Feast of water: Christianity and the economic transformation of a Melanesian society

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Feast of Water: Christianity and the Economic Transformation of a Melanesian Society

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Anthropology

by

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2009
The Dissertation of Ryan Schram is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2009
Dedication

In memory of
Donald F. Tuzin
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Parts of Chapter 5 have been submitted for review in the paper Schram, Ryan, n.d. Witches' Wealth: Witchcraft, Confession and Christianity in Auhelawa, Papua New Guinea. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. The dissertation author was the sole author of this paper.

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Abstract of the Dissertation

Feast of Water: Christianity and the Economic Transformation of a Melanesian Society

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology

University of California, San Diego, 2009

Professor Joel Robbins, Chair

This dissertation is an ethnographic study of cultural and economic change in Auhelawa, a rural, indigenous society of southern Normanby Island (Milne Bay Province), Papua New Guinea. After a century of Australian colonial administration and postcolonial economic and social changes, people of Auhelawa feel as though their culture has undergone a profound and irreversible transformation away from an ethos of mutual interdependence and reciprocity and towards one of individualism and self-interested accumulation. I argue that participation in Christianity, brought by Australian missionaries in the early twentieth century, provides people with a frame of reflexive perception of their historical experience through a Christian cosmology that centers on
individuals. In response to the perception of the negative effects of economic change, Auhelawa embrace their Christian congregations as a radically alternative basis for sociality. They believe that Christian sociality can contain the perceived negative effects of change, and they seek to use Christianity to create an alternative culture that can replace the social world of kinship and exchange. In general, I argue that Christianity, as a mode of reflexive perception and action, shapes the intercultural relationship between Auhelawa and Western culture of which it is itself a part. When perceived through the lens of Christianity, economic transformation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Introduction

A Changing Society

This dissertation will present an ethnographic case of cultural change in Auhelawa, a small, indigenous society on the south coast of Normanby Island in Milne Bay Province, Papua New Guinea. In many ways, Auhelawa appears to be a typical Melanesian gift economy. Economic action consists of a variety of reciprocal exchanges. The circulation of goods reproduces relationships between people and between groups. Auhelawa ethos values mutual interdependence and egalitarianism. Yet, there is more to contemporary Auhelawa life than these aspects. When I conducted my field research in Auhelawa in 2004 and 2006, I found that, in addition to forming reciprocal ties through exchange, people sought ways to earn money from new kinds of economic transactions. A few people had launched businesses of various kinds, and nearly every household regularly sold betelnuts and garden food in marketplaces in the local Catholic mission and in the provincial town. This money was used mainly to pay for school fees and modest household commodity consumption. A small yet growing cash economy existed alongside the gift economy. Yet the cultural influence of market-based transactions seemed to be even more profound than actual use of cash and commodities. Relationships among cognatic kin that normally would be mediated by reciprocity were now mediated by commodity transactions, I was often told. Goods that one would normally expect to be given as gifts were now bought and sold, because everyone was becoming more selfish. A cultural logic premised on the individual as an autonomous and rational actor was also gaining ground against the logic of relationships and interdependence.
What especially caught my attention was that the decline in the value of reciprocity appeared to have two different effects. The first effect was to make people more selfish and cause them to withdraw from involvement in gift exchange. For instance, people said that they gave less in mortuary feasting, the main site for the prestation of reciprocal gifts between kin groups. When people recognized that they were failing to meet the social obligations to give and receive, they justified their pursuit of their own needs over social obligations by saying that people today were poorer than their ancestors, and hence they had no choice but to change their behavior. The second effect was to compel people to use money and commodities to express their commitments to alternative social institutions, especially the local Christian churches. People constantly appealed for unreciprocated gifts of charity from each other in collective fundraising events for their church congregations and other voluntary associations. They sought security in a voluntaristic social group because they no longer thought they could obtain the same security from kinship relationships based on reciprocity. The kind of economic and social transformations at work in Auhelawa in fact seemed to involve more than simply the loss of tradition or the rending of the social fabric. Just as the relational personhood of kinship and exchange seemed to be under threat, a new kind of personhood, individual yet interconnected, seemed to be emerging from Christian practices of charity.

In many places in Melanesia today, as in many parts of the world, one finds the copresence of the economic values of reciprocity and self-interest as a result of colonialism and globalization (see for instance Carrier and Carrier 1989, Foster 1995). Indeed some have argued that these two values can coexist without conflict, or even
support each other (Epstein 1968, Finney 1973, Parry and Bloch 1989). In Auhelawa, one finds that people perceive these values as not only in conflict. They also see this conflict as indicative of their contact with Western culture and the inevitable succession of Western values over indigenous values. Money and commodities, though locally circulated, are nonetheless reflexively perceived as new and foreign forms of value that undermine indigenous forms. While there are many cases from Melanesian societies in which people balance or reconcile this conflict, Auhelawa play it up. They see the conflict between reciprocity and self-interest as part of an inevitable passage from tradition to modernity, and from being isolated to integrated into a global order. Moreover this perception of inevitability of change appears to work like a self-fulfilling prophecy. As much as Auhelawa think of their traditional culture as something from a nostalgic history, they also invest heavily in alternative social forms, and talk often of their need to "develop." Hence the two main questions I will address in this dissertation are: (1) why do Auhelawa temporalize their experience of intercultural contact in this way; and (2), what are the consequences of this perception of intercultural contact for cultural change?

The main point of contact between Auhelawa and Western culture is Christianity, introduced by missionaries from Australia in the early twentieth century and continuously practiced by Auhelawa since then. I will argue that Auhelawa Christian practice plays a crucial and constitutive role in the process of economic change going on now. Christian practice among Auhelawa brings into being a particularly Christian imagination of space and time. In adopting Christian practices, Auhelawa come to see their own society in terms of a Christian narrative of world history. This narrative centers on change as an
event of irreversible rupture, and a succession of epochs in which societies and individuals are totally transformed. This story is furthermore grounded in a Christian cultural geography of scattered peoples who will ultimately be brought together as one church. Christianity thereby provides a framework for people interpret their intercultural contact as a particular kind of change of both themselves and their society. Through Christian practices, Auhelawa impose a dichotomous temporality of before and after which they use to organize their contemporary social life in terms of an irreconcilable contradiction between traditional heathenism and Christian modernity. When they view their lives through their religion, Auhelawa come to value economic alternatives as a way to embody the change that Christianity promotes.

It is important to note here that in proposing this thesis, I do not mean to suggest that Christianity simply provides an ideological buttress to the logic of global capitalism and the destruction of Auhelawa values. Since Weber, many scholars note that there is an elective affinity between the kind of personhood which Christian practice assumes and that of secular modernity (Keane 2007). Others suggest that for this reason missionaries, colonialism and capitalism worked hand in hand to spread the hegemony of Western power (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, Gutierrez 1991, Rafael 1993). At the heart of these analyses is a social theory of religion that emphasizes its ideological function in naturalizing modern institutions that break down traditional social structures and atomize persons. I take an alternative view that religion is a set of ideas, and a subsystem of the culture from which it originates. Practices of religion embody the values and ideas of the religion, and to an extent, the culture of its origin. Many forms of Western Christianity, furthermore, are characterized by the value of the individual person as an autonomous
and self-aware mind. Participation in Christianity, especially in a Christianity brought by Westerners to another culture, involves taking up the tacit premise of the value of this kind of personhood over other ways of being (see Robbins 2004). Doing Christianity involves on some level embodying the basic units of its ontology. In the course of describing Auhelawa practice of Christianity, I hope to demonstrate empirically that a value of individualism is embedded in what they do, say, and think about themselves and their activities.

Yet, I will also complicate the discussion of Christianity and culture. In adopting Christianity as an alternative social framework, I will show that Auhelawa distinguish between the differentiated relational personhood of kinship and reciprocity that typifies tradition and an intimate, emotional, undifferentiated solidarity of Christian fellowship embodied in their church congregation. Often, Christian sociality is used to mitigate, curtail and control certain kinds of economic individualism which people see as destructive. People appropriate the logic of commodities and consumption to express an idealized form of Christian modernity by linking them to a higher value of charity. Above all, Christian modernity is known through its negation of tradition, a mode of behavior which Auhelawa call 'masele' (light). In the spaces they create for the negation of tradition, Auhelawa imagine they are following in the footsteps of European Christian civilization. In actuality they are creating a new kind of modernity based on undifferentiated communalism and unrestricted intimacy, an intimate union of like minds as opposed to a differentiated and complex web of relationships. Auhelawa Christianity sits at the juncture between two cultural worlds, but it also builds a new social form in this interstitial space, and most importantly, in that space people act through that social
form to constitute their intercultural relationships according to their vision of modernity.

By posing the answer to my questions in terms the globalization of religious practices as opposed to acculturation or hegemony, I also wish to highlight the main conceptual problem that this dissertation will seek to resolve. In exploring cultural change, it quickly becomes apparent that it is not merely a direct effect of contact, or that the relationship between intercultural contact and cultural change is unidirectional. There are too many different kinds of postcolonial cultural change to reduce them all to one single causal narrative. Rather the Auhelawa experience suggests a circular relationship between how cultures influence each other and how cultures change. On the one hand, change is an empirical phenomenon. It is something that happens to cultures in the course of their history. This aspect of change, and its relationship to intercultural contact, is widely recognized among anthropologists today. No culture is timeless or isolated. All cultures exist in relation to others, and cultures also influence each other in various ways. On the other hand, change is also a part of a narrative of history. It is a mode of representation of intercultural contact in terms of the movement of time. It follows that cultural changes of different kinds can have different values within a cultural economy of meaning. Insofar as what a culture values motivates social action, then it follows that the stories that a community tells about its own history also serve to motivate actors to relate to foreign cultures in culturally valued ways. The local representation of history, itself an encoding of a local cultural logic, shapes the intercultural juncture and constitutes the intercultural relationship. In this sense one can say that the narrative of change is a "self-fulfilling prophecy" of the empirical process of change (Merton 1949: 181).

In what follows, I will review some of the ways anthropologists have
conceptualized the relationship between intercultural contact and cultural change, especially with respect to contemporary globalization and the challenge it has posed to anthropology as a discipline. New approaches to cultural change focus on individual actions and choices, an emphasis that I criticize for positing an extracultural realm of agency. I then move to discuss a way to bring cultural mediations of agency to bear on the questions of globalization by taking into consideration the reflexivity of perception and action.

An Alternative Modernity

The dominant narrative of cultural change in classical social theory is a linear passage from tradition to modernity. In the wake of many waves of imperialism, decolonization and globalization, the story of modernity is hardly believed anymore. Anthropologists especially have pointed to ethnographic evidence to critique this narrative and the conceptions of traditional and modern societies drawn from it. Anthropology has also applied this critique to itself and tried to free its disciplinary knowledge from previous conceptions of culture that are less applicable in the contemporary era. A loose consensus about how anthropology should conceptualize cultural difference and cultural changes now has emerged around several points.

First, a fixed social order based on unchanging traditions is illusory. All societies are a product of historical forces, and experience systemic change over time. Traditional systems of norms and knowledge may possess legitimacy because they appear to be timeless at any given moment in this history. Yet, in actual practice, traditions are flexible, adaptable, and open to manipulation. Thus, an analysis of social life of so-called
traditional societies cannot focus on sources of stability and order at the expense of its dynamic aspects, or at the expense of the historical processes from which such structures arise.

Second, the unity, boundedness and isolation of traditional societies are illusions too. All societies, whether traditional or modern, exist in relationships of contact and mutual influence with other societies. Their distinctive aspects are in part produced by histories of intercultural contact, as well as histories of structural articulation and domination of one society over another. Consequently the basic unit of analysis should not be the social order in its totality because that would ignore the role played by forces which transect and transcend the apparent boundaries of the social.

Third, what is called modernity lacks as much conceptual unity as what is called tradition. Far from being the culmination of rationality, many aspect of modernity are based in the particular values of different cultures. As such, there are no key criteria that can be used to define modernity as a condition. Moreover, social life in modernity seems itself to be fundamentally irrational. The story of progress often disguises a history of violence and brutality. Modernity itself seems to be based on a precarious balance of conflicts always on the verge of a crisis, rather than a genuinely new way of being and acting. Thus, one cannot take up modernity as an analytic category without in some way endorsing the ideology of power and domination that it comes from. It is just as fallacious to look at modern societies in terms of how they have perfected themselves as it is to look at traditional societies as evolutionary precursors or retrogrades.

Fourth, while recognizing that societies are continually changing, their changes do not all necessarily follow the same natural teleological path. In an era in which one might
have once expected for the world to achieve what Francis Fukuyama (1995) called "the end of history," a high point of a modern global society, there appears instead to be a proliferation of "multiple modernities" (Eisenstadt 2000), each in constant contact with and influencing one another, yet each still following its own trajectory. While the terms applied to this heterogeneous class of plural modernities are debated, there seems to be agreement that cultural change is so contingent and complex that it cannot fit into any one single narrative.

This is a characterization of contemporary anthropology as a discipline in very broad brushstrokes. Many people might wish to challenge this account, because many of these points are actively debated. Nonetheless I feel that, as an overall portrait of implicit assumptions and general tendencies of anthropology as disciplinary knowledge, it is accurate. Current debates would mainly add nuance to this consensus. Also it must be said that some of these points are not new ideas, but are in fact central to early theories of culture. Boasian anthropology rejected evolutionary explanations of human difference altogether, and insisted upon the uniqueness of each society's own development. Marxist social theory, while based on a concept of history as a series of profound transformations, does not hold up the present condition as an end point. Marxist anthropologists embrace dialectical analysis of society as a way to show the dynamics of social reproduction in noncapitalist societies and the unstated imperialism of modernization theory. What seems to be novel about the current consensus though is an agreement that the contemporary era of globalization should compel anthropology to rethink the basic units of its analysis. Neither traditional societies nor modern societies exist as such in the global landscape. Because interchange among cultures is constant, the analysis of single societies and their
internal process of change is naive. I see at least two dominant answers to the question of units of analysis; broadly speaking, the first centers on individual agency and action and the second on a renewed conception of a shared cultural and symbolic order.

The first approach to globalization is best represented by the arguments of Arjun Appadurai (1996). Appadurai eschews both modernization theory as well as world-system theories of globalization in favor of describing globalization as the disjunctive flows of symbolic and material media, including cultures. Rather than any particular social condition, Appadurai claims that the hallmark of contemporary globalization is the "deterritorialization" of social life, the breaking down of social structures, rules and boundaries, and consequently, the opening of spaces for cultural forms to flow from place to place (1996: 38). While Appadurai rejects a teleological conception of modernity, his theory has an unstated modernism in that he assumes that change tends toward the progressive freeing of individuals from structural and normative constraints, especially those of the nation-state. The chief mechanism for the flow of culture is individual action. Deterritorialization liberates individuals to imagine their own life course and to improvise the conditions for life through creative action (1996: 31, 53, 55-56). Instead of homogenizing culture, globalization leads to a proliferation of differences through the contacts, conflicts and appropriations of cultures (1996: 29). Anthropologists can make sense of the global era when they attend to the movement of culture in new imaginary spaces. They misapprehend the current moment when they frame questions in terms of previous geographic systems based on obsolete notions of social boundaries (1996: 188). Several others have made similar observations that globalization produces differential effects through unexpected combinations (Ong 1999; Trouillot 2003; Tsing 1993, 2004).
Across these various analyses is a consistent emphasis on the creative agency of individuals to negotiate, appropriate and resist the effects of transnational capital. They see the global order as dominated by movement, of both capital as well as people, each in their own ways breaking down the old order of the nation-state and the identities on which it depended. Importantly, they tend to assume that the proper unit of analysis of globalizing societies is the individual actor.

This first approach, to my mind, contains a blind spot in its conception of the individual. This approach, like many others in other fields (e.g. Giddens 1990), seeks to acknowledge a need to rethink anthropology's basic research questions in light of globalization. In their retreat from structure and system as units of social analysis, Appadurai and others have emphasized the individual's agency as a key element in the effects of globalization. Yet in doing so there seems to be little attention paid to what is being globalized. One sees everywhere the globalization of market-based economics, liberal and neoliberal political and legal systems, consumer culture, and so on. In other words, the most widely circulated discourses, ideas, practices, and institutional forms are, if not elements of Western culture itself, at least predicated on a Western bourgeois conception of rational, self-interested individuals. This may seem to be too obvious a point to make. Such global flows from Western culture to the rest of the world are a legacy of Western imperialism and contemporary neocolonialism. Also, such an observation may fly in the face of a great deal of evidence that global interconnections have differential effects. Yet it still seems worth making this point. If what is being globalized is in the last instance a Western ideology of individualism, then one risks missing the real nature of globalization by adopting this ideology as one's way of
analyzing the process of its dissemination. By taking up the individual agent as the main unit of analysis, Appadurai and others blind themselves to the depth of cultural change that they wish to explain.

This leads one to the second approach to globalization. This approach insists on the continued importance of culture as a determining force behind actions and events. Culture, in this perspective, is not defined as individual creativity and strategic use of symbolic resources, but as a system that binds people to one another. Culturalist explanations of the effects of globalization take as a core assumption that people need to share a worldview and values with other individuals in order to create a viable society. Hence, even in situations of fluidity and flux, not everything is up for imagination and improvisation. Imagination and improvisation are effective, on the contrary, only in cultural systems that place a value on individual agency. Moreover, when cultures appear to flow across boundaries, maybe that is a part of their reproduction and not their breakdown.

An exemplar of the culturalist approach to globalization which I have in mind is Marshall Sahlins. Sahlins's project is to theorize histories of intercultural interactions and influences (1985, 1988, 1992, 1999). He identifies these conjunctures of cultures in both contemporary globalization as well as a number of previous instances of cultural flows, such as initial European contact with Polynesian societies. He argues that such intercultural relations are an ever-present condition, and play a crucial role in both the reproduction of cultural systems and social orders as well as their transformation. Individuals engage with foreign cultures on the basis of what their culture values. Individual acts of appropriation of the foreign are, for Sahlins, instantiations of
indigenous values. The core elements of his perspective are shared by several others (see, for instance, Baskhow 2004, 2006; Friedman and Carrier, eds. 1994; Knauf, ed. 2002; Robbins and Wardlow, eds. 2004).

While the formulation of his model has changed over time, he generally adopts a view that there is an interdependent relationship between the mental structures of a shared system of meaning and the agency of individuals (see 1978, 1985). While individuals instantiate cultural values through actions, these actions are intelligible, and hence effective, only in relation to a shared system of meaning. More recently, he argues that the dichotomous opposition between structure and agency is an artifact of Western philosophical traditions that oppose society and individual. In this vein, the social is conceptualized as a system of external constraints in conflict with the internally self-sufficient and autonomous individual actor (2004: 139-140). Using these terms as the master trope of social analysis cannot help but fail to comprehend cultures that do not recognize this contradiction. As Roy Wagner has similarly argued, if the premise of social analysis is that individuals must reconcile themselves to external constraints on their freedom, then a culture which does not itself assume this will look to a Western observer as a failed attempt to achieve order (1991: 160). An analogous criticism can be made of how one conceptualizes change. If one assumes a conflict between individuals and society, then one is inclined to view the transformation of society as caused by individual actions. The opposition of traditional and modern societies is, in essence, a restatement of the opposition between the individual and society. Without integrating individuals into society as parts of the same picture, one always runs the risk of reducing the complexity of other cultures' histories of change to being variants of Western
narratives of its own origins.

In regarding the units problem raised by globalization, Sahlins and others (notably Bashkow 2004) suggest that the flow of culture is not necessarily evidence of the breakdown of traditional boundaries, but in fact the spread of a particular worldview to new domains and new contexts. The migration of culture is not its demise but its growth. This points to an important conceptual problem that is ignored by an agency centered approach, a paradox of intercultural relationships. Intercultural relationships are an ever-present condition, yet cultures themselves are always integral. And while intercultural relationships are ubiquitous, action between cultures by definition cannot be outside of culture. As Ira Bashkow (2004) would say, intercultural relations demonstrate the permeability of boundaries, but it is a permeability that permits movement from the inside out, by way of a particular cultural "zone of the foreign" in which a culture classifies foreign forms according its own conception of its boundaries (447). The intercultural space is itself, in other words, culturally constructed.

Sahlins's approach raises the need for a new analytic vocabulary to conceptualize both intercultural relationships and cultural change. This dissertation will seek to create one. Like Wagner, I see the relationship between individual and society as fractal. That is to say, rather than seeing social forms as comprised of individual parts of a social whole, action and norm are better thought of as complementary modalities of social process in which the same cultural values are manifested. There is no scale of analysis of individual actions and events that is distinct from the scale of structural patterns. Both form part of a perpetual loop. I use the term reflexivity to denote this loop between structure and event. There is a reflexive relationship between norm and practice in the sense that there is not
only a necessary interdependence, in the sense of structuration, but also a mirroring of one in the other. I argue that by attending to the reflexive loop between norm and practice, one can better grapple with the paradoxes of intercultural relationships and better understand how intercultural relationships can contribute to cultural change.

**Structure, Agency and Reflexivity**

Reflexivity can refer to a variety of different concepts, so I wish to sketch out what precisely I mean when I use it. All human action is by definition performed with a degree of self-awareness and thus can be called reflexive. People act with some implicit or explicit conception of what they are doing, and this conception of their own action governs the conduct of the action itself. In this way, there is a circular relationship between social norms as ideal conceptions of action and actual instances of social behavior. This kind of circularity between norm and practice is what Merton had in mind when he said that social norms were self-fulfilling prophecies. Hence, reflexivity as a defining feature of social action itself can be considered basic to social analysis.

Interpretive approaches in sociology and anthropology also take off from this point as well. Interpretive approaches regard action in terms of what it means to the actor, and furthermore, analyze actions as attempts by actors to communicate with each other, and thereby construct or establish a shared web of meanings as their reality (see Taylor 1971). Common to these views is that there is always an observer effect at work in society itself; the actor's perception of herself as an actor, and her perception of herself in social interaction with other actors, influences the course of her actions. Insofar as the awareness of one's actions is mediated by acquired social norms, this notion of reflexivity
seems relatively straightforward. By being a member of a society, one acquires implicit knowledge of the society's rules, and hence a system of categories and classifications for different kinds of behavior. One perceives actions through acquired, socially determined frames of reference. However a less obvious corollary would also appear to follow. Action, as a vehicle for meaning, influences what is perceived and understood. Actions communicate messages not only in their perception through the lens of conventional categories of meaning. Rather, actions also provoke the perceptor and elicit particular frames of reference. When interpretive anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz insist on the public nature of meaning, they mean that the meaning of action is not merely a cognitive projection onto physical events. Rather meaning exists between actors through their actions and objects, connecting them in a shared world. The communicative aspect of actions thus draws fellow actors into that world by eliciting a shared perception. There is thus a circular causality between action and its perception.

Anthony Giddens's structuration theory evokes a different conception of reflexivity which gives an independent role to structure as well as action (1979, 1990). In this view, structure is dual in nature. From a sociocentric point of view, structure is a system of rules which constrain the range of possible actions. From an egocentric point of view, the same structure is a collection of different symbolic resources which can be accumulated by acting in certain ways. The two sides of structure are interdependent; actions are constrained by structures, but they also contribute to their reproduction. Giddens describes the actor's reflexive awareness of the relationship between structure and action as a kind of self-monitoring. He resists associating this awareness with rational, self-conscious deliberation, suggesting that it is normally a routine, embodied
and practical self-monitoring. Giddens argues that modernity is type of social system in which the means for this kind of self-monitoring is substituted by technical systems of expert knowledge, surveillance and control. Modern actors appear to be free from traditional rules, but their freedom to exercise reflexive control over their own lives is increasingly confined to a very narrow range of consumer choices and lifestyles. The reflexivity of social process is for the most part taken up by systems of technical management, a process which Giddens and Ulrich Beck have termed "reflexive modernization" (1994). One might say that the self-awareness of structure, as opposed to the individual actor, is more important for this group of theories.

Scott Lash (1994) adds that reflexive modernization is mostly driven by complex informational and communication structures which constantly collect and feed back information about individuals' choices in order to shape and control them through an aesthetic, as opposed to cognitive, mode of reflexivity. The information which mediates the modern actor's reflexive perception is not conceptual, but mimetic or iconic (1994: 138). The mimesis of popular culture and consumers is one way, he argues, that consuming publics are reflexively shaped by information and communication structures. Lash's focus on the semiotic, as opposed to purely structural, mediation of reflexivity brings to bear another concept of reflexivity which is most relevant to this dissertation. Communication itself has a reflexive dimension which governs and shapes the messages it carries. Explicit metacommentary on the meaning of social action, a moral critique for instance, is one form this kind of reflexivity might take. The mimetic relation which Lash sees between popular culture and consumers is another. Language ideologies, statements which evaluate communication by construing them in relation to cultural representations
of identity, prestige, history and power are a similar kind of metacommunicative practice (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994).

Having proposed reflexivity as a way to think through the paradoxes of intercultural contact, I want to define reflexivity in a way that does not restate the same dichotomy between the individual and society which makes intercultural contact hard to think. Like Lash, I wish to avoid defining reflexivity as purely cognitive. Defining reflexivity as a cognitive process implies a separation between a cultural system of meaning on the one hand and action on the other. Also like Lash, I want to also avoid defining culture as ideas and thus as distinct from action, but to see them as different manifestations of the same patterns. Attention to metacommunicative practices would seem to offer a more broadly applicable notion of reflexivity in that it suggests a continuity between thought and action at the level of semiosis. Reflexive relationships between semiotic forms shape how these forms are received and interpreted. Greg Urban (2001) argues that these sorts of relationship govern the circulation of semiotic forms as well. Culture for Urban is a continual process of circulation and translation of signs into new signs, and hence depends on the capacity of signs to comment upon, imitate or otherwise create chains of associations he calls "metaculture." Roy Wagner (1975) argues along similar lines when he defines culture as a dialectical process of convention and innovation. And just as signs can be said to have reflexive relationships with one another, we might also speak of cultures forming metacultural comments on other cultures through similar processes, as Bashkow suggests in stating that cultures define a "zone of the foreign" by which they classify certain forms as other to themselves.

To say that cultural contact is necessarily reflexive is, then, to say that cultures in
contact provide a metacultural frame through which actors of each side perceives the other. Communicative practices which instantiate these frames, be they media, institutional contexts, ideologies, or explicit discourses, set the grounds by which actors interact across cultural boundaries. Contact between cultures is neither a cause of certain kinds of individual action, nor is it an effect. Rather actors reflexively constitute the relationship between cultures through metacultural practices (see Makihara and Schieffelin, eds. 2007). Different modalities of metaculture construe this relationship in different ways. This dissertation analyzes a variety of different modalities of constructing intercultural relationships and seeks to demonstrate how one particular group, Christianity, of these has become dominant. It further seeks to demonstrate how Christianity as a set of practices for constructing a relationship between an indigenous Melanesian culture and Western culture has consequently led to a reflexive transformation of the indigenous culture into the image provided by Christian metaculture (see also Tomlinson 2009). Relatedly, this dissertation argues that the changes which result from intercultural contact, the chief scholarly question of globalization, are also necessarily reflexive as well. What this means is that there a similarly recursive process between events and cultural narratives which govern the perception and valuation of these events with respect to particular representations of change. Such narratives are also instantiated in metacultural practices. In that respect, this dissertation will pay special attention to how the metacultural practices of Christianity shape the perception of the effects of contact on Auhelawa society as well.
Religion and Cultural Change

Religion is a very fertile terrain in which to test these claims. For Weber, one of the main authors of the classical narrative of modernity, religion is a key element in social change. Religion provides a sphere of values in which actors can form themselves as individuals. He credits European Protestant Christianity with developing a model of an autonomous individual as a reflexively self-aware actor which could support the formation of modern capitalism. Weber bases his thesis of modernity on a process of rationalization of action as a unilinear progression. In other words, Weber sees religion as a mode of reflexive perception of the self as an individual, but the reflexive relation he posits between Christianity and individualism is purely cognitive. The reflexivity of the self is always mediated by values and beliefs, that is, mental states. Defining religion in these terms has been rejected as relying upon ethnocentric assumptions of the individual (Asad 2003). The ethnographic study of religious practice, however, has opened up new perspectives on reflexivity and agency. As such religion remains a useful area in which to think about reflexive cultural change.

First, inquiry into the practical basis for reflexivity in religion (e.g. Keane 2007, Hirschkind 2006, Shoaps 2002, Smilde 2007) has also led to a new approach to the relationship between religion and cultural change. For example, Saba Mahmood (2005) argues that Egyptian Islamic revivalism arises from the formation of a new kind of religious subject, one which is freed to act politically by their submission to strict moral regulation. To Western eyes, women's interest in revived Islamic piety as a basis for claiming a public role may appear paradoxically self-defeating. Mahmood argues that such an analysis of Islamic modernity reflects the bias of a view of modernity as
progressive disenchantment and rationalization. Egyptian feminist modernization of religion is not reducible to either Western influence or internal developments of religious ideas about the self. Rather, she argues that the public signs of piety, such as veiling or public prayer, engender a practical and embodied self-reflexivity. To understand these modern forms of piety, she proposes the following: "What is need to understand changes in notions of reflexivity is an inquiry into the creation of historically specific forms of subjectivity that require, and in some sense make possible, particular modes of self-reflection." And, "[I]t is necessary to explore both the discursive conditions under which specific kinds of deliberation become possible, and the practical task that an act of reflection is meant to accomplish" (2005: 55). Drawing broadly on theories of the habitus, Mahmood argues that religion is a system of discourses and practices which both rely upon self-monitoring and engender a particular self-awareness. Rather than issuing from a universal self-reflexive capacity, the religious subject emerges through habituation and self-discipline. She writes, "Self-reflexivity is not a universal human attribute here but, as Foucault suggested, a particular kind of relation to oneself whose form fundamentally depends on the practices of subjectivation through which the individual is produced" (2005: 32). Mahmood's definition of reflexivity echoes that of Giddens's structuration theory in that it seems to assume a separation between ideas and action. Despite this, I would emphasize the connection she makes between reflexivity as a practice and religious forms. Especially noteworthy is her argument that religious modes of discipline enable people to cultivate an awareness of an interiority of self.

Religion is also a useful place to inquire about the relationship between reflexivity and change because religions often construct an experience of intercultural or
transcultural contact as a key part of their cosmology. That is to say, religions often present themselves as outside of any one particular culture. While not necessarily true of all religions, this seems to be especially true of textual traditions, a feature of them which makes them "highly portable" (Keane 2007: 69). Where textual sources have authority, a local community can not ever completely appropriate a religious practice as its own, since its charismatic basis by definition lies outside of the social body (for a limit case, see Engelke 2007). Besides the features of these traditions' material forms which Keane emphasizes, these traditions often contain an explicit representation of a sacred geography which is translocal and hence transcultural in character. These so-called world religions are global not only because they are geographically disseminated, but because they see themselves as taking place in a particular global space of their own creation. Following Giddens, we might provisionally associate traditional religion, like all traditions, with a bounded, continuous and localized spacetime. Disseminated religions also define a sacred geography, yet, like that of nationalism, it is one that is more imagined than experienced, and includes many localities in a virtual simultaneity. This distinction is probably not empirically tenable. More important, however, is that so-called world religions present themselves as occupying a global and transhistorical spacetime. This reflexively globalized sacred landscape serves to orient adherents' practices on the local level, and frames their relationship to other cultures. The epistles of Paul in the New Testament, for instance, frame the church as a spatially disseminated community which nonetheless is oriented to a common center of belief. The contemporary teaching of the Roman Catholic church is that it is a universal religion which subsumes and contains many distinct cultural manifestations. Roman Catholicism sees itself as being transmitted
mainly through translation and localization of the universal to the particular (Orta 2004).

Similarly, other forms of Christianity place special emphasis on the existence of a global community of believers who, despite their spatial distanciation, share a common millennial temporality (Robbins 1997, 2001). This reflexively global character of a globally disseminated religion poses problems for the comparative cross-cultural study of religion. Comparisons between cultures are spurious if the adherents in each culture practice their religion in such a way as to separate their culture from their religion by treating the latter as the transcendence of the former. By the same token, it is useful to attend to religion to understand the dynamics of actors' reflexivity in situations of intercultural contact and influence.

The second point ultimately takes one back to the first. If we define religions as aspects of culture in the sense of a system of ideas, then it is difficult to see how there can be genuine intercultural interaction through religion. If however we reverse the typical Weberian tendency to start from religious ideas, and look instead to religion as an economy of practices, intercultural interaction becomes imaginable. Actors can appropriate the forms of other cultures. They can incorporate into their own cultural system the material products and practical realizations of another culture's ideas. Actors may do this in order to create an innovation in culture, or reproduce their culture's ideas in a new way (Friedman 1994, D. Rutherford 2003, Sahlins 1992). Hence the formal and material properties of cultural forms may serve as points of intersection between social worlds which, at the level of ideas, are necessarily distinct. I suggest that the circulation of religious practices among cultures is a special form of intercultural influence. Unlike, for example, commodities which are converted into prestige goods in a local sphere,
religious practices engender religious subjectivities, and allows the actor to imagine a specifically religious connection between self, space and time.\(^1\) That is to say, in appropriating a new religious practice like Christianity, an actor may habituate oneself to the mode of selfhood, the global geography and historical narrative that Christianity constitutes in its practice. In so doing, the actor may not become fully a convert to Christian culture purely through practice, but by appropriating a new mode of reflexive awareness of self, space and time, the actor will embody a new mode of being which contributes to broader cultural change. Furthermore, where religion moves from one culture to another in this manner, the reflexive aspect of religious practice constitutes the conditions for broader interaction between the two cultures and shapes the process of culture change.

One example of how Christianity has been appropriated into Auhelawa culture will illustrate the kind of intercultural influence I wish to highlight here. Most Auhelawa regularly attend a religious service on Sunday mornings and believe that it is good to respect the Sabbath as a day of rest. While all Auhelawa claim to be Christians, it is quickly evident that people's enthusiasm for Sunday services is highly variable. Many people arrive late and sit outside the church building of their congregation, facing the pulpit, yet so far removed as to be effectively nonparticipants. And yet, even for these latecomers, their arrival in the missionary's village is part of a communal rhythm of movement from the village to the mission. Explicit discourse and symbolic practices frame individual actions in terms of a conventional understanding of the gathering of the congregation as an index of spiritual vitality of the congregation. Moreover, ritual and moral discourse in and around these regular events similarly provide a metapragmatic
frame which reinforces the connection between the local congregation in Auhelawa and the imagined global community of believers. Thus the practice of even something as banal as church attendance reflexively enacts a cultural chronotope in which congregants imagine themselves in relation to each other and nonpresent fellow believers in an enchanted spacetime of Christianity. The more pious members of the congregation, much like Mahmood's Egyptian revivalists, self-consciously cultivate this selfhood through regular attendance. But even where participation is routine and unthought, one might still say that the routine action contributes to a collaboration, a form of distributed agency, which in its practice reflects back on itself and anchors itself in the Auhelawa social world. Even impious Auhelawa avoid openly violating the sacred time of Sunday out of respect for their relatives who would admonish them. Thus, in the Christian practice of making time sacred, individuals' agencies are intertwined in such a way to create a reflexively Christian chronotope. In this dissertation, I wish to claim that it is the practice of Christianity in this way that a novel kind of self-reflexivity is created and which structures people's attitudes and decisions about economic practices such as reciprocity and cash-earning. Unlike Weber, I will not claim that Christianity lays a ideological groundwork of individualism in which capitalism can emerge. Rather Christianity provides an intercultural juncture at the level of practices, producing new social forms within Auhelawa society in which new forms of value can be pursued.

**The Field Situation**

I now turn to a brief picture of Auhelawa society as I saw it in my field research in 2004 and 2006. As a graduate student, I was drawn to study the Kula, a system of
interisland ceremonial exchanges well known to anthropology students through the work of Bronislaw Malinowski. In crafting my research question, I was guided by the work of Nancy Munn on the culture of Gawa Island as a kind of intersubjective spacetime created through exchange (1986), as well as archaeological theories of trade and exchange systems (Allen 1985; Ballard 1994; Chase-Dunn and Mann 1998; Terrell, Hunt and Gosden 1997; Wiessner and Tumu 1998). I was particularly interested in how people's participation in interisland exchange networks created a regional social landscape and how this sociogeographic structure interfaced with the emergence of foreign-financed markets for fresh fish and beche-de-mer. Societies of the eastern islands of Papua New Guinea (PNG) seemed to exemplify a common feature of Melanesian societies generally. In Melanesian societies, one often finds relatively small, compact and kinship-based communities which are simultaneously enmeshed in elaborate systems of long-distance trade and exchange. Thus these social systems exhibit both large-scale areal integration through social practices and forms which are generally associated with small-scale egalitarian societies. They suggest that there can be a kind of social complexity of a region which is detached from social hierarchy.

At the same time, societies throughout PNG were increasingly and unevenly being brought into contact with the flows of foreign capital. The questions of continuity and change, of multiple modernities, in Melanesian culture due to globalization were increasingly a dominant concern for ethnographers (Friedman and Carrier, eds. 1996, Knauf, ed. 2002, LiPuma 2000). Thanks to scholars such as Appadurai, discussion of globalization was inherently and unavoidably done in a language of space. Economic change was represented as a process of connection, networking and flows. I believed that
the question of economic change should not assume that this implicit global geography was the only spatial system in play, but should include the spatial dimension of local economies, and perhaps more generally conceptualize the process of globalization as the interaction of different kinds of social networks.

When I arrived in Alotau the capital and main town of Milne Bay Province, I collected opinions about possible field sites from provincial government officers and others. My original proposal was to conduct fieldwork on the southwest coast of Fergusson Island, in a language group called Morima, which was first visited by Ann Chowning in the 1950s. Many people in Alotau discouraged me from this plan, or to work any where in "Wild West" Fergusson where I might run afoul of "Morima cowboys." There were many reports of piracy of local boats in this area. I also met a self-styled beche-de-mer trader who invited me to accompany him to his home at Bolubolu government station on Goodenough Island, where he was planning to hire some relatives to accompany him on an expedition. Along the way to Goodenough, I visited Ailuluai, a mission station on the south coast. The trader's plans fell through when he could not source fuel for his motorboat, and the season for beche-de-mer harvesting came to a close. After two weeks I went back to Alotau to reconsider my options. My first foray into the rural areas of the province on which I wanted to base my research left me feeling rather bewildered and unsure of how to proceed. The regional social landscape I wanted to immerse myself in proved to be far more dense and convoluted than I had anticipated. Every place I visited seemed to have its own deep history of intercultural contact which positioned it in this terrain. This history was not merely economic either, but also depended on cultural factors, as for example the stereotyping of Morima as criminals and
their part of Fergusson as a "Wild West." It seemed that my initial experiences lent some support to my hypothesis that regional geography shaped the process of globalization, but colonial and postcolonial history of the contemporary landscape confounded me.

From Alotau, I decided to go to Normanby Island, starting in a Catholic mission station called Kurada. In an email exchange, Michael Young suggested that I consider visiting Kurada. Young had recently conducted a rapid social mapping study of the coastal settlements of the southeastern coast of Normanby in 1993 (Young 1995). The settlement pattern of this part of Normanby is very dispersed. Small villages occupied by segments of matrilineages are scattered in a practically unbroken chain along the coast. In his study, Young walked along the coast and surveyed each of the villages to determine how they composed maximal lineages and other associations based on totemic birds. He also recorded some lineages' oral histories of settlement and migration. These narratives described the relationships between places and lineages, and posited connections between lineages based on their common migratory origin or otherwise intertwined histories of settlement and tenure. For this reason, he thought that Kurada was an ideal starting point for me. He had only touched briefly on some of its villages. The language spoken in Kurada, Auhelawa, was considered to be the same as that spoken on Nuakata Island, where Shelley Mallett had conducted fieldwork in 1997 (Mallett 2003), and was considered locally to be more related to languages spoken on mainland New Guinea than Normanby. All of this suggested that Kurada would be an excellent place to examine a regional social landscape in its economic, cultural and historical aspects.

At the Alotau public wharf, I met a Kurada tradestore owner named Lorenzo Mesaki, who also owned the cargo boat MV Wadaheya which he used to supply his own
business and run cargo and passengers between Alotau and south Normanby. His boat and his business were both named after his matrilineal totemic bird, the white cockatoo. For the first two weeks of my time in Kurada, I stayed with him in his village, also named Wadaheya, near the Catholic and United Church mission stations of Kurada. On the first Sunday of my stay, Lorenzo took me to the Mass in the Catholic mission where I could meet the congregation and introduce myself. After the Mass, he took me to the United Church station further down the road to meet their congregation and introduce myself. In this way, I became known to most of the people who resided within the boundaries of the Kurada ward, a part of the Duau government council area which encompassed most of south Normanby. After two weeks in Wadaheya village, I moved to the village of New Home to live with Francis and Lucy Pade, a schoolteacher and nurse couple who had recently returned to their home in Kurada for their retirement. Lucy was one of the older members of her lineage, based in the village of Alogawa. When she and her husband returned, she claimed a portion of land on the top of a small rise above Alogawa near a rushing creek, near her gardening places. Francis used some of his pension to hire some workers to clear the brush and build a house for them and two of their three children. They named the new village New Home. Their eldest son, Charles, it so happened, was married to another schoolteacher working in Kurada's Catholic primary school. Although Charles had just finished building a house for his family in New Home, they had recently relocated to a teacher's house on the other side of the river and up another hill which separated Alogawa from the Catholic mission station in Mwademwadewa village. This unexpectedly opened up a free house, and a rather nice, new and big one too, in New Home. Given the labor and expense of building a house, unoccupied houses are hard to
find, and Charles's move seemed fortuitous.

I later learned that gentle persuasion was applied to Francis and Lucy by the parish lay committee to host me in Charles's house. Charles had decamped suddenly because the parish priest had plans to extend the teacher's quarters into an area which Alogawa lineage considered part of its territory. The conflict was just one more episode in a long series of disputes between Alogawa and the neighboring lineage in the villages of Gomwa and Mwademwadewa, who had hosted rent-free the Catholic mission for two generations. The affair involved a murky and contentious history of migration and settlement by the two lineages, and was never settled to everyone's complete satisfaction. My arrival was merely a sidelight in the ongoing drama.

All of the lineages, with one possible exception, it turned out, claimed to originate from somewhere else. People reported this fact to me as though it explained the whole of their society. Indeed it became clear as I continued to learn more about Kurada that history was a way of thinking. Stories of a lineage's ancestors' migration and the genealogy of her descendants served as the basis for matrilineage membership and rights of ownership in the villages and gardening lands of the lineage. These stories also described a lineage's relationships with other lineages who may have also migrated from the same place, or adopted a lineage's founders. These relationships of clanship opened up possibilities for lineages to find space to make new, noncontiguous villages and access new gardening sites. Such relationships were not confined to the borders of Kurada, but often extended to connect lineages to others all along the island. The temporality of migration created a framework for people's social relationships in a regional space.

While this collective memory seemed to provide a robust basis for long-distance
changes, Auhelawa also felt that their society was changing in such a way that these long-distance connections were no longer trustworthy. As I started fieldwork in earnest, it became clear that people were not interested in articulating the traditional social geography with a new global, capitalist system. Indeed, the desire for money and commodities was said to be the death of the bonds of clanship and exchange on which traditional trade was based. People now looked to trade all manner of goods in Alotau for money, not among each other. Furthermore, even though they and other people of Milne Bay Province were by no means isolated localities, Auhelawa often tried to paint themselves as such in relation to the global community they imagined was vested in their local church congregations. They sought to create a new grounds for sociality in these churches, and thereby unlock a potential for broader social and material changes. An example of this effort occurred almost immediately after my arrival. The Catholic congregation in Kurada was in the midst of preparation for a so'i, a large memorial feast usually only held once in a generation, for the golden jubilee (fiftieth anniversary) of the founding of the Catholic mission in 1954. All of the villages in Kurada, including families who attended the United Church in Sowala village, were involved in raising money to pay for the commodity foods to feed the feast visitors from the Catholic parish's other congregations. To raise the funds for the feast budget, the congregation organized a series of competitive event, called pot-to-pot, in which members would exchange pots of cooked food and other gifts with a partner, and each would contribute a small money gift toward the jubilee feast. In preparation for these events, people actively marketed betelnut and garden foods in the Catholic mission station market and in Alotau town markets. It was obvious that missionary Christianity was also a potential factor in the
process of economic change. Moreover, it seemed that people's acceptance of Christian cosmology also played a role as well. What was striking about the preparations for the jubilee was that not only did the instituted forms of Christianity help to coordinate and motivate cash-earning, but that this cash-earning activity was also invested with religious significance. By joining fundraising to their membership in a church congregation, people hoped that they would overcome the selfishness which normally governed social relationships and create intimate solidarity among congregants which would help people become better Christians. In December 2004, I left Kurada and returned a year later in time for Christmas of 2005. I continued my research in Kurada, staying with Francis and Lucy in New Home again, until December of 2006. As I continued in my research in 2004 and 2006, I found other examples of religious practices which people used to overcome reciprocity as a basis for relationships and replace it with a value of unrestricted sharing based in Christian fellowship.

**An Outline of the Argument**

Each of the chapters of the dissertation helps build the case for my claim that Auhelawa Christian religious practice provides a reflexive frame of reference by which people understand themselves in relation to space, time, self and other, and which motivates the rejection of reciprocity in favor of sharing, intimate community, and ultimately a mode of Auhelawa Christian individualism.

The first chapter argues that historical knowledge is a collaborative practice of reasoning about social relationships. Through the telling of lineage histories, Auhelawa realize the regional social landscape which they inhabit. The practice of telling histories
is aided by memorials, physical anchors which are taken as traces of the past in the present, and are illuminated by historical explanations. Historical knowledge and memorials combine to engender a sense of the continuous unbroken flow of time from the ancestral past to the present. This temporality does not exist by itself. Rather Auhelawa imagine another kind of time, one of rupture and discontinuity, which they posit through an alternative genre of knowledge found in legends and mysterious stories. People use this genre of reasoning to fill in the gaps of knowledge where their own lineage based history falls short. I then go on to show how these two temporalities are invoked to provide different explanations of Auhelawa contact with Europeans and European culture. Whereas contact with the colonial political economy of copra trading and pacification is treated in terms of the logic of continuous temporality of lineage migration and regional space, Christianity is treated as a rupture in time in which everything changed. Christianity, in contrast to other changes, needs to be understood in terms of this alternative temporality of legends. Not only does Christian cosmology rest on such a discontinuous temporality, and thus logically resonate as the inversion of a lineage history, but Christianity is experienced in Auhelawa as a total phenomenon. Because "everyone is a Christian," the event of Christianity is retrojectively imagined as a singular break. In this respect, Christianity is apprehended in terms of local cultural categories of perception, but in a way that emphasizes latent potentials within that system of ideas to express ideas in an innovative way.

The second chapter delves further into the nature of Auhelawa sociality and its changes. In this chapter, I attempt to explain the perception among Auhelawa that people are more selfish and less inclined to participate in reciprocity. This perception of decline
is associated with a perception that garden yields are not keeping up with a growing population. To understand selfishness and why it might be perceived to be increasing, I describe how generosity is practiced. True generosity takes the form of a gift from which the giver abstains. This principle of outward transmission is a way of marking in practice the mutual indebtedness created through reciprocity. This mode of generous giving is a key element in the maintenance of relationships between lineages through lateral kinship and affinity. I suggest that generosity also structures all other social relationships in relation to the paramount standard of reciprocity among lineages. I look at the ethic of management of the annual harvest of feast yams. I show that generosity is the source of a principle of value which structures how people perceive their garden resources.

Innovations in gardening, like the adoption of foreign crops of lesser value, help people to accommodate the growing population, and appear to be largely successful. However, these new foods do not fit easily into the system of food values based on the yam as gift. I go on to suggest that changing gardening practices have exaggerated selfishness, turning it from a residual category of value into a substantial form of value which is opposed to generosity as reciprocity. For this reason, changes in gardening are interpreted as an increase in negative sociality, and the perception of this change gives a warrant for people to pursue cash earning and commodities as substantial forms of selfishness.

Having presented an analysis of changes in economic behavior in terms of reflexive perceptions of change, in the third chapter, I move to discuss the ways in which capitalist accumulation has taken hold in the Auhelawa economy. Despite the use of cash and commodities, Auhelawa economic activity remains very much socially embedded in relations of kinship. Individual accumulation through exchange is perceived to be morally
suspect. Nonetheless, many people like Lorenzo and Francis run relatively successful businesses through which they accumulate money and reproduce a fund of capital. Yet, while these businesses are somewhat successful, the frequent fundraising projects of local church congregations taken as a whole exceed them. I propose that these different modes of licit accumulation can be understood as strategies of reflexively embedding economic activities in different kinds of social relationships, each of which are based on different values. Entrepreneurial activity tends to be reflexively embedded in a network of matrikinship relationships. Accumulation through business is transformed into a communal asset which supports the lineage's reciprocal exchange obligations.

Conversely, fundraising is embedded in the relationships of the church congregation, imagined as an egalitarian fellowship based on common feeling. This feeling is expressed through unreciprocated gifts of charity. The funds accumulated through charity serve as a sign of the collective strength of the congregation. When accumulation is embedded in kinship, the instrumental value of capital is subordinated to the value of reciprocity between lineages. When accumulation is embedded in Christian relationships, it appears to transcend reciprocity and institute a new kind of value of generosity.

The fourth and fifth chapters open a new set of questions about how Auhelawa Christianity frames Auhelawa's relationship to a global, modern order. Overall, these chapters ask why it is that the narrative of modernity as linear progress came to be naturalized in Auhelawa, and what consequences this has for people's social life. The fourth chapter discusses the perception that Auhelawa society is in a social and material decline in terms of religious practices which constitute the congregation in relation to an imagined global Christian church. The discursive practice of the Sunday service, I argue,
is taken up as a prescriptive model of modern sociality and deployed in the context of community-based economic development projects to give ideological support to the aims of economic development. Sunday services enact a mode of relationship and situate it in terms of Christian narratives of salvation and millennial prophecy. They thus naturalize a sense of change as constant forward movement and associate it with the practical and social condition of church fellowship. Secular social life, in which there is little manifest physical change, is seen from a Christian perspective to be an obstacle to progress, or alternatively, a state of decline from a nostalgically recalled time of European missionary presence.

Similarly the fifth chapter examines the association between witchcraft and the wealth and technology of Europeans. Auhelawa witchcraft beliefs, much like those of the Azande of Sudan, and other well known ethnographic cases, are an epistemology of causes of misfortune, sickness and death grounded in the particular social situations engendered by the social order of kinship relations. Much like other societies in which people believe in witchcraft as an invisible causal force, Auhelawa believe that Europeans also possess witchcraft and through it have access to fabulous wealth and luxury, and fantastic powers through technology. Yet, unlike many other cases of modern witchcraft, Auhelawa believe that Europeans long ago renounced witchcraft in order to become Christians, and in so doing, revealed and made visible the instruments of witchcraft which is the fabulous wealth and fantastic technology of Western society. Auhelawa witches, by contrast, persist in hiding this wealth and technology and thus are holding back the transformation of Auhelawa into a Christian modern society. To interpret this situation, I look at the practical conditions of witchcraft confession and
accusation. In Auhelawa, witchcraft is handled through public meetings in which people discuss mutual obligations to one another, and eventually admit to the possibility that their moral failings may have contributed unconsciously to witchcraft attacks. In this way, witchcraft as epistemology is grounded in practices of collaborative reasoning in which people deal with moral ambiguities. I suggest that Christianity as a moral paradigm has emerged to provide people with new ways to think about their own and others' obligations and behaviors. Christianity also provides practical responses to witchcraft. In these ways, Christianity reshapes the epistemic conditions for witchcraft belief. Instead of it being a supernatural abstraction of social tensions, witchcraft is seen through Christianity to be demonic, evil, and a sign of heathen darkness. The imagined wealth and luxury of Western society thus provides a proof of the evil of witchcraft by inversion. Since Westerners are Christians, and since Christianity is good, their wealth and power is a visible sign of their renunciation of witchcraft, and proof that Auhelawa witches are blocking modernity's arrival.

The sixth chapter looks at how people draw upon Christianity to give a concrete form to the modern society they desire for themselves. I discuss the movement among some Auhelawa to change the customs of mortuary feasting from a ritual of reciprocal exchange and mourning taboo to a simple common meal in which food is freely shared among cognatic kin, no debts between lineages are incurred, and no mortuary taboos are observed. This mode of celebrating death, called masele (light), is deliberately crafted as the negation of Auhelawa custom. I argue that the negation of custom expresses a Christian social identity for Auhelawa because people's perceptions of mortuary ritual have shifted from a perspective based in reciprocity toward a perspective based on rules
which constrain the individual. Mortuary ritual in Auhelawa today, whether self-consciously Christian or not, is a site for the negotiation of two distinct paradigms, one based on relational ethic of kinship and reciprocal exchange, and the other based on the individual.

In conclusion, I revisit the paradoxes of intercultural contact and cultural change and ask if it is possible for a true "revolution in values," the emergence of a distinctly modern condition, to take place in Auhelawa (Dumont 1977: 7). Has Christianity led to a modern Auhelawa society? Over the course of the dissertation, I will argue that in order to understand the process of cultural change, one needs to examine reflexive perception of agency. In this way, I hope to have established that the process of change in culture is not predetermined, neither by a universal dialectic of history nor the insurmountable particularism of the cultural system. An Auhelawa modernity would only arise, then, as a fulfillment of Auhelawa's own reflexive perception of the trajectory of their history. Can this self-fulfilling prophecy of change be fully fulfilled in the sense that Christianity leads people to fully reimagine themselves as individuals? I conclude that Christianity gives people a way to see themselves as individuals, but it cannot make them into the kind of individuals that Christian culture values. Throughout the dissertation, I show that Christian practices are one mode of reflexive perception among many. Christianity becomes arguably a dominant mode of reflexivity. Yet its dominance in Auhelawa is not because it has displaced alternative modes of seeing oneself, but because of the dialogical connections it has been able to create between itself and these alternatives. While the resonance between Christianity's metanarratives of history and geography and people's experiences of change motivate people to transform their own way of life to be more in
harmony with their image of global modernity, it is also these dialogical resonances between Christianity and everyday life which limits the extent of the transformation. Christian selfhood in Auhelawa is so thoroughly defined in opposition to Auhelawa society that it cannot really ever do without it. Because all of the imagination of oneself as an individual takes place in conjunction with Christian modes of action and perception, the remainder of people's social experiences are associated with a Christian construct of tradition. This is why economic development and the annihilation of traditional mortuary feasts both provide such a rich religious imaginary. It allows people to conceptualize themselves as a community of Christian subjects. Without a reflexive perception of themselves as a Christian community, I argue, the Christian transformation of society will be forever incomplete.
Chapter 1. Memorials of Modernity

Temporalities of History

For more than a century, Auhelawa society has on many levels engaged in a thoroughgoing intercultural exchange with Westerners. Australian colonial administration and Christian missionary evangelism each separately made contact with Auhelawa in the late nineteenth century, and brought Western culture in contact with Auhelawa and their neighbors. What is remarkable about this engagement is that Auhelawa people themselves see the consequences of this engagement to be a kind of change in their way of life and hence, a change in themselves as well. Intercultural contact is represented as part of an unfolding historical narrative, broadly shared as background knowledge, and regularly retold to pass on to the next generation. In this chapter, I will show that the practices of encoding and circulating historical knowledge lead people in Auhelawa to perceive intercultural contact as cultural change.

Not only are Auhelawa convinced that intercultural contact has led to change, but they have further developed at least two different ways of talking about the kind of changes taking place. In Auhelawa, talk about the past can be done in different temporal registers. When talking about the recent past, people anchor events in relation to the establishment of new villages, the birth of relatives, and their own physical age. They also use common era years to locate events over the last century. When talking in terms of the great sweep of history, they commonly refer to two great epochs, "the time of cannibalism" and "the time of church," the latter being the present. More importantly, people's modes of organizing events in discourse also falls into at least two major
temporalities. When people talk about the sweep of their local history, they tend to characterize it in one of two different ways. On the one hand, people say that the everyday life and the "custom" of the people is gradually changing. Old ways are "fading" and new ways are emerging as a result of foreign influences. People act in new and idiosyncratic "styles," and they are more selfish and less willing to help neighbors, whereas in the past people would have had respect for others and had been more submissive to communal values. In this mode, people are gradually becoming other to themselves as elements of foreign cultures are incorporated into the local sphere. People describe this kind of change as a sort of mixing, not the mixing (vila) of ingredients, but the mixing (mikisi) of languages. As the language is self-evidently becoming hybridized through lexical borrowings, so too, Auhelawa reason, is today's culture obviously composed of ill-fitting pieces. This way of talking about change as a gradual mixing and confusion of order is one dominant temporality.

Another temporality treats change as an event of rupture. The past and the present are conceptualized as being separated by a wide and unbridgeable gulf. No part of the past can live on in the present, because the current era began at the moment when the old order was eradicated. Whereas in the alternative mode, people see others as making behavioral accommodations and compromises between the past and the present, in this mode no such possibility exists. Once new values replace old values, all other aspects of everyday life are immediately and totally transformed. The movement from the past to the present is a passage from "custom" to a Christian antitradition people term "light" (masele). While both of these registers foreground changes, they participate in two distinct temporalities, one of continuity and one of discontinuity. Each temporality
privileges its own kind of change as well. Whereas a continuous temporality emphasizes gradual development and smooth succession through time, its inverse, discontinuous temporality, emphasizes events that rupture the normal order and changes in which the past is replaced by the future. When people think about and talk about intercultural relations, each of these temporalities can be posited, and each conditions the way people understand the influence of foreign cultures as being part of a historical succession or replacement.

The problem of intercultural interaction is one of the foundational problems of anthropology. Boas (1920) thought transcultural borrowings were a decisive proof of the internal integrity of culture as an organized system. More than being mere diffusion of portable cultural traits, Boas argued that any new artifact, practice or idea that a culture acquired for itself would be refashioned to suit the conditions of the borrowers (ibid.: 315). Each culture thus "has its own unique history, dependent partly on the peculiar inner development of the social group, and partly on the foreign influences to which it has been subjected" (ibid.: 317). The problem of intercultural contact is also once again the chief interest of anthropology as anthropologists attempt to situate people everyday life in relation not only to culture but also the experiences of colonialism and globalization and their concomitant economic, political and social changes.  

One of the most influential theories of the significance of intercultural contact has been advanced by Marshall Sahlins. Drawing mainly on cases of interactions between Europeans and Polynesians on the expanding imperial frontier, Sahlins argued that "the transformation of a culture is a mode of its reproduction" (1985: 138). In his study of the colonial history of Hawai'i, Sahlins demonstrates that actors applied local cultural categories of meaning
to assign value to new foreign elements, and they pursued relations with the foreigners insofar as it served local interests. Pointing to the history of Hawai'i and other Polynesian societies' contact with Europeans, Sahlins demonstrates that cultures absorb foreign influences and divert them to accomplish locally valued ends. Thus, even though societies are always changing through intercultural contact, he argues that it is not inevitable that this change will lead to the assimilation of one culture by the other. Indeed, Sahlins has argued, intercultural contact tends to contribute to the continued vitality and efflorescence of cultural systems (Sahlins 1999). Sahlins's interest in intercultural encounters goes beyond Boas in some ways too. He is interested in the relationship between empirical events and the structure of the cultural order, and to an extent the relationship between structure and agency. His central claim is that people can only apprehend events in terms of a prevailing shared structure of meanings, and as such can only act in relation to events as they are culturally meaningful. Thus, actors tend to respond to events in ways that render them as reinstatements of the typical pattern. One's conception of past history would tend to be a reflection of the prevailing order as well (cf. Sahlins 1985: 50). Hence, although Sahlins sees that relationships between cultures are constructed through specific practical engagements, the agency of the local actor plays a relatively minor role in constituting that intercultural relationship in a particular form. Because actors relate to foreign cultures according to cultural patterns of perception and meaning, an intercultural relationship is in Sahlins's eyes a subset of a cultural system.

