change, of course, partially reflects the deterioration in the United Front between the KMT and the CCP and the KMT’s growing mistrust of any cultural organ that it could not dominate or control.) Third, propaganda was in fact one of the key practices of everyday life in the Youth Army; it was integrated into the soldiers’ everyday routine. The creation, dissemination, and consumption of their own propaganda was one of the essential roles and functions of the Youth Army – it was woven intimately into the fabric of everyday life in the barracks. In short, there is no way to separate propaganda from practice in the Youth Army. Fourth, the autobiographical nature of much of this the writing suggests that it was an essential aspect identity construction for these volunteers: it was the key means by which they explored, asserted, and adopted the role of citizen-soldiers. And finally, it must be noted that some accounts are far from flattering for the regime – both outright fabrication and heavy-handed editing seem to have been avoided. For these reasons, this chapter will treat the Youth Army propaganda as serious sources, reading them with the grain to draw out the motivations, ideas, and thoughts that inspired the writing and against the grain to uncover the areas where fiction of obscured reality.

Technologies of the Self: Practices of Political Citizens

As the pinnacle of a state-controlled experience, the military training process consisted of mapping the state's ideals onto soldiers' bodies and minds: the internalization of a set of youthful, vigorous, masculine norms, experiences, and a set of idealized relationships that constituted a citizen-soldier fighting a national war. The youth soldiers were involved in a suite of institutionally

5. Both of these points are fundamental to Hung Chang-tai’s study of wartime propaganda as well; see the introduction of War and Popular Culture, particularly page 9.

6. MacKinnon, Wuhan, 1938, p. 63; see all of MacKinnon’s fifth chapter, “Culture and the Press”, pp. 62-82, for an extended discussion of cultural developments in 1938 Wuhan. This new-found emphasis on “paper bullets” – as propaganda products were called – is usually viewed by later historians with dismay and skepticism, as a deterioration from May Fourth achievements and a slide into mass mediocrity; see Gunn, “Literature and Art of the War Period,” in China’s Bitter Victory, pp. 253-73, for just one example. MacKinnon is more attuned to the positive aspects of the intellectual and cultural fervor in 1938; though both Mao’s 1942 Yan’an talks on literature and art and the Nationalists’ heavy-handed propaganda efforts later in the war leave much less room for positive assessments.
mandated practices and activities that formed the essential elements of a politically active citizen-soldier. None of these were original or distinct to the Youth Army. They were drawn from disparate traditions of political activism and thus were shared with other political organizations.

The Youth Army was a repository of methods, practices, and approaches; some of the sources for these political technologies were the Russian communist party and international fascism. Sun Yatsen and the KMT had been heavily influenced by Russian and Leninist methodologies in the mid- to late-1920s, but after the purge of the communists in the Northern Expedition and then into the 1930s Chiang took a turn toward the right, finding much to like in European fascism. From 1933 onward, Nationalist China had closer ties with Germany than with any other foreign power. While this relationship was grounded in economic and military cooperation, it also included a degree of admiration for the political and cultural possibilities of fascism and National Socialism, which could ameliorate the associated evils of capitalism, imperialism, materialism, individualism, and communism. Chiang sent some of his key advisors and military men on observation missions to both Germany and Italy. Indicative of the attraction that European fascism held for Chiang and his key military supporters, Liu Jianqun, a close associate of He Yingqin, wrote the famous “Blue Shirt” pamphlet advocating Italian-style fascism as a model for strengthening the KMT with an elite core of dedicated loyalists that would eventually become the Society for Vigorous Practice (Lixingshe) and the sprawling Renaissance Society (Fuxingshe). Liu was heavily involved in both groups and eventually the Youth Corps and Youth Army as well. These connections provided models of political identity formation that would be brought into play with the IYVM and Youth Army. As we have already seen in the previous chapter, Jiang Jingguo’s long stint in Russia left an indelible influence on his political approach that he carried into the Youth Army: the YA’s political apparatus and techniques mirrored many of the practices of Russian communists.

In her study of militias as the embodiment of “revolutionary citizenship,” Elizabeth Perry notes that there was significant cross-pollination between the KMT and the CCP in the techniques used to mobilize militias. A whole battery of common elements from the late 1920s and 1930s found their way into both parties, and eventually the YC and YA as well. The KMT-sponsored Industry Defense Corps in Shanghai is a good example: it sought volunteers, required application forms, background checks, letters of recommendation from guarantors, and ran political and military training sessions. Militia members attended small group meetings, were subjected

---

7. The classic study of the Sino-German relationship during these years is William Kirby’s *Germany and Republican China*.


9. “From the early 1920s on, alongside the Soviets in Russia, the Italian fascists pioneered techniques of mass socialization and political identity formation that would subsequently mark the youth policies of other European dictatorships”; Ruth Ben-Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities: Italy, 1922-1945*, p. 93. After 1928 with the ejection of Soviet advisors, Chiang had no other reliable foreign support available to him except Germany and Italy. Reliance on German advisors and aid in the 1930s brought with it an inevitable shift toward fascist policies and ideas, though Chiang never had any use for the racist elements of European fascism.
to shaming tactics, and were required to engage in vigorous self-criticism. All of these institutional techniques were thus available for use in the Youth Army as a strategic political project in the Nationalist government’s late war plans.

One of the key technologies was volunteerism, the act of volunteering itself, though this ran counter to the dominant mode of Nationalist political mobilization. Compulsory participation was not only the norm in wartime conscription and labor (corvée) service, but had a long tradition in Nationalist political mobilization as well. Still, the Youth Army’s reliance on volunteerism was not an innovation, nor a radical break with Nationalist practice; in fact, it too was a regular feature of Republican political mobilization. Local political elites had relied extensively on inspiring voluntary enlistment for political, military, and para-military service. This was true even in Beibei, just north of Chongqing, where authorities experimented successfully with volunteer detachments of paramilitary forces in the 1930s and volunteer units earlier in the war, under Tao Xingzhi. The communists too relied heavily on individual volunteerism, though at times this could backfire when recruiting bandit gangs that preferred to ally as a group with the communists.


11. The Nationalists shared with other post-Imperial governments a tradition of corporatist political mobilization. The state as the harmonious embodiment of the disparate social elements (groups united by collective interests, but subordinate to the KMT party and state), mobilized representatives from various “circles” or “sections of society” (jie jie) – usually occupational and native place groups – to participate in the ceremonies and rituals of political life, to emphasize the legitimacy of the government, and place it above the fractious realm of specific policies and interests. These representatives were often mobilized on the basis of groups defined by the government and in a compulsory or semi-compulsory way; see Henrietta Harrison, The Making of the Republican Citizen, pp. 22-3, 26-30, 118-25, and 207-29. See also the May 1931 convention to produce the Provisional Constitution, which was constituted with delegates from KMT-controlled organizations, most of which were organized by jie; Ch’ien Tuan-sheng, Government and Politics, p. 137. For an astute discussion of the Nationalist state’s self-conscious, though only partially successful, attempts at “shaping, arranging, and reconfiguring” ‘Society’ (with a capital S) during its pre-Northern Expedition tenure in Guangzhou see, Michael Tsin, Nation, Governance, and Modernity in China, pp. 37-142, and particularly his discussion of “the riddle of mobilization” under party and government auspices on pages 143-6 and 170-6.

12. On prewar and wartime volunteer drives and units in Beibei and the Three Gorges Experimental District under the Lu brothers, see qz0081.mj1-213, pp. 28-30 dated 21 November 1932; qz0081.mj1-208, pp. 34a-8b dated 14 October 1933; qz0081.mj3-212, pp. 44-8 dated 1939; qz0081.mj3-212, pp. 68-93, 99-116, 127-31, 133, and 135-44 all dated 1939. For a thumbnail sketch of Tao Xingzhi’s efforts to drum up volunteers, which were part of his much wider wartime involvements with orphans, education, and social mobilization, see Li Xunhua, “Tao Xingzhi zai Beibei zongshu,” pp. 168-74. Tao’s experiences in Beibei were the basis for his proposals, aired in the People’s Political Council in 1939, for the central government to expand its volunteer drives; see YZSL, vol. 1, pp. 418-21.

13. The New Fourth Army used an individual volunteer method in Huaibei. This was especially true in incorporating bandits, where a “stringent” policy of individual volunteerism was adopted. The Red Army demanded that “bandits join the New Fourth Army as individuals rather than as units” and this policy actually drove many bandit units to the KMT and Japanese banners in Huaibei; See Elizabeth Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries, p. 227.
The Nationalists experimented sporadically with small-scale volunteer units during the war as well, though the mechanisms for recruiting these volunteer units were quite different from the IYVM. One of the more famous was a volunteer unit organized in southern Yunnan. Lu Han (盧漢), the commander of the First Army Group, dispatched Wang Peicang (王佩倉) to the Guangnan (廣南) area to recruit a volunteer unit. Wang’s father had served with Lu previously and Lu knew that Wang was a well-connected local elite of the Zhuang minority in the districts around Guangnan. Wang set about mobilizing his personal ties, relying on his friends, relatives, and ethnic connections in local society to recruit for him. The unit’s officers, particularly battalion commanders, were primarily his personal and local connections and they personally recruited the men to fill up their companies’ rosters. The drive resulted in more than 3,000 volunteers. Neither the First Army Group nor the provincial government was able or willing to supply the volunteers, however, so they had to borrow from local wealthy elites to purchase their initial supplies. After a lengthy trek through several provinces, the volunteer unit was broken up once it reached Jiangxi and its individual companies sent to serve in various divisions. It is telling that the Yunnan recruits, while definitely motivated by a patriotic volunteerism, were mobilized through local community structures, in ways reminiscent of the late-Qing anti-Taiping mobilization. Of course, not all small scale volunteer efforts were so obviously reliant on local familial and society ties, but none of these approached the scale of the IYVM, nor were they directly connected to the sinews of national power.

The intellectual youths shared an explicit individual volunteerism with Youth Corps members, who were required to sign a pledge of loyalty to the organization. The YC oath stipulated their willingness to accept punishment should they violate the regulations or orders of the organization. This taking of a vow or oath was a common element in Nationalist political culture, but in most cases in the party it was formulaic and the mass inductions into KMT had long hollowed it out. Other groups, like the Renaissance Society (and its parent, the Society for Vigorous Practice) had oaths and induction ceremonies as well, but these were conducted in strict secrecy. In

---

14. The officers, many of whom were too old for real service were sent back to Yunnan, while the rank-and-file volunteers were dispersed into several different units.

15. See Qin Guangyu, “Kangri zhiyuan bingtuan shimo,” passim; Qin Guangyu, “Canjia Kangri de Yunnan zhiyuan bingtuan,” passim; Dai Qinlin, “Kangri chuqi zai Guangnan zhaoshou de zhiyuanbing dadui,” passim; and Li Zhengtang, “Huiyi canjia Kangri zhiyuanbing de jingguo,” passim for short accounts of the Yunnan volunteers.

16. The volunteer unit in Fenggang (鳳岡), Guizhou is an example of this type. The county’s enthusiastic magistrate recruited county-level administration personnel as officers, who then spearheaded recruitment campaign which drew in some 2,500 to 3,000 county youth as rank and file. The magistrate secured Junzhengbu approval and support for the unit. It was directly subordinate to the local divisional district and after it enjoyed a highly unusual six month training period, it was integrated into the regular military structure seamlessly; see Zhang Xingzhi, “Fenggang zhiyuan bingtuan,” pp. 209-13, in Xi’nan minzhong dui kanglezhan de gongxian, 1992.

17. When they joined Chongqing YC members were required to fill out a simple form and sign an oath that they would respect the corps tenets, articles of organization, and obey orders from their superiors and if they violated any of these they pledged that they would “willingly accept punishment”; qz0095.mj1-96, n.p.
contrast, the act of volunteering for the YA was almost always a public demonstration: the visible, social expression of the youths’ private, individual resolve.

Rituals: Unity and Difference

The volunteering ceremony, in which educated youth went up on stage in public to sign their names in a roster, was the first of a series of four liminal rituals, acts of threshold crossing, or moments that drew a line demarcating the volunteers from civilian society as they crossed over into a new life as a soldier. Military establishments the world over are laced through with ritual proceedings that mark the participants as part of the military fraternity, separating them from civilian-outsiders. The Chinese Youth Army was no exception. Four such rituals were important. The first was the formal signing up, or volunteering, procedure. The specific circumstances and manner of this ritual varied considerably from place to place, but in Chongqing large rallies were held during which youths (of both sexes) would go to the front of an auditorium or up on a platform to officially enter their names on a register of volunteers. These were usually elaborate, public affairs, often resulting in weeping or laughing or both. In smaller locales, this ritual could take the form of a signup drive or competition at a local school. The public display, full of ecstatic and intense emotions, was doubtless responsible for inducing many youths to volunteer out of peer pressure or an impetuous desire to participate.  

Even when a youth preferred to forego the public ceremony, the public rituals often instigated the final decision to volunteer. Tao Shaochun wrote his friends of his decision to enlist. His letter began with a stirring opening: “To my loved ones: I love you, but I love my country more.” With Japanese troops knocking on Sichuan’s door, Tao felt China’s desperate need and decided to answer Chiang’s call for educated youth, but “in my head floated too many question marks . . . ‘Can you [face] death? . . . [What about] my family? My parents only have a single son, me! . . . [If I enlist] I won’t graduate from university . . .” Only after acknowledging his fears was he able to make his final decision. Celebrating the release of tension, he went to a deserted part of town.

[I] sang the songs of heroes, to release the successive nights of pent-up stuffiness in my body. I spread my arms because I felt like embracing to my chest the lovely, open country of our fatherland. This is our land, bequeathed to us by our ancestors. We are the descendents of the Yellow Emperor!” He shouted to the empty streets, “Am I a man? Death isn’t such a big threat! Who can avoid dying? It’s how one dies [that’s important]!

Shortly thereafter, he went to the next volunteer celebration, and watched “flocks and flocks of strong sons and daughters, who marched . . . onto the stage and signed their names as heroes. . . . [Everyone] was crying hot tears.” But although he had already decided “to sacrifice [xiangei 献给] his body for the nation,” he did not go onstage, but instead went “alone, quietly, to the registration office.”

The second ritual of soldierly community demarcating recruits from society was the “send off” for those who passed the examinations and were being dispatched to their training bases. The send-offs followed a standardized procedure that varied mostly in scale, and borrowed heavily from the “theatrical” tradition of public – usually student-based – demonstrations in

18. For a whole string of anecdotes on this procedure, see QNYZJJY, pp. 35-58.
post-1911 China. Local recruiting committees made sure that slogans and banners were put up. Official personnel led the youths, often carrying flags themselves, to the station. Firecrackers were ubiquitous and young girls threw flowers at the volunteers. If trucks were used, as they were in Chongqing, to transport recruits to their bases, the committee made arrangements so that the streets along the route were lined with people throwing oranges and giving gifts to the recruits. Gongs, martial songs, flower-tossing girls, and other festive sights and sounds were common in these ritual send-offs. 20

Chinese armies generally lacked the harsh induction rituals and hazing of new recruits by veterans or NCOs that are a hallmark of many other militaries. This was true even during the warlord period and continued to be so through the war. 21 Unit cohesion and bonding had to be manufactured in other ways. The next two rituals and intense group physical training were the mainstays of the process of turning volunteers into soldiers, bonded with their units. The next step in the sequence occurred soon after reaching the training base, and consisted simply of putting on the new army uniform alongside one's newly met friends in the unit. Uniforms were a common element in schools and paramilitary organizations like the Boy Scouts, which were organized by the YC in many areas. As one educator in China remarked of his students:

[S]tudent homogeneity was emphasized by the school uniform or the alternative Boy Scout uniform; by regulation, students could wear whatever garments they wished under the uniform but not over it. Homogeneity was further emphasized by the extremely short haircuts, virtually head shaves, that suggested attachment to the Generalissimo as the model for an austere, puritanical, nationalistic leadership. Chiang Kai-shek did not usually excite adulation or demand it, but he was a cool leader with immense Face and elicited our students’ support and admiration. 22

Not only schools, but local YC branches too were anxious both to standardize their members’ uniforms and to assert their right to wear YC shoulder insignia and badges when those were not distributed. 23 Many youth soldiers stressed that they marked their transformation into “Chinese soldiers” from the moment they first donned their “modern gray cotton uniforms.” 24 Addressing the volunteers, Luo Zekai, commander of the 202D, put it bluntly, “From today forward, you are not common people, students, or public servants. You have been given the honorable rank of 2nd

20. GMWX, vol. 63, p. 304; QNYZJJY, pp. 72-4; and Wang Zicong, p. 55. See QNYZJJY, pp. 63-8, for an extended description of one school’s send off party. The send-off ceremonies borrowed some of the form, but naturally none of the arrogation of public authority, that marked student protests. As the IYVM was staunchly pro-government, its send-offs displayed no attempts by the volunteers to borrow the language or legitimacy of officials, nor to set up “peacekeeping” institutions, that were common in earlier student protests in Shanghai. The classic study of the public theater of student protests is Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai, Stanford, 1991, passim, but especially his discussion of student protests as “subversive theater”, p. 291-3.


24. QNYZJJY, p. 149 and HYQNJ, p. 50.
class private in this division. From today, your bodies have been completely given over to the nation.”

The final important ritual was the solemn ceremony when rifles were distributed to the troops. After a speech exhorting the youth soldiers to “love [their] weapons” and to honor them as the products of the labor of their compatriots, representatives were sent up onstage to receive rifles on behalf of the whole regiment. We will return to look closely at this ceremony, as a nexus of meanings and exchanges, later in the chapter.

These rituals then were part of the youths’ transformation, the assumption of a new role and identity. These four moments marked a separation from non-soldiers and from their own civilian past, a break that was so sharp and complete that it rendered them unrecognizable. One volunteer, on the day he signed up, wrote a letter to a friend telling him the news; he went on to ask his friend “please do not look at me any more as a university student, now I am an artilleryman.” One reporter addressed his news story to the mothers of the new soldiers. In a tone that stressed the distance between mother and son at the same time that it reassured the mothers of the positive changes their sons were undergoing, he wrote:

If you came here to see your sons, you certainly would not recognize them because they are completely different than before. First, their outward appearance has changed, their clothes are different – a gray uniform . . . a pair of grass shoes, no hair – a bald skull; a changed face – red and fat; their physique is also different – much matured! If they were before you, bowed and told you their recent news, would you be able to recognize your sons?

The general operations manager of the Central Bank, commented in amazement when he failed to recognize youths he had personally known from the bank before they enlisted: “They changed so quickly! Just twenty days ago when they were at the recruiting committee, they all wore western suits and leather shoes with the elegant demeanor of a modern youth!”

One soldier wrote of meeting an old flame, who had also volunteered for service in the women’s auxiliary corps. When they ran into each other on base, the young woman, “looked [him] over from head to toe and asked: ‘Are you still a student?’”

25. HYQNJ, p. 67. The political implications of dress and the role that changes in clothing (and other external markers, such as etiquette) played in constructing the Republican citizen – as opposed to the imperial subject – is ably analyzed by Henrietta Harrison in The Making of the Republican Citizen, pp. 49-85.


27. All rites consecrate or legitimate an arbitrary boundary, by fostering a misrecognition of the arbitrary nature of the limit. “By solemnly marking the passage over a line which establishes a fundamental division in the social order, rites draw the attention of the observer to the passage . . . whereas the important thing is the line. . . . Obviously, it [the line] separates a before and after . . . [But] in fact, the most important division, and the one which passes unnoticed, is the division it creates between all those who are subject to [the rite] . . . and those who are not subject to it . . . The most important effect of the rite is the one which attracts the least attention: by treating men and women differently, the rite consecrates the difference, institutes it“; Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 118.


29. HYQNJ, pp. 115-6. Some observers commented that the vigor and strength of the youths’ actions proved their transformation into soldiers; QNYZJJY, pp. 134-5.

to toe,” but still did not recognize her former boyfriend in his new soldierly self. Yet, he recognized her easily. Despite the changes she had undergone in her recruitment and training, she “still had the same way of skipping as she walked.” The transformation of the male was total, leaving him unrecognizable to those from his past; he was a completely new man, a soldier. The female recruit was changed, of course, but still recognizable. As she had not become a soldier like her male counterpart, the civilian girl’s past identity is not completely effaced or over-written, but just added to, leaving her recognizably “the same” in some way.  

A fundamental requirement for a citizen-soldier was bodily training. Along with remaking their outer appearance (uniforms), the Nationalist military wanted to remake the youth soldiers’ bodies, thus recruits underwent intensive physical training after being inducted into their units in 1945. Like modern militaries everywhere, physical endurance and conditioning were highly valued in the YA.

The importance of physical training, specifically collective drill, can hardly be overestimated. According to William McNeill it forms the most basic of all human “technologies,” likely predating (or even laying the foundation for) language. His study of human (and proto-human) “dance and drill” suggests that the “muscular bonding” of groups practicing synchronized, rhythmic motions has been a key element in human evolution and history.

Sociologists studying World War II experience discovered that what kept men fighting was not propaganda nor words of any kind, but an intense fellow-feeling for those close at hand and sharing imminent, obvious danger. . . . [T]his sort of merger between self and the surrounding group, attained in the heat of battle, is analogous to the ‘boundary loss’ attributed to dancers. It is also induced by close-order drill, though only in

---

31. HYQNJ, pp. 123-5. This obvious and telling gender differential calls to mind Duara’s analysis of the “eternal woman” as a necessary ideological element in constructing “the nation.” There must be an unchanging core at the heart of the national concept, and this eternal essence is often cast in feminine or womanly form; the Chinese woman “was both modern citizen and locus of unchanging authenticity”; Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity, p. 131, but see the entire chapter, “Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity,” p. 131-69. As we shall see, however, the Youth Army’s male volunteers too would lay claim to some “unchanging” core of idealized Chinese-ness.

32. A postwar Nationalist assessment of political work in the military rightly claims that although KMT armies made a start at promoting physical conditioning during the war, they did not begin properly emphasizing physical training until the early 1950s; GJZGSG, vol. 3, p. 2023-9. This was most true for the regular army as a whole. Physical training was largely unregulated in KMT units, being left to each army and school to manage as the commander saw fit. Subject to the CO’s whims, physical conditioning never achieved universal or thorough application in KMT armies. The Youth Army units, however, were key exceptions to this general situation.

33. McNeill, while admitting that his study is unavoidably “superficial and incomplete,” argues quite persuasively that our closest primate relatives have no “group dance” and that “the expanded emotional solidarity that dancing together arouses must have conferred an important advantage on those groups that first learned the trick of keeping together in time,” in other words, our direct ancestors; McNeill, Keeping Together in Time, p. 23.
attenuated measure.\textsuperscript{34}

While war dancing and similar forms of “practicing” war were nearly omnipresent in the human past, McNeill argues that the technology of military close-order drill was a powerful element in the creation of mass armies wherever and whenever they appear. In Europe, Maurice of Orange pioneered close-order drill in the 1590s, and the mass armies that it permitted spread quickly in the early 17th century. At the same time in China, the Ming reformist general Qi Jiguang (戚繼光) stressed new drill and tactics that allowed China to expand its reach into the steppes. China’s early (Warring State period, 402-221 BCE) experiment with mass infantry armies had been rendered obsolete by the arrival of cavalry and the crossbow which made large bodies of even well-drilled soldiers too vulnerable in the open field. This vulnerability lasted until Qi Jiguang’s reforms and innovative military tactics, which relied on mobile fortifications (carts) when operating in the open field, finally provided protection against calvary.\textsuperscript{35} Interestingly, Chiang Kaishek reprinted Qi Jiguang’s most famous training volumes in 1939 as models for his military in the fight against Japan. In McNeill’s words,

- Both in the Far East and Far West, prolonged drill created obedient, reliable, and effective soldiers, with an esprit de corps that superseded previous identities and insulated them from outside attachments. Well-drilled new-model soldiers, whether Chinese or European, could therefore be counted on to obey their officers accurately and predictably . . . The Chinese and all modern European empires were built on the strength of this remarkable behavior.\textsuperscript{36}

The technology of close-order drill laid the foundation for the modern mass army in that it allowed for the recruitment and transformation of “dangerous classes,” men marginalized by the increasingly marketized economy in Europe, into reliable and honor-worthy soldiers for the state. Even more suggestive for the Youth Army is McNeill’s contention that “muscular bonding” began to play a key role in politics only in the nineteenth century, not only in the form of organized demonstrations (as dissent) but also as a form of citizenship: modern nations began using calisthenics, gymnastics, organized physical training, and military and paramilitary training in schools as an expression of national might and excellence.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} McNeill, \textit{Keeping Together in Time}, pp. 9-10. A historian studying French footsoldiers in World War One relates a similar point: battle could be a catalyst for intense personal bonds among soldiers. “Many of the barriers of modesty built up by a lifetime of [etiquette] training gave way at such times, and men experienced for one or another companion of the moment a powerful and warm feeling of nearness . . . Overwhelmed themselves by strong feelings . . . the soldiers did not guard against their emotions”; Prost, \textit{In the Wake of War}, p. 20. McNeill’s contention is that such breakthrough experiences under fire had their foundations in the collective drill of the parade ground.


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 127.

\textsuperscript{37} Hitler self-consciously made use of this most basic of human technologies in the vast Nazi rallies: “The audience is not being informed; it is made to perform; and its performance makes history.” As McNeill notes, and countless memoirs confirm, the communist state on the Chinese mainland was highly attuned to the power of group drill, with morning calisthenics and paramilitary drill being prominent features of political citizenship at least until the 1980s; ibid., pp. 146-9. Anthony Giddens goes even further than McNeill in his reading of the importance of new training, collective training programs. He suggests that the model for industrial assembly-line production and scientific management (Taylorism) originates with the training regimen instituted by Maurice of Nassau for
Both the preliminary training in temporary stations in Chongqing and later formal training in Youth Army bases drew on the experience and example of the Youth Corps' summer camps organized since 1939 in the Chongqing vicinity. The Youth Corps' summer camps had antecedents and models in both worldwide scouting and European fascist movements.\(^{38}\) The summer camps were designed to help youths of both sexes develop physical strength and prowess.\(^{39}\) The camps, lasting for a month, involved five hundred students, ages 16 to 25 sui, at a time. They included military drills and target practice with live ammunition. Sport activities also figured prominently in the daily activities; swimming and team sports like basketball were common, as were martial arts training, mountain climbing or hiking. These activities were often organized in a competitive way. Other goals included political training in the ideals and methods of the Nationalist revolution, inculcating an attitude of sacrificial service to the nation. Political training took the form of lectures, small group discussions, producing wall newspapers, and other forms of printed propaganda materials. Given the high degree of overlap between the Youth Corps and the Youth Army personnel, all these activities and techniques were exported to the Youth Army training programs from the Corps.\(^{40}\)

Thus, in this area too the Youth Army was not original. Its emphasis on drill and bodily training was part of a much larger tradition linking group solidarity and political citizenship, but the intensity and self-consciousness with which it was conducted was something unprecedented in Nationalist China. In their writings about their training, the youth soldiers often resorted to metaphors or literary conventions to describe their experiences. Youth Army sources consistently use metaphors of “forging” or “tempering” to describe the transformation (physical and non-physical) that was a result of the training process: images of “crucibles” or “furnaces of the rev-

\(^{38}\) German fascist youth camps are quite well known, but Italian fascists resorted to a similar constellation of youth policies, including scouting organizations, athletic and sport groups, and hiking and other excursions into nature: “[F]ascist youth policies were harnessed to state social engineering schemes, producing initiatives like children’s holiday camps (colonic) that offered mountain and sea cures while inculcating obedience to authority”; Ruth Ben-Ghiat, Fascist Modernities: Italy, 1922-1945, p. 96. Chinese scouting, even when organized by purely educational institutions, carried a tinge of the paramilitary as well. Again, Gulick’s experience is typical: the day trips, hikes, and signal drills of boy scout training was “a regular part of school activity. Scout uniforms were often worn to class; the patriotic, self-reliant and paramilitary aspects of scouting fitted easily into the wartime aspirations and needs of the Nationalist government”; Gulick, Teaching in Wartime China, p. 209.

\(^{39}\) GMWX, vol. 63, pp. 78. See Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, History of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), pp. 131-5 for a quick description of Boy Scout and military training from the mid-1920s through the war.

olution” fell frequently from their pens. Their bases were “crucibles of the revolution. . .. Here we would all be cast and forged into steel giants of the revolution.”

For recruits handled by the Chongqing municipal committee, rising early and other daily rituals of military life began even before they arrived at their training bases. The Chongqing committee implemented a policy of “life guidance” (生活指導) during the assembly period in order to gradually acclimate the youth volunteers to communal life. Borrowing from the Youth Corps summer camps, the volunteers’ daily schedule while waiting to be inducted into their units included a whole gamut of paramilitary drills and exercises, such as flag raising ceremonies, morning exercises, morning meetings, basic afternoon drills, military lectures, target practice, long hikes, and even classes on weapon construction.

The training regimen presented the volunteers with some challenges to overcome. Students in China were generally not accustomed to exercise. Many youth soldiers mention in their writings that rising early was difficult for them. Their civilian life had been considerably more leisurely, yet once they adjusted to the rougher life, they took pride in asserting that “the great dawn belongs to us soldiers, only to us soldiers” as even the trees and birds were asleep, quiet and dark. One soldier recounted the early morning runs that followed assembly in the drill square and roll call. The soldiers ran through the quiet town streets, forming ranks they were like a “thick, dense, still pine forest,” but then they would start singing stirring martial songs to “shatter the lonely universe” of the morning.

Sport was another mode of physical training. Units organized teams in various sports (basketball, volleyball, etc.), which competed in “friendly competitions” with non-military and even foreign teams. The results of all this physical training were obvious. Remarking on the improvement in physical conditioning, one reporter remarked that, “Before they would sit a long while and say they were tired, but now they can stand for several hours without strain . . . [Before] they would rather ride a bus for half an hour than walk a few steps, but now they go many tens of li at a time, while carrying loads of many kilos.” They became “mechanical men” with “lightning fast actions.” The youths felt healthy, strong, and they frequently mentioned in letters and articles that their body weight had actually increased, demonstrating the vigorousness and healthiness of military life. Photographs highlighted this physicality. The 639th Regiment's nostalgic volume includes many photos of its soldiers engaged in vigorous activities: basketball,
tug of war contests, scaling poles, standing around obstacle courses, marching in rank, doing gymnastics, and bayonet practice. 49

Physical conditioning was connected to the outdoors and nature, combining into the image of outdoorsy manliness in the Youth Army. Placed in areas “suitable for military education and training and in accord with the demands of military life,” most bases were located in the rugged countryside around Chongqing, close to both mountains and rivers. Many of the Youth Army bases and receiving stations in the Chongqing vicinity had been used as sites for the Youth Corps' summer camps, and boasted of “gorgeous scenery”: Beibei, Shapingba, and Nanwenquan. 50 The Chongqing committee organized “countryside travel” for recruits (of both sexes):

In order to forge the student volunteers' body and mould the breadth of their minds, the committee occasionally selected times of mild weather to order short-range excursions into nearby suburbs and to put on mountain climbing competitions. Altogether each male and female youth made one trip to Nanshan and Laojundong . . . playing in the bosom of nature, [we] feel they are even more healthy, strong, lively, and lovable. 51

Training classes for political cadres, led by Jiang Jingguo, ran nearby hills. “Jiang Jingguo chose a cold morning to forge [our] bodies by making everyone run up the slopes of Fuxingguan. He himself stripped to the waist and struggling ran at the head [of the column]. After finishing the run, he said, 'he who runs first is a great man (好漢).’ Thus, that slope was called Hero Hill (好漢坡).” 52 A soldier in the 14th company in the 602nd Regiment (stationed at Tongliang, Hufengchang, a training base about fifty km northwest of Chongqing) jokingly reported conducting two long training hikes in fresh snow wearing just their “superior leather shoes;” when asked by a local what “superior leather shoes” were, the youth soldiers laughingly told him it was a euphemism for bare feet. 53 Training hikes conducted in the hilly terrain around Chongqing were excursions into mountainous nature: “[We] climbed up and down mountains. Everyone was talking and laughing along the way, not seeming like an army on the march, but on a long hike.” 54

These accounts often make the implicit (and sometimes explicit) contrast between the physical military life amidst nature with the youths' former unhealthy urban lives. The “fresh air” of the army bases is noted again and again. Chongqing and their urban lives are painted as thoroughly “gray”, “muddy”, and “foggy”. 55 Reporters making trips to visit the divisions stationed outside Chongqing wrote that they “left the crowded and unhappy characters of Chongqing to see these lively youths” in bases smelling of flowers and suffused with the air of spring. Escape to nature was the cure for the youths’ tiredness and despair. One recruit exclaimed ecstatically: “Training in the wilds is real happiness! . . . Returning after training in the wilds, everyone's spir-

50. QNYZJJY, p. 129. GMWX, vol. 63, pp. 78, 92, and 117.
52. Lü Zhenhuan, p. 88. See also, HYQNJ, p. 183.
54. HYQNJ, p. 53.
55. Ibid., pp. 84, 134, and 138.
its were excited, the entire troop sang loudly! When all you have is happiness, where is tiredness to be found?56

Training and Discipline

The Nationalist military authorities applied a whole range of “hard” and “soft” training techniques in the YA. Many were not specifically military, but common to civilian political organizations as well. Julia Strauss has analyzed the importance of “training” (xunlian 訓練) in the Nationalist era. Xunlian was a key component of Nationalist political life after 1927. However, it often conflated two very different meanings: military or physical drill on the one hand, and civilian intellectual or technical training on the other.

Xunlian (training) and the activities clustered around it were closely associated with the rise and expansion of the KMT Party and the National Revolutionary Army. The term itself was inherently ambiguous: it either simply referred to ‘drill and exercises for military personnel’ or meant ‘education with the purpose of acquiring a certain style of behavior or technical knowledge,’ usually implemented through short-term courses with fixed objectives.57

While at times it could still refer to “on-the-job acquisition of technical skills” without any political indoctrination, from the 1930s on, xunlian was closely associated with “a series of short-term training courses largely centred on the military with the announced objectives of rapid acquisition of technical military skills and indoctrination into the ‘revolutionary’ norms of loyalty and obedience to the central military leadership.” As such, it was a means for organizations – most notably the KMT party and government – to achieve control and “generate commitment” from people in service, a key item in the Nationalist political toolbox.

Acquiring military skills and knowledge was one of the cores of the training experience. Some of the youths had already mastered the basic drill elements from military-style exercises in schools, while other students were starting with no knowledge whatsoever. This unevenness in the exposure of educated youths to military drill indicates the mixed results of the Nationalist state's attempt to use schools as a vehicle for militarizing society.58 The Youth Army was a trial run for the reforms in military training that Bai Chongxi would champion after the war.59 The Youth Army’s instructors were trained under the US Army in Burma and the methods they used were heavily influenced by American approaches, even in the area of personal style.60 The student-soldiers were aware of the rarity of the opportunity to train under these elite, enthusiastic and dedicated trainers. The trainers used a rotation system adopted from their American advisors. Soldiers received instruction and drill in a specific skill and then rotated to a new station to

56. Ibid., p. 122.
58. HYQNJ, p. 100 and Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, pp. 134-42.
59. Bai Chongxi, pp. 11-3.
60. HYQNJ, p. 77. On the mixture of US and Chinese methods in the Youth Army, see Liu Kaihan (1984), p.111. In some units, the trainers were Americans, at least for a period of time.
learn and practice a new one. Liberal use was made of visual aids and models. This approach emphasized practical mastery instead of theory and the youth soldiers made excellent progress.61

The soldiers' bodies were not the only thing being trained in the camps, however; drawing on a long tradition of "spiritual education for soldiers" that started with Sun Yatsen, Nationalist leaders were determined to make political education a key part of the youth soldiers' experience. According to official sources, the Youth Army was "a type of self-education movement."62 At the induction ceremony for volunteers in the 604th Regiment, the commander told the ranks that one of the central goals of the Youth Army was for each soldier "to substantiate and forge yourself."63 "The prison," writes Foucault, -- and we may add, the training ground and barracks -- "though an administrative apparatus, will at the same time be a machine for altering minds."64 Or in John Fitzgerald's phrasing, "Once self-awakening had been conceived as consciousness of the relationship between the self and the state, custodians of the state felt obliged to supervise and to direct the awakenings of the self more generally."65

The YA also made extensive use of both rituals and games, each imparting a different trajectory to the training experience. Rituals were scripted actions and served the purposes of internal integration, uniting the volunteers even with their superiors. Distinctions and inequalities within the YA were minimized in the ritual sphere. Games, in contrast, as tactical contests that relied on skill and judgement, reinforced the soldiers' volitional space. With their zero-sum nature -- there are winners and losers in any game or contest -- games stressed differentiation. Bourdieu reminds us that social agents are defined by their relative positions within a field of social space.66 Both rituals and games served to delineate the social and political space for the volunteers, as we will see below when we discuss the soldiers' self-identities, but what is important to note is that the technologies of self involved not only a physical regimen, but also the volunteers' interior life as well.

Concern for a soldier's mentality was a growing trend in Chinese military training during the twentieth-century. By the late years of the war, the content of military training manuals demonstrated a growing attention to the mind and thoughts of the soldiers. A discussion of training methods and goals written in 1944 shows this explicitly: "The demands of military discipline are not only meek and mechanical obedience, but also require that in times of difficulty, they [soldiers] will have a spirit of waging war independently."67 All the military training materials from the later years of the Nationalist regime that I have inspected contain both the Twelve Principles of Party Members and the Ten Conditions of Soldiers printed at the very beginning. This trend did not start in the 1940s, but it was not a prominent feature of the Qing armies, not even the self-consciously modernized New Armies in the twilight years of the dynasty.68

61. HYQNJ, p. 187; Wu Guoyuan, p. 7; and Huang Wei, p. 72.
63. HYQNJ, p. 67.
64. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 125.
68. Despite the fact that the Qing New Armies recruited officers and cadets from among elite families
Sun Yatsen was one of the first to address specifically the problem of political training for soldiers in a December 1921 speech on the “The Spiritual Education of Soldiers.” While the entire speech is interesting for what it says about Sun's revolutionary priorities at the time, it betrays most obviously an intense concern with inculcating the right attitudes and revolutionary doctrine (an “ism” 主義) in the minds of the soldiers. Spirit was often neglected by modern man, because, Sun argued, “Today men's minds always stress the material [side of things].” Sun felt keenly the need to arouse a “revolutionary spirit” among the soldiers, a spirit that encompassed three attributes: benevolence, courage, and wisdom. Relying on these innate capacities, soldiers were to be able to distinguished right and wrong, understand profit and harm, recognize the current situation, and know themselves and the enemy. But their first priority was to understand their station: “All soldiers must first understand their own position and what the responsibility they bear is.” In wrapping up his discussion of “wisdom” among soldiers, Sun ends with a discussion of the critical importance of “-ism”, or theoretical understanding of political problems. Soldiers too must have a correct “consciousness” in order to succeed at their military tasks because with a revolutionary spirit they will attract the support of the people, even (or especially!) those who are under the rule of the enemy. The main issue, of course, was how to educate such an enlightened soldiery.

John Fitzgerald in his study of revolutionary “awakening” in China, has shown some of the ways that revolutionaries in the 1920s linked education, propaganda, and political training. As

and the New Armies were one of the key loci for revolutionary political activity, the curriculum was not politicized and the Manchu state attempted to limit political activists and training in its military academies. Most modern military men had a highly developed sense of provincial identity. For a thumbnail sketch of the Qing New Armies see, Yoshihiro Hatano, “The New Armies,” in Mary C. Wright, ed., China in Revolution: the First Phase, 1900-1913, pp. 365-82. Donald Sutton’s study of the Yunnan Army acknowledges the officers’ intense nationalism and sense of their mission as “national saviors”, which was a product mainly of their study abroad in Japan. In addition, these men felt their most suitable sphere of action was the province. See, Donald Sutton, Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic: The Yunnan Army, 1905-25, passim. Edmund Fung, writing of the curriculum changes in late Qing military academies, summarizes the new curriculum as follows: “These changes [learning foreign languages, geography modern mathematics and science, military exercises] provide[d] both officers and men with some form of training in citizenship, even if they received] no formal and explicit training in political matters. The new military learning about the new technological world and the systems on which a modern state is based, tended to develop a particular awareness of the relative weaknesses and political dimensions of their own society and of their special role in its development”; Edmund S. K. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution: The New Army and Its Role in the Revolution of 1911, p. 77. Nowhere is anything approaching state-sponsored or direct political education mentioned in these military preparatory schools' courses or training materials. The heightened political consciousness of the New Armies in the late Qing years was a complex product of provincialism, general modernized education, experience abroad, and connections with civilian revolutionary groups; see Landdeck, “Civilian-Military Connections in the Revolutionary Movement and the Anqing Mutiny of 1908, unpublished MA thesis at University of Michigan, 1995, pp. 14-21.

69. Sun Zhongshan, Jingshen jiaoyu, pp. 5-7.
70. Ibid., pp. 13-5.
71. Ibid., pp. 21-2. Sun here draws on the differences between the Southern and Northern soldiers in the clashes between various warlords.
late as 1925, political education in the military, even in the vaunted Whampoa Academy, was of little value and nearly nonexistent. By the time of the Northern Expedition (1927), the army's political bureaus had taken on a wide-range of tasks, but the political training of soldiers was secondary to their other responsibilities.72

By the early 1930s, under the influence of German military advisors, a stronger emphasis on political training took hold, though it was limited almost exclusively to the professional officer corps that Chiang was desperately building. A description of China's “New Soldier” explicitly equated “spiritual education” with “political education.”73 This book, published in 1934, took up Sun's famous speech to argue that soldiers had to be trained in the proper ways to think and understand both themselves and their relationship to China. “The main purpose of spiritual education [for soldiers] is to train regular soldiers, to make them understand the relationship between the military and the country, and the status of soldiers in the citizenry, [to impart to them] the thoughts that soldiers should have and the [sense of] responsibility and duty that soldiers must bear, to make the soldiers have great wisdom, great benevolence, and great courage, to cultivate the armed might to protect the country and the people, and to shoulder the heavy mission of saving the country and nation from decline.”74 Important for this mission was that soldiers have the proper historical perspective: they “must understand the past glory of the Chinese people, the process of [national] weakening, [so that they] have an accurate understanding of China's problems.”75 Describing these problems, and the historical shame which accompanied them, then occupies the majority of the book. In a similar vein, the translation of a post-World War One German training manual, Bubing jiaolian shouce, included a convenient table on China's “humiliations” at the hands of imperialist powers during the previous century and a section sketching out China's military history – both obviously not in the German original. The training manual paints the early dynasties in particular as military cultures and pays much attention to the extension and contraction of China's borders over time.76 While the geographical expansion of the Qing is lauded, the emphasis in this section is on recounting the “shame” of the last six decades of the Qing and the continued foreign aggression after the founding of the Republic.

72. Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, p. 298. Political Bureaus within the army “were expected to train troops to maintain discipline, to conduct themselves properly in dealing with civilians, and, most importantly, to convince civilians of the advantages of cooperating with the Revolutionary Army.” The very first political bureau set up in Whampoa Academy was charged with publishing and distributing reading material within the academy. By the Northern Expedition these bodies had taken on the following additional duties: “subverting the enemy and indoctrinating captured enemy soldiers; winning the cooperation of peasant farmers and merchants in obtaining provisions, transporting goods, offering financial credit, spying, scouting, and sundry other practical tasks; securing conquered territories by establishing local party branches, provisional police forces, and administrative committees and organizing worker, peasant, and merchant associations; and, for the allied soldiers, arranging rest and recreation, caring for the wounded, offering political and literacy education, and establishing party branches within the forces”; ibid., pp. 300-1.


74. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

75. Ibid., p. 8.

76. *Bubing jiaolian shouce*, pp. 158-73. The Xia, Shang and Zhou, are said to be eras when “civilization and military achievements made large advances.”
This insertion of historical knowledge is absent from earlier training manuals and demonstrates a growing emphasis on securing the mental and emotional loyalty of the soldiers to the nation, its sovereignty and status, specifically as seen in its geographical expanse.77

As we have seen, political work in the Youth Army was important to Chiang Kaishek, in part because it was a key power base for his son. Despite this naked political motivation, political education in the YA also demonstrated the expansion of a new type of politico-military technology during the war: the necessity for thinking, independent, politically aware soldiers. This ideal was a combination of independence and discipline, of a developed mind and body working in concert, of political and battlefield awareness. Modern soldiers were to have a disciplined mind housed in a vigorous, forged, machine-like body, and to put both in service of the individual's national consciousness. This new dimension of military training, is reflected in the terminology deployed by the administrative organs involved with the Youth Army. For example, the Student Volunteer Instruction Committee was responsible for the recruits' “studies.” But the word the committee used here, jinxu (进修), is not commonly used for physical training, and while it can be translated as “study” it carries an implication of “moral advancement” or “moral education” not found in more common terms like “to study.”78

Much of the Youth Army’s varied training activities, thus, were political in nature. The range of these programs was wide, including academic lectures by experts and ideological speeches focusing on Sun's Three Principles, the current state of the war and international politics, and even Nationalist government social policies such as its consumer co-operatives.79 Morale Speeches (jingshen jianghua 精神講話) were offered three times a week, and in Chongqing these included personal visits from political leaders of the highest levels. Political bureaus were directed to emphasize cultural and artistic propaganda in order arouse the youth soldiers' interest in military life. In addition, the Youth Army soldiers were put into a system of small group meetings and discussions that were drawn directly from Leninist political practice and thus shared by the CCP, the YC, and the (more active branches of the) KMT.

Jiang Jingguo was a key player determining the repertoire of practices I am calling “technologies of political selfhood,” most especially the methods of propaganda production and the emphasis on autobiographical writing. During his dozen years in Russia, Jiang Jingguo absorbed from the Russian Communist Party a whole repertoire of attitudes and techniques that he would

77. Political education for rank and file soldiers was neglected until after the Japanese invasion. In February 1938, the MAC’s Political Bureau was set up with the goal of reviving political education in the armed forces. General Chen Cheng headed up the Political Bureau, with Zhou Enlai and Huang Qixiang (黄祺翔) as deputy chiefs. By the end of the year, it had expanded to well over 600 subordinate units, with a political bureau assigned to each division. Chiang’s declaration that in the war’s second (stalemate or attrition) phase “politics is more important than military actions and the people are more important than soldiers, the spirit more important than material, and training more battle” fueled a further growth of political work in the army; in early 1939 a political work conference ordered that each company have a political advisor or commissar and by the end of 1940 there was more than 30,000 personnel in the military’s political administration apparatus. The effectiveness of all this organizational expansion, however, is open to serious question; Tang Running, Kangzhan shiqi Chongqing de junshi, pp. 119-24 and Hsi-sheng Ch‘i, Nationalist China at War, pp. 94-8.

78. GMWX, vol. 62, p. 241. This type of language and policy demonstrate a deep concern with the mindset or “consciousness” of the Youth Army soldiers.

rely on for the rest of his political life; as head of the YA’s political administration, he imported these techniques into both the Youth Corps and the Youth Army. One of these was a firm commitment to individual and small-group propaganda production, including wall papers. Jiang Jingguo himself wrote an acclaimed article for Sunovka’s bulletin board, the Red Wall, titled “Reforming the Heart before Conducting Revolution.” It was so well received that the 15 year old Jiang was made an editor of the bulletin board. A second influence that Jiang brought back from Russia was a conviction of the political efficacy of small group discussions and organization. Study at Sunovka included many small group activities, including speeches, the common reading and discussion of specified texts, and writing reports. To the students at Sunovka it seemed that the curriculum was “Meetings First!” (kaihui diyi 開會第一), everything else was secondary to how one performed in the small-group meetings. These strategies found corollaries in the Youth Corps and Youth Army. A third politicizing technique was autobiographical writing. At Sunovka each student was required to keep a diary of their thoughts and actions. These diaries were the prime source for the frequent criticisms and self-criticisms that students wrote on their own and then read aloud and discussed at meetings. This practice was a component of the CCP as well, as noted by Liu Shaoqi in his famous Cultivation of Communist Party Members. Personal, autobiographical writing was thus a key element of revolutionary activism; in the Youth Army, it made up the prime source for the production of propaganda materials. Other Nationalist political organizations shared this tendency; both the Renaissance Society and the Society for Vigorous Practice emphasized the candid admission of members’ “errors.” The elder Chiang had a more Confucian take on this practice, as he routinely wrote weekly and monthly “Self-reflections” (fanxing lu 反省錄) in which he expressed his own failings – though these were intensely private documents. Leninist cells were known for their rigorous self-criticism; something that Jiang Jingguo had made sure to import into the Youth Army via its Youth Corps’ political cadres. The YC set down in its cell guidelines that their meetings must emphasize “life-based self-criticism and mutual criticism.” Underlying the self-criticism practices in these political organizations was a preoccupation with autobiographical writing. Thus, from the top on down, the YA was heavily involved in writing itself, its failings, its successes, its past, and its future. Taking up the pen and writing about themselves formed the basis for one of the Youth Army’s central activities: the production of propaganda about itself.

Self-Writing: Propaganda of the Citizen

Benedict Anderson’s classic study highlighted the importance of imagination in the creation of national communities. His argument that nations were “imagined” into existence points to the fact that national communities are invented: first fictionalized and only then realized. The conceptual ground of modernity, “homogenous, empty time” shared by all, was spread by newspaper

80. Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son, p. 43.
82. See, “How To Be a Good Communist,” in Wm. Theodore De Bary, Wing-tsit Chan, and Chester Tan, Sources of Chinese Tradition, vol. 2, p. 249. Liu’s text was part of the curriculum for indoctrinating new party members, the first of a series of speeches given in Yan’an during the war.
83. Wang Yuewu, Cong zuoren dao zuozhan, p. 53.
84. qz0052.mj1-4, pp. 87-8 n.d.
stories and books—links between the stories were imagined, based on calendrical coincidence.85 Pushing this point in a slightly different direction, Mark Elvin in his book on modern Chinese stories, has commented that “low-level literature”—the Youth Army propaganda certainly qualifies as “low-level” at least in terms of its literary quality—is valuable simply because people “people live in stories, or as if they were in stories. Stories that are a social inheritance, but also in some measure self-created, or at least adapted, edited, or extended. . . . Shared stories understood in this manner give sense and coherence to a particular human group. They define the space in which it operates, its conceptualized physical landscape.”86

Other theorists, most notably Anthony Giddens, have argued that self-narration is at the center of modernity, a key component of modern self-identity. Giddens highlights what he calls the “reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, [that] takes place in the context of multiple choices as filtered through abstract systems.”87 This project places the sense of self in terms of a “trajectory”; the person “lives a biography”, self-consciously making decisions about how to live in a story (or a “temporal unfolding of self-identity”).88 In this “reflexive” project of selfhood, autobiography, especially journal writing, holds a special place. “The autobiography is a corrective intervention into the past, not merely a chronicle of elapsed events. . . . Reconstruction of the past goes along with anticipation of the likely life trajectory of the future.”

The narrative of the self is made explicit. Keeping a journal and working through an autobiography are central recommendations . . . [A]utobiography—particularly in the broad sense of an interpretive self-history produced by the individual concerned, whether written down or not—is actually at the core of self-identity in modern social life.89

85. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 6 and 24. See also Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, pp. 16-7 on the separation or disembedding of time from space that permitted Anderson’s “empty” or universal time.

86. Mark Elvin, Changing Stories in the Chinese World, p. 5.

87. Giddens, Modernity, p. 5.

88. Ibid., p. 14. Giddens continues: “A person’s identity is not to be found in behavior nor—important though this is—in the reactions of others, but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going. The individual’s biography, if she is to maintain regular interaction with others in the day-to-day world, cannot be wholly fictive. It must continually integrate events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the ongoing ‘story’ about the self. As Charles Taylor puts it, ‘In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going.’” Ibid, p. 54, citing Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

89. Giddens, Modernity, p. 72 and 76. Reflexivity in the sense of self-awareness (as a deliberate actor) has always been a part of human experience, but modernity’s reflexivity goes further: it consists (on both institutional and personal levels) of “chronic revision in the light of new information or knowledge”. Chronic revision is necessary because of the systemic doubt and uncertainty which lie at the heart of modern institutional and personal life. Giddens draws on Karl Popper’s work on science and the production of knowledge here: “the reflexivity of modernity actually undermines the certainty of knowledge, even in the core domains of natural science. Science depends not on the inductive accumulation of proofs, but on the methodological principle of doubt. No matter how cherished, and apparently well established, a given scientific tenet might be, it is open to revision—
These theoretical perspectives are not idle speculation. Although China had a long tradition of diary writing among the educated elite during imperial times, the practice was widely promoted and even enforced by educational and work institutions in the twentieth-century. In the 1930s, the Bank of China in Shanghai required new white-collar staff to keep diaries as part of their moral-occupational training. Students in schools were required to keep daily or weekly journals, which were turned in to and graded by teachers. The importance of the practice of self-narration is revealed by an (ironically autobiographical) anecdote related by Fei Xiaotong, China’s leading sociologist in the 1930s. While discussing the realities of rural life that make literacy a superfluous skill, Fei remembers his elementary school experience writing diaries for class. After a while of such assignments, the young Fei realized that his days were all alike, a simple routine of waking up, going to school, playing with friends, and falling asleep. So, he began writing “The same as above” in his diary. The teacher quickly tired of the cop out, despite its honesty, and prohibited it. At that point, Fei concludes, the student-diarists “had to make up lies.” The importance of writing about the self in narrative (as opposed to repetition and stasis) was so overwhelming that lies and fabrications trumped the truth.

Such theoretical observations and revealing anecdotes inform our reading of the Youth Army’s propaganda: the youth soldiers stories and articles were written and consumed as biographical and autobiographical stories that fleshed out a self-story of national citizenry even if it was partially fictionalized. The YA produced a large number of these stories. While we cannot rule out the possibility of official censorship or alteration, outright fabrication is unlikely because of the scattered negative comments about the party, the military and superior officers, the government, and even of military service itself. The Youth Army’s wall papers contained political commentaries, written by university students, and these were not completely blind in their support for the Nationalist regime. Instead, some articles criticized the KMT party and its political factions, making calls for real democracy. In short, the government needed to be supported, but it in turn needed to purge corrupt officials and bring war profiteers to justice. In short, even if we approach the volunteers’ writings as a form of “self-fictionalization,” the pieces remain valu-


91. I am unsure when it came into common practice, but by the mid-1930s, students in schools were required to keep daily diaries or weekly journals which were turned in to and graded by teachers; see Sherman Cochran and Andrew C.K. Hsieh, trans., with Janis Cochran, One Day in China, May 27, 1936, p. 51. The practice was widespread, however. Tang Zong (唐緒), Chiang’s bodyguard, began writing his diary, a practice which he continued right through his years studying at Whampoa Military Academy and serving the War against Japan, in middle school; Tang Zong, Zai Jiang Jieshi shenbian ba nian: shicongshi gaoji muliao Tang Zong riji, p. 1.


93. HYQNJ, p. 141. Such a stance should not be surprising given the influence of the Youth Corps in the IYVM: both of these positions were fundamental convictions among many Youth Corps leaders from Jiang Jingguo on down.
able because they disclose how the youth soldiers saw themselves and how they wished to be seen by others.

As part of the selection process, the volunteers had to write a short autobiography (zizhuan 自傳). This was a common device for evaluating a person for participation in Nationalist state structures, including candidates for KMT party membership and baojia personnel. Normally such autobiographies were formulaic, bland, short, and lacked detail. Those written by Youth Army volunteers, however, were not. Every division had an autobiography editing committee in charge of reading the self-narratives each recruit wrote during the enlistment process. Those with good content were to be prepared for publication by the Youth Army's own publishing press and in other government newspapers, while the rest were kept on file. In fact, the sheer volume of literary output by the YA suggests that all this “self-writing” was an integral part of the the YA’s purpose, a part of the package of technologies the Nationalist state used to craft, or coax into being, a politically reliable body of citizen-soldiers.

One of the Youth Army’s most important missions was the production of its own propaganda; the Ministry of Information stated baldly that the volunteers themselves were the “most effective” means for promoting the movement. From the outset, the volunteers were self-reporters, producing their own news and documentary records. The most important donation items the comfort committees were ordered to collect and dispense to the YA soldiers were writing paper and envelopes. Even before the recruits were inducted into their units, two small-size papers were printed and distributed. The Youth Army (Qingnianjun 青年軍) and Female Youth (Nüqingnian 女青年) were charged with describing the daily life of recruits, but they also carried editorials, art, poetry, and political cartoons. These were produced until the volunteers were inducted into units, when they stopped being published (eight issues of Youth Army and four of Female Youth). After induction, each unit wrote, edited, and published its own wall newspaper (牆報). Pasted up in and outside unit barracks, wall newspapers continued to focus on descriptions of army life to promote the recruitment movement and the YA itself, although other topics appeared too. News media was a convenient avenue for propaganda. Special offices were set up alongside units to facilitate reporters conducting interviews with the volunteers and YA officers. Units dispatched news briefs directly to newspapers. The result was virtually daily coverage on the recruiting drive and YA units in major papers in early 1945.

Some units pursued a more literary approach as well. The 604R (in the 202D, stationed at Qijiang) published a small volume titled Art in the Army (軍中文藝), which collected poetry, ar-

---

94. This was a long-standing tradition for the Nationalists: the original applicants to attend the KMT’s Whampoa Military Academy were required to submit an autobiographical essay on why they wanted to serve their country; Fenby, Chiang Kai-shek, p. 68.

95. GMWX, vol. 63, p. 309; QNJS, vol. 2, p. 378; and GJZGSG, vol. 2, p. 928. Unfortunately, thus far I have been unable to locate any of the original autobiographies, but among the rich body of published writings by the volunteers are a good many which describe their lives, as well as the hows and whys of their volunteering. These are almost certainly the pieces selected for publication by the autobiography editing committees.

96. qz0051.mj2-397 pp. 164a-6a n.d.

97. qz0094.mj10-34, pp. 118-9 dated 18 February 1945.

articles, small essays, and lyric accounts of the regiment’s activities and soldiers. The euphoria was palpable. “Setting Out” (出发), by one Su Zimei (蘇子梅), admitted quite openly that the whole thing seemed like a travel excursion: “everyone had a happy feeling in their hearts. If we hadn’t joined the Youth Army, I’m afraid during my whole life I wouldn’t have had the chance for today’s [free trip]!”

It should hardly need repeating at this point that the Youth Army was not the only Nationalist group to use self-writing or the rhetoric of writing history to motivate people. At the First Congress of the YC in 1943, Zhang Zhizhong had declared to the cadres: “We are youth. We want to write our country’s bright future!” But the YA was so prolific and so self-conscious about its role as writers, literally recording their own experiences on the pages of the newspapers and their own publications, that a closer examination of their self-identities, as both the writer and the subject being written about, is warranted. In short, because they took themselves as their subject matter, any examination of their writings is a look at their self-identities, in other words, the results of the political “technologies of the self.”

Self-Identities of Soldier-Citizens

If the rituals the volunteers went through were part of a transformation from civilian to soldier then the political technologies of selfhood to which they were subjected helped form the specific contours of their new identities. Pierre Bourdieu insightfully comments that “the symbolic efficacy” of rites “is the power they possess to act on reality by acting on its representation. The process of investiture, for example, exercises a symbolic efficacy that is quite real in that it really transforms the person consecrated: first because it transforms the representations others have of him and above all the behaviour they adopt towards him . . .; and second, because it simultaneously transforms the representation that the invested person has of himself, and the behaviour he feels obliged to adopt in order to conform to that representation.” The rite thus signifies to someone what his identity is, and this “line” keeps him “in line” as much as it keeps others out. The volunteers’ identity as youth soldiers was carefully crafted by the rites and practices that made up their daily service as soldiers. The technologies of (political) self(hood) sketched in the previous sections bore fruit in how the soldiers saw themselves and interacted with each other, with their superiors, and with wider society.

99. CQMA materials (资料), magazine section (杂志), #307, passim. The quote is from page 65.
100. Zhou Shuzhen, Sanqingtuan shimo, p. 129.
101. Wasserstrom’s discussion of students’ appeals to non-intellectuals during their Shanghai protests shows much similarity to the IYVM and Youth Army propaganda efforts, including the send-offs; Student Protests, pp. 205-27. However, Wasserstrom does not take into consideration the autobiographical aspect that was so prominent in the Youth Army propaganda. Shanghai’s protesting students were anxious to forge links with non-intellectuals – though they were far from successful in doing so – and this, perhaps, muted the autobiographical element. The Youth Army, in contrast, was quite content in its elitist role, separated from the rest of civilian and non-educated society. The German Freikorps too emphasized diary writing. Klaus Theleweit suggests that in the German context such practices were an indication that the fascist male’s ego was maintained by external egos, namely institutions such as the military and political organizations; Theleweit, Male Fantasies, vol. 2, p. 260.
Military training not only added martial elements to the youth soldiers' self-identities (see below), but it also removed or ameliorated negative elements of civilian life. Chiang Kaishek drove this point home in his speeches to the volunteers. China’s intellectuals previously saw themselves as gentle and cultivated. They favored the civil and disdained the martial, sought ease and hated labor. [This] gradually evolved into [their] present gentle, frail, and dejected spirit, resulting in the nation’s feebleness, the ridicule of [China] as the ‘sick man of Asia’, and inviting unprecedented foreign aggression. This is our nation’s greatest shame!

China needed to blaze a different path, to show the error of “seeking peace, clinging to life in fear of death” and thus extirpate the “evil habit” of sitting and doing nothing while the nation perished.103 The youth volunteers drew on a tradition of blood images to express their determination to do just that. From the May Fourth Movement onwards, China's students and intellectuals often relied on literary blood-imagery to express both their horror and “exhilaration of blood” in political violence. Such images in the wake of the May Thirtieth Incident (1925) came close to “fetishizing the blood” spilt by imperialists.104 While the bloody evidence of Japan's invasion during the Second World War was fetishized in cartoons, photographs, and literary propaganda of the time, the youth soldiers wrote positively about their own“hot blood surging.”105 Their “boiling blood” was a sign of patriotic anger, bravery, determination and was frequently mentioned in connection with an encounter with Chiang Kaishek.106 The recruits, “all educated, hot-blooded youths,” were sure that their boiling blood, in combination with their smarts, would ensure that they would “become China's most elite troops.”107 Official rhetoric strengthened this notion as well.108 Their blood is China's strength and it was to be sacrificial; one student, urging others to enlist, declared that China's youths could not sit waiting for the Allied Powers to defeat Japan, because “only when one's own blood flows can we have true results.”109

103. HYQNJ, p. 1.
105. HYQNJ, p. 47. The Whampoa faction’s satellite organizations, such as the Renaissance Society, shared this positive slant on blood imagery with the Youth Army; see Wang Yuewu, *Cong zuoren dao zuozhan*, p. 19. Unsurprisingly, taking a page from Chiang’s book *China’s Destiny* (中國之命運), the YC billed itself as “new blood” in the Nationalist party-state’s veins; Ma Lie, *Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan*, p. 61. For some examples of the fetishization of blood, see the graphic and bloody cartoons in *Guangzhou manhua* or in Hung, *War and Popular Culture*, pp. 101-5, 108-9, and 114-5 and the poem “Chinese Are Not To Be Trifled With” (中國人不是好惹的) in Wang Yaping (王亞平), *Zhongguo bing de huaxiang*, pp. 41-2. Many of these depict Japanese soldiers or leaders with hands or knives dripping in Chinese blood.
106. HYQNJ, p. 10.
107. Ibid., pp. 75 and 64.
108. See for example, Chiang’s speech, GMWX, vol. 63, p. 292 and 314.
109. Ibid., p. 339. The blood-image was at least partially gendered too. Christina Gilmartin in her study of gender in mass movements in the 1920s, has pointed out that women’s relationship to the prevalent blood rhetoric in the wake of the 1925 May Thirtieth Incident was problematic at best; Gilmartin, *Engendering the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 135-6. Gilmartin is interested in female activists' perception of themselves as targets of violence due to their increased political visibility.
Following Chiang’s lead, many youth soldiers contrasted the cowardice of those who abandoned China in its hour of need with their own noble bravery. One recruit exhibited his disdain for the soft, complicated life of the interior when he castigated friends who discouraged him from joining up: “They think that the army’s usefulness doesn't go beyond protecting the secure interior, providing [protection] for those who are living as if drunk or enjoying their dreams! ... The darkness of homefront society really makes one utterly detest it.”\textsuperscript{110} One youth soldier explained that any “regular person can manage to do the usual jobs in an institution, because of this, I am willing to take this useful vigor of youth and make a direct contribution to the battle for protecting the country.” And another declared resolutely in a letter that he “cannot live an ordinary life, nor die an ordinary death.”\textsuperscript{111}

In his analysis of the “moral language of the front” in the trench journalism written by rank and file French soldiers during World War One, Audoin-Rouzeau notes similar rejection of civilian society, but it was based on the soldier’s battle experience and rear society’s ignorance of the real conditions of the war. The poilu (common soldiers) saw themselves so separated from dirty, complacent, and florid civilian society that they were “sickened” by civilian newspapers. People in the rear areas were disdained because they believed the “eye-wash” (bouffage de crane) of official propaganda that portrayed a heroic vision of the war and soldiers. The French soldiers idealized the “purity” of life at the front and saw themselves as an “elite of courage,” who demanded and deserved respect and gratitude.\textsuperscript{112}

In contrast, the Chinese youth soldiers lacked battle experience, but they remained convinced that their new military life in the barracks and training grounds were sufficient to remove the fundamental causes of China’s weakness. First, the constant closeness of camp life where the recruits ate, trained, recreatet, and slept together forged a collective identity among the soldiers in each unit. “Military life,” commented one, “is the only really collective life. Thirty of us sleep together on a single large bed.”\textsuperscript{113} Second, military life held a simplicity that removed the divisions, acrimony, and temptations of urban civilian life. Their intense training was a “baptism” that confirmed their new identity as soldiers who were “married to their country.”\textsuperscript{114} One reporter remarked at the remarkable transformation on the bases: “They are already soldiers. . . . They already have soldiers’ consciousness and understand the importance of discipline. When they entered the army, everyone liked to be called ‘classmate’; now they call themselves soldiers.”\textsuperscript{115}

The YA soldiers were not only separate from civilian society, but felt themselves to be exceptional soldiers as well. They consistently compared themselves favorably to the regular sol-
diers and conscripts that made up the vast majority of the Nationalist armies. This impression of specialness was publicly confirmed by the celebrations of the act of volunteering and of being shipped to their units. While regular conscripts were supposed to enjoy send-off rallies, this was almost never done in practice. In contrast, the YA send-off rallies were festive and elaborate, including parades, snacks, gifts, fireworks set off by the shops along the volunteers’ truck route. Rhetorical affirmations of the YA’s elite nature were common. Chiang Kaishek stressed the superiority of the YA soldiers in his “Open Address to the Intellectual Youth Volunteers,” admitting bluntly that China’s conscripts simply lacked the “knowledge and skill” to be effective, modern soldiers. (Some, most famously Joseph Stilwell, did not share Chiang’s dim assessment at all: it was the generals and officers that kept China’s peasants from being good soldiers, according to Stilwell.) It was precisely these attributes that the youth volunteers brought to the army; hence Chiang decided that the volunteers were not to be placed in the officer corps, but as privates in regular units where their better grasp of weapons and modern military tactics would make them more effective than peasant soldiers could ever be. But the youth soldiers did not stop there; they even looked down on even the elite cadets from Whampoa Academy, considering them to be “unlearned and without skill.” It was not just enlisted men that Youth Army soldiers disparaged. Wang Ni, in his postwar novel about a Youth Army soldier on Taiwan, expressed unbridled disdain for the many uneducated, illiterate generals in the Nationalist army. Thus, the most exciting and promising aspect of the Youth Army was that the higher educational level of the soldiers greatly sped up the training process. Because of their status as educated people, these youths saw their own intellectual capacity as their defining characteristic. Along with political and military leaders, they were quick to link their mental prowess to their suitability and excellence as soldiers. There were even reports of volunteers grousing about regular conscripts in their units: they simply did not want to serve alongside “stupid people.”

One youth soldier claimed the five-step training process (preparation, explanation, demonstration, implementation, and examination-review) used in the Youth Army was

\begin{quote}
in accord with science, economical in terms of time, and its results were very fast. For example, in the space of five days we mastered light machine guns. The first day was devoted to learning about their history, special characteristics, and names of external [parts]. In the space of two hours we had a very deep impression in our minds. The second [day, we] were taught to disassemble [the gun] and the function of all the parts.
\end{quote}

116. qz0094.mj10-34, pp. 73-4 dated 7 November 1944; qz0061.mj15-4458, p. 39 dated 23 December 1944; qz0061.mj15-4550, pp. 10-1 dated 3 January 1945; and qz0055.mj3-245, pp. 226a-b dated January 1945.


118. Deng Wenyi, Maoxian fannan ji, vol. 1, p. 112. Deng was a a shady man, involved in all sorts of intelligence activities; he was also founding member of the Renaissance Society, deputy-chief of the central Youth Corps propaganda department and heavily involved with the Youth Army, serving on its demobilization committee.


120. Zhang Guchu, p. 78.

121. Dagongbao, 16 January 1945. Nearly every Youth Army division had a contingent of regular soldiers serving in some capacity, usually in support or logistical roles.
Further, they let everyone practice breaking them down several times. During this time, this unfamiliar thing gradually became familiar. The third day was given to learning about the machine gun's breakdowns. The fourth day was lectures on firing principles and standard [shooting] methods. The fifth day we started firing with live ammunition. Further, a surprising degree of discipline was created. This method used by them [the trainers] naturally left us very satisfied. However, it must be noted that the success is, of course, partially due to the rationality of their training methods, but it is also partially because of our high degree of knowledge and the ease with which we accept training. Therefore, the training cadres said over and over, 'China will certainly revive as long as it has you guys. Common soldiers have difficulty mastering the light machine gun in a year, but you have done so in just five or six days. This is just great!'  

This ability to learn quickly was central to the recruits' self-identities as intellectual youth soldiers.

Modern Scholar-Warriors (Shi): The Reunion of Wen and Wu

For all their proud claims to be modern “scientific” soldiers, the youth volunteers were at pains to connect themselves to China’s past. Many scholars have pointed out that modern nations have required the explicit construction of (Hegelian) History or antiquity as the national essence or core. In line with this, the most common metaphor invoked by the Youth Army in its propaganda was that of a revival of China’s ancient tradition of scholar-warriors (shi 士). In a conversation with a reporter, a YA officer opined that people had long neglected the shi character in the word soldier (shibing 士兵). He went on to say:

The spirit of the shi expresses the soul of China. Historically the Chinese gentry [shidaifu 士大夫, note the reappearance of the shi character] dared to resist the feudal emperor, considering it uprightness, and with unyielding will vowed to die [for this cause]. Because of this, they had a decisive and flexible function in Chinese history. They also depended upon the spirit of the shi . . . the spirit of the shi is to lead all; the shi have substance and soul. If we are to revive the nation we must first restore [their] grand spirit. This is what we call the soul of China.

Confucius and his disciples were appropriated as a “glorious tradition” for the youth soldiers to follow, symbols of an earlier age when scholarly learning (wen 文) and martial skill (wu

---

122. HYQNJ, p. 78. Ironically, Maury Feld’s analysis of the Army of the Dutch Republic suggests that the revolutionary impact of the gun was based on the fact that firearms “economized on training and minimized individual skill and experience.” Technical mastery, which could be easily and rapidly taught by manager-trainers using drill methods, replaced individual prowess and skill; Feld, The Structure of Violence, pp. 169-79.

123. See Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 5 and 11, and the chapter “Memory and Forgetting” on pages 187-206; Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, pp. 3-82; and Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity, “Embodying Civilization: Women and the Figure of Tradition within Modernity,” pp. 131-70. Both Anderson and Duara note that nations have “forgotten” their own moments of genesis that marked disruption or break with the past: the traumas of the birth process are written over with the myths of a tradition and primordial essence. For Duara, however, the eternal antiquity at the center of the constructed nation was gendered: the unchanging past of the nation was cast as the mothers, wives, and daughters of its modern male citizenry.

124. HYQNJ, p. 181.
had been united. In Youth Army publications, the tradition of unifying the two polar opposites was traced back to Confucius and his curriculum: the Six Arts of rituals, music, archery, charioteering, writing, and mathematics, were trumpeted as laying “equal importance on civilian and martial” values. A legacy of intellectual youth who, “whenever the country faced danger, would drop their brushes and pick up weapons to defend the country” was publicized. Fore-shadowing the stakes in the war against Japan, the vigorous and healthy tradition of union between the civil and the martial had continued until the threat from foreign invaders had extinguished it: official Youth Army sources claimed that wen and wu parted ways in the Northern Song, with the establishment of the muji (募集) or mubing (募兵) systems of military service. Tellingly, the foreign dynasties of the Yuan and Qing were devoid of any intellectual youth in China’s armies. Nationalist propaganda about the Youth Army stressed the reappearance of the shi by emphasizing both the civil and martial skills of the volunteers: their unique nature was such that after undergoing training they had revived the lost tradition and possessed the rare quality of the shi, a perfect unity of the civil and the martial. Deng Wenyi, deeply involved in all sorts of shady wartime activities on behalf of Jiang and his head of secret police, Dai Li, said of the youth soldiers’ training:

Ten million intellectual youth are armed, bringing about the militarization of literate men. At the same time, although the officers and men are all martial men (武人), they all have rich culture within the army. The education of the Youth Army, taking the Six Arts as the core, emphasizes rites and music, archery and charioteering, and does not neglect lessons in academic research in letters and mathematics. The unity of civil and martial handed down through China’s ages, complete education in both civil and martial, has been revived again in the Youth Army.

125. Ibid., p. 1; also, GMWX, vol. 63, p. 62 and QNYZJJY, p. 9. In terms of factual accuracy, the YA was misappropriating the tradition of the shi, which had originally designated a military nobility during the Zhou period (1046 - 256 BCE). In terms of their origin, the shi were not scholar-warriors at all, but were the lowest level of the Zhou nobility, men whose “authority [was] based on noble descent and martial valor”; Mark Edward Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, p. 32.

126. HYQNJ, p. 1.

127. GMWX, vol. 63, p. 62. Official government pronouncements by the 3AD Inspector, Shen Peng, on the origins of the baojia system, however, claimed that the mubing system originated in the Tang; see Shen Peng, Baojiao xuzhi, n.d., p. 3.

128. QNYZJJY, pp. 9-18.

129. The YA was not the only incarnation of this goal of unifying the civil and the martial. With the infusion of militarized drill at virtually all levels of the educational system, schools in general were supposed to achieve the same goal. By February 1940, educational policy was seen as implementing the four-fold political strategy for the whole nation: management, nourishment, defense, and education. In this formulation, “protection” consisted of “unifying the civil and martial.” Oversight was education in Confucian moral virtues; nurturing was training in labor, productive and technical skills; Xiao Xiaqin and Zhong Xingjin, Kangri zhanzheng wenhua shi (1937-1945), pp. 304-16. However, there is no indication that such ideas ever found any real resonance in the self-images of students. The YA was unique in this regard.

130. QNYZJJY, pp. 129-32, from an article published 25 June 1945, in the Central Daily.
This inspiring reunion could be accomplished only by mastering the gun.131 The invocation of the reunion of wen and wu implied that mastery of the gun completed the educated youth in some way. Seen as the revival of a tradition, youth soldiers’ mastery of the gun as a technic-military object was understood as a key facet of combining “civil” and military” arts in one person, the marriage of wen and wu. By mastering this martial object, they were reuniting the pieces of a “whole” or “complete” (ideal) man in themselves. Calls for intellectuals to master weapons in the Youth Army were an extension of a long-standing discourse. Li Hongzhang as early as 1863 wrote sarcastically about Chinese scholars lack of interest in modern weaponry.

Chinese scholars and officials have been indulging in the inveterate habit of remembering stanzas and sentences and practicing fine model calligraphy, while our warriors and fighters are, on the other hand, rough, stupid, and careless. … In peace time [the scholars and officials] sneer at the sharp weapons of foreign countries as things produced by strange techniques and tricky craft, which they consider it unnecessary to learn. In wartime then they are alarmed that the effective weapons of Western countries are so strange and marvelous, and regard them as something the Chinese cannot learn about. They do not know that for several hundred years the foreigners have considered the study of firearms as important as their bodies and lives.132

Pushing this tradition even further, Chiang lauded the merits of a battle-scarred life to the youth soldiers. In his Declaration to Intellectual Youth Volunteers, published on 22 October 1944, Chiang told the volunteers that the battlefield, a life under the gun, was central to becoming whole men.

If you want to fulfill yourselves, temper your bodies, realize the ambitions of your entire lives, undertake your great enterprise, and become an exceptional person of talent, then you certainly must come study and forge [yourself] in a life of battle. The battlefield is the only school where we can create the foundation for our enterprise. Amidst the cannon fire, we can increase and advance our wisdom, courageous spirit, and physical strength. Only in a life and death struggle can you truly understand the significance of life. … You must know that after you join up, on the battlefield you will

131. There is a certain amount of irony in this construction of mastering the gun as an elite quality. In Europe, with the army of the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth-century, the rifle was a sort of “proto-factory” in that it was actually far easier to master than other forms of warfare, such as archery or even the pike. The gun allowed a mechanistic fighting tactic that, under competent drill masters, could be mastered quickly. It was an instrument that required low technical competence, less valor, and a soldier’s mastery could be easily evaluated by observation of drill procedures. It turned officers into supervisors and managers of de-skilled “workers”, laying the ground work for the modern economic management. The gun, then, was “a great leveler” that “created the concept of marginal economic man. … [I]t not only made every soldier an equal threat, it also represented a technique that almost anyone could be taught, whose teaching could be achieved within a relatively short period, and whose application required no more than executing the instructions of the supervisor. The disciplined armed force was the proto-factory system”; Feld, The Structure of Violence, p. 20, but see also, pp. 169-83 for an longer analysis of the changes surrounding the gun in the Dutch army.

132. Li Hongzhang, Li Wenzhonggong quanji, pp. 70-2; quoted in Ssu-yu Teng and John King Fairbank, China’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923, reprint ed., p. 70.
obtain even broader and more precious knowledge and education. In ancient times and modern, in China and abroad, there have been many mighty undertakings and noble persons, they were all forged out of the hardships of the warrior’s life among the forest of guns and rain of bullets. We need to fulfill ourselves, temper and forge ourselves, and bring about the great enterprise of revolution and national construction; [we] must join the army.  

The youth soldiers repeatedly confessed to an intense desire to master the gun; time and again they reiterated their desire for practical battlefield skills and a lack of interest in “empty [political] theories.”

Archery and charioteering were [the aristocracy’s] duty. … Archery was like today’s firing machine guns or artillery; charioteering like today’s driving tanks or airplanes. If one did not practice archery or charioteering, then one simply could not be counted as a warrior-scholar [shi ]\(\pm\). … All Confucius’ disciples practiced archery and charioteering. This is no different than saying if [we] only want to attain to [the level of] Confucius’ students, then all of us will practice shooting machine guns and artillery and driving tanks and airplanes. Several of Confucius’ disciples even went to war.

The speed with which the volunteers progressed through their training gave credence to the Nationalist claims of a revival. Reporters were told with pride that barely forty-five days after beginning formal training the soldiers were already superior marksmen. Another student confessed that before joining up he had been afraid of guns, but now had already mastered four different kinds of firearms, and consequently felt completely “soldierized” (qiuba le 丘八了).

The photographs in the 639th Regiment's memorial volume made much of the physical training and vigorousness of the youth soldiers. Just as prominent, however, are photographs with an intellectual focus, showing the enlistees studying or practicing military skills of a more academic nature; including pictures of the Sun Yatsen Club; of a painting exhibit of the soldiers’ own work; of the recruits listening to an address in the lecture hall; of soldiers carrying out range finding exercises; of outdoor lectures; of an officers' conference; of a battalion's “club” with soldiers reading papers, playing chess; and other “intellectual” indoor activities. One soldier in this regiment wrote a short essay, “How We Grew Up”, which made this point explicitly: “The

133. GMWX, vo. 63, pp. 289-90; emphasis is mine. At times, however, Chiang interpreted the evocative ideal of unifying the civil and the martial quite differently. During his 1935 trip to the southwest provinces in preparation for the war with Japan, Chiang told the Sichuan KMT party branch that “To save the nation [we] must implement education that unites the civil and the martial, that cultivates morals as well as technology”; Zhou Kaiqing, Sichuan yu dui Ri kanzhan, p. 11. Here wu, the martial, is connected via parallelism to technology or scientific knowledge more generally, rather than specifically military prowess. Such flexibility in rhetoric is hardly surprising given the ambiguity and powerfulness of the tight phrasing in Chinese.

134. HYQNJ, p. 56.

135. QNYZJJY, p. 9.

136. HYQNJ, p. 129.

137. QNYZJJY, p. 150.

mastery of the civil and mastery of the martial is our distinguishing feature.” As official rhetoric put it: the student volunteers having entered the barracks and “receiving military education were able to take their past education as the essence and military training as the means, [and so their] strength in the army was greater than regular soldiers”; their success was transforming the disdain that civil official felt for the military and simultaneously “bringing culture to the army.”

The Nationalist state, by the middle of the Resistance War, had developed a variation on the long-belabored theme of the defects of China’s literati culture which, it was said, had rendered the nation “sick” and open to foreign encroachment. China needed educated people but they had to combine this education with an outdoorsy manliness – a physical vigorousness not found in the polluted, effete, and luxurious urban environment. This ideal of the unity of civil and military arts (wenwu heyi 文武合一) was remapped and re-idealized as the true essence of Chinese culture. Historical precedents (the shi and the Six Arts) were paraded as China’s cultural roots that modern men as authentic citizens had to re-realize in themselves. Chiang, as an exemplar, was the pattern for this revival of the tradition and the youth soldiers were the first of the “numberless, nameless Chiang Kaisheks” who, by their mastery of the gun-object, were the first ranks of this new, complete Chinese man.

Youth Army as Family: Men, Officers, and the Leader Cult

Believing themselves to be the modern embodiment of the ancient shi tradition, and encouraged by state rhetoric that reinforced their sense of specialness, the youth soldiers enjoyed strikingly different relationships with their superiors. The new relationship dynamic reworked a familiar theme, namely the family metaphor.

The Nationalist revolutionary movement, until the mid-1920s, was based in bonds that found expression in fraternal and familial terms. After Sun Yatsen's death (1925), the “bonds of fraternity” among Nationalist revolutionaries who traced their revolutionary parentage back to Sun eroded. Spurred on by communists like Mao and others of a younger generation, ideological correctness replaced ties of emotion and personal connections: revolutionaries of both parties dropped the term “brother” in favor of “comrade” when addressing each other. While this switch may have held within the circles of revolutionary leadership, the older familial connection was not abandoned completely. Chiang’s interaction with his army in particular was parental; he continued to use the rhetoric of family to convey messages of concern for China and the youth soldiers. This parental stance was politically useful for Chiang. He “subconsciously acted as traditional family head of household,” even as he pushed for administrative order in government. One of the key tools for his administration was the “familial relationship” he maintained with the Whampoa graduates and cadets.

139. Ibid., p. 101.
141. Fitzgerald, Awakening China, p. 257. This sea change from emotional pseudo-family bonds to ones forged around ideological and institutional correctness was at the heart of the founding of the communist party; see Hans J. van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade: The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927, passim.
A familial understanding was part of both Chinese official military policy and rank and file experience. An MSO policy statement on the treatment of soldiers declared that officers should “make the soldiers love and respect one another, seeing [their] unit as a family in order to achieve sincere unity.” Still, we must not idealize the officer-soldier relationship in regular units: the harsh treatment inflicted on conscripts in the Nationalist military is well known. As just one example, Zhang Tuowu describes the punishment commonly dished out to recruits and new soldiers in regular army units. Officers would beat new soldiers whose weapons did not pass inspection. Hands, being one of the most sensitive areas on the body, were favorite targets for beating, but officers were careful not to hurt recruits’ right hands as this would be grounds for allowing them to return home – having their trigger hand impaired would hamper their “fighting effectiveness.”

The relationships within the Youth Army and between leaders and followers were conceptualized as distinctly different from the usual interaction in the Chinese military in which officers lived like royalty, not caring if their men died of starvation, cold, or lack of medicine. The relationships within the Youth Army and between leaders and followers were conceptualized as distinctly different from the usual interaction in the Chinese military in which officers lived like royalty, not caring if their men died of starvation, cold, or lack of medicine.

**Footnotes**

143. Junzhengbu bingyishu, ed. Ge budui dui shibing (zhuangding) baoyu gaishan gaiyao, p. 24, CQMA materials, military and police (Junzhengbu) section, #177.

144. Zhang Tuowu, Daima shuzu xuj, pp. 39 and 25. In fact, even the corruption so prevalent in the Nationalist military was motivated in part by commanders’ commitment to their troops. It was common for units to suffer from a severe lack of provisions and support from the rear areas; corruption, in the form of business or black-market trading across the front lines or with rear areas, thus became one of the key ways for commanders to sustain their men; Zhang Ruide, Kangzhan shiqi di guojun renshi, p. 98. Even warlord army units at times became the soldiers’ “surrogate family”; Lary, Warlord Soldiers, p. 39.

