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Why Are So Few Women Elected to Congress? A Theory of Partisan Exclusion

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
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by
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When I was in high school, I was lucky enough to have a teacher who spoke candidly and forcefully about inequality between men and women. While pointing to overt sexism, she also highlighted the microaggressions women face each day and empowered us to identify them on our own. This experience was the beginning of my passion for women and politics. She also told us that we could do anything, which at the time sounded trite but turned out to be true—thank you Deborah Brown for opening my eyes.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Why Are So Few Women Elected to Congress? A Theory of Partisan Exclusion

by

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Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science
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Dr. Benjamin Bishin, Chairperson

Research shows that when women run, they win just as often as men. Evidence suggests, however, that women are running for Congress at record-breaking levels yet the proportion of women in either chamber has not appreciably increased. I reconcile these disparate findings through the theory of partisan exclusion. I argue that the success of Democratic women masks the difficulties Republican women face in their bids for office. I further argue that these divergent experiences are the result of Republican women’s disproportionate absence from the local party networks that identify and vet potential candidates.

In Chapter One, I examine the effects of Republican women’s disproportionate absence from local party networks on their primary election success by comparing several features of their campaigns to those of Democratic women who I argue are more likely to be members of local party networks. I find that Republican women’s campaigns
suffer from serious deficiencies when compared to Democratic women’s campaigns and that these deficiencies contribute to a nine-point difference in primary election vote share between Republican women and Democratic women.

In Chapter Two, I examine the fundraising strategies of Republican and Democratic women. I find that Democratic women heavily rely on external funding sources like political action committees and individual contributions which reflect their increased presence in local party networks while Republican women rely more heavily on self-financing which reflects their inability to access to donor lists and networked donors.

Finally, in Chapter Three I use an original survey of county party chairs to examine potential gender bias in recruitment. When prompted to name a potential candidate, Democratic county party chairs were twice as likely to name a woman than were Republican county party chairs. These differences were magnified amongst county party chairs reporting that they worked within a network to identify and vet candidates.

Taken together, results suggest that women’s underrepresentation in Congress is driven in large part by Republican women’s underrepresentation and that the Republican Party, at least at the local level, does not prioritize the election of women.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Since 1789, only three percent of members of Congress have been women (CAWP 2014).\(^1\) Forty years ago, women occupied few elected positions in U.S. government. By the end of the 1970s, women held less than five percent of the seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, and comprised about ten percent of state legislatures across the country (Lawless and Fox 2012). After the “Year of the Woman” in 1992, the number of elected women in federal government rose, effectively increasing the visibility of female members of Congress. Despite these advances, women continue to be one of the most underrepresented groups in Congress. This trend continues at the local level as well. At the time of this writing, women hold twelve percent of state governorships and only 16% of America’s largest 100 cities have female mayors (Lawless and Fox 2012; National Conference of State Legislators 2015).

Whenever an election cycle ends and the number of women increases in the House and/or the Senate, the media is quick to point to the “record-breaking number of women in Congress” (e.g., Parker 2013). These declarations serve to simultaneously congratulate voters and challenge notions that our government is not representative of the American population. The media reports dramatic increases in the number of women running for and winning seats in Congress (e.g., Parker 2013). These articles are often framed in a way that suggests we are entering a new phase of society where discussions

\(^1\) Although the word “female” refers to a biological sex and the word “woman” refers to a social identity, I use the terms interchangeably throughout the dissertation for grammatical ease.
of the representativeness of Congress, at least with respect to gender, are no longer necessary. These stories are often accompanied by graphs like Figure 1.1.

**Figure 1.1 Number of Women in Congress (1917-2015)**

![Graph showing the number of women in Congress from 1917 to 2015. The y-axis is truncated, and the data is depicted for the Senate and House.]

As Figure 1.1 shows, the number of women in Congress appears to have risen sharply in the years following 1992’s “Year of the Woman” and then again between the 107th and 110th Congresses (2001-2007). It should be noted, however, that what makes this growth look so dramatic is that the y-axis has been truncated. By limiting the range of the y-axis, small increases suddenly look much larger. If one were to adjust the y-axis to represent the full range of possible values for the number of women in Congress, the y-axis would range from zero to 535. Figure 1.2 depicts this same data with an expanded y-axis.
After adjusting the y-axis in Figure 1.2, the rate of growth for women in Congress is much less impressive. In fact, the level of growth appears to have tapered off in the House and completely stagnated in the Senate. I have included a reference line indicating the number of women necessary to reach gender parity in Congress (i.e., 50% of both chambers being comprised of women). It is plainly evident from this figure that women are not even close to attaining representation at a level that mirrors their proportion of the population.

How can it be the case that women are running at record-breaking levels yet the proportion of women in Congress has held steady around 18% for over a decade? After
all, research shows that female candidates tend to do well. Female candidates raise just as
much money as men, often win a sizeable vote share, and win when they run (Burrell
and Leighton 1997). Despite the fact that female candidates are typically quite successful,
women remain the most (numerically) underrepresented group in Congress. If it is the
case that women are just as successful as men when it comes to mounting campaigns and
winning elections, why are there so few women in Congress?

1.1 The Importance of Descriptive Representation

Equality is one of the central tenets of American democracy (Dahl [1956] 2006). Implicit in arguments about equality is the notion that in order for the value of equality to prevail, government institutions should reflect in their composition, the composition of the citizenry. This concept has existed since the founding. John Adams wrote that elected representatives should be “a portrait of the people at large in miniature” (Wood [1969] 2008: 165, as quoted by Tate 2003). In fact, a substantial literature points to the importance of descriptive representation or the idea that people should be represented by legislators who resemble voters’ physical characteristics (e.g., women should be represented by women).

The argument about the importance of descriptive representation centers on the idea that individuals with shared physical characteristics will also have shared experiences. Dovi (2002, 2007) and Mansbridge (1999) stress the importance of descriptive representatives for disadvantaged and/or marginalized groups. Mansbridge (1999) suggests that these groups can benefit from descriptive representation because
“the better communication and experiential knowledge of descriptive representatives enhances their substantive representation of the group’s interests by improving the quality of deliberation” (628). In fact, Swers (1998, 2002, 2005) demonstrates that not only are female representatives more likely to vote for “women’s issue” legislation than are their male colleagues, but female representatives are also more likely to be active (through sponsorship and co-sponsorship) on “feminist and women’s issue” bills.2

Some scholars have argued that focusing on the extent to which members of Congress mirror the population of their districts, or Americans in general, is unnecessary and can even be detrimental to democracy. For example, Pitkin (1967) cautions against conflating representatives who “stand for” a group with representatives who “act for” a group. In other words, substantive, or policy representation does not necessarily result from representatives whose physical characteristics match those of the groups they are representing (i.e., descriptive representatives). Dovi (2002) echoes these concerns and argues that for historically marginalized groups seeking descriptive representation, it is important to be selective when choosing that representative. She acknowledges the importance of diversity within government and even goes so far as to argue that gender

---

2 Discussions of what constitutes “women’s issues” or “women’s interests” often pose problems for many gender and politics scholars. To assert that women share particular policy preferences because they share a biological sex runs the risk of being reductionist. For an extended discussion of the problem of essentialism with respect to “women’s interests” see Fuss (1989) and Williams (1998).
disparity in government represents a “tool of oppression” but she cautions that not just “any woman, black, or Latino” will do (Dovi 2007).³

It should be noted that these scholars are not discounting the importance of equality in government. Instead, they are concerned with the substantive outcomes of representation. Their concern stems from the notion that it is entirely possible that descriptively represented groups might actually receive worse policy representation than they would if they were represented a representative who was descriptively dissimilar. In Pitkin’s (1967) case in particular, the concern is about accountability. She questions the mechanism for assessing the quality of a descriptive representative and suggests that these individuals may be evaluated differently based on voters’ assumptions about their goals and behavior. Indeed, Griffin and Flavin (2007) find that black voters are less likely to hold their representatives accountable when those representatives are also black. This is due, in part, to black voters having different expectations for black representatives than for white representatives. Other scholars point to concerns of “blind loyalty” to descriptive representatives (Mansbridge 1999). This “blind loyalty” stems from beliefs that descriptive representatives share policy preferences or have similar goals for government simply because of shared demographic traits (Wilson and Gronke 2000).

Arguments of caution with respect to the value of descriptive representation have been met with substantial pushback. Scholars have pointed to considerations beyond policy outcomes as evidence of the importance of descriptive representation. For

³ Dovi cautions that conceptualizations of democracy should not solely rest on political representation. However, she suggests that representation is a major component of democracy that becomes especially important when considering the representation of women.
example, Atkeson and Carrillo (2007) find that descriptive representation leads to higher external efficacy among women. Descriptive representatives can serve as role models for historically marginalized groups, which can lead to an increased self-esteem and belief in one’s capacity to become a leader herself. Others argue that descriptive representation leads to sense of increased inclusivity and further that diversity lends legitimacy to government (Phillips 1998). Although scholars of representation differ on the importance they place on descriptive representation, they largely agree that diversity in government is desirable, and that the underrepresentation of women leads to women’s issues being less well represented in government (e.g., Swers 1998, 2002, 2005).

1.2 The Continual Underrepresentation of Women

The continual underrepresentation of women has driven scholars to examine the electoral and institutional processes that might affect the ability of female candidates to run and to win. Explanations for the low number of female representatives often come from one of two camps. One school of thought focuses on the demand side and evaluates the factors that influence the electorate’s willingness to accept women candidates (Niven 1998a). Within the demand side literature, scholars largely focus on the role of stereotypes and candidate quality. The stereotype explanation suggests that the reason there are so few women in Congress is that voters project gender expectations (i.e., stereotypes) on to candidates and that these gender stereotypes disproportionately disadvantage female candidates because female gender expectations are at odds with expectations for leadership positions (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a, 1993b; Koch 1999; Lawless 2004; Leeper 1991; Rosenwasser and
Seale 1988). The supply side explanation, on the other hand, focuses on candidate quality and suggests that female candidates do not win because they do not have the requisite experience, skills, and connections necessary to run for office (Baxter and Lansing 1980; Burrell 1985; Mandel 1981; Whittington 2002).

Scholars evaluating supply side explanations focus instead on the eligibility pool and the candidate emergence process (Niven 1998a). The argument most representative of this branch of literature is that of Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010). Their argument focuses on the role of ambition and how through traditional gender roles and socialization, women are encouraged to be less ambitious than men. As a result, fewer women filter into the “pipeline careers” that typically lead to a bid for elected office and even fewer believe in their ability to run for office (Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010; Palmer and Simon 2008). In what follows, I examine each of these explanations in more detail.

1.2.1 The Role of Stereotypes

Female candidates are often perceived to be disadvantaged because voters make assumptions about their ideology and policy expertise based upon gender expectations. Gender expectations lead voters to attribute what Huddy and Terkildsen (1993a) call “trait stereotypes” to candidates. The origins of these trait stereotypes can be traced to “the roles that are historically associated with being male or female” (Anderson, Lewis, and Baird 2011). As traditional caregivers, women are perceived as being “warm, gentle, kind, and passive” while men, being the traditional providers, are perceived as “tough, aggressive, and assertive” (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a: 121). These stereotypical beliefs about candidate traits persist even in the face of conflicting information. For
example, Leeper (1991) finds that even when hypothetical female candidates assert
toughness and aggressiveness, voters still perceived “latent warmth” and assessed typical
female issue expertise.

Beliefs about personality traits of candidates inform voters’ beliefs about
candidates’ ideological leanings (i.e., liberal or conservative) and as such, act as a
heuristic for assessing policy expertise. According to the belief stereotypes, regardless of
partisan affiliation, women are perceived as being more liberal than men (Huddy and
Terkildsen 1993a; Koch 2000, 2002; McDermott 1998). One result of these attributions is
that women are thought to be more competent to address social welfare issues but less
competent to address defense-related issues (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Huddy and
Terkildsen 1993a; Koch 1999; Lawless 2004; Rosenwasser and Seale 1988). Female
candidates are also seen as especially adept at addressing traditional women’s issues like
abortion and sexual harassment (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a; Kahn 1996).

A second result is that female candidates may suffer electoral setbacks. For
example, Koch (2000) finds that for Democratic female candidates, ideological
stereotypes based upon gender actually alienates voters increasing the likelihood that
voters will vote for the Republican candidate when all else is held equal. Republican
female candidates, Koch (2000) further suggests, actually benefit from these stereotypes
and as a result, attract more voters. These results are challenged by numerous studies that
have demonstrated that women do not suffer on Election Day because of their gender
(Burrell 1994; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Hoffman, Palmer, and Gaddie 2001). For
instance Sanbonmatsu (2008) finds that Democratic female candidates actually benefit
the most from gender stereotypes in politics. She suggests that Democratic female candidates benefit from complimentary gender and partisan cues while Republican female candidates suffer from conflicting gender and partisan cues.

While some have found that gender stereotypes negatively impact women running for higher levels of office (e.g., Fox and Smith 1998; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993b; Koch 2002), others suggest that gender stereotypes may actually benefit female candidates when the issues prioritized by the campaign match up with those issues that women are perceived to be better able to address (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Dolan 1998, 2005; Kahn 1996; Koch 1999; Lawless 2004; Schaffner 2005). More recent scholarship has begun to focus on the role of partisan stereotypes when assessing how gender stereotypes are applied to female candidates. Party issue ownership oftentimes overlaps with gender issue ownership. For instance, issues “owned” by the Democratic Party include education, healthcare, and redistributive policies—the same issues on which female candidates are thought to have policy expertise. Republicans, on the other hand, “own” issues pertaining to defense, crime, and the military—the same issues on which male candidates are thought to have policy expertise. This overlap is reinforced by the fact that the overwhelming majority of female candidates are Democrats (Winter 2000; Wolbrecht 2000).

The alignment of gender and partisan stereotypes, especially with respect to Democratic women, has raised concerns that gender effects may be conflated with party effects in many studies attempting to assess the role of gender stereotyping. As a result, scholarship has turned to assessing and discerning the role of gender stereotypes versus
the role of partisan stereotypes. Results in this vein have been mixed. Some findings suggest that gender stereotypes are mitigated by partisan stereotypes (Dolan 2004; Hayes 2011). Other scholarship suggests that the use of gender stereotypes depends on whether the voter is making decisions in high- versus low-information environments (Branton, Barnes, and Schwindt-Bayer 2010; McDermott 1997, 1998). Finally, others suggest that gender stereotypes are more or less prevalent depending on specific gender issue saliency (Anderson, Lewis, and Baird 2011; Bauer 2014). In all, the interaction between gender and partisan stereotypes is complex and highly contextual.

1.2.2 The Role of Candidate Quality

Conventional wisdom suggests that the reason so few women are elected to Congress is that they are not quality candidates. In other words, female candidates are less skilled politically than their male counterparts. Jacobson and Kernell (1981) measure candidate quality by assessing whether the individual has previously held elected office. The logic being that those who have previously held elected office have demonstrated that they possess the characteristics and skills necessary to win other elected offices. Moreover, candidate quality is amplified when the candidate is an incumbent. As Jacobson (2009) argues, incumbent status confers multiple resource advantages that challengers must overcome if they are to be elected. Essentially, incumbents are the highest quality candidates. Building on Jacobson and Kernell’s (1981) study, Krasno and Green (1988) suggest that the prestige level of the previously held office offers a better indication of candidate quality (e.g., school board member versus senator). Ostensibly, more prestigious offices require more political skill to win.
Some have suggested that the candidate quality measures offered by Jacobson and Kernell (1981) and Krasno and Green (1988) are too subjective. For example, Bond, Covington, and Fleisher (1985) argue that a more objective measure of candidate quality is necessary. They suggest that along with previous political experience, the ability to raise money also indicates whether or not a candidate is a serious contender. Finally, in a study using party chairs and convention delegates as political informants, Maisel, Stone, and Maestas (1999) find that while more strategic qualities are valued in the short-term, personal qualities like problem solving capabilities and the ability to work with other legislators are valued in the long-term. These personal characteristics, they argue, indicate quality candidates while the more “blatantly political qualities can follow” (24).

In an attempt to assess the quality of typical female candidates, many studies have focused on exploring the professional and political experience of this group. Arguments about the lower quality of female candidates stem, in part, from a common belief that many female representatives are widows who obtained their seat through the death of a spouse. Beyond anecdotal evidence in the form of prominent congresswomen like Lois Capps and Mary Bono-Mack, who assumed their husbands’ congressional seats, there is some data to support this belief. Between 1917 (the year the first female representative took office) and 2000, 43 wives received nominations to succeed their husbands in the House of Representatives (Gertzog 2002). By 1962, 45% of all female house members had been congressional widows (Gertzog 2002: 97). Though these women ascended to office through marital succession, it should be noted that many were
prominent philanthropists, community leaders, and educators in their own right so the decision to run for their husbands’ vacant seats were not made by political novices.

A second argument commonly cited regarding low-quality female candidates is that their political success is the result of family connections and extreme wealth (Gertzog 2002). Many early congresswomen hailed from wealthy families embedded within extensive political networks. These women relied on family ties and name recognition to catapult them into elected office. Though it was once true that many congresswomen were widows, this stereotype is inaccurate when examining congresswomen elected in the past 30 years. Moreover, studies show that female legislators are more effective than males (e.g., Anzia and Berry 2011).

Women began winning congressional seats at higher rates starting in the early 1980s. The significant increase in female representatives was “accompanied by a decline in the proportion of those whose social, economic, and political circumstances constitute[d] an elite status” (Gertzog 2002: 101-2). Female candidates are increasingly identified as strategic actors, those who are not only skillful and resourceful, but also calculating and rational (Gertzog 2002; Jacobson 1989). Barbara Burrell (2008) finds that women have become “as adept at acting in the political world as men” they have adapted to “traditional politics, or they have learned to operate within gendered institutions that are masculine in nature” (55). Adding to this behavioral shift is the fact that women are joining pipeline careers at higher rates and have reached parity with men in some career fields (Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010). In all, women are beginning to more closely mirror
the professional and political paths of men suggesting that the candidate quality argument is becoming outdated.

Pundits commonly argue that female candidates are at a disadvantage when it comes to fundraising, a key measurement of candidate quality (Whittington 2002). Female candidates, it is often asserted, have limited access to financial resources and fundraising networks, and as a result, they are unable to fundraise at the same rates as men (Burrell 1985). This belief about women’s ability to raise money has important implications because a large war chest is one of the most important components of a campaign. If conventional wisdom suggests that female candidates cannot raise the funds necessary to mount a successful campaign, their viability as candidates is diminished.

Despite assumptions about the fundraising capabilities of female candidates, multiple studies have shown that by the 1990s, women’s fundraising capabilities were on par with those of men (Burrell 2005; Werner 2008). Traditionally, scholars examining fundraising by female candidates have focused on total campaign receipts and spending, ultimately finding that women, on average, do not raise less money than male candidates (Burrell 1994; Hogan 2007; Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986). These aggregate findings can mask important variation across different levels of electoral competitiveness. Additionally, aggregate findings largely ignore contextual factors like the gender of opposing candidates.

