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Sentimental Geographies: Cervantes and the Cultural Politics of Affect in the Early Modern Mediterranean

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Sentimental Geographies:
Cervantes and the Cultural Politics of Affect in the Early Modern Mediterranean

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Spanish

by

Paul Michael Johnson

Dissertation Committee:
Associate Professor Luis F. Avilés, Chair
Professor Steven Hutchinson
Assistant Professor Santiago Morales-Rivera

2014
For my family, who taught me about passion

*Remember, Paul, it is passion that makes the world go round.* [...] *In the absence of passion the world would still be void and without form. Think of Don Quixote. Don Quixote is not about a man sitting in a rocking chair bemoaning the dullness of La Mancha. It is about a man who claps a basin on his head and clambers onto the back of his faithful old plough-horse and sallies forth to do great deeds.*

J. M. Coetzee, *Slow Man*
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

If for Cervantes reason and affect go hand in hand, then to distinguish between the intellectual and emotional support I have received for this dissertation might also be unnecessarily contrived or superfluous. For its writing would have been impossible without the simultaneously academic and moral sustenance that, in one way or another, a great many people have furnished me over the last several years. Luis Avilés has been an inimitable model of rigorous scholarship and, since the beginning of my doctoral career, an unwavering mentor who challenged me to improve in every aspect of my studies. Just as important, he has become for me a cherished friend and confidante whose influence, guidance, and generosity cannot, quite simply, be overstated. Santiago Morales-Rivera has also provided an immeasurable quantity of both scholarly and social support, and his time, dedication, and enthusiasm for his students have not only contributed directly to my intellectual growth but will continue as a standard to which I can only hope to aspire in my professional future. Steve Hutchinson, in addition to an exemplar of discerning and exacting scholarship, has served as an incredibly generous champion of my work and a caring colleague whose influence must be acknowledged to extend well beyond the scope of these pages. As the most immediate readers of these pages, I owe Luis, Santiago, and Steve a debt of gratitude for their careful and insightful questions, commentaries, and suggestions. While any and all errors remain my own, as members of my committee they have each contributed to the development and improvement of this dissertation.

It would, however, have remained the mere shadow of an idea were it not for several individuals whose sustained mentorship and encouragement allowed me to pursue my studies at various levels in the first place. Barbara Siegfried was the first to instill in me an academic passion for foreign languages and cultures from within the walls of a small, rural Indiana high school Spanish classroom. In my undergraduate studies, Bob Hershberger served a similarly foundational role by recognizing and fomenting a talent of which I myself was not yet fully aware and, since then, has been a friend and colleague whose honest advice and constant support have been of inestimable value. For similar reasons, Linda Elman continues to command my sincere affection and profound respect. I must also acknowledge the mentorship of Art Evans, as well as the support and collegiality of the rest of the faculty of the Modern Languages Department at DePauw University. At the master’s level, Paco Layna served as further inspiration and impetus to my studies—especially in regards to Cervantes—and continues to be a source of wisdom and liberality. At Middlebury College, I also wish to recognize the substantial assistance of Kim Griffin, Rafael Castillo, and Teresa Cordova.

Likewise, the extent of the deeds and names of friends who through the years have contributed, directly or indirectly, to the culmination of my graduate career is greater than can be adequately expressed here. At U.C. Irvine, Sam Jaffee has been a rock of pedagogical, conversational, and gastronomic camaraderie, while Jesús Miguel-Saldaña has been a Golden Age cohort and transatlantic compatriot. Their friendship continues to be one of the most memorable aspects of my Irvine experience, as does that of Paul Kasper, Colby Nixon, Lauren Gaskill, George Allen, Christina García, and Alex Babayan. In Spain, Nazanin Sullivan, Gillian Brassil, Thirii Myint, Manuel Piqueras, Blanca Santos, Laura Medina, and
Lisa Pokorny graciously offered me *hospitalidad y amistad*. I will forever treasure the persistent care, communion, and Catalan culinary nourishment that Gloria Coral offered me in Horta. And in between and throughout, the steadfastness of my friends Tara Zahler, Pete Molfese, Yusaku Kawai, Dan Reck, Libby Prifogle, Danni Roseman, Eric Yttri, Ellis Doan, and Jon Norris has been equally meaningful. My appreciation of the enduring companionship of Diana Leong leaves me at a particular loss for words.

I am also grateful to all the individuals at U.C. Irvine who, though too numerous to list, have helped me in the capacity of fellow grad student, colleague, friend, staff, or faculty member. I would especially like to recognize Ivette Hernández-Torres, whose generosity and hospitality have been constant. For their honest professional advice, giving spirit, and intellectual community I thank Horacio Legrás, Adriana Johnson, Étienne Balibar, Viviane Mahieux, Michelle Hamilton, Juan Villegas, Paul Cahill, Rodrigo Lazo, Carolyn Boyd, Ed Dimendberg, Patricia Seed, and Rei Terada, in addition to all the faculty of the Department of Spanish and Portuguese and the Critical Theory program. I am equally indebted to the staff members of these programs who came to my administrative aid on countless occasions—Sue Showler, Gina Anzivino, Linda Le, Evelyn Flores, and especially June De Turk. My students deserve enormous credit for sharing their insightful observations and reminding me of the true source and subject of my career as a scholar.

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I gratefully acknowledge the additional financial support I received in the form of grants, awards, and fellowships from the University of California Regents, U.C. Irvine School of Humanities, Department of Spanish and Portuguese, Graduate Dean’s office, La Verne Noyes Fellowship committee, Humanities Center, International Center for Writing and Translation, the Modern Language Association, and the SMLA Harper Fund. I thank the editors and editorial boards of *Cervantes: Bulletin of the Cervantes Society of America* and *eHumanista*, who have granted me permission to reproduce portions of work published in their journals or academic presses. My thanks are due as well to the *Cervantes Project* at Texas A&M University and the Banco de imágenes del Quijote, sponsored by the Centro de Estudios Cervantinos, for their assistance and permission to include a number of images.
from their collections. I am also grateful for the feedback I have received from the editors and anonymous readers at the aforementioned peer-reviewed journals and the attendees at various conferences, with especial recognition for those at annual reunions of the Cervantes Symposium of California. I thank, finally, the numerous other individuals who, though I may have failed to name them here, have made a worthwhile and positive impact on the pages that follow.

Last but not least, I want to recognize the loving and unconditional support and encouragement of my family, without which all of this would have truly been impossible. To my grandparents Chuck, Audrey, Clair, and Phyllis, my mom Kathy and my dad Lee, my sister Addy and brother-in-law Brent, and my young nephews Ethan and Eli, I owe each of you an inexpressible intellectual and moral debt for my success. Although my studies have sometimes taken me to faraway places—and although this dissertation itself has taken me farther and longer than I know you might have liked—I also know that you were always at my side. It is fittingly dedicated to all of you.
CURRICULUM VITAE

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PROFESSIONAL APPOINTMENT

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M.A., Spanish, Middlebury College in Spain, 2006

B.A., Romance Languages (minor in European Studies), DePauw University, 2004

SELECTED HONORS AND AWARDS

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-Graduate Dean's Dissertation Fellowship, Univ. of California, Irvine, 2013-2014.
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-La Verne Noyes Fellowship, Univ. of California, Irvine, 2013.
-Graduate Student Research and Travel Grant, Univ. of California, Irvine, 2013.
-Summer Dissertation Fellowship, Univ. of California, Irvine, 2012.
-Humanities Center Research Grant, Univ. of California, Irvine, 2012.
-UCI International Center for Writing & Translation Research Grant, 2012.
-Modern Language Association (MLA) Travel Grant, 2011.
-Advancement to Candidacy with Honors, Univ. of California, Irvine, 2011.
-Graduate Student Research and Travel Grant, Univ. of California, Irvine, 2008 & 2009.
-Summer Research Fellowship, Univ. of California, Irvine, 2008.
-Regents’ Fellowship, Univ. of California, Irvine, 2007-2008.
**Publications**

I. Articles in Refereed Journals


II. Articles in Books & Collections


III. Book Reviews


RECENT CONFERENCE PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS

I. Presentations at Professional Meetings and Conferences


-“Aporias of Love: Articulating the Ineffable in Cervantes’s *Persiles and Sigismunda.*” *Cervantes’s Other Choices: Translation, Emotion, and Ethics in Persiles and Sigismunda, Renaissance Society of America Annual Convention (RSA).* San Diego, California, April 4, 2013.

-“Las tecnologías cervantinas del yo: Autoescritura y afectividad en *Don Quijote.*” *Cervantes y sus enemigos, II Coloquio Internacional de la Sociedad Cervantina de Madrid y Editorial Academia del Hispanismo.* Madrid, Spain, September 27, 2012.

-“Las lágrimas de San Pedro’: Technologies of the Self in Cervantes." *Cervantes y la(s) revolución(es) tecnológica(s), 24th Annual Cervantes Symposium of California.* California State University, Northridge, April 21, 2012.


-“Don Quijote avergonzado: Trayectoria de un afecto en Cervantes.” *IX Congreso de la Asociación Internacional “Siglo de Oro” (AISO).* Université de Poitiers. Poitiers, France, July 13, 2011.


-“Contexts of Violence: Cervantes’ Case of the Captive.” Contextos de Violencia, La Jornada Literaria Graduate Conference. Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, October 11, 2008.

II. Invited Presentations


-“Las culturas afectivas del Mediterráneo moderno y la vergüenza cervantina.” History of Emotions Research Group (HIST-EX), Human and Social Sciences Center, Spanish National Research Council (CSIC-CCHS). Madrid, Spain, March 13, 2013.

-“‘Salido a la vergüenza’: La política cultural de una emoción en el Mediterráneo moderno.” Seminario de Historia Cultural, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Madrid, Spain, February 20, 2013.


RESEARCH INTERESTS

-Medieval and Early Modern Peninsular Literature and Culture
-Critical Theory
-Mediterranean and Transatlantic Studies
-Sentimentalism and theories of affect, emotion, and the passions
-Aesthetics, visual theory, and the crossovers between literature/art and word/image
- Digital Humanities
- Experiential and community-based learning and pedagogy

**ACADEMIC & PROFESSIONAL SERVICE**

- Corresponding member of the interdisciplinary research group *Historia y filosofía de la experiencia* [History and Philosophy of Experience], Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), 2013–present.

- Appointed by the Community of Madrid as judge for the United Nations Global Classrooms/Model UN competition, 2013.


- Assistant to the Editor, Gestos: Revista de teoría y práctica de teatro hispánico (peer-reviewed journal of Spanish and Latin American theater), 2008–2011.

- Appointed Graduate Admissions Committee Member, Dept. of Spanish & Portuguese, University of California, Irvine, 2009–2010.

- Elected Ph.D. Representative to the Faculty, Dept. of Spanish & Portuguese, University of California, Irvine, 2009–2010.

- Member, Irvine Hispanic Theater Research Group, 2008–2010.


**TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

**Teaching Assistant**, Dept. of Spanish and Portuguese, University of California, Irvine, 2008–2011; 2014

**Graduate course taught:**

- SPAN 97: Spanish for Reading & Translation (course taught in English and designed to satisfy foreign language requirement of other departments’ doctoral programs)

**Undergraduate courses taught:**

- SPAN 1A: Fundamentals of Spanish
- SPAN 2A; 2C: Intermediate Spanish
- SPAN 2AB: Intermediate Intensive Spanish
- SPAN 3A: Spanish Composition
- SPAN 3B: Advanced Spanish Grammar
- SPAN 15: Advanced Conversation in Spanish
-SPAN 44: Hispanic Literatures for Non-Majors: Don Quixote
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Courses taught:

-DePauw in Ecuador / Servicio Program (an immersion-based, intensive Spanish language, literature, and culture course with experiential learning component and accompanying travel to Ecuador, Costa Rica, Peru, and Spain)

**Teaching Associate**, School of Humanities, University of California, Irvine, 2011-2012

Courses taught:

-HUM 1A; 1B; & 1C: The Human and Its Others: Divinity, Society, Nature (Humanities Core Course, a nationally recognized, first-year general education series encompassing writing, arts and humanities, and multicultural studies)

**Selected Honorary and Professional Associations**

-Sigma Delta Pi National Spanish Honorary (inducted in 2004)
-Pi Delta Phi National French Honorary (inducted in 2004)
-Modern Language Association
-Renaissance Society of America
-American Association of Teachers of Spanish and Portuguese
-Society for the Study of Renaissance and Baroque Hispanic Poetry
-Cervantes Society of America
-Asociación Internacional Siglo de Oro

**Languages**

1. English, native fluency
2. Spanish, near-native fluency
3. French, advanced oral and written proficiency
4. Portuguese, advanced oral and written proficiency
5. Catalan, beginning-level oral and reading knowledge
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

I. Research & Teaching

-Fulbright Research Fellow, Madrid, Spain (2012-13)
   -Conducted a fully funded, nine-month archival research project at the Spanish National Library and National Historical Archive

-Instructor / Faculty Co-Leader, DePauw in Ecuador / Servicio Program
   -Led undergraduate students on three-week cultural immersion program for six summers (Spain, 2013; Peru, 2011; Costa Rica, 2010; Ecuador, 2009, 2008, & 2007)

II. Study, Residence, & Travel Abroad

-Middlebury College in Spain, Madrid, Spain (2005-06)

-Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain (Spring 2003)

-Nearly three years of total residence in Spain

-Extensive travel experience in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe; additional travel in Central and South America
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Sentimental Geographies: Cervantes and the Cultural Politics of Affect in the Early Modern Mediterranean

By

Paul Michael Johnson

Doctor of Philosophy in Spanish

University of California, Irvine, 2014

Professor Luis F. Avilés, Director

For Miguel de Cervantes, emotions are an integral and inevitable component of the early modern Mediterranean; to narrate a Mediterranean experience is to always already speak of an affective experience. This dissertation thus seeks to understand the author’s works through two principle itineraries: first, in the context of what Fernand Braudel famously called the Mediterranean “world,” or an expansive maritime perspective in which, beyond regional, national, and ideological boundaries, the Sea may be regarded not as yet another barrier but as an analytical point of departure, central staging ground, or medium for exploring issues of difference but also of interconnectedness. Second, this project ventures to illuminate Cervantes’s texts through the problem of affectivity, a critical category that has until recently remained all but cordoned off from literary criticism, particularly in Cervantine and Mediterranean spheres. While considering the interdisciplinary insights achieved by scholarship of the so-called ‘affective turn’ in cultural studies, critical theory, and other literary traditions, the dissertation seeks to build on these
contributions by reading affect, as was done throughout early modernity, as a discrete philosophical category and complex social phenomenon.

That the Cervantine oeuvre offers a privileged site for interrogating these issues is due, on the one hand, to a highly developed rhetorical language for confronting the abiding challenge of emotional expression in the Mediterranean, a language marked by the innovation of new metaphorical tropes and ironic distance from classical ones, aesthetic qualities of complexity and heterogeneity, the appropriation of figures from non-literary cultural practices, and the mobilization of a visual, gestural, corporeal, and material semiotics. On the other hand, Cervantes’s texts articulate affect as a uniquely ethical solution to and form of resistance against the often conflictive encounters that traversed the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Mediterranean world. In this way, Cervantine affectivity ramifies beyond the strictly aesthetic or literary realm to call forth and contest the political conditions of Cervantes’s epoch, especially those which have historically enabled practices of racial and religious persecution, economic violence, ideological compliance, and imperial conquest.
PREFACE: Exploring Affect across Cervantine Works and Mediterranean Worlds

Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings—always darker, emptier and simpler.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Aphorism 179

Miguel de Cervantes begins his Ocho comedias y ocho entremeses of the year 1615 with a rather bold assertion. After alerting the reader in a kind of self-conscious captatio benevolentiae of his imminent audacity—“aquí entra el salir yo de los límites de mi llaneza”—he declares that, “mostré o, por mejor decir, fui el primero que representase las imaginaciones y los pensamientos escondidos del alma, sacando figuras morales a teatro” (Entremeses 92). By way of an interior/exterior or hidden/visible metaphor, his prologue suggestively performs the feat he claims to have accomplished on the stage: by departing from the restrictions of self-imposed decorum (“el salir yo de los límites”), Cervantes shows how his theatrical works departed from the restrictions of aesthetic convention to make visible that which had hiterto remained hidden (“sacando figuras morales”). In other words, it is only by revealing the truth of his internal thoughts and feelings that the author is able to reveal to the reader an analogous truth about his art. As in the manner of actors stepping onto and exiting the stage, such a performative act implies the simultaneous necessity of entering and leaving (“entra el salir”)—entering a public space where one is subject to external scrutiny, while leaving an internal space of private subjectivity. These movements from soul to stage likewise suggest the crossing or transgressing of borders, not just those of early modern dramatic traditions such as the schism of plot or action versus morality or conceptualism (“figuras morales”), but the frontiers between body and
soul or soul and mind, and especially those which have more generally governed the
distinction between thoughts and feelings or reason and emotion. ("las imaginaciones y los
pensamientos escondidos del alma").

This dissertation is inspired and impelled by similar movements and border
crossings, namely those which seek to understand Cervantes's works through two principle
itineraries: first, in the context of what Fernand Braudel famously called the Mediterranean
“world,” or an expansive maritime perspective in which, beyond regional, national, and
ideological boundaries, the Sea may be regarded not as yet another barrier but as an
analytical point of departure, central staging ground, or medium for exploring issues of
difference but also of interconnectedness. Second, and more fundamentally, my
dissertation ventures to illuminate Cervantes's works via the problem of emotions or
affectivity, a critical sphere that has remained all but cordoned off from literary criticism,
especially in the Cervantine and Mediterranean contexts. Indeed, despite its broad
conceptual importance in the Western canon from Antiquity to the twenty-first century—

1 As Hutchinson notes, the imagination was always associated with “una gran intensidad emocional, una
actualidad y viveza” and recalls such related concepts as phantasie, energeia, illustratio, and vision in thinkers
from Aristotle to Longinus and Quintilian (“Afinidades afectivas” 185). Covarrubias's dictionary also makes
clear that the interiority suggested by “imaginación” implies an emotional as well as cognitive content,
referring to the Latin anima (akin to the inner life or soul of the subject) and the expression “No pasarle por la
imaginación una cosa,” which means “no haber tenido pensamiento della ni primer movimiento” (Tesoro
1091). Movimiento, in turn, signified an emotional reaction based on the movements of the soul, as is clear
from Covarrubias's definition of “afecto,” which I discuss below. More broadly, this classical commingling of
thought and feeling within the depths of the inner self, like the Aristotelian imaginative faculty removed from
sensory input, anticipates what I will argue to be a Cervantine emotional philosophy based on the rational or
cognitive qualities of affect. However, it should be briefly noted that with this term I do not mean to imply an
affinity with what has been broadly denominated “cognitive studies” in literary criticism, a fascinating
theoretical approach which has recently come into vogue in North American Cervantes studies. The
shortcomings of this cognitive approach, in my opinion, are that it sometimes tends to emphasize
contemporary neuroscientific or neuropsychological developments at the expense of the artifice of the text or
aesthetic qualities of literature, and this approach has also tended to marginalize literature's emotional
content even further, in spite of notable exceptions (e.g. Wehrs). Obviously, such an evaluation would require
a more thorough analysis than I can provide here, and therefore more studies are needed for understanding
the early modern relationship between cognition and emotion. For cognitive studies in Cervantes, see
Simerka; and Simon, Mancing, and Simerka's recent special issue of the journal Cervantes. For an
approachable neuroscientific study of emotions, see Damasio.
subtending works of philosophical, rhetorical, theological, political, and literary orientations—affectivity as an object of critical and textual analysis has until very recently evaded comprehensive scholarly attention. This neglect could be attributed to the supposed ambiguity and subjectivity attending to any expression of emotion; its conventional opposition and inferiority to modern philosophical rationalism; the difficulty and discord in localizing the source of emotions; its dismissal by the New Criticism’s “affective fallacy”; or, paradoxically, to the very lack of a universal critical vocabulary for describing emotions, a lack largely resulting from the collective historical resistance to their systematic study.  

In fact, until quite recently affect has constituted a particularly intractable critical lacuna for a widespread number of fields in the humanities and social sciences, including history, anthropology, sociology, critical theory, and cultural studies of varying periods and traditions. What has been collectively coined the ‘affective turn’ in many of these disciplines—along with similar scholarly momentum surrounding the theme of emotion in various neuroscientific and psychological fields—stands as a compelling invitation to investigate these issues in what yet remains their comparably underrepresented status in early modern Hispanism. 

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2 For the affective fallacy, see Wimsatt and Beardsley. For a detailed overview of the resistance to the study of emotions in narrative, see Keen. The recent volume edited by Schellekens and Goldie contains several studies on the importance of emotion to aesthetics and literature.

3 In addition to a considerable number of monographs in these fields (see especially Abel; Ahmed; Fisher; Massumi; Ngai; and Terada), the most singularly notable evidence of this momentum are a number of recent edited volumes on emotions: The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social (Patricia Clough, ed., 2007); The Affect Theory Reader (Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, eds., 2010); Reading the Early Modern Passions (Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, eds., 2004); and The Representation of Women’s Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Culture (Lisa Perfetti, ed., 2005). The early modern Spanish context is represented by María Tausiet and James S. Amelang’s collection from the perspective of cultural history, Accidentes del alma: Las emociones en la Edad Moderna (2009). Further evidence that the ‘affective turn’ has also captivated Pensinular scholars and readers in Camps; Chóza; Cruz, Manuel; Marina and López Penas; and Trías.
monographs on discrete emotions, such as Juan Ramón Muñoz Sánchez’s recent *De amor y literatura: Hacia Cervantes* (2012), Steven Wagschal’s *The Literature of Jealousy in the Age of Cervantes* (2006), or Roger Bartra’s *Cultura y melancolía: Las enfermedades del alma en la España del Siglo de Oro* (2001). This scholarship, along with a growing number of article-length studies, has made a worthy contribution to the field while highlighting the need for further research. While considering the interdisciplinary insights achieved by scholarship in cultural studies, critical theory, and other literary traditions, my dissertation seeks to build on these contributions by reading affect, as was done throughout early modernity, as a discrete philosophical category and complex social phenomenon. I also understand affect as a cultural artifact that is encoded in the literary text yet at the same time as a potent mimetic device that produces and circulates meaning *sui generis* at the aesthetic level of literature itself. That is to say, the representation of affect in Cervantes’s fiction is culturally mediated by the historical conditions of his epoch, and its deployment in the narrative not only indexes these conditions but, as a crucial element of the author’s aesthetic technique, amplifies, alters, or resists them as well. Understood in such a way, we are offered the dual potential of, on the one hand, excavating the cultural context of the early modern Mediterranean from the sentimentality that on the surface may have been conventionally regarded as mere literary excess and, on the other, interrogating the

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4 Melancholy is, without a doubt, the one emotion that has been explored in a more or less thorough way in the early modern period, its studies eclipsing those of all other affects. This may be partly due to the fact that the early modern understanding of "melancolía" was quite expansive and could mean anything from sadness to affliction to a more general tendency of simply being ‘emotional.’ See Layna Ranz; Soufas; Peset; Flor; Orobitg; and Bartra’s other studies (*Duelo*; and *Siglo*). For more general theoretical approaches to the topic, see Radden; in addition to the classical studies by Freud ("Mourning"); Kristeva; and Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl.
aesthetics of this “excess” in order to gain a broader appreciation of Cervantes’s works—
poetry, theater, and especially prose fiction—themselves.

But my purpose is not merely to fill a critical void, however gaping it may continue
to be. More importantly, my thesis proposes that Cervantes engages with affect in a
fundamental and highly meaningful way, an assessment shared by Steven Hutchinson, the
Cervantes scholar who has dedicated the greatest energy to the problem of emotion.5

Noting that “the problematic of literature and emotion has yet to be thought out,” he posits
that “[c]ertain ‘places’ are more privileged than others as vantage points... and Cervantes’
 writings offer one such vantage point because they have so much to say about emotion”
(“Affective” 74). The diversity of genre, characters, and narrative styles—coupled with
their long-recognized engagement with political and historical issues—reinforces the idea
that Cervantes’s writings stand as a particularly suggestive lens through which to
interrogate affect and the contours of the social spaces that shape its expression. As should
become clear in the pages that follow, I believe that the status of the Cervantine oeuvre as a
privileged “vantage point” is also due, on the one hand, to a highly developed and
innovative rhetorical language for representing emotions and, on the other, to an ethical
and moral philosophy of emotions which is quite different from that of his contemporaries.
Among the neo-Stoic and similar theoretical currents of his epoch that prescribed reason as
the primary mechanism for personal morality, Cervantes, I will argue, establishes emotion
as the basis of an altogether different philosophy, one which supplies an ethical alternative

5 This is evidenced by the several articles Hutchinson has authored on the topic (“Affective”; “Afinidades”;
“Anagnórisis”, “Poética”; “Los primeros”), as well as a more generalized attention to emotion in his books
Cervantine Journeys and Economía ética en Cervantes. To date and to my knowledge, in addition to Wagschal,
Elena Carrera is the only other scholar to have demonstrated an explicit and sustained interest in the problem
for the *unreasonable* violence and conflict of the early modern Mediterranean. In this way, Cervantine affectivity is a potent instrument for mediating between the aesthetic and the political, clandestinely crossing the sovereign boundaries of realms that had more often than not been content to maintain their autarchy.⁶

To stake a claim for Cervantes's emotional philosophy is not without its immediate and considerable challenges, of course. First and foremost, unlike many of his contemporaries, Cervantes—at least so far as we are aware—never firmly subscribed to or clearly articulated a concrete philosophical or ideological doctrine. Despite easily claiming the distinction as the most studied author in Spanish literary history, certain details of his life are scarce, as is the body of direct sources at the disposal of his writing. Compounding these challenges is his characteristic penchant for establishing what seems to be a concrete ethos only to contradict it, with irony or no, a few pages later. When added to the more general reasons behind the traditional resistance to studying affect that I outlined above, these complexities make the task of distilling Cervantes's emotional philosophy and rhetoric into an easily digestible argument formidable, to say the least. Furthermore, in spite of the historical evidence of the simultaneous primacy of reason and repression of emotion in early modern Europe—as attested, for example, in the moral treatises and behavior manuals that sought to prescribe the display or dissimulation of particular emotions in newly forming social spaces such as the royal court—the public manipulation and exchange of affect continued to play a crucial role in a number of historical phenomena

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⁶ This conception recalls the recently renewed efforts of scholars to vindicate aesthetics as a sphere of social critique and ethical potential. See especially the collections edited by Clark (*Revenge of the Aesthetic*, 2000); and Glowacka and Boos (*Between Ethics and Aesthetics: Crossing the Boundaries*, 2002); in addition Rancière's concepts of “aesthetic regimes” and the “distribution of the sensible,” articulated, among other books, in his *The Politics of Aesthetics*. 
unique to the early modern Mediterranean, such as those of imperial conflict and expansion, the emergence of mercantile capitalism, the Counter-Reformation, captivity and the slave trade, and the Inquisition. Autos-da-fé, the infamous inquisitorial act of public penance for apostates and heretics, represent one example of the historical potency of emotions such as fear, honor, and shame as tools of social control. Despite the well-documented growth of reason and emotional repression in this period, these examples demonstrate that affect continued to command an important stake in the social fabric of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Mediterranean.

For these reasons, I believe that we must generally remain skeptical of any discourse which posits the historical absence or negativity of emotion. To proceed otherwise would run the risk of committing at least a couple of questionable theoretical operations that since the dawn of poststructuralism have perhaps become as seductive as they are unjustified. Following this logic could lead, for example, to the facile presumption that, if emotions were repressed by early modern societies, the penetrating critic’s analysis would perform the work of desublimating or freeing those emotions from their historical repression. A slightly more nuanced yet similar claim might posit—à la Foucault’s repressive hypothesis, so masterfully executed in his *The History of Sexuality*—that it is precisely the proliferation of discourse about the need to repress emotions (a discourse often imposed retrospectively) which indicates that emotions were anything but repressed.

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7 On this point, see Delumeau’s renowned study *Sin and Fear*. At least until recently, cultural historians have been much more willing than literary scholars to explore emotion and thus can provide us valuable theoretical and analytical tools for the task. At the forefront of the impulse to study the cultural history of emotions was Johan Huizinga’s *Autumn of the Middle Ages*; and similarly pathbreaking studies by Lucien Febvre; and Norbert Elias. For more recent developments, see Reddy; Eustace et al; and Rosenwein. Matt and Stearns provide a comprehensive theoretical overview and bibliography; while Tausiet and Amelang offer an excellent introduction to the Spanish context.
Another fallacious move would be to contrive an exaggerated reason/emotion dichotomy or paradigmatic hierarchy only to deconstruct it by showing how emotion ends up subverting reason.  

My argument, I hope, manages to avoid these pitfalls while venturing a bit further. For I would suggest that Cervantes wittily—if not wittingly—plays upon the very emotional repression we, especially as modern readers, have come to expect in an early seventeenth-century text: constantly leveraging affect’s supposed absence as a subversive presence in narrative, skillfully ventriloquizing his characters’ emotions with scarcely our awareness, and thwarting our own assumptions as readers. Since modernity has conditioned us to conceive of affect as a private quality of the self, sometimes this means hiding emotions in the plain sight of public spectacles, communal rituals, and social bonds. As I will show in the chapters that follow, at other times it involves the apparent withdrawal of affects into temporal interruptions of the narrative (Chapter 2) or obscuring and occluding them in figures of ineffability (Chapter 3). The affect of shame is a particularly sharp tool for achieving such an effect, given its own will to concealment in the form of the blush, which was traditionally believed to be a natural mechanism for disguising a subject’s moral deficiencies (Chapters 4-6). Indeed, as I discuss in Chapter 1, Cervantes’s use of a highly visual language, somewhat paradoxically, tends to produce a similar effect by displacing the potency of textual words themselves onto a gestural, bodily, or material semiotics. Oftentimes, of course, such obfuscation is due not necessarily to authorial complicity but simply to the limitations of praxis that inhere in certain habits of

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8 Another corrective to the temptations of a repressive hypothesis or fallacy of bifurcation is the fact that Cervantes frequently lauds the virtues of reason and is, to be sure, by no means the only author to have maintained something other than a strictly antagonistic relationship with emotions, as I explain in my first chapter.
reading. For this reason, I would propose that a kind of optical or perspectival adjustment may be called for in order to appreciate the emotions that otherwise might go—and indeed, have gone—unnoticed in Cervantes’s texts. To employ a favored and subversive visual figure of early modernity, we might say that affectivity, far from absent in the epoch, is suspended in a kind of psychological anamorphosis whereby a repositioning of the modern critic’s gaze is required for fully apprehending what is already present in the image(ry).

It is an attention to this imagery that forms a principle line of analysis and one of the unifying threads throughout the present dissertation, which is divided into two parts of three chapters each. The first part, "Cervantine Affectivity," sets out to establish the theoretical parameters of the thesis as a whole while interrogating the problem of emotion in Cervantes’s works from an aesthetic, philosophical, and ethical perspective. Of primary concern is how through his development of innovative rhetorical and narrative strategies Cervantes confronts the abiding challenge of emotional expression in the Mediterranean, all while suggesting affect as an ethical solution to and form of resistance against the conflicts that traversed this space.

As in the manner of an introduction, in my first chapter, entitled “Diversity of Expression and Deviations from Reason: The Rhetoric and Philosophy of Cervantine Affectivity,” I consider the broader stakes of analyzing affect within a Mediterranean framework and plot the salient topographies of Cervantes’s representation of emotion. After establishing the grounds of his emotional philosophy—based on the idea that affects are neither inferior nor opposed to reason—I go on to discuss the need to attend to the highly visual and corporeal grammar of affect in Cervantes’s narrative fiction. I conclude
by arguing that the concept of variety constitutes a crucial element of the uniquely emotional language of this fiction and an integral component of the modern novel.

Chapter 2 is entitled “A Momentary Lapse of Reason? Cervantine Suspension and Emotional Exemplarity in the Novelas ejemplares” and interrogates the irruption of what I call moments of “suspension” in the novellas. Marked by a number of terms such as “suspensión,” “confusión,” and “admiración,” these moments—related to the affect of surprise—interrupt the temporal flow of the narrative and thus open a space of reflection for the characters and reader alike. By studying the etymological, cultural, and corporeal registers of these terms, I identify their function not only as a fundamental tool for building an aesthetics of sentimental suspense, but as instantiations of Cervantes’s emotional ethics in the Mediterranean context.

In Chapter 3, “Aporias of Love: Articulating the Ineffable in Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda,” I respond to the critical discourse that regards the Persiles as an allegorical love story by showing how the novel resists the very expression of love and desire. My scrutiny of tropes of aporia, ineffability, and materiality suggests that Cervantes avowedly exploited the inadequacies and limitations of poetic language in order to underscore the potency of intense affects, those so frequently suffered by the Mediterranean subject. Moreover, his rhetorical appropriation of mysticism for the expression of human passion implies a broader subversive function of the novel’s language of love.

I elaborate on these issues further in Part Two, “Shame: A Case Study,” while narrowing my focus to this particular affect in order to demonstrate how Cervantine affectivity functions at the level of discrete emotions. The second half of my dissertation reflects an even greater concern for what Sara Ahmed has called the “cultural politics of
emotion,” or the ways in which affect ramifies beyond the strictly aesthetic or literary realm to underwrite and call forth the historical and political conditions of Cervantes’s epoch. Overlooked though it has been, shame, as I demonstrate in these three chapters, is particularly well suited for just such a task.

As such, the fourth chapter of my dissertation is called “‘Salido a la vergüenza’: Inquisition, Penality, and a Cervantine View of Mediterranean Values.” By examining the representation of popular and inquisitorial forms of punishment in the works of Cervantes, here I seek to recover shame as an emotional register of lived experience in the early modern Mediterranean, an affect which has hitherto remained overshadowed by the abundance of critical literature on honor as well as by large-scale Mediterraneanizing studies. The identification of an inquisitorial discourse of shaming in the episodes of Don Quijote’s encagement suggests the need, on the one hand, to reevaluate what twentieth-century anthropology denominated the “values” of Mediterranean society and, on the other, to rehabilitate local (hi)stories that are all marked by blood: the blood of shame’s blush; that which was shed through violent conflicts; and that which governed the politics of blood purity.

My fifth chapter, “Inhabiting Affect: The Cultural, Historical, and Ethical Functions of Shame in Don Quijote,” calls for a reevaluation of the novel’s eponymous character in light of his relationship to and experience of shame. Specifically, I argue that Don Quijote’s evolution throughout the novel is directly informed by the affective binds produced in the tension between his chivalric ethos and the increasing social demands of empire, thus offering an alternative response to traditional scholarship’s emphasis on the influence of Juan Huarte de San Juan’s humoral theory. Importantly, the emotions exhibited by the
novel’s protagonist not only summon the cultural politics of the early modern Mediterranean, but stand to prescribe an ethics of personal virtue for its many challenges.

Entitled “A Soldier’s Shame: The Specter of Captivity in ‘La historia del cautivo,’” in my sixth and final chapter I examine the affective valences of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Mediterranean slave trade and the captivity narratives in which they were reflected. Through a close reading of Cervantes’s novella, I propose the existence of a phenomenon I call the specter of captivity: a continual affective affliction inscribed in the figure of the captive that manifests itself most notably in the expression of shame. This shame is informed by the cultural codes of imperial Spain, among which I examine the stigma that attended the Spanish captive due to the suspicion of apostasy and the popular perception of captivity as contaminating. The social dimensions of the novella’s narrative, consistent with the Aristotelian conception of emotion and fundamental for the Cervantine aesthetic, prescribe the necessity of a public dialogue in order to resolve strong emotional burdens and likewise confront the political and ethical questions in which they are rooted.

My ultimate goal throughout these chapters will not be to identify a singular or defining affect or, to appropriate Raymond Williams’s term, a “structure of feeling” for the early modern Mediterranean—as has frequently and, I believe, erroneously been attempted with its designation as an “honor-shame culture.” Although I do rescue shame as an oft-eclipsed emotion from what has otherwise been a nearly hegemonic discourse of honor in early modern Spanish literary criticism, I do not mean to suggest that shame

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9 For William’s concept, see his Marxism and Literature (128-35). The volume edited by Peristiany, though it also makes worthy contributions, is the most prominent example of the imposition of the “honor-shame” cultural designation. Related is the stereotype that Southern European and Mediterranean cultures are generally more ‘impassioned’ and less given to reason than their Northern counterparts. I critique these ideas and provide further examples in Chapter 4.
necessarily constituted what Heidegger, on the other hand, called a “mood” (*Stimmung*) or psychological culture akin to Bartra’s important study of melancholy in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain. Rather, I am much more interested in recuperating what Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell have called the Mediterranean’s distinct “microecologies” (464-65), or the epiphenomenal conditions of certain enclaves within the *mare nostrum* that differentiate themselves from yet contribute to the unity of the space at large. An admittedly loose interpretation of the word allows me to suggest that Cervantes’s texts compose one such microecology, or to coin a similar term we might say that his texts are aggregated by a nearly endless array of affective micro-(hi)stories. The individual self-narratives recounted time and again by Cervantes’s characters—marked without exception by emotional strife and affliction—are, in some sense, the lifeblood of his fiction. With their stories-within-a-story, these emotional bodies open a kind of bi-directional *mis-en-abyme* through which their affects reverberate outwards to affect the Cervantine body of work and body politic of the Mediterranean as well. Under this analytical framework, focusing on the affective diversity, nuances, heterogeneity, and even seeming minutiæ of the text tends, on the one hand, to foreclose on psychological essentialism and reductionism while, on the other, to disclose critical insights at both micro- and macro-levels.

One of the most persistent accessories to this kind of reductionism, of course, is critical language itself, a fact that is greatly complicated by the lexical and semantic complexities of affect and, even greater still, by the challenge of translation. Hence a note

10 As noted above, Bartra has published several books on melancholy. Heidegger discusses his concept of *Stimmung* at various points throughout *Being and Time*. While maintaining important shades of difference, William’s “structure of feeling” and Heidegger’s “mood” could be compared with Adorno’s concept of “atmosphere” (*Aesthetic* 274) and Benjamin’s of “aura” (222), as in effect Sianne Ngai does while explaining her decision, in her recent book *Ugly Feelings*, to adopt her own term “tone” (87).
on terminology is in order here. Since emotions are culturally and historically mediated concepts, rarely can we expect a modern word or translation to perfectly correspond with its nearest historical and foreign-language equivalents. Sometimes these differences are so vast as to necessitate the creation of emotional neologisms to refer to the feelings of other cultures and time periods that lie wholly outside the conceptual range of even provisional language.\footnote{Examples include Ngai’s coining of the terms “stuplimity” and “animatedness” and the decision by the editors and translators of Oliva Sabuco’s New Human Philosophy to use the portmanteau “angry grief” for a feeling unserved by the idea of “depression” (6-7). On the other side of this coin are those emotions whose terms describe an affect which seems no longer to be felt, at least in the same way, such as ancient and medieval acedia, the nineteenth-century condition of neurasthenia or “Americanitis,” or the phrenological concept of “amativeness.” In Chapter 4, I explore how the Spanish term “vergüenza” functions in a similar manner. The historical linguist Javier E. Díaz-Vera has published a number of studies on the slippages of emotion words between cultures, time periods, and languages (especially between Spanish and English). For an example, see his articles “Reconstructing the Old English Cultural Model for Fear” and, with Rosario Caballero, “Exploring the Feeling-Emotions Continuum Across Cultures: Jealousy in English and Spanish.”} In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain, a surfeit of words—including \textit{afecto}, \textit{afección}, \textit{apetito}, \textit{desorden}, \textit{estado de ánimo}, \textit{imaginaciones}, \textit{movimiento}, \textit{perturbación}, \textit{pasión}, \textit{sentimiento}, \textit{turbación}, and \textit{turbamento}—could all perform the work of signifying what we most generally mean by the term “emotion.” Absent in Covarrubias’s dictionary and the \textit{Diccionario de Autoridades}, its most direct Spanish equivalent, “emoción,” did not enter into common usage until much later, even if the term “movimiento”—which shares its etymological affinity with motion—was common in early modern Spanish.\footnote{Hutchinson discusses in detail the close relation (etymological, analogical, and philosophical) between motion and emotion in “Los primeros movimientos” and \textit{Cervantine Journeys} (15-37).} The word “pasión” was also widely used, having derived from the Latin \textit{passio} and often connoting suffering, as its association with the passion of Christ suggests (Covarrubias, \textit{Tesoro} 1348). The other major term for designating the idea of emotion in English—“affect”—and for which there is a corresponding etymological term in Spanish (“afecto”), is also the one whose early modern definition seems to most accurately and
completely denote what is more or less the same idea: “propiamente es pasión del ánima, que redundando en la voz, la altera y causa en el cuerpo un particular movimiento, con que movemos a compasión y misericordia, a ira y a venganza, a tristeza y alegría; cosa importante y necesaria en el orador” (Covarrubias, Tesoro 49). In addition to this term being the most generalized and complete, Covarrubias’s mention of its necessity to the orator likely derives from the influence of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, whose extensive treatment of emotion is reflected in much of Cervantes’s own emotional philosophy.

Since this Cervantine philosophy tends to conceive of affect not as a condition suffered by the subject but as an impetus to action, my use in the dissertation of the term “passion”—which has even broader connotations in English—is limited, as is that of the somewhat more ambiguous “feeling” and “sentiment.” I believe that the words “affect” and “emotion” carry less connotational baggage, even if, especially since the ‘affective turn,’ they have also begun to acquire newly differentiated meanings. Despite the fact that there is little to no concrete agreement on the nuances of their definitions—at least among literary scholars and cultural theorists—“emotion” is commonly taken to refer to a cognitive concept which can be more readily apprehended and quantified by the subject (especially in its plural form “emotions,” with all their discrete variations) than affect, which for some scholars denotes, on the other hand, that which has more of a bodily, involuntary, or asignifying content and which therefore tends more frequently to elide cognition and human language. I acknowledge the importance of such debates and often choose to employ the terms “affect” and “emotion” in a manner consistent with these provisional definitions. Nevertheless, for both practical and stylistic purposes—and following the lead of still other scholars who refer to the terms indistinguishably—I do not
do so under the auspices of a rigid criterion. Instead, whenever possible I provide both original usage and an abundance of cultural and etymological contextualization for terms whose meanings are at an even greater risk of becoming diluted in translation (such as in my detailed discussion of “vergüenza” and “suspensión”). Though admittedly imperfect, I believe that this solution allows for the greatest equilibrium between, on one hand, the necessary recognition of lexical differentiation and terminological precision and, on the other, an analytical prose that is not overly labored, redundant, or unwieldy. If anything, these deficiencies and debates incontrovertibly signal the need for further work on the problem of affect, to which the chapters that follow are devised as but a modest contribution.

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13 See for example Ngai, who briefly contextualizes the affect/emotion polemic while justifying her decision to use the terms interchangeably (25-28).
PART ONE: Cervantine Affectivity

[E]n sólo manifestar mis pensamientos, mis sospiros, mis lágrimas, mis buenos deseos y mis acometimientos pudiera hacer un volumen mayor, o tan grande, que el que pueden hacer todas las obras del Tostado.

Don Quijote (II, 3: 712)

[A]cudiéronme lágrimas a los ojos y hice una lamentación, que si no la puso el autor de nuestra historia, puede hacer cuenta que no puso cosa buena.

Sancho (II, 4: 716)
CHAPTER ONE: Diversity of Expression and Deviations from Reason: The Rhetoric and Philosophy of Cervantine Affectivity

_The sea that stands between the lands knows very well that the frontier is a place where the richest and the most complex personalities are gathered, precisely because the old worn-out litany of identity is absent, and one can experience diversity._

Franco Cassano, “Southern Thought”

Among the often conflictive relations with other scholars that characterize his long career as one of the most illustrious and influential students of Cervantes of the last four centuries, Américo Castro reserved some of his most trenchant criticism for Fernand Braudel, the father of _longue durée_ Mediterranean historiography and author of the monumental _La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l’Époque de Philippe II_ (1949). Encompassing a panoramic view of the geographical, meteorological, and economic conditions of the Mediterranean basin, Braudel’s volume sought to bring into relief the supra-individual structures which shaped the development of this space across the centuries, from Antiquity to the twentieth century. In a sense, Castro’s foundational _El pensamiento de Cervantes_ (1925) is not all that different. Aspiring to similarly expansive heights, it mapped the varied literary and philosophical influences on Cervantes’s oeuvre and attempted to forge a systematic understanding of his modes of thought. With these works, moreover, Braudel and Castro each managed to set the tone—one that was not always harmonious—for the debates which subsequently followed in both their respective fields and beyond. While the widely admired scope of Braudel’s volume would not be imitated by others for another half-century, Castro wrote prolifically in the near half-century between the publication of _El pensamiento_ and his death and influenced an entire
generation of Cervantes scholars, an impact which, especially in the North American academy, continues to be felt today.¹⁴

Yet unlike Castro—as well as fellow members of the Annales School who both preceded and followed him—Braudel was neither concerned with mentalité nor the cultural history of the internal experience of Mediterranean subjectivity. Predictably, perhaps, this is where Castro’s rebuke is most pointed. Under a rather unsubtle title hearkening back to his philological roots (“El pasado fue como fue: No es manufacturable”), in the foreword to his De la edad conflictiva Castro emphasizes that “La perspectiva económica es contemplada y se hace funcional desde situaciones humanas” (xxvi). Even less subtle is his accusation that “a los historiadores económico-materialistas les estorba cuanto refleje el pensar o el sentir de la gente, pues, a la larga, todo eso es nocivo para la finalidad última de mantener a la grey humana bien enredilada, calladita, y aceptando sumisamente el mandato de sus rabalanes (así acontece en toda forma de dictadura)” (xx-xxi). Reflecting the politically charged climate of the early seventies as well as his own personal circumstances, Castro denounced Braudel and those of his ilk for pulling the wool over our eyes through what he regarded as, somewhat paradoxically, a nearly dictatorial liberty with historiographical interpretation. If this broader polemic is set aside, however, we are still left with a Braudelian model which, according to Castro, subsumes the particularities of Spanish everyday life to a grand economic system and therefore neglects

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¹⁴ In effect, the first large-scale work of Mediterranean historiography to be published since Braudel’s La Méditerranée is Horden and Purcell’s The Corrupting Sea of the year 2000, while Abulafia’s similarly ambitious The Great Sea was first published in 2011. Each of these volumes—more than fifty years on—are more or less explicit responses to Braudel and partly responsible for inaugurating the recent explosion of interest in ‘Mediterranean Studies.’ Castro’s influence on cervantismo can be found in Close (“Aproximación”); and Dopico Black and Layna Ranz’s magnificent collection entitled USA Cervantes. More widely known, perhaps, is Castro’s extended polemic with historian Claudio Sánchez Albornoz concerning “el Ser de España”; see Araya; and Gómez Martínez.
“el sentir de la gente” and, far more troublingly, the racial politics of blood purity between Christians, Jews, and Muslims in which such feelings were frequently embedded (xx-xxi). Castro’s critique thus raises a crucial question: Is it even possible to comprehend something as seemingly individualized and subjective as human feelings within a broad Mediterranean framework such as Braudel’s?

As a whole, my dissertation aspires to be an affirmative response to this question. Although my aims are necessarily much more modest than the contributions of either Braudel or Castro, in the following pages I hope to demonstrate that, for Cervantes, emotions are an integral and inevitable component of the early modern Mediterranean; to narrate a Mediterranean experience is to always already speak of an emotional experience. Such an idea is inherent in the dissertation’s title—bridging Castro (“el sentir”) and Braudel (geography)—even if it is not my intention to reconcile the important differences that remain between these two patriarchs. Rather, “sentimental geographies” suggests that in Cervantes’s works an intimate and mutually influenced relationship exists between affectivity and the spaces in or through which it is expressed. In addition to the Mediterranean at large, emotions are regulated by and resist spaces of more discretely localized contours as well, from national arenas and regional zones to ideological territories, social enclaves, and even individualized psychological spheres. And these sentimental geographies are textual as well as topographical. Emotions in Cervantes’s works perform a remarkably complex function: though at times they disclose a meaningful relationship to the world outside, they are just as frequently sites of signification in their own right, building suspense, shifting meaning, measuring conflict, mapping onto characters, rising and falling with the changing landscape of individual works and passages.
Cervantine emotions are waypoints for navigating the text, yet like the Mediterranean itself, can just as easily produce unexpected encounters or even throw us off course. By sweeping us into emotional eddies and implicating us in their resolution, they disturb the work/world dichotomy by pulling on the needle of our own affective compass until we arrive at the shore of the last page. And yet since the emotions of Mediterranean experience are often difficult to resolve, even after folding the sails or closing the book we may well find ourselves still affected by their lingering intensity.

As I argue in Chapter 6, this is the case with Ruy Pérez de Viedma of the semi-autobiographical "Captive’s Tale," who—due to the perceived social stigma and contaminating nature of Islam in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain—suffers the enduring shame of captivity even after his liberation from the bagnios of Algiers. His circumstances represent one of the many examples of how emotions lay bare the trans-Mediterranean exclusionary politics of racial and religious othering, those which summon the Iberian programs of limpieza de sangre and for Castro are suppressed and ignored in Braudel's model. The second part of my title references these and similar “cultural politics of affect,” and reflects my concern to show that emotions in Cervantes's texts play not only an aesthetic role in entertaining the idle reader but a much more serious, ethical, and even subversive one as well, since they almost always articulate and (re)inscribe the political conditions which rendered the Mediterranean an epicenter of imperial and ideological conflict. On one hand, emotions can be regarded as the inverse or more human side of the logics of maritime profit, naval strategy, and military force; but on the other, these forces also traverse the subjective realm of affect and are quite often the very impetus to feeling. We need only think of Ricote's exile or Zoraida's abandonment of her father in Don Quijote.
to realize that a study of these feelings may help us understand how people responded to these logics and the direction of these forces themselves. The following chapters will therefore consider Cervantes’s texts through and alongside the affective structures that inscribe the Mediterranean as a space of conflict, commerce, expansion, and empire. In this schema, emotion itself becomes a medium of exchange, a kind of common currency or lingua franca whose circulation offers subjective and political possibilities outside the normative contours of this space. As a literary device that to a large degree resists conventional mimetic representation, affect is particularly effective at calling forth and reconfiguring the political structures of what Braudel called the Mediterranean “world economy.” To echo once again the common ground I propose to explore between Braudel and Castro, we might say that Cervantes’s works are traversed by an affective economy, one in which emotions are cast as an alternative commodity to be constantly shared, circulated, plundered, recovered, and (re)valued.

Because of the far-reaching effects of these economies, the Mediterranean ‘world’ of which Braudel speaks—and whose capacious boundaries my own conception of “Mediterranean” adheres to as well—is limited to neither the Sea itself nor its extensive coastlines. It also circumscribes vast areas of Europe, North Africa, and the Near East that were alternately aided and afflicted by the encounters for which the Mediterranean served as a proximate or central staging ground. That it was a kind of geographical medium for these encounters evokes its etymology as a middle land. Indeed, for Braudel the Mediterranean is a space both incapable of being grasped independently of that which lies

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15 Dopico Black; and Hutchinson (“Escribir”) do, in effect, study some of the emotional registers of Ricote and Agi Morato, respectively. In the latter case, “lo exótico se transforma en lo esencialmente humano, la emoción y la simpatía suscitadas desde el texto hacen posible que el otro se convierta en nosotros mismos” (Hutchinson, “Escribir” 661).
outside of it and one which is undermined by an artificial adherence to rigid delineations. In the early modern period it was a nearless endless network of nodes and flows, a space of unity and exchange in which multi- and transnational actors were equally subject to its (mis)fortunes, including captives and corsairs, pirates and privateers, merchants and mercenaries, renegades and ransomers. The Mediterranean likewise intervenes in a great number of Cervantes’s works—from the Cyprus of “El amante liberal” to the Rome of Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda; the Istanbul of La gran sultana or the Algiers of “La historia del cautivo”—even if it is most obvious in those which represent explicitly maritime crossings. In the appropriately broader, Braudelian conception of the Mediterranean, however, as Steven Hutchinson and Antonio Cortijo Ocaña recognize, “más fácil nos sería hablar de lo poco de la obra cervantina que no se sitúa dentro de aquellos confines o que no tiene personajes mediterráneos... porque España, a la vez que mira hacia América y el norte de Europa, es tierra plenamente mediterránea, incluso en su interior” (ii). As they go on to underscore, its omnipresence in the Cervantine oeuvre suggests that “muy probablemente, ningún otro escritor o tratadista de la época haya comprendido el Mediterráneo de su tiempo—o lo haya sabido representar en novela y teatro—como Cervantes” (Hutchinson and Cortijo Ocaña i).16

16 Hutchinson and Cortijo Ocaña further highlight the importance of the Mediterranean in Cervantes’s studies: “Si los estudios sobre Cervantes han puesto de relieve el afán del escritor áureo por destacar y desasirse del ambiente opresivo peninsular, en determinados casos marcado por la intransigencia o el constreñimiento, a menudo proponiendo espacios de inclusión y tolerancia, los estudios sobre el Mediterráneo, desde Braudel a Abulafia, han caracterizado a este variopinto espacio geográfico por su carácter de crisol cultural, añadiéndole las notas de la variedad y la multiplicidad abarcadoras en sus gentes y formas de vivir y pensar” (i). They also enumerate a more complete list of Cervantine works and episodes in which the Mediterranean appears (i-ii). Additionally, see the rest of the special issue of the journal eHumanista on Cervantes and the Mediterranean (Hutchinson and Cortijo Ocaña, eds.); and Hutchinson’s own essay “Escribir el Mediterráneo: Cervantes entre dos riberas.” Although he does not frame his analysis within a specifically Mediterranean rubric, Childer’s book Transnational Cervantes takes a similarly expansive geographical (and diachronic) approach to the author’s works.
'Deviations’ from Reason: Cervantes’s Emotional Philosophy

Although the details of what I have been calling Cervantine affectivity will not become entirely clear until the end of my analysis, the remainder of this first chapter will be dedicated to identifying some of the major landmarks and methodologies that I will follow and build upon throughout the dissertation. Among these, I will first attempt to situate Cervantes’s philosophical conception of affect within a common theoretical genealogy, one which will not only inform my own approach to his writing but also illuminate the broader strokes of his works’ emotional ethos. I then take up the abiding problem of emotional expression in fictional narrative by highlighting the major strategies Cervantes mobilizes for overcoming affect’s resistance to conventional language. Namely, I describe how the author engages in “play” with language, especially at the poles of ineffability and hyperbole and by leveraging classical tropes. After exploring at length how Cervantes activates a uniquely visual, corporeal, material, and theatrical grammar, I will conclude by suggesting that Cervantine affectivity, by skillfully adapting a common Renaissance trope, is marked most importantly by a concern for variety and diversity.

According to José Ferrater Mora’s *Diccionario de Filosofía*, the terms “emoción,” “pasión,” “afecto,” and “sentimiento” are all more or less synonymous and can be collectively defined by their opposition to “razón.” In addition to its complexities and

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17 By “play” I do not necessarily mean to invoke the connotations the term has acquired in literary theory and, more recently, game theory, even if this ludic angle might spark interesting results. The starting point for such a study would have to be Huizinga’s foundational *Homo Ludens*. In the prologue to the *Novelas ejemplares*, of course, Cervantes defined this collection as a kind of game: “Mi intento ha sido poner en la plaza de nuestra república una mesa de trucos, donde cada uno pueda llegar a entretenarse” (80).
resistance to conventional language, this definition highlights another likely reason as to why affect has been given critical short shrift over the years. Most importantly, it recalls the stark oppositional hierarchy between reason and emotion that was espoused by the prevailing philosophical circles of Cervantes’s time, including that of a burgeoning neo-Stoicism which advocated the principle of *apatheia*; a Neoplatonism which censured base desires, sensory appetites, and passions of the soul; a Counter-Reformational fervor that reinforced the relationship between these passions and sinful vices; and what has more generally been argued to have been a curbing of emotional expression as part of what Norbert Elias called the civilizing process.¹⁸ That some of the most pernicious or mortal sins corresponded with emotional states—including acedia, pride, wrath, and envy—was not, of course, fortuitous. But the neo-Stoic movement, in particular, which exerted a considerable ideological influence across much of Europe, had in the Iberian Peninsula reached something of a fever pitch toward the end of the sixteenth and the first few decades of the seventeenth centuries—coinciding almost entirely with the years of Cervantes’s literary career. Based on the Hellenistic school of Stoicism and its fundamental principle of *apatheia*—or the purgation of emotions—and an exclusive recognition of *logos* or universal reason as the keys to a virtuous life, proponents of neo-Stoicism sought to syncretically bring these values into line with Christian doctrine in order to prescribe a moral system for early modern Europe. Inaugurated by the Belgian humanist Justus Lipsius in his 1584 treatise *De constantia*, the neo-Stoic school of thought quickly spread.

¹⁸ In his masterful study of melancholy in the Baroque period, Fernando R. de la Flor describes the stifling climate under which this particular mood managed nevertheless to survive and even flourish: “Por mucho que en aquel tiempo la ética neoestoica predique una abstención del mundo, y avale una suerte de desinversión de energías libidinales en él; mientras, por su lado, el neoplatonismo cristiano confie supremamente en los valores de la suspensión contemplativa, liberándose de todo lo que aparece como sensible y ‘bajo’” (32).
and brought about a renaissance of the works of classic Stoics, especially those of Epictetus and Seneca. The movement also impacted other thinkers such as Montesquieu, Guillaume du Vair, and, in Spain, Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas (El Brocense), Gonzalo Correas, and Francisco de Quevedo.

Quevedo, as a contemporary and literary rival of Cervantes, provides an instructively colorful, if extreme, example of the popularity of this paradigm. Exhibiting a fervent curiosity for neo-Stoicism early on, he exchanged letters with Lipsius himself and incorporated his ideas into his moralist and fictional writing with such zeal that: “Podemos afirmar, sin miedo a equivocarnos, que el pensamiento de la Stoa está presente en toda la producción doctrinal de Francisco de Quevedo; es decir, que el neoestoicismo se mantiene de principio a fin en sus escritos filosófico-morales” (Maillo-Pozo 355). His 1635 translation of Epictetus's *Encheiridion*—a touchstone of Stoic philosophy—further solidified his place as one of the most prominent disciples of the neo-Stoic movement. But according to Segundo Serrano Poncela, for Quevedo the elimination of all passions was not simply a seductive hypothesis that he openly espoused, but a way of life that he actively pursued. From “su actitud despectiva hacia el amor” (38) to “esa actitud desengañada y estoica de quien está de vuelta de tantas cosas deseadas y no conseguidas” (43), it would seem that in neo-Stoicism Quevedo discovered a slightly perverse yet religiously endorsed justification for his own infamous misanthropy. Serrano Poncela goes on to locate the

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19 Blüher’s now-classic study is *de rigueur* for understanding Seneca’s influence on Iberia—the place of his birth—as well as for the philosophical influences of Stoicism more generally.

20 El Brocense and Correas had already published their own translations of Epictetus’s work (in 1612 and 1630, respectively), but Quevedo’s of 1635 was distinguished for being written in verse (see Castanien). Quevedo espoused similar tendencies in his *Defensa de Epicuro*, published the same year. For a study of Quevedo’s neo-Stoic ideology, see Blüher (427-86); Ettinghausen; and Schwartz.
“humor negro peculiar en Quevedo, tan original y personal a la vez” in a distant “infancia desprovista de afectos y generadora de cierta insensibilidad ante lo tierno y lo sentimental, con su correspondiente gusto por el impudor y la obscenidad” (46). Except for an apparently healthy dosage of spleen, aggression, and ressentiment, if we are to believe these accounts, then Quevedo was a living example of the self-evacuation of emotion. At the very least, myopic as he was, he saw little to no redeeming qualities in the personal, philosophical, or moral category of affect.21

If we closely examine the treatment of affect by Cervantes, on the other hand, we find what I believe is an altogether different philosophy, one which acknowledges emotion not only as an effective aesthetic device but as a potentially powerful tool for human ethics. Although Castro did not include any Stoic or neo-Stoic texts among his hypothetical list of direct influences on Cervantes (Pensamiento), Blüher suggests that the author was acquainted with El Brocense’s writings on the subject (386n), and we must believe that Cervantes was at least generally aware of the neo-Stoic movement, especially given the relatively intimate literary sphere of seventeenth-century Madrid in which both he and Quevedo circulated. Erasmus, who scholars have cited as one of the most acute influences on Cervantes, also seems to have flirted with Stoic thought in his own translations of Seneca, even if his cursory treatment of emotions in the Moriae Encomium, on the other

21 Like Kierkegaard’s hunchback and melancholy or Cervantes’s wounded hand and pride as a soldier, Serrano Poncela links Quevedo’s psychological profile to the physical disabilities of his limp and nearsightedness: “convirtiendo su cojera y su miopía en instrumentos agresivos, y con ello desarrolló en su carácter ciertas modalidades, diríamos desvergonzadas, si no supiéramos que tras ellas se esconde, muchas veces, un temperamento sensible y tímido” (52). Quevedo’s own Bilis negra provides a biting example of some of these qualities. For more on the relationship between black humor and melancholy, see Santiago Morales-Rivera’s study in the context of modern and contemporary Spanish culture.
hand, indicates he was not an advocate of *apatheia*. Whatever direct or indirect inspiration he may have had for them, I believe that Cervantes's works reject the deterministic strands of Stoic thought by establishing emotions as an ethical choice—not merely a judgment to be repressed—based on the free will and voluntary faculties of the subject. Although this approach may distinguish him from many of his contemporaries, it should be noted that his broader emotional philosophy itself (as opposed to its aesthetic representation in his works) was not entirely new.

In effect, Cervantes's philosophical conception of affect situates him within a long philosophical genealogy that—beginning with Aristotle—foregrounds affect as a site of social meaning and as an epistemology that at once stands opposed to yet immanent within rationality. In addition to laying the groundwork for Western understandings of emotion, Aristotle’s writing anticipates *avant la lettre* many modern cognitivist attempts at distinguishing the rationality inherent in affect. In *De Anima*, for example, he posits that emotions are not simply autonomic responses located in the body, but that they contain an important cognitive content as well. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, this idea forms the basis of his prescriptive ethical practices in which the subject, in addition to his or her rational

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22 In addition to Bataillon’s eminent study *Erasmo y España*, for the influence of Erasmus on Cervantes see Vilanova; and Castro (*Lo hispánico*). Sellars (142) and Tracy (122) are skeptical of Erasmus’s relationship to Stoicism insofar as it might imply a purgation of emotion.

23 That ancient Greek and Roman philosophy influenced Cervantes is, from my point of view, undeniable, despite the often surprising lack of critical attention paid to classical precedents in his works. Perhaps this is due to a particular kind of presentism whereby the presumptive influence of Cervantes’s contemporaries (e.g. Huarte) displaces the Hellenistic precedents of his less temporally immediate predecessors (e.g. Aristotle). The most complete attempt at recovering and interpreting this influence in *Don Quijote* was recently undertaken by Antonio Barnés Vázquez, who has identified in this work alone more than 1,200 references to the classical world and 62 different classical authors, including Homer (47 references), Aristotle (46), Plato (32), and Cicero (31) (Barnés Vázquez 3). Clearly, as Cervantes scholars we should not take this influence for granted—nor neglect later medieval, Arthurian, Christian, Renaissance, and Baroque influences—but must recognize this intertextuality and continue to investigate the ways in which Cervantes appropriated and transformed classical literary and philosophical tropes in the service of his own unique literary enterprises.
faculties, must ‘feel’ what is morally right or wrong. It is in the *Rhetoric* that Aristotle devotes his greatest attention to discussing emotion. Responding to the Sophists’ unscrupulous manipulation of human passions, he offers what he considered to be a more ethically sound practical guide to engaging public sentiment through the rhetorical art. The success of such a venture hinged on the Aristotelian notion that emotions serve an epistemological function in forging belief; in other words, what people believe is as dependent on rational thought as it is on passionate feeling. The Stoics’ axiomatic rejection of the passions—at least insofar as they lead to action—can be seen as a reaction to Aristotelian emotional philosophy and would play a crucial role in the valuation of reason that characterized major currents of later medieval and early modern thought.

In his *De anima et vita* of 1538, on the other hand, the Renaissance scholar Juan Luis Vives sets forth what he considers to be “the supreme task of philosophical inquiry”: the study of the “affections” of the soul, which, he claims, constitute “the foundation of all moral training, both private and public” (qtd. in Noreña 141). The indebtedness of the Valencian humanist to the Aristotelian notion of *metriopátheia*, or the golden mean of moderate passion, is clear in his conviction that only an excess of affect is truly prejudicial to the well-being of the soul. Reconciling this approach with Christian theology, Vives goes on to describe the affects of the soul as “the acts of those faculties which nature gave the soul in order to seek the good and avoid evil” (qtd. in Noreña 144), thus rejecting the dominant tenets of (neo-)Stoicism while endeavoring to recuperate emotion’s classical utility in mitigating precisely its more vehement manifestations. Writing in the later seventeenth

24 That Vives categorizes emotions according to intensity suggests “that only the violent and powerful emotions can be considered ‘disturbances’ of the soul (*perturbationes*),” unlike the Stoic prohibition of all emotion (Noreña 143).
century, Benedict de Spinoza could also not fail to respond to the latent influences of Stoic philosophy and therefore attempted to develop an alternative mechanism for describing, controlling, and enacting the passions. Following Aristotle’s lead, Spinoza distinguished the passions which surged from within and were suffered by the subject from those affects which acted on the body from an external source and led to action. In this model, the greater the subject’s power to be affected, the greater his or her power to act. This notion formed the basis of his ethical imperative for the subject to constantly transform passion into action.²⁵ Spinoza’s subtle deconstruction of the reason/emotion binary directly influenced later thinkers such as Nietzsche and forms a crucial link in the theoretical genealogy mobilized by Gilles Deleuze and many contemporary theorists and cultural critics working on affect today. Deleuze, for example, “links affirmative practices and their acts of creation to a life of joy, which stands opposed to all the reactive forces and sad passions” (Hardt, Nietzsche and Philosophy x). This methodology, true to Nietzsche, is consistent with Deleuze’s broader anti-philosophy, which rejects the dominance of State reason, and his quest to vindicate affect as an aesthetic and epistemological practice. Informed by the anti-dialectics of Nietzschean and Deleuzian thought, a large part of contemporary work on affect involves a continuing commitment to collapsing the distinction between reason and emotion by demonstrating the ways in which these terms are mutually interdependent or immanent within one another.

A similar yet nuanced approach and instructive example of Cervantes’s broader emotional philosophy can be found in the Numancia. Set in the ancient Mediterranean and

²⁵ Describing Spinoza’s “ontology of the human,” Michael Hardt recognizes that “the perspective of the affects requires us constantly to pose as a problem the relation between actions and passions, between reason and the emotions” (Affective Turn x).
suffused with tragic pathos, this play represents Cervantes’s most sobering meditation on the destructive potential of war and imperial conflict. During a heated exchange in the midst of the increasingly destructive Roman siege of Numantia, the character of Leoncio accuses his friend and fellow citizen Marandro of being unduly swept away by amorous passion and therefore not being entirely focused on the task of defending the city:

Leoncio: ¡Cómo te saca de seso
tu amoroso pensamiento!

[...]

...si al querer no se mide,
como la razón lo pide,
con cuándo, cómo, y a quién.

Marandro: ¿Reglas quies poner a amor?

Leoncio: La razón puede ponellas.

Marandro: Razonables serán ellas,
mas no de mucho primor.

Leoncio: En la amorosa porfía,
a razón no hay conocella.

Marandro: Amor no va contra ella,
aunque de ella se desvía. (64-65, v. 685-708)

Leoncio’s admonition that Marandro temper his love with reason encapsulates the conventional neo-Stoic wisdom of the opposition between rationality and emotion. Believing this to be a disservice to his feelings, however, Marandro rejects his friend’s advice because he sees neither love and war nor emotion and reason as incompatible pairs.
Toward the end of the play, after the city has been all but lost, Leoncio recognizes the truth in Marandro’s statement and regrets his prior thinking: “se nos muestra claro que no hay cobarde enamorado pecho” (96, v. 1575-76). In a general sense, this idea reflects the well-known Platonic concept of an army of homosexual men in love, originally described in the Symposium as the Sacred Band of Thebes, whereby soldierly valor was mutually guaranteed by the potential for shame before one’s fellow lover should conduct on the battlefield be anything less than honorable and heroic.

Leoncio’s conclusion goes further to suggest that love can serve as a form of resistance to imperial violence, even when that love ultimately implies willful self-annihilation. In other words, the Numantians’ collective decision to either die of starvation or commit suicide—as Bariatro does by throwing himself from the tower in an act of fraternal solidarity at the end of the play—denies Cipión the trophy or symbolic victory that even a single prisoner of war would have afforded him. It is the bonds of philia which foreclose on just such a possibility.

More importantly, however, I believe that Marandro’s response affords us a subtle yet critical insight into Cervantes’s philosophical approach to emotion: “Amor no va contra [la razón], aunque de ella se desvía.” Specifically, the idea that love does not run counter to

26 “So I assert that in the case of any real man who loves, were it to come to light that he either doing something shameful or putting up with it from another out of cowardice and without defending himself, he would not be as pained on being observed by either his father, his comrades, or anyone else as by his beloved. We observe that this same thing holds in the case of the beloved; he is exceptionally shamed before his lovers whenever he is seen to be involved in something shameful. So if there were any possibility that a city or an army could be composed of lovers and beloveds, then there could be no better way for them to manage their own city; for they would abstain from all that is shameful and be filled with love of honor before one another. And besides were they to do battle alongside one another, then even a few of this sort would win over just about all human beings; for a real man in love would of course far less prefer to be seen by his beloved than by all the rest when it comes to deserting his post or throwing away his weapons; he would choose to be dead many times over before that happened. And, to say nothing of leaving behind one’s beloved or not coming to his aid when he is in danger, there is no one so bad that, once the god Eros had entered him, he would not be directed toward virtue” (Plato, Symposium 178d-179a). In “La española inglesa,” the character of the English queen explicitly evokes this idea in reference to Ricaredo’s love for Isabela: “Felice fuera el rey batallador que tuviera en su ejército diez mil soldados amantes que esperaran que el premio de sus vitorias había de ser gozar de sus amadas” (303). For the importance of eros in Plato, see Sheffield.
but merely ‘deviates’ from reason provides a significant contrast to the binary oppositions between reason and emotion to which many of Cervantes’s contemporaries subscribed. The verb “desviar,” indeed, seems to deviate from the conventional wisdom which held reason as superior to emotion. This also happens to be the same word Cervantes uses to describe the vicissitudes of fortune in the Mediterranean, for example when Ruy Pérez de Viedma is first captured (“Y fue desta suerte: [...] salté en la galera contraria, la cual, desviándose de la que había embestido, estorbó que mis soldados me siguiesen y así, me hallé solo entre mis enemigos”; 1, 39: 497-98; my emphasis), as well as when his escape ship begins to drift back toward the North African coast. As these examples suggest, in the Mediterranean context such “desvíos” can sometimes mean the difference between freedom and captivity or even life and death. But they are an integral and inevitable part of the Mediterranean experience and, therefore, of emotional experience as well.

Of course, it is largely these same narrative “desvíos” that pique and hold our interest as readers, when a character’s emotional reaction deviates from reason or the plot deviates from its assigned or expected course. I would suggest that such deviations represent a penetrating aspect of Cervantes’s unique treatment of emotion. As noted in my preface, the author appears to play upon the very emotional repression we expect as readers, constantly leveraging their supposed absence as a subtle presence in the narrative, one which seems to pull the strings of the action from behind the scenes while tugging on our heartstrings, at times without our own awareness. In any case, this is how and why emotion—and Cervantes’s works themselves—can affect us so much as readers, and why

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27 Unless otherwise noted, throughout the dissertation I will be quoting from Francisco Rico’s edition of Don Quijote, providing the volume, chapter, and corresponding page numbers in parentheses. I follow similar conventions when quoting from the Galatea and the Persiles.
affect can be so subversive. Perhaps this also suggests that, just as Don Quijote loosens the reins on Rocinante in order to deviate from a set or rational course—and in doing so subtly subverts the Platonic metaphor of emotions as wild horses which must constantly be tamed by the whip, chomp, and bit of reason—in seeking to understand Cervantine and Mediterranean affectivity we should also be prepared, to quote Sterne, to set forth on a “sentimental journey” that takes us through more than a few desvíos.

