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Publication Date
2013

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BEYOND TWO HOMELANDS: MIGRATION AND TRANSNATIONALISM OF JAPANESE AMERICANS IN THE PACIFIC, 1930-1955

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

HISTORY

by

Michael Jin

March 2013

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Abstract

Beyond Two Homelands:
Migration and Transnationalism of Japanese Americans
in the Pacific, 1930-1955

Michael Jin

This dissertation examines 50,000 American migrants of Japanese ancestry (Nisei) who traversed across national and colonial borders in the Pacific before, during, and after World War II. Among these Japanese American transnational migrants, 10,000-20,000 returned to the United States before the outbreak of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and became known as Kibei (“return to America”). Tracing the transnational movements of these second-generation U.S.-born Japanese Americans complicates the existing U.S.-centered paradigm of immigration and ethnic history. The history of these transnational migrants revises the existing model of immigration history by complicating the linear and predictable notion of the so-called sending and receiving societies.

The transnational experiences of Japanese Americans in both Japan and the United States offer diverse notions of citizenship, nationalism, race, colonialism, and loyalty by placing the history of an ethnic community beyond dichotomous cultural and political distinctions between two nation-states. The five chapters in this dissertation explore the period from 1930 to 1955 in Japanese American history as a history of transnational movements. The experiences of Japanese American migrants in Japan, Japan’s colonial
posts, and the United States before WWII illuminate the complex interplay between the rise of Japanese militarism, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Japan, and the heightened anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. During the Pacific War, their education in Japan and their bilingual and transnational identities made the Kibei in the U.S. convenient scapegoats as a pro-Japan element. Declassified federal and military records reveal that the presence of Kibei had a profound impact on the U.S. government’s policy on the mass incarceration of Japanese and Japanese Americans during WWII.

Meanwhile, many Japanese Americans who were stranded in Japan during the war had to endure firebombing and starvation; and many Nisei men in Japan were conscripted into the Japanese military to fight the Allied forces in the Pacific Theatre. For many Nisei strandees in Japan, the war blurred the cultural, political, and even legal boundaries of their citizenship, as they found themselves in situations in which they had little room to negotiate their national allegiance. This dissertation offers an example of how Japanese American transnational experiences before, during, and after WWII demonstrate a critical intersection of the histories of migration, transnational families and communities, and diplomatic policies on both sides of the Pacific.
Acknowledgements

Many wonderful mentors, colleagues, friends, and supporters made this dissertation a truly rewarding and enjoyable project. I am truly blessed to be a student of Alice Yang, my advisor, who has been the greatest source of inspiration and strength in my intellectual life. I am also grateful to the other two members of my dissertation committee. Alan Christy’s incredible intellectual guidance and support has sustained me through all stages of this project. Dana Frank has always been a source of assurance and strength to me, and her constructive criticism has been indispensable for my work.

I have benefited tremendously the wonderful intellectual community at the University of California, Santa Cruz. I owe a debt of gratitude to all of my mentors at UCSC who have helped me develop as a scholar and teacher: Herman Gray, Marilyn Westerkamp, Terry Burke, Gail Hershatter, George Lipsitz, Dana Takagi, Bruce Levin, Pedro Castillo, Minghui Hu, Kate Jones, Matthew Lasar, Bruce Thompson, Brian Catlos, Eric Porter, and Karen Tei Yamashita. I am indebted to our wonderful staff in the History Department—Stephanie Hinkle, Meg Lilienthal, Christine Khoo, Stephanie Sawyer, Rachel Monas, and Kayla Ayers—for their patience and kindness. Also, many thanks to my glorious colleagues in the history graduate program for their friendship and support: David Palter, Sara Smith, Yajun Mo, Chrislaine Pamphile-Miller, Jeff Sanceri, Ana Maria Candela, Colin Tyner, Urmi Engineer, and Noel Smyth.
This project would not have been possible without the financial support from the UCSC History Department, the Institute for Humanities Research, the University of California Pacific Rim Research Program, and the Japan Foundation. I am grateful to the archivists and staff at McHenry Library at UCSC, Charles Young Research Library at UCLA, Claremont University Library, Bancroft Library at UC Berkeley, the Japanese American National Museum, the Diplomatic Record Office in Tokyo, the Peace Museum in Hiroshima, and the Prefectural Archives of Hiroshima and Yamaguchi. I want to give my heartfelt thanks to Yoneyama Hiroshi and the International Institute of Language and Culture Studies at Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto for giving me the institutional support crucial for my research in Japan. I also want to thank Sakaguchi Mitsuhiro, Minimikawa Fuminori, Monobe Hiromi, Kadoike Hiroshi, and other wonderful scholars in Japan that generously gave me their time and advice. I want to extend special thanks to Eiichiro Azuma and Arthur Hansen for their guidance and intellectual generosity.

Lastly, I want to give my most heartfelt thanks to my wife, Sharareh Motallebi, for her love and patience. Also, many thanks to my parents for their tremendous encouragement and support. This dissertation is lovingly dedicated to my family.

Michael Jin
Santa Cruz, California
March 17, 2013
Introduction:

Migration and Transnationalism of Japanese Americans in the Pacific

Nobuyo Yamane’s childhood in Tacoma, Washington in the 1920s and early 1930s looked like that of a typical second-generation Japanese American (Nisei) girl from an average Japanese immigrant family. She grew up with six siblings, attended Japanese language classes after school, and picked strawberries with her friends to earn money during summer breaks. Her grandfather had immigrated to Hawaii in 1886 from Ōshima, a small island off the coast of Yamaguchi Prefecture in southwestern Japan.¹ During the “first wave” of Japanese emigration to Hawaii from 1885 to 1894, Ōshima had produced over one-third of all Japanese contract migrants in Hawaiian sugar plantations.² Yamane’s parents, Yoshi and Moriichi, then joined a growing contingent of Japanese migrants to the mainland United States, settling in Tacoma at the turn of the twentieth century.³

Yamane grew up in the Japanese American community during a time of significant social transformations. The anti-Asian and anti-immigrant sentiments on the U.S. West Coast since the mid-nineteenth century had culminated in a series of legal and judicial measures that excluded Japanese immigrants from the American citizenry during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The enactment of the California Alien Land Law in 1913

² Hori Masaaki, Hawai ni Watatta Kaizokutachi: Sō Ōshima no Iminshi (Fukuoka: Gen Shobō, 2007).
³ Yamane, “A Nisei Woman in Rural Japan,” 183.
and a series of added restrictions to the law in the following decade prohibited Japanese immigrants from owning or leasing agricultural land. Between 1917 and 1925, other “Western” states, such as Arizona, Oregon, Montana, Idaho, Louisiana, and Kansas, also enacted Alien Land Laws. In 1921, the year in which Yamane was born in Tacoma, the State of Washington passed its own Alien Land Law. In the following year, the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Takao Ozawa v. United States officially stamped Japanese immigrants’ status as “aliens ineligible to citizenship” by reaffirming the 1780 U.S. Naturalization Act’s stipulation that the right to naturalization was reserved for “free independent whites.” Three years later, notwithstanding the strong protest from the Japanese government, the U.S. Congress passed the Johnson-Reed Act, or the Immigration Act of 1924, which effectively prohibited immigration of East and South Asians, as well as most Southern and Eastern Europeans, to the United States. Yamane and her siblings were part of the growing American-born Nisei generation that would soon outnumber Japanese immigrants, as the Immigration Act of 1924 abruptly halted Japanese immigration to the U.S.

However, when Yamane turned fourteen, she embarked on a trans-Pacific journey to Japan that would separate her from her family and the Japanese American community in the United States for thirty-eight years. She arrived on Ōshima in 1935 to look after a sick relative. Although her visit to the island was meant to be only temporary, Yamane stayed on and continued to take care of her aunt. Circumstances kept extending her stay in
Japan, as she enrolled in school, found her calling in teaching, and moved to Tokyo to pursue a degree in education. In 1937, her younger brother George was sent to Oshima to receive a Japanese education. Stranded in Japan during the Pacific War, the siblings learned through newspaper articles that Japanese and Japanese Americans in the U.S. were incarcerated behind barbed wires. After surviving the war in Japan, George returned to the U.S., while Nobuyo decided to stay and teach home economics and English. It would take another two decades until she finally returned to Tacoma to visit her family and friends.4

By the eve of the Second World War, thousands of second-generation Japanese Americans had lived and traveled outside the United States. Like George Yamane, many Nisei had been sent to Japan at young ages by their first-generation (Issei) parents to be raised in the households of their relatives and receive a proper Japanese education. Others accompanied their immigrant parents who returned to Japan. Many also sought opportunities for employment or higher education in a country that represented an expanding colonial power in Asia especially during the 1930s. Yet, for many Nisei like Nobuyo Yamane, a temporary visit to Japan turned into a permanent settlement. Although no official data exist to help determine the exact number of Nisei in Japan before the Pacific War, various sources suggest that about 50,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry spent some of their formative years in Japan. Of these Nisei, 10,000-20,000 returned to the United

4 Ibid.
States before the outbreak of Pearl Harbor and became known as Kibei (literally, “returned to America”).

Japanese Americans who migrated to Japan at young ages and those who embarked on subsequent journeys to Japan’s colonial world in the Pacific before World War II rarely appear in popular narratives of Japanese American history. A U.S.-centered immigrant paradigm has confined the history of Japanese Americans to the interior of U.S. political and cultural boundaries. Moreover, because the Japanese American internment during World War II and the emphasis on Nisei loyalty and nationalism have been dominant themes in the postwar scholarship and public history of Japanese Americans, there has been little room for the examination of the wartime experiences of the Nisei in Japan and its colonial world.

The Kibei who returned from Japan before the war and subsequently experienced the wartime internment (1941-1946) along with the other 110,000 or so Japanese and Japanese Americans from the West Coast have become

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controversial figures in both the Japanese American community and scholarship. Many of them, because of their education in Japan, have been stigmatized as pro-Japan elements in the internment camps. As the postwar scholarship focused on the injustice of the internment policy, many scholar-activists found it difficult to write about Japanese Americans educated in Japan when “Nisei as Americans first” was the political motto that drove the postwar movement for redress as well as the history of unquestioned Nisei loyalty. At the same time, the U.S.-centered immigrant paradigm has largely overlooked the experiences of Nisei migrants in prewar Japan and other locations in the Pacific.

Even the critics who challenged the dominant postwar image of Nisei as a quiet, patriotic model minority took caution against potentially damaging the movement for redress and reparations in the 1980s. The most telling example is the pioneering historian Yuji Ichioka’s decision to deliberately delay the publication of an article critical of the history of Nisei loyalty until 1997. In this article, Ichioka presented the case of Kazumaro Buddy Uno, a Nisei who had spent part of his childhood in Japan, returned there later as a young journalist, and then worked for the Japanese military during WWII. Uno’s resentment of racial discrimination in America turned him into a sympathizer of Japan’s war against the U.S., and made him

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radically hostile and even abusive to American POWs he was in charge of interrogating. Ichioka challenged an unquestioned categorization of Uno as a “disloyal Nisei” when he was raised in an American society that “refused to accept the Nisei as Americans.” Ichioka then called for a Japanese American history “inclusive” of complex cases like Uno’s.\(^9\) One of Kazumaro Buddy Uno’s brothers was none other than Edison Uno, a widely respected leader of the redress movement in the 1980s. Ichioka, himself a redress activist, feared that his article might create a backlash against public support for redress legislation and delayed its publication until 1997, after redress recipients were paid by the U.S. government.\(^10\)

It is no coincidence that most English language works on the history of Nisei transnational experience have been memoirs and autobiographies written by individual Nisei in the mid-1990s, after the U.S. government issued an official apology and paid reparations for the wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans.\(^11\) These accounts reveal remarkable complexities in Kibei experiences that complicate not only the history of the Japanese American community, but also the history of immigration and Asians in diaspora. In one of the earliest autobiographies published by an academic

\(^9\) Ichioka, “The Meaning of Loyalty.”
press, labor activist Karl G. Yoneda detailed his experience as an American sojourner in Japan in the 1910s and 1920s. Yoneda’s experience illuminated how complex flows of migration impacted the movement of ideas across the Pacific. Yoneda relocated to Japan at a young age with his family and spent his youth in a poor rural town in Hiroshima Prefecture. An avid reader of the works of Japanese socialist and anarchist intellectuals, he participated in pro-labor demonstrations and strikes in several major Japanese cities in the mid-1920s. In 1926, twenty-year-old Yoneda left Japan to escape conscription into the Japanese military and returned to San Francisco to become one of the most influential labor organizers in California and a vocal critic of Japanese militarism in the 1930s and 1940s.\footnote{Karl G. Yoneda, \textit{Ganbatte: Sixty-Year Struggle of a Kibei Worker} (Los Angeles: Asian American Studies Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1983), xi, 6-9.}

Stories of individual Kibei also complicate the meaning of loyalty in nation-centered immigrant narratives. A Communist Party member who was deeply influenced by radical scholars and union activists in prewar Japan, Yoneda enthusiastically advocated Japanese American support for the U.S. war against what he described as the “fascist militarists” in Japan.\footnote{Yoneda, \textit{Ganbatte}.} During World War II, Yoneda not only rallied for the American war efforts against Japan, but also cooperated with the U.S. government’s internment policies. As discussed in Chapter Three, Yoneda’s zeal to prove his loyalty to the U.S. government led him to turn against some of his fellow internees at Manzanar, California, where he served as an informer for the FBI to report on any sign
of subversive behaviors in the internment camp. He did not hesitate to report on the activities of other Kibei in the camp. Ironically, many Kibei at Manzanar considered Yoneda their worst enemy and even attempted to attack his family for his treatment of fellow internees. The war had turned Yoneda’s internationalist idealism into radical patriotism, which earned him the nickname “*inu,*” or a traitor of his own people.¹⁴

On the other hand, Peter Sano, another California-born Kibei, wrote a memoir, entitled *One Thousand Days in Siberia: The Odyssey of a Japanese American POW,* depicting a drastically different wartime experience. Unlike Yoneda, Sano was a young student in wartime Japan and was conscripted into the Japanese army on the China front during the final days of the Pacific War. Sano spent three years in a Soviet POW camp in Siberia after the conclusion of WWII. Upon his repatriation to Japan, Sano worked for the Allied occupation forces, regained his U.S. citizenship, and eventually resettled in California. Trained as a suicide bomber during the war, he became a peace activist and ardent critic of Japanese militarism after his return to the U.S.¹⁵

The stories of Nobuyo Yamane, Buddy Uno, Karl Yoneda, Peter Sano, and other diverse Japanese American transnational migrants reveal the theoretical limits prevalent in both U.S. immigration history and the emerging field of Asian diaspora. Recent inquiries among migration scholars

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have attempted to place second-generation experiences in multiple sociopolitical, cultural, and legal settings encompassing multiple nations.\textsuperscript{16} However, these studies focus exclusively on second-generation communities within the U.S. borders. They position the U.S.-born children of immigrants in similar transnational “social fields” that have affected their parents’ experiences, such as anti-Asian sentiments in the U.S., international war, and developments in diplomatic relations involving both “sending” and “host” nations. These theorists also add that second-generation communities may find ways to respond to the social and political realities that they constantly experience because of the circulation of people, ideas, and cultural values within and between countries.\textsuperscript{17}

An example of this type of second-generation transnationalism could be found in the Japanese American community in the 1930s when the long existing anti-Japanese sentiment on the U.S. West Coast heightened amid Japan’s military aggression in China. As noted by David Yoo, when the mainstream press in the U.S. relentlessly accused Japan’s aggressive colonial expansion in Asia, many Nisei found themselves and their first-generation parents facing intensified racial hostility. Nisei writers in the United States responded to this situation by using English-language articles in community newspapers to convince the general public that the hostility against Japan in


the international arena was fueling the anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States.\textsuperscript{18}

However, a theoretical debate has emerged questioning how salient this representation of second-generation transnational engagement really was for the rest of the ethnic community. Some scholars argue that like the Nisei writers in the above example, the actions and choices of the second generation operate fundamentally in a transnational world. Others disagree, noting that by virtue of being geographically and culturally rooted in the U.S., many among the second generation could not have experienced the truly bilingual and bicultural experiences that their immigrant parents had undertaken through transnational movements.\textsuperscript{19} In both arguments, however, the second generation remains essentially a U.S.-based group whose contact with transnational developments occurs primarily in terms of the social relations defined by their specific “ethnic” affiliation within the U.S. society.

On the other hand, individuals like Yamane, Uno, Yoneda and Sano, who experienced trans-Pacific migrations and spent various amounts of time in Japan and former Japanese colonies, are a group of transnational individuals whose experiences transcend the limits and premises presented by both sides of the debate. Their experiences were shaped by their physical presence on both sides of the Pacific. Their identities were both socially constructed and self-defined through their interactions with Issei and Nisei


\textsuperscript{19} Levitt and Waters, eds., \textit{The Changing Face of Home}, 4.
within the Japanese American community as well as with people of multiple generations in Japan. Therefore, tracing their movements and experiences offers a unique analytical lens that can help explore the embeddedness of Nisei lives in multiple transnational sociopolitical fields, as they engaged complex legal, political, and social transformations in the U.S. and Japan that shaped their lives as migrants.

The history of Japanese Americans in Japan is also one that challenges diasporic approaches to global migrations. Recent works on Asian migration have placed both transnational movements and settlements of migrants in terms of diasporic communities. These works have offered multiple diasporic localities as a norm rather than the exception in the broad outlook of migration history. They have emphasized the complex formations of transnational families and networks through shared identities and connections. However, the complex experiences of Nisei in the Pacific require an analytical approach beyond the framework of diasporic settlement. Transnational movements of Japanese Americans before, during, and after WWII defy the notion of a singular migration, transmigration, or settlement pattern. Instead, their lived experiences must be examined in the context of fluctuating social, cultural, and political histories and movement between the

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U.S. and Japan. Japanese American migrants made their trans-Pacific journeys to Japan at a critical intersection between U.S. immigration history, the history of Japanese colonial expansion, and Japanese American history. Government records, periodicals, and personal accounts in both Japanese and English reveal that the presence of U.S.-born Japanese Americans in Japan had significant diplomatic implications on the increasingly deteriorating U.S.-Japan relations from the 1920s to the 1940s.

Recent works by Japanese scholars also demonstrate a particular research interest in “diasporic” identities of Japanese Americans in Japan who grew up as Japanese. Heavily reliant on Japanese language sources, many of these works have focused on the experiences of the Nisei educated in Japan as primarily Japanese speakers and writers. For example, scholars like Yamamoto Iwao have researched the literary activities of Kibei and rescued Japanese-language magazines published by Kibei writers in and out of the internment camps from 1941 to 1945. These magazines offer important cultural and political perspectives on Kibei, who had limited creative space to express their views. Kumei Teruko offered historical research on Japanese American experiences in prewar Japan and the return movement of Kibei. Sakaguchi Mitsuhiro used Japanese language community newspapers in the U.S. to examine the establishment of Kibei organizations.

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in Seattle in the 1930s. On the other hand, Kyoko Norma Nozaki and Yoshimi Kaoru have explored transformations of identity expressed in the works and words of individual Kibei artists. These works in Japan have largely focused on personal and life histories in an attempt to respond to the question of individual Kibei’s cultural “self-identity.” Although these works offer valuable perspectives on Nisei educated in Japan that otherwise would have been left unexplored, an examination of Nisei transnational migration in the context of larger Japanese American history and U.S.-Japan relations is the important next step. This dissertation seeks to make such a contribution.

While the history of Nisei who experienced Japan remains a difficult topic to pursue because of the demands of bilingual and transnational research, it nevertheless offers important and meaningful alternatives to the dichotomous U.S. immigrant paradigm. The 50,000 or so Nisei who traversed across the Pacific in the first half of the twentieth century were a group of migrants that defy the notion of the United States as the final terminus of immigrant history. Their experiences also challenge the prolonged concept of the U.S. as the “host nation” of immigrants. The history of Nisei in Japan is one that potentially revises the role of the U.S. as a country of immigrants: to Nisei migrants in Japan, the U.S. represented the “sending nation.” More

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accurately, it is a history that revises the existing model of immigration history by complicating the linear and predictable notion of the so-called sending and receiving societies.

Recent scholars, such as Eiichiro Azuma, have started to bridge the divide between ethnic studies and area studies and shed light on the history of Japanese Americans in the context of larger U.S.-Japan relations. As Azuma notes, however, immigration history and the history of Japanese colonialism still tend to operate in separate academic domains despite recognition of the critical need for examining “intersections.” These intersections exist even beyond the connection between Japanese overseas emigration history and the history of Japanese colonial expansion before WWII. The history of American-born Nisei who emigrated from the United States reveals the complex and unexpected implications of legal, political, and diplomatic developments in the U.S. and Japan that have been largely overlooked in scholarship and classrooms alike.

Recovering the complex experiences of Nisei transnational migrants in the Pacific can demonstrate that the negative public perception of Kibei during WWII did not merely emerge as a simple assumption of their pro-Japan sentiments. Exacerbated by wartime racial hysteria, stigmatization of Kibei in the U.S. during the Japanese American internment as disloyal elements had deeper political, cultural, and transnational roots. Without

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examining Nisei migrations across national borders, these transnational implications would only remain as aberrations in the U.S.-centered Japanese American history. The chapters that follow will reveal that the Japanese American internment and postwar experience were very much a part of the history of Nisei transnational movements, and vice versa. I argue that this history must be understood in the context of larger, international, and transnational legal, political, and cultural history.

The first chapter explores the diverse experiences of Japanese Americas in the Japanese colonial world in Asia before World War II and the role of Nisei transnational migrants in the history of U.S.-Japan relations. Young Nisei students in cities like Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto encountered students from all corners of the Japanese empire. Many Nisei migrants and students also experienced colonies first-hand as they journeyed through the Asian continent. More importantly, in an era of increasing diplomatic tension between the United States and Japan, the presence of a significant number of Nisei migrants in Japan and Japanese colonies shaped both American and Japanese policies on citizenship and immigration.

The second chapter examines Kibei experiences in the United States before the Pacific War, revisiting the question of dualism in the context of U.S.-Japan relations and the growth of the Nisei community in the United States. The chapter examines varied interpretations in Japanese and English sources of the life of Kibei student, worker, and writer David Akira Itami. Using both language sources allow more nuanced understanding of Itami’s
life, as he and other Kibei lived in a bilingual world and left traces of their experiences in both languages. Itami’s experiences in Japan and the U.S. in the years preceding WWII illuminate the intersection between Japanese American history and the history of Japan’s colonial expansion, in which the articulation of cultural dualism had a far more complex meaning than the simple question of national loyalty that would emerge at the outbreak of Pearl Harbor. In this context, “Kibei” as a category was a political construct as much as it was an identity based on a lived experience.

The third chapter follows Itami’s movement to the internment camp and the ways in which U.S. officials and Japanese American elites actively scrutinized the loyalty and cultural identity of Kibei. The War Relocation Authority (WRA), the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), and military records reveal that the articulation of Nisei loyalty during WWII and the policies on relocation, segregation, and repatriation of Japanese Americans were significantly influenced by the existence of Kibei in the United States. WRA administrators and Japanese American elites actively campaigned to promote images of Nisei as assimilated, loyal, and patriotic Americans. And these images during the internment solidified the marginalized and stigmatized status of Kibei as the cultural “other” and pro-Japanese element. This not only represented a betrayal of Kibei’s legal citizenship, but also promoted wartime WRA-JACL identity politics that shaped dominant postwar memories of U.S.-centered Nisei history.
The fourth chapter focuses on the WRA Segregation Center at Tule Lake in northern California as a transnational site. In 1943, the Kibei category again played a central role in determining the segregation policy and the movement of so-called “disloyals” from other internment facilities in the U.S. to Tule Lake. Designated as a facility that housed the so-called “disloyal” internees until its closure in 1946, Tule Lake represented not only an internment camp in the desolate corner of California, but also where multiple wartime histories converged. Exploring the voices of Kibei segregants, the chapter offers their perspectives of the Tule Lake years as a crucial and tragic juncture in their transnational experiences.

The fifth chapter revisits Japan and its former colonial world in order to explore the overseas Nisei outside the history of Japanese American internment during World War II. These Nisei included those who served the Japanese war efforts in various capacities, as well as men and women who endured the war in Japan. The Japanese Americans in wartime Japan and Japan’s military posts remain largely forgotten in the national memories of war in Japan and the United States. The chapter offers voices of those who survived and reexamines race, gender, and citizenship in the history of Japanese Americans beyond two ancestral lands. The chapter also follows David Akira Itami’s journey back to postwar Japan at the intersection between Japanese American transnational history and the U.S.-Japan relations. Examination of Itami’s experience as a former internee and Nisei
linguist in the United States Army illuminates the complexities of loyalty beyond national borders.

The five chapters in this work thus explore a Japanese American history from 1930 to 1955 as a history of transnational movements. It is a history of Japanese Americans who were not only second-class citizens in a racially oppressive society, but also those whose life choices and actions could actually put their citizenship status in serious jeopardy. Transnationality in this work is thus a set of complex and varied lived experiences, rather than a metaphorical concept. These experiences place the history of the Japanese American community beyond its ethnic boundary within the United States.
Chapter 1
The Japanese American Transnational Generation
in the Japanese Empire before the Pacific War

In a special report on April 7, 1939, the Asahi Shimbun announced a wedding ceremony held the previous night at a Tokyo YWCA. The article celebrated the international marriage between Tajima Yukiko, a gifted graduate of women’s schools in Tokyo, and Zheng Zihan, a son of the then mayor of Mukden, the industrial center of the Japanese puppet state Manchukuo. The Zheng family in fact turned out to be one of the most prominent of all Manchu nobles. The groom’s late grandfather, Zheng Xiaoxu, had been the first prime minister of Manchukuo upon the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty Aisin-Gioro Puyi’s installation as the emperor of the puppet state in 1934. The Asahi Shimbun proudly depicted the emergence of a celebrity couple as an event that signified Tokyo as a reigning cosmopolitan center of Asia that had allowed the talented young man and woman to pursue a romantic relationship across national borders. Zheng, a Mukden native and graduate of Shanghai’s Saint John’s University, was a resident scholar in Tokyo who studied at Waseda International Institute and Keio University. Tajima’s credentials as an ideal modern Japanese woman
were also impressive. She had studied at prestigious women’s schools, Keisen Academy and Oyu High School.¹

Tajima and Zheng’s marriage was a byproduct of Japanese colonialism and militarism that had intensified in the 1930s, as Manchuria had become an integral part of Japan’s prized colonial possessions in Asia. The celebratory article on Tajima’s wedding was a part of the efforts made by the Japanese press, under the watchful eye of the militarist government that had seized the country’s political power by the late 1930s, to curtail the negative international publicity brought upon by Japan’s aggressive military and foreign policy in China. The Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria had staged a series of operations that placed the region under the Japanese military occupation in 1931 and the creation of a puppet state the following year. The American and European powers’ refusal to recognize Manchukuo prompted Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations. Then, in July 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident marked the beginning of the second Sino-Japanese War. While the international community in sympathy for the plight of invaded China turned ever critical of Japan’s aggression, the Tajima wedding in Tokyo provided the domestic audience a positive picture of Japan’s influence in Asia.

The story of Tajima’s marriage to Zheng, however, told another complex aspect of international relations. A daughter of Japanese emigrants, Tajima had been born and raised in the United States and relocated to Japan

¹ “Kyō-a no shinsen kekkonsan,” Asahi Shimbun, April 7, 1939.
with her mother and siblings merely six years before in 1933.\(^2\) This highly educated modern Japanese woman thus had turned out to be a young immigrant from the United States. Tajima and her three siblings were part of the Japanese American transnational generation, over 50,000 young men and women, who relocated to Japan before the Pacific War.\(^3\) While the story of Tajima’s marriage to a young Manchu aristocrat in Japan was unique enough to grace a page in a major newspaper, it also serves as a reminder that all of the second-generation Japanese Americans (Nisei) who migrated to Japan found themselves in a world that was intimately shaped by Japanese colonialism in Asia-Pacific.\(^4\) Like Tajima, those Nisei educated in the Tokyo area were in a metropole where they interacted with students, workers, and sojourners from all corners of the Japanese empire. Some Nisei migrants and students witnessed and experienced colonies first-hand as they traveled through Korea and Manchuria for educational and employment

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\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^4\) There were a few third-generation (Sansei) Japanese Americans among the American sojourners of Japanese ancestry in the Japanese empire before World War II. However, the overwhelming majority of Japanese American transnational migrants were Nisei.
opportunities or for the pleasure of touring the colonial frontiers. More importantly, however, the aggressive colonial expansion in Asia undertaken by Japanese militarists in the 1930s had a significant impact on the place of these American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the complex history of U.S.-Japan relations. In an era of increasing diplomatic tension between two competing imperials powers, the presence of Nisei migrants in Japan and Japanese colonies unexpectedly shaped both U.S. and Japanese policies on citizenship and immigration. Because Nisei who were sent to Japan by their immigrant parents during their infancy or early childhood grew up speaking Japanese retained their U.S. citizenship, they were subject to American laws that regulated federal citizenship and nationality policies.

The history of these “forgotten Nisei” reveals complex interconnections between U.S. social, political, and cultural history, the history of Japanese colonialism in Asia-Pacific, and the history of migration. The circumstances that compelled a significant number of American-born Nisei to embark on trans-Pacific journeys reveal social realities and racial relations in the U.S. that affected life decisions in the Japanese American community. Upon relocation to Japan, Nisei migrants of different ages and diverse social backgrounds went through experiences that made them a unique group of American citizens living abroad.

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Americans in the Japanese Empire

Although no accurate data exist to provide the number of Japanese Americans who lived in Japan before the Pacific War, numerous sources suggest that between the mid-1930s and the eve of the Pacific War, the number of U.S.-born Japanese Americans residing in Japan remained consistently at close to 20,000.6 Yamashita Soen, a Hiroshima-born journalist who had lived in Hawaii, wrote extensively about Nisei from Hawaii and the U.S. mainland in Japan in the 1930s. Yamashita claimed that as early as in 1931 Hiroshima and Yamaguchi, two prefectures that had sent large numbers of emigrants to Hawaii in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, had more than 20,000 Nisei. Yamashita also believed that by the middle of the 1930s, 40,000 Nisei had arrived in Japan as young children.7

Reasons and motivations behind the movement of Japanese Americans across the Pacific were far too diverse to indicate any simple pattern. Numerous political, economic, and social circumstances compelled thousands of Japanese Americans to embark on trans-Pacific journeys. The majority of Japanese Americans were either infants or young children accompanying their immigrant parents who returned to Japan. In other cases, Japanese immigrants (Issei) in the U.S. sent their young American-born children to be raised by their relatives in Japan. For many Japanese


immigrant parents in the United States, this was a sensible economic option especially during the Great Depression. When both the Issei mother and father needed to work, sending at least one child to their relatives in Japan alleviated the cost and labor associated with childcare. This was not a practice unique to Japanese families in the U.S., as first-generation Italian immigrants were also known to send their American-born children to Italy to live with relatives during this period.8

In the 1920s and 1930s, bilingual and bicultural education became another important reason for many Issei parents to send their children to Japan. As Yuji Ichioka has shown, Issei leaders saw transnational education as a both ideological and practical solution to cultivating future leaders of the Japanese American community, as the exclusionist movement in the United States during the 1920s compounded the economic hardships of Japanese immigrant families. The anti-Asian and anti-immigrant sentiment that culminated in the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, which placed a restrictive quota on the annual number of immigrants, proved to be especially devastating to the image of Japanese immigrants. Based on the 1890 census, the quota was deliberately designed to halt Japanese and Southern and Eastern European immigration to the U.S. This new immigration law convinced Issei leaders that as a group of excluded immigrants, they could

8 Dino Cinel, From Italy to San Francisco: The Immigrant Experience (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982), 127. Another study by Cinel on Italian return migrants in the early 1900s suggests that a significant number of U.S.-born Italian Americans migrated to Italy with their return migrant parents. For instance, about seventy-five percent of the 25,000 foreigners admitted to four major Italian ports in 1906 were U.S. citizens by birth or naturalization. See Dino Cinel, The National Integration of Italian Return Migration, 1870-1929 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 107-107.
not effectively fend off the anti-Japanese sentiment on the U.S. West Coast that was only growing stronger. Issei intellectuals, such as Abiko Kyutaro, vigorously promoted the idea that the future of the Japanese American community and the legacy of Japanese immigration to the U.S. depended on the second generation, who were American citizens by birth. Immigrant leaders argued that Nisei children should be raised as truly bicultural leaders in order to assume the role of a “bridge of understanding” (kakehashi) between Japan and the United States. According to this ideal, Nisei could become truly bicultural only when they had armed themselves with the knowledge and understanding of their parents’ homeland. Only then would they be able to communicate effectively with the American public and combat the cultural and political misunderstanding that had caused exclusionist movement against the Japanese in the U.S.

Driven by the “bridge of understanding” ideal, Japanese American newspapers, prefectural associations (kenjinkai), religious organizations, and other community groups sponsored “Nisei study tours” (kengakudan) to Japan from the mid-1920s to early 1940s. These study tours lasted several weeks and gave young Japanese American students opportunities to visit major industrial centers and tourist destinations in Japan. In the 1930s, Nisei

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11 Ibid., 72-73.
study tours included excursions to the Japanese colonies of Korea and Manchuria.\textsuperscript{12} Kay Tateishi, a Nisei from Southern California, visited Tokyo in 1934 on a program sponsored by the Young Buddhist Association. After Tokyo, Tateishi’s group toured various cities and towns in Japan, as well as Korea and Manchukuo. While Japanese culture and customs did not impress Tateishi much, he thought Japanese city folks were “more modern” than “humble” Japanese immigrants and their American children in rural California towns.\textsuperscript{13}

Various personal and economic circumstances also forced some Issei immigrants themselves in the U.S. to return to their hometowns in Japan. Among the Nisei who ended up in Japan before WWII were young children of these Issei return migrants. One of the earliest examples of these Nisei children was Glendale, California-native Goso Yoneda. Yoneda was one of the first Nisei born and raised in the continental U.S. In 1913, the seven-year-old son of struggling farmers joined his family’s relocation to Japan. What prompted the Yoneda family to make the difficult decision to relocate to Japan was the illness of Goso’s father Hideo Yoneda, who wished to spend his last days in his hometown in Hiroshima Prefecture. With his father unable to work, Goso Yoneda’s mother tilled the field by herself and saved barely enough money to pay for the family’s journey to Japan. Life in Japan for the Yoneda family hardly improved. Hideo Yoneda died of tuberculosis

just two years after the family’s relocation to the small mountain village of Yasuno, where rice was hard to come by and the young Goso Yoneda “never had any meat, milk, or eggs.” Growing up in a poor rural household in California and Japan shaped Goso Yoneda’s social consciousness and intellectual development during his formative years, as he was drawn to socialist and anarchist literature. His early experience in California and Hiroshima also inspired his lifelong commitment to economic justice and the labor movement, as he participated in pro-labor demonstrations and strikes in several major Japanese cities in the mid-1920s. In 1926, twenty-year-old Yoneda returned to San Francisco as a seasoned labor organizer.\footnote{Karl G. Yoneda, \textit{Ganbatte: Sixty-Year Struggle of a Kibei Worker} (Los Angeles: Asian American Studies Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1983), xi, 6-9.}

Yoneda’s exposure to the works of radical socialist and anarchist intellectuals was not an accident, as the “Taisho” era (1912-1926) saw the emergence of some of the most important proletarian intellectuals in modern Japanese history. It was a period in which Communist and socialist activities flourished in Japan and leading Marxist writers like Nagatsuka Takashi vividly described the wretched conditions of rural Japan. As the title of the leading proletarian literary magazine—\textit{The Sowers of Seeds}—suggested, the miserable life of farmers in neglected corners of the archipelago was one of the foremost concerns of the working-class movement in the early 1920s.
when Yoneda was an avid reader of proletarian literature.\textsuperscript{15} Yoneda himself would later publish a monthly magazine for poor farmers in Hiroshima.\textsuperscript{16}

Yoneda’s growing intellectual appetite also led him to travel through Japan’s colonial frontiers to meet his favorite anarchist writer. At the age of sixteen, Yoneda set out to search for Vasily Eroshenko, a Russian Esperantist who had resided in Japan for two years before being deported in 1921 for allegedly spreading anarchism among the Japanese youth. Upon learning that Eroshenko had gone to China to teach at Beijing University, Yoneda skipped school to work as a longshoreman to buy a ferry ticket from Shimonoseki to Pusan, a southeastern port in then the Japanese colony of Korea. Once he arrived in Pusan, he apprenticed at a glass factory until he had gathered enough means to continue his trip. Yoneda’s itinerary to Beijing was typical of many Japanese travelers’ in their journey from Pusan, the end point of the trans-Siberian railway, through the Korean Peninsula and Mukden in Manchuria; except, Yoneda hitchhiked through the Peninsula to save money. In Mukden, Yoneda found a job as a delivery boy for a tobacconist to buy the train ticket to Beijing. Four months after he left Hiroshima, he finally arrived in Beijing to meet Eroshenko. Yoneda worked for Eroshenko for two months, transcribing the blind Russian anarchist’s fairy tales, before returning to Japan.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} Yoneda, \textit{Ganbatte}, 9.
\textsuperscript{17} Yoneda, \textit{Ganbatte}, 8-9; Stephan, “Hijacked by Utopia,” 7.
The expansion of Japanese empire through the continent and the presence of Japanese emigrants in Korea and Manchuria thus enabled Yoneda to complete his six-month journey. By the time Yoneda traveled through Pusan and Mukden in 1922, the number of Japanese emigrants to Korea and Manchuria had been on a steady rise. According to a conservative figure, Korea, which was Japan’s most prized colony, had over 350,000 Japanese settlers. Although Manchuria was not yet a Japanese colony, nearly 150,000 emigrants had settled there. Hiroshima Prefecture, which had been known since the late nineteenth century as a “prefecture of emigrants” for having sent the largest number of migrants to Hawaii and North America, was one of the top ten prefectures that produced agricultural settlers in Manchuria.18 Thus, as daring and adventurous as Yoneda’s trip to China was, he traveled through the territories that were familiar to people from Japan and from his own prefecture.19 He certainly did not have to learn new languages and customs to survive in places that were well settled by Japanese emigrants.

Another California Nisei, Koh Chiba, followed his Issei father’s return journey to Japan in 1921 after the California Alien Land Law had stripped his family of the right to own or lease property and denied them the opportunity to build a viable economic future in the United States. In the 1910s and 1920s, anti-Asian and anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. culminated in legal

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19 See Stephan, “Hijacked by Utopia.”
measures, such as the Alien Land Laws, that forced many Japanese immigrants in the agricultural and business sectors to rethink their future in America. Chiba’s father learned from his correspondents in Japan that Manchuria had emerged as the next destination for Japanese emigrants in search of land and opportunities. Shortly after the family’s relocation to Japan in 1921, he managed to secure a job in Manchuria and took his family to the future Japanese colony.20

Like many of the Nisei children who followed their Issei return migrant parents to Japan and Japanese colonies in the 1920s, Koh Chiba would live the rest of his life as a Japanese citizen who settled permanently in his parents’ homeland. An eighth-grader at the time of his family’s departure to northeast China, Chiba finished his middle school education in Manchuria before pursuing higher education at Tokyo Imperial University. Chiba subsequently joined the law faculty at his alma mater in Tokyo before World War II.21 After the Pacific War, Chiba began his career in public service, and by the time of his retirement in the 1970s, he had become the highest-ranking foreign-born employee of the Japanese government in history. In 1957, more than three decades after his family had left California, he returned to the country of his birth as an envoy on Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s official visit to Washington D.C. No longer an American citizen, Chiba had become the director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s European

21 Ibid.
and American Affairs Bureau. His long and successful career as a Japanese diplomat would include an ambassadorship to Australia in the 1960s.

Yukiko Tajima also followed her family’s return migration to Japan. Like Goso Yoneda, Tajima saw her mother assume the role of breadwinner after the death of her father. Yukiko’s father, Takayuki Tajima, had left his hometown in Hiroshima Prefecture in 1905 to settle in California, where he would establish himself as the Central Valley’s “lettuce king.” Within fifteen years after his arrival in the U.S., Takayuki Tajima had become the number one lettuce farmer in San Benito County, transporting as much as sixteen cargo cars of lettuces to New York in the spring of 1920. However, Takayuki’s success did not outlast the Great Depression, as he was out of business by 1931. His attempt to reestablish his lettuce kingdom in Napa Valley ended in a failure two years later. Yukiko Tajima had turned sixteen when her father committed suicide in September 1933. Two months later, she was in Tokyo with her dejected mother and siblings, as they began a new life in Japan on a small sum of insurance money.

By the time Yukiko Tajima arrived in Japan in 1933, more and more Nisei had embarked on the trans-Pacific journey to Japan. For many Nisei young adults and teenagers, relocation to Japan offered career opportunities

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23 “Waga Kuni to Kakukoku to no Aida no Shomondai,” *Waga Gaikou no Kinkyo*, no. 7 (December 1967).
24 *The Morning Daily Advance* (Hollister, CA), May 19, 1920.
25 *The Evening Free Lance* (Hollister, CA), September 18, 1933.
26 Japanese government statistics from 1929 to 1932 suggest that between 20,000 and 30,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry had settled in Japan: Nikkei Gaijin Zakken, K.1.1.0.9, Diplomatic Records Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
that were difficult to attain in the United States. In the early 1930s, even Japanese Americans with college degrees struggled to secure employment outside the Japanese American community. In the *History of the Development of the People from Hiroshima Prefecture* in 1929, Japanese immigrant Junichi Takeda lamented the problem of Nisei employment in the U.S. due to “racial prejudice” against Japanese Americans. There was a growing sentiment within the Japanese American community on the U.S. West Coast that Nisei’s U.S. citizenship did not guarantee their full acceptance into American society. The immediate and practical concern was that the existing racial hostility and discriminatory social institutions in the U.S. not only affected the lives of first-generation Japanese immigrant parents, but also threatened their U.S.-born children’s chance of building desirable careers in business, public service, and professional fields outside the ethnic community.\(^{27}\) To some Nisei in the U.S., exploring their career options in the expanding Japanese empire seemed like a logical alternative, if they could learn to speak Japanese well enough. The increasing Japanese economic and political might in Asia-Pacific also compelled Issei parents to urge their children to explore opportunities in the potentially lucrative field of international commerce between the U.S. and Japan.\(^{28}\)

By the early 1930s, Japan’s position as a formidable colonial power in Asia-Pacific lured a significant number of Nisei from the United States.

\(^{27}\) Junichi Takeda, *Zaibei Hiroshima Kenjinshi* (Los Angeles, Zaibei Hiroshima Kenjinshi Hakkojo, 1929), 43.
\(^{28}\) Ichioka, “Dai Nisei Mondai,” 33.
According to the Japanese Home Ministry in 1933, almost twenty thousand Japanese American residents from North America had settled in Japan. For most young Nisei in Japan, the issue of where to settle was determined rather easily, at least at the beginning of their lives in that country. Once they arrived at Yokohama, many Nisei were usually taken in by their relatives, who lived in or near their parents’ hometowns. Naturally, many Japanese American children settled in regions in Japan that had sent large numbers of emigrants to North America. These regions included Hiroshima and Yamaguchi Prefectures in the southwestern part of the main island of Honshu; Kagoshima, Kumamoto, and Fukuoka Prefectures on the island of Kyushu; and the area around Tokyo (commonly known as the “Kanto” region). In 1931, Issei community historian and influential Los Angeles businessman Tsunegoro “Paul” Hirohata claimed that nearly one out of three Nisei whose parents had come from Fukuoka Prefecture were studying in Japan. In *The History of the Development of the People in North America from Fukuoka Prefecture*, Hirohata estimated that at least 6,000 U.S.-born children had parents from Fukuoka. Of these Nisei, 1,878 had traveled across the Pacific to live with their relatives.

