Agency and Intentional Action in Kathmandu Newar

Hargreaves, David

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Agency and Intentional Action
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David Hargreaves
Western Oregon University

1. Introduction

Immersed in ordinary talk, speakers routinely refer to actions and offer interpretations of their own behavior or the behavior of others. While this kind of talk seems mostly unremarkable, speakers will, from time to time, find themselves in situations where reasons for actions seem unfathomable, intentions inaccessible, behavioral descriptions controversial. Talk about intentions and actions can occur in conversation as mundane background or as a salient debatable topic; reference to actions and intentions can be self-evident or problematic.

Not surprisingly, talking about actors and actions turns out to be no small accomplishment and entails a complex array of background assumptions and inferences. Consider, for example, even the simplest case where you observe someone close to you splashing water on her face, or notice the opening and closing of her left eyelid as she looks your way. Although you may know your friend well, her actions do not directly reveal anything about the mental state accompanying her actions. Nevertheless, you would likely describe her actions in conventional terms via specific lexical terms, perhaps RINSE or BLINK. Although her goals or intentions are all inaccessible to simple observation, they are presumed to exist and seem to be easily inferable. However, another observer may label the actions differently, using the lexical items WASH or WINK. The semantic distinctions for lexical pairs such as RINSE vs. WASH or WINK vs. BLINK include attributing different intentional states to the actors, distinctions that are likely to surface as problematic only when conversationalists have reasons to dispute, or paraphrase, descriptions of actions. What’s most important for our purposes is the fact that action descriptions are, in part, a function of the attribution of intentional states to actors.

Yet, despite this indeterminacy in simple behavioral descriptions, we routinely infer that people perform actions with specific frames of mind - intentions that seem to serve the function of representing and guiding purposeful action. We are able to infer this, perhaps, because we understand our own inducements to action and can imagine what frame of mind we would have in a given situated activity. Or can we? Perhaps it is not just other people’s minds that seem inscrutable.

1 The primary data for this paper were collected in Kathmandu in 1984/85 and 1988/89. Examples were drawn from narrative texts and conversational texts followed by direct elicitations. I have many people to thank: Rajendra Shrestha, Gita Manandhar, Suresh Shakya and Syam Maharjan for assisting me in transcribing texts and aiding me in the interpretation of examples; Dr. Manoj Kansakar and Mr. Daya Ratna Shakya for helping me understand Newar grammar. I also want to thank Dr. Tej Ratna Kansakar for several interesting discussions of the historical situation with Newar verbs; Drs. Scott DeLancey and Carol Genetti for providing me with valuable insights on innumerable occasions; my colleagues at CSU, Chico, Drs. Frank Li and Sara Trechter, who gave me several important suggestions which helped clarify my descriptions of Newar grammar for the benefit of readers not already familiar with the Tibeto-Burman/Newar systems; Dr. Austin Hale for valuable comments and delightful correspondences regarding Newar grammar. I alone am responsible for any errors or oversights.
The sources for our own actions may also remain inaccessible to self-scrutiny for a variety of reasons: possession by seizures or spirits, fits of rage, clouds of intoxicants, faulty memory, unconscious psycho-sexual dynamics, fragmented “multi-tasking,” the mind numbing routines of assembly line labor, the self-erasing transcendence of meaningful work. A lack of awareness of one’s own intentions and actions occurs routinely during our simple immersion in a variety of cultural practices, activities unattended by a scrutinizing consciousness, daily routines structured by economic and social contingencies internalized as habit, masquerading as self-evident motivation.

Furthermore, although one’s own actions can be narrated using first person pronouns, the narrative discourse will often contain incongruous mixtures of occluded and omniscient points-of-view, imperfect and uncertain recollections performed as stories without evidential mediation, not to mention the outright fabrications that animate first person narratives. In this sense, the recounting of one’s own past is not unlike a third person narrative, with first person viewpoints authenticated by a discursive slight-of-hand in which the present narrator and the past actor are conflated in the same pronominal form.

Nevertheless, what never seems to be in doubt is the assumption that we all have reasons, particular frames-of-mind, specific construals of our actions, however uncertain we are that we can know them directly, or speak accurately about them. In that sense, we can paradoxically assert that knowledge of intentions is inaccessible, yet never lose the intuition that there is, in fact, some kind of causal link from mental states to bodily actions. Paradoxically, the link between intention and action is as resistant to our scientific and philosophical insights as it is commonplace in our ordinary experience, including the way we talk about people, events and actions.

Thus, despite the thorny philosophical issues involved in attributing attentions and describing actions, talk about actions is ubiquitous, and for the purposes of analyzing the structure of Kathmandu Newar discourse and grammar, we can identify three distinct issues that are involved. Even more to the point, this study will show that in understanding the Kathmandu Newar system of verbal morphology, three distinct components of intentional action must be recognized.

1) First, talking about behaviors entails a theory of other minds and mental states, a distinct form of social cognition (Tomasello 2003; 1999).

2) Second, reference to behavior and action is embedded in ordinary discourse practices, including cultural frames for how intention, action and responsibility may, or may not, be attributed to self and others (Hill & Irvine, eds. 1993; Rosen 1995).

3) Third, the talk instantiates a specific cognitive-linguistic system, including all of the lexical, morphological and syntactic resources that are available for distinguishing among, and making reference to, individual agents, the components of actions and events, and intentionality (DeLancey 1984a; 1984b; Talmy 1985; Van Valin Jr. & LaPolla 1997).
2. **Proto-Newar Verbal Morphology**

One of the most intriguing developments in the history of the language of the Newars, is the rise of two distinct patterns of verbal morphology. In one set of dialects, interpretations of intentional action are indexed directly in the verbal morphology. This type of system is found in the Kathmandu dialect and the other major dialect areas of the Kathmandu valley, including Patan (and surrounding areas) and Bhaktapur (and surrounding areas). Most Newar dialects spoken outside of the Kathmandu valley have been shown to be a result of fairly recent movements by Newars out of the valley (Shakya 1992) and hence exhibit the same inflectional pattern as the valley dialects.

In contrast with the dialects exhibiting the intentionality system, there are two dialects with canonical subject agreement morphology. One dialect is Badikhel Pahari, spoken in an area located about 21 miles from Patan on the edge of the Kathmandu valley. Unlike with other valley dialects, it shows little sign of the intentionality-evidentiality system, exhibiting instead a canonical subject agreement system in finite clauses (Shakya 1992). Another case involves Dolakha Newar. Located outside of the Kathmandu valley, 130 kilometers northeast of Kathmandu in the Dolakha district of Janakpur zone, the language of the Dolakha Newars also exhibits a system of subject agreement, with no overt indexing of the category of intentional action (Genetti 1994:88). Thus, for the verbal morphology in the Newar family as a whole, two types of systems are manifested: an intentionality/evidentiality system and a subject agreement system.

Expanding on evidence and arguments presented in Genetti (1994:188), Van Driem (1993:33; 2001) argues that some of the Dolakha subject agreement suffixes appear to be cognate with Kiranti verbal morphology, suggesting that it is the agreement system, not the intentionality system, that is reconstructible for proto-Newar verbal morphology. The identification of Kiranti cognate morphology in the Dolakha dialect would seem to argue for a close relationship between Proto-Newar and the Proto-Kiranti. However, as Hargreaves and Shakya (1992) pointed out, the fact that the two Newar dialects with subject agreement morphology, i.e. Dolakha and Badikhel, do not themselves exhibit cognate morphology in their respective agreement systems is problematic for reconstructing agreement for Proto-Newar using strictly internal criteria. With the origins of the Badikhel system unexplained, there remains the possibility that the subject agreement system is a result of independent functionally motivated innovations not part of proto-Newar. What this shows, of course, is that our understanding of the historical developments leading to the various systems in the Newar dialects is still quite limited, though an account of these internal developments is central for understanding the linguistic history of Newar and its relationship to other Tibeto-Burman languages.

One prerequisite for an account of Proto-Newar is a comprehensive characterization of each dialect’s verbal morpho-phonology and morpho-syntax from which dialect comparisons and reconstructions can be pursued. Fortunately, there are several studies of Newar dialects by several scholars, Carol Genetti (1994) and Daya Ratna Shakya (1992), and the researchers of the Classical Newari Dictionary Project at Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu have completed a comprehensive dictionary based on classical texts (Malla & Kansakar 2000).

Equally interesting, but rarely commented on, is the fact that the contrast in verb morphology between the two sets of Newar dialects implies the historical development of two
functionally distinct discursive systems for referencing persons, intentions and semantic roles in face to face discourse contexts.

This article, then, is an exploration of how the concepts of intention action and agency are encoded in the grammar of the Newar language of Kathmandu. The primary focus will be to outline the distribution of inflectional forms relative to lexical categories of verbs, person deixis and speech acts, as well as the relationship between the indexing of intentional action in the verb morphology and the patterns of agency and causation marked by ergative case and causative morphology, respectively.

3. Verbal Morphology

The primary focus of this study then is to outline the distribution of inflectional forms in one major dialect group, the Kathmandu Newar system. In this account, I will show how the pattern of verbal morphology in the Newar dialect of Kathmandu can best be understood as emerging from the intersection of distinct functional domains: one lexical semantic, the other discourse pragmatic. As I shall argue, the distribution of finite inflectional forms is a function of lexical structures for verbs interacting with an epistemic constraint on how speakers may (or may not) attribute intentional actions to actors.

In the lexical semantic domain, the inflectional opposition will be shown to vary relative to the inherent semantics of the verb, in particular, the prototypical construal of intentionality for the action being described. More specifically, the distribution of forms suggests three classes of verb: (1) those that describe prototypical self-initiated behaviors, what I will term control verbs, (2) those that describe events incompatible with self-initiated behavior, noncontrol verbs, (3) those that describe events/actions which admit alternate interpretations of self-initiated behavior, or fluid verbs.

The second domain is discourse pragmatic. The same inflectional forms indexing the lexical semantic properties described above will also be shown to vary relative to the roles of participants in the speech situation, in particular, the role of epistemic authority in attributing intentional actions to actors. The distribution shows that first persons in declarative clauses and second persons in interrogative clauses share a discourse role, what I will term the epistemic source for the proposition in the clause.

The description here draws from several important works on Tibeto-Burman languages and Newar dialects. The auxiliary system in Lhasa Tibetan, analyzed in a series of articles by DeLancey (1984a, 1984b, 1985, 1986) exhibits interesting parallels with the Kathmandu Newar system in the indexing of intentional action and evidentiality, although the lexical and morphological elements involved are clearly non-cognate. DeLancey (1992) also notes the functional parallels among person/evidence asymmetries in several Tibeto-Burman families. Discussions of person/evidence systems in Himalayan languages are also found in Ebert (1987) and Bickel (2001; 2002).