These contextual features of races are often overlooked but represent key factors that might affect women’s campaign fundraising. Some of these shortcomings are addressed in research by Burrell (2005) and Fiber and Fox (2005). Barbara Burrell (2005)
finds that even after controlling for partisanship and race competitiveness, female candidates raise just as much money as men.\(^4\) These findings are challenged by Fiber and Fox’s 2005 study examining gender differences in fundraising. They find that in the period between 1980 and 2000, on average, women raised $100,000 more than men. However, when they examine fundraising by race type, they find that in races in which men faced women opponents, the male candidate on average outraised the female candidate by $100,000. These findings suggest that discussions of fundraising need to be more contextual and that some women may actually be at a disadvantage, which is contrary to what previous studies would lead us to believe.

More recently, scholars have turned to examine the role of political parties (Burrell 2006) and PACs (Crespin and Deitz 2010; Wilhite and Theilmann 1986) in campaign fundraising. Although on average female and male candidates raise the same amount of money, their reliance on fundraising sources vary. Research on candidate fundraising finds that not only do Democratic and Republican Party organizations (i.e., DCCC and NRCC) play an important role in supporting female candidates, but on average, both the DCCC and NRCC offer more support to their female candidates facing major party opposition than to similarly situated male candidates (Burrell 2008). Other research examining the role of PACs in campaign financing finds that Democratic female candidates running for open seats receive much more PAC support than Republican women running for open seats. A second and related finding is that female candidates receive more support from individual donors (Crespin and Deitz 2010). Women’s PACs

\(^4\) These findings are with respect to average totals among female candidates. When examining median fundraising totals, women raise less money than men (Burrell 2005).
(e.g., EMILY’s List) have capitalized on this donation behavior creating bundling techniques, which take individual checks from donors in the network and delivering them in groups to candidates.

The various roadblocks argued to have stymied female candidates can actually cause the quality of the average female candidate to be quite high (Anzia and Berry 2011; Milyo and Schosberg 2000). Anzia and Berry (2011) find that women elected to Congress secure more discretionary spending for their home districts and sponsor and co-sponsor more bills than their male colleagues. They suggest that when women perceive sex discrimination in the electoral process, they are more likely to underestimate their chance of success. As a result, only the “most qualified” women will run (Anzia and Berry 2011: 481). Taken together, these findings suggest that women who run (and win) may actually be of higher quality than the average male candidate. This implication is bolstered by findings that demonstrate that when they run, women win at least as often as men (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997).

1.2.3 The Role of Ambition

Most recent work evaluating the dearth of women in elected office suggests that women are not disadvantaged by their gender. Instead, scholars suggest that the reason there are so few female representatives is that there are too few women candidates. As a result, the focus has shifted to explaining why women do not run for office rather than attempting to explain why they do not win.

In the U.S., traditional gender roles have divided the world into a public realm and a private realm. Though a gender division of labor has existed for centuries, Cott
(1997) finds that a gendered understanding of the roles of men and women with respect to work and home life began to crystallize in the nineteenth century. She suggests that women’s understanding of domesticity was in direct opposition to “ongoing social and economic transformation” (Cott 1997: 37). Women were not encouraged to engage in a life outside of home and this doctrine of separate spheres has continued to the modern day. Conover and Gray (1983) also suggest that men, as the traditional providers, historically have had purview of the public realm while women, the traditional caretakers, have had purview over the private realm. These conventional roles have created “perceptual and political barriers unique to women” (Bledsoe and Herring 1990: 213). Jennifer Lawless and Richard Fox (2005, 2010) have continued to explore the effects of “traditional gender role socialization” and suggest that these effects have serious implications for women considering a run for office.

Not only do women continue to bear the responsibility for a majority of household chores and childrearing, they must also balance these responsibilities with their careers—running for political office would constitute a third job for many of these women. As a result of conflicting private and professional responsibilities, many women are “opting out of their careers to fulfill traditional gender roles” (Lawless and Fox 2010: 10). For those women who remain in their careers, the dual responsibility of domestic management and career advancement leave little time to consider running for office as compared to male partners who traditionally play a smaller role in the maintenance of the home and family.
Gendered expectations regarding childrearing and domestic responsibilities account for some of the major reasons so few women run for office. Even when women can effectively balance their personal and professional lives, a run for political office requires them to contend with the “masculinized ethos” of the political environment (Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010). Numerous studies have pointed to the masculinized components of government (e.g., Borelli and Martin 1997; Mezey 2003; O’Connor 2002), the slow incorporation of women into the major parties (Burrell 2006), and male dominance of fundraising networks (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Since formal governmental institutions, party organizations, and media outlets are male-dominated, a biased preference for male characteristics (like aggressiveness and assertiveness) dominates even though there may be no overt gender bias against women (Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010). The preference for male characteristics, especially at the highest elected offices, works to encourage male candidates while discouraging female candidates.

Expanding on previous structural (e.g., incumbency advantage) and social explanations (e.g., pipeline arguments), several studies have examined the role of political ambition in women’s decisions to run for office (Carroll 1985; Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010). In their pioneering study of likely candidates, Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010) find that as a result of gender socialization and the “masculinized ethos” of American political institutions, women are less likely to perceive themselves as qualified and capable of running for office. Even well after the feminist movement and “The Year of the Woman” in 1992, there remains an association of ambition with male characteristics.
The traditional division of responsibilities has created an enduring environment in which women perceive themselves as less competent to run for office. The result has been male dominance of federal office. Critics of Lawless and Fox’s (2005, 2010) argument point to the fact that some local elected offices like school board are dominated by women suggesting that there may be some limitations to the argument.

Both Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010) and Palmer and Simon (2008) address this limitation by examining static versus progressive ambition. According to Palmer and Simon (2008) static ambition is defined the desire to remain in the same elected position for as long as possible while progressive ambition is defined as the desire to hold higher office. They note that generally, politicians work their way first from local office to state office and then from state office to federal office demonstrating progressive ambition. Among women however, this trend does not hold. While and Simon (2008) examine the proclivity of women to run for Senate from the House of Representatives, their results find support at lower levels of office as well. They find that progressive ambition is conditioned on risk aversion. The decision to run for higher office, they assert, is the result of positive reward to risk ratio—women who were likely to win their Senate bid ran, while those who were unlikely to win do not run. When considering the fact that most elected school board officials are women combined with findings that suggest that school board seats are not typically used as springboards to higher elected office (Bullock et al. 1999) it is not surprising that “women are less likely than men to climb the political career ladder” (Fulton et al. 2006; Lawless and Fox 2010: 57; Lawless and Theriault 2005).
1.2.4 Shortcomings

Although female candidates are perceived as being unable to fundraise, thought to be stymied by stereotypical assessments of their qualifications and competence, and are arguably less ambitious than male candidates, they are quite successful in their campaigns for elected office. In fact, when women run, they win just as often as men (Fox 2000; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). Each of the existing explanations attempting to explain why there are fewer women in Congress than men suffer from conflicting findings and mixed evidence.

Arguments citing gender stereotypes as negatively impacting voter assessments of female candidates have been largely disproven. There have been a variety of studies demonstrating that voters do not penalize women on Election Day (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Dolan 1998, 2005; Kahn 1996; Koch 1999; Lawless 2004; Schaffner 2005). Arguments asserting low candidate quality as the reason for women’s underrepresentation in Congress are largely outdated—no longer are congresswomen ascending to office through marital succession nor are they campaigning solely on name recognition or though familial networks (Gertzog 2002). Instead, women are increasingly strategic and learning to operate within the male-dominated political structure (Burrell 2008). Moreover, women have proven themselves to be excellent fundraisers who match, and even exceed, the fundraising of male candidates (Burrell 2005; Werner 2008).

The most reasonable explanation remains: the ambition gap. While Lawless and Fox are the leading authority on the ambition gap and have presented several extensive examinations of the role of ambition in explaining why there are so few women in
Congress, there are other notable studies examining ambition. In a study of potential candidates conducted by Baer et al. (2014), it was found that “ambition alone was not an issue or deficit for the women [surveyed]” (11). In fact, they found that in contrast to Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010), the women in their study displayed “considerable interest in office at all levels, including higher office, and had made personal, professional, and often financial sacrifices to engage in public service” (Baer et al. 2014: 11). These findings, coupled with evidence pointing to the ever-increasing number of women vying for office suggest that there may be other barriers keeping women from elected office.

Extensive research examining the sources of women’s underrepresentation in public office have arrived at largely the same conclusions: women do not suffer from electoral bias, they parallel men on a number of campaign dimensions (e.g., fundraising), and when they run, they win. However, these explanations neglect some important considerations, most notably the differences between Republican and Democratic women.

In the next chapter, I present my theory of partisan exclusion. The theory of partisan exclusion is a departure from existing theories of the source of women’s underrepresentation. I suggest that a large portion of the gender disparity in Congress can be attributed to the low number of elected Republican women. I ground my theory in the extended party networks literature and argue that it’s not for lack of ambition that women are not getting elected. Instead, it is their absence in the requisite partisan social networks that are used for recruitment that is the source of their underrepresentation.
Chapter 2: The Theory of Partisan Exclusion

In September 2009, Linda McMahon left her position as the Chief Executive Officer of World Wrestling Entertainment to run for the U.S. Senate (Venezia 2009). This would be McMahon’s first foray into electoral politics, her only other experience in government being an appointment to the Connecticut State Board of Education in January that year (West 2009). During the primary season, McMahon billed herself as a Washington outsider who had “real-life business experience” (Horowitz 2010). She pointed to the fact that she had brought the WWE, a company she built with her husband, out of bankruptcy and built it up to be a multi-million dollar entertainment force (Horowitz 2010). All of this experience, and dedication to campaigning without special-interest money, was the reason, she asserted, that she chose to self-finance her bid for the Senate. During the primary election campaign, McMahon spent more than $20 million to defeat Rob Simmons, the party-backed candidate.¹

Prior to running for the Senate, McMahon was not part of the Republican establishment in the state (Hernandez 2009). In fact, her emergence complicated the strategy for the national party who had already tapped Rob Simmons, a former representative and Vietnam veteran to run for the seat. Once McMahon announced her candidacy, the party all but abandoned Simmons (Hernandez 2009). Simmons could not

¹ Simmons also picked up an endorsement from the Hartford Courant, the largest newspaper in Connecticut (by circulation). In describing the reasons for his endorsement over McMahon, the editorial staff pointed to his military service and his experience as state representative and as a three-term congressman as uniquely qualifying him for the open seat in the Connecticut delegation (Endorsement 2010).
keep up with McMahon’s media blitz. Some voters reported getting more than 20 mailers from the McMahon campaign while others reported getting as many as 30 (Callahan 2010). When asked about his loss to McMahon, Simmons complained that he was being outspent nine to one and that his campaign receipts would never be competitive with McMahon’s vast personal fortune.

Although McMahon was able to buy her way out of the primary, she ultimately lost to Richard Blumenthal by 12 points in the general election. Despite spending nearly six times more than Blumenthal and Blumenthal’s Vietnam War gaffe, McMahon could not pull out the win. Scholars have shown that for challengers, the amount of money raised and spent is directly related to their chance for success (Abramowitz 1989; Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1978; 1992; Squire 1989). Based on these findings, McMahon should have sailed to victory. On the surface, her loss is puzzling, but upon closer inspection, her loss is less surprising.

Of the $50,181,464 McMahon spent during the 2010 election cycle, only $128,000 came from donors—McMahon spent more than $50 million of her own money financing her campaign (opensecrets.org). Research has shown that all campaign donations are not created equal. In fact, self-financing a significant portion of one’s campaign is correlated with an increased chance of losing (Alexander 2005). Although McMahon claims she spent her own money so that she would be “in no one’s debt” but the voters’ (Applebome 2012), I offer another perspective on the reasons for McMahon’s self-financing and ultimate general election loss.

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2 Blumenthal claimed to be a Vietnam veteran when he had actually never served in Vietnam.
In this chapter I present my theory of partisan exclusion. My theory helps to explain gender disparity between men and women and between Democratic and Republican women in Congress by explaining the reasons why women, and Republican women in particular, face difficulties when it comes to getting elected. I depart from existing explanations in three ways: First, I focus on the partisan foundations of gender disparity in Congress. That is to say, I argue that the gender gap between elected men and women in Congress is actually being driven in large part by the absence of Republican women in both the House and the Senate. Second, I focus on comparing women to women. While existing research in this area tends to focus on the differences between men and women, I argue that there are important differences between Democratic and Republican women and exploring these differences will help us to better understand the sources of gender imbalance in Congress. Finally, I focus my examination on the pre-primary and primary stages of elections (i.e., the candidate emergence process). I ground my theory in the party, campaigns and elections, and gender in politics literatures in an attempt to address this larger question: Why are so few women elected to Congress?

I begin by explaining the importance of comparing the campaign experiences between Democratic and Republican women instead of focusing on more traditional comparisons of women to men. Next, I explore the electoral role of the national parties with a specific focus on their role in identifying and recruiting potential candidates. Finally, I articulate the idea of local party networks and make the argument that women’s absence from these networks effectively excludes them from the recruitment process.
2.1 Women Versus Women

Much of the research on gender and politics focuses on the differences between men and women. This research finds that there are few differences in the ability of male and female candidates to mount successful campaigns (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). Although these studies suggest that women are not at an electoral disadvantage, I demonstrate that research examining the differences between men and women overlook important differences across women. I further argue that Republican and Democratic women are having vastly different campaign experiences and further, that the success of Democratic women masks the difficulties Republican women face when seeking federal office.

According to the Center for American Women in Politics, at the start of the 114th Congress, there were 20 women in the Senate and 84 women in the House (CAWP 2015b). Of the 20 women in the Senate, 16 were Democrats and four were Republicans. A similar trend continues in the House where 62 of the 84 women were Democrats and 22 were Republicans. This disparity between Democratic and Republican women is not a new development. As Figure 2.1 shows, Democratic women have comprised the largest portion of women in the House and Senate for decades.
As is evident from Figure 2.1, the partisan split among women in Congress began after the “Year of the Woman” in 1992 when an unprecedented number of women won seats in Congress. The initial split has widened to the point that Democratic women outnumber Republican women in Congress by nearly three to one. The conventional wisdom for this disparity is that there are fewer Republican female candidates and the ones who run tend to be less successful than Democratic female candidates (Political Parity 2015).

During the 2014 election cycle, 250 women filed to run for the House of Representatives. Of those 250 women, 156 were Democrats and 94 were Republicans. Nearly 70% of Democratic women made it out of the primary while 53% of Republican women were able to do the same. When it came to the general election, more than half of
Democratic women won a seat in Congress (57%) while fewer than half of Republican women won a seat (44%). In 2014, Democratic women were more successful at both stages of the election. In fact, 40% of Democratic women who ran in their party’s primary won their general election while only 23% of Republican women achieved the same feat. As Figure 2.2 shows, this outcome has been consistent since the 1992 election cycle.

**Figure 2.2 House Election Outcomes for Female Candidates, by Party (1992-2014)**

In Figure 2.2, I show in the top panel the total number of women who ran for the House separated by party. The bottom panel of the figure shows the proportion of Democratic women who won a seat in the House out of all Democratic women who ran as compared to the proportion of Republican women who won a seat in the House out of all
Republican women who ran. Two trends are apparent: the number of Democratic women running for the House is consistently larger than the number of Republican women and Democratic women win their seats more often than Republican women. There is a similar trend in the Senate. Figure 2.3 shows how women fare in their Senate campaigns.

Although both Democratic women and Republican women tend to run for the Senate at similar rates, they are not similarly successful.

**Figure 2.3 Senate Election Outcomes for Female Candidates, by Party (1992-2014)**

There are important takeaways from these figures that echo the claim I made above. While it is the case that many Democratic women are successful in their bids for public office, many Republican women are not. Republican women, in general, run and win at lower rates than Democratic women. This difference drives the gender disparity in
Congress. As I show in Figure 2.4, women currently comprise 19% of Congress.\(^3\) If Republican women were to run and get elected at rates comparable to those of Democratic women, women would comprise nearly 30\% of the seats in Congress. This would represent a 47\% increase in the number of women in the House and Senate.

**Figure 2.4 Party Disparity in Congress**

As is evident from figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, Democratic and Republican women experience congressional elections differently. Fewer Republicans run and win. This gap in elected women is particularly important because women are the most numerically underrepresented group in Congress. Closing the partisan gap among elected women

\(^3\) There were 104 women in the 114\(^{th}\) Congress. There were 84 (62D, 22R) women in the House and 20 (14D, 6R) women in the Senate.
would bring women’s representation in government closer in line with their proportion of the national population. Moreover, this gap represents a blind spot in the political science literature. Few scholars examine the severe underrepresentation of Republican women and as a discipline we do not have theories attempting to explain this phenomenon. I address this gap with my current study.

2.2 The Electoral Role of Parties

Conventional conceptualizations of political parties hold of that parties represent an organized attempt to get power (Schattschneider 1942). Party scholars further argue that parties are comprised of teams of politicians vying to win office (Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957; Schlesinger 1984). This view of parties focuses on the relationship between politicians and the electorate and evaluates the institutionalized sources of power and influence among parties. Scholars adopting this view of parties have increasingly found that parties play a minimal role in the recruitment of candidates for Congress.

This minimal role, some argue, is due to the fact that candidates now run candidate-centered campaigns rather than party-centered campaigns (Maisel 2001). During the “Golden Age” of parties during the 19th century, parties were able to exert enormous control over the selection of candidates to run for national office (Maisel 2001). During this time, however, party corruption through the rise of party bosses and their use of patronage also became widespread. The Progressive Era brought with it party reforms that served to limit the influence of party bosses. Moreover, national party rules that were aimed at addressing widespread corruption within the parties actually served to limit the influence parties had on the electoral process (Maestas et al. 2005; Maisel 2001).
Scholars often point to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its amendments as a defining moment in the weakening of the formal party structure vis-à-vis elections. This act served to diminish the parties’ role in campaigns by “limiting contributions and expenditures and forcing the parties to separate their federal election activities from their state and local party activities” (Farrar-Myers and Dwyre 2001: 139). As a result of these limitations, candidates have become the central figure for campaigns. Candidates are increasingly required to be self-starters, create their own fundraising networks, and run their own campaigns (Maisel 2001). With restrictions on behavior and the increasing emphasis on the candidates, scholars conclude that parties are often removed from the task of identifying and recruiting candidates (Maestas et al. 2005).

While the national parties may be weak when it comes to recruitment for federal-level offices, evidence suggests that they may be stronger when it comes to influencing recruitment and nominations at state and local levels of government. This influence can be extremely important when considering that holding a seat at sub-national levels of government can be a springboard to federal office (Jacobson 2009). In a study of the effectiveness of the parties at the local level, Frendreis et al. (1990) find that the formal party can play an important role in the candidate recruitment process for local- and state-level offices. Although some scholars argue that the national party is largely removed from candidate identification and recruitment, the party can still play an important role in “helping potential candidates decide whether or not to run for a seat in the U.S. House” (Herrnson 1989; Kazee and Thornberry 1990; Maestas et al. 2005: 277). In fact, the
national party’s influence can reach beyond the formal party structure and into local communities.

In a survey of potential House candidates, Maisel and Stone (1997) find that local-level committees were more likely to have contacted potential candidates to encourage them to run than were either state- or national-level committees (Maisel 2001). These findings suggest that while the national party committees may appear to be removed from the identification and recruitment of potential candidates for the House, there is evidence that the formal party apparatus extends to local politics and further, that this influence can be the determining factor with respect to the selection of possible House candidates.

