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Race in a “Post-Racial" America: An Experimental and Observational Look at the Effect of Race on Political Behavior

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Neil Visalvanich

Committee in charge:

Professor Zoltan L. Hajnal, Chair
Professor Marisa A. Abrajano
Professor James H. Fowler
Professor Gary C. Jacobson
Professor Taeku Lee

2014
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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2014
DEDICATION

To my parents.
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

Signature Page ................................................................. iii
Dedication ................................................................. iv
Table of Contents .............................................................. v
List of Figures ............................................................... vii
List of Tables ................................................................. viii
Acknowledgements .......................................................... ix
Vita ............................................................................ xi
Abstract of the Dissertation ................................................ xii

**Chapter 1** When Does Race Matter? Exploring White Responses to Minority Candidates in a “Post-Racial” Era ................................................. 1
  1.1 Introduction ................................................................. 2
  1.2 Minority Candidates and Vote Choice ................................. 3
  1.3 A Theory of Race and Candidate Evaluation ............................ 5
    1.3.1 When Does Race Matter? ........................................... 5
    1.3.2 Which Races Matter? ................................................. 7
    1.3.3 For Whom Does Race Matter? ..................................... 10
  1.4 Data .................................................................... 12
  1.5 Results .................................................................. 15
    1.5.1 Examining Racial Bias in Candidate Evaluation .......... 15
    1.5.2 Partisanship and Racial-Political Stereotyping ............ 17
    1.5.3 Where Does Racial Bias Come From? ....................... 19
    1.5.4 Exploring Racial Bias in the Electorate ..................... 24
    1.5.5 The Influence of Incumbency on Race ...................... 27
  1.6 Discussion and Conclusion ............................................ 30

**Chapter 2** Call to (In)Action: The Effects of Racial Priming on Grassroots Mobilization ................................................................. 35
  2.1 Introduction ................................................................. 36
  2.2 Race, Public Opinion, and Political Action ............................ 38
    2.2.1 Racial Priming and Political Behavior ...................... 38
    2.2.2 Public Opinion and Political Outcomes .................... 39
    2.2.3 Expectations and Hypothesis ................................. 40
  2.3 Method and Research Design ......................................... 42
  2.4 Results .................................................................. 46
Chapter 3
Asian Candidates in America: An Experimental Look at East Asian Candidacies

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Asians and Minority Candidate Evaluation

3.2.1 Stereotyping and Minority Candidates
3.2.2 Model Minorities or Foreign Threat?

3.3 Research Design and Data

3.4 Results

3.4.1 Asian Candidates in a Low-Information Environment
3.4.2 Asian Candidates in a Ideological Information Environment
3.4.3 Asian Candidates in a Foreign Born/Immigrant Information Environment

3.4.4 The Effect of Respondent Partisanship and Racial Resentment

3.5 Discussion and Conclusion

3.6 Appendix

3.6.1 Asian Low-Information Bio A
3.6.2 White Low-Information Bio A
3.6.3 Asian Low-Information Bio A
3.6.4 White Low-Information Bio B
3.6.5 Asian Foreign Bio
3.6.6 White Foreign Bio
3.6.7 Asians Native Bio
3.6.8 White Native Bio
3.6.9 Asians Liberal Bio
3.6.10 White Liberal Bio
3.6.11 Asian Conservative Bio
3.6.12 White Conservative Bio

Bibliography
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.1</td>
<td>Marginal Effects of Respondent Racial Attitudes on Competence Evaluations</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.2</td>
<td>Marginal Effects of Respondent Racial Attitudes on Ideological Evaluations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.3</td>
<td>Marginal Effects of Racial Resentment on Vote</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.4</td>
<td>Predicted White Vote Gain for Incumbents by Race</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.5</td>
<td>Predicted Change in Competence and Ideological Assessment for Incumbents by Race</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.1</td>
<td>Percentage of Respondents Who Wrote their Member of Congress</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.2</td>
<td>Percentage of Respondents Who Wrote their Member of Congress by Levels of Racial Resentment</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.3</td>
<td>Percentage of Respondents with High Levels of Racial Resentment Who Wrote their Member of Congress</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.4</td>
<td>Likelihood of Respondent Contacting Member of Congress</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.1</td>
<td>Racial Triangulation from Kim (1999)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.2</td>
<td>Vote in the Low-Information Scenario</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.3</td>
<td>Candidate Perception in the Low-Information Scenario</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.4</td>
<td>Vote in the Ideological Scenario</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.5</td>
<td>Candidate Perception in the Ideological Scenario</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.6</td>
<td>Vote in the Foreign-Born Scenario</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.7</td>
<td>Candidate Perception in the Foreign-Born Scenario</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.8</td>
<td>Marginal Effects of Racial Attitudes on Vote for Asian Candidates</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.1</td>
<td>Minority Makeup for 2010 and 2012 Congressional Elections</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.2</td>
<td>Racial Competition Makeup for 2010 and 2012 Congressional Elections</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.3</td>
<td>Race of Candidate and Vote Choice in Contested Elections, 2010 and 2012</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.4</td>
<td>Logit Model for Vote Preference on Race and Candidate Variables - All Candidates</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.5</td>
<td>Logit Model of Vote Preference on Race and Candidate Variables</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.6</td>
<td>Ordered Logit Model of Ideological Distance from Respondent</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.7</td>
<td>Ordered Logit Model of Competence Rating</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.8</td>
<td>Comparison of Logit Model of Vote on Race with Ideology and Competence Controls (2010)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.9</td>
<td>Racial Resent Population</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.1</td>
<td>Comparison of Survey Sample to 2010 ANES Evaluations of Government and Society Study</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.2</td>
<td>Comparison of Survey Sample to 2010 ANES Evaluations of Government and Society Study</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.3</td>
<td>Logit Model Predicting Willingness of Individual to Contact Member of Congress</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.1</td>
<td>Demographic Summary of Turk Sample (White Respondents)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.2</td>
<td>Logit Model of Vote For Asian Candidate on Respondent Characteristics</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Race in a “Post-Racial” America: An Experimental and Observational Look at the Effect of Race on Political Behavior

by

Neil Visalvanich

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, San Diego, 2014

Professor Zoltan L. Hajnal, Chair

In what many view as a “post-racial” world, does race still have a significant influence the political behavior of whites? I argue that an increasingly racially diverse America necessitates a more dynamic look at how race might effect perceptions of minority candidates and influence public policy outcomes. In chapter 1, I test the relative role race plays in the evaluation of white voters for black, Asian, and Latino candidates of both major parties, examining observational data on Latinos and Asian candidates for the first time. I find that even after accounting for non-racial variables, white voters are less likely to vote for Hispanic and black Democrats because they are viewed as less competent and more ideologically extreme than similar white candidates. Meanwhile, I find that Asian candidates and minority Republicans are largely unaffected by these
biases. In chapter 2, I examine the willingness of individuals to write their member of Congress in support of a non-racial political cause, which I experimentally treat with racial cues. I show that whites with higher levels of racial resentment are less likely to act politically in support of a policy perceived as benefiting ethnic and racial minorities.

In chapter 3, I place an Asian candidate in a bi-racial electoral contest with a white candidate in three different informational contexts - a low-information context, with few political cues, an ideological context, featuring left-right ideological cues, and a foreign information context, featuring cues that emphasize an immigrant/foreigner status. I find that in a low-information context, Asian candidates do significantly better than white candidates. This advantage is largely diminished by placing Asian candidates in an ideological contest, however. And finally, I find that, contrary to expectations, Asian candidates are not significantly disadvantaged from being immigrant and foreign born.
Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

The election and subsequent re-election of Barack Obama were defining moments for race and American politics. Not only did President Obama succeed in being the first person of color elected to the highest office in America, he overcame a weak economy and a polarized electorate to win re-election. According to some commentators and scholars, the election of Barack Obama was merely the culminating point in a “post-racial” America where racial attitudes are no longer as pervasive as they once were (Thernstrom 2009a; Logan 2011). President Obama’s election was undoubtedly important, but was it really a sign of transformative change?

Past studies on minority candidates have grappled with the central question of whether a candidate’s race has a negative impact on their electoral performance (Highton 2004; Sigelman et al. 1995; Terkildsen 1993). Two narratives have emerged from this literature. One views race as a persistent prejudicial screen that is difficult to dislodge (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Terkildsen 1993). The second finds race to be an increasingly significant consideration in candidate evaluation and political outcomes (Highton 2004; Abramowitz 1994; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1999). I propose a third view that considers race as a dynamic variable that changes in its significance depending on racial and electoral context. In other words, I argue that asking whether race matters is merely the first step in a larger exploration. The next question that must be asked is when race matters, by exploring the circumstances under which race has an influence on political and electoral outcomes. Finally, in an increasingly diverse America, we must ask whether candidates belonging to different racial groups are assessed in different ways. This study extends the analysis on minorities candidates to Hispanic and Asian candidates for the first time.

I hypothesize that attitudes towards minority candidates will reflect an emerging racial hierarchy in American politics, with Asians at the top and blacks and Hispanics at the bottom. I also hypothesize that racial bias against minority candidates will be rooted in political stereotypes that see blacks and Latinos as less competent and more ideologically extreme than whites, and that these biases will be diminished by a stereotype-disconfirming partisan label (in other words, a Republican party label). Finally, I hypothesize that racial biases will be especially manifest among the racially
resentful segments of the white population.

In order to test my theory, I turn to a host of new datasources that allows me to explore the electoral nuances of race in a way that incorporates a number of variables that prior observational studies were unable to consider. I draw from the 2010 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (CCES), a nationally representative internet survey that asks respondents not just whom they voted for but also to rate the ideological leanings and assess the competence of their respective candidates. In addition to the variables provided in the CCES, I also incorporate new candidate ideal-point estimation that generates ideological scores for challengers and incumbents (Bonica 2013). Using this data as a baseline, I can examine whether minority candidate evaluations are biased when compared to their “true” ideological leanings.

A thorough analysis of this data confirms my hypotheses. I find a strong perceptual bias against Hispanic and black Democratic candidates in both ideological evaluation and assessment of competence. I also find that these biases do not apply to Asian Democrats and black and Hispanic Republicans. In addition, I find that these perceptual biases account for the bias in the vote against black and Hispanic candidates. Finally, I find that these biases are especially prevalent among those with negative racial attitudes.

1.2 Minority Candidates and Vote Choice

How much does the race of a political candidate matter when it comes to white voters? Does race still matter now, given the social advancements of the Post-Civil Rights Era? The answers to these questions have proved elusive, despite numerous studies that have sought to isolate the effect of race on vote choice. From the Bradley Effect to the recent election and re-election of Barack Obama, scholars have sought to examine what penalty (or benefit), if any, do minority candidates incur from their race (Krysan 1998; Beck, Tien and Nadeau 2010; Jacobson 2011; Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012). In the Pre-Civil Rights era, race undeniably played a major role in the formulation of white political attitudes, both in terms of attitudes on policy and behavior in the voting booth (Key 1949). In the intervening years, however, there has been substantial debate as to whether race remains a significant handicap for minority candidates. In the age of
Obama, some have argued that racism is largely a thing of the past and that we should reconsider the political safeguards put in place during the Civil Rights Era (Thernstrom 2009b). To some extent, the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Shelby County v. Holder*, which repealed certain parts of the Voting Rights Act, endorses this “post-racial” view.

Yet, the pervasiveness of race remains a contentious issue within the literature because of a disparity in findings. These findings can be broadly divided among scholars who believe that race remains an active and continuing impediment to the fortunes of minority candidates, and those who argue that race no longer presents the same persistent barrier to minority representation that it once did. Electoral data suggests that minorities, especially Asians and Latinos, remain underrepresented in elected office (Hajnal 2010), and that there is disparity in the racial composition of electorates that elect minority candidates, with most black and Latino representatives coming from majority minority districts. Asians are the notable exception to this, as most Asian representatives are elected in majority white areas (Hajnal 2007). Prominent studies have found that black candidates fare worse among white voters when paired against white candidates (Terkildsen 1993; Reeves 1997). These studies seek to isolate the effect of race experimentally, and find a significant racial penalty incurred by black candidates, not just in the vote, but also in evaluation of candidate quality and ideological extremity (Williams 1990; Sigelman et al. 1995; McDermott 1998). According to this narrative, overtly prejudicial attitudes may be a thing of the past, but a type of averse or “modern” racism in which whites evaluate their minority candidates negatively despite their qualifications, still exists. Those who support this view argue that even Obama’s election and re-election to the presidency was still marred by racial prejudice, and that he won in spite of his race (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Beck, Tien and Nadeau 2010).

On the other hand, several prominent studies have found race to be a minor or insignificant impediment for minority candidates. The most notable of these studies is Highton (2004), who examined real world black candidates using exit polls. He finds that black incumbents are evaluated on par with their white counterparts and are just as likely to be re-elected. His findings are echoed by Bullock (2000) who studies aggregate white turnout and finds that black Democrats do not receive a lower proportion of the white vote when compared to white Democrats. These studies have been backed up by
surveys of white voters that have found them to be increasingly less resistant to vote for minority candidates (Schuman, Steeh and Bobo 1985; Jones 2012). These results back a narrative of an increasing egalitarianism in American society. According to this narrative, America has changed to the point where race is no longer the predominant motivating factor in the issue positions and political behavior of whites, and that most of the opposition to minority candidates and racial policy is because of political conservatism as opposed to racial bias (Abramowitz 1994; Sniderman and Carmines 1999; Feldman and Huddy 2005; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1999).

In addition to the discrepancy in findings, I argue that the existing literature on race and candidate evaluation is missing two key components. First, it does not take into account the increasing racial and political diversity in American politics, and does not consider how the electorate might respond differently to candidates of different racial groups and partisan stripes. Second, prior observational studies are missing the full array of racial and non-racial variables necessary in creating a test that measures the independent effect of race. I address both these issues by utilizing a dataset that examines candidates from all the major racial groups in America - black, Latino, and Asian. I compare candidates of these groups to white candidates with similar characteristics by controlling for party, spending, incumbency, and candidate ideology by using candidate ideal point estimates. The data allows me to trace the origins of vote bias against minority candidates by examining how ideological and competence assessments of candidates drives white voting behavior. Finally, I examine the impact that differing racial attitudes have on minority candidate evaluation. To that end, I posit a contemporary theory of race and candidate evaluation that seeks to explain how race functions as a variable in the political attitudes of whites.

1.3 A Theory of Race and Candidate Evaluation

1.3.1 When Does Race Matter?

The calculus of voting is already intricate, even without the added component of race. Individual level variables, such as partisan identification (Campbell et al. 1960; Bartels 2000), socioeconomic status (Converse 1966; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980;
Markus 1988), and a voter’s social network (Berlson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Christakis and Fowler 2011; Bond et al. 2012), have a significant influence on vote choice. In addition to these individual level characteristics, electoral context also matters. Candidate quality (Jacobson and Kernell 1983), incumbency status (Mayhew 1974; Hajnal 2001), ideological leaning (Hinich and Munger 1994), as well as national economic conditions (Markus 1988; Hibbs 1987) have all been shown to influence vote choice and candidate perception. How does race figure into this calculus? Popkin (1994) forwards a theory of low-information rationality which argues that voters often make choices based on informational heuristics and cues, like partisan affiliation, incumbency, and campaigns. Using this literature as a theoretical base, I propose a view of racial politics which considers race as an informational heuristic, much like partisan identification or incumbency status. Voters incorporate a candidate’s race as a part of a larger equation of political decision making. A candidate’s race can cue different aspects of that candidate’s politics, whether it be ideology, integrity, or competence.

The strength of race as an informational cue depends on the context of that information. Studies of racial candidate cues have found two distinct types of political stereotyping. The first of these is ideological stereotyping. Prior studies find that black candidates are seen as more liberal and more supportive of minority rights than white candidates (McDermott 1998; Williams 1990; Sigelman et al. 1995). Ideological stereotyping is not surprising, given black America’s strong and enduring allegiance to the Democratic Party (Dawson 1994). The second, more insidious strand of racial-political stereotyping is “competence” stereotyping, in which whites view minorities as inherently less capable and more ill-suited for political office. Sigelman et al. (1995) finds that blacks and Latinos are stereotyped as being unable to manage major policy issues. Hajnal (2007) finds that among black challengers, stereotypes about incompetence are especially pervasive, which leads to a voting backlash among whites.

Because white responses to minority candidates are rooted in these political stereotypes, I hypothesize that the manner in which these stereotypes will effect electoral outcomes will depend on certain contexts, which I define as “stereotype-confirming” or “stereotype-disconfirming” contexts. The psychological basis for these two contexts lies in an “assumed-characteristics” interpretation of candidate qualities, in which informa-
tion about a particular person’s characteristics or beliefs can either serve to confirm or override prior biases (Locksley et al. 1980). I hypothesize that a Democratic partisan affiliation will feed into preexisting racial-political stereotypes and that this will lead to a racial bias against minority Democratic candidates. This bias should manifest itself in respondents rating their minority Democrats as more ideologically extreme. On the other hand, because the strength of party labels can change voter attitudes (Nicholson 2011), I hypothesize that a Republican party label will disconfirm these stereotypes.

