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Three Essays in Applied Microeconomics with an Empirical Emphasis on Questions Facing Households

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THREE ESSAYS IN APPLIED MICROECONOMICS WITH AN EMPIRICAL EMPHASIS ON QUESTIONS FACING HOUSEHOLDS

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

ECONOMICS

by

Nicholas Lovett

June 2014

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Abstract

Three Essays in Applied Microeconomics with an Empirical Emphasis on Questions Facing Households

by

Nicholas Lovett

This dissertation focuses on using empirical, or applied, microeconomics to answer questions of interest. The first two questions of interest are, whether EBT card reforms had unintended consequences, both good and bad, in the form of altered criminal behavior and food security. Chapters 1 and 2, respectively, address these questions using empirical techniques common to applied microeconomics. The third chapter is related in the sense that is also an exploration of a question of interest using empirical techniques common to applied microeconomics. In particular, the third chapter seeks to uncover which individual traits are associated with divorce in China, and how those characteristics have changed across generations. Moreover, I also seek to see if results regarding physical and mental health outcomes are replicable using Chinese data sources.

Chapter 1 considers EBT card reforms and the impact on black market food stamp sales and trafficking. By altering households’ real income, reforms may have altered criminal behavior. Theory is ambiguous as diminished income may decrease alcohol and drug related crimes, but may also cause income motivated crimes such as robbery and burglary to rise. I exploit variation in the timing of EBT adoption in California to identify the effect of EBT on arrests. Despite representing a small decrease in income, I find a significant,
though transitory, increase in criminal arrests resulting from EBT adoption. In particular, following a conversion to EBT benefits delivery, the average county experiences an additional 108 arrests or an increase of about 5%. This increase lasts about 6 months before fading out. This increase in crimes is most noticeable for crimes traditionally motivated by income shortfalls, such as burglary, larceny, prostitution and robbery. In the average county, income motivated criminal arrests rise by about 25 arrests or 9.7%. The increase is persistent for 6 months before fading out. I find little evidence that drug and alcohol related crimes diminished.

Chapter 2 investigates EBT card reforms in California’s food stamp program, and the impact on food insecurity. Our hypothesis is that EBT cards will reduce food insecurity by reducing the food costs associated with loss and theft of benefits, as well as decreasing fraudulent sales of benefits. We use the California Health Interview Survey, and the roll-out of EBT card reforms across California counties, to conduct an event study. Our findings suggest no evidence for a decrease in food insecurity. We do, however, find evidence of a transitory increase in food insecurity immediately following EBT card reforms. Reforms increase the likelihood of food insecurity by about 2% for 1-2 months depending on the measure of food insecurity used. The result is distinguishable from zero, and robust to changes in specification, inclusion of controls, and measurement choices. We posit the increase was due to a less than perfectly smooth transition to the EBT card system.

Chapter 3 uses large, national surveys to investigate individual attributes associated with probability of divorce. In recent years China’s divorce rate has risen rapidly. With this rapid rise has come a large number of potential explanations, both those grounded in
economic theory, and those widely discussed in the public discourse. We investigate which individual attributes are associated with an increased probability of divorce, and to explain which explanations are not empirically substantiated. We find that Western attitudes and a sense of relative affluence are predictive of divorce. Furthermore, most popular explanations are not empirically confirmed. Finally, we find that previous results suggesting divorce is associated with worse mental health outcomes are applicable in China and not only Western nations.
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Chapter 1

Food Stamps, Income Shocks, and Crime: Evidence from California

1.1 Introduction

Food stamps represent a classic in-kind transfer program aimed at alleviating the plight of the poor by providing funds for food purchases. Food stamps (now officially known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP) is a federally funded program with oversight from the US Department of Agriculture. Food stamps are a program of tremendous interest for a variety of reasons, but perhaps most obvious are the tremendous number of program participants (46 million in 2012) and the tremendous expenditures involved ($79 billion in 2012). Moreover, most would agree that the program objective of reducing hunger and food insecurity, especially for children, is an important goal. One constant across all states is that the program is an in-kind transfer program and
not a cash one. The thinking behind this policy stance has been that a cash transfer would result in diminished food expenditures and nutrition. In the cash transfer case, households might smooth cash aid expenditures over several types of consumption; however, the conventional wisdom from a policy standpoint has been that this would be less beneficial than restricting expenditures to food only. This is particularly true in households were children are present. Moreover, there exist separate cash transfer programs aimed at meeting more flexible household needs such as TANF/AFDC and SSI.

However, like many transfer programs there exists considerable potential for fraud, trafficking of benefits, and abuse of the program by program participants. Specifically there exists a market for food stamp benefits where individuals are able to sell benefits, at a discount, for cash. That is, recipients can take their benefits and sell them to others, using the cash for expenditures deemed more pressing than food purchases. Previous research done by the USDA has indicated the presence of a fairly vibrant black market for these benefits across the country. Moreover, the value of a food stamp dollar on the secondary market is rather high. Whitmore (2002) finds the figure to be about 65 cents on the dollar. Furthermore, it is quite common to hear anecdotal tales of food stamp fraud followed by concerns about program implementation. It is perhaps this fairly high re-sale value that makes sales on the black market attractive to food stamp recipients. A key contributor to trafficking has been the relative ease of doing so. If re-sold food stamps become harder to use, or the prospect of being caught and punished rises, it is expected that the re-sale value will drop as many prospective buyers of fraudulent food stamp benefits will find the additional effort and risk cumbersome at best, and prohibitive at worst.
However, in recent years reforms have been enacted that have considerably diminished the ease with which individuals may illicitly buy and sell food stamp benefits on a black market. Conventional economic theory strongly suggests this should reduce the attractiveness of black market food stamps for those wishing to buy them. The reforms referred to are changes in benefits delivery from a paper-based system to an electronic one. Specifically, this translates to the elimination of actual paper food stamps, and replacing them with an Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) card that functions very similarly to a debit card. Given that these reforms make trafficking more difficult, the changes should reduce the volume of food stamps sold, the price they are sold at, or most likely both. This in turn would decrease cash income of program participants that engage in black market sales of food stamps. This paper aims to investigate the impact of reduced black market food stamp sale possibilities on criminal arrests. Economic theory is ambiguous on this front in that it is not clear if the loss of fraudulently acquired income will result in greater criminal activity to offset income losses, or if individuals will face lower consumption possibilities with regards to drugs and alcohol thus diminishing crime by reducing the number of crimes driven by substance abuse.

This paper leverages variation in the timing of reforms within the state of California. California offers a unique institutional environment in that it is the only state to administer its food stamp program at the county level. Thus, each individual county is responsible for disbursing benefits to program participants, but beneficiaries face the same food stamp program state-wide. A natural experiment arises in that different counties implemented their reforms at different times, and in ways orthogonal to any observable county
level characteristics. Crime data is obtained from the California Monthly Arrest and Citation Record, which provides a census of all arrests made within the state for years before, during, and after reforms to the food stamp program.

This paper’s primary finding is that the effect of program reforms on criminal arrests are positive and significant, but that effects are only transitional. In the months following reforms, overall crime rises slightly and then returns to it’s pre-reform level. Quantitatively, arrests increase by about 5% which translates to an additional 108 arrests per month in the average county following EBT card reforms. In particular, this rise in crime appears to be driven by what I have dubbed income motivated crime, or “crimes of destitution”. This refers to crimes such as theft, burglary and other crimes motivated by the need, or desire to acquire income. Thus, it would appear some food stamp participants are ill-prepared for the loss of income as a result of black market sales and turn to criminal activity to fill an income short-fall. This shortfall may manifest itself in two forms. One, is that individuals are forced to sell their benefits for less, thus their real income is diminished. Two, in order to receive the same income as before, individuals must sell more benefits. As a result, during the course of the month there will be a greater need for food and/or the income with which to purchase food and other goods and services. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the relevant literature, section 3 provides an overview of the institutional background and data, section 4 describes the empirical strategy and implementation, section 5 reviews the paper’s results and findings, section 6 investigates the robustness of the paper’s findings, while section 7 offers commentary and conclusions.
1.2 Literature Review

Although there exits a considerable literature with regards to food stamps and other transfer programs, as well as an extensive literature on crime, very little to my knowledge has been done to examine a specific relationship between the food stamp program and crime. Similarly, there has been relatively little work done looking at unanticipated effects of EBT reforms. Although Macaluso (2000) reports that EBT cards have widely been viewed as a tremendous success for the improvements brought about in terms of costs, record keeping, and recipient services, there has not been an explicit research agenda investigating externalities associated with EBT card reforms. However, many papers have made key contributions to the current understanding of the food stamp program, crime and EBT card reforms.

1.2.1 Should Food Stamps be a Cash or In-Kind Transfer?

There exists a sizable literature investigating the question of whether it is better to administer food stamps as an in-kind transfer, or as a cash one. The primary motivation for making it an in-kind transfer is that policy makers want to be sure that the transfer results in greater food purchases, and not purchases of less beneficial goods such as alcohol or tobacco. The competing claim is that food stamps are expensive to administer as an in-kind transfer and food stamps may be distortionary in the sense that program participants end up spending more on food than with a cash transfer. The issue is important from my perspective because the distortions created by an in-kind transfer may increase the likelihood of benefits trafficking.
This question was primarily addressed using observational studies, summarized by Fraker (1990), in which researchers estimate the marginal propensity to consume food using the following specification:

\[
food_{spending_i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Cash_i + \beta_2 f\text{stamp}_i + X_i \gamma + \varepsilon_i
\]

Here the unit of observation \(i\) is the household. \(Cash_i\) and \(f\text{stamp}_i\) are income from cash and food stamps, respectively; while \(X_i\) is a set of household observable characteristics, and \(\varepsilon_i\) is the disturbance term. In this case, the impact of food stamps as an in-kind transfer is the difference between the estimates of \(\beta_1\) and \(\beta_2\), this tells us to what extent food stamps drive extra food consumption that would not have been induced by a cash transfer. Although these studies offered a good deal of new information they suffered from many of the problems of observational studies in past decades. Specifically, program participation is taken as exogenous. Both Currie (2006) and Moffit (1983) study models of program participation and find that participation is effectively a choice variable and positively correlated with preferences for food consumption relative to other goods. Also comparisons are made between families that receive benefits and similar families that do not. As a result estimates are presently believed to suffer from an upward bias.

Besides observational studies, there are also two interesting papers investigating the impact of pilot programs (in Alabama and San Diego) initiated by the USDA to see how a cash transfer would compare to an in-kind transfer. Fraker et. al. (1992) and Ohls et. al. (1992) both find estimates of about 5%. Meaning that households receiving benefits via stamps spent about 5% more income on food than did those households receiving a cash
transfer. In the literature these households are called distorted.

More recent papers written by Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2007 and 2009) instead rely on the historical roll out of the food stamp program within both difference-in-differences, and event study frameworks. Note the setting is slightly different than the randomized experiments from the early 90's in that by using the historic initial launching of the food stamp program, households are receiving a real income shock. However, in the case of randomized experiments in the early 90’s, income is held constant. It is only the form of benefits delivery that is altered, not the households purchasing power. The primary findings of papers using the historical roll-out of the program is that stamps or cash makes no difference for infra-marginal participants (households that spend some cash on food), but that cash transfers will diminish food expenditures for constrained or extra-marginal households (households that only use food stamps to purchase food).

Whitmore (2002) finds that roughly 20% to 30% households are infra-marginal and therefore would be at least as well off in cash only system of benefits. Survey data also suggests that using a cash transfer does result in less aggregate spending on food, but that most of the reductions occur on beverage spending. It is unclear if nutrition is affected although, calories do decrease. For those beneficiaries that have a distorted preference for food consumption as a result of the in-kind nature of the transfer, Whitmore finds they value their benefits at roughly 80 cents on the dollars. This is interesting as it suggest that roughly one fifth to one third of program participants would have an incentive to traffic. A potential point of contention is that since the study doesn’t include pre-intervention data, the definition of an infra-marginal household for the paper is a household that doesn’t use
all its food stamps. Consumer theory suggests this should never occur, unless households sell some of their benefits on a black market. However, the paper also suggests a relatively high re-sale value (80 cents on the dollar) would be necessary to induce the average inframarginal household to engage in fraudulent sales.

Butler and Raymond (1996) also consider nutrition and the possibility individuals select into the food stamp program due to a relative preference for food. Using a sample of the elderly in conjunction with cash-out pilot programs they find that relative to cash, in-kind benefits are not more advantageous. As a counterpoint, Bastiosis et. al. (1998) find that the Food Stamp program is quite beneficial from a nutrition perspective, but their findings rely on data from the 1980’s and do not consider the cash versus in-kind question.

From the perspective of consumption smoothing, Blundell and Pistaferri (2003) find that food stamps do represent a considerable smoothing mechanism in the face of income shocks. However, they find that following a sizable negative income shock, households receiving food stamp benefits consume 30% more food than they would in the presence of a cash transfer.

The question of cash or in-kind is relevant from the perspective that if many recipients spend some of their income on food, there is a much diminished incentive to traffic food stamps. If households engage in trafficking, they must always sell their benefits at some discount. If program participants are spending some of their own cash on food, then selling benefits would leave them needing to buy the same amount of food, but with less ability to do so, since they have sold their benefits at less than face value. Thus, the cash gains would more than be outstripped by the diminished real ability to purchase food.
As a result, trafficking would only be a rational option for constrained (extra-marginal) households that only use food stamps to buy food. In these cases they may find that trading some portion of food benefits for greater liquidity is desirable.

However, there is a criticism of this analysis in that it ignores the within month variation in food stamp benefits and cash availability. The thinking is that at the beginning of the month, households have a relatively high ratio of food stamp benefits to cash. A household that heavily discounts the future (small $\beta$), may choose to sell some benefits for cash. However, later in the month, when food stamp benefits are exhausted, the household may use cash to purchase some food. Thus, a household that spends some of its cash resources on food, may still find it advantageous traffic in food stamps.

1.2.2 How Much Trafficking of Food Stamps Occurs?

A question that has received some attention in the literature is “To what extent is there trafficking in food stamp benefits”. This has long been a concern in that the food stamp program is characterized by very high levels of government expenditure, and with high expenditures comes much scrutiny. Moreover, anecdotal evidence and stories about food stamp misuse, fraud and trafficking are quite common. As a result policy makers are interested in knowing the nature of the market, and its extent.

Whitmore (2002) offers survey data evidence to suggest that food stamps are valued at roughly 65 cents on the dollar. Other estimates have ranged higher, but as this is the most recent credible estimate, it is the figure that I cite throughout the paper. Interestingly, this is not high enough to induce the average infra-marginal household that is estimated to value its benefits at 80 cents on the dollar (Whitmore, 2002). However, this
does not tell us about the relative value that constrained or extra-marginal households may place on their food stamps, particularly at times of the month when they are relatively cash poor.

Macaluso (2000) compiles data from over 10,000 USDA investigations of stores suspected of engaging in trafficking. Findings suggested that a low range estimate of the rate of trafficking is about 4%. That is, at least 4 percent of all food stamp benefits are sold for cash. Moreover, smaller stores are much more likely to engage in this behavior than are large supermarkets. Finally, the suspected degree of trafficking fell during the 1990’s, the author attributes much of this decrease to EBT card reforms which made large scale trafficking much less likely. This last assertion is important with regard to this paper as it supplies empirical evidence for the USDA’s claim that EBT cards increase the risk of a food stamp trafficker being caught and therefore would push down the return for black market food stamp sellers. A key point to keep in mind is that Macaluso offers an estimate of the rate of trafficking that involves stores. It does not, however, offer an estimate with regards to the extent that beneficiaries may sell there benefits to other households.

Ciemnecki et. al. (1998) address an interesting question “Is it possible to rely on survey data to obtain a measure of food stamp trafficking”. The paper relies on a variety of different surveying techniques, as well as ethnographic methods, to ask active food stamp program participants about their behaviors and attitudes towards food stamp fraud and trafficking. Although the authors agree that none of the individual methods was entirely conclusive, all methods suggested that individuals considerable under-reported trafficking. An issues relevant to this paper include assertions that self reported trafficking was lower in
areas that used EBT benefits delivery than in areas that relied on paper-based food stamps. Another key finding was that in the case of EBT trafficking, respondents frequently pointed out that this made selling benefits to other individuals much more difficult as it necessitated both buyer and seller redeem the benefits for food together. This arises as a result of fear on the part of the seller that the buyer will use more benefits than were purchased, or that the card will not be returned.

1.2.3 Stamps vs. EBT

An older literature primarily from the 1990’s examines the benefits and costs of using EBT systems to deliver benefits to program participants. Overall, the literature has been quite supportive of the transition and it is quite likely that the assertions made significantly contributed to the decision to mandate EBT for all states.

Andrews and Wilde (2000) offer a meta-analysis of much of the work done in the 1990’s. One of the key findings that is relevant to this paper is that they find with EBT there are significant benefits from an anti-trafficking perspective. This arises from the fact that in the case of EBT cards, it is very easy for Social Service agencies to monitor the patterns in benefits redemption. A common red-flag is if a store that sells comparatively few groceries (and/or at comparatively high prices) has very large purchases that tend to occur at the beginning of the month. Should this arise with any frequency the store is likely to be investigated. In the instance that investigators find the store engaged in trafficking, the store is likely to lose it’s ability to accept food stamp benefits. Moreover, from the standpoint of program participants, investigators are able to determine which households are engaging in suspicious patterns of benefits redemption.
Andrews and Wilde (1994) also find support for the claim that some households may traffic benefits in the beginning of the month, only to run out of food by the end of the month. Moreover, they are able to show that the general pattern of benefits use throughout the month is far from smooth. It seems the dominant trend is that benefits are redeemed in large quantities at the beginning and end of the month. Interestingly, the largest day for benefits use is the 27th of the month. Many households carefully allocate their spending throughout the month and upon discovering there are sufficient benefits to last until the next release of benefits, they spend the bulk of their balance at the end of the month. The surge at the beginning of the month is consistent with households that did not generally have enough food at the end of the previous month, and those households that are relatively cash constrained and choose to traffic. Interestingly, the bulk of end of month purchases occur in supermarkets (locations that generally are far less likely to traffic benefits), a considerably smaller share of the beginning of month surge occurs in supermarkets, with relatively more transactions occurring in small convenience-type stores (which are generally far more likely to traffic benefits).

Other findings were that EBT was generally much favored by program administrators due to decreased cost and ease of use. The USDA (1994) found that EBT was also shown to be popular with recipients as it diminished shame costs and also lower the cost/risk of loss or theft. Danielson and Klerman (2006) using administrative data, found that EBT coupled with simplified certification resulted in a modest increase in program participation. Hanratty (2006) found that EBT and eased re-certification increased program participation by about 6%, but is unable to separate effects. Interestingly, Haider et. al. (2003) find that
the elderly were generally unresponsive to these changes in terms of participation.

1.2.4 Food Stamps and Labor Supply

Conventional labor theory has strong predictions about labor supply given the presence of social welfare programs that enhance household’s purchasing power. Namely, the expectation is that households will work less in the presence of government aid programs. Hoynes and Schazenbach (2010) use county level variation during the initial roll-out of the Food Stamp program and find that Food Stamps recipiency status are consistent with reduced work hours.

Fraker and Moffit (1988) use structural models and kinked budget constraints to estimate the effect of food stamps on labor supply for female-headed households and found a reduction of about 1 hour of work per week. Keene and Moffit (1998) extend the model by allowing for simultaneous participation in multiple aid programs such as Medicaid, AFDC, and Food Stamps. They find a slightly larger elasticity but still consider a sample of female headed households. Hagstrom (1996) estimates the impact of Food Stamps on married couples’ labor supply using a multinomial logit function. Hagstrom finds estimates of the labor supply response to the reductions in food stamp benefit levels, but not to the program as a whole.
1.3 Background and Data

1.3.1 Historical

The modern Food Stamp Program began with President Kennedy’s 1961 announcement of a pilot food stamp program that was to be established in eight impoverished counties. The pilot programs were later expanded to 43 counties in 1962 and 1963. The success with these pilot programs led to the Food Stamp Act of 1964 (FSA), which gave local areas the authority to start up the Food Stamp Program (FSP) in their county. As with the current FSP, the program was federally funded and benefits were redeemable at approved retail food stores. In the period following the passage of the FSA, there was a steady stream of counties initiating food stamp programs and federal spending on the FSP more than doubled between 1967 and 1969 (from $115 million to $250 million). Support for requiring food stamp programs grew due to considerable press coverage on hunger. This interest culminated in passage of the 1973 Amendments to the Food Stamp Act, which mandated that all counties offer food stamp benefits by 1975.

The food stamp program at its heart, offers qualifying individuals and families vouchers to be spent on approved food items with participating vendors. As of 2008 the food stamp program has been known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Nationally, at present, the average recipient household receives slightly more than $200 a month in benefits. In terms of program administration, states have considerable leeway in structuring the program; thus there are considerable differences in the program’s implementation across different states. However, as long as states meet particular federal standards the ultimate source of funding for the program is at the federal level. Thus, it is
not entirely correct to think of the program as being completely a state or federal program. Although it is a federally funded program, it is administered with federal oversight at the state level in all but one state - California. California is unique in that its food stamp program is administered at the county level with county Social Services offices responsible for determining eligibility, disbursing benefits and aiding clients with program related difficulties. California is still beholden to Federal requirements and is still federally funded, but the day-to-day operations are conducted at the county level whereas other states operate at the state level.

1.3.2 Reforms

During the past 15 years there have been considerable changes in the food stamp program. One such change, that this paper aims to investigate, has been the change in delivery of benefits. Prior to the late 1990’s food stamps were literally just that – stamps. A recipient would receive a booklet of stamps at the beginning of the month containing stamps with particular monetary values that could be used in lieu of cash to make approved food purchases (see Figure 1.1). In contrast, today no recipients use actual stamps. Rather the system of delivering benefits has moved to an electronic system where program participants are issued an electronic bank card (EBT, electronic benefit transfer) linked to an account that contains funds to be used for appropriate purchases (see Figure 2). The system functions very much like a checking account and a debit card. At the beginning of each month a predetermined quantity of funds are deposited into the program participant’s account and the individual is free to use those funds to make purchases. At the point of sale, the participant swipes their EBT card and their account is debited the value of the
purchase being made.

The very first EBT delivery was in Reading, Pennsylvania in 1984. Starting in the early 1990’s several pilot programs were initiated to evaluate the feasibility of benefits delivery via EBT card. In general, administrators advocated for EBT card reforms as a way to reduce costs and improve monitoring, while advocacy groups touted the diminished shame costs associated with EBT cards. By the late 90’s EBT cards had been adopted in some states. In 1996 as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act (better known as the Welfare Reform) the Federal government mandated that all states make the switch to EBT card benefits delivery by October 2002. Full compliance was not reached until late 2004. Although Federal authorities had threatened to withhold funds, in reality this did not occur and there were no disruptions in funding stemming from late conversions to EBT benefits delivery.

1.3.3 Reasons for Reform

The shift from use of paper stamps to an electronic system of benefits delivery was motivated by a variety of concerns. Most prominent among many considerations was cost. Paper food stamps were rather costly from an administrative perspective. Perhaps most interesting among these costs were the measures taken to minimize the impact of counterfeit food stamps. Illustrative examples of costly anti-counterfeiting measures were the use of intaglio printing and sophisticated water marks (see Figure 1.1). Moreover the allocation and distribution of the actual food stamps were quite costly. Some states required recipients come into their local social services agency and collect the stamps in person; thus imposing a considerable cost on beneficiaries. Other states opted for a mail delivery method that
was vulnerable to theft and also exerted sizable mail delivery costs. This method was also problematic for individuals without a permanent address. Moreover, because food stamps were almost as easy to use as cash, mailing food stamps suffered from many of the same problems we might expect to occur had cash been mailed. Thus, a major consideration in the shift to an EBT card system was cost. Not only would social service agencies be able to avoid the onerous costs of producing and delivering food stamps, they would also be able to avoid imposing loss and theft associated with mail based delivery on their clients or the opportunity costs associated with requiring that their clients come to the social service agency to pick-up their stamps in person.

