CHAPTER 4
FROM EDEN TO BABEL

Populous, rapidly-growing Florida was more like Babel than Eden. Speedy growth has meant that transplanted migrants have been entrusted with the future of the state. Everybody in Florida is from someplace else, as the saying goes, making the Sunshine State a caricature of the American Babylon. The consequent anomie, social fragmentation, and loss of community, and the accompanying struggle to build a sense of belonging out of this congregation of unattached individuals, make Florida an interesting object for social inquiry, in a modern context where fears abound that community loss is the tradeoff for material “progress.” Florida's extreme fragmentation may provide insights into our common future. Will we all be strangers, the world a hotel? Or is there hope for reconnection as we alight in one community after another before building our final nest in a snowbird haven like Florida?

This chapter and the next evaluate Florida community-making through the presence of snowbirds and retired migrants. First, chapter 4 looks at snowbirds from the standpoint of the host community. How did its members react to social fragmentation? Specifically, how did they react to one of the most fragmenting aspects of life in Florida – the tourist and snowbird presence? Although Florida ranks as one of the most anomic states, the reaction of Floridians to their leisurely invaders will indicate to what extent the longing for community remains strong in late modern conditions, and will show Floridians’ evolving thinking about such problems. Chapter 5 will look at the snowbird clusters, to learn how snowbirds either sought or built community, and how that can be done in a fragmented, consumerist, late modern context.
4.1 Community Lost

The feeling is pervasive in postwar Florida, especially since the 1960s, that the state is an abnormally fragmented society, incapable of coming together, deprived of the set of feelings, practices, and institutions that make a community coherent. This fragmentation has been blamed on fast growth and in-migration; racial, ethnic, and linguistic diversity; economic inequality; employment and housing markets segmented by age, class, race, and ethnicity; and consequent spatial segregation and isolation. The culprits are many, and landmark events of the past fifty years have made Florida fragmentation rather infamous: its landscape of speculation-friendly condos, tract-based suburbs, and clogged traffic arteries; its eventful desegregation during the 1960s; its thirty-five-year influx of some 800,000 Cubans exiles and immigrants, sixty percent of them concentrated in Miami-Dade by the 1980s; its early 1980s crime wave; the four riots that shook Miami during the 1980s. Some Floridians also blame tourism.

After more than a century of boosterist image-making, after decades of cheerful promotion of leisure and the good life, after Florida dreaming since the sixteenth century, members of the intelligentsia and the Florida elites have in recent years been voicing, with growing urgency, their doubts about the wisdom of depending on tourism to grow the state. They have fretted that true community is being lost in Florida because the geography of the state has been riven by multi-layered segregation and sprawl. There are too many newcomers content to remain strangers, they say, because “most of the people who move to Florida don't think of this as 'home,'”\(^1\) as a journalist lamented in 1991. James Driscoll, of the *Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel*, wondered in 1994 how anyone could covet the governor’s seat in such a “crazy-quilt” state.\(^2\) *St Petersburg Times*’ Robert Friedman opined in 1990 that longtime Floridians wondered "
…how we can re-establish a sense of community and common purpose capable of embracing 12-million comparative strangers who have little in common beyond the color of their license plates. Governor Bob Graham called it the “Cincinnati Factor,” referring to folks who moved to Florida but still subscribed to the Cincinnati paper, rooted for the Bengals instead of the Bucs or the Dolphins, and planned to go back home to Ohio to spend their last years around family and friends and be buried there.⁹³

More recently, Governor Lawton Chiles defined the population of Florida as a *throng* rather than a community.⁴ And historian Gary Mormino has suggested that the anomie of Broward County condoiland shielded six of the 9/11 terrorists prior to the attacks – they went unnoticed, rubbing elbows with their snowbird neighbours while taking flight lessons.⁵

As the rooting of new residents in Florida was mediated by the real estate industry, Floridians seemed to rely on their piece of property and their immediate neighbourhoods to define themselves. A 1988 article lamented the Florida brand of social fragmentation:

> Children riding their tricycles on pleasant suburban streets don't automatically symbolize community, sociologists say. Sprawling South Florida virtually forces people to abandon traditional ideas of a community as a geographic area in which to live, work, play, and worship. Instead, “people parcel out bits of their lives in different settings,” sociologist Lynn Appleton of Florida Atlantic University said. Home buyers shop for houses within tolerable driving distance of their jobs. Often they buy homes in “recreational communities,” enclosed developments that offer parks, athletic facilities, and security – amenities traditionally provided by cities. The new developments even have their own governments. Instead of going to local politicians or city hall, homeowners are likely to turn for help with problems to their homeowner or condo association first.⁶

It seems reasonable to hypothesize that the associations acted as gatekeepers against a diversity that would have threatened property values. Moreover, associations and walled enclosures arguably have made residents indifferent to issues beyond the borders of their development or subdivision, thereby compounding the difficulty of coming together to cope with the ill effects
of growth. {Many readers won't know what a plat is.}

Public concern over the effects of growth first emerged in the 1960s, as Florida newspapers and magazines reported the concern of the elites over the eroding natural beauty of their state. Fast growth and development had produced – at least along the Gold Coast – an ugly urban landscape antithetic to the Edenic image of the state which had lured tourists in the first place. In 1954, a New York Times article described Miami Beach’s aspect as “conspicuous waste.”

By the 1960s, Miami Beach was, according to Holiday magazine, a place of “too much to pay...loud clothes...loud talk.” In 1967, Columnist Charles Whited wrote that “[a]rriving in Greater Miami'...surely must rank as one of the truly great disappointments of American travel.” Southbound on the Sunshine State Parkway, oneself was “snapped back to reality” at the Golden Glades interchange, through the “most bewildering mass of concrete spaghetti south of Washington DC” Eastbound on 167th Street was worse: “[T]hat multi-laned commercial strip fights its way toward the sea through hot-dog stands, gas stations and paint stores.” Southbound, the North-South Expressway was “about as scenic as an airport runway.” Older highways US 1 and A1A fared no better, the former being, “as we all know, an ugly corridor of billboards, roadhouses and used car lots – commercial strip-zoning at its worst – and A1A south of the Broward line cuts through the tawdry garishness of Motel Row.” Similarly, a Miami Herald editorial deplored that “too much of South Florida's lush tropical growth has fallen to the bulldozers, to the asphalt pavers, and to real estate developers who have piled up great clumps of concrete without thought or concern about the natural amenities that brought them consumers from less favoured cities.”

The Floridians most dissatisfied with the assault on the state's environment were the Florida-born and long-time residents, if only because they had witnessed more change than
newcomers. In a 1978 novel, Pennsylvania-born John D. MacDonald attributed Florida's degradation to the rootlessness of its people:

"Florida can never really come to grips with saving the environment because a very large percentage of the population at any given time just got there. So why should they fight to turn the clock back? It looks great to them the way it is. Two years later, as they are beginning to feel uneasy, a few thousand more people are just discovering it all for the first time and wouldn't change a thing. And meanwhile the people who knew what it was like twenty years ago are an ever-dwindling minority, a voice too faint to be heard."

MacDonald's definition of “Floridian” implied a rather short stay in the Sunshine State; as a silver lining to the plague of fast growth, newcomers to Florida seemed to define themselves as locals – Floridians – after a relatively short stay.

In 1989, Orlando-born poet Eugenie Nable narrated a trip to her hometown, where she saw the primitively-enchanted Florida she once knew being covered by a layer of generic suburban landscape:

I do not recognize the straight cut roads
tough I know these shopping centers
and neon beef palaces in other places
Here their stiff squares smirk and crouch
stifle the low breath of the swamp
to cover its mounds and memory with asphalt
Soon even this cemetery will be real estate

Along similar lines, a 1995 poll by a Broward newspaper found that people who had lived in Florida for a lengthy time were the most likely to express dissatisfaction at what the Sunshine State had become.

Even some tourists felt unease over the environmental damage. The contradiction of advanced development with the Florida Dream was not lost on the editors of business-oriented
Florida Trend magazine in the 1990s. They deplored that Florida was turning into “Anywhere, USA,” at a time where emerging tourist segments – ecotourism, for instance – thrived on pristine nature, exoticism, local character, and historical or archaeological sightseeing. They went on to quote a New York Times editorial: “If the Florida that was unique destroys what made it unique, doesn't Florida also become as extinct as the dinosaur? Oh sure, it will still be a geographical site at which people can arrive by air, rent automobiles...And so what? …Florida becomes every place else, and every place else becomes Florida.” Florida tourism is also losing market share because consumers around the globe increasingly prefer destinations that evoke a strong and unique sense of place. In the face of this trend, Florida continues to squander its natural and cultural assets, to the point that its image is now increasingly that of a non-place — a land of generic attractions and condo canyons, surrounded by featureless sprawl that might as well be anywhere."

It might be a particularly ugly part of my hometown, wrote columnist Pierre Foglia, who likened the stretch of US 1 in the Florida Keys to a proverbially ugly commercial strip in suburban Montreal. Another northern writer found it “very depressing” to see so many signs of over-development; he concluded that Florida was doomed to become “nothing but subdivisions, tourist traps, and a few beleaguered nature reserves.” Many commentators expressed their own displeasure with the state’s artificiality by recommending “real Florida” attractions to their readers (away from the malls, golf courses, and suburban landscapes) – places such as “The Florida Isle Developers Missed” or the place where “the strip malls are left behind,” or “one of Florida's best-kept secrets.” Herbert Hiller, a Floridian since 1958 and former cruise line executive, said he worried whether the state could survive tourism, but took comfort in the happy coincidence that “the only way to save Florida tourism is to save Florida itself,” by fighting environmental damage and urban sprawl."

In these comments, the Jeremiahs and Cassandras ignored the almighty climate. They no
longer deemed it a sufficient attraction – and not because the winters of Central Canada and the American Northeast were mellowing through global warming or a favourable breeze. Rather, Florida’s climate simply looked less unique as other sun-and-fun destinations became accessible. This – the decreased advantage of climate – has been a fundamental problem for Florida tourism in this late modern era.