While the expectations for minority ideological evaluations can be clearly delineated by party, formulating how a partisanship effects competence assessments is slightly more difficult. Prior studies (Sigelman et al. 1995) have found that whites view black and Hispanic candidates as significantly less competent than whites, but that negative assessments of competence also cut across party labels. The mechanism by which a candidate’s party may mediate assessments of competence is “expectancy violation," in which white voters evaluate minority Republicans more favorably because they very clearly deviate from expected stereotypes. If this is the case, then we should expect a bias against competence assessments of minority Democrats, but no significant effects for minority Republicans.

From this informational theory of race and candidate evaluation, I posit the first of three hypotheses:

- **1. Racial-Political Stereotyping Hypothesis** - Whites will be perceptually biased against minority Democrats, rating them as more ideologically extreme and less competent than their white counterparts. These biases will have a direct effect on the vote for minorities Democrats. These biases will not apply to minority Republicans.

### 1.3.2 Which Races Matter?

Most scholarly works on minority candidates focus primarily on black candidates and their relation to white voters (Hajnal 2007, 2001; Highton 2004; Bullock 2000; Terkildsen 1993). However, the literature on minority candidacies has yet to account for the increasing racial diversity in the array of candidates running for office at all levels of
government. From Asian-American Governors Bobby Jindal (R-LA) and former Washington Governor Gary Locke (D-WA), to Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Ted Cruz (R-TX), who are of Latin American descent, America has seen a marked increase in the amount of Latinos and Asians seeking and winning elected office, even among white majority electorates. The work that has been done on Asian and Hispanic candidates has focused on the effect of minority candidacies on minority voters. Masuoka (2006) and Baretto (2007) have found increased participation among Asians and Latinos when they are voting for co-ethnic candidates. Many of these studies are motivated by the fact that, especially among blacks and Latinos, most of the minority candidates have run in majority-minority districts. However, the number of minorities seeking electoral support in white plurality/majority districts has increased, and studying the effect of race on white voters has become increasingly relevant. Minority candidates from each major racial group have sought and won office in white majority electoral districts, from municipal offices to the federal level.

How being of Hispanic or Asian descent affects a candidate’s electoral prospects among whites is still mostly a mystery, despite increased political participation from both of these groups (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). The work that has been done has established a link between racial stereotypes and minority candidates (Hajnal 2007; McDermott 1998; Sigelman et al. 1995). Both Hajnal (2007) and McDermott (1998) find that black candidates, challengers in particular, lead to political stereotyping among white voters. Do these stereotypes still apply for candidates of other races? My study will seek to answer this as yet unexplored question.

Extensive studies have been done about the different political stereotypes that afflict each racial group. Bobo (2001) conducted survey research about racial stereotypes and established the existence of a racial hierarchy in the attitudes of white americans. Both blacks and Hispanics are seen as “lazy”, “violent”, more welfare dependent, and Latinos are more likely to be identified with an illegal citizenship status. Asians, conversely, are seen as industrious and hardworking, unlike blacks or Latinos. On the other

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1 Extensive scholarly work has been done on the changing nature of racial classifications. See Omi and Winant (1994) for a thorough examination. I recognize the inherent problems in treating each of these racial classifications as self-contained. I argue, however, that using these broad racial classifications that cut across ethnicities is still very much relevant when studying white attitudes, as whites tend to view racial groups as monolithic. Future studies should focus on the differences of ethnic cues vs. racial cues.
hand, Asians are also seen as foreign and inscrutable. This finding is reflects the theoretical work of Kim (1999), whose theory of racial triangulation posits two dimensions of prejudice, “foreigner-insider” and “superior-inferior”. For the “foreigner-insider” dimension captures the fidelity of a racial group to American social and political traditions. The “superior-inferior” dimension, on the other hand, judges racial groups based on how they behave in society relative to whites. According to her scale, Asians place highly and are more proximal to whites on the “superior-inferior” scale, in which they are seen as hardworking and industrious, but are also seen as perpetually foreign and disloyal to the American civic ideal. Blacks, conversely, are seen as “inferior” and farther away from whites on the “inferior-superior” dimension, but closer to whites on the “foreigner-insider” dimension. Abrajano and Alvarez (2010) find that blacks, Latinos, and whites identify with Asians as a racial group the least when compared to other racial groups. While the literature on racial-political stereotyping provides certain expectations for Latinos and black candidates, the expectations for Asian candidates is more muddy. I hypothesize that the stereotype of Asians as the model minority will make whites more receptive to their political candidacies. It is certainly possible that Asians will cue foreignness and that this could hurt the candidacies of Asian American candidates, however since the expectations of public office largely play into the positive stereotypes of Asians as industrious and hardworking, I expect the model minority stereotype to override concerns about their relative inscrutability.

If race does indeed function as a political cue, then we should expect that minority candidates of different racial stripes should inspire different types of political responses from whites. I propose a theory of racial hierarchy that considers the different role taken by each of the major racial groups in contemporary America. Not all minority candidates will evoke the same reactions from white voters. Black candidacies, having roots in a more thoroughly established political history and clear racial political allegiance towards the Democratic party and the policies of social liberalism (Dawson 1994), are more likely to cue racial-political stereotypes towards political liberalism when compared to comparable white candidates. Hispanics, who suffer from

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2This is difficult to test, as there is no question on the CCES that relates to a candidate’s foreignness. I plan to address these questions in future experimental studies that will test the effect of foreignness on vote choice and candidate perception.
the same stereotypes as blacks (Bobo 2001; Sigelman et al. 1995), will likely inspire a similar reaction. Racial-political stereotypes of Asians, on the other hand, are not rooted in the policies of social liberalism and minority driven policies (like affirmative action and welfare)\(^3\) in the same way black and Hispanics are (Bobo 2001), and instead center around perceptions of being inscrutable, perpetually foreign, and of being a model minority (Wu 2003; Kim 1999). I hypothesize that Asians will be the least racially polarizing candidates of all, and we will see weak to no racial effects in the results.

From this racial-hierarchy theory of race and candidate evaluation, I posit the second of three hypotheses:

- 2. **Racial Hierarchy Hypothesis** - Asians will be evaluated favorably when compared to blacks and Hispanics. A racial hierarchy in candidate perception and the vote will emerge, with Asians on equal footing with whites, and blacks and Hispanics below them.

### 1.3.3 For Whom Does Race Matter?

What segments of the population are most likely to oppose the political candidacies of minority groups? What type of voter will hold the most prejudicial stereotypes of minority candidates? Hajnal (2007) finds political opposition among whites to black mayoral candidacies is largely the result of racial anxiety. Kinder and Sanders (1996) argues that white antipathy towards minorities has taken a more subtle form of distrust of minority candidates and hostility towards race policy. The existence of this distrust is rooted in the theory that while overtly prejudicial expressions are a thing of the past, a certain segment of the white population still very much holds “symbolically” racist views that penalize minorities under socially acceptable grounds (McConahay 1986; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Kinder and Sanders (1996) argues that these racial attitudes are stable and difficult to reverse. If this theory is true, then we should expect those with racially prejudicial attitudes to be inherently distrustful of minority candidates, and render harsher judgements upon minority candidates when compared to white candidates of the same partisan and ideological stripe. On the other

---

\(^3\)Though these issues are linked to Asian Americans in the sense that they are "model minorities" and therefore are not dependent on such policies.
hand, if the “egalitarian” narrative is a more accurate reflection of the world today, then we should see no significant differences between the evaluation of minority candidates and white candidate, when controlling for partisanship, spending, and ideology.

Most observational studies of race have examined the white electorate as a whole without examining how different racial attitudes among whites may effect minority candidacies (Highton 2004; Bullock 1984). While more recent studies have explored the influence of differing racial attitudes among whites on the evaluation of President Obama (Jacobson 2011; Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012), there has yet to be an observational study that examines the effect of racial attitudes on black, Latino, and Asian candidates at the congressional level. This paper examines the effect of differing racial attitudes on minority candidacies by utilizing data that contains survey questions meant to capture a respondent’s racial attitudes.

Measuring racial attitudes has been a challenge that race scholars continue to grapple with. While overtly prejudicial sentiment expressed in survey questions has declined significantly in the post-Civil Rights Era (Virtanen and Huddy 1998; Gaertner and Dovidio 2005), some have found that whites are more willing to express anti-black and anti-minority attitudes when answering indirect questions about race (Schuman et al. 1998; Sears and Henry 2005). The racial resentment scale pioneered by Kinder and Sanders (1996) is the most common survey measure of implicit racial attitudes or “averse” racism, and it is the principle measure that I use to test for whom race matters.4

From this respondent-contextual theory of race and candidate evaluation, I posit the third of three hypotheses:

- 3. Racial Resentment Hypothesis - Biased perceptions against minority candidates will be especially prevalent among the racially resentful segments of the electorate.

4While some have argued that the racial resentment questions has less to do with race and more to do with ideological conservatism (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Sniderman and Carmines 1999), Kinder and Dale-Riddle (2012) found racial resentment to be significantly related to a lack of support for President Obama. For the purposes of this paper, I use racial resentment as my primary measure of racial attitudes, with the acknowledgement of the literature that has challenged its validity as a measurement of racial attitudes. This is partly due to convenience, as the CCES asks the racial resentment question, but also because if the racial resentment measure is not capturing racial attitudes, then it should bias my results against my hypotheses.
Table 1.1: Minority Makeup for 2010 and 2012 Congressional Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Republican</th>
<th>% Democrat</th>
<th>% Incumbent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1,387</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4 Data

For this study, I use 2010 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (CCES), a collaborative effort by political scientists across the country to gather survey data in congressional elections (Ansolabehere 2010, 2012). The CCES has several important advantages over existing studies (Highton 2004; Bullock 2000). First, between the 2010 and 2012 CCES, there were roughly 100,000 respondents. This large sample means that there are enough respondents to examine every Congressional district in America, which allows for an all encompassing examination of minority candidacies across the entire nation. Most critically, this data allows me to study candidates of every racial stripe, political orientation, and experience level. This survey data, in conjunction with the racial and political diversity of candidates who ran for Congress in 2010 and 2012, allows for a more rigorous exploration of the intersection of different candidate variables, like race or incumbency, and candidate race on candidate evaluation. This variation in race, partisanship, and candidate type differs from previous studies, which only look at black candidates, who were mostly incumbent Democrats (Highton 2004; Bullock 2000).

Table 3.3 shows the racial and political makeup for the candidates in 2010 and 2012 Congressional elections. 135 black candidates, 103 Hispanic candidates, and 37 Asian candidates ran for Congressional office between the 2010 and 2012 elections.

5The CCES survey is nationally representative and is conducted through the internet. More information on the CCES can be found at http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces

6For the purposes of this study, South Asian candidates were coded as “Asian”. I recognize the issues with assuming a pan-ethnic identity for all Asian candidates. Examining whether whites view Asian candidates of varying ethnic backgrounds differently should be the topic of a more thorough examination of the relationship between ethnicity and candidate evaluation. An experimental design would be ideal for such a study, since there are not enough Asian congressional candidates of different ethnicities for a significant observational comparison.
Table 1.2: Racial Competition Makeup for 2010 and 2012 Congressional Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Vs. White Democrat</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Vs. White Republican</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While most minority candidates ran as Democrats, there is a fair amount of political diversity among each of racial group. 28 black Republicans, 43 Hispanic Republicans and 8 Asian Republicans ran for Congress. On the other hand, there is substantially less political diversity among minority incumbents, almost all of whom were Democrats.

There is also substantial variation in the racial match ups in these elections. Table 3.2 shows the racial competition makeup in the 2010 and 2012 elections. A black candidate ran against a white candidate in 90 contests, a Hispanic candidate ran against a white candidate in 48 contests, and an Asian candidate ran against a white candidate in 27 contests. While there were races in which co-ethnics ran against one another, there was still a fair amount of diversity among the types of bi-racial elections.\(^7\) Both Table 3.3 and Table 3.2 illustrate the racial and political diversity amongst candidates and election type between these two election cycles. This racial and political diversity enables us to study how voters respond to different intersections of racial and political identities. For instance, we can observe whether voters view black, Hispanic, or Asian Republicans differently than black, Hispanic, or Asian Democrats.

Prior studies relied mostly on exit polling and aggregate vote data. The CCES is unique in several ways. The CCES asks its respondents to rate their candidates ideology on a 7-point scale\(^8\). Finally, the 2010 CCES asks its respondents to rate the competence of their candidates on a 7pt scale (from very strong to very weak).\(^9\) The incorporation

\(^7\)There were only two Non-White bi-Racial races in the sample.

\(^8\)The 2008 CCES asks its respondents to rate their candidate’s ideology on a 1-100 thermometer rating. As of this writing, I have yet to figure out how to adjudicate this ideology scale with the 7pt scale that the 2010 and 2012 CCES uses, which is why I opted not to include the data from the 2008 CCES in this study. I plan on using the 2008 CCES data as a replication dataset as needed.

\(^9\)The 2010 CCES also asks its respondents to rate his or her candidate’s “integrity” which correlates at
of ideology and competence ratings allows for a more nuanced and flexible measure of candidate evaluation that stands in contrast to the binary nature of the vote. Previous observational studies (Highton 2004; Bullock 2000) have looked exclusively at the vote, and while several important experimental studies (McDermott 1998; Sigelman et al. 1995) have found that race can cue ideology, there has yet to be an observational study that looks at evaluations that go beyond the vote. With the CCES, we can look beyond the vote and examine how voters rate candidates of different races.

In addition to the CCES, I also incorporate new candidate ideal point estimations (called Campaign Finance Scores, or CFscores) pioneered by Bonica (2013) into my analysis. This allows us to do analysis on challengers in addition to incumbents. As previously illustrated in Table 3.3, many minority candidates run for office but often lose, especially if they are Republicans. The use of CFscores allows me to incorporate a methodologically rigorous measure of challenger ideology into my analysis. It also provides an objective control for actual candidate ideology, which is important for any analysis of assessments of candidate ideology. Bonica’s ideology estimates resemble DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1984a,b), by mapping candidates onto a liberal-conservative dimension ranging from -3 (most liberal) to +3 (most conservative).10 Bonica found that the correlation coefficient between DW-NOMINATE scores and his CFscores was around 0.90 for incumbents, open seats, and challengers in both the House and the Senate. In my study, CFscores serve as a proxy for a candidate’s “true” ideology.11

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10 The details of how Bonica generates his campaign finance scores is in Bonica (2013). To summarize briefly: Bonica uses an IRT count model to estimate ideology scores for candidates that received money from at least thirty unique contributors during their election cycle. Bonica assumes that giving to a campaign is a reflection of these ideological and political preferences. This is the same assumption made by other spatial models of political preferences, including DW-NOMINATE.

11 There may be a question as to whether voters are able to meaningfully perceive the extremity of their candidates, and whether CFscores can be linked to these perceptions. I explore this question in a different project and find that voters are indeed able to perceive the ideological extremity of their candidates. See redacted (2013) for more details.
Table 1.3: Race of Candidate and Vote Choice in Contested Elections, 2010 and 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race Dem Candidate</th>
<th>% Dem Vote</th>
<th>Diff. with baseline (white vs. white)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>+4%**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race Rep Candidate</th>
<th>% Rep Vote</th>
<th>Diff. with baseline (white vs. white)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-5%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-8%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-20%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*prob< .05, **prob< .01

In order to examine the white vote, I excluded non-white respondents from the sample. I also excluded races that had no challenger, and minority vs. minority contests. In addition, I only included respondents who were able correctly to identify the race of their candidate, since respondents must be able to recognize the race of the candidate in order to use it as a political cue.

1.5 Results

1.5.1 Examining Racial Bias in Candidate Evaluation

I start my analysis with the most basic and fundamental measure of racial bias: bias in the vote. If there is racial bias in the vote, then minority candidates should perform worse than their white counterparts. Table 2.3 shows the raw vote totals for all minority candidates vs. white candidates by party. At first glance, these results suggest that there exists a cumulative racial bias in the white vote against minority candidates of both parties. Compared to the baseline (white vs. white), blacks and Hispanic Democrats do marginally worse. Minority Republicans, on the other hand, do worse across the board, with Asian Republicans doing the worst of all. These results point to a persistent racial bias against minority candidates of almost all racial and political stripes, with the notable exception of Asians Democrats who do better than the baseline. At the very least, this most basic examination of racial bias reveals that, despite a purported willingness
Table 1.4: Logit Model for Vote Preference on Race and Candidate Variables - All Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>(Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Candidate</td>
<td>-0.176**</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Candidate</td>
<td>-0.229**</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Candidate</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.665**</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>0.277**</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Candidate</td>
<td>-0.779**</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Spent</td>
<td>0.129**</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Spent</td>
<td>-0.192**</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycle 2012</td>
<td>0.366**</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cfscore</td>
<td>-0.131**</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Partisan Respondent</td>
<td>4.299**</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent Ideology</td>
<td>0.059**</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.234**</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 104,024
Log-likelihood: -35155.745
$\chi^2_{(12)}$: 39234.966

*prob< .05, **prob< .01

to support minority candidates, whites are not voting for their minority candidates at the same rate as their white counterparts.