The Defiance of Expression

To conceive of the Mediterranean at large as a more or less singular or unified zone is not to imply that it harbors any degree of emotional uniformity. On the contrary, the affects it provokes and which Cervantes uniquely represents are as diverse as the plethora of historical individuals who inhabited or journeyed through it. In fact, there could hardly be a more appropriate contextual analogy than the Mediterranean for the emotions that share its complexity, non-fixity, dynamism, and interconnectivity. Oftentimes, consigning the existence of certain cultural or social phenomena to the limitations of national borders is to ignore the fluid and diaphanous frontiers of and within the Mediterranean. A similar type of reduction results when we categorize certain affects, moods, feelings, or forms of emotional expression into easily divisible and recognizable typologies. Medieval and early modern philosophers were especially fond of developing their own distinct taxonomies for classifying what each considered to be the discrete number of emotions available for human expression. Most if not all of these thinkers were directly influenced by Aristotle’s discussion of various emotions in the Rhetoric, even as they developed their own
distinctive categories and evaluative frameworks. For example, like the Stoics, in the *Tusculan Disputations* (45 BCE) Cicero established the existence of four primary passions (distress, fear, lust, and delight), under which he enumerated several sub-passions. Aquinas, on the other hand, brought what he considered to be the eleven distinct passions into a bipartite division between the irascible (hope, desperation, fear, and daring) and concupiscible passions (love, hate, desire, aversion, joy, and pain), in addition to the special case of anger. Vives hews closely to Aquinas, in which he names a number of emotions that nevertheless all derive from a mere nine (love, hatred, desire, joy, sadness, hope, fear, anger, and shame). The classificatory fervor of early modernity ensured that by the mid-seventeenth century further schemes had proliferated into a vertiginous and seemingly Baroque cluster of competing lists. Hobbes lists about thirty different passions in the *Leviathan* (1651), while Spinoza mentions at least forty affects in his *Ethics* (1675). The comparably restrained philosophical psychology of Descartes in *Passions of the Soul* (1649), for its part, recognized six “primitive” feelings (wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness) even if their admixture could give rise to a number of additional passions. Many other philosophers went to great pains to develop similar catalogues, and some contemporary psychologists have been just as given to produce easily digestible menus of feelings.\(^\text{28}\)

Dizzying as this array of taxonomical systems might be, they all seek to limit the number of emotions, no matter how numerous, to a quantifiable set of affects available for

\(^{28}\) For a contemporary example that is particularly relevant for the present chapter, see Du, Tao, and Martinez’s recent scientific study entitled “Compound Facial Expressions of Emotion” (2014), in which the authors identify through computational models twenty-one different emotions and their corresponding facial expressions, which they note is a significant increase from what had in previous studies been recognized as only six, such as Ekman’s of 1972.
human expression. Yet Cervantes’s works, on the other hand, offer us an entire spectrum of emotional experiences that frequently resist these kinds of neat or facile categorization. Figuring Deleuze’s study of Leibniz, we might say that Cervantine affectivity evokes a more authentically Baroque experience whereby an ‘endless’ number of feelings are possible, multiplied ad infinitum by the increasingly minute pleats of an “operative function” of emotional ‘folding’ (Deleuze, Fold 3). In effect, this is why the author chooses to keenly exploit the trope of ineffability for describing characters’ affects, as I discuss in detail in Chapter 3. To cite merely one example, when in the Persiles Auristela is released from captivity on the barbarous island, the narrator employs the rhetorical figure of adynaton (expressing the inability to express oneself) by openly pondering the expressive limitations of his own pen in portraying Periandro’s feelings: “¿Qué lengua podrá decir, o qué pluma escribir, lo que sintió Periandro cuando conoció ser Auristela la condenada y la libre?” (I, 4: 153). This same rhetorical question could just as easily apply to our challenge as literary critics, for we too must confront the inadequacies of language and the lack of a universal critical vocabulary for describing affect in all its richness and complexity.

In some sense, designating a feeling as “fear” or “sadness” is even more provisional and inadequate than the national delimitations or conventions of periodization to which we often resort in describing a particular object of analysis. As literary and cultural critics, of course, for practical purposes some degree of emotional pigeonholing is necessary in order to render affect intelligible or at least communicable through language, and we obviously depend upon similar linguistic conventions for our own emotional self-expression, especially when we have a clear need or desire to inform another person of our inner emotional state through either speech or writing. On the other hand, the affects we feel—
before expressing them externally—are also mediated by language, a claim that could be readily supported by Wittgenstein’s philosophy of linguistic determinism, not to mention later post-structuralist theories. In this constructivist model, the symbolic order of language informs the type, range, and intensity of emotional experience. Nevertheless, discursive language is not the only means available to us—as feeling subjects as well as literary critics—for expressing and interpreting affect, since it is frequently accompanied by a whole range of contextual, visual, corporeal, gestural, and physiognomic cues. In other words, in order to comprehend that a character is afraid or sad, for instance, we must attend not only to the representation of discursive language (something akin to “tengo miedo” or “me siento triste”), but to the full spectrum of affect’s non-linguistic signifiers as well. In both cases, as I noted earlier and will discuss in more detail later, it is also crucial to understand emotions relative to their specific historical, cultural, and linguistic contexts, since their meanings and forms of expression are far from universal. For the moment, at any rate, what I wish to underscore is the enormous complexity and variety of affectivity—especially in Cervantes’s works and the Mediterranean world.

Cervantes was anything but unaware of these challenges of emotional expression and, as a result, constantly leverages and plays upon them in rhetorically nimble, cunning, and versatile ways. In what would appear to be a quintessentially Cervantine self-contradiction, for example, in “El amante liberal” we are afforded an approach to the relationship between affect and language that is the exact opposite of the example of ineffability in the Persiles. While a captive in the Cypriot capital of Nicosia, the character of Ricardo, believing his beloved Leonisa to be dead, struggles to explain to his friend Mahamut the cause of his intense grief and affliction:
‘Éste es, ¡oh Mahamut hermano!, el triste suceso mío; ésta es la causa de mis suspiros y de mis lágrimas; mira tú ahora y considera si es bastante para sacarlos de lo profundo de mis entrañas y para engendrarlos en la sequedad de mi lastimado pecho. Leonisa murió, y con ella mi esperanza; que, puesto que la tenía, ella viviendo, se sustentaba de un delgado cabello, todavía, todavía...’ Y en este ‘todavía’ se le pegó la lengua al paladar, de manera que no pudo hablar más palabra ni detener las lágrimas, que, como suele decirse, hilo a hilo le corrían por el rostro, en tanta abundancia, que llegaron a humedecer el suelo. (197; ellipsis in original)

There are several indications in this passage of the entropy of language, of its inadequacy in expressing strong affects. Ricardo’s stammering (repeating the word “todavía”), along with the ellipsis that immediately follows in the text, represents inexpressible grief through the very failure or absence of language. The narrator necessarily intervenes in order to supplement Ricardo’s loss of words, explaining to the reader how the character has been overcome by emotion once again. The irony is that Ricardo began his story precisely in order to reveal to Mahamut the cause of his sighs and tears, and it is these same tears which render him unable to finish it. As is often the case with highly emotive scenes in Cervantes’s texts, affects are contagious, and Mahamut soon accompanies his friend in this “parasismo,” incapable of realizing his own desire to console him with words. Eventually, however, both recover from their emotional stupor enough for Mahamut to conclude the following: “Ahora he hallado ser verdadero... lo que suele decirse, que lo que se sabe sentir se sabe decir, puesto que algunas veces el sentimiento enmudece la lengua; pero,
comoquiera que ello sea, Ricardo, ora llegue tu dolor a tus palabras, ora ellas se le avantajen, siempre has de hallar en mí un verdadero amigo” (198).

On the one hand, the idea that what can be felt can be said (“lo que se sabe sentir se sabe decir”) is a direct contradiction of the example of ineffability from the *Persiles* examined above (“¿Qué lengua podrá decir, o qué pluma escribir, lo que sintió...?”), not to mention several others throughout this and other works. But on the other, if we closely examine the functioning of such tropes in Cervantine narrative, there are a number of reasons why in the final analysis this idea holds true. For just as Ricardo manages to convey his extreme affliction in spite of his loss for words, the narrative also conveys intense affect in spite of its contemplation of just such an impossibility. In this sense, emotions are paradoxically expressed in spite of—yet due to—the very withholding of expression itself. It is for this reason that we must interpret the verb “decir” not merely as an ability to speak one’s feelings through speech but as a much broader rhetorical and communicative capacity as well, one which depends as much on speech’s lack as any number of corporeal, gestural, and physiognomic signifiers. The example above of Ricardo’s being tongue-tied and his abundance of tears represents, in fact, two of Cervantes’s most favored means of achieving this effect. What we might call the trope of the “lengua turbada” and what Carlos Romero Muñoz has called an “hipérbole de las lágrimas” (*Persiles* 171n) each appear, among slightly different stylistic variations, with equally striking frequency throughout the Cervantine corpus, from the *Galatea* to the *Persiles*.²⁹ The repeated insistence upon the tongue and tears underlines the considerable

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²⁹ On tears, see Dopico Black’s essay “Las lágrimas de Sancho.” I examine in more detail the emotion of “turbación” in Chapter 2.
aesthetic work that such bodily signifiers perform in conveying intense affects in the narrative, even if, in and of themselves, such topoi may not be entirely new or unique to Cervantes.

Indeed, as we know, he frequently plays upon the simultaneously silly and sagacious qualities of refrains, folk wisdom, and popular conventions, most noticeably in Sancho’s rustic adages. A similar effect obtains with certain of these tropes, prefaced as they often are with a subtle nod to received notions (“las lágrimas, que, como suele decirse, hilo a hilo le corrían por el rostro, en tanta abundancia, que llegaron a humedecer el suelo”; “lo que suele decirse, que lo que se sabe sentir se sabe decir”; my emphasis). Though at times their usage may go so far as to border on parody, the acknowledgement of these commonplaces does anything but neutralize their utility and force. For if at once Cervantes seems to recognize them as somewhat trite, he in the same stroke capitalizes on their popularity as a means of establishing ironic distance and thus of underscoring the challenges, ambiguities, and aporias that more generally inhere in emotional expression. Such “suele decirse” tropes as these yield nearly limitless mileage because, in explicitly citing their extended usage, Cervantes inserts yet another voice into the already polyphonic narrative and, at the same time, leaves us wondering whether he and the narrator are complicit in extending them further or subtly dubious of their veracity. In either case, we are left with the important fact that the author manages to squeeze and finesse these topoi into correspondingly powerful metaphors for the affective limit-experiences of the early modern Mediterranean. By articulating these experiences from the extreme limits of understatement (the “lengua turbada”) to those of exaggeration (the ‘hyperbole of tears’),
Cervantes defies the commensurate limitations of representation while affirming the very efficacy of mimesis itself.

**The Visuality of Narrative**

Of course, these tropes are not the only examples of how a bodily or visual language intervenes in the communication of emotional states, not only as a supplement to but as a stand-in for spoken language. We might say that gestures and facial expressions constitute the distinct *parole* of a structural *langue* of affective communicability, and that Cervantes, the narrator, and the characters are all quite fluent in its nuanced syntax. At the very beginning of *La Galatea*, for example, an attention to facial gestures introduces us to the ambivalent relationship between the eponymous character and Elicio, which will give rise to no small amount of sighs and tears and continue until the end of the pastoral novel: Elicio “hallábase tan contento y atrevido que mil veces quiso descubrir a Galatea lo que con tanta dificultad encubría. Pero la discreción de Galatea conocía bien, en los movimientos del rostro, lo que Elicio en el alma traía; y tal el suyo mostraba, que al enamorado pastor se le helaban las palabras en la boca, y quedábase solamente con el gusto de aquel primer movimiento” (I: 168). Here the mutual scrutiny and visual appraisal that each character performs on one another serves a hermeneutic function for interpreting their inner emotional states. Beyond the classical belief in physiognomy as the science of discerning another’s soul and moral character, this passage evinces the priority given to minute sensory cues as markers of passion, especially when they grant the careful observer a ‘taste’ (“el gusto”) of potential love when the mouth is otherwise ‘frozen’ (“se le helaban las
The discrete and delicate art exhibited by characters of reading facial ‘movements’ or affects corresponds with the refined skill of the author in composing scenes of such emotional interplay and sensorial richness.

Examples of a similar kind abound in the Cervantine corpus, for neither the protagonists of the Galatea nor Auristela are the only ones capable of penetrating the interiority of fellow characters, despite her claim to possess a rare talent for just such an ability (“viendo el rostro de una persona, le leo el alma y le adevino los pensamientos”; Persiles, II, 10: 346). Don Quijote also professes to be skilled in the art of reading the “certísimos correos que traen las nuevas de lo que allá en lo interior del alma pasa,” as he instructs Sancho to be observant of the semiotics of Dulcinea’s “acciones y movimientos exteriores”:

Ten memoria, y no se te pase della cómo te recibe: si muda las colores el tiempo que la estuvieras dando mi embajada; si se desasosiega y turba oyendo mi nombre; si no cabe en la almohada, si acaso la hallas sentada en el estrado rico de su autoridad; y si está en pie, mírala si se pone ahora sobre el uno, ahora sobre el otro pie; si te repite la respuesta que te diere dos o tres veces; si la muda de blanda en áspera, de aceda en amorosa; si levanta la mano al cabello para componerle, aunque no esté desordenado... Finalmente, hijo, mira todas sus acciones y movimientos, porque si tú me los relates

30 According to Aristotle, “It is possible to infer character from features, if it is granted that the body and the soul are changed together by the natural affections: I say ‘natural,’ for though perhaps by learning music a man has made some change in his soul, this is not one of those affections natural to us; rather I refer to passions and desires when I speak of natural emotions. If then this were granted and also that for each change there is a corresponding sign, and we could state the affection and sign proper to each kind of animal, we shall be able to infer character from features” (Prior Analytics 2.27).
como ellos fueron, sacaré yo lo que ella tiene escondido en lo secreto de su corazón acerca de lo que al hecho de mis amores toca. (II, 10: 764)\textsuperscript{31}

In addition to this wonderfully expressive example, countless other personages show themselves to be highly adept at interpreting one another’s emotions, usually by attending to subtle bodily and gestural cues. One of the most obvious examples of this phenomenon is the one which increasingly ensues from the relationship between Don Quijote and Sancho themselves. This is how the latter, having recognized the knight’s melancholic demeanor, is able to christen him, seemingly spontaneously, as the Caballero de la Triste Figura, or how upon observing Don Quijote’s ire he can quickly deflect or pacify it by inventing a clever scapegoat for his own laughter (as he does in the episode of the yelmo de Mambrino; I, 21: 246). As I study in Chapter 5, a number of other characters also temper their laughter when they notice that Don Quijote has begun to blush and sympathetically wish to spare him further humiliation. These kinds of empathy, emotional acuity, and intuition would be impossible without a characterological aesthetics concerned with developing emotional depth and interiority in the first place.

If we recall the prologue to his Comedias y entremeses (cited in my preface), Cervantes, claiming to have been the first dramaturge to represent “las imaginaciones y los pensamientos escondidos del alma” on stage, was clearly invested in these issues. Of course, the fact that he offers no similar statement about his prose fiction makes this genre, in a way, a more interesting object for just this sort of analysis. I would not wish to imply,

\textsuperscript{31} Don Quijote later claims to be well versed in the ‘science’ of physiognomy and therefore able to extrapolate the physical features of chivalric heroes from their moral character: “por la aprehensión que tengo de que fueron como sus historias cuentan, y por las hazañas que hicieron y condiciones que tuvieron, se pueden sacar por buena fisonomía sus faciones, sus colores y estaturas” (II, 1: 693). Instigated by the barber, he then goes on to do just that for the giant Morgante, Reinaldos, Roldán, and Angélica la Bella (II, 1: 693–96).
as he does with his drama, that Cervantes was the first author to endow his narrative prose with emotion, or that his characters exhibit a degree of psychological inwardness like that of the modern realist novel, for example. What I mean to suggest is that Cervantes’s writing, and especially his novels and novellas, maintains a great investment in building up what I have already called an affective economy, in which an emotional currency is exchanged between the author, different characters, narratological levels, and readers. Within this economy, a particularly high premium is placed on self-expressive communicability, on giving an account of one’s emotional state. This is why so many characters are called upon to share the story of their life circumstances before an intradiegetic audience, and why such stories-within-the-story could be called the marrow of Cervantes’s long novels (the *Galatea*, the *Quijote*, and the *Persiles*), or at the very least major events of equal importance to the narrative action. And yet, almost without exception, these kinds of autobiographical narration cannot occur until other characters have noticed something irregular about either the physical appearance or affective temperament of what is usually a newly introduced character and, as a result, entreat him or her to treat them with said narration. These irregularities reveal something about the constitution and internal state of the character and thus stand as an invitation to share “las imaginaciones y los pensamientos escondidos del alma,” to cross the border between exteriority and interiority—or the private and the public—through the act of self-narration. Sometimes the necessary irregularity is related to cultural signifiers like clothing (such as when Dorotea is found dressed in men’s garments or Ruy Pérez de Viedma and Zoraida arrive at the inn in Moorish apparel), but, more often than not, people
take interest in another individual by observing subtle, non-linguistic indications of his or her emotional state—one that is nearly always marked by affliction.

Such is the case of Ricardo in “El amante liberal,” who recounts the details of his misfortune to Mahamut only after the latter has observed from afar the signs of woe in his behavior; namely, his indulgence in a grief-stricken apostrophe to the crumbling walls of the former Christian fortification of Nicosia, “como si ellas fueran capaces de entenderle; propia condición de afligidos, que, llevados de sus imaginaciones, hacen y dicen cosas ajenas de toda razón y buen discurso” (179). Noticing that Ricardo appears lost in his “continuos pensamientos,” and is “rendido a dar miserables muestras de [su] desventura” and “muestras de extraordinarios sentimientos,” Mahamut implores him to divulge “qué es la causa que [le] trae tan demasiadamente triste” (180-81). His perceptive renegade friend has, true to the formula, interpreted these “muestras” or external cues as signifiers of a deeper emotional affliction and requests that Ricardo explain its cause in order that he might help to alleviate him of its burden. In fact, Mahamut expressly defines this exchange with a medical analogy: “para saber qué remedios o alivios puede tener tu desdicha, es menester que me la cuentes, como ha menester el médico la relación del enfermo, asegurándote que la depositaré en lo más escondido del silencio” (179-81). In effect, Mahamut—as well as so many other characters with a similar role in other works—can be seen to perform the function of a physician throughout the story: having identified a symptomatology in the patient (his “muestras”), by means of his medical history, “relación,” or historia(l) he seeks to understand the affliction’s etiology in order to venture a diagnosis and, finally, to prescribe a cure—all while maintaining the tenet of doctor-patient confidentiality (“la depositaré en lo más escondido del silencio,” which is to say
returning the data of his “desdicha” to its original state of privacy). We need only recall the diagnosis and treatment of ‘lovesickness’ to realize that the relationship between affectivity and early medical science is not fortuitous, in spite of a modern critical tendency to attribute an overly Manichean slant to the body/soul distinction. More importantly, the palliative or therapeutic effect of sharing one’s story aloud with another (even, to some extent it would seem, with the inanimate city walls) means that the promise of at least an initial cure is already offered by the story itself. In these characteristically Cervantine exchanges the narrating of one’s personal history—to what turns out to be, without exception, sympathetic listeners—entails the partial relief of an emotional burden before and beyond the practical assistance they almost always offer upon the story’s conclusion. Though the individual may at first be reticent to do so, and in spite of what is often the resistance of his or her affects to oral discourse, these stories thus grant—like the similarly iterative Arabian Nights—a stay of one’s less immediate fate, a temporary respite or deferral of subjective anguish through the act of communal storytelling.

Even if their specifically emotional impact has been largely overlooked, scholars such as Ruth El Saffar, in her now classic Distance and Control in Don Quixote, have cogently analyzed the aesthetic importance of these stories for Cervantes’s narrative. What interests me in highlighting once again is the equally important presence therein of visually observable affects, those which, as in “El amante liberal,” serve as the primary impetus or prerequisite recognition preceding the predominately (but not entirely) discursive expression of emotion in the ensuing narrations. Among these are such signifiers as sighs,

32 Other writers have also used a medical analogy to define friendship and its bonds of intimacy. See for example Plutarch’s “How to Distinguish a Flatterer from a Friend” (61-112).
tears, the hanging of the head, facial movements and complexion, expressions of pensiveness or perplexity, and even silence itself. In his study of sighs in the Abencerraje, Luis F. Avilés correctly identifies this particular bodily sign not as an involuntary response but as “una especie de protolenguaje” (454) or performative utterance (468) that, by granting “un acceso a la interioridad del otro” (460), tends to dissolve the linguistic and cultural barriers of the Moorish frontier.  

Recognizing the sigh as “el preámbulo al diálogo, el inicio de la comunicabilidad de un secreto y la eventual solución” (466), Avilés finds that it functions in much the same way as I have described similar bodily signifiers in Cervantes: “Casi siempre se despierta la curiosidad por quien suspira, queremos saber qué le pasa, si sufre, si está enamorado, si padece algún mal, si está molesto. Las personas usan y se valen regularmente del suspiro para llamar la atención sobre ellos mismos y su propia condición. Cuando se emite en un grupo, tiene la voluntad de despertar la curiosidad” (463; emphasis in original). In this way, protolinguistic signifiers like the sigh are not merely excessive or superfluous features of florid prose but are strategic choices on the part of the author and characters, thereby performing a deliberate, specialized, and highly meaningful role for works of narrative.

The relative scarcity of studies like Avilés’s may suggest, however, that we sometimes forget the visuality, corporeality, and materiality of narrative—modes of expression which are fundamental for the genre of the novel and, more specifically, for the representation of affect therein. While for the theater the importance of such modes is for

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33 Covarrubias observes in “sospirar” the act of crossing the border of interiority: “Sacar el espíritu de lo profundo del pecho, con sinificación del dolor y ansia que padecemos.” Curiously, he recognizes the semiotics of the sigh yet renounces the opportunity to explain further, presumably due to the subject’s complexity: “Los suspiros es pasión muy común a los enamorados; y así dan al suspiro diferentes sinificaciones y építetos; yo no quiero embarazarme en esta materia” (Tesoro 1451).
obvious reasons much more patent, in fictional narrative we have taken for granted, perhaps, the manners in which emotions make their presence both felt and seen. If this is true, then it is because of relatively clear differences of genre, of practices of spectator- or readership, and of other forms of cultural praxis. Nevertheless, dramatic and literary arts share a great deal in common as well, especially, I would suggest, insofar as each is concerned to foment an emotional exchange between characters and consumers of the work. For though it lacks the visual immediacy of the stage, the novel also mobilizes performative praxis in order to endow its characters with a more or less realistic repertoire of bodily and gestural affects for the benefit of the reader’s imagination. The successful realization of such an aesthetic effect directly corresponds with the authorial skill in ensuring that the emotional depth of a character is developed with subtlety, almost without the reader’s knowledge. The visual is, as it were, not always very visible. I would not hesitate to call Cervantes a master of this art, even if, as I suggested above, he constantly plays upon the conventional extremes of subtlety and heavy-handedness, understatement and hyperbole. But I am also suggesting that by attending to the theatrical, histrionic, and highly visual valences of affect in his works we stand to gain a much greater understanding of how the author presses these modes into the service of emotional expression for intradiegetic publics and, ultimately, for the reader herself.

The images I reproduce throughout the dissertation are therefore intended to complement my attention to and discussion of the visuality of affect in Cervantes’s texts. Most of these images were originally created for the numerous illustrated editions of Cervantes’s works, especially Don Quijote, that have been published in various forms since the princeps editions appeared in 1605 and 1615. Over the last four centuries these
illustrations have come to collectively comprise a vast iconography, one which scholars have begun to study with increasing assiduity. Yet while many of the characters represented in the images are quite expressive, in some sense their historical trajectory reflects that of a similar critical inattention to affect in the textual narrative, for it was not until the twentieth century that more personal images began to more consistently appear. Before then, the illustrators and engravers commissioned to produce these images tended—along with the editors themselves—to grant greater priority to iconic episodes and scenes of action than to the much more subjective theme of characters’ emotions. The reason for this is likely due to two related factors. First, as was again the case with a traditional critical resistance to analyzing the affects of literary aesthetics, the very fact that these affects were considered subjective implied that they were somehow extrinsic to the work itself, more dependent on a viewer or reader’s feelings than something like the episodes of action, which were held to be more structural or intrinsically central to the work and, therefore, universal in their appeal. Second, the content of these images diachronically reflects changing attitudes about the practice of reading itself, from the early conception of a popular imaginary or the influence of the oral tradition (akin to the public reading of “El curioso impertinente” among the guests of the inn in the Quijote of 1605), to the increasingly intimate conception of reading in later centuries as an act of individual diversion (even if this is the practice seemingly favored by Alonso Quijano).

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34 Fortunately, the majority of these images are now readily accessible via two principle online databases: the “Iconografía textual del Quijote” (directed by Eduardo Urbina); and the “Banco de imágenes del Quijote” (directed by José Manuel Lucía Megías). For theoretical approaches to these images, see Urbina and Maestro’s edited volume; Lucía Megías’s Leer el Quijote en imágenes; and Schmidt’s study of eighteenth-century illustrated editions (Critical Images). More research with these digital archives is needed for a correspondingly complete synchronic and diachronic understanding of the images they contain.
However, one particular edition of *Don Quijote*, published in London in the year 1738, would seem—like the author whose work it reproduced—to be ahead of its time. Appearing in four volumes under the title *Vida y hechos del ingenioso hidalgó Don Quixote de la Mancha* and known as Lord Carteret's edition, this work is exceptional not only for its accompanying illustrations themselves, but more importantly, for the explicitly reflexive commentary on the illustrations that graces a brief preface to the first volume. Penned by one Don Juan Oldfield, a “Dotor en Medicina,” the “Advertencias” about “las Estampas desta Historia” provides a remarkably frank and insightful analysis of the proper function of the included engravings, as well as of the critical importance of understanding affect in the novel. For these reasons, it is worth reproducing certain parts of the text extensively below:

Aunque las Estampas que se ponen en los Libros casi siempre se estiman como unos meros adornos, y por la mayor parte están compuestas de manera que parecen de poca mayor importancia que los otros pulimentos de la encuadernación y únicamente sirven de divertimiento a los que se pagan de solar galanuras; sin embargo, las Estampas pueden servir a otro fin más elevado, representando y dando luz a muchas cosas, las cuales por medio de las palabras no se pueden expresar tan perfectamente. Y así, como se hallan particularmente en los Autores de esta Clase muchísimos casos, donde la fantasía del Lector le guía a idearse el modo con que las Pasiones y Aficiones del Alma se manifiestan a la vista en cierta coyuntura, y a figurarse la apariencia de ellas con los semblantes y ademanes de las Personas de que se trata; así en tales circunstancias un perito Artista que conoce las impresiones
que los internos movimientos del Alma deben causar en el semblante y compostura exterior de la Persona. (ii)\textsuperscript{35}

In this description literary illustrations could be considered a suggestive analogue for literary emotions, relegated as they have often been to the default status of adornment or excess. For Oldfield, indeed, the art of illustrating ought to surpass their conventionally limited and superfluous function as mere ‘adornments’ or frivolities in order to serve the ‘more elevated’ objective of ‘bringing to light’ those things that words struggle to express. The most important of these is precisely the passions of the soul, which, as I have been suggesting, so frequently rely on the sense of sight. Conceived in this manner, images stand to bolster the representation of that which, like affect, tends to confound spoken and literary language, as Oldfield elaborates: “El Artista, digo, que se anima a representar estos varios efectos valiéndose de la expresión del buril podrá fácilmente suministrar lo que necesita la imperfecta imaginación del que lee y todo aquello que se podría echar menos en la descripción del Autor, la cual en muchos casos no puede dejar de ser fastidiosa, y por eso desagradable” (ii-iii). Images therefore compensate for the ‘imperfections’ of both fictional narrative—the techne of the engraver’s chisel supplementing that of the author’s quill—and the reader’s imagination, lightening the burden of phantasia.

But if Oldfield seems weary or overly skeptical of the potency of narrative (becoming “fastidiosa” and “desagradable”) vis-à-vis the visual, then he levels the playing field later in his preface by pointing out the danger of repetitiveness in imagery, one which by his account the “Estampas” of the 1738 London edition managed to avoid:

\textsuperscript{35} I have modernized the orthography and syntax of this citation, as well as those from Oldfield that follow.
Pero la precaución principal ha sido evitar en todo lo posible la enfadosa repetición de una mismas expresiones en los semblantes y gestos de las personas que se representan: porque como las Pasiones y Afectos del Alma se pueden describir con mucha mayor variedad por medio de las Palabras que por el Diseño y conducirse al oído por muy diversas expresiones de voces, cuando solamente hay una por medio del buril para representar con propiedad las afecciones del Alma; de esta suerte viene a suceder que lo que en un Autor no sería repetición, ofende como tal si se traslada al dibujo. De manera que una pequeña diversidad en las posturas y en otras circunstancias menos esenciales servirá muy poco para evitar semejante embarazo, siempre que los objetos principales y los que más merecen la atención sean unos mismos: como es preciso que suceda todas las veces que unas mismas personas son tocadas de Pasiones de una misma especie. (vi)

Although images may well supply advantages foreign to narrative, according to Oldfield the latter appears more naturally suited to expressing variety and diversity, even if certain technical limitations of engraving itself might be to blame for a diminished potential of nuanced expression relative to other artistic media. The aesthetic quality of diversity, as I will discuss in detail below, was represented by the well-known Renaissance topic of *variatio*, and was prescribed for painting as early as Alberti (“be careful not to repeat the same gesture or pose”; *On Painting* 77) and for narrative by Cervantes himself (“Las peregrinaciones largas siempre traen consigo diversos acontecimientos y, como la diversidad se compone de cosas diferentes, es forzoso que los casos lo sean” (*Persiles* III, 10: 526). The generic and aesthetic differences that Oldfield locates between pictorial and
textual modes essentially amount to a problem of translation, since the engraver must be skillful enough to adapt narrative affectivity to the particularities of his or her own art, lest a more literal translation betray an inexpert and ponderous hand (“lo que en un Autor no sería repetición, ofende como tal si se traslada al dibujo”). In any case, both modes are less than perfect in Oldfield’s paradigm and thus form a complementary relationship whereby each is meant to leverage its unique assets for collectively addressing the challenge of expressing aesthetic emotions.

Oldfield goes on to criticize previous illustrators of the Quijote for having failed to uphold these principles by reproducing some of the most immediately recognizable scenes of action that had already acquired an iconographic status. Of these, he takes specific issue with the scene of the windmills and that of the ‘warring’ flocks of sheep, which explains their notable absence among the other engravings in Lord Carteret’s edition. Instead, Oldfield explains, they set out to represent the scenes of dialogue, conversation, and affectivity that are so indispensable to the novel yet had been so widely ignored:

Lo que principalmente movió a los Dibujantes a escoger los asuntos referidos y otros tales, fue la facilidad de manifestarlos con gran distinción; supuesto que es tanto más fácil, cuanto menos conveniente y gustoso, caracterizar un paso por medio de un Molino, o de una Manada de Ovejas, o de una jaula, o de un Caballo de leño, que por el de una proporción graciosa o expresión deleitable. Y aunque es ciertamente necesario que los asuntos se escojan y dispongan de manera que sin fatiga se puedan reconocer y distinguir, con todo eso muchas veces no es fácil el alcanzarlo en aquellos pasos, que más lo requerirían y darían mayor placer, no obstante toda la ventaja que se puede
sacar así del lugar de la acción como de los caracteres, vestidos, posturas, 
gestos y semejanza de facciones en una misma Persona: particularmente 
cuando se trata de representar Discursos y Conversaciones, donde aunque 
frecuentemente se ofrezca expresar algún paso quizá más deleitoso que los 
que se hallan en otras varias ocasiones, sin embargo muchas veces no se 
encuentra alguno que determine o caracterice el asunto. (iv)

Once again, Oldfield seems to have perceived something that many literary critics 
themselves had failed to appreciate; in remarking on the visual, gestural, and corporeal 
language of the text—and the emotional registers it encodes—he identifies a critical lacuna 
which would not begin to be earnestly addressed by critics for another two and a half 
centuries. Be this as it may, after beholding such a savvy analysis of their content the 
modern reader might well be disappointed upon viewing the engravings themselves, since 
the formalism of their neoclassical style often results in what might strike a post-
expressionist viewer as somewhat rigid or unnatural poses. This neoclassicism is most 
patent in the edition’s allegorical frontispiece, which represents a muscular and half-naked 
Cervantes as Hercules Musagetes, or leader of the muses, who receives the arms of satire 
(represented by the mask of comedy) from a satyr on his way to slay the monsters (i.e. 
books of chivalry) which have invaded Mount Parnassus (see Figure 1).

Still, many other images included in the edition, illustrated by John Vanderbank and 
engraved by Gerard van der Gucht, maintain a more lifelike relation to the author and his 
work and, especially when compared with the vast majority of illustrated editions that 
preceded them, do take great care in attempting to depict the human element of various 
moments in the text. It is clear, moreover, that the scenes deemed worthy of engraving
correspond with what are often the most emotionally intense or moving of the novel. For example, *Grisóstomo’s burial and Marcela’s appearance* (Figure 2) strives to make palpable the affective vehemence that punctuates the pastoral setting—from feelings of grief and loss to love, lust, resentment, and regret—among the characters who linger over Grisóstomo’s lifeless body and Marcela who beckons to them from above. Although the engraving alone fails to represent such an enormous range of emotions, it does succeed, per Oldfield’s prescription, in presenting a diversity of countenances and poses that serves to complement that of the text. A similar effect is achieved with the representation of Don Quijote’s own imminent death (Figure 4), even if the only prevailing emotion is grief or sadness. Furthermore, both of these illustrations, by allowing us to picture the quantity of characters present, may grant us a greater appreciation for the importance of an intradiegetic audience in scenes of intense conflict or affective intensity, through which I would argue our own emotions as readers are channeled and intensified even further. Indeed, it is the sentiments of pity and empathy we might be most likely to feel upon viewing Vanderbank and van der Gucht’s depiction of the dialogue at the beginning of the *Quijote* of 1615 in which Sansón Carrasco offers himself as the knight’s new squire (Figure 3). Once again, the attention to gestures, detailed facial expressions, and bodily postures indexes the status and relationships of characters in the scene while manifesting the material qualities of what in this case is Carrasco’s performative fawning and, especially, Sancho’s sense of rejection and betrayal. Even more significant to note is how emotions continue to play a major role in the image and imagination of what would typically be considered only a minor scene of the novel.
These are a few of the most prominent examples from what, to my knowledge, is the only illustrated edition to have explicitly ventured to bring into relief the text’s varied emotional contours. Even if we were to fully avail ourselves of the vast, cumulative archive of images from the *Quijote* that exists today, there would still be plenty of unrepresented moments—and even more emotions—for which we would have to rely wholly upon the text and our imaginations for picturing. Of course, the paucity of pictorial representations in most early editions meant that the early seventeenth-century reader had to lean on visual language and imagery in the text and on one’s own mental *phantasia* to an even greater extent. Perhaps this well-developed imagination is partly to blame for Don Quijote’s mad penchant for seeing images from the romances of chivalry in everything around him. The point I wish to make, at any rate, is not that extratextual, complementary illustrations are necessary to fully comprehend the text nor that our reading is in any way impoverished without them. Rather, I believe that explicitly visual media, insofar as they materialize what is already in words, can suggest to us different manners of reading, or stated another way, a means of deciphering what Frederick de Armas has called, in his edited volume of the same name, “writing for the eyes in the Spanish Golden Age.”

“Writing,” he explains about this literary period, “often had a strongly visual component. Poets and writers of fiction appealed to this sense in particular since it was thought that visualization was a key to memory” (Introduction 7). The complementary relationship between poetry and painting, in fact, was something of an ancient commonplace, as demonstrated by Horace’s now-famous *ut pictura poesis*, an idea repeated by Don Quijote himself (“el pintor o escritor, que todo es uno”; II, 71: 1315).36 In this sense, images can be

36 The influence of images, especially painting, on early modern Spanish literature has been a popular theme
thought of as tools for rendering visible what might have already had just such an authorial intention and, therefore, might have also been more readily observed by early modern readers. Quite appropriately, then, for our purposes images may serve as optics through which to adjust our focus, to magnify that which might otherwise remain blurry and formless across a great historical distance. Such an optic is especially useful for something as elusive as affects, which, as the scarcity of critical scholarship on them amply demonstrates, continue to go about their aesthetic and political work in spite and in the midst of their invisibility.

**From Novel Emotions to Emotional Novels**

Nevertheless, illustrated editions and other explicitly pictorial images are not the only forms we might summon to our visual aid—especially when we care to establish a distinction between more modern resources and those which were available to Cervantes himself. For this purpose, throughout subsequent chapters I will have occasion to call upon a number of additional practical mechanisms for highlighting, analyzing, and understanding the embodied and visual functions of affect in his works, including what turns out to be the highly corporeal etymologies of early modern Spanish terms for emotion(s); treatises on painting, sculpture, and physiognomy; and stage directions and

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of study in recent years, often from the standpoint of ekphrasis, for which Bergmann; and de Armas (*Ekphrasis*) provide the most extensive examination, while Murray Krieger’s *Ekphrasis: The Illusion of the Natural Sign* continues to be fundamental from a theoretical standpoint. For the importance of the visual in Cervantes’s works, see Avalle-Arce; Laguna; and Riley. Another example of the importance of the image can be found in books of emblems, which were common in Renaissance Europe, such as Covarrubias’s *Emblemas morales* of 1610 (see Nelson). For a theoretical approach to visuality and the gaze, see Avilés and Hernández-Torres.
writings on actorly technique in the early modern theater. In fact, it could well be argued that, for Cervantes, the art of the theater exerted a particularly acute influence on his manner of conceiving and expressing emotion in his works of narrative. Drama, after all, was the poetic form which had been most thoroughly theorized in the centuries before he took up his pen. It was by far the most popular genre in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain, especially in its national variant of the *comedia*. And Cervantes himself was an accomplished dramaturge, even if he never quite achieved the fame for it that he so desperately sought. Precedents for the specific theme of emotions in the theory of dramatic arts existed as well, even if, according to Cervantes, he himself was the first to place on stage the emotional interiority of characters. For Aristotle, who was a principle influence on Cervantes’s fiction (Riley 1-10), they were an unequivocal cornerstone of accomplished tragedy, as is readily apparent in his prescriptive discussion in the *Poetics* of the concepts of pathos and catharsis and fear and pity. Plato, Horace, and Longinus also made fundamental contributions to the philosophy of these issues in drama and poetry, which likewise influenced Renaissance poetics. Even Cervantes’s contemporary and literary archrival Lope de Vega, in his *Arte nuevo de hacer comedias*, mused on which styles of verse were best suited for evoking particular emotions in the audience (148, v. 305-12).

The theoretical or explicitly prescriptive models of which Cervantes could have availed himself for the expression of emotions in prose fiction are slightly scarcer. Alonso López Pinciano, who some regard to have been the single greatest influence on his writing, commits a section of his *Philosophia antigua poética* to a discussion about “afectos,” “passiones,” and “perturbaciones” (I, 64-96); however, beyond reciting some of the

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37 For theatrical aspects of *Don Quijote*, see Syverson-Stork.
taxonomical conventions of philosophers like Aquinas, El Pinciano adds little insight to the
topic and even less in the way of how emotions should function in literature.30 Juan Huarte
de San Juan, on the other hand, dedicates extensive thought in his *Examen de ingenios* to the
question of affective physiology and psychology, and there is little doubt that Cervantes had
this in mind while concocting his most famous character. Nevertheless, as I argue in
greater detail in Chapter 5, this recognition of the influence of Huarte’s humoral theory has
actually tended to produce a contrary effect of restricting our critical understanding of Don
Quijote’s emotional behavior to a binary choleric-melancholic paradigm, one which upon
closer examination is wholly incompatible with the range, complexity, and dynamism of
affect in the novel. And yet if Cervantes is to be considered the father of the first modern
novel of the Western tradition—or at least a principle and pivotal figure in its
development—then much work remains in order to enrich our understanding of the
genre’s relation to affect. Given the explicit import of emotions to genres like theater that
had already been well established before the seventeenth century, how are we to
comprehend the inaugural experiment of the novel without a deeper knowledge of how it
built upon, diverged from, and innovated the role of affect in poetics and literature?

30 Canavaggio was one of the first scholars to detail El Pinciano’s influence on Cervantes (“Alonso López
Pinciano”). Riley himself, however, is much more skeptical of this influence, as he explains more generally
that determining with any degree of certainty the direct textual influences on Cervantes’s novels is an
extremely difficult enterprise: “There are three main difficulties in tracing the derivation of Cervantes’s
theory. He refers to no authority, except to a few standard ancient authors like Plato, Horace, and Ovid.
Secondly, extensive passages transposed with minimal alteration from the works of literary theorists or other
authors are lacking. [...] The third difficulty is that the principal literary tenets were common currency.
Writers repeat themselves again and again. The mere coincidence of a major theme in Cervantes and another
writer is therefore rarely significant. Critics who have asserted the debt of Cervantes to El Pinciano have
failed to take proper account of this. The fact that Cervantes and El Pinciano both refer to the division of
styles, for instance, or show a fondness for the idea that poetry embraced philosophy and the other arts and
sciences, offers no certainty at all that the former was indebted to the latter for these notions” (3-4).
To drive the urgency of this question home a bit further, there are in fact compelling structural reasons to believe that narrative prose—as opposed to other forms of cultural and artistic production, from drama and poetry to painting and sculpture—is uniquely well adapted to the expression of human emotions. This is chiefly because we experience the affectivity of life as a kind of narrative as well, with our moods and temperaments changing over the course of any given unit of time, fluctuating and adapting in response to any number of external events and stimuli. As John Dewey in *Art as Experience* points out, emotion “attends the development of a plot; and a plot requires... a space, wherein to develop and time in which to unfold” (43), which suggests that long-form fiction such as the novel is even better suited than other kinds of narrative to evoking emotion. As the title of his highly differentiated philosophical study implies, for Dewey the operative term is *experience*, a phenomenon that opens onto the work of art as in the manner of narrative temporality: “The *experience* is of material fraught with suspense and moving toward its own consummation through a connected series of varied incidents” (44; emphasis in original).39 These “varied incidents,” once again, anticipate what I identify as the fundamental component of variation in Cervantine affectivity.

It is for these reasons that “poet and novelist have an immense advantage over even an expert psychologist in dealing with an emotion. For the former build up a concrete situation and permit it to evoke emotional response. Instead of a description of an emotion in intellectual and symbolic terms, the artist ‘does the deed that breeds’ the emotion” (Dewey 70). This also explains why psychologists and other students of the mind have

39 In the following chapter I examine the concepts of both suspense and narrative temporality in greater detail.
often made recourse to literature in order to probe or illustrate their hypotheses. Various literary works famously inspired Freud, for example, who used Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* and the Oedipus myth as the basis for some of his most influential psychoanalytic theories. And yet Freud seems to have been mostly allergic to emotions, since by associating them with repression and sublimation he considered them a barrier to the psychoanalytic process. Naturally, Cervantes has been placed on the metonymical couch of various psychoanalytical studies of his works, especially *Don Quijote*, many of which—through the application of the theories of Freud, Lacan, and others—have led, pun intended, to more than a few ‘breakthroughs.’ While these studies have made valuable contributions, they have added little to our specific comprehension of emotions in the Cervantine corpus. But if fictional narrative is uniquely well suited to the lived experience of emotion, and if Cervantes is indeed a pioneer of verisimilitude and the modern novel, then surely we as literary critics—if not scholars from an array of other disciplines as well—have much to gain from broadening and deepening our understanding of affect in his works.

Among the literary precedents of prose fiction at Cervantes’s disposal, he was, so to speak, most well versed in the (chivalric) romance. For obvious reasons, this particular genre has been widely studied in relation to *Don Quijote*, rife as it is with metalinguistic references to the object of its parody. We encounter the theme of emotion in chivalric romance most clearly in these works’ central concern with courtly love, a tradition which,  

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40 Nevertheless, see O’Neill’s edited volume *Freud and the Passions*, and especially Carveth’s essay therein, for alternative interpretations.

41 Johnson, Carroll; El Saffar and De Armas Wilson; and Combet are three of the most prominent examples.

42 In Chapter 3, I briefly examine other genres of prose fiction with which Cervantes was well acquainted, including the Greek romance and sentimental and pastoral novels. In his edition of *Don Quijote*, Rico also notes that the epic, as is suggested in the canon’s quote below, was often identified with prose in Cervantes’s epoch as well (602n).
due to both its long cultural trajectory and its robust body of existing scholarship, I will not analyze in any detail here. May it suffice to briefly recall the fundamental satirical work performed by Don Quijote’s love for Dulcinea and related tropes such as the *princesse lointaine, dame jamais vue*, and “amor de oídas.” The text’s vacillation between how many times Dulcinea was seen by the devoted knight—if at all—along with Sancho’s litany of less-than-sublime characteristics of Aldonza Lorenzo serves to render the satire all the more comical yet no less significant. In fact, one could hardly conjure up a more singularly effective parody for courtly love than a madman enamored of a plebeian woman who might or might not even exist. Unfounded, unrequited, and unconsummated, this love is expressed not by *eros* or impassioned desire but by the enactment of performative rituals culled directly from the books of chivalry. Regardless of whether Don Quijote himself is convinced that his love is true, this performance could be taken to imply that the ‘love’ in the tradition providing the script is just as rote, hollow, or formulaic.

**Conclusion: From Variety of Experience to Diversity of Expression**

Indeed, the various metafictional reflections that appear throughout the novel would seem to indicate that, if there is one quality in terms of emotional aesthetics that all ‘good’ literature should possess, it is that of variety. Although recovering Cervantes’s own perspective from these passages is a fraught if not altogether futile enterprise, his characters provide several examples of this essential element of diversity, most

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43 On these points, see Close (“Don Quixote”); and Avilés (“Damas”).
importantly in relation to the reader’s response (or listener’s, as the case may be). The discussion by characters gathered at Juan Palomeque’s inn of their personal preferences and interpretations of the books of chivalry serves as one such example. Here the individual aesthetic taste of the innkeeper’s daughter is particularly significant: “También yo lo escucho, y en verdad que aunque no lo entiendo, que recibo gusto en oíllo; pero no gusto yo de los golpes de que mi padre gusta, sino de las lamentaciones que los caballeros hacen cuando están ausentes de sus señorbas, que en verdad que algunas veces me hacen llorar, de compasión que les tengo” (I, 32: 405). While reproducing the gendered discourse that limited women’s literary taste to the trifles of sentimentalism, the young girl’s precocious, if slightly naive, interpretation offers a significant contrast to Don Quijote’s own defense of the books of chivalry before the Canon: “lea estos libros, y verá cómo le destierran la melancolía que tuviere y le mejoran la condición, si acaso la tiene mala” (I, 50: 625). In other words, these characters demonstrate that, despite what others may consider its lowbrow qualities or pernicious repercussions, chivalric romance has the potential to produce varying emotional responses, from sadness and compassion to hope and therapeutic enjoyment.

In fact, this is the very effect prescribed for Cervantes’s own novel by the anonymous friend of the prologue: “Procurad también que, leyendo vuestra historia, el melancólico se mueva a risa, el risueño la acreciente, el simple no se enfade, el discreto se

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44 This appears to have been a relatively generalized idea, one that recurs at other times in the novel, such as when Sansón Carrasco recounts to Don Quijote the reception of the publication of his adventures and reminds us that “hay diferentes opiniones, como hay diferentes gustos” and of the “toda imposibilidad imposible componerle tal que satisfaga y contente a todos los que le leyeren” (II, 3: 707; 713).

45 In his “Aprobación” of the “Segunda parte de don Quijote de la Mancha,” Josef de Valdivielso lauds the 1605 volume for having done just that: “alentando ánimos marchitos y espíritus melancólicos” (II, 666).
admire de la invención, el grave no la desprecie, ni el prudente deje de alabarla” (*Don Quijote* I, Prologue: 19). The friend’s advice at the beginning of Part One of the novel mirrors the words of the priest toward the end, who makes a plea for the “buena comedia”:

> “porque de haber oído la comedia artificiosa y bien ordenada saldría el oyente alegre con las burlas, enseñado con las veras, admirado de los sucesos, discreto con las razones, advertido con los embustes, sagaz con los ejemplos, airado contra el vicio y enamorado de la virtud: que todos estos afectos ha de despertar la buena comedia en el ánimo del que la escuchare” (I, 48: 607; my emphasis). Notwithstanding the more generally satirical function of these interventions, I believe that they open a crucial window onto Cervantes’s philosophy of emotional aesthetics—namely, that the excellence or sublimity of a fictional work can be measured precisely by its capacity to produce a diversity of affective responses in the reader or spectator. A similar idea is espoused by Oldfield, who, as I remarked above, was of the opinion that illustrators and engravers should also ensure that a sufficient variety of gestures and emotional expressions be present in pictorial representations.

In effect, in the Renaissance a philosophical and aesthetic prestige had been more widely attributed to the concept of variety, since it was believed that art should aspire to evoke the diversity already found in nature, an idea which “was adduced to justify art’s efforts to relieve monotony, to obtain variety for the sake of the pleasure that it produces” (Martínez Mata 184). Related to the Aristotelian concept of unity and expressed by El Pinciano as “unidad y variedad” (II: 39) and “una y varia” (II: 104), the principle of *variatio* was well known in Cervantes’s time, often invoked with the original Italian phrase “*che per
tal variar natura è bella” popularized by Aquilano. Cervantes, in fact, reproduces this locus classicus in the Galatea (V: 481) and evokes it in Pedro de Urdemalas as well:

Dicen que la variación
hace a la naturaleza
colma de gusto y belleza,
y está muy puesto en razón.

Un manjar a la contina
enfada, y un solo objeto
da disgusto y amohína.

Un solo vestido cansa.

En fin, con la variedad
se muda la voluntad

y el espíritu descansa. (Comedias y entremeses I: 285)46

Yet another variation on the theme of variatio can be found in the Canon’s portrayal of chivalric romance: “Porque la escritura desatada destos libros da lugar a que el autor pueda mostrarse épico, lírico, trágico, cómico, con todas aquellas partes que encierran en sí las dulcísimas y agradables ciencias de la poesía y de la oratoria: que la épica tan bien puede escribirse en prosa como en verso” (I, 47: 602). These words invoke two classical ideas: that of metrical variety, prescribed as early as Horace as a fundamental aspect of the lyric

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46 Fernando Bermúdez y Carvajal lauds Cervantes’s facility with variatio in the dedicational verses preceding the Novelas ejemplares: “Y si la naturaleza/ en la mucha variedad,/ enseña mayor beldad,/ más artificio y belleza,/ celebre con más presteza,/ Cervantes raro y sutil,/ aqueste florido abril,/ cuya variedad admira/ la fama veloz, que mira/ en él variedades mil” (86). Lope also used the trope to justify the admixture of tragic and comic modes in his comedias, criticized though they were by Cervantes.
and that of *oratio soluta*—described by Cicero and Quintilian as a manner not of composing sublime, elevated verse but of imitating, without the constraints of meter, human speech.\(^{47}\) But, as Mercedes Alcalá-Galán explains in her book of the same name, this “escritura desatada” can be seen to describe the stylistic innovations Cervantes himself developed in his novels.\(^{48}\) The hodgepodge of modes, styles, verses, and genres that he deigned to incorporate into *Don Quijote* is not only a unique characteristic of this particular work, but has also been regarded as a defining element of the modern novel itself (Bakhtin). In any case, it is clear that Cervantes was well acquainted with the rhetoric of *variatio* and valued it as an aesthetic principle, as other scholars have recognized.\(^{49}\) To my knowledge, however, no-one has remarked on the concept’s relation to Cervantes’s specifically emotional variation, essential as the examples from *Don Quijote* cited above seem to demonstrate it was for the author. In effect, this is what allows him, to continue the Canon’s use of a visual or textile metaphor, to “[componer] una tela de varios y hermosos lizos tejida” (I, 42: 602).

Although Cervantes was undoubtedly inspired by some of the thinkers I have already mentioned and many more, further work is necessary, beyond existing philological studies of Cervantes’s broader influences, to fully comprehend the multiple strands or “lizos” of his emotional poetics. But in light of my necessarily brief demonstration of the relative dearth of clear precedents for such theories, along with its vitality in Cervantes’s works, I would

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\(^{47}\) In *De oratore*, Cicero uses a metaphor of movement to describe the idea of *oratio soluta*: “unconfined, yet not so that it may fly off or wander without control, but may regulate itself without being absolutely in fetters” (*Cicero* 247).

\(^{48}\) The full title of Alcalá-Galán’s insightful monograph is *Escriura desatada: Poéticas de la representación en Cervantes*.

\(^{49}\) The scholars who have studied the trope in Cervantes’s works have done so almost exclusively in relation to the digressions of the interpolated stories (Martínez Mata; and Campana).
submit that his most immediate influence was simply real life. The lived experience of the former soldier, captive, prisoner, and poet was nothing if not diverse. Consider, for example, Hutchinson’s description of the city of Algiers, where Cervantes spent five years of his life as a captive from 1575 to 1580: “el Argel de aquel entonces—con su diversidad étnica, lingüística y religiosa, su alto índice de inmigrantes renegados y emigrados moriscos, su dependencia del corso y enorme población de esclavos de todas partes, sus peculiares instituciones y ejercicio del poder, sus lujos y hambrunas, sus fiestas y prácticas sexuales—no se parecía a ninguna otra ciudad de la tierra a la vez que reunía en su única configuración a gente de tantos lugares cercanos y remotos” (“Escribir” 648). From Algiers to Alcalá de Henares, Argamasilla de Alba to Andalucía, el Madrid de los Austrias to Italy, Lepanto to Lisbon, Rome to Orán, and everywhere in between, the author’s experience was subject, beyond any reasonable doubt, to a great range of emotional ‘variety’ as well. A great many of these emotional ups and downs took place in the heart of the Mediterranean, in the midst of all its diversity, turmoil, and strife. My purpose in highlighting this fact is not to recover an autobiographical motive for Cervantine affectivity, but to merely establish that Cervantes already had at his disposal an enormous plethora of

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50 Hutchinson immediately goes on to recognize the importance of the human in this experience: “Semejante experiencia por parte de Cervantes autoriza el uso bastante frecuente en sus obras de una palabra tan general como humano con sus derivados y distintas acepciones” (“Escribir” 648).

51 Alcalá was his place of birth; Argamasilla de Alba is where some have claimed he conceived of the Quijote while imprisoned in the Medrano cave; Andalucía was a region that hosted his other stays in prison as well as work in Seville; the historical center of Madrid was home to much of his literary career and place of his death; Italy was the site of various peripatetic enterprises and military itinerary; Lepanto was the stage for the famous 1571 battle in which he lost the use of his left hand; Lisbon was where in 1581 he sought advancement in King Philip II’s court; Rome was his point of arrival in 1569 from what may have been an attempt to flee from Spain in order to prevent that a warrant for his arrest be served on him; and Orán was his destination as a covert royal operative in 1581. Even without the commission to the Indies he sought but was denied, the diversity of Cervantes’s mobility—sometimes willing, sometimes forced—and life experience in the Mediterranean trumps that of most people even today and easily competes with that of his literary characters. Though the fitting subject of many a biography, I recommend Canavaggio’s (Cervantès).
real-life people, heartrending material, and personal experience on which to draw when composing the affective profile of his works. The emotional realism of his characters could be considered a prime effect of this situation, as could the related quality of verisimilitude, which scholars have frequently certified as a unique and distinguishing quality of Cervantes’s writing (Riley 179-99). In his diatribe against romances of chivalry, in fact, the Canon reserves some of his harshest censure for “el que huyere de la verisimilitud y de la imitación” (I, 47: 600), and we might also recall that, conversely, it was the valorization of the human and quotidian elements of Tirant lo Blanc which saved that particular book from the fire during the scrutiny of Don Quijote’s library (I, 6: 90-91). If nature was the inspiration for the aesthetic development of variatio, then what better model could Cervantes have had than human nature for the development of his highly varied and preternatural affectivity? And what better form than the novel—with its oratio soluta and “escritura desatada”—for expressing it?

I would like to conclude by suggesting, in effect, that the novel (that is, Don Quijote as well as the genre itself) granted him the ideal medium through which to express a multitude of variation, from that afforded by its formal properties, to the nearly endless variety of emotions in his characters, and to the diversity of the Mediterranean in which they circulate. Literature was an ideal place for exploring these variations, but also for amplifying, experimenting with, and embellishing them. According to Don Quijote himself,

52 Alternatively, if we recall the idea that affect tends to exceed the limitations of categorization and language, and that Cervantes constantly plays upon these limitations by underscoring the ineffability of emotions, then this question could actually suggest its own solution: Cervantine affectivity is as infinitely variable as nature—which is to say, before language. At any rate, these ideas also recall the Canon’s comparison of books of chivalry with a deformed body, a metaphor related, in fact, to the basis of variatio in nature as a unified body with its various limbs: “No he visto ningún libro de caballerías que haga un cuerpo de fábula entero con todos sus miembros, de manera que corresponda al principio, y el fin al principio y al medio, sino que los componen con tantos miembros, que más parece que llevan invención a formar una quimera o un monstruo que a hacer una figura proporcionada” (I, 42: 601).
it is through its “variada labor,” that “el arte, imitando a la naturaleza, parece que allí la vence” (I, 50: 624). We therefore have reason to agree with Hutchinson that “some characters, rather than being less than real persons, may be more than real persons, and their emotions may be more than those of real persons, but in any event they are still within the modalities of the human” (“Dimensions” 79). By granting the reader access to the intimate and most human depths of his characters’ affect and afflictions, the art of Cervantine affectivity would seem capable of transcending or ‘conquering' not only the many challenges and limitations of emotional expression, but, as I intend to show in the chapters that follow, those of the nature of certain political conditions which ramify beyond the realm of the literary proper. This is why the author’s valorization of variety is so potent, for while similar to Leo Spitzer’s groundbreaking theory of “perspectivism” in the novel, this variety applies not only to practices of naming, styles of verse, or differences of genre, but to one of the most defining characteristics of humanity.

With this we arrive back at the point or port of departure for this chapter having acquired a mode or figure for thinking through the apparent gulf between Braudel and Castro, as well as the interplay and crossings-over that are enabled in between. While the former went to great pains to describe the capacious natural diversity of the Mediterranean and the latter was interested in distinguishing its similarly diversified human contours, Cervantes seems to mediate between the two. For if the aesthetic inspiration for variatio was culled from the natural world, then for Cervantes the heterogeneous human subjects that populated it were surely just as inspiring for his works. A conglomeration of multiple frontiers, topographies, and ecologies, the Mediterranean is also—as Franco Cassano has recently described it in an essay vindicating the region’s cultural practices in the face of the
market-driven logics of Northern and Western Europe—“a place where the richest and the most complex personalities are gathered,” where “one can experience diversity” (cited as this chapter’s epigraph). As if to pay homage to this diversity of which Cervantes was, as an author, uniquely and undeniably conscious, he endows his characters with “the most complex personalities” as well, and allows their multifaceted affects to intervene in the political, ideological, and racialized economies that traversed the early modern Mediterranean and were of such concern, collectively, to Braudel and Castro. Revealing these characters’ interiority, he also reveals something about the larger world outside the work; their micro-stories of emotional affliction reflect back on the macro-structures of history. The nearly endless variety of their affects transcribes the sentimental geographies of a sea of diversity.
Figure 1. John Vanderbank (illustrator) and Gerard van der Gucht (engraver), *Cervantes receives his arms to fight Chivalric Books* (London, 1738; frontispiece). Burin engraving/etching (acquaforse). *Cervantes Project*. Cushing Memorial Library, Texas A&M University.
Figure 2. John Vanderbank (illustrator) and Gerard van der Gucht (engraver), *Grísóstomo’s burial and Marcela’s appearance* (London, 1738; I: 110). Burin engraving/etching (acquaforo). *Cervantes Project*. Cushing Memorial Library, Texas A&M University.
Figure 3. John Vanderbank (illustrator) and Gerard van der Gucht (engraver), Sansón Carrasco proposes himself to be don Quixote’s squire (London, 1738; III: 60). Burin engraving/etching (acquaforte). Cervantes Project. Cushing Memorial Library, Texas A&M University.
Figure 4. John Vanderbank (illustrator) and Gerard van der Gucht (engraver), *Don Quixote’s last will* (London, 1738; IV: 363). Burin engraving/etching (acquaforte). *Cervantes Project*. Cushing Memorial Library, Texas A&M University.
CHAPTER TWO: A Momentary Lapse of Reason? Cervantine Suspension and Emotional Exemplarity in the *Novelas ejemplares*

*Expression is the clarification of turbid emotions.*
John Dewey, *Art as Experience*

In his famous paraleptic or ‘anti-prologue’ to the *Don Quijote* of 1605, Cervantes describes himself as afflicted by a condition with which nearly every writer can intimately relate. Hunched over a blank page, with the pen in his ear, an elbow on the desk and a hand propping up the weight of the head that is hopelessly lost in thought, the author is suffering the early modern symptoms of what we would not hesitate to diagnose as writer’s block. Perhaps even those of us uninclined to share in this kind of parodic self-effacement should be heartened to know that the condition was experienced by Cervantes’s literary self as well. As if to underscore the implacable despair of this literary impasse and implicate us in its resolution, with the urgency of the present progressive tense Cervantes directly interpellates the reader of “esta prefación que vas leyendo.” His languishing state of being “imaginativo,” “confuso,” and “suspenso” is only interrupted by the unexpected arrival of the friend to whom he proceeds to confess his prefatory quandary (11). Soliciting the goodwill of his interlocutor in helping him to overcome his “suspensión y elevamiento” (13), Cervantes implores, “¿de qué modo pensáis llenar el vacío de mi temor y reducir a claridad el caos de mi confusión?” (14). As a rhetorical or dramatic foil and voice of practical reason, the anonymous friend promises to quickly remedy “las faltas que decís que os suspenden y acobardan,” while incredulously pondering “¿Cómo que es posible que cosas de tan poco momento y tan fáciles de remediar puedan tener fuerzas de suspender y absorbar un ingenio tan maduro como el vuestro, y tan hecho a romper y atropellar por
otras dificultades mayores?” (13-14). As we recall, Cervantes’s literary self—by including the hilariously deformed dedicational sonnets that follow—ends up taking the unabashedly picaresque advice of his friend to pay lip service to the formalities of a prologue. But far from putting the matter to rest, the questions exchanged between the prologue’s two characters raise even more questions: What are the further aesthetic implications of the ‘suspension’ Cervantes purports to have suffered? Beyond the intervention of a clever friend, how are these moments of suspension to be resolved? Given the author’s posture, critics have associated it with Dürer’s iconographic angel of melancholy, and Cervantes refers to his own fear as well (“el vacío de mi temor”; “las faltas que... acobardan”). But what other affects might be mobilized through the repetition of words like “suspensión,” “confusión,” and “caos”?

For an answer to these questions, in this chapter I propose to study similar moments of suspension in the Novelas ejemplares, where these and synonymous words appear with equally striking frequency. In this work’s own prologue, Cervantes inaugurates a unique variant of the Horatian dictum *delectando pariterque monendo* by articulating the simultaneously entertaining and exemplary aspects of the Novelas ejemplares: “Quiero decir que los requiebros amorosos que en algunas hallarás, son tan honestos y tan medidos con la razón y discurso cristiano, que no podrán mover a mal pensamiento al descuidado o cuidadoso que las leyere. Heles dado nombre de ejemplares, y si bien lo miras, no hay ninguna de quien no se pueda sacar algún ejemplo provechoso” (79). The reader, in other words, may at the very least reap enjoyment from the text without risking moral corruption (since it is tempered with ‘reason’ and ‘Christian discourse’) and, with a discreet and careful eye, may even discover the exemplarity which
lends the novellas their collective title yet often lies under the surface of their more lighthearted, playful features. But there is something equally significant and potentially subversive about this explanation as well: the idea that “requiebros amorosos” and “ejemplo[s] provechoso[s]” not only occupy different pages of the same story, but that the elevated concept of exemplarity may be found precisely among such base elements as human passions, love, and desire. Indeed, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the early modern emphasis on rationality as a moral code, as well as the neo-Stoicism of many of Cervantes’s contemporaries, formed part of a long philosophical tradition which articulated an oppositional or sublating relationship between reason and emotion, even if Cervantes’s claim for the latter’s moral and epistemological potential was not entirely new. In this chapter I would like to explore additional ramifications of the author’s emotional philosophy by suggesting that the *Novelas ejemplares* further contests the reason/emotion binary and, by extension, invites the reader to consider their emotional exemplarity. This is made possible by the remarkably effective use of affect as a literary device in each of the novellas; as a means of alternately spurring and interrupting the narrative action; of pulling the reader into highly emotive conflicts and dilemmas and implicating us in their resolution; and of producing and maintaining a kind of sentimental suspense. As in the prologue of *Don Quijote*, as readers we share in the anxiety—and at times, perhaps, even the impatience—that such moments produce for characters in the text and, therefore, share a stake in its ultimate resolution as well. By focusing on some of the most intense instantiations of this sentimental suspense in the novellas, I hope to reconcile the

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53 Not all of these functions, of course, are unique to Cervantes’s works. For how the concepts of “tension,” “intensity,” and “suspense” have been identified with the short story more generally, see Dollerup. For additional studies on suspense, see Vorderer, Wulff, and Friedrichsen.
supposedly irrational nature of the affects it provokes with the reasoned, didactic, and moral content that was as important to their reception four hundred years ago as it is today.

In this chapter, furthermore, I want to argue that the *Novelas ejemplares* are populated with moments that evoke a sudden withdrawal from the dynamic and temporal flow of the narrative, marked especially by a number of words that I will collectively refer to as strategies of “suspension.” These words, whose definitions will be examined below, include such difficult-to-translate terms as *admiración, turbación, confusión, sobresalto*, and *suspensión*. In effect, a cursory inventory of the work reveals that these terms constituted for Cervantes a favored means of expressing intense emotional upheavals, since they can be found in varying combinations and degrees in each and every novella, and often appear with repeated insistence. In “La española inglesa” alone, from which I will draw several examples, these five terms and their corresponding variations appear a total of thirty-five times. The irruption of such words in the text alerts the reader to situations of heightened tension, unexpected or unforeseeable events, surprising revelations, outcomes of chance or contingency, or reversals of fortune. Most importantly, they each signal events of emotional turmoil, and, likewise, perform an aesthetic function in creating and building suspense throughout the novellas. However, since these functions have been understudied and poorly understood, before delving into their analysis and a close reading of their unique contours in the novellas, it will be necessary to examine the complexities of the concept of suspension, both in theory and in other cultural practices. As I contended previously, an eclecticist or syncretic approach to literature which studies the affectivity of
other arts is one highly effective means of meeting this challenge.\textsuperscript{54} This is especially true for terms whose meanings, like those of suspension, risk becoming lost in translation or in the cultural and historical divide between critic and text. For example, though the appearance in the \textit{Novelas} of a term like “admiración” might at first glance seem somewhat formulaic or arbitrary, what did it mean to a seventeenth-century Spaniard \textit{to feel} “admiración”? How did he or she express the feeling of being \textit{admirado} or \textit{admirada}? It most certainly meant something different than what the word evokes today—not to mention something only remotely similar, at best, to the English term “admiration.”

Expressed not only by the soul but through the body as well, attending closely to the outward affective manifestations of suspension—including its bodily, gestural, visual, and physiognomic registers—will be crucial for understanding both its cultural significance and the broader ethical valences it activates.

\textbf{The Event of Surprise and the Aesthetics of the Unexpected}

In his renowned study \textit{La cultura del barroco}, José Antonio Maravall identifies suspension as a key element of Baroque aesthetics and briefly notes its ability to “reforzar la consecuencia de efectos emocionales” (438).\textsuperscript{55} In \textit{Don Quijote}, the canon employs these

\textsuperscript{54} Hutchinson concurs, while underscoring the importance of literature as a “temporal art”: “The enormous resistance within literary criticism to regard literature as what it is, namely a temporal art (as Aristotle points out at the beginning of his \textit{Poetics}), has no doubt obscured the affinities that literature has with its nearest of kin: music and film. Much of this, then, can be helpful in formulating how emotion deploys itself in literature, while at the same time literary texts should have at least as much to offer in return” (“Affective” 73-74).

\textsuperscript{55} For our purposes, it bears noting that in the same study Maravall envisions the abrupt suspension of affects as an impetus to further, ‘more energetic’ emotional reactions: “El esfuerzo por cortar de pronto un sentimiento provoca una reaccion que altera el curso normal del desarrollo afectivo de la persona y... debilita su resistencia. Pero puede darse otro caso: que... no llegue a tales efectos negativos, sino que... provoque la reacción de una afección más enérgica” (436).
very terms while prescribing the need for fictional works to create suspense in the reader: “Hanse de casar las fábulas mentirosas con el entendimiento de los que las leyeren, escribiéndose de suerte que, facilitando los imposibles, allanando las grandezas, suspendiendo los ánimos admiren, suspendan, alborocen y entretenan, de modo que anden a un mismo paso la admiración y la alegría juntas” (I, 47: 600). In his equally renowned study *Cervantes’s Theory of the Novel*, E. C. Riley notes that, though “[i]t is not easy to fix the variegated meaning of the word,” “admiración” or *admiratio* “is evidently a powerful sensation for Cervantes” (89; 91). Cervantes, then, was well acquainted with the use of such techniques as a reliable means of entertaining the reader, of providing both wonder and pleasure. But what are the implications of such an aesthetic of suspension in the unique genre of the *Novelas ejemplares*? According to Mikhail Bakhtin’s famous study of time and chronotopes, the genre of the novella—with its “suddenlys” and “at just that moments”—is even better suited to eliciting this kind of suspense (92; also noted in Río Parra 406). To refer to the technique of suspension in temporal terms is in fact quite appropriate, given its tendency to arrest, delay, dilate, rupture, or, indeed, suspend narrative time. These factors, coupled with the relatively short length of each novella, suggest that with the *Novelas ejemplares* we are already faced with a concentrated dosage of sentimental suspense. In their own unique way, these terms can therefore be seen to constitute a crucial component of what Aristotle believed were the most effective *topoi* for producing an emotional investment on the part of the spectator or, in our case, of the reader: “the most powerful elements of emotional interest in Tragedy—Peripeteia or Reversal of the Situation, and Recognition scenes—are parts of the plot” (*Poetics* 1450a32). Frequently, but not always, the terms of suspension I am interested in exploring coincide
with instances of *peripeteia* or *anagnorisis*. Even when they do not directly or singularly correlate with Aristotle’s two most favored poetic tropes, words like *suspensión* in the *Novelas ejemplares* play a major role in the plot by marking moments of surprise and piquing “emotional interest” for characters and the reader alike.

