Title
The Sociology of International Migration

Permalink
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Publication Date
2014

Peer reviewed
Sociology’s foundation as an academic discipline coincided with waves of mass migration at the turn of the twentieth century. Max Weber warned in 1895 that Polish agricultural migrants of a “lower race” (niederstehenden Rasse) were displacing native German farmers (Smith 2011). Across the Atlantic, the early Chicago School sociologists’ concern with social problems they attributed to the arrival of so many foreigners put the study of international migration at the center of the new discipline. Edward Ross, president of the American Sociological Association (ASA), concluded his 1914 volume on immigration by alerting his readers that native whites of northwestern European ancestry were committing “race suicide” by admitting southern Europeans and those of “African, Saracen, and Mongolian blood.” New demographic methods revealed alarming patterns of immigrant criminality and mental retardation amid the declining fertility of native old-stock whites. Writing in the flagship *American Journal of Sociology*, which had long served as a transatlantic channel for eugenicist ideas (Galton 1904), Edwin Grant called for “a systematic deportation” that “eugenically cleanses America” of the “Scum from the Melting-Pot” (Grant 1925).

A century later, international migration remains a fundamental concern of sociology to a degree unparalleled in anthropology or political science. The gallery of ASA presidents includes leading migration scholars such as Herbert Gans (1988), Alejandro Portes (1999), Douglas Massey (2001), and Evelyn Nakano Glenn (2010). One obvious change is that scholars today reject the eugenicist principles taken for granted in the early twentieth century. The field of eugenics lost its scientific racism and evolved into the fields of demography and public health (Bashford and Levine 2010). Rare is the voice unfriendly to immigrants among the 600-plus members of the ASA’s International Migration Section.

Yet one historical continuity is that much scholarship retains the idea that immigration generates a competition between different groups of immigrants
and natives organized along ethnoracial lines. Sociologists no longer call for the expulsion of "weaker races," but they often continue to delimit the field of inquiry as if it were an ethnoracial Olympic Games. In these Games, ethnoracial groups began competing with each other a century ago in the heyday of transatlantic migration. As new groups arrive, they join the Games and are judged by their "attainment" compared to current groups and past competitors, as if the Mexican "team" in 2000 could be compared to the Chinese team's performance in the same year, as well as to the Italian team in 1910 (see Perlmann 2005). It is not simply that individuals and groups at the same time and place are perceived to be in competition, which may objectively be the case in some contexts, but that people separated by a century of history or more are categorized and analyzed as if they were contending with each other. The construction of the field as a multigenerational competition has generated crucial insights, but sociologists are increasingly adopting other perspectives as well to understand international migration in its many facets.

The study of immigration to the United States has disproportionately influenced the study of other migrations. This is due to both the broad influence of the United States in the global academy generally and to the extraordinary and sustained volume of immigration to the United States that has driven much academic interest. During the long nineteenth century, more Europeans moved overseas to the United States than to the rest of the world put together, though there were even larger migrations within Asia at the time that have been ignored by sociologists (McKeown 2004). The 45.8 million immigrants in the United States in 2013 represented more than the total immigrant populations of the next five biggest destinations combined (Russia, Germany, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom). There were more people of Mexican birth alone living in the United States than the total number of immigrants of all nationalities in any other country (Passel et al. 2012).

This chapter is written by a card-carrying member of the ASA with a US passport and Ph.D. It admittedly reproduces some aspects of a US-centric view, but it also aims to show where US dominance has left major casualties on the field of knowledge. The entire enterprise is shot through with unstated and often mistaken assumptions of both universality and US exceptionalism. Assumptions that international migration is constituted by long-distance, more or less permanent immigration betrays the field's roots in understanding the transoceanic migrations of the turn of the twentieth century when sociology was becoming institutionalized as a discipline. While for Americans, there is no more quintessential image of an immigrant than a passenger on a steamship sailing past the Statue of Liberty, a wide range of actors cross international borders, including tourists, traders, students, commuters, and refugees.

The logic of a discipline built around assessing how immigrants and their descendants are faring in a multigenerational competition for resources and status begins to crack when a broader range of mobile experiences is considered.

Assumptions that immigrants will assimilate, or that the host society wants them to assimilate, clearly do not apply in contexts such as the Persian Gulf countries, which have the world's highest rates of in-migration relative to their population, yet make the integration of foreigners all but impossible. Neither is the United States alone a "nation of immigrants." There are many other such self-described nations, many of which have experienced much higher rates of immigration relative to their total population, including Argentina and Cuba in the early twentieth century, and Canada and Australia more consistently (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). The contrast often drawn between the settler societies of North America and Oceania on the one hand, against a Europe that supposedly only discovered migration after World War II on the other, ignores the long history of mass immigration to France and other large-scale circular movements in Europe (Moch 1992). Of greatest theoretical concern is that there is as much migration between countries in the so-called Global South as from the Global South to the North (Castles and Miller 2009). These massive migrations within the Global South remain understudied, and their theorization underspecified vis-à-vis concepts developed in other contexts, to the detriment of sociological understanding everywhere.

A TAXONOMY OF SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

The sociology of international migration has examined experiences of migration from the viewpoints of a wide array of actors in multiple social fields. Table 4.1 summarizes five major perspectives, the definition of the analytical field and its

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The study of assimilation/integration includes multiple perspectives within it. Classical studies of assimilation emphasize convergence between foreigners and natives over time and generations spent in the destination country. The studies differ in the extent to which they describe the process of assimilation—whether immigrants and natives are converging in some way—or claim that at a given endpoint, assimilation either happened or remained incomplete in some unspoken teleology. The endpoint is usually determined as a practical matter by the availability of quantitative data rather than any theoretical rationale. Earlier authors emphasized straight-line assimilation, in which the process moved inexorably forward even if different ethnic groups advanced at different speeds (Warner and Strole 1945), while latter authors such as Gans (1992a) recognized that the process was more of a "bumpy line." The distinction between straight and bumpy lines has become part of the historiography of assimilation but does not represent a current axis of debate, as no contemporary analyst would argue for inexorable, strictly straight-line assimilation.