Following Sahlins, many have investigated the way actors creatively engage with foreign cultures (Bashkow 2006, Merlan 1998, Rutherford 2003). While many of these studies support Sahlins's overall claim that cultural conjunctures tend to contribute to
cultural reproduction, there are also a few notable cases in which the intercultural zone is fraught with contradiction, miscommunication and unintended consequences (Robbins 2004, Robbins and Wardlow, eds. 2005, Wardlow 2006, West 2006). Each in their own way, these studies point to the need to for a theory of agency that explains how people negotiate cultural systems, bringing them into conjunctive relationship. In his study of one Papua New Guinea society, for instance, Robbins describes how Urapmin sought out Christianity on their own. Initially interested in what Christian practices might be able to provide for them, they eventually adopted the religion as a complete cultural system. They were unable to assimilate aspects of Christianity to local categories. Instead they must maintain two separate spheres, each ordered by distinct values. Unsatisfied with the limits of each culture, they oscillate between the two, and struggle to find a way to finally replace the old culture with the new religion. Urapmin as agents seem to act in ways that do not reinstate and reproduce the structure through which they understand foreign influences. They seem, contrary to Sahlins's expectations, to be able to imagine their lives from a completely different position and act accordingly to destroy what they would otherwise consider to be normal and natural. In adopting Christianity, Urapmin constitute their intercultural relationship as one of change. They themselves take up the forms of foreign culture, yet they do not assimilate or appropriate them to past patterns. As such, Urapmin stand as a kind of paradox of cultural change, both apparently confirming and contradicting the Sahlins model of intercultural relationships.

This paradox of change is also a paradox of intercultural relationships in general. On the one hand, cultures are not isolated, but are constantly engaged with each other. Actors have the capacity, alone or together, to make contact with people of other cultures
and engage in communication. Also, anthropologists have shown that this contact and 
communication is bidirectional, and does not merely consist of the encroachment and 
expansion of the powerful against the weak. On the other hand, cultures are coherent and 
total systems and hence their engagement entails a degree of incommensurability. If one 
accepts both premises—intercultural interaction and the totality of an individual 
culture—then one must see communication between cultures as though it were a special 
case of communication within a culture. It is not possible for actors to engage other 
cultures extraculturally. Does intercultural interaction tell one anything of significance 
about the intercultural relationship itself? Moreover, can one in this view comprehend 
why some cultures reproduce themselves through intercultural engagement while others 
are transformed by it?

The Auhelawa case is helpful for exploring further this problem of cultural 
change. Firstly, in Auhelawa the intercultural relationship with the West is not recent. 
Hence one wants to know not so much why Auhelawa pursue this relationship as much as 
how did this particular relationship establish itself as a permanent feature of their social 
world. Secondly, and more importantly, Auhelawa perceive the changes caused by their 
intercultural relationship in at least two distinct, complementing ways. Change is 
perceived in terms of two different temporalities, and hence intercultural relationships are 
also framed in terms of two different temporalities. Auhelawa sometimes think of their 
engagement with Western culture as leading to gradual change and at other times as 
leading to abrupt transformation. This raises the question of what governs a person's 
choice of how to represent time. One can shift the discussion away from the question of 
what structures the conjuncture of cultures in a given historical event to the question of
how people fashion their collective experiences of contact into different kinds of history, and in doing so, argue why certain events are figured as ruptures and others are recuperated into the normal order. In Auhelawa, one has to deal with not only the fact that actors constitute their intercultural relationships in their practice, but also the fact that they have a repertoire of modes of intercultural communication. Auhelawa culture contains the possibility of at least two different intercultural connections. If we understand what structures actors' choices in their practices of memory, then, I argue, we will be closer to seeing how actors shape the course of cultural change.

Anthropology's longstanding interest in the cultural construction of time has prepared the ground for this kind of question by defining temporality as a shared representation of time (e.g. Evans-Pritchard 1940, Gellner 1964, Munn 1986). Yet a strictly culturalist approach to temporality does not help explain why, as in Auhelawa, people seem to be able to adopt alternative temporal frames in their practice. It is better to consider temporality as the reflexive awareness of actions relative to the movement of time. Every event or action has a meaning which derives from the cultural context, and hence can be read for that meaning by members of a culture. Rather than seeing this meaning as being fundamentally conventional, another approach to communication have tended to see cultural meaning as arising from a dialectic of semiosis and metasemiosis (e.g. Agha 2007, Bateson 1972, Keane 2007, Lee 1997, Lucy 1993, Silverstein 1993, Stasch 2003, Urban 2001). This approach starts from the premise that all systems of communication contain a reflexive dimension, and that every communicative act takes place within a particular metacommunicative context on which it depends for its successful reception. Communicative action has meaning in relation then to
metacommunication, a way of establishing why something means what it means, and has the value that it has. One example of this kind of reflexivity is the explicit representation of language, especially of how it relates to its speakers, termed language ideology (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). People's explicit representations and valuation of linguistic variation of dialect within a speech economy, for instance, often taking the form of stereotypes about speakers are a kind of metacommunication. The circulation of these representations serves to naturalize social structural inequalities which correlate with linguistic varieties, and can be said to help reproduce them in that way. Language ideologies are thus a good example of the nature of actors' reflexivity about communication. Actors do not possess a pure, abstract, internal awareness of linguistic differences, nor any aspect of communication. Language ideologies illustrate that the reflexive mediation of communication as such is fundamentally social and situated, and hence an inherently cultural kind of reflexive consciousness. Moreover, language ideologies also illustrate that metacommunicative mediation of communication takes place in its encoding and circulation among participants in communication. We can see metacommunication then as a class of communicative acts in its own right, encompassing both explicit discursive representation and forms of framing communication in interaction as each kinds of metapragmatics. Temporalizing practices are one such instance of a metacommunicative dimension of communicative behavior. Temporalizing practices frame and position action in terms of temporal categories. They provide actors with a way of communicating the temporality of their communication action.

The telling of history serves as an excellent illustration of temporalizing practice. Many scholars have examined cultural practices of telling history and in general conclude
that such practices are both situated in specific social contexts and serve as way people use to mediate and manage social relationships (e.g. Battaglia 1990, Cole 2001, Ho 2006). As a mode of discourse, history creates a shared frame of reference by connecting people's present experiences to past events. In this way, history as a body of knowledge not only exists in relation to a community, but can be said to constitute that community by positing a mutual relationship of its members to a founding moment. Furthermore, the circulation of history constitutes social relationships in that it provides a shared symbolic language of such events in which people can represent their relationships to one another, manipulate and reproduce them. In this respect, the practices of telling history are an example of a reflexive temporalizing practice.

In Auhelawa, the reflexive perception of historical time arises from the dialectic interplay of memory and memorialization. Memory is the explicit recall of the past to explain and give meaning to present experience. Memorialization is the encoding of present experiences in the form of public, conventional signs. People create memorials in order to give a concrete form to subjective experience, thereby making it communicable to others. By erecting memorials of the past, people represent the relationship between past and present in a symbolic form. Memory, conversely, decodes memorials into discourse, making its symbolism explicit. The cycle of memory and memorialization is best illustrated in the Auhelawa practice of matrilineal kinship. I describe how people conceptualize kinship and how they memorialize matrilineal kin in an effort to distinguish it from other, lesser kinds of relationships. I also describe the elaboration of these memorials in genealogical narratives. I then describe how these practices of memory and memorialization are used in tandem as a metasocial practice through which
people creatively extend matrilineal kinship beyond the local community and their immediate living memory. These metasocial practices also impose a constraint on the reflexive conception of their kinship relationships. Because genealogical narratives link people to each other through the past, they create a sense of history as being continuous flow. Furthermore, as people see matriliny as a product of overt acts of memorialization, they assume that in the continuous flow of history, people naturally "forget" their social ties and relationships naturally change.

The representation of kinship as history is the predominate reflexive mode of sociality. People use practices of memory and memorialization to understand their social relationships as historical formations. They thus come to think of history as not only continuous movement, but also a succession of human actors traces of whose agency remains in the present in clear, public, symbolic forms. Reflexive historicization of this kind is one of the main methods of settling conflict and negotiating people's relationships with one another, and pervades people's everyday life and thinking. Yet, despite its dominance, the historical mode of self-awareness is constrained and conditioned by the nature of its practice itself and as such people's normal way of explaining their experiences through a history of human agency cannot answer fundamental cosmological questions. The continuous temporal frame defines itself in opposition to the alternative, a history of discontinuity and rupture, and therefore depends on it. In Auhelawa, people's reliance on a continuous temporality to comprehend the social world leads them to posit the existence of a world of nonhuman agency in the margins of memorialized, public history. This genre of knowledge is represented by legends, stories which explain features of the natural landscape as the memorials of nonhuman agency. At the limit of their
historical consensus, legends are a way people have of reflexively positing an original moment beyond history. This reflexive practice also imposes a complementary constraint on what people may think. In legends, that which lies outside of memorialized history people assume marks an event of rupture.

I argue that the history and legend help one to understand how the initial contacts with the Australian colonial administration and the first Australian missionaries are recalled and rendered as events. I find that these contacts are remembered in one of two ways, reflecting the two temporalities of continuity and discontinuity. The arrival of colonial officers is recalled as bolstering the power of a local leader whereas the arrival of missionaries is remembered as a moment of divine intervention. I argue that these two contrasting cases illustrate how reflexive practices of temporality condition how experiences of change are perceived and evaluated. While the dominant tendency for Auhelawa is to use genealogical practices to construct a history out of their past experiences, the limits of this mode of thinking calls forth the possibility of an inverse temporal frame of discontinuity. All past experience contains two potential temporalizations, either continuity or discontinuity, and hence there are no necessary consequences to any particular past experience. Auhelawa's encounter with Europeans, in people's memory, can be interpreted as being either a smooth historical succession or an abrupt epochal replacement. It is the way one remembers these moments that gives each event its place in history.

**History as a Reflexive Sociality**

Auhelawa constitute matriliney, the basis for the primary social units, through the
temporalizing practice of telling histories. This reflexive enactment of social relationships gives rise to a distinctively historicized social landscape in which an extensive regional kin network is conceptualized as the trace of ancestral migration. In general, societies in Milne Bay Province, especially in south Normanby, have been described as open-ended and fluid, and in no way bounded or localized (Lepowski 1993, Macintyre 1983). People live in settlements dispersed continuously along the coasts of the island. They maintain wide ranging network of trade partners in many communities on Normanby and other islands. The area is well known for long-distance subsistence trade and ceremonial exchange through dispersed networks of partners, the most celebrated of these being Malinowski’s Kula ring of exchanges of shell valuables (1922). Auhelawa society then is at best a relative designation; Auhelawa occupy a node in a social network of remarkably large regional scale.

Auhelawa explicitly represent the regional scale of their social structure in terms of the migratory history of clans. While the main local units of Auhelawa society are small, landholding, corporate matrilineages (susu), nearly all of these lineages claim to be the descendants of migrants who settled in Auhelawa and were adopted by other lineages. A lineage forms an association (bu'una) with another lineage on the basis of putative descent, as well as a belief that the lineages originally migrated to Auhelawa from the same place, or the adoption of the ancestors of one by the other. Auhelawa people, as throughout the region, also claim affiliation to a totemic bird, and believe that they share distant matrilineal ancestry with people of the same bird. The distribution of totemic birds throughout the region is evidence, Auhelawa say, of past migrations. People of the same lineage, of associated lineages, and of the same bird are said to have the "same blood"
('wahina ehebo), and be members of "one group" (boda ehebo). All of these kinds of relationship are expressed in terms of historical knowledge of one's matrilineal ancestors and the path of their migrations. This mode of symbolizing relationships contrasts with an exogamous sphere of bilateral kinship in which people think about their relationships in terms ongoing cycles of reciprocal exchange. The main idiom for all kin relationships is 'memory' (nuwatu-'avivini, think-hold). Behaviors which are appropriate to a kin role are described as a person's 'memory' of their obligations and the relationship. Failure to behave appropriately is described as a 'forgetting' or 'ignorance' (nuwa-pwanopwano) of the relationship. While all relationships are elicited through memories in this sense, matrilineal relationships are selected for additional work. Relationship through women are memorialized through symbolic acts, and these memorials are the basis for the reproduction of a collective memory, and hence the basis for transmission of a lineal identity. The sum product of these practices of memory and memorialization is a shared body of historical knowledge of social relationships which forms the basis for people's everyday sociality.

Tetela, glossed as 'history,' is the explicit discursive recall of a shared memory. It explains present arrangements and relationships with reference to the past. Besides genealogical narratives, many aspects of everyday life "have a 'history' [tetela]," that is, there is a tetela narrative which explains what it is. This history may not be generally known. Often the history of something can only be given by those who "know the history." These people usually claim a connection to that history because it is a part of their lineage's history. For example, the history of a variety of sago palm is known and told by the lineage who claims that their founding ancestors introduced it. Most histories
of things are aspects of histories of people, and in general, when Auhelawa think of the historical dimension to their everyday life, they conceptualize that history as being principally the accumulation of traces of human agency. Hence a genealogical narrative which recounts a lineage's founding ancestors, their origins, their migration through the region and arrival in Auhelawa and establishment of relationships with others is the main branch of history from which other kinds of historical narrative derive. Narrative history of all kinds ultimately derives from the repository of shared memories of accumulated relationships.

Lineage histories begin with the name of an apical ancestress, called the mumuga. People who are the descendants of the mumuga through women form a maximal matrilineage called a susu, often named for the apical ancestress. Others who trace their link to the mumuga through men, while members of other matrilineages, have one of three degrees of lateral kinship with the current members of the lineage. Everyone else is a 'stranger,' also termed mumuga. People who are mumuga may marry whereas people who share a degree of kinship should avoid marriage. Within the sphere of lateral kinship, people naturally forget relationships with every passing generation. Matrimonial alliances between lineages produce sets of cross-cousins who exchange with one another. The children of cross-cousins however have a weaker relationship in the next generation. Their children would barely recognize one another. Among matrikin, people often voice an analogous concern that sublineages will fission and split off from one another, "forgetting" their relationship. To solve this problem, practices of history attempt to reproduce matrilineal identity against the perceived trend toward the gradual fading of kinship.
Lineage histories always narrate the migration of a person or persons who eventually arrive in Auhelawa and found the lineage. The home of these founders is called the dalava watubo (origin village) of the lineage, its 'ebe-lau-ma (instrument for coming). Typically, the founding ancestress, or in some cases her mother or grandmother, leaves her home and migrates to another place. In many stories, this departure is precipitated by a specific event such as a famine, a fight between co-residents, a dispute over a share of meat, or most commonly the woman is swept away by the tide while traveling in a canoe or digging for shellfish on the beach. Adrift at sea, she peregrinates to Normanby. Usually wherever she lands, she is taken in by people already living there and given a place to live. She passes this land on to her female children from whom come the lineage's segments. After this narration of migration, the history shifts to a recitation of the names of the descendants of women of the lineage.

The "full version" of lineage histories is in fact rarely recited in its entirety. I requested lineage elders to recite their complete lineage history in the process of collecting genealogies. In actual practice, people think of the history of their lineage as existing in fragments of which senior members each possess different parts. Senior members of a lineage cooperatively synthesize their knowledge of history to transmit some or all of it to younger members. While I was never able observe the instruction of this information to young people, my impression from talking to people about how they gained their knowledge was that it was itself passed on in fragments over a period of time by multiple mothers' and mothers' brothers, and was not done in a single sitting or through a formal process. Many informants said that they themselves had to undertake an active process of "research" in which they traded on various kinship connections to gain
access to knowledgeable people and interviewed them about what they knew. Lineage history is then best described as a body of information that is broadly shared among members of a lineage, yet neither universally accessible nor forming a solid consensus. It is not held all in one place, nor does everyone know the same things that others do. Rather knowledge is distributed across a network of people and chained together through discrete points of agreement. The transmission and circulation of this knowledge also reflects its distributed character. Lineages transmit history by making memorials (Figure 1). People convert their knowledge from a subjective phenomenon into an artifact that can serve as a public symbol. The pieces of lineage history are each tied to particular memorials which they serve to explain. The remembering of historical knowledge about a specific memorial converts it from a public symbol to a story that connects the present to the past. These memorializations take a number of forms.

Lineages memorialize ancestors in their history through namesaking. Every person has a personal name which is given by the mother in honor of a matrilineal ancestor. The child becomes an 'aivelaha of the ancestor, which was explained as meaning that the child is the ancestor's namesake in the sense of being a successor. Since as a rule names are transmitted to matrilineal descendants, a person's name is thought of as belonging to the lineage and that members of one descent group draw from a common stock to name their children. A child's name is granted by the "owner of the name" on the request of the mother. The owner is either someone so named, or a direct descendant of the person who last had the name. In my genealogies, I found only a very few instances in which a mother named a daughter after herself. Rather the dominant preference is for children to be named after grandmothers, maternal uncles and aunts and mother's
maternal uncles and aunts, if not more distant ancestors, thereby incorporating more of
the lineage's history through a larger cycle of names. Another instance of naming as
memorialization exists between people and sites within the lineage's territory. Gardening
places, prominent rocks and villages are sometimes named in honor of people who are
associated with them. Conversely, people sometimes become the 'aivelahe of ancestors
through the sites named in their honor. In other words, the sites named for people can
serve to memorialize the name for later transmission to a person. Similarly, villages can
be named for the dalava watubo of the lineage to remind the occupants of their ancestral
connection to another place. As 'aivelahe names can demonstrate that people belong to a
lineage, so too does the naming of sites for people and historical places create an
association between the lineage and an object which is both a property claim and a
memorial of the past.

History, genealogy and name transmission are brought together in lineage burial
sites, especially the pre-colonial skull caves and newer European-style cemeteries of the
contemporary era. Before the practice was suppressed by the colonial administration, a
lineage's burial workers would detach the head of their deceased kinsperson, remove the
flesh and then ceremonially enshrine the skull in a cave deep inside the uncultivated
inland forest of the lineage's territory. In the past, when the caves were actively
maintained, skulls were decorated and placed in neat columns representing the segments
of the lineage. Elders of the lineage would visit the caves with other members and refer to
the arrangement of the skulls to narrate the genealogy of the lineage and the relationships
between the lineage segments. One of the first policies of the early colonial
administration was the suppression of traditional burial and requirement that people be
buried outside of their village in deep holes in the ground. Auhelawa lineages gradually established new cemeteries for their members within their territories but outside of their villages. Today, several generations since the creation of these cemeteries, a standard plan has emerged. People are buried head pointing eastward and feet pointing toward the prominent western mountain Bwebweso in the center of Normanby, where it is believed the spirit dwells after death. Graves are arranged in north-south rows according to generation. Cemeteries have taken over the function of the skull cave in that they symbolize in a physical form the subjective memory of the lineage's historical narrative.

People overtly act to create and maintain their lineage's history in resistance to a general tendency for people to "forget" their relationships. With their relatives through fathers and affines people use reciprocal exchange to impose mutual debts which people feel morally obligated to "remember." With their matrikin, by contrast, people use public signs of their shared history to remind them of their solidarity. They erect memorials to the past through naming practices and burial sites, thereby objectifying subjective phenomena. Through the practice of memorialization people encode their history into symbols, and by explaining memorials, people decode symbols into history. Memory then is a complex act consisting of two distinct semiotic practices. First, memorialization converts genealogical history, a predominantly sequential discourse into a symbolic form. Second, remembering makes obvious the symbolism of the memorial through a narrative exposition. It converts the memorial from a symbolic mode in which the sign stands for the past into an indexical mode in which the sign links to it. Similarly, memorialization turns a temporal order into a system of spatial relationships, and remembering temporalizes that spatial system into a linear, and lineal, history.
The spatialized and symbolized form of matriliny is valued over the temporalized form because it is presumed to be more permanent than subjective memory. It also allows for people to manipulate their relationships in a way they could not otherwise and to create a wide-ranging network of matrikin. Remembering not only constitutes lineages by temporalizing space, but it also links together a dispersed and fragmented landscape into a coherent, continuous flow of time that encompasses many discrete lineal identities. Bits of historical knowledge that provide corresponding explanations serve thus to confirm one another and to prove a relationship of shared history among people. A dispersed matrikin relationship called bu'una is something people infer from parallel lines of history. The basis for such a relationship lies not in people's mutual recognition, but their higher order recognition that they possess pieces of the same history, and their distinct knowledges provide corresponding interpretations of memorialization. Bu'una is usually glossed as "same clan" in English, or explained as existing between people who are "boda ehebo" (one group), but might be more precisely rendered as "association." Through the reflexive practice of memory, it is possible for people to discover their matrilineal connections through their mutually confirming interpretations of memorials. Indeed, people assume that their matrilineal kin are dispersed throughout the region and are for the most part unknown potential kin waiting to be discovered. Matrilineal bird totems are one form that this potential matriliny takes, as are shared migratory origins. Auhelawa lineages each have one of six bird species as a totem, all of which occur throughout the region. Auhelawa believe that people of the same bird are distant matrilineal kin even if they cannot reckon the precise genealogical connections. Similarly, people of a shared migratory origin are descendants from a common matrilineal ancestor. As such, lineages
whose histories start from the same origin are bu'una. In many cases these lineages each claim to have buried dead in a single, older common cemetery or skull cave. They thus accept that they have different stories about common memorials as evidence of their kinship even when their precise genealogical relationship is not known. They similarly invoke their use of the same 'aivelaha names, which they interpret to mean that in the past a common line of ancestors transmitted names to each of the two groups. Most lineages in Auhelawa had bu'una lineages within their immediate vicinity as well as at various nearby places around Normanby and other islands. When bu'una lineages discover their common kinship by decoding memorials, they recapitulate that relationship through another cycle of memorialization of their discovery. Bu'una pass on 'aivelaha names to each other's children, ensuring that in the future these names will prove a connection of kinship. They may also bury dead in each other's cemeteries to the same effect. Through memorials, kinship is allowed to extend beyond mere genealogy, and matriliny is seen as something more permanent than other kinds of filiation. The reflexive practice of kinship builds a complex regional social universe, one that governed the well known interisland trade and exchange of this region. The regional landscape is viewed as the trace of people's settlement. By using cultural practices for researching their own kinship, people can discover new opportunities for relationships and extend their networks in many directions.10

By the same token, when people mediate their social relationships in these ways, the nature of their reflexivity places constraints on the sociality they create. People today move in the spaces carved out by the agency of their ancestors. The inferences of relatedness are premised on a temporality of continuously flowing time in which changes
are continually and gradually unfolding. Within this movement, social relationships are further assumed to be circumscribed by people's finite consciousness of them. People may relate for a time until one "forgets" the bond and the relationship lapses. Thus sociality is assumed to be fragile and people need to cement their ties by erecting memorials to their relationships in order to reproduce them. In the next sections I discuss how the these reflexive temporalizing practices and their assumptions extend to people's perceptions of their social life in general and especially how they interpret their engagement with Europeans and Christianity over the past century.

**Mysterious Legends and Ancient Histories**

Auhelawa think that many different phenomena besides kinship are historical formations, and more specifically, are traces in the present of human agency of the past. People need not explicate a specific memorial to demonstrate its historical dimension. Often phenomena were treated as signs of the past in themselves. For instance, people took pains to point out the "real words" for things to me, often saying that words in common use were in fact loan words from neighboring language groups. Corrupted forms in many cases were said to have been introduced by migrated lineages. Similarly, many apparently indigenous food crops were attributed to their recent introduction by in-marrying people of other places. Although not all of these fact claims were, if you will, verified by tetela narratives, there was an assumption that they could be. These sorts of claims were a special kind of historical inference, a retrojection of the past on the basis of the memorialized history of lineages, but not itself encoded in its own oral traditions. People gave these inferences a high degree of plausibility. They formed shared
commonplaces of understanding about the past even in the absence of the testimony of a formal oral history. This illustrates how routine temporalizing practices also serve as the basis for inference about the world, what I would call a temporalizing strategy for the reflexive interpretation of experience.

The assumption that people are surrounded by the trace of history corresponds to another assumption that the world is always in a state of change. People often reasoned about changes to come on the basis of their knowledge of history. Like retrojective inferences, many of these projective inferences had become familiar and broadly shared ideas. For example, while I was learning about gardening, informants often told me that they thought the beginning of the rainy season was gradually shifting later in the year and disrupting the traditional pattern of work. People similarly remarked frequently on the widely held perception of a growing population, declining fertility of gardening soil, diminishing forest reserves, rising sea level and increasing coastal erosion. These perceptions were not simply conditioned by people's understanding of change. People did not merely accept them as articles of belief, but more like tentative impressions that seemed confirmed in people's experience and reflection. There is no doubt some evidence for most of them. What I want to suggest is that these beliefs also show that temporalizing strategies are especially productive of meaning in Auhelawa. People cannot help but speculate about the causes of their experiences and rely upon historical background knowledge to make inferences. Phenomena that could be potential clues of change are always noticed and elaborated, and ultimately confirm a deeply held sense of a transient nature to the world, and that one's current circumstances are merely one episode in an unfolding narrative. Seeing the world in terms of change is a learned habit
which is derived, I argue, from the reflexive temporalization of social relationships in genealogy.

Despite the fact that a continuous temporality is the dominant assumption in people's speculation about change, people's way of knowing about history is limited to explaining the clear, public symbols as traces of their human authors. The collective knowledge of tetela cannot inform people's judgments about everything they experience, or help to answer questions about ultimate causes. The alternative knowledge practice of vedevedede (legends) fills in this epistemological gap. Vedevedede are the opposite of tetela because tetela always presumably refer to real ancestors whereas vedevedede explain natural landscape features as the vague trace of nonhuman agency. Both are concerned with decoding present phenomena as signs for the past, but vedevedede concerns natural signs as marks of nonhuman agents and tetela concerns conventional, human made artifacts as symbols for social relationships. Vedevedede describe "bush rangers," as they are sometimes called in English, supernatural beings who live in the uncultivated bush of a lineage's territory. For instance, one legend says that crystalline white stones are the leavings of the bush spirit Tomodulele. Other vedevedede leave no visible memorial. Their existence is posited, and it is said that only those with "clear eyes" (an idiom for magical vision) can see them. For instance, one particularly well known vedevedede describes a supernatural woman named Sinenipu'ona'ona who lived on the slopes of Hobiya. A man went to his garden and accidentally discovered the woman's house. He invited her to live with him in his village as his wife. When they arrived, she set to work cooking food to give the husband's family (the typical service for a new bride). One of the husband's kinswomen peeked inside the cooking pot and saw
that the woman was only cooking bush greens, not tubers. She started to gossip about how awful the woman was for serving them only greens. The woman overheard how she was being mocked, retreated to her home in the bush and blocked the path to the husband's village by vines so thick they could not be penetrated. Her village remains there to this day, but no one has been able to find it again. Their memorials blocked or absent, these legends mark a rupture in the continuity of historical time. Whereas tetela confirm themselves through memorials, vedevedede like the story of the bush woman are mysterious because their memorials have faded from view.

There is no evidence to be seen, and only the story remains, as people say. This points to the main difference between vedevedede and tetela as people understand it, which is properly seen as a difference in their capacity to be converted between semiotic media. Vedevedede are anchored in the present not by human made memorials but by opaque signs which resist conversion from a spatial medium into a temporal one. Thus they are disconnected from the historicized landscape of normal sociality in a double sense. First, they cannot be converted into the indexical chains of causation that make up the narratives of human histories. Second, in their spatial realizations, they are weak vehicles for the creation of relationships of correspondence and hence they generally lack the capacity to generate new relationships. As noted, some vedevedede are memorialized by an absent presence or their memorial lies behind a blocked path. Vedevedede thus occupy the margins of historical time as Auhelawa understand it. Explication of them relies upon speculation and the positing of an isolated cause.

Despite this, vedevedede are by no means insignificant in relation to historical memory. For one thing, they are not rigidly distinguished on the basis of truth value (cf.
Wiessner and Tumu 1998). Each is true, but in different ways. Each helps people to understand their relationships to each other, but through different semiotic mediations. In some cases, the explication of a landmark with a legend of magical transformation can be as convincing a basis for a claim to ownership as a narrative of genealogical succession, memorial stones and boundary markers. However, vedevedede also create the possibility of doubt in that they reveal the limit of people's ability to construct continuous and linear history from available evidence. Many legendary memorials are explained by a story, but the story does not connect the memorial of nonhuman agency to the memorials of human agency through which Auhelawa understand present social arrangements. In this way, the temporal rhetoric of legends provides an alternative temporalizing strategy by which people fashion events of rupture in the construction of recent history. If tetela give rise to a continuous temporality, vedevedede give rise to a discontinuous temporality.

Continuous time is experienced when memorializations of the past are clear, visible, accessible, and public and provide for a general consensus about the present order of things and how it came to be. Discontinuous time is experienced when these conditions are not met, that is, in the absence of clear memorialization in which signs are read as a mysterious and unexplainable trace of past nonhuman agency. A mysterious vedevedede whose memorializing traces are blocked or invisible is an example of the extreme form of this alternative possible temporality.

While for the most part the two alternative temporalities derive from distinct knowledge practices, many stories of the past combine elements of vedevedede and tetela in their explanations, and frame events in terms of both temporalities. Some examples of the hybrid temporality of history can be seen in Auhelawa historical speculation about
both the peopling of Normanby Island, traditional cannibalism and warfare, and the
arrival of Europeans. Auhelawa do not tell a story of the creation of humans. Latterly
people say it was created by God as described in the Book of Genesis. Closer to home,
the ultimate origin of Auhelawa society is a subject of retrojective inference. Some
people told me of a "time of peace" in which people traveled around, "looked for
villages," and most of the island was unoccupied. Nothing in particular is remembered
about this period except that there was an absence of the warfare and cannibal raids
which are said to have characterized the subsequent period. Some informants interpreted
it as the scattering of humanity after the Fall of Babel. At some later point, there was a
famine caused by a drought in Auhelawa, an event described by the tetela of several
lineages. When people's gardens failed, many fled to other places where food was still
available. Also many people said that it was during this famine that people engaged in
cannibalism for the first time. Warriors raided other villages and captured people to be
eaten. This historical speculation is not a story about the past in itself, like a lineage
migration narrative. Rather it is a retrojection that emerges from the sum of historical
knowledge in general circulation. Since everyone's lineage describes a migration from
elsewhere to Normanby, then there must be some time before everyone migrated to
Normanby. In this way, the positing of a "time of peace" is an illustration of how the
reflective practices of history gives rise to a particular sense of the flow of time. In this
case, the absence of information about the ultimate origins of people leads people to posit
an origin point. Since many tetela mention migrations prompted by famine and cannibal
raids, then people also reason that these individual dislocations must have all themselves
been part of one big cataclysm. These inferences lead people to speak of the recent pre-
contact past as a distinct epoch, "the time when people ate people" (hauga tomowa hi-'ai-'ai).

One story from the cannibal time tells of a famous warrior of Auhelawa named Sanebo. Sanebo is an ancestor of the Magetuwa lineage. In this story, Sanebo rallied his allies up and down the Auhelawa coast, leading them to chase the Dobuans and confront them in the sea in a pitched battle with spears. Because the Auhelawa could maneuver more quickly in their canoes of lighter wood, they managed to capsize most of the invaders' canoes and take captive their crews. Besides one who demonstrated that he was bu'unu, all the captives were distributed to each of the allies of the Auhelawa. While other battles are recalled, this narrative of Sanebo is the most elaborated and best known. It is also in a sense the story of the last battle, and the completion of the cycle of negative reciprocity between these two traditional enemies. One informant, B., whose father was considered to be an expert teller of this story said that after the battle, William Bromilow, the founder of the Australian Methodist mission in Papua, brought Christianity to Dobu. The converted warriors of Dobu went to Auhelawa and paid compensation as a penance for their warmongering, bringing warfare to an end.

Sanebo lived out his retirement in his village of Magetuwa. Besides his grave erected by his kin, Sanebo has no other memorial in his village. Rather people remembered him with reference to the remains of a post of his house in Magetuwa. B. took me to the site of the post, just off the main path along the beach near his village. Nothing was immediately visible, but he and his nephew, John, my research assistant, cleared away weeds and grass until they found a vague circle of stones. B. explained that when he was a child, he remembered seeing the post standing where Sanebo had planted
it. Gradually it sank into the ground until it vanished from sight. B. pointed to the cleared spot and said that this is where he had marked the location of the post in the past when it could still be seen. John and B. rearranged some of the stones to define the circle more clearly before we left.

A memorial that gradually disappears is a motif of some vedevedede, and suggests the way in which these stories seem to present a vanishing past. The "bush rangers" themselves are also said to be disappearing. The story of Sanebo, too, sits between history and legend. As a figure of the past, Sanebo sits within multiple temporalities depending on how his story is told. He is considered to be an ancestor of Magetuwa, and is memorialized by his grave as well as his 'aivelaha in the lineage there. Yet, among his descendants, it is not precisely clear how he is related to them. They trace the descent of their lineage from a migrant to Auhelawa, but do not know or remember in their genealogy whether the warrior was one of her descendants, or perhaps the descendant of a bu'una lineage which has since died out and whose village they have taken over. Within a line of succession there exists also a possibility for replacement of one by another. Vanishing memorials iconize this possibility and express the temporal ambivalence of Sanebo's memory. His place in history eludes memory because the signs of his presence are gradually disappearing. Indeed, it is precisely this ambiguity that makes Sanebo a pivotal figure in the history of Auhelawa's contact with Europeans. The telling of stories about the arrival of Europeans contain temporalizations of intercultural contact each of which depend on a relationship to Sanebo and the era of cannibal warfare he represents.
Two Memories of First Contact

Warfare died out in Auhelawa, according to this story, about the same time as the arrival of Methodist mission and the colonial administration. Auhelawa establishment of relationships with each of these institutions is described in separate stories of different historical personalities. These stories also each reflect discontinuous and continuous temporalities in the way they figure events in history, and thus each give a particular picture of society today. As lineage histories and inferred prehistories help people to figure out their relationships with each other, the stories of government and missionary first contacts are a reflexive mode of mediating people's relationships with dimdims, that is, Europeans, Australians and other whites. Dimdims are tacitly recognized to have migrated from somewhere else. Indeed, in B.'s description of the "time of peace," he said that even dimdims traveled through the region looking for places to live. Contact with the colonial administration is recalled through a story of one man's adoption of dimdims and diversion of their powers to his purposes. This contrasts with stories about missionaries in which their arrival is a rendered as a rupture in time, a gap in historical explanations to account for the appearance of these people.

The First Policeman

The contact with colonial authority is remembered through stories about Didiluwa. Didiluwa is a man from Sanebo's village of Magetuwa. He was said by some to be the sister's son of Sanebo and the inheritor of Sanebo's magic. He lived after the arrival of missionaries and the end of warfare, however, in the telling of stories about him, he represents the perpetuation of the system of values of Sanebo's world. Not only does he inherit Sanebo's magic, he also is able to use magic to make a relationship with the newly
arrived dimdims on his own terms, and appropriate their powers to his advantage.

The polisman of the colonial era, called village constables (V.C.) in the administration's records, were selected by the officers who conducted patrols through the region. The function of village constables was to explain the new regulations of the government (gavaman) and persuade people to follow them. The patrol officer's report from a patrol through Kurada in July of 1917 says the following:

July 25th [...] weather cleared a little went on to the Kulada (sic) villages several of which were very old and dilapidated, these I ordered to be pulled down and new houses built, here I appointed a V. C. DIDILUIA of Magatua subject to the Hon Govt Secretary's approval to control the Kurada district villages which are too far from Bunama for that V. C. to effectively control [...]. (Cawley 1917)

Didiluwa is mentioned in several subsequent reports on patrols through Kurada. His purpose was, as suggested here, to "control the Kurada district villages." While the Sanebo story suggests that Auheleawa was a unified polity centered on Sanebo and his warriors, it was the colonial administration who desired most to reorganize the indigenous population into discrete, named "districts" for the purpose of enforcing their regulations and ultimately for the collection of taxes. Didiluwa's work as a constable was one element of that project. In local stories, when the patrol officer and his party of armed constables arrived, Didiluwa is said to have greeted them at an established point, the border between Kurada and Barabara. From there he would accompany them all the way to the great river of Waipoiana in Bwasiyaiyai, inscribing the new political unit "from end to end" by his movement.

There is no story about Didiluwa's first encounter with colonial officers or his appointment as the first polisman of Kurada. The first remembered fact about him is that
he gave new rules to the people of Kurada which he claimed came from the government. He was known to possess deadly 'sorcery' (balau), and so perhaps for that reason people listened to him. He explained these rules in terms of prophecies about what would come from the government. He told the people that each man had to plant rows of coconuts in a large plantation near his village, saying that "in the future" you will get money from this and have a good life. He also said that those who had plenty of children would be able to get more than those who had few. He also explained to people that they must clean up their villages and build new houses, because when the government officers would come they would tear down the bad houses and would fine and even jail people who did not maintain a clean village. Like Sanebo, who could call up warriors from every end of the Auhelawa area, Didiluwa gave these rules to all the people from Bwasiyaiyai to Buitowolo. He said that he was speaking for the government, but in stories about these rules, it is always said that they are his rules and his instructions that people were following. Didiluwa was both the polisiman and the gavaman.

Didiluwa is also said to have ordered the people to build a barracks (baleki) for the government officers and their armed constables. The people built them out of bush materials on beach of Magetuwa, just meters from Sanebo's vanished house post. Stories today say that the patrol officers gave Didiluwa commodity food as his rations which he kept in the barracks. He gave some of this food to his neighbors, who mistook (teibaba [be confused], or sometimes nuwa-pwanopwano [forget, misunderstand]) what it was or how he had gotten it. In these stories, the people thought that he used his magic to get these things. In one story, after the barracks were built, Didiluwa moved into one of them. In the night, he used magic to fly around the world and collect the machines needed
for the making of copra. He stored all of these things in the barracks. With these, people started to make copra under his supervision. Later, when the government officers came on patrol, Didiliwa fed them with rice and meat, which amazed the people. He continued to enforce his rules, threatening people with his sorcery to get them to comply. As time went on, he used his magic for evil, making people sick and killing them. He married a woman from a neighboring lineage and moved into a house in her village. Once, during a fight, Didiliwa struck her and she fled from her village and ran into Didiliwa's coconut plantation, where she finally collapsed and died. Her blood spilt on the earth among the coconuts made the land forbidden to her affines, Didiliwa's lineage. They gave the entire stand of coconuts to her lineage in compensation (pwaoli) for her death and Didiliwa went back to his village to live. He continued to serve as the polisiman of Kurada for the rest of his life, when as an old man, he was killed by a man from another lineage who accused him of sending witchcraft that killed his sister. After that, the government appointed Didiliwa's sister's son to become the second polisiman.

In the wake of colonial pacification, Didiliwa's appointment as polisiman recapitulates Sanebo's position as a war chief (besinana). Not only does Didiliwa take up Sanebo's mantle of leadership, he is said to have inherited his sorcery from him and uses it to relate to the new people in the region, the dimdims. He brings them into Kurada, much as resident lineages adopted migrants from other islands. He feeds them, an act of generosity and care that cements their solidarity. His ability to give gifts of hospitality to anyone who comes to him to ask makes him a wasawasa, a rich man who is able to proudly claim, "I am capable of anything." Indeed his feat of generously hosting the dimdims is all the more impressive considering that, at this time, dimdims seemed to
possess inconceivable wealth.\textsuperscript{13} Didiluwa represents a kind of continuity with the past in that by establishing a social relationship with foreigners, he incorporates them into local categories. From his perspective, dimdims and their culture are interpreted in Auhelawa terms.

Given this relationship between the dimdims and Didiluwa, one might ask how do these stories serve to help people today draw inferences about the historical relationship between the dimdims and Auhelawa. That is, how does the telling of Didiluwa's story take part in the practices of memory already discussed? It appears that Didiluwa's story corresponds to the kind of continuous temporality that comes from the reflexive practice of matriliny. Specifically, the story renders the contemporary signs of cultural change such as commodities, money and technologies as memorials of Europeans' contact with Didiluwa. The story frames these changes in a way that naturalizes them and makes them part of the continuous narrative of history. These changes do not disrupt people's lives because Didiluwa explained what they are in Auhelawa terms, and moreover he is able to connect them to the future to come by making predictions about them. The prophecies of Didiluwa are the most widely circulated piece of information about him. As mentioned, he explained government regulations and copra production in terms of the future. He warned them that in the future people would need money, so they should plant coconuts so that their children could make copra. He also prophesied about future changes that would come from the dimdims. He foretold the second world war, saying that birds would come in the sky and drop their faeces on the earth. He said that people would wear long trousers and shirts. When the people heard this, it is now recalled, they said that he was lying to them. Now, they say, what Didiluwa predicted had come to pass.
The spot where Didiluwa's barracks stood is still remembered and serves to memorialize his actions. The trees he ordered planted still stand, although they are now mostly used for gathering coconuts for cooking not copra. Part of this plantation, the spot where his wife died, is still held by her lineage. This compensation by Magetuwa people to her lineage is not forgotten. People in both lineages mediate their relationships with reference to it, just as other lineages do with rocks erected by their ancestors. In general, stories about Didiluwa are aspects of Magetuwa's own lineage history. He perpetuates their lineage and its magic, and his inscriptions on the landscape create the places they now occupy. His relationships with others frame those of his descendants. Didiluwa's prophecies accentuate continuity. Prophecy points forward into the future for people to reach back and grasp through memory, each one offering proof of the other. Thus, prophecy and memory join in a cycle of perpetual self-reference to make elements of modernity into a memorial of Didiluwa. The stories render time as a fulfillment, and make the changes wrought by European contact appear to derive from Auhelawa values. His projective inferences are remembered as fulfilled promises, proving the fact of his power to incorporate the dimdims' powers. In that sense, Didiluwa gives people a position in the past with which to interpret the present.

In contrast to those about Didiluwa, stories about the arrival of missionaries are render history as discontinuous. Whereas Didiluwa succeeds Sanebo and perpetuates the world in which he lived in spite of change, these stories present intercultural contact as an event of rupture. Missionaries exhaust the logic of Sanebo's world and replace it with another. Time is not rendered as a circle, but as a line, and the rupturing event marks a irreversible passage from past to present. Didiluwa allows people to conceptualize change
through memorials much in the same way that people conceptualize their kin relationships. In both cases, physical reminders confirm the truth of memory. I show that stories about missionaries hinge on the kind of reasoning people use in the margins of their lineage histories. As with vedevedede and reasoning about the distant past, people use retrojective speculation to posit events that leave no traces themselves, but provide the conditions for the memories that follow. In this mode, the present interprets the past and the kind of change people perceive is revolutionary not evolutionary.

The Coming of the Light

William Bromilow, the founder of the Australian Methodist Overseas Mission in Papua, arrived on Dobu Island in 1892 (Bromilow 1892: xlv). Over the next few years, Bromilow established his Dobuan station as the headquarters of the Methodist Mission in Papua. He sent out Polynesian Christian teachers and catechists from Dobu to other communities. Other European missionaries established their bases in other areas. In 1893, Bromilow's colleague at Dobu, Rev. J. T. Field started to direct missions in the southern part of the region, first on Tubetube Island (Field 1893: lii) and then 1899 in south Normanby on Hegahegai, the steep rocky cape that overlooks a bay named Bunama (Moreton 1899: 82, Field 1900: lxxxvi). He was within a day's walk from Sanebo's village. Looking to the east from Hegahegai, missionaries would have been able to see a continuous stretch of inhabited territory, a chain of villages running along the coast belonging to the lineages of Auhelawa and their near neighbors. From Hegahegai, the next point on the coast is Mutuyuwa, where Sanebo's allies and Auhelawa's immediate neighbors live. Beyond this, one can see the gentle slope of Menumenu, the mountain
that defines part of Kurada. Further still one might be able to see the taller, loaf-shaped mountain Hobiya, home of the bush woman Sinenipu'ona'ona, and the landmark for Kurada's eastern neighbor Bwasiyaiyai.

Field and his successors dispatched Polynesian teachers to the surrounding Normanby communities, establishing schools and preaching places. Starting in 1909, the Methodist Missionary Society of Australasia notes the presence of "a catechist" in Kurada under the Duau circuit based in the Bunama mission in the annual reports (Osborne 1909: 111-112). The Bunama missionary James R. Osborne writes the following in his report for 1910:

At Kulada (sic) we have a fine large native church nearly finished. Our Catechist, Pati Isiah (sic), who has been in [British] New Guinea for nineteen years has been recommended as a candidate for the Native Ministry. Pati is our best worker and well deserves the honor. (Osborne 1910: 114)

In a report two years later, a new missionary at Bunama wrote that the minister Pati Isaia would leave for home after twenty years of service (Burgess 1912: 116). The report suggests that no one immediately replaced him. Based on the records I have located so far, it is not know if and when Pati returned to Kurada and who if anyone replaced him as a resident teacher or missionary at Kurada.

Auhelawa recall the arrival of Pati to Kurada in stories. Auhelawa claim that Pati first arrived in Kurada in 1902. He faced some resistance at first, but then rapidly started winning converts to the new faith. No mention is made of his absence. Indeed the most noticeable feature of the story is that his very arrival is identified with the total, complete and collective conversion of the local people to Christianity. This story of Pati's arrival was told by a woman named A. She was a senior woman of the Gomwa lineage.
When Pati disembarked in Kurada, he was greeted by a man named Maleko, who allowed him to stay in his village. Maleko is an ancestor of A.'s immediate neighbors, the Alogawa lineage, who adopted me during my fieldwork. Not knowing any English, he had to speak by hand gestures. Pati pointed upward, then downward, then pointed to his furrowed brow with head bent and eyes shut. Maleko understood this and allowed Pati to stay in his village and start a mission. People of other villages came to Maleko's village wanting to kill Pati. They took up the traditional weapons of war and demanded Pati from Maleko, who refused them. With hurt feelings at being refused what they thought was their rightful share of "[their] victim," they went home and complained about the inhospitality of Maleko.

That group came and they wanted to kill him, Pati. Maleko said that they should go back. He said, "You all go back." They went back there [to their village] and they said, "Our friend there spoke and we didn't kill and eat that person." And, "He refused [to give us] our body that came [so that] we eat." And so, Maleko himself stayed until night came. Night came and [...] Pati said to Maleko, he said, "You go to your group and you tell them to come." "You tell them to sit," he said, "and we all worship." And so, Maleko's 'mind was bright' (nuwa-'i-masele). Pati communicated with his hand, but Maleko 'completely understood' (bada nuwa-'i-masele-o). And he told the people. And that group that was fighting, they dropped those knives and spears and they got together and went. They came and they sat and they sat together. And, well, they were worshipping and Pati was praying to God. He was praying for those people. He was praying and their minds were good. He made their minds good.

The important details of this story are that Maleko offered protection to Pati in his village of Alogawa, sending away his cannibal neighbors who wanted to kill and eat him. Maleko adopts Pati in a sense that is reminiscent of the way that Auhelawa lineage histories describe how people adopted foundlings and stranded migrants, or how cannibal warriors would adopt captives who could demonstrate kinship with them. Yet one can
also see that this story really derives its force as an account of how Pati's wins over Maleko to his group, and tropically, how Christianity wins over Auhelawa. Unlike Didiluwa, who makes dimdimis into a resource for his own ends and translates the coming future in prophetic metaphors, Maleko and Pati transcend their respective cultural worlds by communicating by hand gestures. In this special extracultural language, Pati is able to cause Maleko's mind to change. Maleko's "mind was bright" (nuwa-na 'i-masemasele), an idiom for understanding. Similarly, Pati tells Maleko to summon the people who wanted to kill him, and Pati holds a church service (tapwalolo) in which he prays to God for the cannibals, and their "minds became good" (nuwa-di 'i-namwanamwa). Thus, A.'s story of Pati renders the arrival of missionaries, the end of cannibalism, and the conversion of the Auhelawa into one single moment in which God through Pati's prayer reaches out to the Auhelawa and changes them forever. The story concludes with Pati asking Maleko where they will build his church. Maleko takes him to Sowala, the village of Maleko's father's lineage. There the people build him a church building by the 'wa'wamo tree on the beach. Here A. borrows from vedevedede style, saying that this tree memorializes the arrival of Christianity. She says, "That 'wa'wamo tree will never fall ... It will never uproot."

Sowala's village had become dedicated to God and set aside as a permanent memorial of the arrival of the light.

The Auhelawa story of the arrival of Christian missionaries extends the story of Sanebo, making Sanebo a sign of the cannibal era. In this perspective, Sanebo is a sign of cannibalism and wanton warfare, as are the belligerent neighbors turned away by Maleko. Today this framing dominates insofar as Sanebo and other warriors are recalled as fearsome characters from a sinister world. The missionaries and their first converts
however epitomize Auhelawa sociality today, peaceful and having good minds which "understand" and "have wisdom." The rupturing event of Pati's arrival puts Sanebo in opposition to Maleko and contemporary Christians. Unlike lineage histories, in which memory construct an unbroken succession from the past to the present, the relationship between Sanebo and the first missionaries is one of replacement. Sanebo's memorial is vanished. Pati's memorial is permanent. The arrival of the missionaries fully exhausts the logic of the world of Sanebo. Sanebo's culture cannot interpret or evaluate this novel religion. Rather Pati's prayer displaces that world in one single moment. The Auhelawa telling of their evangelization represents Christianity as something that provides for its own truth, and hence something that exists outside the cultural world it encounters. In the story, Pati's hand gestures function in this way in that they are an extracultural code. The pointing upward to God, and the furrowed brow are indexical of how Christianity imagines God's relationship to humans, as though Christianity consisted of God as a purely causal force which compels humans to bow in awe.15

It is important to note that this is the sort of story that Christianity likes to tell about itself, and that Auhelawa as Christians draw upon the self-representation of missionaries to make inferences about history. In general, Christians share the idea that God intervened in human history through the death of Jesus. Their whole system of beliefs is based upon one single event as a rupture of the normal order. Thus tales of miraculous conversions in which people abruptly abandon their old lives for the sake of a new faith are a staple of Christian self-representation, Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus being but one example. Methodist missionaries to Papua drew on this tradition and celebrated their own successes in their memoirs and reports to their home churches as
modern miracles. Not only did these stories encourage donations at home, these writings continue to be circulated locally also. The United Church of Papua New Guinea, the post-Independence successor to the Methodist mission, today adopts missionaries' heroic self-narration as an example of the story of Christianity. Historical missionaries are, like their Gospel forebears, presented as models of virtue. They sacrificed themselves for the cause of bringing "light" to the heathens. This is a theme of local preaching as well as the printed versions of missionaries' writings and the derived church histories which are used in United Church schools (e.g. Bromilow 1929, Brown 1908, and cf. Kuehling 2005: 24n4). Many people in Auhelawa, for instance, liked to retell anecdotes of how William Bromilow, the founder of the first Methodist mission in the region on Dobu Island, warded off cannibal attackers in the early days of the mission. According to stories, he put on dark glasses so that people could not see that his eyes were closed when he was asleep. When enemies arrived, they supposed he was looking at them. In another local version of this story, Bromilow is said to have played a radio to suggest he was awake and talking to someone. Since Auhelawa retell mission history as folklore, perhaps then the story of Pati is an extension of a mission history to make inferences about local history where no memorials of a continuous history exist.

Pati's story contrasts with Didiluwa's. Didiluwa's story mediates the relationships between contemporary Auhelawa and dimdims and their technologies. This kind of intercultural relationship is one of an uneasy articulation, accommodation and gradual change. People attempt to earn cash and consume commodities, yet these activities are only possible insofar as the local economy of Auhelawa articulates with a regional and global system. To make sense of dimdims and their goods in terms of both their role in
the regional world, and how their arrival that reshaped that world, people can refer to Didiluwa's prophecies as being fulfilled in their own lives. The memory of Didiluwa conveniently suppresses the humiliations of the new colonial order and the changes it wrought. While Didiluwa prophesied the future worth of copra to his community's viability, his story also does not link the dimdims' arrival to contemporary failure of copra markets and people's resulting rejection of copra as a means to earn cash. In making these erasures, Didiluwa's story offers the prospect of thinking about intercultural contact through local values. To an extent as well, Didiluwa encapsulates all the changes from the time to Sanebo, through his own life to today as being the logical results of Auhelawa people's own awareness of their relationship to dimdims. Thus his story resonates deeply with ideas about how people form, maintain and end relationships through the work of memory. His fulfilled prophecies offer a bitter explanation for Auhelawa's uneven and incomplete incorporation of money and commodities. In telling the story of Pati, however, Auhelawa draw upon missionary stories in the service of a retrojective inference of a decisive moment of rupture, confirming their own self-perception as having been rescued by missionaries and brought into the light. In this story, the change is total, complete and irreversible. Christianity as event is a retrojection of a threshold moment to create the historical foundation for the Christian world that Auhelawa live in today. Through the inference of a single event of change, people understand their history as a dichotomy between the new and the old.

**Conclusion**

In their everyday lives, Auhelawa exhibit two distinct yet complementary modes
of representing time, history and change. In this respect, understanding how their representations of history frame their perception of intercultural contact requires a special approach. Anthropology has generally looked at history as a reflection of the cultural order, and thus assumed that cultural models of history are essentially ones in which a prevailing order is reproduced and maintained through time. Auhelawa people take for granted that change is always happening. Their histories, especially those of their first contact with Europeans at the beginning of the twentieth century, represent the changes that flow from contact as alternatively revolutionary and evolutionary. It raises a question of what the concept of history is for Auhelawa such that it takes multiple forms. In opposition to the usual assumption that cultural categories determine actors' practices of intercultural negotiation, I propose that history be seen as a practice by which people formulate experience in terms of temporalizing frames. In this regard, history is a reflexive practice in which actors give particular value to their acts by positioning them in relation to particular constructs of time.

This chapter has tried to show that intercultural relationships are not simply empirical phenomena, but are themselves constituted through a culturally defined reflexive practice, in this case, reflexively applied temporal frames embedded in local genres of historical knowledge. Through histories, Auhelawa reflexively construct a temporal relationship between Western and Auhelawa society, that is to say, they frame their encounter with Western culture as being a relationship in which Western culture influences and causes changes to Auhelawa culture. One cannot assume that intercultural relationships default to a mode of conservative cultural appropriation. Auhelawa shows that people can reflexively represent intercultural relationships in ways that allow them to
conceptualize cultural change. Moreover, this cultural change can take multiple forms. In Auhelawa, the temporality of cultural reproduction evokes its opposite, the temporality of transformation.

Kinship is the main domain in which one sees temporalizing practice at work. Auhelawa think of relationships as being dependent on human consciousness of them, which they label memory. They thus think of relationships as having a natural tendency to be forgotten. Matrilineal groups are created reflexively through acts which memorialize relationships in public symbols, namely, namesake, burials, and other physical sites. These sites are transformed into a linear narrative of matrilineal descent through the practice of tetela, telling history, about specific lineage memorials. Beyond this, the cycle of memorializing persons and remembering narratives allows people to self-consciously cultivate an extensive network of matrikin by constructing a story of ancestral migration out of matching memories of other people's memorials.

Yet memorialization does not serve to construct all the histories of which people keep track. In the shadow of memorialized history is a world of mysterious legends. These are stories told to explain features of the landscape as traces of past agency of nonhumans. These stories partake of the same symbolic practices of tetela, yet occupy the negative space of the historical knowledge that tetela establish. Since legends are linked to sites which are not made by the ancestors, the memory of legends often hinges upon speculation rather than a stable oral tradition about what they mean. Thus, if historical memory is a process by which people convert public symbols into a continuous narrative of history, then legends resist being remembered and instead suggest the outer limits of memory's reach. They suggest to people the possibility of a discontinuous history
punctuated by events of rupture. Out of this come various historical speculations about the origins of things which do not hinge upon memorialization. Whereas matriliny structures time as a series of successions, legends suggest that history is the replacement of one epoch by another.

With these two complementing strategies for framing experience in temporal terms, Auhelawa approach questions of the significance of their contact with European culture. In interpreting their present state, they are faced with questions of both succession and replacement. One of the main starting points for thinking about this history is the warrior Sanebo and his role in ending the endemic warfare of the time before Europeans. Sanebo was a cannibal and magician. He serves to condense all of what Auhelawa know and remember of how their ancestors lived before contact with Europeans. In memories of their first contacts with the new colonial administration on the one hand and with missionaries on the other, Sanebo is juxtaposed with two other historical personalities. Didiluwa, the first polisiman and agent of the gavaman, is said to be Sanebo's sister's son and inheritor of Sanebo's magic. As Sanebo articulated Auhelawa's relationships with hostile neighbors, so too did Didiluwa succeed him in this function by mediating relations with the dimdims. By contrast, in memories of contact with the Methodist missionary Pati, Sanebo and the world he represents are replaced by Maleko and a new Christian sociality. Pati's arrival brings the order of cannibalism and warfare to an end in one single moment.

These two memories of intercultural contact differ in the kind of time in which they take place because the strategies people use to temporalize these contacts differ. Yet the choice of strategy is not random. Indeed, the memories are crafted in their respective
modes because the kinds of questions people are trying to explain with them are different too. In the case of Didiluwa's story, people are trying to understand the relationships they can have with a new group of people who have entered into the regional world. Dimdims' entry into the region reshaped political realities and economic possibilities for people in ways that still resonate today. People want an explanation for this change and want to craft a history that helps them to incorporate dimdims and their culture into a meaningful order. At the same time, mission history is meant to satisfy another question about life today, which is the relationship between Christianity and pre-contact culture. Christianity by its own self-understanding demands exclusive attention and total personal commitment in a way that colonial institutions did not. Despite glaring inconsistencies in the documented history of Auhelawa's conversion, Auhelawa assume that today "everyone is a Christian." The memory of Maleko and Pati thus helps explain this by positing a event of rupture, a total and collective conversion by divine intervention. Thus two temporalities can share space in everyday Auhelawa thinking because each is situated in relation to different contexts.

Given this, one can conclude that the Auhelawa experience of intercultural contact carries with it no inherent implications for people's recognition of or response to the possibility of cultural change. Contact with European culture did not necessarily compel people to transform their world into something new, nor to find ways to incorporate novelty in the service of traditional values. Rather, actors give specific value to moments of contact by instantiating one of many alternative temporalities. This is difficult to square with other studies of cultural change, which tend to argue that local cultural traditions tend to possess at least some inertia which resists being overwhelmed
Robbins (2007) argues that anthropology has tended to presume that cultures must occupy a continuous temporality. For that reason, he argues, anthropologists describe change solely in terms of the continuity of cultural systems, and seek a model of intercultural contact in which people always act conservatively to minimize the disruption of novel, foreign elements. He suggests that in presuming temporal continuity, anthropologists ignore the cases in which people value and cultivate the experience of a rupture in their cultural order because it offers the possibility to construct a foundational event. Anthropology, Robbins finds, does not have an adequate theoretical language for describing culture as something other than a conservative tradition that seeks its own reproduction. I would suggest that the kind of reflexive agency one sees in the practice of historical memory offers a solution to this problem. The Auhelawa case shows that even in situations in which people reflexively assimilate the foreign into the familiar, this strategy of creating continuity leads people to create strategies of discontinuity by inversion. Thus, just as practices of memorialization can create a sense of continuous time, these practices entail a moment of rupture that lies outside of history, yet serves to found that history. Thus, in reflexively creating matriliny through memorials, Auhelawa implicitly raise the possibility of a memorial for which there is no continuous narrative to explain it. In the same way, by using temporalizing strategies to assimilate the new colonial administration into a familiar system of regional relationships, they imply the possibility that another kind of arrival could come and rupture the prior order and replace it with a new one. Continuity and discontinuity are thus mutually eliciting strategies for representing history. Reflexive practices can frame people's view of history, yet each
framing evokes the possibility of its opposite. In this way, cultures in contact carry with them both the possibility for reproduction and transformation.

In the next chapters, I explore further the consequences of the reflexive perception of social life in terms of either continuous or discontinuous change. These two temporalities occur in many different forms, and as I will show, lie at the heart of a basic dilemma about cultural change with which Auhelawa struggle constantly. I will briefly mention two important aspects of this process here.

First, while the story of Didiluwa draws on a continuous temporality, and suggests that Auhelawa can absorb dimdim culture, this same temporality leads people to perceive contact as leading to a gradual decline from the past to a dimdim future. In the next chapter I will argue that the opposition between selfishness and generosity as categories of behavior is similarly temporalized in a frame of continuous change. The perception that contact with dimdims is causing people to behave more and more selfishly, in contrast to the dominant ethic of generosity, is another example of the reflexive perception of change, and another source of Auhelawa understanding of their relationship to dimdim culture.