The Newar system itself has been described in several excellent articles. Bendix (1974; 1992) locates and describes both the evidential properties of the morphology and the lexical semantic properties underlying the contrasts. Hale (1973) outlines the morphophonemic properties of the system. In the seminal work that establishes the basic terms and principles of the Newar system, Hale (1980) originates the terms “conjunct/disjunct,” describing the system in terms of person distributions relative to a performative model for speech acts, specifically citing the coreference (logophoric) properties of the morphology. Malla (1985:36) adopts Hale’s

Diachronic studies thus far suggest a rather straightforward development of the modern Kathmandu “conjunct/disjunct” system from a system already mostly intact in the classical texts; in other words, no finite subject agreement morphology has yet been identified in the language of the classical literature (Jorgenson 1931; 1941; Kölver & Kölver 1978; Hargreaves 1984; 1989). Whatever the characteristics of the proto-Newar inflectional system turn out to be, the “conjunct/disjunct” system appears to have been well established by the time of the classical Newar texts.

3.1. Finite Verb Inflection

The inflectional opposition we are primarily concerned with in this study is manifested via two sets of obligatory suffixes in finite clauses. Following Hale’s (1980:1) analysis of the system in terms of performative speech acts, the terms most widely used in the English language scholarship are the terms *conjunct* and *disjunct*, though Newar language scholarship has sometimes used the terms ātmā ‘self’ and para ‘other’, respectively (Josī 1992:83 [=NS 1112]). The motivation for the terms conjunct/disjunct followed from the coreference properties of the morphology in certain logophoric contexts, in particular, reported speech. With some reluctance, I have chosen to continue using the terms conjunct/disjunct since they are the most widely used terms in the English language scholarship. As we shall see, when characterizing the distribution in simple finite clauses, the Newar terms ātmā and para are in many ways more transparent in their notional characterization “self/other” than the terms “conjunct/disjunct,” which highlight the structural rather than notional properties. However, while the Newar terms are slightly more transparent, using the English translations ‘self’ and ‘other’ as glosses engenders enough other misleading connotations to also make them problematic. For this reason, I have chosen to continue using the terms “conjunct/disjunct.” We can regard the terms conjunct/disjunct as rather loose English translations for the terms ātmā and para employed in the Newar language scholarship.

Informally, the system can be characterized as follows: Conjugate suffixes occur whenever the actor/subject is also the epistemic source for the action to which the utterance refers. More specifically, a clause will have a conjunct form whenever:
(1) the clause is finite, and
(2) the event being described is interpreted as involving an intentional action by the actor, and
(3) The speech act is either
(a) declarative/first person, or
(b) interrogative/second person, or
(c) reported speech when the matrix clause subject and complement clause subject are coreferential.

Disjunct suffixes occur in all other finite environments except those outlined above. In this sense, disjunct suffixes constitute the default category for finite environments (Hargreaves 1990; 1991; 2003).

3.2. Morphophonemic Alternations

Before examining in detail the lexical semantics of verbs and pragmatic functions of the verbal morphology, it will be usefully to briefly review the morphophonemic alternations for Newar verb stems and the conjunct/disjunct suffixes. Although the morphophonemic alternations themselves are not the focus of this study, they are an important source of data for internal reconstruction in the Newar family since the same verb stem alternations appear to exist in all the Newar dialects, both the conjunct/disjunct systems and subject agreement systems. Thus, they are far less problematically reconstructed for proto-Newar than the inflectional morphology itself (Genetti 1994:128). The morphophonemics of Kathmandu Newar verb inflection are described in several works (Hale 1973, 1986; Shrestacarya 1981; Kansakar 1982; Malla 1985; Josi 1992 [=NS 1112]).

The most important morphophonemic contrasts to note occur with the stem final consonant patterns in which each verb belongs to a morphophonemic class based on stem final consonant alternations.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class 1</th>
<th>‘n-class’</th>
<th>wan</th>
<th>‘go’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class 2a</td>
<td>‘t/n’-class</td>
<td>yā(t)</td>
<td>‘do’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2b</td>
<td>‘t/y’-class</td>
<td>kha(t)</td>
<td>‘be.true’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3</td>
<td>‘l/y class’</td>
<td>wa(l)</td>
<td>‘come’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4</td>
<td>‘l class’</td>
<td>hāl</td>
<td>‘cry out’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 5</td>
<td>‘p,t,k class’</td>
<td>bhālap</td>
<td>‘think’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sat</td>
<td>‘call, invite’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>penk</td>
<td>‘kick’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Verb Classes

Newar verb stems have minimally a vowel nucleus, plus the stem final consonant, which is diagnostic of the morphophonemic class of the verb and appears relative to the inflectional category. Roots without onsets do exist but are rare, e.g., in- ‘to distribute,’ ī(l)- ‘collect, gather up, il- ‘smear, paint,’ u(t)- ‘bake, cremate,’ u(l)- ‘bark.’ The vast majority of Newar verbs include an initial consonant or consonant-glide onset with /-y/- or /-w/-, e.g., kan- ‘tell, narrate,’

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2 As a citation form, I use the infinitive stem plus brackets for the distinct perfective disjunct stems for classes 2a, 2b and 3, where the stem final consonants appear only in the perfective disjunctive inflection.
ki(l)- ‘bow, saw,’ kyā(t)- ‘be.soft,’ yā(t)- ‘do’ ‘ kwā(t)- ‘be.hot,’ wā(t)- ‘spill. The set of diagnostic contrasts with representative members of the primary inflectional groups are outlined in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Past Conjunct</th>
<th>Perfective Disjunct</th>
<th>Imperfective Disjunct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ‘go’</td>
<td>wan-a</td>
<td>wan-a</td>
<td>wā:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. ‘do’</td>
<td>yān-a</td>
<td>yāt-a</td>
<td>yā:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. ‘be.true’</td>
<td>khay-a</td>
<td>khat-a</td>
<td>kha:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ‘come’</td>
<td>wal-a</td>
<td>way-a</td>
<td>wa:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ‘cry out’</td>
<td>hāl-a</td>
<td>hāl-a</td>
<td>hā:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ‘think’</td>
<td>bhālap-a</td>
<td>bhālap-alā</td>
<td>bhālap-yu:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘call’</td>
<td>sa:t-a</td>
<td>sa:t-alā</td>
<td>sa:t-u:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘kick’</td>
<td>penk-a</td>
<td>penk-alā</td>
<td>penk-u:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Past, Perfective and Imperfective Verb Inflection

The imperfective disjunct inflection will appear as stem vowel lengthening for classes 1, 2, 3 and 4, with several notable exceptions (Hale 1986:xli). For class 1, lengthening is accompanied by nasalization in conjunction with the loss of the final nasal. For classes 1, 2, 3, and 4, if the verb stem has the vowel /i/, then /i/ > /y/ and the imperfective form appears as the long vowel /-u/. If the verb stem has the vowel /e/, then /e/ > /y/ and the imperfective suffix appears as /-a/: /.

Class 5 (the p/t/k class) comprises a set of historically compounded stems and acts more irregularly. The imperfective disjunct form is /-yu:/ for verb stems ending in /-p/; all others have /-u:/.

The non-past forms are given in Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Nonpast Conjugate</th>
<th>Nonpast Disjunct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. wan-e</td>
<td>wan-i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. yā-e</td>
<td>yā-i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. kha-e</td>
<td>kha-i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. wa-e</td>
<td>wa-i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. hāl-e</td>
<td>hāl-i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. bhālap-e</td>
<td>bhālap-i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sa:t-e</td>
<td>sa:t-i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>penk-e</td>
<td>penk-i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Non-Past Verb Inflection

Significantly, two of the finite forms are syncretic with two non-finite forms. Specifically, the form for the past conjunct inflection /-ā/ (PST.CJ) is homophonous with the form for a non-finite form glossed as a Concatenation Marker (CM), discussed below; both forms observe the same stem consonant morphophonemics.

In a syncretism that parallels the formal similarity of the past conjunct (PST.CJ) and concatenation marker (CM) noted above, the finite non-past conjunct (NPST.CJ) form is
homophonous with the non-finite infinitive form (INF), exhibiting the same stem final alternations and the same suffix /-e/. 3

3.3. Tense and Aspect

The most commonly used descriptions of Newar verbal morphology in the English language scholarship contrast a past with a non-past for both conjunct and disjunct categories (past conjunct /-ā/, non-past conjunct /-e/, past disjunct /-a/, non-past disjunct /-i/) and then identify a separate habitual/stative form, with the lengthened stem vowel (cf. Hale 1973; 1986, Malla 1980). However, a brief look at the temporal semantics in finite clauses shows a more complex relationship between the conjunct/disjunct system and temporality.

More specifically, the two conjunct forms, /-ā/ (past) and /-e/ (non-past), mark a binary opposition within the conjunct category. In contrast, in the disjunct category, there exists a trinary mixed tense/aspect contrast: (past) perfective /-a/, (past) imperfective /-V: / (vowel lengthening of the stem), and non-past /-i/ . My terminology is intended to reflect this. The evidence is summarized as follows: First, conjunct inflection distinguishes a past from nonpast. 4

1. ji kanhe wan-e 1.ABS tomorrow go-NPST.CJ 'I will go tomorrow.'

2. ji mhiga wan-ā 1.ABS yesterday go-PST.CJ 'I went yesterday.'

3.* ji mhiga wan-e 1.ABS yesterday go-NPST.CJ

4.* ji kanhe wan-ā 1.ABS tomorrow go-PST.CJ

---

3 For semantic reasons outlined in section 5.0 below, the forms khay-ā and kha-e will never appear in finite conjunct environments, only in their respective non-finite environments.

4 Abbreviations: ABL (ablative), ABS (absolutive), ATR (attributive suffix), CAUS (causative), CJ (conjunct), CL (classifier), COMP (complementizer), CON (conditional), DAT (dative), DJ (disjunct), ERG (ergative), EVD (evidential), GEN (genitive), IPFV (imperfective), INF (indefinite), INST (instrumental), LOC (locative), NEG (negative), NMLZ (nominalizer), NPST (nonpast), PVF (perfective), PST (past).
The disjunct category also indexes a past/nonpast distinction.

5. wa  kanhe  wan-i  
   3.ABS  tomorrow  go-NPST.DJ  
   ‘S/he will go tomorrow.’

6.* wa  mhiga  wan-i  
   3.ABS  yesterday  go-NPST.DJ  

7. wa  nakatini  wan-a  
   3.ABS  just  go-PFV.DJ  
   ‘S/he just left.’

8.* wa  kanhe  wan-a  
   3.ABS  tomorrow  go-PFV.DJ  

9. wa  nhũ:nhũ:  wā:  
   3.ABS  day-day  go\IPFV.DJ  
   ‘S/he goes each day.’

10.* wa  kanhe  wā:  
    3.ABS  tomorrow  go\IPFV.DJ  

However, within the disjunct category, reference to past events distinguishes imperfective from perfective aspect.

11. wa  nakatini  wan-a  
    3.ABS  just  go-PFV.DJ  
    ‘S/he just left.’

12.* wa  nakatini  wā:  
    3.ABS  just  go\IPFV.DJ  

13. wa  nhũ: nhũ:  wā:  
    3.ABS  day-day  go\IPFV.DJ  
    ‘S/he goes each day.’

14.* wa  nhũ: nhũ:  wan-a  
    3.ABS  day-day  go-PFV.DJ  

"
The distinction most clearly emerges with a class of stative verbs. Previous researchers have noticed that the perfective form for stative verbs yields an inchoative interpretation, ‘arrival into a state’ (Bendix 1974; Malla 1985; Shresthacharya 1981). In contrast, the imperfective form gives a non-eventive interpretation. The term “habitual” is infelicitous here whereas the term “imperfective” perfectly captures the contrast with the disjunct “perfective” category. Thus,

15. pine ciku:
outside cold\IPFV.DJ
‘It’s cold outside.’