As climate became less relevant, tourists stopped sunning themselves to take in their surroundings. Since the 1960s and 1970s, Florida tourism has paid a price for the dullness of its developed landscape. Neither jungle nor Eden is conjured up by a Jiffylube outlet blocking the view of the beach. And the tourists were even easier to sniff at than the streetscapes – both were depressingly plebeian. Anything “mass” has always offended those with “class.” Some members of the intelligentsia and the international set deemed Florida objectionable because of its very accessibility and popularity. Mass tourism was, they openly said or intuitively felt, a debased consumer version of the ancient quest for revelation through travel and pilgrimage. Marco Polo at the court of the Great Khan – the Pilgrim at Santiago de Compostella – Zebulon Pike on a mountaintop – bloated Everyman baking on a Florida beach – one of these was a modern abomination. Like Daniel Boorstin, these critics of Florida considered “tourism” a base corruption of “travel,” a loss as profound as the loss of community, for travel was noble, adventurous, romantic, and enlightening – and dangerous. Attempting to keep both scoops affixed to a Florida ice cream cone while walking back to a beach towel had nothing in common with Scott of the Antarctic except ice. In denigrating tourism to affordable places, some of these critics were simply setting up barriers of good taste against the masses. Like Henry James, the Brahmin novelist, they commented on tourism – even when it was by the wealthy, as when he described Palm Beach as “vanity fair in full blast”16 – to put the parvenus in their place. Sure, they could afford a Florida vacation; but would anyone with good taste go
where these people went? For tourism to be used as a marker of good taste and social distinction, the self-appointed elite, the intelligentsia, had to differentiate the “in” places and people from those that were “out.” Naturally, anyone who knew where the “best people” lived by the “best” of regimes wanted to keep the riffraff out.

Some of the “better” tourist destinations acted to keep out the unwanted, unscented masses. Coral Gables, for example, was planned in the 1920s as an upper-end reserve, with expensive, tropical landscaping and large home lots. Palm Beach kept day-trippers away by restricting access to its splendid beaches, and Delray Beach tried to sell itself in the 1960s as exclusive: “an island of distinctive resort life, purposely avoiding mass exploitation and its accompanying ornateness.”

By resisting development and searching for the “real Florida,” some writers were building and sharing elitist standards by broadcasting their distinctive tastes. So powerful was this ecology of distinctive leisure that some went as far as to enforce secrecy about their bit of paradise. In January 1981 a New York Times reader complained that a recent article by travel writer Michael Sterne had exposed the little-known beauty of Sanibel and Captiva Islands. Yvonne Freund hoped that Sterne and family would return to the islands to see the results of this publicity: “I hope...they'll find the islands infested with tourists. Then he'll know why those of us who could write about such places, don't.”

But snobbery or elitism are not sufficient explanations for the alarm expressed by so many over the disfigurement of paradise. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that every critic of Florida was auditioning for life in the Hamptons or the Ivy League, for most Floridians have never considered high levels of good taste a necessary social asset. After all, as long as media based in New York (or Montreal, as we shall see) remain the arbiters of good taste, Florida sees no point in playing a game it cannot win. Most Floridians have wisely decided to “be
themselves.” Hence snobbery, while instinctively appealing as the ultimate origin of the sneers from upper-middle-class academics and columnists, is not an adequate explanation for the declensional trope in the story of Florida dreaming. Floridians increasingly have adopted this trope because they have genuinely experienced decline in terms of community and landscape, in their own lifetime, and they concur about the culpability of the growth machine. As the introduction discussed, declensionism has been a staple of the muckraking and historical literature pertaining to contemporary Florida, as it has been in American social commentary and letters almost since the first European settlements.\(^\text{19}\)

It would be foolish to deny Florida’s social fragmentation. It is too obvious to deny, the loss of a community more than an inherited literary conceit. The rapid population growth and spatial segregation must be having an impact. Even if community somehow endured through the transformation of Puritans into Yankees, of farm villages into mill towns, of rural *Canadiens* into urban *Québécois*, and through a five-year Civil War, it is far from obvious that it can survive the transition of Florida from isolated backwater to outlet mall. It would be worrisome if Floridians didn’t worry. But is it fair (or logical) to blame tourists, retired migrants, and snowbirds for community decline? Any answer must start with a survey of the motives and activities of those Floridians who have endeavoured since the 1960s to slow or stop Florida’s transition to anomie.

4.2 Slow-Growth Fantasy

Since the 1950s, jeremiads aside, members of Florida's elites and intelligentsia have conceived fantasies of no-growth, where they depicted a dangerous place, exaggerated the dangers of Florida, likening life in the Sunshine State to a Faustian bargain in which most residents and visitors risked injury or death at the hands of a sort of Florida *fatum* they had
illegitimately tried to avoid. Florida, they said, was a deal with the Evil One, and all the Fausts out there should fear retribution for their sins. This body of writing has grown into what historian Gary Mormino and film critic Roger Ebert have called the “Florida Noir” style, wherein Florida is depicted as “a lost Utopia, a dystopian, overdeveloped land” where the exotic wilderness is both tourist magnet and menace.\(^{20}\) Crime novelist John D. MacDonald has written a number of these fantasies of “Death by Retribution in Paradise” – including a 1957 novel that inspired two movies entitled Cape Fear, where the family of a womanizing lawyer is stalked by a man imprisoned for fourteen years by the former's negligence. Moral corruption became more financial in A Flash of Green (1962) about a covert political scheme to grease the wheels of development on a pristine Florida shore; in 1984 it was turned into a movie and shot in Fort Myers by independent filmmaker Victor Nunez.\(^{21}\) Since the 1960s, crime novelist Elmore Leonard has also plotted stories of greed, scams, and retribution in Florida, arguably with less moralizing forces at play. The first of his stories to be adapted to the screen was Stick (published in 1983); it starred Burt Reynolds as an ex-convict trying to bury the ghosts of his past.\(^{22}\) More recently, in 2001, John Sayles directed Sunshine State, a Florida story where the past haunts the numerous, allegorical characters (blacks and whites interrelating under the obvious pressure of past segregation, a former football star, former high-school friends, old people with stories to tell, real estate developers) in multiple and unexpected ways.

In Florida Noir stories, nature is often the agent of retribution, a threatening character of divine beauty and might. John MacDonald depicted the stifling heat in this fashion in 1959:

The breeze died. The high white sun leaned its tropic weight on the gaudy vacation strip of Florida's East Coast, so that it lay sunstruck, lazy and humid and garish, like a long brown sweaty woman stretched out in sequins and costume jewelry.... The sun turned road tar to goo, overheated the filtered water in the big swimming pools of the rich and the algaed pools of the do-it-yourself clan, blazed on white roofs, strained air conditioners, turned parked cars into tin ovens, and blistered the unwary. A million empty roadside beer cans twinkled in the bright glare. The
burning heat dropped a predictable number of people onto stone sidewalks, of which a predictable number died, drove the unstable into the ugly wastes of their madness...and sent a billion billion salty trickles to flowing on sin-darkened skins.\textsuperscript{23}

One of the favourite ways to plot and play out a Florida no-growth fantasy has been to ponder the effects of the next “big one” hurricane. Writers have imagined how nature would one day, like Mephistopheles, come back to exact its due from foolish humans. MacDonald wrote in the mid-1970s how the storm surge was “going to have real fun with the made land, with the sea walls and packed shells and the thin topsoil...then the local segment of that peculiar aberration called the human race is going to pick itself up, whistle for the dredges, and start it all over again.”\textsuperscript{24} In 1977, MacDonald unleashed his “big one” on Florida’s literary corpus in \textit{Condominium}, a novel in which Hurricane Ella returns to nature a barrier island (Fiddler Key) similar to Siesta Key, Sarasota County, where he lived. Ella brutally exposed the shoddy building practices of the entrepreneurs behind the Golden Sands condo complex, as its tenants were finding out about its inflationary maintenance fees and insolent management.

He was not the only author in Florida anticipating a day of reckoning.\textsuperscript{25} When hurricane Andrew ravaged South Miami-Dade in August 1992, muckraker Carl Hiaasen interpreted it as warning, both providential (“a brushback pitch from God”) and existential – ”There's nothing wrong with South Florida that a good Category Five hurricane couldn't fix.”\textsuperscript{26} Was there a wrathful deity glaring at Florida? Maybe, maybe not, but the state certainly had its share of angry demiurges, not least of them Hiaasen, whose first novel in 1986 featured a journalist who murdered tourists and chamber of commerce people in order to scare them away from the Sunshine State. The book was unsubtly titled \textit{Tourist Season} in reference to hunting. In a 1993 interview, Hiaasen declared: 

I favour immigration controls for Florida. Florida should be treated as a foreign country. With visas. Tourists should get a two-week visa to go to Disney World, and South Beach and
the Keys if they must, and then get out. And they should have to sign a promise that they won't
buy any property, that they won't move here."^{27}

Granted, this statement was fantasy, but it was grounded in dead-serious angst, and in an
ethos that was fostering growth controls, that is, concrete revision of the legal and economic
environment. This ambiguity between fantasy and actual policy was seminal to the legitimacy
of the Florida Noir author: it allowed environmentally-minded (or planning-minded, or
snobbish) readers to identify with the sentiment if not the agenda, whether it was murder or
zoning controls. For that reason, a South Florida columnist knew that there was no risk of
Floridians heeding his advice about broadcasting a rare case of malaria in 1996 even if they, as
hoped, nodded their heads in wry accord: “So, c’mon South Florida, shout it out, say it loud:
We’re malarial and proud! If it means one less beachfront condo, one less shopper in the
checkout line, one less laggard with his left blinker on, it will all be worthwhile.”^{28}

These fantasies were ways for these authors to build a community of readers who shared
a similar despair over what Florida had become. Ironically, fantasy born of despair had a
creative potential, for it could be turned into an imagined community of proud Floridians, as
well as into political mobilization, growth controls, and environmentalist statutes.