Figure 1.1: Food Stamp

Figure 1.2: New York EBT Card

From the standpoint of a benefits recipient, an important consideration was that paper-based stamps were vulnerable to loss and theft. If an individual lost their month’s supply of food stamps, they were just that – lost. Under an EBT delivery system a beneficiary that loses his or her card has not lost any of the benefits (provided no one has used the lost card, which requires knowledge of a PIN number). They can simply contact their case worker and request a new card be issued to them. Along the same vein of thought, theft is a considerably diminished possibility. Under the old regime of paper-based stamps, stolen stamps could be used by just about anyone. However with an EBT card, a thief would not
be able to use the benefits, despite possession of the card, without knowledge of the PIN number. Moreover, many cards showed a photograph of the rightful owner, making stolen cards even harder to use (see Figure 1.3).

Fraud was another chief concern for the move to an electronic system. Since paper based stamps could be used by virtually anyone there was a tremendous possibility for the re-sale of stamps. Although most program participants were more than content to use their benefits as intended (for the purchase of food), many had a preference for the greater consumption flexibility afforded by cash. These individuals would be willing to sell their food stamps at less than face value in exchange for cash that allowed for a far wider range of consumption expenditures. It is important to recall that the food stamp program was specifically structured as an in-kind transfer, in lieu of a cash transfer, to bypass some of these recipient preferences. Previous empirical research has suggested rather high estimates for the discounted value of food stamps on the black market. The most commonly cited figure is 65 cents (Whitmore, 2002). This avenue led to considerable misuse of the program and fraud. Clearly EBT does not represent a complete panacea, but certainly diminishes the ease and attractiveness of food stamp fraud. With an EBT benefits delivery system, the fraudulent seller of benefits would have to accompany the buyer on their grocery rounds or have sufficient trust in the buyer to give them the PIN with faith that the card would be returned or that future benefits would be paid for; thus requiring a considerable degree of either trust, or inconvenience. Of course these additional constraints would presumably lower the value of food stamp benefits and thus lower the quantity sold on the black market.

A second channel is that a considerable portion of food stamp fraud does not take
the form described above where a recipient sells benefits to another individual. Instead a
common form of food stamp fraud is for the program beneficiary to exchange the benefits
for cash (or unapproved goods) with an approved vendor of food. The transaction in the
past would be as simple as a recipient exchanging their paper stamps for cash with a grocer.
The grocer then would redeem the food stamp coupons with the state for the cash value of
the food that was purportedly sold, but in fact was not. This method of fraud also become
much more cumbersome under an EBT card regime, than in the old paper based system.
The simple reason for this is that EBT is electronic and the sales data is retained by the
state. Any irregularities or suspicious aspects of the sales data could result in investigation
of the suspected grocer. To quote the USDA on the matter:

SNAP electronic benefits transfer (EBT) has given USDA new tools to identify, track, and take action against trafficking. We use the electronic “audit trail” from EBT transactions to identify trafficking and other suspicious activity. The Anti-Fraud Locator using EBT Retailer Transactions (ALERT) system monitors electronic transaction activity and identifies suspicious stores for analysis and investigation.

FNS (Food and Nutrition Services) has a dedicated team of over 100 analysts and investigators across the country dedicated to SNAP retailer compliance. They analyze retailer data, conduct undercover investigations, and process cases – including fines and administrative disqualifications – against violating retailers.

A final consideration was a desire to streamline the provision of benefits to individuals receiving benefits under multiple government aid programs. A considerable subset of SNAP participants also receive benefits through other programs such as general assistance, TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) and SSI (Supplemental Security Income). Many states have chosen to link these accounts to one EBT card so that the card can be used for food purchases under the auspices of SNAP, and also used to make cash withdrawals at ATMs under the provisions of TANF, SSI or other cash aid programs. This
further decreases administration costs for states by streamlining the delivery of benefits. Moreover, it has been argued that it increases ease of use for program participants.

1.3.4 Within California

With regards to food stamps, California is unique from the other 49 states in one key way. California administers its food stamp program (known as Cal-Fresh within California) at the county level and not state wide. Thus, when the State Department of Social Services decided to mandate transition to an EBT system, it was left to each individual county to determine how to reach compliance with the new state requirements. This resulted in considerable variation in the timing of reform with some counties adopting an EBT system years before other counties. This variation in the timing of EBT reforms sets the stage for a potentially attractive natural experiment.

However, such a strategy would be severely undermined if the timing of the reform was endogenously determined by factors that correlate with criminal arrest outcomes. Table 1.1 offers evidence that this was not the case. In Table 1.1 I regress a host of covariates associated with arrest outcomes on the timing of the reform. No covariates are significant in explaining the timing of the reform and the result is robust to changes in specification and sampling. Despite this evidence, the causes of variation in timing of reform are of considerable interest.

1.3.5 Sources of Timing Variation

One issue that had a considerable impact on the timing of reforms was the question of whether to use the EBT for food stamps alone, or to use the EBT with other cash
benefit programs as well. Federal regulations under the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 required that food stamps be delivered via EBT, however there were no requirements that other programs’ benefits be delivered via EBT. Moreover, the state of California had not mandated that these benefits be delivered by EBT. However, slightly more than half of California counties chose to also deliver benefits from other programs via EBT as well (37 of 58 counties, generally more populous). These other programs were CalWORKS, General Assistance/General Relief, Cash Assistance for Immigrants and Refugee Cash Assistance. Converting these other programs as well made things quite a bit more complicated and probably increased the conversion time.

Another consideration was what is known as food stamp stagger differences. Food stamps benefits are generally not all released on the 1st of the month in California (in many states this is the case). Rather some program recipients receive their benefits on the 1st of the month, while others receive it on the 2nd and so on until the last recipients receive their benefits on the last day of the stagger (usually the 10th day, but as late as the 25th in some counties). This is meant to smooth the usage of food stamp benefits so as to aid retailers who serve large numbers of food stamp recipients. Different counties had different algorithms for determining which recipients would receive their benefits on which days. Some algorithms depended on last name, others on the 1st digit of the case number, and others on the last digit of the case number. With the mandated EBT conversion, the state required that all states switch to a system based on the last digit of the case number. For counties already using this system, things were fairly painless. However in other counties, switching the algorithm for determining the stagger would result in some people going more
than 31 days without new benefits. This is prohibited by Federal Law. In these cases there was a need to issue emergency food stamps (paper based) for some folks, and more generally, preparing for a rockier transition to EBT.

The matter of mail-based issuance versus over-the-counter issuance also contributed to variation in reform timing. In all counties there are two populations of recipients with regards to the EBT reform - continuing recipients and new recipients. New recipients being the recipients who only become program participants after, or at the moment of, EBT implementation. When issuing the 1st EBT cards counties had to choose whether to mail out cards and PIN numbers, or have their recipients come into the County Welfare Departments’ offices to receive their cards and PIN numbers, as well as training in some cases. This decision had to be reached independently for both the new and incumbent population. Different counties made different choices, with Over-the-Counter issuance being generally much slower. Moreover some counties required mandatory training in the use of the EBT card for recipients (this correlates strongly with Cash EBT), which also slowed the process.

Language support services were another driver of variation in timing of the reform. California provided materials for recipients in 10 languages. However, some counties felt that they had significant populations that required assistance in additional languages (Cantonese and Tagalog in particular). Counties were responsible for translating documents and brochures into these additional languages and as such this additional work tended to delay conversion to EBT cards.

A key fact to keep in mind is that EBT card services are contracted out to private banks rather than directly provided by the state. When counties had to convert to the EBT
system they had to reach an agreement with a private bank. Naturally, given the complex nature of the task, these negotiations often took considerable time. Sticking points in negotiations with commercial banks were sometimes resolved fairly quickly and easily and in other cases took substantially longer. Some counties reached agreements sooner than others. In particular some of the sticking points in negotiations between private banks and county Social Service Departments were: surcharges for cash benefits access, transaction fees for cash benefits access, cash benefits stagger (3 day versus not at all), mailing based issuance of EBT cards and associated costs, customer/recipient support services, availability of acceptable ATMs for Limited English Proficient recipients, loss/theft replacement services, and language issues (i.e. what languages were to be included in mailings and phone support lines, both automated and personal).

1.3.6 Data

I use two primary sources of data in order to uncover any criminal impacts associated with food stamp reforms. In order to do so I need data that uncovers the specific timing of reforms across California and to be able to match them to criminal arrest data. Moreover, the two data sets need to have geographic and time information so that they may be linked.

Food stamp reform data was obtained via a unique data set that was obtained by conducting telephone interviews with each county Social Service agency in California. I called every agency in California and conducted a phone interview with county officials to determine the timing of reforms and a host of relevant contextual information. That contextual information included: whether or not the county used EBT for cash aid programs,
whether or not the county converted under state order or prior to the state order, whether the county reached compliance in time or not, if EBT cards were issued in person, by mail, or both. Finally, I asked the county official if they believed there was anything unique to their county’s conversion process. This generally did not elicit a response, but in some cases it was revealed what the particular difficulties were in converting to an EBT card regime. However, the most important piece of information was the month and the year in which the county converted. This is vital as it allows us to determine if arrests were made in a paper-based food stamp regime or an EBT regime - in effect whether a county at a given time belongs in the treatment group or the control group. In some cases the title of the agency varies. For example, some counties implement food stamps through the office of Health and Human Services, while others have the title of Social Services. Nonetheless, the task of the county agency remains the same. Along the same vein, interviews were generally conducted with an official having the title of “CAL-Fresh Program Manager” or “CAL-Fresh Program Coordinator”. Although the title varies, the nature of the job remains the same.

Criminal arrest data is obtained from the California Monthly Arrest and Citation Register (MACR). The MACR provides a census of all arrests in California at both the adult and juvenile level for both misdemeanor and felony arrests. It includes a host of information about the arrest and the individual level characteristics about the arrested individual such as race, gender, date of birth, date of arrest, offense level (misdemeanor or felony), as well as various classification data revealing the type of arrest (effectively the purported crime, larceny, prostitution, public intoxication, homicide etc.). A minor shortcoming of the data is that in instances where an individual is arrested for multiple offenses, only the most
egregious offense is recorded. That is if someone is arrested for carjacking and driving with a dirty license plate, only the carjacking is recorded. The MACR provides a daily count for every date since 1972. Of particular interest to me is that the data set tells me the date and the county in which the arrest occurred. Thus, for any arrest I am able to determine whether the arrest occurred under a paper-based food stamp regime or an EBT-based regime.

County characteristics are obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS), Current Population Survey (CPS) and the 2000 decennial census. This allows for explicit controls for employment, income, demographics and other observable characteristics. The ACS and Census jointly provide annual estimates (Census in the year 2000, ACS in non-census years), while the CPS provides monthly employment estimates. I also use Federal USDA annual time-series data to control for food stamp program characteristics such as participation rates, and benefit levels by county. The Survey of Income Program Participation allows me to control for some recipient characteristics, annually at the state level.

1.4 Empirical Strategy and Identification

An intervention that effectively lowers the value of fraudulently sold food stamps should reduce the volume and value of fraudulent food stamp purchases. This is a direct consequence of the greater difficulty and/or risk in using trafficked food stamps following EBT reforms. However, the impact on crime may not be so clear. One manner of thinking is that since recipients will no longer be tempted to sell their benefits to the degree that they did under a paper-based regime, they will have less income to spend on items and activities that may increase criminal acts. These crimes may be thought of as crimes of
relative affluence. Since benefits are delivered at the beginning of the month it is likely that any income surge occurs as the beginning of the month. These are crimes that are more likely to occur when individuals have a surplus of disposable income, these offense would likely include petty drug crimes, public intoxication, gambling, solicitation of prostitutes, driving under the influence and any other crime associated with the purchase of what may be considered ill-advised temptation goods. On the other hand a reduction in income from diminished benefits’ resale values represents a decrease in the real income of program participants. This will likely increase the prevalence of crime committed as a result of economic need. These crimes may be thought of as crimes of relative destitution or what I call end-of-month crime since income is likely to “run dry” at the end of the month. Some examples of these crimes are larceny, prostitution, theft, burglary and robbery. In short the reform may, cause drug and alcohol related crime to fall, income motivated crime to rise and the total impact remains ambiguous. Moreover, it is not clear that the intervention will provide a large enough income shock to a large enough component of the population to elicit an impact that is distinguishable from zero.

In terms of the magnitude of the shock, within California during the time frame from 1998 to 2006 the average food stamp recipient receives about $140 per month in current (2013) dollars. The mean size of a household receiving benefits is 2.2 people, so this works out to $308 a month per household. Using the estimate of black market value of 65 cents provided by Whitmore (2002), this works out to a maximum income shock of about $200 per month for the average household. In 2006 the average monthly income of households receiving food stamp benefits was $771 (excluding food stamp benefits). Given these figures,
food stamp benefits are equal to about 40% of a household’s income in California. According to the USDA, at the national level:

*On average, SNAP benefits boosted gross monthly income by 39 percent for all participating households and by 45 percent for households with children.*

Given the above, it is clear that the upper end of potential income shocks is quite likely large enough to have a bearing on criminal acts. Households accustomed to receiving $200 in cash relative to a monthly income of $771 are quite plausibly going to behave differently than households not having to adjust to a large drop in cash income. However, it is not clear what share of households might experience a negative shock, nor what the magnitude of the typical shock might be (other than the estimate of the upper bound). Unfortunately acquisition of such information would require fraudulent users of food stamps and their traffickers to truthfully reveal their behavior. Although this information would certainly be desirable, it is unlikely to be obtained in the near future.

Before considering regression analysis it is important to verify that the empirical environment is indeed appropriate for such techniques to be used. The underlying assumption that allows for analysis is that the timing of the reform is largely exogenous to criminal behavior and/or food stamp participation. If it is the case that some counties reform earlier because the county’s population is disproportionately predisposed to criminal acts or food stamp usage, and county administrators predicate their conversion timing on this information we no longer are able to say that the timing of the reform is exogenous. Without exogenous timing of the reform, I lose the quasi-random timing assumption and my estimates will suffer from confounding factors. Moreover, from an empirical standpoint counties belong to the control group so long as they are using paper based benefits delivery,
and move to the treatment group once EBT card reforms are implemented. The empirical strategy would suffer if the control groups did not serve as a credible counterfactual for the changes in the treatment group.

Table 1.1 presents evidence that timing of the reform is indeed exogenous to relevant observable characteristics. We divide counties into four groups based on the timing of the conversion from a paper-based system to an EBT system. Figure 1.3 reveals the geographic distribution of these groupings. Group 1 is composed of the earliest reformers and subsequent groups converted at a later point in time, with group 4 being the group of counties that reformed the latest. Figure 1.4 presents a time line that shows the order in which all counties adopted EBT card systems of benefits delivery. Table 1.1 shows the means of various relevant observable characteristics such as food stamp usage rates, crime rates, unemployment rates, demographic characteristics and other potential pertinent characteristics. The central finding is that counties across groups are not systematically different across observable characteristics barring urbanicity. In general, early adopters tend to be larger and more urban counties than late adopters. The potentially reflects the fact that larger county welfare agencies likely have more resources that they are able to bring to bear, and thus were generally able to convert more quickly. There are, of course, notable exceptions. San Bernardino County (an extremely sparsely populated county) was among the first to convert, while Ventura County (a quite urban county) was among the late reformers.
Table 1.1: Early and Late Reforming County Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000 Decennial Census</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2005 American Community Survey</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group 1</td>
<td>Group 2</td>
<td>Group 3</td>
<td>Group 4</td>
<td>Group 1</td>
<td>Group 2</td>
<td>Group 3</td>
<td>Group 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>33.64</td>
<td>34.52</td>
<td>35.61</td>
<td>38.13</td>
<td>35.94</td>
<td>36.94</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39.64</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21.92)</td>
<td>(22.13)</td>
<td>(22.64)</td>
<td>(22.91)</td>
<td>(22.35)</td>
<td>(22.75)</td>
<td>(23.02)</td>
<td>(23.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.10)</td>
<td>(2.14)</td>
<td>(1.98)</td>
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<td>(1.98)</td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
<td>(1.80)</td>
<td>(1.60)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Median Income</td>
<td>27000</td>
<td>30000</td>
<td>27000</td>
<td>32000</td>
<td>33200</td>
<td>35000</td>
<td>32000</td>
<td>39000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Stamp Use Rate</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent White</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Asian</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Hispanic</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Married</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Employed</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>0.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity Measure</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>No High School</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Citizen</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td>0.847</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>0.886</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>0.942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

County groupings determined by timing of reform. Group 1 earliest counties with each successive group reforming later. Group 4 being the latest.

Group 1: San Diego and San Bernardino counties.

Group 2: Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno, Humboldt, Imperial, Kern, Marin, Merced, Orange, Riverside, San Francisco, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, San Mateo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Tulare, and Yolo counties.

Group 3: Butte, Colusa, Del Norte, El Dorado, Glenn, Inyo, Kings, Madera, Mono, Monterey, Nevada, San Benito, Shasta, Siskiyou, Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, and Yuba counties.

Group 4: Amador, Alpine, Calaveras, Lake, Mariposa, Modoc, Napa, Placer, Plumas, Sierra, and Tuolumne counties.
Table 1.1 also serves an important role in that as each county transitions to EBT status, other non-EBT counties form the control group which allows me to generate a counterfactual understanding of what the county in question would look like in the absence of EBT reforms. Stated differently, early adopting counties serve as a control group for late adopting counties, and when those late adopting counties finally adopt, their outcomes are then compared to early adopting counties. If it is the case that early and late adopting
counties are wildly different, there would be considerable concern that treatment and control
groups are not sufficiently balanced. Again, Table 1.1 suggests that there are no major
differences between early and late reformers. Thus, the treatment and control groups are
able to create an environment conducive to estimate a reliable treatment effect using credible
counterfactuals.

We use a difference-in-differences (DID) regression framework in order to evaluate
the impact of EBT card reforms on crime. The simplest form of DID requires that we have
two groups and two time periods. One group is a control group that is never effected by a
treatment (EBT card reforms in this case) while another group transitions from not being
effected by the treatment, to being impacted in the second period. This framework is very
attractive as it allows us to rule out confounding issues that are time invariant differences
across the two groups, as well as any time varying changes affecting both groups. Thus,
in the absence of time varying differences across groups we are generally able to uncover
the impact of the treatment provided we have data and an environment conducive to the
technique. The simplest DID framework would take the form of estimating the following
regression:

EQ 1:  \( Crime = \alpha + \beta \text{treatment\_indicator} + \gamma \text{Post\_indicator} + \delta (\text{Post \ast treatment}) + \varepsilon \)

Here \( \delta \) reveals the treatment effect and is given by the interaction of a treatment
indicator and an indicator equal to one in the second time period.

The framework should be slightly more general than the simplest form of DID esti-
mation given the more complex nature of the rollout of EBT card reforms across California.
The circumstances are different in that rather than having two groups in two time periods, there are 58 counties that all change from being paper based counties (control counties), to being EBT counties (treatment counties) and the transition from control to treatment group is specific to each county and can occur in any month from January 1998 to December 2006. This greater degree of complexity suggests a more general specification, but also allows for considerably improved results in that there are effectively 58 quasi-experiments occurring at different points in time. Thus, the robustness and credibility of the results should be enhanced.

1.4.1 Baseline Model

We estimate the following baseline regression to determine impacts on the overall crime level.

\[ EQ\ 2: \ A_{c,m} = \alpha + \sum_{i=-20}^{20} \beta_i (\tau_{icm} = 1) + \lambda_c + \phi_m + X_{c,m} + \varepsilon_{c,m} \]

\( A_{c,m} \) denotes the total number of arrests in a given county during a given month, \( \alpha \) is an intercept term, \( \lambda_c \) represents county level fixed effects, \( \phi_m \) represents monthly fixed effects, \( X \) is a set of county level controls such as the unemployment rate, population, demographics, average benefit levels, average food stamp household size and the like, \( \varepsilon \) is the error term. \( \tau \) is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the month in which an individual county converts from a paper-based regime to an EBT card system of benefits delivery. \( \tau_{5cm} \) means that the county converted 5 months ago while, \( \tau_{-4cm} \) means that the county will convert 4 months later. \( \beta \) is the coefficient of interest and represents the treatment.
effect of EBT card reforms on criminal arrests from month to month. The data is arranged in event-time so that arrest rates are examined relative to the time of conversion and not relative to some more arbitrary point in time. Thus, for an earlier converting county, such as Yolo County, the regression reveals the changes in the arrest rate for a time window around 2002, this remains true for a late converting county such as Fresno County except that the relevant time window occurs around 2006.

This framework is attractive in that it is possible to see the evolution of the treatment effect over time, rather than viewing it as a one time permanent shift as we would have in the traditional framework. The indexing from \( i = -20 \) to \( i = 20 \) indicates that I consider all the months around a 20 month time window both before, and after the conversion to an EBT card system. Thus, it is possible to see how crime evolves for a full year around the moment of conversion. This allows one to see how crime rates evolve leading up to the conversion, and how they change and evolve following the conversion. It is important to note that this excludes the months that are more than 20 months prior to conversion and more than 20 months after conversion. These months outside the window are critical in the sense that they form the comparison group against which the treatment indicators can be understood. Thus, the coefficients of the treatment effect should be interpreted relative to those months that lie outside the 20 month window.

If conversion to an EBT system of benefits delivery has an impact, I should find that the \( \beta \) coefficient estimates are indistinguishable from zero in the months prior to conversion. Positive or negative coefficients different from zero would suggest that people anticipate the change prior to its occurring and alter their criminal behavior as a result.
This does not appear to happen. If there is an impact, I would expect to see a drop or increase in crime at \( i = 0 \), the month of conversion. If the conversion results in an increase in crime, \( \beta \) should be positive and distinguishable from zero, while if the conversion decreases crime we would expect \( \beta \) to be negative and distinguishable from zero.

There is also the issue of permanence. That is, supposing the existence of an effect one would also be concerned with whether an impact is lasting or transitory. If the impact is lasting then I would expect the \( \beta \) to remain different from zero for all the months following conversion. However, it may also be the case that any impact is driven primarily by the unexpected nature of the income shock and/or recipients’ inability to perfectly adjust their behavior just as the conversion takes place. There is also the possibility of a lag. That is, it may take a month or two before any impact is fully realized. Finally, if the effect is transitory in nature we would like to be able to characterize the duration of time before criminal behavior settles back to its pre-conversion long-run average. In the case of a transitory shock, one would expect to see crime rise or fall during the month of conversion and then the effect should converge back to zero over time. By examining the nature of the treatment effect parameter over time, I hope to achieve these objectives.

1.4.2 Crimes of relative affluence

A separate regression is used for crimes of affluence. Recall these are the crimes one would expect to fall given a negative income shock as individuals will have less disposable income to devote to drug or alcohol expenditures. The hypothesis is that conversion to an EBT card system of benefits delivery will diminish the real disposable income to food stamp recipients; as those that choose to sell their benefits will face prospective buyers that
are less willing to pay the same price as under a paper based system. As a result, those crimes that are more likely to occur when individuals possess more income will decrease. These types of crimes include, petty drug crimes, public intoxication, gambling, driving under the influence, solicitation of prostitutes and disorderly conduct. These crimes are all more likely to occur when individuals feel they have an income that more than meets the most pressing of immediate needs. Some proportion of this surplus income will be directed to the purchasing of illegal goods and services, such as drugs and/or soliciting prostitutes. Another possibility is that drugs and alcohol financed by a temporary windfall may lead to other illegal acts, such as disorderly conduct or driving under the influence. Clearly a tremendous proportion of these crimes are not driven by windfall income generated by food stamp sales. However, there may be considerable changes in these crimes attributable to food stamp benefits delivery reforms. My analysis aims to identify them if they do indeed occur. The regression takes the form:

$$\text{EQ 3: } ARA_{c,m} = \alpha + \sum_{i=-20}^{20} \beta_i (\tau_{icm} = 1) + \lambda_c + \phi_m + X_{c,m} + \varepsilon_{c,m}$$

This equation is identical to the prior specification except that I have restricted the data to only include arrests that meet the above definition of crimes of affluence. Here, $ARA_{c,m}$ is the number of criminal arrests in a given county for a given month.