Recent work bridging the party literature with social network theory finds that parties can be widely dispersed (Desmarais et al. 2015). In fact, this literature offers a competing conceptualization of parties wherein parties are described as coalitions of interest groups and activists who seek to control government in order to promote a particular set of interests and ideals (Bawn et al. 2012; Herrnson 2009). Scholars supporting this view of parties argue that parties actually have a much greater influence on elections than the more formal conceptualization of parties has demonstrated (Herrnson 2009). Scholars argue that groups form longstanding coalitions in order to steer the nomination process toward the group’s most desired outcome (Bawn et al. 2012). That is, these relationships are not fleeting. Instead, they span multiple election cycles and “conspire” to direct the priorities of the candidates they put into office.
2.3 The Theory of Partisan Exclusion

Throughout this dissertation, I argue that parties play an instrumental role in driving the gender disparity in Congress through their recruitment practices for candidates for federal office. Building on the literature that views parties as coalitions of groups that often operate outside of the formalized hierarchical parties-in-government, I adopt the view that parties are longstanding coalitions of different types of actors. Although scholarship is increasingly concluding that there are informal networks that advocate for either Republican or Democratic candidates, there are competing ideas of the types of actors included in these networks. For instance, Aldrich (1995) describes parties as being comprised of officeholders, office seekers, and/or benefit seekers. Masket (2011) offers a more detailed description of these groups suggesting that parties are comprised of officeholders, candidates, benefit seekers, political activists, and brokers. While Herrnson (2009) suggests that parties are more like concentric circles where formal party leaders are at the center, the organizations they command surround them and the party allies are found in the third ring. The commonality among all of these theories is that parties are not simply elected officials—parties are diverse and parties adapt to the local political environment.

2.3.1 Local Party Networks and Their Composition

I argue that parties are extended networks of local partisan affiliates, benefit seekers, potential candidates, and officeholders. These groups work together to identify and recruit individuals for local, state, and federal office. I describe each of the actors in these networks below.
• **Local partisan affiliates**: These individuals are part of the formal party structure but who operate largely outside of it. These individuals include city, county, and district party chairs. Local party chairs can be extremely well connected to the national party or they can be largely removed. Not all localities have organized parties with a clear leader. Local partisan affiliates can act as a liaison between the national party and local political forces. Masket (2011) offers a similar definition for his idea of party activists. Under his definition, party activists are typically driven by public issues and are often less pragmatic than other groups. The definition of local partisan affiliates I offer differs in that I am more focused on the individuals and their networks that work to bridge the local party actors with local donors and the national party. In other words, local partisan affiliates serve as brokers to help coordinate the actions of the other members of the network.

• **Benefit seekers**: This group includes businesses, unions, and other moneyed interests who can expend substantial resources on candidates and their campaigns. These actors can be ideologically or policy-driven and have the ability to provide access to vast resources for candidates. Masket (2011) argues that benefit seekers often have “considerable sums of money to contribute directly to candidates” or organization leaders (Masket 2011: 41).

• **Officeholders**: This group is comprised of those who currently hold elected office at the local, state, or federal level. These individuals can interact with local partisan affiliates and benefit seekers to identify potential replacements should
they retire or even identify potential candidates for lower level office or neighboring districts. They use their status and name recognition to influence elections (Masket 2011).

- **Potential candidates**: This group is comprised of individuals who have the potential to be recruited by the network. These individuals can overlap with benefit seekers, local partisan affiliates, or office holders, but they do not have to. These individuals often have experience working with or for the other actors in the network and as such enjoy party backing when opportunities for candidacy arrive.

These actors work together to recruit and slate candidates that are (1) likely to win and (2) promote the ideological and policy goals of the group. Potential candidates are selected based on their loyalty and experience with various actors in the network. This is largely due to the fact that parties are strategic. They are selective with their resource allocation and are more likely to recruit candidates who have worked with or for the party organization in the past (Herrnson 1989; Kazee and Thornberry 1990; Masket 2011).

Candidates backed by these groups enjoy many benefits, like access to donors and elite endorsements—resources that candidates who are not backed by the network must procure themselves (Masket 2011). Recruitment and backing by these networks send signals to candidates about the level of support the party is willing to give, and by extension, a candidate’s chances of winning (Herrnson 1989; Kazee and Thornberry 1990; Maisel et al. 2002). This backing also sends an important signal to potential intraparty challengers in primary elections and interparty challengers in the general
election. Network backing can effectively stave off potential challengers, paving the way for the preferred candidate’s success.

Masket (2011) suggests that political networks tend to be racially and economically homogenous—I suggest that these groups are also lack gender diversity. I also argue that women, and Republican women in particular, are disproportionately absent from these groups. Research shows that women are more likely to identify as Democrats than Republicans (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004, CAWP 2008). Scholars also find that Democratic women are more likely to hold pipeline careers (Lawless and Fox 2010) and that although the number of Republican women holding pipeline careers is increasing, the rates of growth are much slower than those of their Democratic counterparts (Crowder-Meyer and Lauderdale 2014). These traits broaden the supply of potential Democratic women candidates relative to Republican women. This means that the membership of these groups and the pools of potential candidates from which these networks can draw are unequal. The result of the absence of women from these “natural political communities” is that they are effectively excluded from electoral politics.

2.3.2 Why do Women Need to be Networked to be Successful?

Scholars have found that for women, interaction with elites is particularly influential in their decisions whether (or not) to run for office (Sanbonmatsu 2006). Women are less likely to be political self-starters (Bledsoe and Herring 1990; Moncrief et al. 2001). In fact, women’s political ambition is directly tied to their interactions with elites. Women need to be asked, often multiple times, to run for office before they actually consider an electoral bid (Lawless and Fox 2010). These findings are particularly
important when considering findings that suggest that patterns of elite recruitment have lead to fewer Republican women being recruited to run for office and that these patterns have even created a less welcoming environment for Republican women (Crowder-Meyer 2013).

A second reason that being networked is particularly important for women is that, for many women, fundraising represents a barrier to seeking elected office (Duerst-Lahti 1998; Jenkins 2007; Lawless and Fox 2010; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013). When asked about their decision to run for office, potential female candidates often express anxiety over the fundraising requirements of campaigns (Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010). Women who are ensconced in local party networks have access to a pre-formed network of donors whose single goal is to get her elected. Women outside of the network must curate their own network of donors, adding another barrier to running for office.

2.4 Partisan Exclusion Theory and the Gender Gap in Congress

My theory of Partisan exclusion enhances our understanding of women’s underrepresentation and compliments existing theories. By gaining a better understanding of differences among female candidates, we can begin to understand why it is the case that Republican women lag behind Democratic women when it comes to getting elected. Moreover, by explaining the candidate emergence process, I compliment existing studies showing that female candidates are just as successful as male candidates. For instance, if it is the case, as I argue, that women entrenched in local party networks are more likely to make it out of the primary election, then it is not surprising that they go on to launch successful general election bids because they have access to the social, political, and
financial tools of the network. In sum, I offer a theory that helps to explain some of the first stages of an election cycle—my explanation not only helps to better understand women’s underrepresentation in Congress but also the findings of the broader literature that examine the later stages of women’s campaigns.

2.5 Roadmap

To test my theory of partisan exclusion, I generate hypotheses around three domains of the election cycle: the primary election, fundraising, and elite recruitment. In chapter three, I begin to evaluate the differences in how Republican and Democratic female candidates navigate primary elections—a comparison that has been ignored by the literature. Much of the research examining women candidates focuses on the differences between men and women rather than the differences between women. I suggest that this focus masks important differences between women and as a result offers an inaccurate portrait of female candidates and their campaigns. To evaluate these claims I rely on an original data set constructed from the Federal Elections Commission and archived campaign websites. I show that Republican women have a particularly difficult time winning their primary election bids because they tend to face more co-party challengers and they also tend to raise less money to support their campaigns.

In chapter four, I examine the fundraising practices of female candidates between 1980 and 2012. I rely on the Database of Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections to support my claim that as a result of their absence from local party networks, Republican women face more difficulties related to fundraising than Democratic women. I examine Republican and Democratic women’s reliance on different sources of campaign
fundraising as well as differences in the types of groups that support these women. I find that Republican women rely more heavily on their personal wealth to support their campaigns while Democratic women rely more heavily on individual contributions and donations from PACs.

In chapter five, I turn to examine the role of local political elites in the candidate emergence process. I introduce results from an original survey of county party chairs across the United States. I find that the vast majority of local parties rely on networks to identify potential candidates and that county party chairs who report working with a team to recruit candidates are less likely to name a woman when prompted to think about potential candidates in their area. These results are particularly pronounced among Republican men.

Finally, chapter six concludes by summarizing the results and discussing the implications of partisan exclusion theory for the representation of women in government. The central conclusion is that Republican women often face a much different campaign reality than Democratic women. Republican women often lack important political experience before launching a campaign for federal office, they often must self-finance significant portions of their campaigns, and they must overcome gender bias in recruitment within their own party.
Chapter 3:  The Partisan Gender Gap in Congress

There is a real possibility that the U.S. will have colonies on the moon before we have gender parity in Congress (Henderson 2014). One of the most striking sources of gender disparity in Congress is the partisan disparity among women. Nearly one third of Democrats in Congress are women while less than one tenth of Republicans are women. This partisan disparity points to systematic differences between Democratic and Republican women that time alone not will solve. In this chapter, I investigate the sources of this partisan gender gap by examining the 2010 congressional primary elections. I compare the campaigns of Republican and Democratic women and I argue that as a result of their absence from local party networks, Republican women will be particularly likely to face campaign challenges that contribute to decreased primary election success. I employ an original data set that records markers of candidate quality, district competitiveness, and overall success rate across female candidates to show that as a result of their exclusion from local party networks Republican women are much less likely to win their primary elections than are Democratic women.

3.1 Primary Elections as Barriers to Gender Parity in Congress

Most of the work evaluating the electoral success of women focuses on general election outcomes. This focus is largely the result of data limitations. While there exists data on general election candidates, data on unsuccessful primary election candidates and those that chose not to run is much more limited. Work examining the candidate emergence process often utilizes surveys of potential candidate pools to attempt to
identify real and/or perceived impediments among female candidates. These surveys of potential female candidates find time and again that women report receiving less encouragement to run from party leaders, other elected officials, and party activists (Fox and Lawless 2004a, 2004b, 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Werner 1968; Rule 1981).

This lack of support is important because research also shows that women must be encouraged to run, sometimes multiple times, in order to seriously consider a bid for office (Lawless and Fox 2010). These surveys also find that women feel intimidated by the fundraising requirements of running for office and do not perceive themselves as having the time and resources it takes to raise the amount of money that is necessary to field a successful campaign for office (Jenkins 2007; Sanbonmatsu, Carroll and Walsh 2009; LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006). When women do run, they are more likely to run as a challenger or as an open-seat candidate. This initial run for office poses a multitude of difficulties for women because as challengers, they often lack the characteristics that signal to voters that they are to be taken seriously; these traits include name recognition, political connections, previous experience, etc. (Jacobson 2009; Welch, Ambrosius, Clark, and Darcy 1985).

Aside from relative inexperience and self-doubt, women can also face pernicious stereotypes that might hinder their success. Although some studies conclude that voters do not penalize women on Election Day (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Dolan 1998, 2005; Kahn 1996; Koch 1999; Lawless 2004; Schaffner 2005) others suggest that the use of stereotypes is much more nuanced. For instance, McDermott (1997) suggests that stereotypes become much more important in low information environments and Bauer
(2014) suggests that stereotypes become important once they are activated by campaign communications. Findings like McDermott’s (1997) demonstrate that the possibility that female candidates are evaluated differently in low information environments, like primary elections, is real. Voters will rely on gender stereotypes when other cues like partisanship are removed from evaluation.

3.1.1 Primary Elections and Republican Women

Republican women may be particularly likely to suffer from stereotypes. Research has shown that voters perceive women to be more liberal than men (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a; Koch 2000, 2002; McDermott 1997). Research has also shown that primary election voters are more ideologically extreme than are general election voters (Brady et al. 2007). It is not uncommon for primary candidates to present themselves as more ideologically extreme during the primary election cycle to attract base voters in the party. This means that Republican women must present themselves as extreme partisans in order to overcome gender stereotypes about their political ideology (Dittmar 2013). Once the primaries are over, Republican women must then move back toward the center in order to appeal to more moderate general election voters.\(^1\) This feat is difficult for Republican women like Sharron Angle whose extreme primary messaging alienated general election voters (Bard 2010; Silva 2010; Political Parity 2015).

\(^{1}\) The strategy behind this behavior reflects Downs’s (1957) theory of the parties’ larger strategy to attract voters. Downs argues that in two-party systems, parties are incentivized to converge on the median voter, who often holds a moderate ideology.
In a study conducted by Political Parity (2015), researchers found that although primary elections act as barriers for all women seeking elected office, primary elections act as particularly high barriers for Republican women. This study highlighted the fact that the national parties, and the Republican Party in particular, are “hesitant to get involved in primary elections” (Political Parity 2015: 17). This decision to sit out the primary has been to the detriment of Republican. Republican women are less likely to have the coaching and support that Democratic women enjoy and their election bids suffer as a result (Dittmar 2013; Political Parity 2015).

Republican women also face a different intraparty culture than Democratic women. Research on party culture identifies the Democratic Party as pluralistic while the Republican Party is characterized as hierarchical (Freeman 1986). Freeman describes the Democratic Party as being comprised of groups who prioritize their group-specific preferences and compete with one another for the party’s resources and attention. The Republican Party, in contrast, values party loyalty and a “mistrust of group-based claims that appear to put the interests of a specific subgroup before those of the party as a whole” (Cooperman and Crowder-Meyer 2015: 6; Freeman 1986). These party cultures have important implications for female candidates and speak to the particular preferences of party representatives and recruitment priorities.

3.2 Local Party Networks as Gatekeepers

Research on the role of the national parties in the recruitment of candidates has found that the parties are largely removed from the process. According to a survey of women candidates conducted by Baer et al. (2014), respondents reported that the formal
political parties were “nearly absent from recruitment and subsequent support of women candidates” (9). This finding is supported by other scholars who find that the formal party structure is largely removed from the day-to-day process of candidate selection and recruitment (Jewell and Morehouse 2001; Political Parity 2015). If it is the case, as this research suggests, that the national party is not active in selecting and vetting potential candidates, then who is?

I argue that local party networks play an influential role in identifying, recruiting, and vetting potential candidates. Past studies have shown that several factors influence candidate emergence in congressional elections. Among the most important factors are “local partisan forces” within the district (Bianco 1984; Cannon 1990). Local partisan forces include the ideological balance of a district (i.e., is it red or blue), the competitiveness of the district, and the strength of the party organization in the district. Several studies have assessed the influence of the county party organization on the recruitment of female candidates. Niven (1998a) finds that women candidates tend to be evaluated negatively due to their “lack of surface similarity” to the male party elite (57). These findings are echoed in Bjarnegård’s (2009) study of homosocial capital.

Bjarnegård (2009) argues that homosocial behavior, or the tendency to prefer interactions with members of one’s own gender, is the driving force behind women’s underrepresentation in government. The accumulation of homosocial capital, she argues, is what makes candidates successful. She further argues that it is difficult for women to accrue homosocial capital because due the ubiquity of elite men, women are nearly always engaging in heterosocial behavior when they seek elected office. This sentiment is
echoed by Baer et al.’s (2014) study in which respondents pointed to an “old boy’s network” as being responsible for candidate recruitment and who further suggested that informal male networks seek candidates similar to themselves.

I argue that due to the fact that women are less likely to be involved in the activities or have the same professional affiliations as men (Baer 1993; Burns et al. 2001), they are less likely to be a part of the local party networks that identify and recruit female candidates. The gender disparity in recruitment is not nefarious. That is, I argue that there is no conspiracy to promote male dominance. Instead, I suggest that the gender disparity in recruitment is simply a feature of the supply of potential candidates.

3.3 Expectations

I argue throughout this dissertation that women are largely absent from the local party networks that identify, recruit, and support candidates for office. This absence is what drives women’s exclusion from electoral politics. Republican women are particularly disadvantaged by this absence and as a result, face an even larger gender disparity within their party. This logic leads to six specific hypotheses, which I describe below.

An important feature of local party networks as I have conceptualized them is the practice of recruitment and promotion from within the network. In his work evaluating informal party organizations, Masket (2011) argues that one of the most important features of these organizations is the desire to control the nomination process so that the group’s preferred candidate has the highest chance of success. Local party organizations are based around social networks and as such, these networks have freedom to dictate
who lies within (or outside of) their social network. Candidates who reside within the network have greater access to the resources the network confers. By restricting the candidate pool to those imbedded in the network, these groups can rest assured that they will slate a candidate that supports both the ideological and non-ideological goals of that group while reducing the opportunity costs of seeking a candidate from outside of the group.

If it is the case that Republican women are less likely to be included in these local party networks and that these networks recruit from within, I should expect to find that Republican women will be less likely to have had a political career in which they have moved up the political ladder.

**Progressive Ambition Hypothesis:**

*Republican female candidates will be less likely to have moved through the political ladder than will Democratic female candidates.*

The partisan disparity in Congress is also observed in state legislatures. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (2015), women comprise 24% of state legislatures and of those women, 60% are Democrats. Moreover, only 16% of America’s 100 largest cities have women mayors and of those women only a third are Republicans. The party disparity at all levels of office suggests that not only will Republican women be less likely to have climbed the political ladder, but they will also be less likely to have previously held lower levels of office.
Experience Hypotheses:

Republican female candidates will be less likely to have previous local level political experience than will Democratic female candidates.

Republican female candidates will be less likely to have previous state level political experience than will Democratic female candidates.

Republican female candidates will be less likely to have previous federal level political experience than will Democratic female candidates.

Primary elections provide the first opportunity to control the outcome of the general election. If local party networks can exert their influence to ensure that their preferred candidate wins the primary election, they have taken an important step toward their goal. Masket (2011) points to the primary election as the most cost-effective way for groups to exert influence. He argues that since primary elections typically have fewer voters than general elections, the cost of promoting a preferred candidate relatively low.

It is reasonable to expect that local party networks will dominate in non-competitive districts because the group would be required to spend fewer resources to ensure the success of its preferred candidate. Therefore, I should expect these groups to be most active in safe partisan districts. One implication of these networks’ control in safe districts and of the exclusion of Republican women from local party networks is that Republican women should be more likely to run in competitive (i.e., non-safe) districts than Democratic women.

District Competitiveness Hypothesis:

Republican female candidates will run in competitive districts at higher rates than will Democratic female candidates.
If it is the case that local party networks can effectively influence the outcomes of primary elections as Masket (2011) and others argue, this is largely due to the signal that the network’s support sends to potential challengers. This backing from the “folks in charge” (Baer et al. 2014) can send a signal to other potential candidates, which can serve as a barrier for entry for many candidates who may be unwilling to risk time and resources necessary for the possibility of defeating the vast resources of these local party networks. Competitive districts are more likely to have multiple challengers in the primary stage because there is a better chances of success (when compared to safe districts), therefore an implication of Republican women’s absence from these networks is that they should face more primary challengers than female candidates.