145. Zhang Tuowu, Daima shuzu xuj, pp. 9-11. There were few restrictions or restraints on what punishments an officer could mete out to subordinates.

146. Lary, Warlord Soldiers, p. 58.

147. Wang Yuewu, Cong zuoren dao zuozhan, p. 35.
Youth Army was designed to rectify such abuses and finally bring about true familyism in the military. Officers, from the divisional commanders on down, were under orders to establish and maintain easy relationships between themselves and their men. Youth Army units ideally were to be “school-ized” and “family-ized,” with the models for interpersonal interactions drawn from these two civilian institutions: officer-men relationships were supposed to be patterned on the teacher-pupil and father-son model while among the youth soldiers themselves the expectation was that classmate-classmate or elder brother-younger brother dynamics would be at work.\textsuperscript{148} Dai Zhiqi, the commander of the 201st division, was reportedly fond of saying that “squad leaders are not only to be the lord [jun 君] of the soldiers, nor just their teachers, but also their parents as well.”\textsuperscript{149} Direct coercive authority was to be limited to situations of military necessity.

Like the fraternal bonds among revolutionaries, this military familyism was distinct from the hereditary principle of the Qing armies (see chapter one) in that it was to be forged \textit{in the units themselves}. These were not pre-existing familial bonds mobilized to support the regime, but emotive ties created by the common experience and close quarters of military life itself.

Youth Army units were communities of males in which the position of leader was equated with a father image and the units themselves were familial: the ideal relationship between men and officers and amongst the men themselves were all expressed in familial terms, running from Chiang Kaishek on down. In a speech delivered to Youth Army recruits on 10 January 1944, only two months after the start of the movement, Chiang stressed the personal relationship that tied the youth intellectuals to himself: “After today, you students who enter the ranks are all troops under my command, and you are also my sons and younger brothers. . . . I trust you will not disappoint my hopes [in you].”\textsuperscript{150} In a different speech to intellectual volunteers generally, Chiang stressed the same point, welcoming them to “come altogether into a group, under my personal leadership, and be my troops. . . . Youths under my command, I will certainly live and die with you, go through good times and bad together, treat you as my sons and younger brothers, and love you like my own body.”\textsuperscript{151}

Leaders of all ranks were to combine wisdom born of experience, training, and self-confidence with compassion and paternalism. While retaining strong leader-men bonds, the role of leader included a set of attributes that the youth soldiers were to identify with and idolize. Subordinates’ idolization of leaders who were masculine, virile, but tempered and disciplined in both body and mind began with Chiang himself and ran down the entire politico-military ladder. Battle experience won respect and authority for leaders of all levels, but a “calm, sincere, and candid” manner could win over new recruits quickly and completely.\textsuperscript{152}

Chiang insisted that inculcating a complete faith in The Leader be a prominent feature of political work in the Youth Army.\textsuperscript{153} While Mao during the Cultural Revolution would come to be seen as a paradigmatic example of the Cult of the Leader, Chiang also adopted the position

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{148} HYQNJ, pp. 89 and 41. Also, QNYZJJY, p. 145.
\item \textsuperscript{149} HYQNJ, p. 75.
\item \textsuperscript{150} XSCJ, pp. 129-30; this same speech is also found in GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 180-8.
\item \textsuperscript{151} GMWX, vol. 63, pp. 287-8.
\item \textsuperscript{152} HYQNJ, pp. 46, 49, 65, and 75; QNYZJJY, pp 181-2.
\item \textsuperscript{153} GJZGSG, vol. 2, pp. 935 and 938.
\end{itemize}
and image of Great Leader and made extensive use of it with the YA. In some government documents, Chiang himself becomes the motive power for the whole of the IYVM and YA. The apotheosis of his greatness was to be seen in that the youth volunteers responded only to “the call of our highest leader’s great personality.”

The most important way Chiang forged connections with the youth soldiers directly was in his speeches. The sound of Chiang’s voice is mentioned and described most often in Youth Army writings. Its effect was electric and seems to have drawn many recruits into almost trance-like states. A soldier recounted a speech by Chiang, saying that as Chiang spoke his “clear voice” spread out over the assembled soldiers and his “bright eyes seemingly illuminated our very hearts, we were that excited and moved.” Statements of this sort bring to mind the “speech ritual” of fascist leaders, as analyzed by Klaus Theweleit – it was the merging of the individual with a “larger whole” embodied in The Leader that infused speeches with meaning for these participants.

The fascist speech ritual can more accurately be criticized for the forms of experiential organization it offers its participants. What the listeners gain is not any particular meaning: the speaker simply produces twenty or thirty versions of a statement that is in any case already familiar to and applauded by everyone present. They gain access instead to a productive process they experience as their own. Their contact with the speech-as-form constitutes them as active agents: they play a greater part in the ritual than do iron filings in the magnetic field, simply because they assume their own place in the pattern, fuse themselves into the whole. . . . Goebbels writes of his eyes sinking into ‘two great blue stars,’ the eyes of the Führer. This, it seems, is a further element not only of the speech ritual, but of other key fascist situations. The gaze, the meeting of eyes, is the most intense form of contact between man and mass; and it may well be qualitatively different from other forms. For any of our men [the German Freikorps soldiers], an incapacity to look the leader in the eye – or, more precisely, a leader's unwillingness to look into his eyes – is a mark of failure.

In Chiang’s case, his strong eastern Zhejiang accent, which could be difficult for people from other areas to understand, heightened this attention on the quality of his voice and his eyes. The soldiers reported intense physiological reactions that accompanied any close encounter with The

---

154. For a perceptive contemporary discussion of Chiang's character, including the importance of his “personal discipline” for understanding the man and the “demigod” leader, see White and Jacoby, *Thunder out of China*, pp. 119-31. See also, Chen Tingxiang, p. 190.

155. An order of the Executive Yuan, forwarded to the municipal Civil Affairs Bureau by the CQMG: qz0063.mj1-881, pp. 66-7 dated 30 May 1946. In other youth-oriented propaganda, Chiang’s voice, his personal “call”, brought into being the “spiritual fortress” of resistance against Japan and aroused China’s men to enlist in the army. See Sanmin zhuyi qingniantuan zhongyang tuan ganbu, ed., *Zhanshi Zhongguo qingnian xin dongtai*, 1945, CQMA, materials (资料) section, politics (政治类) subsection, item #739, p. 4; this emphasis on Chiang’s call is repeated again and again in this text as it recounts the origins of the IYVM.

156. HYQNJ, p. 16.

157. Theweleit, *Male Fantasies volume two: male bodies, psychoanalyzing the White Terror*, pp. 129-30. Theweleit’s extended analysis of “the gaze” and “the eyes” in fascism can be found in ibid., pp. 130-42.

- 383 -
Leader, Chiang: rising body heat, surging blood, involuntary smiling, reddening of the face, and
general excitement or agitation.\textsuperscript{158}

Egalitarianism, Democracy, and Self-Government

As outlined above, the bonds between men and officers were often characterized in safe-
sounding familial terms, but the officer-men relationship in the Youth Army held dangers for the
regime as well. A strong emphasis on egalitarianism existed in tension with the paternal hierar-
chy of the family. The volunteers, as educated elites, felt (and were told by authorities) that they
were the equals of their superior officers. This sense of equality could potentially produce sig-
ificant and debilitating tension in the intensely hierarchical context of an army, and in fact, as
we will see, the youth volunteers were able to leverage their position to gain some concessions
from the military administration.\textsuperscript{159} In a more positive sense, the Youth Army was an opportunity
to “democratize” the military by operating on the principle of “self-government” (\textit{zizhi} 自治).
This loaded term, which was used for all sorts of local political bodies and reforms under the Na-
tionalist regime, covered considerable ground in the Youth Army as well, although it most often
referred to the soldiers' assumption of certain duties and responsibilities surrounding the pur-
chase, preparation, and distribution of food.

While his father was cast as a father to the Youth Army on a lofty and symbolic level, we
have already seen how Jiang Jingguo cultivated a close personal and almost daily involvement
with the YA. His frequent participation in nighttime gatherings, physical training hikes, and oth-
er activities, lent him an approachable image and demeanor with the trainees in the political
cadre training classes.\textsuperscript{160}

A general informality dominated the barracks and bases. Time and again the youth soldiers
exclaimed that the relationship between officers and men was amicable and even downright
friendly or playful once the day's drill and training classes were finished. “As for our officers of
all levels, except for the times on the drill field or in the classroom when we must absolutely
obey, at other times, we talk together, have fun together without a shred of status distinctions,
without any restrictions.” One writer noted that in the Youth Army “except on the drill ground .
. . officers chat with the foot-soldiers, go to the theater and joke with them, and can even play
mahjong together or sing martial songs.”\textsuperscript{161} This was a deliberate policy on the part of the Na-

\textsuperscript{158} For an account – which would be comic except for its utter sincerity – of Chiang's inspection of
a Youth Army barracks which caught a soldier in a dirty uniform but not daring to change out of
fear of getting caught naked or half-dressed, see HYQNJ, pp. 17-8. Other anecdotes are found
in QNYZJYY, pp. 105 and 111-20.

\textsuperscript{159} A sense of egalitarian citizenship could easily lead to a rift between soldiers and officers, as the
French military in World War One demonstrated. French foot soldiers, as men who believed they
were fighting against “chauvinistic militarism,” were often hostile to “military forms of the
exercise of authority. The veterans did not like regular officers,” particularly career officers who
were seen as embodying the evils of militarism just as much as the Germans. This attitude “was
rooted in a very strong feeling of equality. Even in uniform the soldiers’ attitudes were those of
fellow citizens of the same Republic”; Prost, \textit{In the Wake of War}, pp. 53-4.

\textsuperscript{160} According to political cadres who went through training classes at the Central Training School,
the younger Jiang often stressed that anyone in the class was welcome to seek him out at any
time with problems or questions; Lü Zhenhuan, pp. 88-9.

\textsuperscript{161} GMWX, vol. 63, pp. 362-3 and HYQNJ, p. 79.
tionalist authorities and was made easier by the uniforms distributed to the Youth Army. Political officers in the regular army wore insignias that were red, yellow, and blue. But in the Youth Army officers and men wore identical gray uniforms and it was difficult, especially for outsiders (like journalists), to distinguish who was and who was not an officer. Jiang Jingguo’s elite political cadres wore plain black insignia that minimized the differences between them and regular recruits and stressed their shared character as volunteers. This was a deliberate attempt to avoid officer-men distinctions that would have aroused dissatisfaction among the youth volunteers and the contrast with earlier practices could not have been clearer: warlord and most Nationalist units exhibited a sharp distinction between the drab, cheap cotton uniforms of the enlisted men and the smart, leather and feather bedecked uniforms of officers and generals. One observer commented that even the regimental commander was nearly indistinguishable from the soldiers, only his collar insignia set him apart. As one soldier wrote, the easy relationship between his company commander and the soldiers in the unit “gave full play to the spirit of democracy.”

One result of this easy atmosphere of “democracy” was that officers were more accessible not only to fun and games, but also to criticism. Confrontations between the soldiers and junior officers could and did result in significant loss of prestige and authority for the officers. In one unit, a soldier who had a grievance against a junior officer sought out a public confrontation, which ultimately resulted in the soldiers establishing an autonomous food committee, a self-government council, and having to endure much shorter and less verbose political lectures.

Nonetheless, food provision in military units was far from a trivial matter. One of the most conspicuous areas of corruption in China’s military, carried over from the traditional imperial armies, was the embezzlement of food funds by commanders. Commanders either did not report casualties and so received extra ration funds for the dead soldiers or they dispensed little or no food to their units, pocketing the money and letting the soldiers forage on their own. Consequently, dietary conditions in regular army units were often abysmal, consisting of rice, scanty vegetables and more rice. Soldiers rarely ate meat, and thus lacked protein, vitamins and essential minerals. Prolonged malnutrition produced widespread susceptibility to xerophthalmia (severe dry eye due to vitamin A deficiency, untreated it can result in blindness), trachoma, skin infections, parasitic infections, and anemia.

In the YA, it was the soldiers themselves, via food or self-government committees, who managed many aspects of food provisions in the bases. These committees were a reworked version of the committees that refugee students were accustomed to running to handle board by planning

---

162. Li Zhongshu, p. 106.
163. Lary, *Warlord Soldiers*, p. 52. The obvious difference encoded a distinction that was as much social as it was military, since officers came from an entirely different social stratum than regular soldiers.
164. QNYZJJY, p. 168 and HYQNJ, p. 79. This calls to mind Eugene Weber’s observation that European fascist uniforms were often a symbolic expression of Fascism’s social unity, specifically the “abolition of social differences”; Weber, *Varieties of Fascism*, p. 39.
165. HYQNJ, p. 50.
166. Ibid., p. 80.
menus and purchasing food. The Youth Army food committees often sold the extra rice in the soldiers’ rations to local people and then bought additional meat and vegetables with the profit. The justification was that the soldiers were more thrifty than the military bureaucracy and so the food would be more plentiful and of better quality, as well as the fact that it would avoid corruption, though it was not completely successful on that score.

The self-government committees in some units held wider responsibilities in addition to food provision; many of them were in charge of research, recreation, benefits and a few were involved with meting out discipline for infractions. Such self-government was indicative of a “democratic” spirit in the Youth Army. In at least one unit, a youth-soldier tells us that the “self-government, self-management” style of command that permitted the youth soldiers to handle their own affairs was the main factor that inspired them to follow orders from their superiors. The unit submitted to the rigorous training because they felt there was a “mutual respect” between themselves and their officers – without this respect the soldiers were ready to withhold obedience and cooperation. The “democratic style” of command contrasted with the coercive methods and the “feudal ideas of the warlords” which had never allowed rank and file soldiers any degree of control, nor even the privilege of offering opinions or airing their criticisms or dissatisfactions.

This freedom to offer suggestions and air complaints was, of course, limited to things not of military importance; “democratization” was limited by the need “to avoid obstructing the carrying out of military affairs.” Hence company commanders felt free to solicit the soldiers’ opinions on various matters, but usually only those having to do with daily life, such as what time to return to base from a Sunday leave or when to halt an evening social gathering that was going poorly. Still the issue was critical to the youth soldiers. As one soldier remarked, the motivation


169. See, as representative examples, Wu Zhirong, p. 32; HYQNJ, pp. 25, 45-6, 76, 82, and 92-3. An interesting and detailed contrast can be found in Lü Zhenhuan, pp. 94-5. Lü, a political officer in the 202D stationed at Qijiang (Sichuan), in what bears all the signs of being a self-criticism written many years later, admits to having engaged in the traditional form of military corruption: taking the pay and rations from the vacancies within a given unit. The daily ration for each soldier was two liang of shelled peanuts. Lü, with the approval of his commanding officer, collected at least four extra ration portions every day, for nearly a catty (about one pound or half a kilogram) per day: “Every day at home I ate deep-fried peanuts, sautéed peanuts, boiled peanuts, and still even this way my family and I couldn’t eat them all. And other vegetables and meat were the same way.” With the excess of food and money and the luxurious lifestyle they permitted, Lü claims he quit caring about his duties and let his subordinates do all the political work. Instead, he played cards, gambled with other officers, and feasted on chicken and duck.

170. HYQNJ, pp. 71-3 and 94.

171. Ibid., p. 38.

172. Ibid., pp. 55 and 72. See Wu Zhirong, p. 32, on this point. In one unit, the division commander even held an open discussion meeting in which recruits raised issues and questions for the officers; ibid., p. 69.

173. Ibid., p. 82.
for volunteering was that the youths “want to fight for democracy, to sacrifice for democracy.” This motivation and their willingness to sacrifice for it, justified their demands to enjoy “democracy” even within the military.\textsuperscript{174} Thus, while the limited democratization of the Youth Army was in line with the regime’s own stated goals of reforming the military, the youth soldiers’ cooperation and docility was conditional; we will return to this theme shortly.

**Domestic Peacemakers: Easing Civilian-Military Tensions**

Every aspect of the Youth Army was shot through with political motives, both internally towards the volunteers themselves and externally towards society. For example, the send-offs, while clearly a device to ratchet up the youth volunteers’ own “mood of enthusiasm,” were also designed by Nationalist authorities as a means of “changing [society’s] view of military service.” The Youth Army was a deliberate attempt to remove the social stigma from soldiering and thus remake not only the military but society and the nation as well.\textsuperscript{175}

The tension and open animosity between communities and the military had been a sore spot for the Nationalists even before the Northern Expedition, and it remained so throughout the war. During the Northern Expedition (1927), the army’s political bureaus were created specifically to address the tensions with civilian society: they “were expected to train troops to maintain discipline, to conduct themselves properly in dealing with civilians, and, most importantly, to convince civilians of the advantages of cooperating with the Revolutionary Army.”\textsuperscript{176} Despite these earlier efforts, however, military-civilian relations remained strained – and it ran in both directions. Disdain and separation marked the relationship between soldiers and common people, both during the Resistance War and the Civil War. Even within the army, calling someone a “commoner” was a serious insult, more offensive than saying “Fuck eight generations of your ancestors!”\textsuperscript{177}

Demands for funds, manpower, and material had sorely strained the day-to-day support of China’s interior population for the Nationalist military, but the army itself had exacerbated the problem. There was little use in military men denying their responsibility for the tense relationship. Even the Renaissance Society and the Society for Vigorous Practice, dominated by career military men, acknowledged the problem lay with the army and its soldiers.

The attitude of soldiers easily seems proudful; their acts easily tends to roughness; especially towards the masses, some soldiers only know flaunting their power . . . completely overlooking courtesy and discipline. This is really soldiers’ shame. Historically, China has valued Confucian generals \textsuperscript{[ru jiang 儒將]}, because Confucian generals understood propriety, had a dignified bearing, and did not act proudly or

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{174} Ibid., p. 72.
\item \textsuperscript{175} Undated propaganda directive, qz0051.mj2-397 pp. 164a-6a. See also GMWX, vol. 63, p. 304.
\item \textsuperscript{176} Fitzgerald, \textit{Awakening China}, p. 300. With the 1927 reconstitution of the army, revolutionary leaders realized that they had to try to bring about “close and friendly relations between soldiers and civilians. The political aim . . . was to mobilize popular support for the Nationalist movement generally; the strategic aim was to neutralize civilian hostility toward the demands of the Nationalist Army as it passed through their communities.” Significantly, these reconstruction efforts were to begin with helping officers and men \textit{within} the army to treat each other respectfully, because “only then could they begin to respect the villagers and townspeople with whom they came into contact”; Fitzgerald, p. 292.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Zhang Tuowu, \textit{Daima shuzu xuji}, p. 91.
\end{itemize}
crudely. We are modern soldiers, with a lofty social status. All our actions must be proper and follow the law, as a model for the masses, thereby securing the respect and love of the people.\textsuperscript{178}

The tensions between civilians and the military had worsened during the war against Japan, but responsibility here too lay with the soldiers themselves.

Since the War of Resistance began, some military men say that ‘In many places the people do not understand righteousness, do not cherish the army, and are not willing to aid the military.’ We occasionally hear this sort of statement and perhaps there is some truth to it, but looking at it closely, today when the nation is in danger and our families broken, why do people still not understand righteousness, fail to cherish the army, and remain unwilling to help the army? It must be because of some defect in the military itself that the army and the people are estranged. It is certainly not [because] the people do not understand righteousness. If soldiers were under strict discipline and really cherished the people sufficiently, would the people be late with their welcoming? How could there be any reason to be unwilling to cherish or aid [the military]?\textsuperscript{179}

Taking responsibility for changing the impasse, the Nationalist government intended the Youth Army to shore up the relationship between local society and the military. The Youth Army could not ignore the local population in any case. Training hikes on backroads through mountains and unfinished barracks and bases meant that soldiers were regularly quartered in schools, stores, hostels, and civilian homes. In localities surrounding Youth Army bases, deliberate efforts were taken to improve the army's image among the population; in urban areas, Youth Army units were involved with measures to prepare for air raids and gas-warfare attacks.\textsuperscript{180} In outlying districts, the new recruits were regularly given labor service projects, often road building or repair. The road between Bishan and Tongliang ran through 90 km of hilly, rough road that was slowing down army supply and civilian transportation; Youth Army units in the vicinity were put to work improving it. Similarly, Tongliang, a small backwater town, was reportedly “unbearably filthy”; its streets littered with “cow, horse, and children’s shit” before the Youth Army base was placed nearby. Journalists remarked on the town's transformation: clean and well-swept streets, walls newly adorned with beautifully written slogans and an abundance of Youth Army posters, newspapers, calligraphy, and patriotic cartoons. Not long after their arrival in the area, a soldier boasted that his unit had “already built a bridge between the army and the people.”\textsuperscript{181}

At least in some cases, Youth Army units were placed in locales to help repair the military’s relations with civilian population. The 639R (209D) was stationed in Ruijin, Jiangxi, which had been a communist area and mercilessly attacked by the Nationalist military in the encirclement campaigns of the early 1930s.

Because Ruijin had previously been forcibly occupied by the [communist] bandits for many years, the destruction [there] was very great; the original inhabitants and able-bodied men had been killed or taken captive. There were not many survivors. While it

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{178} Wang Yuewu, \textit{Cong zuoren dao zuozhan}, p. 27.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Ibid., p. 54.
\item \textsuperscript{180} GJZGSG, vol. 2, p. 930.
\item \textsuperscript{181} HYQNJ, pp. 33-4 and 151; see also, p. 130 for another road building project undertaken by Youth Army units.
\end{itemize}
was stationed and training there, our regiment made every effort to initiate military-civilian cooperation by undertaking road repairs and [holding] military-civilian get-togethers.\textsuperscript{182}

The Ruijin area was selected for two reasons. First, to prevent any resurgence of communist influence in an area with a history of successful organizing; and second, to provide residents with an impression of a sympathetic and helpful National military, after the years of violence and destruction during the encirclement campaigns. In the months following the Japanese surrender, the 639th was moved to areas, like Xiaoshan in Zhejiang, that had been occupied by Japanese and puppet government forces.\textsuperscript{183}

Much of this “bridge” between communities and the Youth Army existed only in government propaganda and only to wishful thinkers, such as the youth soldiers. Lù Zhenhuan, a political officer in the 203rd division, related at length an episode concerning the rape of a local girl by the regimental officer and the subsequent cover-up. An impoverished family lived just outside the school where the 607th regiment was encamped. The mother did washing and mending for the youth soldiers, but her daughter was raped by the regimental commander. In anger and grief the mother stood outside the base gate crying and shouting accusations. Familiar with the mother, the soldiers were sympathetic to her complaints and the commander's misdeeds were soon the talk of the entire regiment. Lù inquired of his superiors how he should handle the situation in order to maintain military discipline, but received no answer from Yu Jizhong, the head of the political bureau in the 203rd division. Instead Yu transferred Lù into a short-term training program, effectively limiting his contact with the soldiers in the division, and the commander who had raped the girl forced her family to move out of town. After reporting to the the division commander that Lù was spreading false rumors, Yu confronted Lù with his “uncooperative” attitude (significantly, he never disputed the commander's guilt) and requested instructions from Jiang Jingguo, who decided to transfer Lù to the 202nd division. This incident disabused Lù of his “naive” hopes, as he realized that Jiang was not going to reform the corrupt regime, despite his promises.\textsuperscript{184}

Events in another town showed the asymmetrical nature of this “bridge” between the military and the people. A Youth Army division and town authorities in Hufeng called a joint conference to solve the problem of price rises in the backwater town. The conference, according to a student soldier, decided to give discounts to the youth soldiers to combat the rising trend of prices.\textsuperscript{185} This undoubtably made things easier for the troops, but local civilians would have to continue to pay the increased amounts and the increased purchasing power of the youths would serve only to drive the price of goods in Hufeng up even more for the civilians – hardly a shining example of military-civilian cooperation.

The youth soldiers were convinced that they were remaking China’s interior lock stock and barrel, however. The 604R (in the 202D) published a small booklet titled \textit{Art in the Army} (軍中文藝). It was full of poems and short extemporaneous essays written by the men and officers of the 604th while they were stationed at Qijiang, about sixty km from Chongqing. Along with many articles on training hikes along the Pu River (浦河), the volunteers wrote of the physical
environment and their work in creating (or re-creating) it out of an overgrown, wasted space. In their imaginative reconstructions of the nation, China’s interior was underbrush, neglected, un-clean, useless, and wild. Their efforts alone could clean it up, beautify it, build it up, and give it purpose as a proper national land. A second theme that reappears in their writings is that of dreaming: many essay titles have the word meng (to dream 夢) in them, and their poems are full of dreamlike qualities. It is perhaps not too much to suggest that the repeated invocation of dreaming was an unconscious admission that there was a distinct unreality in their self-images and sense of mission. They were inhabiting a lush dreamland, but many of the soldiers’ most intense dreams and fantasies centered on a material object that both they and the state invested with intricate meanings and a dominating importance, namely the rifle.

Men with Guns

Not surprisingly, the rifle or gun figured prominently in the rituals of becoming a soldier, the rhetoric of the state, and the imaginations of the youth soldiers. The 639th regiment’s post-war memorial volume has a great number of photographs showing the men with their weapons. In many ways this was perfectly unremarkable: militaries the world over impress on their soldiers the vital importance of their weaponry. The Nationalist military was no exception. In his memoirs of life as a regular soldier in the war, Zhang Tuowu has a chapter on the importance of the soldier’s weapon, titled “Second Life”, which was taken directly from a statement in the Nationalist Infantry Manual (Bubing caodian 步兵操典): “Weapons are the soldier’s second life.” But Zhang goes even further, saying that this understates the situation. “There is really no number one and number two lives. You only have one: honor, military discipline, responsibility, integrity, the gun, your own head. How can you say which is first and which is last?” Despite the fact that soldiers’ attachment to their weapons is both commonplace and essential to their performance as soldiers, the cluster of fantasies, rituals, and statements about the gun in the Youth Army was exceptional and demands a closer look.

We have already seen how mastering the gun as a techno-military object was fundamental to the youth soldiers’ view of themselves as modern shi (i.e., the reunion of wen and wu in their own persons), but the volunteers’ desire for the gun was so intense that they fantasized and wrote about it in sexual terms too. This sexualization did not, however, consist of turning the weapon into a phallic symbol, but cast it as a feminine lover instead. Two poems, written by youth soldiers in the 205th Division, combine this feminized vision with that of a dispenser of death. Violent or ambiguous endings suggest that the gun was attached both to seductive, feminine qualities and destructive ones as well.

“Nightsong of the Plains” [草原夜歌]
A secluded and quiet night [一個幽靜的夜晚]
On the vast plains [在那蒼茫的草原上]
There is a beautiful lass [有一個漂亮的姑娘]
Laying in the grass beside a hero [躺在草原英雄的身旁]
He kisses her bountiful breast [他吻着她豐滿的乳房]

186. Junsheng congshu bianzuan weiyuanhui (Military Voice Collectanea Compilation Committee 軍聲叢書編纂委員會), Junzhong wenyi (軍中文藝), n.d., passim; CQMA materials (資料), magazine section (杂志类), #307.
She throws him an enchanting glance [她給她迷人的眼光]
How joyfully the two embrace! [壹個人擁抱多麼歡狂]
Drawn out gunshots come to them [送來了拖長的槍聲]
Devils march into the village [鬼子們踏進了村莊]
With unbounded, joyous laughter, [it] becomes a killing field [無限的歡笑成了屠場] 188

“She” (她)
Young in years [輕輕的年紀]
A gentle and graceful figure [窈窕的身材]
Like a fresh beautiful flower [似一支美麗的鮮花]
She and I stand under a shady tree [我和她站在蔭蔽的樹下]
keeping watch to the ends of the earth [守望天涯]
She follows me close until the end [她終日緊隨着我]
I love her deeply [我深深的戀愛她]
She and I hold hands and talk secrets [我和她携手密話]
On the long embankment roams a crow [長堤漫步著鳥鴉] 189

The rifle in these poems is a seducer, a sexualized and fetishized object. Youth Army soldiers were not the only ones to wax poetic about rifles, nor the only ones to cast it as a feminine companion. Wang Yaping (王亞平), in his book of wartime poems Portrait of the Chinese Soldier (中國兵的畫像), published in 1938, mentions guns and violence many times. The book’s first poem, which the book’s title was drawn from, describes the Chinese soldier: “He had a beautiful companion / It was the steel gun on his shoulder.” 190 Rifles in western militaries have been invested with both sides of the sexual coin. The U.S. Marine Corps’ famous marching chant casts it as a parallel to the male penis: “This is my rifle! This [gesture at crotch] is my gun! This is for fighting! This is for fun!” But a British poet writing war poems after World War One, captured his generation’s attitude toward their weapons in the lines: “Marry it man! Marry it! / Cherish her, she’s your very own.” 191

Chiang Kaishek himself was directly associated with the Youth Army rifles: the memorial volume for the 639th Regiment contains a diagram of the “Chiang Kaishek model rifle.” The model name, zhongzheng (中正), was a play on words. It was both one of Chiang’s alternate (given) names and carried a meaning of “shooting accurately” or “hitting the mark.” It was a copy of the German Mauser rifle, first produced by the Gongxian Arsenal in 1935, and put into large-scale production immediately. 192 Using the Chiang Kaishek rifle to represent all the
weapons of the unit, the diagram elides the fact that the equippage of Youth Army units was far from uniform. Sources mention Chinese-made guns in the Youth Army; but, in fact, it was equipped with a hodge-podge of weapon styles, makes, and nationalities.  

**Figure 6-1:  Diagram of the Chiang Kaishek (Zhongzheng 中正) Rifle**

![Diagram of the Chiang Kaishek Rifle](source: Wu Guoyuan, ed., Zhongguo qingnian yuanzhengjun lujun disanshiyi junshituans xunlian jiyao, 1946.)

By choosing the Chiang Kaishek model rifle to represent all the various rifles in his unit, the editor of this volume, Wu Guoyuan, homogenized the rifles and connected them directly to the generalissimo. The gun, thus, becomes a sign for Chiang, invoking him as the model for the youth soldiers’ guns and themselves. Chiang was aware of, and cultivated, such emulation. In his early January 1944 address to the youth volunteers, Jiang made explicit his role as model to famous, but long-dead, general in the second. Russian arms were given bland letter-number designations (T-34 tanks, for example) and the Germans preferred inspirational names, at least for their tanks. I cannot think of a single WWII example in which the name of a living leader was used as the model name for a weapon. Guns made in Chinese arsenals during the 1920s-1930s certainly had no such practice of naming their products for political or military leaders. In fact, “as if to advertise their own expertise and goad their competition, munitions plants even named their gun makes after the specific arsenal” where they were designed or made; Josh Howard, *Workers at War*, p. 26.

193. Huang Wei, head of the Southeast branch of the Youth Army central administration, wrote in his memoirs that the Youth Army training carried out under his direction used US weapons, materials and methods; Huang Wei, p. 68. Zhang Zao remembered that when the 203D finally saw action against the Red Army around Xi’an in 1947-8, it too fought with US weaponry; p. 126. Su Xin, writing years later, recollected that his unit was equipped with a bewildering array of weapons: German machine guns, American M2 assault rifles, Canadian Sten guns, and Japanese rifles; p. 71. The only reference to Chinese-made guns is in Liu Kaihan, 1989, p. 115; however, Liu describes not a general Youth Army unit but a training class for political cadres in the Youth Army.
be emulated and the implications of his name. The speech was an intimate portrayal of his military education in Japan and the lessons he had learned about military life there. In contrast to other speeches about the Youth Army, the tone Chiang adopted here was a far cry from lofty political rhetoric – it was the voice of an older, wiser man giving young men advice about the trials of military training. Chiang presented himself as an empathetic and concerned elder, personally involved in the success of each individual. He called for each of the volunteers to become a “nameless hero,” for only if China “has numberless, nameless Chiang Kaisheks, able to struggle and sacrifice for the Three People’s Principles and national revolution,” would it survive and be able to carry out the revolution. The gun, a sign for Chiang, invoked his sacrificial soldierly virtues which were the only means to erase the faults of China’s intellectuals and make the nation complete again by reuniting wen and wu.

But what was it that the youth soldiers were supposed to do with their rifles? In bald terms, they were to kill the enemy, to fight, and die. The patriotic War of Resistance against a foreign invader required the youth soldiers to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield. In fact, the war itself, as sloganized by the Nationalist regime in promoting the Youth Army movement, was viewed as a sacrificial exchange between China and Japan: “An inch of territory for a drop [lit. inch] of blood! One hundred thousand youths are a one hundred thousand man army!” (一寸山河一寸血；十萬青年十萬軍). The territory of the land was to be exchanged for Japanese blood, but the second phrase subtly invoked the Youth Army’s future role in winning back that territory, which would be retaken with the Youth Army’s sacrificial blood.

Government propaganda averred that there “was not an iota of mystery” in the fact that the nation’s desperate plight in the death-grip of imperialist aggression had made everyone, even the long-reluctant elite, willing to “sacrifice” themselves. The Youth Army was given a parentage of sacrificial revolutionary precedents: it made “people remember the past footprints of revolutionary youths willingly sacrificing themselves in the 1911 Revolution and on the eve of the Northern Expedition.” Sun Yatsen and his revolutionary followers were invoked repeatedly as a “glorious tradition of sacrifice,” because they had “sacrificed their studies and abandoned their families to promote the Army of Righteousness, to raise the flag of righteousness.” The soldiers wrote about their sacrificial service to the nation. One reported that at his induction ceremony the commander exhorted the soldiers that they had “already turned over [jiaogei 交给] their entire bodies to the nation.” Another private, Duan Jixian, in late November 1944, wrote to a friend that, he “hoped my body can be exchanged for our nation’s freedom and our country’s independence. Then my soul will be so vast!”

The irony is that the Youth Army units were never called upon to sacrifice their lives fight-

---

194. XSCJ, p. 129 and GMWX, vol. 62, p. 187; emphasis is mine. Chiang in his speeches to recruits repeated enjoined them to “call themselves anonymous heroes and to be determined to be nameless Chiang Kaisheks”; Xu Wancheng, Kangzhan banian Chongqing huaxu, p. 20.

195. GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 246-7; the unattributed author describes the psychological changes among China’s elite that finally motivated them to sacrificial resistance against Japan.

196. HYQNJ, p. 1 of preface.

197. Ibid., p. 2.

198. Ibid., p. 67.

199. GMWX, vol. 63, p. 346; emphasis mine.
ing the Japanese; the war in the Pacific ended before any Youth army units saw action at the front or in an invasion of the Japanese home islands. This fact should make us suspect that something other than an un-reciprocated “sacrifice” is at work here, that in fact patriotic sacrifice (or service) was being misrecognized to cover over a system of exchanges – a (political and symbolic) economy. The state’s propaganda naturalized patriotic sacrifice and in so doing obscured a system of exchanges taking place around military service. Some of these, as seen in the previous chapter, were baldly material in nature. Others, as we will see here, were symbolic.

The following analysis hopes to uncover this system of exchanges: a symbolic “economy” of patriotism and citizenship centered around the Youth Army and its guns. A close examination of the youth soldiers’ writings will situate the rifles and the texts which tell of them within a rubric of differentiated “meaning-values” and a set of symbolic exchanges. It is to the construction of difference and equivalence around the Youth Army that we turn first.

Difference and Equivalence: Constructing Meanings

Any system of value and exchange, including society in the most general sense, must rest jointly on (systematic) differentiation and equivalencies that allow exchanges to happen. As we have seen in Chapter Three, the Youth Army volunteers were, sociologically speaking, quite different from the common soldiers conscripted by the Nationalist government. They were better educated and of higher social status than the illiterate conscripts being dragged into service by press-gangs. Their sociological distinctiveness was heightened and hardened by the rituals of entering military life: as we have seen earlier in this chapter, the rituals of becoming a soldier, of which the ceremony for conferring the rifles was the most emotionally charged, delimited the youth soldiers from others, especially non-soldiers. Many volunteers noted the importance of the first time they put on their new uniforms, feeling it to be a transformative experience when the identity and role of a soldier became real. The volunteers’ profound sense of being separate and different from civilian society reinforces Pierre Bourdieu’s observation that “rites of passage” distract attention from the line (or “arbitrary boundary”) drawn between ins and outs by fo-

200. The term “meaning-values” is taken from Lydia Liu’s “Introduction” to Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations. Although the concept of differentiation being the basis for all exchanges is commonplace enough, Liu’s hyphenated term highlights the importance of value and thus brings to the fore the economic logic at work.

201. The social world, according to Bourdieu, is a symbolic system based on the logic of differentiation; Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 237-8.


203. Each recruit had to sign up for enlistment. While not all went through an official ceremony, a great many recruits appear to have done so, especially in Chongqing where the Municipal Recruiting Committee held large public rallies in which volunteers went onstage to sign their names in record books. For a collection of anecdotes concerning the sign-up ritual, see QNYZJJY, pp. 35-58. Examinations, both physical and academic, were administered to each recruit – significant numbers failed the physical check-up. Recruiting committees organized festive “send-off” ceremonies and these too served to distinguish recruits from civilian society.

204. For example, see, QNYZJJY, p. 149 and HYQNJ, p. 50.
cusing on the act or motion of passage; the separation “institut[es] a lasting difference between those to whom the rite pertains and those to whom it does not pertain.”

The youth soldiers believed that their military life in the Youth Army was pure, free from the economic and socio-sexual exchange-relations that characterized civilian life. Without the distractions of “mentally taxing exams,” bothersome labor, or “stifling and boring meetings that strain personal relations,” the soldier youths felt freed from the tensions of school and work. The result was that “our thinking has been purified, we don’t hope anymore for the licentious things so common in student days, and we don’t have golden dreams [of money or wealth] anymore.”

They believed they had rejected the civilian evils of sex and money. The soldierly ideal here is totally devoid of any sexual impulses – except toward the gun itself of course. The Youth Army was a simpler world, as if women were totally excluded, or at least subsumed in the totality of “the people.” In this denigration of material and sexual motives as impure, the youth soldiers fictionalized themselves and their military community as free of exchange and circulation (i.e., economic relations): civilian life is denied by describing the Youth Army as purified of civilian society’s dirty exchange relations of money and sex.

This rejection of the enervating evils of sex and money in civilian life was total in the YA writings. In fact, the soldiers in these writings lacked any sexual tension. The military tradition in western nations has been an almost exclusively male community as well, but one with a wealth of sexualized metaphors and impulses. During the war, the rejection of sex and sexual


206. HYQNJ, p. 84. One author reported that the soldiers he talked with all stated that since entering the army they all “felt ten years younger, [and their] life and thoughts had become so pure”; GMWX, vol. 63, p. 362. Another interesting statement along similar lines is found in a soldier’s farewell letter to a friend, published in the Central Daily Supplement on 18 December 1944; GMWX, vol. 63, p. 338.

207. In the sources on the Youth Army – whether written by journalists or the volunteers – there are precious few which exhibit any sort of sexual aspect at all. In the most obvious, the actresses in a government-dispatched drama troupe entertaining a Youth Army unit were said to have “made the young men’s hearts go wild with joy”; HYQNJ, p. 68. In another account, a student, writing of chance encounters with groups of female students while hiking in the mountains, exclaimed: “Such happiness! This iron training; this poetic life!”; ibid, p. 121-2. In another story, a youth soldier meets up with an old flame training at a nearby women’s camp. Struck by her beauty, he finds her salute overwhelming; ibid, pp. 123-5. While there are some hints of sexuality in accounts of female students helping to recruit male students (see QNYZJJY, p. 73, for one example), the three incidents above are the extent of the “sexual” tension in the writings by the youth volunteers.

208. For a discussion of this and a psychoanalytical dissection of male-community in the pre-World War Two German Freikorps, see Theweleit, Male Fantasies, vol. 1, pp. 61-2; vol. 2, pp. 46-7, 62, and 145-60. Theweleit examines the Freikorps as a community of dysfunctional men knit by inter-male values of loyalty and honor, “soldierly traditions,” and bodily training which transformed pain into pleasure, and ultimately resulted in the creation of an emotionless whirring and churning of the “troop-machine” that was hell bent on destruction of all things feminine. In the German Freikorps, the “movement toward soldiering is depicted as a movement away from women” in both geographical and psychological senses. Joining the Freikorps, leaving tainted civilian society, was full of “joyful partings”; Theweleit, Male Fantasies, vol. 1, p. 29. The only acceptable women, for these German fascist soldiers was a waiting or absent one; ibid., p. 32.
promiscuousness was pronounced, especially for women, but the Youth Army too exhibited a de-
sexualized version of masculine vigorousness that excluded women almost completely. Sun Yatsen stressed that the “love” of soldiers was of a different and higher order than that of the love between men and women, or indeed between any two individuals: the benevolence of soldiers “is different from the love between a man and his father, mother, wife and sons. [It is] taking the object of his love and expanding it; the benevolence [ren 仁] of women cannot compare to it; therefore it is called universal love.”

Beyond this separation from civilian society, the volunteers were convinced of their elite

Theleweit argues persuasively that the Freikorps showed a consistent retreat from sexual encounters. Women, especially proles and nurses, were cast solely as licentious whores and connected to the nightmarish image of a red tide (of menstruation, of blood and of communism) and the specter of shared women under a communist regime; ibid., pp. 41, 50, and 65-70. The fascist soldiers’ intense revulsion at these women found orgasmic release in destroying them; ibid., p. 177-191. Underlying the Freikorps’ urge to destroy the feminine was a fear of losing oneself in “erotic merging”, in other words a failure of proper ego formation; Theleweit, Male Fantasies, vol. 2, pp. xx-xxii. Theleweit’s analysis rests on Freudian psychoanalytic theories of ego and identity formation. It is, of course, debatable how far such theories can be applied cross-culturally. What is interesting in Theleweit is the sheer mass of sexually-oriented material for the German fascist soldiers – sexual impulses were unavoidable, even though they were mis-
directed as a Thanatos-desire for death and destruction. No such dynamic held for the Youth Army soldiers: even though they too rejected sex in their conceptions of male military life, they merely ignored women and did not cast them as a threat to be destroyed. Whether this was because of a non-Freudian process of identity and ego formation in Chinese culture as a whole, or because the youth soldiers were not dysfunctionally raised (damaged goods) as the German fascist soldiers were, is a debate that is far beyond my area of specialization and beyond any real relevance for this study: the links between (bourgeois) individual ego formation and the formation of the centralized state, which underpin Theleweit’s study and which are so ably analyzed by Norbert Elias in The Civilizing Process (vol. 1, p. 262ff, 278.), remain unstudied and completely speculative in China’s case.