What of Floridians beyond the intelligentsia? How did those without the time or skills to
pen fantasies of killing off developers and scaring off every last tourist express their opposition
to paving paradise and putting up the one-millionth parking lot? How did average Floridians
indulge their fear and loathing? With *humour* and loathing, in fact.
4.3 Blaming the Tourist

Tourists and retired migrants were easy to blame for Florida's growth-induced problems. As non-resident outsiders, as transients who often did not vote and had their loyalties up north, they clearly stood outside of the sought-after community of Floridians. As white “Anglo-Saxons,” they could be acceptably blamed for pretty much anything negative about Florida without arousing suspicions of racism. Snowbirds and tourists thus became benign, acceptable scapegoats for venting outrage at overcrowding. This scapegoating ironically accumulated into a community-building folklore through which Floridians sought to voice and share a common meaning of what it meant to be a Floridian amidst conditions of fragmentation and gridlock. Tourist-bashing unified Floridians. It was popular – and “wacky” – enough to be endorsed by a few journalists and columnists.\(^{30}\)

The birth of tourist-bashing in Florida happened around the same time as the rise of environmentalism. Indeed, both “movements” were linked by concern over looming scarcity. In December 1973, South Florida faced fuel shortages due to the first Oil Shock. Local boosters were blamed for issuing emergency advertisements saying to Northern tourists that gas was plentiful. They had been proven wrong. In that context, Florida newspapers reported that Floridians were adopting a “Yankee-go-home” attitude.\(^{31}\) In 1974, Floridians blamed tourists for gas shortages, but also for tighter access to mortgage money, and for causing “commercial overbuild” in Florida, i.e. a glut of retail and service outlets, which made the ongoing recession even worse. The same year, these complaints were expressed, in South Florida, through a popular “Yankee Go Home” bumper sticker.\(^{32}\) Thus tourist-bashing drew upon the re-emerging Southern Rebel attitude, as part of a collective conversation over what it meant to be Floridian amidst a flood of unwanted Northerners. Thereafter it was socially
acceptable to publicly blame tourists for Florida's growth problems. In 1977, asked by the *Miami Herald* “what bugged them,” a substantial number of readers complained about tourists and northern migrants. A self-identified Florida “cracker” from Hollywood lamented that South Florida had become “like a New York suburb with rude, crude, aggressive, unfriendly ignoramuses who have moved down here and changed our environment rather than adapting.” Most complaints deplored traffic gridlock; many denounced the careless driving habits of non- Floridians, and a comment on driving through the Keys outlined the difficulty of passing a slow-moving recreational vehicle. Some did more than talk: in November 1993, a Florida driver shot a .357 bullet at the vehicle of two Québécois tourists; a few years later, many Québécois snowbirds could still remember being the targets of aggressive gestures on Florida roads.33

One columnist, David Grimes of Sarasota, made disparaging Canadian newcomers his trademark: he poked fun at their taciturnity, at the look of Canadian currency, at their northern pallor, their smugness over their welfare state, their sensitivity to patronizing blunders by Americans, as well as “the way they drive, their funny accents, and their odd way of dressing.” Many others accused Canadians of being poor tippers, a belief that Grimes took up. The joke went: “What's the difference between a Canadian and a canoe? Canoes tip.” Again, these rants and jokes were ways to express the stresses of the tourist season: Canadians were stand-ins for the archetypal Tourist. More conveniently, they were the ideal outsiders, more than Cubans or New Yorkers could ever be.34

Behind Grimes’ “Canadians” stood the real Florida scapegoats – the tourist species as a whole, regardless of the subspecies, whether the brash New Yorker, the friendly Midwesterner, or the Canadian errant.35 When faced with a number of complains from Canadian readers, Grimes wryly tried to appease them by writing about his “real” targets – tourists. One column
explained how to differentiate tourists from love bugs, since, he claimed, they could easily be mistaken for one another as, “both like to hover, virtually motionless, around our local roads and, during peak swarming periods, you can hardly smile without getting one stuck in your teeth.” Many other tourist-bashing comments followed the same lines, likening tourists to a flood, an invasion, a necessary evil, an exodus, “exotic pests,” or the migrations of birds or lemmings.\textsuperscript{36}

By then it might have become obvious that typical complaints about tourists read like a catalogue of life’s stresses in contemporary Florida. In Grimes’ words, tourists meant “abundance.” They overcrowded restaurants, beaches, movie theatres, doctors’ offices, banks, and golf courses. By coming in such numbers, they could be blamed for the state’s growth problems. The backlash against tourism was already underway in 1973, before the Oil Embargo, when a state senator and the director of the state tourism division justified a raise in promotional spending by suggesting, debatably, that “tourists don’t stay,” and hence brought revenue to the state without straining its infrastructure.\textsuperscript{37}

As the stresses of rapid growth accumulated, so did the complaints. Seventeen out of twenty-eight county administrators, when surveyed in 1983 about snowbirds’ impact on their communities, blamed them for road congestion. Not surprisingly, in 1990, economic researchers found that road congestion was the most common complaint against tourists in Florida.\textsuperscript{38}

On the other hand, tourists perhaps deserved the opprobrium if they drove as unpredictably and slowly as some harried commuters alleged. Since the Model T first chugged its way through the state, tourists have been accused of “exceeding the speed limit by only five or ten mph,” suggested Grimes, when every native of the state knew that car racing was practically a Southern invention. Canadian tourists have also been blamed for keeping their
headlights on in broad daylight\textsuperscript{39} (when a Southern rebel would have saved money by finding a way to disconnect the wiring mandated by the Canadian government) and all of them were accused of keeping their turn signals on for too long, or unnecessarily, or indicating the wrong direction.\textsuperscript{40} A traffic column in the \textit{Miami Herald} was scalding in its assessment of tourists' driving habits. Its author, a self-appointed “Lane Ranger,” wrote in 1991 that snowbirds “plug up our roads and drive with the skill of dropouts from the Lunar School of Driving and Philately.” Lane Ranger quoted a local truck driver as telling him, “I would die happy if I didn't see another license plate from Quebec” and a bumper sticker as saying, “Someday, I'm going to summer in New York and pay them all back.”\textsuperscript{41} Were tourists the only dropouts from the Lunar School? Not likely, in the home state of the lunar missions. But the tourist was, like Br’er Fox, a convenient character in moral tales designed to educate \textit{all} of the state’s drivers on how to cope with a new era: in this case, the New Gridlocked South.\textsuperscript{42}

Tourists were also accused of poor taste in dress and attire. Grimes put it thus: “tourists dress funny and that's all there is to it...ladies in gold, fruit-laden sandals…men in deerskin shoes, polyester slacks, and white vinyl belts.” Were such people to be despised? No more than Carmen Miranda, the dynamo in the tutti-frutti hat, or Rodney Dangerfield, the sympathetic boor in the movie \textit{Caddyshack}, or, suggested Grimes, most Floridians, who considered that “a shirt and shoes” were dressed-up enough for a “formal” social event. As Grimes' good-natured humour shows, what Floridians were really discussing when blaming tourists was etiquette, mores, and community.

On occasion, lampooning the appearance of tourists took a more nasty turn. During the 1992 and 1993 winters, the Fort Lauderdale weekly \textit{XS} published on its front page photographs of big-bellied, obese Québécois snowbirds in tiny swimsuits. The 1992 headline read: “They're Back! For Locals, French Canadians Represent the Season's Annual Harvest of Shame.”
following year, the words were meaner: “Ribbit, Ribbit, the Frogs (They're Back!) Return with the New Crop from the Harvest of Shame.” The message could not be plainer: unashamed tourists were deemed shameful by their hosts. The dress of Québécois snowbirds and tourists, especially their beachwear, was seen as their most offensive behaviour. Commenting on the controversy, Fred Grimm, a *Miami Herald* columnist couldn’t just stand on the sidelines and sniped: “they slip pale 230-pound bodies into swimwear designed for 19-year-old anorexic Brazilians.” This was the unpardonable sin – to worship the sun when they were no longer young – but Québécois snowbirds were also charged by XS and Grimm with the usual peccadilloes of tourists: they drove badly and too slowly, they acted “as if they own the place,” and they were poor tippers. XS also blamed Québécois for their ignorance of English, interpreting it as a headstrong refusal to mingle with Floridians.43

The discourse about all tourists’ dress or undress was, in part, an objection to their flaunting of their leisure status. They “dressed funny” mainly because they were not dressed for the world of nine-to-five and had the money to spend on ensembles that could only be worn at a (forgiving) beach resort. In this guise, tourists and snowbirds were the perfect outsiders, embodiments of a carefree life for Floridians angered about the daily-life vexations associated with work and commuting. One bumper sticker in the 1980s and 1990s stated: “Not ALL of us are on vacation!” But the XS brand of resentment, because it was also plainly xenophobic, expressed as well the anger that many Floridians felt at the unassimilable migrants of South Florida; Québécois tourists and snowbirds were, like the Cubans, easily identifiable targets for this anger, but unlike the Cubans, also an acceptable target since they were assumed to be politically defenseless foreigners. Naturally, Floridians did not limit their scapegoating to French Canadians: other tourist groups were accused of arrogance, of rudeness; tourists as a species were accused of arrogantly and rudely and constantly comparing Florida with “how we
do it up north.” Many Floridians blamed tourists for their rude, big-city manners; the worst offenders, it seemed, were “know-it-all New Yorkers.” In ways similar to their discussions about tourists, snowbirds, and Québécois, Floridians who targeted the Empire State were distancing themselves from big-city manners, and participating in a collective discussion on the definition and enforcement of what should be the Florida brand of etiquette, manners, and socializing. New Yorkers, easily blamed across the United States for their snobbery, brashness, condescension, and other metropolitan manners, were convenient foils for a number of Americans with other regional loyalties. By thrashing the Big Apple, non-New Yorkers were establishing their own turf, etiquette, and imagined community. For Southerners, this meant, in degrees as diverse as the South itself, embracing an easygoing, hedonistic, antigovernment ethos. When Floridians decided, as individuals or collectively, to root themselves in local soil, they adopted some of the Southern mores. Floridians were Southerners thanks to their geography, social structure, and lifestyle – in the words of literary critique Jason Sanford, “from the panhandle to the keys, Florida is as southern as they come.” More to the point, many Floridians elected to be Southerners, 51 percent of them according to a sociological survey from 1999 – even though a large majority of them were born outside the South.

