A growing number of voices have expressed concern that the expansion of internationalization in higher education is being driven by instrumentalist and income-seeking motives at both institutional and national levels in the Global North (Bolsmann & Miller, 2008; Brandenberg & de Wit, 2011; Stier, 2004). These concerns are heightened given that the rise of internationalization has coincided with public funding cuts that have prompted institutions to increasingly rely on student tuition and other income sources not derived from state appropriations to balance their budgets and enact an increasingly market-like ethos (Gaffikin & Perry, 2009; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Some suggest that growing international enrolment is being treated as a means to subsidize local students’ education and other costs, while potentially contributing to widening inequality in international students’ home countries, as well as to the outsized emigration of highly-educated people from those nations (a phenomena known as ‘brain drain’) (Adnett, 2010; Johnstone & Lee 2014; Waters, 2006, 2012). Several scholars have therefore noted the risk that internationalization might reproduce already uneven geo-political relations and ultimately contribute to the increased polarization of global wealth distribution (Dixon, 2006; Khoo, 2011; Shahjahan, 2013; Tikly, 2004).

In many cases, concerns about the ethical dimensions of internationalization are articulated in response to a recognition and critique of local and global power imbalances, as in the studies cited above. However if, as Bolsmann and Miller (2008) suggest, internationalization is “a continuation of former imperial and political connections that have evolved into financially beneficial markets and sources of income for western universities” (p. 80), then we need to situate the current moment within a longer history of global entanglements organized by colonial, capitalist relations. If we fail to do so, the “ethics of internationalization” will continue to be haunted by the following paradox: the same Eurocentric categories and commitments that reproduce the highly uneven global higher education landscape may also shape many of our efforts to address these inequities.

In this paper I argue that in order to interrupt this circularity of critique and reframe our approaches to ethics in internationalization, it is necessary to identify, denaturalize, and interrupt our satisfaction with existing sociohistorical and geopolitical frames for conceptualizing higher education. In particular, I trace the ongoing effects of colonial relations, and consider how these relate to the developmental logics that shape many global engagements in higher education, as well as how these shape ethical possibilities. After this, I outline five ethical challenges of internationalization. I conclude by emphasizing the need for higher education scholars and practitioners to deepen our engagement with these and other challenges in ways that grapple with complexity, contradiction, and
complicity, and consider the possibilities and limitations of any potential response. Thus, rather than offer a prescriptive alternative, I ask what it would take for us to unlearn and unravel the harmful investments and narrow frames of reference that keep us from imagining a radically different ethics of internationalization.

**Decolonial Critique**

There is no singular definition or lineage of decolonial thought. In one sense it is based in traditions of resistance that are as old as European colonization itself, while in another sense it can be traced to several divergent and potentially incommensurable but broadly overlapping genealogies of theory and critique, including post-colonial, anti-colonial, Indigenous, and Black critical thought. Any brief synthesis of these rich traditions of study, as I provide here, must necessarily dispense with a certain degree of specificity and attention to internal tensions in order to grasp general points of shared concern (for discussions of the tensions between these bodies of work and their orienting concerns, see e.g. Bhambra, 2014; Byrd, 2011; King, 2015; Tuck & Yang, 2012).

Decolonial critique identifies racialization and colonization as constitutive of, rather than supplemental to, Western modernity, including Enlightenment philosophy and the rise of capitalism. In other words, racial and colonial violence are what make possible the currently dominant modes of social, political, and economic organization on a global scale. This violence therefore produces both individual subjectivities and institutional structures, though in highly uneven ways depending on where one is situated. Thus, nearly six centuries after its initiation, we continue to inhabit a capitalist/colonial/white supremacist/anti-Black/Orientalist/heteropatriarchal world (Grosfoguel, 2012; hooks, 1984). Exceeding efforts to simply identify instances of Eurocentrism, decolonial critiques denaturalize and ultimately seek to dismantle the various organizing elements of this world across structures of knowing, being, and relating. This includes:

- **The (geo- and bio-) political economy of knowledge production**, specifically, the notion that Western knowledge is objective and universally valuable, while all other knowledges/ways of knowing are of limited relevance (e.g. Hong, 2008; Santos, 2007; Smith, 2012);
- **The highly uneven distribution of wealth**, which began with Europe’s expropriation of lands, labour, and resources through Black enslavement and colonization of the Americas (and later, of Africa, Asia, and the Pacific), and which continues to rely on (raced and gendered) labor exploitation and resource expropriation (e.g. Silva, 2009, 2015);
- The organization of social relations into capitalist nation-states, which protect private property, police borders, and manage racialized regimes of citizenship (and in the case of settler colonial states, occupy Indigenous lands) (e.g. Spade, 2015; Tuck & Yang, 2012; Walia, 2013); and,
- The selective recognition of difference in equity and inclusion efforts, which are only enacted when they can be instrumentalized to maintain (without substantively challenging) the legitimacy of the nation-state or capital (e.g. Ahenakew & Naepi, 2015; Bell, 1979; Coulthard, 2014).

Decolonial critiques identify European colonization and slavery in the 15\textsuperscript{th} century as the genesis of modernity’s epistemological and ontological violence. These events enabled the emergence of the European/Euro-descended Subject (represented as rational, universal, and therefore rightful in asserting his will on the world\textsuperscript{1}), and the racialized and Indigenous Other (represented as irrational, particular, and therefore rightfully subjugated to the Subject’s will) (Silva, 2007; Wynter, 2003). Within this colonial relation, there are at least two conceptualizations of the Other – threatening or not – although both presume intellectual inferiority and moral deficiency. In the first conceptualization, the Other’s difference is represented as a dangerous pollutant, which then justifies their strict regulation and containment, through invasion/occupation, incarceration, and restricted movement. In contrast, the non-threatening Other may be deemed either pitiable but harmless (often treated as an object of charity), or conditionally equal in the case of those succeeding according to the Subject’s standards (often celebrated as exceptions). However, if their difference becomes too disruptive or if they obtain too much power or resources, they are quickly relegated back into the category of the dangerous Other. Today these representations continue to shape social, political, and economic life, from immigration legislation to IMF and World Bank loan conditions, and the ever-expanding apparatuses of (domestic and global) securitization.

In sum, this division of the world is highly contested but enduring, and has been reconfigured many times, often shifting in response to resistance to it as well as to the changing demands of capital (Biccum, 2010). A particularly significant shift came after World War II and at the beginning of formal decolonization in Asia and Africa, with the promise of development that asserted a clean rupture from the immediate colonial past (Kapoor, 2014). Development was/is a largely Western-led project that promises economic growth and technological ‘modernization’ of the non-West (Ziai, 2016). Within this framing, racialized and Indigenous peoples are represented as being located in the past, and requiring

\textsuperscript{1} The male pronoun is used intentionally here, as the normative Subject is a (cisgender) male.
Euro-descended peoples’ leadership to move forward in linear time toward the realization of a perfected, universal humanity. This echoes the original colonial Subject/Other relation, but with a promised path to equality through progress, which is premised on the Other conforming to the Subject’s (supposedly universal) norms. Yet development consistently undermines its own promises: because it disavows any accounting of responsibility for the cumulative effects of colonialism, and instead designates certain collectives as being by nature underdeveloped, the promise of equality is betrayed at the outset. These disavowals and designations are then used to justify the West’s continued political and economic advantage and intervention (Silva, 2015).

Identifying Colonial Logics in Higher Education

Colonial logics in higher education can be traced to the 16th century when Europe first exported its higher education to its colonies, building new institutions for Euro-descended settler elites and in some cases Indigenous students, as well as recruiting Indigenous students to study in the metropole (de Wit, 2002; Dolby & Rahman, 2008; Mignolo, 2003). The production of knowledge in the modern era of higher education was also largely shaped by the colonial context and the imperial imperative to catalogue, classify, and contain the world (Smith, 2012). This included the creation of categories of human difference, particularly through the onto-epistemological production of the European Subject (framed as the proper subject of knowledge) and the non-European Other (framed as the object of knowledge) (Silva, 2007; Wynter, 2003). As European empires expanded from the Americas to Asia, Africa and the Pacific, so too did the creation of knowledge about these places and peoples, the export of education, and the movement of students to metropoles (Angulo, 2012; Bascara, 2014; Coloma, 2009).