As the center of Japanese economy, politics, and culture, Tokyo attracted a growing number of young Japanese Americans in pursuit of education. According to Yamashita Soen, a prominent Issei community

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leader and intellectual, 1931 was a pivotal year that saw a sharp increase of Japanese American “international” students in Japan. Yamashita believed that before the Manchurian Incident of 1931, the population of Japanese American students in Japan had not exceeded one hundred. However, he found that by 1933, approximately five hundred Nisei arrived in Japan exclusively for educational purposes. The number then increased to seventeen hundred in 1935. Several factors contributed to the exodus of young Nisei students to Japan in the early 1930s. As discussed above, the economic hardships during the Great Depression compelled many Japanese immigrant families to send their children to Japan. The exchange rate during this period also attracted Nisei to pursue international studies in Japan, as the value of the U.S. dollar in 1932 almost doubled from the previous year.

Efforts began in both the U.S. and Japan to accommodate the growing number of Japanese American students in Japan. In 1932, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Kaigai Kyoiku Kyokai, or the Institute of International Education, for the purpose of assisting Japanese American students. Within three years, the institute opened Mizuho Gakuen, a school designed specifically to offer bilingual education to Japanese Americans. Other prep schools for Nisei students in the Kanto area included Kodo Gakuin, Nichibei Gakuen, and the YWCA’s Kokusai Yukobu. In 1936, a “Hawaii Home” Planning Committee was formed in Tokyo to build a new

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31 Yamashita Soen, Nichibei wo Tsunagu Mono (Tokyo: Bunseisha, 1938), 266.
20-room dormitory for Nisei students from Hawaii. According to the project’s promotional pamphlet, the facility would accommodate up to 80 people at a time. It would also serve as a guesthouse for non-student visitors and vacationers from Hawaii.³⁵

Many Nisei sought educational opportunities at schools that catered to the needs of foreign-born bilingual students. The oldest of these schools was Nichibei Gakuen, which opened in 1930s as “Nichibei Home,” a dormitory for Japanese American students in Tokyo. The nine-month curriculum at Nichibei Gakuen focused on Japanese language and culture, as the core mission of the school was providing the students with an opportunity to cultivate their Japanese “national spirit” without turning ultranationalist.³⁶ In Tokyo, secondary private institutions and prep schools like Aoyama School and YMCA’s Nichigo Bunka School attracted Nisei students who wanted to get acclimated to Japanese language and culture before enrolling in public schools or universities.³⁷

Many young Japanese American women in Japan took advantage of girls’ schools. Christian schools in Japan led the way in providing Japanese American girls with bilingual education. Toyo Eiwa School, founded by a Canadian missionary in Tokyo, had students of Japanese ancestry from the U.S., Canada, South America, and Europe. One of the most well-known girls’ academies was Keisen Girls’ School, which opened an international studies

³⁵ “Hawaii Home Yōran” (August 1936), Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken, Diplomatic Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
³⁷ Yamashita, Nichibei wo Tsunagu Mono, 156-157.
program in 1935. The founder and principal of Keisen Academy was Kawai
Michiko, a Bryn Mawr College graduate and former national director of the
Young Women’s Christian Association in Japan. Kawai was one of the most
influential women educators in Japan, whose own international education
and Quaker background shaped the culture and curriculum at Keisen.
Internationalism and biculturalism were the core values taught at the school
and the students were even encouraged to express in their writings opinions
critical of Japanese militarism in China. Los Angeles-native Haruko Kawai
taught English at Keisen when the program for the Nisei started and was
impressed by the school’s emphasis on internationalism. According to
Kawai, activities at Keisen designed to promote internationalism included
numerous excursions to historical heritages throughout Japan, Korea,
Manchuria, and even China. Ironically, Japan’s militaristic expansion into
Asia had allowed the Keisen students to enjoy this early version of
multicultural education. Nevertheless, the centrality of the international
ideology and de-emphasis on Japanese nationalism in Keisen’s curriculum
seemed to have affect Yukiko Tajima’s self-identity. Despite the enthusiasm
and expertise in Japanese culture that she developed throughout her adult
life, she always considered herself American.

A few universities in Japan during the 1930s also opened
“international programs” to accommodate Nisei students. Founded in 1935,

38 Keisen Girl’s School, *The Nisei*, vii; Azuma, “Nisei no Nihon Ryugaku no Hikari to Kage,”
234-238.
39 “The Forgotten Nisei.”
40 Kamisaka Fuyuko, *Mitsu no Sokoku: Manshu ni Totsuida Nikkei Amerikajin* (Tokyo: Chuo
Koronsha, 1996), 51.
Waseda University’s International Institute provided foreign students with Japanese-language immersion programs as well as opportunities to audit regular classes at the university. Waseda International Institute attracted students with long-term interests in pursuing their careers in Japan. The school produced graduates who went on to work for Japanese government agencies, newspapers, and leading corporations.\(^{41}\) Although the majority of the students at “international schools,” such as Waseda International Institute and Nichigo Bunka School, were Nisei from North America, these schools were open to other foreign students in Japan. Zheng Zihan and his two cousins arrived in Tokyo in 1936 to attend Waseda International Institute. While studying in Japan, Zheng befriended young Nisei, including Yukiko Tajima’s younger brother Yutaka, who introduced the Manchu international student to his sister.\(^{42}\)

When it came to attaining the highest level of education in Japan, not many Nisei students in Japan could duplicate the success of Koh Chiba, who graduated from the prestigious Tokyo Imperial University. Nevertheless, those Nisei who had completed secondary education and wanted to pursue higher degrees were well represented at numerous private universities in the Kanto and Kyoto metropolitan areas, such as Waseda, Meiji, Rikkyo, Keio, Toyo, Doshisha, and Ryukoku Universities.\(^{43}\) There were even some Nisei who studied at new Japanese schools in the parts of Asia under Japanese

\(^{41}\) Azuma, “Nisei no Nihon Ryugaku no Hikari to Kage,” 239-240.


occupation, such as Toa Dobun Shoin, a special institution in Shanghai that trained future Japanese diplomats and administrators.\textsuperscript{44}

Meiji University in Tokyo in particular proved to be among the most Nisei-friendly schools of higher learning. Professor Matsumoto Takizo, also known as Paul Matsumoto, played a major role in mentoring Nisei students at Meiji. Born in Hiroshima, Matsumoto grew up in Fresno, California in a Japanese immigrant family and was a native English speaker who learned Japanese at home and after-school Japanese classes. He returned to Japan in 1923 at the age of twenty-two, started middle school in Hiroshima, finished college in Tokyo before he turned 30, and completed graduate studies and joined the Meiji University faculty by 1934. His bilingual and bicultural background, as well as his love of sports, drew him to Nisei students and their interests. Meiji University had enough Nisei students in 1934 to form one of the first American football teams in Japan under Matsumoto’s guidance. All of the players on the inaugural football team at Meiji University were members of the school’s all-Nisei Sigma Nu Kappa club.\textsuperscript{45}

The presence of Japanese American student-athletes in Japan in the 1930s played a crucial role in the creation of Japan’s intercollegiate athletic leagues. Matsumoto’s mentor Paul Rusch, an English professor at the Episcopalian Saint Paul University—known as Rikkyo University in Japanese—was widely known to have introduced American football to

\textsuperscript{44} Toa Dobunkai, \textit{Toa Dobunkai Kiji}, 1938-1940.
Japan. In 1934, Rusch enlisted California Nisei Jiro “Jimmy” Ota to form athletic clubs at Rikkyo University, including the first American football team in Japan. Other schools with Japanese American student-athletes, such as Waseda and Keio Universities, soon followed suit. Japanese American athletes excelled in baseball and hockey, but American football drew the most enthusiastic participation from Nisei student-athletes. On October 26, 1934, the Asahi Shimbun reported on the result of the first unofficial American football match in Japan, held at the Rikkyo University field and refereed by Matsumoto and Rikkyo University football coach George Marshall. Meiji University’s Sigma Nu Kappa defeated a team consisting of Hawaiian Nisei in Tokyo to claim the first ever victory in an American football game on Japanese soil.\footnote{Asahi Shimbun, October 26, 1934.} Soon thereafter, Nisei students and their mentors in Japan arranged the first intercollegiate football games among Meiji, Waseda, and Rikkyo Universities, all captained by Japanese American student-athletes. The founders of intercollegiate league were also instrumental in establishing the Japan American Football Association, which continues to operate as the sport’s governing body in Japan. In 1935, Meiji University’s American football team hosted the first international game at Koshien Stadium outside Kobe, losing to the visiting University of Southern California team.\footnote{Asahi Shimbun, March 24, 1935; Shingo, “Waga kuni ni okeru senzen no amerikan futtoboru katsudo no kiroku.”}

The presence of Japanese American students in the capital produced a cultural stereotype of Nisei as spoiled youngsters who were not committed
to their education. Perhaps this was because many Japanese American students in Tokyo attended schools that offered a wide range of extra-curricular programs and cultural excursion tours instead of going through the rigors of public education undertaken by their Japanese peers. Nisei students in special schools skipped the required secondary public education curriculum that included Chinese classics, advanced Japanese language arts, morals, and civics.\(^{48}\) Another reason for the stereotype could have been the leading role the Nisei male college students played in intercollegiate athletics and the press attention they attracted. There is also evidence that Nisei’s “American demeanors” were not altogether well accepted in Japan. A Tokyo Metropolitan Police report in 1933 stated that Japanese Americans in Japan were not serious students and often displaying excessive flamboyance or “an undesirable manner.”\(^{49}\) There were also complaints that young Japanese Americans were frequenting nightclubs and taverns, wasting hard-earned money that their parents had sent from the U.S.\(^{50}\)

However, the reports of the Nisei’s alleged misbehavior forgot to mention that not all Japanese Americans had gone to Japan to study. Nisei in Japan had a wide range of goals and aspirations outside classrooms. There emerged a few young Japanese American stars in the pre-WWII Japanese world of entertainment. Arguably, the most popular and influential among Japanese American entertainers in Japan was jazz singer and dancer Fumiko

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\(^{49}\) December 15, 1933, Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken, Diplomatic Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

\(^{50}\) Yamashita, *Nichibei wo Tsunagu Mono*, 300.
Alice Kawahata. Born Alice Fumie Tachibana in Hawaii in 1916, Kawahata was a third-generation Japanese American (Sansei) who grew up in Los Angeles. Kawahata was a dance phenom who started her professional career at Los Angeles’ Orpheum Theatre before graduating from middle school. In 1929, her Broadway debut at the age of thirteen caught the attention of leading New York theater reviewers. The *New York Times* described her as “one of the most sensational dance hits of the current New York theatrical season.” By 1932, the aspiring young vaudevillian had performed in over 40 theaters in New York, Los Angeles, and other major cities in the U.S. before arriving in Yokohama. Due to conflicting accounts in American and Japanese press, the true reason for Kawahata’s sudden disappearance from the Broadway and relocation to Japan had been something of a mystery, until Kawahata herself revealed in the late 1990s that she had only intended to stay in Japan for a few months to visit relatives. However, within those few months she signed with Columbia Records Japan and began a new career. Already an experienced performer, she became a singing sensation in Japan, recording several hit songs and performing in musicals and films before the Pacific War.\(^5\)

The diverse experiences of Japanese Americans in Japan thus demonstrate that their lives were not disconnected from their country of birth. Many Japanese Americans in Japan, as Kawahata’s case shows, also

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had plans to eventually return to the United States. They would also find out that complex political developments on both sides of the Pacific threatened their American citizenship.

Race, Gender, and Citizenship: The Toshiko Inaba Case

The anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States and discriminatory U.S. immigration laws during this period not only excluded first-generation Japanese immigrants from American citizenry, but also threatened the citizenship status of U.S.-born Nisei men and women who resided abroad. In early September 1928, nineteen-year-old Walnut Grove, California native Toshiko Inaba arrived at the Port of San Francisco via a trans-Pacific vessel from Japan. At the age of three Inaba had been sent to Kumamoto Prefecture to be raised by her uncle’s family. After spending sixteen formative years of her life in Japan, Inaba decided to return to her country of birth with the intention to resettle permanently. However, her reentry to the United States was denied by the immigration authorities, who determined that Inaba had lost her U.S. citizenship while living abroad. Without permission for readmission to the U.S. soil, Inaba found herself detained at the Angel Island Immigration Station across the bay from the city of San Francisco.52

As Inaba awaited her deportation order at the Angel Island Immigration Station, her family in California hired lawyers to appeal the

52“Honpo ni oite kon’in shitaru nikkei shimin no shiminen soshitsu ni yoru sōkan ni kansuru ken,” May 1, 1930, Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken Volume 1, K.1.1.0.9.1, Diplomatic Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
Immigration Commission’s decision to deny her admission. However, a series of hearings conducted by the U.S. Labor Department’s Board of Special Inquiries did nothing to grant Inaba admission to the U.S. soil. Inaba refused to give up and filed a petition to the U.S. District Court for her admission as an American citizen. As the hearings on her case dragged on, Inaba would remain imprisoned at Angel Island for over a year before her eventual deportation on January 15, 1930. Her 16-month detention made Inaba the longest Japanese detainee in the history of the Angel Island Immigration Station.\(^5\)

Toshiko Inaba was not a Japanese immigrant, but a U.S. citizen with proper paperwork who wanted to resettle in her hometown in Sacramento County. What, then, caused her detention and deportation? Inaba’s fate was a result of complex legal and judicial developments in the 1920s that had shaped U.S. policies on citizenship and immigration. Upon Inaba’s arrival at San Francisco, the immigration officers reviewing her papers discovered that she had married and divorced Torao Yamamoto, a Japanese national, during her sixteen-year residence in Japan.\(^4\) Unbeknownst to Inaba at the time of this marriage, the U.S. Government in 1922 had enacted the Married Women’s Independent Nationality Act, better known as the Cable Act. This law forced American women marrying “aliens ineligible to citizenship” to forfeit their U.S. citizenship. In the same year Congress passed the Cable Act, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *Takao Ozawa v. United States* that Japanese

\(^5\) Ibid.  
\(^4\) Ibid.
nationals did not qualify for naturalization rights reserved for “Caucasians” or “free independent whites,” and formally established Japanese nationals as “aliens ineligible to citizenship.” Thus, the immigration officers at the Port of San Francisco and Angel Island interpreted Inaba’s marriage history as the legal ground on which she had ceased to be an American citizen vis-à-vis the Cable Act of 1922.

If the Cable Act of 1922 and Ozawa v. United States worked in tandem to strip Inaba of her U.S. citizenship, the Immigration Act of 1924 served as the legal measure that directly contributed to the U.S. Immigration Commission’s denial of her return to the United States. The 1924 Immigration Act effectively ended Japanese immigration by imposing permanent limitations on the entry of immigrants from Asia. As someone who had lost her U.S. citizenship by marriage to a Japanese national, Inaba became a stateless individual. For the purpose of immigration proceedings, the U.S. immigration officers reclassified her as a Japanese citizen and an immigrant. The officers at the Port of San Francisco then used the racialized quota system established by the 1924 Immigration Act to deny her admission to U.S. soil. In the eyes of the immigration officers, Inaba had become a Japanese citizen and an immigrant no longer eligible for admission to her country of birth. This sudden change of Inaba’s national identity was not by her choice, but by the mandate of law and the High Court of the United

55 Ibid.
States that had changed her legal and racial status of Japanese while she was away from home.

Thus, the U.S. legal and judicial enactments designed to exclude immigrants from East Asia in the 1920s also redefined the citizenship and national identity of Japanese Americans who resided overseas before the Pacific War. The 1920s marked the beginning of what is commonly regarded in immigration history as the “exclusion era.” Immigration historians and Asian American scholars have emphasized the impact of exclusionary legal measures on the history of U.S. citizenship and naturalization. They have focused on the landmark decision in Ozawa v. United States as a race-specific interpretation of naturalization rights that excluded Asian immigrants from American citizenry. Similarly, studies have focused on the 1924 Immigration Act as a racist policy designed to prevent the influx of an unwanted population from Asia as well as southern and eastern Europe. In other words, only foreign-born migrants were thought to be legally subject to these exclusionary measures.

However, studies of the implications of these historical developments have largely overlooked the unexpected consequences of exclusionary U.S. immigration and naturalization laws. As shown in the Inaba case, second-generation Japanese Americans, who were U.S. citizens by birth, also became legally subject to these immigration and naturalization laws of the 1920s. The changes in legal status of Issei in the U.S., in fact, had serious implications on the citizenship of Nisei who resided abroad. Thus, the history of Nisei in
prewar Japan can shed new light on exclusionary immigration and naturalization laws against Asian immigrants.

The Inaba case also reveals the complex intersection of race and gender in the history of U.S. immigration and citizenship. As Inaba chose to fight her way home by filing court appeals, she argued that her marriage to Yamamoto should have been null and void in the first place because the said marriage had not been in accordance with Japanese marriage law. In an appeal, Inaba via her attorneys claimed that the marriage had taken place “without her own knowledge and without the consent of her parents,” which was required by law in Japan in order for a marriage to be legally recognized. Inaba claimed that she found out about her alleged marriage to Yamamoto in September 1927, four months after it had taken place. At that point, she asserted, she “caused her family record to be changed so that she would no longer be a member of Yamamoto’s family, but a member of her own family.” This act, according to Japanese laws existing at the time, constituted Inaba’s “complete and absolute” release from the alleged marriage.56

However, the opinion of the presiding American judge was hardly sympathetic to Inaba’s plight. U.S. Circuit Judge Franklin H. Rudkin upheld the Board of Special Inquiries decision for Inaba’s deportation and reiterated the legal ground on which her marriage to Yamamoto had stripped Inaba of her U.S. citizenship. As to Inaba’s claim that the marriage had taken place

56 Toshiko Inaba v. John D. Nagle, Commissioner of Immigration (N.D.Cal. 1929), petition for writ of habeas corpus, No. 19919 L.
without her knowledge, Rudkin responded that the “only evidence of coercion was the fact that her husband was selected for her by her relatives, according to Japanese custom.” “If such coercion will invalidate a marriage between Orientals,” the judge added, “it is a matter of common knowledge that few, if any, of such marriage [sic], will result, or can result, in expatriation.”\textsuperscript{57} Ironically, Rudkin’s opinion was based primarily on racialized perceptions of Asian “culture” rather than the legality of Inaba’s marriage in Japan. Nevertheless, it effectively upheld racially-designed U.S. citizenship and immigration laws of the 1920s. Inaba’s experience revealed that as long as these exclusionary legal institutions existed, Nisei women living in Japan constantly faced the possibility that they would not be allowed to return to their homes in the U.S. upon their marriage to Japanese men.

Anti-Japanese Sentiment and Nisei Citizens in Japan

Before the Inaba case, officials at the Japanese Foreign Ministry already had foreseen that the increase in U.S. exclusionary legal measures against Japanese immigrants would potentially affect the citizenship status of their U.S.-born children living abroad. The history of Japanese Americans in Japan illuminates the implications of anti-Japanese sentiments and racially- and ideologically-driven interpretations of American citizenship for diplomatic history. As U.S.-Japan relations began to sour in the 1920s and

\textsuperscript{57} Toshiko Inaba v. John D. Nagle, Commissioner of Immigration, San Francisco, Calif. (9th Cir. 1929).
especially in the 1930s with Japan’s military aggression in China, the presence of American citizens of Japanese ancestry in Japan became a diplomatic issue that neither of the two governments had dealt with before. Japan’s high diplomats became increasingly mindful of the presence of American citizens of Japanese ancestry in Japan. They understood that these laws not only affected the lives of Japanese nationals in the U.S., but also might require the Japanese government to reevaluate the administration of a significant population of American citizens who could lose their citizenship and settle permanently in Japan.

Before Inaba’s arrival in San Francisco, however, neither Japanese diplomats nor American legal experts fully grasped the complex gendered implications of the Cable Act on the lives of Nisei women living in Japan. In 1926, Vice Consul K. Tsurumi in Los Angeles consulted the Japanese Consulate General’s legal advisor Ray E. Nimmo’s opinion about the citizenship problem of Japanese Americans residing in Japan. In a letter, Tsurumi asked Nimmo whether Japanese Americans in Japan would face the danger of losing their U.S. citizenship as a result of their extended stay abroad. \[^{58}\] Nimmo’s legal opinion, based on his research on U.S. citizenship cases, was that for Nisei in Japan to lose their American citizenship, they would have to voluntarily foresew their allegiance to the United States. Based on Nimmo’s explanation, the only realistic cause for Nisei to lose U.S.

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[^{58}]: Vice Consul of Japan in Los Angeles to Ray E. Nimmo, December 9, 1926, Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken.
citizenship would be service in the Japanese military, as it would require them to swear allegiance to the Japanese Emperor.\textsuperscript{59}

The Japanese Foreign Ministry’s concern at this time focused mainly on Nisei men’s citizenship in Japan, as their potential military records in Japan seemed to be the only viable evidence of their voluntary expatriation.\textsuperscript{60}

In reality, however, the number of adult Nisei in Japan in the early 1920s was insignificant.\textsuperscript{61} Nisei military service in Japan would become a more realistic problem once Japan entered a full-fledged war against the Allied forces during WWII and conscripted Japanese American men living in Japan. Many Nisei men in Japan would reach military age by then and indeed lose their U.S. citizenship as a result of their service in Japan’s war against the United States.

It was not until Japanese diplomats in the United States learned of Toshiko Inaba’s detention on Angel Island, her appeals cases, and her eventual deportation to Japan, that they finally realized that Nisei women were more likely to face the possibility of losing their U.S. citizenship.\textsuperscript{62} They paid close attention to the Inaba case and reported to their superiors in Tokyo on the proceedings of her appeals in U.S. District Court. At the same time

\textsuperscript{59} Ray E. Nimmo to Vice Consul of Japan in Los Angeles, December 30, 1926, Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken.

\textsuperscript{60} Consul General of Japan in Los Angeles to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, February 15, 1927, Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken.


\textsuperscript{62} “Nihonjin to kon’in ni yori sōshitsu shitaru beikoku shiminka no rikon go kaifuku shinsei ni taisuru kyōka hanketsu no ken,” March 1927, Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken.
time, the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Home Ministry began an effort to find out more about the whereabouts of Nisei residents in Japan. However, new administrative measures to manage the Nisei population in Japan proved to be far from organized, nor was it ever a high administrative priority in the Japanese government. Moreover, the government could not even manage to determine how many Nisei were actually present in Japan. In 1929, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated that the number of Nisei from the continental U.S. and Hawaii in Japan had reached 30,000. This report claimed that these Nisei were present in Japan for “educational purposes.” However, the Ministry’s estimate did not include those Nisei residing in Japan who were not of school age or those who had gone to Japan for reasons other than a pursuit of education.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Home Ministry made an attempt to gather more comprehensive data in 1932. In Tokyo, the Metropolitan Police determined that there were 450 Nisei from North America present in the capital. Evidence suggests that the Tokyo Metropolitan Police attempted to keep close watch on the activities of the Nisei in Tokyo in the 1930s. Because the police enjoyed the advantage of both logistics and manpower, their records provide one of the most reliable estimates for historians. Official reports on the number of Nisei submitted by prefectural offices were far from reliable, however, as they were rather hastily prepared from various sources without effective means of

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confirmation. Many of these census reports were based on voluntary registrations of families with Nisei living in their households, local school enrollment records, and the estimates prepared by “overseas associations” (kaigai kyōkai) in some prefectures. Moreover, none of the reports provide accurate information about the movements and whereabouts of the Nisei in Japan. It is unclear, for example, how many of the 450 Nisei in Tokyo were students and workers who had moved to the capital from other prefectures.64

What actually concerned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials more than the census data was the impact of the Nisei presence in Japan on growing anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. In the 1930s, reports from the Consuls General in California particularly alarmed the Ministry officials, because leading anti-Japan and anti-immigration activists in the U.S., who actively penned criticism of Japan’s colonial expansion, began to make specific reference to the Nisei in Japan.65

Long after Toshiko Inaba’s deportation in 1930, California Joint Immigration Committee leader and anti-immigration activist V.S. McClatchy thought the Johnson-Reed Act was not exclusive enough to stop the influx of all individuals of Japanese race.66 Throughout the 1920s McClatchy had authored anti-Japanese articles, such as “Guarding the Immigration Gates” and “The Japanese Problem in California.” In the 1930s, he began to pay

64 “Honpo ni kyojuseru bei, ka shussei nikkeijin sūchō no ken,” 1932, Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken.
65 Interim Consul General of Japan in San Francisco to Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 25, 1936, Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken.
66 “Honpō ni oite konin shitaru nikkei shimin no shiminkei sōshitsu ni yoru sōkan ni kansuru ken.”
closer attention to the existence of second-generation Japanese Americans in Japan, and incessantly warned the American public of what he alleged was Japan’s plan to dispatch 50,000 Kibei—Nisei returnees from Japan—to the U.S. West Coast and Hawaii as spies. For instance, in a widely circulated article in 1937, McClatchy claimed that the Japanese government had harbored Nisei saboteurs in Japan and indoctrinated them with the “duties and loyalty of Japanese citizenship.” McClatchy argued that these Nisei would then be sent back to North America to lead Japan’s effort to invade the United States by “forc[ing] entrance for her emigration.” McClatchy also claimed that those Kibei already in California freely infiltrated into the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), an emerging Nisei community and civil rights organization on the U.S. West Coast, and had thus added logistical and organizational prowess to their operation as Japanese agents. In his effort to disseminate his message of warning against the alleged Kibei espionage in the U.S., McClatchy effectively utilized his personal connection with anti-immigration groups in California as well as leading newspapers, such as his family’s *Sacramento Bee* and the Hearst-owned *San Francisco Examiner*. The anti-Japanese sentiment and the negative public perception of Japanese Americans educated in Japan before WWII had far-reaching

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68 V.S. McClatchy to William Randolph Hearst, January 10, 1938, William Randolph Hearst Papers, Box 5, Folder 19, BANC MSS 77/121C, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
transnational consequences. McClatchy’s commentaries caught the attention of Japanese American community newspapers as well as the Japanese government news agency Domei Press (Domei News Agency), which fed translations of McClatchy articles to local newspapers in Japan. In the first half of 1937, these stories of McClatchy’s anti-Kibei messages were often accompanied by a report that the U.S. government had an immediate plan to ban the return of all Japanese Americans residing in Japan. The report warned that the U.S. Congress planned to enact a bill that would require all Japanese Americans residing in Japan to register themselves with U.S. diplomatic missions. The failure to do so would cost the Nisei in Japan the right to return to their homeland.

In May 1937 the Hiroshima Overseas Association reported to the Director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s American Affairs Bureau that McClatchy had written his support for such a bill. This bill would force U.S. citizens who had spent more than two years overseas without registering with the U.S. Consulate to lose their citizenship.69 This kind of report was so widely circulated by the Japanese press that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo soon received a number of requests for confirmation of the news, as well as for instructions to Japanese Americans living in Japan on the proper course of action. In a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on June 28, 1937, the governor of Wakayama Prefecture demanded clarification of an account

69 President of Hiroshima Overseas Association to Director, America Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 25, 1937, Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken, Volume 3, K.1.1.0.9.3, Diplomatic Records Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
in an *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun* report earlier that month on the alleged U.S. bill banning the return of Kibei to their country of birth. The paper reported that the U.S. had launched a legislative campaign to block the return of Japanese Americans from Japan as a response to the ongoing return migration of Kibei to the U.S. West Coast in the 1930s. This legal measure would go into effect as early as July of that year, according to the paper, which admonished local Nisei residents to report to the U.S. Consulate General to register their American citizenship and denounce any intention to seek permanent residence in Japan.\(^{70}\) In Kobe in Western Japan, an emigration brokerage company ran an advertisement offering to file registration paperwork on behalf of Nisei residents in Japan. The ad quoted the Domei News Agency report on the alleged anti-Nisei/Kibei bill and urged the Nisei in Japan to begin the process of registration with the local U.S. Consulate General.\(^{71}\) In the end, it turned out that the reports on the U.S. banning of overseas Nisei had actually started out as a rumor that spread rather quickly. A report from the Japanese Consul General in Los Angeles later that year clarified the matter; no evidence was found of any immediate activism to enact such an exclusionary law.\(^{72}\) However, the impact of this rumor in Japan proved significant, as it revealed the centrality of the issue of citizenship


\(^{71}\) “Keisho,” May 1937, Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken, Volume 3.

\(^{72}\) “Nikkei shimin kibei kinshi un’un no fūsetsu ni kansuru ken” (June 29, 1937), Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken, Volume 3.
among the Nisei in Japan. The potential loss of their U.S. citizenship and the consequent expatriation of thousands of American-born Nisei would become a critical diplomatic issue at a time of growing tension between the U.S. and Japan. This incident also demonstrated that Japanese American residents in Japan had experiences that were deeply embedded in legal and political institutions in the U.S. and Japan, as well as anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States.

The clarification by the Japanese Consul General in Los Angeles about the rumor, and even the repeal of the Cable Act in 1936, far from ended the overseas Nisei’s fear of the potential loss of their U.S. citizenship. In early 1939, about 150 Nisei residents in Japan from nine organizations under the flagship of the League of Young Japanese Americans convened in Tokyo for a special meeting. According to a Tokyo Metropolitan Police report, the League had organized the gathering to provide a one-day information session on Nisei citizenship. The meeting’s purpose was to help ease the anxiety within the Japanese American community in Japan about the possible loss of their U.S. citizenship while residing overseas.73

The keynote speaker at this meeting was Tetsuichi Kurashige, a Nisei journalist who had resided in Japan for 10 years. A graduate of the University of Oregon School of Law, Kurashige had written articles for the Tokyo-based Japan Times Weekly on the issue of Nisei citizenship. A self-proclaimed legal expert in citizenship laws, Kurashige fielded heated

questions from the audience about the matter of Nisei citizenship and marriage. The speaker offered textbook answers: first, Japan’s 1924 Nationality Law allowed Nisei to choose between U.S. and Japanese citizenship; and second, one could lose his or her U.S. citizenship by becoming a naturalized citizen of another country or formally pledging allegiance to the government of another country. He also assured the audience by explaining that a Nisei woman would not lose her U.S. citizenship by marrying a Japanese man, since the Cable Act had long been repealed.74

Hardly more informative than what the Nationality Law had already stipulated, this meeting in Tokyo nevertheless showed that many Nisei in Japan had to live with varying degrees of fear that the life choices they made while living overseas might strip them of their citizenship. Almost a decade after Toshiko Inaba’s deportation from San Francisco, legal measures designed to regulate the immigrant generation (Issei) still had equally significant implications on the lives of American citizens of Japanese ancestry living abroad. Furthermore, anti-Japanese activists in the U.S. were now targeting them as the enemy.

The Nisei Transnational Generation on the Eve of Pearl Harbor

The fear of losing their citizenship caused a growing number of Nisei in Japan to return to the United States in the second half of the 1930s. Other

74 Ibid.
factors also compelled Nisei return migration. As early as in 1935, Japanese American community groups in the U.S. began a movement to bring back the young Nisei from Japan. According to the contemporary accounts, many Issei parents nearing the retirement age wished the return of their children—especially their sons—from Japan to take over the family farms. One of the most instrumental groups that led *Kibei Undō*—the campaign to encourage Nisei in Japan to return to the U.S.—was the Japanese Association of North America. To initiate a systematic effort to bring back Nisei from Japan, the Association sent its representative, Matsunosuke Tsukamoto, to Japan to work with Japanese officials and Nisei leaders in Japan.

Also, toward the end of the 1930s, numerous signs indicated that the opportunities for Nisei in the Japanese Empire were dwindling. The Tokyo-based *Japan Times Weekly* in late 1939 warned young Japanese Americans not to be fooled by the false notion that they could somehow find better jobs in Japan. “Stay west, young men,” the paper admonished, because things had changed for the Nisei in Japan as the competition for jobs had become too fierce. In the summer of 1939, the students at Keisen Girls School found through their research project on “Nisei life” in Japan that the situation for Japanese Americans in Japan was indeed far from favorable. The School’s summer class that year conducted a survey of over four hundred Japanese Americans living in Tokyo and Yokohama and produced a summary of

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77 *Japan Times Weekly*, October 19, 1939.
census data in a pamphlet titled *The Nisei: A Survey of Their Educational, Vocational and Social Problems*. The authors found that because of the language barriers and the lack of knowledge in Japanese customs, the Nisei in Japan had difficulty establishing a viable career. The study made a conclusion quite similar to the *Japan Times Weekly*’s assessment; that the Japanese Americans “who had been unable to find jobs elsewhere seemed to think that in Japan they would be able to find something.” However, *The Nisei* found that most of the working Nisei who responded to the survey had “continued in the same type of work the Nisei were in” in the Japanese American community in the U.S. before they relocated to Japan.78 While those Nisei with means and abilities did achieve their career objectives in Japan, the majority of Japanese Americans who relocated to their parents’ homeland experienced challenges experienced by many immigrant groups during their settlement in the “host society.”

Yet, Japanese Americans continued to make trans-Pacific sojourns to Japan, some still lured by Japan’s colonial success in Asia and others under various personal circumstances. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, despite the heightened U.S.-Japan diplomatic tension, Japan still attracted a few Nisei in the U.S. who wanted to pursue opportunities in education and employment. In 1939, the Japanese government took part in bringing some of these Nisei to Japan. Facing the increasing negative international publicity because of the Japanese government’s aggressive China policy, the Japanese Foreign

Ministry tapped young Nisei as potential cultural brokers that could promote positive images of the Japanese empire. The man behind the project was Kawai Tatsuo, who became the director of the Ministry’s Intelligence Bureau in 1937. Having served as a Consul in Canada and First Minister in the United States, Kawai conceived of recruiting talented young Nisei and training them to become spokespersons for the ideal of Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Upon approval from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kawai named the school Heishikan and led the recruitment effort in early 1939. Kawai carefully devised a plan to place the graduates of Heishikan in positions in public relations at major companies like the Manchurian Railroads on Japan’s colonial frontier. Also, the two-year education at Heishikan would offer Nisei graduates employment as English correspondents at the Tokyo-based Japan Times and Domei News Agency. The opportunities to work for prominent companies and press outlets attracted applications from many Nisei in the U.S. and Canada, once the Japanese Consuls General in the U.S. Pacific States, Hawaii, and Vancouver sent out a call for applications through local Japanese American newspapers. Successful candidates would receive scholarships and stipends for two years.79

Kay Tateishi, who had dropped out of college in 1936 because of financial difficulties, seized the opportunity to compete for a two-year scholarship and a chance to work as a journalist in Japan. A son of...
strawberry farmers in Southern California, Tateishi saw the education at Heishikan as a way out of the family farm. “We were seeking better lives for ourselves,” Tateishi later spoke on behalf of the other Nisei students at Heishikan who had little prospect of pursuing respectable careers outside the Japanese American community in the U.S. in spite of their education and talents:

We didn’t want to toil the earth, work in fruit and vegetable stalls and gasoline stands, handle dirty clothing and laundries, sling hash in cheap restaurants and cafeterias, or slave away as gardeners and domestics.⁸⁰

Sam Masuda, another Southern California Nisei from Garden Grove, also fit the profile of a talented Japanese American stuck in his family farm. Masuda was a gifted debater who won the national speech contest sponsored by the Japanese American Citizens League. He was forced to drop out of high school in 1935 when his father died of illness to run his struggling family farm and later worked at a fruit and vegetable stand. Upon learning of Masuda’s struggle, Sei Fujii, publisher of the Los Angeles-based Japanese American newspaper Kashu Mainichi, praised the young man as a model Nisei youth who sacrificed his own education to support his family. Masuda nevertheless pushed himself to continue his education at Santa Ana Junior

College, and after graduation, applied for the Heishikan scholarship in 1939.81

In the summer and fall of 1939, the Japanese Consulates General selected candidates from a large pool of applicants. In Los Angeles, Consuls interviewed about twenty students in August out of over fifty applicants; In October, they picked four students, including Tateishi and Masuda, to join the first class at Heishikan.82 Heishikan opened on December 1, 1939 and the first class included sixteen students, fourteen men and two women, from the U.S. West Coast, Hawaii, and Canada.83

The curriculum at Heishikan reflected the program’s focus on offering optimal courses that would train students as journalists. The students at Heishikan took classes on the Japanese Constitution, Japanese language, economics, history, geography, stenography, and writing. In addition, they learned to read Chinese characters and Japanese newspapers. Also included in the curriculum was an excursion program that offered students the opportunity to tour various historical and cultural sites throughout Japan. In October, 1939, students visited the ancient Japanese capitals Nara, Kyoto, and Osaka, as well as Ise Shrine, a Shinto shrine dedicated to the mythical sun goddess who is said to be the direct ancestor of all Japanese emperors.84

81 Heishikan Newsletter, June 2004.
82 Rafu Shimpo, October 10, 1939; Consul General in Los Angeles to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 24, 1939, Honshō Shokuin Yōsei Kankei Zakken, volume 2, Diplomatic Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Kay Tateishi, “An Atypical Nisei,” 202-203.
83 Heishikan News, August 10, 1940.
84 “Heishikan no Yurai oyobi Genjo,” Heishikan News, August 10, 1940.
These cultural excursion tours became a significant part of the Nisei students’ education at Heishikan. The school officials devoted a great deal of time and resources to sending students out to different parts of the archipelago in hopes that the Nisei would cultivate positive impressions of their ancestral land. Under the supervision of their teachers, students were encouraged to document their experiences. The students devoted the majority of the pages in *Heishikan News*, the school’s official newsletter in Japanese, recounting their encounters with the splendors of Japanese countryside and cultural heritages. To Yuichi Doiguchi from San Francisco, exploring the historical and cultural sites in the ancient capitals was an indispensable form of “education” that helped him develop greater appreciation for Japan’s culture and the country’s role in “building a new East Asia.”

In June 1940, the students visited Hokkaido and Sakhalin Islands, the northernmost colonial frontiers in the Japanese empire. Hokkaido had become a Japanese territory in 1886 and the country’s second largest island, where the indigenous Ainu people had once outnumbered Japanese settlers. The vast frontier province presented the students a dramatic contrast to the crowded cities on the main island of Honshu. To California-native George Kyotow and other students in the group, Hokkaido’s open scenery looked strikingly similar to that of the American countryside. The spectacular hills and lakes they visited could easily rival the most splendid national parks in North America. In Hokkaido, students also

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stopped by an Ainu village, where a “Japanized” native man told the history and culture of his “tribe.” For Kokuro Nakata from Honolulu, this was not his first encounter with an indigenous people in a colonized land. Yet, seeing the Ainu village stimulated Nakata’s curiosity and he was moved by the “simplicity” and “innocence” of the natives of Hokkaido.86

On the other hand, Sakhalin, then known as Karafuto Prefecture, did not impress the students as much. Tamaye Tsutsumida’s excitement about the opportunity to tour this colonial territory turned into a mild disappointment when she encountered the utterly “desolate” landscape of Sakhalin. Compared to Hokkaido’s splendor, Tsutsumida thought Karafuto felt bleak and empty. Other students thought the climate of Karafuto very disagreeable, as the cold air and perpetual cloudiness added to the island’s desolateness. The itinerary on Sakhalin included Shinto shrines, museums, and agricultural settlements that had been established since the island became a Japanese territory in 1905 as a result of Japan’s victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. The highlights of the tour included a visit to a fox farm, which supplied fur to Japan and Japanese military posts in Asia. Although most students were anxious to return to Tokyo, Kaoru Furuya from Los Angeles thought the trip was worthwhile. A short visit to the frontier had intrigued him about Sakhalin’s future development and he could not wait for a chance to revisit the prefecture one day.87

86 “Hokkaido, Karafuto Kengaku Ryoko,” Heishikan News, September 16, 1940.
87 Ibid.
Many of these Nisei who relocated to Japan on the eve of Pearl Harbor would not manage to return to North America in time and became stranded in Japan when the Pacific War broke out in December 1941. For Japanese American strandees in Japan, the war would forever alter their life plans, goals, and aspirations. While the majority of the Japanese American migrants settled in the southwest or Kanto, small contingents of North American Nisei settled in cities and towns throughout the Japanese Archipelago. Mary Kakehashi was one such Nisei. Born and raised in Vancouver, Canada, Kakehashi was sent to Sendai, a major city in the northeastern part of Japan, to learn Japanese at Miyagi Girl’s School for one year. However, Japan’s war with the United States that commenced in December 1941 led Kakehashi to remain in Sendai longer than she had intended. Stranded in Japan, she relocated to Tokyo to work for a petroleum company. Upon marrying a Japanese businessman in Tokyo, she accompanied her husband to Korea, a colony that attracted thousands of Japanese industrialists and entrepreneurs.88

The Pacific War forced another Nisei, Southern California native Masao Ekimoto, to become a strandee in Japan. Ekimoto was twenty-one years old in 1939, when he learned about Heishikan from Sei Fujii, his father’s friend and the publisher of the Los Angeles-based newspaper Kashu Mainich. The chance of getting a two-year government scholarship to study in Japan intrigued Ekimoto, who had to give up on pursuing a higher degree

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88 “Forgotten Nisei.”
in the U.S because of financial difficulties. Ekimoto was a top student at high school and an experienced writer and editor for the school newspaper. Like many other applicants for the Heishikan scholarship, Ekimoto saw the education in Japan as a way out of the Japanese American community in California, where a few Nisei enjoyed a prospect of building a career outside the ethnic community. By the time he drove to the Japanese American Consulate General in Los Angeles to apply for the scholarship in the fall of 1939, however, Kay Tateishi, Sam Masuda, and two other Nisei had already been selected from Southern California to attend Heishikan. Unswayed, Ekimoto left for Japan shortly after his twenty-second birthday in January 1940, as his determination to continue education convinced the president of a local Japanese American bank to provide a two thousand dollar loan without security.89

Ekimoto boarded the Japanese ocean liner Tatsuma Maru in January 1940 at a moment of heightened U.S.-Japan diplomatic tension, as the Sino-Japanese war dragged on. In fact, when the ship left San Francisco on January 18, 1940, some twenty-three months prior to Pearl Harbor, the war in Europe and Asia already had jeopardized the safety of trans-Pacific voyages between the U.S. and Japan. In December 1939, more than five hundred seamen had scuttled the German cruise liner Columbus off the coast of New Jersey to escape the capture by a British destroyer. They traveled by train to San Francisco to board the Tatsuma Maru on January 18, 1940 bound for

89 Masao Ekimoto, telephone interview with author, August 13, 2011.
Yokohama, where they would embark on a return passage to Germany. This plan was cancelled at the last minute for fears that the presence of German passengers might cause the British navy to intercept the Japanese vessel en route to Yokohama.90 As the Tatsuma Maru set sail, Ekimoto saw two British cruisers approaching the ship to check if German nationals were on board. A week later, while docking at Honolulu, Ekimoto and other passengers on the Tatsuma Maru learned that British naval vessels from Hong Kong had stopped the Asama Maru out of Yokohama and seized two German passengers.91 To avoid any confrontation with the British naval force, the Tatsuma Maru stayed off the direct path to Yokohama and took an alternative route through Micronesia, reaching Yokohama in February 1940. After arrival in Japan, Ekimoto enrolled in a Japanese immersion program at Nichibei Home, a boarding school for Nisei students, before fulfilling his goal of attending college classes at Waseda University. On December 8, 1941, he went to school as usual, only to learn that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had made Ekimoto and the forty members of Waseda’s international student club strandees in Japan.92

Brawley, California-native Peter Sano’s journey to Japan adds to the complexity of the Nisei experience in Japan and their citizenship on the eve of the Pacific War. Sano left for Japan in the summer of 1939 at the age of fifteen to become a yoshi, or an adopted son, of his childless uncle and aunt in

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91 Kizu, Nihon Yusen Senpaku 100-nenshi; Masao Ekimoto, telephone interview with author, August 13, 2011.
92 Masao Ekimoto, telephone interview with author, August 13, 2011. See Chapter Five for Ekimoto’s wartime experience in Japan.
Yamanashi Prefecture in central Japan. Sano’s adoption into his uncle’s household was entirely his parents’ decision, but he accepted it without protest and kept no resentment at the prospect of being separated from his family in Imperial Valley. Instead, he wondered how he would learn Japanese, which he spoke very little, and adjust to new customs and surroundings. Sano managed to learn enough Japanese that summer to enroll in middle school and relocated to Tokyo to attend high school.93 As he entered into the family registry of his uncle as an adopted son, Sano became a naturalized citizen of Japan, as the Japanese Nationality Law stipulated.94 This meant that he was eligible for draft into the Japanese military. After the Pacific War broke out, Sano returned to Yamanashi to wait for the draft order. In 1945, he was among the last group of young Japanese men who joined the army and fought in northeast China.95

Sano was among the hundreds of Japanese Americans who were forced to serve in the Japanese military during World War II.96 While Sano already knew that he would be drafted by the Japanese military as a Japanese citizen, other Nisei men of military ages in Japan, including Seattle-
born Jim Yoshida, believed that their American citizenship would exempt them from military service in Japan. A son of a Japanese immigrant businessman in Seattle, Jim Yoshida accompanied his mother on a vacation to Japan in April 1941. The Yoshidas did not intend to settle permanently in Japan, as Jim had a college scholarship waiting for him in the U.S. However, as the family prepared their return trip to Seattle in early August of that year, the escalated U.S.-Japan diplomatic tension would forever change the course of Yoshida’s life. The Japanese government’s decision to suspend all shipping to the U.S. on August 1, as a response to the U.S. embargo of aviation fuel to Japan, forced Yoshida and other Japanese Americans who had wished to return to the U.S. to be stranded on the archipelago. For the next few months, Yoshida anxiously waited in his father’s hometown in Yamaguchi Prefecture, hoping for the news of normalized diplomacy between the two countries. Instead, the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8 shattered his hope of returning to Seattle and starting college.97

What Yoshida did not know was that at the time of his birth in Seattle in July 1921, the Japanese government had claimed his citizenship and allegiance on the basis of *jus sanguinis* (citizenship by blood). A dual citizen, Yoshida was now subject to conscription into the Japanese military for its war against his country of birth. Although the revised Japanese Nationality Law in 1924 allowed Nisei in the United States to renounce their Japanese

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citizenship, Yoshida’s parents were oblivious to this changed policy and their son remained a dual citizen. Neither they nor Yoshida could have foreseen a war between the U.S. and Japan and how it would impact the lives of Nisei in Japan. In the fall of 1942, Yoshida was summoned by the Japanese Army to report for a physical examination. A member of the 42nd Division out of Yamaguchi, Yoshida would spend the rest of the war years on the Manchurian front before his repatriation to Japan, joining hundreds of Nisei men in the Japanese military who automatically lost their U.S. citizenship as a result of their service to the emperor during the Pacific War. It was not until 1954 when Yoshida regained his American citizenship and resettled in Hawaii.