“As in everyday life, narrative in fiction is inherently disposed towards the relation of the unexpected,” as Mark Currie observes in his recent study of surprise and narrative time (18). Indeed, the unforeseeable nature of literary narrative could be argued to be a defining quality not only of emplotment but of the genre itself, as well as a principal source of our sustained investment as readers. Nothing seems to grab and hold our attention quite like a well-timed surprise and the suspense that crescendoes towards it, from the latest book we cannot seem to put down to, arguably perhaps, the favorite story we've read on countless occasions. It is, quite simply, one of the primary reasons why we read. These observations were not lost on the Stagirite, even if he was more concerned with sustaining the attention of a live theatrical audience than that of private bookworms. But a number of other philosophers have examined the concept of the unforeseeable in both lived experience and literature. For Paul Ricoeur, as Currie explains, “the Aristotelian notion of emplotment is understood as an act of configuration, or composition, which balances a demand for concordance, or the unity of the plot across time, with discordances, or events that are admitted into the plot and which make up the disparate components of the action. A plot is therefore a discordant concordance, and a synthesis of the heterogeneous” (Currie 37). __56_ Ricoeur’s concept of discordance corresponds with Aristotelian *peripeteia*, such that

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__56_ Ricoeur discusses “discordance” and related concepts of narrative temporality in his *Time and Narrative* and *Oneself as Another*. For more on the idea of time in fictional narrative, see Bender and Wellbery.
reversals of fortune are necessary, somewhat paradoxically, for advancing the plot forward. Discordance, in any case, is particularly apropos for describing moments of Cervantine suspension, since as “disparate” or “heterogenous” emotions they interrupt the concordance of the plot while contributing to its “unity.”

If for Ricoeur unexpected events are synthesized under the purview of the narrative plot, for Derrida the unforeseeable seems to undergird the very nature of his fundamental theory of “the event” itself:

> there are those of us who are inclined to think that unexpectability conditions the very structure of the event. Would an event that can be anticipated and therefore apprehended or comprehended, or one without an element of absolute encounter, actually be an event in the full sense of the word? [...] There are those of us who lean toward the assumption that an event worthy of the name cannot be foretold. We are not supposed to see it coming. If what comes and then stands out horizontally on a horizon can be anticipated then there is no pure event. No horizon, then, for the event or encounter, but only verticality and the unforeseeable. (*Psyche* 5-6)

Appealing to a spatial metaphor, Derrida claims that the event must always arrive “from above,” catching us unaware in a way something we might see on the horizon cannot. To be event-ful, it must surprise us. Similarly, for Bakhtin, what he called the “eventness” of an occurrence was also closely related to its “surprisingness.” Although this eventness “is a property possessed only by certain happenings, certain eventful events” (*Currie* 36), it is significant that Bakhtin considered it a fundamental property of decision-making, of the freedom to choose. “Bakhtin viewed all of our choices, however prosaic, as having a
measure of eventness, and he rejected all models of the world that did not allow for ‘surprisingness’” (Morson 22). This relationship between event, choice, and surprise will be important as I discuss how Cervantine techniques of suspension open an emotional space for reflecting upon the ethics of our decisions.

One of the primary objectives of Currie’s study, in which he examines the theories of Ricoeur, Derrida, and Bakhtin, among others, is to address what he considers to be the paucity of scholarship on narrative temporality. As all of these thinkers have shown, it is the interrelated concepts of the unforeseeable, discordance, unexpectability, or surprise that constitute an event which somehow arrests or interrupts the flow of (narrative) time. As Currie explains, “in the affective operations of stories more generally, surprise is the one that takes us, theoretically, straight to the heart of narrative dynamics” (42). And yet I would argue that studies on the “affective operations” of surprise are even more scarce than those which have established its relation to temporality or its place among “narrative dynamics.” It is clear from the philosophers examined thus far that something eventful implies an emotional impact; an unexpected event (even if for Derrida this designation is redundant) must necessarily produce an emotional response or judgment to be designated as such. But what is the affective content of the unexpected? Can surprise be properly considered an emotion? If so, then what are the modal contours of its expression, or how do we feel when we feel surprised? Alternatively, what other emotions might surprise give rise to? And most importantly, how do these questions relate to the literary text, Cervantes’s writing, and our experience as readers?
Spanish Suspension in the English Court: “La española inglesa”

To begin to address these questions, I would like to undertake a close reading of some examples of suspension in the Novelas ejemplares, with special attention to “La española inglesa.” In this Byzantine novella with twists and turns of fate that span not only the Mediterranean but the North Atlantic as well, the character of Ricaredo falls in love with Isabela, a woman taken from Spain as a child and raised by Ricaredo’s parents in England and who gives the work its title. Displeased that his parents had planned to marry Isabela without proper consent yet impressed by her beauty, the queen of England, Elizabeth I, brings her to the court under royal aegis before sending Ricaredo away as captain on a naval battle. Cervantes represents the emotive scene of the enamored captain’s departure in the following way: “Besó las manos Ricaredo a la reina, estimando en mucho la merced que le hacía, y luego se fue a hincar de rodillas ante Isabela, y queriéndola hablar no pudo porque se le puso un nudo en la garganta que le ató la lengua, y las lágrimas acudieron a los ojos, y él acudió a disimularlas lo más que le fue posible” (303). The emotional intensity of this scene is characteristic of many examples in Cervantes’ works of lovers or family members who are tragically separated only to be happily reunited later in the narrative—as would be the case with Ricardo and Leonisa in “El amante liberal” (examined in my previous chapter) and will eventually be with Ricaredo and Isabela as well. This exchange also reveals the complex entanglement of several different emotions, including shame and sadness (and perhaps fear of losing Isabela, who is being courted by another nobleman), as well as the frequent futility of resisting the outward expression of powerful affects. Incidentally, it is partly Ricaredo’s powerlessness over his emotions
which, rather ironically, induces him to feel the added emotion of shame. More importantly, though the specific terms of concern to us themselves (suspensión, etc.) are withheld in favor of a description of Ricaredo’s physiological condition, the effect is quite similar. Like Cervantes’s self-description in the prologue of Don Quijote, the character appears incapable of tempering his thoughts with reason or of translating them into action. The differences in bodily expression notwithstanding (Cervantes’s stoop over his desk vs. Ricaredo’s stoop in front of the queen along with his uncontrolable tears), both characters experience a sort of impasse or paralysis (see Figure 7). In Ricaredo’s case, the act of falling to his knees—like the knot in his throat—is a telling symptom of suspension: not only is it a gesture of reverence toward the queen but also an involuntary effect of his emotional turmoil, akin to feeling weak in the knees, a sensation that often precedes fainting. The ability to stand, to speak, and to control his emotions is suspended.

This is what the characters might be imagined to feel in a similar moment of suspension later in the novella. When Ricaredo first brings Isabela’s long-lost parents before the queen in the English royal court, the narrator describes in detail the emotional weight of the scene:

[57] Silvan Tomkins’s theory of “affective binds” is useful for understanding the excess of shame in this example: “In a shame-distress bind, one feels shame whenever one feels sad or distressed in some way, thus repressing and at the same time intensifying both the sadness and the shame; inasmuch as this emotional complex is mostly unconscious, the subject is left at the mercy of an unidentified but debilitating feeling-state” (qtd. in Adamson and Clark 15). I analyze the affect of shame in greater detail in Part Two of the dissertation.

[58] Similar instances of falling to the knees—with or without the accompanying fainting—occur in “La ilustre fregona” (531) and “El celoso extremeño” (457). The English queen’s response to Ricaredo’s emotional outburst in her court is also highly significant for understanding the complex and pivotal functions of affect in the Novelas: “No os afrentéis, Ricaredo, de llorar, no tengáis en menos por haber dado en este trance tan tiernas muestras de vuestro corazón, que una cosa es pelear con los enemigos y otra despedirse de quien bien se quiere. Abrazad, Isabela, a Ricaredo y dadle vuestra bendición, que bien lo merece su sentimiento” (303).
Ansí como Isabela alzó los ojos, los puso en su madre, y detuvo el paso para mirarla más atentamente, y en la memoria de Isabela se comenzaron a despertar unas confusas noticias que le querían dar a entender que en otro tiempo ella había visto aquella mujer que delante tenía. Su padre estaba en la misma confusión, sin osar determinarse a dar crédito a la verdad que sus ojos le mostraban. Ricaredo estaba atentísimo a ver los afectos y movimientos que hacían las tres dudosas y perplejas almas, que tan confusas estaban entre el sí y el no de conocerse. Conoció la reina la suspensión de entrambos, y aun el desasosiego de Isabela, porque la vio trasudar y levantar las manos muchas veces a componerse el cabello. (318; my emphasis)

Shortly thereafter, the narrator importantly adds that the queen has been left “admirada” by the events of the family’s reunion (319). There are several reasons why these lines represent one of the most highly emotive scenes of the whole collection of novellas. First, such relatively frequent moments of anagnorisis in Cervantes’s works are, as Hutchinson has noted, already some of the most emotionally impactful, given that “Pocas técnicas literarias pueden involucrar tanta participación emotiva de los lectores como una anagnórisis bien conseguida” (“Anagnorisis” 345). In “La española inglesa” Cervantes has indeed executed a masterful crescendo of sentimental suspense, with both intra- and extradiegetic audiences anxiously awaiting the resolution of the international and interfamilial conflict. This heightened tension seems to sharpen everyone’s senses, with each character scrutinizing one another ever more intently in order to discern the significance of their movements and affects (“atentamente,” “atentísimo a ver los afectos y movimientos”). This explains the queen’s astute ability to identify Isabela’s emotional state
of “suspensión” and “desasosiego” through such minute bodily and non-verbal cues as breaking into a cold sweat and obsessively fixing her hair. As readers, we also become acutely attuned to the details of the scene through a similar kind of suspension and unrest as we await its resolution. In short, to evoke the etymology of the term, we as readers are left “hanging” on these moments of suspension.

Beyond their purely aesthetic function in creating suspense, however, I would like to argue that these terms open a self-conscious space for both the characters and the reader in which intense emotion leads to a reflection on the moral and ethical insights that Cervantes offers in each work. The accumulation of confusion in this scene in the English royal court (the term ‘confuso’ is repeated three times) underscores the dissonance between sensory input (i.e. the startling sight of seeing someone unexpected) and innate intuition (i.e. the unshakeable feeling of knowing someone). Here the Platonic idea that the soul—the source and center of emotion—is imprinted with past memories intervenes in favor of the displaced family members, leading Isabela and her parents to confirm the veracity of what they see. In spite of the initial confusion, the implication is clear: following one’s feelings, though seemingly irrational, may lead to the truth. This kind of pre-modern emotional intelligence is facilitated by the very presence of the terms “suspensión” and “confusión” in the passage. That such heartfelt, emotive exchanges between characters take place in the space of the royal court, moreover, stands in stark contrast to the idea prescribed, popularized, and often parodied in courtly literature that the successful courtier was required to repress and dissimulate his true emotions. The strictly regulated social milieu of the court, according to Elias’s theory of the civilizing process, required constant self-control so as to avoid impassioned behaviors. Although the characters in the
novella recognize and at times express shame or regret for transgressing this directive of decorum in front of the queen (including Ricaredo and Isabela’s parents), the fact that they are explicitly condoned, accepted, and even praised for their emotional outbursts in this space is surely significant. By representing the court as the space in which emotions such as love, desire, shame, sadness, and wonder are circulated among characters of distinct genders, nationalities, and socioeconomic profiles, affect becomes a medium of interpersonal exchange and potential resistance to dominant political structures and social expectations as well.

Yet another exchange of correspondingly high emotional stakes occurs later in the novella, when Ricaredo’s parents summon Clísterna from Scotland with the intention to betroth the two while Isabela, convalescing after having been poisoned by the tósigo, has yet to recuperate her original physical beauty. Upon Clísterna’s arrival, “Sobresaltose Ricaredo con la improvisa vista de la doncella, y temió que el sobresalto de su venida había de acabar la vida a Isabela” (327). According to Autoridades, the verb “sobresaltar” signifies “asustar, congozar, y alterar algun sucesso, ò imaginación pronta, y temerosa.” Likewise, “sobresalto” means “temor, ò susto repentino…” and the adverbial form “de sobresalto,” “de improviso, ó impensadamente” (III: 130). Connoting both a temporal and emotional meaning, the term is similar to the sudden affects of surprise discussed above, as the example given in the dictionary underscores: “Los Emperadóres Romanos vivieron en medio de la paz, y de las delicias, tyranizados de sus mismas passiones, y afectos, con

59 Shortly after swallowing the poison, Isabela’s eyes suddenly lose their clarity and become turbid, for which the narrator employs yet another acceptation of the word “turbar”: “Poco espacio pasó después de haberla tomado, cuando a Isabela se le comenzó a hinchar la lengua y la garganta, y a ponersele negridos los labios, y a enronquecersele la voz, turbarlese los ojos y apretársele el pecho” (325). It is interesting to note that these physiological effects of poisoning share some of the same traits experienced by someone suddenly caught in emotional suspension.
sobresaltos de varios temores” (III: 130). In other words, sobresalto conveys an abrupt disturbance of tranquility; it syncopates, accentuates, perturbs an otherwise peaceful repose (if passionate, in the Roman emperors’ case) with strong, unexpected, and fearful affects. In Ricaredo’s situation, his sobresalto is doubly disturbing, since he experiences the shock (“Sobresaltose”) of Clisterna’s unexpected arrival (“la improvisa vista”) and simultaneously fears that just such a shock (“el sobresalto de su venida”) might be enough to kill Isabela in her already weakened state.

Nevertheless, he almost immediately converts these passions into action: “y así, para templar este temor, se fue al lecho donde Isabela estaba” (327). After tempering the shock of Clisterna’s precipitate arrival and issuing to Isabela’s bedside, Ricaredo takes another action that leaves his onlookers in a similarly dazed state of suspension, explaining that:

Isabela de mi alma: mis padres, con el grande amor que me tienen, aún no bien enterados del mucho que yo te tengo, han traído a casa una doncella escocesa, con quien ellos tenían concertado de casarme antes que yo conociese lo que vales. Y esto, a lo que creo, con intención que la mucha belleza desta doncella borre de mi alma la tuya, que en ella estampada tengo. Yo, Isabela, desde el punto que te quise fue con otro amor de aquel que tiene su fin y paradero en el cumplimiento del sensual apetito; que, puesto que tu corporal hermosura me cautivó los sentidos, tus infinitas virtudes me

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60 On the philosophical relationship between passion and action in the seventeenth century, see Susan James’s thorough study.
aprisionaron el alma, de manera que si hermosa te quise, fea te adoro; y para confirmar esta verdad, dame esa mano. (327-28)

Employing a remarkably measured and rational discourse for appraising the situation and confessing his love to Isabela, Ricaredo has not only converted his passion into action, but his emotion into reason. Bringing the emotive suspension of the scene full circle, the narrator reports that “Quedó suspensa Isabela con las razones de Ricaredo, y sus padres atónitos y pasmados” (328). Instead of allowing the mortal shock of Clisterna’s arrival to suspend him indefinitely or to drive him to any number of detrimental or destructive emotions (such as rage, despair, melancholy, or even love for Clisterna), Ricaredo seizes the affective shock of his situation as an opportunity make a different choice. Although he could have expressed his feelings to Isabela any number of times earlier in the novella, it is the sudden instance of emotional shock which produces his decision to propose to her. The significance of this outcome is even greater given that, as he himself realizes, his parents conspired to summon Clisterna in order that her beauty might catch him off guard and impel him to fall in love with her instead. Since he was already in an emotionally weakened state (as Isabela was in a physically weakened state), they had hoped to take advantage of the element of surprise and its tendency to encourage one to act impulsively. And we might expect that their plan for him to exchange ugliness for beauty would have worked were it not for Cervantes’s constant insistence that moments of suspension give rise not to further impassioned impulses but to reasoned reflection and virtuous action. To be sure, these events perform the crucial narrative function of accentuating the impact of these qualities and of reinforcing the ethos of the protagonist, as Ricaredo’s intradiegetic audience so amply demonstrates (“Quedó suspensa Isabela con las razones de Ricaredo, y
sus padres atónitos y pasmados"). Likewise, once again, I do not mean to imply that rationality and virtue are not qualities that Cervantes lauds in their own right. They are obviously a fundamental component of the didacticism of the Novelas ejemplares. But the fact is that here, as in countless other instances throughout the text, such qualities proceed directly from an unexpected emotional event. It is the commingling of reason and emotion therein that provides an uncommon prescription for ethical behavior and, at the same time, a narrative resolution for the compelling ups and downs of Cervantine suspension.

To further clarify this contrast, an examination of the lexical antonyms of suspension is in order, for instance when the narrator remarks that Ricaredo goes to Isabela “para templar este temor.” With templar, in effect, we have a counterpart to sobresalto and similar words of suspension. Yet another remarkably versatile term in the Spanish language, in its most general sense “templar” signifies “Moderar, ò suavizar la fuerza de alguna cosa,” but “[m]etaphoricamente” it also means “sossegar la cólera, enojo, ò violencia de génio de alguna persona” (Autoridades III: 242). The word’s additional metaphorical usages are instructive for our purposes as well, given that they rather vividly evoke the thematic contrast between tranquility and turbulence that spans the present chapter. In the field of metallurgy, for example, templar is the act of endowing metals with “aquel punto, delicadeza, y fineza, que requieren para su perfección” (Autoridades III: 242). In this sense, it resembles the English term “temper,” which may also be applied to both affectivity (e.g. to temper an outburst) and metalworking (e.g. to temper a sword). Yet even more pertinent resonances obtain with the Spanish templar in the arts: in painting, for which it means “proporcionarla, y disponerla de modo, que no disuene, ni desdiga parte alguna de ella,” and in music, meaning “poner acorde los instrumentos según la proporción
harmónica” (*Autoridades* III: 242). Although I will examine the cultural context of music in more depth momentarily, this definition of proportions recalls Castiglione’s description of the necessary existence of discord in order to appreciate true harmony. Prescribing music as an ideal pastime for the courtier, he says that in this particular art “it is a great mistake to place two perfect consonances one after the other, for our sense of hearing abhors this, whereas it often enjoys a second or a seventh which in itself is a harsh and unbearable discord. And this is due to the fact that to continue in perfect consonances generates satiety and gives evidence of a too affected harmony, which is avoided when imperfect consonances are mixed in, establishing a kind of comparison, by which our ears are held in greater suspense, and more avidly wait upon and enjoy the perfect consonances, delighting in that discord of the second or seventh as in something that shows nonchalance” (Castiglione 45-46; my emphasis). Recalling Ricoeur’s theory of discord, for Castiglione the concept serves a sort of deconstructive function in order to provide contrast and greater appreciation of moments of tranquility. In other words, without discord, we would no longer enjoy harmony. Without suspense, we could not appreciate repose. And without immoderation, there would be nothing to templar.

To the definition of “templar,” Covarrubias adds that “Todas las cosas que se han subido de punto, cuando las reducimos se dice templarlas” (1465). The verb thus signifies the action of transforming (or returning to their original state) materials or qualities that

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61 Avilés comments on this passage from *The Book of the Courtier* in his study of aspereza, a complex term which is intimately related to the concept of discord: “La estética que conjuga lo perfecto con lo imperfecto ve una necesidad de mantener vivos los elementos de aspereza que, en el momento oportuno, se convierten en los salvadores de la monotonía” (“Asperezas” 38). He also makes an important distinction between the necessity of aspereza according to professional contexts, since the individual should be “áspero y fiero solamente cuando viere los enemigos... pero en cualquier otro lugar parezca manso y templado” (Avilés, “Asperezas” 32). I consider Avilés’s conclusions in greater detail below. Castro briefly examines the concept of harmony and dissonance in Cervantes’s works in his *Pensamiento* (25-27).
are discordant, disproportionate, and dissonant into those that are concordant, proportionate, and harmonious. Much the same contradistinction holds in another vocation of particular interest for our purposes—that of marine navigation, for which *templar* “significa moderar, y proporcionar las velas al viento, recogiéndolas, si es mui fuerte, y extendiéndolas, si es suave, ó blando” (*Autoridades* III: 242). Here the art of temperance concerns not the aesthetic harmony of a painting, musical composition, or metalwork, but the capricious and often life-or-death conditions of life on the open sea. Beyond its relevance for Mediterranean mobility, however, this acceptation is the one which, metaphorically, most accurately approaches the treatment of emotions in the *Novelas ejemplares*: rather than stoically folding the sails completely, Cervantes suggests that we actively manage them according to the conditions of a particular environment. If at times unbridled emotions may lead us to drift off course or even to capsize, at others it is the very embracing, accentuating, or indulging them which promises to propel us safely forward. The metaphor might be said to hold at the level of narrative as well—the ups and downs of the wind corresponding with the alternately tranquil and suspended states of emotive tension—with Cervantes as the skillful mariner who always seems to know how and when to adjust the sails.

*From Music to Mysticism: Early Modern Cultures of Suspension*

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62 In this definition of “templar,” the dictionary cites Cervantes’s *Persiles* as an example: “Dando voces à los Marineros, que amainassen las velas, y las *templasen*, y assegurassen” (*Autoridades* III: 242).
A closer examination of the etymological and lexical connotations of the remaining terms of Cervantine suspension on which I am focusing will now be necessary to provide further support of their emotional and cultural contexts. According to Covarrubias, the “confuso” signifies “el que está turbado y el que no se sabe dar a entender, mezclando una razón con otra, sin tener distinción” (Tesoro 594), and Autoridades adds that “confusión” is akin to an “embarazo y dificultad para perturbar el ánimo y los sentidos” or an “Inquietúd, turbación y desasossiego del ánimo, procedido de alguna fuerte consideración o de otro afecto y motivo que le altera y perturba.” Importantly, confusión may be “ocasionada de alguna novedad o motivo no esperado” (I: 508). As for suspensión, “suspender” means to “Parar en algún negocio” (Covarrubias, Tesoro 1453) or “arrebatar el ánimo, y detenerlo con la admiración de lo extraño” (Autoridades III: 192). Likewise, someone who is “suspenso” is “el que está parado y perplejo” (Covarrubias, Tesoro 1453) and “suspensión” is “detención en algun movimiento del ánimo” (Autoridades III: 193). Turbación, on the other hand, “Vale también confusión, desorden, ú desconcierto” (Autoridades III: 377), while “turbarse” means “tomar un cierto género de espanto o aglayo, que quita en cierta manera el sentido, perturba la razón y altera la memoria” (Covarrubias, Tesoro 1496). “Metaphoricamente,” moreover, turbar “vale sorprender, ó aturdir á alguno, causandole rubor en algun acto, de modo que no acierte a hablar, ó a proseguir lo que iba á hacer” (Autoridades III: 377).

63 “Confusión” also signified something akin to “shame” in early modern Spanish as well, as I explain in greater detail in Chapter 4.
Beyond the fact that these terms are clearly interrelated and largely synonymous, there are several important points to recognize in their definitions. First is the diversity of emotions elicited by or related to these states of suspension—even if such states may well be considered affects in their own right—including fear, wonder, and shame or embarrassment ("causandole rubor"). We should also take note of the effect that such emotional states produce in the faculty of reason, 'perturbing,' ‘perplexing,’ ‘altering,’ or confounding rational thought. With confuso, this means that the person becomes unable to distinguish one “razón” from another or is faced with difficulties or obstacles (“embarazo”) to understanding, and all of these words seem to similarly blur the distinctions between emotional, rational, sensory, and cognitive faculties more generally, even to the point of affecting memory. In this way, this ‘confusing’ directly affects and destabilizes the sensus communis itself. It is furthermore striking to note the contrasting metaphors of movement employed to convey such an effect: on the one hand, suspender denotes a detention, halting, or arresting of action while, on the other, turbarse seems to imply the very movement, stirring, and turbulence of an otherwise calm, still, and nearly static state. The metaphors of movement that inhere in Covarrubias’s definitions are effectively consistent with the Aristotelian notion that the human soul maintained a state of constant movement and was thus responsible for our passions and desire. But what is even more significant for our purposes are the temporal associations of these terms, since many of the same effects of

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64 Additional early modern terms which according to Covarrubias’s Tesoro maintained a close if not synonymous relationship with those I have already examined included alboroto; alborozo; atójito (“Vale el espantado”; 246); embelesar (“Vale pasmar ... quedar sin senti do ni movimiento. Dicen traer origen del verbo arábigo embelleh, que vale entontecer; 762); and espantar (“Causar horror, miedo o admiración; y dijose espantar, quasi espasmar, de pasmo; o del nombre spectrum, que vale fantasma, espectrar y, corruptamente, espantar [...] Espantarse, maravillarse; espantado, atónico, medroso, maravillado”; 830). All of these can be found, though with somewhat less frequency, in Cervantes’s works as well.
arresting movement can apply to arresting time as well. This idea is importantly related to my discussion above of surprising and unforeseeable events, most apparent in the definition of “confusión” as a state produced by the news of a change or unexpected purpose (“ocasionada de alguna novedad o motivo no esperado”).

The temporal qualities of the term “suspensión,” moreover, are wonderfully underscored by its musical acceptation as “la detencion de la voz en algun punto mas de lo que le corresponde por su intervalo” (Autoridades III: 193). In addition to the representation of emotions more generally, I would suggest that music serves as one of the most powerful and enlightening contexts for considering the specific narrativity and temporal qualities of affect.65 In this case, the subtle delay in which the singer indulges before moving on to the next note evokes in some sense the effect we as readers experience when we stumble upon certain phrases—such as “quedó suspenso”—in a piece of literature. In both cases—musical composition and literary text—the artfulness hinges on the skill or license of the composer, performer, author, or reader (especially in oral literature) to extend or hang upon a point, note, or word longer than strict notation would allow for (“mas de lo que le corresponde por su intervalo”). Though it may seem self-evident, it is these very subjective or interpretative indulgences that constitute art as such.

65 Aristotle’s discussion of music in Book VIII of the Politics is fundamental (1340a). In his dubiously authored Problems, he also suggests sounds are much more propitious for ethics due to their relation to movement (see Martín Moreno 332). In a fascinating passage of his early eighteenth-century Tratado de la Música especulativa y práctica, Tomás Vicente Tosca relates this idea of movement to highly sensitive fibers in the brain: “no hay duda en que del movimiento de las fibras sutilísimas de que se compone el cerebro, resultan diferentes movimientos en los espíritus animales, y de éstos, diferentes pasiones y afeciones del ánimo. [...] Tañiendo o cantando un tono se mueven las fibras del cerebro con un temblor menudísimo, que se les comunica por el órgano del oído; y aquellas se mueven más sensiblemente que por su tensión y disposición están más ajustadas al tono que se oye, con que su tono mueve con especialidad unas y otro otras; el que mueve las fibras, de cuyo movimieneto pende el de los espíritus, que causan alegría, alegran; el que excita el movimiento de las fibras, que mueven los espíritus tristes y melancólicos, causan tristeza” (qtd. in Martín Moreno 339-40). Tosca was influenced by the equally fascinating Musurgia universalis, published in 1650 by the Renaissance polymath Athanasius Kircher. For more on emotion in music, see Harré.
and, I would add, endow it with emotion. Something very similar could be said, of course, of any number of additional arts, from the painter’s brushstroke or the visual artist’s subtle use of color to the dancer’s distinctive style or what Barthes distinguished as the elusive punctum of a photograph. These often-difficult-to-define things are art’s pièce de résistance, if not its very raison d’être. It would obviously be a mistake to conflate the subtleties of these forms of art, since they are largely what enable the power of each to produce an endless range of emotional responses in the viewer, listener, spectator, or reader. But without delving too deeply into the realm of comparative aesthetics, I would like to momentarily dwell on the example of music in order to suggest, rather, that as an art form it is uniquely well suited for contemplating the specific aspects of both temporality and emotions.

I am not alone in claiming that, at least until quite recently, musical criticism has approached the problem of emotion much more thoroughly and satisfactorily than have literary scholars, in particular. This may be partly due to the fact that music is often presumed to somehow be a more emotionally impassioned art, to possess an a priori potential to elicit and sustain emotions in its listeners more readily than literature. That music has traditionally engaged more directly with affect would seem to be confirmed by

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66 It is therefore curious to recall that the Greek term musiké referred as much to language as it did to the audible tones themselves because, as Martín Moreno notes, “la música se basaba en la longitud y tono invariables de las sílabas griegas” (321). He goes on to point out the close relationship between music and rhetoric: “Puesto que el propósito de la música emotiva es persuadir a sus oyentes, se puede decir que se relaciona con la retórica; la retórica musical es, en este sentido, un medio de alcanzar los fines emotivos” (322). Finally, he notes that this relationship was further solidified and ‘Christianized’ by Saint Augustine’s De Musica, after which the Church realized it could “mover los afectos’ de los gentiles y conseguir su conversión al cristianismo a través de la persuasión por la palabra de Dios cantada” (327). More generally, I must agree with Martín Moreno’s assessment that affect theory (“la Teoría de los Afectos”) is “uno de las [sic] principales aspectos, a veces no suficientemente abordados, que mejor explican las características estéticas del citado periodo [barroco]” (343). For his part, Hutchinson also recognizes music as a field which has embraced the study of emotion more readily than literature (“Affective” 73-74).
the development and use of written conventions for directing the performer in the emotional connotations of individual passages—from *affettuoso*, *passionato*, *con anima*, or *con amore*, to *con dolore*, *fleble*, or *lacrimoso*, and everything in between: *molto*, *pochettino*, and *ma non troppo*. Were the interpretation of emotions in literature so easy! The other side of this coin, and probably equally debatable, is that music likewise lacks the power of narrative, that it is more form than content. Such claims would clearly vary were their scope reduced to more discrete genres within these forms, since there are enormous differences in the narrative and emotional potential of, say, a Baroque fugue and a modern rock song, or epic poetry and a contemporary romance novel. Obviously, the dubious merit of such comparisons would also depend upon an entire gamut of immeasurable factors such as whether the music was performed live or recorded, whether it was enjoyed publicly or privately, and the performance venue or recording quality, not to mention the individual taste of the listener. For these reasons we could easily imagine that Bach’s “Fugue No. 2 in C minor” might elicit the same feeling of melancholy in one listener as the Beatles’s “Hey Jude” might in another, or that the same listener might experience anger or disgust from either song depending on her prior mood, disposition, and changing tastes.67 The same can be said of literature. Nevertheless, considering affect and time through the lens of music can be a productive means of compensating for the relatively impoverished critical vocabulary for talking about these concepts in literature, or at least for talking about them in different ways.

67 Kircher recognizes as much in his *Musurgia universalis*: “La mente posee un cierto carácter dependiente del temperamento innato en el individuo, y atendiendo a este carácter es que el músico prefiere un tipo de composición más bien que otro. Pues, en verdad, la variedad en la composición es tan numerosa como la diversidad de temperamentos que viven en los individuos” (qtd. in Martín Moreno 339).
As I have been suggesting, in Cervantes’s writing these concepts often go hand in hand, from the surprising revelation that seems to interrupt the flow of normal narrative time to the suspension that seems to dilate it. In essence, like the singer who holds a well-timed note “mas de lo que le corresponde por su intervalo,” the text lingers upon highly emotive moments in order to render them more powerful and emotionally impactful for the reader. Notes of suspension in the Novelas could be said to announce their arrival, as it were, by a staccato, pointedly accentuating the affective tension of a scene by introducing an unexpected conflict. The inharmonious or atonal notes that follow might be marked, depending on the desired effect of the particular scene’s phrasing, by a fermata or caesura, thus deferring its resolution. A lunga pausa might be added to further prolong the effect. And a number of additional musical techniques—like syncope, counterpoint, and, indeed, suspension—could be considered suggestive analogues for describing the tone and temporality of Cervantes’s text. It is not entirely fortuitous, of course, that terms like “suspension” exist in a number of different arts, vocations, or fields. As I will show in regards to mysticism below, beyond their common etymological roots (the Latin suspendere, for example), these fields mutually influenced one another and likely borrowed and appropriated such terms, a fact which becomes even more evident when we consider the intimate relationship between music and rhythmic poetry, in particular. My purpose, then, in transposing a musical language here is three-fold: first, as a metaphor, music calls forth the curious temporality of Cervantine suspension in a way that conventional critical language simply cannot. Second, moments of suspension in the text constitute an important element of the art of the novella and of Cervantes’s writing in general, beyond what might be either explicitly prescribed or implicitly understood—insofar as they
constitute such tropes as reversal and anagnorisis—as part of neo-Aristotelian poetics. Though it may well contribute to *mythos* or emplotment, Cervantine suspension is much more than a set of ready-made tools designed to build suspense or fit into a traditional conflict-climax-denouement structure. Third, just as listeners of a musical performance, we as readers experience suspension in the text just as much or more than the characters themselves, receiving an intensification of its artfulness and affective tension as it passes through the text, the protagonists, the intradiegetic audience, and the narrator. If, as Hutchinson suggests and I remarked previously, “some characters, rather than being less than real persons, may be more than real persons, and their emotions may be more than those of real persons” (“Dimensions” 79), then perhaps the reader’s experience of these emotions may be much “more” as well.

If the art of music has aided in clarifying the temporal qualities of suspension, then the art of the early modern theater—fundamentally dependent on music as it was—will help to further illuminate its emotional qualities. With more or less equal portions of music and theater, the opera is yet another example of these aesthetic crossovers, and, in fact, it is in the first Spanish opera ever performed that we get a privileged glimpse of music’s affective properties. Lope’s operatic *La selva sin amor* was first represented in 1629 to celebrate King Philip IV’s recovery from an illness, even though he did not attend the performance. As such, in his *Laurel de Apolo, con otras rimas*, which he published the

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68 The relationship between music and theater would seem to be part of Cervantes’s nostalgia for Spanish drama of the likes of Juan de la Encina and Lope de Rueda, as he expresses in the prologue to his *Comedias y entremeses*. Unlike Lope’s *comedia nueva*, in this classical theater “El adorno del teatro era una manta vieja, tirada con dos cordeles de una parte a otra, que hacía lo que llaman vestuario, detrás de la cual estaban los músicos, cantando sin guitarra algún romance antiguo.” He also lauds Navarro because he “sacó la música, que antes cantaba detrás de la manta, al teatro público” (*Comedias y entremeses* n. pag.). Perhaps this is because Cervantes recognized the raw emotional power of live musical performance without the distraction of modern adornments.
following year, Lope thoughtfully explains to the sovereign that, “No habiendo visto V. E. esta égloga que se representó cantada a sus Majestades y Altezas, cosa nueva en España, me pareció imprimirla para que de esta suerte con menos cuidado la imaginase V. E. aunque lo menos que en ella hubo fueron mis versos.” Lope’s distinguishing verses were relegated to the music, as he further expounds: “Los instrumentos ocupaban la primera parte del teatro sin ser vistos, a cuya armonía cantaban las figuras los versos haciendo en la misma composición de la música las admiraciones, las quejas, los amores, las iras y los demás afectos” (n. pag.). His description seems to suggest that Lope found music highly adaptable and capable of representing various emotional states. Since to my knowledge no one has yet done so, it is striking to compare his characterization of operatic emotions in the *Laurel de Apolo* to that of theatrical ones in his *Arte nuevo de hacer comedias*:

Acomode los versos con prudencia
a los sujetos de que va tratando.
Las décimas son buenas para quejas;
el soneto está bien en los que aguardan;
las relaciones piden los romances,
aunque en octavas lucen por extremo;
son los tercetos para cosas graves,
y para las de amor, las redondillas. (148, v. 305-12)

As innovative as Lope’s *comedia nueva* was, it is curious that part of this innovation was the elimination of music, as Cervantes laments, and that Lope seems to find opera innovative because it can accommodate ire, love, grief, suspension, and other affects (“los demás afectos”) all in the same composition, whereas the theater should adhere to his more
limited prescription to pair specific forms of verse with specific affects (tercets for serious things, quatrains for love, and so on).

In his study of the concept of suspension in Calderón’s *La vida es sueño* and its relation to early modern acting techniques, Agustín de la Granja highlights a similarly complex network of emotions which encircle suspension itself: “Tanto la suspensión como la turbación encierran, en el fondo del alma, una compleja cadena de sentimientos o ‘afectos’ (desde el amor gozoso hasta la rabia de unos celos) que aprisiona con fuerza a quienes los padecen” (Granja 151). But just how might this ‘complex chain of feelings’ have been represented on stage? An examination of gesture, which Kevin Dunn notes is “a concept that stands at the juncture between language and image” (31), will help us to understand suspension not merely as a narrative or rhetorical device, but as an experience which is strongly informed by and expressive of affect. “Renaissance theoreticians of gesture,” Dunn explains, “always understood the difference, the gap, between gesture as code and gesture in its fuller sense of expression, an expression that both registers and provokes desire—gesture, in short, as affect” (31). A study of the gestures which an early modern theatrical audience might expect to see in a representation of suspension, then, may address the similar gap that exists in literature between suspension as code (i.e. as a narrative trope) and expression (i.e. the emotions it produces). Granja speculates that, in the more intimate *corrales* of seventeenth-century Spain, there were a number of possible bodily and gestural means through which actors might have communicated the intense suspension or perturbation of their characters to the audience, from using the eyes or gaze to “improvisando una agitación corporal suficientemente visible por el público”; from “un balbuceo o temblor supuestamente incontrolado hasta un repentin enmudecer; desde la
caída brusca de un objeto hasta una respiración entrecortada. El final de la acción—mejor o peor interpretada—podía ser también el desmayo” (155-56). According to Granja, the most widespread and convincing theatrical method for conveying suspension, however, was for the actor to suddenly become motionless and silent like a statue. This is the stance that Ricardo, in the midst of a passage seething with ire in “El amante liberal,” adopts when he sees Leonisa alone with Cornelio: “me quedé como estatua sin voz ni movimiento alguno” (186; see Figure 8). Of course, representing the posture of freezing like a statue would seem to be quite natural for the static nature of pictorial arts. In the dynamic movements of the theater, however, such a stance would strike the audience as even more abrupt. Granja explains:

No cabe duda de que la ‘acción’ que desarrolla un actor del siglo XVII ante una acotación del tipo ‘quédase suspenso’ o ‘pónese pensativo’ es precisamente la de quedarse ‘de piedra,’ si mover pie, ni mano, ni lengua, ni pestañas. Lo mismo vale decir para las actrices, que más parecen modelos de pintor que otra cosa cuando deteniendo el cuerpo y reprimiendo la palabra comunican al público el debate pasional del alma. Como no sueltan prenda, es difícil averiguar lo que piensan, a no ser que sus caras y sus ‘gestos’ delaten sus afectos interiores (su ‘estado de ánimo’). (164)

While highlighting the abiding difficulty in expressing complex emotions through the art of performance more generally, this analysis is especially significant because it subtly evinces

69 Ricardo also reports having momentarily lost his sense of sight in this scene, an effect quite similar to the “parosismo” suffered later by both Ricardo and Mahamut when they believe Leonisa has died (197). In his definition for yet another more or less synonymous term of suspension, “pasmo,” Covarrubias describes a similar lack of movement: “Pasmarse, es quedarse suspenso, sin movimiento” (Tesoro 1348).
a paradox at the heart of suspension: just as the unforeseeable event stupefies the subject and suspends rational and sensory faculties, here the *modus operandi* of actorly technique is suspended as well. In other words, in order to most accurately and convincingly express suspension, the actor must suspend expression itself. Instead of calling upon his or her performative, histrionic, or melodramatic talents, the actor is called to simply stop doing anything. In effect, the theatrical performance itself becomes momentarily *suspended by suspension.*

The arresting of both movement and time in these examples recalls my analysis of surprise and the definitions of the terms of suspension above. As I noted previously, however, the emotional complexity of suspension suggests that simply standing still was not the only means available to an actor whose character had suddenly encountered some *turbación*. One of the uniquely theatrical possibilities for resolving this challenge was the aside, in which the actor could momentarily ‘suspend’ the action of the scene to explain directly to the audience the circumstances and affects of the suspension, as Emilio Orozco Díaz has described. Another important advantage for the actor (or even the reader of plays) was the existence of stage directions, which could—similar to the musical notations considered above—instruct him or her in the most favorable manners of representing

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70 This idea clearly resonates with what I have already mentioned is Cervantes’s exploitation of the figure of ineffability, which I analyze in the following chapter. In both of these cases, the form of expression itself is suspended in order to convey intense affects through negation, lack, or absence.

71 Commenting on a scene in Calderón’s *El mágico prodigioso*, Orozco Díaz says that the actor "se sentirá conmovido de tal forma que, *turbado*, enmudece y apenas si puede hilvanar unas frases. Los apartes que interrumpen su parlamento manifiestan, sólo para el espectador, la profunda conmoción que la belleza de Justina ha producido en su alma. Tras sus iniciales palabras tranquilas de natural cortesía, el personaje, descompuesto, se desdobra en su expresión, dirigiéndose alternativamente a ella y exclamando hacia el público lo que pasa en su interior [...] El convencionalismo de este recurso de la técnica teatral barroca [...] determina un hablar entrecortado que, indirectamente, resulta eficazmente expresivo de la profunda agitación que se ha producido en el alma del joven sabio" (155-56).
suspension. In the _acotaciones_ of Calderón’s _El jardín de Falerina_, for example, the actor is instructed to appear “como en éxtasis, a manera de estatua” (168). In Lope’s _Jorge Toledano_, on the other hand, the instruction to freeze and become silent ‘like a statue’ is implicit within the verses of dialogue themselves, marked by an ellipsis:

Albricias, Jorge, te den
tus amigos de tu dicha.
_Aficionada te estoy..._
_Y estoy tan aficionada_
_y de... afición tan... turbada_
¡Ay, Alá, turbada estoy! (qtd. in Granja 159)

The actor portraying this particular scene would presumably pause in between words, speak in fits and starts, and might even appear to stutter or stammer. But if one of Lope’s female characters expresses suspension by losing control of her speech, then another loses control of an even more primitive physical function. The following verses describe a pivotal scene in _La Gatomaquia_:

_Suspenso y como atónito el senado_
_De ver de acero y de furor armado_
_Un gato en una boda,_
_Donde es propia la gala, y no el acero,_
_Alborotóse todo;_
_Y Zapaquilda, viéndole tan fiero,_
_Humedeció el estrado._

[...]
En esta suspensión, todos turbados,

[...]

Los dejó temerosos y admirados... (34)

In addition to the sobering stakes of suspension and the emotions of fear, pity, and despair which frequently accompany it, this scene amply demonstrates that an experience of suspension could take on a parodic or humorous tone as well.

What all of these cases show, in any event, is that dramaturges and actors alike had a number of technical, dramatic, discursive, gestural, and bodily recourses and cues at their disposal for expressing the complex art and affect of suspension to their audiences.

Likewise, the spectators who attended a theatrical performance—which in early modern Spain implied a relatively small and intimate setting—enjoyed the ability to discern and comprehend the affective state of suspension by observing any number of visual markers on the stage, including asides, stuttering, speechlessness, rhetorical silence, trembling, fainting, wide eyes, dumbfounded expressions, the dropping of an object, or paralyzing stillness. Although not outwardly visible, another possible physiological effect of sudden turbación is the feeling of the heart skipping a beat—a suggestive metaphor in itself for the music-like or rhythmic temporality, accumulative repetition, and syncopation of moments of suspension. Without delving too deeply into philosophy of mind, what is most interesting to me is how, as a particular class of affect or emotional event, these kinds of

72 Another bodily indication of suspension was the blush, even if the early modern actor María de Riquelme seems to have been the only one capable of voluntarily producing it on stage. I examine her particular case in Chapter 5. In Cervantes’s novellas, characters also attend closely to the changing facial complexions of one another, whether this means an increase in color with the blush or a loss of color with an event of fear, shock, or surprise. The most explicit example occurs in Numancia: “Si con atentos ojos has mirado/ incito general, en los semblantes/ que a tus breves razones han mostrado/ los que tienes agora circunstantes,. / cual habrías visto sin color, turbado,/ y cual con ella; indicios bien bastantes/ de que el temor y la vergüenza a una/ los aflige, molesta e importuna” (45, v. 169-76).

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perturbation, astonishment, wonder, awe, shock, and stupefaction were registered in the mind, body, and soul of the early modern subject. These examples also attest to the fact that such affects were mediated by (as well as performed in) the culture of the distinct emotional communities who experienced them. As Granja has recognized, “es difícil averiguar lo que [los personajes o actores] piensan, a no ser que sus caras y sus ‘gestos’ delaten sus afectos interiores” (164). And yet the reader of narrative, on the other hand, lacks the benefit of all of these cues and stage directions, and, for this reason, the task of interpreting the ‘interior affects’ of characters is even more difficult. Perhaps this is why literary critics have predominately shied away from this kind of interpretation and why the affects and techniques of Cervantine suspension have remained largely ignored and poorly understood.

These concepts can be further contrasted with what is perhaps the most striking context for understanding the Cervantine figuration of suspension as a culturally mediated concept: that of mysticism, which shared a common vocabulary with many of the terms of suspension I have analyzed thus far. The words “admiración” and “suspensión,” in particular, were often invoked to describe the unique mental and spiritual states which accompanied mystical visions. In this way, such terms share the sense of separation that also characterizes their irruption in Cervantes’s text. In fact, the concept of suspensio animi is described in Golden Age works of mysticism as a means of suspending cognitive judgment and losing oneself in an ambiguous state of ecstasy (Río Parra 396). Closely related to the expression of admiratio, this kind of suspension was for the mystics a means of transcending consciousness in search of truths which were inaccessible through the faculty of human reason. The parallels between mysticism and literature here are not
fortuitous. Certain erotic poetry exploited verbal confusion for representing the ecstasy of orgasm, and the idea that the reader may be removed, transported, or obliged to contemplate a literary work from a critical distance is more or less explicit in certain manifestations of the Baroque in particular. In Góngora’s poetry, for instance, the reader is often forced into a state of suspension while searching for the main verb of a sonnet or while attempting to decipher a particularly hermetic metaphor (Río Parra 404). Becoming lost in these poetic pitfalls and puzzles—as well as the pleasurable “aha!” moment that arrives upon successfully resolving them—thus mirrors the mystic experience of accessing deeply hidden knowledge or spiritual truth through suspensio animi. We might even say that the act of reading literature—regardless of the form and content of the work—is itself a form of suspension, a way of “leaving” ourselves (Río Parra 405).

There are further similarities between suspension of the mystic variety and the specifically Cervantine kind that warrant closer examination. In his preface to the Obras espirituales of San Juan de la Cruz, the seventeenth-century theologian Diego de Jesús Salablanca explains in detail how during a mystic vision the rational and sensory faculties “están como admiradas en suspensión y sin obrar”:

En ésta sólo quiere decir, que no obran las potencias como de suyo; pues es totalmente infuso lo que reciben, y lo que entonces hay de parte del entendimiento es una simple, detenida y suspensa admiración y un dejarse ilustrar, penetrar y consumar de la Divina luz; y de parte la voluntad, santamente consumir y aniquilar; para que ni sienta, ni ame, ni desee, ni se goce en otra cosa que en Dios solo, y eso con tan gran serenidad y gusto, que no parece que obra por estar aquel afecto amoroso y sencillo tan entrañado y
como sustanciado en el alma, que parece que toca en la esencia y no en las potencias. Parte por la grandeza y radicación íntima y profunda del afecto; parte por la sencillez y suavidad del que por su perfección magis assimilatur quieti, quam motui (como dijeron Aristóteles y Santo Tomás) no es tanto a modo de movimiento y acción, como a modo de quietud y suspensión, y que parece que toca más en hábito que en acto; por estar el alma en una habitual disposición de amorosa inclinación a Dios; que junto toda inclinación habitual, intensa, sencilla y suave a Dios, hizo que no pareciese acción la que lo es, sino cosa como sustancial y transformación de ser. (476)

He adds that “a este obrar sin nuestras diligencias, a este estar el entendimiento parado, espantado y en admiración, llamó la Santa [Teresa de Jesús] no obrar y estar suspenso; y Dios le dijo que era no entender aunque entendiendo” (477). The receiver of the mystical experience of ecstasy is transported, as it were, to an alternate realm or higher plane of consciousness, one simultaneously conditioned by an increased intimacy with the divine and a diminished command of human “potencias.” Suspended from human reason, this ‘no entender entendiendo,’ according to Santa Teresa and Diego de Jesús, affords alternative methods of understanding.73

73 Challenged by the task of glossing these paradoxes, Diego de Jesús offers further explanation of how the state of mystic ecstasy comes to pass: “De aquí se entenderá otras frasis mística y en estos escritos muy repetida, que el alma en este levantando estado de contemplación no ha de obrar o concurrir activamente, sino pasivamente; y la distinción de Noche oscura activa, y Noche oscura pasiva; porque en estas locuciones que suenan pasión y no obrar, no se quiere decir que absolutamente no obra ni libremente no consiente; sino que está entonces el alma en este levantado estado de unión y contemplación infusa, que toca en silencio, vacación y quietud, y cuya perfección consiste en que sin pretensión ni cuidado, sin mezcla de su habilidad, discurso ni trabajo, en santo ocio se deje gobernar y llevar de Dios” (478). Importantly, he also notes that mystic suspension occurs “sin darle lugar a reflexión, por estar toda el alma bien ocupada en el acto principal y directo” (476).
The phenomenological state of being disjoined, isolated, or withdrawn in such a fashion recalls the experiences of Cervantes’s characters, often described as being suddenly deprived of their faculties of sensory or rational control. “Obramos,” Diego de Jesús clarifies, “pero a modo de quietud y como de quien está parado y no se mueve. Hablamos, pero a modo de silencio. Miramos, no como quien mira, sino como quien se admira; y conocemos más por reconocimiento que por conocimiento” (476-77). Such a description, fraught with paradoxes as it is, could just as easily reflect the representation of characters in the Novelas who have been struck by an intense emotional event and find themselves deprived of the ability to move or speak. Stupefied and absorbed by the shock of a surprise or the affects of unexpected anagnorisis (another type of “reconocimiento”), they and we as readers are suddenly left suspended. Diego de Jesús, in fact, remarks that “estas acciones espirituales son instantáneas; como el alma aquí no siente moverse, antes siente en aquel afecto Divino no sé qué manera de inmutabilidad y consistencia que dura, no le parece aquello acción” (476). It is the spontaneous and instantaneous nature of mystic visions, in fact, which led Santa Teresa herself to feel anxiety and the potential shame of experiencing such visions in public, as she confesses in her autobiography (Life 226).74 The sudden, abrupt nature of mystical suspension, along with the temporal qualities of Diego de Jesús’s description, suggest yet another parallel with the literary form. For these reasons the theories of Ricoeur, Derrida, and Bakhtin in relation to the unforeseeable would seem particularly germane for mystic experience as well, since as a sort of discordance it

74 This may also help to explain why Teresa employed the term “suspension” as a kind of euphemism for “ecstasy,” since the latter word seemed to connote a kind of stigma (“I am in the habit of saying ‘suspension’ in order not to say ‘ecstasy’” (qtd. in De Certeau 133). For more on Teresa’s visions, see Balltondre’s recent study; and Carrera (“Pasión”) for a brief analysis of her emotions.
suddenly and unexpectedly interrupts the flow of normal consciousness. Indeed, mystic ecstasy is an event of the most Derridean kind—it comes “from above.”

But here is where all similarities end. If in the mystical tradition reason is suspended in favor of an altered state or higher plane of consciousness, then it also implies a “lack of affection,” or a detachment from human emotion (Río Parra 404n). As De Certeau recognized, “the works of Teresa are ‘esteemed by everyone’” precisely “because they ‘circumcise the desires and affections’” (136).75 The definitions of suspensión and related terms I cited from Covarrubias (as well as their appearance in the Novelas), however, are anything but ‘detached’; on the contrary, they indicate a profound affective experience of shock and emotional disturbance. “[I]t is paradoxical,” then, as Elena del Río Parra notes, “that both concepts are conjoined in one definition” (Río Parra 404n). Nevertheless, in this paradox lies an important insight for understanding the Cervantine configuration of these concepts: both kinds of suspension (the detached, mystical variety and the unexpected, emotional kind) share a circumvention of or—to echo Marandro’s term from the Numancia—a ‘deviation’ from reason, and if one can lead to alternative forms of knowledge, then perhaps, Cervantes suggests, the other can as well. In other words, the aesthetic technique of suspension in the Novelas ejemplares, like its mystical counterpart, offers the characters and the reader access to forms of knowledge outside of a conventional, reason-based paradigm. This access need not depend on a deliberate, premeditated effort, since experiences of visions and ecstasy among the mystics were also spontaneous and unexpected. Likewise, despite the unexpected quality of the events and

75 De Certeau adds that “What was important was a process of fabrication. Diego [de Jesús] insisted on the transformation carried out by the author of the text, to which the operation it brought about in the reader would correspond... In short, it was a practice of detachment” (140). De Certeau relates this process of detachment to circumcision (134).
narrative techniques which produce moments of suspension in the novellas, they offer other ways of thinking—and, indeed, feeling—these events and the problems, challenges, and dilemmas to which they give rise. If the knowledge gained through the mystical experience of suspension is necessarily of a divine, religious kind, then that of the novellas stands as more firmly human(ist), secular, and emotional. Though irrational, this affective knowledge, Cervantes proposes, may serve as a viable ethical solution to the conditions responsible for perturbing us in the first place.

From Apatheia to Admiratio: Ethical Solutions through Affect

Among those of interest in this chapter, the one term of suspension which has been studied at some length is that of admiración. In addition to Riley’s study, noted above, Eduardo Urbina has investigated its seemingly contradictory potential to evoke, on the one hand, humor and laughter of a purely entertaining variety before things of lowly, simplistic, or even stupid nature and, on the other, a kind of wonder and curiosity before those of an elevated status or profound importance (“El concepto”). In classical philosophies, this latter form constitutes an epistemological precursor to knowledge itself, and this is why

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Childers, on the other hand, establishes a relation between admiratio and the marvelous or what he calls “lo real maravilloso.” Although neither Childers, Riley, nor Urbina mentions it, in the prologue to his Laurel de Apolo Lope indulges in a brief tirade about admiración that seems to underscore this distinction, all while engaging in captatio benevolentae for his readers: “El Admirarse tienen algunos hombres por corto caudal de entendimiento; yo no fiaría mucho del suyo: porque siendo opinión de Aristóteles, que de la admiración nació la Filosofía, mal dijo Erasmo (como otras muchas cosas) que era parte de felicidad el no admirarse, y si dela procedió el inquirir las causas, y desta especulación las ciencias, ¿cómo puede ser la admiración ignorancia, si el deseo de saber es natural, y la admiración el principio de haber sabido? Yo, al contrario, presumo que el admirarse nace de un humilde reconocimiento al cielo, que dio tan alta sabiduría a los hombres. Malignidad, y depravado ánimo llamó Plinio el no admirarse de lo que fuese digno de admiración, y pudiera añadir, que es ingratitud y arrogancia. [...] Yo, señor Lector, me admiro, de cuán aumentada y florida está el arte de escribir versos en España, y no veo lucir ingenio que con virtuosa emulación no me haga reconocer cuán lejos estoy de imitarle” (n. pag.). I have modernized the spelling and syntax in this quotation.
Descartes considered wonder to be “the first of all the passions” (52). But beyond its utility as a narrative or philosophical device, which I will discuss momentarily, it should be noted that even admiración could stir affects and produce bodily markers similar to those observed earlier and related to the other terms of suspension. The Spanish Baroque painter Antonio Palomino’s *El museo pictórico y escala óptica*, which first appeared in three volumes in the years 1715-1724, sheds much needed light on this neglected aspect of admiración. In a kind of technical ekphrasis, Palomino describes the bodily expression and physiognomy of admiración: “La admiración es un afecto, que tiene gran variedad en sus expresiones; pues a veces arquea las cejas, abriendo mucho los ojos, y la boca algún tanto. Otras veces cierra la boca, hundiendo los labios, y arrugando la frente, y tal vez tomándose las barbas, si las tiene crecidas. Otras, baja las cejas junto a los ojos, y éstos medio abiertos, atendiendo a el acto, que le admira, ayudándose de las manos, extendiéndolas, y dilatando los dedos” (598). Shortly thereafter, he describes the closely related term “espanto”: “El espanto tiene muchas partes de la admiración, pero no obstante se distingue en lo robado del color y el encogimiento, mostrando timidez, que siempre la trae consigo; y lo mismo es el pavor y estupor, que todos son sinónimos” (Palomino 598-99). These descriptions share many similarities with the external manifestations of suspensión and turbación discussed earlier. We now have a more complete understanding of the ways in which such terms functioned not only as musical, dramatic, narrative, and

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77 Though most renowned for the last volume, which included biographical information for several famous Spanish painters, the largely ignored first two volumes of Palomino’s work are dedicated to the theory and practice of painting. For a similar discussion of the gestures appropriate for the expression of specific emotions in painting, Vicente Carducho’s *Diálogos de la pintura*, published in Madrid in 1663, is fundamental. The topic is also considered by da Vinci in his *Tratado de pintura* and Pacheco in his *Arte de la pintura* of 1649. Further afield yet equally relevant is Charles Le Brun’s famous *Méthode pour apprendre à dessiner les passions*, complete with pictorial representations of various emotions; and Félix de Azúa’s brief yet insightful study of Le Brun.
literary tropes or devices, but as emotional experiences, as often intense affects which were felt, actuated, expressed, and observed through the body as well.

Returning to its conceptual, philosophical, or elevated context, on the other hand, according to Covarrubias “admiración” means “pasmarse y espantarse de algún efeto que ve extraordinario, cuya causa inora. Entre otras propiedades que se atribuyen al hombre es ser admirativo; y de aquí resulta el inquirir, escudriñar y discurrir cerca de lo que se le ofrece, hasta quietarse con el conocimiento de la verdad. De aquí se infiere que el hombre que no se admira de nada, o tiene conocimiento de todos los efetos... o es tan terrestre que en ninguna cosa repara; tales son los simples, estúpidos y mentecaptos” (Tesoro 44). It is in this definition that the idea of suspension as an invitation to further reflection becomes most clear. In this case, the agitated state of uncertainty is only calmed by knowledge of the truth, itself arrived at only through close scrutiny, thought, and questioning (recalling the extreme attentiveness of Isabela, her parents, and the queen during the scene in the English court). The feeling of wonder (“espantarse”) thus becomes a precursor to rational knowledge; the truth is necessarily preceded by an emotional event (“efeto”) which produces epistemophilia or the desire to know. Although attributing it to Garcilaso, in his definition of “admiración” Covarrubias also references a poem, which in point of fact is part of an epistolary exchange between two of Garcilaso’s contemporaries, the sixteenth-century poets Diego Hurtado de Mendoza and Juan Boscán. Following are some fragments from the “Epístola de don Diego de Mendoza a Boscán” that wonderfully highlight the concepts at hand:

El no maravillarse hombre de nada

me parece, Boscán, ser una cosa
que basta a darnos vida descansada

[...]

El que teme y desea están sugetos

a una misma mudança, a un sentimiento:

d’entrambos son los actos imperfetos.

Entrambos sienten un remordimiento,

maravíllanse entrambos de que quiera,

a entrambos turba un miedo el pensamiento.

[...]

Pónese en el estado razonable,

nunca espera, ni teme, ni se cura

de la que le parece que’s mudable.

[...]

Yo, Boscán, no procuro otro tesoro

sino poder vivir medianamente,

ni escondo otra riqueza ni otra adoro.

According to Mendoza, one must strive to avoid suspension in order to live a “vida descansada,” a goal which can be achieved only by carefully tempering “sentimiento,” “mudança” and other volatile emotional states. The one and only thing to be ‘adored,’ in fact, is the ‘richness’ and ‘treasure’ of living in moderation or “medianamente.” Boscán’s response affirms the ideal of a life free from desires and passions: “Así el sabio que vive descansado,/ Sin nunca oír el son de las pasiones.” While evoking the Aristotelian auraea
mediocritas and recalling a Horatian ode, Mendoza and Boscán’s words recall once again the extended conventional wisdom among many intellectual and artistic spheres of early modern Europe regarding the role of the passions in daily life, one which was greatly influenced by both Stoic and Epicurean schools of thought.78 As I discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter, the Spain of Cervantes’s time was particularly indebted to these influences, as rendered evident by the burgeoning neo-Stoicism of many of his contemporaries. The closely related Stoic and Epicurean ideals of apatheia and ataraxia, respectively, lend us another rubric through which to conceptualize suspension. Philosophically and practically, these homeostatic ideals of purging all desires and passions were contrasted with what was regarded as the inevitable dissatisfaction, disturbance, and discord of the emotional and impassioned life. Similarly, what is instructive to recognize in these examples from Mendoza and Boscán’s epistles is the metaphorical language of motion that is adopted to cast e-motions as interruptions to a state of rest, immutability, and perfection—as a still body of water whose surface is broken by the casting of a stone and whose ripples then proceed outward to disrupt an increasingly vast area. If in previous examples we observed how suspension may imply a momentary arresting of time and movement of the body, Stoic language provides an opposing contrast by situating emotions precisely as that which interrupts a generalized state of timeless immobility.79 Though this may seem to be a paradox prima facie, it is easily explained through the body-

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78 See Blüher (298-318) for a thorough discussion of the influence of Horace and Seneca, as well as the Stoics more generally, on Spanish lyric poetry.

79 El Pinciano describes this phenomenon by invoking the animal world: “El appetito mueve a todo animal y le incita a buscar lo que el appetito le pide... si los caracoles y semejantes no mudan lugar, al fin se mueven. Al fin que dezís, según sus partes, mueven sus partes estos animalejos, a su fin llevados del appetito, como en todo todos los demás brutos; los cuales no dan un paso sin orden y mandato de su appetito, ni tampoco están quedos, porque en ellos tiene imperio real y legítimo, y le deven servir como obedientes vasallos” (I, 69).
soul dualism characteristic of this school of thought: while the body may appear still, it belies the movement of the soul. Stated another way, if suspension implies a lack of movement on the surface, it at once assures the existence of turbulence beneath.

Garcilaso’s poetry discloses a similarly Stoic philosophy with respect to emotion. With few exceptions, his amorous poetry portrays love as an arduous tribulation far removed from—if not diametrically opposed to—the tranquility of a life of *apatheia*. In “Canción IV,” for instance, the poetic self recounts a battle in which reason is defeated at the hands of desire (”mi razón vencida”), an outcome which notably causes him profound shame: “Entonces yo sentime salteado/ d’una vergüenza libre y generosa;/ corrime gravemente que una cosa/ tan sin razón hubiese así pasado;/ luego siguió el dolor al corrimento” (*Obra* 153-54). One of his elegies corroborates this idea as well: “Mover no debe un pecho generoso/ Ni entristecello con funesto buelo/ Turbando con molestia su reposo” (”Poesías” 25). Like his friend Boscán and Mendoza, here Garcilaso employs the verb “turbar” as a negative contrast to a state of rest. As Avilés has shown, however, the term “aspereza,” though its prevalence in Garcilaso is quite complex, often functions in a similar manner, from a “condición psicológica del amante afectado por el amor” to the “intención de hacer visibles los vaivenes emocionales del alma” (Avilés, ”Asperezas” 29; 28). In this way, “Garcilaso amplía las posibilidades del signo al relacionarlo con cambios bruscos y alternancias imprevisibles entre extremos psicológicos o pasiones del ánimo”

80 Furthermore, consider the subject of Garcilaso’s “Égloga II,” and “la naturaleza indiscutiblemente patológica de sus nuevos sentimientos” (Morros 45). For a provocative analysis of the Stoicism of Garcilaso’s elegies, see Graf.

81 Additional valences of the word “aspereza” that Avilés identifies include its contrast with “suavidad” as “toda percepción sensible que produzca cierta violencia en el órgano receptor” or its indication of “la escabrosidad del camino” (”Asperezas” 23; 24). Avilés also illuminates and rescues an important political function for the term as it related to war and colonial conquest.
(Avilés, “Asperezas” 27). Unlike many of his poetic forebears and literary contemporaries, Cervantes does not conceive of the passions solely as a force to be dominated by the superior faculty of human reason. Even so, as Avilés’s analysis lucidly shows, both Cervantes and Garcilaso believed that suspension, insofar as it constituted a ‘psychological extreme’ and evinced “cambios bruscos y alternancias improvisibles,” could serve as a highly effective aesthetic device. In other words, for Garcilaso the prescriptive utility of such states as aspereza or turbación is predominately limited to the realm of poetry and aesthetics, whereas for Cervantes these same states hold the possibility not of dissatisfaction or disturbance of peaceful tranquility but of an emotional ethics of personal transformation beyond the reach of apatheia or ataraxia.

It is here that Cervantes offers a solution to the paradoxical dual signification which inheres in the term admiración. As I noted above, critics have divided the “variegated meaning” of admiratio into “two types, the surprising and the excellent” (Riley 89), since in a narrative work the trope could produce, on the one hand, unexpected moments of lighthearted entertainment as well as, on the other, opportunities for moral and didactic edification—or, we might say, exemplarity. Importantly, as Riley observes, “Cervantes refers to [admiratio] repeatedly as an audience-reaction to events related” (90). That is to say, instances of admiración in the novellas subtend not only the surprise and ethical revelation of the characters, but those of the reader as well. “If Cervantes does not specifically connect admiratio with the other, the instructional, function of the novel,” Riley explains, “they were probably not unconnected in his mind. Spingarn sees admiratio as a logical consequence of the Renaissance belief that poetry teaches by example [...] The learned humanist Alexio Venegas says the principal aim of ancient poetry was to direct
men to the precepts of moral philosophy ‘by way of admiratio’” (90). Given the intimate relationship that existed in the early modern mind between the terms of suspension examined above, I do not think it is a stretch to see that in addition to admiración in particular, all of these these terms could individually and collectively perform a similarly didactic function. Put simply, it is not just the characters who experience suspension, but we as readers as well.

Although a foray into reader-response theory would stray far beyond the scope of this chapter, I should like to briefly note that a wide variety of studies concur with this notion that readers are as equally affected as characters by surprising narrative events and the like. In his study of narrative temporality, Currie ponders this “question which the theory of narrative has been oddly reluctant to ask: the question of whose surprise we are talking about.” Referencing Aristotle, he concludes that “This is part of a general bracketing of the audience in Poetics that make it impossible to think about the two activities, of writing and reading, construction and reconstruction, together” (42-43). Hutchinson, on the other hand, relates these ideas specifically to anagnorisis: “Para que una anagnórisis literaria sea eficaz nos tiene que involucrar emocionalmente, lo que supone—entre otras cosas—que tengamos la sensación de ser ‘testigos’ de lo que pasa, que seamos capaces de imaginar cómo se sienten los personajes, y que seamos capaces de sentir cierto grado de simpatía y hasta empatía con los personajes” (“Anagnórisis” 347). Similar evidence has emerged from the fields of empirical aesthetics and neuroaesthetics, which have studied the emotional reactions and psychological impacts of literature on the brain, for example.82

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82 By way of an overview and for a more complete bibliography concerning these fields, see Rolls. For a study of how they have approached the concept of suspense in particular, see Miall.
And finally, as Riley concludes, “Seventeenth-century writers aimed to startle and impress their readers not only because this was pleasant, but in order to engage their attention and put them in a receptive frame of mind in which a moral lesson could be driven home, a universal truth conveyed” (91). It is precisely in moments of suspension—during which an interruption of narrative temporality temporarily opens just such a “receptive frame of mind”—that the transmission of or reflection upon a “moral lesson” or “universal truth” is most opportune. In effect, this suggests another partial solution to the paradox I laid out in the opening paragraph of this chapter—the idea announced in the prologue of the *Novelas ejemplares* that “requiebros amorosos” and “ejemplo[s] provechoso[s]” might coincide, interrelate and activate one another, that intense emotions might harbor the capacity to provide exemplarity. While critics have seldom agreed as to the extent of this exemplarity—some foundering for its presence, others relegating it to parody, while still others denying it altogether—I would suggest that this is precisely where the ethical exemplarity of the *Novelas* resides: in the dual potential of unexpected emotional events to attain a level of both aesthetic admiration and moral imitation. Exemplarity is produced in and at the same time as the surprisingness which produces narrative suspense and thus induces us to continue reading. *It is suspended in suspension.*

**Conclusion: A Mediterranean Emotional Exemplarity**

Furthermore, as in other works by Cervantes in which the Mediterranean in particular becomes a protagonist, in “La española inglesa” the turbulent nature of characters’ emotional states evokes the disquieting uncertainties of maritime travel, of
being ‘suspended’ by the capricious and often ‘confusing’ ocean currents. The nearly endless interruptions and discords experienced at sea almost always correspond with those of an emotional nature, such as the disruption of desire or deferral of an amorous encounter. The unstable and often untimely ups and downs of Ricaredo’s fortune while serving as captain of the English fleet, for example, inevitably govern the temporal and affective parameters of the satisfaction of his desire to return to Isabela. Furthermore, Cervantes’s use of metaphorical language relies heavily upon these parallels in order to mutually evoke the turbulence of the sea and that of emotions themselves. For instance, just before Isabela is poisoned, the narrator remarks that “en aquel breve tiempo, donde él pensaba que la nave de su buena fortuna corría con próspero viento hacia el deseado puerto, la contraria suerte levantó en su mar tal tormenta, que mil veces temió anegarle” (321). Later, a similar metaphor is exploited in reference to Isabela and her parents’ equally inconstant fortune: “Todas estas cosas atormentaban el corazón de Isabela y de sus padres, que tan presto veían turbado el mar de su sosiego” (324). In both of these situations, a sudden reversal of fortune and its resultant emotional effects are represented by a hydraulic, meteorological, or maritime metaphor. Likewise, the turbulent emotional throes of suspension in the narrative strikingly mirror the tribulations faced by the characters, especially those which are conditioned by the fortuity and unexpectedness of Mediterranean events. The emotional tide can turn just as quickly as the literal one.

This interdependency further urges us to contemplate an emotional exemplarity for Mediterranean life. Although I am unable to consider its particularities in detail here, other scholars have convincingly established some specific ethical parameters and values that Cervantes prescribes for the Mediterranean. Avilés, for example, has shown that
Cervantes’s unique conception of the virtue of liberality rests on a complex set of values which are exchanged across this space. In “El amante liberal,” Avilés argues, the expansive quality of Cervantine liberality allows for a corresponding expansion of the self and prescribes an ethical alternative to Mediterranean libidinal economies and those based on forceful possession (“Expanding”). We might consider this a prime example of what Hutchinson, in his broader study of the same name, calls Cervantes’s “economía ética,” in which similarly liberal exchanges are carried out based on mutually recognized ethics and humanist principles of equality. One of these principles is love, whose potency for Hutchinson depends upon a public recognition, one which would seem to be equally appropriate for the Mediterranean context. What is crucially common to these avatars of Mediterranean ethics is choice, a concept which, as I remarked earlier, inheres in the unforeseeable event responsible for producing suspension. “If, for Derrida, the unforeseeable seems connected to chance,” Currie concludes, “for Bakhtin and Morson it is decisively linked to freedom, or to the possibility of momentous choice in the present of a kind that is consistent with surprisingness” (37). From Ricaredo’s sudden decision to propose to Isabela to Ricardo’s reversal of liberality to allow Leonisa to choose the course of her own romantic future, it would seem that for Cervantes the concepts of surprise, choice, freedom, ethics, and love are all intimately linked as well. They form a common currency of the Mediterranean affective economy.

