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From Colonial Jewel to Socialist Metropolis:
Dalian 1895-1955

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

Christian A. Hess

Committee in Charge:

Professor Joseph W. Esherick, Co-Chair
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2006
The Dissertation of Christian A. Hess is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm:

University of California, San Diego

2006
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<tr>
<td>CJSG</td>
<td>Chengshi de Jieguan yu shehui gaizao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFW</td>
<td>Dalian fangwen jiyao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGS</td>
<td>Dalian gang shi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGKJS</td>
<td>Dalian gangkou jishi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJBNS</td>
<td>Dalian jin bai nian shi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Dairen-shi shi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWZL</td>
<td>Dalian wenshi ziliao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDGYS</td>
<td>Ershi shiji Dalian gongren yundong shi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCQDL</td>
<td>Jiefang chuqi de Dalian</td>
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<td>LDGS</td>
<td>Lüda gaishu</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZGDDS</td>
<td>Zhonggong Dalian difang shi</td>
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

From Colonial Jewel to Socialist Metropolis:
Dalian, 1895-1955

by

Christian A. Hess

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, San Diego, 2006

Professor Joseph W. Esherick, Co-Chair

Professor Paul G. Pickowicz, Co-Chair

This dissertation explores the transition of the port city of Dalian, a heavily industrialized seaport located at the tip of the Liaodong peninsula in China’s Northeast region (Manchuria), as it shifted from a wartime hub of the Japanese empire to a socialist urban center heavily influenced by the Soviet Union. How did a long-term center of Japanese colonial modernity transition so seamlessly into socialist urban space? What elements of the Japanese project were fundamental parts of such a transformation, and how did the socialist regimes of the late 1940s and early 1950s deal with this?

In answering these questions, my analysis delves deeply into the most controversial themes in modern Chinese history. I examine the legacies of Japanese colonial expansion and development on the modern Chinese nation-state, the social and cultural experiences of Japanese colonialism, the impact of Soviet occupation and local Sino-Soviet relations, and the nature of regime change, legitimization, and the re-
integration of former colonial spaces into the Chinese state. I argue that warfare played a transformative role in the city’s history. Placing this narrative at the center of my study, one can see commonalities in the Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese projects for governing Dalian, which involved mobilizing its people and resources for the successive campaigns war. Part of the project of establishing legitimacy here also involved how these various powers staked claims to the city. It is precisely because of its tenuous linkages to Japan, Russian, and China that one sees such a need for clarity. The Nationalist government staked a deep claim to Dalian, demanding its reintegration with China, while the PRC took a nebulous stance, choosing to downplay territorial claims by projecting an image of Dalian as part of the broader socialist world. What emerges is a very different picture of postwar nationalism in which the CCP was compelled to downplay the fact that a foreign nation was continuing to occupy Dalian.

I argue that 1945 and 1949 may have been watersheds in Dalian’s history, but they did not represent clean breaks from the past. Rather the city’s socialist transformation was a continuation of many of the same social, political, and economic goals established under the colonial regime. The colonial legacy was, in fact, a key component of the socialist internationalist identity of Dalian in late 1940s, and influenced the rise of the patriotic nationalism characteristic of the 1950s. Similarly, the experience of the five-year Soviet military occupation of Dalian likewise played a part in the socialist definition of the city, and as Sino-Soviet relations rose and crumbled throughout the 1950s, the legacy of Soviet occupation would likewise inform the swift moves toward socialist development in the city.
INTRODUCTION

In September of 1949, hundreds of thousands of visitors flocked to the port city of Dalian, located at the tip of the Liaodong peninsula in Northeast China, to participate in a major international industrial exhibition. Over 300,000 visitors came to see displays of locally produced products, ranging from canned foods to buses, trains, and ocean-going ships.\(^1\) However, there was much more on display than just industrial products. Dalian itself was on display. The city had been a Japanese colony for forty years, from 1905 to 1945. The Japanese built it into one of the finest ports in East Asia, and Dalian boasted modern hotels, parks, shopping districts, hospitals, and numerous tourist destinations. It was the headquarters to the empire-building South Manchuria Railway Company, whose rail lines linked the city to the agricultural heartland of Manchuria. A network of highly efficient tramcars sped people about the city. Now, in 1949, with Soviet guidance, Dalian was on display as an innovative socialist production city, a model for the People’s Republic. In just four years, it appeared to have been transformed from a colonial port to a socialist production metropolis.\(^2\)

Visitors to the exhibition included journalists from all over China. After seeing the exhibition and spending time visiting sites throughout the city, Dan Yuyue, a writer for the Dagong bao newspaper, praised Dalian’s industrial achievements in an article he wrote, noting that state run industries were leading the way for the socialist transformation of the city. He exclaimed: “For this we really have to thank the Japanese imperialists (emphasis mine), and their policies of state monopolization, which gave the Dalian of today the conditions for building socialism.”\(^3\) Was he joking?
Perhaps, but more likely he was pointing out the obvious. No matter how hard the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) authorities were trying to show off the city’s new status as a model socialist city, visitors were well aware of, and even awed, by its colonial avenues and buildings. Moreover, the city’s definition as a model production city rested firmly on colonial foundations.

Yet, by the early 1950s, Dalian was indeed a model for the future of urban socialist China. After 1945, the Soviet military occupied the city, and did not relinquish control until 1950. The last batch of Soviet troops departed in 1955. No other Chinese city experienced such a heavy, prolonged Soviet presence. In large part because of this occupation, Dalian was on the forefront of implementing the Soviet model, a package of management techniques, wage systems, and strategies for ensuring maximum production and loyalty to the CCP well before most Chinese cities. Was Soviet governance that efficient, and its power that total as to have such a rapid impact on the city? Did the forty-year legacy of Japanese economic, political, and social control simply vanish? Or, as Dan Yuyue’s comment points out, did that experience lay the groundwork for the socialist transformation, thereby continuing to be a part of Dalian’s socialist present and future?

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore in detail the transition of the port city of Dalian from a colonial to a socialist city. How did a long-term center of Japanese colonial modernity transition so seamlessly into socialist urban space? What elements of the Japanese project were fundamental parts of such a transformation, and how did the socialist regimes of the late 1940s and early 1950s deal with this?
In answering these questions, my analysis delves deeply into the most controversial themes in modern Chinese history: the legacies of Japanese colonial expansion and development on the modern Chinese nation-state, the social and cultural experiences and impact of Japanese colonialism, the Soviet occupation experience and local Sino-Soviet relations, the nature of regime change, legitimization, and the re-integration of former colonial spaces into the Chinese state. Because of this, much of Dalian’s archive remains closed to researchers. Although discouraging, the plethora of available sources and recently published material, both in Chinese and Japanese, allows for a thorough investigation into the important, yet neglected history of this city.

Accesses to Japanese materials from the colonial era held in the special collections at the Dalian Municipal Library is possible, and the present study draws on a number of sources from this collection, including local newspapers and detailed, statistical compilations and publications made by the South Manchuria Railway Company. In addition, colonial-era sources held in the Tokyo University and Waseda University libraries have also been consulted. Recently published compilations of memoirs and documents in both China and Japan are extremely important sources, which, combined with local newspapers, journals, and gazetteers, provide a major source base for Dalian’s post-1945 history. Finally, combing the flea markets in Dalian and Shenyang proved invaluable, as many restricted documents and books can be found for sale there and from a growing web of online used book dealers throughout China.

Using this data, I argue that 1945 and 1949 may have been watersheds in Dalian’s history, but they did not represent clean breaks from the past. Rather the city’s socialist transformation was a continuation of many of the same social, political, and
economic goals established under the colonial regime. The colonial legacy was, in fact, a key component of the socialist internationalist identity of Dalian in late 1940s, and influenced the rise of the patriotic nationalism characteristic of the 1950s. Similarly, the experience of the five-year Soviet military occupation of Dalian likewise played a part in the socialist definition of the city, and as Sino-Soviet relations rose and crumbled throughout the 1950s, the legacy of Soviet occupation would likewise inform the swift moves toward socialist development in the city.

In this dissertation, I am specifically interested in several interrelated issues. I argue that warfare played a transformative role in the city’s history. Although, after 1905, the city was not a battlefield, its economic function, labor force, and governing patterns were heavily influenced by unceasing warfare from 1937 through the 1950s. Placing this narrative at the center of my study, one can see commonalities in the Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese projects for governing Dalian, which involved mobilizing its people and resources for the successive campaigns war. Production campaigns, industrial priorities, rationing, militaristic mobilization were all familiar to city residents through the successive Japanese, Soviet, and CCP regimes.

Another common feature in the project to govern Dalian was the constant need to define the city, and link it to something larger, be it a hub of the Japanese empire, an outpost of socialist internationalism in the emerging Soviet bloc, or a model production city in the PRC. Part of the project of establishing legitimacy here involved how these various powers staked claims to the city. I argue that it is precisely because of its tenuous linkages to Japan, Russian, and China that one sees such a need for clarity. Much of this was due to the anomalous status of the Guandong Leased Territory, of
which Dalian was the major part. Under the Japanese, we will see that its quasi-autonomous status created tensions within the colonial community about where the city belonged. Was it Japanese? Was it part of Manchukuo? Likewise, under Soviet occupation, the degree of Chinese authority was limited. The Nationalist government staked a deep claim to Dalian, demanding its reintegration with China, while the PRC took a nebulous stance, choosing to downplay territorial claims by projecting an image of Dalian as part of the broader socialist world. This is thus a very different picture of postwar nationalism. The CCP was compelled to downplay the fact that a foreign nation was continuing to occupy Chinese territory.

**Historiography**

This dissertation engages with the literature of several interrelated fields. Recent studies of the Japanese colonial empire have begun to move away from charting the effects of colonialism on the metropole, and focus instead on the political, social, and economic impact on the colonized territories. Work by scholars focusing on colonial Taiwan, and Korea in particular, have started to reassess the colonial legacy in light of the postwar economic success of these nations, leading to the formulation of the concept of the “bureaucratic-authoritarian industrializing regime,” tying this form of East Asian statecraft to the Japanese system that emerged during the wartime period.

Likewise, there has been a boom recently in the study of Manchuria, and of the puppet state of Manchukuo in particular. Prasenjit Duara’s seminal work explores in detail the logic behind the attempts to create this unique form of imperialism. He builds from Cumming’s concept of an East Asian development model, which he sees as a
precondition of something deeper, what he calls the “East Asian modern.” This according to Duara, “represents both an analytical category, where the past is repeatedly re-signified and mobilized to serve future projects, and a substantive category, referring to the circulation of practices and signifiers evoking historical authenticity in the region.” The temporal aspects of the East Asian modern are particularly important. However, Duara’s findings are limited to the 1932-1945 period. A key question is thus, what happens to the East Asian modern after 1945? This dissertation seeks to address this, and examine not only the legacy of Japanese economic development in Dalian, but also how the form of governmentality illuminated by Duara’s study impacted governance after 1945. I argue that a similar process involving re-interpreting and re-circulating the past was underway during the socialist regimes of the 1940s and 1950s. Moreover, Duara’s study does not take into account the situation in Dalian and the Guandong Leased Territory, which was never fully incorporated into Manchukuo. Why wasn’t it, and what did this mean for the colonial project in Dalian, and what does it say about the appeal of Manchukuo? As we shall see, neither Chinese nor Japanese residents in Dalian favored incorporation into Manchukuo.

The present study also adds to a growing body of scholarship that seeks to place the War of Resistance (1937-1945) at the center of modern state-building in China. Rather than view it as a rupture of the development path pursued by the Nationalists during the Nanjing Decade (1928-1937), recent work attempts to show that the economic, political, and social experiences of the wartime period were fundamental to the shape of the early PRC. With the war, both the CCP and the Nationalists pursued a totalistic mobilization of resources and people in their respective territories. What is
lacking from this picture is the Japanese wartime development of Manchuria, which saw similar mobilization and industrialization efforts. This dissertation adds to this scholarship by providing a detailed local case study of the effects of Japanese wartime mobilization on a major port city, and traces how that directly affected its postwar social and economic transition to socialism.

Finally, as an urban history project, the present study adds to the growing body of scholarship on Chinese urban history. To date, there are only a handful of studies of individual cities in Northeast China, and only one dissertation on Dalian. My work thus fills a major hole in our field, and continues the trend of expanding the sub-field of Chinese urban history beyond studies of Shanghai, which continue to dominate how we characterize and conceptualize urban China. Moreover, much of this scholarship builds its narratives and analysis within the standard scheme of historical periodization, beginning or ending their study with 1937, 1945 or 1949. More recently, several groundbreaking works have appeared that have begun to break this mold, and have influenced the direction of the present study. Ruth Rogaski’s book on the changing notion and deployment of concepts of health and hygiene in Tianjin covers the late Qing through the early 1950s. Her analysis reveals some of the common patterns that were shared over time between very different regimes that governed the city and its people. The present study, while not tracing a single term, person, or event through time, nevertheless moves in a similar direction. Like Rogaski, I see significant overlap in the political, economic and social experiences between the colonial era and the PRC, experiences that long-term residents would be familiar with. Older residents of Dalian had, for example, by the outbreak of the Korean War, experienced numerous production
drives urging them to work harder and more efficiently, dealt with market restrictions, price controls, rationing, an invasive public security system, and participated in social organizations that propagated loyalty to the state through modern propaganda efforts.

In her recent study of Beijing, Madeleine Yue Dong focuses less on the city as a stage for political actors, and turns her attention to the city itself. She is interested in understanding the Republican city’s relationship to its imperial past. “New,” Republican-era definitions of the city represent for Dong a continual set of memories and definitions that are “recycled” in various ways in society. As she writes: “Faced with various crises during this period, many of the people, and even the government, of Beijing deal with problems of the present by recycling material and symbolic elements of the past in order to gain some control over the transformation of their city.”¹² In Dalian, with its colonial history, and period of Soviet occupation, recycling in such a manner was not an open option for people or for the post-1945 regime. However, numerous similarities existed between the various powers that controlled Dalian over time, but highlighting them became politically dangerous, even deadly by the 1950s. Culturally, the CCP in Dalian attempted to erase its colonial past, not completely, but by constructing narratives of that past that legitimized the socialist present. A powerful narrative of victimization, for example, became the acceptable form of remembrance of the Japanese era, no matter how far from reality it strayed. Likewise, we see a similar effort to erase the negative legacies of the Soviet presence in the city after 1955 in the form of commemorative events designed to praise Soviet troops as protective brethren.
Structure

To move through this complex terrain, the present study takes a three-pronged approach, examining the political, economic, and social spheres in Dalian under the three prominent regimes that controlled and built the city. While such an approach is broad in its scope, it allows for a clearer picture of exactly where, why, and how key features in the definition and function of Dalian remained constant through successive regime changes. Likewise, it allows us to see the social and political changes brought about by socialism more clearly.

The dissertation consists of three sections, and an introductory chapter. Chapter one examines the history of Dalian and Lüshun from the late Qing through the early 1930s, the eve of Japan’s founding of the puppet state of Manchukuo. It discusses the Russian interests and early development of Dalian and Lüshun, a time when military and civilian conflicts led to the prioritization of the military port of Lüshun over the commercial center of Dalian. It was under the Japanese, who gained control of the territory in 1905, that Dalian experienced its rapid rise to become one of the largest ports in East Asia, fuelled in large part by the development schemes of the South Manchuria Railway Company, and the wealth of the soybean trade.

The first section consists of two chapters covering Dalian’s experience as part of the Japanese wartime empire from 1932 through 1945. Central to these chapters is economic and social mobilization for total war, first in 1937 as Japan formally invaded China, and then in 1941 with the outbreak of the Pacific War. Chapter two deals with Dalian and the Guandong Leased Territory’s political and economic status as it transitioned from being the sole outpost of Japanese imperialism in the Northeast.
(Manchuria), to a less important but no less central place after the founding of Manchukuo in 1932. Central to the chapter is an economic narrative that stresses the transformation of the port from an export to an import center, fuelled in part by the construction of Manchukuo, and finally, to a fully industrialized manufacturing base in support of Japan’s expanding war effort. Politically, Dalian’s anomalous status created friction between Guandong interests and the military, as the latter attempted to draw the city closer to Manchukuo.

Chapter three explores colonial society during the wartime period (1937-1945). It analyzes efforts to define the city, revealing the ways in which it was at once a Japanese, Chinese, and colonial urban space. The chapter then describes the efforts of Japanese colonial authorities to implement a new registration system in the Guandong Leased Territory that drew lines demarcating those Chinese who would be privileged as subjects of the empire, and those who would not. Finally, it provides an in-depth view of a major segment of Dalian’s Chinese population, the industrial workforce.

The second section of the dissertation deals with the transition to socialism after Japan’s defeat in 1945. Here, the emerging Sino-Soviet relationship looms large, as Dalian was under Soviet military rule from 1945 to 1950. Chapter four reveals significant political tensions between Chinese and Soviet authorities, as each tried to adapt to swiftly changing political conditions in China, and the world, at the outset of the Cold War. The narrative of Dalian’s Civil War years is thus quite different from most accounts, which focus on the political struggles between the CCP and the Nationalist party. The chapter reveals that the Nationalists, despite being the recognized government of China in treaty agreements with the Soviets, alienated itself
from any chance to rule the city through mobilizing the support of students and workers by adopting an increasingly anti-Soviet stance. This was a potent form of nationalism, but failed in Soviet-occupied Dalian. The socialist internationalism promulgated by the CCP in Dalian represents their efforts to rally the population around the socialist cause, without disturbing the delicate political balance achieved between CCP and Soviet authorities.

Chapter five discusses the economic reorganization of Dalian under the Soviet regime. It breaks the Soviet occupation into two periods, the first from 1945 to 1947 was a period of growing pains experience by the rural-based CCP, as they attempted to adapt their policies to fit the conditions in Dalian. Renewed hardships brought on by the expanding Civil War with the Nationalists led the CCP to pursue the type of crisis management and legitimacy-building policies that they had honed in the countryside. This included a fascinating effort to redistribute Japanese housing to urban workers along lines similar to rural land reform. The second period, form 1947 through 1949, witnessed the reindustrialization of the city with the goal of producing for the war effort. During that period, the city’s main industries were either in Soviet hands, or jointly operated by Soviet and CCP personnel, and became the testing grounds for implementing the Soviet model in China.

Chapter six explores the development of Sino-Soviet and socialist internationalist cultural forms in Dalian through 1950. It begins by examining the efforts of the CCP to redefine Dalian as a socialist city, a process that involved contextualizing the Japanese past in a way that both legitimated the CCP, and allowed people enough room to activate this interpretation to develop cultural and political
capital with the new political powers. It goes to describe the nature of socialist internationalist rhetoric in Dalian, and describes those groups who actively contributed to this definition of the city. Finally, the chapter deals with the importation of Soviet cultural forms, and traces their impact on society in the city.

The final section, Chapter seven, deals with events in Dalian from 1950 to 1955. Full sovereignty over Dalian was finally returned to the PRC in 1950 in the form of a new treaty agreement between it and the Soviet Union. For the first time in its history, Dalian was ruled by a Chinese political power. The well-known campaigns of the 1950s are highlighted here by the fact that they were implemented just as the city was becoming Chinese. This raised the already high political stakes of the mass campaigns even further. The first half of the chapter examines the city during the Korean War, and reveals the ways in which the newly empowered CCP attempted to forge its legitimacy in the familiar program of totalistic war mobilization. The chapter reveals the shift from working as a means of a livelihood and of rebuilding the city, to a form of patriotism. With such a shift came the need for increasing loyalty to the PRC state, which was subsequently carrying out mass campaigns to root out internal “enemies.” The chapter closes with a discussion of the politics of commemorating and remembering the legacy of the Soviet military in Dalian.

Notes on Place Names and Terminology

Throughout this dissertation, I make reference to “Manchuria” and “Manchukuo” rather than Northeast China. These are of course, politically loaded terms, because they infer colonial control over Chinese territory. Because its use is
contested even today, it should be placed between quotation marks, however, as is now becoming a common convention in the scholarship on the region, I use them without quotation marks throughout the dissertation.\(^{13}\) I use the Chinese name Dalian to refer to the port city of Dalian, which was known in Japanese as Dairen. When specifically speaking about Lüshun, that term is used. The territory controlled by Japan at the tip of the Liaodong peninsula, including Dalian and Lüshun, was known as the Guandong Leased Territory. That name is used throughout when referring to the territory as a whole. Its name changes to Lüda (short for Lüshun and Dalian) in the late 1940s, however I continue to specify which area I am dealing with by using Dalian or Lüshun specifically.

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1 See Dalian gongye zhanlanhui, ed., *Gongye Zhongguo de chuxing* (The embryonic state of industrial China) (Guangzhou: Xinhua shudian, 1950), and Gong zhan hua bao (Industrial exhibit pictorial), no.1 and no.2 (July and September 1949).


8 Ibid., 3.


13 For a detailed discussion of the usage of these terms, see Mariko Asano Tamanoi, ed., Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 1-3.
1. The Rise of Colonial Dalian, 1895-1932

The area which was known to successive Russian and Japanese colonial administrators as the Guandong Leased Territory (Guandong zhōu, Kantō shū) encompassed the southernmost tip of the Liaodong peninsula, which consists of a narrow, hilly strip of land jutting out between the Bohai Gulf and the Yellow Sea. The waters surrounding the peninsula are dotted with small islands, most of them bare rocks jutting from the ocean, some with grass or shrubs clinging to their jagged tops. Several bays stand out along the rocky coastline. Near the tip of the peninsula lies the protected harbor of Lúshun (also known by its English name Port Arthur). Further to the east is Dalianwan, whose gentle sloping shoreline became home to the port city of Dalian after 1898. Dalianwan is a wide bay whose mouth faces south east, shielded from the blasts of northerly winds that hit the peninsula during the winter months. To the west of Dalianwan, on the other side of the peninsula, at the point where the land constricts to its narrowest point with the sea on either side, lies Jinzhou, a walled administrative center and military outpost of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). Once over the tall hills just to the northeast of Jinzhou, the peninsula widens to the northern borders of the Leased Territory, stretching from the western coastline near present day Pulantian, running east to present day Piziwo. The area of the leasehold totaled some 1300 square miles.

What the territory lacked in size was more than compensated by its strategic location in terms of commerce and trade. Jutting out between Korea and the Chinese coast, any trading port here might benefit from Chinese coastal trade as well as trade
with Korea and Japan. From the port of Dalian, for example, it is less than ninety nautical miles to Yantai, on the Shandong peninsula, 249 miles to Tianjin, and 530 miles to Shanghai.¹ To the north lie the vast resources of China’s Northeast, an area known as Manchuria. Harbors on the peninsula are logical ports through which to ship resources in and out of Manchuria. For the colonial powers of the world, armed with their railroad and steamship technology, this small territory had the potential to become the focal point of trade in Northeast Asia, with all of resource-rich Manchuria as its hinterland. Moreover, a military port here would enable the projection of naval power in both the strategic Bohai gulf and the Yellow Sea.

During the late 1890s, rivalries flared between Russia, Japan, and China over control of Manchuria and its resources. As one of the few places with the potential to develop ice-free sea outlets from which to export Manchuria’s resources, the Liaodong peninsula became a focal point in the emerging contest for dominance in Northeast Asia. After 1895, control of Manchuria became a major goal for both domestic regimes and foreign imperial powers like Russia and Japan. After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the Liaodong peninsula remained a hotly contested area in the emerging Chinese Civil War (1946-1949).

Qing Origins: The Jinzhou Garrison and Li Hongzhang’s Naval Port at Lushun

Throughout the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) a small Chinese population lived in coastal villages tucked into the bays of the Liaodong peninsula. Many of the families that settled here fished for a living. The site that would become the booming colonial port city of Dalian was dotted with the small fishing villages of East and West
Salt production was the other major economic activity of the region. Villagers built salt fields along the marshy coasts, draining away the water with large wind-powered pumps unique to the area.

The center of political gravity on the peninsula was the dusty sub-prefecture of Jinzhou. Although a banner garrison was stationed behind its walls, Jinzhou’s military usefulness was eclipsed in the late Qing by the pressing need for an ice-free port for the dynasty’s northern naval force, the Beiyang fleet, under the control of the eminent Qing official Li Hongzhang. As early as 1874, Li called for the fleet to be stationed in Yantai, on the Shandong peninsula, while he searched for suitable ports on the Liaodong peninsula. Following the plans of a German advisor, Li selected Lushun as the site to build a modern naval port. Construction began in 1881, and the following year four large modern dredgers were working to deepen the harbor and close to 10,000 workers were employed in various port construction projects. In 1883 the first telegraph lines were completed linking the port to Yingkou, at that time the largest trading port in Manchuria. However in late 1883 through 1884 the planned dock construction was suspended due to armed conflict with France. Work resumed, with German assistance, in 1885. In 1886 several of Li’s top officials in charge of the project fell ill, and the job was handed, interestingly enough, to a French businessman who oversaw the completion of the plans in 1890.

On the eve of the Sino-Japanese war, after a decade of effort, Li Hongzhang’s plans were realized. He had transformed Lushun into one of the Qing’s finest naval ports. Nature helped. The narrow inlet to the harbor made it easily defendable, while the hills surrounding the bay itself gave commanding views from which to bombard
enemy vessels. James Allan, an Englishman who visited the port in 1894 noted as much, commenting that, “For defensive purposes nature and art have combined to render the place exceedingly strong.” Following German blueprints, thickly-walled forts with heavy guns dotted the hills that ringed the harbor.\(^8\) Allan also noted that the town on the banks of the harbor had grown “from an insignificant village of sixty of seventy mud houses and a few shops, to a town of over a thousand dwellings, as well as two large theatres, two temples, and a number of inns.” The new town had a population of 6,000, plus a garrison force of some 7,000 troops. Modern wharves and warehouses were also built. Allan noted that the new wharves were “fitted with steam cranes, and connected by a railway with the workshops, which contain all the most modern machinery and engines.” The town drew ample fresh water from pipes tapping a spring several miles to the north.\(^9\) In 1890 Li Hongzhang established in Lüshun a school to train modern sailors. Boys ages fourteen to seventeen studied subjects ranging from English to chemistry, while also learning the ins and outs of serving on modern naval vessels.\(^10\) Following a decade of work, Lüshun had grown into a vital part of the Qing’s efforts at military modernization, establishing itself as the most important place on the peninsula. The small cluster of fishing villages which would become the future site of the port city of Dalian, remained largely untouched by this development.

**The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Lüshun Massacre**

Li Hongzhang had scarcely completed work on his new naval port when in 1894 hostilities erupted on the peninsula between Qing forces and Japanese troops. In November Japanese troops stormed Lüshun, Jinzhou, and surrounding areas in what
was one of the major battles of the Sino-Japanese War to be fought on Chinese soil. Despite all the fortifications the well-defended harbor and its town were easily overrun. The Japanese military, having earlier landed at Dalianwan to the northeast, neutralized the defensive strengths of Lüshun by attacking overland. They began their assault on 21 November. Over the next four days Japanese troops rampaged through the area, indiscriminately killing 20,000 men, women, and children. Chinese evidence, corroborated by accounts from foreign journalists, suggests that only a handful of Lüshun’s residents survived.11

News of the massacre spread quickly overseas as the first generation of foreign war correspondents, including those from England and America, were on hand to witness and publicize the event in various newspapers. Local oral histories from survivors of the massacre, together with the eyewitness accounts of foreign journalists and sailors paint a haunting picture of looting and murder. The British sailor James Allan, who found himself caught in the town just as the Japanese forces began their attack, described the scene on the first day of killing: “Shots, shouts, shrieks, and groans resounded on every side; the streets presented a fearful spectacle; the ground was saturated with blood, and everywhere strewn with horribly mutilated corpses; some of the narrower avenues were positively choked with carnage. The dead were mostly townspeople.” After putting on a Japanese uniform to try and escape from the town, Allan stumbled upon a grisly scene, in which dozens of Chinese were trapped in a pond while Japanese soldiers fired upon them. He wrote, “many women were among them; one I noticed carrying a little child, which she held up to the soldiers as if in appeal. As she reached the bank, one of them struck her through with his bayonet…The woman
rose and made a wild effort to regain the child, but fell back again into the water. Her body was hacked in pieces.”¹² The ferocious attack all but wiped out the Chinese population of the town.

Surviving residents of Lüshun found themselves at the mercy of a foreign military power, a state of affairs that would persist in this area for the next sixty years. In April 1895 the Qing signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ceded control of the Liaodong peninsula to Japan. Just one month later, Japan, bowing to the pressure of France, Germany and Russia (a diplomatic event known as the “Triple Intervention”) returned the territory to the Qing government.¹³ Qing control was short-lived, however, for in 1897, on the heels of secret agreements signed with Russia for the establishment of the China Eastern Railway (CER), the Russian navy made its move for dominance on the peninsula. On 18 December 1897, fearing that without decisive action it might lose the port to Germany, who earlier that year had seized Jiaozhou (Qingdao) on the Shandong peninsula, Russian naval vessels entered the harbor at Lüshun. Three months later, on 27 March 1898, Russia and the Qing government signed the Pavlov Treaty, which granted Russia a twenty-five year lease of Lüshun and Dalianwan, “for the purpose of ensuring that Russian naval forces shall possess an entirely secure base on the littoral of northern China.”¹⁴ Russian dreams of ice-free ports and a foothold in Northeast Asia were realized.

In addition to the two ports, the treaty also granted control of the territory stretching north to a line to be determined by negotiations in a treaty amendment of May 1898. This territory was named the Guandong Leased Territory (Guandong zhou), which in 1904 had a total population of over 300,000, including close to 20,000 Russian
civilians and 15,000 Russian troops.\textsuperscript{15} From the perspective of the new colonial power, a key issue now became how to balance military and economic interests in the new colony.\textsuperscript{16}

Foundations of a Russian Railroad Empire: Planning Dalian and Lüshun, 1897-1904

Within a month of signing the Pavlov treaty, Russian officials arrived in Lüshun with the expectation that the port would be open to trading vessels. They were informed by naval officers that Lüshun was to be a military port, closed to commercial vessels.\textsuperscript{17} That year, 12,500 Russian troops were stationed at Lüshun, and by 1904, the number had increased to 35,000 stationed in Lüshun and Jinzhou.\textsuperscript{18} Indeed, as one scholar has noted, overwhelming military power was the key feature of the Russian regime on the Liaodong peninsula.\textsuperscript{19} With an ice-free military port and troops garrisoned at this strategic place, Russia’s military foothold in southern Manchuria was ensured. Yet, questions arose among Russian officials as to whether military goals alone were the main focus of development in the new colony.

Powerful non-military forces also became involved in shaping the direction of Russian colonialism in Northeast China. With its new outlet to the sea, plans were in motion to extend the CER southward from Harbin to Lüshun. The pieces for Russian development and control of trade in the Northeast were falling into place. Such was the vision of Sergei Witte (1849-1915), the powerful Minister of Finance who was overseeing the development of the CER. Witte believed that Russia’s interests in the region were best served by developing trade, and he was obsessed with the transformative possibilities of the railroad.\textsuperscript{20} He selected, with Russian imperial
backing, Dalianwan as the site to build a new commercial port, open to all nations and linked with the planned railway from Harbin. On 8 November 1899, Nikolai II ordered the start of construction of this port city, and christened it “Dal’nii” (Dalian) which means “far away” in Russian.  

Russian power on the peninsula thus had two centers competing for resources in its new Guandong Leased Territory, with the military controlling Lüshun and the CER controlling Dalian. The latter pumped close to 20 million rubles into the construction of Dalian from 1899 to 1903. So many resources seemed to be flowing to Dalian that by 1902, a War Ministry representative lamented that this was taking away from the further development of Lüshun, stating, “Dal’nii’s (Dalian) future is hazy; its value for Russia is problematic. The role of Port Arthur [Lüshun] is completely defined. The very existence of Dal’nii depends on the strength of our position in Manchuria, and in particular, on the completeness and strength of Port Arthur.”  

Despite such complaints, plans continued to go forward for the construction of Dalian. 

In 1899, the engineer V.V. Sakharov, who had earlier been responsible for the construction of the commercial port at Vladivostok, was selected to head the construction of the new town and port of Dalian. Sakharov’s plans were extremely ambitious. For Dalian to rival ports like Shanghai, Tianjin, and Yingkou, it would need major port facilities to accommodate large vessels. Sakharov planned port construction in two phases. In the first phase, from September 1899 to 1902, two main wharves were built to accommodate 25 one thousand-ton ships. Phase two was even more grandiose. It called for facilities to handle 100 one thousand-ton vessels, but was never finished, due to fiscal constraints, and the loss of the territory to Japan in 1905. A major
wharf with a 1,200 meter long dock was built to accommodate up to 250 Chinese junks at any given time.\textsuperscript{26} Thus by 1902, significant facilities were in place, including two major cargo wharves (one with railway connections), and a dry dock for repairing vessels. Moreover, workers had finished laying the foundation for a massive breakwater to further protect the harbor from winds.\textsuperscript{27} Over 900 trading vessels from eight countries docked at the new port in 1902, carrying mostly construction materials.\textsuperscript{28}

A modern port facility was only part of Russia’s plan for the territory. The crucial element in Russia’s colonial plan was the construction of a railway system that could carry goods to the ships waiting in the port. The Pavlov Treaty granted Russia the rights to extend a rail line southward through Manchuria, to Dalian and Lüshun. Railway links from Dalian to Gongzhuling (in southern Jilin province) were opened in August 1902. That year the railway logged over 30,000 passengers coming to and from Dalian. By January 1903, the new port of Dalian was connected by rails to Harbin, Russia’s major outpost in northern Manchuria and headquarters of the CER. The following month, the first express train from Harbin pulled into Dalian station.\textsuperscript{29} On August 14, the line reached the Russian border, covering a total distance of some 2,500 kilometers, connecting the southern outposts of Lüshun and Dalian with the Russian motherland.\textsuperscript{30}

To showcase the new port and railroad trading center, Sakharov laid plans for the construction of a magnificent city on the site of what had been several fishing villages. Much of his plans for the new city of Dalian were based on Paris, and he was highly influenced by the latest theories on urban planning, particularly the “garden city” concept.\textsuperscript{31} Spatially, Sakharov divided the city into three main districts separated by a
large park: a European district, a Chinese district, and an administrative district. The European district was further broken down into three zones: a commercial center, a residential area, and residences for officials. Like the plans for Russian Harbin, Chinese residents were to be segregated from Europeans. A large park, featuring a zoo, separated the Chinese and European sections of the city. The heart of Sakharov’s planned city was a radial pattern of ten boulevards which spread outward from a large circular road, ringed with administrative buildings, foreign embassies, and banks. At the center of the circle was a large square, dubbed Nikolai square, which became a defining architectural feature of Dalian through the Russian and Japanese colonial eras.

The success of Sakharov and Witte’s plan was mixed. The foundations of a new city were set, and some progress was made in areas like road construction, including a long tree-lined motor road of some ten kilometers which ran to swimming beaches in the city’s southwestern suburbs. By 1904 Dalian’s population had grown to 30,000, including 3,000 Russians. By far the bulk of the population was Chinese workers employed in building the city and the port. Yet, despite such growth and development, Dalian could not compete with Vladivostok and Yingkou for trade as the railway connections to the trans-Saharan lines were barely complete. Russians gave the city the nickname “Lishnii,” which means superfluous in Russian. Although planned to perfection, not much was happening in Dalian, and many of Sakharov’s plans remained unfinished. Lüshun, the military and political center of the Guandong Leased Territory, had troubles of its own. Little was spent on developing the town prior to 1903. Lüshun’s economy was geared toward its military garrison of 15,000 troops, and
although work was done to build a new town after 1903, the city developed a negative reputation, according to one Russian writer, as “one of the brothels of the world.”

Thus far we have examined developments on the peninsula from the perspective of the Qing and Russian governments, but what impact did the Russian presence have on the Chinese population in the Leased Territory? How did they experience the changes being brought about here? Contemporary Chinese sources tend to highlight resistance on the part of locals to Russian imperialism, particularly in rural areas. It was the contentious issues of taxation and land reclamation that provoked the most violent conflict. After seizing the tax records from the Jinzhou yamen in 1899, Russian authorities set out to try to collect taxes in their newly acquired territory. An armed tax collection team comprised of twelve officials, ten translators, forty soldiers, twenty-four horses, and thirteen two-wheeled carts was organized to collect taxes. When the team reached Liujiadian village, near the northern border of the Leased Territory, they met with resistance from villagers, who had armed themselves and refused to pay tax. Russian tax collectors called for reinforcements, and two hundred more troops arrived on the scene. Seeing a mob gathering in the village, soldiers fired on the crowd, and with swords drawn charged on horseback. Forty villagers were killed and seventy were injured.

Land requisition was also a potential flashpoint for violence between locals and Russian authorities. Sakharov’s city plan for Dalian called for vast tracts of land to be developed. Consequently, locals were forbidden to farm along a twelve kilometer strip of coastline, losing 5,000 mu of farmland. Many were forced to sell their land and relocate further inland. Upon hearing that Russian planners were selling their land at
much higher prices than they had been paid, villagers stormed the offices of the CER, ransacked the place, and dragged away the Chinese clerks working in the office.  

Yet not all interactions involved violent resistance. Opportunities also existed for many Chinese to exploit the Russian presence. The very clerks who were dragged from the CER office are one example of new employment opportunities for those with skills. Few Russian officials understood Chinese, and translators were in constant demand. This was a potentially powerful position and some notorious individuals used it for personal gain. One translator, Li Yulong, for example, pressed locals for cash, women, free labor, land, food, and even opium by threatening get the Russian police involved if his wishes were not granted. An elite class of wealthy Chinese also enjoyed the fruits of Russian control in Dalian and Lüshun. They included those who had forged long-term relationships with Russian traders, and those with technical knowledge. Chinese engineers and wealthy merchants were occasionally allowed to reside in the highly segregated European residential sections of Dalian and Lüshun, and often attended lavish balls hosted in their honor by Russian military officials. Others enjoyed greater privileges due to connections with the Russian military. Ji Fengtai was one such man. Ji was of the wealthiest Chinese businessmen in Dalian during the period of Russian control. A native of Shandong province, he had worked as a laborer in northern Manchuria, eventually learning enough Russian to earn the job as a labor contractor for the Russian military in Khabarovsk. This position earned him the trust of the Russian military, and he became quite wealthy. He eventually acquired Russian citizenship and took the Russian name Nikolai Ivanovich Tifontai. He used his wealth to build large theaters for Chinese residents in Dalian, Lüshun and Harbin, while
continuing his occupation as a labor contractor bringing thousands of Shandong farmers to Dalian in search of work.\textsuperscript{43}

It is estimated that at the high point of Russian construction efforts, over 40-50,000 Chinese laborers were working in the Leased Territory.\textsuperscript{44} Following a pattern of migratory labor that would remain a constant feature throughout the Russian and Japanese colonial eras, laborers made the short trip from Shandong during the agricultural slack season. The men seldom made the trip alone, but rather were introduced to jobs in the Leased Territory by relatives or fellow villagers who had made the trip. They would then be a part of a labor gang (bang) ranging in size from a few dozen to several hundred fellow workers. A “big boss” (da toumu) was responsible for all the workers, while smaller bosses under them looked after ten to twenty laborers. The bosses took cuts from the worker’s earnings in return for providing housing, meals, and solving and problems that might arise.\textsuperscript{45} This system remained largely unchanged until 1937, when Japanese authorities moved to more aggressively control the labor market.

Despite the grand plans of men like Witte and Sakharov, Russia’s colonial dreams were short-lived. The fist phases of constructing the grandiose city of Dalian had scarcely been completed when war broke out with Japan in 1904. By 1905, victorious Japanese troops were marching through Nikolai square, the heart of Sakharov’s Dalian. In seven years of controlling the Guandong Leased Territory, Russia had developed a powerful colonial blueprint for the future economic exploitation of Manchuria, and for the projection of foreign military power from ports like Lushun. With the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth in September 1905, Japan gained control
of the Guandong Leased Territory and of the railway line from Changchun to Dalian and Lüshun. They inherited both the territory and the Russian blueprint for “conquest by railway.”

Managing and Building the Colonial Boomtown: The Rise of Dalian, 1905-1932

From the vantage point of the Japanese colonizers, the years from 1905 through the late 1920s were boom years for Dalian. Few if any port cities in East Asia witnessed such rapid economic growth. The population grew from 19,000 in 1906 to over 200,000 in 1926. Trade figures for the city in 1907 ranked it 42nd among open ports in China, yet by 1918, Dalian ranked second to Shanghai in terms of trade volume. It had quickly surpassed Yingkou to become the major export and processing center of Manchuria’s soybean trade. With an abundant source of cheap Chinese labor from nearby Shandong, long distance railroad connections to a fertile hinterland, and deepwater port facilities, the sky seemed the limit for the economic future of the city. Indeed, Japanese planners took Witte’s dreams of building a railroad empire and Sakharov’s plans for a modern port metropolis in Northeast Asia to new heights.

Inheriting and Expanding Russian Plans: Port and City Construction

When Japanese troops marched into Dalian on the morning of May 28, 1904, they found themselves in control of a well planned but only partially built city. The Russian administrative section and some port facilities were completed, and the foundations for grand boulevards were cut into the earth, yet most remained unpaved. No train station had been built. Retreating Russian soldiers did not defend Dalian,
opting instead to destroy as much as possible when they left the town. Retreating Russian naval forces laced the harbor with over 700 mines.\textsuperscript{52} When Japanese military officers arrived, they found significant damage to the port facilities and the electricity plant.\textsuperscript{53} Much of the non-Russian population had fled, and the local economy ground to a halt.\textsuperscript{54} Ji Fengtai and other prominent Chinese, who had invested heavily in Russian Dalian, were beheaded by the Japanese military as untrustworthy Russian spies.\textsuperscript{55}

On 11 February 1905 Japanese orders officially changed the city’s name from the Russian Dal’nii to Dalian (Japanese-\textit{Dairen}), marking the beginning of forty years of Japanese colonial rule.\textsuperscript{56} From the perspective of Japanese planners, much work needed to be done in order to rebuild and transform the town into a thriving city of commerce, now molded to serve the growing needs of the Japanese empire. City construction under the Japanese from 1905 through the mid-1930s occurred in three phases. The first phase, lasting through 1910, witnessed the completion of Sakharov’s original construction plans. In response to massive population growth, a new plan was enacted in 1919, greatly expanding the city limits. Finally, the third phase of construction in the 1930s reflected a shift in the role of Dalian from an export-based port to an industrial center.\textsuperscript{57}

In 1904, Sakharov’s blueprints for urban construction were captured, and the Japanese military continued to build the city based on those plans, finishing the work by 1910.\textsuperscript{58} City districts were reorganized under the first city plan set up by the Japanese military in 1905. Japanese plans called for the creation of a district designated for military use, a Japanese residential and administrative district encompassing the old administrative center and part of the Russian era “European” district, and a Chinese
zone, located in the same area it had been in the Russian plans.\textsuperscript{59} Importantly, the 1905 regulations reflect the need on the part of Japanese authorities to deal with Chinese residents of the city. Chinese merchants were allowed to work in the Japanese district and the wealthiest were even permitted to reside there. However, the laborers, vendors, and small shopkeepers who made up the bulk of the Chinese population lived in scattered shantytowns throughout the area. Many families lived among the burnt-out ruins of Russian homes in the southern hills of the city. Starting in September 1905, Japanese authorities launched a campaign to forcibly move these people into a central Chinese district, an area known as Xiaogangzi. Xiaogangzi’s paved streets and row houses were easier for Japanese authorities to police. By November, over 10,000 Chinese had been moved to Xiaogangzi.\textsuperscript{60}

To make room for the booming population and for new businesses, the area that had been designated a military district was decreased in order to make room for commercial and residential growth. Space issues and housing demands, however, continued to be a major problem. Dalian’s population grew to over 100,000 by 1919. New development plans were enacted that year which expanded the size of the city to incorporate outlying areas including Shahekou, where the SMR’s massive locomotive repair and production plant was located.\textsuperscript{61} After incorporating these outlying areas the city covered over 1700 acres. Urban development blueprints for the 1930s continued to place a heavy emphasis on finding space for the expanding industrial sector.\textsuperscript{62} Thus, an industrial district and a mixed-industrial residential district were added to the plans, and by 1934 the city had grown to an area of 5,270 acres.\textsuperscript{63}
Public works projects, parks, and transportation were also expanded in each phase of city planning. Roads were built throughout the Leased Territory linking Dalian with surrounding towns and villages. The first electric tramline was completed in 1908, and by 1926 there were 100 cars riding on 37 kilometers of tracks, providing 60,000 rides per day. By 1934 that number had nearly doubled. Electric streetcars remain a distinctive feature in the city to this day. By 1933, twenty-three electric works had been built in the Leased Territory to provide power for industries and homes. Electric streetlights illuminated much of downtown, and there was even an electricity-themed amusement park just to the west of the city’s core district. A modern sewage system was also constructed, and fresh water was pumped in from reservoirs constructed in the hills to the southwest.

Port construction kept pace with the city’s booming economy and rapid population growth. During the first two decades of Japanese control, the port facilities were greatly expanded. The port was re-opened to international shipping in August 1906, and by 1915, Dalian’s three main wharves had been widened and fitted with new railway tracks. A fourth was completed in 1928. In 1908 1,357 vessels arrived at the newly opened port by 1934 over 5,000 ships per year were arriving, with a tenfold increase in total tonnage. The SMR constructed concrete warehouses to hold the soybeans and other agricultural products exported in ever-increasing quantities to Japan and Europe. By 1934, there were 70 such warehouses and cargo sheds, covering 380,000 square meters. Major facilities for unloading coal were constructed in the northern part of Dalian bay, such that by 1930, four 10,000-ton vessels could be berthed simultaneously while unloading coal to feed the city’s rapidly expanding industrial
enterprises. Likewise, a dock specializing in loading oil, both soybean oil and petroleum, was built in the eastern portion of the bay. The Russian-built dry-dock was enlarged to accommodate up to 6,000-ton ships. Japanese colonial interests had by the early 1930s built Dalian into an economic powerhouse and one of the key cities on its imperial map.

We have seen that Russian imperialism in the region was characterized by a rivalry between civilian and military planners in defining the Russian presence and purpose on the peninsula. Similar issues arose within the Japanese colonial project. To illuminate these tensions, we first need to discuss briefly the different groups of colonial power-holders involved. Guandong colonial administrators, the Guandong army, and the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR) all had their own visions and definitions of the colonial city. Building a prosperous territory may have been a shared goal among these groups, but deciding how to go about it was often a contested process.

Existing scholarship characterizes Japanese activities prior to the foundation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932 as “informal imperialism.” This formulation is useful in emphasizing the unequal treaty system which gave foreign powers like Japan economic advantages and privileges, allowing them to better exploit both natural and labor resources in China. It also allows for a focus on the collaborative efforts of local elites who pursued their own gains through such a system. The emphasis on economic activities contrasts with the later, “formal,” phase of Japanese imperialism, which involved military conquest and formal control over Chinese territory. Recent studies have complicated this picture. Military concerns were, from the start, a major feature of
Japanese control of the Guandong Leased Territory. Yoshihisa Matsusaka’s recent work stresses that much of the early port and railroad construction in the Leased Territory was carried out with military concerns in mind: Japanese military authorities anticipated a future conflict with Russia over control of Manchuria.  

David Tucker’s study of Japanese urban planning in Manchuria notes that economic and city planning in Dalian was characterized by the overlapping administrative authority of the army, the Guandong government, and the SMR.  

While an in-depth analysis of the goals and interactions of these different nodes of authority lies outside the scope of the present study, the following overview of the administration of the Guandong Leased Territory reveals the shifting military and economic priorities that characterized Japanese imperialism in this region through the early 1930s.

*The Administrative Structure of the Guandong Leased Territory: 1905-1932*

The evolution of the administrative apparatus of the Guandong Leased Territory highlights shifts between military and civilian interests, and the collision of policies sent from Tokyo with local colonial concerns. In October 1905 administration of the Leased Territory was in the hands of the Guandong Military Government (Kantō Sōtokufu) subordinate to the Imperial General Headquarters in Japan. In September 1906, the Military Government was replaced by the Guandong Government-General (Kantō Tokokufu), under the Foreign Ministry in Japan. A top military officer was still head of this administration, and the former military governor, General Ōshima Yoshimasa, held the post until 1912. The Guandong Government-General was responsible for administering and defending the territory, to aid in the latter task, the
Army Bureau was established. This institution was the precursor of the infamous Guandong Army (Kantō gun). Civil administration was handled by the Government-General and the SMR, established in 1907. In 1917, efforts to streamline the administration gave the governor-general oversight of the management of the SMR.

In 1919 the Taishō-era democratization that had been occurring in Japan reached the colony, and the Guandong administration was reorganized once again. This time, a civilian governor was established to rule a newly formed Guandong Government (Kantō chō), guided by the Foreign Ministry and the SMR. The Army Bureau, now free from the Guandong administration, was reformed as the Guandong Army (Kantō gun). Significantly, the Guandong Army was now responsible only to the high command in Tokyo and was granted the right to take independent action if necessary, thus setting the course for their preemptive military actions in the region in the early 1930s. In the several years preceding the move toward civilian-led government in the colony, Dalian had established its own local government in 1915. With the ascendency of a civilian-based government in 1919, the once weak city government claimed responsibility over local issues previously governed by the SMR, which established its headquarters in Dalian and had steadily been investing in its development since 1907. The early 1920s was a period when local economic interests, particularly among the Japanese business community in Dalian, had their strongest voice, often clashing with colonial authorities and lobbying Tokyo for policies that protected their local interests.

The Guandong Army’s independent actions to seize Manchuria in September 1931, followed by the founding of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932 caused administrative confusion for the Leased Territory, which, in theory, remained a separate
administrative entity. An official English-language propaganda booklet produced by the Guandong Government in 1934, for example, demonstrates the confusion: “Strictly speaking the term Manchoukuo does not include the Kwantung [Guandong] Leased Territory and the SMR Zone, but sometimes the same term is used as including these districts.” Efforts to unify what was called a “Four-headed Administration,” referring to the competing powers of the Guandong Government, the Guandong Army, the Foreign Ministry (Consulates), and the SMR, began in 1932. That year the Commander of the Guandong Army assumed control of the Guandong Government, while at the same time serving as “Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo (chū Man zenken taishi).” The post-1932 governance of the Guandong Leased Territory, its relationship with Manchukuo and the role of the Guandong Army in controlling its affairs will be taken up in the next chapter.

The South Manchuria Railway Company

From its inception in 1906, the SMR was a defining feature of Japanese colonialism on the peninsula. Within a few years of its founding, the company built and ran the most modern railway in China, spearheading Japan’s own brand of railway imperialism in Manchuria. No travel book or Japanese propaganda about the Guandong Leased Territory failed to describe the wonders of the railway and its construction efforts. Boasting that the company’s role transcended mere transportation, one such book noted “the shriek of these American locomotives across Manchurian plains and through Manchurian cities is the voice of modern enterprise bringing a rich, modern life, opportunity, hygiene, education and happiness to an ancient people.” SMR
administrators and researchers thus saw themselves and their role in the region as far more than that of a railway company; they were the backbone of an empire.

The SMR was created in 1906 in the context of competition among military and civilian government over how best to manage the newly acquired Leased Territory. In a sense, the company itself represented a compromise as its directors were appointed by the government, with 49% of its shares open to the public, while the military was put in charge of the technical specifications of building the railroad, and maintained the right to take it over in a time of war. The early construction of the railroad, as well as much of the port facilities at Dalian was thus designed to serve both civilian and military purposes. This strategy was pursued by the company in areas extending beyond infrastructure and transportation. The SMR established hospitals, research facilities, and schools for Chinese and Japanese students, all of which were conceived as laying the groundwork for future Japanese expansion and control in the region. The company’s first president, Gotō Shimpei, created and advocated this strategy, calling it “military preparedness in civilian garb” (bunsōteki bubī). He wrote, “We have to implement a cultural invasion with a Central Laboratory, popular education for the resident populace, and forge other academic and economic links.” The company quickly grew to become the main vehicle for implementing Gotō’s strategy.

The ascendency of the SMR transformed the growing city of Dalian into a “ground zero” for the economic, military, and cultural penetration of Japanese interests into Manchuria. From its Dalian headquarters, the company pumped capital into its railway network spreading into the Manchurian hinterland. The backbone of the South Manchuria railway was the inherited CER line stretching from Lushun and Dalian to
Changchun, a distance of over 700 kilometers. The SMR built branch lines to this major trunk line, totaling 1,129 kilometers of track. By 1908, workers had finished rebuilding the tracks from the wide Russian gage to the slightly narrower standard gage in use throughout China and Korea.\(^8^5\) The previous year the company had purchased 200 locomotives and over 2,000 railway cars from companies in the United States.\(^8^6\) To service the growing numbers of cars and locomotives, the SMR established a massive repair and construction facility in Shahekou, an industrial zone in Dalian. The Shahekou plant produced its first locomotive in 1914, and by 1934 was capable of building 30 locomotives, 45 passenger cars, and thousands of freight cars in a year, employing 4,400 workers.\(^8^7\) The SMR’s express trains serviced here could make the trip north to Changchun in 12 hours. SMR trains could also roll onto the wharves and accept passengers directly from the steamships that called on the port in increasing numbers. The ships arrived from ports as far away as Seattle, New York, and European locales.\(^8^8\) The railway was thus envisioned as a link between Manchuria and the world.

Trains and steamships were only part of the SMR vision. The company also took up the task of building Dalian into an urban showcase for Japanese colonialism in China. The SMR built a chain of luxury hotels, the Yamato chain, in the major cities along the railroad, with the flagship hotel located on Dalian’s “Great Plaza” (Ō-hiroba), formerly Nikolai square. Moreover it built schools, hospitals, libraries, port facilities, and established industrial enterprises throughout the Leased Territory and the Railway Zone (fuzokuchi), a narrow strip of land controlled by the company on both sides of the tracks stretching to Changchun.\(^8^9\) The SMR invested heavily in hygiene and public health, building a chain of modern hospitals at the major cities along the railway. The
SMR hospital in Dalian was one of the largest modern hospitals in China, with room for 450 patients, and an outpatient clinic serving over 800 people per day. “Hygiene districts” were created throughout the Leased Territory, monitoring for plague outbreaks, and inspecting drinking water sources and meat. The SMR also built schools for Japanese, Korean, and Chinese residents of the Leased Territory. While the vast majority of the funding went to educating Japanese and Korean students, there were ten schools built for Chinese pupils, with 5,000 students attending in 1935.

By far the most extensive and successful of Gotô’s plans was the establishment of a major research facility in Dalian under the auspices of the SMR. This massive institute brought together China experts from various fields, along with economists and other specialists to Dalian to work to compile massive amounts of data about things ranging from the region’s geography, to trade issues, working conditions, and social customs, and social problems. By 1932, researchers had produced hundreds of studies, 26 different kinds of investigative reports, and published monthly journals dedicated to their findings. It was here that Gotô’s concept of military preparedness in civilian clothing had its greatest impact. The SMR research bureau became the center for the collection of knowledge on colonial subjects and the economy in the Leased Territory and eventually, all of Manchuria and North China. This colonial think tank brought together diverse voices, from those on the right favoring closer ties with the Guandong army, to more liberal intellectuals who found the company’s research apparatus more open than conditions in Japan. In the move towards militarism that characterized Japanese imperialism in the 1930s, SMR researchers were increasingly mobilized to
serve the interests of the Guandong army, while the more liberal elements were targeted and arrested.

The SMR thus put Dalian on the map not just as a railway and port city, but also as the nerve center of information gathering on the colonial economy and colonial subjects. Moreover, SMR researchers played a major role in defining colonial society in Dalian. Clean orderly streets, modern sanitation, new housing and hotels, public health programs, and comprehensive social research, all became the hallmarks of Japanese control throughout the Leased Territory. This “colonial modernity” became the subject of much praise from international travelers to the city, and from those in the company itself, who saw Dalian as more modern than Japanese urban centers. Dalian’s rise was well propagated in travel brochures and SMR propaganda pieces, which touted its “boulevards, parks, public buildings, banks, clubs, hotels and business houses planned on the best European models.”

The obsession with scientific planning, order, and hygiene was a major feature of what one scholar has called “SMR culture.” Doctors and researchers employed by the SMR were eager to show off their accomplishments in this regard, particularly in areas like public medicine. In one case, an outbreak of plague in northern Manchuria was celebrated as an opportunity to spotlight the agents of colonial hygiene in action. A member of the SMR Hygienic Administration captured the mood, writing, “Medical Manchuria was thrown into a wild thrill of excitement as the remarkable news (of the outbreak) was flashed to it.” The outbreak was eventually contained, serving to justify the military-like medical regime set up by the SMR, with its mission “to guard communities against the invasion of contagious diseases and to educate the people in
The Japanese colonial authority’s obsession with order was reinforced by the presence of a large Chinese population in the city which in their view needed to be controlled, thereby strengthening the perceived needs for the culture of planning that the SMR represented. Indeed, as Ruth Rogaski’s study of treaty port Tianjin has pointed out, such hygienic efforts on the part of colonial authorities were part of legitimization of modern political authority.97

As the above example illustrates, colonial planners were confident and eager to demonstrate their commitment to SMR culture. This confidence was built on the foundation of unprecedented economic expansion in southern Manchuria. Dalian was growing rapidly into a major center of regional and international trade. Japanese and foreign firms were flocking to the city, along with Chinese and Japanese individuals drawn by the promise of jobs and a better economic future. Within a decade of 1905, the SMR’s showcase city overtook Yingkou as the major port for Manchurian trade, and its overall trade figures began to rival those of the Yangtze trading hub of Hankow, and coastal trading centers like Tianjin and Guangzhou (Canton).98 The dramatic increase was by no mere accident, but rather reflected a conscious strategy to make Dalian the main trading hub of the region. The story of this transformation requires further examination, but, for the purposes of the present study, a brief overview will suffice to provide a sense of the economic forces and economic life in the city that the SMR billed as “the gateway to Manchuria.”99

The “Gateway to Manchuria”: Soybeans and Dalian’s Dominance as a Regional Trade Metropolis
The SMR planned to do more than just build and showcase Dalian as an example of Japanese imperialist development. They wanted to build it into the commercial and trading center of Northeast China. The railway and the expanded port facilities at Dalian provided the necessary infrastructure for such a transformation. Growing international demand for agricultural products like the soybean, which became the main cash crop in Manchuria, gave the SMR the goods to put its railway-to-port imperialism into action. As the politically and militarily stable centerpiece of the Guandong Leased Territory, Dalian became the focal point of a concerted effort to massively restructure regional trade in Manchuria tipping the scales from established Chinese and Russian trading networks in favor of Japanese colonial interests. One item in particular fuelled this restructuring: the soybean. Controlling the Manchurian soybean trade in the early decades of the twentieth century was more than just an issue of generating revenue; it was, as one recent study notes, a power struggle for the economic riches of Manchuria between Chinese, Japanese, and Russian competitors. At the center of it all was Dalian.

Soybeans had long been a key commercial crop in Manchuria. Moreover, large round cakes made from soybean byproducts proved to be an effective nitrogen-rich fertilizer. Until the late nineteenth century, these bean cakes were shipped to southern China, often to be used by sugar plantations. By 1899, Japanese demand for Manchurian bean cake exceeded that of south China, where the cakes were becoming a popular substitute for fish manure. The collection point for the beans and bean cakes was Yingkou, a coastal treaty port located where the Liao River meets the sea.
The Liao River had for centuries served as the main trade route in southern Manchuria. The river is navigable to the town of Liaoyang, after which only shallow draft junks can make the final voyage to Yingkou, a fifteen day journey. In the early twentieth century, the trip upstream was a difficult and slow going voyage. The Liao carries a heavy silt load, with shifting sandbars that make night navigation risky. Moreover, the river freezes solid for four months of the year. Despite these difficulties, the Liao was nonetheless the main artery of regional trade. By the late 1800s, Yingkou had thus emerged as the major center of the soybean trade. At that port the beans were transferred from the shallow junks onto oceangoing vessels for destinations along the Chinese coast, and increasingly, to Japan. A strong Chinese merchant community in Yingkou had over time developed solid ties with the shippers and soy merchants upstream. An elaborate distribution and transport system had long been in place on the Liao. Absentee boat owners from North China hired locals to guide the soy boats down the river. Boat gangs augmented their take from the soy shipment by transporting other goods to various points along the river, playing an important part in the movement of various commodities throughout the region.

Yingkou remained the center of the bean trade through the first decade of the 20th century, holding its own in terms of overall trade with the rapidly developing port of Dalian. The challenge for colonial planners in Dalian was how to divert the bean trade from Yingkou to Dalian. Nature helped their plans. In 1911, a major flood hit the area, and huge amounts of silt flowed down the Liao, leaving a massive, two-mile-long sandbar blocking the harbor at Yingkou. From that point on, Yingkou’s status as the center of the bean trade declined rapidly. By 1920, only 3,000 junks were engaged in
trade. The silting of the port was surely a blow, but it was largely the rise of the SMR and its port of Dalian that captured the Liao trade. The displacement of the bean trade ended the dominance of the Chinese-based trade networks at Yingkou, replaced by Japanese colonial interests through a plan enacted by the SMR known as the “Dalian strategy.”

The plan to develop Dalian as the major regional trading hub in southern Manchuria meshed with Japanese political and military goals aimed at strengthening Japan’s position in the Guandong Leased Territory and indeed Manchuria as a whole. Japan’s total control over the territory ensured that any buildup of trade through the port of Dalian would pass through their hands. Moreover, Dalian’s lack of well-entrenched Chinese trade networks and modern port facilities were, from the perspectives of colonial authorities significant advantages over Yingkou. Dalian’s harbor did not freeze during the cold winter months, and therefore remained open the whole year. Most importantly, the docks were linked directly to the SMR’s railway network, stretching into the heartland of soybean country. Despite such advantages, it was necessary to pursue more direct strategies to end Yingkou’s dominance. One scholar has noted that the need to develop Dalian was so great that discriminatory policies against Yingkou were pursued without regard for Japanese business interests there.

At the core of the Dalian strategy were efforts by the SMR not simply to push the use of the railway and port, but also to establish various additional incentives to lure the soy trade to Dalian. For the SMR, this strategy entailed branching out of the transport sector, and into finance, warehousing and insurance. It was the development of these institutions that allowed the SMR to break Yingkou’s dominance and promote
Dalian as the center of the soy trade. Commodity exchanges, banks and modern warehouses, coupled with the city’s voluminous international trade, tempted traders to move their operations to Dalian. The pooling system furthered the cause. This was a system where beans were graded and held in common storage. The soy merchant would receive a bill of lading to exchange for beans of the same grade in Dalian, or might sell the bill for a quick profit.\(^{109}\) With the addition of modern insurance for shipments and bonded warehouses, Dalian quickly became the center of the soy trade.

Viewed from the perspective of Japanese colonial authorities, the Dalian strategy achieved spectacular results. Trade through Dalian was boosted by a growing international demand for soy products, particularly during the First World War. In 1907 Dalian accounted for just 15 percent of the total Manchurian trade, with Yingkou handling 75 percent. By 1910, Dalian’s trade roughly equaled that of Yingkou, quickly surpassing it by 1912, just six years after the port was opened for international trade by colonial authorities.\(^{110}\) By the 1920s, Dalian surpassed Tianjin, Hankow, and Guangzhou (Canton) in total trade, second only to Shanghai.\(^{111}\) Ships from Japan, England, the United States, and Holland, among others, called on the port.\(^{112}\) Moreover, the port of Dalian also witnessed explosive growth in exports, which began far exceeding its imports. Soybeans, beancake, and soybean oil, were the major export items. In 1912, for example, Dalian exported 177,000 tons of soybeans; by 1921 that figure had ballooned to over 550,000 tons. Likewise, exports of beancakes grew from 500,000 tons in 1912, to over 1,000,000 tons in 1921.\(^{113}\) The strength of Dalian as an export center was apparent after the port was opened to international shipping in 1906. From that point forward, total exports from the port greatly outnumbered imports (see
table 1.1). An export based economy, built on the backbone of the railroad and the soybean, grew exponentially, so that by the early 1930s, the port handled over 60 percent of the total trade of Manchuria. The bulk of these exports went to Japan.

Table 1.1: Goods Exported and Imported through Dalian, 1907-1931

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>65.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>29.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>123.9</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>134.6</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>179.4</td>
<td>136.0</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>214.3</td>
<td>164.3</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>242.0</td>
<td>198.4</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>218.1</td>
<td>166.8</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>248.0</td>
<td>192.7</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>301.2</td>
<td>220.3</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>353.5</td>
<td>259.2</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>420.5</td>
<td>320.2</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>136.9</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>471.0</td>
<td>395.6</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>19.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>439.3</td>
<td>370.5</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>473.8</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>477.6</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>596.7</td>
<td>511.4</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
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<td>550.9</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
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<td>575.1</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>100.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>759.8</td>
<td>662.2</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>832.1</td>
<td>706.9</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>125.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>901.1</td>
<td>757.0</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>144.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
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<td>1930</td>
<td>632.5</td>
<td>543.9</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>735.4</td>
<td>648.0</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DJBNS, 843.

As the city’s economy grew so did its population, from 18,000 in 1906 to 200,000 in 1926. By 1934, the population topped 327,000. One of the defining features of Dalian was its high colonizer population. The Chinese population of coastal treaty
ports like Shanghai and Tianjin greatly outnumbered the colonial population, and in this regard Dalian was not an exception. Of the 327,000 residents living there in 1934, 200,000 were Chinese. However Dalian was notable on the Japanese imperial map for having the largest Japanese population of any city in the empire outside of Japan.

**Japanese Merchants and Businesses**

As Dalian’s economy and trade expanded, so too did its business community. Japanese and Chinese merchants, traders, and families with dreams of overnight riches came to the city hoping to cash in on the boom. The expanding soybean economy and the Twenty-One Demands, a treaty agreement forced on Chinese President Yuan Shikai’s government by Japan in 1915 which forced China to extend Japan’s original leasehold on the Guandong Leased Territory from 1923 (the year the original 25 year agreement between Russian and the Qing expired) to 1997 and gave Japanese the right to settle and establish businesses in southern Manchuria, set the stage for economic optimism. The Japanese business community grew more diverse. In the years following Japan’s defeat of Russia, trading contracts were given only to a select group of entrepreneurs and companies. By the early 1920s, the Japanese business scene in Dalian ranged from large companies from the metropole which came to open branches in the city, to small-scale traders and family-run shops. The SMR was the largest company and one of the leading employers in the city. In 1933, the company employed 25,631 Japanese and 65,765 Chinese people, ranging from officials to “temporary payroll wageworkers” and dock laborers.
Other large Japanese firms set up shop in Dalian, including Mitsui Bussan, a major player in exporting soy products to Japan and Europe, and Mitsubishi, which opened concrete and glass factories and after 1921 moved into the soy trade and various other industrial ventures. As the economy expanded and the city grew, these companies and others began to open factories in the city, producing foodstuffs, glass, machine tools, and chemicals and chemical products. In 1920 there were over 350 factories in the city. The leaders of these industries formed the backbone of the city’s Chamber of Commerce, whose board consisted of the top business, industrial, and trade interests in Dalian and Manchuria. The Chamber of Commerce, along with the SMR, became a powerful lobby protecting Japanese business interests, which were the major benefactors of the “Dalian strategy.” Its members did not shy away from open disagreements and conflicts with colonial policy. The Chamber of Commerce clashed with colonial authorities on several occasions, particularly over the issue of lowering customs fees to help the port remain competitive, even holding a public rally when their demands were not being attended to. The Chamber also vigorously protested plans to develop Pusan in Korea as an alternative port for cotton imports from Japan to Manchuria.