The varied experiences of Japanese Americans in the Japanese colonial world thus reveal the complex interplay between the rise of Japanese militarism, heightened anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States, and the war between two countries. Whether by choice, circumstance, or coincidence, Japanese Americans who traversed across the Pacific in the 1930s and 1940s found themselves in a world that was intimately shaped by Japanese colonialism. Many Japanese Americans also found out how fragile and vulnerable their citizenship status had become as a result of complex legal, political, and diplomatic developments in the U.S. and Japan. From the enactments of discriminatory immigration and naturalization policies in the

99 Yoshida, The Two World of Jim Yoshida.
U.S. to Japan’s colonial expansion in Korea and China to the Pacific War, these Americans of Japanese ancestry found themselves mired in tragic events across multiple regions in Asia-Pacific.
Chapter 2
Beyond “Two Homelands”:
Kibei and the Meaning of Dualism before World War II

Thirteen years after leaving his hometown of Glendale, California, Goso Yoneda returned to the United States in December 1926 to escape being conscripted into the Japanese Imperial Army.¹ By virtue of his ethnicity and the port of embarkation, Yoneda was detained at the Angel Island Immigration Station along with foreign passengers arriving from Japan, China, Russia, Mexico, and other countries. Yoneda’s luck was not as terrible as Toshiko Inaba’s, as the U.S. Immigration Commission released him in a few weeks upon verification of his U.S. citizenship. Within one year after leaving Angel Island, Yoneda moved to Los Angeles and joined the Communist Party under the name Karl Hama, borrowing the given name from Marx. He decided to keep the new first name, and Karl G. Yoneda would eventually become a household name in the history of Asian American labor movement.²

Yoneda was one of the first Kibei who returned to the United States from their sojourns in Japan and Japanese colonies. Like many of his peers

¹ Japanese Americans born in the United States before 1924, such as Yoneda, were automatically considered Japanese citizens on the basis of *jus sanguinis* (“citizenship by blood”). Yoneda and other male Nisei dual citizens in Japan were thus subject to the compulsory military service in the Japanese Imperial Army or Navy. See Egawa Hidefumi, Yamada Ryoichi, and Hayata Yoshiro. *Kokusekihō*. (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1997).
who had been exposed to the Taisho-era liberalism and radical labor activism in Japan in the 1920s, Yoneda was primed to lead the Japanese American contingent of the labor movement in the United States. These early Kibei returnees in the 1920s and early 1930s like Yoneda and James Oda, another young Japanese American Communist, did not fit the image of ideal Kibei that Issei community leaders had envisioned. The Kibei leftists were highly critical of the “conservatism” of their parents’ generation. Instead of pursuing careers in professional fields and entrepreneurship, or inheriting their parents’ agricultural businesses, these radical Kibei devoted much of their time to political activism and participating in the labor movement.3

In 1931, another young Kibei returned to California after spending formative years of his life in Japan. Five years younger than Yoneda, David Akira Itami was an Oakland, California-native who had been sent to Kagoshima on the southern island of Kyushu at the age of three to be raised by his aunt. Although both Yoneda and Itami reached adulthood in Japan in the 1920s, the two Kibei had experiences that were drastically different. Both were avid readers, but their intellectual and life trajectories differed significantly. When Yoneda skipped school to participate in labor strikes, Itami excelled in classes and was allowed to skip a grade to enroll in middle school a year earlier than other students did. While Yoneda was a diligent student of anarchism and radical socialism, Itami immersed himself in the

study of Chinese classics and philosophy. Yoneda had no desire to serve in the Japanese military, but Itami once considered applying for an officer’s training program in Tokyo before he was discouraged from doing so because of his American citizenship.

While Yoneda was an outspoken activist whose autobiography in the 1980s has made him well-known in the Asian American community, Itami has become an obscure figure in Japanese American history. He was a dynamic person who once wielded considerable influence as a newspaper columnist and a leader of the Los Angeles Kibei community on the eve of the Pacific War. However, once the war started Itami became a largely forgotten figure. Although he was a prolific newspaper writer, he left no significant account of his own life, and he committed suicide in 1950—at the age of thirty-nine—leaving a one-page note before taking his own life in Tokyo, where he had been a monitor at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) supervising court interpreters assigned to indicted Japanese war criminals.4

Decades later, however, while Itami’s name remained long forgotten in the Japanese American community in the United States, his life story would become something of a legendary tale that garnered much interest among a number of Japanese writers, some of whom had personally known Itami. Some sensationalized and others sentimental, the biographical accounts of Itami and fictional stories based on his life sought to recreate a

4 David Akira Itami’s hand-written note [1950], published in Ryumon (September 1987), 43.
story of an American who had grown up as a Japanese. However, piecing together these accounts, as well as Itami’s Japanese-language newspaper columns and other sporadic sources related to his life experiences, reveals that the cultural dualism that shaped his experiences on both sides of the Pacific was more complex than the simple dichotomy between his American and Japanese identities. More importantly, Itami’s story as a Kibei writer and community leader in the late 1930s and early 1940s can illuminate the larger political, diplomatic, and social developments in the decade before the Pacific War that shaped the Japanese American community in the United States.

**A Story of a Kibei and the Question of Loyalty**

In 1983, when the movement for redress and reparation for the U.S. government’s wartime mass incarceration of Japanese Americans was gaining momentum, Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) planned the U.S. premiere of its new 51-episode “Period Drama” series *Sanga Moyu* (“Mountains and Rivers are Burning”). Based on Yamasaki Toyoko’s best-selling Japanese novel *Futatsu no Sokoku* (“Two Homelands”) and starring contemporary and future international stars like Mifune Toshiro and Watanabe Ken, the drama’s plot was set in the United States and Japan during and after World War II. The story’s main character, Kenji Amo, was a Kibei whose turbulent life had taken him through such historical stages as the Japanese American internment, the Pacific War, and Japan under the
Allied Occupation. Torn between conflicting loyalties to his two ancestral lands, Amo claimed that he had failed to “find his own country” before committing suicide in the story’s dramatic ending.⁵

Using the life experiences of journalist and U.S. Army linguist David Akira Itami as a model, Yamasaki’s novel was one of the first writings to focus exclusively on Kibei and engendered controversy within the Japanese American community. During her speaking engagements after the publication of the novel, Yamasaki noted that she wanted to give her readers an opportunity to rethink their collective Japanese national consciousness, which she thought had slowly decayed in the postwar years amid overt emphasis placed on the nation’s rapid economic development.⁶ She had once considered writing a story about a modern-day Japanese character’s search of a Japanese identity. However, because the plot she had dealt with hinged upon highly sensitive ideological issues of nationalism and loyalty, she feared that the story would invite public criticism of her novel as an evocation of right-wing nostalgia for Japan’s glorious military past.

According to William Wetherall, a member of the Japanese American Citizens League’s Japan Chapter and principal English-language reviewer of Futatsu no Sokoku, Yamasaki’s decision to feature a Kibei as the main hero was a result of this careful political consideration.⁷

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⁷ “Dual Nationals Caught in a Storm over Their Mt Fuji Inheritance,” Far Eastern Economic Review 124:23 (June 7, 1984), 40-42.
In *Futatsu no Sokoku*, Japan emerged as an emotional homeland for all people of Japanese ancestry, including U.S.-born Nisei. Instead of searching for a Japanese national identity within contemporary Japan, Yamasaki chose to create an image of Japan as a sentimental and spiritual home by depicting the struggle of Japanese Americans in diaspora. Yamasaki’s interpretation of Itami’s life through Kenji Amo portrayed the Kibei as a quintessential victim of war and American racism, whose disillusionment with American democracy and longing for a home constantly drew him back to the country of his parents. As an American citizen by birth, however, Amo was unable to sever his ties to the U.S. and eventually let his conflicting loyalty drive him to end his own life. In this way, Yamasaki invited curious readers in Japan, most of whom in the early 1980s were unfamiliar with the history of Japanese Americans, to discover the meaning of Japan as a homeland through the eyes of an American-born Kibei.

Yamasaki’s simplistic and yet powerful interpretation of the Kibei’s cultural and emotional attachment to Japan touched Japanese readers that have since developed an interest in the novel’s real-life model David Itami. Kono Rikako, a graduate student at Kyoritsu Women’s University, wrote in 2000 that *Futatsu no Sokoku* and *Sanga Moyu* had helped her gain greater understanding of how the war had impacted the lives of Japanese Americans. The life story of David Itami also inspired her to study the history and identity of Kibei in graduate school.² Yamasaki’s reinterpretation of Itami’s

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life also helped Kumatani Minako from Iwate Prefecture learn how racial prejudice in the United States impacted the Japanese American community in the U.S. and forced Itami to prove loyalty to the country that had rejected him, only to have his disillusionment claim his own life.9

Yamasaki’s decision to depict the life of a Kibei might have avoided criticism in Japan, but it invited a heated public outcry from the Japanese American community in the United States. What angered her Japanese American critics was not only the novel’s main theme of the Kibei man’s split loyalty, but also her portrayal of Japanese Americans during and after World War II solely as helpless victims of racism without political means to overcome the mental and physical torments they endured during the internment. Yamasaki had first learned of the Japanese American internment during her brief stint as a visiting scholar at the University of Hawaii in 1978, but she failed to adequately grasp the centrality of Nisei loyalty to the United States during the movement for redress in the 1980s, when her novel had become a bestseller in Japan.10 Many in the Japanese American community, especially the leaders of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), did not receive a tragic story of a Kibei favorably. JACL leaders like Clifford Uyeda and Mike M. Masaoka protested the drama’s U.S. premiere in their letters to Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK) officials. They claimed that Yamasaki’s story grossly distorted Nisei loyalty to the U.S. government that

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10 Yamasaki, “Postscript,” Futatsu no Sokoku.
the community had “proved” during the wartime internment. Masaoka warned the NHK officials that the Sanga Moyu series “could jeopardize good relations on all sides.” A story of a Nisei whose loyalty straddled two ancestral lands did not fit easily into the history of “100 percent Americanism,” which influential lobbyist Masaoka and JACLers vigorously promoted in their campaign for redress and reparations for the wartime internment of Japanese Americans. "There are no torn loyalties," claimed Ron Wakabayashi, JACL’s National Director. Floyd Shimomura, the organization’s president, added: “We spent three generations trying to prove our loyalties. I’d hate to see a TV show undo all of that.”

It was perhaps her lack of appreciation of the JACL’s history of Nisei patriotism that had allowed Yamasaki to write a fictional life story of a Kibei during the height of the redress movement. Yamasaki was puzzled by the Nisei criticism of her work, which had taken five years of what she described as sincere and rigorous research and writing. She complained of what she viewed as unnecessary censorship of the NHK series by Japanese American critics, who she believed were unable to read her novel properly due to their language barrier. She had at least one ally in the U.S. in George Yoshinaga, a columnist for the Los Angeles-based Japanese American newspaper Kashu Mainichi, who argued that it was unfair to treat Yamasaki’s fiction as a work of “historical research.” Yoshinaga thought it was JACL that was doing

11 “Dual Nationals Caught in a Storm over Their Mt Fuji Inheritance,” 40-42.
13 Ibid.
disservice to the Japanese American community by imposing a dominant narrative of hundred-percent Americanism.\textsuperscript{15}

However, her critics in the Japanese American community included those who were able to read and analyze her novel quite thoroughly. Among the most vocal critics of Yamasaki’s work was Yuji Ichioka, pioneering Asian American historian and redress activist. Ichioka’s detailed commentary critical of Futatsu no Sokoku appeared in three different Japanese American newspapers in 1984. He argued that Yamasaki’s depiction of a tragic Nisei hero served her purpose of reviving a nationalistic “attachment” to Japan as a homeland.\textsuperscript{16} Ichioka might have found Yamasaki’s story detrimental to the Japanese American redress movement, just as he thought publishing his own research on Kazumaro Buddy Uno’s life might damage public support for redress legislation. Ichioka’s depiction of Uno as a Kibei disillusioned with American racism who was accused of working for the Japanese military and mistreating Allied POWs during WWII certainly defied the image of “100 percent Americans” that dominated the public narrative of Nisei history in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{17} Although Ichioka would eventually publish scholarly articles exploring Nisei transnational experiences in the 1990s, any effort to analyze the complex wartime experiences of Kibei was difficult in the 1980s when the redress movement was in full swing. In the eyes of many scholar-activists,


\textsuperscript{17} See “Introduction.”

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the inclusion of Kibei in their writings was a politically dangerous choice that could contradict the notion of unquestioned Nisei loyalty and their contribution to American democracy. Ironically, Ichioka would challenge this notion of Nisei loyalty in his article on the life of Buddy Uno.

The narrative in which the state claims the loyalty of citizens and the right to regulate their cultural, socioeconomic, and political activities left little room for the multifaceted experiences of transnational and displaced individuals like Kibei. Yamasaki’s novel framed the main Kibei character’s life in a similar predictable, polarized notion of national loyalty that had shaped the patriotic Nisei history. Amo’s failure to “choose” a country was one of many signs throughout the novel that focused on the Kibei’s seemingly tragic and anomalous inability to reconcile his inner conflict between two nation states. Despite Yamasaki’s bold and ambitious attempt to portray a Nisei life beyond the internment camps, her story nevertheless assumed that the issue of identity resided within the simple and dichotomous notion of loyalty to a nation. Likewise, the JACLers’ rejection of Amo’s split national identity worked within the dominant historical narrative in which Nisei’s political allegiance lay solely with the United States as a nation of their birth.

The Nisei Transnational Generation and the Meaning of Dualism

Both Yamasaki and Nisei elites in the 1980s failed to consider the social, legal, and diplomatic conditions before World War II which shaped
the lives of Japanese Americans in both the U.S. and Japan. The language of
Nisei Americanism emerged in the 1920s and 1930s amid complex
transnational developments. Yamasaki depicted Kenji Amo and other Nisei
as helpless victims of racism in their country of birth. However, the ways in
which Kibei responded to racial hysteria before WWII were far from simple
or passive. Their experiences must be understood in the contexts of complex
generational relationships within the Japanese American community,
changing international and diplomatic conditions, and their increasing
marginalization in both American and Japanese societies.

Growing anti-Japanese sentiment on the U.S. West Coast and U.S.
diplomatic and legal measures to limit Japanese immigration in the first
three decades of the twentieth century had significant implications on Nisei
transnational experiences. The most significant change in the generational
relationship within the Japanese American community during this period
was the growth of the second generation in both in number and influence.\(^\text{18}\)
Policy makers in Japan began to pay close attention to this changing dynamic
in the Japanese American community as they feared Japanese immigrants’
status as an unwanted population might reflect and contribute to Japan’s
negative international image. In the era of Japan’s aggressive colonial and

\(^{18}\) By the end of the 1930s, the population Nisei on the U.S. West Coast outnumbered Issei by
30,000. The vast majority of 72,000 Nisei in 1940 were in their late teens and twenties: Paul
edition (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2009), 75. During WWII, the Nisei
leaders of the Japanese American Citizens League, who had been under the shadow of Issei
leadership, would emerge as the most influential political elites representing the Japanese
American community. See Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s
Concentration Camps* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1976), 44. See also Chapter
Three.
military expansion, the Japanese overseas population had become both important assets as colonial settlers in some areas and a potential liability to Japan’s image in countries like the U.S.

In this context, a growing number of officials and intellectuals in Japan began to advocate “Americanization” of the second-generation Japanese Americans. As early as in 1910, the Japanese Consul in San Francisco urged Issei parents to abandon an immigrant mentality in their education of the second generation. According to Ichioka, the Consul told immigrant parents at the opening of a new Japanese language school near San Jose that their children should be raised “exclusively” as Americans. He also declared that Japanese language schools were no longer necessary in the Japanese American community.\(^{19}\) Two years later, Japanese education theorist Abe Iso echoed the Consul’s sentiment. Abe argued that it was imperative that the Japanese were welcomed by the host society not only economically but also politically. In his view, this could be achieved when second-generation Japanese Americans were educated solely as American citizens.\(^{20}\)

Many Issei educators, who saw the acceptance of their children by American society as the key to the future survival of the Japanese community in the United States, supported the Japanese government’s

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policy on Nisei education. Issei community leaders also began to see Nisei’s dual citizenship as a liability to their Americanization. In 1915, immigrant leaders in the U.S. petitioned the Japanese government to amend its National Law to allow Nisei to abandon their Japanese citizenship, which was automatically given to Nisei on the basis of *jus sanguinis* (citizenship by blood). The Nationality Act of 1916 partially heeded the immigrants’ petition by allowing adult male Nisei to renounce their Japanese citizenship, but only after fulfilling the military service to the Japanese emperor. This meant that in the eyes of Japanese lawmakers, virtually all male Nisei residing in the U.S. remained dual citizens and owed their allegiance to Japan.

It was not until 1924 when the Japanese government fully allowed Nisei to renounce their Japanese citizenship. A petition and lobbying efforts from the Japanese American community again played an important role in the amendment. However, there was also a growing pressure on the Japanese government to release Nisei from dual citizenship because of the legal developments that continued to exclude Issei in the United States. First, the 1913 Alien Land Law in California barred Japanese nationals’ ownership of lands in the state. Then in 1922, the Supreme Court in *Ozawa v. United States* permanently blocked Issei naturalization, forcing Issei to place property in the names of their children, who as U.S. citizens could legally own land on their family’s behalf.

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22 Egawa Yamada, and Hayata, 252-253; Zaibei Nihonjinkai, *Zaibei Nihonjinshi* (San Francisco: Zaibei Nihonjinkai, 1940), 1108.
The 1924 Immigration Act effectively halted Japanese immigration and punctuated the status of Japanese people as an unwanted population in the U.S., dealing another serious blow to the Japanese government’s effort to improve its international image. As noted in Chapter One, the Foreign Ministry began to pay closer attention to the dual nationality of not only the Nisei in the U.S., but also those residing in Japan. The principal concern to the Ministry officials was any possibility that the Nisei in Japan would lose their U.S. citizenship, which would further compound the difficulties of their parents in the U.S. Potential expatriation of Nisei in Japan would also tarnish the Japanese government’s effort to promote Nisei Americanism.

In the second half of the 1920s, Japanese diplomats in the U.S. paid attention to the impact of the Cable Act on Nisei women’s citizenship. The Japanese consuls in Hawaii reported in early 1927 on the case of Hawaii-born Nisei Yoshiko Hoshino. Hoshino filed a petition to the U.S. District Court for the Territory of Hawaii for permission to regain her American citizenship, which she had lost after her marriage to a Japanese national. Unlike Toshiko Inaba, who would file a similar petition two years later in San Francisco, Hoshino had never left Hawaii. She married a Japanese man in Hawaii in 1919 and divorced him in 1925, three years after the enactment of the Cable Act by the U.S. Congress. Upon her divorce, Hoshino applied for naturalization hoping to resume her U.S. citizenship. However, the U.S.

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23 “Nihonjin to konin ni yori soshsu sitaru fujin beikoku siminken no rikon go kaifuku shinsei ni taisuru kyoka hanketu no ken,” March 1927, Nikkei Gaijin Kankei Zakken, Diplomatic Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
Attorney denied her application based on the U.S. citizenship law’s “racial limitation of naturalization” to “free white persons and Africans.”²⁴

The opinion of U.S. District Court Judge De Bolt disagreed with the U.S. Attorney’s denial of Hoshino’s application for naturalization. De Bolt declared that while the Cable Act of 1922 deprived Hoshino of citizenship as a result of her marriage to a Japanese national, it did not strip her of her right to apply for naturalization after the divorce. The judge in this case did not cite *Ozawa v. United States*, claiming that protecting Hoshino’s right to naturalization was “fair and equitable, and accords with reason and justice.”²⁵ Despite the Judge’s favorable opinion, the Hoshino case alarmed the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu, who submitted lengthy reports to the Foreign Minister on the impact of the Cable Act and U.S. citizenship laws on Nisei women.²⁶

Japanese American women residing in Japan were at a greater risk of losing their citizenship by marriage. As demonstrated by the Toshiko Inaba case in 1929, Nisei women in Japan who had lost their citizenship were in double jeopardy, as the Immigration Act of 1924 permanently banned their return to the U.S. Despite their knowledge of this possibility after the report on the Hoshino case in 1927, the Japanese government officials could do little to find a solution. It was nearly impossible to ban Japanese American women’s marriage to Japanese men in Japan, as many Nisei women residing

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²⁴ “In the Matter of the Petition of Yoshiko Hoshino for Naturalization” (U.S. District Court for the Territory of Hawaii, 1927), No. 1466.
²⁵ Ibid.
²⁶ “Nihonjin to konin ni yori sositsu shitaru fujin beikoku siminken no rikon go kaifuku shinsei ni taisuru kyoka hanketu no ken.”
in Japan were Japanese citizens by virtue of their dual nationality. The
gendered dimension of the Nisei citizenship problem proved much more
complex than the Ministry officials had anticipated.

After 1924, however, there was another significant development in the
Japanese American community and in the international arena that would
change the nature of second-generation problem in the 1930s. Japanese
American community leaders began to place greater emphasis on Nisei’s
role as a bridge building force between the U.S. and Japan in a dramatically
changing world. As an emerging group of Nisei elites joined Issei leaders in
their vocal articulations of Americanism, the language of cultural dualism
shaped the image of Nisei as the future of the community.

For example, James Yoshinori Sakamoto, the publisher of the Japanese
American Courier and one of the founding fathers of the Japanese American
Citizens League, emphasized Nisei’s position as the future of what he
conceived of as a new “Pacific Era.” Born and raised in Seattle at the turn of
the twentieth century, Sakamoto recognized quite accurately that the growth
of Nisei, both in number and influence, would surpass that of their parents’
generation in the coming decades. While emphasizing the importance of
Nisei’s “Americanism” and even going so far as to refuse to use the Japanese
word “Nisei,” Sakamoto nevertheless saw in the second generation what he
believed to be a cultural asset that made them potentially better Americans
than even the Americans of European ancestry. Yuji Ichioka noted that
Sakamoto believed the Japanese virtue of loyalty, which Nisei children
inherited by growing up in Japanese households in America, would enable them to become more loyal citizens of the United States. Furthermore, Sakamoto believed Nisei’s Americanism made them suitable candidates for the role of bridging between the land of their birth and the land of their ancestry. Sakamoto encouraged Nisei to learn the language and customs of their parents. These cultural assets, he believed, would help them better understand the complex international conditions in the Pacific and promote better understanding between the United States and Japan.\textsuperscript{27}

There was another, more pressing reason for this articulation of Nisei dualism. Many Issei also wanted to instill into the minds of their children a version of biculturalism suitable for the “Pacific Era.” In the 1930s, many Japanese Americans, particularly Issei leaders, expressed enthusiastic support for Japan’s war efforts in China. The Issei community’s organized effort included educating Nisei about the justification of their support for Japan’s fight in Asia as well as sending remittances to Japan.\textsuperscript{28} While the American public and mainstream media criticized Japan’s aggression in China, the leaders of Issei associations and the community press sought ways to make their U.S. born children understand the immigrants’ position


as Japanese citizens living in a racially oppressive society.\textsuperscript{29} The international situation also convinced Issei that Japan represented an expanding world that could offer a better future for their children. They were hopeful that Japan’s might in East Asia would benefit Nisei position in the greater trans-Pacific world and the U.S.-Japan relations. On a more practical level, many Issei believed that Nisei biculturalism would improve their educational and employment opportunities in this expanding world.

The Japanese government also abandoned its previous policy of encouraging Nisei Americanization and joined in the Japanese American community’s effort to promote Nisei biculturalism. This policy also represented the increasing emphasis on patriotism in Japanese public education in the 1930s. As the mainstream U.S. media actively criticized Japan’s military actions in China, Japanese officials had to rethink the role of Nisei as cultural brokers. They began to fund Issei efforts to promote Japanese American transnational education, which included organized Nisei tours to Japan and its colonies in East Asia.\textsuperscript{30} Nisei transnational experiences and the meaning of dualism before World War II thus had complex social, cultural, legal, and diplomatic backgrounds. Kibei history needs to be placed within the context of important generational and ideological shifts in the Japanese American community in the 1920s and 1930s. These shifts took place amid political and social changes that shaped the Issei and Nisei views of their future.

\textsuperscript{29}Ichioka, “Japanese Immigrant Nationalism,” 197-199. \\
Rethinking “Two Homelands” in the Prewar Japanese American Community

In *Futatsu no Sokoku*, Yamasaki used a real life model to shape the overall life story of the main character as well as the novel’s historical settings. The individual after whom Yamasaki modeled Kenji Amo was Akira Itami, a California-born Nisei who grew up in Japan in the 1910s. Amo’s fictional life closely resembled Itami’s experiences in Japan and the U.S. Yamasaki’s hero was born in California, grew up in the town of Kajiki in Kagoshima Prefecture, attended college in Tokyo, and returned to the U.S. as a young man who found employment at a Japanese American community newspaper. Like Itami, Yamasaki’s character was interned at Manzanar Relocation Center before serving in the United States Army and becoming a monitor who checked the accuracy of court interpretation at the postwar Tokyo Wartime Crimes Trials. Finally, the novel ended with Amo’s suicide in Japan under the Allied Occupation, just as Itami ended his own life by shooting himself in Tokyo in 1950.31

By using Itami’s life experience as a model, Yamasaki’s fiction avoided a complete lack of historical grounding. However, it nevertheless failed to capture Itami’s complex identity as a man who lived through turbulent years as a transnational individual. Like other Kibei who lived through the war, Itami’s life remains largely unknown and misunderstood.

Careful examination of Itami’s life offers an opportunity to explore Nisei transnational experiences that have been heavily understudied in the history of Japanese Americans.

Moreover, analyzing Itami’s interactions with other Japanese Americans before World War II can demonstrate the complexity of prewar intergenerational relations. The simplistic formulation of Issei-Nisei relations based on their citizenship status and language differences does not allow a meaningful analysis of Kibei’s position within the Japanese American community. Itami’s education in Japan, his involvement in the circles of Japanese American writers and journalists, and his perspective of the U.S.-Japan relations require an alternative approach to the meanings of loyalty and prewar Japanese American history.

David Akira Itami, born in 1911 in Oakland, California, was the fourth son of Jojiro and Yoshi Itami, both of whom were natives of Kagoshima Prefecture in the southern part of Kyushu. At the age of two, Itami was sent to the town of Kajiki in Kagoshima, where Jojiro’s younger sister would take charge of raising young Akira and ensuring a proper Japanese education. When he turned five, Itami began studying classical Chinese texts under local intellectuals at a Confucian school called Seiunsha. Itami’s early education in traditional studies and Confucian classics before entering public school was a unique experience that was not available to many children in other parts of the country. Two years after he started reading classical texts, Itami entered Dajo Primary School. By his fifth year in primary school, his
level of academic proficiency allowed him to be admitted to the prestigious Kajiki Prefectural Middle School, foregoing his final year in primary school. At middle school he excelled in both liberal arts and physical education. In a publication celebrating the ninetieth anniversary of the school’s founding, an alumnus of Kajiki Middle School remembered Itami as an exceptionally smart student who outperformed his older classmates. Another former classmate remembered that Itami had displayed extraordinary skills in deciphering complex classical Chinese texts.

Yamasaki’s portrayal of her main character’s deep attachment to Japan seems to have been inspired by Itami’s family and educational background. A descendent of a Samurai family, Itami grew up in his father’s hometown in a region known for courageous and virtuous warrior-scholars of the past. Yamasaki described her main character as a son of “Satsuma hayato,” an ideal Kagoshima man of virtue. Through traditional education, Yamasaki’s Kenji Amo inherited the unrivaled principle and integrity of a true Kagoshima gentleman.

Yamasaki’s imagination of an ideal Japanese man steeped in Japan’s long lost scholar-warrior tradition—revered in the popular historical memory as the highest masculine virtue—shaped her depictions of other main Nisei characters. They generally fell into either good-hearted individuals, who have somehow retained their Japanese sensitivities, or

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35 Yamasaki, Futatsu no Sokoku.
those who Yamasaki portrayed negatively as Americanized Nisei. These Americanized Nisei, including Amo’s Nisei wife, displayed behaviors and attitudes that represented Yamasaki’s overtly generalized notion of Caucasian culture. Unlike Amo, they were individualistic, opportunistic, preferred “American” ways of lifestyle and dress, and had little sympathy for Japan. Amo’s Americanized wife Emy represented a prime example of a self-centered Nisei who was doomed to face a tragic fate. Yamasaki, who had not interviewed Itami’s real-life wife Kimiko, portrayed Emy as a jealous woman who was always at odds with her husband. In Futatsu no Sokoku, Emy fell victim to her own American way of life when she turned to alcoholism after being sexually assaulted by a white man.36

There is further evidence that Itami might have fit into Yamasaki’s model of an ideal Japanese man. Upon graduation from middle school Itami opted to apply to military officer’s schools instead of elite universities in hope to save tuition. He applied to both the Imperial Army Preparatory School and the Naval Academy but was denied admission. After several more tries, Itami received a notification that his applications were rejected on the basis of his “poor physical condition,” despite his high mark on physical education. His friends and acquaintances believed that the reason for the rejection was Itami’s U.S. citizenship. According to Kozo Kanishi, who wrote a biography of Akira Itami, a teacher at Kajiki Middle School had told Itami

36 Ibid.
that the rejection had more to do with his place of birth than his actual health.37

Disheartened by the revelation, Itami nevertheless sought alternatives to educational opportunities. He took the entrance exam to Dai-Shichi Koto Gakko, the present-day Kagoshima University, but to the surprise of himself and those who knew him well, he failed the examination. A year later, he was admitted to Daito Bunka Gakuin, a special postsecondary educational institution in Tokyo, which had been established by the Japanese government in 1923 to offer training in classical Confucian texts and studies in Japanese culture. At Daito Bunka Itami immersed himself in classics, arts, Indian philosophy, and Eastern civilization. He also joined the archery team to maintain a healthy balance between books and “soldierly” refinement.38 Itami’s desire to study at a military academy and his education at Daito Bunka Gakuin gave Yamasaki and the biographers in the 1980s a reason to speculate that he had been a patriot eager to serve the Japanese empire. The founders of Daito Bunka Gakuin were part of the growing nationalist and militarist wing of the Japanese politics. The institution’s emphasis on Asian studies curriculum was part of the militarists’ effort to promote Japanese colonialism and the spirit of “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”39

Itami’s education at Daito Bunka was halted prior to his scheduled graduation from the academy. In 1931 Itami received an urgent telegraph

from his father requesting his return to California — “Mother in Critical Condition Come Home Immediately.” Sogi Takateru, a sympathetic alumnus from Kagoshima and mentor to Itami, arranged help from prominent Kagoshima native and future Minister of Foreign Affairs Togo Shigenori. Togo financed Itami’s return trip to California. Fifteen years later, Itami with mixed emotions would watch Togo from the monitor’s booth at the postwar Tokyo International Tribunal, as the wartime Foreign Minister stood on trial.  

Itami was nineteen when he returned to the country of his birth. Soon after his return, his parents relocated to Kagoshima to tend their illness, and Itami worked and lived briefly in Alaska to support himself. As a cannery worker in Alaska, Itami learned the plight of the immigrant working class, and embraced labor activism. Upon his return to California he attended Los Angeles City College, and although he had spent his formative years in Japan, was able to train himself to communicate effectively in English. In 1934 he started working as a reporter for *Kashu Mainichi (The California Daily News)*, a bilingual Japanese American community newspaper in Southern California. He befriended community intellectuals and literary figures like Bunichi Kagawa and Sei Fujii, and himself rose to the ranks of community leadership as he became an editor of *Kashu Mainichi* and Vice President of the

40 Kinashi, “Hakuun Raikyo,” 42.
Kibei Division in the emerging Nisei community organization Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) in 1939.\textsuperscript{42}

In Futatsu no Sokoku, Kenji Amo, Itami’s fictional representation, also returned to California after ten years of education in Japan and wrote for a Japanese American community paper called Kashu Shimpo. Yamasaki’s imagination focused heavily on the Kibei’s encounter with American racism upon his return to the United States. Amo witnessed blatant harassments and exclusion suffered by his fellow Japanese Americans at the hands of white Americans and himself was humiliated when he was thrown out of a restaurant and couldn’t find a decent job. Amo was torn by the plight of Japanese Americans and was determined to help them regain confidence and pride in their Japanese background. In his articles in Kashu Shimpo, Amo admonished his compatriots to keep their Japanese spirit intact in the face of harsh racism. After Pearl Harbor, Amo was arrested by the federal authorities for his articles critical of white America before being forcefully relocated to Manzanar with his family.\textsuperscript{43}

However, Yamasaki’s fictional character’s predictable actions only served to compound the notion that Kibei’s education in Japan coupled with their inability to deal with a transition into the U.S. society had strengthened their Japanese nationalism. Furthermore, this image of Kibei was not far removed from the idea that they were essentially Japanese in character, and therefore, unable to assimilate into American culture. It was this same

\textsuperscript{42} Kashu Mainichi (English section), April 25, 1939.
\textsuperscript{43} Yamasaki, Futatsu no Sokoku.
generalized assumption shared by the American public and Japanese American elites that would cast Kibei as a pro-Japan element during World War II. In real life, Itami volunteered to be interned at Manzanar in 1942 and even encouraged other Japanese Americans to cooperate with “evacuation,” what the U.S. government euphemistically called the forced detention of Japanese Americans. A former dual citizen, he had already renounced his Japanese citizenship seven years before his voluntary incarceration at Manzanar. He also volunteered to serve in the U.S. Army, gathering and deciphering Japanese intelligence documents during the Pacific War. He would become a recipient of Legion of Merit for this service, the highest honor for a non-combatant in the U.S. military.44

But Itami’s demonstration of loyalty did not always seem consistent to some. Before Pearl Harbor, he wrote what seemed to many Japanese Americans as “pro-Japan” editorials for the Los Angeles-based Kashu Mainichi. His writings earned him the title “pro-Axis Kibei” from his rival writers at Doho, a leftist Japanese American newspaper critical of Japan’s militarism and expansion in Asia.45 Itami’s Japanese-language column “Air Mail” between 1939 and 1941 portrayed Japan’s invasion of China as a necessary action to prevent the spread of Soviet Communism. His editorials also seemed to encourage his readers to cheer for Germany and Italy in European battles during World War II. In early 1940, he went so far as to

44 Kinashi, Dave Itami Akira no Shogai.
45 See Doho, December 15, 1940; February 1, 1941; December 26; 1941, January 23; 1942; January 30, 1942; and March 21, 1942.
claim that many in the Japanese American community wanted to see a “new order” in Europe under a German leadership rather than an existing Anglo order.46

The tension between Itami and his anti-fascist rivals on the Japanese American left did enough damage to divide the Kibei community in Los Angeles. As the vice president of JACL’s Kibei Division in Los Angeles, Itami faced constant challenge from leftist Kibei. Itami took a drastic measure to eliminate his political rivals when he led a campaign to expel Communist Party members James Oda and George Ban from the JACL Kibei Division. Itami’s action would stamp his reputation as a pro-Japan writer and someone who had betrayed his roots as a cannery worker and labor activist.47

In order to understand these conflicting accounts of Itami’s actions, it is necessary to revisit the historical conditions that shaped complex and diverse concepts of what historians have described as “biculturalism” in the prewar Japanese American community. It is also necessary to leave aside simplistic assumptions of Itami’s “pro-American” and “pro-Japan” sentiments as signs of his conflicting loyalty to two nations. Itami’s perception of the world around him and other Japanese Americans did not emerge simply out of a static condition of his position between the two cultural and political entities. His experiences, like those of other Kibei and

46 See “Air Mail,” Kashu Mainichi, December 26, 1939 to June 7, 1940; “Air Mail,” January 8, 1940.
the rest of the Japanese American community, must be placed in the contexts of transforming domestic and international situations.

Itami’s own version of loyalty was a culmination of the complex and shattered experiences that took place in diverse localities across the Pacific. In some ways, Itami’s self-identity as a Nisei who was educated in Japan represented an embodiment of an ideal Japanese American described in Sakamoto’s writings. Kimiko Murata, who was married to Itami until his tragic death in 1950, wrote in 1987 what she remembered as the principle and personal motto that her late husband had held high throughout his life: “If America gives me, a Kibei, her trust, I would do whatever it takes to give myself to her. This is what I consider *yamato damashi*—‘a true Japanese spirit’”48 This came from a man who not only was well versed in classical studies of Japanese culture and philosophy, but also did what he could to acquire American education upon his return from Japan as a nineteen-year-old young man. Itami enrolled himself in Pasadena High School before he studied at Pasadena City College, then at the University of California, Los Angeles.49

Furthermore, as noted above, he renounced his Japanese citizenship in February 1935 as did many other Nisei dual citizens in the United States.50 As noted above, the Japanese government had revised its nationality law as early as in 1924 to allow second-generation Japanese Americans to foreswear

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49 Itami, “Itami Akira Jihitsu no Hennenshiki Kobun Ichidaiki.”
50 Kinashi, *Dave Itami Akira no Shogai*, 53.
their Japanese nationality.\textsuperscript{51} However, Nisei renunciation of their Japanese citizenship did not occur on a large scale until the mid-1930s, when the Japanese American Citizens League launched a vigorous campaign to encourage Nisei to surrender their legal allegiance to the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{52} Therefore, Itami was among the first Nisei to perform this American duty of expatriation from the Japanese government’s claim to his nationality.

However, Itami’s self-identity proved far more complex than Sakamoto’s ideal Nisei as a cultural broker or the JACL’s manifestation of Americanism. His interactions with other Japanese Americans and his activities as a writer and community leader demonstrate how historical conditions and daily experiences shaped the ways in which individual Kibei perceived the world around them. Itami was among the young adult Kibei who played central roles in creating political spaces for other recently returned Kibei in the 1930s. In 1935, Kibei leaders in Southern California established the Kibei Division within JACL’s Los Angeles Chapter. In the following year, San Francisco Kibei groups were integrated into JACL. Despite the romantic notion of cultural dualism, many Kibei shared the experience of social and cultural marginalization in both Japan and the United States as the cultural and racial “other.” According to Mitsuhiro

\textsuperscript{51} Egawa, Yamada and Hayata, \textit{Kokusekiho}, 252-253; Zaibei Nihonjinkai, \textit{Zaibei Nihonjinshi}, 1108.

\textsuperscript{52} Leading JACLers like Saburo Kido penned articles in the League’s organ, the \textit{Pacific Citizen}, in 1935 to the importance of renouncement as Nisei’s American duty. See \textit{Pacific Citizen}, May 1935: “Expatriation—A Duty” and Saburo Kido, “Expatriation will win confidence in second generation.”
Sakaguchi Mitsuhiro, many Kibei were compelled to organized their own groups within the larger Nisei community as a way to facilitate their own collective political voice.53

Young Kibei writers like Itami also played active roles in publishing literary magazines and used these publications as a creative space to grapple with the meanings of their transnational experiences. In addition to James Sakamoto, writers who had experienced exposure to life in both Japan and the United States professed the role of Japanese Americans as the bridge of understanding between the two homelands in other complex ways. These individuals not only included Kibei, but also the first-generation Japanese in the United States referred to by other Issei as “Yobiyose Issei” (or, simply Yobiyose). Yobiyose were those who were born in Japan but raised or educated in the United States. Typically, after their birth one or both of their parents left for the U.S. to find work. After establishing residence and employment the parents would then send for young Yobiyose to join them in the United States. Thus, many Yobiyose and Kibei shared similar experiences, such as being raised in Japan by relatives while their parents were in the United States. Both Kibei and Yobiyose embarked on trans-Pacific voyages, many of them on multiple occasions, and experienced varying stages of schooling in both Japan and the United States.

