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Publication Date
2006
Conflict and Contestation in the Cross-Border Community:
Hometown Associations Reassessed*

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June 2006

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Abstract

Drawing on a broad variety of field research projects among Salvadoran immigrant hometown associations in Los Angeles, conducted over a ten year period, this paper seeks to contribute to the emerging literature on hometown associations by shifting the focus to the political processes underlying associational politics and the characteristics of the organizational field that structures their activities. We argue that conflict, both among migrants in the "hostland", and between migrants in the hostland and stay-behinds in the "homeland" is an inherent aspect of hometown association activities and their efforts to create sociability "here" and development "there." We demonstrate that the homeowners abroad have difficulty deciding what they share in common; those who do engage in organized efforts to span here and there represent a select few. Moreover, the issue of how the migrants and their associations relate to the people and institutions left behind is often a dilemma, resolved in any number of ways, not all of which render satisfaction at either ends of the chain. In practice, the effort to help out the people left behind often belies the notion of a transnational "community" encompassing a collectivity spanning "here" and "there."
The hometown association is a migration universal. Displaced from familiar ground, migrants get treated as strangers, which is why they suddenly discover a commonality in people originating from the same place. Whether we call them landsmann or paisano, immigrant homeowners discover virtue in coming together – finding comfort in the company of a familiar face, gaining pleasure from reminiscing about times gone by, or deriving satisfaction from the effort to make things better for the home and homeowners left behind.

Given the ubiquity of the phenomenon it should be no surprise that the literature on immigrant associations (recently reviewed by Moya, 2005) is vast. That the associations are omnipresent does not mean that they are all the same. Just what ends the associations promote – do they simply provide a space of socializing or do they fulfill some more instrumental end? – has been a matter of dispute (Sassen-Koob, 1979; Basch, 1987). While the stimulus may come from the universal source of the migration process, the degree to which influences stemming from the sending, as opposed to the receiving, country shape the form and content of associational life is also not clear. And though associations appear among both internal and international migrants, taking on similar forms and functioning in like ways, the question of whether the crucial influence stems from long or social distance on the one hand, or the crossing of a political border on the other, remains in play (as discussed in Fitzgerald, 2005).

While scholarly debate on the associations and their causes and consequences has been long been in play, hometown associations are nonetheless getting new found attention. Though never concerned before, the policy and political worlds now see hometown associations as a phenomenon of significant import. Piquing their interest is
their rapidly emerging awareness of immigrant remittances and their impact on
developing countries. Remittances are large (the second largest source of development
finance after direct foreign investment); rising (up by almost 100 percent between 1999
and 2004); stable (with less volatility than other sources, such as capital market flows or
development assistance); and free, requiring neither interest nor repayment of capital
(Ratha, 2005). Most importantly, perhaps, the money that migrants harvest and send
home seems to be at once an effective of means of reducing poverty and a form of self-
help.

If remittances have, therefore, become the “new development mantra” (Kapur,
2005), seen as preferable to the development schemes designed by bureaucrats from
above and afar, investing the hometown associations with similar potential is just one
small step. While the very great bulk of migrant remittances result from the individual
preferences of immigrants acting in parallel, but uncoordinated fashion, the size of the
flow is such that decisions to channel even a small proportion of the funds in the form of
“collective remittances” could yield significant impact. Moreover, migrant philanthropy,
as it has come to be called, appears to be a grassroots phenomenon, an additional virtue in
the eyes of development policymakers, convinced that economic performance and
broader participation go hand in glove (Burgess, 2005). From the standpoint of
development agencies, the prospect that immigrant associational activity in the developed
world could leverage capital and participation for stay-at-homes in the developing world
seems worth the gamble, as evidenced by a rapidly expanding portfolio of research and
program development grants.
Sending state officials are no less interested in “collective remittances”, though they are affected by a somewhat different mix of motivations. Acutely aware of the importance of individual migrant remittances, leaders in the sending states think that the HTAs could channel individual contributions toward collective investments, which, if successfully captured, could produce political gains for the political leaders who bring these benefits home – a view clearly at variance with the goals espoused by the “development community.”

As for social scientists, the thread leads from the ever-growing interest in the myriad of connections that span migrant sending- and receiving states. From this perspective, the hometown associations exemplify the emergence of “transnational communities” linking migrants here and there. In the most favorable view of the phenomenon, HTA engagement in hometown development denotes the advent of “migrant civil society (as argued by Lanly and Valenzuela, 2004, chapter 1),” of which one component is “a common sense of membership in a shared political community,” as Jonathan Fox has written in a recent article (2005) on “Unpacking ‘Transnational Citizenship.’” While more skeptical assessments can be found, the policy and political responses to the HTA development have provided further catalyst to scholars on the lookout for new opportunities for study, as evidenced by the outpouring of research on the various Mexican (federal and state) programs seeking to motivate and channel associational activity.

Whether hometown associations can effect change in the communities from which the immigrants come, and if so, of what type, depends largely on the quality and content of the linkages connecting the migrants to one another, as well as those that tie
them to the friends, families, and neighbors left at home. Scholarly views range the spectrum, with little consensus as to consequences, whether positive or negative, or the features that limit or propel successful associational activity. To some extent, the issue has not fully been posed: as with the broader literature on “immigrant transnationalism,” researchers have been preoccupied with demonstrating the incidence of long-distance hometown engagement, to the detriment of an analysis of why or how it might take place, and with what ends. The researchers also appear to like the phenomenon, which may be why the literature often tends toward celebration. Consistency is also hard to find, with the same authors sometimes emphasizing “the influence that home town civic committees can have on the power structure of places of origin” and insisting that “migrant transnational political activism is more likely to line up with the forces of change... (Portes, 1999: 473-5),” while in other statements noting how “a history of distrust and social fragmentation” can put associational “long term dynamism...in question (Portes and Landolt, 2000).” Illustrating the professional uncertainty is the analysis presented in Peggy Levitt’s The Transnational Villagers (2001), a study of the connections between a group of Dominicans living in Boston and their hometown of Miraflores in the Dominican Republic. Examining a development committee started by the migrants, Levitt depicts the committee as a grassroots effort yielding positive effects: investment in hometown public goods; the fostering social capital, in part by stimulating broader participation, in both home and host-towns; and increased hometown government accountability, as migrants’ dollars and pressure gave stay-at-homes greater leverage over state officials. On the other hand, migrants’ ongoing efforts to do good also entailed a steady shift away from partnership with those left behind, with decision-making
gravitating to the Bostonians, whose priorities increasingly diverged with the Miraflorenos still living in Miraflres.