209. Wartime literature took steps backwards in its portrayal of women protagonists. Ouyang Yuqian’s The New Peach Blossom Fan (and Mulan Joins the Army) were a step backwards from the innovations of Pan Jinlian: “in wartime China, the sexually liberated heroine is replaced by a physically aggressive but morally virtuous female”; McDougall, Bonnie and K. Louie, The Literature of China in the Twentieth Century, p. 164. Ba Jin in his war novel, Ward Four, also makes a point of stressing that sex and sexually oriented fiction is out of bounds. The friend of the protagonist, who is responsible for sending the “diary” to a publisher, argues that the writing should be published: “Though the diary may not be well-written, it is much better than those sluttish new novels that often use any part of a woman’s body to play magic games. … [China must] reduce the production of pornography, which in turn may make our brothers and children get to breathe in more wholesome air. We may also repay our parents for their efforts in nurturing and educating us. By doing so, as the saying goes, we allow ourselves to accumulate credits for our next life.” No mention is made of the military or state, but the sense of guarding purity from prevalent filth and exchanging it for something of a higher (spiritual) order is clear. Ba Jin, Ward Four: A Wartime Novel, Haili Kong and Howard Goldblatt trans., San Francisco, China Books and Periodicals, 1999, p. xiii.

210. Sun Zhongshan, Junren jingshen jiaoyu, pp. 23-4. Sun’s view was echoed time and again, particularly by military idealists in the Renaissance Society; Wang Yuewu quoted directly this passage from Sun in Cong zuoren dao zuozhan, p. 5.
status as soldiers. Whenever they compared themselves to the peasant soldiers that made up the bulk of the Nationalist armies, the youth soldiers felt profoundly different. A group of volunteers complained bitterly when they had to travel to their base in Kunming in a train’s baggage compartment. After two sweaty, uncomfortable days, one of the volunteers, demonstrating an astounding lack of knowledge about how common soldiers were treated by the government, complained: “What sort of treatment is this? It’s not even as good as that given to the common press-gang soldiers!” Other soldiers were more compassionate, feeling sympathy when they encountered the ill-clothed and ill-provisioned soldiers of a non-Youth Army division. Underlying this sympathy, however was a sense of difference: we are not them and they are not us. This difference found expression in the Youth Army’s egalitarianism – the internal erasure (or minimization) of difference between officers and men – that highlighted the gap between the Youth Army and other soldiers. This difference, the “democratic” value of equality between officers and men, as we have already seen, was physically encoded in the Youth Army uniforms. The (idealized) equality and “democracy” in the Youth Army was meaningfully deployed against the highly abusive and authoritarian environment in regular divisions.

However, the essential difference between the youth volunteers and common soldiers lay in the mastery of weaponry and it was this difference that permitted an explicit measure of equivalence, of value, between themselves and regular soldiers to be formulated. The youth soldiers felt unmatched by all other Chinese soldiers, past and present. In a long piece published in the Central Daily Supplement (中央日报副刊), one youth-soldier contrasted the Youth Army’s training and mastery of military skills to that of past soldiers.

Who believes that in the past Chinese soldiers received a good military education? The training they got was [such that] other than the dull ‘at ease’ and ‘attention’, they knew nothing. This was, on one hand, because the quality of soldiers in the past was too low, and also because of the failures of past education. As “scientific talents,” the youth soldiers were able to wage modern war wielding scientific weapons. Along with political and military leaders, they were quick to link their mental capacity to their excellence as soldiers. They believed the Chinese nation needed them as soldiers, because in the “age of scientific war, the mechanical defeats human strength” and only educated youths possessed the skills to master “the technical.”

Chiang Kaishek himself emphasized in his Open Address to the Intellectual Youth Volunteers that regular men were patriotic and physically capable, but they lacked “knowledge and skill.” It was precisely these attributes that the

---

211. Wang Zicong, p. 56.
212. HYQNJ, pp. 34-5.
213. HYQNJ, p. 77; my emphasis.
215. HYQNJ, p. 87. In 1946, Bai Chongxi, minister of military education, would put the relationship between knowledge and war this way: “We all know that education is the preparation for war, while war is the application of education. The quality of the education of an army will thus determine its fighting power. This is an immutable truth. The world today is a scientific world; modern warfare is scientific warfare,” Bai Chongxi, pp. 2-3.
216. GMWX, vol. 63, pp. 291-2. See also, QNYZJJY, p. 24, where the identical sentiment is expressed in an article published in late October 1944 in an editorial from the Central Daily. The
youth volunteers brought to the army; thus, Chiang reiterated, they would not serve as officers but as privates in their units, where their better grasp of weapons and tactics would render them more effective as soldiers.

In fact, the ability to master the gun was central to differentiating the Youth Army from regular soldiers. The Youth Army’s most notable aspect was that its high educational level greatly sped up the training process and improved the results obtained. In a piece titled “For the Mothers,” a second class private, Zheng Bingsen, wrote proudly that although the Chiang Kaishek model rifles appeared simple, they were complicated when disassembled, and yet, his unit “was able within one hour of instruction to understand the entire gun, and remember most of it. The breakdown and assembly of light machine guns were mastered in forty minutes.”

Comments by youth soldiers and reporters on the speed with which the youth soldiers mastered the skills and knowledge of modern warfare abound. This powerful sense of difference allowed Nationalist leaders and the youth soldiers to establish a widely touted equivalence between themselves and common soldiers. Chiang in his Open Address to the volunteers declared that “an increase of one division [of youth soldiers] is no different than an increase in strength of ten regular divisions.” This boast was understandably popular among the youth volunteers. Ironically after years of strangling volunteerist activities, Chiang may in fact have been appropriating a trope originally used by Tao Xingzhi to argue for increased voluntary recruitment years before. As an extension of his involvement with orphan care and education, Tao had promoted volunteer enlistment efforts in Beibei. During the 1939 sessions of the People’s Political Council, he sponsored a proposal calling for energetic government backing for such efforts, even those by “independent” groups and activists. His proposal contained the statement that each willing volunteer was worth ten conscripts. Unlike Tao, Chiang and the YA, however, were not claiming that it was only a matter of psychology, the problems with the zhuangding are given differently in other government sources. One describes their major defects as being: “insufficient nutrition, weakness of body, inferior knowledge.” The intellectual youths, however, because they enjoyed “affluent lives, ... their bodies are healthier and stronger than regular peasant soldiers, and because they have received a school education, they possess a national sense and national consciousness”; GMWX, vol. 62, p. 250.

One youth soldier noted with pride, still evident years later, that “because a majority of our company originally high school students, our progress in various drills was very fast. We were able to complete our training assignment on time”; Zhang Guchu, p. 78. See also, HYQNJ, p. 130 and QNYZJJY, pp. 27-9. For descriptions of the process and methodology of weapons training, see HYQNJ, pp. 168-9; Wu Guoyuan, p. 7-8; and Huang Wei, pp. 68-72. Training was broken down into five steps: preparation, lecture (explanation), demonstration, implementation, test (examination), and review (self-criticism 檢討). Weapons-related topics made up five of fifteen training segments in the 639th Regiment; Wu Guoyuan, p. 8.


218. See also HYQNJ, pp. 86-7, 116, and 129.


220. QNYZJJY, p. 29. Zhou Kaiqing recounts the boast in Daxian, Sichuan, that the 163 recruits from the county packed more punch than an entire regiment of regular troops; Zhou Kaiqing, Sichuan yu dui Ri kangzhan, p. 255.

221. Tao’s proposal can be found at: YZSL, vol. 2, pp. 418-21, dated September 1939.
willingness to serve, but that it was the technical mastery of an object, the gun, and the speed which with he attained that mastery, that endowed the youth soldier with a (theoretical) “value” of ten regular soldiers. This outrageous claim, based as it was upon the mastery of the gun-object, suggests that we pay close attention to the soldiers’ acquisition of the rifles.

Conferring the Rifles: Exchanges Misrecognized

As one of the Youth Army’s central rituals, conferring the rifles was a solemn occasion, often attended by top-level brass and Nationalist dignitaries. On 31 January 1945, the *Central Daily Supplement* printed an account of the ceremony for conferring rifles in a Youth Army unit. Written by Zha Ning, private second class, the account of the climactic ceremony in the sequence of rituals for “becoming” a youth-soldier is worth citing in full.

The 11th of February [1945] was not a normal day in the history of our lives. Our excitement and energy was like the day we signed up to enter the army. It was a newly cleared morning after the rain, with the chill of early spring; the sky was faintly light [when] we got out of bed. Then the entire unit gathered in the regimental square. This morning was the anniversary of Sun [Yatsen], our National Father, and at the same time was also the ceremony for conferring the rifles. Han Di, the regimental commander, saluted; we all saluted back. Although there were so many people in the square, only the sound of breathing could be heard; it was truly solemn. I have never seen anywhere as solemn as that time and place. Four buglers began to play their horns together. The resounding, majestic rhythm immediately made me think of my own responsibility, think of my mother in occupied territory, think of the broken landscape. My heart was so serious. I would not call this feeling tragic, but ardent [instead] and it moved me almost to tears. The commander took the rifles one by one and with unusual solemnity gave them to representative soldiers. Those representatives, all tall in stature, respectfully and carefully accepted [the guns]; the expression on their faces was one of honor, pride, determination, and elation.

The commander saluted as before and began to address us. He earnestly told us of our weapons’ origins: ‘These guns are of course made of steel and iron, manufactured in an arms factory, but they all came from the money given by fellow countrymen, therefore [you are] receiving the weapons directly from the government, [but] indirectly you all are receiving them from our four hundred million countrymen. They [the guns] are bought with the money that the common people obtained by their blood-and-sweat struggle. Why did they give them to us? What will we do with these rifles? [We will] protect the country, protect the territory, and protect the nation’s social order. This is the mission our countrymen have given us…’ He also told us to “love [your] weapons like you love your own life; [you] must live and die with your weapon and take up your weapon to scrub away the shame of the nation and retake our lost land.” His intonation was serious and resolute. He was a man experienced in war campaigns, with more than twenty years in military life, and most of that time on the front lines. The more he spoke, the more excited and animated he became. He told us what the common people on the front lines eat; in lots of places yams or sorghum husks ground into powder are

223. Jiang Jingguo personally presided over the ceremony for presenting rifles to the trainees at the YA political work classes; Lü Zhenhuan, p. 88.
used to allay hunger. They give money, grain, and labor, to help us transport [supplies] and build roads; these were all [things] he had seen with his own eyes.

We were even more moved. Yes, why did we come to be soldiers? We should defend the fatherland, and work for the happiness of these common people. Yes, only by expelling the Japanese devils and establishing a rich and strong, peaceful and happy new China can we be worthy of them. Why did we volunteer to be soldiers? The linked string of questions and answers circled again around in my head; I forgot myself, forgot the time, only when the voice of the master of ceremonies said, “The representative soldiers [will] deliver a reply”, did my attention return to the front again.

One of the representatives who had received the rifles, spoke. The tall fellow said, ‘We love and will protect these guns, just like we love our own lives and our own loved ones. To expel the Japanese, to retake lost territory, and to establish the army, we will exhaust our greatest effort and so be worthy of the guns and the admonition given to us today by the commander.’ Although he spoke so simply, we all had the feeling that he was short on words but long on heart, speaking what we all wanted to say. Finally, amidst excited slogans like ‘Take up weapons to defend the fatherland!’, ‘Take up arms to retake lost territory!’, ‘Take up weapons to protect the masses!’ each platoon dispersed. A swath of light appeared in the sky; everyone was excited, anticipating that today we would see the sun, no more dark and wet weather.224

Despite its wonderfully trite tone, the significance of Zha’s account of the ceremony is in the language he uses to characterize the distribution of the guns. The rifles are given; the Chinese word shougei (授給) means “to bestow” or “to confer,” but hidden beneath this “giving” is a system of exchanges. In commander Han’s speech, this system of exchanges (an “economy”) is disguised or misrecognized as gifts: all the exchanges are masked as voluntary acts of giving. Underneath the language of “the gift,” the nation-state itself is the mechanism through which exchanges are carried out: common people contribute money for guns, which the state buys and distributes to the youth soldiers, who in turn repay the nation with sacrificial service in the (nation-state’s) army. There is no direct contact or exchange between the youth soldiers and the people, instead, the state as intermediary makes the exchanges possible, but only by construing all the exchange-acts as gifts, contributions, service, or sacrifice.

I call this symbolic construction an “economy of sacrifice” because it indicates both the character of exchange surrounding the gun-objects, as well as the consistent fiction (or misrecognition) of those exchanges as “sacrifice” or gifts. The ideological mirage thus constructed obscures the fact that the Youth Army’s guns stood at the end of a series of markets and market transactions (the domestic Chinese labor market, the international commodities market, the international arms market) and state coercion (appropriations in kind, taxes, forced labor service, and conscription of regular soldiers). Furthermore, it is precisely the circulation (via exchange) of the guns that imparts them with such a solemn meaning for Zha. Only by circulating, by being symbolically exchanged through the state, do the guns come to embody the “blood and sweat” of the Chinese people; it is the movement, the circulation itself, that is behind the meaning-value of the gun-object. It should be noted that after years of warlord battles and the Japanese invasion, there were large numbers of accessible firearms in China, yet, clearly just any

224. HYQNJ, pp. 107-9. There are numerous other references to this conferral ceremony, but Zha’s is the longest and most complete account I have located.
gun would not do for the youth soldiers. The ceremony realizes the system of exchange, which encompassed all of China’s “social order” (invoked explicitly by commander Han), and thus it is the ceremony itself that determines which gun-objects are acceptable, namely those declared to embody the labor of the Chinese people.

The seriousness of the conferral ceremony is corroborated by a report of a journalist who visited a Youth Army base. His report further highlights the fictional or fantasy aspect of this propaganda process, as we discover that (the circulation of) the physical object of the gun was not strictly necessary to the process of meaning construction at all.

At the beginning, [after] entering the base, they had a time of excitement, but following that [things became] dull; drilling every day barehanded was naturally easy and uninteresting. Hence they began mining in the hills and worked energetically. Before long, rifles were distributed; this was a big event for them.

Everywhere there were colorful wall newspapers. … What was most striking on the wall newspapers were the love poems and the writing that seemed like expressions of love. I surmised that this was just the bad habit of many youths who write poems on the temple of the city god. But reading such [lines as] “The beauty of your straight lines is moving” or “Your pitch-black and small eye,” I finally realized what their so-called “lover” was. They referred to the ceremony for conferring rifles as a ‘common wedding,’ and the lover was the ‘small black girl.’ However, at this point in time, not everyone even had their own ‘lover.’

The soldiers’ emotion was directed at an absence: “not everyone even had their own ‘lover.’” In Bourdieu’s terms, the ceremony was so overwhelmingly felicitous that the soldiers’ feelings were exercised even without the presence of the material object. Additionally, most Nationalist units were supplied with a bewildering array of weaponry and the Youth Army was no exception; yet, foreign-made guns were somehow not quite symbolically fitting enough. Incredibly, some YA units reported that the volunteers rejected American made weapons because they wanted to be equipped with Chinese-made rifles, despite their overall inferiority. The rep-

---

225. In 1935, Yongchuan county alone had well over 12,000 registered firearms among a population of some 390,000, or one firearm for every 33 county residents; “‘Sanhai’ xing gaicang jin – Minguo nianjian Yongchuan bingzai, tuanhai, feihuo zatan” in Yongchuan wenshi ziliao xuanji, vol. 4, 1988, p. 100. This certainly underestimates the number of available guns. Despite an intensive campaign to get residents to register weapons (and have them branded by the county government), many remained uncounted.

226. HYQNJJ, p. 140.

227. Fantasy, of course, requires the absence of the fantasized object. In regular units, new recruits often were not given guns, but just a stick to carry supplies, like a porter. The gun became a status symbol: veterans were qualified to carry a Chinese-made Hanyang rifle; soldiers who actually killed a Japanese soldier were entitled to a Japanese .38 Arisaka; those who killed ten or more could upgrade again; while only platoon leaders and above got to carry the most desirable firearms, like the American Thompson submachine gun; Zhang Tuowu, Daima shuzu xuji, pp. 37-8.

228. Units were supplied with a confusing array of gun models, from different countries and even of different calibers. This not only made supply of the correct ammunition and replacement difficult, but hampered training and effective use of the weaponry as well. Zhang Tuowu’s unit had American Thompson and Czech submachine guns, as well as Russian and Chinese...
presentation of the rifles created or called into being the guns as the material manifestation of a particular set of social relations, even if they were not physically present. The mystification of exchange-as-gift is nearly total since even the absence of the material object was itself disguised.

Yet within the Youth Army propaganda literature, there are moments when the misrecognition of exchange-as-gift is unveiled, when the game is given away and the war effort is acknowledged as a system of exchange. A new Youth Army volunteer penned a startling observation, by way of metaphor, in an early February issue of the *Central Daily Supplement*. Describing the camp at Hufeng, Sichuan, the base for the 601st Regiment, Qiu Hongyi wrote that the Youth Army base was “the printing house where the securities bonds of victory in the Resistance War are being produced.”  

In an era of corrupt and inflationary government, when bad (government) bonds were not uncommon, that such a metaphor would come so naturally to Qiu says volumes about the implicit bargain struck between the state and the volunteers. If the Nationalist state was printing bonds, who was buying and what was the expected return? In short, what exactly was being exchanged and what profits were being made?

**Sun Yatsen: Equivalence behind Exchange**

Our discussion requires that we return to Sun Yatsen’s important speech on “The Spiritual Education of Soldiers,” because it laid the intellectual foundations for the “economy of sacrifice” and for the theoretical understandings of China’s citizen-soldiers. It is important to keep in mind that this text was read in Youth Army units, as it was one of the officially provided books in all the Youth Army reading rooms.  

Looking at Sun’s theory of military service will help unmask the exchanges operating around the rifles of the Youth Army. As we saw earlier, Sun’s speech was the first modern discussion of the importance of political education for Chinese soldiers and he was at pains to stress the importance of cultivating the proper political understanding (or consciousness) in soldiers. Sun argued that modern society unjustifiably “stresses the material” over the spiritual. To remedy this, he wanted to arouse in soldiers a “revolutionary spirit” composed of three elements: courage (勇), benevolence (仁), and wisdom (智). Here we focus on the last of these. Sun divided wisdom into intelligence (聰明) and experience (見識). These capacities allow soldiers to distinguish right and wrong, recognize current situations, know the enemy and themselves, and understand benefit and harm. In essence, he theorized wisdom as an economic algebra in that cost-benefit analyses are implied in each category. But even further, for Sun, soldiers’ wisdom was linked to their position in society, the foundation for all further calculus: “All soldiers must first understand their own position and what responsibilities they bear.”

What position then did soldiers occupy? Ironically, Sun’s answer was a materialist one: soldiers fill a particular role in the organization of labor within society.

---

Hanyang rifles; Zhang Tuowu, *Daima shuzu xuji*, p. 9. The situation was the same in Youth Army divisions. On the rejection of American guns by some youth soldiers, see Liu Kaihan, (1989), pp. 112-3.

229. HYQNJ, p. 85.

230. Ibid., p. 103.


232. Ibid., pp. 13-4.

233. Ibid., p. 15.
In society’s division of labor, soldiers have the responsibility of protecting the nation and people. What is ‘division of labor’? Occupations in society cannot be achieved by one man alone. For example, agriculture, industry, and commerce. Each person will take up the occupation that he believes he is capable in. This is called the division of labor. [I will] try to give an example to make it clear. If one drifts alone to a deserted island, [one must] make food, catch fish, and pick fruit since there is no one else with whom to divide the tasks. It is not like living in a city [where] every whim is satisfied. There are cooks for cooking food, and even catching fish and plucking fruit each have people engaged in them. Thus, a world of one is different than the social world. A desire for one [loaf of] bread requires doing several things at once – the difficulty [without divided labor] is obvious. Furthermore, not only food and drink are like this; if one wants to avoid the wind and rain or withstand cold and heat, then one would have to build a house alone, with oneself as the carpenter. It is not like in urban places [where] if you want to build a tall tower, simply by opening one’s purse and paying the costs, one can succeed [in having it built], without having to do the labor oneself. The solitary life of one person compared to the collective life of a group is different in that [the former] is difficult and [the latter] is easy. … Therefore, [society] can divide labor to do things. Thus, in this way, the bitterness of labor is reduced and the results obtained are increased. Society is the largest place for the division of labor. Combining the organizations of agriculture, industry, and commerce, etc., starts to make a large society. Therefore, the occupations of society increase as they are divided, and yet [society] is increasingly lively. You are all soldiers, just one of the labor divisions in society. Others do farming, industry, or commerce and so, because [they] each have an occupation, they cannot take up the weapons of war, and so require the protection of soldiers. But the [needs] of soldiers lives are all given to them. It is unnecessary for [soldiers] to provide their own clothing, food, housing, and transportation; there are people to do these things for them. But, what do the soldiers do? What role do [they] carry on behalf of society? It is to protect the people and protect the nation. This is what every soldier should do.\(^\text{234}\)

That fictional paragon of capitalist mythology, Robinson Crusoe, makes a surprising appearance here in Sun’s speech, albeit in hypothetical and anonymous guise. Sun’s use of the image differs from the Crusoe story as deployed in the discourses of European political economy; instead of a glowing invocation of the virtues of capitalist hard-work (and an implicit recognition of its dependence on imperialism once “my man Friday” appears), Crusoe’s island is turned on its head to become a negative counter-example. It is a depiction of society-less (or undivided) labor, and as such it highlights the social division of labor which makes modern soldiery possible. Crusoe’s island, for Sun, negatively demonstrates the modern army’s basis in economic exchange. Having rejected class struggle, Sun was attracted to – or even obsessed by – ideas in which social change offered the possibility of mutually beneficial economic relations – a “moral corporativism.”\(^\text{235}\) It was a position which would have made Adam Smith proud. The division of labor allows members of society to perform tasks for other members \textit{in exchange} for benefits; in

\(^{234}\) Ibid., pp. 15-6.

other words, soldiers defend the nation on behalf of all and, in return, do not have to build their own houses, raise their own food, or make their own clothes. After this discussion of the division of labor, Sun went on to assert that when full material benefits are provided to soldiers, they will willingly defend the nation to their deaths – they will “sacrifice” themselves. In making his point, Sun drew on examples from American and European militaries, which provided decent salaries, retirement pay, and benefits to their soldiers and take care of the dependents of those who are wounded or killed.236

Throughout this discussion, however, Sun consistently uses language of “giving” (gei 给), “aiding” (fuzhu 扶助) or “treating” (daiyu 待遇); only the last of these terms, daiyu, carries a connotation of pay or remuneration, of exchange. But the system as a whole, resting on the division of labor, cannot be described except in terms of exchange. In this way, then, Sun first exposes the core of the economy of sacrifice as a system of exchanges, founded on society’s division of labor, and then immediately papers over it with the language of “giving.” Visual war effort propaganda too exhibited similar features: the state’s role – as compulsory administration and exchange mechanism – were frequently elided in favor of portraying the war effort as direct “aid” or “giving” from the people to the soldiers.

Fig. 6-2: “Let’s Exhaust Ourselves Giving Comfort and Aid to the Soldiers at the Front”

artist: Wang Zimei (汪子美)

236. Sun Zhongshan, Junren jingshen jiaoyu, pp. 19-20. Although Sun’s speech predated He Yingqin’s 1928 conscription plan (examined in chapter one) by seven years, it is in important ways the more fully conceptualized and modern of the two statements. Sun envisions a complete removal of soldiers from economic production. His soldiers are fully dependent on the state, not only during time of war but even in peace. This specialization (or professionalization) of military service rests on the division of labor, but it is the state that enables it. Sun consistently overwrites the soldiery’s dependency on the state with the language of “society”, thereby erasing the government. He Yingqin’s prewar conscription plan, designed as it was to reduce the state’s burden of maintaining a peacetime army by conscripting peasants who would be productive and self-sufficient, seems a step backward in contrast to Sun’s speech.
Furthermore, Sun’s speech reveals what remained obscure in Zha Ning’s piece on the conferral ceremony: that the whole edifice of the economy of sacrifice rests on an (hypothetical) equivalence between the interests of the (nation-)state and the people. Summing up soldiers’ duties, Sun put it this way: “Soldiers protect the people and benefit them; this is right. Not to benefit the people is wrong. Soldiers protect the country and benefit it; this is right. Not to benefit the country is wrong.”

To drive home the link between Sun’s speech and the material object in Zha’s ceremony, Wang Yuewu, a member of the Society for Vigorous Practice and a graduate from the Whampoa Academy, analyzed Sun speech. Following a direct quote of the lines above, Wang wrote:

Soldiers must take protecting the country and people as their most important duty. And they should understand that the masses exchange their blood and sweat for money and goods that are supplied (交給) to the military, because [they] hope the army will really become the people’s armed strength and fulfill their bounden duty to protect the country and people.

The “country” (guojia 国家; the Chinese word, like the English, is ambiguous and can imply the government) and the people are assumed to have identical interests, a concept that in China can be traced back to Yan Fu’s translations (or adaptations) of European political philosophy and political economy in the late Qing period. Protecting the people and protecting the state are equivalent — there is no attempt to deal with any conflicts between the two. Finally, Sun emphasizes soldiers’ need for an “-ism”, or a theoretical understanding of political problems. As principled soldiers (see chapter one), they must have a correct “consciousness” in order to fulfill their duties. At its core, this correct “-ism” is nothing more than accepting the equivalence between the people and the nation-state: seeing the will and hand of “the people” at work in the state and its actions.

In Bourdieu’s terms, the efficacy of the pronouncements which conferred the guns rested on the audience’s acceptance of the state as the mediator of the exchange between the volunteer-soldiers and the farmers who “contributed” money to buy the guns. It was accepting that the interests of the state are identical with (equivalent to) the interests of the people; it was what allowed commander Han to call upon the youth soldiers to “protect the country, protect the territory, and protect the nation’s social order.” The government itself, which enables and conducts the exchange, was equated with the “social order” that must be protected: protection of the people is symbolically (mis)recognized as protection of the state. This fundamental recognition — or misrecognition — was the hidden heart of the entire ceremony: participation in the ceremony was acquiescence to the state’s symbolic power or, in other words, voluntary loyalty. And that loyalty — widely publicized — was the political-symbolic “profit” the state gained from the exchange.

---

237. Ibid., pp. 16-7.
238. Wang Yuewu, Cong zuoren dao zuozhan, p. 53; emphasis mine.
239. Benjamin Schwartz, Yan Fu, p. 79.
240. Sun Zhongshan, Junren jingshen jiaoyu, pp. 21-2.
241. “[S]ymbolic power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it”; Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, p. 164. We should not take this as something unusual or profound, however. In fact, the operation of symbolic power is quite ordinary and
Other theorists, such as Jean Baudrillard, have astutely recognized that the circulation of objects through mechanisms of exchange are a core element of social relations. Baudrillard reminds us that all non-gift exchanges are coded interplays between object-signs. What Baudrillard misses is the role of the state in these systems of exchange. His is a state-less vision of purely marketed exchanges, a theory of consumerism.\textsuperscript{242} Despite the fact that there is an economy at work, the role of the state – on both material and symbolic levels – in the exchanges around the Youth Army rifles is clear. In fact, the exchange surrounding the distribution of the rifles was coded in the bureaucratic literature of the state itself (the regulations and administrative measures set down by the authorized agencies of the Military Affairs Commission) and the speeches by leaders such as Chiang and divisional commanders, but also in the texts which make up the historical record of the Youth Army soldiers. We turn next to the production and consumption of those texts, to help bring into focus a further aspect of the exchange within the economy of sacrifice.\textsuperscript{243}

**Text and Object: The Symbolic Capital of Reading Oneself**

In this and the previous chapter, we have looked at the specifics of the exchange the state “negotiated” with the Youth Army recruits, working through several aspects of the bargain struck between the Nationalist state and the intellectual youth volunteers. The state gained a force of loyal citizen-soldiers, who by the acts of volunteering for military service and the adoption of the identity of Nationalist soldiers, reaffirmed the foundational myth of the state. In return the volunteers received not only the suite of material benefits outlined in the previous chapter, but enjoyed a symbolic payoff as well in the very autobiographical writings they produced as propaganda for the Youth Army.

As we have already seen, as part of the drive to recruit volunteers in 1944 and early 1945, Youth Army agencies actively disseminated propaganda that the volunteers themselves were busy producing. But even after the recruitment drive was over (around January 1945 in Chongqing) the propaganda machine continued to churn out the press conferences, news items, radio programs, wall newspapers, cartoons, exhibitions of literary and pictorial works, and specialized publications which are the main source material for this chapter. The gun poems quoted earlier were part of an exhibition of Youth Army materials held in April 1945; it featured contributions from at least four divisions.\textsuperscript{244} Short pieces were constantly carried in government publications like the *Central Daily* and the military’s *Saodong bao*. Many of these were short essays on the “daily life,” interesting stories, and “personal aspirations and feelings” of the youth soldiers, which were read voraciously by the volunteers in their units’ reading rooms, which shared the name (Chiang) Kaishek with the rifles they carried.\textsuperscript{245}

\textsuperscript{242} Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, pp. 64-6, 74-5 and 149. To be fair, Baudrillard is concerned with deconstructing notions of “taste” and “need” in the context of the capitalist market economy and thus uses concepts of the “the sign” and “signifier” to get at notions of individual identity and group or class formation through the exchange (value) of goods and commodities.

\textsuperscript{243} The concrete aspects of the production and consumption of these texts is far more important (and interesting) than a discussion of the abstract philosophical or theoretical operations here.

\textsuperscript{244} QNYZJ, pp. 142-8.

\textsuperscript{245} GMWX, vol. 63, pp. 303-4 provides a good list of the various propaganda measures taken by the
Once they reached their bases, the youth soldiers felt desperate for “spiritual food” (jing-shen shiliang 精神食粮), a common metaphor for reading materials, because the army had neglected to provide adequate supplies of magazines, newspapers, and books. This lack of intellectual stimulation was one of the causes behind the explosion of wall papers put up by the youth soldiers themselves. The Central Daily (and its Supplement) were read avidly because it frequently printed letters and selections written by the youth soldiers themselves; in its pages they saw themselves, read their own words and “heard the voice of youth.” This need to hear about themselves carried on even after the war: in 1946 the 639th Regiment published a volume of nearly 120 pages, with additional photographs, to help the soldiers remember their brief time together in arms. Even before the war was over the Youth Press (Qingnian chubanshe 青年出版社) began planning a twenty-four volume series titled Model Youth Collectanea (青年模範叢書): ten volumes on historical precedents of educated youth soldiers; eight biographies of earlier revolutionary martyrs, like Zou Rong (鄭容) and Qiu Jin (秋瑾); four more of collected stories of bravery by soldiers, airmen, Youth Corps members, and civilians; and finally, two volumes of descriptions and stories of soldiers in the Youth Army and the Indian Expeditionary Force. I have been unable to determine if all the books were published, but at least three, including the Youth Army and Expeditionary Force volumes, were printed in August 1946, in quantities of three to five thousand. These books were published sequentially by the Youth Army Press in 1945 in the Youth Exemplars Collectanea. In the preface to the series, the editor Liu Keshu (柳克述), explained that the objective was to provide a record of China’s tradition of educated youth serving the country. Liu states that China’s ancient youth, uniting wen and wu by mastering the Six Arts, “dropped their brushes and pick up weapons to defend the country” whenever danger threatened. The modern exemplars of this legacy were the subjects of volumes 2-4 in the series. The final volume was dedicated to the Youth Army, as the highest and most brilliant incarnation of China’s legacy, a “superior tradition of the Chinese nation.”

The Youth Army national administration also undertook to publish a twelve volume series, entitled Youth Soldier Collectanea (青年軍人叢書) at the end of the war. I have been able to locate only one of these volumes, Qingnian yuanzhengjun jianying (QNYZJJY, 青年遠徵軍剪影), but in a short preface, the editors laid down four criteria for deciding on material to include. They indicated that their series would “emphasize historical facts, unadorned, not white-washed, in order to preserve genuine value.” Second, they limited themselves to previously published materials, mainly from Chongqing newspapers. Third, each volume was set at roughly 50,000

---

246. HYQNJ, p. 118.
247. Ibid., p. 37.
249. See the front pages in HYQNJ, one of the books in this series, for this information.
250. Huoyue qingnianjun (HYQNJ, 活躍青年軍), Minjian zhongyong gushiji (民間忠勇故事集), and Yuanzhengjun zai qianxian (遠徵軍在前線).
251. HYQNJ p. 2.
characters. Finally, the “writing must strive to be lively and succinct, in order to be suitable for youth to read.”

While we cannot know for sure who bought and read these books, it seems very likely, especially given the fourth criterion of the editors of the *Youth Soldier Collectanea*, that it was the youth soldiers and perhaps their families who purchased and read this material. Volumes like the *Huoyue qingnianjun* and *Qingnian yuanzhengjun jianying* were mostly reprints of newspaper articles, of little interest to anyone except those who could see themselves in its pages (and perhaps to some historians too). Thus, these texts themselves were part of the larger exchange system surrounding the soldiers and their rifles: products of the volunteers’ own writing, the books were bought and sold, marketed and exchanged. Their circulation conferred prestige upon the soldiers as they read about themselves. It was a final marketization of the Youth Army’s autobiographical writing, the self-conscious story-telling, the self-fictionalizing, that was carried out from the time of volunteer inspection through demobilization and afterwards.

Analysts of cultural practices, such as de Certeau, have remarked that reading is not the passive activity that it is often assumed to be. The idea of “scriptural imperialism,” that readers are captives to the authorial intention within the text, fails to account for the activeness of the reader as he reads.

Reading (an image or a text), moreover, seems to constitute the maximal development of the passivity assumed to characterize the consumer, who is conceived of as a voyeur . . . In reality, the activity of reading has on the contrary all the characteristics of a silent production [by the reader]. . . . He insinuates into another person’s text the ruses of pleasure and appropriation: he poaches on it, is transported into it, pluralizes himself in it like the internal rumblings of one’s body. . . . A different world (the reader’s) slips into the author’s place. This mutation makes the text habitable, like a rented apartment. It transforms another person’s property into a space borrowed for a moment by a transient.

The Youth Army soldiers, however, were both author and reader. In de Certeau’s analogy, they were renting their own house. This was surely a unique position and one granted to them by the state and its media venues. The books, circulating during and after the war, are a concrete trace of the meaning-values encoded in the guns; they were, on one level, an attempt, much like the free education and other benefits, by the state to “live up to its end of the bargain” and retain the loyalties of former youth soldiers even after they were demobilized in 1946.

In the previous chapter we looked at the material benefits of volunteering – in a real sense, these were concrete elements that the state exchanged with the youth volunteers in return for their service. But in many ways, the symbolic rewards just outlined were just as important, if not more so than the material benefits. Almost from the outset, the National Guidance Committee’s propaganda plan ordered that material incentives were to be played down in promoting the IYVM, and that agencies responsible for inciting enthusiasm among youth must “emphasize spiritual encouragement to excite youths’ patriotic heart, their sense of responsibility, sense of honor; and make the utmost effort to avoid making material incentives (daiyu 待遇) the main subject of propaganda” work. Propaganda must inspire youths to “compete to be a model” for

252. QNYZJJY, preface, p. 1; my emphasis.
others. The postwar publishing of Youth Army related books, which explicitly tied the volunteers to a glorious historical tradition, was merely the continuation or fulfillment of this policy. Recalling the commemorative stele of the imperial era, the state mandated that after their service ended, the volunteers’ original schools or institutions were to erect tablets or monuments (碑) in their honor. In short, prestige was the coin with which the state paid the youth soldiers for their “sacrifice.” The Nationalist state thus repaid the Youth Army volunteers with distinction – or more simply symbolic capital – which was encoded in the material objects and texts published both during and after the war.

Photo 6-1: Model Mother Celebrated for Sending Her Son to War

This was the concrete expression of Chiang’s much touted drive to make soldiers the model for all citizens. Under the slogan of “Soldiers First” (junren diyi), he drilled home that “Soldiers must have the most majestic status among our nation’s citizens. Serving as a sol-

254. Undated draft propaganda plan: Zhishiqingnianjun congjun yundong xuanchuan jihua gangyao (caoran) 知識青年軍從軍運動宣傳計畫綱要 [草案]; qz0051.mj3-153, pp. 31a-3b.


dier must be the most glorious of our citizen’s duties. All countrymen must take soldiers as their model.” With Chiang Kaishek and Jiang Jingguo as patterns to emulate, the volunteers were to be exemplars for the rest of the Chinese citizenry. This was a common political technology, and one that would be carried further under Mao, when state efforts at model-making would reach nearly unimaginable heights and bear an impossibly heavy burden of inspiring superhuman efforts from Chinese citizens. Donald Munro has pointed out that in Maoist China imitating models was the key mechanism for citizens’ self-evaluation in that all self-criticism was based on comparing oneself to officially sanctioned models. The deep suspicion of money and market led the PRC to an almost complete emphasis on honor and respect as motivation; Mao explicitly rejected the primacy of material incentives in remaking people and groups. “The primary reward that the model receives [from the state] is group respect”, and this status then only increases the model’s efficacy as instrument of state training efforts. With this point, we come full circle to the technologies of political selfhood that the Nationalist regime mobilized around the Youth Army: making the Youth Army into models, or exemplars, worthy of emulation. Not only were they model soldiers, but model citizens as well. Thus, we may partially correct Munro by noting that while it was never as stringent or total as Maoist doctrine or practice would be, the Nationalist state too relied on state-sanctioned model-making in the Youth Army. It conferred status, as the coin of symbolic capital, on the volunteers in the recognition that published texts gave to the soldiers.

Lest we think that this was all empty sloganeering, it should be noted that this model-making was effective, at least among segments of the population that were predisposed to accept it. (In Bourdieu’s terminology, these people’s habitas had predisposed them to accept and emulate Nationalist exemplars.) One Li Shifang was undecided about volunteering, until he watched a friend turn into “a hero” and “disappear in the dust behind the trucks” as he is transported to a Youth Army base. Witnessing his friend’s transformation right before his own eyes made up Li’s mind to volunteer.

The State of Equivalence

For the youth soldiers much of the meaning encoded in the gun-object was connected to status, i.e., differentiations and equivalences within a code of meaning-values. Made up of educated youths from the social elite, the Youth Army reaffirmed their elite status at the same time that it conferred status upon the volunteers as models of the complete man, further differentiating them from others. But since the youths were never called upon to fulfill their promise of sacrificial service on the frontlines (except against the communists in 1947-49), we are justified in asking what exactly the state received from the exchange – the “value” of the youth soldiers to the state must have lain somewhere other than in the explicit (sacrificial) terms of the exchange. The value (or meaning) of the Youth Army is found precisely in the youth soldiers’ status as elite members of society and in their act of volunteering under the banner of sacrifice. The coin of the exchange for the state was not “status” nor material benefits (as it was for the youth soldiers), but the affirmation of the equivalences embedded in the exchange itself. Simply put, Chiang


258. Donald Munro, *The Concept of Man in Contemporary China*, pp. 137, 139-42, and 156. The quotation is from page 142.

259. HYQNJ, p. 11.
Kaishek and the KMT state’s interest in the Youth Army was that, by their voluntary acceptance of the gun-objects and participation in the “economy of sacrifice,” the youth soldiers sanctioned the state’s most fundamental meaning-value: that the state was equivalent to (and its interests coterminus with those of) the people. Simply put (in Bourdieuan terms), this public and widely publicized affirmation of the state’s legitimacy was the “profit” that the state received in this transaction.

On a slightly different level, we can profitably remind ourselves of William Pietz’s description of the fetish. One of his conclusions is that the fetish allowed exchanges between two divergent value systems, despite a lack of equivalence between them – thus, the fetish is always marked by a misrecognition of value. Misrecognized as “sacrifice,” the youth soldiers exchanged their service, their acquiescence in the essential equivalences hidden within the economy of sacrifice. Without the gun-fetish-object no possible exchange between the separate scales of meaning-value of the participants would have existed – the KMT regime had lost much of its ability to command legitimate acquiescence among educated elites during the war. Under the banner of the economy of sacrifice, the gun was the material objectification of the Nationalist regime’s political and social relations, misrecognized sufficiently to permit the exchange between a distressed state and educated youth in China’s wartime interior.

Whether or not Chiang, his generals, and political allies intended the youth to misrecognize the terms of the exchange is a moot question – lacking military victories with which to credit the Youth Army, they touted it as an administrative and cultural achievement. It was lauded as proof that the regime itself was not moribund and decrepit as its rivals (the CCP, Wang Jingwei’s pro-Japanese government in Nanjing, and Japan itself) insisted it was. In terms of Sun Yatsen’s original theory of the social division of labor and the modern Chinese army, the youth volunteers, by their participation in the embedded exchanges of the conferral of the rifles, displayed their acceptance and affirmation of the fundamental issue: the Nationalist state represented, or was (misrecognized as) equivalent to, the Chinese people as a whole. This, after all, was what the war was fought about. Initially reluctant to resist Japan and constantly challenged by an internal rival, the KMT and Chiang himself were badly in need of reaffirmation of their role as the legitimate government of China. The texts of publicity and propaganda surrounding the Youth Army were not just the state’s negotiated reward for the youths’ service; long after the guns all rusted away, the texts are, even now hidden in the archives, the material form in which the ideological affirmation of the state-as-people circulated.

Unsurprisingly, the CCP also engaged in encoding a similar “economy of sacrifice” among its party members and in its rural soviets. Certainly in later years, against the backdrop of socialized means of production, virtually all material objects and relations would be marked with the fundamental equivalence between party-state and the people. As just one example from the


261. See the story about one local recruiter’s encounter with Chen Cheng, then chief of staff in the Ministry of War, who made exactly this point about the significance of the Youth Army and the volunteer movement as a “huge victory,” in Zhang Kaixuan, p. 145. See also the claims made concerning the “transformation of the public mood” towards the KMT military in a report on Youth Army propaganda; GMWX, vol., 63, pp. 302-4; also, GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 243-9.
PRC era, the communist state laid a direct claim on what students would study what and thus what job they would take in the economic order based precisely on this equivalence: “Chinese theoreticians have made strong, though not original, arguments for the state having some claim over what the individual studies. Since the cost of education is borne by the people, the people therefore have some legitimate voice in what subjects persons study. Students are constantly reminded of how many bushels of grain produced by peasants are required to maintain them in school.”

In short, the model of citizenship as seen in the Nationalist Youth Army was expanded to the entire population in the PRC.

