Title
Congressional Primaries: Ideological Quagmires or Crucibles of Representation

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Congressional Primaries
Ideological Quagmires or Crucibles of Representation

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
In Political Science

by

Mark Andrew West

2016
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Congressional Primaries
Ideological Quagmires or Crucibles of Representation

By

Mark Andrew West
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles, 2016
Professor John R. Zaller, Chair

The “primarying” or targeting of more moderate incumbents by outside ideological groups is commonly discussed in the press as a force for polarization that makes legislative compromise more difficult. Yet, systematic studies of the phenomenon over time are rare. This dissertation uses Federal Election Commission (FEC) and other data to measure the effects of outside ideological contributions in Congressional primaries over three decades. This analysis confirms that outside ideological groups have a discernible effect on primary outcomes and frequently target more moderate incumbents. However, periods of strong targeting do not distort the relationship between Members of Congress and the voters they represent. Rather, periods of strong targeting are followed by stronger representation as measured by the correlation between Members of Congress’s roll call ideologies and their states’ and districts’ underlying ideologies.
The dissertation of Mark Andrew West is approved.

Kathleen Bawn
Jeffrey B. Lewis
Daniel H. Lowenstein
Thomas Schwartz

John R. Zaller, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles
2016
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Chapter One

Introduction

Tea party rallies began in 2009 and salient primary defeats of incumbent Republican Senators followed in the 2010 and 2012 election cycles. These primaries occurred in the wake of several Supreme Court decisions during the 2000s, which made it easier for outside groups such as FreedomWorks and the Club for Growth to raise and spend money. In this environment, media reports frequently tied the tea party movement, along with spending by outside ideological groups, to what was reported as a new phenomenon: the “primarying” of moderate incumbent Republicans due to their lack of ideological purity. For example, following his 2012 primary defeat to tea party challenger Richard Mourdock, Republican Senator Richard Lugar attributed his loss to being the “target of Club for Growth, FreedomWorks and other Super Political Action Committees (PACs) dedicated to defeating at least one Republican as a purification exercise to enhance their influence over other Republican legislators.”

Is the primarying, or ideological targeting, of moderate incumbent Republican Senators a new phenomenon that can be tied to the rise of the tea party and spending by outside ideological groups in 2010 and later? Considering this question, I reviewed Republican Senate primaries during the last 50 years and found multiple cases of incumbent Republican Senators losing primaries to challengers who campaigned on ideologically pure rhetoric. For example, in 1980, 29 years before any tea party rallies were held, Alfonse D’Amato (lifetime first dimension DW-Nominate score of 0.175)\textsuperscript{2}, embraced “Reagan conservatism,” and defeated moderate incumbent Republican Jacob Javits (lifetime first dimension DW-Nominate score -0.250) in the New York Senate Republican primary. Notably, D’Amato waged his successful primary challenge with the financial support of many outside ideological groups associated with the Conservative

\textsuperscript{1} Speech cited in the Washington Post May 9, 2012.
\textsuperscript{2} As the DW-Nominate first dimension scale moves from -1 towards 1, more positive scores are associated with more Conservative roll call vote behavior.
movement, including the National Rifle Association (NRA), the Conservative Political Action Committee (CPAC), and the Life Amendment Political Action Committee, an anti-abortion group.

In order to look systematically at whether the rise of the tea party movement changed the overall electoral performance of incumbent Senators in Republican primaries, I created plots for the periods before and after the first the tea party primaries in 2010. Exhibit 1-A displays (1) the vote margin between Republican incumbents and their highest performing primary challenger and (2) the incumbent’s primary vote percentage. These two metrics are displayed separately for the pre-tea party years of 1962-2008 and the tea party years of 2010 and 2012.3

Exhibit 1-A shows that the overall Republican incumbent performance in tea party era primaries did not drastically differ from primaries held during the prior 46 years. In fact, incumbent Senate Republicans perform slightly better in the tea party era. Incumbents’ median margin over their highest performing challengers was 69 percentage points during the tea party years of 2010 and 2012. This is higher than the median margin of 65 percentage points during the prior 46 years. The median incumbent vote was 84% in the tea party era compared to 82% during the prior 46 years.

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3 To create Exhibit 1-A, I selected all incumbent Republican Senators who had a challenger in a partisan primary. For additional details, please see the Chapter One appendix.
Exhibit 1-A
There is very little difference in the vote margins and vote percentages received by incumbent senators in Republican primaries held prior to the Tea Party era compared to the Tea Party era.

Notably, the data point at the bottom whisker for the tea party era margin plot is slightly lower than the bottom whisker of the 1962-2008 plot. This is because Senator Lugar’s loss by 20 percentage points to Richard Mourdock was the largest margin by which an incumbent Republican senator lost a primary in the entire 1962-2012 period. However, as shown in Exhibit 1-A, Lugar’s loss was an outlier. His margin does not reflect the typical incumbent Republican’s performance in the tea party era.

The fact that ideological challengers have, for several decades, competed in and occasionally won partisan primaries against more moderate incumbents is a theme of this dissertation. Specifically, this dissertation presents evidence that, as far back as 1980,
ideologically motivated campaign donations contributed to the selection of more extreme candidates in primaries, and thereby contributed to a more polarized Congress. However, while ideological primarying incentivizes more ideologically extreme behavior by members of Congress, this dissertation will present evidence that ideologically motivated targeting has helped strengthen the link between voter preferences and the roll call behavior of their elected representatives.

Later in this chapter, I provide additional detail about how this dissertation demonstrates my thesis that for several decades outside ideological groups have engaged in primarying and this behavior has improved representation. Before laying that out, I first (1) give additional detail about Primary Votes and Incumbent Ideology and (2) discuss Tea Party Politics (in the context of) Ideologues Versus Pragmatist.

Primary Votes and Incumbent Ideology

The primarying narrative is not simply about Republican incumbents receiving lower vote percentages in primaries. The narrative is that moderate incumbent Republicans are targeted by tea party activists and outside groups because of the incumbents’ insufficiently Conservative positions, which results in poorer primary performances for moderate incumbents. Exhibit 1-B examines whether the tie between incumbent ideology (measured by their nominate score) and incumbent primary vote percentages is different during the tea party era. Exhibit 1-B illustrates a stronger relationship between incumbents’ primary vote percentages and their ideology during the two tea party elections compared to the entire 1962-2012 period.

However, the tea party elections are at the high end of the normal historical variation. Other two-election periods with a stronger relationship between the incumbent’s vote percentage and ideology occurred several times in the pre-tea party era too. Exhibit 1-B shows that while
the whole 50 year period has a weaker relationship than the two tea party elections, there are a couple of two-election periods prior to the tea party era in which the relationship is stronger than in the tea party era. For example, from 1980-82, the Pearson r correlation coefficient is (.76), and from 2004-06 the r coefficient is (.78), while during the tea party era the r coefficient is (.63). Similarly, the slope coefficient when incumbent vote percentage is specified as a function of incumbent ideology is also slightly greater during 1980-82 (56X) and 2004-06 (60X) than in the tea party primaries (53X).4

**Exhibit 1-B**
While Stronger Than the Pooled Results for 1962-2012, the Relationship Between Incumbent Senate Republicans’ Ideology and Primary Vote Percentages in the Tea Party Primary Years of 2010-2012 Is Not the Strongest of All the Two Year Periods During the Last 50 Years

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4 I checked whether the strong relationship in 2004-2006 and 2010-2012 occurred because the relationship was stronger in the 2000s. There is no evidence that Senate Republican primaries in the 2000s systematically had stronger positive relationships between incumbent ideology and incumbent vote percentage than primaries in other decades. The 2008 relationship was weaker than the relationship for the whole 1962-2012 period. In 2008, the r coefficient was 0.09, the slope was 5X, and the adjusted R² was -.12. Also, for the two elections prior to 2004-06 and 2000-2002, the r coefficient was 0.35 weaker than the whole 50 year period, and the slope was -21X with an adjusted R² of -0.01.

5 In this dissertation I use the convention of “****” to note statistical significance at the .01 level, “***” to note statistical significance at the .05 level, and “*” to note statistical significance at the .1 level.
Overall, the tea party primaries are on the high end of a decades long trend in which more ideologically extreme incumbent Senate Republicans perform better in primaries than moderates. In order to flesh out how the relationship between incumbent vote percentage and ideology varied in the period prior to the tea party era, 1962-2008, I broke those primaries into five election cycle groups. This ensured that each group included 25 or more Republican primaries that included incumbent candidates on which I could perform statistical testing. The results are depicted in Exhibit 1-C.

**Exhibit 1-C**
In Senate Republican Primaries from 1962-2008, More Ideologically Extreme Incumbents Generally Receive a Higher Vote Percentage Than Less Extreme Incumbents

Exhibit 1-C shows a consistent pattern in which incumbent primary vote percentages increase as a function of incumbent ideology. In addition, Exhibit 1-C demonstrates that the relationship between partisanship and ideology has not increased over time; the largest slope coefficient occurred from 1974-1984. Notably, the period with the smallest slope, 18X, is also the earliest period, 1962-1972. It is the only period in which the slope is not statistically
significant. The finding of statistical significance in the later five election periods coincides with passage and implementation of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in the mid-1970s.

In fact, partisanship in Congress increased precipitously after passage of FECA. Exhibit 1-D shows the party medians by chamber and the differences in the medians. The exhibit also demonstrates that the increase in partisanship, while not asymmetric, is stronger among Republicans than Democrats. In the Senate, both Democratic and Republican medians increase during the 1980s. Among Senate Democrats, the rise flattened out and dipped by the 2000s while the Republican partisanship continues to increase. In the House, the increases are stronger. While both parties become more partisan after FECA, the House Republican growth is stronger, accelerates in the 1990s, and continues accelerating throughout the 2000s.

**Exhibit 1-D**
Partisanship Increased After Passage and Implementation of FECA in the 1970s
(Congressional Partisanship for Congresses Elected from 1960-2010)

1. Democratic scores were adjusted so that more positive values reflect higher levels of partisanship.

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6 Democratic scores were adjusted so that more positive values reflect higher levels of partisanship.
The greater movement toward extreme ideology among Republicans demonstrated in Exhibit 1-D shows that Republican ideology has been increasing over the last few decades. Notably, in the following chapters, I show strong differences by party, chamber, and time, in the likelihood that Republican moderates are primaried—Senate Republicans have a higher overall likelihood than Senate Democrats and House Republicans have a higher overall likelihood than House Democrats. I believe the higher likelihood of Republicans being primaried and the changes in Republican Members of Congress’ ideology shown in Exhibit 1-D, occur because the core issue of contemporary American politics, the size and scope of the federal government, is still being worked out among Republicans. It was settled among Democrats in the 1930s. While moderate Republicans accept the larger role of the federal government brought on by the New Deal and only want to manage its expansion into other realms of American life, movement conservatives seek to limit and roll back the scope of the federal government in domestic affairs. This was the argument of Goldwater when he said “A choice not an echo” and Reagan when he said the “government is not the solution, it is the problem.” This too is the rallying cry of tea party candidates today who claim that incumbent Republicans are too comfortable with the “Washington establishment” or the “Washington cartel.”

The seeds of this difference between the two parties were sewn when the Democrats rested the governing majority away from Republicans by offering a massive expansion of federal government activism in the 1930s.7 Among Democrats, the political success of the New Deal

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7 To put massive expansion in context, in 1929 federal government spending constituted less than 10% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). By 1934 it had almost doubled to 18% of GDP. The government’s percentage of GDP spiked at almost 50% during World War II, but after the war it has hovered around 20% and never dipped below 15%. Source: Forbes.com and analysis of Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
eventually settled any debate within the party about a less active federal government. But for Republicans, the party’s future position on the size and scope of the federal government remained to be settled and still has not been settled. When the Democrats’ New Deal coalition crystalized in the 1930s, the Republican Party consisted of progressive Republicans and a core of traditional party members who had been a part of the Republican Party when it was the nation’s governing party, with a few notable interruptions, from the 1860s through the 1920s. Fully aware of the political success of the new deal, pragmatic Republicans, in the wake of the New Deal realignment, offered up a form of “New Deal Light”, rather than an antithesis to the New Deal, i.e., small government conservatism. Small government conservatism did not show its teeth until 1964, when Barry Goldwater, appealing to conservative ideologues, and running against the party establishment, won the party’s nomination. The Goldwater convention of 1964, Ford’s close nomination win over Reagan in 1976, and Reagan’s subsequent victory in 1980 all featured pragmatist versus ideologue dynamics. My claim is that the intra-party congressional nomination battles that have been labeled the tea party movement are little more than a continuation of this theme.

Considering the frequent media discussion about tea party Republicans pulling the GOP to the extreme in both tactics and rhetoric, I want to emphasize that many of the more extreme examples of the tactics and rhetoric are not new. After the first tea party election in 2010, government shutdowns and concern over the federal government defaulting on its debt payments were frequently tied to tea party House members. In considering whether “shut down” brinksmanship is a function of the rise of the tea party in 2010, it is important to remember that budget battles between Congressional Republicans and a Democratic President led to a government shutdown almost two decades prior when the government shut down during the

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8 There is of course, southern Democrats’ prolonged opposition to expanding the federal government’s role in guaranteeing civil rights. Republicans seized upon this with Richard Nixon’s “southern strategy” in 1968 and continue to strengthen their position in the once Democratic stronghold of the American south.
10th Congress in the mid-1990s. The 104th Congress was the first Congress since the rise of small government conservatism in the Republican Party that saw a Democratic President and a Republican Congressional majority, and shutdowns happened almost immediately—during the first budget cycle with the new Republican Congress. In addition, opposition party members of Congress using harsh rhetoric such as claiming that the president is contemptuous of the law and the United States Constitution, rhetoric frequently cited as examples of tea party extremism, is almost as old as the American Republic itself. To cite just one of many examples, Senator Daniel Webster said the following, on the Senate floor regarding President Andrew Jackson, after President Jackson vetoed legislation in the 1830s to extend the Bank of the United States.

If the opinions of the President be maintained there is an end of all law and all judicial authority. Statutes are but recommendations, judgments no more than opinions....If conceded to him, it makes him at once what Louis the Fourteenth proclaimed himself to be when he said, ‘I am the State’ (Quoted in Peterson, 211, 1987).

My view is that the tea party primaries of 2010-2012 are a continuation of the pragmatist versus ideologue dynamic within the Republican Party, which is rooted in the party’s response to the New Deal realignment. A case could be made that the salience of the dispute was boosted by implementation of FECA during the 1970s, which increased the ability of ideological groups to influence primaries. While most of the political science research that analyzes campaign finance rules focuses on general elections and concludes that the changes since the 1990s made parties more influential, an alternative interpretation of how campaign finance rules affect partisanship could be that campaign finance rules make it harder for party insiders to monopolize campaign resources and make it easier for outside groups to collect campaign finance resources. The threat of these outside groups supporting primary challengers provides an incentive for incumbents to behave in as ideologically pure a way as they can and still maintain a general election winning coalition. The core of the campaign finance rules have existed since the 1970s, and there is no
reason to assume that changes to the rules during the 1990s and later are more likely to benefit party insiders than they are to benefit outside groups.

Incumbents’ decisions to move away from moderate positions do not require incumbents being primaried themselves. The fact that outside ideological groups primaried moderates in the FECA era incentivized all incumbents, not to avoid moderate positions per se, but to optimize their roll call ideology so as to avoid being out of step with their states’/districts’ ideology. This was the optimal position to avoid the twin threats of a strong primary challenge or a strong general election challenge. Given that there were so many moderate Senators in the 1970s, the movement toward members’ state level partisanship meant a movement away from moderation.

**Overview of This Study**

The goal of this dissertation is not to demonstrate that FECA caused polarization by making it easier for outside groups to target moderates. While FECA ushered in campaign finance rules that allow outside groups to play an active role in elections, scholars cite multiple causes for polarization such as partisan gerrymandering, income inequality, and the ebb and flow of immigration rates. Rather, my analysis in the following chapters relies on a different aspect of the campaign finance rules ushered in by FECA—the rule that political committees must report each unique contribution they receive to the Federal Election Commission.⁹ I use the unique donation-level reporting data required by FECA to follow the money and measure the extent to which ideological outside groups’ contributions effect primary outcomes. I focus on primaries rather than general elections not simply because of the media attention given to the primarying narrative in recent election cycles, but because the majority of seats in each election cycle are considered “safe” for one of the two political parties. As a result, a sizeable but understudied amount of the action in Congressional elections occurs through the party nomination process.

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⁹ The minimal reporting threshold has increased over time with the initial threshold set by FECA being $50.
This dissertation presents evidence consistent with the claim that ideologically motivated campaign donations have contributed to the selection of more extreme candidates in primaries and have thereby contributed to a more polarized Congress. However, this dissertation will argue that, particularly in the Senate, ideologically motivated targeting has helped strengthen the link between voter preferences and the roll call behavior of their elected representatives.

The following chapters review political science literature related to my theory and present the results of my empirical analysis of ideological money in Congressional primaries. Specifically, Chapter Two provides an overview of FECA and discusses the rise of outside ideological groups’ influence in the context of literature on campaign finance, incumbent behavior, party theory, and Congressional primaries. After reviewing the literature, the chapter describes how, unlike the 1960s and 1970s, ideological interest groups have, since the 1980s, had the tools and been incentivized, to support ideological primary challenges. Chapter Three describes the campaign finance and other data that I used in this dissertation.

In Chapter Four, I begin demonstrating the effects of ideological contributions on primary outcomes by looking at how these contributions affect non-incumbent primaries. This chapter shows that outside ideological organizations’ effect is greatest in Senate Republican primaries. Picking up on the role of ideological contributions, Chapter Five looks at incumbent primaries and shows that outside ideological contributions have a larger effect on primary outcomes than contributions from other sources. Chapter Five also demonstrates that the largest effect of outside ideological contributions is on Republican Senate primaries.

Chapter Six delves into the question of what factors ideological groups consider when deciding whether to support an incumbent or an incumbent challenger. This chapter finds that while groups are more likely to support challengers to moderate incumbents, strategic targeting, i.e., the targeting of moderate incumbents in safe seats primarily occurs in Republican House
primaries. The lack of more across the board evidence for strategic targeting leads me to examine how well incumbents align with the partisan disposition of their states/districts. The alignment analysis shows that heavier ideological targeting occurred in the Senate during the early period, where incumbents were not as well aligned with their states’ underlying partisanship. And it shows that after targeting, Senate incumbents are more closely aligned their states. My analysis of House primaries in Chapter Six leads me to discuss how outside ideological groups behave differently in House Democratic primaries, where they support moderate challengers to extreme incumbents, than they do House Republican primaries. Chapter Seven summarizes the findings and discusses them in the context of how parties and outside groups interact with one another, the role of ideological targeting in incentivizing Senators to align their roll call ideology with their states’ partisanship, and the tension between ideologues and pragmatists. Finally, I discuss topics for future research.
Exhibit 1-A
There Is Very Little Difference in the Vote Margins and Vote Percentages Received by Incumbent Senators in Republican Primaries Held Prior to the Tea Party Era Compared to the Tea Party Era

Exhibit 1-A uses two metrics to compare the performance of Republican incumbents in Senate primaries during the pre-tea party years of 1962-2008 to the tea party years of 2008-2010. One metric is the difference between the incumbent’s vote percentage and the highest scoring challenger’s vote percentage. The second metric is the incumbent’s primary vote percentage.

To create the exhibit, I selected all Senate Republican primaries in which an incumbent sought re-nomination. This resulted in 258 cases in the pre-tea party era and 18 cases in the tea party era. I then excluded the cases in which the incumbent Republican Senator did not face a
primary challenger. This reduced the number of cases from 262 to 122 in the pre-tea party era and from 18 to 14 in the tea party era.

**Exhibit 1-B**

While Stronger Than the Pooled Results for 1962-2012, the Relationship Between Incumbent Senate Republicans’ Ideology and Primary Vote Percentages in the Tea Party Primary Years of 2010-2012 Is Not the Strongest of All the Two Year Periods During the Last 50 Years

Exhibit 1-B depicts four plots and their associated Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression equations, r coefficients, and adjusted R square values. The data used to create the four plots was selected in the same manner as in Exhibit 1-A; for each time period, all incumbent Republican Senators facing primary challengers were selected.

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10 All R square values reported in this study use the adjusted R square, which is calculated using the equation: 1 – ((1- R²)/((N – 1)/(N – k – 1))). “k” is the number of predictors.
In each of the four plots, the incumbent Republican Senator’s primary vote percentage is shown on the vertical axis and is depicted as a function of the incumbent’s ideology as measured by each incumbent’s DW-Nominate score (first dimension), which is shown on the horizontal axis. The first plot, in the upper left quadrant, shows the relationship for the entire study period, 1962-2012. It includes the 136 primary elections that were used in Exhibit 1-A, i.e., the sum of the 122 pre-tea party cases and the 14 tea party cases. The second plot, shown in the upper right, illustrates the relationship in the tea party era only. It includes the 14 races that are shown in the tea party potions of Exhibit 1-A. The third plot, displayed in the lower left, depicts the nine primaries that occurred in 1980 and 1982. Finally, the last plot, shown in the lower right, depicts the 12 Republican Senators who faced primary challengers in 2004 and 2006.

The details of the regressions used to create Exhibit 1-B are shown in the table (Appendix Table 1-1) below. Appendix Table 1-1 also includes the results for 2000-2002, and 2008, which, unlike the plots in Exhibit 1-B, do not show a strong positive relationship. I evaluated these additional time periods in order to examine whether there is a relationship between an incumbents’ ideology and their vote percentage that is stronger in all the primaries of the 2000’s than the relationship in earlier decades. If a stronger relationship were found, it could mean that ideology affected primaries of the 2000s more than earlier decades, which would support the notion that the 2000s had a uniquely different primary environment due to McCain-Feingold or other factors. Additionally, if the 2008 regression results are in line with the 2010 and 2012 results, it could support the claim, often made in the literature, that the 2007 Supreme Court decisions of FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, and McCain et al v. Wisconsin increased the level of primarying. The 2008 results do not shed light on the often referenced Citizens United decision, which was released in June 2010 and would not have affected primaries until the 2012 cycle.
Appendix Table 1-1

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<td>5X</td>
<td>.808</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>10</td>
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Exhibit 1-C

In Senate Republican Primaries from 1962-2008, More Ideologically Extreme Incumbents Generally Receive a Higher Vote Percentage Than Less Extreme Incumbents

Exhibit 1-C was created using the same approach as Exhibit 1-B. Each of the six plots depicts the primary vote percentage for incumbent Republican Senators as a function of their
ideology as measured by their DW-Nominate score. Each of the periods shown in Exhibit 1-C includes at least 25 cases. The first (upper left) plot in Exhibit 1-C shows the results for the entire pre-tea party era back to 1962. The next four plots show decade-by-decade breakouts starting with 1998-2008 and dating back to 1962-1972. Together, these four plots demonstrate that ideology did not become more important over time. Rather, the relationship peaked in the first decade after the passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The final plot, 1950-1972 (lower left), is included to provide a larger number of cases for the pre-FECA period and shows that even when additional primaries are included, the flatter and non-statistically significant relationship of the pre-FECA period does not change. I considered going back further with these plots, but a review of nominations prior to the 1950s shows that many states did not hold party primaries, and thus results in a truncated sample, where many states are excluded. In the earlier time period, party conventions and caucuses are more commonly used to nominate Senatorial candidates.

Appendix Table 1-2 provides additional details about the plots in Exhibit 1-C. For each time period, the intercept, the intercept’s p value, the slope coefficient, the p value of the slope, the Pearson correlation (r), adjusted R², and number of cases (n) are provided.
### Appendix Table 1-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>Intercept Statistical Significance</th>
<th>Slope</th>
<th>Slope Statistical Significance</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation (r)</th>
<th>Adjusted R²</th>
<th>n</th>
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<td>1962-2008</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2008</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>21X</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.33**</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986-1996</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>23X</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
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<td>1974-1984</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>42X</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.72***</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>18X</td>
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<td>1950-1972</td>
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<td>16X</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.26</td>
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Exhibit 1-D
Partisanship Increased After Passage and Implementation of FECA In the 1970s (Congressional Partisanship for Congresses Elected from 1960-2010)

Exhibit 1-D is based upon first dimension DW-Nominate scores from the session of Congress prior to the election listed on the horizontal axis. Democratic scores were multiplied by -1, so for both parties higher scores are associated with more ideologically extreme roll call votes. The upper graphs show the party medians for both the House and Senate. The lower graphs show, also for the House and Senate, the difference in the two parties’ medians, which was calculated by subtracting the Democratic median from the Republican median.
Chapter Two

Overview of FECA, Literature Review, and How Outside Ideological Groups Use Campaign Finance Rules to Influence Congressional Nominations

There is a dearth of scholarly literature connecting contributions from outside ideological groups to either Congressional primaries or the behavior of members of Congress. In order to explain my view about the emergence of ideological primarying in the 1980’s, below, I provide an overview of FECA and discuss recent political science literature on campaign finance. Then, I discuss the literature on primaries and polarization, and the incumbent advantage. Next, I lay out my explanation about how the campaign finance rules ushered in by FECA provided a vehicle for ideological outside groups to influence primaries. This explanation is provided in the context of my claim that the electoral information environment has changed since the 1970s with ideological and other groups now closely monitoring and disseminating information about the behavior of members of Congress. Finally, I discuss how ideological groups’ attempts to influence Congressional nominations fit with contemporary explanations about the formation and behavior of parties.

Overview of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)

During the 1970s, Congress substantially changed the rules governing campaign finance. Since that time, Congress has continued to adjust the rules while a series of United States Supreme Court decisions during the 1990s and later loosened the rules. When Congress passed FECA and its amendments during the mid-1970s, the goal was to reduce elected officials’ dependence upon a few deep pocketed benefactors. Passed in the wake of the Watergate scandal, FECA ended a system of loose federal campaign finance rules, which LBJ described in 1967 as “more loophole than law,” and replaced it with a new system in which hard donation limits were placed on campaign contributions and a new federal bureaucracy, the Federal
Election Commission (FEC), was created to implement a federal campaign finance regulatory system.

Arguably, FECA succeeded at reducing candidates’ dependence on a small number of deep pocketed individuals. With hard caps, originally $1,000 per individual donor, one individual donor could no longer provide the bulk of a candidate’s electoral resource needs. However, a new system emerged that advantaged candidates who could access informal networks of many donors. For example, candidates who could gain the support of groups with national donor lists had the capacity to raise and outspend opponents who could not.¹¹

FECA set the stage for outside groups of policy demanders to have greater influence on elections. With mailing lists of thousands of members, groups like the NRA could encourage all of their members to contribute to candidates the groups identified. Also, groups could form PACs, which had higher donation limits than individuals (initially $5,000 compared to $1,000). Finally, beyond providing direct contributions, groups could fund independent educational media.

Many of the rules governing PACs and campaign fundraising were loosened in recent years. For example, since the passage of FECA, the definition of “independent” and “educational” has been the subject of much additional legislation, regulation, and court decisions, with the result being fewer limits of independent spending during recent election cycles.¹² Also, the most recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, at the time of this writing, McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, struck down the cap that prevented individuals

¹¹ Subsequent regulatory changes in the 2000s led to the rise of “super PACs” and raised concerns that one or a small group of individuals could funnel large donations through super PACs. This would allow the reemergence of candidate dependence on a few individuals. This has occurred in Presidential primaries, but the result for Republicans in 2012 was to draw the primary out, rather than make it easier for insiders to select their favorite candidate. A candidate with a few deep pocketed supporters could stay in the race despite a lack of broad support among voters.

¹² For additional details on the moving target of the campaign finance regulation environment, see Jacobson (2013) and Herrnson (2012).
from contributing more than $48,600 total to federal campaign committees in a two year period. During oral arguments, several justices in the minority said that this decision would undermine FECA’s core principle of limiting the influence of deep pocketed individuals. The McCutcheon ruling does not remove the cap that any one individual can give to any one campaign committee, but minority justices speculated that multiple campaign committees could be established to collect donations from the same individual and these committees could then funnel their funds to multiple super PACs that all advertised in support of the same candidate.