For Floridians of every stripe (even the New York-born), discussing tourist mores was a way to construct a shared, ethical, local culture. As with folklore, the utility of discussions about the manners of outsiders depended not on the veracity of these statements, but rather their usefulness to a community-building strategy. In other words, many “native” Floridians (and Southerners, no doubt) asserted, stated, and shared their commonalities by poking fun or venting impatience at prejudiced Yankees. By talking about rude tourists, they were setting the values of their moral economy. The artificiality of this sectional vocabulary, in a state where most residents had northern roots but had rapidly embraced the cracker identity (as John D.
MacDonald understood),\textsuperscript{47} outlines the necessity behind it: to build and share a set of values about what it means to be Floridian, to affirm and stabilize a Florida community amidst rapid demographic change. By paying close attention to the ethical discourse of native and “naturalized” Floridians, the state’s permanent migrants were able to assume a Florida identity quickly. James Driscoll concluded in the 1990s that a newcomer could be considered semi-native after living in the state for ten years. Indeed, surveys have found that newcomers quickly called themselves Floridians.\textsuperscript{48}

Bumper stickers have displayed Florida’s values for residents and visitors alike. In the Automobile Age, streets have supplemented – even supplanted – the central plaza and marketplace as a public forum for discussion and debate. Anger vented at tourists through bumper stickers carried nativist messages directly to visitors and fellow Floridians where they were most likely to be found – in the very arena of their most unpleasant encounters, the road network. In the winter of 1974, gas shortages pushed many residents to sport “Yankee Go Home” stickers, to the consternation of the tourist industry. One of the most popular stickers during the 1980s simply identified the driver as a “Florida Native.”\textsuperscript{49} Table 4.1 displays some of the put-downs for tourists and retirees found on bumper stickers in the 1980s and 1990s.

Table 4.1: Florida Bumper Stickers, 1980s-1990s.\textsuperscript{50}

On tourism and migration
Keep Florida green; stay home and send money.
It's tourist season. Have you bagged your quota?
Don’t shoot! I'm a local.
Welcome to Florida! Now go home!

Beautify Florida! Put a Yankee on a bus.

Happiness is 100,000 Canadians going home with a braying New Yorker under each arm.
We don't care how you do it up North!!
If you love NY, take I-95 north.
If everything was better up North, why don't you go back?
Florida Native
100% Cracker
(A picture of a shark, saying:) “Got Snowbirds?”

Snowbird
Dig a moat at the border, stock it with Florida's gators, use the dirt to raise New Orleans Florida. I wasn't born here, but I got here as fast as I could

**On traffic conditions**
Florida, the “No Blinker” State

When I Grow Old, I'm Going North and Driving Slow
Pray for Me, I Drive Highway 19
Workers left lane, tourists right!

Some of us have to get to WORK
This isn't road rage. This is righteous anger.

A bumper sticker was better than a bump on the head. The sticker, like graffiti, a letter to an editor, or an angry or humourous newspaper column, was a way to let off steam; as Floridians like Grimes and Hiaasen have remarked, the ritualistic mocking of out-of-state drivers had a cathartic and defensive nature, even as it helped the permanent residents of a state with such multiple and elusive identities as Florida to find common ground by denigrating visitors and snowbirds. In sum, the discourse about the visitors was always as much, if not more, a comment about their hosts. Consider this observation by Carl Hiaasen about snowbird and tourist drivers:

…most of these folks are perfectly decent people of normal intelligence who are launched into traffic with little more than a crude map (generously provided by the rental car company) that shows how to get out of the airport parking lot, and that's all. Distractions abound, particularly in South Florida –construction detours, high-speed police chases, roads mysteriously renamed after felons, bankers, and politicians. No wonder tourist drivers get confused!

Were befuddled visitors the biggest problem in South Florida? Maybe, maybe they could be blamed for the “construction detours” (as an embodiment of growth) but crime (“high-speed police chases”), corruption (“roads mysteriously renamed after felons”), and unaccountable
elites ("bankers and politicians") were difficult to pin on tourists and snowbirds – even if they did drive like donkeys.

4.4 Environmental Protection as a Slow(er)-Growth Strategy

Floridians did more than vent. They took action. Coalitions formed to enact laws to mitigate the environmental damage being done by rapid growth. Environmentalism became a popular cause. Florida's environmental movement had its origins in the 1920s, when a citizens’ committee, the Tropic Everglades National Park Association, demanded the protection of the Everglades; Congress voted the Everglades Bill in 1934, but it took another thirteen years to purchase the land. In 1947, one of the committee's members, Marjory Stoneman Douglas, published *The Everglades: River of Grass*. Reprinted many times since, the shockwaves sent out by this book still stir the national environmental movement. The Association and Douglas' cause was taken up by the *Miami Herald's* John D. Pennekamp and in December 1947 President Harry S. Truman inaugurated the Everglades National Park, the first in the United States to be justified by the protection of biological attributes. In one sense, the victory had come quickly – a mere five years between the Association's formation and the vote in Congress – but in fact it had taken three decades to fashion, in great part to appease Monroe County leaders, who resented the disappearance of all this taxable land. Such delays would be the norm in Florida, for damaging development practices had become firmly embedded in the civic and political cultures of the state by the 1920s.

However, those cultures contained a tourist exception that environmentalists could use to advantage: the broadcasters of the Florida Dream had to save some natural beauty to stay in business. Conservation could become serious policy if defined as essential for tourism. For that reason, the Palm Beach area received sanitary sewers in the early 1950s, to rid Lake Worth, the
salty lagoon between the beach and the mainland, of pollution. A concern for profitable beauty helped foster the creation of the John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park in December 1960 to protect the coral reefs off Key Largo.\textsuperscript{53} Similarly, a project for restoring eroded beaches on Virginia Key and Key Biscayne, south of Miami Beach, with sand dredged from the bottom of Biscayne Bay, was blocked in February 1967 when conservationists warned of threats to recreational fishing.\textsuperscript{54}

Environmentalism was gaining potency (or at least plausibility) because many of Florida's natural resources were actually being depleted to the point of contradicting the Edenic version of the Florida Dream. Lost Eden definitely loomed as a theme when water shortages happened, and water rationing became necessary in South Florida, sometimes as early as the 1950s. Years of draining the marshes with canals, and of building dikes for flood control, had, since the 1930s, and with increased speed in the 1940s, lowered the water table: wells were spurting out brackish water. Water shortages and rationing became a regular occurrence from the early 1960s onwards, and a permanent feature by the mid-1980s in Pinellas County (St Petersburg). In response to the water crisis, by early 1967 marshland drainage had ended in south Dade County\textsuperscript{55} and by 1970 had been curtailed throughout South Florida. In the spring of 1971, a drought, caused by a combination of overpopulation, water mismanagement, and the seasonal coincidence of the tourist and dry seasons, sparked widespread fires in the Everglades, sending clouds of smoke over Miami. The grass fires were almost as damaging to Florida’s image as the burning Cuyahoga River was to Cleveland’s. In addition, the 1971 drought accelerated saltwater intrusion into Pinellas and Miami wells, compelling water rationing along the Gold Coast and Tampa Bay.\textsuperscript{56}

Nowhere could environmental damage strike closer to the heart of the Florida Dream than on Florida’s beaches. By the 1950s and 1960s, some South Florida leaders awoke to the
fact that wide, accessible, public beaches were becoming a scarce tourist resource along the Gold Coast and in Pinellas County. Three processes were at work in depriving people of beaches: private construction was restricting access to the shore; the dredging and filling of shallow coastal waters was dramatically privatizing waterfront land while making it unavailable for loafing and unfit for swimming; and unsustainable building practices were precipitating beach erosion.

Firstly, as South Florida’s shores saw rapid private development, Floridians and tourists were deprived of access to the Beach. By law, only the portion of sand between the mean high tide and low tide lines was public, and private ownership of dry land made many beaches off-limits. As early as 1952, a *New York Times* article deplored the small number of public beaches on the Gold Coast and on the Gulf side of Florida. By 1964 it was estimated that the state’s 2,276-miles-long coastline was accessible through a mere 250 miles of public beaches, half of it in the northwest of the state. Meanwhile Miami Beach’s nine public beaches stretched over less than two miles of shore. The worst case of beach privatization was (and remains) Palm Beach, the 12-mile-long, exclusive oceanfront community having little access and few parking spaces or washrooms to service its two public beaches.57

Some places actively courted beachgoers, and reaped the economic benefits: local governments in Sarasota, Clearwater, and Bradenton were by the early 1950s resisting pressures to sell their beachfront property, and actively improving and widening the accessibility of whatever public access they had. Sarasota had had its Lido Casino, a municipally owned public bathing facility, since 1940; Clearwater was building a fishing pier, along with public parking and restrooms; Bradenton had just purchased 900 feet of beachfront property. By the mid-1970s, local authorities in Manatee County explained a recent rise in tourism by the relative abundance of public beaches around Bradenton. Nowhere was public
access to beaches was more vital than in Dade County. In 1967, County authorities purchased pristine beachfront property on Key Biscayne, to prevent housing development; as a result Bill Baggs Cape Florida State Park turned into the county's most famous site. Further beach mileage was added in Dade County in the mid-1970s, when the North Shore Open Spaces Park opened on a three-quarter-mile stretch at the Miami Beach-Surfside city limits. Still in 2003, when the Florida Trend magazine made a top-five list of the least accessible beaches in the state, all five were on the Gold Coast.58

The most infamous means of beach privatization was to dredge submerged land in order to add some surface to a waterfront property. After Carl Fisher set a convincing example in Miami Beach between 1913 and 1928, dredging and filling became the Florida way of building a real estate paradise on the waterfront. Dredge-and-fill had been legal in Florida since 1856, when the Riparian Act granted underwater land fronting private property to the (riparian) owner of the nearest waterfront lot, as long as the underwater land did not stand under navigable waters. In 1913 the state-run Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, created in 1855 to manage public lands, was granted title to islands and submerged land in Dade and Palm Beach counties, and was authorized to sell such land to riparian owners. In 1915 Monroe County’s submerged land was transferred under the Board's authority. In 1921, the Butler Act enshrined the rights of landowners to dredge and fill, and offered an incentive to do so: submerged lands under navigable saltwater could be divested to riparian owners, under the condition of it being filled. The Act reserved swamps, bathing beaches, lakes, and oyster beds to the state. In 1951, in a move that brought more “fillable” land into the Board's hands, all land covered by tidal waters was vested to the Board, except in Dade and Palm Beach counties. In 1957, a Bulkhead Act allowed local governments and the Board to define and alter bulkhead lines (the limits of fillable land) by their own initiative or upon a landowner's request.
Though this act was intended to enforce the public review of dredging projects, local
governments and landowners gained a freer hand in dredging and filling.⁵⁹ In 1967,
commenting in retrospect on the policy of the Board of Trustees, Attorney General Earl
Faircloth declared it made “private rights paramount to the public interest.”⁶⁰