But if this account of the balance sheet between homeowners “here” and “there” is nuanced, it is also incomplete, leaving aside questions bearing on the political processes inherent to associational activity, as well as the structure of the organizational field in which the associations operate and its impact on associational life. One looks in vain for analysts who might illuminate what Levitt has neglected. Even the most acute analyst, ever-sensitive to the micro-politics of place – most notably, Robert Smith (2005) in his study of the long-distance relations between Mexican migrants in New York and their rural hometown in Puebla – leaves internal associational politics as a black box. And while Smith rightly insists that communities can be at once bounded and contested, the very boundedness of the community under his lens is surely a variable property and one not likely to be shared by all other immigrant populations or the associations to which they give birth.

In this paper, we seek to contribute to the emerging literature on hometown associations by shifting the focus to the political processes underlying associational politics and the characteristics of the organizational field that structures their lives. We argue that conflict, both among migrants in the “hostland”, and between migrants in the hostland and stay-behinds in the homeland is an inherent aspect of hometown association activities and their efforts to create sociability “here” and development “there.” As we will show, the homeowners abroad have difficulty deciding what they share in common; those who do engage in organized efforts to span here and there represent a select few. Moreover, the issue of how the migrants and their associations relate to the people and
institutions left behind is often a dilemma, resolved in any number of ways, not all of which render satisfaction at either ends of the chain. In practice, the effort to help out the people left behind often belies the notion of a transnational “community” encompassing a collectivity spanning “here” and “there.”

The paper is an exercise in grounded theory: we draw on field work to focus on the following set of dilemmas, all of which were inductively identified from the material collected in the field:

- Participation
- Free-riding
- Internal competition
- Opportunism
- Rationalization
- Migrant/hometowner inequality
- Long-distance coordination
- Relationships to state actors

In the narrative to follow, we proceed by summarizing the patterns we encountered, and then provide case study evidence to illustrate some of the most salient points.

The paper builds on field research among Salvadoran immigrant hometown associations in Los Angeles, conducted over a ten year period. The research includes:

- In-depth case studies of five hometown associations, conducted during the early 1990s, including interviews with association leaders in Los Angeles and visits to the hometowns in El Salvador;
- A brief survey of 24 hometown associations, conducted in 1994;
• Ongoing participant observation in an association formed subsequent to the initial research; this activity includes attendance at a wide variety of associational events, in-depth interviews with associational leaders, and a visit to the hometown in El Salvador;

• Over twenty-five in depth interviews with hometown association leaders in Los Angeles and El Salvador, as well as Salvadoran political officials, NGO workers, and members of hometown committees, conducted from winter through summer of 2005, as well as attendance at a variety of HTA events.

Though Salvadoran migration to the United States has its distinctive qualities – most notably because the migration was impelled by civil war, but the migrants were not granted refugee status (see Menjivar, 2000) – Salvadoran HTAs offer a useful and appropriate case. HTA formation occurred rapidly among Salvadorans, immediately following the cessation of hostilities and the signing of peace accords in the early 1990s. As noted, our 1994 survey identified 28 hometown associations, most of which were then newly established. More recently, the Salvadoran government has estimated that there are at least 250 HTAs outside the country, most located in Los Angeles.

As with other groups, immigrants’ ability to leverage U.S.-based resources to effect change in the homeland has galvanized a response both from the home state as well as from development agencies. Following the peace accords of the early 1990s, the Salvadoran Government gradually initiated a program prioritizing collaboration with hometown associations, seeming to acknowledge the success of these organizations in implementing local development projects (Popkin 2003). Through El Fondo de Inversion Social para el Desarrollo Local (FIDSL) and the Dirección General de Atención a la
Comunidad en el Exterior of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Salvadoran government is attempting to leverage the international migratory process by establishing linkages with immigrant organizations in the US that are engaged in local development projects in their country of origin. By offering funds to Salvadoran immigrant organizations abroad, the Salvadoran Government hopes to enhance local development efforts in El Salvador through increased collaboration between the immigrant organizations, and local and national government officials in El Salvador. This program, Unidos Por la Solidaridad, is influenced by a similar program in Mexico that offers matching funds to local projects in Mexico initiated by immigrants abroad.

While associations have proliferated, participation levels are less impressive. Data from the Comparative Entrepreneurship and Immigration Project, collected by Alejandro Portes and his collaborators, do show that Salvadorans are far more likely to participate in hometown associations than are either Dominicans and Colombians. Nonetheless, just under 8 percent of the random sample of Salvadorans surveyed in Los Angeles claimed to participate regularly in a hometown association and even fewer reported making contributions to a hometown project. On the other hand, roughly one out of six respondents, surveyed by the CEIP’s random sample, reported occasional levels of involvement, suggesting that while hometown associations were propelled by an immigrant elite, they nonetheless involved a significant grassroots component, at least if by judged by the usual indicators of civic participation.¹

Receiving context dilemmas

¹ Calculations made by the authors from the public use data set, found at: http://cmd.princeton.edu/data.shtml.
Origins: The hometown associations are voluntary associations, making them vulnerable to the problems encountered by the broader class of organizations to which the HTAs belong. In the ideal typical framework, the association emerges organically out of ongoing activities that bring together homeowners without planning or deliberate forethought. Drawing on the patterns identified by Massey and collaborators in their classic Return to Aztlán (1987), the HTA is part of the process of migrant settlement, with social circles steadily moving beyond immediate family to include paisanos, then informal soccer clubs, and, at the end of the chain, a formal organization of homeowners. The case studies of Mexican hometown associations assembled by Lanly and Valenzuela in their recent edited collection offer numerous supporting examples, whether of an association formed by Zacatecanos settling in the same neighborhood and parish in Los Angeles and converging on a single economic niche (Lanly and Hamman, 2004: 154) or of a group from Pegueros that first came together for football and baseball games and then realized that these regular get-togethers could be transformed into something else (Escala-Rabadan, 2004: 428). Our own fieldwork, conducted in the early 1990s, uncovered beginnings of a very similar sort:

Case study evidence: “Many of the discussions concerning the formation of the associations occurred at the community soccer games. Since the beginning of the 1980s, several male Salvadoran soccer leagues with teams representing the home communities have been established in Los Angeles...[these] soccer games became a place for the community members to exchange information about jobs, housing, social events that are planned, and events back in the home community in El Salvador...Although specific social gatherings such as weddings, baptisms and birthdays (particularly the quinceañera or 15th birthday of young women) also serve as events that enable Salvadorans from the same home communities to come together, it is the soccer clubs that involve the broadest community participation. In each of the five associations studied extensively...the initial discussions that led to the establishment of these organizations were held at the community soccer games.”

2 This quote is drawn from an unpublished paper written by one of the authors in 1994.
At one level, the boundary between soccer game or social gathering, on the one hand, and hometown association, on the other, may be quite blurred. As the literature shows, one single pattern prevails: hometown associations have no paid staff, depending instead on the willingness and availability of volunteers to donate time, energy, and cash in the interest of some public good. It is not even clear that they have members either, a fact reflecting both the low level of organizational formality and the episodic nature of the HTAs’ engagement with the larger, relevant collectivity. “Membership” is rarely a clearly defined category, possibly pertaining to families or to individuals (as noted in Escala-Rabadan, 2004). Like the more informal gatherings from which they sprung, the associations proliferated as a wildcat event, emerging spontaneously, without direction or master plan. Though each association comes together around “its own” hometown, as organizations they are much the same, raising funds and gathering community members in similar ways and under like circumstances. To be sure, not all associations function in identical fashion, but as the outliers are not only more self-conscious about ends and means, but also aware of how they differ from the rest, they turn out to be the exceptions that prove the rule.

Participation and free-riding: Most importantly, the HTAs are established in order to get something done, which means that they also entail a shift from pure sociability to work. Consequently, participation is the first of the dilemmas that the associations confront. It is not that the associations and a broader hometown population never connect. The problem, rather, is that homeowners who appreciate the public goods that the associations generate may also conclude that the individual cost of contributing to the collective good outweighs any benefit, in which case involvement is
likely to be low and episodic. Indeed, the many studies of Mexican hometown associations point in exactly this direction: while the number of associations has burgeoned, the proportion of immigrants participating in the associations is modest, at best.

**Case study evidence:** Describing the evolution of his association, one respondent told us that: “We began with 40 and we finished with 7, plus a son of the group whom we think of as part of our group. Two to three years after we began we invited all the members of the community to a carnival and the idea of that was to have food, give refreshments, the idea was to present ourselves to them and to renounce our posts and to invite them to participate, you understand? About 25-30 persons, families came., everything was nice and they were happy that we invited them...and no one wanted to do it......there are people who say “we want to participate” but we know that [they don’t really want to do it].”

While voluntary associations can be effectively run by a set of core members engaging with a periphery of more erratic participants, maintaining the balance between core and periphery can be precarious. The core may be willing to absorb a disproportionate share of the human and material costs, but that will only be true up to a point; the difficulties entailed in shouldering the burden are all the greater, given the limited resources of the immigrants who animate these particular associations.

**Case study evidence:** The economy of the HTA development effort is built on the economic gap between “here” and “there”. The associations’ collective fund-raising efforts yield relatively modest amounts: according to Orozco (2003), the typical HTA generates roughly $10,000 in contributions, a sum that is probably not adequate to absorb the expenses routinely covered by the hometown associations of the last era of mass migration (e.g. burial expenses), but could nonetheless have a very significant impact on hometown needs in the communities from which today’s migrants’ come. Orozco’s estimates are in line with what we heard in the course of our own field work. A well-attended *fiesta* could generate as much as $5,000, after costs; an association that could organize two such *fiestas*, or perhaps a set of other smaller activities could realistically hope to reach the $10,000 level.

On the other hand, the economy of the HTA development effort can be undone should the expenses and revenues entailed in fund-raising get out of line. Monetary considerations are probably principal, but temporal issues are not trivial. Fiestas usually involve the coronation of a “queen”, typically a young
(often teenaged) woman, often U.S.-born, not always a daughter of a parent from the hometown. Finding the “queens” is time-consuming, entailing visits to families scattered across the Los Angeles area, and conversations with parents (usually fathers) and candidates, both of whom may be quite reluctant (increasingly so, according to some of our informants) to engage. As the typical committee is small the search for the queen can become the single preoccupying activity for a significant stretch of time.

Parties are profit-generating activities when participants make both in-kind and cash donations: e.g., someone who both puts a case of Heineken on the table, to be sold for a dollar or two per bottle, and also buys a ticket, to use an example from one of our interviews. Expenses can also be controlled if the party is held at a homeowner’s house, although that venue sets a limit on attendance and therefore on net profits. Events put on in a rented public space will generate higher attendance, and therefore, greater revenue, but in that case the costs also rise. According to informants interviewed during our most recent fieldwork, the charges for renting a location and band and providing parking for attendees who came from all over the Los Angeles had risen to levels that the HTAs were increasingly unable to afford. The smaller the core group, moreover, the higher the costs, as some activities were no longer donated, but had to be contracted for a fee. In one association, all the active participants were entirely deployed in running and managing the events, requiring the association to engage an outsider to provide food and who received a third of the price on every item sold.

Fund-raising capacity and the demands placed on associational activists reflect the depth of resources that can be tapped. In this respect, the Los Angeles-based HTAers may lag behind their counterparts in the Washington, D.C. area, among whom a sizeable group of successful construction contractors can be found. Paul and Gammage (2004), for example, report that one Virginia-based association sends home collective contributions averaging $25,000 a year; according to Andrade-Eekhoff (personal communication, 2005), some of the Washington-based contractors are at once so successful and so busy that they no longer volunteer to run their fiestas and tardeadas, but rather engage for-profit contractors to take care of these affairs.