The Twenty-one Demands granted Japanese citizens new freedom to live, travel, and establish businesses in southern Manchuria. In a trend mimicked throughout the Guandong Leased Territory, Dalian witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of smaller businesses in the city as individual and family run businesses increased, with shops selling rice, spirits, sundries, toiletries, and real estate the most common. There were over 2500 such enterprises by 1920, a ten-fold increase from 1909. Many came
expecting instant wealth, hearing that “gold is falling from the sky in Dalian.”  

The majority of these enterprises were located in Dalian’s downtown core, an area with the heaviest concentration of Japanese businesses. Two of the city’s main shopping districts were located there, catering to Japanese residents and international visitors. By the early 1930s, there was also a Mitsukoshi department store, whose aisles and departments were full of the same goods as could be found in Japan. However, there were other smaller businesses which operated in Xiaogangzi, a major Chinese neighborhood, and in the industrial suburbs of Shahekou. Particularly in Xiaogangzi, Japanese businesses were located alongside and competed with various Chinese businesses.

Chinese Merchants and Business Associations

The image of colonial Dalian that often emerges from colonial memoirs, and from contemporary Chinese studies on the city, is that of a wealthy Japanese community serviced by Chinese labor. The Shandong “coolie” laborer, thousands of whom worked loading bag after bag of soy beans onto Japanese ships, was no doubt a potent symbol of colonial exploitation. Shandong farmers arrived during the agricultural slack season to take manual labor jobs on the docks or at various construction sites in the city. Yet for some Chinese, Dalian’s colonial economy offered new opportunities to open factories, businesses or small shops. By 1924 there were over 4,000 Chinese businesses of various sizes throughout the city.

There were opportunities for Chinese entrepreneurs in industry as well. In 1916, there were 55 major Chinese industries in Dalian, and 57 Japanese industries. It must
be noted, however, that these Japanese industries had 19 times more capital than Chinese firms.\textsuperscript{129} Despite that disparity, there were some successful Chinese enterprises. By far the largest and most successful were bean mills, which processed soybeans into soybean oil for export to meet the increase in demand from Europe and the United States.\textsuperscript{130} This rapidly growing industry was dominated by Chinese entrepreneurs. Of the 55 Chinese-run industries in the city in 1916, 50 were bean mills. That number grew to 78 by 1923, compared to only 9 Japanese mills.\textsuperscript{131}

The wealthiest of the bean mill owners formed their own Chinese business organizations, which included a Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and a Xigangzi Chamber of Commerce. In a city under Japanese political and economic control, these organizations played a crucial role in representing and protecting Chinese business interests. The Dalian Chinese Chamber of Commerce was first organized in 1905 by Liu Zhaoyi, a Shandong native who was active as a labor contractor in Russian-era Lüshun and Dalian.\textsuperscript{132} The strength of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce reached its peak in the early 1920s, a period that saw its leaders openly confronting colonial authorities over a number of issues which threatened Chinese businesses in Dalian.

The most significant conflict arose over currency reforms proposed by the Japanese colonial government. In the early 1920s, Japanese authorities attempted to implement a gold-standard currency system in the Leased Territory based on notes issued from the Bank of Chôsen in Dalian. This met with fierce opposition from the Chinese business community, which was using a silver-based system, and would lose out in the shift to the gold system. Head of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Li Ziming protested the policy on behalf of the Chinese merchants and businesses.
many Chinese business leaders, Li was from Shandong, and had established himself during the Russian era. Facing the currency threat, and the imminent bankruptcy of a major bank which backed many Chinese industries, Li took radical action. He organized strikes and disruptions of trade, and called for a boycott against buying and selling Japanese goods and stocks at the Dalian stock exchange.\(^{133}\) Li was eventually driven out of the Guandong Leased Territory by the Japanese authorities, at which point the Chinese Chamber of Commerce fell under the leadership of men with closer ties to the Japanese.\(^{134}\)

Chinese business leaders organized and created activities to help them remain competitive in the colonial economy. Their efforts included inspection trips to Japan and the establishment of night schools to train Chinese workers. In the summer of 1924 the Xigangzi Chamber of Commerce, in an effort to learn the latest manufacturing and management techniques, organized an inspection tour of factories in Japan. After returning from the three-week long tour, the heads of the organization set up a night school that included such topics as bookkeeping, commercial law, and Japanese language courses.\(^{135}\) Zhou Wengui, a prominent bean mill owner who had enterprises in Dalian and Harbin, likewise visited Tokyo to study modern techniques for soy oil processing.\(^{136}\) Major Chinese businesses and industries were thus willing to learn from Japan in order to survive and grow. The relatively open period of the early 1920s, characterized by the civilian-dominated colonial administration of the Guandong Leased Territory, gave Japanese business associations space to vocalize their concerns and make demands on both colonial authorities and leaders in Tokyo. Chinese merchant associations also capitalized on the relatively lax political climate organize
and establish niches of dominance for themselves within the context of Dalian’s colonial economy.

Small-scale Chinese merchants and family-owned shops and enterprises likewise found spaces to thrive. In fact, by the 1920s, they began moving into sectors that had previously been dominated by Japanese families. The economic downturn of the 1920s hit hardest those poorer Japanese residents who had come to Dalian hoping to profit from the boom years of World War I. Often times Chinese apprentices in Japanese industries went on to open their own shops, which included laundry businesses, tanneries, tailories, barbershops, cart manufacturers, print shops and restaurants, all of which had previously been run by Japanese families.\textsuperscript{137} The most successful of the smaller Chinese enterprises in Dalian were wholesalers who imported Japanese goods for distribution throughout Manchuria. They enjoyed favorable treatment to encourage the flow of Japanese products into Chinese markets.\textsuperscript{138}

From the above discussion of Chinese and Japanese businesses in Dalian, several things are apparent. First, it must be said that Japanese industries and businesses enjoyed the lion’s share of the profits and opportunities to be had in the Leased Territory. This was a colonial economy designed to extract resources, mostly soy products and coal, for export to Japan. However, we should not ignore the fact that the Japanese settler population was quite diverse, and included not only rich industrialists, well-educated SMR and colonial officials, but also industrial workers and families seeking their fortune in the boomtown economy. During the economic downturn of the 1920s, this latter group found the going rough, and as their shops closed, new one were opened by upwardly mobile Chinese residents in the city,
including those who had formerly worked as workers and apprentices in Japanese shops and industries. Thus, there were opportunities for Chinese in Dalian as well as Japanese, and the leaders of Chinese commerce and industry vocalized their concerns on several occasions, revealing that they too had a stake in the region.

Of course, not all Chinese settlers in Dalian were businessmen. Some did not intend to settle in the city at all, but rather made the short trip from Shandong on a seasonal basis. Thousands of men arrived in Dalian during the agricultural slack season. They came to work on the docks, spending long, backbreaking hours loading soybeans and beancakes onto Japanese steamers. In warmer months, many of the men had no lodging, and slept outdoors. Others were brought to the city by labor contractors and were housed in the massive worker dormitory complex run by the Fukumasa Chinese labor company (Fukumasa kakō kabushiki kaisha). Known as the Fuchang company (Fuchang gongsi) in Chinese, the company was established in 1911 by Aioi (or Asō) Yutarō, and recruited laborers from Shandong and Hebei to work the docks.¹³⁹ The housing complex built by the company was designed to keep seasonal workers separated from the city proper. The high red brick walls surrounding the compound earned it the nickname “Red house” (Hong fangzi) in Chinese. The company provided transportation to and from the compound and the docks on special tramcars, painted bright orange to separate them from regular cars. Within the walls of the facility were opium dens, an opera stage, a temple, a general store, and even a brothel. It housed upwards of 20,000 workers.¹⁴⁰

From the perspective of Dalian’s Japanese colonial authorities, the thousands of Chinese workers pouring into the city was both a source and sign of economic growth,
but their numbers also reinforced the need for the type of order and control that the SMR and colonial authorities tried to implement. On the one hand, a seemingly endless supply of cheap labor ensured maximum profitability for colonial enterprises. On the other hand, this labor supply had to be managed and carefully watched. SMR medical personnel, for example, feared that the heavy flow of Chinese workers into the city increased the risk for contagious diseases. The “Red House” workers compound represented one strategy that addressed such fears by attempting to keep Chinese laborers in a separate quarter of the city. Yet it was more than the threat of contagious disease that troubled colonial authorities. The early 1920s saw a dramatic rise in Chinese nationalism throughout urban China, where Japan’s imperialist actions in China became a major target of protests and strikes. The Guandong Leased Territory, and Dalian in particular, became a focal point in a nationwide protest to restore Chinese sovereignty over the leasehold in 1923. Moreover throughout the mid-1920s organized labor carried out numerous strikes against Japanese factory owners. That this occurred at the same time that certain critical colonial voices were emerging, particularly among Japanese laborers in the region, only heightened the concerns of the colonial authorities.

Critical Voices and Competing Narratives: Cracks in Dalian’s Colonial Foundation

As Japan’s major colonial enterprise in Manchuria, the SMR had its vision for the future of Dalian and its role in the expansion of Japanese colonialism in the region. There were, however, those who did not share the same vision. Reading data charting Dalian’s spectacular economic rise, or romantic travelogues lavishing praise on the city’s clean streets, nice hotels, and timely trains might give a contemporary observer
the impression that all was well with the project. Such a presentation obviously
masked much of what the city was built on, namely military power and control of
Chinese labor. Itō Takeo, an SMR researcher, recalled that he, like many of his
colleagues, was shocked by the exploitation of Chinese labor he witnessed when he first
arrived in Dalian. Those like Itō no doubt had high expectations for what some
observers called a city “at once the monument and the measure of Japan’s ability as a
builder of modern cities.” The scene that shocked them upon their arrival was that of
thousands of shirtless Chinese laborers carrying endless, heavy loads of soybeans and
fertilizer cakes and loading them onto Japanese steamers. “Modern” Dalian was built
on this type of exploitation, and seeing it firsthand removed any romance from
impressions of the modern port city.

Critical voices came from other places as well. As Dalian grew, it developed a
more diverse Japanese population, including artists and writers. A group of avant-garde
poets, led by Anzai Fuyue, began publishing experimental poetry in the journal “A,”
which was published in Dalian during the mid-1920s. The literary significance of the
journal lies outside the scope of the present study. However, the poets and the poetry
in the journal exhibit an important ambivalence and critical gaze toward Dalian and
Japanese colonialism. A recent study of Anzai Fuyue’s poetry and the journal “A”
makes the important point that such poetry reflects a distinct consciousness that
detached both from Japanese culture and from the experiences of the Chinese
population. It is from this position that Anzai casts his critical gaze on the colonial
city. In his poem “Dairen” [Dalian], for example, he laments the city’s lack of a
museum, likening it to a “man without lungs.” In another of his poems, he is critical
of the city’s colonial economy writing: “The city is folded up. Banks go bankrupt, the canal is turning pale.” Anzai’s poetry suggests that behind the façade of the modern, colonial city, there existed underlying problems and tensions.

The May Fourth Movement and Chinese Nationalism in Dalian

Rising Chinese nationalism was a significant threat to Japanese colonial rule in the Guandong Leased Territory. The May Fourth Movement, a period of intellectual activism which began in 1919 and lasted through the 1920s, came to Dalian via progressive intellectuals who spread their messages via a Chinese language press. Representing an attack on imperialism in general, and Japanese imperialism in particular, the May Fourth movement had the potential to seriously undermine Japanese authority in a colonial city like Dalian. Local Chinese language newspapers like the Taidong ribao, and the Manzhou bao carried coverage of major Chinese strikes and protests throughout China, introduced the history of labor movements in Russia, and carried local news about strikes and issues with colonial authorities in Dalian.

The efforts of one individual, Bo Liyu (1881-1945) stand out during this period. Bo originally hailed from Anhui province, and was active in the revolution which toppled the Qing dynasty in 1911. He arrived in Dalian in 1913, fleeing the political purges implemented by Yuan Shikai’s government in the years immediately following the revolution. Bo quickly became a major contributor to the area’s largest Chinese language newspaper, the Taidong ribao, a progressive paper run by Kaneko Setsusai. In addition to his work at the paper, Bo established the “Dalian Chinese Youth Association” (Dalian Zhonghua qingnian hui) in May 1920. This organization grew to
include over 1,000 progressive Chinese intellectuals in Dalian, and it became the focal point of May Fourth nationalism in the city. The association, under Bo’s direction, established the journal “New Culture” which was a source of news and articles written by local and national intellectuals on various political and cultural topics, serving to introduce Marxism and the Russian revolution to its Chinese readers in Dalian. Bo’s association also established schools for Chinese in an effort to boost basic literacy. Moreover, the Dalian Chinese Youth Association played an important role in supporting and disseminating information about various strikes throughout the city. Bo’s association, its journal, and Chinese language newspapers like Taidong ribao thus emerged as important Chinese voices in colonial Dalian.

The spring of 1923 was another important peak in Chinese nationalism in Dalian. According to the original treaty set up by Russia and inherited by Japan, the Guandong Leased Territory was under a twenty five year term beginning in 1898. Japan’s Twenty One Demands of 1915 extended the leasehold for 99 years. However, Chinese viewed the new treaties as illegal, and felt that 1923 should mark the date of the return of the territory. When this date was ignored, a nationwide protest occurred in major cities throughout China, and Dalian found itself, for a time, at the center of Chinese nationalist activism. Given the sensitive nature of the protest and the real potential for a crackdown by Japanese police, it is perhaps not surprising that the movement was somewhat less vigorous in Dalian itself than in other cities. Students at a Chinese school in Lushun had led, in late 1922, a boycott of Japanese goods in protest of the Twenty One Demands. The bulk of the action, however, took place outside of the Guandong Leased Territory, in cities like Beijing and Shanghai. In Beijing a
demonstration was held outside of Tiananmen Square calling for the return of the territory to China. There were also smaller demonstrations in Wuhan, Tianjin, and Harbin. Dalian, and its colonial condition, was for a time on the minds of nationalistic students and intellectuals throughout China.\textsuperscript{149}

\textit{Labor Unrest in the Colonial Metropolis}

In a city built from and dependent on Chinese labor, worker unrest posed the largest threat to colonial control, and by the mid-1920s, posed a serious threat to the SMR’s agenda. The bulk of Dalian’s Chinese population were workers, not well-traveled intellectuals like Bo. Like the semi-colonial port cities of Shanghai and Tianjin, Dalian too witnessed its share of labor unrest throughout the 1920s.\textsuperscript{150} However, unlike those places, Dalian was a city geared entirely toward serving Japan and its emerging empire. Thus it is important to view labor unrest in Dalian together with other tensions in the colonial project, including strikes among Japanese workers, and other colonialist voices critical of Japan’s aims in the area. We must also be careful with official CCP sources. Local historians and labor history specialists in Dalian are likely to highlight Chinese strikes precisely because that narrative meshes with a national history emphasizing the leadership of the early CCP. Chinese strikes and Chinese labor organizations were certainly an important feature of the landscape of this colonial city and an important means for competing with and confronting colonial authority. Yet, the CCP was never able to make significant inroads in Dalian. Thus rather than view labor activities as a tale of CCP successes and failures, it is perhaps more useful to view labor unrest in the early 1920s as a period when workers and intellectuals in Dalian saw
themselves as sharing experiences with other cities in China. Dalian’s economy and infrastructure had been set up to serve Japan, but the city’s majority Chinese residents, through shared strikes and a common language of May Fourth nationalism, began to highlight their links with places like Shanghai, which also had a large amount of industrial laborers working in foreign-owned factories.

The earliest strikes in Dalian were not nationalistic actions by Chinese workers against oppressive Japanese capitalists. Rather, the city’s first major strike wave came as workers demanded wage increases and benefits. Importantly, it was Japanese workers who set this in motion. Linked economically with Japan, the city was in tune with the spread of labor unrest there on the archipelago. In January 1918, Japanese workers at Dalian’s Kawasaki shipyard, in solidarity with their fellow Kawasaki workers in Kobe, launched a strike protesting low wages. One hundred Chinese workers joined the strike, which lasted for two days before many of the demands were met. Just a few days after the Kawazaki strike, a much larger event unfolded at the SMR’s Shahekou locomotive plant, the largest factory in Dalian, which involved over 800 Japanese workers and 1200 Chinese workers asking for a 40 percent wage increase.\textsuperscript{151} Chinese workers continued pressuring SMR bosses in the fall of 1918, when they launched a massive strike at the Shahekou plant involving over 2,000 workers. This time they shut the plant down for a week. Although their demands were met, some early Chinese labor leaders were expelled from the Guandong Leased Territory after this strike. Strikes by Japanese and Chinese laborers at major industries were certainly not part of the SMR’s plans, but were a fact of life in colonial and semi-colonial urban centers like Dalian.
Strikes increased throughout the early 1920s. Between 1919 and 1920 alone there were 73 strikes throughout the city in which over 15,000 workers participated. However, after 1920, Japanese strikes decreased dramatically due in part to a crackdown by the colonial authorities on Japanese labor leaders, many of whom were exiled from the Guandong Leased Territory for their part in organizing the strikes at the Shahekou plant. Chinese labor unrest in Dalian continued to grow throughout the 1920s, particularly after the May 30, 1925 incident in Shanghai, when police fired on a crowd of Chinese protesting the injury of Chinese workers at a Japanese mill in Shanghai. The incident sparked nation-wide protests against foreign imperialism in China, and Dalian was no exception. The stakes were high as such protests were a direct confrontation with Japanese authorities, further questioning their legitimacy. Workers and intellectuals in Dalian staged various protests throughout the city to express solidarity with those killed in Shanghai. The May 30 movement was also a chance to rekindle earlier nationalist protests against Japan’s control of the Guandong Leased Territory. In June, 1925 anti-Japanese banners appeared hanging from electric lines throughout the city, with such slogans as:

The Japanese devils are truly stupid,
they have seized our Lushun and Dalian.
On March 26, 1923 their lease was up,
but they didn’t return it. The little demons’
evil hearts have yet to become satisfied.
Hurry and wake up, China is not like Korea.

Clearly this banner represents a very potent criticism of Japanese colonialism and the message was obvious that Chinese nationalism demanded the return of “our Lushun and Dalian.”
To express their support and connection with Shanghai workers, strikers established a “Dalian Shanghai incident reinforcement brigade” (Dalian Hu an houyuan dui) in support of workers in Shanghai. Guandong colonial authorities tried to block such linkages, and objected to the use of the term “reinforcement” (houyuan), fearing that it carried overtones of resisting Japan. They wanted to limit the city’s intellectual and nationalist connections with greater China. Subsequent efforts to hold major demonstrations in Dalian were curbed by Dalian’s colonial police force. As we will see in the next chapter, by the early 1930s labor in the Guandong Leased Territory was effectively controlled by a Japanese sanctioned labor union which co-opted independent unions via its close ties with colonial authorities, thereby reducing the ability of labor organizers, including the CCP underground, to mount large strikes and protests.

Conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of the period of early colonial control over the Guandong Leased Territory and its main city of Dalian from 1895 through the early 1930s. The themes explored here, foreign military and economic domination first by Russians then by Japanese, would be a defining feature of Dalian’s history well into the 1950s. Studies of imperialism in China have focused almost exclusively on the experience of treaty port cities such as Shanghai and Tianjin, both were places where multiple Western imperialist powers impacted urban society. Shanghai in particular has received considerable attention in recent years as a major site through which to explore issues of colonial modernity in a Chinese city.
Dalian certainly shared some features with cities like Shanghai and Tianjin. It was a leased territory, captured by warfare and gunboat diplomacy, similar to many of the treaty ports. International firms and ships representing various imperialist powers were encouraged to trade there. The most striking difference between Dalian and treaty ports like Shanghai or Tianjin, was that Japanese military and political dominance of the Guandong Leased Territory was total, giving Japanese colonial planners free rein to pursue their visions of modern urban order without competition for space and control with other foreign powers. Dalian was, in effect, a total colonial space, different from the semi-colonial, or “hypercolonial” conditions in cities like Shanghai and Tianjin. Dalian was not a city broken into concession zones, and Japanese policed and governed sections of the city with dense Chinese populations. Thus, the city was an exhibition of Japanese imperialism in a place and on a scale unmatched in other parts of China.

With the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932 and the spread of war throughout North China in the late 1930s, Dalian’s role shifted. Military concerns took precedence over the export trade that had been Dalian’s lifeblood, and the city was reoriented to serve an empire at war. We can thus see in Dalian how the totalistic program of the wartime mobilization of human and industrial resources operated in this setting. How would these changes affect city dwellers, both Chinese and Japanese alike? In Dalian, like Taiwan and Korea, Japanese control had been established for decades. Was the project to control and develop its industries and mobilize its population similar to experiences in those other colonial spaces? To begin to answer these questions and see the ways in which the city was impacted by Japanese wartime imperialism, we must first chart out the changes in the governing structure of the Leased Territory, of which
Dalian was the central part. The next chapter examines such changes, along with how the founding of the Manchukuo regime, Japan’s invasion of China, and Pacific War impacted the city’s economic development.


9 Ibid.


study of the event and how it was reported see Inoue Haruki (Piao Longgen translator), *Lüshun datusha* (The Lüshun massacre) (Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 2001).


16 It is important to note that the Guandong Leased Territory, at least on paper, was not a formal colony/annexed territory such as Korea and Taiwan, nor was it formally integrated as part of Manchukuo after 1932. Japanese authorities maintained that it was a leased territory, and as such, would eventually be returned to China.

17 Ibid., 61.


22 DGS, 127.

23 Quoted in Wolff, To the Harbin Station, 64.

24 Yano Tarō, Roji jidai ni o keru Kantō shū, 204.


27 DGS, 108-111.

28 Inoue Kenzaburo, ed., Dairen-shi shi, 162-166.

29 Ibid., 172-177.

30 DGS, 114.


33 Inoue Kenzaburo, ed., Dairen-shi shi, 650-651.

34 Tarō, Roji jidai ni o keru Kantō shū, 220-221. Russian population figures cited in this work divide the population at this time into those living “inside” (shi nei) the city, and those “outside” (shi wai). The figure for those living “inside” the city is 26,439, while the total population including outlying areas is given as 41,260.


36 Quested, “Matey” Imperialists, 111-112. Quested notes that, for example, there were no decent hotels in the city, one of the few existing inns was run by an alcoholic, and there was no train station, trains merely stopped in an open space.

37 Ibid.

38 DJBNS, 221.
39 Liaoning shifan xueyuan zhengzhi xi lishi jiaoyan shi, ed., Sha E qinzhan Lüda de qin nian, 32.

40 Ibid., 48-49.

41 Changchun tielu fenju gongren lilun zu, Jilin daxue lishixi, ed., Sha E yu Lüda zujiedi (Imperial Russia and the Lüda leased territory) (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1978), 33-35.

42 Quested, “Matey” Imperialists, 109.

43 Ibid., 134. See also, DJBNS, 213.

44 Inoue Kenzaburo, ed., Dairen-shi shi, 123.

45 DJBNS, 274-275.

46 John V.A. MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 522-527.


48 Inoue Kenzaburo, ed., Dairen-shi shi, 15-16.

49 Konishio, Y., Port of Dairen, 35.

50 DGS, 170.

51 Ibid., 652-653.

52 DJBNS, 827-828.

53 DGS, 139.


55 Quested, “Matey” Imperialists, 135. See also DJBNS, 371-372.

56 Wang Xizhi, Han Xingfang, ed. Diguozhuyi qinliüe Dalian shi congshu: Dalian jin bainian shi wenxian (Collected documents of the imperialist invasion of Dalian:
historical documents on the recent hundred-year history of Dalian) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1999), 288.

57 DJBNS, 1518-1520.

58 Inoue Kenzaburo, ed., Dairen-shi shi, 300.

59 Koshizawa Akira, Shokumin chi Manshū no toshi keikaku, 53.

60 Inoue Kenzaburo, ed., Dairen-shi shi, 652-653. See also, DJBNS, 1515-1516.

61 Ibid., 655. See also Robert J. Perrins, “Great Connections,” 101-104.


64 DJBNS, 1522-1523.


66 Ibid., 143-150.


69 DJBNS, 839-841.


71 Matsusaka’s work illuminates the “four-headed” structure of authority in the Guandong Leased Territory: the Guandong government, the Foreign Ministry in Japan, the SMR, and the military. Importantly, he notes that, while there existed some political quarrelling prior to the 1920s, for the most part the vision of the colonial project was

Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932, 74-75, 105-107. Matsusaka notes that the Japanese military anticipated using the SMR lines to rapidly deploy troops and military supplies in Northern Manchuria. The SMRC’s costly efforts to use heavy-gauge track and double-tracked lines served the military’s needs for heavy, rapid troop transport.


The term “Taishō democracy” has been used to describe prewar Japanese politics and society which saw various groups of people, from intellectuals to laborers, take active roles in government either through political parties or through organized labor and strikes. The name refers to the reign of the Taishō emperor (1912-1925). Andrew Gordon favors the term “imperial democracy” to capture the phenomenon, which he sees as beginning in 1905 and ending in 1932. See Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 5-7.


Kantō kyoku, ed., Kantō kyoku shisei sanjūnen shi (A thirty year history of the Guandong Administration), 1080.

An in-depth exploration of the SMR’s activities in Manchuria in general, and Dalian in particular from 1907 through the 1930s lies outside the scope of this project. However, a brief summary of the political, economic, and cultural activities of the company reveals the crucial role it played in defining and developing Dalian through the mid-1930s, thus shedding important light on the nature of Japanese colonialism here


83 Ibid., 107.


Kinney, Modern Manchuria and the South Manchuria Railway Company, 44. See also Adachi, Manchuria: A Survey, 137.


Ibid., 135. See also Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 259-260.


Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushikigaisha shomubu chōsaka, ed, Dairen-kō haigochi no kenkyū (Research on the hinterland of the port of Dalian) (Dairen: Manshū nichī nichī shinbun, 1924), 16.


The British council there estimated that in 1899, some 20,000 junks were engaged in the bean trade in Yingkou. See Adachi, Manchuria: A Survey, 78-79, 242.


Shinozhi Yoshiro, *Dairen* (Dalian) (Dairen: Osakayago shoto, 1921), 802-803.


Ibid., 138.

Ibid., 132.

Shinozhi Yoshiro, *Dairen* (Dalian), 802-803.


Shinozhi Yoshiro, *Dairen* (Dalian), 812-813.

Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushikigaisha shomubu chōsaka, ed, *Dairen-kō haigochi no kenkyū*, 297. See also Shinozhi Yoshiro, *Dairen* (Dalian), 847-849.

*DJBNS*, 851-852.


Shinozhi Yoshiro, *Dairen* (Dalian), 945.

*DJBNS*, 869.


*DJBNS*, 916-918.

*DJBNS*, 1028-1029.

Shinozhi Yoshiro, *Dairen* (Dalian), 949-950.


125 DJBNS, 873.


127 Ibid., 2-4.

128 DJBNS, 999.


131 DJBNS, 985.

132 Fu Liyu, ed. Dalian yaolan (Handbook of Dalian) (Dalian: Taidong ribao, 1918), 78-82.


134 DJBNS, 967.

135 Ibid., 973.

Yanagisawa Asobu, Nihonjin no shokuminchi keiken: Dairen Nihonjin shōkōgyōsha no rekishi, 168-172.

DJBNS, 1002.

Ibid., 693-694.

Ibid., 693-700.


For a detailed analysis of the literary importance of “A” and its contributors, see Toshiko Ellis, “The Topography of Dalian and the Cartography of Fantastic Asia in Anzai Fuyue’s Poetry,” Comparative Literature Studies 41:4 (November 2004):

Ibid., 482.

Ibid., 487.

Ibid., 489.

DJBNS, 1564-1568.


152 Ibid., 97-98.

153 Ibid., 110-111.

154 Ibid., 172.

155 Ibid., 160-164.


158 This term is Rogaski’s. See Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China*. 
By the late 1920s, Dalian was a growing port city, the SMR’s model metropolis, and the center of Japanese economic and political activity in China. SMR planners looked out from their headquarters in Dalian to behold one of the most modern cities in China. Economically, their railway empire and investments made the port the busiest in the region. Cheap labor flowed into the city in the form of thousands of Chinese seasonal workers who worked tirelessly on the docks, loading and unloading goods to and from Japanese ships, and constructing roads, buildings, and houses. A small industrial establishment existed, particularly the SMR’s locomotive factory, but the port remained the heart of the city’s economic activity. SMR trains carried agricultural products from the Manchurian hinterland straight to the dock warehouses. Light industry, much of it in Chinese hands, handled the processing of Manchuria’s agricultural goods, namely soybeans and soy products.

All of this began to change in 1931-1932. On 18 September 1931, the Guandong Army, garrisoned in Dalian and Lüshun, launched an invasion of the Northeast and established the puppet state of Manchukuo. Suddenly, Dalian was no longer alone as the political and economic capital of the Japanese empire in Manchuria. The shift of human and material resources to Manchukuo, and the outbreak of total war in China (1937) and the Pacific (1941) resulted in a fundamental reshaping of the city’s
economic function. From an export port it became an import center and manufacturing base. Before war needs forced such a reorientation, tensions flared in the mid-1930s between those who desired to maintain Dalian’s dominant economic position, and the Guandong Army, which began to pour resources into the utopian mold of the new “nation.” The days of the SMR’s “Dalian strategy” and the privileged trading system that had built Dalian into a major port city were numbered.

The present chapter focuses on the effects of Japan’s militaristic expansion on Dalian, the political and economic center of the Guandong Leased Territory. How was Dalian’s status as the center of Japanese economic and political activity in Manchuria transformed at this time? Why was there so much effort expended to move toward industrial development in a city whose lifeblood and primary function had been as an export center of agricultural goods? What did the demands of a state fighting a total war mean for this project?

In attempting to answer these questions, this chapter begins with an overview and analysis of the shifting political status of Dalian, and its changing relationship with the new Manchukuo regime. A subsequent section provides an outline of the city’s economic development through 1944, focusing on the rise of its heavy industrial core, the changing nature of the port, and the implementation of a wartime rationing system for consumer goods. A third section examines the opportunities for local Chinese residents that came along with rapid industrial development, a theme that will be developed further in Chapter 3. A final section examines the impact of war on the economy and political system in Dalian. Wartime development funneled all available
resources and labor into production, setting in motion a pattern that continued in the post-1945 period.

Tensions within the Empire: Manchukuo, Japan, and Dalian’s Shifting Political Status

With the founding of Manchukuo in March 1932, the political status of the Guandong Leased Territory, of which Dalian was the central city, became uncertain. The Leased Territory was neither a formally annexed colony of Japan like Taiwan and Korea, nor was it ever fully annexed by Manchukuo, a fact which has led one scholar to coin the term “contractual formal imperialism” to describe its status. This is indeed one of the characteristics of Japanese imperialism, and indeed of most modern imperialisms, which maintained simultaneously different forms of colonial administration and control throughout its diverse empire. In the Northeast, several different forms of imperialist rule now bordered one another—the formally annexed colonial territory of Korea, the Guandong Leased Territory (sovereignty over which was “leased” from China), and Manchukuo, established as an independent nation but ruled by the Japanese military.

Viewed in a certain light, such administrative differences may seem trivial. That Japanese military and economic interests were firmly in power is not in question. Many differences in the administration of the Guandong Leased Territory and Manchukuo were only skin deep, beneath which the true power was held by the Guandong Army. However, the anomalous status of the Leased Territory did create tensions among colonial elites, particularly between Manchukuo bureaucrats, those in the Guandong government, and the SMR, which impacted both how these different groups of colonial
elites viewed their roles within the empire, and how they governed the Chinese population in these respective locations.

At stake for colonial powers in Dalian was the city’s identity as a free port and as the SMR’s premier city in the region. As we shall see below, local business interests in Dalian drew battle lines with the Guandong Army. After 1932, the political and economic center of gravity of the region moved northward from Dalian and the Leased Territory to the new state of Manchukuo. The Guandong Army moved its headquarters that year to Shenyang, and would eventually settle in the new capital, Xinjing (Changchun), a city planned and built on a scale which rivaled and exceeded Dalian. Once again, the shifting geography of power within Manchuria would force new definitions on Dalian.

In the brief period of Russian control (1897-1905), the tensions between military and economic interests common to imperialism played themselves out in the development of the naval port of Lüshun at the expense of Dalian’s commercial port. As we have seen in the previous chapter, from 1905 through the early 1930s Japanese capitalists led by the SMR cemented the status of Dalian and its port as the center of Japan’s Manchurian interests. Lüshun, on the other hand, “has been allowed to sink into semi-obscurity, wholly overshadowed by its neighboring city of Dairen, a strictly commercial port.” Now, after two plus decades of growth spurred by the SMR’s railway empire and port, questions about Dalian’s future swirled about in the local press. What would Dalian’s relationship be with the new regime in Manchukuo?

The administrative shifts in the Leased Territory also reflected the Guandong Army’s extension of control at the expense of the SMR. A central issue in this political
wrangling involved the extent to which the SMR and Dalian would continue its dominance over Manchurian trade. Through 1930, Dalian absorbed 87.6 percent of Japanese capital investments in the region, and Dalian was home to 728 of the 1180 Japanese corporations in Manchuria. The port, sizable warehouses, and the largest industrial establishments were run by the SMR. However, after 1932, with the founding of Manchukuo, the economic center of the region shifted to Fengtian (Shenyang).

The period from 1932 through 1934, when the Guandong Army reorganized the governance structure of the Leasehold, was an uneasy one for those with an interest in maintaining the status-quo in the Leased Territory. A notable Japanese author and resident of Dalian, Saitō Mitsuhirō wrote a provocative article in the Dalian Shibao newspaper, asking “who are the people residing abroad in Guandong?” He continued, “now that Guandong is considered an extension of Japanese territory, for those Han people living here, whether consciously or not, we already consider them citizens of Manchukuo (Manzhouguoren).”

Saitō Mitsuhirō’s fears hinged on the administrative uncertainty of the Guandong Leased Territory. He continued, “We should set up a principle of putting Japanese first, otherwise, it will be like it has been in the past, where Han people are the original inhabitants and we Japanese are the people residing abroad. In the Guandong Leased Territory we must establish a system where we Japanese are the principal residents, and Han are the visitors.” From Saitō’s statements we can see the tensions surrounding Dalian’s, and indeed the entire Leased Territory’s uncertain position and role in the expanding empire. It may have been “considered” an extension of Japan, but
a tenuous one, why else would a prominent Japanese writer be urging for clarity.

Saitō’s fears were likely stoked by Manchukuo.

After 1932, the Governor of the Leased Territory was a Guandong Army officer, not a civilian, first Field-Marshal Nobuyoshi Muto, then General Takashi Hishikari.\(^9\) This was the first attempt to combine the offices of Commander in Chief of the Guandong Army, Governor of the Guandong Leased Territory, and Ambassador to Manchukuo, thereby consolidating three of the four main Japanese powerbrokers in Manchuria, the fourth being the SMR.\(^10\) In 1934, the civilian Guandong Government (Kantō chō), which had been the seat of Japanese power prior to Manchukuo, was brought under greater army control through the establishment of a new Guandong Bureau (Kantō kyoku).\(^11\) Located in Xinjing, this new administrative body was headed by a Guandong Army appointee, who “supervised all administrative affairs in the Leased Territory, the administration of the SMR Railway Zone, and the business of the SMR.”\(^12\) In this move, both the Guandong bureaucracy and the powerful SMR came under Guandong army control. Under the new Guandong Bureau, a Guandong District Government (Kantōshū chō) was established in Lushun to handle local affairs in the leased territory.\(^13\) The seat of this government was transferred to Dalian in May 1937.\(^14\) However, the district government merely implemented orders from the Guandong Bureau in Xinjing.

The next significant change occurred in November-December 1937, when the Railway Zone, a narrow strip of land running north from the border of the Leased Territories to Changchun, (along the SMR line) which had been developed by the SMR, and ruled by the Guandong government from 1905, was transferred to Manchukuo.\(^15\)
With this move, Japanese extraterritoriality was abolished in the Railway Zone. This was yet another significant step in curbing the powers of the SMR and the Guandong civilian bureaucrats. Consular officials and Guandong Bureau police, judicial officers, Guandong Bureau postal employees, tax officials and SMR employees, a total of close to 10,000 people who had worked in the SMR zone were “lost” to the company and the Guandong Bureau in the transfer of management to Manchukuo. Most importantly, the removal of extraterritoriality and incorporation of the territory into Manchukuo closed the duty free corridor that business interests in Dalian had enjoyed.

As for the Leased Territory itself, it was not formally annexed by Manchukuo at this time, nor was it ever. The transfer of the SMR Railway Zone and abolition of Japanese extraterritoriality did, however, lead to the assumption that the leasehold would eventually be incorporated into Manchukuo. An article in the SMR publication Contemporary Manchuria had this to say in 1939: “the abolition of Japanese extraterritoriality, and the transfer of administrative rights in the SMR Zone at the end of 1937 are particularly interpreted as steps taken towards eventual abrogation of all special privileges enjoyed by Japan in Manchuria, and infer (emphasis my own) the restoration of the Kwantung Territory to Manchoukuo.” The November 5 1937 treaty between Manchukuo and Japan states specifically in Article Two, that “the Government of Japan shall, in accordance with the stipulations of the supplementary agreement to the present treaty, transfer to the Government of Manchukuo the administrative rights of the South Manchuria Railway Zone.” Importantly, it does not mention the status of the Leased Territory.
Statements made by Prince Konoye after the treaty agreement inferred that the next step might be to abolish, not simply transfer the administrative rights of the Zone. The SMR publication noted that such move would then call into question the status of the Guandong Leased Territory, “If the principle underlying the retrocession of the lease rights were to be carried out to the fullest extent, there would arise the necessity of re-examining the status of the Kwantung Leased Territory.” The piece continues, “It is only natural to assume that friction with Manchoukuo’s administrative policy would occur if the Territory is placed under a separate administration as an extension of Japan proper as at present, and if no measures are devised to readjust the situation.” In fact, the Guandong Leased Territory remained a leasehold, with clear lines of demarcation separating it from Manchukuo on maps. It would remain a territorially distinct feature of the region until 1950, at which time it was incorporated to the geo-body of the Chinese nation. Moreover, as we shall see shortly, the anomalous status of the 1930s and 1940s did indeed lead to friction between the administration and businesses of the Guandong Leased Territory, and the Guandong Army in Manchukuo.

Recent studies of Japanese imperialism have started to address important differences throughout the diverse Japanese empire. Manchuria represented opportunity not simply to Japanese, but to ethnic Koreans and Taiwanese, who as imperial subjects enjoyed a more privileged position. For Chinese residents of the Guandong Leased Territory however, it was not until late in the Pacific War that a more definitive policy was established, one that promised imperial citizenship. We will see in Chapter 3 how this affected local society, particularly the majority Chinese population of Dalian. For the present chapter it is important to note that, as late as 1939, critical voices among
Japanese elites can be found expressing a host of complaints ranging from the subservient role of the Guandong Leased Territory in the Guandong Army’s industrialization programs, to confusion about its legal system. A pamphlet on Dalian published in 1939, for example, lamented that a hodgepodge of Manchukuo, Chinese, and Guandong administration laws created great confusion. The Guandong Leased Territory was thus a unique part of the Japanese empire, whose political status was not easily brought into the fold until after 1937. Even then, tensions remained.

In terms of economic and industrial development, the Leased Territory’s status was clearer. Despite not being officially a part of Manchukuo, Dalian was nonetheless heavily influenced by the Guandong Army’s industrial development plans for the region. Manchukuo’s first five-year plan of economic and industrial development (1937-1941) included Dalian’s industries, which after 1937, were increasingly integrated with larger regional economic structures. One publication proclaimed that the Leased Territory, “located as it is between Japan, Manchukuo and China, occupies a special and important position politically and economically, and serves as a medium in the formation of the Japan-Manchoukuo economic bloc.” After 1941, virtually every publication dealing with Dalian and the Leased Territory discusses its important role in Japanese-controlled Asia. However, the Greater Co-Prosperity sphere was always a vague conceptualization, in which Dalian seemed to occupy some sort of middle space, in between major points. In the regional imagination of Japanese empire, Dalian was portrayed as a node between the East Asian capitals Tokyo, Xinjing (Changchun), Beijing, and Nanjing.
Industrializing the Colonial Port: Manchukuo and Dalian, 1932-1937

Studies of Japan’s empire in Manchuria reveal that, in addition to representing a new phase of imperial expansion and new forms of governance in terms of the creation of what Prasenjit Duara has called “the East Asian modern,” Manchukuo also reveals one of the unique features of Japanese imperialism in terms of industrial development. In Manchukuo, like in Korea, Japan implemented a blueprint for a modern industrial base designed to be a production center serving the expanding empire. This developmental scheme represents a significant break with the patterns common to European imperialism, where the colony simply provided food and raw materials to the metropole. Rather, Manchukuo was a radical experiment, designed to be a self-sufficient part of the empire, able to consume its own resources for industrial development, and feed its population with its agricultural goods. Larger companies from Japan, Nissan in particular, migrated to Manchukuo to form the Manchuria Industrial Development Company (Mangyō). Mitsubishi and Mitsui also invested heavily in chemicals and machine factories.

In Dalian, Manchukuo’s industrialization project fundamentally transformed the economic function of the port and led to the construction of new factories in the city. As we shall see in chapter three, along with this shift arose an increasingly industrial workforce and new strategies to control labor and increase production. A new industrial zone was developed and incorporated into the city, which became a major chemical and manufacturing base. To understand the economic development of Dalian after 1932, it is useful to break our examination into two separate but interrelated periods. The first period, from 1932-1941, witnessed an increasing reorientation to serve the
industrializing agenda of the Manchukuo regime and the war in China. In the second period, 1941-1945, Dalian was drawn into Japan’s total war, and its economy and society were mobilized to serve the expanding war effort in Asia and the Pacific. This period was characterized by increased draconian control of imports and exports, the end of free markets, and increasingly severe rationing of food.

The Manchukuo Boom: 1932-1937

Spurred by the founding of Manchukuo, Dalian and its economy grew dramatically through 1937. Historians of the economic development of Manchuria consider the 1932-1937 period a time of preparation for the centralized planning that followed, Manchukuo’s five year development plan, with its emphasis on heavy industries. In many ways, this was the most dynamic period of economic development in Dalian and the Leased Territory, a period which saw new port construction, a shift in the function of the port toward imports, and the development of an industrial production base. The early thirties also witnessed steady growth of commercialism throughout the Leased Territory, as Chinese and Japanese alike cashed in on the rush to build Manchukuo. The number of factories employing five or more employees stood at 487 in 1932, and reached 1,021 by 1937. The labor force increased 250 percent. Dalian was the center of industry and commerce in the Leased Territory, and 78 percent of the factories there were located in the city, whose factories absorbed 90 percent of investments. Moreover, despite the push to develop industries in Manchukuo, as late as 1936 Dalian and the Leased Territory still accounted for close to 60 percent of the region’s production, 470 million yen compared to 335 million for
Manchukuo. Dalian had by the mid-1930s, 454 factories, while Xinjing (Changchun) had 156 and Fengtian (Shenyang) had 114.

Before the 1930s, Dalian had never been a significant industrial or production center. The bulk of its industry was in SMR hands, namely the SMR locomotive manufacturing and repair facilities. However, with the Guandong Army prioritizing large-scale industrial development after 1932, the SMR and other companies were encouraged to invest in new factories. There were, however, serious constraints to the development of large-scale industrial enterprises in Dalian. Dalian lacked large expanses of flat land, ready access to water demanded by industry, and needed more electricity generating facilities.

The first step in building an industrial base in the city involved finding space. In this respect, Dalian was at a significant disadvantage compared to Shenyang. Much of the city’s flattest land had been developed during the soy boom years of World War I. The only available land suitable for industrial development was an area northwest of Dalian, between the old town of Jinzhou and Shahekou district. It had the added advantage of proximity to the northern section of Dalian bay. This area, known as Ganjingzi district, became the core of industrial Dalian. To fuel these industries, water and electricity were crucial. Between 1927 and 1937, four major reservoirs were constructed to increase the city’s water supply, particularly for industrial use. A major new power plant provided power for the new district’s industries, particularly the chemical plant.

By 1935, Ganjingzi was home to several major chemical plants, an oil refinery, and steel processing and machine tool factories, and as we shall see shortly, continued
to be the main center of industrial growth during the wartime period. In the chemical sector, the Manchuria Chemical Industry Company (Manshū kagaku kōgyō kabushiki kaisha), established in 1933, was one of the largest in the region. The SMR had a 52 percent stake in the company, with Mitsui and Mitsubishi also investing heavily. The company built its main factory in Ganjingzi, and produced ammonium nitrate for export as chemical fertilizers to Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. By the wartime period, explosives were also manufactured here, in addition to sulphuric acid, and ammonium-based chemicals and chemical products. Much of the company’s equipment was purchased from German firms, and was the most advanced equipment available. By the early 1940s, the company employed 2500 workers, with an additional 13,000 part time laborers. Chemical manufacturing was, by 1942, the most valuable of all of Dalian’s modern industries, accounting for 40 percent of the city’s production by value.

Machine tools and metals were another leading sector of the growing industrial economy. These factories produced electrical and communications equipment, and even heavy equipment for mining operations. “Special steel” and galvanized steel were produced, as were rivets and bearings, nickel chrome, and tungsten, all essential wartime industries. There were also automobile parts, bicycle, and shipbuilding facilities in Dalian. The oil refinery was capable of producing 5,000 tons per month, 30 percent of which was gasoline, 20 percent kerosene, and 20 percent machine oil.

One important feature of the industrial system forged in Dalian during the wartime period was that, contrary to the hopes of the Guandong army, it was not an independent production base. For example, trains, cars, and bicycles were not fully manufactured in the city. Rather, component parts were built in Dalian for export to
other finishing centers, or vice versa. Dalian, and all of the Leased Territory, remained
dependent on flows of raw materials and labor from outside its boundaries. Often,
factories lacked machine tool shops to repair the specialized equipment used in the
manufacturing process, relying instead on suppliers in Japan. Most enterprises thus did
have a complete cycle of production, meaning they did not build and finish a given
product all in one enterprise.\textsuperscript{40} We will see in subsequent chapters how this affected the
post-1945 rebuilding of the city under a socialist system, heavily influenced by the
Soviet Union.

Throughout the 1930s, Dalian’s port was reoriented to deal with the city’s
industrial growth. Port facilities were built and expanded in Ganjingzi to accommodate
the burgeoning chemical and oil refining industry that was established there.\textsuperscript{41} These
were specialized wharfs, equipped with loading technologies allowing large ships to
unload raw materials, and load finished industrial products for shipment to Japan and
greater China.

To fuel the construction boom in Manchukuo and the Leased Territory, imports
of construction materials, tools, lumber, and military supplies began pouring into
Dalian’s port. Dalian’s stake in the export of Manchurian goods grew to 76 percent in
1936, an all time high. Clearly, Dalian remained the most important port in the
region.\textsuperscript{42} In 1932, for example, exports rose 65 percent above their levels in 1930.
However, a fundamental transformation of the function of the port was underway.
Dalian was longer envisioned as simply an agricultural export port. It was now viewed
as the critical entry point for goods and materials on their way to Manchukuo.
Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, exports continued to grow, but by 1933 imports
climbed 65 percent from 1930 to 1933 (Figure 2.1). Imports continued to rise through 1937, fuelled by construction and military demands in Manchukuo. For example, lumber imports grew six fold from 1935 to 1939, and imports of metals, machine tools, and motor vehicles tripled at this time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>632.5</td>
<td>543.9</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>735.4</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>866.8</td>
<td>720.3</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>146.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>975.0</td>
<td>742.5</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>232.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1073.4</td>
<td>766.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>307.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>970.5</td>
<td>680.1</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>290.4</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>952.3</td>
<td>638.6</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>313.7</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1032.4</td>
<td>647.2</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>385.2</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DJBNS, 843, 863. Unit: 10,000 Tons

In terms of total value of goods moved through the port, after 1933, imports exceeded exports by a wide margin (figure 2.2). Agricultural products remained the primary main exports. The number of ships calling at the port of Dalian increased from 4500 in 1932, to 5600 in 1936. Importantly, the SMR never intended the port to handle a high volume of imports. The “Dalian strategy” discussed in the previous chapter was based on control of agricultural markets, and the development of the transportation sector to speedily move goods to the port of Dalian. As we shall see below, by the early 1940s, the port had surpassed its handling capacity, setting off a series of crises where dwindling labor and lack of equipment led to significant backlogs.
Table 2.2: Value of Imports and Exports Through the Port of Dalian 1930-1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>280,313,000</td>
<td>371,367,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>221,518,000</td>
<td>440,809,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>269,970,000</td>
<td>423,049,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>389,231,000</td>
<td>337,544,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>449,246,000</td>
<td>335,182,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>464,375,000</td>
<td>315,370,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>526,201,000</td>
<td>442,698,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Unit: yen)


Another feature of Dalian’s port was the increasing monopolization of the trade by Japan. Foreign companies complained that, after 1932, Japanese companies and traders began using the customs system, now in Japanese hands, to press their advantages. From the perspective of U.S. and British companies, the “open door” in Manchuria was swinging shut. They complained that the duty on their kerosene was higher than for Japanese firms, who exploited their new control over the customs at Dalian by classifying Japanese kerosene under a different category, thereby avoiding heftier customs fees.47 Other foreign firms complained that “it is next to impossible to trade directly with Chinese or foreign firms located within that territory, as the Japanese are able to obtain lower freight-rates and customs duties.”48
Illicit Opportunities: Smuggling, Opium, and Morphine Production

Dalian, with its port and its position on the border of various parts of the Japanese empire, was also home to an illicit economy fuelled by rampant smuggling and drug production. Like Hong Kong, the Guandong Leased Territory’s coastline provided many opportunities for smugglers to load and unload cargos with minimal interference. Smuggling activity soared in the years after 1931, in part because the customs system at the port was in chaos. One contemporary publication noted, “Another significant development in the Manchurian situation is the fact that Dalian, since the Japanese occupation, has become probably the largest smuggling center in the world. The illicit traffic includes flour, sugar, oil, cotton goods, not to mention the narcotics business.”

Part of the agreement signed between Japan and China granting the latter control of the Leased Territory included a stipulation that a Chinese customs house be established in Dalian. The highly efficient China Maritime Customs had oversight of the Dalian customs house until the founding of Manchukuo, at which time it was taken over completely by Japanese officials. F.C. Jones, in his early work on the history of Manchuria, noted, that with the Manchukuo takeover of the customs house, “the efficiency of the service was gravely impaired, despite the appointment by Manchukuo of a number of Japanese customs officials. A great increase in smuggling took place across the boundary of the Guandong Leased Territory.”

Moreover, the customs system itself encouraged smuggling because goods in transit through Dalian into Manchukuo had to pay import duty, while those imported for use or consumption in the Leased Territory were free of fees. Prior to the absorption of the Railway Zone into Manchukuo, it too enjoyed this exempt status and was thus a
major smuggling route into Manchuria. Local products, like salt, were also a commonly smuggled item. In the summer of 1934, a major incident was uncovered which revealed the extent of smuggling along the railway. A major smuggling operation was uncovered at the SMR station in Wafangdian, the second major stop on the SMR line outside of the Guandong Leased Territory, involving not only station employees, but also the Railway Zone police controlled by the Guandong government. The incident revealed the extent to which the Guandong authorities allowed such smuggling, and exposed rifts with the Manchukuo authorities. The rationing and price fixing system of the early 1940s further encouraged smuggling. Local Chinese with the means and the money used junks to smuggle goods purchased in Tianjin and Shanghai, paid off Japanese officials to allow them to unload and sell goods at 20 to 30 times the prices set by Japanese authorities.

Recent studies by Japanese scholars have begun to reveal the extent to which opium revenues were vital to Japanese sponsored regimes in Manchukuo and in the lower Yangzi region. The Guandong Leased Territory was no exception. Yamada Gōichi’s recent study makes the important point that the biggest conflicts between the Guandong bureaucrats and the Manchukuo authorities surrounded opium, specifically control of the markets in Manchuria and North China.

However, Dalian was not simply a transit point for opium. It was also a major center for the production of heroin. Technicians from Qingdao arrived in Dalian in 1933 and began manufacturing heroin. Ether, an important ingredient used in the production of heroin, was obtained in large quantities from the SMR’s medicine factory in the Xigang district. An entire distribution system was in place using the railway
and postal system in the Guandong Leased territory and Railway Zone to send packages to distributors up the rail line. Viewed in this light, the elimination of the Guandong government’s control of this area by the military can be seen as a move to consolidate its control of the opium market, a huge source of revenue for Manchukuo authorities.

The Dalian Chamber of Commerce

The Japanese business community in Dalian was an organized, politically active entity in the decades before the 1930s, and had confronted the Guandong authorities when they felt their interests threatened. Their Dalian Chamber of Commerce was established in 1915, and by the late 1930s, had over 1200 members. It was after the founding of Manchukuo that the Chamber of Commerce faced its greatest challenge, and saw a steady erosion of their privileges at the hands of the military. Despite the economic growth described above, priorities had shifted decidedly northward. Fengtian (Shenyang) was to become the main industrial city of the region. It had ample space to grow, and was linked via railroad to the major coal mines and steel plants. Statistics reveal this shift. The number of new industries established in Manchukuo from 1931 through 1939 numbered over 100, while in the Guandong Leased Territory only eight.

The Dalian Chamber of Commerce did not sit passively through this transition. In their publications, they openly lamented and questioned the subordinate status of Dalian and the Leased Territory in Manchukuo’s five year development plan (1937-1941). They complained that the Leased Territory was ignored, and its industrial growth stagnant compared to Manchukuo. Members pinned the blame on Manchukuo’s planned economy, which, they argued, exerted pressure on Guandong, siphoning off labor and material resources. With its political power weakened, they,
argued, the Guandong government was unable to implement its own plans for economic development.  

The Dalian Chamber of Commerce also actively resisted incorporation into Manchukuo. Fearing that the loss of extraterritoriality would take away their advantages, leading members crafted and sent a letter to the Japanese government in protest of the transfer of the Railway Zone away from the Guandong Leased Territory. At the core of their grievance was the fear that the elimination of the Railway Zone would cripple the economy, leaving the Leased Territory severed from its strip of influence running into the heart of the new Manchukuo regime. The Guandong Army’s response to such action was to send in its own corps of spies to Dalian, reigning in open dissent among Japanese businessmen. 

Commercial Opportunities of an Expanding Empire

Dalian, and indeed all of the Guandong Leased Territory experienced rapid population growth after 1932. That year, the population of the city was 285,000, and by 1935, the census reported 514,000 residents, including 145,000 Japanese and 368,000 Chinese. Chinese and Japanese alike began flocking to the city in the hopes of finding work, while others only stopped over on their way northward to the cities of Manchukuo. Among the Japanese community, jobseekers were so plentiful that dorms and hotels were overflowing. The Japanese military expansion into Manchuria breathed new life into many businesses in Dalian which had been suffering due to the global depression of the late 1920s early 1930s.
While there were new opportunities in cities throughout Manchukuo, commercial activity in Dalian also increased, particularly due to the boom in imports. The population growth itself brought commercial expansion, as did urban development. In the new industrial district of Ganjingzi, for example, Chinese businesses far outnumbered Japanese. In fact, the bulk of Japanese businesses remained in the central core of Dalian, the oldest section of the city. Chinese businesses were concentrated most heavily in the predominantly Chinese sections of Dalian, namely the Xiaogangzi district. However, by the 1930s, with the expansion of the city limits first to Shahekou, then to Ganjingzi district, opportunities to open or expand Chinese enterprises in those areas grew. By 1941, 18 percent of the city’s businesses were in Ganjingzi, with 1,795 Chinese establishments and 140 Japanese. In Xiaogangzi, the heart of the Chinese business community, there were 3,600 Chinese firms and 350 Japanese. It is important to note that available sources do not give a clear picture about the size of these businesses or the amount of capital invested. However, it is clear that through 1941, there was a considerable amount of businesses run by Chinese interests. Over 60 percent of wholesalers and general stores were in Chinese hands, as were 52 percent of the hotels and restaurants, and 68 percent of the credit guarantor shops. Chinese continued to dominate the soybean oil manufacturing industry, with 31 factories in operation in 1935, compared with only six Japanese. In terms of the metal industry, including finishing and refining of metal goods and raw materials, Chinese operated 243 establishments compared to 43 Japanese firms. By 1936, the number of Chinese individuals engaged in commerce reached 47,528, up from 37,911 in 1933.
Business surveys conducted in 1941 reveal the continued expansion of commercial enterprises through the early years of the war. In fact, these surveys reveal Chinese businesses and industries gaining ground against their Japanese counterparts (figures 2.3 and 2.4). As we shall see below, this was likely due to the continued prioritization of Japanese heavy industries, leaving space in smaller industries and commerce for Chinese entrepreneurs. Once again, we must keep in mind that Japanese firms dominated in terms of capital and size, however, the data proves valuable for revealing that Dalian’s economy was not entirely dominated by Japanese interests, and afforded opportunities for Chinese.

### Table 2.3: Chinese and Japanese Commercial Enterprises: 1938, 1941

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<th>Ganjingzi</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>1938</td>
<td>2410</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1520</td>
<td>2505</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>849</td>
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</table>

Table 2.4: Chinese and Japanese Industrial Enterprises: 1938, 1941

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Downtown</th>
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<th>Ganjingzi</th>
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<td><strong>Japanese</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Dalian’s Wartime Economy 1937-1945

Although never a frontline city, Dalian paid the price for Japan’s war in Asia and the Pacific. The economic and social costs were high. Increasingly strict rationing and restrictions on imports and exports fuelled rampant smuggling and black marketeering. Forced to compete and share the labor and material resources even more than in the early years of Manchukuo’s growth, it became increasingly difficult for authorities on the ground in Dalian to fuel the city’s industries and feed its population in the frenzied conditions of total war. The once mighty port saw its import and export levels steadily decrease after 1940, plummeting by the end of the war. In the final days of the war, the city began feeding on itself, devouring the very features of colonial modernity that had put it on the map. The tramlines that crisscrossed the city were ripped from the ground, and electric lampposts were toppled, all to be melted for their steel.
However, before the system ground itself apart during the final days of the Pacific War, a significant transformation of the city and its function had taken place, which was to greatly impact the city’s future definition. We have seen in the previous sections how, with the founding of Manchukuo, Dalian’s economic system shifted and grew in new ways. The wartime needs of the empire, coupled with the Guandong Army’s radical vision of Manchukuo, dictated a shift to full-blown industrial development, and the port city of Dalian was to be no exception. As Dalian was reoriented to serve the increasing demands of the Guandong Army in Manchukuo and occupied China, army planners continued to prioritize heavy industries at the expense of other types of development. The final burst of industrialization through the mid-1940s was based on a tightly controlled economic system, which featured forced collectivization of smaller-scale industries, state-control of commodities and food markets, and increasingly draconian control over labor and society. Great power over labor and the economy was concentrated in the hands of the state in an effort to maximize the productive capacity of an entire city, a pattern we will see replicated in a strikingly similar fashion in Dalian’s post-1945 socialist transformation.

**Containing the SMR**

The SMR was a major part of Dalian’s identity as an international city. The company’s imprint was felt everywhere in the city, from its Romanesque headquarters, to the port, hospitals, libraries, hotels and research facilities, one could not go far in Dalian without seeing the SMR’s insignia. Its high-speed train, the “Asia” express, linked the city with the booming metropolises in Manchukuo. Western observers
tended to lavish praise on the company, whose “civilizing” mission and empire building struck a familiar chord to their own imperialist projects. Throughout the 1920s, the SMR presented itself as a gatekeeper of the “open door” in Manchuria, encouraging investments through advertising its mission in publications in the United States. Among the Japanese community, the “Mantetsu man,” like the “salary man” in Osaka or Tokyo, stood as an archetype of colonial society, a proud feature of Dalian’s urban colonial modernity.

As the center of what had been Japan’s “informal” empire, it is easy to portray the SMR after 1937 as falling victim to the military. Indeed, as we shall see below, the Guandong Army did its part to limit and eventually dismantle much of the company. However, it is important to note that the SMR played a major role in the movement of troops and supplies from Dalian into the Manchurian heartland during the Guandong Army’s invasion, moving over 190,000 tons of military supplies from September 18, 1931 through March 1932. Afterward, the company contributed vast amounts of financial capital to the Manchukuo regime. Most of the SMR interests in Dalian were established before the war in 1937, including its shipping facilities, locomotive repair and production facilities, tramcars, a natural gas company, and a labor recruitment and management agency.

During the war, the SMR’s industries, which by 1938 numbered close to 80, were taken over by Manchukuo, and brought in line with its 5-year industrial plan. The Guandong army had long wanted to break the diverse company into its component parts to better control it. After 1936, the SMR was primarily responsible for the management and construction of new railways in Manchuria, no small task given that over 2500
miles of new track had been built between 1931 and 1939.70 The SMR also served as a major research and information-gathering center in the form of its research branch.71 The research bureau was a haven for left-wing scholars and researchers and its members were easy prey for ideological crackdowns. In the final years of the war, dozens of researchers were arrested and imprisoned.72 Thus, by the late 1930s, the SMR, had seen its governing powers and economic diversity steadily eroded, and by the 1940s, many of its top employees were either in jail, or struggling to make do in an environment of uncertainty and war.

The Wartime Port

Dalian’s port continued to experience rapid growth through 1939. That year witnessed an all time high in terms of tonnage of goods moving through the port (figure 2.2). More than 7,000 ships arrived in the port that year. However, the port facilities were increasingly unable to handle volume at such a high level. After 1937, significant backlogs in warehouses threatened to clog the entire system. The military requisitioned one third of the ports berths, warehouses, and storage facilities and began imposing restrictions on rail transport, which contributed to the backup. It was not uncommon at this time for ships to spend long periods at anchor outside of the harbor awaiting a chance to berth. In 1938, over 1,000 ships had to wait outside the harbor over a nine-month period.73 As we shall see below, a labor crisis also compounded this situation.

After 1939, the port experienced a decline as dramatic as its rise. In 1942, only 4600 ships called on the port. Civilian boats of all sizes were increasingly requisitioned for military use, and by 1943 less than 4,000 ships arrived at the port.74 Many private
vessels, trading ships and even fishing boats were taken for military use.\textsuperscript{75} Moreover, with Japan’s inability to protect shipping from U.S. attacks in the Pacific, the number of ships actually reaching the port declined, and the once mighty port began sputtering to a halt.

**Table 2.5: Goods Exported and Imported through Dalian, 1938-1944**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1044.1</td>
<td>610.9</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>433.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1070.4</td>
<td>536.6</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>533.8</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>817.4</td>
<td>379.2</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>438.2</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>718.0</td>
<td>352.3</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>365.7</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>623.3</td>
<td>319.3</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>304.0</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>377.0</td>
<td>185.6</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>192.3</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>232.4</td>
<td>113.7</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>118.7</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *DJBNS*, 863. \hspace{1cm} Unit: 10,000 Tons

The Guandong Leased Territory Development Plan

The need for efficiency and productivity as demanded by the wartime state led to the creation, in 1938, of an integrated development plan for the whole of the Leased Territory (Kantōshū shū keikaku). The plan was designed to maximize the area’s productive capacity, noting, “every foot of land should be utilized and developed according to its adaptability so as to materialize its mission fully.”\textsuperscript{76} It was an unprecedented effort to link city and countryside in a unified production plan. Prior to this, development of the Leased Territory had always been broken down into urban and rural components. Now, the area as a whole was integrated into a single industrial and defense zone. Military planning took center stage in this development plan. Under the plan, land was taken over and distributed to crucial wartime industries, while such critical infrastructure as roads and airstrips were constructed.\textsuperscript{77}
Military needs dictated a strong push to investigate and calculate conditions in a host of planning arenas. For example, detailed statistics were compiled for land use in order to get a clearer picture of which areas in the Leased Territories had room to grow. This was part of “rational” planning for the establishment of industries. In terms of urban-rural connections, greater integration, according to the plan, would help smooth the flow of food to the cities. While the Guandong Leased Territory’s agricultural land was too small for the territory to become completely self-sufficient, the plan hoped to minimize the need to import certain kinds of food, particularly vegetables. Insuring an adequate food supply to urban areas was critical because the Guandong Leased Territory’s urbanization rate grew dramatically. In 1925, for example, 40 percent of households resided in urban areas. By 1942, the percentages had flipped, and 60 percent of the population were city-dwellers.\textsuperscript{78}

The Economics of Militarization: Rationing and Market Restrictions

By the 1940s, the need for increased industrial production took top priority in Manchukuo and in Dalian, particularly in those industries deemed critical for war production. Conditions of total war led the military to view Dalian’s economic situation in new ways. In 1943, the city’s major industries were classified into three ranks, the largest, most crucial war industries—chemicals, metals, machine tools, electricity, ship-building, were given top ranking, which ensured them a more steady supply of raw materials and power.\textsuperscript{79} Those industries had experienced massive production growth through 1941. If the 1932 production levels are taken as 100, by 1941 metal manufacturing and processing reached 2,159 and machine tools 1,044.\textsuperscript{80} New factories
were also being built as quickly as possible in the Leased Territory. Between 1937 and 1943, 800 new factories (those with at least five employees) were established. 

Maintaining such high levels of production proved to be extremely difficult after 1941, as supplies and raw materials were stretched thin. In order to keep production flowing, the military began to completely control all resources in Dalian, prioritizing the flow of necessary raw materials, water, electricity and even food to critical industries. In 1938 regulations were in effect to control electricity use in shops and homes. All other small industries and handicraft manufacturers, those with less than 50,000 yen in capital or under 20 employees, were organized by industry and collectivized into groups of six. This was part of the “rationalization” (gōrika) of production and trade. Energy and resources were conserved by merging small industries together. This rhetoric of conservation, and rationalization grew during the wartime years. Even commercial establishments selling luxury goods were encouraged to organize their employees in the most efficient, rational way possible, and to rationalize and conserve electricity as much as possible.