Most of the fills were situated where demand for waterfront land was highest, and where
waters were shallow enough for the filling to be economically feasible. These places were
therefore mainly bay bottoms near the biggest population centres and tourist magnets, namely
the Biscayne and Boca Ciega bays, respectively in Miami-Dade and Pinellas Counties. In 1946
Shepard Broad, a New York migrant, orchestrated the filling of the shallow waters at the
northern tip of Biscayne Bay, which became the city of Bay Harbour Island. In 1949 the Bahia
Mar marina was built by the city of Fort Lauderdale on a dredged-out island, stretching over 27
acres.⁶¹ In the 1950s, the number of fills around the Tampa Bay area, where dredges ran round-
the-clock, prompted a piece in the *New York Times* travel section extolling the various fills and
canals as recreational grounds for sunbathers and fishermen. By 1963, more than 20 percent
(3,500 acres) of the Boca Ciega Bay's surface was filled. By 1970, dredge-and-fill had added
4,800 acres to Pinellas county. Overall in Florida, between 1950 and 1969, filling had
destroyed 262 square miles of estuarine habitats.⁶² In 1953, novelist John D. MacDonald, in
spite of his relatively recent migration to Florida back in 1949, described growth in the
Sunshine State as “turning water into land and putting houses on it.”⁶³

The demise of dredging and filling in Florida was slow coming, as local
environmentally-minded groups and national streams in the burgeoning environmental
movement coalesced in defeating real estate interests and their wards in local governments. In
1958, the United States Congress adopted the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, which
empowered the Army Corps of Engineers to review dredging projects based on a
consideration, among other factors, of their effect on conservation. Meanwhile, as told by historian Bruce Stephenson, two dramatic confrontations over the dredging and filling of Boca Ciega Bay, on the southwestern edge of the Pinellas peninsula, turned the dredgers’ fortunes around.\textsuperscript{64} Between 1956 and 1960, developers Albert Furen and Lee Ratner secured a permit to dredge and fill 450 acres of Boca Ciega bay, in a fashion that impaired, a great deal more than previous fills, the tidal flow of water that contributed to the bay’s rich marine life. Opposition had been voiced to a growth-oriented Pinellas County Commission, and then to courts, by local citizens, by specialists in the budding science of marine biology, and eventually by Governor Leroy Collins, in vain. Courts found that they could not overturn Pinellas County’s oversight and licensing authority. Other infamous projects were proceeding in the Bay at the time: Dr. Bradley Waldron, with his Detroit-based partners Hyman and Irving Green, had applied in 1957 for a dredging permit to link and enlarge the islands of Pine, Cabbage, and Pardee Keys, to 5000 acres. It is in the resultant town of Tierra Verde that band leader Guy Lombardo opened the Port O’Call cabaret in great fanfare in January 1963, before leaving on a 20-city tour where “several minutes” of each show were devoted to promoting the resort.\textsuperscript{65}

Riding a wave of discontent with politics and pollution as usual, as well as the newfound conservative mood, wealthy bachelor Claude Roy Kirk became in 1967 Florida’s first Republican governor since Reconstruction. He appointed Nathaniel Reed, nature lover from Connecticut and snowbird for half the year at Jupiter Island, as his environmental advisor. Reed would move on to become one of President Nixon’s entourage.\textsuperscript{66} The Board of Trustees clamped a moratorium on underwater land sales early in 1967. Together with state representative Tom Randell of Fort Myers, Kirk and Reed enacted legislation mandating dredgers to come up with a detailed environmental assessment. Between 1967 and 1970, the number of dredging permits issued in Florida plummeted from 2000 to 200 per year. In 1968,
the United States Congress adopted the National Estuary Protection Act, encouraging local governments to plan for the preservation of estuaries, and ordering federal agencies to take into consideration the environmental impacts of coastal development.

Action also came from the bottom up: Elliot Key was saved in the late 1960s from a dredge-and-fill that would have doubled the island’s surface to 8,000 acres, with help from the Miami Herald editorial board. Similarly, two Sarasota keys developed by Arvida Corporation, and a segment of Hollywood (planned by GAC Properties, then Florida's biggest developer), were saved from the dredges by popular demand. And because of public pressure, in a landmark decision, the Army Corps of Engineers denied in 1967 a dredging permit for a rather small (twelve acres) fill in Boca Ciega Bay, for environmental reasons. A Federal court upheld it in 1970. Most Florida-style dredge-and-fill was definitively stopped by the federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, which empowered the Corps of Engineers to ban all dredging that would damage water supplies, fishing, shellfish beds, wildlife, and recreational areas, in all navigable water and adjacent wetlands. In 1972 a civil servant calculated that over a hundred projects were still proceeding, illegally, in the Keys. In the 1980s and 1990s “several entire subdivisions, complete with homes, were found to be constructed on illegally filled lands”.

The third desecration of Florida’s most iconic place was beach erosion. Florida beaches were eroding into the sea during the 1940s and 1950s; shore erosion occurs naturally in storms and high winds, and beaches have natural features and replenishment processes that stave off, or counter the effects of, erosion. Since the early twentieth century, human action on Florida's shores, with sea walls and bulkheads, groins, fills, and the dredging of inlets, has accelerated erosion. Although beach nourishment had taken place as early as the 1920s (at Coney Island, of all places), it was believed, prior to the 1940s, that hard structures such as seawalls and groins actually prevented erosion. As many beaches on the Gold Coast were submerged, a movement
emerged: in 1957 a group of concerned local governments and scholars created the Florida Shores and Beach Preservation Association, modeled after a nationwide association. By the late 1950s, the big-hotel section of Miami Beach had no beach at high tide, as the waves lapped the seawalls in front of the Fontainebleau and its consorts. When the city of Miami Beach reacted in 1960, it was with too little – a zoning rule that mandated a minimal “setback” distance of 90 feet between the building and the bulkhead line – and too late, as the shore was all built up. In reaction to the dredge-and-fill controversy, and to the damaged wreaked on Florida’s shores by Hurricane Donna, the state legislature enshrined shore protection, at least formally, in the 1961 Beach and Shore Preservation Act. A report released to the state Legislature in the winter of 1967 by the Shore and Beach Preservation Association, called for bigger, coordinated, statewide, federally-assisted beach protection and nourishment efforts.

Large-scale, federally subsidized beach nourishment and protection projects in Florida started to take place in the 1950s. Legislation in 1946 and 1956 provided federal funding to an extent (fifty percent if the land protected was public, or impacting on public land), and forbade federal funding for the creation of new land, but the bulldozers and dredges really started combing Florida’s beaches after 1962, when up to seventy percent of the costs were assumed by Washington. In Miami Beach, where beachfront property was tantamount to a private beach, hotel owners fought the first beach nourishment projects that the Corps presented them in 1963. Hotel owners had been told they would have to sign easements “letting the public use that part of the beach which would have been created.” When beach nourishment projects were discussed in again in 1970, hotel owners threatened to sue the government, arguing that a wider beach would allow riffraff on their doorsteps, translating into diminished property rights and less privacy for their patrons.

Nourishment had begun south of the Beach by the late 1960s. As the 1970s begun, the
Miami Beach business elite grew increasingly worried over the economic future of the Sun and Fun Capital of the World. Nourishment finally started in Miami Beach in May 1977; the first wave of these works covered ten miles, and ended in 1982. Because tourist dollars were at stake, nourishment was welcome in the end: in 1996 it was argued that the $50 million spent annually since 1976 to maintain the Beach was much smaller than the amount spent each year by foreign visitors. But federally-subsidized nourishment could be seen as costly to taxpayers: not all Americans belonged to beach-dependent communities. At the pace of an estimated $6 million per mile by the mid-1990s, a third of all federal funds had been spent in the Sunshine State. A more sober mood set in in Congress throughout the 1980s, resulting in substantial cuts in the federal funding of nourishment and shore protection. While the 1986 Water Resources Development Act recognized that storm damage and recreation were the primary motives of shore protection, it reduced Washington’s share in projects and feasibility studies. Further legislation increased the nonfederal share to fifty percent by 2003. As an *ex post* vindication of fiscal conservatism, costs escalated: by 1996, nearly half of all Florida's 800 miles of sandy, oceanfront beaches, and eighteen miles of beaches in Miami-Dade County, experienced some degree of erosion; accordingly between 1991 and 2002 the number of projects rose from three to twenty, and their cost to $90 million; twenty-five projects were expected in 2004.