_Campaign Finance Literature_

Anyone who spends enough time searching campaign finance literature in a library and online may find that existing research falls into two broad and often overlapping camps of advocacy and scholarly work. On the advocacy side, groups like Common Cause see the campaign finance system as a cancer on the body politic that encourages members of Congress to sell their votes to the highest bidder. While groups like Common Cause and OpenSecrets.com clearly have a normative agenda about how campaign finance is regulated, they also provide excellent resources about campaign finance rules and summary data about who contributes to whom.

On the other side of Common Cause in the normative debate are Libertarian and Conservative Constitutionalist critiques of campaign finance regulation from think tanks like the Cato Institute. Many of these arguments fall along the following line. If the Constitution’s first amendment right to free speech means anything, it means the right to free political speech. And without money to get the message out, political speech is like the tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it. Therefore, regulating campaign contributions violates free speech. For a greater exposition of some of the constitutional arguments against regulating campaign contributions, please see Part II of Bradley Smith’s _Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform._
Beyond the advocacy literature, there are two types of scholarly political science work on campaign finance. One camp consists of scholars who study Congress, parties, or Congressional elections. These researchers often discuss the aspects of campaign finance that overlap with their broader sub-fields. Other groups of scholars are specialists in campaign finance or related fields such as lobbying. What is consistent among these two groups is that most of the political science literature about campaign finance does not focus on how the campaign finance affects incumbent Congressional primaries. Specifically, there is a lack of analysis comparing how involved interest groups are in supporting incumbent challengers over time. Rather, the campaign finance literature focuses on the extent to which the evolving mix of campaign finance regulations have loosened FECA’s initial rules and strengthened parties, who play a key role in helping members raise campaign funds. Other research looks at who contributes to campaigns and finds that rather than changing votes, interest group PACs and lobbyists usually support members who share their policy goals.

Scholars observe that Supreme Court decisions loosened FECA’s initially tighter rules. Jacobson (2013) provides a summary of FECA rule changes from as far back as 1996, (2013, 131) that he sees as loosening the rules on “independent” expenditures set in 1976 by Buckley v. Valeo. Herrnson (2012) concluded that the recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Citizens United (2010), FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (2007), and McCain et al v. Wisconsin Right to Life (2007) “resulted in the court overturning several decades of campaign finance law, as well as some of its forerunners’ precedents (301).” He also writes that parties can use these looser rules on outside money to their advantage. He finds that the new set of campaign finance rules incentivizes parties to encourage the formation of 527 and 501(c)s of allied groups.13 While legal restrictions prevent parties from directly coordinating with these groups, Herrnson

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13 527 and 501(c) are references to the Federal tax status of these organizations.
states that 527s like American Crossroads GPS, which is led by two former Republican National Committee chairs and Karl Rove, are well positioned to raise funds from party donors.

Bernhard and Sulkin (2013) also see the looser restrictions on contributions as likely to lead to an increase in the overall level of spending on Congressional races including more outside spending (i.e., spending by 527s and 501(c)s) and a “redoubling of efforts by the parties and members of Congress to maintain their role in campaigns (146).” They explain that the redoubling is done to maintain the central role that “hill committees,” such as the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), which function as arms of Congressional leadership, play. These committees distribute the funds that they raise from both their members and other donors to their parties’ candidates in competitive general election races. Under the law, these distributions to candidates have hard ceilings. However, leadership and hill committees also coordinate donations from their safer members and incumbents with larger war chests to weaker members. Bernhard and Sulkin note that these coordinated donations from members are not merely “encouraged” by Congressional party leaders, rather these donations are “nearly compulsory” for ambitious members seeking to rise in their party’s leadership ranks.

Other researchers studying campaign contributions focus on who PACs contribute to and why. They find that rather than trying to buy votes, PACs often contribute to members who are most in line with the PAC’s policy goals. This work finds that PACs’ goals are to make sure their supporters remain in office. In addition, PACs “lobby” these friendly members to write and pass legislation (Hall and Deardorff, 2006).

**Primaries and Polarization**

Scholars who examined the link between primaries and Congressional polarization did not find a strong link between the two. Ansolabehere et al (2008) note that evidence for the
“folk wisdom” that primary voters are more extreme than general election voters is mixed. While Ansolabehere et al (2001) observe that several scholars including Huntington, Fiorina, Aldrich, and Polsby speculate that primaries pull candidates away from the center. The authors study of candidate positions in U.S. House elections found candidates tend to espouse their national party’s positions rather than their district’s positions. Also, Ansolabehere et al (2010; 2008) find a disconnect between when Congressional primaries became widely adopted in the 1930s and the emergence of ideological polarization in the 1980s. Ansolabehere et al ask, if the widespread use of primaries were the cause of polarization, why was there an incubation period? And Sides and Vavreck (2013) found that looking across several key factors, primary voters were very similar to other voters in their party. This suggests that primary voters are not more extreme than their party and that primaries do not necessarily pull politicians to more extreme policy positions. Boatright (2013) looked systematically at the behavior of incumbents who face primary challenges and concluded that incumbents who face primary challengers “tend to win anyway, and these incumbents do not behave differently in subsequent election cycles (15).” Although, in noting the success of ideological groups like the Club for Growth in occasionally helping to knock of an incumbent, Boatright concludes that it is impossible to know how many incumbents change their behavior out of fear of facing a primary challenger.

Looking more closely at Boatright’s work, he systematically examines four decades of incumbent primary challenges and finds that primary challenges are rare, incumbents seldom lose challenges, and there are “fewer primary challenges today than there were thirty years ago (14).” He also notes that the impact of PACs is not in their direct spending but rather their “orchestration of individual contributions.” Overall, Boatright is unconvinced that ideological primarying has increased since the 1970s, but he is certain that the leaders of groups such as
Stephen Moore at the Club for Growth have successfully convinced the media of their ability to affect primary outcomes.

Beyond Boatright, much of the Congressional primary scholarship focuses on open seat primaries. In general, this work finds that party influences outcomes and established party members are most likely to win. Some of the clearer results of this research can be found in the work of Dominguez and Grossman. Their work shows that endorsements by party members have a strong effect (Dominguez 2009 and Grossman and Dominguez 2009) on primary outcomes. Jacobson (2008) shows that the candidates who are most likely to win open seat primaries are not outsiders, but rather party insiders who have held seats at the state and local level.

_The Incumbent Advantage_

A well-established finding in the study of American politics is the incumbent advantage. A recent measurement by Friedman and Holden (2009) found that House incumbents were reelected over 95% of the time and, in recent decades, this percentage increased to almost 98%. Several explanations are commonly cited about why the advantage exists such as incumbent name recognition, district boundaries drawn to the advantage of the incumbent’s party, and that incumbents are quality candidates, i.e., candidates who won prior elections are proven winners and have what it takes to keep winning elections.

In addition, incumbents enjoy a fundraising advantage over their opponents, and outraising an opponent strongly correlates with electoral success. The literature on this last point goes as far back as 1978, when Jacobson observed that challengers who spent more, relative to incumbents, enjoyed higher levels of name recall, a critical element of electoral success. Jacobson (2013) also showed that challengers seldom raise and spend anywhere near the amount of incumbents. And this trend increased in recent decades. In general elections, during the


1970s, challengers spent about $0.66 for every dollar the incumbent they were challenging spent. In the most recent decade, challengers spent about $0.33 for every dollar the incumbent they were challenging spent. It is not a stretch to say that the incumbent advantage is as strong as ever—incumbents are reelected at as high a rate as ever, and they achieve more fundraising success than ever.

Yet, in the current electoral environment, in which money strongly favors incumbents and incumbents are routinely reelected, there are frequent press accounts of incumbents being primaried. Perhaps, in an era of “vanishing marginals,” red and blue states, and House districts carefully drawn to all but guarantee electoral control by one party or the other, primary challenges should be expected. After all, a district being safe for an incumbent’s party is not the same thing as the party’s nomination process being safe for an individual incumbent. Readers familiar with V.O. Key’s Southern Politics in State and Nation (1949) or other work about the one-party south of the early and middle twentieth century may find it quite predictable that as one-party control grips a district or state, electoral competition moves from the general election to the primary election.

Campaign Finance Reform Incentivized Ideological Groups to Organize Contributions

The tension between pragmatists and ideologues is a constant presence in the party nomination process, but its manifestation changes as rules change. The campaign finance regime that began with FECA provides more than enough latitude through which ideologues can attack pragmatists. Pragmatists seek to nominate moderate candidates who can appeal to the median general election voter while ideologues seek to nominate ideologically pure candidates. My claim is that the current rules empower outside groups, i.e., groups that are not part of the official party structure, because the rules make it difficult for parties to monopolize campaign contributions.
I do not assume more than Mayhew regarding members of Congress’s behavior. I only assume that members are “single minded seekers of reelection,” but the electoral environment changed during the 40 plus years since Mayhew published his theory. When Mayhew wrote his seminal work for candidate centered theories, Congress: The Electoral Connection, (1974), Congressional partisanship was near its nadir. An inescapable theme that comes from reading Mayhew is that voters in the 1960s and early 1970s lacked information about the legislation their members of Congress supported. This allowed incumbents to engage in credit claiming and position taking on policy issues because voters cared about policy, but there was little electoral incentive for members to follow through on their positions because voters were unable to tell whether follow-through occurred. Instead, incumbents worked hard at the provision of particularistic benefits for their districts, such as post offices and dams because voters could see the fruits of the incumbents’ efforts and appreciated them.

In Mayhew’s Congress, members’ roll call votes did not affect primary challenges. The roll call votes of incumbents were not monitored, now they are. Today, ideological, policy-oriented organizations monitor incumbents’ legislative behavior such as roll call votes because monitoring helps the organizations decide which incumbents to actively oppose. Generically, active opposition means supporting a challenger to the incumbent, which can manifest in many ways such as informing the incumbents’ constituents about the incumbents’ unpopular roll call votes. In addition, ideological organizations can make direct donations to an incumbent’s challengers, or groups can encourage their members and supporters, many of whom have no connection to the incumbent’s state or district, to contribute to the incumbent’s challengers. The net result is that unlike incumbents in the 1960s and early 1970s, ideological groups can affect whether or not incumbents face well-financed challengers.
Looking beyond Mayhew, most of the widely accepted political science theories about parties describe parties in the new institutionalism context and do not address incumbent primaries or incumbent challenges. However, without adding assumptions to these theories they can be extended to allow for, if not predict, incumbent challenges. Below, I show how ideologically motivated primary challenges fit well in Aldrich, Cox and McCubbins, and Cohen et al’s theories about parties.

Political science theorizing about parties has, in recent decades, congealed around the theory, most widely attributed to Aldrich (1995), that parties are creatures of the legislature. Schwartz (1989) provides the formal theory that is the basis for the notion that parties first form in the legislature. As creatures of ambitious legislators, Aldrich’s parties are meant to serve members, so the idea of party primaries serving to oust incumbent legislators seems anathema to a party’s purpose. However, one does not need to extend Aldrich’s theory far to see the seeds of Congressional primary challengers within Aldrich.

Aldrich emphasizes the party in elections rather than in the electorate. In other words, ordinary voters are not members of the party, they are consumers of it. Ideology is associated with parties because politicians need motivated and dedicated volunteers in order to win mass elections, so they make concessions to ideological voters who are motivated and dedicated. My claim is that primary challenges by candidates supported by outside ideological groups fit within Aldrich’s theory whenever incumbents make the calculation that their chances of winning the general election are decreased by conceding too much to their parties’ ideological voters. These motivated ideological voters then become susceptible to challengers who are willing to consent more to their goals. As a result, ideological voters support the nomination of ambitious candidates who make ideological appeals.
A second well established party theory, the cartel theory of Cox and McCubbins, also
does not directly address incumbent primaries, but their theory could be extended to predict that
party leaders will in almost all circumstances support their incumbents and attempt to steer their
legislative agenda away from their party’s extremes. In Cox and McCubbins’ theory, parties in
the House act as legislative cartels that provide public goods to their members and seek to corner
the market on the legislation their chamber passes. Party leaders work to gain or maintain
majority party status and they seek to maintain their leadership role within the party. This
requires their party to win the majority in the next election and the party’s members of Congress
to subsequently reelect their party leaders. Considering the high likelihood that most incumbents
will be reelected, it is in the party leaders’ interest to support their incumbents in party primaries.
Otherwise, those incumbents who survive the challenges (i.e., most of them) will have a strong
reason to not support the party leaders when they choose their leadership after the next election.

It is a short extension of Cox and McCubbins’ theory to predict that rational party leaders
will always attempt to balance the cartel’s legislative agenda between one that does not turn off
the majority of voters in the majority of districts, while still delivering policies for the party’s
more ideological members and supporters. Towards that end, the party leaders’ incentive is to
not allow the legislation their cartel passes to be so extreme that it hurts their party’s brand in the
general election. Going too far to either end can result in losing the majority or in subjecting the
parties’ rank and file members to primary challenges. But this balancing is never 100% which is
why ideological primary challenges occur.

A third more recent theory of parties by Cohen et al (2008) posits that parties are
creatures of interests. Not legislative interests, but rather, interest groups in the polity that seek
particular policies. While Aldrich sees parties functioning as long coalitions between members
of Congress, Cohen et al see parties as coalitions of interest groups, formed to promote interest
groups’ goals. The authors do not directly predict primary challenges to incumbents, but their theory almost requires them. The only other alternative for interests that are not receiving satisfaction from their elected members is to form or join another party.

None of these theories were designed to explain ideological primarying, but they all can allow for it. I believe that ideological primarying could occur under any of these theories when there is a representation problem. More specifically, Aldrich’s and Cox and McCubbins’ theories see parties as creatures of legislators. But when ideologues that support and help legislators win do not believe their interests are being represented by those legislators, they have the incentive to support a challenger. Of course, they could support a challenger from another party, but if that party is not appealing to the ideologues’ views, then they may support a challenger in the legislator’s party, i.e., a primary challenger. Similarly, under the Cohen et al theory, which posits parties as creatures of interests, when the interests do not believe they are being represented by the members of the parties they help elect, they have an incentive to support challengers that make appeals to them. In the case of contemporary American politics, by the 1980s small government conservatives found no satisfaction among Democrats and little more among Republican incumbents. The incentive for them to support primary challengers was there. Along with the incentive came the massive expansion of organized interest groups in the 1980s, which provided closer monitoring and dissemination of information about legislators’ behavior. Ideologues and other interests receiving this information then had the information they needed to decide which primary challengers to support. Over the last few decades, this dynamic has occurred against the backdrop of the information revolution, which accelerated the amount of information that could be both disseminated and received.
Chapter Three
Data and Measurement

This chapter describes how I obtained, cleaned, and organized the primary election data that I use to determine the empirical findings presented in chapters four, five and six. In this chapter, I first describe how I estimate group ideology scores for groups that make contributions to Congressional primaries. Next, I provide details on how I built the database used to measure and analyze primary contributions and vote share. Following that, I describe aggregate trends in the primary contribution data; this data is the basis of the independent variables used in the subsequent chapters. The contribution data trend discussion is presented separately for Senate and House primaries. After the data trend discussion, I provide a heuristic example of how I use the contribution data to create independent variables for my analysis. I then discuss the case selection rules that I use in this dissertation. In the next section, I discuss the endogeneity problem between candidates’ vote performances and candidates’ contributions. Finally, I describe the operational definition of several concepts, such as the difference between “ideological targeting” and “strategic ideological targeting,” that I empirically test in later chapters.

Estimating the Ideology of Groups Making Contributions

In order to measure candidates’ contributions from outside ideological groups, I developed a measure of interest group ideology using first dimension DW-Nominate scores and FEC committee (group) donation data. Groups form committees, commonly known as political action committees or PACs, in order to collect and distribute campaign funds in accordance with FEC regulations. The nominate score of each member of Congress that received a donation from a group was mapped onto the group making the donation. A weighted group ideology score was then calculated. The weights were based upon the proportion of the groups’ contributions that
were made to each candidate. The result was a unique imputed nominate score for each interest
group. The FEC committee data includes close to 70 different types of transactions that
committees can make to candidates. I used all the contribution categories to estimate
committees’ nominate scores including indirect spending such as independent expenditures for a
candidate, communication costs for a candidate, and honorarium paid.

I inspected the group nominate scores to examine whether they lined up with a left-right
ideological spectrum. I found that they did. An example using my imputed nominate scores
from three groups illustrates the results. The groups are (1) moveon.org, (2) the American
Dental Association (ADA), and (3) the Club for Growth. As many know, moveon.org is a
Liberal group formed in the wake of the President Clinton impeachment hearings. The ADA is a
trade association of dentists. The Club for Growth is a Conservative group that promotes lower
taxes. If my procedure of mapping nominate scores onto FEC committees accurately estimates
groups’ ideologies, I would expect moveon.org to have the most liberal (negative in nominate
metrics) score of the three. Along the same lines, I expected the ADA to have a moderate score
between moveon.org’s score and the Club for Growth’s score, and I expected the Club for
Growth to have the most Conservative (positive) score. The groups’ scores aligned with my
expectations. My results showed the nominate score for moveon.org’s political action committee
as -.36, the nominate score for the ADA’s political action committee as .05, and the nominate
score for the Club for Growth’s political action committee as .71.

Looking at all the committees for which I calculated nominate scores, the committee with
the most Liberal nominate score was the City of Alameda Democratic Club, a group of
Democratic activists based in the east bay area of California near Oakland. The group with the
most Conservative nominate score was the Liberty League, an organization formed to support
Conservative Democrats in the 1930s, that now supports only Republican candidates and receives large amounts of funding from the DuPont family.

I performed an additional test of the validity of my estimated group nominate scores by checking the imputed scores against a second metric that I calculated. The metric I calculated is the percentage of donations to Republican candidates by the group. This is the number of Republican candidates to whom a group donated, divided by the total number of candidates to whom a group donated. The correlation coefficient between this metric and my estimated group nominate scores was .9 and it was significant at the .001 level.

Measuring Primary Contributions and Vote Share

I built a data base to measure primary contributions and candidates’ primary performance. A critical source for this data base was FEC contribution data. I have reviewed multiple political science and journalistic articles that use summary data that the FEC provides. This shows summary details such as how much of a candidate’s contributions came from labor PACs versus corporate PACs. The data that I used to build my data base was not this summary data. Rather, it is the individual contribution data that is behind this summary data. The data can be found at


Preparing the data for analysis required substantial cleaning, merging, and aggregating of multiple raw data files. Many of the files that were created prior to the late 1990s included legacy characters due to earlier programming languages such as COBOL being saved in different formats; debugging this raw data was done at the individual file level prior to merging. The FEC produces separate files for each two-year election cycle, e.g., the files for 2008 include data reported from 2007 through 2008. The election cycle files go back to 1980; 1980 is the first year
with complete contributions data for all candidate committees. The 1980 files include some cases from 1970’s elections—mostly 1978. Inspection of the files shows that reporting for the 1970s is sporadic. Well over 95% of the candidates do not have committee data and the ones that do have only a few contribution records. While from the 1980s forward, contribution data is complete. For this reason, I use 1980 as the first year for my analysis.

I created a file that, after aggregations, included, for each candidate in a primary, their FEC contribution data, vote count and percentage, and ideology (if an incumbent) based on their nominate score. This was done by merging, for each of the two-year FEC periods, the following FEC files: “Committee Master File,” “Candidate Master File,” “Any Transaction from One Committee to Another File,” “Contributions to Candidates (and other expenditures) from Committee File,” and “Contributions by Individuals File.” The combined contribution data files for each year were then merged together. I next merged in a primary election results file that I built from multiple sources including data on primaries through 1992 that was provided by James Snyder. I merged DW-Nominate first dimension nominate scores into the file as well. I only counted contributions as primary election contributions if (1) the candidate participated in a Congressional primary and, (2) the FEC data showed that the contribution was designated as a primary contribution rather than a contribution for a general election or runoff. I used the contribution date field to distinguish between contributions to candidates who participated in multiple primaries. These criteria affect the number of cases I looked at. Specifically, in cases where an incumbent has a large war chest and runs against a weak primary challenger, both candidates may not receive any primary contributions. As a result, those incumbent primaries would be excluded from the analysis of incumbent primaries because there would be no donation data to examine.
Because of the hundreds of hours involved in cleaning, validating, and merging data, particularly the FEC data, for additional years, I capped the data analysis in this dissertation at 2008. As a result, the dissertation does not include analysis of the effect of primary spending in the tea party primaries. However, it does provide an ample baseline for contrasting the effects of primary spending in the tea party era. As noted in Chapter One, the electoral outcomes of the 2010 and 2012 primaries were not strong aberrations from trends in the prior decades.

*Primary Contributions*

Donations to primary candidates come from two sources, committees and individuals, which are reported in separate FEC files. Exhibit 3-1 shows the aggregate amounts contributed to candidates from these two sources in primaries held between 1980 and 2008. I chose this period because 1980 is the first year with comprehensive and complete FEC data, and 2008 is the last year for which I completed data cleaning, merging, and validating for this project. As shown in Exhibit 3-1, in the most recent years I examined, individual contributions outpaced committee contributions. The dollar values are inflation adjusted to reflect 2008 dollars.

Looking at the Senate, contributions from individuals increased from $60 million in 1980 to $177.5 million in 2008. The increase was not monotonic as some years saw pronounced dips relative to prior years. For example, in 2004, contributions from individuals totaled $269 million, surpassing the 2008 total by more than $91 million. Contributions to Senate primary candidates from committees were smaller. Between 1980 and 2008 they rose from $22 million to $65 million.

The amount of contributions to House primary candidates from both individuals and committees rose substantially between 1980 and 2008. Individual contributions increased from $45.6 million in 1980 to $274 million in 2008. While there are a couple instances of year-over-year declines, the last occurred in 1994. From 1994 through 2008, individual contributions
increase every year. As for committee contributions to House primaries, they increase from $43 million in 1980 to $183 million in 2008.

**Exhibit 3-1**

![Diagram showing contributions to primary candidates by source and chamber (2008 dollars).](image)

To prepare the contribution data for analysis, I first divided both chambers’ data between races in which a sitting incumbent participated, i.e., incumbent primaries and races in which no incumbent participated, i.e., non-incumbent primaries. Non-incumbent primaries are not necessarily open seat primaries because they include races where, for example, Republicans are nominating a candidate to run in the general election against a Democratic incumbent.

I organized the contribution data into three mutually exclusive categories. These categories are contributions from (1) outside ideological groups, (2) outside non-ideological groups, and (3) individuals and local groups. Contributions from outside ideological groups are based on the committee data for groups not based in the same state as the primary, with the 40% most extreme ideological scores. For Republican primaries this is the 40% most Conservative groups and for Democratic primaries this is the 40% most Liberal groups. The outside non-
ideological groups are based on contributions from committees with moderate scores that are not located in the same state as the primary. This includes contributions from groups like the ADA that have Nominate scores in the middle 20%. The last category combines individual contributions with local committees, i.e., committees in the same state as where the primary occurred. As I demonstrate below, the level of contributions from local groups is small, almost negligible. Most groups that form committees tend to be based in the Washington, D.C. area. Combining local groups’ contributions with individual contributions has almost no effect on the magnitude of individual contributions. Combining them allows me to create more parsimonious models by reducing the number of independent variables in my models while still controlling for all the contributions that candidates received.

**Senate Primary Contribution Data**

Exhibit 3-2 shows non-incumbent primaries in the Senate. The first of the two panels, on the left, includes a separate trend line for contributions from local committees. These are illustrated by the dashed, blue line at the bottom of the graph. In the second panel, the values associated with the contributions from local committees are added to the individual contributions in the solid, orange line at the top. Comparing the orange line in the second panel with the purple line in the first panel shows that combining individuals and local committees’ contributions had no noticeable effect on the trend for individual contributions. For example, in 2008, the value of local committee contributions to Senate primary candidates was $332,681. This was less than 1% of the $41.3 million contributed to primary candidates by individuals. Also of note in Exhibit 3-2, is that the non-ideological groups’ contributions, depicted by the dashed, green line, are greater than ideological groups’ contributions. As the exhibits that follow Exhibit 3-2 will show, this pattern holds for both incumbent and non-incumbent primaries in both chambers.
A salient feature of Exhibit 3-2 is the high amount of election-to-election variation in individual donation levels. When looking at this variation, it is important to keep in mind that, in any given election year, there may be very few competitive Senate primaries, and the number can swing substantially between years. For example, in 1996, there were 22 distinct non-incumbent primary races in the Senate, while in 2008 there were 8. Of the years I examined with complete data, the lowest was 1982 when there were only four non-incumbent primaries. Because of the small n, a couple of competitive primaries in a cycle can cause candidates to seek and receive more donations and cause the aggregate amounts to spike. Likewise, the lack of competitive races can cause the totals to nose dive. When I look at House contributions, which are discussed later in this section, the year-to-year variation is diminished because there are a more consistent number of primaries from year-to-year in the House.

**Exhibit 3-2**

Exhibit 3-3 provides a breakdown, by party, of the contributions to Senate primaries in which no incumbent participated. It demonstrates that individual contributions are the dominate
form of contributions in both parties. Further, it shows that the year-to-year variation in contributions, while varying for both parties, varies more for Democrats than Republicans.

**Exhibit 3-3**

**CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIMARIES WITH NO INCUMBENTS PARTICIPATING**  
(SENATE RACES: 1980-2008)

Local Committees and Individuals

Non-Ideological Outside Committees

Ideological Outside Committees

Exhibit 3-4 shows contributions made to incumbent primaries in the Senate. As with Exhibit 3-2, comparing the two panels shows almost no difference in the individual donation trend line when local contributions are added to individual contributions. Also of note, individual contributions greatly outweigh the various types of group contributions. Although, these group contributions are greater in incumbent primaries than in non-incumbent primaries. This can be seen by comparing the red and green trend lines in Exhibit 3-4 (incumbent primaries) to Exhibit 3-2 (non-incumbent primaries).
Exhibit 3-4 shows a breakdown of Senate incumbent primaries by party. One notable feature is the relatively low amount of outside ideological money in these races. This does not stem from a low number of Senate incumbents receiving ideological money. Between 1980 and 2008, 99% of the incumbents who sought reelection received at least one contribution from outside ideological groups. What is rare is an incumbent challenger receiving funding from an outside ideological group. This only occurs in 10% of the cases in which a Senate incumbent sought re-nomination. When an additional selection criteria is added, that is, when I look at (1) incumbents who sought re-nomination and (2) incumbents who faced at least one primary challenger, the percentage increases to 25%. In other words, three out of four primary challenged Senate incumbents do not face an opponent supported by outside ideological groups.

In the House, only 5% of all incumbents seeking re-nomination face a challenger who receives support from outside ideological groups. When looking only at re-nomination seeking House incumbents who face at least one challenger, the percentage increases to 18%.
Exhibit 3-5

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIMARIES WITH AN INCUMBENT PARTICIPATING
(SENATE RACES: 1980-2008)

LOCAL COMMITTEES AND INDIVIDUALS
IDEOLOGICAL OUTSIDE COMMITTEES
NON-IDEOLOGICAL OUTSIDE COMMITTEES

House Primary Contribution Data

Exhibit 3-6 is similar to Exhibit 3-2. The difference is that Exhibit 3-6 looks at non-incumbent House primaries rather than non-incumbent Senate primaries. As with Senate races, the largest source of contributions, especially in more recent elections, were individuals. Like the Senate, combining contributions from local groups with individual contributions does not distort the trend of individual donations.
Exhibit 3-6 breaks out the contributions to non-incumbent House primaries by party. The two parties show similar trends, with individual contributions outpacing local group contributions in most years. One difference is that Democrats, in recent years, show a higher, more consistently increasing level of donations from individuals. Also different is the spike in group contributions to Republican primaries in the early 1980s. This did not occur in Democratic primaries.
Exhibit 3-7 illustrates contribution trends in incumbent House primaries. One salient difference in these primaries compared to those shown above is the higher level of outside group contributions. In the most recent years examined, the combined donations from ideological and non-ideological outside groups into House incumbent primaries equal almost 80% of the amount contributed by local groups and individuals. For example, in 2008, local groups and individuals contributed $190.3 million to House incumbent primaries while outside groups contributed $148.9 million. Looking back prior to 1996 shows that in all the incumbent House primaries through 1994, outside contributions actually surpassed individual and local contributions. So, the high levels of outside contributions in recent elections are a relative decline, proportionally, compared to the earlier period.
Unpacking Exhibit 3-8 by party, as illustrated in Exhibit 3-9, shows that the high levels of group contributions into House incumbent primaries, relative to other sources, are greater for Democrats than Republicans. Non-ideological group contributions, as shown by the green trend line, to Democratic incumbent primaries far outpace Republicans. Although, non-ideological outside group contributions to Republican incumbent primaries rose after the party won the House majority in 1994. These contributions increased year over year until 2006, the year the Republicans lost the majority, and then declined in absolute and relative terms in 2008. Outside ideological contributions to incumbent House primaries are, as shown by the dashed red line, greater for Democrats than Republicans. While both parties received a higher volume of donations from non-ideological groups, the Democrats’ ideological group trend line is, in some cycles, three times the size of the Republicans’ trend line.
Exhibit 3-9

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIMARIES WITH AN INCUMBENT PARTICIPATING
(HOUSE RACES: 1980-2008)

LOCAL COMMITTEES AND INDIVIDUALS
NON-IDEOLOGICAL OUTSIDE COMMITTEES
IDEOLOGICAL OUTSIDE COMMITTEES

DEMOCRATS

REPUBLICANS

IN MILLIONS

1980  2008

Party Contributions

I want to note the role of party money in this data. The FEC data identifies party committees. These are committees like the DCCC and other committees that are legal designated political committees of the national and state Democratic parties. While these committees are active in making general election contributions, I saw very little party money in primaries. Ninety percent of primary candidates received 3% or less of their contributions from parties. In fact, in incumbent primaries, party committees simply do not support incumbent challengers. Because of their small number of primary contributions, I do not break out party committee contributions from other contributions.