At the same time, these results are very preliminary. They fail to control for central aspects of the campaign and candidate characteristics, such as incumbency, spending, and candidate ideology. Perhaps these results are the result of electoral variables independent of race. For instance, many of the minority candidates who ran for office were challengers running against established incumbents. Perhaps minority candidates were unable to raise the same amounts of money to stay competitive with their white counterparts. Or perhaps minority candidates were ideologically extreme and out of line with the electorates they were trying to represent. In order to account for those electoral variables, I turn to a logit regression model that controls for non-racial electoral variables. The main dependent variable is whether a respondent voted for the candidate, which is coded as 1 if the respondent did and 0 if the respondent did not. The independent variables of interest is the race of the candidate, with the excluded category being white, so that each coefficient is a comparison to white candidates. I control for
incumbency (along with open seats, with the excluded category being challengers), how much the candidate spent, how much the opposition spent,\textsuperscript{13} whether the candidate is a Democrat, the candidate’s CFscore (meant to control for candidate ideology), and a control for the cycle year (a dummy variable for 2012). A random effects model was used in order to control for district level variance.

Table 1.4 shows the logit model on the vote with all the aforementioned controls on all candidates (with Democrats and Republicans included in the same model). Whites are the excluded category in this regression and serve as the comparison group. The coefficients for each race reflect a comparison with white candidates after considering all the listed controls. The first result worth noting is that black candidates do significantly worse than whites. Hispanic candidates also do significantly worse than whites. Asians outperform whites, but the coefficient is not statistically significant (p-value of .07). In order to illustrate these results in a more meaningful manner, I generated predicted probabilities for the vote. Black candidates incur a 3\% penalty in the vote when compared to whites. Hispanics incur a 4\% penalty in the vote when compared to whites. Asians, on the other hand receive a 2\% benefit when compared to whites.

The most important result worth noting is that, even after controlling for a host of electoral variables, there is still a bias against black and Hispanic candidates in the vote, while there is a bias \textit{in favor} of Asian candidates. These results stand in contrast with prior observational studies, and indicate that even in a “Post-Racial” America, certain minority candidates are still handicapped by their race. This is also evidence in support of the racial-political stereotype hypothesis and the racial hierarchy hypothesis. While this finding is notable in and of itself, the next step is to explore these two hypotheses in more detail by examining among which candidates are these biases more prevalent and what the perceptual source of these biases are.

\subsection*{1.5.2 Partisanship and Racial-Political Stereotyping}

The regression analysis to this point treats all minority candidates as the same, regardless of party. But my theory of racial-political stereotyping argues that minority

\textsuperscript{13}I generated this measure of campaign spending by taking the total disbursements of all candidates and dividing it by two standard deviations to create a scale of -.5 to 7 with mean 0. See Gelman (2008) for more details.
Democrats are more likely cue perceptual biases than minority Republicans. In order to test whether the racial bias is more prevalent among minority Democrats, I run two separate regressions for Democratic and Republican candidates. The results of these two separate regressions are represented in Table 1.5.

When looking at only Democrats, the results closely mirror the results in the general model. The predicted probabilities bear out similar results to the general model. Black Democrats suffer a 3% penalty when compared to white Democrats. Hispanic Democrats suffer a 6% penalty when compared to white Democrats. Asian Democrats, on the other hand receive a predicted 10% increase in the white vote when compared to white Democrats.

Republican blacks and Hispanics, on the other hand, do not appear to suffer from the same biases that minority Democrats do when all the controls are accounted for. The effect of race on minority Republicans is statistically insignificant across both these racial groups. While the coefficients for each racial group points in the negative direction, the strength of these coefficients is weak for both black and Hispanic Republicans. Asian Republicans do significantly worse compared to their white counter parts, but this likely reflects the idiosyncrasies related to the small number of Asian Republic-
Table 1.6: Ordered Logit Model of Ideological Distance from Respondent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>(Std. Err.)</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>(Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Candidate</td>
<td>-0.288** (.056)</td>
<td>0.108 (.126)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Candidate</td>
<td>-0.301** (.090)</td>
<td>-0.071 (.082)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Candidate</td>
<td>0.026 (.097)</td>
<td>-0.029 (.291)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-0.066 (.040)</td>
<td>0.089* (.038)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>-0.004 (.047)</td>
<td>0.064 (.047)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Spending</td>
<td>0.111** (.034)</td>
<td>0.033 (.029)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Spending</td>
<td>-0.081* (.035)</td>
<td>0.189** (.035)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycle (2012)</td>
<td>0.655** (.038)</td>
<td>0.019 (.027)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cfscor</td>
<td>0.221** (.029)</td>
<td>0.059 (.047)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Partisan Respondent</td>
<td>3.055** (.041)</td>
<td>-2.388** (.039)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No of Obs 38,605 44,768
Log Likelihood -66837 -76805

*prob< .05, **prob< .01; Standard errors in parentheses

cans who ran in biracial contests in 2010 and 2012 (N of 3).

Thus far, these results lend support to the racial-political stereotyping and racial hierarchy hypotheses. Minority Republicans do not incur a significant penalty among white voters when compared to white Republicans. Both black and Hispanic Democrats, on the other hand, incur a racial penalty when compared to their white counterparts. These results support the racial-stereotyping hypothesis. On the other hand, Asian Democrats perform significantly better than black or Hispanic Democrats among whites, which supports the racial hierarchy hypothesis.

1.5.3 Where Does Racial Bias Come From?

How do we explain racial biases in the vote? I posit two possible explanations. The first is that minorities are viewed as more ideologically extreme than their white counterparts. The second is that minorities are viewed as less competent than their white counterparts. Questions in the CCES allow us to explore how voters perceive their candidates in ways that we could not before. In addition to the vote, we can also examine how voters see their candidates ideologically and assess candidate competence. Prior studies have established the importance of how voters perceive their candidates ideologically and their candidate’s competence in determining the vote (Hinich and Munger...
Table 1.7: Ordered Logit Model of Competence Rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Democrats (Std. Err.)</th>
<th>Republicans (Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Candidate</td>
<td>-0.527** (.089)</td>
<td>0.181 (.155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Candidate</td>
<td>-0.409** (.136)</td>
<td>-0.274† (.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Candidate</td>
<td>-0.142 (.108)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.254** (.064)</td>
<td>0.462** (.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>0.192* (.094)</td>
<td>0.066 (.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Spending</td>
<td>-0.005 (.053)</td>
<td>-0.094* (.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Spending</td>
<td>-0.093* (.042)</td>
<td>-0.022 (.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cfscore</td>
<td>0.162* (.053)</td>
<td>-0.024 (.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Partisan Respondent</td>
<td>1.442** (.058)</td>
<td>1.350** (.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Distance</td>
<td>0.592** (.015)</td>
<td>-0.634** (.017)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| No of Obs | 19,194 | 21,468 |
| Log Likelihood | -25766 | -27171 |

*prob < .05, **prob < .01; Standard errors in parentheses

1994; Popkin 1994; Vavreck 2009; Jacobson and Kernell 1983). Exploring how white voters might see their minority candidates as different in both these respects is critical in determining what might generate white bias against minority candidates.

First, I examine the ideological rating of candidates. In order to generate a more meaningful measure of candidate ideology, I construct a measure of ideological difference by subtracting the ideological rating of the candidate with the ideological rating that the respondent gave themselves, both on a 7pt scale. This generates a measure of ideological distance from the respondent, which is arguably more meaningful than a simple measure of ideology. The variable produced is a 12pt ordered variable with 0 representing a respondent perceiving ideological distance from that candidate. For example, if a candidate rates their own ideology as “Very Liberal” and rates their candidate as “Very Liberal,” this would produce a 0 on this scale. Negative values mean that the respondent sees their candidate as ideologically to the left in relation to their own ideology, while positive values indicate an ideological placement of the candidate to the right.

Table 1.6 shows the result of an ordered logit regression of ideological distance. The results of this regression paint a telling picture. Black and Hispanic Democrats are seen to be significantly further away ideologically from white respondents than white Democrats, even after controlling for a candidate’s actual ideology (as measured by
Table 1.8: Comparison of Logit Model of Vote on Race with Ideology and Competence Controls (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Original (Std. Err.)</th>
<th>Control (Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Candidate</td>
<td>-0.371** (.117)</td>
<td>0.141 (.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Candidate</td>
<td>-0.336* (.159)</td>
<td>0.272 (.287)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Candidate</td>
<td>0.061 (.189)</td>
<td>0.560* (.241)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.762** (.056)</td>
<td>0.515** (.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>0.361** (.101)</td>
<td>0.233 (.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Candidate</td>
<td>-0.478** (.136)</td>
<td>-0.495** (.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Spending</td>
<td>0.143** (.044)</td>
<td>0.192* (.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Spending</td>
<td>-0.148** (.047)</td>
<td>-0.191* (.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cfscore</td>
<td>0.016 (.066)</td>
<td>-0.101 (.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Partisan Respondent</td>
<td>3.912** (.046)</td>
<td>2.979** (.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent Ideology</td>
<td>0.028** (.010)</td>
<td>0.082** (.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Distance (abs)</td>
<td>-0.621** (.025)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence Rating</td>
<td>0.943** (.029)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.188** (.081)</td>
<td>2.993** (.188)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No of Obs 52,410 37,825
Log Likelihood -17543 -6430

*prob< .05, **prob< .01; Standard errors in parentheses

CFscores). Asian Democrats, on the other hand, are not seen as significantly more extreme than their white counterparts. On the other hand, minority Republicans are not seen as significantly ideologically distinct from their white Republican counterparts.

These results support both the racial-political stereotyping hypothesis and the racial hierarchy hypothesis. Black and Hispanic Democrats are seen as more ideologically extreme than whites, even when controlling for actual candidate ideology, but these biases do not apply to Asian Democrats and minority Republicans.14 It also provides a possible explanation as to why we are seeing bias in the Democratic vote against minorities. Whites see their black and Hispanic Democratic candidates as more ideologically extreme than white Democrats, and this perceptual bias may be what leads to a bias in the vote.

The other possibility is that whites are biased against minority candidates because they see minorities as less competent. In order to explore this aspect of candidate

14A series of robustness tests were run on this data that verify the same result, with some relatively minor variation. I ran the ordered regression using on the original candidate ideological rating, and also ran the data using DW-Nominate instead of CF Scores.
evaluation, I examine assessments of candidate competence. Respondents in the 2010 CCES were asked to rate the competence of their candidate on a 7pt scale, from “Very weak” to “Very Strong”. Using a similar model that I used for both the vote and for ideology, I ran an ordered logit on ratings of competence on racial variables and other control co-variates. The 2012 CCES did not ask competence questions, so this analysis was run using only the 2010 CCES. The patterns that stand out are similar to the results of the model on ideology. Even when controlling for incumbency, campaign spending, and candidate ideology, both black and Hispanic Democrats are seen as significantly less competent than their white counterparts.

The implications of these findings are potentially far reaching. These results represent the first look at competence assessments of minority candidates. They suggest that perceptual biases against minority candidates remain pervasive even in the age of Obama and five decades after the Civil Rights Movement. Black and Hispanic Democrats suffer the most from these biases, but Hispanic Republicans are also seen as significantly less competent than their white counterparts. This result affirms the racial-political stereotyping hypothesis. The result for Asian Democrats, on the other hand, is not significant, which reaffirms the racial hierarchy hypothesis.

On the whole, the evidence suggests that white voters are perceptually biased against minority candidates, especially minority black and Hispanic Democrats. How do these candidate perceptions influence the racial vote? Accounting for these perceptions could account for the bias in the racial vote and paint a clearer picture of what might cost minority candidates white votes. In order to explore this, I revisit the logit model from Table 1.4 and add in the ideological distance from respondent and competence assessments as control variables in the regression. The purpose of this regression is to see examine how the coefficients on race changes in order to determine whether bias in ideological assessment or bias in competence assessments drive bias in the vote. Table 1.8 shows the results from the original logit on the vote the results with a perception of

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15 The 2010 CCES also asked respondents to rate their candidate’s “integrity”. I found “integrity” to correlate with “competence” at a .89 level so I chose to focus on the competence evaluation for the purposes of this paper. I ran the models in this paper using “integrity” in order to check for robustness, and bore similar results to the models using competence.

16 There was a lack of Asian Republicans in bi-racial contests in 2010, so I could not analyze the effect of competence on Asian Republicans.
ideology variable and competence variable added as controls. Because the competence question only appears in the 2010 CCES, I reproduce the original model on just the 2010 data. The ideological assessment variable was also changed to absolute values. When controlling for competence assessments and ideological assessments, the results of the original regression change significantly. The coefficients on black and Hispanic become insignificant. This means that the bias that does exist against minority candidates is captured mostly by ideological and competence assessments.

The results suggest that whites are voting against minority candidates because they view them as both less competent and more ideologically extreme. Blacks and Hispanics are still faced with deep rooted perceptual biases that fit prevailing stereotypes and that directly affect their electoral prospects. These findings confirm Kinder and Dale-Riddle (2012)’s assertion that minority candidates often win in spite of their race, and that racial bias is still prevalent in this “post-racial” era.

While the results so far point to a general bias against black and Hispanic candidates, I also theorize that this bias will not be distributed equally in the electorate. In the next section, I explore my third hypothesis by taking an in-depth look at which subset of the electorate is more likely to hold biased views against minorities.
1.5.4 Exploring Racial Bias in the Electorate

What portions of the electorate holds racially biased perception of their minority candidates? Among what subsections of the electorate are the biases against minority candidates most prevalent? The results to this point assume that all white respondents are the same. But my theory argues that certain subsets of the population are more likely to be biased against minorities than others. In this section, I test my third hypothesis: that racial biases will especially prevalent among racially resentful segments of the population.17

In order to examine the effect of racial attitudes on candidate evaluation, I use two of the CCES’s racial attitudes questions. Respondents are asked the following: “The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors” and “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” Respondents are asked to indicate whether they “Strongly Agree” with this statement to “Strongly Disagree” with this statement, creating a 5 point ordered scale.18 I combine the answers to both these questions to produce a 9 point ordered measure of racial attitudes. I then interact the race of the candidate and the respondent’s racial attitudes in the model, in order to examine how respondents rate their candidates conditional on their racial attitudes.19 The clearest way to test my hypothesis is by looking at the marginal effects of the interaction. Capturing the marginal effects is essentially looking that the difference between the baseline group, in this case, white Democrats, and the group of interest, in this case, each racial group. Any value significantly lower than the baseline means that a white respondents see their minority candidates as significantly more liberal/less competent than white Democrats. I then plot the marginal effects of these interactions in order to visualize whether the difference with the baseline changes at each level of racial resentment.

The results of this interaction provide very strong evidence in support of the

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17For the purposes of illustration, the interaction models used as a basis for the plots in this section are basic OLS models.
18While these questions focus primarily on blacks and African Americans, I argue that the responses to these questions will be able to capture general racial attitudes of the respondent.
19The proceeding analysis using just one of the scales produced similar results.
racial resentment hypothesis. Figure 3.1 shows the marginal effects of racial attitudes for candidates of each racial group on competence. Because the racial attitudes variable is ordered, I elected to show the marginal effects at each level of the racial attitudes variable, with a value of “1” representing positive racial attitudes and a value of “9” representing the negative racial attitudes. Thus, the graphs in Figure 3.1 show whether white respondents are evaluating their minority candidates differently depending on their racial attitudes.

The most noticeable pattern among each of the racial groups is that negative racial attitudes are strongly related to lower competence ratings for each race, including Asian candidates. As racial attitudes become more positive, bias against minority candidates not only disappears, it appears as though Asian candidates actually do better than their white candidates among respondents with positive racial attitudes. For Hispanic and black candidates, the marginal effects become insignificant. These results clearly suggest that the bias in competence assessments in whites is driven largely by racial attitudes. High levels of resentment even biases respondents against all of the racial groups.

Does racial resentment also lead to a bias in ideological evaluation? Figure 3.2 shows the marginal effects of racial attitudes on ideology rating. Contrary to the results on competence assessments, there are no significant differences between how those with positive racial attitudes view black candidates as opposed to those with negative racial attitudes. Only those with the most negative racial attitudes see Hispanic candidates as
significant more liberal than white candidates. The marginal effects are insignificant at all the other levels for Hispanics. The marginal effects are insignificant across all levels for Asian candidates.

Not only do these results strongly support my third hypothesis, but they also point to an asymmetry in the way the racially resentful evaluate their minority candidates. The key takeaway from these findings is that there exists strong racial biases against minority candidates among the racially resentful, and that these biases are not centered around ideological evaluations, but rather assessments of competence and an ability to perform in office. This suggests that biases against minority candidates go beyond stereotypes about ideology, but are decidedly more insidious and discriminatory. While those with negative racial attitudes might distrust white Democrats because of ideology, they distrust minority Democrats because of a perceived lack of competence.