1.4.3 Crimes of Relative Destitution

Similarly, I also restrict the analysis to crimes that are more likely to occur during periods of economic hardship. In many instances individuals are motivated to engage in
criminal activity because of a lack of disposable income. These crimes offer the very real potential of having a short-run positive impact on an individual’s budget constraint. I consider just about every form of theft, larceny, prostitution, robbery and burglary. I have dubbed these “crimes of relative destitution” because they represent those crimes that are most likely to occur when individuals’ disposable income is insufficient to cover expenses. In these instances, individuals may turn to crime as a way of increasing their incomes. I estimate the following regression:

EQ 4: $ARD_{c,m} = \alpha + \sum_{i=-20}^{20} \beta_i (\tau_{icm} = 1) + \lambda_c + \phi_m + X_{c,m} + \varepsilon_{c,m}$

This equation is identical to the prior specification except that I have restricted myself to only consider arrests that meet the above definition of crimes of destitution. Here, $ARD_{c,m}$ is the total number of arrests in a given county, for a given month.

A separate point worth noting is that since I expect crimes of destitution to rise and crimes of affluence to fall, their magnitudes may determine the effect on total arrests. That is I hope to decompose the total change into two separate effects. One is expected to be negative and the other positive. Thus, the relative magnitude of the two effects will potentially reveal a sizable share of the total effect. If the rise in crimes of destitution dominates than I would expect see a positive total effect. If a fall in crimes of affluence dominates, I expect there to be negative total effect.
1.5 Results

1.5.1 Total Arrests

Table 1.2 reveals the results of estimating EQ. 2 from above. Standard errors are all clustered at the county level. Column (1) is a baseline OLS regression, without fixed effects, and with a set of county level controls. This is primarily provided as a baseline for comparison and also simply to see what OLS estimates suggest. The preferred specification is as shown in the previous section and relies on fixed effects models. All fixed effects specifications include both year/month and county fixed effects. Column (2) includes county and year/month fixed effects, and also offers controls for time and county characteristics (at the yearly observation level). Column (3) is the same fixed effects model but it includes county specific time trends. I include linear trends interacted with pre-treatment controls to control for possible (linear, parametric) trends across counties. Column (4) is the preferred specification. I add monthly time varying county controls to the specification from column (4). Doing so does not appreciably alter the magnitude nor precision of the estimates. Again column (4) is the preferred specification. Results are robust to changes in specification and only modest changes in magnitude and precision are present. This suggests that the identification is “clean”. Note that for tabular purposes I have only shown coefficient estimates for a 6 month window as this is necessitated by space constraints. However, the estimation is done using a 20 month time window as discussed previously. Figure 1.5 reveals the time evolution of the parameter of interest $\beta$ over a 20 month window, in relation to the timing of the reform for the full sample.

It is worth noting that prior to the reform no estimates of $\beta$ are distinguishable
from zero. This is as expected, but also reveals that individuals receiving food stamp benefits do not appear to be altering their criminal behavior in anticipation of any changes in the food stamp program. This would suggest that recipients either: (1) do not believe the reform will create a large enough shock to necessitate criminal acts in anticipation of the reform, or (2) do not correctly anticipate the timing of the reform and thus do not alter their behavior. If I do not consider anticipation and modification of criminal behavior to be a credible possibility, the lack of any effect prior to reform strongly suggests that the reform is driving any impact at the time of conversion and not some confounding factor. It is extremely unlikely that such a confounding factor could closely match the timing of the reform across 58 counties. Thus, the lack of any pre-reform impact is strong support for the validity of the empirical identification strategy.

Potentially of greater interest is whether there is an impact, and if so what is the sign of the impact, at the moment of conversion and the months that follow. Table 1.2 row one shows the impact at the moment of conversion. It is positive and statistically very
distinguishable from zero. Figure 1.5 shows that it represents a sizable jump from the crime rate in the months preceding conversion and in particular the most recent pre-conversion month. This lends strong evidence to the claim that EBT conversion has had an impact on the criminal behavior of food stamp recipients.

Moreover the sign of the impact is positive. This suggests that the dominant mechanism for which the reform altered crime is that individuals’ income has experienced a negative shock and that criminal behavior has increased to compensate for the income shortfall. It this is the case I should also find a positive and significant effect for end-of-the-month crimes. I also must consider whether this income compensating crime is the dominant effect or simply the sole effect. It is possible there is another, opposite in sign, effect by which individuals are less able (or so choose) to engage in certain criminal acts that are enabled by higher disposable incomes such as petty drug crimes and alcohol related crimes.

Another concern is the magnitude of the impact. That is, from the perspective of practical significance, does it appear to be fairly small impact or a relatively large one. Recall that the dependent or left hand side variable is defined as being simply the number of arrests within a county per month. My estimate of the parameter of interest for the month of conversion using the preferred specification is 108.5. This suggests that roughly an additional 108 arrests are made in the average county as a result of conversion to an EBT system of delivery benefits. This may appear to be rather modest, and although not tremendously large, I take a slightly different view. We must recall that the average food stamp household receives roughly $308 worth of monthly benefits. Very few households are
likely selling anywhere near this quantity of benefits. Unfortunately there is no data on these black market transactions, but it is unlikely that many households sell all their benefits. Rather it is much more credible to claim that some households sell some of their benefits. Thus, the negative income shock is likely not to be a tremendously large one from a nominal standpoint. Moreover only some segment of the population is actively receiving food stamp benefits. As a result, the impact, an additional 108 arrests in the average county, must be qualified by these considerations. Finally, we must remind ourselves that only some portion of criminal acts are observed and result in arrests by law enforcement officials. Thus, it is likely that although arrests increase by 79, crimes likely rise by a larger margin. In terms of a percentage, the mean number of arrests in the average county over the period 1997 to 2006 is 2,140. Given that, an additional 79 arrests represents an increase of 5%. In light of the modest income change for a subsample of the population, the impact does not strike me as uninteresting at all. It would be highly desirable if I were able to refine the estimate to reflect a treatment-on-the treated (TOT) estimate. However, that would require knowing an arrestee’s food stamp recipient status, which is simply not possible given current data constraints.

Finally, I are also concerned with the issue of permanence. The evidence implies that there is in fact an impact, it is positive and distinct from zero; however, is the impact lasting or merely transitional? The evidence suggests that it is rather transitional in nature and that effects are not lasting. Figure 1.5 reveals the values of $\beta$ over time and we are able to see how $\beta$ changes in the months following conversion. The impact is largest during the 1st month of conversion, and then shrinks in magnitude. It remains positive and significant
for the first five months following conversion and then returns to its pre-reform levels where it become indistinguishable from zero. Thus, there is an impact, but also considerable fade-out. By the sixth month any impacts are no longer identifiable. I conclude that effects were transitory and not lasting.

Transitory effects would appear to support the interpretation that individuals are able to adapt to the shock of conversion and return to their baseline levels of criminal activity within four months of conversion. Underlying stories to reconcile an initial spike followed by fade out present themselves as two plausible interpretations. One is that recipients are ill prepared for the negative income shock and are at first unable to downwardly adjust their consumption patterns. As a result, they turn to crime as a way maintaining the previous level of consumption. However, over time individuals are able to adapt to a new, lower level of consumption and crime is no longer used as mechanism to smooth the downward consumption shift.

Another interpretation is similar in that individuals need time to adapt to the new environment, but instead of adapting to a new and lower consumption level, they need to adapt to a new and different black market. The thinking here is that with EBT, some individuals that previously sold their benefits, will now need to find a new buyer of benefits. This may take time and effort. During this transitional time, criminal arrests rise until program participants wishing to traffic benefits are able to find a new buyer. This second interpretation seems most valid in the case where SNAP beneficiaries sell their benefits to a grocer. Following EBT card reforms, it is very likely that a reduced share of grocers would still be willing to exchange benefits for cash or prohibited goods.
This is primarily because EBT cards allow for much more sophisticated records regarding food stamp purchases. Moreover, it is still the case that the effective exchange rate for benefits will drop, reflecting the “risk premium” that grocers may demand in the newer, higher risk environment. Finally, in the new environment grocers may not have a complete understanding of the risks involved in food stamp trafficking. In a state of relative ignorance, risk aversion may play an important role.

1.5.2 Crimes of Relative Affluence

Although I have established the existence of a total increase in crime, I am also interested in the types of arrests that increase following conversion to an EBT card system of benefits delivery. The primary mechanism for changing criminal behavior is an expected decline in income for households that chose to sell food stamp benefits on the black market. Following reform efforts I strongly expect that these households will face a decline in disposable income. One effect this may have is that crimes that are more likely to occur in the presence of a surfeit of cash should decline. That is, those crimes that are most likely to occur when households have greater liquidity. These crimes would primarily be petty drug and alcohol offenses. Furthermore I also consider crimes that are frequently associated with, or precipitated by drugs and alcohol such as driving while intoxicated, domestic abuse and disorderly conduct. Gambling also seems a sensible inclusion as this may be far more likely in the presence of excess liquidity.

In short I find no evidence that arrests for these types of crimes show any response to food stamp benefit delivery reforms. Table 1.3 shows regression results for EQ. 3. I follow the same conventions with regards to specification as in the analysis of total arrests.
Here, I see little evidence of any effects different from zero. Figure 1.6 shows the evolution of the parameter of interest over time.

**Figure 1.6: Crime of Relative Affluence, Before vs. After Conversion**

The finding with regards to crimes of affluence suggest a possible interpretation. A potential explanation is that the margin of the negative income shock is insufficient to induce a change in criminal activity. Another way of thinking about this is that these crimes are fairly inelastic with respect to income changes. This strikes me as an attractive interpretation given that a large proportion of the arrests are associated with drug offenses, which may be characterized as fairly income inelastic, especially given the small nature of the expected income shock. Another possibility is that the hypothesis that these crimes are the best to consider when looking for the effects of a negative income shock is simply wrong. That is I should really be looking at other arrest categories, and I have failed to choose wisely.

Again I find little evidence to support the hypothesis that these crimes should diminish following EBT card reform as a result of diminished income stemming from reduced
black market transaction values.

1.5.3 Crimes of Relative Destitution

Given that I find evidence for a total increase in arrests and simultaneously do not find evidence for a decrease in those arrests most expected, I should find that some arrests are in fact rising. Those arrest categories deemed most likely to rise have been dubbed crimes of relative destitution. These are the crimes most likely to see an uptick following a negative income shock. Again I have considered those crimes most likely to be motivated by a need for income. These crimes are larcenies, burglary, robbery and prostitution. Although many of these acts are likely not motivated by a short term liquidity constraint it is entirely reasonable that many of these acts are precisely motivated by a need for income in the short-run. Thus, I expect to see an increase in the number of arrests associated with these criminal acts following food stamp reform.

Table 1.4 shows results for estimation of EQ. 4. Again convention with regards to specification and columns is the same as for total arrests and arrests of relative affluence. In short, the results generally mirror the total arrest effects, but with greater precision and greater persistence. That is I find that there is an uptick in arrests, distinct from zero, at the moment the reforms take place followed by a gradual decline for six months until arrests converge back to the pre-reform levels. The estimate of $\beta$ is 25.68, that is the number of arrests in the average county, during the 1st month EBT cards are used, increases by 25.68. Again, this may seem fairly small, but given that I am considering a fairly modest income shock for a fairly small component of the population, I do not find this result to be an uninteresting one. In terms of a percentage the baseline mean dependent
variable is 256 arrests of this type per month, in the average county. Thus, an additional 25 arrests works out to a 9.76% increase. As stated before, ideally I would like to obtain an estimate for only those individuals participating in the food stamp program at the time of the arrest. This would yield a more desirable treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimate. However, arrest data does not reveal food stamp program participation status so this is not currently possible.

Figure 1.7: Crime of Relative Destitution, Before vs. After Conversion

My results suggest that the hypothesis is correct in the sense that those crimes motivated by a need for greater short-run liquidity, do in fact see a rise following EBT card reform. Again I attribute this result to a loss in real income stemming from a loss in income due to diminished black market food stamp values.

An interesting consideration is to what extent this increase in end-of-month arrests accounts for the increase in total arrests. A simple comparison of the estimates for $\beta$ across the EQ. 1 and EQ. 3 suggests that approximately one quarter of the increase in arrests is accounted for by these income motivated crimes. That suggests that the remaining three
quarters are attributable to increases in other arrest categories. I am generally unable to determine what these other arrests are, but the gap suggests that there are indeed other crimes that also see an increase. However, estimating the impact of EBT reforms on other crime categories generally provides estimates that are too imprecise to yield credible results.

1.6 Robustness

Since the treatment in this case is the implementation of an EBT card system for food stamp benefits, but the estimates of the treatment effect are for the total population it stands to reason that estimates will be larger where a greater share of the population is exposed to the treatment. To translate this thought into the context of food stamp reforms means that I should see a bigger impact of criminal arrests in counties with a relatively high proportion of residents receiving food stamps. In the case of California, the State Department of Social Services defines a county as having a high proportion of residents using food stamps if the use rate is greater than 8%. I am able to determine the proportion of the county receiving food stamps for the year 2000, and for the years from 2006 to present. I take the average participation rate for the years 2000 and 2006 and separate counties into “high” and “low” groups. High refers to the group of counties where the average participation rate exceeds 8% and low is the group of counties where the average participation rate is less than 8%. Table 1.5 presents the result of re-estimating the previous regressions after splitting the sample.

The two left hand columns correspond to estimates for the total arrest counts, while the right hand two columns are restricted to being only income motivated crimes. In
general findings are supportive in the sense that estimates are almost universally larger in the counties that have a high proportion of food stamp recipients than in counties with a lesser concentration of food stamp recipient households. For the sake of clear intuition with regards to the meaning of the coefficients all regressions are done in levels thus dividing each estimate by the constant is necessary. In the case of total arrests the regressions suffer from a considerable degree of imprecision. However, this is to be expected given that I have reduced the sample size by a considerable margin and the estimates gleaned from the full sample, although very distinguishable from zero, are modest in magnitude. In the case of income motivated crimes, estimates are fairly precise and again we see that the magnitude of the coefficients is considerably larger for counties with a high proportion of residents receiving SNAP benefits. Thus, I find this table is supportive of the assertion that food stamp EBT reforms are driving the increase in arrests and not some contemporaneous confounding factor. If it is the case that counties with a higher share of program participants experience a larger effect that counties with smaller shares of program participants, then any confounding factor would not only need to match a sizable component of the 58 counties in the timing of adoption reform, but also would need to create a larger response in counties where food stamp usage is more prevalent. Although possible, I argue that this is quite unlikely.

1.7 Conclusion

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or Food Stamps, has and continues to be a widely used and popular program for assisting low income households with their
food expenditures. In the past decade we have seen a transition from a paper-based system of benefits delivery to an EBT card based system. This change has been primarily motivated by cost considerations. Although the change has been highly successful in this regard, there are other possible changes that remain interesting and worthy of investigation. One such consideration has been the impact of the EBT card reforms on program participants. In particular, EBT reforms have substantially diminished the relative attractiveness of black market food stamp benefits by making the transfer of benefits much more cumbersome and difficult. This paper considers the likely income reduction faced by households that made use of black market food stamp sales and considers the impact of this income reduction on criminal behavior.

Theory is ambiguous on the impact of such an income reduction on criminal activity in that some offenses (what I have called crimes of relative affluence) are likely to fall as they are at least partially enabled by higher disposable incomes. Meanwhile, other crimes are likely to rise as they are associated with relative destitution and the need for great short-run liquidity (what I have called income motivated crimes). Thus, the total effect is ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint.

I exploit quasi-random timing of food stamp reforms in California counties to identify and measure the impact of food stamp reforms on arrests. In California each county is responsible for administering it’s own food stamp program. Following a federally ordered mandate that all states upgrade to EBT card systems, California counties began the conversion process. Some counties completed their conversions quite quickly, while others took several years. Across the 58 counties there exists a considerable degree of variation in
the timing that appears exogenous to criminal behavior at the county level.

My results suggest that following implementation of reforms, total arrests rise and in particular, income motivated crimes rise. The estimates suggest that for the average county the number of arrests rises by about 108 in the first month EBT cards are in use. I find no evidence that drug and alcohol related crimes fall as was expected. Moreover, it appears that the effect is not lasting in the sense that impacts for total arrests fade-out after the first six months under the new benefits delivery regime. That is, total arrests rise and remain at an elevated level for six months and then converge back to pre-existing levels. In the case of income motivated crimes, the impact also lasts for a total of 6 months.

From a policy perspective, two key conclusions can potentially be gleaned. One, is that income shocks need not be large to result in real changes in criminal activity. For those households experiencing a negative income shock following EBT card reforms, it is very unlikely that the shock is terrible large. The upper limit for the income shock appears to be about $200. Moreover it is quite probable that most households do not engage in defrauding the government. Nonetheless, I find evidence of a very real change in criminal arrests. Thus, negative income shocks do not need to be nominally large. Secondly, it appears that any effects are not lasting and that people will fairly quickly learn to adapt to the new environment. Hence crime does not stay elevated for a lengthy period of time following the reform. Policy recommendations would be that if policy makers are able to anticipate policy changes that will diminish the incomes of the poor and needy, they should potentially be prepared for a transitory increase in criminal activity, even if the suspected income drop is small. Moreover, it is particularly those crimes motivated by a need or desire
for liquidity that are likely to rise following a negative income shock.

Further avenues for potential research would be that I am generally unable to determine the magnitude of the income shock and I am unable to refine my estimates to be treatment-on-the-treated estimates. If it were feasible to acquire both of these pieces of valuable information, I would potentially be able to arrive at a very interesting estimate on the income elasticity of criminal acts for a vulnerable component of the population. Successful resolution of these issues would substantially further this line of research.
### Table 1.2: Total Arrests

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Standard errors in parentheses  
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Observations 4,212 6,156 6,156 6,156
R-squared 0.970 0.101 0.144 0.221
Month Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Characteristics Yes No No Yes
Number of counties 58 58 58 58
Mean Dependent Var. 867 867 867 867

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.4: Crimes of Relative Destitution

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Observations 4,212 6,156 6,156 6,156
R-squared 0.965 0.136 0.192 0.145
Month Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Characteristics Yes No No Yes
Number of counties 58 58 58 58
Mean Dependent Var. 256 256 256 256

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.5: County Program Participation: High and Low

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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Chapter 2

Have Electronic Benefits Cards Improved Food Access for Food Stamp Recipients?

2.1 Introduction

During the past 15-20 years numerous in-kind and cash based government aid programs have moved from paper based vouchers, to electronic ones. Electronic delivery of benefits is predicated on a system where benefits are loaded into an account that is drawn down over a period of time using an electronic benefits transfer card (EBT). Essentially, the system works just like a checking account and a debit card. The key differences being that government agencies provide the funds for the account, while contracted banks provide the EBT card, and manage the account with oversight from government regulators. The most
visible of these reforms has been in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps). In the past, aid recipients would receive monthly booklets of coupons or stamps. These stamps would enable them to purchase approved food from participating vendors at no cost. However, the paper based form of benefits delivery has fallen out of favor for a variety of reasons. Paramount among those reasons was the desire to reduce costs, and streamline the provision of benefits. Although it is clear the switch to EBT cards has been highly successful in reducing costs, there remain questions about other less immediately apparent effects. We intend to determine whether or not the use of EBT cards in the food stamp program, had an impact on the food security of program participants.

Food security is a tremendously important issue from a multitude of perspectives. One distressing aspect of food insecurity is that it afflicts tremendous numbers of children who are susceptible to harm stemming from hunger and compromised nutrition. Murphy et. al (1998) shows that children that suffer from food insecurity are more prone to a wide range of health problems, poor social interactions and have worse educational performance. These problems can result in adverse educational, criminal and labor market outcomes. Paradoxically, Jimenez (2003) and Aliamo et. al. (2001) find evidence food insecurity leads to obesity in many children, and a host of deleterious health outcomes associated with obesity. Thus, food insecurity is clearly not a trivial matter. A commonly held opinion suggests that only the most callous could claim children are to be held accountable for their parents ability to ensure sufficient access to food. Moreover, some argue that in a wealthy society such as our own, food insecurity should be exceedingly rare, rather than a common
occurrence for children who may suffer significant costs and are truly undeserving. This thinking is extended by some to include adults. Although few would argue that everyone is entitled to a certain level of consumption, many have made the case that no one should go hungry in such a prosperous nation. We do not explicitly take a stance on these matters, but clearly hunger is an issue that evokes strong opinions and is an issue few would deem unimportant. Moreover, it is likely a very common problem with the USDA reporting as many as 20% of households received food stamp benefits in 2013. It is within this context that we consider EBT card reforms as having had a potentially costless effect in reducing the specter of hunger. This may be especially important given that the USDA reports 76% of food stamp households contain children.

From a theoretical standpoint it is not immediately clear whether or not a change in the method of delivery benefits would have an impact on food insecurity. On the one hand, benefit levels do not change, food prices are independent of benefits deliveries, and there are no surcharges or transaction costs associated with use of an EBT card. However, there are two reasons to think that the transition to food stamp benefits being delivered via EBT might have lasting impacts on food insecurity.

One consideration is that paper based food stamps were relatively more prone to fraudulent sales of benefits. If program participants sell fewer benefits, they would likely use more benefits for the intended purpose of food purchases. This would likely lead to a reduction in food insecurity that would persist for as long as EBT cards diminished food stamp trafficking. The second primary channel would be that many food stamp program participants may suffer from loss and theft of benefits. Under a paper based regime, a
victim of loss or theft would have to wait until the next month to receive new benefits. Under an EBT card regime, the card could be replaced in short order and the benefits would not be able to be stolen without knowledge of a secret PIN number. Together EBT cards should would make loss less costly, and theft less likely as well as less costly. Finally, a transitory impact might be possible from the standpoint that program participants may not immediately know how to make a painless transition from paper based benefits to an EBT card. Some recipients may fail to receive or collect the card in the first months, they may struggle to use the card and they may fail to learn where it can be used. These considerations would likely lead to an increase in food insecurity, but any increase would be merely transitory as program participants would either acquire their cards and/or learn how and where to use the card.

We consider the roll-out of EBT card reforms across California counties during the period from 1997 to 2006. We link data detailing the county roll out of EBT card reforms with self-reported food security measures using the California Health Interview Survey. Furthermore we use a variety of data sources to control for program participant characteristics, county characteristics, benefit levels and economic conditions. Our identification rests on the quasi-random timing of EBT card reforms at the county level. Our findings are generally not supportive of the claim that EBT reforms altered food security for Food Stamp Program participants. We do however find substantial evidence of a very short lived increase in food insecurity at the moment of EBT card reform implementation. In particular, food insecurity becomes roughly 2% more likely for our preferred measure of food insecurity. Effects last only one or two months before disappearing. This transitory
effect suggests individuals may have had an initially difficult transition to the new system that resulted in an increase of food insecurity lasting between 1 and 2 months. This effect is robust to a variety of specifications and measures of food insecurity. However, as stated above, there is no systematic evidence that EBT cards have altered long-run food security.

The paper is organized as follows: section 2 considers relevant academic literature, section 3 contains the necessary background information for understanding EBT card reforms and California specific details of the Food Stamp Program, section 4 presents and discusses the data sources used, section 5 offers analysis and discussion of our results, section 6 offers some concluding remarks.