Studies of segmented assimilation emphasize that immigrants and their descendants engage different parts of the destination society, resulting in a broader set of assimilation paths than could be seen by looking for one form of assimilation to the entire "host society." Instead, the segmented assimilation perspective describes how an immigrant population that is diverse in its ethnic and class origins assimilates to different segments of a host society that is likewise segmented by ethnoracial background and class (Zhou 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Most attention in this perspective has focused on the downward path of assimilation, though there is no inherent reason to conflate segmentation, the degree of similarity between comparison groups, and the direction of mobility.

The transnationalism literature emerged out of anthropology in the late 1980s and early 1990s to reject the notion of assimilation as the master category of migration studies (Glick Schiller et al. 1992). It originally emphasized that many migrants retain strong ties with their places of origin rather than simply assimilating, though later sociological iterations allowed for the assimilatory and transnational processes to unfold at the same time (Levitt 2001; Smith 2006). Some critics of the slipperiness of the concept of transnationalism drew on earlier work in the sociology of North African migration to France and Mexican migration to the United States to develop the notion of dissimilation, which emphasizes ruptures between emigrants and those they left behind in countries of emigration, unlike the reproduction of community across borders highlighted in transnational accounts (Sayad 2004; Fitzgerald 2009).

SELECTIVITY

Theories of international migration attempt to explain population movements across international borders—an ambitious task given the wide array of
rationales for why someone might move. In practice, most theorizing attempts to explain labor migration. Economists' accounts approach circular reasoning when they explain that labor migrants migrate to work, but they make important points along the way about the wage differentials, diversification strategies of household economic portfolios, credit market failures, structural demand for immigrants in modern economies, and liquidity constraints on financing migration that are implicated in labor migration (Massey et al. 1998; Hatton and Williamson 2008). Sociological accounts of the economic rationales for migration have tended to focus on one of a set of diverse factors promoting labor migration, such as the structural demand for immigrants in global cities rising from the concentration of high-skilled professionals seeking lower-skilled labor (Sassen 1999), the efforts of capitalist states to separate the sites of economic production from the sites of family reproduction by recruiting temporary male labor migrants in places such as Southern Africa and the United States (Burawoy 1976), and the economic disruptions to the world system created by neoliberalism (Portes 1978). The world-systems approach to international migration theory emphasizes that colonialism and other foreign interventions generate migration streams in the opposite direction: Algerians migrate to France, Indians to Britain, and Vietnamese to the United States (Massey et al. 1998). As immigrant activists in Britain put it, "We are here because you were there." Sociologists have also emphasized demographic conditions, such as the growth of cohorts of new workers in migrant source countries and the aging of the work force in countries of destination, as causes of increased migration (Bean and Brown, this volume). All of these theories help explain why migration circuits arise at some times and places but not in others.

Economists are also concerned with the characteristics of those who self-select to migrate—that is, how do they systematically differ from those who decide to remain in the country of origin. There is considerable debate about the extent to which some migrant groups are positively selected on education, for example. Borjas (1999) influentially claimed that Mexican emigrants had lower levels of education than that of those who stayed in Mexico, though sociologist Cynthia Feliciano (2005) disputed these findings. There is no question that in some countries, emigrants are highly selected based on education, such as among Chinese, Indians, and Filipinos who move to the United States. For example, most of the population of India does not complete high school, while over 80 percent of Indian emigrants to the United States have completed a bachelor's degree or higher (Aguiar Esteva 2013). High levels of self-selection help to explain the rapid upward mobility of these ethnic groups in the United States (Feliciano 2005). Demographers seek to determine the extent to which emigrants are positively self-selected on health. If healthier people are more likely to emigrate, that would help explain the paradox in which immigrants from lower socioeconomic status groups have better health than comparably situated natives (Jasso et al. 2004).

One of the main sociological contributions to theories of why people migrate has been to explain the networked nature of the phenomenon at a meso level. The reason why people from one community migrate while people from communities in similar economic situations do not can often be traced back to potential migrants' access to border-spanning social networks of family, friends, and people who share the same hometowns (Massey et al. 1987; Boyd 1989; Faist 2000). Social networks allow someone living in a village thousands of kilometers from the destination to be transplanted within a matter of days to find lodging, employment, and information about how to navigate life in a new country. Scholars of the "migration industry" point out that people smugglers, labor recruiters, and travel agents, as well as non-profit charitable organizations, enable migration without social networks, at least for those who have the financial resources (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sorensen 2013).

Once migrants arrive at the destination, social networks shape their subsequent assimilation. Immigrant entrepreneurs use their networks to access investment capital through rotating credit associations (Light 1972), establish ethnic enclaves (Portes 1995), and find jobs in immigrant niches of the economy (Waldinger 1994). Networks comprised exclusively of people with limited resources and information about good jobs eventually can become barriers to social mobility, however. The networks themselves degrade when zero-sum competition over scarce resources overwhelms bonds of mutual obligation (Menjivar 2000). Networks that promote mobility from small towns in Mexico to the United States can trap migrants in exploitative relationships and cycles of indebtedness. Information about the negative qualities of these relationships is self-censored by migrants who feel compelled to gain status in their places of origin by avoiding talk of their hardships in the destination, thus degrading the quality of information about actual conditions in the United States and engendering further out-migration. This mechanism reproduces networked migration under exploitative conditions (Rosales 2013). The opportunities afforded by access to social networks can vary for women and men, as Hagan (1998) shows in her study of how gendered networks in Houston favored the legalization of men following the 1986 US Immigration Reform and Control Act.