Be this as it may, it should also be recognized that, like a stormy undercurrent, emotions may also lead us astray. For this reason, such virtues as prudence, moderation, and discretion are also necessary for ensuring that our emotions remain under control. Cervantes, in fact, leverages his novellas to alert us to a sort of anti-exemplarity in relation
to emotions as well. “El celoso extremeño” is one of the most singularly effective
demonstrations of the potentially destructive force of strong passions and the need to
temper them with reason and other virtues. In the last words of this novella, we even have
what could be considered a contrary example of suspension as an invitation to convert
passion into action, as the narrator laments regarding the injustice of the protagonists’ fate:
“Sólo no sé qué fue la causa que Leonora no puso más ahínco en desculparse y dar a
entender a su celoso marido cuán limpia y sin ofensa había quedado en aquel suceso, pero
la turbación le ató la lengua, y la prisa que se dio a morir su marido no dio lugar a su
disculpa” (458; my emphasis). By way of a highly impactful alternative example in which
turbación fails to produce justice, Cervantes’s choice to end “El celoso extremeño” in such a
way actually reinforces the directive to seize suspension as an opportunity for ethical
reflection and action. The trope of the “lengua turbada,” as I intimated in my first chapter
and as some of the examples considered above might suggest, appears with remarkable
frequency throughout the Novelas, and not always preceding positive outcomes.83 A similar
move of negative reinforcement in the text casts the Mediterranean as a convenient
pretense or excuse for avoiding the ethical confrontation of highly emotive and problematic
situations, most often in the trope of the character who ‘travels’ to Italy or another foreign
locale in order to escape an uncomfortable predicament. A ‘religious pilgrimage’ to Rome
not only serves as the foundational alibi for the Persiles, but in “La española inglesa”
becomes a pretext for Ricaredo himself in order to facilitate his plan to meet with Isabela

83 On the other hand, the trope is also situated as a corrective to unethical behavior, such as at the end of “El
amante liberal,” when Ricardo intervenes to try to betroth Leonisa to Cornelio: “Y en diciendo esto calló, como
si al paladar se le hubiera pegado la lengua; pero desde allí a un poco, antes que ninguno hablase, dijo:
‘¡Vállame Dios, y cómo los apretados trabajos turban los entendimientos! Yo, señores, con el deseo que tengo
de hacer bien, no he mirado lo que he dicho, porque no es posible que nadie pueda mostrarse liberal de lo
ajeno’” (234). While most critics have interpreted this scene ironically or parodically, Avilés rescues its
ethical function by reconciling it with a more inclusive and expansive definition of liberality (“Expanding”).
later in Seville. A variation on this theme surfaces in several other novellas, including “La ilustre fregona,” “La gitanilla,” and “La fuerza de la sangre.” Here the Mediterranean provides an opportunity not of expanding the ethical dimension of the self, but one of geographical mobility and anonymity whereby deceit and duplicity serve to defer the ethical and affective resolution of narrative conflict. In all of these cases, this deferral functions to produce both suspense for the reader as well as a plot device for setting up an anagnorisis, reversal, or recognition of and contrition for the past transgressions of what is always a male character (principal female characters, on the other hand, typically appear as modest and virtuous from the start). Though momentarily an invitation to indulge in picaresque wanderings or subterfuge, in Cervantes’s narrative the Mediterranean always returns characters who, eventually, have grown from their experience and display a more highly developed ethical and emotional maturity as a result. Throughout the suspense of awaiting the outcome of these Mediterranean experiences, which frequently go unresolved until the last page or two of each novella, we must exercise a suspension of judgment as to these characters’ overall exemplarity. At an aesthetic level, of course, their adoption or return to an ethical stance renders the reader’s admiratio all the more poignant, while at the same time providing a final harmonious note as a counterpoint to the necessary discord which preceded it—just as in Castiglione’s prescription for discordance in music as a fundamental element of ultimate harmony. An analogous idea is announced in the explicitly didactic final words of “La española inglesa,” in which we are told that “de las mayores adversidades nuestras” may emerge “nuestros mayores provechos” (345). The intense affects of suspension mark the calamities, conundrums, and “mayores adversidades” we are invited to work through and ‘sacar provecho’ from, and in a complex
and fundamental way represent a characteristically Cervantine kind of exemplarity. Just as Cervantes's literary self overcame his prefatory suspension to produce the *Quijote*, and just as positive outcomes can proceed from the trials of the turbulent Mediterranean, so too can we reap benefit from our turbulent emotions.

The complementary relationship between an affective and ethical economy in the *Novelas ejemplares* suggests that Cervantes eschewed the neo-Stoic model of reason and the suppression of emotion as the only viable means for achieving personal, social, and moral rectitude. Instead, he opens the possibility that other, non-rational modes may be conducive to self-reflection and self-realization, and that ‘feeling one’s way’ toward what is right may be equally valid. Although it bears reiterating once more that Cervantes frequently lauds the virtues of reason as well, it is often portrayed as compatible and even mutually complementary with emotion, and, at the same time, he demonstrates a marked interest in exploring, to quote Feliciano de Silva’s satirical treatment in *Don Quijote*, “la razón de la sinrazón” (*I*, 1: 40)—a most fitting précis for Cervantine suspension. In this way, Cervantes rejects excessive sentimentality for its own sake while situating himself along lines contiguous with a long philosophical movement which sought to vindicate the virtues of sentimentalism: from the moral sense theory of David Hume, Adam Smith, and other cognitivist models that began to materialize in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; to the pivotal affect theories of such figures as Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Deleuze; as well as, more recently, the popular philosophical writings on emotion by Martha Nussbaum, Jesse Prinz, Robert Solomon, Victoria Camps, and the late Eugenio Trías; not to mention a panoply of contemporary self-help literature imploing us to ‘get in touch with our feelings.’ In the *Novelas ejemplares*, Cervantes contemplates the idea that affect and
reason can—and perhaps should—go hand in hand. The proliferation of the techniques of suspension that I have described in this chapter likewise suggests the benefits—aesthetic, emotional, and ethical—of a momentary lapse of reason.

Figure 6. Vicente Barneto y Vázquez, *Cervantes en la prisión imaginando el Quijote (de la roca)*. (Madrid, 1877; xx). Wood engraving/xylography. *Cervantes Project*. Cushing Memorial Library, Texas A&M University.
CHAPTER THREE: Aporias of Love: Articulating the Ineffable in Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda

Thus I desire, as I have said, that modesty and truth should be used in every istoria. For this reason be careful not to repeat the same gesture or pose. The istoria will move the soul of the beholder when each man painted there clearly shows the movement of his own soul.

Alberti, On Painting

La salsa de los cuentos es la propiedad del lenguaje, en cualquiera cosa que se diga.

Cervantes, Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda (III, 7: 497)

To say that critical reception of Los trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda has evolved considerably over the years would constitute an understatement of proportions similar, perhaps, to one unwitting seventeenth-century reader's appraisal of Don Quijote as a “very good book.” In the latter work's dedication, Cervantes seems to intuit the wide gamut of critical opinions that his Persiles would go on to amass, humorously speculating that it will be “o el más malo, o el mejor que en nuestra lengua se haya compuesto,” even if he immediately regrets, with characteristic irony, just such an admission (“y digo que me arrepiento de haber dicho el más malo, porque según la opinión de mis amigos, ha de llegar al estremo de bondad posible”; 679). Indeed, Cervantes himself considered the Persiles to be the crowning achievement of his literary career, and it quickly passed through several international editions within the first few years of its posthumous publication in 1617. Yet for the greatest part of the nearly four centuries that followed, it was—with few exceptions—relegated to the formidable shadow of its internationally hallowed predecessor. From one famous critic's dry summary of the “experiment” as “not a success” (Riley 125) to its somewhat less damning characterization as an “enigma” (Atkinson), the

84 Thomas Sydenham, qtd. in Dewhurst 49.
Persiles was alternately criticized for its strict preceptism, its unnecessarily long narrative digressions, its inverisimilitude and thematic incongruence, and its relative lack of imagination, among other complaints.\(^85\) It had failed, quite simply, to meet Cervantes’s own expectation, audaciously announced in the prologue, to compete with Heliodorus, author of what is widely considered to be the greatest extant Greek romance, the Aethiopica.

If by the later twentieth century modern scholars had begun to exhibit a renewed interest in the Persiles, the formal elements recognized as worthy of either praise or opprobrium diverge as much as the labyrinthine meanderings of the plot for which the novel had previously been so roundly condemned.\(^86\) Be this as it may, many of the critical approaches offered over the course of the last several years have fallen prey to what José Manuel Martín Morán has recently described as a temptation to reduce the novel to a singular semantic unity, due chiefly to a critical tendency to read the Persiles as an allegory (173-75).\(^87\) Similarly, in spite of recent attempts to rescue an avant-garde, (post)modernist, or subversive interpretation of the novel, the received notion that the Persiles is above all a love story whittled from the hollow wooden stock of sentimental fiction is a critical view that has hitherto remained unchallenged. Notwithstanding his censure of prior allegorical interpretations of the novel, for example, Roberto González Echevarría reads the work’s “detailed analysis of the psychology of love” as nevertheless

\(^{85}\) For explaining why Cervantes would “hypocritically” abandon the “modern” aesthetic that he had inaugurated with Don Quijote in favor of its “antidote,” the romance, see Randel 152.

\(^{86}\) Wyndham Lewis, for example, denounced the work as “a labyrinth-novel twice as large and complicated as La Galatea” (qtd. in De Armas Wilson xi).

\(^{87}\) Among the distinct allegorical interpretations are De Armas Wilson; Forcione; and Castillo and Spadaccini. Zimic, on the other hand, uniquely reads the novel as a parody.
constrained by the laws of sentimental fiction (221). Although its generic properties as a
Hellenistic romance have appropriately influenced the work’s treatment of love and its
numerous tropes and allegories, in this chapter I will be interested in exploring how the
novel breaks these supposed laws of love, how it frustrates, destabilizes, and countervails
its very categorization as a love story. It does this, I will argue, by activating a complex and
variegated aesthetic strategy for the representation of affect, one which surpasses the
bounds of sentimental fiction in favor of a paradigm not of “life [as] subject to the rules of
art” (González Echevarría 222), but ultimately of an art which throws out the rules in order
to more closely resemble life.

While the writing of the *Persiles* was most certainly influenced by sentimentalism,
this generic designation is itself an inadequate singular lens for comprehending the
complexity of emotions in the novel. For unlike the conventions of sentimental fiction or
the pastoral apotheosis of love in his own *Galatea*, in the *Persiles* Cervantes is concerned
with not only the emotion’s excesses, but also its shortcomings, pitfalls, uncertainties, and
impossibilities when mediated by language. Hence I will seek to show, as I did in the
previous chapter, how Cervantes takes a cue from the playbook of mysticism as well. By
employing what I identify as tropes of aporia, ineffability, and materiality, Cervantes calls
attention to and challenges the limitations of mimetic representation and of poetic
language’s capacity to express intense emotions such as love and desire. The inherently
indeterminate and irresolute nature of these emotions, I argue, evokes both the early
modern conception of the human soul as marked by a perpetual, dynamic state of
movement and the interruptions, interdictions, digressions, and deferrals that constitute
the narrative structure of the *Persiles* itself. Even more importantly, these qualities reflect
the historical uncertainties of lived experience in the early modern Mediterranean, where one’s fortune—like that of the characters in the novel—could easily be interrupted, deferred, or reversed. Indeed, like the mundo al revés trope that repeatedly appears throughout, the novel’s setting in the septentrional seas can be seen as a conveniently exoticized analogue for the Mediterranean geographies of more immediate concern for Cervantes and his readers. If in the previous chapter my intention was to explore how Cervantes articulates an emotional ethics for the Mediterranean experience, then here my interest will be to investigate the rhetorical, linguistic, and aesthetic means through which Cervantes expresses the intense emotions that inevitably attend the uncertainties of life in the mare nostrum: How to convey such emotional intensities and uncertainties to readers, especially those who had never abandoned the relative safety of Spanish shores? How can language, poetic or otherwise, be called upon to express sentiments as mutable and turbulent as the great Sea itself? How, indeed, can the powerful force of the feeling of love—tenuous though it may be in this space—be expected to transfer to the comparably passive, receptive act of leisurely reading?88

Beyond Sentimentalism

To try to write love is to confront the muck of language: that region of hysteria where language is both too much and too little, excessive... and impoverished. Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments

88 The Persiles is an ideal work among the Cervantine canon for interrogating the rhetorical means of expressing feeling through writing. As Alcalá Galán explains, “al final del libro se puede hablar de dos historias, la de los protagonistas y otra subterránea que se traslúce a través de la primera y que deja percibir la tensión creadora que acompañó a su composición. La literatura como proceso se acerca a la idea de taller del texto, de la literatura como algo que se hace, que se nos muestra en su curso de creación” (15-16).
In his recent comparative literary study of what he calls the “vehement passions,” Philip Fisher employs the terms “disposition” and “passion” in order to underscore the opposition between, respectively, those emotions which lend themselves to linguistic forms of expression and those like love which through their “vehemence” confound various forms of representation by defying the very nature of language. The simultaneous excesses and inadequacies of expressing the emotion of love have more lately been explored by Richard Terdiman, who succinctly considers the ontological challenges that just such an opposition poses to literary scholars, vitally dependent as we are upon language in order to decipher texts which are so suffused with the topic of love that “’love studies’ [are] as uncompassable as literature itself”: “Love challenges language. But language is the foundation of our discipline” (472). What Barthes, Fisher, and Terdiman have each sought to address in the last several years, then, is fundamentally a dual problem—as old, perhaps, as literature itself: How can an author express intense affects like love, and how are we as readers to grasp this intensity?

The proliferation and enduring popularity of genres dedicated, wholly if implicitly, to these questions attests to the fact that this dual problem is not so daunting as to preclude the development of highly successful formulae for addressing it. The Greek romance, medieval literature of courtly love, the *novela sentimental* (germ of many a bestseller in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Iberia by such authors as Juan Rodríguez del Padrón, Diego de San Pedro, Juan de Flores, and Juan de Segura), *les Amours* of seventeenth-century French literature (including Antoine de Nervèze, Nicolas des Escuteaux, and François du Souhait), eighteenth-century English-language sentimental fiction, the *novela rosa* or *roman à l’eau de rose* of the European Romantic movement, as
well as contemporary pulp romance novels (which in North America continue to outsell by far all other literary genres) leave little doubt of this reality.\textsuperscript{89} Even outside of these popular examples in which its presence is explicit, the stories and studies of love constitute a literary and critical archive of nearly Borgesian proportions. The works of Cervantes are certainly no exception to the subtle idea that the term “literature of love” may often be redundant. From the \textit{Galatea}'s foray into pastoral passions to the comparatively brief lessons on love that constitute a major plot point of nearly all the \textit{Novelas ejemplares}, Cervantine narrative is frequently impelled—like the chivalric ethos of his most famous character—by (the performance of) unbridled amorous passion. To write a dissertation on the role of emotions in Cervantes without studying love would constitute, perhaps, more than just a conspicuous oversight.\textsuperscript{90} And yet it is this very ubiquity, I would suggest, that has prevented a more thorough examination of the rhetorical means through which Cervantes confronts the ‘hysterical region’ of language to which Barthes alludes, that oppositional divide between the “too much and too little, excessive… and impoverished.”

In the \textit{Persiles}, I would like to propose that this critical lacuna is especially pronounced regarding the latter pole, the one marked by poetic language’s inadequacies in expressing love. Barthes’s words perform a suggestive epigraphic function here because in reactivating the Greek romance—a genre known almost exclusively for its sentimental ‘excesses’—the \textit{Persiles} has been received as yet another instantiation of sentimental

\textsuperscript{89} According to \textit{The Business of Consumer Book Publishing 2013}, the romance genre constituted the largest and most lucrative category of fiction in the United States, earning well over $1 billion in revenue in 2013 (qtd. in “Romance Industry Statistics,” on the website of the group \textit{Romance Writers of America}). For problems in defining and delimiting the genre of sentimental fiction, see Cortijo Ocaña (7-18). For the influence of sentimental fiction on Cervantes, see Cvitanovic (331-58). For more general studies on sentimentalism, see Deyermond; Gwara and Gerli; and, for a more complete bibliography, Whinnom.

\textsuperscript{90} With respect to the theme of love in Cervantes’s writing, the most complete study is Juan Ramón Muñoz Sánchez’s recent and monumental \textit{De amor y literatura: Hacia Cervantes}. 135
fiction and subjected to a prevailing critical paradigm which largely condemned the novel for just this sort of excesses. But in trudging headlong through what Barthes called the “muck” of language, Cervantes fashions a language of love marked by its impoverishment as much as its excess, by meiosis (understatement) as much as auxesis (exaggeration), by poetry’s impotence as much as its power.  

The critical discourse which situates the Persiles as a latent example of sentimental fiction—and not a particularly good one, at that—is also responsible for the notion that the genre is largely devoid of meaningful political content, that such fictional sentiments as love are indulged for their own sake or for the benign pleasure of the reader’s immediate consumption. In effect, the increasing popularity of the fifteenth-century sentimental novel has often been assumed to correspond with a growing desire for escapist diversion on the part of the powerful noble, aristocratic class (Cortijo Ocaña 297-98). Although it was popularized more than two centuries after its Southern European counterpart, similar judgments attended traditional criticism of eighteenth-century English-language sentimental fiction, such as Sterne’s Tristram Shandy and A Sentimental Journey, and later authors of the Romantic period such as Austen, Brontë, and Eliot. In addition to peddling the simultaneously bourgeois yet lowbrow commodities of “fine feeling” and “cheap sentiment,” the excessive sentimentalism of late eighteenth-century English fiction was accused of fomenting such psychopathological and sociopathic conditions as nervousness  

91 Although I will be focusing on the ineffability of emotions and the resultant inadequacy of poetic language in representing them, a rhetoric of excess is certainly not absent in the Persiles, as demonstrated by the following quote regarding Auristela: “quedó suspensa, quedó atónita, quedó más triste que la tristeza misma” (I, 20: 259). According to Niklas Luhmann’s systems-theory approach to love, this kind of excessiveness is a defining element of the emotion: “The various paradoxes (conquering self-subjugation, desired suffering, vision in blindness, a preference for illness, for imprisonment, and sweet martyrdom) converge in what the code proposes is central to love, namely: immoderateness, excessiveness... Excessiveness itself becomes the measure of all behavior” (67; also see 70-71).
and oversensitivity among the reading public (Rowland 195-96; also see Braudy). Not surprisingly, the Marxist philosopher and literary critic Georg Lukács took umbrage with sentimental fiction on different, though related, grounds. Basing his analysis on Hegel’s distinction between “world” and “mind,” Lukács lamented the literary turn toward sentimentality, melancholic sensibility, and self-reflective inwardness inaugurated by such works as Flaubert’s *Sentimental Education* as a turning away from the world. By focusing on the mind, sentimental fiction for Lukács amounted to little more than an overly aestheticized form of navel-gazing at the expense of objectivist, realist, or materialist representations of the world. In situating *Don Quijote* as the first modern novel, he even went so far as to directly oppose the protagonist’s picaresque heroism and Cervantes’s “abstract idealism” against what he termed the “disillusioned romanticism” of writers like Flaubert (Lukács 116).

In spite of such criticisms, however, more recent studies have attempted to probe the cultural and political registers of sentimentalism, suggesting that not even its supposedly refined sensibilities are entirely devoid of subversive elements. In his recent study of Spanish sentimental fiction, Antonio Cortijo Ocaña describes the genre as a hybrid, intertextual body capable of revealing distinct social realities, polyphony, crisis, and ruptures of uniformity and homogeneity, in addition to a highly developed feminine voice (297-99). Recalling major plot points of the Greek novel, he even goes so far as to say that “El amor es fuerza igualadora y los enamorados, tras múltiples vicisitudes y peripecias, arrastrados a la catástrofe por un hado ciego y empecinado, acaban demostrando que el amor vence o siembra calamidad. ¿Podía encontrarse un ideal de mayor poder subversivo?” (3). For Cortijo Ocaña, the democratic, egalitarian nature of love in newly
emerging forms of sentimental fiction harbored the potential to disrupt the dominant order of the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Iberian Peninsula. Nevertheless, he concludes that sentimentalism is merely “deliberativa,” a kind of rhetorical exercise far removed from affective reality: “No hay personajes masculinos o femeninos de carne y hueso, sino posibilidades retóricas de argumentación hechas carácter” (300). This is, above all, the distinction I hope to make concerning the *Persiles*: although relying on various rhetorical techniques to do so, Cervantes distills his characters from the often messy, unstable, and discordant emotions of everyday life, preserving a more verisimilar relation to the ‘flesh and bone’ of lived experience. It could thus be said that, in Hegelian terms, he manages to synthesize “world” and “mind.” This emotional realism cannot but stand to threaten the cultural politics of representation, aesthetic decorum, and social hierarchy much more than the sentimentalism on which it is based—and yet forges beyond.\[92\]

At the heart of these issues is Cervantes’s marked interest in exploring alternative modes of expressing emotions and holding in abeyance the capacity of language to pigeonhole them into clear or easily agreed upon categories and values.\[93\] The tension produced by this polyvalent technique is in fact consonant with both the structural and thematic qualities of the novel—with its dilated narrative digressions, interruptions, and interpolations—as well as the early modern understanding of emotion, namely the idea

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\[92\] According to Leo Braudy, in order to make characters’ emotions seem more real and less mediated by fictional aesthetics, eighteenth-century authors of English-language sentimental fiction included stylistic tropes such as the “discovery” of an original manuscript (as in the case of Horace Walpole’s gothic novel *The Castle of Otranto*) or the cobbled together of disjointed tales (as in Sterne’s *A Sentimental Journey*) (5). Cervantes, of course, had already mastered such tropes as means of playing upon the emotional suspense and investment of the reader, even if Braudy fails to credit him for it.

\[93\] This dynamic may explain why, while some literary critics have panned the Greek romance for its excessive sentimentalism, others have remarked on the “strange affectlessness of Cervantes’s protagonists” of the *Persiles* (De Armas Wilson 137).
that the soul maintained a state of perpetual movement and was thus responsible for the
irruption of our passions and irrational feelings. In other words, Cervantes’s constant
refusal to permit the signifier to collapse into facile, essential, and static categories—such
as “love”—mimics the dynamic movement of the soul and performs the very non-fixity and
indeterminate nature of affect itself. I believe that this technique of expressing affect at the
very limits of representation may nevertheless be profitably analyzed through its division
into three principle categories, each of which mobilizes affect in its own unique way: the
aporetic, the ineffable, and the material. After examining each of these distinctions and
demonstrating their importance through a close reading of their discrete instantiations in
the novel, I will return to the question of mimetic representation in order to show how
Cervantes’s aesthetic program paradoxically destabilizes knowledge while advancing his
own concept of truth, one which both suggests a more verisimilar relation to everyday life
and ultimately prescribes a potentially more pervasive and subversive political ideology for
seventeenth-century Spain.

**Aporias**

*If you tie a runner’s arms to his side, you take away his speed; likewise, emotion frets at being
impeded by conjunctions and other additions, because it loses the free abandon of its
movement and the sense of being, as it were, catapulted out.*

—Longinus, *On the Sublime*

Just like the etymological origin of the term “mystic,” the crux of the novel’s
narrative action is founded upon a secret: that of the amorous relationship between the
two main protagonists, Periandro and Auristela, who masquerade as siblings until the very
end of the work. Due largely to both the fantastic nature of their wanderings and the necessity of concealing vital biographical details, the characters of the Persiles are traversed by what we might call an affective economy of undecidability. Despite the attempt by theorists such as Niklas Luhmann to elucidate a systematic code for the expression of love, Cervantes evinces a nearly post-structuralist skepticism toward the stability or reliability of just such a codification. The novel is populated by numerous instances in which an intradiegetic audience finds itself at odds over how to respond emotionally to an event or to another character’s narration. Likewise, an uncertainty or inability to effectively interpret one another’s emotional states—contrary to most of the examples we have examined thus far—foregrounds many of the exchanges among the novel’s distinct personages and often originates or sustains narrative conflict. At other times, the text emphasizes the nearly infinite diversity and disparity of emotional responses that one particular event or story may provoke in its audience. This effect is consistent with Alcalá Galán’s characterization of the Persiles as a “semillero de historias,” as a text in which a nearly endless diversity of narrative possibilities are contemplated, in which the ultimate outcome seems to arise as much by happenstance as by a fixed authorial ideal or intention (218-19). A similarly boundless and ambiguous nature attends the

94 Luhmann’s study treats love not “as a feeling (or at least only secondarily so), but rather in terms of its constituting a symbolic code which shows how to communicate effectively in situations where this would otherwise appear improbable. The code thus encourages one to have the appropriate feelings. Without this, La Rochefoucauld believed, most people would never acquire such feelings.” (Luhmann 8-9). I believe that Cervantes, on the other hand, though not rejecting the existence of such codes (without which it would be impossible to communicate nearly anything about love, much less write a novel about it), would argue alongside contemporary post-structuralists and affect theorists that our feelings also erupt in a visceral, bodily way, for which language—at least the spoken or written variety—is often at a loss to describe.

95 Such is the unique talent, she argues, of Cervantes’s practice of writing: “El libro que conocemos es pura potencia: en sus páginas se encierra la percepción de que tenemos entre nuestras manos un libro infinito que se ha materializado en una forma casi casual y que podría haber sido de muchas otras. El Persiles creo que es
emotional states of the characters, even if in the act of writing Cervantes was ultimately forced to select a word—or several words, inadequate though they may have been—to describe this affective plurality. Among the “trazas y máquinas amorosas” of Policarpo’s palace, for example, the narrator makes a point to remark on “los pechos de los confusos amantes: Auristela, celosa; Sinforosa, enamorada; Periandro, turbado y, Arnaldo, pertinaz” (299-300). While consistent with my discussion in Chapter 1 of the crucial diversity of Cervantine affectivity, here the difficulty already inherent in articulating inner emotional states is surely exacerbated when all other characters are feeling something completely different. Earlier, in the aftermath of the holocaust that destroyed the barbarous island, the mixed emotional reaction among the party of survivors is underscored when they disembark “entre lágrimas de tristeza y entre muestras de alegría” (I, 6: 181), a trope that reappears several times throughout the novel (“entre tristes y alegres, entre temor y esperanza” [I, 12: 206]; “juntamente los alegró y los entristeció” [I, 19: 253]; “yo cantaré, si no canciones alegres, a lo menos endechas tristes que, cantándolas, encanten y, llorándolas, alegren” [III, 4: 463]; “entre alegre y triste” [III, 9: 526]; “entre triste y alegre” [IV, 14: 712]).

In many of these examples, this emotional variability manifests itself not only among the distinctive members of a group of characters, but within one single character, suggesting that an affective response oscillates and divaricates at the level of the interpersonal as well as the individual. This type of construction divests meaning from its polar extremes (“alegre” or “triste,” for example) and deposits it in an intermediary space.
of in-betweenness, thus consigning the preposition “entre” true semantic responsibility. It is as though the conventional, ossified signifiers of emotion have lost their capacity to carry meaning, relegated at best to the status of catachresis and denoting something which no linguistic term can adequately convey.

Moreover, this type of construction may be considered a form of oxymoron, in which the juxtaposition of two contradictory terms or ideas reveals a conceptual paradox. Such a paradox, it should be noted, need not be confined solely to poetic language or entirely foreign to everyday experience: to cite two of the most conventional or even hackneyed examples, most of us have at one time or another experienced tears of joy or bittersweet feelings.97 This is, once again, one of the major points upon which I will be insisting throughout this chapter: that Cervantes’s own insistence on creative, contradictory, and often messy linguistic constructions is evocative of the lived reality of affective experience, of the emotional paradoxes and conflictive internal sentiments that are part and parcel of human life. And yet, pressing beyond a mere contradictio in terminis, oxymora such as ‘triste alegría’ undermine language by striking at the core of its inadequacies with a double blow: a left hook of a negative emotion immediately followed by an opposite right jab of a positive one, leaving language (and the reader) reeling from the jarring impact of a one-two punch. Indeed, as a kind of metasememe, the oxymoron leaves language by deviating or escaping from conventional linguistic signs. This move itself could even be seen as oxymoronic, since while underscoring the impossibilities of language (i.e. the lack of a term to adequately express a complex emotional state) it at once points up its extreme

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97 On this point, Lilían Camacho Morfín notes that in Don Quijote “Resulta interesante constatar cómo la alegría no se expresa jamás con risa, sino a través de las lágrimas” (373).
possibilities as well (i.e. the inventive cobbling together of contradictory terms to express a complex emotional state). It is precisely these impossible possibilities that undergird the very nature of poetic language as well as Cervantes’s own inventiveness in conveying the complex emotions of his characters.

The rhetorical use of the oxymoron recalls the mystics’ reliance upon this particular figure of speech. Perhaps the most famous example is San Juan de la Cruz’s “cautiverio suave,” which suggests an emotional discord similar to the simultaneous experience of happiness and sadness in Cervantes’s characters. In his seminal study The Mystic Fable, Michel de Certeau characterizes mysticism as “chiefly a way of using language,” or “a manner of speaking” (113) that in turn “is centered on turns of phrase or usages that reflect a different practice of language” (132-33). Following the Dutch theologian Sandæus’s claim that the mystic practice of language is formed “per tropos” and “tropice loquutiones,” De Certeau describes tropes as “the elementary units of mystic discourse”: “A tour and detour, a turn of phrase, a conversion, the trope stands in opposition to the proper meaning. [...] This process of deviation is no longer based, as was the traditional allegory, on an analogy and an order of things. It is exit, semantic exile, already ecstasy. [...] This deviation creates strangeness in the order (or the ‘proper’) of language” (142-43). It is these sorts of rhetorical deviation—analogous to the geographical deviation of the Persiles’ protagonists and what I have already distinguished as “deviations” from reason in Cervantes’s emotional philosophy—that continually destabilize language in the text. As I will elaborate later on, this is also why a strict allegorical reading of the novel—as a story of

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98 San Juan de la Cruz’s famous oxymoron is found in his poem “¡O llama de amor viva,” in a strophe brimming with oxymoronic fervor: “¡O cautiverio suavé! ¡O regalada llaga!/ ¡O mano blanda! O toque delicado,/ que a vida eterna save/ y toda deuda paga,/ matando muerte en vida la ha trocado” (263). Diego de Jesús also provides an analysis of the oxymoron “cruel y furiosa quietud” (471).
love, religious redemption, or otherwise—must necessarily remain problematic and unstable as well, and the attempts at reducing the work to a semantic unity will continue to fail to appreciate the full extent of its affective complexities.

One of the most significant and explicit descriptions of mystic language is to be found in Diego de Jesús Salablanca’s “Apuntamientos y advertencias,” which served as the layperson’s prolegomenon to San Juan de la Cruz’s *Obras espirituales*. Due to the audacious and reformatory spirit of its contents, the volume’s publication was altered and delayed until 1618, more than a quarter-century after San Juan de la Cruz’s death. It is for similar reasons that Diego de Jesús’s commentary adopts the tone of an apologist, painstakingly seeking to gloss the mystic language of the text and justify its right to exist, beginning with the subtitle itself: “De cómo cada arte, facultad o ciencia, tiene sus nombres, términos y frasis. Y cómo en la profesión de Teología escolástica, moral, positiva, y mucho más en la mística, hay lo mismo. Y que como en la verdad se convenga, se ha de dejar a los profesores de las facultades libertad para que puedan usar de sus frasis y términos” (468). Validating the unorthodox nature of mystic language, he goes on to legitimize the need to “buscar modos y frasis con que declarar y dar a entender las verdades que profesa: tanto, que es propiedad algunas veces usar de impropiedad y barbarismo, y gran gala de retórica... no reparar a veces en la propiedad literal de los términos, ni en la elegancia o falta de ella, cuando fuere necesario para la sustancia de la inteligencia” (468-69). Through its necessary recourse to specialized language, mysticism is for Diego de Jesús both common to other arts, sciences, and faculties and yet unique among them: the extreme importance of its content allows for a rhetorical impropriety and barbarism in mystic language which would be inappropriate for other disciplines. “El filósofo moral en oyendo demasiá,” he
continues, “dirá que es extremo y exceso que sale del medio que se requiere para virtud, y así reprehensible y vicioso: pero en frasis de Escritura a cada paso se verá el nombre de demasía aplicado a cosas perfectas y Divinas” (469). The unique status of mystic language likewise admits a degree of “demasía” or excess unparalleled by less divine, more imperfect things.

In a reasoned apostrophe to potential skeptics, Diego de Jesús elaborates by pondering the very concept of a normative rhetorical standard for mystical discourse: ¿cómo pondremos tasa, límite, orden y modo en los términos con que tan superior cosa se ha de declarar, queriendo que cosa tan sin término, tan inefable pase por las reglas ordinarias, sin transcender las comunes frasis y términos guardadas [sic] para escuelas, para discípulos y maestros, artes y modos, que se pueden enseñar y saber? Licencia tiene el místico (como se sepa que en la sustancia de lo que dice no contradice a la verdad) para alentarla y ponderarla, dando a entender su incomprehensibilidad y alteza con términos imperfectos, perfectos y sobreperfectos, contrarios y no contrarios, semejantes y desemejantes. (471)

This wonderful citation is rife with insights which will be useful in thinking about Cervantes’s own attempt to develop a different kind of language for expressing intense affect. Above all, Diego de Jesús’s words strikingly evoke the opposition laid out in my opening section between what Barthes called the “too much and too little, excessive... and impoverished” nature of writing love. On one end of the spectrum, mysticism admits of excessive, barbarous language through terms that are deemed overly- or super-perfect (“sobreperfectos”). On the other, ‘imperfect,’ ‘dissimilar,’ and ‘contrary’ terms authorize
the ‘incomprehensibility’ inherent in concepts of such a high or superior nature ("tan superior cosa"). For Cervantes, as I will demonstrate momentarily, emotions are also a “cosa tan sin término,” and therefore require extreme terminologies, tools, and tropes from all points of the rhetorical spectrum as well. In this way, Diego de Jesús’s description of mystic language could just as easily stand as a prescription for the Cervantine language of affect. Were he to have provided a similarly detailed prolegomenon for the Persiles, Cervantes might also have questioned the need to limit the boundlessness of love with order, measurements, preset values, and rhetorical precepts (“¿cómo pondremos tasa, límite, orden y modo...?”). If he had, perhaps the perplexity and objection of the novel’s many critics would have remained softened, just as Diego de Jesús had accomplished for the works of San Juan de la Cruz.99

Of the rhetorical tropes that subtend the mystic practice of language, De Certeau dedicates significant attention to that of the oxymoron. An extensive examination of his analysis should likewise corroborate the functions of oxymora I have attempted to highlight in Cervantes’s text. According to De Certeau, the oxymoron refers to something beyond language. It is a deictic: it shows what it does not say. The combination of the two terms is substituted for the existence of a third, which is posited as absent. It makes a hole in language. It roughs out a space for the unsayable. It is language directed toward non-language. In this sense also, it ‘disturbs the lexicon.’ In a world taken to be entirely written

99 Indeed, in terms of the reception of the Persiles, it is interesting to note what De Armas Wilson has called an “aversion to unintelligibility” in the late sixteenth century: “a strong reaction appears to arise against the idea of veiled and unintelligible truths, of ineffable revelations and catalogues of arcana... a high premium is placed on clarity in writing” (Allegories 59).
and spoken, therefore ‘lexicalizable’, it opens up an absence of correspondence between things and words. (143)

The repetitive appearance of the “entre triste y alegre” formula in the Persiles functions in a similarly deictic way by indicating the ‘holes’ in language, the gaps in the emotional lexicon, the “absence of correspondence” between sentiments and semiotics. In this way, the oxymoron attains “the status of an in-between: an in-between speech and an interdiction” (De Certeau 144). While evoking the function of the preposition “entre” upon which I remarked earlier, for De Certeau this in-betweeness more importantly “offers us the quasi-abstract formula for ‘excess’: it is not reducible to either of the two components, nor to a third thing, which is precisely what is missing. It exceeds language […] What must be said cannot be said except by a shattering of the word. An internal split makes words admit or confess to the mourning that separates them from what they show’” (144). This ‘excess’ calls forth once again the Barthesian opposition between the “excessive” and “impoverished” nature of the language of love. It also underscores the fact that, like the mystic writers who are the object of De Certeau’s study, in the Persiles Cervantes is fundamentally invested in forging a ‘different practice of language.’

By foreclosing on language’s tendency of coming to rest in a monolithic signifier, it should also be noted that the affective aporias I have described mimic the Augustinian understanding of the soul as a constitutive part of humanity and marked by perpetual motion. Cervantes’s narrator invokes this conception while explaining the amorous desire that overcomes Arnaldo for Auristela: “Como están nuestras almas siempre en continuo movimiento, y no pueden parar ni sosegar sino en su centro, que es Dios, para quien fueron criadas, no es maravilla que nuestros pensamientos se muden, que éste se tome, aquél se
deje, uno se prosiga y otro se olvide, y el que más cerca anduviere de su sosiego, ése será el mejor, cuando no se mezcle con error de entendimiento” (III, 1: 429). The continuous yet capricious nature of desire can be arrested only with the death of the soul and its return to God, its “center,” which—like affect—tends to confound language. Yet this conception of desire as lack is contradicted by the “most important” maxim of the novel (De Armas Wilson 90), the last one to comprise the Flor de aforismos peregrinos, a metacollection of “sentencias sacadas de la misma verdad”: “No desees, y serás el más rico hombre del mundo” (IV, 1: 631; 634). Although the character of Antonio, marveling at the sagacity of the aphorism, goes on to summarize it by making explicit reference to the notion of lack (“está claro que lo que se desea es lo que falta y, el que no desea, no tiene falta de nada,” IV, 1: 635), here we have yet another fundamental aporia, one that constitutes a veritable axis of the novel: how is one to achieve the lofty goal of ceasing to desire when the continual movement of our souls impedes it? How are we to fulfill a lack (to go from “desasosiego” to “sosiego”) that proceeds directly from the soul’s separation from its divine center? The association of desire with lack, articulated as early as Plato, was famously taken up by Jacques Lacan in his theory that desire is never articulated in relation to an object but to lack (manque) itself, a lack which comes to represent that of the signifier in the Other

100 The theme of the movement of the soul is emphasized by two similar references in the novel (II, 3: 293; and IV, 10: 690). De Certeau, on the other hand, identifies movement as a fundamental element of mystic language: “a term becomes ‘mystic’ by virtue of the itinerary… that founds its new usage” (142).

101 In some classical literature, it should be noted, the concept of “desire” was virtually synonymous with “emotion.”

102 For De Armas Wilson this is the “most subversive” of all the maxims in the Persiles as well. It has also been interpreted, she notes, as a reference to the Avellaneda of the “false Quijote.” For our purposes, the maxims most importantly “stand out as a textbook demonstration of how the sexes are imprisoned in their separate languages, within their own maxims of desire” (De Armas Wilson 89-90).

103 For a discussion of the various cultural and political implications of movement toward and away from the concept of a center in the novel, see Avilés (“To the Frontier”).
and, along a continuous metonymic chain of desire, of the subject him/herself. Hutchinson, in his momentous study of travel and movement in Cervantes’s works, takes issue with this Lacanian conception of desire as “lack, absence, rupture, gap, incompleteness, the Other, irretrievable loss, metonymy, difference, and so on” because it tends to exert an arresting effect on movement and lacks precisely “a sense of how desire deploys its energies, how it’s felt and how strongly, how it interacts with the desired other and redefines human relationships, how it improvises, fluctuates, emerges, and submerges” (69). He goes on to argue that Cervantes’s novels, on the other hand, actively mobilize and explore this more dynamic kind of desire. I fully agree with Hutchinson that the Persiles deploys a more complex and nuanced representation of desire than can be adequately understood solely through the static nature of lack. But instead of regarding these two models of desire as incompatible, I believe they may be seen to form a productive tension throughout the novel. The class of amorous desire experienced by the characters of the Persiles is impelled forward by the unrelenting drive to satiate itself, yet its momentum is impeded at every turn by other characters’ competing desires and all manner of narrative pitfalls, interruptions, and digressions. That is to say, the active, dynamic desire of the soul comes up against the impossibility of satisfying its continual movements and attachments, a phenomenon which finds its correlative in the novel’s forward progress, which is in turn constantly stymied by the lack of narrative closure, the consummation of Periandro and Auristela’s desire nearly endlessly deferred until the ‘center’ of Rome. But this protracted frustration of desires, contrary to countless critics’ censure of the novel, is precisely the

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104 It bears mentioning that Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus also object to Lacan’s association of desire with lack, instead considering desire to be a productive force in and of itself.
point of Cervantes’s aesthetic technique, as demonstrated by Hutchinson’s keen description of emotions as movement: “As motion, emotions thrive on discursive disorder and discontinuity; their pathways are no simple lines here, but instead irregular routes whose traveling involves leaps and unexpected moves of the mind choreographed so as to let emotions exert themselves” (25). The examples of affective aporia cited above constitute a uniquely Cervantine kind of “disorder and discontinuity” while enabling emotions’ ability to “exert themselves,” attesting finally to the Persiles’s intensification of affect produced paradoxically through its very forbearance and withdrawal. Contrary to Longinus’s injunction against the risk of impeding emotion through “conjunctions” and “other additions,” it would seem that affect is “catapulted out” precisely and paradoxically by the proliferation of narrative hurdles. But if this is indeed the case, then it is made possible by Cervantes’s constant refusal to allow language to tie the arms of affect.

Ineffability

*Ce qui n’est pas ineffable n’a aucune importance.*

Paul Valéry, *Mon Faust*

The aporetic withholding of the signifier is further aggravated through Cervantes’s nearly total foreclosure on poetic language’s capacity to represent affect through the topos of ineffability.105 As before, this technique is deployed at the intradiegetic level of the

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105 Employed as early as Sophocles and Aeschylus, the relatively extended Renaissance topos of ineffability appears in other works by Cervantes as well, often in the lexicalized form of “un no sé qué,” for example in *Don Quijote*: “cosa que despertaba en mí un no sé qué de celos” (I, 24; 292); “Porque me daba un no sé qué de contento verme tan querida y estimada de un tan principal caballero” (I, 28; 354); “Todavía llevan un no sé qué los de las armas a los de las letras” (II, 24; 911). For a lengthy historical discussion of the trope, see Porqueras Mayo. In his *Teatro crítico universal*, the late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Galician Enlightenment thinker Benito Jerónimo Feijóo notably dedicated one of his many essays to discussing the
novel’s principle characters as well as by the narrator, varying considerably from the explicitly stated unrepresentability of certain feelings to more subtle accounts in which silence becomes the most meaningful figure. In the latter case, the text is literally perforated by productive silences, which not only attest to the abiding difficulty of communicating internal emotional states but also stand as highly significant sites of meaning in their own right. When the characters encounter the love-stricken Portuguese soldier Manuel de Sosa Coitiño, for example, he reports that “ni supe ni pude hacer otra cosa que callar y dar con mi silencio indicio de mi turbación,” to which the father of his beloved replies, “puede ser que este silencio hable en su favor de vuesa merced más que alguna otra retórica” (I, 10: 201). Though language may fail them in expressing intense affects, these characters are endowed with a consciousness of the fact that such a failure may ultimately do more justice to their feelings than any words ever could. Also a part of this particular exchange is the father’s recognition of the genuineness of the Portuguese suitor’s feelings, implicitly corroborated by the notion that rhetorical arts are not as reliable as non-verbal cues for judging the veracity of another’s emotions. Historically, as Luhmann notes, “the codification of forms of expression inversely furthered doubts as to the genuineness of feelings. [...] True love or false love—this question became of central importance not only because of the difference between code and behavior, but also owing to the temporal deferral in achievement of the end” (70). Although Luhmann concludes that this question was resolved by the honnestes gens, or those sectors of the early modern populace who due to their nobility were presumed to maintain a more intimate relation concept of the “no sé qué” as well. For a pan-philosophical study of ineffability and collection of other thinkers’ writings on the subject, see Franke’s recent two-volume compendium On What Cannot Be Said.
with truth, in the *Persiles* love remains unstable and resists certainty, even among such aristocratic characters as Periandro and Auristela themselves.\(^{106}\)

In his study of the philosophical implications of ineffability, William Franke remarks on the irony of what we might call these examples of significant silence: “While in principle the Unsayable would seem to demand silence as the only appropriate response, in practice endless discourses are engendered by this ostensibly most forbidding and elusive of topics,” and “what ultimately defeats all articulation remains nevertheless the object-elect, the darling, of copious discourses” (“Varieties” 490-91). One of the most striking examples of this phenomenon corresponds with what is perhaps the most sudden and intense irruption of affect in the entire novel, when Periandro nearly dies after falling from the tower near the end of Book Three. Auristela, believing him dead, desperately rushes to her lover’s broken body in an attempt to capture a part of his soul through his expiring breath (a traditional act of piety which, not incidentally, the narrator reports would have been impossible: “puesta la boca con la suya, esperaba a recoger en sí alguna reliquia, si del alma le hubiese quedado; pero, aunque le hubiera quedado, no pudiera recibilla, porque los traspillados dientes le negaban la entrada”; III, 14: 574). Constanza, on the other hand, “dando lugar a la pasión,” finds herself completely immobilized by the shock of the occurrence and is unable to help her troubled companions (III, 14: 574). Bartolomé, their muledriver and guide, is the only one who outwardly expresses any emotion, crying bitterly at the spectacle (“Sólo Bartolomé fue el que mostró con los ojos el grave dolor que

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\(^{106}\) This formulation of love is consistent with the wonderfully ineffable description of the emotion in the anonymous *L’escole d’amour*: “un ie ne scay quoy, qui venoit de ie ne scay où, et qui s’en alloit ie ne scay comment”; “et par ces termes qui ne nous apprennent rien, ils nous apprennent tout ce que s’en peut scavoir” (qtd. in Luhmann 65-66).
en el alma sentía, llorando amargamente,” III, 14: 574-75). Yet all of the characters’ reactions share one trait in common—that of silence: “Estando todos en la amarga aflicción que he dicho, sin que hasta entonces ninguna lengua hubiese publicado su sentimiento” (III, 14: 575).

Silence thus becomes synonymous with inexpressible grief and affliction, representing the paralyzing effect that a traumatic event exerts on the body and on the capacity for language. The delayed reaction that accompanies extreme shock is then delayed even further by the subsequent interruption of the scene by the seemingly casual arrival of Deleasir, Belarminia, and Félix Flora, three French maidens with whom the group had become acquainted earlier, followed immediately by a cadre of armed men intent on kidnapping Félix Flora. The unexpected appearance of these characters serves to intensify the affective weight of the episode by introducing additional intradiegetic witnesses to the event and by once again deferring its resolution. The piling of one unexpected conflict on top of another also disorients the reader, who is forced to bracket off the original conflict and await its resolution only after the secondary conflict has been introduced (but also not yet resolved). The narrator, almost always astutely conscious of his complicity in these types of narrative trickery, returns to the moribund Periandro only after reiterating the silence of the scene: “las lenguas, en amargo silencio tienen depositadas sus quejas” (III, 14: 576). Here we can effectively interpret “lengua” in the dual meaning of the term—it denotes the organ responsible for producing language as well as, synecdochically, language
itself. The fundamental message is clear: tongues falter and fall silent when faced with the challenge of expressing intense emotional affliction.107

In addition to these instances of productive silence, language is used even more explicitly to call attention to its own inefficacy in representing affect. As I noted in Chapter 1, when Auristela is released from captivity on the barbarous island, for example, the narrator’s use of adynaton openly ponders his own limitations in portraying Periandro’s feelings: “¿Qué lengua podrá decir, o qué pluma escribir, lo que sintió Periandro cuando conoció ser Auristela la condenada y la libre?” (I, 4: 153). Consistent with the endless interruptions and deferrals of the narrative action, at other times Cervantes figures the affect of startled surprise with a sudden break or reversal in the text itself, such as when Auristela, already overcome by the jealousy of Periandro’s many suitors, laments her fortune while “escuchaba atentísimamente el capitán del navío y no sabía qué conclusión sacar de ellas; sólo paró en decir... Pero no dijo nada, porque, en un instante y en un momentáneo punto le arrebató la palabra de la boca un viento que se levantó, tan súbito y tan recio que le hizo poner en pie sin responder a Auristela” (I, 23: 272; ellipsis in original). Owing to Cervantes’s use of yet another crucial rhetorical figure, aposiopesis (a sentence rendered incomplete because of an inability to continue), Auristela is denied the cathartic possibility of a complete dialogic exchange with her interlocutor, his own words arrested

107 Similar instances of productive silence in the novel include the following: “quise hablar y anudóseme la voz a la garganta y pegóseme al paladar la lengua y ni supe ni pude hacer otra cosa que callar y dar con mi silencio indicio de mi turbación” (I, 10: 201); “no sé yo cómo la lengua no se me pegó al paladar; sólo sé que no supe lo que me dije” (III, 12: 562). Also see II, 5: 305; II, 5: 308; IV, 11: 695; and IV, 11: 697. These tropes, as Romero Muñoz notes, have Biblical and Latin precedents, the latter in the form of vox faucibut haesit (201n). Similarly, according to De Certeau, a “Greco-Roman tradition leads the mind toward silence (sige, siope, hesyche, etc.) and designates with the term ‘ineffable’ not only a critique of language but its absence” (114). Silence, of course, connoted the traditionally feminine virtues of modesty, honor, and shame as well; for example, “No sé cómo pueda decirlo sin que la vergüenza no me turbe la lengua” (I, 12: 215); and “cuando la honestidad ata la lengua de modo que no puede quejarse, da tormento al alma con las ligaduras del silencio” (IV, 8: 678). For the relation between silence and the emotion of shame, particularly in Cervantes’s treatment of the figure of the captive, see Chapter 6 as well as my recent article (“A Soldier’s Shame”).
by the pregnant pause that abruptly announces yet another turn in the narrative. The affective tension of the episode is thus prolonged and suspended, as it were, by the *puntos suspensivos* of the text. In fact, I would argue that the novel is exceedingly adept at producing and sustaining what I have already termed a kind of sentimental suspense, despite other scholars’ view that “Cervantes did not write a suspenseful book, largely because he chose to delay and even arrest its plot by some dozen subplots” (De Armas Wilson 36). From my perspective, it is precisely these delays that prohibit the timely resolution of the characters’ emotional afflictions and thus permit the reader to maintain her own affective investment in the novel, hanging on and sus-pended by this lack of an emotional denouement. Indeed, the etymological roots of the word “suspense” evoke the same uncertainty, deferment, and holding in abeyance that characterize the affective aporias addressed above.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, these kinds of deferment and narrative obstacles in the *Persiles* mirror the necessary course of an amorous relationship in real life, since, according to Luhmann, “The moment of fulfilment [of love] itself almost comprised the end, and one therefore almost had to fear such a point, defer it or attempt to avoid it... Precisely for this reason one had to hold resistance, detours or obstacles to one’s love in high regard, because only through them does love endure” (70-71). Paradoxically, the constant delay for Periandro and Auristela in consummating their relationship allows their love to endure. And this delay allows the reader’s emotional investment in the text to endure as well.

¹⁰⁸ Jeremy Robbins, in his suggestive study of the novel’s digressions, remarks on the receptive impact of this narrative deferral as well: “The entire pilgrimage itself, then, is simply a sustained act of deferral... the teleological thrust of the genre, romance, and its framing, pilgrimage, are subverted... The thwarting of our carefully fuelled expectations of narrative purpose is a *peripateia* that impacts the reader far more than either of the characters” (17).
Such sentimental suspense is unambiguously palpable during the several chapters set in King Policarpo’s castle, a not altogether surprising fact given the plurality of love triangles, jealousies, and unrequited desires that fill their pages. When it seems the tension of these conditions has become unbearable for the characters themselves, Policarpo implores his daughter Sinforosa to begin to release it by breaking her silence and articulating her affliction: “No más suspensión, hija; no más silencio, amiga; no más” (II, 5: 305). Shortly thereafter, the motif of suspension resurfaces in the tense exchange between Clodio and Rutilio: “Suspendióse Clodio con las razones de Rutilio, con cuya suspensión dio fin a este capítulo el autor desta grande historia” (II, 5: 311). The author of this great story, indeed, avowedly plays upon the suspended emotions of his characters in order to carry those of his reader across the rupture of the chapter break. And although the abrupt interruption of this break threatens to disrupt the flow of the narrative, this is, once again, precisely the point: the reader’s desire for narrative resolution mirrors the characters’ desire for emotional resolution, both suspended by an equally unyielding lack. While this quintessentially Cervantine move could on the one hand be seen to parody the sentimentalism of the romance genre through its overwrought or heavy-handed recourse to the authorial bag of tricks, it is, on the other, an acute technique in its own right for circumventing the reader’s desire for closure and prolonging the sentimental suspense. In any case, at the beginning of the following chapter, we find this suspense intact: “Todos tenían con quien comunicar sus pensamientos: Policarpo con su hija y, Clodio, con Rutilio; sólo el suspeso Periandro los comunicaba consigo mismo, que le engendraron tantos las razones de Auristela, que no sabía a cuál acudir que le aliviase su pesadumbre” (II, 6: 311). The “suspended” Periandro, overcome by his amorous affliction and doubts about
Auristela’s motives, goes on to indulge in a disquietingly modern soliloquy of self-lamentation. So overcome by his emotions is the forlorn lover, that he unwittingly pronounces for the first time in the novel he and his ‘sister’s’ true names (Persiles and Sigismunda), startling and obliging himself to verify that no-one has overheard him (“en pronunciando esta palabra, se mordió la lengua y miró a todas partes, a ver si alguno le escuchaba”; II, 6: 312). Eager to release his emotional tension, he proceeds to reflect upon the fraught relationship between Auristela’s jealousy and his own feelings of love for her, eventually concluding that “mi amor no tiene términos que le encierre ni palabras que le declare” (II, 6: 312), thus accentuating an already psychologically fragile moment of the text with his inability to articulate its closure. This moment of je ne sais quoi ultimately produces Periandro’s decision to abandon the spoken word in favor of writing his feelings out in a letter, thereby managing to defer even longer his own therapeutic release of emotional tension and, likewise, that of the reader, who is forced to wait until a few pages later to read the letter.109

In addition to these expressly inexpressible moments in the text in which the narrator or characters openly confess their inability to capture affect, at other times the topos of ineffability is suggested more subtly by the mere refusal to articulate a feeling in words. For example, while recounting his life story and the circumstances which carried him to the barbarous island, the young Antonio describes a moment in which he found himself on an another island overrun by wild wolves. Claiming to have been warned “en

109 Periandro, in fact, never gets around to delivering this letter or reading its contents directly to Auristela. Instead, through this therapeutic written interlude, he appears to recuperate his own voice, confronting her in person and in his own words. Since according to Socrates thinking is a dialogue with oneself, in the absence of an adequate “other” with whom to communicate his conflicting thoughts and emotions, in this way Periandro works through them by means of a Socratic dialogue with himself.
voz clara y distinta y en mi propia lengua” by a lone, merciful wolf to flee before he ended up “hecho pedazos por nuestras uñas y dientes,” he consigns the designation of his emotional state in this situation to his interlocutors: “Si quedé espantado o no, a vuestra consideración lo dejo” (I, 5: 170). Although this statement could easily be dismissed as a mere rhetorical convention or means of mitigating the threat that a protracted description of his fear could pose to his masculinity, its status as an utterance of ineffability is certainly consistent with the tenor of the examples we have already seen. Yet the implications of this locution are even more significant due to its immediate juxtaposition with a perfectly articulate, Spanish-speaking wolf. According to the widely-known Aristotelian doctrine, the two characteristics which distinguish humans from animals are our capacity for reason and our use of language. Here, however, as in numerous other instances of the novel, we are presented with a character incapable not only of tempering his passions with reason, but of fully articulating them in spoken language.110

Antonio’s withholding of his emotional state (“Si quedé espantado o no, a vuestra consideración lo dejo”) is also reminiscent of San Juan de la Cruz’s copla “Entréme donde no supe,” in which the mystic poet struggles to express an experience of spiritual ecstasy: “no diré lo que sentí/ que me quedé no sabiendo” (264). The inverisimilitude of the talking wolf episode is wholly atypical for Cervantes’s writing, which tends to maintain a

110 In fact, as demonstrated by Auristela near the end of the novel, language is represented as something that undermines the silent tranquility of reason by stirring up the passions of the soul: “Mientras callé, estuvo en sosiego mi alma; hablé, y perdíle” (IV, 11: 695); Moreover, this scene clearly has resonances with and further implications for the omnipresent civilized/barbarian motif of the first two parts of the novel, given that the barbarian has since Antiquity been defined by an inability to speak. Improper language was similarly dismissed as barbarism, even if, as De Certeau explains, this impropriety was exploited to great effect by the mystics: “barbarism was a type of extremism that claimed to guarantee inspiration by lexical excess. The greatest grammatical disorder would make the disturbing presence of the highest word credible. It created verisimilitude” (146).
relationship of plausibility between fiction and historical reality, or between speculative imagination and the natural world. Even among the generally fantastic qualities, exaggerated coincidences, and larger-than-life characters of the *Persiles*, Antonio’s account stands out for this reason. Like Don Quijote’s experience in the *Cueva de Montesinos*, it is difficult to corroborate and likely leaves more than a little doubt in the minds of the reader and other characters as to its veracity. But while this inverisimilitude could easily be accounted for by Don Quijote’s madness and the young Antonio’s fear on the wild northern frontier, both episodes rather faithfully reproduce many circumstances of a mystic vision, in which sacred knowledge is transmitted through a hallucinatory, oneiric, or ecstatic state. The repeated verse “toda sciencia tracendiendo” in San Juan’s copla (“Entréme donde no supe”) would therefore seem to be equally appropriate for Antonio’s *copla* (an outlandish story), the merciful talking wolf standing in for God.

As San Juan’s copla paradigmatically demonstrates, the topos of ineffability itself is most often found in mystic poetry or religious treatises of mysticism, in which an author’s divine vision or transcendent experience escapes the mundane properties of language. These specifically metaphysical manifestations of ineffability are closely related to the idea of apophasis or the *via negativa*, in which a divine subject cannot be described in affirmative terms, but only by what it is not.\(^\text{111}\) Partly rooted in Neoplatonic thought and largely developed by the ancient Christian theologian Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, apophatic or negative philosophy went on to influence a number of key medieval mystics, from the German thinkers Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa and the Castilian

\(^\text{111}\) Later seventeenth-century Baroque drama, especially that of Calderón, staged similar themes in its “speculative penchant for the explicitly transcendent” (Franke, “Varieties” 494). According to Franke, “even very banal forms of silence may after all be akin to absolute silence and participate in the pregnant pauses characteristic of apophasis, the impotence of the word” (493).
Carmelites San Juan and Santa Teresa de Jesús, down to the Jewish philosopher Maimonides from al-Andalus, whose hermetic writings attested to the impossibility of assigning any positive category, quality, or value to God due to the divine realm’s non-accessibility through human language and understanding. Although he does not employ the term itself, Diego de Jesús clearly invokes the idea of apophasis for the readers of San Juan: “Como las criaturas, por perfectas que sean, distan infinitamente de Dios, y él las excede sin proporción: más perfecto conocimiento de Dios es el que negándolas nos dice lo que Dios no es” (471). Himself coining the wonderfully oxymoronic term ‘dissimilar similarities,’ he goes on to explain that descriptors of God “más son para decirnos lo que no es y llevarnos en sencillo vacío de criaturas al lleno del que sobreexcede a todo, sin dejarnos reposar ni hacer pie en ese material; y mejor sirven y más aprovechan para esto unas desemejantes semejanzas” (472).

These mystic figures’ reputation for heterodoxy—which in the case of San Juan and Santa Teresa led to persecution by fellow Carmelites who were opposed to ecclesiastic reform—could be partly due to the fact that their preference for the ineffable or apophatic ran counter to the far more accepted doctrine in Western Christianity of cataphatic or positive theology, which held that human language was indeed capable of describing God. The biblical apophthegm “God is love” (Contemporary English Version, 1 John 4.8) is probably one of the most recognizable examples of cataphasis. For Cervantes to suggest

112 In an analysis that could just as easily describe the Persiles itself, De Certeau reasons that these “‘dissimilarities’ are not signs but machines for setting adrift—machines for voyages and ecstasies outside of received meanings” (148).

113 Looking ahead to Part Two of this dissertation, it is interesting to note that in her autobiography Santa Teresa remarks that she felt ashamed of her mystic visions and hoped not to experience them in public (Life 226). This self-conscious shame might have been related to the persecution suffered by the mystics, or more broadly to the normative expectations of social behavior in a public space, to which a fit of mystic ecstasy would hardly have conformed. More research on these questions is needed.
that love itself is also ineffable, the fundamental simplicity of this particular proverb is rendered significantly more complex, if not neutralized entirely: How is the divine to be understood if human love is equally unintelligible? How can the vehicle of love communicate anything of the tenor of God? On the one hand, God would appear to be doubly ineffable. But on the other, if both elements of the metaphor “God is love”—the tenor and vehicle, ground and figure—are to be taken as equally ineffable, then we are left with what is nevertheless a logical statement, albeit devoid of content: God and love both lie beyond the reach of linguistic expression and, as equivalents, each can therefore be used to refer to the other. In any case, here we have yet another suggestive means of denoting the opposition or discursive tension which runs throughout the present chapter and which Cervantes teases out and plays upon in the Persiles: a cataphatic approach in which linguistic excess affirmatively lends itself to emotional expression, and what I will call *apophatic affect*, which vehemently resists language and at best can be expressed only by recourse to negative figures of ineffability.

What all of this suggests is that the most potentially subversive implication of Cervantes’s extensive use of ineffability is a theological one. Despite its origins as a means of expressing divinity, in the Persiles the language of ineffability is appropriated for expressing the most mundane everyday experience of human passion and desire. By wresting the ineffable from the mystical or metaphysical and thrusting it, as Valéry might say, to a level of equal importance, Cervantes threatens to banalize the unsayability that hitherto had enjoyed a largely privileged theological function. This poetic subversion reflects the structural implications of the novel as a whole: the religious pilgrimage to Rome is exploited as a pretense to sustain an illicit amorous relationship, one that is finally
made possible not by divine revelation but by the circumstantial death of Periandro’s older brother, Magsimino. As Robbins notes, in this way “the city’s heavy religious connotations yield to earthly love; ‘Roma’ is reversed and becomes ‘Amor’” (16).

Be this as it may, it would be a critical error to insist too forcefully upon a literary interpretation in which Cervantes is granted a role akin to secularizer or religious subversive. This is true for several reasons. First, it should be noted that affect—and love in particular—have enjoyed a long association with religious devotion and mystic spirituality. In his attempt to classify the different currents of mystic thought, Menéndez y Pelayo established a tripartite division between what he distinguished as eclectic, intellectualist, and affective traditions. Represented by Franciscan and Augustine schools of thought, he characterized this latter tradition by a theological doctrine in which sentimentality prevailed over intellect as a means of entering into communion with God. Though herself a Carmelite, Santa Teresa was especially concerned with the relationships between love, divinity, and devotion, penning the treatise “Conceptos del amor” and referring at length to the “fuego del amor de Dios” in her poetry and autobiographical writing.114 Many of these poetic metaphors—directly informed by lyrical poetry of a secular nature—work to construct a broader motif of the saint as lover or spouse, her human chastity supplemented by an amorous desire for God himself, thus blurring the lines between the eternal and the erotic, the sacred and the sensual, spiritual ecstasy and sexual ecstasy.115 More broadly, of course, both philotheia (love for God) and philanthropia (love

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114 To cite merely one of the most famous examples: “Esta divina prisión/ del amor con que yo vivo/ ha hecho a Dios mi cautivo” (“Vivo sin vivir en mí,” 41).

115 Along similarly blurred lines, De Certeau also references “the tradition of the Cistercian monks, which, since Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1153), introduced the erotic element of the affectus into the dialogical work of the chorale of the Opus Dei” (122).
of God towards humanity) have long formed a fundamental element of Christian dogma, as demonstrated by my discussion above of the biblical verse “God is love.” These examples underscore the fluidity and mutual influence between secular and religious forms of writing and, more specifically, the ways in which mystic authors such as San Juan and Santa Teresa borrowed from but also contributed to the development of new poetic forms in early modern Europe. In this sense, it should also be recognized that Cervantes was not necessarily unique in appropriating elements of mystic discourse for his own writing. Early modern literary scholars such as Humberto Huergo have identified similarly mystic resonances in the poetry of Góngora, for instance (“Afasia y negación”; “Las dos lenguas”). Finally, I believe that any argument which posits Cervantes as a figure of religious heterodoxy should be tempered by an acknowledgement of the numerous examples of compliance with Catholic doctrine throughout his works, including the _Persiles_. My own claim that through a multifaceted use of emotional ineffability Cervantes subverts a predominately religious rhetorical figure is itself more hermeneutic than philological, since I am more interested in exploring the experimental dynamism of Cervantine language than in demonstrating the specific authorial precedents that Cervantes might or might not have accessed in forging it. Perhaps this approach is fitting: if mysticism was founded on the search for hidden meaning, then there could hardly be a more suggestive analogy for the practice of literary exegesis and interpretation, for uncovering the secrets that—like Periandro and Auristela’s recondite love—seem to seethe and infuse the novel with passion, fervor, and suspense.
Cervantes's aesthetic program of mobilizing affect through modes resistant to conventional mimetic representation may be instructively analyzed by means of one final categorization, that of materiality. Since this is a concept charged with a rather long history of critical divergence, I feel it necessary to advertise at the outset my understanding of this term in two principle yet interrelated ways: first, I locate materiality in the slippages between content and form, an understanding of “material” that proceeds from its vernacular usage as that which pertains to matter. In a more discrete sense of this definition, I also take materiality to mean that which designates the body as opposed to the soul or spirit, a distinction which importantly recalls the aforementioned opposition between the mundane and the divine.\textsuperscript{116} Second, my approach to the problem of materiality responds to what recent cultural theorists have broadly denominated “non-representational theory,” which is concerned with interrogating the ways in which various forms of cultural production can be seen to deconstruct the Platonic distinction between appearance and the real.\textsuperscript{117} Non-representational theory, of which affect has been a crucial

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\textsuperscript{116} This opposition also resonates with Raymond Williams’s observation that materiality was historically opposed to spirituality in terms of class distinctions (\textit{Keywords} 164).

\textsuperscript{117} See, for example, Miller and Thrift. For the materiality specifically of love, see Terdiman (478-79). Theories of materiality also form part of what recent critics have termed “posthermeneutic” approaches, which concern such issues as affect, “mediality” and “presence” as well. Further afield yet related are the recent movements in critical theory of post-humanism, speculative realism, and object-oriented ontology.
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focal point, thus attempts to demystify the privileged status of the Idea while staking a claim for the inherent, *sui generis* meaning of material things themselves. The modern Spanish literary and cultural scholar Jo Labanyi has recently called for such “ways of thinking beyond, or outside of, representation” as “a stimulus to new forms of research which...have not been tried in Spanish studies” (223), citing affect and materiality as two such avenues in need of further study. I have already shown how the *Persiles* advances aesthetic techniques at the limits of representation through its contemplation of affective aporias and ineffability. In this final section, I will be suggesting that Cervantes, *avant la lettre*, provides a unique early modern response to this call for an exploration of non-representational forms through materiality as well, even if I will maintain that Cervantes’s writing remains within—though at the extreme limits of—literary representation.

One of the most crucial means for doing so is enabled by the recurrent recourse to visual and ekphrastic representations throughout the *Persiles*, a fact that scholars have seized upon in studies of the varying uses of painting, sculpture, and other pictorial arts in the novel. But as I detailed in Chapter 1, the representation of affect also relies upon visual, non-discursive devices, which, if at the expense of poetic language, only serve to intensify the aesthetic effect. Ranging once more across multiple narrative levels, these strategies are mobilized through the persistent emphasis on the semiotics of gesture, the gaze, and corporal manifestations of affect such as sighs, cries, moans, and—especially—tears. The provocation of certain emotions is in fact often predicated on the sense of sight,

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118 See, for example, Bearden, who claims that, “Instead of assuaging heterodox views, Cervantine ekphrasis serves as a wedge to pry open Eurocentric concepts of fiction, history, and cultural otherness” (740); and López Alemany, who takes issue with some of Bearden’s claims. Castillo and Spadaccini, on the other hand, detail how the varying iconography of ecclesiastic spectacles began to be favored by the late sixteenth-century Church as a means of evoking particular religious emotions in the spectators (“admiración y suspensión que habrían de facilitar la captación del público y reforzar el sentimiento de comunidad religiosa y política,” 120; also noted in Bearden 739).
a commonplace of Cervantes’s era which the narrator notes regarding the vengeful anger of the recently widowed Ruperta: “La ira, según se dice, es una revolución de la sangre que está cerca del corazón, la cual se altera en el pecho con la vista del objeto que agravia y tal vez con la memoria” (III, 17: 590). After naming the various objects (“estas insignias dolorosas”) whose sight awakens her rage—a silver box with the likeness of her dead husband, the sword that killed him, and the tunic that she imagined was still wet with his blood—the narrator goes on to emphasize the material qualities of this rage: “Llovían lágrimas de sus ojos, bastantes a bañar las reliquias de su pasión; arrancaba suspiros del pecho, que condensaban el aire cerca y lejos; añadía al ordinario juramento razones que le agravaban y tal vez parecía que arrojaba por los ojos, no lágrimas, sino fuego y, por la boca, no suspiros, sino humo: tan sujeta la tenía su pasión y el deseo de vengarse” (III, 17: 591).

To the already material manifestations of her emotion (tears, sighs) are assigned even more visibly powerful yet equally evanescent elemental qualities (fire, smoke). The visual register is thus enlisted to substantiate the potency of affects that would be rendered comparably ineffectual in formal or abstract poetic language.

It could be argued, of course, that these examples, their rich and vivid imagery notwithstanding, are ultimately just as dependent on language as any other form of verbal representation—they are, after all, still words on a page, and poetry has by definition always enjoyed extensive recourse to visual imagery. But when considered as a whole and alongside the other techniques of affective representation we have seen thus far, it becomes clear that a more fundamental investment in alternative modes of conveying affect is indeed at stake. The narrator’s subsequent words corroborate this: “¿Veisla llorar? ¿Veisla suspirar? ¿Veisla no estar en sí? ¿Veisla blandir la espada matadora? ¿Veisla besar
la camisa ensangrentada y que rompe las palabras con sollozos?” (III, 17: 591). This sudden anaphoric apostrophe to the reader compels her to reflect upon the mental phantasia produced by the preceding visual description of Ruperta’s burning emotions. More importantly, it implicates the reader in the task of verifying (or confirming the truth of) those very emotions by holding the efficacy of their visual representation up to scrutiny. Indeed, the potent image of Ruperta’s breaking of words with sobbing (“rompe las palabras con sollozos”), in what strongly resembles a state of mystic ecstasy (“no estar en sí”), recalls De Certeau’s description of the “shattering of the word” (144) produced by mystic utterances and underscores the often superior competence and authority granted to the materiality of affect over more conventional language. Similarly antagonistic juxtapositions between words and non-linguistic signifiers of affect can be appreciated elsewhere in the novel as well, the latter nearly always given the upper hand. For example, after Auristela, consumed by jealousy for Sinforosa’s pursuit of Periandro, attempts to reasonably explain her feelings to him, the narrator imparts the following: “Aquí dio fin Auristela a su razonamiento y principio a unas lágrimas que desdecían y borraban todo cuanto había dicho,” (II, 4: 301). It is as though her tears had soaked the page and caused the ink to run and blur into a state of unintelligibility, her prior words negated by the material manifestation of her true feelings.

Tears, indeed, perform a remarkably active role in the novel, to the point of constituting a veritable leitmotiv or, as noted earlier, what Romero Muñoz has coined an “hipérbole de las lágrimas” (171n), as illustrated in these examples, just two of many: “aumenté las aguas del mar con las que derramaba de mis ojos” (I, 5: 169); “hizieronse fuentes los [ojos] de Periandro y ríos los de todos los circunstantes” (I, 5: 171). The
hyperbolic and hydraulic force of these tears threatens to drown the purely linguistic, desiccated signifier in a deluge of materiality, neutralizing the discursive logic of the text just as Auristela’s tears washed away her words of reason. Lest we conceive of this materiality as a facile solution to the aporias and ineffability enumerated above, however, it should be noted that affect continues to pose problems of undecidability and impossibility. That is to say, despite their oft-represented superior efficacy over language in conveying internal emotional states, semiotic codes of the visual, gestural, and material remain equally susceptible to and contingent upon the vagaries of subjective interpretation. Such uncertainty is liable and indeed likely to produce the kinds of narrative discord, digression, and deferral I described earlier with respect to the feelings of characters and their means for expressing them.