In most analyses of patriotism or nationalism, the feeling is a black box of sorts: it can be said to exist, but why and on what basis remains unknown, unknowable or, somehow, innate. By looking at the meanings and logic around the gun, I have unpacked the heart of the youth-soldiers’ loyalty, the basis of their voluntary “patriotic” service, as a give-and-take bargain with the Nationalist government. It is obvious that this analysis is, at heart, economic, drawing extensively on Pierre Bourdieu’s scholarship in two regards: first, Bourdieu’s realization that misrecognition of an “economy of exchanges” is an essential part of all social reality (objectivity); and second, his by no means uncontroversial application of economy (difference and exchange) as the fundamental bedrock of all social life. This observation, quite naturally, is behind Bourdieu’s consistent reliance on economic terminology, e.g., the idea of symbolic capital. In particular, Bourdieu’s study of language, Language and Symbolic Power, was influential in its treatment of linguistic exchanges; instead of looking at them only in terms of their internal aspects (i.e., a structuralist or post-structural analysis), Bourdieu retains his customary sensitivity to the fact that language is irrevocably social. All utterances, as social acts, are embedded in specific socio-political circumstances. This is not to reduce all interactions to strictly material bases, but to find an economic logic at work in human interactions: various social resources (or “capital”) are differentiated and exchanged between social actors. This perspective on the Youth Army is not meant to imply that human interchanges are merely material in nature, but that the logic of economics is the proper tool for examining human society, acts, and meanings, as they are all the result of complex systems of exchange. It is in this sense that the texts produced by the YA were a dialog or a bargain – in a Bourdieu-ian analysis the two are interchangeable – with the state. Like all successful bargaining, there was give and take on both sides.

Lax Discipline and Delinquency

The foregoing discussion has perhaps left the impression that the youth-soldiers accepted their new roles and identities completely and seamlessly. This was not the case. The dialog or bargain between the volunteers and the state involved, as all bargaining does, tension from the offers, rejections, and counteroffers which made up the process of negotiating the terms of the exchange. Even in the propaganda materials they produced on behalf of the Nationalist military machine, the youth left suggestions that their identity as the state's agents of violence, as soldiers, was contingent upon certain conditions and was, in some cases, only skin deep. Their more urbane selves and habits were not always cast away so effortlessly nor joyously. For example, civilian recreations remained attractive to the volunteers. They spent their moments of spare time scanning the movie advertisements and showing times in Chongqing papers – it was “just a

262. Donald Munro, The Concept of Man in Contemporary China, p. 182.
263. Bourdieu, Logic and Practice, p. 159.
habit; they feel that 'looking is also fun.'”

Inculcating discipline among groups of people as a means of establishing or asserting power was far from a new technology of power in China; both the fear of punishment (Legalist harsh laws) and self-policing (Confucian self-cultivation) strategies have long traditions in China. John Fitzgerald has done excellent work on the Nationalist administrative discipline and propaganda during the Nationalist Revolution (1925-1927). With the consistent metaphor of “awakening” tying them together, Fitzgerald brings sharply into focus the various mental transformations that Chinese leaders, from intellectuals like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, to revolutionaries like Sun Yatsen and Mao Zedong, sought to bring about among the Chinese people. Much of his book's original research is concerned with aspects of the organizational apparatuses that leaders sought to use to ensure consistent (i.e., disciplined) propaganda, pronouncements, revolutionary doctrine and publications. There is little discussion of how the awakened individual self related to, and limited, discipline in China.

The discipline of groups of armed men was a constant issue for both the Nationalist and communist armies during the Sino-Japanese war. The Nationalist military was castigated by the contemporary press and later historians for its less than stellar results in this area. But these assessments are based on the military as a whole. Despite some disciplinary problems, the Youth Army was a partial exception to this general rule. Certainly, the reports of undisciplined behavior by Youth Army units (and there are many of these) change the picture of thoroughly disciplined bodies and minds. However, examining the actual events and statements surrounding moments of ill-discipline will show the compromises that the regime had to make to secure the continued cooperation of the youth soldiers. For this reason I argue that undiscipline in the Youth Army was of a fundamentally different nature than that of regular conscript units: the Nationalist military and state was committed to securing the loyalty and docility of the volunteers and as a result it had to cater to their civilian self-identities that required an unprecedented autonomy within the larger field of “discipline.”

In other words, the process of cultivating citizen-

---

264. HYQNJ, p. 118.
266. “In promoting a statist notion of society as a rational aggregation of awakened selves, early utopian theorists helped to establish one of the ground rules of revolutionary politics in China: that ordinary, sentimental people who fail to match up to the ideal of the New People, the citizen, the patriot, the proletarian, or the People have to be taught to make up the difference through instruction by a caste of vanguard tutors”; Fitzgerald, p. 77. In essence, “political instructors were entitled to rule the country and discipline the people until the community had reached an approved level of self-consciousness. . . . National consciousness was located in the leadership of the Nationalist party under a tutelary (kunzheng) state, which was legitimized by its role in teaching people how to be Chinese citizens;” Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, p. 79.

267. For a quick look at some issues surrounding discipline in the New Fourth Army, a communist unit active in Jiangnan, see Landdeck, “Xinsijun Collection: A Military-Patriotic Revolution,” unpublished paper, p. 17-23. The eight volume documentary collection *Xinsijun* (Beijing, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun lishi ziliao congshu bianzhen weiyuanhui, 1990-1994) contains many documents demonstrating the CCP’s intense concern over ensuring the discipline of their troops on and off the battlefield.

268. This of course resonates with the ideal soldier put forward in the military training manuals:
soldiers was naturally a give and take proposition: the youth volunteers were not lumps of inert clay to be molded as the state willed. The volunteers’ pre-existing identities as intellectuals allowed the state to make effective use of the technologies of self, as well as new approaches to training, but their status as volunteers and those same identities as intellectuals also imposed limits and restrictions on the state. This section looks at the ways the youth-soldiers retained elements of their non-soldier lives and selves and the impact that this had on the administration of the military training experience by the state.

One soldier made a broad claim, ringing with pride at having overcome the undisciplined lifestyle of his civilian days, that “a disciplined life is better than an undisciplined one, and labor not only improves one's health, but it also lifts one's spirits.”269 While visiting the 202nd division, a reporter was told by the commander, Luo Zekai, that the army’s mission in training the youth soldiers was to “militarize” and “discipline-ize” the intellectual youth into becoming soldiers. But to do this required that commanders first “settle [them into their new military] life” and “establish discipline” among them. This, Luo went on, was to be accomplished by relying on the youth soldiers’ sense of self-respect, their self-motivation and desire for self-govern-ment.270 Discipline involves a high degree of self-involvement and self-policing, as noted by Foucault: “He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.”271 This dynamic was commented on by the youth soldiers and by journalist observers. The “iron discipline” that was inculcated among the youth soldiers “came from spurring on each volunteering comrade’s self-respect.”272 As evidence of this, the reporter recalled how amidst a nighttime rainstorm, the youth soldiers refused to enter an off-limits building to escape the rain and cold. Another journalist noted the changes in body motions and language that marked the internal transformation into soldierhood:

They already have soldiers' consciousness and understand the importance of discipline. When they entered the army everyone liked to be called ‘classmate’; now they call themselves soldiers. . . . Watching them stand at attention, salute, and walk, they are all soldiers. . . . Their slogan is ‘self-respect’ and if they do not maintain discipline, they punish themselves. This is far more effective than commands.273

The normative goals of the state resonated with the procivilities of the youth soldiers themselves (their habitas to use Bourdieu’s term): having internalized the restraints normally exer-cised by external authority, the volunteers were self-policing. That this was in complete contrast with units made up of conscripts was one of the key “triumphs” that the Nationalists laid claim to

disciplined, but with a recognized sphere of individual autonomy, at least on the battlefield. The irony was that the Nationalists were unable to combine this battlefield autonomy with political discipline; thus the ideal was never fully realized and brought in its wake a tendency to erupt in moments of its opposite pole, undiscipline.

269. HYQNJ, p. 163.
270. Ibid., pp. 155-6.
272. HYQNJ, p. 136.
273. Ibid., p. 139.
with the Youth Army. (They could not, of course, claim any military victories since the Youth Army divisions did not see action against the Japanese.) They shared this belief that self-discipline was the expression of democracy within the army with Mao Zedong:

In any system where discipline is externally imposed, the relationship that exists between officer and man is characterized by indifference of the one to the other. The idea that officers can physically beat or severely tongue-lash their men is a feudal one and is not in accord with the conception of a self-imposed discipline. Discipline of the feudal type will destroy internal unity and fighting strength. A discipline self-imposed is the primary characteristic of a democratic system in the army.  

Despite (or perhaps because of) such “democratic” discipline, the fact of volunteering left psychological space for the youth soldiers to resist authority when they felt slighted or abused. Two incidents, both recalled by youth army soldiers in memoirs written long after the war, help to illustrate this point. In the first incident, the soldiers of the 207th got wind that their unit was going to be transferred to the Sixth Army fighting in Burma under the overall command of American generals. Hearing rumors that elements from the Sixth Army were already enroute with new weapons and uniforms, the youth soldiers of the 207th immediately began a protest. Banners went up overnight proclaiming: “We are Chinese; we won't wear American uniforms; we don't want American guns!” “We don't want the New Sixth Army! We Want the General Inspectorate [of the Youth Army]!” The base flagpole was decorated with several pairs of grass shoes swaying in the breeze after the news broke. The commander tried to assuage the soldiers' anger by increasing rations; the soldiers dumped the food on the ground in contempt. In a rage, the new commander locked up one of chief organizers of the protest. The youth soldiers retaliated by refusing to drill or to go to classes and by sending representatives to issue formal protests with the general's office. The commander, realizing the situation threatened to careen out of control, relented and released the soldier in custody, which returned the unit to normal and, tellingly, it did not see action in Burma.

The second incident occurred in Wenshan (Yunnan) before the county recruits officially entered their camp for training. At the send-off ceremony in the county city, the mother of one of the recruits began to weep loudly, disrupting the joyous atmosphere. Having only just been informed that her son was going off to war, her grief was a mixture of surprise, fear, and loss. Her loud, public sorrow threatened the fiction of families united in sending their educated sons off to war by unmasking the fact that some youths had volunteered against the wishes of their family and parents. Seeing the ruckus she was causing, a member of the recruiting committee came over and scolded the mother. The soon-to-be soldiers however confronted the rude committee-man and flatly refused to get in the trucks for their journey. After repeated commands and threats for the volunteers to get in the trucks, Wang Zicong levelled the ultimate threat at the committeeman: “Anyway, I have not yet put on my uniform nor eaten one day's of rations. I volunteered to join up, [so] of course I can unvolunteer to be a soldier.” The soldiers then spent


some time comforting the still weeping mother and only when she quieted down and accepted her son's departure did they board the waiting vehicles.\textsuperscript{276}

The volunteers could de-volunteer themselves, or at least threaten to do so at certain points in time. And this possibility, however remote, meant a degree of agency based on this “contingent identity.” The youth volunteers appropriated, or allowed themselves to be molded into a certain pattern, but that identity was always limited by the fact that it was self-ascribed. The volunteers reserved the right to revoke their assent. Their new identity was contingent on their continued approval and voluntary docility. One soldier, writing about the lectures delivered by his unit's political cadre, scoffed at the idea put forward by the cadre that the youth soldiers had relinquished their old identities as teachers, students, and journalists. The student impatiently remarked that the cadre's speech was illogical because their new role as soldiers was for a set time only; after the two years of service were over “professors will still be professors, journalists will still be journalists” and, of course, students will still be students.\textsuperscript{277}

The volunteers’ occasional delinquent behavior was a result of the awkward position of the state vis-à-vis its elite citizen-soldiers. Chinese students had long tradition of rebellious activism and testing the boundaries of authority. They brought this attitude with them when they volunteered for the Youth Army.\textsuperscript{278} In the political calculus of its leaders, the Nationalist regime could not afford to lose the support of the youth soldiers. The result was a form of discipline that (deliberately) incorporated areas of laxity, where delinquency could flourish, as a condition for continued cooperation. The state itself was forced to accept certain areas of youth soldier self-assertion and un-discipline as a condition; their docility had to be bought – it could not be coerced. Occasionally this was literally true: in at least one county the only method that proved successful in preventing outbreaks of trouble was to reward the recruits with cash payments for good behavior on the way to their training camps.\textsuperscript{279} This was tolerated because, by the very act of volunteering and accepting the rifles, the soldiers had already subscribed to the fundamental (political and logical) premise of the whole economy of sacrifice: that the state (or its representatives) was synonymous with the “nation,” with all of China and its people.

The Nationalist state and the military authorities involved with the Youth Army acknowledged the youths' contingent identities by deliberately relying on less coercive methods of command. Generally, civilians entertained images of corporal punishment and verbal abuse when they heard of military management, but the Youth Army was different.\textsuperscript{280} As we have already seen, the regime dealt with the dissatisfaction of the youths over less than ideal food or living conditions in part by giving them a degree of “democratic” self-management over issues of qual-

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{276} Wang Zicong, p. 55.
\item \textsuperscript{277} HYQNJ, p. 55.
\item \textsuperscript{278} “Their activism at the provincial and national levels, with its elements of antiforeignism, independence of spirit, and rejection of authority, had its counterpart on campus in student distaste for regimen and discipline within the school community”; Edward Gulick, \textit{Teaching in Wartime China}, p. 50.
\item \textsuperscript{279} Rong Bida, p. 54.
\item \textsuperscript{280} HYQNJ, p. 81.
\end{enumerate}
ity of life and issued benign exhortations for the students to accept that the government was doing all it can.\footnote{GMWX, vol. 63, pp. 294-5.}

The youths were to endure the hardship of being commanded by officers who were less educated than the soldiers themselves. Thus, the soldiers’ very identity as intellectuals could prove to be a source of difficulty. Liang Hancao, the Minister of Information, acknowledged the difficulty that the volunteers would face in their new military life, especially when it came to issues of authority. Although the government desired that “every unit be like a school or a family [with] officers and men [relating to each other] like teachers or parents and students or sons,” in fact, not every relationship was cozy. The volunteers needed to recognize that their feelings toward their superiors would sometimes be strained. They needed to trust that the officers’ “motivation is never bad.” Liang, got right to the heart of the matter:

For example, you are a university professor, or department secretary, or enlisted with the credentials of a university or technical school student, but leading you is a squad leader with a military background, or with [only] a primary or middle school education. Under these conditions, [if] you think [to yourself] that once in the army [one should] always make military matters the chief [thing], all other learning and qualifications should be temporarily put to one side, then naturally you will not feel offended.\footnote{GMWX, vol. 63, pp. 295-6, citing Wang Yun (王芸) and Shen Xingyuan (沈興原), eds. Congjun chao (從軍潮), Chongqing, 1945, pp. 1-6.}

Such urgings for the recruits to respect their superiors betrayed an obvious pleading tone. In essence, the high command requested that the youth soldiers be understanding toward their officers, especially on those inevitable occasions when the officers were mistaken. The authorities were wary of violating the youth soldiers' self-identities and, in the last resort, were reduced to requesting the youths' understanding and cooperation. The students could not be treated like regular soldiers because their self-esteem was easily damaged; and the state reminded commanders of this fact. A report by the Chongqing recruiting committee, summarizing important issues for the Youth Army administration to be aware of, cautioned that Youth Army commanders “absolutely cannot rely on their usual attitude toward regular troops to deal with [soldier-]youths' casual offenses, [nor can they] use corporal punishment without first inquiring about the circumstances of arrest and [obtaining] authorization, [because this] will severely damage the youth volunteers' self-respect.”\footnote{GMWX, vol. 63, p. 315; the exact date of this order is unclear.} Under these orders, the divisional officers in 202D held an open discussion meeting in which recruits could raise issues and questions for their superiors. Some of the harsher officers were “grilled” by the student-soldiers. In response to the meetings, the divisional commander personally tried to get to the bottom of the complaints against the offending officers, but then reaffirmed their position as superiors with authority. He also promised that the government was already dealing with the lack of reading material and other complaints: each company was soon to carry four different newspapers and the division would be printing its own soon too.\footnote{HYQNJ, pp. 69-70.}

The regime acknowledged the importance of maintaining the youths’ voluntary support and submission.

The youth soldiers went further in demanding concessions from the military, however, par-
particularly in the key area of political indoctrination and cultural activities. Despite the volunteers’ acceptance of the central myth of the Nationalist state, these volunteer soldiers proved irritingly resistant to Nationalist political doctrine in some ways. Most notable was their discontent with political instruction. The anti-communist paranoia in the Nationalist administration contributed to the lukewarm reception that political classes received. False rumors of communist agitation within Youth Army units and subsequent clamp downs on directly critical of the regime or the military could cause “everyone to clam up” (lit: “close up like a cold/scared cicada”). Despite its high hopes for what it called “political consciousness” on the part of the volunteers, the youth soldiers disappointed their leaders’ hopes in this area. The political education originally offered by Jiang Jingguo's political bureaus consisted of large doses of bland lectures that were ill-received by the youth soldiers. Several soldiers writing together offered this scathing review of their unit's cadre:

We are unsure whether he underestimated our political understanding [lit. political heads 政治頭腦] or whether his own understanding is limited to that old stuff. His speech was divided into two points. The first was to recite history from the Revolution to the War of Resistance and the second was to tell us ‘You are each now a soldier.’ During the political cadre’s speech, many comrades seemed to have let the sleep-demon make a surprise attack and weakly wanted to sleep. Naturally this shouldn’t happen. . . . Modern youths have long ago lost interest in insubstantial, empty theories. What they want urgently is to study practical knowledge. And [we] intellectual youth recruits have this tendency to a greater degree [than other youth]. Right now the knowledge that [we] comrades are demanding is how to be a soldier, how to shoot a gun, drive a tank, and assault and kill the enemy. [We] do not want to come to this camp to hear admonitions on revolutionary determination or reconstructing the nation.

The youth soldiers were completely cold towards the low-brow fare offered by the political cadre; time and again they reiterated their desire for practical battlefield skills and a lack of interest in “empty [political] theories.”

The state acquiesced and accommodated the youth soldiers: the emphasis that units increasingly placed on the cultural and recreational dimensions of political work was a direct outcome of the volunteers’ indifference to and rejection of the bland speechifying that was forced on them by the political bureaus. Political cadres in the Youth Army, led by Jiang Jingguo, changed their tactics to accommodate the tastes of the soldiers by dropping or downplaying the boring lecture style of political education in favor of cultural activities, sports, and other less charged modes of education. Originally, the provision of “spiritual nourishment” was to be “the collective responsibility of cultural organs and associations” and not handled by the military or the YA itself. However, donations and suitable arrangements were not forthcoming, and this led to a

---

285. Wu Zhirong, p. 32. See also the fiasco surrounding a suspected communist plot in Lü Zhenhuan, pp. 95-8.
286. HYQNJ, pp. 39-40.
287. Ibid., p. 56.
storm of criticism from the volunteers who blamed the military for their boredom. 290 Especially during the early weeks at the training bases, the constant references and intense pleas for donations of any and all reading materials underline the importance of this intellectual stimulation for the volunteers and highlight the fact that the state bowed to pressure on this issue by revising its stance on how these materials were to be provided. The intellectual youths scoured the nearby towns for reading materials. 291 Many were accustomed to Chongqing’s thriving book trade; reportedly the city had 184 bookstores in early 1945. Sales of printed material were so strong that print runs routinely sold out in a matter of weeks. Demand for new titles was so great in the capital that “even if it was just local paper [tuzhi 土紙] with some black ink characters on it, as long as it had about one hundred pages, it could be a book” and it would sell out immediately after being published. 292 The Chongqing bookstores were often jammed with people reading, so much so that Lin Yutang called them “a kind of reading room, without chairs.” 293 To go from such an environment to small hill towns that offered almost nothing to occupy their minds was trying for these “intellectual youths.” The problem was so acute that one volunteer, nicknamed “Soldier Poet” (qiuba shiren 丘八詩人) in the 603R, compared the base to a desert as far as intellectual stimulation was concerned. Although not far from Chongqing, the base was in a small town, whose transportation links to the capital were tenuous and often unreliable. Chongqing papers arrived late and other reading material was scarce and expensive. Magazines were often more than a year old. For the intellectual youths, accustomed to a steady diet of fresh reading material, living in such a cultural backwater was akin to “suffocation.” They sent delegates to commanders to complain and got a promise to show more movies and have Chongqing drama troupes put on plays. 294 In other units, the soldiers’ self-government committees petitioned commanders for improvements in the provision of cultural materials, political training activities, and military drill methods. The recruits suggested that the army itself provide newspapers, especially those from Chongqing, and publish a paper devoted solely to the Youth Army. 295

By February 1945 the situation was much improved. In one division, each company had 13 different papers, eleven in Chinese and two in English, delivered to its newly constructed Chiang Kaishek and Sun Yatsen reading rooms. 296 The change was noticeable as youth soldiers were now caught reading papers during lectures, and even on the drill field. 297 The volunteers were

290. HYQNJ, p. 63 and 87.
291. Ibid., p. 37.
292. Xu Wancheng, Kangzhan banian Chongqing huaxu, pp. 4-5.
293. Lin Yutang, The Vigil of a Nation, pp. 49-50. This is still true today; Chongqing bookstores of all varieties are still packed with readers, often lounging on the floor with books they have borrowed from the shelves.
294. HYQNJ, pp. 93-4.
295. Ibid., pp. 71-3.
296. Ibid., p. 96. This was in marked contrast to the Sun Yatsen reading rooms in regular units, which were stocked poorly, if at all. Zhang Tuowu’s unit had only one New Life Movement paper in its reading room; Daima shuzu xuji, p. 113.
297. HYQNJ, p. 87. The Youth Corps ran a successful donation campaign to solicit contributions of books, one for each and every volunteer: 100,000 books for 100,000 youth-soldier; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 132. Either the YA units never saw these volumes, or they were
permitted to engage in a range of cultural activities, all under the direction of political cadres within the units.\textsuperscript{298} These cultural involvements expanded to include a very broad range of activities, and in stark contrast to the early days, many of these later activities bordered on outright entertainment. The Youth Army divisions began providing a diverse range of cultural activities, which the soldiers valued highly: visits by dance troupes, regular movie showings, travelling theater engagements, and the like. Zhou Wenhua, the political cadre in the 14th company of the 602nd Regiment, explained that his soldiers had undergone “political training, which had started with enjoyable and fun activities [designed] to settle them into military life and enliven their mood.” After a dinner party given by the unit to honor local officials, Zhou's soldiers put on a skit which they had written. In the play, while Axis leaders attended a conference in Tokyo, the Allied attack on the Japanese islands began. As the Youth Army divisions broke through with the final assault, the Axis chiefs killed each other. The play ended with the heroic youth soldiers singing triumphantly on the Axis leaders' dead bodies.\textsuperscript{299} All of this was clear indication of a growing emphasis on providing cultural activities for the recruits.

Despite all these concessions, the Youth Army soldiers were still occasionally undisciplined. While “self-government” was one end of the spectrum of resistance (or conditional docility) to the state's agenda of soldier-making, there were other less benign responses as well. From the outset, both military and civilian authorities were faced with several problems, including desertion, unapproved leaves of absence, and outbursts of petty violence. Naturally these do not make an obvious appearance in the contemporary propaganda writings of the Youth Army. One youth-soldier wrote, in a piece carried by the \textit{Central Daily}, that “When the Youth Army was being assembled, a few bad elements got in and in every city where they assembled, they left a few blemishes [on the Youth Army record] behind,” but after training they either had changed their ways or were cut from the ranks due to the “iron discipline,” which was as much a product of the soldiers’ intense self-respect as from external pressure from superiors.\textsuperscript{300} There was some truth to this claim of improvement, particularly concerning the pampered and trouble-making sons of elite leaders, many of whom were either pushed out of or quit the Youth Army of their own accord as the high tide of public interest waned and as they themselves chafed under the rigors of military life.\textsuperscript{301} Still, the volunteers’ constant rebuttals of rumors that their units were causing trouble around their bases suggests that the problem was not so easily dealt with.\textsuperscript{302}

The \textit{Historical Materials} memoirs coming out of the mainland in recent years contain many accounts of scandals and other forms of youth-soldier trouble-making. This material provides a much needed corrective to the picture of totally disciplined and responsible soldiers present in

\textsuperscript{298} Lü Zhenhua, pp. 90-2; and HYQNJ, p. 166.
\textsuperscript{299} GMWX, vol. 63, pp. 364-5.
\textsuperscript{300} HYQNJ, p. 136.
\textsuperscript{301} Zhao Xiukun, “Wannian yi wang hua shengping”, pp. 55-7.
\textsuperscript{302} In one of these publicity counterattacks, the author dismisses accounts of Youth Army misbehavior as bald attempts “to arouse general society's disgust against us [on the one hand], and on the other hand to spread rumors that the youths are angry with the authorities, [and in doing so] hinder youths from joining up;” HYQNJ, p. 32.
the Nationalist propaganda, but has its own biases and exaggerations as well. Youth Army units were notorious for the abuse they heaped on local residents and businesses. Cases of rowdy behavior, like brawls, smashing up shops, patronizing brothels, and refusing to pay for goods or services are mentioned frequently.  

In fact, the 207D, recruited mainly from Shaanxi and originally based in Xi’an, was reportedly airlifted to Yunnan and stationed there in part because of the unruly behavior of the recruits who were running amok in an area they knew all too well. In one instance in another division, which was notorious for visiting bathhouses and brothels and then smashing them up after their business was done, police fired on a rowdy group of youth soldiers, injuring one of their number. In retaliation, bands of youth soldiers began indiscriminately beating residents, eventually venting their anger by pursuing the county head through town, storming the government buildings, severely beating the county's chief financial officer, and finally breaking into the county head's residence. This sort of open clash between the Youth Army and local government indicates that the state was hardly accomplishing all its goals with the youth soldiers. Because of this lax discipline, the Youth Army was sometimes called the “youth bug swarm” （qingnianchong 青年蟲） and labelled as one of the “four great harms” or the “five poisonous creatures.”

As the youth volunteers collected in Chongqing in late 1944, the municipal police bureau in consultation with the city’s Recruitment Committee put forward measures to help curb the spate of “ruckuses” that occurred. Significantly, the policy largely amounted to handing disciplinary authority over to the Youth Army itself, specifically its “self-rule patrols.” While external agencies, such as the city police force and regular military MP units, were ordered to give full cooperation to the Youth Army and a liaison office was established under Citizen Militia auspices, they were explicitly ordered not to arrest Youth Army volunteers. Local police were only permitted to take down suspects’ names and unit designation and report incidents to the Recruitment Committee. Officially, this policy did not last very long; by mid-March 1945 the Chongqing Garrison Command ordered the municipal police that “henceforth, regardless if they are still in reception centers or have already entered the barracks, all [youth volunteers] that violate the law or break discipline must be punished in accordance with the law.” But the preference given to handling Youth Army disturbances internally remained entrenched and the police found themselves hamstring when dealing with rowdy youth soldiers.

In one case, bands of youth volunteers clashed openly with police units following a ruckus at a movie theater. Despite an inspector’s efforts to calm the crowd of Youth Army soldiers, their

303. See, as representative, Li Zhongshu, pp. 101-2; Huang Wei, p. 73; Zhang Kaixuan, p. 144.
304. Liu Kaihan, p. 110.
306. Zhang Kaixuan, p. 144; Rong Bida, p. 54; and Zhang Zao, p. 126. The four great harms or four catastrophes also included KMT national representatives, reporters, and the Army Headquarters. The five poisonous creatures or five evils is a reference to the traditional pantheon of toxic creatures: scorpion, viper, centipede, house lizard, and toad; Zhao Xiukun, “Wannian yi wang hua shengping,” p. 59.
307. Chongqing Municipal Police Bureau order to the 10th District Branch; qz0061.mj12-55, p. 50 dated 29 December 1944. See also qz0051.mj2-397, pp. 188-9 dated 14 December 1944.
numbers continued to grow and their mood worsen. Shots were fired, and in the ensuing melee the youth soldiers not only smashed their way into a police station, but also severely beat and wounded a policeman, pelted the station chief with stones and bricks, and ruined two police rifles.  

Another case, shortly after the Japanese surrender, shows the delicate position local authorities occupied vis-à-vis disruptive Youth Army soldiers. A disagreement in Tongliang county between a youth soldier, Shu Xianming (舒顯銘) of the 602R of the 201D, and a local county resident, Zhi Qian (志騫), escalated quickly once local authorities got involved. Shu apparently felt his honor was besmeared even by being questioned about the dustup. Shu verbally abused the military court investigator, Li (李), saying, “I am an honored youth soldier. Who are you to admonish me?” Li replied that he was a colonel appointed by the Provincial Police Headquarters to the county’s military court and that since Shu had made a formal accusation against Zhi, Li had a duty to question and enlighten Shu. Shu responded by heaping abuse on Li, calling him a “bastard” and then trying to rough him up. Li avoided injury and, in an attempt to assert his authority and avoid any further violence, ordered the police to arrest Shu for being out of uniform (it lacked the proper insignia). Shu’s commanding officer was notified, but by the time police questioned him the insignia was in plain view, and this just fueled outrage among the youth soldiers. (Police reports speculated that Shu had his buddies smuggle a needle and thread into jail so he could sew on the missing insignia.) Youth soldiers converged on the jail in numbers, some of them pledging they would mount a rescue operation to spring Shu from jail. The county government feared just such escalation and notified the commanding officer to handle the case speedily. With a thousand or more youth soldiers protesting Shu’s imprisonment, representatives put forward their objection that holding a youth soldier was damaging to the “dignity” of the entire Youth Army. The magistrate’s attitude toward the protesting soldiers was strict, but he dared not risk a direct confrontation. The soldiers continued to protest by rioting, throwing stones, and breaking windows. The chaos got to the point that the county secretary and colonel Li forbade the county’s administrative personnel from coming in or leaving the county compound. The townspeople, clearly fed up with the rowdy soldiers, added fuel to the fire, as the whole marketplace went on strike. The soldiers demanded that the magistrate deal with this new affront as well. Battalion commanders attempted to calm the situation, but only the appearance of the regimental commander and the magistrate’s turning Shu over to him put an end to the disturbance. The magistrate urged that there be closer cooperation between his office and the regimental command to prevent further incidents, summarizing his experience:

Since [I] took office, there has been two regiments of MPs, three regiments of the Youth Army, a unit of Air Force cadets, and a battalion of the 83D stationed within the county border, making supply complicated and maintaining military discipline difficult. It was only with the greatest forebearance, being careful in every way and dealing properly with matters that [everyone] was able to get along peacefully without any conflicts occurring. The MP regiments were transferred out of Sichuan after the

309. Largely due to the persistent attempts by the Chongqing police to replace their lost weapons and ammunition a lengthy paper trail exists for this case. Several months of wrangling resulted in the approval for replacement rifles to be issued by the First Arsenal in Shapingba, but the expended ammunition – a mere 54 rounds – remained an issue well into August; qz0061.mj15-4478, pp. 1-27 dated February - August 1945.

- 422 -
Japanese surrender. Right after induction, the Youth Army had especially poor discipline, [but] after training for a long time gradually there was improvement, only because it implemented ‘democratized management.’ Commanders were not able to thoroughly oversee the soldiers, with the result that off-base illegalities were frequent. For each reported case, if it was real but there was no way to get proof, [we] would inform the commanding unit to investigate and deal with it; when there was proof, [we] would handle it according to law, sending the details of [how it was] handled [to the unit]. In trifling [cases] where there was no major injury, punishment was meted out leniently.\textsuperscript{310}

The seriousness of Shu’s defiance and the belligerent youth soldiers’ threats to assault the county jail could not be ignored, however, as it would have damaged the county’s civil government too much. Though, even here, the final punishment – if there was any – was handled by the Youth Army commander, not the civil authorities.

After the war’s end, the problem of early returns, unauthorized leaves, and outright desertions (to return home) escalated significantly in the Youth Army. While these problems existed in 1944 and early 1945, they worsened considerably after the Japanese surrender.\textsuperscript{311} The problem was serious enough that the Guidance Committee felt it necessary to issue regulations for the handling of volunteers who were shirking their duty. Making their way through both the military and civilian administrative structures, the committee’s orders stressed that if they deserted after induction they were to be apprehended by the military police and prosecuted under military law.\textsuperscript{312} With the new recruitment for and remobilization of the Youth Army for the Civil War the problem with desertion worsened considerably in 1946 and 1947, to the point of violent clashes between the Youth Army and police.

In late September 1947, the Chongqing police bureau’s Caiyuanba station chief, one Dan Siming (詹思明), recommended a friend as a new policeman to the Shangqiao (上橋) branch. Dan wrote that his friend, Li Rongjun (李榮君), was of “good character” who had quit school the previous semester because he was short of money; Li came to Chongqing in search of a steady job and wanted to join the police. The Shangqiao station chief assessed Dan Siming’s character as good: he was knowledgeable and careful in his duty – there was little likelihood of error in his report. Li took the entrance examination in early October, but during his interview at the station, a small group of armed men (a platoon commander, vice-commander, four soldiers, and one plainclothes agent) none of whom were wearing unit insignia, barged their way past the guards

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{310} qz0055.j3-274, pp. 98a-9b, 106a-15a dated 24 January 1946.
\item \textsuperscript{311} See the Chongqing Police Bureau order to its Tenth Branch indicating that the commander of the 201D, Dai Zhiqi had secretly requested aid from the police in apprehending volunteers who had left their bases without leave or had left on leave and not returned; qz0061.mj12-55, p. 58 dated 28 March 1945. Also relevant is an August 1945 cable from the 201D to Ba county (forwarded to Renhe township) reporting that during the prior two months many soldiers had left their units to return to their families and homes in the Chongqing area. The division requested Ba county’s help in ordering local baojia units to turn violators over to the division (or to the military police authorities, who would notify the division). The division would dispatch men to handle the reports; qz0059.mj2-65, p. 49 dated 13 August 1945.
\item \textsuperscript{312} qz0104.mj1-93, p. 70a dated 18 September 1945 and qz0061.mj15-4458, p. 45 dated 28 September 1945.
\end{itemize}
and into the station. When the station chief, Cai Shulin (蔡述臨), questioned them, the men claimed to be from the 203D, on a mission to arrest escaped soldiers. They had no documents, so Cai refused to let them search the station offices and demanded that they go through proper channels. While Cai and the platoon leader were arguing, Li Rongjun fled the station. In the subsequent pursuit and capture of Li, shots were fired by the Youth Army squad, who later informed Cai that Li had fled his unit with two machine guns and other military property. The youth soldiers were anxious to recover those weapons, but promised to return the next day to give Cai a full report. Unable to detain them, the police could only watch as the Youth Army squad took Li away.313 When civilian police and the Youth Army clashed, it was invariably the former who gave way to the latter.

Imperfections in the Ideological Mirage

Thus, despite the success of the Youth Army’s cultural practices and the genuine nature of much of the volunteers’ propaganda, there were imperfections in the practical matter of discipline. These lapses had corollaries in the self-images of the soldiers. Perhaps what is most striking about these areas of slippage is that they were reflected in contemporary accounts in the state-run media as well. Even in a time of dire need, the state’s own propaganda gave voice to the sense of loss that accompanied the volunteers’ new role of citizen-soldiers. At times, at least, even the regime’s most central propaganda vehicles implicitly acknowledged that the volunteers’ new identities were contingent, ephemeral, and all too easily subverted. Here I would like to quote in full a short piece written by a volunteer and carried in the Central Daily Supplement on 31 January 1945.

“Gray Night” by Li Tianhou (李天厚)

My night life, which ate away at my health for more than two years, met up again with me here last night – I was on sentry duty.

Carrying a gun, I paced back and forth in front of the barracks and recalled many past events, a succession of tangled and fresh memories. Formerly, in the deep of night, I would hold a soft brush and in the stove-warmed editorial office, work bent over my desk. But last night, standing under the sky as fine rain sprayed down, I shouldered a heavy and hard rifle and peered into the gray surroundings. Then it was as if I could see the face of every one of my past work comrades, and as if I could hear the light and crisp bell-sounds of people calling; I was completely intoxicated with nostalgia for the past.

The other sentry [lit. another comrade] seemed to feel the same and he said, “Chongqing is still lively right now. The 8:30 [PM] movie should just be letting out . . . The play at the Kangjiang Hall should just be at the climax! . . .” I sighed in agreement, as this swept me away thinking even more of the sweet stories of the past. I thought again that right now was the tensest time for my co-workers in the editorial office; they were using all their wisdom and brain power to put out valuable and exciting written offerings before the readers tomorrow.

“Memories are always sweet,” I agreed. But I couldn’t help but catch an intermittent whiff of sourness [in my memories], so I didn’t have the courage to keep reminiscing; I could only carry on with my present mission heart and soul. I surveyed

every gray corner within my field of view, pricking up my ears at every tiny sound, like I was spying on the world’s secrets. The nearby foliage, buildings, and mountain peaks were all hidden in the limitless gray; all was still as if dead. I felt disappointed and empty. Only the sound of the sluice gate on the Sanxi, some five hundred meters away, gave this dead field a bit of life. Was this a whisper or a sigh? Perhaps it was a jeer at my usefulness! [I] grabbed my gun; how is it that I can’t shoot a single enemy?

Fed up with this silent loneliness, I took a clip of ammo and jammed it into my gun, preparing to test the might of this [Chiang] Kaishek rifle. But the other sentry [lit. comrade] stopped me saying, “Soldiers are easily startled at night!” He continued on, telling me stories of past alarms, which were full of terror and danger. I finally relented.

Suddenly, a tiny spot of flame approached from afar, and gradually I could hear a faint cough. Solemnly, I called out, “Password!”, shattering the boundless gray silence. The reply came back, “I’ve come to relieve you.” Actually, we still had not been given a password, it was all just to shake off the boring emptiness.

I gave the gun and ammo to him, lowered my head and returned to the sleeping quarters. From the town came three melodious strikes of the gong. I looked at my watch, it was just midnight. I thought to myself, just about now my coworkers at the newspaper would be having a midnight meal. The same night, but two different kinds of lives, both have left a deep impression on my memory.

Li’s longing for the delights of Chongqing’s nightlife was an urbane professional’s desire to be free from the enforced “emptiness” of military life. His forlorn night on sentry duty spotlights the gaps in the Nationalist rhetoric and ideology: the gun was not only the concrete manifestation of the government’s legitimacy, but also a symbol of alienation of the soldiers from civilian society. Despite the ecstatic affirmations in the Youth Army writings, the gun was also experienced with a sense of loss that poked through in the quiet moments while standing sentry amidst the fog of a cold, gray night.

Some of the elements of Li’s evocative piece, such as a persistent desire for civilian life and the farcical aspect of playing at being a soldier, are found in other Youth Army accounts as well. One volunteer, in particular, was keenly sensitive to the idea that the youth soldiers were adopting a role in a theatrical production, rather than a new identity. He reported having performed in a Resistance play at the start of the war, in which he acted the part of a soldier. Now, seven years later, he had “jumped off the stage and gone from drama to the real . . . from the abstract and symbolic to reality.” But much like donning a costume, putting on his new military uniform was distant from reality: it was only “like putting on a fake skin” that left him just a “soldier uncle.” He and his fellow soldiers appeared authoritative and awe-inspiring, even more so than their superiors in their own eyes, but in actuality they were living too comfortably, making him suspicious that they were lacking some essential element of soldiers and were (again) only acting a role on stage. This writer consistently adopted this attitude: when a political cadre lectured the unit on their new duties and roles, stressing that they had relinquished their old identities as

314. HYQNJP, pp. 113-4; originally published in the Central Daily Supplement on 31 January 1945. Ironically, six of the major movie theaters in Chongqing all gave free seats nightly to Youth Army volunteers who were in the city. The same was true for several of the drama theaters as well; QNJS, vol. 2, pp. 366-80.
teachers, students, and journalists, the author’s reaction was that the cadre’s speech was illogical. Impatient and annoyed, he remarked that this new role could hardly be a wholly new identity as it was only for a set term of service, after which “professors would still be professors, journalists would still be journalists.” Needless to say, soldiers who idealize and hold intense desires to return to civilian life pose serious problems of unreliability for regimes, especially when they are called upon to serve on the frontlines.

The French poilu of WWI were similarly torn. On the one hand, they rejected civilian society for its ignorance of the brutalities of trench warfare; the soldiers’ isolation on the front led to a strong resentment of civilians. But on the other hand, contact with rear society while on leave gave the soldiers a taste of the free life to come after the war. Thus, despite their antipathy toward rear society, the French soldiers had a fascination with the peaceful, quiet life of civilian society, which eased their reconciliation with noncombatants after the war: “the attitude of mind required in the isolation of the trenches could not survive the return of the individual soldier to the civilian life to which he had always felt attached, which he had never entirely abandoned, and which he had never despaired of rediscovering.” Leonard Smith’s study of mutinies in the French army during World War One is sensitive to this issue of soldiers’ desire for a return to civilian life. For various reasons, French soldiers had their loyalties divided: French foot soldiers in their trenches expressed sentiments quite similar to Li Tianhou’s. They foreshadowed their later mutinies with an intense longing to return to civilian life. Smith quotes a novel on the arrival of new recruits at the front line, and the reaction of seasoned veterans of the trenches as they saw the new recruits: “Just yesterday they were still walking the streets, they were eyeing women, tramways, and boutiques. Just yesterday they were living like men. And we [the seasoned soldiers] looked at them amazed, envious, like voyagers arriving in a fantasy land.” The 1917 mutinies, the Chemin des Dames, were in essence a “complex ‘political’ renegotiation of the parameters of command authority” in which the refusal to re-enter the trenches “involved [the soldiers] reasserting their peacetime identities as human beings, as fathers and sons, and as citizens. Their demands covered the ‘political’ spectrum, from the international to the personal.” Demands for peace centered primarily around the soldiers’ links to civilian life: once a reformed leave system was implemented, the soldiers dropped their demands for peace.

Li Tianhou’s impatience with the realities of military life and longing to return to his “stove-warmed” office, to lively excursions to theaters and midnight meals with co-workers, were subtle cracks in the ideological mirror of citizen-soldiers. The gun, that central object of the volunteers’ new identity as soldiers, marked the loss of these civilian joys. Such moments of slippage were doubtlessly influential in the Nationalists’ scrupulous attention to fulfilling the material promises it made to the volunteers. Those benefits along with the symbolic capital and status that it lavished on them prevented those cracks from shattering the mirage completely and secured the long-term loyalty of the volunteers, but they could not completely paper over the fractures even in its own propaganda on the Youth Army.

315. HYQNJ, pp. 54-5.
316. Audoin-Rouzeau, Men at War, p. 154 and 137.
317. Leonard Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience, p. 86.
318. Ibid., pp. 179, 189, and 190-1.
Conclusion

This chapter examined the culture (the practices and propaganda) of the Youth Army as a way of looking more directly at the experience of the intellectual youth volunteers and the terms of the bargain they struck with the embattled Nationalist state. Their experience after volunteering was fundamentally shaped by a constellation of practices that Chiang’s state deployed in the Youth Army. Adopted from, or shared with, other political organizations, these practices consisted of means for inculcating politically active and responsive – disciplined – individuals. While the volunteers’ discipline was far from perfect, this was in many ways the fulfillment of the Nationalists’ pre-war plans for a Nationalized military, one made up of citizens who had accepted a direct relationship to their government in their duty to serve as soldiers.