Political sociologists emphasize the role of states in shaping migration flows. Sociologists engage in dialogue with political scientists, especially a group whose work is practically indistinguishable from sociologists (e.g., Zolberg 1978, 1999; Guiraudon 2003; Cornelius et al. 2004; and Geddes 2003). In both disciplines, scholars typically focus on macro explanations of differences in migration policies over time and place. Sociologists such as Schmitter Heisler (1985), Oishi (2005), FitzGerald (2009), and a multidisciplinary team assembled by Green and Weil (2007) have followed Zolberg (1999) by describing the changes in policies of countries of emigration that allow and shape international migration in the first place. John Torpey's (2000) path-breaking
book showed that the very notion of comprehensive state control over movement across borders is a recent historical accomplishment. The passport did not become a widespread requirement for international travel until around World War I.

Contemporary sociological accounts of migration policy typically focus on rich, liberal-democratic countries of destination in Western Europe, North America, and Australia. Scholarship on state policy is especially developed in Europe, given an intense interest in the way that the European Union is shifting many aspects of immigration policy into an unprecedented supranational dimension, whether through direct legal mechanisms or the influence of epistemic communities of experts. Research funding by the EU and a supranational entity that still contains much national variation is especially conducive to comparative studies (Morawska 2008).

One puzzle for political sociology is the yawning gap between public opinion surveys that typically show majoritarian demands for greater restriction of immigration and policies that continue to admit more immigrants than the public wants. Christian Joppke (1998) has written compellingly about this paradox in his work on why liberal states accept unwanted immigration. His answer is the “self-limited sovereignty” of independent judiciaries, client politics, and cultural norms of nationhood based on immigration in the United States and norms of obligation toward formerly colonized peoples in some European countries. While Joppke argues that liberal states have all but ended their explicit selection of immigrants by ethnic criteria because liberal democracy is inherently incompatible with racism, FitzGerald and Cook-Martin (2014) challenge this thesis by showing that in the Western Hemisphere, liberal-democratic states were leaders in promoting ethnic discrimination and laggards in its formal elimination. Indeed, political systems with high degrees of societal inclusion, such as democracies and populist regimes, have been especially vigorous in promoting policies of ethnic selection.

The Japanese case presents a further puzzle both for claims of liberal democracies’ inherent openness to immigration and economic accounts of advanced market economies’ structurally embedded demand for high levels of immigration (Hollifield 1992). Japan has very little immigration despite its status as a rich, liberal democracy with a market economy. Only 1.6 percent of the population was foreign-born in 2010, an anomaly that Skrentny et al. (2012) argue lies in a widely shared understanding of immigration in Japan that emphasizes the perceived sociocultural costs of introducing foreigners.

Foreign policy rationales have been underappreciated in most analyses of immigration policy. With the exception of studies of refugee policy, most research looks within the boundaries of a nation-state to explain changes over time (Fitzgerald 1996). However, political sociologists increasingly attend to foreign policy considerations. For example, Skrentny’s (2002) analysis of the end of the US national-origins quota system in 1965 shows that it was primarily the result of Cold War pressures to appeal to publics and governments in Asia and Africa whose nationals were subject to the law’s discrimination. Opening the doors to those nationalities removed a diplomatic embarrassment that favored the Soviets in their struggle with the United States for the hearts and minds of the Third World. FitzGerald and Cook-Martin (2014) go on to show how pressures to end negative ethnic discrimination in the United States and Canada began in Latin America and Asia as part of the geopolitics of decolonization. Brubaker and Kim’s (2011) account of favorable ethnic selection policies in Germany and South Korea highlight the unsung foreign policy considerations that only favored particular groups of ethnic Germans and Koreans, revealing that these policies were not simply about generic ethnic solidarity, but rather foreign policy goals vis-à-vis Communist neighbors. In a similar vein, Sunak (2008) highlights the efforts of Japanese government officials to raise Japan’s international prestige through mostly symbolic openings in immigration policy.

Most studies of international migration focus on a single case study or compare several countries as if the country is the obvious unit of comparison and any differences in state policy can be attributed to internal differences within a case. Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) strongly criticize this stance as “methodological nationalism.” Understanding the policy in a given country may also require understanding the interactions among the migration policies of different countries. For example, Cook-Martin (2013) shows how the nationality policies of Argentina, Spain, and Italy were shaped by the policies of each other as they competed for the bodies and political loyalties of mobile citizens. Similarly, the immigration policies of countries throughout the Americas can only be explained by tracing distinct mechanisms of policy diffusion in which policy shifts in one country caused changes elsewhere (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). Geography matters in these explanations more than sociologists would often like to admit. Reitz (2012) points out that geographic position can shape immigration policy more than national institutions such as official multiculturalism. In his account, Canada’s geographic isolation and ability to use the United States as a buffer with Latin American countries of emigration explain the success of Canadian policies in attracting a greater proportion of highly skilled permanent immigrants than most destination countries.

Curiously, the sociology of migration, particularly in the United States, has paid comparatively little attention to questions of forced migration policy. “Theories of international migration” do not systematically address migration resulting from the threat of violence or persecution. “Refugee studies,” sometimes rechristened as “forced migration studies” to include broader causes of displacement resulting from developmental projects or environmental disaster, was created as a field of knowledge in the 1980s. Refugee studies now has its own research centers, journals, conferences, and professional networks— all of which overlap surprisingly little with the sociology of international migration.
DAVID SCOTT FITZGERALD

Some scholars have attempted to bridge this divide, particularly in Australia and Europe, where asylum seekers are a far more salient subject in contemporary political debates about international migration than in the United States. Sociological investigation of the determinants and practices of national policies and the international refugee regime is better developed in these regions as a consequence (Castles 2003; Geiger and Pécoud 2010).

Basic research remains to be done on the extent to which many of the broader findings of the migration literature apply to refugees. For example, while the designation of individuals as refugees is typically thought of as obeying a foreign policy logic (Fitzgerald 1996), class politics may be implicated as well. Under what circumstances are refugee policies a backdoor for attracting workers? There are certainly examples of such policies, as when the Canadian government accepted Polish refugees from World War II on the condition that they work in agriculture for two years (Satzewich 1991). How do class politics and foreign policy interact in other contexts? Sociologists have written extensively about the social networks of labor migrants, entrepreneurs, and reuniting families, but at least in some contexts, refugees also rely on social networks to migrate, even though the refugee category is a political construction of states and intergovernmental agencies (Hein 1993; Koser and Pinkerton 2002). Given the literature on refugees tends to be so dominated by normative concerns that include the political goal of carving out refugees as a special category for protection, there is insufficient attention to specifying when, how, and why the experience of refugees differs from that of other types of international migrants.