The Yobiyose and Kibei, with whom Itami interacted before World War II included some of the most active literary figures in the Japanese

American community. The most prominent and influential of them all was Bunichi Kagawa, whom Japanese literary scholars have considered the father of “Kibei literature” for his influence on young bilingual Kibei writers. Born and raised in Yamaguchi Prefecture, Kagawa joined his parents in Los Altos in northern California at the age of fourteen. Kagawa’s intellectual struggle to define his transnational identity made him turn to poetry early on, as he began to publish poems in both English and Japanese since the 1920s. With help of Stanford poet and literary critic Yvor Winters, who had befriended Kagawa since reading the young poet’s works in newspapers, Kagawa published a collection of his poems, Hidden Flames, in 1930. However, Kagawa’s most significant contribution to Japanese American literature, particularly “Kibei literature,” would culminate in the publications of literary magazines in the internment camps, especially at Tule Lake Segregation Center, during World War II by young Kibei writers whom he had influenced.

In 1936, Kagawa helped found Hokubei Shijin Kyōkai, or the “Association of Poets in North America,” a group of primarily Kibei and Yobiyose writers in California. In the first issue of the club’s organ Shūkaku (“Harvest”), Kagawa declared that for Japanese in America (particularly


55 Sataye Shinoda, “Tessaku: hatten tojo no kibei nisei bungaku” in Tessaku:, Nikkei Amerika bungaku zasshi shuhei, 5-6 (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1997), 7-10; At Tule Lake, Kagawa played an influential role in the publication of literary magazine Tessaku, which featured works by Kibei writers such as Masao Yamashiro and Akira Fujita, who later established careers in literature. For more on Kibei writers at Tule Lake Segregation Center, see Chapter Four.
those who had spent their youths in both Japan and the United States), the act of writing constituted both mental and physical expression of the “inevitable” struggles of their daily lives.\textsuperscript{56} Kagawa and the members of Hokubei Shijin Kyōkai stressed the value of the magazine as the collection of works that reflected daily occurrences in their lives as sojourners, rather than focusing on abstract themes. They used the Japanese-language publication as a means to wrestle with the meanings of their transnational experiences.

Despite efforts of Sakamoto and other community leaders in promoting Nisei biculturalism, the 1930s was also a time of deepening chasm between Issei and emerging Nisei leaders. Although they were expected to be the cultural bridge between Japan and the U.S., Kibei found themselves increasingly marginalized by this generational polarization within the Japanese American leadership. Kibei and Yobiyose writers sought an alternative space to find the language for self-portrayals of their social formations.

Itami was a founding member of Hokubei Shijin Kyōkai and actively communicated with other young writers as well as with Kagawa.\textsuperscript{57} He continued to correspond with his fellow writers in the U.S. after WWII from Tokyo, where he was stationed during the International Tribunal, and their communication often took place in poetry. Itami’s interaction with Kagawa also continued after Pearl Harbor when they were both incarcerated at Manzanar and until they went their separate ways: Itami to the Army

\textsuperscript{56} Kagawa Bunichi, “Sokan no kotoba.” \textit{Shukaku} 1 (November 1936), 1.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Shukaku} 1 (November 1936).
Language School in Minneapolis and Kagawa to Tule Lake Segregation Center in 1943. In March 1951, upon learning of Itami’s unexpected death, Kagawa wrote a poem dedicated to his former colleague and student.58

One of the political issues that Yobiyose and Kibei writers dealt with in *Shukaku* included their positions on the Sino-Japanese War and its effects on the lives of Japanese Americans. A number of the magazine’s short stories published after the outbreak of the war in 1937 described the intensified anti-Japanese sentiment. In these stories Japan’s invasion of China caused white Americans to look upon the Japanese as objects of contempt and ridicule. And consequently, their existing racist attitudes against Japanese Americans only became worse. In some stories the war also shattered the once amicable relationship between Japanese and Chinese immigrants as they turn against each other. These stories did not represent a single ideological or political position of Yobiyose and Kibei writers, as some expressed their support for Japanese imperialism while others stressed the fear of renewed racial hostility and the loss of Japanese American respectability.59 In this way, writing functioned as a cultural and political outlet for young Japanese-speaking Yobiyose and Kibei to address issues that they believed were the immediate part of everyday Japanese American lives. The writers’ varied responses to the Japan-China relations were not too different from the concerns of other Issei and Nisei in the community. When the mainstream

59 *Shukaku*, volume 5 and 6.
press described China as the victim of Japan’s military aggression, many
within the Japanese American community felt they in turn would fall victims
of intensified anti-Japanese agitation.\(^{60}\)

Itami was mindful of the anti-Japanese sentiment fueled by Japan’s
aggression in China in his own writings in *Kashu Mainichi*. However, he
approached the issue from the perspective of international relations. He read
periodicals published in the United States, Japan, and China and tried to
identify what he thought was misinformation that caused people to have
conflicting views on Japan’s actions and the future of the U.S.-Japan relations.
Rather than using the tone of racial victimization or a voice overtly critical of
the U.S. society, Itami joined Sei Fujii, publisher and editor of *Kashu Mainichi*,
in presenting a positive future for the Japanese Americans in the Pacific Era.

Sei Fujii, an Issei leader who had a profound influence on Itami’s life,
also had migrated to the United States as a young man. A graduate of the
University of Southern California School of Law, Fujii founded a bilingual
daily newspaper *Kashu Mainichi* in 1931 and also served as the president of
the Japanese Association.\(^{61}\) Within four years after Fujii hired him as a
reporter for *Kashu Mainichi* in 1934, Itami started his own column, titled “Air
Mail,” in the Japanese section of the daily newspaper. Fujii considered Itami
a valuable colleague who possessed excellent foresight and understanding of

\(^{60}\) David Yoo explains that many English-language newspaper articles written by Nisei also
attempted to convince the public that Japanese Americans were target of racial hostility

the political future of Japanese Americans and gave his employee his complete trust and approval.\textsuperscript{62}

Fujii used his columns in both \textit{Kashu Mainichi}’s Japanese and English sections since the start of the Sino-Japanese War to rally the Japanese American community behind Japan’s campaigns in Asia. In late 1937, in order to educate the Nisei about the nature of Issei patriotism, he began to run daily “Uncle Fujii Speaks” columns in the English section, which according to Ichioka were written in Fujii’s broken English that he believed young Nisei readers would find more appealing.\textsuperscript{63} Although many of the “Uncle Fujii Speaks” pieces dealt with mundane topics, including the publisher’s own experience as once a young Issei in the United States, Fujii devoted most of his columns to implicitly tell the Nisei about the purpose of the war and call for a united support from the Nisei community.\textsuperscript{64}

Like Fujii, Itami shunned any criticism of Japan’s actions in China. He was concerned that the criticism of Japan would generate political hostility against the first-generation Japanese immigrants, who were by law Japanese citizens. Itami was reluctant to accept the concept of Japanese American loyalty as a complete allegiance to the U.S. In other words, he believed that establishing his patriotism was not equivalent to rejecting Japan. What he rejected was the notion that one had to align himself with the opinion and sentiments of the mainstream U.S. society to prove his Americanism. In his

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\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 201n34.
\textsuperscript{64} See “Uncle Fujii Speaks” in \textit{Kashu Mainichi} (English section), 1938-1942; Ichioka, “Japanese Immigrant Nationalism,” 189-190.
\end{flushleft}
view, that kind of simplistic notion of patriotism did more harm to the U.S.-Japan relations by compounding the existing anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. Therefore, despite the criticism from the Japanese American left against him and other columnists at *Kashu Mainichi* for penning what seemed to be “pro-Japan” propaganda, Itami did not refrain from justifying Japan’s actions in China.65

Itami also hoped to convince Japanese American readers that Japan’s activities in Asia did not pose threat to the United States. His editorials in 1940 demonstrate his optimism for the future of U.S.-Japan relations. In January 1940, Itami reported that the U.S. had planned to increase the naval budget to bolster its Pacific fleets around Guam and the defense of Alaska. However, Itami dismissed the idea of the plan as a potential preparation for a war against Japan. Instead, Itami suggested a scenario, which he maintained was “not too farfetched,” of a possible U.S. strike on the Soviet Pacific ports in order to prevent the spread of Communism. Itami argued that the real threat to the U.S. national defense was the Communist Soviet Union rather than Japan.66

Itami also maintained his optimism on the eve of Prime Minister Abe Nobuyuki’s resignation after he had failed to retain support from the military and political factions. The imminent cabinet change in January 1940 caused some to worry that the new cabinet would take a more hard-line

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65 Itami’s columns from 1940 to 1941, when there was a growing concern among Japanese Americans for a war between the U.S. and Japan, especially sought to make this appeal to his readers. See “Air Mail.” *Kashu Mainichi*, 1940-1941.
66 “Air Mail,” January 9, 1940.
diplomatic stance against the United States. However, Itami assured
Japanese American readers that “whoever becomes the next prime minister,”
would not affect the lives of the Japanese in America. He quoted an
American journalist in Tokyo in insisting that the inauguration of the new
cabinet did not mean a swift change of the Japanese policies.67

Itami’s optimism in the future of U.S.-Japan relations also represented
a view shared by many Issei leaders. Sei Fujii’s “Why America Won’t Fight,”
which he ran as a seven-day special serial column in Kashu Mainichi from
June 1 to June 7, 1940, insisted that the U.S. entrance to the Second World
War was highly unrealistic. Fujii argued that America had not yet fully
recovered from the Great Depression, and the Roosevelt administration
would not overcome the stiff opposition from both corporate leaders and the
general public to the direct U.S. involvement in the war. He also argued that
sending the U.S. troops to fight alongside the Allied Powers was a grave risk
and lost cause in spite of the Allies’ relentless call for help. He claimed that
the Allied forces in Europe were losing battles due to Germany’s strategic
brilliance rather than the shortage of troops and equipments. In such a
situation, fighting the war on two fronts would be an utterly unfeasible
task.68

Itami justified Fujii’s position in his “Air Mail” column and urged the
Japanese American community to heed the veteran publisher’s opinion

67 “Air Mail,” January 10, 1940.
68 See Sei Fujii, “Naze beikoku wa tatakunaka,” Kashu Mainichi (Japanese section), June 1-
June 7, 1940.
about the unlikelihood of the U.S. declaration of war against the Axis Powers. He insisted that the newspapers in Japan quoted Fujii’s argument in their debates over whether the U.S. would enter the war, which was a topic of great interest and concern in Japan. Itami claimed that an expert in the Japanese American affairs and long-time U.S. resident and veteran businessman like Fujii had a better understanding of the political situations affecting the U.S.-Japan relations.

Itami was also frustrated by negative public opinion about Japan, which he believed had much to do with reporting practices of the U.S. press. Itami phrased his criticism very carefully in order to direct readers’ attention to what he viewed as American newspapers’ fear-mongering tactics that seemed to violate democratic principles and journalistic integrity. Itami refrained from criticizing the U.S. government policies or the American public, but instead highlighted what he felt was the mainstream media’s encouragement of the U.S. entrance into the war against Japan and its allies.

His tactics often involved criticizing the mainstream press for its distortion of what he saw as a more realistic and positive developments in the U.S.-Japan relations. For example, in early 1940 Itami wrote in “Air Mail” that the mainstream newspapers had refused to report a statement by the Department of State, which assured the continuation of normalized trade relations between the two countries even in the case of suspended

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69 “Air Mail,” June 3, 1940.
70 “Air Mail,” June 7, 1940.
diplomacy. Itami also emphasized that Secretary of State Cordell Hull had told the Japanese Ambassador Harunouchi that diplomatic tensions would not affect the rights and interests of the Japanese living in America. He used his criticism of the U.S. papers to convince his readers that the threat of imminent war between the U.S. and Japan was part of the anti-Japanese agitation fueled by the mainstream papers.

Therefore, while Yamasaki’s depiction of Kenji Amo’s despair and eventual death relies on the polarized concept of national loyalty, Itami’s prewar experiences were too complex to warrant a simple fate. In her remembrance of her father’s tragic death in Tokyo in 1950, Itami’s daughter Michi stated that although it is easy to speculate her father’s suicide as a result of his inability to find a homeland, he easily could have had other complex personal “circumstances” that compelled him to take his own life. Perhaps these simple words of Michi Itami should serve as a reminder that David Akira Itami’s life experiences must be placed in historical contexts beyond national narratives.

Itami’s experiences as a Kibei in the United States in the 1930s also reveals the complexity and multiplicity of cultural dualism. When the Sino-Japanese War on the other side of the Pacific fueled the anti-Japanese sentiment in the U.S., Itami understood the political dilemma of Issei, who were permanently excluded from the American citizenry. At the expense of

71 “Air Mail,” January 13, 1940.
72 Ibid.
being labeled a fascist columnist, Itami justified the Japanese immigrant community’s support for Japanese militarists’ actions in Asia. Itami’s biculturalism and loyalty to his community was intimately shaped by his experience as a student, worker, and writer on both sides of the Pacific.
Chapter 3
From “The Japanese Problem” to “The Kibei Problem”:
Rethinking the Japanese American Internment during World War II

When the U.S. government published in 1943 its official explanation of the decision to intern Americans of Japanese ancestry, few among the press and American public problematized its racist rhetoric. Entitled The Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942 and formally authored by Western Defense Commander John L. DeWitt, the document consisted of DeWitt’s 1942 “Final Recommendation” to Secretary of War Henry Stimson. In the “Final Recommendation” DeWitt claimed that “the racial strains” of Japanese, including U.S.-born second and third generations, were “undiluted.” Both U.S. citizens and non-citizens of Japanese ancestry, the Lieutenant General insisted, were a threat to the defense of the Pacific Coast.¹

The Final Report attempted to mask the recommendation’s blatantly racist language by highlighting the military logic of the mass evacuation. In so doing, DeWitt used the existence of Kibei on the West Coast to justify his view that racial strains could indeed pose a realistic problem to military objectives. Much like V. S. McClatchy’s anti-Japanese writings in the 1930s, DeWitt found in Kibei a convenient scapegoat and used their education in Japan as evidence of their alleged pro-Japan attitudes. DeWitt claimed that

Kibei were a “homogenous, unassimilated element” who possessed unbreakable “ties of...custom and indoctrination of the enemy.” He argued that Kibei’s ideological contamination of the entire Japanese American community could not be overlooked. DeWitt’s warning was that the militant Kibei would only expedite the process of turning the rest of Japanese Americans into an army of saboteurs. This assumption of the Kibei’s cultural homogeneity and imperialist indoctrination helped weave racial and military reasoning behind the decision to intern Japanese Americans.

The presence of Kibei thus served DeWitt and other proponents of the internment within the U.S. government as a justification of the “military necessity” to remove all Nisei from the West Coast without due process of law. The policymakers had to be mindful of the fact that the majority of the 120,000 West Coast residents of Japanese descent were citizens by birth. The government could use the alien status of the Issei as the legal basis for mass wartime internment. However, forceful removal of American citizens, including infants and children, posed a critical question of future legal ramifications. Military and federal authorities in their debate on the means and necessity of mass evacuation of citizens had to find a way to avoid the high court’s ruling of the internment as unconstitutional. The Final Report’s depiction of Kibei as de facto Japanese nationals and dangerous traitors offered the military wing of the government a rationale to advance its “military necessity” argument for the mass incarceration of U.S. citizens.

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When there was no hard evidence of Nisei’s potential role as Japanese saboteurs, labeling Kibei as a dangerous pro-Japan element would allow the proponents of the internment to argue that all American citizens of Japanese ancestry could be a national security threat.

Such extreme distrust of Kibei would shape the debate on Japanese American loyalty throughout the war, and ultimately, the wartime internment policies. Identifying Kibei as a dangerous pro-Japan element became a pressing issue for both government authorities and the Japanese American Citizens League leaders. DeWitt’s Final Report highlighted the presence of Kibei as a crucial element of the “Japanese problem” on the West Coast. More importantly, however, the term Kibei simultaneously emerged as a political and cultural construct that would eventually transform the issue of wartime loyalty from a “Japanese problem” to a “Kibei problem.”

Multiple parties involved in the development of wartime internment policies took part in shaping the “Kibei problem.” They included DeWitt’s rivals in the intelligence sector of the U.S. government—namely the Justice Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence—who initially opposed the mass evacuation of Japanese Americans. Some of the most vocal and prominent leaders of the Japanese American Citizens League also targeted Kibei within the Japanese American community as scapegoats that would help spare the rest of the Nisei from mass evacuation. From the outbreak of Pearl Harbor, JACL’s national leaders like Mike Masaoka and Ken Matsumoto, as well as Southern California’s Fred Tayama, worked
vigorously to promote the image of loyal Nisei. When this effort failed to prevent the internment of Japanese Americans, many JACLers continued to use the image of disloyal and troublemaking Kibei as the antithesis of Americanized Nisei. Tayama even served as an informant for the FBI at Manzanar Relocation Center, actively reporting on Kibei internees. When the War Relocation Authority’s civilian administrators headed by Dillon S. Myer took over the management of the internment camps in Summer 1942, they also devoted considerable effort to dealing with the presence of Kibei within the camps.

Both government and Japanese American Citizens League wartime documents reveal that the existence of Kibei was central to shaping the history of Japanese American internment during the critical years of the Pacific War on the West Coast (1941-1946). However, the “Kibei problem” has received little scholarly attention for several political reasons. As Yuji Ichioka argues, Nisei loyalty to the United States has been a “central theme in Japanese American history.” Such emphasis on Nisei loyalty implicitly accepts the notion that any evidence of disloyalty, individual or collective, may be used to justify the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans. This has made the wartime Kibei experience a difficult topic to pursue. To scholars who have sought to uncover the wartime injustice inflicted upon

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3 Fred Tayama, “Brief Report of the Kibei Meeting Held at Mess Hall 15, Manzanar Relocation Center, August 8, 1942, attached to Tayama’s letter to Major Richard E. Rudisill, August 9, 1942, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians files (hereafter cited as CWRIC), National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter cited as NARA).
Japanese Americans, dealing with any potential Japanese nationalism among Japanese Americans was a politically challenging—and unacceptable—task. In the eyes of some scholars, the inclusion of Kibei might have contradicted the notion of unquestioned Nisei loyalty to the United States. As noted by Naoko Shibusawa, a state-imposed concept of nationalism is undoubtedly at work not only in the public narrative of Japanese American history, but also in the postwar scholarship on the Japanese American internment, which emphasizes “Nisei as Americans first.”

Kibei and the History of Japanese American Internment

A national historical narrative that claims the loyalty of Japanese Americans has had little room for the experiences of transnational individuals like Kibei during World War II. Both the postwar scholarship and public discourse on the Japanese American internment have grappled with the issue of locating the proper place of the Japanese American internment and various notions of Nisei Americanism within national history. Although the question of loyalty has been one of the most important overarching themes in different versions of the internment history, scholars, politicians, and activists at different times since WWII have presented multiple and contradicting interpretations. From the sociological studies of the camps by researchers hired by the U.S. government to JACL accounts of

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Nisei patriotism to scholar-activists’ analyses of Nisei resistance in the camps in the civil rights era, the history of Japanese American internment has produced one of the most thoroughly researched and debated topics within Asian American studies. Remarkably, despite numerous commentaries related to Kibei in both the U.S. government and JACL documents throughout the war, the voices of Kibei remain a relatively untouched subject within the scholarship.

The absence of Kibei in the historical narratives of the internment can be attributed to several factors. First, there has been a general misunderstanding of the Kibei as a group of transnational individuals. Many of the Kibei who were interned during the Pacific War had received their education in Japan between the 1920s and early 1940s when Japan’s political path was steered increasingly by the militarist and imperialist wing of the government. Under this circumstance, it was easy for American policymakers and military leaders like DeWitt to claim that Japanese Americans who returned to the U.S. before the Pacific War from Japan had been indoctrinated with that country’s imperialist agenda as a result of their education in Japanese public schools. Even those within the U.S. government who opposed the mass internment of Japanese Americans in 1942 accepted the notion of Kibei as a pro-Japanese faction within the Japanese American community without much criticism.

Instead of challenging this public indictment of Kibei’s alleged loyalty to Japan, JACL leaders in the United States during the Pacific War chose to
distinguish themselves and the Japanese American community from the negative Kibei image. As the JACLers opted for wartime cooperation with federal authorities to demonstrate Nisei loyalty, they saw the hostile reports on Kibei as a threat to the image of patriotic Japanese Americans. JACL’s national leaders determined that policing the thought and behavior of Kibei would be among the priorities in their campaign to promote Nisei Americanism. Within days after Pearl Harbor, JACLers employed scare tactics, including a threat to turn over the names of Kibei to federal authorities, in order to demand the full cooperation of individual Kibei. In this way, Kibei were forced to show even stronger manifestations of loyalty than the rest of the Japanese American community.

Mike M. Masaoka, a well-connected political lobbyist, was instrumental in shaping JACL’s version of the history of Japanese American internment. While he was aware of the bitterness felt by many Japanese Americans because of his organization’s extreme measure of cooperation during the war, Masaoka throughout the postwar years maintained his view that JACL’s wartime policy served the best interest of his community. He proudly told the members of Congress during the hearings on Evacuation Claims in 1954 that JACL should be credited for evoking a “generally cooperative attitude assumed by almost every evacuee.” JACL’s role, according to Masaoka, was to help Japanese American internees prove that their “attitude that bordered on submissiveness” was superior to any “other
racial or minority group in the United States.”

Thus, central to the JACL version of the history of the internment, as Masaoka articulated, was the belief that unequivocal cooperation was the truest expression of loyalty. This view worked to justify JACL leaders’ treatment of Kibei during the war.

After the war, JACL-oriented writers continued to endorse Masaoka’s version of loyalty as the dominant theme of the internment narrative. For example, Bill Hosokawa’s *Nisei: The Quiet Americans* portrayed the wartime accommodation as a nearly universal attitude among Japanese American internees. As the title of the book suggests, Hosokawa’s work contributed greatly to the image of Japanese Americans as a model minority who triumphed over racial injustice through sacrifice without resistance. Masaoka himself in his postwar testimonies and writings, including his autobiography entitled *They Call Me Moses Masaoka*, reiterated the absolute cooperation and sacrifice during the internment years as key to Japanese Americans’ postwar acceptance into American society.

The official history presented by the War Relocation Authority (WRA), the U.S. government’s civilian agency in charge of managing the ten “Relocation Centers,” differed significantly from DeWitt’s account. The WRA’s paternalistic director Dillon S. Myer wanted to mold the image of

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Nisei as loyal Americans and worked closely with Masaoka throughout his
tenure. *WRA: A story of human conservation*, an official history of the agency
published in 1946, credited JACL leaders for proving the Nisei’s “worth as
American citizens beyond all possibility of reasonable doubt.”10 However,
the WRA’s account of Nisei loyalty was not a simple repetition of JACL’s
version of patriotism. Although Myer and JACL leaders had a shared vision
of proving Japanese Americans’ loyalty and acceptability, the former made it
a both political and personal goal to promote the internees’ Americanization
on the WRA’s own terms. In his 1971 memoir, Myer praised the WRA for
helping Japanese Americans overcome discrimination and protect their civil
rights.11 In developing and evaluating WRA policies, Myer frequently
referenced government-sponsored studies in the camps to highlight the
internment program as a scientifically proven success. As discussed in more
detail in Chapter Four, the WRA used the studies conducted by its
Community Analysis Section (CAS) researchers to even claim that the
agency had helped assimilate the majority of Kibei, which the WRA had
regarded as the “most acute ‘problem group.’”12

Prominent camp researchers after the war largely confirmed the
positive role of fieldworkers in shaping the WRA’s administrative methods.
Edward Spicer, who headed the Community Analysis Section, suggested
that the knowledge and insight of anthropologists and community analysts

helped bridge the gap between WRA administrators and Japanese American internees. Co-written by Spicer and his colleagues Asael T. Hansen, Katherine Luomala, and Marvin Opler, Impounded People in 1969, which essentially served as a final report of the WRA researchers, exemplified this attitude. Rather than systematically analyzing how the WRA executed its administrative policies, the researchers focused on their observations of the internees’ behaviors and activities. The researchers typically attributed the main cause of negative attitudes among some internees, including the Kibei, to the general misunderstanding and miscommunication on the part of the WRA staff. While they proposed their fieldwork as the basis for policy improvement, the researchers were limited by their own misunderstanding of Kibei, particularly in their disregard of the government and JACL treatment of the group after Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{13}

If CAS researchers’ goal was to assist with the WRA’s administrative objectives, participants of the Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study (JERS) could claim that their studies offered more independent and “objective” observations of the camps.\textsuperscript{14} Headed by

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item JERS studies were based largely on University of California researchers, their graduate students, and Nisei research assistants in the camps. Anthropology graduate student Rosalie Hankey later published a book revealing the limits of researchers’ objectiveness and problems stemming from their assumptions and methods. See Rosalie H. Wax, Doing Fieldwork: Warnings and Advice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). For studies on JERS researchers, see Yuji Ichioka, ed., Views from Within: The Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study (Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles Asian American Studies Center, 1989); Peter T. Suzuki, “The University of California Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study: A Prolegomenon,” Dialectical Anthropology 10, no. 3 (April 1986): 189-213; Murray, Historical Memories of the Japanese American Internment and the Struggle for Redress, Chapter 4.
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University of California sociologist Dorothy Swaine Thomas with Myer’s approval, JERS researchers shaped a different version of the positive view of the internment history. To JERS fieldworkers, the internees’ sufferings did not stem simply from misunderstanding or the existing anti-Asian discrimination in the United States. Written immediately after the conclusion of the internment, Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto’s *The Spoilage* framed the experience of second-generation Japanese Americans, including the Kibei, in the camps as a life marginalized and damaged directly by incarceration.\(^{15}\) The researchers’ depiction of Kibei as a minority within the internee population and yet the leading protesters to War Relocation Authority policies suggested that Kibei suffered from even greater marginalization than did their Issei and Nisei counterparts.\(^{16}\)

In the years following the internment, scholars and some of the former camp researchers sympathetic to the plight of all Japanese Americans began to expose the damage suffered by the internees. Lawyer and activist Carey McWilliams attacked the government’s decision to incarcerate Japanese Americans as a violation of their civil rights.\(^{17}\) Legal scholar Milton R. Konvitz two years later placed the Japanese American internment in the

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\(^{16}\) Swaine and Nishimoto, *The Spoilage*, 69, 78-81.

context of long-existing exclusion of Asians in the United States. Konvitz’s examination of discriminatory measures against Japanese Americans during WWII showed that through the claim of citizenship rights, the government exercised control over social and legal resources available to racially targeted “alien” groups.\(^\text{18}\)

While these early works challenged U.S. government wartime policy by focusing on broader political and legal implications, more rigorous efforts by scholars to synthesize the research findings from the camps in the larger historical context began with social liberalism in the civil rights era. Gary Okihiro criticized Euro-American scholars’ depiction of incarcerated Japanese Americans simply as passive victims. Employing his training in the history of African resistance against institutional oppression, Okihiro focused on resistance in the internment camps as a defining moment in the long history of Asian American struggle against racial oppression. Instead of marginalized victims, Kibei in Okihiro’s work emerged as heroic protesters.\(^\text{19}\)

In the 1970s and 1980s, “revisionist” scholars like Okihiro, Arthur A. Hansen, David A. Hacker, and Roger Daniels were among the first to confront the Kibei problem. While none of their works focused exclusively on Kibei, their effort to dispel the popular myth of resistance as a sign of disloyalty included the struggle of Kibei resisters in the camp. Instead of “troublemakers,” the Kibei in these writings appeared as cultural,


generational, and political resisters to the overtly patriotic JACL representation of the Nisei community or rightwing opponents of the collaboration between the JACLers and government authorities. However, they were unwilling to confront the charges of violence and disloyalty against Kibei. While challenging the emphasis on the notion of Nisei as quiet Americans, their works still tended to employ an interpretive framework that considers the question of loyalty within the realm of “Americanism.” Their efforts have not overcome a limited analysis of Kibei wartime experience in the context of radical male Kibei’s resistance to the government’s unfair treatment during the internment.

As voices critical of JACL’s policy of cooperation emerged within the Japanese American community in the 1970s, scholars and activists have made more vigorous efforts to include the perspectives of the Nisei who did not fit the image of quiet Americans. For example, activist John Tateishi’s collection of oral histories in 1984 included testimonies of Nisei draft resisters and those who voiced their opposition to JACL’s attempt to represent the

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Japanese American community since WWII. The first study devoted to a Kibei life experience, Sue Kunitomi Embrey, Arthur A. Hansen, and Betty K. Mitson’s interview with Harry Y. Ueno in 1986 explored the perspective of a man who for a long time had been regarded as a defiant troublemaker in the internment camps. In 1943, Ueno was at the center of a “riot” at Manzanar Relocation Center, where he was accused of instigating a disturbance and attacking JACL informant Fred Tayama. In interviews conducted decades after the internment, Ueno was a vocal critic of JACL’s ostracism of Kibei.

Perhaps a study most critical of JACL’s wartime policy was conducted by a JACL-commissioned researcher in 1989. JACL hired attorney and San Francisco State University Asian American studies instructor Deborah Lim to write a report on JACL activities during the war. Lim studied JACL-related archival materials and interviewed scholars and community leaders to prepare a 95-page report by the end of the year. Lim’s report included wartime JACL meeting minutes and press materials that revealed JACL’s active cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence. The report also included Lim’s findings on the JACL

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national office and Southern District Council’s attempt to control the opinions and activities of Kibei residents. These included JACL’s internal correspondences that identified prominent Nisei leaders, including Mike Masaoka, who directed systematic efforts to police the thoughts and behavior of Kibei and did not hesitate to identify Kibei as convenient scapegoats. However, JACL’s condensed official version of the report was reduced to 28 pages, with mere 20 pages of selected material from Lim’s findings. The official version also omitted Lim’s study on the JACLers’ wartime cooperation with federal authorities.\(^{24}\) Although Lim’s original version has been circulated widely on the Internet and quoted by scholars, JACL’s decision to censor the findings of its own study of wartime history demonstrated that the organization’s old guard was unwilling to tolerate a challenge to a narrative of patriotism.

There is no question that the issue of loyalty was of paramount importance to the wartime policy of forced migration of Japanese Americans. To many Kibei, the internment was a critical extension of their transnational movement, and the stigma of disloyalty had a profound impact on their internment experiences. WRA policies of relocation and resettlement involved close scrutiny of the internee’s self-professed and perceived loyalty and assimilation. A disproportionate number of Kibei were excluded from security clearance at various times that allowed other Nisei internees to leave

the Relocation Centers, a process that began as early as in the Fall of 1942. By the late 1943, the WRA imposed restriction on adult male Kibei’s eligibility for permanent leave from the internment camps, with the only exception to this “Kibei leave rule” resulting from voluntary induction into the Army’s Military Intelligence Service. The WRA policy of segregation, which transferred the so-called disloyals and their family members to Tule Lake Segregation Center in California, was in part a result of a series of debates among civilian and military authorities over the Kibei problem.

However, just as Kibei are not a culturally and economically homogenous group, their wartime experiences varied significantly. To say that all Kibei went through the same internment experience would betray the diversity inherent in their transnational experiences. Many among the Kibei internees actively cooperated with JACL and the War Relocation Authority’s campaign to promote the loyal Nisei image. For various political and personal reasons, some Kibei even volunteered to serve as informants for camp authorities and intelligence agencies. The exemplary service of Kibei volunteers and draftees in the Army between 1943 and 1945 defied the previously unchallenged notion of their Japanese nationalism and further complicated the WRA and JACL’s dealings with the question of Kibei loyalty. In short, the history of Kibei internment experiences is as complex as that of the Japanese American internment as a whole.

Dealing with the “Japanese Problem”

In 1942, the general consensus among the intelligence community was that DeWitt more or less based his intelligence work on public hysteria and the pressure from politicians to remove persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast. On February 1, 1942, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover told Attorney General Francis Biddle that the Western Defense Command’s intelligence activities were “disorganized” and “incapable,” swayed largely by wartime racial hysteria and “lack of judgment.” Hoover’s report to Biddle two days later again discredited DeWitt’s proposed solution to the “Japanese problem.” Hoover argued that California state and local officials’ demand for removal of Japanese and Japanese Americans had put immense pressure on the movement for an executive order. Moreover, Hoover noted that “public hysteria” and media commentators had played an equal role in putting pressure on the military’s involvement in devising a plan for evacuating all Japanese Americans from the West Coast. Even some among the senior ranking generals within the Army later criticized DeWitt’s intelligence unit (G-2) for relying on political pressure instead of factual data. Major General Joseph W. Stillwell viewed DeWitt’s G-2 as “just another amateur, like all the rest of the staff [of the Western Defense Command].”

Public pressure in favor of the mass evacuation of Japanese Americans was indeed mounting in early 1942. Anti-immigrant organizations in

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27 CWRIC, Personal Justice Denied, 73.
28 CWRIC, Personal Justice Denied, 64-65.
California, such as the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association and the California Farm Bureau Federation demanded removal of Japanese, many of whom were farmers, from the state. Local chapters of the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, a leading nativist group in California, “passed resolutions demanding removal of the ethnic Japanese from the coast.” Politicians also took active measures to aid the mass removal of Japanese Americans. In February 1942, Los Angeles City and County offices fired all Japanese American public employees and called for removal of all Japanese from the West Coast. In many ways, public pressure compelled political leaders, including both Governor Olson and Attorney General and future champion of civil rights Earl Warren to endorse the removal of Japanese and Japanese Americans from California.  

Those in the intelligence field who did not agree with the military necessity argument for mass evacuation downplayed the “Japanese problem” and the idea of “undiluted” Japanese “racial strain.” Lieutenant Commander Kenneth D. Ringle of the Office of Naval Intelligence in Los Angeles reported to the Chief of Naval Operations in January 1942 that “[at] least seventy-five percent [of Nisei] are loyal to the United States.” Ringle also stated that “the large majority” of the Japanese-born Issei were “at least passively loyal to the United States.” Ringle supported the findings of the State Department’s “Special Representative” Curtis B. Munson, who insisted in his intelligence

29 CWRIC, Personal Justice Denied, 68-69, 73.
reports to President Franklin Roosevelt’s confidant John Franklin Carter that the “Japanese problem” on the West Coast bore little to no significance.\textsuperscript{31}

“The entire ‘Japanese problem,’” Ringle insisted, “has been magnified out of its true proportion.”\textsuperscript{32} The Justice Department’s Director of Alien Enemy Control Unit Edward J. Ennis’ memo to the Solicitor General in April 1943 suggested that the Navy maintained its opposition to mass internment because of its distrust in the Western Defense Command’s intelligence capability. In explaining the Navy Intelligence’s view, Ennis cited Ringle’s October 1942 article in \textit{Harper’s Magazine} that once again disputed the military necessity of the internment and the “Japanese problem.”\textsuperscript{33}

However, in a striking resemblance to DeWitt’s amateur intelligence, reports that rejected the “Japanese problem” nevertheless stuck to the idea that any fifth-column threat would be caused largely by the Nisei educated in Japan. Ringle warned that those Kibei who had spent their childhood in Japan and returned to the U.S. were “the most potentially dangerous element of all.” He suggested that the Japanese government could have sent these Kibei back to the United States to perform espionage. While Ringle saw the “Japanese problem” as no more serious than “the problems of German, Italian, and Communistic portions” in the United States, he was determined that the Kibei in Southern California should be categorized as “enemy aliens” subject to “custodial detention.” Ringle’s recommendations did not include

\textsuperscript{31} Munson was a Chicago businessman who gathered intelligence while acting as a Special Representative of the State Department.

\textsuperscript{32} Ringle, “Report on the Japanese Question.”

\textsuperscript{33} Edward J. Ennis, Director, Alien Control Unit, “Memorandum for the Solicitor General, Re: Japanese Brief,” April 30, 1943, CWRIC, NARA.
the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans. Instead, he recommended detention of “potentially dangerous United States citizens….as well as aliens” based on individual case reports submitted by Military and Naval Intelligence and the Department of Justice. Instead of singling out Japanese Americans, Ringle’s suggested list of U.S. citizens “dangerous to the internal security” included “dangerous Kibei or German, Italian, or other subversive sympathizers and agitators.” Thus, Ringle’s report effectively singled out Kibei among Japanese Americans as a pro-Axis element that posed the greatest security threat.

Ennis again confirmed Ringle’s view that “the only important group of dangerous Japanese were the Kibei.” Ennis concluded that the Navy Intelligence officers’ recommendations included evacuation of only three groups within the Japanese American community: the Kibei, the parents of Kibei, and members of pro-Japanese or militarist organizations. Despite their differences, both DeWitt and leading intelligence officers identified Kibei as the primary group to be rounded up and placed in confinement as enemy aliens.

By early 1942, JACL’s National Vice President and Los Angeles-based leader Ken Matsumoto had established a “close-working relationship” with Ringle. In the wake of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the racial hysteria on the West Coast prompted the emerging Japanese American community elites

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34 Ringle, “Report on the Japanese Question.”
35 Ennis, “Memorandum for the Solicitor General, Re: Japanese Brief.”
within JACL to articulate the language of loyalty in the form of active cooperation with federal authorities. The “Japanese problem” debate had a devastating impact on the Japanese American community even before the commencement of mass removal. JACL leaders took measures to cooperate with the FBI, Naval Intelligence, and other federal and local government agencies in identifying potential saboteurs within the Japanese American community. On the evening of Pearl Harbor, 48 leading Nisei leaders of the Japanese American Citizens League’s Southern District Council in Los Angeles established an “Anti-Axis Committee.” The committee’s chief aim was to demonstrate the Nisei’s unequivocal loyalty to the federal and local authorities. It deliberately policed and monitored the activities within the Japanese American community and furnished the authorities with a list of any potentially subversive individuals and organizations. The Anti-Axis Committee announced its intention to cooperate with the FBI, military authorities, the Los Angeles City Council, as well as the Native Sons and Daughters of the Gold West, one of the major sponsors of V. S. McClatchy’s California Joint Immigration Committee.37

The extreme public distrust of Kibei expressed by McClatchy, Ringle, and others compelled the Anti-Axis Committee members to identify the mere existence of Kibei in the Los Angeles area as an obstacle to their loyalty campaign. While the public image of Kibei as a disloyal element made scapegoating them a pragmatic solution, it also served Nisei elites’

37 Bulletin, JACL Southern California Council, December 1941, JACL Anti-Axis Committee; Anti-Axis Committee Log, December 7, 1941, JACL records, Box 301, Folder AAC, JARP.
ideological goal of promoting their Americanism and gaining the approval of the federal authorities. The JACLers in their zeal to protect the image of Japanese Americans decided to take an extreme measure to control the Kibei problem. Regardless of social and economic backgrounds or the varied amounts of time spent in Japan, the committee regarded all Kibei as a group that needed to be actively policed. The influential chair Fred Tayama was instrumental in the Anti-Axis Committee’s deliberate targeting of all Kibei in the Los Angeles area. On December 9, 1941, two days after its declaration, the committee raised the question of Kibei loyalty. In the meeting, Tayama decided that the committee would approach Kibei representatives and “will help them where they see fit.”

On December 12, the Anti-Axis Committee summoned David Akira Itami, who had become the vice president of the JACL Los Angeles Chapter’s Kibei Division two years before. The committee members informed Itami of their intention to assist law enforcement and military authorities and demanded complete cooperation of the Kibei Division. According to the committee’s meeting minutes, Itami and his fellow Kibei representative Ted Okamoto were “very confused and skeptical and were quite undecided about” their course of action. Itami’s skepticism about the committee’s tactics was not unfounded. He read with suspicion the Japanese version of the committee bulletin, which had been translated from its English version for

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38 Minutes, Anti-Axis Committee, December 7, 1941, JACL records, Box 301, Folder AAC, JARP.
39 Kashu Mainichi (English section), April 25, 1939.
40 Minutes, Anti-Axis Committee, December 12, 1941, JACL records, Box 301, Folder AAC, JARP.
distribution among the Japanese-speaking Issei and Kibei. A section from the original English text, which read “We pledge our unequivocal repudiation of Japan” had been translated into Japanese as “We declare complete severance of connection with Japan.” The English version allowed the “repudiation of Japan” to be interpreted simply as Nisei’s denouncement of Japan’s aggression. However, the Japanese version’s call for “complete severance of connection with Japan” required that the Japanese-speaking Issei and Kibei exercise a vigorous form of self-rejection, based on the assumption that they had more heavily invested personal and cultural ties with Japan. The Anti-Axis Committee’s demand also meant to many Issei and Kibei that they would have to terminate correspondence with their relatives in Japan.

Moreover, the committee members notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Postmaster General that the committee would monitor and “control” Japanese American community newspapers. Itami’s Kashu Mainichi columns thus became a target of censorship for the first time, and by none other than the leaders of his own community.

Intimidated by the JACL leaders’ determination to report those who failed to adhere to the Anti-Axis Committee’s patriotic manifesto, Itami agreed to urge other Kibei to submit to the committee’s policy. The committee’s Public Relations Chairman and the JACL National Office’s number two man Ken Matsumoto reported on December 16 that Itami was

41 Bulletin, Anti-Axis Committee, JACL Southern District Council; Bulletin, “Southern Federation Japanese American Citizens League Anti Axis Committee,” Anti-Axis Committee, JACL Southern District Council [translated from Japanese], December 1941, JACL Box 301, Folder AAC, JARP.
42 Anti-Axis Committee log, December 8, 1941, JACL Box 301, Folder AAC, JARP.
confident in the Los Angeles Kibei’s loyalty and that all Kibei members of the chapter would “work whole-heartedly” with the Anti-Axis Committee. In addition to encouraging other Kibei to cooperate with the JACLers, Itami used his writings in *Kashu Mainichi* to deflect negative images of Japanese Americans amid increasing racial hysteria on the West Coast. In the absence of *Kashu Mainichi*’s publisher and editor Fujii Sei, who was detained at the Department of Justice camp in Santa Fe, New Mexico along with other Issei community leaders, Itami took charge of the paper’s publication. Under Itami’s supervision, *Kashu Mainichi*’s alleged pro-Japan commentaries all but disappeared.

Itami’s cooperation with Nisei elites proved to be of no avail. In the following month, Tayama and the Anti-Axis Committee decided to turn over the list of all Kibei members of the JACL’s Los Angeles Chapter along with names of “pro-Japanese Kibei leaders” to Richard Hood of the FBI in Los Angeles. Harry Ueno, a Kibei who would emerge as a leader of the Mess Hall Workers Union at Manzanar Relocation Center was still embittered more than fifty years after WWII by the Anti-Axis Committee’s wartime cooperation: “People should help their own people. Instead, they betray[ed] their own people.” The Anti-Axis Committee’s betrayal of Itami’s loyalty

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43 Minutes, Anti-Axis Committee, December 12, 1941.  
demonstrates just how far the JACLers were willing to go in order to gain the trust of white authorities.