Capture: If the public good characteristic of the HTAs may be one factor that could lead homeowners to free-ride rather than invest, the potential for capturing the association, so that it meets the goals of a narrower group, may be the source of other
problems. In general, associational activity is a minoritarian affair (as noted by Carling, 2004: 12). Research on Mexican HTAs highlights the over-representation in associational activities of an immigrant elite. As described in Escala-Rabadaña’s recent review article:

In the great majority of cases, it is a matter of migrants of the first generation, well established in the United States (a decade or more after having migrated), who have already achieved a certain socio economic level: many of them are owners of small businesses (insurance, real estate, Mexican restaurants); some are professionals (lawyers, social workers, doctors) or government employees. At the same time, the majority of leaders and members are men... (Escala-Rabadaña, 2004: 435).

The associations studied in our initial phase of fieldwork were similarly animated by a small, somewhat selective group, with a core membership of 8 to 15 people, almost all of whom were men, with the exception of the occasional woman elected as secretary.

Returning to the field roughly ten year later, the Salvadoran organizations seem more varied in their propensity to recruit an elite group, at least as compared to the Mexican associations described by Escala-Rabadaña. At one end of the spectrum is an association with home country linkages to government officials and right-wing party leaders in El Salvador and L.A.-based linkages to Latino entrepreneurs of differing national backgrounds. Of somewhat similar nature is an association established by an immigrant who became wealthy as the result of an unusual windfall. Less exclusive, but still selective relative to the average immigrant is a well-organized, socially conscious association, with a committee of 14, 8 of whom are property owners in the hometown.

At the other end, is a small, but quite dynamic committee that is entirely female led, and whose members' low level jobs (as babysitter, for example) shows how the huge gap in
wage conditions and living standards between “here” and “there” allows migrants of the most modest standing to emerge as significant social actors back home.

As noted earlier, associational activity entails a cost/benefit ratio that may discourage many, if not most, homeowners from participating in all but peripheral ways. On the other hand, once in place, there are reasons for leaders to be content with a small, selective group. The cost/benefit ratio does seem to differ for those in control, since the associations provide visibility and allocate offices to people who often have few other opportunities for recognition. Likewise, the home country impact yields contact with higher status persons, which can be the source of satisfaction. Beyond purely selfish considerations, there are perfectly good practical reasons for the core to hoard control, as it is easier to do things with a smaller, rather than larger group – considerations likely to weigh heavily on immigrants with limited time for leisure time activity. While there are associations that have an organizing, membership-building, expansionary orientation, that outlook appears not to be widely shared.

Conflict: Participants or public may be content to allow the leaders to self-select and self-reproduce. However, there is always the potential for conflict or competition – in which case, an organization formed to bring homeowners together might instead give them an occasion to fall apart. That there is potential for conflict would not be news to the hometown activists, who come from a highly polarized society, and whose cleavages have also been transplanted to the new land. Indeed, conflict is meant to be averted, as indicated by the three-point “philosophy” of an association of associations: “no politics, no religion, no profit.” There would be no need for such an injunction, if homeowners were normally apolitical or indifferent to matters of faith; rather, these issues are
intrinsically hard to keep at bay, which is why the associations have to strive to keep their inner lives as a separate sphere.

Moreover, the tension between instrumental v expressive ends has operational consequences that are difficult to escape. Associations seeking to do more than provide a venue for nostalgic homeowners will have to care about the competence of their officers. But as competence is unlikely to be shared by all who want recognition, someone’s quest is bound to end in frustration. Conflicts can be managed, a matter likely to depend on the nature of the ties that link the homeowners to one another and the exchanges that flow through those connections. While the greater the mutuality, the greater the incentives for friendly conflict resolution, mutualism does not appear to characterize the contemporary HTA. Likewise, other binding factors, such as residence in a common neighborhood or work in a similar occupation, seem present to a very minor degree. In fact, the homeowners are often not a clearly bounded group, as residence in the United States has facilitated relationships of a much more diverse kind. Though associational events engage families, the adults often have partners from a different hometown or national group. Likewise, the tight spatial and occupational groupings emphasized by the literature have loosened, a tendency already noticeable in the early 1990s, when participants in the soccer leagues no longer came from a single residential cluster, but commuted from a variety of places across the region. A decade later, ongoing observation of an association highlights both geographic dispersion and social class diffusion: this association runs its social events in two different parts of town, as the more middle-class homeowners living in the San Fernando Valley no longer feel comfortable
spending evenings in south Central Los Angeles, where their less successful compatriots reside.

With hometown social ties loosened, the incentive structure may favor secession, as the impediments to starting up a rival group are low, and populations may be large enough to support more than one association from the same hometown. This pattern was evident almost from the start: noting the schismatic tendency, Eekhoff's 1994 study also pointed out that separate associations never coordinated their activities and rarely communicated with one another. Geographic factors come into play: collaboration with homeowners located in other areas of Salvadoran concentration, such as Washington or Houston, often proves difficult, in part because associational activists are sometimes not even aware of one another's existence. Even a history of ongoing contacts across the different nodes of immigrant concentration may not be enough, as evidenced by the experience of a long-established association whose affiliates in southern and northern California have seen priorities diverge. In effect, the hometown associations appear not so much transnational as doubly bi-localistic, with connections extending from a particular place in El Salvador to a particular place in the United States, and weak or non-existing ties linking the homeowners residing in different parts of the migrant world.