We have seen that through 1941 businesses in Dalian continued to grow. After 1941, local economic conditions worsened considerably. With Japan’s entry into the Pacific War the need for increased production, labor, raw materials, and food rose to new heights. In order to keep the wartime economy running, and ensure supplies reached where they were needed most, the military began tightening and eventually completely controlling almost all economic activities. Beginning in April 1940, trade restrictions were put in effect which essentially banned free trade by restricting the
import and export of many commodities. A year later prices of commodities and daily use goods were likewise strictly controlled. With this move, Guandong traders and businesses were effectively sealed off from their trade patterns as the flow of goods was severely restricted and all available resources were to be put toward the war effort. Dalian’s economy was brought into closer coordination and integration with Manchukuo. In January 1942, the Manchukuo-Guandong Trading Association (ManKan bōeki rengōkai) was established, which was a centralized entity regulating the trade in daily use commodities. It oversaw the organization of commercial enterprises and shops into collectivized receiving and distribution fronts for the military’s rationing scheme. By 1943, most shops and businesses that traded in clothing, shoes, medicine, all foodstuffs, tea, and paper had been collectivized into various tōsei kumiai.

These businesses, and indeed all enterprises which traded or produced items for consumption, were highly regulated, their wares handed over to the association, which then pooled all resources for distribution. Rationing activities siphoned off scarce resources, including electricity, and channeled them to heavy industry and the military. Food rationing began as early as 1939, and by 1940 was widespread in Manchukuo. The rhetoric of racial harmony, which was prevalent in Manchukuo, could not hide the fact that, under strict rationing, those privileged by race and class received more food to feed their families. Japanese and Koreans received rice, while Chinese received sorghum and millet.

Beginning in 1941, strict food rationing was in effect in Dalian and the Guandong Leased Territory. Food and daily commodities were obtained with tickets,
which were distributed by neighborhood heads or public service teams (hōkōban), part of mandatory citywide labor campaigns of the wartime period.\textsuperscript{88} Japanese city residents were to receive 24 jin (12 kilograms) of grain per adult per month, while Chinese residents received 19.5 jin (9.75 kilograms).\textsuperscript{89}

The ranking of industries, broken down into three classes, also affected food rations. There were 20 factories that received the top classification, a list which included such heavy industries and manufacturing enterprises in Dalian as shipbuilding factories, chemical plants, machine tool factories, the SMR railway factory, and the port authority. Those industries classified in the second rank numbered 31, and included soybean oil factories, transport and communications, and public utilities. There were also 37 establishments ranked third, mostly food processing industries and smaller chemical plants.\textsuperscript{90} In an effort to ensure the labor supply in these critical industries, particularly the top ranks, workers actually saw their rations increased in 1943.\textsuperscript{91} Thus, workers at the prioritized industrial units, Chinese and Japanese alike, enjoyed slightly larger rations than those employed in other sectors of the economy. A Japanese worker received close to 29 jin (14.5 kilograms) and Chinese 23 jin (11.5 kilograms).\textsuperscript{92} We will see in Chapter five, that these figures are actually higher than rations provided in Sino-Soviet factories in Dalian after 1945. After 1943, however, authorities distributed food on a weekly basis, reflecting the growing precariousness and instability of the food supply. For Chinese workers and their families, meals consisted mostly of corn, sorghum, and noodles.\textsuperscript{93}

In the next chapter, we will see how, despite dwindling resources and tighter rationing, the wartime state continued to press for production increases, carrying its
message to the masses through labor campaigns and a growing discourse about production in the press. This too represents a major change in terms of the way the state structured and created a discourse about production that pervaded all levels of society. Chapter Three examines the social impact of the shift toward industrialization and wartime growth of the city and its industries.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the ways in which the city of Dalian and its surrounding territory was reoriented from one form of colonial development to another. The SMR-based export economy drove the city’s economy through the early 1930s. Chinese and Japanese alike seized what opportunities they could in such a system, and Chinese business community grew up around the soy-processing industry. The militarization and total war of 1937-1945 radically restructured the city’s economy. Industrialization, rationalization, and tight control of markets and resources, part of the military’s centralized planning for Manchukuo, characterized economic life in wartime Dalian. Thus, by the early 1940s, in addition to an increasingly industrialized economy, the state, with its price controls, rationing and market restrictions, had also extended itself into society at unprecedented levels.

Recent scholarship on the colonial experience in Korea and Taiwan has begun to reexamine the legacies of the wartime period. There is no doubt that war development left its scars on colonial society. The next chapter examines in detail the exploitative and coercive labor practices that became commonplace in the final years of the war. However, total war is not simply a tale of destruction. Work by Carter Eckert and
Bruce Cummings on colonial Korea, for example, sheds light on how a modern industrial core was established under the Japanese wartime regime, which became a crucial part of the postwar economic growth in Korea.\textsuperscript{94} Much of what Eckert notes about Korea’s industrialization during the wartime period holds true for Dalian; a workforce that had been urbanized and trained for the modern industrial sector, which was built up rapidly to serve as a production base for the expanding regional conflict. His work also pays significant attention to the social impact of rapid economic change and industrialization forged by the wartime Japanese state. Bruce Cummings likewise finds many elements of the Japanese wartime project surviving and even thriving in postwar Korea and Taiwan, features of what he refers to as a “bureaucratic–authoritarian industrializing regime.” Cummings contrasts the developmental, industrializing model of colonial development prominent in Korea and Taiwan with French colonialism in Vietnam, which he sees as “colonialism without development.”\textsuperscript{95}

These studies and more recent work on Manchuria attempt to move beyond nationalistic histories, which tend to ignore the transformative effects of wartime development, and sees only collaboration, resistance, and victimization.\textsuperscript{96} Of course, these were indeed elements of the social fabric under Japanese rule. However, we cannot ignore the fact that in Dalian the very industries and patterns of heavy state control over resources and labor set up by a militarized state at war set the stage for building an urban socialism that shared many of these features. This is not to argue simply that Japanese colonialism was somehow a positive force for modernization. Rather, we should see wartime development under the Japanese in the context of similar efforts carried out simultaneously by wartime states like the Nationalists, who likewise
strove for state control of industry, and totalistic mobilization of people and resources, as it attempted to build a new industrial core in remote inland areas.

How, then, did Japan’s wartime development project impact society in Dalian? This will be the subject of the next chapter. Duara’s study of Manchukuo is a significant move beyond previous studies, which focus solely on economic development. His concept of the “East Asian modern” involves, among other things, pinpointing elements of colonial governmentality—how power operated in the social and cultural realm. What did this look like in Dalian, a space located as it was, in between Manchukuo, Korea, and Japan? Were there differences here? The next chapter examines such questions, looking specifically at changing labor practices, colonial education, entertainment, and life in the Chinese community during this time.


6 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 251-252.

7 DJBNS, 423. The quote is taken from a May 1, 1933 article in the journal Dairen Jipō.
8 Ibid.


24 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 241-306.


30 Liu Shiqi, ed., Lüda dīlì (Geography of Lüda) (Xin zhishi chubanshe, 1958), 43, and DJBNS, 1029.


35 *DJBNS*, 1107-1108. See also Dalian dianyeju bian., *Dalian dianye bainian huiyilue* (Recollections of one hundred years of Dalian’s electricity industry) (Changchun: Xinhua chubanshe, 1990), 3.

36 *DJBNS*, 1089-1090.

37 Ibid.


41 *DGS*, 189-190. See also “Kōgyō kō toshite no Dairen kō no shōraisei” (The future of Dalian as an industrial port) in *Tōa shōgyō keizai* vol 3 no.5 (May 1939): 1-20.

42 *DGS*, 186.


46 *DGS*, 204.


48 Ibid.


56 DJBNS, 884.


58 “NichiManShi keizai burokku to kantōshū no kögyō” (Japan-Manchuria-China block and Guandong industry) in Tōa shōgyō keizai vol 3 no.3 (March 1939): 19-21.

59 “Kantōshū no kigyōrikī kyōka no mondai” (The problem of strengthening commercialization in the Guandong Leased Territory) in Tōa shōgyō keizai vol. 3 no. 8 (August 1939): 5.


66 Dairen minsei sho, Dairen minsei sanjūnen kinen shi (Commemorating 31 years of Dairen’s civil government) (Dairen: Toppan insatsu kabushiki kaisha, 1938), 96-97.

67 ESDGYS, 301-302.


69 DJBNS, 505.


75 *DJBNS*, 861.


77 Kantōshū keizaikai, ed., *Kantōshū keizai nenpō* (Guandong Leased Territory Economic Yearbook) (Dairen: Kantōshū keizaikai, 1944), 263.


79 Kantōshū keizaikai, ed., *Kantōshū keizai nenpō* (Guandong Leased Territory Economic Yearbook) (Dairen: Kantōshū keizaikai, 1944), 98.


81 Lüda gaishu bianji weiyuan hui, ed. *Lüda gaishu* (A brief account of Lüda) (Lüda: Lüda gaishu bianji weiyuan hui yinxing, 1949), 44.

82 *DJBNS*, 526.


84 *DJBNS*, 960-961.


89 DJBNS, 535.


91 Dalian shizhi bangonshi, ed., Dalian shizhi laodong zhi (Dalian labor gazetteer) (Dalian: Dalian renmin chubanshe, 1999) 21.

92 Liu Gongcheng, Dalian gongren yundong shi (A history of the labor movement in Dalian) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1989), 271.

93 Su Chongmin, Mantie shi (A history of the South Manchuria Railway) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990), 592-593.


We have seen in the previous chapter how Japan’s militaristic expansion fundamentally transformed the nature of Dalian’s economy, changing its function from an export-driven trading port to an import center and military industrial base. The present chapter explores how this transformation affected Dalian’s urban development from the mid 1930s through 1945. It seeks to shed light on where and how shifts in Dalian’s role and definition within the empire affected local society, including state-society interactions, urban culture, and everyday life in the city. How did the mobilization of the city’s human and material resources for total war affect peoples lives here? What did it mean for the identity of the city?

Through the early 1930s, Dalian had pulsed with the beat of treaty-port capitalism, and railroad-based colonial development, dominated by Japanese firms and spurred on by the development projects of the SMR. American and British interests also operated in the city, as did thousands of Chinese traders and industrialists. The soybean trade was the lifeblood that fuelled the city’s development into one of the most modern urban spaces in East Asia, rivaling Shanghai. Streetcars brimming with people crisscrossed much of the city. Shopkeepers, businesses large and small, and trading firms took advantage of the free port and enjoyed low customs duties on imported items. Dalian was also home to one of the largest, most comprehensive hospitals in the Northeast. Fine hotels had been built to house international businessmen and tourists. A modern cosmopolitan culture also thrived here. Movie theaters, playhouses, high-line department stores, and a bustling shopping district were all features of urban cultural
consumption. A general reader on the city, written for a Japanese audience, praised its cosmopolitan status by using sugar consumption as a barometer of culture, noting that Dalian’s per-capita sugar consumption (among Japanese) was higher than in Japan, although still far lower than Britain. The city was also home to the darker yet no less recognizable side of colonial urban modernity.

Behind the sheen of Japanese progress, celebrated by Japanese bureaucrats and Western travelers, were hundreds of thousands of Chinese residents, whose labor, commercial activity, and cultural activities were also a major feature of the city. Some of them, like the shipping magnate Zhang Benzheng, grew wealthy under the Japanese, and became leading representatives of the Chinese community, while at the same time being deeply enmeshed in the colonial project, serving as heads of state-sponsored charities and redemptive societies. A Chinese merchant association, Shandong native place associations, and religious organizations provided a sense of community among Chinese residents, separate from Japanese visions of the city. In shantytowns, and factory dormitories, migrant laborers from nearby Shandong, whose inexpensive labor fuelled Dalian’s port and construction trades, lived far from the epicenters of colonial modernity in the downtown core, revealing patterns of exploitation and segregation common in colonial settings.

In his groundbreaking work on Manchukuo, Prasenjit Duara notes that “the wider effects of Manchukuo’s massive industrialization, urbanization, and modernization—perhaps more massive than elsewhere in Asia during the period—have barely been probed.” While Dalian’s links to Manchukuo were not always clear, the present chapter takes up Duara’s call to explore the social ramifications of Japan’s
modernizing project. Here, the wartime period is equally important. The wartime state mobilized resources and labor in order to continue building the material components of the city’s urban modernity, while forging greater control over society. It was during the wartime period that the people of Dalian, Japanese and Chinese alike, were thrust into new relationships with an expanding state that was becoming deeply ingrained in society in ways it had not before. This included the increasing control of labor, restrictions on movement of individuals and their families, the militarization of society through forced labor and military preparedness drills, and a heavier police presence and surveillance in neighborhoods and workplaces throughout the city. Military rule brought censorship and a heightened police presence to all city residents. New laws criminalized certain economic and political behavior, creating new categories like “economic” and “political” crime. Yet, at the same time, the state was also promising greater inclusion for certain groups through registration and educational policies aimed at turning Chinese residents into subjects of the empire.

This chapter begins by examining three experiences and definitions of wartime Dalian: the city as a Japanese place, as a colonial/imperial place, and a Chinese place. These are not, of course, rigid categories. Japan’s colonial system involved various attempts to incorporate Chinese within the hierarchy of imperial subjects. This in turn affected how segments of the Chinese population experienced and contributed to the city. Likewise, although the Japanese population was quite large, and was firmly in power here for decades, the majority Chinese population of Dalian, whose challenges to Japanese authority, exploitation at the hands of Japanese capitalist and military interests, and competition with Japanese businesses, never made it easy for Japanese authorities
and Japanese residents to define the city as Japanese. Even among those most responsible for Dalian’s colonial development, the SMR planners and researchers, there was uneasiness each time they went to the docks and saw the exhausted Chinese laborers. The chapter then examines the composition and mobilization of the wartime labor force, the nature of the wartime state’s control of labor, and where it failed. Importantly, we will see that key patterns were established at this time which continued to influence the city well after Japan’s defeat in 1945.

Defining Wartime Dalian

With the founding of Manchukuo, we have seen that there arose questions about Dalian’s definition and role in the expanding empire. In some ways, the war that spread through China, Asia, and the Pacific from 1937 through 1945 clarified these questions, or rendered them irrelevant. The industrialization, production, militarization, and mobilization experienced in Dalian was common to all urban areas under Japanese rule. Yet the tremendous growth of the city and its economy during the wartime period led to new questions about what the city was, and where it was headed. Dalian’s population, both Chinese and Japanese, rose significantly at this time, totaling over 800,000 by the end of the war. The Japanese population grew rapidly, and surpassed 200,000 by the Pacific War. To what extent was it a Japanese city? Dalian was also home to close to 600,000 Chinese by the end of the war. In what ways was the city Chinese? If Manchukuo was envisioned as a melting pot, with utopian cities, symbolized by its new utopian capital Xinjing (Changchun), how was Dalian, a city whose rise to power followed the familiar script of European imperialist expansion of railroad and port
mastery, resource control, and cheap Chinese labor, to be conceptualized in the expanding Japanese empire?

These are crucial questions because, in charting out the different experiences of Chinese and Japanese city dwellers, and seeing where and how people interacted, and where they did not, we can better see the tensions, collaboration, and conflict inherent in the colonial city. Moreover, such an examination highlights the fact that the Japanese regime, and the socialist system which followed, had to grapple with issues of how to claim and contain the city, either within the geo-body of an empire, a socialist bloc, or a nation-state. To what extent did city dwellers influence this process by either accepting or resisting the legitimacy-building efforts of those in power? What identities did people create and/or maintain for themselves outside of state control in wartime Dalian?

Making Dalian Japanese

During the first few years of the wartime period, Japanese planners continued to add to the city’s definition as a highly modern urban center. The invasion of North China spurred the development of a new train station, along with a new government district, featuring a large square, surrounded on three sides by a massive new headquarters for the Guandong government and new buildings housing courts and police.\(^3\) Phone services in Dalian expanded rapidly during the wartime period, from 12,000 subscribers in 1935, to over 20,000 in 1941, 5,000 of which were Chinese businesses. Dalian was, in fact, home to the first dial telephone service on the Asian continent.\(^4\) In 1937, there were just over 21,000 radios in the city. By 1941, there were upwards of 60,000. The largest increase was among Chinese residents, who owned
1,400 radios in 1937, and 21,000 by 1941.\(^5\) Tourism continued to thrive well into the wartime period. The number of annual hotel patrons in Dalian jumped from 54,000 in 1934 to 116,000 in 1939.\(^6\) Plans were carried out after 1937 to expand Naniwa street, downtown Dalian’s modern shopping district, dominated by high-line Japanese stores. Naniwa was a stark contrast to the cramped commercial streets in the Chinese section of the city. Its broad promenade was strung with thousands of electric lights, creating quite a spectacle in the evening hours. Modern storefronts lined the streets, selling Western and Japanese goods. A Mitsukoshi department store, one of the most luxurious chains in Japan, opened there in 1937.\(^7\)

As we saw in Chapter One, Japanese urban plans for Dalian’s development followed Russian blueprints, which called for a city segmented into districts separated by function and by race.\(^8\) For the most part, Chinese and Japanese residents lived in segregated neighborhoods. However, these were not hardened political boundaries like those found in international quarters of treaty-port cities like Shanghai. Wealthy Chinese did in fact live in villas alongside Japanese, whose homes were spread throughout several areas. There were western-style homes and hillside villas in the hills to the south of downtown. Running southwest from the downtown core, a large residential district for Japanese featured parallel-running tree-lined boulevards lined with row houses, home to many SMR employees and their families. Houses featured natural gas for cooking, and had running water and electricity.

There were over 200,000 Japanese residents calling Dalian home by the final years of the war. Japanese certainly dominated most aspects of city life, and by the late 1930s-early 1940s, a new generation of Dalian-born Japanese was graduating from high
schools and technical schools. In her memoirs, Kazuko Kuramoto, who was born and raised in Dalian until 1945, recalls the air of confidence that she and other Dalian-born Japanese possessed at times about their identity, and about the city’s identity as a leading part of Japan. She wrote, “the Japanese of my generation, who had been born in Dairen, grew up taking the Japanese supremacy for granted and were totally unaware of the hardships and true feelings of others around us. To us, to me, Dairen was Japan—not an extension of Japan, but the representation of its power, the symbol of its international supremacy.”

Yet, for Kuramoto and others, there was always an uncertainty, a tension inherent in their claims that Dalian was a Japanese space. Dalian was very much Japan’s showcase city in the region, eclipsed in utopian, modern planning only by the new capital of Manchukuo, Xinjing (Changchun). However, until the “imperialization” (kōminka) movement of the wartime period, which promised certain Chinese residents status as subjects of the empire, Dalian existed as two cities, with two different experiences. We will see shortly that the Chinese experience was quite diverse, and that a certain segment of Chinese were not simply passive victims of colonialism, nor were they the heroic nationalists of the sort lauded by PRC scholarship. Even with the wartime rhetoric of imperialization, however, we see evidence that in schools, for example, Japanese children still held racist views of their Chinese classmates, and of Chinese people in general. From the perspective of Japanese authorities, where and when the two cities, the two experiences, came together was often viewed as a social “problem” or, for many Japanese residents, as pangs of guilt.
We will explore the changing colonial policies toward Chinese in the following section. As for colonial guilt, Kuramoto, a nursing student, reveals this most vividly in her recollection of seeing her first autopsy performed at the medical college. The body was that of a Chinese laborer who had died in an accident. Her feelings of both racial prejudice and guilt rose to the surface while staring at the body, which, she noted, “probably had never been as clean as this while he lived.” She continued, “The upper part of the body was deeply tanned, while the lower part, from the waist down, was ghastly pale. It told this dead man’s life story, that he had labored half naked all his life under the dry, harsh Manchurian sun.”

This image, this reality, began to haunt Kuramoto and others of her generation, as the myth of unity between Chinese and Japanese unraveled.

Starting with the population boom in the 1920s, there had been considerable public discourse in Japanese journals about the problems associated with mixed residency, with Chinese and Japanese living side by side. While these articles noted with some pride that Dalian was an “international city,” the authors quickly turned their attention to the cultural differences between Chinese and Japanese, and how this impacted daily life. According to one author, Ishikawa Tetsuo, while it was part of the city’s cosmopolitan character to have mixed commercial streets, it became more problematic with mixed residency, where cultural differences and hygiene were “issues.” Ishikawa found mixed streetcars, for example, to be too much to handle, particularly when he had to sit with Chinese laborers. As the city grew, it became unrealistic to expect that there would be completely segregated neighborhoods throughout the entire city. The streets that bordered Xigang, a predominantly Chinese
neighborhood, were mixed neighborhoods, with Chinese and Japanese living side by side. Chang Weihua’s family, his father a merchant, arrived in Dalian from Beijing and lived in one such neighborhood. Chang recalls that it was very uncommon for Chinese and Japanese children to play together in most neighborhoods, except in the mixed areas, where contact was inevitable. He remembers speaking a mixture of Chinese and Japanese with children in the neighborhood.13

With the intensification of the war, Dalian’s Japanese community, as it was in Japan and throughout the empire, found itself living in a city increasingly militarized under the fascist policies of the Guandong Army. Just as imperial rhetoric about unity among Asian races increased throughout the war, the reality on the ground was increasing segregation. Tramcars were now segregated, as were schools (with some exceptions, as there were a number of Chinese allowed to attend Japanese schools), shopping districts, and residential areas. Most Chinese children raised in Dalian from the mid-1930s onward seldom stepped foot in a Japanese neighborhood. On those occasions when they did, it could easily be a traumatic experience. Zhou Wulu, the son of Zhou Wengui, the prominent Chinese businessman, recalls his first trip to a Japanese neighborhood. Japanese children taunted him with racial epithets. At first, he did not understand the terms, but could tell by the acrimony of the children shouting at him that he was being insulted.14 Japanese children seldom played with Chinese.

The war reached deep into everyday life for Dalian’s Japanese residents. Japanese men and women registered for labor service, participated in thrift and savings campaigns, rationalized their consumption of daily goods and resources, and took part in air raid drills.15 Businessmen, bankers, bureaucrats and even bus drivers now wore
“national clothes” (*kokumin huku*), rather than western-style suits. Kuramoto remembers that “the father I remembered had always worn a suit and tie, but now he wore khaki clothing closely resembling a military uniform.” People likewise found themselves bombarded with rhetoric linking Dalian and the Leased Territory not just to Manchukuo and Japan, but also to the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere. In the previous chapter, we saw that Dalian’s economic function shifted with the war to become a manufacturing base within this larger conceptualization of empire. Along with that shift came a new ideology of labor, which linked ones job to the state through patriotic loyalty to a degree it had never before. By the final years of the war, there was little time for people to complain about racially integrated housing, or about sitting next to Chinese laborers on tramcars, as more and more Japanese residents found themselves putting in days of hard labor for the war effort through the mandatory labor service laws.

There were, by the wartime period, very concrete markers of Japanese culture and hegemony in Dalian, which were sharpened as the war intensified. Dalian’s main Shinto shrine occupied a commanding position at the base of a hill overlooking the city. Japanese residents, students, and bureaucrats in particular, began to spend more time at the shrine, attending mandatory, monthly events. Beginning in 1939, students were expected to visit the shrine on the first day of each month to pay respects for the war dead and show support for Japan’s campaign in Asia. This changed to the eighth of each month to commemorate the attack on Pearl Harbor and the widening of the war. As we shall see below, Chinese students also participated in these shrine visits, as part of an attempt to broaden their inclusion in the wartime empire at the very moment it began to grind itself apart.
The Colonial City and its Identities

Dalian through the 1930s had been Japan’s colonial jewel in China. It was the center of Japan’s colonial expansion efforts, the headquarters of the SMR, a hygienic city with a modern hospital, a massive port. It was a colonial space different from many other cities in China. Its colonial society shared more with Hong Kong than Shanghai and other treaty port cities. Like Hong Kong, it had a large colonizer population, but also a massive Chinese population, with established, well-traversed cultural and economic links to Chinese territory, in this case, Shandong. It was designed, from its inception, as a colonial urban space to showcase the best Japanese interpretations of global urban planning. Architecturally, few outstanding buildings linked it to China or Japan.

Dalian had no wall, no ancient temples to serve as points of interest for tourists, or as definitive markers and centers of Chinese culture. What Chinese buildings existed, like Ji Fengtai’s opera house, were relatively recent constructions by those who had grown wealthy through the imperialist system, first under the Russians, then the Japanese. The SMR developed in Dalian a modern tourism industry based not on ancient relics but on beaches, hot springs, and commemorative battlefields reminding Japanese tourists of their glorious victory over the Russians. In this sense, Dalian was different from the other older cities along the SMR railway, places like Shenyang. There, Japanese travel guides used orientalist imagery to package and define the Chinese section of the city as an ancient land. SMR travel advertisements proclaimed, “Beneath a towered gateway leading out through the great brick wall that surrounds the Old Town you’ll find a busy money-changer behind his tiny table. Oriental splendor
and amazing scenes crowd the hu-tung, or streets, of Mukden.”  Another played with the contrast between the “old” Chinese part of town, and the “new” Japanese zone, “Divided into an old and a new city, the tourist meets Oriental scenes and modern accommodations found only in this paradoxical country.”

Dalian could not be so neatly orientalized in this way. There was no old city, and the Chinese that lived within it were not easily separated or contained physically and conceptually by an older walled city. Dalian had its Chinese districts, the bustling Xigang neighborhood the largest among them. However, Xigang was more like a Chinatown that one might see in a U.S. city. Guidebooks and postcards used pictures of Xigang’s cramped, crowded streets filled with Chinese peddlers and hawkers to contrast with the Japanese shopping districts. Dalian had little in common with the pattern of colonial development seen in places like Shenyang, where an “old” Chinese city was separated from a “new” city. Nor did it share many features of the utopian architecture featured in Manchukuo’s new capital city, an attempt to blend Chinese, Japanese, and European styles. Much of its built environment had a European flavor, constructed during the soy-driven boom years before the 1930s. Architecturally, Dalian was a colonial space unlike most cities in China.

Such differences were felt in less concrete ways as well. We saw earlier that Japanese residents like Kazuko Kuramoto possessed a certain confidence about Dalian as a Japanese space. Yet, Kuramoto also felt there was something different about her identity as someone from Dalian. She felt this most strongly when she was around Japanese girls at school who were born and raised in Japan. She noticed that not only did her hairstyle and clothing differ, but so did her mannerisms and attitude as well.
She noted “we were more casual and out-spoken, not easily intimidated, while still keeping our respectful distance, and while the sophomore girls spoke Kyushu dialect, we spoke Japanese without an accent simply because no local dialect existed in colonial Dairen.”

A racial hierarchy characterized colonial society in Dalian. Japanese, regardless of class, were on top, and enjoyed the best housing, education for their children, and high-paying jobs. The Korean population, although never sizable, also enjoyed a privileged status as Japanese subjects. The large Chinese population had its own hierarchy as well. At the top were Taiwanese, who like Koreans, were thought of as loyal subjects. Most Taiwanese in Dalian came to attend technical schools, and were often trained as doctors. Next were those classified as “Kantōshū jin” (People from Guandong), who were registered permanent residents of the Guandong Leased Territory. Below them was the vague term “Manshū jin” (Manchurians), referring to people who came from the Northeast. At the bottom were Chinese migrants, the vast majority of whom were from rural Shandong, and often referred to as “hai nan ren” (people from the southern sea) or simply “Shandong ren” (Shandong people). This system, as we will examine below, was not codified into hardened legal categories until the outbreak of the Pacific war. In most statistical compilations and census data, Japanese authorities typically divided the population into three categories: Japanese, Korea, and “Man-Shi jin” short for “Manshu jin” (Manchurians) and the pejorative “Shina jin” (Chinese).

Until the wartime period, there had been considerable confusion among colonial bureaucrats in Dalian and the Leased Territory about how best to classify the Chinese population. Much of this can be attributed, as we saw in Chapter Two, to the unique
political status of the Guandong Leased Territory, particularly prior to the founding of Manchukuo. While many bureaucrats saw the extension of Japanese laws in Guandong as beneficial, others wondered what it would mean for the Chinese population. Were they to become subjects of the Japanese empire like Taiwanese and Koreans? If not, were they to be treated like “foreigners” (*gaikokujin*)?\(^{24}\) Through the 1920s and 1930s, the status of most of Dalian’s Chinese population was somewhere in between, and often depended on one’s economic status.

By the early 1940s, Japanese authorities established a more definitive registration policy for the Guandong Leased Territory. The new registration laws of 1942 divided the Chinese population into two categories. Those whose family registry was now in Guandong were granted “registered” (*minseki*) status. Everyone else, including those who wanted to work in the city for more than 90 days with the hopes of someday becoming a permanent resident, was considered a temporary resident (*kiryū sekī*).\(^{25}\) To establish permanent residency, one had to have a permanent home in the Leased Territory, usually by owning property or a house. A stable job was also a factor. An individual hoping for this status would present these qualifications to the neighborhood or village leaders to forward to the higher up authorities for approval. Once approved, an entire family could gain status as registered residents of the Leased Territory, with permission to work and move about far more freely than others.\(^{26}\) They would then be issued a “zhoumin zheng” or Guandong permanent resident card.\(^{27}\)

The new residency system privileged those with close ties to the Japanese authorities, those with money, with stable employment, and who owned property. Temporary residents, on the other hand, were typically laborers, or recently arrived
migrants and refugees from Shandong. In the rationed economy of the wartime city, this group received less food rations than the permanent residents, and had poor access to housing and education.

Being a registered resident of the Leased Territory, a “Kantōshū jin,” allowed one’s children to attend better schools, and afforded opportunities to try and attend Japanese-run schools, training institutes and colleges. College for most Chinese in Guandong was not a possibility, only 6.5 percent of Chinese students attended colleges. Enterprising families from Shandong who had yet to attain permanent status might be able to send their children to school, but their path to success was much harder. Zhang Lianmin was born in a shantytown area outside of Dalian. His family was from Shandong, and lived in a community with others from their home village. Zhang was lucky enough to attend a school nearby, and recalls learning the harsh lessons of the colonial hierarchy, where Shandong people were generally mistrusted by the authorities. Shandong children who first started attending school had to learn not to refer to themselves as Chinese.

While a comprehensive examination of the colonial education system lay outside the present study, a brief overview of the situation after 1941 sheds light on the development of more inclusive policies designed to bring a large segment of the Chinese population closer to Japan. We have seen that those with Guandong resident status attained better access to education. It was precisely this group that after 1941 found itself on the frontlines of “imperialization” (kōminka), the attempt to turn colonial peoples throughout the empire into imperial subjects. This began in 1938, when a key goal of educational reforms was to “cultivate good residents of Guandong (Japanese:
Shū min, Chinese: Zhou min), and to “develop a harmonious international spirit.”
Courses in morality would “foster international people with international morals.” As we shall see in subsequent chapters, a discourse of internationalism did not disappear in Dalian after 1945.

The June 1943 “Guandong Education Law” codified many of the changes that had been brewing the previous two years. At its core, the educational system was to target Guandong residents, that privileged Chinese strata, and subject them to the same educational system as children in Japan, where reverence to the emperor and the cultivation of the national spirit were fundamental qualities expected of all students. A new curricula was implemented stressing Japanese morals, language, and history. Here the vague “internationalism” was replaced by more specific references to the emperor and Japan.

Each morning before classes, Chinese students, like their Japanese counterparts, attended martial-style assemblies. Song Dayi, born to the north of Dalian in 1931, recalls that at his school, each morning after their exercises, the students would bow in unison toward the east, in reverence to the Japanese emperor, while their instructors chanted slogans about Japanese-Manchurian friendship. Trips to Shinto shrines also became commonplace for Chinese students at this time. Zhang Fushen, born in Dalian in 1926, recalls his monthly trips to a Shinto shrine in the hills outside of Jinzhou. He remembers that the mood the day of each trip was quite solemn, and the procession to the shrine was not unlike a military march. The most dramatic episodes of the imperialization policies involved name changing. The most widespread attempts to change colonial subjects surnames to Japanese occurred in Korea. However, there were
attempts carried out in Dalian and the Guandong Leased Territory, although evidence is scarce about the extent to which this occurred and Chinese resistance to such a policy.

Chang Weihua, born in Dalian in 1932, recalls vividly the day he went to register his new Japanese surname with the police. As he was writing his new name in the register he watched as the policeman erased his Chinese surname. In Jinzhou, local Japanese authorities called together prominent Chinese families, all of whom had Guandong residency. They were told that they were to change their names to a Japanese surname, and to select it from a list of 20 some Japanese surnames, and that resistance would be punished. In this case, families refusing to change their names would be shipped to northern Manchuria to reclaim wasteland. However, the protests to this policy were severe enough that the local authorities decided to leave the matter unsettled, and did not force name changes.

*Life in Chinese Dalian: Worker dormitories, Shantytowns, and Xiaogangzi—Dalian’s Chinatown*

Each year, thousands of Chinese immigrated to Dalian from nearby Shandong. They fled famines, droughts, floods, battles, poverty, all in the hopes of making a living in a modern city. Some came with introductions to manual labor jobs from relatives or friends working in Dalian. One of the most basic, yet grueling jobs in the city was as a laborer on the docks. Day in day out, thousands of men worked throughout the year in long shifts, carrying stacks of heavy beancake fertilizers, bags of soybeans, salt, coal, and boxes of consumer goods to and from the oceangoing ships that called on the port each year. With little money, and only a temporary residence permit, tens of thousands
of men, some with their families, moved into one of Dalian’s most infamous residences, the worker dormitories of the Fukushō Chinese Labor Company (Fukushō Kakō kabushiki kaisha).

Located in the eastern side of the city, just south of the port, the Fukushō company built a massive dormitory complex to house Shandong migrant workers, which they called “Hekizansho” or “Blue mountain manor.” To Chinese it was known as “hongfangzi” or the “red house,” for its red brick walls. Construction of the dorm complex began in the first few years of Japan’s rule. It was, from its inception, designed to be a city within a city. Japanese colonial authorities had expressed the desire to keep the Chinese migrant population contained and removed from Dalian proper, and Blue mountain manor was designed to accomplish this task. The dorm buildings themselves were built in long rows, some single-level others multi-level, 92 in all. Although designed to house 15,000 workers, throughout the 1930s and 1940s its actually capacity was between 30-40,000, making it extremely cramped. In addition to the living quarters, the complex featured 10 gambling halls, seven opium dens, 13 brothels, 11 money-lenders.36 There was also an opera stage and a temple facility. Each year, on July 15, company representatives made offerings to commemorate those workers who died on the job.

In reality, the “Red house” functioned like a prison. It had high walls, topped with metal fencing, and restricted access to only one main gate, which featured a tower with a large clock with faces in all four directions. Each morning at 4 am, the clock’s bells would ring, signaling the start of another long work day.37 Workers were shuttled to work on special tramcars, painted bright orange to indicate they were from the “Red
house.” Gate inspections occurred twice daily as workers entered and exited the dormitory, and included body and clothing searches. Outbreaks of infectious disease were especially brutal in the cramped quarters of the dorms, and often occurred in deadly waves. Between March and June 1943, 3,500 workers died from disease. At the peak of an outbreak, dozens died each day. Those admitted to the infirmary seldom came back alive, and workers called it “the execution ground.”

Wang Zhuanshu, was born in Shandong, and recalls recruiters coming to his village promising men who signed up for work in Dalian three meals a day, time off for the big holidays, and free travel money every year to see his relatives back in Shandong. Reality, however, was quite different. Wang recalls that the whole system in the dormitory and on the docks was ruled by labor bosses, who took cuts out of workers' wages, assigned them their sleeping quarters, and were responsible for meals. Wang remembers that while he and his fellow villagers managed to survive the workdays, “southern workers” recruited in from Shanghai during the Pacific War, had real difficulty adapting to the work demands, and were often ill. Shandong workers had long made up the majority of the residents of the “Red house.” Prior to 1937, they represented 89 percent of the workers housed there. By the Pacific war, more workers from Hebei and Shanghai were recruited, and Shandong workers were then only represented 60 percent of those living in the dorm complex.

The families of many seasonal and permanent laborers who did not live in the dorm lived in shantytowns on the outskirts of Dalian. These ranged from migrant camps, where families lived in makeshift tents, to more permanent shantytowns. Shantytown communities were often occupationally organized. Qionghanling, for
example, was a shantytown located near the “Red house” dormitory inhabited by dockworkers and their families. Construction workers lived to the northwest of downtown, in a shantytown community called Xianglujiao. These communities swelled with refugees from Shandong and Hebei during the wartime years. People with jobs, like dockworkers, were the lucky ones. The influx of refugees made finding work even more difficult.

Japanese authorities established three small police and administrative headquarters around Qionghanling, from which they conducted searches and routine patrols of the neighborhood. The local headquarters employed Chinese as translators, and to help on patrols. These men were feared by locals for their close relationship with Japanese authorities. They routinely exploited this position of power to extract money, goods, and sexual services from residents. By far the most feared were the Japanese inoculation teams, sent out each year to shantytowns to administer forced inoculations, and to seize and detain those deemed threats to the public health. Local residents referred to Japanese medical doctors as “Yao baozi” and would scream “Yao baozi laile!” (The doctors are coming!) when teams arrived.

The goal of many shantytown residents, was, quite understandably, to get out. The hope was to land a more permanent factory position, and to move out of the shantytown and into more permanent housing in neighborhoods within the city, places like Xigang. The Xing family represents a typical case. Xing Guihua arrived in Dalian with her family from Shandong in search of work in 1940. The Xings eventually moved out of the workers dormitories and into a flat in Xigang, the heart of the permanent Chinese community in Dalian. Although their apartment was very small,
with seven family members shared a room six meters square, this was a considerable move “up” from the dorms. With time and money, the Xing family could apply for residency with the Japanese authorities.

Xigang was the center of the Chinese community—colonial Dalian’s “Chinatown.” Its narrow streets were packed with small shops and residences. Street-side restaurants and a bustling outdoor market, where crowds often gathered to watch street performers and acrobats, these were the features of daily life in Xigang, much as they might be in any other Chinese city. It was here that Chinese elites, and certain Chinese associations exercised some power. Most Chinese residents, businessmen, and workers did not wield any real political power under the Japanese system. Unlike the occupied Lower Yangzi region, there was not an appointed Chinese leader or puppet government in Dalian. This is not to say that Chinese were utterly powerless. There were prominent Chinese who headed many of the city’s redemptive societies, founded charities, and served as heads to the Chinese business community.

Recent scholarship on Japanese-occupied Shanghai complicates narratives that stress collaboration, resistance, and victimization as the only experiential factors of the wartime period. At the center of these studies are Chinese intellectual and business elites, and their experiences with occupation. Dalian, for thirty years a Japanese colonial city, was not “occupied” in the manner of Shanghai, and thus did not “fall” to the Japanese. Residents of Dalian experienced the shifts toward militarism in a different way from the people of Shanghai, Tianjin, or Beijing. Rather than destruction, invasion, and the establishment of a “puppet” order, they witnessed continued industrial growth coupled with increasing state control over society—Chinese and Japanese alike-
- that came with the wartime period. Chinese shopkeepers and entrepreneurs built their livelihoods, and in some cases made their fortunes, under the Japanese system. They thus knowingly made certain choices about moving to Japanese territory and working in a colonial city. This is not to say that in this environment they did not make similar, individual choices about resistance, indifference, or collaboration as people in occupied Shanghai. As is often the case, the colonial experience was a gray zone, with the state and its policies affording opportunity and new identities while subsequently mobilizing, classifying, and restricting certain segments of society.

The Shandong Native Place Association was a major Chinese organization in Dalian. Unfortunately, few documents survive in the Dalian archives to allow for a comprehensive examination of its composition and activities over time. However, available sources reveal that the association functioned much like native place organizations throughout urban China. Japanese sources estimate that the association had 3,000 prominent members, and its main board of trustees, 300 in all, were drawn from the well-off merchant families and heads of the lucrative soybean oil industry.47

The head of the association was Chi Zixiang, one of the wealthiest Chinese businessman in Dalian. Born in 1884 in rural Shandong, Chi arrived in Dalian in 1903, and worked in a general store. After the Japanese took control in 1905, Chi opened an import/export business and made a fortune during the soy boom years. At that time, there emerged four main groups of Chinese merchants in colonial Dalian, organized by native place. Chi was the head of the Shandong group. There was also a “native” group (bendi bang), which was headed by the shipping magnate Zhang Benzheng, which was comprised of people born in Dalian, Lüshun, and nearby towns in the
Guandong Leased Territory. The Shandong leaders provided guidance and financial support to those Shandong people most in need. This included aid for the destitute, burials, money to help bring family members to Dalian, and providing some form of education to children in Dalian. In 1927, the Shandong Native Place Association created a special branch to aid the growing number of refugees arriving in Dalian from Shandong.

In one of the few surviving documents from the association held in the Dalian municipal archives, a 1940 work report, we can catch a glimpse of some association activities. Several destitute men from Shandong, labeled criminals by the Japanese police, were picked up shortly after arriving on a junk. The association secured their release and paid for their return to Shandong. Indicative of the advantages of learning Japanese, that year, the association ran a popular night school for Japanese language study. Each evening at 7 pm, over 65 students gathered to study in the hopes of landing better jobs.

The most powerful Chinese organizations in the city were the Dalian Chinese Business Association, and the Xigang Chinese Business Association. All of Dalian’s prominent Chinese merchants belonged to one or both of these organizations. In addition to representing Chinese business interests, these associations also ran schools and welfare societies in Xigang, and in this sense they enjoyed prestige and power among the Chinese community. Members of the “native” group of merchants headed the Dalian Chinese Business Association, and typically had long-term ties with Japanese, and in addition to their positions on the board of these business organizations, many of them belonged to the kinds of redemptive societies discussed by Duara in his
examination of Manchukuo. Zhang Benzheng, the head of the Dalian Chinese Business Association, was by far the wealthiest and most prominent Chinese individual in Dalian through 1946. He was founder and head of the “Zheng ji lun Shipping Company,” which by the wartime period had a fleet of over 40 large ocean going vessels. Zhang was born in a poor village near Lüshun in 1865. He held various odd jobs, and even tried his luck as a farmer, but returned to Lüshun and operated a general store. During the Sino-Japanese war, he ingratiated himself with a Japanese spy, whom he allowed to use his store to smuggle military supplies. He then switched his operation to Yantai, on the Shandong coast, and it was there that he entered the shipping trade. At the outset of the Russo-Japanese war, he helped move supplies for the Japanese military with rented boats. By the 1920s and 1930s, he had shipping operations in all major ports in China, and increasingly, in Japan.

Throughout the forty years of Japanese rule here, Zhang served on 49 various business association and governmental boards, making him the most visible Chinese member of the Japanese ruling elite.51

We saw in Chapter 2, that the development of Manchuria and total war in Asia and the Pacific brought significant industrialization to Dalian. This had a major impact on society here, and throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s, the number of industrial enterprises and jobs rose steadily. With that, the industrial workforce became a part of the fabric of society in Dalian. Who worked in the war industries, and what was their experience like?

Dalian’s Workforce at War
The present section examines the development of policies for labor control, and using data from classified surveys, memoirs, and secondary labor histories, sheds light on the composition and experience of Dalian’s Chinese workforce during the wartime period. We will see how, by the early 1940s, the wartime state came increasingly to see its population in terms of labor power. Following the Guandong administration’s subordination to the military in 1934, a major feature of governance in Dalian was the development of mechanisms for cataloguing and controlling the labor force, both in terms of the flow of workers in and out of the Leased Territory, and on the factory floor. We will see this repeated in the post-1945 order, when the new socialist regime faced a similar challenge in terms of maintaining a disciplined labor force under conditions of war. This is not to argue that nothing changed after 1945. Rather, as this dissertation aims to demonstrate, key patterns of governance were established under Japanese colonialism and wartime empire which were subsequently built on by the post-1945 socialist order.

The industrial development of Dalian through the mid-1930s created new jobs for thousands of Chinese, who continued to flock to the Guandong Leased Territory and Manchukuo in search of work. At the top in terms of wages, education level, and stability of employment were industrial workers. Below this group were manual laborers in the construction trade and stevedores, many of whom were seasonal laborers. They had lower wages, and, as we shall see shortly, lived in dormitories or in shantytowns on the outskirts of the city. We will examine that experience in a subsequent section. The present section deals with industrial workers, whose numbers
grew steadily through the early 1940s. Surveys taken of the labor force in Dalian in 1927, for example, list a total of 18,000 workers. By 1938, that figure rose to 78,000, with 55,000 employed in factory labor.\(^52\) The largest employers were in the shipbuilding and machine manufacturing industry, which accounted for 40 percent of the industrial workforce, followed by textiles, chemicals, and food processing industries.\(^53\) Women comprised 11 percent of the workforce, and 6,060 of the 6,090 women workers recorded in a 1940 industrial survey were Chinese, and they worked almost exclusively in textile mills and food processing plants.\(^54\)

From 1934 through 1937, Japanese authorities restricted the flow of Chinese workers into the Guandong Leased Territory and into Manchukuo.\(^55\) They pursued policies that encouraged the recruitment of locals to work in mines, construction, and industries. This was all part of the Guandong army’s broader goal of severing Manchukuo’s links to North China, and linking it more closely with Japan. It was hope that locals and Japanese settlers would provide the bulk of the labor force.\(^56\) Such a decision was driven in part by efforts to create more jobs to alleviate local unemployment. Security was also a major concern, as the military authorities feared that a more porous immigration policy might allow anti-Japanese forces to enter Manchukuo.

To enact these restrictions, the SMR’s economic investigation branch, following the requests of the Guandong army, put forth plans in 1933 to regulate the labor force by controlling the immigration flow into Guandong and Manchukuo.\(^57\) In 1934, the military’s role labor grew with the establishment of the “Guandong Army Labor Control Committee,” which began to coordinate labor and immigration controls in the
Leased Territory and Manchukuo. This organization set annual employment quotas for unskilled labor among construction, mining, agricultural and dockworkers. In 1935, the Guandong army promulgated the “Foreign Worker Control Regulations,” an order that called for the issuance of worker identity cards, along with interrogations for all Chinese entering the Leased Territory and Manchukuo. The regulations were enforced by a new organization, the Dadong Company, which was responsible for labor recruitment and issuing registration cards to workers entering Guandong and Manchukuo.\(^{58}\) As we shall see, this was a precursor to a more comprehensive, state-controlled entity that would be formed during the war years. This was the first step in the state’s effort to regulate and control labor on an unprecedented scale.

The Dadong Company’s efforts were effective, and the years 1934 through 1937 witnessed a marked decrease in the number of migrants arriving in Dalian and Manchukuo, due in part to these new restrictions.\(^{59}\) After 1937, labor quotas were lifted in order to ensure a growing supply of workers, however, labor shortages became increasingly severe in Dalian. Although Dalian certainly saw a remarkable growth in terms of industrial jobs, wartime production demands from 1937 through 1945 brought increasing competition for labor resources, which ultimately resulted in chronic shortages of labor. Manchukuo and the Japanese military-backed regimes in North China demanded a growing labor force for their own industrialization projects, and this had an impact on the labor situation in Dalian and the Leased Territory, which began to lose workers. Manual labor was hardest hit. To the north, in Manchukuo, the construction trade was booming, and jobs there paid better, and the work was not as
grueling as loading soybean cakes on Dalian’s docks. Thus although the total number of laborers entering Dalian increased, fewer were staying there to work.\textsuperscript{60}

After 1937, restrictions on the movement of people, particularly skilled labor, shifted from limiting their entrance into Dalian and the Leased Territory, to keep them from leaving. By the Pacific War, labor shortages were a growing problem in all sectors of the economy, and the Japanese authorities began to turn to forced labor in an attempt to solve the labor problem. For example, there was such a need for dock labor that 1200 workers from Shanghai were recruited and shipped in.\textsuperscript{61} The Manchukuo Construction Association, themselves short of labor, desperately asked Guandong labor authorities in 1940 for 10,000 needed workers. Citing their own labor shortages, they refused the request.\textsuperscript{62} By 1943, the labor situation was dire, as the number of workers entering the Leased Territory shrank by 51 percent from the previous year.\textsuperscript{63} Job turnover at most enterprises remained heavy, the majority of workers in Dalian, particularly those in less skilled positions, had been at their job for less than two years, most having only worked a year or less.\textsuperscript{64} We shall see below that in order to try and solve the labor situation, the wartime state created new institutions and policies in an attempt to achieve an unprecedented level of control over workers, Chinese and Japanese alike. Before we examine such efforts in detail, it is useful to construct an image of the composition of Dalian’s industrial labor force, which was a major target for labor controls during the wartime period.

\textit{Dalian’s Industrial Labor Force}
Finding a voice for the experiences of thousands of laborers and factory workers in colonial Dalian is a difficult task for the historian. Few exist outside of the accepted narrative constructed by the CCP, which tends to emphasize brutality and exploitation at the hands of the Japanese, along with heroic resistance led by underground party members. Before focusing in on some of the many acts of personal and collective resistance to Japanese authority, it is essential to try to construct a portrait of the workforce as a whole during the wartime period. The Guandong Labor Association (Kantōshū rōmu kyōkai), the officially sanctioned organization responsible for recruitment and control of labor in the Leased Territory during the wartime period, carried out several detailed investigations of the composition of the labor force in Dalian in the late 1930s and early 1940s, which provide a snapshot of the composition of the workforce at that time. We will examine the inner workings and activities of this important wartime institution shortly. This organization, in charge of registering and controlling labor throughout the Leased Territory, produced extremely detailed surveys which we will draw on below.

What then, do Japanese labor surveys tell us about the wartime workforce? First, it was overwhelmingly Chinese, and predominantly male.65 This was true not just of manual labor jobs, which absorbed thousands of seasonal unskilled laborers from agricultural regions of Shandong and Hebei, but also of skilled and semi-skilled jobs in Dalian’s growing modern industrial sector. In 1941, 91% of the total workforce was Chinese. In any given factory in Dalian, the vast majority of workers were Chinese. A classified survey of 50 of the largest Chinese-managed enterprises in Dalian in 1940 reveals that the vast majority of workers were from Shandong. Of 4689 Chinese
workers surveyed, 3116 were from Shandong, and they were employed primarily in the ceramics and soy processing industries.66

In 1941, 58 percent of the labor force worked in Chinese-run enterprises, most of which were smaller factories employing 30 people or less.67 The experiences of Chinese working in these enterprises are an under-explored aspect of labor history in Manchuria, one rarely dealt with by PRC historians. Source limitations make it difficult to ascertain whether there were major differences with Japanese industry. One thing is clear, Chinese enterprises generally paid their workers higher wages. The average wage for Chinese workers in Chinese factories was 1.32 yuan per day, compared with 1.15 yuan per day in Japanese-owned industries. However, in Chinese-owned machine tool shops, shipbuilding enterprises, and vehicle parts manufacturing firms, Chinese workers received lower wages than their counterparts in similar Japanese-owned factories.68 Perhaps this is a reflection of what it took to compete with Japanese enterprises at this time.

Despite official rhetoric of racial harmony under the empire, wage patterns reveal significant inequalities. Cheap Chinese labor had been one of the driving forces in Dalian’s development, and Chinese workers continued to earn less than Japanese and Koreans. On average, Japanese workers received 2.3 yuan per day, Koreans 1.8, and Chinese 1.1. However, with the resources of the wartime state increasingly stretched throughout the expanding empire, wages in the Leased Territory were actually becoming more equal than they had been in the 1920s. For example, in 1927, Japanese workers earned 3.9 yuan per day, compared with .78 for Koreans, and 0.56 for Chinese. Japanese worker’s wages fell consistently through the 1930s, while Korean and Chinese
wages grew, and nearly doubled between 1936 and 1939.\textsuperscript{69} This trend had little do with conscious efforts on the part of Japanese authorities to address wage inequalities. The need to keep all available labor and increase production likely led to increases in Chinese wages during the wartime period. Similar efforts were carried out in the final years of the war, when wages and rations for Chinese workers in critical war industries were increased in an effort to keep people on the job and working hard.\textsuperscript{70}

Another common portrayal of the colonial-era labor situation in Dalian, one highlighted in CCP labor history, is that the Japanese monopolized technical knowledge. Of Dalian’s 3,070 highly skilled technical workers, only 480 were Chinese.\textsuperscript{71} However, several factors must be taken into consideration when considering such a portrayal. First, chronic shortages of skilled labor and technicians, even among Japanese, and that this was a systemic crisis throughout the wartime period. In a desperate attempt to rectify these shortages, degree requirements were slashed at technical schools, like the engineering college in Lushun.\textsuperscript{72}

Moreover, it would be misleading to portray the rest of the labor force as simply unskilled. In fact, a large number of Chinese held factory jobs which required some specialized skills or training for which they had first served as apprentices, earning considerable less than permanent workers for the chance to land such coveted skilled jobs in the future.\textsuperscript{73} In such non-industrial trades as construction, for example, the line between skilled and unskilled was often a matter of owning tools. Statistics reveal that over 22,000 workers, or 43 percent of the total labor force in Dalian and the Leased Territories, worked in modern machine tool manufacturing and shipbuilding industries.\textsuperscript{74} A large number of these workers were from the Leased Territory, not
recent immigrants from Manchuria or Shandong. In machine tools, for example, 44 percent of those surveyed were born in the Leased Territory, for shipbuilding and vehicle manufacturing, 51 percent were natives.\textsuperscript{75} Workers in these sectors, not surprisingly, also tended to have been at their jobs longer.

A large portion of the workforce in Dalian had also received some level of education. Over 40 percent of the Leased Territory’s industrial workforce was literate. In metals, the literacy rate among workers stood at 50 percent, and among the shipbuilding and machine tools trade, stood at 43 percent.\textsuperscript{76} The above statistics lend weight to Japanese praise of the local workforce in publications on Dalian’s economy in the 1940s. They wrote that the educated, permanent labor found in the city to be a key feature of its continued industrial growth, and that locals were well suited for factory work due to a “higher cultural level and an educational system in place for Chinese.”\textsuperscript{77} Thus, these were not simply easily replaceable manual laborers, but tended to be literate and married men, in their 30s-50s. In fact, in key industries, half of the labor force was married.\textsuperscript{78} Metals and shipbuilding workers were most likely to be married.

What were working conditions like? Job turnover was high, and the working hours were long. Approximately half of the 4600 Chinese workers surveyed in the 1940 investigation had been on the job for less than two years, and 500 had only held their current position for 6 months. It must be noted, however, that some enterprises had only been built in the mid-1930s, so that it was rare to find a worker with more than five year of experience. Unskilled labor, including stevedores and construction workers, along with semi-skilled kiln operators and bricklayers, tended to draw the least experienced workers, those who had been on the job for less than one year.\textsuperscript{79} By
contrast, among the 6,000 Japanese workers in Dalian, over 3,000 had held their job between one a five years. Japanese workers were employed primarily in the shipbuilding, vehicle manufacturing, and machine tool industries.

Most factory workers put in long hours, and over 80 percent of those Chinese surveyed in 1939-1940 worked over 10 hours per day. After 1942, the working day was extended even further, and 12-13 hour shifts became commonplace. Labor shortages on the docks forced stevedores to work longer days, while other laborers shoveled salt from the Leased Territories lucrative salt fields in backbreaking 16-hour shifts. Under such conditions, accidents were common, as was the spread of infectious diseases among an increasingly exhausted workforce. Open resistance to these conditions was dangerous and even fatal. Nevertheless, despite increased police and military control of factories and neighborhoods, worker resistance was a constant problem for Japanese authorities.

Worker Resistance

One of the key differences between Dalian’s labor history and that of other cities in China was the lack of a powerful labor union. We have seen in the previous chapter that through the 1920s there had been a vigorous labor movement in Dalian, often spurred on by nationalistic leaders in tune with national protest events. However, several factors severely weakened organized labor in the city. First, as a Japanese colony, there was very weak representation by the main political parties which carried out union work in other industrial centers in China. Dalian and the Guandong Leased Territory had never been a part of the modern Chinese nation-state, and thus the
Nationalist presence was virtually non-existent throughout the Japanese era. As for the CCP, their position was strongest during the nationalistic strikes of the 1920s, but by the 1930s, successive waves of arrest at the hands of Japanese authorities decimated their core leadership. By the early 1930s, the CCP was so weakened and scattered that it had significant trouble receiving and responding to directives and communications from other parts of the country. Deprived of this experienced leadership, coupled with increasing Japanese military and police presence throughout society, it became exceedingly difficult to launch strikes.

Finally, we have seen that strikes among Chinese workers were often initiated by Japanese actions. Throughout the 1920s, Japanese labor launched a number of strikes in Dalian, often in coordinated with strikers in Japan. By the wartime period, however, strikes became increasingly rare as surveillance and repressive factory management clamped down on such action. Moreover, the Japanese wartime state began creating new organizations to manage labor in Dalian, restricting worker mobility, implementing, for example, a strict identity card system, and extending its repressive power to the factory floor through surveillance and fascistic organizations which made open resistance increasingly difficult. CCP labor histories likewise point out that the Japanese hiring and worker classification system likewise created divisions among workers. Apprentices and floating labor received significantly less wages, and had little job security, while those classified as registered temporary and permanent workers held the more advanced positions with the best pay.

Despite the weakness of organized labor due to the factors mentioned above, throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s workers in Dalian, both Chinese and
Japanese alike, carried out sporadic episodes of large-scale, even violent resistance to Japanese rule. The actions of the “resistance arsonists” (*kang Ri fanghuo tuan*), is one such example, celebrated in PRC labor histories of Dalian. This was a clandestine group of individuals who took orders from Soviet agents in Shanghai, and organized and recruited small cells of local workers to carry out attacks on critical Japanese infrastructure. The group claimed to have members from all strata of workers, from skilled workers to dock laborers. Dalian’s modern infrastructure and industrial development provided ample targets of opportunity for attacks. Between 1935 and 1940, there were over 50 such attacks in Dalian, and they caused considerable material and psychological damage to the Japanese community in terms of the scale of the attacks. Some of the more notable included a January 1937 raid on a large Japanese-owned soy oil mill, which was burnt to the ground in the middle of the night. In February 1938, an operative named Wang Jingtai set 300 tons of soybeans ablaze in a warehouse at the docks, while in April of that year, group members blew up two large storage tanks at the oil refinery in Ganjingzi, igniting a massive fire fuelled by 60,000 barrels of oil stored there. The conflagration could be seen for miles. Japanese police expended considerable resources in hunting down these clandestine operatives, and by 1940 had arrested most of the individuals responsible for the attacks.

Resistance activity was not always as dramatic as nighttime raids on warehouses and oil tanks. Poshek Fu’s work on Chinese intellectuals in occupied Shanghai, which remains one of the more nuanced studies of collaboration and resistance at the individual level, concludes that Chinese intellectuals, as individuals chose to resist, collaborate, or even remain passive in all sorts of ways, and that these choices were not
mutually exclusive. The hundreds of thousands of Chinese residents of Dalian in the 1940s who made the choice to live in a Japanese city, moving with their families to take advantage of economic or educational opportunities, cannot easily fit into categories like “collaborators.” A worker in a Japanese factory might, at some level, be collaborating with the regime, accepting wages and housing from the Japanese, and so on. Yet, he/she might also choose to resist in subtle, even personal ways while on the job. Working slowly, skipping work, and disrupting the production process whenever possible by losing or damaging tools and equipment were common strategies used by Chinese workers to hamper the Japanese war effort. A high rate of worker absences, as we shall see shortly, was a major problem for Japanese authorities. Japanese surveys also reveal that slowdowns and time-wasting were endemic problems on the factory floor, in some factories, surveyors found employees “working” only 40-55 percent of their time on the job.

For example, groups of workers at a plant that made tools for shipbuilding developed techniques for napping and resting when Japanese supervisors were not nearby. They would only work when a supervisor was in the immediate area, and once he passed, they would slow down or stop working completely. Often this involved appointing a watchperson from among the group who would alert fellow workers of an approaching boss. In this way, workers took several days to complete jobs that could be done in half a days work.

Destroying, damaging, and purposefully losing tools was also a common form of worker resistance in factories throughout the Guandong Leased Territory. At the ship repair facilities in Lüshun, for example, workers were constantly repairing
damaged Japanese naval vessels. There a Chinese worker, Wang Chengying, led an undercover campaign to lose and damage tools, and, whenever possible, carry out shoddy repairs on naval vessels. Wang was an electrician, who came to the factory in 1941. In his memoirs he recalls his dealings with a Japanese supervisor named Utsumi, whose was responsible for coordinating Chinese labor. Utsumi was notoriously strict with Chinese workers, making him very unpopular, but he respected Wang’s work. Utsumi would often only casually inspect and supervise Wang’s projects. Taking advantage of this situation, after Utsumi’s inspection, Wang would often undo the repairs he had made.93 Other workers, like old-timer Cao Benli, organized their apprentices to help damage tools and equipment, even dumping them off the docks into the bay. Under Cao’s guidance, his apprentices learned how to sabotage tools slowly over time, often by skimping on maintenance and repairs. Cao’s men ruined a number of expensive drilling machines this way, which slowed repairs.94

Violent treatment at the hands of Japanese authorities was another catalyst for protests. As this is precisely the kind of narrative CCP labor histories tend to highlight, one must proceed with caution when using tales of resistance, however, there is no doubt that such instances were real, and that they catalyzed workers to take action on numerous occasions. At the Dalian Signal factory, for example, a notorious Japanese supervisor routinely forced workers to line up and stand for inspection at the end of each shift before they were allowed to leave the factory. In the dead of winter, he would purposefully move extremely slowly through the line, making the workers stand in the cold for extended periods of time. For this, he earned the nickname “King of Hell” (Yan wang). Several old-timers at the factory, Wang Jiaxing and Guo wengui,
decided to get back at him by dropping rocks on his head at night when he left the factory. One incident in particular tested the “King of Hell’s” resolve. When he was interrogating a worker in his office, a rock sailed through his office window, striking him in the forehead and drawing blood. Furious, he stormed out of the office only to find 300 rock-wielding workers at the ready. The problem had grown so out of hand that the other Japanese guards decided to have the “King of Hell” transferred. Wang and Guo, who had been arrested, were released.95

Importantly, joint strikes by Chinese and Japanese workers continued through the early 1940s. Although generally small in scale compared to the activism form the decades before, these were important events, particularly in the segregated social environment of the wartime period. Japanese workers took dramatic actions on several occasions to protest wartime working conditions. In a ship repair factory in Lushun, for example, a Japanese worker named Fukushima took a personal stand against the war. Fukushima was well liked by his Chinese colleagues. Like them, he and the other Japanese workers put in long hours together, often working late into the night. Fukushima, and several Chinese co-workers were caught one evening dozing on the job. Drawing the attention of the authorities, he was told that he would be drafted and sent to the front for his intransigence. Several days later, his Chinese co-workers noted that his disposition had changed, and one day, he let out a sigh, walked over to a power-planer, and, almost casually, shoved his right hand through its spinning blades. Useless to the military, he was subsequently sent back to Japan.96

Japanese workers also continued to play leading roles in the few major strikes of the wartime period. In 1943, a new wage system, based on daily piecework, was
introduced in factories now producing crucial tools for the war effort. This proved highly unpopular to workers, who received considerably less wages per month under the new system. In the Dalian Machine Tools Factory, Chinese workers decided to ask for the support of the factory’s Japanese workers in launching a strike for better pay. They approached an older, well-respected Japanese worker, Kosaki, who agreed that a joint strike was in order. Several days later, 900 workers stopped working. Kosaki, and several other prominent Japanese workers were arrested during the strike, however, management agreed in the end to raise wages. Despite winning this battle, the future possibility of joint strikes was jeopardized by the arrest of the older Japanese workers, along with Chinese mediators, some of whom had developed lasting relationships with management. Several of these experience Chinese labor organizers died in prison, while Kosaki and other Japanese were sent back to Japan. The incident reveals the extent to which Japanese authorities feared such joint actions.

The Wartime State’s Control of Labor: the Guandong Labor Association

During the wartime period that the Japanese military made significant attempts to control labor on a massive scale. This was a multi-faceted effort, which aimed to limit the movement of the population through immigration controls, and allocate labor resources to those industries most in need of workers. As such, it was part of similar activities carried out throughout the Japanese empire and in Japan, where labor shortages and worker mobility likewise threatened wartime productivity. From the late 1930s on, labor unions in Japan and the colonies were outlawed, and the state turned toward fascistic labor controls, many of which were techniques imported from
Dalian was no exception. What union activism existed in the 1920s and early 1930s ended, co-opted and contained by new organs of the state. The main organization in the Leased Territory behind such efforts was the Guandong Labor Association (Kantōshū rōmu kyōkai). It was responsible for the creation of a vast knowledge base about the available workforce through the registration of workers and issuance of identity cards, which along with name and native place, also listed an individual’s labor experience and skills.

Labor concerns were a key part of governance in Manchukuo from the start. Shortly after its founding in 1932, a Labor Control Committee was established, comprised of Manchukuo officials, the Guandong Army, and members of the SMR. In 1935, this organization oversaw the reorganization of the Dadong Company, a limited stock company with branches in Dalian and Tianjin, set up to handle the immigration and registration of labor in the Leased Territory and Manchukuo. After 1937, the wartime state sought to tighten its grip on labor in line with new labor and mobilization laws promulgated in Japan in 1938 and 1939, which gave the government powers to conscript civilians for labor in Japan and the colonies, and to register skilled workers. To achieve this, in October, 1938, officials from the Guandong Bureau founded the Guandong Labor Association, which assumed full responsibility for enforcing labor controls in the Leased Territory, taking over many of the Dadong Company’s duties. The heads of this organization were all leading officials of the Guandong administration, which also included top members of the police in Dalian and Lüshun. The police would come to play a central role in enforcing labor regulations.
The internal organization of the Guandong Labor Association consisted of two levels, “special members” (teshu huiyuan) and those referred to as regular members. Special members included Guandong administrators and high-ranking heads of the police in Dalian and the Leased Territory. Regular members were drawn from factory owners and local business elites, particularly those with operations employing 20 or more people. It is interesting to note that the majority were Chinese. In 1941, there were 613 Japanese and 1668 Chinese members. In this way, Guandong authorities, working through the Labor Association cast a wide net throughout Dalian’s industries, and indeed local society.

One of its main responsibilities was to oversee the recruitment of labor in Dalian and the Leased Territory. In 1943, for example, the Guandong Labor Association established a branch in Shanghai, where it distributed hand billets promising three meals a day, good pay, and housing to those willing to come to Dalian. Association leaders were also instrumental in securing skilled carpenters from northern Manchuria to build wooden vessels for the Japanese navy, who began to pile up heavy losses from U.S. naval attacks.

However, the Labor Association was, from its inception, far more than a tool for labor recruitment. Its close connections with the police and the administration, and its task of registering and investigating every Chinese individual arriving in the Leased Territory made it one of the most important institutions of social control during the wartime period. It had 18 branches in neighborhoods throughout Dalian, plus five other branch headquarters in Jinzhou, Ganjingzi district, and Lushun. Between 1938 and
1943, the Guandong Labor Association registered over one million people, including 300,000 in 1939.107

The Labor Association had four main tasks. First, it carried out a comprehensive registering of the population. This included registering all workers already employed in Dalian as well as those arriving from Shandong in the hopes of finding employment. One key task was the issuance of modern identification cards, affixed with photographs. The cards listed one’s job skills, and place of employment. Once registered, an individual received a labor card (laogong piao), which they were to carry at all times. The labor card became one of the most potent forms of control during the wartime period, and could be requested at anytime by the police. At the conclusion of each working day, a worker’s card would be marked at gate inspection as he/she departed the factory or workplace. Without that the mark, one could be considered a delinquent employee, subject to arrest and forced labor service.