These qualities are demonstrated by two paradigmatic examples involving Auristela: “A todo esto no respondió palabra Auristela, antes le vinieron las lágrimas a los ojos, que comenzaron a bañar sus rosadas mejillas. Confuso Arnaldo de tal acidente, no supo determinarse si de pesar o alegría podía proceder semejante acontecimiento” (I, 15: 229). In spite of their ubiquity, tears are an unstable semiotics, as singularly insufficient as words for determining with any degree of certainty the true emotions experienced by Auristela. Later on, “Auristela casi por el mismo modo y con los mismos afectos miraba a Sinforosa, aunque en las dos eran diferentes las intenciones: Auristela miraba con celos y, Sinforosa, con sencilla benevolencia” (II, 2: 289). Here again, outward emotional cues can be deceptive, since nearly identical bodily affects (“los mismos afectos”) and manners of gazing (“el mismo modo”) belie inward emotional states of an entirely different and
contradictory nature. The visual cues of tears and the gaze may denote opposing emotional states in the person who produces them, in spite of Auristela’s own avowed talent for reading the soul of a person on his or her face (“viendo el rostro de una persona, le leo el alma y le adevino los pensamientos,” II, 10: 346). The popular faith in the efficacy of this practice in the classical and early modern periods later meets with utter failure in communicating love, this time in Renato’s account of his relationship with Eusebia, “a quien sólo con los ojos la di a entender que la adoraba, y ella, o ya descuidada o no advertida, ni con sus ojos ni con su lengua me daba a entender que me entendía” (II, 19: 408). Although Cervantine characters in other works are remarkably adept at intuing the emotional states of one another (especially when accompanied by a visual cue), the personages of the Persiles often fail at understanding, interpreting, and sharing each other’s emotions, even when they produce a visible, material, or corporeal response. Affect thus confounds discursive as well as sensory modes of interpretation, each one as tenuous and unstable a hermeneutics of emotion as the other.

What this suggests is that in order to most effectively convey the aporias that inhere in affect, the poet, painter, or historian must necessarily exploit the techne of multiple arts. Like the eleventh-century al-Andalus thinker Ibn Hazm, Cervantes also makes recourse to more expressive visual modes in order to supplement language and render intelligible the aporias of love. He might also have agreed with Ibn Hazm that love is as variable and

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119 Another example of the failure to interpret the meaning of a character’s tears can be found in I, 4: 154-55. The instability and uncertainty of external emotional cues is highlighted by the character of Arnaldo earlier in the novel as well: “A todo esto callaba Arnaldo y consideraba los afectos y demostraciones con que Periandro contaba su historia, y de ninguno de ellos podia sacar en limpio las sospechas” (II, 15: 386). These examples would seem to contradict Ibn Hazm de Córdoba’s fascinating descriptions of the semiotics of love in his El collar de la paloma (see especially the short chapter “Sobre las señas hechas con los ojos,” 175-77).
dynamic as the iridescent colors of the dove’s neck that forms the title of his most famous work, *El collar de la paloma*. Along the lines of the quote from the *Persiles* that opens this section, such an aesthetic practice allows the artist to ‘escribir pintando’ and ‘pintar componiendo.’ Moreover, by commissioning a corporal and visual grammar to perform the work of expressing affect, Cervantes manages to invert and reconfigure the binary oppositions of conventional mimetic representation, such as content/form, body/soul, mundane/divine, and appearance/real. The emphasis placed on the material content of tears, for example, tends to destabilize the reigning formal authority of poetic language in the novel. Similarly, the Platonic tenets of mimesis are called into question by the very idea that those same tears are not a referent to a prior, more authentic signified, but that they embody, produce, and circulate meaning in and of themselves. Finally, the appropriation of multiple artistic techniques and forms for the purpose of representing the quotidian, mundane, and base qualities of human passion and desire—typically sublated by and reserved for the divine—suggests at the very least a critical revaluation of traditional aesthetic and moralist hierarchies.

In my view, although the examples of affect and materiality examined here constitute what recent cultural theorists have broadly denominated “non-representational theory,” they are nevertheless brought about by words of a literary text. They are also sites for signification, interpretation, and meaning, no matter how problematic, unstable, or limited the affects or their representation may be. This is why I would suggest once again that the language of mysticism may serve as a more instructive template for appreciating Cervantes’s own interest in developing novel ways of communicating intense passions: in providing lay readers—as San Juan de la Cruz and Teresa de Ávila attempted with mystic
experience—access to the ecstasy of emotional experience—and agony of emotional affliction. San Juan de la Cruz, it is worth noting, made recourse to the visual realm as well, producing a now-famous charcoal sketch of Christ on the cross (uniquely portrayed from above) in an attempt to more faithfully represent the content of a mystic vision. And yet this is also where the mystics and Cervantes diverge: instead of a divine vision from above, the visual grammar of the *Persiles* is employed to aid the expression of human passions from below or within. In fact, like most of his clerical contemporaries, San Juan de la Cruz openly denounced the passions of the soul or “apetitos,” as Diego de Jesús explains: “lo que dice que son inmundos los pensamientos y concepciones que el entendimiento hace de las cosas bajas de la tierra y de todas las criaturas, las cuales como son tan contrarias a las cosas sempiternas ensucian el templo del alma” (475). Compared with Cervantes’s words cited in this section’s epigraph above, the contrast could scarcely be any starker: if San Juan’s “cosas bajas de la tierra” tarnish the soul, for Cervantes the contemplation of “bajezas,” “hierbas y retamas,” and “cosas humildes” achieves the overall effect of enhancing the work (“la poesía, tal vez se realza”), in content as well as form. Instead of ‘conversing among the heavens,’ the divine qualities Cervantes grants to poetic language contain the potential to illuminate the human soul and give voice to the passions it produces.120

**Conclusion**

120 Although Cervantes’s treatment of love has often been associated with the Platonists, it bears noting that Cervantes diverges from certain tenets of Neoplatonic thought here as well, namely that of unity and the idea that the spirit should maintain primacy over matter.
Las peregrinaciones largas siempre traen consigo diversos acontecimientos y, como la diversidad se compone de cosas diferentes, es forzoso que los casos lo sean [...] Es excelencia de la historia que cualquiera cosa que en ella se escriba puede pasar, al sabor de la verdad que trae consigo; lo que no tiene la fábula, a quien conviene guisar sus acciones con tanta puntualidad y gusto, y con tanta verisimilitud, que, a despecho y pesar de la mentira, que hace disonancia en el entendimiento, forme una verdadera armonía. Cervantes, Persiles (III, 10: 526-27).

Cervantes’s recognition that love “es una vehemente pasión del ánimo” (III, 19: 610) and that its conditions “son tan diferentes como injustas y sus leyes tan muchas como variables” (I, 23: 274) is consistent with Philip Fisher’s distinction of love as a “passion” that defies understanding and representation (21). As though he were goaded by this challenge, however, Cervantes responds by defiantly pushing mimetic representation to its limits in order to express intense affects, coaxing their representational resistance into his own emotional lenguaje. As I have attempted to illustrate, through various rhetorical figures (including hyperbole, meiosis, auxesis, anaphora, apostrophe, adynaton, and aposiopesis), the reappropriation of classical topoi (such as the “sonrisa entre lágrimas” or “antítesis simétrica” tropes), the taking up of mystical figures (oxymora, ineffability, apophasis), the exploration of alternative modalities (ekphrastic and visual language), and new aesthetic horizons beyond the bounds of conventional poetic language and monolithic signifiers (emphasizing the materiality of affect), Cervantes manages to countervail the vehemence of love. What I have denoted as affective aporias, ineffability, and materiality underscores the contentious and indeterminate nature of a whole range of emotions across multiple narrative levels; the resistance of these categories vis-à-vis determinate, logocentric forms of language likewise indicate Cervantes’s concern to avoid the blithe sentimentalism of the Greek romance while pressing the classical genre into service of his own innovative experimentation with affect. Of even greater significance is the fact that the
inherently undecidable, irresolute nature of affect and the suspense it produces mirrors the narrative structure of the *Persiles* itself, its protracted series of interruptions, interdictions, digressions, and deferrals prolonged until the very last pages of the text. It is for these reasons that a strict allegorical reading of the novel—as a story of love, religious redemption, or otherwise—must necessarily remain problematic and unstable, and attempts at reducing the work to a semantic unity will continue to fail to appreciate the full extent of its structural, thematic, aesthetic, and affective complexities.

Moreover, by elevating the materiality of human passions through what I have termed apophatic affect, Cervantes’s language of love subtly vindicates human agency over divine authority. Although any critical attempt at rescuing a generalized subversive function for the novel should be tempered by a recognition of the significant examples of imperial compliance, racial and ethnic essentialism, and religious dogma, my reading does allow for the potential to strike at the heart of these orthodoxies. As an epistemological alternative to reason and one that tends to elide and erode master discourses, affect invites us to consider the political possibilities of a new representational paradigm, a task being explored by a number of interdisciplinary scholars working on affect today. More fundamentally, I would argue, by undermining both hierarchical and universalizing logics, the aporetic qualities of the *Persiles* open a space of discord, dissent, and difference that is directly opposed to the apodictic, determinate nature of conventional discourse and knowledge. The Cervantine denial of a singularly effective hermeneutic for interpreting affect similarly suggests an almost postmodern skepticism of consensus and coalition.

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121 Although a complete list of such scholars would be far too long to include here, some principle examples of studies that focus on the interstices between affect and politics include Ahmed; Massumi; Protevi, *Political*; and Thrift. For a critique of the “affective turn” and its supposedly ambiguous relationship to political engagement, see Leys.
politics, advocating instead for a collective plurality in which mutual difference becomes productively valued instead of repressed. In short, in fashioning a ‘different’ practice of language, Cervantes offers us a language of difference.

And yet, while insisting on the relative nature of subjective experience, the Persiles does not reject out of hand the concept of absolute truth, as might be expected in a strictly Derridean model of aporia. Rather, it subsumes the normative standards of truth under its own affirmative valuation of difference. A closer examination of Cervantes’s discussion of history and fiction, cited above, will further aid in clarifying this point. First, the diverse experience of pilgrimage requires that its representation be equally diverse and composed of different things (“como la diversidad se compone de cosas diferentes, es forzoso que los casos lo sean”), a precept most certainly upheld by the Persiles, not to mention other Cervantine works, as I have already suggested. Fiction, in general, (understanding fábula in its broadest sense) is also dependent on diversity and difference but, unlike history, is predicated on a lie. This foundational lie of fiction, according to Cervantes’s narrator, produces dissonance in the rational faculties of the soul (“hace disonancia en el entendimiento”), but does not obstruct the formation of true harmony (“forme una verdadera armonía”). This statement thus encapsulates a microcosm of the novel as a whole: the dissonance of affect—effectively synonymous with the “desasosiego” of the soul—disrupts the logical flow of the narrative yet ultimately contributes to its harmony—a harmony, of course, of difference. Recalling Alberti’s prescriptive method for representing truth in every istoria (cited in this essay’s opening epigraph), Cervantes

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122 The multiple perspectives opened up by the affective aporias here, as I noted earlier regarding Cervantes’s innovation of the variatio trope, recall what has now become a commonplace that Cervantes’s works are “perspectival,” most famously suggested by Leo Spitzer’s study of Don Quijote. David Castillo, in (A)wry Views, updates the perspectival approach by claiming that Cervantes’s writing is “anamorphic.”
capitalizes on this difference by carefully yet nearly endlessly varying the affective gestures and poses of his characters, the movement of their souls moving those of his readers.

It has been widely argued that with his last novel Cervantes abandoned his long-standing commitment to verisimilitude. Américo Castro, for instance, claimed that the *Persiles* is “conscientemente inverosímil de la cruz a la fecha” (*Pensamiento* 95). But I would like to conclude by suggesting once more that, by depicting emotions in all their deferrals, discordance, and difficulties, Cervantine language in the *Persiles* consciously plays upon and mirrors the reality of such difficulties. “The language of this work,” De Armas Wilson contends, “is at times so innovative, so gnostic in its stance toward authority, that it disrupts the signifying order, expanding the bounds of the possible” (*Allegories* xiv). Indeed, as I demonstrated by the use of such paradoxical constructions as the oxymoron, Cervantes exposes and expands the *impossible possibilities* that undergird language. In the language of the mystics, “The greatest grammatical disorder would make the disturbing presence of the highest word credible. It created verisimilitude” (De Certeau 146). A similar kind of disorder in Cervantes’s language of affect creates verisimilitude as well. Unlike the romance genre upon which it is based, which according to Northrop Frye tends to avoid and elide “the ambiguities of ordinary life, where everything is a mixture of good and bad” (50), the consciously ambiguous, indeterminate, and ineffable qualities of emotion in the *Persiles* reflect the uncertainties of love and desire in lived experience. Such difficulties are even more pronounced in the Mediterranean, its own trials and tribulations.

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123 Ortega y Gasset; and Schevill and Bonilla are among the critics who have also chided the inverisimilitude of the *Persiles* (Riley 179). For more on the debate, see Riley (179-99); Alcalá Galán (226-31); and De Armas Wilson (*Allegories* 32-34). A most significant contribution to the question are the narrator’s own words, which promise in Book Two to describe “cosas que, aunque no pasan de la verdad, sobreponen a la imaginación, pues apenas pueden caber en la más sutil y dilatada sus acontecimientos” (I, 23: 276).
having undoubtedly produced and exacerbated emotional challenges, predicaments, and ambiguities for not only those historical individuals who found themselves subject its (mis)fortunes at sea, but whose friends, spouses, and lovers awaited news on _terra firma_ with similar anxiety and uncertainty. According to Aristotelian poetics, upon which the narrator's metafictional reflection is based (cited in the epigraph above), history represents what _did_ happen while fiction represents what _could have_ happened. However, a fictional representation should always adhere to a standard of verisimilitude, such that a verisimilar impossibility is always preferable to an inverisimilar possibility.\footnote{124} What may well be a preeminent truth of the _Persiles_ lies conspicuously in this distinction: its impossibilities are verisimilar. In real life, affect—and love, more specifically—is often aporetic and ineffable. It can be hindered by obstacles, misunderstandings, uncertainties, and differences. Love can even be a _trabajo_ or trial that is difficult to resolve, and the more cynical of us might even argue that “true” love is in fact impossible.\footnote{125} Perhaps it is this engagement with the Byzantine feelings of everyday life that, in spite of the work’s divine pretense and mystic precedents, also makes the _Persiles_ one of Cervantes’s most human.

\footnote{124}Along these lines, and in a twist of characteristically Cervantine irony and self-referentiality, at the beginning of Book Two the narrator remarks that "Parece que el autor desta historia sabia más de enamorado que de historiador" (II, 1: 279), due to his prolixity in describing jealousy.

\footnote{125}This is, in fact, what Derrida himself might have argued, given that, as in his analyses of friendship and the gift, true love cannot be experienced independently of an economy of reciprocity in which the beloved other is reduced to a calculation of utility (similar to Aristotle’s original formulation of “friendships of utility”). See Derrida, _The Politics of Friendship_; and Protevi, "Love." De Armas Wilson, for her part, implicitly recognizes the realism of such a claim when she offers that “Generic transformation is inscribed directly into Cervantes’s title where he employs the word _trabajos_ (trials, labors, ordeals) as a substitute for Heliodorus’s use of _amores_ (loves). Love in the late Renaissance, as the _Persiles_ makes clear, is becoming harder work for men and women alike” (_Allegories_ 42-43).
Through feeling shame, the body inaugurates an alternative way of being in the world. Shame, as the body’s reflection on itself, may reorder the composition of the habitus, which in turn may allow for quite different choices.

Elspeth Probyn, *Blush*
CHAPTER FOUR: “Salido a la vergüenza”: Inquisition, Penalty, and a Cervantine View of Mediterranean ‘Values’

The art of punishing, then, must rest on a whole technology of representation.
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish

The seventh of November, 1604 was to have been a memorable day for the residents of Triana, an arrabal along the banks of the Guadalquivir which had hosted the headquarters of the Spanish Inquisition since the year 1481. Preparations for an auto de fe scheduled for that day were nearly complete, and, on the eve of the infamous act’s celebration, throngs of ardent spectators filled the streets to witness the procession of the Green Cross, all while the prisoners awaited their fate in the town’s castle. As Fernando de Acevedo—a canon, inquisitor, and statesman for King Philip III—described the scene, “estaba todo el arsenal [sic, arenal] de Sevilla y Triana y el castillo lleno de gente, y que eran las once de la noche, y todos esperando a la mañana, para ver salir los presos al auto, y la Cruz puesta en el cadahalso, y doce religiosos velándola” (109). And then, around the same time that night, an urgent royal decree was received to suspend the auto de fe: “Cuando está Sevilla y toda su comarca esperando la celebración del auto, oyen la voz de un pregonero diciendo que por justos respetos se suspendía y luego comenzó un sentimiento grande en todos, una tristeza interior como si cada uno fuera el agravado... conocióse en este sentimiento y suceso el amor y respeto junto con temor que a la Inquisición se tiene”” (Acevedo 108). As the most visible face of the Inquisition’s varied activities, the public

126 I have modernized the spelling of these citations from Acevedo. After the intervention of the Grand Inquisitor before Philip III himself, the auto de fe was eventually rescheduled and carried out, much to the satisfaction, according to Acevedo, of the population of Triana, “que se alegró y consoló al doble del desconsuelo que habían recibido del lance pasado” (111). For the reasons behind its original suspension, see Domínguez Ortiz 86.
auto de fe general capitalized on its increasingly theatrical qualities as a Baroque spectacle to become a potent force in the imagination of the Spanish populace, a source of public fervor as well as a repository into which it was strategically channeled. But Acevedo’s account also poignantly illustrates the range and intensity of the emotions that such a spectacle (or, in this case, its last-minute cancellation) could stir in its attendees, from a general feeling of affliction and internal sadness to seemingly contradictory sentiments of love, respect, and fear. The observation that each jilted bystander felt as though he or she were the “agraviado,” by internalizing the feeling of offense typically reserved for the accused, suggests at least two more: honor and shame, concepts which have been identified as largely accounting for the general effectiveness of inquisitorial practice in the early modern Mediterranean.

Although the aggrandizing or propagandistic identification of ‘love’ and ‘respect’ for the Inquisition in Acevedo’s description would likely contrast rather starkly with the affective associations of many everyday citizens with the institution, this disparity alerts us to the rhetorical, discursive, and performative praxis of inquisitorial attempts to appropriate and exploit certain collective emotions toward politico-religious ends. In Pierre Bourdieu’s terms, honor and shame thus constituted an emotional “habitus” that structured social and political practices, actuated through a kind of recursive function or feedback loop in which the affective content of lived experience was absorbed and instrumentalized by an institution such as the Inquisition only to percolate back down to inform the feelings of everyday life. This phenomenon is perhaps most clear in the morphological distinction between shame as a noun (the feeling of being ashamed) and shame as a verb (the action of shaming), one which will form a principle line of analysis in
the present chapter. Literature and other forms of cultural production intervene in this tension as well, and Cervantes’s writing, in particular, demonstrates a marked interest in exploring the affective valences that inevitably attend historical practices, even one at first blush as cold and calculated as the inquisitional auto de fe. While a more or less explicit representation of an auto de fe in Don Quijote has long been recognized by critics (Sancho’s parodic trial in the duke and duchess’s castle [II, 69: 1294-1301]), I identify a similarly inquisitorial discourse in the principle character’s encagement throughout the final chapters of the 1605 novel (I, 46-52). Until now, the critical attention paid to Don Quijote’s enjaulamiento has chiefly focused on either its historical use as a treatment for madness or its precedents in the romances of chivalry.127 Without discounting these intertextual parallels, my close reading of these chapters uncovers a potentially more subversive influence: that of early modern methods of dealing with criminality, and especially those informed by inquisitorial and popular practices of public shaming. As far as I am aware, this particular element has yet to be recognized as an historical undertone of Don Quijote’s encagement. Beyond recovering an alternative historical context for these episodes, my purpose here will be to suggest how, by attending closely to the characterological manifestations of an emotion like shame, we stand to gain a more nuanced—if ultimately less unified—view of the ways in which it was expressed, manipulated, transformed, and exchanged in the affective economy of the early modern Mediterranean. My consideration

127 “Hay aquí, sin duda alguna, una reminiscencia de un viejo tema caballeresco, el vergonzoso carro en el que Lanzarote se ve precisado a montar, siendo objeto de la mofa de todo el mundo, cuando parte para rescatar a la reina Ginebra, episodio fundamental de la novela de Chrétien de Troyes Li chevaliers de la charrette, que fue imitado en libros posteriores. La humillación de Lanzarote es en cierto modo similar a la humillación de don Quijote” (Riquer, Aproximación 129). In his Caballeros andantes españoles, Riquer also details the “ósmosis entre lo real y lo novelesco” concerning the historical and literary theme of the knight errant (15). For the cage’s relationship to madness, see Shuger.
of the heuristic possibilities opened by shame will allow me to conclude by gesturing towards an ethical reevaluation of its role in the constitution of supposed Mediterranean ‘values,’ a role which stands to challenge dominant structures of power through an affirmation of defeat and to prescribe an ethics which dwells at the intersection of personal virtue and political, non-violent dissent. First, however, it will be necessary to situate my analysis against the multidisciplinary backdrop of the ongoing and often polemical debates surrounding honor and shame in the Mediterranean.128

Rooted in Roman Catholic doctrine and practiced in Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and the Papal States, the Christian Inquisition—despite its more limited practice in other parts of Europe and later expansion to some Asian and American colonies—was a decidedly Mediterranean phenomenon. The inquisitor’s manuals, instrucciones, and cartas acordadas that governed inquisitional practice were often circulated and reprinted across the Mediterranean and thus formed part of its dynamic networks of exchange. Likewise, honor and shame have long been identified—to employ the terminology of mid-twentieth-century anthropology—as the ‘values’ of Mediterranean society. In Cervantes’s works, shame—as well as emotion(s) more broadly—is often framed by historical structures which were at once common to a significant part of the Mediterranean context at large—such as the Inquisition—as well as locally developed along cultural, regional, national, and

128 As has been the case with emotion more broadly, the number of studies on shame and its various cultural and literary applications has increased significantly in the last two decades, and especially the last five years, for example in relation to psychoanalysis (Adamson and Clark; Broucek); queer studies (Munt); death (Kauffman); and Shakespeare (Fernie). Additional recent monographs on shame include Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni; Bewes; and Boquet. For shame’s relationship to penalty and criminality in an even broader European context, see Hamblet; Stuart; Sère and Wettlauffer; and Nash and Kilday.
imperial lines. By focusing on these structures or shame’s enabling conditions, a more complete mapping of these lines stands to be drawn, in addition to the networks, nodes, and flows between them. This approach is consistent with the Braudelian view of the Mediterranean as a space both incapable of being grasped independently of that which lies outside of it and one which is undermined by an artificial adherence to rigid boundaries. The very nature of shame is such that it may be provoked precisely by a transgression of these boundaries, simultaneously calling our attention to their existence while highlighting the fluidity, dynamism, and interdependence of cultural contact zones. In short, and to reiterate the argument I set forth in Chapter 1, the geographical unity of the Mediterranean should not be taken as a priori evidence of emotional uniformity. My analysis in this chapter, therefore, supposes two complementary yet divergent conceptual maneuvers: on the one hand, forestalling the reification of a homogenous or monolithic ‘Mediterranean(ism),’ and, on the other, demystifying the honor-shame binary by recovering the real, material, or corporal conditions of the latter. Throughout this analysis, I intend to keep the lines of conversation between Braudel and Castro open, even if it is here that the latter’s criticism—namely, that Braudel’s model had neglected “el sentir de la gente” and the racial politics of limpieza de sangre—may seem to be in starkest relief. By continuing to withhold any attempt at resolving these apparent dialectical differences, I likewise hope to further plot some of the shared profits and perils that arise upon

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129 For more information on Don Quijote’s own relation to the Inquisition, including the censorship of one passage in particular, see Castro’s “Cervantes y la Inquisición” (Obra reunida 493-99). If, as Olmos García asserts, Cervantes exhibited “una actitud hostil” toward the Inquisition (81), then the case of Cenotia in the Persiles is probably the most convincing proof: “La persecución de los que llaman inquisidores en España me arrancó de mi patria, que cuando se sale por fuerza de ella, antes puede decirse arrancada que salida. Vine a esta isla por extraños rodeos, por infinitos peligros, casi siempre como si estuvieran cerca, volviendo la cabeza atrás, pensando que me mordían las faldas los perros, que aun hasta aquí temo” (II, 8: 332).
interrogating Cervantine affectivity within a Mediterranean framework. All the while, by anchoring my analysis in a case study of shame punishments, the dialogue with Horden and Purcell’s paradigm of “microecologies” will continue as well, wary though we ought to remain of any facile temptation to prescribe it as a synthetical solution.

**Anthropologies of Mediterranean Honor and Shame**

*Blushing is the most peculiar and the most human of all expressions.*
Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*

In addition to a direct response to Braudel, the coining of this term, in fact, is an attempt by Horden and Purcell to account for the place of honor and shame, which “might suitably be interpreted as the values of Mediterranean microecologies” (518). Indeed, an overt assumption that honor and shame are simply counterparts of the same cultural phenomenon has tended to color many anthropological studies of these Mediterranean ‘values.’ In the introduction to *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, for example, J. G. Peristiany discusses honor and shame as merely “two poles of an evaluation” (9). Such a conflation is perhaps partly responsible for the disproportionate level of critical attention that has been granted to honor over its complementary “pole.” As a fictional theme, it is nearly ubiquitous in the *comedia*, especially those of Lope, Calderón, and Tirso. Lope went so far as to prescribe honor as the most reliable means of moving a theatrical audience.130 Castro has written extensively on the importance of honor in Cervantes’s

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130 In his *Arte nuevo de hacer comedias*, Lope states that “los casos de honra son mejores,/ porque mueven con más fuerza a toda gente” (149). The nearly ubiquitous presence of honor in the *comedia* has also been studied at length by scholars such as Arellano; Caro Baroja (“Religion”); Castro (“Algunas observaciones”);
works, and it was no less omnipresent, so the story goes, as a social phenomenon: it was the linchpin in relations between *caballeros*, the *sine qua non* of female worth, the watchword of early modern Spanish society at large. Bartolomé Bennassar even went so far as to claim that "If there was one passion capable of defining the conduct of the Spanish people, it was the passion of honor" (213). Shame, on the other hand—perhaps due to its own will to concealment—is not equally visible, neither in the primary texts themselves nor in works of early modern historiography and textual criticism. As I hope will become clear, however, the affect of shame is not only distinct from honor and a meaningful object of study in its own right but is also present as a crucial narrative feature in *Don Quijote*, even if not as immediately discernible as honor. Modern psychologists and personality theorists such as Silvan Tomkins, whose work on shame was responsible for inspiring several later publications in the field of cultural studies, have identified a number of other contrasting emotions for shame and placed them on “axes” that correspond to the affect’s polyvalent attachments, such as shame-pride, shame-humiliation, shame-guilt, shame-fear, and shame-rage. The extended idea in classical, medieval, and early modern thought that shame could serve a positive function as a marker of virtue—in effect, as a quality seen as honorable—further serves to deconstruct a facile honor-shame dichotomy. By remarking on these complexities, what I wish to underscore is not that shame was entirely independent of the ‘honor code’ that has often been taken for granted as a fundamental

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131 In his study of Renaissance concepts of shame, Gundersheimer notes a few—but not all—of these axes as well (34-36). Among Tomkin’s broad influences are the physician and psychiatrist Donald L. Nathanson and the late literary critic and cultural theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, both of whom have written extensively on shame. See especially the latter’s “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins” (with Adam Frank).
characteristic of Mediterranean societies, but rather that shame often functions in modes quite different from honor and which would remain overlooked by a strict adherence to such traditional generalizations. The picaresque novel, a genre for which we might identify yet another axis for shame—shamelessness—rather conspicuously attests to this reality: although honor tended to be reserved for a relatively small sector of society, shame was available to all, even if the very idea of the picaresque is borne by the figure of the sinvergüenza. Troubling the honor-shame binary even further is the fact that, in this way, vergüenza itself could also signify something akin to honor, since “[p]ersons con vergüenza are persons of honor, persons of their word” (Cassin 1196). Something similar happens in English when the theoretically antonymical terms “shameful” and “shameless” coincide to describe a brazen and deplorable action, an action that ought to have produced shame—and yet seems to lack it entirely.

These unique complexities of shame also inhere in the semantic registers of the word itself, for which, as I noted in my preface regarding such terms as affect, emotion, and passion, at this time another word of caution is in order regarding the problem of translation. Although the translation of nearly any term or concept must necessarily

132 The most comprehensive critique of the overstated importance of honor in Golden Age society is to be found in Taylor, who advocates instead for a “rhetoric of honor” by undermining the rigidity of the ‘honor code’ through an extensive examination of seventeenth-century criminal justice proceedings. For her part, Poska shows that the ‘honor code’ did not in practice apply to the impoverished members of early modern Galician society, especially women. The fallacy and limitations of the honor-shame binary are also underscored by Wikan (635-36); and Kressel and Arioti.

133 In this way, vergüenza could be considered a striking example of what Freud, in his short essay remarking on a pamphlet by the philologist Carl Abel, calls words of “antithetical meaning.” Terms of this kind constitute “contradictory primal meanings,” or in essence contain in a single term both a defining quality and its opposite. Among others, Freud cites as an example the word sacer, which in Latin could denote both “sacred” and “accursed” (99). At the heart of this paradox is a problem that would go on to occupy Freud in his discussion of the Unheimliche, as well as the foundation of Saussurean linguistics and, later, Derridean deconstruction (see Freud’s “The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words”; also noted in Allen 204). Curiously, it might be noted in passing that shame itself received little attention from Freud, who instead focused more on guilt and anxiety and regarded shame as a cause of repression and thus, like other emotions, as a barrier to the process of analysis.
confront the challenges of most adequately conveying its unique cultural context, this is particularly true of emotions, and especially of shame. Yakov Malkiel, for example, has suggested “five distinct shadings” of the classical Latin *verecundia*, from which the Spanish *vergüenza* derives: “(1) ‘reserve,’ ‘restraint’; (2) ‘delicacy,’ ‘decency,’ ‘bashfulness,’ ‘chastity’; (3) ‘sense of shame,’ ‘blush’; (4) ‘respect,’ ‘esteem’ (for somebody else); (5) ‘timidity,’ ‘self-consciousness,’ ‘embarrassment’” (514). He further notes that *vergüenza* underwent “a significant extension of meaning” beyond these connotations of its Latin precedent and speculates that this semantic variation is due to the complex nature of shame as an affect: “shame is inherently ambiguous, applying to the hesitation to commit something that is censurable (i.e. an emotional state preceding the action) and the regret or repentance felt after the action has been accomplished” (514). The term “vergüenza” is even included in Barbara Cassin's recent *Dictionary of Untranslatables* (1195-98), an ambitious collection of singularly unique terms from many different languages whose meanings hold valuable philosophical insights yet resist facile translation. Unlike the French *vergogne*, for example, which has become obsolete except in its negative form (*sans vergogne*, “exclusively as a figure of accusation or judgment”), *vergüenza* is considerably more nuanced and complex, especially in its uniquely lexicalized form *vergüenza ajena*. Connoting and contributing to a truly untranslatable sense of “social solidarity” and “sense of community,” the concept of *vergüenza ajena* is a theme that, in one way or another, will span the course of these remaining dissertation chapters (Cassin 1196).

And yet in addition to simply “vergüenza,” the idea of shame is expressed by a plethora of other sixteenth- and seventeenth-century words, especially those which etymologically denoted its physiognomic qualities, such as *acato, afrentarse, atajarse,*
confusión, correrse, cortedad, deshonra, desprecio, empacho, encogimiento, infamia, pudor, pundonor, recato, rubor, sonrojo, and turbar, as well as related yet equally complex terms like sinvergüenza, desvergüenza, and vergüenza ajena. The very proliferation of such terms attests to the mutual influence between language and affect while underscoring the abiding complexity of their mediation by early modern Spanish culture.\footnote{The proliferation of refrains corroborates the cultural importance of shame in early modern Spain as well, for example: “Mucho miedo, y poca vergüenza”; “Cara a cara vergüenza se cata”; “Más vale vergüenza en cara, que mancilla en corazón”; “Quien no tiene vergüenza, todo el campo es suyo” (Autoridades III: 464); “A poca barba, poca vergüenza”; “Al moço vergonçoso, el diablo le llevó a palacio” (Covarrubias, Tesoro 1002).} What is clear is that the English word “shame” remains inadequate for expressing these nuances, and a risk emerges that the great complexities of the emotion end up neutralized by the limitations of a single term.\footnote{Herzfeld recognizes similar pitfalls regarding “honor,” for which English-language cognates, “which are not necessarily matched in the semantic domain, make it particularly hard to abandon the habit of assuming virtual equivalence,” and goes on to say that “such concentration on a single well-defined variable suggests that the term ‘honour’ may itself be redundant. Its use has already introduced an element of nominalism” (“Honour and Shame,” 340).} Similarly, far from a kind of master key for the entire psychological profile of Don Quijote, shame must be understood in terms of its polyvalence as well as the fluidity and interdependence it maintains with other affects such as pride, guilt, melancholy, or honor. I will thus attempt whenever practical to contextualize my analysis with original usage and reference to both Covarrubias and the narrative circumstances of the emotion’s appearance. In short, it is my desire to highlight the heuristic benefits of reading Don Quijote through the lens of shame without subsuming the complexities of the novel nor those of shame itself to the limitations of language (insofar as that is ever possible).

It bears recalling that honor and shame have often been entangled in the kinds of stereotypical or unquestioned essentialisms that sought to relegate Mediterranean cultures to a more irrational and uncivilized status than that of their northern European
counterparts, a phenomenon not unrelated to the imperial and ideological interests behind the Black Legend (which was partly fuelled by Spain’s association with the Inquisition). But these gestures have influenced a vein of Spanish literary criticism since the nineteenth century as well: on the one hand, ethnocentric attempts to dismiss southern European cultures as hopelessly impassioned, violent, and obsessed with honor; and on the other, their no less vocal defenders, who sought to elevate the supposedly exceptional valuation of personal honor as a Spanish national virtue—to claim honor itself as a badge of honor, as it were. Of the former camp, the words of A. F. Schack may ring particularly forceful to modern ears: “Esta costumbre era tan general y absoluta, que nadie podía esquivar su imperio... El apasionamiento de este pueblo meridional sentía crecer su sed de venganza por la influencia de la opinión pública” (qtd. in Castro, *Semblanzas* 321-22). In the latter, Menéndez Pidal responded no less vehemently by criticizing his “españolísimo” compatriot and Golden Age literary champion Menéndez y Pelayo for his suggestion that honor was impelled by an “egoísmo enfermizo”:

> es muy impropio llamar egoísmo al que impulsa las venganzas de honor [...] Todo hombre digno ha de conservar intacto el precioso patrimonio del honor social de que cada uno es depositario y guardián, honor que anima la existencia entera de la comunidad, para vivir su vida colectiva con elevado ánimo y virtuoso esfuerzo. No defender ese patrimonio es cobardía bastarda, es hacerse cómplice del atropello cometido por el ofensor en daño del honor colectivo, maltrecho en la parte al individuo encomendada. (357; 361-62)\(^{136}\)

\(^{136}\) In light of these words, further demonstration of Menéndez Pidal’s views would seem dispensable; however, he goes on to recognize, perhaps *malgré lui*, the entanglement of other feelings with honor: “Basta recordar de un lado al norteamericano Ticknor, quien, tan incomprensivo siempre a todo lo extraño a su
Menéndez Pidal, along with Castro (who also suffered his fair share of accusations of tainting the purity of Spanish literary history), endeavored to trace the concept of a uniquely Spanish sense of honor back to a plethora of possible historical and literary sources: from the epic (Menéndez Pidal 365) to the Italian drama (Castro, *Semblanzas* 329) as well as the casuists (350-54), Arabs, Goths, romances of chivalry, and, quite simply, Spanish national character (324). It would be difficult to cite a case as compelling as these examples of how the affective valences of early modern literature have continued several centuries later to exercise such a powerful influence over their reception, stirring sentiments of disdain, pride, rancor, indignation, and, indeed, honor among philologists so ostensibly detached by reasoned objectivity from these works of the national canon. While denouncing Menéndez y Pelayo’s “apreciación emotiva,” Menéndez Pidal himself even ponders the peculiarity of this emotional investment, ascribing it to the idea that “el honor queda en un pasado próximo que prolonga sus efectos entre nosostros y que miramos todavía con pasión de actualidad y casi de partido” (361).

Indeed, the reception of *Don Quijote*—the work that would eventually attain the honor of the most famous and celebrated in the history of the Spanish canon—evinces similarly passionate debate and, according to Agapita Jurado Santos, even violent responses among critics who regarded the novel as damaging to national pride, honor, and dignity (272). In his mid-eighteenth-century defense of Spanish theatre, Tomás de Erauso y Zavaleta averred, for example, that “Aquel ruidoso parto de la fantasía de Cervantes, tuvo y tiene universal aprecio que durará mientras hay nombres. Esto no es fortuna ni honroso pensamiento protestante, juzgaba extravagante por enteró la idea del honor; basta poner de otro lado al españolísimo Menéndez Pelayo, que hallaba odiosos los protagonistas de las venganzas maritales. Esta repulsión en críticos de orientación tan diversa indica que hay en el antiguo sentimiento del honor algunos aspectos que pugnan muy honda y muy complicadamente con otros sentimientos” (357).
título de la Nación como creen muchos [...] porque, bien mirado, más es borrón que lustre su Obra, en que hallan los Estrangeros testimoniado el concepto que hacen de que somos ridículamente vanos, tios, fanfarrones y preciados, con aprehensión errada, de una tal alta y seria cavallerosidad, que nos hace risibles” (qtd. in Jurado Santos 272). To the classicist argument that Cervantes’s innovation failed to uphold traditional standards of verisimilitude and other poetic precepts Erauso y Zavaleta added the complaint that it had made a mockery of Spaniards themselves, and in this he was not alone. Critics from both within Spain and beyond claimed that the Quijote scandalously tarnished not only the national literary reputation, but the moral one as well, as pointedly demonstrated by a mid-eighteenth-century poem of dubious authorship:

Aplaudió España la obra
No advirtiendo, inadvertidos
Que era del honor de España
Su autor verdugo y cuchillo,
Constando allí vilipendios
De la Nación repetidos,
De ridículo marcando
De España el valor temido [...] 
Hicieron de España burla
Sus amigos y enemigos.
Y ésta fue la causa porque
Fueron tan bien recibidos
Estos libros en Europa,
The portrayal of *Don Quijote* as the death blow to Spanish honor will only serve to strengthen my argument below of the potential of the novel and its principal character to undermine the honor discourse of the early modern Mediterranean through shame. In effect, the perception among the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Spanish elite that “*don Quijote está ridiculizando a la nobleza y el sentido de la honra y del honor de su tiempo*” reveals that “*lo que sintieron fue la vergüenza de que los lectores extranjeros pudieran identificar a un personaje, visto esencialmente como ridículo con ellos mismos*” (Jurado Santos 272; 274).

In his introduction to the first edition of *Don Quijote* by the Real Academia Española of 1780 (“Juicio crítico o análisis del *Quijote*”), Vicente de los Ríos intervened in the polemic by vindicating the novel not as a critique of Spanish society at large (or of the Spanish nobility in particular), but as merely a critique of the outmoded romances of chivalry, and more specifically of the vices of knight errantry (such as invoking the name of their maidens instead of God before a battle) or “*el falso pundonor de la caballería andante*” (275). Going on to show that knight errantry was itself a broader European phenomenon, Ríos simultaneously attempted to quell the debate over the novel that had roiled among the aristocracy and foreign critics since its publication, to conjure and defend a more respected place for it in the national canon, and to deflect some of the moral objections away from
Spain: "la verdad es que el espíritu caballeresco era común a toda Europa, y que Cervantes fue demasiado sabio para ignorarlo, y muy honrado para ser ingenioso en desdoro de su nación [...] Cervantes intentó desterrar aquellos excesos y los libros que los autorizaban y lo intentó sabiendo por experiencia propia que su práctica y lectura era moda dentro y fuera de España, y que eran vicios de los hombres, y no precisamente de los españoles" (275). By attempting to absolve Cervantes of the allegation that he was the “verdugo y cuchillo” of Spanish honor, Ríos not only resuscitates the victim, but also paves the way for the author to become lionized (not without considerable irony) as the archetype of Spanish literature and point of pride for the country at large. And yet in the same stroke, Ríos disavows the national shame that Don Quijote had originally produced, since his attempt to advance a new interpretation of the novel “no es otro que el de sentir vergüenza de lo que se nos representa ridículo y apartarnos así de ello” (Jurado Santos 275). As I will argue in the following chapter, these words might apply just as convincingly to the novel’s main character, who gradually tries to distance himself from the shame and humiliation he feels before the ridicule of other characters.

Ironically, once again, the novel’s elevation ultimately depended upon foreign critics—especially nineteenth-century German romantics and philologists—as Francisco Rico succinctly explains: “La excepcional fortuna del Quijote en el resto de Europa es un elemento básico para comprender que en España se convirtiera en el clásico nacional por excelencia. Ese encumbramiento quizás no se hubiera producido si sólo se lo hubiera contemplado de fronteras adentro” (qtd. in Jurado Santos 278).

Ríos himself confesses as much in the following quote: “Todos los hombres tenemos una secreta propensión a la sátira y a la burla [...] En ella encontramos dos gustos: el de ver lo ridículo de los vicios, y el de verlo aplicado a otro sujeto distinto. Esto... nos mueve a desviar y apartar lejos de nosotros la ridiculez que en otros nos ha provocado a risa. Igualmente, aquellos pocos a quienes el mismo amor propio les permite que se conozcan poseídos de aquel vicio, y comprendidos en la burla o remedio, no sólo no se atreverán a continuarlo, sino que lo evitan con cuidado, temiendo hacerse objeto de risa a los demás, y parecer en público como retratos de aquel original” (275). After studying several more examples than those I have briefly mentioned here, Jurado Santos concludes that “hoy, después de tres siglos, no podemos sorprendernos o rechazar lo que los documentos presentados demuestran claramente: que entre los siglos XVII y XVIII algunos lectores españoles, buena parte de la nobleza, sintió vergüenza al ver la difusión internacional de ese ridículo caballero manchego” (278).
What these examples of criticism over the course of three centuries lay bare, in any case, is that with honor we are dealing not so much with the affective reality or feelings of a discrete epoch as with a discourse, one with a lengthy trajectory in various spheres of Mediterranean culture, historiography, and the popular imaginary. By this I do not mean to imply that seventeenth-century everyday life was devoid of honor or that the Spaniard, noble or otherwise, did not feel honor. On the contrary, its extreme popularity in the comedia stands as singular proof of the fact, as Scott K. Taylor’s albeit skeptical study of the Iberian ‘honor code’ concedes, that “honor gripped the imaginations of early modern Castilians themselves” (5). It is clear, rather, that the proliferation of discourses of and about honor has exceeded the enabling conditions that accompanied its emergence; the signifier has largely eclipsed the signified, not to mention its oft-polarized counterpart of shame. For these reasons, recuperating honor’s meaning as an affect—as I am attempting to do with shame—would prove to be highly fraught, if not altogether problematic. It could be argued, of course, that shame is just as discursive a phenomenon as honor; in effect, the discourse of shame is what to a great extent enables its force as a tool of coercion, politico-religious power, and punishment, as I hope to demonstrate in the following analysis. But in pointing out shame’s visual, material, physiognomic, or bodily qualities, I hope to establish that such characteristics are distinctive not only of the affect itself but of Cervantes’s art of the novel as well.

These examples, furthermore, alert us to the care that must be taken whenever attempting to ascribe certain emotional characteristics or moral values to any collective social group, and even more so when that group encompasses a geographical and cultural area as vast and diverse as the Mediterranean. The publication of Peristiany’s volume
marked an important advancement in sociology and cultural anthropology and, specifically, in building an anthropological framework for a comparative understanding of Mediterranean emotions. While conceding that honor and shame were present to some degree in all societies and attempting to qualify their conclusions by focusing on discrete ethnographic contexts within the Mediterranean, *Honour and Shame* served as the touchstone for a disciplinary and ideological debate among anthropologists in the following decades.\(^{139}\) This debate was led by Michael Herzfeld, who echoes the acute linguistic limitations I described above in order to sound a warning bell regarding the ethical stakes of an honor/shame-based Mediterranean and its inherent danger of giving “the impression that the objective of anthropological analysis is to generalize about the cultural characteristics of particular regions, rather than to synthesize the results of a far more intensely localized form of ethnography into a globally effective portrait of humankind.”

Even more alarmingly, he adds that ‘Mediterraneanism’ “thus becomes one of several means whereby anthropology risks aiding and abetting the perpetuations of cultural stereotypes” (“The Horns” 439). Notwithstanding such concerns, recent interdisciplinary developments and momentum in affect theory stand as a compelling invitation to reopen the debate regarding these emotions of such ostensibly fundamental importance to the

\(^{139}\) Regarding the debate among anthropologists, see especially Herzfeld (“Honour and Shame”; “The Horns”; “Of Horns and History”); and Galt, who carried out an exchange of mutual criticism in the journal *American Ethnologist* in the mid-eighties that centered largely on the honor-shame question in Mediterranean cultures. Boissevain; Davis; and Horden and Purcell (485-523; 637-41) are also important for contextualizing the more general polemic of Mediterraneanism among anthropologists and ethnographers since the publication of Peristiany’s volume. It should be noted, however, that this work was not the first to generate controversy through an attempt to classify regional or national emotions. One of the most influential examples remains Ruth Benedict’s *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, an anthropological attempt at describing the purportedly shame-based culture of WWII-era Japan in opposition to the predominance of guilt in Western society. A similar distinction was made by Dodds from a more literary perspective in his renowned study of classic Greek culture. Rosaldo, on the other hand, provides a helpful discussion of how anthropology may approach the question of emotions more broadly.
early modern Mediterranean—especially shame, whose social, cultural, and literary value has been relegated to the dialectic shadow of honor far too long.

And yet I hasten to add that as literary scholars we must take similar care not to fall prey to the pitfalls of Mediterraneanism confronted by cultural anthropologists in the latter half of the twentieth century. Although temporal and objective distance may dampen the impact of such questions (i.e. the study of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century cultural production as opposed to ethnographies of living populations), it should not blunt the precision and historical accuracy with which we engage our texts. We must also remain mindful of these lessons from anthropology in order to avoid perpetuating generalizations, reducing complexities, or reproducing essentialisms—for example that of a putative early modern Spanish ‘honor society.’ This task is now even more imperative given the current and rapidly growing interest among humanities and social science fields in ‘Mediterranean Studies.’ To be sure, these pitfalls are further magnified in the psychological realm: due predominately to what I have already noted is the lack of a universal critical vocabulary for classifying and analyzing emotions, an oversimplification of Mediterranean affectivity is nearly unavoidable. In the midst of these numerous cautionary cases and caveats, however, an affect like shame, when contextualized within discrete historical practices and social structures, offers considerable purchase for understanding how various forms of cultural production intervened in the construction of a distinctly Mediterranean affective economy, as well as for disentangling the more localized threads of everyday emotional experience which were gradually interwoven across this dynamic space to form the complex, knotted tapestry of values, valorizations, and reevaluations that confront cultural historians and literary scholars of the Mediterranean basin today.
Visual Topographies of Shame

‘Shame is in the eyes.’
Proverb noted by Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

Returning to the problem of shame itself, Aristotle describes the affect as intimately associated with the public sphere and as one that typically circulated in and through economies of the visual. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he defines shame as a “kind of fear of disrepute” (1128b11) and essentially “an emotional response or judgment regarding public opinion” (Sokolon 109). In the *Rhetoric*, he elaborates this definition in order to demonstrate shame’s utility as a rhetorical device precisely for manipulating the opinion of one’s public: “Since shame is imagination [phantasia] about a loss of reputation and for its own sake, not for its results, and since no one cares about reputation [in the abstract] but on account of those who hold an opinion of him, necessarily a person feels shame toward those whose opinion he takes account of. [...] And they feel more shame at things done before these people's eyes and in the open” (1384a22-36). For Aristotle, shame is not only irreducibly social, but asserts itself in varying intensities according to social status or another’s capacity for providing favors or material gain. In ancient Greece, for example, this meant that one would never have been ashamed before a slave, but should feel shame only among peers of equal or greater social standing. This description also underlines shame’s crucial interdependence with the sense of sight by its explicit location ‘in the eyes’ as well as its particular efficiency in producing visual representations or *phantasia* in the mind of whoever contemplates its socially deleterious effects. These visual registers of shame are partly responsible for what was regarded by Aristotle as its virtuous function:
the concern with one’s appearance before the *polis* prescribed shame as a form of social regulation in its ability to develop and control ethical citizens. In other words, the fear of shame was seen to ensure proper behavior and mitigate the moral transgressions of those who lacked innate virtue (i.e., women, slaves, and the young).

Another unique aspect of the visual modalities of shame resides in its often involuntary capacity for provoking bodily, physiological evidence of its presence, especially in the form of blushing, a response also recognized and described by Aristotle. The blush was understood as part of shame’s will to conceal, since “shame threatens the soul that is revealed to us by means of facial expression, blood rushes to the face to cover it. Gesture provides a second line of defense, for in a state of shame ‘people cover their face with their hands and lower their eyes as if they wanted their whole face to disappear under their brows’” (Gundersheimer 47). As Charles Darwin would succinctly enumerate later on, additional semiotic cues of shame include “averting of the gaze; turning away of the face; covering of the face with the hands; partial or complete closing of the eyes; involuntary movements of the eyes; unnatural brightness in the eyes; affectation of manner” (qtd. in Walton 241). These observations highlight the recognizable power of shame to manifest itself in a visible manner as well as its inducement of the subject to physically evade the cause of his or her emotional discomfort (i.e., attempting to hide him- or herself from the gaze of another). These strictly physiognomic indicators of shame facilitated the affect’s aesthetic representation in pictorial arts and literature. That is, as an affect which could be
visibly observed, it was particularly well suited to the narrative descriptions of a character’s emotional state.¹⁴⁰

More recently, scholars of cultural studies and other literary traditions have emphasized that shame is not merely an emotion to be repressed, overcome, or, indeed, ashamed of, but that it is attached in an affirmative way to what Tomkins called “interest.” Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank, highly influenced by Tomkins, explain that “the pulsations of cathexis around shame... are what either enable or disenable so basic a function as the ability to be interested in the world” (97). Shame thus has the potential to “[highlight] unknown or unappreciated investments,” to indicate where one’s interests lie even when they are not self-evident (Probyn 14). These interests or investments roughly correspond to what I have already referred to as shame’s enabling conditions, or the cultural, historical, and aesthetic factors which, to one degree or another, inevitably attend its expression in Cervantes’s works. Fictional narrative can therefore be a powerful tool for exploring shame as a lived experience, for uncovering the “unknown,” “unappreciated” or poorly understood regarding these factors; likewise, the vital, lived experience of shame offers an equally potent means to reflect upon Cervantes’s writing. In Don Quijote, Cervantes developed a psychologically complex character capable of self-reflection, inner doubt, and emotional dynamism, qualities informed not only by the poetic conventions of the novel, but also by Cervantes’s keen awareness of the historical and political landscape of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Mediterranean. Don Quijote’s evolution throughout the novel is thus informed by the affective binds produced in the tension between, on the

¹⁴⁰Antonio Martín Moreno provides a fascinating account of the physiognomy of emotions like shame, which led to ekphrastic descriptions of and prescriptive treatises on their aesthetic representation in authors such as Antonio Bonet, Charles Le Brun and Fray Matías de Irala (Martín Moreno 342; 354-57).
one hand, the heroic impulse of his chivalric ethos and, on the other, the increasing social demands of modernity, the courtly strictures of the “civilizing process,” the rise of the state, the development of modern practices of warfare and military professionalism, and popular and inquisitorial forms of punishment. As an affect which is culturally inflected (that is to say, shame was felt in the seventeenth century for different reasons than today), shame alerts us to this tension as, like the blush on Don Quijote’s face, a kind of red flag indicating the various anxieties behind its emergence.

In accordance with Darwin and others, Tomkins explains that the “innate activator of shame is the incomplete reduction of interest or joy. Hence any barrier to further exploration which partially reduces interest... will activate the lowering of the head and eyes in shame and reduce further exploration or self-exposure” (Affect 23; see also Tomkins, “Varieties”). Along with the blush, these physiognomic and visual registers of shame—as those of various other emotions I discussed in Part One of the dissertation—often play a crucial role in signaling shameful moments in the novel. Although I will examine several of these examples in greater detail in the following chapter, the episode of the fulling hammers is particularly illuminating for this phenomenon and my purposes in this chapter: “Cuando don Quijote vio lo que era, enmudeció y pasmose de arriba abajo. Mirole Sancho y vio que tenía la cabeza inclinada sobre el pecho, con muestras de estar

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141 On the point of military professionalism, see the excellent collection of essays titled The Chivalric Ethos and the Rise of Military Professionalism, edited by D. J. B. Trim. I discuss Elias’s theory of “the civilizing process” in greater detail in Chapter 5.

142 For this reason, the study of affects like shame in the novel should not, of course, be limited only to the character of Don Quijote. Among the multiple manifestations of shame in female characters, the case of Dorotea stands as merely one example: “es tanta la vergüenza que me ocupa solo el pensar...[...] Calló en diciendo esto, y el rostro se le cubrió de un color que mostró bien claro el sentimiento y vergüenza del alma” (I, 29: 364). One of the most poignant reflections on women’s shame can be found in María de Zayas’s “La fuerza del amor,” of which Cohen-Steinberg undertakes a comparative study in her dissertation on women’s shame and guilt.
corrido” (I, 20: 239). In general, Cervantes’s characters are remarkably adept at reading the emotional states of one another by observing behaviors, demeanors, gestures, and facial expressions, and here Sancho immediately intuits that Don Quijote has become ashamed. But the typically involuntary nature and visible signs of shame, in particular, facilitate such immediate recognition by other characters and readers alike, the blush of the face and lowering of the head serving as semiotic features which lend shame a narrative role that functions quite differently from that of honor's (see Figure 1). As I will demonstrate shortly, such features can be discerned in Don Quijote throughout the final chapters of Part One of the novel as well, in which shame acquires what I will call a punitive function. It is here that the character’s shame becomes so great that he is left no other alleviation from its effects but to passively encloister himself in the psychological comforts of denial and disavowal which his otherwise accursed enchanter offers him. The priest and the barber’s deceptive ploy to return Don Quijote home at the end of Part One of the novel begins, in actuality, when they observe the potent effect on the knight of their feigned story of the galeotes robbery. In other words, they have recognized Don Quijote’s susceptibility—or, in Bourdieu’s terms, his “disposition”—to shame and, consequently, decide to exploit it as a means of manipulation toward a concrete end (which will in turn produce further shame for Don Quijote, thus recalling the emotional feedback loop suggested in my introductory remarks). It is in fact hard to imagine a more effective means of manipulation, parody, and punishment than shame for a character whose chivalric ethos is defined by such antithetical values of pride, renown, and fame.

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143 As I argued earlier in Chapter 3, a notable exception to this mutual legibility of characters’ emotions is found in the Persiles.
The Art of Infamy in the Episodes of Encagement

*Et por ende el pueblo non debe ser atrevido para perder vergüenza de su rey, mas débenle ser obedientes en todas las cosas que él mandare*

Partida II, título 13, ley 16

The theatrical quality of the stratagem employed in order to convince Don Quijote to abandon his knight errantry and return home has been well documented (Díaz Plaja 115; Syverson-Stork 32-36), but I would like to suggest that these episodes represent the staging of a particular historic practice that, while equally dependent on theatricality, was of a considerably more sinister nature: that which was well known in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as “sacar a la vergüenza.” Turning to Covarrubias: “Sacar a uno a la vergüenza, es pena y castigo que se suele dar por algunos delitos, y a estos tales los suelen tener atados en el rollo por algún espacio de tiempo, con que quedan avergonzados y afrentados” (Tesoro 1523). This juridico-religious practice of shaming or *escarnio público* is referenced earlier in the episode of the galley slaves when one of the prisoners is overcome with emotion and unable to describe his crime. Another condemned man offers himself as a spokesperson to explain: “Este hombre honrado va por cuatro años a las galeras, habiendo paseado las acostumbradas, vestido, en pompa y a caballo”; Sancho then immediately confirms his acquaintance with the practice by responding: “Eso es... lo que a mí me parece, haber salido a la vergüenza” (I, 22: 261).  

144 Interestingly, Lea notes that, in order to fulfill the pressing needs of Philip II’s armadas, the galleys became an alternative to the shame punishment of the sambenito by way of a 1567 judicial decree which “suggested—suggestion being equivalent to an order—that sentences to the galleys could be substituted for those to prison and sanbenito” (142).
shame undergirds many of the well-documented forms of popular and inquisitorial punishment in medieval and early modern Europe, among them the charivari, stocks, yellow badge, pillory, sambenito, and auto-da-fé. Francisco de Goya dedicated several of his darker and most socially disturbing paintings and engravings to the practices of the procession, the sambenito, and the auto-da-fé (Figure 11, Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14). Almost without exception, the victims that Goya immortalized in these works adopt a stance nearly identical to Tomkins’s physiological descriptions of shame, as well as to Don Quijote as he is described in the text and represented in various illustrations (Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 15): cowering posture, lowered head and gaze, silent and motionless state.

Goya’s medium performed a similar yet inverse function to the *pittura infamante*, a form of defamatory painting in Renaissance Italy which granted representational art the mandate of municipal justice in order to shame common criminals through the proliferation of frescoes depicting the delinquent and his crime. Like Nathaniel Hawthorne’s famous ‘scarlet letter,’ the practice of branding was another violent yet permanent means of inscribing shame on the body of slaves, delinquents, and criminals. The correspondence between particular iconographies of branding and national or linguistic conventions attests to their widespread use across the Mediterranean: the fleur-de-lis in France, the keys of Saint Peter in the papal states, and the “L” for ladrones in Spain all marked their victims with popularly recognized symbols for adjuring their crimes.

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145 See Edgerton for a fascinating historical study of the *pittura infamanti*, or what he calls these ‘effigies of shame.’ Mills discusses their probable use in other parts of medieval Europe (and analogues such as the German *Schandbilder*), although, conspicuously, not in Spain (42-49). Nash and Kilday examine other forms of shame punishment in Great Britain, including the ‘branks,’ ’skimmington ride,’ ‘wooden horse,’ and ‘rough music’
Many of these practices, as was the case with inquisitorial procedure more generally, were inherited from ancient Roman law, which prescribed, for example, that fugitive slaves be branded with the letters “FUG” to alert others to their status as *fugitivus*, serving to stigmatize the bearer and attempting to deter further transgressions. In Castile, similar customs survived in the *Fuero Juzgo* and Alfonso el Sabio’s *Siete Partidas*, which called upon popular ridicule as a means of punishment and compliance through such acts as public beatings, the carrying of chains, the amputation of limbs, or being publicly disrobed and covered in honey and flies.\(^{146}\) Although to some extent a commutation for penitents of the capital crimes of heresy and apostasy, a shame punishment nonetheless was regarded as exceedingly severe, since, according to Inquisition scholar Henry Charles Lea’s famous study, “those exposed to it regarded death as a mercy, preferring to die rather than to endure a life of infamy” (138).\(^{147}\) Whether in popular or inquisitional form, the exploitation of shame and infamy through penality at once capitalized on their affective capacity as a form of social control while extending their viability in subjective consciousness and the public sphere.

\(^{146}\) For an enumeration of these methods of punishment, see especially Partida VII, título 14, ley 18: “escarmentar los furtadores públicamente con feridas de azotes ó de otra guisa en manera que sufran pena et vergüenza” (617); and Partida VII, título 31, ley 4: “la primera es dar á home pena de muerte ó de perdimiento de miembro. La segunda es condepanlo que esté en fierros para siempre, cavando en los metales del rey, ó labrando en las otras sus labores ó sirviendo á los que las ficieren. [...] La setena es quando condepan á alguno que sea azotado ó ferido paladinamente por yerro que fizo, ó lo ponen por deshonra dél en la picota, ó lo desnudan faciendole estar al sol untado de miel porque lo coman las moscas alguna hora del día” (709-10).

\(^{147}\) Lea’s quote reflects what was inscribed in law by the *Siete Partidas*: “El infamado, aunque no haya culpa, muerto es en cuanto al bien y a la honra de este mundo” (qtd. in Menéndez Pidal 358); and in letters by Lope: “Porque no hay mayor castigo, Que dar vida a un afrentado” (*El testimonio vengado*, qtd. in Castro 338). Roberts also recognizes that shame and shunning can be more effective in garnering compliance than other, supposedly heavier-handed instruments of the law (26), while Nussbaum studies the ethics of shaming in the modern legal system (especially 172-305).
Cervantes contemplates the practice of public shaming—and reflects upon its ethical ramifications—several times throughout his works. Beyond his typical penchant for referencing historical events, this is not altogether surprising given that the peak of the Inquisition’s activities between the years 1590 and 1620 (Bujanda 228) corresponds almost exactly to that of Cervantes’s literary activity. In the *Persiles*, he stresses the potency of shame punishments as a kind of spectacle with the story of Ortel Banedre, a Polish man who laments his fate of having been humiliated by his wife after she absconded with a former lover (III, 6-7). Expressing his vehement desire to avenge such an affront to his personal honor, he tells the pilgrims that he is on his way to Madrid to exact the punishment which he believes his adulterous wife and her lover deserve. Serving as the novel’s typical voice of tempered reason, however, Periando advises the jilted man:

¿Qué pensáis que os sucederá cuando la justicia os entregue a vuestros enemigos, atados y rendidos, encima de un teatro público, a la vista de infinitas gentes, y a vos, blandiendo el cuchillo encima del cadáver, amenazando el segarles las gargantas, como si pudiera su sangre limpiar, como vos decís, vuestra honra? ¿Qué os puede suceder, como digo, sino hacer más público vuestro agravio? Porque las venganzas castigan, pero no quitan las culpas; y las que en estos casos se cometen, como la enmienda no proceda de la voluntad, siempre se están en pie, y siempre están vivas en las memorias de las gentes, a lo menos en tanto que vive el agraviado. Así que,

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148 In addition to the examples I describe below, Preciosa’s ‘grandmother’ in “La Gitanilla” also refers to public shaming: “Tres veces, por tres delitos diferentes, me he visto casi puesta en el asno para ser azotada” (119); as does the mayor in the episode of the “false captives” of the *Persiles*, who threatens that “han de pasear en [asnos] estas calles estos dos señores cautivos” (III, 10: 533-34).
señor, volved en vos y, dando lugar a la misericordia, no corráis tras la justicia. (III, 7: 501-02)

The logic of Periandro’s counsel revolves not around the law, justice, or personal virtue, but the degree of infamy which Banedre’s act of vengeance would undoubtedly bring upon him. His reference to the visual image of the perpetual guilt imbued in public memory of his disgrace (“las culpas... siempre están vivas en las memorias de las gentes”) recalls Aristotle’s description of shame as phantasia or imagination of a future “loss of reputation.” Periandro further communicates the looming potentiality of shame by emphasizing his exposure to the gaze of “infinitas gentes,” and referring to the scaffold as a ‘public theatre.’

The scaffold or gallows (cadahalso) was in fact placed in the express service of shame punishments in the early modern era, and, as Michel Foucault famously elucidated in Discipline and Punish, the supplice became a public spectacle of state power wielded to repress the populace through the extreme visibility of punishment. To use Foucault’s terminology, the affect of shame, I would suggest, becomes an especially potent “technology of representation” in the aesthetics of penality deployed through the ‘public theatre’ of the scaffold. In effect, the increasing efficacy of shame in this context would seem to be coextensive with the increasing population of urban spaces and the rise of the early modern city, evidenced in Periandro’s earlier comparison between the disgraced couple’s small pueblo of Talavera and the city of Madrid: “Hasta agora no estáis más deshonrado de entre los que os conocen en Talavera, que deben de ser bien pocos, y agora vais a serlo de los que os conocerán en Madrid” (III, 7: 500). If the rural character of medieval Spain was more conducive to the defense of personal honor through the righting of an affront, it would seem that the high visibility of an urban space like Madrid frustrates
traditional codes of gentlemanly honor by aggravating the *agravio* through the very attempt at its conventional remedy.\textsuperscript{149} Moreover, Periandro’s emphasis on the public dimension of shame at once points up what is perhaps the waning of personal virtue alongside a legal-penal apparatus which seems ineffective at meting out justice. In its place, the early modern subject is called upon to carry out a form of self-policing or self-discipline, a task of which shame is a fundamental aspect. This example from the *Persiles* also illustrates how an affect like shame, while preserving its conventional potency as public visibility, is made, willingly or unwillingly, to conform to the warp and woof of a particular sociohistorical context. At any rate, the superior efficacy of “vigilant habits of shame and self-scrutiny” (Fernie 64) over either the law or an ethics of personal virtue would seem to be confirmed by Periandro’s ultimate success in dissuading Banedre from enacting revenge and his adding almost as a mere afterthought to his advice that “finalmente, quiero que consideréis que vais a hacer un pecado mortal en quitarles las vidas” (III, 7: 502).\textsuperscript{150} Periandro’s admonition that the only effect achieved in such an act would be to make his affront more public (“hacer más público vuestro agravio”) underscores the vital role of shame in the early modern Spanish imaginary and echoes a piece of exemplary wisdom from “La fuerza de la sangre”: “Más lastima una onza de deshonra pública que una arroba de infamia secreta” (396).\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{149} For a discussion of the distinction regarding *agravios*, *afrentas*, and *injurias*, see Menéndez Pidal (90); and Carlos Romero Muñoz’s footnote in his edition of the *Persiles* (III, 9: 514n).

\textsuperscript{150} A similar kind of mercy or pardon is granted to adulterers in “El licenciado vidriera” and “El celoso extremeño” in the *Novelas ejemplares*.

\textsuperscript{151} On this point, see Carrera’s highly relevant, if theoretically limited, study of shame in “La fuerza de la sangre” (“Social Dimension”).
Another exemplary novel, “Rinconete y Cortadillo,” offers further insights for understanding the Cervantine take on public shaming when the eponymous characters and other professional *pícaros* in Seville, we recall, are convened to review the week’s business. Taking out his personal memory book, their illiterate leader Monipodio asks Rinconete to recite its contents, which notably includes the following subheading: “Memorial de agravios comunes, conviene a saber: redomazos, untos de miera, clavázón de sambenitos y cuernos, matracas, espantos, alborotos y cuchilladas fingidas, publicación de nibelos, etc.” (287). This enumeration of disturbances and delinquency reveals the appropriation of rituals of public shaming by a group of private citizens. In particular, the hanging of sambenitos and the publication of libelous acts represent a form of renegade justice directly informed by the inquisitorial practices of the State.152 In other words, these *outlaws* make use of instruments of punishment that fall well within the law of seventeenth-century Spain, thereby leading to two important conclusions: first, that these types of shame punishment were effective enough in the public sphere to be adopted by citizen-criminals who, due to their position outside the law, would presumably have recourse to any number of additional means of intimidation, vengeance, and coercion. That Monipodio and his men employ the “clavázón de sambenitos” and “publicación de nibelos” suggests that such practices were exceedingly effective at achieving the desired result. Shame is thus simultaneously a more precise yet more brutal weapon than other violent means at the

152 A related theme can be found among the *libros becerros* and *libros verdes*, which recorded the inquisitional sentences of generations of Castilian and Aragonese families and, due to their strong potential for shaming these families, were forbidden to possess by a royal decree of King Philip IV in 1623. Nevertheless, as Caro Baroja notes, “manuscript copies of them have survived until modern times, sometimes copied for scholastic purposes, and sometimes with scandalous intent” (“Honour and Shame” 23n; 131). The potential of a document or discourse to provoke shame in certain of its destinations or receivers also recalls various forms of satirical poetry such as the *cantigas de maldecir* and *obras de burlas*, especially the *Coplas del Provincial* (“the most defamatory ever written about any society” [Menéndez Pidal 90]).
disposal of these hitmen for hire. Second, Cervantes’s fictional portrayal attests to the common familiarity of these practices among the Spanish citizenry, a fact that, not incidentally, greatly accounted for their very efficacy.

Even more significant, however, are Monipodio’s words as Rinconete continues to read the list of planned affronts but is stopped short of pronouncing the names of their targeted victims: “Tampoco se lea—dijo Monipodio—la casa ni adónde, que basta que se les haga el agravio, sin que se diga en público, que es gran cargo de conciencia. A lo menos, más querría yo clavar cien cuernos y otros tantos sambenitos, como se me pagase mi trabajo, que decillo sola una vez, aunque fuese a la madre que me parió” (287-88). The startling irruption of moral conscience in a figure who is otherwise portrayed as the unscrupulous ringleader of Seville’s criminal underground is meaningful in and of itself (288n). It is also curious and seemingly hypocritical that Monipodio so strongly adheres to a personal imperative to never publicly speak the name of the shamed (among fellow delinquents, no less), while at the same time perpetrating acts which expose them to even greater public infamy. But the fact is that Cervantes’s choice to offer such an ethical reflection through the words of a criminal underscores the gravity and seriousness with which the author approaches the topic of public shaming. This particular kind of ‘honor among thieves’ is partly responsible for lending “Rinconete y Cortadillo”—an often humorous and entertaining picaresque novella—its own unique exemplary tone.

If in the Novelas ejemplares a gang of commissioned outlaws appropriates legal forms of shame punishments, then another group of outlaws pays for their crimes several-fold in the final chapters of Don Quijote. I am referring to the moments just before the principle characters are captured by Roque Guinart and his gang of bandoleros, when
Sancho becomes frightened upon noticing legs and feet dangling from some trees, to which
Don Quijote responds: “No tienes de qué tener miedo, porque estos pies y piernas que
tientas y no vees sin duda son de algunos forajidos y bandoleros que en estos árboles están
ahorcados, que por aquí los suele ahorcar la justicia, cuando los coge, de veinte en veinte y
de treinta en treinta; por donde me doy a entender que debo de estar cerca de Barcelona.”
The narrator immediately confirms that “así era la verdad como él lo había imaginado. Al
partir, alzaron los ojos y vieron los racimos de aquellos árboles, que eran cuerpos de
bandoleros” (II, 60: 1221). Although banditry was widely associated with the
Mediterranean enclave of Catalonia, this kind of penal spectacle was in fact practiced across
much of Castile as well (Bernaldo de Quirós 11-13; 59-60). And while public shaming was
popularly regarded as more severe than death, both punitive methods coincide in this
practice. This was essentially a makeshift extension of the pillory, since in the absence of a
picota or rollo criminals were sometimes hung from prominent trees, which, like their
architectural counterparts of stone, were often situated near the entrance to a town or
municipal district so as to advertise to residents and visitors alike the potent authority of
the local “justicia.”

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153 This practice is referenced in Luis Vélez de Guevara’s El diablo cojuelo: “dieron sobre el Rollo de Ecija,
diciéndole el Cojuelo á don Cleofás: Mira qué gentil árbol berroqueño, que suele llevar hombres como otros
fruta,” an episode quoted by Bernaldo de Quirós in his study of the picota (59-60).