2.2 Literature Review

Although a considerable literature with regards to food stamps exists, and there are papers that considers the costs and benefits of EBT cards, very little to our knowledge has been written investigating a specific linkage between EBT cards and food security. More generally, there has been relatively little work done looking at externalities, or unintended effects of EBT reforms. Despite this general void, two recent papers have considered the possibility of a relationship between EBT cards and crime. Lovett (2014) and Wright et. al. (2014) use the roll out of EBT card reforms in California and Missouri, respectively to determine if EBT cards had any bearing on criminal acts. Lovett considers the effect of lost cash income on crime. The income loss stems from decreased fraud opportunities as a result of EBT card reforms. Wright et. al. consider EBT card reforms as decreasing the cash holdings of food stamp households through the same channel - diminished sales of
food stamp benefits. Lovett reports an increase in some crime categories, while Wright et. al. report an overall decline in crime.

Apart from these two papers linking EBT to crime, there has not been an explicit research agenda investigating externalities associated with EBT card reforms. However, many papers have made key contributions to the current understanding of the Food Stamp Program, and EBT card reforms.

2.2.1 Paper-based Delivery versus Electronic Delivery

An older literature, mostly from the 1990’s, considers the benefits and costs of using EBT systems to deliver benefits. In general, the literature has been very supportive of the use of EBT cards and it is quite probable that the benefits resulting from EBT cards substantially contributed to the decision to mandate EBT cards as part of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996. Some of the benefits noted by Fraker et. al (1992) and Ohls et. al. (1992) are that EBT cards have been a success in terms of cost reduction, better record keeping, and provision of recipient services.

Andrews and Wilde (2000) offer a meta-analysis of much of the work done in the 1990’s. A central finding that is pertinent to this paper is that they find EBT offers significant benefits from an anti-trafficking perspective. This stems from the consequence that with EBT cards, it is much easier for the USDA to identify suspicious patterns in benefits redemption. A common red-flag is if a store that sells relatively few groceries (and/or at comparatively high prices) has disproportionately large purchases occurring at the beginning of the month. If this is a common occurrence the store is likely to be investigated. Should USDA investigators conclude that the store engaged in trafficking, the store will
likely lose it’s ability to accept food stamps. Furthermore, investigators are often able to observe which households are engaging in suspicious behavior and pursue action against those households.

Andrews and Wilde (1994) also find evidence that there are households that choose to engage in trafficking even though they often run out of food before the end of the month. Moreover, they find that within months the pattern of benefits usage is often far from smooth. They note that the dominant trend is that benefits are used in large quantities at the beginning and end of the month. In particular, the largest day for benefits use is the 27th day of the month. They document that many households cautiously allocate their spending throughout the month and upon learning there are ample benefits to last until the next release of benefits, they spend the bulk of their balance. This typically occurs near the end of the month. Although this behavior typifies many households, another important subset is likely to use the bulk of their benefits at the beginning of the month. A surge of benefits usage at the beginning of the month is consistent with having run low on, or out of, benefits the previous month. Having run out is by no means a sufficient condition for having trafficked, but is often very much related. Consistent with this interpretation is that bulk of end of month purchases occur in supermarkets (locations that generally are far less likely to traffic benefits, while a much smaller share of the beginning of month surge occurs in supermarkets, with many more transactions occurring in small convenience-type stores (which are generally far more likely to traffic benefits).

Macaluso (2000) reports that EBT was generally much favored by program administrators as a result of cost savings and general ease of use for program participants.
A USDA report (1994) states that EBT was also popular with recipients as they reported diminished shame costs and lowered risks associated with loss or theft. Danielson and Klerman (2006) make use of administrative data, and find that EBT, paired with a simplified certification process, led to a small increase in program participation. Hanratty (2006) was able to replicate this finding and found EBT card reforms coupled with eased re-certification increased program participation by about 6%. It should be noted that for both of these studies the authors are unable to separate effects resulting from EBT and altered certification. Interestingly, Haider et. al. (2003) find that the elderly were generally unaffected by these changes and did not participate in the program at altered rates.

### 2.2.2 Cash versus In-Kind Transfers

At one time a very active research agenda related to whether it was a good idea to have the Food Stamp Program as an in kind transfer. As a result there are numerous papers considering the likely impacts of changing food stamps into a cash transfer program. This is often referred to as “cash-out”. Food stamps has always been an in-kind transfer for several reasons, but the most important has been the desire to ensure benefits are spent on actual food and not purchases of other goods and services such as alcohol or tobacco. This is especially true in households with children, which constitute the bulk of food stamp households. Of course, it is not clear that the goods and services bought would necessarily be alcohol or other potentially problematic goods. The arguments for cash out are that food stamps are more costly to administer as an in-kind transfer, and food stamps are often distortionary. In this case distortionary means that recipients consume more food than they would under a cash transfer. This is a matter of some importance because distortions may
create a considerable incentive to engage in food stamp trafficking, which is potentially a key channel for impacting food security.

This question of distortion has primarily been addressed using observational studies, summarized by Fraker (1990), in which researchers estimate the marginal propensity to consume food using the following specification:

\[ \text{food} \text{spending}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Cash}_i + \beta_2 \text{f stamp}_i + \mathbf{X}_i \gamma + \varepsilon_i \]

Here the unit of observation \( i \) is the household. \( \text{Cash}_i \) and \( \text{f stamp}_i \) are income from cash and food stamps, respectively; while \( \mathbf{X}_i \) is a set of household observable characteristics, and \( \varepsilon_i \) is the error term. Under this framework, the differential impact of food stamps as an in-kind transfer is the difference between the estimates of \( \beta_1 \) and \( \beta_2 \). The difference between the two coefficient estimates reveals the extent to which food stamps create extra food consumption that would not have occurred under a cash transfer. These studies offered important and interesting conclusions, but are currently viewed as suffering from general problems associated with observational studies that do not randomize treatment exposure. In particular, program participation is taken as exogenous. Related to the issue of exogeneity both Currie (2006) and Moffit (1983) study models of program participation and find that participation is effectively a choice variable. Thus, individuals choose to participate or not and that choice is correlated with preferences for food consumption over other forms of consumption. Moreover, comparisons are made between eligible families who participate and those that do not participate. These problems have led to the present belief that estimates of distortion suffer from bias.
In addition to observational studies, there are two papers investigating the impact of pilot programs (in Alabama and San Diego) initiated by the USDA on the consequences and feasibility of cash out. Fraker et. al. (1992) and Ohls et.al. (1992) report estimates of distortions being about 5%, meaning that households receiving in-kind benefits had 5% higher expenditures on food than households that received a cash transfer.

A more recent trend is exemplified by papers written by Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2007 and 2009) that rely on the initial roll out of the Food Stamp Program. It should be noted that the setting is meaningfully different than the randomized experiments in Alabama and San Diego, in that the initial launching of the Food Stamp Program resulted in households receiving a real income shock. In comparison, the randomized experiments of the early 90’s held income constant. Only the form of benefits delivery is altered, not household purchasing power. The central findings of papers using the historic roll-out of the program, is that stamps or cash do not constitute a meaningful difference for infra-marginal participants (households that spend some cash on food). However, cash transfers will diminish food expenditures for constrained or extra-marginal households (households that only use food stamps to purchase food). Thus, distortion occurs for extra-marginal households, but not infra-marginal ones.

In terms of quantifying this split in household types, Whitmore (2002) finds that roughly 20% to 30% households are infra-marginal. These infra-marginal households would be relatively unaffected by a transition to a cash only system of benefits. Whitmore also uses survey data to suggest that a cash transfer may result in less aggregate spending on food, but that most of the reductions occur on beverage spending. The implication being
that nutrition is unaffected. Although it is not clear that nutrition is unaffected, calories ingested do decrease.

Whitmore notes that for program participants with a distorted preference for food (as a result of the in-kind nature of the transfer) value their benefits at roughly 80 cents on the dollar. This valuation is important as it implies that roughly one fifth to one third of program participants would potentially have an interest in trafficking. A potentially problematic issue is that the study doesn’t make use of pre-intervention data and as a result the definition of an infra-marginal household is a household that doesn’t use all its food stamps. Very basic consumer theory strongly implies this should never occur, unless households sell some of their benefits. The paper does not offer a choke price for extra-marginal households. This price would presumably be lower than for infra-marginal households, but to what extent is unclear.

Butler and Raymond (1996) also consider the issue of nutrition, and whether or not preferences for food consumption cause some individuals to select into the Food Stamp Program. Using a sample of seniors within a cash out pilot program, they find that compared to cash, in-kind benefits do not offer any advantages. In comparison, Bastiosis et. al. (1998) note that the Food Stamp Program is quite beneficial from a nutrition perspective, but findings rely on older data from the 1980’s and they do not consider the cash versus in-kind question.

Blundell and Pistaferri (2003) consider the possibility that food stamp income may be useful as a consumption smoothing mechanism. They find that food stamps do aid households in smoothing consumption in the face of income shocks. However, following
a large negative income shock they find that households using food stamps consume 30% more food than they would had they received cash instead. Although this large negative income shock may be viewed as something of a special circumstance, this implies a higher degree of distortion than in other papers.

Although it may not be immediately apparent, the findings of the cash or in-kind debate is relevant for us in that if many recipients spend some of their income on food, there is a much diminished incentive to traffic food stamps. This results from the simple fact that if households engage in trafficking, they must always sell their benefits at some discount. If program participants are spending some of their own cash on food, selling benefits would result in them needing to buy the same amount of food, but with less purchasing power to do so, since they have sold benefits at less than full face value. As a result, any cash gains would be more than offset by the loss of purchasing power. Thus, trafficking would be a rational option only for constrained (extra-marginal) households that never buy food with their own cash. Extra-marginal households may find that trading some portion of their food benefits for greater consumption flexibility is warranted.

It should be noted that some feel the above thinking is too simplistic in that it ignores the within month variation in food stamp benefits and cash availability. Essentially, at the beginning of the month households may have a relatively high ratio of food stamp benefits to cash. A household that heavily discounts the future, may choose to sell some benefits for cash. However, later in the month after food stamp benefits are exhausted, the household may use some cash to purchase food. In this case a household that spends some of its cash food, may still choose to traffic in food stamps as a result of the changing
2.2.3 How Much Trafficking Occurs

A natural question for us is: “To what extent are food stamp benefits actually trafficked”. This is important since a key channel for altering food insecurity are changes in the extent of food stamp sales. Households that sell some of their benefits are clearly more likely to experience food insecurity than if they had not sold some of their benefits. If EBT card reforms diminish sales of benefits, this should translate to a reduction in food insecurity. Thus, the frequency with which trafficking occurs will likely be important in determining the magnitude of any food insecurity decreases. It is worth noting that the only case in which food insecurity would not fall, is if only households with ample food resources engaged in trafficking prior to EBT card reforms. If households with ample food stuffs are the only households trafficking benefits, then a reduction in fraudulent sales may not result in improved food security. This can also be thought of from the perspective of distortion. Distorted households will be more likely to traffick and EBT card reforms may make them even more distorted. These distorted households are less likely to experience food insecurity.

Anecdotal evidence and stories regarding food stamp misuse, fraud and trafficking abound and despite the lack of rigor, policy makers are very much interested in knowing how this market functions, and to what extent it exists. Whitmore (2002) uses survey data to suggest that food stamps are valued at roughly 65 cents on the dollar. This is an interesting implication in that 65 cents is not sufficient to induce the average infra-marginal household to sell benefits, which she estimates values its benefits at 80 cents on the dollar in

marginal utilities of cash versus food during the course of the month.
previous work. However, since we don’t have an idea what the valuation of extra-marginal households is, the estimate of 65 cents does not tell us whether extra-marginal households would likely be interested in trafficking or not. Moreover, the estimate does not account for the possibility that the value may change throughout the course of a month.

Macaluso (2000) investigates data from more than 10,000 USDA investigations of stores suspected of black market activity. Findings claim that roughly 4% of all benefits issued can be traced to misuse in investigated stores. The USDA’s current position is that EBT cards have reduced this number, but it is not known to what extent this has occurred. Macaluso also notes that smaller stores are substantially more likely to engage in trafficking than supermarkets. Finally, the suspected degree of trafficking fell during the 1990’s with the author attributing much of this decline to EBT cards, which made large scale trafficking much less likely. This last assertion is important with regard to this paper as it supplies empirical evidence for the USDA’s claim that EBT cards increase the risk of a food stamp trafficker being caught and therefore would push down the price for black market food stamp sellers. A key point to keep in mind is that Macaluso offers an estimate of the rate of trafficking that involves stores and does not account for person to person sales. Since this avenue is not considered, 4% might safely be thought of as a lower bound.

An interesting aside worth considering is that if EBT reduces trafficking and in doing so reduces food insecurity, this may not always be an unambiguously desirable outcome. Although we imagine food security as being a paramount concern, there exists the possibility that cash generated by trafficking is used for other goods and services that could be potentially quite important. Examples might be households that sell benefits and suffer
some food insecurity, but in doing so generate cash income used for medication or utility services. Given the nature of the Food Stamp Program as an in-kind transfer, a consequence is that distorted households will consume more food than if they had received cash. These households presumably value other goods and services more highly than food. There exists the distinct possibility that even from a paternalistic perspective, we may not always view higher valuation of other goods and services as problematic. Clearly, if a household chooses to sell benefits for sin goods we would likely view this as undesirable. However if a household sells benefits to finance the purchase of necessary medication, the normative conclusion is far less clear.

Ciemnecki et. al. (1998) addresses the question “Is it possible to rely on survey data to obtain a measure of food stamp trafficking?” The authors rely on several different surveying techniques, and also make use of ethnographic methods, to ask food stamp recipients about their behaviors and attitudes regarding fraud and trafficking. It should be noted that although the authors feel that none of the individual methods were entirely conclusive, all of the methods employed suggest that individuals considerably under-report trafficking. In terms of important take aways, we note that self reported trafficking was lower in areas that used EBT cards than in areas that used paper stamps. An additional finding was that where EBT cards were in place, respondents frequently stated that this made selling benefits to other individuals much more difficult, as it required the buyer and seller to redeem the benefits together.
2.3 Background

2.3.1 Historical

In 1961 President Kennedy announced the creation of a pilot food stamp program in eight counties and the modern Food Stamp Program (FSP) was created. In the following two years the pilot programs were expanded to 43 counties and successes with these pilot programs led to the Food Stamp Act of 1964. The Food Stamp Act gave county governments the authority to start up the FSP in their county. As is still the case today, the program was federally funded and benefits were redeemable at approved stores. With considerable press attention, demand for food stamp programs grew and this interest culminated in passage of the 1973 Amendments to the Food Stamp Act, which required all counties to offer food stamp benefits by 1975.

The food stamp program provides qualifying individuals and households with vouchers to be spent on approved food items with participating vendors. Since 2008 the FSP has been known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). As of 2013, the average participating household receives slightly more than $200 a month in benefits. With regards to program administration, states have considerable freedom to structure the program as they see fit; thus there are considerable differences in implementation across states. However, so long as states meet federal standards the final source of funding is at the federal level. As a result it is not entirely correct to think of the program as purely a state or federal program. California is different from the other 49 states in that its food stamp program is administered at the county level, as opposed to the state level. This means that county Social Services offices are responsible for determining eligibility, disbursing benefits.
and assisting beneficiaries with program related difficulties. California is still accountable
to Federal requirements and is still federally funded, but the day-to-day operations are
conducted at the county level, whereas elsewhere the program is administered at the state
level.

2.3.2 Reforms

There have been considerable changes and reforms to the FSP during the past
15-20 years. This paper aims to investigate food security changes stemming from changes
in the delivery of benefits. Until the late 1990’s food stamps consisted of small rectangular
pieces of paper with dollar value denominations. A recipient would receive a booklet of
stamps at the beginning of the month that could be used in place of cash to make approved
food purchases (see Figure 2.1). However, today no one uses actual paper stamps. In their
place, benefits delivery has moved to an electronic system where beneficiaries receive an
electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card linked to an account that contains funds to be used
for appropriate purchases (see Figure 2.2). In essence, the system functions like a checking
account and a debit card. At the beginning of each month benefits are loaded into the
account and the individual is free to use those funds to make purchases.

The first EBT trial was in Reading, Pennsylvania in 1984. Starting in the early
years of the 1990’s several pilot programs were conducted to evaluate the feasibility of EBT
benefits delivery. By the end of the decade EBT cards had been adopted in several states.
In 1996, as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act (generally
known as Welfare Reform), the Federal government required all states switch to use EBT
cards by October 2002. Compliance was not achieved until the end of 2004. Although there
were threats of withheld funds, in practice this did not occur and there were no disruptions in funding to states that converted after the October 2002 deadline.

2.3.3 Reasons for Reform

The shift from paper stamps to an electronic system was motivated by a variety of concerns. Most prominent among many considerations was cost as paper food stamps were rather costly from an administrative perspective. Among the most interesting of these costs were measures taken to diminish the ease and impact of counterfeit stamps. Examples of these costly measures were intaglio printing and fairly sophisticated water marks (see Figure 2.1). In addition to anti-counterfeiting measures, allocation and distribution of the stamps were fairly costly. Some states made it obligatory for recipients to come into the local social services agency and receive their stamps in person. This imposed considerable costs on program participants. In other states the preferred method was delivery by mail. This had its own problems in that it was vulnerable to theft and also created non-trivial mail delivery costs. Mail delivery was also problematic for individuals without an address or a stable one. Another issue was that because food stamps were basically as easy to use as cash, mailing food stamps was not terribly different from mailing cash in the sense that there were considerable opportunities for theft. By switching to EBT cards, Social Service agencies would also be able to avoid imposing loss and theft associated with mail based delivery on their clients. Similarly, repeated opportunity costs associated with requiring that their clients come to the social service agency to pick-up stamps in person could be avoided.

For program participants, an important consideration was that paper-based stamps
Figure 2.1: Food Stamp

Figure 2.2: New York EBT Card

were vulnerable to loss and theft. In the case of loss, the month’s supply of food stamps were just that – lost. With an EBT card a beneficiary that loses their card has not lost the funds associated with the card (provided no one has used the lost card, which requires knowledge of a PIN number). They can request a new card be issued to them, and the new card will still have the same account balance as the old card. Along similar lines of thinking, theft is a considerably diminished possibility and a potentially less costly one. Under the old regime of paper-based stamps, stolen stamps could be used by just about anyone. However, with an EBT card, a thief would not be able to debit the account, despite physical possession of the card unless they also know the PIN number. In some cases cards showed a photograph of the correct owner, making stolen cards even harder to use (see Figure 2.2). These questions of loss and theft are quite important from a food security perspective in that someone who has lost, or had their benefits stolen, would be much worse off under a paper based regime than an EBT card regime. They would potentially be unaffected under an EBT card regime as the card can be replaced quickly and nearly costlessly. Theft of a card would be virtually meaningless, unless the thief also knows the PIN number.

Fraud was another motivating factor for the move to an EBT system. Since stamps could be used by anyone, there was considerable ease in re-selling stamps. Of course
most beneficiaries were content to use their benefits as intended (for the purchase of food). However, many might have a marked preference for the greater consumption flexibility afforded by cash. These individuals would likely be willing to sell their benefits at less than full face value in exchange for cash. It is for this reason that the food stamp program was specifically structured as an in-kind transfer, and not a cash transfer. That is the paternalistic desire to bypass some of these recipient preferences for non-food consumption. Clearly EBT does not represent a total solution, but one that diminishes the ease and attractiveness of selling benefits. With an EBT card, the seller of benefits would have to accompany the buyer during their purchases or sufficiently trust the buyer to give them the PIN. These additional complications and inconveniences would presumably lower the value of food stamp benefits and decrease the number of transactions.

It is worth noting that the most common form of food stamp trafficking is not the person to person example described above. Instead the program beneficiary exchanges benefits for cash (or unapproved goods) with an approved retailer of food. In the past, the transaction would be as simple as a recipient swapping stamps for cash. The grocer then would redeem the stamps with state authorities for the cash value of the food that was purportedly sold, but in reality was not. However, this type of transaction becomes riskier under an EBT card system. The simple reason for this is that since EBT is electronic and the sales data is retained by the state, any irregularities or suspicious aspects of the sales data could result in investigation of the suspected grocer. To quote the USDA on the matter:

SNAP electronic benefits transfer (EBT) has given USDA new tools to identify, track, and take action against trafficking. We use the electronic “audit trail” from EBT transactions to identify trafficking and other suspicious activ-
ity. The Anti-Fraud Locator using EBT Retailer Transactions (ALERT) system monitors electronic transaction activity and identifies suspicious stores for analysis and investigation. FNS (Food and Nutrition Services) has a dedicated team of over 100 analysts and investigators across the country dedicated to SNAP retailer compliance. They analyze retailer data, conduct undercover investigations, and process cases— including fines and administrative disqualifications— against violating retailers.

The issue is potentially very relevant from a food security perspective as food stamps trafficked are likely used for non-food consumption. As such, food stamp trafficking may potentially increase food insecurity for individuals choosing to sell benefits for cash. By diminishing fraud, EBT may result in households having greater real income for food purchases, thus diminishing food insecurity.

It is worth noting that directly altering food insecurity was not a primary motivator for the transition to EBT cards. There was, however, a secondary channel considered that may have had an indirect impact of food security. Policy makers and advocacy groups have been long concerned with what are generally termed shame costs. These shame costs may prevent many eligible program participants from applying for and receiving food stamps. The idea behind shame costs is simply that using food stamp benefits is a publicly observable activity that can be a source of shame for many people. For some marginally inclined people, these shame costs may be sufficient to alter their binary decision to apply for and use food stamp benefits. Use of an EBT card is far less obvious than the use of stamps. Thus, any shame would be greatly reduced as others would not be privy to knowledge about food stamp usage. If reduced shame costs mean more program participants, this would likely reduce food insecurity in the general population. Thus, EBT cards may create a selection effect that could potentially reduce food insecurity.
A final consideration motivating EBT card reforms was the desire to streamline the provision of benefits to individuals receiving aid under multiple social welfare programs. A sizable subset of food stamp recipients also receive assistance from other programs such as general assistance, TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) and SSI (Supplemental Security Income). Many states have chosen to link these accounts together with a single EBT card.

### 2.3.4 California Specifics

In terms of the food stamp program, California is unique from the rest of the nation in one key way. California administers its FSP (known as Cal-Fresh within California) at the county level, rather than at the state level. As a consequence, when the State Department of Social Services mandated transition to an EBT system, it was left to each individual county to reach compliance. This resulted in considerable variation in the timing of reform implementation, with some counties adopting EBT years before other counties. This variation in the timing sets the stage for a potentially attractive natural experiment.

However, such a strategy would be severely undermined if the timing of the reform was endogenously determined by factors that correlate with food insecurity outcomes. Table 2.1 offers evidence that this was not the case. Despite this evidence, the causes of variation in timing of reform are of considerable interest.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000 Decennial Census</th>
<th>2005 American Community Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group 1</td>
<td>Group 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>33.64</td>
<td>34.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21.92)</td>
<td>(22.13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Family Size</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>3.56</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.10)</td>
<td>(2.14)</td>
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<td>Median Income</td>
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<td>30000</td>
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<td>Food Stamp Use Rate</td>
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<td>0.051</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent White</td>
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<td>Percent Black</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Percent Married</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Employed</td>
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<td>0.442</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urbanicity Measure</td>
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<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No High School</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Citizen</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td>0.847</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

County groupings determined by timing of reform. Group 1 earliest counties with each successive group reforming later. Group 4 being the latest.

Group 1: San Diego and San Bernardino counties.

Group 2: Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno, Humboldt, Imperial, Kern, Marin, Merced, Orange, Riverside, San Francisco, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, San Mateo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Tulare, and Yolo counties.

Group 3: Butte, Colusa, Del Norte, El Dorado, Glenn, Inyo, Kings, Madera, Mono, Monterey, Nevada, San Benito, Shasta, Siskiyou, Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, and Yuba counties.