Following World War II, as many once-colonized nations gained their formal independence, a new and intensified era of international education engagement was initiated by the West with these and also various Latin American countries. Organized around the logic of development, Western institutions provided “technical assistance” or led structural reforms at universities in the non-West (de Wit, 2002; Gonzalez, 1982), and recruited non-Western students to study in the West (Goodwin & Nacht, 1991; O’Mara, 2012). Not surprisingly, it was those that were designated as ‘non-threatening Others’ who were selected to be international students. According to Kramer (2009), these students were chosen “from among what was believed to be another society’s future ‘directing’ or ‘leading’ class of political, cultural, and intellectual elites,” which was framed as

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2 But see Biccum (2010) for an account of the precedents of post-War development, which began with a “shift from the British mercantilist colonial regime to free trade imperialism (c. 1834-1846)” (p. 27). This included European powers’ earliest promises of freedom, progress, and civility to their colonies.
“politically neutral recognition of worth and leadership capacity on the basis of universally agreed-upon criteria” (p. 779). The intention was that the students would adopt the values and knowledge of the West, bring these back to help ‘develop’ their home nations, and also serve as brokers of important diplomatic and economic ties: although in practice things did not always operate as host nations planned.

Today, the logic of development in higher education is somewhat subtler than in the past, yet it continues to strongly influence the conceptualization and implementation of internationalization programs and policies.³ For instance, Marginson (2006) suggests, “the development of higher education capacity in the emerging nations, especially research capacity, can modify global asymmetries and uni-directional transformations” (p. 35). He proposes the need to advance “emerging nations’” global position and build their capacity in ways that “maximise ‘brain return’, make effective use of foreign-trained nationals and act as a magnet for diasporic investment” (p. 35). Despite the stated intention of achieving greater equity, framing Western universities as the basis for higher education development presumes that Western institutions represent a universal standard to which all other nations should aspire (Deem, Mok & Lucas, 2008; Matus & Talburt, 2015; Suspitsyna, 2015). This leaves unquestioned the feasibility and desirability of this standard, its suitability for particular contexts, and its potential harms. However, as Blanco Ramírez (2014) argues, universities in the “Global South face the choice of either accepting Global North quality ideas and standards or becoming isolated” (pp. 126-127).

International students themselves are also often treated as objects of development. Madge et al. (2015) identify the common framing of international students “as a metaphor of absence (lacking the knowledge, failing in the classroom, emblematic of the problem of immigration, depicted as marginal victims) against which the ‘development’ and intellectual advances of western education and knowledge can be pictured” (p. 684) Notably, developmental logic does not always operate in ways that explicitly critique international students. In one example, Hail (2015) found that local US students often initiated their engagement with Chinese international students in ways that were critical of China and evoked defensive responses. He argues: “if Western educators want to encourage Chinese students to appreciate pluralism and think about how democracy works, then showing students examples of the expression of civil rights in democratic countries may be more effective than directly criticizing China’s human rights situation” (p. 11). While it is indeed crucial to address the problems with antagonistic attacks toward students and their home nations’ governance systems, this framing of the proposed alternative also

³ Development-like, deficit-based logics significantly shape higher education policies and programs about and for racialized and Indigenous students within the West as well.
does not question the exceptionalism of liberal democracy and the West’s own numerous historical and ongoing abrogations of civil and human rights.

Finally, investment in developmental logics at Western institutions is not limited to domestic students and faculty. For instance, in her study of Chinese international students, Fong (2011) found that the students “were both consumers and promoters of the discourses that portrayed developed world citizenship as the paradise toward which everyone should be striving” (p. 219). While this in no way diminishes the imperative to reformulate deficit-based pedagogical frameworks and interrupt racism directed toward international students, it does point to the global reach of developmental logic and to the complexities that must be considered in any effort to denaturalize it (Suspitsyna, 2015).

Ethics and Politics

Ethical commitments are informed by particular conceptualizations of relationality (and/or the denial of relationality). While ethical questions have increasingly come to the fore in public discussions about internationalization (e.g. ACDE, 2014; CBIE, 2014), there is also a risk that concern for the ethical dimension may eclipse or elide an equally important consideration: the political dimension. But in fact, these are intimately intertwined. That is, ethical frameworks are not articulated or enacted in political vacuums; rather, ethics are formulated, situated, and negotiated within and between particular socio-historical contexts, collectivities, subjectivities, and power relations. Thus, politics are not supplemental to ethics, but instead centrally inform the context, content, and framing of any particular ethical approach or engagement.