154 According to Bernaldo de Quirós: “En despoblado, capturado el malhechor en su fuga desesperada, poste
de ejecución fue algún árbol, y mejor un árbol seco, muerto por el rayo (arbor infelix, de los romanos). Por
una de esas estéticas delicadezas que iluminan repentinamente el alma, incluso de los más toscos, la turba
perseguidora del matador, del robador ó del incendiario, sintió la repugnancia—hasta el punto de inhibir
momentáneamente la irritada vehemencia del castigo—de ultrajar el hermoso árbol exuberante de vida
inocente con el peso de un malvado y la fealdad del castigo, que avergüenza después á los ejecutores” (54-55).
Citing Tirso (“En la picota del Rollo/ un reloj he de poner”), the author also notes that the terms picota and
rollo were more or less synonymous (58). The Latin terms arbor infelix, arbori suspendere, and infelix lignum
all refer to what in the Western world has undoubtedly become the most iconic shame punishment of them
all: that of crucifixion. In ancient Roman territories, crucifixion (supplicium servile) indexed the social status
of its victim, having been reserved for slaves and enemies of the state, while noble citizens were afforded less
shameful forms of punishment such as fines, exile, or at most, decapitation. The capital punishment of
iconographic association with infamy and shame, as attested by its lexicological inheritance in contemporary idioms such as “poner en la picota” and “enviar/hacer ir al rollo” (similar to the English expression “to pillory”). As original epicenters of local justice, it is somewhat ironic that the areas of the town immediately surrounding the pillory came to acquire a reputation for delinquency and infamy themselves, leading to speculation that some families even uprooted their homes to avoid these peri-penal zones.\textsuperscript{155} A similar phenomenon surrounded the figure of the executioner or \textit{verdugo}, whose profession garnered such figures a loathsome reputation as both dispatchers and depositories of shame, influencing urban development through inhabitants’ desire not to live anywhere near them.\textsuperscript{156} What each of these examples makes clear is the powerfully contagious nature of shame in the early modern popular imaginary, its seeming ability to spread and infect through spatial and interpersonal proximity. Like the ill-fated \textit{bandoleros} in the novel, the suspended, lifeless bodies served the dual historical function of shaming the hanging was also regarded as shameful, and the particular posture of hanging (without causing death) even gained an associative connotation of shame, an image which calls to mind Don Quijote’s humiliation at being left hanging outside the inn after having his hand tied by Maritornes (I, 43: 559-60). For an in-depth study of the iconography of hanging, including its association with the \textit{pitture infamanti} and the \textit{mundus inversus}, see Mills.\textsuperscript{155} “Quizá pudiera señalarse, en algunos lugares, un movimiento de desviación del caserío, que no se ha rectificado desde entonces, á la manera del que señala De Maistre en torno á la casa del verdugo” (Bernaldo de Quirós 89). The term “peri-penal” I owe to what Salillas calls “peri-presidiales” in reference to communities surrounding prisons in his \textit{La vida penal en España} (qtd. in Bernaldo de Quirós 87). An example of the tendency for crime to cluster around the pillory can be found in \textit{La pícara Justina}: “Fui adelante y por mis pasos contados me fui al rollo... [...] porque mujer junto al rollo, ¿qué otra tela tiene que echar ni otro oficio que hacer sino es ahorcarse de una manera ó de otra, haciendo ocasión para todo?” (qtd. in Bernaldo de Quirós 85-86).

\textsuperscript{156} This revulsion is highlighted by Quevedo’s \textit{El Buscón}, in which the protagonist’s father is an executioner and constant source of shame for the young Pablos. The French Counter-Enlightenment philosopher Joseph de Maistre penned a treatise on the “sublime being” of the executioner, remarking on both his dishonorable status and his indispensable importance for maintaining order and social hierarchy in the modern State (Maistre 70). Additional examples of “defiled trades” are examined in the German context by Stuart.
criminals and their families as well as intending to deter other citizens from similar transgressions of legal and religious authority.

Although Don Quijote’s own fate is not as immediate or terminal, the oxcart used to deliver him home performs a function homologous to that of the trees: as another kind of makeshift pillory, it is the material structure responsible for ensuring that he is exposed to a protracted visibility before public spectators. Like the branches of the trees or arbori suspendere, the wooden bars of his cage can be said to suspend the feeling of shame, to hold it in place for all to see. Suffused with pathos, Doré’s engraving of this scene (Figure 15) foregrounds this effect by placing the viewer in the cage with Don Quijote and thus subjecting her to the same piercing gaze of the grotesque figures who crowd in from all sides to witness the spectacle. Similar practices were employed by the Spanish Inquisition as means of publicly shaming citizens who had been accused of perpetrating such petty crimes as theft. One account describes the events of January 1605 along the Guadalquivir in Seville, where several confraternities had gathered to perform a “triste pero cristiana tarea”: “Desenterrar los cadáveres de los ahogados en el río y de los asaeteados por la Santa Hermandad y quitar de las escarpias y jaulas en que, por los caminos, estaban expuestos los despojos de los delincuentes á quienes las justicias habían hecho descuartizar de un año á aquella parte” (Rodríguez Marín 205). Later, as part of granting the deceased criminals a proper Christian burial, the members of the pious orders prepared these remains for the procesión de los huesos, “una de las más extrañas procesiones de que hay noticia en los anales de nuestras ceremonias eclesiásticas,” in which they were paraded through the city by a diverse entourage of priests, confraternities, and clerics:
Iban delante, llevando sus estandartes é insignias, todas las cofradías de la ciudad, encendida la cera de los entierros; seguían multitud de clérigos y frailes de todas las órdenes; tras ellos, con estandarte y cruz, algunos hermanos de la Caridad, y los curas del Sagrario con la cruz alta, y á la postre, conducidos por otros hermanos, en grandes literas cubiertas de paños azules, que prestaba para este efecto la piedad de algunos vecinos, los despojos de los ahogados, asaeteados y descuartizados. (Rodríguez Marín 206-07).

As in the aforementioned hanging of bandits, this particular punishment was exacted to lethal ends, along with a public spectacle of infamy. Like the priest and the barber in Don Quijote, the inquisitorial authorities used “jaulas” for displaying their victims while parading through the streets. What is significant is that both parties—executioners and redeemers—employed the procession as a mobile ritual for exposing the remains of these former criminals to the eyes of the masses, first as punishment and later as pardon. The procession, then, was seemingly just as efficient at procuring the redemption of those upon whom it had previously bestowed infamy and shame—at least for those who were already deceased.

The similarly visual and spectacle-like qualities of Don Quijote’s encagement invite us to consider it a narrative form of the pitture infamanti, commissioned by the priest’s religious authority (“trazador desta máquina” [I, 46: 587]) and ekphrastically produced throughout the final chapters of Part One of the novel. The centrality of shame in these

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157 Bernaldo de Quirós elaborates on the extended nature of these processions: “las Hermandades de Misericordia, que asistían en sus últimos instantes á los reos de muerte y enterraban sus restos, luego que habían sido expuestos en lo alto de las picotas y en jaulas y postes de madera en los caminos donde delinquieron. Madrid, Sevilla y las demás poblaciones donde una cierta densidad social mantenía una criminalidad continua, vieron entonces las macabras procesiones de los huesos organizadas por estas Hermandades” (70).
episodes is confirmed by the intentions and actions of other characters, the proliferation of metaphorical references to shame in the narration, and, most importantly, Don Quijote’s own behavior and affective reactions to his treatment. Similar to the silent shame he will display at other moments of the novel, Don Quijote’s demeanor while in the cage confirms that he has intuited and internalized the shame of his punishment: “Iba sentado en la jaula, las manos atadas, tendidos los pies y arrimado a las verjas, con tanto silencio y tanta paciencia como si no fuera hombre de carne, sino estatua de piedra” (I, 47: 594). In spite of the differing landscapes, composition, and technique, his physical stance in Puiggarí’s depiction of this scene (Figure 10) greatly resembles that of Jiménez Aranda’s representation of his shame before Sancho (Figure 9): motionless state, lowered head, downward gaze, and a passive, nearly cowering posture. To recognize that many of these outward cues are similar to what we might imagine would feature in a representation of melancholia, we need only recall the angelic figure of Dürer’s famous 1514 engraving of the same name. The Caballero de la Triste Figura, the text reports, indeed felt melancholy in the cage, and the partly shared physiognomy of shame with this emotion serves to underscore, as I noted earlier, the often complex interrelationality between affective states in lived experience as well as in the novel. But we might also imagine, had Jiménez Aranda and Puiggarí not worked in a black-and-white medium, that they would have complemented such bodily symptoms by adding a light dash of red to Don Quijote’s cheeks.

When he is first placed in the cage, the barber, masking his true identity, proclaims prophetically: “¡Oh Caballero de la Triste Figura!, no te dé afincamiento la prisión en que vas, porque así conviene para acabar más presto la aventura en que tu gran esfuerzo te puso. La cual se acabará cuando el furibundo león manchado con la blanca paloma
tobosina yoguieren en uno” (I, 46: 588). While embellishing the performance of Don Quijote’s capture, this statement also reveals the recognition of its capacity to produce shame. Specifically, “afincamiento” anticipates the general humiliation of the scene and “manchado” represents a play on words between manchego and mancillado (588n). The mancha, or stain, on the man of La Mancha’s reputation is exacerbated precisely by the shameful spectacle of his public imprisonment.158 Later, when knight and squire have the opportunity to consult privately about what Don Quijote believes are the consequences of enchantment and what Sancho clearly sees to be a grand artifice, the latter humorously attempts to persuade his master with empirical evidence: “Pregunto, hablando con acatamiento, si acaso después que vuestra merced va enjaulado y a su parecer encantado en esta jaula le ha venido gana y voluntad de hacer aguas mayores o menores, como suele decirse” (I, 48: 611). Sancho’s prefacing of his query with “acatamiento” confirms the commonplace that bodily functions were of themselves considered shameful, and Don Quijote’s response that “no anda todo limpio” reinforces the scatological quality of the scene while insisting on the stain—in this case literal as well as figurative—which may come to his honor as a result of his encagement (I, 48: 612).

Even more significant is the fact that these examples, tacitly yet unmistakably, point toward the far more troubling Iberian program of limpieza de sangre. Begging the priest to allow Don Quijote to momentarily vacate his cage in order to evacuate his bowels, Sancho declares that “si no le dejaban salir, no iría tan limpia aquella prisión como requiría la decencia de un tal caballero como su amo” (I, 49: 613). The metonymical remove here

158 These words also strikingly recall the popular refrain, “Más vale vergüenza en cara que mancilla en corazón,” referenced later in the novel (II, 44; 1077) and in Covarrubias (Tesoro 1523).
between the bodily fluids of “aguas mayores o menores” and blood is minuscule enough as to leave little doubt of the latter’s patent symbolism. Along with the metaphors of cleanliness signaled above (“manchado”; “no anda todo limpio”), these insistent details clearly evoke the historical forms of racial and religious persecution which haunted the Spain of Cervantes’s time. The societal and institutional racism which sanctioned the forced conversion, expulsion, or execution of countless Moors and Jews on the Peninsula, in fact, often masqueraded under nearly identical metaphors of blood purity, as attested by the proliferation of a limpio/sucio motif in historical documents of official as well as popular natures.159 Sancho’s deceptively innocent observation “que estas visiones que por aquí andan, que no son del todo católicas” lays bare the original inquisitional mandate of prosecuting the crimes of heresy and apostasy which threatened the hegemony of Catholic doctrine, while nearly stretching to the limit any latent ambiguity regarding the episode’s suggestive subtext (I, 47: 591). “Muchas y muy graves historias he yo leído de caballeros andantes,” admits Don Quijote, “pero jamás he leído, ni visto, ni oído que a los caballeros encantados los lleven desta manera” (I, 47: 590). Such a strikingly frank assessment by the condemned knight is perhaps the most overt evidence yet for the reader that the stakes of this episode are more urgent than a mere parodic reworking of the romances of chivalry. That the referent is lost on Don Quijote only serves to underscore the persistence of the real and reinforce the historical gravity of the apparent novelty of his punishment. The

159 An example of this motif—along with what may be the most compelling proof yet of the differentiation between honor and shame—can be found in an anonymous (though perhaps apocryphal) seventeenth-century “papel” on the statutes of limpieza de sangre: “En España ay dos géneros de nobleza. Una mayor, que es la Hidalguía, y otra menor, que es la Limpieza, que llamamos Christianos viejos. Y aunque la primera de la Hidalguía es más honrado tenerla; pero muy más afrentoso es faltar la segunda; porque en España muy más estimamos a un hombre pechero y limpio que a un hidalgo que no es limpio” (qtd. in Domínguez Ortiz 196; 229).
distinction between history and fiction that is prescribed so emphatically by the priest and
canon throughout these same chapters of the novel asserts itself rather more forcefully
here: the “[m]uchas y muy graves historias” of Don Quijote’s fictional world would seem to
pale in comparison to the reality of his firsthand experience of public shaming in the cage.

Further implicit indications that the shaming of Don Quijote is modeled on early
modern inquisitorial practice abound. The presence of the cuadrilleros, cura, and
canónigo—representing royal and ecclesiastical authority—and their overseeing and
sanctioning of Don Quijote’s punishment lend it an official juridico-religious quality.
Furthermore, the spectacle of the entourage greatly resembles the aforementioned
historical processions sponsored by the Holy Office in which the condemned were publicly
paraded through the streets, often on the way to an auto de fe. This theme is
complemented by the appearance of the disciplinantes, whose penitence would have
recalled for the early modern reader well-known religious imagery of a similar context.
The public auto de fe, like the elaborate scheme to return Don Quijote home, “was a
meticulously planned, stage-managed theatrical event” (Rawlings 37). The further striking
parallels between it and Don Quijote’s arrival to his village can be witnessed in the
following passage:

Llegaron a la aldea de don Quijote, adonde entraron en la mitad del día, que
acertó a ser domingo, y la gente estaba toda en la plaza, por mitad de la cual
atravesó el carro de don Quijote. Acudieron todos a ver lo que en el carro
venía y, cuando conocieron a su compatrioto, quedaron maravillados, y un
muchacho acudió corriendo a dar las nuevas a su ama y a su sobrina de que
su tío y su señor venía flaco y amarillo y tendido sobre un montón de heno y
sobre un carro de bueyes. Cosa de lástima fue oír los gritos que las dos
buenas señoras alzaron, las bofetadas que se dieron, las maldiciones que de
nuevo echaron a los malditos libros de caballerías, todo lo cual se renovó
cuando vieron entrar a don Quijote por sus puertas. (I, 52: 644-45)

The *auto de fe general*, as in my opening example of the events in Triana, also typically
occurred on Sundays in the main plaza of the town and always drew large crowds of
onlookers who came to witness the spectacle (Lea 212-13; Rawlings 37). The yellowness
of Don Quijote's complexion, in addition to the color's association with melancholy and
indication of his sheer depravity after six days of traveling in a cage, calls up the image of
penitents whose sambenitos of yellow signified their contrition and desire for
reconciliation (as opposed to the black sambenitos worn by the unrepentant).

Indeed it is the act of reconciliation which colors the Canon's exhortation to Don
Quijote that he return to reason: “¡Ea, señor don Quijote, duélase de sí mismo y redúzgase
al gremio de la discreción y sepá usar de la mucha que el cielo fue servido de darle,
empleando el felícísimo talento de su ingenio en otra letura que redunde en
aprovechamiento de su conciencia y en aumento de su honra!” (I, 49: 616). The
metaphorical use of the expression “reducirse al gremio” may well be the most manifest
example of Cervantes's appropriation of an inquisitorial discourse throughout the episode:

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160 There are additional references throughout the episode which, if not directly influenced by historical
practice, are worth noting for their striking parallels with shaming. For example, when in a characteristic fit
of rage Don Quijote takes off in pursuit of the *disciplinantes*, the narrator makes a point of noting that he
“apretó los muslos a Rocinante, porque espuelas no las tenía” (I, 52: 640). Historically, chopping the spurs off
of a disgraced knight's boots was, in fact, a symbolic act of shaming (Riquer, *Caballeros* 166). For more on the
shaming of historic knights, see Riquer (*Caballeros* 155-67). Through his extensive reading of chivalric
literature, Alonso Quijano would have undoubtedly been familiar with such practices of shaming and
degradation, providing further proof that Don Quijote has intuited the symbolic and affective purposes of his
punishment. Trigg (81) examines an example of these practices from *Tirant lo Blanc*, a prominent work in
Quijano's library.
it referred to the historical practice of appearing before the Inquisition in order to undertake formal reconciliation with the Catholic Church after having apostatized.\footnote{As will be explored in Chapter 6, this is the same process which the renegade of “La historia del cautivo” undergoes after returning to Spain: “Seis días estuvimos en Vélez, al cabo de los cuales el renegado, hecha su información de cuanto le convenía, se fue a la ciudad de Granada a reducirse por medio de la Santa Inquisición al gremio santísimo de la Iglesia” (I, 41: 538-39).}

Besides his direct entreaty to Don Quijote, the Canon’s extensive indictment of the romances of chivalry could be said to perform a function parallel to that of the \textit{Sermón de la Fe}, a public sermon which always accompanied the \textit{auto de fe} and served a pedagogical and proselytizing objective upon the spectators. These sermons complemented the instructive potency of the processions and the staging of shame in the public exposure of the condemned, reinforcing social and religious conformity and the hegemony of the Old Christian model. Don Quijote’s response to his shame punishment indicates it has been equally effective. His uncharacteristic passivity, resignation, silence, and acceptance of his fate of imprisonment, while significant manifestations of the defeated knight’s shame, also suggest he is self-conscious and even repentant of his (ab)errant behavior. This self-consciousness, a mentally reflexive state commonly associated with the emotion of shame, offers a space for reflection upon the chivalric ethos and the real consequences of Don Quijote’s madness. Exasperated by Sancho’s persuasive insistence that he is not in fact enchanted, in attempting to quell the debate Don Quijote conspicuously disavows his shameful guilt: “Yo sé y tengo para mí que voy encantado, y \textit{esto me basta para la seguridad de mi conciencia}, que la formaría muy grande si yo pensase que no estaba encantado y me dejase estar en esta jaula perezoso y cobarde, defraudando el socorro que podría dar a muchos menesterosos y necesitados que de mi ayuda y amparo deben tener a la hora de ahora precisa y estrema necesidad” (I, 49: 613, my emphasis). Although not going so far as
to completely renounce his knightly profession as he will do after his shameful defeat at the end of Part Two of the novel, this moment of consciousness is a significant instantiation of the defense mechanisms that escape his madness.\textsuperscript{162} The hackneyed excuse of enchantment notwithstanding, Don Quijote’s willful return to the cage implies a bid of atonement for his errant transgressions and links him once again to processional penitents, his shabby (and soiled?) underclothes standing in for the yellow scapulars of the sambenitos.\textsuperscript{163}

In addition to the important consequences for the affective and psychological state and later behavior of the novel’s main character, the ritual shaming of Don Quijote portends even broader implications when juxtaposed with the Canon and the priest’s damning portrayal of the romances of chivalry. The interpolation and interweaving of the \textit{enjaulamiento} episodes and the novel’s most direct and extensive critique of the literary object of its parody is in itself significant and invites us to consider them alongside one another. In the penal and inquisitorial practices of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain, shame constituted what in Foucauldian terms could be considered a particular technology of representation. Likewise, as I have demonstrated, shame is deployed as a

\textsuperscript{162} The debility of Don Quijote’s madness and argument for enchantment here have been commented extensively; for example, Gonzalo Torrente Ballester frankly affirms that “Don Quijote sabe sobradamente a dónde va y quién lo lleva” (155). Similarly, Layna Ranz notes that the excuse of enchantment “conduce a don Quijote a enclaustrarse en su misma conciencia” (252). The alibi of enchantment thus serves to mitigate or allay his feeling of shame, just as it did concerning Sancho’s \textit{manteamiento}: “el ventero les contó punto por punto la volatería de Sancho Panza, de que no poco se rieron todos, y de que no menos se corriera Sancho, si de nuevo no le asegurara su amo que era encantamento” (I, 46: 586).

\textsuperscript{163} As I have detailed elsewhere (“Don Quijote avergonzado”), the shaming of Don Quijote portends even broader implications when juxtaposed with the Canon and the priest’s damning portrayal of the romances of chivalry, since shame can be seen to perform an analogous role at the metanarrative level as well. The protagonist’s placement in the cage represents a symbolic indictment of the books responsible for his madness, his deviation from the normative standards of sanity corresponding to the aesthetic deviance with which the authors of the romances of chivalry betrayed the prescriptive norms of Aristotelian verisimilitude.
crucial techne in the theatrical representation designed to return Don Quijote to his village. Yet shame can be seen to perform an analogous role at the metanarrative level of aesthetics as well: the condemnation of the romances of chivalry through the words of the Canon and the priest can effectively be read as a public shaming of these inferior works of popular fame. Their deleterious, Platonic effects which these characters admonish are embodied in Don Quijote, whose placement in the cage represents in turn a symbolic indictment of the books responsible for his madness. His foolish deviation from the normative medical and social standards of sanity corresponds to the aesthetic deviance with which the authors of romances of chivalry betrayed the prescriptive norms of Aristotelian verisimilitude. Don Quijote is thus punished simultaneously for his own crazy and misguided conduct and made to answer for the fallacious aesthetic logic of the books which gave birth to his character. His heightened visibility while in the cage effectively renders him a shameful object of humorous ridicule while at the same time a vessel through which to scrutinize and effect a shaming of the romances of chivalry.

The scrutiny to which both Don Quijote and these books are subjected here recalls the earlier scene in which the priest and the barber judge which books to condemn to the fire (I, 6), and the priest remarks to the Canon that the book-burning was satisfying yet ultimately ineffective in restoring Don Quijote’s sanity. Just as shame punishments in early modern Spain were popularly feared for their efficient severity over burnings at the stake, the public shaming of Don Quijote has proven (and will continue to prove) more effectual in immobilizing him than the burning of his library. Similarly, the satirical treatment of the

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164 The Canon also demonstrates he is ashamed for Spain’s international literary reputation by the popularity of the comedia: “Que todo esto es en perjuicio de la verdad y en menoscabo de las historias, y aun en oprobrio de los ingenios españoles, porque los estranjeros, que con mucha puntualidad guardan las leyes de la comedia, nos tienen por bárbaros e ignorantes, viendo los absurdos y disparates de las que hacemos” (I, 48: 607).
romances of chivalry by and within *Don Quijote* would seem to be much more effective in securing the former’s infamy than a stricter policy of royal censorship which the priest and Canon openly desire. In this way, these episodes convincingly represent what could be considered a microcosm of the novel as a whole—they stage through the affectivity of Don Quijote the parodic shaming of the romances of chivalry performed by the novel in its totality. The episodes of Don Quijote’s *enjaulamiento* represent one of many examples of how the politics of shame inform the construction of Cervantine irony, narrative, characterization and, indeed, the emotional and affective registers which invariably traverse and animate these elements and without which literary aesthetics would remain shamefully remiss.

**Conclusion: (Re)valuing Shame**

*If, as Tomkins describes it, the lowering of the eyelids, the lowering of the eyes, the hanging of the head is the attitude of shame, it may also be that of reading.*

Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank, “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold”

I would like to conclude, however, by suggesting an alternative interpretation of Don Quijote’s shaming in the cage, one which underwrites an investment of even greater political stakes and harbors the potential to destabilize the honor discourse from the inside out. For Castro, Cervantes conceived of honor not as a quality inherited through blood and nobility, but as a personal virtue, “un bien más interno que externo” (*Semblanzas* 363), an idea conspicuously announced in *Don Quijote* as well: “La honra puédela tener el pobre,
pero no el vicioso” (II, Prologue: 677).\footnote{This idea is also consistent with Stoic moral philosophy, as well as that of Erasmus and Petrarch’s De remediis utriusque fortunae (Castro, Semblanzas 378-79).} Similarly, an implicit rejection of vengeance and violence as means of responding to an affront to one’s honor has also been perceived in Cervantes’s works, such as in my previous examples as well as Sancho’s own words: “No hay para qué... tomar venganza de nadie, pues no es de buenos cristianos tomarla de los agravios” (II, 11: 782).\footnote{Menéndez Pidal speculates that Cervantes’s unique posture against honor vengeance stems not from ideology but from the genre of the novel: “La novela destinada a la lectura privada invitaba a la reflexión condenatoria de una venganza sangrienta, mientras el teatro exigía entregarse a los sentimientos de mayor efectismo” (368). A common dramatic resolution to problems of conjugal honor in the comedia, on the other hand, was that of wife-murder, which Menéndez Pidal attributes to the fact that “el recuerdo de la antigüedad romana ahogaba en la venganza de honor, como en la defensa de la patria, los sentimientos más primarios y naturales del hombre, hasta el punto de convertir la hazaña en acto necesario, exigido y aplaudido por todos, que se cumple casi sin vacilación, casi sin emoción dramática” (363). Taylor, nevertheless, regards the wife-murder trope as relatively limited in both literary and historical terms (2-3), as well as the honor theme more generally, as noted above.} In point of fact, the renunciation of personal vengeance was consistent with the increasing desires of royal, governmental, and legal bodies to bring the management and punishment of disputes—traditionally settled through individual, familial, and clan-based claims to honor and vengeance—under the purview of the early modern State (Caro Baroja, “Honour” 98-99). This renders the appropriation of inquisitorial discourse and practice in the enjaulamiento episodes all the more poignant: that individual citizens wield the political tool of punitive shame as a means of controlling Don Quijote parodies not only the character, his madness, and the romances of chivalry, but also the structures of power which increasingly sought to remit the control of personal honor to the state. While reflecting upon what a powerful weapon shame can be in the hands of authority, however, Cervantes suggests that the emotion may serve as a form of resistance to those very structures of power.
While recent historical studies have also speculated that extra-literary honor was not reserved exclusively for nobles, old Christians, and other elite members of society (Taylor; Horden and Purcell 519-22), what remains clear is that shame, on the other hand, was readily available and abundant for all. By its very nature, it is agnostic to privilege, whether cultural, social, economic, or religious. As a kind of universal, democratic affect of the commoner, shame thus contains the potential to disrupt the dominant order and the discourse of prestige which attended early modern historical claims to honor. Indeed, honor can be seen as a sort of shibboleth or cipher for the Iberian programs of limpieza de sangre, through which claims to honor were necessarily mediated—and quite often foreclosed—by one’s ethno-religious past. The conversos, moriscos, and marranos were all surely well acquainted with the feeling of shame, even if they were privately able to maintain a certain pride in their traditions. We might even draw a parallel between the ontological status of these crypto-Jews and Muslims and shame’s own will to concealment.\footnote{On this point, see Derrida’s discussion of the figure of the marrano: “Let us figuratively call Marrano anyone who remains faithful to a secret that he has not chosen, in the very place where he lives... Is it not possible to think such a secret eludes history, age, and aging?” (Aporias 338).} If “the body’s expressions—including that classic one of shame, the hanging of the head—act as a metonym for the wider structures of social domination” (Probyn 53), then there could hardly be a more striking reminder of the politics of limpieza de sangre than the blush whose appearance depends in an equally vital way upon the same bodily fluid. Along these lines, Don Quijote’s compliance with his shame punishment can be suggestively read as an invitation to adopt the subject position of these members of history’s defeated, as a kind of ‘virtue of losers’: on the one hand, it represents a rejection of the violence and vengeance which characterized the hegemonic discourse of honor in early
modern Spain and, on the other, a refusal to conform to that very discourse by embracing shame as an alternative ontology. Instead of making recourse to external mechanisms of vengeance (as we might expect in Lope or Calderón’s honor plays) and thus perpetuating forms of punishment similar to that suffered by his primary character, Cervantes suggests that vergüenza may serve as a means of peaceful resistance to state-based and popular forms of violence, as a way of arresting the feedback loop, as it were.\(^\text{168}\)

Moreover, as a tool for reflecting on the racial, religious, and imperial conflicts which traversed Cervantes’s Mediterranean, shame holds a unique power to call forth the stories and subjects that risk becoming lost in the expansive dimensions and unifying interests of certain Mediterraneanizing projects. As I noted in my first chapter, such a risk is apparent in both Castro’s strong rebuke of Braudel for relegating the human—and dehumanizing—elements of Mediterranean history to a grand economic system, as well as the tendency to conflate honor and shame as merely two sides of the same essentialist coin. Recovering shame as its own distinct emotional currency corresponds, then, to rescuing the forgotten “microecologies” or local (hi)stories of Mediterranean subjectivity. To pull them from the cage of the homogenizing logics of historiography is to remember the struggles of those punished by the dominant forces of history, a move analogous to Sancho’s empathetic and unsettling call to consciousness in directly confronting the priest: “Todo esto que he dicho, señor cura, no es más de por encarecer a su paternidad haga conciencia del mal tratamiento que a mi señor se le hace, y mire bien no le pida Dios en la otra vida esta prisión de mi amo” (I, 47; 597). This is what makes the novel so unsettling as

\(^{168}\) Domínguez Ortiz cites a fascinating historical case which begins to suggest what this sort of resistance through shame might look like: a Portuguese converso who walked through the streets “con un sambenito, y con tan gran desenfado, y desahogo que causaba ira en todos los que lo miraban” (qtd. in Olmos García 86-87).
well, both from a political and aesthetic perspective: the reader is offered no easy outlet from the suffering of shame and, having identified with Don Quijote as a “sufridor de afrentas” (I, 52: 643), is therefore obligated to inhabit or embody it in a similar way, to consider the ethical repercussions of and possibilities within shame, to meditate on the ‘virtue of losers’ from the defeated’s own position and on his or her own terms, to adopt an anamorphic or bottom-up perspective on the world—as in Doré’s depiction—from within the cage. In short, to acknowledge the marginalized of the *mare nostrum* by prompting an inversion or alternative view of Mediterranean ‘values.’ The novel’s ability to make shame linger in this way is a prime example of Cervantes’s talent for articulating the deep emotional registers of Mediterranean lived experience and for wielding affect as both a political and aesthetic instrument. But that he makes Don Quijote sally forth again in 1615, pride intact, is perhaps the most powerful gesture of all.
CHAPTER FIVE: Inhabiting Affect: The Cultural, Historical, and Ethical Functions of Shame in Don Quijote

Shame here seems to compel a future anteriority—in shame one feels viscerally the conditional sense of ‘as if’: a tense that highlights the implications of one’s present actions. This is a good working definition of ethics: to be aware of what one’s actions might set in motion.

Elspeth Probyn, Blush

Ever since the influence of Juan Huarte de San Juan’s humoral theory on Don Quijote was demonstrated at the beginning of the last century, there has been almost total consensus among Cervantes scholars that its protagonist is a choleric that becomes melancholic in Part Two of the novel. This binary structure owes, in part, to the passivity of Don Quijote before the acceptance of his fate, the sadness that arises due to his inability to disenchant Dulcinea, and the long series of failures and humiliations that the Knight of the Sad Countenance suffers throughout his story. Despite what some scholars have identified as its limitations,\(^\text{169}\) the importance of humoralism in the formation of the character and his melancholy is undeniable. But perhaps it is due to the insistent emphasis on the humors that other affects in the novel have been largely ignored by critics, for this emphasis tacitly rejects the idea that Don Quijote is capable of expressing emotions which lie outside the colérico/melancólico paradigm, or at the very least presumes that such emotions are of secondary or circumstantial importance to the novel. Though we may agree that

\(^{169}\) See Soufas (1-36), who argues that Huarte’s influence over Cervantes was not as acute as it has traditionally been regarded by critics like Green; and Salillas. Regarding melancholy, Soufas underlines its confusing status as “a nearly all-encompassing term for excesses of sentiment, imbalance of mind and spirit, antisocial and/or obsessive behavior, and a variety of psychological and physiological aberrations” (8); and regarding choler: “There is no textual evidence in Don Quijote, however, that Alonso Quijano is ever naturally choleric or that excessive heat characterizes his physiological condition before his period of excessive reading” (20). Soufas even claims that Cervantes “goes about undermining and parodying [Examen de ingenios] by means of Huarte’s very vocabulary” (32).
Cervantes’s familiarity with early modern theories of the humors informed the construction of his most famous character, such a concession need not imply a determinism which subsumes Don Quijote’s emotional complexity to the psychological limitations of his *ingeniosidad*. In reality, despite his lengthy analysis of the humoral, environmental, and behavioral factors that largely determined an individual’s temperament, not even Huarte himself discounted the import of affectivity and the passions. Locating them in the imaginative faculty, he believed that affects were produced and stimulated by the ‘vital spirits’ which circulated through the body and, in turn, incited an individual to act.

Huarte’s first example of this phenomenon is instructive: “Porque si el hombre se pone a imaginarse en alguna afrenta que le han hecho, luego acude la sangre arterial al corazón y despierta la irascible, y le da calor y fuerzas para vengarse” (290).

These words alert us to the fact that, even within a humoral model, an affect such as ire is not manifested due solely to a warm and dry choleric predisposition, but also to an external object, in this case that of an imagined affront. Although it may seem obvious, we should recall that beyond his generally irascible nature, Don Quijote’s own ire is stoked by similarly extrinsic objects and events in the narrative—imagined or otherwise. Huarte’s example also foreshadows the specific affect of primary interest for this chapter—shame—since it is the one most strongly suggested by the threat of an affront; indeed, the “fuerzas para vengarse” are summoned precisely by the shameful thought of allowing such a threat

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170 According to Huarte, “los espíritus vitales... andan vagando por todo el cuerpo y están siempre asidos a la imaginación y siguen su contemplación. El oficio de esta sustancia espiritual es despertar las potencias del hombre y darles fuerza y vigor para que puedan obrar. Conócese claramente ser éste su uso considerando los movimientos de la imaginativa y lo que sucede después en la obra” (288-90). This is an idea reiterated by Serés: “La afectividad, las tendencias y las pasiones también están en función de la imaginativa; a través de los ‘espíritus’” (36). Likewise, Cummings notes that “Shame resists humoristic classification, and remains a puzzle in its precise physiognomic formation” (29). It should also be borne in mind that Covarrubias considered *afrenta* to be nearly synonymous with shame, as I detail below.
to remain unavenged. This situation is one which Don Quijote will confront on countless occasions throughout the novel, and his unwillingness, failure, or lack of “fuerzas” to avenge his reputation will often end in shame. Thus while nearly always manifesting one of the inverse affects of shame—excessive pride—there are important moments in which this pride is challenged and begins to flag, exposing the fragility of his self-esteem. These questions are directly related to Don Quijote’s profession as a knight errant and his self-professed chivalric ethos, which can be largely characterized by his spirited resolve to confront problems with swift, definitive action. His preoccupation with his reputation and the portrayal of the fame, honor, and courage of his deeds is also part and parcel of his characterization as a kind of outdated epic hero. It could even be argued that emotions are the single greatest motor of the narrative action of the novel, spurring the protagonist to combat the limitations of his body, of the cold decrepitude, inactivity, and lack of passion that are more characteristic of the hidalgo’s true age. His varied emotions—and not just anger—warm up and prepare the body for the coming conflicts and adventures, unlike the strictly humoral understanding of melancholy as a paralyzing force which leads to constant cognitive reflection instead of motor action.

This is why I would like to propose that, rather than reading Don Quijote solely through the relatively limited lens of humoralism, the novel and its principal character are

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171 Layna Ranz highlights the difficulty of this proposition by advising the following: “No me cabe duda alguna que se podrían organizar infinitos congresos sobre cómo se manifiesta en don Quijote la soberbia, la envidia o la ira. Y tampoco tengo ninguna sobre el poco acuerdo al que se llegaría. No creo, sinceramente, que se pueda discernir con seguridad cuáles son los afectos que dominan a don Quijote” (215-216). Although the concrete reasons for which he believes the identification of specific affects in Don Quijote to be such an arduous task are not clear, I have also acknowledged the numerous difficulties inherent in analyzing affectivity. However, I do not believe we should allow such a lack of consensus to deter us from the arduous task of analyzing the emotions of Don Quijote and countless other Cervantine characters. Hutchinson seems to arrive at a similar conclusion: “Si históricamente ha habido lectores que han visto el Quijote como el libro más triste que se haya escrito, y otros que lo han visto como el más alegre, no hay ninguna garantía de que vayamos a coincidir en las cualidades emocionales que le atribuyamos” (Hutchinson, “Poética de la emoción,” 1375).
more illuminated by interpretative modes which grant free range of movement to affect, to an emotional dynamism on par with that of Cervantes’s writing. Instead of the hydraulic constraints of choler, the classical idea of thymos may thus be more effective for understanding the protean emotional temperament of Don Quijote. In his recent study of the classical precedents and contemporary political stakes of rage, Peter Sloterdijk identifies the Greek concept of thymos as a fundamental component of the ancient heroic psyche. As “the impulsive center of the proud self,” thymos constitutes the part of the soul responsible for impelling the warrior to overcome obstacles and defeat enemies through unbridled indignation, spirit, and pride (11). According to Sloterdijk, the thymotic qualities of the ancient Greek hero, especially manifest in the figure of Achilles and in Homer’s Iliad, are defined by their involuntary or uncontrollable nature in regards to the subject, largely due to these characters’ “lack [of] reflective inwardness, intimate conversations with themselves, and the ability to make conscientious attempts to control their affects” (10). We might well say that Don Quijote’s madness is impelled by similarly thymotic qualities, albeit shaped more directly by chivalric romance than Homeric epic. Yet contrary to what a strictly determinist reading of humoral theory might imply, the protagonist’s choleric disposition is not uncontrollable and, as will become clear throughout my analysis, is quite susceptible to “reflective inwardness.” To cite merely one of the most notable examples, after the beating he gives Sancho for mocking him in the batanes episode, Don Quijote apologizes to his squire by invoking the classical commonplace that “los primeros

172 Nevertheless, as Cervantes’s first biographer Gregorio Mayans recognized, the Iliad and Don Quijote—and the ire of their protagonists—maintain an intimate relationship: “La Fábula de Don Quijote de la Mancha imita la Iliada. Quiero decir que, si la ira es una especie de fúor, yo no diferencio a Aquiles airado de Don Quijote loco. Sí la Iliada es una fábula heroica escrita en verso, la Novela de Don Quijote lo es en prosa, que la épica (como dijo el mismo Cervantes) tan bien puede escribirse en prosa como en verso” (Mayans 164–65).
movimientos no son en mano del hombre” (I, 20: 241). So while he is often moved by involuntary emotional reactions, Don Quijote is not unconscious of their effects, and makes a progressively concerted effort to temper such outbursts. These distinctions, as I suggested in my first chapter, owe considerably to the generic limitations of epic poetry vis-à-vis the modern novel, for which Cervantes developed a psychologically complex character capable of self-reflection, inner doubt, and emotional dynamism. Instead of being impelled simply by choler, melancholia, and madness, he is moved by an affective attachment to (and ultimate failure of) a version of himself as a chivalric literary hero.

Shame, as I will demonstrate in the present chapter, alerts us to these tensions by irrupting in the very gulf between the lofty ideals of knight errantry and Don Quijote’s incapacity to realize them due to the mundane reality of a changing world, one in which the thymotic spirit of heroes past is no longer effective or appropriate for meting out what he sees to be justice. Incidentally, it bears noting that the fine line between positive and destructive forms of rage was one confronted with limited success by historical Spanish soldiers as well, who gained an infamous reputation for cruelty in their wars of conquest, colonization, and Counter-Reformation. One of Don Quijote’s principle responses to this reality is inaction, an effect which, despite its additional association with melancholy, is emblematic of his shame. A preliminary example should suffice to explain this phenomenon. In Part Two of the novel, Don Quijote seems to recognize that Sancho has become too astute to buy the hackneyed story of enchantment after he fails to defend his squire against the attacks of the braying village (II, 27-28: 256). Instead, he justifies his

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173 Don Quijote later uses a similar terminology to refer not to his ire but to his amorous passion, concerned that his historian might not have portrayed him in the most elevated light: "teniendo a raya los ímpetus de los naturales movimientos" (II, 3: 705).
flight from danger as nothing more than wise military prudence. After escaping the fracas, Sancho confronts and accuses his master of abandoning him, to which Don Quijote responds, “No huye el que se retira... porque has de saber, Sancho, que la valentía que no se funda sobre la basa de la prudencia se llama temeridad, y las hazañas del temerario más se atribuyen a la buena fortuna que a su ánimo. Y así, yo confieso que me he retirado, pero no huido; y en esto he imitado a muchos valientes, que se han guardado para tiempos mejores, y desto están las historias llenas; las cuales, por no serte a ti de provecho ni a mí de gusto, no te las refiero ahora” (II, 28: 257). Don Quijote’s reference to prudence in battle reflects a well-known dictum of military theory and the behavior of the virtuous soldier, described as early as Aristotle, in which prudence constituted the virtuous balance between cowardice and temerity. Sancho’s accusation—as well as his master’s reticence in discussing it (“ni a mí de gusto”)—implies that Don Quijote has allowed himself to be carried away by fear and, more importantly, by withdrawing while his squire was still in danger, he commits an error of grave proportions which undermines the moral creed of knight errantry. His attempt to justify his inaction by means of a military ethos of soldierly conduct serves to parody his own chivalric ethos and underscores the incompatibility of the two in a modern, uncertain, and increasingly militarized republic.

Though he sees himself as embodying the spirit of the andres epiphaneis—the Greek conception of heroic men of action in the highest sense—there are other important instances in which Don Quijote for various reasons defers, renounces, or otherwise avoids direct action. In addition to the well-worn excuse of enchantment, these include prudence (I, 23: 272-73; II, 28: 942-43; II, 60: 1222) and a number of excuses culled from the romances of chivalry, such as the obligation not to take up a new cause until prior
obligations are met (leaving the innkeeper to a violent beating, I, 44: 561-62; 565); the prohibition of raising his sword against non-knights or squirely folk (I, 44: 566; II, 11: 782); or, quite simply, that the adventure is meant for someone else (I, 43: 557; II, 29: 955).

Many of these examples result in serious and often life-threatening consequences for other characters. By drawing our attention to these moments of despondency, denial of his unique thymotic spirit, and other chivalric shortcomings, shame is particularly effective for comprehending the seeming vicissitudes or variations in the emotional demeanor of the protagonist as well as the complexities of his madness, the justifications that he constantly invents in shameful moments, his fragility as a military and ethical figure, and his evolution throughout the novel. Moreover, I will suggest that Don Quijote’s shame reflects that of the romances of chivalry responsible for his madness and forms, as I have demonstrated in previous chapters, an integral component of Cervantine narrative and aesthetic technique. Finally, by studying the radical possibilities of shame as an affirmation of defeat, I will attempt to build upon my conclusions from the last chapter by showing how these questions stand to challenge dominant structures of power while, at the same time, framing shame as an invitation to self-transformation. First of all, however, it will be necessary to outline a brief methodological trajectory as well as to stake out several potential pitfalls which must inevitably be confronted when attempting to address the issues I have just proposed.

To undertake an analysis of the affective profile of Don Quijote, of course, necessarily poses at the same time the thorny problem of his madness, perhaps another reason why Huarte’s humoralism has remained so seductive yet limiting to modern critics. How, for example, are we to understand the (il)logical nature of the thoughts, feelings, and
actions of someone defined precisely by his insanity? Even more axiomatic is the fact of Don Quijote’s existence not as a human subject with unlimited possibilities of agency and analysis but as a fictional character, conceived and elaborated with artful deliberation in Cervantes’s own imagination. But all this does not mean that Cervantes was uninterested in exploring emotion through his principle character, nor that Don Quijote’s madness is incompatible with the emotional complexity of a “verisimilar, eminently believable—in short, novelistic—literary personage” (Johnson, Carroll 2). The following analysis therefore departs from the premise that, apart from his madness, Don Quijote exhibits rational, non-pathological qualities as well, since “Cervantes is concerned simultaneously with normal mental processes” (Johnson, Carroll 12). According to many theories of shame, Don Quijote may actually be considered the most likely character for embodying and expressing this particular emotion. By its very nature, shame implies a reflection upon the self, since it surges forth upon the recognition of the gap between one’s (or someone else’s) ideals and reality. This intimate relation with self-consciousness anticipates modernity’s characteristic rupture of the subject, and indeed many contemporary writers have seized upon this unique aspect of shame as a means for understanding modern subjectivity and related problems. Yet this rupture was present in the early modern experience of shame as well, as attested by the definition of “confusión” in the Diccionario de Autoridades: “Se toma algunas veces por abatimiento, encogimiento, empacho y vergüenza, nacida del propio conocimiento de sí mismo, ù del exceso con que uno se halla favorecido: y assi se suele decir comunmente, Esto me sirve de confusión” (I:

174 The close relation between madness and passions such as ire existed as a classical convention (Layna Ranz 204–05). But I am suggesting here that shame permits us as readers to witness precisely the limit-moments of Don Quijote’s locura.
This conception would seem to aprioristically favor the psychopathological qualities of Don Quijote: his confusing of fiction with reality leads to the construction of an identity which must constantly confront the excesses of this rupture between the real (Alonso Quijano) and the ideal (Don Quijote). Indeed, toward the end of his first sally—when, after his beating by the merchants, he begins reciting a hodgepodge of literary references from Abindarráez to Valdovinos—he appears to be several characters confused into one (I, 5: 78-79). It is in these moments—when an unexpected realization or recognition of the self exposes the rupture between his ideals and reality—that Don Quijote will be most overcome by shame.

I regard the classical and early modern philosophical understandings of shame to be a crucial part of interrogating its importance in the novel, since Cervantes often demonstrates his recourse to these precedents and at other times represents the affect in manners consistent with classical theories. I noted in Chapter 1 that, for Vives, the cultivation and careful manipulation of particular emotions served a therapeutic function in managing the expression of other, more sinful emotional states. In his treatise of 1538, it is shame that he distinguishes as the most useful passion in this regard. For the early modern subject, shame thus performed a paradoxical dual role: on the one hand, it was a passion suffered in its original sense of passio by those who were subjected to its humiliating effects before a judgmental public and, on the other, it actively suspended or deferred the often more shameful repercussions of passions such as fear, love, and ire. Although the emotional taxonomies of Thomas Aquinas and René Descartes reduced shame respectively to a kind of fear and sadness, Vives, on the other hand, devotes significant attention to discussing shame as an independent yet invariably complex emotion, one
which occupies a rather curious place among the passions. Since in its classical conception shame was associated with the negative reputation that proceeded from a social disgrace, it was an affect which was produced and sustained by a public exchange and intimately dependent upon another (unlike melancholy, which was understood by Freud as a withdrawal of cathexis toward the self). Yet since, as I noted in the previous chapter, the degree of shame corresponded to the importance of or respect toward this other, it also inevitably indexed cultural codes of power and social status. In this way, shame performed an ethical function in externally controlling the behavior of those who were traditionally seen as lacking internal virtue. Shame thus supposes a dialectic relationship between interiority and exteriority: emerging from the inner depths of the soul, it is outwardly manifested in the form of the blush, a physiognomic feature easily recognized by a regulating public and, as was conventionally believed, a natural mechanism for hiding a moral shortcoming or sinful transgression. While striving to veil the private qualities and feelings of the self, the external deployment of the blush ironically ended up

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175 Here I differ from Gundersheimer’s claim that moral and ethical theorists like Vives “manifested little or no interest in reexamining the concept” of shame after its “succinct,” “simple,” and “perfunctory” treatment by Aristotle (Gundersheimer 37). Vives’s treatment of emotion, from my perspective, represents an attempt to forge new understandings while building upon Aristotelian precedents. Vives claims, for example, that the Stoics “corrupted the entire subject with their fallacies” and that Aristotle “dealt with it from a purely political perspective” (qtd. in Noreña 141). It is perhaps ironic, then, that Vives was a vocal critic of Don Quijote due to what he considered its lack of moral and didactic content (Jurado Santos 268).

176 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (1128b10-35). Vives echoes this ideology as well: “The feeling of shame was given to man as a tutor […] Nothing is more useful to those who do not know the duties of life, than a feeling of shame […] The feeling of shame is extremely necessary to all those who want to live in the communion of society” (115).

177 Annibale Pocaterra, Italian physician and in 1592 the first to write a book dedicated entirely to the topic of shame, says the following: “Ma se allo’contro la natura s’accorge, il detrimento, e l’offesa esser un bene esterno, com’è l’honore, e perciò non haver luogo la difesa del cuore; ivi non si ferma; ma quasi d’un balzo risalta di fuori, per far riparo al danno vegnente: e ciò s’argomenta di fare in quel modo migliore; che puo, e che sa, coprendo il volto, con intenzione di coprir anche l’anima peccatrice d’un purpureo velo di sangue, e non e maraviglia; perche l’ascondersi, il coprirsi e natural proprieta di quello affetto” (qtd. in Gundersheimer 47n).
calling attention to those same shameful inner qualities. Incidentally, this also facilitated
the affect’s aesthetic representation in pictorial arts and literature. As an affect which
could be visibly observed, it was particularly well suited to the narrative descriptions of a
character’s emotional state. These unique qualities underline the involuntary nature of
shame: unlike love or anger, for example, it is generally difficult to both simulate and
dissimulate the visual effects it produces. Although there are several literary examples in
which honor is feigned—we need only recall the squire’s toothpick in *Lazarillo de Tormes*
or other visual strategies of self-presentation—in general shame either appears regardless
of the will of whomever feels it, or it is simply not present.

As elsewhere in this dissertation, however, I do not confine the following analysis to
a rigidly philological criterion for determining the philosophical precedents which may or
may not have informed Cervantes’s understanding of shame, even if I make extensive
recourse to classical and early modern treatises on the subject. I am equally interested in
very recent theoretical attempts at thinking about shame in different, innovative, and at
times subversive ways, for which Tomkins’s writings were largely responsible. Eve
Sedgwick and Adam Frank’s groundbreaking 2003 article “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold:
Reading Silvan Tomkins,” for example, introduced Tomkins’s unique work to contemporary
cultural critics and, as “the most mercurial of emotions,” granted shame the distinction of
“the exemplary affect for theory” (97; 115). As I discussed in the previous chapter, of

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178 According to Theodor Adorno, this paradoxical quality of shame is also common to taste, “the most
accurate seismograph of historical experience. Unlike almost all other faculties, it is ever able to register its
own behavior. Reacting against itself, it recognizes its own lack of taste” (145). “Almost exactly the same can
be said of shame, which registers its own shamefulness the moment it is invoked” (Beweis, *Postcolonial 7*).
Limon aptly calls this self-referential quality of shame and its blush a kind of “visual onomatopoeia” (549).
This idea also recalls Derrida’s reflection upon the affect in the first several pages of *The Animal that
Therefore I Am*, a reflection spurred by his self-conscious nakedness before his cat: “It is as if I were ashamed,
therefore, naked in front of this cat, but also ashamed for being ashamed. A reflected shame, the mirror of a
shame ashamed of itself, a shame that is at the same time specular, unjustifiable, and unavowable” (4).
particular relevance to these claims is the idea that shame is not merely an emotion to be repressed, overcome, or, indeed, ashamed of, but that it is attached in an affirmative way to “interest.” In other words, shame surfaces only when the subject is sufficiently invested in an object, idea, or ideology (such as knight errantry) so as to enable such a feeling when these interests face a barrier to their realization (such as Don Quijote’s failures). If in the last chapter I attempted to show how these interests responded to the cultural politics of penalty in the early modern Mediterranean, here I hope to continue exploring shame as an invitation to self-conscious, ethical reflection on the part of both Don Quijote and the reader, as well as to show how the lived experience of shame offers an equally potent means to reflect upon literature and Cervantes’s novel as a whole, to which I will now turn.

**Don Quijote’s Blush: The Syntax of Shameful Chivalry (I)**

*What do you consider most humane? --To spare someone shame.*

Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*

The physiognomic and visual registers of shame I examined in Chapter 4 as well—including the blush, lowering of the head or gaze, silence, and inaction—will continue to play a crucial role in signaling the attachments, interests, or investments of Don Quijote’s chivalric ethos and the dissonance produced when such interests fail to be fulfilled. Such shameful moments in the novel can be witnessed with Don Quijote’s very first discursive exchange as a knight errant. Attempting to reassure the two prostitutes (“dos destraídas mozas”) standing at the door to the inn of his good intentions, the title character introduces
us to his antiquated and aureate manner of speaking by exclaiming to them, “Non fuyan las vuestras mercedes, ni teman desaguisado alguno, ca a la orden de caballería que profeso non toca ni atañe facerle a ninguno, cuanto más a tan altas doncellas como vuestras presencias demuestran” (I, 2: 53). Nonplussed by his words, their reaction of laughter produces an immediate effect on Don Quijote: “como se oyeron llamar doncellas, cosa tan fuera de su profesión, no pudieron tener la risa y fue de manera que don Quijote vino a correrse” (I, 2: 53). Consulting Covarrubias’s Tesoro, we find that, “Correrse vale afrentarse, porque le corre la sangre al rostro. Corrido, el confuso y afrentado. Corrimiento, la tal confusión o vergüenza. Andar corrido, andar... afrentado” (618).

Similarly, ‘afrenta’ is defined as “el acto que se comete contra alguno en deshonor suyo, aunque sea hecho con razón y justicia, como açotar a uno o sacarle a la vergüenza; y a este tal dezimos que le han afrentado [...] Díxose afrenta, quasi en la frente, porque de la vergüenza que toma el afrentado le salen colores al rostro y particularmente a la frente, por la sangre que sube al ceñuro” (51). In other words, Don Quijote is ashamed by the humorous response to his earnest attempt at consoling the doncellas. As readers, of course, we are invited to share in the humor and incipient schadenfreude toward Don Quijote that such infelicities produce in the text. This comical ridicule is supported and augmented by an astute form of irony in the scene: the character’s shame is contrasted by a certain shamelessness regarding the textual representation of prostitutes (and their being taken for maidens). This tone—characteristic of a large part of the novel as a whole—is

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179 In 1675, Antoine de Courtain provided an alternative etymology for afrenta that wonderfully underscores its emotional registers: “porque la cara, que es el frente del cuerpo, no sólo es la parte más elevada y la que mejor señala la dignidad, sino que de todo el cuerpo, es la que mejor indica los sentimientos del alma. Ella se expande en la alegría y se contrae en la tristeza, por eso se la tiene por el alma misma, de suerte que afrontar o hacer una afrenta a alguien, es como darle un golpe en el corazón y en la parte más noble de sí mismo” (qtd. in Pérez Cortés 110).
announced on the same page when the narrator parenthetically remarks on the word “puercos”: “(que sin perdón así se llaman)” (I, 2: 53). On a metanarrative level, Cervantes thus ironically plays on the precepts of aesthetic decorum by flaunting the modesty toward topics popularly considered shameful.

Humor and laughter play a distinct yet equally important role in another shameful moment later in the novel when Don Quijote and Sancho encounter the batanes (I, 20), an episode in which “Prácticamente todo lo que pasa...está motivado por emociones” (Hutchinson, “‘Los primeros movimientos’” 201). Initially, knight and squire are both affected by the feeling of fear regarding the sounds of thunderous pounding in the night, an emotion typically reserved exclusively for Sancho, “que naturalmente era medroso y de poco ánimo” (I, 20: 227). But when Don Quijote finally discovers that their true source is not something sinister but an occurrence that is, so to speak, much more run-of-the-mill—fulling hammers—, this fear suddenly turns to shame: “Cuando don Quijote vio lo que era, enmudeció y pasmose de arriba abajo. Miró Sancho y vio que tenía la cabeza inclinada sobre el pecho, con muestras de estar corrido” (I, 20: 239). As one of the many characters adept at reading the emotional states of one another by observing behaviors, demeanors, gestures, and facial expressions, Sancho immediately intuits that Don Quijote has become ashamed upon recognizing the mundane reality of the hitherto dangerous adventure that seemed to await him. The exchange continues: “Miró también don Quijote a Sancho y vio que tenía los carrillos hinchados y la boca llena de risa, con evidentes señales de querer

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180 In yet another testament to the importance of filling the critical void of studies on emotion in the novel, Hutchinson laments the scant attention paid to the emotional registers of this episode by remarking that “pasar por alto la emotividad de este texto equivaldría a comentar ‘La forja de Vulcano’ de Velázquez o ‘Los fusilamientos del tres de mayo’ de Goya con escasa referencia al desbordante patetismo de estos cuadros” (“‘Los primeros movimientos’” 201).
reventar con ella, y no pudo su melancolía tanto con él, que a la vista de Sancho pudiese dejar de reírse” (I, 20: 239). While attesting to the intimate relation between shame and melancholy, this delightful citation further underscores the intuitive and infectious nature of the pair’s mutual gaze. As we know, Sancho’s uncontrollable laughter and later mockery of his master end up reigniting the latter’s ire and leading to a pair of hard blows with the lance as a reminder that the insolent squire mind his place. Such exchanges, however, stress the dynamism and fluidity with which Cervantes moves the emotions of his characters and readers, even between and across seemingly manic transitions from humor, fear, shame, pity, melancholy, mockery, rage, and back again.

Another explicit manifestation of shame in the main character can be witnessed when he later encounters the priest and the barber and asks them why they are on the road without servants or provisions. Wanting to see how Don Quijote would react to a false provocation, the priest responds by claiming that they were robbed by a gang of galley slaves who had been liberated by someone “que debía de estar fuera de juicio, o debe de ser tan grande bellaco como ellos, o algún hombre sin alma y sin conciencia” (I, 29: 377). Having been informed by Sancho beforehand of the episode involving Ginés de Pasamonte and company, the priest fabricates the story of his assault—and condemns the actions of whatever man was crazy, stupid, or unscrupulous enough to have contravened royal decree and liberated such criminals only to have them attack innocent travelers—in order to elicit a humorous response. Yet Don Quijote’s immediate reaction of grim silence is one which clearly reveals his contrasting emotional state: “se le mudaba la color a cada palabra, y no osaba decir que él había sido el libertador de aquella buena gente” (I, 29: 377). The blush of the face serves as a semiotic feature which indicates that Don Quijote is mortified by the
consequences of having freed Ginés de Pasamonte and company, a feeling exacerbated by
the fact that his failure has been exposed to the eyes of those he esteems, in this case his
friends the priest and the barber. If we think about the great quantity of episodes of
secondary narration or in which an intradiegetic audience is present in the novel, it
becomes clear that the protagonist will frequently be subject to this kind of situation and
conscious of his actions before a similar public, one which will not always prove to be as
sympathetic. Shortly thereafter, Don Quijote recognizes the opportunity to demonstrate
his knightly worth and recoup his friends’ esteem when the group runs into the young
shepherd Andrés. Boasting of the way in which he spared the boy the whipping from Juan
Haldudo, Don Quijote prods Andrés to corroborate the story of his heroic intervention. But
when the latter replies that Don Quijote only served to aggravate his cruel master’s abuse,
the knight errant reacts in a similar manner: “Quedó corridísimo don Quijote del cuento de
Andrés, y fue menester que los demás tuviesen mucha cuenta con no reírse, por no acaballe
de correr del todo” (I, 31: 402). The superlative “corridísimo” can be seen to confirm the
extended idea that shame increases according to the degree of importance of the public
who witnesses a shameful event. Unlike later episodes of the novel, however, Don Quijote’s
friends have been merciful by controlling their laughter in order to limit such an increase in
shame, an act which once again points up their immediate facility in reading Don Quijote’s
facial demeanor and intuiting his internal emotional state.

On the other hand, beyond a personal interest in his fame as a knight errant, these
examples (just a few of many) point to an ethical reflection on the part of Don Quijote, who
recognizes that his actions have not achieved the desired results but, in fact, have
degenerated the life conditions of the very people he aspired to help. Shame delineates the
thin red line of his madness by involuntarily escaping the customary justifications he provides in other moments of impotence or failure, namely the excuse of enchantment. In the mendacious story of the robbery by galley slaves as well as the case of Andrés, Don Quijote finds himself suddenly incapable of supplying an alibi for his actions and, in its place, blood rushes to his face and signals his shame. In the Quijote of 1615, this shame and humiliation is exacerbated further by the character’s ever-present awareness of the publication of the first part of his adventures and thus of the fact that he is constantly subjected to the discerning gaze of his historian and that of his readers. His proud desire for knightly fame is thus rather ironically tempered by the shame proceeding from his self-consciousness of the very readership in which such illusory hopes for fame are inevitably predicated.

Don Quijote’s Blush: The Syntax of Shameful Chivalry (II)

It was as if the shame of it should outlive him.
Franz Kafka, The Trial

The last will and testament of the Valladolid resident Nuño Pérez de Monroy, resident of Valladolid in the year 1326, modestly beseeches his surviving family members to ensure “que a mi alma no se vea en vergüenza ante la su faz” (Rucquoi 355). Had he been granted due access to the law, perhaps Josef K., the principle character of Kafka’s The Trial, would have expressed a similar dying wish in light of the very last words of the novel (cited above), words Kafka himself, in a letter to his father, echoed in reference to his inner

181 For a distinction between the closely related concepts of shame and humiliation, see Miller, Humiliation (134-36; 178-83).
emotional state: “He is afraid the shame will outlive him, even” (*The Basic 214*). The author’s own will, we recall, instructed that his published and unpublished work be destroyed upon his death, a request which Kafka’s literary executor, Max Brod, ceased to uphold by printing *The Trial* in 1925. While ultimately satisfying countless modern readers, according to J. Hillis Miller this decision forced Kafka “to suffer the posthumous shame of Brod’s refusal to carry out the command.” These examples, though separated by precisely six-hundred years, alert us to the abiding and implacable nature of shame, its seeming capacity to outlive the subject and therefore to produce a kind of after-life anxiety. Such an ability to survive body and text recalls early miasmatic theories, in which diseases such as cholera or the Black Death emanated from cadavers and circulated in the air until contaminating their next host. Perhaps the principal difference is that shame, if similarly pathological, continues beyond the grave to affect the already deceased as well, leading, in the case of the Valladolid will, to the explicit desire to control its posthumous effects with earthly legal mechanisms.

Like Pérez de Monroy and Kafka, it could be argued that Cervantes was also concerned with the potential effects of shame on his literary reputation and posterity, most notably in relation to the publication of Avellaneda’s apocryphal *Quijote* in 1614, which incited Cervantes to expediently finish the definitive sequel a year later and to kill off its main character (“te doy a don Quijote dilatado, y finalmente muerto y sepultado, porque ninguno se atreva a levantarle nuevos testimonios,” II, Prologue: 677). If Kafka would indeed have been ashamed at the publication of his manuscripts after his death, then it is not difficult to imagine that similar feelings were stirred in Cervantes by the usurpation of

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102 Accordingly, for Walter Benjamin shame was Kafka’s “strongest gesture” (129).
his characters while living. The Prologue of Part Two, in fact, attests at length to the profound emotional responses to Avellaneda's affront, even while couched in Cervantes's characteristic irony. Directly addressing the reader, he claims, for example, that “puesto que los agravios despiertan la cólera en los más humildes pechos, en el mío ha de padecer excepción esta regla. Quisieras tú que lo diera del asno, del mentecato y del atrevido, pero no me pasa por el pensamiento: castíguele su pecado, con su pan se lo coma y allá se lo haya”; and later, “Si por ventura llegares a conocerle, dile de mi parte que no me tengo por agraviado” (673; 675). In this way, Cervantes displaces his feelings onto the reader, whose hypothetical clamoring for revenge is astutely contrasted by the author's seemingly more enlightened and magnanimous posture. The irony, of course, is that while purporting to withhold “venganzas, riñas y vituperios” (673), Cervantes does in fact manage to land more than a few blows on his anonymous adversary, a paraleptic move analogous to the writing of his 1605 prologue while simultaneously claiming to dispense with the formality of a prologue altogether.183 Moreover, his overt refusal to take umbrage implies that Avellaneda's status is too low to merit a correspondingly indignant yet gentlemanly response, of the sort which Don Quijote constantly initiates with the accusation ‘mentís.’ Such a refusal on the part of Cervantes represents a subtle example of shaming as what Austin and Searle would respectively call a performative utterance or speech act, such as the admonishment “Shame on you!,” which simultaneously pronounces the utterance and produces just such an emotional effect upon its object. In this case, the insinuation that Avellaneda is not worthy of an ‘agravio' or honorable response deflects some of the shame

183 “Sólo quisiera dártela monda y desnuda, sin el ornato de prólogo, ni de la innumerabilidad y catálogo de los acostumbrados sonetos, epigramas y elogios que al principio de los libros suelen ponerse” (I, Prologue: 10).
produced by the apocryphal Quijote back onto its author. This also attests to the fact that the relation between vergüenza and venganza is not merely paronomastic but that Cervantes has much to say about shame and/as revenge.\(^{184}\)

Irony notwithstanding, the 1615 prologue betrays the reality that Avellaneda has succeeded in provoking an emotional reaction by mocking Cervantes for his age, physical disability, and supposed jealousy of his literary arch-rival Lope’s extensive fame: “Lo que no he podido dejar de sentir es que me note de viejo y de manco”; “He sentido también que me llame invidioso y que como a ignorante me describa qué cosa sea la invidia” (II, Prologue: 673; 674). The choice to employ the verb sentir here leaves no doubt that considerable resentment has been piqued in the ‘manco’ from Lepanto, and it is indeed his honorable military service which Cervantes invokes in responding to Avellaneda’s ridicule: “Las [heridas] que el soldado muestra en el rostro y en los pechos, estrellas son que guían a los demás al cielo de la honra” (674).\(^{185}\) He thus turns his battle scars and physical disability into a point of pride, reappropriating their original use as a tool for shaming and mockery on the part of Avellaneda. Incapable of moving it though he may be, Cervantes’s mangled left hand serves as bodily proof of his honor and, by extension, of Avellaneda’s shameful ignorance regarding the importance of military service and its ideology of self-

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\(^{184}\) For historical practices of vengeance in relation to social codes of honor, see Artiles (“La idea de la venganza”); Pérez Cortés; and Riquer, Caballeros. A similar rhetoric is employed, of course, in the courtly-love influenced appeals to Don Quijote’s ‘sweet enemy’ Dulcinea: “[Oh, princesa Dulcinea, señora deste cautivo corazón! Mucho agravio me habedes hecho en despedirme y reprocharme con el riguroso afinamiento de mandarme no parecer ante la vuestra fermosura” (I, 2: 51). In the seventeenth century, the mentís was considered by some to be the strongest and most shameful kind of affront possible, beyond more general debates as to whether a physical or verbal affront was more dishonorable (Pérez Cortés 110-13).

\(^{185}\) Don Quijote feels a similar kind of resentment when he interprets the barber’s anecdote about the insane man (who believes himself to be Neptune) to be a thinly veiled reference to himself. The barber excuses himself (“que no lo dije por tanto, y así me ayude a Dios como fue buena mi intención, y que no debe vuestra merced sentirse”), to which Don Quijote replies: “Si puedo sentirme o no... yo me lo sé” (II, 1: 692).
sacrifice. The greatest irony of the prologue, however, may inhere in the two anecdotes involving madmen and dogs, which Cervantes entreats the reader to recount to Avellaneda if she ever happens to encounter him. But the moral lessons of the “hinchar un perro” and “podenco” stories are not as important as their common symbolism: in addition to their vulgar, animal nature, the loco effectively comes to represent Avellaneda himself. In this way, the figure of the madman is utilized as a public instrument of shaming, just as Cervantes’s own crazy protagonist was shamed through his return to the village in the oxcart at the end of Part One of the novel.

If such lingering traces of shame can be observed at various authorial levels, we can affirm with even greater certainty that Don Quijote has been ‘outlived’ by shame. He is afforded little extratextual respite from its effects in the ten years since he was first introduced to the world, for upon sallying forth once again in 1615 he finds that many other characters are already familiar with his madness due to the metafictional publication of the first part of his adventures. This means that he will find himself even more subject to the humiliating practical jokes of other characters and the shame they produce, leading us to observe in Don Quijote a growing internalization of the “civilizing process” of self-discipline, ever more complex mechanisms of self-consciousness, and the inward psychological effects of shame. Whereas in Part One we witnessed how the protagonist expresses shame in the presence of others and in response to explicit methods of punitive shaming, his evolving relation to the affect and its increasingly potent effects in Part Two impel him to feel ashamed even in the absence of these others. More importantly, below I

\footnote{For a lengthy interpretative analysis of further significance of Cervantes’s maimed hand, see Lezra (177-256).}
will attempt to show how Don Quijote adopts shame as both a performative strategy and technology of the self, crucial narrative developments of the novel that nevertheless remain consistent with the classical precedents which inform its Cervantine representation as well as the sociocultural context of the early modern Mediterranean.

The Passion of the Court: Shame and the Politics of Performance

*Al moço vergonçoso, el diablo le llevó a palacio.*

A popular refrain, cited in Covarrubias

A performative function of shame is at stake in a social space of considerable importance to this period, one governed precisely by the imperative to *aparentar* and *disimular*: that of the royal court. Drawing once again upon Vives’s fundamental notion that emotional dispositions are molded by the normative contours of a particular environment, here I will consider the ways in which shame is both suffered and strategically deployed in Part Two of *Don Quijote*. The episodes of the duke and duchess’s castle, in particular, stage the affective possibilities and prohibitions that attended the early modern courtly subject by reflecting and building upon Vives’s conception of shame. Concretely, I will argue in this section that in order to comprehend the polyvalent attachments of shame in the court and the social conditions they necessarily index, we must recognize at least four distinct functions of the affect, which I will respectively classify as therapeutic, performative, ritual, and psychological.

In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain, the decorous restraint of passion was perhaps no more crucial than within the strictly regulated milieu of the royal court. This
characteristic partially accounted for its scathing depiction through the literary topoi of *de curialium miseriis* and *menosprecio de corte*, common in moral and fictional literature of the Renaissance. Spanish writers were particularly indebted to Italian treatments of these themes, especially in works such as Castiglione’s *Il libro del cortegiano* and Della Casa’s *Galateo*, in addition to a panoply of early modern behavior manuals. Antonio de Guevara was inspired to share in this contempt for the court by juxtaposing it with what he considered to be the salubrious and morally superior space of the countryside in *Menosprecio de corte y alabanza de aldea* of 1539.\(^\text{187}\) In addition to prescribing the expression, repression, or attenuation of other affects, Guevara distinguishes shame as a critical technology of self-presentation in the court: “No loo al caballero que pierde la vergüenza... en decir desacatos a los príncipes y contra los príncipes; porque a los reyes y grandes señores permítese avisarlos, mas no se sufre reprehenderlos” (112), adding that, “a los buenos príncipes por ninguna cosa se les ha de perder la vergüenza ni alzar la obediencia” (113). Similarly, Guevara cautions those of choleric dispositions to refrain from the court, lest they suffer the shame of its endless affronts and offenses they would be unable to avenge: “Al hombre colérico y mal sufrido no le conviene ser cortesano, porque si todas las afrentas y disfavores y sinsabores que a uno hacen en la corte se para a las pensar y piensa de las vengar, téngase por dicho que en solas las que rescibió en un mes terná que vengar en diez años” (146). As mentioned earlier, these strategies illustrate what Elias denominated “the civilizing process,” or the self-disciplinary practices that the early modern subject was required to adopt in order to successfully navigate the newly forming

\(^{187}\)The idea that “el honor se fué a la aldea” became something of a literary commonplace, as Castro notes (qtd. in Peristiany, 73-74n, from *Cinco ensayos sobre Don Juan*). In response to Montesquieu, Voltaire also wittily opined that it was at court where the least amount of honor was to be found (qtd. in Peristiany 23).
webs of shared social space. The repression or attenuation of affect, an important component of Elias’s theory, was crucial for the aspiring courtier’s advancement in the court, a space which likewise formed the epicenter of the civilizing process.\textsuperscript{188} Shame, once again, performs a key function in this respect: it aids in the avoidance of behaviors that could be censured as ill-mannered, impassioned, or dishonorable, while concealing other emotions whose expression in the court would be inappropriately shameful.