Nisei leaders’ effort to single out the Kibei did not stop there. In February 1942, the JACL National Headquarters issued a “Kibei survey” and directed each regional chapter to collect responses from local Kibei residents. Seattle’s *Japanese American Courier* published the survey on February 20, claiming that the questionnaire would help the JACL provide “assistance” to Kibei residents. However, as the survey’s heading suggested, the foremost purpose that the JACL leaders seemed to have in mind was “the interests of Americanism.” National Secretary Mike Masaoka insisted that the survey was “a purely voluntary one,” but also suggested in a press release that his organization would closely scrutinize the loyalty of any Kibei who failed to complete the questionnaire. “Certain inferences may be made against you,” Masaoka warned “all Kibei.” He emphasized that the JACL would determine “the degree of your loyalty to the United States” on the basis of “the degree of your cooperation” with the JACL’s voluntary Kibei survey. The JACL’s national office also warned each local JACL chapter that a failure to administer the Kibei survey would be “reported to the authorities.”

The questions on the Kibei survey looked tailor-made for a report that could be readily furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The 22 questions on the survey solicited detailed personal information about

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46 Press Release #82 [February 1942] and JACL Bulletin #114 [February 1942], JACL Archives, San Francisco, California, quoted by Deborah Lim, *Research Report Prepared for the Presidential Select Committee on JACL Resolution #7*. 

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individual Kibei that could help gauge the level of each respondent’s cultural and ideological connection to Japan. The survey asked respondents to identify their occupation, age, the total number of trips to Japan, and the years spent in that country. It also asked to detail the respondents’ educational experiences in both the U.S. and Japan. Designed specifically to probe the evidence of male respondents’ past and present national allegiance, the survey asked them to list their military service records—years of service, rank, unit, and location—in the United States and Japan. The survey then asked Kibei respondents to list their past and present membership and rank in Japanese religious, prefectural, social, or political organizations. Finally, the survey asked respondents to disclose their dual citizenship. In this way, the Kibei survey of early 1942 served as a lesser-known prelude to the following year’s loyalty questionnaire in the internment camps, which all internees were required to complete.

In the months prior to the mass removal of Japanese Americans from the West Coast, identifying Kibei among the West Coast Nisei became central to both JACL leaders’ and the government’s response to the “Japanese problem.” While DeWitt emphasized the presence of Kibei to highlight his justification for the internment of all Japanese American citizens, Ringle and other critics of military intelligence did not hesitate to use their own generalization of Kibei. On the other hand, wartime hysteria led JACL leaders to take measures that perhaps caused the greatest damage to the

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community’s unity in their deliberate targeting of Kibei. Emerging Nisei leaders like Fred Tayama might have felt that a sacrifice forced upon Kibei would improve the fate of the majority of the Japanese American community in time of war. However, the Nisei loyalty campaign would only exacerbate the alienation and stigmatization of many Kibei throughout the internment years and leave many more in the community to feel bitter in the years to come.

Evacuation and The Question of Loyalty

The JACLers’ extreme measure of cooperation and even their submission of the list of Kibei in Los Angeles did little to stop the U.S. government’s decision to remove all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast. When U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle issued an order establishing “strategic military areas” on the West Coast on January 29, 1942, removal of Nisei “enemy aliens” emerged as a realistic possibility. However, the plan for mass wartime internment of persons of Japanese ancestry unfolded as the War Department gained ground. The chief advocate of DeWitt’s recommendation, Secretary of War Henry Stimson successfully lobbied for internment as an operation under a military command. Roosevelt’s February 19 Executive Order 9066 authorized Stimson the power to redraw “military areas” and control movements of “any or all persons.” Within one month, forced evacuation began and Japanese American leaders,
Despite experiencing a serious blow to their patriotic effort, pledged cooperation.

With his employer Fujii Sei at the federal detention center and his own name and identity as a Kibei leader turned over to the FBI, Itami faced a dire situation that called for the best of his sense of urgency.\textsuperscript{48} Itami decided that the best course of action was to turn to the language of patriotism. Itami’s motivations since the commencement of evacuation often seemed to straddle between principle and expediency. In spite of the Anti-Axis Committee’s treatment of Kibei, and perhaps because of the JACLers’ determination to continue its unequivocal cooperation with federal authorities by any means possible, Itami sought means beyond Japanese-language columns to profess his loyalty. In a letter titled “Nisei’s Duty” to \textit{Time} magazine on March 16, 1942, Itami expressed his support of the military necessity of Japanese American evacuation from the West Coast. Without acknowledging his Kibei status, he wrote that he believed the cooperation with evacuation plans to be Japanese Americans’ “duty” to help the Army defend the coast by not getting in the troops’ way. He also believed that the evacuation would relieve the “worry and anxiety of our fellow Caucasian citizens on the coast.” Itami seemed apprehensive of what he perceived to be a near certain consequence of the West Coast Nisei’s failure to perform this “duty”: “we have [no] desire to be charged responsible if and when any

\textsuperscript{48} FBI File No. 100-10834, March 27, 1942, Yuji Ichioka Papers Box 38, Folder 1, JARP.
single [Japanese] bomb is dropped here.” He reasoned that “for it is quite certain that enraged public will look for a scapegoat in us on such event.”

In the absence of Fujii, Itami and his colleagues at *Kashu Mainichi* devoted their last effort to avoid the branding of their paper as a pro-Japan publication. In *Kashu Mainichi*’s final editorial before its suspension on March 21, Itami joined acting publisher Kazuo Terada and English section editor Robert Hirano in urging Japanese Americans to cooperate wholeheartedly with the evacuation policy. The editorial claimed the situation was the “supreme test” of the Japanese American community’s loyalty to the American government. The editors did not forget to pay tribute to the freedom of press and democratic system in the United States that had allowed *Kashu Mainichi* to serve its bilingual community for years. They finally announced that *Kashu Mainichi* would terminate wartime publication and cease to function as a community newspaper during the Japanese American “exodus” to relocation centers. The readers were advised to trust the Wartime Civilian Control Administration under the direction of the Army for the dissemination of necessary information.

Itami showed his pledge of loyalty beyond the limits of newspaper columns. He was among the first to volunteer to join the advance working party, which arrived at the Owens Valley Reception Center in Manzanar, California on March 23, two days after *Kashu Mainichi* suspended its publication. Despite his repeated messages of cooperation and his

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50 “Notice,” *Kashu Mainichi* (English section), March 21, 1942.
volunteerism, Itami’s critics at the Japanese American leftist weekly *Doho* viewed his presence at Manzanar with suspicion. Itami’s patriotism did little to change his label as a “pro-Japan” writer, as Japanese American leftists did not forget what they saw as Itami’s mistreatment of the Kibei Communists at the JACL’s Kibei Division prior to the war. The paper dedicated to “complete victory over Japanese militarism and Nazi fascism” reported in early April that “rabid pro-Axis ‘Air Mail’ columnist” “Kibei Akira Itami” had been assigned as the head of the evacuee information office at Manzanar, which included another former *Kashu Mainichi* staffer Roy Takeno. The *Doho* article portrayed the transition of the working crew and their family members as otherwise being smooth and pleasant. And despite inconveniences inevitable in what the paper described as a “pioneering project,” families reported little complaints. Even Issei, claimed the paper, began to appreciate the democratic process of evacuation and the daily provision they received at the camp.\(^{51}\)

Rather than responding to the *Doho* writers, Itami again turned to the national audience to improve the public image of Japanese Americans and perhaps his own image as well. In his second patriotic letter to *Time*, which he wrote from Manzanar after his arrival at the camp, Itami could not have agreed more with *Doho’s* positive portrayal of evacuation. In fact, his words sounded even more “pro-American” than those featured in *Doho*. In the letter Itami reported that the Japanese American evacuees at the Owens

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\(^{51}\)“Manzanar Will Be Extremely Successful, ’ Nisei Writes *Doho.*” *Doho*, April 10, 1942.
Valley Reception Center enjoyed excellent treatment and high morale. Itami depicted the camp life as a positive experience, with sufficient food and support from the Army and federal staff. He also stressed that young Nisei in camp maintained high spirit and pride, as they were mindful of their American identity and citizenship. Apart from “occasional sandstorms,” Itami’s letter even depicted the climate at Manzanar as being “very good to our health.” “Under the snow-covered High Sierra mountains,” Itami wrote, the evacuees were enjoying a wonderful life in their “new home.”

Itami’s articulation of loyalty and cooperation, and more importantly, his ability to articulate himself in both English and Japanese, did enough to convince the Wartime Agency Civilian Control Administration staff to put him in charge of the evacuee information office. Among those who looked suspiciously at Itami’s enthusiastic cooperation with internment authorities was James Oda, who remained bitter toward Itami for his treatment of Kibei Communists. Oda was “alarmed” to find Itami working with Manzanar administrators. Himself a former Doho writer critical of Itami’s columns, Oda was certain that Itami was quietly awaiting the right moment to muster the pro-Japan faction and instigate a disturbance at Manzanar. Oda joined his leftist associates in warning the WRA administrators of Itami’s potential as a

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53 See Chapter Two.
leader of pro-Japan elements, but their warning did little to convince camp authorities.\textsuperscript{54}

As more evacuees arrived and more vocal JACLers assumed camp leadership, Itami kept a relatively low profile at Manzanar. He largely avoided getting into camp politics and kept enough distance from both avid JACLers and leftists. He was absent when JACL leaders like Togo Tanaka and former Anti-Axis Committee members Fred Tayama and Joe Masaoka joined forces with Kibei Communists like James Oda and Karl Yoneda to form the Manzanar Citizens Federation in June 1942. According to Yoneda and Oda, the formation of the Manzanar Citizens Federation came out of the anti-Axis Nisei’s attempt to retaliate against what they saw as the growing influence of pro-Japan activities led by the Manzanar Black Dragon Association, which was headed by a Kibei named Ben Kishi.\textsuperscript{55} Kibei leftists like Yoneda proved to be a great asset to the Nisei campaign to prove loyalty, and ironically, these anti-fascist Kibei were among the most active informants for the authorities on the activities of other Kibei in the camp.\textsuperscript{56}

The war fostered a strange alliance between the JACLers and Japanese American Communists. Soon after the outbreak of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, experienced Bay Area labor organizer and Communist Party member Yoneda actively spoke out against Imperial Japan. Not only did he encourage other Kibei groups to support the war against Japan, but he also

\textsuperscript{56} See Karl Yoneda’s “Notes and Observations of ‘Kibei Meeting’ held August 8\textsuperscript{th}, 1942 at Kitchen 15,” CWRIC; Oda, \textit{Heroic Struggles of Japanese Americans}, 53.
joined Japanese American Communists in recommending that the JACL in northern California follow the lead of the Southern District Council by forming an Anti-Axis Committee of its own. He also encouraged JACL National Director Mike Masaoka to lead the Japanese American community even more forcefully in the direction of patriotism. Among the first volunteers to the internment camp, Yoneda took charge of leading “the participation in war efforts” for the Manzanar Citizens Federation. Before Masaoka and JACL leaders pushed for a Nisei unit in the U.S. Army, Yoneda proposed that the JACL make a public proclamation of the Nisei’s desire to serve in the American military. In July 1942, Yoneda and Nisei Communists led a campaign to petition President Roosevelt to allow Japanese Americans to join the U.S. Armed Forces. Itami was among two hundred eighteen signers of the petition.57

Itami’s days at Manzanar did not last long. When the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) moved to its new facility at Camp Savage, Minnesota in June 1942, he volunteered to become one of the first wartime Japanese language instructors. After Itami left for Minnesota, some allegedly pro-Japan Black Dragons who discovered his departure branded him as a traitor. They even attempted to harass Itami’s wife and infant daughter, who remained temporarily at Manzanar. Those sympathetic to Itami protected his family from the attackers.58

57 Yoneda, Ganbatte, 116, 118-119, 136.
What motivated Itami to take a patriotic path in 1942? Was he an opportunist who was able to simply abandon his prewar loyalty to Japan to gain a favorable position when the internment had become an unavoidable fate of Japanese Americans? Was he a pragmatist, as his one-time associate Masao Yamashiro suggested after the war, who saw that teaching Japanese at Camp Savage would secure him and his family permanent leave from the Relocation Center? James Oda, who volunteered for the Military Intelligence Service and was sent to MISLS in November 1942 for language training, was “flabbergasted” to find himself sitting in Itami’s class. Soon, however, the former enemies put their past differences aside as Oda was convinced of Itami’s sincerity in “changing horses.” Oda seemed especially impressed by Itami’s decision in 1943 to give up his position as a relatively high-paying civilian chief instructor to volunteer for enlistment in active military service. Oda even criticized Yamashiro for considering Itami as a mere pragmatist. Even Itami’s prewar writings supportive of Japan’s military aggression in China, Oda reflected, could simply have been the young journalist’s obligation of being Fujii Sei’s employee. No matter the intention, Itami could only prove his loyalty to the United States through his actions, just as other Nisei during the war were asked to. What Itami, Oda, and other Kibei did during the internment prove that to many Nisei, war complicated the question and meaning of loyalty. To many Kibei, articulation of loyalty had as much to do with survival as the means to fight fascism.

The War Relocation Authority and the “Kibei Problem”

The War Department had no intention to devote its resources to managing the internment camps for the remainder of the war. Plans to create a new civilian agency were under way as the Western Defense Command’s Wartime Civilian Control Agency continued to administer the evacuation of Japanese Americans. In March 1942, Executive Order 9102 established the War Relocation Authority (WRA) under the Office of the President and appointed Milton Eisenhower as its director.\footnote{The WRA was subsequently transferred to the Department of the Interior in 1943.} Pressure from West Coast politicians and Mountain state governors to ban evacuees from relocating out of camps forced Eisenhower to manage the internment as long-term detention.\footnote{CWRI, Personal Justice Denied, 107, 154-55.} However, when Dillon S. Myer took over as new director in the summer of 1942, the focus shifted toward resettling Japanese American evacuees. Throughout the war years, Myer insisted that the goal of the WRA was to successfully relocate internees back to American society. In his view, the WRA’s ten Relocation Centers would serve as safe temporary facilities that would assimilate Japanese American internees and prepare them to rejoin the postwar America. By 1944, Myer was confident in the Nisei’s ability to prove themselves as loyal Americans:

the campaign against Americans of Japanese ancestry….\[was\] to identify the people in relocation centers as closely as possible with our
real enemies across the Pacific....It assumes that merely because an individual is of Japanese extraction, he is somehow immune to the effects of our public school system and of all the other Americanizing influences that operate in a normal American community....I have more faith than that in the strength of our American institutions. And I feel positive that they have been far more influential in molding the minds of the nisei than the transplanted institutions of Japan.}

In Myer, Mike M. Masaoka’s ideal of Nisei assimilation and acceptance found a congenial partner. Throughout the war, Masaoka and other JACL leaders urged Japanese Americans to prove their loyalty by cooperating with the government’s wartime policy. Masaoka declared that the JACL’s aspiration was to prove the “assimilation and Americanization of all Japanese Americans.” He was determined to convince the American public of Nisei “allegiance through active participation in the war effort.”

The shared views of Myer and Masaoka were indispensable for their wartime alliance, which also shaped the two men’s lasting approval of each other. Masaoka reflected in his 1987 autobiography that he and the WRA director were amicable partners from the moment that Myer assumed the position. “We established mutual trust and respect,” asserted Masaoka, who found in Myer a man dedicated to “justice and humanitarian principles.”

Myer also regarded Masaoka as an effective and enthusiastic leader who

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62 Myer, “The War Relocation Authority is Firmly Committed.”
63 Mike M. Masaoka, a memorandum to “national board members, national council members, active and associated members, sponsors, friends, and supports of the national JACL,” April 22, 1944, JACL records, Box 301, Folder Mike M. Masaoka, JARP.
allowed the JACL to keep “in close touch with WRA throughout World War II.”

Myer’s awareness of the Kibei problem was influenced largely by his relationship with JACL leaders, who despite the cooperation of leftist Kibei were still branding most other Kibei as a dangerous element and threat to the loyal Nisei image. By the time Myer became the WRA director, the JACLers in the internment camps had already been liaising actively between the authorities and evacuees. Mike Masaoka and JACL leaders were eager to establish political power within the Japanese American community and lead the campaign to restore the rights of evacuees. As Michi Weglyn has noted, the JACLers at the outbreak of the war were a “politically unsophisticated and neophyte” group who were under the shadow of Issei leadership. Once the war started, government authorities changed this political hierarchy by picking well-connected JACLers like Masaoka to represent the Japanese American community.

What Myer described as “the Kibei problem” would emerge as an issue that shaped the WRA’s policies of confinement and relocation from mid-1942 to early 1946. He was determined to prove his agency’s ability to mold the Japanese American character and struggled with the question of

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66 Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 119.
67 Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 44.
69 Dillon S. Myer to WRA Project Directors, February 1944, William C. Carr Papers (hereafter cited as Carr Papers), Box 55, Folder 1, JARP.
what to do with Kibei.70 Myer faced pressure from the military to segregate
Kibei from the rest of Nisei before the transfer of evacuees from the Western
Defense Command to the War Relocation Authority was complete on
October 31, 1942. Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt in his letter to George C.
Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, on August 23, 1942 warned that the “co-
ingling” of Kibei with the rest of Nisei would expose all Japanese
Americans to “Japanese indoctrination.” DeWitt reiterated his point in the
Final Report by asserting that Kibei remained a threat to national security and
to “large numbers” of loyal Nisei. He believed that the task of separating
Kibei from the rest of the evacuees could be achieved by the War Relocation
Authority’s collaboration with “cooperative Nisei” informants to identify
Kibei in the camps. DeWitt believed that segregation of Kibei would become
necessary in the absence of military supervision after the Western Defense
Command’s complete release of its jurisdiction over Japanese American
internees. He went further by recommending not only the segregation of all
Kibei in a separate facility but also stripping them of their U.S. citizenship
“through appropriate legal processes or means” under the direction of the
Department of Justice.71

70 Dillon S. Myer, “The War Relocation Authority is Firmly Committed to the Principle that
American Children Should Not Be Penalized for Accidents of Ancestry,” March 14, 1944 in
Reinstitution of Selective Service: Summary of the Policies of the Selective Service System, War
Department and W.R.A Which Affect Nisei by the Citizens Committee of Topaz and the
Community Council, Topaz, Utah, June, 1944, Edward N. Barnhart Papers (hereafter cited as
Barnhart Papers), Box 49, Folder 6, JARP.
71 “Separation of Kibei from Nisei,” Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt to the Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army, War Department, August 23, 1942, attached to DeWitt’s letter to the Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., October 5, 1942, CWRIC.
DeWitt had known as early as in August 1942 that “cooperative Nisei” had already begun spying on Kibei. Fred Tayama, who had led the Anti-Axis Committee’s submission of the Kibei list to the federal authorities in January 1942, again took charge. “Recorded by memory the following morning,” Tayama prepared a report on a “Kibei meeting” chaired by Ben Kishi in a Manzanar Relocation Center mess hall in the evening of August 8, 1942. Tayama described remarks made in the meeting on the poor camp conditions as unsolicited complaints. The report began with a description of Raymond Hirai’s demands for more doctors, a school for children, and better food. Hirai also demanded union wages for internees who made camouflage for the Army. To Tayama, perhaps Hirai’s most defiant remark was a demand for greater “self-government” for internees by “re-election of all Block Leaders.” Tayama’s report also claimed that a Hawaiian-born Kibei who had spent 30 years in Japan likened his situation to having been “thrown in this dump like pigs.” Then Hirai took the microphone again and proclaimed, according to Tayama, that camouflage work should belong only to Kibei and other Nisei workers should be encouraged to quit.

Tayama sent his report on the “Kibei meeting” to the FBI to alert the agency of “some dangerous element here within the camp.” He then sent the report to Major Richard E. Rudisill of the Naval Intelligence in Los Angeles, urging the Office of Naval Intelligence to launch an investigation on the

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72 Memorandum, Western Defense Command, August 1942, CWRIC.
73 Fred Tayama, “Brief Report of the Kibei Meeting Held at Mess Hall 15, Manzanar Relocation Center, August 8, 1942, attached to Tayama’s letter to Major Richard E. Rudisill, August 9, 1942, CWRIC.
activities of Kibei internees at Manzanar. Karl Yoneda also served as an informant at the meeting, which he described in his report as “definitely pro-Axis and anti American.” At the meeting, Yoneda’s short speech dismissive of a Kibei gathering was met with a near collective accusation of him being an American and Communist spy. After the meeting, Yoneda and Tayama were threatened by a gang of Kibei men who accused them of being “inu,” or traitors. The fact that Yoneda himself was a Kibei only added to these Kibei men’s indignation toward Yoneda’s “American” disposition. James Oda, who was also present at the meeting, believed that the gathering was a part of an effort by Kishi’s Black Dragons to win support of all Kibei and their sympathizers at Manzanar.

The conflict between the JACLers and their vocal Kibei critics was enough evidence for military leaders to push for segregation of Kibei and others with any “pro-Japan” disposition. In October 30, 1942, as the Army was transferring the last evacuees to the WRA’s ten Relocation Centers, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy told Myer that the War Department had been alerted of the movement at some camps that might interfere with “the prompt rehabilitation” of the internees. The Kibei and Issei at some internment camps, McCloy stressed, were attempting to “exert heavy pressure on the Nisei” who were “well-disposed toward America.” McCloy warned Myer that the War Department would be ready to deploy

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75 Oda, Heroic Struggle of Japanese Americans, 50-51,
troops to internment camps in the event of disturbance. To prevent such an “unwelcome” situation, McCloy urged Myer to “deal at once” with the Kibei and other like-minded individuals by planning segregation.76

As early as in the summer of 1942, the WRA’s top administrators also considered favorably the idea of separating the Kibei population from the rest of the evacuees. Despite the pressure to swiftly deal with the Kibei problem from the JACLers, the War Department, and even his own staff, however, Myer was not keen on branding a significant portion of Japanese Americans disloyal and segregating them.77 Also, Myer at this point was reluctant to undertake a segregation project, which would have been a logistical nightmare to the new director, as the segregation at Tule Lake, California from 1943 to 1946 would eventually prove. Also, rather than military intelligence, Myer placed more trust in his social scientific experts at the Community Analysis Section (CAS), who monitored the behaviors and attitudes of the Japanese American internees. The WRA in 1942 established CAS in each relocation center to assess grievances among the internees, but more importantly, Myer used the CAS reports as scientific proof of Nisei Americanization. The CAS ethnographers, many of whom were academics

76 Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy to Dillon S. Myer, October 30, 1942,
77 War Relocation Authority, WRA: a history of human conservation (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), 45-46. It should also be noted that Myer at this point was reluctant to undertake a segregation project, which would have been a logistical nightmare to the new director (as the Segregation at Tule Lake from 1943 to 1946 would eventually prove. See Chapter Four).
with advanced degrees, evaluated and reported on “what the evacuees are thinking on all subjects.”

Throughout the internment, Myer turned to the Community Analysis Section to study Kibei behaviors and attitudes and simultaneously to promote Nisei loyalty. The Community Analysis Section reports from 1942 served this purpose by identifying and designating a separate categorization of “pro-Japan” constituents from the rest of the internees. These reports suggested that the majority of Japanese American internees were anti-Axis, but identified adult male bachelor Kibei as a group mostly sympathetic to the cause of Japanese empire. Rather than targeting all Kibei, the WRA’s focus throughout the internment would be on this gender- and age-specific group of Kibei.

Anthropologist and Japan expert John F. Embree led the CAS’ effort to study and monitor Kibei thoughts and behaviors in the internment camps. In his first report, “Dealing with Japanese Americans,” in October 1942, Embree determined that the internees were generally divided in their acclaim of Japanese and the U.S. war efforts along the generational line. As a social scientist, however, Embree warned against swift generalization. He suggested that some Issei who were educated in the United States were more “American in point of view.” “Probably,” Embree suggested, “many Kibei are culturally Japanese, but by no means all.” He posited that those Kibei educated in Japan for “several years and since 1935,” including “old

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78 “Community Analysis Section” in The Pen, published by The Outpost (Rohwer, Arkansas), November 6, 1943.
bachelors” were mostly likely pro-Japan. These Kibei, according to Embree, were pronouncedly pro-Axis as a result of their education during the years when Japan was moving increasingly toward militarism.⁷⁹ Myer enthusiastically endorsed the report and distributed it to all relocation centers, and encouraged the WRA staff to utilize Embree’s findings on the cultural and racial characteristics of the subgroups within the evacuee population.⁸⁰

If Embree’s report gave Myer a reason to postpone removing all Kibei from the rest of the internees, another CAS report the following summer provided an even more encouraging result that convinced Myer that his assimilation project might work for Kibei. In the section titled “Are the Nisei Assimilated?,” the report suggested that Kibei’s education in Japan was not of their own choosing, but due to their parents’ desire to “impart” Japanese culture and values to their children. The report claimed that similar desire for cultural education existed in other immigrant communities. More “privileged” immigrant groups, like Irish Americans and French Canadians, did not have to send their children to the mother countries because they were able to attend “special ‘nationality’ schools” in the United States. The report asserted that the lack of such privilege forced Japanese American children to embark on their “educational pilgrimage,” which had little to do with indoctrination or Kibei’s unwillingness to “adopt American ways.” The

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⁸⁰ Dillon S. Myer to WRA Staff Members [1942], C-1258-C-NOBU, Carr Papers, Box 55, Folder 1, JARP.
report emphasized that Japanese Americans’ “acquisition of American traits” were well documented in studies and any notion of their inferior assimilation was a “false impression.”

Helping the assimilating process of the most problematic group—adult Kibei—then became one of the most important components of the WRA’s overall assimilation project. English classes for Kibei started throughout the Relocation Centers. The Adult Education Department at Poston Relocation Center opened its English classes in October 1942. Tule Lake Relocation Center announced its plans to accommodate students with special needs—classes for those “suffering from physical handicaps” and English classes for adult Kibei in February 1943. The WRA also offered “Americanization classes” to educate adult Issei and Kibei on the culture and customs of the United States to better prepare them for resettlement in American society.

Despite these efforts, results of CAS studies were not unanimously reassuring. A CAS study in July 1943 reported Kibei’s general unwillingness to assimilate on the WRA’s terms. This study indicated that Issei and Kibei internees were consistently uninterested in the WRA’s adult education

81 WRA Community Analysis Section, “Community Analysis Report No. 6,” July 21, 1943, WRA Documents Section, Carr Papers.
83 “English Classes for Kibei,” The Daily Tulean Dispatch, Tule Lake Relocation Center, September 2, 1942.
84 WRA Community Analysis Section, “Project Analysis Series No. 8,” July 1943, p. 3. Carey McWilliams Papers (hereafter cited as McWilliams Papers), Box 2, Folder 2, The War Relocation Authority Records Collection, H1944.1, Claremont Colleges Special Collections (hereafter cited as WRA).
program designed specifically for them, including “Americanization classes” called “Understanding America” and “Preparation for Relocation.” The conductors of this study seemed to have been puzzled by the disinterest in the Americanization program among Issei and Kibei. The researchers, however, overlooked the WRA administrators’ assumption that a special indoctrination program was needed to Americanize Kibei, no matter how long they had been back from Japan. This attitude also disregarded the Kibei’s U.S. citizenship, as the WRA hardly made a distinction between Kibei and Issei, who were Japanese citizens ineligible for naturalization, when designing the Americanization program. To many among the WRA staff, most Kibei largely remained perpetual foreigners within the Nisei community. In September 1943, Heart Mountain’s English classes for “foreigners” continued to look for Issei and Kibei enrollees. Such attitude reflected the popular assumption among the WRA staff about Kibei’s unassimilability, and ultimately, their disloyalty, as many WRA employees continued to regard Kibei as the “most dangerous” group.

Myer’s effort to promote Nisei loyalty found help from an unlikely source as the war in the Pacific dragged on. At the same time that McCloy and DeWitt pushed for segregation of Kibei, the War Department needed qualified linguists to break the Japanese code. In October 1942, the Army asked citizens in the internment camps who received education in Japan to

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85 WRA Community Analysis Section, “Project Analysis Series No. 9.”
86 Heart Mountain Sentinel, September 4, 1943.
87 WRA Community Analysis Section, “Community Analysis Report No. 7, October 16, 1943, p.4, Carr Papers, Box 55, Folder 1, JARP.
sign up for language training at Camp Savage. Recruits had to be graduates of high school in the United States, but preference was given to those who attended elementary and middle school in Japan. Volunteers were required to have “thorough knowledge” of spoken Japanese and preferably “a fair knowledge of newspaper Japanese.”

Although volunteers were not guaranteed enlistment in the Army, enrollment at Camp Savage offered them an opportunity to leave the camps for the duration of the language training. Ironically, adult bachelor Kibei, who were regarded as the most problematic and disloyal group, had become among the most useful for the country and to Myer’s goal to prove Nisei loyalty.

**Road to Segregation**

In February 1943, the WRA required all adult evacuees to complete what was popularly known as the “loyalty questionnaire” as proof of their readiness for permanent relocation out of the internment camps. Designed initially to register male evacuees for military service, this program was adopted by the WRA in an attempt to punctuate Japanese American assimilation and loyalty. Myer hoped that positive results of registration would accelerate the loyal evacuees’ release from the relocation centers and acceptance by the general American public. Optimism among many Japanese Americans was also high. Staff and JACLers at Tule Lake expected

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89 *The Minidoka Irrigator*, November 11, 1942.
the vast majority of the adult population to sign the loyalty questionnaire. However, Questions 27 and 28 on the questionnaire proved to be problematic, as they asked citizens and non-citizens, male and female, and young and old for their willingness to serve in the U.S. military and to swear “unqualified allegiance” to the U.S. by renouncing any loyalty to the Japanese emperor. Evacuee reactions to these questions varied, from confusion to outrage to enthusiastic support. To Myer’s surprise and dismay, the loyalty questionnaire sparked a series of unrest at a number of camps.

While some internees answered no to one or both of these questions and others refused to answer at all, many “loyal” Nisei and WRA administrators had the impression that the Kibei were leading the charge to resist and sabotage the registration program. There were indeed a few Kibei among those who adamantly opposed registration, but such a wide belief in the Kibei’s role in instigating trouble did not emerge out of vacuum. The term Kibei had come to carry such a negative connotation that it was not uncommon for JACL-oriented Nisei to use it as an adjective to camp agitations. Embree documented that at Topaz Relocation Center in Utah, the most vocal opposition to registration came from a group of Kibei. According to his report, these Kibei attempted to persuade other internees to vote for a

91 *The Daily Tulean Dispatch*, February 8, 1942.
92 John F. Embree, “Registration at Central Utah,” WRA Community Analysis Series No. 1, February 23, 1942, McWilliams Papers, Box 2, Folder 2, WRA.
“fight for civil rights” before registering. Only the camp director’s invocation of the Espionage Act prevented the vote.93

This incident further intensified the widespread mistrust of Kibei in the internment camps. Moreover, what seemed to be the Kibei-led obstruction of the registration program compounded the WRA’s notion of Kibei disloyalty. A group of young Nisei who called themselves “Young Democrats” complained to Embree that many Kibei were “misrepresenting” the majority opinion about registration at Topaz. The Young Democrats told Embree that the Kibei’s “fight for civil rights” was nothing more than an attempt to disturb the registration process because the Kibei had no will to fight against Japan. Other Nisei accused the Kibei gang for being cowards who feared becoming combat casualties.94 There were also reports of violent attacks on the JACLers by troublemakers that intensified during the registration period.95 The JACLers were quick to blame Kibei for any violent camp incident, calling one event a “typical Kibei attack from the rear with a lead pipe.”96 Eric L. Muller has found that after a half century since the conclusion of the war many old JACLers have continued to express their suspicion of those who opposed the registration program. Some Nisei critics of resistance, according to Muller, continue to believe that any attempt to

93 Ibid.
94 Embree, “Registration at Central Utah,” 5.
96 Daniels, Concentration Camps: North America, 107.
interfere with registration was an act of “laziness” and “cowardice.”97 Disturbances during the registration also contributed to the WRA staff’s perception of all Kibei as “citizens in name only,” who had “almost nothing in common with other second generation Japanese Americans.”98

The WRA’s Solution to the Kibei Problem

As the disturbances mounted, the WRA began to consider more seriously the immediate segregation of “disloyals.” Thus, the timing of segregation was in part a byproduct of the registration program. As resistance to registration continued, the WRA began to devise a way to separate disloyal troublemakers from the majority of evacuees. In July 1943, the agency announced its segregation plan. Myer stated that the program was designed to ensure the safety of “loyal American citizens and law-abiding aliens” in the relocation centers and to expedite the process of preparing them for post-internment resettlement.99 Masaoka and the JACLers enthusiastically endorsed the segregation policy, which would isolate the “agitators from those who wanted to cooperate with the government.”100 In general, the WRA staff viewed the segregation program as a “means to weeding out potentially dangerous people,” including Kibei.101

98 Myer’s reference to a WRA registration report, in Myer to Project Directors, February 8, 1944.
99 “Segregation to Start September 1, Declares Myer,” Topaz Times, special ed. (Topaz, Utah), July 14, 1943, p.1, Barnhart Papers, Box 49, Folder 6, JARP.
100 Masaoka, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, 131.
101 Ibid.
of Kibei was so severe that as the segregation program was announced, rumors began to circulate among evacuees that all Kibei would be relocated to Tule Lake Segregation Center in California. Expectation among many WRA staff members on the complete segregation of Kibei was high. They believed that the segregation of disloyals would help alleviate the difficulty of supervising these alleged troublemakers.102

And the Kibei were indeed high on the WRA’s priority list of disloyals who would be transferred to Tule Lake in September 1943. The WRA’s Administrative Instruction in July 1943 stipulated the agency’s tentative plan on the “separation of evacuees of doubtful loyalty from loyal evacuees.”103 The instruction designated “bachelor Kibei” among disloyals in the internment camps to depart for Tule Lake before “all others” to join those who had applied for repatriation or expatriation. The Kibei category specified in the instruction largely dovetailed with Embree’s first report in 1942. A “bachelor Kibei,” it stipulated, was a man who spent “a total of three or more years in Japan since January 1, 1935.”104 Such attempt to separate a problematic group from the majority of Nisei was reminiscent of the Anti-Axis Committee’s singling out of the Kibei in late 1941 as a group that could tarnish the image of Nisei loyalty.

However, the WRA would reverse its policy in August and eliminate the Kibei category in its official publication explaining the segregation policy,

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104 Ibid., 3.
instead using the neutral term “persons.” Myer and WRA administrators had to consider the fact that despite the negative public perception of Kibei, it was becoming increasingly difficult for them to cast all Kibei as potential troublemakers. To the ever-paternalistic Myer, who wanted to be remembered by Japanese Americans as a “great white father,” Embree’s February 1943 report from Topaz included an encouraging episode. The report suggested that with help of supportive white authority, Kibei could overcome their difference from other Nisei. Embree found a “very significant development” in the Kibei attitudes. He noted that a young Topaz Kibei accused by Nisei evacuees of “misrepresenting” the majority attitude toward registration “brought himself to cooperate with the very government he had attacked.” This change in the young man’s heart occurred after he met with Embree, to whom he expressed his bitterness and resentment of the WRA. After consultation with Embree, the young Kibei ceased to display militant behaviors and became more “reasonable.” Embree called this therapeutic event a “redemption of a Kibei,” an important revelation which demonstrated the Kibei’s capability of becoming cooperative, and ultimately, assimilating.

Perhaps the most encouraging evidence of Americanism among Kibei proved to be the words and actions of patriotic Kibei themselves. During the registration program, a number of Kibei internees stepped forward to

announce their desire to fight for the United States. At times Kibei volunteers were even more articulate than their Nisei counterparts in declaring their intention to join the U.S. war efforts. Some Kibei in fact demonstrated that their overseas experiences had armed them with a sense of internationalism that allowed more sophisticated expression of patriotism. A young Kibei volunteer at Topaz Relocation Center declared, for example, “to serve in the United States Army, I am thinking not only of defending American democracy against all foes, but also of whatever contribution I may be able to make toward the emancipation of all peoples.” He wished to fight for the “common people of Japan,” because while in Japan he had “learned the meaning of fascism” and “learned to fight against its oppressive measures.”

Another Topaz Kibei claimed that he wanted to fight not just for the emancipation of Nisei internees but for the “right of the ‘common man.’”

Many Kibei proved especially useful in the U.S. intelligence warfare in the Pacific Theater. In 1943, the U.S. Army trained an increasing number of Nisei and Kibei to serve in the Military Intelligence Service (MIS). A Nisei MIS member observed that Kibei were overrepresented in the MIS units, and they were the most skilled interpreters translating Japanese documents into English. The rising demand for military interpreters also prompted the

107 Karl Akiya in “Why They Volunteered,” Fighting Americans, Too! 2nd ed, Volunteers for Victory, Topaz, Utah, April 1943, Barnhart Papers, Box 49, Folder 6, JARP.
108 Ernest S. Iiyama in “Why They Volunteered.”
109 See Chapter Five for the role of Kibei linguists in the Pacific.
Army to transfer Kibei soldiers from other combat and medical units to the MIS and ship them to the Pacific.\textsuperscript{111} Brigadier General John Weckerling, who was instrumental in establishing the Military Intelligence Language School, praised the Kibei servicemen’s role in the Pacific campaigns and insisted that any belief in Kibei’s pro-Japan tendency was a mistake.\textsuperscript{112} In fact, white officers valued the service of Kibei linguists not only because of their Japanese proficiency, but also because of their experiences in Japan. The Army even recruited those Kibei who had once been conscripts in the Japanese military and found them to be among the most valuable assets to the MIS in the Pacific, specifically because of their knowledge of the Japanese Army.\textsuperscript{113} The increasing number and usefulness of Kibei volunteers, collaborators, and servicemen meant that the WRA could no longer treat internment camp troubles simply as “Kibei problems.”

Thus, by the late 1943 the question of Kibei loyalty was becoming increasingly complex in the WRA-JACL identity politics. However, while policymakers and Nisei elites could no longer label all bachelor Kibei as troublemakers, they nevertheless failed to adequately understand that the question of loyalty had affected Kibei in different ways because of their

\textsuperscript{111} Hiroshi “Harry” Kobashigawa, interviewed by author, Los Angeles, CA, September 8, 2005.
diverse transnational experiences. For instance, Karl Yoneda’s prewar transnational education was a significant factor which influenced his commitment to fighting the Axis powers by allying with the JACLers. His exposure to radical, anarchist, and socialist literature in Japan had made him a staunch denouncer of “fascism” in Japan even before the Pacific War began in 1942. Kibei volunteers like Yoneda and JACLers might have shared their zeal to cooperate with the American war efforts. However, the internationalism that had informed Yoneda and the Topaz volunteers suggest that their version of nationalism clearly distinguished between the Japanese government and the people of Japan. Although the wartime demand for loyalty had forced them to choose between two countries, it did not compel them to completely sever connection with all things Japanese.

114 Yoneda, *Ganbatte*, xi-xii.
Chapter 4
Hotel Tule Lake:
The Segregation Center and Kibei Transnationalism

In the July 1943 publication explaining the War Relocation Authority’s plans for the segregation program, Myer stressed his agency’s role as the benevolent custodian of all Japanese American internees, regardless of their professed national loyalty. Myer claimed that the WRA was respectful of each internee’s decision in answering loyalty questions 27 and 28. The WRA would, Myer indicated, protect the interests of both “loyal” and “disloyal” internees by separating them physically, thereby allowing them to spend the rest of the incarceration with fellow internees of similar ideological and cultural dispositions and avoid political frictions within the internment camps. Myer emphasized that segregation was thus not “a measure of punishment or penalty” for the internees selected to be transferred to the Tule Lake Segregation Center. Despite the fact that it was the WRA that had created the controversy and conflict among the internees by mandating each adult internee’s completion of the loyalty questionnaire earlier that year, Myer defended the registration program as “the opportunity” provided to the internees to exercise their free will.¹

Myer was determined to showcase the result of the loyalty survey to justify the segregation program, although the WRA’s Community Analysis Section reports submitted to him had noted mixed reactions among the internees to the loyalty questionnaire. In their reports, the social scientific researchers on the WRA payroll had had difficulty interpreting the meaning of these diverse, and at times hostile, responses to what Myer had envisioned as a simple way of allowing Japanese Americans to profess their loyalty to the U.S.\(^2\) Despite the flaws inherent in Questions 27 and 28, however, Myer was relieved that the majority of Japanese American internees nevertheless answered affirmatively to the loyalty questionnaire, thanks to the vigorous campaigns led by his JACL supporters in the camps. Of the 77,957 evacuees over seventeen years of age who registered, more than 68,000 answered “yes” to Question 28, which tested their allegiance to the United States.\(^3\) Myer opted to use the results to help promote his agency’s role in helping the majority of Japanese Americans assert their loyalty to the U.S. government.

The Director also crafted an answer to the potential attack by the press against the WRA’s failure to produce a 100% affirmative result. Myer insisted that the WRA was a democratic facilitator of the registration


program that encouraged the internees to exercise their “individual choices” in determining their national allegiance, although the WRA had forced all adult internees to answer the loyalty questions. Myer thus effectively held the internees themselves responsible for their own fate as the WRA’s segregation program forged ahead. Through this public relations posture, Myer deftly played the protector of those internees who “proved” themselves as loyal Americans. Simultaneously, he presented segregation in the guise of his benevolent accommodation to the internees who had chosen not to answer “yes” to the loyalty questions. In his zeal to shape the image of Nisei as loyal Americans on his own terms, Myer opted to sacrifice the internees who had protested the loyalty questionnaire. They would pay the price so that Myer could promote the ideal of unquestioned loyalty and Americanism demonstrated by the Nisei who did not question the integrity of the WRA internment policy.