CLASSICAL ASSIMILATION AND INTEGRATION

The work of Park and Burgess (1924) and Warner and Srole (1945) initiated the classical canon of assimilation studies in the United States. Park and Burgess defined assimilation as "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life." They imply an "ultimate homogeneity" of American culture at the end of the process. Two typologies from Milton Gordon (1964) later sharpened analytical tools in the sociological kit. First, Gordon highlighted different modes of assimilation: the Anglo-conformity desired by earlier authors, the melting pot, and pluralism. Anglo-conformity represented the mode in which immigrants to the United States changed to become like the Anglo-Saxon majority, a concept made transportable outside the US context by Horowitz (1975), who termed it "incorporation." By contrast, in the melting pot, both immigrants and natives change to accommodate each other through the creation of a new national entity. In the pluralist mode, which aligns with contemporary US understandings of multiculturalism, immigrants adapt to the host society in some ways while still retaining some ethnic difference. Gordon's second typology unpacked the idea of assimilation, whatever its mode, into different dimensions of change such as acculturation, inter-marriage, and acceptance by the host society in attitude and practice. These domains can be operationalized for empirical study and make it possible to measure systematically the direction and pace of change in each dimension and patterned sequences of change across dimensions.

The term "assimilation" was widely discredited in the US academy during the ethnic revival of the 1970s for its association with forced assimilation, or at least the assumption that Anglo-conformity was a good thing and that the moral responsibility for change lay in the hands of immigrants rather than natives (see Brubaker 2001). Alba and Nee (1997, 2003) revived the use of the term by distancing themselves from its use in promoting assimilation. Alba and Nee's definition of assimilation as "the decline, and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it" (1997: 863) is useful because of its focus on "distinction." A given cultural practice or representation is only a source of ethnic distinction if it is a significant boundary marker in the perception of actors in a given context (Barth 1969). By viewing assimilation as a process of boundary dissolution or reconfiguration, the insights of Barth can be applied to assimilation in a way that both broadens the kinds of circumstances studied while more carefully specifying the mechanisms involved (Zolberg and Woon 1999; Alba 2005; Wimmer 2008).

The general starting assumption of assimilation studies in the United States is that over time, and certainly over the course of a generation, immigrants want to assimilate, and the host society wants them to assimilate. This perspective fits many examples in US history, but it struggles to accommodate other basic facts. For example, in the United States as throughout most of the Western Hemisphere in the late nineteenth century, policy makers recruited Chinese temporary workers because they were considered to be different from natives in ways that made them better workers. In the United States, Chinese were legally segregated on the West Coast and then later blamed for refusing to assimilate, thus legitimizing further exclusionary measures (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). Interviews with Canadian agricultural employers of temporary migrant workers show that many employers prefer Mexicans to West Indians because they consider Mexicans less likely to assimilate or protest working conditions, given their limited English skills and the lack of an established Mexican community (Prebish and Binford 2007). Temporary migrant workers are often preferred because they are different, not because they are considered more assimilable.

It would be a mistake to think that US models of assimilation apply globally. Governments and public opinion in countries with large populations of permanent immigrants do not always want them to integrate. For example,
Rogers Brubaker's (1992) comparison of nationality in France and Germany argued that the French policy of *jus soli*, the principle of attributing nationality to birth on the national soil, differed from the German policy of *jus sanguinis*, the principle of attributing nationality based on descent, in large part because of the cultural meaning of the nation in France as being framed by the borders of the state, in contrast to German understandings of the nation as extending to a community that had been divided by wars and mass emigration to stretch across state borders. The effect was to make it extremely difficult for immigrants to naturalize in Germany compared to France. While Brubaker's predictions of policy continuity and interpretation of historical details came under attack from other scholars (Joppke 1999; Weil 2008), the book showed the importance of differential configurations of political culture and the effect of path dependency in shaping the very possibility of immigrants achieving political incorporation.

Gino Germani (1970) extended the comparative study of assimilation by examining the Argentine case together with the United States, Brazil, and Canada. Germani argued that the two main demographic conditions for full assimilation, or "fusion," were when the stock of foreign-born residents was larger than that of older inhabitants and when the native population was initially small. However, the subsequent growth of mass migration to the Persian Gulf shows that such demographic factors are insufficient bases for assimilation. Naturalization is all but impossible for most migrants in the Gulf. Male workers are often housed in barracks while women work as atomized live-in domestics to limit their interactions with native society. Workers from non-Arab countries are desired because they are different from natives and thus can be more easily controlled and excluded (Fargues 2011). Political factors matter as much as demographic factors in shaping the nature of integration.

Claire Adida's (2011) fieldwork in West Africa further expands understandings of how different local contexts shape assimilation. Based on surveys and interviews with two major immigrant communities (Yorubas and Hausas) living in four countries (Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, and Niger), she surprisingly finds that the most culturally similar immigrants are the least likely to integrate. As she explains this paradox, immigrant leaders patrol cultural boundaries to prevent their constituents from "passing" in the host society and defecting from the informal institutions controlled by the leaders. Members of the host society are quickest to reject culturally similar immigrants, whom they fear will be a greater source of competition for scarce resources if they can pass as natives. Assimilation is not the natural condition of immigrants and their descendants, but rather a product of only a subset of many possible configurations of migration policies and cultural expectations.