Group 4: Amador, Alpine, Calaveras, Lake, Mariposa, Modoc, Napa, Placer, Plumas, Sierra, and Tuolumne counties.
2.3.5 Sources of County Timing Variation

One issue of substantial consequence on the timing of reforms was the matter of whether to use EBT for food stamps alone, or to use EBT with other governmental aid programs as well. The Welfare Reform Act of 1996 stipulated that food stamps be delivered via EBT, but there were no such requirements that other programs use EBT. Despite the lack of a federal or state mandate slightly more than half of California counties chose to deliver benefits from other programs via EBT as well (37 of 58 counties, generally more populous). Converting other aid programs likely made reform implementation more complicated and increased the time needed to convert to EBT.

Another consideration was what is known as the food stamp stagger and differences across counties in use of the food stamp stagger. The stagger essentially works in the following way. Food stamps benefits are usually not all released on the 1st of the month to all beneficiaries. Instead some beneficiaries receive their benefits on the 1st of the month, while others receive it on the 2nd and so on until the last recipients receive their benefits on the last day of the stagger (usually the 10th day, but as late as the 25th in some counties). Different counties used different algorithms for deciding which recipients would receive their benefits on which days. Once the state mandated EBT, they also required that all counties use an algorithm based on the last digit of the case number. In many counties, this was quite problematic because switching the algorithm resulted in some people going more than 31 days without new benefits. This is prohibited by Federal Law. In these instances agencies had to issue emergency food stamps (paper based), and more generally, prepare for a rockier transition to EBT.
The issue of mail-based delivery or over-the-counter issuance also contributed to timing variation. When issuing the first EBT cards, counties had to choose to mail out cards and PIN numbers, or instead to have recipients come into County Welfare Department offices to receive cards and PIN numbers (as well as training in some cases). This decision had to be reached independently for both the newly entering participants, and those that were continuing in the FSP. Different counties opted for different methods, with Over-the-Counter issuance being generally much slower.

Language support services were another factor creating variation in reform timing. California as a state provided support materials for program participants in 10 languages. Despite this some counties felt that they had significant populations that would need assistance in other languages. These counties took it upon themselves to translate documents and brochures into additional languages. This additional work likely delayed conversion to EBT cards.

An imperative fact to bear in mind is that EBT card services were contracted out to private banks, not directly provided by the state. Counties had to reach an agreement with a private bank. Given the complex nature of the task, these negotiations often took a great deal of time. Some of the sticking points in negotiations between banks and county officials were: surcharges for cash benefits access, transaction fees for cash benefits access, cash benefits stagger (3 day versus not at all), mailing based issuance of EBT cards and associated costs, customer/recipient support services, availability of acceptable ATMs for Limited English Proficient recipients, loss/theft replacement services, and language issues (i.e. what languages were to be included in mailings and phone support lines, both
2.4 Data

We rely on two essential sources of data in order to determine if EBT card reforms have had a bearing on food insecurity for food stamp beneficiaries. One data set, provides us with information about California’s roll out of EBT card reforms, while the other allows us to contemporaneously track food insecurity across California. The central condition for both data sets is that they need to have time information at the monthly level and they need to have geographic detail down to the county level. Given that this information is available, the two data sets can be linked to answer questions about changes to food security at the time of EBT card reforms.

2.4.1 CALFresh Data

Food stamp reform data was obtained via a unique data set that was obtained by conducting telephone interviews with each county Social Service agency in California. We called each county agency in California and conducted a phone interview with county officials to determine the timing of reforms, as well as a host of relevant contextual information. That contextual information included: whether or not the county used EBT for cash aid programs, whether or not the county converted under state order or prior to the state order, whether the county reached compliance in time or not, if EBT cards were issued in person, by mail, or both, if a change in delivery methods occurred at the time of EBT reforms, and if any other changes to the programs administration coincided with EBT card
reforms. Finally, we asked the county official if they believed there was anything unique to their county’s conversion process. This generally did not elicit a response, but in some cases it was revealed what the particular difficulties were in converting to an EBT card regime. However, the most important piece of information was the month and the year in which the county converted. This is vital as it allows us to determine if food insecurity occurred in a paper based food stamp regime or an EBT regime - in effect whether a county at a given time belongs in the treatment group or the control group. In some cases the title of the agency varies. For example, some counties implement food stamps through the office of Health and Human Services, while others have the title of Social Services. Nonetheless, the task of the county agency remains the same. Along the same vein, interviews were generally conducted with an official having the title of “CAL-Fresh Program Manager” or “CAL-Fresh Program Coordinator”. Thus, the title varied, but the nature of the job remains the same.

2.4.2 California Health Interview Survey

The second data source used is the California Health Interview Survey or CHIS. The CHIS is modeled on the well-known and oft used National Health Interview Survey, but is intended to give greater detail and within the confines of California. The CHIS is a random state-wide health survey conducted every two years since 2001. Participants in the CHIS survey are chosen at random, and the sample is extensive enough to be statistically representative of California’s diverse population. CHIS telephone surveys are conducted in all 58 counties of California and in person interviews have been conducted in all counties, but not in every biennial wave.
CHIS covers a great many health issues, but importantly for us asks a series of questions pertaining to food security. Moreover, these are considered core questions, and as such are repeated in each survey in order to measure significant shifts over time. These food security questions ask about the frequency in which the respondent has run out of food due to lack of money, couldn’t eat balanced meals due to lack of money, eaten less than they should, or skipped eating some meals to ensure food would last throughout the month or food would be available for dependents. This is highly valuable as it allows us to consider a wide range of food security measures that could be potentially impacted by changes to the food stamp recipient population.

CHIS also allows us to observe a great deal of individual level detail about the respondent such as education, age, income, gender, food stamp program participation, WIC program participation, known health problems, as well as racial, demographic and some economic information. Thus, we are able to explicitly control for a host of potentially confounding attributes in our analysis using CHIS data.

CHIS data does have some notable shortcomings for the purpose of our analysis. Notably CHIS data begins in 2001, thus we have post EBT reform information for all 58 counties, but we only have pre-reform data for 54 counties. San Diego, San Bernardino, Alameda and Yolo counties are the adversely affected counties. According to USDA definitions, San Diego, San Bernardino and Alameda are all “large counties by food stamp program population”. Another shortcoming is that although CHIS is representative at a state level, it may have underreporting for some smaller, low population counties. Thus, there may be some bias regarding estimates related to smaller counties.
2.4.3 Other Data Sources

We incorporate information regarding the changing nature of the food stamp program using USDA SNAP data relating benefits levels and participation levels within California over time. The USDA data allows us to explicitly control for differing benefit levels across counties and over time. We use the decennial Census and ACS to account for changing economic and demographic conditions at the county level.

2.5 Analysis and Results

2.5.1 Necessary Assumptions and Conditions

Before considering regression analysis it is important to verify that the empirical environment is indeed appropriate for such techniques to be used. The underlying assumption that allows for our analysis is that the timing of the reform is largely exogenous to within county food insecurity. If it is the case that some counties reform earlier because the county’s population is disproportionately predisposed to food insecurity, and county administrators predicate their conversion timing on this information, we are no longer able to say that the timing of the reform is exogenous. Without exogenous timing of the reform, we lose the quasi-random timing assumption and our estimates will suffer from bias. To be explicitly clear from an empirical standpoint, counties belong to the control group so long as they are using paper based benefits delivery, and move to the treatment group once EBT card reforms are implemented. The empirical strategy would suffer if our control groups did not serve as credible counterfactuals for the changes in the treatment group. Thus, it cannot be the case that early reforming counties are radically different than late reform-
ing counties, and conversely late converting counties should not be radically different than early converting counties. Since each group serves as a counterfactual control group it is necessary that they essentially be good controls.

Table 2.1 presents evidence that timing of the reform is indeed exogenous to relevant observable characteristics. We divide counties into four groups based on the timing of the conversion from a paper-based system to an EBT system. Figure 2.3 reveals the geographic distribution of these groupings. Group 1 is composed of the earliest reformers and subsequent groups converted at a later point in time, with group 4 being the group of counties that reformed the latest. Table 2.1 shows the means of various relevant observable characteristics such as food stamp usage rates, crime rates, unemployment rates, demographic characteristics, and other potential pertinent characteristics. The central finding is that counties across groups are not systematically different across observable characteristics barring urbanicity. In general, early adopters tend to be larger and more urban counties than late adopters. The potentially reflects the fact that larger county welfare agencies likely have more resources that they are able to bring to bear, and thus were generally able to convert more quickly. There are, of course, notable exceptions. San Bernardino County (an extremely sparsely populated county) was among the first to convert, while Ventura County (a quite urban county) was among the late reformers. An important take away is that it is very unlikely that the timing of EBT card reforms are endogenously determined by the severity of food insecurity problems.
2.5.2 Estimation

We use a difference-in-difference (DID) framework to estimate the impact of EBT card reforms on food insecurity. Our framework is slightly more general than the two period form of DID estimation. This is largely due to the more complex nature of the rollout of EBT card reforms across California. The circumstances are different in that rather than having two groups in two time periods, we have 58 counties that all change from being paper based counties (control counties), to being EBT counties (treatment counties), and the transition from control to treatment group is specific to each county and can occur in any month from January 1998 to December 2006. Given the nature of spatial and time variation, we use a form of the DID technique commonly referred to as an event study framework where we consider changes to food security in each county as it transitions from a paper based regime to an EBT card regime. This greater degree of complexity suggests a more flexible specification may be beneficial. Presumably an event study framework allows
for considerably more nuanced results since it more closely accounts for the fact that we effectively have 58 quasi-experiments occurring at different points in time. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we prefer an event study framework because it allows us to consider the treatment effect as dynamic over time and not static, as is the case with a two period DID framework.

We consider a variety of estimation techniques including ordinary least squares as a linear probability model (LPM), probit and logit. Estimates do not vary substantially across specifications, however we follow Horace and Oaxaca (2006) in preferring the probit specification as it is better able to handle measurement error in the dependent variable. Since survey respondent are asked to recall their food security status for past months, we believe this is a reasonable choice, thus our preferred specification is to use probit. In any case, our estimates do not vary in any large way based on estimation technique.

We estimate the following equation

\[ \Pr(Y_{ict} = 1) = \alpha + \sum_{g=-20}^{20} \beta D(t_i - T^*_c = g) + z_{ict}\gamma + x_t\phi + w_{ct}\tau + \varepsilon_{ict} \]

\(i\) indexes individual, \(c\) indexes county, \(t\) indexes time by month and year.

\(D\) is an indicator equal to one in the year and month that a county introduces the EBT as the delivery system for food aid with \(\beta\) being the related estimate of the treatment effect. Naturally this is our variable of interest and reports the impact of EBT card reforms on food insecurity in any month within the 20 month time window on either side of the conversion month. It should be noted that \(\beta\) is relative to the excluded time periods that occur outside the 20 month time window. \(t_i\) is the year and month when the interview was
conducted for each individual, and \( T_{c}^{*} \) is the year and month of conversion for county \( c \).

\( z_{ict} \) represents a column of individual level characteristics obtained via the CHIS sample. Characteristics included are: age, sex, marital status, household size, presence of children in the household, employment status, housing status, race, a WIC recipiency indicator and health insurance status. \( \alpha \) is our intercept term. \( w_{ct} \) provides county level characteristics such as mean income, employments rates, mean benefits levels, an urbanicity measure, obesity rates, and whether benefits delivery was mail based or in-person. \( x_{t} \) controls for time varying state food stamp program characteristics. This includes controls for asset limits, and qualifying income thresholds. \( \varepsilon_{ct} \) are unobserved county, time and individual effects. Finally, \( Y_{it} \) is our dependent variable, a dummy for an affirmative answer to having experienced food insecurity.

Again, the variable of interest is \( \beta \) the estimate of the treatment effect. Essentially this tells us the impact of EBT card reforms on food insecurity for a 40 month time window surrounding the month of conversion in each county. Specifically, each observation is given an event time relative to the date of conversion in that particular county. We are then able to consider the average impact of EBT card reforms, over time, for each of the 58 California counties. The framework is attractive in that we are able to observe if there is a treatment effect, but we are also to observe how a treatment effect may vary over time. This differs from the two period, DID framework where the treatment effect is viewed as a one time permanent shift. For a two period model, the treatment effect is effectively the average change for all the periods following implementation of the reform (usually referred to as the post period). The event study framework allows us to see what the treatment impact is
for each individual month, and not just the average of all the months following the reform. Moreover, the event study framework is also attractive in that it allows us to see if there is any change prior to implementation of the reform. Finally, a plot of the treatment effects for each month allows us to have an additional visual gauge for how much underlying noise is present in the estimate.

A result consistent with EBT card reforms altering food insecurity, would be for the treatment effects to statistically indistinguishable from zero for the period leading up to the month in which EBT card reforms take effect, and then experiencing an abrupt change at the date of conversion, followed by months of a sustained shift. This would be consistent with reforms altering food insecurity and having a lasting impact. Another possibility is that EBT cards have an impact, but it is not immediate. This would be shown by the same pattern as just described, except that there may be a lag between intervention and a shift in the magnitude of the treatment effect. Thus, an impact, but not an immediate one. Another possibility, is that EBT card reforms have an impact, but the impact is not permanent. This would result in a shift of treatment effects’ magnitude at the moment of intervention, but that the treatment effect will then decrease and return to it’s pre-reform mean.

2.5.3 Results

The fundamental question to this study is “Did you eat less than you should because of money?”, which we believe is the overall effect of EBT conversion on food insecurity. The simple reason is that this is the most flexible and comprehensive, in the sense that other questions are less general, and therefore they may not capture as complete
an image of the nature of food insecurity. Thus, the estimates from other questions are likely not as representative or general as “Did you eat less than you should because of money?”.

Since the other questions can be thought of as being ancillary to this question, we interpret EBT’s impact on answers as the overall treatment effect on food insecurity. Table 2.2 shows regression estimates for this particular question using multiple specifications. We vary inclusion of controls for year effects, month effects and individual characteristics. The treatment effect estimates are denoted in the following way, \( t_{-6} \) represents the impact on food insecurity of being at a point in time 6 months prior to EBT conversion, \( t_{-2} \) represents the impact on food insecurity of being at a point in time 2 months prior to EBT conversion, \( t_0 \) represents the impact of EBT card reforms in the first month of EBT card reforms, and \( t_6 \) represents the impact of EBT card reforms 6 months after the initial reforms.

Table 2.3 presents estimates for the above specification with 4 different dependent variables. The 4 dependent variables are positive responses for the following questions: “Were you unable to afford balanced meals?”, “Did you run out of food because of money?”, “Did you skip meals in order to conserve food?”, and “Did you eat less than you should because of money?” Respectively these are food insecurity measures 1, 2, 3, and 4, as reported in Table 2.3. As stated previously, we believe “Did you eat less than you should because of money?” is the overall treatment effect of EBT conversion of food insecurity. However, we also believe that the other questions are well within our topic of interest, and would like to utilize all the relevant questions to analyze the impact of EBT conversion on food insecurity through multiple angles. Table 2.3 shows estimates for our other three questions of interest, obtained using probit estimation methods following Horrace and

In general, we find that EBT cards did not have a meaningful impact on food insecurity in the hypothesized way. Recall the hypothesis was that EBT card reforms would diminish food insecurity by reducing the harmful effects of loss and theft, and that by making food stamp fraud riskier fewer people would choose to traffic food stamps. Those people that used to traffic and now do not, would likely have a reduced risk of food insecurity. However, treatment effect estimates are not consistent with the hypothesis. Rather, it appears EBT cards resulted in a very short term, but statistically significant increase in food insecurity. This relationship can be seen by noting the estimates of to and t1 across specifications and dependent variable. The estimates are very distinguishable from zero, moreover there is no evidence of an impact in the months prior to conversion suggesting the impact is not created by some unknown factor that roughly mirrors the timing of EBT card reforms. The result is robust to different measures, inclusion of controls, and estimation techniques. Thus, we feel that the result is a credible one, but perhaps not terribly interesting from a policy perspective. A key take away is that the impact is extremely transitory in nature. The impact is identifiable for only one or two months at the 95% confidence interval and returns to the pre-reform mean level of food insecurity. In terms of the magnitude of the impact, we also present OLS estimates as probit estimates do not lend themselves to a very intuitive interpretation of the coefficient. However, our OLS estimate suggests that residing in a county during the month of EBT card adoption increases the probability of experiencing food insecurity by 2%.

It is worth noting that our estimates are for a 40 month time window, 20 months
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Number of counties 58 58 58
R-Squared - 0.033 -
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Month Controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual Characteristics No Yes Yes
Mean Dependent Var. 0.0571 0.0571 0.0571

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

FI refers to Food Insecurity. Thus each of the dependent variables has its origins as a direct question regarding food insecurity as part of the CHIS survey.
Table 2.3: Impact of EBT Conversion on Food Insecurity

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Number of counties 58 58 58 58
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Month Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dependent Var. 0.0571 0.0995 0.0968 0.0518

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

FI refers to Food Insecurity. Thus each of the dependent variables has its origins as a direct question regarding food insecurity as part of the CHIS survey.
prior to conversion and 20 months after. However, for reasons of space, both Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 show estimates for only 12 total months. Importantly, the estimates are obtained from running a regression over a 40 month window, not a 12 month time window. Figures 2.4 through 2.7 graphically reveal the treatment effect for the full 40 month window. We experiment with multiple time windows, however the result does not change in any dramatic way. Moreover, given the timing of the reforms and CHIS data collection, 20 months is the largest practical pre-intervention period. Thus, for the pre- post- period to be balanced we use a 40 month window. We are, however, able to trace out treatment effects for a longer post window, but nothing of interest or value appears to be revealed.

Figure 2.4: Eat Less than Should Because of Money

Figures 2.4 through Figure 2.7 show a graphical representation of the treatment effect over a 40 month time window, 20 months prior to EBT card introduction and 20 months after the initial implementation of EBT card reforms. Figures are obtained using the full set of controls and a probit estimation. The figures offer some value above and beyond
the tables in that we are able to see a larger time window, and obtain a more intuitive sense of how the treatment may have impacted food security over time. Again our results suggest a short lived, transitory increase in food insecurity that occurred following EBT card reforms’ introduction. The magnitude varies slightly, but is roughly 2%. Although this is not a massive change, it is notable and very distinguishable from zero, and moreover, the result shows considerable degree of robustness through changes in the measurement of food insecurity. The effect mostly only lasts for 1 month, but in the case of our primary question of interest, “Did you eat less than you should because of money?”, the effect is slightly longer persisting for 2 months. This is somewhat expected, relative to other questions, given the more inclusive nature of the question. It’s magnitude is also slightly larger, for the same reason, i.e. the more comprehensive nature of the question.
2.5.4 A transitory increase

Interpreting the result requires some thought, in that it is fairly different than hypothesized. Our conclusion is a fairly mundane one, but one we think is quite likely. That is, EBT card reforms did not alter long run food insecurity, but reforms were not a purely smooth process that resulted in a fleeting increase in food insecurity. Presumably, many individuals had trouble using their EBT cards in the initial month or months of the EBT card regime, and as a result experienced an increase in food insecurity. This could have manifested itself through a variety of channels. One important one is that there were differences across counties in terms of how EBT cards were given to recipients. In some counties cards were mailed to beneficiaries, while in others beneficiaries had to come into social service offices and pick up their cards in person. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages, but importantly neither is impervious from beneficiaries not getting their cards in a timely manner. Ohls and Beebout (1993) note that a commonly cited
regularity in social work literature is that program participants are often characterized by frequent changes in address that make mail based delivery problematic. On the other hand, mandating that individuals come into the social service agency solves problems associated with mail-based delivery, but is often very difficult for beneficiaries who may not opt to come into the office in a timely manner for a variety of reasons. These reasons would likely include the need to work during business hours, long travel times from home to social service agencies, lack of reliable transport options and the need to coordinate a specific appointment time with their constraints. Finally, at least 6 counties in California used the movement to EBT card regimes to transition from one form of delivery to another. In 5 cases, the county went from mail based delivery to in person pick-up. It is quite likely in these 5 counties many program participants were expecting to receive their EBT cards via mail, but did not. In the one case where the move was from in person to mail based, it is reasonable to expect there to be some difficulties in reaching recipients without stable
Another simpler possibility is that some recipients may have had difficulty operating their new cards, or may have found that their cards did not work as intended due to malfunction. In interviews we conducted, county officials have suggested that the transition was fairly smooth and successful, but not completely free of hiccups. For example, Fresno county officials reported that by the second week of EBT card reforms only about half of cards had been used to make a transaction despite the overwhelming majority of the food stamp population already having their cards. Moreover, Fresno county officials stated that currently in a typical month, at least three quarters of food stamp households make a transaction within the first three days of getting a new month’s benefits. Although, other counties did not volunteer this particular story, other counties did suggest that the transition was far from painless for many households in the days following reforms.

Another potential problem is that some vendors did not immediately make the transition from paper based to EBT based transactions. This share of vendors is admittedly likely to be quite small, as food stamp customers are a vital segment of the customer base for many vendors. Moreover, they would not be permitted to continue accepting paper based benefits so failure to make a successful transition would result in lost sales opportunities.

2.5.5 Why not a decrease in food insecurity?

All of these possibilities suggest that there are very plausible reasons for why a transitory increase in food insecurity would materialize. A related question then becomes why the hypothesized effect, namely a lasting decrease in food insecurity, did not materialize. Essentially, this reduces to considering the validity of each of the two channels that led to
the hypothesis that food insecurity would fall.

The first channel is that reforms would lead to less fraud, and therefore greater expenditures on food leading to a decrease in food insecurity. The most likely answer is that many of the individuals engaging in food stamp fraud, were able to do so precisely because they were not experiencing significant food insecurity. The thinking being that it would be fairly irrational for a person to traffic food stamps, if doing so would lead to food insecurity.

Although this may appear an innocuous assertion, one of the enduring puzzles food stamp program administers face is that from a purely rational perspective, food stamp trafficking should be a fairly rare occurrence. This stems from the fact trafficking food stamps would only make sense for what are called extra-marginal households, that have ample food supplies. Extra-marginal households are those households that do not spend any of their own income on food. Food stamp trafficking may be attractive for these households as their food needs are met, and they are not selling benefits only to end up having to use their own income to buy food later. Contrast this with what are generally called infra-marginal households. Infra-marginal households are households that spend some of their own income on food. It does not generally make sense for these households to engage in food stamp trafficking, as doing so means that they will have to replace the food they would have gotten with sold benefits. For infra-marginal households, trafficking implies that they sell benefits for cash today, but tomorrow have to buy food and have less purchasing power then if they hadn’t sold their stamps yesterday. Since food stamps benefits always sell at a discount, these households would be accepting a loss in real income or purchasing
power. Thus, from a rationality standpoint, infra-marginal households will not choose to fraudulently sell food stamp benefits. However, the majority of food stamp households are considered infra-marginal, and yet food stamp administrators believe fraudulent sales are quite common as noted in Macaluso (2000). Additionally Macaluso reports anecdotal details that suggest fraud is not confined only to extra-marginal households. Thus, the assertion that EBT did not reduce food insecurity via reduced fraud because prior traffickers were extra-marginal and had ample food, is not without doubts.

The second channel is that EBT card reforms would make loss and theft less costly in terms of lost access to food stamp benefits. It is perhaps more challenging to explain why this channel appears to be inconsequential. In theory, it is abundantly clear that loss should be far less problematic in the case of EBT cards. The EBT card itself does not represent benefits, merely a vehicle for accessing an account where benefits are safeguarded. Contrast this with paper stamps, which represent real benefits and it is clear that loss of a card is far less problematic than paper based stamps. Moreover, cards can be replaced within a fairly short period of time. The most likely, but far from definitive, answer would be that loss of benefits did not account for a sizable share of food insecurity. It is still possible that EBT cards did reduce food insecurity through this channel, but since the frequency and/or magnitude of costs associated with loss is quite low and/or the data is too noisy to pick up the effect. The alternative explanation is simply that loss is not an issue for the overwhelming majority of food stamp beneficiaries and regardless of the data we would not pick up an effect.