16. pine cikul-a
outside cold-PFV.DJ
‘It’s gotten cold outside.’

17. ji-ta ciku:
1-DAT cold\IPFV.DJ
‘I’m cold.’

18. ji-ta cikul-a
1-DAT cold-PFV.DJ
‘I’ve gotten cold.’

The imperfective form is compatible with a non-punctual adverbial; the perfective is not.

19. bahani-e nhyābale ciku:
night-LOC always cold\IPFV.DJ
‘Nighttime is always cold.’

20.* bahani-e nhyābale cikul-a
night-LOC always cold/PFV.DJ

In contrast, the perfective form is compatible with a punctual interpretation; the imperfective is not.

21. ji-ta chakalā: cikul-a
1-DAT suddenly cold-PFV.DJ
‘I suddenly got cold’

22.* ji-ta chakalā: ciku:
1-DAT suddenly cold\IPFV.DJ
Finally, the imperfective/perfective contrast can be seen in negative forms such as the following, where the adverbial form *chakalā:* ‘suddenly’ is impossible in (23), but possible in (24).

23.  
bhukāe  ma-bwa:  
ground.ABS  NEG-quake\IPFV.DJ  
‘The earth didn’t quake.’

24.  
bhukāe  chakalā:  ma-bwal-a  
ground.ABS  suddenly  NEG-quake-PFV.DJ  
‘The earthquake suddenly stopped.’

In contrast with the perfective and imperfective disjunct, the past conjunct form */-ā/* does not distinguish perfective from imperfective temporal profiles.

25.  
ji  nakatini way-ā  
1.ABS  just  come-PST.CJ  
‘I just came/arrived.’

26.  
ji  nhi:  nhi:  way-ā  
1.ABS  day-day  come-PST.CJ  
‘I come/came each day.’

The contrasts in the inflectional morphology are summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PAST</th>
<th>NONPAST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONJUNCT</td>
<td>-ā</td>
<td>-e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISJUNCT</td>
<td>-a</td>
<td>-i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERFECTIVE</td>
<td>-V:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPERFECTIVE</td>
<td>-i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4: Summary of Verbal Inflection*

For the semantic and pragmatic oppositions marked by the contrast between the conjunct/disjunct categories, we now turn to a discussion of the conjunct/disjunct system itself. Section 4.0 will outline the basic distributional properties of the conjunct/disjunct system in declarative and interrogative main clauses as well as in reported speech, attributive (i.e., relative) clauses, nominalizations, and verb concatenation (serial) constructions. In section 5.0, we turn to the lexical semantic issues, in particular the lexical semantic categorization of verbs and the construal of “intentionality.” Section 6.0 examines the notion of epistemic source, in particular the person deictic and evidential constraints on the attribution of intentional actions. Given the high degree of overlap between notions of intentionality, agency, and causation, section 7.0 examines the relationship between the conjunct/disjunct inflection system for verbs, the system of ergative/absolutive/dative case marking, and the system of causative morphology.
4. **The Conjunct/Disjunct Distribution**

Conjunct/disjunct inflection varies along two dimensions: lexical semantic distinctions as a function of event/action types, and an indexical distinction between speech participant roles. We will consider the lexical semantic issues in more detail in section 5.0 below.

4.1. **Declarative Clauses**

In the first set of examples, wan- ‘go’ is an intransitive control verb with an absolutive subject. The past conjunct suffix /–ā/ occurs with first person only. The past disjunct suffix /-a/ occurs with second and third persons.

27.  ji  wan-ā  
     1.ABS go-PST.CJ  
     ‘I went.’

28.  cha  wan-a  
     2.ABS go-PFV.DJ  
     ‘You went.’

29.  wa  wan-a  
     3.ABS go-PFV.DJ  
     ‘S/he went.’

The non-past shows the same opposition.

30.  ji  wan-e  
     1.ABS go-NPST.CJ  
     ‘I will go.’

31.  cha  wan-i  
     2.ABS go-NPST.DJ  
     ‘You will go.’

32.  wa  wan-i  
     3.ABS go-NPST.DJ  
     ‘S/he will go.’

In the second set of examples, yā(t)- ‘do’ is a transitive control verb with an ergative subject. Again, inflection varies with the opposition between first and non-first person subjects.

33.  jī:  jyā  yān-ā  
     1.ERG work  do-PST.CJ  
     ‘I did the work.’
34. \( \text{chā: } \text{jyā } \text{yāt-a} \)  
2.ERG work  do-PFV.DJ  
‘You did the work.’

35. \( \text{wā: } \text{jyā } \text{yāt-a} \)  
3.ERG work  do-PFV.DJ  
‘S/he did the work.’

36. \( \text{jī: } \text{jyā } \text{yā-e} \)  
1.ERG work  do-NPST.CJ  
‘I will do the work.’

37. \( \text{chā: } \text{jyā } \text{yā-i} \)  
2.ERG work  do-NPST.DJ  
‘You will do the work.’

38. \( \text{wā: } \text{jyā } \text{yā-i} \)  
3.ERG work  do-NPST.DJ  
‘S/he will do the work.’

Not all verbs exhibit the first/non-first distribution in declarative clauses. With a second class of verbs, which we will call noncontrol verbs, the first/non-first person distinction is neutralized and only disjunct forms occur. The disjunct forms (perfective, imperfective, and non-past) all exhibit this distribution. Since the non-past and imperfective forms exhibit the same distributional pattern, I will simply use the perfective disjunct to illustrate the distribution. The verb then- ‘arrive’ takes an absolutive subject and belongs to the class of noncontrol verbs.

39. \( \text{jī } \text{mhiga then-a} \)  
1.ABS yesterday  arrive-PFV.DJ  
‘I arrived yesterday.’

40. \( \text{cha } \text{mhiga then-a} \)  
2.ABS yesterday  arrive-PFV.DJ  
‘You arrived.’

41. \( \text{wa } \text{mhiga then-a} \)  
3.ABS yesterday  arrive-PFV.DJ  
‘S/he arrived yesterday.’

Similarly, the transitive verb \( \text{thu}(l)- \) ‘understand’ is a noncontrol verb. It takes an ergative subject and exhibits only disjunct forms.

42. \( \text{jī: } \text{thul-a} \)  
1.ERG understand-PFV.DJ  
‘I understood (it).’
In short, the distribution of conjunct/disjunct inflection with first person reveals a covert distinction between two classes of verbs, which we will term control/noncontrol.

In addition to the control/noncontrol opposition, there is a small class of verbs allowing either conjunct or disjunct inflection in first person clauses, depending on the attribution of intention. The occurrence of a conjunct form indicates an intentional action; the occurrence of a disjunct form indicates a non-intentional action. We will call these fluid verbs.

With the transitive verb na-pa-la(t)- ‘meet/run into’, both intentional and non-intentional interpretations are equally plausible and commonly attested in discourse.5

5 Interestingly, the verb itself is complex, consisting of the preverbal element na-pa ‘together, with,’ and the stem la(t)- whose core meaning is something like ‘happen, occur, befall,’ suggesting that originally the verb was a noncontrol verb.
Again, the distinction is not manifested for non-first person, where only the disjunct form is possible.

49. \(\text{wā: mānaj nāpalāt-a} \)
   \(3.\text{ERG Manoj.ABS meet-PFV.DJ} \)
   ‘S/he met Manoj.’

50.* \(\text{wā: mānaj nāpalān-ā} \)
   \(3.\text{ERG Manoj.ABS meet-PST.CJ} \)

4.2. Interrogative Clauses

In contrast with declarative clauses, interrogative clauses with control verbs distinguish second person from non-second person. Consider the pairs below: The verb \(\text{twān-} \) ‘drink, smoke’ is a control verb.

51. \(\text{jī: a:pwa twān-ā} \)
   \(1.\text{ERG much drink-PST.CJ} \)
   ‘I drank a lot/too much.’

52. \(\text{jī: a:pwa twān-ā lā} \)
   \(1.\text{ERG much drink-PFV.DJ Q} \)
   ‘Did I drink a lot/too much?’

The context for the declarative clause in (51) is the morning after a feast; the speaker is merely narrating the activities of the previous night and taking responsibility for the action. The context for the interrogative clause in (52) is the morning after a feast where the speaker cannot clearly recall all of the previous night’s events. The speaker is asking an addressee, who also attended the feast, about what happened.

In contrast, an interrogative clause with second person requires conjunct inflection. Recall that the declarative clause requires disjunct inflection.

53. \(\text{chā: a:pwa twān-ā lā} \)
   \(2.\text{ERG much drink-PST.CJ Q} \)
   ‘Did you drink a lot/too much?’

54. \(\text{chā: a:pwa twān-a} \)
   \(2.\text{ERG much drink-PFV.DJ} \)
   ‘You drank a lot/too much.’

The distinction is neutralized with third persons.

55. \(\text{wā: a:pwa twān-a lā} \)
   \(3.\text{ERG much drink-PFV.DJ Q} \)
   ‘Did s/he drink a lot/too much?’
Similarly, the distinction is neutralized with noncontrol verbs. Thus, the noncontrol verb gyā- ‘be afraid’ takes disjunct inflection and is unaffected by the declarative/interrogative contrast.

The distribution of conjunct/disjunct forms in interrogative clauses is not confined to yes/no questions with the interrogative particle lā. Any interrogative clause will exhibit the same distributional properties.

In sum, in interrogative clauses, conjunct forms occur whenever the verb is a control verb and the actor is second person. Disjunct forms occur elsewhere in interrogative clauses.

4.3. Reported Speech Clauses

In reported speech, conjunct forms index coreference between the actor/subject of the verb of speaking and actor/subject of the control verb. Disjunct forms occur in all other environments. Contexts for reported speech can be constructed via the overt use of a verb of speaking such as dhā- ‘say, tell’ or the hearsay evidential particle hā.

In (61) below, the context again reflects the morning after a feast. Clause final hā is an evidential particle marking reported speech.
Although the clause in (61) is a declarative first person clause, it takes disjunct inflection in the reported speech environment. That is, the disjunct form indexes the fact that the source for the hearsay evidence and the clausal actor in the reported clause are not co-referential.

Examples (62) and (63) illustrate how conjunct inflection functions logophorically. It is used when the evidential source for the reported event is coreferential with the actor in the reported event.

62. syām-ā  a:pwa  twan-a  hā
   Syam-ERG  much  drink-PFV.DJ  EVD
   ‘It’s said that Syam drank too much.’

63. syām-ā  a:pwa  twan-ā  hā
   Syam-ERG  much  drink-PST.CJ  EVD
   ‘Syam said that he drank too much.’

Recall that the verb thu(l)- ‘understand, realize’ is a noncontrol verb; hence, the conjunct form is impossible. The logophoric/non-logophoric contrast is neutralized.

64. wā:  khaā thul-a  hā
   3.ERG  matter  understand-PFV.DJ  EVD
   ‘S/he said that s/he understood.’