*Opportunism:* Collective goods are vulnerable to capture in yet another way: namely, by opportunists seeking to take advantage of others' trust. Opportunism is the malevolent side of the social capital that leads social scientists and right-thinking advocates of social change to find such appeal in the HTAs. Opportunism is hardly new to migrants accustomed to seeing home country public officials behaving in predatory ways. As an extension of everyday sociability, however, the HTA is an entity of a
different type, reason for the homeowners to donate funds and time under the assumption that people who are “all of a kind” are therefore “all in the same boat.” Moreover, the operating principles of the association differ from those of a bank, which is why trust is provided without verification. But the same factors that induce giving also facilitate stealing, either by thieves who pass themselves off as brothers or friends, or by persons of initially good inclinations, but who find that larceny is a temptation that they cannot resist. On the other hand, ownership, as in marriages or partnerships, may be a matter of point of view. Not only will some homeowners contribute more than others; it may be that doing good for the group is also a way of doing good for oneself. Generating material benefits makes ownership a practical question, in which case, the dispute over what belongs to whom may be ground for divorce. If barriers to entry are low, then unhappy partners trading mutual accusations of theft may be inclined to continue to celebrate and help their hometowns, but doing so in their own, separate ways.

**Case study evidence:** In some instances, competition trumps common origins by taking divorce-like form. A member of one of the first-established HTAs did publicity for the broader group, a process that brought him into contact with the entrepreneurs who patronized the association’s event. The publicity activities evolved into a little business, generating revenues sufficient for purchase of computers and other equipment needed to produce a newsletter sent to the hometown as well as an annual brochure. But to whom did this equipment rightly belong?...the homeowner who took the initiative? Or the association on whose behalf he worked? Not able to reach agreement, the parties opted for separation, with the result that two different associations now exist. Another permutation can be found among homeowners from a small city, who maintain three associations, each with their own set of activities and hometown linkages. This is a case, not so much of divorce, but rather of organizational profusion, as each one seems to have been established to pursue a different vision of the imagined community left behind. Those differences, in turn, express a variety of cleavages, some having to do with ideology, others with social class background, others with differing views as to how the associations should be run and toward what end.
Rationalization: Rule-making and rationalization are the time-honored means of ensuring that money and other resources are used as their donors had intended. But rationalization conflicts with the purely social principles and feelings that frequently animate the homeowners, which is why informality is often preferred. For the same reason, the boundaries between the association and the community it claims to represent often remain amorphous. As long as membership is ill-defined, however, the effective decision-makers are those who show up for any one meeting, in which case claims to representativeness are open to question:

Case study evidence: One such case emerged from fieldwork conducted in the early 1990s: A number of migrants not previously involved with one of the then newly founded associations came to a meeting held to elect a new directiva (board of directors). Although the association had been formed to provide aid to the hometown, these newcomers had a different view, advocating instead the provision of support for migrants who needed assistance with funeral expenses. As the newcomers brought large numbers of supporters to the meeting, they elected two representatives to the directive. An enormous amount of conflict erupted in the association. Eventually, the newcomers left the established entity and founded a hometown organization of their own.

On the other hand, membership criteria involves more than drawing lines distinguishing the association from the “community” – namely, a structure that would administer those lines. But such a structure is probably more than many of the associations can bear. In our view, seconded by a knowledgeable Salvadoran government official with a good deal of first-hand information, associational administrative capacity generally takes a rudimentary form. Informality tends to prevail, in part because that is simply how things are done: it can be that even the most rudimentary organizational principles, such as setting regular meeting dates and times, have to be learned. Keeping good books and maintaining them transparent are other seemingly simple devices for controlling funds and directing expenditures; they are also skills, of a non-trivial nature,
that activists have to acquire. While some associations have opted for formal non-profit, 5013b status – a development strongly advocated by the Salvadoran officials interacting with the HTAs – formalization has mainly increased administrative burdens, with little in the way of off-setting benefits. Although transparency is not always avoided – with one association going so far as to put is annual budget on the web – it is not always welcomed, as leaders seeking to hold on to positions of authority are often reluctant to invite accountability.

Looking backwards to the evolutionary sequence by which the associations emerged, it appears as if the shift from soccer game to formal organization involves a greater break than noticed by either HTAers or their scholars. After all, there’s no ambiguity about how a soccer game is to be run, as everyone plays by the same rules. Likewise, team membership can be fluid: the same group of players need not assemble on the field every week for a game of the same sort to start. But each association represents a new beginning, with plenty of room for disagreement as to the rules of the game, and few guidelines as to which rules should be invoked. As long as the associations seek to go beyond sociability and actually do things, moreover, the decision makers can’t be selected as if one were still playing a pick-up game of soccer, even though the desire to just have fun with a group of friends may have been the catalyst that brought the homeowners together in the first place.

**Sending context dilemmas**

Although the literature emphasizes the boundary-spanning aspects of immigrant “transnationalism,” its preconditions are in fact the boundaries that separate receiving and sending communities. Movement to a new place gives the migrants freedom not
possessed before; as emphasized above, residence in a rich country means that even people of modest means have access to resources that can make a difference back home. For the same reason, therefore, they can exercise leverage in their dealings with home community interactants, a factor making for imbalance in the relationship between the two sets of homeowners and increasing the likelihood that the migrants will have access to home society influentials, not fully shared by the hometown rank and file. In addition to the strictly material, the migrants possess something else that the stay-at-homes don’t share: namely, the experience of migration and exposure to a new way of life and its culture. While the HTA represents the power of continued home country attachment, those attachments are almost inevitably expressed in ways that reflect the changes that the migrants have undergone. As we heard from a long-time, left-leaning activist:

Here we learned that the United States is a great country because even the most insignificant gringo, on Sunday, he will volunteer in some place, perhaps in his church, they’ll say you have to sweep, you have to take care, you have to do this, here they will volunteer. There, no one wants to volunteer. They all say, “give me,” it comes from the United States.

While the analyst shouldn’t accept this point of view as an accurate empirical description, one does have to acknowledge its existence: though speaking community, the homeowners here and there are really no longer the same.

While there are certain attributes that the migrants simply cannot share with the stay-at-homes – such as presence in the hostland and the consequences thereof – these may not be decisive for the question at stake: namely the extent to which the homeowners “here” and “there” represent trans-state collaborations, in any meaningful sense. Following Fox, who in turn draws on Keck and Sikkink’s work on transnational advocacy (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), we focus on two aspects of the interaction between
the migrants and stay-at-home: jointness in the formulation of goals and projects; and balance in the relative influence exercised by either side.