Questions Related to Contribution Data

Overall, the contribution trends depicted in the above charts raise several questions. One question that is very germane to my analysis is, given the relatively low amount of outside ideological contributions in primaries, particularly in Senate Republican incumbent primaries, should we expect these contributions to affect primary outcomes? The empirical data in the
following chapters shows that outside ideological contributions have their largest effect in Senate Republican incumbent primaries where they comprise the smallest percentage of all contributions. Moreover, the data I present shows that the effects of outside ideological contributions are smallest where their percentage of all contributions is largest (Democratic incumbent primaries in the House). This suggests that other dynamics are in place that lead to outside ideological contributions having a greater effect among Senate Republicans. These are discussed in Chapter Seven.

Assigning Candidates a Percentage of Contributions

The plots and regression results presented in the following chapters use, as independent variables, each candidate’s percentage of contributions made to all candidates. The contribution percentages are categorized into contributions from the three contribution sources discussed above. These are (1) outside non-ideological groups, (2) outside ideological groups, and (3) individuals and local groups. A percentage for each of these categories is assigned to a candidate in each unique primary. For each primary race, the amount each candidate received from each of the three contribution sources is divided by the total amount of all contributions to all candidates in the primary. This yielded a data set where, for each primary candidate, I could examine the candidate’s vote percentage as a function of the candidate’s percentage of all contributions that were ideological outside group contributions, non-ideological outside group contributions, or local and individual contributions. In this dissertation, when I refer to the percentage of “outside ideological contributions,” or other percentages of contributions that a candidate received, the above description is how those percentages are calculated.

The following is a heuristic example of how these percentages are calculated, which is also illustrated in Exhibit 3-10. Assume a party primary with two candidates in which the total value of all contributions made to both candidates is $100. Then 100 will be the denominator for
all independent variable calculations. If candidate A receives $10 from outside ideological groups, then the percentage value assigned to candidate A for the independent variable called “Outside Ideological Groups” would be 10%, i.e., 100 X ($10 ÷ $100). If candidate A also receives $30 from outside non-ideological groups, then the percentage value assigned to candidate A for the independent variable called “Outside Non-Ideological Groups” would be 30%, i.e., 100 X ($30 ÷ $100). Finally, if candidate A also receives $25 from local and individual sources, then candidate A’s value for the independent variable called “Local and Individuals” would be 30%, i.e., 100 X ($30 ÷ $100).

### Exhibit 3-10

**Example of Method for Assigning Percentages for Each Primary Candidate’s Contribution Source**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Contribution</th>
<th>Candidate A</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Candidate B</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total All Candidates</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dollars From Source</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Dollars From Source</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Dollars From Source</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Dollars From Source</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Ideological Groups</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>$20</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>$30</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Non-Ideological Groups</td>
<td>$30</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>35%</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local and Individuals</td>
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<td>25%</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Case Selection

Except for the analyses in which I specifically state that I am using different case selection rules, I use consistent case selection filters throughout this dissertation. As a result, when I examine a specific primary type/party/chamber/time combination, I use the same cases in each analysis I report. For example, readers will notice that when I analyze incumbent primaries from 1980 through 2008, my filters consistently select 83 Senate Republican incumbents, 82 Senate Democratic incumbents, 460 House Republican incumbents, and 922 House Democratic incumbents.

In order to be transparent about how I chose the cases I examine, I provide the following summary about my selection criteria for Republican Senate incumbents between 1994 and 2008. Initially, I selected all the Senate Republican incumbents who ran in a regularly scheduled, (i.e., non-special election) partisan primary between 1994 and 2008. This totaled 107 unique incumbent cases. I next excluded cases where the incumbent did not have a primary opponent, i.e., only challenged incumbents. This reduced the cases from 107 to 46. Forty-six constitutes all the cases I analyzed for Republican Senate incumbents between 1994 and 2008.

Below, I summarize additional selection rules that I applied to all primaries I examine. None of these rules further reduced the 46 1994-2008 Republican Senate incumbents in the pool, but they do affect the number of cases examined in different time periods, chambers, or parties. These rules are as follows.

1) The primary had to be closed or semi-closed. That is, the purpose of the primary was to nominate a candidate from the party being examined (i.e., a Democratic or Republican candidate) for the general election. Multi-party primaries are not included.

2) House races where redistricting resulted in two or more incumbents facing off against each other were not counted as incumbent primaries. These cases were dropped.
3) Cases where a candidate’s name was on the ballot, but the candidate was incapacitated, died, or dropped out without their name being removed from the ballot are excluded.

4) I required at least one candidate in each unique primary to have received at least one contribution.

Challengers, Targeting, and Strategic Targeting

In Chapter Six, I examine whether outside ideological groups are strategic about the incumbents they challenge. Below, I am explicit about the terminology I use. A “challenged” incumbent is an incumbent who has a primary opponent. I do not include write-in candidates as part of my selection rules for determining if an incumbent is challenged. A “targeted” incumbent is a challenged incumbent in a primary where the incumbent challenger receives contributions from outside ideological groups. Simple “ideological targeting” occurs if more moderate incumbents systematically face more outside ideological group supported primary challengers than more ideological incumbents face. “Strategic ideological targeting” refers to outside ideological groups accounting for how safe a state or district is for the party when making decisions about ideological targeting.

Endogeneity of Contributions or the Ingratiation Problem

A problem with statistical modeling that treats campaign contributions as a causal factor of candidate vote performance is that contributions may be endogenous. Candidates who are likely to win collect bandwagon money from those who want to ingratiate themselves with the winner. In other words, being likely to win may cause contributions. In the context of this concern, I want to discuss the focus of the contribution analysis in this dissertation: the effect of outside ideological contributions on primary candidate’s vote performance. While I think the ingratiation problem is a real concern when interpreting the relationship between non-ideological contributions and vote performance, it is much less plausible a problem when looking at the contributions of groups formed around policy goals such as the Club for Growth and EMILY’s
List, who are trying to make winners rather trying to get on winners’ good sides. While money is tainted, ideological money is much less so. The main reason I include non-ideological contributions in my models is to use them as a control variable. It is therefore quite notable that, despite its relative non-endogeneity, ideological money turns out, as the following chapters show, to often be the most important contribution variable.

In addition, there are a couple of other reasons that I use models that specify vote performance as a function of contributions. Primarily, while contributions may be endogenous they are still the best way to understand what happened, i.e., who supported who. In a similar vein, even if money has no causal effect, it allows us to see who the ideological candidates are and the conditions under which they emerge (e.g., when the incumbent is too moderate).

Incumbent Ideology

In parts of my analysis, I separate incumbents into three ideological groups. This is always done within a chamber and party. I use a 25%-50%-25% assignment method, which is based on DW Nominate scores. For example, moderate House Democrats are the 25% of House Democrats with most moderate, i.e., least Liberal DW Nominate scores (scores closer to 1). Continuing the example, House Democrats who are categorized as ideologues or ideologically extreme are House Democrats with the 25% most Liberal DW Nominate scores (scores closer to -1). Mainstream House Democrats are defined as those incumbents with the 50% of DW Nominate scores that fall between the moderates and ideologues. Among House Republicans, a similar approach is used with the 25% most Conservative DW Nominate scores (scores closer to 1) being used to define ideologues, the middle 50% of scores being used to define mainstream House Republicans, and 25% most Liberal scores (scores closer to -1) being used to define moderate House incumbents. Scores are assigned based on their percentile in the pooled time period, i.e., 1980-2008. I do not reassign scores when I break the pooled time period into sub-time periods.
Chapter Four

The Effect of Ideological Money in Non-Incumbent Primaries

In recent election cycles, non-incumbent primaries provided salient examples of how ideological outside groups support for an ideologue crippled GOP fortunes in the general election. The 2010 cases of Christine O’Donnell in Delaware and Sharon Angle in Nevada saw establishment Republican candidates losing nominations to ideological candidates. In the case of O’Donnell, she had never before held office and she defeated Michael Castle (previously a governor and a member of the U.S. House of Representatives) in the Republican primary. In her path to a surprise primary victory, Ms. O’Donnell received funding from multiple outside ideological groups such as Sarah Palin’s PAC, SarahPAC, and the Senate Conservative’s Fund, which frequently supports primary challengers to moderate Republicans. Under the assumption that Castle would secure the Republican nomination, political handicappers such as Charles Cook at Cook Political Report rated the 2010 Delaware Senate race between a “slight lean Democrat” to a “toss-up.” After securing the Republican nomination, O’Donnell subsequently lost the general election by 17 percentage points to Democrat, Chris Coons. In the case of Nevada, Republicans held a non-incumbent primary in order to select a candidate to challenge Democratic Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid. Early polling showed Reid as vulnerable, with many forecasting a Reid loss to Republican primary candidates Danny Tarkanian or Sue Lowden. But with financial support from outside ideological groups such as Freedomworks, Sharon Angle won the Republican nomination over these establishment supported candidates. She then went on to lose the general election to Senator Reid by five percentage points. This outcome supports the interpretation that Angle’s nomination cost the GOP the opportunity to not only pick up a seat but to knock off the majority leader who had, on several high profile occasions, used parliamentary procedures to outmaneuver Senate Republicans.
This chapter analyzes the proposition that support from outside ideological groups results in parties nominating more ideological candidates. It then investigates the roll call voting of these outside ideological group supported candidates when they are in office. First, I show the bivariate relationships between primary vote share and the three types of contributions described in Chapter Three. The bivariate analysis establishes that candidates who receive higher proportions of ideological contributions also receive higher percentages of primary votes. However, the bivariate analyses show that candidates who receive more of each type of contribution, not just outside ideological contributions, receive higher vote percentages. Next, I present results for multivariate regressions that simultaneously control for all three types of contributions. The multivariate analysis shows that in aggregate, for Republicans, outside ideological contributions have a stronger effect on primary performance than other types of contributions. Moreover, moving past vote share and looking at which candidates win, among both parties in both chambers, ideological contributions have a clear effect on candidates’ likelihood of winning their party’s nomination. In addition, I show that there is evidence that the winners of House non-incumbent primaries who had stronger support from outside ideological groups go on to post more extreme roll call votes in Congress than winners with less support from outside ideological groups. The evidence is more mixed in the Senate. The coefficient for Senate Republicans is large, but it is only significant at the .1 level. The finding for Senate Democrats is flat.

_Bivariate Relationships for Non-Incumbent Primaries_

The FECA era, non-incumbent primary, bivariate relationships between candidate vote percentage and each of the three contribution categories are depicted in the plots below. The results show that the largest effect occurs with outside ideological contributions. For both parties in both chambers, the slope coefficients for candidate vote percentage as a function of outside
ideological contributions are larger than the slope coefficients for candidate vote percentage as a function of either outside non-ideological contributions or individual and local contributions. The largest effect of outside ideological contributions occurs in Senate Republican primaries. Because the statistical estimates presented below include multiple candidates from the same primary, I calculated heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Please see the Chapter Four appendix for a description of the error calculations.

Exhibit 4-A shows that, when looking at bivariate relationships, outside ideological contributions’ largest effect occurs in Republican Senate primaries. In addition, Exhibit 4-A illustrates that outside ideological contributions have a statistically significant effect (at the 0.01 level) on vote percentages in both parties and in both chambers with the smallest effect occurring among House Democrats. For non-incumbent, Republican Senate candidates, a one percentage point increase in the amount of contributions from outside ideological sources increases their vote percentage by 2.9 percentage points. The correlation coefficient (r) is .78. Senate Democrats are second with a 2.4 vote percentage point increase for each additional percentage point increase in outside ideological contributions. Their correlation coefficient is .74. House Republicans are third with a 2.0 percentage point increase, and House Democrats are last with a 1.6 percentage point increase. The Republican and Democratic House candidates’ correlation coefficients are .64 and .69 respectively.
Exhibit 4-A

Exhibit 4-B shows that the strong positive relationship between a candidate’s contribution level and vote percentages are not unique to outside ideological contributions. However, while the strongest effect for outside ideological contributions occurs among Republican Senate candidates, the strongest effect for outside non-ideological contributions occurs among Senate Democratic primary candidates. For Senate Democratic primary candidates, each one point increase in the percentage of outside non-ideological contributions results in a 1.9 percentage point vote increase. The effects of non-ideological contributions are positive and statistically significant among both parties in both chambers. The other slope coefficients are 1.7 for Senate Republicans, 1.5 for House Republicans, and 1.4 for House Democrats. The correlation coefficients varied by six percentage points with a high of .74 among Senate Democrats and a low of .68 among House Republicans.
In fact, the relationship between non-incumbent primary candidates’ contribution percentages and their vote percentages are strong for all three types of contributions. Exhibit 4-C shows strong positive relationships between candidates’ percentage of contributions from individual and local sources and their primary vote percentages. The largest slope coefficient occurs among Senate Republican candidates where a one percentage point increase in individual and local contributions is associated with a .92 percentage point increase in the candidate’s primary vote. The smallest slope coefficient, .77, occurs among Senate Democrats, while the slope coefficients for House Republicans and House Democrats are .80 and .79 respectively. The correlation coefficients are .79 for Senate Republicans, .73 for House Republicans, .71 for Senate Democrats, and .67 for House Democrats.
Overall, the bivariate plots show contributions from all sources affect candidate vote share, i.e., the more money non-incumbent primary candidates raise relative to other primary candidates, the better they perform. The largest coefficients stemmed from outside ideological contributions. To examine the relationship between vote share and contribution source, while holding the other sources constant, I created multivariate models with all three contribution sources as independent variables. These models include a control variable for the number of candidates.

**Candidate Vote Percentages and Multivariate Non-Incumbent Primary Models**

To determine the effects of the different sources of campaign contributions when controlling for other contribution sources, I use all three contribution sources as independent variables in a multivariate regression. The dependent variable is, as in the plots above, each candidate’s vote percentage. I also include an independent variable to control for the number of
candidates in the primary, which was calculated by dividing 1 by the number of candidates in each race.

I apply this model to each party in each chamber while testing four different case selection criteria. The first criterion selects all incumbent primaries. The second criterion selects competitive states/districts where the incumbent’s party’s presidential candidate received between 40% and 60% of the vote. The third criterion selects districts that are safe for the incumbent’s party where the incumbent party’s presidential candidate received more than 60% of the vote. The last criterion selects states and districts that are uncompetitive for the party; these are states and districts where the party’s presidential candidate received less than 40% of the vote. My discussion of the results pays little attention to this last group because it is comprised of nominations where the winner is unlikely to be competitive in the general election. Exhibit 4-D summarizes the ideological outside contributions’ coefficients from the multivariate models. The exhibit includes results for all the models for competitive and safe seats.

When looking at all the states and districts in which a party’s candidates competed in non-incumbent primaries, ideological outside contributions’ strongest effects occur in Republican primaries. The results in Exhibit 4-D show that outside ideological contributions play an important role in Republican Senate primaries under all three of the depicted selection criteria and also have significant and positive effects in Republican House primaries in competitive districts. It is only in safe Republican House districts where outside ideological contributions are not statistically significant. In contrast to Senate Republicans, outside ideological contributions do not have a significant effect in Senate Democratic primaries. Among House Democratic primary candidates, there is a positive effect for safe Democratic seats, but not for competitive Democratic seats.
While outside ideological contributions are statistically significant under only two of the six selection criteria for non-incumbent Democratic primaries, the opposite is the case for outside non-ideological contributions. As shown in Exhibit 4-E, outside non-ideological contributions are significant in four of the six selection criteria for non-incumbent Democratic primaries. The two insignificant coefficients for the Democratic models occur when Democratic safe seats in both the House and Senate are examined. The all seat and competitive seat selection criteria are significant in both chambers for Democratic candidates. Among Republican House candidates, outside non-ideological contributions are significant and positive under all three selection criteria; in fact, the largest coefficient in Exhibit 4-E is associated with safe Republican House seats. However, among Republican Senate candidates, while outside non-ideological contributions are significant when safe Republican Senate seats are examined, these contributions are not significant when all Republican Senate seats are examined, nor when competitive Republican Senate seats are examined.
Support from individual donors and local groups is critical to candidates’ primary performances. As shown in Chapter 3, individual and local contributions are the largest of the three sources I examined. In addition, individual and local contributions are significant in all the models of non-incumbent primaries that I examine in this chapter and the effect size is similar between parties and chamber. The various coefficients are summarized in Exhibit 4-F. The exhibit shows a fairly narrow spread from model to model and across parties. In 11 of the 12 models, the difference between the largest and smallest coefficient is .14 points. In other words, in the models with the largest effect, House Democrats in safe Democratic seats and Senate Republicans in competitive Republican seats, a one percentage point increase in the individual and local contributions received by a candidate increases their share of the primary vote by .57 of a percentage point. While for the model with the eleventh highest coefficient, a one percentage point increase in the individual and local contributions received by a candidate increases their share of the primary vote by .43 of a percentage point. The lowest coefficient occurs among Senate Democrats running in primaries for safe Democratic seats.
Looking at the full multivariate results for each party in each chamber, Exhibit 4-G depicts the results for Republican Senate candidates in non-incumbent primaries. Outside ideological contributions have the largest coefficients under each of the three selection criteria on which I focus, and all the coefficients are statistically significant at the .01 level.\(^{14}\) The outside ideological coefficients are more than twice the size of the individual and local contribution coefficients, which are also significant at the .01 level in all four models. Outside non-ideological contributions are not significant at the .05 level in any of the Senate Republican models.

\[^{14}\text{The coefficient in safe Democratic states is not statistically significant, but I am not focusing on these nominations because the nominee has little chance of winning the general election in those states.}\]
The results for Democratic candidates in non-incumbent Senate primaries contrast with the results for Republican candidates for two of the contributions variables. These differences are seen by comparing the Democratic results in Exhibit 4-H to the Republican results in Exhibit 4-G. While outside ideological contributions show the largest coefficients among Republican Senate candidates, Exhibit 4-H shows that they are smaller and not statistically significant at the .05 level among Democratic Senate candidates. And while outside non-ideological contributions are not statistically significant at the .05 level in any of the Republican models, outside non-ideological contributions show the largest, statistically significant effects of all the contribution variables in two of the Democratic models. The one contribution variable where Republican and Democratic Senate primary candidates are similar is individual and local contributions; these are statistically significant in all the models. The consistency of the individual and local contribution variable’s effect and statistical significance demonstrates the necessity of financial
support from individuals in order for candidates to wage competitive non-incumbent Senate primaries.

**Exhibit 4-H**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>OUTSIDE NON-IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>INDIVID AND LOCAL MONEY</th>
<th>1/NUMBER OF CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE DEMOCRATS Adj. R² = .78/n=198</td>
<td>.75 (.98)</td>
<td>.51 (.42)</td>
<td>.79** (.31)</td>
<td>.47**** (.05)</td>
<td>43.74**** (7.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE DEMOCRATS (COMPETITIVE STATES) Adj. R² = .80/n=138</td>
<td>.36 (2.45)</td>
<td>.49 (.38)</td>
<td>.70** (.28)</td>
<td>.51*** (.05)</td>
<td>44.64*** (8.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE DEMOCRATS (SAFE DEMOCRATIC STATES) Adj. R² = .74/n=44</td>
<td>1.31 (3.43)</td>
<td>3.13* (1.75)</td>
<td>-.79 (1.34)</td>
<td>.36** (.16)</td>
<td>38.51** (17.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE DEMOCRATS (SAFE DEMOCRATIC STATES) Adj. R² = .74/n=16</td>
<td>1.63 (10.55)</td>
<td>-1.39 (.95)</td>
<td>2.26*** (.58)</td>
<td>.42* (.21)</td>
<td>45.44 (3.497)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 4-I illustrates the results for models depicting non-incumbent House Republican primaries. The most notable difference between the House models and Senate models is the sample size. When all House Republican cases are examined together the n is 1,482, which contrasts with the n of 209 when all Senate Republican cases are examined together. Under two of the selection criteria, all House Republicans’ and House Republicans’ in competitive districts, outside ideological contributions are the largest of the contribution coefficients. But outside ideological contributions are not significant in primaries for safe Republican seats. Also, the House Republican models again demonstrate the importance of individual contributions that were seen in the Senate results. Under each of the three selection criteria on which I focus, the individual and local contribution variable’s slope coefficient is close to .5 and significant at the .01 level.
Exhibit 4-J displays the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results for non-incumbent Democratic primaries in the House. Similar to their effect on Democratic non-incumbent primaries in the Senate (see Exhibit 4-H), outside non-ideological contributions have a large and statistically significant effect on primary outcomes in two of the models for House Democrats. Non-ideological outside contributions have the largest slope coefficients when all House Democratic candidates are evaluated and when candidates in competitive districts are evaluated. Also like Senate Democratic races, outside non-ideological contributions do not have a statistically significant effect in safe Democratic districts. However, unlike the results among Senate Democrats, which show no statistically significant effects for outside ideological contributions, House primaries, show statistically significant effects for outside ideological contributions when all Democratic races are examined and in safe Democratic seats. In fact, in safe Democratic districts, outside ideological contributions have the largest coefficient. The results for non-incumbent House Democratic primaries again illustrate the importance of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>OUTSIDEIDEOLOGICALMONEY</th>
<th>OUTSIDE NON-IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>INDIVID AND LOCAL MONEY</th>
<th>1/NUMBER OF CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE REPUBLICANS</td>
<td>-.08 (.50)</td>
<td>.57*** (.15)</td>
<td>.48*** (.11)</td>
<td>.49*** (.02)</td>
<td>50.78*** (2.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .79/n=1,482</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE REPUBLICANS (COMPETITIVE STATES)</td>
<td>.03 (.68)</td>
<td>.83*** (.19)</td>
<td>.33** (.14)</td>
<td>.48*** (.03)</td>
<td>50.37*** (2.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .79/n=981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE REPUBLICANS (SAFE REPUBLICAN STATES)</td>
<td>-.12 (.77)</td>
<td>.15 (.29)</td>
<td>.81*** (.17)</td>
<td>.54*** (.04)</td>
<td>46.61*** (4.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .81/n=403</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE REPUBLICANS (SAFE DEMOCRATIC STATES)</td>
<td>-.11 (2.46)</td>
<td>.27 (.24)</td>
<td>.33 (.24)</td>
<td>.43* (.06)</td>
<td>60.65 (9.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .75/n=98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
individual and local support that is demonstrated in the above exhibits as well. The individual and local coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.01 level in all of Exhibit 4-J’s models.

**Exhibit 4-J**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>OUTSIDE NON-IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL AND LOCAL SUPPORT</th>
<th>1/NUMBER OF CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE DEMOCRATS</td>
<td>0.06 (.30)</td>
<td>0.44*** (.09)</td>
<td>0.56*** (.08)</td>
<td>0.45*** (.02)</td>
<td>52.27 (2.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE DEMOCRATS (COMPETITIVE STATES)</td>
<td>0.01 (.67)</td>
<td>0.28 (.11)</td>
<td>0.67*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.44*** (.03)</td>
<td>53.51*** (3.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE DEMOCRATS (SAFE DEMOCRATIC STATES)</td>
<td>0.36 (.95)</td>
<td>1.09** (.46)</td>
<td>0.43 (.29)</td>
<td>0.57*** (.06)</td>
<td>36.71*** (6.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE DEMOCRATS (SAFE REPUBLICAN STATES)</td>
<td>0.08 (1.97)</td>
<td>0.48*** (.12)</td>
<td>0.46*** (.08)</td>
<td>0.38*** (.05)</td>
<td>57.55*** (6.99)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at all the above models together, there are four findings about contributions and vote performance in non-incumbent primaries that I want to emphasize. First, candidates who receive higher proportions of contributions perform better. While all the contribution slope coefficients are not statistically significant, they all have positive point estimates. Second, individual and local support is always important; regardless of party or chamber, candidates need support from individuals and local sources in order to gain votes. Third, outside ideological contributions play an important role in determining vote performance in many Republican primaries; the effects of outside ideological contributions on Democratic primaries are less consistent. There is no clear relationship between outside ideological contributions and vote performance among Democratic Senators, while in the House, outside ideological contributions have a strong impact on primaries in safe Democratic districts, but not on primaries in competitive Democratic districts. And fourth, the stronger findings for the effect of outside
ideological contributions on Republicans running for competitive seats relative to Democrats running for competitive seats suggests that Republicans who eventually win these competitive or swing seats are more dependent on the support of outside ideological groups than Democrats who win these swing seats.

Likelihood of Winning and Multivariate Non-Incumbent Primary Models

The above models show the relationship between candidates’ contributions and vote share. They do not directly address the link between contributions, vote share, and winning. To examine the likelihood of winning, I built multivariate logistic models with a dependent variable coded as 1 for candidates who won their primary and 0 for candidates who lost. I focus the models on all candidates by party and chamber, i.e., not breakouts by state/district competitiveness. This allows me to compare the logistic models to the overall findings for the vote percentage models while using all available cases.
Exhibit 4-K

NON-INCUMBENT PRIMARIES
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EQUALS 1 IF CANDIDATE WON, 0 IF LOST
CELLS SHOW B COEFFICIENT AND (STANDARD ERRORS)/EXP(B) FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT (SE)</th>
<th>OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL MONEY (SE)</th>
<th>OUTSIDE NON-IDEOLOGICAL MONEY (SE)</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL AND LOCAL CONTRIBUTIONS (SE)</th>
<th>1/NUMBER OF CANDIDATES (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE REPUBLICANS /n=209</td>
<td>-3.61*** (.08)</td>
<td>.66*** (.18)</td>
<td>-.07 (07)</td>
<td>.07*** (.02)</td>
<td>-3.84 (2.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE DEMOCRATS /n=198</td>
<td>-3.38*** (.76)</td>
<td>.67*** (.33)</td>
<td>.01 (22)</td>
<td>.05*** (.01)</td>
<td>-3.71*** (2.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE REPUBLICANS /n=1,482</td>
<td>-3.35*** (.22)</td>
<td>.23*** (.04)</td>
<td>.06** (.03)</td>
<td>.05*** (.01)</td>
<td>-3.35*** (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE DEMOCRATS /n=1,431</td>
<td>-3.45*** (.23)</td>
<td>.09*** (.03)</td>
<td>.12*** (.09)</td>
<td>.06*** (.01)</td>
<td>-.64 (.78)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 4-K shows the results for the logistic regression models. The largest contribution coefficients occur for outside ideological contributions in the Senate. These results are likely influenced by the large portion of Senate primaries in which only one candidate received ideological contributions. Among Senate Democrats, only one candidate received outside ideological contributions in 43% of the non-incumbent primaries and that candidate won all of those primaries. Among Senate Republicans, only one candidate received outside ideological contributions in 36% of the non-incumbent primaries and that candidate won all but one of those primaries.