Myer also placed the ultimate responsibility of the segregation project itself in the hands of American legislators by asking the U.S. Senate to pass a resolution seeking the President’s order to establish a segregation center. When the Senate resolution calling for the segregation of “disloyals” within the internment camps passed on July 3, 1943, Myer was able to claim that the WRA’s segregation plan was “in accord with the will of the legislative branch of the government.” By highlighting the segregation program as a

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mandate by federal lawmakers, Myer promoted the WRA’s role in running the segregation center as his contribution to national security.5

Myer sought to ensure that the segregation program did not give the press a reason to insist on the War Department’s supervision of Tule Lake Segregation Center. He feared that such transfer of jurisdiction to the military over even “disloyal” internees might encourage the anti-Japanese press on the West Coast to argue that the WRA had failed to demonstrate its ability to control potential troublemakers within the Japanese American population. Myer was thus determined to prove that segregation under the WRA’s management was a crucial part of his legacy. He directed his subordinates in the WRA to follow his position on the segregation program in their official communications. When the project directors at the ten WRA Relocation Centers convened at Denver in July 1943 to discuss the segregation plans, they were careful not to contradict Myer’s view of the program. A Community Analysis Section (CAS) study in October 1943 indicated that the project directors at the Denver conference adamantly stressed that the segregation program should not be interpreted as a “punishment” against the evacuees who answered “no” to the loyalty questions. Topaz director Charles F. Ernst even refused to use the term segregation and insisted that the program was “one of ‘Transfer.’” The project directors generally agreed, according to the report, that the basis of segregation was simply “separating” the internees who wanted to be

5 “Segregation to Start Sept. 1, Declares Myer,” Topaz Times, July 14, 1943.
repatriated to Japan from those who wished to pursue an American way of life.\(^6\)

Myer also reversed his own directive earlier that summer by eliminating “Kibei” as a category for the basis of segregation. Before the Denver conference, Myer had instructed his project directors to designate “bachelor Kibei” among disloyals as the first group to arrive at Tule Lake.\(^7\)

This had been in part a response to the pressure from Lt. General DeWitt and his supporters in the War Department to segregate adult Kibei. However, while DeWitt held firm his belief that Kibei were the most “Japanese” of all internees thus the most dangerous element, the commanders in the Army’s Military Intelligence Service began to see the benefit of enlisting bilingual Kibei out of the internment camps. The decision to eliminate Kibei as a criterion for segregation was Myer’s calculated move to further distance the WRA from the War Department, whose ranks of officers and military advisors in Washington D.C. and the battlefields in the Pacific developed positive views of Kibei men that contracted DeWitt’s. Instead, Myer focused on the WRA’s image as an agency that helped transform those “loyal” and Americanized Kibei into patriotic fighters.\(^8\)


\(^8\) Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy to Dillon S. Myer, October 30, 1942; War Relocation Authority, WRA: a history of human conservation (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 45-46. See also Chapter Two.
Myer in the end ensured that any direct reference to Kibei was not represented in the WRA’s official explanation of the segregation program. In both *Segregation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Relocation Centers*, a WRA publication in August 1943, and the agency’s official history, *WRA: A story of human conservation published* in 1946, the categorization of Kibei as a basis of segregation disappeared. Despite his effort, however, as the segregation program commenced in September 1943, Myer’s subordinates became more explicit in their approach to the program as a means of punishment. They regarded the internees selected for segregation as “trouble-makers” and “agitators” rather than simply people who “wanted to be Japanese.” In the meantime, Mike Masaoka and the JACL supported the WRA’s segregation policy as a means to stamp the image of “loyal Nisei” outside Tule Lake. Moreover, many on the WRA staff in various camps clung to the idea that adult male Kibei were the most dangerous group that needed to be separated from the rest of the internees. This attitude compounded the growing anxiety among the internees about the fate of Kibei on the eve of the segregation program. There were widespread rumors throughout the internment camps that the U.S. government had intended all Kibei to be transferred to the Tule Lake Segregation Center, and ultimately, deported to Japan at the war’s end.9

The incarceration at the Tule Lake Segregation Center from September 1943 to the camp’s closure in March 1946 marked a both crucial and tragic juncture in many Kibei’s transnational experiences. Overrepresented at Tule

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9 WRA Community Analysis Section, “Community Analysis Section Report No. 7, October 16, 1943, Carr Papers, Box 55, Folder 1, JARP.
Lake, Kibei segregants responded in diverse ways to the WRA’s segregation program. From leading protests against the camp authority’s treatment of the segregants to mobilizing community service to producing unique and creative literary works, the Kibei at Tule Lake in various ways defined their role as cultural brokers on the eve of their imagined journey back to Japan.

The segregation program at Tule Lake also marked an important turning point in the WRA’s internment project. Within two months after the Tule Lake’s transformation into the Segregation Center, Myer would learn that running a separate camp of “disloyals” proved to be nothing but smooth. Sensationalized by the mainstream press, protests at Tule Lake in November 1943 brought nationwide criticism against the WRA’s role as the cultivator of Japanese American loyalty and assimilation and even threatened the agency’s existence. The aftermath of what would become known as the “Tule Lake incident” would redefine the WRA’s policy and the administrators’ interpretation of Kibei as a subgroup within the Japanese American community.

**Tule Lake Segregation Center**

Despite both the WRA staff and JACLers’ hope that segregation would help promote Japanese American loyalty at the other nine camps by confining potential troublemakers to one segregation center, the segregation program turned out to be far from smooth. In their selection of Tule Lake as the site of the segregation center, the WRA administrators underestimated
the impact of movements to and from the camp or the demographic orientation of the segregation center. The segregation program, as Myer would find out, turned out to be a logistical and administrative nightmare for the War Relocation Authority.

To the WRA administrators, Tule Lake seemed like a logical choice for a segregation center. Located in the northeastern corner of California just below the Oregon State line, the Tule Lake camp sat on a fertile tract of land suitable for farming. Since the center’s opening in May 1942, Tule Lake internees developed a farm that produced crops for themselves and the internees at other relocation camps. In the summer of 1943, the camp was the largest among the relocation centers, with a capacity of 15,000. As the camp with the largest population, Tule Lake had a greater number of internees who responded negatively to the loyalty questionnaire. The WRA administrators hoped that keeping these “disloyals” at Tule Lake would minimize the need to accommodate the transfer of segregants from other relocation centers.\(^\text{10}\)

While Tule Lake’s capacity and geographic features made sense to the WRA planners of the segregation program, they overlooked the potential impact of the camp’s location within the evacuation area on the West Coast. Tule Lake was a constant target of anti-Japanese public hostility and negative press. Since 1942, the extreme hostility of the local Klamath Falls area residents toward Tule Lake evacuees had been well documented in

\(^{10}\) War Relocation Authority, *Segregation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Relocation Centers*, 11-12.
mainstream California papers like the Los Angeles Times and San Francisco Examiner. Many Tule Lake evacuees learned from these newspapers, which circulated within the camp, that however remote and desolate their camp was from major urban centers, the anti-Japanese sentiment remained a threat to their livelihood.\textsuperscript{11} Local law enforcement officials eagerly chimed in to express their anti-Japanese attitudes. In blatantly exterminationist language, a sign posted on the Modoc County Sheriff’s office announced “Open Season” for “Jap Hunting,” for which the Sheriff promised a limitless supply of licenses.\textsuperscript{12} Newspaper editorials further demoralized the Tule Lake evacuees by supporting West Coast politicians and public officials’ demand for deportation of the Tule Lake internees to Japan.\textsuperscript{13} As both the WRA administrators and Tule Lake residents would find out, the segregation program the following year would only intensify the public hostility and negative press.

The extreme anti-Japanese hostility in the Klamath Falls area did not help Myer’s cause, either. Since the early days of the camp’s operation, many local residents had reacted discontentedly to the camp’s management by a civilian agency rather than under a military supervision. Myer’s insistence on his agency’s role as the custodian of Japanese American internees had quickly turned the local community members against the WRA. Local

\textsuperscript{11} Carey McWilliams, \textit{Prejudice: Japanese-Americans: Symbol of Racial Intolerance} (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1971), 181; Social and Industrial Branch, Tule Lake War Relocation Center Project Area Report of Investigation, 1942, RG 210, Box 91, NARA.

\textsuperscript{12} Project Report #9, Social and Industrial Branch, Tule Lake Relocation Center, Record Group 210, Entry 4, Box 89, Project Reports, Tule Lake, 1942, NARA.

\textsuperscript{13} McWilliams, \textit{Prejudice}, 178.
residents accused WRA for “coddling” Japanese American internees at Tule Lake and made misinformed complaints that the camp administrators were feeding the evacuees “expensive foods” that were unavailable to local civilians under wartime conditions. The administrative ineptitude of the WRA staff at Tule Lake since mid-1942 added to the discontent of local residents and damaged the WRA’s relationship with the communities surrounding the camp. The WRA administrators often failed to pay local contractors on time for goods and supplies. Merchants in Klamath Falls complained in November 1942 that they had not been paid in full for the sundry items and produces delivered to Tule Lake in May of that year. The frustrated business owners pushed the Klamath County, Oregon, Chamber of Commerce to confront the WRA officials. In a December 1942 letter to then-Tule Lake Project Director Harvey Coverley, the Chamber’s executive secretary urged the WRA leadership to promptly settle the unpaid accounts.

In addition to the hostile surrounding environment, the internal situations at the Tule Lake Relocation Center prior to September 1943 also proved to defy the WRA administrators’ expectation of a smooth transition into segregation. Under the watch of project directors Elmer L. Shirrell and Harvey Coverley from May 1942 to September 1943, the Tule Lake

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14 Philip J. Webster, Acting Assistant Regional Director to Harvey Coverley, Acting Regional Director, Tule Lake Relocation Center, November 14, 1942, RG 210, Box 91, NARA.
15 Ibid.
16 Executive Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, Klamath County, Oregon, to Harvey Coverley, Project Director, Tule Lake Relocation Center, RG 210, Box 3, File: 100 Administration, Tule Lake, CA, 1942, NARA.
administration struggled to staff its positions with able personnel and fulfill the needs of the evacuees. The WRA staff often failed to deliver basic necessities to the internees, whose complaints were met with indifference or punitive measures. Top administrators at Tule Lake turned a blind eye to any effort by the internees or even WRA employees to conduct negotiations to ameliorate the relationship between the Tuleans and camp authority. When Myer promoted Shirrell and transferred him out of Tule Lake, Coverley, then the acting director, refused to communicate with protesters within the camp. From August 1942 to August 1943, Tule Lake saw a farm strike, a mess hall strike, a coal worker strike, a furniture factory strike, a packing shed strike, and a warehouse strike. Coverley did not hesitate to turn to the Military Police to deal with the internal turmoil, refusing to make concessions to the internee demands.

Myer’s appointment of Raymond R. Best to the director of the Tule Lake Segregation Center in August 1943 did little to improve the situation. Myer understood that tight control of the Segregation Center was crucial, as a failure to respond effectively to protests would invite criticism from his rivals in the War Department as well as the press and local residents. Despite his paternalistic idealism, he was willing to exercise punitive measures to discipline agitators within the internment camps. Myer was determined to prove that the WRA was capable of “establishing additional safeguards against sabotage by” those “who are known to be disloyal.” In the need for

establishing tight security without the direct interference from the military, Myer tapped Best as the ideal man to run the Segregation Center. Best was the former director of the WRA Isolation Center at Leupp, Arizona, a special detention facility for leading “troublemakers” and agitators arrested in the Relocation Centers. Myer described Best as “a pioneer” with “a reputation for considerate and just administration.” However, designating an expert in running a prison to direct the Segregation Center did more to agitate the internee population at Tule Lake. Best announced in his message to Tule Lake residents before arriving at the segregation center that he had no plan to implement changes to the existing camp policy under Coverley.19

Harry Ueno, a Kibei segregant who had been detained at Leupp Isolation Center after his involvement in a mess hall strike at Manzanar in 1942, knew that things at Tule Lake were about to get worse. Ueno arrived at Tule Lake soon after Best began his tenure as the director of the segregation center in September 1943. Ueno recalled his days at Leupp: “I fought with Best for my rights. I had so many arguments with him....Then he started scare tactics, you know right by the side of the building, target shooting. I knew what he intended, mental torture.”20 The appointment of Best was another sign to the internees at the segregation center that they were at Tule Lake to stay while other camps prepared the resettlement of internees out of the Relocation Centers.

18 War Relocation Authority, Segregation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Relocation Centers, 12.
19 “Best Greets Residents: Center Policies Told To Combat Spreading of Unfounded Rumors,” Tulean Dispatch, August 4, 1943.
20 Ross and the Tule Lake Committee, Second Kinenhi, 97.
Perhaps the most significant fact that forced the planners of the segregation program to choose Tule Lake was the greatest number of negative responses to the loyalty questionnaire from this camp. Registration at Tule Lake in February 1943 stirred widespread turmoil throughout the camp. By the time the Army representatives arrived at Tule Lake to hand out registration papers, the evacuees had lost their faith in the WRA staff. The camp administration had failed to explain the registration procedure or even adequately brief the internees on the general scope and purpose of registration. For example, after the registration period began, many Issei, who were not U.S. citizens, demanded instruction on how to answer Questions 27 and 28 only to have their request ignored by the WRA staff.21 Many Issei at Tule Lake were especially resistant to permanent relocation out of the camp upon learning that they would be forced to resettle in unfamiliar urban areas outside the West Coast.22 While reports on violent reactions to registration were scarce, far more Tuleans were at least passively resistant to registration than the internees in other centers. Instead of providing the evacuees with adequate explanation about the registration, the WRA staff threatened resisters by invoking the Espionage Act, as instructed by the national office.23 The ineffectiveness of the WRA’s handling of registration at Tule Lake even frustrated an Army representative, who stepped forward to

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22 “Preliminary Survey of Resistance to Resettlement At the Tule Lake Relocation Center,” WRA Community Analysis Section, June 23, 1943, JARCR, Box 19, File 11.
finally explain the registration policy to the evacuees in the *Tulean Dispatch* in February 1943.\(^{24}\)

The result of the registration program at Tule Lake was the most negative of all relocation camps, as disproportionate numbers of frustrated evacuees refused to complete the questionnaire. While almost all eligible Issei and Nisei at other camps registered, more than 600 male citizens and 700 female citizens at Tule Lake refused to register. Also, far more internees from Tule Lake than other camps answered “no” to the two loyalty questions. Based on the compilation of registration forms, of the 7,625 adults who registered at Tule Lake, 1,130 answered “no.”\(^{25}\) Over forty percent of adult Tuleans answered negatively to Questions 27 and 28 or refused to answer, while the average percentage of “nonaffirmative” or no responses in the other nine camps was less than twenty.\(^{26}\) The significant number of negative responses at Tule Lake made the camp the most “disloyal” of all relocation centers by the eve of segregation. To the WRA administrators, it simply made sense to designate the camp as the segregation center.

The WRA faced virtually no criticism from either within the ranks of the agency’s administrators or the outside of this ill-conceived segregation process. Only vocal expressions of discontent came from the Tuleans themselves, whose voices were dismissed as further manifestation of their disloyalty. One of the WRA employees critical of the agency’s segregation

\(^{24}\)“Registration Is Clarified: Army Major Says Choice Must Be Made,” *Tulean Dispatch*, February 18, 1943.


policy at the time, CAS researcher Marvin K. Opler did not approve of the agency’s decision to turn Tule Lake into a segregation center. However, Opler chose not to openly criticize what he believed was the WRA’s unfair and grossly mismanaged segregation policy. Instead, he remained at Tule Lake as the director of the segregation center’s research center to study the social psychology of the segregant population. Popular among segregants for his sympathy for Japanese Americans and his modest lifestyle within the camp, Opler would quietly become an influential figure in shaping the WRA’s official, and more positive, view of Kibei.27

The administration of the segregation center proved to be far from easy. When the transfer of segregants to Tule Lake was completed in the fall of 1943, the center was hardly a “disloyals’” haven. As noted by Donald Collins, segregation had made Tule Lake the “most heterogeneous of all centers.”28 Tule Lake director Raymond Best reflected in September 1944 that the conflict within the Segregation Center population defied the expectation that segregation would allow a smooth management of the camp. In addition to the so-called “disloyals,” who responded negatively to the loyalty questionnaire, Best noted that the Tule Lake population included their family members, elderly Issei who wanted to return to Japan to spend the remaining years of their lives in their home country, and the original Tuleans

who wished to remain in the camp to “sit the war out there.” As a result, Tule Lake was overcrowded and its living conditions among the harshest of all WRA Relocation Centers.

“Hotel Tule Lake”

The editors of *Tessaku*, a Japanese-language literary magazine published at the Tule Lake Segregation Center from late 1943 to 1945, began the magazine’s second issue by declaring, “Tule Lake is but a hotel on our journey back to Japan.” The three editors, all Kibei, continued, “our wait at this hotel may be a lengthy one. 20,000 of us are dwelling here without knowing when our ship will arrive [to take us back to Japan].” In an even more dramatic fashion, the editors claimed that their stay at Hotel Tule Lake would mark the closing chapter in the short history of Japanese immigration to the United States. This view reflected a widespread belief shared by the segregants at Tule Lake that they would be deported from the United States and permanently banned from returning. Iwao Shimizu, a Kibei segregant, was among those anticipating a one-way trip to Japan at the end of the war. Shimizu, whose father had been arrested by the FBI soon after Pearl Harbor,

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29 War Relocation Authority, “Information Concerning Tule Lake Center,” Tule Lake Segregation Center, Newell, California, September 1944, Verne Austin Papers (hereafter Austin Papers), Box 45, Folder 5, JARP.
in fact had awaited his deportation order since May 1942, when he transferred to Tule Lake from the Tanforan Assembly Center.  

However, hope was not lost entirely in this short essay written by the Kibei writers. The Tessaku writers reminded the fellow segregants that the imprisonment at Tule Lake would not be the end of their story. The writers asserted that Tuleans would emerge as quiet heroes who persevered in the face of prejudice and discrimination inflicted upon them not only by the U.S. government, but also by the leaders of their own ethnic community in the U.S. The writers encouraged the readers to look forward to the day their ship docked on the Japanese shore, where their countrymen would welcome them with open arms.

Many segregants at Tule Lake shared the Kibei writers’ sentiment that the Tuleans had no place other than Japan to pursue their new future. However, this view by no means represented the sentiment of the entire segregant population. When Tule Lake became a Segregation Center in September 1943, the camp’s population included not only the internees from the other nine Relocation Centers that responded negatively to the loyalty questionnaire, but thousands of “loyal” internees and their families who decided to stay at Tule Lake until the WRA would allow them to leave the camp and resettle in communities throughout the United States.  

Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, researchers for the Japanese

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33 War Relocation Authority, “Information Concerning Tule Lake Center.”
American Evacuation and Resettlement Study (JERS), observed that the majority of the segregants were “those who had made no hard and fast decision favoring either American or Japan as a future place of residence or symbol of allegiance.” Thomas and Nishimoto believed that these segregants wanted to wait until the end of the war to make decisions about their future.\(^{34}\) Thus, not all segregants at Tule Lake desired or anticipated relocation to Japan at the end of the war. In most cases, internees’ loyalty or national allegiance had little to with their decision to relocate to Tule Lake. To those who did not wish to return to the American society hostile to Japanese Americans, the barbed wire fences at Tule Lake would delay their relocation out of the camp and offer protection from the rest of the world.

Nevertheless, the Kibei writers’ depiction of Tule Lake as a way station for segregants before their repatriation to Japan was not entirely unfounded. The WRA administrators failed to adequately prepare themselves to deal with diverse political dispositions among the segregants at Tule Lake. Moreover, the WRA officials’ communications with the internees and the general public in the summer of 1943 about the segregation policy suggested that the U.S. government would not distinguish between “loyal” and “disloyal” segregants at Tule Lake. In his official explanation of the War Relocation Authority’s segregation program in July 1943, two months before the program commenced, WRA director Dillon S. Myer claimed that the internees outside the Tule Lake Segregation Center would

\(^{34}\) Thomas and Nishimoto, *The Spoilage*, 227.
have demonstrated their interest in “the welfare of the United States.” By virtue of showing their loyalty, Myer declared that these internees would be immediately “eligible to move from the relocation centers to outside communities” in the United States. For those internees “who want to be American,” Myer promised “the opportunity to live as Americans.” However, his explanation provided no prospect for the Tule Lake segregants’ future resettlement in the United States. Myer announced that all segregants’ eligibility for permanent leave from the internment camps would be suspended indefinitely, stirring a widespread anticipation throughout the ten Relocation Centers that segregants would no longer be considered U.S. citizens.  

Without the prospect of resettling in the United States and permanently labeled “disloyal,” repatriation to Japan seemed to many segregants as the only option granted them. When young Morgan Yamanaka answered “no-no” to Questions 27 and 28 at Topaz, he was fully aware of the general assumption among the internees that those who did not answer “yes” to the loyalty questions would not be allowed to resettle outside the camp. Yamanaka’s decision to respond negatively to the questions demonstrates how complicated the question of loyalty was to Japanese Americans whose siblings and children were on the other side of the Pacific. San Francisco-born Yamanaka’s Nisei brother and sister were in Japan when the rest of their family were relocated to Topaz Relocation Center in 1942.

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Unable to communicate with his siblings in Japan since Pearl Harbor, Yamanaka thought by the time the registration program commenced in 1943 that his brother likely would have been conscripted by the Japanese military and sent to a battlefront. To Yamanaka, answering yes to the loyalty questions and pledging to fight for the U.S. government against Japan presented an inconceivable scenario of facing his own brother on the battlefield. His entire family at Topaz thus chose to become “no-no’s,” the notorious term that described internees who answered negatively to both Questions 27 and 28 on the registration questionnaire, with an understanding that they would remain incarcerated until the end of the war.\footnote{36 John Tateishi, \textit{And Just For All: An Oral History of the Japanese American Detention Camps} (New York: Random House, 1984), 113-114.}

Yamanaka also considered his decision as a silent protest against the government’s attempt to claim the loyalty of the Nisei after stripping them of their rights as citizens. “Hell, we’re not citizens anyway; otherwise we wouldn’t be here,” Yamanaka reflected on his decision to relocate to Tule Lake, “the logical thing appear[ed] to be no-no.” The Yamanakas were also convinced that the stigma of “disloyalty” would provide them with no future in the United States: “Once we said no-no, the next logical step was renunciation [of U.S. citizenship].”\footnote{37 Ibid.}

Minoru Kiyota, a nineteen-year-old Kibei who had spent four years in Japan during the 1930s, echoed Yamanaka’s sentiment. Kiyota saw the
loyalty questionnaire as his “only opportunity to take a stand against oppressive government authority.” Moreover, the test of loyalty imposed by the U.S. government also had caused “anguish” for the Kibei who had a deep personal connection to Japan. To Kiyota, declaring total allegiance to the United States “meant hoping for the total destruction” of Japan. He even saw the pledge of loyalty to the U.S. under the cruel circumstance would mean “collaborating in killing and wounding of people who lived in Japan.”

It was in this moment of uncertainty that Masao Yamashiro, Kazuo Abe, Kenji Nozaki and hundreds of other Kibei arrived at Tule Lake in the fall of 1943. All of these Kibei writers were “no-no’s.” However, these “disloyals” defied the WRA staff’s assumption that Kibei segregants were likely pro-Japan agitators. The three “no no’s” in fact showed little sign of turning into troublemakers, as they quietly accepted their fate as potential repatriates. Graduates of Los Angeles Polytechnic High School, the three Kibei writers had no desire to get involved in camp politics or protests against the United States government. They instead turned to literary activities to keep themselves and other interested Kibei occupied until their relocation to Japan.

The Kibei editors of Tessaku stressed that it was imperative for young American-born Nisei at Tule Lake to sharpen their Japanese language skills

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38 Minoru Kiyota, Beyond Loyalty, 97-101.
to ensure their future survival in Japan. The editors wished to contribute to Nisei segregants’ future adjustment to Japanese schools and workplaces by encouraging young students at Tule Lake to practice writing in Japanese. The three editors managed to convince a few young writers to submit poems and short stories for publication in their magazine.40

Other young Kibei emerged as leaders of a movement at Tule Lake that sought broader approaches to providing the segregants with the opportunity to prepare themselves for resettlement in Japan. Formed in March 1944, the Tule Lake Young Men and Women’s Association, or Seinendan, organized art exhibits, Japanese film screenings, and public lectures on Japanese culture. Seinendan used the proceeds from these events to establish a library and Japanese-style classes for young children.41

A contributor to Seinendan’s Japanese-language magazine Doto aptly articulated how segregation had forced many segregants to accept their identity as Japanese. The anonymous writer believed that young Nisei and Kibei at Tule Lake should strive to embrace their role as “good Japanese” who made positive contributions to the community. The oppressive conditions at Tule Lake could cause many segregants to turn to idleness, the writer feared. In order to make the best out of the camp environment, this writer encouraged young segregants to participate in sporting events that could help transform them into active cultural brokers. In particular, the

40 “Epilogue,” Tessaku, volume 1, 1944.
writer proposed a development of an active baseball league as a camp-wide communal pastime that would rejuvenate the spirit of all Tuleans. The writer believed that the shared love of this American sport among segregants of all generations would strengthen the unity of the community and help ease their transition to the life in Japan, where the popularity of baseball was second to none.\(^{42}\)

In addition to editing the literary journal, Masao Yamashiro also taught Japanese classes to Nisei children of elementary and middle school ages at Tule Lake. Newspapers in the spring of 1945 informed him that Japan was surely losing the war and Yamashiro felt that the segregants’ days at Tule Lake were numbered. He believed it was his responsibility to help young Nisei find purpose in their stay in the camp in a moment of uncertainty. In addition to helping them prepare themselves for their potential future in Japan, Yamashiro hoped that Japanese classes would keep the Nisei children at Tule Lake busy.\(^{43}\)

The Kibei community organizers at Tule Lake distanced themselves from the camp politics and instead focused their energy on maintaining a semblance of normal life in the camp. They determined that the unforeseen future that lay ahead of the segregants made it necessary for them to use their transnational background in keeping the community intact. In this way, segregation defined their role as cultural brokers and allowed them to fulfill

\(^{42}\) “Danso,” *Doto*, volume 1, April 1945.

the bridge-building ideal that the leaders of the Japanese American community had advocated in the 1930s.44

“The Battle of Tulelake” and the Kibei Problem

What defined the lasting image of Kibei, however, was not the role of Kibei writers and community organizers in creating cultural activities at Tule Lake, but the War Relocation Authority’s continued mismanagement of the camp. The effort by the young Kibei to use these activities as a creative space to help Tuleans pass time far from eliminated the segregants’ frustration over the camp’s living conditions. When it came to expressing their grievances, the segregants turned to more outspoken leaders to represent their voices in negotiating with the camp authority. By early 1944, Myer had come to realize that the “Kibei Problem” was far more complex than he had imagined. In a memo, he told his subordinates at the War Relocation Authority that there was “not a single Kibei problem with a single solution.” He maintained that his agency could not generalize the entire Kibei as a pro-Japan element. In fact, since late 1943, the WRA’s public statements had ceased to equate the problem of loyalty to the “Kibei Problem.” The turning point was November 1943 when disturbances erupted at Tule Lake Segregation Center. Two months after the segregation program began, the WRA’s supervision of the so-called disloyals proved to be anything but easy, defying the expectation of the administrators.

44 See Chapter Two.
On November 1, 1943, a demonstration broke out at Tule Lake and evacuee representatives demanded a meeting with Tule Lake’s Project Director Raymond Best and WRA chief Myer, who was on a visit. Elderly evacuees, mothers, and children joined the demonstration to show their support for the representatives, whom evacuees had chosen to address the poor camp conditions and the administration’s decision to fire the evacuee farm workers. The Nisei and Kibei representatives were experienced former organizers of resistance at Jerome, Poston, and Heart Mountain Relocation Centers prior to their arrival at Tule Lake. They understood the general frustration among the Tuleans with the WRA’s mismanagement of the camp since before the segregation began and were able to mobilize popular support for a collective action. When the meeting in Best’s office was granted to the representative committee, or Daihyo Sha Kai, committee leader and California Kibei George Kuratomi did not hesitate to tell Myer that Project Director Raymond Best was to blame for the difficulties at Tule Lake. Kuratomi claimed that Best had “lost complete faith” with segregants for his failure to improve harsh living conditions in the camps. The representatives read a statement demanding the formal dismissal of Best as the Project Director. They also asked for the removal of the WRA administrators of the camp’s Internal Security Division, Agricultural

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46 WRA Project Analysis Series No. 14, March 27, 1944.
Division, and mess hall operation, as well as “all the Caucasian doctors” and nurses.\textsuperscript{47}

In the meeting, Kuratomi promised Myer that segregants were committed to a peaceful resolution and there would be no “unnecessary commotions.”\textsuperscript{48} However, while the demonstrators surrounded the administration building, a small group of radical young men seized the opportunity to instigate trouble when they attacked chief medical officer Reece M. Pedicord.\textsuperscript{49} Since his tenure as Tule Lake’s chief medical officer in January 1943, Pedicord had been notorious for his discriminatory treatment of Japanese American doctors under his supervision and the internee population in general. According to WRA researcher Marvin Opler’s report, Pedicord routinely called his Japanese American medical staff and patients “Japs.” Opler described Pedicord’s attitude as “a manner calculated to convince the resident staff that skin-color would henceforth be a criterion in scientific judgment.” The evacuees were to “submit to [Pedicord’s] medical methods of the ‘I won’t coddle you’ variety.”\textsuperscript{50}

The attack on Pedicord on November 1, 1943, although small and isolated, signified a culmination of the segregants’ frustration with the WRA administration that had mounted since before the segregation program. The incident also made many of the WRA personnel fear that they could be the next target. A few WRA employees fled to nearby towns. During a series of

\textsuperscript{47} Minutes of Meeting, November 1, 1943, Austin Papers Box 43, Folder 5, JARP.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Marvin K. Opler, “Community Attitudes Toward Hospital Administration at Tule Lake Project,” 1943, Social and Industrial Branch, RG 210, Box 3, NARA.
meetings the next day, the remaining WRA employees demanded a military intervention. Local residents employed by the Segregation Center angrily told the Christian Science Monitor two days later that the WRA should be held responsible for its failure to immediately call in the Army. Myer dismissed the accusation, insisting that there was no serious riot during his visit to Tule Lake and the gathering of segregants outside the administration building on November 1 had occurred in a peaceful and orderly fashion. The National Director’s comment did not convince the WRA staff at Tule Lake, who decided to erect a fence separating the “Caucasian” section from the internee residences and allowed no evacuees to enter Caucasian section without a pass.

Thus, the panic of the WRA employees exacerbated the situation at Tule Lake, which Myer hoped Raymond Best with the assistance of a small military police unit would be able to handle. By dividing the segregant section of the camp from the isolated Caucasian section, which would become known as the “stockade,” they also created further tension between the segregants and themselves. WRA employees’ demand for a martial law was achieved three days later when the Army seized control of Tule Lake. What the San Francisco Examiner described as the “Battle of Tulelake [sic]” began on November 3. The paper described the incident at Tule Lake as an armed revolt led by “eight thousand Japanese internees, some brandishing

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52 Collins, Native American Aliens, 39-43.
Knives and heavy clubs.” The Examiner alleged that the WRA tried to hide the incident and the military occupation of the camp was imminent. Best was on the verge of losing his jurisdiction over Tule Lake as troops of the Ninth Service Command prepared an invasion of the camp to place the segregation center under a martial control. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy’s warning to Myer the previous year about a potential military intervention in the event of disturbance became a reality. As tanks moved in the next day to seize the camp and the troops drove the lingering demonstrators back in to the shacks with tear gas, California Governor Earl Warren called for a permanent military takeover of Tule Lake. According to the Examiner, Warren was distressed by the WRA’s ineptness and recommended a complete removal of the federal administration from the center. On November 4, the pressure from the press, local residents, its own employees at Tule Lake, and the public officials forced the WRA to hand over the control of Tule Lake to Colonel Verne Austin of the Ninth Service Command.

The public hostility toward Japanese Americans and the negative press in California that had haunted Japanese American Tuleans turned the

53 “Armed Jap Revolt At Tule Lake Center Revealed by Witness,” San Francisco Examiner, November 3, 1943.
54 Ibid.
55 Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy to Dillon S. Myer, October 30, 1942; See also Chapter Three.
56 “Army Tanks Quell Cal. Jap Riots, Seize Camp,” Los Angeles Evening Herald Express; San Francisco Examiner, November 6, 1943.
57 “2,000 Defiant Japs Driven to Quarters By Use of Tear Gas,” San Francisco Examiner, November 6, 1943.
58 “Army Takes Control of Tule Lake Japs!,” San Francisco Examiner, November 5, 1943.
“Battle of Tulelake” into a national headline. The situation gave the press a chance to recount the series of “incidents” in the forms of strikes and disturbances that broke out at Tule Lake between 1942 and 1944. West Coast newspapers relentlessly attacked the WRA’s inability to handle the internees. With the segregation center under martial law, these papers called for the end of the WRA’s supervision of Tule Lake and for a permanent military takeover of its facilities. On November 8, the San Francisco Examiner presented a statement by James Stedman, an investigator for the House Committee on Un-American Activities headed by Congressman Martin Dies, who argued that the Tule Lake incident was evidence that the “WRA had proved itself unfit to continue administration of the camps.” This marked a significant blow to Myer and JACL leader Mike M. Masaoka’s confidence in Nisei loyalty and Americanization and WRA administrators sought ways to reassure the public of the agency’s successful assimilation program.

In Col. Austin, DeWitt could not have found a better example of a Western Defense Command officer who could teach Myer how to run a segregation center. Under Austin’s watch, military regulations replaced WRA policies in establishing rules that governed daily lives of segregants. Austin imposed a strict curfew, as segregants were prohibited from leaving their residential areas. He promised the segregants provisions of food and essential items “in the manner as prescribed by the military” and promised

59 San Francisco Examiner, December 3-5, 1943.
60 “Tule Revolt Probe Opens Today; State, National Inquiry Set,” San Francisco Examiner, November 8, 1943.
that he would not welcome any suggestions or demands from the representatives selected by segregants. The Commander of “Camp Tulelake” announced that only he “shall be the judge of how this job will be done.”

Myer’s problem was compounded by the press’ depiction of the camp uprising as a Kibei revolt. On November 6, the *Los Angeles Times* accused 1,200 disloyal Kibei of causing trouble at Tule Lake. As the Kibei problem began to resurface, Myer’s biggest fear was that the Tule Lake incident would give DeWitt and McCloy a reason to blame the WRA for failing to act upon to their recommendation for the isolation of the entire population of adult male Kibei from the rest of the evacuees. Myer instructed the WRA staff to make no connection to Kibei in their public comments on the Tule Lake incident. To his relief, none of the WRA’s public responses to the press singled out any Kibei for instigating the Tule Lake incident, despite the widespread distrust of Kibei among the WRA employees. In the weeks that followed, the WRA tried to curtail the significance of the “incidents” by depicting the instigators as a few rowdies who “drifted off” from the mainstream Nisei. In response to mounting criticism, a member of the WRA staff insisted that the camp was under control and there actually was no

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61 “Speech by Lt. Col. Austin at Tulelake [sic] Center,” November 13, 1943, Ninth Service Command, Tule Lake, CA, Austin Papers, Box 43, Folder 5, JARP.
62 “Focal Point of Trouble At Camp Was 1,200 Kibei,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 6, 1943.
major outbreak. Another WRA official told the Examiner that “only ‘a handful of malcontents’ forced” the other evacuees to join the rebellion.

As discussed in the previous chapter, WRA administrators’ silence about Kibei disloyalty at Tule Lake was not unrelated to the agency’s new attitude toward the Kibei problem. By the end of 1943, it had become increasingly difficult for the WRA to cast the entire Kibei population as a pro-Japan element. When the press relentlessly attacked the ineffectiveness of the civilian camp administration and called for a permanent end to the WRA supervision of the segregation center, Myer and his staff faced a dilemma. To the WRA, the question of loyalty was no longer a suitable option for identifying troublemakers. Because Tule Lake consisted of both so-called “loyals” and “disloyals,” the removal of the WRA would spoil its reputation as the protector of loyal Nisei and further tarnish the image of Japanese Americans in a state where the hostility toward Japanese was at its height. At the same time, the administrators had to be cautious about labeling the demonstration a typical sign of the Kibei’s manifestation of pro-Axis intentions, as many Kibei volunteers and draftees were undoubtedly “proving” their loyalty in the 100th Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat Team. When the Army took possession of Tule Lake and the media relentlessly challenged the WRA’s existence, administrators needed to find an alternative way to explain the nature of the incident.

65 “Tule Declared a WRA ‘Experiment,’” San Francisco Examiner, November 10, 1943.
66 See Chapter Three.
Kibei as Immigrants

In early 1944, the War Relocation Authority got its break. Much to the dissatisfaction of the anti-WRA press, the Army vacated Tule Lake and the WRA took back control of the “Jap Camp” on January 15.67 The “army was too busy winning the war to supervise” Tule Lake, reported the San Francisco Chronicle on the statement of Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, who had replaced John L. DeWitt as head of the Western Defense Command.68 With Tule Lake back in its jurisdiction, the WRA now approached the twin problem of Kibei and loyalty. They looked to the Community Analysis Section to produce a more through study of Kibei.

The January 28, 1944 Community Analysis Section report, “Japanese Americans Educated in Japan,” provided the WRA with social scientific “proof” of the agency’s newest claim that the troublemakers at relocation centers were a few malcontents among assimilated Nisei and Kibei. The report’s main contributor Marvin Opler summarized the complex adjustment experiences of Kibei upon their return from Japan and how Kibei’s re-assimilation into America determined their varied responses to the internment experience. The report proved to be more than an anthropological study, as it offered the WRA a new ideological and intellectual tool that could dispel the generalized notion of Kibei disloyalty. This was especially crucial to solving the WRA’s public relations problem, because of the widespread notion that the pro-Japan sentiments of Kibei

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68 “General Explains the War Comes First,” San Francisco Chronicle, January 19, 1944.
were the root of camp disturbances. Eliminating loyalty as the central issue would provide the WRA with alternative options for interpreting the Kibei problem and the possibility of eliminating the question of Kibei loyalty once and for all.

The new CAS report helped Myer accomplish this by recasting the Kibei’s transnational identity and their nationalism. The report asserted adamantly that any sweeping generalization of Kibei’s loyalty or cultural disposition was unfounded. The Kibei’s preference for American or Japanese ways of life, according to the report, represented diverse and complex views based on individual circumstances. However, the CAS researchers confidently claimed that all Kibei at various points in their lives must go through an experience that made them fundamentally different from other Nisei. The researchers described this common experience among Kibei as “conflict within themselves” as a result of their experiences in both the U.S. and Japan.69

The report suggested that Kibei must be regarded as a “new immigrant group” rather than Americans despite their legal citizenship. Such Kibei were subject to assimilation like other Japanese immigrants. However, because Kibei were also Nisei, and thus American citizens by birth, the process of their Americanization would be more complex. The report asserted that this complex identity made them a “minority group within a minority.” Upon their return to their country of birth, Kibei would

undoubtedly experience “conflict in their personal adjustment.” The report suggested that the degree of assimilation varied according to the individual will, ability and the social surroundings. Some “drifted off into their own society” and into “non-assimilation.” Some extreme cases of “maladjustment” made them “pariahs within the larger minority group.”

After the war, Opler elaborated further on maladjusted Kibei in his psychoanalytical study of a Kibei youth at Tule Lake. The troubled young Kibei, whom Opler named “Jiro” in his study, had spent his childhood in Hiroshima before returning to his native hometown in northern California at the age of fifteen. Jiro had been a “persona non grata” in Japan, struggling to adjust to life there. A shy, smallish, and sick boy, Jiro had been a constant target of ridicule from his peers, neighbors, and even from his authoritarian and condescending grandfather. Jiro returned to the U.S. dejected and suffering from an acute inferiority complex.

According to Opler’s study, Jiro’s trouble grew worse during his readjustment phase, as he “found himself an unwelcome citizen” in his country of birth. He grew even more silent and insecure and developed strong resentment and jealousy toward his Nisei siblings and friends, who rejected his awkward manner and inability to speak English fluently. He also resented their critical view of Kibei in general as outsiders. He felt lonely and his passive hostility toward his own family and other Nisei grew stronger.

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After the family’s forced relocation to Tule Lake in 1942, Jiro withdrew to a small circle of Kibei friends, with whom he responded “yes” to the loyalty questions, but also wrote next to his answer, “if my citizenship rights are restored.” Jiro remained at Tule Lake as a segregant while the rest of his family, who had answered positively to the loyalty questionnaire, departed from the camp. His resentment grew even stronger at this outcome. Already weak physically and emotionally unstable, Jiro was declared “confused, depressed, frightened, and inwardly hostile” by psychiatric examination. While Jiro’s “culture conflict and personal stress” were severe, Opler believed that Jiro was not alone in suffering from “periods of acute onset” experienced by other Kibei at Tule Lake. Opler concluded that Kibei’s common struggle in two cultures had made them a unique “class” whose conflict with non-Kibei had added “new strains into [Japanese American] family structure” during wartime incarceration.73

However, the CAS report also suggested three other categories of Kibei. First were those who adjusted economically and socially, with stable families and businesses. They tended to be actively pro-American and staunch “flag wavers.” They were “conscious-American[s]” and willing to cooperate with the WRA. The report claimed that these Kibei “were assimilated” and a little to no difference existed between them and the “majority of the Nisei.”74 The WRA here likened them to the JACLers, who

73 Opler, “Cultural Delimma of a Kibei Youth,” 302-316.
tended to be business owners and professionals and worked cooperatively with the WRA.

The second most assimilated group of Kibei were those who utilized positive aspects of both American and Japanese cultures to “find functions and status.” They often contributed to “constructive action in the centers.” Based on this assessment, Karl Yoneda’s assimilation rate would probably be placed somewhere between the first and second categories, as he was a “flag waver” and a Communist at the same time. The third were quiet, polite, “unobtrusive” Kibei, who largely withdrew from the society and avoided political or ideological confrontations, behaving in a “Japanese” manner accepted and tolerated by the American society.

The final type of Kibei were the “maladjusted” ones like Jiro, who had rendered their “reputation to the whole” as troublemakers. They had “never accepted American ways” or returned too recently to have been properly Americanized. At the relocation centers, they displayed fiercely pro-Japan attitudes and behaviors and attempted any means necessary to secure their chance of returning to Japan. The majority of Nisei regarded them unfavorably as a “rowdy and uncontrollable group.”

Thus, the report effectively divided Kibei into good, acceptable, and bad categories. While the good Kibei included the ones whose degree of assimilation was the most advanced or relatively complete, the third type, or the “unobtrusive” Kibei were essentially Japanese in culture but harmless to

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the WRA administration.\footnote{WRA Community Analysis Section, “Japanese Americans Educated in Japan,” 13.} However, the last type of Kibei were the most dangerous, not because they were culturally or ideologically Japanese, but because they were neither Japanese nor American. The report asserted that their misbehavior resulted from the “straddling of two cultures” in ways unfitting to both. They were neither active and productive Americans nor harmless Japanese. Their rebelliousness had come from the false sense of what Japan and America meant to them. In short, they were “men without a country” who would soon discover that they had “devoted themselves to an ideal that does not exist,” because a “Japan of their own over-heated imagination” was generated by their maladjustment and “lack of status in any society.”\footnote{WRA Community Analysis Section, “Japanese Americans Educated in Japan,” 12.}

The report’s new interpretation of loyalty and nation thus acknowledges the influence of Kibei’s transnational experience. It is within this notion of transnational identity that the WRA’s criticism of the maladjusted Kibei’s “false sense” of nation eliminated the issue of loyalty from the Kibei problem. However, the WRA’s notion of transnational adjustment reinforced the binary concept of national loyalty, as Kibei were expected to choose between the American and Japanese ways, according to the WRA’s rearticulation of the two. An idea of nation that did not fit into the WRA model was therefore deemed a false sense of nationalism. At the same time, promoting the “good” types of Kibei’s transnational adjustment offered new possibilities of highlighting the WRA’s version of
Americanization and the successful stories of Kibei and Nisei’s assimilation. These new categories provided an ideal of proper assimilation, which dovetailed with the image of ideal Nisei promoted by the JACLers.

**A Model Kibei**

In December 1941, when the Anti-Axis Committee was spying on Kibei in Los Angeles, any JACL promotion of loyal Kibei would have been unimaginable. However, by the fall of 1944, things had changed as the JACLers joined in the WRA’s rearticulation of good Kibei as successfully Americanized immigrants. The WRA’s new concept of Kibei found an ideal model in an “assimilated” and bilingual veteran of the 100th Battalion’s European campaign. Wounded in the Battle of Cassino in Italy in January 1944, Private First Class Thomas Taro Higa had returned to the U.S. for medical treatment. Upon his recovery, the JACL arranged a nationwide speaking tour that showcased this dynamic and articulate model Kibei whose speeches in fluent standard Japanese and Okanawan dialect inspired primarily Japanese-speaking Issei. The JACL promoted the lectures as an opportunity to “further the war effort” and to “promote national unity.” The JACLers believed that Higa’s tour convinced many elders of the Japanese American community to support Nisei military service.