*Migrant-homelowner inequality:* The HTAs are indigenous organizations of the migrants, not carryovers or imports from the home country, nor extensions or branches of home country organizations. While some HTAs leaders had been activists in the Solidarity movement, during which time they effectively functioned as long-distance members of a Salvadoran political party, the advent of the associations represents something different: the activation of ties that cross-cut party or ideological differences, undertaken in the absence of signals from organized entities at home. For the same reason, the goals and objectives are likely to have a made-in-the-USA quality, most importantly, heightened expectations regarding public services and infrastructure, on the one hand, and the value of participation beyond elite levels, on the other.

Consequently, initiatives, especially in organized form, have largely, if not exclusively, been taken on the U.S. side. Field work in the early 1990s showed that a return trip was often the catalytic event. With the end of the civil war, migrants able to return home for the first time in a decade or more were startled by the gap in living conditions that they confronted:

“I returned to Cacaopera for the funeral of my mother and was saddened to see the situation the. I used to work as a health care worker in the town, and I was shocked to see the poor sanitation conditions, the lack of medicines and supplies in the health clinic. These conditions made me realize that my situation in Los Angeles was considerably better.”

Throughout the period, moreover, dramatic or catastrophic events – such as earthquakes or hurricanes – provided the spark that generated the forming of an association.

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3 This quote is drawn from an unpublished paper written by one of the authors in 1994.
As we found during our 1994 survey, initiatives initiated by *individuals* in El Salvador were not infrequent. Eekhoff (1994) provides several relevant cases, such as an association that responded to a request from a hometown soccer team or one that received an appeal from a nurse in the local hospital. According to our survey, most HTAs were activated by explicit appeals from El Salvador, with the rest emerging as the result of events and processes taking place on the U.S. side. On the other hand, *none* of the home country initiatives observed during this earlier phase of research emanated from an organized entity to which the U.S.-based HTA could have functioned as branch or balanced partner.

As the organized initiatives are undertaken stateside, so too are the fundamental choices for the migrants, *not* the stay-at-homes, to decide: which goals are to be met, how help is to be delivered; to whom assistance should be provided. HTA assistance generally falls into a small number of categories: charity; infrastructure; human development; productive (profit-making) projects; advocacy (Alarcon, 2000; Orzoco, 2003). Choosing one option rather than the other bears on the range and style of possible partnerships: charitable aid can be given directly to existing institutions; infrastructural development almost always involves some coordination with political leaders and agencies on the ground back home, who are also ultimately responsible for implementation; human development, as in the form of scholarships, can support existing institutions, but can be allocated according to criteria established by the association. Likewise, the migrants need to decide how best to involve the stay-at-homes, whether as partners, advisors, or simply as the more or less passive recipients of help.
Goal-setting is affected by any number of factors, starting with the migrants’ desire to do good for their hometown and homeowners. But HTA views of how best to do good are largely *ad hoc*. Their preferences frequently lead to visible physical investments, such as recreational facilities or ambulances (a particularly common donation). These choices reflect grassroots understandings of how the migrants’ collective resources might be deployed with greatest effect, as opposed to professional assessments, which might instead emphasize the provision of drinkable water or nutritional supplements for schoolchildren. They are also not fully realistic and therefore not fully consistent with the preferences of the stay-at-homes or local officials. In particular, the HTAs tend to underestimate long-term costs of maintaining investments in physical goods, as in one small city, where the ambulance donated by an HTA had become immobilized because funds were lacking to replace punctured tires, or in a small town, where neither the local government nor the HTA was prepared to finance maintenance for the recreational facility that the migrants had built.

While the HTAers want to do good, it is not clear that they *only* want to do good: physical investments are tangible products, reminding the stay-at-home public of the good that the HTAers have done. Nor is HTA goal-setting immune to the influence of naked self-interest, which can yield hometown investments that suit the migrants, but not necessarily the stay-at-homes.

**Case study:** The hometown is a classic migrant sending community, located in one of the poorest of the country’s regions, but now filled with large houses. The *caserio* is the Beverly Hills of the *municipio*, displaying modernization without development: nice and well-constructed houses, paved roads, electricity, landlines and cell phones for almost every inhabitant of the *caserio*. However there is no drinking water nor a sewage system. They still get the water from a water well. For the local residents, furnishing the funds that could provide drinkable water has been the most important goal sought from the homeowners living in the
United States. The HTA, however, has had different priorities... While it funded construction of a well, the work was done in the property of a relative of the association’s president. Sometime afterwards, the well ran dry....

Long-distance coordination: As to whether to collaborate with the stay-at-homes, research conducted during the early to mid 1990s found little evidence of partnering. Of the five associations that we studied, only one had developed a fully collaborative relationship with a committee of local residents. The other associations opted for a more hierarchical structure. One worked directly with the mayor’s office; a second, supporting a local hospital, coordinated with the hospital director; a third, initially developed a relationship with a pre-existing civic committee, but severed the ties when that committee turned out to be inactive and continued working without any established partner; a fourth collaborated with a local committee possessing advisory capacity but no decision-making influence. Likewise, Eekhoff’s contemporaneous study, found that only one of the twenty associations she studied had opted for a mutually collaborative relationship, with most relying on a single contact, whether acting on an individual basis or in an organizational capacity.

Partnering now seems more common, though far from universal. As one might expect, prior relationships of _compradazgo_ or direct kinship often influence the choice of local partners. Consequently, the existence of a partner committee doesn’t necessarily denote partnership between the migrants and the hometown “community,” whose bounds almost always surpass the limits of the migrants’ social circles.

Case study evidence: One of the first to get started, the association is unusually well organized, with a stable structure, a core group of highly committed activists in northern and southern California, and ongoing links to a broader set of involved migrant homeowners. From its earliest stages, the association had established a local committee, with which it has continuously collaborated. The local committee is a relatively elite group, consisting of teachers, salaried employees,
and business owners, all of them residents of the municipio’s urbanized area, to which the bulk of the association’s infrastructural investments have gone. However, development needs are greatest in the municipio’s rural fringe. While community councils (Adescos) in the rural areas are eager to collaborate with the local committee, the latter is resistant and has thus far been unwilling to diversify its ranks or reorder its priorities.