The labor card system is indicative of the fascistic system of labor controls carried out by the Japanese wartime state. Labor mobility was brought firmly under the states control, as it became impossible for a worker to legally move from job to job without permission noted on his/her labor card. Sheldon Garon’s work on Japanese labor reveals that this system was imported from the Nazi’s in their efforts to contain the labor force of their expanding territory.108 In the Guandong Leased Territory, moreover, these cards served as both an identification card and a work visa. Some cards granted the holder multiple-entry allowances, while most were valid for the duration of an individual’s employment contract.109
Police on patrol throughout Dalian’s neighborhoods, routinely asked to see labor cards, and could enter homes at will and demand that occupants present their cards for inspection. Those without a card were assumed to be delinquent or unemployed, and were drafted into manual labor service teams for the Japanese military, where they would toil for long hours engaged in airfield and road construction, digging defensive ditches and building bunkers and air raid shelters. Dalian had always had a large number of free laborers, over 20,000, who moved at will from job to job, including construction workers and day laborers. The card system enforced by the Labor Association aimed to reign in this group so that they might be channeled into needed sectors of the economy.

A second task was to fingerprint workers during the registration process. In addition to the photograph, a full set of fingerprints were to be kept on file. This was one of the largest fingerprinting efforts in the Japanese empire, resulting in the collection and filing of the fingerprints of over 400,000 individuals. The Labor Association was also responsible for registering skilled laborers. This became increasingly important as the war progressed, and skilled labor grew scarce. All men from the ages of 14 to 55 throughout 144 various enterprises, schools, and technical institutes had to register.

The Labor Association played a very large role in enforcing restrictions on the movement of people, and in coordinating immigration of laborers into Dalian and the Leased Territory. A major goal was to drastically reduce and block completely the exodus of labor from Dalian, particularly skilled labor. It coordinated police efforts to investigate all outgoing passengers at the entry points to the Leased Territory. Those
individuals found fleeing jobs or with technical skills were forbidden to exit, and were sent back to Dalian.

The efforts of the Guandong Labor Association reveal the concerns of the wartime state for its control over labor. Part of this project involved highly modern techniques of governance—registration cards, fingerprinting, restriction of movement, which we will see again with the socialist state in the post-1945 period. While these were all part of what Japanese authorities considered a modern package of “rational” labor management, and were increasingly totalistic in their attempts to control both Chinese and Japanese workers, the fact that worker resistance did not disappear, nor was there a significant rise in productivity points both to the failure of the Japanese wartime state’s labor policies, and to the considerable resistance it met at the hands of Chinese workers.

*Total War and the Factory Floor: Militarization and a New Ideology of Labor*

In addition to what we have examined in the above passage, the Guandong Labor Association also focused its attention on the factory floor, where it orchestrated attendance and production campaigns. It provided a crucial link in trying to actualize the abstract rhetoric about increasing productivity put forth by the military which began filling the pages of economic journals and publications in the early 1940s. While it was clear that increasing production was critical for Japan’s expanding war effort, what was less clear was how to go about achieving this goal. The wartime state put forth new concepts about the nature of labor, many of them heavily influenced by fascism, which, as we shall see, ultimately failed to take root among the population. In Dalian the
rhetoric of labor service, stressing equality and inclusive participation as an imperial subject clashed with the political and economic reality, where the status of Chinese was often unclear in the imperial hierarchy. Scholarship on wartime labor reveals the failure of such policies, both in Japan and throughout the empire, as the final desperate years of the war witnessed forced labor throughout the empire and at home while supplies and raw materials. We will see shortly that Dalian was no exception, and forced labor became commonplace throughout all levels of society. However, there were important changes brought about in terms of labor relations and labor policies during the wartime period, which set patterns that extended into the post-1945 period.

First, by the early 1940s, Dalian’s industries, including machine tools, chemical and shipbuilding facilities, were taken over by the military by the early 1940s. In some cases, this meant quite literally that factories shifted to producing weapons and war supplies for the Japanese army. In most modern industries throughout the city, however, militarization also had profound effect on the nature of the working day. Workers found themselves subjected to observation by a number of new organizations within the factories which further divided the workforce. In the Manchuria Oil Company’s main refinery, for example, which employed 2300 people, there was now a security detail, military police, a hygiene team, and a fire prevention brigade, not to mention spies among the workers. One scholar estimates that for every eight workers there was one member of these groups present in a given factory during the wartime period.

The shipbuilding industry was one of the first to have police and gendarme details inside the factory. Here they began carrying out more detailed investigations of workers backgrounds through what they called a “labor division” (rōmu ka) and a
“training division” (yōsei ka). The labor division conducted investigations into workers backgrounds, particularly those who arrived from Shandong. The training division was essentially long-term surveillance program aimed at understand workers attitudes and attempted to root out underground CCP activists and others who resisted Japanese authority.\textsuperscript{116}

The Guandong Labor Association also mounted a major effort to combat increasing absenteeism, particularly among the Chinese population, and to try and spread a discourse of production along with a new ideology of labor to the factory floor. Official publications lamented that a large number of Chinese employees often missed work, and worked slowly while on the job. Official surveys of factories in Dalian from 1942-1943 reveal numerous areas which, from the perspective of those officials in charge of increasing production, were major problems. Time wasting, slow production processes, technical workers handling menial tasks were all singled out as issues to be remedied.\textsuperscript{117} However, absenteeism was by far the largest problem. We have seen that, for many individuals, missing work, or underachieving on the job was a potent form of resistance. To try and remedy this situation, the Labor Association launched a major campaign, the “perfect attendance movement” (Rōmuka kaikin jikkō undō). The main targets were Chinese and Japanese workers at the 187 industries in Dalian and the Leased Territory that employed over 100 people.

This campaign was part of a series of “factory prescriptions” which the Labor Association hoped to implement in order to achieve the goal of increasing production. This included the vague instructions to “rationalize” the production and labor process, and have better use of raw materials and distribution of resources. Discipline on the
factory floor was also brought up, citing high rates of worker absences, and serious time wasting among workers at work. Interestingly, we will see similar efforts to address many of these same problems in the postwar period by Soviet and Chinese authorities.

The attendance campaign of 1943 was designed to last for several months from June through August, and took the form of a competition among industries to see which ones had the biggest increase in worker attendance. Leading up to the competition, the Labor Association officials selected model workers from among the Chinese and Japanese workforce and presented them with material rewards for perfect or near perfect attendance rates. Those who had worked for two years with little or no absences were honored in speech campaigns at various factories. This was an all out campaign, propagated in factories and throughout Dalian through radio broadcasts, handbills, and posters.

From the perspective of the Labor Association officials in charge, the perfect attendance movement was a total failure. Rates of absenteeism among Chinese and Japanese workers actually increased during the movement. For example, among Chinese workers in chemical plants, the attendance rate at the start of the campaign was 91 percent, but dropped to 88 percent by August. Most industries saw similar decreases. Even among Japanese workers, whose attendance figures were in the 90 percent range, there was little change before and after the campaign, with some industries losing attendance as it wore on. Success hinged on ideological efforts to compel Chinese workers to sacrifice for the emperor and in the name of “co-prosperity.” While such efforts proved more effective among Japanese, whose rates of absenteeism were lower than Chinese workers, it was not an effective means to mobilize the Chinese workforce.
Along with this increased militaristic control of the labor force, the state attempted to forge a new ideology with respect to labor, based on the fascist New Order visions of the Konoe Cabinet. At the core was a concept of “dedicated labor” (kinrō), through which one’s loyalty to and participation in the empire was demonstrated by one’s labor. Inherent in this concept is a manufactured notion of equality based on labor service to the emperor and nation. As one scholar puts it, “blue and white collar workers and employers, too, could become true members of the Japanese nation (kokumin) only as “workers” (kinrōsha) serving the state by means of their dedicated labor, and in that sense they were all equal.” However, this ideology failed to effectively mobilize workers in Dalian, as it did in Japan. Just as total war mobilization seemed to create equality though such a conceptualization of labor, the reality of daily life pointed to the clear inequalities generated by the wartime state, where racial and class divisions were solidified by colonial registration and labor policies privileging Japanese, Korean, and those registered as permanent, settled Chinese residents of Dalian. Labor campaigns like the attendance movement failed, and Japanese authorities attempted no such campaigns after this. Rather, they resorted to widespread conscript labor among all segments of the population, mobilizing women and children to participate in long hours of grueling work.

**Forced Labor**

Rationing, the prioritization of raw materials and supplies to military industries, and restrictions on imports and exports took their toll on the people of Dalian. By the 1940s, total war began to cut into almost every sphere of life. Trade restrictions and
price freezes all but destroyed the free market, and the ordinary rhythms of daily life,
like a trip to the market, turned into highly stressful activities involving long lines,
dwindling goods, and ration tickets. Air raid drills became frequent parts of
neighborhood life as early as 1934, when the Guandong army tightened its control of
Dalian and the Leased Territory. Increasing numbers of city residents, including
students and women, were forced to build defensive bunkers, emergency airfields, and
military roads as part of mandatory labor service (*kinrō hōshi*).

One of the features of total war in general, and of Japan’s wartime empire in
particular, was that under the extreme conditions of mobilization for total war the
population was equalized in the eyes of the state, primarily in terms of their labor.
From the perspective of the Japanese wartime state, compulsory labor was one extreme
of the ideology that labor service was an individual’s most important participatory
contribution to the state, above all else, the emperor. The reality of grueling forced
labor, however, and the conflicts it fuelled between Chinese and Japanese labor teams
certainly points to a much different reality experienced by those forced to work.

In Dalian, Chinese and Japanese alike had to perform mandatory labor services
in the closing years of the war. Shortages of technical workers and trained engineers
were widespread, further blurring those divisions of the labor force. The mandatory
labor service law of January 1943 called for the mobilization of all male residents of the
Leased Territory between the ages of 14 and 40, and unmarried women under 25, for 30
days of compulsory labor. This law was changed the next year, to include males aged
13 to 45, and stipulated 6 months to one year of service.
Students in Dalian, Chinese and Japanese alike, were mobilized to perform mandatory labor service in much the same way they were in Japan and throughout the empire. In Dalian, the Guandong Vocational Guidance center was established in March 1943. Although ostensibly a labor training institution, its real purpose was to organize students for needed labor projects. By 1943-1944, classes in middle schools and high schools throughout Dalian and the Leased Territory had all but stopped, as students old enough were sent off to join work teams.

The labor was hard and there was seldom enough food. These conditions of privation were ripe for conflicts over food and shelter. Liu Chongming participated in forced labor in 1944. Liu was born in 1930 in Shandong, and entered high school in Lüshun in 1944. However, like children throughout the Japanese empire, he did not study much that year because his class was recruited to perform labor services making an airfield and repairing roads. In his memoir, Liu recalls an incident which led to a near riot between Chinese and Japanese students, both forced to work on the airstrip. He remembers that mistrust and resentment steadily built up between Chinese and Japanese students, who were also called to work. Although they worked the same hours, handling the same jobs, Japanese students enjoyed better meals and baths, and lived in actual building, while Chinese sweltered in tents. This led to resentment, and a scuffle broke out between Japanese and Chinese students. The next evening, Chinese students, including Liu, surrounded the Japanese students dormitory and threw rocks through the windows. One student screamed “topple the Japanese devils!” Gendarmes arrived on the scene and arrested many students.
Inequalities in food and living conditions were not limited to preferential treatment for Japanese. Chinese students attending premier, Japanese-run schools, like the high school in Lushun, enjoyed more daily rations than Chinese students for smaller, Chinese-run schools. Lushun’s high school was a prestigious institution, and many of its graduates went on to attend technical colleges in Guandong, Manchukuo, and Japan. Ge Zhimou, a Lushun student, recalls sharing his food with students from Dalian’s Xigang district school, who received less rations than the Lushun students.\textsuperscript{128}

This type of labor student labor was common in Korea as well. In his memoirs, Richard Kim remembers spending his second year in junior high under much the same conditions as students in Dalian and Lushun, building an airstrip with his classmates on the outskirts of Pyongyang day after day. Kim describes the conditions of the tents that he and his classmates lived in, writing “We have learned to breathe with our mouths open, to avoid, at least, the sickening sensation we get when we inhale or sniff the air through our noses. When it rains, the earthen floor and the path get flooded and muddy, and the reddish brown clay stays wet for several days, giving off a smell that reminds you of rotting fish.”\textsuperscript{129}

The experience of Ma Yongsheng, a fifteen-year-old migrant and his family is typical of the forced labor situation in wartime Dalian. The Ma’s arrived in Dalian from Shandong, in the early 1940s, fleeing Japanese military incursions into their village. They came to Dalian because it was relatively peaceful compared to the Shandong countryside, and their were opportunities for work in the city. Ma’s father took up work on the docks, and lived in the infamous worker dormitories there. Yongsheng found work as an apprentice in a medicine shop. Because he was a recent arrival, Yongsheng
was singled out to work on a forced labor team, where he and 100 others, all drawn from the ranks of restaurants, barbershops, small factories, and merchant shops, worked to construct an airfield in the suburbs.\textsuperscript{130}

Teams were divided into groups of 20, each with a team leader who could speak Japanese. The whole division was supervised by a Japanese named Yamamoto, along with Japanese and Chinese police. Interestingly, the head Chinese policeman, named Han, went by a Japanese surname. Work was grueling. Ma and his fellow workers were essentially prisoners for the duration of their assignment. The team of 20 were forced to work within a fenced area, approximately 50 meters square. If they moved beyond the fence, they faced strict punishment. All 100 workers lived in a large tent near the work site, which was stiflingly hot during the summer months.

Jin Chuan, who worked on a conscript labor team building the airstrip at Zhoushuizi, the present day site of the Dalian international airport, recalls the Japanese labor bosses screaming at the workers to complete their task, “These are the orders of the emperor, we cannot be careless, no matter what happens, we have to complete this task! Only then can we win the great East Asia war and realize the Greater East-Asian Co-prosperity sphere. If you do not, there will be sever punishments, don’t you know this?!” To which Jin and others screamed “Yes!” The bosses then yelled, “then can we complete this task?!” To which Jin and his fellow laborers screamed “Yes!” Using rhetoric about the Japanese military that is remarkably similar to that used for the Soviet military in the postwar period, Guandong authorities were on hand to give patriotic speeches. One Japanese official rose to give the following speech to the collected workers: “Who gave us Guandong people (\textit{zhou min}) this bountiful life? Take a look!
The Imperial Army, which as we speak is heroically fighting the enemy, who are they fighting for? How can we thank them? By coming here and taking up our duty to labor, only then can we be good Guandong people (zhou min) and fine imperial citizens!”

When one worker complained about hunger, a Japanese guard beat him soundly, and made an example of for the whole work team. His fellow workers were told he was not a good citizen of Guandong, and that any more failures to carry out imperial orders would be severely punished.

Thousands of others toiled at various crash-construction projects in the final months of the war, including building a military hospital for the Japanese on the outskirts of Jinzhou. There, 30,000 people were drafted to work, and 8,000 perished in the process. For thousands of city people, and those living throughout the Guandong Leased Territory who were forced to work from late 1943 through early 1945, this was the reality of their “participation” as people of the empire. Although inequalities still existed, an increasingly large segment of Dalian’s society was put to work. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, these were poignant memories of exploitation and suffering seized upon by the CCP in its efforts to forge a new socialist city. Forced labor was certainly a very real, very brutal experience, however it was the end phase in a series of efforts to link Dalian more closely to Japan, a time when imperialization was at its peak, and opportunities were afforded to those in a position to accept this rhetoric, and have better access to education and jobs.

Conclusion
Although far from comprehensive, this chapter has attempted to outline several key features and sectors of urban life that were profoundly affected by the events of Japan’s militaristic expansion of its empire. Wartime Dalian was not a city easily defined. Certainly, few would argue that it was an essential port city, featuring a modern, urban landscape. Yet beyond that there were tensions and questions within the colonial project there, which began to sharpen in the wartime period, just as definitive answers were established. Was Dalian Japanese? There is little doubt about Japan’s power here, but we see hints of uncertainty about this question as well. As a city of the Japanese empire, another question was who was Japanese? Specifically, how far would the imperialization project go?

It was during the wartime period that concrete policies were established to register a certain segment of the population as “Guandong residents,” a privileged status, somewhere between “Chinese” and “Japanese” within the imperial hierarchy. Dalian, the colonial city, was an environment that afforded different identities to both Chinese and Japanese who lived there. With the industrial growth of total war came an increasingly modernized, factory workforce in Dalian, the majority of which was Chinese. Japanese authorities paid considerable attention to how best to manage and control this growing group of people. For an industrial worker, their “labor ticket” was as important if not more than any other imperialization project, for it gave them access to a livelihood, a salary, a home.

The next three chapters look at what happens in Dalian after the Japanese wartime state is defeated. The year 1945 was certainly a watershed for Dalian, more meaningful in some ways than 1949. The political, economic, and social system that
had built the city and ruled it for 40 years was gone, and a new occupying army, that of
the Soviet Union, equipped with its own needs and its own ideology of what the
postwar world would look like, planted its flag in Dalian. The following chapters
explore this transition, and ask what was the legacy of Japanese imperialism here? Its
concrete forms did not disappear, but rather, appear to become, almost seamlessly, part
of the fabric of the new socialist city. What institutional and social patterns can we see
between the wartime period and the post-1945 era? Perhaps most importantly, was
wartime mobilization of society, and industrialization and state control of the economy
a fleeting condition of Japanese wartime imperialism, something to be washed away in
the post-1945 world order, or had such development established lasting patterns which
we might see repeated in the transition to socialism, itself a period of constant warfare
and renewed foreign occupation.

1 Yokohama shōkin gingkō chōsa ka, ed., *Dairen tokuhon* (Dalian Reader) (Dairen:
1939), 3.

2 Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian

3 Yanagisawa Asobu, *Nihonjin no shokuminchi keiken: Dairen Nihonjin shōkōgyōsha
no rekishi* (The Japanese colonial experience: the history of Japanese entrepreneurs in

4 Robert Burton Stauffer, “Manchuria as a Political Entity: Government and Politics of a
Major Region of China, Including its Relations to China Proper. Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Minnesota, 1954, 237.

5 Dairen shōkō kaigi, ed., *Dairen keizai benran* (An economic handbook of Dalian)
(Dairen: Dairen shōkōkaigi, 1943), 68.

6 Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime


Yanagisawa Asobu, *Nihonjin no shokuminchi keiken: Dairen Nihonjin shōkōgyōsha no rekishi* (The Japanese colonial experience: the history of Japanese entrepreneurs in Dalian) (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1999). The subjects of this book, a series of oral histories of Chinese who attended schools in Dalian and the Leased Territory, is full of their recollections of racial slurs and prejudice. While this is no doubt part of the accepted narrative of victimization, such recollections are vivid enough and numerous enough, and should be taken quite seriously.


The September 1924 edition of *Shin tenchi* magazine, published in Dalian, carried numerous articles discussing mixed residency in Manchuria and Dalian. See for example, Ishikawa Tetsuo, “Dairen shi to zakkyo mondai” (The problem of mixed residency in Dalian) in *Shin tenchi* Setpember, 1924: 43-45.


Takenaka Kenichi, *Dairen akashia no gakusō: shōgen shokuminchi kyōiku ni kōshite* (Dalian, the schools of Acacia: True records of resistance to colonial education) (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2003), 137-142.


20 South Manchuria Railway advertisement, in Asia (June 1921):564.

21 South Manchuria Railway advertisement, in Asia (October 1922): 833.


23 Guo Wei, “Dalian diqu jianguo qian de Taiwan ren ji zuzhi gaikuang” (The organization and situation of Taiwanese in Dalian prior to the founding of the PRC) in Dalian wenshiziliao no. 6 (December 1989): 67-74. See also, Qi Hongshen (Takenaka Kenichi transl.), “Manshū” o ōaru hisutori: “doreika kyoōiku” ni kośhite (Oral histories from “Manchuria”: resisting slave education) (Tōkyō: Köseisha, 2004), 501-514.

24 Yamada Takeyoshi, Kantōshū no shisei mondai (The problem of city administration in the Guandong Leased Territory) (Dairen: 1928), 2-4.


27 “Aiguo de minzu gongshangyezhe—Xu Jingzhi” (A patriotic industrialist—Xu Jingzhi) in Dalian wenshiziliao no. 6 (December 1989): 18.


29 Takenaka Kenichi, Dairen akashia no gakusō: shōgen shokuminchi kyōiku ni kośhite (Dalian, the schools of Acacia: True records of resistance to colonial education) (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2003), 80-87.


35 DJBNS, 525.

36 ESDGYS, 345-346.


40 Chong Feng, “Xiri ‘hongfangzi’ buru shengchu de Zhongguo gong ren” (The ‘hongfangzi’ of former days: Chinese workers as less than animals) in Dalian chunqiu 1995, no. 1: 14-15.

41 ESDGYS, 352.


44 Lao Xigang huigu dangnian “pinmín bànjiā yundòng” qiaoluo dagu zhu jin Riben fāng (Looking back at the poor peoples moving campaign in old Xigang, ringing in moving into Japanese homes with gongs and drums) in Dalian wanbao, March 19, 2006.

45 Ibid.


47 Dairen shōgakkai kenkyū bu, “Dairen chihō ni okeru shinajin no shakai jigyō” (Social enterprises of Dalian’s Chinese residents) (Dalian: 1930), 8-11.


49 Dairen shōgakkai kenkyū bu, “Dairen chihō ni okeru shinajin no shakai jigyō” (Social enterprises of Dalian’s Chinese residents) (Dalian: 1930), 8-11.

50 Dalian Shandong tongxianghui.  “Huiwu baogao shu” (Work report of the Shandong native place association) 1940, Dalian Municipal Archives I-36.


54 Kantōshū rōmu kyōkai, “Kantōshū kōjō rōdō chōsa” (A survey of factory labor in the Guandong Leased Territory) (August 1939) in Shen Jie and Nagaoka Masami, ed.
Shokuminchi shakai jigyō kankei shiryōshū [Manshū, Manshūkoku] hen (Collected materials on colonial social enterprises in Manchuria and Manchukuo) vol. 11 (Tokyo: Kingendai shiryō kankōkai, 2005), 63, 75.

55 DJBNS, 708.


57 DJBNS, 705.


63 ESDGYS, 398.

64 Kantōshū rōmu kyōkai, “Kantōshū kōjō rōdō chōsa,” 57.

65 159,900 of the total 167,000 workers in the Leased Territory in 1941 were men. DJBNS, 724.

66 Kantōshū rōmu kyōkai, “Kantōshū ManShijin keiei kōjō rōdō chōsasho” (An investigation of Chinese-managed factories in the Guandong Leased Territory) (August

67 Dalian shizhi bangonshi, ed., *Dalian shizhi laodong zhi* (Dalian labor gazetteer) (Dalian: Dalian renmin chubanshe, 1999), 69.

68 Kantōshū rōmu kyōkai, “Kantōshū ManShijin keiei kōjō rōdō chōsasho,” 140-141.


71 Dalian shizhi bangonshi, ed., *Dalian shizhi laodong zhi* (Dalian labor gazetteer) (Dalian: Dalian renmin chubanshe, 1999), 69.


73 Apprentices made between 0.18 and 0.25 yuan per day, while a permanent factory worker earned 1.3 yuan per day. Liu Gongcheng. *Dalian gongren yundong shi* (A history of the labor movement in Dalian) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1989), 270-271.

74 Kantōshū rōmu kyōkai, “Kantōshū kōjō rōdō chōsa,” 75.

75 Kantōshū rōmu kyōkai, “Kantōshū ManShijin keiei kōjō rōdō chōsasho.”

76 Kantōshū rōmu kyōkai, “Kantōshū kōjō rōdō chōsa,” 50.


78 Kantōshū rōmu kyōkai, “Kantōshū kōjō rōdō chōsa,” 61-64.


80 Kantōshū rōmu kyōkai, “Kantōshū kōjō rōdō chōsa,” 55.

81 *DJBNS*, 724.

83 Kantōshū keizaikai, ed., Kantōshū keizai nenpō (Guandong Leased Territory Economic Yearbook) (Dairen: Kantōshū keizaikai, 1944), 60.

84 Dalian shi zonggonghui gongyunshi yanjiushi, ed., Dalian gongyunshi jianghua (Conversations on the history of Dalian’s labor movement) (Dalian: (no publication date) 1983), 109-112.


86 ESDGYS, 406.


90 Here, I find Timothy Brook’s definition of collaboration, borrowed from Henrik Dethlefsen’s study of Denmark under German occupation to be quite useful. As Brook points out, Dethlefsen is quite sensitive to definitions that reduce the entire population under occupation to the status of “collaborator.” Rather, the two scholars share the view that “those who collaborate must exercise power to be said to have collaborated.” Timothy Brook, Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 1-2.

91 Kantōshū keizaikai, ed., Kantōshū keizai nenpō (Guandong Leased Territory Economic Yearbook) (Dairen: Kantōshū keizaikai, 1944), 63.

92 ESDGYS, 414.


96 ESDGYS, 417.


98 Dalian shi zonggonghui gongyunshi yanjiushi, ed., Dalian gongyunshi jianghua (Conversations on the history of Dalian’s labor movement) (Dalian: (no publication data) 1983), 107-108.


103 Han Yuexing, “Dalian de Guandongzhou loawu xiehui” in DLCQ 1997 no. 3: 24-25.

104 Han Yuexing, “Dalian de Guandongzhou loawu xiehui” in DLCQ 1997 no. 3: 24-25.
Han Yuexing, “Dalian de Guandongzhou loawu xiehui” in *DLCQ* 1997 no. 3: 24-25.

*DJBNS*, 716-723.

Dalian shizhi bangonshi, ed., *Dalian shizhi laodong zhi* (Dalian labor gazetteer) (Dalian: Dalian renmin chubanshe, 1999), 63, and *DJBNS*, 719.


*DJBNS*, 719.


Dalian shizhi bangonshi, ed., *Dalian shizhi laodong zhi* (Dalian labor gazetteer) (Dalian: Dalian renmin chubanshe, 1999), 64.

Han Yuexing, “Dalian de Guandongzhou loawu xiehui” in *DLCQ* 1997 no. 3: 24-25.

*DJBNS*, 721.


Kantōshū keizaikai, ed., Kantōshū keizai nenpō (Guandong Leased Territory Economic Yearbook) (Dairen: Kantōshū keizaikai, 1944), 132-133.


Dalian, Dalian shizhi bangonshi, ed., Dalian shizhi laodong zhi (Dalian labor gazetteer) (Dalian: Dalian renmin chubanshe, 1999), 66.

Takenaka Kenichi, Dairen akashia no gakuso : shogen shokuminchi kyoiku ni koshite (Dalian, the schools of Acacia: True records of resistance to colonial education) (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2003), 17-18.

Ge Zhimou, “Jianyi Lüshun gaogong shifan bu” (Brief recollection of Lüshun high school teacher training branch) in Dalian wenshi ziliao no. 5 (September, 1988): 55-63.


ESDGYS, 402.
Section Two
Big Brother is Watching: Rebuilding Dalian Under Soviet Occupation, 1945-1950

4. Building a Sino-Soviet Political Order in Dalian, 1945-1950

In early August 1945, Dalian was an eerily calm place. Even as the Soviet Red Army swept through Manchuria engaging the Japanese Guandong Army in massive battles, one Japanese observer commented that the city displayed “none of the urgency and confusion of the defeated country.”¹ Another noted that during even as late as the week of 15 August, as Soviet forces raced toward Dalian and Lüshun, things in the city seemed to go on as if nothing had changed, “company men kept going to the office, and the streetcars kept running on their usual schedules.”² That sense of calm was shattered with the arrival of Soviet troops and tanks on 22-23 August, signaling the end of four decades of Japanese rule in Dalian. Soviet military units were initially met by Dalian’s Chinese population with jubilation. A photograph of overjoyed residents surrounding Soviet tanks, their smiling commanders resting casually on the turrets, has been reprinted numerous times in recent collections of historical memoirs and materials on Dalian.³ These sources hail Soviet troops as Dalian’s “liberators.”

Yet, locals would soon find themselves asking whether this was liberation, or a re-occupation. Dalian was now in the hands of a foreign military force that had its own intentions for the city and its resources. Armed with treaty agreements which essentially returned to them the imperialist privileges enjoyed during the Czarist era, the Soviets took control of the valuable industries and port facilities in the heavily industrialized and urbanized Guandong Leased Territory, maintained the right to station
troops throughout the territory, move military supplies in and out of Dalian with no
customs inspections or fees, and enjoyed extraterritoriality for all Soviet military
personnel. Soviet authorities did not allow Chinese military units, either Nationalist or
CCP, to enter the area, affording them no role whatsoever in the territories liberation.

This chapter examines the Soviet arrival not as liberation but as an occupation.
The inhabitants of Dalian, and indeed, all of the former Guandong Leased Territory
found themselves once again under the thumb of a foreign occupying force. The
territory was essentially a Soviet semi-colony with the Soviet Red Army commanders
acting as its imperialist masters. Residents experienced the changing order with a
mixture of uncertainty, opportunity, fear, animosity, and violence. The Soviet
military’s occupation of the region marked a return to the colonial settlements that the
Russians had lost to the Japanese in 1905, a fact not lost on either leaders or troops.
The opportunity to win Dalian back from the Japanese added extra significance and
satisfaction to the Soviet’s occupation. Stalin himself alluded to this and is quoted as
saying at the end of the campaign in the Northeast: “We have our own special account
to settle with Japan. We of the old generation waited forty years for this day.”

With the breakdown of the Japanese war machine and the dissolution of the
empire, questions and confusion reigned. Who would Dalian’s once mighty industries
and port facilities now serve? What would be its defining features in the postwar era?
Most importantly, whose city was it? This chapter argues that in order to fully
understand the complicated political situation that existed in Dalian, one has to account
for Soviet intentions and actions and how they interacted with Chinese powers, be they
Nationalists or the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP). The Soviets cast a long,
wide shadow here well into the 1950s and did not fully withdraw their military forces from Lüda until 1955. Their authority had many dimensions: political, economic, and cultural. The economic and cultural factors will be discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. The present chapter examines the political situation in Dalian as CCP, Nationalist, and Soviets interacted to forge a new political order on the foundations of this Japanese colonial territory.

The subject of the Soviets’ postwar intentions in East Asia and their relationship with Chinese authorities has received considerable attention in recent years. New work by Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, and Dieter Heinzig situates Sino-Soviet relations within the broader context of the emerging Cold War.\(^6\) Within this framework, we see Soviet actions in Manchuria in general and Dalian/Lüshun in particular as part of a Stalin’s desire to keep America out of the region, while finding a suitable way to influence and project power in East Asia. Dieter Heinzig makes the important point that in October 1945 “some 300,000 Soviet soldiers in Manchuria faced some 110,000 U.S. troops in the rest of China.”\(^7\)

This new scholarship examines in detail the motivations behind the Yalta Agreement, reached by the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union, and subsequent Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed between Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government and the Soviet Union in February 1945. To summarize briefly, at Yalta Stalin received support from the U.S. and Great Britain to recover Czarist privileges in Manchuria, including the right to control and station troops at a naval base at Lüshun and joint Soviet ownership Manchuria’s railways. As for the city of Dalian, the U.S. wanted the port to remain open to international shipping, and stopped short of
granting full control of the city to the Soviets, instead guaranteeing that “the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded with respect to Dalian.” Throughout the summer of 1945, Stalin and Molotov met with Nationalist officials T.V. Song and Wang Shijie to negotiate a treaty that would confer these rights to the Soviets. The negotiations were not easy, and problems arose over Soviet interests in Outer Mongolia among other issues. In the end, the Soviets were granted a 30-year lease for a Naval base at Lüshun, control of over half of the port facilities at Dalian, and the right to move military supplies through that port with no customs or taxes. They also signed a 30-year lease for joint control of Manchurian railroads. A Chinese “civilian government” was to be responsible for governing the area, including Dalian. Importantly however, until a peace agreement was reached with Japan, the Lüshun naval base area, which encompassed the most of the former Guandong Leased Territory, would under Soviet military rule. Stalin was apparently pleased enough with the agreement, to have pointed to Lüshun and Dalian on a map, proclaiming that “they are ours.”

Even at this macro-political level, however, things were far from clear throughout the late 1940s. Recent scholarship has shed much light on Soviet intentions in Manchuria, portraying Stalin as playing a “double game” in Manchuria. That is, he had to maintain some fiction of good relations with the Nationalists in order to honor the treaty and keep a firm grasp on Lüda. He was however, increasingly willing to aid the CCP, if for no other reason than to build a buffer state in Manchuria between the Soviet Union and a perceived U.S. backed- Nationalist regime in Central and South China. Stalin’s support swung back and forth between Nationalist and CCP in a rapidly changing global political and military environment, which led to a large amount
of frustration for both Nationalists and CCP cadres alike as they attempted to establish
themselves in Manchuria. This chapter will reveal how in Lüda this “great game”
narrative resulted in confusion, communication breakdowns, cultural differences, and
frustration for the CCP, Nationalists, and Soviets alike. It also highlights the postwar
transition in Dalian from a Japanese colonial to Soviet-led socialist system, revealing
important similarities and differences in those systems.

Who Controls Dalian?

At the end of the Second World War, the Guandong Leased Territory, like all of
Manchuria, was a major prize sought by the Soviets, Nationalists, and CCP alike. We
have seen that the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed between the Nationalist
government and the Soviet Union gave the Soviets control of a major naval base at
Lüshun which encompassed the former Japanese Guandong Leased Territory, hereafter
referred to as Lüda. That treaty stipulated that governance of the area was to be in the
hands of a “civilian” Chinese administration, with Soviet oversight. The Nationalists
assumed that they would be given control of this government, and would be allowed to
use the port facilities at Dalian to move troops and supplies to aid in the recovery of
Manchuria.

Likewise, the CCP had high hopes that the Soviet presence would allow them to
operate in the city and use its port to ensure that its cadres, not the Nationalists, were
first to reach Manchurian cities. Meanwhile local elites in Dalian, wealthy merchants
and businessmen, continued to hold considerable power through networks forged during
the colonial era. They presented themselves to Soviet military authorities as willing and
able to maintain some semblance of order in the city. Moreover, there were over
200,000 Japanese living in the city, and those with the means mobilized themselves to
protect their families. As in all cases of occupation, collaboration with the Soviet
authorities was an option for certain Japanese in the closing months of 1945.

The new reality was that any would be political powers in Dalian had to work
with and through the Soviet military to achieve any kind of control, to say nothing of
attempts to carry out urban revolution. Moreover, there were no blueprints for what
kind of relationships, if any, the Soviet military authorities might establish with
Nationalists and CCP cadres, a situation which caused a great amount of confusion in
the urgent atmosphere of August and September 1945.14 Thus the exact extent and
shape of Soviet power here was only beginning to become clear to CCP cadres and
Nationalists alike as they rushed to establish themselves in Dalian in late 1945.

What this chapter reveals is that the situation on the ground in Dalian seldom
matched Soviet, Nationalist, or CCP expectations. This was particularly true for the
period stretching from August 1945 through early 1948, a time when the exact shape of
the local order was murky at best. Soviet military authorities had to establish some kind
of working relationship with Chinese political actors, and it was unclear for a time
whether that would be with the Nationalists or the CCP. We shall see that throughout
this period, the Soviets protected their local interests at the expense of CCP activity.
Decisions had to be made about what would be done with the enormous population of
Japanese civilians residing in Dalian while they awaited repatriation. For the
Nationalists, questions existed of how they would seize the momentum of Japan’s
defeat and establish a foothold in Dalian. CCP cadres faced a similar test when they
began arriving in the city from various rural base areas. Could they carry out revolutionary projects to reshape urban society like they did in rural areas? Let us turn our attention to a brief discussion of the various political actors vying for control in late 1945, with particular emphasis on expectations.

*Soviet Intentions: Big Brother’s Wishes, Big Brother’s Headaches*

In the context of the emerging Cold War, the Soviets had in Lüda a strategic postwar foothold in East Asia. Moreover, they inherited the valuable wartime industries in Dalian with which to rebuild their own shattered industrial base. We will see in greater detail in Chapter 5 the Soviets intentions to dominate these industries, and extract what goods and resources they could from the city. As they had in cities throughout the Northeast, Soviet troops systematically removed major industrial equipment and infrastructure from Dalian’s factories. According to a memoir written by the city’s top CCP official, Han Guang, Soviet authorities were quite frank about the removal of such equipment. Han remembers Soviet military leaders justifying their actions by telling him that the Soviet Union had suffered greatly during the conflict with Germany, and that the equipment they took was necessary to rebuild a war-torn Soviet economy. Thus, for example, massive generators were taken from a Japanese power plant to the north of the city. Dalian’s port facilities, under Soviet control, provided an easy way to quickly ship such large equipment. Paul Paddock, the head of the U.S. consulate which opened in Dalian for a short time in 1948-1949 believes many Japanese prisoners were put to work by the Soviets to remove equipment. Japanese memoirs also note the removal of large amounts of equipment from the industrial areas of the
city. Araki Takichi, who worked in the department responsible for overseeing the manufacture of precision machinery, recalls seeing truckloads of industrial equipment heading for the port in October 1945.\

The stripping of industries was just one example of Soviet power in Dalian. Unlike the rest of Manchuria, the Soviet’s presence here was to be more permanent. Available sources make no mention of industrial looting after 1945. Soviet commanders on the ground in Dalian must have recognized that they were in this for the long haul, and that keeping local factories running was one way to maintain economic and social order in the city. In accordance with their treaty agreements, the Soviets faced the difficult task of establishing some kind of civilian government. This threw them into the fire of Chinese domestic politics, as all aspirants to power here, be they CCP, Nationalists, or others, worked through their authority. In terms of high politics, the Soviets proved highly flexible, able to ally with the Nationalists to achieve certain goals, while aiding the CCP to achieve others. For Soviet commanders in Dalian, it was not clear how much authority to grant to either of the Chinese political powers as they built a local government. As we shall see in part two of this chapter, Soviet commanders dealt with all kinds of conflicts and complaints as they found themselves in the middle of the tortuous process of brokering a new political order.

General Kozlov (1886-1967) arrived in Dalian and assumed command of the Soviet military garrison there in early September. He was in charge of establishing order in the city, and putting a gentler spin on Soviet military occupation. This was necessary because in the chaotic closing weeks of August 1945, General Yamanov, the commander in charge of Dalian, took few disciplinary actions against his troops, whose
looting, sexual assaults, and violence against Chinese and Japanese was rampant. Kozlov was a veteran of the campaigns in Turkistan, and had experience establishing Soviet control in hostile, foreign environments. His first orders promised that the Soviet military would protect the peace and property of the citizens of Dalian.20

Kozlov’s most pressing matter was setting up a civilian Chinese government as stipulated in the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. In order to assess who controlled what in the city upon their arrival in August 1945, and who might best be able to achieve what the Soviets wanted, Koslov called for a city-wide meeting of public organizations in the city, to be held on October 27, 1945. Those in attendance included CCP cadres, colonial era local elites like businessmen Chi Zixiang and Zhang Benzheng, Nationalist representatives, local religious leaders, and a large delegation of the Shandong Native Place Association. It was here, and in a latter meeting, held on November 7 that the foundations of a city government were spelled out.21 What was, to the Soviets, an equally important task to setting up a local government was to find out exactly how much power various groups really had. Thus, between the October meeting and November 7, when another assembly was called to announce the founding of a city government, Soviet authorities asked each of the groups that had made a showing in the October meeting exactly how many people they represented. In one of the first blows to the nascent CCP organization in postwar Dalian, and an example of the tense relations to come, Tang Yunchao, the leader of the newly established “Dalian Federated Union” claimed his union represented 20,000, a figure well above what other groups were reporting, but the Soviets simply did not believe him, and dismissed his claim.22 As we shall see below, Tang and other CCP cadres would never forget this
negative treatment and would continue to speak out against Soviet policies until things reached crisis levels.

Kozlov’s interactions with leading CCP cadres reveal how he expected them to follow his orders, and accept Soviet policies. In a meeting with Han Guang, the CCP’s party secretary sent by Yan’an to work in Dalian, Commander Kozlov discussed the urgency of setting up a city government, and made it clear that the CCP was allowed to appoint a vice mayor. Han insisted that the CCP be allowed to appoint a mayor. Kozlov resolutely refused the request, stating that “Moscow has already decided to appoint a businessman, Chi Zixiang as mayor.” During the course of meeting with Han, Kozlov made it clear that just as the CCP was allowed to bring cadres to the city, so too were the Nationalists. Kozlov made this point by moving the discussion onto his office balcony, the top floor of the extravagant Yamato hotel, which had a spectacular view of the circular central plaza of Dalian ringed by Russian and Japanese-era colonial buildings. He pointed imperiously to one of the buildings across the plaza and said, “That’s where I put the Nationalists.” Pointing to another building he then declared, “That’s where you will set up office.” Kozlov then proceeded to lecture Han on the need for the Nationalists and the CCP to work together in the city.23 With such a policy, it is not surprising that Soviet authorities dealt with complaints and outright conflict from disgruntled CCP and Nationalists operatives in Dalian. Stalin’s “double game” was causing headaches for local commanders like Kozlov, who, as we will see came into increasing conflict with CCP cadres.

Above all else, Soviet authorities demanded that no actions be taken which might threaten the delicate political agreements enabling them to maintain a firm grasp
on Lüda and its resources. They feared that open activities by CCP cadres in particular, might provoke the U.S. to more forcefully back the Nationalists in taking back the city. Ensuring that this did not happen was a top priority for Kozlov. An event in late 1945 reveals the extent of Soviet concerns about local order. After arriving in the Dalian many CCP cadres began to mobilize residents to struggle openly against and seize certain Japanese determined to be war criminals. They felt that orchestrating such public events as mass struggle meetings against them would build broad popular support for the party. One incident involved a public meeting in which several Japanese accused of murder were hauled in front of a large crowd for sentencing. Just as the crowd was gathering, Soviet tanks arrived on the scene. Thinking it was some type of insurrection, Kozlov had the leading cadres apprehended and, in a rage, scolded them. Liu Yelou, a CCP cadre with fluent Russian, who arrived in Dalian with the Soviets in mid-August, explained the situation. Eventually, the accused Japanese were dealt with in a non-public trial.²⁴ As we shall see, the Soviet’s insistence on preserving order, at the expense of the CCP’s efforts to establish themselves in the city, led to significant conflicts between the two.

**Colonial Era Elites**

Soviet military authorities were willing to grant power in late 1945 early 1946 to those offering social stability in a potentially unstable environment. Both the CCP and the Nationalists were new on the scene and did not represent a significant force through which to control the city. What this meant in practice was a continued reliance on remnants of the colonial power structure. Japanese who could maintain key technical
positions were allowed to do so, while more immediate power was granted to colonial-era Chinese elites like Zhang Benzheng, an elderly yet savvy Chinese businessman who had established his status under the Japanese colonial system, and his colleague, Chi Zixiang, both of whom were poised to seize the opportunity of the Japanese defeat for their own personal power.

Zhang Benzheng’s (1865-1951) story reads, at the outset, like many rags-to-riches “success” stories of crafty businessmen now appearing with great frequency in collected oral history projects. Zhang, a native son to the area, was born in 1865 near Lüshun. By the age of 16, he was helping his family with their small business, selling peanuts and collecting cooking fuel. At age 18, he moved on to carpentry and one year later, opened his own shop. In his twenties he moved into trade, and began making more serious money. From these humble origins, Zhang ascended to prominence under Japanese control. By the 1940s, Zhang had become a local shipping magnate, possessing over forty large ships engaged in regular trade with Japan and Korea. He also held extensive landholdings (over 1,000 mu) and owned over 1500 houses and buildings throughout Dalian.²⁵

On the eve of Japan’s defeat Zhang Benzheng was the richest, most powerful Chinese person in Dalian. Thus, despite his advanced age, he was in a position to trump both the local CCP and Nationalists in Dalian, in his ability to serve the Soviets immediate needs for keeping order.²⁶ He did this in two ways. First, he marshaled those labor bosses who had worked for him in the past to organize, and in some cases to take charge of, existing police groups throughout the city.²⁷ Second, he presented his case, and the fact that he could control over 3,000 armed men in four main areas of
Dalian, to the Soviet authorities. Zhang was at the right place at the right time, and offered the Soviets what they wanted; any locals they might rely on for maintaining order, particularly in outlying parts of the city. Zhang established the “Dalian Public Security Maintenance Committee” \((Dalian\ zhi\ an\ weichi\ weiyuanhui)\).\(^{28}\) A serial collaborator, Zhang’s ability to adapt to and collaborate with the needs of a new foreign force had once again served him well, and for a brief period, he maintained a great deal of power over city affairs.

However, Zhang’s power relied on total Soviet support. He was not popular among the Chinese laboring classes in Dalian, by far the largest portion of Chinese people in the city. Resisting Zhang and other people branded “traitors” became a potent rallying point as the CCP built its relationship with organized labor. For example, on the evening of November 7, at a public meeting that was held in preparation for the establishment of the new Soviet-chartered city government, Zhang was set to take the stage and deliver a speech. However, upon reaching the stage, he was drowned out by the crowd, who chanted: “Down with traitors!” Zhang was forced to stop talking and leave the stage. At the end of the meeting the situation grew tense, as labor agitators became more vocal and moved to surround Zhang. Once he was outside Zhang was confronted by a large number of workers who had been barred from attending the meeting. Surrounding himself with his armed guards, Zhang escaped but not before one of his men ended up shooting dead a protestor, Yu Jizhi. Yu subsequently became a martyr for the young CCP-led labor movement in the city, and his coffin was paraded through the streets of downtown Dalian.\(^{29}\)
Zhang’s days were clearly numbered. He would be of little continued use for the Soviets with such popular indignation. Zhang managed to maintain power a little while longer, however, thanks to the support of officials sent by the Nationalist government as they attempted to establish a foothold in Dalian. Lacking strong local contacts in the city, Nationalist operatives needed to use Zhang for any chance to build a base of support. Zhang even shared his company headquarters with Nationalists operatives. With little popular support, however, this pairing was doomed to fail. For the Nationalists, their close, public alliance with former colonial elites certainly did not help them establish legitimacy. Zhang, having outlived his usefulness to the Soviets, was left out of the formal city government apparatus set up in November 1945.

His seat was filled by Chi Zixiang (1884-1951), who although a colleague of Zhang’s, was for the Soviets a more tolerable and effective choice to install as a local power figure. Chi was chosen to be mayor of Dalian under the government set up on November 8, 1945. Chi, like Zhang, was a major business leader throughout the colonial era. He had served as president of the powerful Shandong Native Place Association in the 1920s, and joined with Zhang in the 1930s to become one of the areas wealthiest businessmen. Chi was, in effect, a Soviet-installed figurehead, and when it came time to flex any kind of mayoral power, he found he was outmatched by the Soviets and the CCP, a fact which became evident to him throughout 1946. At that time a city wide confiscation of former Japanese owned properties was in full swing. Chi tried to use his position to confiscate valuable property for himself, but was turned away by CCP cadres. Chi even went so far as inviting some CCP cadres to a lavish banquet to try and bribe them into letting him takeover Japanese real-estate.
Chi, however, proved effective for the Soviets in unexpected ways. He had been appointed to keep up appearances of Soviet compliance with the Sino-Soviet Friendship agreement. When a Nationalist inspection team arrived Dalian in June 1947 with the hopes of negotiating a takeover of the city, it was Chi, essentially a useless figure in terms of real political power, who spent the most time with these officials. According to one press report, “Chi’s presence made the group members feel very uncomfortable.”\(^{34}\) He was not a Nationalist official, and was viewed by the inspection team members as a colonial-era traitor. When first greeting the team, Chi allegedly said, “The so-called government that rules China has never bothered itself to care for Dalian and its people. Now we have been liberated by the Soviet Red Army and have our own government here. I have been democratically elected as leader.”\(^{35}\) Such sentiments surely rattled the confidence of the inspection team members that they might have unquestioned support in the area. But it also made clear Soviet intentions. A “democratically elected” civilian government had already been established in the area, in full accordance with the Sino-Soviet treaties. There was thus no need for Nationalists officials here. It was their assumption that they would dominate any civilian government, but Chi, as a mouthpiece for the Soviets, proved them wrong. Chi’s appointment really did not help the CCP either, who had to swallow the bitter pill of coming in second, at least on paper, to colonial era capitalists.

_The Nationalist Government’s Expectations_

Like the Soviets and CCP, Nationalist intentions in Dalian can be explored at various levels. Following the defeat of the Japanese at the hands of the Soviet army, the
Nationalist government rushed to move its troops and officials into Manchuria in an effort to regain control of that region’s major cities before the CCP. As it was the Nationalists Government, not the CCP that had signed the Sino-Soviet Friendship Agreement, Chiang Kai-shek and other top officials had high hopes that their forces would be allowed to move into Dalian and build a city administration. He hoped to use the port to bolster his position in Manchuria.

In September 1945, on the heels of the Soviet victory in the Northeast, the Nationalists started planning how to recover Dalian. It would not be an easy task. After all, the city had been dominated by Japanese colonial powers for forty years. Leaders in Chongqing, the capital of the Nationalist government during much of the war with Japan, appointed a mayor for Dalian, Shen Yi, who began to set up the backbone of a city government from his offices in Chongqing and later Shanghai. Nationalist party branches were established by small groups of operatives in September and early October in Dalian, Lüshun, and in Jin county, a rural county to the north of Dalian city.36 Efforts to organize students met with success, and much of the city’s Chinese population was receptive to the Nationalist government, particularly students and intellectuals. Japanese memoirs, for example, recall that Nationalist flags were ubiquitous at public celebrations following the defeat of Japan.37 Finally, the Nationalists hoped to use the port at Dalian to land troops, and establish communications and air traffic control stations there in preparation for retaking all of Manchuria.38

Despite the fact that Nationalist officials had arrived earlier than their political rivals, the CCP, the Nationalists failed to build any lasting power on the Liaodong
peninsula. No Nationalist mayor ever stepped foot in Dalian, Shen only pushed papers in offices in Shanghai and Shenyang. On the diplomatic front, Chiang Kai-shek’s government struggled with the Soviet Union over interpretations of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Those conflicts surrounded the Soviet’s refusal to allow Nationalist troops to use the port at Dalian as an entry point and staging ground to retake Manchuria. A final attempt to investigate the situation and pressure the Soviets via an official inspection tour in early June, 1947 turned comical, as Nationalists officials on the trip were closely watched and chauffeured to and from prearranged inspection sites, unable to gather much valuable information. Adding insult to injury, Chi Zixiang, the colonial-era businessman appointed by the Soviets as head of the Guandong civilian government, was sent to greet the Nationalist officials. He revealed the Soviets strategy rather bluntly, stating that “the so-called government that rules China has never bothered itself to care for Dalian and its people. Now we have been liberated by the Soviet Red Army and have our own government here. I have been democratically elected as leader.”

The narrative of the Nationalist’s failures during the Civil War years (1945-1949) has of course been well documented. This scholarship leaves little doubt that their takeover of cities, for example, was fraught with corruption and ineffective administration. In the case of Dalian the Nationalists were stymied not by their own ineffectiveness or corruption, but by Soviet military authorities who refused to let them achieve their political and military goals for taking over the city. CCP memoirs reveal that the inspection tour was nothing more than a carefully planned, Soviet-orchestrated show designed to maintain the status quo: Soviet control, and limited, backdoor support
of CCP operations in Dalian.\textsuperscript{42} The Nationalists, for their part, failed to effectively organize workers, a segment of the population that would prove to be of the backbone of the CCP’s early support. However, as we shall see shortly, Nationalists operatives did challenge the emerging socialist order by using anti-Soviet nationalism to press for the speedy recovery of this crucial, “Chinese” territory. That this was incompatible with the political situation of Soviet occupation doomed the Nationalists locally, but it also put pressure on the CCP because it presented their operations as selling out to Soviet interests.

\textit{CCP Cadres}

The narrative emphasized by contemporary CCP sources that the Soviets aided the CCP in its efforts to build an urban base area in Dalian is largely correct. The long term presence of the Soviet military in Dalian did provide cover for CCP to send its cadres to the area, allowing them to rebuild certain industries and produce military goods to supply CCP armies in their military battles against the Nationalists. There were of course certain shared ideological goals between Soviet and Chinese cadres which might enable them to work together. As we will see in subsequent chapters, by the late 1940s and early 1950s, Dalian was ground zero for the propagation of Sino(CCP)-Soviet friendship, and was hailed as a showplace of Soviet-style, urban socialism in China.

None of this, however, was clear in 1945. Only in late 1947-early 1948, following the CCP’s decision to emphasize learning from the Soviet’s experience, would local CCP-Soviet relations begin to strengthen. In 1945, the Soviet’s willingness
to sign treaties with the Nationalists regarding the future of Manchuria struck a major blow to Yan’an’s hopes of quickly recovering that territory, as the jubilant news of the Soviet Union’s entry into the war with Japan quickly faded and CCP-Soviet relations faded into “an all time low.” Despite this, cadres were rushed to Dalian in the hopes of forging any kind of working relationship with Soviet military commanders. It was not until 1949, however, that the CCP was allowed to openly operate in the city. Up until that time, Soviet authorities would not permit cadres to go about their work openly in the name of the party. Thus, to build a base of support, cadres turned to an established mode of using institutions like labor unions and Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations to spread their message of socialist transformation to city residents.

The CCP’s inexperience in city administration and its diversity did not help matters. Cadres came from Yan’an, from Shandong, from the Soviet Union, and from local cells which had been underground throughout the colonial era. They now found themselves trying to come together and build control in a major city with little experience operating in such an environment. There simply was no script for recovering a major modern industrial center let alone one occupied by the Soviet military which was in the midst of playing a delicate political balancing act. In such a fluid environment, flexibility was crucial. However, for the CCP this often entailed making its own objectives and agendas subordinate to Soviet demands. That they had to do this at a time when building legitimacy in the eyes of the population was most important fuelled intense conflicts between the two, exposing key differences in their respective brands of socialism.
As if matters were not complicated enough, Soviet authorities and CCP cadres had to deal with Dalian’s huge Japanese population. Eventually the bulk of the city’s Japanese residents would be repatriated, but exactly when that would happen was unclear in late 1945. In the meantime, pressing questions about how to manage the Japanese community, and to what degree and in what capacity certain Japanese might be used to re-activate the industrial base of the city needed to be answered. With Nationalists playing an anti-Soviet nationalism card to criticize the Soviet’s actions and the CCP’s compliance with their authority in Dalian, the matter of allying with Japanese, from the CCP’s perspective, was made all the more difficult.


Japan’s military in Manchuria may have been swiftly defeated by Soviet forces in August 1945, but that did not sweep away forty years of colonial rule in Dalian overnight. As we have seen, forging a new political order on the soil of what had been the Guandong Leased Territory involved the interactions of the CCP, the Nationalists, local Chinese elites, and Soviet military authorities. It also involved the city’s Japanese population. This massive population included not only military troops, but also colonial officials, bureaucratic functionaries, police, industrial workers, students, shopkeepers, traders, doctors, teachers, wives and children. The majority of these people were not repatriated until well into 1947, some not until 1949 or later. The prolonged presence of Japanese nationals posed unique challenges for the city’s emerging Sino-Soviet order, marking it as one of the defining features of postwar Dalian.
Official sources highlight the CCP’s efforts to tear down the colonial order through mass rallies against high-profile Japanese capitalists, military men, colonial officials, and their Chinese collaborators. Doing so was an important way for the CCP to build legitimacy using proven methods of mass mobilization so effective in rural base areas. This was made all the more important because Soviet troops, not CCP cadres, were the visible liberators of Dalian. Yet the majority of the city’s Japanese residents were not war criminals or combatants. Moreover, for Soviet and CCP leaders there was no getting around the fact that in order to keep the city functioning and recover its vital wartime industries, Japanese managers, technicians, doctors, and even colonial administrators, were needed at their posts. For example, 700 of the 2600 functionaries serving in the Soviet-sanctioned government established in late 1945 were Japanese.\textsuperscript{45} In the medical field, Japanese made up over 95 percent of the city’s doctors and nurses. The repatriation of these medical workers in 1947 and 1948 posed a great challenge for the few Chinese doctors in Dalian, who scrambled to train people as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{46} Japanese technicians and their families were among the last to be repatriated, a fact that further highlights their important role in Dalian. In 1949, roughly half of the 2,600 Japanese individuals remaining in Dalian were technicians, most of who were scattered throughout Chinese and Soviet run industries.\textsuperscript{47}

To fully understand the social and political conditions in Dalian between 1945 and 1950, we must pay attention to how Soviet military officials and CCP cadres managed and used the Japanese population to successfully accomplish their rebuilding efforts. Japanese civilians, particularly industrial managers, technicians, and those with other technical skills in fact played highly visible roles in Dalian’s postwar
reconstruction. This is perhaps surprising given that the Soviets’ treatment of Japanese in Manchuria ranged from indifference to brutality, imprisonment, and rape. Likewise, CCP cadres from rural base areas were trained in an environment of total war against Japan, their success in which was a major source of legitimacy in the eyes of those living in CCP controlled areas. Indeed, an entire culture of resistance had been fostered by the CCP during the years of conflict with Japan. Now cadres were asked to govern and in some cases, learn from Japanese technicians. Moreover, they had the difficult task of having to explain such action to people at a time when they were fighting to establish their legitimacy among a host of other political actors including the Soviets and Nationalists.

The Nationalists too, had to deal with the continued presence of Japanese in cities under their control. They faced many of the same challenges that Soviet and CCP authorities did, including the unpopular move of keeping Japanese skilled workers on the job and keeping colonial police forces on their beats. In Nationalist-held cities in Manchuria, the Nationalists government even went so far as to establish a bureau to look after the Japanese communities needs. However, major differences existed between how Nationalists and the CCP dealt with Japanese in cities under their control. The most important of which was that Nationalists were never able to incorporate Japanese participation in rebuilding postwar China into any kind of ideological framework. In fact, certain Nationalist sources reveal poignant criticisms of the high status afforded to Japanese experts by Soviet and CCP cadres in Dalian. For the CCP, using Japanese managers, technicians, and skilled laborers not only contributed to rebuilding Dalian’s industrial base and economy, but also became an important way to
demonstrate that a new socialist order was at hand, an order that was in theory at least, truly internationalists and inclusive of Japanese, Korean, Russian, and Chinese alike.

Policies for Protecting Japanese Civilians

On the morning of October 2, 1945 an earthquake jolted Dalian and the Liaodong peninsula, further shaking the already rattled nerves of Japanese residents who began to panic about dwindling food supplies, a lack of water and power, and the menacing presence of armed Russian men in their neighborhoods. Like most of Dalian’s residents, the Japanese experienced the chaos of 1945 and 1946 with great anxiety. Many had lived in the city for decades, enjoying the spoils of colonial life in one of the most modern cities in Northeast China. Now defeated citizen and soldier alike faced an uncertain future. In the chaotic weeks following the arrival of Soviet troops, Japanese were easy prey for looting soldiers and mob violence. Rape was not uncommon, and neighborhoods did their best to protect their families and their property. Men organized themselves into neighborhood defense teams and women ventured out only if necessary for fear of being sexually assaulted by Soviet soldiers. Thousands more Japanese refugees came to Dalian from other parts of Manchuria by the train full. Among them were no small number of youths, some of whom were organized into last ditch “Hokoku eikyu tai” [Heroic Dedication to Manzhouguo Brigades]. With no way out and nowhere to go, amidst a city filling up with Japanese refugees lucky enough to have escaped with their lives from northern Manchuria, it is not difficult to sense the panic and tension in the air.
Such tension could and did spill over into full blown unrest. Tokisane Hiroshi, a Japanese police translator fluent in Chinese lived in Dalian at the end of the war. In his memoirs, he recalls reports of armed clashes between Chinese and Japanese pouring into police precincts each night, as gunshots rang out from all neighborhoods in the city. Small fights grew into large scale conflicts. On August 25, just days after Soviet troops arrived, ecstatic Chinese went parading through the streets, waving the (Nationalist) Chinese flag, eager for the arrival of Nationalist troops. When they reached Jōban bashi, a street on their parade route, a Japanese spectator made the unwise decision of tearing a flag away from a Chinese marcher. The parade ground to a halt and chaos ensued as more and more people joined the fray. A riot broke out in which dozens of people were seriously injured and nearby Japanese businesses were ransacked.

In the early hours of September 1, 1945 another major confrontation erupted which threatened to pit Japanese against Chinese in full scale street battles. Seitoku Street, where the incident occurred, was located between the densely populated Chinese district of Xiaogangzi and Japanese residential areas of the Shahekou district. In the days before Soviet troops arrived rumors spread throughout the city’s Chinese neighborhoods that defeated Japanese soldiers were going to attack, and that towns and neighborhoods should prepare to defend themselves. In the ensuing weeks Japanese residents of Seitoku Street, themselves fearful of Chinese attacks, organized their own self-defense team headed by a retired Guandong army officer named Iwai Kanroku. Under Iwai’s direction they built a barricade between the Chinese and Japanese
neighborhoods in an effort to stop Chinese from looting their homes.\textsuperscript{61} Patriotic young men swelled the ranks of Iwai’s group, prompting him to call for one last battle.\textsuperscript{62}

With Japanese and Chinese alike arming themselves for fear of mutual attack, a clash seemed inevitable. On the night of September 1, an armed mob of Chinese surrounded Iwai’s neighborhood. Armed with pistols and swords, Iwai’s men moved toward the equally well armed Chinese crowd.\textsuperscript{63} Only the direct intervention by a high ranking Japanese police officer, who dramatically urged the crowd to disperse, stopped the brewing fight. He screamed at the armed youth, urging them to come to terms that “we are the people who lost the war!” He further warned that violent actions would only lead to “the annihilation of Dalian’s Japanese.” After bitterly cursing the police officer, the young men dispersed. Several weeks later, on September 12, over 100 Japanese youths, armed with swords, attacked a group of Chinese at an abandoned air raid shelter, killing three.\textsuperscript{64} Despite the presence of Soviet forces, a power vacuum existed in many neighborhoods throughout Dalian, highlighting the very real danger of the city descending into armed conflict between Chinese and Japanese. Furthermore, the Soviet military’s own predatory actions against Japanese and Chinese city-dwellers further exacerbated rising tensions.

By late November 1945 much of the lawlessness had been reigned in and General Kozlov, along with CCP leaders, turned his attention to the development of long term policies to deal with Dalian’s Japanese community. On November 24, 1945 the Soviet-backed local government issued “Decisions regarding policies for the treatment of Japanese residents” (\textit{Dalian shi zhengfu guanyu duidai Riben ren zhengce de jueding}). This ten-point proclamation was the first major statement about the city’s
Japanese residents put forth by Soviet and CCP authorities. It emphasized that not all Japanese were war criminals, and that those with technical skills were vital to building a new Dalian. They, the report emphasized, should be separated from the war criminals and organized to follow the same path as Chinese in the struggle to “building a democratic, free, prosperous new Dalian.” It called for the protection of small businesses and industries owned by Japanese, and for an end to racial antagonisms between Chinese and Japanese.65

One week later the city government issued a public version of the report in *Renmin husheng*, one of the first Chinese language daily newspapers published in postwar Dalian. The “Dalian city government’s administrative program for Japanese nationals” (*Dalian shi zhengfu dui Riben qiaomin shizheng gangling*), opens with a stern warning that any Japanese caught hiding weapons would be considered a war criminal. It then goes on to reassure Japanese residents that their livelihoods were to be protected. Japanese owners of small industries and businesses, workers with technical knowledge, and well known intellectuals were ordered to register with the government. Welfare for those without work was to be provided by Soviet-sanctioned organizations from within the Japanese community itself. The blueprint also called for the elevation of Japanese women in society, including the freedom to marry. The mobilization and participation of women in the city’s rebuilding efforts will be discussed in Chapter 6. Here it is important to note that Japanese women, like their Chinese counterparts, were to participate openly in the new socialist order as workers. Eventually this category penetrated into the home, and in May Day celebrations in 1948, Japanese housewives
marched in the parades and took part in organized labor activities. Finally, no mention was made about when and how Japanese nationals would be repatriated.66

*Those Unwilling to Surrender*

The emerging policy for dealing with Japanese called for a distinction between war criminals and “ordinary Japanese nationals” (yiban Riben qiaomin). It is no surprise that some patriotic loyalist Japanese, particularly those in the military, chose to continue the fight. Violent action by Japanese troops and officers unwilling to surrender after August 1945 stretched well into 1946. One of the most dramatic incidents occurred in March 1946, when a major gun battle raged between Japanese gendarmes and Chinese and Soviet police, resulting in the deaths of six Chinese police, four Soviet soldiers, and several Japanese bystanders.67 The case involved a former military police officer named Tanaka, who along with several colleagues carried out a clandestine operation to attack the city’s new authorities. After recovering a stash of hidden weapons, they robbed and killed both Chinese and Japanese alike in a series of home invasion robberies until their plot was discovered. In the early morning hours of March 10, 1946, Tanaka and his cohort were surrounded by plainclothesmen from Dalian’s nascent CCP-controlled police force in an abandoned building in Ōsaka chō, a neighborhood in colonial Dalian’s red light district. A major battle ensued as Chinese police made numerous attempts to storm the building only to be turned away by gunshots from Tanaka and his men. Pinned down by gunfire, they even forced a Japanese man to try and break open the iron gate to the building using an axe. That
Typical of the growing tensions between Soviet and Chinese cadres, Soviet gendarmes arrived on the scene only after hours of heavy gunfire and pleas from Chinese police for help. Moreover they promptly accused the Chinese of cowardice. A Soviet team then attempted to storm the building only to retreat after an officer was struck by a bullet in the forearm. Desperate for a plan of action, police then summoned an elderly Japanese man who happened to be passing by on his way to market. He was ordered to enter the building to try and see where Tanaka and his men were hiding. The man entered the building armed only with a gourd he had been carrying! After a few tense moments of silence a shot rang out. The gourd-bearing old man had been shot in the head. Finally, by late afternoon, the standoff came to a close as Tanaka’s men set fire to the building to cover their escape. It is not known how many died in the fire, but Tanaka managed to flee. He made it to Wafangdian, a town at the northeastern border of Soviet-controlled territory. After several clandestine trips back to Dalian, Tanaka was finally caught in May, 1946. 69

News of the battle and death of CCP policemen was highly publicized and politicized. Local papers praised the heroism of the police, along with their spirit of “serving the people” along with their willingness to keep up the fight to capture the “Japanese fascist gang.” 70 Fighting and capturing Japanese resisters was a sure way to build legitimacy in the eyes of the population, and base area-cadres, trained in an environment of resisting Japan, were well suited to the task. However, this type of operation was a far cry from the type of deliberate, CCP-orchestrated struggle sessions
designed to rile the masses and inspire their awe of the CCP and its cadres, tactics downplayed and blocked by Soviet authorities.