In sum, in a reported speech utterance conjunct inflection functions logophorically just in case the actor in the main clause is also the source of the reported speech. It is this function that motivated Hale’s (1980) term “conjunct/disjunct.”

4.4. Attributive Clauses and Nominalizations

Thus far, the distribution of conjunct and disjunct forms has been observed in simple finite clauses and reported speech. The opposition also occurs in attributive (i.e., relative) clauses and nominalizations, although the aspectual contrasts in the disjunct category are eliminated. The perfective disjunct form never occurs in nominalizations and attributive clauses, and the imperfective disjunct takes on the interpretation of a generalized past. The inflectional paradigm is thus reduced to a two-way opposition between conjunct/disjunct on the one hand, and past/non-past on the other.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PAST</th>
<th>NON-PAST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONJUNCT</td>
<td>VERB -ā -NMLZ</td>
<td>VERB -e -NMLZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISJUNCT</td>
<td>VERB -V: -NMLZ</td>
<td>VERB -i -NMLZ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Verbal Inflection in Nominalized Clauses

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6 Note that we will continue to gloss the disjunct imperfective form as IPFV.DJ, although it does not formally contrast with the perfective when it appears in attributive clauses and nominalizations.
Attributive clauses are preposed as modifiers to a head noun and are marked with one of three nominalizer/attributive suffixes depending on the animacy and number of the head noun (Hale 1985; Kölver 1977). The choice of conjunct or disjunct inflection is again determined via the interaction of verb type, person and speech act.

The suffix -gu occurs with inanimate head nouns. In the first set of examples, cwan- ‘stay, remain’ is a control verb. Hence, in a simple declarative clause conjunct occurs with first person; disjunct occurs elsewhere.

65. ji cwan-ä-gu che 
   1.ABS stay-PST.CJ-NMLZ house 
   ‘The house where I stayed...’

66. cha cwâ:-gu che 
   2.ABS stay\IPFV.DJ-NMLZ house 
   ‘The house where you stayed...’

67. mânaj cwâ:-gu che 
   Manoj.ABS stay\IPFV.DJ-NMLZ house 
   ‘The house where Manoj stayed...’

In contrast, when the verb is a noncontrol verb, the conjunct/disjunct opposition is neutralized and only disjunct is possible. Recall that then- ‘arrive’ is a noncontrol verb.

68. ji thyâ:-gu thâe 
   1.ABS arrive\IPFV.DJ-NMLZ place 
   ‘The place where I arrived...’

69. cha thyâ:-gu thâe 
   2.ABS arrive\IPFV.DJ-NMLZ place 
   ‘The place where you arrived...’

70. mânaj thyâ:-gu thâe 
   Manoj.ABS arrive\IPFV.DJ-NMLZ place 
   ‘The place where Manoj arrived...’

The same distribution occurs with the nominalizing/relativizing suffixes -mha and -pî:, which occur with singular animate and plural animate head nouns, respectively.

Nominalized clauses occur as complements of copula-like verbs (e.g., kha(t)- ‘be.true’, da(t)- ‘be.at’), perception verbs (e.g khan- ‘see’, swa(l)- ‘watch’, tâ(l)- ‘hear’), and in subordinate/adverbial constructions. In addition, nominalized clauses occur in certain discourse environments as “non-embedded” nominalizations (cf. Matisoff 1972 for Lahu). As with attributive clauses, the aspectual contrast in the disjunct is neutralized. The suffix -gu marks the nominalization.
For example, nominalization occurs with complements of the verb da(t)- ‘be.at’ to indicate a kind of perfect aspect. In the complement clauses, the conjunct/disjunct opposition occurs as a function of the interaction of verb type, person and speech act.

71. \( \text{ji cheä: cwan-ä-gu du} \)  
1.ABS house.LOC stay-PST.CJ-NMLZ be\IPFV.DJ  
‘I’ve stayed home.’

72. \( \text{mänaj cheä: cwä-gu du} \)  
Manoj.ABS house.LOC stay\IPFV.DJ-NMLZ be\IPFV.DJ  
‘Manoj has stayed home.’

Again, when the verb is a noncontrol verb, the conjunct/disjunct opposition is neutralized and only disjunct is possible.

73. \( \text{ji thyä:-gu du} \)  
1.ABS arrive\IPFV.DJ-NMLZ be\IPFV.DJ  
‘I have arrived.’

74. \( \text{mänaj thyä:-gu du} \)  
Manoj/ABS arrive\IPFV.DJ-NMLZ be\IPFV.DJ  
‘Manoj has arrived.’

More interestingly, these nominalized clauses often occur in “non-embedded” environments. In questions with “background” or “presupposed” information, they function as being less “interrogatory” (hence polite or merely phatic) than questions with finite verb forms. The same opposition between conjunct and disjunct applies: the verb mä- ‘need, want’ in (76) is a noncontrol verb taking infinitive complements.

75. \( \text{cha ganaä: way-ä-gu} \)  
2.ABS where.ABL come-PST.CJ-NMLZ  
‘Where is it you have come from?’

76. \( \text{ji: äthē yā-e mä:-gu} \)  
1.ERG just do-INF need\IPFV.DJ-NMLZ  
‘It was just that I had to do it.’

The non-embedded form in (77) shows that third person subject occurs with the disjunct form as expected.

77. \( \text{mänaj cha pihä: wa:-gu} \)  
Manoj.ABS why out come\IPFV.DJ-NMLZ  
‘Why is it that Manoj has come out?’

To conclude, in simple finite clauses the conjunct/disjunct distribution exhibits the full range of paradigmatic oppositions. In attributive clauses and nominalizations the aspectual
contrast between perfective and imperfective is neutralized in the disjunct category. Despite the neutralization of the disjunct aspectual contrast, the opposition between conjunct and disjunct is maintained. The choice of inflectional form is determined via the interaction of lexical semantics for verbs, person and speech act.

4.5. Verb Concatenation Constructions

The conjunct/disjunct opposition occurs in simple clauses, in attributive clauses and nominalizations, and in a complex clause construction which I will term the verb concatenation construction.

Verb concatenation constructions are complex verb phrases in which an otherwise independent verb takes on an auxiliary function indicating directional, aspectual, and other auxiliary concepts whenever it occurs second in a verb concatenation (Hargreaves 1986a; 2003). The first verb in the concatenation subcategorizes the core arguments in the clause and occurs in the invariant /-ā/ form, which is identical to the past conjunct form. The final (auxiliary) verb in the concatenation may introduce oblique arguments (such as benefactives) or simply elaborate the directional and aspectual properties of the main verb. As the final verb, it realizes the finite inflection for the clause. Thus, while it is the lexical category of the main verb as control or noncontrol which determines the potential for conjunct/disjunct inflection forms, the inflectional morphology is realized on the final, auxiliary verb.

For example, as an independent verb, cwan- ‘stay, remain’ is a control verb, exhibiting the usual conjunct/disjunct opposition.

```
ji yala-e cwan-ā
1.ABS Yala-LOC stay-PST.CJ
‘I stayed in Yala (Patan).’
```

```
wa yala-e cwan-a
3.ABS Yala-LOC stay-PFV.DJ
‘S/he stayed in Yala (Patan).’
```

However, cwan- ‘stay, remain’ can also function as a progressive aspect auxiliary in verb concatenation constructions. In the first set of examples below, the first verb, ‘go,’ appears in the invariant concatenation form wan-a. The auxiliary verb cwan- ‘stay, remain’ realizes the finite inflection.

```
ji yala-e wan-ā cwan-ā
1.ABS Yala-LOC go-CM stay-PST.CJ
‘I was/am going to Yala (Patan).’
```

```
wa yala-e wan-ā cwan-a
3.ABS Yala-LOC go-CM stay-PFV.DJ
‘He was/is going to Yala (Patan).’
```
In the example below, the verb \textit{ju(l)-} ‘become’ and verb \textit{tyānu(l)-} ‘be.tired’ are given noncontrol interpretations. Consequently, in the verb concatenation constructions the auxiliary verb takes disjunct inflection.

82. \textit{ji biraìmi jul-a}  
1.ABS ill become-PFV.DJ  
‘I became ill.’

83. \textit{ji biraìmi juy-ä cwan-a}  
1.ABS ill become-CM stay-PFV.DJ  
‘I was becoming ill.’

84. \textit{ji tyānul-a}  
1.ABS be.tired-PFV.DJ  
‘I got tired.’

85. \textit{ji tyānuy-ä cwan-a}  
1.ABS be.tired-CM stay-PFV.DJ  
‘I am/was becoming tired.’

In the examples below, the subject nominal is marked with ergative case, though absolutive is also an option here, given the appropriate pragmatic conditions (cf. Genetti 1988). Ergative case is licensed by the main verb \textit{yaì(t)-} ‘do.’ Absolutive case is licensed by the auxiliary verb \textit{cwan-} ‘stay, remain.’

86. \textit{jì: jyā yān-a}  
1.ERG work do-PST.CJ  
‘I worked.’

87. \textit{jì: jyā yān-a cwan-a}  
1.ERG work do-CM stay-PST.CJ  
‘I was doing some work.’

88. \textit{chā: chu yān-a}  
2.ERG what do-PST.CJ  
‘What did you do?’

89. \textit{chā: chu yān-a cwan-a}  
2.ERG what do-CM stay-PST.CJ  
‘What are you doing?’

90. \textit{wā: chu yāt-a}  
3.ERG what do-PFV.DJ  
‘What did he do?’
What’s s/he doing?’

Inflection on the auxiliary verb also indexes logophoric reference in reported speech. In the examples below, \textit{mhit(al)-’play’} is a Control verb.

92. \texttt{wā: tā:s mhit-a cwan-a ħā}
\texttt{3.ERG cards play-CM stay-PST.CJ EVD}
‘S/he said that s/he is playing cards.’

93. \texttt{wā: tā:s mhit-a cwan-a ħā}
\texttt{3.ERG cards play-CM stay-PFV.DJ EVD}
‘It’s said that s/he is playing cards.’

Thus, in verb concatenation constructions, finite inflection is marked on the clause final auxiliary verb. The head verb, which subcategorizes the lexical semantic feature of control/noncontrol and the case marking for nominals, appears in a nonfinite form /-ā/.

5. The Conceptual Structure of Intentional Action

As we have seen, the distribution of the inflectional morphology suggests an interaction between two domains: one lexical semantic, the other determined by person and speech act. In this section we examine in more detail the lexical semantic domain, in particular, the properties of the three semantic classes of verbs (control, noncontrol, and fluid). The goal here is to isolate the lexical properties of verbs, in particular, the morpho-syntactically relevant semantic features of intentional action. To do so requires that we isolate the lexical semantics of intentional action from the interaction with discourse roles, i.e., persons and speech acts. For this reason, the data will be primarily restricted to first person declarative clauses. The data will suggest that there are two morpho-syntactically relevant features in the conceptual structure of intentional action for Newar verbs:

1) The lexical structure of a control verbs entails that the actor initiate a force or motion constitutive of the action referred to by the lexical item, what I will call the force dynamic (Talmy 1985).

2) The lexical structure also entails that the force dynamic be accompanied by a mental state unique to the representation of that particular action, what I will call the representational domain (Pleines 1976; Jackendoff 1985). Semantic tests show that the representational domain is subject to various evidential restrictions; the force dynamic is not.