Second, because there are multiple alternative temporalities within one culture, there is a possibility of choice in their use, and hence necessarily a cultural schema of values which puts alternatives in relation to one another so that people can make choices. In this chapter, continuous and discontinuous temporalities exist in a hierarchical relationship. The continuous temporality, I have tried to show, is dominant because it derives from the system of matrilineages, which as a system provides a framework for defining most of the social relationships people have. Discontinuous temporality is a
residual category defined in opposition to the main form. Foreign cultural forms need not be reflexively perceived as instantiations of dominant values. Indeed, Auhelawa reflexively perceive Christianity as a rupture in history because that allows them to explain its widespread acceptance today even though it is doubtful that it was first experienced that way. Moreover, Christianity's own self-representation is premised on the rupture of continuity. European missionaries told a history of Christianity which resonated with this local perception of it as well, creating a feedback loop. As I will show in later chapters, this reflexive perception of Christianity as a rupture leads to its perception as the inversion of Auhelawa cultural values embodied by Didiluwa and Sanebo. It preserves a special marginal status for Christian practices in everyday life. Christianity thus becomes a site through which people can reflexively reframe the temporal relationship they perceive between themselves and their ancestors.
Chapter 2. Hunger and Plenty

New Food

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the reflexive perception of everyday life in historical terms is especially productive of meaning for Auhelawa. There is a strong tendency for people see phenomena like environmental changes as evidence of historical changes, in other words, to read social significance into the physical world. One of the prominent themes of this kind of speculation is decline, a reflexive apprehension that one's life is not as it should be, but is in fact getting worse. For instance, during my fieldwork, people commonly remarked to me that they cannot grow the same amount of food that their ancestors could, especially the most socially valued crop, 'wateya (the greater yam, Dioscorea alata). They explain this by saying that the population is increasing rapidly and consequently people have less food with which to feed more children. Today they believe there is hunger, people are more selfish with their neighbors and kin and mortuary feasts are smaller. In this chapter, I argue that this perception results from how people evaluate recent historical changes in the practice of gardening through the lens of the cultural values placed on food, consumption and exchange. I argue that people see themselves as impoverished today because of a perception of increasing reliance on subsistence foods which cannot contribute to social relationships through reciprocity. The perception of decline in these terms is a moral practice.

The claim that selfishness is increasing in Auhelawa is likewise a reflexive social perception which sheds light on how Auhelawa represent and manipulate their social relationships through symbolic practices, and how their reflexive representation of
relationships in practices shapes social changes at a structural level. One can speak of the discourse of selfishness and generosity as a kind of metasociality, a collective representation of a collective state. In particular, selfishness as an evaluation of behavior is defined in opposition to generosity, which is itself understood in terms of its conventional expression in the form of reciprocal exchange. Different kinds of reciprocal exchange are distinguished on the basis of the degree of abstention from the gift by the donor. The most prominent and socially valued form of reciprocity is between laterally and affinally related lineages in mortuary feasts, in which the donors are forbidden to share any of the 'wateya yams they give to the recipients. Other feasts and other important relationships, although not necessarily between laterally related lineages, are structured in terms of reciprocal exchange through the transaction of donor-abstained gifts. Also, there are lesser forms of exchange which fall short of this ideal of reciprocity, and contain some element of selfishness. In this sense, selfishness and generosity are opposed poles on a continuum of forms defined in terms of reciprocal exchange, and ultimately grounded in the interlineage relationships of kinship and affinity. This conceptual system creates a framework through which people can perceive resources in terms of their obligations in social relationships. The manipulation of a households' yam harvest and other produce through practices of planning, management, and budgeting are symbolic actions through which people manipulate their social relationships in order to realize an idealized social form.

In rural, subsistence-agricultural societies like Auhelawa, food is a useful vantage from which to consider the process of cultural and economic change. In this area, one can easily point to, on the one hand, empirical changes in what and how much people eat,
and, on the other hand, changes in how people perceive and evaluate food, agricultural resources and their environment, both on practical and ideological levels. There can be no doubt that the population of Auhelawa, like many other rural societies in Papua New Guinea, has grown quickly and put pressure on land and resources. Auhelawa gardeners have responded to this trend by innovating their agricultural practices and continue to achieve a reasonable subsistence from their gardens. They plant a wide variety of introduced vegetables that provide food throughout the year. During lean times they supplement their garden produce with fruit and nuts from introduced trees. Unlike their ancestors, they use steel tools—nowadays they occasionally use chainsaws—and other technology to make their work easier and more efficient. Today it is common to earn money by selling some food crops to buy commodity tools to help with gardening work and commodity food when needed. Despite the widespread feeling that gardening land is in short supply, Auhelawa appears to have ample land to support its population, especially when compared to communities on smaller islands (e.g. Foale 2005). Furthermore, besides people's perception, there is no evidence of an absolute decline in garden yields that would suggest that their gardens are less fertile, and there is some evidence that people today can and do produce in excess of their immediate needs.

Auhelawa would appear to be an example of a subsistence agricultural system that has successfully innovated in order to preserve its socio-ecological balance. In these circumstances, one might reasonably expect that their cultural and ceremonial lives would be enriched by a greater variety of foods and new tools with which to make gardens. Yet, Auhelawa perception is mismatched with their adaptation to a growing population and new economic opportunities. After over a century of rapid social and
demographic changes, they do not perceive themselves to be enriched but impoverished. Moreover, when they look back on the past century, Auhelawa see the gradual fading away of their traditional institutions and the basis that they provided for proper sociality. These institutions were fuelled by 'wateya, and today 'wateya cannot sustain their sociality.

In this chapter, I argue that Auhelawa perception of their poverty and decline is a function of otherwise successful agricultural innovation. To feed the growing society, people have incorporated vegetables that are meant to nourish persons but have no other social values. In the process of agricultural innovation, people have given a substantive form to selfishness. People adopted these crops and began to change their gardening practice to create space to grow them alongside their prestige crops. Thus, foods which served principally to nourish the gardener's conjugal family are now tended alongside foods which principally serve to create relationships of mutual indebtedness and interdependence through reciprocal exchanges. Selfish consumption, which would typically be seen in relation to one's obligation to be generous to lateral kin and affines, can now be concretely experienced in introduced crops. By innovating agricultural practices, people create a situation in which their everyday experience of production and consumption stood at variance with their ideal model of subsistence economy, itself an icon of ideal sociality. These changes in cropping patterns, diets and work patterns were all consequences of these innovations, meaning that people's everyday behavior now sends a different message than the reflexively ethical cultivation of prestige crops for gifts. This shift is glossed as declining yam harvests, a lower standard of living, and generally a moral decline. Thus, Auhelawa culture's efflorescence has become a victim of
its own success in that people's perceptions of their changing circumstances has led them to abandon values of the past in favor of an alternative culture.

**Selfishness and Generosity in Social Relationships**

Selfishness is defined in opposition to generosity, identified with an ideal of reciprocity, and ultimately grounded in the exchange obligations between laterally and affinally linked lineages. Similarly, the perceptions of famine and plenty are structured in terms of reciprocity. Having plenty is not an objective quality of a resource, but a capacity for a gardener to meet ongoing social obligations to be generous. Before discussing what people mean by the claim that selfishness is increasing, it is necessary to briefly sketch the relationships of lateral kinship and affinity, and how they are linked to the values of generosity and plenty. In the previous chapter, I argued that people formulated group identity and relationships of matriclanship by memorializing their common origins and consubstantiality. This sphere of relationships does not, of course, exhaust the relationships people have. One also articulates relationships on the basis of difference as well as sameness. I noted in that chapter that one also uses one's personal genealogy to reckon several degrees of relatedness through men to members of other lineages. Typically, the range of cognatic kin within four generations are prohibited from marrying, as they "know each other" and have obligations to one another as cognatic kin. More distant relatives and others are classed as "strangers" with whom one may marry. The husband and wife of a married couple become, respectively, wohiwa (in-marrying male) and hinevela (in-marrying female) to each other's parents and lineage mates. Iva (affines) are obligated to help one another, yet they also avoid contact with each other
because of the shame for parents and other kin that attaches to the conjugal relationship.

Wohiwa and hinevelam are especially required to act deferentially toward the parents-in-law, and generally try to be as self-effacing as possible. A wohiwa or hinevelam does not eat in the presence of the parents-in-law, and when walking out of the village to the toilet, must take a bush knife and pretend to be going to cut betelnuts. The children of a married couple would then become patrilateral kin (natuleiya) of the father's lineage. They would also become connected to the lineages of the father's father and mother's father as classificatory grandchildren. Immediate cross-cousins must also avoid one another and act with reserve. Moreover, a person treats with deference and submission the father's sisters' children and the father's lineage. Anything connected to the father's lineage, especially the lineage cemetery (magai) and other lineage memorials, is strictly forbidden to his children. Contact with these things is a dangerous violation of taboo and causes illness. Also, the spouse and children of a man perform the most important ritual acts of mourning during the feast hosted by his lineage. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, they perform these acts for the benefit of the father's sisters' children and other kin, out of respect to them. Hence, marriage creates new relationships beyond the lineage, creating a cognatic network of kin for the children. Cognatic kin and affines help and support one another, but unlike matrikinship, their relationships are based on the observance of strict protocols of behavior.

Although they pertain to different structural levels, in practice, affinity and lateral kinship have much in common. They are both characterized at the interactional level by avoidance and deference. Auhelawa tend to classify all of these behaviors as forms of ve'ahihii, which they gloss in English as 'respect.' Auhelawa consider 'respect' to be a
central component of the relationship with persons of laterally related lineages and affines. Etymologically, the word for respect seems to imply separation. It is related to the word for 'part' (ve'a), as in an apportioned share of a gift, and the word for sorting-out or organizing (‘oive'aha), as in making distinctions between different things. Respect, furthermore, is said to be absent from relationships among matrikin. These people can be free with one another, and act unencumbered by the need to avoid shaming others with inappropriate behavior. Behavior among matrikin is said simply to be 'careless' (besobeso, 'awawa'uhi).

Thus one can speak of an Auhelawa person's total social network as consisting of relationships of two broad classes. On the one hand, one has relationships with people of other lineages which arise from marriage and lateral kinship, and consist of both mutual support and avoidance. These relationships are based on differences and divisions, and are classed as magai (cemetery, forbidden things). On the other hand, one has relationships with people on the basis of sameness and shared substance and genealogical history, principally matrikin, but also patrilateral parallel cousins (taliya-natuleiya, children of the same father's lineage). These are classed as mohili (native, natural), and are not governed by rules of avoidance.

People who are magai to each other not only avoid one another's lineage properties, but take an active interest in each other's lives. Avoidance in these relationships is not the absence of contact, but rather the cultivation an estranged engagement. Because magai relationships involve avoidance, they also involve a great deal of reflexive self-monitoring of behavior and how it appears to the other member of the magai relationship (see also Stasch 2003). For instance, when I was living in
Alogawa, I saw this kind of elaborate enactment of the magai relationship among Lucy and her siblings and step-siblings. Lucy's step-brother Paul spent about half of the year in 2006 living in Lae and Madang with relatives. During his absence, a member of his father's lineage died. Normally, as this lineage's natuleiya (child of male of the lineage), he would attend the memorial feast, wail for them and give gifts of yams in honor of the deceased. After several such feasts, the lineage would release their natuleiya from a taboo on entering the village and walking along the road in front of the village. When he returned, Paul heard that he had missed all of these events. He had arrived in the afternoon, and the very next morning left to go to his father's lineage's village, as he said, "to cry." As was explained to me, he planned on going up to the threshold of his father's village and ritually 'wail' (dou) in the road. His father's kin would also wail with him, and then embrace him as an acceptance of his demonstration of grief. The avoidance one observes during death and mourning of magai relatives, in other words, does not cut one off from them. On the contrary, Paul urgently sought out the chance to mourn as a part of the respect he felt for his father's kin.

Lucy, my adoptive mother, provides another example of how people cultivate their relationships with magai relatives through acts of respect. Lucy and Paul's mother, Eteli, first married a man from Wadaheya village named Makadonia. They divorced before Eteli gave birth to Lucy. She remarried Weliyai, Paul's father. Lucy and Paul both grew up as the natuleiya of Weliyai's lineage. Eteli, Lucy recalled, wanted Lucy to think of Weliyai as her father and treat his lineage with respect. Eteli forbade Lucy from visiting with her biological\(^1\) father, Makadonia, and the people of Wadaheya. When Eteli died, Lucy started to make attempts to show respect to the lineage of Makadonia,
attending their burials and memorial feasts, giving gifts, and visiting with them to offer
care when one of them got sick. She also strenuously observed the taboos on the magai of
Wadaheya, as well as those of Weliyai's lineage. This was especially the case with the
children of Makadonia's sister, Adrina, including Lorenzo, the manager of the boat which
first brought me to Kurada. Her patrilateral 'cross-cousins' (nibai) reciprocated these
gestures by attending Alogawa feasts, and giving small gifts to Lucy. All of these were
ways she could show respect to them, and thereby constructing with them a magai
relationship. Wadaheya lineage people also evaluated Lucy's behavior as respectful, and
acknowledged it by giving her permission to make a garden in their lineage territory.
Lorenzo gave Lucy a credit account at the Wadaheya lineage trade store, and asked her
opinions about his management decisions. When he had an idea to raise money from the
Kurada community to erect a memorial for his mother's brother, Makadonia, he
appointed Lucy along with other Wadaheya members to sit on a committee which would
oversee the use of the money. Lucy also maintained her relationship to Weliyai's lineage
through similar gestures. Lucy's story shows how the symbolic actions of respect, though
involving avoidance, also help reproduce a relationship of solidarity as well.

Magai relationships are where one can find prototypical instances of generous
behavior, because respect is associated with generosity. In magai relationships,
generosity must be expressed as reciprocity. In this respect, magai relationships reflect a
basic structural contradiction in matrilineal kinship systems between patrifiliation and
matrifiliation, best known through the work of Richards as the "matrilineal puzzle"
(Richards 1950). Richards defines it as a contradiction between a father's authority over
his children and their membership in another social group. Writing about Dobu, Fortune
(1963 [1932]) similarly argues that the father's role in matrilineal societies is ambiguous and creates divided loyalties between a man's lineage and his children's lineage.

The contradiction inherent in Auhelawa magai relationships can be stated as such: a father has an obligation to provide and care for his children throughout his life, and yet his children are of a different blood than him, which means that they cannot share everything since the father's lineage's resources are forbidden to his children. Likewise, cross-cousins have a common male relative which unites them as kin, and entails their mutual care and support. Yet despite being closely tied, they are members of different groups. In other words, magai relationships require simultaneously solidarity and separation. This contradiction is mediated through avoidance behaviors and reciprocal gifts, two modes of action that contain both of these values. Both reciprocity and avoidance in the magai relationship reflect its basis in difference as opposed to sameness (Stasch 2009). Similarly, the paradox between the obligation to support and separate in magai relationships can be solved through reciprocal gifts from which the donor abstains. Giving as a temporary sacrifice creates a debt with the recipient which reflects the mutual interdependence of the partners.

Both avoidance behavior and reciprocity seem to evoke the other, each being a necessary element in the formation of the magai relationship as one based on difference, complementarity and interdependence. In this way, giving gifts in reciprocity is the standard of generosity to others. Other forms of giving are measured in relation to the degree to which the donor violates the respectful avoidance expressed in the donor's abstention. The reciprocal gift between people who are magai to one another, patrilaterally relatives or affines, creates a 'debt' (vaga) which is always repaid by a
'repayment' (maiha) in the form of an exact equivalent in kind, size, and number. For example, if one gives a basket of 'wateya to another in a feast, the maiha for that vaga is a basket of yams of the exact same number and approximate size. Other, lesser forms of gifts will be discussed in Chapter 3. Here it is sufficient to note that these gifts are distinguished on the basis of how much the donor shares in the gift with the recipient. The extreme end of this continuum is the sharing of the same piece of food, which only usually occurs between gwala (matrilineal heirs) and 'aivelahe (namesakes).

The role of reciprocal exchanges in kinship behavior is one of the core issues in the ethnography of Melanesian societies (see for example Damon 1983, Feil 1978, Foster 1995, Godelier 1986, Lederman 1986, LiPuma 1988, E. Schieffelin 1976, M. Strathern 1988, Wagner 1967). These discussions tend to echo Levi-Strauss's reinterpretation of kinship as a system of reciprocity and dualism (M. Strathern 1984). In these discussions it is commonplace to show that reciprocity among kin is connected with complementary categories of relatives. For example, Wagner identified the principle that one shares food with agnates and exchanges food with matrilateral relatives (1967). At first glance it would seem that a similar principle applies in Auhelawa; one exchanges with magai relatives and shares with mohili. In fact, magai and mohili are not opposed in this way. Instead, the effect of making reciprocity a high value is to displace the contradiction of kinship with social others into the economic domain. Instead of seeing a contradiction in being related to people on the basis of difference, people perceive a much more intractable dilemma between generous giving-abstaining and selfish consumption. Since it is considered superior to give the gift to another and abstain entirely from sharing it, feeding oneself when one could be giving to another is being truly 'aiduma (selfish). Yet
it is unavoidable that one must consume something of what produces, especially since in Auhelawa, subsistence work is organized at the level of the household. To solve this, people try to eliminate the possibility of selfishness from sociality by making all social situations into opportunities for giving gifts by abstaining from what they offer to others. For instance, I was frequently told that as I went to different villages to visit people, I should expect to be offered food immediately. And indeed, people would call me from the road to come and eat with them. Making the offer to share food converts a family's selfish act of private eating into a kind of outward transmission. When food is served to guests, even in the context of sharing an everyday meal, hosts will serve a pot of food to guests, who are allowed to pick out which and how much food they want to eat. Only when a guest has finished eating will hosts serve themselves. Abstention from sharing inscribes an event as a canonical form of a gift. By abstaining from sharing in what is given, a givers distinguish themselves from recipients. Even within the family, the same process occurs. Typically a woman will cook the food for the family, serve it to her husband and children, who eat first. When they have finished eating, the woman will eat what remains. If none remains, or if the food is not enough to feed the family, the woman will excuse herself from eating at all, saying that she cannot bring herself to eat the food that she smells on her own hands, but can consume what is served to her by others. This feigned lack of appetite is one way, I was told, that a woman can absorb a food shortage in the family through her personal sacrifice. In order to make a gift of food, the woman must abstain from eating, even if it means going hungry. Thus, the opposition between generous reciprocity and selfish sharing is not complementary. There is a default tendency toward reciprocity as the basis for positive connection. This starts with people
of different lineages, and the tendency toward reciprocity is also applied recursively among those with whom one is mohili, even to the level of the household. Selfishness is in this sense marked in opposition to generosity. Ideally, every meal is a gift of which the giver does not eat, and 'aiduma is only a negative residual category of sociality.

**Selfishness as Change**

Selfishness is a residual category of sociality insofar as Auhelawa strive to structure every interaction in terms of generous outward transmission. The highest form of generosity is giving a gift which one does not share in, epitomized in the gifts between magai relatives. Selfishness is the asocial retention of value. The way that people discuss selfishness today suggests that it is no longer merely defined in the margin of generosity, but has a life of its own. The alternative form of selfishness is connected with perceived processes of economic and social change. When people say that others behave more selfishly than in the past, this is meant both in the sense of a loss of an ethic of generosity as well as in the sense of new behaviors which are intrinsically selfish. Selfishness is tied with a perception of increasing individualism, loss of social control and loss of order. At the same time, the perception of increasing selfishness is attributed to the insufficiency of food, especially yams, from household gardens to feed the growing population. A few examples of the specific things people point out will illustrate the discourse of selfishness as change and suggest why changes in food production are linked to social changes.

One example of increasing selfishness often given is that yam gifts given between lineages in mortuary feasts are much smaller in the past, and people are reluctant to host large feasts because they do not want to become greatly indebted to others. Changes in
mortuary feasting practices, both real and perceived, are complex, and I discuss them in full in Chapter 6. Here it is sufficient to note that visitors to feasts are often gravely offended and shamed when hosts do not sometimes accept the gifts they present, and that when I asked for what they though was the reason for the refusal, they said that nowadays it was common to simplify and reduce feasting exchanges because hosts are afraid that they will not be able to grow enough yams to repay the gifts. Hence the perception of increasing selfishness occurs in the context of people's obligations to one another in exchange, and is morally inflected.

There is also a feeling of loss of communalism in everyday life. People point to a defunct practice they call "exchange of plates" as an example. An "exchange of plates" was the exchange of cooked food between households of the same village or neighboring villages. People who came home early from their gardens would cook for their neighbors who had not yet returned. Givers would present cooked food from their own cooking pot to the latecomers when they arrived. At some point in the future, the recipients would come home early and cook food as a return gift. This kind of gift is not given anymore, and people say that this proves that people are more selfish than they were in the past, and less willing to show their neighbors this kindness. Similarly, Francis often wanted me to take special note of what he saw as the replacement of cooperative forms of work with individualistic forms. Fishing, hunting and prawn-catching were all things he said that people used to do together in large groups and share in the catch. Today, however, an individual tended to do these alone in order to keep the fruits of the work for oneself. Similarly others pointed out to me often that people built their family houses far from other lineage mates and from the road instead of in compact villages. Not only were these
seen as forms of moral decline, but often such changes were attributed to cultural influence by dimdims, who were seen as more individualistic, independent and self-interested.

Thus, selfishness is today partly defined by its positive features, especially its connection to the market and dimdim culture. One example is the moral evaluation of marketing betelnut and other food for cash and its bad consequences for garden work. In this discourse, women are singled out for a large share of the blame. Women are said to go to the market every day except Sunday in the Catholic mission station to sell food, and spend the better part of the day gossiping. They do not give cooked food to the children to carry with them to school in the Catholic mission, because they are too lazy to cook for them or have not harvested enough food to provide for their children. Instead mothers are said to usually given a few 20 toea coins with which to buy sweet banana or bread from the mission station market for the children to buy their lunch. Because people are so eager to sell food in the market, they are "finishing" all the food they grow at home and forcing themselves to act selfishly. Informants attributed the decline of feasting partly to the influence of cash-earning.

People also comment upon the commodification of everyday social life as well. People say that most others only think about earning money so they can buy commodities like rice, tinned meat and household goods like pots, bedding and clothes. They do not give gifts generously to their neighbors and kin when they are in need, but instead demand payment for things. Sago palm leaves, the material used to make roof thatch is something that many people have to ask lateral relatives to give them from their own sago groves. Sago is unevenly distributed and so some villages will have an abundance of
building materials while others have none. Many told me that they now expect to have to pay a significant amount of money for sago leaves even from close lateral relatives who should normally be expected to "help" (hagu) their relatives. Similar stories are told about any kind of movable wealth, including betelnuts, garden crops, tree fruits, coconuts, live animals, timbers, sand and gravel. In choosing how to dispose of any valued good, "people are thinking of their market," or they think first of how to make money from selling what they own. These earnings are meant to increase the consumption of the immediate family, the spouse and children, of the seller. In this instance, selfishness means privileging household consumption above giving generously to relatives.

Taking into consideration the precise meaning of selfishness in Auhelawa thought, the question of why people think selfishness is increasing can be restated more precisely. Auhelawa discourse about selfishness opposes reciprocity and self-interest as inversions. Hence when people say that selfish behaviors are increasing, they also imply that reciprocity is on the decline. This tension between different values parallels the tensions between the norms of different classes of relationship as well. It is rendered into an iconic form, in the words of one informant, "[Today] no one is a rich man, we are all just cassava-eaters." This statement is one example of the reflexive perception of foreign foods as signs of decline. Why are introduced foods like cassava and sweet potato emblematic of the loss of reciprocity, and more generally social values? I argue that the perception of increasing selfishness is grounded in people's objectification of their relationships in the medium of food. The duality of social relationships of magai and mohili is reflected in the domain of gardening in a dual division between home
production and social production which people now believe has become dangerously unbalanced. Whereas prestige foods serve as symbols of relationships to magai and various other important people, new, common foods serve doubly as signs of the inverse of generosity and its decline. To explain this, I turn now to a discussion of the Auhelawa system of gardening.

The Gardening System

Through exchange, people objectify their relationships in the symbolic medium of food and food gifts. Yams are signs of relationships. Hence, in gardening, the hierarchical opposition between generosity and selfishness is especially salient. By contrast, when people objectify their relationships in terms of historical knowledge and memorials, as discussed in Chapter 1, ideas relating to memory, time and space come to the fore. The application of the generous-selfish continuum to gardening work brings out another conceptual opposition between 'plenty' (bahuna) and 'famine' (vahali). Here, too, the precise meanings of plenty and famine underscore again that Auhelawa conceptions of gifts structures the field of perception of all economic resources. Since people symbolize their relationships through food, when they perceive the food they produce in their gardens, they interpret and evaluate it in terms of their social obligations to others. Plenty is not an objective quality of food. Rather, it means that a person has the capacity to satisfy all of their obligations to give gifts to others. Famine is a state of insufficiency to be generous to others. It is connected to the behavior of 'aiduma, or hoarding. 'Aiduma is conceptualized as secretly eating by oneself. It connotes not only stinginess but also wasteful consumption in which a person completely devours all of what they have.
Famine is a symptom of selfishness in that 'aiduma can cause a famine. It is also the cause of selfishness. In famine, one searches for food only for oneself, and even if one is able to feed oneself, one is still 'private' (pravat), an English loanword which Auhelawa use to signify that one is unable to act socially through gifts.

In gardening, one sees an analogous dual division between home production and social production, creating a system of garden work which parallels the system of social values. By encoding the concepts of generosity and selfishness in their work patterns, Auhelawa orient themselves toward the aim of creating plenty, and thereby realize the ideal of generosity in gifts. Given that plenty is the aim of gardening, one can understand why it is that the success of recent adaptations in gardening have led to the perception of increasing selfishness and hunger. After a discussion of the culture of gardening, I then go on to show the consequences of these reflexive perceptions for people's attitudes to other economic changes which might also be seen as selfish.

Yams as Food for Others

Auhelawa people practice an extensive mode of swidden horticulture in which food gardens are cleared, planted, harvested and replanted over two years, then allowed to fallow for about three to six years. In one year, a household may look after several newly cleared and planted gardens called 'oya (also a generic word for garden) and some gardens from the previous year replanted with secondary crops, called yaheyahe. While all villages and nearly all residences are within 200 meters of the beach (le'awa), both oya and yaheyahe are generally made in the bush (nu'ula) on the steep slopes of inland hills ('oya). 'Oya and yaheyahe are made in areas of land that have been repeatedly cultivated
and fallowed by a gardener for many years, defining a gardener's 'ebe towolo (instrument for standing), an individual's portion of territory for work.

At its most basic level the gardening system reflects a dual division between home production and social production in the two types of garden. After being harvested, a new yam garden becomes a yaheyahe when it is replanted with secondary crops for the family's own consumption. Crop rotation like this followed by a long period of fallowing is common for the region of the island and seaboard societies of Milne Bay Province. Malinowski notes that Kiriwina taytu yam gardens (kaymata) are distinct from taro gardens (tapopu) and secondary crop gardens (kaymugwa) (1935: 58, 256). Most of the food of the kaymata is grown to given to others. Taro and secondary crops provide mainly for a gardener's family during the hunger period when the yams have all been consumed or given. Moreover, kaymata are laid out in such a way that the gardener makes separate plantings for his affinal tribute and his wife and children's own consumption. A similar kind of distinction between foods grown for household consumption and prestige foods can be found in descriptions of several gardening systems of the Milne Bay Province region (Austen 1945; Kahn 1986; Young 1971).

While Auhelawa's gardening practice is not exactly the same as its neighbors, I believe that all of these systems are structured by the same unequal division between home production and social production. Like in Kiriwina, the harvest from the Auhelawa 'oya is also recursively divided into greater and lesser parts for gifts and for home use respectively. This principle of recursive unequal division, starting with the separation of 'oya and yaheyahe and continuing to the division of the yam harvest, is the central principle of Auhelawa gardening. I will now discuss how this principle organizes the
production and management of the different species of yams, 'wateya (D. alata) and halutu (D. esculenta), for exchange purposes. I will then turn to the yaheyah, the lesser half of the gardening system, and show how it functions as an emblem of selfishness, as a source of change.

Each year, a married couple will make several new gardens. Typically, they will make a new garden in their respective 'ebe towolo of their own lineage's territory, and one or both of the spouses will make a garden on part of the father's 'ebe towolo. New gardens are usually cleared beginning in October, and the clearing away of bush (daibi), digging up of the soil (tudai) and planting (peli) of a household's new gardens should ideally be finished well before Christmas, but often can extend until early February. The work of clearing and digging is done by men. One common way for this work to be organized is as an exchange between affinally linked villages called 'iliwa. The husband summons his male kin and joins with his wife's male kin to dig the couple's gardens in each of their villages over several days. Women of the village cook food, also called 'iliwa, to feed the workers. In reciprocation, the men of the wife's village form a party and go to their in-law's village to clear his gardens, for which they again are fed in return for their work. The daily movement of large groups of men carrying heavy iron spades in the hot sun back and forth between villages characterizes "the season of work" (paihowa yana hauga) at this time of year.

Once the gardens are cleared and dug, a woman plants her yam seeds in her gardens and her husband's seeds in his gardens (Figure 2). Each row (laba) of the garden is planted with the portion of seed set aside for each child of the couple. A gardener plants two species of yam in separate rows of the gardens, or if enough gardens are
available, in separate gardens. The species planted are Dioscorea alata, the greater yam, called ’wateya and Dioscorea esculenta, the thorn yam, called halutu. Additionally a variety of ’wateya called pwane'ahu is usually planted in its own row.

’Wateya and halutu are by all accounts the main staple and most important food crops in Auhelawa. In a household survey in 2006\textsuperscript{19}, all households reported that they planted at least one new garden with yams of both species, and most planted all of their new gardens with yams. Yams require a large investment of labor and usually the best and most fertile land. They must be planted in a newly cleared garden, and they must be given adequate space to grow and receive regular weeding. Yet, despite these apparent disadvantages, people work hard to have as large a harvest of yams as they can and preserve as much of it as possible for seed for planting next year, thereby increasing their harvest year on year. Successful harvests allow people to meet exchange obligations and gain renown as good gardeners, but are not meant to provide the food a family will eat on a regular basis.

’Wateya and halutu also present a special problem as a food crop. They require approximately seven months after planting to produce tubers and for the tubers to grow to their maximum size. If properly tended over this period, they will produce tubers abundantly all at once, then die. Harvested tubers will remain dormant and can be stored for nearly a year before they germinate and need to be planted again. During this time, they must be kept dry so they do not develop rot. The seasonality of the yam means that people who rely upon it for food will experience roughly equal periods of abundance after the harvest and lean times from the planting of next year's gardens. To avoid hunger, yam gardeners must work hard in the garden and also exercise proper management of
their stored wealth after harvesting.

Auhelawa represent these constraints imposed by the yam's biology in terms of a strict gardening ethic. Good gardening, in essence, mandates that people keep time with the yam, the development of which follows its own schedule in time with seasonal changes. People who explained gardening to me usually started with the importance of timing work properly to coincide with natural seasonal changes. For instance, the blooming and falling of rosewood flowers are said to correspond to periods of gardening activity, and serve to alert people when to start a new phase of the gardening cycle, as does the movement of the Pleiades (gamayawe) across the sky. Human beings must attend to these "signs" because they themselves are not set by natural rhythms. Rather, people must use their minds to interpret the signs of the season, understand them and respond appropriately. Gardeners cannot be lazy at their work lest they miss a crucial window for necessary work. Auhelawa gardeners readily admit that they are not always eager to work in the garden. The result of this, they say, is that they are "late" in doing their garden work, and will thus not achieve the best harvest from their garden. Good gardeners are aware, attentive and diligent all the time, an ethic which Auhelawa describe as a kind of punctuality.

People believed that it is most important to attend to changes in the garden itself and read them as signs of the growth of yams. To read the signs on yam plants requires, of course, frequent trips to the yam garden to inspect the plants. Garden "visits" (taubo'e), using the same term used to denote a social visit, are one of many ways in which Auhelawa say that they "respect" (ve'ahihi) yams. By this they mean that they treat their yam plants as if they were people (tomowa), and show them the same care and respect
that would show humans lest they offend the yam and they wilt from shyness and fail to grow. This begins during planting. When planting yam seeds, the gardener ceremonially washes (vehuguvi) her seeds in the juice and oils of leaves from selected bush plants and trees. This treats the seeds with a "medicine" that makes them grow big and produce many tubers. As the yams grow, the gardener will visit the garden often to inspect the development of the yam plants. Upon entering the yam garden, one often greets the yams by saying "Good morning!" and encourages them to grow, speaking gently to them as one would to children. Finally, people respect yams by harvesting them with care. They gently dig them up by hand and softly brush away dirt stuck to the sides. It is bad, for instance, to tap away dirt from harvested tubers with a digging stick, as I did during my first observation of a yam harvest. This got me a swift but good-natured reprimand from the garden owner, who said I would make the yam "sad." When yams are piled up in the yam house, they should not be dumped from their baskets, but handled gently and placed one by one inside. Piles of yams are made carefully so that any rotten or blighted tubers can be separated and no healthy tubers accidentally rest on diseased ones. One should not make a fire underneath the yam house, because the smoke will irritate them. I was told that in neighboring societies, it is a custom for a gardener to sleep inside the yam house next to the newly harvested tubers so they do not get lonely. While Auhelawa do not practice this, it was given to me as an illustration of the same respect for yams that Auhelawa also practice. People explained the "respect" for yams as a way of "looking after" ('ita'avivini) them. They are treated as children, who also need to be shown special care to grow up well. Moreover, caring for yams requires deliberate and constant attention to their needs. The relationship of gardener to garden is thus not only
conceptualized as a social relationship, but also as a nurturing relationship in which the gardener lavishes affection on the fickle yam.

The timing of the harvest is conducted in accordance with explicit norms as well. When the leaves of the yam vines dry up and fall off, it is time to harvest the yams. In the past, it was forbidden to harvest one's yams before one's neighbor. It was thought that if one harvested early, it would cause the yam vine leaves of the neighbor's garden to fall off. The time before the harvest of new yams is the leanest time of year, and people must fast until they all agree upon a day to harvest their gardens together. Many families may have no food, but they must still abstain from breaking the taboo on harvesting until the agreed time. In some people's explanations, the wasawasa, an elder and renowned yam gardener, would fix a date for the harvest for his lineage. Others said that neighboring families would discuss among themselves when they would all be ready to harvest. In the days before harvesting, families can secretly harvest small immature tubers called bwalesi. These yams are said to have little food in them, and taste slippery. Adults refuse to eat them, because they are unsatisfying and instead feed them to children. They must take care to discard the peelings from these yams in the bush, and not in the sea with their normal trash, so that their neighbors do not discover that they are eating yams early. On the date when everyone harvests, people leave their villages and make camps in their gardens, where they work for several days. During this time, people are free to visit others in their gardens and receive gifts of fire-roasted yams and small tubers.

Harvesting, like all other aspects of yam gardening, requires that people orient themselves to others. By fasting and patiently waiting for the harvest time, people control their selfish desires in order to make their yam harvest bigger and the supply last longer.
The ethic of gardening extends to include the management of yams, called 'enao. After harvest, people store their yams in the yam house and regularly draw from their stocks until the next harvest. They must ensure that they have enough yam tubers to plant as seeds, enough yams to give as gifts in feasting, and after these needs have been satisfied, they must ensure that what remains lasts until the next harvest. In 'enao, one can see the principle of recursive unequal division that underlies the economy of all food. All the work of growing yams up to this point has been to ensure that the harvest is as big as possible. Yet as big as the harvest may be, yams do not continuously produce throughout the year. It is the long shelf life of yams, so to speak, that is the real source of their value. Hence, they must be consciously managed and monitored over a long period of time in order to make them last.

'Enao starts with proper sorting and classifying of yams. Up to this point, I have mostly spoken about the two types of yams, 'wateya and halutu, as one crop. In many respects they are one, as they are often planted in the same garden in separate rows. They both receive approximately the same amount of attention while they are growing, although halutu are not believed to be people, and their "respect" is less elaborated. Now it is relevant to talk about the ways in which Auhe lawa distinguish between the two. While 'wateya (D. alata) is considered to be an traditional crop of Auhe lawa, halutu (D. esculenta) is believed to be a foreign import from Fergusson Island. While 'wateya is considered to be the superior crop of the two in all respects, and hence is used in feasting gifts. Although Auhe lawa are aware that halutu is used by the people of Fergusson in feasting the way they use 'wateya, they said that halutu was only appropriate for home consumption. When 'wateya and halutu are harvested they are sorted into separate groups
and stored separately in the yam house.

People plant several different named varieties of 'wateya and halutu, distinguished on the basis of color, texture, taste, size and shape. A few of these are used for special gifts in feasting, and if a gardener is propagating a line of these varieties, she will sort them out and put them in its own pile. Pwane'ahu, a long, skinny and crooked variety 'wateya, for instance, is used as a particular feast gift. Very large, round and well formed tubers, consisting mainly of starch and unable to be planted again are set aside as the highest grade of tuber, called 'wateya mohili (pure yams). One third of a typical yam garden's yield of 'wateya fall into this category. 'Wateya mohili are set aside as gifts for others in feasts. They are for discharging the 'jobs' (paula) of the gardener, their social obligations to attend feasts and give gifts. What remains of the 'wateya harvest can be used as seed or for home consumption.

The remaining 'wateya are divided into piles of seeds, one for each child of the family, so that they may be planted in the next year's yam garden and propagated until they are received as a gift from the parents to start their own yam garden. Not all of the harvested tubers can be used as seeds. Some have rot and other imperfections and need to be separated out. These are called yabayaba (bad) or belabelala (sickly) yams; they are fit only for consumption at home. A large number are the tiny tubers that sprout along the top of the main tuber, and have no seed material. Not much bigger than marbles, these yams are called ma'am'a (tiny). Other tubers, called mebwala, which have not fully developed are not harvested but replanted into the old yam mound.

The wife and mother of the family is the sole authority for decisions about what and when to take yams from the family's yam house. Nowadays people build doors on
their yam houses and lock them with steel padlocks. The woman of the family holds the key. Everyone I spoke with emphasized that only one person should take food from the yam house. If another person went instead, they might take the wrong thing, or too many yams. A good woman, it is said, knows exactly how many of each type of yam are sitting in her yam house. People say that a yam house is "like a bank." In it, the family stores its wealth, and withdraws from it according to their budget for the year. Yam management consists of making a fixed amount of wealth last as long as possible. Women's material control of the yam wealth of the family has often been noted by anthropologists as evidence of women's high status and power in Milne Bay Province societies (e.g. Kuehling 2005, Mallett 2003). I would further add that this authority is not merely material, but is associated with the ethic of 'enao as an exercise of control over knowledge as well. The woman is responsible for classifying and generating the information about the yam harvest, and the representation of yam harvest in terms of its size and dimensions of quality and type exists in her mind as well as in the material artifact of her organization of the yams in the yam house. This is reflected also in the belief that it is inappropriate to inquire directly about what and how much a woman has stored in the family's yam houses, as well as look inside another person's yam house. Women are both charged with the responsibility of controlling access to the yams as well as access to the information about them. It shows that the plenty which the harvest of yams embodies is not just a sheer material quantity, but a nuanced set of symbolic resources which people manage through measurement and classification.

Having organized the yams, a woman draws food from the yam house on an almost daily basis, starting from the smallest yams and gradually taking larger and larger
tubers, but always striving to use as few as possible and only what is necessary, so that sufficient seed yams for each child can be replanted and 'wateya mohili can be saved for upcoming feasts or other social obligations. The categories of 'wateya have a clear bias toward what Munn (1986) would call the socially productive transmission of food from the family to others in the form of gifts. Gifts of 'wateya mohili to people of other lineages are vaga, debt-creating gifts. By preserving them for the next year's garden, seeds are in a sense given to children as an inheritance, and hence are another kind of outward transmission. Management of yams consists of always privileging outward transmission, either as gifts or as preserved seeds, and reducing home consumption as much as possible.

The management of halutu also illustrates this principle of the economy of yams. Although halutu are not organized into the same categories as 'wateya, they are subject to the same kind of economizing. A harvest of halutu will typically include a number of large tubers called halutu 'ai'ai-na (meaning they are full of food). These are similar in size to 'wateya mohili. While these are not used for feast gifts, they are saved to be used to feed visitors, workers from other lineages, or to give "refreshment" (tamahina) to people who attend feasts and work for the host lineage. Other halutu are for home consumption, but the yam house manager will draw the smallest tubers first and take as little as possible over the year in order to preserve enough seed for the next year's garden. Hence, although the classification of halutu is less developed than 'wateya, a similar bias toward outward transmission and against home consumption governs how halutu are managed.

If people follow the ethic of yam gardening thoroughly, then "the food will be
stacked up" ('ai'ai 'i-hi'wa, or more commonly 'ai'ai 'i-stockim, borrowing the Pidgin word for "stocked," like a full trade store), and they will have "plenty" (bahuna). "Plenty of food" ('ai'ai bahuna) is a condition of an overabundant surplus, and hence an excess capacity to feed others, give gifts and be generous. Proper gardening is supposed to ensure that one harvests plenty and can thus engage confidently in expected acts of generosity and reciprocity. Proper management of the harvest is meant to maintain the state of "plenty" as long as possible. The exemplars of this ethic are the wasawasa and 'alawata, respectively the "rich" man and woman whose big gardens allow them to stage huge feasts and display generosity to many. Wasawasa and 'alawata are entitled to say proudly, "I am capable of everything" (Ginauli maimaidoi-na howahowa-gu), meaning they can satisfy any request and respond to any obligation to reciprocate. The opposite of this status is someone who just "stays quiet" and does not ostentatiously display generosity, lest they prove themselves unable. People say that when they run out of yams, they have to be 'private' (praivat), unable to make gifts until the next harvest. Given these attributes of wealth and poverty, the value placed on yams lies in their capacity to serve as gifts and to make and maintain relationships. Hence, having plenty should be understood in those terms.

While 'enao is explained to be the woman's way of taking care of her family by minimizing their consumption, 'enao is not so much about conserving food for home use, and is really more about balancing conflicting demands on the food supply while still privileging the value of yams as gifts. Consuming food at home always comes at the expense of giving food as a gift to create a social relationship. Thus, Auhelawa divide their harvests into two unequal parts, the greater for giving and the lesser for eating at
home. Obviously, despite the greater value placed on gifts, one cannot eat only food one receives as a gift. Both home production and social production are necessary and the satisfaction of one depends on the satisfaction of the other. One cannot give away the entire harvest, since one must plant some of the harvest as seed. Conversely, one cannot live purely by the fruits of one's own labor since, in addition to all the other essential functions it plays, feast gifts secure rights to make gardens in the 'ebe towolo of one's father. To achieve a balance yet maintain the value of social transmission, the unequal division of the harvest is applied recursively several times over (Table 1).

Table 1. Hierarchy of Yam Classifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HALUTU</th>
<th>'WATEYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Ai'ai-na</td>
<td>Seeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pwane'ahu Other Varieties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>mohili child's seeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>seed &quot;bad&quot; tubers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The resulting system of classification and ranking of yams creates a structure for keeping home consumption and social transmission in balance. Plenty of food means that one can comfortably satisfy social obligations to give and practical obligations to propagate seed lines while still having enough yams and other foods to eat through the year.

Secondary Crops as Food for the Family and the Market

'Enao is supposed to adapt humans to the fickle and difficult yam crops and make it possible for people to eat yams through the whole year. By diligently following the ethic of gardening throughout the year, people could grow enough food and by carefully
managing their food supply, they could make this food last until a new harvest was ready. This ethic centered on people checking their personal wants and working in lockstep with their neighbors, their yams, and nature itself. Old people describe a gardening system of their childhood in which food production moved like clockwork and everyone had sufficient food for themselves and others. In the time before the arrival of missionaries, people of Auhelewa subsisted on four main crops: 'wateya, halutu, pona'e (a species of banana, Musa sp.), and weda (taro, Colocasia esculenta). 'Wateya and halutu were planted in a new garden, and weda and pona'e were 'aihaitu, that is, they were planted in the interstices of yam mounds. Taro was also planted in its own gardens on soil more favorable to its cultivation. When yams dwindled, taro was available for people to eat. There was never hunger or lean times prior to harvest except during occasional droughts and crop failures.

This picture of a previous agricultural system of four crops is perhaps an idealized vision. Today people eat crops from secondary gardens during a hunger period called tagwala and throughout the year as a supplementary food source. Tagwala lasts after the time when yam seed is planted, when the non-seed yam tubers have been eaten or given, until the next harvest. Ideally, then, proper 'enao would allow one to preserve yams to eat until the next harvest. In practice this does not happen and people consume other crops during tagwala. Immediately after harvesting an 'oya, people replant (yahe) the yam mounds of a few of their yam gardens. These gardens are called yaheyaha. In addition to the occasional mebwala yams previously mentioned, people plant tapiok (tomwa'a, cassava, Manihot esculenta) and kumwala ('anu'anule, sweet potato, Ipomoea batatas). Unlike yams, these crops are both less demanding of soil nutrients and can grow in the
depleted soil of the yam garden. They also develop rapidly and can be harvested after three months. Consequently, a family can draw food from a yaheyahie throughout the year. Unlike yams, food from the yaheyahie is harvested as needed. After a year, the yaheyahie is allowed to fallow for at least three years, at which point it is called ya'waya'wala. Food from ya'waya'wala can occasionally be found at times when other gardens have been completely harvested. A woman harvests on a nearly daily basis from the family's yaheyahie, collecting (lauyaba) the "rubbish foods" (yabayaba) that the family eats every day, as well as the cultivated green leaf plants (pam) people eat as a relish. Food from yaheyahie is also collected for the purpose of selling in the small market at the Catholic mission station, where the mission staff buy most of their food. Thus even during tagwala, people have a steady supply of food for the family's consumption from their yaheyahie.

Tending of yaheyahie is an entirely different work from the tending of yam gardens. Whereas yam gardens have an elaborated ethic of their care, yaheyahie are irregularly tended. Also unlike yam gardens, work in yaheyahie is not coordinated or regimented either by the seasonal calendar or by agreement among neighbors. People work in their yaheyahie when they have a need, and take from it when they have a need. Lauyaba is quintessentially individual work. The food produced in yaheyahie is not fit to be given as a ceremonial gift but can only be consumed at home. This should make sense since the food from a yaheyahie is intended solely for the gardener and her family too. It is meant to provide food during lean times and as a supplement to the other foods the family eats during the year. Yam gardens, as I stated earlier, are food produced for others. In this way, yaheyahie and yam gardens form a unequal pair that mirrors the same dual
division of food wealth underlying the management of yams. Yaheyaha help make the
yams "plenty" because they provide substitute foods that can feed the family in place of
yams and thus make the yam harvest last longer and serve the more valued purpose of
being given as a gift.

Here it is important to note that Auhelawa representations of the traditional
gardening system are not only at a wide variance with contemporary practice, but also
seem to be intrinsically unattainable. Talk about traditional gardening is reflexively
temporalized as a lost past. Ideally, yams and taro were harvested in succession and there
was no gap in the food supply which necessitated supplementation. Yaheyaha and
secondary crops, hence, would play no role at all. While it is impossible to know how
true this memory is, it is nonetheless interesting to note that, first, taro is known to be in
marked decline now, and second, the other crops of the yaheyaha are nearly all
introduced, and are recognized as such. Contemporary yaheyaha gardening practice has
evidently changed far more than yam gardening. Moreover, it seems to be important to
Auhelawa to highlight this as a way to express the value of generosity through a temporal
rhetoric. The belief that halutu are themselves more recent than 'wateya also suggests
this. Auhelawa attribute the introduction of both sweet potato and cassava, as well as
squash, corn, pineapple, watermelon, cucumber, and tomato, to missionaries. In local
understanding, these crops were brought as alternative foods to help alleviate hunger
during tagwala. Missionaries were also said to have introduced a Polynesian variety of
breadfruit which was more edible than the indigenous type. People adopted these plants
and started to rely upon them when yam supplies ran out. By and large, they cultivated
them alongside and in addition to the traditional staples. When I conducted a household
survey, I found that yaheyahe were nearly universally planted with cassava and sweet potato, often to the exclusion of any other crop. In the minds of people today, missionaries had provided a valuable opportunity to their parents and grandparents by giving them something new to plant in addition to the yams they tended in their new gardens. Before there was few foods but now people could grow a great variety and grow crops throughout the year. Feeding one's family is seen to be much easier than in the past thanks to introduced vegetables, although they are worthless as gifts. Not only is prescriptive discourse of gardening cast in terms of decline, introduced vegetables are also framed as contributing to a decline from generosity.

In addition to these many introduced foods, some traditional crops are in the process of being lost. People say that pona'e is less widely cultivated than in the past. Pona'e is an indigenous species of starchy banana. Today, many new varieties of banana, both sweet and starchy, have been introduced and they are planted in gardens and in villages to provide both food and sweet fruits for children and for marketing. Also, even though it is said to be one of the traditional main staples, it is thought that taro is very difficult to grow because it needs to be planted in gardens that can be checked regularly so that the parrots which eat it can be scared away. For this reason, many said they did not want to plant taro because it was too much work to inspect the gardens. Also, many people stopped planting taro after a blight in the 1980s. In the household survey, taro was planted in at least one garden by 58% of all households, although it was planted only in 22% of all gardens in the survey. By comparison, 'wateya, halutu, cassava were each planted in at least one garden by 100% of all households. Table 2 shows the percentage of households who plant various crops in at least one of their gardens. We see that a few
crops are universally planted. Thus, it appears that people's perceptions of taro's diminishing importance are correct. While it is said to be a main staple of the traditional system of gardening, it is not widely planted when compared to yams and several new staples.

Table 2. Percentage of Households Planting Crops in at Least One Garden By Crop

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Local Name(s)</th>
<th>Percentage of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater yam (D. alata)</td>
<td>'wateya</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesser yam (D. esculenta)</td>
<td>halutu</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taro (C. esculenta)</td>
<td>weda</td>
<td>58.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banana (M. spp.)</td>
<td>bihia</td>
<td>79.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet potato (I. batatas)</td>
<td>kumwala, 'anu'anule</td>
<td>95.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava (M. esculenta)</td>
<td>tapioko, tomwa'a</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squash (sp. unknown)</td>
<td>susugelu</td>
<td>45.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn (Zea mays)</td>
<td>pegapega</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarcane (sp. unknown)</td>
<td>gwaito</td>
<td>15.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pineapple (sp. unknown)</td>
<td>painaba</td>
<td>13.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrowroot (C. edulis)</td>
<td>pwa'e</td>
<td>15.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other crops</td>
<td></td>
<td>each less than 10% of households</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The replacement of taro by cassava and sweet potato, and the overall importance of introduced vegetables, is further demonstrated by the proportion of households who eat these crops as opposed to taro. Table 3 shows the percentage of households who said that they ate certain foods as a part of any meal the day previous. The survey was taken in mid-May, a time just before people start to harvest new yams. At this time, the most frequently reported starch foods are cassava (83.34%) and sweet potato (50%), followed by banana and both kinds of yams (each 29.17%). Taro, by contrast, was eaten by only
8.33% of households. This confirms the belief that taro no longer plays the same role that it did in the past. Instead, cassava and sweet potato are far more likely to be eaten prior to the yam harvest, as are several gathered foods like Polynesian breadfruit and commodity foods.

Table 3. Incidence of Foods in Household Daily Consumption by Food

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Name</th>
<th>Percentage of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coconut</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>83.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>83.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>58.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet Potato</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banana</td>
<td>29.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halutu</td>
<td>29.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Wateya</td>
<td>29.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breadfruit</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sago</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chestnut</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taro</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squash</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread, buns or scones</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bwalesi</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitpit</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One way to understand the role of yaheyahe is as a supplement to the food produced in yam gardens. In this sense, yaheyahe are like the 'aihaitu crops such as taro and banana which people say were once the main secondary staples. Yaheyahe
complement yam gardens as the lesser half of the household's total production, a dual division that parallels the recursive dual division of the yam harvest. By growing lesser foods in a secondary garden, people can more easily conserve their yam harvest for gifts.

Yet, the minor role of taro relative to cassava and sweet potato raises the question of why people maintain the memory of taro's prominence, or, conversely, why they continue to mark introduced crops as "Polynesian" despite their deep penetration. It appears that this memory of taro serves the ideological purpose of reinforcing the value of generosity and its expression in a narrative of increasing selfishness and material decline. Despite having successfully adapted new foods and innovated local practices, Auhelawa still mark taro as lost because it confirms the reflexive perception that reciprocity and self-interested production are inversions. Taro's cultivation, like yam, is timed according to the rhythm of the agricultural cycle. Timing of work and disciplined management of gardens are both connected to the gardener's proper orientation outward toward others. Growing cassava and sweet potato, however, introduces a completely new kind of garden work. These foods grow rapidly and when harvested do not store for very long. Hence, unlike with yams, there is no need to practice any system of management of secondary crops to make sure the maximum amount is conserved for gifts. Similarly these crops are propagated by cuttings, not by using the whole tuber as seed, so there is no need to conserve part of the harvest for the next year's gardens. Work in the yaheyahe is thus not governed by any ethic which orients the person toward producing for others. The work in the yaheyahe is produced for the benefit of oneself and one's family. Ideally the production and consumption of yams should be mediated by reciprocal relationships such that one's individual labor is converted into gifts that debts with others. Growing and
eating sweet potato and cassava is however unmediated, that is, it is the conversion of individual labor into goods of individual benefit. Thus one can understand why people emphasize the loss of taro, perceive their yam harvests to be diminished, feel that selfishness is increasing. Contrary to what they believe is the proper balance, a significant and irreducible portion of their productive work is inescapably selfish. Given that there is no evidence that yam harvests are smaller or insufficient, it seems reasonable to then conclude that this belief arises from the perception that secondary crops are becoming more important. Since these represent an inversion of the values embodied in yam gardening, yams are believed to be in decline.

As previously mentioned, most Auhelawa households sell garden produce in local markets and in town to earn cash. The money earned is used mainly to pay school fees for children. Most households with school-age children plan one or two marketing trips per year to Alotau to accumulate the money for fees, children's clothes and school supplies. Many households also sell regularly in the market at the Catholic mission station. In contrast to town markets, the mission market does not allow for one to accumulate a large amount of money quickly. Rather, people sell a small amount of betelnut and garden produce to earn a regular income for commodity consumption. This kind of marketing is viewed as a purposeless and leisurely activity. Instead of working, people in the mission "finish" the surplus of food of the household, making them selfish and unable to make gifts. It is worth noting that the value of commodities in people's everyday practice is not necessarily antithetical to reciprocity. For instance, one frequent major purchase made by households who traveled to Alotau for market was a 10-kilogram bag of rice, which was often said to be for providing 'iliwa to the affines who will clear the new yam gardens.
Similarly, a household might raise money through marketing to buy 'wateya or a pig as a part of a feast gift. Nonetheless, informants emphasized that the purpose of marketing was mainly for the household's own benefit, which necessarily came at the expense of its exchange obligations. In this respect, the practice of cash-earning through marketing is perceived to be part of an overall trend of increasing selfishness.

To be clear, there is nothing in marketing that encourages people to change the way they garden. In my household survey and conversations with people about gardens, I found that only a few households planned their planting of crops based on what they could sell. There are no cash crops which are planted in gardens. Betelnut is the largest source of income for marketers. Nor is there anything in the introduced crops themselves which encourages their sale for money, just as there is nothing specific to secondary or introduced crops which require that they be used only for home consumption either. Secondary crops are marketed, as are yams, only when the garden manager, the woman of the household, selects them for sale. What marketing and secondary crops have in common is they lack the outward, social orientation which yams and their cultivation embody. The concepts of generosity and selfishness, plenty and hunger, thus become a framework through which people can represent cash-earning and commodity consumption as economic values. While there may be no inherent tendency for introduced crops or commodity consumption to lead to economic changes, one can say that there is a mutual resonance between the two.

**Conclusion**

I began this chapter with the observation that in spite of the apparent fact that
people produce more than enough food to meet their immediate needs, people believe that their production of food has declined. I have tried to argue that this perception results from the cultural values placed on foods according to their capacities to support positive forms of sociality. In order to understand why people believe that their yam harvests have become smaller, I first showed that having plenty of yams really means having enough food to satisfy ongoing social obligations in the form of reciprocal debts that people create with members of other lineages in feasts. More generally, "plenty" is a state in which there is a balance between the conflicting demands to be generous and transmit food outward from the family as a gift on the one hand and feed one's family and preserve food to be replanted next year. The comprehensive ethic of yam gardening, the classification of yams, and the specialization of gardens into yam gardens and yaheyaha all illustrate this basic principle of maintaining a balance in which most of one's produce is converted into gifts and the smallest possible remainder is eaten selfishly.

To create this balance, and hence to create plenty, Auhelawa prefer as much as possible to convert everyday situations into opportunities to give reciprocal gifts. In doing so, they reframe normal consumption that might otherwise appear to be selfishness as a socially positive form of mutual indebtedness and interdependence. Their classification of gardens and crops and the management of their yam harvests illustrate the same kind of balancing of competing interests in a way that maintains the value of generous giving and minimizes the potential for selfishness. Ideally the production and consumption of food should be mediated by reciprocal relationships such that one's individual labor is converted into gifts that debts with others. Growing and eating sweet potato and cassava is by contrast unmediated, that is, it is the conversion of individual
labor into goods of individual benefit. Being selfish then is not the same as being greedy or stingy, but simply failing to take an opportunity to socialize with others.

Yet, as I have shown, these lesser foods today take up a much larger portion of people's gardens than people believe that they once did. Sweet potato and cassava are universally planted in Auhelawa and an important part of people's diet. At the same time, as inferior foods, they cannot be used to make gifts. By growing and eating these introduced foods, people automatically engage in the unmediated conversion of one's own labor for one's own food. While new crops may have satisfied the need to feed children as the population has grown in the last century, they do so in the least socially valued way, by providing food that can only be consumed selfishly. As a result of adopting these new crops, people have increased the magnitude of the residual category of selfish eating. I would argue that through the incorporation of new crops, people feel that they cannot achieve the same balance between generosity and selfishness that they once could or believe that they should. They interpret this as not having "plenty" of food. It is perhaps more accurate to say that do not have enough of the right kinds.

The particular way in which new foods have been absorbed into the Auhelawa economy illustrates an important aspect of intercultural contact. The main principle of the Auhelawa gift economy is the unequal division of goods in which the greater and more valued half is given in reciprocity. In adopting introduced crops, gardeners treated them as supplemental to the elaborate system for producing plenty of yams. Like other minor foods of the Auhelawa traditional diet, missionary foods were classified as having a residual value with respect to their capacity to act as gifts. Hence, they treated them as secondary crops which could be planted after yams had been harvested. Cassava and
sweet potato, needing less soil nutrients, were certainly preferred over other possibilities, since they could be grown most easily in yaheyahe. Yet, even as these foreign imports were classified in local terms as lesser crops, the category of secondary crops is altered in its practical application to agricultural innovation, and acquires new meanings. As a result, the system overall is changed (cf. Sahlins 1985: 138). This process resembles the process discussed in Chapter 1 by which moments of contact with Europeans are assimilated to alternative genres of historical knowledge, with different consequences for how these contacts are today remembered and narrated. Likewise, reciprocity evokes its inversion in the form of selfishness. ‘Wateya as symbol of reciprocity similarly evoke their inverse in halutu, and yams their inverse in taro and more recently cassava and sweet potato. Thus, even when one value is dominant, it is haunted by its opposite, and the possibility of an alternative valuation in lesser circumstances. What was once a residual deviance to be minimized today has a substantial form. Whereas selfish behavior primarily stems from the failure to act generously by giving gifts, now it is also possible to deliberately act selfishly, that is, to expend effort with self-interest and without any outward orientation to others. One sees this substantial form of selfish behavior in the daily gathering of minor foods for the family from the yaheyahe, and in the nearly daily trips to the mission station to buy and sell. In Auhelawa eyes, both of these activities are uncoordinated, undisciplined, individualized and wasteful; in other words, they do not produce plenty. Yet, these novel forms contain both the potential to support the value of reciprocity as a minor supplement, and the potential to transform the economy altogether. Because selfishness is embodied in these practices, it is possible for people imagine an alternative to reciprocity through selfish behavior. When people make an association
between the decline of yams and the rise of the market, they connect the substantial form of selfishness to an inverse world in which self-interest is the highest priority. In some contexts, this is morally dangerous. Yet, in others, it allows for the elaboration of a whole new system of values. In the next chapter, I discuss people's exploration of this alternative culture through their efforts to accumulate money through business and church fundraising.
Chapter 3. Finding Money

Awkward Accumulation

One night in August of 2006, Lucy's brother's son Kolbe came to our village to talk to Francis. Lucy had gone to the mission station for a late meeting of the Catholic women's fellowship. Kolbe asked Francis to borrow an old Methodist Church hymnal so he and his friends in the neighboring village could practice singing the Dobu language hymns for an upcoming hilauwa (all-night wake). While the United Church congregation uses this hymnal in their services every Sunday, many of the hymns are sung at hilauwa and at Christmas, and are familiar to everyone as traditional tunes of the mission era. Lucy owned a copy that she rarely used, and Francis went inside their house, retrieved it and handed it over without a second thought. Kolbe went off to his friends' clubhouse down the path. After a while, he came back and called for Francis. He gave him back Lucy's hymnal and said that they did not want to borrow it. When he got to their house and sat down to practice, he said, he opened up the hymnal and found a stack of twenty and fifty kina notes, at least K300 in all, wedged in between the pages. He wanted to bring the book back quickly and show the money to Francis, saying that he did not want Lucy to think they were trying to steal her money. The next morning, Francis told me that Lucy was upset when she found out about it. She did not want it to be generally known that she had so much cash.