A paradigmatic example of these courtly functions of shame can be found in \textit{El vergonzoso en palacio}, one of Tirso de Molina’s first comedias which likely appeared in the year 1606. It centers on the character of Mireno, a shepherd of modest country circumstances who is unaware of his true noble origins, hidden from him by his father for political reasons. After exchanging clothing with the disgraced and former secretary to the Duke of Avero, however, he travels to the court where he is soon favored by the Duke’s daughter, Doña Madalena. Despite her impending marriage to a powerful count, Madalena quickly falls in love with Mireno, who decides to adopt the nobler moniker of Don Dionís to correspond with his dress and newly acquired status in the court. Yet although the former shepherd shares an equally passionate desire for the noble lady, he finds himself incapable

\textsuperscript{188} In addition to his \textit{The Civilizing Process}, see Elias’s \textit{The Court Society}, in which he explains that “affective outbursts are difficult to control and calculate. They reveal the true feelings of the person concerned to a degree that, because not calculated, can be damaging: they hand over trump cards to rivals for favour and prestige. Above all, they are a sign of weakness; and that is the position the court person fears most of all. \textit{In this way the competition of court life enforces a curbing of the affects in favour of calculated and finely shaded behaviour in dealing with people}” (121). Despite Elias’s status as one of the first scholars to devote significant attention to affect, he has also been criticized by contemporary critics for establishing master narratives, especially with respect to ‘modernity,’ and for “having promoted a view of history that tends to discard emotionality as history ‘progresses’” (Eustace 1495). The medieval historian Barbara Rosenwein has taken an even stronger stance, claiming that Elias “was wrong for the most elementary of reasons: he didn’t know how to read his sources” and that he took various writers’ “word as a transparent window onto the world” (Eustace 1493; see also Rosenwein’s article “Thinking Historically about Medieval Emotions” for a similarly provocative critique of the pioneering cultural historian Johan Huizinga). In spite of this scathing criticism, I believe that Elias’s theories continue to be useful for framing a discussion about the cultural and social history of emotions, especially when contextualized within a space such as the royal court and confined to a discrete emotion such as shame.
of confessing his love, silenced and impeded by his own shame. He frustratingly declares to himself: “Vergüenza: ¿por qué impedís/ la ocasión que el cielo os da?/ Daos por entendido ya” (108), and later, “cuando más me provoca/ y hablalla el alma comienza,/ enojada la vergüenza/ llega y tápame la boca” (121). Madalena, growing equally frustrated with Mirenó’s shy reservedness, adopts increasingly bold strategies to insinuate her feelings of desire and coax him to declare his own, asserting that, “No sé yo para qué viene/ el vergonzoso a palacio./ Amor vergonzoso y mudo/ medrará poco, señor,/ que, a tener vergüenza amor,/ no le pintaran desnudo” (122). Performing the function prescribed by Vives, Mirenó’s shame mitigates the risk of neglecting courtly protocol and affronting both Madalena’s feminine nobility and her father’s sovereign authority by occluding the expression of his amorous desire.

Yet it is clear that Mirenó’s dramatic defect and affective state is importantly informed by the apparent social disparity underlying the two suitors’ exchanges in the court. His shame is befitting to the lowly shepherd he believes himself to be, yet for Madalena it stands in dissonance to his noble attire and position in the court. The issue of social status is in fact expressly treated in Vives’s discussion of shame: “In making the distinction between the proper and the unbecoming, one has to think of the circumstances of space, time, and personality. [...] When love is associated with a belief in the greatness of the beloved, it calls forth a feeling of embarrassment; otherwise, it prevents it, as in the love among equals. Greatness here means any excellence recognized as such: social rank, wealth; any quality of body, soul, or mind” (113). The affect of shame thus encodes one’s

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189 Madalena unequivocally highlights the contentious relationship between shame and the court by succinctly adding, “El palacio nunca acoge/ la vergüenza” (128).
hierarchical position in social space, betraying his or her status despite, in Mireno’s case, an earnest attempt to overcome his emotional habitus. Nevertheless, he is originally able to gain the favor of Madalena and the audience or reader of the work because his shame operates precisely as a signifier of his modesty and astute recognition of appropriate courtly behavior. Here shame at once functions therapeutically, as a bridle to reign in excessive passion; as well as performatively, as a spur to the pathos and sympathy of one’s public. But what are the implications of this performative shame, especially in light of my attempt in the previous chapter to underline the involuntary nature and corporal, material qualities of the affect?

It should first of all be noted that what I refer to here as a performative function is not to be confused with earlier examples of shame as a performative speech act, even if the two are closely related through their recognition of the power and autonomy of language. In the court, I am suggesting that shame becomes a particular mode of performative self-presentation for enacting the deference required by persons of power and authority in this space. Nevertheless, the most singularly fascinating example of performative shame can be found, rather appropriately, on the early modern Spanish stage, the space of performance par excellence. It was here that attendees at some of Lope’s plays were treated to the sublime flair of one María de Riquelme, a seventeenth-century actress known for her uncanny ability to simulate affect, to embody the feelings of her characters with a high degree of realism. “Es singular en los afectos,” raved Lope himself, “por camino que no imita de nadie, ni aún podrá hallar quien la imite” (Cartas 291). Among Riquelme’s laudable and inimitable talents of emotional expression, the most remarkable was the apparent ease with which she produced the blush of shame or modesty, as Lope goes on to
describe: “cuando representaba mudaba, con admiración de todos, el color del rostro” (qtd. in Granja 153). Perhaps the epithet Cervantes directed toward Lope himself—calling him more or less affectionately a “monstruo de naturaleza” (Entremeses 93)—could just as easily apply to the latter’s favored actress: her ability to control a typically involuntary physiognomic response by blushing, as it were, at the behest of stage directions, suggests an almost unnatural inclination beyond the expectations of actorly technique.\(^{190}\) The most plausible explanation for Riquelme’s theatrical savvy with shame, however, is that because of the normative standards of feminine decorum and modesty, she felt genuinely embarrassed by the amorous scenes that brought about her blushing on stage, whether due to the topical nature of the scenes themselves or the art—shared by many a successful actor—of embodying the role to such an extent that she was able to convince herself the scenes were somehow real.\(^{191}\) Either way, Riquelme’s case is compelling not only because it seems to be truly unique among early modern actors, but precisely because it blurs the lines between what we conceive as ‘genuine’ or ‘real’ emotions and those we produce by virtue of learned performance and societal expectations. What some might consider this thoroughly modern idea was marvelously evoked in verse by Fray Hortensio Paravicino, a seventeenth-century Spanish preacher and yet another ardent admirer of Riquelme’s

\(^{190}\) In this way, Riquelme’s case would seem to trouble the prevailing notion described by Cummings: “For what bodily response is more seemingly calculated to invite explication, and yet what bodily response is stranger and more recalcitrant in its physical form to the assumption of calculation? Nothing is more impossible than the calculated blush, as it were the crocodile blush. Blushing is an intense form of self-attention but the blusher may not even be aware of blushing and certainly cannot control it” (33). Allen, on the other hand, referring to Augustine’s concept of natural signs, explains that “There is no choice about signa naturalia, and if a blush is a natural sign of shame, then it can be no more suppressed than it can be forced; it has no intentionality as such” (197).

\(^{191}\) Granja concludes that “su turbación obedecía a un sentimiento irreprimible de vergüenza que la hacía enrojecer espontáneamente cada vez que interpretaba escenas amorosas” (153). It should also be noted that thinkers from Aristotle to Darwin have long considered women to have a greater propensity to blush than men. See especially Allen.
facility with blushing: "María, a tal propiedad/ vuestra imitación aspira/ que a hilos de la
mentira/ corre sangre a la verdad" (qtd. in Granja 153).

Paradoxically, in the space of the court this class of performative shame is deployed
as a means of preemptively foreclosing on the kind which could be aroused by its own lack.
Stephanie Trigg, in her study of courtly shame in English and Arthurian literatures, finds
that “the sense of shame as the constant threat to one’s name, or reputation, is an emotion
that drives much courtly literature” (86). Confronting similar questions around the
“uncertain quantity” of “the subjectivity of the courtier,” she concludes that “courtly shame
is the pre- eminent, or extreme instance of this kind of performative shame, because it is
always to a greater or lesser degree constituted by ritual or performative praxis” (76).
These problems, of course, are also related to the semantic complexities of shame, for
which we might distinguish between a courtly shame which is equal parts passive modesty
and sycophantic reverence from a psychological shame which is called forth independently
of “performative praxis.” While Trigg finds the latter type at best elusive in courtly
literature (84), I will momentarily demonstrate that Don Quijote experiences shame of both
courtly and psychological varieties. In El vergonzoso en palacio, in any case, Mireno
ultimately overcomes his shame in order to declare his love to Madalena and, in an emotive
anagnorisis, discovers that he is of noble blood after all, permitting the couple’s marriage
and the work’s joyful denouement. As a dramatic and aesthetic recourse, shame augments
the impact of the work by suggestively performing its own will to conceal and fueling
dramatic tension. Similarly, the paradoxical, labyrinthine qualities of the affect—reflected

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192 In addition to her noble upbringing as a daughter of the dramaturge Alonso de Riquelme, this may also
explain why María de Riquelme acquired a reputation for being virtuous, since according to Fray Luis de
León, “En las mejillas suelen aparecer los indicios del pudor y de bondad y de modestia y de ánimo muy
ingenuo y bien educado” (qtd. in Granja 154). For a humorous account of performative modesty, see Miller,
Faking It (211-19).
in the complex intricacies of the plot—would seem to render shame particularly well suited to the *comedia de enredo*.

Although shame finds a solution in Tirso, in *Don Quijote*, it accompanies the principal character right until the end of the novel. Without a doubt, Don Quijote suffers some of his most intense moments of shame during his stay in the castle of the duke and duchess (II, 30-42: 955-1062). A great number of the pranks to which he is subjected here, from the soaping of his beard to the sack of cats, are designed to provoke laughter in the other characters through a parody of courtly protocol. Recalling the historical practice of degradation for a disgraced knight, these examples, in which shame is wielded as a kind of weapon by someone of privilege or power, constitute what we may call a *ritual* function of shame. Given the classical notion that the intensity of shame corresponds to the importance or nobility of one’s public, it is certainly before the duke and duchess that the poor knight is most disposed to feel this emotion. Don Quijote is also notably conscious of the normative behavioral expectations and shame’s performative role in the court. It is for this reason that he so emphatically scolds Sancho when the latter ignores appropriate protocol in asking Doña Rodríguez to take care of his donkey: “¿No adviertes, angustiado de ti, y malaventurado de mí, que si ven que tú eres un grosero villano o un mentecato gracioso, pensarán que yo soy algún echacuervos o algún caballero de mohatra?” (II, 31: 965). Don Quijote feels shame for the lack of such an affect in Sancho, whose rustic simplicity has prevented him from being self-conscious of his behavior and knowing how to adjust it according to the norms of the nobility. But in spite of Sancho and all of the serious challenges and setbacks that Don Quijote experiences in the court, the duke and duchess—just as the priest, barber, and company did in Part One—seem to control their laughter for
the well-being of the very object of their jokes: "Púsose don Quijote de mil colores, que sobre lo moreno le jaspeaban y se le parecían; los señores disimularon la risa, porque don Quijote no acabase de correrse" (II, 31: 969). Here, shame moves from a technology of parody to one of pathos, and the art of dissimulation so characteristic of the court prevents to a large degree that Don Quijote feels even more ashamed among the other characters who inhabit this space.

Della Casa’s advice on etiquette and courtly behavior in his Galateo, known to have influenced Cervantes (Giordano and Calvo 95), provides an interesting discussion of the act of escarnio, which will aid in understanding the duke and duchess’s restraint. "El escarnio consiste," Della Casa explains, “en recrearnos en la vergüenza que causamos a los demás, sin que nos reporte beneficio alguno, por lo que al tratar con la gente es mejor abstenerse de escarnecer a nadie” (181). He also advises against “quien suelta grandes carcajadas y se regocija con alguna necedad que diga otro, y quien se divierte haciendo ruborizar a los demás,” concluding that “estos modos son, con toda razón, odiados” (181). According to Della Casa, in other words, it is improper to engage in the kind of ridicule or derision that might induce someone to feel ashamed. Similarly, such infelicitous activities as laughing too boisterously, gloating at another’s mistake or misfortune, and indulging in schadenfreude are to be avoided, lest they cause others to blush. This description recalls Aristotle’s definition of hubris as “the doing or saying of things that bring shame to the person who suffers them, not to get anything out of it oneself other than to have it happen, just to get pleasure from it” (Rhetoric 2.2.1378b23-25).193 Della Casa goes on to compare

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193 According to Aristotle, hubris (often translated as “insolence”) is one of the three forms of belittling, the other two being contempt and spitefulness (Rhetoric 2.2.1378b10-25).
those who engage in *escarnio* with *burlones*, supplying a fascinating terminological distinction between the two:

> A esta gente se asemejan mucho los burlones, es decir, aquellos que disfrutan burlándose y escarneciendo a todo el mundo, no por afrenta ni por desprecio, sino por diversión. Debes saber que no hay ninguna diferencia entre escarnecer y burlarse, salvo el propósito y la intención diferentes que comportan uno y otro, pues las burlas se hacen para entretenerte y los escarnios para herir, a pesar de que hablando corrientemente y escribiendo se confunda un vocablo con otro. Quien escarnece siente placer de la vergüenza ajena; quien se burla no siente placer por el error ajeno, sino solaz, mientras que por la vergüenza de esa misma persona sentiría acaso dolor y congoja.” (181)

In addition to further clarifying some of the lexical distinctions between the different kinds of shame I have been analyzing, what is noteworthy about Della Casa’s description is the importance he grants to being attuned to the shame of others, prescribing an awareness of and sensitivity to the emotional (dis)comfort of one’s fellow citizens that, judging merely by the popularity of the *Galateo*, was surely shared by persons beyond the Italian court. Although these outward manners are consistent with Elias’s civilizing process, it is also curious to note the priority Della Casa gives to the spirit or purpose behind these kinds of ridicule: that a prank is designed to entertain is much more favorable than one intended to hurt. Indeed, just like the class of *escarnio público* wielded by politico-religious authorities and examined in the previous chapter, shame clearly holds the potential to cause not only pleasure to those who observe its effects at a safe distance, but to produce severe
discomfort, pain, distress, and sympathy as well. Here, it would seem, the duke and duchess are well acquainted with Della Casa’s advice, since they take care not to cross the threshold between being *burlones* and practitioners of *escarnio* upon taking notice of Don Quijote’s shame.

And yet, in spite of the important role of an interlocutor or public that witnesses a shameful act, perhaps the most striking moment of shame for Don Quijote occurs when he is alone. Having retired to his chamber of the castle, upon removing his shoes he discovers that the threads of his sock have come apart, and reacts in the following way: “Afligióse en estremo el buen señor, y diera él por tener allí un adarme de seda verde una onza de plata” (II, 44: 1075). Don Quijote’s great affliction here for something that would not have caused him the least anxiety earlier in the novel is significant in and of itself. In addition to underscoring the evolution of the character, this emotional reaction marks the assertion of a decisive self-consciousness that impels him to reflect upon his profession and chivalric identity. The poverty of the knight errant, represented synecdochically by the run in his stockings, has grown to be nearly intolerable for him: he finds the shortcomings of his physical appearance and his material hardship to be shameful in the court, where a high degree of socioeconomic well-being is expected. It is as though Don Quijote has just embodied the fable of the peacock that forms part of his advice on self-knowledge professed to Sancho moments earlier: that bird “se envanecía al desplegar su rueda, pero...se avergonzaba cuando miraba sus pies” (1059n). His pride as a knightly gentleman seems to vanish before his shameful attempt at becoming a courtly subject: although well acquainted with the distinct cultural codes of the royal court, Don Quijote despairs as the lofty ideals of knight errantry are confused and conflated with the mundane practices of
courtly life. His experience indicates a profound, psychological shame, one that has pulled on the moral and spiritual threads of his knightly ethics, leaving it as thin and threadbare as his worn-out stockings.

This shame is also directly related to the economic plight of the seventeenth-century lower nobility, whose hijos de algo had in many cases ended up with next to nothing save for an increasingly outmoded and widely parodied title. Since the hidalgo title prevented engaging in various forms of labor, this class was ill-equipped to confront the newly expanding modes of production brought forth by mercantile capitalism and the waning of the ancien régime. Don Quijote is, of course, the archetypal literary hidalgo, scraping by on a meager income while squandering his estate in order to buy more books for his library. The squire in Lazarillo de Tormes relies on the young protagonist’s picaresque activities to stave off the extreme hunger of his poverty. And a slew of similar characters are satirized in works of courtly fiction, in which the aspiring courtier faces starvation—material and moral—by pouring his limited funds into expenses of fancy attire in order to buttress the false appearance that he is economically affluent. But in addition to being an extended literary motif, the association of poverty with shame has an historical basis as well, perhaps most notably in what is known as the “shamefaced” poor. As a relatively common demographic across early modern Europe, the shamefaced poor or poveri vergognosi were precisely those members of the nobility who endeavored to keep their poverty a secret so as not to tarnish the reputation afforded by their otherwise elevated

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194 Don Quijote “posee conocimiento de la gramática de la corte, reconoce los códigos y la importancia atribuida a determinadas prácticas; no obstante,... el caballero acaba por perder su norte a medida que los ideales de la caballería se confunden con las prácticas mundanas de la vida cortesana” (Vieira 397).

195 For the juridical status of the hidalgo, see Partida II, título 21, ley 3 (Las siete partidas 199-200).
social status. Barred from labor, commerce, and trade, these real-life hidalgos often relied upon the discrete donations of local confraternities in order to meet their basic needs without incurring shame, a phenomenon which seems to have been more extended in Italy, where, for example, the *Opera Pia dei Poveri Vergognosi* was founded in Bologna in 1495. Nevertheless, the (*en*)vergonzantes of Habsburg Spain have been the tangential subject of a few limited studies, such as those of Martz (5; 9) and Flynn (*Sacred* 79-80).

In his analysis of social welfare systems for the poor in England, Steve Hindle shows how, toward the end of the sixteenth century, “badges were evolving from tokens of approval to become symbols of humiliation, and those who wore them were being transformed from the respectable to the dependant poor” (3). Recalling the visual semiotics of various shame punishments I examined in the previous chapter, the early modern European practice of badging—originally conceived as a benevolent means of regulating charitable giving—eventually came to mark and stigmatize its bearers with shame. Hindle remarks on the paradox that was produced as a result: “On the one hand, feelings of shame were actively to be discouraged in the indigent, for it was argued that the deserving must always make their needs known in order that they could be fed, clothed and sheltered. On the other, the shame-faced poor were admired, and sometimes even rewarded, for their humble reluctance to advertise their plight” (9-10). As witnessed earlier in literary treatments of the royal court, here we have yet another suggestive indication of the performative qualities of shame, in this case that which could be similarly feigned as a sign of humility in order to gain not social advancement but material reward.

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196 *Autoridades* defines the “pobre vergonzante” (*pauper pudens*) as “la persona que por su calidad y obligaciones no puede pedir limosna de puerta en puerta y lo hace de modo que sea con el mayor secreto posible” (III: 305). On the other hand, the mendicant who was permitted to do so was often shamed “jocosamente” with the feminine form “pobra” (III: 304).
As Hindle emphasizes, in this way "the idiom of shame was consistently rehearsed and played upon by applicants for both parish relief and endowed charity long into the seventeenth century as they explained to vestrymen and trustees alike that they had covertly borrowed and even pawned goods from their neighbours rather than publicly ask relief of their betters" (10). Such an “idiom of shame” would surely have been coveted—and likely mastered—by countless peninsular pícaros as well, both literary and historical.

The religious welfare institutions for these shamefaced poor may be contrasted with the “voluntary” poor, the mendicant monastic orders which were supported by alms in order to renounce material wealth and mimic the shaming and humiliation of Christ. A further contrast, of course, is to be found in those individuals and characters who begged for charity not by choice but out of necessity, that borne by their fate as an “hijo de nadie,” as lamented by Mateo Alemán’s picaresque protagonist. In Spain, these questions were traversed by ethnic and religious tensions as well, since most economic enterprises were considered shameful due to their stereotypical association with conversos and Judaism, which was “considered infamous on two counts: by descent from the murderers of Christ—that is, by an inherited dishonour of a religious nature—and by being usurers, or, in other words, by a legal ‘cause of infamy’” (Caro Baroja 97). The resultant infamy of business and commerce effectively restricted the “honorable” old Christian to the professions of farmer or soldier (Castro, De la edad xxi).

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197 The theme of the poveri vergognosi has been studied by Ricci (“Annibale Pocaterra”; “Povertà, vergogna e povertà vergognosa”; and Povertà, vergogna, superbia); and Spicciani, who, though omitting analysis, provides a minutely detailed historical and economical account of the phenomenon.

198 Castro elaborates: “Los franceses venían en gran número a España a sacar provecho de la desidia española, del temor a “deshonrarse” si manufacturaban todos aquellos objetos que importaban los vendedores franceses, tan despreciados por Quevedo” (De la edad xxiii). Another contrast is offered by Quintilian, who advises that ‘shame and hunger do not dwell well together’ (Non habitant simul pudor et fames). In the
between emotion and economics, such examples also underscore the ways in which the early modern expression of shame was traversed by profound socio-historical anxieties related to class, race, religion, reputation, material wealth, and social mobility.

Many of these socioeconomic anxieties are laid bare by Don Quijote’s affliction while alone in his chamber of the duke and duchess’s castle. Here he has failed once again as a knight errant, this time in evading the mundane reality of a changing economic system and his increasingly inadequate social status. If his penitent destitution and nakedness on the Peña Pobre was a point of pride, his impoverished appearance in the court is a badge of shame. In contrast to the parodical humor of Don Quijote’s earlier mishaps, the representation of this kind of inward, psychological shame produces pathos for the reader, an effect which grows increasingly poignant throughout Part Two. Even though it has been said that Don Quijote, unlike the modern novel, lacks detailed descriptions of the interiority or psychological profile of characters, an attention to the narrative irruptions of an affect like shame can afford us a glimpse of that interiority. The protagonist’s experiences in the duke and duchess’s castle contribute not only to the affective depth of the character, however, but in their own unique way to the early modern tradition of ritually shaming the royal court. As with Mireno’s desire for love, Don Quijote’s proud desire for honor and fame is thwarted by the politics and social markers undergirding the affect of shame. By way of a sartorial trope, both characters are situated in a space to which their status does not seem to correspond and must navigate the affective challenges and pitfalls produced as a result. The characters’ suffering in the court indicates their mastery of only a limited

following chapter, I examine the three traditional professions of “Iglesia, o mar, o casa real” in more detail in “La historia del cautivo” of Don Quijote (I, 39: 494), as well as Islam’s relation to popular notions of shame.
range of shame’s functionality, rendering them objects of parody yet also of pathos—for their intradiegetic audience in the works as well as the reader. By staging its therapeutic, performative, ritual, and psychological registers in the royal court, Cervantes underscores the distinct etiologies and polyvalent manifestations of shame, as well as the cultural, political, and economic anxieties in which the affect is invariably embedded.

**My Own Worst Enemy: Shame as Technology of the Self**

*Why, right here, stranger, is the first and best of all victories, the victory of oneself over oneself; and being defeated by oneself is the most shameful and at the same time the worst of all defeats. These things indicate that there is a war going on in us, ourselves against ourselves. Plato, Laws*

Approaching home at the end of Part Two of *Don Quijote*, Sancho ceremoniously declares, “Abre los ojos, deseada patria, y mira que vuelve a ti Sancho Panza tu hijo, si no muy rico, muy bien azotado. Abre los brazos y recibe también tu hijo don Quijote, que, si viene vencido de los brazos ajenos, viene vencedor de sí mismo, que, según él me ha dicho, es el mayor vencimiento que desearse puede” (II, 72: 1322). Marking the close of the protagonists’ adventures and introducing the final scenes of the novel, Sancho’s grandiose apostrophe to the village underscores the supreme importance of the struggle that, although more often subordinated by the narrative action, lively battles, and fame-seeking feats of knight errantry, Don Quijote has waged against himself. Earlier in Part Two, we recall, he announced the knightly enterprise of “enderezando tuertos” not only in the material world but in the moral and spiritual realm of desires, passions, and vices as well:
Así, ¡oh Sancho!, que nuestras obras no han de salir del límite que nos tiene puesto la religión cristiana que profesamos. Hemos de matar en los gigantes a la soberbia; a la envidia, en la generosidad y buen pecho; a la ira, en el reposado continente y quietud del ánimo; a la gula y al sueño, en el poco comer que comemos y en el mucho velar que velamos; a la lujuria y lascivia, en la lealtad que guardamos a las que hemos hecho señoras de nuestros pensamientos; a la pereza, con andar por todas partes del mundo, buscando las ocasiones que puedan hacer y hagan, sobre cristianos, famosos caballeros. (II, 8: 754)

The ultimate victor of this undertaking is to be determined not by the skill with lance, shield, and steed but by the steadfast resolve of the subject over what would seem to be a much more elusive enemy—the internal giants of the self. Such a personal struggle against unethical or sinful immoderation has since the classical period been metaphorically characterized as a battle against oneself, similar to Don Quijote's description (Foucault, *Pleasure* 66). If, as Sancho claims, the knight errant has indeed been victorious in this internal struggle as a “vencedor de sí mismo,” then by what means has he garnered surrender or defeat? What arms does he press into service in order to vanquish this most important and implacable of enemies? And, indeed, who or what exactly constitutes this enemy within oneself?

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199 Commenting on this same passage, Layna Ranz notes that Don Quijote’s form of knight errantry “supone también la disputa contra las afecciones que turban el alma, todo un proceso, como bien puede verse, de mejora interior” (215).

200 Foucault identifies an entire series of similar metaphors in Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, and others, such as “setting oneself against the pleasures and desires, not giving in to them, resisting their assaults, or on the contrary, letting oneself be overcome by them, defeating them or being defeated by them, being armed or equipped against them” (*Pleasure* 66-67).
These are some of the questions that will frame the remainder of this chapter. By tracing the concept of self-mastery from the classical and Stoic traditions through medieval Christian doctrine, I first hope to illuminate these practices which Michel Foucault famously denominated “technologies of the self.”\(^{201}\) I will then turn to demonstrating the complex ways in which the character of Don Quijote appropriates and embodies these technologies, showing that an affirmative valuation of passions and desire—instead of a Stoic repression of emotion—is necessary to understand the battles that he wages within and against himself.\(^{202}\) Specifically, I will argue that the emotion of shame constitutes an important affective technology not only for Don Quijote, but for the aesthetics of the novel and the *technè* of writing itself. Yet even if we can refer to a character’s literary “self,” how does Don Quijote go about caring for or mastering himself, when the conditions of his madness would seem to indicate precisely a lack of self-care or self-mastery? Although it would be tempting to equate his lucid return to reason at the end of the novel with his mastery over the self, I will argue that these phenomena are not, in fact, coextensive. Rather, I will attempt to show that, his considerable madness notwithstanding, Don Quijote unwittingly appropriates various technologies of the self throughout the novel. Finally, through a close reading of the often overlooked poem “Las lágrimas de San Pedro,” I hope

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\(^{201}\) Although I will be referring primarily to their classical precedents, these forms of self-reflection, self-knowledge, and self-mastery are found in early modern Spanish treatises as well, for example Melchor Cano’s *La victoria de sí mismo* or Oliva Sabuco’s *Coloquio del conocimiento de sí mismo*. The topos is recognized by Rodríguez Marín in Seneca (“Qui seipsum vincit, omnia vincit”), in the *refranero*, and also in Lope and Calderón (Cervantes, *Don Quijote* 235n). Romo Feito, on the other hand, locates the idea of “vencedor de sí mismo” in *Amadís de Gaula* and other works of the same period. Nevertheless, until now critics seem to have passed over the concept’s classical precedents, which, from my perspective, are even more fundamental for understanding the phenomenon.

\(^{202}\) Along these lines, consider Hutchinson’s conclusion that “*don Quijote es desde el principio un personaje apasionado*. Inseparables de su visión del mundo, sus pasiones predominantes le guían en todo momento de tal modo que le predisponen a reaccionar de determinadas maneras ante las situaciones en las que se encuentra y a dotar sus emociones de intencionalidad” (”*Los primeros movimientos*” 202).
to demonstrate the importance of shame in the novel insofar as it both reveals socio-historical anxieties and performs through various visual metaphors the increasing priority of self-mastery in early modern Spain.

These techniques constituted what Foucault terms an “art of life” or “aesthetics of living” in ancient Greece, in which the attenuation and control of unseemly appetites, desires, and passions was a widespread aspiration. The Stoic ideal of *apatheia* represents what would become a highly influential and perhaps the best known method of self-mastery. But a broader array of techniques not wholly dependent upon a Stoic model are equally important to what Foucault discusses as the “care of the self.” These included the practices of self-reflection, the careful monitoring of one’s dietary regimen and bodily needs, and—most importantly—the presence of an “other”: a mentor, colleague, or confidante capable of listening to and critiquing one’s thoughts and desires. To a considerable degree, the utility of an other was informed by the fear of a bad reputation or social disgrace that such indiscretions as unseemly passions and inappropriate behavior could bring about among the polis. As mentioned earlier, the teaching of virtue and self-control was performed to a large extent by the irreducibly social nature of the emotion of shame. In the physical absence of another person, however, the act of writing was prescribed as a means of exposing the self to the potential corrective scrutiny of an external

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203 A critical element of Foucault’s analysis is the primary importance granted to the “care of the self” (*epimeleia heautou*) over the Delphic maxim of “know thyself” (*gnōthi seauton*), which, he claims, has unjustifiably captured more critical attention than the former concept. See especially *Hermeneutics* 2-4. The aphorism figures among the advice that Don Quijote offers to Sancho before the squire assumes his post as governor of the *insula*: “has de poner los ojos en quien eres, procurando conocerte a ti mismo, que es el más difícil conocimiento que puede imaginarose” (1059).

204 The equation of shame with virtue was a common concept in the classical as well as early modern eras, as attested by Sabuco in a section of her *Nueva filosofía* dedicated to shame: “Este afecto es bueno, y aunque no es virtud, es gran señal de la virtud” (110). For more on virtue in general, see Pieper.
The fourth-century theologian Athanasius details this practice as “a safeguard against sinning: let us each note and write down our actions and impulses of the soul as though we were to report them to each other; and you may rest assured that from utter shame of becoming known we shall stop sinning and entertaining sinful thoughts altogether [...] blushing at writing the same as if we were actually seen, we may never ponder evil” (qtd. in Foucault, Ethics 207, my emphasis). This particular form of self-writing, to which I will return shortly, thus served a kind of proxy therapeutic function in eliciting shame in the solitary writer or ascetic.

The classical utilization of shame as a means of social and self-control finds its medieval correlative in the Augustinian tradition of tempering the passions through other emotions (as opposed to the Platonic and Stoic strictures of reason). In this model, as demonstrated earlier, shame could be employed as a moral check on the body’s temptations, as a means of deferring a more shameful emotional outburst, for example. Despite the enduring influence of Stoicism (and incipient articulations of Neo-Stoicism), these Christian “technologies of the flesh” exercised a diverse influence on medieval conceptions of the soul, the practice of confession, and politico-religious prohibitions. Yet it has been argued that these technologies are not fully realized until the early modern era,

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205 For an alternative translation, see Robert C. Gregg’s edition of Athanasius’s The Life of St. Antony (73).

206 This kind of self-writing could be said to perform an opposite function as that of Monipodio from “Rinconete y Cortadillo” (examined in my previous chapter): while the picaresque character’s notebook reminded him who to publicly shame, Athanasius’s reminded one to be privately ashamed through the writing itself. For a fascinating examination of the concept of “self-writing,” including the use of hupomnēmata or personal notebooks as memory aids, see Foucault, Ethics 207-22. For a broader discussion of the association of shame with the act of writing, see Probyn 129-62. And for a compilation of the ascetic characteristics of Don Quijote, see Hatzfeld.

207 Maureen Flynn correctly points out that “The idea that one can counter a bad mood only with another mood seeps through the writings of other classical philosophers read in Spain during the Renaissance, despite all the overt claims for the primacy of reason,” citing Vives as one illustrative example (“Taming” 879).
when the subject is no longer restrained merely by social or divine authority but by the
demands of self-discipline imposed by Elias’s theory of the “civilizing process.” As
demonstrated above, with the newly forming social space of the royal court, shame
becomes internalized and the demands of self-control are intensified. Although still
informed by a strong preoccupation with one’s social reputation, this shame is both a
producer and product of self-consciousness in the early modern period.

In all of the examples of shame in the novel that I have examined thus far, what is
important to recognize is that Don Quijote is not immune to the external judgment and
ethical consequences of his actions, a fact attested by Cervantes’s subtle and artful
management of emotion—especially shame—in the text. Crucially, it is the authorial
manipulation of multiple narrative levels that amplifies the effect of these emotions, for the
characters of the novel as much as the reader. For Don Quijote, once again, the awareness
of the publication of the first part of his adventures and the omnipresent gaze of his
historian give rise to a palpable self-consciousness and concern regarding the reception of
his actions by his reading public.208 These anxieties cannot but produce an increasingly
acute sense of shame in the protagonist—as demonstrated in the preceding examples and
many more—and, therefore, dispose Don Quijote to contemplate the internal battle against
himself.209

208 Regarding the importance of the reader as witness to Don Quijote’s actions as well as of the figure of the
spectator in general, a fundamental study is that of Avilés, who demonstrates that, “Los espectadores son
incentivos para mantener la consistencia en el carácter, la grandeza de ánimo y la fortaleza en momentos de
peligro... Esta condición de una fuerte conciencia del espectador domina a Don Quijote” (“En el límite” 12).

209 Here I differ strongly from Edwin Williamson’s claim that “There can be no genuine process of self-
questioning or introspective doubt” due to the limitations of Don Quijote’s madness (202). It is precisely the
affect of shame, I would argue, which opens the very possibility of self-doubt for Don Quijote.
Yet it is in my final example that shame as a form of self-discipline reaches its apogee. Suggestively performing shame’s own will to concealment, it is located in a sort of mis-en-abyme in the novel: an ottava rima poem attributed to Luis Tansilo’s “Las lágrimas de San Pedro,” recited by the character Lotario from the interpolated novella “El curioso impertinente” (discovered among some papers in an abandoned suitcase at Juan Palomeque’s inn), inserted in the middle of Part Two of the novel.  

It follows:

Crece el dolor y crece la vergüenza  
en Pedro, cuando el día se ha mostrado;  
y aunque allí no ve a nadie, se avergüenza  
de sí mismo, por ver que había pecado:  
que a un magnánimo pecho a haber vergüenza  
no solo ha de moverle el ser mirado;  
que de sí se avergüenza cuando yerra,  
si bien otro no vee que cielo y tierra. (I, 33: 420)

The lines of this stanza, despite their burial within several textual and narrative layers, represent what is probably the most direct treatment of the theme of shame in the entire novel, even though, as I have attempted to show, the affect is in reality never far below the surface.  

To venture yet another depth metaphor, we might say that this poem is

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210 Although attributed directly to Tansilo in the text, “la versión de esta octava parece obra de Cervantes” (I, 33; 420n).

211 Here I must disagree rather strongly with Bewes, who claims that “In literary works, shame does not exist in some buried state, to be unearthed by the penetrating critic; rather, shame appears overtly, as the text’s experience of its own inadequacy” (Postcolonial 3). Though this may often be the case—especially with Bewes’s particular object of analysis, postcolonial literature—there are surely others in which shame does not assert itself so patently. Beyond shame’s own will to concealment, there are a number of reasons why it might exist in a “buried state,” not least of all due to its relegation as a mere counterpart to honor, as I discussed in the previous chapter. In Cervantes’s works, I would contend that the complexity of shame is
concerned not with the outward manifestations of shame but with those which spring from deep inside the subject. This idea is evidenced in the pain and shame which grow in Pedro, not propagated by an other outside of him. The etiological repositioning of shame from an external to an internal source lays bare what could be considered the culminating practice of self-discipline. Yet it is significant to note a continued privileging of the other's gaze and economy of the visual in both form and content. First, the use of the verbs 'mostrar,' 'mirar,' and 'ver' clearly denotes the importance of appearance and sense of sight in the poem. Additionally, the latter is phonetically reproduced in the words 'haber,' 'moverle,' and, most importantly, 'vergüenza.' The rhythmic repetition of 'vergüenza' and 'avergüenza' in lines 1, 3, 5, and 7 endows the term with a weightiness that strikingly recalls its more excessive qualities as an affect. Finally, the formal element of enjambment in the three lines ending in 'vergüenza' (1, 3, and 5) works to enhance the word’s textual visibility and lyric availability, and at the same time discomforts the reader and obliges us to avert our eyes to the next line, thus mimicking the gesture of the subject who lowers the head in shame. Such an extratextual, self-recursive move immediately blurs the subject/object distinction, directly implicates the reader, and induces us to perform the very same gesture which is called for in the poem: redirecting our gaze from others and toward ourselves.

such that it “appears overtly” at times as well, even if in the final analysis it has been hitherto largely ignored by the “penetrating critic.”

121 In yet another fold of self-referentiality, through the technique of enjambment, “the only criterion for distinguishing poetry from prose,” the poem as a form “reveals the goal of its proud strategy: to let language finally communicate itself, without remaining unsaid in what is said” (Agamben, The End 109; 115).

213 This idea strikingly recalls Galen’s admonition regarding the shame of oneself: “When those men [in public life] have done some wrong and are caught, they are not ashamed of themselves but that others have found them out. But you must be ashamed of yourself and pay special heed to him who says: ‘Of all things, be most ashamed of yourself.’ If you do this, some day you will be able to tame and calm that power of passion within you which is as irrational as some wild beast” (45-46). Regarding the subject-object distinction, “It would be
Beyond the preoccupation with the gaze of a judgmental public, then, the subject should inherently feel shame at his or her moral transgressions even in the absence of another. This self-vigilance is emblematic of the civilizing process and of the early modern transition from a theocentric to an anthropocentric, self-centered paradigm. Nevertheless, the last words of the poem (“si bien otro no vee que cielo y tierra”) would seem to stand as a reminder of the lasting potency of shame before divine (‘cielo’) and social (‘tierra’) authorities. In any case, Lotario outlines for his friend Anselmo the classical moralizing function of poetry, attempting to convince him of the need to turn his gaze upon himself just as the reader was invited to do: “puesto que aquello sea ficción poética, tiene en sí encerrados secretos morales dignos de ser advertidos y entendidos e imitados” (I, 33: 420). Lotario’s injunction clearly appeals to a traditional, Aristotelian model of poetics in which mimetic representation contained lessons of ethical truth. A parodic inversion of this ideal, of course, is embodied in the character of Don Quijote himself, who represents the Platonic danger of poetics in provoking the imitation not of philosophical truth but literary falsehood (by making himself a knight errant and enacting the romances of chivalry). On a much larger scale, then, Cervantes’s novel can be read precisely as a shaming of these inferior works of literature. Moreover, Cervantes’s treatment of shame foregrounds a culmination of technologies of the self, from the classical authority of a judgmental public, to the medieval Christian consciousness of the divine gaze, and, finally, to the early modern 

more accurate to say that, in shame, subject and object coincide—but even this formulation is not quite adequate. Shame is an event of incommensurability: a profound disorientation of the subject by the confrontation with an object it cannot comprehend, an object that renders incoherent every form available to the subject” (Bewes, Postcolonial 3).

214 These ideas recall Montesquieu’s famous characterization of Spanish literature through the lens Don Quijote: “Le seul de leurs livres qui soit bon est celui qui a fait voir le ridicule de tous les autres” (55).
anxieties of self-control and the civilizing process. Shame is deployed as a therapeutic possibility (and subtle alternative to reason) on Don Quijote's long and winding road to self-mastery and impels him to be self-conscious of his actions, thus introducing an ethical component into his behavior. As an aesthetic technology, the emotion even exercises a potent influence on the character's reception by the reader, blurring the tragic and comic modes through shame's potential to provoke both parody and pathos.

Yet I would like to conclude by suggesting that shame plays an even more fundamental and modernizing role in the poetics of the novel itself. The phenomenon of self-consciousness, which inevitably attends feelings of shame, has often been associated with modernity and cited as a crucial characteristic of the modern novel.215 The multiple narrative layers of Cervantes's work open a space of self-reflexivity in which the otherwise concealed passions of the soul are exposed and offered up for scrutiny, thus mirroring the very act of self-examination that constitutes the various technologies of the self. The verses of “Las lágrimas de San Pedro” perform in both content and form this gesture of self-scrutiny through the affect of shame, reflecting in a sort of microcosm of the novel the evolution of Don Quijote's relation to himself, from his inaugural shameful failures and the self-consciousness of his historian until the suggestively self-reflexive confrontation with Álvaro Tarfe and Avellaneda. This self-recursive set of relationships is given yet another turn when we consider that Don Quijote, as a literary hero spawned and self-fashioned from the pages of the romances of chivalry, is an embodiment of writing itself. Like Athanasius's classical form of self-writing in which shame worked to stave off unethical

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215 See, for example, McDonald (64-65) and Schmidt (Forms 131-34). Foucault himself famously identified Don Quijote as one of the first examples of self-reflexive writing, a key tenet of modernity (Order 46-50).
practices, Don Quijote inhabits the role of an other, simultaneously reflecting upon and re-writing himself.

Be that as it may, Sancho’s melodramatic encomium that Don Quijote has triumphed as a “vencedor de sí mismo” meets with a response from the knight errant which would seem to dismiss outright such a possibility: “Déjate desas sandeces” (1322).216 But in addition to standing as a prototypical reply to his sidekick’s interventions, this rejection reflects a cornerstone of Cervantine irony: the apparent ignorance of Don Quijote when everyone else seems to be in on the joke, just like the pranks that made him blush while making the other characters laugh. In other words, this ‘nonsense’ does not diminish the relevance of the internal evolution which, unwittingly or not, Don Quijote has undergone throughout the novel. On the contrary, it substantiates the aforementioned potential for irony and parody to accompany a more profound ethical and aesthetic reflection. Following the words of Plato (cited at the opening of this section), it is ironic, of course, that upon defeating himself Don Quijote has also spared himself “the most shameful” and “worst of all defeats,” despite all of the rest he is forced to suffer throughout his career as a knight errant. But even more significant is the fact that it is precisely his humiliation before other characters and his imagined readers that the protagonist comes to recognize the internal moral shortcomings against which he professed to do battle. In this way, for Don Quijote shame becomes a substitute for reason, the reader stands in as an other, and letters become one of the most powerful arms for combatting one’s own worst enemy—the self.

216 On this point, see especially Urbina, who provides a more skeptical reading of Don Quijote’s self-mastery while affirming that the protagonist is a victor “gracias al conocimiento y autoconocimiento ganados en el ejercicio de su imaginación y de su virtud a través de la creación de su Historia” (154-55).
Conclusion: The Cervantine Event of Shame

*The capability to suffer from an affront is the mark of a great fighter. Such a fighter does not yet need the virtue of losers, to “let things be.”*

Peter Sloterdijk, *Rage and Time*

The full significance of these practices is laid bare upon Don Quijote’s ultimate defeat on the beaches of Barcelona. Although some critics have identified this moment as the height of his melancholy and cause of his eventual death, it is fitting to ask to what extent that very melancholy may be occasioned or exacerbated by shame or how it is imbricated with other emotions that have yet to be fully explored. After piteously lamenting his bad fortune at the hands of Sansón Carrasco, Don Quijote recognizes his lack of fortitude and the opportunity to demonstrate the true virtue of his character as a knight errant: “cada uno es artífice de su ventura. Yo lo he sido de la mía; pero no con la prudencia necesaria... Atrevíme, en fin, hice lo que pude, derribáronme, y aunque perdí la honra, no perdí, ni puedo perder, la virtud de cumplir mi palabra” (II, 66: 1276). His cowering, dejected posture and lowered gaze while being escorted a short time later by the duke’s servants (Figure 18) are consistent with the pictorial representations of his shame at the end of the *Quijote* of 1605. The fact that Don Quijote’s final defeat is all part of yet another artifice to secure his return home makes the episode all the more ironic yet no less tragic, reminding us once again of shame’s unique capacity for evoking both parody and pathos. In this way, it is an affect which confounds not only structuralist attempts at reducing the novel to a choleric/melancholic paradigm, but also the age-old debate over the so-called

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217 Sabuco, for example, contemplates the powerful effects of shame on people’s lives and its ability to even cause death (110). Contrast with Melczer (“Did Don Quijote Die of Melancholy?”).
‘hard’ or ironic versus ‘soft’ or romantic approaches to *Don Quijote*. Anthony Close, one of the former paradigm’s most ardent defenders, has argued that Cervantes “stresses the dignified semblance of his hero’s sentiments in order to intensify the humorous shock of our appreciation that they are undercut by that initial, insistent blunder” (242). One person’s shame can certainly be another’s schadenfreude, as confirmed by many of the episodes analyzed above. This fact is likely responsible for Vladimir Nabokov’s famous characterization of the novel as one of “hideous cruelty” (52). But among the protagonist’s endless diversity of sentiments, perhaps it is shame that is most likely to foil any rigid adherence to the idea that the novel’s emotions are wholly either funny or sad, entertaining or serious. The various functions of shame that I have described throughout my analysis—parodic, pathetic, punitive, performative, ritual, therapeutic, and psychological—highlight this reality, one which reflects, moreover, the dynamism and uncertainty of early modern Mediterranean life. Such critical complexity is also consistent with the nuanced and often paradoxical modalities of shame itself: marking the limits of Don Quijote’s madness while straddling the public and private, the visible and concealed, the ethical and the shameless. As I have demonstrated, these are the very qualities that invite its use as a critical lens while permitting a broad variety of perspectives on the novel.

I began this chapter by suggesting that the classical concept of *thymos* could offer more interpretative possibilities for the character of Don Quijote than the humoral strictures of choler. Yet I have also shown that, through cumulative experiences of shame, humiliation, and infamy, Don Quijote gradually renounces the thymotic spirit which characterized the inauguration of his heroic, knightly enterprise. While suffering many affronts, his increasing inaction and unwillingness to avenge himself and others indicates
that the pedagogy of shame has led him to become content to “let things be,” lest he be subjected to further humiliating defeats and failures. But to quote Sloterdijk once again, what is this “virtue of losers”? Are we with Don Quijote at the threshold of a modernity in which the rage of heroes past is no longer compatible with the structures of state, in which the *thymos* of ancient men of action must be repressed for the good of civil society? Although Sloterdijk concludes that rage is in fact incapable of control and that it must therefore be productively channeled into resolving the global political challenges of the twenty-first century, Cervantes offers possible alternatives through his meditation on shame and its mediation by the cultural circumstances of the seventeenth century.

Although squarely within the “romantic approach,” one of the most valuable and potentially subversive of these alternative perspectives is precisely that of the “virtue of losers,” overtly suggested by Don Quijote’s acceptance of personal responsibility for his failure (“cada uno es artífice de su ventura”) and discussed at the end of my previous chapter. Those conclusions regarding an affirmation of the experience of defeat can now be revisited in light of Don Quijote’s further evolution throughout Part Two of the novel and his struggle not only with the external forces of shaming but those which surge forth from a more inward, psychological struggle with shame. For Cervantes’s character, his blush stood as an invitation to examine, attenuate, and transform himself. For his readers, Don Quijote’s self-transformation invites us to do the same. Indeed, summarizing Nietzsche (who also had a great deal to say about shame), Paul Redding claims that “The appropriate reaction to one’s own shame is a type of self-transformation” (qtd. in Probyn 63). Instead of a top-down, moralistic admonition that might be expected in certain seventeenth-century didactic and religious literature, however, the Cervantine representation of shame
eschews external structures of control in favor of the affect as a profound marker of change for the self and, therefore, as a tool for disrupting those very structures. As Probyn concludes, “Through feeling shame, the body inaugurates an alternative way of being in the world. Shame, as the body’s reflection on itself, may reorder the composition of the habitus, which in turn may allow for quite different choices” (55).

In fact, the self-reflective and self-recursive nature of shame that appears throughout Don Quijote recalls similar qualities of the affect that scholars have seized upon in recent years. Fundamentally, Tomkins suggests that since with shame “one is as ashamed of being ashamed as of anything else,” it “is an experience of the self by the self” in which “the phenomenological distinction between the subject and object... is lost” (Affect 136-37). Philosophers, even those who have not been clearly influenced by Tomkins or other psychological understandings, have taken these claims even further, expanding shame into a category, paradigm, or ontology all its own. Quoting Heidegger, for instance, Agamben emphasizes that “shame is something ‘more than a feeling that man has’; instead, it is an emotive tonality that traverses and determines his whole Being. Shame is thus a kind of ontological sentiment [...] Being itself carries with itself shame, the shame of Being” (Remnants 106). Agamben goes on to claim that shame is “nothing less than the fundamental sentiment of being a subject, in the two apparently opposed senses of this phrase: to be subjected and to be sovereign” and that shame “is truly something like the hidden structure of all subjectivity and consciousness” (Remnants 107; 128).

218 The quotes Agamben analyzes here come from Heidegger’s Parmenides. It should also be noted that many of the studies from the last several decades that have examined shame have done so from the point of view of the Holocaust. This is the case with Agamben’s own study of shame and the Muselmann in Remnants of Auschwitz, which is largely indebted to Primo Levi’s account of the shame of surviving the concentration camps in his autobiographical If This Is a Man and The Drowned and the Saved (70-87).
In the interest of concluding this chapter, I cannot examine in detail the broader implications of these bold claims for *Don Quijote* or its eponymous protagonist. But in light of my preceding analysis, the all-encompassing nature granted to shame by philosophers like Agamben and Heidegger do invite us to consider how shame suffused Cervantes’s writing, not as a theme or literary motif, but as an experience within, through, and beyond the text; not just as an historical or psychological dimension, but as an ontological one as well. While Probyn convincingly proposes “that a form of shame always attends the writer”—any writer—due to “not being equal to the interest of one’s subject” (xvii), I would like to insist that Cervantes’s writing is rather unique in this sense. Yet another contemporary disciple of Tomkins, Timothy Bewes, in his appraisal of the works of the contemporary novelist J. M. Coetzee, plots a distinction between shame as rhetoric or “instantiation” and shame as “event.” To understand shame in Coetzee, he claims, “it is necessary to reconfigure it as a principle for reading the work—not, in other words, a lesson one might take away from it but an axiom presupposed by it, that governs our reception of every moment within it. Shame would at that moment become not an instantiation within the work but an event, existing alongside and inseparably from it, neither preceding the work nor emerging belatedly as an effect of it” (“The Call” 9). Bewes goes on to elaborate that “Coetzee’s shame, instantiated in all of his works, simultaneously asks us to think a shame that cannot be instantiated—an event of shame that exceeds the concept of shame” (Bewes, “The Call” 14).²¹⁹ I would like to conclude this chapter by

²¹⁹ Although I find Bewes’s description of event here stimulating and suggestive for my argument, I nevertheless must maintain important differences with his conception. In part, this is due simply to the fact that Bewes analyzes shame specifically in a postcolonial context with which Cervantes’s works are largely incompatible, but also because Bewes attempts to evacuate the (ethical) content of shame from the literary works he studies, using shame instead as a kind of material form beyond the text for understanding.
suggesting that, in addition to its numerous instantiations throughout both volumes of the novel, shame in *Don Quijote* also appears to us as an event, as an affect that exceeds the text and the concept of shame itself. But what would it mean to read Cervantes through the event of shame?

A provocative yet provisional response would marshal what I have already described as a uniquely Cervantine concern for, on the one hand, foregrounding the deep emotional registers of the Mediterranean lived experience and, on the other, challenging the aesthetic and ethical bounds of what it means to *embody* or *inhabit* shame. As I suggested in the previous chapter, to do so would entail adopting the subject position of the historical individuals who were themselves most likely to inhabit shame in this period, those same individuals of which dominant political forces and official histories were most eager to dispose: the *conversos*, *moriscos*, and *marranos* in particular, in addition to the racially, sexually, or socioeconomically marginalized in general. In this sense, inhabiting shame represents a refusal to conform to the hegemonic discourse of honor and blood purity by embracing shame as an alternative ontology. As a whole, *Don Quijote* thus presents us with a paradox made possible only by the coupling of the complexity of an event like shame with the perceptiveness of Cervantes’s writing: on the one hand, inhabiting shame can be a means of coercion and punishment, while on the other, of affirmation and resistance; it can be a vessel for societal complicity, or an invitation to personal transformation; an opportunity for schadenfreude, or a spur to sympathy. In my postcolonialism and decolonization. I engage more directly with Bewes on these questions in the next chapter.
final chapter, I will draw upon these complexities once more as I explore the shame of Mediterranean slavery, an event inhabited by Cervantes himself.

Figure 16. José Jiménez Aranda, ‘Quijote’ del centenario: El ingenioso hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha (Madrid, 1905-08; II: 15). Reproduction of original sketch in Chinese ink and goauche white. Cervantes Project, Cushing Memorial Library, Texas A&M University.
CHAPTER SIX: A Soldier’s Shame: The Specter of Captivity in “La historia del cautivo”

Le capturé apparaît donc toujours comme frappé d’une tare originelle et indélébile qui pèsera sans fin sur son destin.
Claude Meillassoux

Don’t you know that shame is collective? The shame of any one of us sits on us all and bends our backs.
Salman Rushdie, Shame

Many of the political, economic, and religious anxieties of the sixteenth- and seventeenth century Mediterranean were brought to bear upon and largely embodied in the figure of the captive, a living commodity whose circulation in turn permeated the consciousness of Spanish national identity and informed the construction of an early modern political, popular, and literary imaginary. Much as the Mediterranean was a contested space of empire, the captive can be read as a contested body which is affected and inscribed by imperial forces, a body imprisoned and marked indefinitely by its encounter with the otherness of captivity. For despite many attempts at defining the legal status of the captive in the theoretical, philosophical, and juridical writings of scholars from Aristotle to Francisco de Vitoria, the Mediterranean powers of the early modern era were far from establishing a practical consensus on the ethically problematic nature of captivity. Many authors of the period contributed to this debate by exploring the complex status of the captive in their fictional writing as well—especially Cervantes, whose own captivity in Algiers greatly influenced his literary production.²²⁰

²²⁰ Likewise, the theme of captivity has been the object of several studies and continues to receive considerable scholarly interest today, particularly in the case of Cervantes. For a general treatment of the literary manifestations of captivity in the Golden Age and its precursors, see Camamis; and Teijeiro Fuentes.
The contentious nature of the captive is apparent even in the etymology of the term itself. According to Joan Corominas’s dictionary, cautivo “significó ‘infeliz, desdichado’” (735). Furthermore, the term cautivo “supone inocencia; excita sentimientos de confraternidad, de compasión y de ternura, y trae consigo la idea de las mazmorras, de los grillos y cadenas, y de los padecimientos en general; y por esta razón se han apoderado los poetas de las voces cautivo, cautiverio, o cautividad para expresar las penas del amor” (Roque Barcía 824). Accordingly, the term cautivo connotes an important socio-historical meaning that was related precisely to Mediterranean slavery in the early modern period. But this definition indicates that the captive was laden with an affective content as well, conjuring strong feelings of pathos and palpable images of dungeons and chains. It is these affective registers of captivity that I would like to explore in the present chapter. By studying the character of Captain Ruy Pérez de Viedma (of “La historia del cautivo”) in Don Quijote (1, 37-42: 475-548), I will posit the existence of what I will call the specter of captivity: an excess of affect and affliction that continues to haunt the captive well after his liberation from imprisonment. I further define the specter of captivity as the complex emotional burden manifested through the (in)action of the captive and the insistent need to conceal his condition from the recognition or gaze of the other. In the case of Cervantes’s

For a trans-Mediterranean historical approach, see Hershenzon. For a review of the numerous historiographic and biographical studies on the effects of Cervantes’s captivity, see Sánchez. María Antonia Garcés’s Cervantes in Algiers: A Captive’s Tale represents the most recent and exhaustive attempt at determining the effects of Cervantes’s captivity on his writing, arguing that the trauma of this experience gave impetus to his literary works. I also highly recommend Francisco Márquez Villanueva’s recent Moros, moriscos y turcos de Cervantes.

Unfortunately, these connotations are all but lost in the English word captive; nevertheless, from this point forward I will venture to use primarily the term captive in an attempt to remain faithful to the original usage of its Spanish equivalent and to avoid any confusion with the term prisoner of war which, within the modern international legal system, is defined by very specific juridical parameters. For the often blurry distinctions between the terms cautivo, prisionero, and esclavo, see Covarrubias (Tesoro 480); and Burns’s thorough English edition of Las siete partidas (516-17).
Captain, the specter of captivity can be witnessed most significantly in his inconspicuous yet unmistakable expression of shame, an affect which induces him to be consciously discreet in his rhetorical self-presentation at the inn. I will thus understand shame here as a “kind of fear of disrepute,” the definition of the emotion offered by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1128b11) and which Renaissance historian Werner L. Gundersheimer claims “constitute[d] the *locus classicus* for most subsequent treatments” (37).

This definition underscores the fact that, in spite of its multifaceted relationship to the self that I explored in the previous chapter, for Aristotle, shame—as well as emotion(s), more broadly—are irreducibly social. Unlike modern, empiricist, or subjectivist conceptions, emotion was for centuries understood not as a private, individual phenomenon but as an experience produced and sustained by a public exchange. It is for this reason that Aristotle devotes so much energy to discussing emotions in the *Rhetoric*, a guide to engaging public sentiments through the rhetorical art. The elicitation of an affect such as shame was thus inseparable from external judgment and the consciousness of one’s status before an audience, considerations which point up shame’s association with a desire to conceal or diminish that which could be outwardly observed as a moral transgression or personal defect. In much of Cervantes’s writing, especially *Don Quijote*, characters are constantly confronted by situations in which they are asked to recount their life stories and circumstances. These episodes of secondary narration constitute a critical element of

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222 As I noted previously, Gundersheimer also claims that, although he “deals with shame in a somewhat perfunctory manner,” Aristotle laid the groundwork for medieval and Renaissance understandings of the emotion: “While acknowledging the role of shame in distinguishing virtuous from vicious behavior,” moral and ethical theorists “manifested little or no interest in reexamining the concept” (37). In my last chapter, I attempted to demonstrate through thinkers like Vives why I believe that this claim is exaggerated and that, at least implicitly, the complexities of shame are manifest in several spheres of early modern culture. Nevertheless, as I remarked in my first chapter, Aristotle’s significant influence on later thinkers in this regard (in addition to his influence on Renaissance poetics) is another indication that Cervantes’s notion of shame would not have been inconsistent with its Aristotelian precursors.
Cervantes’s aesthetic technique: instead of a narrator’s in-depth descriptions of a character’s psychological state (such as are found in the modern realist novel), we are more often provided with an intradiegetic audience’s public reaction and emotional response to another character. In this way, the Aristotelian conception of emotion is particularly illuminating for Cervantine narrative, which foregrounds the social dimension of these kinds of affective exchange. Although, as will become apparent, the Captain’s story is by no means devoid of references to captivity as a personal struggle, the specter of captivity is suggested most strongly when he is confronted by other characters whose judgment and estimation he highly values. This dependence upon a judgmental public also informs the specter of captivity's curious temporality: although weighing on the captive during imprisonment, the most intense manifestations of shame occur when he contemplates either a future potentiality of the other’s recognition or the actual appearance before the other well after having regained his freedom. Thus the captive is haunted by the possibility of liberation as well, since even the anticipation of freedom summons the affective burden of the awareness that he will have to produce a rhetorical representation that convincingly dispels the other’s suspicion of captivity. Nevertheless, an additional modality of shame that I will consider in this chapter proceeds from the classical conception of the emotion as an “indicio de virtud y de modestia” (Covarrubias, Tesoro 1523). This civic function of shame problematizes the Captain’s captivity by conferring upon it an affirmative quality through which shame is paradoxically the source of and solution to his trials in the bagnios of Algiers.

After describing the manifestations of shame in the Captain’s narrative, I will examine three personal and social phenomena to which I attribute the specter of captivity
and the Captain’s resultant anxieties. The first of these is undergirded by relations of
kinship, or the familial and economic expectations and obligations that become unfulfilled
upon the protagonist’s capture. The second aspect of the Captain’s shame is evidenced by
the characteristic of reticence within his story, a reticence rooted in his physical treatment
during captivity. The final explanation I will propose is based on the common
stigmatization of captives who, even after their liberation, often continued to be regarded
with suspicion and contempt. This element of the Captain’s shame is the one most deeply
enmeshed in the unique cultural context of the early modern Mediterranean, where the
experience of captivity was always accompanied by the disquieting possibility of apostasy.
The proliferation of renegades—historical and literary—attests to what was regarded as
the powerful threat of Islam to the politico-religious discourse of Catholicism, otherwise
grafted almost seamlessly onto Spanish national identity. The temptation to convert often
hinged on the promise of the improved living conditions, greater social freedoms, and,
indeed, full liberation from captivity that apostates enjoyed merely by renouncing their
Catholic faith. These shameful suspicions and stigmatizations attending to Spanish captives
also explain why they would be inevitably more haunted by the specter of captivity;
nevertheless, the full significance of these socio-historical phenomena is not self-evident.
Rather, as I have done in preceding chapters, I will contend that a better understanding of
them is directly informed by any earnest attempt to comprehend the emotional states they
produce. Writing on the Aristotelian affiliation between emotion and politics, Marlene K.
Sokolon observes, “since emotions are essential for the development of ethical dispositions,
any analysis of ethics, justice, and the good political regime similarly requires an
understanding of the role of emotions in human social and political action. A
comprehensive understanding of human emotions is, therefore, also an essential aspect of understanding human politics” (32). I thus hope to demonstrate how an analysis of the Captain’s shame can ultimately lead to a better understanding of the social, political, historical, and ethical factors that traverse and are simultaneously inscribed by the specter of captivity in the early modern Mediterranean.

Once again, this is not to say that fictional characters’ emotions correlate directly to the affective registers present among a given readership or society, and much less to what may be imprecisely termed the historical “reality” of that society. To imply otherwise would be not only to commit a fundamental epistemological error, but also to neglect the aesthetic value of the representation in question. Hutchinson’s suggestion that characters’ “emotions may be more than those of real persons,” while “still within the modalities of the human” will continue to be instructive for my analysis (“Dimensions” 79). The emotive peculiarities of Zoraida and the intensity of the scene in which she abandons her father, in particular, constitute a prime example of this phenomenon. But I would suggest that the affective valences surrounding Ruy Pérez de Viedma are even more complex and worthy of exploring for their imbrication of sociopolitical meaning bound up in the already affectively charged figure of the captive. Incidentally, the historical prevalence of Spanish captives also lends this character greater verisimilitude than that of his Moorish savior, Zoraida, and thus places him more squarely “within the modalities of the human.” In addition to its oft-cited historical and semi-autobiographical value, the literary effectiveness of the episode hinges largely upon Cervantes’s artful deployment of affect and its circulation among the characters of the Captain’s narration as well as the guests of the inn. As as I have suggested

223 See especially González López.
about other episodes of secondary narration in *Don Quijote*, the reader receives a sort of cumulative effect of the buildup of these emotions and comes to empathize with the storyteller through and alongside the intradiegetic audience in the novel. It is precisely this empathy from and symbolic acceptance by his public at the inn that would seem to diminish the Captain’s shame and portend at least partial relief from the specter of captivity, and it is his rhetorical expertise and calculated narration of his story that ultimately procure this acceptance and exonerate the Captain from the judgmental gaze of his audience. Thus, while a victim of the economy of captivity that circulated in the early modern Mediterranean, the Captain is in part relieved of its specter by virtue of an affective economy that circulates among the other guests at the inn.

**Recounting Captivity**

In effect, the characters who have gathered at Juan Palomeque’s establishment promptly announce their function as judges by sizing up the strangely dressed couple upon their arrival. Expressing their zealous suspicion of Zoraida, Dorotea says, “el traje y el silencio nos hace pensar que es lo que no querríamos que fuese” (1, 37: 482). As Avilés notes, “No cabe duda que esta manera de articular una opinión partiendo del nosotros es una manifestación a nivel micro de cierto poder que se ejerce desde el grupo” (“Lenguaje” 184). In addition to announcing their strong feelings toward the Muslim religion, this subtle demonstration of power indicates the group’s critical role in the Captain and Zoraida’s eventual acceptance or rejection at the inn and, symbolically, in greater Christian Spain. The Captain hastens to explain to the onlookers that, “Dios será servido que presto
se bautice con la decencia que la calidad de su persona merece, que es más de lo que muestra su hábito y el mío” (1, 37: 482; my emphasis). His explicit acknowledgment of their appearance indicates that the Captain has intuited the judgmental power of the group and is self-conscious of its gaze. According to Jacques Lacan, the mere placement of a subject within the field of vision of the other implies a reduction of the subject to shame, a phenomenon predicated on Jean-Paul Sartre’s original conclusion that “shame is shame of oneself before the Other” (303). Equally important to Sartre’s conception of shame is appearance (“I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other”; 302) and recognition (“Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me”; 302).

Shame circulates in a similar economy of the visual in the scene at the inn: the Captain recognizes that his appearance is being apprehended by the gaze of his many onlookers, a gaze which is patently manifest in Aranda’s representation of the scene (Figure 19). Shame is thus inscribed upon the Captain from the moment of his arrival and independently of the social factors informing the specter of captivity. The narrator affirms that “si estuviera bien vestido,” the other characters would consider him a “persona de calidad y bien nacida” (1, 37: 481). Although granting the Captain conditional approval, the use of the imperfect subjunctive mood here (as earlier in Dorotea’s “no querríamos que fuese”) serves to reinforce the power of this conditionality and of the group’s judgmental authority. Eager to gain full acceptance and estimation by his audience, in the Captain’s description of Zoraida he himself acknowledges the crucial priority of physical appearance,

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224 “The gaze sees itself—to be precise, the gaze of which Sartre speaks, the gaze that surprises me and reduces me to shame, since this is the feeling he regards as the most dominant... A gaze surprises him in the function of voyeur, disturbs him, overwhelms him and reduces him to a feeling of shame” (Lacan 84). Sartre displayed a broader interest in emotions in his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions and Existentialism and Human Emotions.
contrasting it with the strength of spiritual desire which lies underneath: “Mora es en el traje y en el cuerpo; pero en el alma es muy grande cristiana, porque tiene grandísimos deseos de serlo” (1, 37: 482). Given the economy of appearance that reigns in the scene, it is not surprising that the other characters are unsatisfied with this attempted justification of Zoraida and require more tangible, visible proof of her internal convictions. Dorotea, as spokesperson, entreats her to remove her veil, and her astounding beauty serves as this necessary evidence by immediately melting her initially icy reception: “Y como la hermosura tenga prerrogativa y gracia de reconciliar los ánimos y atraer las voluntades, luego se rindieron todos al deseo de servir y acariciar a la hermosa mora” (1, 37: 483).

Soon thereafter, the group at the inn beseeches Ruy Pérez de Viedma to remove the veil of his past by telling his story, yet he shows himself reluctant, fearing that “el cuento no había de ser tal, que les diese el gusto que él deseaba” (1, 38: 492). Although couched in the Captain’s typical modesty, this fear of not pleasing his audience is an indication of his shame and further evidence of the former captive’s self-consciousness before his public, which, as his brother later observes, “era gente principal toda la que allí estaba” (1, 42: 542). Just as he himself was visually appraised upon his arrival, the Captain would not have failed to recognize the predominantly noble composition of his audience who—even in the case of Don Quijote (whose discourse on Arms and Letters the Captain witnessed)—seems to be relatively culto and well-educated. The collective nobility of his audience—comprised of Don Fernando, Cardenio, and Luscinda as well—is significant in that it would have rendered the Captain even more self-conscious and ashamed. Indeed, for Aristotle the

225 As Avilés acknowledges, this sentence further signals the religious tension of the episode: “Pero ‘reconciliar’ tiene un contenido religioso muy importante, ya que implica una breve o ligera confesión donde el penitente se reconcilia con la Iglesia. […] El narrador nunca diría esto si no existiera un contenido de tensión en toda la escena” (“Lenguaje” 186-87).
emotion of shame is sensitive to the social status or esteem held for one’s public, since “the people before whom we feel shame are those whose opinion of us matters to us” (Rhetoric 1384a26-27). Having already recognized the otherness embodied in his appearance, the first words of his narration reflect an attempt to diminish the shameful tension produced by his arrival and to secure a more normative rapport with his powerful public: “En un lugar de las montañas de León tuvo principio mi linaje” (1, 39: 493). More specifically, this opening statement is clearly designed to establish the Captain as a *cristiano viejo* and therefore address the fact that, as Garcés notes, “he would be suspected, along the lines of Zoraida, of belonging to the ‘other side’” (211). The effects of such a performative utterance are similar to those achieved by Zoraida’s spontaneous insistence on being called “María.” The crucial difference, however, is to be found in the Captain’s shame: unlike Zoraida, he would be well acquainted with the cultural and religious fervor of Spanish society and therefore employs conscious strategies of self-presentation in order to tame his shameful otherness. Here again, shame implies recognition or awareness of one’s appearance before the other and produces a self-conscious attempt to reconcile or normalize the encounter and thereby reduce the original shame.

Ruy Pérez de Viedma continues his self-presentation by describing the familial circumstances which led him to become a soldier. Echoing a common folkloric trope, his father instructs his three grown sons to elect a profession “que os honre y aproveche”; namely: “Iglesia, o mar, o casa real” (1, 39: 494). A crucial element of his motivation, however, is that, having already squandered a large part of the family patrimony, the father decides to divide his estate among his sons before his prodigality bankrupts them. Despite the significant observation that his father’s profligate nature derived from his experience as
a soldier, it is Ruy Pérez, the *primogénito*, who follows in his father’s footsteps by choosing to serve in the king’s *tercios*, since “es dificultoso entrar a servirle en su casa; que ya que la guerra no dé muchas riquezas, suele dar mucho valor y mucha fama” (1, 39: 494). This economic caveat of his chosen profession notwithstanding, the young, future Captain takes pity on his father and returns to him most of the money he was allotted through the sale of the family *hacienda*. His younger brothers follow suit, each returning a thousand ducats, and, before leaving home to embark on their respective careers, make an important promise to their father: “nos despedimos dél y de aquel nuestro tío que he dicho, no sin mucho sentimiento y lágrimas de todos, encargándonos que les hiciésemos saber, todas las veces que hubiese comodidad para ello, de nuestros sucesos, prósperos o adversos. Prometímoselo” (1, 39: 495). Recounting his participation in various historic military campaigns and his rise through the ranks as a soldier, Ruy Pérez de Viedma quickly demonstrates that he has indeed gained much valor, fame, and honor and has thus fulfilled the ethical requirements of his profession as well as the expectations of his father. In reference to the famous Battle of Lepanto of the year 1571, he says, “que yo me hallé en aquella felicísima jornada, ya hecho capitán de infantería, a cuyo honroso cargo me subió mi buena suerte, más que mis merecimientos” (1, 39: 497), thereby showing a befitting sense of humility as well. Conducting himself with the bravery and leadership expected of an officer, the Captain is the first of his company to storm an enemy ship just before it is diverted and he is left alone at the hands of the Ottoman Turks. A dramatic shift in the tone of his narration, which becomes laden with affective descriptions of his sudden turn of fate, marks his first encounter with the specter of captivity.
The first reference to the newly captive Captain’s emotions stands in stark contrast to the overwhelmingly positive feelings shared by the victors of the Battle of Lepanto:

Y aquel día, que fue para la cristianidad tan dichoso, [...] entre tantos venturosos como allí hubo (porque más ventura tuvieron los cristianos que allí murieron que los que vivos y vencedores que quedaron), yo solo fui el desdichado; pues, en cambio de que pudiera esperar, si fuera en los romanos siglos, alguna naval corona, me vi aquella noche que siguió a tan famoso día con cadenas a los pies y esposas a las manos. (1, 39: 497; my emphasis)

This passage provides insights into the psychological impact of captivity through the use of several contrasting metaphors, including his hyperbolic account of being the only ill-fated soldier among so many victors; his being less fortunate in life than other Christians in death; the darkness of his first night of captivity following the brightness of such a famous day; and the handcuffs and chains as opposed to a Roman naval crown. The Captain further accentuates this contrast by noting with forsaken resignation, “yo solo fui el triste entre tantos alegres y el cautivo entre tantos libres” (1, 39: 498). In this way, he immediately establishes a mental and emotional link between sadness and captivity as well as happiness and freedom. Even death in battle is associated with “buena ventura,” given that he echoes the ideology of self-sacrifice so important to military service.226 Although not surprising in themselves, these correlations can be observed for the duration of his captivity and suggest that it be conceived as an emotional burden that is only temporarily alleviated by circumstances which either remind him of freedom or offer him the hope, however remote,

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226 This suggests another possible explanation for the Captain’s despondency: that which has become rather commonly known as “survivor guilt” (see Lifton; and Garcés 224). A similar concept is that of the guilt of the prisoner who is released while his comrades are left behind; for a modern example, see Deigh (168).
of regaining that freedom. Indeed, after several failed attempts at escape, he confesses that, “jamás me desamparó la esperanza de tener libertad; y cuando en lo que fabricaba, pensaba y ponía por obra no correspondía el suceso a la intención, luego, sin abandonarme, fingía y buscaba otra esperanza que me sustentase, aunque fuese débil y flaca” (1, 40: 506). In essence, the Captain has found it necessary to seek and even invent therapeutic circumstances and possibilities in order to withstand the psychological and emotional burden of his captivity.