The Youth Army soldiers, in general, responded favorably: influenced by the Nationalist technologies of political selfhood, they adopted a sharply etched self-image as citizen-soldiers. The mantle of service that they took on when they put on their uniforms was colored with the dye of the ancient past – they cast themselves as modern warrior-scholars, the re-embodiment of the shi tradition. As modern intellectuals, however, they saw themselves as scientific talents and democratic men. Their self-worth demanded that in some important ways they be treated as the equals of their officers and political leaders and that the relationship between soldiers and superiors be adjusted and put on a different footing. In addition, as men with superior mental abilities, they demanded – and were granted – a degree of self-management completely unprecedented in the Nationalist military.

By shifting gears to examine the material object of the soldiers’ gun, and the meanings invested in it and deployed around it, this chapter unpacked the symbolic aspects of the bargain between the Nationalist state and its citizen-soldiers. The youth soldiers in the act of volunteering and accepting the gun affirmed the Nationalist state’s symbolic identity with the Chinese people, while the state in turn recognized these young men as exemplars, models of citizenship for the entire country, and this prestige or honor was encoded in books and published materials. Keeping in mind that these youth volunteers would go on to be some of the most committed and loyal defenders of the KMT regime and its leaders, the symbolic aspects of this bargain take on a particular importance as the foundation of the volunteers’ loyalty to the state and the government’s dependence on the Youth Army, not only as a military and paramilitary force, but also as the reaffirmation of the state’s fundamental myth or claim.

It should be clear that in this study the word “state” has two separate, but interrelated, meanings. The first is as an concrete administrative apparatus. This is the common, and relatively unproblematic, usage. It is not intended to anthropomorphize what is, in fact, a complex, diverse, and far from unified, set of institutions and persons. The Nationalist state (like complex governments everywhere) was shot through with a dizzying array of competing organizations, approaches, and people. To lump them all in together under one umbrella term, admittedly, does some violence to the complex reality. However, for many people under the jurisdiction of these institutions, such subtleties were often lost; they experienced “the government” as a set of concrete powers that they had no influence over and which had to be evaded as best as possible, using whatever means were available. This observation leads us directly to the second meaning of “the state” in this study: the creation of that ideological mirage of a unified State. While little of conscription’s propaganda resonated in the Sichuan countryside, the Youth Army was fertile soil for the meaningful deployment of symbolic capital. Centered around the gun, and the meanings imbued in it, a foundational mythos of the modern, citizen-based State was given concrete form:
embodied in the material object of the rifle and enacted in the rituals and pronouncements around that object was the symbolic claim that The State was coterminus with the people, that it was the all-pervasive mechanism of symbolic and material exchanges in the political and military spheres. Michael Taussig in his evocative essay reminds us that “much of the power of the State ‘with a capital S’ comes from its insubstantiality, felt or fantasized by those outside the central nexus.”

The State, as a felt or imagined entity, has been brought into existence by the imaginings of the people.

In Bourdieu’s language, the Nationalist state enjoyed legitimacy (which was nothing more than a form of symbolic power) because of the bargain it struck with the youth soldiers. The volunteers’ acknowledgement of the state’s legitimacy was the political profit reaped by the Nationalist regime from the exchange. Such symbolic power is hardly unusual or surprising, but rather quite an ordinary form of “everyday” power. Symbolic power is merely an ‘invisible power which is ‘misrecognized’ as such and thereby ‘recognized’ as legitimate. . . . [It is] an aspect of most forms of power as they are routinely deployed in social life . . . [where] power is seldom exercised as overt physical force: instead it is transmuted into a symbolic form, and thereby endowed with a kind of legitimacy that it would not otherwise have.

As such, it requires and rests on an “active complicity” of those who are (or let themselves be) subjected to it. The fact that this is an “everyday” form of power is precisely the point: the legitimacy of the Nationalist State was in many ways an ordinary thing among those who felt, acquiesced to, and helped create its power, namely men who saw themselves as real citizens of that state. In short, the ideological construction of citizen-soldiers and the Nationalist state, as seen and encoded in the Youth Army, was both a material reality and an imagined fantasy. While they were undeniably enmeshed in a very real institutional embodiment of state authority, the intellectual youth volunteers helped create and sustain the fundamental fiction of The State itself, through the cultural practices and propaganda they conducted on the state’s behalf. This was, of course, a bargain struck with the Nationalist regime, and they exacted their pound of flesh from it in return: not only direct material benefits, but symbolic capital in the form of prestige, distinction, and state-sanctioned honor. Reminiscent of the way in which the material object of the gun encoded symbolic relations of the political and social world, the prestige and distinction which the state gave the volunteers in return was encoded in the material realm of books and publicity materials.

This symbolic strategy of the Nationalist State ran counter to the sacralization of the Chinese Nation found in wartime journalism and independent National Salvation demonstrations. As ably analyzed by Charles Laughin, wartime journalism exhibited an intense geographical focus that implicitly located the spirit of the nation in the geographical expanse of the country.


320. John Thompson’s introduction to Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, p. 23. In Bourdieu’s own words: “The distinctiveness of symbolic domination lies precisely in the fact that it assumes, of those who submit to it, an attitude which challenges the usual dichotomy of freedom and constraint. ...The propensity to reduce the search for causes to a search for responsibilities makes it impossible to see that intimidation, a symbolic violence which is not aware of what it is (to the extent that it implies no act of intimidation) can only be exerted on a person predisposed (in his habitus) to feel it”; *Language and Symbolic Power*, p. 51.
Along with resistance demonstrations, this journalism effectively sacralized the geography of the nation, as the “collective spirit of the Chinese people.” Locating the national spirit in the land itself meant that it transcended the authority of any particular government. Violence by authorities, such as the endemic abuses in conscription, were thus cast as sacrilege, spiritual violations of the sacred nation, and treason. Laughlin argues that in such journalism and political demonstrations, the nation came to exist on the visceral and sacred levels for citizens. In one sense, by universalizing the nation and patriotism, it enhanced the sense of responsibility of citizens to defend the nation’s sovereignty, but it simultaneously detached this responsibility from the Nationalist state. Reattaching the responsibility of citizens to the specific authority of the Nationalist government was a key issue for Chiang and Nationalist authorities. The Nationalist military’s answer to this symbolic threat was to reassert the government’s fundamental identity with the people of the nation; a reassertion that was embodied and encoded in the volunteers, their guns, and the propaganda pieces they wrote for the regime’s newspapers. The youth soldiers were an important symbolic fulfillment of the long-standing ideal, put down by Yan Fu in the late nineteenth century, of having a congruence, or identity, between the interests of the state and the interests of the individual.

However, the internal logic of KMT citizenship as a bargain between discrete citizen-soldiers and a desperate government, implicitly affirmed individual, personal welfare and created a certain degree of alienation among even its most committed citizens. Additionally, and unfortunately for the Nationalist military, realizing the ideal of citizen-soldiers was restricted to the youth volunteers. Throughout the war, as we have seen, the conscription administration remained unable to find ways to reach the vast majority of Chinese men except in harsh, extractive ways – the state’s conscription administration “bargained with” (extracted from) communities and not individuals. There was hope among authorities that the Youth Army would fundamentally change the social attitude toward military service. In a piece titled “The Transformation of the Public Mood,” the author admitted that among most Chinese people the general view of military service could be seen in the anecdote of an old man breaking his leg but rejoicing since he was no longer in any danger of being dragged into the army – and all he had to suffer for this boundless good fortune was a mere broken leg. Contrasting the story to the enthusiasm of the student volunteers, the author concludes with the remark that the stark difference between them was enough “to make one suspect that these [two attitudes toward military service] did not in fact come from the same nation [minzu 民族].” Commander Dai Zhiqi of the 201D, stationed at Bishan, lamented the elitism and separation of the youth soldiers from the people: the volunteers upon donning their uniforms “changed and became different from regular people.”

323. GMWX, vol. 62, pp. 243-5. Before, men broke their own bodies to avoid being conscripted, and but now one sees “mama personally sending her only son to join the army; old men chasing their sons to enlist; famous personages in the party and [Youth] Corps sending their sons to request a military posting . . . Even more surprising are the monks chanting all day long, ‘Amida Buddha’, have also dropped their percussion instruments and picked up the ‘butcher knife’, [and are] standing fast to kill the enemy.”
324. HYQNJ, p. 46.
failed to notice, however, was that the youths’ act of volunteering, their docility and loyalty toward the regime were the direct outcome of these youths’ distance from the experience of the vast majority of Chinese in the interior. Indeed, how far the Youth Army was from the everyday experience and reality of commoners can be seen in a short anecdote written, again, by the perceptive Zha Ning. His unit conducted labor service in the county town near their base, which meant regular contact with townspeople. Zha worked together with a young housewife. From our talks I found out that she had escaped from Songjiang and that there were still many family members in occupied territory. ‘What did you do before [joining the army]?’ she started off asking me. ‘I worked in a newspaper office.’ ‘You don’t seem like a worker, your hands are so clean.’ ‘Yes, I wrote.’ ‘Oh!’, she continued, asking, ‘Isn’t writing good? Why did you want to join the army?’ This was her final, long-pondered question. She wanted a clear answer. I worked and at the same time told her [my story] in detail. In great surprise, they [sic] finally said, ‘You are not like them [the other volunteers] in [your reasons for] becoming a soldier.’ ‘No, I’m just like them. [I want to] fight just like [them], exert myself for the nation just like [them].’ ‘Oh . . .’

There was simply a fundamental disconnect between the motivations of the youth volunteers and this townswoman. Zha’s explanation of his loyalty and patriotism left her speechless. In terms of motivation and experience, the two could not have been more different. Zha remained confident that his example demonstrated unequivocally certain truths to the woman, but in hindsight one suspects that she (and the millions of potential Chinese citizens in the hinterland) remained unmoved, simply uncomprehending the Youth Army’s loyalty to the Nationalist regime which never found a way to strike a meaningful bargain with, or extend a convincing vision of citizenship to, anyone except the intellectual youths.

325. Ibid., pp. 101-2.

- 430 -
Conclusion

Modern China as a Warfare State

A Monumental Metaphor for Re-Writing the War

In downtown Chongqing stands the People’s Liberation Monument (Renmin jiefang jinian bei 人民解放纪念碑, usually shortened to the Liberation Monument, jiefangbei 解放碑). Nearly twenty-eight meters (90 feet) tall, its off-white bricks are accented by tan corners. Both a tourist attraction and landmark, the spire is now overshadowed by the facades of buildings on three major streets, Minquan, Zourong, and Minzu roads. But at night, brilliantly lit by floodlights and the flashing rainbow colors of neon signs and advertisements the octagonal obelisk is a shimmering icon of recent prosperity. In the 1990s and early 2000s, massive investment from the Chongqing municipal government turned the immediate vicinity into China’s largest foot-traffic-only shopping district, populated with movie theaters, dance clubs, luxury shops, and restaurants of every kind. Luxury retailers, like Cartier and Swarovski Crystal, do brisk business with foreign businessmen and the city’s own nouveau-riche, while second-tier shops and street food stalls cater to the growing middle-class and petty urbanites who want to window shop, sip coffee at Starbucks, and rub elbows with tourists and those who have the day off. Yet, few people know that the monument did not originally commemorate the communist revolution, but the victory against Japan in the War of Resistance (1937-45), or that it is not the original structure at all.

Where the Liberation Monument now stands was the site of the “Spiritual Fortress” (jing-shen baolei 精神堡垒) constructed by the Nationalist government in December 1941. A grim, foreboding rectangular tower, the Fortress was reminiscent of a military blockhouse. Consisting of five levels, the edifice was seven Chinese yards (zhang 竺) and seven Chinese feet (chi 尺) tall (about 23.5 meters, or 77 feet), to commemorate the date of Japan’s invasion (7/7). The structure was wood, with the exterior painted black to avoid being a landmark for Japanese bombers. A flagpole stood above the top tier. Nationalist authorities hoped it would be a symbolic reminder of the need to be strong in the face of an implacable and well-equipped enemy, but it was never very popular. Lin Yutang, one of the regime’s staunchest propagandists, wrote that it was “hideous as a name and as a piece of architecture – a concrete pole that resembles a magnified chopstick. The architecture isn’t Chinese, nor is the nomenclature, which as a phrase is in line with the affectations of modernism in contemporary Chinese writing.”¹ A few large government rallies were held in the square which surrounded the giant “chopstick”, but the monument was largely neglected. And when the wood rotted inside, the whole thing collapsed, to be replaced for the remainder of the war with a simple flagpole flying the national flag. While it

1. Lin Yutang, The Vigil of a Nation, p. 36.
lasted, the Spiritual Fortress was a shabby and ill-loved memorial, fitting for a grubby and ill-
tempered war.

In early October 1946 (at the 336th Municipal Congress), the mayor of Chongqing, Zhang Dulun (張築倫), backed a proposal to rebuild on the site. The new structure was named the War of Resistance Victory Memorial (Kangzhan shengli jigong bei 抗戰勝利紀功碑), inscribed in gold plated characters on the front of the structure. The Chongqing Municipal Planning Committee was responsible for the plans, contracting the Tianfuying Construction Company (天府營造 廠) to do the building. The city spent well over 200 million yuan on the monument; the foundation was laid on the 31st of October and construction began in December. By August 1947 work was completed and it was unveiled at a special ceremony on National Day, October 10th, the anniversary of the Wuchang Uprising that touched off the 1911 Revolution and the end of the Qing dynasty. An octagonal spire four meters taller than the Spiritual Fortress and made of reinforced concrete, the memorial sported relief carvings and inscriptions on the exterior and a circular staircase to the top in the interior. Eight pillars, engraved with the complete text of the KMT directive making Chongqing the wartime capital and inscriptions by various KMT luminaries, surrounded the base of the memorial. Four clocks were installed in the top tier. Set to toll at the top of every hour, the clocks were notoriously out of time. Often each one tolled independently of the others, fitting for a memorial that was running out of time, out of sync with the revolutionary currents that soon swept around it. The Victory Memorial would not last long, at least in name. In 1950, just months after the city was liberated from Chiang’s regime (30 November 1949), the communist Southwest Military Administration Committee (西南軍政委員會), chair-
manned by Liu Bocheng (劉伯承), renamed the war memorial as the People's Liberation Monu-
ment, literally over-writing the war with the revolution. In many ways, the story of the two (or three) monuments is a diorama of the effacement of the national war by the communist libera-
tion. With the exception of a fixation on the communist guerrilla actions during the Resistance War, this effacement has, until quite recently, been almost total in mainland China and among historians as well.

This dissertation is an attempt to return to the war, particularly in the KMT-held interior, as a subject of serious inquiry, by examining the Nationalist government’s most fundamental task: the mobilization of men for service in the army. The war, as a long-term conflict (two years longer than the war in Europe and more than four years longer than America’s Pacific War), required the mobilization of all sectors of society, in all facets of material and cultural production; the men who fought and died as soldiers were the most concrete aspect of the national mobilization. Instead of looking forward to the communist regime, my dissertation has look backward to trace the changes in state mobilization from imperial and warlord patterns to modern statist ones.

Interestingly, the impulse to return to the war and rewrite it as an important moment in China’s twentieth-century finds further resonance with the monuments in Chongqing. Beginning in the 1980s there were calls in the Municipal Consultative Committee to restore the original Victory Memorial. Reportedly there were even some recommendations to have the Liberation Monument moved, decentering the revolution in favor of Chongqing’s contribution to the national cause of the Resistance War. These proposals stressed that the original memorial was the only war monument for the entire Chinese nation, thus implicitly rejecting the supplanting of the national story by the communist party-dominated history. For most, however, the proposals to rewrite the war back onto the monument were not a rejection of the liberation narrative, but merely...
expressed the desire to restore the wartime resistance to its (proper) place of honor in the urban landscape.\textsuperscript{2}

Despite his revulsion at the Spiritual Fortress, Lin Yutang was right, however, when he noted the original wartime edifice was not identifiably Chinese, but monstrously “modernist.” As a physical metaphor, it fittingly invoked the difficult, awkward, ugly, military-dominated modernization and state-building projects that were embedded in the Nationalist regime’s wartime mobilization. Ideology aside, the desire to overwrite that tragic story with a brighter, more hopeful narrative of Liberation is hardly surprising. Still, intellectual honesty requires that we now rewrite that grubby, ill-tempered story back into its proper place an integral part of the history of twentieth-century China.

\textbf{Restoring A Sense of the Possible}

To appreciate the full complexity of the War of Resistance, it is necessary to restore some sense of the possible to the wartime era. This effort has a dual dimension. First, the sense of possibility that outcomes might have been different: the war did not irrevocably determine the Civil War and Revolution which followed it. It must be treated on its own terms; the uneven and contradictory developments must be fully explored and elucidated, even in areas that we thought we knew well from contemporary anecdotes and observers. Second, a sense of what constrained actors (what was really “possible” for them to do) must be restored. Much of mainland and Western historiography on the Nationalist government has grown out of politically charged wartime disappointments that were themselves based on misperceptions and wishful thinking. Understanding the war requires that we shed these and take the actions of those in the Nationalist-held interior seriously, on their own terms. This study of the Nationalist wartime military mobilization in Sichuan has had these two dimensions of the possible firmly in mind.

One common implicit perspective is that the KMT could have relied on volunteerism to mobilize men, a position that fundamentally misunderstands the war. The fact is no major combatant in World War One or Two relied primarily on voluntary service; it was at most a supplementary route into service. And most of those countries did not have to contend with foreign forces on their soil.\textsuperscript{3} If volunteerism was really such an effective way to mobilizing for large-scale, total warfare, then why did regimes with far better educated populaces, far more resources and wealth, far more modernized administrations, and far more effective communications infrastructure not rely on it? We need to restore a sense of what was really possible under the conditions of the war. It is simply unrealistic to hold the KMT to a hypothetical standard that no other combatant government adhered to. I have not stressed this point in my dissertation, because it seems clear to me that there was no chance for volunteerism to be a viable strategy, particularly given the casualty rates that China endured. As refugees flooded across the countryside, stories of the war's brutality and lethality were inevitably spread everywhere – how many Sichuan peasants

\begin{footnotes}

\item[3] Russia is the major exception, but it did not have to deal with competing political parties or puppet regimes – and it too was famous for its very draconian forms of compulsion: political commissars shot "cowards" who refused to charge German positions.
\end{footnotes}
were going to volunteer to go be slaughtered in Changsha or overrun by Japanese tanks in Hebei after hearing tales of Nanjing, Shanghai, or Wuhan? The alternatives were not between compulsion and voluntarism, but between compulsory resistance and capitulation. Chiang's choice was to continue to resist rather than surrender. Rather than argue (or imply) that there was a (theoretical) "solution" to the systemic problems and abuses in conscription, this study tries to understand military service in the both the concrete (social, political, and administrative) and ideal (normative) dimensions.

Here it is useful to note that the CCP is not really a worthwhile comparison as its guerrilla strategy (and one might even argue that the continued existence of the base areas themselves) depended on the foundation of the KMT's conventional war effort. Suggestions that the communist recruitment was somehow a viable alternative is, I believe, a legacy of the war-era misunderstandings of the CCP that set up a persistent, but unrealistic, standard of what was possible for the Nationalist state. The impression that the CCP was somehow providing a democratic and volunteerist alternative that could be a model for the whole war effort in China is almost a cliché in the reports from journalists and US advisors. While it was an important and politically courageous suggestion at the time, we now know that it was based on a whitewashed version of the CCP's activities during the war. The CCP successfully masked not only its carefully managed class warfare (land reforms), but of all sorts of genuinely unsavory involvements, from party-sponsored drug trafficking to outright press-ganging, retreat on its promises of gender equality, mistreatment/abandonment of veterans, rigged elections, and deals struck with vicious bands. Yet, somehow the idealized picture (or its shadow) remains as a hypothetical yardstick of "democracy" and "volunteerism" with which to measure the KMT's mobilization.

To reiterate, this line of reasoning is not intended as a sophisticated "excuse" or justification for the systemic problems within the Nationalist military service administration (or regime more generally), but only an attempt to understand what pressures were at work on the different actors, including the administrators who set up and tried to control the conscription system. We have long understood, anecdotally, the peasant's viewpoint: conscription was experienced as an arbitrary and capricious brutalization. But do we stop at that perspective as the final word? Our scholarship has remained trapped in the arena of brutality, lacking a genuine exploration of what the state administrators thought they were doing, what efforts they made to fix the problems, the actual administrative mechanisms at work, and what social realities persistently eluded their grasp.

Aside from providing a more nuanced picture of the war in the Nationalist-held interior, why does all this matter? There are two major stories here. The primary one, which has been the main focus throughout the study, looks backward to the imperial and warlord regimes; and a more suggestive one that looks forward, across the divide of 1949, to the communist state.

The Question of Significance: Looking Back, Moving Forward

This study has explored military service, with a focus on Sichuan, in the form of conscription and the Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement. In doing so, it looked beyond the surface layer of abuse and corruption, to take a look at the state-making and citizenship projects embed-

4. What follows is an attempt not only to summarize the importance of this study for the pre-1949 period, but also an attempt to place it in terms of the longer-term significance for twentieth-century China, for which I have allowed myself to speculate a little more freely in order to note interesting or evocative areas of continuity and change across the Liberation divide.
ded within the Nationalist government’s wartime mobilization. Beyond the obvious (and strategically successful) military goal of supplying bodies for the army, the Nationalists had wider administrative and political goals for military service. These included state-making purposes of administrative expansion, but also the desire to construct loyalty, to inculcate genuine identification with the state.

In looking backwards, we see that what was happening in the Sichuan hinterland was state-building. Wartime mobilization should be appreciated for its place in the long-term militarization of state and society in twentieth-century China; developments in military institutions are of prime importance and any genuine assessment of Chiang’s regime requires a careful look at the way in which the Nationalist state mobilized for war. During the war itself, we have Joshua Howard’s excellent study of the militarization of arsenal workers. Nationalist authorities attempted, only partially successfully, to bring discipline and docility to arsenal workers through vari-

---

5. On the topic of the conscription administration’s venality, some may object that opportunity does not necessarily mean corrupt practices. That may be true in an abstract sense. However, I believe that in desperate circumstances it is the rare person who will not take advantage of opportunity. Corruption in the mundane sense was rampant before, during, and after the war and throughout the PRC era as well. It is, actually, the norm. In that sense, it needs no special comment; the periods in which it was not the norm are the aberrations that require explanation. Why is that so? I would argue that throughout the 20th century (and now into the 21st in certain respects), incomplete administrative discipline or oversight allowed interstitial moments in administrative procedures and practices to remain unregulated or unsupervised. Whenever situations were desperate (which describes most of the twentieth-century) and oversight lax, corruption is more or less endemic. A few upright activists always exist, as highly touted models, but systemic corruption flourishes. The early PRC, of course, was a different beast from the Nationalist wartime state: corruption was not so much outright extortion of money or the manipulation of "market" transactions, but instead control over state-granted benefits and resources (since the state replaced the market as the mechanism of distribution). Whenever oversight is relaxed, the interstitial moments lead almost immediately to “corrupt” practices. Friedman, Pickowicz and Seldon's study of Raoyang/Wugong is a good example. When things are going well, when the economy is recovering and when residents are able to enjoy their pork dumplings at New Years, people are more or less well-behaved. But, as soon as the PRC restricted access to goods/services (i.e., shuts the market economy down and makes itself the only conduit for sale/purchase of produce and goods), false reports and protective and predatory corruption flourish, often led by local cadres. During the Great Leap, the result is disaster: plans were made on the basis of the numbers that were cooked up in order to impress superiors and secure increased state-benefits for the people filing the reports. The mode of securing improper benefits changed (securing political capital and state-favoritism instead of extorting money) but the end result is a “corrupt” attempt to secure material benefits or power. At the lowest common denominator level, it seems clear to me that desperate people do not generally turn away from opportunities to enrich themselves, or just make their lives marginally easier, when such chances exist. The War of Resistance was a desperate time, for everyone, and as such, mundane (monetary) corruption does not really require a special explanation. What I find most interesting is that during the war corruption did not stop at merely material transactions, but included the real sale of bodies, in a commercial traffic that amounted to (or at least approached) something that sure looks a lot like a state-sponsored slave trade. The messiness of social life and the incomplete administrative control meant that all attempts to eradicate this traffic in bodies failed. The lofty ideals that conscription held in the Nationalist imagination only make this outcome that much more tragic.
ous measures, such as military-style uniforms and ranks. Total mobilization rested on the state’s administration of both rural and urban society. Despite the exceptionally trying circumstances, the wartime state was prying open the hinterland villages and recruiting a stratum of local agents, albeit ones who continued to protect their communities on the margins. This plotline puts the lie to one of modern China’s fundamental myths: spontaneous resistance based on national unity in the face of foreign aggression. This myth took shape after a small skirmish at Sanyuanli against British troops shortly after the Opium War, but during the 1930s it was cemented by intellectuals, Manchurian activists, communists, and eventually the central government, all of whom portrayed resistance to Japan as natural and innate in the Chinese people. Postwar history and political rhetoric, on both sides of the Taiwan strait, has only deepened the impression of natural, popular resistance. It is time to put such myths to rest. For the War of Resistance, we must acknowledge the importance of state-directed compulsion. Patriotic rhetoric aside, armed resistance to Japan was not spontaneous, but had to be compelled by the Nationalist state. This was no small task.

As China lost its major cities and economically developed coastal areas during the first 18 months of the war, many of its urbane intellectuals got their first taste of the rural villages of the interior. Men like Fan Changjiang, China’s most famous war reporter, bemoaned the peasantry’s lack of patriotism and even awareness of Japan’s invasion. It was precisely this social indifference that was behind Feng Yuxiang’s scathing indictment in December 1944, cited earlier: “Everyone who sees [well-dressed officers escorting ragged conscripts] considers it to be just like new nobility guarding convicts. People along the road still view the country’s heroes and champions as beggars. Those stalwarts who unselfishly give their bodies for the people are considered to be lower class men whose sufferings are unimportant. Such unfeeling hearts!” This was the real problem of rural inertia that faced the KMT government as it mobilized for a long-term war.

Nation-wide resistance rested on compulsion, and compulsory service rested on local administrators, the baojia men in both town and village. To mobilize the country, the Nationalists pushed the membrane between state and society lower than ever before: the baojia were state agents in the villages. They supplied the state with the bodies needed for resistance. Particularly in Sichuan, this was a state-making process, connected with the prewar central penetration of the province. Despite the use of imperial era terminology and the decimal principle of organization in the baojia system, this was a break from traditional rural governance. The modern state broke the old mold and kept the villages “open” to its demands. The new administrative sinews were too strong. While the villages were not completely transparent or open, they were more porous than ever before. Kicking and screaming, the villages were being brought into the modern age when the state would get its pounds of flesh (literally in this case) one way or another.

Scholarship on pre-1949 China has tended to look at citizenship in terms of the issue of “identity.” Henrietta Harrison, for example, outlining the participatory aspect of political life focuses on participation in this self-ascriptive sense. Formal participation in governance, via instruments of voting etc., has not been a major element in twentieth-century China. However, aside from ascriptive identification and rights, there is another dimension of citizenship that is connect-


ed to people’s embeddedness in an administrative system. A *logistical* type of citizenship, which took shape during the course of the first half of the twentieth-century, is less concerned with individual self-ascription into a political community of China than with the administrative reach of the state into communities, the compulsory enmeshment of people into state-centered systems of exchange. It is an economic view of the state and citizenry, not an identity-based one. Rather than voluntary self-labeling, logistical citizenship is participation (often compulsory) in a political “market” in which the state itself is the mechanism of exchange.

Logistical citizenship had two distinct aspects during the war. The first was the growth of the central conscription administration itself: the central handling of military service and many related roles. The Nationalist authorities aspired to a consolidated system and uniformity of practice under their auspices. They were never able to achieve this completely, of course, as even its own agents proved difficult to control. The second, more important, aspect, however, centered around attempting to achieve a real state presence at the lowest local level. From 1936 through the war, this was a concentrated attempt to bring *baojia* (as local instrument) into the center’s administrative structures, as the lowest level of state apparatus. Nationalist authorities sought to turn *baojia* heads into state agents, as a new level of administrators, responsive to the central government. The state was dependent on them, and expended a great deal of effort on trying to tie them to itself (via training, lines of authority, expanded responsibilities, punishment and reward). This attempt was not entirely successful, to be sure, as administrative capacity was limited by the realities of the war itself, a weak communications infrastructure, a lack of firm census data, and the extreme mobility of the population during the war. In Chongqing, institutions and agencies acted almost as villages themselves, and sheltered their human resources from the draft.

The reach of the Nationalist state was limited, both by social realities in the countryside and by the density of urban institutions – primarily the state’s own. Studies on the “the reach of the state” in China have focused almost exclusively on revenue extraction. Scholars such as Vivienne Shue, Madeleine Zelin, and Prasenjit Duara have outlined the issues around the Chinese tax systems: their rationality, the ability of localities to resist state demands, and modernizing states’ reliance on unruly tax brokers. This focus on financial and symbolic extraction has come at the expense of any examination of the state’s mobilization of bodies. This study’s focus on the mechanics of the state’s disposition of bodies – citizens conscripted and sent to the front lines to serve as soldiers – is not meant to align it with a Foucauldian vein of analysis on discipline or incarceration, but to call attention to an overlooked area of state extraction of resources. Attending to the mobilization of manpower for war highlights the place of violence (or war-making) in the formation of the modern state. By neglecting this area of research, studies of modern China have shared a tacit view, common to many historical researchers, that war and violence are abnormal circumstances for the modern state. Revenue extraction – and “civil” dimensions of pow-

---

8. A similar assumption is found in sociology as well. From the canonical figures of Durkheim and Marx on down, the attention paid to violence and the means of violence by orthodox sociology is pitifully small. This myopia remains largely subconscious, except perhaps for Herbert Spencer who made explicit his view that premodem societies are inherently warlike, while modern industrial society is naturally pacific: “military conformity coercively maintained gives place to a varied nonconformity maintained by a willing union”; Herbert Spencer, *The Evolution of Society*, edited by Robert L. Carneiro, University of Chicago Press, 1967, p. 61, cited in Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, p. 23. The very fact that the literature of international relations remains separate
er more generally – is treated as normal and normative, while mobilization for war and the military are cast as abnormal and dysfunctional. As an indirect statement of ideals or hope for a more humane world, this is an understandable scholarly stand (one I am sympathetic to), but as a statement of lived human experience it is at best myopic, and at worst intellectually dishonest. As Anthony Giddens has astutely analyzed, the belief that modern society is normally pacific is just not so: violence and organizing for violence, conducted within an international system of states, is the heart of modern state power.

Thus, this dissertation treats the conscription administration as a serious attempt at state-making, particularly the penetration of local communities by the extractive state. Baojia structures were created, trained, and used throughout the war. Sichuanese militia were co-opted and turned into conscription-related agents in the Citizen Militia. These were sustained attempts to extend real administrative control into the lowest levels of society, villages and neighborhoods, in order to bring about a new mode of military mobilization of individual citizen-soldiers.

Despite its strategic military success and the expanded administrative presence in villages, KMT authorities from Chiang Kai-shek on down were profoundly disappointed with the draft. Why? What were they hoping to accomplish, beyond military resistance, with conscription? The root of their disappointment was that they had pinned larger, non-military, hopes on it, namely the political incorporation of the citizenry. Following European examples, domestic cultural critics, such as Professor Lei Haizong, as well as military authorities like General He Yingqin (who was minister of war during the War of Resistance) saw compulsory service as a “schoolhouse of the nation,” an opportunity not only to expand the state’s control but also to involve the population in the affairs of the country in a new way, breaking from the imperial past.

The Qing dynasty had relied on gentry-led recruitment in its suppression of the massive Taiping Rebellion (1850-64). The decay of these traditional armies in the last decades of the dynasty had thoroughly discredited mobilization based on hereditary or social ties. Mercenary recruitment, of course, was anathema to Nationalist state-builders as it was the mainstay of the warlord armies which had kept China fragmented for more than a decade. Both these mobilization modes had invited foreign aggression by keeping China weak and divided. The Nationalists were committed to bypassing social ties or market forces. Conscription offered the promise of mobilization without resorting to either of those suspect methods; forging a direct relationship between the state and men, compulsory service would turn farmers into soldiers and soldiers into citizens.

As we have seen, the realities of rural society and state-making thwarted this hope: rural baojia men remained embedded in their communities and urban institutions, both private and public, defended their human resources from the draft men. As a result, both the ills that the Nationalist authorities were dead set against – the market forces of commercialization and the informal social ties of community – continued to exert a powerful and brutalizing effect on conscription. The draft suffered from both sets of illegitimate influences. The state was made, but incompletely and in a form that was far from the hopes of the KMT authorities.

If conscription was the iron hand, then loyalty or identification with the state was supposed and cut out of sociological analyses of modern societies, as if it is irrelevant to developments within societies, shows precisely the extent of the problem. Giddens in his second volume critiquing historical materialism, The Nation-State and Violence, explicitly attempts to remedy this gaping vacuum in the sociological literature.
to be the velvet glove. Looking at the sinews of citizenship – the administratively constructed ones that penetrate mundane aspects of daily life – we see that many simply did not obtain for the farmers in China’s interior. Life in rural villages was not shot through with national symbols. And in important areas, such as conscription, where the administrative symbols and powers were prevalent, they were experienced in an alienating way: individuals, families, and communities did what they could to evade and escape them. Given time, these experiences may have evolved into the silken bonds of loyalty, just as Eugene Weber’s peasants slowly were drawn into being Frenchmen.9 Anthony Giddens puts this idea in the typically dry language of sociology:

In many cases the mass of the population of traditional states did not know themselves to be 'citizens' of those states, nor did it matter particularly to the continuity of power within them. But the more the administrative scope of the state begins to penetrate the day-to-day activities of its subjects, the less this theorem holds. The expansion of state sovereignty means that those subject to it are in some sense – initially vague, but growing more and more definite and precise – aware of their membership in a political community and of the rights and obligations such membership confers.10

But during the war this process did not elicit a strong sense of loyalty or duty among many rural farmers in Sichuan; they remained alienated from national military service. If the peasants remained unaware of the velvet glove, the educated youth of the Youth Army were not. They provide an avenue into the Nationalist citizenship project within military service, namely the construction of loyalty in the conventional selfascriptive vein. As evidenced by He Yingqin’s prewar (1928) plan, this goal of nourishing an active citizenship through service in the army was supposed to be accomplished by conscription. The war and Cheng Zerun’s MSO disabused Chiang and his generals of this dream, as conscription alienated rural farmers and urban workers alike. By 1944, the regime was desperate to shore up sagging public confidence and in need of a high-profile restatement of the government’s political viability and its ability to attract loyal soldiers even in its most desperate hour.

The Youth Army, as a carefully managed publicity campaign, grew out of the Nationalist regime’s eagerness to have a symbolic reaffirmation of loyalty. Charles Laughlin in his study of war reporting has argued that the domestic Chinese reportage combined with resistance demonstrations and rituals to sacralize the nation so that it transcended the authority of any particular government. The Chinese “nation” became a “collective spirit of ‘the Chinese people.’” Such an attitude, common in National Salvation literature as well as war reporting, implied that violence by authorities against the people was treason or sacrilege. This cultural development was both an opportunity and a danger for Chiang Kaishek and his government in that it universalized the nation and patriotism, but simultaneously detached it from the Nationalist state per se.11 The United Front with the CCP was a political reflection of nationhood’s separation from a particular government: loyal service – even military service – was conducted by forces not under Nationalist control. (The nominal designation of communist forces as central units fooled no one, particularly after the Southern Anhui Incident in 1941.) Nationalist conscription only exacerbated the

problem with its brutal (and thus treasonous) treatment of the people. This deep political alienation within conscription motivated Nationalists authorities to construct a high-profile model of proper military service, one connected to the specific state, not just to the generalized sacred “nation.” Militarily marginal, if not entirely irrelevant, the Youth Army would meet this political need.

Yet, in order to secure this publicity the Nationalists had to elicit demonstrations of loyalty from individuals, inspiring them to volunteer for service and submit to the state’s discipline and training. The Intellectual Youth Volunteer Movement, thus, partook of a modern focus on the individual citizen and his contribution to the nation. In one sense, this was an old rubric for concerned thinkers and state-makers in China. Going all the way back to Yan Fu (1854 – 1921), many theorists and politicians assumed an identity of interests between the state and individuals.12

The question of how people came to identify with the nation and/or nation-state has attracted scholarly attention. Byrna Goodman’s book on regional networks in Shanghai argues that national sentiment could be based in urban identity, bypassing provincial ties to proceed directly to the nation as locus of identity and commitment.13 This study of military service, a quintessential barometer of citizenship and national identity, suggests that questions of metropolitan and/or hometown identity are misplaced. The key factors for the Intellectual Youth Movement were disembeddedness – not being entangled in a local community or institution – and a pre-existing dependence on the state itself.14 Of course, the state still had to find a pitch that would resonate with the youth, and make sure that it included emotional, material and symbolic aspects. The analysis of the socio-economic situation of the YA volunteers is intended to answer the questions of how that identification with the state was constructed and what were the bases of the state’s appeals.

Once the educated youths had volunteered, their value to the Nationalist state rested on them conspicuously fulfilling the role of citizen-soldiers. Achieving that required not only living up to the conditions of its “bargain” (material and symbolic) with the volunteers, but also deploying a whole suite of practices around political identification with the state among these volunteers. Many of these techniques were not unique to the IYVM, but the Youth Army was unique for the density and intensity of its citizenship practices and rhetoric. The densest cluster of meanings and associations centered around the volunteers’ rifles. The writings and rituals connected with this material object constructed a vision of the state in which it stood coterminous with the people, operating as a hidden exchange mechanism (a market) for all of society.

12. Benjamin Schwartz, Yan Fu, p. 79. Other thinkers, most notably Zhang Taiyan (章太炎), opposed this and opened up a possibility of a state with less dominance over individual interests, but they were in the minority; Wang Hui, “Zhang Taiyan’s Concept of the Individual and Modern Chinese Identity,” in Wen-hsin Yeh, Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond, pp. 231-59. The dominant mode and normative structures of political engagement required an identification with the state.

13. Byrna Goodname, Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937, passim.

14. The youth volunteers fit well with the groups some theorists identify as most susceptible to nationalism: 1. those dependent on state for a living (public-sector workers, teachers, officials); 2. youth, educated by the state; and 3. military; Maria Hsia Chang, Return of The Dragon, p. 8.
This rhetorical structuring of “The State” had its roots in Sun Yatsen’s revolutionary philosophy in the mid-1920s, but it is eerily similar to the communist vision of the state that would be institutionalized in the 1950s (see below).

The Nationalist state was both a material reality and an imagined fantasy, seen and encoded in the ideological construction of citizen-soldiers in Youth Army. Enmeshed in the quintessential institution of state authority, the intellectual youth volunteers helped create and sustain the fundamental fiction of The State itself, through the real cultural practices and propaganda they conducted on its behalf. The state in this study is used in two senses. First, in the sense of an institutional apparatus, complex and with multiple axes of action and reception. But, second, as something itself created out of the interplay of actions and reaction of individuals, organizations, and meaning-values. This second sense may appear nebulous, but it reflects my conviction that “The State” is part mirage, or a shared misrecognition, felt insubstantially or fantasized by people. This is not to deny its naked power (the very real tentacles of institutional power) at all, but to understand the construction of The State as existing on both levels.

Yet even in the Youth Army, the fantasy of the The State was not complete, nor was its ideological mirage without cracks. One important source for the dissonance periodically experienced by youth soldiers was the contradictory ideological foundations of political identity in the Youth Army. On the one hand, the Nationalist technologies of the (political) self rested on elements shared with Marxist (and Maoist) theories, while on the other hand, they also borrowed frequently from some of the fundamental fictions or assumptions of Western liberalist thought. Essential for understanding this tension is the Nationalist practice of “training” (xunlian 訓練). Nationalist theorists of military discipline, like Wang Dongyuan, explained the need for xunlian by theorizing the process of internalizing discipline, inculcating a "voluntary, automatic discipline" [自覺自動的紀律].

Intensive xunlian rested on a conception of personhood that was partially Confucian and partially Marxist, borrowed from Soviet Russia. Donald Munro in his study of the political and psychological theories of “man” in Maoist China has outlined the philosophical bases for this commitment to state-sponsored training of citizens. The key point for our discussion is that Maoist theorists held that humans are perfectible, or improvable, by state-directed education. The state’s proper role – even duty – is to foster the proper attitudes and thoughts among its people. This rested on the conviction that humans are wholly social creatures, a direct contrast to the liberal view, which splits human beings into social and private selves. The liberalist self has individual autonomy, a private self endowed with innate capabilities, potentialities, and desires that

---

15. In a series of speeches given to KMT cadres undergoing an intensive training course late in the war, Wang stressed that reliance on coercion and punishment was the shallowest and weakest form of military discipline. The German way had been to inculcate discipline by "breaking in from the outside" through strict physical drill and demands to adhere to formal requirements in the hope that gradually the restraints would be internalized through repetition. An alternative existed in a French model, according to Wang. Rather than inculcating discipline from external bodily actions and postures, this other method consisted of proceeding "from the internal to the external"; it required mental (or spiritual) education, a firm grasp of and commitment to national consciousness and ideology; Wang Dongyuan, pp. 62-4. Wang, a native of Anhui, got his military education at Baoding. He held various command posts thereafter. In April 1946, he was appointed chairman of the Hunan provincial government. He went to Taiwan with the KMT and was eventually made ambassador to Korea by the ROC government; Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng da cidian, p. 881.
will flourish if given the chance. This private realm apart from the social must be protected if it is to grow to its full potential. The implications for the state are profound. Under a liberal conception of humanity, one of the state’s primary duties is to stay out of the way, to respect the privacy and free development of its citizens. A Confucian-Communist commitment, on the other hand, requires the state to be active in “fosterage,” the bringing about of citizens’ proper social nature, which includes thoughts and actions since these are not private, but socially constructed in the first place. The Nationalists, with their policy of “political tutelage” (xunzheng 訓政), shared a Leninist emphasis on training and model-making with the CCP. From the early 1930s onward, national and social problems were consistently cast as solvable with proper training of individuals. Chiang’s New Life Movement had long emphasized that individuals were the key to China’s revival and strengthening. The Central Training Corps of the KMT (zhongxuntuan 中訓團) was based on the belief “that the problems of the nation could be largely located in the internal orientation of the individual” by rectifying the problems of physical weakness, lax habits, dissipated spiritual energy, and poor organizational élan.