Hunting down Japanese militarists was thus only one side of the coin. The vast majority of Dalian’s Japanese population did not actively resist the new order. We have seen that Soviet authorities and CCP cadres made moves to control and include labor in Dalian’s new power structure almost immediately upon their arrival in the city. Japanese labor was no exception. With Soviet backing, Japanese managers and technicians were allowed not only to remain in their positions in key industries throughout Dalian, but also to form their own union, which quickly grew to become the main institution through which Soviets and CCP cadres controlled the city’s Japanese population. The subject of Japanese postwar labor activities will be taken up in detail in chapter six. For the present chapter it is important to note that the union was led by high profile leftists, many of whom were imprisoned in the closing years of the war for their criticisms of the war, and that this organization became the most visible and powerful postwar Japanese institution in Dalian.

This section has explored how the expectations of various political actors in Dalian were seldom met given local realities. Just as building a new order in Dalian involved new sets of cooperative relationships, like those between Japanese labor and Soviet and CCP authorities, it also involved new sets of contestations and conflict. Japanese participation in rebuilding Dalian, for example, was necessary given the lack of trained Chinese technicians, but when that participation came at the expense of Chinese workers, it led to tensions between Soviet and CCP authorities. This, along
with increasingly vocal efforts by Nationalists to cast Soviet control as a foreign
occupation, threatened to destabilize the political situation in Lüda.

**Nationalist Protests and Anti-Soviet Nationalism**

Blocked from assuming a high profile in the Soviet-brokered political apparatus
in Dalian and unable to use the area for any military purposes, it is easy to see the
Nationalist government’s experience as nothing but a failure. Wang Yuyang, the
Nationalists leading official sent to Dalian had no sooner established a small
headquarters as he was arrested by Soviet gendarmes for spreading anti-Soviet
propaganda.\(^{71}\) Things were no better for his replacement, who was essentially forced to
work underground in the city. However, Nationalist operatives did have success in
mobilizing students and intellectuals in the city, and lead protests that harnessed a strain
of nationalism that exposed the Soviets activities in Dalian in a negative light. While
these activities were quickly contained in Dalian itself, their message was carried
throughout the nation via press reports and books published in Shanghai and Nanjing
which put the city on the Nationalist’s map as a pivotal battle ground against
communism and “red imperialism.”\(^{72}\) Recovery of Dalian thus became essential for the
health of China as a whole. One Nationalist book on the situation in Dalian, published
in 1947, urged its readers “to pay great attention to Lüda, it is an issue of our nations
survival, if we cave easily to Soviet demands, we are committing suicide.”\(^{73}\)

*Anti-Soviet Student Protests: 1945-1947*
Nationalist operatives reached Dalian as early as September 1945, and while they had little success among workers, they did enjoy popular support from students and intellectuals. CCP leaders recall that in schools throughout the city there were anti-Soviet slogans pasted as early as October 1945. The group largely responsible for such activity, the Lüda Youth Volunteers (Lüda qingnian yiyonghui), traced its origins to nationalistic student groups active during the colonial era, and saw itself continuing the fight to return Dalian to China. It was reorganized by Nationalists shortly after their arrival in the city into the Three People’s Principals Youth Corps (Sanmin zhuyi qingniantuan). Its most visible function in 1945 and 1946 was to lead student protests on the streets of the city.

The first major student demonstration against the Soviet authorities occurred on November 12, 1945. Like many student protests in China, this one began as a commemoration of an important historical date, in this case Sun Yat-sen’s birthday. The Soviets had also just completed setting up a civilian government for the city. Over 10,000 students gathered in the morning at a park and gave speeches for several hours. In the afternoon they took the streets and gathered in front of police stations and newly established government offices carrying placards and shouting slogans; “Down with the puppet government!” “Support the Nationalist government!” “Welcome Mayor Shen Yi!” and “Topple Communism!” When police arrived to calm the situation, things quickly escalated as students began pelting them with rocks. Eventually they were dispersed.

Just as the Soviets and the CCP were taking part in the city’s first May Day celebrations, another round of Nationalist-led protests erupted. Students carrying pro-
Nationalists banners attempted to take part in parades that day but were stopped by union militia members. Seizing the momentum of May Fourth, the seminal date of the first modern protests in China in 1919 and considered the birth of modern Chinese nationalism and student activism, Nationalist leaders pushed the anti-imperialist message further. In commemorative lectures to students that day set up by CCP cadres, Nationalist organizers sent students to the podium to pose questions likening the Soviets to imperialists, armed with unequal treaties and military force and asked cadres to explain the situation, causing a great deal of commotion. Two days later, on 6 May 1947, students broke into teams and went to neighborhoods throughout Dalian to spread anti-Soviet, pro-Nationalist propaganda.

Soviet and CCP police quickly put a stop to organized protests in the city, but not before an important message had been sent. Questions about Soviet imperialism put CCP cadres in a difficult spot. Local CCP cadres too viewed certain Soviet actions and intentions in Dalian in a negative light. They now had the unenviable task of having to build their own legitimacy under Soviet rule. In short, as we will explore later in chapter 6, the burden fell on them to come up with answers to the questions raised by students about Soviet imperialism, and their relations with the Soviet authorities.

Taking Their Case to the Nation: Dalian in the Chinese Press

The Nationalists were quick to seize on their difficulties in recovering Dalian, and like the student protests, used their failures to point out dubious Soviet intentions for the region. In books and articles written during the late 1940s, the situation in Dalian was cast as a life and death struggle for the nation in the context of civil war and
the march of global communism. Those Nationalist officials and operatives who had been arrested and exiled from the city took their case to the media and to Chiang Kai-shek’s government. In April 1947 a letter was sent by these leaders to Chiang himself, in which the Soviet’s occupation was portrayed as no different from the Japanese claims to the territory. Likening the situation to a “second 9/18,” the date of Japan’s seizure by force of Manchuria, the letter demanded “the return of Lüda by force.”

The recovery of Dalian was marked as “the touchstone of China’s survival.” The argument was laid out that without Dalian, there could be little control of Manchuria, and without Manchuria, there was no hope of rebuilding China. Dalian was thus, according to one source, far more important than Harbin. Plans were drawn for a Lüda Commemorative Hall [Lüda jinianguan] to be built in Nanjing, as if to serve as a permanent reminder to the Nationalist government of imperialist injustice. As much as this type of coverage stoked popular resentment against Soviet imperialism and the need to fight for Dalian, it also exposed the Nationalist’s weaknesses. Press coverage of the failure of the inspection tours revealed helpless officials bullied by the Soviets and their “puppet” government. Editorials urged action “Port Arthur (Lüshun) and Dalian are Chinese territories, and China has a sovereign right to take them over. Whoever prevents China from taking them over will be China’s enemy.” The next time Dalian commanded so much national attention was in 1949, when, with the Nationalists all but defeated in China, it was portrayed by the CCP as a vanguard Sino-Soviet production metropolis. Yet the ease at which this apparent transition was made, from a center of Soviet imperialism to a major production city in new China masks more than just the
different perspectives of Nationalist and CCP commentators. It hides the fact that relations between CCP cadres and Soviet authorities in Dalian were far from cordial.

The “Lüda Incident” and Sino-Soviet Conflict in Occupied Lüda, 1945-1950

As hundreds of CCP cadres poured into Lüda from rural liberated areas in late 1945, a key question was how their vision of governing a former Japanese colonial urban center might relate to that of the Soviet Union. We have seen the fact that the Soviet’s negotiations with the Nationalists had already struck a blow to the CCP’s confidence that they might be allowed to easily move into the area with Soviet assistance. One recent publication, referring to the issue of the Soviet military’s ten year presence in the area, summarized the situation quite bluntly “In taking over Lüda, the local CCP organization and its efforts to build a new life and political system for its people faced a severe test.”

Lüda may have been fertile ground for the CCP, but it was also an environment ripe for conflict. The political and social problems which lay ahead would indeed test the early relations between the CCP and the Soviet Union in this local setting. The “Lüda Incident” and its aftermath, in which several top-ranking CCP cadres in Lüda were ordered to step down by the Soviet military authorities, provides an important window through which to view local Sino-Soviet political relations.

Buildup to a Crisis: Street-level Conflicts and Limitations to Communist CCP Operations
Upon their arrival in October 1945, CCP cadres confronted the reality of Soviet military rule in Lüda. The Soviet occupation army’s misconduct toward Chinese civilians put strains on Sino-Soviet relations almost immediately. While details of this sort are difficult to find in the available sources, internal publications and CCP memoirs provide a glimpse into the problem of troop misconduct, particularly sexual assaults on Chinese women. One case in particular highlights the tensions this sparked between Chinese cadres and Soviet soldiers.

Liu Yuquan was one of seven cadres from the Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Army who were sent to Lüda and trusted by Soviet authorities to head a district police force. These men had spent time in the Soviet Union, wore Soviet military uniforms, and were among the first wave of CCP personnel sent to the area, often arriving alongside Soviet forces. As such, they enjoyed a privileged position compared with other CCP operatives. One day it was brought to Liu’s attention that two Soviet Air force officers were raping a Chinese woman. Liu arrived on the scene of the attack and angrily refused to let the two men leave. During the heat of the argument, one of the officers un-holstered his firearm and put a round in the chamber. Feeling threatened, Liu fired on the man, killing him. It turned out that the Soviet officer killed was a decorated war hero, a fact that prompted a full-scale investigation of the incident by Soviet authorities. Liu was eventually released on the grounds of self defense and because the men had indeed raped the Chinese woman, but he was forced to leave Lüda. Dong Chongbin, also a Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Army officer, likewise recalls having to forcibly stop a Soviet soldier from sexually assaulting a Chinese
woman. The episode ended when Dong disarmed the man and brought him to a local police station.  

Less violent problems also lurked in the complicated task of building some sort of political order to govern the residents of Lüda. We have seen that the Soviets, in accordance with the stipulations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, appointed a civilian mayor for Dalian. Although Chi Zixiang was only a figurehead, his presence at all official functions was a constant source of annoyance for the CCP. Han Guang, the CCP secretary in Lüda from October 1945 to July 1948, recalls the countless times he called on Soviet authorities to remove Chi, only to be rebuffed. In April 1947, when the Soviets established a civil administration for the whole of the Lüda area, Chi was again tabbed as the visible leader.

Other Soviet appointments were also poorly received. Pan Chengyu, a colonial-era labor boss, was allowed to serve as head of police for a neighborhood encompassing the downtown core of Dalian. Han Guang and other CCP leaders wanted him removed and replaced with one of their own. On the afternoon of November 17, 1945 Pan was seized by the CCP’s police force. Upon hearing this news, the head of the Soviet military security bureau in Dalian sent for Han Guang. Han was berated for arresting a Soviet-appointed policeman. The furious Soviet official informed Han that he and his men now faced arrest for their actions. Only cautious discussions with Kozlov days later resolved the situation.

Troop misconduct and unpopular political appointments were one source of early conflict between the CCP and the Soviet military in Lüda. These issues began to subside by the middle of 1946, when a new problem arose, one with more damaging
consequences for local CCP authority. As more and more cadres arrived from Shandong and North China, they began to go about their work using the tactics honed during their tenure in rural CCP base areas in the War of Resistance against Japan. In both rural and urban areas of Lüda, businessmen, landlords, labor bosses, and former colonial police collaborators were all likely targets for the CCP’s “settling of accounts” movement.

No sooner had these cadres started their activities than Soviet authorities began to restrict and in some cases, violently stop them. Indeed, the years 1946 and 1947 may be viewed as a period of political contestation and conflict, where the different operating styles of CCP cadres and local Soviet military leaders clashed. With CCP urban policy still in its infancy, cadres found themselves not only on the frontlines of forging a game plan for urban governance, they also had to deal on a daily basis with Soviet military authorities who attempted to restrain their efforts. Eventually, an emphasis on strengthening Sino-Soviet relations emerged as a dominant theme in political work here. However, the strength of Soviet authority in Lüda had yet to be tested, and the attractiveness of Soviet guidance and models for urban management were, for many of the cadres sent here, secondary to their own tactics and needs. Even in Lüda’s outlying rural areas, many of the CCP’s standard tactics for developing mass support came under fire from Soviet military authorities.

The Soviets initially had no specific orders about activities in the countryside. That began to change, however, as cadres began to conduct “settling of accounts” movements and land reform in February and March 1946. After witnessing a mass meeting in Jin county, a rural area north of Dalian, Soviet authorities called for such
activity to stop, for it seemed to them to be a disorderly, destabilizing attempt at social
reordering. Cadres believed that the Soviets simply did not understand their intentions
and tactics. Miscommunication had dire consequences for land reform activities in
rural areas throughout Lüda. Cadres in a village southwest of Dalian organized a mass
rally to denounce a local landlord. Informed that the meeting was a cover for armed
bandits preparing to go on a looting spree, Soviet troops arrived and fired upon the
sizable crowd. The cadres in charge of the meeting were arrested, and it was only after
Wang Qiren, the CCP secretary for Lushun, urged an investigation into the matter that
the men were released. Wang, a cadre sent from Shandong in November 1945, refused
to accept Soviet interference in mass mobilization efforts. He openly confronted the
Soviet officers, saying “Chiang Kai-shek doesn’t grant the common people the freedom
to assemble and now you Soviets also won’t allow them to hold meetings either!”

But it was Jin county that became a hotbed of conflict over land reform. One
might think countryside would be fair game for CCP, however, northern Jin county was
the border between Soviet-controlled Lüda, and Nationalist China. Nationalist sources
report that the county was swelling with over 10,000 “refugees” from Dalian. Unrest
here would be very threatening to Soviet control, and might result in attempts by
Nationalists forces to move in. In 1947, major problems erupted in Meijiacun village.
There village cadres, defying Soviet orders, had been carrying out land reform
“secretly.” Soviet authorities soon discovered this, and immediately called on Jin
county’s CCP secretary, Chen Shaojing. Chen was informed that the cadres involved
would be jailed. The head of the Soviet garrison in the area reportedly even told the
landlords involved not to worry, that this sort of trouble would soon stop. A CCP
work report also mentions the problems in Jin county. It describes an episode in which Soviet authorities, upon discovering land reform activities in an unnamed village, actually ordered cadres to return confiscated land to a landlord.\textsuperscript{95} The more their efforts were blocked the more the cadres began to grumble that Soviets were against all agrarian work and were meddling in China’s internal political issues.\textsuperscript{96} Cadres like Wang Lizhi, sent from Shandong to serve as a district head in Jin county, were so despondent with the situation that they actually used a variety of excuses to leave. In Wang’s case, he said he had to return home to look after his family. Actually he returned to work in his original base area.\textsuperscript{97}

Efforts to hold mass meetings denouncing traitors and labor bosses within city limits were initially more successful than those in rural areas. Available sources discuss “settling of accounts” movements in poor neighborhoods throughout Dalian, and little is mentioned about direct Soviet interference. Liu Yunguang, a labor leader sent to Lüda in November 1945 from Shandong, recalls in his memoirs the difficulty he faced as he tried to convene a mass meeting in a poor neighborhood. “We wanted to root out traitors, counter-revolutionaries, and landlords. Especially in ‘the Red Building’ (Hong fangzi), people there had started struggling against traitors and colonial-era henchmen. How could we stop them? We had to guide them. The Soviets did not allow us to hold these kinds of meetings. They said Moscow doesn’t have these policies, and told us to stop them and if we had carried them out, to correct our ways."\textsuperscript{98} Despite Soviet wishes, Liu and other cadres did carry out open struggle sessions against traitors and colonial-era labor bosses.\textsuperscript{99} However, Han Guang, bowing to Soviet pressure, called for an end to this type of activity by late 1946. Han was later criticized for allowing these
operations to take place given the strong objections of the Soviet authorities to all forms of public CCP-led mass movements. Another problem with such activity, from the CCP’s point of view, was the fact that many high value targets, big businessmen like Chi Zixiang and Zhang Benzheng, both of whom grew rich during colonial days, were protected by the Soviets. Any hopes of dragging Chi Zixiang onto the stage at a mass struggle meeting and forcibly dividing his wealth among the poor were laid to rest when he was appointed head of the Soviet-supported civilian administration of Lüda in April 1947.

The CCP’s most successful programs in urban areas throughout 1946 and early 1947 aimed at alleviating the most pressing issues facing the urban poor. When these efforts did not involve open struggle, or the forcible seizure of land and property, Soviet authorities were willing to grant the CCP some flexibility and assistance. One program involved a city-wide movement to relocate poor families from outlying shanty-town areas into the apartments and houses formerly occupied by Dalian’s Japanese residents. One-fourth of the city’s population before 1945, the Japanese had controlled over 65 percent of Dalian’s real estate. The repatriation of Japanese citizens beginning in late 1946 freed up considerable housing space throughout the city, and by the end of 1946, over 16,000 Chinese families had been relocated into apartments formerly occupied by Japanese. Because the movement involved settling people into the empty property left by the Japanese, open class-conflict was minimized, a factor that meshed well with the Soviet policy of avoiding such conflict. This allowed the CCP an outlet for its desire to build support among urban residents. The movement was highly publicized in the local media, with much praise for the Soviets’ aid.
The CCP thus met with a measure of success in carrying out some of its programs within the city limits of Dalian. Urban “settling of accounts” meetings, although eventually put to an end, were not forcibly halted like they had been in the countryside. The CCP’s experience in urban governance in Lüda through 1947 consisted of alleviating housing needs, providing short-term menial labor jobs to the many unemployed, feeding the population, building a police force, and competing with the Soviets for control over various leftover resources from the Japanese colonial period. While these measures ensured temporary social stability, the CCP in Lüda faced the greater challenge of how to manage and mold a more permanent urban society, and how to bring factories back on line while providing for an urban workforce. Moreover, they had to do so in ways that did not conflict with Soviet authorities, who had their own agenda, to say nothing of greater experience in governing cities and managing labor in large-scale industries. These unique political conditions led cadres in Lüda to confront early on what would be one of the key themes in the history of the early People’s Republic: to what extent, and in what capacity, would they follow the Soviet Union? Some cadres found the limitations placed on them to be too great. Others developed a distrust of Soviet officials and a disdain for their policies in Lüda. Things came to a boiling point in 1947, as several of Lüda’s top cadres began to speak out openly and aggressively against Soviet control, and began refusing to act in accordance with their policies.

*Growing Pains: CCP Cadres Revolt*
One of the first things that CCP cadres had to do when they arrived in Lüda was change their wardrobe. Quite literally, a fashion makeover was mandated by Soviet authorities for officials serving in the Guandong Administration, the civilian government established by the Soviets in April 1947. Cadres in Lüda were expected to wear western-style suits, a necktie, and leather shoes. In his memoirs, Han Guang refers to this policy as one of the “special characteristics” of working in Lüda, where the military-style uniforms and clothing common in other base areas were prohibited. Han recalls, “we called this the ‘watermelon policy’ (xigua zhengci), green on the outside, red on the inside.”107 Other top cadres were less willing to adapt to such conditions. Liu Shunyuan, vice CCP Secretary of Lüda, reportedly despised this regulation. Born and raised a farmer in Shandong, he was never comfortable in a suit and tie. Liu even received jabs from Soviet officers for his grooming habits. One Soviet official reportedly commented to Han Guang about Liu, “your man Liu, doesn’t he have enough money for a haircut? Tell him to come in (to Soviet army headquarters) and we can loan him some.”108

The issue of proper attire was but one of the policies and regulations in Lüda that were a difficult fit for many cadres. Throughout the late 1940s, the local CCP makeup could best be described as a diverse mix of revolutionary base area cadres, seasoned local underground operatives, and those like Han Guang, who had studied in the Soviet Union and had proficient Russian language ability. They came to Lüda with different agendas, different directives, and different experiences. Some were sent from neighboring Shandong to purchase clothing, medicine, and even munitions for the CCP’s civil war efforts. These people had little permanent stake in local politics, they
were there to get what they needed and leave. Others were sent to establish all sorts of trade and small manufacturing companies to raise funds for their area. Although these cadres remained in Lüda, their objective was to aid the economy of their respective base areas. The long-term economic and social development of an urban center like Dalian was of secondary importance. Such enterprises paid little attention to resource conservation, and were later criticized as “killing the hen to get the eggs” (sha ji qu luan). Cadres like Tang Yunchao, the head of Dalian’s labor union, had been working underground in the area for years. Others, like Liu Shunyuan, were sent from Shandong to serve in the local government. This diversity made forging a single road for urban management difficult. It also led cadres to view Soviet authority through a variety of lenses based on their own background and experience.

What came to light in 1947 were divisions among this diverse cast of CCP leadership at the crucial moment when the CCP’s mission grew from controlling rural areas to include larger urban centers, particularly in the Northeast. Those in charge of Lüda were on the forefront of a trend culminating in Mao’s 1949 proclamation that the city was to lead the countryside. The CCP’s political mission was shifting, and many cadres in charge of urban work found themselves criticized throughout 1947-1948 for their continued attempt to transfer rural-based policies to urban environments. Yet in Lüda, one must also take into account conflicts between CCP cadres and Soviet authorities as part of this political picture. Serious rifts began emerging between local cadres in positions of authority and their Soviet counterparts as the latter’s way of doing things began to be widely implemented. Such rifts led to a major Soviet-initiated
shakeup of local leadership in late 1947 which highlights the extent of Soviet power and the centrality of the Sino-Soviet relationship in local politics in Lüda.

To best describe and explain what happened between CCP leaders and Soviet authorities, it is worth briefly examining the backgrounds and actions of two of the main cadres involved in the “Lüda Incident” of 1947. Tang Yunchao arrived in Dalian in 1945 from neighboring Jinzhou, where he had worked in an underground capacity during the final year of the War of Resistance. Tang was a local man, born in Jinzhou. He had spent his career organizing workers in Dalian throughout the 1920s and had served three jail terms for his activities there. Armed with the task of organizing workers and building the foundations for a massive labor union, Tang’s main charge in August 1945 was to create teams to protect factories and industrial equipment from being stolen or destroyed. By early September 1945, Tang’s union had over 200 members representing 52 different small factories, and grew exponentially within a matter of months. His reputation for looking out for workers and his fiery style of confrontational tactics earned him the respect of his constituents, but also garnered disdain from his targets, including wealthy colonial-era businessmen like Zhang Benzheng, from whom Tang regularly demanded cash donations for his union.

It was, however, his attitude toward the Soviet occupation forces which would have the most profound effect on Tang’s career. As efforts to revive production picked up steam in late 1946 and early 1947, Tang’s clashes with Soviet authorities escalated. This was particularly true in factories under Soviet control. His distrust and eventual rejection of Soviet guidance stemmed from several specific incidents. The first issue involved a loss of face for Tang. Soviet factory leaders at the Dalian locomotive factory,
a former Japanese industry under Soviet control, told Chinese workers that they were safeguarding equipment and new uniforms in the factory storehouse. Tang negotiated a purchase price for the goods, and upon delivery of the cash the items were to be distributed to his workers. It turned out that what he had negotiated to buy were nothing but piles of rags and used uniforms. When Tang demanded the money be returned his requests were denied. He had been ripped off, and his workers knew it.

Conflicts lurked in the area of wages as well. Through 1946 and 1947, workers in Lüda’s factories were frequently paid in grain. Promised that his workers in Soviet-controlled factories would have comparable salaries to those in Chinese enterprises (which had higher wages as part of the CCP’s policy for developing the support of the working class), Tang found that in fact workers at the Soviet enterprises were receiving between five and ten kilograms less grain than those at Chinese factories. According to Soviet authorities, Tang reported this openly through his union publications, and even allowed his workers to refer to the Soviet Union as “an imperialist country.” In spring 1947 Tang complained openly about these issues at a welcoming meeting for a general from the Soviet Far East Military division. For the Soviets, Tang’s behavior crossed the line. In a summary of their indictment against him, Soviet authorities highlighted the following incidents. Tang’s union routinely ignored Soviet proclamations and failed to carry articles lauding the Soviet’s liberation of the Northeast in their publications. His popularity led workers to “praise him for helping them, for liberating them” while no mention was made of Soviet assistance. Concerned primarily with the immediate welfare of his workers, Tang, according to the Soviets, saw little future in his trade union’s relationship with them. In one of the few
references made in available sources to Gao Gang, Tang mentions in his memoir that Gao had pronounced him guilty of being “anti-Soviet” (fan Su). Tang’s days in Lüda were numbered.

Liu Shunyuan was one of the top cadres in Lüda. He was vice CCP secretary in Lüda, and the vice chair of the visible “civilian” government, the “Guandong Administrative Office” (Guandong xingzheng gongshu) set up by the Soviets in April 1947. Liu was also one of the most outspoken critics of Soviet authority, and it was his contestation of several key policies that set in motion a major purge of CCP leadership in Lüda. To be sure, even before his protests arose over specific policies, Liu had problems with the Soviets’ way of doing things. In his memoirs, he recalls what he considered to be the oppressive presence of Soviet liaison officers in all CCP organizations. “Every office, no matter how big or small had a Soviet military representative, and for all affairs, big or small, you had to have his support to do anything,” he complained. “When they wanted something done it was handed down like an order. If you argued, or refused to act you would be reprimanded.” Particularly disturbing for Liu was the Soviet’s presence at CCP meetings, even at those where cadres were criticized. “When, in our meetings, the discussion heated up, they (Soviets) were there, watching and listening. I never grew accustomed to this.”

The first of Liu’s major confrontations involved his outright criticism and mistrust of Soviet authorities in carrying out currency reforms in 1947. The Soviet military had been issuing its own currency since arriving in the Northeast in August 1945. However, as their forces pulled out of all but Lüda, the CCP feared that the Nationalists might use the cash to flood the Lüda market, severely affecting prices and
causing even more economic instability. To solve the problem, Soviet authorities initiated a plan to revalue the notes in circulation. Residents could exchange their old Soviet military dollars for new ones at the set rate of ten to one. A limit of 300 dollars (of old notes) per person could be changed. Liu and other top cadres had little or no knowledge of the plan until it was ready to be implemented and had no say in the exchange rates. Liu was fearful of the effects the switch might have on the average resident’s standard of living, and so vehemently protested the idea. He even ordered subordinates to disregard the policy. Soviet authorities, trying to ease the situation, explained to Liu and other skeptics that they had conducted research into the matter, and the situation would only hurt rich people, not average workers. Liu simply did not trust Soviets or their policies.

Liu’s protests hit crisis level, however, when he began to openly denounce and ignore his posting in the Soviet-installed civilian government. Criticizing the organization for being composed of capitalist big businessmen, Liu refused to participate in any of its important activities. When the head of the Soviet’s civil administration [minzheng ju] in Lüshun ordered Liu to act in his capacity as a vice-chair by participating in a meeting in Jinzhou organized to commemorate the Soviet army’s liberation of the Northeast, he simply refused to show up. Liu was also noticeably absent from subsequent high-profile meetings commemorating the liberation of Lüda.

His refusal to sign an agreement setting up Sino-Soviet joint enterprises was the final straw for Soviet authorities. In his own words, Liu recalls his interpretation of the Sino-Soviet companies. “The Soviets were afraid the Nationalists would regain control of Dalian and all of its industrial capacity,” he wrote. “So they set up these ‘Sino-
Soviet’ industries in the event that even if the Nationalists came, the Soviets could maintain control over them. Actually we (the CCP) were merely hanging our name on such industries, while in reality the Soviets were in complete control.” When called to Lüshun to sign the agreement, Liu flatly refused. He was informed that the treaty must be signed that day, and remembers waiting for hours well after nightfall until finally being allowed to see the document. He refused to sign, saying that he and other CCP cadres must first adequately review the agreement. The presence of an eager-to-sign Chi Zixiang, the colonial-era industrialist then serving as the figurehead chairman of the Guandong government, made Liu even angrier. 

With top cadres like Liu and Tang openly confronting Soviet policy, issues of authority and of the nature of the role of CCP in rebuilding Lüda came to a boiling point throughout 1947. By September the Soviets had had enough. On September 17, Soviet military authorities vented their criticisms and frustrations in a meeting with Du Ping, a key cadre in the Northeast Democratic Allied Army (Dongbei minzhu lianjun) on an inspection trip to the area. For Du and other CCP leaders like Han Guang it became apparent that both the CCP’s own goals in the area and its relationship with the Soviets needed to be strongly clarified. Tang and Liu’s behavior would no longer be tolerated. Soviet authorities told Du that “when your comrades engage with us (Soviets) they should not be so arrogant. Please believe us, if you follow us, then the area’s economic problems will surely be fixed and we can help with your plans.” Addressing the issue of Liu Shenyuan, Du was informed that “Liu simply doesn’t get it. This place is under Soviet military control. He thinks it shouldn’t be. He thinks that it should be just like other liberated areas, under the control of the CCP.” The critique continues, “Liu thinks
capitalists and landlords should have their money taken from them. We feel that economic recovery needs the cooperation of all, including capitalists, workers, and the common people.” Liu and others were accused of taking tactics and policies from other liberated areas and applying them in Lüda, and of disregarding Soviet authority.\(^{125}\)

In Du’s view, something had to be done, or conflicts would continue. In response to the criticisms put forth by the Soviets, Han Guang called for a meeting of top cadres in October, 1947 in order to spell out what was now becoming the “correct line” on the role of local Sino-Soviet relations, and to lay to rest what lingering conflicts remained between the CCP and the Soviet authorities in Lüda. A policy of “Putting Soviets First” (yi Su wei zhu), which called for the strengthening of Sino-Soviet relations across the board in Lüda, became a central feature of the political landscape.\(^{126}\) Top local cadres like Han Guang were now caught in the middle. The main issue for leaders like Han was how to carry out this new line in a context of ongoing Sino-Soviet conflict which continued to damage the CCP’s relations with the local populace.

**Picking up the pieces: “Putting the Soviets First”**

When the smoke had cleared from the political conflicts and meetings held in late 1947, the Soviets had successfully demanded the removal of three of the five top-ranking CCP cadres in Lüda. The leadership core in Lüda had been purged. The CCP lost the popular head of the area’s largest labor organization in Tang Yunchao, and it lost a vice CCP secretary in Liu Shunyuan. Also ousted was the head of police, Bian Zhangwu, and several other labor organizers.\(^{127}\) Bian Zhangwu was removed for “secretly increasing production without notifying Soviet authorities.”\(^{128}\) This incident
illuminates the extent of the Soviets’ power in Lüda. It is clear that openly criticizing Soviet policy and authority had disastrous political consequences for CCP cadres.

It must be pointed out that these meetings came at a time when the CCP was starting its anti-leftist campaign throughout its base areas, when much of what cadres like Liu Shunyuan and Tang Yunchao believed in would come under attack. However, the initial impetus for removing Liu and Tang stemmed from their refusal to recognize Soviet authority. Top cadres in the Northeast believed that these cadres had stepped out of line in their critique of the Soviets. In other words, the CCP’s relationship with Soviet authorities was a major factor in local politics. The new political line for governing urban centers was swinging to the right, toward more Soviet-style policies and reforms. For local cadres in Lüda this meant acceptance of Soviet authority. Would cadres like Tang and Liu have been removed as leftists regardless of their conflicts with Soviets? Reading internal documents and minutes from CCP meetings that aim to explain to other cadres just why these men were banished, it appears that Liu and Tang’s insolence toward Soviet authority was their main fault. Liu recalls in his memoirs being briefed by top CCP cadres, like Liu Shaoqi, about why he needed to understand the new line, and work with the Soviets. Despite their removal from Lüda, Tang and Liu continued to hold top positions in other areas.

One of the first points Han Guang put forth at the October 1947 meeting was that “the main responsibility of our work in Guandong is to act in accordance with the needs of this Soviet controlled base area.” Another was to “uphold the Soviets and propagate their policies.” The meeting also pointed out the urgent need to develop better communication between Soviet and CCP authorities, particularly with regard to
policy implementation. Liu Shunyuan’s fears and distrust over Soviet policy may have been dampened had policies like the currency reform been discussed with CCP cadres ahead of time. Guidelines for dealing with conflicts were also outlined. Han was clear that although top cadres had erred in their rejection of Soviet authority and in their assumption that Lüda was like other liberated areas, Soviet military officials were also to blame for their attitudes toward CCP cadres. “As for incidents of Soviet chauvinism, we are not to blindly tolerate and accommodate this,” he ordered. “Rather, you should criticize such behavior like you would criticize that of a fellow comrade.” To conclude, Han spelled out why there were so many problems: “We have no plan for the management of economic and social life. We have no concrete plan for economic development.” The task of the CCP was now two-fold: follow its new slogan of “develop production, stabilize the peoples’ lives”, and do so by following the Soviets. The irony of this, from the view of a local leader like Han Guang, was that doing the latter seemed to interfere with the former.

The CCP’s own rectification movement in 1948 would further cement the new line. The mistakes of Liu and Tang brought top cadres in charge of the Northeast to Lüda in order to resolve past mistakes and lay out future plans. Zhang Wentian, a leading official from the Northeast Bureau in charge of organizational work, held one such meeting for top cadres in Lüda. As a student, Zhang had studied in Russia. In his opening remarks, Zhang notes that “Lüda is very complicated place, particularly in the urban environments, and we recognize that for our local comrades to solve all of the areas problems at once is very difficult.” However, he continues, “those comrades with responsibility here have had some shortcomings, for example, their work style had
problems in terms of dealing with relations among classes. Fortunately we have the Soviets to help us, and if we follow their basic policies, we can avoid much turmoil. The Soviets are wiser than we. “134

Yet what did putting Soviets first mean in Lüda? It meant first and foremost an end to policies like land reform in the countryside, which the Soviets viewed as a threat to production. More importantly, open CCP activity would be a breach of the Yalta agreement and might give the United States pretext to intervene. Class struggle in both urban and rural areas was to take a back seat to increasing production, which became the main shared goal between the CCP and the Soviet authorities. Zhang Wentian thus concluded his speech “only by increasing production can workers have any sort of life.”

Following the Soviets also meant developing and using a system of courts to take care of social problems and crime. The CCP, in liberated areas throughout China, had grown accustomed to handing out punishments at mass meetings. Landlords and traitors were often sentenced on the spot, following the purported will of the crowd. Soviets wanted such sentencing to take place behind closed doors, within the confines of a courtroom. Thus they instructed the CCP to build up legal, police, and surveillance systems to manage society.135 The first wave of cadres assigned the responsibility for building courts were often from rural liberated areas and had little or no formal training in law. Zhou Meixin, sent from Shandong to take charge of running legal courts in Lüda, recalls “as for legal procedures, at that time we had no idea what these were.” He continued, “The only people we had who had any kind of legal expertise had studied the Nationalist law, or the legal system of the Japanese colonial regime.”136 Unable to handle legal matters like they had in liberated areas, and with no formal legal system yet
developed by the CCP, these cadres were forced to use the Nationalists’ legal system in order to follow the Soviets’ rules. Building up a police force and using closed courts reflects a Soviet blueprint for building socialism, with its emphasis on institutions and social order. Cadres were also urged to “take this opportunity to study our Soviet comrades’ management of factories, industries, trade, anti-espionage tactics, and propaganda efforts.”

All this was, of course, consistent with a well known shift in CCP policy in late 1947 through 1948. The situation in Lüda, like in the rest of CCP-held urban centers, was in part a conflict between two CCP lines, one pro-Soviet, and the other favoring more indigenous policies. What complicates Lüda’s experience even more, however, was the reality of local Soviet military authority. Despite the call to follow and learn from the Soviets, many cadres in Lüda still had qualms about following Soviet policy when their first hand experience working with Soviets had been so strained. A slogan circulated among doubtful cadres at the time reflects this apprehension: “putting the Soviets first is to take us as their slaves” (yī Su ēi zhū, yī wōmén wéi nu). Bowing to Soviet authority not only meant learning from foreign expertise; it also put local cadres on the spot in terms of how to deal with new and ongoing conflicts.

With cadres still harboring doubts about the new line, more work had to be done to build a better working relationship. Local CCP leaders like Han Guang were in the difficult situation of having to implement the policy shift while at the same time resolving ongoing conflicts with Soviet authorities. To this end, Han Guang and other top cadres sent a carefully crafted 6,000 character letter to the head of the Soviet military command in Lushun on March 15, 1948 outlining new problem areas in CCP-
Soviet relations. This document provides valuable insight into the CCP’s perception of Soviet attitudes toward local cadres at the time. It also gives us a glimpse of what the Soviets expected to gain from their control of Lüda. The document mentions several problem areas, including issues of taxation and trade, continued Soviet interference in the CCP’s work with the “masses,” and communication breakdowns between the public Guandong civil authorities and the Soviets’ own civil administration office.141

Conflicts over trade and taxation reveal the extent of Soviet control over Lüda’s economy. The Soviet military, in full control of Dalian’s sizable port facilities, exported goods tax free to the Soviet Union using their military ships. However, civilian vessels had their cargoes taxed. In spring of 1948, however, a non-military Soviet trading vessel docked at a pier in Dalian, and ordered the Chinese dockworkers to begin loading the ship with salt. The captain refused to pay any taxes on his cargo. Upon hearing this news, Han Guang ordered the dockworkers to strike if no taxes were paid. They were not to load this ship until the matter was resolved. Han phoned Soviet military authorities, and explained the situation. Because the vessel was indeed a non-military ship, the Soviets promised to pay the tax.142 For Han, there was more at stake than just tax revenues on salt shipments. How could local cadres be expected to learn from the Soviet Union when its local representatives were trying to cheat them?

Han’s letter also illuminates other ways in which the Soviets intended to gain and protect economic advantages in Dalian, even if it resulted in damaging the CCP’s ability to carry out its programs and promises to the local population. Han’s major complaint involved the Soviets’ manipulation of trade and falsification of export records. One such instance involved trading salt (a local product) for valuable fertilizer,
no doubt part of the CCP’s promises to aid local farmers. The Soviets were to receive the salt in exchange for a pre-set amount of fertilizer. Yet the Soviets, who accepted the salt, failed to deliver the promised amount of fertilizer, causing, as Han notes, considerable damage to the CCP’s agricultural planning in the region. He also discusses conflicts arising over the manipulation of the prices of important local crops like peanuts, with the Soviets demanding that peanuts be traded on the “free market” at lower prices.143

The emphasis on production led Soviets to order a decrease in holiday time in Lüda. This became an issue for the CCP, who had promised workers certain rest days and holidays. Han Guang’s letter cites a specific example of how this caused a significant loss of face for CCP officials, who actually had to cancel a holiday which they had already promised to hold. The case involved a planned day off for International Women’s day, March 8, 1948. The CCP, after highly publicizing the plan, was ordered by the Soviet authorities to cancel the holiday. Han notes this was a major dent to the legitimacy of the CCP-led women’s federation and the Guangdong government. Even Chi Zixiang, who owed his political position to the Soviets, complained “see, I approved of it (the holiday), the vice chair approved it, county leaders approved of it, city leaders approved of it, but in the end without Soviet approval, we can’t do anything.”144

Han Guang’s letter did have an impact and in a meeting held the day after it arrived at Soviet headquarters, new guidelines were put forth to deal with the major issues the letter discussed. Meetings were now to be held each month between CCP cadres and their Soviet counterparts to discuss problems and upcoming issues. Soviet
authorities promised to treat CCP cadres with more respect, and both agreed that increasing production was the main task in Lüda. The problems of 1947 as manifested in the “Lüda Incident” prompted the CCP and the Soviet military to examine their relationship in Lüda. While a new policy, one which emphasized subordination to Soviet leadership was forged out of that period of conflict, we see that it too gave rise to a host of new problems which had to be dealt with.

Conclusion

What changed in Dalian during the years 1945-1949? Certainly, Japanese domination of the economy and society of the former Guandong Leased Territory, including Dalian, came to an end. This did not happen in a single, rapid event. Rather, Japanese authority bled slowly into a new political order, with some privileged Japanese able to participate in building “new” Dalian. Japan’s slow exit gave rise to efforts by Chinese political powers to capture and harness what had been a major industrial center and longtime symbol of Japanese empire in China, marking Dalian as a significant postwar prize. For the Nationalists, unable to recover or operate in Dalian, the defining feature of the city propagated in the nation-wide press was that of a colony. Dalian continued to exist on the Chinese map as a symbol of foreign domination. That was the case in 1923, when Dalian appeared for a brief flash on the national stage during anti-Japanese demonstrations to protest what was considered their continued illegal occupation of Chinese territory. It continued to be the case in 1947, when Nationalist officials publicly criticized the Soviet’s refusals to allow them to enter the city as
“Soviet imperialism.” Did the city then merely pass from one imperialist power to another?

There is little doubt that Chinese political actors were restricted by Soviet authorities, which had put their own political and economic interests above all else. However, this chapter reveals that the situation was far more complex than a mere transferal of colonial authority. Indeed, by the end of the civil war, Soviet and CCP interests in the city had meshed to a degree which limited the kinds of conflict revealed in CCP memoirs from 1945 to 1948. Despite, as we shall see in the next chapter, some key differences, Soviets and CCP cadres alike hammered out a shared blueprint for building a socialist economic, social, and cultural system in Dalian. We will see in chapter six that a key part of the socialist redefinition of Lüda involved using the rhetoric of socialist internationalism, which was placed above that of nationalism, particularly that strain which had been deployed by Nationalists to attack the Soviet’s position in Lüda.

An equally interesting question is what did not change. That a new political regime came to power in Dalian is not in question. Yet in what ways were the goals for the city, totalistic mobilization and production, the same as they had been under the Japanese wartime empire? To explore this question we need to move beyond examining shifts in the political order and investigate the economic reconstruction and subsequent social reordering of Dalian under a socialist regime.


3 See *JCQDL*, 1, and *SHIJZLD*.


8 Ibid., 58.


The phrase is used by Heinzig, *The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance*, 77.

Ibid., 78-79.

Hereafter Lüda will be used when describing the Soviet-held areas of the former Japanese territory known as Guandong. When specifically describing individual locations within Lüda, such as Dalian, Jin county, or Lüshun, those names will be used.


SHJZLD, 69.

Though direct evidence is lacking, it is not much of a stretch to make such an assumption. Levine believes that the reluctance to allow large numbers of GMD troops and officials into the city was likely due to the large amount of equipment being removed through the port, a fact that would have likely met with resistance from Chinese authorities. Levine, *Anvil of Victory*, 69.


Tominaga Takako, *Dairen, kūhaku no roppyakunichi : senko soko de nani ga okotta ka* (Dalian, six hundred days in a vacuum: what happened here after the war) (Tokyo: Shin Hyōron, 1999), 258.


ZGDDS, 134-135.

SHJZLD, 80. Tang, in an effort to prove his strength, ended up bringing over 3,000 people to the November 7th meeting. Most of these people had to wait outside while the
A meeting was held. As a result of such a display, Soviet authorities recognized Tang’s union as the legitimate trade union in Dalian.

23 Han Guang, “Lüda ba nian” (Eight years in Lüda), in SHJZLD 36-39.


26 Zhang was eighty years old in 1945. Zhongshan wenshiziliao 1 (1990): 135-159.


28 Zhu Xiuchun, “Su jun jinzhu Dalian chuqi de dangpai huodong qingkuang” (The state of political parties in Dalian during the early phase of Soviet occupation), in SHJZLD, 117-119.

29 Ibid, 22, 32-33.


31 Tang Shufu, Huang Benren. “Dalian ‘Zheng ji lun chuan gongsi’ Zhang Benzheng.” Zhang eventually fled Dalian, and was captured in Tianjin and executed by the CCP in 1951, at the age of 86.

32 The nomination of local businessman Chi Zixiang was consistent with Soviet strategy in other places as well. In Harbin, for example, they nominated a local elite, Zhang Tingge, to be mayor of that city. See Soren Clausen and Stig Thogersen, eds. The Making of a Chinese City: History and Historiography in Harbin. (New York: Armonk, 1995): 149-173.
33 *JCQDL*, 88.

34 Zhong Su ribao, Shenyang, June 19, 1947 (Chinese Press Review, American Consulate General, Shenyang).

35 *SHJZLD*, 236-237.


39 Ibid., 19-20.

40 *SHJZLD*, 236-237.


44 Statistics for 1944 list 202,807 Japanese residents in the city of Dalian. An additional 14,458 lived in Lüshun, 6,045 in Jinzhou, and 3,474 in Pulandian a city near the border of the Guandong Leased Territory. The postwar population of Dalian city swelled as refugees arrived from Pulandian, Jinzhou, and other parts of Manchuria; however I have not come across an exact figure for the post 1945 Japanese population. See Lüda gaishu bianji weiyuan hui, ed. *Lüda gaishu* (Hereafter *LDGS*) (A brief account of Lüda) (Lüda: Lüda gaishu bianji weiyuan hui yinxing, 1949), 11.
46 Guo Wenhua, “Jiefang chuqi Dalian Yiwujie de yi xie qingkuang” (The situation of medical work in Dalian during the early period of liberation). Dalian wenshi ziliao 2 (December 1985): 72-81. See also Lüda gaishu bianji weiyuan hui, ed. Lüda gaishu, 300.

47 LDGS, 32-34.

48 Very little work has examined the postwar experiences of Japanese in Manchuria in general and Dalian in particular. The only English-language study remains Donald Gillin’s “Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949” in Journal of Asian Studies 42.3 (May 1983): 497-518. Gillin makes the important point that Japanese military and technical personnel remained a force used by Communists and Nationalists alike well into the Civil War period. He also notes that the warlord Yan Xishan, who controlled Shanxi Province in North China, retained Japanese technicians and managers, as well as Japanese soldiers after 1945. Gillin also highlights the privileged role granted to Japanese civilians with technical knowledge. The present study builds from Gillin’s findings. Numerous memoirs exist from Japanese living in Dalian during and after 1945, which I draw on extensively in this section. As sources, they must be read with care, as they often recount narratives intended to portray Japanese as victims free of any complicity in the wartime empire. Such problems aside, they are an invaluable source of information on the activities and experiences of the postwar Japanese community in Dalian.

49 Ibid., 502-503.

50 See for example, Hung Chang-tai, War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).


54 Tominaga Takako, *Dairen, kūhaku no roppyakunichi : sengo soko de nani ga okotta ka* (Dalian, six hundred days in a vacuum: what happened here after the war) (Tokyo: Shin Hyōron, 1999), 251-255.

55 It is not surprising that Japanese memoirs discuss their victimization at the hands of Russians and Chinese in detail. This deflects the very sensitive issue of their complicity in the wartime empire. That said, I do not believe that such accounts are necessarily overblown but rather reveal the terror that Japanese civilians experienced as their colonial privileges were wiped away through defeat. For accounts of violence experienced by Japanese residents in the closing years of 1945, see Saito Ryōji, *Kantōkyoku keisatsu yonjunen no ayumi to sono shūen* (The 40 year history of the Kantō Bureau Police and its demise) (Tokyo: Kantō kyoku keiyūkai kan, 1981), 144-183, Takamori Mitsuno, *Soren senryōka no Dairen : aru fujin no teikō to dasshutsu* (Soviet occupied Dalian: one woman’s resistance and escape) (Tokyo: Daitōjuku Shuppanbu, 1974), 29-64, Tokisane Hiroshi, *Gen ei no Dairen: Kantōkyoku Chugokugoku tsūyakusei no kiroku* (Illusions of Dairen: records of a Kantō Bureau Chinese language translator) (Osaka: Daisō shōbō, 1978), 34-39, 218-220


57 Born and raised in Dalian, Kazuko Kuramoto, the daughter of a well to do colonial administrator, recalls that many refugees came from nearby Lushun (Port Arthur), having been removed from there homes by Soviet troops, busily re-organizing the city for use as a Naval base. Others fled from Shenyang. Kuramoto Kazuko, *Manchurian Legacy: Memoirs of a Japanese Colonist*, 75-76, 85. The August 15, 1946 issue of Xin sheng shi bao published “excerpts” from a diary of a Chinese resident of Dalian, a Mr. Lu. He chronicled events that led up to the Soviet arrival in Dalian in 1945. He noted that between August 4 and August 6, trains full of Japanese began to pour into Dalian, many included young people organized into the groups mentioned above. Xin sheng shi bao, August 15, 1946.

58 Louise Young estimates that 78,000 Japanese died of illness and starvation following defeat, including 11,000 who either committed suicide or were violently attacked fleeing from the Northeast. Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 409-411.

59 Tokisane Hiroshi, *Gen ei no Dairen: Kantōkyoku Chugokugoku tsūyakusei no kiroku*


61 Tominaga, Dairen, kūhaku no roppyakunichi : sengo soko de nani ga okotta ka, 106-107.

62 Tokisane Hiroshi, Gen ei no Dairen: Kantōkyoku Chugokugō tsūyakusei no kiroku, 61-62.

63 Ibid., 60-71. See also Saitō, Kantōkyoku keisatsu yonjūnen no ayumi to sono shūen ,148-150, and Tominaga, Dairen, kūhaku no roppyakunichi : sengo soko de nani ga okotta ka, 105-108.

64 DGS, 227.

65 A text of the policy is reprinted in Shan Wenjun, ed., Chengshi de jieguan yu shehui gaizao (City control and societal transformation) (Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 1998), 506-508.

66 See “Dalian shi zhengfu dui Riben qiaomin shizheng gangling” (The Dalian city government’s administrative program for Japanese nationals) in Renmin husheng December 12, 1945.

67 Ishidō Kiyomoto, Dairen no Nihonjin hikiage no kiroku, 80-81.


70 Renmin husheng, March 17, 1946.


72 This term was used by Nationalist operatives in anti-Soviet slogans pasted throughout Dalian. Ibid., 49, 54.

73 Li Chongsheng, ed., Lüda de Jinxi (Lüda’s present and past) (Nanjing: Bati shuju, 1947), 83.

74 Han Guang, “Lüda ba nian,” in SHJZLD, 47.

75 Xu Mengxiong, Lüda zhi mingyun yu geming yundong (Revolutionary activities and the fate of Luda) (Taipei: Zhongyang wenwu gongying sheyingxing, 1956), 64-102.

76 Ibid., 94.

77 Ibid., 95-96. See also Han Guang, “Lüda ba nian,” in SHJZLD, 47, and Li Chongsheng, ed., Lüda de Jinxi, 93-94.

78 Xu Mengxiong, Lüda zhi mingyun yu geming yundong, 97-98.

79 Ibid., 100.


81 Li Chongsheng, ed., Lüda de Jinxi, 70.

82 Dongbei jiefang ribao July 16, 1947. See the American Consulate General, Mukden, China Press Review July 16, 1947.


86 Ibid, 276-277.

87 The most reliable population statistics are available for 1949. They list Lüda’s total population at 904,554. Forty two percent of this population resided in the urban areas of Lushun and Dalian. See Lüda gai shu bian ji weiyuan hui, ed. *Lüda gai shu* (A briefing on Lüda) (Lüda: Lüda gai shu bian ji weiyuan hui yinxing, 1949), 21-22.

88 Han Guang, “Lüda ba nian” (Eight years in Lüda), in *SHJZLD*, 65.

89 Han Guang, “Lüda ba nian” (Eight years in Lüda), in *SHJZLD*, 64-65.


91 “Su jun zhu Jin xian de qingkuang” (The situation of Soviet troops stationed in Jin county), in *SHJZLD*, 208-215.

92 Wang Qiren, “Chuli yu Su jun dangjiu guanxi de ji ge yuanze” (Some principles on dealing with the Soviet military authorities), in SHJZLD, 105.


94 “Su jun zhu Jin xian de qingkuang” (The situation of Soviet troops stationed in Jin county), in *SHJZLD*, 213.

“Zhang Wentian zai Dongbeiju zuzhi bu zhaokai de Lüda ganbu huiyishang de jianghua” (Zhang Wentian’s speech given at a meeting of cadres from Lüda called by the Northeast bureau), in *SHJZLD*, 288-290.

“Su jun zhu Jin xian de qingkuang” (The situation of Soviet troops stationed in Jin county), in *SHJZLD*, 213-214.


In a rectification meeting held in 1948 by Wu Xiuquan of the Northeast Bureau’s Organization branch, Han’s cessation of what was referred to as the “Recollection Movement” (*huiyi yundong*) was praised. This was an urban form of the “settling of accounts.” He was criticized for letting it occur despite “the Soviet military’s persistent opposition to settling of accounts struggles within city limits.” See “Wu Xiuquan zai Dongbei ju zuzhibu zhaokai de Lüda ganbu huiyishang de jianghua” (Wu Xiuquan’s speech at the Northeast Bureau Organization branch meeting for Lüda cadres), in *SHJZLD*, 291.

Chi and Zhang were both executed as counterrevolutionaries in 1951.

Repatriation of Dalian’s sizable Japanese population occurred in three main waves, the larges lasting from December 1946 to April 1947 in which 180,000 Japanese were sent back to Japan. For more repatriation statistics see Dalian gangshi bian wei hui bian. *Dalian gangshi* (A history of the port of Dalian) (Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 1995), 242-244.

5,895 families were moved (close to 60,000 people). Shan Wenjun, ed., Zhong gong Dalian difang shi (a local history of the CCP in Dalian) (Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 1996), 152-153. See also Xi Gang qu weilangshi ban, ed., “Xi Gang qu Qiong ren da banjia” (Moving day for Xi Gang District’s poor residents) Xi Gang wenshi ziliao (Selected historical materials from Xi Gang district) 4 (1997):71-75.

Local papers, like the Xinsheng shibao and Dalian ribao, carried articles about the movement almost daily between August and October 1946. Winning support here was obviously crucial for the CCP, and a successful movement like this one helped them to shed the image of being a rural organization.

Statistics for September 1947 list at over 35,000 the number of people without work and without enough food to eat in Dalian. See “Guandong muqian xingshi yu Dang de renwu” (The present state of the CCP’s situation and responsibility in Guandong), in SHJZLD, 285. For labor as welfare see Cong Xuanyou, “Kaizhan shengchan ziqiu yundong” (Developing the movement for welfare production) in Zhongshan chunxiao (Dawn of spring in Zhongshan) (Dalian: Dalian haiyun xueyuan chubanshe, 1992), 99-104. For the competition between Chinese police and Soviet military authorities for control over Japanese goods and property, see Xie Qian, “Zai Dalian gong’anju de houjin zhanxianshang” (The Dalian police force on the frontline of logistics) in Jiefang chuqi de Dalian (Early post-liberation Dalian) (Dalian: Dalian ribaoshe yinshuachang, 1985), 81-92.

Han Guang, “Lüda ba nian” (Eight years in Lüda), in SHJZLD, 64. See also Ding Qun, “Liu Shunyuan yu ‘Lüda shijian” (Liu Shunyuan and the “Lüda Incident”), Xinhua wenzhai 5 (1996), 139-144.


See Zhao Jichang, “JinChaji bianqu zhu Dalian de banshi jigou” (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border region’s administrative body stationed in Dalian) in Dalian dangshi ziliao tongshun (Reports of the CCP’s historical material in Dalian) vol.6 (September, 1983), 23-32.

“Guandong muqian xingshi yu Dang de renwu” (The present state of the CCP’s situation and responsibility in Guandong), in SHJZLD, 286.

See Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: the Political Struggle, 1945-1949 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999 [1978]), 331. Pepper quotes Mao’s famous March 5, 1949 statement that “the period of ‘from the city to the village’ and of the city leading the village has now begun.”
250


115 The Soviets took over the main Japanese heavy industries in Dalian in August, 1945. These became Sino-Soviet “Joint Enterprises” in 1947. They included Dalian’s shipbuilding facilities, an oil refinery, a power station, and salt making facilities, totaling over thirty factories and enterprises in all. See Zhu Li, “Jinian Su jun jiefang Dalian 52 zhou nian” (Commemorating the 52nd anniversary of the Soviet army’s liberation of Dalian) Xigang wenshiziliao 4 (1997), 135.

116 Tang Yunchao, “Riben touxiang hou Su jun zai Dalian de qingkuang” (The situation of the Soviet military in Dalian after the surrender of Japan) in SHJZLD, 86.

117 “Ba Shen yu Du Ping tanhua jiyao, September 17, 1947” (A summary of the talks between ‘Ba Shen’ and Du Ping on September 17, 1947) in SHJZLD, 279-280.


119 Set up in April, 1947 this was the visible, “civilian government for the area” which followed the stipulations of the Yalta Agreement. The Soviet military authorities, headquartered in Lüshun, also had their own office for handling civilian administration, referred to in Chinese sources as the Minzheng ju (Civil administration office).

120 Liu Shunyuan, “Zhonggong Dalian Dang zuzhi yu zhu lian Su jun guanxi” (The organization of the CCP and its relations to the Soviet army stationed in Dalian), in SHJZLD, 76-77.


122 “Ba Shen yu Du Ping tanhua jiyao, September 17, 1947” (A summary of the talks between ‘Ba Shen’ and Du Ping on September 17, 1947), in SHJZLD, 278-279.
This organization existed simultaneously with the Guandong government, and was the Soviet office through which issues and proclamations regarding non-military affairs and policies went through. This was one strand of a confusing bureaucratic web in the area, and CCP cadres often complained of a communication problem between their organizations and the Minzheng ju. All of the polices and public statements made by the CCP-controlled Guandong government had to first be approved by the Minzheng ju. See “Guanyu Lian Gong yu Zhong Gong tongzhai zai wancheng gonggu Guandong Sulian haijun junshi genjudi gongtong renwuzhong de gongzuo guanxi wenti de jidian yijian” (Some opinions regarding the issues of mutual responsibility in completing the task of strengthening Chinese Communist CCP-Soviet CCP relations in the Guandong Soviet naval base area], issued by the Guandong CCP Committee on March 15, 1948, reprinted in SHJZLD, 292-299.


“Ba Shen yu Du Ping tanhua jiyao, September 17, 1947” (A summary of the talks between ‘Ba Shen’ and Du Ping on September 17, 1947], in SHJZLD, 278-279.


For more on the anti-leftist campaign in cities, see Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China, the Political Struggle, 1945-1949, 377-381.

Liu was appointed vice CCP Secretary of Shandong, while Tang went on to organized unions in Harbin. Liu Shunyuan, “Zhonggong Dalian Dang zuzhi yu zhu lian Su jun guanxi” (The organization of the CCP and its relations to the Soviet army stationed in Dalian], in SHJZLD, 76-77. See also Tang Yunchao, “Riben touxianghou Su jun zai Dalian de qingkuang” (The situation of the Soviet military in Dalian following Japan’s surrender) in SHJZLD, 88.

“Guandong muqian xingshi yu Dang de renwu” (The present state of the CCP’s situation and responsibility in Guandong), in SHJZLD, 284.

“Guandong muqian xingshi yu Dang de renwu” (The present state of the CCP’s situation and responsibility in Guandong), in SHJZLD, 284-286.

“Zhang Wentian zai Dongbei ju zuzhi bu zhaokai de Lüda ganbu huiyishang de jianghua” (Zhang Wentian’s speech given at a meeting of cadres from Lüda called by the Northeast bureau), reprinted in SHJZLD, 288-290.

Han Guang, “Lüda ba nian” (Eight years in Lüda], in SHJZLD, 63-64.


See Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China, the Political Struggle, 1945-1949, 377-381.

“Wu Xiuquan zai Dongbei ju zuzhi bu zhaodai de Lüda ganbu huiyishang de jianghua” (Wu Xiuquan’s speech given at a meeting of cadres from Lüda called by the Northeast bureau), reprinted in SHJZLD, 288-290. In Chinese, the phase literally means “taking the Soviets as masters.”

“Guanyu Lian Gong yu Zhong Gong tongzhi zai wancheng gonggu Guandong Sulian haijun junshi genjudi gongtong renwuzhong de gongzuoguanxi wenti de jidian yijian” (Some opinions regarding the issues of mutual responsibility in completing the task of strengthening CCP-Soviet CCP relations in the Guandong Soviet naval base area), issued by the Guandong CCP Committee on March 15, 1948, reprinted in SHJZLD, 292-299.

Han Guang, “Lüda ba nian” (Eight years in Lüda], in SHJZLD, 59.

“Guanyu Lian Gong yu Zhong Gong tongzhi zai wancheng gonggu Guandong Sulian haijun junshi genjudi gongtong renwuzhong de gongzuoguanxi wenti de jidian yijian” (Some opinions regarding the issues of mutual responsibility in completing the task of strengthening Chinese Communist CCP-Soviet CCP relations in the Guandong Soviet
naval base area), issued by the Guandong CCP Committee on March 15, 1948, reprinted in *SHJZLD*, 293-294.

144 Ibid., 296.

5. The Tensions of Rebuilding: Economic Reconstruction, Social Revolution, and Civil War

On the morning of September 18 1949, Dalian was bustling with activity in preparation for hosting a major industrial exhibition, the first of its kind in a Chinese city under Communist control. The three-month exhibition served to highlight Dalian’s industrial recovery under the Soviets and the CCP, cementing the city’s new definition as a vanguard model production metropolis of new China. Newspaper reporters, travel writers, and thousands of other visitors, including oversees Chinese industrialists, flocked to Dalian to see the exhibition, which was carefully organized following months of researching similar events held in New York, San Francisco, and even those held by the Japanese regime in Manchuria in the 1930s. In the three months that it lasted, the exhibition attracted over 300,000 visitors.¹

Walking through the display halls, visitors saw industrial products made in Dalian’s recently recovered industries, including items ranging from machine tools and chemical products, to buses and tramcars. One observer noted that Dalian was capable of producing things that Shanghai and Beijing had never been able to produce, and people visiting from Beijing felt that many products were the same quality as those found in the United States.² The final hall of the exhibition was a heavily propagandized homage to Sino-Soviet relations, featuring pictures and displays driving home the point that Soviet aid, and Dalian’s full embrace of the Soviet model, made the futuristic world of production they were witnessing possible. Industrial products and exhibits, however, were not the only things to see. The city itself was on display.
Numerous journalists and writers who came to report on the exhibition also took in the sights of Dalian, and reported what they saw. “Dalian,” one visitor wrote, “has been made into a true production metropolis. City people’s productivity and labor, this is the new character of Lüda.”

Dalian’s sizable industrial base and port facilities, left largely intact by the Japanese, gave the city huge potential as a revamped industrial base. Soviet military protection ensured it remained a relatively stable environment, free from direct attack during the Chinese civil war. These facts help us to understand how, by 1949, Dalian emerged as a model of socialist urban industrialization for the newly established People’s Republic of China. Yet, how did city residents experience the transformation? The fact that Dalian was hailed as a model is remarkable given the hardships and privations that city residents had suffered during years of warfare stretching from the late 1930s through the late 1940s. As this chapter will demonstrate, Lüda’s population experienced “liberation” in 1945 as a continuation of the disruptions and shortages that plagued the region in the final years of the Japanese wartime empire. Once the initial short-lived high of victory wore off, people in Lüda found themselves under renewed foreign occupation, remobilized, and reordered to serve the wartime needs of an emerging socialist state.

Moreover, the new state actively compared its own production targets and goals with those of the Japanese regime. War production peaked under the Japanese in 1943, and the CCP use those figures as benchmarks for their own economic recovery. Surpassing the 1943 levels of production became the major goal for the economic recovery plans through the early 1950s. A report on economic construction in 1949
reveals the speed of Dalian’s recovery. It states that in 1948, Dalian had reached 45 percent of the productive capacity of 1943, and by 1949 had reached 75 percent. Thus, visitors to Dalian’s industrial exhibition, for example, learned that by using Soviet production and management techniques, Dalian’s shipbuilding factories had increased their rate of manufacturing to over 20 times the levels achieved under the Japanese.5

Yet there were important institutional and material changes in Lüda, including the rise of a powerful CCP-controlled labor union, which helped to provide for workers needs, including overseeing the massive redistribution of housing throughout the city. These material changes kept hopes alive among the population that things were changing for the better, and the tightening control of the local economy to serve the goals of the city’s new power-holders. However, what benefits people stood to gain from the new socialist regime while it waged continuous war led to tensions between workers and Soviet and CCP authorities.

For those CCP cadres trying to govern Lüda under the watchful eyes of the Soviets, the main task through 1947 was how to stabilize the economy and win the support of workers. Given the economic hardships faced by city residents, this was no easy task. Renewed military conflict between the Nationalists and the CCP for control of China made all the more urgent the task of getting Dalian’s industries back up and running. Manchuria was the critical military theater in the civil war at this time, and both CCP and Nationalists realized that control of this region would dictate the outcome of the war. Control of Lüda, with its industries and strategic proximity between the emerging Manchurian battlefields and the CCP-held base areas in Shandong and North China was thus particularly important.6 As this chapter will reveal, warfare not only
played a major role in the recovery of Dalian’s industrial base, it also spurred the CCP’s social reordering and mobilization projects, as cadres tried to squeeze every drop of labor from the population in support of the war effort. Yet, as we have seen in earlier chapters, totalistic wartime mobilization was nothing new to city residents. Rationing and forced labor had become the norm toward the end of the Pacific War. After 1945, the burden fell on local cadres to try to raise production for their own massive war effort to levels achieved by the Japanese regime while at the same time presenting policies that appealed to people in order to further legitimate CCP authority.

By 1948, the industrial recovery of Dalian was well under way, fed by more steady access to resources and, as we have seen in the previous chapter, a more stable political relationship with the Soviet military authorities. As Manchuria came increasingly under CCP control, the party shifted the thrust of its policies in Lüda from crisis management operations designed to elicit maximum support from the masses to more long-term economic recovery and socialist social engineering projects. This coincided with clearer lines of communication between Soviet authorities and local cadres, resulting in an end to much of the conflict between the two. The CCP also shifted much of its attention toward recovering major urban centers, and rebuilding industry. To do so it looked to the Soviet model, and in so doing privileged the experiences learned in Lüda’s largest factories, many of which were in Soviet hands. By 1947, CCP cadres at these major industries began to adopt elements of Soviet planning, wage systems, and management.

This chapter analyzes two phases of economic recovery and reordering in Dalian. In the first phase, from August 1945 through early 1947, the CCP used a
variety of tactics to provide material benefits to appeal to the urban poor and to workers. The CCP had little experience governing large cities at this time, and local cadres carried out many of their policies in a trial and error fashion. Moreover, during these years the Nationalists’ military and economic blockade of the area created food and material shortages that forced CCP cadres to prioritize crisis alleviation over long-term production goals. Although such hardships left Lüda on the brink of social and economic collapse, they were in fact favorable conditions for local cadres to deploy many of the tactics developed in rural base areas to mobilize support, attack colonial-era elites, and begin to redistribute Japanese wealth to Chinese residents.

In the second phase, from late 1947 through 1949, the CCP put forth plans to increase production and rebuild Dalian’s industrial base in order to serve CCP needs in the widening military conflict with the Nationalists. It was during this phase that, as Lüda’s factories were brought back online, the CCP adopted elements of the late-Stalinist model to manage production and labor. However, as we shall see, this transformation was far from easy and involved conflicts between Chinese labor leaders and Soviet planners that threatened the very emergence of this model. These years also saw increasingly coercive efforts at social reordering designed to serve the new production goals through economic reforms designed to funnel as much of the population as possible into factory labor.