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79 *Pacific Citizen*, September 9, 1944.
80 Japanese American Citizens League, “PFC Thomas Higa Speech Tour, September 15-December 10, 1944,” Thomas Higa Papers (hereafter Higa Papers), Box 153, Folder 8, JARP.
The stories of Higa’s speaking tour provided the JACL an opportunity for nationwide publicity of Nisei loyalty. In his 120-day tour, Higa visited seventy-four cities across the United States, speaking before 20,300 people. The JACL contacted over 80 newspapers to disseminate the news of Higa’s patriotic speeches.\(^81\) Higa delighted the JACLers by telling the *New York Times* that Japanese Americans were “as loyal as other groups.”\(^82\) The WRA officials were thrilled to find an ideal spokesperson in Higa for the agency’s campaign to showcase its successful Americanization of Nisei to the national audience.\(^83\) The Relocation Authority also produced a “moving” film which accompanied Higa’s speech.\(^84\)

The WRA’s new definition of Kibei Americanization thus needed recasting of all Kibei as an immigrant group, as well as the help of its allies at the JACL. Kibei were now invited to join the WRA-JACL collaboration in promoting the ideal Nisei image. Thus, the Kibei problem disappeared, at least in the public language of the WRA-JACL identity politics. As the WRA-JACL rearticulation of Kibei nationalism and transnational identity demonstrates, federal officials and Nisei elites themselves understood that the “Kibei problem” was not merely a problem of disloyalty and internment camp militancy. Perhaps these shapers of ethnic self-identity recognized

\(^{81}\) Ibid.

\(^{82}\) “Japanese-American, Wounded in Italy, Says Unit Was Treated Like Other G.I.’s,” *New York Times*, November 19, 1944.


\(^{84}\) Ayako Ellen Nakamura (Bridgeport, New Jersey) to Mike M. Masaoka, November 21, 1944, Higa Papers, Box 153, Folder 8, JARP.
before any scholars that the issues of transnational identity, nationalism, migration, and assimilation were central to approaching Kibei experience.

The successful WRA-JACL campaign to promote the image of loyal Nisei has had a profound impact on how people understand the history of Japanese American internment. The public narrative of Nisei loyalty and “Nisei as Americans” has been ingrained in the minds of postwar activist, teachers, students, historical actors themselves, and the early postwar scholars on the wartime internment. Sixty years after the conclusion of the Pacific War, former Kibei internee Frank Goya retold the wartime Japanese American experience in a manner strikingly similar to the JACLer’s version. He told of Nisei loyalty in the face of wartime incarceration endured by him and many others, as well as the story of the heroic Nisei unit in Europe, although he himself was not a member of the 442\textsuperscript{nd} Regimental Combat Team. He then moved on to telling about the triumphant redress movement.\textsuperscript{85} This Kibei man’s deliberate forgetfulness of the complex past suggests that the postwar narrative of wartime Nisei loyalty has not allowed many Kibei any public means to conceptualizing and expressing their memories.

The WRA and JACL’s reassertion of Kibei nationalism distorted multiple historical issues, such as gender, education, and class, that shaped the transnational experiences of Kibei. Nisei elites and WRA administrators, through deliberate misunderstanding of the Kibei’s transborder nationalism,

\textsuperscript{85} Frank Goya, interviewed by Author, Los Angeles, September 5, 2005.
imposed particular brands of immigrant identities on individual Kibei. They assigned new definitions to the notions of Kibei’s national loyalty and assimilation based on CAS researchers’ description of Kibei perspectives. This rearticulation merely transformed a notion of fixed national loyalty into static categories of transnational identities. Kibei who did not fit into the WRA’s concepts of “Americanization” and “Japanization” were now made, in Donna R. Gabaccia’s term, historical “nowhere men” who possessed a false sense of nation.86

The JACLers’ and the WRA’s rearticulation of Kibei identity implicitly invoked economic, social, generational, and gender dynamics in a gendered and class-specific language.87 The notion of national loyalty that persisted throughout the wartime internment had a profound impact on shaping this language implicit in the WRA-JACL articulation of Nisei identity. The glorification of the military service and civic volunteerism of loyal Nisei men highlight the gendered notion of national loyalty and assimilation invoked by the JACL and the WRA. The JACLers glorified the masculinity of the heroic veterans while demonizing the effeminacy of troublemaking and draft dodging Kibei. According to CAS analyst John F. Embree, Topaz Nisei in 1942 accused a Kibei gang of disturbing the registration program because of their fear of becoming combat casualties in a war that they did not wish to

87 Kurashige, Japanese American Celebration and Conflict, 6, 9, 91.
participate.  

Eric L. Muller has found that after a half century since the conclusion of the war many old JACLers have continued to express their suspicion of draft resisters. Some Nisei critics of resistance, according to Muller, continue to believe that any attempt to interfere with draft was an act of “laziness” and “cowardice.”

As Alice Kessler-Harris has argued, gender has played a crucial role in articulating the idea of nation by “mediating the imagination, periodically refiguring the assumptions, constraints, imagery, and expectations.” Such “gendered limits of social citizenship,” to borrow Kessler-Harris’ terms, were undoubtedly at work in the JACL-WRA articulation of Nisei loyalty. In this context, the heroic Nisei men of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, the famed all-Nisei unit during World War II, earned back the right of citizenship for the rest of Japanese Americans. The 442nd was so widely praised for its combat records that the 100th Congress named a 1987 resolution “H.R. 442,” the provision for redress and reparations for the wartime internment, in honor of the Nisei unit. On the other hand, the militancy of those classified by the WRA as “unassimilated” Kibei, such as Tule Lake’s George Kuratomi, denied them of a WRA recognized national

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88 Embree, “Registration at Central Utah,” 5.
91 Kessler-Harris, “In the Nation’s Image,” 1251.
identity, as the agency interpreted their behaviors as the result of bad transnational adjustments and a false sense of nationhood.

The WRA’s implicitly class-specific rearticulation of Kibei’s identity as “new immigrants” also demanded social mobility and assimilation of individual Kibei regardless of the differences in their social, economic, and educational backgrounds. The WRA and the JACLers promoted middle-class and entrepreneurial Nisei as Americanized models, and thus undermined diverse economic and occupational background and transnational class formation of Kibei. Unlike the WRA’s new definition of good Kibei, Karl Yoneda, who was deeply influenced by the international labor movement, was neither a self-made businessman nor a socioeconomic misfit. Moreover, the WRA’s new interpretation of Kibei transnational experience underestimated the potency of Yoneda’s transnational education which influenced his expression of nationalism and “loyalty.” As Ian Tyrrell suggests, “international ideologies” of individual actors are useful for “contextualizing nationalism.”93 Yoneda’s transnational education was a significant factor which influenced his commitment to fighting the Axis powers and allying with the JACLers. His exposure to radical, anarchist, and socialist literature in Japan made him a staunch denouncer of “fascism” in Japan.94 Thus, while the WRA-JACL rearticulation of Kibei’s Americanization took into account Kibei’s experience as migrants, it deliberately distorted the

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nature of their transnational experiences. The WRA-JACL campaign to promote the image of loyal Nisei during WWII cast most Kibei as outsiders without publicly acknowledging the complexity of their transnational experiences and identities. While CAS analyst Marvin Opler recognized this in his report, Myer and his agency never affirmed to the public the diverse range of Kibei responses to the wartime internment.

Tule Lake: A Transnational Site

While war veteran Thomas Higa emerged as a poster child for the WRA’s successful Kibei stories, the Kibei at Tule Lake remained voiceless. The WRA researchers’ formulation of Kibei as “immigrants” made the Tule Lake Kibei indistinguishable from the Issei, who were permanently excluded from the American citizenry. At times, even the Tule Lake Nisei who had never seen Japan were seen as no different than the quiet, unobtrusive Kibei. On May 24, 1944, a bachelor Nisei truck driver named Shiochi James Okamoto returned to the camp from his assigned farm work. An Army sentry stopped Okamoto to search him, took him to the rear of the truck, and shot him. Okamoto was taken to the camp hospital and died. He was survived by his mother and siblings at Tule Lake. The rest of his family and relatives were at the Heart Mountain Relocation Center in Wyoming. A native of Garden City, California, Okamoto had never left the United States.95

95 War Relocation Authority, “A Confidential Report of the Community Analysis Section, May 27, 1944,” Austin Papers, Box 44, Folder 2, JARP.
According to a Community Analysis Section report, several rumors circulated within the camp about the details of what took place that afternoon. One of the widely-told rumors described Okamoto as a Kibei bachelor. Based on this story, Okamoto had returned to the camp on his truck after a trip to a coal mine. The white sentry allegedly said a few words to Okamoto, who, according to the rumor had lived in Japan since his childhood and did not possess even the basic English conversational skills. Unable to understand the guard’s command, Okamoto allegedly smiled and proceeded to enter the camp compound when the guard stopped him, uttered insulting words at the drive, and shot him to death.96

This story thus added to the CAS report’s formation of Kibei as immigrants and perpetual outsiders. The CAS researchers’ formulation of Kibei’s assimilation rates failed to consider that the WRA Relocation Centers surrounded by barbed-wired fences could hardly qualify as an ideal place to conduct ethnographic research. The Okamoto story blurred cultural and generational differences among Issei, Nisei, and Kibei by depicting the victim as essentially a Japanese man indistinguishable to a white soldier.

However, many Kibei at Tule Lake had a different way of articulating their complex transnational identity. The segregation had convinced many segregants that they had no future in the United States; that the condition that forced them to choose Japan had little to do with the question of their loyalty, assimilation, or their failure to cultivate Americanism upon their

96 Ibid.
return from Japan. A young Kibei contributor to the Young Men’s and Women’s Association’s Japanese-language magazine Doto (”surging waves”) regarded segregation as a policy had permanently stripped their identity as Americans. The writer argued that the situation presented all Tuleans, regardless of their citizenship or place of birth, the need to claim themselves as “Japanese” lest they become stateless individuals, both legally and culturally. In this way, segregation forced Tuleans to live in borderlands; and for many Kibei segregants, Tule Lake truly defined them as transnational individuals.

Chapter 5
The War and Its Aftermath:
Japanese Americans in the Pacific Theater and the Question of Loyalty

The war in the Pacific that commenced upon the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 cut off virtually all commercial and diplomatic channels between Japan and the United States. The civilians in Japan whose family members were “trapped” in the Allied nations turned to the Geneva-based International Committee of the Red Cross to deliver their letters to the “enemy nations.” In March 1943, 25,000 letters from all over Japan arrived at the Red Cross Headquarters in Tokyo to be translated and mailed to the United States, Canada, as well as other Allied nations and territories where more than half a million Japanese were interned as enemy aliens.1 Translating and sorting out these correspondences in the Red Cross office were thirty young Nisei residents in Tokyo who volunteered to render their assistance in a moment of great uncertainty. Many of these Nisei, too, had no way of learning the fate of their families and friends in the United States, except through the help of the Red Cross.2

While more than 110,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans in the United States endured mass incarceration in the WRA camps, the war also

1 Asahi Shimbun, March 17, 1943; The Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs determined that at the outbreak of the Pacific War, the number of Japanese nationals residing in the Allied nations and territories were 570,000: Kiyomoto Ishido, Gaiji Keisatsu Gaikyo: Kyokuhi volume 8 (Tokyo, Ryukei Shosha, 1980), 163-168.
2 Asahi Shimbun, March 17, 1943.
had a significant impact on thousands of Japanese Americans who were stranded in Japan. The Nisei in Japan did what they could to endure wartime hardships—firebombing, starvation, and the fear of living in Japan as U.S. citizens. As the battles in Asia-Pacific dragged on, the Japanese government drafted an increasing number of Japanese American men to serve in the military especially during the final phase of the Pacific War in 1944 and 1945. Those Nisei soldiers and sailors in the imperial armed forces who returned to Japan alive after the war learned that their U.S. citizenship had been stripped as a result of their service to the Japanese Emperor. The war also brought 6,000 Nisei linguists in the U.S. Armed Forces to the Pacific. Many of these Japanese American soldiers in the U.S. Military Intelligence Service (MIS) played an integral role in the major U.S. military operations in all corners of the Pacific Theater, from the Philippines to China to the islands on Central Pacific to Okinawa.

More than six decades after the conclusion of World War II, the diverse stories of Japanese Americans in the Pacific Theater remain largely unexplored. The stories of the Nisei survivors of the Second World War in Japan have received little scholarly attention in the United States. These Nisei in the former Japanese colonial world in Asia-Pacific have been at the margins of Japanese American history, as the scholarship in the United States has focused on the implications of the mass wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans and the question of Nisei loyalty to the United States.
However, to Japanese Americans in the Pacific, the war made the issues of citizenship and loyalty ever complicated and elusive. Although Nisei in Japan as a group were never treated as “enemy aliens,” they nevertheless faced a mounting pressure to demonstrate their support for the Japanese war effort against their country of birth. For instance, despite their “racial” and cultural ties to Japan, the Japanese press scrutinized the national allegiance of Nisei residents in Japan because of their U.S. citizenship. Under this pressure, some Japanese Americans in Japan served the Japanese war effort by working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Intelligence Bureau. Although the role of the few Japanese Americans in the Japanese intelligence war remains an underdeveloped topic, it nevertheless has generated debates in Japan about whether the Japanese government had systematically trained Nisei as spies.

Examination of the Japanese Americans in the Pacific Theater during World War II illuminates an important gendered dimension of loyalty and citizenship. For many Nisei male dual citizens who were stranded in Japan during the war, the Japanese government’s claim of their citizenship forced them to take arms against the United States against their will. These Nisei’s military service under duress cost them their American citizenship and permanently excluded them from the dominant public narrative of Japanese American loyalty and Americanism.
The Question of Loyalty and Nisei in Japan during the Pacific War: Spies, Collaborators, or Innocent Helpers?

Less than two weeks before Pearl Harbor, the first graduating class of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s all-Nisei school Heishikan had little trouble securing employment as press attaché at various colonial posts. Three Nisei graduates were hired by the government-run Domei News Agency. Bill Ishikawa, a Hawaiian Nisei, started his post at the Japanese Consulate General in Nanjing, China. Another Heishikan graduate, Kazumaro Uyeno, departed for Manchukuo to work for the Central Broadcasting Station in Changchun. The majority of the graduating class remained in Tokyo and worked for the Foreign Ministry’s Broadcasting Section, managed by the Ministry’s Intelligence Bureau. These seven Nisei Heishikan graduates’ primary task was to monitor shortwave English radio broadcasts from Allied countries. When the war suspended Japan’s diplomatic channels with the Allied Powers and isolated the Japanese sphere of influence from the rest of the world, the Intelligence Bureau relied on overseas radio programs to gather latest information about the political developments in the United States and the British Empire.

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3 “Heishikan Kiroku,” Heishikan News, June 5, 1942. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has reorganized the Intelligence Bureau (Johokyoku) after WWII and renamed it the “Intelligence and Analysis Service” (Kokusai Joho Tokatsukan); http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/sosiki/koku_j.html.

By late 1945, the Broadcasting Section’s “Radio Room” employed about fifty monitors. These monitors included Nisei journalists who worked for Japanese press outlets, such as the Tokyo-based Japan Times, and Heishikan students who took classes during the day and took night shifts in the “Radio Room.” Despite the important role these Nisei monitors played in gathering information for the Japanese Foreign Ministry during the Pacific War, little has been written about their experiences in the Broadcasting Section. In Japan, the Sections’ former Japanese staff Ikeda Norizane detailed the activities in the “Radio Room” for the first time in 1979. Thereafter, a few sporadic and speculative accounts alleged that the Japanese Foreign Ministry had used Heishikan to train Japanese Americans as intelligence agents. More recent research by Kumei Teruko, as well as the testimonies of the former Nisei Heishikan students and “Radio Room” monitors, however, have rejected any allegation against the Nisei’s wartime service in the Japanese Foreign Ministry as espionage work. Moreover, the former monitors have maintained that their employment by the Foreign Ministry should not be considered an act of disloyalty against the United States.

The role of Nisei monitors in the Broadcasting Section remains largely unknown to the public at large. This is a stark contrast to the sensationalized

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5 Kumei, “Yujo to Yoko wo Musunde,” 5; Ikeda, Hinomaru Awa, 10-11.
story of Iva Tokugi. Toguri was a Japanese American who appeared in the wartime Japanese propaganda radio broadcast “Zero Hour” and was notoriously dubbed “Tokyo Rose,” a moniker that actually had been coined by Allied troops listening to Japanese radio broadcasts before Toguri’s appearance. Los Angeles-native Toguri went to Japan in July 1941 to visit her relatives only to be stranded in Tokyo when the Pacific War broke out in December 1942. She was working as a typist for Radio Tokyo when Charles Cousens, the Australian prisoner of war placed in charge of “Zero Hour,” recruited her in November 1943 to host the show. Cousens had gotten to know Toguri while he was an inmate at a Tokyo POW camp. Toguri had helped Cousens and other Allied inmates by smuggling food into the prison. Cousens was impressed by her outgoing personality and impeccable American English accent. Toguri initially refused to work on the radio program, but agreed to join the Zero Hour team when Cousens promised that she would not have to make anti-American comments on the show. Although Toguri’s role during “Zero Hour” broadcasts was limited largely to announcing music and telling funny stories under the nickname “Orphan Ann,” the American media and government after the war accused her of betraying her country. Despite the fact that she was one of more than dozen female propaganda broadcasters—all Japanese citizens except Toguri—over the wartime Japanese radio, Toguri’s American citizenship made her appearance on “Zero Hour” an act of treason against the United States. Largely swayed by the public hysteria surrounding “Tokyo Rose,” the U.S.
government convicted Toguri of treason, stripped her U.S. citizenship, and sentenced her to ten years in prison.⁹

Numerous news reports and studies since have restored Toguri’s honor by exposing the fallacy of the “Tokyo Rose” legend that had made Toguri wrongfully accused of performing propaganda work for the Japanese government.¹⁰ These works have revealed that the treason case had scapegoated Toguri, whom the media had established as the voice representing all wartime English-language propaganda radio announcers in Japan, and essentially handled her case as a trial against the mythical character of “Tokyo Rose” rather than against Iva Toguri’s actual deeds. Ironically, it was her decision to keep her American citizenship during the war that allowed the U.S. government to try her for treason. Despite the pressure from her superiors in the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Intelligence Bureau to renounce her American nationality as a measure to prevent potential future repercussions, she was adamantly loyal to her citizenship by birth.¹¹

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¹⁰ On March 22, 1976, the *Chicago Tribune* published the first report by its Tokyo correspondent Ronald Yates, who discovered that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had forced the key witnesses to fabricate their testimonies alleging Toguri’s propaganda work for the Japanese government during WWII. See *Chicago Tribune*, March 22, 1976; Russell Warren Howe, *The Hunt for “Tokyo Rose”* (New York, Madison Books), 304-306.

Unlike Toguri, the former Heishikan students and “Radio Room” monitors faced virtually no public allegation in the immediate postwar years against their wartime involvement with the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s intelligence work. A few published sources, testimonies of former Nisei “Radio Room” employees, and a U.S. government investigation suggest that the role of Nisei monitors was too limited to warrant any evidence that would incriminate them as spies. Also, Heishikan’s curriculum included no special training that would have qualified its students as intelligence agents. During the war, Heishikan remained open to educate Nisei in Japanese language, culture, and law. These classes were continuously taught in English and the cultural excursion programs also continued during the war.

In general, Heishikan’s Nisei students, who had become strandees in Japan after Pearl Harbor, saw the school as a haven that enabled their survival. They lived in the school’s dormitory in Nakano Ward in the outskirts of Tokyo and continued to receive stipends. Fumiko Tabata, a Nisei strandee in Japan who enrolled at Heishikan after Pearl Harbor, thought it “remarkable” that classes were held in English, the “language of the enemy” that had been banned elsewhere in Japan.\(^{12}\) When the Foreign Ministry called upon Nisei Heishikan students to work in the Broadcasting Section as radio

\(^{12}\) Heishikan Newsletter, November 2006.
monitors, they considered it an obligation to render their service to their benefactor.\textsuperscript{13}

No longer able to invite students in the U.S. to apply, Heishikan recruited new students among young Nisei stranded in Japan after December 1941. Masao Ekimoto, a Nisei college student in Tokyo who was running out of money, applied for the Heishikan scholarship and was admitted to the school in December 1942 and immediately started working in the “Radio Room.”\textsuperscript{14} Ekimoto’s experience illuminates how the war between the U.S. and Japan complicated the issue of citizenship and loyalty for the Nisei Heishikan students. A former dual citizen, Ekimoto had renounced his Japanese citizenship before relocating to Japan in 1940 and thus had no obligation to serve in the Japanese military. After Pearl Harbor, however, he felt uncertain about what his legal status as a citizen of the enemy nation might do to his chance of sitting out the war in Japan. When he secured admission at Heishikan, however, he could feel safe as a student at a government-run institution for foreign nationals of Japanese ancestry.\textsuperscript{15} This circumstance provided him and other Heishikan students with little room to consider their service to the Foreign Ministry’s Intelligence Bureau during the war as a breach of their loyalty to the United States. For Susumu Saiki, a Stockton, California native who graduated from high school in Hiroshima and moved to Tokyo in August 1943, the education at Heishikan offered him

\textsuperscript{13} Heishikan News, June 1942-1944; Masao Ekimoto, telephone interview with author, August 23, 2011; Heishikan Newsletter, November 2006.
\textsuperscript{14} Heishikan News, August 10, 1941; Masao Ekimoto, telephone interview with author, August 23, 2011.
\textsuperscript{15} Masao Ekimoto, telephone interview with author, August 23, 2011.
the opportunity to brush up on his English. While his family in the United States spent the war years behind the barbed wire, being stranded in Japan actually allowed Saiki the luxury of continuing his education. Nori Hideo from Wapato, Washington, who joined Heishikan in April 1944, worked as a “Radio Room” monitor and transcribed “Voice of America” broadcasts after taking classes during the day. When he visited a friend’s home in a rural town in Fukuoka during the summer break, he was stunned to find that almost all of the men from the village had been conscripted into the military. His enrollment at Heishikan and service to the Foreign Ministry thus had allowed him to avoid the possibility of being drafted and taking arms against his country birth.

Hide and other Nisei monitors in the Broadcasting Section were busy taking rotating shifts while juggling their studies or jobs. Those Nisei monitors on the night shifts walked or hitchhiked to the “Radio Room” in the remote rural section in western Tokyo after air raids had destroyed railways. Veteran insider of the Japanese intelligence community Ikeda Norizane has left an account of the Nisei monitors’ activities at the Broadcasting Section. A Tokyo-native who had studied in Britain, Ikeda was a member of the Japanese diplomatic mission in Australia when the Pacific War broke out in December 1941. His boss, the Japanese First Minister in Melbourne at the time, was none other than Kawai Tatsuo, the founding

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17 Masao Ekimoto, telephone interview with author, August 23, 2011.
father of Heishikan.\textsuperscript{18} Upon repatriation to Japan in October 1942, Ikeda was transferred to the Broadcasting Section to work with fifty monitors, including more than forty Nisei.\textsuperscript{19}

The Broadcasting Section’s “Radio Room” operated twenty four hours a day and dispatched Nisei monitors on designated shifts to intercept Allied broadcast programs, such Voice of America, Radio Australia, All India Radio, and BBC News. Ikeda observed that among the fifty monitors working in the “Radio Room,” the Heishikan students stood out as the most productive group. Some of them aptly applied their Heishikan training in stenography to transcribing live broadcasts, while others used typewriters, until the Broadcasting Section obtained recording devices in 1945. Based on the information compiled from the notes taken by the monitors, the Broadcasting Section put together a sixty-page daily report called the “Shortwave News,” copies of which were delivered to the Cabinet ministries and military branches.\textsuperscript{20} Clearly, Nisei graduates and students at Heishikan played a significant role in the Intelligence Bureau during the Pacific War. The “Radio Room” operation served the Japanese government as one of the critical methods of gathering international news from the outside the Japanese sphere of influence, which was virtually isolated from the rest of the world.

\textsuperscript{18} Ikeda, Hinomaru Awa, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{19} The Japanese government and the governments of the British Dominions, including Australia, agreed to exchange all members of diplomatic missions in the autumn of 1942. Yuriko Nagata, Unwanted Aliens: Japanese Internment in Australia (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1996), 96.
\textsuperscript{20} Ikeda, Hinomaru Awa, 11-13.
The role of Japanese Americans in the wartime intelligence works at the Japanese Foreign Ministry became the basis for the assertion made by some postwar critics of Heishikan that Kawai’s brainchild essentially had been a spy school. In an article published in a monthly news magazine in 1997, Shimojima Tetsuro accused the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the wartime “crime” of using young second-generation Japanese Americans for espionage. Based primarily on Shimojima’s interview with former Heishikan student George Ogishima, the article claimed that the young Nisei students at Heishikan had been deceived and manipulated by the Intelligence Bureau officials to serve the Japanese war efforts.\(^{21}\) Ten years after the war, a former student under the pseudonym of Ikuro Hiroda, who claimed that he had been born in Great Britain and studied at Heishikan, recalled that the school had been nothing but a “modern” training facility for spies.\(^{22}\)

However, most of the Heishikan graduates after the war have dismissed the allegation that monitoring shortwave broadcasts had qualified them as Japanese spies. They also rejected the idea that Heishikan had trained them to conduct espionage and contribute to the Japanese war effort against the United States. More than fifteen years after the closure of the school in 1945, the alumni stood firm in their belief in the bridge-building ideal of Heishikan’s mission:


The purpose of Heishikan, at the time of its establishment, was to have the students train themselves well, to enter society, and, in the end, to stand between Japan and the United States and...to erect a shining, golden bridge across the Pacific Ocean, a bridge over which the traffic will be not one-way but in both directions.  

Masao Ekimoto, a member of the school’s second class, told his fellow alumni during a reunion luncheon in 2006 that Shimojima’s accusation against Heishikan was a “regrettable case” stemming from ignorance and misunderstanding. Ekimoto argued that because the school had been founded by the Foreign Ministry’s Intelligence Bureau on the eve of the Pacific War and the Nisei graduates did work for the Bureau’s Broadcasting Section, it was easy for the critics like Shimojima to conclude that the Japanese government had established the school as a spy-training facility. Heishikan, Ekimoto reminisced, was “truly a warm...‘home away from home’ in a strange land during a difficult period.”

In fact, Ekimoto and other Heishikan students even saw their work in the “Radio Room” as a way to fulfill the bridge-building purpose of their education. They hoped that the work of monitoring radio programs from the Allied nations during the war would somehow help ameliorate the U.S.-Japan relations by providing the Japanese Foreign Ministry with accurate information from home. Norio Hide wrote to his fellow alumni in November

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23 Heishikan Folio, November 1960, 6.
24 Heishikan Newsletter, November 2006.
2006 to stress that his education at Heishikan during the war had strengthened his “international understanding” through his service to both Japan and the United States. Hide believed that the “spirit of Heishikan” and the knowledge of Japan he had gained from the school had allowed him to build a career in the U.S. Department of Defense after the war and enabled him to serve effectively as a liaison between the U.S. and Japanese forces for forty-seven years.25

The role of the Nisei in the Intelligence Bureau during the Pacific War remains a controversial topic, but a few factors suggest that the claim about the Nisei monitors as trained spies indeed could have been exaggerated. While the Nisei monitors dispatched to the “Radio Room” took on the rigorous task of spending many hours carefully listening to shortwave broadcasts, the extent of their service was strictly limited to transcribing the broadcasts. It was never their job to translate or analyze the transcripts. Instead, Kabayama Sukehide, the head of the Broadcasting Section, led a team of Japanese analysts consisting of Ikeda and Maki Hideji, who was the liaison between the “Radio Room” and the Foreign Ministry’s Intelligence Bureau Headquarters. Each morning these three men analyzed transcripts prepared by the Nisei monitors.26 Maki delivered copies of the “Shortwave News” and other relevant reports to the Intelligence Bureau supervisors.27

25 Ibid.
26 Ikeda, Hinomaru Awa, 13.
27 Kumei, “Yujo to Yuko wo Musunde, 5.
The Nisei monitors were effectively excluded from the task of summarizing and interpreting the gathered information.

Although the Nisei monitors proved to be valuable assets to the “Radio Room” operation, the three Japanese staff of the Broadcasting Section did not hold a high regard for the young Nisei’s qualification as analysts. To Kabayama, Ikeda, and Maki, even the young Nisei monitors who had gone into the field of journalism in Japan lacked the experience necessary for analyzing the intercepted news. Despite limiting the role of Japanese Americans in the “Radio Room” strictly as monitors, the Japanese supervisors trusted the Nisei enough to dispatch Heishikan-graduated George Ogishima and other monitors abroad in 1945 to procure recording devices unavailable in Japan.28

The Broadcasting Section enlisted one Nisei journalist, Tamotsu Murayama, however, to provide critical editorial assistance to the “Shortwave News” project.29 A seasoned journalist working for the Tokyo-based Japan Times, Murayama was already well into his thirties when the Pacific War broke out in December 1941. Born in Seattle in 1905, Murayama received middle school education in Nagano Prefecture, returned to the U.S. to join his mother in San Francisco, then began his career in journalism at the San Francisco Chronicle. After brief stints at the Alliance News Agency and the Associated Press, Murayama relocated again to Japan to work for Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) before joining the

29 Ikeda, Hinomaru Awa, 13
Japan Times. Murayama’s extensive experience working for both American and Japanese media outlets made him stand out among Nisei journalists in Japan and also made him an ideal collaborator to the wartime intelligence work.\textsuperscript{30}

Perhaps a more decisive reason for Murayama’s acceptance into the inner-circles of the Japanese intelligence community was his proven loyalty to the Japanese cause since the early days of the Pacific War. Murayama wrote a number of columns urging Nisei in Japan to show their support for Japan’s war against the United States. In summer 1942, Murayama called upon Nisei in Japan to “return to a consciousness of their race” and aid Japan’s “struggle of the Greater East Asia War.”\textsuperscript{31} He deftly adopted the “pioneer” narrative of Japanese emigrants to the United States to depict the Nisei in Japan as a new immigrant community making inroads in helping to build a Japanese empire in Asia-Pacific. He was confident that the Nisei in Japan would “live up to the spirit of the pioneers” and render their complete cooperation to “the Japanese government for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

In an article published in Kaigai no Nippon (“Japan Overseas”) in July 1942, his articulation of Japanese American patriotism went even further. Murayama claimed that Japanese Americans in Japan were ready to perform the duties of Japanese citizenship. Through his emphasis on Nisei migrants’

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Tamotsu Murayama, “Dai Nisei to Nichibei Senso,” Kaigai no Nippon 16:7 (August 1942), 10.
cultural and racial ties to Japan, Murayama articulated the role of Japanese Americans as ideal leaders of the expanding Japanese empire. As sons and daughters of the pioneer Japanese emigrants, he articulated, Nisei possessed the “great perseverance and spirit of sacrifice necessary for the construction of Greater East Asia.”

Regardless of how sincere Murayama’s patriotism really was, his passionate articulation of loyalty to Japan secured his position as an influential journalist during the Pacific War. Murayama’s case offers an opportunity to explore how complex and salient the issue of loyalty— to the Japanese government—was to thousands of Japanese American strandees in wartime Japan. As soon as Japan’s war with the United States commenced in December 1941, the Japanese press began to scrutinize Nisei’s nationalism. Influential Japanese journalist Tomomatsu Toshio admonished Japanese Americans to abandon any lingering allegiance to their American citizenship: “Wise Nisei have probably recognized that the land of their birth is but a false and base foreign country.” He told Nisei in his 1942 essay that “their birth certificate is only a scrap of paper.” Propaganda writers in Japan even wrote pieces that demanded Japanese Americans behind barbed wires in the U.S. internment camps to cultivate a pro-Japanese consciousness. When reports from the U.S. about Nisei’s induction into the U.S. Armed Forces and the creation of the 100th Infantry Battalion reached Japan in 1942,

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Kanda Yoshi claimed that “good” Nisei would never dream of fighting against their parents’ homeland. Government official Kawamura Masaehei was confident that at least the good Nisei whom he had personally known would rather commit suicide if asked to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{34}

Murayama was not the only Japanese American in wartime Japan that enthusiastically professed allegiance to the Japanese government. Noboru “Fred” Miike echoed the sentiment of Japanese writers who believed that all Nisei’s racial and cultural consciousness should compel them to proclaim their loyalty to Japan. Miike joined the Japanese wartime propaganda effort critical of racial discrimination in the U.S. and reiterated the notion of the Pacific War as Japan’s anti-imperial quest to liberate racial minorities in the U.S. territories. No reasonable “person of any color skin—white, black, yellow, red, brown—would want to fight for a country that does not grant him equality,” claimed the Hawaii-born Nisei in 1942.\textsuperscript{35}

While many Japanese Americans in the American internment camps faced a dire situation that compelled them to prove their loyalty to the U.S. government, pressure was also on Nisei in Japan to demonstrate their allegiance to the Japanese government. There were signs that Japanese policymakers and political commentators were suspicious of Japanese American residents’ ability to become loyal Japanese citizens. For instance, policy analyst Nakase Setsuo in early 1942 was far from convinced that Nisei

\textsuperscript{34} Stephan, \textit{Hawaii Under the Rising Sun}, 163.
could readily abandon their “American life-styles.” As the war dragged on, another analyst Murakami Tsugio was extremely doubtful of Nisei’s ability to emerge as pioneering leaders in an expanded “Co-prosperity Sphere.” Murakami went so far as to claim that Nisei’s “American character” disqualified them from becoming productive Japanese citizens “however much they are made to know about their ancestral land’s divinity and however much is cultivated in them the spirit of sincerity.”

Although none of these Japanese thinkers held a radically negative view of the Japanese Americans in Japan or branded them as “enemy aliens,” their cautious distrust of the Nisei residents was enough to alarm Murayama. In his wartime writings in Japan, Murayama persistently urged Japanese readers to recognize Nisei as the legitimate heirs to the “vanguard of the Japanese race” and as “loyal citizens and soldiers.” In Kaigai no Nippon, he implored the readers to remember that the Nisei in Japan were children of “pioneer” emigrants who were enduring “the inhuman treatment” in the form of mass incarceration in the United States. Although “Japan had been so unkind and heartless” in her suspicion of Nisei’s loyalty to Japan, Murayama announced that the Japanese Americans in Japan were determined to dedicate themselves to the “victory of [Japanese] Imperial forces.”

38 Stephan, Hawaii Under the Rising Sun, 165.
Murayama’s patriotic language showed striking resemblance to the language of unquestioned loyalty to the American government expressed by JACL-oriented Nisei like Mike M. Masaoka in the United States during and after World War II. As a matter of fact, it was not a secret that Maruyama held a high regard for Masaoka since the two men first encountered each other in 1936 in Masaoka’s hometown of Salt Lake City. Masaoka, then a young University of Utah student, impressed Murayama with exceptional public debate skills at a meeting to establish a JACL chapter in Utah. During World War II, Masaoka emerged as an articulate spokesman for the Japanese American community in the U.S., championing the notion of Nisei’s unquestioned American patriotism and shaping the image of a loyal Japanese American. Similarly, Murayama in wartime Japan spoke on behalf of Japanese American residents in Japan, depicting them as loyal and patriotic members of the Japanese empire. Murayama’s emphasis on unconditional Nisei loyalty, cooperation, and sacrifice during the war almost sounded like a Japanese version of Masaoka’s “allegiance through active participation in the war effort,” although Masaoka certainly would not have approved of Murayama’s allegiance to the Japanese government.

Murayama remained in Japan and continued working for the Japan Times after the war, but his career as a propagandist was over as soon as

40 See Chapter Three for examples of Nisei loyalty to the U.S. government during WWII.
42 Mike M. Masaoka, a memorandum to “national board members, national council members, active and associated members, sponsors, friends, and supports of the national JACL,” April 22, 1944, JACL records, Box 301, Folder Mike M. Masaoka, Japanese American Research Project, University of California, Los Angeles.
Japan lost the war in August 1945. He quickly shed his identity as a pro-Japan writer and established a new career as a philanthropist and administrator that allowed him to work closely with Americans. Murayama became known for his dedication to building the Boy Scouts Federation of Japan during the three decades after the war.\textsuperscript{43} He died in 1968 at the age of sixty-three on his trip to Hong Kong for an international Boy Scouts conference.\textsuperscript{44} His wartime activities as a propaganda writer have remained long forgotten in Japan and the United States.

Murayama’s passionate expression of loyalty to Japan and his cooperation with the Japanese intelligence work during WWII did not seem to affect his relationship with Bill Hosokawa, an influential JACL historian. Like Mike M. Masaoka, Hosokawa was instrumental in shaping the postwar public narrative of Japanese American loyalty to the U.S. government and hundred-percent Americanism.\textsuperscript{45} Murayama and Hosokawa had become acquainted with each other before the Pacific War when the former had worked as a journalist in San Francisco. Despite Murayama’s pro-Japan sentiment during the war, no animosity existed between the two men in the summer of 1960 when Murayama visited Hosokawa in Denver as the leader of the Japanese delegation to an international Boy Scouts jamboree in

\textsuperscript{43} William Hillcourt, “Scouting in Japan,” \textit{Boy’s Life}, November 1969; After the war Murayama also contributed to the California-based \textit{Pacific Citizen}, such as a 1955 article on Japanese “war brides”: Tamotsu Murayama, “20,000 War Brides in America,” \textit{Pacific Citizen}, February 12, 1955.

\textsuperscript{44} Fuji Scouts Club of Japan, \textit{Murayama Tamotsu to Boy Skauto: Murayama Tamotsu “Tanjo 100 Shunen” Kinen} (pamphlet), Saitama, Japan, February 22, 2006.

\textsuperscript{45} Bill Hosokawa, \textit{Nisei: The Quiet Americans; The Story of a People} (New York: William Morrow, 1969). See also Chapter Three.
Colorado. Hosokawa helped Murayama meet Denver mayor Dick Batterton, who agreed to establish a sister-city relationship between Denver and Takayama, a small mountainous city in central Japan.\[^{46}\] Perhaps Hosokawa understood that like the Japanese Americans in the U.S., Murayama and other Nisei in wartime Japan had faced a situation in which they needed to take extreme measures to claim their loyalty.

Hosokawa also could have been aware that even American intelligence experts did not view young Nisei’s wartime activities in the Japanese Intelligence Bureau as spy work. A 1949 State Department report from the U.S. Political Advisor in Kobe dismissed the idea of Heishikan as a training facility for spies. The school, according to the report, had been decidedly “liberal” and non-militaristic in its pedagogical approach. The report claimed that the Heishikan curriculum, which included history, politics, law, classics, and calligraphy, resembled that of any standard diplomatic training course, including an American version.\[^{47}\]

The report signified that the U.S. government did not consider the wartime employment of young Nisei by various Japanese press outlets as well as the Japanese Foreign Ministry as evidence of their service to the Japanese Emperor. According to the 1940 U.S. Nationality Act, “performing the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a


foreign state” could become a basis for one’s loss of his or her U.S. citizenship.48 This provision did not apply to the Japanese American monitors in the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Intelligence Bureau. Several former Nisei Heishikan graduates and Broadcasting Section monitors had little trouble obtaining American passports soon after the war’s end and returned to the United States.49 Susumu Saiki, a member of Heishikan’s third class and former Broadcasting Section monitor, remained in Japan after the war to continue his education at Meiji University. He returned to California in 1958 facing no legal obstacle against the proof of his loyalty to the U.S. and resettled in San Francisco. Saiki was appalled by the postwar Japanese articles alleging that the Heishikan students’ employment as a shortwave broadcast monitor for the Foreign Ministry could have been a sign of treason against the United States.50

Nisei Draftees in the Imperial Armed Forces and the Question of Loyalty

While the former Heishikan students and Japanese American civilian monitors in the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Broadcasting Section had little trouble retaining their U.S. citizenship, the same could not be said about the Nisei men who were conscripted into the Japanese military during the Pacific War. After the war, the U.S. government strictly enforced the provisions in Section 401 of the 1940 Nationality Act. According to this law, the Japanese

Americans who served in the Japanese armed forces during the war had “serv[ed] in, the armed forces of a foreign state” without authorization of the U.S. government and committed the treasonous act of “bearing arms against the United States.”

Because the Japanese military records do not specify whether or not their servicemen during WWII held foreign citizenship, it is difficult to ascertain the number of Nisei who were forced to fight against the Allied Forces during World War II. Nisei male dual citizens of the military age in Japan could have numbered more than a couple thousand, but only a handful accounts of former Japanese American servicemen in the Japanese armed forces emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century. Kay Tateishi, a Heishikan graduate who avoided conscription by working for Domei News Agency during the war, suggested that almost all of the military-age Nisei male dual citizens in Japan served in the imperial armed forces against their will during World War II. Many of the Nisei men like Tateishi who did not serve in the military had acquaintances who entered the

51 76th Congress, H.R. 9980.
52 Although Kadoike Hiroshi has speculated that between 20,000-30,000 Nisei served on various battlefronts in Asia-Pacific from 1942 to 1945, this figure is not based on any military or government record: Kadoike Hiroshi, *Nihongun Heishi ni natta Amerikajin tachi: Bokoku to Tatakatta Nikkei Nisei* (Tokyo: Genshu Shuppansha, 2010), 34-35; Kadoike Hiroshi, interviewed by author, Osaka, Japan, August 10, 2010.
army or navy during the war. Shigeo Yamada, a Nisei officer in the Japanese navy during the last two years of the war, remembered to visit his friends, including Ekimoto, whenever he was on leave. One of Ekimoto’s fondest wartime memories was seeing his friend return to Tokyo alive and spending a few days together in the city constantly under firebombing.\(^{55}\)

Yamada, who grew up on a potato farm in Idaho, moved to Japan in 1939 after graduating from high school to enroll in a Japanese emersion program at Nichibei Gakuin and later at Keio University. Although university students were initially exempted from military service, the Japanese government reversed this policy and started to conscript young men out of colleges in December 1943, when the Japanese battlefield casualty rate was reaching a staggering twenty percent.\(^{56}\) Yamada left Tokyo in the fall of 1944 to start training in the navy signal corps, where he specialized in decoding enemy wireless transmissions. He was commissioned as an ensign on Christmas Day, and upon completion of his training, dispatched to the cruiser \textit{Yahagi}, which joined the Tenth Destroyer Squadron near Sumatra.\(^{57}\) Joining him on \textit{Yahagi} was another Nisei ensign Shigeaki Kuramoto, who had played football at Meiji University before joining the navy.\(^{58}\)

\(^{55}\) Masao Ekimoto, telephone interview with author, August 23, 2011.


\(^{57}\) Yamada, “An Idaho Potato Goes to Japan.”