This story shows how money often awkwardly fits into everyday life in Auhelawa. Marketing and commodity consumption is widespread, and perhaps even necessary to subsistence. People thus need to carry money with them or put it away
somewhere for safekeeping. Yet, people have no safe place to put it, and do not like to carry it with them. Lucy's choice to hide money was in fact a common way to keep money. She could not securely lock it in her house, but she wanted to protect it from thieves and from casual pilfering from her hand basket. She had a small used medicine bottle, her "bank," which she used to keep coins and small bills for making change when she sold food and buns in the market. This would normally be sufficient to safely keep a small amount of money for a normal volume of transactions. However, at this moment, Lucy had a bit more money that usual. Her youngest son, Malachi, had recently gotten paid a hundred kina for helping the village councillor's clerk to enroll voters for the 2007 election, and gave his mother the money to hold on to. I gave Francis and Lucy K200 every month which I called "rent" and they normally divided in half and each called a "present" of K100 to each of them individually. Lucy had the month's K100 from me in her hymnal. And she had started to buy dried tobacco from several growers from other places, chopping it and rolling it in newspaper to make small cigarettes to sell in the market. She had accumulated a lot of cash from her marketing in advance of her next order. While Lucy always marketed so that she would have "her own money," the profits generated from making and selling tobacco sticks was starting to take on the scale of a small business. Thus she needed to store more and more money in her hymnal. While people who knew her could guess that she had a store of money, she felt she needed to hide it. She did not even tell her husband where she kept it.

In keeping her money hidden, Lucy was not deliberately holding back her wealth from Francis and her family. Rather, Francis's ignorance of her money and her choice to hide it underscores the fact the paradoxical nature of all articles of value in Auhelawa. On
the one hand, yams, money and other goods are media of exchange and hence social relationships. At the same time these goods are stores of value that can grow through investment. Preserving yam seeds enables the production of more yams in the next harvest. Similarly, the reproduction of money through marketing allows one to grow a stock of capital. As with yams, money presents a moral dilemma to the Auhelawa actor. One can either generously use money to make a gift to others, or selfishly hoard it for one's own use. In either case one is deprived of one or the other aspect of the value of the money, the solidarity created by generosity or the use value of the commodities it could purchase. Hence, Lucy's cash earnings appear to be at least potentially the result of selfish behavior.

In actuality, people employ many strategies for making selfishness into generosity. In the previous chapter, I argued that the management of the yam harvest illustrated a basic pattern of subdividing a stock of goods into greater and lesser parts, recursively subdividing the lesser part, to generate a hierarchy of value of what they possess which guides them to consume at home the least and make gifts with the best. Thus they avoid the dilemma of selfishness in practice by making every good a potential gift and making goods consumed at home a residual category. In this scheme, the large accumulation of anything of value for oneself would not be possible. The fact that anyone accumulates anything, as one must in order to acquire cash to buy even basic commodities, is interpreted as a moral decline. One might then think that the only space for the accumulation of money would then be in order to fulfill specific short-term needs, such as buying rice to feed garden workers, or selling garden vegetables to pay a child's school fees. Yet, in Auhelawa today, there is a growing sphere of transactions in which
Several individuals, households and lineages operate growing businesses of various kinds. Also, church organizations are consistently successful in raising money for their own activities on a regular basis.

In this chapter, I discuss how these forms of accumulation can be seen as morally legitimate. I argue that private businesses and church fundraising each represent two alternative strategies for pursuing accumulation of money. Private businesses attempt to insulate themselves from moral criticism by framing commodity transactions in terms of gift relationships. Church groups raising money through fundraising activities, by contrast, attempt to present their accumulation as an expression of charity, which they oppose to debt-creating gifts as a form of selfishness in its own right. I furthermore argue that private businesses are less successful in their strategy of disguising accumulation than church fundraising groups are in their strategy of inverting the dominant values to make accumulation a good in itself. I conclude that church fundraising has the greater potential to motivate a broader change in the local economy as a system because it taps into religious ideas about charity to reorganize the local system of economic values.

**The Embeddedness of Accumulation**

The dominant position in economic anthropology is that the individual pursuit of accumulation through exchange is asocial, and that market transactions are anathema to the normative order embodied in a social collectivity. Since Mauss argued that the motive for exchange in many societies derives from a moral obligation to reciprocate, anthropologists have been interested in exploring the moral regulation of economic
Mauss's claim that reciprocity as a moral obligation motivates exchange is a counterpoint to the classical definition of transactions in markets as necessarily self-interested and hence amoral. Economic anthropologists have generally inverted this assumption and suggested that only under certain circumstances does one find genuinely self-interested, accumulative transactions in an open marketplace.

Mauss's critique of classical economics, while opening the question of social control of individuals' economic behavior, has tended to be interpreted as excluding a role for individual accumulation in local economies, and more generally a consideration of the question of change in gift economies. If one conceptualizes economic behavior in terms of its social foundation, one is left with the question of whether one social order can contain two alternative modes of transaction. Similarly, the critique of the classical concept of rationality has tended to dismiss, not address, what precise role individual agency plays in the economy. When looking at economic activities in Auhelawa, one is thus led to a problem. On the one hand, Auhelawa believe reciprocal exchange is a moral value. On the other, Auhelawa also accumulate money not only for their own consumption, but also to reproduce and grow capital in enterprise. How can reciprocity and accumulation as valued activities coexist?

Two approaches to the social basis of the economy have developed as answers to this question. Each of them descends from Mauss though in different respects. The first approach is based on Polanyi's use of the concept of reciprocity in his institutionalist theory of the economy. Polanyi argues that the economy, in its "substantive" sense, has an institutional basis (1971 [1957]: 243). Economic actions of individuals, he further claims, are determined by the institutional structure of the economy. Rational, self-
interested choice itself is only one kind of institutional context for economic action, and a recent development at that. Early economic anthropologists like Bohannan and Dalton, dominated itself by a functionalist reading of Mauss's theory and heavily influenced by Polanyi's critique of formal, rational conception of the economy, apply Polanyi's theory to so-called primitive societies, and treat economic action as wholly determined by the overarching social structure (Bohannan 1955, Dalton 1965, Douglas 1962). Individual self-interested accumulation, furthermore, is anathema to social order. By freeing the individual to pursue their own interests, market exchanges introduced through western contact break down the socially based distinctions of exchange value in primitive economies (Bohannan 1959; Bohannan and Dalton 1962: 6; see also Bohannan 1955: 69-70). In this application of Mauss's critique of political economy, economic change and the coexistence of accumulation and reciprocity is seen as being an exceptional case, usually due to acculturation.

A second approach to these questions comes from a later, Marxist reinterpretation of Mauss. Marxist economic anthropology argued that different economic values could coexist through articulation of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production (e.g. Meillasoux 1981). Gregory (1982) similarly argued that gift economies based on reciprocity could not only coexist with market economies based on commodity exchange, but effloresce by actors' incorporation of goods from the market sphere into gift transactions. For Gregory especially, reciprocity is a theory of value in its own right, not merely an external social obligation of non-market economies. Goods exchanged in reciprocity possessed a certain value in relation to the social bond the exchange created between transactors. On this basis, Gregory contrasts gift and commodity exchange as
distinct, mutually exclusive social logics. While commodity exchange is premised on the alienability of the commodity from the transactor, and hence the essential autonomy of the person, gift economies created relationships between people through the exchange of goods which remain unalienable from their transactors. While Gregory develops the Maussian paradigm in a new way, others have questioned his strong distinction between gifts and commodities (Appadurai 1986; Parry 1992), and his exclusion of the possibility of self-interestedness in reciprocity. Gregory has generally responded to these criticisms (see 1997) by arguing that apparent exceptions to this distinction usually assume individual choice and agency as economic forces, which ignores Mauss's fundamental point about reciprocity. Nonetheless, while Gregory's Marxist reading reciprocity gives one a macrosociological view of the coexistence of reciprocity and accumulation, it is not clear how a particular economy might shift from one value to another. A theory of economic action is necessary to understanding structural change.

Granovetter sees a similar problem in the field of economic sociology. Dissatisfied with the atomized view of social action assumed by both social determinism and rational choice theories, Granovetter proposes a new definition of embeddedness, one of Polanyi's key ideas. Polanyi argued that individuals' choices are embedded in social structures in the sense that social norms and rules determine people's behaviors through internalized constraints. Thus, actors who are so embedded in social structure are essentially social automations and cannot help but fulfill a given institutionalized pattern of behavior. As he states,

Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside of a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts
at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations. (1985: 487)

Actors depend on a network of personal relationships in order to achieve economic ends. They maintain these networks in order to support economic goals. Thus instead of defining embeddedness of the economy in terms of its functional role in maintaining a social structure, Granovetter proposes that embeddedness is properly the non-economic aspects of interpersonal behaviors which influence economic actions by placing them in particular situations.

Granovetter proposes that the embeddedness of economic action may have special applicability to the problem of dual economies (1985: 507). While Granovetter does not specifically cite any particular theory of gift economies, Curry (1999, 2003) and Benediktsson (2002) both adopt this suggestion, and show that small-scale businesses in Papua New Guinea often depend on social networks based on kinship to sustain themselves. For the entrepreneurs they study, there is no inherent conflict between profit-seeking business and the norm of reciprocity. They strive to embed their self-interested action in the networks of moral obligation they have with kin. For other societies in Melanesia, however, such an arrangement is not possible because actors assume that there is an inherent conflict between self-interest and obligation, and hence they strive to segregate the two kinds of activity (e.g. Foster 1995, Akin 1999, Smith 2002). Foster argues that for many such societies the marking of boundaries between the two spheres of exchange corresponds to latent categorical distinctions between lineal kin and other relations. People normally behave according to different values in their relationships with people of different classes of relative. Only certain kin relationships are a receptive
context for business activity, while the obligations entailed in other relationships negated the possibility for self-interested accumulation. This points to a weakness in Granovetter's concept of embeddedness. While social networks can serve as supports for economic activity, not all social relationships are of the same quality. In small-scale societies in which there is little institutional differentiation, personal relationships shape social situations in multiple ways, and individuals' behavior is closely calibrated to interpersonal context, even with apparently friendly, informal and solidary relationships. Gregory's concept of distinct social logics of transaction can help one to modify Granovetter's concept of embeddedness of economic action.

In Auhelawa, the pervasive dualism of interpersonal space is a perfect illustration. In social situations, one is either interacting with someone whom one must respect (ve'ahihi) by acting with shame (hinimaya) or with someone who is a natural relative (mohili) with whom one can behave carelessly ('awawa'uhi). These classes of relationship have both genealogical as well spatial correlates; one never behaves disrespectfully in the presence of patrilaterals or affines, and one always approaches quietly with gaze averted the villages of the father's lineage. At the same time, people with whom one is either respectful or familiar are equally sources of material support and security in contradistinction to unrelated strangers (mumuga). Space, body, genealogy and gifts are thus all media through which people enact relationships of different types, impose different frames of reference on their interactions each with different entailed expectations. They are, to use Keane's phrase, a "moral metalanguage" which actors can reflexively deploy to provide a context for their action (2008). Likewise, Gregory's most recent formulation of reciprocity defines value as a perspective which actors use to
achieve mutual recognition (1997). This suggests that actors reflexively apply cultural values in order to construe social relationships as having a specific quality. Granovetter proposes that the embedded agent navigates a social network in ways that are neither strictly routine nor freely chosen but sensitive to particular situations. Yet, he neglects any role for culture to define the qualities of interpersonal situations. If one defines value as a perspective through which actors achieve agreement about the nature of their relationship, one can then see a role for culture in creating different kinds of relationships.

Similarly, the social settings in which people define relationships and form social networks are themselves social and historical formations. Just as cultural categories of persons inflect personal relationships with different qualities, so too can the history of institutional settings influence the quality of relationships which emerge from them. In Auhelawa, Christianity as a set of instituted practices has emerged as a new way of belonging to a group. The Methodist missionaries encouraged Auhelawa to think of their belonging to a church as a voluntary choice which transcends their ascribed membership in kinship groups. The later arrival of Catholics, although their ideology of evangelism was substantially the same as the Methodists on these two points, also introduced the question of the significance of a person's choice to change their religious affiliation. All of these factors contribute to the meaning of a relationship between members of a congregation as a volitional egalitarian communion. The most important aspect of this kind of sociality for this discussion is that missionaries have long emphasized, and congregants firmly believe, that the best expression of their membership is through freely contributing to the maintenance of their congregation through gifts of money, food and
labor. These gifts should make the congregation self-sustaining. They normally take the form of a pooling of money gifts in large church-sponsored fundraising events. Charitable gifts and fundraising appeals are a familiar ways in which Christian groups seek to anchor themselves in economic spheres in order to give a mediated, material form to their distinctive sociality (Bialecki 2008, Elisha 2008, Keane 2007). Fundraising events are common among churches in Melanesia, and similarly serve as sites for the expression of congregational solidarity (Eriksen 2005, Kuehling 2005: chap. 6, McDougall 2003). Commenting on one such event in a Motu church, Gregory (1980) observes that charitable gifts are premised on a logic of alienability in contrast to the inalienability of reciprocal gifts, and may be an embryonic form of accumulation. In the events at which they make charitable gifts to their churches, Auhelawa also underscore that such gifts are done without an expectation of return. They label these gifts as velau or mulolo, which they describe as being "free," "presents," and "help" in contrast to the "debt" created by the giving of feast gifts. They laud these gifts of velau as being superior expressions of love and care for their church.

In Auhelawa, there are then two distinct social domains, kinship and Christianity, in which people embed their economic activity. Both of these domains are also sites in which people exchange for the purpose of accumulation. The pursuit of accumulation takes different forms in either setting, and is conceptualized as having different value by actors as well. For instance, the few individual entrepreneurs who run profit-seeking businesses like tradestores have embedded their business activity in networks of kinship as a way to support their goal of making money as well as to justify their apparent hoarding of money and goods. By contrast, church congregations and voluntary
organizations within them accumulate funds through charitable donations with the aim of achieving perpetual financial independence. Given the heterogeneity of actors' social network, one must shift away from looking at the embeddedness of the economy as a constant and move towards seeing embeddedness as a problem of actors' choices. In this respect, Granovetter's argument that economic activity is embedded in concrete situations is especially pertinent. Choices are central to the classical paradigm. When one sees that a social actor has multiple alternative paths, one is inclined to import a concept of choice as a product of rational, internal deliberation. Bourdieu (1977) and Appadurai (1986), in opposition to Mauss, each propose that exchange, of gifts or of commodities, should be analyzed in terms of actors' strategies. This seems to inevitably import the model of a rational actor. Granovetter rejects these kinds of interpretations as giving an atomized view of social action. He argues that actors choose to maintain particular social ties with others first and, in the context of that concrete situation, then pursue abstract strategic goals. People in relationships must first establish the basis for their mutual recognition before they use such recognition as grounds for embedded action. I have suggested that, following Granovetter, one should consider the role of cultural values as providing a system of classifications for these particular social ties, and furthermore, a metalanguage through which people in relationships can come to agree on the basis for their interaction and exchange. The structure of values through which people understand alternative socialities shapes the kind of economic action that is embedded in it.

In what follows, I will show how Auhelawa use ideas about kinship and Christianity to reflexively embed their attempts to accumulate money in relationships of different kinds. I will further argue that their options are defined in oppositional
relationship to reciprocity as a paramount value. One example is the ways which business owners seek profit through retail trade in the context of kinship relationships and the associated ideology of mutual help among kin. In this respect, business profits are conceptualized as a lesser form of exchange which people usually use to meet their obligations in the sphere of reciprocal feasting exchange. While on the one hand this makes business profits appear to be unselfish, on the other hand, it also limits the extent to which businesses are free to grow. Another example is charitable fundraising activities among church congregations. This kind of accumulation is defined as the negation of the sphere of reciprocity. Whereas kinship-based businesses define the kind of help that profit can give as subordinate to the obligation to reciprocate, church fundraising groups define the help of charity to the church as being the inverse of reciprocity. Christian conceptions of charity are tied to local notions of generosity in the constitution of the congregation as an instituted social form. Other similar voluntary associations, although secular in character, model their own fundraising on church groups, suggesting that the emergent form of Christian sociality is becoming a dominant site for the embedding of economic action and the creation of value. I conclude that Auhelawa forms of accumulation suggest that the embeddedness of the economy ultimately suggests that actors' agency is necessarily distributed across networks. Given this, the study of the economy should proceed from the conception of exchange as neither norm nor strategy but as network extension because this best equips one to grapple with the question of economic change.
Gifts as Debts and Helps

In the previous chapter, I described the two main forms of relationship in Auhelawa kinship, 'forbidden' (magai) and 'natural' (mohili), and their correlated kinds of behavior, generous and selfish. I argued that these categories are defined not in terms of complementarity, but in terms of a hierarchical opposition in which generosity encompasses selfishness as residual category of devalued behavior. Whereas generous behavior creates relationships, selfishness is thought of as a retentive self-isolation. One sees the same basic hierarchical opposition repeated within the domain of outward transmission of goods to others, that is, behaviors which are considered to be generous. The conceptual space of generosity thus contains distinct degrees, making up a system of classifications for kinds of transmissions. These distinctions are important to understanding how Auhelawa classify commodity transactions. The main opposition is between gifts which create debts, and hence form cycles of reciprocal exchange, and a lower sphere which supports these exchanges.

As discussed in the previous chapter, a donor's abstention from the gift epitomizes generosity. If one offers food to a visitor, one must not take food back from the visitor by eating from the same pot. To do so would be like contaminating a generous act with selfish desire. One should always control this desire to be selfish so that one's regard for the recipient is undivided. In so abstaining, the donor creates an obligation on the part of the recipient to reciprocate in equal amount, and thus maintain a social relationship between them. The most elaborate expression of this mode of giving is the gifts of yams given by visiting lineages to the lineage hosting a feast. The donors in feasts abstain from eating any of what they have given, and indeed will refuse to use the cooking pots which
are used to cook feast gifts to cook their own food. In this context, people explain the prohibition by saying that "You cannot eat your own blood," a maxim they also invoke to explain similar kinds of gifts in other contexts. Reciprocating feast gifts is considered to be the highest form of social obligation. People see the ties thus formed between groups as forming an interdependence that is not only lasting but also absolutely necessary to their social viability.

By abstaining from the gift, the donor signals an expectation of a return gift, the 'payment' (maiha) for the 'debt' (vaga). Such a return gift does not come at the time of either party's choosing. Repayment is delayed, but it is more precise to say that the timing of the repayment is fixed by the rhythm of the life cycle, and thus actors cannot choose to delay their return. Feast gifts are only reciprocated on the occasion of death in the donors' lineage, at which time the debtor gives a gift that is exactly equivalent in size and number, and will usually give additional vaga to their partners to renew their relationship. Similarly, gifts of vaga and maiha are transacted at other interlineage exchanges, such as marriage and memorial feasts, and in intralineage intersegment exchanges on the occasions of namesaking and heir-naming. The cycle of giving is thus tied to the passing of generations and the cycle of social reproduction. The delay in reciprocity reflects the immutable temporality of social life laid down by the structure of lineal succession, what Evans-Prichard called "structural time" (Evans-Pritchard 1940: 94). By abstaining, the donor frames the act of generosity not as a excessive self-denial or act of humility, but as a contribution to the cycle of social reproduction.

To make a feast gift, ideally one should acquire the resources through one's own gardening labor and husbandry for pigs. Through the proper management of yams,
preservation of seeds and restraint on home consumption, one should be able to create the wealth one needs to make a feast gift. Normally, however, one must engage in another, less prestigious, kind of exchange in order to make up the feast gift. For instance, one might 'borrow' (sagena) a pig or basket of feast yams to give as a feast gift from a distant relative. Also, one can ask for 'help' (hagu), that is, contributions towards one's feast gift, from co-residents of one's village. In-married relatives are expected to give help from their gardens toward the feast gifts of their spouse's kin as a part of their affinal service and deference. This help is reciprocated when the helping donor's kin have to prepare a feast gift. This formalized help gift most closely resembles the balanced reciprocity between lineages. One can also call upon other matrilineal relatives to give help towards feast gifts which is not strictly balanced in its reciprocation. Rather, such helps are given as a part of an expectation of generalized mutual aid among matrilineal kin.

Similarly, other helps are given among all people who consider themselves cognatic kin or bu'una, creating a sphere of what Sahlins terms "generalized reciprocity" (Sahlins 1972: 193). Help connotes physical support from behind, and is used generally as a term for any kind of assistance from close relatives and affines. Requests for this kind of help are most often made to obtain timber and other natural materials like sago palm leaves, stalks and fronds for the purpose of housebuilding. No single lineage territory will comprise the full range of natural materials that people use in building and craft, but among the territories of lineages that are joined by kinship or bu'una ties, a group which tends to span a large and more diverse geographic terrain, all the materials can be easily sourced. People feel that they should be open to requests from their cognatic kin and bu'una for these materials, and provide them freely, with a general expectation
that they can be reciprocally treated when they have a need.

The ethic of help also encompasses subsistence trade, which is generally conducted among those with whom one has kinship or bu'una ties who live in different places. For instance, the clay potters of the small southern islands of Tubetube and Ware and of the arid eastern tip of the mainland Kehelala have traditionally brought pots to Auhelawa to trade. They would seek out their partners, distant kin or bu'una, with whom they normally traded and set their wares before them. If the Auhelawa wanted to trade, they would put a basket of yams before the visitors. Auhelawa view this trade as a help to their partners who could not grow enough food. Auhelawa were not always the ones in the superior position of surplus. They also went into the interior of the island with fish and asked to trade for yams from their bu'una in Me'udana, Kelologeiya and Gui who have yet more fertile gardens. This type of exchange seems at first glance to be the most like a commodity exchange. Goods are prized for their use value, and hence the fact that they are different is salient to their value. They are transacted on the spot in satisfaction of at least one party's needs. While this might seem distinct from the generalized reciprocity of help, Auhelawa see trading as being on a continuum with it. They only trade with partners to whom they have some pre-existing relationship, the same as those whom they might reach out to for 'loans' (sagena) or other helps of scarce resources.

The sphere of helps is considered less valuable than that of reciprocal debts. People transact helps in order to obtain what they should ideally be able to provide for themselves through investment of their own work and patient management of resources. Asking for help is however, as a practical matter, normal and simply a part of the generosity of everyday sociality. To understand relationship between the two spheres it is
useful to consider two opposed theses about reciprocal exchanges based on similar data. The first is proposed by Sahlins, who argues that there are degrees of reciprocity, varying on the dimensions of timing of return and ratio of goods exchanged, and correlated with degrees of social distance (1972). The second is proposed by Bourdieu, who argued that all acts of reciprocity are fundamentally the application of a strategy to maximize the gain of prestige in the fulfillment of an otherwise routine obligation (1977). Neither of these claims is well supported by Auhelawa practice. Sahlins claims that degrees of reciprocity are defined by structural categories. In Auhelawa one can ask for help from the same people with whom takes on reciprocal debts. Furthermore, the establishment of relationships though balanced reciprocity in feasting is considered to be necessary for the maintenance of ties with lateral kin and affines, and hence the fulfillment of the obligation to reciprocate is a precondition for receiving helps. By the same token, neither form of exchange lends itself easily to manipulation by individual strategies. Feast gifts for instance cannot be gamed, since they are required under certain recognized circumstances of mourning and mortuary ritual. There is no possibility for an actor to control the timing of the return of a vaga. Helps are more flexible since they are not governed by structural constraints. It would appear that giving helps to people would elevate one's personal reputation, strengthen one's social bonds and allow one to pursue social strategies by creating relationships with these gifts. Yet the ideology of giving help, both among local kin and in long distance trade, is that it should be done with people whom one can trust to reciprocate. Many people expressed concern that they would be deceived by those they helped, because they did not know them, and said that they limited their generosity to those they knew well. Conversely, people also said that
fulfilling requests for help were practically obligatory because of a fear that spurning a request would be perceived as selfish and provoke a person to use witchcraft in revenge. Hence, neither a model of reciprocity as socially determined or strategically chosen gives a complete account of Auhelawa spheres of exchange.

In order to see that relationship, it important to recognize that the sphere of helps is subordinate to that of debts. That is, people rely upon exchanges of helps in order to reciprocate debts; helps do not have value in themselves as debts do. Moreover, help is conceptualized in hierarchical opposition to debt as form of value. Helps are conceptually distinguished from debts with respect to a number of features.

First, debts are created through the abstention of the donor, and hence must be reciprocated in exact amount in order to repay the loss to the donor. For this reason debts are scrupulously counted in feast gifts, and these counts are often written down. Helps are mostly generalized in their repayment, and are not counted. They are assumed to balance out over time because they are, in a sense unlike the gifts in feasts, thought of as portions of a common pool of resources created by the ethic of mutual aid among kin. An exception to this contrast is the practice of 'borrowing' (sagena), which must be repaid in exact amount. Borrowing is however something with an expectation of repayment is done with people with whom one does not necessarily have a strong social tie. Most other forms of help are generalized in repayment and more freely given. The difference between borrowing and creating debt, however, leads to the other distinguishing features of helps.

The second distinguishing feature of helps, as well as loans, is that they are initiated by the recipient. In the sphere of debt, the donor initiates the exchange by giving
a gift. Recipients, that is, hosts of the feast, may try to prevent taking on debts through various tactics, such as scheduling a feast quickly after the initial mourning period. When visitors from other lineages give them their feast gifts, the hosts are obligated to repay them at the next feast. At this time, they may also give additional vaga to start the cycle over again. Sagena and other helps are characterized by the fact that the recipient makes a 'request' ('awanoi) for them. When one seeks help, one goes to the prospective donor 'emptyhanded' (nima'a'ava-) to ask, risking rejection and exposing oneself to scrutiny. The request for help itself emblematizes the practice of the exchange in the verbs used to denote help-seeking. The word for 'mouth' ('awa-) acts as a verbal prefix that combines with a noun to form a verb that refers to the seeking of a gift of that thing, for example, 'awa-suga means asking for sugar, 'awa-kero means asking for kerosene. There is no similar way to produce terms for seeking repayments of helps. Asking for repayment collapsed into the act of requesting.

Interestingly, the act of ceremonially exchanging of shell valuables known to anthropologists as kula exchange is termed 'awa-'une, meaning 'ask for valuables.' The exchange of shell ornaments is thought of in terms of the ideology of help. Although the ornaments are exchanged according to their rank and are thus said to balance each other in exchange, they are transacted upon the request of the recipient. The recipient is also said to approach a trade partner emptyhanded, as anyone seeking any help, and kula partners are said to cultivate a high degree of trust. In these ways, kula exchange is classified in terms of the exchange of helps.

A third and related characteristic of helps is that they satisfy wants of the recipient. Recipients of helps are motivated to request them because they need them for
some purpose. This contrasts with the gifts given in feasts not because these are purely ceremonial, but because they exceed purely material value. Feast gifts are total prestations, to use Mauss's term, in that their giving expresses an all-encompassing interdependence between donor and recipient which is their perduring relationship. Similarly, subsistence trade, which is done between relatives and bu'unas who can trust one another, is thought of as a kind of help because the two parties swap unlike, complementing goods on the spot. They rely upon an ethic of help to conduct trade so that they will be treated fairly. In few descriptions of trade I collected, there is no negotiation or bartering. Hence, for Auhelawa, the offer of trade goods is a substitute for a verbal request, an invitation not so much to exchange use-values, but a special way of asking for help by means of a gift.25

The fourth of these features is the timing of the return. Repayment of debts in feast takes place in a zero-degree of temporality in that one can only repay a feast debt in the next feast. The cycle of reciprocity is completely determined by the regular pattern of structural time. By contrast, helps are usually given when they are asked for and hence take place within a smaller scale of time that structures individuals' ongoing relationships, such as the pace of daily life and occasional needs for coconuts, kerosene, timbers, and palm fronds. Sagena are also repaid when the lender asks for repayment.

Overall these distinguishing features of helps contribute to the relatively superior prestige that attaches to debt as opposed to help. Exchanging helps is optional, although an underlying ethic of kinship makes it seem normative. Exchanging debts is obligatory, not in the sense that it is a moral rule or duty to do so, but because not doing so is disruptive to the constitutive basis for people's social identities, that is, the articulation of
descent groups in their alliances to other descent groups, and to a lesser extent, the
textension of descent-based identities to other groups through bu'unas. Furthermore, there
is no moral motivation to exchange helps among people who are not related, that is, not
already in some way tied to each other through an ongoing cycle of feast debt. In the
absence of this precondition of participation in a cycle of balanced reciprocity, people
tend not to exchange helps because they are afraid of being cheated.

There is also a way of giving that negates reciprocity, which is giving gifts
without abstaining from them. For instance, when a lineage hosts a feast, they provide
food to the visitors called sana'upwa. This food is not a return gift for the vaga, but is
called "free food" for any attendee of the feast, host or guest, to eat. There are no
restrictions on who can eat this food and hence there is no expectation of a return, nor is
there any relationship created through the giving of sana'upwa. This food is essentially
shared among donors and recipients, and hence barely qualifies as generous giving.
Communal eating in church sponsored events, a frequent social activity, is also likened to
sana'upwa because there are generally no restrictions on who can eat food served in a
church context. Auhelawa use the word teibolo, derived from the English loan word
'table', as a term of derision for this kind of unrestricted generosity that characterizes
mission-style events. They also use this term to describe sana'upwa. The same kind of
unrestricted gift is given when people beg betelnuts and betel pepper, pour part of their
lime powder into another's container, or break off a piece of a tobacco stick. People call
these gifts velau, which they usually glossed into English as 'present'. In contrast to
reciprocity, velau epitomize a domain of conative and affective expression. They are
given at Christmas and on Father's Day, events of family togetherness and sentiment. The
word velau denotes greeting, shaking hands, and familiar embrace. Though the kind of sociality it engenders is positive, it is also clearly subordinated to reciprocity of debts and helps. People say that teibolo is a bad way to give gifts in feasts because people will eat everything on the spot and go home empty-handed. In other words, sharing does not produce debt and hence durable solidarity. It creates intimacy through commensal yet wasteful consumption. It is the lowest form of reciprocity.

When Auhelawa use exchange to make and maintain relationships, they draw from a differentiated conceptual palette from which they become aware of the value of what they are doing. They can exchange helps, debts, or loans, or share freely. Each of these courses of action carries with it a constellation of associated ideas of the kind of relationship they will create between them. Each of these kinds of relationships is signaled in the act of exchange through the features which distinguish between different kinds of gifts. To say that the transaction of any type of good is embedded in social relationships is precisely to say that it is mediated by explicit representation of the relationship between transactors. Transactors recognize each other through the mediation of these ideologies and understand their obligations to each other accordingly. While this may suggest that transactors can freely negotiate what kind of relationship they want, using different types of gifts as alternative choices, one must also note that all of these alternatives defined in opposition to the central value of reciprocity which in its basic form does not permit for negotiation because it is obligatory. Transactors form relationships through a hierarchy of values in which their actions have different value with respect to obligation.

Given this understanding of value as perspective, how then do actors come to
understand what they are doing when they exchange commodities? Disembedded consumption of commodities and accumulation of cash each risk being seen as 'aiduma, selfish hoarding. There are two alternative ways which people try to reframe this behavior. One can either see it in terms of the value hierarchy of reciprocity. Or, one can see it as the inversion of this scheme of values, so to speak, as good accumulation. Consequently people practice accumulation either by embedding it in kinship relationships, or by embedding it in social relationships which are outside of that social system altogether. In the next section, I describe these two possibilities in details. Accumulation takes place in the context of kinship and the church congregation, each with different results.

**Family Businesses**

Auhelawa's history of involvement with commodity exchanges is as long as their contact with Europeans, almost 125 years. Initially, people only exchanged alienated goods with others outside of their network of kin and bu'una. This has gradually shifted such that today people exchange commodities with those whom they also exchange gifts. Commodity exchange is fully part of normal social life in Auhelawa.

Even before Didiluwa was appointed the colonial village constable, Auhelawa could trade their labor to acquire commodities. Blackbirders are said to have taken some Auhelawa to Queensland. Others traveled to plantations in colonial British New Guinea to work and acquire steel tools in exchange. Australian and European trader also traded commodities for shells and beche-de-mer. Didiluwa himself worked on the boat of one such trader (MacGregor 1891-1892). Didiluwa is remembered not for this fact, but for
teaching people to earn money by selling copra, a labor-intensive coconut product people could produce in their own villages and sell to buyers in the colonial headquarters. Copra production brought most Auhelawa into market exchanges in the colonial period, giving many people access to money and commodities for the first time. Tradestores opened to sell commodities like rice, flour, sugar and hardwares, sometimes in exchange for copra. The price of copra is much lower now than in its heyday, and it is no longer profitable to produce it. Marketing betelnut and garden foods, both in town and in the Catholic mission station, are now the main ways people earn money.

A few people also try to go beyond marketing and start a business. The term 'business' covers a range of different activities all of which share the common purpose of reproducing and growing a fund of capital as well as providing income to the owners from profit. When running a tradestore, the owner must sell enough goods to cover the cost of the next wholesale order, as well as gain some money to pay for losses and other costs. A motorboat owner has to earn enough from fares to pay for fuel costs for each run, but also gain enough profits from fares to pay for the regular maintenance of the main asset of the business, the motor. Marketers tend to sell produce in proportion to their need for cash. To prepare for this, they attempt to set aside a portion of their produce by prohibiting its consumption and when they have stored up enough through savings, they actively sell it in the mission station and in Alotau until they reach the amount they need. Business in the sense that Auhelawa give it is thus distinct because it is ideally perpetual and is not justified by consumption needs. Also, and more significantly, whereas marketers generally see themselves as selling to wage earners among the mission staff and town dwellers, local businesses depend on local customers,
the overwhelming majority of whom are not wage earners and do not have a regular cash income for commodity consumption.

During my fieldwork, there were three tradestores in Kurada ward which had been running continuously for many years, and one which had recently started up. Another longstanding store was located in Bwasiyaiyai ward. Unlike in previous years, when mission organizations and the copra cooperative sold trade goods, these stores were all located in villages. Moreover, they tended to be identified with one or two individuals who were their initiator and executive manager. For these individual business owners, running a business entailed accumulation of money. The primary motivation that was most frequently cited for wanting to start a business was to have a regular cash income and be able to create something of lasting value to support the commodity consumption needs of oneself, one's children and other relatives in the future. For owners, there was no necessary conflict between profit-seeking and normal sociality based on generosity and mutual help. Rather, in interviews with me, they tried to harmonize these two values. Many recognized that keeping a business going could mean setting aside generosity in order to accumulate, but even when they dilemmas of this sort, they still felt like their overarching aim of a self-sustaining source of income was still possible. What I wish to argue is that these business owners are aware to an extent of the necessary embeddedness of their profit-seeking in the same kinds of social relations in which other kinds of transactions are embedded, specifically, the networks of support, debt and obligation among kin and affines. In the practice of running their business, owners seek to reproduce these relationships in which they are embedded as economic actors by appealing to the values of the domain of reciprocal gifts, and thereby aligning the aims of their business
with the value of reciprocity.

The process followed by business owners to start and sustain a store illustrates the embeddedness of business. Owners act as though their businesses are self-contained and self-sufficient, yet, they also depend on support from others to get started. In the beginning, a store needs to have its own building. A trade store is housed in separate building within the village of the owner near their house. Structurally, they are less complex than a standard house, usually having only one room in which goods are stored and a verandah on which customers stand and order goods through a window. Most of the stores in operation in Kurada were fabricated from local building materials, although all of them incorporated some manufactured building materials, such as sawn timbers and iron roofing panels. Trade stores begin their lives in buildings made mostly of local materials. Owners draw upon the same networks of support that they would use to obtain materials and labor to build a house, and may only spend money to buy nails, which are also often used in residential homes as well. Minimally, the store owner will buy a set of locks and latches to secure the door and windows of the store to protect the goods. One also often buys a cash box and bookkeeping stationary. One tries to preserve as much as possible from the fund one has for starting a store for the purchase of the first order of goods, and hence store owners generally planned on starting the business as small and simple as possible, making incremental improvements with the profits they earn from each wholesale order. Only one store in Kurada, the largest and oldest, was housed in a permanent materials building. The owner had continuously reinvested his profits in his enterprise and built a building deliberately designed to look like the large tradestores in town. The store sat on a cement foundation, in contrast to most houses, which are on
piles. Customers entered through a ground level front door, stood in front of the counter and ordered from the goods displayed on long shelves along the back wall. Toward the end of 2006, another store in Kurada bought several sheets of roofing iron and hired a chainsaw to cut lumber for a new, larger store building. Lineage members cut the rosewood from their lineage territory for the timber frame. Each of the owners of these stores saw their businesses as growing gradually from the profits they accumulated and reinvested. However, both stores drew upon resources from the network of relationships of their owners through non-market transactions.

In most people's minds, each of these stores were owned and controlled by one or a few individuals. The people who were regarded as the owners did exercise the most control over the business, but they also attempted to diminish the perception that they exclusively possessed all of the assets of the store. The stores in Kurada and Bwasiyaiyai were all run by men, and as such, their control over the business as property existed in relation to their position within their matrilineage. Two owners in Kurada built their businesses in their wives' villages, and when asked to tell the story of how they started the business, they cited their obligations as in-marriage men to their wives' lineages. Both mentioned that they needed to obtain permission to run a store from their wives' senior relatives, and made clear that the proceeds of the business would help maintain their children. Indeed, both of these stores were named after the owners' children, one of which in the form of a possessive construction. The other two stores represented an alternative strategy. They were started by men in their home villages and bore names of either the lineage totemic bird, or the grandparents of the founders. One of these store owners insisted that he be known as the manager of the store, saying that his lineage was the real
owner. Other male kinsmen of his lineage played prominent roles in the running of the business, as did male kinsmen of the other lineage-based store.

Store owners in Kurada also tried to represent their relationship to their business through a narrative of how they came to have the money to start the business. Two store owners said that they started their business with a gift of money from a wage-earning relative. Two business owners claimed to have accumulated the money for a store from their own cash earning, although one said he planned on asking a relative for help. Teachers, nurses and other public servants pay into a superannuation fund during their service. When they reach the mandatory retirement age, they are given the option to receive their pension as a monthly check or in a single lump sum. Auheleawa public servants, like most other nationals, have the life's ambition of retiring in their natal village. For the most part, they were raised in Auheleawa and selected for further education and training as they moved through the school system. They wish to return home permanently after years of living abroad. Given this, most people assume that receiving a regular stipend is pointless since one does not need maintenance income in the village, where one hopefully still has rights to garden on lands of the lineage. Furthermore, the lump sum payment option offers an opportunity of tens of thousands of kina, several orders of magnitude more money than most people in the village ever possess at one time. Having in mind the model of business as a mechanism for reproducing and growing funds, people usually take the lump sum with the intent of sharing their wealth with kin by starting businesses.

One illustration of this pattern is my own adoptive family. Francis and Lucy both worked in Catholic missions for most of their adult lives. As a schoolteacher, Francis
exercised his pension benefit when he retired from teaching in 2000. He collected a lump sum which he planned to live on during his retirement in Kurada. He bought a fiberglass dinghy and outboard motor, the preferred form of ocean transport. His eldest son, Charles, operated the boat and transported people going to and from the mainland for marketing. Francis also built a store in his wife's village, where they had settled, intending to pass it on to his children. He encouraged his other children to learn how to run the business and gave them money to start up their own enterprises. This was, he said, his way of providing for them and giving them security in the future, which he said was similar to the father's practice of planting betelnut palms for his children in the mother's village. He also said that his sister's children, that is, his lineage members, asked him to provide them with gifts from his money. He eventually bought a second fiberglass dinghy and motor for them to look after and operate as a business opportunity in their own village. His children's interest in business waxed and waned, and for the most part, Francis administered the store for them. Toward the end of my stay in the village in 2006, his younger son took on increasing responsibility and autonomy, aided by his sister's husband, Steven, a new teacher and an in-marrying man like Francis. For his part, Steven saw himself as meeting his obligations to his parents-in-law and his new son, Francis's grandson, by loaning money to the store and making plans to expand it. Francis decided that the store now belonged to his three adult children and his two-year old grandson.

Other store owners told similar stories of asking for and receiving start-up money for starting a business from kin who were earning wages or who had retired. They cast these contributions toward the business as gifts of help, and as part of an ethic of sharing and mutual support. In general, people believe that those who earn wages should freely help
their kin with gifts of money in response to needs, such as for school fees. Start-up money is an extension of this ethic. The money is not given as a loan, nor did owners who took money to start businesses claim that their benefactors were co-owners. Rather, owners cast themselves as managers of property that came from another person, and hence they saw themselves as obligated to steward the money, "watching over it" as is often said, and ensuring its reproduction and growth. Owners suggested that it would be bad to lose the money by being an irresponsible manager and, to use the Auhelawa expression often invoked in this context, "eat the money," that is finish the goods off in heedless, selfish consumption without gaining the money from them needed to make a new order and replenish the stock.

As mentioned, two store owners each claim that they did not receive a gift of money to start their businesses. Nevertheless, each of their own stories of starting businesses illustrates some of the same patterns as the other two businesses. Both of them described pressures from their wives' kin to give 'help' (hagu) to them, either money or food. One abandoned his first business in his wife's village and launched a new store in his natal village, which was intended to be a cooperative enterprise of all the members of his lineage, who all had rights in the business and obligations to work for it. Another planned to ask wage-earning relatives to give him help to regain some of what he lost from meeting the needs of his wife's lineage.

Besides giving help to neighbors for them to meet their own obligations in a sphere of reciprocity, businessmen give credit purchases generally as another way to give help, and to present their own accumulation as unselfish. Stores usually prominently displayed a sign that stated that no purchases could be made on credit, or that non-
members could not buy on credit. Yet, in practice, all stores allowed people who asked to buy on credit on a regular basis. Credit purchasing is a common feature of all cash-earning activity. Auhelawa use the term buki to refer to these kinds of purchases. The term comes from the English word book. Its precise origins are unclear. On one level, buki is similar to Auhelawa practice of sagena, or borrowing, and this might be interpreted as an extension of the idea of delayed reciprocity to commodity consumption. Also, informants said that members in the cooperative society could buy on credit freely and repay their accounts by selling copra to the society. Their purchases would be recorded in a book under their account number. Also, several informants told stories of dimdim copra traders who once ran trade stores on Normanby and permitted booking. These credit purchases could be repaid with copra. When I first asked store owners about credit, they said that people should not book purchases. In my later conversations with them, they revealed that they were more inclined to book purchases than they first claimed. They all suggested that booking was unavoidable. Francis had set up his store in Lucy's village near the mission school to serve teachers and mission staff. Since their money came only through their fortnightly wages, he allowed them to maintain a credit balance and sign over their paychecks to the store.

Even though it is an established practice, Francis and other owners often faced the problem of unpaid debts to the store and had to harass customers to pay. Store owners explained that they tried to make distinctions between the kinds of people who booked. Wage earners and other people often try to give the impression that they had plenty of money to pay their accounts, and would book purchases again and again, all the time promising to repay what they owed soon. These people, they all said, should not be given
the chance to book. However, other people could be trusted to repay booked goods quickly. Store owners commonly gave a hypothetical example of a old woman who wanted to book a packet of flour to make bread to sell in the marked. In 2006, a one-kilogram packet of flour usually sold for about five kina, on which a seller could expect to make about two kina in profit. Store owners thought that this was a perfectly reasonable situation in which to give the flour on credit, and assumed that the woman would sell her buns and return at the end of the market day with money to buy another packet of flour for her next market. It often seemed as though store owners were eager to give credit to people who were selling in the market, especially if they were members of the store, relatives or consociates. They were not concerned with sales in themselves, but with judging who would be "honest" about booking who were deserving of their help.

Overall, owners are aware that their business activity can be construed as selfish, and try to present their activity as being a kind of help to their kin and affines. Business owners accede to the formal requests of help of their relatives as much as possible. They gave money and food for feasts hosted by the lineage of where they lived without expectation of repayment. They also allowed individuals to book purchases as a kind of help. Business owners also talked about others' relationship to the store as being help as well. For instance, many lamented that people who booked were ultimately proved to be dishonest, saying "We are helping them, but they cannot help us." People who wanted to receive help from the store were often asked to give help back in the form of work, building materials and timely payment of credits. This strategy was much easier to do when the business was based in a lineage, rather than between intermarried lineages. In lineage-based businesses, the flow of help appeared to be more balanced overall and was
additionally construed as co-ownership. Both of the lineage-based store owners formalized this relationship by compiling a membership list consisting of people of their lineage and other lateral kin and affines who had helped them build the store, lent start-up money, or helped with the work of running the business. The help of the lineage was seen as a cooperative effort of the lineage to create value through commodity transactions that they could use to meet their obligations in a sphere of interlineage reciprocity. As one owner said, "We wanted the store to be 'our thing' ['ai yama ginauli],'" which he explained as a common perpetually-lived fund of money and goods that they could draw upon to pay school fees and generally support the lineage, as well as to feed visitors in feasts. Smaller stores, based in the village of the wife of the owner, did not have members. These owners said that they did feel an obligation to help their wives' kin by giving them money and goods from the store, but this was not expressed in terms of co-ownership, but in terms of affinal deference. The strategy of embedding the business within the lineage seems to have greater potential to allow for accumulation of money than one of embedding it within the sphere of obligations of a father to wife's kin and to children. The latter, besides being defined by interpersonal exchanges, is conceptualized as being mostly unidirectional because Auhelawa marriages ideally create asymmetric alliances. Both strategies, however, end up nesting commodity transactions as a subsphere within a sphere of gift and countergift, vaga and maiha, and thus end up being defined in relation to the underlying value of reciprocity. The selfishness of business is not denied or transcended. If anything it is confirmed, but also contained and neutralized much in the same way that people assume that everyone is retentively selfish in their management of their yam harvest.
**Church Fundraising as Accumulation**

In private enterprise, people embed their accumulation of profits in various kinds of kinship. In contrast to this strategy, church fundraising embeds accumulation in the relationships among congregation members, and makes the accumulation of a fund a sign of the viability of the congregation as a public group. When setting out to raise funds for church activities, people create a new context for their accumulation, specifically, a distinct sphere of relationships that is not based on kinship. Drawing on Christian ideology and reflexively contrasting it with other economic spheres, fundraisers define the relational context of their activity as the inversion of reciprocity. One sees this in both discourse about charitable gifts and in the staging of ceremonial fundraising events. I will now discuss the practice of charity in Auhelawa and the annual cycle of church fundraising activities.

A major influence on contemporary Auhelawa's idea of charity comes from their contact with missionaries. Missionaries' annual reports illustrate through their rhetoric the idea of charity they promoted. The Australian Methodist missionary body published its annual reports as periodicals to which churches throughout Australia as well as individuals could subscribe. The reports served the primary purpose of promoting the aims of the organization, which operated missions throughout the Pacific Islands. Reports were almost always accompanied by direct appeals to subscribers to support the missions in the Pacific, especially as missions spread and developed through the early twentieth century. In the years after the first world war, the Methodist mission society redesigned the format of their previously terse reports to be more eye catching. They started to include more graphics, photographs, art nouveau scrollwork and page decorations,
suggesting that the reports could be read for leisure, and not just as sober documentations of expenditures (although such figures continued to be included along with the subscriber list and donations). The 1915 issue included a full page map of the Pacific islands and Queensland, suggesting a natural connection between the Australian metropole in New South Wales below and the extensive tropical hinterlands between the Equator and the thirtieth southern parallel. Across the top of this map is written the caption:

How much PRAYER will you pour forth?
How much LIFE will you give out?
How much MONEY will you set free?

To Win These Islands for Christ. (Methodist Missionary Society of Australiasia [MMSAu], 1915: 8).

The parallelism of the first three questions suggests an equation among prayer, life and money as resources which can be freely given in support of evangelism. Later issues included pictures of miserable looking native children with captions such as "Will you help to save this child?" (MMSAu 1922: 9) and "Give me a chance, please!" (MMSAu 1923: photos). All of this strongly suggests, as do the constant pleas in this and later issues, that readers should give generously and freely in support of the cause of Christianity, and that through money gifts, volunteering and prayer, home churches become part of a collective action of evangelism. Freely given money, alienated and without expectation of return is thus associated with a person's duty to the church as a body.

Accompanying these appeals, missionaries wrote from their respective fields of their efforts to win converts, build churches and provide schooling with subscribers' donations. In these stories, missionary writers gave special emphasis to the growth of
their congregations in number and the increased individual interest in Christianity as cult and church. They illustrated the former with statistics on the number of new places where preachers, catechists and pastors had been sent, the number of hearers who attended services, and the number of baptisms. They also often included summary statements which characterized the growth of their congregations in terms of spiritual movement, growth, revival, or alternatively, doldrums. To illustrate the latter and connect the numerical growth to matters of belief, missionary writers included stories of conversion and commitment to the church by individual converts. In these stories, personal profession of faith and individual rejection of heathenism are frequent motifs. Such stories interpellate the reader into the position of supporter and colleague of the writer, and indeed are often accompanied by an explicit appeal to respond with donations and prayer.

One frequently occurring type of story is that of annual fundraising meetings. Missionaries would hold annual meetings in their headquarters in which the congregations making up surrounding circuit would present offerings in support of the mission. The aim of these meetings was to raise enough money to support the missionaries and their staff through the year, making the mission circuit "self-supporting" (MMSAu 1919: 15, see also MMSAu 1922: 55). To understand what this meant to the missionaries, consider how the founder of the Dobu mission, William Bromilow, described the first meeting in 1899:

Each village pastor led a band into the church with songs of praise, and the gifts of money or native articles were laid in front of the rostrum in the true spirit of giving. Giving in its true sense has not hitherto been known amongst this people, and we recognize that only the Spirit of God could have influenced our members to join so heartily in these contributions to
God's work. (Bromilow 1900: lxxix)

While not stated here, Bromilow contrasts the authentic spirit of generosity in church offerings to his understanding of the local value of reciprocity, which he understood as epitomized in what he called the "lex talionis" of Dobuan warfare (cf. Bromilow 1929: 71). He thus takes the total sum of gifts as a sign of the commitment of the donors to his faith in opposition to their heathen culture of birth. Accounts of these meetings always reported the total amount raised and often mentioned whether the total exceeded the previous year.

Consider also what another missionary writes in 1918:

The following incident is recorded as illustrating the spirit which often lies behind the gifts of these native Christians. A village teacher, whose annual salary and allowances total L17 16s was overheard talking to his people one day about giving, thus: "I am only a stranger in your villages but I have set aside L2 for the Missionary meeting, and my dog, my cat, my pig, my goats and my fowls are all represented in the gift. Don't give for yourself alone, but give something for every good gift that God has given you."
(MMSAu, 1919: 15)

The teacher in the story is said to give above and beyond what might be normal, out of love for the church. His gift represents a large part of his income as a teacher, yet he states that he will give even more than he might usually in gratitude for what he has, even his pets. To give in this way is called "liberal" by the reporter (ibid.). Moreover, although he uses an idiom of reciprocity, it is an inversion of its stereotype among missionaries. The teacher's gift is meant to give thanks to God for what He has given him, not to create a debt with missionaries.

One might even go as far to say that the teacher is meant to serve as a model of generosity to the reader. Minimally, the story and other reports of fundraising meetings
show that missionaries believed that gifts are given freely and out of love, without any expectation of return, because the gifts contribute to a common fund, and support a common cause of enlarging the global Christian community. The stories of missionary meetings thus combine two major indicators of the mission's success: authentic personal change and numerical growth. In reports, they employ the total amount of funds collected from offerings as a symbol of their success. As discussed in detail below, the kind of gift that missionaries valued most is not only distinct from the notion of debt in Auhelawa culture, but often explicitly inverts that value. The missionaries' ideology of charity then is that the gift is an expression of authentic sentiment, which has the capacity to bind the giver to other similar givers in a community of common sentiment. The intimacy created by gifts of this kind creates a feeling of a common purpose. Moreover, this community is discursively united with the churches in Australia and Polynesia, a metonym of the global Christian church. By the same token, the missionary gift is discursively opposed to a caricature of heathenism which is imagined as the inversion of Christianity itself.

The social and material practices of missionaries also reinforce the relation of this ideology of charity to the sociality of the congregation. As they valued liberally and generously given charity, so did missionaries also value signs of change, specifically, authentic personal and voluntary commitment. Often in reports, missionaries wrote of emotional individual decisions to become a candidate for baptism over the interference and temptations of the village community. They also wrote of candidates' who failed to live up to standards and were rejected for baptism. As Bromilow writes in 1894, "Amongst a people like this, where there is so much superstition, immorality and deceitfulness, we require great wisdom to discern true signs of penitence, and at the same
time not to discourage any who may, however feebly, be seeking after God" (MMSAu 1895: xlix). Both positive acts and backsliding on the part of converts could equally serve as signs of individual commitment because, at bottom, missionaries defined that commitment in relation to a clearly marked boundary between the old culture of the village and the new culture embodied in the mission itself.

There is a substantial continuity between contemporary Christian practice of charity and that of the missionaries. Missionaries' discourse of charity, especially its association of alienated money gifts with a voluntarily chosen intimate union, continues to resonate with Auhelawa Christians today. Auhelawa conceptualize charity as a Christian mode of giving which is distinct from help. Help expresses an ethic of mutual assistance among people with common ancestors. Charity is, by contrast, something one gives in the context of church membership in support of the church as an institution. In the case of charity, then, the echo of missionary practice in contemporary Auhelawa culture echoes the intentions of missionaries. One knows from their writing about its value as a sign of commitment that charitable gifts should be given liberally and generously to create an intimacy among individuals as fellow believers. In practice, this intimacy seems to have been enacted in the routine attendance records, altar calls, and blessings of offerings at missionary meetings. The overall effect has been to create a community among Christians in which charitable gifts are normative. Charity is Christian, then, because it is a self-conscious claim to membership in the Christian church through the vehicle of a gift. Membership in a congregation is normative and presumed to be universal, and hence charity today does not express individual choice. Rather the motivation to cooperate accumulate money is to create a perpetually lived
fund through which the congregation as a group can come into being. Auhelewa have inherited charity from missionaries, and turned it from a mode of individual self-fashioning into a mode of social reproduction.

The local understanding of Christian charity can best be seen in the fundraising events which the two local congregations each hold every year. The United Church congregation at Sowala usually holds its Offering Day in May. The Catholic community holds an event which is modeled on the local Methodist tradition on the feast day of its patron saint, Peter, on June 29. These events are locally called mulolo. In mulolo, members of the congregation take turns publicly presenting a love offering of money to the church staff and deacons, who then announce a grand total at the end. Mulolo would appear then to be the successors of the annual missionary meetings held in the colonial era. According to informants, mulolo is a word from the Tubetube language which was used by missionaries at Sowala. They generally glossed mulolo as velau in Auhelewa, a word that denotes a freely given token of affection, carrying with it no obligation to repay, and connoting sharing. Indeed, this identification of a church offering with a love gift is reinforced by the neologism teibolo, which people use to describe gifts of hospitality which are shared freely in feasts and do not incur debts. Teibolo is a way of serving food which is considered characteristic of the mission style in contradistinction to traditional feasting, in which visitors and hosts are prohibited from sharing food. Hence, love offerings are seen as being tied to a distinctly Christian kind of sociality in contrast to reciprocity. The self-reflexive translation of missionaries' words into a local idiom serves to underscore that Christian charity pertains to a distinct sphere of value. Whereas velau are otherwise considered to be socially insignificant, in the context of supporting
one's congregation they are paramount. Furthermore, unlike sana'upwa or other kinds of velau, people are not free to share in what they give to the church. Yet no debt is incurred by abstention in this context. In participating in mulolo, congregants reflexively embed the accumulation of money for church finances in a distinctly Christian form of social relationship. In the act of giving itself, donors and recipients signal that they are doing something different from reciprocal exchange.

The two mulolo I observed in 2006 were both held on Sundays after the main service of the congregation. What I describe is a basic outline of the event based on my observations of both cases. After the Sunday service, a group of men put a table in front of the assembled congregation. These people had been asked to run the event, and would collect, count and record the contributions. They put a bowl and notebook on the table. Behind them, they propped up a chalkboard to face the congregation. On the chalkboard and in the notebook, they made up a balance sheet listing in columns the name of the lay groups which had members in the congregation, contributions and a running total. Sowala differed from the Catholics in that Sowala's contributions were tallied by village while the Catholics tallied the contributions by the ten base communities which comprise the local congregation. The congregation sat at a distance facing the table, leaving space for people to proceed upward to present their gifts.

One person at the table called up each group to the table one at a time. The group would mass in front of the table at several yards remove holding in their hands their bills and coins. The group sang a church hymn or chorus. About midway through the song the group processed slowly toward the table while singing. They stood directly in front of the table and completed their song, thrusting their money gifts forward into the bowl all at
once. As the song finished and the group started to back away, other people came up
from the sides and behind individually to drop in small coins on top of what had been
given. The men at the front then rapidly dumped the money from the dish to count and
sort the bills and coins into stacks. When they had worked out the total given in the name
of one group, it was recorded on the balance sheets and added to the running total. The
total given by the group and the running were then announced from the table to applause
from the audience.

The contribution of additional money in support of a group making a presentation
demonstrates an important aspect of the mulolo as gift. Despite their spontaneous
appearance, these supportive gifts of coins were planned by individuals in advance. Many
came up from the sidelines during pauses in the action to change bills and coins into
smaller denominations, which they then could parcel out among various other groups
with whom they had some tie. When I asked one participant, a Catholic, from my village
why I saw him drop a few 20-toea pieces in the dish for another village at Sowala, he
said, "If it's our father's village then we have to put something." Many of the people who
gave these small gifts in other groups' names were similarly the patrilateral or affinal kin
of the group.

Supporting gifts are themselves characterized as help, and seem to flow along
similar lines of kinship. Yet, in mulolo, this help is subordinates to the concept of velau,
and also is modified to be more unrestricted. For instance, in the Sowala mulolo, one of
the men behind the table would usually shout out some epithet at the group while they
sang, meant to remind the audience some distinctive talent of the group which they
shared with others. For instance, for a village that had a lot of sago palms, he said
"Our (incl. edible) sago!" or "Our (incl.) roof thatch!" The items he called out at different times were varied, and consisted not only of natural tree products, which villages usually share with other associated groups, but commodity foods (for villages with stores, or who were active in marketing), a school, and a boat. This was meant to remind the audience what their fellow congregation members had done for them and to encourage them to give supporting gifts. While many people took care to make these sorts of gifts, they were clearly subordinated to the main purpose. They were made with trivial amounts of money, itself only a part of the total amount an individual was prepared to give. It seemed to be more important to stand with the group than to actually make a significant difference to their total. This was underscored by one incident during the Sowala mulolo. As her group moved toward the table to present their gift, one woman holding a palm frond decoration turned to the audience and plucked off a few betelnuts and sticks of tobacco she had tied onto the leaves and flung them into the audience, saying "This is to help you!" Her light sarcasm provoked laughter from the audience, and a few stood up to join with her group and give a few coins.

The event continued until each listed group had been called to the table. Then the announcer called two more items from the list, each one serving as a last chance for anyone to add to the mulolo. First he called out for gifts "in memory of those who had died." A few more people came up individually to drop in some more coins, none making any remarks about the person they were remembering. Then the announcer called for gifts in saukwaiya, a Dobu word which was explained to mean, "where you look around for any last coins you've been holding in your pocket." A few more came to drop in some coins into the dish. After this money had been collected and counted, the grand total was
announced to the audience, who applauded.

During the event, people framed the mulolo as a mode of group integration, contributions to a common pool. Several of the church leaders stood up to give 'thank-you speeches' (walo velau). They said that total offering was the "limit of the strength" (the maximum possible effort) of the congregation, and that they would now use the money for the 'development' ('abi'abi) and 'growth' ('ini) of the church. A deacon spoke and invited anyone from the audience who wished to make any comments about the event to stand and speak. One senior man stood up to speak about the generosity of the group. He said that the congregation could have raised a great deal more had more people come to church and gave more generously. He concluded by saying that God gives everything, including money, and so one should always give back to the church. His point that the congregation's total offering was so small because some people failed to give thanks to God tied into themes of the other speeches and other talk surrounding the mulolo in the weeks leading up to it.

Leading up to the mulolo at Sowala, members of the church talked about what they hoped would happen. The circuit administration had assigned to the Sowala congregation the goal of raising K3,600. Each congregation in the circuit was given a different goal, and congregation members at Sowala took it and the total ultimately raised as signs of the "strength" of the group, both the numerical strength and the individual commitment of the members. There was some correction for the economic conditions of each congregation. For instance, once while talking to members of the Sowala congregation about their mulolo goal, I asked the new pastor how much his home congregation usually raised. He was born on the small island of Skelton, in the Engineer
group, which lies near enormous reefs from which people collect beche-de-mer for sale. He sheepishly admitted, "Sometimes we reach K30,000 or K40,000." Communities which were endowed with an abundance of marketable resources, like beche-de-mer or trochus shells, were expected to raise much more. Although Sowala could not hope to raise so much money, the Sowala members marveled at the fact that their neighboring congregations could completely provide for themselves through charity, paying not only the salaries of the pastors and ministers, but for the upkeep of their concrete and iron church building and staff houses.