*Victory and its Aftermath*

By the summer of 1945, years of Japanese rule in an exhaustive environment of total war had taken its toll on Dalian and its residents. Yet hopes for peace and a sense
of liberation were short-lived. We have seen in the previous chapter how no sooner had Soviet troops arrived than they began looting and attacking the local population, both Chinese and Japanese alike. The excitement among the Chinese population for the seemingly immanent, triumphant return of Dalian to China, and to a return to some kind of normalcy, was smothered by the painful reality that Lüda yet again served a foreign master. In late 1945, Lüda’s immediate future was hazy and questions filled the air. When would the Nationalists arrive? How long would the Soviets stay? Would the Soviets allow the CCP to take control of the region? Would Dalian’s once prosperous industries recover? How was a city that functioned entirely in support the Japanese wartime empire to survive in the postwar world order?

The imperialistic actions of Soviet military authorities were but one of the problems facing the people of Lüda in late 1945. As the empire it served came apart, Lüda’s sizable industrial economy ground to a halt. Chronic shortages of raw materials and power shut down the factories, leaving tens of thousands without work. Japanese-controlled Manchuria and North China together had provided over 80 percent of the raw materials used by local industries during the years from 1937-1945. These materials, which once flowed into the city via the vast railway network and through the port, evaporated as renewed fighting between the CCP and Nationalists disrupted supply lines to the city.

By 1946, Nationalist forces occupied the areas immediately north of Lüda, effectively severing the area from its remaining resource base by cutting the railway connections to the peninsula. Moreover, the Nationalists also set up a naval blockade in June 1946, which slowed trade through Dalian’s port to a trickle. In a ten-month
span from 1946 to 1947, Nationalist forces seized over 90 major vessels coming to and from Dalian. Because of the blockade, the total tonnage of goods flowing in and out of the port for the 1946-1949 period was a mere 4.2 million tons. In contrast, in 1934 alone the port handled over 10 million tons of freight. At the peak of the blockade in 1947, the total tonnage of goods moved through the port reached a mere 185,000 tons.

The social costs of the blockade, like its economic effects, were high. Any hope for a quick recovery of Lüda’s industrial capacity faded quickly by 1946, and CCP cadres sent to work with the Soviets to govern the city began operating in a crisis mode. Without raw materials and power, factories could not operate. The local economy imploded and over 70,000 factory workers either returned to their native places in Shandong, or walked the streets hawking materials stolen from factories and Japanese homes in order to earn enough to feed their families. The number of people moving out of Lüda exceeded that of those moving in by over 80,000 per year from 1946 through 1949. Food became scarce and the price of grain, as it had throughout most of China, skyrocketed. In 1946 alone, the price of grain, corn, rice, and soybeans rose between 1,000 and 2,000 percent. This occurred despite the newly established Soviet-backed local government’s attempt to fix prices. With its heavily urbanized population and its low-grade agricultural land, Lüda relied heavily during the colonial era on imported grain from Manchuria. Less than half of the food consumed was produced locally. After Japan’s defeat, a portion of Manchuria’s grain surplus was taken by the Soviet Union in order to alleviate its own food crises in 1946-1947. Corn was a local staple in Lüda, but farmers had always considered it a risky crop due to the climate, choosing instead to grow fruits and vegetables for the marketplaces in Dalian.
and Lüshun. Food scarcity and exorbitant prices were an unpleasant fact in the first few years of Soviet occupation. Victory over the Japanese thus only ushered in another harsh period of scarcity and uncertainty for the people of Lüda.

CCP cadres arriving in the area faced the difficult task of stabilizing the local economy, feeding people, creating jobs, rebuilding industries, dealing with Japanese residents, all the while trying to build legitimacy and power for themselves in an unfamiliar, Soviet-occupied urban environment. Like their experiences in Kalgan and Harbin, the CCP grappled with the dilemma of balancing the demands of a wartime state with the urgent need to create policies aimed at winning over the urban population. From August 1945 through 1947, however, providing welfare, housing, and food took priority over industrial recovery. To accomplish this, CCP cadres turned to a familiar repertoire of activities that had proven successful in winning over people in diverse rural base areas, and attempted to implement them in the urban environment of Lüda. Importantly, in pursuit of these strategies, the CCP found arenas through which to build support and power that were relatively free from Soviet intervention.

**Stabilizing the Food Supply**

The most pressing problem was securing an adequate food supply for the city. By April 1946, the effects of food shortages reached all levels of society, and the CCP began making its first push for massive grain distribution. As they would throughout the civil war years, the CCP seized the crisis for political advantage, holding meetings at the ward and neighborhood levels to propagate the fact that the dire food situation was due to the Nationalist blockade. Finding any grain supplies that might be horded or
hidden in shops, buildings, and homes throughout the city was the first step in providing food to hungry people. Grain redistribution committees (*tiaoji liangshi weiyuanhui*) were set up at the ward level to send investigation teams into neighborhood homes and shops to seek out food. For example, in a particular ward located in Xigang, a densely populated Chinese district to the west of the downtown core, the teams uncovered over 50 large sacks of corn, soybeans, and rice hidden in a single shop. Those who did not turn over their food supplies faced punishment, while rewards awaited people who uncovered and reported hidden stashes to the authorities.  

For grain distribution purposes, CCP cadres classified city residents into four levels based on class. Here we can see how cadres wanted to move beyond reliance on the market and toward a more egalitarian system that ensured food supplies for all residents. Those classified as “level one”, a group that included unmarried or widowed poor people, received grain rations free of charge, while those at levels two and three, classified as urban poor and middle class families respectively, were eligible to purchase grain at reduced prices. These people made up the majority of the city population. "Level four" included people who were considered able to purchase their grain on the open market. In Xigang district, a heavily populated Chinese section of Dalian, 1,090 families were classified as level one, while over 12,000 families were classified as level two or three. During the peak months of the food shortage, from July 1946 through May 1947, residents of the Xigang district received 1,500,000 *jin* of grain that had been purchased or recovered by the CCP, while the Soviet military authorities provided an additional 500,000 *jin*, much of it shipped from North Korea. In fact, the
Soviets continued to provide grain relief well into 1948, this despite the food shortages experienced in the Soviet Union from 1946 through 1947.\textsuperscript{18}

Agricultural production with the goal of a self-sustainable food supply became a major part of the planned industrial recovery of Lüda, beginning with the production drives (\textit{da shengchan yundong}) of 1947. In official documents for the launch of the production movement in February 1947, agricultural concerns took center stage, right down to what types of crops should be planted. Although heavily urbanized, the Japanese colonial territory now under Soviet control was comprised of rural areas with roughly 1.5 million \textit{mu} under cultivation.\textsuperscript{19} However, historically, this was not enough to feed the population, and grain was shipped from northern Manchuria throughout the colonial era. After 1945, no bit of land was spared in the attempts to boost agricultural production, and close to 10,000 \textit{mu} was brought under cultivation within the city limits of Dalian itself, including hillside land and parks.\textsuperscript{20} Rural base area cadres, in their initial attempts to govern Lüda, were quite literally cultivating the city in an effort to alleviate the food shortages. This was, however, not the only rural-based tactic to be implemented within city limits. The city, like rural areas under CCP control, would experience its own version of land reform.

\textit{Experiments in Urban Land Reform}

Perhaps the most visible of all the CCP’s projects in Lüda through 1947 was an attempt to redistribute housing in a manner similar to that of farmland in rural areas. Known officially as the “Housing readjustment movement” (\textit{zhuzhai tiaozheng yundong}), and by residents as the “moving campaign” (\textit{banjia yundong}), the campaign
was highly publicized in local papers. It occurred in three waves during 1946 and 1947. During that time, over 16,000 families were relocated, in a highly publicized campaign, from some of the poorest neighborhoods into colonial era-houses and apartments, referred to in local newspapers as *yang lou* (Western-style) houses, which once belonged to Japanese and wealthy Chinese.

This campaign reveals much about the expectations and early activities of CCP cadres, with little or no experience working in cities, as they attempted to formulate urban policies. It was above all an effort to redress the social and economic disparities of the old society. Not surprisingly, CCP cadres launched the movement simultaneously with their moderate version of land reform throughout the Northeast, which involved the redistribution of Japanese-owned land in rural areas. Now cadres in charge of urban work in Lüda adopted a similar program concerning urban housing and real estate. As discussed briefly in chapter four, during the wartime period the Japanese controlled over 60 percent of Dalian’s real estate but comprised only 25 percent of the population. Japanese residential districts consisted of broad avenues with spacious apartments and homes, many of which were equipped with natural gas for cooking. The majority of the city’s Chinese, by contrast, lived in cramped neighborhoods near the city’s core, or in outlying slum neighborhoods. Conditions in the latter were terrible, as most dwellings were nothing more than shacks assembled in whatever manner possible. Heavy rains brought misery as streets turned to mud, and often washed away poorly constructed buildings. Zealous CCP cadres set out to move these people from such neighborhoods into colonial-era housing, particularly as
increasing numbers of Japanese residents were repatriated during 1946 through 1947, leaving their spacious apartment buildings vacant.

From the start of the movement, the local, CCP-controlled press, used strong patriotic and racial overtones to characterize the campaign, creating a sense that the comfortable life once denied Chinese was at hand. The campaign was front-page news in local newspapers, which carried stories of children now playing on the safe, modern streets of in front of their new homes, in sectors of the city once completely denied to them under the Japanese regime. Newspaper articles carefully and clearly explained the statistical inequalities of the colonial era housing situation: “Under Japanese imperialism, Chinese children wouldn’t dare play in Japanese neighborhoods, if they did they’d be beaten and cursed. Chinese couldn’t just freely build a house, rather they lived in wooden shacks built on sewage canals, and even then had to bribe Japanese police.”

In an effort to contrast the situation in Dalian with cities in Nationalist-held areas, articles described how the Nationalists were demolishing poor neighborhoods in Nanjing without relocating or providing for the residents. “The democratic government cares about city people and their housing situation. Now poor live in good homes. In Nationalist-held areas there are lots of good houses, but they don’t give them out to the poor.” This was a particularly effective way of driving home the point that the Soviet-backed government would take better care of them than the Nationalist government.

Newspapers also carried moving day activities in detail, and we can see that it was designed to be an exciting, emotionally powerful event. On the morning of August 17, 1946, one hundred families living in the cramped, overcrowded streets of Dalian’s
Xigang district awoke to the sounds of gongs, drums, singing, and the idling engines of six large trucks parked in their neighborhood. With a mixture of excitement and anxiety, the families brought out their belongings, and police and labor union volunteers, on hand to help move belongings and ensure their protection throughout the course of the move, loaded them onto the trucks. The moving convoy, was, in fact, only part of a gala parade which served to publicized the campaign. Labor union volunteers sang songs and marched with the families, while at the head of the parade, family members marched in teams holding homemade banners that read: “The People’s Democratic Government has taken us from hell and delivered us to heaven!” Deliverance from hell to heaven was a common theme in the rhetoric of the movement, as was an emphasis on family. Slogans used in the campaign included “The police, government, and the people are all one family!” One overjoyed neighborhood even vowed to send pictures of themselves and their new homes to Mao himself. Their new housing was larger, far cleaner, and offered obvious protection from the elements that many of these families had never enjoyed.

Participants also praised the Soviet military during the movement for liberating the city and allowing people to move into their new bit of “heaven.” Importantly, the Soviets had little direct involvement with this movement, other than that they allow it to happen. Soviet military leaders were present at highly publicized events to launch the moving campaign, and participants were told that it was due in part to Soviet cooperation that their families were able to move. However, they did not play a heavy role in planning and implementing the campaign.
Unable to operate openly in the name of Mao and the CCP due to Soviet political restrictions, campaigns like this created a crucial environment through which cadres could interact with people and explain their vision of China’s future. Moreover, given the economic difficulties in Lüda, the CCP was in need of any positive policies through which to gain the support of workers and the urban poor.

The *banjia yundong*, like grain relief activities, was thus one of the first comprehensive efforts by CCP cadres to work closely with urban residents. It was an important arena for organizing and mobilizing the masses under the guidance of the CCP. The heavily publicized drama of moving day was simply the final stage of what had been a series of events aimed at validating and explaining to urban residents what the CCP stood for, drumming up activists among the urban poor, and reorganizing the way people lived together. Through this campaign, the CCP introduced its socialist program to the urban masses, giving them an active role in the redistribution of colonial property.

A brief examination of the process involved in this unique attempt at urban housing redistribution reveals the trial and error fashion of CCP urban policy at this time. In the campaigns first phase, carried out in the summer of 1946, cadres paid little attention to long term planning, focusing instead on providing for the immediate housing needs for the poorest of the city. Although Soviet military authorities curbed violent “settling of accounts” (*qingsuan*) movements in the city, the CCP was able to carry them out in many of the poorest neighborhoods in Dalian. It was in this context of mobilizing poor residents to criticize, attack, and seize the property of Japanese and those who collaborated with them, that the *banjia yundong* was first carried out. In
early 1946, some cadres took this too far, seizing homes by gunpoint on several occasions.\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, there was little planning for the long term consequences of who moved where, as urban laborers without work were moved away from their factories and given land in the rural suburbs.\textsuperscript{32}

In the second phase of housing reform, carried out from December 1946 through February 1947, CCP cadres were instructed to avoid these mistakes. An internal report on the movement from 7 July 1946, placed great emphasis on building support among the masses. Cadres should lead the way in organizing the city’s poor to carry out much of the movement themselves, in this way, the report says, “the poor can be made to feel that they are the masters.”\textsuperscript{33} Moreover, great care was taken to clarify the legitimate targets of the movement. It was the urban poor, and workers without jobs, cadres were instructed, who were to receive first priority in housing. The report states that homes were to be supplied by Japanese militarists, large capitalists, diplomats, and high-level functionaries first. Interestingly, it also reveals the CCP’s reliance on Japanese workers, as it calls for the homes of skilled Japanese workers, technicians, and poorer Japanese laborers to be left alone. If need be, the report states, their homes might be seized, but only after comparable relocation had been provided for them.\textsuperscript{34}

To get the movement started, cadres from the district and ward level formed “housing readjustment work teams” (zhuzhai tiaozheng gongzuodui). One of the most important pressing jobs was deciding on which families should be moved first. This decision was to be initiated by cadres, but pushed along by neighborhood heads and “activists.”\textsuperscript{35} Like land reform in the countryside, investigations were first necessary to determine which neighborhoods were the poorest, and what the housing conditions and
family sizes were like in such neighborhoods. For the ward leaders, their first task was
to present their claim as a poor neighborhood. For example, the head of the number
fourteen ward, on Shidao Street, lobbied cadres that his ward was quite poor, with many
families living on hillside shacks. Moreover, many residents earned their living as
rickshaw pullers, and had little money and food.\(^{36}\) Cadres spent up to several months in
neighborhoods like this, carrying out investigations of social and economic conditions
there, right down to the household level.\(^{37}\)

Following these efforts, cadres able to speak Japanese went into Japanese
neighborhoods to scout out and secure new housing for their move. The next step was
to appoint neighborhood activists. These people were responsible for overseeing the
details of the move for up to twenty families.\(^{38}\) In the final phases, cadres organized
mass meetings in the neighborhoods and, like in the land reform process in rural areas,
poorer families were encouraged to vocalize their plight and speak their minds against
those who had made them suffer in years past.

The meetings were also an opportunity for cadres to discuss such topics as the
conflict with the Nationalists, the desires and programs of the CCP, and to dispel
rumors circulating about an immanent takeover of Lüda by the Nationalist armies.
However, the opportunity to voice criticisms at such meetings often spun out of the
cadres’ control, and people began to discuss rumors and voiced complaints about the
moving process.\(^{39}\) Like the early land reform efforts, this movement had some major
problems, which ultimately ended up compromising the gains that the cadres had
evenvisioned upon its launch. The first and perhaps most basic problem was the fact that
people who had been moved in the initial phase had complaints about their new housing,
which they vocalized and shared with their neighbors who were awaiting their chance to move. These included anxiety about where their water would come from, the cost of water, and the cost and availability of electricity. Elderly people complained that they were given apartments on the top floors of buildings and found it difficult to go up and down the stairs. Cadres were thus not always careful in their investigations of what kind of residence the families would receive. As a result, some large families received smaller spaces, while families with fewer members received large homes. Interestingly, these complaints were published quite openly in local newspapers, reflecting a level of openness in the press which would soon disappear.

Some residents expressed skepticism and simply did not want to move, or questioned what the future would hold after they moved. One such person, at a neighborhood meeting shouted “It is great that you give us new housing, but we don’t have enough to eat, what about that!” Given the dire food situation, this was indeed serious criticism. One elderly couple complained that they simply didn’t want this type of housing, they were unaccustomed to it, and simply wanted a house that would keep the rain out. Yet perhaps the most damning questions involved “rumors” of the immanent arrival of the Nationalist military in Lüda. Some residents were not willing to move into new apartments if they felt they were going to be left high and dry to answer to Nationalist accusations of being traitors and/or CCP sympathizers. At one mass meeting, for example, one participant repeatedly threatened those families planning to move. “The government is just tricking you! They want to get rich from this. Go ahead and move! It will cost you in the future.” He later threatened that he would tell the Nationalists the names of those who moved.
Despite these difficulties, the moving campaign did provide better housing for thousands of poor urban residents. Like grain distribution, CCP cadres ranked families by their occupation, income, and family size in order to determine the terms of their ownership. Those whose existing houses had few problems were classified as “grade one”, the lowest priority for a move. Those whose homes were damaged but could be rebuilt were “grade two”, while “grade three” were families and individuals with completely dilapidated homes, or those with no homes at all. Many poor families were given full proprietary rights over their new dwellings. In the Xigang district for example, of the over 2500 families relocated by the end of the campaign, 2000 received proprietary rights, while another 350 families received five years of free rent, and 80 families were granted three years of free rent. However, in the early phases of the movement, some merchants and small businesses also received free rents and proprietary rights. Because of this and other problems in the initial classification efforts, in May 1947, CCP cadres re-investigated and adjusted titles and rental agreements, ensuring that those with the means to pay for their new property would do so.

The final phase of the housing campaign, carried out in the spring of 1947, was the most controlled, and reflected the CCP’s growing emphasis on industrial recovery and other economic reordering policies. CCP cadres established clearer guidelines for decisions about rents and property rights. They also paid more attention to integrating economic development with the movement of people. Thus, the newly established Finance Bureau (caizheng ju) coordinated the distribution of shops and retail properties. By the summer of 1947, as the movement wound down, newspaper
articles lauded the achievements of the housing campaigns, boasting that over 20 percent of city residents received western-style housing.49

Given Lüda’s dire economic situation, the highly publicized housing redistribution campaign was an important early success for the CCP. Beyond providing new housing, it contributed to the illusion of grass roots political power via mass meetings, in which selected activists chided residents to follow the script laid out by CCP cadres. Once they moved into their new neighborhoods, however, residents found themselves dealing with other new institutions. We shall see below how production-obsessed cadres created various consumer and production cooperatives to funnel people’s resources and labor into the emerging production drives. The orderly streets of their new homes were patrolled by the massive police force assembled by the CCP in Dalian, which by 1947 set about enforcing a new residency system. Many of the neighborhood activists joined and organized local neighborhood defense teams, which worked closely with the expanding branches of the municipal police force, which played a highly visible role in the housing campaigns.50

In its initial stages, then, idealistic cadres sought to redistribute colonial spoils to the city’s poor. Housing redistribution can thus be viewed as a key adaptation of a rural based strategy, used in an urban environment to build support in times of crisis by providing what urban poor needed, better housing. By 1947, however, the CCP showed its concern for integrating social policies like this with the overall economic functioning of the city, both in terms of ensuring that small businesses pay for their property, but also as the momentum generated by the moves carried over into such organizations as local production cooperatives. Thus, from the perspective of top CCP officials, housing
reform emerged as part of a larger effort to remold society into a more efficient, disciplined economic force.

Re-Shaping Urban Institutions: The Dalian Federated Labor Union

Although policies like the housing campaign were carried out nominally by the Soviet-backed “Democratic government” (minzhu zhengfu), the CCP relied heavily on other institutions, like the Federated Labor Union (Dalian shi zonggong hui) and the municipal police force, to push their economic policies in Lüda. Statistics from 1946 suggest that over 70,000 skilled laborers were out of work, as most of the city’s major industries shut down. From the perspective of CCP cadres sent to the area from rural base areas, Lüda seemed like fertile ground on which to carry out urban revolution. They had high hopes that the tens of thousands of workers who had toiled under the Japanese could be organized, indoctrinated, and mobilized to support the party and take up their role as the new master’s of society. Yet Lüda was plagued with social and economic chaos, to say nothing of Soviet hegemony in the area. Moreover, the CCP-backed labor union was not the only option for workers.

Colonial era labor bosses and capitalists like Zhang Benzheng recruited laborers for his own public security organization (zhi an dui), which controlled the streets of many neighborhoods in late 1945. Others chose to wait it out and see if the Nationalists might return. However, in the immediate years following Japan’s defeat, the CCP’s labor union, led by prominent local laborers, played a key role in ensuring that the core of Lüda’s sizable industrial workforce remained in the area during these difficult years. It did so by providing various kinds of economic support for its members, which
included the distribution of cash gained from Japanese capitalists and enterprises, and the establishment of consumer coops. By late 1946, union members received cash subsidies from this pool of funding. Its attacks on colonial-era capitalists provided needed cash, but also served to bolster the CCP’s image among workers. However, this type of activity could not continue indefinitely. As increasing production became the goal for Lüda by late 1946 early 1947, it was through the union that the CCP started to develop and enforce the standards of a new labor regime.

We have seen in chapter two that a comprehensive labor organization had existed in Dalian under the Japanese wartime regime. CCP labor organizers used the remnants of this organization to mobilize workers for a new labor union. In fact, the CCP’s union established its headquarters in the very same offices used by the Japanese-era Guandong Labor Association (Kantōshū rōmukai). Membership in the CCP’s new union grew extremely fast, which also suggests that cadres built on preexisting organizations in forming their organization. Tang Yunchao, the leading CCP cadre in charge of union organizing, was himself a local with years of experience working in Lüda. Within a span of several months, from its founding in November 1945, the CCP-backed union grew to over 100,000 members with over 300 branches. The union’s broad promises to laborers, which included distribution of welfare funds and food, including three months wages as a subsidy, also contributed to the rapid rise of participants.

Bolstered by its growing numbers, the next step taken by union leaders was to remove colonial-era labor bosses, factory owners, and capitalists while protecting factories from continued looting. In addition to the Soviet’s removal of industrial
equipment, Chinese and Japanese workers alike stripped and sold off whatever they could in order to raise funds for themselves and their families. Recognizing that such actions were detrimental to long term stability, one of the early functions of the CCP’s labor union was to curb such activity by organizing pickets (jiucha dui) to protect factory equipment and materials. By October 1945, just several months after the Soviets arrived, over 7,000 workers joined such teams helping put a stop to the looting of industrial equipment and supplies.\footnote{56}

A major threat to the CCP’s early activities was the shipping magnate Zhang Benzheng, who enjoyed Soviet backing in late 1945 as the civilian leader of the city’s Chinese residents. Zhang used his assets and patronage networks to mobilize his own small army, whose members were drawn from the ranks of labor bosses, factory foremen, and common workers. In fact, the Soviet military authorities initially refused to believe that the CCP had mobilized so many workers for its labor union, and denied them participation in meetings to establish a civilian government. Instead, the Soviets favored Zhang Benzheng. Through public struggles against Zhang and his men, mentioned briefly in chapter four, CCP union leaders like Tang Yunchao succeeded in convincing the Soviets that Zhang enjoyed little widespread support. Meanwhile, Tang’s union had grown too large to ignore. In fact, Dalian’s Soviet garrison commander Koslov, declared, “I’ve come from Western Europe to Asia, and I’ve never seen such a show of force from organized labor.”\footnote{57}

With Zhang out of the way, union leaders turned their attention to squeezing cash from Japanese businesses and industrial enterprises. These efforts were quite successful, netting the union over 100 million Yuan by the end of 1945.\footnote{58}
used much of these funds to create a large-scale consumer cooperative for union members. The “People’s livelihood trading cooperative” (Minsheng maoyi hezuoshe), established in February 1946, sold daily use commodities, food, and vegetables at prices significantly lower than in the marketplace. Access to the cooperative, along with cash subsidies, made union membership attractive to those without jobs.59 Cheap prices offered by cooperatives were one more advantage for factory work and union membership.

The shifting political environment, however, soon stymied this initial success. The union’s membership base was quite diverse, which gave rise to a host of conflicts and dissension within its ranks, threatening to undermine its ability to unify laborers throughout the city and provide for their needs. Attempts by colonial-era bosses to co-opt the union and block it from organizing workers represented a serious problem for CCP labor leaders. In the former Mitsui bean mill, for example, colonial-era supervisors hijacked the CCP’s nascent union, claiming that their distribution of aid was unbalanced. They convinced many of the workers to resist joining the union, and workers were told that the CCP union would simply come and take the supplies of food at the bean mill and distribute them to other factories. The bean mill bosses were content to keep the CCP union at bay, and distribute their own food. They told the workers, “We have enough food to eat for three years, let’s wait for the Nationalists to come.”60 Rumors of an impending takeover by the Nationalists flared in the days leading up to the Nationalists inspection team’s visit in 1947, and this caused further fissures among workers, many of whom believe that the Nationalists arrival would
signal the reopening of the port facilities and railroad connections to the city, thereby alleviating Lüda’s economic plight. In an unstable environment of scarcity and renewed foreign occupation, asking workers to sacrifice and spread what food and resources equally among fellow workers throughout the city was a difficult task for union organizers. The CCP’s strategy was to explain to workers that it was the Nationalist’s military campaigns, and increasingly effective blockade of Lüda, which was leading to supply problems. In his work report at the inaugural congress of the Lüda Federated Union, in early December 1946, Tang Yunchao divided the postwar months into two phases, a pre-blockade phase, and a post-blockade phase. It was the Nationalist’s economic blockade, Tang told those assembled, that was responsible for the current economic plight of the region. Tang’s strongest language in the report, however, reveals how the CCP attempted to shame workers into believing that, unlike in other liberated areas, Lüda had yet to experience true sacrifice and struggle for its liberation. The people of Lüda, Tang suggests, “did not have to go through the fight that Chinese in liberated areas continued to go through in order to achieve the fruits of victory, which were dropped on them by the Soviet military.” The way to redemption, both in terms of the immediate economic situation, and in terms of uniting through struggle with the rest of CCP-held China, was production. “We workers from Dalian have been forged in a mold of modern industry for 40 years, and we have much firsthand experience with production and endless stamina. Given the present difficulties, we must use all of our experience and effort to increase production and for it is through this effort that we carve a path for ourselves.” One wonders how
hungry workers received this call to return to work given the uncertain environment of renewed civil war and Soviet occupation.

To create and enforce a loyal power base among worker, the CCP launched small “training” (gongren xunlian ban) classes in order select and train a core of cadres to serve as the backbone of its union leadership. These classes were held on and off from October 1945 through April 1946 and trained over 1200 workers. The basic curriculum included elementary Marxism/Leninism, a brief history of the CCP, and the struggle of the working class in world history. Here, like in Tang’s speech, cadres reminded trainees of the hardships faced in other parts of the country. For example Han Guang, the head of the CCP in Lüda, upon visiting a class and eating with the workers, overheard them complaining about the quality of the food. He seized the opportunity to remind those present, that the CCP cadres in Yan’an all faced such privations. Han exclaimed, “This is the best food I’ve had since I’ve come to Dalian, it’s like I’ve returned to Yan’an.” These classes represented the first phase of establishing a new system of labor in Lüda, complete with its own rationality, morality, and discipline.

This became a top priority because by 1947 the widening war with the Nationalists began breathing new life into Lüda’s industries. With an all-out push for war production, the CCP expended great effort to put factories back online, allowing workers to return to work. Yet rebuilding the industrial base also exposed key differences in how the CCP and Soviets managed industries and organized labor, which led to serious conflicts between the two. Moreover, just as workers were returning to their jobs, with hopes for a stable future, they were now told to expect years of hardships in return for promises of a better life. War returned to Dalian, with familiar
consequences; workers were told to increase production at all costs, and the CCP’s labor union, which had provided for them briefly, now became the main institution responsible for ensuring that they understood why worker demands were to come second to production demands.


By early 1947, increasing production to support the growing war effort became the major economic policy throughout CCP-held parts of China. CCP directives informed local cadres in Lüda that production should be the single focus of all of their work in 1947. Warfare and forced labor were certainly familiar themes in the lives of residents of Lüda. CCP cadres, as they did in other liberated areas throughout China, mobilized women and children by the thousands to work in handicraft industries, making fishnets and shoes. Hailed by the CCP for providing welfare to families while at the same time increasing production of war supplies, for women and children it meant long hours of stitching. Neighborhood production co-ops likewise put residents without factory jobs to work. As for Lüda’s larger industries, they were to be brought online as quickly and to whatever extent possible. The time for urban revolution, for redistributing the wealth and housing of the Japanese, was over as the CCP in Lüda came to share the Soviet’s emphasis on order and control necessary to increase production. As Steven Levine notes in his groundbreaking study of the revolution in Manchuria, “the Party that stood for revolutionary upheaval in the countryside was posing at the same time as the Party of revolutionary order in the cities.” It was
during this time, as tensions with the Soviets eased, that the CCP turned increasingly
toward the Soviet model to aid in the rapid recovery of industry.

From the perspective of the CCP leadership in Lüda, the move toward stable
production put an end to questions about the immediate future of the city. Prior to 1947,
work reports regarding Lüda’s economy and finances had been cautious about how
quickly Lüda might recover its industrial capacity. A report from October 1946 states
frankly that, “what takes us several years to learn in the countryside regarding economic
work will take at least five years to learn in a large city like this.” Moreover, what
resources existed in Lüda, if not taken by the Soviets, were shipped off to various base
areas in north China. Lüda, and Dalian in particular, had been treated as a supply depot
for other liberated areas, which sent cadres in to try and recover and ship-out what
materials they could get their hands on.69 This was a common practice in CCP-held
urban centers through 1947.70 The economic work report of October 1946 laments that
this occurred without any centralized planning or concern for the rebuilding of Lüda’s
economy.71 Such activity was later soundly criticized in high-level government work
reports and rectification meetings.72

By 1947, Lüda stopped being considered a temporary supply depot. Instead,
efforts were underway to remold the city into a major industrial base in support of the
crucial military campaigns against the Nationalists. Speed now became an issue, and it
was no longer acceptable to push industrial recovery years in the future. The recovery
of large-scale industries, something the CCP had relatively little experience with, now
became the top priority for local cadres. To accomplish this task, leading CCP officials
in Lüda first had to ask Soviet authorities to hand over to them key industries. Despite
the political frictions between the two, the next step was to work closely with the Soviets, and learn from their industrial experts. CCP cadres learned that bringing factories online was only part of the process required to boost production. Other social and economic reforms would have to be implemented, which together would ensure that workers would return to factories, and work harder than they had before. A rapid social reordering based on Soviet-initiated currency reforms, the closure and restriction of markets, an increase in consumer cooperatives tied to industrial enterprises, and the elimination of economic activities deemed “unproductive,” including rounding up street hawkers and peddlers and channeling them into factory work, all bore the hallmark of a coercive system of late-Stalinist development which CCP cadres were learning from their Soviet occupiers. As we shall see below, such efforts resulted in the rapid, socialist transformation of Lüda’s economy, something that would not be seen in most Chinese cities until well into the 1950s.

Public Security and the Economy

While a full examination of the activities of the police in Dalian lies outside the scope of this study, it is important to mention that it was one of the CCP’s earliest urban police forces, and many of the officers trained here were sent out to build the urban public security apparatus in cities throughout China. Because of the conditions imposed by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945, CCP military units were not allowed to enter Lüda. As a way of circumventing this restriction, CCP military forces arrived in the city to work as police. In fact, the number of police in Dalian grew so large and so rapidly as to concern Soviet authorities. When Han Guang
asked Soviet military authorities for rifles and guns to equip his police force, which totaled over 13,400 men, Soviet authorities were shocked at the size of his request, and replied that for a city this size only a force of several thousand was needed. In fact, the CCP had succeeded in building a police force in Dalian that rivaled the Nationalist’s long-established police units in the much larger cities of Shanghai and Beiping (Beijing). When pressed as to why the force was so large, Han mentioned that the fight against the remnants of Japanese fascists, and protection against the American-backed Nationalist’s military threat required such a large public security force. Reflecting this priority, from 1945 through 1949, the public security apparatus received a larger percentage of city revenues than any other sector of the local administration.

The CCP used this large police force in carrying out much of its economic and social reforms. For example, police played major roles in the housing campaigns, helping ensure a safe, orderly moving process. Following the moves, they were also responsible for setting up ward and neighborhood defense associations comprised of residents working with local branches of the growing public security apparatus. They were also highly involved in efforts to recover Japanese goods, in establishing household registrations (hukou), and enforcing travel restrictions. As mentioned briefly in chapter four, those cadres in charge of establishing the police force, upon arriving in Dalian, quickly shifted much of their emphasis from security operations and toward the recovery of Japanese buildings and property, where they searched for hidden stashes of weapons, food, cloth, and machinery. Often this was in direct competition with Soviet forces, who likewise hoped to find whatever of value they could and ship it back to the Soviet Union. The CCP’s police force also opened its own factories, using hundreds of
sewing machines seized from Japanese buildings to operate a small-scale clothing factory to supply winter uniforms for CCP forces.  

Household registration and travel restrictions resumed in 1947, on orders from Soviet military authorities. Here again we can see continuities between the Japanese regime and the CCP-Soviet order of the postwar period, in which residents of Lüda, like they had in the final years under Japanese rule, once again faced restrictions on their travels to and from the area. Moreover, the logic used to justify the restrictions was similar. Fear of spies and underground operatives of the Nationalist army entering Lüda was one of the reasons for the restriction. Acts of sabotage against key infrastructure in Dalian, particularly train derailments, and murders of Soviet gendarmes in nighttime attacks continued well into 1948.  

However, the greater fear was that the available labor force might shrink as people fled the area. In a classified summary of public security work from 1947 through 1949, restrictions on the movement of people were justified as much in order to stop the potential loss of “productive elements” (dui shengchan youli zhe) as much as blocking spies from entering the territory. Due to the strict enforcement of free travel, by 1949 only 46,000 people left Lüda, a 50 percent decrease from 1948. Those now forced to stay in the area faced a series of sweeping reforms aimed at gearing their lives toward renewed production.

Reshaping the Local Economy: Currency Reforms, Consumer Cooperatives, and the Cleanup of Street Peddlers

We have seen how the CCP redistributed much of the population spatially through its housing campaign. In the relatively stable environment provided by the
Soviet military, the CCP took advantage of its own heavy police presence and turned its attention to reordering the city economically. Before the Nationalists applied their economic blockade, Lüda’s war-weary population had hopes that the strict economic and social controls carried out by the Japanese wartime regime had finally come to an end. Markets flourished throughout the city, full of Japanese goods, from furniture to military surplus goods. Those factory workers out of work did what they could to secure stability for their families, buying and selling furniture, clothing, tools, jewelry and food. The number of street hawkers and peddlers rose dramatically, estimated to top 80,000 people in the end of 1945.  

Japanese families, who had their assets frozen, sold off what possessions they could in exchange for food or cash. Japanese memoirs recall how the floors of the formerly high-end Japanese department stores were converted into stall spaces for people to sell their worldly possessions to both Russian and Chinese alike. Food and grain dealers that had once operated through the black market in violation of the strict rationing in place toward the end of the war openly sold what food they could secure and sell. Cafes and small restaurants reopened to serve Chinese, Japanese, and Russian customers. In her memoirs, Kazuko Kuramoto recalls a trip to a coffee shop with a Chinese friend in the winter of 1945, “people were trying to outtalk one another, in Japanese, in Chinese, in Russian, clattering the cups, ordering out loud, arguing and laughing.” However, much of this economic activity was based on the initial transferal of Japanese wealth and material goods to anyone with the means to seize it. As the flow of goods slowed, and the Nationalists blockade set in, the number of peddlers had, by 1946, dropped to 43,000. However the CCP and Soviet military also
began to undertake comprehensive, systematic attempts to curb what economic activity they deemed to be “non-productive.”

The all out emphasis on production that the CCP pushed in 1947 involved controlling the renewed free market, curbing it, and funneling people and resources into factory production. One of the first steps to accomplish this involved a series of currency reforms, first initiated by the Soviet military authorities in May 1947. These were an important social-leveling strategy that also aimed to lower prices, thereby helping to alleviate economic pressures, particularly in urban areas. The Soviet military issued its own currency in Lüda, as it had in cities it controlled throughout Manchuria in late 1945 and early 1946. As we have seen, in June 1947 an inspection team from the Nationalist government arrived in Lüda with the hopes of negotiating with the Soviets to allow Nationalist forces to use the port at Dalian. Fearing that they would try to flood the market with Soviet-issued currency, which they collected as the Soviets withdrew from the major cities in Manchuria, Soviet military authorities pushed for currency reform with little advance warning to CCP cadres. Given only five days to implement the reforms, local cadres used the newspapers to urge residents to hurry and change their currency before it was too late.

Although one of its main purposes was to block the Nationalists from flooding Lüda with Soviet-issued notes, this type of currency reform was a strategy developed and carried out almost simultaneously with cities in the Soviet Union, which was no doubt fresh on the minds of Soviet military authorities. Soviet cities faced many of the same problems as Lüda, namely food shortages, deindustrialization, and unemployment. Currency reforms were designed to reign in some of these problems, and lower
commodity prices. Speculators were one of the reforms main targets. In addition to Soviet notes, all sorts of currencies flowed through the markets, creating a lucrative environment for speculators.86

The core of the reforms involved individuals exchanging their old cash into new notes at Soviet and CCP approved exchange centers. In Lüda, new notes were not printed, rather old cash, including both old Manchukuo notes and Soviet-issued notes, were stamped with a seal, and only notes with this seal could be used as legal tender.87 Individuals over the age of 16 could exchange up to 3,000 yuan of the old currency at a 1:1 rate. To accomplish the reforms, Soviet and CCP authorities sent nearly 4,000 cadres throughout the city at various exchange centers.88 Another round of currency reform was carried out in 1948. This time, workers, educators, and small businesses could exchange 5,000 Yuan per person into new notes. Anything above this amount could only be exchanged at the highly unfavorable rate of 10:1. Individuals with large savings accounts saw them decrease in value dramatically because of the reforms.89 Yet the imposed 5,000-Yuan limit affected skilled workers and the middle class as well. The upside to the currency reforms, as publicized by the CCP, was a 20 percent drop in commodity prices.90 However, the reforms also had a powerful social leveling effect by decimating personal savings. This in turn, and, as it had in the postwar Soviet Union, forced people to go back to work as wage earners, rather than attempt to live off of savings and investments.

The spread of consumer cooperatives was another measure designed to decrease the number of small shops and peddlers by bypassing them and selling products at lower prices through the cooperative. Close to 100,000 people belonged to such
cooperatives throughout Lüda by 1949. Membership was open to workers, fisher-folk, urban poor, government employees and teachers, military, small shopkeepers, and street peddlers. Cooperatives were set up by individual wards and neighborhoods, by the union, and by individual factories. In poor neighborhoods like those found in the Xigang district, co-ops grew in size throughout 1947, and made agreements to provide labor for sideline industries producing goods for the war. Thus, co-op members, particularly women, were mobilized to make shoes in exchange for food. Under this arrangement, for each pair of shoes, the coop received a set amount of grain or corn.

The most dramatic sign of social reordering, however, was the CCP’s intensive work at getting the thousands of street peddlers, the most visible components of the immediate post-Japanese economy, off the streets, and into what they considered to be legitimate, regulated shops, or into factory jobs. From the point of view of CCP cadres engaged in economic work, controlling and regulating marketplaces and shops were essential for building revenues through taxes. This was essential because throughout the 1945-1949 period, the CCP lowered taxes from Japanese-era levels. Income taxes, for example, decreased from 61 percent under the Japanese military regime to 20 percent under the Soviet and CCP-backed government.

The core of the CCP’s policy for dealing with markets and street peddlers, however, revolved around getting able bodies off the streets and into the factories. This was accomplished in a number of ways. Open-air markets where hundreds or more peddlers congregated were shut down in Dalian’s densely populated neighborhoods, making it increasingly difficult for these people to find places to operate. Police and CCP work teams carried out detailed investigations at markets throughout the city in
order to determine the best ways to reign in the peddlers. Restrictions were placed on
the types of items that could be legally sold, including antiques, “dangerous items”
(weixian pin), superstitious items (mixin pin), and articles deemed hazardous to public
hygiene. The labor union, working with the police and the investigation teams,
funneled those peddlers between the ages of 18 and 40 into available factories based on
their abilities and previous work experience, while others were allowed to open
legitimate shops in more controlled markets. By 1949, the number of street peddlers
had dropped dramatically, to 3,235. Statistics from February and March, 1949 reveal
that the majority of the peddlers that year took up factory employment.

The currency reforms, consumer cooperatives, and peddler cleanup campaigns
were thus important initial steps at reordering the city’s economy and people’s lives
toward production. Currency reforms which limited the amounts of money that could
be converted ensured that few people could simply live off their savings, or use large
amounts of cash for personal investments. Rather, they would have to work, preferably
in factories and other sectors deemed “productive.” Consumer cooperatives and anti-
peddler policies likewise ensured that people were being channeled into the process of
production. All of this was possible not simply by the laborious efforts of CCP cadres.
Warfare once again fueled the factories of Lüda.

*Warfare and Industrial Recovery*

We have thus far explored how CCP cadres were able, under Soviet authority, to
carry out some of their own policies aimed at redistributing and reordering the economy
and society of Lüda. Tactics like the housing redistribution campaigns grew from
adaptations of rural-based policies and were designed to elicit popular support through revolutionary social changes. In the case of urban land reform, Chinese urban poor from outlying slums moved into the city to reside in colonial-era housing reserved for the upper and middle classes of colonial Dalian. By 1947, however, the exigencies of military conflict forced the CCP to pursue and create in Lüda a new economic definition and function. No longer was it to be simply a temporary supply depot for various base areas to pilfer supplies. Revolutionary social projects gave way to policies which emphasized funneling all available labor and resources into a new production regime.

By 1947 and 1948 rebuilding Lüda’s industries was viewed as a vital part of winning the civil war with the Nationalists, and the CCP turned its attentions to recovering and managing larger industrial enterprises in order to produce war supplies ranging from shoes to bullets. The number of industrial workers rose from 26,000 in 1946 to over 80,000 in 1949.99 In a telegram to cadres in Dalian from late 1946, Zhu De, the head of the CCP’s Red Army, called for cadres to recover Dalian’s industries for the purpose of war production. He wrote, “There are over two hundred factories in Dalian which have not been recovered. The equipment there can readily be used to manufacture weapons and ordinance. There are also Japanese technicians, and able cadres could recover these factories and have them operational within days.”100 Zhu was right about Dalian’s potential, but he underestimated the difficulties faced by CCP cadres in recovering these industries, a process that exposed the CCP’s lack of experience, inter-party rivalry, and CCP-Soviet conflict.

No doubt the continued Soviet presence kept the region free from direct military attack, thereby creating an environment that made it possible for the CCP to use Lüda as
a relatively secure production base. However, all of the large-scale industrial enterprises throughout the area were in Soviet hands. Shortly after their arrival in Lüda, Soviet military authorities took control of the largest of the Japanese industries in Dalian, including the ship-building and ship-repair facilities, and the SMR railroad factory. By 1947, CCP and Soviet authorities had negotiated a system of joint-ownership of key industries, including the Far East Electricity Company, Sino-Soviet Oil, and the Sino-Soviet Fishing Company. Under the agreement, Chinese were to have a 51 percent stake and Soviets a 49 percent stake in these enterprises. As we will see in subsequent chapters, these industries were the frontlines of implementing Soviet management techniques and salary policies. By 1949, one third of Dalian’s total labor force was at work in one of the Sino-Soviet joint enterprises.101

In addition to these jointly-operated companies, CCP cadres were granted permission in 1947 to recover a number of former Japanese industrial enterprises which had been occupied by Soviet military personnel and stripped to various degrees of industrial equipment. Zhu De and other leading cadres hoped that these industries might quickly be made operational in order to produce military supplies, particularly armaments and ordinance, in support of the expanding battles of the civil war. From late 1946 through 1947, cadres from the Huabei Bureau (Huaibei ju) were sent to Dalian to investigate the possibilities for such a plan. As we have seen in previous chapters, much of the industries in Lüda were created in the 1930s and early 1940s to serve the Japanese war effort, particularly after the start of the Pacific War. The chemical and machine manufacturing factories in particular had been greatly expanded at that time. Soviet authorities handed over to Huabei cadres seven of these former
Japanese military enterprises, including the Manchuria chemical company, steelworks, and machine factory. They formed the core of what became the massive Jianxin Company, the largest modernized military heavy industrial complex in CCP hands. However, in 1947, much work needed to be done in order to get these enterprises operational. The Soviets had, in late 1945, taken over these factories and shipped some equipment back to the Soviet Union. In an internal report on the state of the various factories, the steelworks was the most intact, with 80 percent of its equipment operational, while the chemical plant was only 25 percent operational. However, upon the CCP’s request, they decided to hand them over to the CCP with the condition that no armament production was to take place within the city limits of Dalian city, which would breach the terms of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty. The bulk of the factories which made up Jianxin were located in the industrial areas of Shahekou district, to the west of Dalian, an area which was incorporated into Dalian county, a semi-rural suburban county, rather than Dalian city.

It does not appear that the Soviets provided much in the way of fiscal support for the undertaking. In fact, Huabei cadres initially attempted to keep details of their plans for Jianxin hidden from the Soviets, for fear of restrictions. Available data suggests that the entire project was financially backed first by the CCP’s Huabei Bureau, then in January of 1948, by the Northeast Bureau, which called for cadres from all base areas to come and invest what money and expertise they could to recover some productive capacity from these factories.

At its peak, in 1948-1949, the Jianxin employed over 8,000 workers and produced much of the ordinance used in the pivotal battles for control of North and
Northeast China. The majority of its products went to support the fronts in Huabei. Throughout the civil war, its chemical factories produced millions of bullets and hundreds of tons of explosives. Official histories of the company proudly declare that “the victory at Huai-Hai could not have been won without wheelbarrows from Shandong and ordinance from Dalian.”

In addition to its obvious military importance, Jianxin served as a crucial CCP-controlled testing ground for managing large industrial enterprises. This role took on greater importance as the civil war wound down and it became apparent that increasing numbers of large cities would be in the CCP’s hands. Unlike the jointly operated Sino-Soviet enterprises, here the CCP enjoyed total control. Liu Shaoqi, in late 1948, reflected on Jianxin’s importance, telling the company’s leading cadres, “In liberated areas, there is no significant modern industry to say nothing of technically-trained cadres. Jianxin is a large-scale combined industrial enterprise, with many production departments, it is therefore the perfect training ground for cadres to learn industrial management.” He continued, “in the future, thousands of you Jianxin cadres will move south, and establish many similar enterprises throughout China.”

Importantly, Jianxin was party-controlled from its inception, with high-ranking cadres from various base areas comprising the top leadership positions. These cadres formed a technocratic elite within the CCP. Their duty was to hone the technical capabilities of the factories and its workers. Many Jianxin cadres, like Zhu Yi, were sent to Dalian because of their technical backgrounds. Zhu was a Yanjing University graduate with a degree in chemistry. Political indoctrination of workers went hand in hand with the development of their technical expertise, and political study courses were
a staple of workers lives from day one at Jianxin.\textsuperscript{111} Total party control was but one of a number of features of the Soviet model that would come to characterize industries throughout Lüda, Manchuria, and eventually all of China. At meetings held by the CCP’s Northeast People’s Government’s Bureau of War Industry in April 1948, this new direction was made clear. CCP cadres from Jianxin returned from the meetings to spread the news that their previous “handicraft industry management styles”, could not be used to run a modern industry.\textsuperscript{112} Big changes were in store for the enterprise.

At a union committee meeting in October 1948, Li Yimin, the leading CCP official in charge of the company, spelled out its future goals. It was necessary, he urged, to continue studying how the Soviets operate modern industries. Li called for detailed economic planning, the use of production quotas to increase productivity, and the implementation of the personal responsibility system (gangwei zerenzhi) on the factory floor. A new wage system, based on piece rates was implemented in early 1949.\textsuperscript{113} The late-Stalinist model had arrived, but at what cost?

\textit{The Soviet Model and its Discontents: Forging a New Production Regime in Lüda}

In 1945 and 1946, the CCP in Lüda faced a dilemma that would become a key issue in recovering cities throughout China in that it had little to no experience successfully running and managing large scale, urban industrial enterprises. We have seen that the major efforts of the CCP in Lüda through 1947 consisted of redistributing Japanese wealth and providing basic welfare, including organizing the jobless to labor in CCP-established handicraft “factories” making fishnets and shoes. In 1946 and 1947, the CCP decided to make people work for welfare in Lüda. By March 1947, the largest
work-for-welfare enterprise was a fishnet factory that employed over 15,000 people. This type of labor was likely more desirable than the efforts used in 1946, when CCP cadres and Soviet mining industry officials agreed to send 3,000 jobless Chinese to Siberia to mine ore. Although these types of enterprises employed thousands, they were nothing more than large-scale handicraft industries, requiring little training and little technology. In an effort to absorb rampant unemployment, fishnet factories remained operational well into the 1950s. Given the dearth of factory work through 1947, it is not surprising that union organizers lamented that membership had decreased from 120,000 to just over 50,000 in the course of a year. Many workers fled the city and returned to their native places, particularly to nearby Shandong. Still others left the ranks of the union to join the police force or the military. Those that stayed had expectations that their economic situation would stabilize.

For CCP leaders like Tang Yunchao, overcoming the demands of newly liberated workers stood in tension with the harsh reality of renewed wartime production goals. A CCP work report dealing with finances, dated 20 October 1946 reflects this tension. It admits a basic paradox between pursuing policies for the economic benefit of workers and those in the interests of fuelling higher rates of production, but provides no specifics to resolve it. The report notes that, “the CCP should research how to provide basic wages for workers, but also the union should attempt to educate workers to recognize they are still going to have difficulties, many of which cannot yet be fixed.” This was in fact a problem faced in newly liberated cities throughout Manchuria, as cadres attempted to strike some kind of balance between the demands of a war state and providing for local workers. By 1948, the pressing need for increased
production came before workers needs, and cadres in the CCP’s labor union in Dalian, once filled with the hopes of providing a better life for workers who had toiled under the Japanese, found themselves explaining to workers the reality of their current plight. Li Yimin, an official from Jianxin, addressed union members in October of 1948. After explaining the current situation of the civil war, Li warned workers to expect to endure “another three to five years of hardships.” Although Soviet management was now the prime goal for the enterprise, Li told workers “that China is fighting a war of liberation, we cannot expect conditions to be the same as the socialism of the Soviet Union, we have to endure difficulties.” Li also pointed out that it was unrealistic to expect a six day work week like that experienced in the Soviet Union prior to World War II. He then came to the crux of his speech. Socialist labor struggles, Li told the workers, were different from those in imperialist countries. Strikes were not an option now. Li continued, “Jianxin is such a large factory, in order to carry out production, we face many difficulties. At times it may be impossible to pay you.” Dismayed workers were then informed that while the union “would continue to work for their benefit, the most important priority was to establish a new labor attitude, and that only with such a new perspective, could labor be organized, planned, and in tune with management to work together to increase production.”

The CCP was undergoing in Lüda, as it was in other Manchurian cities, a painful metamorphosis. The emphasis on production and industrial recovery highlighted incompatibilities with previous urban strategies and propelled local cadres toward adopting the Soviet model. The key difference between Lüda and other industrial cities in Manchuria, however, was Soviet authority. Conflicts with the implementation of
Soviet-derived strategies for rapid industrial recovery rekindled tensions between CCP cadres and Soviet authorities. Local cadres like Han Guang, and labor leaders like Tang Yunchao, found themselves caught in the middle, as they tried to appease workers while constructing a foreign system designed to squeeze maxim productivity from each individual worker.

Lüda provides clarity on the process through which the Soviet model of industrial management was first attempted in a Chinese urban center. We will examine in detail the socio-cultural impact of this model, and the details of how it played itself out in Lüda through the 1950s in subsequent chapters. For now it is important to note several things. First, leading cadres in Lüda like Han Guang, received mixed signals about the degree and extent to which to follow Soviet expertise. We have seen in chapter four that the response to the political conflicts between Soviet military authorities and CCP cadres through 1947 included both the expulsion of vocal critics of the Soviets, including Tang Yunchao, and a policy of “putting the Soviets first.” Han cracked the whip on local cadres who criticized Soviet authority, and took steps to ensure that CCP activities were subordinate and not harmful to the Soviet’s position in Lüda. However, by 1948, just as calls for adopting the Soviet model echoed throughout Lüda, the CCP’s own internal rectification campaign soundly criticized local cadres like Han Guang for straying too far from the CCP’s interests there. In high-level rectification meetings, Han was criticized for overemphasizing the “unique situation” (Soviet power) in Lüda, at the expense of stressing its similarities and connections with conditions in other liberated base areas. Clearly then, one had to be careful in just how far one took the policy of following the Soviets.
It is also important to note that the late-Stalinist model adopted here from 1948 onward and spread throughout China in the 1950s was itself the product of specific crises in the Soviet Union, which was desperately trying to rebuild itself after World War II. The magnitude of this task was quite large. In his recent study of the postwar restoration of the Stalinist system in the Soviet Union, Donald Filtzer notes that “when the war ended, the regime faced a crisis not just of acceptance and popular expectations, but of monumental physical and institutional proportions. It had to restore a shattered economy, and at the same time it had to reconstruct the institutional foundations through which it had managed the economy.”

What this meant was that the CCP was, at this time, adopting a system that had been geared to the urgent needs of controlling and disciplining the Soviet population in the postwar chaos. Deborah Kaple’s study of the legacy of late-Stalinism in China likewise notes that “the CCP learned the particularly intrusive methods of Communist Party control in management, especially in the administering of campaigns and competitions, but perhaps did not fully understand the effects of these on workers and industrial production alike.”

It should thus come as little surprise that the most potent criticisms of the Soviet model, as we saw briefly in chapter four, came from labor leaders like Tang Yunchao, who bore the brunt of worker criticisms as the new labor system began to be implemented. The CCP-led labor union in Lüda attracted its members and built its power through 1946 by pursuing activities that provided for its workers, and through efforts to organize people to carry out struggles against colonial-era powers. By 1947, however, union members found themselves asked to buckle down, work long hours, and implement a foreign management system that seemed incompatible with their demands.
for a better life. The Jianxin Company, and Lüda’s four main Sino-Soviet enterprises, became showcases of the new Soviet system for all China to see by late 1949. They were thus also the frontlines of criticism for the new system.

The crux of the problems in 1947 and 1948 revolved around the fact that while this new system was carried out in Sino-Soviet factories, in other, Chinese owned factories in the city, the older system was still in place. Sino-Soviet industries had implemented wage reforms in 1947. Workers in Chinese factories received better wages and more grain than those in the Sino-Soviet enterprises, prompting Tang to claim that his workers were exploited by the Soviet military. In Chinese factories, workers received between 20 and 30 jin of grain per month, while those in Sino-Soviet managed enterprises received 16 jin or less. By 1948, this lower wage scale was implemented in all industries throughout Lüda. During the CCP’s rectification campaigns in 1948 it was admitted that this wage policy had set wages too low. The problem faced by the CCP at the time was characterized in a 1949 publication as a dilemma between allowing workers to “eat their fill” (chi bao) or “eating equally” (chi ping), which meant receiving less grain per month. Behind this was the larger question of whether the CCP should first secure and look after the livelihoods of workers and then worry about production goals or vice-versa. We have seen that in the continued environment of total war, production took center state. Workers expecting big changes after Japan’s defeat found themselves enmeshed in yet another foreign-derived scheme to squeeze them to work harder, faster, and longer. It was with no small amount of irony then that their new production target was surpassing the Japanese wartime regime’s record production levels of 1943, a task accomplished in Dalian as early as 1951.
Conclusion

For the CCP, constant war forced them to pursue a policy that put production goals over worker demands. Elements of the late-Stalinist model itself created to rapidly reindustrialize and control the Soviet economy and society after the war, was carried out in Dalian’s factories well before most other parts of China. Part of that process involved controlling more than just the factory floor, and we have seen how the CCP likewise carried out currency reforms, market closures, and social reforms aimed to rebuild the industrial workforce in as short amount of time as possible. As we shall see continue to see, for workers in Lüda, there was no letup in the all-out emphasis on production. War remained a constant feature fuelling such efforts. As the civil war ended, the outbreak of the Korean conflict once again stoked the fire of Lüda’s industries.

Given the tortuous path that the city and its leaders walked in the process of recovering Dalian’s industrial base, one wonders what locals thought of the industrial exhibition, opened in September 1949. For many, it was likely their first chance to see clearly the new state’s definition of “new” Dalian. The city was now a model socialist city. They also wrote that they felt they were visiting a truly socialist city. Unlike any other city in China in 1949, Dalian had gone the furthest toward emulating the Soviet Union in terms of industrial development and economic management. This chapter has shown what that economic transformation entailed. Dalian’s future no doubt must have seen bleak to some. One visitor wrote, “riding the streetcars, it is easy for us to feel that we are already living in a society led by workers. Everyone on the trams is a worker, wearing dark uniforms in blue and gray. Even the women wear these, we saw no gaudy
clothing.”126 How then, did these sweeping changes affect society here? What types of new cultural forms were created or deployed to soften the harsh realities of totalistic wartime production campaigns? What did the new social definition of Lüda involve? What did it suppress? We will now turn our attention to exploring these questions of the social redefinition of Dalian as a model socialist metropolis.

1 See Dalian gongye zhanlanhui, ed., Gongye Zhongguo de chuxing (The embryonic state of industrial China) (Guangzhou: Xinhua shudian, 1950), and Gong zhan hua bao (Industrial exhibit pictorial), no.1 and no.2 (July and September 1949).


3 DFW, 12.

4 Lüda xingzheng gongshu, “Guanyu 1949 nian jingjianjihua de jiben zongjie yu 1950 nian jingjian renwu” (An outline of economic construction plans from 1949 and our tasks for economic construction in 1950) in Jingji (Economy) vol.2 no.2: 5-12


7 Lüda gaishu bianji weiyuan hui, ed., Lüda gaishu (A brief account of Lüda) (Hereafter LDGS) (Lüda: Lüda gaishu bianji weiyuan hui yinxing, 1949), 45.

8 ZGDDS, 155.

9 DGS, 228-229.

10 DGS, 236.

11 LDGS, 271.

12 LDGS, 260-261.
13 Renmin husheng, March 28, 1946.

14 LDGS, 128-130.


16 LDGS, 196.

17 LDGS, 197-198.


19 LDGS, 128-129.

20 Lüda zhilüe bianxie xiaozu, ed., Lüda zhilüe (A brief record of Lüda)(Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1960), 75. See also ZGDSS, 156.

21 See Xin sheng shibao, August 27, August 28, September 18, September 19, September 21, 1946, and also Dalian Ribao August 27-29, 1946 and September 14, 1946.

22 LDGS, 274-275. See also ZGDSS, 151-152. This source lists the figure at 15,895 families moved, close to 60,000 people.


24 “Zhonggong Lüda diwei guanyu kaizhan Dalian zhuzhai tiaozheng yundong de jue ding” (The CCP Lüda committee’s decisions regarding the spread of the housing redistribution movement), July 7, 1946, in CJSG, 515-520.

25 Cong Xuanyou, “San qu zhuzhai tiaozheng yundong” (The housing redistribution movement in three districts) in Zhonggong Dalian shi Zhongshan qu wei dangshi
bangongshi, ed., *Zhongshan chunxiao* (Zhongshan’s dawn of spring) (Dalian: Dalian haiyun xueyuan chubanshe, 1992), 41-42.

26 *Dalian ribao*, August 27, 1946.

27 *Dalian ribao*, August 27, 1946.

28 *Xin sheng shibao*, August 27, 1946.

29 *Xin sheng shibao*, September 1, 1946.

30 *Xin sheng shibao*, September 14, 1946.


32 Relocating the urban poor, and those deemed “unproductive” into rural areas was a tactic carried out in other cities throughout Northeast China (Manchuria). See Steven I. Levine, *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria 194-1948*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 188-190. For such resettlement in Lüda, see Zhang Pei, *Dalian fangwen jiyao* (Summary of a visit to Dalian) (Herafter DFW) (Shenyang: Dongbei Xinhua shudian, 1949), 2-3.

33 “Zhonggong Lüda diwei guanyu kaizhan Dalian zhuzhai tiaozheng yundong de jueding” (The CCP Lüda committee’s decisions regarding the spread of the housing redistribution movement), July 7, 1946, in CJSG, 515-520.

34 “Zhonggong Lüda diwei guanyu kaizhan Dalian zhuzhai tiaozheng yundong de jueding” (The CCP Lüda committee’s decisions regarding the spread of the housing redistribution movement), July 7, 1946, in CJSG, 515-520.

35 The city in February 1946 was broken down administratively into 5 districts (qu). Each district was composed of between 20-40 wards (fang), with each ward containing 25 neighborhoods (lu). Finally, each neighborhood was composed of 25 families. Many of the ward heads and even neighborhood heads were essentially the same people that had been in charge during the Japanese regime. See LDGS, 269-270, and ZGDDS, 136-137.

36 *Xin sheng shibao*, September 7, 1946.

37 *Xin sheng shibao*, August 28, 1946.

39 Xin sheng shibao, August 27, 28, and 30, 1946.

40 Xin sheng shibao, August 28, 1946.

41 Zhonggong Zhongshan qu weidangshi bangongshi, “Dalian zhuzhai tiaozheng yundong” (The housing readjustment movement in Dalian), in CJSJ, 322.

42 Xin sheng shibao, August 30, 1946.

43 Dalian riabo, August 20, 1946.

44 It was this latter response that I have found some evidence for in local newspapers. See Xin sheng shi bao, August 27, 1946.

45 Dalian riabo, August 27, 1946.


48 LDGS, 275.

49 Guandong ribao, June 5, 1947.


51 LDGS, 271.
“Tang Yunchao zai Lüda zhigong di yi ci daibiao dahuishang de gongzuo baogao” (Tang Yunchao’s work report at the inaugural congress of the Lüda Federated Trade Union) in CJSG, 543.

LDGS, 362-363.

ESDGYS, 448-449. See also Tang Yunchao, “Chongfan gongyun zhanxian” (Returning to the battle lines of the labor movement) in CJSG, 159.

LDGS, 363.

Tang Yunchao, “Chongfan gongyun zhanxian” (Returning to the battle lines of the labor movement) in CJSG, 158-159.

LDGS, 363.

Sun Xiuying, “Dalian jiefang chuqi de gonghui gongzuo” (Labor union work in early-liberated Dalian) in CJSG, 349.

ESDGYS, 493-494.


LDGS, 365.

“Tang Yunchao zai Lüda zhigong di yi ci daibiao dahuishang de gongzuo baogao” (Tang Yunchao’s work report at the inaugural congress of the Lüda Federated Trade Union) in CJSG, 540.

“Tang Yunchao zai Lüda zhigong di yi ci daibiao dahuishang de gongzuo baogao” (Tang Yunchao’s work report at the inaugural congress of the Lüda Federated Trade Union) in CJSG, 540.

Shen Tao, “Yi Dalian gongren peixunban” (Recollections of workers training classes in Dalian) in JCQDL, 34.

Shen Tao, “Yi Dalian gongren peixunban” (Recollections of workers training classes in Dalian) in JCQDL, 32.

“Zhonggong Lüda diwei yu kaizhan shengchan yundong de jueding” (The Lüda CCP committee’s decisions on the spread of the production movement) in CJSG, 553-558.
Labor registration cards from this period reveal that girls as young as 12 were employed in handicraft industries, particularly stitching fish netting.


Han Guang, “Lüda ba nian” in *SHJZLD*, 51. See also *ZGDDS*, 161.

Steven I. Levine, *Anvil of Victory*, 144.

“Zhonggong Lüda diwei guanyu jinhou caijing gongzuo de jueding” (The Lüda CCP committee’s decisions regarding future finance work) in *CJSG*, 521-529.

See “Guanyu Lian Gong ju Zhong Gong tongzhi zai wancheng gonggu Guandong Sulian haijun junshi genjudi gongtong renwuzhong de gongzuo guanxi wenti de jidian yijian” (Some opinions regarding the issues of mutual responsibility in completing the task of strengthening Chinese Communist Party-Soviet Party relations in the Guandong Soviet naval base area], issued by the Lüda Party Committee on March 15, 1948, reprinted in *SHJZLD*, 292-299.

In a three year span from 1947 through 1949, over 4,500 men were trained in Lüda. See Zhang Dianxuan, ed., *Dalian gong'an lishi changbian* (Historical chronicles of the Dalian police)(Dalian: Dalian yinshua gongye zongchang yinshua, 1987), 322-323, 328.

Han Guang, “Lüda ba nian” in *SHJZLD*, 43.


Dalian shi caizheng ju, ed., *Dalian caizheng zhi* (Dalian Financial Gazetteer) (no publication data), 207-211.

Zhao Jie, “Teshu de zhandou: huiyi Dalian jiefang chuqi de gong'an gongzuo” (A special fight: memoirs of police work during the initial period of liberation in Dalian), in *JCQDL*, 56-80.

*Renmin jingcha*, November 11, 1949.

*LDGS*, 347-348.

*LDGS*, 311.


83 LDGS, 311.


86 *DFW*, 8-9.


88 *Dalian riabao*, November 16, 1947.

89 *DFW*, 8-9.

90 LDGS, 186-188, 287.

91 LDGS, 215.

92 LDGS, 220-221.

93 *Renmin husheng*, March 16, 1946.

94 LDGS, 310-311.

95 *DFW*, 6-7. See also LDGS, 310-311.

96 LDGS, 311.

97 LDGS, 313.


“Zhongyang junwei guanyu pai ganbu dao Dalian zuzhi binggongshengchan de liang fen dianbao” (Two telegrams from the Central Military Committee regarding ordering cadres to Dalian in order to organize war industry production), in Zhonggong Dalian shiwei dangshi yanjiushi bian, ed., Dalian Jianxin gongsi binggongshengchan shiliao (Historical materials of Dalian Jianxin company munitions production) (Dalian: Dalian waiguoyu xueyuan, 1988), 132.

Dalian shizhi bangonshi, ed., Dalian shizhi laodong zhi (Dalian labor gazetteer) (Dalian: Dalian renmin chubanshe, 1999), 77.

LDGS, 62-63.

ESDGYS, 512-513.


Li Zhuping, “Hua Dong ju caiwei zhu Dalian banshichu he Jianxin gongsi” (The Dalian branch of the Hua Dong bureau’s finance committee and the Jianxin company) in, JCQDL, 119-120.

ESDGYS, 516.

Ge Yuguang, Mei Zuozhou, “Dalian Jianxin gongsi de teshu gongxian” (Dalian Jianxin company’s special contributions) in CJSQ, 395.

“Sui Zhu Yi tongzhi dao dang zhongyang huibao Dalian jungong shengchan,” in JCQDL, 135.