On April 6, 1945, five days after the American invasion of Okinawa that signified the near complete victory of the Allied forces, Yahagi escorted the famed battleship *Yamato* into South China Sea in what would turn out to be the Japanese navy’s final desperate sortie. Yamada and Kuramoto’s main task was monitoring radio traffic between the Allied fleet and pilots and translate the transmissions simultaneously.\(^{59}\) The next day, hundreds of American planes joined the Allied submarines and destroyers in a one-sided battle that nearly wiped out the Japanese squadron. Yamada survived miraculously in spite of being an “Idaho potato” who didn’t know how to swim. He clung onto debris from the destroyed ships to stay afloat until a Japanese destroyer that had escaped the battle rescued him and other survivors. The fellow Nisei officer Kuramoto was not as fortunate, as he drowned with nearly three thousand Japanese sailors aboard the ships.\(^{60}\)

Peter Sano, who had moved to Japan in 1939 to enter into his uncle’s family registry in Yamanashi Prefecture as an adopted son, was another Nisei serviceman in the Japanese military.\(^{61}\) Sano had discarded his English name and went only by his Japanese given name Iwao. When he was drafted into the army and reported to the assembly center in Tokyo in March 1945, the possibility of dying on the battlefield abroad did not affect him much, as he looked forward to leaving the city ravaged by the air raids and food shortage. Sano and fifteen other draftees traveled through the Korean

\(^{59}\) Yamada, “An Idaho Potato Goes to Japan”; Ikeda, “Imperial Navy’s Final Sortie.”

\(^{60}\) Ibid.

\(^{61}\) See Chapter One.
Peninsula to join the 118th Regiment of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria to be trained as suicide bombers. Sano felt relieved that he was not assigned to a unit in South Pacific, where he would have been forced to fight against the American forces. Sano’s fear was that his own brother, Patrick, who had remained in California with his parents, could well have been drafted into the U.S. Army. For Sano, the prospect of becoming a human bomb felt less dreadful than the possibility of facing American troops on the battlefield.62

Sano served in the Kwantung Army when the Japanese military was desperately scraping through the final phase of the war. By the time Sano arrived in Manchuria, the 118th Regiment had shipped its artillery to the Pacific front, where the Allied forces were scoring decisive victories. With their arsenal virtually empty, Sano and other troops of the regiment went through the training as suicide bombers to carry remaining bombs and blow up themselves under Soviet tanks. By the time they prepared for the final showdown in August 1945, however, the war had come to an end and the regiment surrendered to the Soviet army. For Sano, the end of the war was the beginning of his three-year ordeal in the Soviet POW camp in Siberia. As a prisoner of war in Krasnoyarsk, he was forced to perform heavy labor that included coal mining and factory work producing tank tracks. What threatened the prisoners’ chance of survival, however, turned out to be hunger and the bitter cold. Sano was constantly preoccupied with securing

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food, but he also observed that the camp’s Russian employees were in the similar plight, as the war had devastated the Soviet Union. Sano was one of over 650,000 Japanese POWs detained in Soviet camps after WWII. While the majority of the three and a half million Japanese POWs surrendered to the American forces in the Pacific and China were repatriated to Japan in 1946, it took Sano and other POWs in Siberia another two years until they were allowed to return to Japan. In June 1948, Sano arrived at Maizuru in western Japan, one of the coastal cities designated as repatriation ports.

For Yamada, Sano, and other Nisei who served in the Japanese military and returned to Japan alive, their ability to speak English offered an opportunity to work for the Allied Occupation Forces in charge of governing Japan after the war. Despite these Nisei’s act of “disloyalty” to the United States during the war, the Occupation government embraced their service in the various Civil Staff Sections, as their language skills proved to be a valuable asset. After his discharge from the Japanese navy, Shigeo Yamada returned to Tokyo and worked for the Civilian Intelligence Section at the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). According to the report prepared by the SCAP, the Civil Intelligence Section operated as “a sort of F.B.I. for the Occupation.” Yamada’s background as a Japanese naval officer helped secure this

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63 Ibid.
employment in 1946. Yamada conducted security surveillance by analyzing the activities of “radically inclined” Japanese groups, such as organized labor and rightwing “militarist” organizations.\textsuperscript{66} After his return to Yamanashi Prefecture in June 1948, Peter Sano translated local newspapers at the Civil Information and Education Section of the Occupation office in Yamanashi. He transferred to the Section’s Tokyo office, where he met his future wife Minako Hirata, also a translator at the Civil Information and Education Section.\textsuperscript{67} Because their service in the Japanese armed forces had stripped their U.S. citizenship, both Yamada and Sano were employed by the SCAP as Japanese civilian staff.

Jim Yoshida, another former Nisei serviceman in the Japanese army, worked as a civilian employee for the British Commonwealth forces that occupied Mizuba in Yamaguchi Prefecture, procuring local workers for postwar rebuilding of infrastructure in the region. In his memoir, Yoshida emphasized that he had had no desire to fight for the Japanese military during World War II and was torn by the “helluva fix” in which he found himself. When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, he was eager to show his loyalty to the country of his birth. He volunteered to work as a civilian interpreter for the U.S. Army in Korea, where he spent more than six months in combat zones. Yoshida hoped that helping the American war efforts in Korea would boost his chance of recovering his U.S. citizenship, which he

had lost as a result of his service in the Japanese military against his will. It took Yoshida pains to regain his citizenship, as he navigated the bureaucratic red tape to obtain a special visa that allowed him to travel to Hawaii and file a civil suit against the U.S. government for taking his citizenship away. In 1953, Yoshida regained his citizenship and resettled in Hawaii.68

On the other hand, for Shigeo Yamada, the question of loyalty was not a simple matter of choosing sides. Like Yoshida, the thought of fighting in the war against the United States had deeply troubled Yamada’s conscience, and he obeyed the conscription order lest he be thrown into jail. Nevertheless, Yamada also accepted the military duty for the Japanese emperor as his service to the people “of the same blood.” Yoshida reflected that two years of education in Japan had “rather brainwashed” him to give his service to the Japanese navy. After the war, Yamada decided not to recover his U.S. citizenship. “I don’t consciously feel it’s right,” Yamada told Michael Hirsch of the Associated Press in 1990, “I did take arms against my country of birth.”69

When the war forced many Nisei men in Japan to fight against the United States against their will, the question of loyalty affected them in different ways. What they shared in common, however, was that however reluctant they were about serving in the military and taking arms against the

United States, the Nisei strandees had little choice but to fulfill their duty as Japanese citizens.

**Nisei Linguists in the Pacific and the Story of David Itami**

In June 1942, David Itami left Manzanar Relocation Center to work as a Japanese language instructor at the newly relocated U.S. Army Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) at Camp Savage, Minnesota. As noted by leading Nisei anti-Axis activists James Oda, some of the Nisei students at Camp Savage, who had volunteered to serve in the Military Intelligence Service out of their enthusiastic support for the U.S. war against the Axis Powers, did not fully trust Itami’s sincerity in helping the American cause. Oda, himself a Military Intelligence Service (MIS) volunteer and one of Itami’s most vocal critics, was shocked to learn in late 1942 of the former _Kashu Mainichi_ editor’s presence at Camp Savage as one of the school’s civilian instructors.70 Itami’s critics still had not forgotten his newspaper columns justifying Japan’s military aggression in Asia before Pearl Harbor. It was easy for them to assume that Itami had volunteered to teach Japanese at MISLS to pursue a comfortable life outside the internment camp rather than out of his patriotism. However, in an act that impressed even his worst critic, Itami quit his position as a language instructor at Camp Savage in 1943 to enlist in the U.S. Army. Itami’s decision to leave the comfort of the language

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classroom and fight against the Axis Powers moved Oda, who no longer doubted his former enemy’s loyalty to the United States.\footnote{Oda. Heroic Struggles of Japanese Americans, 119-122.}

Itami’s proficiency in the Japanese language placed him high on the list of linguists who would play a critical role in military intelligence during the Pacific War. He worked in the Army Intelligence in Washington D.C., intercepting and deciphering Japanese codes. He excelled at this task not only because of his ability to comprehend coded conversations, but also because of a remarkable coincidence that proved to be a critical factor that made him the most qualified man for the job. In 1944, the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan selected some of the most complex regional Japanese dialects to conduct their coded international communications so that these conversations would be almost incomprehensible for the Allied linguists trained in the standard Tokyo dialect. One of the dialects selected for this purpose was the southern Kagoshima dialect, which was extremely difficult even for native Japanese speakers outside the region to understand. What the Japanese officials could not have expected was that the U.S. Army Intelligence had David Itami, a Kibei who grew up in Kagoshima and had been educated in the region’s traditional classical studies since age five.\footnote{Shimamura Kyo, Jitsuroku Sanga Moyu (Tokyo: Yamanite Shuppan, 1983); Kinashi Kozo, Dave Akira Itami no Shōgai: Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban Hishi (Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 1985).}

One of the Japanese officials who managed communications during the war was Maki Hideji, one of the Broadcasting Section’s Japanese...
supervisors at the Foreign Ministry’s Intelligence Bureau. In addition to working with the Nisei monitors in the “Radio Room” during the war, Kagoshima-native Maki communicated with Japanese diplomats abroad to gather reports from outside the Japanese sphere of influence. In 1944, the Army Intelligence in Washington D.C. intercepted Maki’s phone conversation with a Japanese attaché in Germany in the heavily coded Kagoshima dialect. Itami was summoned immediately to decipher the phone call consisting of a report from the European Theater and a discussion about the strategic positioning of the Japanese fleet in the Pacific. During this assignment Itami would learn that the Japanese diplomat in Berlin at the other end of the phone conversation was Sogi Takateru. Sogi had been Itami’s mentor in Kagoshima who had arranged financial help for Itami’s return trip to California in 1931.\footnote{See Chapter Two; Kinashi Kozo, “Hakuun Raikyo,” Daito Forum 13 (2000), 42. See also Chapter Two.} For his contribution to the American intelligence war against Japan, Itami received the Legion of Merit, the highest medal awarded to non-combatant members of the U.S. Armed Forces.\footnote{Kinashi, “Hakuun Raikyo”; Kayoko Takeda, Interpreting the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal: A Sociological Analysis (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2010), 60-61.}

Itami and Sogi would meet again in Japan under the Allied Occupation, as Itami’s career as a linguist would eventually take him back to Tokyo at the end of the war.\footnote{Shimamura, Jitsuroku Sanga Moyu.} Before his arrival in Tokyo, however, Itami made stops on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, where he stayed with the U.S. occupation forces for four months after the conclusion of the war in August.
On Iwo Jima, Itami compiled the information gathered from over eight hundred Japanese prisoners of war interrogated by Nisei members of the MIS. By early 1945, the War Department had deployed hundreds of Japanese American soldiers in the MIS to the Pacific Theater. In early 1945, the Honolulu-based Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA) sent more than fifty Japanese American MIS soldiers to Iwo Jima to assist the Marine Corps’ invasion of the island. On Iwo Jima, Terry Takeshi Doi, a Kibei graduate of MISLS, searched caves “with only a flashlight and knife persuading many enemy soldiers to come out and surrender.” The Army awarded Doi a Silver Star for his bravery on Iwo Jima. Although trained to be interrogators, MIS soldiers like Doi often found themselves on the frontline, exposed to the same dangers that the Marines faced. “The Nisei were brought here for office work,” a Marine battalion commander on Iwo Jima told the press in April 1945, “and by golly, they’ve done better in the field than anyone.”

These sporadic accounts of heroic Nisei linguists in the Pacific were largely overshadowed by the storied campaigns of the all-Nisei combat unit in Europe that had graced the pages in both national and Japanese American community newspapers since 1943. In fact, because of the sensitive nature of Nisei linguists’ intelligence work and the overrepresentation of Japanese-speaking Kibei in the MIS, the Army did not even make a public

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acknowledgement of Nisei’s military service in the Pacific until February
1944.79 As discussed in Chapter Four, the popularity of the 100th Battalion
and 442nd Regimental Combat Team even allowed the War Relocation
Authority and Japanese American Citizens League in 1944 to make Thomas
Higa, a wounded Kibei veteran of the Italian campaign, a national hero and
spokesperson for Nisei loyalty by organizing a nationwide speaking tour.80
In the following year, Higa, a fluent Okinawan speaker, agreed to join the
Army Intelligence in Okinawa to help persuade Japanese civilians in hiding
to surrender.81 His service as a linguist, however, went almost unnoticed by
the press, and no welcome ceremony or speaking tour awaited Higa when he
returned from his duty in Okinawa. Any serious effort to document the
varied experiences of MIS servicemen in the Pacific would emerge many
years after the war.82

79 McNaughton, Nisei Linguists, 263.
80 See Chapter Four for the discussion of Private First Class Thomas Higa’s national speaking
tour in 1944.
81 Thomas Taro Higa, Aru Nisei no Wadachi, 1915-1985 (Kaneohe, Hawaii: Higa Publications,
1988); McNaughton, Nisei Linguists, 366.
82 Examples of MIS veterans’ accounts include the Military Intelligence Service of Northern
California Biographies, National Japanese American Historical Society, San Francisco; Tad
Ichinokuchi, ed., John Aiso and the M.I.S.: Japanese-American Soldiers in the Military Intelligence
Service, World War II (Los Angeles: Military Intelligence Service Club of Southern California,
1988); Thomas Taro Higa, Aru Nisei no Wadachi, 1915-1985 (Kaneohe, Hawaii: Higa
Publications, 1988); James Oguro, ed., Sempai Gumi (Honolulu: MIS Veterans of Hawaii,
1981); Joseph D. Harrington, Yangkee Samurai: The Secret Role of Nisei in America’s Pacific
Victory (Detroit: Pettigrew Enterprises, 1979); Clifford Uyeda and Barry Saiki, eds., The
Pacific War and Peace: Americans of Japanese Ancestry in Military Intelligence Service, 1941 to
1952 (San Francisco: Military Intelligence Service Association of Northern California and
Valor: M.I.S. Personnel, World War II Pacific Theater, Pre-Pearl Harbor to Sept. 8, 1951 (Honolulu:
Military Intelligence Service Veterans Club of Hawaii, 1993); Unsung Heroes: The Military
Intelligence Service, Past-Present-Future (Seattle: MIS Northwest Association, 1996); Stanley
American Veterans Association, 1995); Richard M. Sakakida and Wayne S.
Kiyosaki, A Spy in their Midst: The World War II Struggle of a Japanese-American Hero (Lanham,
M.D.: Madison Books, 1995); Hawaii Nikkei History Editorial Board, Japanese Eyes, American
One MIS linguist’s heroic service in the Pacific, however, did receive a national attention in early 1945. Frank Hachiya, a Kibei from Hood River, Oregon, participated in the “liberation” of the Marshall Islands in 1944, spending five months translating Japanese military documents. After his service in the Marshall Islands, Hachiya was scheduled to return to JICPOA in Hawaii, but he instead volunteered for one more combat tour. In December 1944, he led a team of linguists attached to an infantry division on Leyte in the central Philippines, where fierce battles had continued for days. Two nights before the New Year’s Day, Hachiya was caught in an ambush and shot in the abdomen while returning to his unit after interrogating a Japanese prisoner. According to newspaper reports, Hachiya crawled his way back “out of the valley and up the hill, through the grass and the scrub” and completed his duty as “he was dying when he finally reached his lines” and made “his report while they bound his wound.” Five days later, Hachiya died and the Silver Star was awarded to him posthumously for his valor on the battlefield.

The story of Hachiya’s heroic service and tragic death stirred a nationwide controversy as the press also exposed an incident that had taken place a month before in Hachiya’s hometown of Hood River, Oregon.

American readers learned that the American Legion of Hood River on November 29, 1944 in a blatant act of prejudice had removed the names of all Japanese American inductees from the county’s “roll of honor.” Readers who were moved by Hachiya’s death responded to this discovery with outrage and the campaign to restore the honor of Nisei soldiers from Hood River ensued. An editorial in the *New York Times* in February 1945 lamented: “Perhaps some day what is left of [Private Hachiya] may be brought back to this country for rebuttal among the honored dead.”86 Two months later, Associated Press’ Joe Rosenthal, who photographed the famous “flag-raising” on Iwo Jima, called the Hood River American Legion’s decision a “crying shame.”87 In April 1945, the mounting public pressure forced American Legion in Hood River to restore the names of Nisei inductees to the roll of honor. Hachiya’s identity as a Kibei, however, remained unannounced to the public.88

On the contrary, Itami’s service in the Pacific did not attract any press coverage. Perhaps because of his role in handling sensitive intelligence work, not much has been known about his activities in the Pacific before his arrival in Tokyo four months after Japan’s surrender. In 1950, Itami shot himself to death in Tokyo at the age of thirty-nine. Itami told no one of the circumstance that led him to end his own life and the exact reason for his suicide remains unknown. Thirty-three years after his death, the publication

of Yamasaki Toyoko’s *Futatsu no Sokoku*, a novel based on Itami’s life, generated discussions in Japan that speculated the cause of the Kibei linguist’s death. The interest that Yamasaki’s work sparked in Itami’s life and death inspired a few essays and biographical works that explored his inner world and imagined him as a man torn between his two homelands. These works reveal how Itami’s identity as a Japanese American who grew up in Japan shaped an interpretation of loyalty that contradicts the image of Nisei as hundred-percent American.

When Yamasaki’s *Futatsu no Sokoku* became a bestseller in 1983, there emerged a growing interest among some writers in the life of David Akira Itami, who had been Yamasaki’s model for the novel’s main character Kenji Amo. In particular, Itami’s work in the U.S. Army Intelligence during the war made his life story something of a legend among a small circle of Japanese writers and Itami’s former acquaintances. Since the publication of Yamasaki’s novel and NHK’s serialization of the story into *Sanga Moyu*, a few biographical accounts have emerged in Japan, some claiming to provide an authentic account of Itami’s life and thoughts. Some sensationalized and others reflective, these works have claimed that Itami’s suicide at the age of

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thirty-nine was a result of his emotional struggle between his two homelands.

Many of the posthumous accounts of Itami’s life portrayed him solemnly, yet romantically, as a tragic hero who remained true to his upbringing as a traditional Japanese man. His elementary school classmate Kishino Yoshi emphasized the centrality of classical Confucian training unique to the town of Kajiki as the “backbone” of Itami’s philosophical and spiritual world.90 Others familiar with the background of Itami’s family or his childhood education in Kagoshima also highlighted Itami’s identity as an heir of the long line of virtuous warrior-scholars. These accounts suggested that Itami’s excellent performance in school and his exemplary military service were evidence of the undiluted warrior-scholar qualities he had inherited. According to Ono Koji, a law professor from Kagoshima, Itami’s ancestors had been elite samurai who had settled in Kagoshima in the seventeenth century.91 Goto Tokuji, another Kagoshima native, reiterated the historical importance of Itami’s Kagoshima background in his interpretation of Itami’s life experience. Goto believed that Itami’s formative years in Kagoshima had made him “more Japanese” than the most Japanese men. Goto claimed that as a true Kagoshima man, Itami embodied the patriotic spirit that had enabled the Kagoshima warrior-scholars of the past to lead the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and modernization of Japan.92

Itami’s life and death as a Kibei thus sparked an interest among Japanese in exploring the meaning of loyalty during the war that devastated Japan. These accounts went further to suggest that Itami’s death was the ultimate expression of his allegiance to Japan. Ono even compared Itami’s decision to shoot himself to death as a samurai’s ritual suicide. Ono quoted Hoga Rokuro, Itami’s childhood friend from Kajiki, in describing Itami’s suicide as an honorable death in the spirit of a warrior, who “dedicated his last prayer to the peace and well-being of his two countries.”93 Goto interpreted Itami’s emotional struggle that caused his suicide as a sign of remorse for taking arms against Japan and dishonoring his roots, as if he had “shot an arrow at his own country.”94 Sato Hachiro, an alumnus of Kajiki Middle School where Itami had studied, believed that Itami must have felt he had betrayed his homeland. In a collection of essays focusing on Itami’s life, Shimamura Kyo speculated that the reason for Itami’s suicide was the feeling of shame that he had developed while performing intelligence work against Japan during the war, especially when he felt he had betrayed his mentor Sogi Takateru.95

While these accounts attempt to claim Itami’s identity as a loyal Japanese by lionizing his life and death, the true reason for Itami’s decision to end his own life at the age of thirty-nine remains unknown. Also, because Itami himself left no written traces of his experiences, any attempt to recreate

95 Shimamura, Jitsuroku Sanga Moyu, 43, 196.
the narrative of his life story beyond few available sources has been a
difficult task. Perhaps the dearth of records on Itami’s combat mission and
personal life prompted the author of Futatsu no Sokoku to search for another
real life model to sustain her dramatic story telling about a tragic Kibei hero.
In a chapter titled “Brothers,” Yamasaki invented a story of two Nisei
brothers who encountered each other on a battlefield as enemies. Instead of
David Itami, the real life model that inspired Yamasaki’s depiction of the
main character Kenji Amo in this chapter is Harry Fukuhara, a Kibei MIS
linguist from Seattle. In 1933, thirteen-year-old Fukuhara moved to Japan
with his mother and brothers. In 1938, he returned to the United States by
himself to attend college, leaving his mother and three brothers in Hiroshima.
With his family stranded in Hiroshima during the Pacific War, Fukuhara
joined the MIS. Although he had spent just five years in Japan, Fukuhara
possessed excellent language skills, and upon completing the MISLS training,
he emerged as one of the most reliable U.S. Army linguists. In April 1943
Fukuhara left for the Pacific with no basic military training, serving in New
Guinea and the Philippines, where he became a commissioned officer in
August 1945 just a couple weeks before Japan’s surrender.96

As the 33rd Infantry Division in northern Luzon prepared the invasion
of Japan in early August 1945, Fukuhara’s worst fear was that he might
encounter his brothers on the battlefield, as they would likely have been
conscripted into the Japanese armed forces. To Fukuhara’s relief, the U.S.

96 Stanley Falk and Warren M. Tsuneishi, eds., MIS in the War against Japan (Washington,
deployment of atomic bombs on August 6 and August 9 made the invasion seem no longer necessary. However, he was soon horrified by the news that one of the bombs had been dropped on Hiroshima, where his family lived. He was now anxious to find out the whereabouts of his mother and three brothers. When Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender on August 14, Fukuhara was determined to return to Japan to look for his family. In the following four weeks in the Philippines, the 33rd Infantry Division would rapidly transform itself “from attacker to peacekeeper.” The unit assigned Fukuhara the task of educating the American soldiers on the culture and customs of Japanese people before leaving Luzon to occupy Japan.97

Two weeks after his unit landed on Wakayama in western Japan in September 1945 as a part of the Allied Occupation Forces, Fukuhara obtained permission to travel to Hiroshima to find his family members. In early October, he returned to his family home in the destroyed city. His mother had found a shelter in time to narrowly escape the blast from the atomic bomb, but his older brother Victor had fallen victim to the blast and radiation. Just as Fukuhara had anticipated in Baguio City in Luzon, his two younger brothers Pierce and Frank had been conscripted into the Japanese Army. They had returned to Hiroshima shortly after the end of the war and thus avoided the atomic bombing. Fukuhara learned that his younger brother Frank had been trained for a kamikaze mission in Miyazaki Prefecture on

Kyushu, the place where the 33rd Infantry Division had originally planned to invade. The atomic bomb that destroyed his family’s hometown and killed thousands of Japanese people thus prevented the Fukuhara brothers from pointing rifles at each other on the battlefield.

Harry Fukuhara’s story did wonders for Yamasaki’s formulation of the main character Kenji Amo’s dramatic wartime experience in the Pacific. The author of *Futatsu no Sokoku* interviewed Fukuhara in Japan as part of her research for the novel before 1983. Fukuhara’s vivid description of the 33rd Infantry Division’s liberation of Baguio in Luzon in 1945 combined with his fear of facing his brothers on the battlefield offered Yamasaki a perfect material that could add more drama to her story and fill the void between David Itami’s Washington and Tokyo years. In the “Brothers” chapter, Yamasaki twisted Fukuhara’s story to set up a dramatic scene in which U.S. Army lieutenant Kenji Amo met his younger brother Tadashi, a Nisei strandee in Japan who had become a Private in the Japanese Imperial Army, face to face in the Battle of Luzon in 1945.

Yamasaki put together bits and pieces of Itami’s and Fukuhara’s life stories to set up Kenji Amo, the novel’s heroic and tragic representation of Itami, as a linguist officer attached to the U.S. Army’s 33rd Infantry Division that landed on Luzon in early 1945. Yamasaki also set up the scene to highlight Amo’s emotional dilemma, as he was torn between his Japanese

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98 Ibid.
100 Yamasaki, *Futatsu no Sokoku*, 105-233.
consciousness and his allegiance to the American government. On the eve of the U.S. attack on Baguio, Amo saw on a list of Japanese POWs the name of a young soldier from Kajiki, Kagoshima, where Amo and his siblings had grown up. Amo decided to interrogate this Japanese prisoner, named Isa Shinkichi, hoping to learn the whereabouts of his brother Tadashi. When the interrogation commenced, not only did Isa know Amo’s younger brother Tadashi, but he also recognized Amo: “Aren’t you Amo Otoshichi’s son Kenji, the one who moved to America?” When Amo denied adamantly, Isa continued, “Well, you look just like him….I’ve heard from everybody in Kajiki that although Kenji Amo was an American-born Nisei, he was a fine Satsuma gentleman with true Japanese spirit, even better than ordinary Japanese. No way he would be interrogating Japanese prisoners of war.” As a feeling of guilt swelled up inside Amo, Isa pressed harder, “Well, you look like you’re well fed and your hair is shiny. And you’re wearing that dandy American uniform. But do you have any idea what Tadashi’s going through now?” Amo finally gave in: “Tell me about my brother.” At Amo’s request, Isa revealed that Tadashi Amo was a member of the Japanese Army’s “Asahi” Division on Luzon.101

The drama continued as Kenji Amo volunteered to join the patrol units on the frontline to look for his brother, hoping he would persuade Tadashi to surrender. Meanwhile, Yamasaki’s plot placed Tadashi Amo in a small scouting party stranded on the American side in Baguio and

101 Yamasaki, Futatsu no Sokoku,” 177-181.
desperately trying to catch up with their unit. While Tadashi’s group went in hiding, Kenji arrived at the scene accompanied by Caucasian soldiers, who soon discovered the Japanese soldiers and started shooting. In this chaotic moment the eyes of the two brothers met each other and the stunned Tadashi murmured in English, “Really you?” Kenji called to his brother, “Tadashi, surrender! You’ll be killed!” He then turned to his comrades, “Cease fire! He’s my brother!” A Japanese sergeant, realizing what was happening, pointed his rifle at Tadashi’s back, determined to shoot him if he surrendered to his brother in the American uniform. Tadashi had no intention to surrender and certainly had no desire to provoke his sergeant by showing any sign of disloyalty. As both sides exchanged fire, Kenji threw himself in front of his brother, rescuing him in a most dramatic fashion and capturing him as a prisoner of war.  

Yamasaki thus appropriated from the experiences of Itami and Fukuhara dramatic elements that could allow her readers to see Kibe as perpetually torn between two sides. At the same time, the nature of Kibe’s split loyalty became clearer as the story progressed, as the novel emphasized Amo’s emotional and cultural ties to his family and his “hometown” in Kagoshima. His connection to Japan by blood and his upbringing as a virtuous Kagoshima man would always outweigh his duty to the U.S. as a legal citizen.

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102 Yamasaki, *Futatsu no Sokoku,* 196-200.
The next climactic part in Yamasaki’s dramatic reinterpretation of Itami’s and Fukuhara’s life experiences revisited Hiroshima in 1945. As the story moved toward its ending, Yamasaki continued to add more drama to convince her readers that the Kibei’s emotional struggle between the two homelands directly contributed to his suicide. The story that followed Amo’s battlefield encounter with his brother took place in August 1945 in Manila when Kenji Amo received a top secret that an atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima. The news of the atomic bombing brought back the memory of his intelligence work in Washington D.C. the previous year when he had been assigned to decode an intercepted telephone call between Tokyo and Berlin. In this dramatization inspired by David Itami’s real life experience, Yamasaki reinvented the content of the coded conversation in Kagoshima dialect to set up the prelude to the novel’s tragic ending. Kenji Amo recalled that the Japanese official in Berlin had hinted to Tokyo in coded language that the scientists who had worked on developing a devastating weapon in Germany had fled to England and America and potentially worked for the Allied Powers. Could that devastating weapon have been an atomic bomb? Amo drove to a church outside Manila, knelt before the altar, and wondered whether his report on that coded phone conversation had been responsible for the U.S. government’s development and hasty deployment of the atomic bomb that claimed thousands of Japanese lives. A pipe organ sounding solemnly in the empty cathedral,
Amo trembled in utter remorse for what he could only conceive as an unforgivable act committed by a person of Japanese ancestry.\textsuperscript{103}

Throughout the novel these traumatic moments made Kenji Amo’s emotional struggle between his two homelands grow stronger, and eventually, strong enough to kill him. As the story reached the main character’s return to Japan as a member of the Occupying Forces, Amo’s guilt and anguish for his role in causing Japan’s suffering became unbearable. His loyalty and dedication to his country of birth had only torn him and his family apart. Amo felt “lost between the two homelands—America, the country of his citizenship, and Japan, the land of his ancestors to which he was connected by blood.” Disillusioned, Amo turned to death as the final solution to his suffering. To the last page, Yamasaki made it clear that it was the Kibei’s inability to find his own country that claimed his life. In Tokyo, Amo shot himself in the head, and in his dying moment the images of the Stars and Stripes and the Red Sun appeared before him. He reached out his hand, but could not grasp the flags of his two homelands.\textsuperscript{104}

Yamasaki’s imaginative and overtly dramatized portrayal of a Kibei man’s deep attachment to Japan nevertheless evoked nostalgia for what other Japanese writers exploring Itami’s life story romanticized as the image of a patriotic warrior-scholar. These commentators on Itami’s Kagoshima upbringing asserted that even Itami’s fulfillment of his duties as an American citizen during the war must have been inspired by his roots in

\textsuperscript{103} Yamasaki, \textit{Futatsu no Sokoku}, 208-212.
\textsuperscript{104} Yamasaki, \textit{Futatsu no Sokoku}, 587-589.
Japanese culture and moral tradition. They portrayed Itami’s suicide as an ultimate expression of his loyalty to Japan. For many Japanese readers and especially for those who appreciated Itami’s background as someone who had spent his childhood in Kajiki, the renewed interest in Kibei man’s life and death offered them the pleasure of rediscovering the meaning of Japanese nationalism.

Loyalty Has Many Faces

The diverse experiences of Japanese Americans in various corners of the Pacific during World War II demonstrate that the meaning of loyalty was far more complex and fragile than the matter of choosing between two countries. For many Nisei strandees in Japan, the war blurred the cultural, political, and even legal boundaries of their citizenship, as they found themselves in situations in which they had little room to negotiate their national allegiance. The Japanese government’s treatment of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry during the war never amounted to the mass incarceration endured by Japanese Americans in the United States. Nevertheless, the loyalty of Nisei strandees to their ancestral land was under close scrutiny, and they responded in various ways to render their service to the Japanese war efforts against the Allied forces. When the Japanese government exercised the right to demand Japanese American men’s legal obligation to serve in the Japanese military, Nisei draftees’ service to the ancestral land stripped their American citizenship. As Jim Yoshida and
Shigeo Yamada’s cases demonstrate, although Nisei veterans of the Japanese military could recover their U.S. citizenship after the war, the onus was on them once again to convince the U.S. government that they had been forced to serve the Japanese Emperor under duress.

The Kibei volunteers and draftees’ education in prewar Japan made them most ideal linguists in the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Service in the Pacific during the war. Ironically, their transnational education was precisely the same reason that the U.S. government and military authorities also had suspected these Kibei men as a pro-Japan group. When Kibei linguist David Itami’s wartime experience became a model for a popular Japanese novel in 1983, however, it added yet another dimension to the interpretation of Japanese American loyalty and nationalism. As discussed in Chapter Two, Yamasaki’s portrayal of Itami’s cultural and spiritual ties to Japan alarmed the Japanese American community leaders in the U.S. who believed that even a fictional account of a Japanese American with split loyalty could threaten the image of Nisei Americanism. Itami did not live long enough to respond to these varied interpretations of Kibei’s wartime loyalty and identity. Like many Japanese Americans in the Pacific, however, Itami lived through the war years that engendered volatile, complex, and unpredicted circumstances beyond the narrative of dichotomous loyalty to a nation.
Epilogue:
Legacies of Japanese American Migration and
Transnationalism in the Pacific

It took former Heishikan student Masao Ekimoto thirty-six years to return to his country of birth. When he visited California in 1976 as a special guest at a combined high school and junior college reunion, a curious attendee asked him whether he “felt to be more American or more Japanese.” Without hesitation, Ekimoto responded, “I feel I’m 70% American and 70% Japanese; it doesn’t add up mathematically, but that’s the way I feel.”¹ Ekimoto’s conceptualization of his cultural dualism serves as a simple reminder that the discourse of “hundred-percent Americanism” has offered little room for the history of multifaceted and complex transnational experiences of Japanese Americans on both sides of the Pacific.

The wartime language of loyalty and Americanism suppressed the dynamic celebration, debates, and critiques of the cultural dualism and “bridge of understanding” ideal in the Japanese American community.² As Eichiro Azuma notes, the war between the United States and Japan from 1941 to 1945 “culminated in a complete polarization between things Japanese

and things American in each warring state.” For both Issei and Nisei in the United States, it became no longer possible “to openly fancy Japanese American compatibility or their mediating roles in the Pacific.” Such polarizing notions of America and Japan during the war resulted in the sweeping characterization of the Nisei educated in Japan as cultural and political outsiders and undermined their rich, complex, and even tragic experiences in both the U.S. and Japan before WWII. “Kibei” was no longer a term that simply described those who returned to America. It became a moniker that stamped the image of the Nisei returnees as those who came back from Japan with an identity and cultural baggage incompatible with the image of Americanized Nisei.

The issue of Nisei loyalty and nationalism has had a lasting impact on the public narrative of Japanese American history, as postwar scholars have grappled with the need to challenge and complicate the meanings and implications of the history centered on Nisei Americanism. However, World War II did not end Japanese American transnational history, nor did the question of loyalty become salient only within the confinement of the history and memory of Japanese American internment. As the experiences of Japanese American strandees demonstrate, the war also forced the Nisei in the Japanese colonial world to negotiate ways to deal with their national allegiance and citizenship. More importantly, they were forced to negotiate

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ways to survive the war in unfamiliar territories, from the firebombed city of Tokyo to the battlefronts in the Pacific to the POW camps in Siberia.

Yet, the war is only a part of the story. As Yuji Ichioka has argued, what transpired during the war years “cannot be fully comprehended without an understanding of the historical continuities and discontinuities between the 1930s and 1940s.” This dissertation has explored the history of a large contingent of American-born Nisei as emigrants and sojourners who moved in multiple directions since the decade that preceded the Pacific War. These Nisei migrants lived in a world that was actively shaped by volatile international relations between the United States and Japan. The aggressive Japanese colonial expansion in Asia, anti-Japanese racial hostility in the U.S., and citizenship and nationality policies in both countries intimately intertwined with their experiences in Japan and Japanese territories. In addition to the 50,000 Nisei migrants who worked and studied in prewar and wartime Japan, there were many young Japanese Americans who visited Japan on a variety of occasions. Many of the Nisei who participated in short-term study tours returned to the U.S. with varying impressions and new perspectives on Japanese culture, politics, society, and colonialism. In other words, Nisei’s contact with Japan and the movements of Japanese Americans across the Pacific in both directions were common throughout the decade.

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before the war. The Nisei transnational experience was a norm rather than the exception.

The prevalence of Nisei’s movements and transnationalism in the Pacific in the 1930s not only illuminates the intersection of legal and sociopolitical developments in both the U.S. and Japan, but also reveals the fallacy of the essentialized and dichotomous distinction between Nisei and Kibei as “Americanized” and “Japanized” groups. Many studies that focus on the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans have contributed to the fixed generational conception of the categories of the Issei, Nisei, and Kibei. As Azuma notes, the “alleged differences, rifts, and struggles” among these groups that “became manifest inside the camps” have shaped our understanding of their backgrounds, as well as their political and cultural dispositions.6 A case in point is the 1944 Community Analysis Report (CAS), which cast Kibei as “new immigrants” subject to assimilation. The literal meaning of the term Kibei—“returned to America”—notwithstanding, the report called for a “narrowed” definition in order for it “to have much use as designating a distinct type of Japanese American.” The CAS report suggested that bona fide Kibei should have spent “anywhere from two to twenty years” in Japan to have been “influenced in important ways by [their] stay [in Japan].”7 Such artificial definition has reinforced the generalized

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image of Kibei as perpetual outsiders and the antithesis of the Americanized Nisei.

WWII altered the lives of many Japanese Americans in the Pacific, as those who survived the war faced difficult decisions on where and how to pursue their future. Some Nisei decided to stay in Japan permanently and live the rest of their lives as Japanese, while others returned to the United States. Many Japanese Americans who lost their U.S. citizenship as a result of their service in the Japanese military were confronted with the American legal system that once again scrutinized their loyalty. Peter Sano returned to the United States in 1952 as an immigrant and soon became an American citizen again. Having lost his U.S. citizenship in Japan, Sano had to apply for naturalization, going through the citizenship test, interview, and pledge of allegiance, the procedure designed to assess foreign-born immigrants’ loyalty and Americanization. In California, the former suicide bomber became an architect and a passionate peace activist who participated in antiwar demonstrations. Sano also refused to work on any project related to the military.8

Many stories of the Nisei survivors of the war in Japan remain to be told. Despite the dearth of primary sources, numerous possibilities exist for future studies that will illuminate the implications of war and transnational migration on the history of Japanese Americans beyond national borders.

8 Iwao Peter Sano, 1,000 Days in Siberia: The Odyssey of a Japanese-American POW (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 203-204, 208-209; Peter Sano, interview with author, July 12, 2007, Palo Alto, CA.
Among these Nisei were more than one thousand Japanese Americans trapped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki when the atomic bombs were dropped in August 1945. While Japanese historian Sodei Rinjiro has made an attempt to document the history of Japanese American victims of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima, the postwar experiences of those survivors who resettled in Japan and the United States after WWII remain largely forgotten in the historical memories of war in both countries. The struggle of these American survivors of the atomic bombing should constitute a crucial part of the extended life histories of Nisei on both sides of the Pacific.

The history of Japanese American transnational migrants also demonstrates that the dominant paradigm of U.S. immigration history needs to be continuously challenged. The linear and predictable notions about “sending” and “receiving” societies in immigration studies have kept the experiences of migrants and sojourners who moved in multiple directions and lived across national boundaries outside the realm of dominant national narratives. The history of Nisei transnational migrants demonstrates that the geographical boundaries of Asian American history, immigration history, Asian history, and the history of American West are intimately interconnected not only within the United States, but also throughout the Pacific Rim. The stories of people who encountered multiple legal and educational systems, racial ideologies, and cultural and linguistic barriers can challenge the salience of the linear process of assimilation and

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Americanization. Further studies on U.S.-born emigrants and trans-migrants will be an important addition to the transnational scholarship bridging ethnic studies and area studies.\(^\text{10}\)

Such complex conceptualizations of migration and region making present both a need for and the possibility of research methods that integrate multilingual sources. As diasporic communities, nationalism, and the concepts of home and settlement have become no longer monolithic concepts, transnational history will benefit from multilingual oral histories that integrate diverse American experiences that do not fit neatly into the conventional immigrant narrative. These sources will help historicize Asian American migrations that often involve movements and settlements that are both temporary and permanent, and life in the United States as not the whole but a part of the overall migrant experience. Moreover, they will help illuminate the interconnectedness of diverse experiences that shape lives in multiple diasporic locations on the Pacific Rim. Asian American immigrants, sojourners, students, travelers, refugees, POWs, and activists have traveled through and lived in the Americas, Asia, and the Pacific Islands, shaping and influenced by international and cross-regional political, economic, and social developments.

This work has demonstrated how the experiences and life choices made by Japanese American migrants complicated transnational family dynamics. Future studies in immigration history need to reconsider the conceptual limits of the generational relations focusing on first-generation immigrants (foreign-born aliens) and second-generation children (U.S.-born citizens). In the spring of 2008, Kanda Minoru, a Japanese businessman and independent scholar, reflected on the story of his grandmother and granduncle, both of whom had been born and raised in Hawaii and had gone to Japan to study in the 1920s and 1930s. His granduncle, Jiro Kato, returned to Hawaii after completing his studies at Meiji University. Kanda’s grandmother, Kimie Kato, remained in Japan, got married, and lived the rest of her life in that country. Kanda was fond of his grandmother, who helped raise him in his native hometown in Nara prefecture.\footnote{Kanda Minoru, interviewed by Author, May 4, 2008, Osaka, Japan.}

Although his grandmother had lived the rest of her life as a Japanese, Kanda believed that the legacy of her “American heritage” had been passed onto him and his family. His grandmother had claimed that no one around her knew that she had come from Hawaii.\footnote{Ibid.} She spoke Japanese impeccably, but Kanda noticed from time to time signs that suggested to him that his grandmother was not an ordinary Japanese woman. He remembered her humming the American national anthem while watching Olympic medal ceremonies on television. Her American upbringing also influenced the lifestyle of her Japanese grandsons. “My brother and I could’ve been the only
boys in Nara Prefecture in the sixties eating oatmeal for breakfast,” Kanda quipped during a talk on his family history.\(^{13}\)

The memory of having the daily oatmeal breakfast prepared by his Hawaii-born grandmother inspired Kanda to explore the legacy of his own family’s transnational history. He reached out to his relatives in Hawaii and attended family reunions there to meet his granduncle’s children and grandchildren, the Hawaii-born Sansei (third generation) and Yonsei (fourth generation). Kanda wondered how the generational designations—Issei, Nisei, Sansei, Yonsei—would apply to his grandmother and himself, who have lived at the margins of the linear immigrant narrative that have shaped both Japanese emigration history and Japanese American history. He concluded that a new framework was needed to examine the multidirectional movements that shaped the experiences of individuals like his grandmother. He proposed the concept of “transnational Japanese” (\textit{ekkyo nihonjin}), rather than the conventional Issei and Nisei, for the studies of Japanese return migrants and U.S.-born Japanese Americans who settled in Japan.\(^{14}\)

Kanda’s approach to studying Japanese American transnational families and the varied experiences of the Japanese American transnational generation remind us of the critical need to rethink the geographical and conceptual boundaries of Asian American history. Future studies of


\(^{14}\) Kanda Minoru, interviewed by Author, May 4, 2008, Osaka, Japan; Kanda, Kanda Minoru,”Toranku no Naka ni Irete Motte Kaetta Mono wa Nini ka.”
migration and transnational families must consider Asian American history beyond the U.S.-based immigrants and their descendants whose experiences are presumed to be confined to their respective ethnic communities within the U.S. political borders.

As Arif Dirlik has argued, Asian America is not merely a place within the United States, but a multiple location in the world in constant transition. The multilocality of Asian America allows us to reconsider “nationalities, racial affinities and ethnicities” as ideas that are constantly reshaped by historical and political developments in both the U.S. and Asia-Pacific. This dissertation offers an example of how Japanese American transnational experiences before, during, and after WWII demonstrate a critical intersection of the histories of migration, transnational families and communities, and diplomatic policies on both sides of the Pacific.

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