*Co-Party Challengers Hypothesis*

*Republican female candidates should face more primary challengers than will Democratic female candidates.*

Candidates backed by local party networks enjoy expertise and resources unavailable to other candidates. One valuable resource available to those entrenched in partisan networks is political mentors (Baer et al. 2014). Another resource available to those in the network is access to a vast fundraising network. According to Masket (2011), officeholders within the informal political organization use their relationships with other political officials to influence elections and gain benefits for the groups preferred candidate. He further suggests that benefit seekers provide much of the financial backing necessary to launch a successful campaign.

Candidates outside of these networks must gain access to influential politicians and raise funds using their own networks of donors, which are much less likely to be as
extensive as the networks imbedded within these local party networks. If it is the case, as I argue, that Republican women are less likely to be backed by these networks, then they may be more likely to rely on their own finances to support a campaign.

**Campaign Finance Hypothesis:**

*Republican female candidates will self-finance greater portions of their own campaigns than will Democratic female candidates.*

When combined, these factors point to a decreased chance of Republican women winning primary elections. Without backing from these networks, candidates will have a much harder time launching successful campaigns; therefore we should expect to see fewer Republican women winning their primary elections.

**Candidate Success Hypothesis:**

*Republican female candidates will be less likely to win their primary election campaign than will Democratic female candidates.*

### 3.4 Data and Methodology

To test these hypotheses, I constructed an original dataset for the 2010 primary election cycle. I collected election returns from the Federal Elections Commission and supplemented this data with various measures of candidate quality, demographic information, and personal and professional experience for each of the 2,376 candidates who ran in a congressional primary during 2010. Although 2010 was a midterm election cycle, it was widely expected to be the “New Year of the Woman” or the “Year of the Conservative Woman” (McManus 2010; Parker 2010). Since the expectation was that there would be first, a Republican wave and second, a female wave, this election cycle was chosen to maximize the number of female Republicans in the sample.
From the filing with the Federal Election Commission, I was able to collect the name, state, district number, partisan affiliation, incumbency status and primary vote share for all 2,376 candidates who ran in congressional primaries in 2010. In order to record data on candidate sex, I first coded all unambiguous names (e.g., Robert, Susan, etc.) as belonging to either a male or a female. I then searched archived websites for candidates with names marked as ambiguous (e.g., Jagdish, AJ, etc.) or androgynous (e.g., Pat, Kelly, etc.). Using photos, statements, and biographies, I was able to identify whether the candidate was male or female. If no campaign website was available, I searched newspaper archives from the state to determine the candidate’s sex.

I supplemented the information from the Federal Election Commission’s election return filings with information from candidates’ personal websites and Project Vote Smart. Between these two sources, I was able to collect information on candidate’s educational backgrounds and their previous political experience. I also gathered fundraising totals from the Federal Election Commission fundraising reports. I also included data on district competitiveness and the district’s vote share for President Obama in 2008 from the Cook Political Report. Finally, I collected data on the number of women in state legislatures from the National Conference of State Legislatures.

In order to test the Progressive Ambition and Political Experience Hypotheses, I used the data I collected for previous political experience among Democratic and Republican women. I created an indicator variable for each of the three levels of office I

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2 A complete description of all variables used in this analysis, their coding, and the sources from which they were acquired can be found in Appendix A.
recorded: local, state, and federal. Using candidates’ self-reported previous experience as mentioned either on a personal website, Project Vote Smart, or in local media coverage I recorded “1” for each of the levels of office mentioned and “0” for all levels of office that were not mentioned.\(^3\) So for example, a candidate who stated that she was previously elected to state senate but stated no other previous experience would receive a “0” for previous local experience, a “1” for previous state experience, and “0” for previous federal experience. I measured party identification using an indicator variable where “1” represented a Republican and “0” represented a Democrat (third party candidates were excluded from this analysis). Finally, I created a political ladder measure that recorded whether or not a candidate had held office at the local, state, and federal level (i.e., they had climbed the political ladder). To test whether or not Republican women would be less likely to have previous electoral experience and whether or not Republican women would be less likely to climb the political ladder, I used a \(t\) test to examine the difference in means among these women.

To evaluate the Competitiveness Hypothesis, I collected Cook Political Report ratings for each congressional district in the US. The Cook Political Report has seven ratings categories: “Safe Republican,” “Likely Republican,” “Lean Republican,” “Toss-Up,” “Lean Democrat,” “Likely Democrat,” and “Safe Democrat.” I included all districts that were measured as “Lean Republican,” “Toss-Up,” or “Lean Democrat” as competitive while districts classified as “Solid Republican,” “Likely Republican,”

\(^3\) For previous political experience at the state level, I also included service as a delegate to the national party convention.
“Likely Democrat,” and “Solid Democrat” were recorded as non-competitive. I used a $t$ test to examine whether or not Republican women were more likely to run in competitive districts. I also created a continuous variable to measure the number of co-partisan challengers female candidates faced during the primary election. Using a $t$ test, I was able to evaluate whether Republican female candidates faced more co-partisan challengers than Democratic women. To examine the Campaign Finance Hypothesis, I created a continuous variable that recorded the percent of a campaign that was self-financed. I then utilized a $t$ test to examine the differences in self-financing between Republican and Democratic women.

Finally, I ran an OLS regression to test whether or not Republican female candidates were more likely to lose their primary election bids than were Democratic female candidates. The model includes candidate sex, candidate party identification, district competitiveness, number of co-partisan competitors, percent of campaign that was self-financed, the 2008 district vote share for President Obama, and the percent of the state legislative seats that are held by women.

### 3.5 Results

Overall, the results suggest that Republican women face challenges when it comes to securing a primary election win. Figure 3.1 depicts the distribution of self-reported previous political experience across Democratic and Republican women.

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4 This coding decision was based off of Cook Political Report’s definition of what each classification means. “Lean” districts are considered competitive, but one party has a slight advantage. “Likely” districts are not considered competitive.
At first glance, it is evident that Democratic women have more experience at all levels of government than Republican women. When comparing local level experience, one can see that 24% of Democratic women had experience in local politics prior to running for the House while only 12% of Republican women had similar experience. I conducted a difference of means test and found that this difference was statistically significant (p<.05). Thirty-three percent of Democratic women had previous electoral experience at the state level while 26% of Republican women had previously served their state. While this difference does not reach conventional levels of significance (p<.20), the results are in the anticipated direction and were the dataset expanded to include more
election cycles, I am confident that these results would mirror those of local and federal office. There are many more Democratic women in Congress than there are Republican women. This difference is reflected in the federal experience bar in Figure 3.1. Forty-one percent of Democratic women had previous federal experience (many as incumbents) as compared to 14% of Republican women. This difference is statistically significant (p<.001).

When examining the combined measure for candidates with local, state, and federal experience, I found that 8% of Democratic female candidates had climbed the political ladder in 2010, while only 2% of Republican female candidates had done the same. The difference was significant (p<.05) and suggests that Republican female candidates have less applicable political experience than do Democratic female candidates, which may affect their ability to run successfully. Moreover, the fact that so few Republican women have previous political experience before seeking congressional seats is consistent with my theory that Republican women are absent from the local party networks that tend to recruit and promote from within.

Turning to evaluate the competitiveness hypothesis, I found that 30% of Republican female candidates ran in districts classified as Lean Republican, Lean Democrat, or Toss-Up (i.e., competitive districts) as compared to 17% of Democratic women (p<.05). Table 3.1 depicts the distribution of female candidates across district type.
Table 3.1 Female Candidates and District Competitiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republican Women</th>
<th>Democratic Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safe Republican</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Democrat</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Districts classified using ratings provided by the Cook Political Report. N=268; 133 Republican women and 135 Democratic women

A plurality of Democratic women sought office in Solid Democratic districts while Republican women were equally split between Solid Republican, Solid Democrat, and what I have called competitive districts. Republican women were 50% more likely to run in a competitive district than were Democratic women (p<.05) and most strikingly, Republican women were no more likely to run in Safe Republican districts than were Democratic women. One interpretation of these results is that Republican women run in districts that are more difficult to win because they are shut out of the districts in which party-backed candidates are running.

Turning to evaluate the co-party challengers hypothesis, I find that only 12% of Republican women ran unopposed in their primary election bids while nearly 40% of Democratic women faced no opposition (p<.001). On average, Republican female candidates faced three co-partisan challengers while Democratic women, on average, faced only one co-partisan challenger. This difference (p<.001) is important because basic intuition suggests that more candidates result in a lower chance of success for each individual candidate. Moreover, research shows that challengers amass when there exists no high quality candidates to deter them (Jacobson and Kernell 1981). In all, these results
suggest that not only were Republican women running in districts in which it was harder for them to win, but on average they faced three times as many competitors than did Democratic women. These findings are consistent with my theory of partisan exclusion because they demonstrate that Republican women are likely to enter crowded primary elections with little previous political experience while Democratic women are likely to have previous electoral experience and enter primary races in which they are the only candidate.

If it is the case, as I argue, that Republican women are excluded from local party networks, they should be more likely to have difficulty raising the requisite funds to run for office. I find that on average, Republican women financed 23% of their own campaigns while Democratic women averaged only 8%. This difference was statistically significant (p<.001) and suggests that Republican women may have a more difficult time fundraising than Democratic women. To examine the effects self-financing has on primary vote share, I ran an OLS regression controlling for party identification, district competitiveness, and district ideology—factors that might also affect a candidate’s primary election vote totals. Figure 3.2 shows the vote share candidates can expect when these contextual factors are held at their means but the percent of the campaign that is self-financed is allowed to vary.
The first takeaway from this image is that self-financing is strongly associated with lower primary vote share when all else is held equal. There are two vertical bars on this graph that represent the average amount of self-financing by Democrats (8%) and Republicans (23%). The dashed horizontal bar represents the success line (i.e., 50% vote share). As the percent of a campaign that is self-financed moves from 0 to 100, the predicted vote share steadily decreases. For instance, the predicted primary vote share for the average Democratic woman financing 8% of her campaign is about 55% while the predicted primary vote share for the average Republican woman self-financing 23% of her campaign is about 52%. It is worth noting here that although Republican women’s predicted vote share is above 50%, the confidence interval does cross the 50% line.
Republican women are prone to self-finance their campaigns. They finance more frequently and more significant portions of their campaigns, these results, when coupled with my results showing that self-financing is correlated with lower primary vote shares, suggest that financing at these rates can be contributing to primary election losses.

Republican women’s self-financing reflects their absence from fundraising networks. This claim is bolstered by the fact that the average Republican female candidate raised about $600,000 to support her election bid while the average Democratic female candidate raised over $950,000. Oftentimes influential outliers skew averages. To address this possibility, I calculated the median fundraising totals across women. The median fundraising total among Republican women was $145,000 while the median amount raised among Democratic women was $694,000. This disparity may be due, in part, to the places where women run. Table 3.2 shows the regional breakdown of where women candidates emerge.

**Table 3.2 Regional Variation in Female Candidate Emergence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Midwest</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Northeast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Women</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Women</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=268; 133 Republican women and 135 Democratic women

From Table 3.2 it is clear that Democratic women and Republican women appear in different regions of the United States. The plurality of Democratic women run in western states (and of those states California dominates) while the plurality of Republican women run in the South. Campaigns are likely to be more costly for candidates in California than
in the South due to due to expensive media markets, increased infrastructure requirements, and higher wages.\textsuperscript{5} Even after controlling for district competitiveness, Republican female candidates raised less money than Democratic women (p<.01). A greater reliance on self-financing coupled with lower fundraising totals further suggests that Republican women are less likely to be part of fundraising networks than are Democratic women.

Using an OLS regression, I examined whether Republican female candidates are less likely to win their primary election bids. Table 3.3 displays the results.

**Table 3.3 Predicting Primary Election Vote Share Among Female Candidates, 2010 (OLS Regression Estimates)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-8.47**</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>31.09***</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ladder</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>6.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Competitiveness</td>
<td>-5.55†</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Co-Partisan Competitors</td>
<td>-6.24***</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Self-Financed</td>
<td>-10.0†</td>
<td>5.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Democratic Vote Share</td>
<td>-0.20*</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Women in State Legislature</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>78.78***</td>
<td>9.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R\textsuperscript{2}</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{†}p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

\textsuperscript{5} One must be careful not to discount the role of competitiveness in driving up campaign costs. According to Open Secrets, the most expensive House seat in 2010 was Minnesota’s 6\textsuperscript{th} district at a cost of $18 million.
Table 3.3 shows that Republican women have lower primary election vote shares even after controlling for factors like incumbency, political experience, district competitiveness, self-financing, and district ideology. A quick examination of Table 3.3 reveals that, as would be expected, incumbency is the largest predictor of a candidate’s primary success. In fact, incumbents receive vote shares that are 30 points higher than non-incumbents. Several factors contribute lower primary vote shares for candidates. For example, for each additional percent of a candidate’s campaign that is self-financed, she can expect to receive ten percentage points fewer votes in the primary election. The substantive impact of these results is evident when considering that Republican women are more likely to self-finance and less likely to win their primary election bids.

Candidates running in competitive districts will receive fewer votes in the primary election than candidates running in non-competitive districts. Moreover, for each additional co-party challenger in a primary race, candidates can expect to receive six percentage points fewer votes. These results make intuitive sense because more competition means that the race will be harder for any individual candidate to win.

Lower primary vote shares are, of course, associated with unsuccessful bids for the party’s nomination, but what is the real effect of campaigning as a Democratic woman versus a Republican woman? Figure 3.3 depicts the predicted primary vote share for the average Democratic woman and the average Republican woman.
Figure 3.3 Republican Women are Less Likely to Win Their Primary Elections

As Figure 3.3 shows, the average Democratic woman in 2010 could expect to receive 58% of the vote share in her party’s primary while the average Republican woman could expect to receive 49% of the vote. These results are striking not only because the average Republican woman receives 20% fewer votes than the average Democratic woman, but also because the average Republican woman falls short of the 51% often needed to win a primary.\textsuperscript{6} Republican women are less likely to be incumbents so they do not enjoy the increased vote shares that come with that distinction. They are also more likely to self-

\textsuperscript{6} Since a plurality of the vote is often all that is necessary to secure the party’s nomination, the fact that Republican women on average receive less than 50% of the vote is not necessarily problematic. However, vote totals below 50% can be met with concerns about a candidate’s legitimacy and certainly show that voters are conflicted.
finance their campaigns, run in competitive districts, and face more co-partisan challengers in the primary election, all three of these factors are associated with lower primary vote totals. These results comport with my theory of partisan exclusion because they are all indicate that Republican women lack the party support enjoyed by Democratic women.

3.5.1 The 2010 Election and the Tea Party

The 2010 election expected to be a wave year for conservative women (Parker 2010). The rise of the Tea Party and the excitement among the base for this new brand of conservative was palpable. In fact, some suggest that the increase in women running in 2010 can be largely attributed to the number of Tea Party-affiliated women seeking election (Knickerbocker 2010, Zernike 2010). Because Tea Party candidates tend to emphasize their status as outsiders to the “establishment,” they also tend to be self-starters who have little political experience (Barone 2010). This raises the question of whether or not female Tea Party candidates are driving my results. If it is the case that Tea Party candidates, on average, were of lower quality than the average Republican candidate, I should expect to find that they underperform Republican candidates in the primary elections.

In order to test whether or not Tea Party candidates are driving my results, I created a Tea Party indicator to include in my analysis of primary vote share. To construct this measure, I searched for Tea Party affiliation for every Republican woman in my data set. Any candidate claiming Tea Party affiliation, claiming to be a “mamma grizzly,” and/or caucusing with the Tea Party once elected to the House was coded as “1” and all other
Republican women were coded as “0.” Of the 131 Republican women running in primaries in 2010, more than half claimed Tea Party affiliation.\(^7\) I then compared Republican women candidates to Tea Party candidates across all of the measures included in my original set of hypotheses.

To first examine whether or not female Tea Party candidates were less likely to have previous electoral experience than mainstream Republican women, I used a \(t\) test to compare the average electoral experience across these groups. I find that women claiming Tea Party affiliation were not less likely to have had previous local, state, or federal electoral experience than mainstream Republican women. Similarly, a \(t\) test revealed that Tea Party women were also not any more likely to run in more competitive districts nor did they face more challengers than mainstream Republican women.

One area where there were slight differences between these groups was campaign financing. A comparison of fundraising totals between these groups shows that Tea Party-affiliated women self-financed lower proportions of their campaigns than did Republican women (\(p<.10\)). In fact, Tea Party-affiliated women, on average, self-financed 19% of their campaigns as compared to Republican women without Tea Party affiliation who self-financed 29% of their campaigns.

Finally, to assess the impact of Tea Party affiliation on primary election vote share, I included the Tea Party indicator in an OLS regression predicting primary vote share for female candidates. I include all of the same controls I used for the regression results presented in Table 3.3. In Table 3.4 I show the results.

\(^7\) 71 out of 131, or 54\% of Republican women claimed Tea Party affiliation.
Table 3.4 The Effects of Tea Party Affiliation on Primary Vote Share Among Women in 2010 (OLS Regression Estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-11.93**</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>31.56***</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ladder</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>6.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Competitiveness</td>
<td>-5.07</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Co-Partisan Competitors</td>
<td>-6.23***</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Self-Financed</td>
<td>-8.62†</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Democratic Vote Share</td>
<td>-0.21*</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Women in State Legislature</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea Party</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>77.14***</td>
<td>9.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted R²       0.65
N                  217

†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Adding a control for Tea Party affiliation does not change the results. Republican women were still less likely to win their primary election than Democratic women. In fact, after controlling for the effects of Tea Party-affiliated candidates, the predicted vote share for Republican women is reduced from 49% in the original model to 47%. From these results, it is clear that Tea Party candidates are not driving my results. In fact, Tea Party-affiliation is associated with higher primary vote totals suggesting that on average, Tea Party women do slightly better than mainstream Republican women.

3.6 Conclusion

Despite massive gains in Congress, women hold only one fifth of the seats. The theory of partisan exclusion holds that a large portion of the gender disparity in Congress stems from partisan disparity among elected women. Republican women are absent from
the local party networks that select, vet, and support candidates for all levels of office. This absence effectively excludes Republican women from consideration and results in a systematic disadvantage when it comes to seeking and winning the party’s nomination during primary elections.

Throughout this chapter I have offered evidence supporting the theory of partisan exclusion. For example, when comparing the political experience of Republican and Democratic women, I find that Republican women are less likely to have previous political experience before running for Congress. Local party networks typically move their preferred candidates through successive levels of office (i.e., from local, to state, to federal). Owing to their absence from these networks, Republican women are less likely to move through successive offices (i.e., climb the political ladder). The fact that Republican women have little previous political experience before running for Congress suggests that they may be operating outside of these networks.

I also showed that Republican women face more competition in their bids for office. Masket (2011) suggests that informal political organizations utilize their influence and political capital to control primary races in which they have slated candidates. He also argues that backing by these organizations can send signals to potential challengers thereby limiting the field. I argue that there is clear evidence that many Republican women are not receiving the benefits of being a part of their party’s network. I have shown that Republican female candidates are less likely to run unopposed in their primary races than are Democratic women and they face, on average, three times as many competitors than do Democratic women.
Even after controlling for district competitiveness, Republican women are more likely to subsidize their campaigns with their own money. Consequently, Republican women are much more likely to use their own resources to fund their campaigns because they are less likely to have access to the fundraising networks available within local party networks.