114 Dalian shizhi bangonshi, ed., *Dalian shizhi laodong zhi* (Dalian labor gazetteer) (Dalian: Dalian renmin chubanshe, 1999), 23.

115 Dalian shizhi bangonshi, ed., *Dalian shizhi laodong zhi* (Dalian labor gazetteer) (Dalian: Dalian renmin chubanshe, 1999), 72.


117 “Zhonggong Lüda diwei guanyu jinhou caijing gongzuo de jueding” (The Lüda CCP committee’s decisions regarding future finance work) in CJSG, 527.


120 See “Zonggong Lüda diwei zhengdang dahui guanyu ruogan wenti de zongjie” (An outline of various problems from the CCP Lüda Committee rectification meeting) in CJSG, 572-579. See also SHJZLD, 288-290.


“Ba Shen yu Du Ping tanhua jiyao, September 17, 1947” (A summary of the talks between ‘Ba Shen’ and Du Ping on September 17, 1947) in SHJZLD, 279-280.

See “Zonggong Lüda diwei zhengdang dahui guanyu ruogan wenti de zongjie” (An outline of various problems from the CCP Lüda Committee rectification meeting) in CJSG, 572-579.

DFW, 4-5.

Yan Jing, ed., Dongbei fangwenlu (Records of a journey to the Northeast) (Beijing: Shenghe, dushu and xinzhai sanlian shudian, 1950), 120.

Throughout the late 1940s, society in Dalian was in a state of constant flux. Workers lost their jobs as Japanese factories closed. They turned to selling goods on the streets to survive, only to return to the factories as renewed war production jumpstarted the city’s industries. Chinese urban poor were on the move through massive campaigns to redistribute Japanese homes. CCP cadres from rural base areas came and went along with Soviet military personnel. We have seen that politically, by 1947, a CCP-Soviet alliance had been worked out, and that the economic restructuring of the city also fell along Soviet lines. Yet it was not clear whose cultural orbit the city would enter at this time. Dalian’s colonial foundations and the prolonged Soviet occupation heightened the need for the city to be reclaimed and redefined after the dissolution of the Japanese empire. What were Nationalist China’s claims to Dalian? The Nationalist government commanded the loyalty of many students and workers in Dalian, who viewed it as the legitimate government of China. Would the city be integrated more closely with CCP base areas? Many cadres sent to Dalian were outsiders, from rural areas. Could people in Dalian embrace their cultural forms, honed in an environment of privation and rural wartime state building? We have seen that the Soviet Union exerted a strong influence on local politics and economic recovery. Soviet-run newspapers, Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations, and Soviet movies and educational practices pointed to a future closely linked to the emerging world of socialist states. To what degree might the city become a satellite of the Soviet Union?
This chapter reveals that the extension and creation of new definitions of city life and cultural influences in Dalian from late 1945 through 1950 was a complex process, full of contingencies and mixed signals. The city had few spatial or cultural markers that unequivocally linked it to China. It did not have non-colonial pasts to “recycle,” it had no city wall, and had no Chinese administrative history. There were no efforts to build large-scale Confucian temples in Dalian the way prominent Chinese carved a “Chinese city” out of Russian Harbin. Dalian was a total colonial space, dominated by Japanese interpretations of western architecture, Japanese factories, hotels, train stations, massive port facilities, and by concrete markers of Japanese culture, including a large Shinto shrine in the center of the city. It lacked even the “Chinese city” that sat beside the foreign concessions of Shanghai and Tianjin. Much of the CCP’s early activities involved recovering and redistributing Japanese property, as opposed (with the exception of the Shinto shrines) to tearing it down. As in Changchun, Soviet and CCP authorities occupied Japanese administrative buildings, and used them as the headquarters for the new government. This inherited colonial modernity thus became a central part of the new, socialist city.

What rose to the fore in the late 1940s were multiple definitions of new Dalian. Under renewed occupation, with China engulfed in civil war, efforts were underway to establish a certain kind of cultural linkage with China, the Soviet Union, and broader socialist world. The present chapter examines the social and cultural aspects of Dalian’s transition from a colonial port to a socialist metropolis. It seeks to understand both the processes involved in the transformation—the specific efforts of CCP and Soviet authorities to redefine social practices, and, most importantly, their effects on
society. This chapter seeks to illuminate the ways in which people experienced and influenced such a project. To what extent did Soviet political and economic control affect the shape of new social practices in Dalian? How did people respond to this? While not a “blank slate,” Dalian’s colonial past made it a more open environment in terms of receiving new cultural influences than many other places in China. There was a great desire for the city to be reconnected in some way with China, but there was no clear-cut road map of how to do so.

Competing Chinese authorities simultaneously defined Dalian as a site of Soviet imperialism, a socialist metropolis at the leading edge of implementing the Soviet model, a socialist workers paradise, and an “international” port city. Under the language of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, the international ramifications of which had been agreed upon at Yalta in the closing days of the Second World War, Dalian was to remain open to the world as an “international port.” This concession to the United States, who hoped to use the port and re-establish a consulate in the city, set Dalian apart from other cities in post-1945 China. Even Mao Zedong, in negotiations with Stalin for the return of full Chinese sovereignty over Dalian and Lüshun in 1950, asked quite directly whether the PRC would have to continue using this language to describe the port.³ Thus, the issue of Dalian’s definition, and its national and international roles, was very much contested and in flux through 1950.

This chapter balances an inquiry into top down efforts to define and stake nationalist and internationalist claims to the city of Dalian through 1950, with attempts to understand how people there experienced such projects. The first section explores the ways in which Dalian was defined by official sources after 1945. Specifically, it
examines key themes utilized to understand the recent colonial past, contextualize the present, and link the city toward a socialist future. Because of Dalian’s status as a former total colonial space, and the fact that it remained under foreign occupation throughout the civil war era, attempts to build socialism there were heavily tinged with the language of socialist internationalism. This allowed for the participation of key segments of the Japanese population, and helped justify the prolonged Soviet presence in the area. The second section examines Japanese participation in the project of building socialism in Dalian, while a third section explores Sino-Soviet institutions and assesses the impact of Soviet culture on local society. While the everyday, lived experiences of people accepting and challenging these efforts are difficult to attain due to source limitations, a careful read of local newspapers and cultural magazines allows us to catch glimpses of how people experienced such changes in Dalian at the time.

Defining New Dalian

In post-1945 Dalian, numerous overlapping efforts to mold a new definition for the city and its inhabitants were underway. Dalian was described simultaneously as a model production city, a workers paradise, an international port, a vanguard of Sino-Soviet relations, and by Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government, a symbol of Soviet imperialism standing in the way of a unified China. The environment of renewed warfare, economic crisis, and political change, coupled with Dalian’s colonial past only heightened the need for new definitions and models. From the CCP’s perspective, this was a critical part of the process of claiming the city, and fitting it into a new
configuration of the Chinese nation, and to a socialist future, heavily tinged with images of socialist internationalism, that briefly existed in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

For local people new definitions provided signposts pointing to new models and modes of work, recreation, gender relations, and even the city’s relations with the rest of the world. This was especially important in Dalian, where memories of the colonial city were still fresh in people’s minds. They lived in colonial-era homes, and rode colonial era trams to work in the same factories that once served the Japanese wartime empire. Models signifying change were necessary to highlight difference, even when the economic goals of the city—increased industrial output for an all-encompassing war effort—were shared by pre and post-1945 authorities.

Defining Dalian’s Past: “Children without a country”

For the CCP, forging a new definition of Dalian, one that linked it to a socialist future, required framing its colonial past. This process involved constructing and packaging the history of Dalian as a city of victims, symbolized most often by a discourse of what people here lacked because of Japanese imperialism. Recent scholarship on the Japanese occupation of Shanghai and the lower Yangzi region has added to our understanding of the complexities of occupation in China during the War of Resistance. These studies have shown that most people living through occupation rarely fit neatly into black and white categories of “collaboration” and “resistance,” and that in daily life, individual and family choices were often far grayer.

Applying rigid definitions of collaboration and resistance were effective ways for the new regime to single out high profile individuals to attack, in the case of those
who openly collaborated and profited under the Japanese, or reward, for those who sacrificed their lives and freedom through violent resistance. However, the vast majority of the population could not fit so easily into one category or another. Open resistance to Japanese rule in Dalian was limited after the strike waves of the 1920s, as the Japanese military and police system clamped down on such activity. From the CCP’s perspective, it would be difficult after the war to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the public if they treated the majority of city residents as collaborators.

Narratives of victimization could, however, be applied to a broad range of society, easing and erasing issues of complicity and collaboration. There is little doubt that the war years (1937-1945) were difficult times for almost everyone in Dalian, particularly after 1942, years that saw the city’s resources stretched too thin and with rapidly worsening labor conditions. This period continues to serve as the mold to shape a powerful definition of a city of victims, crystallizing the worst of the war years as the acceptable narrative for much of Dalian’s 40-year colonial history.5

Narratives of victimization were inclusive of a broad swath of society in Dalian. Manual laborers, semi-skilled factory workers, shopkeepers, even educators and students could come forth as victims. These groups contributed to the CCP’s project of translating victimization into empowerment in the new society. This was by no means a simple, clear-cut process. Rather, confusing messages and mixed signals swirled in the press and in propaganda campaigns. For example, certain articles scorned those who received an education under the Japanese as elitist traitors. An article on the status of women for example, lambasted those who received an education, “Under the Japanese, only the children of the rich, and of the lackey traitors went to school, and even then
few girls attended. How then could girls from poor families go to school?"\(^6\) However, it was clear that education could put one ahead in colonial society, and that might also translate into privileges in the new society. Perhaps it was no coincidence that some of the men and women selected as model workers in the new society received some degree of education under the Japanese. They too could present themselves as victims. A model worker proclaimed, for example, that, although he had received an education under the Japanese, “I received the education of a slave; my teacher was Japanese, and our classes were taught in Japanese. We were all becoming Japanese; we could only refer to ourselves as ‘Zhou min’ (referring to Guandong zhou) but were not allowed to say we were Chinese!”\(^7\)

The Japanese colonial education in Dalian certainly did attempt to erase Chinese identity among the residents of the Guandong Leased Territory. But one need not uncritically accept a nationalistic reading of that experience. Rather, it is important to see how a narrative of victimization aided the process of legitimizing the new order by allowing people to build and activate social and political capital. During the years from late 1945 through 1947, the CCP experimented with radical policies of urban governance, including, as we have seen in chapter five, efforts to redistribute colonial-era housing to the poor. Presenting one’s self as a victim during this process became political and, in some cases material capital with the new regime. In the case of urban housing redistribution, for example, rituals of “speaking bitterness” about one’s victimization at the hands of the Japanese resulted in families gaining the homes of their former colonial masters. Within a year of Soviet and CCP arrival in Dalian there were in place concrete rewards for being a victim of the Japanese.
Moreover, this very public discourse helped smooth over the fact that Dalian’s new socialist authorities were generating and perpetuating new inequalities and privileges, some of which were carried over from the colonial era. The new wage system implemented in Sino-Soviet joint industries, for example, continued to privilege those workers with technical skills by giving them higher salaries. Yet some skilled workers in key industries had received that training under the Japanese. Wang Richun, for example, was part of a small core of Chinese technicians who took leading roles in the city’s electrical utility company after 1945. He received his technical training in 1941, graduating that year from a technical school run by a Japanese utility company.8 Others who served on the board of directors of the post-1945 electric company included Zhang Youxuan, a local who was educated in Japanese schools and attended the prestigious engineering college in Lüshun.9

Ironically, however, a major component of this narrative of victimization involved imagining local residents as somehow lacking or lagging behind intellectual and cultural trends in the rest of China. Often, accepting or positioning oneself as a victim of Japanese imperialism carried with it the connotation that one was “less Chinese.” CCP cadres in charge of art and culture, for example, lamented openly that, culturally, Dalian, was a place cut off from China, and they characterized intellectual life here as “lacking a foundation” (haowu jichu).10 Chinese students educated under the Japanese, for example, were not viewed as collaborators, but as victims of a Japanese educational system that erased their sense of racial and national consciousness.11
The artistic forms and foundations of May Fourth-era art, and the new understandings of the role of art and literature in modern Chinese society that had been hammered out in Yan’an, these were things that, from the perspective of CCP outsiders, people in Dalian did not understand. Like the bustling scrap markets that symbolized economic life in Dalian’s first year after Japan’s defeat—a city devouring itself, art here was described as “scrap” (polan), still characterized by leftovers from Japan and Manchukuo. CCP cadres in charge of cultural work believed their main task was to get rid of these scraps, and introduce new cultural forms to the people of Dalian.

The leftover “scraps” of imperialist culture included songs, music, and dramas from the colonial era, which remained popular for a time after 1945. In an attempt to stop the flow of these artistic forms, CCP cadres, led by the Northeast Literature and Art Work Team (Dongbei wenyi gongzuo tuan) which arrived in the city in 1946, worked to promote new songs through singing and songwriting competitions, often carried out at schools. Works of new art and literature were second only to political tracts in terms of volumes published at the CCP-controlled presses in Dalian. CCP cadres in charge of cultural work used the former Japanese radio station to broadcast a special series on music, discussing the origins and meanings of songs in an attempt to educate listeners what was “wrong” with Japanese-era songs, and why the CCP’s conceptualization of art was “right.” Dalian’s radio station began broadcasting in January 1946. Because of the large number of radio sets in the city, this medium was a major part of the CCP’s project to reshape culture in Dalian. In 1946, over 149 programs on “revolutionary art and literature” were broadcast. That number approached 500 the following year. Often, new songs were introduced by lectures from
members of the Northeast Literature and Art Work Team.\textsuperscript{15} Despite these efforts, many artists, musicians, and teachers in Dalian felt that the new songs were “dull” (\textit{ganzao wuwei}), and lacked the history of the more established genres.\textsuperscript{16}

In an attempt to erase colonial era artistic forms, and in keeping with the CCP’s totalistic war mobilization efforts, the Northeast Literature and Art Work Team declared war on old cultural forms, and dedicating itself to promote rural artistic forms, honed in Yan’an. Han Guang, the CCP Party Secretary, asked the team to use “art as a weapon” (\textit{yi wenyi wei wuqi}) in combating the flow of colonial era art. As early as November 30, 1945, CCP cadres in charge of forging some kind of city government apparatus in Dalian called for the importance of promulgating new culture in an attempt to rid Dalian of the influence of “slave education.”\textsuperscript{17}

What followed was a relentless campaign to spread the yangge and other rural operas and dances in Dalian. At schools and factories, people were encouraged to join yangge teams. Model dancers and dance teams were rewarded with cash prizes, “yangge chuangzuo jiangjin” at dancing contests that took place over new year holidays.\textsuperscript{18}

Perhaps the most significant portrayal of the social consequences of Japanese imperialism was that people in Dalian lacked national consciousness, and had forgotten their identities as Chinese.\textsuperscript{19} Through newly established newspapers and journals, model workers presented readers with memories of their lives under the Japanese. One such article, from the pages of “Democratic Youth” (\textit{Minzhu qingnian}), entitled “Love the motherland” (\textit{Ai zuguo}), was the result of a conversational meeting arranged by publishers of “Democratic Youth” to address the question, “How should we love our country?” In one section, titled “We were children without a country” (\textit{women ceng shi...}
metyou zuguo de haizi), readers learned that workers and students from pre-1945 Dalian had lost track of who they were. Liu Meilan, designated as a model student during a literacy campaign (tedeng shizi mofan), told readers, “I started working in factories when I was 11, and at that time I did not know I was Chinese.” Another worker, Zhang Xulan, wrote, “I had no idea where my country was.” Articles like this in the pages of “Democratic Youth” likely struck a cord with its educated readership, most of whom likely attended school under the Japanese.

The date of such an article is also crucial. “Love the motherland” was written in 1950, at a time when the CCP was firming up loyalties to the newly established People’s Republic of China. In other words, there was a CCP-controlled nation in existence to love. Prior to that, such nationalist loyalty was harder to cultivate. After all, the city was under Soviet occupation, and the Nationalist government presented itself as the legitimate government of China. For the CCP, the task through 1949 was how to contain and define the future of Dalian, and mark the city as Chinese. Moreover, they had to do this in the Soviet-occupied present. As we shall see, this involved heavy Soviet influence, and an image of Dalian as a socialist-internationalist metropolis.

Contextualizing the Present: Dalian as a Model Production City

By 1949, newspapers and journal articles published throughout China hailed Dalian as “new China’s model metropolis.” At the core of this definition was an image of the city as a center of production. Throughout the late 1940s, such an image was inseparable from Dalian’s position as a Soviet-occupied space. Sino-Soviet industries became laboratories for implementing the Soviet model in China. All of this was a
major part of Dalian’s definition as a “production city” (shengchan chengshi),
propagated in the national press.

Dalian’s image as a production metropolis for new China was cemented at a
major industrial exhibition, held there in late 1949. The three-month exhibition drew
nationwide attention to the city’s industrial recovery under Soviet and CCP guidance,
cementing its definition as a model production-metropolis of new China. Newspaper
reporters, travel writers, and thousands of other visitors, including oversees Chinese
industrialists, flocked to Dalian to see the exhibition, which was carefully organized
following months of researching similar events held in New York, San Francisco, and
even those held by the Japanese regime in Manchuria in the 1930s. In the three months
that it lasted, the exhibition attracted over 300,000 visitors.22

In a special two-part pictorial magazine covering the exhibition, pictures of men,
women, and children, diligently carrying dirt and bricks were marked with captions
proudly declaring that over 15,000 people had been mobilized to build the exhibition
halls. The construction of the exhibition itself was propagated to a nationwide audience
as evidence of new Dalian’s productive society. Walking through the display halls,
visitors viewed industrial products made in Dalian’s recently recovered industries,
which included items ranging from machine tools and chemical products, to buses and
tramcars. Dalian produced things Beijing and Shanghai could not; they had not yet
achieved the status of true production cities. The final hall of the exhibition was a
heavily propagandized homage to Sino-Soviet relations, featuring pictures and displays
driving home the point that Soviet guidance made the futuristic world of production
they were witnessing possible. Industrial products and exhibits, however, were not the
only things to see. The city itself was on display. Numerous journalists and writers who came to report on the exhibition also took in the sights of Dalian, and reported what they saw. “Dalian,” one visitor wrote, “has been made into a true production metropolis. City people’s productivity and labor, this is the new character of Dalian.”

By the early 1950s, one goal of urban policy in the newly established People’s Republic of China was the transformation of “consumer cities” into “production cities.” Reading the coverage of the industrial exhibition, writers constructed a portrait of Dalian as a city that, by the late 1940s, had successfully made this transition before most of urban China. Journalists writing for a national audience helped create that image by consistently describing a city that pulsed to the rhythms of production. The tranquility of Dalian’s streets, one observer wrote, was attributed to the fact that most able-bodied residents were working in factories. Travelers to the city noted that Dalian’s famous colonial-era streetcars were staffed almost entirely by teenage girls, and many of the trams were driven by female drivers. One observer wrote “this shows you two things: first, there is no disorder on the trams, so these young girls can work, and second, the men are all working in the factories, freeing up these jobs for girls.”

Reaffirmation of Dalian’s production-obsessed definition extended down to the level of individuals through campaigns to create and reward model workers. Model workers were selected from industries throughout the city. These exemplary citizens of the new production metropolis attained their privileged status in a number of ways, many of which were tied to emergent aspects of the Soviet model. Such efforts were not unique to Dalian. Model workers became a ubiquitous part of rural and urban life throughout the People’s Republic. However, Dalian was one of the first major cities to
launch Soviet-style production competitions and rationalization campaigns, which rewarded time and energy saving shortcuts in the manufacturing process. Rewards included notoriety and cash.²⁸

The quest for ever-increasing industrial production was not a new feature in Dalian. We have seen in chapter five that, in fact, the production goal under socialism through the early 1950s was to surpass the peak years of Japanese production in the city. The status of workers in society, including the large-scale participation of women in the workforce was, however, a major change brought about under socialism. New marriage laws, new political and social organizations for women, and literacy classes were all indicators that the new powers took seriously the task of elevating women’s position in society.

However, a pressing concern for authorities in Dalian was to increase women’s participation in production, which became the main indicator of their new position in society. This urgency was due in part to the pressing need to resume production for the CCP’s expanding war with the Nationalists. Mobilizing women was thus a major part of the production campaigns of 1946 and 1947. In 1947 alone, some 34,000 women throughout Dalian labored tirelessly making shoes for soldiers.²⁹ Over 60,000 worked sewing ropes together to make fishnets.³⁰ This contrasted sharply with figures for women’s labor under the Japanese, when only 8,000 women were involved in production, mostly in textiles and food processing industries.³¹

By far the most publicized of all Dalian’s model workers were women train engineers. In 1949, the story of Tian Guiying, China’s first female train engineer, made headlines throughout China. Her story wove together several threads that helped to
propagate the types of changes occurring in new Dalian. Tian was a local, born into a family that fished for a living. She began fishing at the age of seven, and by the time she was twenty had worked in various factories throughout the city. While attending night courses established by the railway bureau, she was inspired by a teacher, who told her that, “for women to be truly liberated, they must participate in socialist labor.” Tian was then determined to learn a technical trade. After seeing pictures of Soviet women train engineers, she asked if Chinese women might someday attain such skills. A Soviet technician decided to take Tian and forty other women and train them as engineers, and she was on her way to becoming one of the first female train engineers in China. Tian’s saga was even made into a motion picture.

Stories like this hammered home the point that, with Soviet guidance and the right attitude toward production, a new socialist society was at hand, inclusive of women. They also revealed that one’s proximity to Soviet and Sino-Soviet industries was an indicator of privilege and opportunity. In 1950, Tian traveled to the Soviet Union as a youth representative. For many women, however, the working day was far less spectacular. Sewing shoes and fishing nets was tiring and monotonous labor. It required little technical skill, and thus, there was little need for contact with Soviet technicians. Yet even in this environment, women were drawn into the Soviet model through “rationalization” (helihua) drives. Women making fishnets were selected as model workers based on their ability to create and implement techniques that saved materials and increased output.

Imagining Dalian’s Future: “A Workers Paradise”
When carried to its extreme, the image of Dalian as a model production city took on a utopian dimension when the city’s experience was presented to the rest of China. Dalian had become, in one author’s opinion, not just production base, but “in the last four years it has transformed itself into a worker’s paradise.” The concrete aspects of Dalian’s colonial modernity set the foundations for its new role as a utopian socialist metropolis. Many of the journalists who visited Dalian in 1949 wrote glowingly of the colonial aspects of the city. Walking out of the train station, one writer was moved by the vista of “such a modern city” (jindaihua de chengshi). “The Japanese, as far as city planning is concerned, had great skill--the streets are very wide, and lined with trees.” Praise for aspects of Dalian’s colonial modernity did not stop there. The author continued, “The Japanese have very hygienic practices, and as a result the buildings here are quite spacious and ordered.”

In direct comparisons with Shanghai, and Beijing Dalian was favored for its highly developed public transportation, particularly the colonial era streetcar system, which “reaches nearly every corner of the city.” In other words, Beijing and Shanghai were years behind Dalian in perfecting modern infrastructure. Likewise, the author notes that Beijing “has too many bicycles”, and, like many cities of the interior, “not enough public transportation,” while Dalian, he notes, “among all of China’s cities, has the best public transportation, the price is cheap, you don’t have to wait, and you can get anywhere.” Spacious apartment buildings, once the residences of Japanese, were now home to workers and their families, who “abandoned their old huts and now live in these western-style buildings.”
The concrete colonial foundations of the city, were now in Chinese hands. The challenge, from the CCP’s point of view, was how to continue to use this foundation to build a new socialist modernity. After praising Dalian’s colonial modernity, journalists writing for the People’s Daily newspaper, wrote of how the city was “transformed from an oppressed Japanese imperialist colony, to an industrial base of New Democracy and New China.” The colonial infrastructure may have survived, but the city beat to a different pulse. The same author who celebrated the colonial-era streetcars concluded from a look at the passengers that: “we knew then that we were living in a new society, led by the working class.” The author continued, noting, “everyone on board was a worker, a student, or a technician. They wore short-jackets and simple clothes, in dark colors like black and grey. Some carried lunchboxes.” None of the women, according to the author, wore gaudy clothing. Other writers praised Dalian for its gender equality, noting that “women and men are already treated the same, and women now hold jobs as train conductors, and bus and tram drivers.”

Other former colonial buildings served as worker’s social clubs and reading rooms, over one hundred and fifty of which existed throughout the city. Inside such clubs were sofas, books, pool and ping-pong tables, small stages, and nice bathrooms. Dalian workers, on their days off, if they were not strolling through “Worker’s Park,” (which like the exhibition hall, had been built by the city’s workers), might stop by such clubs for an afternoon of singing or reading. Thus, Dalian’s colonial infrastructure, which made the city a showcase of Japan’s city planning in Manchuria, was fully integrated into the new, socialist city.
Model work units, like the Dalian Transportation Company (Dalian jiaotong gongsi) pointed to a future where urban work units would provide for all of a workers needs. The “worker house,” (gongren zhi jia) a dormitory affiliated with the Dalian Transportation Company (Dalian jiaotong gongsi), represented the best that urban socialist living might offer, and was a frequent stop for travel writers and journalists. Here, over three hundred men and women worked and studied together, training to be technicians, repair people, and train and bus drivers. Visitors were shown how workers daily needs were all taken care of by the company, including mess halls, barber shops, showers featuring electric lighting, sports facilities, and even a dancing area.\textsuperscript{41} The aim, as one writer who visited the dormitory wrote, was “to show that workers from any place can all share what those in Dalian have, by using their own efforts they can build their own paradise.”\textsuperscript{42}

Yet, perhaps the most dramatic visions of the future were presented in the Sino-Soviet Friendship hall, the final hall of the industrial exhibition. Images in this hall set the context for the present and framed the future. The hall featured a large map of the tip of the Soviet-controlled naval base, stretching from Lüshun to Shihe, on which were displayed the branch locations of Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations. Near the map, were large portraits of leading Soviet military officials who participated in the “liberation” of the Northeast and Dalian, along with images of Soviet tanks arriving outside of the Dalian train station. The displays contextualized local Sino-Soviet relations in visual form. Images show Soviets distributing grain to residents during the GMD blockade. Soviet aid, visitors were told, provided the people of Dalian with work by opening massive fishnet factories. They also shared their technical knowledge by
training Chinese technicians, something that set them apart from the Japanese. The Sino-Soviet Friendship hall also provided a brief history lesson on the Russian revolution and its impact on China, historicizing Sino-Soviet relations as an ongoing phenomenon.

We have seen that the Soviet Union exerted a strong political and economic influence on Dalian, and shortly we will examine their cultural influences. However, participation in the project to redefine Dalian as a socialist urban space was not limited to Chinese residents. What about Dalian’s Japanese population, the majority of which was not repatriated until 1947-1948? How did their continued presence affect the project to re-orient the city toward the socialist world? What, if any, role did they play in this transformation? The coverage of Dalian’s industrial exhibition makes no mention of this.

**Socialist Internationalism at Work: Japanese Participation in New Dalian**

On May 1, 1946, residents of Dalian witnessed and participated in the city’s inaugural May Day celebration. It was the first of a series of commemorative dates that reaffirmed Soviet authority and linked the city to the broader socialist world. Importantly, a major theme stressed at the celebration was socialist internationalism. The most visible element of this internationalist theme was the highly publicized participation of Japanese and Korean workers in key events throughout the city.

**Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Russian alike participated in a massive May Day parade, riding together on floats, and holding banners that proclaimed “Japanese**
militarism has been toppled!” and “Long live the union of the Soviet, Japanese, and Korean people!” That day a massive rally of over 200,000 people, including 12,000 Japanese was held on the grounds of the old colonial-era sports stadium. Members of the newly formed labor union for Japanese workers sat alongside Soviet and CCP leaders at speeches and reviewing stands. City residents lined the parade route to watch the spectacle, which marked the return of some kind of order to a city that had managed to get through the chaotic final months of 1945 without spinning apart.

That Soviet and CCP authorities held May Day celebrations in Dalian is not surprising. What is striking was the level of participation of the Japanese community in the event. Post-1945 histories are largely silent on the experiences of the hundreds of thousands of Japanese who lived in Manchuria at the end of the war. Nationalist histories of Japan, China, and Korea, often treat 1945 as a major historical rupture. One of the main points stressed throughout this dissertation is that when one places the historical lens on Dalian, such clarity becomes murky.

Dalian’s huge Japanese population did not disappear after 1945. In fact, a core group of Japanese, protected by policies from the Soviet-backed local government, played an active, public role in new Dalian. From the moment of their arrival in the city, CCP cadres had to deal carefully with the sizable Japanese community. In the rush to claim and control Japanese property and resources after 1945, for example, the CCP found at times that treating certain Japanese respectfully was often the best way to achieve their objectives of confiscating as much property and loot as possible. Xie Qian, a cadre in charge of such efforts, recalls that in the process of taking goods from Japanese shopkeepers, “we would first gather all the Japanese capitalists together, then
take their stuff and seal it up while enumerating the crimes of Japanese imperialism, telling them that these were goods stolen from the Chinese people. But they still wanted ‘face’ and said it was alright to ‘recover’ (jieshou) the goods, but not to ‘confiscate’ (moshou) them. We gave them face, and in the future referred to our activities in terms of recovery.”

Meanwhile, in the press, Chinese newspapers carried stories describing the newfound friendship between Chinese and Japanese, emphasizing, “Only under the banner of May Day is there genuine friendship (between Chinese and Japanese).” The pages of Minshu tsūshin, a Japanese-language paper published by the Soviet military, were likewise devoted to coverage of Japanese participation in May Day and such other “international” socialist events as Women’s Day. At an assembly held to commemorate international women’s day in March 1948, for example, Japanese women played a major role. Haneda Sumiko, the representative of the Japanese Women’s Association, gave a rousing speech to her “Chinese sisters” in which she laid out the shared path of the transformation of Japanese and Chinese women’s roles in society brought about under socialism. Like the new, production-based status of Chinese women, one of the main goals of this organization was to contribute to the economic development of Guandong.

The message driven home in journals and local newspapers was that Japanese labor had a role to play not just in aiding the recovery of Dalian, but also in the new, Soviet-led world of socialist states. Japanese in Dalian helped clarify the emerging Cold War order. By 1948 and 1949, those Japanese workers and their families who remained in Dalian often gave speeches that emphasized a new common enemy—the
United States. Speaking to a youth assembly in 1949, Niyata Humiko, the representative of the Japanese Democratic Youth organization (Dalian Ri qiao minzhu qingnian tuan), declared, “Dear Chinese comrades! Our common enemy, the reactionaries led by the American imperialists will use whatever new means possible to make war.” Linking the Chinese revolution to Japan, Niyata proclaimed, “The victory of the Chinese revolution will certainly influence democratization in Japan.” She concluded her speech with a rousing “Long live humanity’s greatest protector of peace, our dear Stalin! Long live the great leader of the Chinese people, Mao Zedong!”

Women like Haneda and Niyata had high profiles because their parents and husbands were industrial experts and skilled workers. This core of Japanese technicians took center stage in the industrial recovery of Dalian from 1945 to 1949. CCP cadres pouring into Dalian from Shandong had little or no experience running the large-scale, modern industrial enterprises that had been built in the city to fuel the Japanese war effort. As uncomfortable as it may have seemed to base area cadres, they needed Japanese expertise to get the city’s industries up and running. This was a top priority not just in terms of stabilizing local society, but also because such industries were vital to the CCP’s military effort to defeat Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists. Japanese experts played prominent roles in transferring their technical knowledge to Chinese workers in these important industries.

The largest and most important Japanese organization of the postwar period by far was the Nihonjin Rōdō Kumiai [the Japanese Labor Union]. The Japanese Labor Union was established on December 2, 1945, following the Soviet military’s calls for the establishment of democratic associations for Dalian’s Japanese residents. At its
peak, in 1947, union membership topped 20,000. Founding ceremonies were held on 20 January, 1946 in a gala event attended by top CCP cadres and Soviet representatives. Tang Yunchao, the head of the CCP-controlled Chinese labor union, took the stage at the event, and urged Japanese workers to “overcome their racial bias and work closely with Chinese workers to build a new democratic Dalian.” Doki Tsuyoshi, the head of the Japanese union, echoed that message, commenting that, “Under the pressure and bitter life imposed by the Japanese fascist militarists, we had no free thoughts, now we Japanese workers of Dalian want to thoroughly eliminate the remnants of war criminals and fascists. Only then can there be true liberation, world peace, and the construction of a new, democratic Dalian.”

The union drew its leaders from leftist officials, managers, and technicians, many of whom had been imprisoned by the Japanese military in the closing years of the war. Toki Tsuyoshi, the head of the organization, had served as chief of personnel at the huge SMR locomotive factory in Dalian’s western industrial district. Ishidō Kiyomoto, another key leader of the union, formerly worked as a member of the SMR’s research division, which had a number of its leaders persecuted and jailed in a series of arrests by Japanese military authorities in 1943. These men were highly receptive to the message of international labor solidarity put forth by the Soviets and the CCP in Dalian. They had been critical of Japanese militarism during the war, and after 1945, wanted to combat what they saw as the failure of those leaders to move in any positive direction to protect or aid the vast Japanese population.

Importantly, the Japanese Labor Union was not built from scratch, but was rather the culmination of earlier efforts by certain segments of the Japanese population
to take active roles to protect and provide for their community in the weeks after Soviet troops arrived. The main precursor to the labor union was the Dalian Japanese Democratic League, whose primary goal was to organize those Japanese with technical skills to work with Soviet and Chinese authorities in rebuilding the city’s industrial base.\(^{54}\) Steps were taken to link this group with such CCP-controlled organizations as the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association (Zhong-Su youxiehui), and the CCP-backed labor union, perhaps out of fear that, like the Youth Volunteers, its members might be co-opted by the Nationalists in their own attempts at establishing a governing structure in Dalian.\(^{55}\) It was in this context, of linking Japanese groups with CCP-backed associations, that the Democratic League was reorganized into the Japanese Labor Union.

The Japanese Labor Union had a number of functions. Providing material assistance to destitute Chinese and Japanese residents was one of their main activities. Union leaders accomplished this task by systematically collecting money from Japanese industries, businesses, and any individuals able to give. In 1946, their efforts raised over 14 million yen, most of which helped feed 36,000 of the city’s poorest residents.\(^{56}\) Some Japanese, particularly those less open to socialism, looked upon the labor union in a negative light. Their experiences reveal a coercive side to union operations. Tokisane Hiroshi, a former translator for the Japanese police during the colonial era, recalls union members harassing his family, pressing them to donate relief funds. He likened his interactions with union members with that of a police interrogation. In one such session, union leaders asked him in detail about his background and his former employment history. After continually refusing to pay, Tokisane was hounded by members of the
union, who showed up repeatedly at his home. He was eventually apprehended by Chinese authorities, something he blamed on the labor union.\textsuperscript{57}

Tokisane’s interrogation by Japanese union members, and his eventual arrest, highlights the role the Japanese union played in tracking down and helping to apprehend former army soldiers, policemen, and other wartime leaders throughout the city.\textsuperscript{58} For loyalists, and those unsympathetic to the cause of working with Soviets and CCP cadres, the union was viewed as nothing more than a tool of the Soviet military, and “the enemy of Dalian’s Japanese community.”\textsuperscript{59} From the perspective of Soviet and CCP authorities, using the Japanese union to help identify and seize war criminals was of great benefit.

Such action reveals the new lines drawn in society, from national to class lines. The activities of the Japanese Labor Union reveal that not all Japanese were portrayed as racial enemies in the post-1945 period. Rather, through their participation in that Soviet-sanctioned organization, some Japanese were included as part of the key component of the socialist urban environment as class-conscious friends. Ishidō Kiyomoto, was not a worker, but like other SMR researchers was a sympathetic Marxist willing to participate in Dalian’s socialist rebuilding. Under their control, the Japanese Labor Union actively sought out those members of their community who were deemed enemies, most notably police and military officers, men like Tokisane.

Another of the union’s main functions was to aid in the process of getting Dalian’s industries back up and running.\textsuperscript{60} To this end, union members were organized into 13 branches spread throughout the city’s main industries. At ceremonies for the establishment of the branch at the former SMR locomotive factory, Mr. Wada, a
Japanese union leader, spelled out their goals for the factory. “We have united in order to recover our productive capacities and to atone for our previous mistakes toward the Chinese people. To build new Dalian’s industries, we will cooperate with Chinese laborers.” Seventeen technicians were then selected to serve as instructors for classes to train Chinese workers for the technical jobs long held by Japanese throughout the colonial period. Japanese assistance proved vital to the success of Dalian’s military industries during the Civil War, the largest of which was the Jianxin Company. Jianxin was home to the largest branch of the Japanese Labor Union, and from 1948 through 1949, eight Japanese workers from the company were selected for awards as outstanding laborers.

Japanese technicians were so crucial to Jianxin’s operations that the company established a special liaison department with the sole function of handling affairs with Japanese labor. Li Yenong, a New Fourth Army officer, headed such efforts. Li and other top Jianxin officials often called on Japanese industrial experts at their homes. Often, Japanese engineers were given compensation that outmatched high-ranking CCP cadres. For example, in 1946, three Japanese engineers were sent to Shandong to work. While their families remained in Dalian, Jianxin gave each family an additional 10,000 yuan per month in support. Most CCP cadres received no more than 6,000 yuan per month in Dalian.

Great care was taken to create and extend attractive contracts to Japanese experts. They were not forced to work, but rather, extracted major concessions from Jianxin. In 1948, for example, CCP cadres negotiated new contracts in an attempt to
keep engineers from returning to Japan. These contracts included 33 percent pay increases, along with other benefits including subsidized health care and education.64

Viewed in such a light, this segment of the former colonial population was far from passive in defeat. There is no question that the Japanese Labor Union was a potent tool used by Soviet and CCP authorities to propagate their vision of Dalian’s socialist future. It was also an effective way to manage the Japanese population and squeeze useful technical knowledge from industrial experts. From the perspective of union members, collaborating with Soviet and CCP authorities brought with it the possibilities of stability and protection for individuals and their families. The fact that the Soviets brokered and legitimated such organizations is significant. Many Japanese leaders were far from passive in the first months of Soviet arrival. They actively sought Soviet approval to ensure their own protection, and to help protect the livelihoods of their friends and families. For example, after taking control of the port facilities, Soviet authorities kept Japanese experts at their positions in all of the main divisions of the ports administration. In the machinery division, a certain Nakamura Hiroshi, was able to use his position to increase the number of Japanese workers from 173 to over 700, so that Japanese workers outnumbered Chinese in this division. Only in May 1946, after repeated objections by Chinese labor leaders, did the Soviets act to remove Nakamura and decrease the number of Japanese workers.65

The incident reveals how Japanese labor leaders skillfully used what little power they had to work with the Soviet authorities to ensure jobs for Japanese. While CCP labor leaders may have courted Japanese expertise in critical industries, when it came to taking jobs away from Chinese, a line had to be drawn.
Japanese participation in redefining Dalian further highlights the fact that, given the territory’s continued status as a leased territory/Soviet military base, the rhetoric of socialist internationalism that was publicized at union events, May Day parades, and in local newspapers, provided at least a solid ideological basis for including certain Japanese in the new order. Japanese involvement in the process of refashioning Dalian into a socialist city served as a powerful way to highlight the inclusive rhetoric of socialism. At most major public celebrations or commemorations, Japanese, like Chinese and Soviets, gave speeches aimed to drive home the point that Dalian was now part of a new world of socialism.

While Soviet films and images were used to generate images of socialist internationalism throughout China in the early 1950s, in Dalian, the direct participation of Japanese and Soviets in recasting the city in a socialist mold brought the rhetoric of socialist internationalism to life. The next section examines various efforts to propagate positive images of the Soviet Union, Soviet troops, and Soviet culture through new institutions that reached all levels of society in Dalian.

From “Big Noses” to “Big Brothers”: Sino-Soviet Cultural Production in Dalian

We have seen in previous chapters that in terms of political and economic developments, the Soviets exerted significant influence in Dalian. Less clear, and more difficult to evaluate is what impact the Soviet presence had on the process of building new socialist identities for the city and its people. The local population, with little or no knowledge of the Soviet Union or its brand of socialism, harbored doubts about why the Soviet military was in charge in Dalian. They viewed Soviets as foreigners. Stories of
Soviet troops raping, looting, and removing industrial equipment were well known. Locals often used racial slurs to describe Soviet troops. In some cases, the attitude and behavior of individual Soviet commanders could rouse local condemnation. In Jin county, the rural area to the north of Dalian, certain Soviet garrison commanders were notorious for public cruelty toward Chinese. Such behavior led to a popular slogan likening the Soviets to the Japanese before them with the racial epithet, “the small noses (Japanese) have gone, but the big noses (Soviets) have arrived” (zou le xiao bizi, lai le da bizi).66

Chinese locals resisted Soviet authority in whatever ways they could. Ticket collectors for busses and trains, for example, made Soviets wait until after Chinese bought their tickets to purchase their own. They charged Soviets double the price for haircuts, tailoring, and rickshaw rides. Chinese plumbers turned off taps to Soviet homes and charged high rates to “fix” the problem.67 Others fought back violently. Mundane conflicts quickly turned deadly, revealing deep mistrust and anger. When a Chinese night watchman caught four Soviet soldiers picking fruit from an orchard in a rural suburb, a fight ensued. In the melee, the night watchman shot and killed two soldiers and injured two others.68

In the mid to late 1940s, people in Dalian did not easily subscribe to the image of the Soviet military as saviors and liberators, nor did people seamlessly accept Soviet models and images of the future. Efforts to change negative perceptions of Soviet authorities were one of the major challenges confronting the CCP in Dalian. Great care was taken to create and mobilize local newspapers, radio programs, films, magazines, artistic performances, and new institutions like Sino-Soviet Friendship associations and
youth organizations to spread positive images of the Soviet military, explain the significance of their presence in Dalian, and present images of a Soviet future. Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations (Zhong-Su youhao xiehui) propagated Soviet culture through various social activities, speech contests, and artistic events. Summer camps (xia lingying) for children, themselves a Soviet import, became a locus of significant contact between Soviet troops, their children, and local Chinese students, and served to reinforce the image that China was on the verge of enjoying the fruits of socialism just like the Soviet Union was. These examples are representative of widespread efforts to reach large segments of society and spread the message that acceptance of Soviet authority was the only acceptable political option in Dalian.

What this meant on the ground was that the CCP downplayed activity that would easily expose the negative side of the Soviet military presence and authority, including acts of Chinese nationalism against the continued Japanese and Soviet presence. As we saw in chapter four, CCP cadres eventually put the blame for anti-Soviet activity on the Nationalists. An article written for students in Dalian, the group considered most susceptible to anti-Soviet nationalism, explained, “Chiang Kai-shek’s agents have used your patriotism and your national pride for the evil purpose of resisting the Soviet Union.” Yet, for many Chinese residents, resistance to foreign occupation, Soviet, Japanese, or otherwise, was a cornerstone of the nationalism forged throughout China in the early 20th century.

The burden fell on local officials as to how to justify their position vis-à-vis the Soviets, while at the same time trying to soften and blur the similarities to the Japanese-era total war effort. They had to build a positive image of Soviets, define their
relationship with them, and link Dalian to a socialist future full of promises. CCP work reports in Dalian, for example, refer to the need for its leaders to “free themselves from a narrow nationalist view of local affairs, and fully embrace socialism and an international perspective.” What is interesting is that, as we have seen, similar rhetoric was used to mobilize Japanese technicians to help rebuild Dalian’s industrial base.

Socialism and socialist internationalism thus became a key part of the identity that Chinese Communists tried to construct at this time in Dalian, yet most residents, and ironically, even those who the CCP sent to operate in the city, had little understanding of what this was, or what it would look like. Many had joined the Chinese Communist party in its rural base areas during the fight against the Japanese. Now they were asked to internalize and propagate socialism in an unfamiliar urban environment without themselves having a clear understanding of what this meant. One thing was certain; it was to be intimately linked with the Soviet Union.

The Shihua bao: Dalian’s Sino-Soviet Newspaper

The main conduit for propagating Sino-Soviet ties was the *Shihua bao*, a Chinese-language daily newspaper run by the Soviet military in Dalian. Next to movies and Sino-Soviet Friendship Association publications like “Friendship” (*Youyi*), the *Shihua bao* (Pravda) newspaper was the major Chinese language mouthpiece of the Soviet military in Dalian, spreading news and information about the emerging socialist world. Its chief editors were Soviet military personnel, but the majority of the staff were Chinese. The vice editor, Li Xinxin, was a Soviet-born Chinese. In the first few
years of its existence, the paper’s staff were in high demand not only as reporters, but for their Russian language skills. As more and more CCP cadres arrived from Shandong and other base areas, the language barrier became an increasing problem. Eventually, Russian staff from the paper were asked to help set up Russian language training classes for CCP cadres.71

The *Shihua bao* first hit newsstands on August 14, 1946 and ended its publication run in 1951. Like Soviet films, the *Shihua bao* was a major source of information that introduced all aspects of the Soviet Union to Chinese readers, including its political system, economic development, childhood, recreation, and cultural forms including introductions to Soviet art and literature. In addition, it carried news stories directly from Soviet news wires. Its international coverage framed events in terms of the emerging Cold War at a level most Chinese language papers did not. For example, it contextualized the War of Resistance in socialist internationalist terms that emphasized the growing divisions between Cold War power blocks. China’s struggle “opened up the path for all oppressed peoples of the east to walk the road of liberation.”72 In this conceptualization, western imperialist nations did nothing to protect China from Japan. Only the soviets intervened to help defeat the Japanese, and continue to keep peace in the region.

Readers of the *Shihua bao* were taken beyond the borders of Dalian and China. Through its relentless coverage of all aspects of the Soviet world, inclusive of Dalian in particular, readers linked their experiences with that of people in the Soviet Union and in the new states of Europe that fell under Soviet control. Articles on Soviet agriculture, industry, women, children, science, art and literature filled the pages of the paper. A
leading article in the October 30, 1947 *Shihua bao* titled “The ever increasing welfare of the people is the guiding principle of socialist development” introduced people to the promises and wonders of socialism, which, in the Soviet Union, the article stated, led to a society full of increasingly well-off, technically trained workers, who enjoyed free education and insurance. Such images introduced socialism and made big promises about the future. In addition to the *Shihua bao*, images of socialism and socialist internationalism were also spread through the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, one of the largest new institutions created in post-1945 Dalian.

**Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations**

By far the most important new institution in terms of spreading knowledge about socialism and Soviet Union was the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association (ZhongSu youhao xiehui). By the mid-1950s, this organization grew to be a ubiquitous part of associational life throughout China. By the mid-1950s, this organization grew to be a ubiquitous part of associational life throughout China. In Dalian from 1945 through 1950, it served many critical functions, and was a highly dynamic organization. The political complexities of Dalian, where the CCP could not operate openly, made the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association an extremely important conduit for the CCP to reach a broad spectrum of the population. Most of the CCP’s cultural activities were handled through this organization. For example, when cadres from the Northeast Art and Literature troupe, first arrived in Dalian, they did so through invitations made by the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. This was the only way for them to arrive and perform openly in the city due to the delicate political situation. Moreover, its stated mission to propagate Sino-Soviet friendship and knowledge of the Soviet Union served the
multiple tasks of explaining to people the significance of the Soviet presence in Dalian. The role of the association was not simply to show off Soviet achievement, but also to explain to people the Soviet military’s position in Dalian along with the CCP’s interpretation of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty.75

In late 1945, Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations were established in Lüshun, Dalian, and Jinzhou. Although theoretically voluntary, in practice, membership was often forced on local residents. In rural areas throughout Jin county, some cadres threatened to reduce the wages and rations of those families who refused to join. Other people admitted to having joined because of promises of material benefits associated with membership, including less trouble at Soviet-manned border checkpoints at the borders of the Soviet naval base area. Here trucks with Sino-Soviet Friendship Association badges on the windows could more easily pass through the Soviet military checkpoints.76

In Dalian, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association was used as a front for CCP operations in the city, particularly during the recovery of small-scale Japanese industries in late 1945 through 1946, when party cadres established trading enterprises under the name Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.77 In Jinzhou, the Association’s founding had an interesting twist, one that further reveals the political complexities in this area at this time. There the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association was originally established by members of the Nationalist government, and drew its membership from local elites who had served under the Japanese. The organization quickly became a front for anti-communist activity, and it took time and considerable effort for CCP cadres to retake this branch.78
After 1947, in accordance with the party’s new push to strengthen Sino-Soviet relations, the role of Friendship Associations grew and branches were formed in every city, town and village in the territory under Soviet control. By 1949 one in five people in the area claimed membership in one of over 800 branches. These revamped Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations served to propagate Soviet culture through films, newspapers, magazines, lectures, and discussions, and were also convenient ways for cadres to discuss and listen to what people felt about the Soviets. Their activities were quite prolific, and by 1949, the Guandong Sino-Soviet Friendship Association claimed to have held over 180 photography exhibitions, 3,000 discussion sessions, and to have shown hundreds of Soviet films.

Film was a major medium used by the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association to spread knowledge about and popular images of the Soviet Union. Association leaders organized traveling movie projection teams to visit factories and outlying rural areas on a regular basis. Within the city of Dalian, Soviets and CCP cadres took advantage of the large and numerous movie theaters built by the Japanese to show Soviet films. After their arrival in August 1945, Soviet military authorities established the Soviet Film Export Company, Dalian branch, which took over several of the largest Japanese movie theaters. Renamed with Russian names, these theaters began showing Soviet movies almost exclusively. It was through this company that Chinese subtitles and voiceovers were added to films. Most of the early films dealt with Soviet history, Lenin and Stalin, and the Soviet military’s defeat of fascist Germany.

Between 1946 and 1949, of the 1,596 films shown in Dalian and Lüshun, 1,310 were Soviet films, with a total attendance figure of 1,857,880. This was by far the
most effective and exciting way for people to learn about the Soviet Union, and imagine their future as similar to those images on the screen. In her recent work on the impact and reception of Soviet films in China in the 1950s, Tina Mai Chen has examined the internationalist theme presented in such films, which she sees as providing “visual imagery, language, and a comparative framework central to Chinese self-understanding.” It was hoped that watching Soviets on screen would inspire people that they were a part of the emerging socialist world. This visual power cannot be underestimated. Recall that, as sources tell us, Tian Guiying, China’s first female train engineer, was inspired to ask about this career after having seen images of Soviet women driving trains. As Chen notes, these films were especially powerful tools when coupled with lectures and speeches, often provided by Sino-Soviet Friendship Association leaders, which aided greatly in the process of imagining common bonds between Chinese and Soviet people.84

Another major function of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association was the promotion of Soviet and Sino-Soviet celebratory holidays and commemorative days. This included February 23, the founding of the Soviet Red Army, and a series of three events, August 15 (Soviet entry into the war in Manchuria), August 22 (Dalian’s ‘liberation’) and September 3 (Japan’s defeat). These August and September dates became part of a massive citywide celebration known as “Sino-Soviet Friendship month” (ZhongSu youyi yue).85

Many of the activities held on these commemorative dates were designed to elicit support for the Soviet military and attempted to situate the Soviet presence in Dalian in global terms. On the morning of September 3, 1946, for example, tens of
thousands of city residents gathered on the largest public square in Dalian to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the Soviet Red Army’s victory over the Japanese. Buildings that once served as headquarters for the Japanese colonial government apparatus surrounded the space, which had a few months before been renamed “Stalin square.” The highpoint of the event featured the unfurling of a massive red silk banner, signed with the names of thousands of Chinese people in Dalian, which was to be sent to Stalin, thanking him for liberating the area from Japanese rule. The celebration, a mandatory event in Moscow and in all cities now under Soviet control, from Eastern Europe to Dalian, was accompanied by official speeches praising the Soviet military for protecting the peace in the Far East. Soviet authorities and those Chinese they appointed as local leaders led the crowd in chants of “Long live Stalin, our great emancipator!”; “Long live the Soviet Red Army!” and “Long live the great friendship of the Soviet and Chinese people.”

For the Chinese audience, the participant observers of this spectacle, such a scene must have resonated uncomfortably with the recent past. Here, amidst the same buildings that once were headquarters to the Japanese administration, they witnessed similar events which praised the Japanese military, with its own promises of peace and prosperity, and a different yet equally vague conceptualization of regional belonging. Celebrations of the founding of the Soviet Red Army, February 23, were likewise full of pageantry and symbolism designed to highlight the power of the Soviet military. At mass rallies, for example, Chinese girls presented Soviet soldiers with flowers in staged ceremonies, thanking them for liberating the city.
Articles written to commemorate the founding of the Soviet Red Army paid homage to the Soviet military in Dalian, whose presence “brought peace in a time of war.” The continued presence of the Soviet military was explained to readers in the geopolitical terms of the emerging Cold War. The United States and its continued occupation of Japan constantly threatened the peace in the region, which up to this point was protected by the heavy Soviet military presence on the Liaodong peninsula.\(^89\)

These commemorative dates also included artistic performances by both Soviet and CCP culture troops, and representatives from Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations gave speeches on life in the Soviet Union in work units and schools, while traveling movie projection teams showed films at work units and in villages throughout the countryside.\(^90\) By 1947, CCP leaders began using the commemorative holidays to jumpstart their own attempts to eradicate the city’s colonial past. Here we can see that through the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, and events designed to commemorate Sino-Soviet friendship, the CCP began to carry out some of its social policies. For example, acting in the name of Sino-Soviet solidarity, the CCP launched the “recollection movement” (\textit{huiyi yundong}) during the 1947 Sino-Soviet Friendship dates between August 14 and September 3, which was designed to illicit the support of the masses in order to root out high profile “traitors” from the colonial era.\(^91\) At the same time, odes to the Soviet military and to Stalin, while still a major part of commemorative holidays, were softened by the participation of CCP artists and cultural troupes, which put a Chinese face to the celebrations. During these commemorative holidays, Soviet films shown in theaters were often free of charge, and traveling
projection teams arrived in factories and villages, often reaching audiences of 40,000 in
less than a week of showing films.  

Most importantly, Friendship Association meetings provided a forum for active
engagement with locals on the subject of socialism, a foreign concept to most, that was
now used to explain exactly how and why the Soviet military was not an imperialistic
enemy, but a familial “big brother” (Sunian laodage), and why certain Japanese were
not enemies but friends. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations also served to
explain to people the Soviet military’s position in Dalian, and the CCP’s interpretation
of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty. An examination of articles in the main
publication of Dalian’s Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, a journal called
“Friendship” (Youyi) reveals a fascinating glimpse into the kinds of discussions held
between officials trying to propagate socialism and visions of a socialist future, and
skeptical locals who see the Soviets as imperialist occupiers.

At association meetings, CCP officials found themselves facing difficult
questions from people about the Soviets and their intentions. After listening to a long
lecture on the history of colonial oppression in Dalian, one worker asked the following
highly charged question: “How is it that this used to be a Russian colony, and now it has
been liberated by the Soviets? The Soviets are Russian people after all. What is really
going on here?” The answer, of course, was that these Russians were different now
because they were socialists. However, what did that mean?

Many rural CCP members had a very rudimentary understanding of socialism,
which became a major problem when they were put on the spot at Association meetings.
One official, Huang Yutian, admitted frankly that, “Before I really couldn’t tell you the
difference between socialism and imperialism. Now I know what a socialist country is, and that the Soviet Union is our friend. 95 The head of the Association branch at a soybean processing mill likewise admitted, “I knew the Soviet Union was good, and it was a socialist country, but I didn’t know exactly why it was good. Come to think of it, just what exactly is socialism anyway?” 96

It was, Ironically, the perception of a shared experience of poverty that locals in Dalian attempted to understand how their lives might share some similarities with people in the Soviet Union. No doubt, Sino-Soviet propaganda emphasized that the Soviet Union was a powerful nation. After all, their military had defeated the Japanese in a matter of weeks. Yet socialist concepts about the leadership of the proletariat were often characterized at Sino-Soviet friendship meetings as kindness to the poor. This contributed to conflicting images of just what the relationship with the Soviet Union was.

On one hand, the Soviet Union was presented in films and newspapers as a powerful, socialist paradise of plenty, a status to be attained by China some day; on the other hand, we see cases where people in the poorest neighborhoods of Dalian were identifying with Soviets because they understood them to be like themselves: poor. For example, an employee at a small tobacco plant, upon hearing a story about Soviet soldiers helping Chinese exclaimed, “See our Soviet big brothers are really great, this just goes to show you that all of us poor people under heaven are one big family.” 97 Another member said confidently, “I always knew that the Soviets and Japanese were different, that in fact the Soviets were the opposite of the Japanese. Japanese hated poor people, but Soviets really love the poor.” Chinese Communists held the Soviet Union
as the model socialist nation, yet it was understood to be “poor” (qiong) while countries like America were “rich” (fu). This was such a problem that it was addressed openly in the pages of Youyi. Cadres in charge of Sino-Soviet Friendship Association work were instructed to “strengthen their understanding of internationalism.” Ward heads, and Sino-Soviet Friendship Association branch leaders attended night school meetings aimed at instilling them with the internationalist creed “workers of the world are all one family” and to combat the notion that the Soviet Union was ruled by a “poor party” while the U.S. was a “rich party.” What we see in these candid presentations of Sino-Soviet Friendship Association meetings is the process through which a socialist and socialist internationalist perspective was presented to people in Dalian, and how they internalized these concepts and images. While adults worked out these conceptual problems, young people were presented in the local media as living the internationalist good life, dancing and singing with their new Soviet friends.

**Socialist Internationalism and Youth: Sino-Soviet Summer Camps**

While the Lüshun middle school had begun experimenting with Soviet educational techniques in the late 1940s, it was a new Soviet import, the summer camp, which became an educational and recreational phenomenon for young people in Dalian. Summer camps were a direct import from the Soviet Union. There the popularity of summer camps grew steadily after 1945, and by 1949 there were over 6,000 summer camps held throughout that country, with over 5,000,000 participants. Soviet camps were usually held in resort areas, either at the sea or mountains, and represented privilege under the Soviet system.
Local youth first attended summer camps in Dalian in August 1948, and camps were held each year thereafter throughout the 1950s. Each August, local newspapers and the magazine *Democratic Youth* (*Minzhu qingnian*), carried detailed stories about the camps and their activities. These articles included photographs of group activities and scenes of happy participants playing in the ocean and on the beach. The flagship camp was held in Lüshun, which hosted over 1500 students each summer. The camps popularity quickly made them a major feature of Dalian’s cultural scene, and by the early 1950s, students from throughout the Northeast were invited to participate in Dalian’s summer camps. The numerous beaches and small islands in the area, once the playgrounds of Japanese tourists, were now the summer scene of socialist abundance where children “played” the part of good socialists.

Camps usually lasted ten days and had multiple components. For children attending the camps, it was an exciting but also difficult experience. Social activities like dances, singing, communal games, playing in the ocean, and campfire stories were indeed fun, and were the main attractions and source of excitement for camp participants. Yet the camps were about work as much as play. For many students, this was their first time away from their parents. Like in the Soviet Union, summer camps in Lüshun had a military flavor. While at camp, students slept in communal dorms and ate together in large mess halls. Students themselves ran much of the camp’s activities. They were responsible for helping prepare food and serve meals, guarding the camp, and even taking care of each other’s minor injuries. In one article, a child drew a series of pictures depicting camp life that reflected its marshal qualities. Children are
depicted in one scene saluting the camps flag at a rigid flag-raising ceremony, while another depicts a female student tending to a wounded boy.\textsuperscript{105}

Labor was a major component of camp life. Volunteer labor teams set out from camps in Lüshun and Jinzhou, to perform various types of labor for the local community. Often this was heavy labor done in the summer heat. In August of 1948, students from the Lüshun summer camp formed volunteer labor teams (\textit{yiwu laodongdui}) and set out to repair and extend a road through several villages. Goals were set for boys and girls teams, 80 meters of road for boys, 75 for the girls. Each day the students worked for five hours.\textsuperscript{106}

The camps also stressed small group study of political tracts, history lessons of the War of Resistance, and the role labor in society. A typical day included two hours of self-study in various political and historical topics, followed by group discussions in the morning. Once again, the emphasis was on active participation in group learning exercises. Sports activities, along with dancing and singing exercises, took place in the afternoons and evenings.\textsuperscript{107}

The final component of camp life was learning firsthand about the Soviet Union and its culture. In this regard, summer camps brought socialist internationalism and Sino-Soviet friendship to life. Reading the pages of youth magazines like \textit{Democratic youth}, one can see how students might imagine themselves participating in something happening simultaneously in the larger socialist world. For example, interspersed among the pages describing Chinese camps were detailed descriptions of life at Soviet camps.\textsuperscript{108} Moreover, the camps taught Soviet cultural forms to students, just as they
implemented Soviet educational reforms. It was here that students from Lüshun middle school played leading roles.

Lüshun middle school students played an active role in bringing Soviet educational techniques from the classroom to the camp. In many ways they were the stars of the summer camp. In 1949, for example, they took the lead in teaching Russian dances to campers from Dalian. Learning these dances was often the center of cultural activities at the camp. The Lüshun student’s skills and knowledge of Soviet culture were a source of pride, and they served as models for other students to emulate. One student participant, from Dalian, noted, “When I saw the students from Lüshun middle school dancing these Soviet dances, I felt really embarrassed, but after they helped me learn I was able to shed my feudal way of thinking.”¹⁰⁹ Lüshun middle school students studied Russian dance throughout the school year, and once a week on Sundays played together with Soviet kids, often in friendly soccer competitions.¹¹⁰ They also played important roles in leading small group discussions based on the self study of political tracts, including the writings of Mao, and party and Soviet history.¹¹¹ Meanwhile, the cadres responsible for organizing the summer camp in Lüshun spent time participating in and observing activities at the Soviet camp for children from military families.¹¹²

One of the most exciting events of the camp was the opportunity to interact with Soviet children. A lucky team of Chinese students, selected from each district of Lüshun represented at the camp, was given the chance to spend the day at the Soviet camp.¹¹³ Moreover, the entire Soviet camp, over 150 children in all, would come to the Chinese camp for an evening get-together which featured communal singing and dancing.¹¹⁴ These joint parties were a major highlight of the camp experience,
especially for participants from other parts of the Northeast, who enjoyed a rare chance to interact with their Soviet piers. For such experiences, one came to Dalian.

The camps were one activity that put Dalian on the map as a center for socialist internationalism and Sino-Soviet Friendship. In the spring of 1950, Dalian hosted “world youth week” which featured representatives from the Soviet Union, Korea, and Japan. Niyata Humiko was once again on hand to emphasize the power of socialism to melt away differences. Niyata now represented Japanese youth, who were now not the purveyors of imperialism, but its victims. American imperialism, and its Japanese reactionary allies, were forcing Japanese youth down the path of war once again. She concluded her speech by reporting on the efforts of Dalian’s remaining Japanese population to rationalize their labor in order to complete the 1950 economic plan. Following the speeches, a massive parade was held, and Soviet and Chinese flag bearers led the parade, followed by children holding the flags of many other countries.

Through publications like *Democratic Youth*, solidarity between Chinese and Soviet young people was further emphasized by reports on children’s lives in the Soviet Union. The message here was that Soviet children were enjoying the fruits of socialism, and now we Chinese are too. Importantly, Chinese camps were also shown to be a part of similar cultural activities going on throughout the communist world. In summer 1951, for example, 11 Chinese children were invited to participate in an “international” summer camp of communist countries held in East Berlin. By the early 1950s, summer camps were one highly visible tool for the party to drive home the point that socialism would bring leisure activities that were not known in the “old society.” Even during the Korean War, “happiness” (xingfu) is used repeatedly in
descriptions of the camps. Gone are notions of thrift and hardship that characterized the experience at Yan’an. Students were shown to be living the socialist good life through this Soviet institution.

Yet, these pleasures were under a new threat, and came at a cost familiar to any old enough to experience the decade of the 1940s. In 1950, Dalian’s party secretary Ouyang Qin visited the Lüshun summer camp. After eating dinner with the students he rose and gave a speech: “Children I have seen you’re happy and bountiful life at this summer camp, and that you, the children of Stalin and Mao’s age can finally have such joy. We of the older generation did not have this experience; we worried about how to pay for school, and worried about finding work.” He continued, “We went to the countryside, took up arms and fought the imperialists, and fought feudalism. We experienced ten years of civil war, eight years of war with Japan, and four years of struggle for liberation to get to this day.” Ouyang drove his point home, “Our enemy still wants to take this from us! The American imperialists….want to take us back to the age of oppression. We must hate this enemy, hate him to the bone.”

After years under Japanese and Soviet military rule, in wartime conditions, young people barely had time to catch their breaths as they played on the shoreline of their new nation before they discovered that their time in the sun had been re-politicized and re-militarized. Across the sea, another war raged on. As they had for decades, the people of Dalian faced another totalistic campaign that would require and take all of their energy, this time, to prove their loyalties to the new Chinese nation.

Conclusion
We have seen that unlike most cities in China, Dalian emerged by the early 1950s as a model socialist metropolis. This chapter has argued that a major part of that definition involved overlapping efforts to define the city’s colonial past in a way that both highlighted change, and allowed a broad spectrum of society to actively participate in the process of building a new socialist identity for themselves, and for the city. New definitions of Dalian also involved strains of socialist internationalism. This was not an abstract concept, or a status hoped to be attainable some day in the future. In post-1945 Dalian, people were living amongst Soviet Red Army troops and Marxist Japanese workers, whose presence activated what they were reading or hearing about the new world order. Locally, socialist internationalism served multiple purposes. It helped to justify and smooth over a prolonged Soviet military occupation. Through the activities of Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations, Soviet troops, originally viewed by many locals as occupiers, were presented as socialist brothers. Newspapers like the Shihua bao helped create images of an emerging socialist world, of which Dalian would be a part. Socialist internationalism was inclusive, allowing a key segment of the Japanese workforce to remain in the city, at their posts, actively contributing to building a socialist city.

In their praise for this model city, writer’s descriptions contained a hint of uncertainty, and an emphasis on the necessity of making sure, in the words of one author, that Dalian “faced” (miandui) the whole country in the future, and that the benefits that the city was sure to reap were not limited to Dalian itself. Perhaps the author also might also have been concerned over the sharing of the city’s wealth with the Soviet Union, hence the need to “face” China. For the time being, however,
ideological and economic realities pointed toward greater contact between the Soviet Union and the newly-founded People’s Republic.

By 1950, the People’s Republic of China began staking its claim to Dalian. A new agreement was reached between the new country and the Soviet Union, and although Soviet troops remained in the area through 1955, their military authority over all but Lüshun ended in 1950. In the next chapter, we will explore the process of how Dalian was more closely integrated with the People’s Republic. This involved the fading of socialist internationalism from the scene. It certainly did not disappear, but those elements which gave it a dynamic form in society, the heavy Soviet and Japanese presence, started to recede. With the exception of a small number of technicians, most Japanese had been repatriated by 1949. The gradual Soviet military pullout coincided with efforts to concretize the memory of Sino-Soviet relations, a process that involved constructing memorial spaces, and in increasingly propagandistic campaigns which created a memory of the Soviet presence that, as we shall see in the next chapter, was increasingly removed from reality.