Individual and lineage contributions are less significant than the collective effort towards a goal. No debts are incurred by giving a velau to the church. Individuals and lineages are conceptualized as refractions of the congregation as a whole. In the thank-you speeches at the end, speakers appraise the generosity of members as individuals abstractly and through the total raised by the congregation. Informal gossip too evaluates people's generosity based on the total. The numerical quantity of the gift takes on special salience in this context. To plan for their goal, Sowala set a target contribution of K36 per head, apparently based on an assumption about the number of church members. Each family would contribute based on the number of church members they had. After the event, many people said they were disappointed that the congregation could not reach K1000 (They raised K959.30). Others praised the few groups who had raised over K100. The number served not so much as a measurement as a symbol of a quality of the group. In this way, congregation thus subsumes individual and lineage identities through gifts of charity. The congregation so constituted through its members' charity is a distinct social entity. Members' relationships to each other take the form of an intimate union expressed
through voluntary alienable gifts.

**Fundraising and Reciprocity**

If church fundraising represents an alternative hierarchy of values, and hence creates an alternative sociality in which accumulation can take place, one might wonder whether the value of charity actually menaces the value of reciprocity. Since private businesses in Auhelawa flourish only in contexts where they support interlineage exchange obligations, one might then also expect that congregations' accumulation is similarly delimited in scope. That is to say, even when congregations raise a common fund, the value this expresses is merely an exception in an otherwise unchanged order. On the contrary, the value of charity to create sociality in which one can accumulate influences the practice of everyday sociality. One can see this in three ways.

First, individuals' cash earning through marketing in the mission station is spurred by the desire to give charity. Individual sale of betelnut, tobacco and other vegetables requires people to withdraw somewhat from exchanges in spheres of help and debt in order to accumulate cash. In the past, commodity transactions were done only with people who are outside of those spheres, like town residents and station employees. The overall volume of these kinds of transactions was limited by the rule of market days on Wednesday and Saturday. People appealed to others to forgive their apparent selfishness by saying that they were only trying to "find money" for a special purpose, like school fees, health care fees, or commodity food to feed others. People also legitimate their cash-earning by saying they are doing it to prepare a money gift to their church congregation for an upcoming fundraising event. In the weeks before large fundraising events like
mulolo, there is a much larger crowd at the Catholic station marketplace. Many also leave their household work and other chores and traveled to town to market for mulolo gifts. One of the signs that Auhelawa point to as an example of their increasingly selfish behavior is that people market on every day of the week except Sunday. The rule of market days was first broken in 2004. That year, the Catholic parish held a feast on June 29 in honor of its golden jubilee. Months in advance, the parish council decided to raise K5000 toward the feast. Each base community was told to raise K500 as well as contribute many baskets of feast yams and one pig. To prepare for this, people said that they marketed much more than they normally would have and markets were held in the Catholic station nearly every day. The intrinsic selfishness of marketing is insulated by the broader aim of charity.

Second, people organize group fundraising events as a means to create new social identities through public groups. Although many of these identities are secular, they bear the distinctive stamp of the Christian culture from which they are drawn. They are public groups based on an intimacy of common feeling and purpose among members. They transcend ascribed statuses in a voluntary spirit of cooperation. For instance, to raise money to send two members abroad for a training course, the Sowala youth fellowship held a "walk-a-thon" through the villages of Barabara, Kurada and Bwasiyaiyai. They walked from one end to the other over several days, some staying overnight at relatives' villages along the way. As they walked they sang and played guitar choruses, stopping in each village to ask for money gifts. I was absent on the day that the group came to my village, and when I came home Francis told me that he and his nephew had not seen the group. Francis said he and his nephew were hiding, because they did not have any money
to give. They were embarrassed to see the walk-a-thon without anything to give them.

The youth fellowship raised K150 from the walk-a-thon. At a Sunday meeting, the Sowala congregation held a small farewell party for the two young men that were taking the course. Two deacons presented them each with half of the money they had raised for their trip. The youth fellowship president gave them an additional K20. Then, the members of the youth fellowship stood and sang choruses in front of the church's wooden table. Members of the congregation took this time to go up individually to put coins on the table, similar to the saukwaiya collection during mulolo.

Often it seemed as though a voluntary group came together only to raise money, as though the accumulation of a treasury for its activities was itself a warrant for its existence. In the middle of 2006, I took a few days to attend a workshop on HIV and AIDS held by the Catholic parish. At the end of the week, the attendees agreed to form a parish committee in charge of running an educational program. In our first meeting after the workshop, everyone agreed that the committee should do something to try and raise money for its supplies, because, as the chairman said, people might start to think that they were "dead" and that they had been misleading people with promises to work.

The HIV committee decided that they would lend batteries and a flashlight to some young men to do nighttime reef fishing while they were visiting Nuakata Island on church business (where the chairman's wife was born and he could get permission to use the reefs). They would give some of the fish to the young men and sell the rest for the committee's fund. In the future, they might do further fundraising. While this chain of value conversions may seem inordinately complex, to Auhelawa people it is routine. This was the most preferred option because it was actually the simplest to organize. It
illustrates how the concept of accumulation for a public purpose (buying supplies for the committee) often encompasses not only private accumulation (marketing fish) but also the network of help among kin and affines (obtaining access to reefs, and presumably access to the labor of the young men).

Other secular groups also used mulolo as a model for generating their own funds. Local soccer teams held events when their club members could contribute toward the club's league association fee of K200. An elementary school held a similar event in which parents of students could contribute to a fund to buy school supplies (in addition to the funds raised though school fees, which were as a rule, mostly unpaid). Lorenzo, whose mother's brother was Kurada's first elected ward councillor (and Lucy's father) wanted to give a small portion of his village's beach area to the local government for them to use for their meetings. He also wanted to erect a concrete memorial to his famous uncle Makadonia, and to raise the money he held a public fundraising event in which all Kurada residents were asked to contribute toward the memorial and new barracks for the ward councillor's committee meetings.

Third and finally, Auhelawa reject reciprocity as a value by satirizing it in a new kind of fundraising. During my fieldwork, people had recently started to host fundraising events alternatively called basket-to-basket, tanatana (a reduplication of the Auhelawa word for basket), pot-to-pot, and potpot. Besides being a means of generating money for a public group, these events were also popular entertainments to which people looked forward and for which they spent a lot of time and resources preparing. The event consist mainly of a meeting of two groups, called sides. One side would host the potpot and the other side would come and visit them. Each member of a side would be matched with
another member of the opposing side. They would exchange gifts of food in either pots or baskets with one another and then separately contribute a money gift to their side. At a later time, the visitors would host a potpot and invite their partners to come.

Ideally, a potpot is part up a cycle of balanced reciprocity that resembles the flow of gifts between lineages in feasts. The overall form of the event and the manner of giving seems to evoke the feast as a template for people's gifts. The two sides are supposed to be from different organizations with different needs for which they both wanted to raise money. After all the members of the sides had exchanged gifts and given their contribution to their side's total, the two totals would be combined and presented to the hosts in support of their fundraising. The visiting side would then have a "book" or "credit" with their hosts. That is, they have the right to ask for a "return match" from their hosts several months later, at which time they would receive the total money raised from both sides.

In the context of Auhelawa practice, potpot rarely seems to function according to the principles of reciprocity. Even when people try to organize a potpot as a delayed cycle of reciprocal exchange, it can be very hard to successfully pull off. The sides are not necessarily familiar or friendly with each other, and may not trust each other to deal fairly. It is much easier and more common for members of a single group to divide in half, or for two existing segments of a larger group, to organize a potpot amongst themselves than to seek a partner group from the outside. In these contexts, too, potpot is at best a simulacra of reciprocity and reflects the values of charity which underlie mulolo, including the way charity inverts the value of reciprocity. After the second match, the credit between the sides is paid and there are no further rounds. Thus, potpot do not
create perpetual alliances between groups through the renewal of debts. The relationship exists for a period of time to serve the interests of each side to fundraise and then dissolve. At an individual level, the exchanges between members also do not approach the kind of relationship people create through reciprocal debts. At the beginning of the potpot, the leaders of each side come together with lists of members to make sure that an equal number of people will participate from each side. Usually they also assign numbers to each person on the list, and then draw numbers from a hat randomly to determine the order in which gifts are presented. Another method used for matching partners is for one side to call a name from the membership list and for any member of the other side to volunteer to stand up and exchange a gift with that person. People preferred it if partners were matched according to the quality and type of gift they gave to their partner, or if people were free to choose to exchange with a "wantok" who would give them a worthy gift. If a partner was randomly selected, then one might end up receiving less than one gave. While in many cases, the partners will have a second opportunity to exchange gifts again in the return match, I also observed many instances in which this was not considered important and new partners were matched up from the list of attendees. While reciprocal exchanges create perduring relationships between persons, exchanges of these gifts seemed to be evaluated in terms of their relative material value.

The individual gifts of food between partners are also conceptualized as love-gifts, in contrast to vaga or buki. They are given in a spirit of fun to please and amuse the partner, who is a "friend." In this respect, the manner of presentation of these gifts reveals the real value of the gift. Gifts in potpot are elaborately decorated, wreathed with betelnut, frangiapani and hibiscus, and festooned with streamers, tobacco and mustard.
leaf. These elaborate decorations make the gifts all the more enjoyable. Betelnut and tobacco are things which are meant to be shared and given to guests in hospitality. The decorations also evoke the decorations most often used in church events. The presenters also decorate themselves with flowers and oil for their presentation. In the presentation of the gift it is common for people to embrace their partner, garland them, and to sprinkle baby powder on their head and face. All of these are meant to be signs of love and celebration. Indeed, many people get carried away by the presentation of their gift and clown around in front of their partners, trying to get a laugh from them and the audience. In this respect potpot exchanges are like the song processions of mulolo, which also involve bright, cheerful decorations. In both instances, the presentation of the gift distinguishes it from those given in feasts, which also have their own distinctive manner of presentation, and associate it with an opposed concept of velau.

In two instances, participants decorated and presented their gifts to their partners in deliberate parody of feast gifts. One man beat on a traditional sinaha (TP. kundu) drum and sang a traditional song as he led a procession of his friends carrying bags of betelnuts and pots of food to his partner. His presentation culminated when he dumped a large canvas bag of betelnuts on the head of his partner. The audience whooped and cheered this display, but his partner thought he was being mocked and started yelling until the man apologized saying he was acting in "celebration" (yaliyaya). In another event, a man had fashioned a platform with two long poles on either side so it could borne on the shoulders by two people. It resembled the platforms which are used to carry pigs to a mortuary feast. Instead of a pig, the man put a clay pot of food on the platform and wrapped it in flower garlands. As his side massed to enter the village of their hosts, he
was brought forward to the front of the group. These examples of gifts as parodies of tradition show that people contrast what they are doing in potpot with what they are doing in feast exchanges. The former are fun events of sharing and fellowship, put on in such a way to make the latter seem formal and rigid.

Thus, despite appearances, potpot is not an instance in which the practice of fundraising recapitulates the value of reciprocity and takes the form of a perduring cycle. It is more accurate to say that potpot is a new kind of economic action which takes a familiar form of social interaction, feasting exchanges, and uses it to organize people's charitable gifts. Ultimately, feast-like exchange gives way to the Christian sociality that people create in other charitable gifts, and the possibility of reciprocal alliances also gives way to a community united in its co-ownership of a fund of money.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have described two alternative routes people take in pursuit of accumulation of money, private business and church fundraising. While individual accumulation of value through exchange is morally suspect in Auhelawa, I have shown that each of these modes of economic action are considered legitimate because of how they are embedded in different kinds of social relationships, and how the funds generated through them lend support to the reproduction of those relationships. The nature of the social relationships in which each activity is embedded is different, and hence church fundraising seems to be overall a more successful strategy for people to participate in the cash economy. Private businesses tend to be cooperative ventures among kin and are most successful when they contribute to a lineage's participation in reciprocal exchanges.
through feasting. Commodity trading in trade stores, for instance, is assimilated to the lesser sphere of generalized reciprocity among kin called 'help,' and serves as a resource on which people can draw support for their prestige exchange of 'debts.' Church fundraising too is seen as based on people's contributions of charity toward the maintenance of a public group, typically a church congregation. Gifts of charity are understood to be a duty of Christians to their congregation and a self-conscious claim to a Christian identity. Church fundraising as an accumulation of money is thus embedded not in kinship, but in a self-consciously formed Christian relationship.

While charitable gifts appear at first glance to be the circulation of helps within a group, and thus might be said to recapitulate a traditional value in a new venue, I argue that one can see that charity is distinct from the value of help when one puts its practice in the historical context of missionaries' efforts, and the social context of church congregations where missionaries' discourse still has salience. In the early colonial period, missionaries promoted a concept of charity as freely given gifts which express emotion and create an intimate solidarity. They aligned this specific kind of "liberal," generous giving with the kind of inner experience of true Christian belief and the voluntary, egalitarian fellowship of the church congregation. They sought to elicit from Papuan hearers signs of a voluntary rejection of their former lives and total devotion to the Christian mode of life represented by the mission station. Annual fundraising events were one important site for the instantiation of a Christian group as an inversion of normal sociality. If the world of the village was governed by the exchange of debts, then life in the mission was governed by teibolo, unrestricted sharing, and velau, love gifts. Contemporary congregations, inheritors of the mission's institutional apparatuses, have
retained fundraising through charitable gifts as an important mechanism for their social reproduction. The fund which they generate in annual mulolo events is a moral form of accumulation because it is embedded in the self-consciously cultivated Christian sociality of voluntary, egalitarian cooperation which inverts and transcends kinship as a mode of relationship. Fundraising totals serve as symbols of the strength of the congregation as voluntary union of individuals wedded by their shared intentions. They are hoped to be the material and social basis for a "self-supporting" mission, a distinctive social formation which attempts to consciously will itself into a perpetual existence. Having inherited the social technologies of the mission, contemporary congregations enact themselves through charity also. The total amount they raise in mulolo is a symbol of the strength of their intimate union. By embedding their activity in the social network of the congregation and not the lineage, people can accumulate money more easily that they otherwise could alone. Church congregations provide people with a model of a kind of group, characterized by voluntary membership, egalitarianism, achieved status and an ethic of charitable velau to the group by members, in which the accumulation of money is possible. Many secular activities are also organized on the basis of the church congregation with an aim to accumulate funds through charity. This also provides people with opportunities to accumulate money privately through marketing.

In describing these forms of economic activity, I have tried to show that while all economic action is embedded in social networks, as Granovetter argues, not all social networks are equally conducive to accumulation. This point has previously been suggested by Gregory, in his analysis of a competitive church fundraising event in Hanuabada as an example of accumulation through gifts (1980). He suggests that charity
might be a kind of gift system with the unique "potential" to develop into accumulation (1980: 647). Instead of asking, Gregory and I do, why people accumulate money through church congregation, or more generally what Christianity in Melanesia has to do with economic change, one can just as well ask why church congregations want to accumulate money in the first place. Gregory does not provide an answer except to suggest that competitive exchange systems in which wealth is sacrificed or destroyed, as in pre-colonial Hanuabada society as well as in the Kwakiutl potlatch, provided foreign missionaries with an opportunity to "appropriate" resources from the local economy toward their own accumulation (1980: 630). He argues that while the main motive to give charity for congregants is prestige competition, for "the Church" it is to accumulate (ibid.). In analytically distinguishing as he does the interests of congregation from church, Gregory does not provide any suggestions for how to understand why a congregation would want to constitute itself as church through the accumulation of its own charity, as Auhelawa apparently do.

Based on Gregory's analysis, one might conclude that in the colonial era, the interests of missionaries and local people were distinct, perhaps even opposed. Yet one must also keep in mind two aspects of the separation between missionaries and local people. First, missionaries produced this opposition in the service of promoting a particularly dualistic conception of history. Second, as heirs of the mission system, contemporary churches continue to maintain this opposition in their practice, distinguishing congregational life from everyday, heathen sociality. Congregations accumulate money not because Christianity is one of "the basic institutions of the European capitalist system," as Gregory states (1980: 648). Rather, money is the medium
through which not only the congregation is reproduced but also its opposition to the indigenous social environment which is key to its identity as Christian. Christian charity is another example of how local actors constitute an intercultural relationship of a certain kind through reflexive practices.

In the previous chapter, I discussed the way Polynesian, mission-introduced foods are reflexively perceived as iconic of cultural change. They continue to be marked as foreign imports despite people's wide adoption and reliance on them. Fundraising seems to take part in the same process of reflexively marking a history of intercultural influence. In fundraising, congregations reproduce the historical rupture which creates Christian identity through the symbolism of mulolo, a freely given gift of Christian love. In the next chapter, I discuss the Auhelawa conception of themselves as Christians in terms of a process of becoming other to oneself. This understanding of Christian identity as self-estrangement has consequences for people's understanding of and desire for systemic social and economic change, or development.
Chapter 4. Back to the Village

The Last Place

Auhelawa often say that they are the "last village," "way back" and "poor." These phrases capture the prevalent feeling among them of abjection, deficiency and distance in both space and time from dimdim societies in Australia, Europe and America. People trust that development in some form will help them overcome this lack. This chapter will argue that Auhelawa religious discourse and discursive practice help to naturalize an ideology of economic development. While many feel ambivalent about particular manifestations of social change, Auhelawa think that it is legitimate and worthy for them to improve their living conditions by changing their social and economic organization. More importantly, as it is expressed in Auhelawa talk about social change, it is assumed to be natural that societies tend to progress towards the living standard and type of society enjoyed by people of the developed world.

As I have noted previously, it is also common for people to view their own community in a state of moral and physical decline. They often extend this perception to the country as a whole; that is to say, they see Papua New Guinea (PNG) as losing the progress that had been made since its contact with Western modernity. A version of this discourse circulates among international experts, too. They speak of increasing poverty, decreasing per capita income, and the outstripping of agricultural productivity by greater population growth (Hughes 2003; Manning and Windybank 2003). The print media of PNG bring together the elite, bureaucratic-scientific language of decline with anecdotal perceptions like those heard in Auhelawa in editorials and letters. Indeed, the anniversary
of the country's Independence is often celebrated in PNG's national newspapers with numerous reflections on whether PNG is in decline (e.g. Joku 2008; Anonymous 2008a,b,c). The rhetoric of lastness and the rhetoric of decline appear to elicit one another. PNG remains in last place because it keeps losing whatever gains it once had. More darkly, many suggest that PNG is in a post-Independence decline because the national leaders were either unprepared to takeover the colonial administration, or deliberately corrupted it, confirming that their society is intrinsically inferior. Associated in this way, decline legitimates development. It naturalizes the ideology that says that capitalist economic transformation is social progress. The spectre of decline confirms that there's nowhere to go but up, that is to say, it is natural for societies to progressively change themselves into the foreign culture of the structurally dominant.

Among experts, the rhetoric of social decline naturalizes a particularly neoliberal, postnationalist agenda of reform. At the local level, Auhelawa's use of the same rhetoric emphasizes the absence or failure of the state to provide services and opportunities for mobility. Elites point to decline as evidence for a more laissez-faire state, and locals use the same evidence to cultivate a nostalgia for colonialism as a benevolent, paternalistic state. Given this contradiction, local people cannot be said to have internalized a hegemonic discourse. Yet these two views of decline do share an implicitly linear temporality and global social hierarchy. How, then, do development and decline get connected in people's minds? Why do people adopt the idea that exchanging one culture for another is linear progress? Auhelawa appropriation of the myth of progress, a key piece of Western culture, is not merely a straightforward story of acculturation and economic hegemony. It is another example of an intercultural relationship that is
constructed locally by actors' reflexive engagement with a foreign culture. This engagement, I argue, is locally grounded in specific social practices. In this chapter, I will show that decline and development are part of a temporal rhetoric which frames sociality with respect to the ideal of voluntary intimate union embodied in the Christian congregation. Through this lens, people see their own society as deficient and believe that a collective intervention in the local economy, usually through the agency of the local church, will help them achieve modernity.

Auhelawa people's belief in development may seem surprising given what has been presented about their self-understanding thus far. On the one hand, Auhelawa frame history in terms of the arrival of the Methodist pastor, Pati and Christian conversion as an event of epochal shift in which the heathen culture was totally replaced by Christianity. Yet, on the other hand, and specifically regarding economic changes, they also have a somewhat nostalgic view of the past as a time of plenty which was free of many contemporary social ills. Auhelawa perceive their social decline as specifically an increase in selfish, individualistic behavior which they find concretely embodied in commodity consumption and cash earning. One might suspect that Auhelawa attempt to curtail or subordinate unrestricted self-interested accumulation as a way to resist this trend. Yet instead, it is more common for people to transform money and commodities into charitable gifts, and to embed otherwise accumulative cash earning in the context of Christian fellowship as against kinship and reciprocity. In other words, Auhelawa's response to negative effects of economic change is to embrace a radically distinct alternative sociality found in Christianity. For my informants, building a strong congregation with a big mulolo is the kind of development they want. Likewise, church
activities are considered good models for intentional, collective projects of material improvement, most of which are locally initiated. Marketing, furthermore, is not regarded as development because it fails to deliver a tangible, lasting and irreversible change in the direction of dimdim society. People try to achieve the modernity promised by Western discourses of development in their local churches, as opposed to the state, enterprise, or industry. While Auhelawa see themselves as being already completely Christian by virtue of missionaries' arrival, they also look to their churches as social institutions to develop them materially, by which people mean to connect them more fully to the world of dimdims. If Pati bridged a cultural gulf in order to convert the Auhelawa, then contemporary church leaders and foreign missionaries are expected to continue Pati's work by bringing the Auhelawa out of the darkness of poverty.

One finds both the temporality of decline and development in Auhelawa religious discourse. As temporalizing frames for social relationships, they constitute the congregation as a social body. They encode in a temporal symbol the opposition between asocial selfishness and voluntary intimate union, an opposition which I have previously shown to be important to Auhelawa conceptualization of their religious life. Because Auhelawa see Christianity as something that conveys membership in a global and transhistorical community, yet also depends crucially on their continued voluntary participation in the exclusive activity of Christian sociality, then the possibility that they may experience decline as well as development is entailed in their beliefs about social change. Development is conceptualized as the transformation of society into some other form. This form, associated with Western society, is furthermore normative in the sense that it is a fulfillment of God's will. Yet because people must choose to change, and
continually reaffirm their choice, the lack of change must be read as a failure of will, and in a sense, also a loss of what is gained by conversion. Lastness and decline are thus isomorphic of the Christian metanarrative of change. I further argue that people adopt this mode of inhabiting time not only in Christian ritual contexts, but in their everyday life as well. Everyday discourses of development borrow a Christian rhetoric of time and derive from it a representation of the present as debased, deficient and impoverished. Talk about development projects, paralleling talk about the congregation in Christian contexts, presents the future as a horizon of both material and social transformation. Likewise the narrative of decline is not merely a frame of backward movement, but of failure of individuals to overcome selfishness and enter into an intimate union.27 It posits a past time in which a social ideal was achieved, but from which people have fallen away. In this way, temporalities of development and decline are reconciled as complementing expressions of the underlying Christian temporality of social transformation. Social change is inscribed within a Christian model of an autonomous individual consciousness, which by its own commitment can either succeed or fail to embrace the future.

Development as Discipline and Desire

The concept of development is by no means simple or neutral way of talking about social change. When applied to biology, development conveys the notion of realization of innate potential through growth. By contrast, when the United States started to promote the concept of economic development in the decolonizing world after the second world war, the term connoted a process of reorganization and restructuring of people's lives around principles of Western industrial capitalism (Esteva 1992: 8, 13).
Development programs of the postwar period of decolonization were based on an assumption of underdevelopment, implying that development has an end, and that Western societies were models for the rest of the world (Sachs 1992: 2). Economic development was a process by which non-Western societies would become more like the West. Postcolonial societies were to be lifted from poverty through foreign aid, but also compelled to shift away from a traditional social and economic system which was presumed to be deficient. The development concept is a kind of international power play. Development projects, foreign aid and loans compel recipient countries to turn away from alternative policy frameworks and pursue a Euroamerican social and economic agenda.

Ferguson (1994) and Escobar (1995) each draw upon Foucault's (1995 [1977]) theory of power to separately argue that development be seen as a discourse which legitimates institutions of Western neocolonialism. By this they mean that modernization is an ideological guise for those institutions, embedded in the structure of development projects themselves, and forming a system of ideas and practices. In participating in development, postcolonial peoples must accept the representation of themselves and their actions as part of that linear path to modernity. They are formed as subjects of a power which is distributed across a system of institutions and techniques of development: foreign economic expertise, economic measurement, and international lending. The effect of development discourse is to simplify the complexity and particularity of local social systems and people's economic activities in terms of a linear, evolutionary scale. In doing so, underdeveloped societies are assessed and diagnosed in terms of their distance from Western culture. This has the effect of defining situations in terms of technical problems,
taking away the possibility for political considerations (Ferguson 1994: 87, Escobar 1995: 52). When development projects do not achieve their ambitions, the failure is attributed to the resistance of the local people, which justifies further intervention into their lives. Even failures of development are recuperated by discursive practice in the service of the ideology of progress as criterion of truth (Ferguson 1994: 254-256, Escobar 1995: 150-151).

The evidence that development is a discursive naturalization of power does not satisfactorily explain, however, Auhelawa's desire for development. Despite these scholars' arguments for a disseminated view of power, most of their examination of development discourse deals with what Western and postcolonial elites do and say, and not with local actors' participation in development, let alone their motivation to participate (Brigg 2006, Kean 2000). Hence, although it is argued that development is a new modality of power, based on a decentered network of scientific knowledges, practices and technologies, as opposed to simple dominance, the critique of development offered assumes that power remains concentrated, and its use follows a design. Likewise, a Foucauldian conception of discourse tends to discount the value of individual actions, because individual agency is itself an effect of the actor's role in instituted practices. Yet, in discussing the end of the era of big development, Escobar notes the importance of local actors' creative appropriation of foreign resources to create a hybrid culture which could adapt them to economic exploitation (Escobar 1995: 219). If Escobar is correct that this is a "postdevelopment" era, and that neoliberal, post-Fordist capitalism now depends less on state power to shape the global economic order (Escobar 1995: 217), then at a minimum one needs to revise his main thesis to explain development discourse's continuing
legitimacy in Auhelawa among the people themselves well into the postdevelopment era. Furthermore, given that Escobar thinks individual agency can in fact play a role in finding alternatives to development, it seems equally plausible that individual agency plays a role in spreading development discourses in more ways than simply either reproduction or resistance.

Sahlins offers an alternative approach to economic reorganization which does emphasize the role of local participation. Sahlins rejects the concept of development both as a social theory of change, and as an artifact of Western hegemony. He argues that while some Pacific societies may appear to submit themselves to new economic regimes, they do so only insofar as such participation allows them to draw material and symbolic resources into local economies, and contribute to the expansion and efflorescence of their own values, and not those of the capitalist world system (1992). Sahlins argues that local cultural values structure the way people understand and evaluate economic alternatives, and hence the local economy is reproduced through people's selective appropriation of new resources and opportunities. Sahlins names his thesis "develop-man," a term he derives from Pacific Pidgin English, to contrast his thesis with development theory, suggesting that development theorists are misapprehending the intent behind Pacific societies' engagement with foreign capital and apparatuses of power. Activities that may indeed serve Western hegemonic control may equally serve the reproduction of a local economy. For instance, Auhelawa embed tradestore businesses in kinship networks, and funnel cash flows into reciprocal exchange cycles. Hence, their apparent enthusiasm for commodities and new technologies, and their willingness to change their own livelihoods to get them, may in the end have local significance beyond the Western myth of progress.
Hence, the creative appropriation of the foreign is not only characteristic of the postdevelopment era, but is also a constitutive if invisible element of what Westerners see as efforts by others to develop.

In making this claim, Sahlins however recognizes that many societies do eventually become inextricably dependent on an encompassing global economy, and actors in such systems begin to value accumulation and commodity consumption over local cultural ends. He suggests that such a transition from develop-man to true development only comes about when people undergo a cultural humiliation, and "learn to hate what they already have ... and want, then, to be someone else" (Sahlins 1992: 24). A society's embrace of the project of development as self-transformation thus comes not through coercion but from the adoption of a new way of seeing itself. This new way of seeing often comes not from being subject to technocratic power, but in the adoption of an alternative moral framework, encoded in the western cultural narratives of modernity, development and progress found in religion and other sources of meaning (Karp 2002, Keane 2007: 47). Many recent studies of PNG societies have found that local adoption of Western narratives of both material and social progress play a greater role in cultivating a desire for development as a self-willed cultural change than their entanglement in particular institutional networks (Errington and Gewertz 1993, 2004, Gilberthorpe 2007, Jacka 2005, Kean 2000, Robbins 2005a, West 2006a, 2006b). To use Robbins's term, development as moral discourse creates a "negative nationalism," a recognition of the self as degenerate that emerges from seeing oneself through another culture's perspective (Robbins 1998).

One can see that there are several key differences between postdevelopment
theory and Sahlins's humiliation approach. Sahlins argues that local participation in intercultural relationships is always necessary to the process of change whether that change is aimed toward reproduction or transformation of a local culture. Sahlins does not say that the techniques of neocolonial power are necessarily the only sources of humiliation. Rather, he says that foreign forces of economic production and circulation can be converted into eufunctional processes, but that missionary Christianity might play a crucial role in bringing humiliation (1992, see also Robbins 2005a,b). This flow of discourse seems inadequately expressed as a mode of power. That perspective suggests that those who participate in its circulation can only resist its effects. In Sahlins's mind there are a diversity of interests and intentions for pursuing economic changes, coming from a range of local and foreign actors in a wide field of intercultural contact. The interaction of these different interests is complex and the changes they effect can be unpredictable.

Sahlins's concept of humiliation, defined as an experience of seeing oneself in another's eyes, demands an alternative approach to intercultural relationships in development. Taking up this task, Robbins (2005b) argues that humiliation is often culturally specific in its manifestation, and hence events which compel transformation are often historically contingent and particular to the cultural context. Humiliation is not simply something that transects the boundary between cultures ruptures the local culture. Local conceptions of shame, sorrow, uncertainty and anxiety mediate this experience. In other words, humiliation is something quite often people do, not just have done to them. Robbins and Wardlow show that even when a dominant culture assaults local cultural values, this intercultural relationship is also constituted through the reflexive practice of
local actors as they frame their humiliation in culturally specific terms. One can think of
the Auhelawa story of Pati again. Retrospectively, the conversion of the warriors is
remembered as a singular event of rupture and replacement, much like a mysterious
legend. Auhelawa knowledge of Christian conversion is not unmediated by Auhelawa
cultural categories. Rather, while continuous histories serve well to narrate other kinds of
intercultural influence, Christianity is assimilated to the lesser category of uncertain
knowledge and self-doubt, and hence given a legendary character. This reflexive marking
of church history as being something special and singular seems to be elicited by the need
to understand the normative place of Christian identity today.

Humiliations which lead to transformations can thus be seen to be the effect of a
local cultural discourse about how change happens, and hence we can look to discursive
practices to see the process of seeing oneself through another's eyes. To understand this
role of discourse and local actors' discursive practices in enabling humiliations, Bakhtin's
theory of discourse seems especially relevant (1981; see also Merlan 2005). Bakhtin
focuses on explaining the nature of the utterance and the production of discourse, not the
instituted typical form on which such is based, as Foucault does. Bakhtin argues that
every particular discursive act is inherently dialogical, that is, it engages with other
discursive acts in its own production. No utterance, for instance, can be understood
independently of the dialogue of which it implicitly takes part. All utterances to some
extent incorporate other utterances in their own production, and every utterance consists
of a play of multiple voices. Bakhtin further argued that discourse situates itself in time
and space, creating a chronotope that orients the act of communication. Genres of
discourse are characterized by the particular kind of chronotope they create, and the
incorporation of different types of discourse into one's discursive acts of communication thus carry with them the chronotope of those discourses, which furthermore shapes the way participants in communication see themselves in relation to each other in space and time. Given this, if Auhelawa and others like them ultimately do accede to the Western model of development over their own concept of development, then one can say that what they are doing is reflexively reshaping their perception of the spacetime of their social relationships by positing an alternative social chronotope which comes from development discourse. In the developman mode of intercultural contact, local people may have posited themselves as the center of the universe, drawing to them foreign resources from outside. In adopting the voice of development, they posit a vantage on themselves from the outside, making themselves peripheral socially, spatially and temporally. In taking up the voice of development discourse, actors construct a revised geography through their own discursive practices. They draw upon foreign voices in order to mark boundaries and connections between cultures, and to enact a position that is socially and spatiotemporally external to the local place. Through the construction of an external realm, actors can create the effect of self-estrangement which is central to humiliation.

In what follows, I will look at how a conception of development is formulated and naturalized in the discourse of Auhelawa Christian worship. Christian worship constructs a social spacetime of the congregation through the narrative chronotope of Christian world history. In previous chapters, I show how Auhelawa represent foreign cultural forms as inversions of local forms. Now I wish to argue that these inverse relationships between local and foreign culture are linked with an encompassing historical narrative and global geography. In so doing, Christian discourse frames Auhelawa society with
respect to an outside world. In church worship, there are three main forms which this framing takes. The first is referential discourse about the world and world history drawn from the Bible and from missionary teaching. The second is discursive and metadiscursive frames which shape the event of worship and position participants in a hierarchy of encompassing orders of space and time. The third is the use of multiple voices drawn from the Bible and missionary languages to index foreignness and ancientness. These discursive acts enact and constitute the congregation as a social group and imbue it with religious significance. Christian discourse uses the temporalities of development and decline to position Auhelawa society with respect to the outside world. By encoding the congregation and its place in Christian spacetime, it inscribes the congregation within individual consciousness. Movement within the Christian spacetime is voluntary. Both development and decline are equally possible, each depending on whether the congregation's members choose to come together in a voluntary intimate union.

Having shown how the congregation is constituted through a Christian chronotope, I then move to show how this frame is borrowed strategically to constitute secular social groups on similar lines. Church discourses are used to form community groups which come together for cooperative projects. The same temporal rhetoric of decline and development naturalizes the sense of lack and deficiency which development projects assume. The consequence of this borrowing is that a distinctly Christian form of sociality as intimate fellowship comes to be seen as necessary to achieving true economic change. Moreover, the contemporary society is positioned in dichotomous opposition to this idealization of society. Finally, I turn to an example which illustrates how Christian
spacetime becomes commonsense. The work of reflexively reshaping social relationships by positioning them with respect to a Christian global history is captured in a poetic cliché through a local anecdote of recent history. Auhelawa tell a story of the first failed development project, an effort to build a small town where all Auhelawa would live together. In chronicling the resistance of a traditionally far-flung people to urbanization, Auhelawa capture in a pragmatic metaphor the discursive constitution of a voluntary group. Such stories, I argue, confirm for them that the only road to development is through their renewed commitment to transforming their society through Christianity.

**Time for Tapwalolo**

Worship (tapwalolo), whether by Catholics and Uniteds, is a distinct activity defined by what Auhelawa call 'one mind' (nuwatuwu ehebo). Tapwalolo presupposes a formal activity in which everyone participates and respects its sacredness with quiet attention and reverent demeanor. Church leaders often remark that in people's normal lives, each person goes their own way, thinking "all sorts of different thoughts [nuwatuwu vagadi vagadi]." In tapwalolo, they stress, individuals must set aside these personal thoughts and have "one mind" with the congregation to think on God's word, and let it "enter [their] hearts." Thus the practice of tapwalolo is principally collective, defined by a unity of purpose, but it also has emotional and spiritual effects on individuals. Tapwalolo takes the collective form that it does because this is believed to involve participants in certain kinds of desired interactions with each other and with God. In this sense, tapwalolo assumes that individuals' agencies must be subordinated to collective agency in order to enter into sacred time and space.
The frame of 'one mind' is constituted first through the organization and coordination of individuals' activities to create a shared, sacred space and time. The day of the Sabbath, Sunday, is a key example of this. Sundays are given over entirely to church worship, meetings and socializing. Both Catholics and Uniteds believe it is important to respect the Sabbath by avoiding work all day. Following the mission practice, two church bells are rung in advance of the morning service. One is rung an hour before the scheduled time and another immediately before the congregation enters the church. Because most people have to walk up to an hour to reach the Catholic and United stations, they leave the village in the morning and start walking. Catholics and Uniteds also hold small evening devotional meetings on Sundays in their villages. Hence, most of one's activities on Sunday are done in connection with tapwalolo and one's congregation. People who avoided Sunday service and went fishing or stayed home, for instance, were subjects of gossip for their lack of respect for the Sabbath. Ideally, Sunday in its entirety should be spent with people of one's congregation, either in worship, church meetings, fellowships or social events hosted by the church. Avoidance of work on the Sabbath day, a familiar rule in Methodist culture but rarely observed in Catholic communities in other parts of the world, is one important way in which tapwalolo regiments time for both Uniteds and Catholics in Auhelawa. Because of the taboos on secular activities, Sunday is devoted exclusively to tapwalolo and its related activities for both United and Catholics. More importantly, however, it brings together people into a group for tapwalolo and allows them to act as a group, creating 'one mind' throughout the day.

Given the centrality of regular communal worship, nonattendance, lateness and
noncooperation are therefore closely related problems which the two churches focus on. In both churches, services rarely ever begin at the appointed time because so few of the congregants arrive early. People's lateness is a constant source of complaint by church deacons and catechists who say that the delay of others makes other people wait for them. People from outlying villages are advised to rise early and cook quickly in the morning and are invited to bring food to eat after the service so they could arrive on time for worship. My informants often pointed out to me that people's chronic lateness is an example of "Papuan time" or "PNG time," common expressions that suggest that Melanesian people are always late because they are either lazy or are unused to Western ways of measuring time and coordinating their activities with respect to a single standard of time. To explain this, informants often described gardening as totally different than life in town. People in the garden were free to work as hard as they wanted, and then rest whenever they felt like it. Or, if one day they felt like staying home and resting, or going fishing, they could do that too. Westerners and town dwellers, however, worked by the clock, and could never miss their time for work, or rest from their work until the scheduled time.\textsuperscript{28} This notion of a temporality of gardening which is primarily solitary and unshared, and thus the inverse of church time, is frequently expressed in local Christian discourse.

As I lived near both the Catholic station in Mwademwadewa village and the United Church station in Sowala village a few hundred yards up the road, I usually started every Sunday by going to Mwademwadewa village after the first bell. There, residents of the nearby villages could usually be found waiting outside the church. On days on which the resident Catholic missionary priest, Lino Pedercini, would say Mass in
the church, usually about once a month, the mission bell was rung once at nine o'clock (by the church's clock) and services began promptly at ten o'clock. Other weeks, as Father Lino and his workers got ready to board the mission motorboat to go to one of the outstations of the parish, lay leaders and mission workers rang the bell at nine and prepared the church for a Bible reading service. When most of the congregation had arrived, people began to trickle into the church building. After the Catholic service, people sat in the station to socialize and hear community announcements. Often, the meetings of church committees were held at this time.

Around eleven o'clock, I would leave the station and walk through Eli’awa village to the United Church station at Sowala. I usually came well before the beginning of their service and sat with other church members waiting for the rest to arrive. As more of the congregation appeared, the pastor, his wife or one of the church members would beat the church’s garamut, a wooden slit drum carved in a Polynesian style which was introduced by the first Methodist missionaries. Sowala's drum was carved by Lucy's step-father, Weliyai. At this time, people would often comment that only a few of their group came early, and that people would be arriving one at a time, slowly, and not moving as a group. Usually by noon or one o'clock, but often later still, more of the congregation would arrive and someone would ring the second bell and people would enter the church for service.

Church activities are in fact only minimally coordinated by clock time, so ignorance of clocks is not why people are late. Indeed, people are encouraged to come early to church not by minding the time on the clock, but by submitting themselves to the congregation as a whole. Statements such as "when you see people on the road, you know
it's already time to move," encourage people to be ready to move with others on Sunday morning. Women are especially advised with statements such as, "right in the morning, get up and cook for your children and come." They are told they should prepare properly for Sunday on Saturday by going to the garden to fetch enough food for Sunday. In other words, people can avoid being late by following the group and working with discipline at household chores. Those who failed to come to church or who came late were almost always described as people who, for individual reasons, willfully refused to go. When I asked Uniteds why people were late, they usually said that people just decided themselves to stay back or to move slowly that day. A person's lateness in that sense was a symptom and consequence of one's unwillingness to submit to the collective order of time. Being late is a form of individual agency which undermines the collective agency of the congregation. Timeliness, being "on time" for church or other collective tasks, is conversely an indication of agreement and cooperation. Concerns with lateness illustrate the assumption that the congregation should encompass and subsume the agency of individual members. The encoding of collective temporality of church worship in the bell and the movement of others on the path, as well as explicit talk, construes all solitary action as antithetical to the congregation in the frame of 'one mind.'

Practices that coordinate people in time continue in the sequential order of the service. Here I draw mainly from my observations of the United Church, but similar attitudes can be found in Catholics' ideas about tapwalolo as well. Firstly, the entry into the church building creates a special time which people associate with the unity of the congregation. At the final ringing of the bell, people enter the building and are seated. Both Catholics and Uniteds believe that entry into the church building for worship marks
the beginning of worship, and an individual should not go in and out needlessly, but stay in the building until the end of the service. Thus, by entering the church building one enters into a group for tapwalolo and cannot by oneself divorce oneself from the group.

Tapwalolo is always led by a designated individual whose actions help constitute the group as an intimate union. Talk addressed to the group, both explicit instructions and formal speech, is however heavily voiced in an inclusive first person plural ('ita). Preachers commonly underline the equal co-participation of leaders and led conveyed by the we-voice with frequent stylistic use of vocative phrases "you and I" ('owa na yau), "you(pl.) and I" ('omiu na yau) and parallel phrases which separately mark first person and second person, e.g. "in your(pl.) heart and my heart" ('ate-mi-yai na 'ate-gu-wai). We-voicing also marks the talk of other members of the congregation. After the main service, congregants usually rise to make announcements about the activities of fellowship groups. Often members would exhort each other to attend fellowship meetings and contribute work on the fellowships' projects. These announcements stress that people submit themselves to work in coordination with the group. For example, as the day for an important regional synod in Bunama loomed, the chair of the women's fellowship rose one Sunday to say that she wanted "we women" to spend all of their "free time" weaving mats for the meeting, and not going to market in the station or town. On another Sunday, a man took the church's two wooden benches for the pastor and minister and pushed them from the back wall where they usually sit and moved them up several feet towards the pulpit. At the end of service, he rose during the announcements to say he moved the benches to mark where people should sit inside the church. They should not spread themselves out and sit at the back, because "it looks bad." He wanted everyone to go all
the way into the church and sit close to the pulpit to listen and pay attention. The ritual words and practices of the worship service create a collective spacetime through which people experience 'one mind' as an intimate union based on a common purpose and intention. Furthermore, the production of this shared time is a means by which people take up a position outside of themselves, which is the we-voice of church discourse. We-voicing links the experience of shared time to the ideal of 'one mind,' or intimate union. Conversely, solitary time is linked with selfishness, and appears as an obstacle to unity, in this voice.

The temporality of tapwalolo extends the shared spacetime of the congregation to join a narrative time of God's plan for human beings and the future for his believers. Here I draw from United lay preachers' sermons to illustrate the rhetorical formation of this religious temporality. In these examples, preachers evoke both the temporality of decline and of progress. In each case, the representation of society as either in decline or in progress serves to constitute the congregation and place it in relation to Christianity as a global phenomenon. Sermons' temporalization of the audience is an example of the reflexive shaping of a Christian social identity. The first comes from a woman, O. The second comes from a man, T. Both are active members of the congregation and preach frequently in church.

O.'s sermon discusses a reading from Paul's second letter to Timothy (II Timothy 3:1-5). In 2006, the United Church liturgical calendar featured several readings from Paul's two letters to Timothy. O. said, by way of introducing her sermon, "This book is familiar. Everybody uses it for preaching." Suggested themes for sermons usually highlighted virtues of the Christian person that Paul describes in the letters. In other
sermons on this letter, preachers tended to emphasize that Paul was giving advice and guidance to his younger disciple, Timothy, and that this and other epistles gave examples worthy of imitation. In this reading, Paul lists the various forms of wickedness and heresy which will increase "in the last days" (verse 1). Hence, rather than merely listing traits of the godless person, the passage sets godlessness in terms of a narrative frame of decline. In O.'s sermon and other sermons on this letter, Paul's advice to Timothy is interpreted as a call to "towolo wahiyala" (stand firm) in his faith. In O.'s sermon, she emphasizes this aspect by adopting the perspective of a narrative of decline, identifying the present time with the future about which Paul warns Timothy.

O. begins her sermon in the usual fashion by describing the standard narrative of Paul's ministry to the Gentiles and the identity of Timothy. In many other sermons, Paul is said to have been told by God to travel the entire world to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ and build the first Christian churches. In the course of this ministry, he selects Timothy to be a pastor in the church at Ephesus. Paul's letters to Timothy are to encourage him in his work. In such sermons on Paul, preachers often link the early churches with present day Christianity as parts of the same era. Historical missionaries who came to Papua are often paralleled to Paul as bearers of the same gospel. Paul's ministry is represented as the beginning of the spread of Christianity which culminated in its finally reaching Papua New Guinea. This preface, called 'explanation' (abiymasele), orients the Bible text and O.'s own performance, in terms of European Christian history. In this frame, Auhelawa Christians and Timothy's Ephesian Christians are part of the same epoch.

After explaining Paul's ministry briefly, O. begins to explain the passage verse by
verse, intercalating the Dobu verses with paraphrases in Auhelawa, occasionally expanding on the text. The first and second verses of the reading are:

1. But mark this: There will be terrible times in the last days.

2. People will be lovers of themselves, lovers of money, boastful, proud, abusive, disobedient to their parents, ungrateful, unholy…

O. expands on these verses in Auhelawa by saying:

He says, [reading the Dobu text] "Natugu, nuwa 'i da sabwalema [...] tuta 'ana 'ebe losalowa 'i memai manuna." He says, Understand that in the future you will find it. How many years will finish and then you will find this life. Stand firm, stand firm on the work of Jesus. Hold up your church and direct it, in Ephesus. And he says, a time before us will come, he says, these problems will appear. He says, people themselves will do only their own things. People will only think of themselves all the time. He says, later you will find this, discover this, and you will know. In the future, he says, You will speak to people, tell them the rules of the church and they won't obey you, they won't follow you. They will only do their own things. A person's own life how. [A person's own life will be like this.] He hunts for his meat. He looks for his money. He works for his food. A person will search around and work for his own wealth. He thinks all the time about himself.

(Recorded on April 2, 2006.)

She goes on to explain each of the characteristics Paul lists in the rest of the passage. She spends more time explaining the characteristics of bad people than in her translation of the next verses, drawing special attention to the future selfishness of people. It is worth noting also how she associates the future disobedience of Timothy's church members to his rules ("You will speak to people, … they won't follow you") on the one hand, and their selfishness ("They will only do their own things"). Hunting, working for money (by selling in the market), and garden work are considered to be solitary tasks for home consumption, akin to lauyaba (food collecting) from yaheyahe (secondary gardens) discussed in Chapter 2. Preachers frequently contrasted these activities with church and community projects.
After working through the passage verse by verse, O. turns to the next section of her sermon. Like many other lay preachers, she organizes her sermon using a sermon outline written in the Dobu language by the United Church administration. Here, O. reads again the first question from the sermon outline and poses it to the congregation, but offers no single response.

What way do we discover God's power? Because Paul said it already! He says, in the future, he says, my son, in the future you will find these problems, see them and you will know. You will experience them. You will find them in your church, in your community, and Papua New Guinea and the whole world. He says, later they will appear, he says, you will see these things and you will know. And so, on point one I have said, "To'eda enega Yaubada 'ina waiwai ta da 'italoba?" [What way do we discover God's power?] A long time ago, Paul wrote this book as a letter to Timothy. And at this time, me, I am talking about it and you all are hearing it. At this time, Paul is talking to you all and us(ex.), to us(in.). And so, this question paper [sermon outline] appeared. Now, Paul is speaking to you and me. Will we find them, or do we already see them? In these times, what Paul said—if I talked about them and you go and experience them you'll say "Oh, true." At this time, what Paul has said is with you, with me, in Milne Bay Province, Papua New Guinea, and it is in the whole world. Paul already said it out and it is. And so, from which [way] will we observe our verse, verse five, [reads verse 5 in Dobu]? Which [way] will we decide and we see that this has truly come? Because we've already seen killings close to us, fighting close to us, swearing close to us, with us, in our lineages. No love for mother and father is in our houses. Everything Paul wrote, we see it already. I have put our theme already: "Yaubada 'enaia yage yauyauna kapekapeyana." [With God, all things are possible.] How will we discover it?

In this passage, O.'s uses a common strategy of self-effacement through quotation. Preachers when they disavow their authority to preach, and describe their own sermons as a "sharing" of "what the Holy Spirit has revealed to me." After reading her Bible passage, O. herself says, "This is the end of our reading. Through God's spirit, it will preach to each of us(in.)." When O. and other preachers do this, it is not only out of modesty. O. attributes agency to the reading itself in order to neutralize the distinction between herself
as leader and her congregation and create an "each of us(in.) ['ehebo 'ehebo ... 'alidai]."

For O., the sermon outline and theme are themselves extensions of the Bible reading, which is itself the inspired word of God. Indeed, United Church ministers appear to have this close association in mind when they choose to write themes and questions that themselves incorporate the words of the readings. Hence, following the typical practice in this congregation, O. incorporates the exact words of the theme and questions into her sermon much in the same way she does the Bible reading. She sets both the words of the sermon outline and the Bible off from her own talk with quotative phrases such as "Our theme says..." or "Our verse is...." She reads them in the original language (both the Bible she uses and her sermon outline are in Dobu), then follows this by translating them into Auhelawa. She does not, directly at least, respond to the questions with her own thoughts, but defers to them as authoritative voices independent of her own. Here she defers to Paul as a response to the question, itself phrased in the terms of final verse of the reading. Her deference to the text helps maintain the frame of 'one mind.'

By diminishing her own voice in her sermon, O. also temporalizes her act of preaching in several ways. As mentioned above, her contextualization of the letter construes the Ephesian and Auhelawa congregations as being co-present in a Christian epoch. Additionally, the voices she incorporates by definition also precede her, that is, they come before her and thus suggest that she is merely adding on to a cumulative history of the spread of Christianity. Finally, the voice of Paul which O. incorporates into her talk is itself constitutive of a specific temporality of decline. Paul encourages Timothy to maintain his faith. Characteristically for Paul, he uses a prophetic genre to give form to what right behavior should look like, thereby temporalizing morality as a
continuously willed commitment. The degree of unity and sincerity of participation in the congregation is also a key image for Paul of moral decline. O. takes up this temporality given by Paul by explicitly stating that Paul's prophecies of moral decline have been fulfilled "now" in the midst of the congregation itself. She further draws out the lesson that the proper response for Christians is to remain steadfast in their commitment to the 'one mind' of the congregation.

O.'s weaving of the voices of Paul and United Church administration with her own thus has a double significance. Firstly, by diminishing her own authorship of her talk, she maintains the frame of tapwalolo as being collective. Secondly, as her quotations index the foreignness and ancientness of the voices of Paul and United Church administration, she constructs an outside world of which the congregation is a small part. By putting her congregation in the same category as those of the New Testament, she construes people's own experiences in terms of predictions made by Paul. The contemporary life of the church then is positioned in relation to Paul's concept of steadfastness, and renders people's experiences as a failure or lack what should have been maintained from the time of Paul. O.'s sermon illustrates how the church's uses of Christian texts function to construct an externalized position from which people can see themselves in terms of an overarching movement of Christian history. In keeping with church discourse in general, the external position created through authoritative texts is linked with an image of the congregation as a communal group and in opposition with that of a selfish individual.

In a sermon given on New Year's Day, a Sunday in 2006, one can find a similar construction of Christian community through temporalities of both development and
decline in the sermon given by a male member of the congregation, T. Using the theme of New Year's Day as a time for personal change and commitment to Christian principles, T. draws upon the ideas of church celebrations of New Year's and Christmas to depict what kind of change people should work for through Christianity, what they can anticipate and what is necessary for its realization. At many turns, T. associates personal change with reviving interest in church activities, and rebuilding of the United church facilities.

For this service, being a church holiday, the United liturgical calendar suggests two readings. The first, from the Gospel of Mark, describes Jesus leading his apostles across the Sea of Galilee through a storm. The second, from Exodus, describes Moses's parting of the Red Sea in the Israelites flight from Egypt. T. reads these and begins his sermon by briefly explaining both of them, extemporaneously retelling the stories in Auhelawa. He states the theme of service as "crossing over is a change of life," saying it in Dobu and then in English. He explains the meaning of the word 'crossing' (geyo'awa), saying that its meaning in this context is similar to its meaning when one "crosses" a river during a flood. When the river floods and becomes murky, one must climb across on a log bridge or paddle across on a canoe, or risk being carried away. He describes the celebration of a new year as an illustration of a similar kind of change. The concept of crossing creates an explicit metaphor of change as forward movement, which T. develops further through the image of crossing a river. Thus one understands that this change is supposed to be willed and permanent. Also, at several points in his sermon, T. also introduces a metaphorical frame of change as moving up (hae). Like many Oceanic languages, Auhelawa orients horizontal space by using the words up and down as
directional markers. T. also uses it to orient time as well, using up (hae) to denote movement towards the future. The use of this orientational axis reinforces the irreversible direction of change implied by crossing, and as one sees later, connects the notion of change to the idea of material progress, also idiomatized as upward movement.

He says that in a new year, people leave behind all of the problems of the old year and have a chance for a fresh start. Thus, crossing into a new year is an opportunity to change how one lives. T. draws another illustration from the slavery of the Israelites in Egypt, saying that they suffered greatly in Egypt and wanted to change their lives and go into Canaan so that, using an English phrase, they could change their "living standard." Once in Canaan, they praised God and they grew in number and spread the word of God all over the world. He makes an analogy between the Israelites and Auhelawa. First he suggests that "If the Egyptian life was with us, we'll see. Maybe they'd kill us all and we'd all disappear after one year. They'd make Auhelawa just disappear. I think it looks like that." Second, he makes the parallel explicit by calling for Auhelawa to embrace change:

And you and I likewise cross over to 2000 (sic) the same way. Let's also change our living standard. And let's you and I all of us(in.) stand firm and let's preach God's word throughout the world every year. We shouldn't board the canoe and come back again and again. That's the meaning of a new year. That's the meaning of the new year we always celebrate. We should work to build ['abi] the living standard so it goes up [hae]. And so, we change [saugerasi]. (Recorded on January 1, 2006.)

T. takes the parallel further than what may have been suggested by the theme of "crossing." Having said that the deliverance of the Israelites into Canaan led them to grow in number and prosper, T. says that not only should his congregation cross into a new year, but that they too should change through collective work. Here he introduces new metaphors of change as building ('abi), and moving up (hae). He uses a Dobu word,
saugerasi, which is used in United Church liturgies and translations as a gloss of "change." This connects his English phrasing of "living standard" to material progress, an idea which he develops further as he goes ahead. Having explained this meaning of new year in these terms, T. starts a new section in his sermon in which he addresses more pointedly the failure of the church members to work towards change. He starts with a criticism of their preparation for New Year's Eve. Making reference to the theme of "the changing society" used by the United Church literature to denote modernity and loss of social control in villages, T. says that the church did not put on its traditional New Year's Eve celebration because they did not prepare properly as they had in the past.

We didn't invent Christmas and we didn't invent New Year's. It is an event of the church. The church started them, and the church does them. You and I did not start the celebration of New Year's and Christmas. So from that we can understand properly. We have to change! At these times themselves. On these days, on these events themselves, we have to change. That is the meaning of what is Christmas and what is New Year's. That is always the church's event. And we people always take Christmas and New Year's as our opportunity to celebrate stupidly. But we should understand it. We full-stop everything and pray to God.

By this point, T. has shifted his focus away from individual change to the idea that the church as an institution calls one to celebrate Christmas and New Year's Day as times for renewal. These holidays are not something created by people, certainly not merely for their own entertainment, but they stand on their own as if they had an independent reality to themselves to which people must attend and conform. This is reinforced by his juxtaposition of "the church" and "God" as recipients of the actions of "we," "you and I," and "we people." As in O.'s sermon, T. displaces himself by his repetitive indexing of himself as part of his own audience, maintain the frame of 'one mind.' The final of these pronomial of the congregation as a group is most telling of T.'s thinking. T. says "we
people" ('ita tomowa), a phrase which people gloss as "we human beings" and explain as having the same value as the English terms "we mere mortals." As days on the church calendar, both literally and figuratively, Christmas and New Year's days that belong to the church and God in contrast to humans, and as such the proper celebration of these events requires individuals to set aside their private concerns and "full-stop everything" (that is, in this Auhelawa colloquialism, completely stop). For T. then, the we of the congregation only exists in connection with the external and superordinate institution of the church as manifested in its calendar. The unity of the congregation comes through its subordination to a forward march of time, the perpetual renewal and growth of the church as foreordained by God. Saying that New Year's Day comes only once in a year, T. continues.

You and I, this is our day. Because tomorrow, the second, it begins and we head towards ['we go up' (ta-hae)] it [the next new year] and who will command you(sing.)? Who will command you(sing.)? No one. It's your(sing.) day.

Today the church comes together to praise God, but tomorrow the new year begins and each person is free to do what they want, until the next year. In this passage, "you and I" no longer indexes the congregation as "humans," but as a group that transcends the individualized, secular time that will begin after the holiday. Presenting people with a choice to either move forward together or stay back alone is an example of encoding the state of the congregation in a temporal frame of development and decline.

From here, T. closes his sermon and repeats his previous statements about looking ahead to the new year and trying to change for the better. Again he calls on the church congregation as a group to similarly pursue change by working together to improve the
church. In this statement, he says that this too should be linked to material progress as well. Calling on the congregation to work for change in the new year, he says "Maybe the bush will overgrow Sowala and we'll just be cutting it back until 2007. And we'll cut it back until 2008, but no other change. We want change." T. then rapidly fired off a number of building projects that the congregation had planned on and off for a number of years but had never executed. He says:

Right now, only one [house] is standing and is rotten, and the bush is growing over there, and it looks like not. That isn't change [saugerasi]. We're just going back. We're going back to the 1970s and we'll come back to this house which long ago was with our grandparents [the church building].

This curious image of a mission station in decline as its buildings rot and collapse tells us a lot about the underlying representation of time at work in T.'s talk. Many people of Sowala remember with pride a time many decades ago when the church raised money to build a minister's house in their station, and prior to that, the church had worked to lay the cement foundation for a new church building that would be larger than ever before. In recent years, the local congregation has never been able to raise even small sums of money for the maintenance of the station and their pastor, minister and their families. Never maintained, the houses grow decrepit, and seem to be slowly falling down. Rather than indicating the age of the mission in Sowala, people read the buildings as signs of decline of past development, and hence reverse progress. The strength of the congregation as a cooperative group is diminishing over time, and consequently the development of a past era is now being reversed. Meanwhile, as the church has declined physically and socially, T. said that people just entertained themselves unaware of "the coming-back of Christ." Here T. makes oblique reference to the parable of the servants
who entertain themselves and are caught unprepared for the return of their master (Matt. 24:45-51, Mark 13:33-37, Luke 12:35-48). He concludes by saying people should first think of the church and its call to people to come together to praise God. Without this collective work and worship, how can there be change, T. asks? Only after correctly observing tapwalolo, go and celebrate the new year as they saw fit and do whatever work they wanted throughout the year.

The juxtaposition of decline and progress as complementing models of change further reinforces the opposition between individual and collective agencies. Collective agency is identified with movement in the direction of God's plan, symbolized in the church calendar and its authoritative prescription to commit to progress. The individual's choice to refuse or resist the collective will obstructs this forward movement. In T.'s sermon, material change and progress is said to be the consequence and the proof of proper cooperation, shared time among members of church, and forward movement of the community towards the future. By the same token, as this progress is also linear and in a sense foreordained as part of a Christian calendar, individual agency can also be construed as backward movement away from a normative state of collective harmony, or the decline and degradation of what had already been obtained in the initial forming of congregation as a body. Hence, T.'s sermon shifts freely between a temporality of progress and one of decline because they are complementary images of the opposition between solitary will and 'one mind.' As separate temporalizing frames of the audience of the sermon as a congregation, they both reinforce the sense that it is a transcendence of the individual. Moreover, T.'s sermon slips from spiritual development to concrete material forms of development, suggesting that Christian discourse validates material
progress as a sign of true change.