Morawska (2008) argues that European studies of integration have tended to pay more attention to the effects of state policies than studies in the United States, due to the relatively greater weight of the state in European social life generally and state dominance of European research funding. Comparative studies of official multiculturalism have been one way to understand the institutions that promote or inhibit different forms of integration. Unfortunately, multiculturalism can have contradictory meanings and intentions (Koopmans 2013). In Canada and the United Kingdom, for example, multiculturalism refers to a state-sponsored celebration of ethnic difference that should be maintained among permanent immigrants and their descendants, under the umbrella of a common national identity. In the Netherlands of the 1970s, by contrast, multiculturalism referred to a policy of maintaining the ethnic difference of foreigners expected to return to their countries of origin. Teaching the second generation in their parents' native languages was aimed at preventing their full integration into Dutch society that would retard return to countries such as Morocco (Entzinger 2006).

Notwithstanding extensive attention to national variation in citizenship policies among sociologists (Joppke 2010), political scientists (Vink and Bauböck 2013), and legal scholars (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001), a debate raging since the 1990s disputes the extent to which national citizenship matters at all in shaping access to social rights of state services. Access to rights is constitutive of political integration and shapes the possibilities of economic and educational integration. Soysal (1994) argued that universal personhood—the quality of being a human being—is more important than territorial personhood—the quality of membership in a particular place-based community—in justifying the extension of social rights to non-citizen residents of a territory. Soysal's argument that a more universalistic, postnational moment had arrived was widely criticized for misrepresenting the source of rights and the applicability of the argument beyond the unique setting of the EU (Hansen 2009), but it was spectacularly successful at opening a debate and cited more than 3,200 times in fewer than 20 years.3

If there was previously a lack of attention to how state policies affect immigrant integration in the United States, it had eroded by the turn of the twenty-first century. Bloemraad (2006) draws on the greater promotion of multiculturalism in Canada relative to the United States to explain higher levels of naturalization in the former even though naturalization requirements are quite similar. Alba and Nee's (2003) optimistic assessment for the assimilation of the second generation of post-1965 immigrants is predicated in part on official anti-discriminatory policies, which stand in contrast to the pre-Civil Rights era, in which open, often legal discrimination against despised racial groups was rampant. Fox's (2012) historical reconstruction of social policy toward immigrants beginning with the New Deal in the 1930s highlights how early policies favored southern and eastern Europeans relative to Mexicans, with lasting consequences.

Sociologists have taken the lead in attempting to establish the extent to which the legal status of immigrants, and the legal status of their parents,
affects assimilation. An estimated 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants lived in the United States in 2011, 59 percent of whom were from Mexico, leading to concerns that overall levels of assimilation will be slower for Mexicans than other groups. Bean et al. (2013) warn that unauthorized status has a wide range of negative outcomes for unauthorized individuals and their children alike. Dreby (2012) highlights the emotional distress of growing up in a household with unauthorized parents, a situation that affects many US citizens, authorized immigrants, and unauthorized immigrants alike, given the prevalence of mixed-status families (Menjívar and Abrego 2012).

SEGMENTED ASSIMILATION

Beginning in the 1990s, prominent scholars began to argue that the second generation of US immigrants was assimilating downward in what Gans (1992b) called “second-generation decline.” Zhou (1997) and Portes and Rumbaut (2001) point out that immigrants can assimilate not only toward native whites but also toward marginalized native minority groups, thus forming part of a “rainbow underclass” (see also López and Stanton-Salazar 2001). The “segmented assimilation” perspective advanced by these authors is distinguished by its assertion that the target toward which immigrants assimilate is differentiated by race and class, such that immigrants and their descendants assimilate into different segments within US society. Portes and Rumbaut are particularly concerned with a mode of “dissonant acculturation,” in which the second generation takes on values of US street culture and learns English much faster than immigrant parents. By contrast, in the pattern of “consonant acculturation,” children and parents become Americanized at a similar pace. “Selective acculturation” has many of the same characteristics of consonant acculturation, except that both parents and children retain some aspects of their immigrant ethnic culture, allowing them to be bicultural and more upwardly mobile than in the other modes of segmented assimilation.

Scholars have sharply disputed how common the pattern of dissonant acculturation is, and more generally, how much downward assimilation is actually occurring. Waldinger and Feliciano (2004) find little evidence of a rainbow underclass. Kasinitz et al. (2008) suggest that the second generation may even have unrecognized advantages given their capacity to act as cultural brokers in the diverse metropolis of New York City. Drawing on the same data, Waters et al. (2010: 1185) argue that dissonant acculturation is “the exception, not the norm.” In response, Haller and his colleagues (2011) vigorously defend the notion of downward assimilation, noting that the local mode of incorporation affects the extent to which a particular group can assimilate upward. In particular, given the host society’s negative views of blacks and Mexicans, the authors argue that the downward assimilation experienced by second-generation Mexicans, Haitians, and Jamaicans/West Indians is unsurprising. Telles and Ortiz (2008) are particularly pessimistic about the assimilation of latter generations of Mexican Americans based on their study of Mexican Americans in Los Angeles and San Antonio in 1965 and 2000. However, Alba et al. (2013) argue that because Telles and Ortiz confine different cohorts of immigrants with different generations, the study missed important changes that have taken place over time. The second generation born in 1945 faced a different set of challenges and opportunities than the second generation born in 1965 or 1995. There is significant upward mobility among a non-trivial portion of the population in the study.

Sociologists working on Europe also have raised the specter of downward integration. The recency of mass, extra-continental immigration to most of Europe, and limited data on ethnicity and immigrant generation in some national censuses initially hampered understandings of assimilation as a multigenerational process (Morawska 2008). Major resources subsequently poured into projects such as TIES (The Integration of the European Second Generation). A team of political scientists, anthropologists, and sociologists surveyed the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and Morocco living in fifteen European cities in eight countries (Crul et al. 2012). Bean et al. (2012) compared the incorporation of the second generation in two US cities and eleven European cities to tease out important local as well as national effects. In France, Patrick Simon (2011) found that the second generation is generally doing better than the first across a wide range of socioeconomic outcomes, but ethnic segregation remains. European-origin immigrants are less segregated than African and Turkish-origin minorities. Anthropologist Hans Vermeulen (2010) notes that as quantitative studies establish the risk of “downward assimilation” among various immigrant groups in Europe, they generally fail to show that there is an existing “oppositional culture” or “underclass” that would be a cognate to the one putatively driving downward segmented assimilation in the United States.