In its wartime mobilization, the Nationalist state left behind the community-based appeals of the anti-Taiping mobilization, and thus was completely “modern.” Yet, it was far from completely consistent in its trajectory and implications. Even in the propaganda it pumped out for the regime, the Youth Army was not a monotone in this regard; with its autobiographical bent, the news and stories written by the volunteers implicitly affirmed individual, personal welfare and fulfillment. This tacit liberalism, with its bifurcation of the social and private self, opened up a space for an emotional “alienation” among even the state’s most committed and voluntary citizens (see the “Gray Night” piece, translated in Chapter Five). There was a gap in the Nationalist rhetoric: the gun became a symbol of alienation too. Despite the ecstatic affirmations in the Youth Army writings, it was experienced with a sense of loss that could poke through in the quiet moments while standing sentry amidst the fog of a cold, gray night. The ideology of citizenship embodied in the Youth Army was, like its rifles, a hodge-podge of makes and models. Many of the techniques (models, small group activism, self-criticism, managerial democracy, even intensive xunlian as a transformation of the volunteers’ social nature) were all either adopted from or shared with orthodox Marxism. Yet, the Nationalist regime simultaneously reaffirmed a more liberal and bourgeois vision of the citizen, even while promoting the basic idea (inherited from Yan Fu) that there was no conflict, potential or real, between the interests of the government and that of individual citizens. The ideological mirror of the state was cracked and fractured: implicitly, some features reaffirmed bourgeois or liberal views, while other features were Leninist in orientation. The end result was that, despite the successful and advantageous bargain struck between the volunteers and the Nationalist state, the youth soldiers unavoidably experienced a deep sense of personal loss alongside the gains.

We should not infer, however, that the cause of the KMT’s collapse on the mainland was ideological imperfections. In the final analysis, the Nationalists’ failure was a military one, brought about on the battlefields of the Civil War. We see in the Youth Army only a statement of the state’s internal logic and the contradictions within it, contradictions that were experienced as

ill-discipline, moments of slippage, or a sense of loss even for the most ideal of its citizens. Even without those cracks, however, the the Youth Army version of citizenship was limited in its appeal.

The discussion of the Youth Army is suggests that the KMT and the Nationalist state were capable of inculcating a sense of political commitment (citizenship) through military service, but that their attempts to do so were ultimately dependent on a set of socio-economic factors (education, deracination, and pre-existing dependency on the state) that did not obtain in the countryside. Politically or ideologically, it resulted in a citizen-soldiery that was explicitly elitist and hence, unattainable by illiterate farmer-peasants. My analysis then is an exploration of how the KMT went about constructing loyalty and the very real limitations of that loyalty. Successful among the refugee youth, there was little hope that this version of citizenship could be extended to farmers in the countryside. The Nationalist citizen-soldier was attractive only to an elite that was predisposed, in terms of its habitus (to use Bourdieu’s concept) and material circumstances, to accept the fundamental terms of the bargain. In some senses, the Youth Army resembled a militarized version of the KMT’s bureaucratic-capitalism, a bargain struck with the elite, those already with capital who were ready to support the regime in return for greater capital gains. It remained unsatisfying to the vast majority of potential citizens. Yet, Nationalist authorities hoped that the Youth Army would bring about a “transformation of the public mood” and end the bifurcated attitudes toward military service in Sichuan, but even staunchly partisan publicists remained incredulous. Alongside the enthusiastic youth volunteers, stories circulated of old men glad to have broken their legs, because it meant they were no longer in any danger of being dragged off to the front. It was, one writer admitted, “[enough] to make one suspect that these [two attitudes toward military service] did not in fact come from the same nation (minzu 民族).”

By placing Nationalist mobilization into its historical context, by looking backwards and noting the breaks with previous mobilizations under the Qing and warlords, the state-making project embedded in Chiang’s military service becomes clearer. Yet, the concept of “logistical citizenship” here looks both backwards (to Sun Yatsen and early KMT ideas about government and society) and forward as well. The war was a period in which previously unrealized ideas about the role of the state began to be planned and implemented out of necessity. Chiang’s wartime regime, then, was a concrete implementation of the ideology and rhetoric of an earlier era and, in turn, it was continuous with the socialist era state as well. In an important sense, the PRC after 1949 was an intensification, to the point of total disaster in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, of logistical citizenship governance: the communist state became virtually the only conduit not only for economic goods and services but for social welfare and political capital as well.

Thus, the second larger story or significance of this study lies in the overall historiographical picture of twentieth-century China. My reading of wartime military service as a state-making endeavor challenges the conventional trajectory of modern Chinese history, which is heavily teleological. The wartime Nationalist regime was not completely bankrupt or bereft of political resources; instead, there were processes of construction occurring right alongside the processes of disintegration. This reappraisal throws the communist revolution into a different light. Instead of an inevitable conclusion to a socio-economic contradiction, or a process of wholesale

political collapse within the Nationalist state, 1949 becomes primarily a military event, a drama of armed conquest that needs to be re-written in terms of strategic choices, battles, diplomacy, and espionage.

Additionally, the close examination of wartime military service opens up areas of continuity across the “Liberation” divide. We are long past the point of seeing the communist state as a “clean slate.” Elizabeth Perry’s recent study of workers militias as a window into the transformation from revolutionary conflict to state-building reminds us that state-making was a process that connected both of China’s party-states, though she neglects the important place of the war in this process.\footnote{Perry, Patrolling the Revolution, passim.} Militarized mobilization did not end with the Japanese surrender, nor even with the communist revolution in 1949. Modes of wartime mobilization and citizenship soon came to be extended to the whole population, on both the mainland and Taiwan. For the postwar era, it can be argued that on both sides of the straits a militarized – certainly militant – mode of citizenship and mobilization was undertaken for decades: the KMT on Taiwan with martial law, continued conscription, and its various preparations to retake the mainland; the PRC with its involvement in the Korean War, which was planned by Mao even before the dust from 1949 had settled. Less directly military, many of the PRC’s political and economic campaigns took forms (deliberately) reminiscent of military mobilizations. As just one minor, if evocative, example, Neil Diamant argues that during the 1950s and 60s, the CCP viewed leisure suspiciously as bourgeois and decadent. The party-state tried to solve this perceived problem with the “regimentation, organization, and politicization” of both time and space.\footnote{Diamant, Revolutionizing the Family, p. 199.} What Diamant overlooks, however, was that this was not new: this sort of regimentation and organization was shared by the KMT during the war as well – the total mobilization of the socialist era was a carry over from the war which preceded it.

Ironically, it would remain for the KMT’s conqueror, Mao’s Communist Party, to put into place a state that would give administrative teeth to the political ideals of Nationalist conscription. Underneath the sea change from the KMT’s corporatism to the CCP’s class discourse, the communist state pushed the KMT’s suspicion of social-ties and market forces out from the narrow arena of military service to the entire politico-economic system. In Mao’s rush toward for radical socialization, social and market forces were completely displaced by the state’s administrative conduits. The administrative tendrils of the PRC – the household registration system, work-unit system, and communes – more or less succeeded in making the state itself the only exchange mechanism for social and economic goods. By the time of the Great Leap Forward, the communist state had eradicated all market forces, becoming the sole circulation mechanism for goods, services, and political benefits.\footnote{See the classic study of the political economy of Raoyong/Wugong, by Friedman, Pickowicz, and Seldon, Chinese Village, Socialist State.} The result was devastating and tragic. The logistics of wartime mobilization were carried from the incompletely realized Nationalist state into Mao’s communist one, where the monopoly over market and social functions was almost total, with disastrous consequences in the Great Leap Forward.

As suggested in Chapter Four, at the village level there are other PRC parallels with wartime conscription too. Recent studies show that communist cadres remained embedded in,
and partial to the interests of, their villages, work teams, production brigades, and communes. Rural communist cadres met state demands, but protected their communities on the margins whenever possible. They too were unreliable state agents, difficult to control completely – a picture strikingly reminiscent of the KMT’s baojia heads. Likewise, recent rural protests in the 1980s and 90s have made use of similar repertoires as the wartime Sichuanese villagers: accusations and petitions appeal to higher authorities to rein in the abuses of village cadres. In its partially successful state-making, Nationalist conscription resembled its successor’s extraction of revenue, as analyzed by Vivienne Shue. Shue argues that while the causal analysis is not at all the same as with imperial times, the CCP’s local rural communist cadres (team, brigade, commune levels) were in a similar position to the imperial gentry: “[T]hese cadres tended to recreate zones of local politics, which once again, even under socialism, limited central state penetration and control of rural villages.” The state was dependent on these rural cadres for essential tasks of extracting surplus and maintaining order. The cadres’ personal salaries were dispersed from the state, but the budgets of the units they were running were restricted to the financial well-being of the unit itself. This served, at least at times, to make the cadres identify with the interests of their units and not with the state. And as with dynastic gentry, “[p]etty local despotism and petty local protectionism are two sides of the same coin in a peasant society that is not yet fully integrated into a modern polity penetrated by a modern state structure.” Shue’s conclusions on the difficulty of PRC-era revenue extraction fit quite well with the assessment of wartime baojia found in this study.

In terms of loyalty construction, the communist state shared aspects, trends, and techniques with the Nationalist regime. For example, the technologies of self employed in the Youth Army were not unique, nor were they the most portable or influential version of many of these practices. The CCP would do much better than the Nationalists in universalizing some of these technologies, bringing them out from barracks and party meetings into the factories and wider society. In his classic study of PRC era factories, Andrew Walder outlines the CCP’s recruitment of “activists.” Interestingly, even in these cases of ostensibly revolutionary class-activism, it is not too hard to discern the material and symbolic exchanges – crass bargains being struck – between the worker-activists and the party-nation. Judith Stacey’s fascinating, if controversial, study of communist patriarchy argues that the CCP made a gender bargain that sacrificed socialist ideals of gender equality in order to gain the support of rural men to serve as guerrillas and soldiers during the war. Outside the factories, the CCP successfully turned farmers into national men, while the KMT’s constructed loyalty remained an elitist, “intellectual youth”, affair, with cracks

22. Even Shue’s causes for the situation resonate with wartime draft levies: Maoist policies (a) fused political authority, economic power, and social status in a small elite and (b) strengthened local economic introversion (autarky) to the point of nearly total isolation and self-reliance, decimating horizontal links and market ties; Shue, The Reach of the State, particularly chapter three: “The Reach of the State: A Comparative-Historical Approach to the ‘Modernization’ of Local Government in China,” pp. 73-122; the quotations here are from pp. 105, 107, 108, and 113.


24. Judith Stacey, Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China, passim. Her study is not without problems, and in some ways is reminiscent of Chalmers Johnsons’ monocausal explanation for rural support for the CCP. The chief issue with Stacey’s work is simply that the CCP’s power-building in rural areas was incredibly complex and involved a large variety of strategies and tactics, including class-based appeals (land reform) as well as outright coercion of the weak and co-optation of local
in the carefully constructed image. Thus, while the Nationalist political technologies at work in the Youth Army shared some key features with the communists, it was less hegemonic in its logical consistency and social application.

If, as argued here, the Nationalists were never completely successful in uniting the compulsory and loyalist aspects of logistical citizenship, then it fell to Mao and the CCP to finally unite the two halves by making citizenship (ascriptive loyalty to the Chinese state) available and attractive to China’s farmer-peasants. Citizenship in the People’s Republic shifted to class identification: “countrymen” (tongbao 同胞) and “citizens” (guomin 國民) were successfully supplanted by “comrades” (tongzhi 同志) and “The People” (renmin 人民) in Mao’s “mobilizational state.” However, unifying the two halves of Chinese citizenry came at a cost, namely the permanent internalization of the wartime paranoia of foreign enemies and domestic traitors, which was smuggled into the very heart of peacetime citizenship, a process that was very likely cemented by the decision to go to war in Korea as part of the CCP’s consolidation of domestic control.\(^{25}\) Domestic class enemies (whether determined by family background or by their own actions) were technically citizens of the PRC, but enjoyed a second-rate version of citizenship: defined as outside “the people” or revolutionary masses (geming minzhong 革命民眾), they were subjected to neglect or outright suppression by the communist state.\(^{26}\)

This somewhat speculative summary of continuities across the Liberation divide is not to argue for a direct line between Nationalist rhetoric and communist institutions, but to suggest (if only evocatively) that there was some shared DNA between the two. Or, to put it more prosaically, that the Nationalist versions of the real and imagined fantasy of “The State” during the war shared some fundamental features with its socialist cousin, even during peacetime. Wartime military service under the Nationalists, thus, established patterns that would hold for the communist state too, which suggests that both of China’s modern states have been, until very recently, deeply marked with the ideals and patterns of wartime mobilization. Even in peacetime, twentieth-century China has been a warfare state.

---

25. For an excellent study of Mao’s decision-making concerning the Korean War, see Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. Domestic control issues, including how mobilizing for war against a perceived “imperialist” invasion threat could contribute to the CCP’s consolidation of internal power, played no small role in Mao’s calculus.

Epilogue

Postwar Youth Army: Promises Fulfilled, Loyal Services Rendered, 1946-49

Demobilization Decisions

By late 1944, it was obvious to many that the Nationalist military with nearly 6 million men (in 124 armies, 354 divisions, and 41 independent brigades) was a massive drain on government finances and the economy without managing to be an effective fighting force. Demobilization of the ineffective units was one proposal, though top level leaders were far from united on whether demobilization was necessary, let alone on questions of how deep the reductions should be or which units should be decommissioned. Despite this lack of consensus, however, Chiang pushed the process through. Beginning in early 1945, the military went about demobilizing nearly one-fifth of its manpower (1.1 million men) and one-third of its units (36 armies, 111 divisions, and 21 brigades), with plans were for a further reduction of 1.4 million men in the following 18 months. Chiang and his supporting generals believed that this would cut the dross from the military, leaving behind the best units, soldiers, and officers, who could then undergo further training to produce a more elite military. The hopes for this “crack troop doctrine” in any future conflict with the CCP was high.1

The Youth Army, despite its status as an elite unit and the proud boasts that a division of intellectual youths was worth ten divisions of regular troops, was not exempt from Chiang’s plan for demobilization. This is one reason why viewing the IYVM and the YA as an anti-communist ploy from the outset rings false; while the YA would indeed play active roles (both military and civilian) against the CCP in the Civil War, the path to these roles was roundabout and the decisions leading to them were ad hoc.

Jiang Jingguo and his supporters tried to prevent the YA's demobilization. At the 46th meeting of the YC Central Standing Committee, Hu Gui proposed that the YA could only fulfill its promise as a foundation for a new military if it was retained as a distinct fighting force. Demobilizing the YA, reducing it to the level of ordinary divisions, or even incorporating it into “com-

1. Demobilization was only one part of a large program of military reorganization which included establishing the National Defense Ministry using the US as a model. Unlike the American system, however, the Defense Minister was more or less a figurehead in China: the real power lay with the Chief of Staff. Chiang gave the more or less empty Defense Minister post to Bai Chongxi, the nominally Muslim general from Guangxi who was by all accounts very capable, and installed one of his most trusted generals and YC leaders, Chen Cheng as Chief of Staff. Bai and Chen's relationship was far from smooth and eventually deteriorated to the point where neither would even attend meetings at which the other was present. Key military leaders, such as Bai and Xu Yongchang (徐永昌), were opposed to the reorganization and later would argue that it did more harm than good; Wang Chaoguang, p. 225-33 and 237.
mon” units, was to admit it had failed and would adversely impact the regime’s youth movement. But after several rounds of discussion, Hu’s proposal was “retained”, which meant tabled and forgotten. This crushed Jiang’s highest hopes for the YA, but he soon adjusted his tactics in light of the new situation. The 50th meeting of the YC Central Standing Committe established the YA Demobilization committee, which Jiang Jingguo dominated. In January 1946, he called together some of his most trusted YC and YA supporters (Hu Gui, Yu Jiyu (俞季虞), Cai Shengsan (蔡省三)) to discuss the imminent demobilization of the YA; Jiang remained optimistic: “This is not the end of the YA, but a new beginning for its development. From today on we need a new strategy: to make the YA into the elite of the National Military’s reserves. Simultaneously we must strengthen political training work in the YA, making it into a ‘newly risen revolutionary strength’ in society.”

Zhao Xiukun (趙秀昆), regimental commander and then chief of staff of the 203D, wrote in his memoirs that at the time of the first demobilization Jiang Jingguo met with Zhao and Zhong Bin (鍾彬) at Luxian to explain his new plan for the YA veterans. “Although we have beaten Japan, the struggle against the communist party will be even more arduous. They are adept at using youth; if we do not fight to bring youth over [to our side], they will be used by the communists. In the past the YC and military training in the schools has not been sufficient and poorly handled. Therefore, we have decided to use this method, which was originally suggested by Ye Qing [葉清]: to make youth even more willing to join the military we must demobilize them on schedule” and disperse them across the country, keeping them ready for action. By the end of the Lushan conference in July 1946, Chiang Kaishek was onboard, pushing this same vision of the Youth Army’s future role. To those who expressed doubt over the demobilization of the YA at a time when the government needed soldiers to fight against the CCP’s Red Army, Chiang responded: “The intellectual youth who have been trained in the army are one of our most important strengths. They can remain in the army or they can be moved to other places as [our] backbone [force], increasing our troops on all sides. Let them go to school or jobs, where their function will be even larger [than if they remained in the army] and they can develop many divisions, regiments, battalions, companies, and squads. Let them go everywhere to deal with the communist party and bandit elements. Therefore, if these people leave [the army] it is not in vain. At the same time we can very quickly organize a new Youth Army and have even more youths continue training.” The conference called for another set of divisions to be called up, which would turn a whole new group of youths into “Loyal Defenders of the Party-State.”

Except for the 207D and a few men who elected to remain in service, the YA was ordered to

---

2. Ma Lie argues that it was parental pressure, in the form of a deluge of letters to the Nationalist military authorities, that forced Chiang and Jiang to demobilize the Youth Army; Ma Lie, Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan, p. 135. This may have some basis in fact, and if so, only strengthens the sense that the YA soldiers saw themselves as entitled to certain “rights” in return for their term of service. But it is hard to imagine that the generalissimo’s long-term strategy was so influenced by parental letters. Instead, it is likely that his decision to insist on demobilizing the Youth Army reflects his general turn away from the YC and YA and back to the KMT, which began in 1946 and would result in the merging of the YC into the KMT in late 1947.


5. Luo Chang’an, pp. 81-2.
demobilize in early June 1946, but before that Jiang Jingguo put his plan into motion: regular political work classes continued (housed in the YC Central Cadre School, naturally), but even more important the YA divisions were given a nearly six months of additional training to prepare the YA as the foundation of the postwar reserve system. After finishing the reserve training course, YA soldiers were given an exam, and those who passed were given a commission as second lieutenant in the reserves. But the training was more than that, it was deliberately and self-consciously political as well. Units were given strong doses of politicized education. Much of this was bluntly anti-communist in nature. For example, the notorious anti-coomunist expert Ye Qing made a two week trip to the 204D to spread anti-communist materials.

The reborn YA produced and distributed materials that were subtler and more intellectual than the baldly strident approach. The Reserve Officer Training Office, a direct descendent of the YA Demobilization Office, put together textbooks for training purposes, one of which was *A Critique of Chinese Political Parties* (*Zhongguo zhengdang pipan* 中國政黨批判, 1947). This booklet was a part of the training for reserve officers in their role as “pacification cadres,” and it provided a more sophisticated defense of the Nationalist regime. Claiming to have “adopted the position of the citizenry, with an objective attitude”, the writers examined all the major political parties of the time. In the early sections it featured an interpretation of Sun Yatsen’s Three People’s Principles that placed the People’s Livelihood (*minsheng*) at the center of recent history. As Sun’s chief goal, The People’s Livelihood meant “average land rights,” and committed the Nationalist government to pursuing the growth of national capital and the restraint of private capital. The *Critique*’s account of KMT-CCP interaction was biased to stress the faithlessness of the CCP, portraying many of its actions as deliberate attempts to thwart national unification and sovereignty. And, naturally enough, it portrayed the CCP as a mere adjunct of the Third International, just a form of disguised (Russian) imperialism, but the outline of the CCP organization and tenets of Marxist doctrine was succinct and free of derogatory language. It went on to mount a philosophical rebuttal of historical materialism, attempting to demonstrate that “matter” and materialism cannot explain existence, and thus is not the only decisive thing in human history. Spirit or “life” is just as necessary, even on a cosmic scale. Instead of Hegel’s dialectics, the nameless author(s) stressed an almost Daoist conception of opposites as “two sides of the same unity.” The *Critique* continued with an attack on some fundamental ideas in Marxist ideology, such as the negation of the negation, and called into question the orthodox communist position of anti-nationalism and the successes of communist policies in the USSR.

7. Zhou Shuzhen, *Sanqingtuan shimo*, p. 249. Ye Qing (葉青), also known as Ren Zhuxuan (任卓宣), was heavily involved in the YC and with the re-education camps for suspected communists run by Kang Ze, under Youth Training Corps (青年訓練團) auspices.
8. *Zhongguo zhengdang pipan*, p. 3, 11, and 12. The booklet contains no indication of authorship, but it is possible that it was penned by Ye Qing. He often taught a class titled “A Critique of Political Parties” (*zhengdang pipan* 政黨批判) for the Youth Corps and the re-education camps; Ma Lie, *Jiangjia fuzi yu sanqingtuan*, p. 112.
10. Ibid., pp. 34-9, and 51. Other parties were dealt with perfunctorily: parties such as the China Youth Party (*中國青年黨*), for example, are dismissed as superfluous because their goals and aims are
To handle the demobilization process, a national YA Demobilization Office was established along with subordinate local branches, and a network of local communications offices to coordinate information about the demobilization process as it worked with local governments.\(^1\) Jiang Jingguo was placed in charge of the Demobilization Office and he ensured that it maintained close links to the Youth Corps, aided by the fact that the entire YA was ordered to join the YC en masse.\(^12\) In Beiping and Nanjing, for example, the branch office of the Youth Corps alumni association were located at the same address as the Demobilization Office.\(^13\)

As part of the larger military reorganization process, the YA Demobilization Office almost immediately (August 1946) became the Defense Ministry’s Reserve Officer Training Office, with Jiang at the helm, and this office was upgraded to the Reserves Officer Bureau shortly thereafter. This connection between the YA and the national military reserve system was inspired by the US example. Under American guidance, the Chinese government hurriedly established a Defense Ministry (\textit{Guofangbu 国防部}) in 1946, which was directly modeled on the US, including the ROTC system. China, of course, could not rely on its tiny population of university students to supply the officers it needed for the reserves, but the Youth Army was the closest substitute and already at hand.\(^14\) All of this was part of the preparation for the looming political and military conflict with the CCP. Both Chen Cheng and Jiang belonged to an informal group of hawks who advocated using military force against Mao. In 1946, the KMT “Renewal Movement,” started by a loose group of high-level YC men, such as Liang Hancao, Ye Qing (Ren Zuo’xuan), Liu Jianqun, and Xu Fuguan (徐復觀), was preparing to fight a “two front war,” one against the CCP and one against the regime’s own internal corruption.\(^15\)

Securing the demobilized YA as a future resource, both as politicized civilian activists and as future army reserves, meant careful handling of their return to civilian life. In June, when the order to begin the immediate demobilization of the Youth Army divisions came down, there were some exceptions. A certain proportion of youth soldiers were allowed to remain in service in the much reduced divisions or trained as officers for other divisions, but the vast majority were demobilized (the total by May 1947 stood at 71,440).\(^16\) The most significant exception was the

---

11. qz0063.mj1-881, p. 73 dated June 1946.
12. Zhou Shuzhen, \textit{Sanqingtuan shimo}, p. 249. Jiang was actually the vice-director, under Chen Cheng, but he was the one in charge; other vice heads were Deng Wenyi and Peng Weiren (彭位仁).
13. Huang Wei, pp. 81-2 and Li Zhongshu, p. 107.
16. QNJS, vol. 2, pp. 505-7. The retainees were put into officer training battalions for extended training. Some sources claim they were rotated to the Central Military Academy for regular army officer training, eventually ending up as the officer corps for the YA divisions in the Civil War; Zhou Shuzhen, \textit{Sanqingtuan shimo}, pp. 250-3. Other sources that they were retained as junior grade officers for the second, civil war, incarnation of the Youth Army in 1947; Ma Lie, \textit{Jiangjia fuzi yu}
207D, stationed in Shenyang, which was retained intact. Its strategic position gave it a “special mission” to defend the city as part of the attempt to secure the all-important area of Manchuria for the Nationalist government. But the majority of the youth soldiers were demobilized and they immediately demanded that the state fulfill its obligations to them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number Demobilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>201D</td>
<td>5,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202D</td>
<td>6,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203D</td>
<td>5,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204D</td>
<td>8,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205D</td>
<td>5,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206D</td>
<td>7,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208D</td>
<td>10,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209D</td>
<td>10,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14R Truck Transport</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15R Truck Transport</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Transport Training</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP 3R Training</td>
<td>869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP 4R Training</td>
<td>1,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP 5R Training</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Independent 2nd Battalion</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Independent 3rd Battalion</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6A Political Bureau</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9A Political Bureau</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31A Political Bureau</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Work Guidance Committee</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table E-1: Youth Army Demobilization

Demobilization: Promises Fulfilled

In 1946 many YA volunteers were anxious to go back to school or work. By mid-June, the demobilization office had received thousands of requests from the volunteers to return to their studies or their original job. Anticipating this demand, and motivated by the realization that the

-sanqingtuan, p. 136.

17. qz0065.mj1-881, pp. 107a-b dated June 1946.
future willingness of youth to serve the regime depended on fulfilling the promises made to the volunteers, Jiang Jingguo and the demobilization office designed a plan to let former students resume their studies and return others to employment. In cooperation with the Education Ministry, soldiers who wanted to go back to their studies at their original schools were allowed to do so, while those students whose schools had closed or who had no way to return to their original schools were permitted to transfer to other schools. These soldiers were tested (by the new school); if they did well enough, they were advanced a semester or a year from their pre-volunteer class level; otherwise, they returned to their original class standing. To prepare these students for their placement tests YA units began holding college prep classes and summer training camps. As a further measure, the Demobilization Office established Youth Army Middle Schools in Chongqing, Guiyang, Wanxian, Hanzhong (Shaanxi), Hangzhou, and Jiaxing (Zhejiang). Those who wanted to go back to work went back to their original workplace, if it had an opening. However, given the chaos of the war, many institutions had ceased to exist or had no openings, and so the demobilization office set up vocational training programs to train the soldiers for jobs in teaching, communications, accounting, business, or farming. The southwest branch of the Demobilization Office went a step further, writing letters of introduction for those with experience and willing to work in government. Each county and municipality was ordered to help demobilized YA soldiers find suitable positions or enrollment opportunities after returning home. Mirroring their responsibilities during the IYVM, local governments organized returning home parades, arranged for lodging, supplied transportation into and out of their jurisdictions, and provided medical care and entertainment for returning youth soldiers. These steps were motivated by fear that there would be incidents if the government failed to fulfill its promises.

As per the regulations established by the national demobilization office, the Chongqing municipal committee was chaired by the mayor, Zhang Dunlun, but real duties were handled by the vice-chairs, Long Wenzhi and Chen Jiesheng (陳介生). Long was the head of the municipal KMT branch, and a YC member; early on Chen was a central YC leader, in the economic section. Formally called for the first time in mid-May, the Chongqing demobilization committee had to work quickly, calling on the resources and manpower of the Chongqing Garrison, municipal government, police, public health, transportation, YC, KMT and nearby YA divisions.

---

18. qz0063.mj1-881, pp. 82-4 dated 27 May 1946 and QNJS, vol. 2, p. 504. The students were to retain their pre-service scholarship and funding when they returned to their studies.

19. The CQ school enrolled 3,000; Guiyang and Hanzhong, 2,000 each; Hangzhou and Jiaxing, 1,500.

20. GJZGSG, vol. 2, pp. 1337-9. The vocational programs were located at Wanxian and Luxian Sichuan, Hanzhong (Shaanxi), and Hangzhou and Jiaxing in Zhejiang. Luxian had 3,000; Wanxian and Hanzhong both had 2,000; Hangzhou and Jiaxing only 1,500. In Changchun (Manchuria), a small YA Middle School and vocational program were set up for the few soldiers demobilized from the 207D.

21. qz0065.mj1-881, pp. 52a-b dated 18 June 1946.

22. qz0063.mj1-881, p. 9a-b; MAC and CQ Field HQ forwarded YA Demobilization Oversight Office order to CQMG, dated 25 May 1946. Long-distance transportation for the demobilized soldiers was handled by various national government institutions; QNJS, vol. 2, pp. 502-3.

23. For a complete roster of institutions, committee and sub-committee members, see qz0063.mj1-881, pp. 47-51 dated 17 June 1946.
Chongqing anticipated bearing a heavy burden, as it had to manage not only the 7,000 soldiers who were natives of the city, but also an estimated 20,000 who would pass through on their way home.\textsuperscript{24} The committee established reception and service stations around the city and at transportation hubs, such as the Jialing (鶏凌) docks, Lianglukou (兩路口), and Taipingmen (太平門).\textsuperscript{25} In late May, the Chongqing demobilization committee began actively soliciting donations of needed goods; blankets, toothbrushes, handkerchiefs, letter paper and envelopes, reading materials, shoes and socks, and cash were all accepted at a special station set up at Lianglukou.\textsuperscript{26} The hurried arrangements were soon put to the test the returning youth soldiers hit the city in the first three weeks of June. The demobilization committee successfully and more or less smoothly processed more than 4,000 returnees by mid-month. As the rush abated, the committee closed down one of its two major reception stations, cut the personnel at the first station, and reduced its own numbers drastically, turning to the more mundane and longer term aid issues surrounding returning the volunteers to their work and studies. The total number of youths handled, and whether or not the estimates of 20,000 were wildly high or not, is unclear.\textsuperscript{27}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table E-2: Youth-Soldier Post-Demobilization Activities</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>resume studies (original school)</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resume studies (transfer to new school)</td>
<td>1,577</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>begin studies (not previously enrolled)</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enter (YA-run) Middle Schools</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enter (government-run) vocational schools</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political cadre training exam</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resume studies at a higher level</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>8,167</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: QNJS, vol. 1, pp. 249-51

The demobilization regulations for the YA were taken seriously and implemented conscien-

\textsuperscript{24} qz0063.mj1-881, pp. 74-7 dated 13 May 1946. YA divisions were required to notify Chongqing of the number of soldiers being sent to the city; the estimate soon dropped to “not more than 20,000.”

\textsuperscript{25} qz0063.mj1-881, pp. 82-4 dated 27 May 1946.

\textsuperscript{26} qz0063.mj1-881, pp. 20a-b dated 28 May 1946.

\textsuperscript{27} The reports in the CQMA do not continue after this. It is quite likely that many of the youth soldiers stationed in the counties around Chongqing just walked or found their way back to their homes in the area. The committee members, drawn from a whole range of municipal and governmental institutions, returned to their original workplaces. qz0063.mj1-881, pp. 116-21 dated 17 June 1946. A report from the re-enrollment sub-committee filed in the second week of June suggest that perhaps the total was much less than the anticipated numbers, as it listed only 247 men as having begun the procedures to resume their studies. qz0063.mj1-881, pp. 109-12 dated 9 June 1946.
tiously.²⁸ In May, the Executive Yuan, issued strict orders to the Chongqing Municipal Government that all obligations to the youth soldiers were to be met. Symbolically, the municipal government was to publicize the contributions of the intellectual youths in firming up the national will, despite the fact that the Youth Army never saw action against the Japanese.²⁹ Government institutions that anticipated re-hiring YA volunteers requested regulation clarifications and decisions from the municipal government, some of which were clearly attempts to lighten the financial load that such returnees might have. For example, the Chongqing finance bureau petitioned mayor Zhang proposing that if the nine volunteers from the bureau did not report for work within three weeks of being demobilized that the bureau be freed of its obligation to re-hire them.³⁰

In cases where institutions tried to evade their responsibilities, Youth Army soldiers were quick to assert their rights, demonstrating that these educated volunteers had a unique relationship to the organs of power. Ma Fu (馬輔), a volunteer in the 601st regiment, was one such case. He had worked in the Chongqing Air Raid Shelter Management Office prior to volunteering, but the Air Raid authority had halted his benefits and had ignored his written petitions. So, in his quest for his old job and the year and half back pay he was due, he turned to the municipal government. While the outcome of the case is not recorded, the municipal Civil Affairs Office did pass his case on to the mayor’s office.³¹ In a similar case, a group of youth soldiers from the 201D undertook a letter writing campaign to authorities when the 3AD ignored their repeated requests for their previous positions, even when the commander of their regiment, the 601R, wrote an open letter on their behalf to the 3AD. The case went so far as to eventually get general Chen Cheng, as head of the national demobilization office, to render a decision on behalf of one of the volunteers, granting him a one-time payment (for back pay) and ordering the 3AD to help him find new employment. With the Sichuan provincial government declaring that the volunteers had “fulfilled [their] citizens’ duty,” the national Demobilization Office eventually weighed in on

²⁸ On demobilization of the Youth Army and the fulfillment of many promises to youth soldiers, see Luo Chang’an, p. 84; Fang Jingzun, p. 154; Zhang Guchu, p. 81; and Wang Zicong, pp. 61-2. Huang Wei outlines in considerable detail the provisions successfully undertaken by the Nationalists after demobilization in 1946; pp. 76-8. It should be noted that all of these are sources published on the mainland well after 1949 and hence are far from friendly towards the Nationalist regime. Huang Wei asserts that recruits only “received a certain level of fulfillment of these promises,” but he never elaborates on the areas left unfulfilled; p. 76. In fact, his list of policies in 1946-7 seems to demonstrate just how thoroughly the Nationalists provided educational benefits for the former youth soldiers. As dry as this list is, it forces us to acknowledge that Chiang and his generals were engaged in a deliberate set of material exchanges with the youth soldiers.

²⁹ qz0063.mj1-881, pp. 66-7 dated 30 May 1946. See also, qz0051.mj2-397, p. 211a dated 6 June 1946, a report from the Chongqing demobilization committee to the national demobilization committee in summer 1946.

³⁰ qz0065.mj1-881, p. 4 dated 4 May 1946. The record in surrounding counties is, again, much thinner than for Chongqing, but also suggests that the YA demobilization was taken seriously, though, of course, on a much smaller scale than in Chongqing. See for example, qz0055.mj2-621, pp. 137-8, from Ba county, dated June 1946 (MG 35.6), which granted youth-soldiers their benefits and back pay from their original institutions.

the other soldiers in the case, ordering the 3AD to pay out back pay and find positions for the volunteers if their claims were validated.\footnote{32}

The handling of the demobilized YA soldiers could hardly find a starker contrast than with the regular soldiers and officers in the Nationalist army. While official Executive Yuan plans called for a massive program to train and then put demobilized soldiers to work in a host of national reconstruction projects, the plans never materialized, quite likely due the staggering costs it would have required.\footnote{33} Demobilized officers and men straggled back to their hometowns, abandoned by the Nationalist state. Sun Yuanliang, commander of the Chongqing Garrison after the war, wrote of the plight of the 4,000 destitute demobilized officers in the city. They wandered the city eating at restaurants and paying with IOUs that they had no means to pay; in a popular joke this was the officers’ \textit{youshi} (literally: roving meals, \textit{youshi} 游食), a play on words since it was a homophone for a contraction of the word for a (political) demonstration (\textit{youshishi} 游行示威).\footnote{34} After the war, Hu Zongnan noted that soldiers had become beggars (\textit{qigai} 乞丐), due to impoverishment and decline in their social status; the common soldiers, more or less abandoned by the Nationalist state, joined the ranks of the ubiquitous beggars in Chongqing’s streets and alleys.\footnote{35} In contrast to the unfortunate regular soldiers and officers who were forgotten by the Nationalist military, the YA soldiers were treated with kid gloves.

The hopes that Jiang Jingguo had for these YA veterans required that some means of keeping in touch with them, of organizing them, be found. The communications offices set up in twenty-six major cities for information-gathering and disseminating aid to the former youth soldiers during demobilization were an easy choice, and Jiang quickly moved to turn these into the


\footnotesize{33} Wang Chaouang, pp. 227-8.


\footnotesize{35} Zhang Ruide, \textit{Kangzhan shiqi di guojun renshi}, p. 97, citing \textit{Hu Zongnan shangjiang nianpu} (胡宗南上將年譜), p. 144. It is worth noting that the Nationalists were not alone in their lack of commitment to rank and file veterans. Despite the praise lavished on them in propaganda, Red Army veterans were disregarded, ignored, and mistreated by the CCP after the war as well. PLA soldiers’ marriages not protected by the PRC state in the 1950s and 1960s, especially when the soldiers’ wives were involved with party cadres; Diamant, “Between Martyrdom and Mischief: The Political and Social Predicament of CCP War Widows and Veterans, 1949-66,” in Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon, \textit{The Scars of War}, pp. 162-75 and Diamant, \textit{Revolutionizing The Family}, pp. 232-43. European states often did no better in the wake of World War One. France, in particular, was also rather poor in attending to the real needs of its veterans, especially the disabled. Delays in the process of demobilization “was [a form of] victimization” that aroused great irritation among soldiers impatient to return to civilian life. During the interwar years, French veterans were angry and resentful at civilians, particularly when they refused to give their previous jobs back to the returning soldiers. A common attitude was that the common solders had “truly earned the right to live by working now that the war is over”. Such concerns were behind the surge of voluntary veterans associations, such as the Union Fédérale and Union nationale des combattants; Prost, \textit{In the Wake of War}, pp. 28-34.
local branches of a YA Veterans Association. Like the YA itself, the Vet Association maintained an umbilical connection to the YC; the Nanjing branch was physically located inside the YC’s Central Cadre School Alumni Association. Branch offices opened in major cities, summer camps were held, and the association began publishing *Dawn* (*Shuguang bao* 曙光報) as a mouthpiece and way to stay in touch. The demobilization communication offices and the Veterans Association did their job and kept YA veterans politicized and active. 1947 saw reports of YA veterans organizing paramilitary and military actions against CCP forces in Hebei, Shandong, and Hubei.

**Veterans in Schools: A Blunt and Loyal Instrument**

As part of this post-demobilization activism, YA veterans were key components of the government’s ill-managed campaign against growing student protests. In some state-run schools, YA veterans dominated new enrollment; in the year immediately after the Japanese surrender as many as 50 per cent or more of the freshmen in some schools were YA veterans. These YA students made crude attempts to counter what Nationalist authorities were convinced were communist instigated student demonstrations.

While numerous small-scale student protests flared up almost constantly, four major waves of student demonstrations occurred during the postwar years prior to the liberation of the mainland: the December 1st Incident (Kunming) in 1945; the Anti-US Movement (Beiping) in December 1946; the Anti-Hunger, Anti-Civil War Movement in May and June 1947; and the Anti-Oppression, Anti-Hunger Movement in April - June 1948. The student protests were motivated primarily by anti-war sentiments and the conviction that the economic and political price of pursuing the Civil War to prop up Chiang’s regime was too great. The four protest waves succeeded in gradually linking up student demonstrations into a loose national movement that was increasingly defiant towards the regime.

The Anti-Hunger, Anti-Civil War Movement in 1947 provides a good example of the range of activities that the YA and its veterans participated in as they attempted to keep a lid on the growing unrest among students. The movement began among professors at the National Central University, dominated by the CC Clique. The professors requested a range of reforms that would help save schools, students, and professors from the crushing inflation brought about by the Civil War and the KMT’s mismanagement of the economy. The movement spread from professors to students, and from Nanjing to Beiping, where students at Qinghua University and Beida called a three day strike beginning on the 17th of May. On the 18th, groups of students who were putting up flyers and posters in the streets were beaten by soldiers from the YA 208D. In Nanjing and

---

40. A succinct account of the student movement is found in Pepper, pp. 42-93. See also Jeffrey Wasserstrom, “Student Struggles of the Mid-1940s,” in *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China*, pp. 240-76.
41. This was the exception, rather than the rule in Beiping. Chiang was reportedly willing to use any means necessary to crush the student protests, but local Beiping educational, governmental, and even military authorities were more moderate in their responses. Li Zongren, the Beiping Garrison
Shanghai, the violence was greater and the campaign of intimidation against students was carried out by a wide range of military, intelligence, and police agencies, including YA divisions and veterans associations within schools.\textsuperscript{42} Not all the YA activities were violent. Jiang Jingguo himself went to Shanghai to help mobilize the YA veterans, especially the university students, against leftist students, at times leading them in counter-demonstrations in support of the government and to demand a return to classes.\textsuperscript{43} Although the government’s main objective, preventing large-scale demonstrations on the declared Anti-Civil War day (June 2), was achieved, the cost was cementing the conviction among educational circles that the KMT regime was beyond rescue and hastening the founding of the All-China Students Association, which adopted a determined and defiant attitude toward the central government. Indeed, even some YA veterans abandoned their pro-government stance in light of repressive tactics. In early 1948, Deng Te, a demobilized YA soldier from the 208D studying at Beida, aroused much sympathy for his mistreatment and torture by government authorities after he put up a wall paper which was critical of the regime.\textsuperscript{44} The fundamental problem, of course, was that despite the loyalty of the YA veterans toward the regime, mobilizing them could not address the fundamental problems behind the student demonstrations. Leaders like Jiang Jingguo were convinced that the students in China’s major cities were being stirred up by underground communist agents – a claim which persists even in recent YA Veterans Association materials. The YA students were an attempt to organize civilian shock troops to counter this assumed communist influence, but there was no communist conspiracy in the schools during the Civil War. On this issue of communist instigation of the student movement, Suzanne Pepper concludes rightly that some degree of influence was there, motivated by the desire to win allies and isolate the Nationalist government from as many sectors of society as possible, but the speed and widespread nature of the protests indicate that the economic and anti-war issues were genuine among students and not the result of covert communist agitation:

\begin{quote}
commander, adopted a lenient attitude, but scattered incidents of violence against student protestors continued, almost certainly carried out by Dai Li’s intelligence organization, which was outside Li’s control; Pepper, \textit{Civil War in China}, pp. 62-3.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., pp. 64-5.
\textsuperscript{43} Taylor, in his biography of Jiang, suggests that he was quite moderate in his use of the YA veterans: “Ching-kuo went frequently to Shanghai to deal with growing student agitation. His most important asset in trying to counter Communist activity on the campuses of Shanghai were the several thousand Youth Army veterans in the city, especially the 500 or so who were now university students. Although he could have used the mass organizations at his disposal in an intimidating manner, he refused to do so. The head of the Youth Army Federation in Shanghai at the time, Ch’en Chih-ching, recalled how on one occasion Ching-kuo responded to a student strike at Fudan University. Chiang mobilized a mass meeting of Youth Army veterans who were also students to demand a return to classes. The veterans rallied as instructed, but a large group of leftist students formed a wall at the entrance to the University and barred their entry. Instead of ordering the pro-KMT students to break through the human barrier, Ching-kuo commanded them to move to Huangpu Park where he would address them. In his speech Ching-kuo stressed that it was the Communists who were using force to prevent students from meeting on their own campus”; Taylor, \textit{The Generalissimo’s Son}, p. 146-7. The same episode is alluded to in the YA Veterans Association official history as well; QNJS, vol. 1, p. 251-8. This particular incident, while likely true enough, is not entirely representative of all the YA veterans’ activities during these wild and wooly years.