Each of these results in isolation may weaken a campaign. When they are combined, they lead to primary election loss. This outcome was reflected in OLS regression results that showed that the average female Republican received 49% of the votes in her primary election (i.e., she lost).

I also considered the potential impact of Tea Party candidates in 2010. Conventional wisdom suggests that Tea Party candidates were self-starters who are on the ideological fringe. However, after comparing female Tea Party candidates to mainstream Republican women, I find that Tea Party candidates not driving my results and that Tea Party women actually outperform mainstream Republican women.

While these results cannot offer definitive proof of the existence of local party networks nor of their exclusion of Republican women, they do demonstrate that Republican female candidates face electoral hurdles that Democratic female candidates do not.
Chapter 4: Gender, Partisanship, and Campaign Fundraising

Throughout this dissertation I have argued that one source of the underrepresentation of women in Congress is the partisan disparity among elected women. Democratic women outnumber Republican women in Congress by three to one and this disparity is not expected to be resolved in the near future (Dittmar 2013). Scholars have proposed several reasons for Republican women’s underrepresentation in Congress. Some suggest that due to the fact that more women identify as Democrats than as Republicans, the pool of potential female Democratic candidates is larger than the pool of female Republican candidates (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004). Others suggest that fewer Republican women work in pipeline careers and that Republican women have lower levels of educational attainment (Crowder-Meyer and Lauderdale 2014; Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010). I argue that an important and often overlooked source of gender disparity in Congress can be traced to the absence of women in the local party networks that identify and recruit candidates. Moreover, I suggest that the partisan disparity among women in Congress can be attributed to the fact that Republican women are particularly likely to be absent from the networks that funnel potential candidates into electoral politics.

In Chapter Three, I demonstrated that Republican women were less likely than Democratic women to win their primary election bids in 2010. I also showed that Republican women lagged behind Democratic women on a number of indicators of candidate quality. In this chapter I examine the effects of Republican women’s absence
from local party networks by comparing the fundraising practices of Republican and Democratic women. Partisan exclusion theory holds that candidates who lack network support will also lack access to the network’s donors. As a result, those candidates will need to build their own network of contributors, which will likely be leaner than the network of contributors within the local party network.

4.1 Women and Fundraising

Pundits commonly argue that female candidates are at a disadvantage when it comes to fundraising (Whittington 2002). The logic behind these arguments is that female candidates have limited access to financial resources and fundraising networks, and as a result, they are unable to fundraise at the same rates as men (Burrell 1985). This perceived difficulty in fundraising manifests itself in women’s decisions whether or not to run for office (Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010; Thomsen 2014). Surveys of potential candidates indicate that women express particular anxiety about fundraising and perceive themselves as incapable of raising the funds necessary to be competitive (Duerst-Lahti 1998; Jenkins 2007; Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010).

Despite concerns about the fundraising capabilities of female candidates, several studies show that women’s fundraising capabilities equal those of men (Burrell 1985, 1994, 2005; Hogan 2007; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997; Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986; Werner 2008). For example, Burrell (1985) finds that women’s fundraising is on par with men’s and further that male and female candidates received similar support from individual contributors, political action committees, and the parties. Although her data was from the 1970s and 1980s, her results have since been replicated with more recent
data that shows not only do women raise just as much money as men, but they also outraise men on occasion (e.g., Fiber and Fox 2005).

Studies documenting the differences in fundraising practices between men and women neglect differences between Democratic and Republican women. There is reason to believe that Republican and Democratic women differ in their fundraising practices. I argue that these differences are driven by women’s relative exclusion from local party networks and that fundraising differences between Democratic and Republican women contribute to partisan disparity among elected women, which drives gender disparity in Congress.

4.2 Networks and Candidate Fundraising

For potential candidates, the ability to raise a significant amount of money is imperative for success. The ability to build a network of donors signals a candidate’s viability (Jacobson 2009). Fundraising is also particularly important for challengers who start off at a disadvantage because they lack name recognition, political experience, and voter support (Herrnson 2000). Vast amounts of money are necessary to overcome the electoral advantages enjoyed by incumbents who typically start the election season with a cash advantage that only increases throughout the course of the campaign (Jacobson 1992, 2009; Krasno et al. 1994). The money that challengers raise determines their visibility and viability and is correlated with vote share (Abramowitz 1991; Jacobson 1989, 1990). These findings are particularly important for women, who are more likely to run as challengers and in open seat elections (Political Parity 2015).
The sources of campaign contributions are also an important facet of campaign finance. Challengers receive a larger benefit from spending than incumbents (Abramowitz 1991; Gerber 2004; Jacobson 1990, 2006). Although campaign spending is generally associated with success, scholars evaluating campaign fundraising have found that not all funding sources contribute equally to electoral victory. For House candidates, contributions from individuals, the parties, and political action committees are particularly important as they are markers of confidence in candidate success (Alexander 2005; Francia et al. 2003) whereas self-financing is an indicator of weakness (Brown 2013). These findings coupled with the theory of partisan exclusion generate five testable implications, which I describe below.

4.2.1 Political Action Committee Contributions

Political action committees are strategic actors who donate to campaigns in an effort to affect policy outcomes (Eismeier and Pollack 1986; Snyder 1990; Wright 1985). There are a wide range of factors that might influence the contribution strategies of these interest groups. Some of the factors highlighted by research include candidate quality, party and committee leadership positions, and district competitiveness (Evans 1988; Gopian 1984; Grenzke 1989; Herndon 1982; Poole and Romer 1985; Wright 1985). Alexander (2005) suggests that higher levels of PAC funding can be viewed as a proxy for factors that indicate candidate strength, such as “recommendations from party leaders, private polling data, or knowledge of factors unique to particular districts or candidates” (2005: 357).
I argue that candidates who are part of local party networks will receive more PAC support for two reasons. First, local political organizations are likely to have ties to interest groups and political action committees as part of their internal donor network. Second, candidates backed by the network will be of higher quality (as measured by Jacobson and Kernell 1981) and will therefore attract PAC donations. Candidates outside of the network will have limited access to PACs and will have more difficulty attracting donations from them than will Democratic women who are more likely to be included in local party networks. Democratic women also have access to EMILY’s List a PAC for which there is no Republican analogue.1

**PAC Contribution Hypothesis**

*Non-Incumbent Republican women will receive less money from PACs than will non-incumbent Democratic women.*

4.2.2 *Individual Contributions*

When deciding whether to donate to a candidate, donors evaluate a candidate’s “charisma, policy positions, resolve, likeability, and public relations skills” (Brown 2013). That is to say, donors are drawn to the same characteristics to which voters are drawn (Thomas et al. 1984; Popkin 1993; Baum 2005; Merolla et al. 2007). Donors will not waste money on candidates with little chance of winning (Jacobson 1978; Green and

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1 In a survey of congressional donors conducted by Cooperman and Crowder-Meyer (2015), respondents were asked about their familiarity with several women’s PACs. They found that more than 80% of Republican donors had never heard of the various conservative women’s PACs. This included more than two thirds of Republican women. For comparison, fewer than 10% of donors had never heard of EMILY’s List. Even more striking is the fact that more Republican donors (both male and female) were familiar with liberal women’s PACs than with conservative women’s PACs.
Krasno 1988; Krasno et al. 1994) and as such, donations serve as a proxy for candidate quality.

Francia et al. (2003) argue that there is an “enduring pool of individuals who consistently make contributions” in congressional elections (21). A survey of congressional donors revealed that more than half of congressional campaign donors give in “most” elections to House candidates, and further, that more than half of donors who made contributions in 1978 were still making contributions in the 1990s (Francia et al. 2003: 22). These results clearly indicate that contributing is a habitual behavior that persists across elections. An examination of contribution patterns across candidates, levels of office, and interest groups revealed that most donors are contributing to all types of candidates and groups across all levels of government (Francia et al. 2003).

Habitual donors are typically part of multiple groups and play an integral role in campaign fundraising. For instance, Francia et al. (2003) find that congressional donors are networked. Business professionals and executives are heavily sought after due to their financial resources but ideological and interest-based donors are also linked. Networks mobilize their members on behalf of their preferred candidates and urge them to donate to particular candidates. In fact, Francia et al. (2003) find that some groups even “rent” their membership lists to candidates who can then use those lists to request support (36).²

² Though both the Democratic and Republican Parties rely on a network of donors, those networks are comprised of vastly different members. The Democratic Party’s donor base is comprised of business professionals, feminists, and environmentalists whereas the Republican Party’s donor base is comprised of business professionals, gun enthusiasts, evangelicals, and social conservatives (Francia et al. 2003).
I argue that owing to their absence in local party networks, Republican women will have limited access to donor lists that have been curated by the network. As a result, Republican women will have to build their own list of donors that will be much more limited than that of candidates who are backed by the local party network. As a result, Republican women will receive less money from individual donors than Democratic women.

**Individual Contribution Hypothesis**

Non-incumbent Republican women will receive less money from individual donors than will non-incumbent Democratic women.

While fundraising totals from individual contributions can offer suggestive evidence of Republican women’s exclusion from local party organizations, a comparison of the number of individual donors between Democratic and Republican women will offer more concrete evidence. If it is the case, as I argue, that Republican women are less likely to be a part of these networks and that their access to contributors suffers, I should expect to find that Republican women receive fewer individual contributions from unique donors than Democratic women.

**Unique Donor Hypothesis**

Non-incumbent Republican women will receive contributions from fewer unique donors than will non-incumbent Democratic women.

4.2.3 **Candidate Contributions**

Donors are strategic and they are drawn to candidates who are the most likely to win (Eismeier and Pollack 1986; Snyder 1990; Wright 1985). Since donors are drawn to strong candidates, it is not surprising that candidate self-financing can be seen as a sign of
weakness. In fact, Steen (2006) finds that most self-financers never even make it out of the primary.

Steen (2006) finds that self-financed candidates give more to their campaigns than fund-raisers raise. The fact that self-financers are willing to go to extremes to support their campaign is simultaneously a sign of their enthusiasm over their candidacy and a signal to external donors that they are not viable. Sorauf (1992) finds that institutional donors support candidates whom they perceive as having a chance of winning. Results from Steen’s (2006) study show that as the rate of self-financing increases, receipts from outside donors decrease. These results, combined with those of Sorauf (1992) suggest that donors perceive self-financed candidates as weaker than more traditional fundraisers.

Candidates unable to finance their campaigns through individual donors or PAC contributions may rely on their own personal wealth to support their campaigns. Moreover, reliance on self-financing can be an indicator that a candidate is not part of a fundraising network. Alexander (2005) argues that reliance on self-financing may cause candidates to miss out on political linkages to interest groups, community leaders, and individual voters—important resources acquired through more traditional campaign fundraising. I argue that this relationship is actually endogenous. Republican women finance larger portions of their campaigns because they are not part of networked fundraising and in self-financing their campaigns, Republican women forego building inroads to those networks.
Recalling that candidate quality, as measured by Jacobson and Kernell (1981), is based largely upon previous experience in elected office, and my previous work (see Chapter Three) demonstrating Republican female candidates’ relatively low levels of previous political experience during the 2010 midterm election, I should expect to see Republican women self-finance larger proportions of their campaigns than Democratic women.

**Partisan Self-Finance Hypothesis**

*Republican women will self-finance a greater proportion of their campaigns than will Democratic women.*

### 4.2.4 Total Campaign Receipts

When considering (1) that most donors to Congress are white, rich, and male, (2) the fact that Republican women do not have their own expansive network of female donors (Cooperman and Crowder-Meyer 2015; Dittmar 2015), and (3) female Republican candidates are, on average, lower quality candidates than Democratic women, it would not be surprising to find that Republican women raise less money than Democratic women. If 2010, is indicative of a more general trend among women candidates, I should expect to see that over time, Republican women raise less money than Democratic women.

**Partisan Funding Disparity Hypothesis**

*Non-incumbent Republican women will raise less money than non-incumbent Democratic women.*
4.3 Data and Methodology

To examine possible differences in the way Republican and Democratic women finance their campaigns for the House, I used the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (hereafter DIME). This database identifies candidates for state and federal government and records Federal Elections Commission data on campaign financing, candidate (and donor) ideology, and election outcomes for all election cycles between 1980 and 2012. I focus on non-incumbent candidates for this analysis with the intuition that the effects of being excluded from local political networks will be most evident among this group because as challengers, they are the candidates who would rely most heavily on the benefits these networks confer.

With my first two hypotheses I examine differences in external funding sources between Democratic and Republican women. To test for differences PAC contributions I created a continuous variable recording PAC contributions. Female candidates received an average of $140,000. To test whether Democratic women raised more from PACs than Republican women I employed a $t$ test.

Next, I created a continuous variable measuring the amount of individual contributions a candidate received. The average amount raised from individual contributions among female candidates was about $300,000. To test my hypothesis that Republican women would raise less from individual contributions, I used a difference of means test. I also created a measure of the number of unique donors from which each candidate received contributions. This variable is calculated per election cycle, with the

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3 A complete description of all variables used in this analysis, their coding, and the sources from which they were acquired can be found in Appendix B.
average number of donors for female candidates being 332. I used a $t$ test to evaluate the unique donor hypothesis, in which I predicted that Republican women would receive donations from fewer unique donors than Democratic women.

In order to assess candidate self-financing, I created a continuous variable measuring the percent of a candidate’s total receipts that was self-financed. To arrive at this figure, I divided the amount of money a candidate contributed to her campaign by the total reported campaign receipts. I then used a $t$ test to compare the average percent self-financed between Democratic and Republican to test my hypothesis that Republican women self-finance greater portions of their campaigns.

To test my final hypothesis that Republican women would raise less money than Democratic women, I created a series of indicator variables measuring electoral context. I created a measure for incumbency status where incumbents were coded as “1” and non-incumbents were coded as “0.” Similarly, I created a measure for seat status where open seat races were coded as “1” and all other races were coded as “0.” I also include the measure of district partisanship used in the DIME dataset, which is measured using Kernell’s (2009) scale where positive numbers indicate more Democratic districts and negative numbers indicate more Republican districts. Finally, I include a measure of partisanship where Republicans are coded as “1” and Democrats are coded as “0.”

To determine whether after controlling for alternative explanations Republican women raise money

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4 This figure had a range of -5.68 to 2.86, which means that the most Republican district is more conservative than the most Democratic district is liberal.

5 Third party candidates are excluded from this analysis.
less money than Democratic women I employ an OLS regression. I present my results in the following section.

4.4 Results

Overall, results suggest that Republican women do finance their House campaigns differently than do Democratic women. I argued with the PAC contribution hypothesis that non-incumbent Republican women would raise less money from PACs than would non-incumbent Democratic women. The results confirm this expectation. On average, non-incumbent Republican women receive less money from PACs than Democratic women. This trend has persisted since the 1980s and is depicted in Figure 4.1.

**Figure 4.1 PAC Contributions to Non-Incumbent Female Candidates, by Party (1980-2012)**
On average, non-incumbent Democratic women receive $20,000 more per election cycle from PACs than do non-incumbent Republican women (p<.001). These results can have direct electoral impact.

Depken (1998) finds that PAC contributions have a larger impact on vote share than do individual or party contributions. The intuition behind these findings is that an individual contribution represents a single vote while a PAC donation represents a bloc of votes. His model shows that in 1996, each $100,000 contributed by PACs increased a candidate’s predicted vote share by 3.4 points while each $100,000 contributed by individuals only increased a candidate’s predicted vote share by 0.4 points. Moreover, Depken (1998) finds that these effects are magnified for Republican candidates.

Although non-incumbent Republican women saw a surge in PAC donations starting in 1994, they dropped significantly between 2004 and 2010. The larger trend is that non-incumbent Democratic women receive more donations from PACs during nearly all election cycles between 1980 and 2012. These results come from t tests where only the means are compared. To get a better sense of the sources of the differences I document between Republican and Democratic women more broadly, I ran an OLS regression controlling for the contextual factors of a campaign that might influence PAC donations. Those results are depicted in Table 4.1
Table 4.1 Predictors of PAC Contributions to Female Candidates, 1980-2012 (OLS Regression Estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>31316.95†</td>
<td>17511.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Race</td>
<td>-309268.8***</td>
<td>13320.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Financed</td>
<td>.136756</td>
<td>.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Contributions</td>
<td>11.15***</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger</td>
<td>-354775.3***</td>
<td>12137.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midterm Election Cycle</td>
<td>-9575.86</td>
<td>9377.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Partisanship</td>
<td>18396.32***</td>
<td>4913.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican X Challenger</td>
<td>-82697.09***</td>
<td>19885.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican X Open</td>
<td>-86554.67***</td>
<td>21786.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican X Midterm</td>
<td>23923.17†</td>
<td>15079.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican X District Partisanship</td>
<td>-24358.62**</td>
<td>8800.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican X Self-Financed</td>
<td>-.078</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>396045.7</td>
<td>10923.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2560</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

The results from Table 4.1 suggest, as expected, that challengers and candidates running for open seats each receive significantly less money from PACs. For example, running as a challenger results in a $350,000 drop in PAC contributions. Knowing that PACs are strategic donors, it makes sense that they would be wary of donating to first-time candidates or to candidates in races with a lot of uncertainty. Alexander (2005) finds that PACs prefer to donate to candidates who are likely to win because corporate PACs in particular are attempting to curry favor and buy access once those candidates are elected to Congress (Wright 1985).
It is also evident that the context of the election vis-à-vis Republican women seems to matter more to PACs than does the sources of their other funding. Nearly all of the interaction terms in the model are significant suggesting there is a compound effect of being a Republican woman and a particular electoral context that is associated with lower PAC donations. For instance, Republican women running as challengers were significantly less likely to receive PAC contributions. The same trend holds for Republican women running in open seat races and for Republican women running in more liberal districts.

The fact that self-financing does not influence PAC contributions seems to pose a challenge to my second set of hypotheses and larger theory. However, there are some important considerations to keep in mind when evaluating these results. There is evidence to suggest that outside of electoral context, PACs also consider a multitude of candidate characteristics when contemplating whether (and how much) to donate to a particular candidate (Brown 2013). Many of these characteristics (e.g., charisma, policy positions, etc.) are not captured by this dataset and therefore cannot be included in models attempting to predict PAC contributions.

Turning to my second hypothesis that non-incumbent Republican women would raise less money from individual contributors than would non-incumbent Democratic women I found that non-incumbent Democratic women, on average, raise about $50,000 more from individual contributions per election cycle. These results are depicted in Figure 4.2.
Non-Incumbent Democratic women received more money from individual contributions through most of the time period included in this analysis. Democratic women experienced a drop off in 2010 that is likely attributable to the backlash against President Obama that resulted in large Republican gains. Since 2010, however, individual contributions to Democratic women have rebounded. Results also support my unique donor hypothesis. I found that non-incumbent Democratic women on average receive contributions from more unique contributors. I present these trends in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3 Unique Donors to Non-Incumbent Female Candidates, by Party (1980-2012)

![Graph showing unique donors to non-incumbent female candidates by year and party.]