5.1. Diagnostics for Control Verbs

Control verbs are defined as those verbs which may occur with conjunct forms in first person declarative clauses. In first person clauses, control verbs do not occur with disjunct forms unless certain evidential operators are present. In other words, whereas ordinary intentional actions appear to entail a unique mental representation of the action by the actor, evidential
operators in first person clauses may be used to indicate that the first person narrator does not have the appropriate representation of his or her own action. Consider the examples below.

In the first example, repeated from (51) above, the verb *twan-* ‘drink, smoke’ is a control verb. The combination of first person actor and a control verb requires conjunct inflection. The conjunct form suggests recollection (and responsibility) for the action.

94.  

jiːː aːpwa twan-a  
1.ERG much drink-PST.CJ  
‘I drank too much.’

In contrast, when a first person clause such as (94) above is marked with *hā* (reported speech evidential) or *khanisā* (visual/inferential evidential), the disjunct form is obligatory. The evidential markers indicate that the form of awareness expected of first person intentional action has been obviated and a secondary source of evidence is being indexed. In these types of examples, the fact that the agent initiated and performed the action is not in doubt; in other words, the force dynamic constitutive of the action is entailed by the lexical semantics of the verb, but the assumed frame of mind, the expected representation of the action by the actor, is obviated by the evidential.

95.  

jiːː aːpwa twan-a hā  
1.ERG much drink-PFV.DJ EVD  
‘It’s said that I drank too much.’

96.  

jiːː aːpwa twan-a khanisā  
1.ERG much drink-PFV.DJ EVD  
‘It appears that I drank too much.’

Examples (97) and (98) below illustrate the normal distribution of conjunct/disjunct forms with the transitive control verb *caphu(t)*- ‘break string, twine.’

97.  

wāː kā caphut-a  
3.ERG thread break-PFV.DJ  
‘S/he broke the thread.’

98.  

jiːː kā caphun-a  
1.ERG thread break-PST.CJ  
‘I broke the thread.’
With \textit{khanisā}, only the disjunct form is possible.\footnote{The sentence final evidential \textit{khanisā} seems to consist (diachronically) of the nonpast disjunct form of the verb \textit{khan} ‘see, be visible’ plus the conditional suffix –\textit{saī}. The syntactic evidence that clauses with \textit{khanisā} do not function as embedded complements comes from the fact that the finite perfective disjunct can occur with \textit{khan}, whereas only the non-finite imperfective disjunct can occur as a complement of the verb \textit{khan} ‘see, appear’ (see section 4.4).}  

99. \[wāː kā caphuṭ-a \textit{khanisā} \]  
3.ERG thread break-PFV.DJ EVD  
‘It appears that s/he broke the thread.’  

100. \[jiː kā caphuṭ-a \textit{khanisā} \]  
1.ERG thread break-PFV.DJ EVD  
‘It appears that I broke the thread.’  

101.\footnote{ As noted in section 4.4 above, the form \textit{khanisā} is the nonpast disjunct form of \textit{khan} (see section 4.4 for details on disjunct forms).} \[jiː kā caphuṇ-ā \textit{khanisā} \]  
1.ERG thread break-PST.CJ EVD  

The use of \textit{khanisā} suggests an inferred result. In example (99) above with a third person actor, the speaker is indicating that s/he was not a direct witness to the action, only its result. The first person clause in (100) refers to a situation in which the speaker initiated some action, pulling on the string perhaps, that resulted unexpectedly in breaking the thread. In other words, the speaker is not denying the force dynamic constitutive of the transitive action of breaking, nor is there any denial of the speaker being the proximate cause of the breaking; instead, the disjunct form indicates that the speaker did not undertake the action (force dynamic) with that result in mind (representation).  

The verb \textit{cā(l)}- ‘sense, feel’ can also be used as a semantic diagnostic for distinguishing the representational domain from the force dynamic. With nominalized complements, for example, it indicates awareness of the proposition expressed in the complement.  

102. \[ji bhukāe bwaː-gu cāl-a \]  
1.ABS earth quake\IPFV.DJ-NMLZ feel-PFV.DJ  
‘I felt the earth quake.’  

103. \[lihāː ma-waː-gu cāː-гу́ː \]  
return NEG-come\IPFV.DJ-NMLZ feel\IPFV.DJ-because  
‘Because (I) realized (he) had not returned...’

With the adverbial suffix -\textit{ka}, the form \textit{cāeka} is used to indicate actions done “consciously.” The emphatic form \textit{cāeka-cāekā}, with reduplication and nasalization, strongly implicates that the action was done “consciously”, hence “deliberately” or “intentionally.” In the example (104) below, the evidential \textit{thē} ‘like, seem’ also appears, indexing the fact that the speaker is attributing a mental state to the third person on the basis of appearance. In fact, most speakers I consulted did not find a sentence such as (104) felicitous unless the inferential evidential \textit{thē} ‘like, seem’ was used. Thus:
104. wa: cāeka-cāeka kā caphut-a thē
3.ERG conscious thread break-PFV.DJ like
‘It seems like s/he deliberately broke the thread.’

The negated form yields an adverbial construction meaning ‘unconsciously’ or ‘unintentionally;’ note also that ergative case marking is unaffected.

105. wa: ma-cāeka kā caphut-a thē
3.ERG un-conscious thread break-PFV.DJ like
‘It seems like s/he unconsciously (carelessly) broke the thread.’

Thus, the adverbial form ma-cāeka ‘unconsciously’ can be used as a diagnostic for showing whether some notion of “consciousness” is a semantically relevant operator with respect to the use of conjunct and disjunct forms. For example, with first person clauses, speakers clearly prefer disjunct forms with ma-cāeka ‘unconsciously.’ In the example (106) below, the clause final particle ni marks ‘obviousness...against possible refutation’ (Kölver & Shresthacarya 1994:186). In contrast, in example (107), the particle ka is an “emphatic particle” (Kölver & Shresthacarya 1994:32) asserting a proposition counter to expectation, and in need of extra assertion.

106. ji: cāeka-cāeka kā caphun-ā ni
1.ERG conscious thread break-PST.CJ EMPH
‘I consciously (deliberately) broke the thread.’

107. ji: ma-cāeka kā caphut-a kā
1.ERG un-conscious thread break-PFV.DJ EMPH
‘I unconsciously (carelessly) broke the thread.’

Speakers also clearly distinguish between examples with ma-cāeka and examples with the verb lá(t)- ‘happen, occur.’ The verb lá(t)- takes an infinitive complement and suggests that the actor was only an indirect cause, probably lacked physical control, and is not a responsible for the causal chain of events. The use of lá(t)- obviates the interpretation of direct causation rather than intentionality directly. Note also that the ergative case continues to be licensed by the complement clause verb caphu-e. In this construction, the verb caphue is non-finite, occurring as an infinitive complement, and no evidential operators are necessary at all.

108. ji: kā caphu-elāt-a
1.ERG thread break-INF happen-PFV.DJ
‘I happen to break the thread.’

Finally, a complete lack of responsibility for any direct causal dynamic can be expressed by using the intransitive non-causative form of the verb, part of a causative/simplex pair reflecting the PTB causative *s-, i.e., cabu(t) ‘break string, twine, etc. ’(intrans)/ caphu(t)- ‘break string, twine, etc. (trans)’ (Malla 1984:99; Hargreaves and Tamot 1985).
In sum, with control verbs and first persons, the use of adverbials such as ma-cäeka ‘unconscious,’ and the use of evidential operators hä ‘reported speech,’ or khanisä ‘visual/inferential’ all function to distinguish the “intention” (representation) from the “act” (force dynamic). In other words, when used in first person clauses, the evidential operators override the default assumption that first person actors are aware of (and responsible for) their own actions. Significantly, the force dynamic is still entailed by the use of a control verb.

5.2. Diagnostics for Fluid Verbs

In contrast with control verbs, which require an evidential operator in order to occur with a disjunct form, fluid verbs are defined as those verbs which freely occur with either conjunct or disjunct forms without requiring evidential operators. There is a further important difference between control and fluid verbs. With control verbs, the use of conjunct forms in first person clauses is the default choice, and the use of disjunct forms is a marked usage, determined solely on the basis of the evidential criteria.

In other words, the lexical structure of control verbs entails that the actor initiated some motion or force dynamic constitutive of the action. With first persons, the conjunct inflection functions to index the default assumption that the action was initiated with the appropriate representation and responsibility for the action. In contrast, with fluid verbs, conjunct and disjunct forms do not clearly distinguish the representational domain from the force dynamics.

For example, the verb thwä(t)- ‘kick, bump with foot’ is a fluid verb occurring with both conjunct and disjunct forms. The conjunct form suggests a telic component to the action initiated by the speaker, i.e., swinging the foot and kicking. The disjunct form is simply vague as to the causal chain that caused the event of bumping to occur. Since the force dynamic is not entailed in the lexical structure of fluid verbs, speaker awareness of an initiated action is also not entailed; hence, no evidential operators are necessary when using the disjunct form.

There is significant variation among speakers as to which verbs are acceptable as fluid verbs. For example, most of the speakers I have consulted do not generally accept behavior verbs like nhil- ‘laugh’ and khwa(l) ‘cry, weep’ with the disjunct form, unless some evidential operator is present in the clause. In this sense, these two verbs are distributionally defined as control verbs. A couple speakers, however, did find the disjunct form for nhil- ‘laugh’ acceptable.
without an evidential operator, in which case it elicits a non-intentional interpretation. By the criteria used here, it would be (for those speakers) a fluid verb.

More interestingly, most of the speakers I consulted allow both conjunct and disjunct forms with the verb *ju(l)*- ‘become, happen,’ if it occurs with nominals that plausibly admit intentional interpretations. Thus, the English borrowing *dákta*ju(l)*- ‘become a doctor’ is acceptable with the disjunct form where the emphasis is on the circumstances that bestow the honor, comparable to English ‘I was made a doctor.’

112.  

\[ ji \text{ dákta} \text{ } ju-l-a \]
1.ABS doctor become-PFV.DJ
‘I became a doctor.’

The conjunct form is also acceptable when the emphasis is on the personal ambitions and initiative, comparable to the interpretation ‘I worked to become a doctor.’

113.  

\[ ji \text{ dákta} \text{ } juy-á \]
1.ABS doctor become-PST.CJ
‘I became a doctor.’

At the same time, speakers found the Nepali borrowing *gajab* ‘surprise’ acceptable with the disjunct but unacceptable with conjunct presumably because the semantics of the nominal predicate ‘surprise’ prohibit an interpretation of intentionality.

114.  

\[ ji \text{ gajab} \text{ } ju-l-a \]
1.ABS surprise become-PFV.DJ
‘I became surprised.’

115.*  

\[ ji \text{ gajab} \text{ } juy-á \]
1.ABS surprise become-PST.CJ

One problematic member of the fluid class is the verb *cā(l)*- ‘feel, sense’ in combination with the nominal form *tā*: ‘anger.’ The conjunct form is strongly preferred over the disjunct form, when the subject is first person absolutive.