Scholarship on Britain stands out for greater attention to racialized dynamics than one finds in most of the rest of Europe (Morawska 2008). Nancy Foner (2005) compares how the presence of an established black native population in New York caused different racial experiences for West Indians in New York than for those in London. West Indians are usually portrayed as a success story vis-à-vis native African Americans in New York, while in London, West Indians are portrayed as disadvantaged vis-à-vis native Britons and Asian immigrants. The presence of an established African American population in New York created the conditions for a pan-black political alliance that strengthened the political power of West Indians, yet West Indians often have sought to telegraph their ethnic distinctiveness in daily life to avoid being lumped together with African Americans and suffering the same discrimination in daily life. Political incorporation and acculturation in the two cities are thus shaped by different racial historical contexts.
sociology, native whites are the touchstone against which all other groups' "achievement" is measured, a practice that many observers have criticized for perpetuating the idea that only whites fully belong in the United States, or even that to be a full member of US society is to have achieved categorization as white. Jiménez and Horowitz (2013) argue that the educational mainstream in some communities in California is now defined by Asian Americans, many of whom come from highly select professional family backgrounds. The local segmented norm to which upwardly mobile native white students aspire is defined by Asian Americans. Defining a particular ethnic group as a timeless norm against which all other change is measured would not allow the analyst to take into account local and historical variation. Further, there is no stagnant group against which immigrants can be measured, because the boundaries of each group change and new groups are invented. In the United States, for example, categorizations of who constitutes the white and Latino categories have changed radically over time (Wimmer 2008).

Finally, the notion of upward and downward assimilation exacerbates the sense that every domain of social life is part of a group competition—a sort of ethnic Olympic Games in which national or racial groups are entities moving through time that spar with each other. Brubaker (2004) cautions that such notions of eternal "groupness" should be the object of analysis rather than an assumption about the world, but in the sociology of immigration's version of the Games, sociologists are record-keepers in the grand competition. How are the reds doing versus the blues this year in the high-school-completion event? In the incarceration event? In the home-ownership event? Are the reds learning the language of the blues at the same speed as the greens, or at the same speed as the yellows did at the Games 80 years ago? The most sophisticated analysts scour the team rosters to determine how many reds are defecting to play for the blues and on which roster to place the purples who are products of blue/red unions.

To be fair, the answers to these questions do reveal important social processes. They are a useful way of measuring ethnic inequalities that might otherwise go suspected but not demonstrated empirically. The research is important, and I have tried to make modest contributions to it myself, but it is worth remembering that this is only one way of approaching the study of international migration. It makes less sense in contexts of temporary or circular migration. Ethnicity is demonstrably the master category explaining many outcomes, but its elevation as the assumed master category may occlude processes that also are affected by geography, foreign policy, class, gender, or other dynamics.

**TRANSMIGRATION**

The sociology of assimilation is squarely concerned with processes in the country of destination, but the study of international migration has never neglected
the emigrant homeland altogether. The notion of diasporic ties stretches back to antiquity (Dufoix 2011). Sociologists William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki’s five-volume *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918–20) analyzed the entire length of the migration chain and the communications that sustained ties between its anchoring sites in Poland and the United States. Influential works by anthropologist Manuel Gamio (1930) and economist Paul Taylor (1933) examined how migration affected emigrant source communities in Mexico, followed by the surveys of political scientist Wayne Cornelius (1976) and sociologists Rafael Alarcón, Douglas Massey, and Jorge Durand (1987). British anthropologists sought to understand the effects of labor migration on communities of origin in Britain’s African colonies by investigating changes such as the gendered division of labor (Richards 1939; Van Velsen 1960). Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, an explicitly transnational perspective rising out of anthropology in the Mexican, Filipino, and Caribbean cases has revived attention to migrant homelands, highlighting processes encompassing all poles of a migration circuit (Rouse 1989; Glick Schiller et al. 1992).

Authors writing in the transnationalism framework emphasize that those who move abroad are not definitively immigrants or emigrants, but rather people whose lives span international borders. Whether migrants physically move back and forth or participate in the lives of their places of origin from a distance through remittances and communications, their experiences cannot be understood from the perspective of the destination country alone. The more postmodern versions of transnationalism in anthropology and geography reject altogether the dichotomous categories of origin and destination, emigrant and immigrant, and even the geographic spaces of here and there—arguing instead that a single community, social field, or third space has emerged across international borders. This perspective emphasizes the reproduction of community. Rather than compare the differences between different groups of sedentary and mobile people, this body of literature emphasizes how even people who do not move are affected by processes of migration. For example, people living on Caribbean islands with high levels of emigration become part of a “transnational community” linked to islanders in New York without ever even leaving home. These accounts undermine the notion that nation-states are “containers” for distinct national cultures (Bhabha 1990; Basch et al. 1994; Faist 2000; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007).

Earlier versions of the transnationalism literature positioned themselves against the assimilation literature by correctly pointing out that a rigid focus on dynamics within the destination country had blinded researchers to the ongoing ties between migrants and their places of origin (Basch et al. 1994). Subsequent sociological revisions argued that assimilation and transnationalism are not incompatible processes (Levitt 2001; Smith 2006; Tamaki 2011). Erdal and Oeppen (2013) offer a useful typology for the variable way that integration relates to transnationalism along multiple dimensions. Within each dimension, interactions may be additive, synergistic, or antagonistic to duality. Snel et al.’s (2006) survey of immigrants in the Netherlands from Morocco, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Dutch Antilles, Japan, and the United States shows that the degree to which transnational practices and integration into the destination country coexist depends on the sending country. Guarnizo et al. (2003) find that the most engaged members of Latino immigrant hometown associations in the United States are long-term residents with legal papers allowing them to travel back and forth to their places of origin. Most evidence for substantial cross-border ties is limited to the first generation, with the exception of cases in which there is a perceived major threat to the homeland, in which case subsequent generations may become involved (Schaus 2009; Soehl and Waldinger 2012).