From Figure 4.3 it is evident that although contributions from unique donors to non-incumbent female candidates tracked closely together for most of the 1980s and 1990s, Democratic women began receiving contributions from more donors starting with the 2000 election and that this trend has only increased since then. During the 2012 election cycle, non-incumbent Democratic women received contributions from an average of 1,254 unique contributors while non-incumbent Republican women received contributions from an average of 173 unique contributors. These results are striking and offer evidence that Republican women do not have a network of donors on which they can rely when seeking office. Between 1980 and 2012, non-incumbent Democratic
women received contributions from nearly three times as many unique donors as non-incumbent Republican women (p<.001). Not only are Democratic women drawing more monetary support from individual donors, but they are also drawing from a wider base of support. These findings are consistent with partisan exclusion theory because they demonstrate that Republican women draw on a smaller base of supporters, which suggests they lack access to larger pools of donors.

If it is the case that non-incumbent Republican women are receiving fewer individual and PAC contributions than non-incumbent Democratic women, how are they supplementing their campaign coffers? I argue that Republican women are supplementing their campaigns with their personal resources. Between 1980 and 2012, the average non-incumbent Republican woman contributed $25,776 to her campaign as compared to the average non-incumbent Democratic woman who contributed $14,637. These results are presented graphically in Figure 4.4
Non-incumbent Republican women spent 75% more on their campaigns than non-incumbent Democratic women (p<.05). As Figure 4.4 shows, this trend has been persistent since the turn of the 21st century, and has become particularly pronounced since the 2006 midterms.

In fact, a striking trend emerges when examining all sources of funding among non-incumbent Republican women. In Figure 4.5, I show funding sources for non-incumbent Republican women between 1980 and 2012.
In figure 4.5 I included reference lines for the 2006 midterm elections on each of the four panels. The marked increase in self-financing in 2006 coincided with decreases and/or stagnation in other campaign funding sources. For instance, in 2006 the number of unique donors for Republican women decreased from the previous election cycle while the amount of money raised from individual contributions stagnated. Non-incumbent Republican women also saw continued decreases in the amount of money contributed by PACs. These events likely conspired to incentivize self-financing among Republican women and it appears as though this behavior is becoming habituated as self-financing among this group continues to increase.
Campaign fundraising can be highly contextual. For instance, competitive races may cost more to win than non-competitive races. In order to assess whether these results were robust, I also ran an OLS regression controlling for candidate status, district partisanship, and alternative funding sources. Table 4.2 depicts the results.

Table 4.2 Predictors of Self-Financing Among Female Candidates, 1980-2012 (OLS Regression Estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-9975.223</td>
<td>8399.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Race</td>
<td>21929.51**</td>
<td>7656.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Contributions</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC Contributions</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midterm Election Cycle</td>
<td>-3784.79</td>
<td>3849.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Partisanship</td>
<td>-174.52</td>
<td>2583.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger</td>
<td>17704.92**</td>
<td>7326.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican X District Partisanship</td>
<td>11676.85**</td>
<td>4612.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican X Open Seat Race</td>
<td>33177.08**</td>
<td>11392.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican X Challenger</td>
<td>21395.8*</td>
<td>10433.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3817.70</td>
<td>6858.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2560</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

From Table 4.2, it is clear that regardless of party, female candidates self-finance more of their campaigns when they are running in open seat races or running as challengers. However, Republican women running in open seat races spend significantly more money on their campaigns than do Democratic women even after controlling for
election type, district partisanship, and other sources of campaign fundraising. In similar open seat races between 1980 and 2012, Republican women could be expected to spend $30,000 more of their own money on their campaigns than Democratic women.

The results also show that Republican women running in more liberal districts rely more heavily on self-financing. This result makes sense intuitively because these districts will be harder for Republican women to win. This result also speaks to my findings in Chapter Three that in 2010, 42% of Republican women ran in districts that were classified as competitive by Cook Political Report.

These results not only support my hypotheses, they are also consistent with the theory of partisan exclusion. I have argued throughout this chapter that Republican women face fundraising disadvantages because they are excluded from the donor networks contained in local party networks. Recalling the findings from Alexander (2005), candidates who self-finance tend to have lower political skill and experience and also tend to be disconnected from important fundraising networks. The implications of this exclusion are shown in the interaction terms from Table 4.2. Republican women running in open seat races or as challengers self-finance significantly more of their campaigns than other female candidates.

I argue with my final hypothesis that non-incumbent Republican women will raise less money for their campaigns than Democratic women. The intuition behind this argument is that if it is the case that Republican women are excluded from local party networks,

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6 Results are substantively the same when using district-level percentage of the two-party vote share won by the Democratic presidential nominee in the most recent presidential election as an alternative measure of district partisanship.
they are excluded from the networks of donors these groups use. As a result, they will raise less money than non-incumbent Democratic women who are more likely to be a part of local party networks. My results confirm these expectations. On average, non-incumbent Republican women raise less money than non-incumbent Democratic women. Between 1980 and 2012, the average non-incumbent Republican woman raised $305,000 while the average non-incumbent Democratic woman raised $355,000. Non-incumbent Republican women on average, raise about $50,000 less than non-incumbent Democratic women ($p<.05$). Every dollar is extremely important for congressional challengers (Jacobson 2009). The fact that non-incumbent Republican women, on average, raise nearly 20% less money for their campaigns certainly speaks to their more frequent electoral defeats.

4.5 Conclusion

At nearly all points between 1980 and 2012 more Democratic women than Republican women sought seats in Congress. Figure 4.6 depicts these trends.
The left panel of Figure 4.6 shows the number of Democratic women running for House seats and the subset of those candidates who won their primary election bids. The right panel depicts the same information for Republican women. When examining Figure 4.6, it is clear that more women run as Democrats than as Republicans at nearly all points between 1980 and 2012 and further, Democratic women are more successful at winning their primary election bids (p<.001). These findings corroborate studies of the recent 2014 elections conducted by Political Parity (2015).

I have argued throughout this dissertation that these trends are the result of Republican women’s higher rates of exclusion from local party networks. In this chapter, I examined one of the implications of this exclusion: fundraising. The results presented

Figure 4.6 Primary Election Success of Female Candidates, by Party (1980-2014)
here are consistent with my expectations. Not only do Republican women self-finance a larger portion of their campaign than do Democratic women, but they also receive fewer PAC contributions during their campaigns. These differences in campaign funding sources provide important insight into the reasons Republican women have so little representation in Congress. I found that Republican women receive fewer donations and less money from individual contributors than Democratic women and that this disparity leads to increased self-financing among Republican women and a reduced perception of viability among voters and other donors. These results also begin to help to explain why although more and more women are running for Congress their numbers have not appreciably increased.

Strong candidates are also frequently the best fundraisers. Donors act strategically and direct contributions to the strongest candidates (Brown 2013). In a study of the effects of candidate sex on party support of candidacy, King and Matland (2003) find that Republican women have a more difficult time finding support within their own party. These results are derived from an experiment wherein participants were asked about the leadership qualities of male and female candidates. Republican respondents consistently gave significantly lower scores to female candidates on assessments of leadership qualities (King and Matland 2003). Moreover, when respondents were asked if they would be willing to vote for a Republican woman, both Independents and Democrats indicated that they would be willing to “crossover” to vote for a female Republican, but Republican women did not receive any extra support among Republican respondents (King and Matland 2003: 602).
These results become particularly important when considering the interconnected relationship that I assert exists between the party and donors. A common activity in which donors engage is soliciting campaign contributions from their colleagues and peers (Francia et al. 2003). This behavior suggests that one of the ways that potential donors become involved in politics is through their social network. Francia et al. (2003) also observed, “In the process of building donor and social networks individuals engage in conversations about candidates among themselves. These conversations usually occur in golf clubs, board rooms, and other locations to which the average citizen has no access” (28).

If Republican women continue to enter elite politics directly from industry and/or self-finance their campaigns, they risk being out of touch with important financial and support networks. Even if they have the resources to contribute their personal wealth to their campaign, the fact remains: If donors are not attracted to Republican women, voters won’t be either.
Chapter 5: Party Elites and Networked Recruitment

Studies show that when women run, they win (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). That fact that female candidates tend to enjoy general election success rates that are equal to men’s means that gender disparity in elected candidates must be attributed to phenomena that happen before the electoral phase of a campaign. I argue, following Rule (1981) and Sanbonmatsu (2002) that this critical stage is in the candidate identification and recruitment phase of an election. Although many scholars examine gender disparity in recruitment to government office, these studies are fragmented. For instance, some studies focus on the influence of gendered institutions and psychological traits endemic to women as possible reasons why they are not recruited for national office (e.g., Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010). Others focus solely on women’s recruitment to state legislative office (e.g., Rule 1981; Sanbonmatsu 2002, 2006; Welch 1978). Few studies examine differences in how the parties recruit women to national office (but see Crowder-Meyer 2010; Niven 1998).

Throughout this dissertation I have argued that candidate identification and network ties each party’s recruitment of candidates and that Republican women are particularly likely to be absent from those networks. In this chapter, I explore the role of the party-affiliated actors in local party networks. I examine the role of these elites through an original nationwide survey of county party chairs—a group who according to partisan exclusion theory serve as liaisons between local interests and the national party. Gaining a better understanding of the ways in which these individuals identify potential
candidates and how they interact with donors and activists will help to better understand why Republican women face such difficulty in getting elected. I find that there are significant differences in the ways that the Republican and Democratic Parties approach recruitment and that these differences have important implications for the representativeness of government.

5.1 Contextual Factors Affecting Women’s Recruitment

Scholars have examined candidate stereotyping, voter bias, and incumbency advantage as the sources of women’s underrepresentation (Burrell 1994; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a, 1993b; Palmer and Simon 2005). Evidence suggests that these factors are not driving women’s underrepresentation. For instance, Seltzer, Newman, Leighton (1997) find that women do not face voter bias on Election Day and when women run, they win at rates comparable to men. As a result, scholars have begun to focus on women’s ambition and recruitment patterns sources of women’s underrepresentation.

A central problem is that women do not perceive themselves as capable of running for political office nor do they express much interest in running (Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010). When potential candidates were asked about seeking political office, the majority of women in their study stated that they had not put much thought into running for office.\(^1\) Women also reported being discouraged by many of the components of campaigning that required extreme extroversion (e.g., fundraising). Their results

\(^1\) Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010) distributed their survey to individuals who held careers that often lead to political bids (e.g., lawyers, business persons, etc.). Their rationale was that finding differences between men and women among most likely candidates would signal widespread differences among the general population.
further suggest that women are also less likely to self-start their campaigns; they typically require much more cajoling than their male peers to consider a run for office (Bledsoe and Herring 1990; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2010; Moncrief et al. 2001).

Although Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010) argue that women’s underrepresentation can be attributed to women’s lack of ambition, plenty of other studies suggest that women are, in fact, ambitious and are interested in seeking office (Baer et al. 2014). These studies conclude that women’s underrepresentation can be attributed to gender disparities in recruitment. Scholars arguing that recruitment patterns are driving unequal representation point to studies documenting variation among elected women as evidence of the gatekeeping role recruitment plays. For instance, in a study of candidate emergence in 12 Midwestern states, Welch (1978) finds that there was a large pool of eligible women—women who had the “appropriate” professional, educational, and social qualifications to run for public office—yet women’s representation in the legislatures lagged behind the predicted proportion based on the success of comparable potential male candidates.

More than 30 years later these trends continue. According to the National Council of State Legislatures, as of 2014, women comprised 24% of state legislatures nationwide. The proportion of women in individual state legislatures has been shown to vary wildly (Rule 1981; Sanbonmatsu 2006). In 2014, for instance, women comprised 12.5% of state legislators in Louisiana and 41% of state legislators in Colorado. The variation in women’s representation also persists at the federal level. California has sent more women to Congress than any other state while Delaware, Mississippi, and Vermont have never
elected a woman to either the House or the Senate (CAWP 2015a). These figures offer suggestive evidence that recruitment of female candidates also varies.

Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010) find that elite recruitment can narrow the gender disparity among candidates and, in turn, elected officials. Recruitment, however, is not necessarily the panacea Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010) suggest. Several studies have found that the role of recruitment in ameliorating gender disparity among elected officials is more complex.

Studies show that women’s political recruitment is dependent on a number of contextual factors. First, candidates must be receptive to running. When considering a bid for public office, candidates must weigh several considerations. For instance, candidates must think about their chance of success as compared to the costs of running. These costs are both monetary and non-monetary. Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010) show that one of the most important limitations for women is their own perceptions that they are not qualified for public office. This finding is echoed by psychological studies that find that women persistently display lower “global” self esteem than their male peers throughout nearly all life stages (Kling et al. 1999).

A second issue affecting women’s recruitment is the fact that women often take different pathways to office (Burrell 1994; Carroll and Strimling 1983; Diamond 1977; Dolan and Ford 1997; Thomas, Herrick, Braunstein 2002). For instance, Burns et al. (2001) document the continued gender division of labor in the home and the

\[\text{Global self-esteem is an overall assessment of self rather than a domain-specific assessment of self (Kling et al. 1999).}\]
disproportionate childrearing responsibilities for women. As a result, women often enter the political arena much later in life. Women also tend to enter politics from different professional occupations. For example, Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2010) find that female state legislators tended to enter politics from female-dominated career fields (e.g., elementary school education) instead of having a law or business background like male state legislators. If women enter politics later in life and from careers that are not considered to be part of the political pipeline, they are less likely to have built the relationships that lead to recruitment and electoral success.

In 1994, Darcy et al. predicted that women would comprise half of non-incumbent women running for state legislatures by 2006. This prediction was based on the assumption that as the pool of eligible women rose, so too would their ascension to public office. Recently, studies conducted by the Center for American Women and Politics and Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010) show that women’s presence in pipeline careers (i.e., law, business, and education) has risen substantially. Moreover, despite sustained increases in these fields, women’s composition in public office has not appreciably increased. Darcy et al.’s (1994) prediction has not come to fruition despite women’s advancements in pipeline careers suggesting that women’s absence from these careers in the past was not driving their underrepresentation in government.

Arguments about women’s lower ambition as driving underrepresentation are also suspect. Welch’s (1978) study shows that even when qualified women are plentiful they are not proportionally slated as candidates. In fact, women are running at record-breaking levels and these numbers increase nearly every election cycle (CAWP 2015a). Moreover,
as Matland (2005) suggests, the pool of women seeking office is nearly always sufficiently large that political parties have the ability to compensate for the skewed pool of candidates (Matland 2005: 97). Even if it is the case that 5% of men and 1% of women have sufficient ambition to seek political office, then we would still have a pool of one million women with sufficient ambition—more than enough to fill half the seats in government.

If neither the eligibility pool nor gender differences in ambition are driving the gender gap elected officials, what is? I argue that we should also consider the role that parties, and local party networks in particular, play in recruiting female candidates for public office.

5.2 Local Party Networks as Gatekeepers

Parties have not been traditionally evaluated as a potential source for gender disparity in public office. Although at one time parties exerted considerable influence on elections, their role has been diminished considerably in the wake of election reform laws (Maisel 2001). The result of these reforms has been an evolution toward candidate-centered campaigns and away from party-centered campaigns. Although some evidence points to a limited role for the formal parties in electoral politics, other studies point to the importance of party recruitment, especially for women. For instance, Lovenduski and Norris (1993) argue that American parties are not incentivized to recruit and slate women because there are no quota systems in place. I suggest that examining the parties’ recruitment practices can shed light on the ways in which women are encouraged (or discouraged) to seek office. For example, Bledsoe and Herring (1990) argue that
supportive parties can help women overcome some of the barriers they often face in getting elected. Parties can provide women with social and business linkages that would otherwise be inaccessible.

I adopt the view that the parties’ actually reduce women’s ability to launch a successful bid for office. Specifically, I argue that local party networks act as gatekeepers for women. While the formal parties have been shown to lack the infrastructure to inject themselves into local electoral environments (Norris 1993), local party organizations have been shown to be very active in candidate recruitment (Crowder-Meyer 2010, 2013). Sanbonmatsu (2002) finds that strong party organizations are correlated with fewer women in state legislatures and Carroll (1994) finds that lack of party support was often cited among female candidates when surveyed about their experiences with the Democratic and Republican Parties. Taken together, these findings suggest that evaluating the parties’ role in candidate recruitment is imperative to better-understand the gender gap in Congress.

Although candidate success rates suggest that parties treat candidates similarly, the fact that women run at disproportionately lower rates than men and that Republican women run at even lower rates than Democratic women suggests that the parties are not treating male and female potential candidates similarly.

5.2.1 Expectations

Recall that a central component of partisan exclusion theory is that informal networks work together to identify and vet candidates for elected office and also that
Republican women, in particular, are likely to be absent from these networks. These features of my theory create five testable implications, which I describe below.

Under my conceptualization, county party chairs serve as liaisons to the larger formal party and as such, carry an influential role in local party networks. If it is the case, as I assert, that women are less likely to be a part of local partisan networks, one implication is that there will be fewer women in party leadership positions.

**Gender Disparity Hypothesis**
*Fewer women will hold positions as county party chairs than will men.*

Not only should I expect to find fewer female county party chairs, but I should also expect find fewer female Republican county party chairs because women are less likely to identify as Republicans. They will therefore be less likely to serve roles in party leadership as compared to female Democrats.

**Party Disparity Hypothesis**
*Female county party chairs will be more likely to identify as Democrats than as Republicans.*

When recruiting candidates, parties first turn to their own internal pools of potential candidates (Crowder-Meyer 2010, 2013; Masket 2011). Masket (2011) argues that for parties, it is preferable to select candidates from within a network because individuals from within the group are guaranteed to have similar political views and goals for government. A second benefit is the reduction in selection and vetting costs. Therefore, one result of women’s absence from local political networks is that it is more costly to recruit them to run for public office and there is greater uncertainty about their behavior if elected.
Another impediment women face is the in-group favoritism among male leadership across all professional spectrums. For instance, Main, Gryski, and Shapiro (1984) document bias against female candidates among party elites in the South and multiple studies of hiring and promotion demonstrate bias against women in the workplace (see for example Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales 2014). This bias is a symptom of a larger “expectancy effect” wherein beliefs about a person’s abilities based on particular traits, in this case sex, lead to a difference in treatment, which results in the underperformance initially expected (Snyder 1984; Niven 1998b: 29).

Taken in combination, research on parties and gender suggest women should be underrepresented in the party rosters. Consequently, women’s recruitment will suffer because recruitment outside of the network increases the costs associated with selecting candidates. Moreover, recruitment of women outside of the network will be particularly unlikely due to in-group favoritism among males in leadership positions. Thus, I hypothesize that, when prompted to name a potential candidate, county party chairs will disproportionately name male candidates. I further suggest that this inclination will be particularly likely among Republican county party chairs due to the scarcity of Republican women within the network.

**Potential Candidate Hypothesis**

When prompted to name a potential candidate, county party chairs will name a woman less than 50% of the time.

**Party Bias Hypothesis**

When prompted to name a potential candidate, Republican county party chairs will be less likely to name a woman than will Democratic county party chairs.
Finally, I argue that the gender bias in local party networks will be particularly evident among county party chairs that work in conjunction with a network to identify and recruit candidates. Partisan exclusion theory holds that local party networks are racially and economically homogenous and also lack gender diversity. I argue that local party networks are likely to be comprised disproportionately of men and that in-group preferences exacerbate existing gender disparities within the county party. That is, preferences among members to recruit from their social network leads to a bias in favor of potential male candidates. If it is the case that the Republican Party is less likely to include women in its network than the Democratic Party, I should expect to find that Republican county party chairs who report working with other community and business leaders to identify candidates will be less likely to name a woman as a potential candidate than will Democratic county party chairs.