Theft presents the same considerations, namely that it simply isn’t important
and/or that the data contains too much random noise, but with an additional wrinkle. That wrinkle is that theft remains a possibility with EBT cards, but requires that the prospective thief also know the card’s PIN number. If it is the case that most thefts are carried out by individuals with knowledge of the PIN number, then we would not expect EBT cards to reduce food insecurity by means of reducing theft. This is simply because the number of thefts would not have dropped since EBT technology has not been effective in making theft more difficult.

A final consideration is the extent to which food insecurity is, or isn’t experienced by food stamp program participants. If a large proportion of those suffering from food insecurity are not participants in the food stamp program, this would substantially attenuate our results and increase imprecision in our estimates. Within the CHIS sample fully 36% of those that confirm food insecurity do not report receiving food stamps. This number may be problematic for two reasons. One, is that many who receive food stamps do not admit to receiving benefits as it is potentially shameful. A second consideration is that many who experience food insecurity are not permitted to receive benefits due to matters of immigration status. Moreover, many are not willing to disclose their immigrant status. Thus, there is considerable room for measurement error, as well as an attenuating effect stemming from the potentially large number of individuals who experience food insecurity, but do not claim to receive food stamp benefits.

As to why this is potentially problematic for our analysis, the thinking here is that those experiencing food insecurity, but not receiving food stamp benefits, would not experience any changes in food insecurity as a result of EBT card reforms. Another way
of stating this is that our estimates are not treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimates. A potential way around this would be to restrict the sample to only food stamp recipients. However this dramatically reduces our sample size and so thoroughly increases imprecision in our regressions that we are unable to say much of anything of interest. Thus, one of the key shortcomings of the CHIS data has been the relatively small sample size for individuals that report receiving food stamp benefits. Of course, there is likely to be significant under reporting as food stamp program participation is a source of shame for many individuals. Moreover, the CHIS sample reports rates of food stamp program participation substantially less than reported by the USDA during the relevant time window. Thus, there is some evidence for under reporting.

2.6 Conclusion

We investigate the rollout of EBT card reforms in California during the period 1998 to 2006 to determine if EBT card reforms had a causal impact on food security for California recipients of food stamp benefits. Although we expected to see a decline in food insecurity, as EBT cards would likely reduce trafficking, loss and theft of benefits that all contribute to food insecurity, we found no such evidence of a relationship. However, we did find evidence of a very transitory increase in food insecurity immediately following implementation of EBT card reforms. The magnitude of the effect is roughly a 2% increase in the likelihood of an individual reporting food insecurity in the past month. The result is significant at either the 95% or 99% confidence interval and lasts for only one or two months before returning to pre-reform levels. We consider a variety of measures of food insecurity
and find the result fairly robust to changes in measurement and inclusion of controls. We posit that the transitional increase in food insecurity stemmed from program participants’ difficulty navigating the new EBT environment. Potential avenues for these difficulties are recipients failure to obtain their EBT cards in time, lack of knowledge about how to use the card, card malfunction, and vendors that were slow to make the transition to EBT transaction terminals.

Although we find the transitory increase in food insecurity credible and highly plausible, we are surprised by the lack of a long-run decline in food security following EBT card reforms. The effect may simply not exist as hypothesized, or our data resources may not allow for sufficiently precise estimates. In terms of offering a possible answer as to why a reduction in food insecurity does not appear to have materialized, we offer a few thoughts.

A distinct possibility is that the reduction in fraud is not meaningful from a food security perspective. This would likely stem from the possibility that the majority of those that traffick in food stamps are extra-marginal, and have distorted consumption as a result of the in-kind transfer. These households do not need to spend any income on food and any excess food benefits are likely to be sold. Whitmore (2002) argues exactly this and Cunha (2014) finds strong evidence for this in international settings. If it is indeed true that only extra-marginal households engage in food stamp trafficking, it is highly unlikely that EBT card reforms would have diminished food insecurity through this channel alone. This is because EBT card reforms would only effect households that were not food insecure to begin with as food insecure households would necessarily be infra-marginal. Although this seems quite likely in retrospect, it is important to consider that an alternative framework
emphasizes differing marginal utilities of cash and food at different times in the month. Under this framework, it is still possible infra-marginal households will choose to sell food stamp benefits. If this were true, we suspect a reduction in food insecurity would be apparent. Thus, our results may be interpreted as supporting the conclusion that infra-marginal household trafficking is a rare occurrence within California.

In terms of the loss and theft channel, we are generally puzzled by the result that EBT card reforms have not been meaningful. Our weak inclination is that, perhaps food insecurity stemming from loss and theft were considerably less than we had previously thought. At present, we are unable to find data to confirm or reject this, but hope in the future such data will be available. We believe this may be a fruitful venue for further research. In particular, the USDA may have data that would shed light on the matter.
Chapter 3

An Empirical Examination of Divorce in China

3.1 Introduction

A distressing aspect of many nations’ transition to modern, affluent societies has been the perceived deterioration of successful marriages. Although the definition of a successful marriage is far from clear, it does appear to be a widely held belief that divorce is not a socially desirable outcome. In many newly industrialized nations, particularly in East and Southeast Asia, increases in economic development, education, and career opportunities have come with an increase in the proportion of marriages ending in divorce. This has been true in the cases of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Japan. In more recent years, mainland China has also come to exemplify this trend; that is, as China has emerged as a modern and increasingly affluent nation, a common occurrence is that a
great many marriages end in divorce. A litany of explanations have come forward in order
to better understand this phenomenon, but for the most part these explanations are based
largely on conjecture and anecdote. Although a causal explanation is beyond the scope of
this paper, we hope to explain which factors are most associated with divorce, and how
they have changed over time for different generations of Chinese citizens.

The increasing occurrence of divorce in China, may be of considerable interest for
a variety of reasons. Perhaps most obvious, is that as the world’s most populous nation, and
one where marriage is very much the norm, there are tremendous numbers of individuals
that experience the costly and potentially pernicious effects of failed marriage. These effects
can take many forms, among many others emotional, economic and health outcomes are all
altered in the face of failed marriages. Another cause for interest, is that as a developing
nation the Chinese experience may offer the opportunity to understand divorce in a way
that is particularly relevant to other developing nations, particularly those that are on the
cusp of industrializing. That is, there may be considerable external validity or generality in
reaching a greater understanding of divorce in China.

Moreover, there is considerable evidence that marriage may be desirable for a
variety of economic and social reasons. General findings from previous research suggest that
marriage represents a valuable mechanism for risk sharing and may substantially increase
living standards for marriage partners through the sharing of household expenses and non-
rivalrous goods. Moreover, there are significant gains to be had from within household
task specialization and consumption complementarities. Perhaps most importantly, there
is considerable evidence suggesting there are benefits to child rearing within marriage. This
may be particularly pertinent in the Chinese case as 74% of marriages result in children. Wang et al (2007) find that some of the benefits of within marriage fertility and child rearing (as opposed to child rearing outside of marriage) in China include better infant health, better child educational attainment, better nutrition and better school attendance. Thus, marriage remains a very important family institution that potentially sets the stage for better lives for those children born within the confines of marriage. Additionally for adults, marriage is associated with greater rates of home ownership and greater labor force participation, which presumable offer benefits to society at large.

It is worth noting that it is quite possible that divorce in China may be very different from divorce in modern Western nations in a variety of ways that make this study of greater interest. Since China is a relatively poorer nation, the economic dislocations associated with divorce may be potentially quite a bit more dramatic and costly for those that divorce and must return to life on a single income. Along the same vein of thinking, Wang et al (2009) notes that laws meant to protect those that are economically ill-prepared and not at fault for contributing to a divorce, are relatively less stringent and poorly enforced than in many Western nations. Moreover, since such a high percentage of Chinese marriages result in marriage, it is far more likely a divorce will occur in the presence of children than in Western nations. As such, the impacts of divorce will on average affect children at a greater rate than in the West. Another key difference, is that as a rapidly developing nation the key contributors and outcomes associated with divorce are far less likely to be as stable as in modern western nations. Rather, an accurate understanding of marriage and divorce is more likely to be in a state of flux and change over time that may merit relatively more
frequent investigations that for the relatively more mature economies of Western Europe and North America.

We conduct two related, but different analyses of divorce in China. Our primary objective is to determine which factors are associated with divorce in the Chinese context over time. This would presumably be of interest because the Chinese divorce rate has grown quite rapidly in the last 10 to 15 years. Secondly we wish to determine what impacts might be associated with divorce. In particular, we consider matters of physical health and mental health since an empirical regularity in Western studies has been that divorce is costly from a health perspective. However, this has been largely unconfirmed in the Chinese case. We use two nationally representative data samples, the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey, (CHARLS) and the China Family Panel Study (CFPS). These data sets allows us to obtain a fairly complete understanding of the predictors of divorce, and how the ever divorced population differs from the married, but never divorced population. That is, the dataset allows us to consider how those that experience divorce, are quantifiably different from those that have marriages that do not end in divorce. This would presumably be of interest because the Chinese divorce rate has grown quite rapidly in the last 10 to 15 years and has led to a preponderance of potentially faulty explanations. A clear benefit of having two large, detailed surveys is that it allows us to cross check results from one survey to another, and form a more credible perspective on the predictors of divorce.

Having a more empirically founded understanding of divorce may be quite useful from a policy perspective in that the Chinese government has expressed considerably concern about the perceived break-down of family structures. Although divorce and marriage are
not the only visible signs of family deterioration, they are highly visible and of considerable concern for a society greatly concerned with stability and harmony. If policy makers are better aware of which predictors are strongly associated with divorce policy can be directed in such a way to discourage what might be perceived as inherently risky marriages and encourage those marriages seen to be less likely to end in divorce. For example, if it were found that education was associated with lower rates of divorce it is possible current valuations of the benefits to education are too low. In this case, policy makers would potentially choose to increase their valuation of the positive externalities associated with education.

We find that factors more strongly associated with divorce are, several proxies for possessing modern attitudes about divorce such as use of the lunar calendar and viewing Mandarin competence as highly important, having migrated, and feeling one is relatively wealthier than others. The role of migration is not entirely clear. Migration is a strong predictor of divorce for individuals in the CFPS, but is virtually meaningless for the older individuals that are surveyed in the CHARLS. Interestingly, the following factors were generally not associated with a greater incidence of divorce: educational attainment, lack of siblings, income and age at time of marriage. We also consider how both physical and mental health outcomes differ for the divorced, the remarried, and those that marry but never divorce. In general, we find divorce is harmful from a mental health perspective. Some portion of this damage is eliminated via remarriage, but not all as the remarried are generally worse off than the married, but never divorced segment of the population. In terms of physical health, we find some evidence that divorce is associated with worse
outcomes for chronic disease and the average number of hours an individual sleeps. It is important to be clear that our results are not causal, and no attempt is made to present them as such.

The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner: section 2 considers relevant contributions from the Economics literature, section 3 lays out the data sources, section 4 offers background information about the environment of marriage and divorce in China, section 5 offers analysis of the data and results, section 6 offers a short discussion and conclusion.

### 3.2 Literature Review

The vast majority of research conducted looks at divorce in modern Western nations and considers a variety of explanations, both social and economic, for increases in the rate of divorce. Most studies have been done in the US, although many others also been done in Europe. Relatively fewer studies have been done in the developing world. Moreover, very few English language studies have been conducted with regards to the newly industrialized nations of East and Southeast Asia.

A great many papers from the Economics literature looks at marriage and divorce as being products of rational thinking where individuals choose to marry if the perceived benefits of marriage outweigh the costs of marriage. These papers are discussed in greater detail below, but the central message across nearly all papers is that divorce ensues when the costs appear greater than the benefits. In general, benefits arise from intra-household specialization (particularly in the form of one partner specializing in work within the home,
and child rearing), risk sharing, and consumption complementarities. Costs stem from lost employment opportunities, and loss of individual autonomy. Gary Becker’s 1981 seminal paper on marriage laid out the theory of production complementarities as being a key driver of marriage and divorce.

However, US entry into marriage has declined since the 1950s and 1960’s. Furthermore, divorce rates rapidly accelerated from the 1960’s into the 1980’s, but have since stabilized. General explanations for this phenomenon within Economics circles is that intra-household specialization has decreased and become less important. Moreover, some of the benefits of marriage may have decreased in recent years as child rearing within marriage has declined, more production within the home can be replaced with inexpensive purchased substitutes, the legal cost of divorce may have declined, and the need for risk sharing may have also declined. Furthermore, as the labor market has become more open to women and more remunerative, and within the home labor has become relatively easier due to technological advance, the relative cost of staying married or entering marriage is likely to have shifted for many women.

As a general statement, the Economics literature suggests that the relative decline of intra-household specialization is at least partially overcome by the relative increase in the importance of consumption complementarities. The central theme behind consumption complementarities is that marital partners are able to achieve higher levels of utility and leisure because marriage partners are able to share non-rivalrous goods and reduce costs by cohabiting. As partners are better matched and enjoy each others company to a greater degree, consumption complementarities expand.
Below we consider several of the subsets of the Economics literature and how they relate to marriage and divorce.

### 3.2.1 Household Technology

One of the key reasons for entering marriage and staying in a marriage is the perception that there are gains from specialization within the household. Although it is not necessarily the case, this is most often seen as one partner, usually female, specializing in home production. The other partner specializes in market production, or more explicitly works for a wage. However, in the past 100 years or so household technology has substantially changed, and lowered the level of labor input for most domestic work. Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorokoglu (2005) document this change and suggest housewives were freed from lives of toil and converted into “managers” of an “army of household appliances”. An important consideration is that the time savings afforded from these appliances may simply lead to greater consumption of home produced goods (a substitution effect), or may lead to greater leisure and/or consumption of non-home produced goods (an income effect). The authors find that time savings generally translated into greater consumption of non-home produced goods (an income effect), and substantially greater female labor market participation. Although they do not empirically investigate the impact on marriage and divorce, this would alter the relative cost and benefit ratios for those considering entering into or exiting a marriage. More specifically, this trend would diminish the gains from intra-household specialization, as wages could increasingly substitute for home production.

A similar consideration is that technological changes may have contributed to goods that were previously produced at home, now being produced to a much greater
extent in the market. Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro (2003) find that during the period 1950 to 1990, time spent on home food production and clean-up was roughly halved. Moreover, the primary explanation for this decline was the greater availability of market produced food, and the decline of home produced food. Again, this would seem to diminish the gains from intra-household specialization.

This is surely an avenue of thought that would be highly pertinent to China in the modern era, but perhaps not so much in the most recent years when divorce rates have grown the most. Prior to modernization China was very much an economy with considerable home production and has since moved to a new paradigm with dramatically less home production. However, it is quite likely that these changes have diminished in recent years as China as converged to modern market based economy. Thus, this may be an important consideration, but not likely a sole determinant.

### 3.2.2 Skill-Biased Technical Change

Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) point out that the change in the relative benefits of single life versus married life, is not likely to be felt uniformly across the population. Specifically, technological changes will be far more beneficial to those that have skills well suited to the labor market. Moreover, it is relatively less skill intensive to use a washing machine than to use older laundry technology. To the extent that this example is representative, the relative value of home production may decline. As more individuals relocate from home production to market activity, selection effects will favor those that are relatively higher skill. Therefore, it is not surprising that women with more market oriented skills had relatively less to gain from marriage, and were therefore less likely to marry (or more likely to
divorce). The authors note that only now that most would characterize women’s entry into the labor market as being *en masse*, do we find that the education gap in marriage rates among women has closed. Presumably this is driven by the fact that until quite recently, well educated women had less to gain from marriage and were therefore less likely to enter into marriage. However, reverse causality remains a possibility as those women less well suited to marriage may pursue greater educational attainment, which results in fewer gains from marriage.

Since there is little evidence for decreased entry into marriage within China, this would likely manifest itself in greater divorce rates for those that are better suited to the labor market. Educational attainment would likely present itself as a credible proxy for those with greater skills and those that are better suited to labor market participation.

### 3.2.3 Consumption Complementarities

In essence, consumption complementarities suggest that marriage partners may be able to enjoy leisure and consumption to a greater degree with one another, than without each other. This primarily stems from similar tastes and preferences that arise around non-rivalrous goods, as well as positive externalities that arise from shared consumption. Moreover, many goods and services may be able to be consumed at greater levels in a shared framework, than in an independent one. Lam (1998) suggests that marriage may be increasingly built around this aspect of marriage as the gains from intra-household specialization decline.

An interesting feature of Becker’s 1981 work is that in a marriage built around production specialization, there tends to be assortative matching in the sense that one
partner will typically be a high wage earner, while the other partner will be a low wage earner. However, Lam suggests that as consumption complementarities become relatively more important, this type of assortative matching is likely to decline as consumption complementarities are likely to be greater for those of similar, educational, skill and income backgrounds. It is also noted that in theory, assortative matching should persist in a risk sharing form for two career marriages. The thinking here is that marrying someone unlikely to experience unemployment at the same time as you, may be a valuable method of risk sharing or consumption smoothing.

It is not entirely clear how the relative importance of consumption complementarities may affect the likelihood of a marriage ending in divorce. It is quite likely that the relative decline in production specialization and the rise in consumption complementarities will alter the individuals that will select into marriage. Since the population entering into marriage is different, it is likely that explanations of divorce and its relative frequency will change. However, it is not clear if in theory we should expect more, or less divorce. Although the theoretical impact of increases in consumption complementarities is ambiguous, we think that the issue may be relatively pertinent in the Chinese case since there is very little that is potentially specific to Western nations about the theory. Moreover, consumption complementarities may be particularly salient in an environment of rising consumption standards. Surely China during the past 25-30 years is a case of dramatically increasing consumption standards.
3.2.4 Changes in the Legal Environment of Divorce

A fairly active area of research in the US has been the effects of changing divorce laws on divorce. Namely, laws have changed to allow for unilateral divorce and no-fault divorce, but there has been significant variation in the time implementation of these changes, as well as spatial variation, in that most divorce laws in the US are determined at the state level. Becker et al (1977) argue that a move towards no fault divorce should not in theory alter the frequency of divorce, because a change in the laws represents a shift in property rights from one spouse to another. As such, they apply Coase Theorem and argue that the end result should be relatively unaltered. However, this argument has not been widely accepted for the simple reason that Coase theorem is not likely to apply to the case of divorce where costless bargaining is likely the exception, and not the rule.

In the case of unilateral divorce, Wolfers (2006) examines divorce rates and laws across states during the period 1956–1998. Findings suggest that divorce rates rose sharply in the two years following the adoption of unilateral divorce laws, but subsequently the divorce rate reverted back toward earlier levels. A decade after these reforms no discernible effect on the divorce rate remains. This is explained as resulting from an interpretation of the courts as servicing pent up demand. Once it has been serviced, the divorce rate reverts to its old pre-unilateral divorce rate.

An older literature investigating unilateral divorce exists and includes contributions from Peters (1986 and 1992), Allen (1992), and Friedberg (1998). Although different conclusions are reached as to the nature and presence of an effect, there are some points of significant agreement that bear consideration. Namely, that any effect is either small or
non-existent, and the presence of an effect does very little to explain the large increases in US divorce rates post 1960.

A different consideration is that unilateral divorce may change the nature of intra-household bargaining. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) find that female suicide and domestic violence fell following passage of unilateral divorce laws, suggesting a shift of bargaining power to women in marriage. This may alter the choice to enter into marriage in the first place. Rasul (2006) finds that indeed, the presence of unilateral divorce laws contributes to a decline in the marriage rate.

In the case of China, the legal environment has not changed until 2014. Since these changes have occurred so recently they are not within the scope of this paper. However, while we generally feel the legal environment is an issue of considerable importance in explaining marriage and divorce. We feel that in the case of China, the legal environment has been fairly static while divorce rates have not. Thus, we do not expect legal matters to be a key determinant in explaining the recent surge in divorce.

3.2.5 Changing Labor Market Compensation

Since the 1970’s an empirical regularity in the US has been rising wage inequality between high and low skill workers. Several explanations have been considered for explaining this, such as skill biased technical change, de-unionization, and declines in the real value of minimum wage work. However, from a theory standpoint, increased wage inequality may have interesting impacts on marriage and divorce. Gould and Paserman (2003) argue that increased wage inequality has increased the value of a good marital match, thus prolonging the search process and resulting in fewer matches. Essentially, greater wage inequality in-
creases the option value of remaining unmarried and causes greater valuation for continuing in the search process. This is tested at the city level by comparing cities over time with different levels of wage inequality. The central finding is that in cities typified by greater inequality, the authors find marriage rates decreased by as much as a third for young women.

Blau and Kahn (2000) also consider wage inequality, but from a gender perspective. They argue that explicitly sexist hiring, management and compensation policies have diminished over time, and the resulting decrease in wage inequality increases the opportunity cost of marriage for women as a result of diminished gains from intra-household specialization. Blau and Kahn do not, however, consider the matter from an empirical perspective.

A common theme in marriage across countries and cultures is that typically men enter marriage at a later age than do females. Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) suggest that this is because the specialized investments women made in preparation of being a homemaker, were less valuable to singles. Moreover, these specialized investments in human capital were typically made at a younger age than the investments men made in preparation for entry into the paid labor market. Thus, men were more likely to enter into marriage relatively later than females. However, in recent years this trend has declined and in many developed nations there is near parity in age at first marriage.

Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002) posit that as labor market returns to the highly educated increase, both sexes, but especially women, will find it advantageous to delay marriage to later age. Although it is not clear what impact this may have on divorce, the authors suggest it may result in better matches, but may also decrease within mar-
riage child bearing, which may alter divorce decisions. Presumably better matches should decrease divorce, but decreased marital fertility may increase divorce.

A general problem with this vein of work is that there exists a considerable possibility of reverse causality. Stated simply, women that are less enthusiastic about marriage or believe they are not well suited to successful marriage are very likely to make greater investments in their human capital, and actively seek better labor market outcomes. Similarly, they are less likely to make investments geared towards maximizing the gains from within household production specialization. Prominent examples of research illustrating these possibilities are Johnson and Skinner (1986) and Stevenson (2006), which respectively show that women who anticipate divorce are far more active in the labor market, and unilateral divorce laws led to greater labor market participation for both married and unmarried women.

This strand of thinking may be quite valuable in the Chinese case, in that women’s labor market participation has continued to increase in recent years. Women’s compensation has also increased as part of a general trend of rising wages, as well as rising educational attainment among women. However, increases in women’s labor market participation have been modest in recent years, while divorce increases have been decidedly immodest. As such, it is likely rising wages and labor force participation are important, but not sole contributors to increases in divorce.

3.2.6 Emergence of reliable, low cost, birth control

Many academic papers have considered how the birth control revolution ushered in by widely available oral birth control may have affected marriage, divorce and fertility.
Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) argue that the availability of reliable birth control and abortion, put women under greater pressure to engage in pre-marital sex, but left them less able to extract a promise of marriage in the event of pregnancy. They document a notable increase in out-of-wedlock births from the 1960’s through the 1980’s and argue that this reflects a movement away from marriage, and subsequently may have resulted in fewer divorces as well. Bailey (2010) uses a Supreme Court decision that struck down laws banning sales of contraceptives to empirically identify the impact of oral birth control on fertility. In this case, findings suggest that previous work substantially underestimated the impact of oral birth control on fertility, and contributed to a reduction in marriage. Katz and Goldin (2002) make the case that oral birth control likely delayed marriage and reduced fertility by reducing the number of fertile years a woman is married. A key point worth noting is that the decline in fertility would decrease the degree to which intra-household specialization justifies marriage, in the sense that a significant benefit to this specialization is child rearing. In the absence of children, or in an environment of decreased fertility, the gains from marriage would decline. This could manifest itself in either lower marriage rates, higher divorce rates, or both (which is what is observed in the time period).