The sociology of transnationalism quickly encountered skepticism both within and outside the discipline. Historians debunked incautious claims of a novel new phenomenon by showing that return migration was substantial during the turn of the nineteenth century, and that migrants to the United States from China and Europe had maintained similar ties to their places of origin more than a century earlier (Wymann 1993; Hsu 2000; Moraw ska 2001). Organizing based on migrants’ regional origins has long precedent. Karl Marx, after all, was co-president of his migrant hometown drinking club (Moya 2005). Analyses selecting on the dependent variable of high levels of cross-border interaction assume a phenomena that needs to be explained. Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) note that the study of migrant transnationalism conflates long-distance nationalism, plural affiliations, and universalisms that transcend the particular. They ask what conditions foster cross-border interactions given the border-closing activities fundamental to activities that make nation-states. Although much of the transnationalism literature has emphasized that new transportation and communication technologies are responsible for new forms of cross-border ties, a decline in wars between states that reduces charges of dual allegiance, norms of cultural pluralism, and the diffusion of policy models from countries that have successfully reached out to embrace emigrants abroad are probably more consequential than technological shifts.

The research interests of sociologists and economists have coincided in their studies of the possibility of using migrant remittances to spur economic development in places of origin. Remittances worldwide constitute more than twice the level of direct foreign aid received by developing countries. In many developing countries, remittances exceed foreign direct investment. Remittances represented more than 10 percent of GDP in twenty-one countries in 2009. Economists and sociologists share a concern with understanding the use and effects of such remittances, but they differ in that sociologists are much more likely to engage in case studies of remittance dependency, pay special attention to collective remittances, and explain the policies of countries of origin such as India that aim to increase remittances (Goldring 2004; Naujoks 2013). Portes
and most research on emigrant lobbies has focused on the US case. Since the 1990s, many Latin American countries with large populations in the United States have actively tried to form emigrant lobbies. The political scientist Rodolfo de la Garza (1997) has argued that such lobbies are rarely effective because Latin American emigrants and their US-born offspring usually have negative attitudes toward the government of their country of origin. Nevertheless, the dream of emigrant lobbies in Washington continues to entice policy makers in El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Mexico. In the Mediterranean, Cyprus embraced Greek Cypriots living in the United Kingdom for the same reason, and Turkey extended the possibility of dual citizenship in 1995 partly in the hopes that Turks living in Western Europe would become more integrated into their host countries and push the European Union to admit Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).

New, more flexible features of emigrant citizenship are not universal, however. At the source country level, strong state-led nationalism and an antagonistic relationship with destination countries make it more difficult for source country governments to accept dual citizenship in particular. For example, India allows dual citizenship for Americans, but not Pakistanis (Najam 2013). In the destination country there is a curvilinear relationship between the degree of assimilationism and the flexibility of migrants to pick and choose from a large menu of practices. For example, in the Persian Gulf, naturalization and most forms of social assimilation are all but impossible for most migrants, so they are not able to easily parlay having their feet in two countries to their advantage. On the other extreme, the political culture of highly assimilationist countries such as France renders ethnic lobbies of the American sort illegitimate. The United States, and Canada to an even greater degree, encourages a pluralistic form of assimilation that has an elective affluence with dual nationality and dual affiliations. At the individual level, migrants who are unauthorized, live under “Temporary Protected Status” or some other liminal legal category, or who have low levels of various kinds of capital, have less flexibility to define their citizenship. Conversely, professionals and entrepreneurs are best positioned to take out multiple citizenships and to seek out tax advantages as an “insurance policy” in case conditions deteriorate in a given country. They diversify their portfolio of visas and passports as a measure of protection against the risk of economic and political turmoil in a given country (FitzGerald 2012). Political conditions in countries of origin and destination, and socioeconomic status deeply shape variation in the ability of migrants to live their lives across borders.

DISSIMILATION

Building on the assimilation and transnationalism perspectives, the concept of dissimilation offers a third approach. Dissimilation, the process of becoming
different, is the forgotten twin of assimilation, the process whereby groups and individuals become similar. As immigrants and their children become similar to other members of the destination country, they become dissimilar from the non-migrants they leave behind. The degree of difference is shaped by the possibilities of assimilation. Migrants denied the opportunity to assimilate in the destination if they wish are less likely to disseminate from their places of origin. Patterns that hold in the case of Algerian migration to France or Mexican migration to the United States are not universal. Yet in contexts in which much assimilation does occur, the differences that develop between migrants and their children, on the one hand, and those who stay in the country of origin, on the other, are often much greater than the small differences in the country of destination upon which scholars of assimilation focus their microscopes (Jiménez and Fitzgerald 2007; Fitzgerald 2009).

The dissimulation perspective draws on the work of Abdelmalek Sayad (2004), who eloquently wrote of the cultural changes in Algerian villages wrought by emigration to France. His work emphasized that migration engendered not the reproduction of community and the continuities found in the transnationalism literature, but rather the absence created by out-migration. Fitzgerald (2009) extended the concept of a politics of absence in describing how the Mexican government and the Catholic Church in Mexico developed techniques and institutions to embrace absent migrants living in the territory of another country. International migrants upset the neat distinctions between insiders and outsiders. Immigrants are subject to the laws of the host country by virtue of their presence in it, its territory, but they are not (yet) considered members. By virtue of their absence, emigrants are not directly subject to the laws of their country of origin, but they may still be considered part of the legal and cultural nation. The presence of foreigners and the absence of citizens crack apart the fusion of polity, society, and territory that constitutes the nation-state as a specific form of political organization.