It follows that since a significant portion of the electorate holds these negative views of minority candidates, this should translate to less support in the vote. In order to examine this, I return to the logit model on the vote and interacted racial resentment with race and plotted the marginal effects in Figure 3.3. In keeping with the racial attitudes hypothesis, the results show a persistent bias in the vote against all minority candidates among those with very negative racial attitudes. For Asians, this bias seems to be offset by Asians receiving much higher levels of white support than the baseline among those with very positive racial attitudes. These results hold to a lesser degree for blacks, and positive racial attitudes do not help Hispanic candidates in any significant way.

**Figure 1.3**: Marginal Effects of Racial Resentment on Vote
Table 1.9: Racial Resent Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Attitudes Value</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - Strongly Positive</td>
<td>3.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - Mixed</td>
<td>13.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - Strongly Negative</td>
<td>30.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the whole, the results of these interactions suggest that much of the bias in competence assessments of minority candidates comes from the racially resentful subsections of the population. These results also point to three different groups of white voters: those for whom race helps, those for whom race hurts, and those for whom race is insignificant. How large are these groups in relative terms? Table 1.9 shows summary statistics of white respondents and where they place on the racial attitudes scale. Those who scored the highest on this scale represent a significant portion of the sample, easily a plurality (30%). While blacks and Asians perform significantly better among respondents who are less racially resentful, those who scored 1-4 on this scale comprised of only 21% of the sample. This proportional imbalance means that any benefit minority candidates may receive from their race in the electorate is likely nullified by the sheer size of those who hold negative racial attitudes.

1.5.5 The Influence of Incumbency on Race

How much does incumbency mediate biases against minority candidates? And does incumbency help certain groups more than others? The final part of this paper examines the effect of incumbency on minority candidates. A possible reason why we observe these biases against minority candidates is that white voters may be perceptually biased against minority challengers who are relatively unknown quantities. The theoretical underpinnings of this expectation lies in a “ambivalence-amplication” model of out group judgement (Carver et al. 1979; Katz 1981) in which ambivalence towards
a minority group can lead to extreme judgements about that group in attempts to correct for this uncertainty. Prior studies have found that, at least at the local level, black incumbents are able to assuage initial racial fears through competent governance (Hajnal 2007, 2001). This is in keeping with findings that incumbents dominate the flow of information in election campaigns and command most cross-partisan defections (Jacobson 2004). Perhaps the racial biases we observed in the prior sections will be washed out if we only examine minority incumbents.

In order to test the effect of incumbency on race, I interacted incumbency with each of the racial categories in the original logit regression. I then generated predicted votes for each racial category based on their incumbent or non incumbency status. Figure 1.4 shows the predicted white vote gain for each racial group by incumbency status. As one would expect, incumbency increases the share of the white vote for all racial groups. However, the magnitude of this increase varies widely by race. Whites, on average, gain 15 percent more of the white vote from incumbency. Both Hispanic and Asian candidates gain roughly 15 percent of the white vote from incumbency as well, suggesting that incumbency has similar effects on the vote for Hispanics and Asians as

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**Figure 1.4: Predicted White Vote Gain for Incumbents by Race**
Examining the effects of incumbency on candidate perception yields similar patterns in bias. Figure 3.5 shows the predicted change in ideological and competence of assessments of candidates based on incumbency, with candidate party and ideology controlled for in the model. What these two plots are meant to show is how incumbency changes the perception of voters on these two dimensions. White incumbents are viewed as more ideologically distinct than white non-incumbent, but the magnitude of this effect is small. Black incumbents, on the other hand, are seen as drastically more ideologically extreme than black non-incumbents, which means that rather than having a mediating effect on the perception of black candidates, incumbency actually amplifies the perception that black candidates are ideologically extreme. The same is the case for Hispanic incumbents, who are seen as more ideologically extreme than Hispanic non-incumbents, but not to the same degree that black incumbents are. The effect of incumbency on ideological assessments for Asians is statistically insignificant.

The patterns for competence assessments bear similar results to the results for ideological assessments of candidates. White incumbents are seen as significantly more competent than white non-incumbents. Black incumbents, on the other hand, are seen as...
significantly *less* competent than black non-incumbents, a result that points to a perceptual bias against black candidates that is even *stronger* among incumbents. The effect of incumbency on competence for Hispanic and Asians is not statistically significant.

The first takeaway from these results is that incumbency affects difference racial groups asymmetrically. For black candidates, incumbency seems to amplify perceptual biases and a lower share of the white vote when compared to other minority groups. While Hispanic candidates still gain white votes on par with white candidates from incumbency, there is still an ideological bias against Hispanic incumbents, who are viewed as more ideological extreme in spite of incumbency. This is in keeping with the racial hierarchy hypothesis, that bias is primarily centered around black and Hispanic candidates. And while white candidates are seen as more competent based on their incumbency status, all the other racial groups do not reap the same perceptual benefits from incumbency that whites do. These results run contrary to findings by Hajnal (2007), who finds that black incumbents benefit from incumbency. Hajnal (2007) studies black politicians at a local level, focusing specifically on city mayors. It is possible that white voters are more open to support minority incumbents who hold executive office, given the less-ideological nature of the office that is focused more on governance, competence, and deliverance of social services rather than the highly polarized and ideological nature of Congress.

Ultimately, these results illustrate a dire picture of the plight of minority candidates. Not only do minority candidates start with a number of perceptual biases that feed into a bias in the vote, but incumbency seems to have no effect in alleviating these biases. In fact, these results point to a disturbing finding that incumbency may actually *amplify* the perceptual biases against minorities, especially black candidates.

### 1.6 Discussion and Conclusion

The election of Barack Obama was without doubt an important symbolic point in American history. However, the results of this study show that despite the success of President Obama and increasing representation of minority groups across racial stripes, America remains far away from an idyllic “Post-Racial” society. Minority candidates,
especially Latino and black Democrats, remain at a disadvantage among white voters, especially those who hold strongly negative racial attitudes. Not only is this racial handicap significant, the size of this penalty is comparable to the marginal effect of variables like campaign spending and candidate ideology. The bias in the vote against minority candidates can be traced to perceptual biases in how whites view their candidates’ ideological leanings and competence. Whites see black and Hispanic Democrats as both more ideologically extreme and less competent than their white counterparts, even after controlling for a candidate’s actual ideology and controlling for incumbency.

Race is an especially significant factor in the political calculus of racially resentful white Americans. Those who score highly on the racial resentment scale are more likely to see their minority candidates as more liberal, less competent, and are ultimately less likely to vote for their minority candidates. On the other hand, white respondents with low levels of racial resentment are significantly more receptive to their minority candidates. However, whatever benefit a minority candidate may receive from their race is likely washed out by the large proportion of white voters who are racially resentful.

Given the uneven distribution of racial attitudes among whites that skew negatively, these results point to a disturbing electoral reality for certain minority candidates: that there exists a persistent racial handicap for black and Latino Democrats. Kinder and Dale-Riddle (2012) found that racial resentment cost Barack Obama around 3% of the white vote in the 2008 presidential election. This racial penalty not only applies to a national figure like President Obama, but also extends to black and Latino Congressional candidates as well. Whether this penalty is enough to swing individual elections, especially at the national level, is a separate question. Some studies have found that minority candidates are no more likely to lose than their white counterparts (Juenke and Shah 2014), yet other studies have found that marginal differences and racially unequal turnout has a significant influence on who wins and loses, especially in bi-racial city and local elections (Hajnal 2010). It seems that when these candidates are successful it is often because they are able to overcome this handicap. As more and more minority candidates seek office in white plurality or majority districts, this racial handicap will undoubtedly become a more pressing issue for minority representation, especially since significant portions of the white electorate hold attitudes that are hostile towards
minority candidacies.

Yet, the results also shows that whether race is a significant impediment on minority candidacies depends primarily on three distinct contexts: the racial group the candidate belongs to, the partisan identity of the candidate, and the racial attitudes of the white respondent. Each of these contexts warrants its own separate discussion. When it comes to the candidacies of Asian candidates, it is telling that they are not afflicted by the same perceptual biases that afflict black and Latino candidates, which is in keeping with the racial-hierarchy hypotheses I laid out earlier in the paper. However, the results also indicate that Asian candidates, after taking into account ideological and competence assessments, do significantly better than white candidates. This could be because the type of Asian candidate that runs is either of exceptional quality or more uniquely suited to appeal to a white electorate since most Asian candidates run in white majority/plurality districts.\footnote{Only three Asian candidates ran in Asian majority/plurality districts: Colleen Hanabusa (Hawaii 1st), Mike Honda (California 17th), and Judy Chu (California 27th). The rest ran in white majority/plurality districts.} In addition, it seems as though Asian candidates do not suffer a penalty in the vote, or competence and ideological assessments, despite prevailing stereotypes of perpetual foreignness. It is difficult to get at the possible effect of this stereotype because there is no clear way to measure how “foreign" a respondent perceives his or her candidate to be, nor is it clear what kind of effect this would have on the candidacies of Asian-Americans. It is possible that the negative evaluations of Asian candidates among the racially resentful are the result of stereotypes of foreignness. An experimental design which tests the independent effect of having a foreign background would go a long way towards answering these questions.

White perception of minority Republicans has been an unexplored part of the literature, principally because comprehensive data on how whites view a different array of minority Republicans has not been available until recently. The results of this study show that whites view minority Republicans as categorically different than minority Democrats. This result is in line with other recent work that finds that racially resentful respondents are willing to support black Republicans under certain circumstances (Karpowitz et al. 2014). While it might follow that the GOP label would correct for ideological bias against minority candidates, why we observe insignificant results on
competence evaluations is less clear. That the Republican party label eliminates bias in both ideological and competence evaluations of minority candidates may speak to the strength of partisan labels that not only cue voters as to their politics, but also cue voters as to their racial nature. The Republican party label is so strong, it enables minority Republicans to make credible appeals to whites about their political ability and ideological leanings that minority Democrats can not.

On the other hand, whites with racially positive attitudes are not only receptive to the candidacies of minorities, they favor them over white candidates. This finding is in keeping with Kinder and Dale-Riddle (2012) finding that while, on the whole, Obama suffered a racial penalty as the result of his race, his candidacy was viewed favorably by racially progressive white liberals, which contributed to his victory over Hillary Clinton in the 2008 Democratic Primary. This subset of the white electorate may find minority candidacies appealing from a symbolic and representational standpoint, similar to how many whites appreciated Obama’s symbolic value as the first president of African descent. For Asian candidates, it would seem as though the effect of positive racial attitudes is enough to wash out any racial handicap they do suffer. On the whole, these results have strong implications for the future of racial politics. As more and more minorities seek to represent white electorates, the makeup of racial attitudes among these electorates will have a significant impact on the barriers these candidates face. And as America becomes increasingly diverse, how white attitudes change will have a significant impact on minority representation. Whether white attitudes become more negative or more egalitarian with increasing diversity will determine whether America becomes truly “Post-Racial.”

To conclude, I return to the fundamental question in the study of race and ethnicity in American politics: does race matter? The answer to that question is yes, but with the caveat that it is dependent on which racial groups, what subsection of the population, and what types of candidates. It’s clear from these results that race matters for minority candidates, who still face steep obstacles when it comes to appealing to white voters. Barack Obama may have broken new ground with his election, but the obstacles that afflict minorities remain as pervasive as ever. In a “Post-Racial” America, we must not only consider whether race biases whites against minorities, but also how different
subsets of the population responds to different minorities. This study is merely an important first step in understanding how race matters in a modern era. But it is very clear that race does indeed still matter.
Chapter 2

Call to (In)Action: The Effects of Racial Priming on Grassroots Mobilization
2.1 Introduction

How salient are racial cues in moving the attitudes and more importantly the political actions of the American public? In the realm of public opinion, scholars have found that how issues are framed in regards to race has a significant influence on the attitudes of the electorate. Specifically, many scholars have argued that race-based considerations are a significant motivating factor in the formation of public opinions of white Americans on race-inspired policies, like affirmative action, welfare, and immigration (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Gilens 1995, 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay 1986; Sears and Speer 1979; Merolla, Ramakrishnan and Haynes 2013).

Another strand of the literature acknowledges that while race once played a significant role in the formation of white political attitudes, the effect of these racial cues are now largely contextual, dependent on the type of respondent and the context in which the cue is delivered. One of the central points of contention is whether the origins of this opposition comes from an ideological opposition to government-sponsored social programs (Sniderman and Carmines 1999; Sniderman et al. 1996) or from racial attitudes. These scholars argue that the strong effects of race on public opinion about social policies may be confounded by their close relationship to conservative opposition to policies that undermine principles of individualism (Abramowitz 1994; Carmines and Merriman 1993; Sniderman and Carmines 1999; Sniderman and Piazza 1993).

The problem with the ongoing discussion of the effects of racial cues and racial priming is two-fold. First, the focus on policy attitudes misses a more important aspect of political behavior - political mobilization. Indeed, public engagement on an issue has a powerful effect on policy that goes beyond the expression of public opinion (Bergen 2009). There is also a substantial difference between holding political opinions and taking political action. Acting on opinions requires time and energy that voters are often unwilling to expend (Schuman, Steeh and Bobo 1985; Stout and Kline 2008) and may involve personal and economic consequences (LaPiere 1934). Thus, the opinions that individual respondents express are not always reflective of the actions they take (LaPiere 1934; Stout and Kline 2008). While people may be inclined to hide their true sentiments when expressing their political opinions, when faced with a politically costly action,
respondents are more inclined to act on latent motivations. We argue that examining the relationship between racial cues and political action provides a clearer picture of the true effect race has on the different dimensions of political behavior.

Second, studies of the effects of race on public opinion have focused on policies that have both a strong racial implication and also a close connection with conservative ideological opposition (Sniderman and Carmines 1999). As such, it is difficult to separate the racial component of these issues from the conservative component to get a clean comparison between the two types of opposition (Abramowitz 1994; Carmines and Merriman 1993; Sniderman and Carmines 1999; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). While some argue that race continues to play a significant role in the formation of opinions (Federico and Sidanius 2002), others argue that it is nothing more than an artifact of opposition to policies on the basis of ideological conservatism (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Sniderman et al. 1996).

To address these problems this paper provides a clear test of the effects of race on the grassroots mobilization, rather than the political opinion, of white Americans. While numerous studies have looked at the effect of race on the public opinions of white Americans around policy issues, we focus our study on a more costly behavior that requires individuals to take action around that policy. Specifically, we look at the effect that racial cues embedded in a political appeal have on the willingness of individuals to become involved in the political process outside of the ballot booth. The cost of political action provides us with a more stringent test of racial bias on political behavior.

In addition, our study addresses the issue of confounding the effect of conservatism with negative racial attitudes in two ways. First, we focus on a non-racialized issue that conservatives should be more inclined to support - the reduction of government bureaucratic regulation - then infuse a racial cue into that issue experimentally. This allows us to distinguish racial considerations from conservatism and gauge the effect of race on political behavior, separate from actual policy. Second, we also present another experimental treatment that infuses the issue with a non-racial but similarly ‘specialized’ group cue. The purpose of this cue is to compare its effects to the effects of the racial cue in order to see if the bias against minorities is also present for non-racial groups. This allows us to address concerns that biases against minority groups are the
result of conservative objections to non-universalistic policies.

Using a survey experiment, we asked respondents to contact their member of Congress about an issue and randomize whether we describe the beneficiaries as being a racial minority group, another specialized non-racial group, or society as a whole. We then examine whether respondents in these experimental treatment groups are more or less likely to contact their representative. We find that the presence of explicit racial cues embedded in the call to action lowers the likelihood of participation among those with higher levels of racial resentment. We find that this effect is not, however, the result of an ideological preference for individualism. Rather, we find that when benefits of the policy are construed towards another non-racial specialized group individuals are no more or less willing to contact their member of Congress than when the policy is universal.

2.2 Race, Public Opinion, and Political Action

2.2.1 Racial Priming and Political Behavior

A significant portion of the literature on racial priming argues that negative racial attitudes among whites leads to opposition to social policies thought to benefit minority groups (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Gilens 1995, 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay 1986; Sears and Speer 1979). These studies have found that policies presented with a racial justification results in a significant decline in support among white respondents (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Skocpol 1991; Sniderman and Carmines 1999). These studies have found that white opposition to these programs is not necessarily the result of blatant racism, but rather a belief that the lack of economic progress in the black community is the result of laziness or other character shortcomings (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Henry 2003). In essence, whites are much less likely to support social programs in part because of the perception that blacks are overly reliant on them (Gilens 1995).

Whether the effects of race on opinions are also manifest in an individual’s willingness to act around policy issues is another question. How people respond when asked their opinions may be different from the decision they take when presented with
an actual choice or actions. LaPiere (1934) seminal work on the difference between the expressed attitudes of hotel and restaurant purveyors towards Chinese-Americans and their explicit actions found that the two were fundamentally different. Most service providers, when asked their opinion, expressed an unwillingness to serve or accommodate Chinese-Americans. However, when presented with the opportunity to provide services to individuals of Chinese descent, few of these same individuals actually denied service. Similarly, studies have shown that individuals are willing to lie or decline to respond when they know their views are not perceived as socially acceptable (Berinsky 1999, 2004; Hopkins 2009; Schuman, Steeh and Bobo 1985; Vogel and Ardoin 2008). While studies have regularly shown that race changes whites’ opinions on policy issues, it is not as clear whether those opinions translate into political actions.