The results presented in Exhibit 4-K reflect multivariate logistic model coefficients and error predictions. I created Exhibit 4-K-B to help interpret the magnitude of the outside ideological contribution coefficients. In Exhibit 4-K-B, I depict the probability of winning a non-incumbent primary by setting all other parameters in the model to their median while varying the outside ideological contribution variable between its 10th and 90th percentile, which for all four chamber-party combinations is between 0% and 20%. In other words, in all four
models, the 90th percentile of a candidate’s percentage of all contributions that are outside ideological contributions is a value that is less than 20%. Consistent with the larger coefficients in the Senate models, Exhibit 4-K-B shows that candidates’ probability of winning greatly accelerates and approaches 1 when their share of outside ideological contributions moves between 10% and 20% of all contributions. The probabilities in the House models never approach one and are smallest among House Democrats.

Exhibit 4-K-B

The clearest differences between the likelihood of winning logistic models and the vote share models occur for Senate Democrats. The effect of outside ideological contributions is large and statistically significant in the logistic regression models, while it is not statistically significant in the vote share model (compare Exhibit 4-K to Exhibit 4-H for All Senate Democrats). And outside non-ideological contributions have no effect in the logistic regression model for Senate Democrats, while they have a strong and statistically significant effect in the vote share models.
While there are strong differences for Senate Democratic primaries, the likelihood of winning logistic models and the vote percentage models (Exhibits 4-G, 4-I, and 4-J) show similar patterns for the other three chamber-party combinations. The effect of outside ideological contributions on Republican Senate candidates is the largest coefficient in both the logistic winning and vote share models (compare Exhibit 4-K to Exhibit 4-G for All Senate Republicans). For House Republican candidates, the outside ideological coefficient is statistically significant and has the largest effect size in both models (compare Exhibit 4-K to Exhibit 4-I for All House Republicans). Among House Democratic candidates, for both the likelihood of winning logistic regression model and the vote percentage model, the coefficients for outside ideological contributions are statistically significant but smaller than the coefficients for outside non-ideological contributions (compare Exhibit 4-K to Exhibit 4-J for All House Democrats).

As with the multivariate vote percentage models, the likelihood of winning findings show that higher levels of contributions from individuals and local groups plays an important role in helping candidates win primaries. The effect size is very similar between parties and chambers. The largest effect size occurs among Senate Republican candidates where a one percentage point increase in the share of individual and local contributions increases a candidate’s likelihood of winning by 7% (exponentiated B of 1.07). The smallest effect sizes occurred among Senate Democrats where a one percentage point increase in the share of individual and local contributions increases a candidate’s likelihood of winning by 5% (exponentiated B of 1.05). The individual and local contributions variable is statistically significant at the .01 level in all four models.

The takeaway from the likelihood of winning analysis that I would like to emphasize is that the analysis shows the strong positive effect of outside ideological contributions on winning.
For all four chamber party combinations, outside ideological contributions’ effect is statistically significant at the .05 level or higher, and outside ideological contributions show the largest effect of any of the contribution variables for three of the four chamber-party combinations. House Democrats’ largest effect occurs for outside non-ideological contributions. Together, the logistic models predicting winning and the OLS models predicting vote percentage, show that when all cases in a chamber and party are analyzed, outside ideological contributions have a strong, positive and statistically significant effect on primary performance. The only exception is with Senate Democrats in the vote percentage models; however, when winning is the dependent variable in the logistic models, Senate Democrats have the highest coefficient.

**Roll Call Voting and Ideological Contributions in Non-incumbent Primaries**

In this section, I examine the roll call voting of candidates who won non-incumbent primaries and then went on to win the general election. I find that in three of the four chamber-party combinations, and while holding state/district partisanship constant, candidates who receive larger portions of outside ideological contributions are more partisan than candidates who receive less outside ideological contributions. The effect, as measured by the coefficient of outside ideological contributions on a primary winner’s future roll call ideology is strongest among Senate Republicans; the effect is flat among Senate Democrats.
Exhibit 4-L shows the OLS results for four chamber-party combinations models where I selected non-incumbent primary candidates who won both the primary and the subsequent general election. The dependent variable is the winner’s roll call ideology as described in Chapter Three. The independent variables are the winners’ three primary contribution percentages, state/district partisanship, and a control variable for the number of candidates in the primary. The results show that higher levels of outside ideological contributions lead to higher roll call ideology among Senate Republicans, and both parties in the House. The Senate Republicans show the largest effect, but they are only statistically significant at the .1 level while members of both House parties are statistically significant at the .01 level. The results for the effect of outside ideological contributions on Senate Democrats’ ideology are flat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>STATE/ DISTRICT</th>
<th>OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>OUTSIDE NON-IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>INDIVID/ LOCAL MONEY</th>
<th>1/NUMBER OF CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE REPUBLICAN NON-INCUMBENT PRIMARY WINNERS Adj. R² = .14/n= 65</td>
<td>.717*** (.241)</td>
<td>-.009** (.004)</td>
<td>.017* (.009)</td>
<td>-.010** (.005)</td>
<td>-.002 (.002)</td>
<td>.569* (.317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE DEMOCRATIC NON-INCUMBENT PRIMARY WINNERS Adj. R² = .35/n= 57</td>
<td>.926*** (.147)</td>
<td>-.011*** (.003)</td>
<td>.000 (.006)</td>
<td>-.005 (.004)</td>
<td>-.002 (.001)</td>
<td>.217 (.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE REPUBLICAN NON-INCUMBENT PRIMARY WINNERS Adj. R² = .15/n= 184</td>
<td>.656*** (.072)</td>
<td>-.005*** (.002)</td>
<td>.008*** (.003)</td>
<td>-.009*** (.002)</td>
<td>.002** (.001)</td>
<td>-.136 (.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE DEMOCRATIC NON-INCUMBENT PRIMARY WINNERS Adj. R² = .45/n= 379</td>
<td>.609*** (.035)</td>
<td>-.008*** (.001)</td>
<td>.004*** (.001)</td>
<td>-.003** (.001)</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
<td>.018 (.073)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to illustrate the magnitude of these findings, I created Exhibit 4-L-2. When all other variables in the model are set to their medians, and the outside ideological contributions values are varied between their 10th and 90th percentiles, outside ideological contributions’ steep effect for Senate Republicans is made clear. The less steep but still salient effect for House members is also made clear. The flat slope for Senate Democrats is also depicted.

**Exhibit 4-L-B**

**OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND NON-INCUMBENT PRIMARY WINNERS’ ROLL CALL IDEOLOGY IN CONGRESS (1980-2008)**

Summary of Major Findings

This chapter showed five findings which I want to emphasize. First, this chapter establishes that contributions matter. Specifically, they have a positive effect on a candidate’s vote performance. This is demonstrated by the bivariate models and that in the multivariate models predicting vote percentages. All contribution sources are always positive and usually statistically significant. Considering the consistent effects that local and individual contributions

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15 When reviewing Exhibits 4-L and 4-L-2, please keep in mind that the cases are only non-incumbent primary winners who went on to win their general election, so the numbers of cases is smaller than when I looked at all non-incumbent primary candidates earlier in the chapter. The 90th percentile for outside ideological contributions is higher for this general election winners only group than for Exhibit 4-K and 4-K-B where all chamber-party combinations show 90th percentiles below 20%. For this group, all chamber-party combinations are below 35%, so that is the maximum value to which I set the horizontal values.
are shown to have on primary performance, it is possible that these contributions may have a moderating effect on member behavior. Second, outside ideological contributions matter more in terms of vote performance than other types of contributions in Republican primaries. This is demonstrated by outside ideological contributions’ strong effects in the vote share regression model and the logistic regression model predicting winning. Third, ideological contributions also affect Democratic primary candidates’ performance, but the effect is not as clear as for Republican candidates. Fourth, the effect of outside ideological contributions in Republican primaries was strong in competitive seats in both chambers but among Democrats, outside ideological groups showed an effect in safe Democratic seats but not competitive seats. This suggests that Republicans from swing districts need the support of outside ideological groups more than Democrats from swing states/districts. And fifth, there is statistical evidence consistent with the claim that higher levels of outside ideological contributions lead to more ideologically extreme roll call behavior by the winners of non-incumbent primaries. The magnitude of the evidence is strongest for Senate Republicans, while House members have lower magnitude but higher levels of statistical significance. Senate Democrats are the exception to this finding.
Chapter Four

Technical Appendix

Non-incumbent Primaries Regression Error Assumptions

Several of the plots and statistical findings in Chapter Four are based on candidates who ran in a non-incumbent primary that included two or more candidates in which at least one of the candidates received a contribution from an outside ideological group. These plots and regression models use cases that represent multiple individual candidates nested in unique primaries. Due to this, the values of both the dependent variable and the independent variables are not independent of one another; there is an intra-cluster correlation. For example, in a two candidate primary, if candidate A received 60% of the vote, then candidate B could not receive more than 40% of the vote. Similarly, if candidate A’s outside ideological contributions represent 50% of the contributions in the race, then candidate A’s contributions from outside non-ideological and individual and local sources cannot exceed 50%. Also, candidate B’s contributions from all sources cannot exceed 50%.

The data’s structure may make it inappropriate for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression because the data violates the OLS assumptions. The errors may be heteroscedastic rather than homoscedastic. To address this possibility, I calculate standard errors for these OLS regressions in Chapter Four using as few standard error assumptions as possible. The source for these robust standard error calculations is the work of Hayes and Cai (2007) and MacKinnon and White (1985). They provide five different approaches for calculating heteroscedastic consistent standard errors.

These approaches can be expressed using matrix algebra as the following.

For the formulas HC2 through HC4, \( h_{ii} \)s are the leverage values or the diagonal elements in the “hat” matrix \( H = XX'X^{-1}X' \).
HC0 (Huber White) = $(X'X)^{-1} \text{diag}[e_i^2]X(X'X)^{-1}$

HC1 = $\frac{n}{n-p-1} (X'X)^{-1} X' \text{diag}[e_i^2]X(X'X)^{-1}$

HC2 = $(X'X)^{-1} X' \text{diag}\left[\frac{e_i^2}{1-h_{ij}}\right] X(X'X)^{-1}$

HC3 = $(X'X)^{-1} X' \text{diag}\left[\frac{e_i^2}{(1-h_{ij})^2}\right] X(X'X)^{-1}$

HC4 = $(X'X)^{-1} X' \text{diag}\left[\frac{e_i^2}{(1-h_{ij})^{\partial_l}}\right] X(X'X)^{-1}$ where $\partial_l = \min\{4, \frac{nh_{ij}}{p+1}\}$

For the bivariate scatterplots presented in Chapter Four, I provide below, all five heteroscedastic standard error calculations. For the multivariate OLS regression in Chapter Four, I report, in each table, the HC1 standard error.

**Bivariate Plots for Non-incumbent Primaries**

Exhibits 4-A through 4-C plot pooled results for primaries that occurred between 1980 and 2008. Cases were selected using the criteria described in Chapter Three in the section titled, “Case Selection.” I point out these rules to note that in order for a candidate to be included in these plots and the other multivariate analyses in Chapter Four he or she did not need to receive contributions himself. But he did need to be a non-write-in candidate in a partisan primary in which at least one of the candidates received outside ideological contributions. Statistical significance in these plots is based upon the robust standard error calculation describe in H1 above. The tables below provide all five robust standard error calculations and the OLS standard error calculation.
Exhibit 4-A depicts four plots and their associated regression equations, r coefficients, and adjusted R square values. Separate plots were created for Senate Republicans, House Republicans, Senate Democrats, and House Democrats. In each of the four plots, candidates’ primary vote percentage is shown on the vertical axis and is depicted as a function of the percentage of outside ideological contributions that the candidate received. The first plot, in the upper left quadrant, shows this relationship for Senate Republicans. The plot in the lower left shows the relationship for House Republicans. The plot in the upper right shows the relationship for Senate Democrats, and the plot in the lower right shows the relationship for House Democrats. The details of the regressions used to create Exhibit 4-A are shown in the table (Appendix Table 4-1) below, which includes the coefficients standard errors and the number of cases used in each regression model. In addition, the five approaches for calculating heteroscedastic standard errors discussed in the “Non-Incumbent Primaries Regression Error Assumptions” section of this appendix are included along with their associated p value. All
coefficients in Exhibit 4-A remained statistically significant at the 0.01 level after applying the various heteroscedastic standard errors.

**Appendix Table 4-1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS Standard Error /Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC0 Standard Error /Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC1 Standard Error /Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC2 Standard Error /Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC3 Standard Error /Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC4 Standard Error /Signif (p)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senate Republicans</strong></td>
<td><strong>Adj. R²=.60/n= 209</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant = 19</td>
<td>1.347/000</td>
<td>1.254/000</td>
<td>1.260/000</td>
<td>1.260/000</td>
<td>1.267/000</td>
<td>1.269/000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slope = 2.9</td>
<td>.162/000</td>
<td>.204/000</td>
<td>.205/000</td>
<td>.208/000</td>
<td>.213/000</td>
<td>.222/000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>House Republicans</strong></td>
<td><strong>Adj. R²=.41/n=1,482</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant = 19</td>
<td>.468/000</td>
<td>.475/000</td>
<td>.476/000</td>
<td>.477/000</td>
<td>.478/000</td>
<td>.481/000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slope = 2.0</td>
<td>.060/000</td>
<td>.112/000</td>
<td>.112/000</td>
<td>.113/000</td>
<td>.114/000</td>
<td>.116/000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senate Democrats</strong></td>
<td><strong>Adj. R²=.54./n= 198</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant = 19</td>
<td>1.414/000</td>
<td>1.321/000</td>
<td>1.328/000</td>
<td>1.333/000</td>
<td>1.346/000</td>
<td>1.361/000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slope = 2.4</td>
<td>.159/000</td>
<td>.211/000</td>
<td>.212/000</td>
<td>.220/000</td>
<td>.229/000</td>
<td>.249/000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>House Democrats</strong></td>
<td><strong>Adj. R²=.47/n=1,431</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant = 18</td>
<td>.467/000</td>
<td>.448/000</td>
<td>.448/000</td>
<td>.448/000</td>
<td>.448/000</td>
<td>.448/000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slope = 1.6</td>
<td>.046/000</td>
<td>.055/000</td>
<td>.055/000</td>
<td>.056/000</td>
<td>.056/000</td>
<td>.056/000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Exhibit 4-B depicts four plots and their associated regression equations, r coefficients, and adjusted R square values. Separate plots were created for Senate Republicans, House Republicans, Senate Democrats, and House Democrats. In each of the four plots, candidates’ primary vote percentages are shown on the vertical axis and depicted as a function of the percentage of non-ideological contributions that candidates received. The first plot, in the upper left quadrant, shows this relationship for Senate Republicans. The plot in the lower left shows the relationship for House Republicans. The plot in the upper right shows the relationship for Senate Democrats, and the plot in the lower right shows the relationship for House Democrats.

The details of the regressions used to create Exhibit 4-B are shown in the table (Appendix Table 4-2) below, which includes the coefficients standard errors and the number of cases used in each regression model. In addition, the five approaches for calculating heteroscedastic standard errors discussed in the “Non-Incumbent Primaries Regression Error Assumptions” section of this methods appendix are included along with their associated p values. All coefficients remained
statistically significant at the .001 level after applying the five approaches for calculating heteroscedastic standard errors.

**Appendix Table 4-2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS Standard Error /Signif (p)</th>
<th>HCO Standard Error /Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC1 Standard Error /Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC2 Standard Error /Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC3 Standard Error /Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC4 Standard Error /Signif (p)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senate Republicans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²=.53/n= 209</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant = 20</td>
<td>1.446/.000</td>
<td>1.511/.000</td>
<td>1.518/.000</td>
<td>1.356/.000</td>
<td>1.605/.000</td>
<td>1.716/.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slope = 1.7</td>
<td>.110/.000</td>
<td>.220/.000</td>
<td>.221/.000</td>
<td>.235/.000</td>
<td>.251/.000</td>
<td>.288/.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>House Republicans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²=.46/n=1,482</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant = 18</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.065/.000</td>
<td>.066/.000</td>
<td>.067/.000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Senate Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²=.54/n=198</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant = 18</td>
<td>1.420/.000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.163/.000</td>
<td>.167/.000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>House Democrats</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²=.50/n=1,431</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.1369/.000</td>
<td>.071/.000</td>
<td>.073/.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Exhibit 4-C depicts four plots and their associated regression equations, r coefficients, and adjusted R square values. Separate plots were created for Senate Republicans, House Republicans, Senate Democrats, and House Democrats. In each of the four plots, candidates’ primary vote percentages are shown on the vertical axis and depicted as a function of the percentage of local and individual contributions that candidates receive. The first plot, in the upper left quadrant, shows this relationship for Senate Republicans. The plot in the lower left shows the relationship for House Republicans. The plot in the upper right shows the relationship for Senate Democrats, and the plot in the lower right shows the relationship for House Democrats. The details of the regressions used to create Exhibit 4-C are shown in the table (Appendix Table 4-3) below, which includes the coefficients standard errors and the number of cases used in each regression model. In addition, the five approaches for calculating heteroscedastic standard errors discussed in the “Non-Incumbent Primaries Regression Error Assumptions” section of this methods appendix are included along with their associated p value.
used in testing the null hypothesis. All coefficients remained statistically significant at the 0.01 level after applying the five approaches for calculating heteroscedastic standard errors.

**Appendix Table 4-3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS Standard Error / Signif (p)</th>
<th>HCO Standard Error / Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC1 Standard Error / Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC2 Standard Error / Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC3 Standard Error / Signif (p)</th>
<th>HC4 Standard Error / Signif (p)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senate Republicans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²=.63/n=209</td>
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<td>.1237/.000</td>
<td>.1283/.000</td>
<td>.1269/.000</td>
<td>.1281/.000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slope = 0.9</td>
<td>.049/.000</td>
<td>.061/.000</td>
<td>.062/.000</td>
<td>.063/.000</td>
<td>.063/.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>House Republicans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²=.54/n=1,482</td>
<td>Constant = 12</td>
<td>.492/.000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>.025/.000</td>
<td>.025/.000</td>
<td>.025/.000</td>
<td>.025/.000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Senate Democrats</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²=.71/n=198</td>
<td>Constant = 14</td>
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<td>.1352/.000</td>
<td>.1359/.000</td>
<td>.1360/.000</td>
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<td>.064/.000</td>
<td>.064/.000</td>
<td>.065/.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>House Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²=.50/n=1,431</td>
<td>Constant = 14.3</td>
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<td>.517/.000</td>
<td>.518/.000</td>
<td>.518/.000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slope = 0.8</td>
<td>.023/.000</td>
<td>.031/.000</td>
<td>.031/.000</td>
<td>.031/.000</td>
<td>.032/.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Five

The Effect of Ideological Contributions in Incumbent Primaries

Outside ideological contributions in incumbent primaries are common. As noted in Chapter Three, almost all (99%) of the incumbents in incumbent primaries receive at least one outside ideological contribution. What is somewhat rare is for incumbent challengers to receive outside ideological contribution. Only 10% of the Senate incumbents and 5% of the House incumbents, who seek re-nomination, face a primary challenger who receives any outside ideological contributions. In this chapter, I investigate whether the level of these ideological contributions affects incumbents’ performance and their likelihood of winning the nomination.

I examine the effects of contributions using four analytical approaches. In aggregate, these approaches provide strong empirical evidence that incumbent primary candidates who receive higher levels of ideological contributions, do better in incumbent primaries. The evidence that the effect is strongest on Republican Senate primaries is solid, though not entirely impeccable. The strongest contribution coefficient under three of the four analytical approaches is outside ideological contributions in Republican Senate primaries. The first approach examines the bivariate relationships between candidates’ primary vote percentages and each of the three types of contribution sources. The bivariate results show the largest coefficient for the effect of outside ideological contributions on incumbent vote percentages occurs among Senate Republicans. The second approach uses multivariate models predicting incumbent vote percentages as a function of all three contribution sources and estimates the strongest effect for outside ideological contributions on Republican Senate incumbent vote percentages. The third approach expands the selection criteria of the multivariate models to all candidates in incumbent primaries, rather than just incumbent candidates. This third approach produces coefficients that attribute the largest effect to outside ideological contributions in Republican Senate primaries.
However, the fourth approach finds no effect for outside ideological contributions in Senate Republican primaries. This fourth approach uses multivariate logistic models with a binary dependent variable that is coded 1 if a candidate won and 0 if a candidate lost.

_Bivariate Relationships for Incumbent Primaries_

The FECA era, incumbent primary, bivariate relationships between candidate vote percentages and each of the three contribution categories are depicted in the plots below. Similar to the bivariate relationships for non-incumbent primaries, the results show that the largest effect for outside ideological contributions occurs in Republican primaries. Because these plots examine incumbent primaries, they are based on incumbents only; other candidates were not included. The dependent variable is the incumbent’s vote percentage and the independent variables are each incumbent’s percentage of, depending on the plot, (1) outside ideological contributions, (2) outside non-ideological contributions, and (3) individual and local contributions.

Exhibit 5-A shows that ideological outside contributions affect Senate Republican primaries more than Democratic Senate primaries or House primaries. This is similar to the finding for non-incumbent primaries (Exhibit 4-A). The plots depict incumbent vote percentage as a function of the percentage of contributions the incumbent received from outside ideological groups. The effect of outside ideological contributions on incumbents is only significant for Senate Republicans and House Democrats, and the slope for Senate Republican incumbents is more than twice as large as the slope for House Democrats. For Senate Republican incumbents, a one percentage point increase in ideological contributions is associated with a .74 increase in the incumbent’s primary vote percentage. While among House Democratic incumbents, a one percentage point increase in ideological contributions is associated with a .34 increase in the incumbent’s primary vote percentage.
Exhibit 5-A
Contributions From Outside Ideological Groups Have a Greater Impact on Incumbent Senate Republican Than on Others

Exhibit 5-B shows that outside non-ideological contributions affect House incumbent primaries but not Senate incumbent primaries. The four plots in Exhibit 5-B depict incumbent vote percentage as a function of the percentage of contributions the incumbent received from outside non-ideological groups. The effect of these contributions on incumbent vote share is significant for House races but not Senate races. The slope for House Democratic incumbents (lower right plot) is the largest. Among House Democratic incumbents, a one percentage point increase in non-ideological contributions is associated with a .28 increase in the incumbent’s primary vote percentage. While among House Republican incumbents, a one percentage point increase in non-ideological contributions is associated with a .16 increase in the incumbent’s primary vote. Among Senate incumbents, the results were flat and not statistically significant.
Receiving campaign contributions from individuals and local sources affected incumbent primary performance. The larger the percentage of individual and local support incumbents receive, the better they perform in primaries. This is illustrated in Exhibit 5-C. The relationship is strongest for Senate incumbents. Among Republican Senate incumbents, an increase of one percentage point in individual and local contributions results in a .23 percentage point increase in the incumbent’s primary vote percentage. Among Democratic Senate incumbents, an increase of one percentage point from individual and local sources results in a .19 percentage point increase in the incumbent’s primary vote percentage. Among House incumbents, the coefficients are .14 and .08 for Republicans and Democrats, respectively. The results for both parties in both chambers are statistically significant at the .01 level.
Exhibit 5-C
Campaign Contributions From Individuals and Local Sources Affects Incumbent Primary Performance

**Multivariate Incumbent Primary Models**

As with the non-incumbent primary contribution data in Chapter Four, I tested models using incumbents’ share of all three contribution sources as independent variables in a multivariate regression model in order to determine if the effects of the different contribution sources change when other sources are held constant. Only incumbents and their percentages are analyzed under this approach. I also include an independent variable to control for the number of candidates in the primary. This variable is calculated by dividing one by the number of candidates in the primary. The dependent variable is, as in the plots above, each incumbent’s vote percentage. I applied this model to primaries for each party in each chamber. Within a party and chamber, I use four sets of case selection criteria that look at (1) all incumbents, (2) incumbents in safe seats where the incumbent’s party’s presidential candidate receives more than 60% of the vote, (3) incumbents in competitive seats where the incumbent’s party’s presidential candidate receives between 40% and 60% of the vote, and (4) non-safe seats, where the
incumbent’s party’s presidential candidate receives less than 40% of the vote. While I report the results for these non-safe seats, my discussion does not focus on these cases as winning the nomination for these seats means little because the nominee is unlikely to win the general election. I focus my discussion on the models using all incumbents because several of the subgroups, particularly in the Senate, have an extremely low n.

Two salient findings of the multivariate incumbent primary models are (1) that outside ideological contributions had a larger impact on Senate primaries than House primaries and (2) just as in non-incumbent primaries, outside ideological contributions’ largest impact occurs in Senate Republican primaries. The larger impact of outside ideological contributions in Senate primaries is summarized in Exhibit 5-D, which graphs the coefficients for outside ideological contributions from the four multivariate, incumbent primary, regression models that include all incumbents. The Senate Republican coefficient can be interpreted to mean that an incumbent’s primary vote percentage increases by 1.52 percentage points for each one percentage point increase in the incumbent’s share of outside ideological contributions. For Senate Democrats, the primary vote percentage increases by 1.22 percentage points. For both parties, these coefficients were much larger than their peers in the House. The Republican Senate coefficient is more than double, in fact, almost three times, the size of the .52 coefficient for House Republicans. And the Senate Democratic incumbents’ coefficient is almost double the size of the coefficients for House Democratic incumbents, .62.
Inspection of the models using all of the cases for a chamber-party combination shows that outside ideological contributions matter more than other types of contributions in the Senate and, to a lesser extent, among House Democratic incumbents. However, these differences are not seen among House Republicans.

Exhibit 5-E shows the four model selection criteria for Senate Republican incumbents. The coefficient for outside ideological contributions among all Republican incumbents, 1.52, is much larger than the next contribution coefficient, individual and local contributions, which is .85. And the outside ideological contribution coefficient is almost three times larger than the coefficient for outside non-ideological contributions, .52. This pattern holds when examining only competitive seats for Republican Senate incumbents. The coefficient for outside
ideological contributions, 1.50, is much larger than the next largest contribution coefficient, individual and local contributions, which is .82. While the outside ideological contribution coefficient is more than three times as large as the coefficient for outside non-ideological contributions, .49. The pattern breaks down when only safe seats for Senate Republican incumbents are examined; however, these safe seat results are based upon only 12 cases.

Exhibit 5-E

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>OUTSIDE NON-IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>INDIVID AND LOCAL MONEY</th>
<th>1/NUMBER OF CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE REPUBLICANS Ad. R² = .60/n=83</td>
<td>6.82 (9.05)</td>
<td>1.52*** (.19)</td>
<td>.52*** (.13)</td>
<td>.85*** (.09)</td>
<td>-3.55*** (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE REPUBLICANS (COMPETITIVE SEATS) Ad. R² = .60/n=59</td>
<td>6.20 (10.77)</td>
<td>1.50*** (.23)</td>
<td>.49*** (.14)</td>
<td>.82*** (.11)</td>
<td>-2.28 (1.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE REPUBLICANS (SAFE REPUBLICAN SEATS) Ad. R² = .89/n=12</td>
<td>-52.78*** (99.98)</td>
<td>5.76*** (.81)</td>
<td>6.42*** (1.13)</td>
<td>6.27*** (1.0)</td>
<td>-2.57** (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE REPUBLICANS (SAFE DEMOCRATIC SEATS) Ad. R² = .74/n=12</td>
<td>-22.99 (25.95)</td>
<td>2.06** (.81)</td>
<td>3.4 (44)</td>
<td>1.05*** (.22)</td>
<td>6.73 (.49)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 5-F shows the results for Senate Democratic incumbents. The differences in the coefficient sizes for outside ideological contributions compared to other contribution coefficients are not as large as they are among Senate Republican incumbents. The coefficient for outside ideological contributions among all Democratic incumbents, 1.22, is larger than the next largest contribution coefficient, individual and local contributions, which is 1.00. The outside ideological contribution coefficient is also larger than the coefficient for outside non-ideological contributions, .76. The pattern of outside ideological incumbents having the largest coefficient holds when examining only competitive Democratic Senate seats. The coefficient for outside
ideological contributions is 1.71, which is larger than the next largest contribution coefficient, individual and local contributions, which is 1.47. The outside ideological contribution coefficient in the competitive seat model is also larger than the coefficient for outside non-ideological contributions, 1.23. The pattern breaks down when safe seats for Senate Democratic incumbents are examined; however, these results are based upon less than 20 cases.