In light of this tight relation between ethics and politics, it is significant that most Western ethical frameworks disavow the foundational colonial event that created (and continuously recreates) the dominant modern categories of Subject and Other. Rather than seeing these as co-constitutive positions that are always already in relation, and taking this as the starting point, ethical questions tend to be framed around the notion of freely chosen engagements between autonomous individuals and communities. While such engagements may be important, they are often depoliticized or ahistorical. For instance, recognition of ethical responsibility to respond to a flow of refugees may be framed as a largely technical question: How do we, as ethical actors, ensure that these individuals who are fleeing violence have adequate food and shelter? This is a vitally important question. Yet, by itself it fails to interrogate our own (historical and ongoing) role in the (re)production of the violence refugees are fleeing. Without tracing the entangled (bio- and geo-)political relations out of which the particular event to which ‘we’ are ‘ethically’ responding emerged, we might fail to see a bigger picture. In particular, this would include asking questions around how we
are implicated in, benefit from, and to some extent, are constituted by, the very violence that we seek to ameliorate.

Thus, while the ethical imperative to meet the immediate needs of the refugee is preferable to demonizing them and denying them services and mobility (i.e. framing them as a threatening Other), by treating them as a non-threatening Other without an account of the colonial relation, we are at best engaged in damage control, and we will not necessarily identify and understand, let alone denaturalize or interrupt, the actual roots of the problem. By erasing the systemic complicities that exceed individual histories or intentions, our efforts to act ethically may even result in the creation of symbolic value – affirming our sense that we are ‘good’, benevolent (and more developed) Subjects.

Thus, even earnest efforts to reconceptualize global relationality may, as Jazeel (2011) suggests, “bear the burden of European thought and history - the (self-denying) centre - that will continue to measure, recognize and arbitrate on difference through the very categorizations it has conjured into existence” (p. 86). This “burden of European thought,” and its colonial categories of the Other’s difference and the Subject’s universality, also shape efforts to conceptualize ethics within Western higher education, even when the stated intention is to disrupt these patterns (Roy, 2006). For instance, Stone-Mediatore (2011) notes that “global ethics,” as it has been elaborated in Western universities, is “premised on the recognition that ethical problems and responsibilities cross national, cultural, and geographic boundaries” (p. 44), yet it still tends to presume the universality of ethics defined by Western thought. The simultaneous recognition of capacious ethical demands and reproduction of Eurocentrism and colonial disavowal in conceptualizing a response to those demands signals a failure to adequately address invisibilized frames of ontological and epistemological dominance, and invisibilizes the numerous ethical-political possibilities that fall outside these frames. However, in order to imagine an ethics not premised on the violence of the colonial cut between Subject and Other, that political relation must also be denaturalized and our satisfaction with it disrupted. The task of doing so while avoiding circularity in critique is considerable.

Given the significant challenges involved in any effort to rethink and reimagine the ethics of internationalization, how might we nonetheless heed Gaztambide-Fernández’s (2012) call for educators to facilitate different kinds of knowing, being, and relating than those instituted by colonialism, in a way that “both opposes ongoing colonization and that seeks to heal the social, cultural, and spiritual ravages of colonial history” (p. 42)? I argue that in order to do so, higher education scholars would need to address the colonial origins of the ethical frameworks and conceptual categories that we frequently use to both diagnose and respond to the highly uneven global higher education landscape. Below, I identify the complexities of five ethical challenges that accompany efforts to
“internationalize” higher education, after which I elaborate on each and offer a series of open questions in an effort to avoid reinscribing the very problems diagnosed.

**Five Ethical Challenges of Internationalization**

1) **The “national container”**: Commitments to internationalization often challenge the boundaries of the nation-state, yet the modern university was largely developed to serve national political and economic needs.

2) **Equity and access on a global scale**: Ensuring access to higher education as a public good is frequently understood as an ethical imperative at the national level, but this rationale is strained in the context of global higher education.

3) **Higher education as global export**: Particularly as the notion of public goods becomes strained, it is matched with the rise of the idea that higher education is a legitimate export product for purchase on a now-global market.

4) **Epistemic dominance**: The ongoing colonial politics of knowledge production and circulation continue to shape the form and content of curricula, affecting both domestic and international students, as well as faculty.

5) **Market-driven and liberal humanist rationales**: Despite their important differences, instrumentalist and humanitarian rationales for international engagement in higher education can both reproduce colonial relations.