2.2.2 Public Opinion and Political Outcomes

Because opinions are effortless and bear fewer consequences, they do not necessarily translate into political action, which bears greater consequences and is more costly. While public opinion can have an effect on the actions of political elites under certain circumstances (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978), the opinions of legislators’ constituents are often not well known (Butler and Nickerson 2011; Miller and Stokes 1963). Instead, legislators rely extensively on other forms of inference, such as constituent initiated contact through phone calls, postcards, and email (Ainsworth 1993; Bergen 2009; Cigler and Loomis 2011; Kollman 1998), which in turn rely on the willingness of individuals to become involved in the political process. Thus, while racial priming may affect the formation of opinions among white Americans, it is unclear how the effect of racial priming or racial cues embedded in social and policy issues affect an individual’s willingness to become politically involved, and which decision has a greater effect on political policy outcomes.

The ideological and social cues contained in calls to action can have a significant effect on the willingness of individuals to become involved with and to donate to political causes (Han 2008; Levine N.d.; Miller and Krosnick 2004). At the same time, research about campaign donors suggests that not all donors respond to the same set of appeals (Brown, Powell and Wilcox 1995; Francia et al. 2003; Mabelby, Goodliffe and
and that campaigns vary their messages to target donors with a message designed to elicit the best response (Cho and Gimpel 2007; Hassell and Monson 2014; Hassell 2011; Shea and Burton 2006). Indeed, there is reason to believe that, as with other primes in political mobilization efforts, racial primes may influence some individuals while having no effect on others. Building off of these previous findings, the next section details our theory of political action and racial cues.

2.2.3 Expectations and Hypothesis

If racial priming and cues have an effect on white Americans, it is important that we document that effect not only on political attitudes, but also political behaviors. As such, we hypothesize that the presence of a racial cue should have a negative effect on the willingness of individuals to engage politically on an issue. Because political action around a policy issue is a more costly behavior, this test significantly raises the stakes of the effects of racial cues. Thus, even when the political issue at hand is an issue that the respondent would normally be inclined to support the presence of racial cues will lower the likelihood of participation.

- **Hypothesis 1** - If race remains a significant variable in the political decisions of white Americans then the presence of a racial cue in the political appeal should make whites less likely to respond to attempts at political mobilization compared to a race-neutral appeal.

On the other hand, if the opposite is true and if race is no longer the overriding influence it once was, then we should observe no tangible differences between the racial appeal and the race neutral appeal.

In addition, scholarship has suggested that the effects of appeals may be different among various subgroups (Francia et al. 2003; Kinder and Mendelberg David O. Sears, Jim Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo; Sears and Henry 2003). Because political action is more costly, negative racial attitudes should have an especially significant effect when the call to action benefits minority racial groups. In order to further test the effect of race on different subgroups, we also incorporate a standard measure of racial resentment to
measure an individual’s underlying attitudes towards minorities (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Using this measure of racial resentment, we posit a second hypothesis.

- **Hypothesis 2** - Respondents who score higher on the racial resentment scale will be less likely to mobilize in the racial experimental scenario when compared to the control appeal, while the experimental variation will have no effect on those with lower levels of racial resentment.

Several scholars have challenged Kinder and Sanders’s claim that the measurement of racial resentment effectively measures the salience of race in the minds of individuals. Scholars have long had a difficult time disaggregating racial prejudice from conservative views on social welfare policy (Kinder and Mendelberg; David O. Sears, Jim Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo; Sears et al. 1997; Sidanius et al. 2000). Kinder and Sanders (1996) make the claim that while overtly racially prejudicial views are considered taboo, these views now manifest themselves as symbolically racist views, in which whites are hostile towards policies that promote the social standing of minorities. Kinder and Sanders argue that these racial attitudes can be teased out with questions that indirectly elicit racial attitudes, more commonly known as racial resentment questions. On the other hand, some scholars have argued that because contemporary racial policies have become subsumed in the policies identified with political liberalism, opposition to these policies is actually an artifact of political conservatism as opposed to racial prejudice (Sniderman and Carmines 1999; Feldman and Huddy 2005). In this view racial resentment actually measures opposition to all policies tailored to benefit narrow political subgroups, as opposed to racially prejudicial attitudes.

In order to test these two competing theories, we can vary the use of implicit cues in appeals to action in a crucial way. In the primary iteration of our experiment, we include a racial cue that indicates that the benefits of the policy would primarily affect “minority workers.” In another iteration of our experiment, we include a cue indicating that a non-racial but specialized group (“construction workers and building contractors”) would receive the primary benefits. If racial prejudice and not adherence to an ideology of individualism is the main motivating factor in deciding whether an individual becomes involved in support of a policy, our results should confirm a third hypothesis.
- **Hypothesis 3** - Respondents with higher levels of racial resentment will be more likely to mobilize in response to the non-racial specialized group appeal when compared to the racial appeal.

### 2.3 Method and Research Design

In order to test the effect of racial cues on the willingness of individuals to become politically involved we designed an experiment that manipulated information individuals were given about a political issue embedded in a call to action similar to the appeals interest groups send out to activate grassroots support. A group of 720 white U.S. Citizens over the age of 18 was recruited via Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk website in early 2012. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is a website where requesters publish tasks (Human Intelligence Tasks or HITs) and provide payment to those who choose to participate. Those who request a task can limit the availability of the task to respondents who have certain characteristics such as age or location. Recruitment through Mechanical Turk is similar to other web-based approaches such as YouGov that maintain panels of participants and invite them to participate in studies in exchange for a payment or other incentive. Previous research has shown that samples collected from Mechanical Turk are more representative of the U.S. population than undergraduate samples or samples populated from those who respond to web advertisements (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012). Additionally, studies run from samples collected from Mechanical Turk have been shown to replicate important experimental findings in psychology (Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling 2011).

Table 1 compares our sample with some metrics from white Americans in the 2010 American National Election Evaluations of Government and Society Study II (ANES) which was also conducted online in conjunction with Knowledge Networks. Compared to ANES, our sample has several notable differences. The majority of our sample had an income of less than $40,000 per year and is significantly younger, more educated, and leans liberal and Democrat.

More important than these summary socio-demographic statistics is whether our sample is representative on our variables of interest, and as a result whether the conclu-
Table 2.1: Comparison of Survey Sample to 2010 ANES Evaluations of Government and Society Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Sample</th>
<th>ANES 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Voted in 2008 Election</td>
<td>68.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Previously Contacted Public Official</td>
<td>43.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Volunteered with a campaign</td>
<td>9.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with Income $40K</td>
<td>63.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with less than a College Degree</td>
<td>50.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Under 35</td>
<td>64.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Conservative or Very Conservative</td>
<td>21.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Republican</td>
<td>19.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% No Racial Resentment</td>
<td>31.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sions we find in this sample would also play out in the general population. Sixty-six percent of respondents reported voting and 43% reported having contacted a member Congress in the past four years. While our study population is more politically active in areas other than voting, political campaigns and interest groups specifically target more politically active individuals with their calls to action (Grant and Rudolph 2002; ?).

We also asked respondents a series of questions to measure levels of racial resentment. Respondents in our survey had slightly lower levels of racial resentment than those in the more representative ANES.1 In our study 32% indicated through their answers that they held no racial resentment, compared to 23% of white respondents in the ANES.1 There was, however, no significant variation in the distribution of racial resentment across ideological and partisan subgroups when compared to the ANES sample. Roughly 45% of liberals had no racial resentment in the ANES sample compared to 41% of self-identified liberals in our sample. Likewise, 16% of self-identified conservatives in the ANES sample indicated having no racial resentment while in our sample it was 12%. The percentage of Republicans and Democrats in our sample with no racial resentment was 15% and 43% respectively compared to 13% and 35% respectively in the ANES sample.

After gathering basic demographic information, respondents were randomly assigned to one of three groups. All groups were presented with a text similar to appeals

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1While our survey used a battery of six questions to reveal an individual’s level of racial resentment, the ANES used only four. For the purposes of this comparison of samples we restrict the analysis of our survey to the same four questions that were asked on the ANES.
sent out by a national interest group emphasizing the need for increased job growth to help the economic recovery. The text follows the typical structure of information presented in political mail and email (Godwin 1988; Hassell 2011). The text highlighted the importance of the “Regulatory Accountability Act" which would decrease the regulatory burdens on small businesses and allow businesses to increase employment levels and emphasized the need for the respondent to help lobby their member of Congress to help pass the law.

One group of respondents, however, was shown this same text but with added phrases emphasizing the high levels of unemployment among racial and ethnic minorities and the effect that the legislation would have on increasing employment among minorities rather than the general public. However, as some scholars have posited that individuals may not take action because the targeting of benefits to a specialized group violates ideological preferences for individualism (Abramowitz 1994; Carmines and Merriman 1993; Sniderman and Carmines 1999; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). To distinguish whether ideological preferences or racial bias is the primary motivating factor, a third group was presented with the same original text, but with additional phrases emphasizing the high level of unemployment among building contractors and construction workers and the effect that such a change in policy would have on these individuals.

At the bottom of the message was the call to action, inviting respondents to write a letter to their member of Congress advocating support for the Regulatory Accountability Act. Although we do not report our findings here, we also ran the same experiment alternatively using images of white or black workers and found no effects. Our manipulations, however, were not as extensive in their use of implicit associations as previous work that has found effects (Mendelberg 2001). If individuals indicated they were willing to write a letter, they were directed to a page with a link to an interest group’s website where they filled out their address and personal information and could edit the text that the interest group would send to their member of Congress. In order

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2The full text can be found in the appendix.
3The full text can be found in the appendix.
4Although the cues we provided respondents explicitly relied upon race, many techniques in grassroots mobilization rely on implicit associations, both racial and non-racial (Levine 2009; Mendelberg 2001; Whicker 1992; Weaver 2012). Scholars, however, continue to debate whether implicit racial appeals are still effective in the Post-Civil Rights era (Huber:2006, Mendelberg:2001, Mendelberg:2008)
Table 2.2: Comparison of Survey Sample to 2010 ANES Evaluations of Government and Society Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of Racial Resentment</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial-Resentment 1</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>18.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial-Resentment 2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial-Resentment 3</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial-Resentment 4</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>13.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial-Resentment 5</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>13.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial-Resentment 6</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>16.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial-Resentment 7</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>14.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Liberal</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>16.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>27.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Conservative</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To assure that respondents who expressed a willingness to act had actually filled out the form we coded individuals who spent less than 20 seconds (about the amount of time it took the authors to speedily fill out the basic information requested) on the interest group’s website before continuing with the survey as not having sent a letter to their member of Congress. Most individuals who engaged with the form spent significantly more time.

Consistent with other studies that attempted to measure respondents levels of racial resentment, at the end of the survey we asked respondents whether they agreed with the same six statements Kinder and Sanders (1996) used to evaluate racial resentment. Although some critics of the measure argue that racial resentment is also highly correlated to the politics of individualism (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Schuman 2000), the measure has been shown to be a consistent measure of internal beliefs distinct from ideological conservatism, and not an artifact of shared-item content with policy-attitude items (Tarman and Sears 2008). Table 2 presents summary statistics of racial resentment and conservative ideology. Levels of racial resentment within our sample is uniformly distributed, while ideology is more normally distributed, albeit with a liberal skew. Within our sample, our measure of racial resentment correlates with our measure of conservatism at .48. This shows us that while there is some relationship between
conservatism and racial resentment, the racial resentment measure is still capturing attitudes for which political conservatism does not account. However, to control for these concerns that other scholars may still have about the use of this measure, we also show below that in our case a respondent's level of racial resentment does not correlate with the provision of specialized benefits to other non-racial groups.

2.4 Results

2.4.1 The Decision to Act Politically

We begin by comparing the willingness of white respondents to contact their member of Congress about the Regulatory Accountability Act under our three groups of interest: the control group which received no cue, the racial treatment group, and the non-racial treatment group. Figure 1 shows the percentage of white individuals who sent a message to their member of Congress about the Regulatory Accountability Act in the control and experimental groups.

The results show the likelihood that a white individual sent a message to their member of Congress through the interest group’s website is significantly lower for those who were shown the appeal containing racial cues. Almost 19% of respondents who
were given the treatment containing no racial cue agreed to write the letter to the member of Congress compared to only 11.7% of those individuals who were shown a treatment containing racial language. There is no significant difference between the response rates of the control group and those individuals shown the treatment containing language referring to construction workers. Whites are significantly less willing to become involved when they are primed with racial cues compared to both the control and the construction worker treatment group. This central finding confirms our first hypothesis: that a race specific appeal has a significant and negative influence on mobilizing political action. When compared to both the construction worker appeal and the control group, the racial appeal leads to significantly less political engagement.

The race based appeal also leads to significantly less mobilization when compared to the non-racial specialized group appeal. This indicates that the content of the race based appeal is distinct from the non-racial construction worker appeal. The race based appeal demobilizes respondents in a way that the construction worker appeal does not.

2.4.2 The Effect of Racial Resentment

In order to examine the effect of racial resentment on our outcome of interest, we divide the sample into those who have high levels of racial resentment and those who have low levels of racial resentment.\(^5\) When we divide the sample in this way, we observe a different pattern for those with high levels of racial resentment and those with low levels of racial resentment. Figure 2 shows the results for both groups separately. Only 5.4% of white respondents with high levels of racial resentment who were shown an appeal containing racial cues visited the interest group’s website to send the letter to their member of Congress compared to 17.3% of similar respondents who were shown appeals without racial cues.

As expected, while we find strong effects for those individuals with high levels of racial resentment, we find no effect of the racial cue for those with low levels of racial resentment.

\(^5\)For the purpose of these figures we created a scale of racial resentment from zero to one using the responses to the six racial resentment questions. Individuals with a racial resentment score of 1/2 or greater were considered to have high racial resentment, and individuals with scores of less than 1/2 were considered to have low racial resentment.
racial resentment. When presented with the generic appeal, 21% of respondents with low levels of racial resentment sent a letter to their member of Congress, compared to an insignificantly different 20% of those who were presented with the racial primed version of the appeal.

This result confirms our second hypothesis that respondents who score higher on the racial resentment scale will be less likely to mobilize in favor of the race based appeal. The strong significance of these results suggest that the race based appeal is especially strong among those with high levels of racial resentment, indicating that race based appeals do not affect the population in a uniform manner. In the next section, we test whether the source of this opposition is a result of the politics of individualism, as opposed to racial resentment.

2.4.3 The Response to Other Specialized Non-Racial Groups

Although the issue of deregulation is largely considered an item on the conservative agenda, it could be that respondents identified as having higher levels of racial resentment also hold preferences towards policies promoting individualism. In that situation those individuals would oppose policies designed to favor a specific group of individuals regardless of that group’s race and ethnicity. To examine this possibility we also compare actions taken by those with high levels of racial resentment in the control group to those with high levels of racial resentment who saw a call to action indicating
that the effect of the Regulatory Accountability Act would benefit construction workers and building contractors in Figure 3.

Unlike the results previously shown from Figure 2, in this case respondents with high levels of racial resentment are no more or less likely to contact their member of Congress after being a call to action that indicated that the legislation would benefit construction workers and building contractors when compared to similar individuals in the control group. The increase from 17.3% to 17.4% of individuals who contacted their member of congress is statistically indistinguishable. While an explicit statement indicating that racial minorities will benefit from the implementation of the legislation under consideration substantially decrease the willingness of individuals with racial resentment to take political action, there is no effect on the willingness of these individuals to participate when the benefits are designated to another specific non-racial subgroup.

These results confirm our third hypothesis, which is that racially resentful respondents are more likely to mobilize in favor of the non-racialized group cue when compared to the race-based group cue. Finally, in our next section we turn to an interaction regression model in order to test the effect of racial resentment with a full

\[\text{Figure 2.3: Percentage of Respondents with High Levels of Racial Resentment Who Wrote their Member of Congress}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{6}There is also no significant difference between those individuals with low levels of racial resentment, although, in this case the percentage of respondents who contacted their member of Congress declined slightly.}\]
complement of demographic controls.

2.4.4 Modeling Race Motivated Political Behavior

To model the effects of racial resentment on the willingness of individuals to respond to grassroots mobilization we build a model controlling for the propensity of individuals to engage in political activity. Table 3 contains a series of logit models predicting the likelihood that a respondent wrote a letter to a member of Congress after reading the appeal to do so. In addition to the variables of interest, we have also included a series of demographic and socioeconomic controls routinely found to influence an individual’s participation rates.\(^7\) We also include a summary variable indicating an individual’s political involvement in the past four years.\(^8\) In addition, a common criticism of the racial resentment measure is that it actually captures political conservatism as opposed to racial resentment (Feldman and Huddy 2005). As an additional test above what we have previously done, to see whether our results are driven by political conservatism we add an interaction between the independent variables of interest and political conservatism of the respondent in a third model. Comparing the coefficients in the racial resentment model and the conservatism model will indicate whether our results are driven by conservatism.