**Exhibit 5-F**

**INCUMBENT DEMOCRATIC PRIMARIES IN THE SENATE (1980-2008)**

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CANDIDATE VOTE PERCENTAGE

CELLS SHOW COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>OUTSIDE NON-IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL AND LOCAL MONEY</th>
<th>1/NUMBER OF CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE DEMOCRATS</td>
<td>-8.54</td>
<td>1.22***</td>
<td>.76***</td>
<td>1.00***</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .63/n=82</td>
<td>(8.65)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE DEMOCRATS (COMPETITIVE SEATS)</td>
<td>-54.93***</td>
<td>1.71***</td>
<td>1.23***</td>
<td>1.47***</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .74/n=61</td>
<td>(12.33)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE DEMOCRATS (SAFE DEMOCRATIC SEATS)</td>
<td>-12.49</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.74**</td>
<td>.94***</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .56/n=18</td>
<td>(22.48)</td>
<td>(.54)</td>
<td>(.31)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(7.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE DEMOCRATS (SAFE REPUBLICAN SEATS)</td>
<td>NOT ENOUGH CASES FOR STATISTICAL ESTIMATES</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 5-G shows a lower effect for outside ideological contributions among House Republican incumbents compared to other chamber-party combinations and other contribution sources. While the overall effect size of outside ideological contributions among incumbent House Republicans, .52, is comparable to the .62 effect size for House Democrats, both are far smaller than the 1.52 and 1.22 for Senate Republicans and Senate Democrats. And, unlike House Democratic or Senate incumbents, the Republican outside ideological coefficient is smaller than the other contribution coefficients for House Republicans. The largest contribution coefficient when all House Republicans are examined is .69, which is associated with individual
and local contributions. The coefficient for outside non-ideological contributions, .67, is also larger than the outside ideological contribution coefficient of .52. When looking at competitive seats and safe seats for House Republicans, outside ideological contributions also show the smallest of the three contribution coefficients. Among competitive seats, the coefficient for outside ideological contributions is .51, while it is .58 and .56 for individual and local and outside non-ideological contributions, respectively. Among safe Republican House seats, the coefficient for outside ideological contributions is .46, while it is .84 and .83 for outside non-ideological and individual and local contributions, respectively.

Exhibit 5-G

INCUMBENT REPUBLICAN PRIMARIES IN THE HOUSE (1980-2008)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CANDIDATE VOTE PERCENTAGE
CELLS SHOW COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL CONTRIBUT.</th>
<th>OUTSIDE NON-IDEOLOGICAL CONTRIB.</th>
<th>INDIVID AND LOCAL CONTR.</th>
<th>1/NUMBER OF CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE REPUBLICANS</td>
<td>22.96*** (4.94)</td>
<td>.52*** (.09)</td>
<td>.67*** (.05)</td>
<td>.59*** (.05)</td>
<td>-.15*** (.75)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .42/n=460</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE REPUBLICANS (COMPETITIVE SEATS)</td>
<td>33.97*** (6.88)</td>
<td>.51*** (.11)</td>
<td>.56*** (.07)</td>
<td>.58*** (.06)</td>
<td>-.55*** (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .40/n=252</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOUSE REPUBLICANS (SAFE REPUBLICANS SEATS)</td>
<td>10.24 (7.05)</td>
<td>.46*** (.13)</td>
<td>.84*** (.08)</td>
<td>.83*** (.07)</td>
<td>-.157 (1.18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .48/n=192</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE REPUBLICANS (SAFE DEMOCRATIC SEATS)</td>
<td>-.40.42 (224.92)</td>
<td>1.07 (1.86)</td>
<td>.91 (2.12)</td>
<td>1.55 (2.12)</td>
<td>-.28 (10.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .07/n=6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 5-H shows that Democratic House incumbents have a similar pattern (though lower magnitude) to the Senate results (Exhibits 5-E and 5-F) in that the largest coefficient occurs with outside ideological contributions. The coefficient is .62 when all races are examined. This can be compared to coefficients of .55 and .50 for individual and local contributions and outside non-ideological contributions, respectively. The pattern of outside
ideological contributions showing the largest coefficient holds when only competitive seats and safe Democratic seats are examined. When looking at competitive seats, the coefficient for outside ideological contributions is .58, which can be compared to individual and local contributions’ coefficient of .52 and outside non-ideological contributions’ coefficient of .47. When looking at safe Democratic seats, the coefficient for outside ideological contributions is .74, which can be compared to individual and local contributions’ coefficient of .63 and outside non-ideological contributions’ coefficient of .53.

**Exhibit 5-H**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL CONTRIB.</th>
<th>OUTSIDE NON-IDEOLOGICAL CONTRIBS</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL AND LOCAL CONTR.</th>
<th>1/NUMBER OF CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE DEMOCRATS Adj. R² = .50/n=922</td>
<td>38.86*** (2.73)</td>
<td>.62*** (.04)</td>
<td>.50*** (.03)</td>
<td>.55*** (.03)</td>
<td>-4.57*** (.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE DEMOCRATS (COMPETITIVE SEATS) Adj. R² = .49/n=491</td>
<td>44.92*** (3.79)</td>
<td>.58*** (.05)</td>
<td>.47*** (.04)</td>
<td>.52*** (.04)</td>
<td>-5.81*** (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE DEMOCRATS (SAFE DEMOCRATIC SEATS) Adj. R² = .55/n=343</td>
<td>29.82*** (4.40)</td>
<td>.74*** (.09)</td>
<td>.53*** (.06)</td>
<td>.63*** (.05)</td>
<td>-3.71*** (.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE DEMOCRATS (SAFE REPUBLICAN SEATS) Adj. R² = .18/n=98</td>
<td>55.96*** (9.93)</td>
<td>.50*** (.12)</td>
<td>.28*** (.10)</td>
<td>.30*** (.10)</td>
<td>-4.09*** (1.97)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown above, the level of support incumbents receive from outside ideological groups affects their primary performance. The greater the share of incumbents’ outside ideological contributions, the higher their vote percentages. For Senate incumbents as well as House Democrats, outside ideological contributions have a greater impact on primary performance than other contributions sources. These findings are based on models that look only at the incumbent’s performance.
Multivariate Incumbent Primary Models with All Candidates

In order to examine how robust the above findings are, I expanded my selection criteria to include all candidates, not just incumbents, who participated in incumbent primaries. In doing this, I include an additional binary variable that is coded 1 for incumbents and 0 otherwise. Because the cases in these models are candidates nested in primaries, I again use the robust standard errors that are calculated using HC1 as described in the Chapter Four Appendix. The results for these models are provided in Exhibit 5-I and 5-J. These tables list the results for selection criteria that uses all candidates (not separate breakouts for competitive or safe seats), which allows me to compare the results to the prior section’s findings for all candidates.

The models shown in Exhibit 5-I support the same conclusions regarding outside ideological contributions in Senate primaries as the Senate models, which are presented in Exhibits 5-E and 5-F. When looking at incumbent primaries, regardless of whether only incumbents (Exhibits 5-E and 5-F) or all candidates (Exhibit 5-I) are examined, candidates do better when they receive higher levels of contributions. And receiving higher levels of outside ideological contributions helps candidates more than receiving higher levels of contributions from other sources. This is shown for Republicans in Exhibit 5-I by looking at the row for all Senate Republicans (the top row). The coefficient for outside ideological contributions is 1.51 while the coefficients for individual and local contributions and outside non-ideological contributions are .91 and .59, respectively. Similarly, for Senate Democrats (second to last row in Exhibit 5-I), the coefficient for outside ideological contributions is 1.28 while the coefficients for individual and local contributions and outside non-ideological contributions are 1.02 and .74, respectively.

A perhaps surprising finding in these Senate models, which is not seen in the House models, is that when contributions are controlled for the coefficient for incumbency is negative,
large, and statistically significant. For Republican Senate primaries, once contributions are controlled for, incumbents can be expected to lose almost 22 percentage points simply for being an incumbent. And for Democrats, the number is higher; Democratic incumbents lose 24.5 percentage points. Is there no incumbent advantage in the Senate? Or does this mean the incumbent advantage in Senate primaries is really just a contribution advantage and once contributions are controlled for, incumbency is negative? The Senate evidence does indeed suggest that the ability of incumbents to outraise their challengers is their major advantage. This is seen in the second and bottom rows of Exhibit 5-I, where I run the models without controlling for contributions, but still include the incumbency flag. Under this specification, contribution advantages could be attributed to the incumbency variable. When contributions are not included in the models, Republican incumbents receive almost 60 percentage points just for being incumbents while Democratic incumbents receive 67 percentage points. In summary, there is a major shift in the interpretation of the incumbency variable that fluctuates based on whether contributions are used as independent variables.

**Exhibit 5-I**

INCUMBENT SENATE PRIMARIES WITH ALL CANDIDATES AND ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS 1980-2008

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS CANDIDATE VOTE PERCENTAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>OUTSIDEIDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>OUTSIDE NON-IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>INDIVID AND LOCAL MONEY</th>
<th>1/NUMBER OF CANDIDATES</th>
<th>INCUMBENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE REPUBLICANS /Adj. R² = .92 /n=203</td>
<td>23.00*** (2.22)</td>
<td>1.51*** (.23)</td>
<td>.59*** (.13)</td>
<td>.91*** (.10)</td>
<td>-3.27*** (.61)</td>
<td>-21.97*** (8.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE REPUBLICANS /Adj. R² = .84 /n=203</td>
<td>27.83*** (2.82)</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>-3.94*** (.72)</td>
<td>59.68*** (2.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE DEMOCRATS /Adj. R² = .96 /n=196</td>
<td>20.08*** (2.26)</td>
<td>1.28*** (.16)</td>
<td>.74*** (.13)</td>
<td>1.02*** (.11)</td>
<td>-3.51*** (.77)</td>
<td>-24.51*** (10.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE DEMOCRATS /Adj. R² = .84 /n=196</td>
<td>24.58*** (3.62)</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>-4.30** (1.24)</td>
<td>67.23*** (1.80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The models shown in Exhibit 5-J support the same conclusions regarding outside ideological contributions in House primaries as the House models, which are presented in Exhibits 5-G and 5-H. When looking at incumbent primaries, regardless of whether only incumbents (Exhibits 5-G and 5-H) or all candidates (Exhibit 5-J) are examined, candidates do better when they receive higher levels of contributions. For House Republicans, receiving higher levels of contributions from outside ideological sources does not help quite as much as receiving higher levels of contributions from individual and local sources or outside non-ideological sources. This is shown in the first rows of Exhibit 5-J. The coefficient for individual and local contributions is .69 and the coefficient for outside non-ideological contributions is .67. The coefficient for outside ideological contributions is lower, .55. The second to last row in Exhibit 5-J shows that for House Democratic incumbent primary candidates, receiving higher levels of contributions from outside ideological sources helps slightly more than receiving contributions from other sources, although the error bands on the coefficients overlap. The coefficient for outside ideological contributions is slightly higher, .64, than the coefficients for individual and local contributions, .59, and outside non-ideological contributions, .57. As with the Senate models, the size of the coefficients for incumbency greatly decreases when contribution variables are added to the models.
Exhibit 5-J
INCUMBENT PRIMARIES WITH ALL CANDIDATES AND ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS 1980-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>OUTSIDE NON-IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>INDIVID AND LOCAL MONEY</th>
<th>1/NUMBER OF CANDIDATES</th>
<th>INCUMBENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE REPUBLICANS / Adj. R² = .91 / n=1,049</td>
<td>25.22*** (1.03)</td>
<td>.55*** (.09)</td>
<td>.67*** (.05)</td>
<td>.69*** (.04)</td>
<td>-4.03*** (.35)</td>
<td>-1.63 (4.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE REPUBLICANS / Adj. R² = .87 / n=1,049</td>
<td>30.18*** (1.24)</td>
<td>not in model</td>
<td>not in model</td>
<td>not in model</td>
<td>-4.77*** (.44)</td>
<td>58.07*** (.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE DEMOCRATS / Adj. R² = .93 / n=2,224</td>
<td>18.37*** (.58)</td>
<td>.64*** (.05)</td>
<td>.67*** (.04)</td>
<td>.59*** (.03)</td>
<td>-1.99*** (.18)</td>
<td>9.38*** (3.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE DEMOCRATS / Adj. R² = .88 / n=2,224</td>
<td>22.31*** (.60)</td>
<td>not in model</td>
<td>not in model</td>
<td>not in model</td>
<td>-2.41*** (.24)</td>
<td>62.20*** (.51)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Multivariate Incumbent Primary Models With Winning As the Dependent Variable**

The multivariate models in the prior section show that receiving higher levels of contributions has a positive effect on incumbent primary candidates’ vote shares. In three of the four chamber-party combinations, outside ideological contributions show larger positive effects on candidates’ vote percentages than contributions from other sources. In Chapter Four, after I established the effect of outside ideological contributions on vote percentage in non-incumbent primaries, I then tested the three contribution sources’ effect on the likelihood of candidates winning using logistic regression models. In Chapter Four, the binary logistic models showed the same patterns as the continuous dependent variable models with one exception; outside ideological contributions were statistically significant for Democratic Senate candidates in the binary logistic (winning) models but not the continuous variable (primary vote percentage) models. Below, I apply this same approach to incumbent primaries.
In Exhibit 5-K, I use the same cases and variables that I used to create Exhibits 5-I and 5-J. The only difference is that instead of using vote percentage as a continuous dependent variable, I coded candidates as 1 if they won the primary and 0 if they lost. I then ran logistic regression models for each chamber-party combination. With the notable exception that outside ideological contributions are not statistically significant in Republican Senate primaries, these models show that outside ideological contributions have the largest effect of any contribution variable on an incumbent primary candidate’s likelihood of winning. The outside ideological contribution variable is statistically significant and has the largest coefficient of any of the contribution variables for Senate Democrats and both Republican and Democratic House candidates. Outside ideological contributions are also the largest of the contribution coefficients in the Senate Republican models, but with a large error term it is, as already noted, not statistically significant.

When interpreting Exhibit 5-K, it is important to keep in mind that the cases include both incumbents and non-incumbents. When only incumbents are examined (Exhibit 5-E) the effects of outside ideological contributions on vote percentages are strong and statistically significant. In this context, the slightly weaker results for some of the contribution variables could be interpreted to mean that while higher levels of contributions help increase a candidate’s vote percentage, contributions alone may not put a candidate over the top in terms of winning. Considering that the only contribution model that does not show a statistically significant effect for outside ideological contributions is the Republican Senate model for winning an incumbent primary, which includes the seldom winning non-incumbents, the results for Senate Republicans support the interpretation that simply because a challenger receives a high level of outside ideological contributions does not mean the challenger will ultimately garner enough votes to unseat the incumbent.
### Summary and Conclusion

This chapter showed that higher contribution levels have a positive and statistically measureable effect on incumbent primaries. Incumbent primary candidates who receive higher levels of contributions perform better. And outside ideological contributions often have the largest effect on primary outcomes of any of the contribution variables. In other words, candidates who get more support from outside ideological contributors are often better off than if they had received more support from outside non-ideological or individual and local groups. The effect is strongest for Senate Republican primary candidates under three of the four analytical approaches.

By comparing these findings with the findings of Chapter Four, we can conclude the following regarding non-incumbent and incumbent primaries. First, money matters. The higher proportion of contributions primary candidates receive, the better they do in terms of vote percentages. This is shown both in the binary relationships between contribution type and vote

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**Exhibit 5-K**

**INCUMBENT PRIMARIES 1980-2008**

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EQUALS 1 IF CANDIDATE WON, 0 IF LOST

CELLS SHOW B COEFFICIENT AND (STANDARD ERRORS)/EXP(B) FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>OUTSIDE NON-IDEOLOGICAL MONEY</th>
<th>INDIVID AND LOCAL MONEY</th>
<th>1/NUMBER OF CANDIDATES</th>
<th>INCUMBENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE</td>
<td>-3.92**</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLICANS</td>
<td>(1.98)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.76)</td>
<td>(2.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/n=209</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>/1.41</td>
<td>/1.14</td>
<td>/1.09</td>
<td>/58</td>
<td>/1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE</td>
<td>-3.69</td>
<td>.66**</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>-.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATS</td>
<td>(2.34)</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.91)</td>
<td>(2.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/n=196</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>/1.93</td>
<td>/.99</td>
<td>/1.13</td>
<td>/57</td>
<td>/0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE</td>
<td>-5.09****</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.04*</td>
<td>.09***</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>2.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLICANS</td>
<td>(.87)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/n=1,049</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>/1.12</td>
<td>/1.04</td>
<td>/1.10</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>/11.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL HOUSE</td>
<td>-5.07***</td>
<td>.09***</td>
<td>.05***</td>
<td>.08***</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>3.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATS</td>
<td>(.48)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/n=2,224</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>/1.09</td>
<td>/1.05</td>
<td>/1.08</td>
<td>/39</td>
<td>/26.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
percentages (Exhibits 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, 5-A, 5-B, 5-C) and the multivariate models predicting vote
percentages (Exhibits 4-G, 4-H, 4-I, 4-J, 5-E, 5-F, 5-G, 5-H). When looking at models using all
the cases for each chamber-party combination to predict primary vote share, 10 of the 12
contribution variables in non-incumbent primaries have a positive and statistically significant
effect on candidate vote share (outside non-ideological contributions for Senate Republicans in
4-G and outside ideological contributions for Senate Democrats in safe seats in 4-H are the only
exceptions). And all 24 of the contribution variables that predict vote percentages in the Chapter
Five incumbent primary models (Exhibits 5-E through 5-J) that use all cases for each chamber-
party combination are positive and statistically significant.

The evidence that money matters is also strong when looking at binary logistic models
that predict a candidate’s likelihood of winning his or her party’s nomination. Exhibit 4-K
shows that 10 out of 12 contribution variables have a positive and statistically significant effect
on the likelihood of a candidate winning a non-incumbent primary. The total number of
statistically significant coefficients is a little less when looking at the effect of contribution levels
on the likelihood of a candidate winning an incumbent primary. Eight of the twelve contribution
variables are positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better in Exhibit 5-K.
Comparing Exhibit 4-K to Exhibit 5-K shows that the effect of outside ideological contributions
on a candidate’s likelihood of winning a primary is the same or stronger in non-incumbent
primaries for each of the chamber-party combinations.

In addition to showing that contributions matter, the two chapters also show a strong
effect for outside ideological contributions and, in particular, ideological contributions in Senate
Republican primaries. Outside ideological contributions in Republican Senate primaries show
the largest coefficient of all 12 of the bivariate contribution analyses presented in Chapter Four
and all 12 of the bivariate contribution analyses presented in Chapter Five. Outside ideological
contributions in Republican Senate primaries are also the largest coefficient in the non-incumbent primary models presented in exhibits 4-G through 4-J. And under both the selection rules (just incumbents and all candidates) in the multivariate incumbent primary analysis that predict candidate vote percentage in Chapter Five, outside ideological contributions in Senate Republican primaries have the largest coefficient. The only break in the pattern of outside ideological contributions in Republican primaries having the largest effect occurs in the binary logistic models that predict winning. Exhibit 4-K shows that while outside ideological contributions have a larger effect on winning non-incumbent Senate primaries than non-incumbent House primaries, the effect on both Republican and Democratic Senate candidates is about the same, 0.67 for Democrats and 0.66 for Republicans. And, as noted in the paragraph above, outside ideological contributions do not have a significant effect on winning Senate incumbent Republican primaries. This suggests a limitation on outside ideological groups’ ability to influence incumbent Republican primaries. There is strong evidence that they affect vote share, but the evidence is not clear that they have a decisive impact on who wins incumbent primaries.

Finally, Chapter Four established that not only do outside ideological groups affect who wins non-incumbent primaries, but that after controlling for state/district partisanship, higher levels of outside ideological group support is statistically associated (with the exception of Senate Democrats) with more ideologically extreme roll call behavior by those primary winners who go on to win their general elections. The next chapter looks at whether incumbents end up being punished by outside ideological groups when the candidates’ roll call behavior is not ideologically extreme.
Chapter Six

Ideological Targeting in Congressional Primaries

While the prior chapters show that ideological contributions affect candidates’ primary performance, this chapter examines which candidates receive ideological contributions. The analysis focuses on the question of whether groups engage in ideological targeting, and if they do, is it simple ideological targeting, or strategic ideological targeting. I define simple ideological targeting as groups supporting challengers to more moderate incumbents wherever the group finds them, i.e., the underlying partisanship of the state or district that more moderate incumbents represent is not relevant to the likelihood that more moderate incumbents are targeted. I define strategic ideological targeting as groups accounting for states’ and districts’ underlying partisanship when making ideological targeting decisions. Another way of phrasing this is, “do outside ideological groups consider their likelihood of being better off if an incumbent they target loses the primary?” For example, an ideological group would be better off if they supported an ideological primary challenger who unseated a moderate incumbent and then went on to win the general election. However, an ideological group would be worse off if the more ideological challenger they helped win the primary then lost the general election to a candidate from the opposite party who opposed the outside ideological group’s policy preferences even more than did the moderate incumbent. If groups behave strategically, I would expect them to target moderate incumbents in more partisan districts where the groups preferred party is likely to win, and I would expect them to be less likely to target more moderate incumbents in swing districts.

In addition, this chapter argues that ideologically motivated targeting helps strengthen the relationship between members of Congress’ ideology and their constituents’ ideology when this relationship is not closely aligned. In the early 1980s, the ideology of incumbent Senators was not closely aligned with their states’ voters’ partisanship, but the alignment strengthened after a
period of simple ideological targeting. House members were more closely aligned with their districts’ underlying partisanship at the beginning of this period, simple ideological targeting did not occur, and less change occurred among House members’ ideological alignment with their districts than Senators’ ideological alignment with their states. My claim is not that ideological targeting incentivizes Members of Congress to be as ideologically extreme as possible, but rather, it incentivizes them to be as close to the median voter of their reelection coalition (both primary and general), as it is the safest position to hold when facing the twin threats of an ideological primary and a general election challenge.

*Analysis Overview and Major Findings*

To examine incumbent targeting, this chapter presents the following. First, I examine *incumbent ideology and contributions from outside ideological groups*. This shows that more ideologically extreme incumbents receive more contributions from outside ideological groups. Although varying by chamber and party, a strong relationship exists between incumbent ideology and the level of outside ideological contributions an incumbent receives. Of course, just because ideological contributions are not going to an incumbent does not mean they are going to a challenger. As established in Chapter Three, the vast majority of incumbent challengers do not receive any outside ideological contributions. So I next examine contributions to incumbent challengers. I begin this analysis by first showing that incumbents facing challengers who are supported by outside ideological groups (i.e., targeted incumbents) perform worse in primaries than incumbents who are not targeted by outside ideological groups. This is done in the section called, *Targeting and Vote Performance*.

I then present statistical models that test for the presence of simple ideological targeting and strategic ideological targeting by chamber and party. This is done for the pooled time period in the section called *Incumbent Ideology and the Risk of an Ideological Group Supported*.
Primary Challenger. I test for simple ideological targeting with logistic regression models that estimate the probability of an incumbent’s primary opponent receiving funding from an outside ideological group as a function of the incumbent’s ideology.16

The pooled findings in this section show that more moderate incumbents are targeted by outside ideological groups. For the time period between 1980 and 2008, the risk of Senators, in both parties, and House Republicans facing an outside ideological group funded primary challenger increases as incumbent ideological extremeness decreases. The risk of simple ideological targeting varies among these three chamber-party combinations with Senate Republicans having the greatest risk of the three. There is no evidence of simple ideological targeting for House Democrats in the pooled time period analysis.

To test for strategic ideological targeting, I add two variables to the model. These are state/district marginality and an interaction term that is the product of incumbent ideology and state/district marginality. I report results for statistical tests that examine the joint significance of adding both variables to the model and the statistical significance of each individual variable. The strongest evidence of strategic ideological targeting in the pooled time period is among House Republicans. The statistical evidence is less clear among other chamber-party combinations; however, these tests are done with a reduced sample that uses only one case per incumbent in their career. In some cases, the variances are quite large. Because of these data limitations, in addition to the statistical tests in the strategic ideological targeting models, I also pay attention to the predicted risk of targeting curves that different groups of incumbents (moderates, mainstream, and ideologues or ideological extremists) have at different levels of state/district partisanship.

16 Again, only groups associated with the incumbents’ parties are used to define outside ideological groups, i.e., for Republican incumbents these are the 40% most Conservative groups and for Democratic incumbents these are the 40% most liberal groups.
Next, in the section called *Differences by Time Period*, I look at differences in simple and ideological targeting by chamber, party, and time period. These sections present breakouts showing the risk of an incumbent being ideologically targeted and strategically ideologically targeted during the early FECA period and the later FECA period. The findings show that Senate incumbents are subjected to simple ideological targeting in the early period, which declines during the later period. Strong statistical evidence of strategic ideological targeting of Senate candidates is not present in either time period. The strongest evidence exists for Senate Democrats in the later period, and I do discuss how results such as the shape of the risk curves and joint significance tests relate to strategic ideological targeting. But, the lack of moderate targeting, as well as heightened ideologue targeting, in the later period suggests strategic ideological targeting is not occurring in these later period Democratic Senate primaries.

The time breakouts for the House show different patterns by party. The statistical tests for House Republicans as well as the shape of their simple ideological targeting risk curves do not support the claim that simple ideological targeting occurred in either time period with House Republicans. However, there is some evidence for the strategic ideological targeting of incumbents in both periods. In fact, the House Republican models show the best evidence of strategic ideological targeting among the four chamber-party combinations; although, not all the risk curves are consistent with strategic ideological targeting. For example, in the most recent period, the House Republican incumbents with the highest probability of being targeted are the most extreme incumbents in the safest districts. This phenomenon of extreme incumbents in safe districts facing primary challengers who are supported by outside ideological groups is not unique to House Republicans. It is something I see in three of the four chamber-party combinations. When I look more closely at the specific candidates involved, I see differences in the type of challengers outside ideological groups support. For House Republicans, outside
ideological groups support challengers who usually did not win and who ran ideological rather than centrist campaigns.\textsuperscript{17}

When I break House Democrats out by time, the results are consistent with one element of strategic targeting. That is, incumbents in safer Democratic districts are more likely to be targeted by outside ideological groups. However, particularly in the later period, the results suggest that rather than targeting moderates, the most extremely Liberal Democratic incumbents are at the greatest risk of facing a primary challenger who receives funding from an outside Liberal group. This is similar to the finding for House Republicans and Senate Democrats in the later period. Although, from inspecting cases where this occurs, House Democrats appear to be the only chamber-party combination where extreme incumbents are successfully replaced after targeting, and they are replaced by more moderate members.

To help interpret the differences in ideological targeting by time, I provide plots showing how closely incumbents’ ideology, as measured by DW-Nominate first dimension scores, are aligned to their states and districts’ underlying partisanship. These reveal that Senators are not closely ideologically aligned with their states when simple ideological targeting occurs in the early period. In that time period, ideological groups appear to target more moderate incumbents wherever they find them. After the simple ideological targeting of the early period, incumbent Senators are more closely aligned with their states in the later period. And, simple ideological targeting declines in the later period.

\textsuperscript{17} I used the data in the models to identify primary challengers who received outside ideological group support and who took on ideologically extreme incumbents in safe districts. I used the data I had compiled to determine if these challengers won the primary. If the challenger won the primary, I then used sources such as The Almanac of American Politics to determine if the primary challenger won the general election. If the challenger did win the general election, I looked up the DW-Nominate score of the new Member of Congress and compared it to the unseated incumbent to see who was more ideologically extreme. If the challenger did not win the primary or lost the general election, I used summaries from The Almanac of American Politics as well as online sources to determine if the losing challenger had campaigned to the center of the incumbent.
Unlike the Senate, House members are closely aligned with their districts in the early period. There is no evidence of simple ideological targeting in this period. In the later period, incumbents are not substantially more closely aligned with their districts than they are in the early period.