In the next section, I discuss examples of the use of the same kind of temporal rhetoric of the Christian ritual in non-religious contexts. These examples illustrate how the Christian temporality one sees in tapwalolo and sermons is fully naturalized. In these examples, tapwalolo itself stands as the sign of the cooperation needed for change. Lack of cooperation is not merely construed as deviant but evidence of a heathen past yet to be overcome. I first examine how the discourse of a community meeting to discuss a development project naturalizes the value of development and progress, and ties people's future fortunes to their ability to renounce selfishness in favor of cooperation. Following this I examine how these values are encoded in the form of an explanatory narrative in which the present lack of material change in Auhelawa is the result of refusal and conflict.

**Christian Temporality in Community Meetings**

For several years before my arrival, the Catholic diocese of Milne Bay Province had undertaken an ambitious plan to build new schools and health centers in Catholic communities under its supervision. Through this new initiative, a cadre of missionary priests from the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Missions (Pontificio Istituto Missioni Estere, PIME) of Italy had been sent to the diocese to work in different parishes. Kurada parish had received the benefit of several new permanent-materials buildings both in its main station and in neighboring Catholic communities. Father Lino, a PIME priest with expertise in construction, came to reside in Mwademwadewa mission station and oversee the parish's many building projects. Non-Catholics were inevitably involved in these
projects through the ward councillor, who decided that everyone in the ward should contribute to the church's projects to build educational and health facilities since these were used by everyone.

The Catholic mission in Mwademwadewa forms a parish which extends to include several Catholic communities in south Normanby Island. Representatives from each of these communities attended quarterly meetings of the parish council. The purpose of the council is to organize projects in the parish, and in recent years has participated actively in assisting the diocese with its building programs by organizing contributions of land, labor, bush materials, beach sand and gravel (for the making of cement). Over 2005 and 2006, the council discussed submitting to the diocese a proposal to build a new provincial high school near the Catholic mission in Bwasiyaiyai. Approximately half of all students who complete the eighth grade at the local Catholic primary school are selected to attend high school. Usually students can choose to attend either a United Church or Catholic high school, but both of these are on neighboring islands. Parents often complain about the danger and cost associated with students' travel. The proposed "Normanby Island High School" at Bwasiyaiyai was meant to remedy this problem by bringing advanced schooling closer to Normanby Island students. Auhelawa also foresaw the spin off benefits associated with hosting a school, including the opportunity to sell vegetables to school staff and make use of the proposed school's medical aid post.

Moreover, as one member of the parish council said to me, people thought it would be good to plan a project for Bwasiyaiyai "to spread the development out." Compared to Kurada, its nearest neighbor, Bwasiyaiyai had little in the way of "development."

Students walked great distances to attend school in Kurada and residents also went to
Kurada's station to sell in the market and visit the health center. It was considered to be the poor cousin of Kurada and it was hoped that the high school would help the ward to progress.

Members of the parish council from Bwasiyaiyai and Kurada, each active church members with high education and extensive work experience, drafted a proposal for a high school to be built at Bwasiyaiyai on land adjacent to Catholic mission's small chapel. The landowner of this area, Bwasiyaiyai's Catholic catechist, had previously donated part of his lineage's territory to the parish for a chapel. He wanted to donate another area, named Topolupolu, for the high school, in exchange for only a token compensation. His offer of land was thought to be an especially attractive opportunity to everyone. Because he had no sisters, and his mother had no sisters, he was considered to be the last surviving member of his lineage and thus no one was likely to claim the land when he died and his lineage disappeared.30

During 2006, the proposal committee held several public meetings to discuss their submission. The first of these, held on April 4, 2006 in Gogosi'i village of Bwasiyaiyai, was to obtain the signature of the landowner on a form to indicate his willingness to lease the land for the project and also to obtain "community support statements" from residents to be appended to the proposal. The latter of these is what I will discuss now. K., the committee chair and main author of the proposal, D., the secretary, and I walked from Kurada to Bwasiyaiyai on the morning of the meeting. We met along the way several other members of the committee and accompanied them to Gogosi'i village. Eventually people from surrounding Bwasiyaiyai villages arrived and sat with us under the main house in the village. When enough people had arrived, the meeting began. As K. and D.
presented it, the community could not simply "agree" (talam), but had to "really agree from the heart" (moiha 'atedi hi-talamwei). The committee also said that they could not "just agree" (talam mohili), "speak empty words and then turn our(in.) backs" (kawanaya na ta-taudageladagela), or "lie to the bishop" (bishop ta-'oyamai). Rather, the committee strove to impress upon the attendees to the meeting that they needed a serious, lasting commitment from everyone as a "community." The way the committee ran the meeting projected onto the event a frame in which attendees' possible contributions, and the significance of what contributions they made, were tightly controlled to serve the purpose of the committee. This frame was further developed in comments made by K. the chair of the proposal committee.

K. made some introductory remarks. He said that the "title of the proposal" was "Normanby Island High School," which K. explained meant that the proposal was asking the church to build a high school for all the people of Normanby Island as a "development" that everyone could benefit from. The "services" that came from it would come about because "we(in.) Bwasiyaiyai people carried [supported] it." For that reason, they wanted to have a meeting for "we(in.) Bwasiyaiyai group" to talk about the work for "we(in.) Bwasiyaiyai our(in.) thing" that could come "in the future." In the first statements, K. established that the proposal was a concrete manifestation of a request made by the local community to the Catholic diocese, and that the purpose of this meeting was the feeding of information from the "Bwasiyaiyai community" to the proposal authors to give to the Catholic diocese. This discursive frame runs throughout the meeting.

In parallel with this frame, K. also established a frame in which the committee
members were distinct from "the Bwasiyaiyai community," and in which Bwasiyaiyai people would participate in the meeting and the committee would listen and later speak for them in the form of the proposal. K. continues by introducing himself and the other members of the committee, all of whom sat together facing the attendees. He introduced D. as his secretary who would take minutes of the meeting and record what people said. He then asked who had come from the community to attend the meeting, whether people had come from every village, and whether attendees thought that the number of people had come was enough to make decisions. One of the attendees observed that only young people had not come to the meeting, but the senior men and "tauwalowalowo" (literally, speaking people) of each lineage had come. Another echoed that the "elders," using the English word, had come and so there were enough people to discuss things and come to a decision.

K. also laid down some explicit ground rules for participation. He said that anyone could speak on any of the agendas, "when I have put them on the ground and opened them." He asked that people not argue with each other, but "(you[pl.]) speak in a meaningful way so that we(ex.) understand you according to what you mean" He also asked that when people speak, they should: "say the name of your lineage so that you note 'this is the talk of this lineage.' [...] We see that it's the words of this group." Later in the meeting, K. asked again that people identify themselves by their lineage when speaking so that D. would write their comments for inclusion in the proposal. K.'s presentation of the meeting made it clear that people's support for the project would be made credible if the attendees spoke to the committee in a way that allowed their talk to objectified and put into the proposal, and if through this translation, the committee would
speak to the diocese on their behalf. The discourse of the meeting also served the committee's aims in this respect as a "power code" (Hill 1985) to which the participants had unequal access. Besides his deployment of concepts of quorum and rules of order, K.'s talk is saturated with loan words and calques from English taken from the discourse of professional meetings such as "agenda," "proposal," "chairman," "secretary," "minute," "motion," "floor," "witness," "statement." Some participants joined in supporting this frame by phrasing the community's attendance in terms of a sort of intercultural vernacular of community meetings ('elders' [tautaubada, Police Motu: pl. senior man]), and by using a calque "tauwalowalowo" to mean "spokespersons." More important than this use of meeting talk is that in acceding to this construal of the interaction, participants implicitly agree that K., as "the chairman," controls the flow of discourse and for D., as "the secretary," to translate it into a specific kind of written document which could be compiled into a "proposal." Chairmen and secretaries are part of a chain of communication and translation of the meeting participants' intentions into an effective request to an outside agency, the Catholic diocesan bureaucracy. In using the language of the community meeting, participants index this larger intercultural context for their acts in the meeting. The imagined audience of the bishop, a synecdoche of his expatriate Roman Catholic mission and PIME, serves as the external position in relation to which participants imagine themselves as a unified community that can pursue development.

Consider how K. first solicits attendees to make verbal pledges of support on the record:

So, all of this development is in our(in.) home. And, you must know that you(pl.) the Bwasiyaiyai community, you(pl.) are the hosting area for this proposal and this institution. We(ex.) Auhelawa are behind you. Now, on
this part you(pl.) consider and talk. And, they will take minutes and what is your supportive statement will appear in the proposal. And, if they look inside it, they'll say "Oh, the Bwasiyaiyai community really gives permission from their hearts. They give permission for their resources. They give permission for their labor. And this proposal came out." Did you(pl.) understand what I said? [Attendees murmur in agreement.]

You(pl.) talk on the easy things [about the project], and you(pl.) talk on what are the difficulties with it too. Don't just talk about the good of it, and twist the people around, and in the future when something bad comes up, you(pl.)'ll say, "Hey, they didn't inform us(ex.) about this before."

OK. Before I put this agenda, like, on the ground and you(pl.) talk about it, I will put my thought to you(pl.) and you(pl.) think about it.

This thing in the bush [a euphemism for the high school project], it's in the hands of we(in.) the Bwasiyaiyai community. We will own the good of it and the bad of it. [...] If we(in.) decide it on paper and we(in.) community don't decide it inside ourselves(in.), they are going to say this thing is a lie. They'll say, "Ah, K. is lying." The problem will come back to us(ex.). So, I want you to decide through discussion now. (Recorded April 4, 2006.)

In this passage, K. ties the attendees to the meeting to the "Bwasiyaiyai community" and makes clear that the proposal will represent them as such. By contributing to the meeting in an acceptable way, attendees are positioned as a "Bwasiyaiyai community" through their supportive statements. The community has the legitimate right to give permission to the high school project, hence people must assent to this view of themselves in order for their opinion to count. The figures of the meeting minutes and the proposal function to make clear what people's roles in the meeting are to be. Similarly, K. takes up the voice of an imaginary reader of the proposal, one presumes the bishop, who he says will pass judgment on the authenticity of the community's commitment by deciding whether the Bwasiyaiyai community "really gives permission from their hearts" or that "K. is lying." K. instructs the people to discuss openly their thoughts so that a true consensus is reached and then can be translated into the text of the
proposal. He contrasts this with a parody of the attendees' own talk, suggesting that they should not support the proposal now and withdraw that support later. K. states clearly that people's contributions can either be supportive of consensus and thus an authentically united community, or they can be deceitful and result in the collapse of the unity needed for the proposal to work. This should remind one of the frame of tapwalolo as 'one mind.'

The proposal and its imagined readers are similar to the discursive constructs of an external authority people vest in the church and its traditions. The fact that the imagined readers of the high school proposal are church officials also gives further weight to K.'s way of framing the meeting. The parallels between Christian discourse and that of the meeting continues when one looks at how K. links people's cooperation with the proposal committee to the prospect of development, and furthermore how he construes development as a necessary by pairing it with the possibility of failure and decline. K. continued his comments by saying:

You(pl.) consider also that the coming of this institution to this place has a benefit for you(pl.) in some ways. The strengthening of your cash flow. Like, you will find a little strength in the movement of the economy of your village. Services, also, will be easier for you(pl.). And, you(pl.) know that Bwasiyaiyai from end to end is not like the past. In the past, the population was not big. Now, if we(in.) come to the lineages in Bwasiyaiyai, there are many more children than we(in.) adults. And do you(pl.) have a plan for these numerous children in Bwasiyaiyai or not?

[Attendee: Nope!]

So, we should get the meaning of that. We(in.) people who have recently married, and had our children, we should think of them. And let's be motivated because it's for the livelihood and the future of our children. We should not get this understanding and then give it back. The reason for this is now, while fishing and in our gardens, we don't think about meetings. We don't think about community work. We(in.) just turn back to the village by ourselves. They call a meeting and two or three come. They call a church event and two or three come. They call community work and two
or three come. If you(pl.) want this high school to come, you(pl.) stop this attitude now in Bwasiyaiyai.

In this passage, K. moves from the anticipated benefits from the building of the high school to speaking of the "future" of the community. He shifts the stakes of the debate over development from a position in which people choose either to accept or reject some possible benefits to a position in which people must pursue development to correct some deficiency in their present-day life. The meaning of "future" moves away from an open field of possibility to being one side of a dichotomy, and thus a telos of history; today, as K. says, "is not like the past." K. states that the Bwasiyaiyai population is growing rapidly. It is a widely held perception in the region that the population is growing too fast and that as a result it is increasingly difficult to achieve subsistence for the growing number of children. As discussed earlier, K. makes use of both a sense of social decline and a desire for social progress to compel people to see their own individual behavior in relation to a community. He provokes his audience with a question asking if they "plan" for the "future." His audience readily acceded to this, one man dryly echoing back an exaggerated negative (ni::gele). K. replies with a metapragmatic gloss on the audience's own response, saying that they should take hold of the "meaning" of his question, that is, the external view of themselves as individuals in relation to an idealized cooperative group needed for development to advance. K. then explicitly provides a picture of Bwasiyaiyai as seen from the outside in unusually harsh terms. They are, apparently, a people who think only of working in the garden and fishing, which as I point out in Christian discourse are considered to be solitary pursuits for individual benefit. At the occasions when an impersonal "they" calls them together for communal
work, only a few come. The rest "turn back" to the village. K. provokes the people to self-awareness through the starkly dualistic lens he provides: instead of coming together in cooperation to prepare for the inevitable future, people instead selfishly withhold themselves from the community and pursue their own desires. In his conclusion to his comments, K. emphasizes again people's failings. He condemns also his own people in Kurada, parodying their resistance to helping their missionary priest:

Don't be like up-that-way [Kurada] and when Father Lino is collecting sand, "Hey, my gravel!" And where is your(sing.) child schooling and where are all the services you are living off of? When you are sick, where do you go? Or do you sleep in the village and later you get better? Now, our life has changed. Don't think about the life of our(in.) ancestors from the old days.

The selfishness of people is an obstacle not only to specific development projects, but is itself a throwback to the "life of our ancestors." In this framing of development, the concept of the future serves as a horizon against which an idealized social body, and alternatively, the loss of the social norm of cooperation and generosity are imagined. The frames of progress and decline are juxtaposed to bolster the underlying framing of the project in terms of the subordination of individuals' self-interest to the unity of purpose in the community. The community, both the subject and the object of development, represents not only the promise of progress, but the potential for loss. Both views naturalize change as an irreversible forward movement. The community meeting interpellates participants individually as obstacles to this movement and shapes them collectively into a new kind of social body. Like religious narrative and ritual, the discursive frames deployed in community meetings also construe people's participation in a way that naturalizes the need for development. Meetings reflexively reframe
participants as members in a voluntary union which exists in relation to a global spacetime. The figures of the proposal and the bishop mark the external world in which community sees itself, as does Biblical text and Paul's prophecy do in O.'s sermon. This global spacetime of development similarly encodes the ideal of voluntary union in terms of the temporality of development and decline.

A Myth of Development: Makadonia's Town at Pwapwata

Now I will move from a discussion of the metasocial pragmatics of Christian discourse to a discussion of how these become seen as commonsense truths about social life. The rhetorical images of decline and development in church and in meetings take on a stereotyped form in a well known anecdote from local history, leading people to see the loss of intimate union in the community as a constant feature of daily life. The story relates Auhelawa experience with local development projects of an earlier generation. I present a story which tells of the efforts of Makadonia, Lucy's father and the first elected leader of Kurada, to gather dispersed villages into a town by encouraging everyone to cut down jungle and build new houses together. In the story, images of buildings and collective work express the desire for change in the nature of social life itself, and images of private subsistence work represent decline and failure to achieve a modern future. Makadonia tries to persuade people to come together in support of a idealized future community. Insofar as the Catholic church's social services would lay the foundation for a future Auhelawa town, tapwalolo figures as a sign of the unity needed for transformation. In this story, the opposite of this idealized unity is represented in the figure of a lone individual who foments doubt and dissent about the hard work to make a
town, and ends up disrupting Makadonia's plan for a town. The high school meeting illustrates the practice of constituting a community based on voluntary union by framing social relationships in terms of Christian temporalities. Makadonia's story renders that process in an iconic form. The selfish individualism which is linked to the past and backward movement, and opposed to collective unity, is personified in this story in the figure of Vianney, Makadonia's rival. Thus the story is an ideological myth which suggests that individuals' stubbornness has always been an obstacle to change.

In 1963, Makadoina was elected as the representative to the new local government council created by the colonial administration. The job of the local government councils was to initiate local economic development projects. Whereas Didiluwa is remembered for explaining the mysterious colonial government and its future plans to Auhelawa, Makadoina is remembered as a person who could make use of the government's powers to create development in Auhelawa. For instance, he secured food aid from the local council during a drought. He also obtained the necessary support from the new local government for the Catholic mission's plans to build a new school building and health center. He organized the community to clear a coastal path into a continuous dirt walking track that connected all of the small settlements between Auhelawa and the government station on the other side of the island. At the time, he said that maintaining the track would lead eventually to its being developed into a road for trucks.

One of the more elaborate stories about Makadonia is his plan to a hill near the Sowala United church named Pwapwata into a space for an airstrip, new buildings for the Catholic church, school and health center. In the future, he is recalled to have said, Pwapwata would become a small town. A man P. told me the story of Makadonia in
2004. He said that the people of Kurada believed in Makadonia when he said he could build a town at Pwapwata, so they followed his orders for them to go to Pwapwata and clear the bush. At that time, the land had never been cleared for gardens and was a thick forest of large trees. Everyday the people worked at cutting trees and clearing the bush. The work was hard, but there was only 'loina ehebo' (literally 'one rule,' that is, assent to Makadonia's command) and the people arrived every day to work and only departed in the evening to cook and sleep.

According to P., Makadonia wanted everyone to build houses on Pwapwata, and live together in one place as people do in town. As the work of cutting down the bush went on, a colonial government officer came to Kurada on his regular patrol. During this time, colonial agents held public meetings to give instructions to the people. During the work at Pwapwata, P. says, a man named Vianney stood up to speak. P. says that Vianney had learned English at the Catholic school at Sideia Island, and could speak English to the government officers. He asked a question of the officer:

He said, "Gavaman, Makadonia has decided that we should build a town here. What do you think? Is it good that we build a town here?"

The officer said, "Good! A good plan." [...] And so his second question was, "What if everybody lives here and I live in my village? Are you going to fine me if I don't live in the town?"

And [the officer] said, "Ah, that's only up to each of you yourselves to decide. If you want, you live in the town. And if you don't, you stay in your village and you only come and work on the instructions I give you."

That clarified everybody's thinking. They said, "If we don't live in the town, he won't come and fine us." They dispersed and went back to their villages. They rejected the town. (Recorded July 19, 2004.)

As authority figures who give 'orders' (loina), Makadonia and the government
officer represent the unity and harmony needed for collective projects. The figure of Vianney, who questions the officer and raises doubts, represents conflicts that arise when people pursue individual goals. In P.’s telling, Makadonia's rule, and his future town, encompass and subordinate individuals and their work in their home gardens. Because villages are dispersed, living together in one place would require a dramatically different organization. This was underlined in P.’s telling of Makadonia's plan. He said that in his opinion, Makadonia's plan was good and had they followed it today there would be good order in the community of Kurada. It would be better because people could be summoned for work and they would all come. Today, he said, if work is called, some go into their gardens to work, some go fishing, and only few actually obey the law that says they must work in the mission station on community projects once a week. In P.’s conception of the town, people would spend all their time in the town and only leave to work in their gardens in the separate "blocks" of land that people inherit through their lineages. Everything else would happen in the town, thus basically inverting the precedence of solitary pursuit over community effort that P. says exists now. Living in a town, P. said, would mean that there would be "'one rule' and 'one mind' in the village." He said that had everyone followed Makadonia, today Kurada would be orderly,

[...] because all of us would be inside [the town] and we would make decisions. We would see each other and we would follow our rule. We would respect each other, have shame for each other and fear each other and live inside the town.

In other words, the entire population of Kurada would be reconfigured as a single village centered upon one rule and one mind. P.’s interpretation of Makadonia's idea is that the usual social pattern of dispersed villages, segmented descent groups and great
personal autonomy is mismatched with the idea of a modern community working for its development and material progress. P.'s imagined town, like the situations people imagine in church worship and through sermons, consists of people voluntary submitting themselves to a group and giving up individual interests like subsistence activities to work for a common purpose. To solve the problems of everyday social life, P. says Auhelawa should have followed Makadonia in trying to transcend selfishness and conflict and realize true solidarity in a totally new social form. Yet, Makadonia could not maintain one rule once Vianney let people see that the government could not coerce them to work for the town, and Pwapwata was never developed.

No airstrip, town or other project was built on Pwapwata. The Catholic mission continued to build its own facilities within the land given to it. The United Church station continued to use the land heading towards Pwapwata. Pwapwata itself was now cleared of bush and trees. The landowners started to make gardens on it. By the time I arrived, the land was still being actively cultivated by their descendants. In many versions of this story told to me, the current use of Pwapwata for gardens by its landowners was highlighted. Like the figure of Vianne, the current state of Pwapwata functions as an inverse image of an imagined future of cooperation and harmony. Instead of having become a town in which everyone lived together, the land is used for the production of food for the families who live on it.

The story of Makadonia ultimately presents the Pwapwata town not as an alternative possible future, but as a future held in abeyance by people's failure to cooperate. The collective push toward Makadonia's town succumbs to internal conflict and eventually a dissolution of energy. In P.'s telling, the main difference between living
in a town and living in the village is that the town would provide the conditions necessary for cooperation and harmony. The very conditions that would have allowed Makadonia's plan to be realized obtain in the imagined future, and conversely are absent from the normal, everyday village life from which Makadonia wanted people to escape. In this sense, the figures of Makadonia and Vianney, condense the parallel oppositions between individual and collective agencies, conflict and harmony, village and town, and present and future. As the opposite of everyday village life, the future is not so much something that one hopes to progress to, it is an external position on which one can look at oneself. The failure of the project is, in this sense, a failure of social organization. The failed collective effort is made salient when people imaginatively project Makadonia's town onto the contemporary landscape as what could have been and what still can be. Similarly, in the high school proposal meeting, K. and his committee seem to anticipate the project's own failure for similar reasons, and try to head it off by deploying a similar ideal image of a harmonious collectivity working towards and benefiting from a new high school. K. opposes this image to one of the present as a world of Vianneys in which everyone goes off their own way.

Is this imagination of a ideal of communal harmony in the form of an urban society, however, Christian in nature? In another interview, I asked a woman E. what she thought of Makadonia's plan. She said that Makadonia would have been successful had it not been for Vianney's resistance. Makadonia wanted to help people work for the "future" (hauga mulita [the time that follows]), and build "a town for children [to live in when they grew up]." Instead of thinking of these things, the people thought of themselves. They complained of the work and, when Vianney gave them the chance, they gave up
working for the town. She continued by saying:

If they decided on Makadonia's plan and he was strong, well, they would have built this place here and it would go there. And this would go up to that mountain. It would be like Moresby. We'd go up to the town and live inside of it. We'd go some place on a bus. [all laugh] Well, isn't that right? That was his plan. I'm not lying. True. And likewise in the Father's worship, in his sermons. He says, "New heaven, new earth." In his sermons every morning, likewise. We(in.) have changed. We(in.) people have changed. And God himself already changed his followers and they have appeared as new. New sicknesses, new deaths, new heaven, new earth. The New Jerusalem has already arrived on earth. It has arrived from heaven and is now on earth (Recorded April 24, 2006).

My field assistant, E. and I all laughed at her fanciful suggestion that we should be driving from her village to other places, but for her it seems that such an image is not merely a fantasy, but indicates that there is an underlying logic of Auhelawa history which is derived from Christian religious practices and encoded symbolically in stories about Makadonia. She places the story of Makadonia in an overarching religious narrative which she derives from the daily Masses in the nearby Catholic mission. Every morning she goes for Mass and listens to the Catholic priest give a homily in which he speaks of the coming New Jerusalem, a future ordained by God in which everyone and everything will be changed and become new. To conceptualize the future, E. and other Auhelawa use images of town life and technology. As P.'s telling of Makadonia's story shows, these images of development render comprehensible an idealized sociality free of conflict. In E.'s mind's eye, also, she says she sees how Makadonia's plan could transform the landscape, filling the valley on which people make their gardens with sprawling urban development. I argue that E.'s and P.'s interpretations of the Makadonia story only serve to unpack the meanings condensed in the single sign of Makadonia. They make explicit that the story itself functions to contextualize and interpret everyday life in terms of
temporality of Christianity.

**Conclusion**

I have argued that Christian religious practices use images of development and decline to construct a contradiction between the church congregation and the solitary individual. The church community embodies forward movement, the future and collective well being, and individual goods are represented as things that cause conflict, create disunity, obstruct change and, so to speak, hold back the group from entering the future. Change and forward movement toward the future thus appears natural and inevitable in Christian temporality. Time marches forward according to God's plan. Human beings must themselves, however, strive to keep up. They have to overcome their individual wants to enter the church and forsake the past in order to move forward. Gardening and the food quest are, I would argue, emblematic of individualism, the failure to achieve unity, and the past.

One sees how sermons construct this contradiction in terms of decline and development in O.'s sermon about Timothy. O. invokes Paul's prophecies of the "last days" to foreground the temporality of God's plan. Paul, as the apostle to the Gentiles who founded the first Christian churches, is a figure who reminds one of the basic temporal dichotomy of Christianity. In his letter to Timothy, Paul encourages him not only to lead people to righteousness, but to hold on to what they gained when they were saved, that is to say persevere in the last days and maintain the integrity of their community in the face of the moral decline around them. Right living in Pauline Christianity is basically maintaining the church as a community in preparation for the end
of time. O. persuades her audience in her sermon by interpellating them as an
congregation into the position of the Ephesian church, placing their experiences in the
framework of a global Christian history. This effect comes about through the interplay of
different voices in O.'s sermon. She incorporates Biblical language, the words of religious
authorities, and cites these sources in her own statements to create a code which not so
much indexes the foreign sources from which it is composed, but constructs the
difference between the future and the past along which lines the whole sermon is built.

The temporalities of Christian discourse are not confined to purely religious
contexts, but are borrowed from those contexts and deployed in secular contexts. In these
contexts as well, a rhetoric of decline as a code for disunity naturalizes a program of
change through development. In both religious and secular domains, people use decline
and development to imagine their place in global order relative to other societies, and
thus come to understand themselves as deficient with respect to an external standard of
value. Christian discourse is, in this respect, the effective means by which people
experience what Sahlins calls a cultural "humiliation," a necessary precondition for a
person to forsake their own culture's values in favor of another way of life.

Temporalizing discursive frames, I want to suggest, solve an important problem
in Sahlins's conception of cultural humiliation. The problem is a form of the paradox of
intercultural relationships I discuss in the Introduction and Chapter 1. If people's
experience of humiliation precedes their embrace of development values, then they must
experience what their culture defines as a humiliation. Yet, if their culture can make an
experience of intercultural humiliation meaningful, then that experience can ironically
contribute to the maintenance of their culture's own values. Thus one encounters a
bootsrapping problem, that is, a problem of understanding how the system of cultural transformation starts itself. Cultural transformation may be brought on by humiliation, but true humiliation may require cultural transformation in order to be palpable. In a recent collection of essays, anthropologists have taken up this problem by examining several Melanesian cases of cultural practices of humiliation and their relationship to experiences of cultural transformation (see the essays in Robbins and Wardlow, eds. 2005, especially Robbins 2005, Stewart and Strathern 2005). More broadly, many recent studies document how people understand themselves in relation to and by way of their interaction with foreign cultural values and ideas (for example, Akin 2004, Bashkow 2006, Demian 2006, Eriksen 2005, Fong 2007, Foster 2002, Gilberthorpe 2007, Jorgensen 2007, Lattas 2006, Merlan 2005, Robbins 1998, Wardlow 2002, Wilk 1995). These cases all suggest that foreign cultural products can serve as sites of "thirdness" (Rio 2005), that is, sites outside the cultural system that represent it to itself (see also Tomlinson 2004, Stasch 2003). Auhelawa Christianity seems to be a similar resource for generating a reflexive self-awareness in the terms of another culture, and consequently a source of legitimation for Auhelawa's quest to intervene in their local economy through development.

I want to draw out one aspect of the reflexive awareness of social change which Auhelawa derive from Christianity, which is the role that individualism plays. Thanks to work of Robbins (2004) on the Christian conversion of the Urapmin of West Sepik Province, PNG, it has become accepted that Christianity has a distinctive cultural content which often challenges the local cultural values of people who adopt its religious forms. For Robbins, a central part of Christianity's culture is the emphasis it places on persons as
autonomous individuals. When the Urapmin adopted Christianity, they often faced moral dilemma resulting from the contradiction between the local relational concept of personhood and Christian individual personhood. As Urapmin struggle to fully establish themselves as a Christian community, they find themselves also necessarily drawn into a Western worldview, and thus see themselves in relation to that worldview. One of Robbins's informants expressed his own realization of the inherent individualism of Christian belief by saying "I can't break off a piece of my belief and give it to my wife." In other words, Christian belief as an attribute of the individual person, is something that is totally ontologically different than anything in the pre-Christian Urapmin world. In that world, persons are defined not by inalienable attributes, but by their relations to other persons. This relational constitution of social life is embodied concretely in the ethic and practice of reciprocal exchange. Faith cannot, however, be exchanged. Its value pertains to a sphere in which individualism is the standard.

In Auhelawa Christian discourse, people are conceptualized as individuals. Yet, perhaps unexpectedly, these individual persons are selfish, stubborn and solitary—all negative qualities—in contrast to the Christian congregation. Auhelawa Christianity echoes the negative value of selfishness that one sees in the ethos of gardening and reciprocity. One might then wonder whether Auhelawa Christian congregations embody local values of reciprocity and relational personhood, serving as a contrasting case to the Urapmin form of radical cultural change through Christianity. In other words, because Auhelawa embrace Christian community as a vehicle for development as opposed to other social trends which seem to be atomizing them socially, perhaps Auhelawa Christianity is better seen as a combination of Western and Auhelawa values in a new
social form. While I think of Auhelawa congregations as a social innovation, to see Auhelawa Christianity as a recapitulation of traditional values is a mistaken conclusion.

Auhelawa congregations are composed of individual persons. Congregations define themselves as collection of persons who are intimately united in their common beliefs and commitment to their church and hence each other. The commonality among them is emotional and intellectual. It creates what Durkheim would call mechanical solidarity. This is quite different from the kind of relationship people have in lineages and among their cognatic kindred. In those relationships, persons are irreducibly interdependent. Consequently, they stand in relations of difference to one another. Auhelawa Christian discourse constitutes participants in an intimate union in part by contrasting this mode of sociality with solitary individualism of everyday life. Whether people behave as solitary individuals in their everyday life is beside the point. This discursive frame is a reflexive projection of the Christian value of individualism onto people's social lives. People see themselves through a hierarchy of values which centers on individual choice of union with God. As Dumont argues, cultures organize values in hierarchies, and thereby sort out and separate different social contexts according to which level in the hierarchy they fall, that is, how closely they approximate the highest value. In the Auhelawa Christian value hierarchy, the individual choice of salvation encompasses its opposite, the individualism expressed in stubborn refusal and selfishness. Through this hierarchical framework, Auhelawa Christian discourse re-encodes Auhelawa society in terms of individual persons. This too is very different than the discourse of declining harvests discussed in Chapter 2. In that discussion, I showed that the selfishness which is perceived to be increasing is defined in relation to reciprocity as an ideal of generosity. In
that case, the ethos of kinship serves as a lens through which to understand how society is changing as it incorporates foreign elements. The ideal of society in this framework is a clockwork cycle of harvest, ethical management of wealth and generous gifts. In the Auhelawa Christian imaginary, social life reaches its highest point in the congregation because the congregation is a group inscribed within individual consciousness. It exists insofar as its members will it into existence. Of course, in spite of this, social life is defined mainly by obligations to others. In Auhelawa, this is expressed very explicitly in the ethos of 'respect' (ve'ahihi). Yet Christian discourse attempts to suppress this reality by making the congregation the model of society. That which does not fit the mold is rendered as an obstacle to the self-realization of the congregation. Perhaps too this is why time is such a fertile medium for the imagination of a Christian society. The Christian society of individual persons is something that can never be fully realized and so always exists in the future. Christian commitment is the participation in an intimate union in an effort to will into being the existence of a new world.
Chapter 5. Witches' Wealth

Giving Up Witchcraft

Christian discursive practices encourage the desire among Auhelewa to transform their society into the modernity embodied in Western societies. In the talk of church and community meetings, the model for this kind of change is the congregation coming together into a union of minds. In this and the next chapter, I will explore another side of this 'one mind' framework of intercultural relations. Coming together in 'one mind' also entails the renunciation of something else which inhibits union. Insofar as the Christian ideal of intimate union defines itself in opposition to an everyday social life, creating this union in practice, and enabling desired social transformation, means renouncing the grounds for society. One way in which this is expressed is that Auhelewa must renounce witchcraft, an invisible magic which causes most sickness and death. In the Christian framework of society and its relation to modernity, witchcraft in an inherent feature of Auhelewa life which must be renounced in order for change to come. For Auhelewa, the relative affluence of white, European (dimdim) societies is taken as a sign that they have renounced the practice of witchcraft. Conversely, the material poverty of Auhelewa is seen as proof that many among them are still secretly practicing witchcraft. Indeed, Auhelewa witches possess invisible versions of Western goods and technologies. This chapter attempts to explain how a traditional belief in invisible causes of misfortune has changed to become a reflexive perception of the material differences between Auhelewa and dimdim.

The belief in witchcraft is, in my view, an embodied and instituted form of moral
perception, and not merely a supernatural belief people hold out of habit. As they do with
lineage histories and garden management, people use witchcraft as a way to perceive the
state of their social relationships through a frame structured by moral values. In what
follows, I examine a case of public witchcraft confession as a mode of reflexive
manipulation of social relationships in which women's speech is construed as a special
kind of visual evidence for invisible witchcraft. I then go on to show how the situation of
witchcraft confession today is made ambiguous by Christian discourse of personhood. As
Christianity provides people with an alternative set of practices for constructing
themselves as moral persons, the conception of witchcraft has similarly shifted away
from a transient tension in kin networks to a diabolical evil and obstacle to change
through Christianity.

The new conception of witchcraft articulates a relation between Auhelawa and
dimdim. The belief itself does not so much explain the wealth of dimdims, or the poverty
of Auhelawa, as it expresses a belief in the possibility of a total social transformation. In
this respect, Christianized witchcraft beliefs are another example of a practice which
reflexively reframes the intercultural nexus between the West and Auhelawa societies in
terms of a temporality of rupture. Proof of this is in a story which is the source of the
beliefs about witchcraft and wealth. It is a story of the death of Didiluwa, a historical
figure who represents a temporality of continuity with the past despite change. When
Didiluwa died, his relatives attempted to renounce all witchcraft and create a total social
transformation. Contemporary tellings of this story reinforce the belief of dimdims' own
renunciation of witchcraft. When people tell this story, or when they talk about witchcraft
in ways that tacitly assume it, they provide evidence for a Christian model of change
through renunciation of society.

**Witchcraft and Modernity**

All anthropological interpretations of witchcraft belief refer back to Evans-Pritchard, who argues that witchcraft belief arises from a need for people to explain misfortune in a way that is both logically coherent and socially meaningful (1937). Azande's claims about witchcraft, taken as a whole, do not form a coherent theory of causes. Rather, Evans-Pritchard argues that Azande invoke witchcraft as an explanation in specific social situations. People appeal to witchcraft not merely to find a cause for misfortune, but to understand it in moral terms. The claim that Zande epistemology is closely linked to their mode of sociality has been an important starting-point for subsequent discussions (e.g. Douglas, ed. 1970).

More recently, many anthropologists have separately noted that a belief in witchcraft persists despite drastic cultural and economic changes. Anthropologists have found witchcraft in unexpected contexts as well; witches afflict city dwellers and business owners; they help politicians gain power; they stall economic development and drain public resources (see, for example, Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, 2003, Kiernan, ed. 2007, Lattas 1993, Moore and Sanders, eds. 2001). In his study of Cameroon, Peter Geschiere notes that European capitalism is said to be "the witchcraft of white people" (Geschiere 1997: 143) because it mysteriously produces surplus wealth from nothing. Cameroonian witches are also said to use magic to acquire money and commodities (Geschiere 1997: 147). 33

Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff (1993) argue that contemporary witchcraft
serves to make palpable the inherent contradictions of neoliberal capitalism by depicting exploitation as an evil, occult force. They contrast their position with the preceding generation's functionalist approach to witchcraft. Previously, anthropologists had argued that witchcraft mediated tensions within social structure (e.g. Marwick 1965, Nadel 1952, Wilson 1951). As such, many argued that witchcraft effloresced as social and economic changes under colonialism intensified social structural contradictions (Richards 1935, Ardener 1970, Willis 1970). Ultimately, the functionalist theory predicted that witchcraft beliefs would fade as the traditional social system which supported it declined (e.g. Brain 1981). Comaroff and Comaroff oppose their position to both of these claims. Modern witchcraft belief is not a function of local social conditions oddly transplanted to make sense of novel situations. Rather it responds to the contradictions inherent in the Western capitalism which lead to the exploitation of African societies. Furthermore, the increase of witchcraft accusation is not a symptom of local people's adjustment to change. Rather it shows that the African experience of capitalism constitutes a unique form of modernity.

Notwithstanding their call for a pluralized conception of modernity, Comaroff and Comaroff tend to conceptualize modernity in terms of a global "metanarrative" in which modern witchcraft is just one local instance (1993: xi, cf. Englund and Leach 2000). Comaroff and Comaroff's view of witchcraft derives from their view of that social relations of production determine consciousness, which leads them to see occult beliefs as evidence of people's awareness of capitalist exploitation (see Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: chap. 9, 2003). As Harri Englund observes, Comaroff and Comaroff think "witchcraft should be interpreted as an argument about modernity, not merely viewed as operating within modernity" (1996: 259, original emphases). Only if one accepts their
universalist assumptions is it possible to imagine that local actors engage in reflexive metacommentary on their economic exploitation. If people who accuse capitalism of being witchcraft are really just becoming cognizant of its true nature, then the modernity they inhabit is not truly an alternative.

Englund's criticism of Comaroff and Comaroff anticipates the conclusions of several other anthropologists who report cases of contemporary witchcraft belief (Green and Mesaki 2005, Rutherford 1999, Sanders 2003, 2008 see also Ranger 2007). Each of these in one way or another attempts to show that modern witchcraft is neither necessarily more intense, more prevalent or tied exclusively to economic changes. To link witchcraft to economic exploitation is to impute an intention to it which may not exist (Green and Mesaki 2005). In some postcolonial settings, white people are imagined to be free of fear of witchcraft (Ashforth 1996: 1212). Similarly, witchcraft's persistence is interpreted as the survival of a "tradition" which obstructs development (Green and Mesaki 2005, B. Rutherford 1999, Sanders 2003), or Christian salvation (Meyer 1992).

Others have argued more generally that modern instances of witchcraft are continuous with the particular epistemology of causation in local cultures (Colson 2000, Eves 2000, Moore and Sanders 2001, Nyamnjoh 2001). Moreover, these findings have been interpreted as giving support to an alternative theory of witchcraft as the apperception of the social as such (Kapferer 2002, Rio 2002). In this view, people's belief in witchcraft and magic in either its traditional or modern manifestations is not a form of rationality that is conditioned by the social environment (Kapferer 2002: 22, see also Stephen 1987a on the unconscious element in witchcraft). Rather witchcraft belief is an act of imagination that is grounded in a distinctive social ontology in which relationships
are basic.\textsuperscript{34} Given this, Kapferer, for instance, rejects the functionalist and Marxist interpretations of modern witchcraft as imposing a false equation between distinct ways of apprehending social reality, and argues that witchcraft constitutes social reality (Kapferer 2002: 24). Modern witchcraft is merely the same process of making society through the imagination with new symbolic elements, but otherwise signals no real change.

Thus one reaches an impasse in the interpretation of modern witchcraft. On the one hand, one can take the view that modern witchcraft is a local instance of an unfolding global process of change, and that its cultural significance can only be located in the frame of capitalist modernity. On the other hand, one can reject the possibility of any generalization about witchcraft and situate it within the frame of the irreducible particularity of local culture. While there are reasons to adopt either perspective, neither is very intellectually satisfying. Just as witchcraft belief itself is surprisingly common throughout the world, its contemporary persistence and creative extension to foreign contexts is similarly widespread. It demands that one move beyond individual cases to a general explanation. At the same time, as Englund argues, attempts to read Western metanarratives of modernity through the behavior of people in other societies make contemporary local beliefs into "an argument about modernity" and not a feature of it (1996: 259). Moreover, while the advocates of both universal and particular explanations both assert that they are not arguing for a teleological model of change of witchcraft beliefs, ultimately both positions are implicitly teleological. Neither perspective helps one to conceptualize what kind of modernity is meant by the term "multiple modernities."

Universal explanations, like that of Comaroff and Comaroff, take for granted the
dialectical materialism of Marx's theory of history, especially the claim that capitalism lurches from crisis to crisis, perpetually intensifying and expanding. Likewise, the ethnographic exceptions, to the extent to which they advance a theoretical argument at all, imply that all new ideas, practices and experiences are ultimately understood in terms of local concepts. This old-wine-in-new-skins approach to change is at best a cyclical teleology, not an alternative modernity. If one wants to understand modern witchcraft as an example of cultural change, yet more than just acculturation or cultural revival, what is needed is a model of behavior which contains both the potential for reproduction as well as transformation.

This impasse, it should be noted, is a special case of the paradox of intercultural relationships generally. The position taken by Comaroff and Comaroff requires that one think about the intersection of wealth and witchcraft as occupying a space which is outside of any particular cultural world. They imagine that particular African cultures articulate with Western modernity in and through an extracultural level of real, material conditions, and that this is at the level at which one must look to understand how cultures change through economic globalization. The critique of this position sees modern permutations of witchcraft belief as reducible to witchcraft beliefs which are part of a cultural system of ideas. In this regard, changes in the content of these beliefs are not properly intercultural because these new beliefs still can be shown to functionally participate in the culture as a totalizing worldview. This dilemma of interpretation then is part of the problem with which this dissertation has been centrally concerned, which is how one should reconcile cultural closure and intercultural influence.

The thesis that witchcraft is "outside all reason"—that is, it is the work of
imagination, and not a cultural or practical way of mediating and reasoning about society and its changes—suggests a useful new direction (see Kapferer, ed. 2003). The claim that people's imagination of witchcraft is constitutive of society, not a product of it, leads one to consider actors' reflexive awareness of their sociality, and their capacity to intervene in creating the conditions for sociality, as an alternative explanation for the discourse of witchcraft. Past approaches to witchcraft have tended to explain witchcraft as a belief which individuals acquire either through internalizing social norms, or through their practical engagement with alienation. Seeing witchcraft as imagination inverts this relationship, suggesting that actors construct their world through witchcraft. However, the assertion that witchcraft's content says something about the distinctive social ontology of the people who imagine it leads one to a view of witchcraft as a kind of floating signifier of society, much like Mauss's theory of magic as a symbol of the collective as such (2001 [1902]). The theory that witchcraft always signifies society leads back to the very same dilemma between universal and particular explanations.

I want to suggest that we can escape from this dilemma by considering the representation of phenomena as witchcraft as the result of social practices through which people achieve a reflexive awareness of their social conditions. As a theorist, Evans-Pritchard tended to define beliefs as being contextual and intersubjective facts, rather than as collective representations or propositions in the Durkheimian sense. Evans-Pritchard argues that when people appeal to witchcraft, they really want an explanation for why a single misfortune occurs in a particular situation to a particular person (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 72). Witchcraft is thus elicited in particular "situations" (1937: 540). A "situation," as I interpret Evans-Pritchard, is a concrete moment in space and time of
social interaction. While situations are broadly shaped by culture, they do not determine actions. Rather, the actor's experience of them elicits action as actors draw upon culture as shared knowledge and convention in an effort to create a shared understanding. Hence, Evans-Pritchard can be seen as arguing that witchcraft cannot be reduced to a form of belief, rational or otherwise. The representation of a phenomenon as witchcraft is a product of collaborations between actors to create reflexivity. Acts, symbols, and artifacts are tools by which actors can reflexively construct intersubjectivity in social situations. My claim is that the mode of finding grounds for agreement shapes the content of what is perceived. As people adopt alternative modes of collaboratively reasoning about phenomena, they constitute themselves differently. In attending to actors' use of resources to reflexively shape their intersubjective reality, one has an opportunity to interpret modern witchcraft without assuming any particular teleology to social action.

Contemporary Auhelawa practices surrounding witches provide a useful case for exploring this possibility. Auhelawa witchcraft has a history that is intertwined with that of economic change. Witches are believed to possess invisible wealth of whites (dimdim). Yet, the image of the modern Auhelawa witch is not necessarily as a selfish and lustful consumer who helps the predations of capitalism to advance, as Comaroff and Comaroff describe for African cases. Although witches possess invisible wealth, the renunciation of witchcraft, not the practice, is the reason why dimdems possess their visible wealth. Because Auhelawa witches keep their wealth hidden as instruments of invisible witchcraft, they prevent capitalism from growing and transforming Auhelawa society. Auhelawa beliefs link witchcraft and wealth much as people do elsewhere, yet with inverted moral valences. Wealth of dimdems is licit because it is obtained through
the renunciation of witchcraft. Auhelawa relative poverty is conversely a sign of their own failure to follow the dimdim's path away from witchcraft to modernity. Hence, the content of these new beliefs cannot be explained in the same ways that modern witchcraft has elsewhere. Witchcraft in Auhelawa is an imagination of people's own failure to create a what they consider to be a viable society, that is, their failure to renounce witchcraft and enter into modernity.

I argue that the reason for this configuration lies in the specific social situations to which the belief in witchcraft is a response. I present a case of a public witchcraft confession. I argue that such events are processes of collaborative moral reasoning about social relationships in which revelation and concealment are tropes of sincerity and deceit. By producing evidence of witchcraft in these situations, people make apparent and palpable that the ultimate cause for a misfortune is a human agency, and thereby confirm their moral assumptions about their mutual responsibilities. A belief in witchcraft is a negotiated and achieved consensus about the state of social relationships, and a kind of moral reflexivity which arises from social practice (Akin 2004, Flikke 2006, Keane 2008). As moral thinking has however become progressively Christianized, and specifically as people's moral ideas have been recast in terms of a Christian temporality of radical change, people have reimagined witchcraft as an obstacle to their collective self-transformation into a new society. Auhelawa witchcraft in contrast to Europeans' visible wealth has become a key trope of this new moral history. Thus the content of Auhelawa witchcraft belief has changed because the social situations which elicit witchcraft as explanation have themselves changed.
Auhelawa Witchcraft and Society

Modern Auhelawa beliefs about witchcraft are interesting because they imagine a relationship to a world of which few Auhelawa have any direct experience. As discussed in Chapter 3, most people try to earn money through marketing. A few run successful, profitable businesses. Yet, a livelihood in which needs are met entirely through commodity consumption is far more imagined than real. People know about Western society and its material goods mainly through what they learn in school, through the media, and only somewhat through their contact with people who live in such a world. Nonetheless, this information has influenced the imagination of witchcraft. Auhelawa associate the availability of Western goods and technologies with the modern life to which they aspire. Their lack of these goods marks them in their eyes as deficiently unmodern. Witchcraft plays a double role in this belief. First, witches—who are by definition invisible—are said possess vast material wealth and modern goods which they keep invisible as instruments of their witchcraft. While normal Auhelawa struggle on in an undeveloped society, witches enjoy the fruits of modern life, though invisibly. Second, Westerners (dimdim) are thought to possess their advanced material culture because they have renounced witchcraft. Hence, the material trappings of modernity, both specifically and generally, are glossed as "the witchcraft of dimdims" as a shorthand expression for the belief that dimdims became rich by making visible their witchcraft in order to give it up. This renunciation is identified with dimdim acceptance of Christianity. The contemporary representation of witchcraft is thus manifestly and self-evidently different from traditional beliefs in spite of the fact that the social world in which one finds it is not itself drastically different. Witchcraft appears to function as a theory of modern consumer
culture for people who feel that they are excluded from its benefits. To help clarify these associations, I will briefly sketch the meaning of the concept of witchcraft in Auhelawa and the typical social contexts in which it occurs.

Auhelawa witchcraft is generally similar to what anthropologists mean by the term. Auhelawa believe that most sicknesses and deaths result from the invisible attack of a witch ('alawai). Many people possess witchcraft ('alawai) inside them, giving them the potential to become witches. People say that when a witch feels she has been wronged by a person, even if unintentionally, she will attack the person with sickness. The target of a witch's attack is always her close kin and affines, that is, people with whom she has existing relationships of mutual support and obligation, not strangers. Witches are paradigmatically women. Although men can and do possess witchcraft inside them, the image of the witch is a typification of femininity. The stereotype of women is that they have a "tongue of fire;" they are acutely sensitive to insult, and quick to anger, gossip and complain. People said that a witch can cause sickness merely by voicing her "pains," her complaint of feeling wronged, left out, or denied a share. The utterance itself can cause the illness. This leads to the doubly moral aspect of witchcraft. Both the jealousy of others' greater wealth and righteous anger at perceived selfishness of others motivate witchcraft attacks. On the one hand, the witch is an image of deviance, acting jealousy and doing violence to people who may not have even intended to do wrong. On the other hand, the witch is also believed to be justified in her motive for an attack by the victim's lack of generosity. I also want to note here that the Auhelawa way of talking about this sort of relational morality is distinctly gendered. The relevance of this fact will become apparent when I describe witchcraft confessions.
Auhelawa also treat witchcraft as something improbable because the witch is always invisible. The well known stories of witches are in fact openly doubted by many. Informants said of them, "We don't believe this one.... We don't see the sign." One man said, "I think it's real but you know we— we can't believe. Because it doesn't come out, open. It's just a story down there." In other words, while people share many stories about witchcraft that they could use to explain events, they reject them because they are not supported by direct sensory evidence, paradigmatically a form of sight in contrast to secondhand report. The signal quality of witchcraft, invisibility, makes it difficult for people to accept that it is real. When, for instance, people walk at night, they recognize that they anticipate witchcraft because of the stories of their childhood. Thus they suspect witchcraft is the source of certain fleeting sounds and feelings, but remain unconvinced of witches' real presence until they personally see the lights and fire made by witches, or hear about it from people who have "clear eyes," a capacity to see witches. Since people privilege sensory and experiential, especially visual, evidence over stories, the knowledge of witchcraft that might warrant a conclusion about causality is itself intrinsically unreliable.

Someone for whom visual evidence is more reliable than hearsay cannot trust that an invisible force is a sufficient explanation for phenomena. This contradiction is similar to that which Evans-Pritchard finds in Azande belief. He asks how it can be that an Azande accused of witchcraft almost always sincerely confesses responsibility given that witches are assumed to act with malice (1937: 118). The Zande way of untying this Gordian knot is the assertion that witches are generally conscious of what they do, but it is possible that a witch can act unintentionally. This apparent exception is in fact the most
prevalent mode of witchcraft among Azande. This conception of witches' intention parallels the Auhelawa belief that a woman can unintentionally send her witchcraft to a victim merely by gossiping or complaining.

Consider how one of my informants explained how he came to be convinced that witches were real. One night while walking, he saw what he called a "lamp" suspended from a tall coconut tree. In his telling of this story, he explicitly drew the conclusion: A lamp cannot sit in the air by itself, it must have someone to hold it up. Visible signs, in other words, can be read as evidence for invisible causes, or witchcraft. As he said later, the reason that people sometimes get a feeling that a witch is near is "I think that [witches] just want to teach us that there are some things around, ah?" Witches are invisible because they hide themselves, preventing humans from knowing about them. Yet they can also choose to reveal themselves, too.\textsuperscript{37} Witchcraft thus contains both the possibility of invisibility and visibility. Invisible magic does harm, but when a witch makes herself visible, she is not harmful. Just as the witches giving signs of themselves reminds people to be on their toes, as in the story of the lamp, revealing oneself as a witch makes one's witchcraft harmless. This is a unique feature of Auhelawa witchcraft is rooted in the social response to illness and misfortune. Looking at this response and how it is changing helps to understand also why Auhelawa believe wealth is the witchcraft of dimdims.

In Auhelawa, illness caused by witchcraft has traditionally generated an elaborate collective response in an effort to heal the victim. The process by which people move from illness to cure, and the elements of social organization that are mobilized to accomplish this, elicit the assumptions of hidden human agency and responsibility that
underlie the inference of witchcraft. In short, the healing takes the form of a confession by women to men of the possibility of their collective and individual responsibilities. Confession is a ritual in which talk makes the invisible visible. People admit to hidden feelings which may cause witchcraft, and thereby neutralize their effects, and cure the victim. Witchcraft confessions are performed in a public setting of a "witchcraft meeting." Witchcraft meetings are similar to the responses to witchcraft in other parts of Milne Bay Province in which people affirm the possibility that they are either individually or collectively responsible for witchcraft (Fortune 1932: 156-157, Munn 1986: chap. 10). In Auhelawa, such meetings occur infrequently, and so, I was only ever able to observe one meeting in full. However, my conversations with informants both before and after lead me to believe that what I saw is representative. When someone is struck with grave illness, one suspects witchcraft as the cause. The victim may call for a "meeting" where people will come together to "talk" about the witchcraft-caused illness. This meeting would normally involve the people of the victim's lineage, father's lineage and spouse's lineage. In other words, the victim's total network of kin will attend, all of whom are multiply related to each other, pledged to share resources, and reciprocally indebted through cycles of mortuary feasting and marriage exchanges.

Witchcraft meetings are settings for "the talk of women," meaning discussion of women's responsibility for witchcraft (see also Munn 1986: 261). I was told that women are expected to stand up in meetings and say one of two kinds of things, either a denial ("She is my grandchild. Why should I do like this?") or a qualified admission and pledge to desist ("Maybe it was my witchcraft that made her sick. I promise to stop now.") Women should not directly accuse anyone, but should only speak about themselves. If
women admit bad feelings which could become witchcraft, then the illness should pass. During the meeting I observed, another kind of talk accompanied and complemented women's talk. Elder men and women called on women to say what they knew and not to remain silent or to accuse others. They evaluated the talk of women as either a good or bad contribution to an ideal of sincere self-disclosure and contrition. Both this unlabeled talk and "women's talk" played a role in creating what would count as the revelation of witchcraft.

In the meeting, the wife of the victim was the first to speak. She described the symptoms of the illness and their unsuccessful efforts to find a cure by going to different health centers and to the regional hospital to see a doctor. She also said she had thought about her behavior and decided that she was not to blame. She then called on everyone to "examine their lives" and explain the illness. Women took turns standing to speak, at first denying their responsibility and the responsibility of their lineage mates. Men also stood to speak, calling on women to keep talking about what they knew and not to throw up obstacles by denials and accusations. Some men prefaced their statements with their own denials, and then indirectly suggested other people who might be the source, which immediately prompted a reply from those mentioned. In this way, men and women from each of the lineages related to the victim through kinship, descent or affinity took a turn to speak and deny their responsibility.

As the denials were repeatedly given and repeatedly rejected, the meeting grew increasingly tense. Men stood up to tell their stories of their own past illnesses by witchcraft, thereby making the case the longstanding presence of witchcraft among this group. Perhaps sensing that his meeting was at risk of derailing, the victim interrupted the
series of speeches to clarify that he did not want to lay blame, and only wanted an "explanation," saying that if the doctors could have cured him already, they would have. This teary-eyed plea seemed to bring everyone back from the brink. Women and men who had previously spoken stood again and hinted at the possibility that they harbored ill feeling toward the victim. The husband of the victim's sister, having been silent for the whole meeting, also stood up and said that members of his lineage had some "bad thinking" about the distribution of gifts in a recent feast. Seizing on the apparent shift, the victim's wife (who happened to be a school teacher) got up and said, "This is witchcraft, but what is witchcraft?" She paused for a beat to prompt her audience, and, pointing a rigid index finger to her mouth, all said in unison, "It's gossiping!" Finally, women stood up to agree with this statement, saying that "we" and "we women" gossip too much and should renounce this bad talk because of the harm it does. Others spoke more generally about "dishonesty" among cognatic kin. They came to each other's feasts to mourn, but some were not sincerely crying. The victim then said abruptly that he was satisfied by what he heard. He asked a man to give a closing prayer. After this, the crowd broke up into casual conversations. Several people came up to greet the victim and wish him well. The victim's sister, her husband and their children unrolled a nice mat on the ground, spread tablecloths and laid out flatware. They served a large bowl of cooked bananas and boiled greens, and invited the senior men and women in attendance to come and eat. One man eating drew weak laughter when he made a lame attempt at humor with the Auhelawa cliche, "Ah, bananas, we can never finish them."

The main result of this meeting was to ritually produce talk that could be taken as evidence of witchcraft in the absence of visual proof. This kind of talk is idealized as
sincere self-disclosure of a person's feelings and expression of contrition for having these
doing, not only does women's talk cure the person they have harmed, they give proof by admission of the existence of the invisible world of witchcraft. Confessional talk thus functions as a collective epistemic practice by which people demonstrate to themselves and each other the existence of witchcraft. Starting from the normative premise that kin should help each other, the attendees collectively conclude that people's deviance is the invisible cause of an ambiguous phenomenon. Ideally, the occasion of the meeting automatically produces the talk of women from women. In practice, the process is more dynamic and emerges from the interaction gradually. The victim and other elder men of the group frame the situation as a dangerous unknown phenomenon in need of an explanation. They demand this explanation come in the form of honest talk from women. Hence, women are interpellated into the position of the witch by the structure of the interaction itself. Denial and non-participation are not useful options, since they confirm their culpability as much as confession does. In the meeting I observed, the clear eyed men of the group kept the meeting going in the right direction by juxtaposing women's denials with comments in an almost purely metadiscursive register. They characterized every denial as an accusation and obstruction ("Don't go around saying, 'you you you,'" one man said). Through its framing in the context of the meeting, confessional talk comes to condense in an iconic form several different behaviors. Speaking about the self and one's own thoughts and feelings is brought into alignment with revealing invisible forces, and these are aligned with the notion of explanation (itself expressed through the trope of untying, as in
untying a knot). Witchcraft thus becomes known as the inverse image of its confession. It is the invisible force that arises from people's hidden bad feelings. Witchcraft is made knowable by a ritual of producing a story that can be accepted as being visual evidence.

I wish also to note the role that gender meanings play in construing the talk of the meeting. While women are the primary targets of the compulsion to confess, men's talk and women's talk in meetings are not exclusively correlated with individuals' gender roles. In the case I describe, both men and women engaged in metadiscursive talk aimed at eliciting confessions. For instance, the victim's wife, taking the teacher's voice, explicitly states that witchcraft is gossip. Thus, male and female are not gendered categories of persons, but reflexively applied typifications of talk that cures, causes or identifies witchcraft. By the end of the meeting, the "talk of women" that was achieved was not the talk of any one particular woman or group of women. Rather the talk of women was in actuality a collective statement of everyone's potential responsibility for the victim's illness. Men and women suggested that "maybe" they or people in their lineages felt badly toward the victim. The victim's wife offered the compromise that "gossiping," the ultimate example of authorless talk, was the real cause. Many women then agreed that gossip and deceitful talk were circulating and everyone should pledge to stop it. Given this, one can understand that women's talk in practice is a personal typification of a collective phenomenon. Witches are typically women because women serve as a symbol of the social tensions that are brought out in meetings between kin of different lineages (see Strathern 1981).

Such a qualified admission of collective responsibility does not mean that meetings evoke witchcraft as a symbol of deviance such as gossip. Rather the reverse is
true; the meeting provides proof by admission that witchcraft lurks invisibly behind
everyday sociality, and embodies the inherent capacity for the social group to injure itself
through interpersonal strains. In the course of the witchcraft meeting I observed, there
were two distinct phases of the discussion. First, there was a series of denials by
representatives of different matrilineages who had relationships to the victim. Second,
there was an explicit shift to supportive, collaborative statements that ended in a vague
collective confession and pledge of unity. Thus, in the space of the meeting itself there
was a movement from a frame of the participants as being from distinct, exclusive groups
in opposition and conflict to a frame of participants as forming a solidary, cognatic group.