In the two models featuring the racial resentment, we find a consistent effect of the interaction between an individual’s level of racial resentment and having seen the appeal containing racial cues. While the appeal containing the racial prime does not have an independent significant negative effect on the likelihood that the respondent will take action, those individuals who have higher levels of racial resentment are less likely to act when presented with a call to action that contains racial cues.

This response, however, is not the result of a conservative world view that discourages government intervention or assistance. If the results are driven by political

\(^7\)In addition, we also examined other variations and transformations of the age and income variables and found no effects. The inclusion of these alternative measures does not alter the direction of the coefficients nor their significance.

\(^8\)Individuals were asked to indicate whether they had done the following political activities in the past four years: voted, donated to a campaign or political group, attended a rally or protest, volunteered for a political campaign or cause, and contacted their member of Congress or Senator about an issue. An individual’s responses were then scaled from 0 to 1 based on the number of items the respondent reported having participated in.
Table 2.3: Logit Model Predicting Willingness of Individual to Contact Member of Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 (Std. Err.)</th>
<th>Model 2 (Std. Err.)</th>
<th>Model 3 (Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race Appeal</td>
<td>0.024 (.404)</td>
<td>0.030 (.411)</td>
<td>-0.353 (.663)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Appeal</td>
<td>-0.533 (.439)</td>
<td>-0.469 (.450)</td>
<td>-1.870 (.705)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
<td>-0.196 (.442)</td>
<td>-0.093 (.484)</td>
<td>-0.388 (.371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Resentment x Race Appeal</td>
<td>-1.539* (.778)</td>
<td>-1.575* (.780)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Resentment x Construction Appeal</td>
<td>0.558 (.714)</td>
<td>0.384 (.727)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatism x Race Appeal</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.598 (1.250)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatism x Construction Appeal</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.010** (1.200)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Ideology</td>
<td>1.229 (.751)</td>
<td>-0.612 (.556)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>-0.201 (.223)</td>
<td>-0.176 (.222)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Income ($80K+)</td>
<td>-0.053 (.409)</td>
<td>-0.044 (.406)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid Income ($40-$80K)</td>
<td>-0.118 (.252)</td>
<td>-0.101 (.252)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.011 (.009)</td>
<td>0.012 (.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Involvement</td>
<td>1.327** (.406)</td>
<td>1.268** (.406)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.365**</td>
<td>-2.434** (.477)</td>
<td>1.915** (.521)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 (Std. Err.)</th>
<th>Model 2 (Std. Err.)</th>
<th>Model 3 (Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>-0.669 (.558)</td>
<td>-0.612 (.556)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of Obs</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.0237</td>
<td>0.0507</td>
<td>0.0554</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*prob < .05, **prob < .01; Standard errors in parentheses

conservatism we should expect respondents with a conservative ideology to disengage when shown both specialized group cues. However, the third model shows the conservatism interaction to be insignificant with the racial cue and positive and significant with the non-racial specialized group cue. The insignificance of the conservatism interaction in conjunction with the significance of the racial resentment interaction indicates that the racial resentment measure captures racial attitudes that the conservatism measure does not.

In addition, we should expect conservatives to support regulatory reforms that would lessen the role of government intervention in the business world. In confirmation of this, we find that individuals with a conservative ideology were marginally, albeit not quite significantly, more likely to respond to the call to action about regulatory burdens than the general public. Interestingly, the interaction between conservatism and the construction worker appeal is significant and positive, indicating that those who are politically conservative are more likely to support a construction worker appeal. We interpret this result to mean that political conservatives can be influenced by certain non-racialized group-specific appeals. Our findings indicate that respondents with higher levels of racial resentment were not acting in response to a conservative world view that disdains acting in support of a policy aimed at a specialized subgroup. Instead, these individuals were disinclined to support policies that specifically target African-
To illustrate the racial resentment interaction more meaningfully, we plot the predicted probability of political mobilization based on differing levels of racial resentment while holding the other contributing factors at their means. These results are illustrated in Figure 4. As an individual’s level of racial resentment increases from 0 to 1, the likelihood of an individual sending a letter to their member of Congress after reading the appeal without the racial prime does not vary. The change in likelihood over the same range of racial resentment after seeing an appeal that does contain the racial prime, however, decreases significantly and substantially from just under 19% to 5.5%.

2.5 Discussion and Conclusion

The findings presented here corroborate previous findings that race plays a significant role in the public’s evaluation of policy. More importantly, however, they also show that race also plays a role in the more costly decision of individuals to become involved in the political process. Expressed opposition to public policies does not appear to be mere cheap talk, but also has a large effect on the more costly political behaviors as well. The effects of framing a policy as benefiting minorities have a significant effect not only on the opinions of white, but also on their willingness to become involved in
the policy process. The choices groups make to frame political debates not only affect public opinions but they also affect the dynamics of who chooses to become involved in the political process. We show that those with higher levels of racial resentment are less likely to be willing to take political action in support of a cause that they perceive to benefit ethnic and racial minorities. We show that racial cues are not only effective at changing opinions, they also change the dynamics of who becomes involved in the political process.

We also find that this effect does not appear to be the result of a conservative ideology that encourages individualism. By using a policy that conservatives should support at higher levels we differentiate between the effect of a conservative ideology (an significant and positive effect) and the effect of racial resentment (a significant and negative effect) on the likelihood of an individual taking political action in response to the appeal that contained racial cues. We find that individuals with higher levels of racial resentment are less likely to become politically involved when presented with information that suggests that ethnic minorities will benefit from changes in policy, even when the policy is a traditionally conservative policy that would limit government. Those with high levels of racial resentment were also no more or less likely to act when shown a non-racial specialized group cue when compared with the control, and significantly more likely to be involved when compared to the minority cue. For those with low levels of racial resentment, the presence of a racial cue does not prompt a significant difference in the likelihood of becoming politically involved in the lobbying process.

While we find strong evidence that racial cues can demotivate whites from participating politically, we recognize that this study remains narrow in its focus. In this study, we focus on race as primarily a demotivating variable in political action. Since race can demotivate political action, it is also plausible that racial cues can motivate different parts of the electorate to participate. Among whites, racial cues, along with the right political action appeals, could possibly move those with high-degrees of racial resentment into political action. On the other hand, racial cues might also be an effective tool in mobilizing minority groups into political action as well. The results from this study opens up new avenues of research in order explore these possibilities.

While others have suggested that the effects of race no longer influence the actual
political behaviors of white Americans, we find substantial effects to the contrary. We find that that race continues to play a significant and substantial role in the decision of white Americans to respond to grassroots mobilization techniques commonly found in political calls to action.

2.6 Appendix

2.6.1 Minority Treatment Text

The full text of the question with the racial prime in parentheses and italics: Our nation’s economic recovery needs job growth. Yet, increased regulatory burdens are instead stopping companies from hiring, with employers citing 'regulatory uncertainty’ as their top reason for their inability to hire new (racial and ethnic minority) workers and get our economy moving again. (The group most hurt by these unfair regulations is minority workers.) According to the Small Business Administration, the annual cost of federal regulations increased to more than $1.75 trillion in 2008. While all citizens pay some portion of these costs, the distribution of the burden heavily falls on businesses, with small businesses bearing the largest impact. This is one of the major barriers to increasing employment (among minorities). However, recently the Regulatory Accountability act was introduced in the House and Senate to improve accountability and the integrity of the rule making process. **We need your support to reform the way regulation is formed in Washington and help businesses hire more (minority) workers.** If you are willing to write a letter to your senator to tell your members of Congress to support the Regulatory Accountability Act, which would update the process by which federal agencies promulgate regulations, easing the burden on small businesses and allowing businesses to hire new workers and decrease the nation’s unemployment rate (among minorities), please check yes below. (bold emphasis in the original)
2.6.2 Construction Worker Text

The full text of the question including the information about construction workers and building contractors was as follows: Our nation’s economic recovery needs job growth. Yet, increased regulatory burdens are instead stopping companies from hiring, with employers citing ‘regulatory uncertainty’ as their top reason for their inability to hire new workers and get our economy moving again. The group most hurt by these unfair regulations is building contractors and construction workers. According to the Small Business Administration, the annual cost of federal regulations increased to more than $1.75 trillion in 2008. While all citizens pay some portion of these costs, the distribution of the burden heavily falls on businesses, with small businesses and building contractors bearing the largest impact. This is one of the major barriers to increasing employment among construction workers. However, recently the Regulatory Accountability act was introduced in the House and Senate to improve accountability and the integrity of the rule making process. We need your support to reform the way regulation is formed in Washington and help businesses, especially building contractors, hire more workers. If you are willing to write a letter to your senator to tell your members of Congress to support the Regulatory Accountability Act, which would update the process by which federal agencies promulgate regulations, easing the burden on small businesses and allowing building contractors to hire new construction workers and decrease the nation’s unemployment rate in the construction industry, please check yes below. (bold emphasis in original)

2.7 Acknowledgements

This chapter is co-authored with Hans J. G. Hassell and is currently under review for publication. For helpful comments, we thank Gary Jacobson, Zoltan Hajnal, James Fowler and Marisa Abrajano, as well as the participants in the American politics graduate workshop and Race and Ethnicity graduate workshop at UCSD. All questions regarding the data and design of the experiment should be directed to the authors. Both authors contributed to study design, data collection, analysis, and preparation of the manuscript.
Chapter 3

Asian Candidates in America: An Experimental Look at East Asian Candidacies
3.1 Introduction

When Gary Locke (D-WA) won election as Governor of Washington, it was historic for many reasons. Running on a platform of apolitical stewardship of the state’s economy, he became the first Asian-American to be elected governor of a mainland state. Prior to Governor Locke’s election, most of the Asian-American elected officials, at local, state, and federal level, came from the state of Hawaii, where people of Asian descent hold decisive majorities in the electorate. Since Governor Locke’s election, America has seen an increasing number of Asian candidates seek elected office at all levels (Khrais N.d.). Many of these candidates have emerged victorious, often in electorates that feature non-Asian or white pluralities (Bureau 2012). From Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal (South Asian descent) to Illinois Congresswoman Tammy Duckworth (Southeast Asian descent), more and more Asian-American candidates are seeking office and many of them are winning.

Despite the Asians being one of the fastest growing minority groups in America (Bureau 2013), and the increasing success of Asian candidates, the literature on race and ethnic politics lacks a clear understanding of what effect, if any, race has on the candidacies of Asian Americans. Extensive work on the candidacies of blacks and latinos has found that white voters often incorporate racial stereotypes into the evaluation of their candidates (Terkildsen 1993; McDermott 1998; Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012). The racial stereotypes of Asians are distinct and unique from blacks and Latinos. Asians are seen as the “model” minority, which includes positive traits like industriousness and intelligence (Chou and Feagin 2008). On the other hand, at various times in American history, Asian-Americans have been seen as a foreign threat (Chang 2004; Kim 1999; Chou and Feagin 2008), and continue to have to deal with stereotypes of perpetual foreignness and questions about their loyalty to America (Lee 2000; Wu 2003). The socioeconomic status of Asian Americans also make them distinct from blacks and Latinos as well. Asians are much more likely to have a higher median income than blacks or Latinos, and are more likely to be college educated when compared to blacks, Latinos, or whites (DeNavas-Walt, Richardson and Stringfellow 2010). How these impressions of Asians might play into the evaluation of Asian candidates remains an open question.

Because of the fact that many Asian candidates have been successful at attract-
ing the votes of whites, it stands to reason that the stereotypes of Asians do not affect Asian candidates in the same negative way they do blacks and Latinos (Sigelman et al. 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Terkildsen 1993). It is possible that the image of Asian Americans as a hard working “model minorities” actually benefits Asian candidates in the electoral arena. On the other hand, it is also possible that the perception of Asians as inscrutable and perpetually foreign might also hurt their candidacies. In order to test whether the commonly held racial stereotypes of Asians have an effect on their political candidacies, I design an experiment meant to isolate the effect of race on Asian candidacies as well as test the interaction of candidate race with ideological cues and foreign-born/immigrant cues.\footnote{This paper primarily looks at the candidacies of East Asians, while recognizing that different stereotypes might apply to different sub-groups of Asians. The stereotypes that might afflict South Asian and Middle-Eastern candidacies, as well as inter-ethnic variation might be significantly different from the results presented in this paper. This avenue of research remains unexplored and should be explored in a separate project.} I find that Asian candidates are actually favored by white when compared to white candidates with the same biography in a low-information election. On the other hand, I find that this advantage diminishes significantly when ideological cues are added. Finally, I find that foreign Asian candidates are significantly advantaged as well, suggesting that Asian candidates are not handicapped by the foreign stereotype.

### 3.2 Asians and Minority Candidate Evaluation

#### 3.2.1 Stereotyping and Minority Candidates

Many of the studies on race and candidate evaluation feature experimental designs and look primarily at the candidacies of African Americans. Terkildsen (1993) features fictional candidates running for governor of a nearby state and asks the respondent to choose one candidate over the other and finds that white respondents are more likely to penalize their black candidates after accounting for racial self monitoring. Other studies delved into the possible sources of this racial handicap. Sigelman et al. (1995), also with an experimental design, found that both black and Latino candidates are seen as more liberal and less competent than whites. These findings are echoed by McDermott (1998) who finds that blacks are perceived as more likely to hold liberal
policy positions that are pro-social welfare.

The thrust of these studies find that white voters impute existing racial-political stereotypes onto their minority candidates. Bobo (2001) finds that blacks as well as Latinos are more likely to be seen as liberal and more pro-social welfare, qualities which are reflected in the evaluation of black and Latino candidates. In addition to political stereotypes, studies have found that white voters impute social stereotypes onto minority candidates as well. Bobo (2001) also finds that blacks and Latinos are seen as less trustworthy than whites or Asians. These racial stereotypes have been found to apply to black and Latino political candidates, who are seen as more liberal and less competent than whites (Sigelman et al. 1995). Hajnal (2007) similarly found that black candidates are seen as less trustworthy and more threatening when seeking office for the first time. This finding along with studies that show that negative racial stereotypes are often deeply ingrained and difficult to dislodge (Fazio et al. 1995), have produced a picture of a white electorate whose racial attitudes are so deeply embedded in the bulk of its consciousness that it becomes a defining factor in the evaluation of minority political figures (Hajnal 2007).

If a white electorate imputes its stereotypes and prejudices onto black and Latino candidates, we can also assume that Asian candidates are afflicted by their own social and political stereotypes as well. However, while blacks and Latinos are afflicted by the same types of stereotyping, especially in regards to political orientation (left leaning) and policy (pro-social welfare), it is less clear how Asian racial stereotypes will effect the candidacies of Asian-Americans.

### 3.2.2 Model Minorities or Foreign Threat?

Central to how we should consider the candidacies of Asians is the idea of racial hierarchy in America. As Kim (1999) argues, it is best to view prejudice and stereotypes of minorities not on one dimensional scale, but on a two dimensional scale. In this configuration of racial stereotypes, which Kim calls “Racial Triangulation”, races are viewed in two dimensions: “superior-inferior” and “foreigner-insider”. Blacks score high on “insider” scale, with African-American heritage dating back to the founding of the country. On the other hand, blacks place low on the “superiority” scale, as they
are often “poor” and, as Kim puts it, “lazy, irresponsible, and thieving”. Conversely, Asians place highly on the “superiority” scale, being seen as hardworking and docile, while they place lowly on the “insider” scale, being seen as perpetually foreign and inscrutable. This multi-dimensional way of viewing racial stereotypes is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Kim’s theory is borne out empirically in a survey study examined by Bobo (2001), who found that while whites are more likely to perceive Latinos and Blacks as “less intelligent” and “more demanding of welfare”, these stereotypes do not apply to Asians. By contrast, Asians are seen as intelligent, hard working, and economically successful, and therefore less likely to be reliant on social-welfare.

Thus, Asians in America contend with two distinct strands of stereotyping. The first can be interpreted as a “positive” stereotype. On the one hand, Asians are seen as more intelligent, harder working, and more competent than other minority groups, perhaps even more so than whites. They are also seen as apolitical and physically non-threatening (Chang 2001). This fits into a “model minority” narrative of Asians in America. According to this narrative, Asian-America’s propensity towards hard work and industriousness as well as a disinclination towards challenging existing American
social-political structures is responsible for their relative socio-economic success despite their minority status. The concept of the “model minority” has drawn strong critiques from social scholars, who view it as both overly simplistic and as a tool to shame other minority groups. Kim (1999) argues that the “model minority” stereotype is meant as a tool to shame other races who seek to challenge the dominant white racial groups, while simultaneously keeping Asians as a racial subgroup by defining them as foreign. Other studies have debunked it as overly simplistic (Chou and Feagin 2008), failing to take into account the amount of socio-economic diversity within the Asian-American community. Despite these critiques, survey research has shown that white Americans do apply “model minority” stereotypes to Asians as a whole.2 Bobo (2001) finds that Asians are seen as trustworthy, industrious, and less threatening than blacks or Latinos. And while many aspects of the “model minority” stereotype of Asians is overly simplistic, some are grounded in accurate socio-economic qualities of the Asian community as a whole. For instance, while Asian Americans have had an increasing affiliation towards the Democratic Party (Wong et al. 2011), many Asian Americans still chose to not identify with any political party (Hajnal and Lee 2011), fitting into the stereotype of Asians as apolitical. In addition, Asians are much more likely to come from a middle or upper class background (DeNavas-Walt, Richardson and Stringfellow 2010), which also fits into the stereotype of Asians as hard-working and industrious.