**Party Network Hypotheses**

Republican county party chairs working with networks to recruit candidates will be less likely to name a woman than will Democratic county party chairs working with networks to recruit candidates.

5.3 Data and Methodology

In order to evaluate these hypotheses, I conducted a national survey of county party chairs.³ Between November 2014 and February 2015, I distributed the survey using

³ Some states do not have county party chairs. Instead, they may have city, town, or district (though not drawn along congressional district lines) chairs. I use the term county party chairs for brevity and that term encompasses all of the varieties of local party leadership I surveyed.
Qualtrics, which is a web-based survey instrument.\(^4\) In order to distribute the survey, I visited the county party websites for both the Democratic and Republican Parties for each of the 3007 counties in the United States. From these websites, I collected all available contact information for county party chairs. I was able to collect an email address for 4,346 county party chairs. Email addresses were not available for 1926 county party chairs so they were excluded from this study. The total number of responses for this survey was 538, yielding a response rate of 12\%.\(^5\)

Of the 538 who responded to the survey, 35\% identified as Republican, 40\% identified as Democratic, while the remaining 25\% identified as Independent (even though all county chairs worked for either the Republican or Democratic Parties). Women comprised 36\% of all respondents. Most (88\%) respondents hailed from small towns and rural areas. The average respondent was white, male, 58 years old, makes between $75,000 and $100,000 per year, and has been involved in politics for 22 years.

To evaluate the potential candidate and party bias hypotheses, I asked respondents to consider the following question: “Can you name a person in your county that you think should run for office?” Respondents who said that they could name a person in their

\(^{4}\) The complete survey instrument can be found in Appendix D

\(^{5}\) The response rate for this survey was lower than expected. I attribute this low response rate to several factors: (1) the survey was fielded directly following the 2014 midterm elections, a time when many parties were becoming less active due to the end of an election cycle; (2) 63\% of emails were never opened suggesting they may have been filtered into junk mail; and (3) a non-trivial number of chairs emailed refusing to participate due to concerns that any information gained through the survey would be distributed to the opposition party. The response rate among those who actually opened the email was 33\%.
county were then asked to name that person. From those responses, I created an indicator
variable measuring whether or not the respondent provided a woman’s name.
Respondents naming a woman were coded as “1” and respondents naming a man were
coded as “0.” Respondents refusing to answer were excluded from this analysis.6 If no
gender bias exists, I should expect to find that 50% of potential candidates named are
women. To examine whether county party chairs name fewer women, I compare the
actual percent of women named to the 50% we should expect to find absent gender bias.
To determine whether there exists a partisan difference in the tendency to name a woman
as a potential candidate, I combined the potential candidate variable with the indicator
variable for party identification to use a difference of means test to see whether or not
Republican county party chairs would be less likely to name a woman as a potential
candidate.

In order to test the gender disparity hypothesis, I constructed an indicator variable
measuring the sex of the county party chair. All counties with female chairs were coded
as “1” while counties with male chairs were coded as “0.” To test whether or not county
parties are less likely to be chaired by women, I employed a simple difference of means
test to compare men to women.

Recall the party disparity hypothesis holds that Republican women will be less
likely to be county party chairs than will Democratic women. To test this claim, I created
an indicator variable measuring partisanship. All Republican respondents were coded as

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6 Of 538 respondents, 369 refused to name a candidate. A large number of those refusing
cited confidentiality concerns. But a sizeable minority of chairs cited concerns that I
would divulge those names to the opposition party.
“1” while all Democrats were coded as “0.” I also evaluated this hypothesis with a difference of means test; here I compared Democratic women to Republican women.

Finally, to assess whether or not recruitment through networks disadvantages Republican women, I asked respondents the following question: “When it comes to recruiting candidates to run for local and state office what role do you play?”

Respondents were given four choices: recruitment was solely their responsibility, recruitment was someone else’s responsibility, they worked with a team to recruit candidates, or they don’t know who is in charge of recruitment. Respondents who reported that they worked with a team to recruit candidates were coded as “1” while respondents reporting that they were solely in charge of recruiting or that it was someone else’s responsibility were coded as “0” and respondents who did not know who was in charge of recruitment were excluded from analysis. I then combined this teamwork variable with the party identification and potential candidate variables to use a difference of means test to examine whether networked recruitment leads to fewer women being named as potential candidates.

5.4 Results

The potential candidate hypothesis holds that one implication of women’s exclusion from local party networks leads to their exclusion from leadership positions within the party. Of the 538 survey participants, 36% were women. Using a t test, I examined whether or not my sample containing 36% women was statistically different from the expected outcome of women comprising 50% of county party chair positions. I
found that this difference was significant (p<.001). These results support my argument that women will hold fewer leadership positions within their parties.

To what extent do we see differences across parties? Recall the party disparity hypothesis holds that owing to their decreased presence in local party networks, Republican women are be particularly unlikely to hold positions as county party chairs. Of the 191 women in my sample, 53 identified as Republicans (29%) and 120 identified as Democrats (63%). It is interesting to note here that the partisan breakdown of female county party chairs mirrors the partisan breakdown among women in Congress where Democratic women outnumber Republican women by three to one (CAWP 2015b). A simple difference of means test reveals that Republican women are less likely to hold leadership positions within their party (p<.10) offering further support for the party disparity hypothesis that women are particularly disadvantaged by their absence in these groups.

The potential candidate hypothesis holds that when prompted to name a potential candidate in their area, county party chairs, in general, would be less likely to name a woman. If there were no in-group bias or network influence, county party chairs should be equally likely to name a man or a woman. That is to say, county party chairs should be expected to name a woman 50% of the time. I find that county party chairs only name a woman 32% of the time and that this is a significant departure from the expected outcome (p<.001).

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7 The remaining 18 (8%) women identified as Independent/Other.
Moreover, when I break these results down by party, it is clear that Democratic Party chairs are significantly more likely to name a woman than are Republican Party chairs (p<.05). I present these results graphically in Figure 5.1 to give a sense of the dramatic difference between Democrats and Republicans on this dimension.

**Figure 5.1 Percent of County Party Chairs Naming a Woman as a Potential Candidate, by Party**

Democratic county party chairs named a woman 37% of the time while Republicans named a woman only 20% of the time. Although both fall well below the target of 50%, it is clear that Democrats are nearly twice as likely to contribute to gender diversity in their party. Beyond supporting my hypothesis that Republicans would be less likely to name a woman as a potential candidate, these results are consistent with the claim that
women’s absence from these groups has significant electoral repercussions that contribute to women’s underrepresentation.

The party network hypothesis holds that since recruitment is network-based and Republican women are more likely to be absent from those networks, I should expect to find that Republican county party chairs that reported that recruitment was a team effort would be less likely than Democratic county party chairs to name a woman as a potential candidate. First, I compared the two parties; those results can be found in Figure 5.2

**Figure 5.2 Percent of County Party Chairs Who Reported Working with a Network to Recruit Candidates Who Also Named a Woman as a Potential Candidate, by Party**

More than a third of Democratic county party chairs that reported recruitment was a team effort named a woman as a potential candidate as compared to 14% of
Republicans. This difference means that when working with others in the network to identify potential candidates, Democrats were nearly three times as likely to have a woman’s name come to mind (p<.05).

Informal party networks, as I have conceptualized them, are not formalized groups with membership rosters. Instead, they are informal groupings built around social networks and shared political goals/interests. As such, proof of their existence and gender composition is difficult to provide. To address this concern, I asked respondents how their teams identified potential candidates. A common theme among both Democratic and Republican respondents was the importance of community standing and the use of networks. In fact, 43% of county party chairs directly stated either community ties or networking in their descriptions of their team’s candidate identification process. For example, one Republican respondent described his team’s process,

We identify the seat where a candidate is needed, usually based on vacancy and the likelihood of success, and then generate a list of potential candidates from those we know or who have expressed interest before. Word of mouth and networking is the largest part of it.

Democratic party chairs echoed this sentiment, “Everyone on our recruitment team contacts people they know in their networks.” Another Democratic chair described his network as being comprised of “friends, people active in politics, and other candidates.” These statements by party leaders combined with the empirical evidence that nearly half of those surveyed described to a reliance on social and political networks for candidate identification, support the theory of partisan exclusion.

When the results of this analysis are combined, three trends emerge: (1) Women are less likely than men to be county party chairs; (2) local party leaders are less likely to
name a woman as a potential candidate; and (3) local parties heavily rely on social and political networks for candidate identification. Although I cannot speak to the gender composition of the networks, nationwide trends offer face validity to my claim that these networks are likely to be predominantly men. Two of the most common occupations for aspiring politicians are law and business. According to the National Women’s Business Council, women comprise 29% of small business owners and a recent report conducted by the American Bar Association found that women comprise 34% of attorneys in the United States. These figures alone suggest that women are going to comprise far less than 50% of political networks and that Republican women will be particularly unlikely to be included.

5.5 Conclusion

A cursory examination of the composition of women in Congress reveals that women are underrepresented relative to their proportion of the public and Republican women are particularly rare. In this dissertation I offer an alternative view of women’s underrepresentation in Congress called partisan exclusion theory, which holds that women’s underrepresentation stems in large part from the underrepresentation of women among party networks. Specifically, I have argued that recruitment is network-based and that women are less likely to be present in those networks. In this chapter, I have provided substantial evidence supporting these claims.

More than two thirds of survey respondents indicated that they relied on a network or on community standing to identify potential candidates for office. Local party leadership is male-dominanted with only one third of survey respondents identifying as
female. While I cannot directly measure network memberships, I demonstrated that county party chairs that reported working with a team were more likely to name a male candidate than those not working with networks to recruit candidates. These results can be attributed to the male dominance of those networks. In sum, my results suggest that the parties’ recruitment practices contribute to the scarcity of women in public office and further, that these practices are disproportionately disadvantageous to Republican women.

Although evaluations of parties as a source of women’s underrepresentation have been largely eschewed in favor of explanations focusing on women’s self-esteem or their presence in pipeline careers, these explanations only capture a small part of the story. Consistent with past research on the social eligibility pool of candidates, I find that local party leadership is comprised predominantly of men. What makes my findings unique is that I also find that this membership is self-perpetuating. When prompted to think about potential candidates in their area, party leaders were overwhelmingly more likely to think of a man rather than a woman. If male party leaders display a preference for male candidates, whether due to overt or implicit bias, the electoral ramifications are massive.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

The 114th Congress is touted as the most diverse Congress ever seated. Of the 535 members, 19% are women, 9% are black, 6% are Latino, and 2% are Asian (Krogstad 2015). As Table 6.1 shows, although Congress is more diverse than ever before, it certainly is not representative of the U.S. population.

Table 6.1 Diversity in the 114th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino/a</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>114th Congress</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 6.1, it is clear that every non-white group receives less representation in Congress than they comprise of the national population. The most numerically underrepresented group, however, is women. Women comprise over half of the population yet they hold less than one fifth of the seats in Congress. This underrepresentation is important because it speaks to one of the core components of American democracy: equality.

Implicit in arguments about equality is the notion that in order for the value of equality to prevail, government institutions should mirror the composition of the citizenry they represent. This goal is particularly important for traditionally marginalized groups (e.g., women, racial and ethnic minorities) whose representation can be enhanced when represented by legislators who are also part of these groups (Dovi 2002, 2007; Mansbridge 1999).
Although women do not need to be represented by women (i.e., descriptive representation) in order to receive policy representation (i.e., substantive representation), women are more likely to receive policy representation on “women’s issues” when they are represented by women. Female legislators are more likely to sponsor women’s issue and feminist legislation (Swers 1998, 2002). They are also more likely to serve on committees relevant to women’s issues (Carroll and Taylor 1989; Thomas and Welch 1991). Democratic women in particular have been on the forefront of suggesting new women’s rights concerns as well as proposing policy solutions to these issues (Wolbrecht 2002).

Women also legislate differently than men. Women chairing committees are more likely to “facilitate open discussions among committee members, sponsors, and witnesses” while male chairs use their power to “control the hearings” (Kathlene 1994; Reingold 2006: 11). Women are also more likely to employ consensus building and bipartisanship (Swers and Larson 2005; Whicker and Jewell 1998).

Women also differ from men in their legislative priorities. Women are more likely to receive constituency casework requests (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998; Epstein, Niemi, and Powell 2005) and to prioritize addressing constituency service (Richardson and Freeman 1995) than similarly situated male colleagues. Beck (1991) finds that women place a higher value on constituency service than men. Whereas female representatives viewed service as an activity that enhanced their role as a representative, male colleagues viewed service as an activity that they should avoid spending too much
time working on (Caldeira and Patterson 1988; Hibbing and Thomas 1990; Caldeira, Clark, and Patterson 1993; Reingold 2000, 105-106).

The benefits of descriptive representation extend beyond the legislative arena. Descriptive representation leads to higher levels of external efficacy among voters (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007). Descriptive representatives can also serve as role models for historically marginalized groups, which can lead to an increased self-esteem and belief in one’s capacity to become a leader herself. Others argue that descriptive representation leads to sense of increased inclusivity and that diversity lends legitimacy to government (Phillips 1998).

6.1 Partisan Exclusion Theory and Women’s Underrepresentation

Throughout this dissertation I have argued that an important but often overlooked source of women’s underrepresentation in Congress is the disparity between elected Republican and Democratic women. Democratic women outnumber Republican women in Congress by three to one. If Republican women were to run and win at rates comparable to Democratic women, women’s representation in Congress would increase by 54% and women would go from comprising one in five members of Congress to comprising one in three members of Congress.

Differences between the candidacies of men and women are well documented. Women candidates in the aggregate fare just as well as male candidates (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). There are few differences between male and female candidates with respect to campaign styles, fundraising, and success rates (Burrell 1994; Palmer and Simon 2008; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). While the differences
between men and women have been studied extensively, little research focuses on the differences between Republican and Democratic women seeking seats in Congress (but see Crowder-Meyer 2010, 2013). In this dissertation, I began to address this gap by focusing on the ways in which local party networks identify candidates and how those practices contribute to women’s underrepresentation.

In this dissertation I presented my theory of partisan exclusion. While existing studies seek to uncover gender differences in the general election stage of a campaign, I argued that women’s underrepresentation in Congress can be traced back to the initial stages of candidate identification and recruitment. I further argued that while the formal national parties may not play a role in these early stages of an election, the local party and their networks of donors, benefit seekers, and entrenched incumbents work together to identify candidates for office. I further argued that while women in general will be underrepresented in these networks, Republican women in particular will be underrepresented because women are less likely to identify as Republicans (Box-Steiffensmeier 2004), they are also less likely to be professionals in pipeline careers that lead to political office (Crowder-Meyer and Lauderdale 2014; Lawless and Fox 2010).

If it is the case that women are disadvantaged by their absence in local party networks there are three areas in which we should expect to see the effects of this absence: primary elections, campaign fundraising, and recruitment patterns. In Chapter Three I examined the primary phase of elections under the logic that if Republican women were disadvantaged by their absence in local party networks that it would be acutely felt during the primary stage of a campaign. If it was the case that Republican
women were particularly likely to be excluded from local party networks and the resources they offer, that Republican women would face more obstacles in their primary election races.

I argued that Republican women would have less previous electoral experience than Democratic women because they would not have moved through successive political office under the stewardship of the local party network. I also suggested that Republican women would run in more competitive districts and face more intraparty competition in primary races because they would not be able to use the resources of the network to ward off rivals. Republican women’s absence from local party networks also limits their ability to raise money. As a result, Republican women will be more likely to spend their own money on their campaigns.

Taken together, these campaign shortcomings contribute to lower primary vote shares among Republican women. Using an original data set for the 2010 midterm election cycle, I showed that not only were Republican women lower quality candidates than Democratic women (as measured by Jacobson and Kernell 1981), but also they ran in races that were more difficult to win and spent significantly more of their own money supporting their candidacies. All of these obstacles contributed to primary vote shares that were nine points lower than those of Democratic women and an average primary vote share of 49% (i.e., a primary election loss).

In Chapter Four I argued that a second area in which absence from the local party network would be felt was fundraising. I argued that network-backed candidates would have access to expansive donor lists and that women outside of the network would need
to build their own donor lists that were likely to be much smaller. I also argued that because Republican women are particularly likely to be absent from local party networks, they would struggle to solicit contributions from political action committees that prefer to donate to candidates who are likely to win. I also argued that Republican women would face more difficulty raising funds from individual contributors and that they would receive donations from fewer unique individual contributors because they would not have access to donor lists curated by the local party network. As a result of fewer contributions from external sources, Republican women are more likely to turn to self-financing to shore up their campaigns. Fewer receipts from external sources coupled with a reliance on self-financing leads Republican women to raise less money to support their candidacies than Democratic women.

I was able to test these expectations using the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections, which tracks contributions to all candidates that filed with the Federal Elections Commission between 1980 and 2012. At nearly all points between 1980 and 2012 Republican women received less money from political action committees than Democratic women. While trends for individual contributions are less clear, Republican women on average receive about $50,000 less per election cycle from individual contributions than Democratic women. The more revealing difference between Democratic and Republican women occurs when examining the number of unique contributors women from each party can expect. Democratic women receive contributions from nearly three times as many unique contributors than Republican women perhaps offering some of the best evidence of the power of networks.
I also showed that Republican women are more likely to turn to self-financing to support their campaigns. This trend among Republican women started with the 2006 midterm elections and coincided with dips in contributions from individuals and PACs. Finally, I showed that Republican women raised significantly less money to support their campaigns than Democratic women.

In Chapter Five I examined the recruitment practices of county party chairs in an attempt to find direct evidence of women’s exclusion from local party networks. I argued that one direct implication of women’s absence from these networks would be that there would be fewer women serving as county party chairs and if it is the case that Republican women are disproportionately underrepresented in local party networks, that among female county party chairs there would be more women identifying as Democrats than as Republicans. I also argued that as a result of male dominance of these networks that when prompted to name a potential candidate, county party chairs would name a woman less than half of the time and that Republican county party chairs would be particularly unlikely to name a woman as a potential candidate. I also suggested that county party chairs that worked with networks to recruit candidates would be less likely to name a woman as a potential candidate.

I conducted an original survey of county party chairs across the nation to test these hypotheses. I found that not only were county party chairs disproportionately men, but also that Democratic county party chairs were twice as likely to name a woman as a potential candidate than were Republican county party chairs. This effect was magnified for county party chairs working with networks to identify and recruit candidates.
Republican county party chairs who worked with a network to identify and recruit candidates were three times less likely to name a woman as a potential candidate than were similarly situated Democratic county party chairs.

The process by which candidates are identified and recruited is not necessarily geared toward the exclusion of women and local party networks are not necessarily seeking ways to limit women’s representation in government. Instead, I argue that these networks are biased in favor of male candidates because they are comprised disproportionately of men. This is especially true for Republican networks because women are twice as likely to identify as Democrats than as Republicans (Box-Steffensmeier 2004). Therefore, the universe of potential network participants is smaller for Republican women.