This may be of interest in the Chinese case because Chinese marriages are different than Western marriages from a fertility perspective in two key ways. One is that a relatively high percentage of Chinese marriages result in children with estimates varying over time from 84% to 93%. This is noticeably higher than in Western nations. However, since the 1980’s the overwhelming majority of married couples that do have children, only have one. Thus, it is not clear whether this would constitute decreased fertility within marriage and
potentially lead to more divorce. However, it is worth noting that these fertility trends have been fairly stable in China during the past 10-15 years when the divorce rate has rapidly accelerated. Thus, is is unlikely that changes in within marriage fertility are a key driving factor in explaining divorce.

3.2.7 International Comparisons

Unfortunately, from our perspective, little has been done to consider how Chinese marriages and divorce are similar to, or different from the experiences of other nations. However, there has been a fair amount written about how the US compares to other industrialized nations and how that has varied over time. Wolfers and Stevenson (2007) find that there are some distinct commonalities between the US and some nations, but that there are very large differences with others. Italy is cited as perhaps being the most similar in that attitudes about the relevance of marriage (very relevant) and cohabitation rates (low) are quite similar. Divorce rates are lower in Italy, but convergence appears to be likely. However, a key difference is that remarriage is much more common in the US, while in Italy it remains somewhat uncommon.

A stark contrast with the US, is what is sometimes referred to as the Nordic Model of Marriage, which is characterized by high rates of cohabitation, low marriage rates, and high levels of extra-marital fertility. Wolfers and Stevenson posit that nations such as Sweden are increasingly adopting the attitude that marriage and fertility need not be linked. They also offer evidence that many other high-income nations such as France, the UK and Canada are moving in this direction, with increasing rates of cohabitation, increasing fertility outside of marriage, later age at first marriage and declining rates of
marriage.

3.3 Data

Data for this investigation stems from two primary sources: the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey (CHARLS), and the China Family Panel Studies (CFPN).

3.3.1 China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey

The CHARLS dataset is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of adults age 45 and older. The baseline national wave of CHARLS was fielded in 2011 and includes about 10,000 households and 17,500 individuals in 150 counties/districts throughout the nation. The individuals are followed up with every two years. All data is to be made public one year after the end of data collection, although in reality this has not happened. CHARLS makes use of a multi-stage stratified PPS sampling method. However, it is important to note that at this time CHARLS is not longitudinal in the sense that data from the second wave of collection has not yet been released. Response rates are 86%. The interviews are done by household, where one household member responds to a variety of questions about themselves, their household, other household members, the past experiences of themselves and their household members. Importantly individuals are asked about their previous marriage histories and questions are asked about current and past spousal partners.

The survey is somewhat limited in that its intended respondents are those aged 45 years or more. As such, the sample may not be highly applicable in explaining the recent rise in divorce rates. This stems from the fact that the sample is biased towards an older
generation that divorced at much lower rates than the current generation, which divorces with much greater regularity. On the other hand, it is attractive in that respondents have had ample opportunity to marry, divorce, and in many cases remarry. Furthermore, it is attractive in that it allows us to account for some of the long term consequences associated with divorce, in particular the survey provides a good deal of information regarding the physical and mental health of respondents. We are thus able to consider whether divorce is associated with adverse health outcomes.

3.3.2 China Family Panel Studies

China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) is a nationally representative, annual longitudinal survey of Chinese communities, families, and individuals. The baseline wave was conducted in 2010. The CFPS collects information every two years and focuses on the economic, and non-economic, wellbeing of Chinese children and adults. A fairly wide range of issues are addressed including economic activities, educational outcomes, family dynamics and relationships, migration, and health. The CFPS is funded by the Chinese government and administered and maintained by Peking University. As stated previously, although the survey is a panel it is for our purposes a single cross section as the 2012 survey has not been released to the public yet. The 2010 survey interviewed about 15,000 families, and over 40,000 individuals within these families. Moreover, the survey is meant to be nationally representative as it draws responses from all over China.

The survey is attractive for a variety of reasons. Namely, the survey contains many observations and allows for considerable precision in estimation, the survey asks questions that allow researchers to re-construct an individuals entire marital history, and the survey
contains a rich set of background information about each individual.

A shortcoming of both data sets is that they present information only regarding marriage and divorce, as opposed to other outcomes such as separation or estrangement that have not resulted in legal divorce. Thus, a severely troubled or de facto failed marriage will be counted as a successful one, so long as it does not reach the point of legal divorce.

3.4 Background

3.4.1 Historical Trends

According to Diamont (2000) divorce has only become common in China since the nation’s development rapidly accelerated following initial economic reforms in 1979. Prior to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, divorce was an extremely rare occurrence and one commonly rooted in infertility. With the communist revolution came some change to the acceptance of divorce, and it became fairly straightforward from a de jure perspective to obtain a divorce. However, it remained a fairly rare occurrence, at least partially because divorces required government permission that was difficult to obtain and frequently required years of petitioning. Beginning in the 1980’s, the Chinese government became far more willing to grant divorces and divorces became more common, but still far below that of most industrialized nations. Throughout the 1990’s divorce rates increased further, albeit at a fairly modest rate. Starting in the early 2000s the rate of divorce dramatically increased and reached a level similar to other industrialized nations in East and Southeast Asia. Figure 3.1 shows China’s gross divorce rate over time. Since 2004 divorce rates appear to have stabilized.
Figure 3.2 shows divorce rates over time for the US, Singapore and China. We chose to show US rates as this is perhaps the most familiar context while Singapore presents highly reliable data using the same metric as the US and China. Moreover, Singapore may be of interest as it is another Asian nation that has experienced rapid growth and has a majority Chinese population from an ethnicity and language perspective. The key take away for our purposes is that while China’s divorce rate has increased in a dramatic fashion in recent years, Singapore and the US present different trends. Although the US continues to have a higher divorce rate than either other nation, its divorce rate has actually declined in recent years. Singapore, on the other hand, has been fairly stable. Thus, China might not be viewed as part of a general global increase in divorce rates, rather the increase in divorces in China is likely not explained by global or regional phenomena.
3.4.2 Common Explanations for Divorce Increases in China

As China’s divorce rate has dramatically increased, a variety of possible explanations have surfaced. Most are merely touted as explanations within the public sphere, but many of them are very popular and likely believed by a great many people. We hope to shine light on the validity of these explanations.

Increasing economic opportunity costs to traditional marriage

In the case of this explanation, marriage is viewed as being an impediment to economic mobility, namely that by being married, labor mobility is compromised and job seekers are not able to find the same quality of match in the labor market, as they would were they single and unmarried. This argument implicitly assumes that individuals are
not fully aware of the opportunity cost imposed on their labor market outcomes prior to marriage. The costs becomes clearer after marriage, and as a result some marriages end. An interesting aspect of this argument is that labor mobility in China has increased dramatically in recent years, and to some extent this has coincided with the increase in marriages ending in divorce. Another interesting aspect of this explanation is that it does not imply that the increase in divorce is necessarily an adverse outcome. Rather, individuals make a rational choice about the trade-offs associated with continuing a marriage in the face of opportunity costs.

One child phenomenon

This explanation has gained considerable traction in recent years and has become a favorite explanation in the Chinese media. The rationale behind this possibility is that the current generation of Chinese young adults marrying and divorcing is composed largely of individuals that were only children without siblings. The thinking is that such individuals are accustomed to being the center of attention, and may be ill prepared to endure the sacrifice and compromise that they would have endured had they grown up in the presence of siblings. In its essence, this argument hinges on the claim that the presence of siblings serves as valuable preparation for marriage, since it may lead to the development of skills to prevent, diminish or resolve inter-personal conflicts. An interesting component of this argument, is that it is perceived to be fairly China specific, as only China has implemented family planning policies that have effectively created an entire generation of only children.
Increased Education

A feature of China’s development is that, over time, educational attainment has increased. As a result, the generation of young people marrying today tends to be substantially better educated than the generations that have preceded it. This, of course, roughly coincides with increases in the divorce rate. The intuition is that increased education may make marriage relatively less attractive from a variety of perspectives. This is very much mirrored in the Economics literature that suggests intra-household specialization gains decrease as both partners become wage earners. A point worth noting, however, is that this argument relies to some extent on the premise that education has made continuing a marriage relatively less attractive, but likely has not altered the proportion of individuals entering into marriage, which has remained fairly static over time. This would be necessary to reconcile the increase in divorce with the lack of a decline in the number of marriages entered into.

Adoption of Western Attitudes

This argument posits that traditional Chinese culture is relatively less pre-disposed to divorce than is modern Western culture. As China has modernized and industrialized there has been an increasing influence of Western values and beliefs, regarding marriage and divorce. These cultural changes may have made divorce relatively more acceptable, and as a result more couples opt to end their marriages. From an Economics perspective one might think of divorce as carrying certain shame costs, however, those shame costs are not felt equally across the population. Rather, those with more traditional attitudes, will
3.4.3 Experiences of other Newly Industrialized Countries

Other industrialized nations in East Asia are also typified by relatively large increases in the gross divorce rate in the past 50 years. Both South Korea and Taiwan have experienced very dramatic increases in their divorce rates and are now among those nations where the divorce rate is the highest. Taiwan’s gross divorce rate went from being roughly 0.2 in 1980 to 6.2 as of 2012. This places it behind only Russia, the US, the UK, and South Korea. Taiwan, in particular, may be the best comparison to mainland China as Taiwan possesses roughly the same culture, as both are predominately Han Chinese, and speak Mandarin Chinese as the sole official language.

The experiences of Japan and South Korea are worth considering as well. Although their cultures are far more distinct in relation to China than is Taiwan, there is much cultural overlap and these nations have also experienced very dramatic growth trajectories. In the case of South Korea, the pattern of rising divorce began modestly in the 1980s, accelerated in the 1990s and appears to have peaked in the last 6-8 years. Thus, the experience has been quite similar to that of Taiwan. Japan’s economic expansion occurred much earlier than did China, Taiwan or South Korea. It’s divorce rate has seen a more steady rise in the past 40 years and does not appear to experienced a period of rapid growth. However, as a result of a near continuous rise in divorce rates, Japan as of 2012 has a fairly high gross divorce rate estimated to be about 2.2 per 1000 people per year. However, it has been suggested that this metric gives an artificially low number since Japan is a fairly elderly society and divorce is primarily an outcome associated with young and middle aged adults.
3.4.4 Geographic Context

China is a geographically heterogenous nation from many perspectives, but this is true from a divorce perspective as well. Figure 3.3 shows the divorce rate by province. Notably, there are some pronounced differences by province. Some notable take aways are that the three Northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang have significantly more divorce than most of the rest of the country, while the southeastern provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi have significantly less. However, apart from those two areas and the very lightly populated far west, there appears to be fairly similar rates of divorce despite very different levels of economic development.

Figure 3.3: Map of China: 2012 Divorce Rate by Province

Many have suggested that generally higher levels of development and affluence drive increased divorce rates. However, a simple examination of divorce by region would suggest this interpretation may be problematic. In particular, the relationship is far from perfect as there are many areas where the divorce rate is quite different than what might be expected, given levels of development. If development levels were sufficient to explain
changes in the divorce rate, we would expect northern China to be characterized by lower rates of divorce, than is southern China. However, there is not a large or systematic difference between northern China and southern China, and if there is any relationship at all, it would appear to be the opposite of expectations.

3.5 Analysis

We wish to determine those factors the strongly predict an increased likelihood of divorce. Moreover, we are interested in presenting evidence that will either substantiate or weaken many of the potential explanations for rising divorce in China. We also wish to consider how divorce and re-marriage affect health outcomes for the ever divorced population. Finally, we wish to see how the predictors of divorce are different for different generations of Chinese. We conduct separate analyses using the CHARLS and CFPS datasets.

We estimate the following equations using ordinary least squares.

For the CHARLS data set:

\[ divorce = \alpha + \beta_{\text{predictors}} + \gamma_{\text{geographic controls}} + \theta_{\text{economic controls}} + \epsilon \]

For the CFPS data set:

\[ divorce = \alpha + \beta_{\text{predictors}} + \gamma_{\text{geographic controls}} + \theta_{\text{ethnicity controls}} + \epsilon \]

Note that the specifications are somewhat different, but in general fairly similar. Differences in the specifications are motivated by the fact that the two surveys do not contain
the same questions, and therefore present different information sets about the respondents. The similarities are motivated by two considerations. One, is that we want to be able to make as close to direct comparisons as possible so that we can see how potential divorce predictors differ across the two populations in the two surveys. This should allow us to gain some insight into how divorce has changed from the older generation of Chinese, to a younger generation. The second reason is that our choice of independent variables is motivated by the factors we believe to be the most important predictors of divorce. Thus, we choose what we believe is most likely to be the best specification given data constraints.

Geographic controls consist of province dummies, ethnicity controls consist of a series of dummies for different ethnic groups, economic controls account for employment status, retiree status, asset value, and housing square footage. Table 3.1 presents general results. Columns 1 and 2 consider the entire population, but use different OLS and probit estimation techniques. Since we consider a probit specification we include estimates for marginal effects in column 3 directly next to column 2, which reveals coefficient estimates for our probit specification. The results suggest use of one technique over the other is not an important distinction. Columns 4 and 5 consider divorce for the opposing populations of urban and village residents. Columns 6 and 7 consider the differences in the well educated population versus those that are relatively less educated. Finally, columns 8 and 9 consider those with siblings versus those that do not have siblings.
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<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) OLS divorce</th>
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<th>(3) Probit ME divorce</th>
<th>(4) Village divorce</th>
<th>(5) Urban divorce</th>
<th>(6) Educ divorce</th>
<th>(7) Non Educ divorce</th>
<th>(8) No Siblings divorce</th>
<th>(9) With Siblings divorce</th>
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<td>(0.0203)</td>
<td>(0.0954)</td>
<td>(0.0158)</td>
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<td>9,351</td>
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<td>CHARLS</td>
<td>CHARLS</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SE in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Coefficients and SE are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation
3.5.1 Age

It is worth noting that many of the subsequent factors associated with divorce are likely to positively correlate with age. For example, older people are more likely to harbor traditional values, are less likely to migrate for economic reasons and are more likely to have married at a younger age. Moreover, those that are older have on average spent more years as married individuals, and are therefore more likely to have experienced a divorce. As such, it is very important to control for the age of respondents. Moreover, there is the possibility that age may interact non-linearly with both divorce and many of the correlated explanatory variables. For this reason, we consider a wide range of specifications that allow age to enter into the regression non-linearly. We consider using polynomial terms, as well as using dummies for age categories. In both instances, the results of additional explanatory variables is non-significant via an F-test. As such, we have presented results for the most intuitive, but also basic, specification allowing age to enter the regression very simply as just the age of the respondent at the time the survey was conducted.

Table 3.1 and Table 3.4 present results for estimates of the coefficients associated with age. As expected age is highly significant and positive, although this is fairly uninteresting since the cumulative probability of a marriage ending in divorce increases as a couple remains married longer. Thus, the result is not one we view as an important predictor of divorce, but rather, a necessary inclusion to diminish the extent of omitted variable bias. This result and interpretation is true across data sets and specifications.
Table 3.2: Divorce and Related Physical Health Outcomes

<table>
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<th>(4)</th>
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<td>cd2</td>
<td>hs1</td>
<td>hs2</td>
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<td>(16.9)</td>
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<td>Hours Sleep</td>
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<td>16.8*</td>
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<td>(2.34)</td>
<td>(9.67)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Remarried</td>
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<td>(0.206)</td>
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<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.39</td>
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<td>(1.32)</td>
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<td>(5.28)</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Coefficients and SE are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation
3.5.2 Only Children

A common explanation for the increase in the prevalence of divorce in China is that the current generation of Chinese young adults entering into marriage is a generation largely comprised of only children that were not reared in the presence of siblings. The intuition behind this is that only children may be less adept at resolving conflict and reaching compromise with their spouses as they do not have a history of doing so with siblings. Although we are unable to make any claims as to the validity of such thinking, we are interested in whether or not the presence of siblings is associated with diminished probabilities of divorce.

We examine this from a variety of angles. We first consider what the CHARLS data set suggests. In table 3.1 specifications (1) through (7), we explicitly include number of siblings as an independent indicator variable. We find as a result that, in general, the presence of siblings decreases the probability of divorce. However, the result is only significant at the 10% confidence interval, as such the relationship is not impervious to doubts. In terms of a magnitude, we find that is generally between 0.001 and 0.002. Stated more intuitively the presence of siblings decreases the probability of divorce by roughly 1‰. This would suggest that the presence of siblings may diminish the likelihood of divorce, but the relationship is quite weak. Thus, at least for the older generation it does not seem to be the case that the presence of siblings is terribly important in explaining successful marriages and divorce. It is worth noting that in the case of the CHARLS data set the vast majority of respondents are over age 45 and as such, very few of them are only children. If we restrict the sample to just those that are only children (column 9), we find that the
sample of ever married only children shrinks to less than 400.

We next turn our attention to the CFPS data and see how this compares to the results suggested by the CHARLS data. Table 3.4 presents regression results. We find that the results are somewhat similar to that of the CHARLS analysis in that the coefficient is quite small and significant in some specifications, but only at the 90% confidence interval. In terms of magnitude, the presence of a sibling is associated with a 1‰ decline in the likelihood of divorce. Thus, the result is nearly identical to our estimate using CHARLS data. However, there are a great many more only children in the CFPS data so we feel relatively more confident in this result. The relationship appears slightly more pronounced for the relatively highly educated as shown in column 4 of Table 3.4. However, we again only find this to be significant at the 90% confidence interval. Although the presence of siblings is associated with a 3‰ decline in the likelihood of divorce, this is certainly not supportive of the popular interpretation that only children’s failure to maintain successful marriages is a primary driver of divorce in China.

Given the very small magnitudes of our estimates across specifications and data samples, we conclude that the increasing prevalence of only children in China is not a primary driver of the recent increases in divorce. Moreover, it would appear that the presence of siblings is associated with a very similar decrease in the probability of divorce for both the older generation of Chinese and a younger one as well.
3.5.3 Role of proxies for Western Attitudes

Use of a Lunar Calendar Using CHARLS Data

Another common explanation for the increased prevalence of divorce in China is that many traditional attitudes about marriage have been replaced by Western ideals that are more accommodating of divorce. Unfortunately, the presence and acceptance of Western attitudes is inherently unobservable. Despite this, there are some interesting proxies that are observed in the data. One such example is that in China individuals often differ in how they report their dates of birth. Roughly two thirds of the sample uses the same western calendar as is used for day to day activities. However, another segment of the population instead reports their date of birth using the traditional lunar calendar that is far more closely tied to traditional ceremonies and spirituality. Whether one chooses to use the Western calendar or the lunar calendar would appear to be an excellent proxy for the extent to which one ascribes to more traditional Chinese attitudes about marriage and divorce.

We test this possibility by using CHARLS data as this survey allows respondents to report dates of birth and death using the lunar calendar. Interestingly, the answer seems to be that use of the lunar calendar is significant in explaining divorce tendencies. Table 3.1 suggests that the relationship between divorce and the lunar calendar is significant at the 99 percent confidence interval and the sign of the coefficient is negative. Thus, those that use the lunar calendar are less likely to get a divorce. In terms of a magnitude across specifications it appears that most estimates are just slightly over 0.01 thus, using the lunar calendar is associated with roughly a 1% decline in the probability of divorce. This would
lend support to the claim that traditionally minded people, who are more likely to use a lunar calendar, are more likely to view marriage as being permanent.

A related, but surprising result is that village dwellers are more likely to become divorced than their urban counterparts. In particular, Table 3.1 suggests village residence is associated with a 3% increase in the likelihood of divorce and is significant at the 99% confidence interval. Although this appears somewhat surprising, it is possible that the dummy for lunar calendar is accounting for traditional thinking about marriage. In a regression specification without the lunar calendar dummy, village residence is associated with lower divorce. However, once we control for traditional mindsets by using a lunar calendar indicator, the sign switches and becomes positive. This suggest that a less nuanced investigation might erroneously conclude that rural people are less likely to divorce, when the decrease is a function of traditional attitudes, and not rural living.

Another consideration is to see if lunar calendar use remains important for city dwellers, and within the sample of village dwellers. Hence, we divide the sample and estimate the previous regression for these two distinct samples. This is shown in Table 3.1 columns 4 and 5. If we restrict the sample to just village residents, we again find that use of the lunar calendar is significant. The result is robust in the urban case as well. A potential interpretation is that regardless of location, more traditionally minded individuals are more likely to use the lunar calendar, and are also less likely to divorce. Similarly, these individuals are less likely to have adopted Western attitudes about divorce and are less likely to divorce. This supports the interpretation that within the group of village or city dwellers there are individuals that are more traditional minded, and importantly, those
more traditional minded individuals are less likely to divorce.

Age at First Marriage

Traditionally, Chinese are expected to marry fairly young by current Western standards. However, since the unification of China under the Communist Party the typical age at marriage has risen and now the mean ages for first marriage are roughly 23 for women and 25 for men. However, there remains considerable heterogeneity in age at first marriage. In particular, a young age at first marriage may be considered a good proxy for a traditional mindset. We seek to examine whether or not age at first marriage is predictive of divorce.

In general, findings are supportive of the interpretation that later marriage is associated with a higher likelihood of divorce, moreover the relationship is highly significant across specifications. Table 3.1 shows that as the age of first marriage increases by one year, the likelihood of divorce rises by roughly $2\%$. Although this may appear very modest, it is important to note that this is a per year estimate. That is for every year that marriage is delayed, the probability of divorce rises by $2\%$. Thus, we do not find the implication uninteresting.

This may appear at first glance to be surprising as it is rather different than what we might expect in modern Western nations (specifically we tend to think of people who marry very young as being at a greater risk of divorce). Moreover, from a purely quantitative perspective, we might think that as years married increases the cumulative probability of divorce increases. However, in the case of the Chinese, younger ages at marriage are very likely associated with more traditional attitudes and expectations of marriage. It is likely for this reason, that we see such a robust relationship between age at first marriage and
incidence of divorce. It is worth noting that this is not a consequence of omitting observable variables positively associated with age at first marriage such as education, village or urban dwelling, or the other proxy for western thinking - use of the lunar calendar. Thus, the relationship between divorce and age at 1st marriage, is significant independent of these observable and included covariates.

We also consider the age at first marriage using the CFPS data. Table 3.4 shows results that are rather different than for the CHARLS data. In the case of the CFPS data, we again find that later marriage is associated with a greater degree of divorce, but the result is not distinguishable from zero. Moreover, the sample size is generally quite large and estimates are reasonably precise. This would suggest that for the older generation of Chinese, early marriage was a good proxy for traditional attitudes and an indicative of a lower probability of divorce. However, given results using CFPS data it would seem that this is not a useful predictor of divorce for a younger generation of Chinese. This may simply indicate that age at marriage is no longer important, or that age at marriage is merely a proxy for traditional attitudes which do matter. However, it is only a reliable proxy for older Chinese and not younger Chinese.

**Importance of Mandarin using CFPS**

Although the CFPS doesn’t allow for respondents to provide important dates using the lunar calendar, there is another question that may be deeply revealing of the degree to which individuals are traditional minded or not. In particular, the CFSP asks respondents how important the feel an intimate knowledge of the Mandarin Chinese language is. Our thinking is that in order to be connected with media, education, non-agricultural job op-
opportunities, and a life outside of the ancestral village, knowledge of Mandarin is absolutely necessary. The alternative is to only know one’s very specific dialect, which will still allow one to engage with their immediate locality, but not much else. Since traditional minded individuals are generally much less interested in life beyond their immediate sphere, they will likely not value Mandarin as much as more modern minded individuals. On the other hand, those with an outward disposition and a desire to engage with the modern world will feel that Mandarin is absolutely necessary.