This nearly existential reliance on hope is coupled with an almost total subjection to chance, marked throughout his narration by the incessant repetition of words such as “acaso,” “suerte,” “ventura,” and “desdichado.” As we have already seen, as the lone “desdichado” of the battle, he attributes his initial capture precisely to bad fortune: “Y fue desta suerte: [...] salté en la galera contraria, la cual, desviándose de la que había embestido, estorbó que mis soldados me siguiesen y así, me hallé solo entre mis enemigos” (1, 39: 497-98). The very use of the verb desviar in this sense confirms a sudden reversal of fortune based solely on the unpredictable and capricious currents of the choppy sea, a phenomenon witnessed again when his escape ship begins to drift back towards Africa. The Captain’s insistence on the vicissitudes of chance reinforces the fact that he has acted in accordance with his profession as an infantry captain, and, therefore, his capture is not the result of cowardice or an inherently shameful dereliction of duty, but simply ill fate.  

227 The aleatory nature of war has been recognized in a number of other theoretical and literary works. Consider, for example, Carl von Clausewitz: “No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war” (26). Similarly, in El Abencerraje the character of Rodrigo de Narváez explains that, “en la guerra los caballeros han de ganar y perder, porque los más de sus trances están sujetos a la fortuna” (138). Vitoria even echoes the Captain’s description of his own plight by remarking that “la libertad y la cautividad se encuentran entre los bienes de la fortuna” (199-200).
The continued emphasis on chance throughout his narration represents an attempt both to ascribe meaning to what has happened to him and to articulate the psychological burden of captivity.

Even more meaningful, however, is how the Captain—already a victim of the wheel of fortune—becomes seemingly so convinced of the futility of his actions in the face of fate that he effectively comes to be a captive of his own inaction. Although there are instances which mitigate this despondency, it is significant to note the degree to which he depends on others (namely Zoraida and the Renegade) for his eventual freedom. The Captain’s passivity is even more surprising if we consider once again his profession as a soldier who, by demonstrating exceptional initiative and leadership abilities, quickly rose to the rank of infantry captain. Besides relying on Zoraida for hatching the basic plan of escape and for providing the ransom money, the Captain says that he and his co-conspirators “haríamos todo cuanto nos aconsejaba [...] y que en ella sola estaba dilatar aquel negocio” (1, 40: 516). Beyond the logical reliance on the Renegade’s linguistic abilities and contacts in Algiers, Ruy Pérez is nearly as beholden to him as he is to Zoraida, and he frequently defers to the Renegade’s authority as well. Even though the Captain and the other prisoners of the bagnios initially feared that the Renegade would reveal the escape plan and put their lives at risk if they did not accede to his insistence that he be the one to obtain the escape vessel, the Renegade continuously demonstrates his agency vis-à-vis the Captain’s passivity.

This relationship is even reflected in Doré’s imaginative depiction of the interior of the bagnios, in which the Renegade is quite clearly the central subject (Figure 22). In addition to his positioning at the center of the engraving and its vanishing point, the Renegade is the only figure directly facing the viewer. His seated, upright posture is a
striking contrast to the captives who appear to languish and lay about in varying states of despondency, ennui, and misery, and the angles of their bodies—including that of the Captain, who appears to be engaged in conversation with his newfound ally—all lead the eyes of the viewer back to the Renegade. Beyond the typically orientalist indulgences of the work, his ornate Berber-style clothing reflects the historical fact that his decision to convert to Islam would have afforded him much greater freedoms and luxuries than those captives who, like the Captain, remained steadfast in their original belief system. The reality of this situation suggests, of course, that the Renegade would have been granted a priori the opportunity for and advantage of greater agency. And yet the extent of his initiative and resolve appears to be more than circumstantial when compared with the Captain’s passivity: besides leaving to secure the escape ship, it is the Renegade who directs the Captain and the other Christians to immobilize its Muslim crew before fetching Zoraida; who quickly runs to subdue Agi Morato after he awakens and discovers the Christians in his garden; who insists on taking Zoraida’s father hostage to prevent his sending of a pursuit ship; and who gives the near fatal command to remain silent when summoned by the French vessel. While some of the Captain’s inaction may be attributed to his chivalric devotion to and concern for Zoraida—he justifies not rushing to subdue her father by saying, “yo no osé desamparar a la Zoraida” (1, 41: 526)—it stands in stark contrast to the enterprising efforts of those to whom he owes his eventual liberation. This “melancólica pasividad de su destino aceptado” (Márquez Villanueva, Personajes 122) represents yet another symptom of the specter of captivity.

The height of the Captain’s determined passivity in regards to his captivity, however, can be witnessed in his unwillingness to perform the very act which, in historic
terms, would have promised him the greatest and most expedient chance at freedom: the writing of a letter to petition financial support for his ransom. While serving on a galley ship in the Mediterranean, he seems to recognize this as the most realistic means of regaining freedom while at the same time refusing to do so: “En todos estos trances andaba yo al remo, sin esperanza de libertad alguna; a lo menos, no esperaba tenerla por rescate, porque tenía determinado de no escribir las nuevas de mi desgracia a mi padre” (1, 39: 500). Soon thereafter, he repeats these intentions, adding that not only does he plan not to write to his father, but to no one at all: “yo vine de Constantinopla, algo contento, por estar tan cerca de España, no porque pensase escribir a nadie el desdichado suceso mío, sino por ver si me era más favorable la suerte” (1, 40: 506). His refusal to act condemns the Captain to a longer and perhaps more brutal captivity; as he himself recognizes, when higher-value captives delay in negotiating a ransom, “entonces, por hacerles que escriban por él con más ahínco, les hacen trabajar y ir por leña con los demás, que es un no pequeño trabajo” (1, 40: 507). As if that were not enough, however, his silence also constitutes a moral transgression by breaking an important promise to his father which, as we have seen, he and his brothers made upon leaving home: “encargándonos que les hiciésemos saber, todas las veces que hubiese comodidad para ello, de nuestros sucesos, prósperos o adversos. Prometimosello” (1, 39: 495; my emphasis). The Pérez de Viedma brothers have made a promise to keep in touch with their family no matter what adversity they might encounter; yet, shortly after being captured, the Captain matter-of-factly renounces this obligation. After hearing part of the Captain’s story from the priest at the inn, the oidor openly expresses amazement at his older brother’s carelessness:

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Vive aún mi padre, muriendo con el deseo de saber de su hijo mayor, y pide a Dios con continuas oraciones no cierre la muerte sus ojos hasta que él vea con vida a los de su hijo. Del cual me maravillo, siendo tan discreto, cómo en tantos trabajos y afluciones, o prósperos sucesos, se haya descuidado de dar noticia de sí a su padre; que si él lo supiera, o alguno de nosotros, no tuviera necesidad de aguardar al milagro de la caña para alcanzar su rescate. (1, 42: 545)

A nineteenth-century French edition of Don Quijote included an engraving by Tony Johannot illustrating in emotive detail the grief, confusion, and these “continuas oraciones” suffered by the Pérez de Viedma patriarch (see Figure 21). For Juan Pérez de Viedma, it is inconceivable that his brother would not apprise him or his father of his condition as promised, however deplorable or unfortunate it may have been. As an already established honorable soldier, and as—in the opinion of Zoraida (to whom he also makes a promise)—the only true Christian gentleman to have passed through the bagnios, his silence presents a striking contradiction for his brother and the reader as well: why does the good, honorable Captain betray his word?

**Reading an Unwritten Letter**

The first clue to this question lies in the content of the very letter that the Captain refuses to write: “las nuevas de mi desgracia” (1, 39: 500). Covarrubias defines desgracia as “La mala suerte del que no pensava en ella. Desgracia y estar desgraciado, no traer entera salud. Desgraciarse, desavenirse, y también no estar bueno” (Tesoro 689). While
evoking a concession to chance similar to that of the other words used to describe his fate, here we have an even more unfavorable and nearly pernicious portrayal of the Captain’s condition. The connotations of both “no estar bueno” and, especially, “no traer entera salud” inscribe his disgrace with an almost pathological quality and accentuate the repercussions of an emotional event on the body.\footnote{Aristotle’s conception of shame, as Sokolon affirms, shares this corporeal imagery: “[t]he idea of shame […] contains the connotation of personal disfigurement. In social disgrace, such disfigurement may not be physical disfigurement, but it is an observable ugliness” (Sokolon 109-10).} These characterizations lay bare the specter of captivity and its salient mark of shame, manifested most strikingly in the Captain’s desire to conceal his captivity from his father and fellow Spaniards. Similar to his appearance before the guests of the inn, here the Captain’s shame is closely associated with metaphors and relationships of the (in)visible. In this case, the Captain imagines the shame that would be produced or intensified upon the father’s reading of a petition for ransom, the specter of captivity embodied in the materiality of the letter. Ever conscious of this potentiality, the Captain forecloses on such an event of recognition simply by remaining silent and, as it were, invisible.

If indeed the Captain’s state of affective affliction, passivity, and desire to conceal his misfortune can be attributed to the manifold ways in which shame is brought to bear on his being, the question remaining to be answered is why he feels so ashamed of his captivity in the first place. The most apparent explanation is based on a sense of unfulfilled economic and familial obligations. In his discourse on Arms and Letters, Don Quijote says in reference to the letrado that, “quien es pobre no tiene cosa buena” (1, 37: 486). Similarly, the Captain’s father, upon instructing his sons to choose a profession, explains the three traditional career options in terms of reputation and economic wealth: “Quien quisiere
valer y ser rico, siga, o la Iglesia, o navegue, ejercitando el arte de la mercancía, o entre a servir a los reyes en sus casas'; porque dicen: ’Más vale migaja de rey que merced de señor’” (1, 39: 494). In both of these examples, success and self-worth are essentially equated with material wealth, even though the most important life lesson is not to depend on anyone else for survival or personal prosperity. Despite the fact that “la guerra no dé muchas riquezas,” the elder Pérez de Viedma continues, soldiers in poverty “son como monstruos que se ven raras veces” (1, 39: 493). Having relied upon his captors to survive the destitution of captivity (and Zoraida and the Renegade for his liberation), the Captain would seem to embody a monstrous instantiation of his father’s admonition. In any event, it is clear that Juan Pérez de Viedma, the man of letters, has been much more economically prosperous than his older brother. After observing him from a distance at the inn, the Captain recognizes this inequality and quite conspicuously expresses shame for his own impoverished appearance: “Pidióles consejo qué modo tendría para descubrirse, o para conocer primero si, después de descubierto, su hermano, por verle pobre, se afrentaba o le recibía con buenas entrañas” (1, 42: 543; my emphasis).²²⁹ Once again, shame impels the subject to conceal himself, yet here has the additional potential to affect others as though in the manner of a contagion. The use of the verb “afrentar” in Juan Pérez’s reaction indicates that the Captain fears his brother will also be ashamed: in addition to the definitions I examined in preceding chapters, afrenta is closely associated with vergüenza and is “el acto que se comete contra alguno en deshonor suyo” (Covarrubias, Tesoro 51). The specter of

²²⁹ This specific manifestation of familial and economic shame is expressly treated by Aristotle in his discussion of shame as well: “For Aristotle, it would be shameful […] to not have a similar education or wage to those in [one’s] faction or family” (Sokolon 115). As I discussed in the last chapter, the shame of poverty was also intimately related to the historical conditions of the lower nobility and hidalgos, as was patently demonstrated by the existence of the envergonzantes or shame-faced poor.
captivity, capable of passing from the captive to the other by means of the gaze, can thus be spread and contracted through the medium of the visible.

By constituting a significant economic burden for his family, the Captain's liberation through ransom would also imply an extension or circulation of the specter of captivity. This burden would be all the more pronounced by the father's prodigality and resultant division of his hacienda. As historian Robert C. Davis emphasizes, “The burden of raising a ransom obviously fell on well-to-do slaves as much as poor ones, but at least captives from comfortable backgrounds usually had a broad network of both relatives and financial institutions on which they could draw in this situation” (147). According to the testimony provided by acquaintances of Cervantes and collected in the Información de Argel (examined in greater detail below), Cervantes’s own family directly experienced this financial burden, decimating the family patrimony to rescue the future author and his brother, Rodrigo.230 In addition to the purely economic burden, however, it seems that the Captain would feel shame before his loved ones due to the inherent conceptual burden of merely depending on others, something which, as his father expressed, is worse than poverty. With the notable exception of Zoraida and the Renegade, the self-reliant Captain tends to characteristically reject offers of assistance and favors. After telling his story at the inn, Don Fernando and the other prominent guests proffer their status and goodwill in order to facilitate the Captain’s reintegration into society; a process which, tacitly proven by the very act of offering such assistance, will be less than straightforward. After years of

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230 For example, the “Declaración del alférez Mateo de Santisteban” attests to the fact that Cervantes’s father, also named Rodrigo, “[es] muy pobre, y no tiene bienes con que poder rescatar al dicho Miguel de Cervantes su hijo, porque por haber rescatado a otro hijo que le cautivaron en la dicha armada, quedó sin bienes algunos” (Cervantes, Información 31; I have modernized the spelling). Like the Captain, Miguel de Cervantes was presumed to be a high-status captive and therefore required a correspondingly higher sum of money to be rescued.
being at the mercy of his captors and relying on them for his most basic human needs, his refusal of such a favor likely reveals an emphatic psychological desire for true independence after finally achieving freedom.

In addition to the familial and economic source, the Captain's shame originates in other important, if less conspicuous, aspects of his captivity, the first of these being his physical treatment. As mentioned earlier, although some writers of the early modern era were already advocating the humane treatment of prisoners, it would take several more centuries before a theoretical consensus on the issue was achieved. This discord was even more pronounced in practice. As Garcés notes, "How captives were treated, in effect, depended on who their owners were. Some private owners in Algiers kept their captives fettered in dungeons; others regarded their slaves as members of their households whose living arrangements depended on their status in the house" (76). In his Topografía e historia general de Argel, Dr. Antonio de Sosa (a friend of Cervantes while both writers were imprisoned in Algiers) describes in graphic detail the more cruel punishments which some captives were forced to endure.\footnote{Although traditionally attributed to Diego de Haedo, scholars have convincingly traced authorship of the Topografía to Dr. Sosa (Camamis, 124-50; and Garcés, 32-34). The best critical edition of the first volume of Sosa’s Topografía is Garcés’s An Early Modern Dialogue with Islam, which, in addition to an English translation by Diana de Armas Wilson, includes an exhaustive introduction and copious endnotes, something all Spanish editions have lacked to date. Rodríguez-Rodríguez studies the specific imagery of pain and death in the Topografía.}

¿Y quién dirá otra cosa si los mira como empalan un hombre vivo, metiéndolo todo aquel agudo palo por baxo hasta el colodrillo y le espetan como un tordo, invención, sin duda, de demonios infernales? Desta suerte es también lo de la maza de hierro con que rompen a un hombre las piernas, los
brazos, las espaldas y huesos todos, y despedazado le echan a un muladar que le coman las bestias y aves del cielo. Desta suerte es la crueldad de entapiar los hombres vivos, echando copia de tierra y pisándola sobre él a grande fuerza con los pisones. [...] Con estas crueldades tan extrañas, usan de otros muchos tormentos que son largos de contar, y no hay palmo de tierra desos campos de Argel, y de toda su marina, que no den testimonio destas sus carnicerías, porque todos ellos están llenos de huesos y cenizas de muy muchos cristianos, y de la sangre dellos tan teñidos y bañados... Y siendo cualquiera destos tormentos de que usan tan terribles, y el espectáculo de tan grandes crueldades tan horribles, que solamente oírlo decir y la representación imaginaria dello hace temblar las carnes y erizar los cabellos con espanto. (123-24)

Despite its literary embellishment and hyperbole, Sosa’s meticulous account attests to the abuse to which captives in Algiers, if not victims themselves, would at least have been eyewitneses. In addition to the physical torture, it is not difficult to imagine the degree of emotional trauma that such abuse and degradation could produce in its victim as well as in other captives who witnessed such acts.

Significantly, toward the end of the dialogues that comprise Volume Two of his Topografía, it is this very emotional trauma that Sosa invokes as proof of the verisimilitude of his chronicle, declaring that it would be impossible to invent such a story precisely because it so gravely moving: “Pero yo digo, y realmente es así, que todo esto aún es muy poco para lo que con razón se pudiera decir, mas llámese como quisiere, esto, a lo menos, es muy cierto y muy fuera de duda, que no es posible poderse imaginar o fingir cosa que
más digna pueda ser de lágrimas, de pura compasión, las entrañas, la alma, y el corazón, siento de tal suerte conmovidos con sola la imaginación y representación de tantos males, que realmente se me rompen de dolor” (190). Here we have yet another testament to the power of affect in (and for) narrative: blurring the lines between history and fiction, the intensity of emotional trauma exceeds the capabilities of reason to validate the reality of an extreme or limit-experience such as captivity.232 Referencing Cervantes’s *El trato de Argel,* Ellen Friedman provides historical evidence of this emotional trauma by showing how even the most routine treatment of prisoners could elicit feelings of shame. In that work, “the mouth of a young captive was examined by a prospective purchaser to be sure he was healthy. It was not unusual for a potential buyer to demand that a captive disrobe, to see whether he had hidden defects. The entire procedure could be quite humiliating, but had to be endured by the captive” (57). In fact, the shaming inherent in the public exposure of a captive’s treatment was analogous to that which was historically exploited as a form of discipline in early modern Spain, as I examined in detail in Chapter 4. These shame punishments were most visible in the *autos de fe,* in which apostates and heretics were forced to endure a public penance, as well as in the potent symbolism of the *sambenitos,* hung from parish churches as a visual reminder of the authority of the Inquisition.

Attempting to explain why, despite the considerable popularity of the topic, there existed no full-length Spanish novel dedicated to captivity, Antonio Rey Hazas has speculated that, “ello quizá se deba a que la sangrante realidad del cautiverio argelino—que estos cuentos desarrollaban, y acentuaban o no, según la fórmula que adoptaran—

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232 Along these lines, compare additional sixteenth- and seventeenth-century narratives and treatises on captivity by Valera; Gracián de la Madre de Dios; and Galán, each of which has been recently republished in excellent critical editions.
imponía a sus autores cierto pudor, cierta vergüenza que les llevaba a ensayar un espejismo de ocultación, mediante su inserción en narraciones de mayor envergadura y temática diferente” (qtd. in Teijeiro Fuentes 59). The violent, ‘bloody reality’ of captivity in Algiers, if overtly represented, might have run afoul of aesthetic decorum and the tastes of early modern readers, and authors may have therefore felt too modest or ashamed to represent such violence at length. Rey Hazas’s rather provocative theory also suggests that the contagious nature of the shame of captivity was so great that it extended into the narrative realm and over the author himself. Similar motives may explain why in “La historia del cautivo” the Captain tends to reserve description of his own treatment in favor of that of others or of a more anonymous depiction of the general conditions of the bagnios. For example, he emphasizes the cruelty of Barbarroja’s son toward his captives, but his use of the third-person plural pronoun leaves it unclear whether he himself was actually subjected to “la crueldad con que los trataba” (1, 39: 499). Nevertheless, as a slave on a galley ship, the Captain would most certainly have suffered, and it is significant that it is immediately following his description of this moment of his captivity (“En todos estos trances andaba yo al remo” [1, 39: 500]) that he first announces his intention not to write to his father. Ruy Pérez de Viedma’s most extensive depiction of his treatment warrants reproducing in its entirety:

También los cautivos del rey que son de rescate no salen al trabajo con la demás chusma, si no es cuando se tarda su rescate; que entonces, por hacerles que escriban por él con más ahínco, les hacen trabajar y ir por leña con los demás, que es un no pequeño trabajo.
Yo, pues, era uno de los de rescate; que como se supo que era capitán, puesto que dije mi poca posibilidad y falta de hacienda, no aproveché nada para que no me pusiesen en el número de los caballeros y gente de rescate. Pusieronme en una cadena, más por señal de rescate que por guardarme con ella, y así pasaba la vida en aquel baño, con otros muchos caballeros y gente principal, señalados y tenidos por de rescate. Y aunque la hambre y desnudez pudiera fatigarnos a veces, y aun casi siempre, ninguna cosa nos fatigaba tanto como oír y ver a cada paso las jamás vistas ni oídas crueldades que mi amo usaba con los cristianos. Cada día ahorraba el suyo, empalaba a éste, desorejaba aquél, y esto, por tan poca ocasión, y tan sin ella, que los turcos conocían que lo hacía no más de por hacerlo, y por ser natural condición suya ser homicida de todo el género humano. (I, 40: 507)

It is significant to note how the Captain continues to exclude himself from the description of the king’s ransombale captives before abruptly returning to the first-person singular subject and identifying himself as “uno de los de rescate.”233 It is as if he glosses over what are perhaps the most shameful aspects of his captivity; in this case, the forced manual labor of collecting firewood with the more common captives. Indeed, manual labor was commonly disparaged by medieval and early modern Spaniards as dishonorable and degrading, especially to nobles and professional soldiers, as Sosa affirms: “entre [los turcos] no hay alguna manera de honra, tampoco hay puntos, y aquellos tan grandes bríos

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233 This passage is also significant in demonstrating how the captive is reduced to nothing more than a commodity or, as Hutchinson observes, “una especie de grado cero del valor personal” (Economia 81). Although futile for the Captain, who has renounced ransom as an option, the manual labor and chains serve a symbolic function to a greater economic end because “their captors thought it would be easier to obtain high prices for important captives if they were kept in miserable surroundings” (Friedman 71).
Another possible explanation for the Captain’s self-exclusion is his skill in the narrative art: mindful of his noble audience, he is careful not to over-dramatize his story or seem too boastful. This sense of modesty, witnessed before in the attribution to luck instead of skill regarding his military promotion, is supported by his periphrastic and litotic description of the work as “un no pequeño trabajo.” Also, by declaring his “poca posibilidad y falta de hacienda,” he indicates his humble preference to forego any special treatment that his rank might offer. Finally, though admitting that “la hambre y desnudez pudiera fatigarnos a veces, y aun casi siempre,” he claims he is more disturbed by the cruel treatment of the Christians in general and the abuse of other captives, which he goes on to describe as a manifestation of the murderous nature of his master. He thereby gains the sympathy and acceptance of his audience by reinforcing shared ideological conceptions of the enemy, in this case that of the Turks’ extreme cruelty. The Captain’s omission of the details of his

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234 As Garcés notes, here “Sosa uses the term puntos or “points” of honor, from the Spanish pundonor, meaning professional or military honor or pride” (Dialogue 330). In a kind of underhanded compliment, Sosa remarks on these “points” again in his short chapter on Algerian virtues, speculating that, unlike the honorable chivalric traditions of Iberia, men in Algiers do not often physically wound one another: “a esto se puede decir que la causa es no tener ellos algún modo de honra y, por tanto, no haber entre ellos puntos ni honra que poder perder ni cobrar” (182). In his predictably longer chapter on Algerian vices, Sosa comments in detail on several “ceremonias muy vergonzosas” (178), and the general contrast between supposed Christian honor and Muslim shamelessness is a theme that reappears several times throughout Sosa’s text. For example, “muy fácilmente [los moros] comportan cualquier afrenta que se digan, aunque sea tirar de la barba y dar un par de bofetones en público al más rico y poderoso alcayde, como ha acaecido muchas veces” (167); and “suceden cada día y cada hora cosas harto vergonzosas” (139). Sosa reserves some of his harshest critique for the practice of sodomy and the figure of the “garçon”: “la cosa más notable y más digna de llorar (que tal cosa se use entre los hombres y con tanta desvergüenza y tan pública) de cuantas en el mundo pueden ser ni imaginarse” (89). Although the speculation that Cervantes engaged in similar homosexual acts might help to explain why his life was pardoned after his escape attempts (Garcés 110-11), there is no convincing evidence to support this theory. Likewise, without textual support I must conclude that homosexual sodomy must remain a wholly speculative cause for the Captain’s shame. For a general study, see Munt’s Queer Attachments: The Cultural Politics of Shame. The other major theory for why Cervantes’s life was spared is that he was connected to the rings of espionage and political intrigue that surrounded Agi Morato (Canavaggio, Cervantés 97-99).
physical treatment, just like his written silence in refusing to communicate with his family, is equally as telling as that which is overtly communicated, and is further evidence of shame’s incitement to conceal. At the end of his narration, in fact, the Captain admits to his listeners that “el temor de enfadaros más de cuatro circunstancias me ha quitado de la lengua” (1, 41: 539). Whether due to his modesty, his narrative talent, the perceptiveness of his audience, or simply to shame itself, it is not unrealistic to surmise that he has intentionally left out the most abusive moments of his captivity.

A third possible avenue for understanding the Captain’s shame is the existence of a general societal stigma inscribed in the figure of the captive. In his extensive sociological study of slavery, Orlando Patterson concludes that, to one degree or another, captives and slaves across nearly all societies were stigmatized not only during bondage but after manumission as well. Even if the former captive was “[n]ominally granted almost complete equality, politically and legally, with ‘free’ persons, freedmen nonetheless remained stigmatized,” and “[t]he stigma of former slavery meant that the freedman was rarely perceived as an equal” (Patterson 247).235 Thus the politico-legal recognition granted to former captives in Spain was not necessarily constitutive of broader social acceptance. Sosa affirms the existence of this stigma by describing the reaction of those who encounter someone they knew before his captivity:

235 Another example of this kind of stigma is referenced in Benedict’s famous post-war study of Japan as a supposed instantiation of a “shame culture.” Remarking on the shame felt by Japanese prisoners of war, Benedict draws a contrast with American views of captivity: “The shame of surrender was burned deeply into the consciousness of the Japanese. They accepted as a matter of course a behavior which was alien to our conventions of warfare. And ours was just as alien to them. They spoke with shocked disparagement of American prisoners of war who asked to have their names reported to their government so that their families would know they were alive. [...] And they could not accept the fact that Americans had no shame in being prisoners of war” (40-41).
In spite of Sosa’s penchant for hyperbole, this is probably the most compelling evidence yet that a popular stigma of captivity existed in early modern Spain. Such popular revulsion underscores the definition of shame as an emotional response informed by public opinion. Yet here the shameful stigma of captivity is so strong that it not only elicits fear of reputation for the captive himself, but also from anyone who happens to communicate with, go near to, or merely see the captive. The corrupting or contaminating influence of captivity is, as demonstrated earlier, contagious and therefore capable of being transmitted through a discursive interaction or visual recognition. Garcés recognizes the reality of this stigma as “the ambiguous space of those who returned to Spain ‘tainted’ by a long captivity in Barbary. […] As literal revenants, brought back to life, the Barbary slaves were regarded by other Spaniards as ‘tainted’ or ‘polluting’” (195). She locates the source of this “tainting” in the captive’s encounter with death. In fact, scholars have recently described slavery precisely as a form of “social death,” a conception anticipated by Sosa’s juridical definition.
of the captive as “un cuerpo muerto o sin ser” (20). Insofar as the captive ‘without being’ is excluded from the law while remaining subject to its condemnation, Sosa’s conception recalls Agamben’s designation of the homo sacer or “bare life,” the experience of captivity constituting a particular “state of exception” in which the rule of law is suspended. Beyond embodying the mark of a stigma, the specter of captivity implies an ontological, vital evacuation of the subject—a phenomenon that portends grave legal, social, and emotional challenges and consequences for a former captive’s reintegration and return to life.

Religious Contamination and Contested Reintegration

The general stigmatization of former prisoners along with the shame produced by their physical treatment are unfortunately cross-cultural phenomena that are more or less observable independent of their historical context. The element of the Captain’s shame that is most deeply enmeshed in the unique context of early modern Spain, however, is the stigma produced by what was considered the corrupting influence of Islam. The Captain would feel this burden simply because “his own status as a Christian would be contested by

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236 For the concept of social death, see Patterson (38-45) and Meillassoux (Anthropology, 99-115). Garcés also claims that the captive is reduced to a “liminal persona”: “The state of captivity, as well as the situation of the soldiers who inhabited the borderline between two cultures, transformed these individuals into transitional beings or ‘liminal personae,’ [...] the liminal persona is neither living nor dead from one aspect, and both living and dead from another, a definition that echoes Cervantes’s and Sosa’s description of the captive as a ‘dead being’” (190). These associations are somewhat ironic given “[el] concepto bien conocido en la jurisprudencia de aquellos tiempos, de que el estado de cautivo o esclavo nace de la conmutación de la pena de muerte que el vencedor aplica al vencido” (Camamis 99). In other words, despite its juridical origins of being a more or less positive alternative to death, captivity ends up being conceived as an alternate form of death.

237 Agamben discusses these concepts principally in two works by the same name: Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life and State of Exception.
his experiences in Barbary. Like the men who returned to Spain after a long period of captivity, he would be suspected, along the lines of Zoraida, of belonging to the ‘other side’” (Garcés 211). As already seen, the religious tension produced by his physical appearance informs the Captain's self-consciousness and shame before the gaze of his fellow Spaniards at the inn. This phenomenon also recalls Erving Goffman's classic definition of stigma as the “bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier” (1). The sheer duration of the Captain’s imprisonment, coupled with his refusal to write a ransom letter, would serve as further cause for suspicion. The character of the Renegade in “La historia del cautivo,” of course, exhibits to an even larger degree these symptoms of the “tainting” nature of captivity while also serving as an explicit reminder of the religious tone of the episode. Referred to as a “miembro podrido,” the Renegade is expressly portrayed as a rotten limb which must be metaphorically severed to prevent the infectious spread of the Muslim religion. If for Paul Julian Smith the mere existence of the Renegade “suggests duplicity or deviance” (230), then the Captain's association with and essential dependence on him further tarnish Ruy Pérez de Viedma's reputation for moral and religious probity.

Nevertheless, the presence of the Renegade can alternatively be read as a foil for the Captain, as an even more shameful figure that accentuates the latter's moral triumph in a rigorous religious trial. Indeed, according to the information he chooses to provide in his narration, Ruy Pérez de Viedma was never tempted to convert to Islam and thus maintained his honor and integrity in a place where it could have so easily been lost. As

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238 For an exhaustive historical study of renegades in the early modern Mediterranean, see Bennassar and Bennassar.
Willard King notes, “la fe, el no renegar, se ensalza sobre cualquier otro valor para el español valiente” (285); as such, the Captain proves his valor not only in the tumult of the wartime Mediterranean, but, perhaps even more remarkably, in the face of the unrelenting temptations of the dungeons of Algiers. In this sense, “enslavement, for all its torments, could be cast in somewhat more affirmative terms, as a way in which God tested the faithful, proving the strength of their devotion in the hard forge of bondage” (Davis 176). This affirmative conception of captivity provides an alternative ethical explanation for the Captain’s general passivity. As we have seen, on the one hand his reliance on fate as well as Zoraida and the Renegade indicates a sort of melancholic despondency; on the other hand, it can be conceived as a sort of penance for his shame in which his faith and morale are pushed to the breaking point. By refusing to actively fight against his captivity, the Captain in a sense demonstrates even greater valor, a circumstance that also produces an important aesthetic effect on the narrative action: “His situation in the tale must appear to be nearly hopeless in order to make Zoraida’s intervention nearly miraculous” (Murillo 236). The Captain accepts Zoraida’s plan of escape only after he has prevailed in the moral and religious trial of captivity.

Historically, in order to prove their steadfastness to the Catholic faith and moral integrity, returning prisoners—especially renegades—were to present themselves before the Inquisition, a judicial process that Cervantes himself passed through. The collection of cartas de fe, in which fellow captives attested to one’s moral behavior during imprisonment, helped to ensure the former captive’s acceptance back into Spain and reconciliation with the Church. Such confessional testimonies can be seen as performing the dual function of satisfying the juridical and religious requirements of the Inquisition,
while at the same time helping to free the former captive of an emotional burden. Likewise, these Inquisitional tribunals “helped to give the confession a central role in the order of civil and religious powers,” as Foucault noted in his famous study of the confessional in *The History of Sexuality*. “For a long time,” Foucault explains, “the individual was vouched for by the reference of others and the demonstration of his ties to the commonweal (family, allegiance, protection); then he was authenticated by the discourse of truth he was able or obliged to pronounce concerning himself” (58). The *cartas de fe* thus formed an integral part of the economy of truth in which former captives were obliged to participate, corroborating through third-person testimony the confessional content provided to the Inquisition by the captive himself. Since the Middle Ages, according to Foucault, in this way “the confession became one of the West’s most highly valued techniques for producing truth” (*History* 59).

The direct relationship between confession and truth in the Foucauldian paradigm, however, is significantly complicated and contested by shame, as becomes clear upon further historical examination of confessional documents from the early modern Iberian peninsula, which attest to the fact that shame was a major barrier to receiving truthful confessions from those parishioners who were too ashamed of their sins to report them to their priest. In an Inquisitional trial or *relación de causas de fe* of 1589, for example, it was noted that in his sermon to the Mallorcan town of Monacor, a friar and confessor explicitly stipulated “que ninguno callese por vergüenza algún pecado” (295). Such pious supplications took on a more urgent and dramatic tone in the account of a sermon by one Father Andrade, who, by means of a violent wolf/sheep analogy, invoked the devil himself as responsible for the parishioners’ shameful silence: “Temo oyentes míos, que los
enemigos infernales... os angustiarán, cercandoos como lobos sangrientos, y para
despedazaros harán lo que el lobo con la oveja, pues asiendoos de las gargantas, y no
dexandoos hablar a los pies del confesor, os harán callar por vergüenza vuestros más
enormes culpas, y así el conocerlos será, sino los confesáis, para mayor condenación, y
confusión vuestra” (Gelabertó 57). Further evidence of this phenomenon can be found in
the fascinating personal diary of Father Juan de Medinilla, a monk of the Merced Order who
recorded the first-hand experience of his mission as a confessor in mid-eighteenth-century
Asturias, including individual cases of the numerous “almas” or devoted followers who
eagerly confessed to him the truth of their sins. Nevertheless, Medinilla takes note of at
least a few cases of “culpas calladas,” including that of a twelve-year-old girl who confessed
‘poorly’ and a woman “que habitaba en una montaña alta acia Obiedo” who, despite
receiving the Extreme Unction on two occasions, while confessing was “siempre callando
culpas por empacho y vergüenza” (Ruiz de la Peña 384). In all of these cases, shame seems
to function more efficiently than guilt and, rather ironically, ends up denying not only the
possibility of truth but of complete exculpation for those individuals who may have initially
been moved to seek redemption by that very shame. What would have been even more
troubling to these historical religious figures is that, according to Catholic doctrine, an
improperly thorough confession—in which grave sins have been withheld—cannot purify
the soul and may thus lead to the mortal sin of sacrilegious communion. Although Foucault
claims that confession was a “highly valued” technique “for producing truth,” here the
potency of shame is such that it impedes the discursive production of truth itself.239

239 This idea may be contrasted with the concept of parrhesia (also discussed at length by Foucault in The
Government of Self and Others; The Courage of Truth; and elsewhere): for example, the Cynics, parrhesiastes
par excellence, overcame shame and fear to speak truth to power and, in fact, to criticize other people’s
According to the Decree of the Council of the Inquisition of 1528, the procedure for former captives of providing testimony seems straightforward and even welcoming: “delante los Inquisidores del partido donde fueren naturales, confiando e siendo ciertos que los dichos Inquisidores [a los renegados] los abraçarán y recibirán a misericordia y los tratarán muy benignamente sin les hazer vergüenza alguna” (qtd. in King 281-82). The explicit reference to shame here is, I believe, significant, both for openly acknowledging its presence as though it were to be entirely expected, and as an added enticement for those renegades who might believe in the veracity of just such a claim and thus be more willing to provide a complete and truthful confession. Despite the official policy against shaming former renegades, King also questions their acceptance by society at large: “No sabemos cuántos renegados se aprovecharon del edicto de la Inquisición, ni tampoco se sabe si el proceso contra el renegado era tan benévolo como se prometía. [Algunos casos] parecen indicar que sí fue fácil la reconciliación, pero ¿la actitud del pueblo hacia el renegado reconciliado?” (282). While conceding there is no direct testimony of the general population’s attitude toward renegades who underwent the process of reconciliation, King responds by citing Los cautivos de Argel, a comedia from 1599 possibly written by Lope, in which a renegade attempts to dissuade a captive Christian from converting to Islam himself due the scorn he will surely face upon returning to Spain: “Si me voy/ a España, seré afrentado;/ llamaránme el renegado,/ afrenta a mis deudos soy;/ nadie querrá andar conmigo” (King 282).

shame, as Vives laments (110). The other side of this coin, recalling my discussion of performative shame in the previous chapter, is noted by Allen: “In the epistemological uncertainty of the confessional, one can never be sure that shame is not false” (205). Sosa references the biblical injunction against confessional shame as well: “dixo muy llanamente Nuestro Señor Jesu-Christo, que al que tuviere vergüenza de confesarse delante los hombres, él también se afrentará reconocerle y confesarle delante su Eterno Padre” (165). For more on biblical and confessional shame, see Neyrey.
In any case, Cervantes himself requested and submitted formal testimony before an Inquisition tribunal as well, the transcripts of which have been published under the title *Información de Argel* [...]. Although, like his fictional character Ruy Pérez de Viedma, there is no indication he was ever tempted to convert while a captive in Algiers, Cervantes was sufficiently concerned about his reputation upon reintegration to desire the recording of judicial testimony from witnesses attesting to his moral rectitude. The common practice of soliciting this notarized affidavit functioned as a kind of “passport,” which in turn served to allay the suspicions of Inquisitional and civil authorities regarding former captives’ consciences and behavior during their Barbary slavery—and yet “the *Información de Argel* is much more than this” (Garcés 99). It includes extensive testimony from twelve different witnesses, often with emotional descriptions and subjective characterizations of Cervantes’s virtuous reputation among the Christians of Algiers—claims that would no doubt be dismissed as “hearsay” in a modern court proceeding. Cervantes may have been further prompted to submit to this process—and err on the side of copiousness—due to the presumably false testimony of Dr. Juan Blanco de Paz, a fellow captive in Algiers who, according to witness statements in the *Información de Argel*, betrayed several Christian captives who were relying on the assistance of Cervantes to escape. Later, the enmity between the two captives was aggravated when Blanco went so far as to masquerade as an Inquisitional official in an attempt to gather damning testimony against Cervantes “porque el dicho Miguel de Cervantes se quejaba, con razón, que le había quitado la libertad a él y a

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240 Among the distinct emotions that appear in the *Información* are anger (33), guilt (52-53), shame and infamy (“injurias y afrentas”; 53 and “agravios y afrentas”; 78), fear (57; 62), pride (73), and, not surprisingly, honor (70; 73). For more historical information on the *Información* in general, see Garcés (99-118) and Ohanna, (“Cervantes”).
toda la flor de los cristianos cautivos de Argel, como era pública voz y fama y cosa muy sabida, el dicho Doctor Juan Blanco, viéndose aborrecido de todos, corrido y afrentado, y ciego de la pasión, amenazaba al dicho Miguel de Cervantes, diciendo que había de tomar información contra él para hacerle perder el crédito” (60-61). For our purposes, it is significant to recognize that Blanco, generally portrayed as a violent, irascible figure, seems to be impelled to seek revenge against Cervantes due to the feeling of shame (“corrido y afrentado”). In addition to the common proliferation of this kind of testimony itself, this reference may well indicate a heightened awareness of questions of reputation and infamy and an increased sensitivity to shame for individuals in captivity. In light of the “Manichean view of the two antagonists” (Garçés 100) in the Información de Argel, it is of course exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to determine with any degree of certainty the truth of such subjective testimony, even if, as Cervantes scholars, we may well be inclined to favor the word of his twelve witnesses, despite the fact that they may have had their own interests in mind when agreeing to support the future author and that we lack any “información” that might defend Blanco’s case.

Captive Audiences

241 I have modernized the spelling of this quote from the Información de Argel.

242 As Garçés reminds us, “most of the men who testified in this inquiry were involved in the escape attempt organized by Cervantes. The betrayal, then, could have had grave consequences for them, including the death sentence. Some of these captives even talked of stabbing and killing Blanco de Paz… as a revenge for his perfidy, but they were dissuaded from this by Dr. Sosa” (100). Derrida, on the other hand, has importantly demonstrated “the disturbing complicity between fiction and testimony,” arguing that “there is no testimony that does not at least structurally imply in itself the possibility of fiction, simulacra, dissimulation, lie, and perjury—that is to say, the possibility of literature” (Demeure 43; 29).
Whatever the motives behind Cervantes’s testimony may have been, Captain Ruy Pérez de Viedma, on the other hand, does not have what could be considered the benefit of a relatively disinterested judicial evaluation or the written testimony of eyewitnesses. The only eyewitness to his captivity present, after all, is Zoraida; a woman who was raised a Muslim, has not yet been baptized, and, in any case, cannot speak the language.243 Instead, the Captain has had to rely on his own rhetorical talent in order to prove the consistency of his moral and religious character to the de facto jury of the guests at the inn. The rhetorical effectiveness of Ruy Pérez de Viedma’s story is evidenced by the fact that it continues uninterrupted while Don Quijote and company are, so to speak, held captive by the ‘Captive’s Tale’ (see Figure 20). There are several reasons why this is so, both for his listeners at the inn and for Cervantes’s readers: its content is at once suspenseful, intriguing, heart-rending, and fantastic, and yet not outside the Aristotelian realm of verisimilitude. Its inclusion of real historic events and figures not only lends credibility to the Captain’s own past, but also provides his audience well-known references that make the story all the more relevant and interesting.244 This aesthetic consideration extends to the Captain’s self-portrayal, which, as we have seen, is concerned with depicting a soldier who is both ethical and valiant, yet humble enough not to seem boastful. The amateur storyteller’s awareness of his audience’s noble composition, along with his intuition of their discerning taste, lead him to strike the perfect balance between, on the one hand, self-

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243 Alternatively, Diane E. Sieber suggests that, “Zoraida appears at the inn as an exotic artifact—as tangible evidence of the veracity of the Captive’s narrative—and therefore that she serves much the same function as the written testimonials sought by the renegade in Algiers” (124).

244 A contrasting example of this verisimilar credibility is the tale of the “false captives” of the Persiles (III, 10: 526-39), which Lisa Voigt treats along with an extensive examination of the value of truth in captivity narratives (40-98).
exaltation and modesty and, on the other, melodrama and pathos. In addition to content and form, the Captain also seems to endow his narration with just the right tone, beginning it with “voz agradable y reposada” (1, 38: 492), and concluding by demonstrating his knowledge of the correct way to close a rhetorical argument. As Don Fernando expresses, the Captain is ultimately successful in employing these elements and eliciting a positive response to his tale: “Por cierto, señor capitán, el modo con que habéis contado este estraño suceso ha sido tal, que iguala a la novedad y estranjeza del mismo caso [...] y es de tal manera el gusto que hemos recibido en escuchalle, que aunque nos hallara el día de mañana entretenidos en el mismo cuento, holgáramos que de nuevo se comenzara” (1, 42: 540). The term modo in this remarkable critique is key in accounting for many of the aforementioned narratological talents of the Captain, and compels the rest of the guests to concur by offering him their assistance: “Cardenio y todos los demás se le ofrecieron con todo lo a ellos posible para servirle, con palabras y razones tan amorosas y tan verdaderas, que el Capitán se tuvo por bien satisfecho de sus voluntades” (1, 42: 540). In this way, the Captain shows, just as Zoraida did through her beauty, that thanks to his rhetorical expertise he has been able to “reconciliar los ánimos y atraer las voluntades” (1, 37: 483). This collective empathy for the Captain represents a partial transference of the emotional burden of captivity as well as a long awaited release of the tension produced by the couple’s arrival.

Still, the specter of captivity nonetheless remains for the Captain, and his shame asserts itself most visibly with the subsequent arrival of his brother, the oidor or judge Juan Pérez de Viedma. Once more, the Captain physically manifests his unmistakable shame by concealing himself and asking the priest to first “feel out” his brother before actually
reuniting with him face-to-face. The former captive expresses his fear of sibling rejection, but, by virtue of yet another appraisal based on appearance, the priest is certain that the oidor will be prudent enough to distinguish between the results of inept or unethical behavior and those of simple misfortune. However, lacking confidence in his brother due to his own shame, the Captain insists on dissembling his true identity: “Con todo eso [...] yo querría, no de improviso, sino por rodeos, dármelo a conocer” (1, 42: 543). Serving the Captain as promised, the priest eventually agrees to help ease the former captive’s emotional anxiety and recounts his story to Juan Pérez as though the Captain were not present at the inn. Averted from sight while voyeuristically observing his brother’s reaction to the priest’s story—just as Zoraida scrutinized him from outside the bagnios—the Captain, after hearing his long-lost brother’s lament (which was cited above), ultimately summons the courage to step out and reveal his true identity (see Figure 23). Juan Pérez de Viedma, as an unconditionally loving family member, is able to look beyond the Captain’s poverty and shameful stigma as a former captive in order to immediately accept him as his brother. Although the legal weight conferred by his profession as a judge is offset precisely by his familial relation to the object of his approval, his approbation relieves the expectant sadness among the rest of the guests and, after a tearful yet joyous reunion, “todos quedaron contentos y alegres del buen suceso del cautivo” (1, 42: 547). Juan Pérez’s acceptance of his older brother denotes a further relief from the specter of captivity for the latter and implies an equally emotive reunion with his father. Wonderfully underscoring the near unrepresentable, ineffable quality of the affective weight of the scene, Cervantes’s narrator concludes that, “Las palabras que entrambos hermanos se
dijeron, los sentimientos que mostraron, apenas creo que pueden pensarse, cuanto más escribirse” (1, 42: 546).

The emotional intensity of the final scene’s anagnorisis is enhanced for the reader by the important presence of the guests at the inn who, already having heard and passed judgment on the Captain’s story, await its outcome in equal suspense. The narrative accumulation of this emotive tension—beginning with the captive himself and then transmitted through the various listeners of his story—produces an affective intensification for the reader. Yet the episode would have been even more profound for Cervantes’s early modern readers, who would have undoubtedly been aware of the practice of taking captives and who may have even personally felt its effects by knowing a community or family member who had suffered imprisonment in Algiers. If a popular social stigma of captivity did indeed exist in early modern Spain, then the pathos produced by Cervantes’s artful construction of this episode and its poignant finale could well have incited the reader to look beyond such a stigma, just as the guests of the inn came to do. Be that as it may, the characteristically happy ending of this narrative belies the reality of the cultural politics underlying the challenge of the former captive's eventual reintegration into the old Christian stronghold of León and Spanish society at large. For the conclusion of the episode defers to the reader’s imagination the outcome of the events promised in the text: the Captain’s reunion with his father, Zoraida’s baptism, the couple’s marriage, and their ultimate social acceptance or rejection. This implicit narrative irresolution performs what Meillassoux has called the “indelible defect” of captivity and the similarly irremediable qualities of intense emotions such as shame (qtd. in Patterson 38). Though such a climactic anagnorisis might appear to conceal the enduring specter of captivity, its quintessentially
Cervantine irony at once can be seen to acutely acknowledge the bitter reality of the unresolved burden that would continue to confront the former captive.\textsuperscript{245} The reader of part two of \textit{Don Quijote}, with its powerfully emotive representation of the 1609 expulsion of the \textit{moriscos} embodied in the character of Ricote, may well be even more cognizant of the artful inverisimilitude of the episode’s joyful denouement.

Nevertheless, the Captain’s ethical behavior during captivity and his rhetorical expertise in narrating his story are instrumental in procuring his eventual acceptance at the inn and fostering the generosity and support of his fellow countrymen. This virtuous behavior in turn is predicated to a large degree upon his affective responses to captivity, especially that of shame, an emotion that signifies the source of the specter of captivity while paradoxically producing—within the confines of what is explicitly revealed in the text—the ultimate relief from its burden. As an emotion which is intimately dependent on the recognition of the other, the Captain can be released from his shame only through his appearance before this other. Garcés interprets Cervantes’s writing as a crucial release from the trauma of his captivity, as a form of self-therapy in which his traumatic experience as a captive is gradually confronted and worked through. For this reason Cervantes is compelled to return time and again to the theme of captivity in his literary works. Yet his release from trauma does not depend on the reader of these works, since the very act of writing is precisely what, according to Garcés, provides this release. Conversely, for the Captain (despite his initial reticence in speaking about his ordeal), the release from the specter of captivity depends directly on the need for an audience. Thus in “La historia del

\textsuperscript{245} Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra recognizes the historical reality of the challenges of reintegration confronting former captives: “Ni siquiera la libertad del apresado supone que se olviden las penalidades del pasado ya que no resulta infrecuente noticia de cautivos que al volver a España deciden volver a tierras musulmanas por no poderse integrar nuevamente en su antigua sociedad” (157).
“cautivo” this essential necessity of the other opens a much larger discursive space in which the political, ethical, and affective elements of captivity are engaged, thereby prescribing the need to develop a public voice on a common social affliction. Returning to the Aristotelian conception of emotion not as a private exercise of the self but a dynamic interaction with others, the fundamentally social elements of the specter of captivity and the narrative space of its Cervantine representation call for an approach that is equally cognizant of the public dimensions of psychological and emotional affliction. In other words, instead of releasing trauma through the largely self-oriented process of artistic expression, the Captain’s story suggests that the emotional burden of captivity may be more effectively worked through by means of a recognition by and exchange with an other. The dialogic nature of this exchange permits the free circulation of emotion and, therefore, contains the risk of contamination and contagion witnessed in the contraction of shame and the stigma of captivity. But at the same time it offers the possibility of a common cure.

**Conclusion: The (Re)solution of Shame and the Politics of the Public**

Foregrounding the social dimension of shame in this way, in addition to providing what I believe is a more useful and historically appropriate rubric for understanding how the emotional burden of captivity could be worked through, invites the possibility that it may be equally useful for thinking about other problems that collectively affected a given society. Stated another way, if a public dialogue can work to alleviate the feeling of shame when it is not morally warranted, then shame may also lead to a public dialogue about societal injustices for which it is. In addition to Aristotle’s, this conception of shame is
consistent with its broader Greek precedent, *aidôs*, as well as the mythology of how it came to exist: fearing humanity might soon destroy itself, Zeus sent Hermes to bring men *aidôs* and *dikê* (usually translated as “justice”). These virtues were meant to “serve as the organizing principles of cities and as the bonds of friendship” (Cassin 1198). Together, *aidôs* and *dikê* made up the *aretê politikê*, or a politics of excellence and moral virtue. Unlike *techne*, the *aretê politikê* needed “to be distributed equally among all” (Cassin 1198).

Inherent in the ancient Greek definition of *aidôs*, then, is the broad sense of a collective conscience or responsibility to one another, of sharing shame as a kind of community good for ensuring the excellence—and, indeed, survival—of the polis. It is through this examination of shame’s classical precedents, I believe, that we truly begin to appreciate the ethical potential that the emotion holds.

As I demonstrated earlier, unlike many of its Romance language counterparts, the Spanish *vergüenza* is unique in that it maintains a similar sense of community yet today. This is especially true of the lexicalized term *vergüenza ajena*—which we might rather awkwardly translate as “vicarious shame.” Despite the fact that the concept of vicarious shame in English is not as immediately recognized and certainly not as frequently used, Tomkins deemed it “at once a measure of civilization and a condition of civilization” (162). According to Eduardo Crespo, *vergüenza ajena* “captures the feeling of shame that is experienced in the face of the incompetent or inadequate conduct of another person. The feeling of shame in this case has nothing to do with the subject’s actions, for he or she has not done anything and cannot feel responsible or be held guilty” (qtd. in Cassin 1196). This definition is highly applicable to Ruy Pérez de Viedma’s situation: to those who hear his
story, he was guilty only of intrepid action and military heroism, and yet we might speculate that *vergüenza ajena* was both another possible source of his own shame (i.e. he internalized the shame that was lacking among the renegades and less moral of his fellow captives) and another reason his audience was moved to sympathize with him. “It is precisely because there is no direct relation to the person for whom one feels shame,” Cassin explains, “that the sentiment of *vergüenza* exhibits and constructs the tie. *Vergüenza* in this sense helps build a sense of community. The one who brings *vergüenza* (as in the related expression *¿No te da vergüenza?*) does not stand accused or excluded from the community but is, rather, recalled to the duty of dignity” (1196). Ultimately, this is what shame in Cervantes’s interpolated story is about: a community that does not exclude others on the basis of a popular stigma but that reaffirms their dignity. Instead of shaming the other, the community shames shame, as it were. Regarding the specter of captivity, it asks, *¿no te da vergüenza que esto sea así?*

An equally important acknowledgement of the other in “La historia del cautivo” is evidenced by the crucial roles of Zoraida and the Renegade—traditionally marginalized characters—as well as by the Captain’s own otherness, which is embodied in his shame and in his conscious struggle with the specter of captivity. As a formative and affirmative experience, his confrontation with the other, as well as his ethical resolve during captivity, can be conceived as part and parcel of a broader ethos expounded by Cervantes. The author’s decision not to portray the tribulations of captivity in their strongest intensity—unlike Sosa, for example—suggests an attempt to rescue a positive result from an otherwise detrimental and intractable event. In this way, captivity represents an effective medium for exploring the permutations and slippages between ethics and subjectivity,
inviting the reader to consider the complexities of liberty alongside emotion, not to mention the values associated with family, economic prosperity, and social status. By staging the ethical repercussions of the stigma of captivity, Cervantes holds the contentious status of the captive up to scrutiny and tacitly calls for a collective reappraisal of a practice that so deeply permeated the consciousness of the early modern imaginary, political economy, and civil society. A better understanding of the affectivity that simultaneously imbricates, informs, and resists these registers is likewise productive in framing what is at stake not only in Cervantes’s (con)text but in that which may lie underneath or even beyond it as well.

As Sokolon concludes, “Aristotle believes that shame compels the citizens to follow demands of justice internally, but most people do not feel similar shame when their government treats other peoples despotically or unjustly. In fact, most people are [...] shameless in their disregard of justice concerning other peoples” (124). Shame thus offers itself as a particularly provocative lens through which even contemporary issues concerning captivity and prisoners of war may be interrogated, a task whose urgency has been recently underscored by the ongoing debate among legal scholars and in popular media over the status of the prisoners of Guantánamo, the abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison, and the government-sanctioned use of torture as a means of gathering intelligence. And yet, as Deleuze and Guattari propose,

We also experience [shame] in insignificant conditions, before the meanness and vulgarity of existence that haunts democracies, before the propagation of these modes of existence and of thought-for-the-market, and before the values, ideals, and opinions of our time. The ignominy of the possibilities of
life that we are offered appears from within. We do not feel ourselves outside of time but continue to undergo shameful compromises with it. This feeling of shame is one of philosophy's most powerful motifs. We are not responsible for the victims but responsible before them. (*Philosophy* 108-09).

To be responsible not “for the victims” but “before them” evokes, once again, the connotations of *vergüenza ajena* not as an assumption of guilt but as a collective, ethical response to “conditions” of “meanness and vulgarity.” Taking this logic a step further is Marx, who in his “Letters from the *Franco-German Yearbooks*” held that “Shame is a revolution in itself... Shame is a kind of anger turned in on itself. And if a whole nation were to feel ashamed it would be like a lion recoiling in order to spring” (199-200).247 If only *vergüenza ajena* were not such a *concepto ajeno*.

On the other hand, remarking upon the tendency of broad sectors of the American public to dismiss the events of Abu Ghraib and related policies as shameful, John Limon has recently claimed, à la Benedict’s original distinction between “guilt cultures” and “shame cultures,” that the United States has become a highly developed form of the latter: “The United States is a shame society of which shamelessness is the sign” (548). More importantly, he argues that this shamelessness is intimately tied to the power structures of American foreign policy: “The shamelessness of the administration is part of the strategy, and the shame that thousands of Americans feel, even it if is not welcomed by the administration, is built into it” (546). Bewes (whose theory of the “event” of shame I

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247 Sartre commented on Marx’s words in the preface he wrote to Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth*. “Have the courage to read it,” Sartre said of Fanon’s text, “primarily because it will make you feel ashamed, and shame, as Marx said, is a revolutionary feeling” (Sartre, Preface xlix).
examined in the previous chapter), follows up on Limon’s critique in order to support his broader project of evacuating the ethical content from shame, to advance the claim that shame is not an ethical response to injustice, but its “precondition,” since “He who is able to disavow his shame will wield power over he who is unable to do so” (37-38). For Bewes, shame thus serves as a “figure of incommensurability” (23), or a formal way of analyzing the daunting ontological disparities that inhere in postcolonial relations. Similarly, the circularity that Limon identifies in American imperialism (“The shamelessness of power creates the shame of powerlessness”; 570) allows him to conclude that, “To focus on the shame and not the guilt of Abu Ghraib is to make a fateful decision; it is a decision, in effect, neither to name precisely the responsible parties nor to apportion responsibility” (550).248

Limon’s and Bewes’s points are both well taken, and in the context of the twenty-first century American political system and postcolonialism, respectively, they each make very provocative and largely convincing arguments. Their call to radically reevaluate the nature of shame in these contexts should be heeded. By interrogating what Žižek might call the fetishistic disavowal of shame(lessness), these studies, at the very least, suggest new avenues for understanding such issues and promise to further advance the momentum of criticism and scholarship on theories of shame. However, since it is not entirely clear whether Limon and Bewes regard shame as devoid of ethical content merely within the discrete political contexts of their most immediate concern or whether they presume this to be true for shame a priori and in general, I feel it necessary—and by way of a more or

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248 This kind of complacency about shame recalls Salman Rushdie’s robust portrayal of the emotion in his novel of the same name—Shame—in which the narrator observes that, “Wherever I turn, there is something of which to be ashamed. But shame is like everything else; live with it for long enough and it becomes part of the furniture... you can find shame in every house, burning in an ashtray, hanging framed upon a wall, covering a bed. But nobody notices it anymore. And everyone is civilized” (Rushdie 21).
less definitive conclusion—to dwell once more upon the near staggering complexity of this particular affect.

For if there is one thing that my analysis over the last three chapters has shown, I hope, is that in the early modern Mediterranean and in Cervantes’s writing there is no singularly adequate rubric for understanding shame. Like the blush it gives rise to, shame constitutes a locus of meaning yet confounds facile interpretations, essentialisms, and reductionism. For this reason, it may well be the one emotion whose complexity best mirrors that of Cervantes’s writing itself, as well as of the Mediterranean experience with which his writing so emotively engages. Shame is present in practices of punishment and those of piety; of penance and of pardon. It produces both parody and pathos, provokes both schadenfreude and sympathy. It functions performatively, ritually, therapeutically, psychologically. Whether explicit or concealed or public or private, it asserts itself in spaces inquisitorial and courtly, of poverty and prosperity, of charity and captivity. It is the sole counterpart to neither honor nor pride, guilt, humiliation, fear, rage, nor shamelessness—but is related to these emotions and many more. It is a marker of modesty and reputation, disfigurement and beauty, impotence and potency, stigma and status, disability and empowerment, conformity and difference, contrition and resistance, redemption and reintegration. It transforms the self and is transformed by the social. It is alternately cause and effect, textual and historical, phenomenological and ontological, cultural and universal. Manifest in individual inaction, it calls us to collective action. Though it does not transcend inequalities and injustice, it does visually—and viscerally—alert us to them. It would be complacent, if not entirely naïve, to claim that shame holds the key to all breaches of ethics or that its lack is their fundamental cause. But it is equally
short-sighted to think, in light of its immense complexities, that it is devoid of all ethical content and potential to refute, resist, and reorder the habitus.

Shameful or shameless, the political events of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are likewise troubling reminders that, despite the theoretical comprehensiveness granted to prisoners of war in modern international accords such as the Geneva Conventions, in practice the body of the captive continues to be a synecdochical repository of imperial forces. These forces were constitutive of Cervantes’s experience as a soldier and captive, inscribing his body with the mark of captivity and his body of work with the powerful affective valences that are necessarily produced as a result. His writing attests to the potency—aesthetic and political—of affects such as shame in articulating injustices and prescribing a communal approach to their engagement and resolution. By performing the Aristotelian conception of emotion not as a private quality of the self but as intimately dependent on the other, Cervantes invites us as readers to share in the circulation of these emotions and a public debate on the timeless ethical questions they pose.
Figure 19. José Jiménez Aranda, ‘Quijote’ del centenario: El ingenioso hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha (Madrid, 1905-08; XXXVII: 12). Reproduction of original sketch in Chinese ink and goauche white. Cervantes Project, Cushing Memorial Library, Texas A&M University.
Figure 20. José Jiménez Aranda, *Quijote’ del centenario: El ingenioso hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha* (Madrid, 1905-08; XXXVIII: 3). Reproduction of original sketch in Chinese ink and goauche white. *Cervantes Project*, Cushing Memorial Library, Texas A&M University.
Figure 23. Luis Jiménez Aranda, ‘Quijote’ del centenario: El ingenioso hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha (Madrid, 1905-08; XLII: 2). Reproduction of original sketch in Chinese ink and goauche white. *Cervantes Project*, Cushing Memorial Library, Texas A&M University.
"The shame of being a man—," Gilles Deleuze ponders in his Essays Critical and Clinical, "is there any better reason to write?" (1). While for him writing represents a means of bearing witness to or atoning for the shame of human frailties and injustices, thinkers like Elspeth Probyn have suggested that the act of writing—all writing—always already implies the possibility of shame, due predominately to the incommensurability between the writer and the reader’s "interest." For many of the same sociohistorical reasons I have identified in his works, one could argue that Cervantes maintained an even more intimate and abiding relationship with shame throughout his life, whether due to his ostensibly secret converso roots, his struggle with relative poverty, his failure to fully realize his aspiration of garnering fame as a dramaturge, his confrontations with the law and imprisonment, his experience as a captive in North Africa, his inability to attain royal approval and win important administrative posts, his outward physical handicaps, the usurpation of his most famous work by an impostor, or the criticism he received regarding aspects of his novel literary experiment. Perhaps, to echo Layna Ranz’s claim for the “eficacia del fracaso” in Don Quijote, one could also argue that it is these potentially shameful biographical circumstances and failures that endow Cervantes’s works with their unique literary effectiveness, with their power to immortalize the struggles of history’s defeated amid a subtly defiant stance toward the authority and affective arms of their vanquishers. The reader would thus be invited to inhabit the shame that not only suffuses his works but that was an event experienced by the author himself.
This would be one argument. But in these final pages I will be more interested to reflect upon how affect tends rather to disrupt or contest the very critical impulse to extract a singular, unified meaning—authorial or otherwise—from a text. For if there is, nevertheless, one thing I hope that my analysis in this dissertation has shown, it is that of the enormous complexity, heterogeneity, and diversity of emotion(s) in Cervantes’s works. Without or before that analysis, a declaration of such qualities might seem to be self-evident or to undermine a definitive conclusion, if not to preclude the existence of a cogent analytical criterion altogether. It could also give the appearance of a self-fulfilling argument or tautological exercise—of the kind, for example, whereby an investigation into the reasons behind a critical resistance to the study of emotional complexity were to return the finding that emotions are complex. But to accept in theory what would obviously be the specious validity of these hypothetical maneuvers in practice would be tantamount, I believe, to reinforcing the received notions and unquestioned assumptions about literary emotions which have until recently cast them into the critical dustbin of readerly whims and ‘affective fallacies.’ Instead, a consideration of the evidence marshaled in the preceding pages, I hope, demonstrates that for Cervantes emotions are not merely literary excess, frivolous adornments, or a byproduct of formal aesthetic conventions. Nor are they produced only on the side of the reader’s ‘subjective’ response. They constitute, rather, an integral component of the work’s content and context and, therefore, they have something uniquely important to say about the work, author, and society in which it was written.

Complex though emotions may be in real life, Cervantes does not merely lift this complexity and deposit it in his works. Acutely conscious of the linguistic and literary challenges that inhere in emotional expression, by exploiting, adapting, improvising, and
experimenting with poetic language and its limitations, the author manages to mold this inherent complexity into a signifying figure in and of itself. As with the motif of (in)visibility—coaxing the prospect of emotional absence into a subversive presence in the narrative—he seems to constantly thwart and play off of our expectations as readers in order to render the emotional impact all the more poignant. From recycling classical tropes with just enough ironic distance to achieve a novel effect, to appropriating cultural forms from theater and mysticism, to punctuating narrative temporality with events of suspension, to laying bare the materiality of intense affects, and to mobilizing innovative rhetorical constructions of his own invention, Cervantes manages to countervail the deficiencies of expressive language even while dwelling upon its own lack. Yet the variation on these strategies is such that, just when we as readers think we know the script, another well-timed narrative twist exploits a kind of affective hysteresis, in which our emotions are piqued even before we are cognizant of it. True to form, with affect Cervantes seems to indulge and delight in his subtle complicity in these sorts of narrative trickery.

And yet this rhetorical dexterity with all things emotional ramifies beyond the pages of his oeuvre. Cervantes's representation of affect is highly effective at mediating text and context—serving as a medium through which to articulate a variety of moral concerns and sociohistorical anxieties, while at the same time functioning as a kind of mediator or central meeting point between extremes or between cultural spheres that might otherwise appear to be sovereign, such as those of politics and aesthetics and ethics. Or to invoke Braudel and Castro once more, between the Mediterranean basin and far more localized communities; between the macro- and the micro-; the economic and the human; the material and the sentimental; the structural and the subjective; the public and the private;
the social and the individual; the exterior and the interior. Along similarly diaphanous lines, Cervantine affectivity tends to elide the reason/emotion binary itself. That these multiple border crossings take place in the vastness and variety of the Mediterranean world is not fortuitous, for even beyond a biographical approach that attributes the sentimental and geographical diversity of Cervantes’s texts to that of the author’s own life, these crossings are reciprocally enabled by the equation "Mediterranean experience = emotional experience." This textual, geographical, and emotional mobility is useful not simply because it provides mutually felicitous metaphors for talking about such qualities. Much more importantly, it is crucial for thinking through, between, and around problems that might otherwise come up against the firmness of more typically hermetic conceptual boundaries, for it encourages us to push off from the relatively static and rational comforts of terra firma to explore the dynamic emotional horizons of the open sea, whose aleatory currents in turn open ever more foreign epistemological itineraries or ‘deviations’ from reasoned thought. We are thus called upon to consider not only ‘unreason’s reason’ ("la razón de la sinrazón") but what we might conversely call reason’s unreason. No wonder Plato distrusted sailors as much as unbridled passions.

Indeed, according to this model the Platonic metaphor of the ship of state as a majority-ruled democracy begins to take on water. For if we follow the diversity of Cervantine affectivity to its (il)logical ends, then we might well imagine that the implied stakes of emotional variatio are greater than the concern for readers’ differing aesthetic tastes. When the priority granted in Don Quijote to fomenting and accommodating an entire range of emotional responses is considered alongside the entropic failure of discrete emotional terminologies to fully capture the complexity of affect in the Persiles, we already
have what amounts to an intriguing psychological worldview. Upon recalling in the latter work the valuation of extreme difference through affective aporias, then an even more suggestive paradigm is inferred; namely, that which is inclusive of an equally differentiated and infinite spectrum of religious creeds and political ideologies. Importantly, if Cervantes’s emotional philosophy of diversity is to be any guide, then this multitude would not be subject to the potential tyranny of the majority or, in contemporary terms, the often veiled yet exclusionary effects of multicultural liberalism and coalition politics. A more genuinely egalitarian model such as this would be situated in opposition to the hegemonic or colonizing discourse of reason as well as the logic of *reductio ad unum* that so often abetted imperial conquest. In fact, it would be difficult to imagine a more appropriate—and appropriately complex—politico-ethical solution than this model for the Spain of Cervantes’s epoch, in which a compliant Old Christian majority witnessed the forced expulsion of a sizeable minority population of *conversos*, *marranos*, and *moriscos*. Plato’s metaphorical ship of state takes on a whole new meaning when we imagine it manned not by representatives of the rational majority but, like the character of Ricote, by members of an afflicted minority and entire Mediterranean diaspora in search of “libertad de conciencia.”

As the discrepant affects of the *Persiles* attest, this model is imperfect yet, partly for that very reason, is also eminently more human. Along with its complexity and heterogeneity, this human(izing) element is another salient landmark of the often asperous Cervantine emotional topology, whence the potential recognition of the racial and religious other is perhaps even more apparent. Ricote is only one example of the ubiquitous Cervantine phenomenon in which a character’s emotional affliction becomes the impetus to
share one’s life experience through narration. This leads to the building and sustaining of social bonds and stands as yet another instantiation of the mediating role performed by affect in the middle sea. Once again, these bonds should not be taken to imply complete unity, but rather a harmony of the sort described by Castiglione as relying on dissonance as much as melodious tones. Cervantine narrative’s similar reliance on narrative discord as a means of introducing sentimental suspense and polyphony also produces a unique kind of aesthetic harmony. While more broadly consistent with the politics of difference I just discussed, this discord crucially inaugurates a suspension in narrative temporality and thus an opportunity for the reader to voluntarily reflect on the ethics of affect, of which the examples I have mentioned here are but a few of the nearly endless possibilities opened by Cervantine affectivity.

I would like to conclude by suggesting that these alternative epistemologies might invite us to reflect on their specific stakes for our scholarship as well. I have already remarked on the particular reductio ad unum tendency of certain Mediterraneanizing logics, especially that which has established honor as a ‘value’ of Mediterranean society, or, along national lines, the similarly spurious distinction of Spain as an ‘honor society,’ all while tacitly excluding those inhabitants proscribed from attaining this very same ‘value’ (i.e. conversos, marranos, and moriscos). But affect may also be seen to mediate certain disciplinary ideologies of Cervantism itself, such as the oft-exaggerated distinction between ‘Romantic’ and ‘hard’ critical approaches to Don Quijote—the notion that the novel is either wholly parodic in its intent or that its tragic undertones might enable it to be something more than just a ‘funny book.’ A critical attention to the affective dynamism of the novel—and humor and tragedy can be considered affects, too—cannot but threaten to foil and
destabilize the most rigid interpretations of bipolar categories such as these, just as it does
with a choleric/melancholic paradigm. Shame, in its potential to alternately provoke
parody and pathos, sympathy and schadenfreude, is a particularly demonstrative example
of these slippages. This does not mean that the alternative that results from these
slippages, however, must necessarily be a nebulous or ambiguous scholarship trapped by a
kind of postmodern relativism, or that it should be devoid of broader schools of thought or
interpretative methodologies. Nor would such an approach suggest that these critical
dichotomies, on the other hand, be funneled into a sort of Hegelian synthesis or
Habermasian consensus whereby scholarly debate (or its lack thereof) is governed by a
majority-rules democracy akin to the political model discussed above.

On the contrary, the broader implications of Cervantine affectivity would suggest
neither a monolithic, binary, nor formless model, but one comprised of a multitudinal
variety of points of difference. As Hutchinson recognizes regarding the Quijote, “no hay
ninguna garantía de que vayamos a coincidir en las cualidades emocionales que le
atribuyamos” (“Poética de la emoción,” 1375). My interpretation of Cervantine affectivity
suggests that this is precisely the point: as readers we are invited to enjoy an endless
diversity of affective responses equal to or greater than the emotional variety that animates
the characters of the Cervantine canon. Yes, these responses are subjective—if by that
term we mean an inherent quality of the human subject and one that is therefore open to
individual differences—as opposed to what might otherwise be a top-down, structural(ist)
paradigm, in which one would have to (dis)agree on either a hard or soft approach to the
novel. But these complex, diverse, subjective, and human elements of Cervantine affectivity
are what make it and Cervantes’s works themselves such opportune objects of aesthetic
pleasure and critical analysis. These elements are the very reasons why they should no longer be regarded as bridles for reining in ostensibly less rational and therefore less valid critical studies, but as spurs for reflexively contributing—through a renewal of literary scholarship on emotion—to just such qualities of complexity, human subjectivity, and diversity (in addition to what is surely a variety of many more), and for setting forth to explore and traverse new aesthetic, political, ethical, and critical frontiers.


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