**“The National Container” of Higher Education**

There is a significant challenge in imagining ethics on a global scale given that ethical questions in higher education have previously been largely framed at the national level. Yet, according to Rizvi and Lingard (2010), “globalisation has weakened the authority of the state in promoting stronger redistributive policies and programmes” (p. 159). At the same time, there is a need to take into account the harms that have historically been perpetuated by and in the name of the nation-state. Shahjahan and Kezar (2013) argue that higher education scholarship has been limited by a tendency to reproduce methodological nationalism, which takes for granted the nation-state as a bounded entity and as the assumed scale of social relations and responsibility. Their argument that “the nation-state was always relativized by the global much as it now is (e.g., through imperialism,
colonialism, global trade circuit, and earlier forms of technology)” (p. 21) complements decolonial critiques of the nation-state as a form of social organization that justifies violence to maintain internal order and border the earth in the name of the safety, security, and cohesion of a national ethical/political subject.

What Shahjahan and Kezar suggest is that when higher education researchers take the nation-state for granted, we feel “reduced responsibility for human suffering tied to national boundaries” (p. 27). Yet there is more than one way to recognize responsibility for harm, or global interconnections, and not all of them disrupt colonial entitlements. This is particularly so when one positions oneself as outside of (and benevolently intervening to ease) that suffering, versus recognizing one’s complicity and indeed constitutive place in (re)producing it. Emphasizing “the global” can also be mobilized for institutional and national self-interest, particularly as the past several decades have seen a decline in public funding for higher education. Commitments to internationalization are often accompanied by paradoxically nationalistic rationales, which assert that these efforts will ensure a country and its citizens’ success in the global economy, and serve national security interests (Tannock, 2007). Any critique of methodological nationalism must therefore include analyses of the shifting but enduring role of the nation-state in the organization and justification of higher education, and attend to the complicated history of the concept of the global (Jazeel, 2011). As Hartmann (2010) suggests, “we should be careful in our analysis of internationalisation not to substitute too hastily methodological globalism for methodological nationalism as a new normative orientation” (p. 170).

In light of these ethical challenges, the following questions arise: What happens to the national justification for public higher education when the nation-state container is put under question? Is public funding and access to higher education contingent on a narrative that coheres around nationalistic exceptionalisms and entitlements? How are understandings of ethical responsibility beyond the local informed (or not) by shifting funding structures? To what extent is growing acknowledgement of more expansive (global) ethical responsibility premised on inclusion of the Other into existing (local) ethical frameworks, without questioning the universality of those frameworks? What happens when perceived commitments and responsibilities to the nation conflict with commitments and responsibilities to other (local and/or) global communities?

**Equity and Access on a Global Scale**

According to Marginson (2007), higher education produces the following public goods: knowledge, literacy, and social opportunity toward a more equitable system. Indeed, when education was primarily a national affair, particularly in the
post-World War II years, expanding access was framed as a part of a commitment to ensure equal opportunity to pursue social mobility (Goldrick-Rab & Kendall, 2014; Tannock, 2009). Arguments that position higher education as a public good rest on the notion that its benefits exceed those that accrue to individuals, and also exceed benefits measureable through strict market measures (Folbre, 2010; Letizia, 2015). However, with increasing privatization, Slaughter and Rhoades note (2004), “new configurations and boundaries [of higher education] change our conception of what ‘public’ means” (p. 306).

Internationalization complicates this yet further. According to Letizia (2015), “Public education institutions must see their larger role in providing global public goods” (p. 12), while Enslin and Hedge (2008) specifically argue for extending global access to higher education: “If widening access to higher education is a necessary response within the nation state, it is an equally compelling goal internationally” (p. 116). Yet, putting aside to what extent equal access was ever universally assured at the national level (Bell, 1979; Johnstone, 1992), according to Brown and Tannock (2009), “there are no political or moral (social justice) frameworks at the global level that provide an alternative way of re-imagining equality in educational opportunity as a global project” (p. 386). Without such frameworks for conceptualizing access as a global public good, as Marginson (2007) argues, it is often simply assumed, “The nation is public, the global is a market” (p. 314).