Other battles took place throughout the 1960s, each one contributing to define environmental protection as a durable fixture of Florida’s politics and civic ethos. In 1962, as Miami businesspeople and Dade County leaders weighed the creation of Seadade, an oil refinery and deep-water port in southern Biscayne Bay, thirteen local landowners created the City of Islandia to cash in on the project. In response, alarmed leaders in Miami Beach asked the federal Department of the Interior in 1963 to protect their stake in the Bay by designating part of it as a national monument; they also sued Dade County to prevent the construction of
the refinery, as it would constitute a “public nuisance.” In 1964 Hardy Matheson was elected metro commissioner (for Dade County) on a conservationist platform, with the editorial support of the *Miami Herald* and financial support of vacuum cleaner magnate Herbert W. Hoover Jr. Soon thereafter, Seadade was killed by metro commissioners. \(^{74}\)

The next debate came in 1965 when developers planned luxury housing developments for the southern tip of Key Biscayne and, further south, for Elliot Key in the paper town of Islandia. John Pennekamp and his colleague Bill Baggs at the *Miami News* sought to prevent development by seeking state and federal protection for the two areas, on the grounds that there were few other pristine public beaches left in Miami-Dade. The state government responded in the spring of 1966 by purchasing land for a state park on Key Biscayne, while Miami-area voters countered the developers’ machinations by electing Claude R. Kirk for governor. As these leaders, with a few local associations, tried to prevent the dredging and filling of Elliott Key in southeastern Dade county, local representative Dante Fascell and the United States Congress responded in 1968 by creating the Biscayne Bay National Monument. \(^{75}\)

This battle won, more or less, nuclear power triggered the next chain reaction. In the late 1960s the Florida Power and Light Company built a nuclear power plant at Turkey Point on Biscayne Bay, at the site of a conventional power station. By 1970 the plant had attracted critical public, state, and federal scrutiny for dumping excessive amounts of hot water into the Bay, killing marine flora and fauna. Next, protests in 1971 stopped the construction of a large airport west of Miami in the Big Cypress Swamp. \(^{76}\)

By the early 1970s, Hardy Matheson, Claude R. Kirk, Reubin Askew, Dante Fascell, Richard M. Nixon, and others had proved that positive political results came of catering to the demands of the environmental movement. This was nowhere more evident than around the President’s winter retreat, in Greater Miami. In October 1972, John B. Orr Jr, the mayor of
Miami, newly elected on a conservation platform, promoted a countywide Master Plan. Although the new blueprint was only applicable to unincorporated areas, and left municipal regulations intact, it intentionally slowed population growth by charging the costs of infrastructural construction to developers and aimed at preserving agricultural land, swamps, and other wetlands.77

Given the stamina of Florida’s local growth machines, comprehensive planning, if any, had to come from the state level. And Governor Reubin Askew, prodded into action by the 1970-71 drought, espied the political (and ethical) benefits of environmental protection, convening the South Florida Water Management Conference in September 1971. In his 1972 opening address to the Florida legislature, Askew evoked Eden: “Florida, like California, is in great danger of becoming a 'paradise lost.'” Taking heed, legislators enacted four major environmental statutes: the Environmental Land and Water Management Act, the Water Resources Act, the Land Conservation Act, and the Comprehensive Planning Act.78 In the following months, voters approved a $240 million bond issue to finance the purchase of land needed for these conservation measures.79 The first act enabled local governments to set up or license local planning bodies, to draw up local land use plans, and to determine the conformity of development projects to local and state plans. The state cabinet was empowered to designate and protect areas of “critical state concern,” and to single out the larger development projects as having a “Regional Impact.”80 The state could then evaluate the projects and advise local governments on their planning. The first “area of critical state concern” designated by Florida was the Big Cypress Swamp, northwest of the Everglades, coveted by developers at the time; the second area was the Keys. The second act set up five water management districts, to coordinate local planning of water resources; the third set up bond issues to finance the purchase of “environmentally endangered lands” and land for outdoor recreation; and the
fourth set up a structure for comprehensive planning. Contemporary commentators decried these measures as far from satisfying: the first act outlined maximum acreages of areas to be protected, and had a grandfather clause protecting developments authorized prior to the designation of the area as “endangered.” The main criticism was that the legislation left all the initiative and most of the interpretation to local governments. The fourth act promised no state comprehensive planning and no state-level overriding powers in case of delinquency.81

After conservation proved its political value by re-electing Askew, the legislature approved in 1975 the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act, requiring all local governments to establish a planning agency to draw up – as the title said – a comprehensive plan. Each plan had to address a list of mandatory issues, and had to be drawn up in conformity with the (forthcoming) state plan, after a minimum of two public hearings. By 1984, every county government had the requisite plan82. While many jurisdictions in Florida, including the cities of Miami Beach, Miami, and St Petersburg, as well as Dade County, had adopted local plans as early as the 1920s and 1930s, a great number of local governments were chartering their turf in unprecedented ways, thanks to the Comprehensive Planning Act. And studies found that the existence of statewide planning guidelines allowed better-quality local plans83. Yet flaws remained: there were no formal means to control the quality of local plans, or to tie plans to implementation rules; there was no state funding for implementation, no comprehensive state plan before 1985, and state supervision was limited to “review and comment.” A number of evaluations conducted in the early 1980s found that many plans were vague and easily amendable, that few resources or regulations were available to enforce them, and that they varied greatly between localities, even neighbouring ones. To the newly planning-minded Floridian, this was all too sadly in tune with the American tradition of urban-fragmentation-by-home-rule depicted by historian Jon Teaford.84
But while commentators saw the planning and environmental reforms as toothless, their passage nonetheless pointed out a major shift in Florida’s civic and political cultures. As the environmental movement grew, a peculiar and contested policy emerged to preserve Florida nature: “growth management,” if not growth control. Florida’s fragile ecosystems needed growth control as Canada’s wilderness needed logging management. The growth management initiatives in Tallahassee, pioneering as they were in the state of the Great Land Boom, were mirrored at the local level. The campaign to preserve Florida and its community life and ecology from the perils of growth began, predictably, in the Gold Coast areas most threatened by over-development. In the early 1970s, several communities sought to preserve themselves by adopting slow- or anti-growth policies. One particularly famous move was Boca Raton’s 1972 cap on housing units, accompanied by a restriction on new building permits. In 1973, Hollywood set a limit to the density of multi-family dwellings, to preserve its small-town atmosphere in sharp contrast with neighbouring Hallandale, which was becoming the state capital of condo towers. In the spring of 1974, Dunedin (Pinellas County), then in the process of drawing up a comprehensive plan, imposed a month-long moratorium on all building permits and a six-month moratorium on zoning changes. In May 1975 the city government won a referendum authorizing it to charge the cost of building new infrastructure to developers of new subdivisions (the so-called “impact fees”). Meanwhile Stuart, fifty miles north of Miami, initiated a four-storey limit on new construction, impact fees on developers, and a formal approval process for building projects. Many jurisdictions followed Stuart’s example, including Broward and Palm Beach Counties in 1977 and 1979 respectively.

As impediments to growth developed, so too did opposition from impacted developers. Slow-growth battles in the Florida Keys were numerous and infamous. Victory was uncertain. Chapter 1 has already related how the implementation of the tourist tax in Monroe County was
resisted by local voters during the early 1980s, and was belatedly implemented within Key West. In 1990, pro-growth sentiment prevailed, voting down a proposal to charge a fifty-cent toll on the highway leading to the Keys, to fund the protection of marine wildlife.\(^8\) By contrast, slow-growth won out when, in the fall of 1996, county authorities proposed to widen highway US 1 to four lanes between Florida City and Key Largo, allegedly to facilitate emergency evacuation in case of a hurricane. A majority opposed the proposed widening as a misrepresented, pro-growth measure that threatened the tourist value of the Keys. Carl Hiaasen explained the furor: “What's always made the Keys so special, and so alluring to visitors, was how different it was from Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and the rest of urban Florida.” Victory over the forces of growth was, however, temporary. The Army Corps of Engineers finally approved the plan in 2004, during a record-breaking hurricane season. Still fighting, a coalition of Keys residents sued the state government the following year to stop works on that stretch of road.\(^8\)

In 1999, residents of the Keys upheld a county ordinance banning the rental of homes for periods of less than a month (28 days), in hopes of walling off residential neighbourhoods from partying tourists. In the fall of that same year, slow-growth activists started a campaign to end the county’s campaign to promote tourism in the Keys because it had been “too successful.” They argued that the islands’ growing popularity had pushed up rents by an oppressive 14 percent a year since 1970. Moreover, who needed more tourists? There were quite enough of them already – an average of 50,000 a day descending on a permanent population of 81,000. As a fateful sign of overcrowding, in the summer of 1999, Key West beaches had to be closed for a few weeks when the sewage network overflowed.\(^8\) The Keys’ permanent residents could take little solace in the fact that at least Key West had a sewage facility; prior to 1989, it had none. City commissioners reacted quickly: by November, local voters had approved improvements to their sewage treatment plants. Still, by 2008, the Keys’ wastewater
infrastructure remained inadequate and plagued by escalating costs: when the state legislature voted to study the feasibility of removing the “critical state concern” designation for the Keys, the Department of Community Affairs could only conclude that state support was still necessary.90

However piecemeal or local, growth controls were an unsettling innovation to those who profited from the bull market in Florida realty. Indeed, Boca Raton's growth controls had been branded as “un-American” by a real estate agent.91 By the 1980s, given the mounting evidence (like a garbage pile) of environmental damage wreaked by Florida’s passion for rapid growth, growth management had entered the Florida mainstream. Miami Herald columnist Al Burt lamented: “Unmanaged growth did not do all of [the environmental damage], but it accelerated a process that need not have been inevitable. Unplanned, dollar-following growth guided by a treadmill philosophy and a myopic, nineteenth-century belief in no limits made it worse.”92

By the 1980s, a significant part of Florida's elites, and most of its intelligentsia, had embraced growth controls.93 Tallahassee legislators enshrined growth controls with the Growth Management Act in 1985. Not only did this act compel recalcitrant communities to draw up a growth plan, it also gave the state veto power over local development projects. As well, it promoted the practice of charging impact fees to developers for road construction. In the Keys, as well as in Hillsborough (Tampa) and Collier (Naples) Counties, the powers granted under the Growth Management Act were used to limit residential development to incorporated areas and core cities. In 1986, a citizens’ watchdog group, the “1,000 Friends of Florida,” emerged to make sure the state held firm to controls.94