116.  

\[ ji \text{ tā:} \text{ } cāy-á \]
1.ABS anger feel-PST.CJ
‘I felt angry.’

117.??  

\[ ji \text{ tā:} \text{ } cāl-a \]
1.ABS anger feel-PFV.DJ
‘I felt anger.’

The circumstances of ‘being angry’ can also be encoded via a dative subject construction with *tā*, in which the conjunct form is completely unacceptable to all of the speakers I consulted (but
cf. Bendix 1992:242). The disjunct form is required, the verb wa(l) ‘come’ is preferred, and the interpretation is that the speaker has less control over the anger than in example (116) above.

118. \(ji-ta\) tā: căl-a
   1-DAT anger feel-PFV.DJ
   ‘I got angry.’

119. \(ji-ta\) tā: wāl-a
   1-DAT anger come-PFV.DJ
   ‘I got angry.’

120.* \(ji-ta\) tā: căy-ā
   1-DAT anger feel-PST.CJ

121.* \(ji-ta\) tā: wāy-ā
   1-DAT anger come-PST.CJ

Although on the basis of these oppositions, Parish (1994:226) suggests that “Newars have two ways of talking about anger,” the existence of a third example such as (122) below renders his simple dichotomy suspect. Example (122) with the verb pi-kā- ‘express, produce, take out’ (Manandhar 1986:150) is interpreted as indicating a higher degree of control, perhaps over the display of anger.

122. \(jiä: taä: pi-kay-ā\)
   1.ERG anger out.take-PST.CJ
   ‘I got angry/expressed my anger.’

Taking these variable occurrences into consideration, it turns out that when we define the fluid class as just those verbs which freely allow both conjunct and disjunct forms without evidential operators, the class of fluid verbs is actually quite small. The clear cases fall into two identifiable semantic classes:

One class includes intransitive body motion verbs with weak directional vectors which may or may not be self-initiated (the ‘roll’ class): gwārā tul- ‘roll over/curl up,’ san- ‘move,’ khā(t)- ‘shake, tremble,’ dun- ‘submerge/dip into water.’

123. \(ji\) gwārā tul-a
   1.ABS ball roll-PFV.DJ
   ‘I rolled over/curl up’ (nonintentional)

124. \(ji\) gwārā tul-ā
   1.ABS ball roll-PST.CJ
   ‘I rolled over/curl up’ (intentional)

A second class includes transitive verbs with variable telic interpretations (the ‘touch’ class): thi(l)-‘touch,’ nāpalā(t)-‘meet,’ ghwā(t)-‘elbow, bump,’ thwā(t)-‘kick, bump.’
125. \( \text{jì: jà thil-} \) 1.ERG rice touch-PFV.DJ
'I touched the rice (nonintentional).'

126. \( \text{jì: jà thiy-} \) 1.ERG rice touch-PST.CJ
'I touched the rice (intentional).'

The greatest variation in speaker judgments occurred with two other classes. One includes a small number of transitive perception verbs that take ergative subjects, and vary between control and non-control interpretations, e.g., \( \text{tā(l)-} \) ‘hear/listen,’ \( \text{khan-} \) ‘be visible to/see.’ The second includes a small number of copular-like verbs taking nominal arguments, such as \( \text{ju(l)-} \) ‘become,’ \( \text{cā(l)-} \) ‘feel/sense’.

5.3. **Diagnostics for Noncontrol Verbs**

The noncontrol verbs make up the largest class for the simple reason that whereas control and fluid verbs require an animate being that can potentially plan and initiate actions as well as speak about the actions as first persons, noncontrol verbs have no such restrictions. Thus, the majority of the noncontrol verbs are non-action predicates with inanimate subjects. In distributional terms, noncontrol verbs are defined as those verbs which take only disjunct inflection in finite clauses.

Unlike control and fluid verbs, noncontrol verbs do not admit conjunct forms even with forced intentional interpretations. In (127) below, the conjunct is not possible even with an interpretation such as ‘intentionally get wet or dampen oneself.’

127.* \( \text{ji pyān-} \) 1.ABS be.wet-PST.CJ

128. \( \text{ji pyāt-} \) 1.ABS be.wet-PFV.DJ
'I got wet.'

A somewhat awkward alternative for an intentional interpretation would be with the causative suffix \(-k/-kal-\) and the reflexive pronoun. The causative stem inflects like a control verb. We return to the interpretation of causatives below.

129. \( \text{jì: (thā:} \text{yāta) pyā-k-} \) 1.ERG (self-DAT) be.wet-CAUS-PST.CJ
'I got (myself) wet.'

Although the majority of the noncontrol verbs are intransitive, there is an interesting class of transitive noncontrol verbs which assign ergative case. They are all verbs of mental
activity: $si(l)$- ‘know, ‘ $mha\ si(l)$- ‘know a person, be acquainted’ $thu(l)$-‘understand,’ $mhan$- ‘dream’, $luman$- ‘remember,’ $lwaman$- ‘forget.’ We examine some of their special syntactic properties in the section on causatives below.

In concluding this section on the distributional relationship between verb semantics and the inflectional morphology, it is important to note that when using first person declarative clauses as our diagnostic environment, it turns out that the class of fluid verbs is actually quite small. In elicitation sessions, speakers from time to time do allow for first person disjunct forms without evidential operators, but their interpretation of the contexts always include some evidential obviation. Although situations of non-intentional action are easily imaginable, the sole use of the inflectional morphology to code such situations appears to be extremely rare in actual discourse practice. Instead, other periphrastic or lexical means are used.

### 5.4. The Periphrastic Construction

One final type of evidence that the lexical structure for control verbs distinguishes between a force dynamic for self-initiated action and the mental state of awareness comes from a periphrastic construction that I will call the ‘premeditation’ construction. This construction expresses the relationship between intention and action by subordinating a quotation complement clause to a main clause; the plan of action is represented as a quote complement and the main clause represents the action.

Example (130) below shows a simple nonpast conjunct clause. Examples (131) and (132) illustrate direct quote/speech and direct quote/thought, respectively.\(^8\)

130. $ji\: ja\: na\: e$  
1.ERG rice eat-NPST.CJ  
‘I’ll eat (rice).’

131. $ji\: j\: na\: e\: dhaka\: dhay\: a$  
1.ERG rice eat-NPST.CJ COMP say-PST.CJ  
‘I will eat (rice), I said.’

132. $ji\: j\: na\: e\: dhaka\: bic\: y\: a$  
1.ERG rice eat-NPST.CJ COMP think do-PST.CJ  
‘I’ll eat (rice), I thought.’

Example (133) illustrates the periphrastic ‘premeditation’ construction.

133. $ji\: j\: na\: e\: dhaka\: nay\: a$  
1.ERG rice eat-NPST.CJ COMP eat-PST.CJ  
‘Intending to eat (rice), I ate (rice).’

The non-past conjunct form $na\: e$ in the quoted complement clause functions logophorically to index coreference between the actor in the quoted complement clause and the

---

\(^8\) The form $dhaka$: is a causative form of the verb ‘say, speak’ functioning as a complementizer.
actor in the main clause. Third person constructions of the type illustrated in (134) below are a common strategy in oral narrative for marking the internal point-of-view for characters.

134. \( jā \) na-e dhakā: nal-a  
    rice eat-NPST.CJ COMP eat-PFV.DJ  
    ‘Intending to eat (rice), s/he ate.’

When the subjects in the complement clause and the main clause are not coreferential, the complement verb takes disjunct inflection.

135. ji-ta dā-i dhakā: bisyū: wan-ā  
    1-DAT hit-NPST.DJ COMP flee go-PST.CJ  
    ‘(Thinking) they will beat me, (I) fled.’

6. Epistemic Source

We have already seen that the attribution of intentional action occurs only under the appropriate combinations of speech acts and persons. Although it is possible simply to list the conditions under which the conjunct and disjunct forms occur, this section argues that the distribution results from the interaction of independent functional domains.

We have already considered one common intuition about the semantic representation of actions, recognized early on by Sapir (1917) and later by Talmy (1985), in which an actor self-initiates some behavior or force. We have called this the force dynamic component of lexical-semantic structure. We have also considered another intuition about the semantic representation of actions, which links issues in the semantics of actions with the semantics of propositional attitudes: the actor initiates the behavior in accordance with an appropriate form of awareness which entails some form of self-construal in carrying out the behavior (Pleines 1976; Jackendoff 1985). We have called this the representational domain of lexical-semantic structure.

Thus, the occurrence of a conjunct form indexes the co-occurrence of both dimensions of action construal: a force dynamic and the appropriate representation. Finally, the occurrence of a conjunct form is also an index of speech participant roles: first person for declarative speech acts, and second person for interrogative speech acts. I will label this discourse pragmatic notion epistemic source.

Epistemic source, then, is a function of the interaction between the roles of speaker or addressee, the pragmatic preconditions for declarative or interrogative speech events, and a specific evidential principle, which I shall call privileged access, where privileged access refers to the ontological constraint on having direct evidence for the mental states of non-self (Gunderson 1990:302; Searle 1990:277). This section examines the nature of these interactions.

6.1. Privileged Access to Mental States

Researchers have long noted that there are distributional asymmetries in the attribution of the internal states entailed by the use of sensation and emotion predicates. The English examples below are illustrative. In (136), the lexical form ‘feel’ refers to internalized subjective awareness. The truth conditions for verifying the proposition are “ontologically subjective” (Searle 1995).
A:  Do you feel hot?
B:  Yea, I feel hot.

In contrast, in (137) the lexical form ‘feel’ suggests reference to the skin surface. The answer given by B is only possible after having touched A’s skin, a common scenario when checking for a fever.

A:  Do I feel hot?
B:  Yea, you feel hot.

In short, the contrast entails two fundamentally different means by which the truth conditions for the state of affairs can be verified.

With the English predicate ‘feel,’ the contrast is an underspecified component in lexical structure. Interestingly, a comparable contrast in Newar is manifested via two distinct lexical items. For example, the verb tā:nwa- ‘be.hot’ must be used when the English ‘internalized sensation’ meaning is intended. It may occur with or without the implied dative subject. Note the typical adjacency pair in (138) below:

A:  chaä-ta tā:nwa: lā  
(2-DAT) hot\IPFV.DJ Q  
‘(Are you) hot?’
B:  ā ji-ta tā:nwa:  
Yea (1-DAT) hot\IPFV.DJ  
‘Yea, (I’m) hot’

In contrast with the examples above, virtually all the speakers I have consulted reject the examples below:

A:  ji-ta tā:nwa: lā  
1-DAT hot\IPFV.DJ Q  
B:  ā chaä-ta tā:nwa:  
Yea, 2-DAT hot\IPFV.DJ

In contrast, the verb kwā- ‘be.hot’ can only be given an external/object interpretation. Unlike tā:nwa-, it refers to the externally verifiable quality of an object, not the internalized experience or sensation.

la:  kwā:  
water hot\IPFV.DJ  
‘The water is hot.’

*la:  tā:nwa:  
water hot\IPFV.DJ
With first and second person subjects, *kwā-* is always interpreted to mean externally verifiable body temperature, rather than internal/atmospheric temperature. Thus, unlike *tānwa-*, a first person interrogative is possible with *kwā-*, so long as it refers to external body temperature, verifiable by touching.