Even when global public goods are imagined, there is a risk that their presumptive “goodness” might obscure their potential colonizing effects, particularly if their meaning is largely determined by Western frameworks. When it comes to imagining global public goods, it is therefore necessary to consider the origins and effects of these imaginings, asking questions such as: “who decides? in whose name? for whose benefit? how come?” (Andreotti, 2011, p. 199). Further, if, as decolonial critiques suggest, the social mobility of a few within a capitalist system was and is necessarily subsidized by the exploitation of many others (both locally and abroad), then the motivations and desired outcomes of expanding access to Western higher education on a global scale become muddled. If we seek to not simply have more people competing for the few spots at the top of a highly unequal, global system that requires harm for its reproduction, then we may need to rethink how access, equity, and justice are currently conceptualized and enacted.

With this in mind, how do different theoretical and political assumptions shape understandings of what constitutes the global public good, in general and specifically with regard to higher education access? How might we be exporting Western categories and conceptualizations of the world and of ‘the good life’ in well-intended efforts toward a global public good? What are the limitations of, and potential alternatives to, a public good that is defined as the (impossible)
promise of universalizing the Western middle-class? Why is it so difficult for many of us to imagine, let alone enact, these alternatives?

**HE as Global Export**

In 2012 over 4.5 million students studied higher education abroad, with the majority traveling from East and South Asia (in particular, China, India and South Korea) to study in the West (in particular the US, UK, Canada, France, Germany, and Australia) (OECD, 2014). Yet it is only relatively recently that European and white-majority settler countries started to welcome international students in such high numbers. After World War II, these numbers were comparatively lower. At that time, international student enrolment was not viewed as a means of income generation, but as a form of international aid, organized by the developmentalist presumption that the West held superior knowledge that international students should absorb (Bu, 2003; Kramer, 2009). By the 1980s things had started to shift from “aid to trade” (Cudmore, 2005; O’Mara, 2012). What was once conceptualized as a benevolent gift of knowledge was being reframed as a potentially lucrative export, leading to the growth of what Thiago and Andreotti (forthcoming) describe as a global “educational credentials export market (ECEM).” Today international student tuition fees are unregulated in many countries, and tend to be considerably higher than domestic students’ tuition fees (Bolsmann & Miller, 2008). From the perspective of “receiving” countries, selling education credentials generates significant income (helping to make up for declining public funding), creates local jobs, brings in new tax revenues, and prepares highly educated potential immigrants (Chellaraj, Maskus, & Mattoo, 2008; Owens, Srivastava, & Feerasta, 2011).

As a result there is growing concern that international students (as non-threatening Others) are being recruited primarily for the economic value they bring to host institutions and countries (through their tuition fees and other spending), and the symbolic value they bring to local students (through the social capital-enhancing consumption of their difference). Enslin and Hedge (2008) argue that “there is a serious ethical tension between, on the one hand, universities’ declared commitment to social justice and, on the other hand, regarding those students as paying customers to whom we can sell our education as a traded high premium commodity” (p. 108). As receiving countries compete to attract more students in the ECEM, some have also started to express concern about brain drain in their home countries (Adnett, 2010; Johnstone and Lee, 2014). At the same time, as their numbers continue to grow, international students have also experienced resentment and backlash (Coloma, 2013; Rhee & Sagaria, 2004). These students are reframed as threatening Others when they start to be perceived as competing for limited spots in universities or on the job market –
spots to which local (particularly, white) students believe they are entitled (Stein & Andreotti, 2015).

Several questions therefore arise around the growth of the ECEM: In what ways does a move toward treating students as customers affect their teaching and learning? How should we address the possibility that the ECEM may exacerbate inequalities within international students’ home nations (Rhee & Sagaria 2004; Waters, 2006, 2012)? Who are the primary beneficiaries of the ECEM, who are the ‘losers’ of the ECEM, and what are the possibilities for the market’s reform or reversal? What makes the West the site of such continued interest for international students coming from the non-West? How can we avoid reaffirming the West as the global epistemic centre by equating ‘social justice’ with expanded access to its universities? How might concerns about brain drain potentially contradict calls for expanding/equalizing global access to Western higher education? How can we interrupt the presumed entitlements of local students?