Relevant decisions, regarding how to target, with whom to collaborate, and with what degree of jointness, reflect other differences: most notably, ideological commitments and political sophistication. Hometown associations led by migrants with leftist inclinations are sometimes constrained in their ability to implement development projects in the home community if local leaders there represent other political tendencies.

Additionally, while many of the motivating concerns cut across ideological divides, associational activists with prior leftwing experiences nonetheless seemed to have a distinctive point of view. According to one HTA leader, quoted in a report written by two Salvadoran sociologists, the experience of arriving with donations from the United States left him feeling like a type of Santa Claus (see Morales and Coastillo Rivas). For associational leaders with a left background, experiences of this sort cut against the grain. For them, help from afar was a necessity, but not necessarily an unmitigated good: like the remittances sent by individual migrants, the collective assistance of the HTAs alleviated suffering, but at the expense of relieving the government from actually intervening to effect change.

Case study evidence: One left-leaning association, a focus of ongoing ethnographic research, began modestly, by providing children with soccer balls. It later developed soccer and track and field teams, a scholarship program for students, and eventually a program of infrastructural support, oriented toward rural areas, including the provision of tanks of potable water. Although the latter project was initiated by the association, and provision was supervised by its on-site committee of locals, the HTA only provided a partial subsidy. “We don’t want them to be too dependent; otherwise, it’s a charity. We don’t help institutions already in place. That’s the government’s responsibility.” By
contrast, other associations with connections to the same hometown supported established institutions.

On the other hand, the relationship between local and migrant committees demonstrates the degree to which social structural inequality between stay-at-homes and migrants overrides the impact of ideology. The L.A. based committee set up the criteria by which scholarships for high students were to be awarded; the local committee made the actual selection. Likewise, clothing was collected in Los Angeles, but distributed by locals. Decisions regarding costlier university fellowships, however, were made by the L.A.-based committee. Physical distance notwithstanding, the migrant associational leaders also enjoyed better connections to local political leaders, who were quicker to respond to communications from the migrants than from the nearby locals.

Regardless of ideology, implementation is ultimately affected by conditions and people on the ground - a crucial factor affecting the balance of influence between locals and the migrants residing in Los Angeles. While scholarships are a common form of HTA support, the behavior of scholarship students is far more difficult to monitor from afar than on-site. After all, the very same conditions that make the beneficiaries eligible support - namely, poverty - are also likely to inhibit regular attendance or adequate school performance. The involvement of locals can be an effective check, increasing the likelihood that the migrants' investments are actually fulfilled as originally intended - but only if the migrants are ready to work with a group of “stay-at-homes.”

Successful collaboration assumes that homeowners here and there share similar, if not identical, goals. But as we found during the phase of research conducted in the early 1990s, priorities often diverged, making for ongoing negotiation and in some cases conflict between local stakeholders and migrants.

**Case study evidence:** Conflict revolved around the largest project, a children's park. During the construction of the park, the full $10,000 for the project was sent by the community by the association. However, when several members of the association visited the hometown to inspect the completed project, they found that it was not finished and that all the funds had been expended. They expressed their concerns to the mayor and threatened to inform the rest of the community that funds had been misappropriated by the mayor's office. Apparently, the
mayor saw to it that the project was completed promptly, particularly since the threat to inform the community occurred during an election year.

Not all such long-distance negotiations proceeded quite so smoothly. An HTA that donated four water tanks to a poor rural community, in the outlying areas of the hometown, expected that service would subsequently be provided by the national water authority. HTA leaders accompanied locals to a meeting with the agency, which resulted in a commitment to refill the tanks every two months with fresh water. When the agency failed to meet its commitment, the association felt it had no choice but to subsidize the delivery of potable water. Another association, headed up by a long-time Solidarity activist, used funds collected in Los Angeles to construct a basketball court, but, as they later realized to their sorrow, homeowners “here” and “there” had variant perceptions of local needs:

…there isn’t a connection, no identical thinking in what those of over there (los de alla) want and what we want. For example, in our hometown, we wanted to build a lighted basketball court and they dynamited it, “they destroyed it” (in English). The people, no, because they say that we don’t want basketball courts, we want football, soccer (in English). So we have been thinking like semi-gringos, thinking that they want a basketball court. But the people of over there (say), “I don’t want a basketball court, give me a soccer ball and a soccer field if you want to, if you don’t want to, I don’t want it.”

On the other hand, insofar as implementation required involvement by local officials, it biases contacts toward local influentialss, as noted in the Salvadoran case study cited above, where the crucial local collaborators were sympathetic bureaucrats who could reach local decision-makers.

State actors: Last, homeland decisions have also affected the options available to locals, whether rank and file or influentialss. As noted above, autonomous migrant social action has produced a response from officials at different levels of the Salvadoran
state, all of them seeking to capture a greater share of the migrants’ made-in-the-U.S.
resources (see Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarollo, 2005, esp. chapter 6).
Mayors have been galvanized into action by HTA intervention in local affairs, traveling
to the United States to meet with hometown committees. Ideological differences can
distance mayors from the migrant homeowners, though the politically agile mayors often
know how to bridge these gaps. Regardless of ideology or party affiliation, other factors
make for divergence, if for no other reason than the highly localistic ties of the migrants –
for whom the community may be a small caserio – are not fully shared by mayors, who
depend on the votes of the entire municipio, and not just one of its hamlets.

More important is the role of the Salvadoran central government. As other
analysts have noted (see Popkin, 2003), strengthening ties to the migrant population in
the United States and elsewhere has become a priority. In particular, the state has greatly
stepped-up consular services, expanding the number of consulates and adding to consular
staff, while also seeking to stabilize the legal status of the migrants, via lobbying of the
U.S. executive and legislative branches to secure passageways from undocumented to
legal status and then using consular services to encourage immigrants to take advantage
of these new programs.