The results of this study demonstrate gender bias within the candidate recruitment process and whether it is overt or implicit, it has extreme ramifications for women’s representation in Congress. There is also evidence to suggest, however, that the lack of Republican women may be attributable to an unwelcoming environment within the Republican Party.

6.2 Political Implications

The underrepresentation of women in Congress is driven by the underrepresentation of Republican women. A series of recent public opinion polls point to important differences between Republicans and Democrats that may shed light on the ways these two groups view women and their candidacies. Evidence from these surveys
suggests that the Republican Party is not concerned with helping women to get elected to Congress.

In a 2013 poll conducted by Langer Research Associates, respondents were asked whether electing more women to Congress would be a “good thing” or a “bad thing.” Their results showed that 43% of Americans thought it would be a “good thing” if more women were elected to Congress. That is, a majority of those polled did not agree with the statement that electing more women to Congress is a “good thing.” These results are troubling because they suggest that many Americans do not prioritize reducing the gender gap in Congress.

When these results are broken down by party and gender, more striking trends emerge. Among Democrats polled, 60% agreed that electing more women to Congress was a “good thing.” A gender breakdown of Democrats reveals that 54% of Democratic men and 69% of Democratic women said it would be good if more women were elected to Congress. Although there is a stark split between Democratic men and Democratic women vis-à-vis their support for putting more women in office, more than half of both groups agreed that electing more women to office is desirable.

This same trend does not hold for Republicans. Only 23% of Republicans agreed that electing more women to office is a “good thing.” Of those Republicans, 22% were men and 24% were women. These results show much lower levels of support for increasing gender diversity in Congress among Republicans. They also show that whereas Democratic women are about 30% more likely than Democratic men to think

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1 Respondents could also volunteer a “no opinion” or “don’t know” response.
election of more women to Congress is desirable, Republican men and Republican women do not differ in their responses to this question. The stark contrast between Democrats and Republicans coupled with accusations of the Republican Party’s “war on women” speak volumes about the value the Republican Party places on electing more women to office and about women’s underrepresentation more broadly.

Spokespersons for the Republican Party often argue that there is no “war on women” because a “war on women” presupposes that all women feel similarly about women’s issues like access to contraception and abortions. Even if the “war on women” is a fabrication by the Democratic Party and liberal media (e.g., Hamel 2012; Milbank 2015), the Republican Party has not embraced women candidates, and as a recent study revealed, they often show outright hostility toward them.

In a recent study of Republican primary election voters conducted by Public Policy Polling (2015), researchers found that when a random woman’s name was included in a candidate favorability survey, 20% of respondents reported unfavorable views of her. Respondents had no other information about this candidate except for an unmistakable female name. These results suggest that the default assessment of a female candidate for one in five Republican primary election voters is negative.

In my survey of county party chairs I asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “It is just as easy for a woman to be elected to a

---

2 The Random name inserted into the candidate list was Emily Farris. Emily Farris as a professor of political science at Texas Christian University.
high-level office as it is for a man.”³ Two thirds of Republican county party chairs agreed that it was just as easy for a woman to get elected to higher-office as a man while 57% of Democratic county party chairs disagreed with the statement. This difference was statistically significant (p<.001) and suggests that the Republican Party may not think that Republican women need extra help to get elected despite the fact that Republican women are less likely to make it out of primary elections than Democratic women (Dittmar 2013; Political Parity 2015; Skulley 2013).

The vast majority of Republicans do not think electing more women to Congress is a “good thing,” one in five Republican primary election voters has an unfavorable view of a female candidate they know nothing about, and Republican county party chairs think it is just as easy for a woman to get elected to political office as a man. When these beliefs are combined with the results of this investigation, it is not surprising that there are so few Republican women in Congress and unless these attitudes change, Republican women will continue to be token members of their party.

³ Respondents were also given “Neither agree nor disagree” and “Don’t know” as response choices.
## Appendix A: Data Dictionary for Chapter 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Sex</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Candidates with female names and/or photos were coded as &quot;1&quot; and candidates with male names and/or photos were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td>Federal Election Commission election returns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Candidates running as incumbents were coded as &quot;1,&quot; all non-incumbents were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td>Federal Election Commission election returns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ladder</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Candidates having held elected seats at local, state, and federal levels of office were coded as &quot;1,&quot; and all other candidates were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td>Federal Election Commission election returns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Competitiveness</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Districts classified as &quot;Lean Republican,&quot; &quot;Lean Democrat,&quot; or &quot;Toss-up&quot; were coded as &quot;1,&quot; while all other districts were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td>Archived Cook Political Report district competitiveness ratings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Co-Partisan Competitors</td>
<td>Continuous variable. A count of the number of co-party primary election competitors a candidate faced.</td>
<td>Federal Election Commission election returns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Self-Financed</td>
<td>Continuous variable. The amount of a campaign the candidate has paid for with her own funds divided by the total amount raised by the candidate.</td>
<td>Federal Election Commission campaign finance reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Democratic Vote Share</td>
<td>Continuous variable. The percent of the district's presidential vote that went for Barack Obama in 2008.</td>
<td>Federal Election Commission election returns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Women in the State Legislature</td>
<td>Continuous variable. The number of women in the state legislature divided by the total number of state legislators.</td>
<td>National Conference of State Legislators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Candidates from the following states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming were coded as &quot;1,&quot; while all other candidates were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td>US Census region designation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>US Census region designation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Candidates from the following states: Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin were coded as &quot;1,&quot; while all other candidates were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Candidates from the following states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont were coded as &quot;1,&quot; while all other candidates were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Candidates from the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia were coded as &quot;1,&quot; while all other candidates were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix B: Data Dictionary for Chapter 4

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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Partisanship</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Candidates identifying as Republican were coded as &quot;1&quot; and candidates identifying as Democrats were coded as &quot;0&quot; (Independents were dropped from this analysis)</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Sex</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Candidates with female names and/or photos were coded as &quot;1&quot; and candidates with male names and/or photos were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Candidate</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Candidates running for the House were coded as &quot;1&quot; and candidates running for the Senate were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midterm</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Election cycles occurring outside of presidential election cycles were coded as &quot;1&quot; and presidential election cycles were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Candidates running as incumbents were coded as &quot;1&quot;,&quot; all non-incumbents were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Candidates running as challengers were coded as &quot;1&quot;,&quot; all incumbents were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Seats with no incumbents running were coded as &quot;1&quot;,&quot; all other seats were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>Within-District Donors</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Number of within-district donations for each cycle</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount Spent</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total disbursements for a given campaign</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Committee Donations</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total donations from party committees</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount Self-Financed</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total donations from candidate</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Raised</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total receipts</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PAC Receipts</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total receipts from PACs</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Individual Receipts</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total individual receipts</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Partisanship in the 1990s</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Kernell’s (2009) measure of district partisanship in the 1990s. Higher numbers indicate more Democratic district</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Partisanship in the 2000s</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Kernell’s (2009) measure of district partisanship in the 2000s. Higher numbers indicate more Democratic district</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Vote Share for President</td>
<td>Continuous variable. District-level percentage of the two-party vote share won by the Democratic presidential nominee in the most recent presidential election.</td>
<td>Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Committee Donations (adjusted for inflation)</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total donations from party committees adjusted to 2012 dollars.</td>
<td>usinflationcalculator.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount Self-Financed (adjusted for inflation)</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total donations from candidate adjusted to 2012 dollars.</td>
<td>usinflationcalculator.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Raised (adjusted for inflation)</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total receipts adjusted to 2012 dollars.</td>
<td>usinflationcalculator.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PAC Receipts (adjusted for inflation)</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total receipts from PACs adjusted to 2012 dollars.</td>
<td>usinflationcalculator.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Individual Receipts (adjusted for inflation)</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total individual receipts adjusted to 2012 dollars.</td>
<td>usinflationcalculator.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
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<td>Calculation</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Committee Donations (as a percent of total raised)</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total donations from party committees as a percent.</td>
<td>Manually calculated from data available in the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount Self-Financed (as a percent of total raised)</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total donations from candidate as a percent.</td>
<td>Manually calculated from data available in the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PAC Receipts (as a percent of total raised)</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total donations from PACs as a percent.</td>
<td>Manually calculated from data available in the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Individual Receipts (as a percent of total raised)</td>
<td>Continuous variable. Total individual receipts as a percent.</td>
<td>Manually calculated from data available in the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Competitiveness</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Districts with &lt;10% margin of victory were coded as &quot;1&quot; and all other districts were coded as &quot;0&quot;.</td>
<td>Federal Election Commission election returns</td>
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### Appendix C: Data Dictionary for Chapter 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female Chair</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Female respondents were coded as &quot;1&quot; and male respondents were coded as &quot;0.&quot;</td>
<td>2014 County Party Chair Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Potential Candidate</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Respondents listing a female name for a potential candidate were coded as &quot;1&quot; and respondents listing a male name were coded as &quot;0.&quot;</td>
<td>2014 County Party Chair Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Respondents reporting they are members of the Republican Party are coded as &quot;1&quot; and respondents reporting that they are members of the Democratic Party are coded as &quot;0.&quot;</td>
<td>2014 County Party Chair Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Recruitment</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Respondents reporting that they work as a team to recruit candidates are coded as &quot;1&quot; and all other respondents are coded as &quot;0.&quot;</td>
<td>2014 County Party Chair Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major City</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Respondents reporting that they live in a major city were coded as &quot;1&quot; while all other respondents were coded as &quot;0.&quot;</td>
<td>2014 Survey of County Party Chairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Respondents reporting that they live in the suburbs were coded as &quot;1&quot; while all other respondents were coded as &quot;0.&quot;</td>
<td>2014 Survey of County Party Chairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Town</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Respondents reporting that they live in a small town were coded as &quot;1&quot; while all other respondents were coded as &quot;0.&quot;</td>
<td>2014 Survey of County Party Chairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Indicator variable. Respondents reporting that they live in a rural area were coded as &quot;1&quot; while all other respondents were coded as &quot;0.&quot;</td>
<td>2014 Survey of County Party Chairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Active in Politics</td>
<td>Continuous variable. The number of years respondent reports having been involved in politics.</td>
<td>2014 Survey of County Party Chairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D: County Party Chair Survey Instrument

County Party Chair Survey 2014

Q1 You are being invited to participate in a research study about candidates and elections. This study is being conducted by Carrie Skulley from the University of California, Riverside. You were selected to participate in this study because you are (or were) a party chairperson. For this study, I am surveying 7,410 current and former party chairs with the purpose of understanding how political parties develop our future politicians. If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to complete an online survey. This survey will ask about your role within your party and your experiences with potential candidates and it will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

Q2 Some risks are unforeseeable; I have addressed all foreseeable risks and this study involves no more than minimal risk. There are no known harms or discomforts associated with this study beyond those encountered in daily life. By participating in this study, you will be helping to illuminate the candidate recruitment process thereby contributing to our knowledge about the identification and cultivation of potential candidates for public office. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you can withdraw at any time prior to submitting the survey. Your responses to these questions are confidential and your name will not be connected to your responses in any way. You are free to skip any question that you choose.

Q3 If you have questions, complaints, or concerns about this project or if you have a research-related problem, you may contact the researcher, Carrie Skulley by phone at (805) 403-0561, or by email at carrie.skulley@email.ucr.edu. If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, please contact the UCR Office of Research Integrity at (951) 827-4811 or (951) 827-5549, or to contact them by email, please use HRRB1@ucr.edu. By clicking “I agree” below you are indicating that you are at least 18 years old, have read and understood this consent form and agree to participate in this research study. Please print a copy of this page for your records.

☐ I agree (1)
☐ I disagree (2)

If I disagree Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey
Q4 In what type of area do you live?
- Major city (1)
- Suburb (2)
- Small town (3)
- Rural area (4)

Q5 What is your current occupation?

Q6 How long have you been active in politics?

Q7 When thinking about how your county differs from your state, would you say your county is:
- More conservative than my state (1)
- Neither more nor less conservative than my state (2)
- Less conservative than my state (3)
- Don't know (4)

Q8 In some places primary elections for U.S. Congress are very competitive, while general elections are not very competitive while in other places, the opposite may be true. In general, how would you describe the competitiveness of races in your county?
- Primary elections races are more competitive than general elections (1)
- General elections are more competitive than primary elections (2)
- Both primary and general election races are very competitive (3)
- Neither primary nor general election races are very competitive (4)
- It really depends (5)
- Don't know (6)

Q9 When it comes to recruiting candidates to run for local and state office what role do you play? Typically recruiting is:
- My responsibility (1)
- Someone else's responsibility (2)
- I work with a team of people to recruit candidates (3)
- Don't know (4)
Answer If When it comes to recruiting candidates to run for local and state office what role do you play? Typically recruiting is: My responsibility Is Selected

Q10 With respect to local and state office, would you say that you:
- Actively recruit candidates (1)
- Wait for potential candidates to contact you (2)
- Seek recommendations from others (3)
- Other; please specify: (4) ____________________

Answer If When it comes to recruiting candidates to run for local and state office what role do you play? Typically recruiting is: Someone else's responsibility Is Selected

Q11 With respect to local and state office, would you say the person in charge of recruitment:
- Actively recruits candidates (1)
- Waits for potential candidates to contact him/her (2)
- Seeks recommendations from others (3)
- Other; please specify: (4) ____________________

Answer If When it comes to recruiting candidates to run for local and state office what role do you play? Typically recruiting is: I work with a team of people to recruit candidates Is Selected

Q12 With respect to local and state office, would you say your team:
- Actively recruits candidates (1)
- Waits for potential candidates to contact you (2)
- Seeks recommendations from others (3)
- Other; please specify: (4) ____________________

Answer If With respect to local and state office, would you say that you: Seek recommendations from others Is Selected Or With respect to local and state office, would you say your team: Seeks recommendations from others Is Selected

Q13 When seeking recommendations from others, on whom do you rely?

Answer If With respect to local and state office, would you say the person in charge of recruitment: Seeks recommendations from others Is Selected

Q14 When seeking recommendations from others, on whom does the person in charge of recruitment rely?
Answer If With respect to local and state office, would you say that you: Actively recruit candidates Is Selected And When it comes to recruiting candidates to run for local and state office what role do you play? Typically recruiting is: My responsibility Is Selected

Q15 How do you identify potential candidates?

Answer If When it comes to recruiting candidates to run for local and state office what role do you play? Typically recruiting is: Someone else's responsibility Is Selected And With respect to local and state office, would you say the person in charge of recruitment: Actively recruits candidates Is Selected

Q16 How does the person in charge of recruitment identify potential candidates?

Answer If When it comes to recruiting candidates to run for local and state office what role do you play? Typically recruiting is: I work with a team of people to recruit candidates Is Selected Or With respect to local and state office, would you say your team: Actively recruits candidates Is Selected

Q17 How does your team identify potential candidates?

Answer If With respect to local and state office, would you say the person in charge of recruitment: Seeks recommendations from others Is Selected Or With respect to local and state office, would you say that you: Seek recommendations from others Is Selected Or With respect to local and state office, would you say your team: Seeks recommendations from others Is Selected

Q18 How do they identify potential candidates?

Q19 Is the recruitment process for state and local office different from the recruitment process for federal office?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)
- We do not recruit for federal office (4)
- Don't know (3)

Answer If Is the recruitment process for state and local office different from the recruitment process for federal office? Yes Is Selected

Q20 When it comes to recruiting candidates to run for federal office what role do you play? Typically recruiting is:

- My responsibility (1)
- Someone else's responsibility (2)
- I work with a team to recruit candidates (3)
- Don't know (4)
Answer If When it comes to recruiting candidates to run for federal office what role do you play? Typically recruiting is: My responsibility Is Selected

Q21 With respect to federal office, would you say that you:
○ Actively recruit candidates (1)
○ Wait for potential candidates to contact you (2)
○ Seek recommendations from others (3)
○ Other; please specify: (4) ____________________

Answer If With respect to federal office, would you say that you: Actively recruit candidates Is Selected

Q22 How do you identify candidates?

Answer If When it comes to recruiting candidates to run for federal office what role do you play? Typically recruiting is: Someone else's responsibility Is Selected

Q23 With respect to federal office, would you say the person in charge of recruitment:
○ Actively recruits candidates (1)
○ Waits for potential candidates to contact him/her (2)
○ Seeks recommendations from others (3)
○ Other; please specify: (4) ____________________

Answer If With respect to federal office, would you say the person in charge of recruitment: Actively recruits candidates Is Selected

Q24 How does the person in charge of recruitment identify potential candidates?

Answer If When it comes to recruiting candidates to run for federal office what role do you play? Typically recruiting is: I work with a team to recruit candidates Is Selected

Q25 With respect to federal office, would you say your team:
○ Actively recruits candidates (1)
○ Wait for potential candidates to contact you (2)
○ Seeks recommendations from others (3)
○ Other; please specify: (4) ____________________

Answer If With respect to federal office, would you say your team: Actively recruits candidates Is Selected

Q26 How does your team identify potential candidates?
Answer If With respect to federal office, would you say that you: Seek recommendations from others Is Selected Or With respect to federal office, would you say your team: Seeks recommendations from others Is Selected

Q27 When seeking recommendations from others, on whom do you rely?

Answer If With respect to federal office, would you say the person in charge of recruitment: Seeks recommendations from others Is Selected

Q28 When seeking recommendations from others, on whom does the person in charge of recruitment rely?

Answer If With respect to federal office, would you say your team: Seeks recommendations from others Is Selected Or With respect to federal office, would you say the person in charge of recruitment: Seeks recommendations from others Is Selected Or With respect to federal office, would you say that you: Seek recommendations from others Is Selected

Q29 How do they identify potential candidates?

Q30 In thinking about qualifications to run for office, which do you think is the most important?

- Having relevant professional experience (1)
- Having connections to the political system (2)
- Being wealthy (3)
- Being a good self-promoter (4)
- Being a parent (5)
- Other; please specify: (6) ____________________

Q31 What three personality traits are most important in making a candidate successful?

1. (1)
2. (2)
3. (3)

Q32 Can you name a person in your county that you think should run for office?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Answer If Can you name a person in your county that, you think, should run for office? Yes Is Selected

Q33 What is that person's name?
Q34 Some people say there is widespread bias against women, while others disagree. How much do you agree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree (1)</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree (2)</th>
<th>Disagree (3)</th>
<th>Don't know (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is just as easy for a woman to be elected to a high-level office as it is for a man (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When women run for public office, it is more difficult for them to raise money than it is for men (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q35 How would you describe your political philosophy?
- Liberal (1)
- Moderate (2)
- Conservative (3)
- Other (4)
- Don't know (5)

Q36 What is the highest level of schooling you have completed?
- Never completed high school (1)
- High school graduate (or equivalency) (2)
- Attended college (no degree, yet) (3)
- Completed trade or vocational school (4)
- Completed college (B.A. or B.S. degree) (5)
- Attended some graduate school (no degree, yet) (6)
- Completed graduate school (7)
Q37 What is your sex?
- Male (1)
- Female (2)

Q38 What is your age?

Q39 In what category was your household income last year?
- Under $25,000 (1)
- $25,001-$50,000 (2)
- $50,001-$75,000 (3)
- $75,001-$100,000 (4)
- $100,001-$150,000 (5)
- $150,001-$200,000 (6)
- Over $200,000 (7)
- Don't know (8)
- Refuse to answer (9)
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