### Epistemic Dominance

Decolonial theories problematize the politics of knowledge that naturalize the West’s projection of epistemic supremacy and categorization of its “Others” as objects of knowledge, and the use of this knowledge to rationalize colonial and racial subjugation. As Wainwright (2008) points out, “colonial knowledges have outlasted formal colonialism and live on in the present, constitute the present as such, and have ongoing political effects” (p. 14). Though the content of this knowledge may shift over time, the frameworks of mastery, coherence, control and the (always incomplete) efforts to order the world persist, and continue to deny the existence of alternatives outside of these ordering categories (Santos, 2007). For example, the kinds of knowledge that are most commonly thought to be a “global public good” (because they are presumed universally relevant and objective) tend to be Western (Stiglitz, 1999). Epistemic dominance also affects international students from the Global South, who may be treated as “empty vessels” to be filled up with Euro-American knowledge” (Ninnes & Hellstei as cited by Haigh, 2008, p. 432), as well as domestic students in the Global North, who are being educated in a narrow range of knowledge traditions, and may not have the supremacy or universalism of these traditions challenged in substantive ways (Stone-Mediatore, 2011).

Contesting this persistent epistemic Eurocentrism, Nandy (2000) argues, “The main responsibility of a university is to pluralize the future by pluralizing knowledge in the present” (p. 122). Incorporating more non-Western knowledges into Western universities is both necessary and risky, as it may lead to them being misheard and misrepresented (Kuokkanen, 2008), absorbed/assimilated into existing fields (Alcoff, 2007), or commodified for profit (Nandy, 2000). Ultimately, any effort to achieve epistemic justice would also require dedicating
more resources for the research and teaching of marginalized knowledges, including hiring practices, the revision of existing award and promotion procedures, and a wholesale reconsideration of the Eurocentric perspectives that dominate curricula in nearly every department. This would include interrupting not only the content but also the frames of Western knowledge production that treat knowledge as a means of mastery and control, and treat difference either as a threat and/or an instrumentalized object of consumption for producing value.

In enacting the pluralisation of knowledge Nandy (2000) describes, a number of ethical questions therefore arise. For instance: What is the relation between the politics of knowledge and (geo)political economic questions? How can internationalization efforts in the Global North avoid erasing local epistemic heterogeneity in the rush to seek epistemic difference abroad (Roshanravan, 2012)? What precautions are necessary so that the incorporation of more non-Western knowledges into Western universities does not result in their tokenism, decontextualization, or exploitation? Beyond simply adding more diverse knowledge to existing curricula, what institutional reforms might make it possible for students to imagine different horizons and aspire to alternative futures? Are there limitations to the kinds of transformation that are possible within these institutions?

Market-driven and Humanist Rationales

Much of the literature on the internationalization of higher education identifies two major discourses that shape practice and policy: market-driven and liberal humanist (e.g. Bolsman & Miller, 2008; Khoo, 2011; Stier, 2004). As discussed above, market-driven motives are most often identified in the context of international student recruitment. Humanist approaches, in contrast, tend to emphasize the development of cultural competency, social responsibility, and cosmopolitanism, and are increasingly included in policies, curricula, and practical initiatives related to international partnerships, study abroad, and international service learning and volunteering programs.

Many humanist efforts are specifically humanitarian in nature, in which individual students seek to ‘give back’ in recognition of their relative advantage in existing systems. In the context of internationalization, this framing may be preferable to market-driven approaches, yet its construction of relationality maintains the student in a position of benevolence and enlightenment vis-à-vis those they are understood to be ‘helping’ (Jefferess, 2008). In this ethical formation, students from the Global North are generally situated as those with superior knowledge, values, and experiences that they generously grant to the ‘less fortunate.’ Within this paternalistic dynamic, the student is rarely prompted to question the underlying systems or causes of inequality or to consider how they benefit from and perpetuate these systems. Rather, the Other becomes a vehicle
for affirming their exceptionalism and moral ‘goodness’ – potentially as a means to justify their own privilege. Gaztambide-Fernández and Howard (2013) point out that this investment in “Being good and having moral standing is a social outcome that is premised on the unequally distributed ability to do certain things, to enact certain roles, and to mobilize particular discourses” (p. 2). This framing then forecloses the opportunity for students to examine their own complicity, and may be understood as an example of what Tuck and Yang (2012), drawing on Malwhinney, describe as “moves to innocence,” through which an individual seeks to assuage their guilt, deny responsibility, preserve a positive self-image, and maintain their existing investments in harmful desired futures.