But there is also the possibility that the government’s Strategy to Integrate and
Link the Salvadoran Communities in the Exterior, as elaborated in a report prepared by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, may also serve to channel the migrants’ collective
remittances in ways more closely aligned with made-in-El-Salvador priorities, at least as
defined by state elites and political leaders. In that effort, the latter have both
considerable motivation and a strong card to play, one that might tip the balance of
influence away from the migrants and towards the stay-at-homes, albeit of a not
particularly representative sort. Engagement with the “Salvadorans abroad” can help
build a partisan political base among migrants capable of providing both material backing
and personal endorsements to political allies back home. Moreover, the same
constituency can be harnessed for activities oriented toward collective investments, made
all the more desirable if funneled in ways that reward localities dominated by stay-at-
home, political supporters.

**Case study evidence:** As example, we point to the formation of the *Comite El
Piche*, a hometown association originating among migrants from the small
community of *El Carmen* in the eastern-most department of *La Union*. Led by a
local entrepreneur closely linked to the ruling party, *El Piche* began modestly, but
soon developed fund-raising ability well beyond the scope of the typical
Salvadoran HTA, leading government officials to now see it as the model for
other HTAs to emulate. The key innovation involved mobilizing some of the
more successful Salvadoran immigrant entrepreneurs, while connecting with a
diverse, deep pocket, constituency of business owners servicing an LA-based
Salvadoran clientele. Recent contributors to El Piche’s efforts include: the
Israel–born owners of the small (but highly profitable) *La Curacao* department
store chain, with a flagship store in the Pico-Union neighborhood where the first
wave of Salvadorans settled and where a significant Salvadoran population still
remains; the Cuban–born owners of Liborio supermarkets, an expanding local
chain, one of whose six stores is also located in the Pico-Union area; and the Los
Angeles Galaxy, a professional soccer team with a famous Salvadoran player on
its roster. *El Piche*’s fund-raising in Los Angeles has generated exceptional
benefits for the target communities in El Salvador. As of May 2005, the *Comite
El Piche* generated just under 9 percent of the roughly six million dollars of
contributions provided by HTAs participating in the matching fund programs run
by the government’s *El Fondo de Inversion Social para el Desarrollo Local
(FIDSL)*; in return, however, the FIDSL directed fully 20 percent of its
expenditures towards projects associated with *El Piche*.

**Conclusion**

If there is much for citizens to admire and scholars to learn in these organized
efforts to do good, it is still true that all that glitters is usually not gold. Hometown
associations may possess the capacity for using resources leveraged in the rich countries
where the immigrants live to produce social change in the poor countries from which the immigrants come, but if so they will have to surmount the dilemmas that we have reviewed above. Associations seek to bring homeowners together, but in doing so they may also provide an opportunity for the group to fall apart; consequently, conflict and its consequences – most notably secession – almost inevitably ensue. As many of the goods created by associations belong to the relevant (hometown) public, quite a few homeowners can benefit without having to participate, making free-riding an abiding dilemma. On the other hand, as low levels of participation reduce conflict, leaders may prefer strategies that effectively discourage involvement. Moreover, not all homeowners with access to collective resources will be looking out for the community, making the betrayal of trust a common phenomenon. While that danger can be reduced by running the organization according to the rule book, rationalization stands in tension with the desire for informal sociability that gave rise to the association in the first place.

With the extension of scope from sociability in the new land to development in the old country, there is an additional set of dilemmas for the HTAs to confront. The scholars of transnationalism write of transnational social fields in which persons participate and belong to a common social world, regardless of physical location in sending or receiving community. Though some scholars have emphasized the “power of status” deployed by the so-called “transmigrants” when intervening in “transnational social fields” (e.g., Goldring, 1998), they have not carried the observation to its logical conclusion: namely, that the real estate agent’s maxim of “location, location, location” is what proves decisive. Residence in a rich country and access to its resources are the conditions that let migrant homeowners, often not far advanced beyond the ranks of
modest wage-earners, effect change in the places they left behind. In addition to possessing new-found leverage, the migrants are also likely to have new and different ideas, precisely because they have been changed by the experience in the new land (as noted by Carling, 2004).

Moreover, asking just how the homeowners “here” and “there” can actually collaborate, and which of the homeowners on either side of the divide participate in the process, the obstacles to trans-state cooperation move into clearer relief. To begin with, there are the practicalities of long-distance coordination. Physically, people can only be in one place at one time, a factor likely to be important if face-to-face communication matters – as appears to be the case. Not everyone can go from “here” to “there” and back with equal ease: among the migrants, the crucial interlocutors are likely to be those with the cash and legal resources that make travel a possibility; as to the stay-at-homes, they are largely precluded from on site intervention with the HTAers living in the new land.

That the migrants present themselves as homeowners, moreover, does not mean that they are actually one and the same. As noted by Portes, the impetus for hometown-oriented activity frequently derives from rejection in the new land. However, the satisfaction sought from intervention in the community left behind often bespeaks unequal, not collaborative, relationships with the stay-at-homes:

I really live in El Salvador, not in L.A. [says the president of a Salvadoran HTA].

When we have the regular fiestas to collect funds for La Esperanza, *I am the leader and am treated with respect*. When I go back home to inspect the works paid with our contributions, *I am as important as the mayor*. (quoted in Portes, 1999: 466; italics added).
On the other hand, the plans developed by one group of people living in one place must inevitably be implemented by a different group of people living in somewhere else. In the event that the latter are excluded from the planning or implementation process, or feel themselves to have been neglected, they possess the means to make their discontent felt. An additional complication is created by the involvement of state actors, who possess the capacity to possibly frustrate the HTAs or, alternatively, steer them in directions quite different from those preferred by the grassroots.

In the end, this case study of Salvadoran hometown associations, while providing little evidence that migrants’ “here-there” ties take the form of “transnational communities,” nonetheless demonstrates that trans-state connections are an inherent aspect of international migration, albeit in varied and unpredictable ways. As international migration escapes states' efforts to border their populations, it generates ideational, cultural, economic, and political spillovers that in turn yield significant effects, on both receiving and sending ends. The content and form of those spillovers, however, are not determined in advance. As they are as likely to be positive and negative, they also provide the means and motivation for conflict -- among the migrants; between the migrants and the stay-at-homes; and between the migrants and various other home society actors.
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