142. A:  
\[ ji \ kwā: \ lā \]  
1.ABS hot\IPFV.DJ Q  
‘Am I (my body) hot?’  

B:  
\[ (chā-gu \ chyā:) \ kwā: \]  
(2-GEN forehead) hot\IPFV.DJ  
‘(Your forehead is) hot’

In addition to the *tānwa-/kwā-* opposition, Newar has two predicates for ‘cold’ *ciku-/khwāu-* which indicate the internal/external interpretations, respectively:

143. A:  
\[ chā-ta \ ciku: \ lā \]  
(2-DAT) cold\IPFV.DJ Q  
‘(Are you) cold?’

B:  
\[ ā \ ji-ta \ ciku: \]  
Yea (1-DAT) cold\IPFV.DJ  
‘Yea, (I’m) cold?’

144. *A:  
\[ ji-ta \ ciku: \ lā \]  
1-DAT cold\IPFV.DJ Q  

*B:  
\[ ā \ chā-ta \ ciku: \]  
Yea, 2-DAT cold\IPFV.DJ

In contrast, the verb *khwāu-* ‘cold’ can only be given an ‘external/object’ interpretation:

145.  
\[ la: \ khwāu: \]  
water cold\IPFV.DJ  
‘The water is cold.’

146.*  
\[ la: \ ciku: \]  
water cold\IPFV.DJ

Where the verb *ciku-* would be unacceptable, the external interpretation of *khwaū-* is acceptable.

147. A:  
\[ ji \ khwāu: \ lā \]  
1.ABS cold\IPFV.DJ Q  
‘Am I cold?’
B: ā lḥā: khwāː:
yea hands cold\IPFV.DJ
‘Yea, (your hands) are cold.’

The semantic and distributional properties for the two pairs of Newar sensation predicates are summarized as follows:

First, in terms of morphology, all the lexical forms follow non-control verb distributions. While the semantic oppositions labeled “internal” and “external” are part of an underspecified semantic domain for the English lexical item ‘feel’, the Newar system distinguishes the internal/external interpretations by mapping the contrast onto two lexical items. Thus, the verbs ciku- and tāːnwa- refer to an internal state of feeling/sensation. Internal states by definition are only accessible to first persons. Thus, it follows from their lexical meaning that there is privileged access to the evidential conditions for verifying their truth.

Second, because of the “internal/external” semantic contrast and the evidential constraint on attributing internal states to others, the lexical items interact with the domain of person deixis, i.e., speech participant roles in face to face interaction. In this domain, pronominal forms function as indexicals mapping between the speech act role of speaker/addressee and the semantic role of an individual in relation to the event/action coded by the verb. In other words, “internal/external” experiencer, as a semantic role, is indexed with speaker or addressee as a role in the speech event, thereby constructing the deictic preconditions for the construal of epistemic source.

Third, another pre-condition for constructing epistemic source is the domain of the speech acts themselves. The opposition “declarative/interrogative” identifies contrastive social actions of asserting and questioning, each of which presupposes a distinct epistemic relationship between knowledge states for the speech event participants in relation to the truth of some proposition.

More simply, in a declarative speech act, the speaker (first person) is assumed to be the epistemic authority for the proposition being asserted; otherwise, the declarative clause will be indexed with evidentials, or other modality disclaimers, several of which we have seen already, ḥā ‘hearsay/reported speech,’ khanisa ‘EVD/visual inferential,’ and thē ‘looks like/similar.’ In other words, the self-attribute of epistemic authority is constitutive of a declarative speech act.

In contrast, in an interrogative speech act, the epistemic authority for the truth of proposition is attributed to the addressee, and the speaker is requesting information from the addressee. This attribution is constitutive of the interrogative speech act.

Finally, there is a clear parallel between the use of the internal sensation predicates, ciku- and tāːnwa-, and the conjunct form with control verbs. The deictic preconditions for epistemic source are the same for both internal sensation predicates and conjunct verb forms. In other words, epistemic source is a function of an evidential constraint on privileged access to the internal states, which covaries relative to person deixis (first/second person) and speech act (declarative/interrogative).

In sum, the lexical-semantic structure of a control verb entails both a force dynamic and a mental representation where the attribution of the mental representation is subject to the evidential constraint of privileged access. Although the conjunct forms can thus be said to have the “meaning” of attributing awareness and responsibility for an action to an actor, their systemic “value” is emergent in the interaction of semantic and pragmatic domains.
7. Case Marking and Causatives

Thus far, we have seen finite inflectional morphology marking tense/aspect and the conjunct/disjunct opposition. Given the close connections between the construal of intentionality and the more general concepts of agency and causation, there remains the task of examining two other clause level morpho-syntactic properties: ergative case marking and causativization.

7.1. Case Marking

The Newar case system has been well described in several previous works. Mappings between semantic role categories and case forms are described in a tagmemic sketch of the system in Hale and Manandhar (1980). A comprehensive study of verb subcategorization and case forms appears in Köver (1976). The discourse function of the ergative/absolutive opposition is examined in Genetti (1988). My summary here elaborates somewhat from the previous research. Of primary interest is the relationship between the syntax and semantics of case assigning properties of verbs, and the categorization of verb types. The occurrence of overt case marked nominals in Newar provides evidence for a conceptual schema which opposes two macro roles, source and goal:

The case suffix -na marks an abstract source category, including locative and causal sources: ablatives, instrumentals, transitive agents, and causal subordinate clauses.

In contrast, the suffix -(yā)ta marks an abstract goal category, including the canonical dative functions of recipient, benefactive and experiencer, as well as animate patients and purpose infinitive clauses.

The unmarked absolutive form occurs with the single argument of intransitive verbs or with inanimate patient arguments of transitive and ditransitive verbs.

For example, the suffix -na (whose allomorphs include nasalization and vowel lengthening) marks ablative source. The absolutive stem for ‘water tap’ is hiti.

\[
\begin{align*}
148. & \quad la: \quad hiṭi: \quad pihā: \quad wal-a \\
& \quad \text{water.ABS tap.ABL out come-PFV.DJ} \\
& \quad \text{‘Water came out from the tap.’}
\end{align*}
\]

It can also mark Instrumental functions.

\[
\begin{align*}
149. & \quad lhāt-ā: \quad na-e \quad jiū: \quad lā \\
& \quad \text{hands-INST eat-INF be.proper\IPFV.DJ Q} \\
& \quad \text{‘Is it OK to eat with (my) hands?’}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
150. & \quad cupī: \quad yā-e \quad jiū: \quad lā \\
& \quad \text{knife.INST do-INF be.proper\IPFV.DJ Q} \\
& \quad \text{‘Is it OK to use a knife?’}
\end{align*}
\]

The suffix also marks transitive agents, i.e., ergative case; the first person absolutive form of the pronoun is ji.
151. ji: wa-yāta dhebā biyaā
1.ERG 3-DAT money.ABS give-PST.CJ
‘I gave him/her money.’

Significantly, the ergative function of the suffix -na also occurs with transitive cognition verbs, a category of noncontrol verbs assigning ergative case. We will return to this class below.

152. ji: siu:
1.ERG know\IPFV.DJ
‘I know (it).’

Finally, it marks causal subordinate clauses (cf. Genetti 1986; 1991; Hargreaves 1984). In the example below, nasalization marks the causal interpretation for the subordinator -guli.

153. bhukhāe bwa:-guli: ji pihaā wanā
earth quake-SUB.CAUS 1.ABS out go-PST.CJ
‘Because of the earthquake, I went outside.’

In contrast, the suffix -(yā)ta marks a variety of goal functions. The goal category includes recipients of transfer verbs and benefactives:

154. läksmiā: ji-ta dhebā bil-a
Laxmi.ERG 1-DAT money.ABS give-PFV.DJ
‘Laxmi gave me money.’

The goal function includes affected animate patients:

155. läksmiā: ji-ta jwan-a
Laxmi.ERG 1-DAT grab-PFV.DJ
‘Laxmi grabbed me.’

Experiencers are also marked as goal. The goal and motion components for experiencers can be overt as in the example with the verb wa(l)‘come’ below:

156. wa-yāta bwaksi wal-a
3-DAT witch.ABS come-PFV.DJ
‘S/he became bewitched.’

Or implicit in the case of sensation predicates:

157. ji-ta tyānul-a
1-DAT be.tired-PFV.DJ
‘I became tired.’
Finally, purpose clauses are also marked with -(yā)ta:

159.  
aelā kā-e-ta  
Liquor.ABS get-INF-PURP  
‘To make aela (liquor),

mj du-e mā:  
fire.ABS distill-INF need\IPFV.DJ  
(you) have to distill (it).

In sum, overt case marking of Newar noun phrases suggests an opposition between two macroroles, Source and Goal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-na</th>
<th>-(yā)ta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(SOURCE)</td>
<td>(GOAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Animate Patient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognizer</td>
<td>Experiencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ablative</td>
<td>Benefactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Recipient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal Subordinate</td>
<td>Purpose Subordinate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Case Marking and Source/Goal Macro Roles

7.1.1. Case and Intentionality

Despite the overlapping semantic properties of the agent semantic role (mapped onto nominal case morphology) and intentionality (mapped onto verbal morphology), it turns out that there is no direct interaction between the lexical properties underlying the control/noncontrol categories of the verb and the lexical properties underlying case assignment. In other words, whatever semantic affinities may exist between the agent role and intentionality, they are invisible to the system that links semantic structures and morphosyntax. For example, absolutive case occurs with all three categories of verbs.

Intransitive Control verbs:

160.  
ji den-ā  
1.ABS lie-PST.CJ  
I laid (down)/slept.'
Intransitive Fluid verbs:

161. ji gwārā tul-a
1.ABS ball roll-PST.CJ
‘I intentionally rolled over/curled up.’

162. ji gwārā tul-a
1.ABS ball roll-PFV.DJ
‘I unintentionally rolled over/curled up.’

Intransitive Noncontrol verbs:

163. ji libākka then-a
1.ABS late arrive-PFV.DJ
‘I arrived late.’

Consistent with the idea that the dative case marks an abstract goal category, dative intransitives are, without exception, noncontrol verbs:

164. ji-ta nae pityāt-a
1-DAT eat-INF hungry-PFV.DJ
‘I’ve become hungry.’

Ergative case aligns prototypically with transitive control verbs below:

165. jì: lā tyān-ā
1.ERG meat mince-PST.CJ
‘I minced the meat.’

However, ergative case itself may be optional with some verbs, especially those with non-protypical patient/direct objects such as ‘dance’ in example (166) below. Ergative case marks an agent focus, which may be interpreted semantically or pragmatically (cf. Genetti 1988). More importantly for our purposes here, the conjunct inflection is a function of the conceptual structure of intentional action (representation and force dynamic) and is independent of case assigning properties.

166. ji pyākhā: lhuy-ā
1.ABS dance dance-PST.CJ
‘I danced.’ (event focus)

167. ji: pyākhā: lhuy-ā
1.ERG dance dance-PST.CJ
‘I danced.’ (agent focus)
Moreover, there are transitive fluid verbs that require ergative case but allow either conjunct or disjunct inflection.