One can think of witchcraft as being part of a process by which people reflexively
reinterpret kinship relationships in order to mediate the inherent contradiction between
the matrilineal principle of social groups and the value of generalized cognatic solidarity.
In that sense, in the context of the witchcraft meeting, women are used as a symbol of
bad sociality, selfishness and resistance in contrast to men as a symbol of collective
harmony and generous sharing. The process of the witchcraft meeting underscores the
link between epistemology of witchcraft and the ethics of kinship. Resistance to
cooperation is interpreted as a sign of hiding witchcraft. Witchcraft is however revealed
and neutralized, ultimately, in the inclusive-we voice of collective responsibility.

Witchcraft meetings thus ground the epistemology of invisible causes in a
collaborative practice of moral perception and reasoning. Invisible causes would
normally be implausible, but the ritual of confession makes it possible to imagine them.
In itself, however, the practice of witchcraft confession offers no suggestions as to why
witches have invisible wealth, or why dimdims have such a curious form of visible
witchcraft. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, kinship is no longer the only basis for moral thinking in Auhelawa society. For many generations, people have participated in Christianity as cult and taken up its moral framework and historical metanarrative in their everyday life. How then has people's adoption of a Christian worldview altered their moral reasoning about misfortune? Can we look to the influence of Christianity to explain the belief in witches' wealth, and in what way?

**Christianity, Witchcraft and Wealth**

Perhaps the most surprising part of seeing a witchcraft meeting firsthand was the ambiguous role played by Christian belief and practice in the proceedings. At the beginning of the witchcraft meeting I observed, the victim asked a female cross-cousin to give an opening prayer. While prayer is an obligatory form of opening formal social events in Auhelawa, the woman's words reflected her ambivalence. She seemed unable to suspend a commonly held feeling that there is a contradiction between Christianity and witchcraft confessions. To begin, she rose and said to everyone that they came to "talk" but it would not be a kind of talk that would praise God, but a "different sort of talk." She said that some people would try to deceive, but God would know the truth. Addressing herself to God, her prayer expressed the perfunctory words of praise and thanksgiving, followed by a request for healing on behalf of the victim. Besides these familiar formulas, the woman also drew to mind the possibility that people might lie in the eyes of God, implying a grave sin. She ended by voicing a desire for unity and mutual obligation, "We don't want others to cry or mourn while we celebrate and decorate ourselves," a sentiment that resonates with people's belief that witchcraft is provoked by unequal sharing. At first,
she drew a distinction between Christian and non-Christian worldviews as represented by different kinds of talk. Yet, in the next turn, she expressed a hope that God could actually join in the aim of the meeting to bring healing to the victim and harmony to the group. This kind of Christian ambivalence about witchcraft and the traditional response to it are important to understanding the role of witchcraft in contemporary society.

Christian religious belief entered into the meeting at several other points. The metadiscursive talk that elicits confession also frequently invoked Christian morality. For instance, one elder man encouraged women to confess witchcraft by saying that church doctrine forbade witchcraft and sorcery. Other men said that witches were doing the work of Satan on earth. Thus one could surmise that people think of a witchcraft meeting as being itself a Christian practice. Witchcraft confession corresponds to people's understanding of repentance of sins. It is also consistent with people's general beliefs that praying to God can protect a person from illness.

It seemed that even in the era of Christianity, witchcraft meetings could still effectively mediate transient tensions among kin by generating the representation of witchcraft. Yet in this same meeting in which the woman prayed for God's support of the meeting, others expressed an alternative hope that witchcraft need not be confessed in order to be neutralized. People's practice of Christianity sits uneasily with the presence of witchcraft itself and the consequent need to have meetings about it. Many people said to me that witchcraft meetings were infrequently held in recent years because people thought that they were inconsistent with being Christian. As one informant put it, how could one go to church one day and stand in front of the congregation claiming to be a Christian, and then the next day go to a witchcraft meeting and admit even just the
possibility that one is a witch. That is to say, if one were truly a Christian, one should have no truck with witchcraft meetings since they involve everyone in collective responsibility. Instead, one should simply be content to protect oneself from witches' attacks through the means provided by Christian practice only. For example, people said that one should pray for protection from witchcraft, and use holy water to bless oneself. Similarly, when taking a Christian perspective, people also suggested that what were normally considered witchcraft illnesses could be in fact caused by one's behaviors and one's "spiritual health." One female participant in the meeting said repeatedly that the "lifestyle" of the victim was to blame for his illness. She said that his illness was caused by God, not anyone's witchcraft. In her Christian opinion of illness, the individual is the basis for moral personhood, and individual morality is posited as a cause of sickness. Witchcraft in this view was a superstition to be doubted and ignored, since God was the ultimate cause of illness and death.

The Christianization of witchcraft resembles to an extent what Birgit Meyer calls "diabolization." In the process of incorporating Christianity, Meyer argues that the local cultural cosmology of the Ewe of Ghana is reconceptualized in terms of good and evil (1999). She also argues that, in general, local cultural values are consigned to the side of the Devil in opposition to the Western European culture brought by Christian missionaries. Hence witches become devils in Christianized cultures, and the pre-Christian ways of dealing with witchcraft are lumped together with the practice itself as part and parcel of a past heathen epoch. For Meyer, the diabolization of witchcraft in Africa has consequences for people's practice of Christianity. Taking up the idea of Christian salvation as articulated in local concepts, Ewe attempt to battle local spirits as
demonic forces. A similar process could be said to inform Auhelawa Christian responses to witchcraft as well. Illness and death often lead people to pray for God's protection from witches. Catholics and United bless themselves with holy water when sick. When someone hears the nighttime sounds that suggest a witch lurking nearby, they might drink holy water and spit it out in a spray around their house as protection from the witch. These responses suggest a shift to a conception of the witch as an exogenous, evil force.

More common, however, is the historical view of witchcraft based on the Christian metanarrative of change. This was the view that, even if it is real, witchcraft should be ignored, not addressed in meetings, because it is part of the past. Witchcraft violates the order of society created by the historical event of Christian conversion (Robbins 2007). Witchcraft and its response were considered embarrassing evidence of an incomplete shift into the light of Christianity (as discussed further in the next chapter). For instance, early in fieldwork, my questions about witchcraft were answered by saying that it had existed in the past but women had "set it aside" in becoming Christian. The persistence of witchcraft in the Christian era served as a sign of the influence of Satan. Hence, the best response to witchcraft was to resist engaging it directly in meetings, but to pray to God for protection from Satanic forces. In the adoption of Christianity, Auhelawa have acquired a new way of evaluating knowledge. As Webb Keane has recently argued, in the history of European Christian evangelism, missionaries have usually distinguished between, on the one hand, the simple faith in what is not seen and, on the other hand, the alleged heathen fetishism of spirits (Keane 2007). Not all invisible beings are created equal. For most Christians, the most valued form of knowledge is that which is revealed by God and known through faith. In Auhelawa, Christian discourse
about witchcraft condemns both the practice of witchcraft by witches as well as the belief and fear in them by everyone else, asserting that both are contrary to true Christian faith because they are superstitions which have no basis in church teaching. Pastors and church leaders of both denominations encouraged people not to "think" or "talk" about witchcraft. These habits of mind themselves were treated as indicators of a weak Christian convictions. The way people have modified their own behavior as a part of their own sense of religious duty was of even greater consequence than any church teaching. Most people are reluctant to participate in witchcraft meetings because they seem to endorse witchcraft. If confession is an epistemic practice that produces visual evidence of witchcraft, then avoiding meetings only serves to make witchcraft seem more strange and fearsome. By being treated as a superstition by historical missionaries and local Christian leaders, witchcraft ironically becomes more evil and dangerous among everyone else (see also Akin 2004).

This is not to say that Auhelawa Christians only try to dissuade themselves of witchcraft. Rather, Christianity as a metanarrative of history creates new social situations which elicit an alternative conception of witchcraft. These social situations are structured by the rupture in time separating tradition from Christianity. Looking at society through this historical frame, everyone must either choose to identify as being a Christian or be seen as rejecting Christianity (as will be discussed in the next chapter). In this frame, the chiasmus formed between witches and dimdims also takes on its full significance. The Christian conception of witchcraft also hinges on the possibility that witchcraft can be neutralized by being revealed. This possibility is accentuated in the Christian imagination and used as a symbol for the Christian metanarrative of rupture. Dimdims' wealth is the
sign of their total and final revelation of witchcraft. Dimdim witchcraft is open, visible to all, and not harmful. This is associated with dimdims' universal and total acceptance of Christianity. In this way, material wealth is not something that needs to be mediated by local ideology. Rather, material wealth, as an emblem of a foreign culture and its religion, is taken as revealed witchcraft. Thus it serves as evidence for the continued hidden witchcraft in Auhelawa. It is important to also note that the concrete qualities of dimdims' wealth are not its most salient feature. Rather the unequal distribution of this wealth is selected in Auhelawa Christian conception of the difference between themselves and dimdims. Dimdims' wealth is above all read as a sign of their superiority. That is to say, it is not the mystery of its acquisition which leads Auhelawa to call dimdim wealth a kind of witchcraft, but the fact that dimdims have it and Auhelawa do not. When Auhelawa think of the wealth of dimdims, they remind themselves of their own lack of wealth, which signifies their own moral failings. This reflexive perception is engendered by the categories of the Christian metanarrative of history. The possession of wealth by dimdims is a sign of their essential difference between dimdim and Auhelawa, which itself derives from the division in time at the heart of the Christian metanarrative of change.

One well known story from Auhelawa illustrates how Christianity structures the relationship between witchcraft and wealth. The story tells of a woman named 'Alawai tried to convince all the witches of Auhelawa and its neighbors to reveal witchcraft once and for all. Like the story of Makadonia and Vianney, this story condenses the Christian reframing of witchcraft as an obstacle to be renounced permanently by being revealed in a icon of transformation. Also like the story of Makadonia and Vianney, telling the story grounds the perception of present circumstances in terms of a belief in the possibility of a
sudden, total transformation. In most tellings I heard, 'Alawai nearly succeeded in revealing all the witchcraft, and in so doing nearly made visible all of the witches' hidden treasures, including invisible buildings, roads and cars that made up an invisible town. She was ultimately defeated. Just as the witches' town was becoming visible, she was forced by another witch to quit and the town vanished again. The story illustrates the temporal dichotomy in the same tropes of visibility link witchcraft to material wealth. The visible evidence afforded by Europeans' material wealth becomes the basis for people's contemporary knowledge of witchcraft, and in turn their self-perceived failure to achieve the same material standard of living. The persistence of witchcraft is thus itself expressive of Auhelawa's understanding of its relationship to modernity as a transformation deferred.

While many people told me brief versions of the story of 'Alawai, they could not provide detailed answers to my questions about it. Many suggested that I talk to A., a woman of Gomwa village who had told me many stories from Auhelawa history. She also told me stories of Didiluwa, the first colonial policeman in Auhelawa. For her, the story of 'Alawai concludes the tale of Didiluwa's work. 'Alawai was a matrilineal relative of Didiluwa, who was himself both a witch and sorcerer. Stories about Didiluwa, as discussed in Chapter 1, draw from the temporality of genealogy and lineage memorials, a sense of continuous time, to suggest a continuity between the precolonial past and the postcolonial present. These stories contrast with the narrative of Auhelawa Christian conversion, which is described as an abrupt and total transformation. In Chapter 1, I argued that these two metanarratives of history were grounded in different aspects of present social conditions. Didiluwa as figure of one history helps explain why
intercultural relationships have led to gradual, yet apparently incomplete and ongoing changes while Pati, the Samoan missionary, helps explain the perceived totality and finality of Auhelawa religious change. In the story of the death of Didiluwa, the kind of change he represents is circumscribed by the kind of transformative change represented by stories of Christian conversion. This story of witchcraft's renunciation thus demonstrates that not only is witchcraft a way to understand the relationship between dimdim and Auhelawa, it is a way to understand the relationship between Auhelawa and its own past. The story presents an icon of A.'s generation's disconnection from Didiluwa and the Auhelawa of the precocolial past. A.'s story of 'Alawai starts with her personal memories of Didiluwa from her childhood, and tells some of the witchcraft attacks between her father's lineage and their related lineages. This sets the scene for the murder of Didiluwa and the consequences that followed.

Didiluwa was a senior matrilineal relative and 'namesake' (aivelahe) of A.'s father, and hence her classificatory 'grandfather' (tubu). She began her story by talking about the time when she lived with her parents in her father's village. At that time, Didiluwa adopted and raised her. She remembers times when he would take her in his canoe to go fishing. She would fall asleep in the canoe, and Didiluwa would catch a fish, cook it and wake her up to give her fish to eat. A. said that her father objected to this because he thought Didiluwa was trying to pass on his witchcraft to A. Her father was a deacon in the Methodist mission church and forbade this. He said to him, "My namesake, you should not give my child your witchcraft. I'm a deacon and that is a sin. I will take my child back so that you do not give her witchcraft." Didiluwa's first attempt, then, to pass on more than just his name to the next generation is foiled by his namesake's commitment
to the new Christian way of being.

A.'s family and Didiluwa and his daughter continued to live in the village of Magetuwa. Didiluwa was still the policeman for Auhelawa, and was suspected by everyone to possess witchcraft and sorcery that he used to enforce the colonial regulations. A woman from Sawaliyeliye became deathly ill, and summoned her brother to her, saying "Oh, my brother, if I am your sister, take my revenge! Kill the one who bewitched me!" The brother of the woman, named Welilibo, suspected that Didiluwa was the witch. A. did not explain any particular reason for this, but she instead said that the sick woman was married to her father's elder brother. When A.'s family heard the news that the woman was sick, they left their village and went down the road to Sawaliyeliye to cry (dou) for her. On their way down, they met Welilibo and his kinsman Dogale coming toward them on the road. "Where are you going?" they asked. The two replied, "Oh, we're going up to Bunama mission to get kerosene. We will come back for the wake (hilauwa)." They were really going to Magetuwa in search of Didiluwa. They found him working in his garden with one of his daughters. They approached him and asked him to say a spell ('oba, an openly practiced form of beneficial magic distinct from 'alawai and balau) over a nettle leaf to cure Welilibo's sister. As he took the leaf and held it near his mouth to say the spell, Welilibo cut his neck with a bush knife and decapitated him. Didiluwa flailed. Mysteriously, he appeared to lunge at the men, but then collapsed. His 'alawai, something that looked like a large round rock, emerged from the base of his neck and disappeared. Didiluwa's daughter called out to Didiluwa's sister's son, Pati, while Welilibo and Dogale fled into the bush.

Pati went to Bunama to use the mission's radio to call the government station at
Samarai, who came to investigate and arrest Welilibo and Dogale. The colonial officer appointed Pati to succeed Didiluwa. Meanwhile, 'Alawai considered what to do about Didiluwa's 'alawai. In the night she became a witch and flew to Sawaliyeliye where she met with another man, Bomisi, who was also a witch. They talked about Didiluwa's witchcraft, now "out in the open" where everyone could see it. Implying that this could not be taken back, she asked Bomisi, "How can we hide it?" 'Alawai proposed that she, Bomisi and all the other witches of the region reveal their witchcraft once and for all. She said, "Let's put our witchcraft 'out in the open' (madeya-i) so that there won't be death. We'll put it 'out in the open' (madeya-i) and don't bother with it! Our lives will be fine. They will be peaceful." Bomisi agreed and flew in the night to all parts of Normanby Island, and to other islands, telling the witches to come to 'Alawai's village to reveal their witchcraft forever and bring and end to sickness and death. The witches came together in Magetuwa, and 'Alawai stood in front of them. She started to spin like a top. She spun and spun, and got smaller and smaller until she was "as small as a baby." Exhausted, she lay on the ground and said, "It's too hard. The witches are blocking me." Having failed to obtain agreement with the other witches to reveal witchcraft, nothing changed, and for this reason "death is still happening."

Other more common versions of this story differ somewhat from what A. told me. Most people said that 'Alawai summoned all people to a meeting in her village and tried to show them her witchcraft. As she spun, an invisible town came slowly into view. People could hear trucks running on the road and see iron buildings. While she was spinning, a man from the crowd interrupted her and she stopped. The witches' town vanished again. I asked A. about this and she said that what 'Alawai was really trying to
do was to reveal all witchcraft so that there would be no death. This would likewise
transform the world as people knew it, too. She explained why people might think that
'Alawai's revelation would make a town appear by saying:

White people have already put their witchcraft out in the open. So, they
make boats and planes.... That all appeared from their witchcraft. And,
we(ex.) here Papua New Guineans hide our witchcraft. So, that's why death
is still going. Like that. That's the answer to your question. That's the
explanation of that witchcraft, Didiluwa's witchcraft. If it appears, then
we(in.) would just be 'one group' (boda ehebo). And we(in.) would arrive in
heaven, a new village.

A.'s telling of the story of 'Alawai fuses personal childhood memories with stories
she learned from her father. In her version, one sees another version of Didiluwa, one of
the central characters of Auhelawa oral history. Here, he is also a player in an ongoing
drama of kinship between the lineages of Magetuwa and Sawaliyeliye, interrelated
through marriage and yet still locked in a cycle of reciprocal violence both magical and
physical. A. does not explain these relations in great detail. Rather the poetic image of her
family's encounter on the road with Didiluwa's killers seems to iconize the essence of
kinship as elusive connection that contains both mutual recognition and deception. While
A.'s family went down to mourn for their affinal kin, demonstrating by their sincere
sorrow that they did not cause her illness, Welilibo and Dogale went up to take revenge,
hiding their true intention with a lie. When Didiluwa is killed and his witchcraft escapes
from his body, 'Alawai decides that this power should not be passed on. She and a man
from Sawaliyeliye summon their own kind of witchcraft meeting in which they will
reveal their witchcraft and destroy its power to kill. By pledging to renounce and reveal
witchcraft, 'Alawai and Bomisi intend to establish unity and harmony among their
cognatic kin network, just as people do in actual witchcraft meetings. In the story,
however, it is clear that their act would be a final and ultimate renunciation. In this
respect, it demonstrates the Christian reframing of witchcraft as a sign of a past epoch in
dichotomous opposition to a Christian present. 'Alawai and Bomisi's meeting echoes the
refusal of A.'s father, a Methodist deacon, to permit Didiluwa to transmit his witchcraft to
A. By taking his daughter back, A.'s father breaks a line of continuous transmission that
he himself embodies in his own name. Also, when A. says that 'Alawai was trying to
make a "new village," she explicitly interprets the significance of 'Alawai and Bomisi's
actions as being part of a Christian metanarrative of change as radical and purposeful
rupture. She says that if everyone renounced witchcraft absolutely, then the world would
become a paradise without death, and all people would live together as one forever. The
fact that death continues is itself evidence of people's failure to achieve this ideal of
Christian moral personhood.

A.'s version of this story positions it as the conclusion of Didiluwa's career in
Auhelawa history. It is interesting to note that no other person who told me this story
mentioned that 'Alawai was a descendant of Didiluwa, or that her actions were motivated
by Didiluwa's 'alawai. For them, the image of 'Alawai making an invisible town appear
out of thin air seemed to be itself sufficient to express the kind of radical, total change
that 'Alawai was trying to bring about. Her failure similarly reinscribes the absolute
difference between dimdims and Auhelawa. As previously argued, stories about Didiluwa
figure him as a part of an a continuous temporality of history in which intercultural
contact contributes to the reproduction of the basic pattern of Auhelawa life. By recalling
Didiluwa as a historical source for economic changes, people frame their contemporary
life in terms of a continuous history in which dimdims and Auhelawa are each trade
partners in a ever changing regional landscape. It should also be noted that an important part of the Didiluwa story was his ability to produce commodity foods through magic. In A.'s story, one sees Didiluwa in a larger frame of reference. The kind of continuous time that people imagine through stories about him is circumscribed by a discontinuous temporality of a past epoch in opposition to a present that could have been. 'Alawai's story is one of a paradise deferred. Given this, the kind of temporality which Didiluwa embodies takes on a decidedly negative cast in opposition to the encompassing frame of a Christian temporality in which God's plan for a new heaven and new earth is held in abeyance until all humans choose to follow along. 'Alawai's failure to reveal witchcraft is represented in the continuity of death and the persistence of untransformed village life. Witches association with dimdims' wealth thus is a way for people to represent a Christian view of their own moral deficiencies. The presence of dimdim's wealth, either hidden in the hands of witches, or visible in the hands of dimdims, shows that Auhelawa have adopted a Christian self-understanding of their own imperfection.

**Conclusion**

My central claim is that the association of witchcraft and wealth arises from the changing epistemic basis of belief in witchcraft, specifically the changing moral situations in which witchcraft belief works as an effective response. While witchcraft still reflects people's concern for the ethics of kinship through a trope of visuality, the intervention of Christianity has altered the kind of time and space people imagine they inhabit. In the face of the Christian historical metanarrative of their own society, ideas about wealth as visual evidence of change have come to be a new idiom in which people
represent themselves. Whereas witchcraft among kin can be exposed and neutralized in meetings, Christianity leads people to see it as a vestige of an incomplete social and spiritual transformation. They point to dimdins' wealth as proof of what that transformation should be: the final renunciation of demonic works and the total transformation of their material existence.

The traditional witchcraft meeting turns on one unique aspect of Auhelawa witchcraft, the potential for its neutralization in revelation. The confession of witchcraft responds to illness, death and misfortune by revealing hidden thoughts in order to neutralize social conflicts and renew bonds of solidarity among kin. This way of curing through the removal of hidden witchcraft from relationships emphasizes mutual responsibility and obligation. A witch may be doing harm to a victim, but the victim's own bad behavior is also seen as the motive for witches' anger. Thus the most satisfying outcome is a collective pledge of unity and harmony. Auhelawa see their way of responding to misfortune by confession of witchcraft to be compatible with Christian belief on one level. However, Christian discourse contributes to a temporalization of morality which ultimately undermines the validity of witchcraft confession as a moral response and as an epistemic practice. It emphasizes the idea that witchcraft can be visible and is then benign, and extends this by imagining a permanent renunciation of witchcraft, a permanent revelation of it, as a symbol of the rupture in history and the gulf between Western Christians and Auhelawa. The predominant Christian interpretation of witchcraft is that it is something that most of the ancestors gave up and did away with when they converted to Christianity. Witchcraft is something to be renounced, but true and effective renunciation should be a singular, final break from the past. To participate
in witchcraft confession as a regular response to misfortune suggests the persistence of
the past in the present, and falsifies the claim to true change which Christianity values
most.

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Parts of Chapter 5 have been submitted for review in the paper Schram, Ryan, n.d.
"Witches' Wealth: Witchcraft, Confession and Christianity in Auhelawa, Papua New
Chapter 6. Sit, Cook, Eat, Full Stop

Christian Custom

Christian discourses define Christianity in dichotomous opposition to the ethics of kinship, as well as a lot of what Auhelawa would take as familiar and automatic ways of feeling and acting, through a temporality of rupture through which Auhelawa come to view their everyday existence. The practice of Christianity partakes of this temporality implicitly and fosters a perception of the world as if it were on the verge of a sudden, total transformation. When viewed in this way, it seems natural to people to not only purposely pursue economic alternatives, but also to work against the norms of reciprocity. It even seems justified to radically adjust one's most basic social relationships in the name of modernity. Auhelawa way of talking about this kind of social alternative is keyed by the term masele. Masele literally means 'light,' but in this context is a metaphor for the Christian era in contrast to the 'darkness' (guguyou) of the pre-Christian past.

Yet, while Christian discourse suggests an intrinsic purity to the social identity of Christian, such an identity depends on the existence of a tradition which it opposes. Even though they are antithetical, Christianity evokes a tradition which comes before it, and haunts it by its persistence. Furthermore, even though Christianity motivates the elimination of tradition as a way of inscribing in the present itself as a transformational event, the elimination of all traditions can never be complete. Tradition must live on at least as a memory in order to give shape to Christian identity. What this suggests is that the claim to have turned away from tradition and become Christian, or in other words the claim to a Christian social identity, is necessarily articulated in an intercultural space. The
claim to be a Christian is a reflexive alignment of two cultures such that Christianity and tradition form a categorical dichotomy and temporal sequence. In Auhelawa, one sees an example of this in the different ways in which people purposefully attempt to reform mortuary feasting and interlineage exchanges to be more Christian.

For instance, masele is a name for a set of ideas about changes in mourning and death feasts in Auhelawa. A masele way of mourning and feasting has two distinct meanings. On the one hand, it is a simplification of the requirements of mourning, a lesser emphasis on taboos around death, and a reduction of the size of prestations between relatives of the deceased. In this vein, it represents change as a gradual loss and decline of past values. On the other hand, for many Auhelawa, masele is a deliberate choice one can make to not do anything one would do for a traditional feast. In this sense of masele, a death should be celebrated by a common meal among the deceased's relatives and friends. Unlike the traditional pattern, one should decidedly not force certain classes of kin to assume mourning taboos. Nor should observers of taboos show ritually marked deference to the deceased's lineage or give a large combined gift of yams and pigs that they do not share in eating. The death and its traditional obligations are "finished" quickly, ideally on the day of the burial, rather than moving through a series of stages that can last years. In this sense of masele, changes in traditional feasting involve a deliberate break with the past.

In my fieldwork, I found that many people in Auhelawa had some personal reservation about engaging what they self-consciously represented as their traditional culture, that is, what they called (using the English loanword) their 'custom.' Many said that custom was 'hard' (ololo), and they wanted to 'finish' (ve'ovi) obligations quickly so
they could be 'free' (English loanword). Many people also said they did not want to practice any form of custom at all because they thought it was not appropriate for a churchgoer to do so. These people rejected custom because they said it led people to think too much about the dead person, think bad thoughts about who was responsible for the death, and judge those who ritually mourn for the dead. Masele removes these problems by negating the practices associated with them. Yet, surprisingly, masele is not engaged with traditional practice as a survival from the pre-Christian past. It negates contemporary non-Christian practices, already substantially simplified by a century of Christianization. Custom mourning today accommodates the demands of missionaries of the past, and now expresses the idea that mourning should be finished quickly. The idea of masele makes no compromises with even radically changed customs. It is not an attempt to reform tradition, or find an accommodation between western religious ideas and a Melanesian social context. Masele is an argument for eliminating non-Christian practice as such.

Masele discourse is another example of the reflexive practice of intercultural communication. When one talks about feasts in a temporal and cosmological frame of masele and guguyou, one puts Christian culture and traditional Auhelawa culture into dialogue, and articulates the underlying values of each in opposition to the other. In this chapter, I first present a brief summary of the main features of traditional Auhelawa mortuary practices and the ideas that underlie it. I show that the traditional system of mortuary feasting organizes rituals and taboos in the service of creating a cycle of reciprocal exchange that reproduces lateral ties between matrilineages. Second, I discuss ways in which this tradition is understood. I argue that after a century of contact with
missionaries and the state who wanted to suppress certain ritual acts of mourning, people now think of mortuary feasting as a set of rules and protocols of behavior that form a traditional custom in opposition to normal life. Third, I present an Auhelawa pastor's description of masele as a "Christian custom." I examine it as a distinct reformulation of mortuary practice in which he posits himself as a solitary self by his radical refusal of custom. Finally, I describe a death feast which illustrates the interdependence of masele on its opposite and hence the limits of masele as a way of revolutionizing culture.

**Auhelawa Society and Religion**

As first discussed in Chapter 2, Auhelawa kin relationships fall into one of two broad classes, those which are 'natural' or 'native' (mohili) among matrikin and bu'una and those which are 'forbidden' (magai) among patrilateral relatives and affines. Patrilateral and affinal relationships are especially fraught. They are sources of support and solidarity yet also different in kind from matrilineal kinship. One must always be heedful of the need to respect (ve'ahihi) the people of the father's and affines' lineages in ways that one never does with matrikin. A person must practice avoidance of the parents and senior kin of one's spouse, as well as act with deference and a self-effacing quiet politeness. In the father's village, children must always avoid coming into contact with the lineage property associated with death and the ancestors, magai. A child can never enter the graveyard (also called magai) of the father, visit the ancestral skull cave (duluva; a pre-colonial burial site), or touch the central stone platform (da'eda'e) found in original villages of the lineage where the lineage prepares a deceased member's body for burial. Food from trees and gardens, and water from springs and rivers near these sites is
also forbidden. Similarly, one avoids the spouse's lineage property. The violation of these taboos is thought to cause illness.

Because magai relatives are of a different blood, one always feels a sense of shame (hinimaya) in their presence. Indeed, unlike matrikin, failing to show respect to lateral relatives may cause them to feel so much shame that they break off relations altogether (hiyau). As mentioned in Chapter 5, those with whom one is in conflict within the immediate circle of one's lateral kin are the first suspects of witchcraft, the cause of most serious illnesses and deaths; the witch is never a stranger (see also Munn 1986: 216). And yet one is also regularly in contact with magai relatives, especially the father's kin, because only people who have common grandparents can share resources of land, bush materials, sea resources and labor. If mohili relatives cannot provide for all of their needs among their shared resources, then one needs to ask for 'help' (hagu; see Chapter 5) from a magai lineage. People from another island who marry someone from Kurada and live there will typically find a lineage with whom the spouse's lineage is not associated and ask to be adopted (awatoutougu). Lateral relationships are fragile and contingent, yet at the same time they are critical for personal security and a complete social personhood. Auhelawa sociality mediates this structural fault line with reciprocal exchanges, the most important being mortuary feasting. 39

**Death in Auhelawa**

The dualism in people's social network also organizes the exchanges of every mortuary feast. One's death brings together one's magai and mohili relatives, gives them an occasion to honor their different symbolic investments in the deceased, and renews the
relationships among themselves and between lineages through reciprocal exchanges of food in a series of mortuary feasts. In any feast, the matrilineal kin of the deceased are termed the "owners" of the feast. In preparing the feast, owners can call upon not only the rest of their lineage, but all of their associated lineages and, if they wish, other lineages whose members are not prohibited from contact with their magai. I will refer henceforth to this side as the owner's side of the feast. The lineage of the deceased's father is part of the opposing side in the feast, the visiting party. If the deceased is a married woman, her children are owners and her husband and his lineage are visitors. If the deceased is a man, then his wife and children and their lineage are all visitors. Those people who are immediately related to the deceased, i.e., the widow or widower and the children of a man, are mourners in the feast. The role of these relatives is to perform all the ritual acts of mourning, discussed in detail below. Here I only want to note that they are basis for what I shall call the mourning or visiting side of the feast.

Mourners call on support from other segments of their own and associated lineages. Households who stand in a similar relationship to the lineage of the deceased as the mourners are expected to help the mourners. The lineage's natunatuleiya (the children of men of the owning lineage) and its tubutubuni (the children of male and female natunatuleiya) should all contribute to help the mourners, as should the wohiwa (in-marrying men) and hinevelam (in-marrying women). These people all share in common the prohibition on the owners' magai, hence they support each other in their feasting obligations. Owners can invite their patrilateral parallel cousins, their taliya-natuleiya, to join in the owners' side in the feast. The term denotes the category of people who are natunatuleiya of the same lineage. Taliya-natuleiya can enter each other's magai and are
similar to bu'una (lineage associates). As natunatuleiya of the same lineage, they would normally assist one another in feasts in which one comes as a mourner. Their invitation to participate in each other's feasts as an owner is meant to honor their mutual support and is marked by exchange of gifts during one stage of mourning. The line between the two sides is based on the relationship one has to the deceased, but at the same time, people who normally ve'ahihi the owners will support mourners and vice versa. Every death then effectively divides the social world into halves.

The line between owners and visitors is further marked by the quiet deference and general avoidance of the owners by all visitors. Visitors must always be respectful the owners in the process of mourning and treat them with grave politeness. Even small children will be severely verbally reprimanded for breaking the decorum with normal childhood play. Owners, for their part, are entitled to react angrily to visitors who they think are not showing them due respect. Those most closely linked with the deceased must observe even more arduous prohibitions. The spouse and (if a man) the children are prohibited from washing and wearing neat clothes. They must abstain from meat and eat only small, inferior garden foods. They cannot appear in public, such as church or at the market, and should not walk around too much or appear to be anything other than grieving. They must also avoid walking on the road in front of the villages and the graveyard of the deceased's lineages, instead walking down to the beach or on a side-path to avoid the sight of either of these. Owners observe no prohibitions of this kind.

The visitors contribute to give a bwabwale gift to the owners and their supporters. The owners alone distribute bwabwale amongst their side; it is forbidden for visitors to eat food given as a bwabwale. Bwabwale is the term for this gift and the generic name for
any mortuary feast in which it is given. Bwabwale creates a 'debt' (vaga). The donor is forbidden to share it with the recipient, and must abstain from it. Hence, the recipient must eventually reciprocate the vaga with a 'repayment' (maiha) which is equal and identical to the vaga. People conflate this aspect of bwabwale with the prohibitions they as visitors observe on the magai, and the mourning taboos observed by those closely related to the deceased. A visitor calls all of these prohibited things "bwabwale-gu" ("my prohibition"). Bwabwale is given at several feasts, each feast releasing the principal mourners from some of their mourning taboos, moving them into the next stage of mourning until the death is "finished," and the mourners can live free of all but the usual avoidances on magai. This sense of being released or free from mortuary obligations is termed bayau. Bayau is usually glossed as "free," but other informants explained that bayau also means feeling strong after eating, or "struggling to lift a heavy load and then finally lifting it," and that a mourner whose work of mourning is finished is bayau in this sense. The shifting meanings of bayau in the context of custom and change will be discussed again below.

I will now briefly summarize the process of mourning from the death until the final feast. As I will discuss in the next section, even the so-called traditional feasts done today are substantially different than the ideal process. What I describe is based on my observations of several feasts, as well as numerous conversations with informants who could explain how a traditional bwabwale should be done. This description is meant to highlight some of the key ideas that underlie the bwabwale sequence. I will then move on to how these ideas are evaluated today.

The death of an individual in Kurada and the surrounding region requires a ritual
response. This response takes the form of a series of gifts, called bwabwale, to the lineage of the deceased. In some ways, bwabwale feasts are synecdochal of traditional "custom" in general. As an informant said, "When someone dies, we go into custom," meaning all deaths set off a series of traditional rituals that interrupt the normal flow of life. When someone dies, a period of mourning called malahilili begins. In this period, people observe a taboo on making direct reference to the death. One says instead "They say a death has occurred" ("Hi-walo asiyebewa"), asiyebewa being a deliberately vague term meaning death, injury or a fatal or grave illness. A person is not said to have died, but rather the euphemism, "His/her time is finished" ("ana hauga 'i-'ovi") is used.

It is thought ideal that a person near death should be taken home to their natal hamlet to be reunited with lineage kin before passing, and then buried in the lineage magai. The natal village of the deceased is the site for all of this activity, and all the subsequent feasting in memory of the deceased in later years. In malahilili, all non-owners respect the death by not making noise near the village. Natunatuleiya and tubutubuni often avoid entering the village of their father during this period. As the news spreads, people who are related to the deceased go to the village where the body is displayed to wail (dou) over the body. This event is called aimehelino (crying).

Dou occurs in every stage of the sequence of mortuary feasting. It is in essence an affected hysterical sobbing and wailing. The sound of dou is a sustained, high-pitched keen. People will keen their kin term for the deceased. Wailers also commonly douta'eata'e (literally, cry-talking), that is, they cry out statements of what they and the deceased used to do together and do for each other. Mourners often improvise songs in this keening style about these memories and their feelings of abandonment. These songs
briefly interrupt the mourner's wailing. Owners, especially the immediate matrikin, also
dou with the mourners. This wailing, though shared among both kin and visitors, is not
necessarily a mutual experience. There is a persistent concern about the cause of the
death. Although it is rarely expressed in public, and almost never in explicit terms, most
people believe that death is caused by the witchcraft (alawai) of another person. As
discussed in Chapter 5, many people often discourage each other of "thinking about
witchcraft too much," and emphasized other explanations for deaths, like disease. Yet,
even those people who reject the belief in witchcraft employ a widespread rhetoric of
responsibility. They assume that every death has to have a reason. That is to say, their
moral perception of misfortune is framed by an assumption of human agency as the
ultimate cause of suffering. In the midst of mourning, people gossip about whose actions,
supernatural or otherwise, may have caused this death. Hence, in the deaths I observed
during fieldwork, the local health center was often the target of complaints after the
deaths of patients. Other individuals were gossiped about for failing to provide care or
visit their aging and ailing relatives. The event of death is inscribed in the dynamics of
social relationships, which is to say in the cycle of reciprocity between laterally related
lineages. Informants explained that owners "watch" who attends to ensure that mourners
pay the proper respect and do not appear to be mourning falsely. Dou can even include
accusations and replies between owners and mourners. If the mourners dou appropriately,
owners acknowledge that the mourners have met their obligation, and give them a small
'present' (pwaoli) such as a plate, cup, used clothing, or a baby chicken. This gift is
reciprocated when the recipient hosts an aimehelino in the future. Thus we see that ritual
expressions of grief are fundamentally elements in a cycle of reciprocal exchange among
By the time news of the death has spread, and the mourners have begun to arrive for aimehelino, the owners will hold a hilauwa (literally, awake or alert), an all-night wake. In the evening, people start to arrive at the owners' village. The lineages of natunatuleiya and tubutubuni, people with an especially close relationship to the deceased, and youths, often make up the bulk of attendees. The body of the deceased has been dressed, placed on a bier, laid on a new woven pandanus sleeping mat and pillow, and covered by a bed sheet shroud. Sitting on the ground, visitors from other lineages encircle the body. They gather around people with old Methodist hymn books. They sing songs not frequently sung in other contexts, such as Sunday services. They sing slow, somber songs whose lyrics talk about God's comfort for sorrow, Jesus's sacrificial death, and the eternal reward in heaven for Christians. This continues until dawn with only short breaks for visitors to eat food served by the owners. At dawn, the singing concludes and it is common for one or two visitors to be chosen to give a prayer or brief sermon, and then lead the group in a final song. Then the shroud is unveiled and the owners dou as the singers—all non-owners—quickly leave.

After hilauwa a date is set for burial and a feast called welowelolo (also often called by a synonymous term ipa'ipatu) which marks the end of mourning taboos on the principal mourners. After burial work is completed, the natunatuleiya will cook for them a gift of food called lagu. Owners also cook food for the grave workers, called nimaladana (literally, hand-wash). They may also give a prestigious gift like a bagi shell necklace as a gift to the galiyauna, the leaders of the party of workers, called nimapai (literally, hand-tie). Owners also ceremonially wash, dress and decorate the principle
mourners. In doing so they release mourners from the taboos on self-feeding, washing and wearing clean clothes. They have observed these taboos since the announcement of the death and the beginning of mourning. Now that the body is in the ground, one phase of their mourning, and one component of their separation from owners, ends. The immediate crisis created by death now over, owners make a decision about when they will host the major feast of the sequence, called bwabwale.

In the past, bwabwale was usually held up to a year after a death, during which time, owners and mourners would plant and harvest gardens of 'wateya (Dioscorea alata), the yam used in feasting exchanges. Both mourners and owners would amass the yam wealth they needed for their contribution to the feast. 'Wateya mohili (pure yams) are set aside from the rest of the harvest because they are large enough to be given as gifts in a bwabwale. Bwabwale is the main purpose for 'wateya. In keeping with the orientation toward outward transmission which is built into the management of the yam harvest (see Chapter 2), the best of the harvest is dedicated to bwabwale vaga and maiha gifts for magai relatives. The individual households of the principal mourners also look after a pig to give as part of their bwabwale. On the day of the feast, the groups of visitors and their supporters arrive carrying the pig and yams. The mourners walk at the front of the line and begin to dou as they near the village. They are met outside of the village by some of the owners, who also begin to dou. The owners take the mourners by the hand and lead them through the village. As they walk, the owners and mourners dou the kin term of the deceased person they honor in the feast. These are of course distinct terms. The owners cry out "my mother's brother," "my brother," "my sister" or "my mother." Mourners would cry out terms of relationships that crosscut lineages, such as "my father" or "my
spouse." Both address their cries to the deceased, saying that they see the house where the deceased lived or worked. Often, the owners lead the mourners and the men bearing the pig to the entrance to the cemetery, where they will pause briefly and dou. Continuing to dou, they then turn around and return to the owners' village. By taking them by the hand, owners ceremonially break the taboo and release the mourners from the taboo on walking on the road near the owners' village and magai. The recurrence of dou here not only connects the procession to a sequence of events following the death. At every stage of mourning ritual, owners and mourners dou whenever they are present together. It signals their separation in the ritual space and time of mourning, indicating that they are still moving through a sequence of which the outcome is the reproduction of their ties of lateral kinship.

The mourners heap up their baskets of yams and their pig in the village of the owners. Owners heap up a separate pile of food, and sometimes another pig. This is a gift, called sana'upwa, to the mourners and other visitors. However, it is not a return for the bwabwale given in the feast. My informants consistently said that sana'upwa was "free food;" anyone of the attendees could eat from it whereas bwabwale could not be eaten by those who contributed to giving it. The gift of bwabwale would be reciprocated in the future feasts hosted by the lineages of mourners. Each basket of yams presented as bwabwale is either a debt (vaga) or a repayment (maiha). Debts will be repaid in exact amount to the owners when they hold a feast the next time a member of their lineage dies. New debts given as bwabwale cannot be distributed among owners. The gwala (principal heir) holds onto the whole amount given as a debt. Only repayments given in the feast will be cooked and eaten by owners, or distributed among them. The gwala is responsible
to organize the repayment of new debts, and so holds on to these gifts to remember what is owed. The sana'upwa does not create or cancel any debts. Most of it is cooked and eaten on the spot.

In summary, when the event of death occurs, it is refracted through the lens of kinship, specifically the dual division and reciprocal bond between magai and mohili relatives of the deceased. The relationship between these classes of relative is expressed in ritual acts and gifts, which upon closer inspection, are really two sides of the relationship of reciprocity. The separation of the two groups is marked by the avoidance and deference paid to the owners by mourners, especially the principal mourners of the deceased, who observe onerous mourning taboos. In the feasts, mourners present owners with a large gift of food. This gift is returned by the owners when a mourner's lineage hosts a mortuary feast. In this way, people maintain lateral ties of kinship through reciprocal exchange. What I would emphasize is that in the Auhelawa way of seeing, mourning taboos and feasting gifts to owners are part of the same idea of bwabwale. People suggest this when they term all of those people who stand with the owners in a feast as 'owners of the bwabwale' (tonibwabwale) and 'eaters of the bwabwale' (bwabwale tau-ai). Those people who contribute to the bwabwale gift are 'visitors' (laulauma) who cannot eat the bwabwale. Even though bwabwale can denote a feast and a taboo as well as a gift, bwabwale seems to be foremost a gift given according to certain kinds of rules. The split between the two sides in the feast revolves around the giving of bwabwale gifts. The mourners' avoidance of owners and their observance of taboos underscores that the mourners will be giving a gift according to rules that entail a delayed return. Indeed, the expectation of mourners to receive a pwaoli gift for their dou, and for owners to also dou
at the mourners' future aimehelino suggests that ritual mourning is not an act as much as a kind of reciprocal gift. The ritual actions of mortuary feasts serve to elaborate the idea of a certain kind of reciprocal relationship that is meant by bwabwale.

As Schieffelin (2005) argues for Kaluli society, Milne Bay cultures also use a pattern of separation and opposition to frame certain acts as exchanges. Schieffelin argues that social process is framed in terms of exchange because reciprocity as a value conditions the understanding of behavior. Thune (1989), writing about the Loboda people of the northeast corner of Normanby Island, argues that the exchanges in mortuary feasting mediate the contradictions inherent the ideal of a self-sufficient and autonomous, yet exogamous lineage. Macintyre (1989), discussing the neighboring island of Tubetube, finds that mortuary feasting celebrates the solidarity of the lineage and its ability to "triumph" over the death of an individual member, but argues that this success rests upon the reviving of the complex "paths" of exchange between intermarried and patrilaterally related lineages, which occurs in the exchanges in feasts in which debts of long ago are remembered and honored. Similar points about the relationship between exchange and reproduction of lateral ties are made in many studies of mortuary feasting in Milne Bay Province societies (Battaglia 1985, Kuehling 2005, Munn 1986).

There is also the evidence provided by the association Auhelawa people make between the concept of bwabwale, reciprocity, and the reproduction of lateral ties. When asked to explain bwabwale, informants tended to focus on the death of their own father. One informant told me that the biggest work one would ever do in one's life was prepare the bwabwale gifts after the death of one's father. The death of the father as a paradigmatic case reflects people's preoccupation with managing the ties to the father's
lineage. When asked why it was important to properly observe a bwabwale, people said that it was in order to ensure that one could continue to receive support from the lineage of one's father. The support and solidarity of one's own lineage, in contrast, was thought to be natural and did not need to be actively maintained. Auhelawa describe an uncontrollable feeling of shame called hinihinini that compels them to attend feasts hosted by the lineage of their father and give bwabwale, whether the father is alive or long dead. Ideally, by attending to these relationships, children will continue to be welcomed and supported by the father's lineage even after the death of the linking relative. During mourning, the children of a man separate themselves from his sister's children in order to pay respect to them, but also to create a debt by the giving of bwabwale. If natunatuleiya perform their duties to their patrilateral cross-cousins adequately, then they will stand as substitute fathers to the natunatuleiya. They will allow their natunatuleiya to have some of the privileges that they had when the father was alive, like gardening rights. Natunatuleiya and their "fathers" will continue to attend each other's feasts to contribute to bwabwale given by other lineages in honor of other deaths. The death of the father can be interpreted as an important biographical event if not a rite of passage in itself. The death of the father initiates adult children, so to speak, into a relationship of reciprocal exchange. These relationships can even be passed to the next generation. Tubutubuni of owners can act as mourners, create debts through bwabwale, receive repayment of their gifts, and foster a sense of solidarity and mutual support between their lineages. By maintaining reciprocal exchanges in each other's future feasts they also become important contributors to the bwabwale presentation of other lineages, and part of a larger system of feasts that incorporates more people and a larger volume of
transactions. This final point is worth emphasizing. Feasts for death are not merely responses to something that happens occasionally. Rather every feasting sequence is itself part of one or more cycles of exchanges between owners and their natunatuleiya and tubutubuni. This system precedes and provides a basis for everything that goes on inside the rituals. Thus the events of bwabwale feasts, and the prohibitions of bwabwale taboos only have value as acts because they are part of the larger system of reciprocal exchanges of bwabwale, and hence their role in rituals is determined by bwabwale as a value. Several studies of mortuary feasts in the region have underlined this pre-eminent role of reciprocity in ensuring social reproduction and order (Battaglia 1985, Munn 1986, Weiner 1976).

In the next section, I discuss ways in which bwabwale has changed. Through government and missionary efforts to reform the practice, the conception of bwabwale itself has shifted from a kind of exchange to a set of rules. These rules are also seen as forming a 'custom' which contrasts with a dimdim way of life. Attempts to replace bwabwale with masele, I will show, are concerned with the relationship between Christian identity and custom in this sense.

**Christianity and History in Contemporary Auhelawa Feasts**

Anthropologists' accounts of the region have noted a strong influence of mission churches on traditional beliefs and practices, especially on traditional mortuary practices and feasting (see for instance Damon 1989: 10, Demian 2006, Macintyre 1989: 136, Munn 1986: 302n11, Thune 1989: 175n8, 175n12). For the most part, however, these studies have found that missionaries were only able to effect superficial changes, and that
in spite of cultural change, mortuary feasting performs the same functions as it did in the traditional system. For instance, Macintyre (1983: 134) observes that on Tubetube, many of the taboos and mourning rituals of the traditional sequence of events after death have been stopped, but that people still made traditional exchanges of food, and these exchanges still played the same role in solidifying kin groups. Kuehling (2005: 244) reports that the traditional mourning taboos on Dobu Island have been "significantly relaxed" and many lineages perform an "alternative feast" in which no mourning taboos are imposed and owners choose to take a "short-cut" by holding a exchange between owners and visitors a few days after the burial. She writes, "A quick feast is in line with 'modern ways'.... [The contemporary form of this feast] now serves Christian ideals by limiting mourning restrictions" (Kuehling 2005: 245).

The practice of bwabwale has already undergone significant modification over time. Today, there appears to be no overt conflict between the requirements of being Christian and requirements of bwabwale feasting. Feasting has changed to accommodate Christian and governmental ideas of the right way to dispose of corpses. Traditions that were in open conflict with these authorities are simply no longer practiced. More importantly, however, contemporary practice of bwabwale also reflects what the people themselves want today. Auhelawa people incorporate their Christian belief into bwabwale with prayers, blessings and songs. Mourning taboos are never severe or long lasting; people say they are excessive impositions on "normal life." "Normal life" includes not only the daily round of gardening and household work, but a fair amount of community activities at the mission station, including, but not limited to, marketing, building projects, various committee meetings, and sports. Bwabwale interrupts this
normal routine. Mourners should themselves abstain from these everyday activities to show their respect to the owners. This is why people often said to me that they did not like "custom." They described the custom of bwabwale to be difficult, burdensome, time-consuming and costly. They wanted the death to be finished quickly so that normal life could resume. In one instance, the Kurada local government council member wished to cancel Saturday sports-playing when the mother of a prominent man died on a Friday. The man said he didn't wish for youths to miss out on sports because of the death, mentioning that their coming to sing during hilauwa was all that he expected. This was consistent with his expressed wish that the death be observed "in a modern style." More commonly, people explained that bwabwale was a burden because traditional taboo observance would inevitably conflict with church attendance. Since one cannot be observed without neglecting the other, they reason, it is right that bwabwale change to accommodate Christianity. In line with this change, people often schedule bwabwale feasts no more than a week after burial. They combine different phases of mourning into single feasts. The time when a death could be considered finished is today much shorter than in the past. This also applies to the exchanges within the feasts. By scheduling feasts to occur soon after burial, if not on the same day, owners said that they could limit the number of attendees, and thus the size and number of vaga (gifts recipients repay) they might be forced to accept as a part of a bwabwale. Nonetheless, people insist that these acts, however small they seem in comparison to the observances of the past, perform the same social work of renewing and perpetuating relationships between lineages.

By many people's account, it was the early Polynesian Methodist missionaries who encouraged these changes to mortuary practice. Their objections, in people's
recollections, were that the taboos on certain foods and on self-cleaning were unhealthy if followed for a great length of time, especially for old people. Similarly they advocated western burial practices on the grounds of health and hygiene. Since principal mourners were forbidden to appear in public, missionaries asked that this taboo be lifted so that mourners could attend Sunday services. It is important to note that this historical memory appears to be largely a construction. The changes in Auhelawa mortuary practice did not come about the way it is widely remembered. Early records of the colonial government show that its officers worked closely with missionaries to push for people to bury dead in graveyards apart from villages. While they did have an interest in improving the health and hygiene of indigenous people, enforcement of government rules to obtain compliance had a value in itself. In 1905 the lieutenant-governor of the British protectorate reported that the villages of Normanby Island were making "considerable progress" to building new and cleaner houses, after having a number of "old, dirty hovels" torn down in his last visit of inspection. He notes in this context that burial in graveyards according to the Native Burial Regulation is now "fairly well observed" and he announced that his officers would then move to enforce a new rule, the "Cocoanut Planting Regulation," which would require every adult indigenous male to plant ten coconut palms for the production of copra (MacGregor 1905: 25). The reform of burial and mortuary practice appears to have more to do an overall program of creating good colonial subjects. In a report on the positive and cooperative response to colonial rule and its laws in the nearby Trobriand Islands, the same official wrote "...[T]hey will eventually become useful and spirited citizens" (MacGregor 1898: 38). Similar evaluations of the progress of different indigenous communities towards achieving the administration's goals are made
throughout the official colonial record. Examining missionaries' own accounts, it is clear that Methodists desired to wipe out, not reform, most if not all pre-Christian practices. They did not advocate acculturation for practical reasons or for encouraging weekly church attendance, but because they saw indigenous norms and institutions as impediments to making the missionary church the center of indigenous society (Spencer 1964, Bromilow 1929, but see also Macintyre 1989: 136). In their recollections of missionaries' work, people assume that the present situation is what the missionaries had in mind when they pushed people to change their ways. What is more likely is that people themselves, over the course of a complex history of interactions with missions and the government, gradually altered their practice of traditional obligations to bring them into accord with a changing social context as they experienced it. Looking back, they assume they have only been following a path they believe missionaries laid out for them. The end result, however, is a simplified and less burdensome system of feasting exchanges that they themselves chose to institute.  

The result of this history of external pressure to alter or eliminate mourning practices has resulted in two different ways for people today to relate to bwabwale as a custom. The first way is the one held by most Auhelawa people. They consider it self-evident that all of these changes to bwabwale arose gradually as part of a long history of missionization. As they understand it, they were evangelized, converted and the missions built schools and started to teach people how to live. People gained "wisdom" (sonoga) from the missions and they "understood clearly" (nuwamasele). Thus, they say, the result is that mourning feasts are far smaller, less burdensome to mourners, and take less time to finish. "They brought light," "The light came to us," "They planted a church" are
heuristics people used in narrating the changes in life in Auhelawa brought about by missionization, including and especially changes in mortuary practice. Custom, in this view, is fading away and may soon be gone altogether. Because it was valuable to finish mourning obligations quickly and allow people to go back to normal life, people often spoke of seeking an ideal "mix" of bwabwale and modern mourning that should be somewhere in between tradition and modernity. This was explained to mean that the gift should not be too big, and the observance of taboo not too severe. As a result of pressure to stop what appeared to be the imposed burdens of mourning taboos, the difference between bwabwale and bayau appears to now serve as a model for the difference between tradition and modernity. Bayau, the feeling of relief from being freed from mourning taboos, is now thought of as a state of being that is "free" or characterized by "normal" sociality. As Auhelawa society changes, bwabwale as a norm is said to be "fading away" and people are progressively being freed in a manner analogous to bayau. Most people, however, still thought that the system of bwabwale exchanges still existed and still helped people to create and maintain lasting lateral ties with other lineages. The sequence of feasts is compressed and less elaborate, feasting gifts have become smaller, and deaths are finished more quickly. Yet, these simpler feasts still center on an exchange of bwabwale between owners and mourners.

The second way people have of relating to bwabwale as a custom is to make a choice to reject custom as a way of declaring one's commitment to Christianity. During my fieldwork I found that some people would regularly choose not to hold any bwabwale feast at all. They explicitly refused participate in what they thought of as the Auhelawa "custom," and wanted instead to do something suited to them as Christians. When one of
their matrikin died, they held a common meal for the owners and the lateral relatives. All brought food to share. Nothing was given as a bwabwale gift, and no one displayed the marked deference usually expected of visiting mourners. The burial and feasting were finished in one day. There was no recording of vaga or maiha in this feast; there was no expectation that mourners would receive a return when one of them died. I interviewed a retired United Church pastor from Sowala who claimed to have originated this mode of celebrating a death. Under his leadership, his lineage nearly always practiced what he called masele, as did neighboring lineages. From what I could determine, masele was not exclusively the practice of United Church members. Catholics and Pentecostals also participated in these feasts. Masele meaning light in the sense opposed to guguyou, meaning darkness. It is also sometimes called maedana, the word for light in the Bible language of Dobu. For people who talk about masele as a choice, it is self-consciously drawn from Christian ideas, even though the contemporary church hierarchy remained mostly neutral on whether custom was permissible. The pastor's characterization of masele as "only sit, celebrate, eat and it's over" was underlined later when he called masele feasts "Sit, cook, eat, full stop." Other Auhelawa in general responded positively to the practice of masele feasting. Most people found it persuasive that true commitment to Christianity required total rejection of custom, even if only some consistently carried out masele feasts. Many people participated in masele feasting without objection, even if they did not identify as closely with tapwalolo as the pastor and his lineage did, or even if they thought custom was valuable. This is how the pastor described masele:

My own understanding of bwabwale and light [masele] is that I say bwabwale is earthly—in your language—custom. Maedana, or light [masele], is Christian custom. I strongly want to follow Christian custom
and I don't want earthly custom, or bwabwale.... So its very bad to me, this earthly custom. Bwabwale isn't good. Christian custom, light [masele], isn't bad. I shouldn't take people's pigs or their wealth or their good things for this dead person. And any time a Christian person dies, they only sit, celebrate, eat and it's over. No wailing, no bad thoughts. I refuse to take my friend's things on credit. I refuse to spoil his things. Earthly custom is hard for me.

In this example, masele is defined through a series of asymmetric oppositions.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>bwabwale</th>
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<td>custom</td>
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<td>wailing</td>
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<td>I refuse ... to credit</td>
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<td>spoil</td>
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For the pastor, masele is not just new. The defining characteristics of masele are constructed as negative forms of certain selected characteristics of bwabwale. Thus, masele is constructed as occupying the negative space of bwabwale. Some of these terms require some explanation. Dou has already been mentioned. The pastor also said there should be no "bad thoughts" (nuwatuwu yababana) by which I was told he meant the feelings of frustration and anger that can come up between owners and mourners when they discuss whether the maiha (repayment) gifts given by the mourners are adequate. People's neglect of return gifts over the course of the cycle of feasts for one death can create "bad thoughts." There is also a fear that such kinds of bad thoughts lead to witchcraft among exchange partners, and the phrase "bad thoughts" connotes magic influence. Bad thoughts can also mean what is felt when owners argue with mourners about whether they could bring new vaga to the feast to create a debt for owners to repay.
later. Buka, an English loanword derived from "book" means "to buy on credit." It is most frequently used in the context of the trade-goods store, where a storekeeper has historically written credit purchases in a book. Buka has become a term to refer to any kind of loan or gift in which repayment is expected. It also is used to denote the vaga gifts of bwabwale prestations which, like store credit purchases, recipients must repay by contributing to the bwabwale when the giver's lineage holds a feast. At a time when earning cash through marketing is a nearly universal practice, crediting purchases from friends and family members is common, but a source of tension when the seller wants to "help out" friends, but at the same time is trying to accumulate money. People resist giving credit to people they do not trust to pay them later. Buka has become a pejorative, implying a dishonest transaction. When the pastor says he refuses to "spoil [abiyababa] my friend's things," he appears to be restating his reluctance to receive gifts from visitors, especially if it imposes a great burden on them by depriving them of surplus food. What is important is that masele has none of these elements, and that this exclusive opposition is the basis for a parallel opposition between bwabwale and masele.

One useful way to think about exclusive oppositions of A/not-A, such as the relation between bwabwale and masele, is to see them as forming hierarchies based on unequal opposition, or markedness (Waugh 1982). In a hierarchical opposition one member of the opposition can, in a more general sense, stand for both sides. For instance long can denote both distance ("How long is it?") and a large distance ("The road is long") whereas short can only denote shortness. Short is marked in relation to the term long, which comprises both a restricted sense that opposes the marked term and a general sense that encompasses both. This is the relationship between custom and "Christian
custom." For most of my informants, custom and masele do not have this relation because custom and bwabwale are synonymous. They would normally interpret the changes they observe in their own practice of bwabwale as the gradual "fading" or "finishing" of custom, a process they associate with the historical sense of masele (see also Demian 2006, Strong 2005). The pastor suggests that other Christians elsewhere "just sit, celebrate and it's over." This too is a commonly held view among people who see custom as a fading vestige. As someone who was presumed to come from a Christian country, I was asked many times to confirm the belief that Americans have no custom and that all people in America are buried in a common cemetery. Yet, whereas most of my informants would interpret this as meaning that American Christians have no custom, the pastor might emphasize that it is because of "Christian custom" that Americans don't follow bwabwale, that is, the unmarked term "custom" in its restricted sense. He extends the meaning of custom by making it the unmarked term in the hierarchy of custom and Christian custom. Custom, understood as a kind of rule, then becomes a ground on which the figure of Christian ideas can be expressed in relation to bwabwale. The significance of this becomes clear as one examines what else the passage associates with custom and masele.

A second aspect of the pastor's thinking is the alignment of masele with the congregation and Christian sociality, symbolized in the opposition between heaven and earth. At several points, the pastor says that bwabwale is "earthly custom" or "the custom of earth" (bale'u yana custom). It becomes clear later in our conversation that this term is based upon the opposition between bale'u (earth, land, gardening land) and galewa (sky, heaven). As he was admired as a preacher, the pastor's United Church congregation often
gave him a turn to lead the service even in his retirement, as they did for many active lay members. In one sermon, to explain "God's will" (Yaubada yana nuwatuwu) he quoted the line of the Lord's Prayer that says "thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven" (it is normally rendered in Auhelawa as Yam nuwatuwu 'a-paihowa-i dova galewa-i). He said, "We do your will as in heaven, because it is being done in heaven. It is being done in heaven; that's why we, the Sowala congregation, also do it."