\textsuperscript{44} Pepper, \textit{Civil War in China}, pp. 71-2.
“If there were Communists participating, they were following the students, not leading them.”

The loyalty and commitment of the YA veterans to the Nationalist regime made them a ready tool, but one completely unable to address the real issues of inflation, the gutting of educational budgets, and the Civil War which were behind the protests. Instead, the YA participated in the repressive tactics that the Nationalist authorities were so ready to resort to, and thus only heightened the disaffection and defiance of the mass of students toward the government.

From Demobilization to Re-mobilization: The (Reborn) Youth Army in the Civil War

The YA veterans were not the only ones mobilized by the Nationalists; the remnants (and reconstituted divisions) were active in a range of anti-communist (so-called pacification) activities. The 209D was active in Shanghai from mid-July 1946 on. Convinced that unrest among both workers and students were the result of communist agitation, the division was charged with a whole host of roles in securing the city and its westward counties. The 209D handled population registration activities and citizens’ training classes; established informant networks; and staged counter-demonstrations to the student protests.

While elements of the YA were fighting against the CCP front line units in northern Anhui in the fall of 1947 (see below), the YA veterans put down worker and student demonstrations in Shanghai and engaged in “peace preservation” work in the Nanjing-Shanghai area. Elements of the 202D were active in the Suzhou-Changzhou area, keeping order in small cities and townships. Attached to various Pacification Districts and the Songpu-Shanghai Garrison, the division patrolled roads, the Yangzi riverbanks, and the northeastern area around Lake Tai (太湖). The YA units were not restricted to purely military and paramilitary roles however. As a holdover from the wartime practice of engaging with local society around the YA bases, non-military, social involvement tasks continued as well. In the Third Pacification District, YA units undertook baojia and household registration; suppression of opium, gambling, prostitution, and extortion; and promoted the New Life Movement. For suppressing unionization and the student movement in Suzhou, the 202D relied on already de-mobilized recruits who had re-enrolled in schools and set up secret organizations and spy networks. YA veterans identified suspected communist activist students or professors, whom they hounded with “ingenious arrangements and methods” into leaving on their own for Beijing, Nanjing, or Shanghai. These suspects were then arrested secretly as they fled Suzhou. The YA worked closely with Nationalist intelligence agencies (specifically, the Zhongtong 中統, the Central Sta-

45. Ibid., p. 84. “Because they persisted in the claim – and apparently believed – that a small but strategically placed group of Communist cadres was responsible for the student protests, KMT leaders never seriously attempted to explain why so many students participated in them. Had the Government done so, it would have been obliged to come to grips with the reasons for the failure of its own youth workers to acquire a mass following in favor of the war and the KMT. ... The Government failed in its efforts to ‘pacify’ the students because it could not bring itself to acknowledge certain facts about their protest movement: that it was spontaneous; that the radicalizing issues were the Civil War itself and the Government’s repressive tactics; and that the most active students in the movement, unlike the KMT’s youth workers, were genuine student leaders in terms of activism and intellect, who represented the prevailing aversion to the war and dissatisfaction with the KMT”; ibid., pp. 86 and 89.

tistics Bureau) in this task: the arrested “communists” were handed over to the intelligence group or the Capital Garrison Command.47

Demobilization was just a prelude to re-mobilization: as noted earlier in August 1946, the YA Demobilization Office was converted to the National Defense Ministry Reserve Officer Training Office.48 In many ways, this was the realization of He Yingqin’s 1928 conscription plan: a reserve system that could be activated quickly when needed, but that would not only reduce the financial burden, but also allow soldiers to be economically productive during peacetime. But there was to be no peace in late 1940s China, and the YA divisions soon found duty calling again. Jiang Jingguo had already recognized this possibility in early 1945, and decided to transform the YA into the Reserve Officer Corps. But the YA was not only dispersed into regular units as officers; it was also resurrected as a direct successor to its wartime incarnation as well.

As open hostilities against the communists ramped up, Chiang Kaishek and the Nationalist military started a new drive for educated youth volunteers in late 1947.49 Due to the hasty resumption of recruiting, the quotas for this new drive for intellectual youth volunteers were initially included in the general conscription quotas in the districts around Chongqing, although Chen Cheng’s urgent order for a renewed volunteer drive specified that volunteers were to be taken only on the basis of their own volition and without regard to their hometown.50 Administrative exhaustion made it impossible to realize the same type of special administration that had characterized the wartime IYVM, but YA recruitment was not to remain the domain of the regular conscription apparatus: reformed YA divisions were allowed to recruit directly within the city, setting up enlistment stations to accept volunteers almost on the spot.51 In some cases, YA divi-

47. Ibid., pp. 130-4. The YA Veterans Association in its official history crowed that they nabbed several communists in this way: one assistant professor, eleven mid-level vocational school teachers and fifty students. On the Zhongtong (CSB), its leadership and ties to the Chen brothers, its role as KMT party secret police, and intense antagonism with Dai Li’s Juntong (Military Statistics Bureau) see Wakeman, Spymaster, pp. 130, 206-9, and 253-5. By the summer of 1947, the 202D helped suppressed the student movement on Shanghai campuses as well, especially those most active in the student demonstrations, like Jiatong University.

48. QNJS, vol. 2, pp. 508-9. Bai Chongxi in his report on training to the Military Reorganization Conference (November 1945) stressed the urgent need to implement a reserve system, both to maintain a level of preparedness but also to reduce the enormous expenditure of sustaining the military.

49. Huang Wei, pp. 75-9; Luo Chang’an, pp. 80-2; GJZGSG, vol. 2, pp. 1337-43. One document dated from mid-1947 concerns the 203D, under Pan Huaguo, recruiting up to 10,000 new volunteers from Chongqing and Chengdu, but this seems to be an isolated case; qz0053.mj14-97, p. 50-50b dated 11 June 1947.


51. qz0063.mj1-895, p. 11 dated 2 July 1948: the 203D and 201D, under the Baxian Regimental District, were both recruiting youth volunteers in Chongqing. For the recruitment areas and activities of each of the divisions, see QNJS, vol. 1, pp. 106-7 (201D); pp. 128-30 (202D); pp. 144-5 (203D); pp. 157-8 (204D); p. 169 (205D); pp. 179-80 (206D); p. 207 (207D); pp. 220-3 (208D); and pp. 251-2 (209D).
sions would return to a warlord era pattern of recruitment, stationing a portion of their strength in an area to recruit and then shipping the volunteers to the main strength of the division.\textsuperscript{52}

In early 1948, the 203D, under Pan Huaguo (潘華國), was given permission by the Defense Ministry to recruit in various places in Sichuan and Shaanxi during the lunar new year vacation period. The 203D seeded stations over a large swath of Sichuan, in four cities and 31 counties.\textsuperscript{53}

Recruitment, however, was anything but organized as 1948 wound on; other divisions and training offices began recruiting widely, often on their own and often in the same areas. For example, the First Training Office received orders that starting in June 1948 it could begin unified recruiting and training to fill up YA divisions. However, the 201D was simultaneously recruiting 6,000 volunteers in Chongqing. The 203D meanwhile set up a recruiting station in Guizhou province and then sent personnel to Guizhou, Chongqing, Chengdu, Luxian, and Wanxian to establish recruiting stations in those areas too.\textsuperscript{54}

From the extant volunteer declaration forms, it seems likely that the character of YA volunteers changed greatly. The educational level of the volunteers fell precipitously; refugee youths had returned home and were no longer signing up for the YA during the Civil War period.\textsuperscript{55}

Surviving rosters of Sichuan youth volunteers from late 1947 show a great proportion of thumbprints instead of signatures, indicating that many recruits were illiterate.\textsuperscript{56}

From 1947, the new YA recruiting stations from 1947 on specifically targeted the unenrolled and unemployed youths. One unintended consequence of the Nationalist government’s catastrophic economic policies during the previous years was that the pool of recruits for the new YA was large. The 203D recruiting station at Daping (大坪) in Chongqing recruited 294 unemployed/unenrolled volunteers in early 1948: 5.8% (17 men) were demobilized soldiers; 4.4% (13 men) had lost their job due to job cuts at their workplace; 60% (176) were plainly “unemployed”, which meant most likely they were simply unable to find a job; 0.3% (1 man) was in the midst of a career change; 25.9% (76 men) were unable to attend school for various reasons; and 3.7% (11 men) listed that they had volunteered for service.\textsuperscript{57}

While the recruits in 1948 revived the wartime pattern in that they were again more educated (after the 1947 dip above), they were still

\footnotesize{52. QNJS, vol. 1, pp. 106-7.}

\footnotesize{53. Its recruiting stations included Chongqing, Bishan (璧山), Longchang (隆昌), Suining (遂寧), Neijiang (內江), Santai (三台), Mianyang (綿陽), Guangyun (廣雲), Wanxian (萬縣), Jiangjin (江津), Qianjiang (綦江), Daxian (達縣), Nanchong (南充), Zigong (自貢), Chengdu, Guang'an (廣安), Yuechi (岳池), Wusheng (武勝), Hechuan (合川), Luxian (瀘縣), Xi'an, Nanzheng (南鄭), Yangxian (洋縣), Baoji (寶雞), Ankang (安康), Xingping (興平), Shiquan (石泉), Baihe (白河), Ziyang (紫陽), and Pingli township (平利鎮). The divisional education officer, Li Huaiyuan (李懷遠), was the recruitment station chief in CQ; qz0063.mj1-895, pp. 1a-b, 2, and 7.}

\footnotesize{54. qz0063.mj1-895, pp. 68, and 70a-2 dated 16 September 1948.}

\footnotesize{55. qz0055.mj3-279, pp. 38, 45, 49, 51, and 56 dated October 1947.}

\footnotesize{56. While there was one Hunan native among them, the rest were local boys. The 204D and 209D divisions reported the same decline in educational qualifications; QNJS, vol. 1, pp. 157-8 and 252.}

\footnotesize{57. Another fifty-three at a different recruiting station all listed family trouble as the reason behind their financial situation and an additional three were demobilized YA soldiers; qz0063.mj1-895, pp. 68 and 70a-2 dated 16 September 1948 and qz0063.mj1-895, pp. 36-9 and 42-9.}
primarily local Sichuan boys, lacking the widely dispersed (refugee) origins of the wartime IYVM volunteers.58

In contrast with its wartime service, many YA units saw action during the Civil War. Starting in September, the 201D, 209D, and elements from the 203D fought in a series of actions against the CCP (commanded by Liu Bocheng) in the Dabie mountains (between Anhui and Hubei), Qianshan (嵐山), Xishui (溪水) and Konglong (孔龍). In 1949, the 201D was stationed at Fengshan (鳳山) on Taiwan and sent units to Jinmen in rearguard actions as the mainland fell. For its service at Jinmen, the division was given a commendation, the Tiger Flag (虎旗).59 The 202D was stationed along key transportation and communication lines in the Shanghai-Nanjing area in mid-1946. During the fall of 1947 and into 1948, along with the 209D it saw action against CCP forces in northern Anhui.60 Detachments of the 203D fought in Hanzhong in November, and the whole division was transferred to the Xi’an area to reinforce the wavering Nationalist forces there.61

The 204D was sent to Taiwan in 1948, taking up city and harbor defense in Gaoxiong (Kaohsiung). In the fall, it was sent back to the mainland, near Qingdao, and then moved up to Beiping in defense of the city. It was decorated for its role in the Xu-Bang (徐蚌) battle and was involved in both the defense of Nanjing (April 1949) and Shanghai (May 1949).62 The 205D also used Qingdao as a staging area in October of 1948, but it went on to the Tianjin area, and thence to the defense of Beijing from the 208D, fighting in the Tangshan engagements in early November.63 The 208D was expanded into a full Army, the 87th, in September 1948. Shortly thereafter, it was charged with holding the western section and key points along the Beijing-Ningbo railroad. It saw little action there as the collapse of the Nationalist position in Manchuria and Lin Biao’s advance into north China caused Chiang to abandon the railroad and move south; instead it fought in the Ningbo area against Chen Yi’s forces in March of 1949.64

The 206D and 207D were special cases that saw far more action than other YA units. The 206D defended the Yellow River in March 1947 at Toucang (頭倉) and suffered heavy, though not crushing casualties. Other actions followed quickly, however: at Zhongmou (中牟), at Yuncheng (運城) and Anyi (安邑) (both in southern Shaanxi). The division was in heavy fighting in these cities and towns, with many casualties. Granted no respite, it continued fighting in western Shandong (July-August 1947) and then in the Xuchang-Zhengzhou battle (late August 1947). One brigade, holding the Longhai railroad line, was attacked by CCP forces, who captured the brigade commander and one of his regimental officers. The brigade commander, Jiang Gongmin, was executed by the communists. The 206D fought at the Yi River (伊河) in Septem-

58. Ibid. The educational background for the three recruiting groups listed above was recorded as: primary school 153; private school 15; middle school 263; teacher’s college 5; military primary school 2; university 1; and unknown 1.
60. Ibid., pp. 130-4 and 254-8.
61. Ibid., p. 145.
63. Ibid, pp. 169-1.
64. Ibid., pp. 217-29.
ber, then both Luoyang battles in October 1947 and February 1948. While involved in this last battle for Luoyang against the CCP general Chen Yi, the 206D’s 5R was recruiting volunteers in Wuhan to replace the heavy losses the division was suffering. The rest of the division ended up defending the Luoyang Middle School after the PLA broke through the city defenses. Using amassed artillery firepower, the PLA reduced buildings in the area to rubble. With ammunition running out and surrounded, the 206D was left in an indefensible position. The division commander, Qiu Xingxiang (邱行湘) led the remnants in a breakout attempt, but he himself was captured and executed. After being thoroughly smashed at Luoyang, the 206D remnants were sent to Nanjing to be reorganized, with Tang Shouzhi (唐守治) as division commander. And in October 1948 it was transferred to Gaoxiong Taiwan for training and assigned to defense of the central-southern section of the island.65

The 207D was stationed near Shenyang at the time of the Lushan conference (1946) that consolidated the Youth Army divisions to pursue the “crack-troops” policy. The 207D’s critical role in the northeast meant that not only was it exempt from demobilization, but it was actually expanded.66 In general, it was well equipped, well led, and with high morale.

From March 1946 on, the 207D was engaged in communist suppression activities, trying to bring some order to the city. In mid-May, most of the division (minus the 621R, which remained in Shenyang) was dispatched to Kaiyuan (開原) to take part in a series of actions around Siping (四平).67 On May 31, the division was reviewed by Chiang and given honors. It continued to participated in the Nationalist defense of Manchuria until October 1948, when the western Liaoning and Changchun defenses caved in to the CCP. The 207D, receiving no aid after Zhou Fucheng’s 53A defected to the Communists, broke out of the encirclement and headed to Tianjin, Beijing, Nanjing and eventually Shanghai, but only 2-3,000 men made it back. Despite these heavy casualties, the 207D continued to play a role: the remnants that made it back to Jiangsu after the Changchun collapse formed the core officers for several divisions, the 207D, 339D, and 363D in Jiangsu (Shanghai and Songjiang regimental districts). The re-constituted 207D was assigned to coastal defense, including the Penghu islands, in February 1949. In April 1950, the 207D was honored with a memorial at Taipei’s Martyrs Shrine.68

Despite the YA’s active military and political support for the Nationalist regime, the YA was also one of the core components of Jiang Jingguo’s last attempts to reform the government and the KMT from the outside. Thoroughly frustrated with the KMT’s corruption and inept handling of postwar issues, Jiang mobilized his key political resources, the Youth Corps and Youth

65. Ibid, pp. 179-84.

66. Although it was still under the New 6A, both of its brigades were increased by a whole regiment (to three regiments each). After the Siping battles (July 1947), the central command expanded the 207D again, by adding a third brigade, for a total of nine regiments, with more than 26,000 youth soldiers and a further 4,900 conscripts (35,000+ men in all). Promoted to commander of the entire 6A, Luo Youlun asked the Manchurian high command for permission to set up an independent battalion to recruit Manchurian youths. The battalion elicited a strong response: within five days it had recruited a full complement of volunteers, which formed the core officers as it was expanded into a full regiment. After going through preliminary training it saw action in the battle for Changchun.

67. Siping was north of Shenyang, about halfway between Shenyang and Changchun.

68. Ibid, pp. 192-211. The text of the memorial, written by the 6A army commander, Dai Pu, focuses on the Civil War, anti-communist, contributions and sacrifices of the 6A (i.e., 207D).
Army, in 1946 and 1947.\textsuperscript{69} Drawing on latent discontent within the YC against the KMT, he packed the YC’s 2nd Congress (September 1946 at Lushan) with his supporters, even going so far as to get YA divisions to send representatives even if they were not YC members.\textsuperscript{70} Alarmed at the increasing roles they were taking on in both the military and political arenas, Chen Lifu and other KMT leaders, like Dai Jitao, were suspicious of Jiang’s YC-YA growing power. They informed Chiang Kaishek of their concerns; dissatisfied with the KMT himself, Chiang remained strongly opposed to a separate party and he took these concerns seriously, rejecting the idea of the YC as an independent power base. He went in the opposite direction, merging the YC back into the KMT, in an attempt to revitalize it with “new blood.” In February 1947, Chiang made Chen Lifu chairman of the committee which was to oversee a readjustment of the KMT-YC relationship that would place the KMT back over the YC.\textsuperscript{71} The Chen brothers won this round, though the price was that Jiang Jingguo and his core powerbase of the YC-YA was brought into the heart of the Nationalist government for good.

Jiang Jingguo’s attempt to establish a true base of power outside the KMT failed, but his YC and YA were still available as last ditch tools to the regime. In a last attempt to shore up the regime, Jiang was assigned with implementing emergency currency reforms and cleaning up Shanghai in 1948, by controlling hoarding, speculation and inflation. During the course of this failed attempt to reverse the Nationalist regime’s collapse, Jiang relied on the YC and YA veterans as political troops. Mistrustful of Shanghai’s entrenched bureaucracies and KMT authorities, Jiang set up a special unit, the Sixth Suppression and Reconstruction Brigade, to enforce the tough reforms he tried to implement in Shanghai. The unit was commanded by Wang Sheng (王升), one of Jiang’s key supporters and former student from Gannan, and beefed up with Youth Army veterans. The squads of this unit netted many speculators and hoarders, even some high-ranking officials, which of course was one reason why the campaign failed.\textsuperscript{72}

The role of the YA in the last months of the regime on the mainland was twofold. First, Chiang Kaishek established a Political Department in the military, with Jiang in charge. The younger Jiang used this position to assign YA veterans as political commissars in military units down to the battalion level.\textsuperscript{73} The Political Department and the commissars played a key role in

---

69. Taylor, \textit{The Generalissimo’s Son}, p. 150.

70. Zhou Shuzhen, \textit{Sanqingtuan shimo}, pp. 277-95 and QNJS, vol. 1, pp. 322-30. At the KMT’s Sixth Party Congress in April 1945, the YC members had raised a great deal of strong criticism against the KMT; Taylor, \textit{The Generalissimo’s Son}, pp. 123-4.


72. “Ching-kuo [had] concluded that inflation was not the core problem. The only way the KMT could reverse its decline was to cease being the party of the establishment and to become again a party of social revolution. On September 12 he addressed a mass meeting of 5,000 Youth Army veterans in the Shanghai Gymnasium. He led the crowd in singing a song called “Two Tigers” and shouting ‘down with profiteers and speculators,’ ‘make revolution,’ ‘root out corrupt forces!’ The hall shook with enthusiasm.” Jiang Jingguo would soon be forced to abandon this strategy of attacking bureaucratic capital; Taylor, \textit{The Generalissimo’s Son}, pp. 155-8. See also, Pepper, \textit{The Civil War in China}, pp. 121-7 and Zhou Shuzhen, \textit{Sanqingtuan shimo}, pp. 299-308.

73. “Youth Army veterans . . . would provide a large number of the new political commissars assigned to
the evacuation to Taiwan. Due to concern over the possibility of communist attempts to infiltrate the refugees fleeing the mainland, each person boarding ships or planes for Taiwan had to have documents issued by the Political Department. On Taiwan, this Political Department, and Jiang’s tight control over its commissars, was one of the key factors that prevented the US from replacing Chiang with someone more tractable to US interests (Sun Liren was a key candidate). The YA was also a flexible and mobile force for special tasks. Jiang Jingguo turned to his versatile YA veterans when his father charged him with transferring to Taiwan the gold reserves from the Central Bank.  

74 There is doubtless a great deal more detail to be uncovered about the YA’s activities and central political importance once the Nationalists were on Taiwan. The Youth Army’s role in the Nationalist suppression of the student movement and Jiang Jingguo’s reliance on them as political commissars and paramilitary troops ready for a variety of tasks were the origins of its fearsome postwar reputation, a reputation that was further cemented by Chiang’s reliance on the Youth Army veterans as intelligence agents and thugish enforcers on Taiwan. Usually shadowy in historical records, this later aspect of the Youth Army is at least hinted at in fictional accounts of the years of martial law under the KMT on Taiwan.  

75 All of that is far beyond the scope of this project; however, what is clear from this (admittedly spotty) thumbnail sketch of the postwar situation is that the YA was committed to supporting the state and leaders which had called it into being. The strategy of securing a new style of military force by appealing to a hitherto untapped resource – educated youths who were un-enmeshed in any local community and already dependent on the state for their material welfare – was a remarkably successful one. The YA leaders, most notably Jiang Jingguo, would be rewarded with the YA’s loyalty in the Civil War and for years after on Taiwan.

---

74. Ibid., p. 121-87.
75. Wang Ni, Zouguo kongbu de shidai, Caogen chubanshe, Taipei, 2000. For slightly more information on the connections between Jiang Jingguo and the YA veterans on Taiwan, see Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son, particularly pp. 191-293.
Bibliography


*Bingyi Biaoyu Huiji* 兵役標語彙集 [Collected Conscription Slogans]. Junzhengbu bingyishu yizhengsi xuan chake, 1942.


- 465 -


Chen, Hansheng. *Frontier Land Systems in Southernmost China: a Comparative Study of*


Guo, Xiong 郭雄, et al., (eds.) Kang Ri zhanzheng shiqi guomindang zhengmian zhanchang  - 470 -
zhongyao zhanyi jieshao 抗日战争时期国民党正面战场重要战役介绍 [An Introduction to the Important Conventional Battles of the KMT during the War of Resistance].
Han, Suyin. Destination Chungking. London: Jonathan Cape, 1953.
York: Brassey's, 1991.


*Kunzhengbu bingyishu chengli er zhounian jitian tekan* 軍政部兵役署成立二週年紀念特刊 [Special Commemorative Publication for the Second Anniversary of the Founding of the Junzhengbu’s MSO]. Chongqing: 1941.

*Kunzhengbu bingyishu* 軍政部兵役署, (ed.) *Ge budui dui shibing (zhuangding) baoyu gaishan gaiyao* 各部隊對士兵（壯丁）保育改善概要 [General Outline for Improving Units Care for Soldiers (Conscripts)]. (1941).


Lai, Zheming 赖哲明. “Erlingjiu shi zai Shanghang” 二零九师在上杭 [The 209D in


- 474 -


Liu, Kaihan. “Beibei junxunban shouxun de qianqihouhou” 北碚軍訓班受訓的前前后后 [The Complete Story of the Training Received At the Beibei Military Training Class]. *Fengxian wenshiziliao*, vol. 7 (1986): 114-18.


Qin, Guangyu 秦光玉. “Canjia kang Ri de Yunnan zhiyuanbingtuan” [Participating in the Resist-Japan Yunnan Volunteer Regiment]. In *Xinan minzhong dui*.

Qingnian yuanzhengjun jianying 青年遠征軍剪影 [Portrait of the Youth Expeditionary Army].

Qingnianjun de dansheng 青年軍的誕生 [The Birth of the Youth Army]. Chongqing: 1945.


Shen, Huaiyu 沈懷玉. “Jin qishi nian lai Zhongguo zhi bingyi zhidu” 近七十年來中國兵役制


Tien, Chen-Ya. *Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern*. Oakville, Ontario, Canada: New - 480 -
Wakeman, Frederic E. *Strangers At the Gate; Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.
Wu, Guoyuan 吳國元, ed. Zhongguo qingnian yuanzhengjun lujun disanshiyi junshituans xunlian jiyao 中國青年遠征軍陸軍第三十一軍師團訓練紀要 [Summary of Training for the Units of the 31st Army in the Chinese Youth Expeditionary Army]. n.p.: 1946.
Wu, Jisheng 吳濟生. Xindu jianwen lu 新都見聞錄 [A Record of the New Capital]. Shanghai: Guangming shuju, 1940.


Appendix

Early Repertoires Revisited

The Zhou (1046-256 BCE) consisted of a loose feudal organization of noble lineages, with the ruling house only more powerful but not fundamentally different from the lesser families. Each noble lineage raised its own soldiers and the Zhou army was merely a conglomeration of these lineage-based forces, which could (and did) operate independently of the rest. Dominated by noblemen, battle was short, heroic and polite, emphasizing the valor of the combatants. Dishonoring one’s opponent was the main goal, and thus an enemy who retreated or fled was not pursued, but allowed to leave the field of battle with his disgrace intact. Some of this politeness faded as inter-lineage warfare intensified in the Eastern Zhou era as the Zhou ruling house’s control waned. Increasingly the goal of warfare was not merely to disgrace one’s enemy but to wipe his lineage out, or at least disperse it, so that it could never recover. Yet, throughout the Spring and Autumn period (722-481 BCE) wars were still primarily fought for prestige and honor, not territory, and engagements featured noblemen in chariots.¹

The Warring States (453-221 BCE) through the first empire, the Qin dynasty (221-207 BCE), saw intense experimentation with military organization. So successful and momentous were these innovations that they would mark Chinese military organization and theory indelibly. (In this sense, professor Lei Haizong was not far off: in military organization and recruitment, the Qin provided a monumental contribution to China’s future.) The Warring States were aptly named. From start to finish, they were organized around and for the purpose of war. Driving the many innovations of this time was warfare and its fundamentally altered purpose and methods: battle was no longer restricted by polite rules of honor among nobility, but was pursued as a means of enlarging the state’s territory, population, and power. To achieve this required a whole suite of changes to weapons, tactics, military organization, recruitment, financial and tax administration, and even the social and political organization of the population as a whole.

Iron farm tools permitted increased agricultural output, which in turn led to population increases in the hinterlands surrounding the city-states. The metal-working technology which produced those tools was put to use militarily forging iron swords, crossbows, iron armor, military horse stirrups as well, while the swelling population offered the possibility of cavalry units and large armies of well-armed footsoldiers.² As honor-based inter-lineage battles of the Spring and Autumn period morphed into no holds barred warfare of the Warring States period, armies swelled to enormous sizes. This “meant that any state or lineage that hoped to survive had to recruit soldiers from an ever larger base, and this could be achieved only by continuing the process of socially extending military service to the lower levels of the population and geographically ex-

---

¹. This thumbnail sketch is taken from Michael Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China (1990); David Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare (2002), and Robin D. S. Yates, “Law and the Military in Early China”, chapter in Military Culture in Imperial China, p. 22-44.

². It is impossible, given the sparse documentation, to determine whether military uses for iron technology preceded or followed agricultural ones, or whether they developed simultaneously.
tending it to wider ranges of the hinterland.”

3. Before the Warring States “armies of ten thousand men or less were the norm. Campaigns seldom lasted more than a few weeks, and battles were usually resolved in a single day’s action. … [By the late 3rd century BCE] the major states were accustomed to fielding forces of several hundred thousand men; wars could drag on for years, and entrenched armies of crossbowmen might confront each other for months along a front extending for many miles.”

4. These mass armies were manned mostly by conscripted peasants who were led by officers drawn from the lower elite, the shi.

5. Military service, which had once been the privilege of the noble elite of city-states, was transformed into an obligation shared by the common men: extended both geographically and socially.

Laying the foundation for ever wider mobilization of the hinterlands’ peasant population, Guan Zhong of Qi in the early seventh-century BCE invented the principle of “housing the army among the people” (yubing yu min; the same idea is sometimes phrased as yubing yu nong, among the farmers or peasants). Guan Zhong did not mean bivouacking the army in people’s homes, but drawing the soldiery directly from the people, though during his time military service was still restricted mainly to the capital and surrounding area and was not extended into the countryside or outlying districts. This axiom would be pushed to the limit by Qin and other Warring States. In fact, the mobilization of the general population was one of Qin’s fundamental policy successes that propelled it to unify the territory of the Warring States and set up the first genuine dynasty. Recent research has suggested that not only were the interlocking administrative innovations of the Qin driven by the need to mobilize the peasant population, but that the very means of these administrative policies (and their extension to the administration of the civilian hinterland) were derived directly from military units and administration. The hierarchical organizing principle itself (each administrative level consisting of a number of units from the next lowest tier) was adopted from army units and applied to other spheres, including civil government functions. As another example, Robin Yates has argued persuasively that the criminal law of Qin and other Warring States grew out of the military law provisions which were developed to control, train, and discipline the burgeoning peasant conscript armies. Not only Qin criminal law, but even its rural administration, the household registration (lianzuo 連坐) system, the district units (xian 縣) which would evolve into China’s county system, and the mutual responsibility system were all adopted lock stock and barrel from the military. The Qin system of mutual responsibility in which groups of neighbors were organized hierarchically into small units in which each member was responsible for the actions of all the others was inspired by the measures taken to improve moral and effectiveness of units on the battlefield. What is certain,

8. Ibid., p. 31. Yates, perhaps, pushes the argument a bit too far, however, by stating that the Qin household registration and mutual responsibility systems meant that the “loyalty and solidarity of every member of society were turned toward the Qin state.” As much of the mutual responsibility system relied on meting out harsh punishments for infractions or not reporting the infractions of
However, is that the extension of military service to the whole (male) population in the Qin state effectively united three functions into one military-civil administration: military mobilization, police, and the basic army units themselves, were all rolled into one system; it was “a new form of state.”9

The Warring States and Qin, thus, laid down the foundation for a key normative concept, which would be cemented by the Han dynasty: the “ideal of a mass, conscript army, with all adult males of the farming population trained to arms and capable of serving the state as soldiers whenever necessary” and returning to their primary occupation, agricultural production, whenever the crisis had passed. As is obvious, the Qin mobilization had some striking resonances with modern European developments and Nationalist theories, such as General He Yingqin’s 1928 plan. This resemblance is doubtless one of the reasons why the Qin period was so attractive to professor Lei and other intellectuals.10

For much of the Han periods (206 BCE - 220 CE) all males over the age of 23 sui were under obligation to serve the dynasty. One year of service was rendered in their home areas, during which they were given military training. Some were given an additional year of service, either on guard duty at the capital or in garrisons along the northwestern frontier, after which they were returned to their home communities, but were eligible for re-mobilization until the age of 56 sui. To keep them ready, they were required to participate periodically in refresher training exercise. Compulsory military service was not distinct from regular labor service (corvée of one month of labor per year), which meant that certain high social groups were exempt and the wealthy could pay for substitutes to serve in their stead.11

While Qin-style conscription based on household registration of the rural population remained a feature of military mobilization for much of the Han, a further dimension was added as the dynasty faced military challenges from nomadic horse-cultures of the north and northwest. This was the creation of (what many scholars mislabel as) a “professional army” of non-conscripts.12 The challenge of the Xiongnu nomads along the northwestern frontier exposed the dif-
difficulties of relying on conscripted peasants for long-term campaigns in far-flung areas. Han Wudi (reigned 140 - 86 BCE) initiated changes to the dynasty’s armed forces to meet this challenge by raising troops that would be intimately familiar with frontier geography and mobile warfare. The first requirement meant soldiers who would be available for lengthy terms of service, while the second required intensive training in cavalry warfare. The need to field a mobile cavalry force that could outmaneuver the nomadic Xiongnu in the expanses of the Gobi Desert and neighboring regions required long-term training in mounted archery that simply precluded relying on earth-bound peasant-soldiers. Surrendered tribesmen from the Xiongnu and other nomadic people provided some measure of trained manpower, but the raising and training of a large cavalry force needed lengthy training and service terms in order to be effective.¹³ Conscript farmers were used to man large scale agricultural colonies (tuntian 土田) to provide provisions, and frontier districts still supplied conscripts, but more and more the Han relegated conscripts from inner provinces (commanderies) to anti-bandit roles and began to rely on different sources of manpower for major military endeavors. One of these new groups were volunteers, specifically amnestied convicts who were released upon the condition that they serve as permanent soldiers. Other groups were delinquents, hoodlums and other deracinated elements of society. The Han dynasty thus expanded the available repertoire of models for military service to include not only conscripted farmers – men of good social standing, liangmin (良民) – but also “volunteers” in the form of released prisoners, criminals, and recruited vagabonds.¹⁴

The four centuries (220-617 CE) that preceded the Tang dynasty (618-917 CE) were marked by incredible variation in the methods of military mobilization. As David Graff’s comprehensive

in terms of internally formulated criteria. It is best understood in opposition to a nonprofessional officer class, which can be defined as one where these processes are more or less determined by the ideological and social biases of the dominant political system. . . . [P]rofessionalism, i.e., the emergence of objective criteria for the management of the officer-corps – education and experience as opposed to birth and social position – was a radical [and modern] innovation’ that paved the way for the modern mass army; Feld, The Structure of Violence, pp. 142-3. Samuel Huntington’s discussion of professionalism in the military is also relevant. A profession is a vocation that has expertise (specialized knowledge), responsibility (not just to a ruler, dynasty, or an individual but toward “society” – in essence, a social contract) and “corporateness” (a professional organization which sets and maintains standards for competence and fulfillment of the social contract); Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 7-18. In short, being highly skilled and serving for a lengthy period are not sufficient to warrant the use of the term “professional.” The differences between occupation and profession escape most historians working on imperial Chinese armies, though some use scare quotes around the word professional when discussing the Han military.

¹³. While his numbers may be suspect, Chun-shu Chang has outlined at length the creation of this Han cavalry; Chun-shu Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Empire, vol. 1, pp. 162-86. Chang summarizes the changes thus: “There is no indication in Han dynasty sources that the army ever went back to the rotating conscription of soldiers from men of regular social station (liang-min); the conscription system was replaced by a professional army. . . . The army now was an asylum for men of lowly social status and other undesirable elements of society, and military service was no longer mandatory”; ibid, p. 186.

work on medieval Chinese military developments makes clear, the repertoire of mobilization techniques was broadened yet again in these years. While it took various forms in different eras and under different ruling houses, one frequent feature during these centuries was the personalization of command and loyalty through hereditary military households that served hereditary military commanders. This stood in stark contrast to the bureaucratic and impersonal conscription of the Qin and Han. Enlisted peasants were still to be found, but they were increasingly relegated to logistical and support roles. In years of chaos, a further feature was the recruitment of willing volunteers drawn from the destitute and refugees that the internecine warfare created. This was particularly true during the short-lived Three Dynasties (220-280) and Northern and Southern Dynasties (420-589). Many of these low-class recruits were allowed to set up their progeny as soldiers as well, thus forming a key source of the hereditary military families. In some of these ephemeral regimes—such as the Song (420-479) and Qi (479-502)—the voluntary recruitment system, mubing (募兵), supplanted both conscripts and hereditary soldiers as the core of the military. Under other administrations, such as the Eastern Jin (317-420), Western Wei (535-556), Northern Zhou (557-581), and Sui (581-618), imperial rulers co-opted the social structure by recruiting mid-level officers or local elites who brought men and units into service with them.\(^\text{15}\)

As a long-lasting dynasty, the Tang (618-907) faced much the same problem as the Han: how to mount long-term defense of the frontier against outside threats while simultaneously preventing or suppressing internal revolt.\(^\text{16}\) Early on the Tang rulers adopted a conscription-based solution for both roles. The fubing (territorial garrison府兵) system involved local recruitment of farmer-soldiers, who were rotated for one-month guard duty per year in the capital. They could also be sent to frontier garrisons for stints lasting up to three years, but this was not universal nor systematic. The age of service was 21-60, with limited exemption from taxes and labor service. The fubing combined service with farming and thus have been called “militia” at times, but given their lengthy terms of service they were highly effective in the seventh century. The rotational system of service, particularly for guard duty in the capital, prevented potentially disruptive ties from forming between generals and the men under their command. Problems with the fubing soon became apparent, however. One was that service was unevenly distributed. Prefectures that had been quick and loyal to support the Tang in their rise to power and those along the northwestern frontier were saddled with high quotas for fubing soldiers, while those areas that were considered unreliable or were far from the frontier were not conscripted from at all. A second, more serious problem, was that the fubing were not suited to lengthy campaigns far from their home districts: such actions played havoc with the rotational schedule upon which the entire system rested. (To help ameliorate these disruptions, Tang emperors experimented with enlisting tribal allies and short-term conscripts that could be called up for emergencies, close to where they were needed, but neither of these were solutions to the problem of long campaigns.) Expeditionary campaigns (invasions) against Korea and along the western frontier against Tibetans brought to light the difficulty of relying on the fubing for sustained action far away from the soldiers’ home districts against enemies that were immune to a quick knock-out blow. When deci-

\(^{15}\) David Graff, *Medieval Chinese Warfare*, pp. 38-152. Graff’s work contains a wealth of detail on specific dynasties, campaigns, and rulers during this often neglected and very complex period.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., pp. 189-247.
sive victory eluded the Tang armies, retreat would only incite the enemies to be more aggressive; thus, the dynasty’s forces began to settle into permanent bases and garrisons along the frontiers. These gradually solidified and a system of providing replacements (both fubing and conscripts) to the garrisons was set up, but this put strain on the rotational schedule of the fubing in particular. Fubing numbers grew quickly, but the system as a whole struggled as people began to evade duty in large numbers. The conscription system too faltered as it was simply not suited to sustaining a distant, long-term garrison force. By 737, the Tang moved to establish a frontier army of recruited volunteers. “An imperial edict issued on June 12 of that year called upon frontier commanders to calculate their manpower needs and establish quotas to be filled by the recruitment of currently conscript-recruits and members of migrant families to serve as long-term jian’er” (健兒), soldiers who were enticed with offers of full exemption from corvée and taxes and government-granted farmland and houses. The response was strong and “by the middle of the eighth century, the jian’er were the most common and characteristic element of the frontier armies.” The local recruitment and dependence of these new garrison forces upon their commander resulted in close ties of loyalty between the military governors and the men and officers under their command. Officers were no longer locally prominent men who led detachments from their area in the fubing system, but garrison officers who had been promoted from within the jian’er ranks and thus were unwaveringly loyal to their garrison commander. Loyalty to the commander, the military governor, supplanted loyalty to the Tang court.

This displacement of loyalty toward the military governors on the frontiers was a powder keg for the dynasty and the fuse was lit by An Lushan (安祿山), the military governor of Fanyang (范陽). The famous rebellion which bears his name (755-763) was eventually put down by the Tang (a story that is too lengthy to go into here), but in doing so the dynasty had to make further adjustments to its military recruitment administration. Outlying military governorships and garrisons remained largely independent of central control, but the interior was highly militarized to counterbalance the frontier armies: the main interior army was made up of recruited jian’er and defensively-minded prefectural forces, which consisted of conscripted militia-farmers serving short terms in return for tax and corvée exemptions. In effect, the late Tang became a mercenary system: interior provinces were highly militarized (to counterbalance the garrison power near the frontiers) with a huge number of soldiers, made up of voluntary recruits who demanded remuneration. The “greatest reservoir of potential recruits was provided by the landless, desperate, and destitute, and particularly by peasants who were no longer able to wrest a living from the land after the breakdown of the government’s land redistribution system and the formation of private estates. Once they entered an army, they became full-time mercenary soldiers who were almost entirely dependant [sic] on the pay they received from their commanders in order to sustain both themselves and their families.” Simply put, loyalty was bought with remuneration. Armies were so entrenched, and governors so dependent on them, that mid-level officers could even drive out unpopular governors and have them replaced.

Removed from agriculture and gathered in garrison towns, entirely reliant on military service for their livelihood, the soldiers were in a good position to develop a keen sense of corporate identity and collective self-interest – and to strike out violently when they

17. Ibid., p. 209.
18. Ibid., p. 238.
perceived their interests to be threatened. . . . And they belonged to a society in which commerce and market transactions were playing an ever-increasing role. Determined to exact the best possible deal for themselves, the professional soldiers of late Tang came to resemble a privileged and parasitic caste. Some units took on a hereditary character as sons followed fathers in the ranks; when a man was killed in battle a son or brother might claim the privilege of inheriting his military status and emoluments. . . . The predatory mercenary soldier, essentially a product of the new conditions of the late Tang, was part of the Tang legacy to Song and would be a recurring problem in China’s later history – including the first half of the twentieth century.19

The Jin (1115-1234), Yuan (1271-1368), and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties conquered native Chinese ruling houses by relying on tribally-based militaries. Based on north and northeast nomadic cultures, these foreign dynasties grew out of a military tradition in which the entire tribe were fighting. These foreign dynasties followed the pattern of earlier non-native dynasties such as the Northern Wei with its Tuoba rulers and Xianbei loyalists. The Northern Wei (386-535) had retained tribal, north Asian elements as the core of their army, but Han peasants also called up to support campaigns, primarily for support and logistical roles and for garrison duties on the frontier as well. Peasants thus served more in a corvée role than as soldiers.20

China’s imperial history, thus, had a variegated repertoire of mobilization techniques: impersonal bureaucratic conscription, hereditary military families, mandatory rotational capital guard duty, voluntary service from lower classes and prisoners, permanent agricultural colonies settled by farmer-soldiers on the frontier, and tribally-based units. Professor Lei Haizong’s statements notwithstanding, there was nothing stagnant about this rich tradition.

19. Ibid., p. 239. It should be noted that Philip Kuhn, drawing on a much older body of scholarship, has a very different picture of the Tang fubing soldiers. He paints them as “a species of permanent military serfdom,” though it is not clear from his very functional analysis whether he is discussing the entire dynastic period or just an earlier part of it; Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, pp. 15-20.

20. Ibid., p. 97.