A point to be made is that we include a measure of Mandarin importance only after controlling for age, province and educational attainment. Thus, the measure will not be confounded with provincially based language preferences, the general trend towards greater Mandarin acceptance over time, and the fact the formal education is conducted in Mandarin. We find that attitudes about the relative importance of Mandarin are associated with the incidence of divorce. People that feel Mandarin is relatively more important are more associated with divorce. This reflects our interpretation that those that view Mandarin as important, are less traditional minded, and therefore more likely to divorce. Table 3.4 shows our estimates for the relationship between Mandarin importance and divorce. Our result is significant, but only for our preferred specification (column 1). Once we divide the sample into different segments of the population (columns 3-6), standard errors grow and the result loses any significance. Thus, the result is an interesting one, but not a robust one.
3.5.4 Economic Explanations

A variety of economic explanations are worth considering in terms of explaining Chinese divorce. Among them are the effects of education, economic migration, income and relative affluence.

Education

Education may be important for at least two prominent reasons. One is that education may alter an individual’s beliefs and expectations about what constitutes an appropriate marriage. Available data do not allow us to consider how education may affect beliefs and expectations, but we are able to see how education has a bearing on divorce. The other fairly salient possibility is that education alters the opportunity cost of marriage. Quite simply, the idea is that marriage may require economic sacrifices that are likely to be more dramatic for the relatively well educated, than for those with more modest levels of education. This is a common explanation for the recent surge in divorces, essentially the argument suggests that marriage constrains economic mobility and the ability to pursue a variety of economic opportunities. As individuals become more educated the value of these lost opportunities rises. If this is the case, it is very likely that higher levels of educational attainment will be associated with a greater incidence of divorce.

Another related interpretation is that as individuals gain education they will find that the gains from intra-household specialization declines precipitously and divorce becomes a relatively more appealing option. Of course, the flip side of the same coin is that educational increases may lead to less assortative matching. As a result, marital partners
are more likely to have similar educational backgrounds and consumption complementarities may rise, making marriage more attractive. Separating these two possibilities is beyond the scope of this paper, but we hope to indicate how and if education is associated with divorce.

We consider educational attainment and how it relates to divorce. The CHARLS survey is somewhat limited in that it only asks if respondents completed primary school or middle school. It does not further refine its questions to ask about high school or post high school education. Although this may seem bizarre, it is important to recognize that the sample in the CHARLS dataset is primarily those aged 45 and up. Thus, at the time these individuals received their education, China was still a very poor and developing nation where illiteracy was quite high. Moreover, the dataset includes those that would have received some additional education, but did not as the Cultural Revolution rendered many forms of further education politically problematic.

Table 3.1 shows the results of our estimation. We use dummies for primary school attainment, and middle or higher attainment. The omitted or baseline group are those that did not complete primary school. This is roughly 14% of the surveyed population. We find that there is not a significant relationship between education and divorce. This would seem to lend support to the interpretation that at least for older generations, higher educational attainment is not associated with more divorce. It remains possible that by altering expectations and opportunity costs, education does impact divorce, but in opposite ways of a similar magnitude. Thus, lost gains from intra-household specialization push divorces up, while gains from consumption complementarities diminish divorce by a similar
magnitude. Although we cannot rule this out, it strikes us as rather unlikely. A potential problem in the results is that the data set does not identify highly educated individuals, thus we are not able to determine if high levels of education are associated with a greater or lesser degree of divorce.

We also consider the effect of education for respondents to the CFPS survey. This may potentially be of greater interest for two key reasons. One is that educational attainment has risen in recent years, therefore the CHARLS data and its older respondents are potentially not representative of those entering into marriage today. The other reason, is that CFPS is far more specific than is the CHARLS survey in asking people about their educational attainment. CFPS allows researchers to identify schooling to within half a year. We consider a variety of ways that education may enter into our regression, but the central finding remains the same. That is, education does not appear to be associated with a change in the probability of divorce. Table 3.4 allows years of education to enter into the regression on a year by year incremental basis. Across specifications and populations the result is not distinguishable from zero. We also allowed for education to enter with polynomial terms and used dummies for discrete educational cutoffs in the event that education may interact non-linearly with divorce. In the case of these alternative methods, results were the same, but with less precision and lower $R^2$.

This finding would seem to suggest that education is not terribly important in explaining divorce even after correcting for some of the shortcomings of the CHARLS data.
Migration

Migration within China may also be an issue worth devoting some attention to. Ostensibly, the idea being that those that migrate are likely to place a greater value on economic opportunities. As such, they may feel the economic opportunity costs of marriage more acutely. Of course this decision is likely not reached in a vacuum, rather there may be some degree of endogeneity in the decision process. That is, couple who feel their marriage is particularly strong may be less deterred by the prospect of migration. If it is the case that migrants value economic opportunity more highly and do not because they systematically feel more stable in their marriages, we would expect to find that migrants are generally more likely to experience divorce. We find this is not the case as shown in Table 3.1. Across specifications and populations, it appears being a migrant is not associated with greater or lesser incidence of divorce.

This may be universally true, or may only be true for the elderly. It is quite possible that for the older generation migration was not particularly associated with the pursuit of greater economic opportunity. However, today migration is inexorably linked to labor market activities as most individuals must sacrifice their access to publicly provided goods and services if they migrate. A peculiarity of Chinese domestic policy is that although all citizens are able to receive certain social services, they must be residing in their approved locality (usually the place of their birth) in order to collect services and benefits. As such, today people generally only migrate if they believe the benefits will outweigh the costs of lost access to social services, such as education and health care provision.

We also consider migration using the CFPS data set. Table 3.1 shows that results
are generally very different for this data than for CHARLS data. In particular, not having migrated is associated with a diminished likelihood of divorce. The result is significant at the 99th percent confidence interval, and is robust to changes in specification and changes in the population considered. The magnitude suggest not having migrated decreases the likelihood of divorce by between 2% and 3%. As to why this is so different than in the CHARLS dataset, our thinking is that migration was less likely to be for economic reasons for the older generation, as such it likely did not radically alter the opportunity costs of marriage. This stems from the fact that levels of economic development across China were far less heterogenous prior to the post Tiananmen economic reforms. As China has undergone rapid development, the economic value of migration has likely increased a great deal, as some parts of China became far wealthier and were able to offer desirable employment to many people.

In terms of interpreting the result within a marriage framework, two thoughts come to mind. Migration may result in the couple living apart and/or having to adapt to a stressful new environment. This is likely not good for marriage prospects. Our second thought, is that in terms of a more traditional economic model, couples that migrate are probably those that are more career oriented and more likely to feel the loss of economic opportunities due to marriage. Furthermore, migration is more likely to result in dual earner households where gains from intra-household specialization are diminished. This would also likely increase divorce in a ceteris paribus setting.
Income disparities across married couples may also be important in explaining divorce. On the one hand, higher incomes may be associated with those that value career relatively more, those with higher levels of education, and those with more modern attitudes about marriage and/or divorce. This would suggest divorce rates will be higher for the affluent. On the other hand, life may be relatively less stressful for the affluent and consumption complementarities may be more pronounced for households with greater consumption. This would suggest, divorce is less likely for those with higher incomes.

The CHARLS data set does provide income information, but it is limited to income in the previous month, which is quite noisy with many individuals reporting an income of zero. Moreover, there are a great many observations which are missing values, as well as some observations that appear highly suspect (reports of incomes much greater than would be normally expected). As such, it appears this particular independent variable is at best very noisy, and at worst, unreliable. Given this, we chose not to make use of income as an independent variable. Instead, we have used a measure of relative affluence.

To obtain a measure of self perceived relative affluence, surveyors present the respondent with a fictitious individual referred to as Mr. Wang. The survey participant is told a good deal about Mr. Wang's income, assets and leisure time. The respondent is then asked to evaluate how wealthy they are relative to the fictitious Mr. Wang. Responses are restricted to: much worse than Mr. Wang, slightly worse than Mr. Wang, about the same as Mr. Wang, slightly better than Mr. Wang, and much better than Mr. Wang. The respective frequencies of each of these 5 responses is roughly 10%, 26%, 29%, 23%, 7%.
According to CHARLS administrators, Mr. Wang is intended to be viewed as fairly middle class. We use this as an independent variable to account for how wealthy the respondent feels from a relative perspective. Findings are presented in Table 3.1. The variable name is SR Wealth for self-reported relative wealth. In short, it seems those that view Mr. Wang as worse off than themselves are quite a bit more likely to have divorced at some point in their life. The result is highly significant and robust to changes in specification. Roughly speaking, viewing oneself as one increment wealthier (among the five options) is associated with a 1 to 2 percent increase in the likelihood of divorce. This suggests that self perceived economic success may be associated with a greater incidence of divorce in China. The relationship is very significant and distinguishable from zero.

It is difficult to extrapolate from this how income alters divorce, since our measure is both relative and self-reported, but is still a result of some interest. It lends support to the idea that as China has become wealthier, divorces have risen. However, it is important to note that this measure is entirely about relative wealth and not absolute wealth. As such, it may be more correct to think of China as experiencing more divorce as the society becomes economically less equal. Finally, as with all results from the CHARLS data, it is imperative to keep in mind that the result is for those age 45 and older at the time of the survey. Thus, the result may not hold for today’s generation.

CFPS data presents income in a much more expected fashion having measures for income at the individual and household level for the past year and month. Moreover, the data do not appear to present any discomfiting irregularities. Additionally, there are no questions such as the Mr. Wang question in the CHARLS data. Thus, we consider inclusion
of income into our regression framework from a variety of perspectives. We estimate the coefficient value using multiple measures of income, but we ultimately settle upon using the log of annual income as this is the standard given the fact that incomes can become quite far from the center of the distribution, and also because of the diminishing marginal value of income.

None of the measures suggest a relationship distinguishable from zero. We find that the log of income does not suggest the presence of a relationship between income and divorce. This suggests that high income households and low income households do not face radically different divorce probabilities. In terms of reconciling this result with CHARLS data results, we recognize that this is not straightforward and an interpretation is very likely to be incorrect. Having said that, we feel the two results may not be truly comparable since one is a measure of absolute income, while the other is a measure of relative well being from a wealth and leisure perspective.

3.5.5 Health and Divorce

The CHARLS dataset is quite well suited to considering the long run health implications of divorce, in that the sample is mostly comprised of middle-aged and elderly respondents, including many that have experienced a divorce. We examine their physical and mental health to see if those that have experienced a divorce are generally different in their health outcomes, than those who have not divorced. A potentially surprising trend in China is that the majority of the ever divorced population is able to remarry at a later date in time. As such, a significant subset of the ever-divorced population has re-married. Therefore, it is of interest to consider how their health outcomes differ, if at all, from the married
and never divorced, and the divorced but not re-married individuals. A final consideration is whether adverse health outcomes are purely mental, physical, or both.

In theory, a divorce is a mentally and emotionally taxing experience that may result in worse health outcomes. This may be true from both a physical and mental health perspective. Moreover, prior research by Amato (2000) suggests this is a common occurrence for Westerners who divorce. Moreover, Amato’s research suggests these effects may still be present for the remarried, but to a lesser extent than for those that divorce and remarry. We wish to be unambiguously clear that our analysis is descriptive, and not causal. A key criticism of studies linking divorce with health outcomes astutely notes that there may be significant reverse causation. That is, divorce may be a result of poor health, and not simply an outcome. Moreover, the population of individuals who divorce are likely to be different than those that do not experience divorce in a great many observable and unobservable ways. Failure to account for these differences, which is virtually guaranteed in an observational setting, will result in biased coefficients. Our analysis, like others that have preceeded it, is clearly not immune to these problems.

Despite identification short comings, we wish to see to what extent Chinese data is supportive of Western findings that poor health is associated with divorce. To consider this we regress a host of self reported health outcomes on the following specification, and explicitly allow for dummies that indicate whether a person is remarried, or divorced without having remarried.

\[
\text{health measure} = \alpha + \beta_{\text{currently divorced}} + \beta_{\text{remarried}} + \gamma_{\text{controls}} + \epsilon
\]
There are some individuals that have been married and divorced on multiple occasions, as these individuals are not common, nor easily categorized, they are omitted from consideration. The omitted reference group is the population that has married, but never divorced. Widowed and never married individuals are dropped. Findings are reported in Table 3.2. In general, findings suggest that divorce is associated with worse self-reported health. The act of remarrying appears to diminish some of these adverse effects, but is unable to reduce them to the levels found in the married, never divorced sample.

**Mental Health**  In general, findings are supportive of the claim that divorce is harmful to mental health and remarriage appears to alleviate some of the mental burden, but not all of it. For example, Table 3.3, columns 5 through 10, show that the divorced, but un-remarried, are more likely to report feeling lonely, not wanting to continue living and report lower levels of life satisfaction. In all cases, the result is highly significant and distinguishable from zero. However, in each of these cases the magnitude of the coefficient is considerable smaller for the remarried portion of the sample. This would suggest remarrying is at least somewhat effective in reducing some of the mental trauma associated with divorce. However, it is worth noting that the remarried still exhibit worse outcomes relative to the never divorced portion of the sample, and the relationship for remarried individuals is also very significant and distinguishable from zero.

In the case of feeling fearful about the future, the relationship appears to be that being divorced has no effect, but being re-married is associated with an elevated probability of feeling fearful about the future. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.3 suggest this pattern in that the coefficient for the divorced population is not distinguishable from zero. However,
it appears that the remarried are nearly 10% more likely to feel fearful about the future than the never divorced, and the relationship is very significant. Notably, the magnitude of the coefficient is higher for the divorced, but less precise. However, this odd outcome is most likely explained by the relatively fewer observations where individuals divorce, but then do not remarry. As such, the coefficient estimate is inherently less precise and for this reason we are unable to unequivocally point to the existence of a relationship between feeling fearful, and having been divorced, but not remarried.

The relationship is essentially the same for feeling hopeful about the future. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.3 reveal the relationship between divorce, remarriage and feeling hopeful about the future. In short, we are unable to rigorously point to a relationship between divorce and feeling hopeful about the future, but we can make the claim that there is a highly significant relationship for the remarried, who are less likely to report feeling hopeful about the future. Again, the magnitude of the coefficient is larger for the remarried, but by virtue of fewer observations the coefficient estimate is much less precise.

The CFPS does, however, have several measures of mental health, much like the CHARLS, but they are slightly different as outlined above. These may be slightly less problematic than physical health, since it is less clear that these particular indicators for mental health are fairly rare for younger people. Thus, the fact that CFPS has relatively fewer elderly respondents, may be less problematic from the perspective of mental health, than from the perspective of physical health.

Table 3.5 columns 2-6 show our coefficient estimates for dependent variables related to mental health. In general, results are supportive of what was gleaned using
CHARLS data. Namely, mental health outcomes are worse for both the divorced and un-
remarried, and the remarried, than it is for those who married, but never divorced. In terms
of a ranking the best off are those that marry and never divorce, followed by the divorced
and remarried, followed by the divorced, but not remarried who fare the worst. Within the
context of the table, the baseline comparison group is composed of individuals that have
married but never divorced.

Being divorced is associated with a worse outcome for all considered measures,
and the findings are significant at 99% confidence intervals. That is the divorced and un-
remarried are more likely to score highly on measures of depression, pessimism. Yet, they
are more likely to score lowly on measures of social satisfaction, optimism and happiness.
However, for the remarried group, only some findings are significant. Namely, the remarried
are less likely to feel happy or socially satisfied at 99% confidence intervals. In both cases the
magnitude is quite a bit less than for the divorced, un-remarried population. Furthermore,
the remarried are slightly less likely to score highly on a measure of optimism, but the result
is only significant at the 90% confidence interval.

**Physical Health** The relationship between, divorce, remarriage and physical health out-
comes is generally less easily characterized than the relationship with mental health. Two
variables of interest the CHARLS allows us to consider are the prevalence of chronic dis-
ease, and average hours of sleep per night. Chronic diseases include diseases such as cancer,
Diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and other long term non-communicable ailments. Results
are shown in Table 3.2.

The relationship between divorce and chronic disease matches expectations fairly
well, in that relative to the married but never divorced population, the remarried population is significantly more likely to suffer from a chronic disease. The thinking behind this result is that divorce is a traumatic experience they may have a bearing on physical health. Remarriage alleviates some of these problems, but is unable to completely “undo” some of the adverse outcomes associated with divorce. This is mirrored in research by Amato (2000) using western data sources. Indeed, in the CHARLS sample the remarried, are 5% more likely to have a chronic disease, and the result is very significant. In the case of the divorced, but not remarried population the effect is not distinguishable from zero. This appears to be driven by imprecision in estimating the coefficient, and likely stems from the fairly small sample size of divorced, but un-remarried individuals.

The relationship between hours of sleep and previous divorce is less easily characterized and unexpected. Table 3.2 columns (3) and (4) show that although the divorced and un-remarried are generally unable to sleep as much as other segments of the population, the relationship is again fairly imprecise. More unexpectedly, it seems that the remarried actually sleep more hours than the married, but never divorced population. Moreover, this relationship is very distinguishable from zero. The finding that the divorced and remarried typically sleep more than married, never divorced people is quite surprising.

We also make use of the CFPS to consider how divorce may impact health. The CFPS is perhaps less well suited than the CHARLS data for one clear reason. That is that the CHARLS data is almost entirely those old enough to begin experiencing chronic illness, while the CFPS contains a great many individuals that are likely to young in most instances to have first hand experience with chronic disease.
We estimate the following equation:

\[ health_{measure} = \alpha + \beta_{currently\_divorced} + \beta_{remarried} + \gamma_{controls} + \epsilon \]

For dependent variables we consider measures of: Presence of a Chronic Disease, Depression, Feeling Pessimistic about the Future, Self-reported Overall Happiness, Degree of Social Satisfaction and Feeling Optimistic about the Future. All measures are self reported. Chronic disease is binary. Depression, happiness, and social satisfaction are scaled on a measure from 1 to 30 based on responses to other questions that we do not have access to. Feeling Pessimistic or optimistic about the future are continuous measures from zero to 1 and again are obtained by virtue of questions we do not have access to.
Table 3.3: Divorce and Related Mental Health Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Hopeful</th>
<th>(2) Hopeful</th>
<th>(3) Lonely</th>
<th>(4) Lonely</th>
<th>(5) Continue Life</th>
<th>(6) Continue Life</th>
<th>(7) Overall Satisfaction</th>
<th>(8) Overall Satisfaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remain Divorced</td>
<td>-11.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.8***</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.7***</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.4***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(6.62)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(6.91)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(6.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarried</td>
<td>-16.6***</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.9***</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.15**</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.97*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.98)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.97)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.64)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-1.37***</td>
<td>-1.35***</td>
<td>0.649***</td>
<td>0.613***</td>
<td>0.433***</td>
<td>0.419***</td>
<td>-0.578***</td>
<td>-0.592***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.0845)</td>
<td>(0.0846)</td>
<td>(0.0780)</td>
<td>(0.0781)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunar</td>
<td>-0.147***</td>
<td>-0.148***</td>
<td>0.0602**</td>
<td>0.0579**</td>
<td>0.0638***</td>
<td>0.0633***</td>
<td>0.0226</td>
<td>0.0216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.12)</td>
<td>(3.12)</td>
<td>(2.56)</td>
<td>(2.56)</td>
<td>(2.03)</td>
<td>(2.03)</td>
<td>(1.83)</td>
<td>(1.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Village</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>-6.04*</td>
<td>-4.41</td>
<td>-6.28**</td>
<td>-5.75**</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td>0.732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.30)</td>
<td>(4.29)</td>
<td>(3.53)</td>
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<td>(2.81)</td>
<td>(2.80)</td>
<td>(2.52)</td>
<td>(2.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ Primary</td>
<td>12.2***</td>
<td>12.2***</td>
<td>-13.0***</td>
<td>-12.9***</td>
<td>-11.0***</td>
<td>-10.9***</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.288</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.21)</td>
<td>(3.21)</td>
<td>(2.63)</td>
<td>(2.63)</td>
<td>(2.09)</td>
<td>(2.09)</td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ Middle</td>
<td>12.7***</td>
<td>12.7***</td>
<td>-10.4***</td>
<td>-10.2***</td>
<td>-7.96***</td>
<td>-7.91***</td>
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<td>(2.23)</td>
<td>(2.23)</td>
<td>(2.00)</td>
<td>(2.00)</td>
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<td>Sibling</td>
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<td>0.527</td>
<td>-0.596</td>
<td>-0.626</td>
<td>-0.0961</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>-0.180</td>
<td>-0.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.643)</td>
<td>(0.642)</td>
<td>(0.524)</td>
<td>(0.525)</td>
<td>(0.417)</td>
<td>(0.417)</td>
<td>(0.379)</td>
<td>(0.379)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age First Marriage</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>-1.05***</td>
<td>-0.923***</td>
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SE in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Coefficients and SE are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation
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<td>0.162</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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SE in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Coefficients and SE are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation.
Table 3.5: Divorce and Related Physical and Mental Health Outcomes

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<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>(1) Chronic Disease</th>
<th>(2) Depression</th>
<th>(3) Pessimistic</th>
<th>(4) Happiness</th>
<th>(5) Social Satisfaction</th>
<th>(6) Optimistic</th>
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<td>Remarried</td>
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<td>(5.59)</td>
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<td>(0.0577)</td>
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<td>(0.0643)</td>
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Observations: 20,491 20,333 20,333 20,489 20,477 20,451
Geographic Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income and Educ Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared: 0.058 0.064 0.064 0.076 0.068 0.079
Data Source: CFPS CFPS CFPS CFPS CFPS CFPS

SE in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Coefficients and SE are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation
A shortcoming of the CFPS data is that there is only one measure of physical health present, namely whether or not the respondent suffers from a chronic illness. The respondent is not restricted to some subset of chronic disease, but rather is given an explanation for what constitutes a chronic disease and is then asked if they feel that they have one or not. Table 3.5 column 1 suggests that the divorced and remarried are not different than the married, but never divorced population. In the case of the divorced and remarried, they both have positive coefficients, but the estimates are not significant at any level. Thus, they are not distinguishable from zero. This would suggest that results from the CHARLS are either not robust to changes in data source, or that the CFPS does not contain a sufficient number of people that are of an age where they are likely to experience chronic illness.

3.6 Conclusion

Given the recent dramatic increase in divorce in mainland China, a plethora of explanations have been circulated in the media and public discourse. Moreover, the Economics literature has also provided a variety of explanations and associated issues to consider. In light of these considerations, we consider which factors are associated with divorce in China using two large, detailed, national samples that reveal individuals’ marriage histories. One sample is more representative of the over 45 population, and the other sample is more representative of the nation as a whole. In doing so, we hope to see how marriage and divorce have changed in China. We find that Western or modern attitudes, as measured by several proxies, are quite predictive of divorce, moreover individuals that feel they are relatively well off compared to others are also more likely to divorce. Interestingly, many attributes
one might expect to be predictive of divorce, are not. These fairly unimportant predictors include, education, income and age at marriage. The relationship between migration and divorce depends on the sample. Since the result varies by data source, we do not wish to make a strong claim, but note that migration is a strong predictor for the relatively younger set of respondents in the CFPS, but migration is not meaningful for the relatively older population surveyed in the CHARLS.

We also consider how divorce may affect physical and mental health. We find that both surveys lend strong support to the interpretation of divorce as being associated with worse mental health outcomes. However, we find mixed evidence that divorce is associated with worse physical health outcomes. Namely, we find that the remarried fare worse than the married, never divorced population. However for the divorced and unremarried population, estimates are less precise as the sample size is much smaller. Thus, we are unable to marshall significant evidence that physical outcomes are worse for the divorced, but unremarried population.
Bibliography


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Katherine Alaimo, Christine Olson and Edward A. Frongillo (2003), “Low family income and food insufficiency in relation to overweight children, is there a paradox?” *Archives of Pediatrics*.


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