In other words, Christians follow God's will to make earth more like heaven (see also Errington and Gewertz 1995: chap. 4). Their unity of purpose in the congregation is associated with the perfection of heaven, and the fulfillment of God's will. The pastor often talked about heaven in this way. Even later in our conversation, he said that he was afraid "false prophets" (a vague reference to the new local Pentecostal fellowships) would lead Auhelawa people away from heaven. The opposition between heaven and earth is, of course, central to the Auhelawa Christian cosmology. In the moral discourse of Sunday service prayers and sermons, heaven is the eternal reward for living a Christian life on earth. God, who reigns in heaven, created the earth and people. But the earth is separated from God, and to go to heaven Christians must consistently observe the teaching and examples of God's messengers, most notably Jesus, but also the prophets of the Old Testament, the apostles, historical European missionaries, and church leaders. Christian life requires that one heed the example and fully model one's life on the virtues of these messengers and moral exemplars. In the sense that it is a future horizon, either personal or social, heaven is a temporalization of 'one mind.' The rules by which individuals conform themselves to the congregation and create 'one mind' are opposed to the 'custom' of heathen institutions, which are of the earth as opposed to heaven. The opposition
between bwabwale and masele thus exist in a Christian temporality which one finds in the practice of Christian worship.

A third important aspect of this passage is its pragmatic function of positing an "I" of discourse, that is to say, creating in discourse a self for the pastor to occupy in relation to custom (Rumsey 2000). Consider the following self-references:

- "I don't want to follow earthly custom,"
- "I strongly want to follow Christian custom and I don't want earthly custom, or bwabwale."
- "I refuse to take my friend's things on credit."

These statements anchor the pastor in relation to masele and custom through his 'mind' (nuwa) and his 'desire' (nuwanuwa), inalienably possessed and unique aspects of himself as a person. Most of the quoted passage, and much of our subsequent discussion, dwelt on the pastor's thinking. This close association between the speaker's personal choice and his idea of masele was not lost on my research assistant. He said to me after the interview, "He's very brave, a revolutionary! To go against all customs like that."

Given the Christian context of the topic, this reaction is not surprising. Robbins (2004) emphasizes that Christian concepts of morality are predicated on individualism as a value. Conversion to Christianity, he argues, requires that people cultivate self-awareness and privilege their understanding of themselves as individuals. This concept of individual self-awareness was a major part of sermons in Kurada church services as well. In one sermon, a preacher illustrated the theme of "being a worker for Jesus" by saying: "If I go to town and I ask a worker [to define work], he would say that ... every minute, every hour, every second I am watched." It becomes clear in her sermon that workers for Jesus
are, like workers in paid employment, people who consistently show certain personal qualities and meet certain responsibilities. In this respect, religious discourse fashions the believer as a person who possesses valued inner qualities. The difference between a true believer and a less committed person can be as different as village and town. And indeed, the pastor's description of himself through his description of masele makes use of the dichotomy between custom and Christian custom. He is tied to Christian custom and conversely detached from custom. A person should choose to take the course of masele, committing themselves to the "Christian custom" at the exclusion of the alternative. Thus the speaker posits himself as a certain kind of individual that is important to Christian belief.

If masele is presented as the marked contrast to the custom of bwabwale, one should note that the pastor is being very selective in his presentation of the content of bwabwale. He describes bwabwale as a system of rules which inhibit 'one mind' and obstruct entry into heaven. In the statements I quote above, the most concise presentation of his ideas, he chooses wailing, bad thoughts and taking without paying as its main features. That is to say, he chooses two things which relate to the ritual separation of mourners from owners, and suggests that delayed reciprocal exchanges are like an unpaid store credit account that will "spoil" other people for being generous. As we continued to talk, he stated he was opposed to mourning taboos and all the burdens associated with obligations of mourning. He also said that he did not understand why it was only Normanby Island that prohibited people from working in the graveyard of the father's lineage. He chose to emphasize the rules of the ritual at the expense of the system of circulation in which the feast is one part. Mourning taboos were normally explained to
me as ways of showing grief and expressing one's hinihinini. The pastor explains them as externally imposed obstacles to unity, presumed to be a normal state elsewhere. Moreover, these rules are imposed on individuals and their nuwa. They obstruct a unity of mind, the composition of a social group through the harmonization of many individual consciousnesses, which is so central to Christian sociality. Similarly, he uses the idea of buka to associate ceremonial exchange with a practice most people assume is dishonest. He emphasizes personal conduct over the relationship between transactors. Traditional custom is presented as social norms which burden the individual with onerous obligations to others. Christian custom is defined by the inversion of these rules. Or, perhaps more precisely, in masele discourse, Christianity's rule is to invert heathen customs. The custom of Christians is to not be encumbered by relationships, but use the individual self as the measure of everything.

To summarize, the pastor is using an exclusive, hierarchical opposition between bwabwale and masele to bring the idea of a Christian individual self into relief against the background of tradition. This opposition of masele and bwabwale is brought into parallel, first, with a cosmological frame of reference of the opposition between heaven and earth, and second, an individual self is posited through refusal and masele frames this self. As Jakobson points out (quoted in Waugh 1982: 300), the marked term is generally that which requires motivation. Hence, in the pastor's view, masele has to be chosen in favor of the normal, expected course of action. This is very different than the way many other people in Auhelawa think about masele. They associate the idea of custom with bwabwale, and masele with a gradual historical trend away from traditional past and towards a new, easier way of feasting that still maintains a norm of reciprocity. For the
pastor, both are customs. But custom must be taken as having the meaning he gives it. It is a set of external rules that an individual can decide for themselves whether to take up or not. The choice is important; to indulge in anything of tradition is to risk losing heaven, because one's understanding what it means to be a good Christian is based upon an inverted image of tradition. Hence masele has a much greater pragmatic value in this frame of reference. Often masele signifies a vanishing point of custom, or an absence. As a "Christian custom," it posits a new subjectivity.

The Limits of Masele

The pastor's concept of masele is based on a personal choice, and yet all mourning is in some way collective. It raises the question of how successful his dream of a Christian custom can be. He seems to be asking people to work together to articulate themselves as individuals in opposition shared understanding about mutual obligations. Indeed, in actual practice, I observed very few instances of collective mourning which also lacked crying, taboos, and debts. People believed it was possible. Informants told me that the owners of the feast had the right to decide among themselves whether a particular feast would be masele or bwabwale. Yet, even when owners felt strongly about holding a feast which entailed no future obligations to exchange, they were willing to make compromises with potential donors and take on some debts. Likewise, even though donors would declare their respect for the decision of the owners, they found ways to give a gift from which they would abstain. Contrasting perceptions and miscommunications about what was actually taking place in any given feast as it was going on were quite frequent and it was often unclear to me whether they were ever fully
Bwabwale and masele seemed to shadow each other. I remember once attending an 'aimehelino in which the owners announced that they wanted the mourning feast to be masele. A day before the announced time for this feast, a woman of the owning lineage came to New Home to talk to Lucy, who was also a natuleiya of the owners. The woman said that she and the other owners had changed their mind. Some of the in-marrying men of the owning lineage upset them by joking that they were looking forward to all the free food that they would be able to eat at the masele feast in their wives' village. Angrily, the woman listed off all the vaga her in-laws had eaten at previous feasts in their home village. Each gift of food they accepted pledged them to give a maiha to the donors. The owners decided that they could not let these disrespectful affines get out of a debt so easily, and so the choice of masele was abruptly changed.

The difficulty of pulling off a truly masele feast may suggest that the deliberate rejection of bwabwale is limited by the norms of reciprocity and the bonds they create. People might entertain the possibility of rejecting custom for masele, but if they did go down that road, they would inevitably have to forsake a pre-existing debt as a consequence of the rejection. In the woman mentioned above, such a possibility was grossly offensive. Masele is fine for a person alone to choose for oneself, but in actual social circumstances people are never really alone, so they will always face resistance. In fact, on its face, a real commitment to masele feasting should be unthinkable because if it really could be accomplished, it would mean disconnecting a person from the bonds of kinship altogether, not just in word but in deed. Not only would one be declaring oneself to be an autonomous individual, but one would also be making oneself into an
ontologically novel being, a person who does not reciprocate with magai relatives. And so, one interpretation of masele is that it is merely expresses a subordinate social value, something good to imagine and toy with but not something which is implicitly and unquestionably the right thing to do. Ultimately one cannot really choose to be outside of society.

Yet one feast I observed seem to arrive at masele from a different process. Instead of trying to reject custom and ending up being caught up in social obligations, this feast was made masele from on high, as it were. The occasion of the feast was the placement of a cement headstone over the graves of three people of one lineage who had died over the past few years. The owning lineage and a neighboring bu'una lineage invited the natunatuleiya of their lineage to attend a common meal. While the male owners would be working alone in the cemetery, forbidden to visitors, the natunatuleiya would be cooking food from the owners' and their own gardens for the owners and visitors to share. No food was bwabwale, and nothing was to be exchanged. I asked one of the visitors what the plan for the feast was, and he smirked and said, "This is only teibolo," that is the food would be given to all freely, like food served to a congregation from a mission table. When I asked him why he thought that the owners had chosen to do this, he said that all feasts were like this now because people were afraid to accept big gifts in bwabwale they would have to repay later. Since food was hard to produce, everyone was more selfish and more eager to suspend the norm of bwabwale. His was a perception of changes as moral decay and increasing selfishness which I had heard many times before. If this was masele, masele meant an absence of obligation and hence had a null value. Later I asked an owner about their plans, and he furtively agreed that they had chosen masele, but they
might take on some gifts from visitors after all. He said that there was a disagreement, but did not elaborate. Towards the end of the day, the workers came back into the village from the cemetery, their work unfinished. The timber frame they had constructed to mould the cement had been measured wrong and was too long for the grave. They had to start over tomorrow.

The next day, I returned to the village hoping that the workers' job would be finished and that either a common meal or mix of masele and bwabwale would be done today. The village was nearly empty. Everyone, it seemed, had left off from their work to prepare for the feasts and left behind the baskets of food and pigs intended for the feast. I asked someone waiting behind where everyone was, and he said that they had all gone to the cemetery. Feeling foolish for arriving late and potentially missing something really different, I rushed down the road toward the owner's bu'una lineage's cemetery, several villages away, where all the work was being done. I was shown where the path to the cemetery was by some people sitting in the bu'una village, and headed up the steep, muddy path to the top of the hill. About halfway up, I practically collided with someone I had never seen before. I could tell he was a pastor of the United Church, carrying a leatherbound Bible and smartly dressed in "blacks and whites," black trousers, white shirt and black tie, as one should always wear for tapwalolo with the Uniteds. "Yauwedo" (Hello) he said, and kept going down. (I later met him again at the United Church in Barabara, between Bunama and Sowala, which is actually closer to this village than Sowala.) The cemetery was on the very top of the hill overlooking the village below. On a clear day one could look from there west and see the entire coastline of Auhelawa, and on the horizon, Kehelala, the eastern cape of New Guinea. Dry cement bags, steel tools
and wooden frame sat around two unmarked graves. By the time I got to the top, visitors and owners of the feast were turning to head down the path. Whatever happened was already over. I went back with the group to the village where we would hold the feast. Later I found out what had happened. The day before, while the workers were still in the cemetery, some visitors and owners had argued over whether visitors could give gifts in honor of their dead magai relative to the owners. The workers unexpectedly found that the frame did not fit into the burial plot they way they wanted, even though they had measured it carefully. Everyone agreed that the spirit of one of the deceased to be honored, who hovers near the cemetery whenever work is done there, was offended by this disunity and caused the problem with the frame. This particular deceased person was in fact a United Church pastor, and strongly believed in masele as a substitute for bwabwale. His supernatural action was meant to be a warning to his descendants to honor him with a real masele feast, and not to argue over gifts and debts. So, the next morning, the owners and visitors all went together into the owners' cemetery to have a worship service with a local United pastor. They prayed to their deceased ancestor to ask for forgiveness, and "to ask him to ask God to forgive them." The work continued in the cemetery and was eventually finished. At the end of the day, the owners and visitors cooked and ate together. The only concession to bwabwale was a gift of a dog and 'wateya to the principal graveworkers, who were themselves bwabwale because of their contact with the grave. All the other food was shared.

In this case, the masele feast was not really a purely individual, freely chosen act of rejection. Rather people's sharing of food ended up resulting from the need to maintain a relationship to an invisible person, an ancestor spirit attached to a lineage cemetery, yet
also a more pure embodiment of Christian selfhood. Thus when the human actors could not agree on the form their relationships should take, a nonhuman supernatural actor chose that form for them. Masele, though initially a Christian custom existing in opposition to the rules and taboos of tradition, ends up being most fully realized as part of a complex chain of interdependent social relationships.

**Conclusion**

Van Gennep writes that "[funeral ceremonies] have a duration and a complexity sometimes so great that they must be granted a sort of autonomy." (Van Gennep 1966: 146). For van Gennep, a person's death was, from a social point of view, a change of status that, like others, required ceremonialization to be effected. The rite of passage from life to death creates a period of transition in which the deceased is moved from one status to another. In the period of mourning for the deceased, people take on ritual statuses according to which the various duties of mourning are assigned. Van Gennep's observation echoes that of Hertz (1960), who saw mortuary ritual as fulfilling a function of social reproduction (see also Bloch and Parry, eds. 1982). The ritual treatment of the dead body reflects for Hertz the changes occurring in the social body as a result of the death of one member. He draws special attention to the widespread practice of secondary burial as a symbol of a group reclaiming part of itself in the form of physical remains, and the long transitional process of mourning (see also Metcalf and Huntington 1991).

An autonomous sphere of social reproduction has been an important concept to Melanesianists' studies of ritual, though they have usually emphasized the system of exchanges that make an individual's life cycle part of the circulation of a gift economy. In many Melanesian societies, mortuary feasts define the relationships between the basic
units of the society (Battaglia 1985, Foster 1990, Macintyre 1989, Mosko 1989, Munn 1986, Thune 1989, Weiner 1976: chap. 3). These feasts tend to consist of reciprocal exchanges between kin-units such as clans or lineages. Mortuary feasting obligations follow on other obligations between these units that arise from ties of kinship and affinity. Each feast is an opportunity for these relationships to be initiated and maintained. In this way, the cycle of feasts provides the structure of the society to be reproduced through the succession of generations. This is a productive perspective to take on Auhelawa bwabwale, in which ritual, exchange and kinship all come into play in the process of feasting. What I have tried to show in this chapter is that an alternative perspective is needed to understand the different ideas about death and social relationships that are now emerging in a situation of social change.

I would argue that by giving this autonomous position to feasting as a social system, it becomes difficult to comprehend historical changes within that system. As I have noted, mortuary feasts tend to be interpreted in the context of an encompassing, autonomous order of exchange. If anthropologists place such importance on the functioning of this system, then changes to the ritual process appear to be the breakdown of the system and the failure of feasts to accomplish reproduction of society that is attributed to them. Historical changes to mortuary feasting are something in need of critical attention, especially if they have the power attributed to them. Bloch (1982) predicted that if mortuary ritual allows society to transcend exigencies of life and death and paint a picture of transcendent order, then the power of mortuary ritual will often be called upon to provide legitimation of a particular kind of order. The converse could also be said to be true: that efforts to change the culture—by colonial governments,
missionaries, and other agents with interests in making indigenous people pursue new goals instead of that of their own collective well-being—have to attack the sources of legitimate social reproduction in order to gain legitimacy for themselves. In Auhelawa, mortuary feasts were so contested by missionaries who wanted the church to become the center of society, and by colonial administrators who wanted people to become subjects of a new form of power. While the ability of Auhelawa traditional mortuary rituals to define social relationships may be an important feature of them, focusing on their autonomy with respect to everyday life may not be the best way to shed light on how these rituals are changing. It is better to understand them as contingent phenomena, that is to say, it is better to see them as being expressions of certain ideas about social relationships and contextualize these ideas in terms of how Auhelawa people organize and attach value to them (Dumont 1980).

Bwabwale is an idea that covers a feast organized around a dual structure that is a basic principle of kinship, a range of mourning taboos observed by feast visitors, a forbidden gift of food that visitors will not share with the recipients, the feast owners. What I have tried to argue is that bwabwale is primarily a kind of gift that creates a relationship of reciprocity. In mediating the contradictions of kinship, bwabwale gives expression to reciprocity as a valuable form of sociality. As a result from a complex history of interaction with Christian missions, their education system, and a long period of colonialism and state-building, people today express ambivalence about bwabwale and do not always represent it in terms of reciprocity and reproduction of kinship relations. Bwabwale is defined now as a kind of an onerous taboo and burdensome work for others. As a result of this changing context for the system of feasts, I argue, bwabwale has
become progressively less elaborate, shorter in duration and less burdensome for both mourners and owners.

For some in Auhelawa, like my informant the pastor, bwabwale needed to be even more radically reframed in terms of his idea of "custom" in order to give form to an idea of individualism that is so much a part of Auhelawa Christianity. In this discursive frame, the pastor presents masele as a kind of motivated choice. This has implications for theories of objectified, self-reflexive traditions. That custom often emerges in a polarized field of meaning is well established (Foster 1995, Sahlins 1999, White 1991). Yet I would argue that the nature of the opposition between custom and change makes a difference in how these terms function. As it poses "choices among unequals" (Waugh 1982: 316), the marked opposition of custom and change can make tradition the neutral background for alternative subjectivities.

The pastor's choice resonates quite profoundly with how Auhelawa Christians think about their relationship to God. Bwabwale is of the "earth" and masele is of "heaven." Thus the emergence of masele, at least in the pastor's formulation of it, is not a historical trend, but self-willed cultural change. By opting to celebrate death in the pastor's version of a masele feast, people are taking up his individualistic point of view on traditional institutions. As long as people interpret sociality in terms of individualism as a value, bwabwale will have lost its legitimacy as a form of social reproduction. By displacing the norm of reciprocity, social reproduction through exchange becomes unreliable. One then might argue that the pastor's wants to construct a basis for sociality in the way that bwabwale reproduces that basis. That is, he wants to make 'one mind' the substitute for bwabwale as the central principle for social life. In this respect, masele
shares a lot with other radical Christian-inspired movements as an attempt to remake the world (Burridge 1969). In that model of change, everything that is normal, expected and taken for granted needs to be uprooted precisely for the reason that on the idealized horizon of change, normal sociality does not apply (see also Robbins 2001).

Yet masele is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to realize in practice according to the vision of the pastor. Masele is, from a sociological point of view, paradoxical. It claims to be a collective form of an individual choice, a collaborative realization of a personal identity. In actual practice, many earnest attempts to declare a feast to be masele end up devolving into bwabwale, suggesting that while the former is theoretically desirable, the latter is everyone's default social mode and as such can never be fully replaced. On the other hand, I encountered one instance in which masele was a truly social and collective experience. When owners and visitors prayed to an ancestor in the owners' cemetery, they broke the taboo of the magai yet also honored their lasting connection to each other. In that event, their kinship was mediated not by exchange but by a mutual connection to a deceased ancestor who was believed to be in heaven. Through him they could imagine a social arrangement which was consistent with their ideas about Christianity yet not so individualizing that it destroyed the possibility of society itself. If Auhelawa Christianity is predicated on individualism as a way of seeing the world, then we must ask what kind of individualism is this?

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New Guinea). Oceania 77(2): 172-190. The dissertation author was the sole author of this paper.
Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have attempted to describe Auhelawa society and the way it has attached itself to a globalizing, Western culture through its incorporation of Christianity. I have argued that Christian discourse and practices create a spatiotemporal frame in which people reflexively perceive their relationship to Western modernity. This frame of reference is itself structured by a Christian metanarrative of change as a singular rupture. By adopting this frame as a way of seeing themselves, Auhelawa transvalue reciprocity, mutual obligation, and the ethics of identities of kinship as encumbrances and obstacles to a social transformation they see as both necessary and inevitable. Through Christian practices, Auhelawa embody an alternative mode of sociality which they see as capable of more fully connecting them to modern Western culture and thereby bringing forth the kind of social transformation which a Christian metanarrative of change promises. Hence, the adoption of Christian practice and cosmology leads people to see their own lives as in a state of decline from self-sufficiency and order, but also towards a new basis for social life. Auhelawa lament the loss of an ethic of reciprocal interdependence; yet they hope not to regain it but to replace it. I argue that this acquired collective perception of change motivates the abandonment of the logic of the gift in favor of accumulation and participation in a market economy. Here I want to conclude by briefly reviewing the story I have told about Auhelawa Christianity and cultural change, and consider what it can tell us about modernity and the emergence of individual personhood.

In presenting this case, I have tried to open up a space for a new perspective on cultural change. The Christian metanarrative of change sounds like many similar
metanarratives which structure Western social theory and have led previous generations of social scientists to view social change in terms of a teleology of rationalization, or the disembedding of institutions from traditional, primordial social ties. Yet in presenting the Auhelawa engagement with Christianity I avoid drawing the premature conclusion that Christianity's influence can be reduced to this explanation. In trying to explain the ways in which Auhelawa society has changed and continues to change, I have tried to maintain the recognition that Auhelawa Christianity is part of an ongoing intercultural encounter and to examine the mechanisms by which this intercultural zone is constituted. This has been a theme of anthropology's critical inquiry into the nature of change in a globalizing world. Yet, in looking at contact between cultures, there is a tendency to see the spaces of contact as being somehow extracultural. Similarly, in looking at sociocultural contact through the lens of the translocal networks and connections, emphasis is placed on individual actors and their choices and strategies. Cultural contact is narrowed to a conception of a single person's active negotiation of conflicts, navigation of constraints, and appropriation of diverse palettes of symbolic resources. Even as anthropology pushes back against a conception of modernity as a global Gesellschaft of autonomous individuals, the imagination of alternative paths of change seem to implicitly depend on seeing intercultural spaces as extracultural zones of individual, not collective, self-creation.

Studying Christianity in the postcolonial global era should only draw attention to this problem. Because Christian cosmology and institutional forms are predicated on autonomous individuals, it would not make sense to also make the individual agent the unit of analysis. Too many of the assumptions which follow from such a framework
simultaneously partake of the very object, the Christian subject, to be explained. Indeed, in Auhelawa's own eyes, the era of light is characterized by the disembedding of persons from the constitutive relations of kinship and exchange. In other words, it is they who have come to see cultural change as the emergence of the individual subject. It is they who, through participation in Christianity, have come to see individuals as the true locus of effective agency. The challenge is to explain how Auhelawa's intercultural relationships lead to the emergence of Auhelawa individualism without assuming that autonomous individual agency is a precondition for intercultural relationships.

I have suggested that attention to reflexivity in action helps meet this challenge. Reflexivity is an inherent property of human agency. All actions are meaningful, and hence socially effective, only insofar as they are mediated culturally and recognized as culturally valued. Agency is an effect, in that sense, of perception through a given cultural frame in which possible relationships between subjects and objects of action are either highlighted or suppressed. Reflexivity, however, does not only lie at the level of given cultural frames of self-perception. This derives from the view that culture is a constraint on individual consciousness. Instead we can see it as a metadiscourse of agency itself. Such metadiscourses of agency are not simply mental structures of perception, but are embodied in practices, symbols and institutional forms. They are better thought of as metapRACTICES, or metacommunicative actions which frame, construe and shape communicative action. They compel people to perceive agency of a certain kind by highlighting certain relations between actor, action and object. In that sense, metapRACTICES create a reflexive loop between perception, action and the world. Taking this view, interaction across cultures only counts as such when it is mediated in terms of a
conception of cultural boundaries, which are themselves cultural constructs. Extracultural action appears as such to the actor, then, only when she reflexively perceives her own actions through a cultural conception of its own limits. Not only agency, but a process of cultural change itself, could be then conceptualized as a reflexive process of boundary making and breaking. Similarly, a metadiscourse of change that highlights individual autonomy could be then what allows individual persons to emerge.

Understanding the inherently reflexivity of intercultural contact and cultural change forces one to restate the kinds of questions anthropologists normally ask about these topics. For instance, it is normal to ask why Christian converts would adopt a new, foreign religion, and on what terms. It is also normal to ask what effects arise from their participation in that new cultural system for the other domains of social life. These sorts of questions lie at the heart of the emerging field of the anthropology of Christianity, which attempts to account for the role of Christian churches in places where they have been imported or imposed, and the contemporary growth and globalization of Christianity. While these questions are worthwhile, they can only be answered through an account of historical events in which agents' actions break from normal routine and have a lasting effect on stable, structural patterns. The perspective I have proposed assumes that such events only appear in the reflexive loop between actions and metadiscourses of action that connect them to actors and their objects in particular ways. Christianity is such a metadiscourse of history which people can draw upon to frame their past experiences and memories in terms of a particular mode of change. Anthropologists of Christianity should not be content to conclude that a society's incorporation of Christianity as a cultural system entails the replacement of a previous cultural system. That is to say,
Christianity leads to the development of modernity and individualism. That, too, is a
version of the story that most mainstream Western Christian histories tend to tell about
themselves. Nor should we be content to conclude the inverse either, that is, that cultural
variations of Christianity demonstrate the failure of Christian culture to eliminate a rival
indigenous system. That is to say, indigenous cultures domesticate Christianity and make
it safe for traditions. If anything, the real question to ask about colonial Christianization
and the globalization of Christianity is not how it manages to displace a previous culture
as a system but how it has integrated itself into that culture as a new element in a
manifold of metacultural repertoires. In Auhelawa, Christianity is undeniably not new. It
has been a continuous presence for well over a century. Yet through its practice people
construct a palpable sense of its newness and foreignness. In this way, Christianity has
been incorporated as a resource for recasting everyday life in a dichotomous frame of not
only good and bad, but new and old, and foreign and local. Yet this is only one such
possible way of framing everyday life among many. Indeed, we might say that
anthropologists' use of the trope of culture in its classical sense as a system of shared
representions is itself a metadiscourse of our informants' discourses, which may or may
not be relevant to their many ways of framing their own actions. Continuity and rupture
are rival metaphors of cultural change deployed by Christians and anthropologists, yet we
often do not stop and ask whether other people use these tropes also, and to what ends.
The question to ask about Auhelawa Christian beliefs and practices is how they connect
themselves to other modes of reflexive practice such that a Christian metadiscourse of
sociality becomes dominant.

We can safely reject teleological accounts of social change because they rely on
the premise of an opposition between traditional cultural structure as constraint and
convention and individual action as a source of innovation and change. Instead we must
recognize that Christianity's own telling of its history as a rupture also frames actions in
these terms of structural constraint and individual agency. In so doing, the practice of
Christianity generates that same teleological narrative of tradition and modernity as a lens
through which people see their own history.

We see this in the way Auhelawa people have incorporated Christian missionaries
and other experiences of Australian colonialism into their own local history. Tetela,
genealogical narratives of a lineage's migration and settlement in Auhelawa, are the
dominant framework by which people interpret their present social networks in terms of
time. Alongside tetela there is another genre of knowledge which is its complementary
inverse, called vedevedede, or legend. Legends are stories of unknown or uncertain truth
value which explain the presence on the landscape of mysterious memorials. Yet unlike
tetela narratives, these legendary stories are disconnected from people living today, and
as such vedevedede and the mysteries they narrate seem to take place out of normal time.
The stories of Didiluwa of Magetuwa village, as I argue, are attempts to explain the
present relationships Auhelawa have with Australian culture, especially money and
commodities, in terms of a temporality of genealogical history. Didiluwa was the first
village constable appointed by the Australian colonial administration, and the stories of
his actions and decisions mediate people's present connections to a postcolonial order.
Especially salient in stories of Didiluwa is his prophecies of the future. Looking back,
people take these prophecies as having been fulfilled, further reinforcing the continuity
that the figure of Didiluwa constructs in history. The arrival of Pati, the Samoan pastor
and first missionary in Auhelawa, however, fits into a different temporal logic. Pati is remembered for rupturing social relationships and instituting a new basis for relationship in Christian religious practices. His story, including his capacity to transcend cultural differences and communicate with Maleko of Alogawa village in an extracultural sign language, and his prayer for the conversion of the warriors who wanted to kill him, takes part of the logic of legends. In telling these stories of cultural contact in these divergent ways, I argue that Auhelawa figure their experiences of historical changes differently.

Didiluwa suggests that cultural contact has led to gradual, continuous changes. Pati suggests that contact with Christianity caused a decisive event in which an old order was replaced with a new one. Importantly however is the dialogical relationship that the logic of legends shares with the logic of Christian self-representation. Both legendary time and Christian metanarrative of history work together to justify the reflexive perception of contemporary Auhelawa as a totally Christian society. Because there is no kinship, so to speak, between genealogical narrative and Christian discourse, then there is no time that they can share either. Christianity is perceived as the advent of a new order.

The metadiscursive register in Auhelawa everyday life bears the traces of this dialogue between Christian and indigenous practices of historical memory. Auhelawa talk about their lives with respect to historical figures of Sanebo the last warrior, Didiluwa, the first polisimani, Pati, Makadonia. The deployment of each of these names is an iteration of either a temporality of continuity or of rupture. By citing figures of history, people call up a narrative frame connecting the past to the present in a particular ways. Moreover, these narrative frames partake of Christian historical frames as well.

The metadiscursive words which Auhelawa frequently use to characterize their
contemporary life in terms of history—words like custom, tapwalolo, light, darkness, mixing, change—are themselves also iterations of one of the temporalities grounded in alternatives reflexive practices. We cannot help but note, too, that the dialogue of Christian and indigenous temporalizations marks these metadiscourses as well. Speaking of the mixing of cultures through the trope of mikisi is a good illustration. Mikisi is not so much a referential category of change as it is a self-referential icon of change as corruption. Custom and tapwalolo signal not only two mutually exclusive domains of behavior, but also reiterate the epochal structure of history instantiated by the story of Pati. In this sense, Christianity is not just evidence of cultural change, it is a way of seeing change that both interferes and resonates with other similar modes of temporalizing contemporary life.

If the Christian metadiscourse of history becomes dominant when it enters into a dialogical engagement with the metadiscourses of everyday life, such as kinship, clanship and place, what does this tell us about people's practice of Christianity as individual Christian subjects? Consider how Auhelawa society might be described as simply an imported social institution in an otherwise traditional structure. For instance, if we take a perspective that Christianity is simply a new institutional context in which actions are read as evidence of individual belief, then we might conclude that when people do Christian things in Christian contexts, they are acting reflexively as individual persons. In other contexts, they would not appear to themselves or others in that capacity. On Sunday, they cultivate a mode of being and acting which they understand as part of their individual soul, their individual mind, and their individual faith because that is what Sunday services elicit from them. On Monday they set aside that mode of being and
adopt a relational personhood that is elicited from the everyday contexts of clanship, kinship, reciprocity and so on. Yet, although we can say that social context powerfully compels a specific mode of being, the boundaries between Sunday and Monday are not absolutely fixed by a structure of social contexts. Rather, there is always a submerged element of an alternative personhood contained within the dominant one, much as legendary time is submerged within the dominant time of genealogical history. The ethic of generosity that governs a Monday morning visit to the yam garden contains an alternative ethic of 'aiduma (selfishness) which can only be expressed in the secondary garden of bad foods. The ethic of unanimity and nonreciprocal charity expressed by Sunday fundraising can also leave room for reciprocal relationships of gift exchange, as in pot-to-pot. In either case, the subordinate mode of being is certainly devalued, but never eliminated. Subsistence production would not be viable were it not for supplemental crops which one does not exchange, even though such cultivation is a mark of shameful selfishness. And because it is not eliminated, the lesser alternative can be a source of innovation. A structural homology between the Sunday actor and the Sunday action as against the Monday actor and the Monday action, though powerfully compelled, is also open to an analogic connection between the subordinated type of action on one side and the dominant type on the other. Hence residual selfishness in the gardening system resonates in an analogical way with substantive expressions of selfishness in other domains, such as cash accumulation and commodity consumption. Similarly, the legendary character of Pati's arrival has a deep intertextual resonance with miraculous conversions from the time of Paul to the time of William Bromilow. By itself, the metadiscourse of gardening as an ethical discipline contains a notion of its own limits in
the category of bad foods. Yet in the intercultural zone, this dirty secret of subsistence practice takes on additional meaning because the gardening ethic is now called upon to interpret practical innovations in subsistence strategies. From this conjuncture, people can elaborate a narrative of change as cultural and material decline which corresponds in many ways with narratives of change in Christian discourse. Christian discourse of history too is called upon to interpret present experience in terms of decline, but in a way that frames the source as a willfully selfish individual person who obstructs social and material transformation through community development projects. Reflexive frames of perception enter into dialogue through these sorts of analogic connections, and lets foreign ways of seeing and thinking take hold.

We see this dialogue in the practices of church fundraising, the rhetoric of development, and changes in witchcraft beliefs. Church fundraising differs from other kinds of cash accumulation in that it is framed in terms of individual gifts of charity which express individual sentiments. Fundraising makes cash accumulation appear to be prosocial by framing the activity of accumulation as located in the congregation as a special kind of social group which is based on a union of individual sentiments. Thus it emphasizes the alienation of the gift from the donor to the congregation. To mark the difference between the sociality of the congregation and that of everyday life, the discourse of fundraising inverts the hierarchy of exchange values centered on the balanced reciprocity of vaga (debt) and maiha (payment). Similarly, to convey the volitional nature of congregational unity, church sermons often situate the congregation in a chronotope of Christian world history in which individual choice and commitment motivate change and mitigate backsliding. Decline and development are complementing
tropes of sermons by which preachers link the continued existence of congregation to the individual will of its members to join it. In discussing the enactment of the congregation through worship, sermons, and fundraising, I noted the importance of the metadiscourse of 'one mind' as the frame of Christian sociality. Being Christian means reflexively acting in concert with other fellow Christians with a unity of purpose. Christianity is reflexively perceived as a union of individual minds on the basis of like belief, and hence the Christian congregation is reflexively a meta-individual, an ideally autonomous, self-sufficient and self-perpetuating institution. In some ways the dream of the Christian congregation is to completely break its ties from the host society, to become a substitute society as opposed to a part of an encompassing social order. This self-perception is expressed in rhetorics of historical time, global geographic space, money and images of material wealth and poverty. Each of these tropes relies upon a framework in which Christian sociality is the inverse of indigenous sociality.

By giving Auhelawa a way of talking about how their society has changed and continues to change, Christian metadiscourse makes individual subjects appear as agents. By looking through their everyday lives through a Christian lens, a lens which warps the image into a polarized field of before and after in which either side is the inverse of the other, people come to see themselves and others as individuals. This self-awareness is not only a product of participation in Christian institutions, it depends crucially on the dialogical connections between Christian and indigenous practices. Perhaps most importantly, this integration of Christian metadiscourse has instilled in Auhelawa a deep belief in the possibility of social transformation. By constantly temporalizing their present circumstances in a rhetoric of rupture, people seem to believe that at any moment
a whole new society could simply break out, provided that they as individuals commit themselves to this collective change. Church practices themselves express this kind of hope, but more important are the ways in which Christian forms serve as templates for organizing action in other contexts, like community development projects. The perception of witchcraft too appears to be structured by assumptions of individual agency and responsibility as opposed to the relational ethos of kinship. Witchcraft, now increasingly represented as a hidden, invisible wealth which witches refuse to share or reveal, iconizes a destructive individualism which must be overcome in order that a transformation of Auhelawa society can manifest. This transformation is not only material, but social, in the sense that it would not only develop Auhelawa, but would catch it up to dimdim societies of the West. As God wants for everyone, dimdims have already renounced witchcraft; Auhelawa has not yet. Christian metadiscourse of rupture frames Auhelawa's relationship to the West in terms of an Auhelawa's choice to become something other, to reject themselves, to destroy the very basis for normal social life. Auhelawa see themselves as individual agents, but to realize themselves as a Christian subjects requires them to reject indigenous alternatives.

Auhelawa's own conception of its modernity then centers on coming to see social life in terms of individual agency and refusing alternative perceptions of agency. While Christianity encourages people to see actions as the result of individual choices, indigenous conceptions of kinship, gardening, exchange and witchcraft, among others, allow people to reflexively perceive their actions in relation to supraindividual and intersubjective forces. Social scientists might call these reflexive perceptions by terms such as obligation, interdependence, relationship, or other words for social forces.
Auhelawa label the same reflexive perception of distributed, social agency by terms such as respect, debt, prohibition, shame, and memory. As one informant said, "It hits the heart" to be suddenly made to realize how one is connected to and dependent on other, and the only response is to honor one's social obligations with gifts and acts of respect. The reflexive perception of a genuinely prosocial, interpersonal agency, unlike elsewhere in Melanesia, is not called custom. When we look at the institution of mortuary feasting, where the metadiscourse of custom is particularly prominent, custom only makes sense in relation to conception of ritual as a system of onerous rules and obligations. Custom talk elicits the possibility of a world without such externally imposed rules where individuals are truly free all the time and can go about their normal lives without interruption. The reflexive perception of the force of society as custom is in this sense already structured by the Christian metadiscourse of rupture and transformation, especially the opposition between the heathen past as a time of darkness and the contemporary Christian present as a time of light. Likewise, the reflexive perception of an alternative Christian sociality as being of the light is articulated as a negation of custom. Making individual agency central means eliminating any other basis for social action or relationship. Of course, as much as many Auhelawa people seem to want this, the dream of masele is in fact impossible. Carried to its logical conclusion, imposing masele as the basis for social life means eliminating every source of non-individual agency, even kinship and reciprocity. It would mean destroying society altogether.

In the end, too, it seems that the total transformation of Auhelawa society into a world of Christian individuals is to be forever unrealized. This does not mean that there is a limit to the Christian influence on reflexive self-perception. Rather, reflexive perception
of agency in Christian terms ultimately makes room for a subordinated kind of agency. People can still believe in the efficacy of their relationships to dead relatives as long as those persons are believed to be in heaven. Similarly the congregation as a group of 'one mind' makes room for collective action which can stand as a surrogate for and evidence of individual faith. Even when one's own self-perception is uncertainly Christian, it can be enough to go to church, hear the preacher and sit in the deacons' meeting.

Strengthening the congregation seems at times just as important as individual commitment. If the Auhelawa path to modernity is going to be shaped by the dominance of Christian practices and perspectives, then the future of Auhelawa Christianity will depend on how much it can break from its missionary roots and recuperate the social imaginary. By making space for people to act collectively, Auhelawa Christianity, though centered on a Western model of personhood, can become a viable basis for a Melanesian society.
Appendix

Figure 1. A Memorial for an Ancestor of the Lineage at Asa‘ila’ila Village.
Figure 2. A Yam House
Notes

1 On this point, see Smilde 2007: 45-53 on the imaginative rationality of conversion.

2 For an argument for the continued relevance of Boas's theory of culture and acculturation at a time when anthropology is once again centrally concerned with intercultural contact, see Bashkow 2004.

3 A possible way to explain this coincidence of terms is that "strangers" are people to whom one is related through one's apical ancestress or yet more distant relatives, and thus mumuga signals an upper limit of kinship and thus a zeroth degree of relatedness. The distinction between stranger and kin occurs at several levels of the kinship system. In the broadest sense, kin are people related through the founding ancestor or any known descendant thereof. Auhelawa also reckon degrees of lateral kinship by counting generations. The first ascending generation is called hina (mother), followed in ascending order by tubu (grandmother), tuwa (greatgrandmother), and mumuga. In this model, people who have common greatgrandparents through men or women are considered kin and more remote relations are called strangers and may marry each other. A few people described a variant system of counting in which tuwa was followed by a generation termed hina-'uyo (mother-again) and then another cycle of grandparents and greatgrandparents until arriving at the mumuga. While this system appears to suit generation counts in genealogies, in none of the genealogies I collected did people explicitly use these terms. In practice, people's exogamous sphere of kin
tends to coincide with their genealogy narrative. That is, the maximal lineage's founder was also thought to be the mother of the greatgrandparents of the current adult generation. Those lineages who possessed longer genealogies usually distinguished between a very distant mumuga and a more proximal mumuga through which people traced local kin and reckoned a boundary of exogamy. The ways in which people are able to play on this ambiguity in the term mumuga is related to how people use lineage history to manipulate and create social relationships through processes of objectification and will be discussed in detail below.

This practice is also sometimes derisively termed politiki, after the English word politics, by which it is meant that the overeager, overt effort to accumulate knowledge of histories is derided as an attempt by one person to control how history is interpreted for one's own ends. Indeed, people's description of how they had acquired their knowledge often had some relationship to an ongoing dispute between lineages which motivated them to learn more about their history to understand where they really stood. Questions about history are often viewed with suspicion for these reasons. See Mallett 2003: 106.

For a theory of the special systemic properties of distributed knowledge, see Hutchins 1995. Hutchins argues that people's everyday cognition should be seen as an embodied, situated and interactive process. As such, he considers the use of elements of the physical world as "material anchors" (Hutchins 2004) for subjective phenomena to be elementary to any cognitive task in real-world situations. These anchors function
to encode, symbolize and store information for later processing or for transmission to other actors. Tasks of memory recall are not necessarily internal processes, but are often mediated by artifacts which actors can explicate to others. The network of human actors and their artifacts is a system of distributed cognition. Lineage histories, defined by the dual processes of memory and memorialization, appear to be an illustration of such a system.

6 Another example of a novel mode of memorialization of lineage history is the production of written lineage genealogical books (see also Keesing 1992). This is not as widely practiced as other modes of memorialization, although for those lineages who do maintain written records, they serve as a powerful mediation of its history and they were often eager to show them to me. Arguably this new mode of reflexivity departs the most from the pattern I have described for the past because it involves foreign technologies and participation in formal schooling. Also, I produced written genealogies as a part of my research, and my interest in producing that kind of a record involved me in relationships with Auhelawa informants that I had not anticipated. Having said that, because only a few people produced these records, it would be difficult to adequately generalize about what their actual role in the contemporary practice of reflexive kinship and its significance for the production of Auhelawa everyday sociality. My impression is that despite the change of medium, written records as a novel reflexive practice reinforces the same sort of historical consciousness one finds in the making of cemeteries, skull caves and other memorials.
Indeed several informants said that books were in essence a new kind of skull cave. For these reasons I do not discuss genealogical books in this chapter.

7 There are also a number of important reciprocal exchanges that people make with matrikin that are modeled on the exchanges between allied lineages. These cycles of debt, like Auhelawa reciprocity in general, compel people to "remember" relationships by remembering what they owe each other. Perhaps not surprisingly, these exchanges are mostly concerned with lineal transmission. One such exchange is made among kin whose children are each others heirs (gwala). Another is made among people who bury each other's close matrilineal relatives (sparing each other a task that Auhelawa consider to be so incapacitatingly sorrowful that someone of another sublineage must do it). It is possible that a close analysis of these remembrances through exchange would show how interlineage exchange and lineage history are each part of one single practical rhetoric of temporality, governed by the master trope of memory, that produces all forms of sociality. In this chapter, it is sufficient to show how such a rhetoric within the domain of matriliny gives rise to a historical consciousness elsewhere.

8 For similar cases of spatiotemporal conversion of social relations, see Parmentier 1987, Basso 1996 and Rumsey and Weiner, eds. 2001. More generally, the cycle of memory and memorialization parallels Wagner's (1975, 1986b) cycle of innovation and convention through which cultural systems are reproduced, or the similar relationship between image and meaning he uses to explain ritual (1986a). Wagner is
interested cultural meanings move from being arbitrary to necessary and natural, and in that sense anticipates my concept of reflexive practice.

9 The basis of bu'una is analogous to indirect relationships mediated by a third party to which each member have corresponding relationships. There are a number of such relationships in the sphere of lateral kinship, which are usually labeled taliya (same). For instance, a man's child is a natuleiya (child of male kin) of his lineage and people of different lineages whose fathers are from the same lineage are taliya-natuleiya, meaning children-of-male-kin of the same lineage. I use the term association as a label for the social function of bu'una to distinguish this kind of interlineage relationship from alliances between lineages which are intermarried or laterally related through common male relatives. At the behavioral level, allied and laterally tied lineages "respect" (pay deference to) each other, and make formal reciprocal prestations in feasts. Associated (bu'una) lineages also make minor prestations to each other, but freely share or pool resources and behave besobeso or 'awawauhi (carelessly, jokingly, casually) with each other. In the context of reflexive historical memory, it is noteworthy that people try to reproduce associations, but not alliances.

10 For a comparative case of reflexive enactment of kinship in contradistinction to other types of relation, see Stasch 2003. Auhelawa extensions of relationships by analogy also resonate with Wagner's (1977) analysis of the flow of analogic resemblance by which Daribi kin relationships are practiced. Only through the overt and self-conscious interruption of the analogic flow of relatedness by the imposition of an
affinal taboo, Wagner says, can Daribi constitute discrete clan identities.

The Auhelawa word for cataclysm is bwaneta, a term I learned in the context of eliciting vedevedede and tetela. Several informants spoke vaguely of a specific cataclysmic event in the region in which the sky turned black. None of these people recalled specific details, but only remembered hearing stories about it from their childhood. One informant recalled that his grandmother told him about a time when "the sky sneezed," and dark rain fell. As a college educated geologist for a local mining company, he interprets this as a story about a volcanic eruption on Dobu Island. He also inferred a connection between this event and the time of famine which initiated the time of cannibalism and warfare. When I inquired further with other people about the meaning of the word bwaneta, one said that a bwaneta is what happened "when they killed Jesus or something like that," referring to the Gospel story of Jesus's death on the cross (cf. Matt. 27: 51-53, and especially Luke 23: 44-48). He said he did not know of any other examples of bwaneta, but "if we tell histories (tetela), we will find it." This is another example of history as collaborative practice of synthesizing knowledge. It also illustrates how the nature of reflexive awareness is conditioned by the practices which generate it. Specifically, when people put together their histories, gaps in historical knowledge are rendered as events of rupture and transformation. Additionally, both the geologist and this informant freely borrowed practices of reflection and reasoning from foreign sources, namely the Bible and science, to draw their conclusions about bwaneta. This also illustrates the
characteristically hybrid temporal register in which Auhelawa people usually speak about the past.

12 My informants today gloss dimdim as "white," and contrast it with other "races" such as "Nigolo" (African or African-American [from the English word Negro]) "Sina" (Chinese, or Asian), "Manila" (Filipino), and others. Macintyre (1983) argues that dimdim is in fact a toponym, not an ethnonym. She suggests that it originally meant, "from the horizon," meaning that Europeans were migrants from outside the known world. This is not only in keeping with the local convention of labeling people by their origin place, but also grammatical function in Auhelawa. For instance, I was occasionally addressed as Dimdim, as is common for white expatriates. However, when referring to me as a dimdim, people added an ablative suffix as they do to generate toponymic person-reference terms. This suggests that dimdim is a place from which I originated, not a category.

13 While previous contacts by Auhelawa with dimdims are not usually mentioned in these stories, it seems pertinent to mention that many of Didiluwa's contemporaries had already had an opportunity to acquire cargo and money. They obtained them by working for years at a time on plantations and mines elsewhere in the region. Prior to that, blackbirders had recruited laborers from Auhelawa, and there are some who believe that a few of these ancestors managed to return. In either case, people came home loaded with knives, metal goods, calico and tobacco, all of which they gave to their relatives as lau-tom, a gift signifying that they had "cut" (tom) themselves off
from their stint abroad. Didiluwa manages to magically reverse the relationship between dimdims and Auhelawa by giving generously to them.

14 In 2002, in honor of the centenary of Christianity, people erected a concrete memorial in the village of Alogawa, where Pati first arrived.

15 To my knowledge, the use of hand gestures specifically as a narrative device in Auhelawa storytelling is unique. In stories, people use gesture to objects in the environment as a means of illustration of objects in the story world. For instance, in telling a story about a young girl, a teller might gesture to a nearby girl and say that the character in the story was about the same age. Similarly in telling the Sanebo story, B. pointed to nearby villages to illustrate the position of the Auhelawa war canoes relative to their enemies. In this case, Pati's gestures connote a specific mode of communication and highlight his foreignness. They thus appear to express something about Christianity itself. The way that Pati's hand signs seem to be construed in this story seem to be itself part of a Christian semiotic ideology (Keane 2007). That is to say, Christians think of their religion as being more than just human-made vessels for spiritual meanings. In the words of the old evangelical saw, if religion is man reaching for God, Christianity is God reaching out to man. In other words, Christianity is the cult of God's redemptive intervention into the human world. God's grace needs no translation because it is not made of symbols, but is a pure cause, and derives its value from that. I heard this description of Christianity from a visiting Australian missionary while at a United Church synod in Bunama in 2006. It was his rather undisguised way
of indicating his contempt for my description of my research as a social study of
ing a foreign country for over a year, his position on the insignificance of local culture is in
fact similar to Auhelawa people's relationship to the pre-contact culture of Sanebo.
That is, it is something that ended with Christian conversion. While I have no concrete
evidence that the hand signs are part of official mission history, this kind of
extracultural communication falls in line with everything else the old Methodists did
to describe themselves, and moreover with the language with which Auhelawa
describe their religion today. Bromilow used the word tapwalolo for Christian
worship, deriving it from local words for "kneel" or "bow down." The arrival of
Christianity was described as the arrival of "light" (masele) that penetrated the
"darkness" (guguyou) of heathendom. Auhelawa people also say that when Pati came,
people's "minds became enlightened" (nuwa-masele) and they "became wise"
(sonoga). I would argue that this conception of God as extracultural, his worship as the
natural response of awe before the divine, and Christianity as the overturning of error
by truth, are all part of a single semiotic register. This suggests strongly that the story
of Pati is influenced by Christian ideology.

16 This usage of the verb 'oive'aha to denote making distinctions occurred in a
conversation about Bible translation in which the speaker suggested that a translator
had made some poor word choices. A related usage, to denote division into categories,
ocurred in a conversation with an elementary school teacher about how he would
translate the concept of 'food groups.' Also, in mortuary feasting, if a person who is not a member of the hosting lineage went into the lineage's cemetery to work, people might ask rhetorically, "Hava 'ana 'oive'aha?" (What is his division?), by which they would imply that the person had put himself on the wrong side of the division in the organization of the feast. Only lineage owners and their bu'una can enter a cemetery to bury someone. One is thus inclined to think of ve'a (part) as the key element in the meaning of ve'ahihi, and what Auhelawa gloss in English as 'respect' is best thought of as avoidance.

17 Auhelawa distinguish between genitor and pater, calling the former the 'real father' (tama-moiha). As we shall see from Lucy's relationship to Wadaheya, though, this is only a recognition of the basis of the relationship in shared substance. It does not preclude one creating a magai relationship with adoptive and steprelatives.

18 These sorts of gifts between people within and between lineages are not the same as vaga and maiha, which must be reciprocated in identical amount. They are gifts of help (hagu) which are reciprocated when the donor is in need for something that they recipient has. These gifts are discussed in the context of ideas of business and charity in Chapter 3.

19 In mid-May of 2006, with the help of two research assistants, I conducted a survey of households' gardening, consumption, and cash earning. A 20% sample of households (N=24) was obtained by a linear walk from house to house, selecting a person from every fifth house (or the next house if no one was available). The survey was carried
out during a patrol by the ward councillor's clerk (who is also one of my assistants) as he enrolled all eligible adults for the common electoral roll. The survey questionnaire consisted of 24 questions translated in advance by a research assistant. The questions asked respondents to list the members of their household (the people who eat meals together regularly), and several basic questions about their gardening in the past year and their cash-earning activities. The purpose of the survey was to obtain data that would show the general pattern of economic activity in Auhelawa. Overall, the economic profiles of households surveyed were substantially similar. Further information about the basic economic pattern was obtained from in depth interviews and garden visits with three households during one day of their harvesting of 'wateya. During these visits, the 'wateya harvested from one yam garden was sorted into seed and 'wateya mohili, and both kinds were weighed. Gardeners also described their garden site and harvest in qualitative terms. Several further interviews were conducted with renowned garden experts on matters of traditional customs of gardening, traditional foods, and recent changes in gardening.

20 Despite this claim, no one knew or heard of any account of the event of the arrival of halutu. It is not attributed to the migration of any lineage, as are several varieties of sago and 'wateya. When pressed, informants speculated that halutu was brought "through marriage" (that is, foreign spouses gave it to their Auhelawa in-laws) or "in recent times" (when people have been able to travel more widely than in the past), and thus was not chronicled in ancestral stories.
21 It is generally accepted that sweet potato was introduced into Milne Bay Province by missionaries in the late nineteenth century. See Allen 2005 for a review of the evidence.

22 These data were collected from responses to a free recall by the respondent of foods eaten by members of the household the day previous. In all, respondents named 22 different food terms to describe what the family ate in a day. Table 3 lists combines several synonymous or generic terms into one category and presents the sum.

23 This second position depends in part on the reappraisal of Marx in 20th century Western scholarship. In Polanyi's eyes, Marx was just as much a materialist as his fellow classical political economists because he located value in production. American and British social anthropologists generally avoided Marxian concepts for similar reasons (see Halperin 1994). French-trained scholars like Friedman (1974) and Godelier (1978 cited in Godelier 1979), however, drawing on Levi-Straussian structuralism, tended to read Marx as theorist of social structure who could provide the conceptual tools needed to give an account of how societies reproduce themselves as a total system. A social structure, they argued, was not a static system of normative constraints on material activity, but a condition for it, and was equivalent to what Marx called the social mode of production, comprising both relations of production and forces of production. For those of this school, the question of economic activity could not be answered simply by utilitarian or social perspectives, since both were properly part of a system of social reproduction. The shift of focus to social
reproduction over structure and function is what I wish to highlight here, not a contrast between Polanyi's institutionalism and Marx's materialism, which may only have to do with the changing social and political circumstances of Marx's reception after the second world war.

24 For a recent application of this theory to the exchange practices of Auhelawa's near neighbors on Dobu Island, see also Kuehling 2005.

25 The reason my data on trading are so limited is because it is practiced by Auhelawa so little. My informants said that they and their trade partners now market in town the goods they once traded with each other. While market principles are recognized to affect prices in town marketplaces, most people also believed that market goods should have a conventionally fixed price, and hence an conventionally fixed rate of exchange between unlike things. To the extent that this ideology does govern the markets in town, it makes selling akin to the practice of overseas trading. There is also no bargaining or haggling in town marketplaces. Most purchases are done without any but the most formulaic utterances.

26 These lay devotional groups are known locally as “small Christian communities” or “Gospel sharing groups.” While they appear to have been inspired by Latin American Roman Catholic base communities, they function mainly to lead devotions in villages, and have no political purpose.

27 The phrase 'intimate union' was introduced in the previous chapter as a label for the distinctively and self-reflexively Christian mode of sociality among Auhelawa
churchgoers expressed in the act of charity. I use it extensively in this chapter for the same reason. The phrase is sometimes used in Western theology to describe the relationship between the Church and God (see Ephesians 5: 21-33). The meaning is roughly the same. The basis for the gathering of fellow believers into a group is the fact that they each individually feel drawn to God in the Church, and hence the social existence of a church congregation is inscribed within an individual consciousness which is free to choose. While I find 'intimate union' to be an apt label for what Auhelawa try to achieve in their own religious practices, I do not mean to suggest that Auhelawa congregational life is an ethnographic illustration of a point of Western theology. I am more interested in demonstrating that Auhelawa Christians partake of an ideology of 'one mind' among themselves, and strive to make their local version of Christianity match their beliefs about it. The fact that there is such a close relationship between Auhelawa ideology of 'one mind' and Western theology raises a more complex question involving the full history of intercultural relations in Auhelawa as well as the culture of Western Christianity. Such an analysis, though very interesting, is outside the scope of this dissertation.

This perceived contrast is interesting for how it reveals what people think of the difference between agrarian and industrial work patterns. It is unclear how much however it says about people's beliefs about modern time and how much it shows that people place value on good organization needed for collective effort. In comparing garden work to wage labor, people make the tasks performed by oneself, and hence
done in one's own time, represent all garden work. Collective gardening work, which is also important, is conveniently elided in this comparison. This invidious distinction serves all the better to underscore the collective nature of tapwalolo as against everyday life.

29 Every sermon outline suggests a theme around which the sermon can be organized and a key verse from the reading to highlight. From the theme, outlines suggest subsidiary questions to stimulate reflection and advise preachers to frame their responses to these questions as a set of "points" to make in their sermon.

30 This situation happens quite often, and when it occurs, is always immediately recognized by everyone as a political opportunity. Those familiar with Melanesian kinship systems' indifference to strict unilineal descent groups may wonder whether Auhelawa lineages adopt or assimilate non-uterine kin to buttress themselves against these demographic contingencies. They do to an extent. However, because matrikinship is conceptualized as being innate and natural, lineages are presumed to become 'extinct' when a lineage produces no daughters. Adoptees would find it hard to claim land of their adoptors for this reason. In this way, Auhelawa cultivate an externality to their social system by placing a limit on their ability to manipulate social relationships, thereby creating the possibility for apparently random events to come up and disrupt the existing order (although as I noted in Chapter 1, regional and bu'una relationships are manipulated to create continuities). The social construction of external events which interrupt normal lineage succession are very salient politically
because they are one of a few instances in which a large area of land can permanently change hands among lineages.

31 Underlined passages indicate words that were spoken in English.

32 The same kind of language is used in the United Church both in regional meetings of church ministers and in meetings of the local ekalesiya. Given the broad participation of ekalesiya in meetings like this, it appears that it was Methodist missionaries who introduced this system decades ago.

33 On variations of this kind of chiasmus, see also Ashforth 2005: 142-143, 146-148; Niehaus 2001: chap. 4, Shaw 1997.

34 In this respect, those who argue that witchcraft cannot be reduced to a single unitary phenomenon find support in cases where the image of the witch is not an inversion of a normal person, or is not always considered to be an outsider. For instance, in her dissertation on Faiwol witchcraft, Jones (1980) shows that people saw witchcraft attacks as part of a perpetual cycle of reciprocity, and not an aberration. All illness and death was caused by witches, but such was an accepted part of living with others in society. Munn (1986) shows that Gawans believe that all witchcraft they suffer is done to themselves collectively on some level. This might suggest a typological contrast between Melanesian systems of witchcraft. For instance, in an introduction to a collection of cases of Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft, Stephen (1987b) argues that African models cannot be unproblematically applied to Melanesian societies.

35 I want to note that Comaroff and Comaroff also claim that Evans-Pritchard's main
insight was that witchcraft was socially situated, not socially determined, knowledge (1993: xxvii). They point out that Evans-Pritchard argued that witchcraft was tied closely to rituals of divination and protective magic as practical responses to situations, and did not lead to sure knowledge (see also Bongmba 2006). Where they differ from me is in their equation of Evans-Pritchard's unique conception of social action with Marxian praxis, which deprives one of the opportunity to understand the cultural specificity of subjectivity which emergence from social life.

36 The term 'alawai refers to both the person and their magical power. In my informants' usage, these two senses presuppose one another and there is no sense of 'alawai as something distinct from a person who is 'alawai. Furthermore, to be an 'alawai is to "have" 'alawai, which is expressed in Auhelawa language in terms of possession. Likewise, the attribute of 'alawai only attaches to persons, not things.

37 For another discussion the link between seeing, knowing and intentionality, see Bloch 2008.

38 In other Melanesian societies, it is common for people to objectify indigenous culture by using the Pidgin English word 'kastam' (custom). Pidgin is very rarely spoken in Auhelawa and Milne Bay Province, and furthermore the functions of Auhelawa 'custom' as a discursive construct are not entirely the same as those of Pidgin 'kastam' (e.g. Foster 1995), so I use the English term to avoid confusion.

39 The connection between dual divisions and reciprocity is a familiar theme in Melanesian ethnography. See for examples Fortune 1932, Rubel and Rosman 1978,
Writing about her work on the Suau Coast of the Milne Bay Province mainland, Demian (2006) discusses how a similarly self-imposed devaluing of traditional forms of sociality is conceptualized as a "loss" or "forgetting" of culture. She argues that local populations followed the models of social life promoted by missions in anticipation of changes to their life that would come by becoming part of an encompassing colonial order. Having repudiated kastam ways of being and acting, they see the failure of the earlier generation's project of change through conversion to be a loss of culture.

Mix (mikis) is an idiom Auhelawa use to talk about change in both language and culture. The term is, like custom, a loanword from English. Thus when Auhelawa speak of a "mixed feast" or say "We(excl.) new people are mixing our language." ('ai vauavau-mai 'alina-mai 'a-mikimikis), there is an uncanny self-referentiality which even they sometimes observe.

The speaker did not mean to suggest that people in Kurada are somehow less consistent or hard-working in their subsistence activities. Rather, it seemed that she wished to use an exotic experience of working in paid employment to highlight what she saw as the great difference between of Christian self-awareness and everyday habits.

Indeed, by saying he "refuse[s]" custom, the pastor indexes himself in a way that Munn suggests is markedly antisocial and selfish in relation to the normal assumption

of generosity and cooperation in Milne Bay Province societies (Munn 1986: 260). In my own observations, I have found that refusal to cooperate is similarly deviant in Auhelawa. The point however is not whether the self posited through refusal is culturally valued, but that a self is posited in alignment with the marked choice of masele.

44 This was his understanding of other cultures' practices. Auhelawa people generally believe that the people of neighboring islands follow fewer mourning taboos and do not sharply distinguish between the mother's and father's kin in mortuary feasts.
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