168.  
\[ \text{ji: } \text{thi}y-\overline{a} \]
1.ERG touch-PST.CJ
'I (intentionally) touched (it).'</n
169.  
\[ \text{ji: } \text{thil}-a \]
1.ERG touch-PFV.DJ
'I (unintentionally) touched/made contact with (it).'</n
More interesting is the class of transitive noncontrol verbs which also assign ergative case marking. These are psych/cognition verbs and take disjunct inflection with all persons.

170.  
\[ \text{ji: } \text{wa}-\overline{ya} \overline{g}u \text{ kh}\overline{a} \text{ thul}-a \]
1.ERG 3-GEN-ATR matter understand-PFV.DJ
'I understand his point.'</n
171.  
\[ \text{ji: } \text{mha}\overline{a}:\text{sa} \text{ mhan}-a \]
1.ERG dream dream-PFV.DJ
'I dreamt (a dream).'</n

Thus, the components of conceptual structure underlying the control/noncontrol opposition and hence conjunct/disjunct inflection are independent of those components of conceptual structure that comprise the syntax-semantics interface governing case assignment.

7.2. Causatives

The distribution of the causative suffix -k/-kal- reveals another important aspect of lexical structure and the interaction of causation and intentionality. In the canonical causative process, the causative suffix adds a causer/agent role to the event schema, increasing the valency of the clause. The simplex lexical form may be a control, fluid, or noncontrol verb; the derived causative stem will function as a control verb, triggering the conjunct/disjunct distribution.

However, there is a class of verbs, primarily cognition verbs (noncontrol verbs assigning ergative case) and experiencer verbs (noncontrol verbs assigning dative case), which behave differently. With these verbs, the causative suffix does not add a new participant to the event structure, or increase the valency of the clause. Instead, causativization converts a noncontrol verb to a control verb, \textit{without} increasing the valency of the clause. In other words, noncontrol predicates simply become control predicates.

7.2.1. The PTB Causative Prefix *s-

Before examining productive causatives with the suffix -k/-kal-, it is important to note a set of non-productive causative pairs. Non-productive causatives involve a restricted set of intransitive verbs and their transitive counterparts. The simplex/causative alternation, a reflex of
the Proto Tibeto-Burman causative prefix *s-, is realized via a voiced/voiceless aspirated alternation for stem initial consonants (Malla 1985; Hargreaves & Tamot 1985; Hargreaves 2004).

With causative stems, the causer is assigned ergative case. Whereas the simplex form can be control, fluid, or noncontrol, the causative form is always a control verb.

Control-Verb: *den- ‘lie’ > then- ‘lay’

172. ji den-ä  
1.ABS lie-PST.CJ  
‘I lay down.’

173. ji: wa-yâta then-ä  
1.ERG 3-DAT lay-PST.CJ  
‘I laid him/her down’

174. wâ: ji-ta then-a  
1.ERG 3-DAT lay-PST.CJ  
‘S/he laid me down’

Fluid Verb: *dun- ‘submerge’ (intrans) > thun- ‘submerge’(trans)

175. ji lakha-e dun-ä  
1.ABS water-LOC submerge-PST.CJ  
‘I dipped into the water.’

176. ji lakha-e dun-a  
1.ABS water-LOC submerge- PFV.DJ  
‘I unintentionally sank into the water.’

177. ji: wa-yâta lakha-e thun-ä  
1.ERG 3-DAT water-LOC submerge-PST.CJ  
‘I dipped him/her into the water.’

178. wâ: ji-ta lakha-e thun-a  
1.ERG 3-DAT water-LOC submerge- PFV.DJ  
‘S/he dipped me into the water.’

Noncontrol Verb: *gyâ- ‘be.afraid’ > khya- ‘frighten’

179. ji gyât-a  
1.ABS fear-PFV.DJ  
‘I became afraid.’
7.2.2. The Causative Suffix -\textit{k/-kal-}

When the causative stem is marked with \textit{-kal/-k-}, the causer is assigned ergative case. Animate causees are assigned the dative case; inanimate causees are absolutive. Simple forms can be control, fluid, or noncontrol. The causative form is always a control verb.

**Intransitive Control Verb:** \textit{khwa(l)}- ‘cry’ > \textit{khwae-k-} ‘make cry’

182. & ji & khway-ā
  & 1.ABS cry-PST.CJ
  & ‘I cried.’

183. & ji: & wa-yāta & khwae-k-ā
  & 1.ERG 3-DAT cry-CAUS-PST.CJ
  & ‘I made him/her cry.’

184. & wa: & ji-ta & khwae-kal-a
  & 1.ERG 3-DAT cry-CAUS-PFV.DJ
  & ‘S/he made me cry.’

**Transitive Control Verb:** \textit{na(l)}- ‘eat’ > \textit{na-} ‘feed’

185. & ji: & jā & nay-ā
  & 1.ERG rice/ABS eat-PST.CJ
  & ‘I ate rice.’

186. & ji: & wa-yāta & jā & na-k-ā
  & 1.ERG 3-DAT rice eat-CAUS-PST.CJ
  & ‘I fed him/her rice.’

187. & wa: & ji-ta & jā & na-kal-a
  & 1.ERG 3-DAT rice eat-CAUS-PFV.DJ
  & ‘S/he fed me rice.’
Intransitive Fluid Verb: *gwārā tul-* ‘roll over/curl up’ > *gwārā tui-*k-* ‘roll someone over’

188.  

**ji**  

1.ABS ball  roll-PST.CJ  

‘I intentionally rolled over.’

189.  

**ji**  

1.ABS ball  roll-PFV.DJ  

‘I unintentionally rolled over.’

190.  

**ji:**  

1.ERG 3-DAT ball  roll-CAUS-PST.CJ  

‘I rolled him/her/it over.’

191.  

**wā:**  

3.ERG 1-DAT ball  roll-CAUS-PFV.DJ  

‘S/he rolled me over.’

Transitive Fluid Verb: *thī(l)-* ‘touch’ > *thī:-k-* ‘make touch.’

192.  

**ji:**  

1.ERG rice.ABS touch-PST.CJ  

‘I (intentionally) touched the rice.’

193.  

**ji:**  

1.ERG rice.ABS touch-PFV.DJ  

‘I (unintentionally) touched the rice.’

194.  

**ji:**  

1.ERG 3-DAT rice.ABS touch-CAUS-PST.CJ  

‘I made him/her touch the rice.’

195.  

**wā:**  

3.ERG 1-DAT rice.ABS touch-CAUS-PFV.DJ  

‘S/he made me touch the rice.’

Unlike control and fluid verbs, causative marked noncontrol verbs exhibit two patterns. First, there is the causative pattern we have already observed with control and fluid verbs. In this case, as we have seen, the creation of a causative stem converts a noncontrol verb to a control verb, assigns ergative case to causer, and increases the valency of the clause, assigning absolutive and dative case to inanimate and animate causees, respectively.

196.  

**khāpā**  

door/ABS open-PFV.DJ  

‘The door opened.’
197. jiä: khāpā cāe-k ā
   1.ERG door.ABS open-CAUS-PST.CJ
   ‘I opened the door.’

198. ji libākka then-a
   1.ABS late arrive-PFV.DJ
   ‘I arrived late.’

199. wā: ji-ta libākka thē:-kal-a
   3.ERG 1-DAT late arrive-CAUS-PFV.DJ
   ‘S/he caused me to arrive late.’

200. jiä: wa-yāta libākka thē:-k ā
   1.ERG 3-DAT late arrive-CAUS-PST.CJ
   ‘I caused him/her to arrive late.’

In contrast with the above examples, a second causative pattern converts the noncontrol verb to a control verb, assigns ergative case to the causer, but does not increase the valency of the clause. Instead, the verb is interpreted as a kind of middle voice; the action is controlled but does not entail a distinct patient/object argument (Kemmer 1994; La Polla 1995). Noncontrol verbs with dative subjects tend to exhibit this pattern of causativization.

201. syām-yāta lāksmi ya:
   Syam-DAT Laxmi.ABS be.pleasing\IPFV.DJ
   ‘Laxmi is attractive to Syam.’

202. syām-ā: lāksmi ye:-kal-a
   syam-ERG Laxmi.ABS be.pleasing-CAUS-PFV.DJ
   ‘Syam has chosen Laxmi, or Syam likes Laxmi.’

203. ji-ta lāksmi ya:
   1-DAT Laxmi/ABS be.pleasing\IPFV.DJ
   ‘Laxmi is attractive to me.’

204. ji: lāksmi ye:-k ā
   1.ERG Laxmi/ABS be.pleasing-CAUS-PST.CJ
   ‘I’ve chosen Laxmi, or I like Laksni.’

As noted earlier, ergative noncontrol verbs also tend to exhibit this pattern.

205. ji: khā luman-a
   1.ERG matter remember-PFV.DJ
   ‘I remembered the matter.’
Finally, there appears to be some variation among speakers with respect to causative interpretations. For example, with the verb *thu*(*l*)- ‘realize, understand’ and the causative stem, *thui*-k-, some speakers have suggested that the contrast between an causative interpretation ‘cause him/her to understand’ and a middle interpretation ‘figure out for oneself’ is best disambiguated via a verb-concatenation construction. All speakers I consulted accepted the interpretation in (209a) below; only some accepted the interpretation (209b).

(209)  
\[ wā: \quad \text{thui-kal-a} \]  
3.ERG understand-CAUS-PFV.DJ  
(a) ‘S/he figured (it) out’  
(b) ‘S/he explained (it) (to someone).’

All speakers agreed that the contrast below with the verb-concatenation construction clearly disambiguates the two interpretations.

(210)  
\[ wā: \quad \text{thui-kā} \quad \text{kāl-a} \]  
3.ERG understand-CAUS-CM take-PFV.DJ  
‘S/he figured (it) out.’

(211)  
\[ wā: \quad \text{thui-kā} \quad \text{bil-a} \]  
3.ERG understand-CAUS-CM give-PFV.DJ  
‘S/he explained (it) (to someone).’

The special behavior of the class of verbs which undergo this type of causativization suggests a distinct lexical structure for this class of verbs and, indeed, Kansakar (1990) argues convincingly for an unaccusative lexical structure for this class of verbs.

Thus, whereas the marking of fluid verbs with conjunct/disjunct inflection is a function of the control/noncontrol lexical semantic properties, middle causatives occur as a function of unaccusative lexical structure. Moreover, the encoding of intentional action with fluid verbs is subject to evidential and discourse role constraints; in contrast, the formation of the middle causative stem is not subject to these constraints. In other words, the middle causative construction is not constrained by epistemic source.
8. Conclusion

In contrast with the Tibetan copular/auxiliary systems or the complex Kiranti agreement paradigms, the morphological paradigm in Kathmandu Newar involves a binary opposition of two sets of forms, the so-called conjunct/disjunct system. However, in its distributional properties, the system indexes the functional interaction between:

1) the construal of intentional action as a force dynamic with an appropriate mental representation,
2) the deictic properties of speech acts and speech participant roles,
3) an evidential principle requiring privileged access to internal states.

In this sense, the paradigmatic distribution of the conjunct/disjunct forms is an emergent property of the interaction of these three functional domains.

References


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Dr. David Hargreaves
hargred@wou.edu