These Senate and House results lead me to the conclusion that the amount of simple ideological targeting that occurs at the beginning of the FECA era is related to how closely incumbents are aligned to their states/districts’ partisanship. When they are not closely aligned, more simple ideological targeting occurs, and simple ideological targeting incentivizes members to be more closely aligned with their states/districts’ partisanship. The result of the closer alignment is less simple ideological targeting.

There is some evidence of strategic ideological targeting in incumbent Republican House races during both periods. This leads me to the conclusion that Conservative groups are active in Republican districts and generally incentivize members to favor more extreme ideological positions. However, as noted above, in the later period, in the safest districts, some of the most ideologically extreme incumbents are the most likely to be targeted by Conservative groups. Unlike House Democrats where there are multiple cases of ideological groups successfully replacing ideologically extreme incumbents with more moderate candidates, the challengers to Republican House extremists do not run as centrists and seldom win. Among House Democrats, however, there are multiple examples of Liberal groups successfully suppressing ideological radicalism in safe Democratic districts by supporting successful and relatively moderate incumbent challengers to ideologically extreme incumbents. Hence, differences in the goals and effectiveness of the Conservative and Liberal ideological groups may partly explain the differences in the level of partisanship that we see in House members’ Nominate scores (see Chapter One, Exhibit 1-D).
After covering time period differences, I discuss the conclusion I draw from Chapter Six. My overall conclusions about the effects of ideological targeting are as follows. While the type of strategic ideological targeting we see among House Republicans may incentivize higher levels of ideological extremeness, this is not the only observable effect that can be tied to the actions of ideological groups in primaries. In the Senate, simple ideological targeting provides an incentive for Senators to be more closely aligned with their states, which improves representation. Among House Democrats, these groups provide a throttle on ideological extremeness in the safest Democratic seats.

From a normative view of delegate (rather than trusteeship) representation, outside groups engaging in ideological targeting may be seen as a positive. It provides incentives for Senators to more closely align with their states. In the House, the effects of strategic ideological targeting in Republican primaries appear to incentivize extreme positions. However, as the close association between House Republicans and their districts shows, the actions of Conservative groups in House Republican primaries has not had a demonstrably negative effect on how closely members reflect their districts’ underlying preferences. Among House Democrats, Liberal groups appear to thwart extreme positions from being represented, but again, the close association between House Democrats and their districts’ partisanship, shown in the plots, suggests that the actions of these groups has not substantially damaged representation of district preferences.

*Incumbent Ideology and Contributions from Outside Ideological Groups*

In Chapter Three, I noted that 99% of incumbents receive contributions from outside ideological groups. Below, I flesh out this finding by showing that as incumbents’ roll call ideology increases the support they receive from outside ideological groups, increases. In other words, more ideological incumbents receive greater contributions from outside ideological
groups. This is shown in Exhibit 6-A, which depicts the level of outside ideological contributions incumbents receive as a function of their ideology. The OLS models used to create Exhibit 6-A also control for state/district partisanship using partisan marginality. The plots in Exhibit 6-A show each chamber-party’s contribution trend lines for the 10th-90th percentiles of their respective incumbents’ ideologies. Partisan marginality was set to the median for each group being examined in order to draw the curves depicted in Exhibit 6-A. Exhibits 6-B and 6-C show the coefficients used to create Exhibit 6-A and also show the coefficients for models that do not control for state/district marginality.

Exhibit 6-A demonstrates that outside Liberal groups in the House give greater weight to incumbent ideology than do outside Conservative groups. The differences between the two parties in the Senate are much smaller. The evidence for these claims, as illustrated in Exhibit 6-A, is that incumbent ideology has a larger effect on outside ideological group contributions to Democratic incumbents than to Republican incumbents. This is seen by comparing the Democrats’ dashed blue lines in Exhibit 6-A to the Republicans’ solid red lines. The trend line for House Democrats is the steepest; the trend line for House Republicans is the flattest. The partisan differences are less extreme in the Senate. Senate Democratic incumbents have a slightly steeper trend line than Senate Republican incumbents.
Exhibit 6-B shows the coefficients and other regression model details for the Senate incumbents depicted in Exhibit 6-A. Senate Democratic incumbents have larger ideology coefficients than Senate Republican incumbents. After controlling for state partisan marginality, a one-point increase in incumbent ideology increases a Democratic Senate incumbent’s outside ideological contributions by 16 percentage points.\(^{18}\) The increase is slightly less than 11 percentage points for Republican incumbents.

\(^{18}\) When interpreting these coefficients, please keep in mind that the measure of ideology is based upon DW-Nominate scores, which generally vary between -1 and 1. Thus, while the coefficients are large, the universe of possible scores is close to 2 units. And, within a party, particularly in recent decades, the highest and lowest incumbent scores are usually within one unit of one another. Therefore, the coefficient value for a point change in ideology is close to the expected range of difference we would see among co-partisans. Using the Senate Democrats in Exhibit 6-B as an example, 16 percentage points is the expected difference in outside ideological contributions between the most Liberal Democrats, those with ideology scores close to one, and the most conservative Democrats, those with ideology scores close to 0.
Exhibit 6-B also shows little change in the incumbent ideology coefficient when district partisanship is included in the model. Among Senate Republicans, the coefficient for incumbent ideology is 11.66 in the bivariate model where an incumbent’s percentage of ideological contributions is the dependent variable. When both state partisan marginality and incumbent ideology are included as independent variables, the coefficient for incumbent ideology decreases by slightly less than a point to 10.71, and the partisan marginality coefficient is small and not statistically significant. Among Senate Democrats, the incumbent ideology coefficient is 14.55 in the bivariate model. It increases to 16.09 when partisan marginality is included as a dependent variable. The coefficient for partisan marginality is, as with Senate Republicans, small and not statistically significant.

Exhibit 6-C shows the coefficients for House incumbents. House Democratic incumbents have much larger incumbent ideology coefficients than House Republican incumbents. A one-point increase in ideology increases a Democratic House incumbent’s outside ideological
contributions by more than 25 percentage points. The increase is less than five percentage points for Republican incumbents.

The effect of district partisan marginality differs between the two House parties. Among House Republican incumbents, controlling for partisanship decreases the already small effect of incumbent ideology by slightly more than a percentage point; the change is from 6.10 to 4.75; district partisan marginality is not statistically significant. However, controlling for district partisan marginality has a strong effect on the estimate for incumbent ideology in the Democratic House model. Outside Liberal contributors do appear to consider how safe seats are for the Democratic Party when deciding how much to support a Democratic incumbent. The change in the coefficient for incumbent ideology shows that controlling for district partisanship increases the estimated effect of incumbent ideology by nine points. The marginality variable for the House Democratic model shows that outside ideological contributions increase by .18 of a percentage point for each one-point increase in partisan marginality; that is, as districts become less Liberal, Liberal groups give more to the incumbents. In short, Liberal contributors reward Democratic incumbents in less safe districts.
In order to determine if, as Exhibit 6-C suggests, outside Liberal groups reward more ideological incumbents in moderate districts, I created Exhibit 6-D. It shows that in competitive districts, incumbent House Democrats will increase their portion of outside ideological contributions by 27 percentage points when their ideology increases by one point. The increase is less than 17 points in safe Liberal districts. There were enough cases to also look at Democratic incumbents in Conservative, “safe Republican” districts. In these cases, incumbents increase the outside Liberal contributions they receive by almost 34 percentage points when they increase their partisanship by a point. Outside Liberal groups reward more ideologically extreme Democratic House incumbents with primary support when those incumbents are in districts where being more Liberal could adversely affect the incumbent in the general election.
I created Exhibit 6-E in order to compare the results in Exhibit 6-D to House Republicans. Among Republican incumbents, the ideology coefficient increases from slightly under five in all Republican House districts to a little more than eight in competitive Republican House districts. This means that in competitive House districts, Conservative contributors increase their primary contributions for incumbent Republicans to eight percentage points for each one-point increase in the incumbent’s ideology. This is far smaller than the 27 percentage points Exhibit 6-D shows for Democratic incumbents in competitive districts.
Exhibit 6-F shows that unlike incumbent House Republicans, incumbent Senate Republicans with higher levels of ideology who represent competitive states do not receive a boost in ideological contributions relative to all incumbent Republican Senators. The coefficient for all Republican Senators is 10.71 and it declines slightly to 9.71 for incumbents in competitive states. In safe Republican states, the coefficient is 3.36 and not statistically significant.
Exhibit 6-F

INCUMBENT REPUBLICAN PRIMARIES IN THE SENATE (1980-2008)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: IDEOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS MADE TO INCUMBENTS

CELLS SHOW COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>INCUMBENT IDEOLOGY</th>
<th>STATE PARTISAN MARGINALITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL SENATE REPUBLICANS</td>
<td>17.72***</td>
<td>10.71***</td>
<td>-11 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .18/n=83</td>
<td>(3.84)</td>
<td>(2.83)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE REPUBLICANS (COMPETITIVE SEATS)</td>
<td>19.60**</td>
<td>9.92***</td>
<td>-.16 (.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .16/n=59</td>
<td>(8.65)</td>
<td>(3.54)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE REPUBLICANS (SAFE REPUBLICAN SEATS)</td>
<td>62.67****</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>-1.22** (.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = .45/n=12</td>
<td>(15.64)</td>
<td>(7.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE REPUBLICANS (SAFE DEMOCRATIC SEATS)</td>
<td>.85 (29.26)</td>
<td>8.72</td>
<td>.18 (.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R² = -.03/n=12</td>
<td></td>
<td>(8.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibits 6-D through 6-F can be compared to Exhibit 6-G, which shows the results for Democratic Senators. Like House Democratic incumbents, Senate Democratic incumbents with higher levels of ideology who are in competitive states receive a boost in outside ideological contributions compared to all Senate Democratic incumbents. The coefficient increases from 16 for all Senate Democratic incumbents to over 27 for incumbents in competitive seats. When only the incumbents in safe seats are examined, the coefficient for incumbent ideology is small and insignificant suggesting that Liberal groups are not motivated to increase their support for the most extreme incumbents in the safest seats.
Together, the findings in this section show that outside ideological groups provide higher levels of contributions to more ideological incumbents facing a primary challenger. Overall, the level of support from these groups is stronger among Democrats than among Republicans. But, do these groups also punish ideologically moderate incumbents by supporting incumbent challengers? This is investigated in the next sections.

**Targeting and Vote Performance**

In the next sections, I examine ideological targeting and test whether it is also strategic. That is, I look at whether more moderate incumbents are more likely to face primary challengers who are supported by outside ideological groups (simple ideological targeting). I also look at whether outside ideological groups are more likely to support primary challengers to more moderate incumbents when those incumbents are in safer seats (strategic ideological targeting). Of course, for targeting to be effective, targeted incumbents must fair worse in primaries. Exhibit 6-H shows that they do. Exhibit 6-H compares the vote percentages received by
incumbents facing outside ideological group supported primary challengers to the vote percentages received by incumbents facing primary challengers with no outside ideological group support. Incumbents who face primary challengers that receive outside ideological support do worse in primaries than incumbents who face primary challengers that do not receive outside ideological support.

**Exhibit 6-H**

*Incumbents Facing Primary Challengers Who Were Supported By Outside Ideological Groups Receive Lower Vote Percentages Than Incumbents With Challengers That Receive No Outside Ideological Group Support*

Exhibit 6-H shows that incumbents who face outside ideological group funded primary challengers perform worse in primaries; the difference in the median vote percentage is more than 20 percentage points for both parties in both chambers. The largest spread, 27 percentage points, occurs among Senate Democrats. The median vote percentage for Democratic Senate incumbents with challengers lacking support from outside ideological groups is 86%, compared to 59% for incumbents who face outside ideological group supported challengers. Among Senate Republicans, the percentages are 86% compared to 65%, a difference of 21 percentage
points; among House Republicans and Democrats, the differences are 83% to 62%, and 82% to 61%, respectively.

*Incumbent Ideology and the Risk of an Ideological Group Supported Primary Challenger*

While the first section in this chapter shows that more ideological incumbents are rewarded with higher contribution levels from outside ideological groups, that section does not directly measure the extent to which moderate incumbents are targeted, which is investigated in this section. I also examine whether the targeting is strategic. I do this by looking at the pooled time period from 1980 through 2008 and measuring whether outside ideological groups are more likely to contribute to the primary challengers of moderate incumbents than to the primary challengers of more ideological incumbents, i.e., simple ideological targeting. Additionally, I test whether the interaction of state/district marginality and incumbent ideology affects which of the more moderate candidates are targeted, i.e., strategic ideological targeting.

The pooled time period analysis shows simple ideological targeting in the Senate, i.e., moderate incumbents are more likely to be targeted by outside ideological groups. Though not as strong as the Senate findings, there is also evidence that House Republicans experience simple ideological targeting. There is no statistically significant evidence of simple ideological targeting among House Democrats.

The statistical testing for strategic ideological targeting of Senate incumbents does not yield statistically significant results; however, the direction of the coefficients and shape of the probability curves are consistent with strategic ideological testing for both Senate parties and for House Republicans. Further, there is some statistical evidence that strategic ideological targeting occurs among House Republicans. There is not statistically significant evidence of strategic ideological targeting among House Democrats.
Targeting, as discussed in Chapter Three, is relatively rare and requires several circumstances, such as a viable primary challenger, in order for it to occur. The models of ideological targeting that I construct test whether incumbents are ever targeted during their careers. To do this I created a sample of incumbents that includes one case per incumbent for their career. I use one case per incumbent for their career in order to avoid including every primary in which an incumbent participates because longer serving incumbents have greater exposure to being targeted and thus could bias the outcomes. In addition, I take several steps to address the different exposure times among incumbents. First, the dependent variable is coded as one if the incumbent was ever targeted and zero otherwise. Second, when I test for targeting and strategic targeting using logistic regression, I control for exposure by including a variable that reflects the number of primaries in which an incumbent participated. In addition to the logistic regression model, I conduct Cox Regression survival analysis because several sources claim that simply using elapsed time as an independent variable is an inadequate control for addressing difference in exposure time (Breen, 1996 and, Miller & Halpern, 1982). Whereas the Cox regression approach accounts for censored and truncated data, i.e., data where exposure time differs, and where the final outcome is only partially known, incomplete, or cut off. Finally, I want to note that only using one case per incumbent reduces my n.

The reduced n results in high variance calculations and some distorted coefficients. I try to deal with this by not simply basing my conclusions on only the statistical significance of variables. I also pay attention to the overall risk probability curves that are estimated using the models and the cases in the models. Also, when I am measuring strategic ideological targeting, I test whether the inclusion of the strategic variables, i.e., marginality and the product of ideology

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19 I report the Cox Regression estimates in my initial discussion of results. They confirm the direction of the logistic regression model results; although, there are some differences in statistical significance. Because of the confirmatory results, I do not include the Cox Regression results in the tables in the later part of this chapter where I focus on comparing risk probability curves.
and marginality, improve the fit of the model. This is done with joint significance testing of these variables.

Exhibit 6-I shows the results for logistic regression models that test for simple ideological targeting. The logistic regression models that are the basis for exhibit 6-I are found in the second row of the tables in exhibits 6-I-A through 6-I-D. These models predict the likelihood that incumbents are targeted during their career as a function of the incumbents’ ideologies and a control for exposure. For comparison, these tables also include results for (1) logistic regression models without a control for exposure, which are found in the first row of the tables, and (2) models that use Cox Regression survival analysis, which are found in the third row of the tables. A finding indicating statistical evidence of simple ideological targeting occurring is indicated by a negative and statistically significant coefficient for Incumbent Ideology. This means that the likelihood of being targeted decreases as incumbents become more ideological.

Exhibit 6-I plots the risk that an incumbent is ideologically targeted as a function of their ideology. Among Senate incumbents, the risk of being targeted increases as incumbent ideology decreases. The findings are strongest among Senate Republicans. The trend for House Republicans also shows their risk increases as their ideology moderates, but Incumbent Ideology is not statistically significant in the plot. However, Exhibit 6-I-C shows that when the model is specified differently, Incumbent Ideology is statistically significant for House Republicans. Incumbent ideology is not statistically significant in any of the three House Democratic models that test for simple ideological targeting. To create the plots in Exhibit 6-I, for each chamber-party combination, incumbent ideology is varied between its 10th and 90th percentile while exposure is set to its median.
Exhibit 6-I
Ideological Outside Groups Are More Likely to Target Moderate Incumbents

The coefficients for Republican Senators that are the basis for Exhibit 6-I can be found in Exhibit 6-I-A. Exhibit 6-I-A shows that under all three modeling specifications, i.e., not controlling for exposure, controlling for exposure, and Cox Regression survival analysis, incumbent ideology is statistically significant for Senate Republicans. In other words, there is consistent evidence of simple ideological targeting.
Exhibit 6-I-A

INCUMBENT REPUBLICAN PRIMARIES IN THE SENATE
(1980-2008)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE CODED ONE IF INCUMBENTS FACED OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL GROUP FUNDED PRIMARY CHALLENGERS DURING THEIR CAREER, 0 OTHERWISE.
CELLS SHOW B COEFFICIENT AND (STANDARD ERRORS)/EXP(B) FROM LOGISTIC OR COX REGRESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>INCUMBENT IDEOLOGY</th>
<th>EXPOSURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION (N=53)</td>
<td>1.39***</td>
<td>-5.08***</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.00)</td>
<td>(1.65)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/4.03</td>
<td>/.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION (N=53)</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>-5.46***</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.72)</td>
<td>(1.76)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/2.77</td>
<td>/.004</td>
<td>/1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COX REGRESSION SURVIVAL ANALYSIS (N=53)</td>
<td>NOT ESTIMATED</td>
<td>-2.93***</td>
<td>TIME FACTOR IN THE SURVIVAL ANALYSIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>/.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 6-I-B shows, for Senate Democrats, similar findings to Senate Republicans.

Under all three model specifications, ideological targeting is indicated, i.e., *Incumbent Ideology* is always negative and statistically significant. One difference between the models is that the model not controlling for exposure and the Cox Regression survival analysis model show that *Incumbent Ideology* is significant at the .01 level rather than at the .05 level indicated by the model used in Exhibit 6-I.
Exhibit 6-I-B

INCUMBENT DEMOCRATIC PRIMARIES IN THE SENATE
(1980-2008)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE CODED ONE IF INCUMBENTS FACED OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL GROUP FUNDED PRIMARY CHALLENGERS DURING THEIR CAREER, 0 OTHERWISE.
CELLS SHOW B COEFFICIENT AND (STANDARD ERRORS)/EXP(B) FROM LOGISTIC OR COX REGRESSION.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>INCUMBENT IDEOLOGY</th>
<th>EXPOSURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION</td>
<td>1.22 (1.03)</td>
<td>-6.31*** (2.93)</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=39)</td>
<td>/3.39</td>
<td>/.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION</td>
<td>1.22 (1.06)</td>
<td>-6.94** (3.26)</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=39)</td>
<td>/3.37</td>
<td>/.001</td>
<td>/(.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COX REGRESSION SURVIVAL ANALYSIS</td>
<td>NOT ESTIMATED</td>
<td>-8.10*** (2.73)</td>
<td>TIME FACTOR IN THE SURVIVAL ANALYSIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=39)</td>
<td></td>
<td>/.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 6-I-C shows that two model specifications identify statistically significant ideological targeting in Republican House primaries. The finding of ideological targeting is significant at the .1 level in the model that does not account for exposure. It is significant at the .05 level in the Cox Regression survival analysis model. It is not statistically significant in the model used to create Exhibit 6-I.
Finally, the lack of simple ideological targeting among House Democrats is shown in Exhibit 6-I-D. Incumbent Ideology is not significant in any of the three House Democratic models. The sign is in the opposite direction (not negative) of simple ideological targeting in two of the three models.
The models in this section are specified conservatively in order to avoid biasing the findings with multiple cases from the same incumbent. They support several conclusions about simple ideological targeting over the pooled time period from 1980 through 2008. First, there is strong evidence of simple ideological targeting in the Senate. Both moderate Republican and moderate Democratic Senators are at greater risk of facing an opponent who is funded by an outside ideological group. The case for simple ideological targeting is not as strong in the House. Among the three House Republican models, *Incumbent Ideology* is statistically significant at the .05 level in one, the .1 level in another, and not statistically significant in the third. Although, the plot of the non-significant model that is used in Exhibit 6-I shows that the direction of the risk curve that is estimated by the non-statistically significant House Republican model is consistent with simple ideological targeting. House Democrats are a clear outlier. *Incumbent Ideology* is not statistically significant in any of the three Democratic models, and the plot for House Democrats in Exhibit 6-I shows that their risk curve is flat and not in the direction of simple ideological targeting.
In order to test for strategic ideological targeting, I added two new variables to the logistic regression models used to create Exhibit 6-I. The two new variables are State/District Marginality and the Interaction of Incumbent Ideology with State/District Marginality. To examine strategic ideological targeting, I look at (1) whether the interaction term is statistically significant and points in a direction that, in conjunction with the direction of the ideology and marginality terms, shows the risk of being targeted increasing as districts become safer for the incumbent’s party, (2) whether a joint significance test of adding State/District Marginality and the Interaction of Incumbent Ideology with State/District Marginality is statistically significant, and (3) the risk curves of different ideological categories of incumbents relative to one another. When looking at the risk curves, in order to see evidence of strategic ideological targeting, I expect the core group’s risk curve, i.e., mainstream candidates’ curve and the curve for all candidates, to increase as districts become safer for the incumbents’ parties. I also expect mainstream candidates, when at the same level of marginality as other groups, to have less risk than moderates and more risk than ideologically extreme incumbents.

The interaction terms are not statistically significant in any of the strategic ideological targeting models for the pooled time period. Tests of the joint significance for adding these two new marginality variables show that they are only statistically significant (.05 level) for House Republicans. Hence, while the analysis above provides statistical evidence for simple ideological targeting among both Senate parties and House Republicans, there is only statistical evidence for strategic ideological targeting in House Republican primaries. The results of the new models are shown in Exhibit 6-J below. The inclusion of the interaction term that is partially based on incumbent ideology, along with the high variance and low n of these models, also results in Incumbent Ideology not being statistically significant in the strategic ideological targeting model. Notably, Incumbent Ideology is statistically significant at the .05 level or better.
if only a marginality variable, but not an interaction between marginality and ideology, is included in the models. Please see Exhibit 6-K for the results of the models without the interaction terms.

**Exhibit 6-J**

**STRATEGIC IDEOLOGICAL TARGETING DURING AN INCUMBENT’S CAREER (1980-2008)**

DEPENDENT VARIABLE CODED ONE IF INCUMBENTS FACED OUTSIDE IDEOLOGICAL GROUP FUNDED PRIMARY CHALLENGERS DURING THEIR CAREER. 0 OTHERWISE.

CELLS SHOW B COEFFICIENT AND (STANDARD ERRORS) /EXP(B) FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>INCUMBENT IDEOLOGY</th>
<th>STATE MARGINALITY</th>
<th>INTERACTION EXTREMEX MARGINALITY</th>
<th>EXPOSURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sensor</td>
<td>1.806</td>
<td>-.5.175</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republics</td>
<td>(4.20)</td>
<td>(11.62)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=53)/.925</td>
<td>/6.084</td>
<td>/.006</td>
<td>/1.986</td>
<td>/.991</td>
<td>/1.234</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>1.853</td>
<td>1.523</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.223</td>
<td>.043</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>(5.38)</td>
<td>(16.31)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.37)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=39)/.312</td>
<td>/6.377</td>
<td>/4.585</td>
<td>/.997</td>
<td>/.800</td>
<td>/1.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>1.366</td>
<td>2.183</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>-.096</td>
<td>-.113**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republics</td>
<td>(2.22)</td>
<td>(4.33)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=140)/.022</td>
<td>/3.919</td>
<td>/8.869</td>
<td>/.990</td>
<td>/.909</td>
<td>/.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
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<td>2.981</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.079</td>
<td>-.158***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(2.88)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=220)/.144</td>
<td>/1.092</td>
<td>/19.705</td>
<td>/1.014</td>
<td>/.924</td>
<td>/.854</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
When an Interaction Term is Not Included, Incumbent Ideology is Statistically Significant in Three of the Four Party-Chamber Combinations

PROBABILITY THAT INCUMBENTS ARE “PRIMARIED” DURING THEIR CAREER (1980-2008)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE CODED ONE IF INCUMBENTS FACED OUTSIDEIDEOLOGICAL GROUP FUNDED PRIMARY CHALLENGERS DURING THEIR CAREER, 0 OTHERWISE. CELLS SHOW B COEFFICIENT AND (STANDARD ERRORS)/EXP(B) FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>INCUMBENT IDEOLOGY</th>
<th>STATE MARGINALITY</th>
<th>EXPOSURE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SENATE REPUBLICANS (N=53)</td>
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<td>-5.65*** (1.85)</td>
<td>-.02 (.04)</td>
<td>.21 (.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/7.003</td>
<td>/.004</td>
<td>/9.83</td>
<td>/1.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATE DEMOCRATS  (N=39)</td>
<td>5.35* (3.15)</td>
<td>-8.37** (3.65)</td>
<td>-.08 (.05)</td>
<td>.04 (.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/209.81</td>
<td>/.000</td>
<td>/9.25</td>
<td>/1.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE REPUBLICANS (N=140)</td>
<td>3.19*** (1.10)</td>
<td>-1.77** (1.87)</td>
<td>-.05** (.02)</td>
<td>-.11 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/24.166</td>
<td>/.170</td>
<td>/9.48</td>
<td>/8.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE DEMOCRATS (N=222)</td>
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<td>-.56 (1.00)</td>
<td>-.02 (.01)</td>
<td>-.16*** (.05)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>/5.381</td>
<td>/.574</td>
<td>/9.81</td>
<td>/8.51</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Given the limited number of cases involved, the high variance, and low ns, I am hesitant to dismiss the models in Exhibit 6-J as confirming the absence of strategic ideological targeting. While the variables lack statistical significance, the four chamber-party models in Exhibit 6-J offer substantive insight about the contours of strategic ideological targeting experienced by incumbents of different ideological stripes. This is shown in Exhibit 6-L, which depicts the likelihood of being targeted, by chamber and party, for moderate (the most moderate 25%), mainstream (the middle 50%), and extreme (the most extreme 25%) incumbents. Each ideological group’s predicted probabilities in Exhibit 6-L are based on the group’s unique marginality values between the 10th and 90th percentiles. The other variables are set to the ideological group’s median in order to create the predicted values.
Exhibit 6-L shows that the risk curves associated with the models in Exhibit 6-J are consistent with strategic ideological targeting in three of the four chamber-party combinations. The three models show that, generally, the probability of an incumbent facing an ideological outside group funded opponent increases as districts become safer for the incumbent’s party. Moderate incumbents have higher risk than mainstream incumbents at the same level of district partisanship, and mainstream incumbents have higher risk than ideologically extreme incumbents at the same level of district partisanship. The predicted trends for House Democratic incumbents are, as in the simple ideological targeting analysis, unique. House Democratic incumbents with the highest probability of being targeted are the most extreme Democratic incumbents in the most partisan Democratic districts.

To summarize the prior sections in this chapter, first, the section *Incumbent Ideology and Contributions from Outside Ideological Groups* shows that there is an incentive for incumbents to be more ideologically extreme as more ideologically extreme incumbents receive larger shares...
of ideological contributions. Further, the section called *Targeting and Vote Performance* shows there is an incentive for incumbents to not want outside ideological groups to contribute to primary challengers because incumbents facing challengers that are supported by outside ideological groups do worse in terms of vote share than incumbents facing challengers who do not receive outside ideological support. The section called *Incumbent Ideology and the Risk of an Ideological Group Supported Primary Challenger* looks at the pooled time period and shows that for all chamber-party combinations except House Democrats, simple ideological targeting occurs. The evidence is strongest for Senate incumbents, but several models show statistical evidence for House Republicans as well. However, the statistical evidence does not make it clear that the ideological targeting is strategic, although the direction of the coefficients and predicted risk curves are, with the exception of House Democrats, consistent with strategic ideological targeting. Given the low n, large variances, and the shapes of the probability curves associated with the strategic ideological targeting models, I do not treat the statistical significance tests of the variables in the strategic ideological targeting models as conclusive.