The 1,000 Friends have had to be ever-vigilant, for growth controls have remained a hotly contested issue. By the 1990s as a new, somewhat pro-business spirit came to Tallahassee, momentum gathered to reform growth management legislation once again. In
1994, the Legislature raised most of the thresholds by which larger building projects could be deemed of “regional impact” and submitted to more stringent, state-level reviews – by 50 to 150 percent. Critics of the 1985 legislation blamed it for failing to prevent sprawl, water shortages, school overcrowding and traffic congestion. At the heart of the “infrastructure backlog” plaguing local governments and citizens was the concurrency rule, which, in spite of charging the cost of infrastructure to developers, was too growth-friendly, too lenient to adequately provide services, prevent sprawl, and control infrastructural costs. A study commission on growth control recommended a (little) more government intervention: the integration of schools in the mandatory local planning infrastructure, new forms of financing, and “a uniform model for evaluating the true cost of new development.” The same commission, as well Enterprise Florida, the public-private agency for economic development created in 1996, followed the mood of the times, asking for smart growth (compact, transit-oriented, multi-use), a streamlining of growth management regulations (especially for projects identified as priorities or deemed uncontroversial by planning regulators), more autonomy for local planning bodies, regional co-operation between local governments, and fewer regulations and more incentives or market-based approaches to achieve statewide goals – what one voice called “growth leadership.” Legislators ended up implementing some of the proposals: in April 2002, the procedures for the state review of developments deemed of “regional impact” were streamlined. Governor Bush signed the school proposal into law in June 2002, as the gubernatorial campaign was entering its final stretch. In 2009, further legislation further streamlined the planning process. To the anger of the environmentally minded and local governments, Senate Bill 360 waived the concurrency requirement for transportation – the requirement for developers to fund roads to their development – in “dense urban land areas” and in localities where the transportation infrastructure was provided within a planned “urban
services boundary.” While it made sense for downtowns to drop a requirement for more streets, this particular legislation provided a much-too-wide definition of “dense urban land”: counties of over a million residents and cities with densities of over 1,000 per square mile. The list of eligible localities ended up including eight counties and over 200 cities – in their entirety, not just their downtowns. SB 360 therefore offered to tract developments a free ride to Sprawl-Land.97 However, environmentalists are still pushing ahead: in 2004, growth-control advocates initiated a petition drive to put a growth-control referendum on the state ballot; the measure proposed that significant amendments to the municipal and county plans would have to be approved by local voters. Opposed by the state’s business community and former Governor Bush, the measure was defeated in 2010, in a statewide referendum.98

4.5 Community Regained?

Even as Floridians strove to strengthen their control over growth, they also sought to reinforce their "imagined community" in order to build a polity for permanent residents. Some idea of the magnitude of this task can be gleaned from the story of the Festival of States. The snowbirds of St Petersburg began putting on this annual festival in 1913, through the agency of state societies, their most visible social clubs. It evolved into one of the Gulf Coast's most important communitarian celebrations, perhaps only second to Tampa’s Gasparilla. The festival climaxed with the coronation of a beauty queen and a parade. The Queen was chosen among girls elected by the state societies, and the parade was a Parade of the States, one of which, since the beginning, was Canada. In the 1950s the festival's program even included the election of a Miss Canada.99

The reverence in which Florida visitors were held helped create the most important yearly local event in St Petersburg – a celebration of the visitors' origins! Imagine: a city with
so little sense of its own self that its premier community event featured outsiders. Eventually, local leaders felt uneasy with St Petersburg's self-abasement. Compounding St Petersburg elites' unease, the unapologetically self-mythifying Gasparilla festival, across the bay in Tampa, contributed to creating a strong sense of place, with help from the ethnic flavour of the Ybor City district, and with a great deal of carnivalesque mythmaking around the buccaneer past of the Gulf Coast. As the Festival of States outgrew the capacities of the chamber of commerce staff, a group of fifty business leaders, calling themselves the Suncoasters, took over the festival's operation in 1958. They promptly changed the name of the event to the Sunshine Festival, to re-root the event more firmly in local soil. While organizers retained the beauty pageant, it was turned into the coronation ball of a Sun Goddess, chosen among candidates from Florida colleges and universities. A Mr. Sun was chosen from among outstanding local leaders.100

Apparently sexual stereotypes were harder to reform than the St Petersburg civic ethos, but not much harder: by 1961, the event had been rebranded as the Sunshine Festival of States. “Sunshine” was omitted in 1963. However, the same civic urge that transformed the Festival of States into an event for the entire community also brought one particularly colourful effort to redefine St Petersburg in favour of its permanent population. In 1961, the city’s publicity department announced that the 1950s had seen a rejuvenation of the population, and a group of local leaders set up a “Project 61” image-remaking campaign in favour of a younger clientele of visitors and migrants. Their first action was highly symbolic: the city government repainted 4,000 green benches, their color closely associated in the public mind with the retired crowd, in more modern pastel. Initially, the original dark green was banned, but some retailers, breaking ranks, repainted their benches in snowbird green. The municipality relenting, a city ordinance in 1962 authorized all colours, green included.101
St Petersburg’s struggle to define itself as something more than God’s waiting room had its counterpart, sooner or later, in virtually every Florida community. Miami Beach spent the 1970s trying to rejuvenate its population, its image, and its clientele. In the 1990s, Hollywood debated whether its small beachfront motels and mobile home communities were truly in the public interest. Their critics accused the city government of failing the permanent population by implicitly supporting businesses that made the town look like a cheap, lower-class resort.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, two sets of events illustrated the newfound strength of the slow-growth agenda at the state level. The tourist industry was, as we have seen, a target of slow-growth advocates. By the 1970s, it had become obvious that the economic benefits emanating from tourism were not without externalities. Nowhere was Sun and Fun’s fallout more obvious than on the Gold Coast: in Miami-Dade County, persistent Florida Dreaming had also fostered persistent poverty, inequality, and ethno-racial fragmentation, both in spatial and economic terms. Persistent poverty turned into persistent disorder: Miami suffered three riots in May 1980, December 1982, and January 1989, compounded by further unrest in Tampa in 1987 and 1989 and in St Petersburg in 1996, and a spate of violent crime against tourists on the Gold Coast in the early 1990s.

Miami civic and business leaders reacted in the spring of 1985, when the Beacon Council, a public-private agency for the recruitment of businesses, was formed. It issued a set of eighteen recommendations for the economic development and diversification of Miami-Dade county: among other priorities they outlined the economic integration of ethnic and racial minorities; law-and-order enforcement; the improvement of education at all levels; and incentives for the recruitment of globally-competitive and high-technology businesses. This council was one of many: at the time, a rising number of local economic agencies were
jumping on the high-tech bandwagon. Nonetheless, by 2006, Miami-Dade’s efforts were hailed as significant in changing its economic structure.\textsuperscript{106}

By the late 1980s, as economic modernization accelerated, the economic effect of tourism appeared less profitable than it used to: for instance, many of the tourism jobs were low-paid and dead-end, such as theme park staff, hotel chambermaids, and gas station attendants – these workers strained the state’s frayed social safety net and cheap housing stock. Florida was efficient at creating jobs, but many of these were in low-wage, low-skilled sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and construction. Accordingly the state’s workers earned about 90\% of the United States’ average. In the gloomy economic mood of the early 1990s, oft-quoted data spoke of Florida’s vulnerability to economic cycles and global competition: the state ranked 44\textsuperscript{th} in per capita wages, but first in income derived from interest and dividends; the share of manufacturing employment was half the national figure; finally, the state hosted a minuscule share, one half of a percent, of the United States’ venture capital.\textsuperscript{107}

The Florida Chamber of Commerce issued its own set of proposals for economic diversification. In April 1989 the Chamber published its Cornerstone Report, advocating stronger, coordinated, public-private efforts in the development of a skilled labour force, in the recruitment of high-tech businesses and support for research-and-development, in financing the creation of new businesses, and in the defense of the quality of life that was as much a trademark of Florida as a precondition for a high-skills economy.\textsuperscript{108}

In 1991, the Chamber called for the creation of a public-private agency for economic development. Early in 1992, the nonprofit Enterprise Florida was formed, with a mandate and a subsidy from the legislature, and help from the business community. Governor Lawton Chiles presided over its first board meetings, where members agreed to achieve a consensus on how to diversify the state’s economy to “create high-quality jobs for Floridians.” Economist Beldon
Daniels explained to the board: “The whole thrust of Enterprise Florida is to switch from a tourism-based, real-estate based, low-wage-based economy to a high value-added, innovation-driven, export-oriented economy.” By 1995 the Florida legislature transferred responsibility for economic development from the state Department of Commerce to Enterprise Florida, following a trend in public affairs towards more “flexible” and entrepreneurial public administration.109 One of the agency’s strategic plans, outlined in 2004, made the diversification of Florida’s economy its central priority. While these plan recognized the current importance of tourism, Enterprise Florida repeatedly affirmed the necessity of diversifying the state’s economy in order to provide better-paying, knowledge-based jobs to Floridians, and to raise the technological and competitive level of the state’s businesses and workforce in a context of global competition.110 Further along, when Governor Bush appointed a Century Commission to outline long-term priorities “for a sustainable Florida,” top priorities called for a diverse and globally competitive economy, as well as a skilled workforce.111 Many of these objectives – education, if only that – ran counter to the reality of the tourist economy. It was, therefore, highly significant that consensus-building, consultative initiatives such as Enterprise Florida could agree on rejecting so vocally the most important pre-existing development model.112

In a follow-up report, issued in September 2003 and unceremoniously titled New Cornerstone, the Florida Chamber outlined once more its vision of the state’s challenges: high manpower and regulatory costs, growth-related problems (including on the road network and in public schools), a persistent gap in high-tech investment and high-skills employment, and a “global image as a place to retire and vacation, but not a place for business.” As a testimony to the increasing popularity of the creative class school of economic development, New Cornerstone stressed the importance of Florida’s quality of life in attaining its goals. Yet little
had changed since 1989, as one commentator noticed.\textsuperscript{113} 

If some parts of the business community still voiced their support for tourism, their voices were faint compared to the consensus on diversification. And when the industry’s voice was heard, the result showed how tourism was no longer in the central place where it used to sit: in the Cornerstone reports and Enterprise Florida’s \textit{Strategic Plans}, it was deemed necessary to raise the share of \textit{international} visitors amongst Florida tourists. Tourist businesses could no longer bask in the satisfaction of catering to over seventy million North Americans – they had to play their part in the push for export-oriented development, even as stricter immigration and Homeland Security regulations impeded the travel of foreigners to the United States. In another telling instance, tourism, especially its emerging cultural segments, was identified as conducive to quality of life, the type that would attract and retain high-end jobs and highly-skilled workers – the state’s iconic industry had become a means instead of an end in itself, a means to reach the trendy, much-sought-after status of haven to the creative class. Kevin Crowder, Miami Beach’s director for economic development, put it thus: “tourism is also a key player in creating 'quality of place,' which is essential to the development and growth of entrepreneurship and business recruitment in the state.”\textsuperscript{114} 

Very few voices retorted in kind, assailing high-tech development as defective in comparison with tourism. Because of its reliance on the uniqueness of landscapes, sights, and attractions, tourism always had been, in a sense, immune to global competition, whereas high-tech businesses and workers were prone to footlooseness. Tom Flanigan, spokesperson for Visit Florida, insisted: " 