Thus, despite their important differences, both market-driven and humanist approaches to internationalization are often premised on developmental notions of humanity, and are shaped by a “convenient amnesia” of colonial histories and current structures of harm (Thobani as cited by Stone-Mediatore, 2011, p. 49). Questions that therefore arise include: Why does encountering difference in the context of internationalization often reproduce rather than disrupt assumptions about the supremacy of Western knowledge and society? How might humanitarian efforts abroad function as a means to avoid addressing local injustices? How do developmental logics limit the possibility of engaging in relationships premised on solidarity and self-implication rather than instrumentalization for affirmation of a benevolent self? What might prompt students to see their own material comforts as part of the cause of inequity? What might interrupt our satisfactions with existing formulations of self/subject and other/object, and is it possible to imagine an approach to ethics that begins and ends with neither?

**Conclusion: Im/possible Ethical Demands**

There is a danger that our critical approaches to the ethics of internationalization may be circularly repeating the very violence that we seek to disrupt. In order to make visible the ways that colonial categories and capitalist imperatives are reproduced, scholars of higher education need to historicize the deep entanglements of our institutions and our subjectivities with empire, trace the origins of our dearest concepts, face our own investments in the false promises of universal humanity and linear progress, and consider how all of these frame and thereby limit available ethical and educational possibilities. As Unterhalter and Carpentier (2010) note, “Global higher education seems uniquely well placed to serve the interests of redressing inequality, enhancing participatory debate and deliberation. But to do this requires higher education institutions recognizing problems of their past and present in order to contribute to ideas of justice for our future” (p. 29). Decolonial analysis, as I have offered in this paper, is just one means of doing this work.
However, analysis itself is insufficient. Having identified the depth of the problems we face, it is common to promptly begin the search for concepts and plans of action that can renew our hope and that we believe will lead to something better. This desire for guaranteed alternatives may be in part related to the fact that conversations about internationalization tend to be, as Waters (2012) suggests, “dominated and driven by educational practitioners – education institutions, state-level policy makers and public bodies, as well as private, commercial enterprises – with a vested interest in the ultimate success of internationalising initiatives” (p. 127). The imperative toward immediate improvement and assured success is also a deeply embedded dimension of Western thought, which constantly seeks to reduce complexity and eliminate uncertainty in order to smoothly engineer the future. And there is good reason for seeking solutions; harmful practices and policies do not stop producing harm when we name them. Every critique therefore begs the follow-up questions: “So what? Now what?” (Andreotti, 2011, p. 227).

These questions are important, and answering them is one essential element of our responsibility as researchers and educators to contribute to the reduction of ongoing harm. There is a strong need to produce practical, accessible, and impactful resources for use in higher education classrooms, policy reforms, training for administrators, and social justice programming for students and staff. At the same time, these solutions often create their own unforeseen problems. Furthermore, desires for coherence, consensus, and guaranteed futures have all contributed to the reproduction of significant harms as certain experiences, individuals, and even entire communities are sacrificed or silenced in order to achieve these goals. Although we cannot live and act in a space of uncertainty and ambivalence at all times, the immediate search for practical action and answers can also foreclose difficult but necessary conversations and questions that have no easy resolution. We also need to learn to sit in this space of uncertainty and discomfort to consider questions with either no answer, or too many answers to count; to lay out on the table the contradictory elements of all possible answers to our ‘so what, now what’ questions; and to ask self-implicated questions about our own deep investments in a harmful system.

To conclude by offering a normative prescription for how to engage this difficult work of unlearning and reimagining ethics in the context of internationalization would enact the same closures of possibility, totalizing accounts of reality and justice, and presumptions of my own innocence that decolonial critiques suggest are part of the problem. Instead, I offer a few final questions to orient further conversations in these areas: What would we have to give up in order to imagine and enact radically different ethical possibilities, and why is this so difficult to do? In what ways do the structures of our existing higher education institutions prohibit or potentially provide spaces for these alternatives? How can we balance the need to: enact immediate change to reduce harm,
examine with greater depth the full complexity of the issues we face and our own complicity in them, and look toward long-term transformations that are still emergent and as yet undefined? If both critique and immediately practical solutions are important but insufficient, then what other work remains to be done? How do non-Euro approaches to ethics signal the limits of Eurocentric frameworks, and how can we engage these without simply instrumentalizing them? Earnest consideration of questions like these should be part of any effort to imagine the ethics of internationalization otherwise.

**Works Cited**


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