A look at real world candidates reveals that media narratives around Asian candidates include much of the same types of stereotyping, and sometimes Asian candidates themselves play up these stereotypes. Then candidate for Governor of Washington Gary Locke (D-WA), for instance, emphasize his abilities as an apolitical technocrat in his capacity as a county executive. When he ran for re-election, the headline in the local newspaper was “Gary Locke: Results Beats Talk” in an article emphasizing his stewardship as a technocrat in his victory over a conservative talk show host. From the “model minority” stereotype of Asians, I posit the first of two hypotheses.

- **Model Minority Hypothesis** - Because Asians are stereotyped as “model” minori-

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2 Conversely, respondents may instead view the “model minority” stereotype with resentment. It is possible that the stereotype of Asians as “hardworking” may foster an image of overachievement that could breed resentment. However, I argue that the image of Asians as industrious will be a net positive given the qualities that voters value in their politicians, which is competence and industriousness (Jacobson and Kernell 1983).
ties, they will be evaluated as equal to or favorably compared to whites.

On the other hand, it is not necessarily a given that Asian candidates will benefit from these stereotypes in all instances. The negative stereotypes of Asians are not of the same nature as blacks or Latinos, who are seen as less competent and more prone to crime and violence. For Asians, they are often stereotyped as “perpetually foreign”, inscrutable, and, as a result, less trustworthy than white candidates (Kim 1999; Lee 2000; Wu 2003). Lee (2000) found that the “perpetually foreign” stereotype is pervasive, with a majority of Asians surveyed claiming to have been victims of this kind of discrimination. Kuo, Malhotra and Mo (2014) finds similarly that stigmatization as foreign contributes to Asian American political identity and predisposes them towards the Democratic Party. These stereotypes, in turn, affects non-Asian attitudes towards social policy considered favorable towards Asians. People who are more likely to believe in Asian stereotypes are also more likely to oppose issues like legal immigration or reparations for Japanese-American victims of internment.

How might foreignness stereotyping afflict Asian candidates? Many Asian candidates who do run for office are either first or second generation Americans, reflecting the fact that Asians are still a mostly immigrant community (Chang 2001). Questions about loyalty to America or general untrustworthiness might undermine Asian candidacies. A brief look at Asian candidates who run for office show that often they seek to emphasize their ties to the community and their personal history, perhaps in an attempt to combat these stereotypes. For instance, Oakland Mayor Jean Quan’s website features an extensive political history which emphasizes a life-long residence in the city of Oakland and a lifetime of service to the city of Oakland as a public official. Kevin Kim, the first Korean-American City Councilman from New York City, ran a campaign which emphasized ties to community organizations, including the Black-Korean Mediation Project, and the Organization of Chinese Americans.

So, from the “foreign threat” stereotype of Asians in America, I posit my second hypothesis.

• **Foreign Threat Hypothesis** - Because Asians are stereotyped as “perpetually foreign”, they will be evaluated less favorably compared to whites.
Finally, we need to consider how the Asian racial cue might interact with partisan political cues. Partisan identification has proven to be a dominant force in American politics, influencing all aspects of candidate evaluation (Campbell et al. 1960; Popkin 1994; Bartels 2000). Partisan cues are even more important in an era of increased polarization, motivating not just vote choice but also how voters process political information (Nicholson 2011). Given the apolitical nature of both the “model minority” and “foreign threat” hypotheses, I argue that the nature of ideological cues will either overwhelm or significantly diminish the effect of the Asian racial cue. I posit last of my hypotheses:

- **Ideological Hypothesis** - Given the polarizing nature of ideological cues, any racial effect that exists for Asian candidates will be diminished or extinguished by ideological cues.

### 3.3 Research Design and Data

In order to test the effect of race on the candidacies of East Asians, I designed a survey experiment that presented respondents with the biographies of fictional two candidates running a contested election for local office and asked each respondent to evaluate each candidate’s ideological leaning, prospective performance, and then to choose who they would hypothetically vote for in that election. This survey experiment was administered to 2,443 American respondents over the age of 18 through Amazon Mechanical-Turk. Amazon’s Mechanical-Turk is a website where requesters publish tasks (HITs or Human Intelligence Tasks) and provide payment to those who choose to participate. Those who request a task can limit the availability of the task to respondents who have certain characteristics such as age or location. Recruitment through Mechanical-Turk is similar to other web-based approaches such as YouGov that maintain panels of participants and invite them to participate in studies in exchange for a payment or other incentive. Previous research has shown that samples collected from Mechanical Turk are more representative of the U.S. population than undergraduate samples or samples populated from those who respond to web advertisements (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012), and that studies run from samples collected from Mechanical-Turk replicate important findings in psychology (Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling 2011).
Table 3.1: Demographic Summary of Turk Sample (White Respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>White Respondents</th>
<th>Survey Sample</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat (with leaners)</td>
<td>59.14%</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican (with leaners)</td>
<td>24.95%</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>16.09%</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income less than $40K</td>
<td>64.83%</td>
<td>1,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with less than college degree</td>
<td>44.79%</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>62.65%</td>
<td>1,035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were paid 50 cents per valid response and the average response time for completion of the survey was 8 minutes. In total, a sample of 2,443 respondents were recruited into the sample. Of that initial sample, 1,652 self-identified as racially white. Since this study is an exploration of white attitudes towards Asian candidates, I look exclusively at white respondents. Table 3.3 summarizes the demographic qualities of this sample. The respondents recruited through Mechanical-Turk lean Democratic and tend to be poorer, less educated, and younger. Despite the skew in the sample, respondents recruited through Mechanical-Turk are still more representative than experimental convenience samples commonly used in social science (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012).

Respondents were randomly assigned into three different treatment scenarios and a control scenario. The first treatment is a “low-information” scenario which is meant to isolate the effect of race on candidate evaluation without other political cues, like issue positions and political ideology. The “low-information” scenario features biographies of two candidates that are competing with each other for a seat on Los Angeles City Council. A local office was chosen for external validity; it is plausible that a city council race would be a non-ideological and non-partisan contest. Biography A features a candidate who was born locally and who promises to “promote government efficiency while in office and is committed to improving roads and schools.” Biography B also

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3In order to ensure that respondents were reading the questions fully, I included a validation question which asked respondents to answer a specific question in a specific way in order to ensure they were paying attention. Answering this question incorrectly would lead to a prompt that told the respondents “You are not reading the questions fully. Please read the questions in their entirety before answering the questions.” This prompt is meant to deter respondents who were just clicking through. I also took the responses generated by this validating question along with time spent on the survey and dropped any respondent who spent less than 3 minutes on the survey.
features a local candidate who promises a “commitment to constituent services as well as public safety and disaster planning”. Respondents were randomly assigned whether each biography featured a picture and name of an Asian candidate (David Wong) or a white candidate (Carl Guenther).

The second treatment is an “ideological” scenario. In this treatment, respondents are given two candidates with distinct political ideologies, and ask to evaluate both of them. The purpose of this treatment is to see whether any racial effect from the low information treatment carries over when other political cues are added. The liberal biography features a candidate who is described as a “liberal progressive” with the endorsement of “environmental groups” and “labor unions” who promises to “expand social programs for the urban poor” while in office. The conservative biography features a candidate who is described as a “business-friendly conservative” with the endorsement of “local business groups” and the Chamber of Commerce” who promises to “lessen the regulatory burden on businesses” while in office. Like the low-information scenario, respondents were randomly assigned whether the liberal or conservative biography featured a picture and name of a locally based Asian candidate or a white candidate.

The third treatment is a “foreign-born” scenario in which one of the candidates is a foreign born immigrant who competes against a native born candidate. The purpose of this treatment is to see whether East Asian candidates are significantly disadvantaged if they are foreign-born immigrants. The foreign born biography features either a foreign born Asian candidate with a foreign name (“Yuan Wong”, unlike the low/ideological information’s more Anglicized “David Wong”) versus an American born white candidate or a foreign born white candidate with a foreign name (“Gerhard Guenther”) versus an American born Asian candidate. In order to isolate the effect of “foreignness” on candidate perception, both candidates were presented without any other overt partisan or ideological cues.4 The immigrant/foreign candidate is presented as a part of immigrant advocacy groups and a proponent of immigrant interests.

Finally, respondents were also randomly assigned to a “control” scenario, which featured a white versus a white candidate with minimal cues. The control is meant to establish a baseline for a broader comparison.

4Future iterations of this experiment will examine the interaction between partisanship and immigrant status
All respondents were given a pre-treatment survey that asked the normal array of demographic questions including - partisan identification, partisan lean, education, income, age, race, and gender. After being randomly assigned a treatment scenario, each respondent is asked to evaluate their candidates’ ideology, probable performance in office, rate each candidate on a 1-100 point feeling thermometer, and indicate who they would vote for if they were to vote in the election. The ideology rating is 5 point ordered scale (1=Very Conservative, 2=Conservative, 3=Moderate, 4=Liberal, 5=Very Liberal). The performance metric is also on a 5 point ordered scale (1=Very Poorly, 2=Moderately Poorly, 3=Average, 4=Moderately Well, 5=Very Well). The vote, ideology rating, and probable performance are the three main ways I operationalize my dependent variable, candidate perception.
3.4 Results

3.4.1 Asian Candidates in a Low-Information Environment

I start my analysis with the by examining the racial effect of East Asian candidates in a the low-information treatment scenario. Although both biographies in the low-information scenario were written to minimize political cues, there is a possibility that certain aspects of each specific biography will advantage one biography over the other. For that reason, I choose to look at Candidate Biography A for the Asian and white candidate.\footnote{Candidate Biography B yielded similar results, but for the sake of clarity I look exclusively at Candidate Biography B.} Figure 3.2 shows the rate in which respondents chose to vote for Biography A, split by race. Respondents were, on a whole, more predisposed to support the candidate with Biography A. However, Asian candidates do significantly better than white candidates by a substantial margin. Asian candidates with Biography A drew 80% of the vote. On the other hand, white candidates with the same biography drew 60% of the vote. A difference in proportions test yields a p-value of $Pr(T < t) = 0.0000$. At first glance, it appears that Asian candidates are actually advantaged because of their...
Figure 3.3: Candidate Perception in the Low-Information Scenario

A more thorough examination of the data reveals that Asian candidates do significantly better in other metrics of evaluation as well. Figure 3.3 compares the ideological evaluation and the performance evaluation between Asian and white candidates in a low information scenario. Asian candidates are seen as more moderate with the average rating of 2.95 on the scale, close to the “moderate” rating of 3. Respondents, on average, rated the white candidate as more ideologically conservative, with an average rating of 3.21, however a large standard error of .4 indicates that there was a good deal of variation in how respondents rated the white candidate. This difference between white and Asian candidates in ideological rating is not statistically significant. On the other hand, white respondents are significantly more likely to say that Asian candidates will perform better in office than white candidates with the identical biography. This difference is statistically significant ($Pr(T > t) = 0.0002$).

Figure 3.2 also shows the average thermometer rating for white and Asian candidates with the same low-information biography. Asian candidates average 70 on the 1-100 thermometer rating scale, significantly more than white candidates who average 60. This difference is statistically significant ($Pr(T < t) = 0.0000$). This result indicates that white respondents have more positive impressions of Asian candidates and is even
more confirmation that Asian candidates in the low-information scenario are advantaged over white candidates.

On the whole, the results in the low-information scenario provide strong evidence that Asian candidates actually benefit from their race. Asian candidates are seen as better able to perform and are better liked than white candidates with the same biography. Most importantly, Asian candidates are significantly advantaged in the vote when compared to white candidates with identical biographies. This result supports the “Model Minority” hypothesis. The next step in my analysis examines whether this racial advantage holds when we add ideological cues into the mix.

### 3.4.2 Asian Candidates in an Ideological Information Environment

Figure 3.4 shows the vote total for white and Asian liberals as well as for white and Asian conservatives. The liberal Democratic lean of the sample is apparent in these results, as the liberal candidates in both scenarios are favored over the conservative candidates. However, a comparison of white liberals versus Asian liberals reveals a slight advantage for Asian candidates. Asian liberals received 70% of the vote from white respondents. White liberals, on the other hand, received 64% of the vote. This difference
Asian Vs. White Ideology

White Asian White Asian
Liberal Conservative

Asian Vs. White Performance

White Asian White Asian
Liberal Conservative

Asian Vs. White Thermometer

White Asian White Asian
Liberal Conservative

Figure 3.5: Candidate Perception in the Ideological Scenario

is statistically significant \( Pr(T > t) = 0.03 \). Asian conservatives maintain a similar advantage over their white conservative counterparts. Asian conservative candidates received 36% of the vote while white conservative candidates received 30% of the vote. This difference is not statistically significant, \( Pr(T > t) = 0.09 \), however it is close to statistical significance. Overall these results indicate that Asian candidates do maintain an advantage in the vote even when ideological cues are added. However, the results also indicate that the extent of this advantage is diminished significantly when compared to the low-information scenario. Asian candidates in the low-information scenario had a 20% advantage on their white counterparts. Adding ideological cues reduced this advantage to 6%.

Figure 3.5 shows a comparison in ideological, performance, and thermometer rating between Asian and white liberals as well as Asian and white conservatives. There is no significant difference in most of the perceptual ratings between Asian and white candidates of both conservative and liberal biographies. The difference in ideological rating of liberal candidates is statistically significant \( Pr(T > t) = 0.025 \), with Asian liberals being seen as slightly more moderate than white liberals. This difference is marginal at best, however. All the other perceptual measures, performance and thermometer rating, yield insignificant differences between the races.

On the whole, these results suggest that the addition of ideological cues reduces the positive benefit of race for Asian candidates significantly. A comparison of the results of the Low-Information treatment to the Ideological treatment supports the ide-
ological hypothesis that the addition of ideological cues will diminish the effect of race for Asian candidates. A difference in differences test in the vote between the Low-Information and Ideological treatments is significant ($Pr(T > t) = 0.000$). While Asian candidates in the ideological scenario maintain a marginal advantage in vote choice, they lose their advantage in all other measures of candidate perceptions. As I will show later in the results section, this minor advantage in the vote is washed away when controlling for respondent partisanship.

3.4.3 Asian Candidates in a Foreign Born/Immigrant Information Environment

The last treatment scenarios I explore are Asian and white candidates in a foreign-born/immigrant scenario. In this scenario, one of the candidates, either white or Asian, is given a foreign born biography (with the country of origin being either Germany or China) and a foreign born name. The foreign candidate is also shown to be supportive of immigrant interests and immigrant groups. Ideological cues are kept at a minimum in order to isolate the effect of race in combination with a foreigner cue. If the “Foreign-
threat" hypothesis is supported, then we should observe foreign Asian candidates doing significantly worse than foreign white candidates and native Asian candidates.

Figure 3.6 shows the vote for foreign and native candidates, between both white and Asian candidates. Contrary to the expectations of the “foreign-threat” hypothesis, foreign candidates actually do significantly better than all other candidate types in the foreign-born/immigrant scenario. Asian candidates with a foreign biography drew 65% of the vote, versus white candidates with a foreign biography who drew 42% of the vote and Asian candidates with a native biography who drew 58% of the vote. Not only do foreign Asian candidates do significantly better than white foreign candidates with virtually the same biography ($Pr(T > t) = 0.000$), they do significantly better than Asian native candidates as well ($Pr(T > t) = 0.0419$). These results suggest that not only are Asian candidates not handicapped by a foreign born biography, they actually benefit from the cue.

Figure 3.7 shows the difference in ideological rating, performance rating, and thermometer rating between foreign white and foreign Asian candidates. There are no significant differences between how respondents view foreign Asian and white candidates in each of these perceptual metrics. This is more evidence that goes against the “Foreign Threat” hypothesis. Along with the results in the vote, the totality of the results
Table 3.2: Logit Model of Vote For Asian Candidate on Respondent Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian Candidate</td>
<td>0.930**</td>
<td>(.227)</td>
<td>0.877**</td>
<td>(.171)</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>(.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican PID</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>(.276)</td>
<td>-1.140**</td>
<td>(.201)</td>
<td>-3.144**</td>
<td>(.290)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>(.117)</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>(.089)</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>(.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>(.146)</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>(.103)</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>(.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>(.100)</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>(.078)</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>(.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>(.099)</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>-0.028**</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.134</td>
<td>(.607)</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>(.466)</td>
<td>1.943**</td>
<td>(.672)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No of Obs 428 615 474
Pseudo $R^2$ 0.0394 0.0808 0.3041

*prob<.05, **prob<.01; Standard errors in parentheses

indicate that not only are Asian candidates not handicapped by a foreign biography, they seem to actually receive a political benefit from being foreign. The null difference in the other measures of candidate perception means that whatever is driving the advantage in the vote for foreign Asian candidates is not captured in these other measures. I discuss what might be driving these results in the discussion and conclusion section.