The analysis could stop here. I could conclude that with the exception of House Democrats there is strong evidence of simple ideological targeting, and moderate evidence of strategic ideological targeting. The fact that the best statistical evidence for strategic ideological targeting occurs among House Republicans certainly could support a conclusion that the ideological partisanship shown in House Republican Nominate scores is at least partially driven by the strategic ideological targeting that occurs to House Republican incumbents. While I consider all that to be correct, stopping here would ignore the questions of (1) whether the relationship shown in the pooled results for 1980-2008 changed over time, and (2) whether outside ideological groups engaging in targeting affects representation. These two questions are addressed below.
Differences by Time Period

This section examines differences in ideological targeting and strategic ideological targeting in the most recent years of 1994-2008, and in the early FECA years of 1980-1992. I show that simple ideological targeting declined for both Senate parties in recent years. There is some evidence of strategic ideological targeting in the Senate, but it is not consistent or clear. For House Republicans, there is evidence of strategic ideological targeting in both time periods. Although there are unique trends for Republican moderates and ideological extremists, these trends vary between the two time periods. Among Senate Democrats, House Democrats, and Republicans in the later period, the most extreme incumbents in the safest districts are at higher risk than others of being targeted by outside ideological groups. However, this type of targeting is only successful among House Democrats where the primary challengers ran as relative moderates compared to the ideologues they challenged. After examining ideological targeting in each section, I discuss the relationship between incumbent ideology and their constituents’ ideology as a possible cause for differences in the type and level of targeting I observe.

Senate Republican Differences by Time Period

Simple ideological targeting of incumbent Republican Senators declined in recent years. As depicted in the upper panels of Exhibit 6-M, there is statistically significant evidence of simple ideological targeting in Senate Republican primaries during both the early and later time periods. The predicted level of targeting (as shown by the height of the risk curves) and the coefficient’s statistical significance (0.1 compared to 0.05) is greater in the early period.
As with the pooled time data, there is not statistically significant evidence of strategic ideological targeting in either the early or the later periods. This can be seen by looking at the coefficients in Exhibit 6-M-A, which show the coefficients of the models that are the basis of the plots in lower panels of Exhibit 6-M. The results of the joint significance tests for adding the strategic ideological targeting variables are not statistically significant. However, the lower panels in Exhibit 6-M demonstrate that the strategic ideological targeting models’ predicted risk curves are, in the early period, consistent with strategic ideological targeting. Risk increases as states become safer for Republicans, and risk is greatest for moderates (in red) and lowest for ideologues (in green). In the later period, although more moderate Senators are still at greatest risk, risk decreases as states become safer. Both the upper left and lower left panels show ideological targeting in the later period, but the targeting is not strategic. Given the lack of statistical significance for the marginality variables and the lack of joint significance in adding those variables, along with risk decreasing as states become safer in the later period, I conclude that there is little evidence of strategic ideological targeting among Senate Republicans. The
plots and models are consistent with simple ideological targeting that declined, but continued at a lower level, in the most recent period.

**Exhibit 6-M-A**

**PROBABILITY THAT INCUMBENT REPUBLICAN SENATORS ARE “PRIMARIED” DURING THEIR CAREER (1980-2008)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES / Marginality Variables</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>INCUMBENT IDEOLOGY</th>
<th>STATE MARGINALITY</th>
<th>INTERACTION EXTREME X MARGINALITY</th>
<th>EXPOSURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGICAL TARGETING 1980-1992 (N=21)</td>
<td>1.919 (1.404)</td>
<td>-9.494** (4.836) / .000</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>.348 (.694) / 1.416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGICAL TARGETING 1994-2008 (N=32)</td>
<td>.133 (1.048)</td>
<td>-3.495* (2.053) / .030</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>.252 (.268) / 1.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC TARGETING 1980-1992 (N=21)</td>
<td>4.085 (9.909)</td>
<td>-6.554 (28.155) / .001</td>
<td>.035 (.182) / .965</td>
<td>-.052 (.533) / .949</td>
<td>.113 (.774) / 1.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC TARGETING 1994-2008 (N=32)</td>
<td>-.520 (5.157)</td>
<td>-4.369 (14.068) / .013</td>
<td>.012 (.094) / 1.012</td>
<td>.024 (.270) / 1.024</td>
<td>.250 (.276) / 1.284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The time period differences for Republican Senators show that simple ideological targeting declined after 1992. To more closely examine the dynamics underlying the targeting models, I looked at the distribution of moderate, mainstream, and extreme incumbents by state partisanship in the two periods. In the first cut of this correlation comparison, I used all incumbents who participated in primaries with a challenger. I did not filter out incumbents if they participated in more than one primary. I did this to determine whether there were more moderates in more extreme states in the early period. Exhibit 6-N depicts the results for Republican Senators and shows that a stronger correlation between incumbent ideology and state partisanship emerged after 1992. In the early period, from 1980-1992, the r coefficient (Pearson correlation) for the bivariate relationship between incumbent ideology and state partisanship is negative and not statistically significant. However, in the later period, after 1992, the r coefficient is a positive, .472, and statistically significant at the .05 level. I interpret these plots.
to show that in the later period Republican Senators are more ideologically representative of their states.

Keeping in mind that the later period change occurs after moderates experience simple ideological targeting in the early period (shown in Exhibit 6-M above), the results support the view that simple ideological targeting helped strengthen the relationship between voters’ ideologies and their Senators’ ideologies. Specifically, if I use the simple definition that perfect representation would have a Pearson correlation coefficient of 1, in which the most moderate Republican Senators represented the least Republican states and the most extreme Republican Senators represented the most extreme Republican states, then Exhibit 6-N shows a change towards stronger representation after the simple ideological targeting in the early period. After the representation relationship strengthened, simple ideological targeting declined in the later period. As Exhibit 6-M shows, the overall risk of simple ideological targeting in the later period is lower and the statistical significance drops from the .05 level to the .1 level.

**Exhibit 6-N**

![Diagram showing ideological representation over time with correlation coefficients](image-url)
The cases shown in Exhibit 6-N represent only the incumbents I used in the incumbent analysis in Chapter Five. That is, they are the 83 Republican Senate incumbent cases that meet my selection rules. Exhibit 6-N does not show whether a similar pattern occurred among all incumbent Republican Senators. In order to determine whether a similar pattern emerged among the broader group of Republican Senators who sought re-nomination, I created Exhibit 6-N-A. Exhibit 6-N-A includes all 188 incumbent Republican Senators who stood for re-nomination in party primaries from 1980 through 2008. The exhibit shows that the patterns seen in Exhibit 6-N apply to all re-nomination seeking incumbent Republican Senators. In the early period, there is no relationship between incumbents’ ideologies and their state’s partisanship. The Pearson r correlation coefficient between state partisanship and incumbent ideology is -.137. It is not statistically significant. In the later period, the relationship is much stronger, .563, and statistically significant at the .01 level.
Overall, the analysis of whether ideological and strategic ideological targeting occurs in incumbent Senate Republican primaries shows a higher likelihood of ideological moderates being targeted by Conservative outside groups in the early period. This higher likelihood of targeting preceded a different relationship in the later period in which Senators’ ideologies more strongly reflect the underlying partisanship of their states. In the later period, Republican Senators were both more closely aligned with their states and more Conservative. While in the words of Boatright, “it is impossible to know” whether Senators in the later period are responding to the incentive of ideological targeting, the stronger relationship between state ideology and Senator ideology is consistent with an explanation of members choosing these positions in the later period because they are safer positions for surviving the threats of both an ideological primary and a general election challenge.

**Senate Democrats Differences by Time Period**

I modeled ideological and strategic ideological targeting of Democratic Senators using a similar approach to the one I used to model Republican Senators. This analysis shows modest statistical evidence (.1 level) of simple ideological targeting in the early period. This is shown in the upper right panel of Exhibit 6-O. In the later period, ideological targeting is no longer statistically significant, although the panel in the upper left corner shows that the shape of the curve is similar to the early period, with the likelihood of being targeted increasing as incumbents’ ideology scores become more moderate. The overall risk in the later period is also lower.
The coefficients for the models that are plotted in Exhibit 6-O are depicted in Exhibit 6-O-A. None of the strategic ideological targeting variables in the early period are statistically significant. However, the strategic targeting plot for the early period, in the lower right panel of Exhibit 6-O, is generally consistent with strategic ideological targeting. The core cases, all cases, in black, and the 50% of cases that are mainstream cases, in blue, show a higher likelihood of being targeted as states become safer for Democratic incumbents. Further, these groups’ risk of being targeted is far lower than the risk of being targeted faced by moderates in states with a similar level of Democratic partisanship. And mainstream incumbents’ risk of being targeted is higher than ideologically extreme incumbents. However, the curve for extremists does not increase as states become safer, which is what I would expect if strategic ideological targeting is occurring.

In the later period, there is more statistical evidence of strategic ideological targeting; but, at the extremes, the probability curves are not consistent with strategic ideological targeting. Exhibit 6-O-A illustrates that the interaction term is statistically significant at the 0.1 level in the
later period, and the joint significance test for adding the strategic targeting variables is significant at the .1 level. While the curves for mainstream and all candidates show higher risk as states become safer for Democrats, a finding consistent with strategic ideological targeting, the other risk curves are not what I would expect if strategic ideological targeting is occurring. The risk of moderates being targeted crashes as states become safer for Democrats. Also, as states become safer, the risk for ideologues being targeted explodes past mainstream incumbents. There is an extremely large coefficient for Incumbent Ideology, which I partly attribute to the variance level in the model as well as the low n, which could cause some of the wild findings. However, overall, I do not think the Senate Democratic models show clear evidence of strategic ideological targeting in either time period.

**Exhibit 6-O-A**

When I looked at scatterplots of Republican Senators ideology and their states’ partisanship, it was consistent with the view that outside groups’ simple ideological targeting of moderates in the early period incentivized Senators in the later period to have roll call records that are closer to their states’ ideologies. A similar, though less statistically strong, pattern
appears among Democratic Senators. First, looking at the upper panels in Exhibit 6-O, we see moderate evidence of simple ideological targeting in the early period. The likelihood of a Democratic incumbent facing a Liberal outside group funded challenger increases as incumbent ideology moves from extreme to moderate. This was significant at the .1 level for Democrats; it was significant at the .05 level for Republicans in Exhibit 6-M. In addition, Exhibit 6-P, below, shows that the correlation between Democratic incumbents’ ideology and state partisanship increases in the later period. The Pearson correlation is .057 and not statistically significant in the early period. In the later period, the Pearson correlation is .301 and statistically significant at the .1 level. This suggests the same dynamic that was seen with Republican Senators.

Ideological targeting in the early period incentivized Democratic Senators to hold positions more in line with their states’ underlying ideology. The simple ideological targeting in the early period is less intense in terms of coefficient magnitude and statistical significance for Democrats than Republicans and so is the change in Democratic Senators’ alignment with their states. However, when the stronger correlation emerges in the later period, the statistical evidence of simple ideological targeting subsides and there is less evidence that Liberal groups target moderates wherever they find them.
In order to examine whether the pattern in Exhibit 6-P applies more broadly, I looked at all Democratic Senate incumbents seeking re-nomination regardless of whether they faced primary challengers or whether any of the candidates received primary contributions. These results are shown in Exhibit 6-P-A. The results are similar to Exhibit 6-P. The general pattern of a weak relationship in the early period, which strengthened in the later period, is shown in Exhibit 6-P-A. The correlation increased from .005 to .452. Comparing Exhibit 6-P-A to Exhibit 6-P shows that the correlation in the later period is stronger when all incumbents are included. It is .452 in Exhibit 6-P-A compared to .301 in Exhibit 6-P. The later period correlation coefficient in Exhibit 6-P-A is significant at the .05 level.
Overall, the analysis of Senate Democratic incumbent primaries shows that, similar to Republicans, Democratic Senators are more representative of their states in the later period (after 1992). However, the degree of change was not as severe for Democrats. Among incumbents who faced challengers, the Republican correlations changed by .731 between the two periods (-.259 to .472 in Exhibit 6-N) and .700 for all incumbents (-.137 to .563 in Exhibit 6-N-A). The comparable Democratic shifts are .244 for incumbents who faced challengers (Exhibit 6-P) and .447 for all incumbents (Exhibit 6-P-A). I attribute the Democrats’ smaller change and lower correlations in the later period to the lower level of simple ideological targeting directed at Democrats in the early period. Democratic incumbents are not subjected to incumbent primarying at the same level as Republicans. The evidence for this is shown by the lower and less statistically significant probability during the early period that is depicted in the upper right panel of Exhibit 6-O for Democrats compared to the upper right panel of Exhibit 6-M for Republicans.
**House Republicans Differences by Time Period**

Based on the logistic regression equations, there is not statistically significant evidence for simple ideological targeting of House Republican incumbents in either the early or late time periods. This can be seen by the relatively flat curves in the upper panel of Exhibit 6-Q. However, a different story emerges when strategic ideological targeting is modeled, which is depicted in the lower panel. Exhibit 6-Q-A lists the coefficients and statistical significance of the variables used to create the plots in Exhibit 6-Q. It shows evidence of strategic ideological targeting in both periods; although, the variables are only statistically significant at the .1 level in the early period. Also, in the early period the joint significance test is not statistically significant; it is in the later period. In the later period too, *Incumbent Ideology* and the Interaction of *Incumbent Ideology* and *District Marginality* are statistically significant at the .05 level but *District Marginality* is not.

**Exhibit 6-Q**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Simple Targeting, 1994-2008 (n=94)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of a Group Funded Challenger (0-100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Simple Targeting, 1994-2008 (n=94)" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Simple Targeting, 1980-1992 (n=46)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Simple Targeting, 1980-1992 (n=46)" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Targeting, 1994-2008 (n=94)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Strategic Targeting, 1994-2008 (n=94)" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Targeting, 1980-1992 (n=46)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Strategic Targeting, 1980-1992 (n=46)" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Moderate**
- **Mainstream**
- **Extreme**
- **All**
Beyond statistical significance, the direction of the signs and the probabilities predicted by the model offer some support for a claim of strategic ideological targeting. Focusing on the core cases of the strategic ideological targeting plots in Exhibit 6-Q, the probability of being targeted for all incumbents, in black, and the 50% of incumbents who are mainstream cases, in blue, increases as districts become safer for Republicans, which is what I would expect to occur if strategic ideological targeting is occurring. In the early period, ideological extremist are less likely to be targeted as districts become safer, which is not what I expect to see if strategic ideological targeting is occurring. However, the majority of the ideological extremists’ curve is lower than other curves at similar levels of partisanship in the early period, which is consistent with strategic ideological targeting. The probability of moderates being targeted in the early period increases as districts become safer for Republicans, which is also consistent with strategic ideological targeting. However, most of the moderates’ probabilities are lower than other groups at the same level of district partisanship, which is not consistent with strategic ideological targeting.
In the recent period, 1994-2008, the probability of being targeted for all incumbents, mainstream incumbents, and extreme incumbents increases as districts become safer for the GOP, which is consistent with strategic ideological targeting. However, the risk for roughly half the curve for ideological extremists is greater than for mainstream incumbents, which is not consistent with ideological targeting. Also, the decline in the risk for moderates as districts become safer is not consistent with strategic ideological targeting. However, there are no moderate cases in the safest Republican districts in the later period so a curve of their risk is not depicted. And at almost all levels of district partisanship where there are moderates, the risk for moderates is higher than for other groups at the same level of partisanship, which is consistent with strategic ideological targeting.

I plotted, as I had with Senate incumbents, the early and later period correlations between incumbent ideology and district partisanship for House Republicans. These are depicted in Exhibit 6-R. A salient difference between the House Republican correlations from both Senate correlations is the much higher r value in the early period for House Republicans. In the early
period, House Republicans' correlation is .309 and statistically significant at the .01 level. This contrasts to the -.259 early period correlation for Senate Republicans (Exhibit 6-N) and the .057 early period correlation for Senate Democrats (Exhibit 6-P). Rather than targeting moderates wherever they found them, Conservative groups had to be strategic in House primaries and target incumbents who poorly fit their districts. The effect of the targeting, however, appears to be the same as in the Senate. The correlation tightened, but the magnitude of change is smaller.

Exhibit 6-R shows that in the later period the correlation increased to .453. This .14 increase was smaller than either of the Senate increases, both of which are greater than .20. Notably, Exhibit 6-Q’s interaction for the later period shows that strategic targeting continued. However, the lower left of Exhibit Q-A shows that the overall level of targeting was lower in the later period (observe the lower curves relative to the vertical axis compared to the curves in the lower right of Exhibit 6-Q-A) when incumbents were more closely aligned with their districts.
As with the Senate scatterplots, I compared the results in Exhibit 6-R to a second construction of the scatterplots, which selected all 921 Republican House incumbents who sought re-nomination in party primaries between 1980 and 2008. These are depicted in Exhibit 6-R-A, which shows a strong and statistically significant correlation, .415, in the early period that was statistically significant at the .01 level. This correlation strengthened by only .006 points in the later period, moving to .421. In short, the small change in Exhibit 6-R is smaller still when all Republican House incumbents who sought re-nomination are included (6-R-A). Unlike the Senate, the correlation between Republican House incumbents’ ideologies and their district partisanship does not dramatically change between the early and late periods. Republican House members were well aligned with their districts in the early 1980s.
House Democrats by Time Period

The early and later time period analysis of House Democrats contains some of the most unique findings for any of the chamber party combinations. Simple ideological targeting for House Democrats in the later period runs in the opposite direction; more ideological candidates have a higher risk of facing a primary opponent funded by an outside Liberal group. In addition, House Democrats had the strongest early period correlations of any of the four chamber-party combinations, and they are the only chamber-party combination in which the correlation declined in strength in the later period.

Looking at simple ideological targeting, the upper right hand panel of Exhibit 6-S shows a moderately sloped, non-statistically significant early period trend where more moderate incumbents have a higher risk of being targeted. This is reversed in the later period. In the later period, the targeting is aimed at more ideologically extreme incumbents; Liberal groups support challengers to more ideologically extreme Democratic incumbents. The coefficient, shown in Exhibit 6-S-A, is statistically significant at the .05 level, and the plot, in the upper right panel of
Exhibit 6-S, shows that as incumbents become more ideologically extreme, they are at greater risk of facing a primary challenger funded by outside Liberal groups. Of the eight simple ideological targeting models I ran by time, chamber, and party, this is the only one in which the risk of being targeted by ideological groups allied with one’s party increases as incumbents become more ideologically extreme.

Looking at the strategic ideological targeting models, while the ideology, district partisanship, and the interaction term are not statistically significant, the plotted probability curves show (1) that risk was higher in the early period, and (2) that the risk of an incumbent being targeted increases as districts become safer for Democratic candidates. Among the three ideological groups in the early period, the highest probability of being targeted is associated with the most ideological Democratic incumbents in the most partisan Democratic districts. This is shown in the upper end of the green curve. Notably, most of the moderates’ risk curve is higher than most of the extremists’ risk curve; when moderates are in districts with the same level of partisanship as extremists, the moderates have the higher risk of being primaried. But the upper
end of the extremist curve is higher than the moderates’ curve. In the more recent period, the gap between the three ideological groups is narrower than in the early period, and extremists have the highest probability of being targeted. Again, this occurs in the safest Democratic districts.

**Exhibit 6-S-A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INTERCEPT</th>
<th>INCUMBENT IDEOLOGY</th>
<th>STATE MARGINALITY</th>
<th>INTERACTION EXTREME X MARGINALITY</th>
<th>EXPOSURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGICAL TARGETING 1980-1992 (N=118)</td>
<td>1.007* (0.540)</td>
<td>-0.843 (1.053)</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>-0.084 (0.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGICAL TARGETING 1994-2008 (N=104)</td>
<td>-0.668 (0.564)</td>
<td>2.742** (1.360)</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>NOT IN MODEL</td>
<td>-1.160** (0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC TARGETING 1980-1992 (N=46)</td>
<td>2.344 (2.359)</td>
<td>-0.159 (4.256)</td>
<td>-0.015 (.041)</td>
<td>0.051 (.082)</td>
<td>-1.121 (.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC TARGETING 1994-2008 (N=94)</td>
<td>.666 (2.323)</td>
<td>1.089 (4.643)</td>
<td>-0.025 (.049)</td>
<td>.018 (.110)</td>
<td>-.161** (.071)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The House Democrats’ correlations between incumbent ideology and district partisanship are the most unique of the four chamber-party combinations. The Pearson correlation in the early period, .632, is the highest for any of the eight chamber-party-time period combinations I examined. In addition, it is the only correlation that is smaller in the later time period; although, at .587 and statistically significant at the .01 level, it is the strongest of the four later period correlations. The plots of the House Democrats’ correlations are found in Exhibit 6-T below.
As in the other chamber-party analyses, I also examined whether the pattern in Exhibit 6-T remained when I look at a broader group of incumbents seeking re-nomination. These are depicted in Exhibit 6-T-A below. The major difference between Exhibit 6-T and Exhibit 6-T-A is that for Exhibit 6-T-A, the correlation is stronger in the later period. When compared to the other chamber-party exhibits that showed the broader groups of re-nomination seekers, Exhibit 6-T-A has the largest correlation coefficients. House Democrats also had the highest early period correlations of any of the four groups, and they also had the highest late period correlation. In short, House Democratic incumbents’ ideology fit their district partisanship well in both periods.
Considering the strong correlation between district partisanship and incumbent ideology among House Democrats in the early period, there was less outside ideological groups could do to strengthen the relationship between House Democratic incumbents’ ideology and their districts’ partisanship. If Liberal outside groups wanted to attack moderates, they would have needed to attack moderates in more moderate districts, i.e., engage in non-strategic behavior. The strategic targeting curves suggest that this did occur (Exhibit 6-S) in the early period. The interaction variable is not statistically significant, but the joint significance test is significant at the 0.1 level. The simple ideological targeting curve in the later period, which is statistically significant at the .05 level, demonstrates that more ideologically extreme Democratic incumbents are at a higher risk of being targeted. While the strategic targeting curves suggest that these more ideologically extreme Democratic incumbents are most likely to be targeted if they are in the most partisan Democratic districts.

Tying the House Democratic results together, the type of targeting that is seen does not look like simple primarying of moderates nor can it be explained as resulting from a lack of
correlations between voters’ ideology and their representatives’ ideology. House Democrats had the strongest correlations. A different explanation is needed for House Democrats. My explanation is that Liberal groups expect to win in the most extreme Democratic districts, and these groups primary incumbents who they consider too extreme. As to why this occurs, the answer may be that they are protecting the party’s brand name or that they are helping to maintain more mainstream policy goals to avoid the types of riffs experienced by Republican House leaders with their more ideologically extreme members. Notably, the late period risk curves for Senate Democratic ideologues and House Republican ideologues also show high risk in the safest districts, which is not consistent with strategic ideological targeting. When looking at the cases where this occurred, I found House Democrats to be unique in that (1) the challengers being supported by ideological groups ran to the center of the incumbents, and (2) the challengers often won and replaced incumbents. I will discuss these cases in the next section.

Discussion

The evidence presented above supports the view that simple ideological targeting is most likely when incumbents are not closely aligned to their states/districts. Under these conditions, outside ideological groups target more moderate incumbents wherever they find them. When the correlation between state/district ideology and incumbent ideology strengthens, simple ideological targeting declines. I expected that under stronger correlations, strategic ideological targeting would come into form because outside ideological groups would need to pick their spots. The evidence for strategic ideological targeting under stronger correlations is mixed. Among Senate Republicans, simple ideological targeting certainly declined in the later period when the correlations are stronger, but neither the risk plots nor statistical tests show that strategic ideological targeting emerged in this period. (See Exhibits 6-M and 6-M-A.) Among Senate Democrats in the later period under stronger correlations, the interaction term is
statistically significant and the joint significance test for adding the strategic targeting variable is statistically significant. (See Exhibits 6-O and 6-O-A.) While the core model risk curves, i.e., all cases and mainstream cases, are consistent with strategic ideological targeting, the accelerated risk for ideologues and the decelerating risk for moderates run counter to what I expect under strategic ideological targeting.

House Republicans have strong correlations in both periods and show little evidence of simple ideological targeting. This is consistent with the claim that simple ideological targeting is unlikely when the correlations are strong. The statistical evidence shows a statistically significant interaction term that, despite changing signs in the two periods, lines up with the signs of the other coefficients in the respective time periods to show that the core risk curves for all cases and mainstream cases are consistent with strategic ideological targeting. In addition, the joint significance test for adding the strategic targeting variables is significant at the .01 level in the later period and barely missed significance (.11) in the early period. Only the curves for moderates and ideologues prevent the House cases from looking like a strong example of strategic ideological targeting occurring when incumbents are closely aligned with their districts.

There are explanations about the shape of the House Republican curves for moderates and ideologues in Exhibit 6-Q that support a view of strategic ideological targeting. In the early period, moderates’ risk increases as districts become more favorable to Republicans, which is consistent with strategic ideological targeting and moderates have the highest risk in the safest Republican districts. The early period risk curve for ideologues looks more like outside Conservative groups are trying to find candidates who fit the district, rather than blindly supporting the most Conservative candidates. Ideologues in swing districts are targeted, but the risk of ideologues being targeted rapidly declines as districts become safe. This suggests that in the early period, Conservative groups want to preserve the Conservative incumbents who have a
high chance of winning the general election, i.e., those in the most Conservative districts, but these groups are willing to help cull incumbents who may be too Conservative for their districts. This not strategic ideological targeting as I defined it, rather it suggests that in the early period, these groups were more focused on helping the party win the general elections.

A key difference in the later period is that the Republican Party held the House majority for all but three of the election cycles that occur in the later period; it did not hold the House for any of the early period’s election cycles. The curves suggest that Conservative groups are engaging in strategic ideological targeting in the more moderate districts during the later period. In those districts, ideologues are safe from targeting. However, targeting of ideologues accelerates in the safe districts. I examined cases where this occurred. They included cases like Ron Paul’s primary challenge in 2008, and Dan Burton’s challenge by John McGoff who in later elections was an unsuccessful tea party candidate. Looking at these cases showed they consisted of Conservative incumbents who were challenged by Conservative challengers who did not win the primaries. Though seldom successful, these Conservative challengers could gain at least some support from some Conservative groups that resulted in the incumbents they challenged being coded as “targeted.” My theory as to why this occurred in the later period, and not the early period, is that the appeal of serving in the majority, which was a low likelihood for Republican House members in the early period (1980-1992), attracted quality Conservative candidates—the type of candidates who could attract some contributions from outside Conservative groups, in Conservative districts. The higher risk probabilities for ideologues in the later period are the result of ambitious Conservative challengers who had some connections to Conservative groups. Of course, this does not explain why moderates’ risk curve in the later period does not increase as districts become safer, but please keep in mind that the curve does abruptly end in safer Republican districts. There simply are no moderates left to strategically
target in those safer districts, and in the more moderate districts, moderate incumbents still have higher risk than mainstream incumbents and ideologues.

House Democrats had the strongest correlations between incumbent ideology and district ideology and showed no evidence of simple ideological targeting. Like House Republicans, this supports the view that simple ideological targeting is unlikely when there is a strong relationship between district ideology and incumbents’ ideology. The evidence for strategic ideological targeting is only moderate. The shape of the curves in Exhibit 6-S and the joint significance test for the early period in Exhibit 6-S-A support a conclusion of strategic ideological targeting. However, a unique aspect of the results for House Democrats, whether we look at simple ideological targeting in the later period or strategic ideological targeting, is the high level of risk for the most extreme candidates. This is not as easy to explain as for House Republicans. Both the early and later period strategic ideological plots in Exhibit 6-S show that the highest risk among all Democratic incumbents is the risk experienced by the most ideologically extreme incumbents in the safest districts. Unlike Republicans in the later period, reviewing the cases where this occurs does not support the conclusion that these are simply Liberals challenging similarly extreme Liberals with the challenger receiving some outside group support.