Policy makers and scholars have viewed some immigrants’ adoption of urban youth culture in the United States as a failure of assimilation (Gans 1992b), but the same set of facts is viewed in Mexico as evidence of Americanization. Non-migrants commonly claim that migrants are “neither from here nor from there.” In other words, migrants have dissipated from the Mexican mainstream, but they do not belong in the US mainstream either. Alarcón (1992) explained that communities of origin had become “northernized,” in the sense that they were more affected in some cases by migration to the North (the United States) than processes linking them to the rest of Mexico. Return migration, even if temporary, carries risks for nationalists when immigrants introduce noxious ideas and practices associated with a foreign competitor. Case studies around the world suggest that many non-migrants consider these cultural imports to be prejudicial to morality and the national culture (see Moya 1998 on Spain; Cinel 1991 on Italy; Guarin 1997 on the Dominican Republic; and Sayad 2004 on Algeria).

As with assimilation, dissimulation can be parsed into different domains of social life. Migration may dramatically open opportunities for marrying outside the group, for example, while doing little to change some aspects of the cultural content encountered in the place of destination. It is difficult to measure migration’s independent effect on cultural change in the country of emigration, because flows of media, goods, and tourists introduce heterogeneity in countries of emigration and immigration. Migrants become different from those who stay behind, while those who stay behind also change, as places of origin experience vast transformations only partly attributable to migration.

While scholars in the transnationalist tradition also have described cultural transformations in places of origin (Lavitt 2001; Smith 2006), Alarcón emphasizes the disruptions in community formation, first from the perspective of the community of origin, and later, from the perspective of immigrant communities in the destination. Alarcón et al. (2012) explain the processes of long-term settlement that have several immigrants’ ties with their places of origin, and how even hometown associations are increasingly turning their attention to life in the destination community. Seo and Waldinger’s (2010) analysis of survey data shows that this is not simply an idiosyncracy of recent Mexican immigrants, but rather a pattern that applies to the largest groups of contemporary Latino migration to the United States.

The dissimulation perspective shares the transnational approach’s attention to the country of origin and the possibility of migrants’ new and ongoing ties across borders, but the dissimulation perspective differs in important ways. Against the transnationalism literature’s focus on reproduction and similarity in a community spread across international borders, the concept of dissimulation focuses attention on the creation of difference between populations divided by the border. Dissimulation questions the very concept of community by highlighting negotiations over who is a legitimate member of the community, what kinds of behavior are acceptable, and struggles over where the boundaries of the community begin and end.

CONCLUSION

The variety of ways in which scholars frame the sociology of international migration leaves ample room for innovative questions that borrow from neighboring disciplines, but that same variety poses significant challenges to creating a coherent research program. One way forward is to more systematically specify when, how, and why different processes of selectivity, assimilation, transnationalism, and dissimulation take place. A comparative-historical sociology of international migration stands positioned to establish the scope conditions of theoretical claims and the conditions under which particular patterns emerge (FitzGerald 2012; Bloemraad 2013). While this project is historically grounded, it attempts to go beyond theory-building via
periodization as described in this volume by Donna Gabaccia. The scale of the scope conditions around the theoretical claims that sociologists make is usually higher than the claims of historians. There is much truth to the old saw that sociologists tend to be “lumpers” and historians tend to be “splitters,” even as these patterns inevitably blur on a continuum of methodological practice.

Theories of international migration could better define what kinds of migration they are attempting to explain. Types of mobility left out of those theories could then be subjects of their own theorization efforts, which could point out similarities and differences in the factors driving multiple forms of mobility. For example, what is the role of social networks in driving tourism, student migration, and forced migration? Under what conditions do governments and employers attempt to select migrants who are more or less easy to assimilate, in their view, over what period of time, and with what rights?

The assimilation research program can be revitalized by questioning systematically the conditions that promote or inhibit different forms of integration. To what extent do government policies matter relative to the actions of migrants themselves, non-migrants, and the institutions of civil society? Sociologists no longer cheer on the Germans against the Poles or northwestern Europeans against everyone else, in contrast to Max Weber and the early Chicago School, but the sociology of assimilation continues to celebrate its own Games with the release of every census. Analyses that more carefully attend to boundary-making and transforming processes, rather than taking the multigenerational group as a self-contained organism reproducing itself, offer more subtle understandings of the interactions among immigrants, their offspring, and diverse native populations. All modern societies are highly segmented, and all assimilation is segmented. Better specifying the reference groups and the rationales for their selection in tracing processes of change is one way to avoid the methodological nationalism of slipping back into faulty assumptions that the nation-state contains a society.

Debates about whether transnationalism exists have helped to sharpen analysis of the different and sometime contradictory notions within this paradigm, from long-distance nationalism to binational ties to universalisms that reject nationalism in all its forms. Sociologists are breaking new ground in dialogue with other disciplines to answer the questions raised by transnationalism. Along with economists, they are seeking to determine not simply whether remittances promote or inhibit economic growth in the country of origin, but under what conditions remittances promote different kinds of economic activity. Along with political scientists, they are measuring the effects of the new institutions promoting migrant long-distance political participation and dual engagement. Along with historians, they are determining what really is new about cross-border connections relative to earlier ages of migration, and the institutional, technological, geopolitical, and other forces that explain changes over time.

The dissimilation literature is less developed, but it offers a way of looking at the world that yields different insights vis-à-vis the scholars of transnationalism, who highlight the reproduction of ties between migrants and their countries of origin, and the newly institutionalized possibilities for dual nationality and cultural pluralism. Where migration streams are dominated by patterns of circularity or short-term flows, long-distance ties may prevail. Assessments of the strength of assimilation, transnationalism, and dissimilation should not be articles of faith, but rather the subject of empirical investigation in different contexts.

NOTES

1. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Jane Lilly López and Rawan Arar, as well as the comments of Tomás Jiménez on an earlier draft.
2. See Jiménez and FitzGerald (2007) for an empirical application of this taxonomy showing how different theoretical perspectives yield dramatically different, if not contradictory, findings about the educational prospects of immigrants and their descendants.

REFERENCES