3.4.4 The Effect of Respondent Partisanship and Racial Resentment

Thus far, I have found that Asian candidates are advantaged compared to white candidates in each of the different informational scenarios, although this advantage is diminished significantly in an ideological scenario. While this is strong evidence in support of the Model Minority Hypothesis, it is possible that these results are driven by the skew of the sample. As I discussed earlier, the sample culled from Amazon Mechanical-Turk skews heavily towards the Democrats and liberals, even among whites. It is possible that the liberal, Democratic, and racially liberal lean of the sample is skewing the results. In order to ensure that this is not the case, I turn to a parametric test of my data using a logit model for each of the treatment scenarios.

The results in Table 3.2 show the results of the logit model in each of the treatment scenarios. The dependent variable is whether the respondent voted for biography A in the low information scenario, the foreign biography in the foreign information scenario, and the liberal biography in the ideological information scenario. The main independent variable is a dummy variable for whether the candidate in the given sce-
nario was Asian. In order to account for partisanship and racial resentment, I also add a dummy variable for Republican Party identification and a six point ordered variable for racial resentment. I also add demographic controls, including ordered variables for education and income, as well as age.

The results of the regressions mirror the basic difference in proportions test I conducted. Even after controlling for partisanship and racial resentment, the Asian cue is significant and positive in both the low-information scenario and the foreign-born scenario. These results provide a robustness check for difference in proportions test done earlier and shows that in the low-information and foreign information scenario, Asian American candidates are still advantaged even after controlling for partisan identification and racial attitudes. The results of the logit regression also provides support for the ideological hypothesis, showing that in the ideological scenario, controlling for party identification and racial resentment renders the Asian American cue insignificant.

The regression results show that, even after controlling for partisan identification and racial attitudes, Asian candidates are advantaged in the low information and foreign information scenarios. It is still possible, however, that Asian candidates may be disadvantaged among certain subsets of the white population, specifically those who hold negative attitudes towards minorities. On the other hand, it is also possible Asian candidates, as “model minorities,” appeal to racially liberal subsets of the white electorate. In order to properly test the independent effect of racial attitudes, I interact racial attitudes and candidate race in the logit model on the vote and plot the marginal effects of race at each of the ordered levels of racial resentment. The marginal effects compares the Asian candidate to the white candidate at each level of racial resentment.

Figure 3.8 shows the marginal effects plots for each of the treatment scenarios.

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6I incorporate the standard measure of racial resentment pioneered by Kinder and Sanders (1996). Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: “Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Minorities should do the same without any special favors.” “Over the past few years minorities have gotten less than they deserve.” “It’s not really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if minorities would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.” “Generations of discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for minorities to work their way out of the lower class.” “Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a minority person than from a white person.” “Most minorities who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if they tried.” Agreement with any of these statements were coded as 1, disagreement as 0. I then added these values to created an ordered scale of racial resentment.
The first result worth noting is that respondents who were more racially liberal (scored 1-3) were more favorable towards Asian candidates in the low information scenario and the foreign born scenario. On the other hand, the effect of racial attitudes is insignificant across the board for Asian liberals. Interestingly, respondents with negative racial attitudes (specifically, 5) still favored the foreign born Asian candidate over the white candidate. It is worth nothing that the effects at the highest and lowest ends of the racial resentment scale are insignificant. This is likely because there were very few respondents who scored the lowest on the racial resentment scale (1) and very few who scored the highest on the scale (6) and the large standard errors and confidence intervals reflect the small sample size.\footnote{The distribution of racial resentment can be found in the appendix.}

On the whole, the marginal effects of racial resentment show that increasing levels of racial resentment do not impact the vote of Asian candidates when compared to white candidates. This result stands in contrast with the effect of racial resentment on attitudes towards blacks and Latinos, for whom increasing levels of racial resentment is a strong indicator of white hostility towards racial policy and candidates of these groups (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Karl N.d.). Respondents with low levels of racial resentment are actually significantly more likely to vote for the Asian candidate over the white candidate, indicating that Asian candidacies is especially appealing to respondents with racially liberal views. These results suggest that racial resentment among whites does not negatively effect attitudes towards Asian candidates.
candidates in the same way they do towards candidate of other minority groups. To conclude this paper, I will discuss what aspects of Asian candidacies may make them especially appealing to whites and future avenues of research.

3.5 Discussion and Conclusion

It is clear from the sum of these results that Asian candidates are advantaged, at least in a low-information and non-partisan/non-ideological environment. These results provide strong evidence in support of the “model-minority” hypothesis, showing that not only were Asian candidates not disadvantaged due to their race, they actually consistently outperformed white candidates with the same biographies. In addition, this paper found evidence against the “foreign threat” hypothesis, showing that even when foreignness was cued, Asian candidates outperformed their white counterparts significantly. This paper also found that adding ideological cues diminished the advantage of Asian candidates significantly, showing that partisan and ideological considerations overwhelms race as the primary consideration of white voters with regards to Asian candidates. Finally, these results hold up even after controlling for partisanship and racial resentment, and I find that increasing levels of racial resentment does not negatively effect Asian candidates in any of the treatment scenarios.

Why would Asian candidates be advantaged when compared to white candidates? And why do foreign-born Asian candidates do so well given the extensive literature on Asians as a foreign threat? The answer to the first question may lie within the measures of candidate evaluation. Perceptual evaluations of Asian candidates in the low-information scenario show that they are indeed evaluated as “model-minorities”. Asians seen as moderate, which reflects the “apolitical” stereotype of the “model minority”. Despite the fact that Asian-Americans as a whole have been trending towards the Democrats over the last 15 years (Wong et al. 2011; Green 2013; Kuo, Malhotra and Mo 2014), it does not appear as though this partisan orientation has colored political perceptions of Asian candidates the same way it has with Latinos and blacks (Dawson 1994; McDermott 1998). In addition to being seen as ideologically moderate, Asian candidates in the low-information scenario are also seen as more likely to perform well when
in office, which fits into the “model minority” stereotype of Asians being competent and industrious. Finally, Asian candidates also had a significant advantage in thermometer rating, which indicates that white respondents are generally favorable towards Asian candidates.

Why whites prefer foreign-born Asian candidates is more difficult question to answer. Within that broader question lies two questions worth discussing. The first is why Asian candidates might not be penalized for being foreign, and the second is why whites might actually prefer the candidacies of foreign-born Asians. It is possible that Asian candidates are not penalized for being foreign because the “foreign threat” stereotype is conditional on the place Asian-Americans hold in society in modern society. While the stereotypes of Asians as inscrutable and foreign persists, its salience has varied throughout American history, depending largely on context and who America considers to be its enemy overseas (Wu 2003; Chang 2004). While the past, the enemies of America have been Asian nations like Japan and China, currently, Asians are not considered to be as much of a threat as Muslim-Americans or Latinos (Salaita 2005; Abrajano and Alvarez 2010), and therefore whites may not perceive Asian candidates as a threat either. The other possibility is that, given the relative standing of Asians in America right now, merely cuing foreignness is not enough to cue foreign threat. If this is true, another experiment might be needed to cue foreign threat.

Even if the foreign-born biography is not cuing foreign threat, how do we explain the advantage foreign-born Asian candidates receive? Like Asian candidates in the low-information scenario, foreign-born Asian candidates maintain the sizable advantage in vote total. Unlike Asian candidates in the low-information scenario, foreign-born Asian candidates to not have the same perceptual advantages in ideological, performance, and thermometer rating that low-information Asians have. This indicates that the advantage foreign-born Asian candidates get is not captured in these typical measures of candidate evaluation.

It is possible, conversely, that the foreign-born biography actually cues a positive stereotypes about Asian-Americans and the Asian experience. Part of the “model minority” stereotype is the industriousness of Asians in America. Part of that narrative about Asians centers around their immigrant status; it revolves around a story of immigrants
coming from overseas, assimilating, and succeeding in America and living the “American Dream.” It is possible that cuing foreignness actually cues a positive narrative about Asian candidates instead of the “foreign threat” narrative.

While this study has established the relative perceptual advantage of Asian candidates in low-information elections, there are other avenues of research that remain open for further exploration. This paper looked primarily at East Asian candidates while recognizing there is certainly a possibility that the racial and political stereotypes that apply to East Asian candidates may not apply to South Asian candidates. A separate or companion study examining South Asians would go a long way towards seeing what kind of political stereotypes afflict this Asian subgroup. This study also did not examine difference between different Asian ethnicities. While there is evidence that whites generally view East Asians as a uniform racial group (Bobo 2001; Chou and Feagin 2008), whether this view of racial uniformity holds in candidate evaluation is a yet unanswered question. It is possible that whites may evaluate different Asian ethnicities in varying ways, given the different histories each Asian ethnic group has in America (Chang 2004; Wu 2003; Chin 2002).

As America becomes a more diverse nation, not only is the nature of our electorate changing, but the makeup of our candidates are as well. This paper sought to examine Asian American candidates in different political and informational environments and found that Asian candidates are, on the whole, advantaged. It is clear that research and race and ethnicity in American politics that includes Asians must consider the unique nature of racial effects imputed on Asians as a racial subgroup. On the other hand, the history of Asians in America is still young. Whether these advantages endure in the future remains an open question.

3.6 Appendix

3.6.1 Asian Low-Information Bio A

David Wong is a candidate for an open city council seat for the next municipal election in Los Angeles. The responsibilities of a city councilman are to represent the members of his or her district and propose and vote on legislation to that effect while in
David Wong lives with his family in the first district of Los Angeles where his children attend local public school. He owns his own business and has a history of being involved in local business organizations as well as the serving local school board.

Candidate Wong promises to promote government efficiency while in office and is committed to improving roads and schools.

3.6.2 White Low-Information Bio A

Carl Guenther is a candidate for an open city council seat for the next municipal election in Los Angeles. The responsibilities of a city councilman are to represent the members of his or her district and propose and vote on legislation to that effect while in office.

Carl Guenther lives with his family in the first district of Los Angeles where his children attend local public school. He owns his own business and has a history of being involved in local business organizations as well as the serving local school board.

Carl Guenther promises to promote government efficiency while in office and is committed to improving roads and schools.

3.6.3 Asian Low-Information Bio A

David Wong is the opposing candidate for an open city council seat for the next municipal election in Los Angeles. The responsibilities of a city councilman are to represent the members of his or her district and propose and vote on legislation to that effect while in office.

He lives with his family in the first district of Los Angeles's city council with his wife. Prior to running for city council he served in the Los Angeles County Planning Commission.

David Wong is running on a platform of commitment to constituent services as well as public safety and disaster planning.
3.6.4 White Low-Information Bio B

Carl Guenther is the opposing candidate for an open city council seat for the next municipal election in Los Angeles. The responsibilities of a city councilman are to represent the members of his or her district and propose and vote on legislation to that effect while in office.

He lives with his family in the first district of Los Angeles’s city council with his wife. Prior to running for city council he served in the Los Angeles County Planning Commission.

Carl Guenther is running on a platform of commitment to constituent services as well as public safety and disaster planning.

3.6.5 Asian Foreign Bio

Yuan Wong is a candidate for an open city council seat for the next municipal election in Los Angeles. The responsibilities of a city councilman are to represent the members of his or her district and propose and vote on legislation to that effect while in office.

Yuan Wong was born in China. Him and his family immigrated to America when he was in his teenage years. He completed high school and college in the United States. This is his first attempt for political office. After graduating from UC Berkeley business school, he settled in Los Angeles shortly afterwards.

He lives with his family in the first district of Los Angeles where his children attend local public school. He became involved in Chinese business associations as well as immigrant advocacy groups.

Wong is running on a platform of commitment to constituent services as well as public safety and disaster planning.

3.6.6 White Foreign Bio

Gerhard Guenther is a candidate for an open city council seat for the next municipal election in Los Angeles. The responsibilities of a city councilman are to represent
the members of his or her district and propose and vote on legislation to that effect while in office.

Gerhard Guenther was born in Germany. Him and his family immigrated to America when he was in his teenage years. He completed high school and college in the United States. This is his first attempt for political office. After graduating from UCLA business school, he settled in Los Angeles shortly afterwards.

He lives with his family in the first district of Los Angeles where his children attend local public school. He became involved in the German-American community as well as immigrant advocacy groups.

Gerhard Guenther promises is running on a platform of commitment to constituent services as well as public safety and disaster planning.

### 3.6.7 Asians Native Bio

David Wong is a candidate for an open city council seat for the next municipal election in Los Angeles. The responsibilities of a city councilman are to represent the members of his or her district and propose and vote on legislation to that effect while in office.

David Wong was born and raised in Los Angeles and this is his first attempt for political office. He is a 4th generation Chinese-American. He lives with his family in the first district of Los Angeles where his children attend local public school. David Wong started his career in politics as a local business owner who advocated on behalf of local business interests. After several years of this, David Wong decided to run for political office.

While in office, he promises to promote government efficiency while in office and is committed to improving roads and schools. As a representative on city council, Wong promises to serve the entire community.

### 3.6.8 White Native Bio

Carl Guenther is a candidate for an open city council seat for the next municipal election in Los Angeles. The responsibilities of a city councilman are to represent the
members of his or her district and propose and vote on legislation to that effect while in office.

Carl Guenther was born and raised in Los Angeles and this is his first attempt for political office. He lives with his family in the first district of Los Angeles where his children attend local public school. Carl Guenther started his career in politics as a local business owner who advocated on behalf of local business interests. After several years of this, Carl Guenther decided to run for political office.

While in office, he promises to promote government efficiency while in office and is committed to improving roads and schools. As a representative on city council, Guenther promises to serve the entire community.

3.6.9 Asians Liberal Bio

David Wong is a candidate for an open city council seat for the next municipal election in Los Angeles. The responsibilities of a city councilman are to represent the members of his or her district and propose and vote on legislation to that effect while in office.

David Wong was born and raised in the suburbs of Los Angeles and this is his first attempt for political office. His parents immigrated to the United States from China in the 1960s.

He lives with his family in the first district of Los Angeles where his children attend local public school. David Wong started his career in politics as a local activist who volunteered for various progressive organizations within his district. After several years of activism, David decided to run for political office. David Wong describes himself as a liberal progressive and has committed to fight for social justice while in office. He has the endorsement of many left-leaning organizations, including organizations that support immigrant rights, local union support, and the Sierra club.

While in office, he promises to support an expansion of social programs that benefit the urban poor. He promises to focus on specifically increasing the representation of the local minority population.
3.6.10 White Liberal Bio

Carl Guenther is a candidate for an open city council seat for the next municipal election in Los Angeles. The responsibilities of a city councilman are to represent the members of his or her district and propose and vote on legislation to that effect while in office.

Carl Guenther was born and raised in the suburbs of Los Angeles and this is his first attempt for political office.

He lives with his family in the first district of Los Angeles where his children attend local public school. Carl Guenther started his career in politics as a local activist who volunteered for various progressive organizations within his district. After several years of activism, David decided to run for political office.

Carl Guenther describes himself as a “liberal progressive” and has committed to fight for social justice while in office. He has the endorsement of many left-leaning organizations, including organizations that support immigrant rights, local union support, and the Sierra club.

While in office, he promises to support an expansion of social programs that benefit the urban poor. He promises to focus on specifically increasing the representation of the local minority population.

3.6.11 Asian Conservative Bio

David Wong is a candidate for an open city council seat for the next municipal election in Los Angeles. The responsibilities of a city councilman are to represent the members of his or her district and propose and vote on legislation to that effect while in office.

David Wong was born and raised in the suburbs of Los Angeles and this is his first attempt for political office. His parents immigrated to the United States from China in the 1960s.

He lives with his family in the first district of Los Angeles where his children attend local public school. David Wong started his career in politics as a local business owner who advocated on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce for local business inter-
ests. After several years of activism on behalf of the business community, David Wong decided to run for political office.

David Wong describes himself as a Òbusiness-friendly conservativeÓ and has committed to fight for lower-taxes while in office. He has the endorsement of many right-leaning organizations, including the Chamber of Commerce, the Los Angeles Tax-Payers Association, and local real estate developers.

While in office, he promises to push for a lower tax and regulatory burden on businesses in order to promote a friendlier business environment.

3.6.12 White Conservative Bio

Carl Guenther is a candidate for an open city council seat for the next municipal election in Los Angeles. The responsibilities of a city councilman are to represent the members of his or her district and propose and vote on legislation to that effect while in office.

Carl Guenther was born and raised in Los Angeles and this is his first attempt for political office. He lives with his family in the first district of Los Angeles where his children attend local public school. Carl Guenther started his career in politics as a local business owner who advocated on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce for local business interests. After several years of activism on behalf of the business community, Carl Guenther decided to run for political office.

Carl Guenther describes himself as a Òbusiness-friendly conservativeÓ and has committed to fight for lower-taxes while in office. He has the endorsement of many right-leaning organizations, including the Chamber of Commerce, the Los Angeles Tax-Payers Association, and local real estate developers.

While in office, he promises to push for a lower tax and regulatory burden on businesses in order to promote a friendlier business environment.
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85


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