5 Similar issues are at play in South Korea and Taiwan, where the colonial legacies have crystallized into victimization narratives, erasing certain memories of the Japanese occupation while highlighting others. See for example, Mike Shi-chi Lan, “Neither victors nor victims: transplanted/suppressed memories of the Sino-Japanese War in postwar Taiwan” in *The International Institute for Asian Studies Newsletter* no.38 (October 2005). See also Kyu Hyun Kim, “War and the colonial legacy in recent South Korean scholarship” in *The International Institute for Asian Studies Newsletter* no.38 (October 2005).

6 Chen Wei Ying, “Liang ge butong shiqi de Guandong funü” (Guandong women from two different eras) in *Minzhu qingnian* no. 24 (1948):9.


10 Chen Long, “Guandong liang nian lai de wenyi gongzuo zhi wo jian” (My impressions of two years of artistic work in Guandong), *Minzhu qingnian* no.22 (1948): 7-8.

11 In 1942 there were over 85,000 Chinese students in primary schools in Dalian. *DJBNS*, 1438-1440.

12 Chen Long, “Guandong liang nian lai de wenyi gongzuo zhi wo jian” (My impressions of two years of artistic work in Guandong), *Minzhu qingnian* no.22 (1948): 7-8.
13 Chen Long, “Guandong liang nian lai de wenyi gongzuo zhi wo jian” (My impressions of two years of artistic work in Guandong), Minzhu qingnian no.22 (1948): 7-8.


16 Chen Long, “Guandong liang nian lai de wenyi gongzuo zhi wo jian” (My impressions of two years of artistic work in Guandong), Minzhu qingnian no.22 (1948): 7-8.


18 Ibid., 18-19.

19 Lüda gaishu bianji weiyuan hui, ed. Lüda gaishu (A brief account of Lüda) (Lüda: Lüda gaishu bianji weiyuan hui yinxing, 1949), 371.


21 Chen Qiying, “Dalian—xin Zhongguo de mofan dushi” (Dalian—new China’s model metropolis), Luxing zazhi vol.23 no.11 (November 1949).

22 Dalian gongye zhanlanhui, ed., Gongye Zhongguo de chuxing (The embryonic state of industrial China) (Guangzhou: Xinhua shudian, 1950), and Gong zhan hua bao (Industrial exhibit pictorial), no.1 and no.2 (July and September 1949).

23 Zhang Pei, Dalian fangwen jiyao (Summary of a visit to Dalian) (Shenyang: Dongbei Xinhua shudian, 1949), 12.
24 Liu Shaoqi et al., Xinminzhuyi chengshi zhengce (the urban policy of the new democracy) (Hong Kong: Xinminzhu chubanshe, 1949), 32-36.

25 Zhang Pei, Yi ge shengchan de chengshi: Dalian fangwen jiyao (A production city: the summary of a visit to Dalian) (Shanghai: Xinhua shudian, 1950), 1-14.

26 Chen Qiying, “Dalian—xin Zhongguo de mofan dushi” (Dalian—new China’s model metropolis), Luxing zazhi vol.23 no.11 (November 1949), 4. See also Yan Jing, ed., Dongbei fangwen lu (Records of a visit to the Northeast) (Beijing: Shenghuo, dushu, xinzhi san lian shudian, 1950), 118.

27 Yang Jing, ed., Dongbei fangwen lu (Records of a visit to the Northeast) (Beijing: Shenghuo shudian, 1950), 117-120.

28 ESDGYS, 525.

29 Liu Yulan, “Dalian jiefang chuqi de funü gongzuo” (Women’s work in Dalian during the early years of liberation) in CJSG, 356.

30 Guo Chao, Jiefang chuqi Dalian funü gongzuo de huigu (Looking back on women’s work in Dalian during the early years of liberation), in Dalian dangshi no.2 (1992): 12-15.

31 ESDGYS, 345.

32 Dalian shi funü lianhehui, ed. Dalian funü yundong shiliao (Historical materials on the women’s movement in Dalian) (Dalian: Zhonggong Dalian shi weidangxiao yinshuachang, 1992), 150.

33 Li Zongying, Liu Shiwei, and Liao Bingxion ed., Dongbei xing (Travels through the Northeast) (Hongkong: Da gong bao chubanshe, 1950), 50.

34 Yang Jing, ed. Dongbei fangwen lu (Records of a visit to the Northeast) (Beijing: Shenghuo shudian, 1950), 117-120.

35 Li Zongying, Liu Shiwei, and Liao Bingxion ed., Dongbei xing (Travels through the Northeast), 46.

36 Dalian gongye zhanlanhui, ed., Gongye Zhongguo de chuxing (The embryonic state of Industrial China) (Guangzhou: Xinhua shudian, 1950), 7-10.

37 Yang Jing, ed., Dongbei fangwen lu (Records of a visit to the Northeast) (Beijing: Shenghuo shudian, 1950), 118.
38 Chen Qiying, “Dalian—xin Zhongguo de mofan dushi” (Dalian—new China’s model metropolis) in Luxing zazhi vol.23 no.11 (November 1949), 6.

39 Li Zongying, Liu Shiwei, and Liao Bingxion ed., Dongbei xing (Travels through the Northeast), 46.

40 Zhang Pei, Dalian fangwen gaiyao (Summary of a visit to Dalian) (Dongbei xinhua shudian, 1949), 50-52.


43 Ishidō Kiyomoto, Dairen no Nihonjin hikiage no kiroku, 53-55. Ishidō was a founding member of the Japanese Labor Union. Much of this book is based on his memoirs and notes written in the early 1950s.

44 ESDGYS, 457.

45 Xie Qian, “Zai Dalian gong’anju de houjin zhanxianshang” (The Dalian police force on the frontline of logistics) in Jiefang chuqi de Dalian (Early post-liberation Dalian). Dalian: Dalian ribaoshe yinshuachang, 1985, 85.

46 Renmin hushengbao, May 4, 1946, reprinted in ESDGYS, 457.


48 Handea Sumiko, “Riqiao funü yao wei jianshe xin Guandong nuli” (Japanese women want to work diligently to build a new Guandong), in Minzhu qingnian no.27 (1948): 14.

49 Niyata Humiko, “Geming xianfeng” (Vanguard of revolution), Minzhu qingnian no.70 (1949): 8.

50 Ishidō Kiyomoto, Dairen no Nihonjin hikiage no kiroku, 59.

51 ESDGYS, 455.

Ishidō Kiyomoto, *Dairen no Nihonjin hikiage no kiroku*, 59.

ESDGYS, 453-454.


Ishidō Kiyomoto, *Dairen no Nihonjin hikiage no kiroku*, 68-69.

Tokisane Hiroshi, *Gen ei no Dairen: Kantōkyoku Chugokugou tsūyakusei no kiroku*, 204-207.

Tominaga, *Dairen, kūhaku no roppyakunichi: sengo soko de nani ga okotta ka*, 249-250.

Takamori Mitsuno, *Soren senryōka no Dairen: aru fujin no teikō to dasshutsu*, 133-139.

Ishidō Kiyomoto, *Dairen no Nihonjin hikiage no kiroku*, 62.

ESDGYS, 457.

Ibid., 459.

Du Yongsheng, ed. “Guanyu Jianxin gongye gongsi dui Ri ji jishu renyuan gongzuo de qingkuang” (The situation of the Jianxin Industrial Company’s work regarding Japanese technical employees) in Liaoning sheng guofang keji gongye bangongshi

64 Ibid., 72-73.

65 *DGS*, 231-232.


67 Ibid., 214-215.

68 Ibid., 212.

69 Wu Gaizhi, “Guanyu renshi Sulian wenti de shangliang” (Discussions regarding the problem of recognizing the Soviet Union) in *Youyi* (Friendship) no.11 (1946), 1-3.

70 “Shi youxie Lingqian qu fenhui san dai dahuishang zongjie siba niangongzuo de bao gao” (The third committee meeting of the Lingqian district branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association’s 1948 work report summary) in *Youyi* (Friendship) no.7 (April 1) 1949: 23-24. See also “Jiang Hua gei Han Guang de xin” (A letter to Hang Guang from Jiang Hua), December 6, 1947, in *SHJZLD*, 287.


74 Ge Yuguang “Dongbei Wengongtuan zai Dalian” (the Northeast cultural troupe in Dalian) in Dalian shi yishu yanjiu shi, ed. *Dalian wenyi shiliao* (Historical materials on art and literature in Dalian), no.1 (December, 1984): 223-225.


“Shi youxie yi nian ban gongzu zongjie” (A summary of one and a half years of Sino-Soviet friendship association work in Dalian) in *Youyi* (Friendship), 3.8 (October 15, 1948), 18-21.


Ibid., 105.


See *Shihua bao* August 10, 14, 25-26, 1949.


88 Dalian de er yue ershisan” (February 23 in Dalian), *Shihua bao*, February 25, 1947, reprinted in Dalian shi shizhi bangongshi bian, ed. *Dalian Shihua bao shiliaoji* (Collected materials from the Shihua bao) (Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 2003), 353.


94 “Shahekou qu youxie gongzuo yu shejiao gongzuo jiehe” (Combining Frienship Association work and social education in Shahekou district) in Youyi (Friendship) 3.1 (July 1, 1948): 15.

95 “Lingqianqu ganbu xunlianban diandi jingyan jieshao” (An introduction to the cadre training class in Lingqian district) in Youyi (Friendship) vol. 3 no. 7 (1948): 21.

97 Gui Fang, “Jieshao Siergouqu youxie fenhui” (an introduction to the Siergou district chapter of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association) in Youyi (Friendship) 3.5 (September 1, 1948): 13.

98 “Shi youxie Lingqian qu fenhui san dai dahuishang zongjie siba niangongzuo de bao gao” (The third committee meeting of the Lingqian district branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association’s 1948 work report summary) in Youyi (Friendship) no. 7 (April 1) 1949: 23-24.

99 “Fengfu de Sulian xuesheng xialingying shenghuo” (The abundant summer camp life of Soviet students), Dalian renmin ribao, August 10, 1952.


101 Ren Jiu, “Qingnian huopo de yi qun: ji de shi tian qingnian xialingying shenghuo” (A lively bunch of youth: remembering ten days of summer camp life), Minzhu qingnian no.42 (September 2, 1948): 19-20.

102 Leng Yi, “Women guanlizhe ziji de shenghuo” (We manage our own lives), Minzhu qingnian no. 107 (1950): 13-14.

103 “Women shenghuo zai Dalian qingnian xuesheng xialingying—ji gei Dongbei ge sheng, shi tongxue de yi feng xin” (Our life in Dalian’s young student summer camp—a letter to our classmates in each province and city in the Northeast), Minzhu qingnian no. 151 (August 21, 1951):12-14.

104 “Xingfu de qingnianmen: qingniantuan Lüshun xialingying” (Happy youth: the youth organization’s summer camp in Lüshun), Minzhu qingnian no. 74 (August 21, 1949): 28-31.

105 See Minzhu qingnian no. 74 (1949).


108 “Zai Yierbinhepan” (In ‘yierbinhepan’ [Russian name]) in Minzhu qingnian no. 74 (August 21, 1949): 22-23.

110 Ibid.

111 Lū zhong shi zenyang xuexi de: Lūshun xialingying di si da dui xiang Sulian xuexi fangfá” (Lūshun middle schoolers study this way: the Soviet study methods of Lūshun summer camp’s team number four), Minzhu qingnian no. 74 (August 21, 1949): 33.


113 She Meng, “He Sulian shaoxiantui zai yiqi” (Together with the Soviet youth vanguard) in Minzhu qingnian no. 107 (1950): 19-20.

114 “Ji Zhong Su qingnian xialingying lianhuan wanhui” (Remembering the Sino-Soviet youth summer camp evening party), Minzhu qingnian no. 143 (August 21, 1951): 18.


116 Ibid.

117 “Sulian qingnian yukuai guo xiatian” (Soviet youth joyfully pass the summer), Minzhu qingnian no. 105 (1950): 12.

118 Zhang Huizhen, “Women zai guoji shaonian xianfeng xialingying” (At the international children’s vanguard summer camp), Minzhu qingnian no. 149 (August 1951): 11-12.


120 Ni Xi, “Qingnian—Xingfu de yidai: Ou Yangqin tongzhì canguan qingniantuan Lūshun xialingying” (Youth—a happy generation: Comrade Ou Yangqin’s visit to the youth association’s summer camp at Lūshun) in Minzhu Qingnian no. 107 (1950): 17.

121 Zhang Pei, Dalian fangwen jiyao (Summary of a visit to Dalian) (Shenyang: Dongbei Xinhua shudian, 1949), 74-75.
In October 1949, Dalian, like many cities throughout China, held celebrations for the founding of the new nation, the People’s Republic of China. On October 2, CCP officials in Dalian organized a mass rally of over 200,000 people, to celebrate the founding of the People’s Republic in Beijing. Interestingly, although this event is not ignored in CCP histories of Dalian, most give the celebration a few sentences at the most, before quickly jumping to the political campaigns of the 1950s. In fact, it seemed that much more effort had gone into gearing up for the major industrial exhibition, which the city hosted in September. What was made clear at the celebrations was that Dalian’s role in the new nation was to have its residents go back to the factories, and work even harder than they had during the turbulent 1940s. At rallies held in public parks throughout the city, audiences were told that Dalian’s industries were leading the nation. Dalian, they were told, produced 70 percent of the new nation’s train engines and equipment. In one of Mao’s first addresses to the people of Dalian, he thanked them for their efforts. On November 16, he released the following statement: —“Thank you (the local CCP committee) and the people of Lüda, I wish that you continue to work hard to increase production and achieve bigger results.”¹ In other words, welcome to the new nation now get back to work.

This is not to argue that the founding of the PRC in October 1949 was an unimportant date in Dalian. However, it was also not a watershed, as it often is
presented in the pages of modern Chinese history. The CCP apparatus was allowed by
Soviet military authorities to present itself publicly for the first time in April 1949, but
was largely a formality, not any major transferal of power. The more meaningful
political dates in Dalian are February 1950, at which time a new Sino-Soviet Treaty was
signed between the PRC and the Soviet Union, formally ending Soviet military rule of
Dalian, and 1955, when the last batch of Soviet troops departed the region. The
mobilization, press-coverage, propaganda, and mass-ceremonies for the 1955 event, for
example, far outweighed the celebrations of 1949.

The dates 1950, and 1955, had great local meaning because they represented the
political independence of Dalian from foreign control for the first time in its history.
In major cities like Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, the early years of the
PRC were characterized by an experience of occupation and takeover, where the chaotic
disorder of the final days of the Civil war had to be reigned in, and a new order
established. Dalian, we have seen, did not share the same experience. Rather, the
state-building efforts that characterize the early 1950s began here in 1947, crossing over
both the 1949 divide, and the 1950s dates discussed above. With the Soviet military
maintaining order, Dalian’s Japanese-era industrial base was firmly in Soviet and CCP
hands, there were no powerful Chinese industrialists to win over or destroy like in
Shanghai and Guangzhou. As a result, Dalian began carrying out reforms based on the
Soviet model that would not take root in coastal cities until the 1950s. Even its prison
was a model unit, producing China’s first motorized tractor in 1950. Dalian’s status as
a vanguard production city was further evident, when, on 30 April 1950, the wages of
workers throughout the city that day were donated to help their unemployed comrades
in Shanghai. The early 1950s were thus a time of emerging from the shadow of Soviet occupation, and establishing legitimacy for the new state. It was also a time for people to accept, reject, and negotiate the CCP’s definition of Dalian as a Chinese city.

This chapter continues to explore the impact of successive regime changes in Dalian, and how they impacted local society. We saw in previous chapters how Dalian emerged as a model industrial city for the new nation, heavily influenced by both the Soviet Union and the Japanese industrial base. Now, a new regime was building legitimacy and power for itself, in much the same ways as its predecessors had. Moreover, the socio-political and economic contexts were also quite similar. Once again, the state that ruled Dalian found itself at war, and was forced to legitimize itself while continuing to mobilize the city, its people, and its resources in that context. How did the new state establish itself in Dalian? What features of state building did it inherit from the Japanese and Soviet periods, and what did it mean to sacrifice for and defend the homeland, given that what was asked for by the state was often so similar to the Japanese and Soviet regimes? How and why did people participate in the legitimization process? Who chose not to?

In answering these questions, the present chapter focuses on several events and themes relevant to the process of making Dalian a Chinese city in the 1950s. It argues that the CCP came to define the Dalian of the 1950s as a potent, Soviet-derived model for the future of urban China. Yet, the city’s links to the new nation had yet to be completely formed. Yet how did locals experience this transition? People had to make decisions about where they stood in relation to the new authority. The stakes were high,
and the consequences for making the “wrong” decision, started becoming apparent soon after the outbreak of the Korean War.

As the CCP established its hegemony across the divided, war-torn land, decisions about whether or not to support or reject the new state played out in complex ways. Mobilization for the Korean War, mass campaigns against corruption, and against “counter-revolutionaries,” these are familiar territory for historians of the PRC period. In Dalian, these campaigns were more than simply the top-down commands of the new state. They were part of the process of making Dalian a Chinese city, and people actively participated in them as such, particularly young people. Others rejected them, choosing to remain passive, while some chose to resist the new state more openly, at great peril.

In the late 1940s, a major issue facing the CCP in Dalian was how to erase certain legacies of colonial rule while ignoring or justifying certain continuities. This occurred in an environment of Soviet occupation, when it was unclear what the relationship with Soviet authorities would be, and how long they might remain in power. By the early to mid-1950s, the Soviet occupation was over, and certain memories of that period too had to be cleansed and packaged in a manner deemed appropriate by the CCP. Thus, part of the project of making Dalian a Chinese place in the 1950s involved dealing with both the legacy of Japanese state building, and the Soviet occupation.

Political Shifts: Dalian, the PRC, and the Cold War Order

The high politics surrounding the new relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union have been well documented in recent years. Dieter Heinzig in particular, has
used materials from Soviet and Chinese archives to construct a detailed account of the political relations between the two sides in their political negotiations through 1950. His work reveals that the return of Lüshun and Dalian was crucial for CCP leaders, who had long felt betrayed by the prolonged Soviet occupation of Chinese territory, and the Soviet’s recognition of the Nationalists. As late as 1949, Stalin pressed for the maintenance of the status quo in terms of Dalian and Lüshun, in order not to deviate from the Yalta agreement.\(^5\) Heinzig’s analysis of the meetings leading up to the 1950 treaty reveals that the Dalian and Lüshun issue was extremely sensitive for both sides. Stalin had admitted in 1949, that the 1945 treaty, which he signed with the Nationalists, was “unequal” but he was not prepared to risk conflict with the U.S. by breaking the terms of the Yalta agreement, and signing over Dalian and Lüshun to the CCP. However, in December 1949, he appeared ready to do so, famously responding to Mao’s worry about a new treaty deviated from the Yalta agreement by saying, “Yes, it goes against it---and to hell with it (Yalta)!”\(^6\)

The new “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance” between the Soviet Union and the PRC, signed on 14 February 1950, effectively put an end to Soviet military rule over Dalian and surrounding territory. For the CCP apparatus in Dalian, the treaty brought to a close much of the political tensions and the delicate balancing act that came to characterize the Soviet-CCP order in the area. Article Three of the “Agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railroad, Port Arthur (Lüshun) and Dalian,” a major part of the new treaty, dealt specifically with Dalian, stating definitively that, “The administration of Dalian shall be wholly in the hands of the Government of the People’s Republic of China.” It also states that the PRC would take over all Soviet
property in Dalian. Article Two dealt with Lüshun. Here it was agreed that Soviet
troops “shall be withdrawn from the jointly used naval base of Port Arthur and that the
installations in this area shall be transferred to the Government of the People’s Republic
of China immediately after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan, but in any case
no later than the end of 1952.” It goes on to specify that, “the civil administration in the
aforesaid area shall be under the direct control of the Government of the People’s
Republic of China.” At Mao’s request, the Soviet military stationed at Lüshun
remained after 1952 to help protect the region from possible U.S. attacks during the
Korean War. This final batch of troops departed in 1955, at which time the naval
facilities were formally handed over to China.

Although Soviet troops remained stationed in Lüshun, the Soviet military was
no longer calling all the shots in terms of local policy and governance. The CCP
received the Soviet’s significant holdings in the area, including 47 factories, 11 movie
theaters, and 188 residential buildings. For the first time, Chinese authorities enjoyed
total governing power over Dalian, and no longer had to factor Soviet considerations in
carrying out their policies. They now turned their attention to linking the city to the
new nation. Dalian’s communication network for example, once a major
communications hub of the Japanese empire linking Japan, Korea, and Manchukuo, had
to be completely rerouted. That task of establishing communications links with Beijing
and Tianjin was completed in March 1950. What did this shift toward greater
integration mean for people in Dalian? How was the new treaty explained to locals?

News of the treaty was heavily publicized in 1951, a year after its signing. In
the context of the Korean War, the treaty was framed in newspapers and speeches in
global terms. On the one-year anniversary of the signing of the new treaty, newspapers throughout Northeast China and Dalian carried commemorative stories about the global meaning of the agreement, and local leaders gave speeches attesting to the international significance of Sino-Soviet friendship. This served a number of purposes. It helped legitimize the new PRC as an important part of the international community while at the same time strengthening ties with the Soviets, who were now cast not simply as Dalian’s liberators, but as co-defenders, along with the PRC, of world peace against U.S. aggression. In this, the Soviets and the PRC stood together, representing “one-third of the world’s people.” The image of Soviet troops as “protectors” would serve to justify their continued presence in the region through 1955, and was reinforced, as we shall see in a subsequent section, by “friendship stories” which further developed an image of Soviet troops as familial protectors. In commemorative articles celebrating the Soviet military’s liberation of Dalian and defeat of Japan, the PRC and the Soviet Union were presented as an invincible bloc, 700 million strong, covering one quarter of the globe “stretching from the tropical south to the north pole.” As for what the regime change meant for people in Dalian, much of it looked familiar. War and production remained a constant factor, as did talk of a Soviet-inspired future. Many of the same organizations, Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations, and women’s associations continued to operate as they always had. However, with the new state came new dangers, and new opportunities to advance one’s position socially, politically, and economically through loyalty to the new nation.

Dalian and the Korean War: A War on Many Fronts
The Korean War was fought not simply in the hills and plains of Korea, but in schools, homes, and factories throughout Dalian, and it was in this context that the city was linked more directly than it ever had to the Chinese nation-state. Many parts of China experienced regime change in 1949-1950, as areas under Nationalist or Japanese rule transitioned to CCP control. Yet in Dalian, an area never before governed by a modern Chinese government, more was at stake. This was an opportunity for the people of Dalian to shed their complicity with the Japanese, and participate in forging a new Chinese identity for themselves, and for the city itself. What that identity was to look like, and the extent to which people might be empowered to define it, was far from clear, but these were the major issues in play in the 1950s. The people of Dalian experienced the early 1950s in much the same way as greater China-- a confusing mixture of familiar war mobilization, state-sanctioned social violence that had been strictly controlled and wielded by Japanese and Soviet authorities, and promises and images of pleasures and happiness to be brought about under socialism. What made Dalian different from other places in China, however, was that at stake was not only political regime change and social revolution, but also the ideological, social, and economic links to China, and the nature of the city’s efforts to become a Chinese city. Much of the latter project had started in 1949, with the industrial exhibition that served to define and introduce new Dalian to China as a vanguard, Sino-Soviet production metropolis. Now, with the CCP in power, and another war raging, people had to make choices about how they would engage the new authorities.

The new Sino-Soviet treaty may have ended Soviet military rule in Dalian, however, people once again found themselves living in a militarized society. Air-raid
defense teams were organized throughout the city, much as they had been under the Japanese, and a strict curfew was in effect. As we shall see shortly, school children were mobilized to drill and exercise for potential military service to the new nation. As they had been during the Civil War, CCP cadres organized women and children to produce shoes and military uniforms for the war effort. In just over one year, from 1951 to 1952, women workers made close to one million uniforms. At makeshift shoe factories, women who remembered making shoes during the 1947 production drive, were told that things were different now, and that they would be using new techniques to make even more shoes. What this meant in practice was working weeks at a time without a day off. In factories as well, workers now competed against one another in patriotic labor campaigns in support of the war effort.

Economic Development and Labor during the Korean War

We have seen throughout this dissertation how warfare affected the industrial development of Dalian from the late 1930s through the 1940s. In the early 1950s, the pattern of state and military controlled heavy industrial development that began in the mid-to-late 1930s continued. Economic production targets in the first few years of the PRC took the peak years of Japanese war production in Dalian as a benchmark to measure the progress for the city’s industrial development. For example, by 1952, Dalian’s industrial production was 50 percent greater than in 1943. That same year “modern industrial production” (xiandai gongye chanzhi) accounted for 96 percent of the total industrial output of Dalian, and 86 percent of the city’s industry was state-
owned. In the eyes of the new state, Dalian was a rarity—a modernized industrial city with a jump on the rest of urban China in implementing Soviet production techniques. The city continued to grow rapidly, and by 1956, the population approached 500,000, double what it was in 1949. In 1952, there were 191,000 workers in the city, 70 percent more than in 1949. The Jianxin Company, as it had during the Civil War campaign, pumped out armaments at a record pace. When PLA units found their rockets and hand grenades bounced off new U.S. tanks in Korea, or simply lacked the explosive power to stop them, they turned to Jianxin engineers to create and manufacture new, more powerful weapons. Dalian’s medical facilities, built by the SMR and further developed by the Japanese military, continued to grow, and the city was a major medical base during the Korean War. A construction boom in hospitals provided jobs for thousands of workers, and 14 new hospitals were built throughout the city.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, the CCP launched the “Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign” (kang Mei, yuan Chao yundong) across the nation, and Dalian was once again called on to act as a production base for a major military campaign. From the CCP’s perspective, the city was poised to take up this role with seemingly little resistance from the population. Most labor union difficulties had already been dealt with in Dalian in 1947 and 1948. There had been little independent union activity in Dalian since the 1920s, and there were no conflicts between Nationalist and CCP-backed labor unions in Dalian as there had been in Beijing and Tianjin. Lack of housing for workers and their families, a major issue in coastal and central Chinese cities, was not an issue in Dalian, where vacant Japanese homes were set aside for
workers. Under the Soviets, the city had been an orderly place compared to the wartime chaos throughout the rest of China during the Civil War. Yet, as we shall see, the simultaneous drive to take root out counterrevolutionaries, enemies, and spies revealed the limits of state control here. Many workers and students were skeptical of the new policies and programs, and, as we shall see below, attempted to remain passive in the campaigns of the early 1950s.

As early as 1946, production campaigns, labor competitions, and the selection of model workers had been a part of the working day in industries throughout Dalian. At that time, they were a part of new Soviet management techniques for increasing production through “shock brigade” style small labor groups, competing against one another to outperform set production quotas. CCP cadres in charge of labor worked to ensure stability in the workforce, however, as the Civil War raged and Dalian remained under the sovereign power of the Soviet Union, patriotism was not a component of worker mobilization. The ideological emphasis was on production, learning from the Soviet Union, and on developing a sense of socialism and socialist internationalism, linked to the localized goal of building a new “democratic” Dalian.

During the Korean War, the rhetoric circulating in industries throughout the city still revolved around increasing production, rationalization, elimination of waste, and emulation campaigns. However, with the founding of the PRC, patriotism and nationalism became a key part of the propaganda on the factory floor. While learning from the Soviets was still a major catchphrase, workers in the early 1950s were now expected to participate in exhausting labor campaigns out of love for their new country.
The war was brought into the factories. Beginning in March, 1951, slogans linking production to the Korean War were widespread in Dalian’s industries, “Factories are the battlefield, tools are the weapons, complete your mission, and exterminate American imperialism” (gongchang jiushi zhanchang, gongju jiushi wuqi, wancheng renwu, xiaomie Mei di). Part of the campaign to stoke the fires of patriotism among workers involved linking memories and likening images of Japanese imperialism to U.S. imperialism in Korea. This was done through lectures and newspaper articles that compared Japanese military actions of the 1940s to U.S. actions in the early 1950s. The most direct links were fears that the U.S. was re-arming Japan in an effort to fuel a third world war.

The Korean campaign provided the means for CCP cadres to establish firmer control over workers. Dalian’s party secretary, and other top cadres in the Dalian administrative apparatus routinely made personal inspections to major industries, urging workers to labor harder for the war effort. Labor competitions, as we have seen in previous chapters, were a major part of working life in Dalian through the 1940s. In October 1950, a society wide mobilization program was established to increase production to support the Korean campaign. For industrial workers, this took the form of a “patriotic labor competition and production drive” (Aiguo zhuyi laodong jingsai he zengchan jieyue yundong). Not surprisingly, the factories with the most experience in such campaigns, Sino-Soviet and Soviet-controlled enterprises, posted the largest production gains, but dockworkers were not far behind. One unit accomplished the exhausting feat of loading in 41 hours what would normally take 184.
Workers at the former SMR locomotive factory launched over 80 “production battles” pitting small groups of workers against one another to see who could produce the most in the shortest amount of time. Throughout the factory over 500 small production teams were established, and 7,000 workers competed in labor competitions. It was the former Sino-Soviet and Soviet-run enterprises, which posted the greatest gains. There, workers had participated in similar movements during the Civil War years, and thus had several years to acclimate to a system which rewarded their loyalty to the new production process. They were now rewarded for perfecting the Soviet-style labor campaigns. Eight thousand were selected as model workers-- patriots, supporting the PRC through their labor. However, the rules were changing. Faithfully working, accepting new wage systems, participating in labor campaigns, rationalizing the manufacturing process were by 1951, not enough. The new CCP state demanded ideological and political loyalty as well. There were still enemies within, workers were now told. Failures on the job might be interpreted as purposeful resistance to the new state. Workers at a machine shop, for example, were branded “counterrevolutionaries” when the tanker truck they had welded failed to operate. Casualties of the “campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries” would be widespread.

*The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries*

Mobilization for the Korean War provided the context for the CCP to bring radical social changes into neighborhoods, homes and workplaces throughout the city. CCP cadres in factories, schools, and at neighborhood meetings told people to find the enemies, saboteurs, and spies among them. The “Campaign to Suppress
Counterrevolutionaries” movement (Zhenya fangeming yundong), which lasted nationwide from 1950 through 1952, tapped into longstanding desires for revenge in Dalian that had been contained by Soviets through the Civil War period. Under the Soviet military occupation, acts of retribution to redress grievances from the colonial era were severely restricted, and we have seen that powerful business interests, people who had enjoyed all of the privileges afforded them under the Japanese colonial system. Now, violence against them rose to the surface with the support of the new regime.25 Once the movement was in full swing, the Dalian police received over 30,000 letters of accusation from people, accusing their neighbors and co-workers of counterrevolutionary crimes. Those who had any kind of elevated status under the Japanese were easy targets.

The wealthy capitalists, former leaders of Dalian’s Chinese community, who thrived under the Japanese, men like Chi Zixiang and Zhang Benzheng, were obvious targets for the public’s demand for retribution. Both of these men were captured and executed in 1951, Zhang was in his 80s when the executioners bullets put an end to his life. In one of the city’s largest public parks, a “Suppression of counterrevolutionaries exhibition” was built, which featured photos of notable counterrevolutionaries, listing their crimes and captions about the efforts to capture them. Public executions also occurred for the first time, and teams of police carried out sweeping raids to root out people accused of sabotage, those who had aided or joined the Japanese police or military, leaders of popular religious groups, and Nationalist “spies.” One such raid, carried out for three hours in Lüshun on April 26, 1951 by 2500 police officers, organized into 440 teams, resulted in 500 arrests. One hundred of these people were
executed, including 38 Japanese-era spies, police, labor bosses, landlords, and 20 members of religious groups like the Yiguan dao. 

According to classified police documents and reports, crimes, rumors, and attacks on military and factory installations were a reality in the early 1950s. Numerous acts of sabotage carried out in Dalian during the early 1950s, and some were very costly. While this was often the work of small groups of people or individuals, the sum of such activity was to heighten the tension throughout Dalian and its hinterland as the campaigns of the 1950s developed. Activities ranged from posting anti-CCP slogans, to destroying property. Dalian police found that many of the anti-CCP slogans pasted at various places throughout the city matched those coming from “Voice of America” radio broadcasts beaming into the city. Such slogans ranged from “Topple Mao Zedong!” to “The U.S. will soon be in Lüda, anyone with CCP ties will be killed!” There were in fact over 600 cases of industrial sabotage, ranging from destruction of equipment in factories to train derailments. In a food processing factory, one employee purposefully poisoned over 10,000 of tins of food that was to be sent to the troops in Korea. Outside of Jinzhou, military communication lines were severed seven times. Military guards were also attacked. In one instance, a woman lured a guard away from his post while several men jumped him from behind, stealing his weapon. Soviet troops stationed in the region were also targets of resistance. In Soviet garrisons and residential areas, flying rocks were a constant nuisance, breaking windows on a nightly basis. Soviet homes were ransacked, and on occasion, shots were fired at Soviet patrol vessels leaving the port.
Although Dalian was by far one of the more orderly cities “recovered” by the CCP, police reports reveal that, despite 5 years of stable socialist development under the Soviet military and CCP, there were numerous instances of theft, sabotage and resistance to policy implementation. Dalian’s development, coupled with the large number of military installations, provided numerous opportunities for theft. Bribery was not uncommon, particularly at military bases. For example, Zhang Decai and his partner, Wang Decheng headed an extensive oil, gasoline, and automobile parts smuggling ring in Dalian. Before their capture, they used wine and monetary bribes to get military gendarmes to allow them access to these military supplies.\footnote{31}

Capture, either for robbery, or as a “counterrevolutionary,” led to terrible tortures leading up to a confession. In the first year of the campaign, police reports detail the use of 16 torture tactics brought to bear on the accused. These included tightly binding body parts with cords, canning, striking of the hands, using beer bottles to strike the feet, whipping with steel chords, suspending the accused from the ceiling while beating them, and threatening the accused with summary execution by firing squad. So many people died in police custody that an internal police report chastised this level of torture, noting that it often produced forced confessions. The most brutal tactic involved shoving ammonia into the nose, a tactic during which the accused “would say anything to stop this, and would retract those statements once the punishment ended.”\footnote{32}

There were many ways people resisted the violent campaign. Not everyone chose to participate, particularly when it reached into every nook of society. Confusion reigned as friends and neighbors were targeted and arrested, and it was unclear for
many what a “counterrevolutionary” was. Inter-generational conflicts erupted as the war penetrated the home. Students, bombarded with patriotic activities in schools and summer camps, clashed with their parents over their new desire to serve the state, and wrote about their conflicts publicly in the pages of CCP youth publications.

From the perspective of CCP cadres, one of the problems among the workforce in the initial period of the campaign was worker indifference. Police reports note that a common attitude among workers, particularly at the major enterprises, was that they had no interest in the campaign, and felt it was none of their business. Dock workers, urged by cadres to find the counterrevolutionaries in their midst, reportedly responded: “We are too busy unloading and loading ships to deal with that, besides we don’t understand what kind of spy you are after, this is your (government) business.” Others claimed, “We thought there weren’t any counterrevolutionaries here, that only intellectuals (zhishifenzi) were spies.”

Workers also actively resisted the arrest of popular and skilled workers. The latter is particularly revealing. Under the logic of the pre-1950 system, technical skills and ones ability to reach production targets were the major factors in setting wages, and in “proving” oneself a part of the new order, building a socialist Dalian. Workers had learned to operate within this system, but were now watching in disbelief as some of the most skilled workers in a given enterprise were seized and shot. Workers began to ask how could they be expected to reach their production targets with this happening? Weren’t technical skills and education something prized among the workforce? One old timer at the Ganjingzi oil refinery, exclaimed “Aiya! How can you take away these workers, they have technical skills and education?” Other labor leaders took matters
into their own hands, and tried to protect and console the accused. Zhou Xuezhi was a highly popular worker. However, much to the dismay of his coworkers, he was seized and imprisoned as a counterrevolutionary. His foreman, along with other coworkers, refused to accept the charges against him. CCP labor organizers from Zhou’s factory even organized a team of workers to go to police headquarters to show their solidarity for Zhou. In the end, these men were severely criticized for their actions, and Zhou’s sentence stood.³⁴

Paranoia and fear set in across the workforce, and indeed throughout the city, as arrests seemed to grow increasingly arbitrary. One dock worker, upon seeing police arrive, exclaimed “now who are they after?” Fear led other workers to withdraw from social activities. Even jokes could now be used to cast doubt on someone’s character. According to a police report, on hearing of Stalin’s death, one worker said, “Oh, Stalin is dead, well, looks like we get another holiday.” That branded him a counterrevolutionary.³⁵

*Mobilizing Youth: Militarization at School and at Summer Camps*

Students were a major target of the state’s mobilization campaign in support of the Korean War. The pages of CCP-sponsored youth journals, like the *Minzhu qingnian* (Democratic youth), were filled with images of the paradoxes of the time. Some scholars have called the early 1950s a “honeymoon period”, particularly in areas hard hit by years of incessant warfare. It was a time when normalcy and security returned. Others, see the 1950s as a series of terroristic campaigns carried out on a war-weary population. Dalian had elements of it all, and young people were often on the front
lines. The pages of Minzhu qingnian featured stories and images of students enjoying a happy life, frolicking with classmates at seaside summer camps. Images of abundance and repetitive use of the term “happiness” (xingfu) and “cheerful life” (yukuai shenghuo) are common features of the rhetoric behind these reports. Yet, along with these images, are articles on the need to root out counterrevolutionaries, featuring a cartoon of a CCP cadre executing a weary-looking Chinese man with a rifle shot to the back.36

There were other paradoxes. Summer camps may have represented the good life brought about by Mao, the CCP, and the Soviet Union, but with the Korean War raging not far away, students in Dalian were eager to prove themselves, and fashion their identities through the struggles of war. In a fascinating exchange, students from the Number Three Middle School in Dalian sent a letter to their comrades at a school in Yan’an, bragging about their efforts in protecting the homeland. In the Yan’an student’s letter of response, we can see the imagined links—bonds forged through war, that were made between children in Dalian and Yan’an. The letter exclaimed, “We are childhood comrades in arms (qingnian zhanyoumen) of Mao’s generation!” The letter continued, “now you (Dalian) are on the border of our motherland, facing the enemy. Just two years ago we faced another, Hu Zongnan, and he was a bandit of U.S. imperialism, equipped with U.S. weapons!”37 The student’s sense of a new Chinese identity, and of belonging to the new nation was forged by war. Such links to Yan’an are also not insignificant and represent at some level an attempt to link Dalian’s current struggle with the revolutionary struggles that occurred in Yan’an.

We saw in chapter six that summer camps were a major cultural event for young people in Soviet-occupied Dalian. The camps of the late 1940s were microcosms of an
idealized model socialist society. Socialist internationalist propaganda was prevalent, along with a strong labor component, in tune with the production campaigns sweeping through the city during the Civil war years. By the early 1950s, the ideological thrust of the camps shifted. Articles on summer camps in the early 1950s describe an experience of pleasure and happiness, matching the utopian imagery of abundance that became a common feature of propaganda at that time. The camps were described as one of the new forms of happiness brought to children under Mao and the new PRC. Importantly, there are fewer images of labor in the pages of Minzhu qingnian’s description of the 1950s summer camps. Images of boys and girls playing at the beach and in the water are interspersed with camp descriptions with titles like “Lüda student’s joyous summer camp life has begun!”38 A typical camp had close to 1500 participants, with 400 students and teachers invited from all over the Northeast.39 For those non-locals, the trip to Dalian to sun on the beaches was a very exciting event, and dispatches from these participants printed in youth journals helped construct the image of the city and its beaches as a paradise. When Feng Zhenkui, a teacher from Shenyang was selected to attend a camp in Dalian, his students were jealous, telling him to “bring back the fresh sea air from Dalian for us to breathe, we will be waiting.” Feng’s dispatches from the camp to his students hammered home the new political message that, “under the old society, we suffered greatly, who looked after our lives then!? Only those of us who have grown up as Mao’s generation can finally have such a happy life.” Feng continued, “now American imperialism wants to destroy our happiness, but we students, for our happiness, for our homeland, for chairman Mao, we will never allow anyone to plunder our happiness!”40
The virtue of performing labor services to build a new democratic Dalian, a major feature of the 1940s camps, was now replaced by patriotism and military training to serve the homeland. Activities were designed to cultivate student’s loyalty and utter devotion to Mao Zedong. For example, the students from the Number Three Middle school that sent a letter to Yan’an bragged that they were so dedicated to Mao that some students wrote pledges in front of Mao’s portrait in their own blood. Socialist internationalist rhetoric was still present, but now took on a militarized form—an image of China and the Soviet Union battling global imperialism.

Military drills became a standard part of camp life in the early 1950s, a reflection of the militarization and mobilization of society in Dalian as a whole during those years. Boys and girls participated equally in such training. No doubt, part of the excitement of the camp for many youngsters was that it brought boys and girls together. Yet in previous years, in the micro-model society that the camps re-created, girls often assumed such gendered roles as “nurses.” Breaking up into various teams, and taking turns doing the “jobs” that the new society required, including hard labor, patrolling, cooking, medical care among others, continued into the early 1950s camps. However, there was a greater emphasis on the types of surveillance activities common to the new state. For example, in addition to student-run security detail, there were now also hygiene inspection teams, and discipline inspection teams (jijian jiancha). Moreover, military training also became a major feature of camp life, both for boys and for girls.

Courses in military affairs were a standard part of the study assignments at camp in the early 1950s. One student recalled “each day, we participated in military affairs courses, learned about various weapons, practice marching drills, and learned how to
“Fire a gun.” Police officers from Dalian came to the camp to give special lectures and lead many of the drills. A camp participant proudly declared, “Now, because of our diligent studying, we can fire weapons from a standing and kneeling position, and understand the proper use of hand grenades and .38 rifles.” Dao Zhi, a young camp participant, recalls “my knees and shoulder was sore from firing the rifle all day.” But, he continues, it was all worth it, because “My country—my mother, I can now take up arms to defend you!” Dao left camp pumped up with patriotic bravado, bragging that “every muscle in my body had developed, and now my body and my skin are healthy and beautiful.” Even one’s sense of beauty then, was tied to martial training and patriotism. It is little wonder that many students left camp eager to prove their mettle by fighting the American imperialists in Korea. However, they often found their parents to be very unsupportive of such attitudes, leading to serious intergenerational conflict created by the new state.

The War at Home

In the early 1950s, the CCP-sponsored journal Minzhu qingnian, published in Dalian, began carrying a series of letters to the editor. These provide a fascinating glimpse into the form of governmentality that emerged in China in the 1950s. Topics ranged from questions about marriage, love, work, and familial relations, and not surprisingly, were tied in to the various campaigns launched in many of these spheres during the early 1950s. In using these sources, we must proceed with caution, as it is difficult to verify whether or not these letters were fabrications for propaganda purposes. Regardless, the intention was to allow readers to imagine their lives in relation to the
problems posed by the letters. In this, they represent a very powerful form of 
propaganda. In terms of the rapid changes occurring in Dalian, the letters reveal 
conflicts between students, on the cutting edge of CCP propaganda, and their parents, 
typically people who were old enough to live through the regime changes in Dalian over 
the past several decades.

One of the biggest conflicts between children and their parents involved 
mobilization for the Korean War. Students, as we have seen, were filled with patriotic 
confidence at school and at activities like summer camps. Often, their parents were far 
more skeptical about the new state, and, as it turned out, did not want their sons and 
daughters to participate in war. A series of letters to the editor of Minzhu qingnian in 
1951 dealt with the problem. One letter spoke about a students wish to join the army. 
His mother repeatedly threatened him, “if you try and join up I’ll follow you to school 
and stop you!” The student expressed concern for his mother, who “at fifty was ill, and 
besides, she had never been exposed to the new society’s education.”44 Other tales 
were more emotional. Zhao Xiwen wrote to the journal with a personal story about his 
parents shock at this decision to go to Korea. He recalls how his mother cried and 
pleaded with him not to go, even exclaiming “who will take care of us now that we are 
getting older!” Only after school officials discussed the situation did Zhao’s parents 
agree to let him volunteer.45

Another letter, titled “My father and I” dealt with the tricky issue of a father 
afraid to let his son, Yu feng, go off to the war. In the end, of course, the reluctant 
father, clinging to the old societies selfish ways, is won over by the conviction of his 
son that “we are new China’s masters, protecting the country is our bounded duty,
joining the military is our right!" In the following weeks edition of the journal, the editors responded to such letters. For example, while supporting Yu Feng, they chastised him for using “big words” to argue with his father. The editors wrote, “your father hasn’t received any of the new education that you have, so he can’t understand your explanation. This will not only not help your situation, but will confuse your father even more.”

Other young writers wrote to complain that their “backward families” (luohuo jiating) were “like rocks tied to their wastes, holding back the progress of the new generation.” In other cities throughout China, this conflict is reminiscent of the generational clashes of the New Culture era. However, it is important to note that such clashes were uncommon in Dalian, where the activism of that period was tempered in part by Japanese colonialism. Now, the activism and patriotism of youth, and their desire to support the state’s campaign in Korea, caused clashes with parents. The war was brought into the home. One article, titled “Reforming the family is our responsibility!” carried the following message, “Revolutionary youth have a responsibility to reform society, and reform the world, we should also reform our own families.”

With the “Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries” in full swing, just how far some children would go to “reform” their families often had tragic results. Several letters from students appear in Minzhu qingnian denouncing their family members who had been accused of counterrevolutionary crimes. Zhang Xinyue, upon hearing of his fathers arrest as a Nationalist spy, wrote a scathing denouncement of his father entitled “He is my most hated enemy!”
The fallout of the mass campaigns throughout the 1950s, including mobilization for the Korean War, had numerous costs and consequences. The new state extended its reach deep into society. Workers who had adapted to the conditions of Soviet-occupation learned that mastery of the production-based system which borrowed heavily from the Soviets was now not enough to prove oneself to the new state. Schools were hotbeds of mobilization, where loyalty to the new nation was held above familial ties, and militarization and patriotism were assets. All of this destruction and reform was part of the complex process of making Dalian a Chinese city. What about the Soviet Union, whose presence had been a key component in the socialist redefinition of Dalian in the late 1940s? How did the new state deal with the lingering memories of Soviet occupation, and how did this affect Dalian’s links to the PRC?

Remembering ‘Big Brother’: Memorializing the Soviet Military

The early to mid 1950s are generally considered the golden years of the Sino-Soviet relationship, a time when Soviet experts in industrial, medical, and educational fields had great impacts as China rushed toward implementing the Soviet model. Dalian, as we have seen, was on the cutting edge of implementing Soviet-style economic reforms, management techniques, and was a major site of Sino-Soviet cultural interaction. However, it was also a hotbed of local disputes between CCP cadres and Soviet military officials, and between Dalian residents and Soviet troops. Although this had quieted by the late 1940s, there were still plenty of negative memories of the Soviet occupation swirling about the city.
Part of defining new Dalian involved contextualizing the recent past, including the period of Soviet military occupation. Thus, through the late 1940s, such new institutions as the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association were major tools used to propagate positive images of the Soviets, to turn them from “big noses” to “big brothers,” while at the same time attempting to legitimize the CCP. The images of Soviet troops as heroic liberators and teachers were one such effort, prevalent in the late 1940s. From 1950 through 1955, local Sino-Soviet ties entered a new phase, following the political shifts occurring in China and the Soviet Union. There was understandably more emphasis on propagating the role of the PRC and the CCP in standing alongside the Soviets, leading the new socialist world, particularly after the conflict in Korea ended.

It was in this context that the massive celebrations commemorating the Soviet military’s role in Dalian and Lüshun were launched throughout 1955, building up to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the handover of the last bits of the former Soviet naval base in Lüshun to the Chinese military. Just as Sino-Soviet relations were at their highpoint, here was a celebration of the Soviet military finally relinquishing control of Chinese territory, and leaving. Throughout the spring, people in Dalian were engaged in furious Sino-Soviet friendship activities. Massive rallies were held in Stalin square, the largest public space in Dalian, to commemorate Sino-Soviet relations, and to thank the Soviet army for liberating and protecting Dalian and Lüshun. Images of smiling Soviet troops splashed the front pages of local newspapers. Depicted more as superstars than soldiers, some are shown being hoisted into the air by a jubilant crowd of Chinese people, other images show them signing autographs for excited young Chinese
students. In still another photo, an elderly Chinese woman presents a gift of writing brushes to a young Soviet soldier.\textsuperscript{50} Three major commemorative statues were unveiled that month, including a large bronze statue of a Soviet soldier on top of a marble foundation, part of a commemoration of Soviet martyrs who died helping to liberate the Northeast.\textsuperscript{51} On guard for eternity, the bronze soldier firmly grasps a machine gun as he stares out at the offices of the Lüda government.

The macro-political narrative surrounding the event is clear. Mao had requested Soviet troops stay on in Lüshun during the Korean war, and now, in a gesture of solidarity and friendship, and in keeping with the equality of the 1950 “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance,” Soviet troops, some 120,000 in all, departed the region. The naval base, and much of the Soviet equipment stationed there was handed over to the Chinese military, and was a very significant transferal of military equipment and technology. This included 1300 cannons, 388 tanks, 59 pieces of heavy construction equipment, 1600 motor vehicles, and 410 airplanes.\textsuperscript{52}

The return of the Lüshun base brought to a close one of the more unique chapters in modern Chinese history, and had a major impact on Dalian, which now entered a new phase in its definition. While the military base and its equipment was a major acquisition, local people, and those sent to govern them, had mixed reactions to the Soviet departure. Many breathed a sigh of relief, they no longer had to deal with potentially explosive political issues brought about by large numbers of Soviet troops stationed in the area.

Most importantly, the episode provides a glimpse into the politics of memory and commemoration in Dalian during the early years of the PRC. Part of new Dalian
involved remembering the past in a way that was politically acceptable to the new regime. We saw in the previous chapter, that this involved propagating a memory of colonial life under the Japanese through a narrative of victimization. A similar effort was underway in 1955 albeit with a different focus. The reality of Soviet rule came to a close, and local manifestations of the power of socialist internationalism faded in Dalian. Japanese technicians returned to Japan. What took their place were memories of the Soviet presence. In Sino-Soviet Friendship Association meetings, and in newspaper and journal articles, people began reading “friendship stories” (youyi gushi). These commemorative tales, part fact, part fiction, abstracted the local Sino-Soviet relationship and fossilized it, presenting Soviets in Dalian and Lüshun as caring soldiers, heroic doctors, loving mothers, and friendly neighbors, and bringing Soviet “big brother” further into the Chinese family. They helped construct an image of familial closeness between the Soviet and Chinese people. However, the stories also abstracted and attempted to erase the complex reality of the Soviet occupation experience. Sino-Soviet conflict was washed away. Yet, so too were more exciting, empowering hopes about living in a socialist-internationalist place. The reality of the 1950s involved renewed production campaigns, and the creation of increasing lines of division among society as the campaigns against counterrevolutionaries heated up.

The first step toward abstraction was the changes to Sino-Soviet Friendship month. This had been a regular event in Dalian’s cultural scene since 1946, and occurred between August and September, around the important trilogy of summer dates: the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, the liberation of Dalian, and the defeat of Japan. In 1952, however, Sino-Soviet Friendship month was moved away from these potent
memorial dates. After 1952, it fell between October and November. The change is significant, for the commemoration no longer fell on meaningful dates for people in Dalian. From the point of view of the state, it safely removed the dangers of renegade memories of Soviet misconduct and quasi-Soviet imperialism that might flare up on the August dates.

Sino-Soviet friendship stories (ZhongSu youyi gushi), spread through the Friendship Association and local newspapers were heavily used tools in propagating Sino-Soviet relations to the general public beginning in 1946. By the 1950s, these stories consisted of several main themes, and had grown into a genre, bombarding readers with repetitive tales of Soviets-as-saviors. In Dalian such stories were more than mere propaganda, but may be read as part of the politics of commemoration that led up the Soviet troop withdrawals in 1955. Collections of Sino-Soviet Friendship stories, most of which were set in Dalian and Lüshun, were published for a wider audience in publishing houses in Beijing and Shenyang. Here Dalian was imagined by the readers throughout China as a harmonious place where the aid of the Soviet Union radiated to every corner of the city. Domestic themes were not uncommon. For example, the story “Neighbors” involves a Chinese family living next door to a Soviet family. They live next to one another for five years, such that “it was as if we had become one family.”

Dalian’s Sino-Soviet Friendship stories represent embellished interactions between Soviet military personnel, doctors, technicians, and even nannies, and local Chinese. Some recounted heroic efforts on the part of Soviet soldiers to aid local Chinese, which often involved saving the life of a child or an elderly person. Stories
with an emphasis on family were another major theme. In Dalian, these went beyond the standard familial references to Soviets as “Soviet elder brother” (*Sulian lao dage*). They often involved themes which brought the Soviet military into the Chinese family. One type of story involved Chinese children professing their love for Soviet soldier “uncles” (*Su jun shushu*) and Soviet mothers. The maternal theme was a particularly potent way to propagate an image of Soviets in Dalian as protecting and helping Chinese people.

Some stories combated negative images of Soviet troops as “foreigners.” For example, Song Fengchou, a sixth grader, wrote an article entitled “I love my Soviet army uncle” (*Wo ai Su jun shushu*) in which he learns that his “uncle,” a Soviet officer in his neighborhood, is really not like other foreigners. He asks, “In the past, when we lived under Chiang Kai-shek’s bandit regime in Nanjing, I used to see American soldiers and fear for my life. Why is it that when I see Soviet soldiers I am not only not afraid, but I find it easy to be around them?” The answer, provided by Song’s mother, is of course that “Americans are an imperialist country” while “Soviets are socialists like us.” Here the message is that it was the common bond of socialism which transformed the foreign soldier into someone more familiar, in this case part of the family.

The theme of motherhood was another feature of friendship stories, and those involving Soviet women adopting Chinese children were not uncommon. Many of these surfaced in 1955, when Soviet troops and their families finally pulled out of Dalian. These usually build up to a tearful parting at a train station, where a Chinese individual is left to watch his or her Soviet family return home. Yan Shouming, for
example, lived with a Soviet family for nine years and her story was publicized in a
daily newspaper. In her column, Yan remembers that her Soviet mom “loved me just as
much as my birth mother loved me. I believe that all Soviet mothers love all Chinese
children.” Yan wrote of her sorrow upon her family’s departure, “My most loved
mother, my dearest brothers and sisters finally departed from me, how could I be
anything but sad?”

It is hard to imagine how popular indifference and outright resentment and
resistance to Soviet military authority had been so quickly transformed into familial
love. Obviously, such tales did not reflect reality for many people in Dalian. Rather,
friendship stories were designed to humanize Soviet troops, often through familial
rhetoric and present an image of them as helpful and caring toward Chinese residents.
They reached their peak during the Korean War and during the months leading up to the
Soviet military withdrawal from Dalian in 1955, after most of the political conflict had
ended and acceptance of a Soviet presence became the only political option here. These
stories were one way of driving this point home to people. How could one despise the
Soviet years in Dalian when they were such caring mothers and heroic soldiers?

Conclusion

The early 1950s witnessed the strong establishment of the CCP’s legitimacy in
Dalian. Soviets faded from memory because there were other, more pressing concerns
for people in Dalian. The state’s campaigns against internal enemies spread terror and
paranoia to many, but also empowered others. Tens of thousands of letters accusing
neighbors, friends, and coworkers of counterrevolutionary crimes flooded the desks of
the public security bureau. These may have been retribution and revenge for some, but others were actively building their capital with the new regime. In the past, hard work, acceptance of Soviet-style reforms, and participation in new social organizations like Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations were the major ways for a worker to show loyalty to the new regime. The new state established in the early 1950s demanded much more. Hard work and production were still factors, but were overshadowed by political loyalty and patriotism.

As Soviet troops departed the city in 1955, the acceptable memories for people were both concrete—bronze statues and commemorative parks, and propagandistic—friendship stories to remember the ten-year Soviet presence. The 40 meter high bronze statue of a Soviet soldier that stood overlooking Stalin square was one of the few concrete reminders of the Soviet presence. Work on the statue began in 1952, and it was unveiled in a ceremony in May 1955. Yet, other than this statue, and a few other memorial spaces built in Lüshun, there were few other concrete signs of Soviet influence. The grand buildings and factories that now defined the city as a socialist metropolis were all, for the most part, relics of Japanese imperialism, with a different set of memories attached to them.

What the Soviets left behind was a mixed legacy. Their military occupation and control of resources resulted in the rapid implementation of the Soviet model. That would linger for a few more years. Yet, one wonders how CCP cadres felt as they arrived for work in the headquarters of the Dalian municipal government. That building, built during the construction boom of 1937, once housed the Japanese colonial administration of the Guandong Leased Territory, with all of its memories. As they
stepped outside, the walked across Stalin square, toward the bronze statue of their “big brother” grasping his machine gun as he stared toward their office building. Was he protecting them? Or did it stir up more painful memories? By the late 1950s, Dalian, and indeed, China, began charting a new course for itself. Big brother’s help was no longer needed. Dalian would face yet another redefinition, as the Soviet model was abandoned and the Sino-Soviet relationship frayed and turned hostile. No longer a protector, the soldier’s stare turned menacing as the battle of to redefine the city raged once more.

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4 Ibid., 80.


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34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Minzhu qingnian no. 137 (June 21, 1951).

37 “Women shi zhanzhengzhong chengzhang de” (We are coming of age during war) in Minzhu qingnian no.121 (1951): 18.
38 Liu Bingye, “Lüda qingnian xuesheng yule de xialingying shenghuo kaishile!” (Lüda student’s joyous summer camp life has begun!) in Minzhu qingnian no. 142 (August 11, 1951): 12.

39 “Women shenghuo zai Lüda qingnian xuesheng xialingying” (Our lives at the Lüda young student’s summer camp) in Minzhu qingnian no.143 (August 21, 1951): 12-14.

40 Feng Zhenkui, “Dao Lüda xialing qu” (To the Lüda summer camp) in Minzhu qingnian no.142 (August 11, 1951): 13.

41 “Women shi zhanzhengzhong chengzhang de” (We are coming of age during war) in Minzhu qingnian no.121 (1951): 18.

42 Ibid.

43 “Women shenghuo zai Lüda qingnian xuesheng xialingying” (Our lives at the Lüda young student’s summer camp) in Minzhu qingnian no.143 (August 21, 1951): 12.

44 “Women zeyang guo jiating zhi yi guan?” (Is this how we deal with our family?) in Minzhu qingnian no. 121 (1951): 11.

45 “Lüzhong di wu zhibu zeyang bangzhu Guo Xiwen jiejuele jiating wenti” (How Lushun middle school’s number five class helped Guo Xiwen solve his family problems) in Minzhu qingnian no. 126 (1951): 16.

46 “Fuqin he wo” (My father and I) in Minzhu qingnian no. 121 (1951): 11-12.

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48 Wei Jian, “Gaizao jiating shi women de zeren” (Reforming the family is our responsibility) in Minzhu qingnian no. 122 (1951): 11.

49 Minzhu qingnian no. 135 (June 1, 1951): 6.

50 See Lüda renmin ribao (Lüda people’s daily), May 9-10, 1955.

51 For a brief history of the construction of the statue see Zhang Yufen, Dalian aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu jidi xunzong (Education for building the base of nationalism in Dalian) (Dalian: Liaoning shifandaxue chubanshe, 1995), 69-71.

52 Xian Ming, “Su jun cheli Lüda de qingkuang” (The situation of the Soviet military withdrawal from Lüda) in SHJZLD, 130-133.
53 SHJZLD, 373.

54 Zhang Lin, Lūshunkou de youyi (The friendship at Lūshun) (Beijing: Xinwenyi chubanshe, 1957), 47-66.

55 “Qiu ming en ren” (Life saving benefactor), Lūda renmin ribao, June 6, 1955. See also Wang Xianglan, “Qin shen de jingli gaosule wo shenme” (What my own personal experience tells me) in Lūda renmin ribao, May 28, 1955.

56 Odd Arne Westad briefly mentions the importance of this imagery in his introduction to Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963, 4.

57 “Wo ai Su jun shushu” (I love my Soviet army uncle) in Lūda renmin ribao, June 6, 1955. Stories of Soviet “mothers” involve experiences in which Chinese children, sometimes orphaned, other times with families to poor to care for them, are raised by a Soviet family. See Yan Shouming, “Zuo Sulian mama zui xihuan de ren” (I want to be the one my Soviet mom likes best) Lūda renmin ribao May 28, 1955, and Li Feng, “[Li na] (Xu Guiying) he ta de mama” (‘Lina’ (Xu Guiying) and her mom) in Zhong Su youyi de gushi (Stories of Sino-Soviet friendship) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1955), 69-73.

58 “Wo ai Su jun shushu” (I love my Soviet army uncle) in Lūda renmin ribao, June 6, 1955.

As the last batch of Soviet troops departed Dalian, and the celebrations of May 1955 came to a close, people in Dalian barely had time to pause and reflect in front of the shining Soviet memorials before their city was once again thrust onto a new development track. Although our story ends in 1955, the people of Dalian continued to experience massive changes in their lives, and in the city they called home. The Soviet model, acceptance of which had been a political necessity form 1945 through the late 1950s, was now abandoned, and Dalian lost another cornerstone of its definition. Who wanted to be known as a Sino-Soviet city when the relationship with the Soviet soured? Meanwhile, the CCP continued to extend its reach into society, mobilizing residents at unprecedented levels during the Great Leap Forward.

Today there are hardly any signs of the Soviet presence left in Dalian. Stalin square has been renamed “People’s square.” The bronze statue was removed in the mid-1990s, a time of transition for the city once again. The new, foreign-investment friendly climate leaves little need for a protector from a by-gone age. The statue now sits in exile in a park in Lüshun, the site of major Chinese naval facilities, and a place which foreign visitors are not allowed to freely visit. These memories seemed to have been totally jettisoned.

Dalian Today: The Hong Kong of North China

Today, Dalian is a vibrant port city, touting a cosmopolitan identity. In the 1980s, under Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, it was the only SEZ (special economic zone) of the Northeast. Deng proudly declared that it would become “the Hong Kong of
Northeast China.” Certainly, Deng was thinking about its port, and its rapid
development into a major economic center, but given the area’s colonial history, the
comparison to Hong Kong is fascinating. Dalian today rests on complex colonial
foundations, which at once empower its current economic position in China and in the
North East Asian region, and continually threaten to simmer to the surface politically.
Comparisons to Hong Kong bring up some very important avenues for future research.
A comparison between these two cities would likely yield fascinating insights into the
nature of colonial rule and its aftermath in contemporary China. Both cities had large
colonizer populations, yet also feature an active, large Chinese population. Both
experienced successive regime changes.

In a recent study of colonial Hong Kong, John Carroll asks an important
question about the city, was it an anomaly? Was Dalian, with its unique history of
regime changes, long-term Japanese influence, and Soviet-occupation, simply an
anomaly? The local historian is haunted by such questions. Dalian, among Chinese
cities, certainly has a unique history. Few other places experienced such a sequence of
regime changes. It differed from the experience of Japanese occupation in cities like
Shanghai. Dalian’s prominent geographic location thrust it into the spotlight of major
trends and conflicts in North East Asian in the turbulent first half of the twentieth
century.

Comparisons with Hong Kong, and with the experiences of Changchun, and
other cities in Manchuria will likely reveal that, while much of Dalian’s history was
exceptional, it shared certain features with other colonial spaces in China. This
dissertation highlights many of the features of Dalian’s history that makes it unique. It
also reveals that Dalian is an important site to view processes that affected all of China. The nature of regime changes in Dalian was likely similar in other urban centers. The need to claim, reclaim, and define cities, as an essential part of establishing legitimacy is likely a salient feature of cities throughout China in the turbulent 1940s and 1950s.

**Contemporary Dalian’s Colonial Legacies**

The new generation of leaders in the PRC considers Dalian a dynamic success story of urban economic development in China. The city has escaped the crisis currently gripping much of China’s Northeast, where the closing of massive, unprofitable state-run heavy industries has turned the region into China’s rust-belt. Dalian hosts an international fashion exposition, a marathon, and is on the cutting edge of environmental reforms. A massive investment zone, to the north of the city and connected by a high-speed rail service, is home to hundreds of Japanese and Korean companies, many of whom were players in the cities colonial past. They are now welcomed to Dalian for their jobs, and the technical training they provide some workers.

It has done so by once again positioning itself as a major hub of transnational economic ties and trading networks. Japan has returned to the city in full force. As China’s largest trading partner, Japan pumps more capital into Dalian than it does anywhere else in China. Japanese companies are now outsourcing thousands of jobs to Dalian, much like the way the U.S. has to places like India. Japanese is one of the most popular foreign languages studied by students in the city. The two countries are linked economically as never before, and Dalian is ground zero for those ties, yet in recent
years political relations between China and Japan have sunk to all time lows. Dalian thus also stands at the forefront of growing regional tensions between China and Japan.

How then are colonial legacies remembered today? One entrepreneur, Mr. Zhou Libin, has recreated two colonial streets in an effort to spur domestic tourism, and luxury housing development in Dalian. One is called “Russian customs street” which has restored and recreated some of the Czarist architecture from the brief period of Czarist Russian colonial days. Mr. Zhou even planned to build a replica of the Kremlin here, but backed away from those plans. Each summer, thousands of Chinese and Russian tourists come here to buy cheap trinkets and eat at various restaurants on the street. As far as making a profit, the development is a success. In recent years, particularly since political relations with Japan have soured, fewer Japanese tourists come to Dalian. Russians, on the other hand, now flock to the city in the summer months to enjoy its temperate weather and beaches. They stay for weeks at a time, and contribute to the local economy. It will be interesting to see the degree to which Dalian begins to cater to their tastes, perhaps with more memorial zones celebrating a romanticized image of the czarist days.

The other project of Zhou’s has been a colossal failure: “Japanese customs street.” Each time I have visited it has been a virtual ghost town. Unlike the sterile (and far-away) past recreated in “Russian culture street,” “Japanese customs street” comes too close to colliding with sensitive narratives about the nature of Japanese colonialism in Dalian. It will be a long time before there is a profitable “Soviet culture street” drudging up mixed memories of Soviet rule. We began our inquiry with a quote from an astute reporter, boldly thanking Japan for its fascistic development of Dalian,
which allowed for the city to rapidly transform itself. Perhaps that lurks in the background in contemporary Dalian as well. Nobody wants to celebrate or visit “Japanese customs street,” especially when the Japanese economic presence exists in uneasy tension with contemporary Chinese nationalism at every corner of modern Dalian.


Map 1: The Guandong Leased Territory
Map 2: Dalian, 1901
Map 3: The City of Dalian, 1945
Map 4: The Lüshun Soviet Naval Base Area
(Note: Dotted line above the solid boundary line denotes approximate boundary of the former Japanese Guandong Leased Territory). Source: Edwin W. Pauley, “Report on Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States, July 1946.”
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