High tech is considerably more portable than tourism. It means that those things that make Florida a more desirable visitor destination are highly unlikely to leave anytime soon. I don't see our 1,100 miles of beaches relocating to Montana, whereas there is massive
competition among all states and even internationally for high-tech positions."\(^{115}\)

Flanigan echoed Miami Beach promoter Hank Meyer, who, back in the heady days of 1955, had told *Newsweek*: “You can't bottle it, or pack it, or ship it. If the American people want this, and I know they do, then they will come down here to get it.”\(^{116}\)

Another part of the smarter/slower-growth shift targeted retirement migration. In 2002, alarmed by the proliferation of retirement communities in competing states, Florida’s tourist industry had realized it could no longer take retirees’ patronage for granted, even as the graying of the Baby Boom generation guaranteed that snowbirds would soon be flocking south in record numbers. It persuaded Governor Bush to create Destination Florida, a fifteen-member commission to promote retirement migration. The initiative owed much to Al Hoffman, fundraiser for the Governor, and Chief Executive Officer of WCI Communities, a builder of retirement communities. Hoffman asked in June 2002 for a new marketing institution, specifically aimed at affluent retirees. A study sponsored by WCI claimed that the impact of retired persons in Florida was great, but warned that other states managed better in recruiting them: during the year 2000, more retirees had settled in the Carolinas than in Florida. Destination Florida issued its report in 2003, advocating a strong promotional initiative, including an awareness and education campaign directed at Floridians who had obviously grown less sensitive to what elderly migrants brought to the state.\(^{117}\) It was met with a barrage of criticism, one editorial suggesting that the commission’s proposals were old-school, chamber-of-commerce, real-estate-growth-at-all-costs practice, no longer tolerable in a state plagued with growth-related and environmental problems.\(^{118}\) Instead, by 2006, the Florida Department of Elderly Affairs downplayed the recommendations, ostentatiously warning potential elderly migrants to inquire as to the “real” Florida before making a move. By 2009,
the DOEA’s publications, even its strategic plans, made no reference whatsoever to elderly migration. For this department, health care costs and the complexity of late-twentieth-century Florida had made the Florida Dream *passé*, even dangerous to public health in a state with an unprecedented number of elderly residents.

Whatever the strategy adopted, whether community re-branding, slow-growth policies, environmentalism, or tourist-bashing, Floridians have evinced a growing need since 1960 to find a way to heal the divisive effects of mass tourism in order to build (or rebuild) genuine community. Floridians increasingly defined the tourist business as detrimental to the creation of a coherent, autonomous, and vital polity rooted in local soil. The goal was a state that provided work for its own citizens, and not simply surcease for outsiders. The jibes at tourists and snowbirds by Floridians therefore expressed their desire to build a state worthy of their young. America as a whole had not been a gerontocracy since Thomas Jefferson refused to wear a white wig, and it was high time for Florida to empower its working-age residents.

The most visible means that Floridians have taken to redefine their home are through environmental and slow-growth militancy. But a similarly widespread, less-heralded movement was at work in the construction of a public ethos, a folklore of the perils of allowing snowbirds and tourists on the state’s byways. Floridians drove around with admonitory bumper sticks warning of gridlock, mendacious signal lights, and dangerously slow drivers in the same way that the State Highway Department posted signs advising of construction and lane-narrowing ahead. Another way to define Florida away from tourism was to have the state’s intelligentsia broadcast fantasies of no-growth where visitors and boosters alike were punished for their sins, often by the natural forces which they had defiled. The advocates of planning and environmental controls used such fantasies – Florida Noir – for more than deterring potential tourists; they built a regulatory context for the eventual emancipation of Florida from the
ravages of its addiction to mass tourism.

Florida in the era after World War II was increasingly being defined as a community in its own right, and less as a Sun and Fun fantasyland. Meanwhile, migration was also pushing Florida to evolve into something more than a tourist haven. As Florida has become younger, urban, and more Latin since the 1970s, it has been outgrowing its Edenic, carnivalesque, sun-and-fun past, outgrowing tourism as a central economic activity, as the most visible representation of the Florida Dream. In a Florida where an increasing proportion of residents and visitors have become less loyal, even indifferent to their Northern roots, less likely to define Florida as merely an outpost of New York or Cleveland or Havana, the prospects of a locally rooted identity and polity have improved. Indeed, by the 1980s the newfound cosmopolitan, big-city atmosphere in Miami and Tampa had become a tourist attraction in itself.\textsuperscript{120}

One might say that the subtropical sun was hot enough to fuel a melting pot that was molding a Florida community. Ironically, the glass by which Floridians kindled their communal melting pot was the distorted lens through which tourists had long viewed their state. Community was being built through the discovery of a shared aversion to having Florida defined primarily by tourism. Florida was more than a place to visit; by 2006 eighteen million people actually lived there, more than all but three of the other states.

As Floridians defined tourists, snowbirds, and in-migrants as “the other” in order to define \textit{themselves}, the question inevitably arose: were these three groups – especially the most problematic, the most liminal group, snowbirds – actually part of the community being built by Floridians? Most would answer by saying that tourists merely flitted through Florida; they made no pretense of wanting to belong there. In sharp contrast, most of the migrants who became permanent residents clearly hoped to fit into the community being built. But what
about snowbirds? What exactly was their relationship to the community of Floridians? Did these sojourners behave more like tourists or more like settlers? Would they ever truly belong in a newly “normal” state in which most people did not directly benefit from tourism? In other words, would Florida community-building have to include or exclude the snowbirds?

4 Keever, “Hometown, Fla."
8 *Miami Herald, The Other Side of the Sun.*
11 Eugenie Nable, “Flight 318 to Orlando,” 150.
14 Hiller, “Marketing the Real Florida,” 44.


17 Delray Beach Chamber of Commerce, “Delray Beach Visitor's Map” (Delray Beach, late 1960s).


19 Bender’s sentences comes from his *Community and Social Change* book (p. 46), and has been repeatedly quoted, here by Kenneth Kusmer, “The Concept of 'Community' in American History,” *Reviews in American History* 7 (September 1979): 320; see also Stout, “Forum: The Place of Religion in Urban and Community Studies,” 116.


Narsi Donoas, in Boca Raton, remarks that anti-snowbird remarks are more acceptable when aimed at Canadians: “Why Not Tax the More Numerous New Yorkers?” *Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel*, 19 February 1995; when readers of the *Sarasota Herald Tribune* react with outrage to a column, Grimes reacts by playing down any insulting meaning. Grimes, *Tourists, Retirees, and Other Reasons to Stay in Bed*, 6-8, 10-12, 26, 28, 75; on a query from *St Petersburg Times* to its readers about the impact of tourists: Bill Adair, “Traffic that Drives


The ethic of good driving is a widespread and useful as a means of creating and transmitting a folk knowledge of road security and proper driving techniques. Even academia does not refrain from rants about bad drivers, as can be seen in Rae, *The Road and the Car in American Life*, 141.


Sanford, “Where is the South in Today's Southern Literature?” *storySouth* (summer 2002).


See note 10.


Peter Sleight, “This Resident Enjoys Season Over on the Other Side of Town,” *Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel*, 12 March 1986.


Five of the least accessible beaches: Palm Beach (the town), Longboat Key (on the Keys), Hillsborough Beach (south of Deerfield, Palm Beach county), Jupiter (northern Palm Beach county), Ponte Vedra Beach (St. Johns county, between Jacksonville and St. Augustine): “Land of Sunshine Needs Parks,” Miami Herald, 6 March 1967; Clarke, “Key Biscayne Retrieves…”; Vogel, “Access”.


Mansfield, “Privateering Public Land?” Miami Herald, 6 February 1977.


DeGrove, *Land, Growth, and Politics*, 117; broadly defined as affecting the population of more than one county. Specifically: shopping mall of more than 40 acres and/or more than 2,500 parking spaces; power plant with capacity of 100 mW or more, postsecondary campus for more than 3000 students; racetrack, sports stadium; housing development, mobile home park, or subdivision of 250 units and more in nonmetropolitan counties, or more than 3,000 units in metropolitan counties; airports, large ports, oil storage tanks, high-voltage electric transmission across county borders, mines; hospital serving more than one county (99 beds and less exempted); industrial district; plant with parking space for more than 1,500 cars. *cf.* Stroud, *Land, Growth, and Politics*, 148, 149; Barnett, “Environment.”

Weitz, “From Quiet Revolution to Smart Growth,” 284, 288.

Ibid., 284-8.


Villano, “The Paradise Paradox.”


Allen, “Florida, Canada’s Hottest Province,” 69.

C. Winn Upchurch, “Sunny Pageantry,” NYT, 8 March 1959, sec. 10; Flynn, Florida: Land of Fortune, 205, 206.


Robert Trigaux, “Florida’s Vision Looks Sadly Familiar,” St Petersburg Times, 2
In the summary of regional forums convened to produce “Roadmap to Florida’s Future: Strategic Plan for Economic Development 2004-2009” (2003), the West Central Florida panel (Tampa Bay area) relays an appeal not to “forget about the importance of tourism and construction to the state”; meanwhile the Southeast region’s panel outlines the necessity to see tourism within a “quality of life” lens; Tourism as a means to another end, as an activity that “can’t be offshored,” or as priority for a few voices in forums held by Enterprise Florida: Roadmap to Florida’s Future (2007-2012), 32-3, 73, 103, 120, 139-40; and Roadmap to Florida’s Future (2010-2015), 56, 57, 75-6, 81, 89-98, 104, 108. (Crowder is quoted here, in annex on “Stakeholders’ submissions”; more explicitly in favour of creative class thesis, a number of members of Broward Alliance’s (Broward’s equivalent to Miami’s Beacon Council) Creative Industries Task Force contributed to Enterprise Florida’s 2009 forums.) All accessed 2010, http://eflorida.com.


Meyer is quoted by Ruby Leach Carlson, “Forty Years of Miami Beach,” Tequesta 24 (1964).


“Retire to Florida, We’re Cheap,” St Petersburg Times, 22 February 2003.


Coconut Grove as a cosmopolitan Florida: Barber, “Le Paris de Miami,” 110, 111.