Inspection of the Democratic House data shows that many of the challenged incumbents in more extreme Democratic districts are in African-American majority districts and there are multiple examples of these incumbents losing to challengers who ran as moderates in the primaries. For example, Sheila Jackson Lee won the 1992 Democratic primary in the heavily Democratic (Clinton won 75% of the 1992 presidential vote in the district) Texas 18th. Lee ran to the right of incumbent Craig Washington who opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and favored reducing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) funding. In a Houston based district that was home to many business that traded with
Mexico and where NASA had many employees, these were not views that were in line with employers in the district. Washington claimed NAFTA would hurt American labor and exploit Mexico by taking advantage of its weaker labor and environmental laws, and he believed NASA funding was not a budget priority given all the other issues the federal budget needed to address. Lee’s message focused on the need for investment and economic development in the district, and she received funding from the corporate PACs’ of companies like Exxon, Mobile, Volero Energy, and even Enron and Haliburton. In addition, she received support from established outside Liberal groups (all among the 40% most Liberal) including many groups that support Democratic women candidates such as Emily’s List, the National Abortion Rights Action League, and the National Women’s Political Caucus.

The example of Lee’s (Nominate score of -.468) primary victory over incumbent Representative Washington (Nominate score of -.751) is just one of many examples of primaries where Liberal groups supported primary challenges against Liberal Democratic incumbents. Other examples of these types of challenges in which the challenger won are the more recent victories of Arthur Davis (Nominate score of -.221) against Early Hilliard (Nominate of -.491) in the Alabama 8th and Denise Majette (Nominate score of -.340) against Cynthia Mckinney (Nominate score of -.543) in the Georgia 4th. Both Representatives Hilliard and Mckinney were to the far left on multiple issues including being dovish on the War on Terror. These examples show that in solidly Democratic minority districts, ideologically extreme incumbents lose primaries to challengers running to their right. These are “extremely safe seats” for the Democratic Party in the general election; the electoral competition in these districts occurs in the primaries, and Liberal groups appear to actively work at moderating these districts’ representatives.

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20 In 2004 Cynthia McKinney won the seat back.
A final point I want to make about the ideology correlations between members of Congress and their constituents that I present in this chapter, is that while I discuss the correlations in the later period as outcomes, I am aware that further analysis of the effect of targeting on representation with models that go beyond changes in correlations over time may better nail down the degree to which targeting affects the relationship between members of Congress and their constituents. Keeping this mind, I want to suggest a more modest interpretation of the correlations. That is, for all the primarying that went on in the 1980s, representation did not erode. In fact, it strengthened in three of the four chamber-party combinations; it strengthened in all four if we consider Exhibit 6-T-A rather than Exhibit 6-T. So, even if we make a minimalist interpretation that the changes in the correlations are unrelated to primarying, there is no reason to believe that primarying has damaged the connection between members of Congress and their states/districts. Thinking back to Chapter Two, where I note the scholarship that sees changes to campaign finance laws in the 1990s and later as weakening the original intent of FECA, it is work keeping in mind that the strong correlations between members of Congress and their constituents in the 1994-2008 period, corresponds to the same period that scholars warned about.

Summary of Findings

Picking up on Chapter Five, which showed that outside ideological contributions affect primary performance, Chapter Six provides detail about how outside ideological groups select primary candidates to support. The first analysis section, Incumbent Ideology and Contributions from Outside Ideological Groups, establishes that, after controlling for district partisanship, more ideological contributions go to more ideological incumbents. I then move away from looking at contributions to incumbents and look at incumbent challengers who receive contributions from outside ideological groups. The section Targeting and Vote Performance makes the point that
incumbents facing challengers who receive any outside ideological group support do substantially worse than incumbents facing challengers who do not receive outside ideological group support.

Next, I examine ideological targeting and the strategic ideological targeting of incumbents. I show results for the pooled time period that demonstrate clear statistical evidence that simple ideological targeting occurred for incumbents in both Senate parties. There is some evidence, though not as clear as for the Senate, that House Republicans also experience simple ideological targeting. There is no evidence that House Democrats experienced simple ideological targeting in the pooled time period.

I also test for strategic ideological targeting and plot the results of strategic ideological targeting models for the pooled time period. The evidence for strategic ideological targeting is mixed with the strongest evidence occurring among House Republicans. With the exception of House Democrats, the trends shown by the plots of the strategic targeting models (Exhibit 6-L) are consistent with strategic targeting. According to the plots in the pooled time period, moderate incumbents are more likely to be targeted by outside ideological groups than mainstream incumbents, and mainstream incumbents are more likely to be targeted than ideologically extreme ideologues. Because of the low n nature of the one case per incumbent career data, I treat these results as partial evidence of strategic ideological targeting.

I next examine ideological targeting and strategic ideological targeting in the early and late time periods in the context of how closely aligned incumbents are with their states and districts. I view simple ideological and strategic ideological targeting as incentivizing incumbents to be more closely aligned with their states/districts, as it is the safest position to survive the problems of primary and general election challenges. Because Senators’ correlations in the early period are not well aligned with their states, primarying helped to improve (from a
delegate notion of representation) representation of voters’ preferences by their Senators. In the early period, Senators were not closely aligned with their states. Outside groups could engage in simple ideological targeting, i.e., target moderates wherever they found them, and thus provide an electoral incentive through primary challenges for incumbents to be closer to their district preferences. In the later period, incumbent Senators are more closely aligned with their states and simple ideological targeting weakens relative to the early period.

In the House, members are closer to their districts in the early period than Senators are to their states. Republican outside ideological groups engage in strategic ideological targeting as simple ideological targeting might target mainstream and moderate incumbents in districts the party was likely to lose if the nominee was too extreme. In the later period, the correlations changed only slightly and the strategic targeting of House Republicans continued. Among House Democrats, the early period correlations are the highest (greater than .5) of any of the chamber-party combinations. While the plots are somewhat consistent with strategic ideological targeting, several of the House Democratic results show that the most extreme incumbents in the most Democratic districts (in both periods), are at greatest risk of being targeted. While ideologues in safe districts face challengers who receive financial support from outside ideological groups is not unique to House Democrats, my review of the cases showed that what is unique about these challenges is that the outside Liberal groups support primary challengers who ran to the middle against ideologically extreme incumbents. More unique still, is that several of these challengers won. I discuss several of these cases and suggest that Democratic outside groups work to suppress extremism by supporting moderate challengers to ideologically extreme members in safe Democratic districts. By contrast, when Conservative groups support challengers to ideologues in safe Republican districts, the challengers do not tend to run as moderates. The success of the Liberal groups in replacing ideologue extremists with more
moderate candidates while Conservative groups support Conservative challengers may help explain the spike in House Republican ideological extremeness that Nominate score analysis shows.
Chapter Seven

Discussion of Findings and Future Research

In this chapter, I first summarize my findings and discuss how they can be interpreted to support the view that ideological primarying is pulling members of Congress to extreme positions. I then note that this view is not the only conclusion that I draw from the analysis. My view is that primarying has incentivized stronger ideological representation. In describing this view, I note that ideological contributions effect on candidate behavior occurs in concert with contributions from other sources as well as other electoral incentives. The upshot of all these incentives is that the optimal roll call ideology for reelection seeking members of Congress is close to the preference of the median voter in the incumbent’s reelection coalition, and not the most extreme preference of a group contributing to one of the candidates in the primary. After laying out my theory, I then discuss my findings in the context of several themes that have been noted in my analysis. These include party theory and outside groups, primarying and representation, and ideologues versus pragmatists in Republican nomination politics. Then, I discuss topics for future research.

Primaries as Ideological Quagmires

What conclusions does the research and analysis presented in the prior chapters lead to? Have Congressional primaries become ideological quagmires favoring more extreme candidates? Does primarying incentivize members of Congress to pursue such extremely ideological policies to ward off their next potential primary challenge that compromise between the two Congressional parties is impossible? These are the types of concerns that have been raised in numerous accounts of tea party primaries. The Christine O’Donnell and Sharron Angle nominations certainly provide examples for anyone wanting to make the case that outside ideological groups’ involvement in primaries promotes the selection of candidates who are too
extreme to win general elections and cost their parties seats. Further, the Richard Lugar nomination loss certainly provides an example of a seemingly mainstream Republican incumbent losing his party’s nomination because the incumbent was not sufficiently extreme. Moving beyond these anecdotes, chapters four and five show systematic evidence that outside ideological contributions affect the primary performance of both non-incumbents and incumbents, respectively. While the pooled models in Chapter Six demonstrate that more ideological incumbents receive more support from outside ideological groups. The pooled results also show that for three of the four chamber-party combinations more ideological incumbents are less likely to face challengers supported by outside ideological groups. These effects are generally strongest in Republican Senate primaries, the chamber and party on which media accounts of primarying in recent years have focused.

In several places, my findings support the view that Conservative outside groups have more influence on Republican primary outcomes than Liberal outside groups have on Democratic primary outcomes. For example, when looking at non-incumbent primaries in Chapter Four (Exhibits 4-G through 4-J) outside ideological group contributions’ largest effect on primary vote percentage occurs in Republican Senate primaries and their second largest effect occurs in Republican House primaries. Also, when looking at the pooled results for incumbent primaries in Chapter Six (for example Exhibit 6-I), the statistical significance, curve shape and highest risk levels show that moderate Republican Senators are more likely to face simple ideological primarying than moderate Democratic Senators, while the curve shapes show that moderate Republican House members are more likely to face simple ideological targeting than moderate Democratic House members.

In fact, with the notable exceptions of some high profile incumbent challenges in the Senate (e.g., Lieberman lost to Lamont in Connecticut’s 2006 Democratic primary before
winning the general election as an independent), a case can be made that the Democratic Party’s congressional leadership appears to have had better success at keeping outside groups focused on general elections rather than primaries. An example of the role played by the party is provided in the book *The Thumpin’* in which Naftali Bendavid describes how through much cajoling, bluster and threats, Rahm Emanuel used his (then) position as head of the DCCC (an organ of the party’s Congressional leadership) to help guide the party to winning back both the House and the Senate in 2006. According to Bendavid’s account, the DCCC did not simply target the party’s money at the most strategically important general election races. Rather, the DCCC worked with donors and outside groups to ensure support for incumbents while simultaneously soliciting open seat candidates who “fit the district” or state. The DCCC also encouraged the party’s donor base and Liberal outside groups to contribute directly to the candidates that the DCCC had identified as fitting the district/state. One example of the type of candidate the Democratic Party worked to nominate was Jim Webb, who had the national defense bona fides to run as a hawkish Democrat in Virginia, which, in 2006, was a fairly red state. At the time, Virginia had voted for the Republican candidate in every presidential election since 1964. The moderating influence of Liberal groups is something I also note in Chapter Six. By supporting challengers to the most extreme House incumbents, these groups incentivize moderation among the safest Democratic incumbents. This can be contrasted to the incentive structure provided by Conservative groups.

The narrative that Conservative and tea party groups’ involvement in GOP primaries pushes the party’s nominee to the right is not simply a press observation; it is a stated goal of the groups. For example, the president of one group, Matt Kibbe of FreedomWorks, said that his group’s goal is to change the “incentives that all Republicans face,” so Republican officeholders will be more responsive to their party’s ideological base (*New York Times*, June 12, 2011). Other observers also find this to be the case. For example, The Wichita Eagle wrote “that the
potential of tea party primary challenges” led all of Kansas’ Republican members of Congress “to conclude it’s impossible to be too conservative in 2014 Kansas” (The Wichita Eagle, January 31, 2014). However, my claim is that if Conservative groups are indiscriminate and seek to defeat moderates in red states like Kansas, blue states like Delaware, and purple states like Nevada, then they are engaging in the same type of behavior we saw Conservative groups engage in throughout the FECA era, which is what the statistical results in this dissertation show.

**Primaries as Crucibles of Representation**

While there are press accounts and statistical evidence that outside ideological groups’ involvement in primaries incentivize ideologically extreme behavior by Members of Congress, this narrative does not take into account that in the age of primarying, representation, as shown in the correlation plots of Chapter Six, strengthened where it was weak and maintained strength where it was strong. In fact, the simple ideological targeting of more moderate Senate incumbents in the early years of FECA preceded a major strengthening in the correlation between Senate incumbents’ roll call ideology and the underlying partisanship of their states.

My view is that outside ideological contributions’ works in concert with other contributions, as well with candidates’ own read of their electoral coalition (both primary and general), to incentivize candidates to stake out optimal ideological positions. These optimal positions line up with the preferences of the candidate’s median reelection voters’ preferences; Senate candidates seeking these positions brought Senators more closely in line with the states they represent. The evidence I examined does not show that outside ideological groups engage in a never ending cycle of ideological targeting that pulls incumbents further and further to extremes. Rather, the plots depicting incumbent ideology and state/district partisanship in the early and late FECA era provide a different context in which to interpret primaries. Heavy, simple ideological targeting leads to stronger correlations between members of Congress and
their states/districts; where those strong correlations exist, heavy, simple ideological targeting does not occur. The targeting was strongest among Senate Republican incumbents in the 1980s. After 1992, the correlation strengthened and ideological targeting declined. While for Senate Democrats, ideological targeting also occurred in the 1980s, though not as strong as for Republicans, and the correlations strengthened and targeting declined. In the House, the correlations were much stronger at the dawn of the FECA era and less ideological targeting is seen.

Of course, before concluding that a shift toward better representation occurred due to outside groups targeting, it should be considered that I am specifically referring to how well a state/district is represented and not how well individual voters or the groups with whom those voters identify are represented. Considering the American electoral system is one of gerrymandered districts and a Senate where the influence of small states outweighs their population, I am aware that there are other approaches to evaluating representation beyond applying a delegate view of representation to a system that is not designed to maximize the representation of every individual’s preferences. But, when voter preferences are measured through their state/district partisanship, it does appear that states/districts were better represented after the primarying of the early FECA era.

While the evidence presented in prior chapters no doubt shows that outside ideological contributions affect primary outcomes, I want to emphasize that I made efforts to present the effects of outside ideological contributions along with the effects of other types of contributions. Other types of contributions also often show an effect on primary performance, and when theorizing about how contributions affect primary outcomes, it is important to pay attention to all types of contributions. Many benefit seekers support candidates in hopes of non-ideological benefits. These can have moderating effects on candidate positions. As a result, the net effect of
the current campaign finance regime is not ideological contributions pulling candidates to increasingly ideologically extreme positions. Rather, all three contributions sources together influence candidate behavior. Returning to the example of the Texas 18th from 1992 that I describe at the end of Chapter Six, this primary shows how the different sources of contributions can affect primary outcomes in unexpected ways. In the Texas 18th, non-ideological benefit seekers like pro-NAFTA businesses and energy companies in Houston supported Lee. Her candidacy against a more extreme opponent was also supported by some of the most Liberal outside groups.

The Texas 18th example illustrates the point that all contribution types affect primary outcomes, and being close to one’s district’s needs can give a primary candidate fundraising credibility. I believe the reason many of the models in previous chapters consistently find positive effects for individual and local contributions is a reflection of how critical this core support is to candidates of both parties and in both chambers. While the effects of outside contributions ebb and flow in magnitude and statistical significance from model to model, individual and local support consistently shows positive effects. The best way to keep individual and local support is to represent one’s districts’ interests.

*Parties and Outside Groups*

Any group within a party, ideological or otherwise, attacking elected members of the party is not something conventional party theory predicts; nor do earlier theories. Thinking back to one of the earliest political scientists to describe American political parties, in *The Semisovereign People*, Schattschneider describes politics as a street fight and notes that the way to win a street fight is to expand the fight. The party is the result of the expanded street fight. Using this analogy, an intraparty primary challenge is equivalent to one of your street fight compatriots turning around and punching you in the jaw. If that happens, why would anyone
ever expand the fight? The answer is to win. That is why Schattschneider said you expand a street fight in the first place. If intraparty strife emerges, parties should have mechanisms in place to deal with it, which the Democrats wield. For example, as described by Bendavid, party leaders can steer donors away from supporting particular challengers. Because of their deeper ideological division, Republican Party leaders may be less influential with primary challengers’ potential donors.

When I discussed party theory in Chapter Two, I noted that the most widely held party theories could be extended to allow for, if not predict, primary challenges. These challenges are not mutually exclusive from party theory. Mitigating the damage of the ideologically extreme portions of the party is one of the public goods party leaders can provide their members. Here, I would like to make explicit my view about the balance party leaders try to strike with outside groups.

I assume outside groups that attack incumbents put themselves in an awkward position with party leaders, particularly Congressional party leaders, because the groups are attacking the members who vote for Congressional party leaders. Considering that incumbents seldom lose, party leaders who want to remain party leaders have little incentive to do anything but support primary challenged incumbents. If party leaders did not support the incumbents then, upon being reelected, the incumbents would likely support an alternative leader.

However, party leaders also have incentives to cooperate with outside groups. One reason is that these groups can provide support to party leaders and party members in general elections. The second is that by delivering on some of the outside groups’ goals, the party leaders can protect their incumbents from incurring outside groups’ wrath. The result is that the party leaders must craft a legislative agenda that is extreme enough to stay the ire of primary challenges to incumbents while moderate enough that incumbents’ votes will not come back to
haunt them in the general election. Hence, party leaders are in a continual state of optimizing their members’ choices in order to stave off electoral challenges in either the primary or the general.

Ideologues versus Pragmatists

Another conclusion that can be reached from the scatterplots in Chapter Six is that at the outset of FECA, House Democrats had a stronger relationship between district partisanship and incumbent ideology than House Republicans (compare .642 to .415 in Exhibits 6-T-A and 6-R-A). I believe this reflects the greater agreement about the scope and size of the federal government among Democrats. The Republican civil war is a decades old contest between pragmatists and ideologues that first became salient when ideologues nominated Barry Goldwater in 1964 and which can be traced back to the 1930s when Democrats displaced the Republican majority with new a programmatic agenda built around an active federal government. This agenda helped Democrats win mass elections after progressive reforms had removed the clientelistic basis that both parties used to organize and motivate voters in order to win mass elections during the 1800s.21

The GOP’s ideological infighting is most salient and well-known at the Presidential level. The end result of the Goldwater nomination battle, which was won by ideologues, was a trouncing defeat to Lyndon B. Johnson. Then, prior to Watergate, and competing against a Democratic Party that was splitting over issues such as the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon was able to unite the Republican Party and win two Presidential elections. While Watergate and the Nixon pardon certainly weighed down Gerald Ford in 1976, he also represented the pragmatist establishment and faced a strong challenge for the 1976 nomination from Ronald Reagan who

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21 For additional details on how progressive era reforms eroded the clientelistic and patronage systems of 19th Century American politics, please see chapters 9 and 10 of Francis Fukuyama’s *Political Order and Political Decay* (2014).
appealed to conservative ideologues. Reagan showed the ability, in 1980 and 1984, to appeal beyond the GOP’s ideological core and win mass elections. Reagan’s success is often cited by Conservative pundits such as National Review’s Ramesh Ponnuru as proof that conservative candidates can win mass elections running campaigns based upon Conservative and small government themes. This perhaps helps explain the motivation of ideological groups in attacking moderate Republicans in moderate states and districts. These groups believe conservative candidates can have mass appeal beyond their ideological base. George H. W. Bush, the consummate pragmatist, benefited from Reagan’s coalition in 1988, but in 1992 suffered a strong primary challenge from conservative populist Pat Buchanan, who had never before held an elected office. Bush then went on to lose the three-way 1992 general election against Bill Clinton and Ross Perot. By juxtaposition himself against John McCain, George W. Bush won the 2000 Republican primary as the more reliable conservative and went on to win a narrow electoral college victory under the mantra of compassionate conservatism.

I claim that strains similar to those seen in presidential nominations exist between ideologues and pragmatists in Republican Congressional primaries, and they have waxed and waned just as the presidential primaries have for decades. Conservative outside groups contributed to some high profile primary victories by ideologues in recent years, but my analysis shows that they were more active in targeting moderates in the early period of FECA than in the recent era. The strategic ideological targeting of House Republicans that is shown in Chapter Six may help explain the higher levels of House Republican partisanship compared to House Democratic partisanship.
The findings and conclusions presented above raise multiple topics for future research. Below, I summarize several of these areas.

**Determine if Outside Ideological Groups Promote Greater Representation**

Two topics from the representation analysis presented in this dissertation could be further developed. These are (1) developing a statistical model of representation that goes beyond bivariate correlations and (2) looking at how partisan tide years are affected by the nomination of extreme candidates.

The findings presented can be interpreted as showing that ideological groups promote a stronger correlation between state/district partisanship and members’ ideology. They do this by primarying ideological apostates, which incentivizes members of Congress to hold positions that align with their states/districts. The evidence that candidates who receive more ideological contributions do better in primaries and, the evidence that moderates are targeted, is demonstrated in multiple chapters using various statistical models and selection rules. The evidence that while this ideological targeting occurred, representation improved, is based on analysis of eight bivariate correlations. Future research should develop stronger statistical models to measure changes in representation, which are less subject to the methodological risks of reading too much into correlations, e.g., drawing the wrong conclusion due to not controlling for other factors that may drive change in the factors being analyzed.

The analysis of tide years could include analysis about how ideological groups help to unintentionally maintain representation by nominating candidates who are too extreme to win. By helping to nominate more ideologically extreme conservative candidates in Democratic states, Conservative groups help ensure that the Democratic Party, which better represents those
states, holds the seat in years (e.g., 2010 for Democrats) where a tide flows against the Democrats. The O’Donnell nomination in Delaware demonstrates this point. By helping to nominate an ideologically pure candidate in blue Delaware, conservative outside groups helped a mainstream Democratic candidate win a Senate seat that many thought the Democrats would lose. In short, the groups that helped O’Donnell win the Republican nomination helped ensure that Democratic Delaware was represented by a Democratic Senator rather than a Republican Senator. The dynamics of the O’Donnell nomination can be systematically examined using the type of data I collected. Future research could look at (1) do outside ideological groups help select candidates that are too extreme for their states/districts, and (2) do these candidates then lose general elections in tide years when their party is otherwise doing well?

Apply the Analysis in the Previous Chapters to the Tea Party Elections

Chapter One showed that the tea party elections were simply on the high end of the normal variation of the FECA era and the subsequent chapters established a baseline for the FECA era. These chapters did not compare that baseline to the tea party era. Doing so would provide additional evidence to support or refute my claim that the tea party primaries are not idiosyncratic.

This analysis could address whether ideological outside groups are acting differently in later elections. I noted that there is less opportunity in Republican Senate primaries for groups to attack moderates in ideological states. How are groups responding to this? Are they attacking mainstream candidates too? Are these candidates losing? This would be consistent with Kibbe’s stated goal of changing all candidates’ calculations. If conservative groups think conservative ideas have mass appeal, then it would certainly be within reason for them to want to not just replace moderate Republicans with more Conservative Republicans, but to also want to replace mainstream Republicans with more Conservative Republicans.
Define Tea Party

What makes a tea party challenger a tea party challenger? Is it because the challenger is an outsider, because certain groups back or endorse the challenger, or because the candidate advocates certain issue positions? The point of my question is that the term tea party often seems to depend on context or situational definitions. Republican primary challengers who use Conservative or even anti-incumbent rhetoric are labeled tea party challengers. This is not analytically useful because, of course, primary challengers in Republican primaries will attempt to paint the incumbent as too liberal or as having been in “Washington, D.C. too long.” That is what primary challengers, who want to win, do.

Defining what makes a tea party candidate a tea party candidate would help avoid post hoc definitions that are based on election outcomes. For example, Dave Brat, the economics professor who defeated Eric Cantor in the 2014 Republican primary for the 7th District in Virginia is commonly referred to as a tea party candidate. This label appears to rest almost entirely on Brat’s outsider status. Brat did not raise gobs of money from tea party groups. In fact, Cantor outspent Brat 27 to 1. Yet, in the aftermath of Brat’s win, he was labeled a tea party challenger because he painted Cantor as pro-amnesty for undocumented migrants. Do single issues such as amnesty define tea party candidates? If being anti-amnesty or favoring a “path to citizenship” is what defines a candidate as a tea party member, then all the press accounts that referred to Marco Rubio as the tea party candidate in 2010 are incorrect because Rubio went on to sponsor a bill that advocated a path to citizenship but was widely labeled as amnesty by conservative critics. And, while Brat was an outsider, Rubio, a former speaker of the Florida House of Representatives who had former Florida Governor Jeb Bush’s endorsement when he sought the Senate seat was not. Moreover, outsiders have long existed in American politics.
Both Reagan and Carter were labeled as such. So, if a candidate’s status as a tea party member is based on the candidate’s outsider status, then the tea party is not a new movement and it is not unique to Conservatism.

I do not want to ignore the fact that, at the time of this writing, the 2016 Republican Presidential nomination battle has increased the incoherence of the term, tea party. Marco Rubio, the 2010 tea party Senate candidate, was often portrayed as a mainstream or establishment candidate in the 2016 Republican nomination contest. The presumptive Republican nominee is the consummate political outsider, Donald Trump, who is waging a campaign described by some observers such as Mathew Yglesias at Vox as a Conservative critique of globalization. But, is Trump a tea party candidate? While vaguely alluding to cutting the deficit and cutting taxes for the middle class and businesses, Trump does not claim that big government is the problem as much as he claims that incompetent government that makes “bad deals” is the problem. In this area, he lacks the small government focus that characterizes so many in the tea party and Conservative movement. Moreover, Trump’s chief rival, Senator Ted Cruz, is a poster boy for Conservative tea party politicians. Considering this, we could conclude that Trump is not a tea party candidate, but that raises a question about voters. Is Trump receiving support from tea party voters? One does not have to commit to watching a large amount of election coverage to hear the analysis that many Trump voters were also tea party voters. I raise this point not to answer it, but rather to demonstrate the need for precise and clear definitions when we evaluate how the tea party’s involvement in primaries affects the outcomes of those primaries. What makes a Conservative candidate a tea party candidate? Is there a difference between tea party candidates’ and Conservative candidates’ voters, ideas, or rhetoric? In this paper, I have approached this topic of definitions with the notion that the tea party is a
manifestation of small government Conservatism, which has been present in the Republican Party for decades.

Account for Anti-Incumbency Swings

Controlling for ant-incumbent years could strengthen the finding for the relationship between ideological money and primary performance. By examining the primary and general election results for candidates of both parties over time, we can identify years in which incumbents performed systematically worse after controlling for party. These are anti-incumbent election cycles when a “throw the bums out” mindset finds greater traction with voters. In an anti-incumbent year, incumbents are more likely to find primaries, as well as general elections, difficult. In these cases, incumbent vulnerability in a primary should not be interpreted as a shift to more ideological candidates, even if the challenger paints the incumbent as a Washington, D.C. insider who does not care about the party’s core ideological principles.

Representation and Reducing Extremists

The role allied Liberal groups play in maintaining a more moderate Democratic party is understudied. These groups’ challenges to ideologically extreme incumbents disincentivizes extremism among Democratic office holders, while Conservative groups incentivize extremism among Republicans.

One of the more surprising findings for me in conducting this research occurred when I looked at the Democratic House primary challengers that were supported by outside Liberal groups in extremely Democratic districts. There are many cases of liberal groups supporting challenges to the most extreme incumbents in the Democratic Party. The examples of Representatives Lee, Davis, and Majette that I cited show outside ideological groups not just supporting moderate challenges, but cases where the more moderate challengers won. While
Conservative groups challenging non-extreme Republican incumbents is frequently noted in media and other sources, Liberal groups helping to take down the Democratic party’s most extreme representatives is not. Moreover, while there are some cases of Conservative groups supporting Conservative challengers to Conservative incumbents in strong Republican districts, these challengers do not tend to win. Moreover, the pattern is not nearly as strong for Republicans. Remembering the upper left panel in Exhibit 6-S, we saw clear evidence of the uniqueness of Liberal groups in House primaries. The risk of targeting (I do not call it ideological because it is the reverse) increases as incumbents become more extreme—this is not seen among House Republicans.

Liberal groups’ primarying extremist and the repeated media stories we hear about tea party Republicans making bipartisan compromise impossible raises several normative questions about representation and democracy. Does the more extreme Republican Party better represent the range of perspectives among the party’s voters? Do Liberal groups’ challenges to extreme Democrats suppress representation of some of the most extreme perspectives within the Democratic coalition? If the answer to both those questions turns out to be “yes,” does preventing more extreme incumbents from staying in office make compromise easier? Are moderation and bipartisan compromise most likely to occur when parties’ elected representatives do not reflect all the varied perspectives of the parties’ supporters?
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