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Intersubjectivity, Progressivity, and Accountability: Studies in Turn Design

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Intersubjectivity, Progressivity, and Accountability:

Studies in Turn Design

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

by

Chase Wesley Raymond

2016
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Intersubjectivity, Progressivity, and Accountability:

Studies in Turn Design

by

Chase Wesley Raymond

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

University of California, Los Angeles, 2016

Professor John Heritage, Chair

By examining different features of turn design, this conversation-analytic dissertation investigates a range of “account-able” “members’ resources” (Garfinkel 1967) that are mobilized by participants in the service of intersubjectivity, progressivity, and the interactional negotiation thereof.

First I describe the structure and interactional use of what I term the ‘do-construction’ in English-language conversation (e.g., The kids do eat cake; cf. The kids eat cake). It is illustrated that, across a variety of sequential positions and in conjunction with a range of social actions, this construction is used consistently to index a contrast. After establishing the contrastive work that this resource accomplishes as a general feature of turn design, I consider how the use of the do-construction can be seen to be relevant to particular sequences of action, and conclude with a
discussion of the relationship between this grammatical construction and ‘embedded other-correction’ (Jefferson 1987).

Chapter 3 reports on a subset of do-construction cases in which the contrast indexed through use of the do-construction is not with the content proper of a prior utterance or sequence of utterances, but rather with a potential implication thereof. That is, this grammatical resource is routinely mobilized to index contrasts not only with explicit or otherwise demonstrated understandings (as in the majority of the cases in Chapter 2), but also with possible ambiguities and potential misapprehensions that might be gleaned from prior talk. Through the use of the do-construction in such contexts, speakers can be seen to be actively holding themselves and one another accountable for the commonsense inferences (Garfinkel 1967; Schütz 1962) that prior talk may have generated, while simultaneously working to refine and shore up the shared understanding being developed with their hearers.

Chapter 4 takes as its point of departure the distinction between “unmarked” and “marked” progressivity across turns within a sequence (Heritage 2013, 2015, frth.), examining two turn-initial particles in Spanish: bueno and pues. The chapter argues that both bueno and pues preface some “unexpectedness” to come in the responsive turn, but a different sort of “unexpectedness” is foreshadowed by each particle. I demonstrate that bueno-prefaced turns do not overtly problematize the prior utterance, but rather accept its terms before departing from them, and thereby acquiesce to the prior turn’s design (albeit a marked form of acquiescence compared to a turn that is not qualified with a turn-initial particle). Pues-prefaced responses, on the other hand, are directly addressed to the prior turn, but they cast that prior turn’s action or design as problematic in some way. That is, rather than acquiescing to the terms of the first-position utterance (as with bueno), pues-prefaced responses target and problematize some aspect
of the prior turn, thereby noticeably ‘pushing back’ on, for example, its presuppositions or epistemic stance. In this way, pues-prefacing is also a harbinger of “unexpectedness”, but, contrary to the case of bueno, the unexpectedness of pues derives from the second speaker’s comparatively on-record registration of difficulty with the terms set for response by the prior turn, as opposed to his/her tacit acceptance thereof.

The final substantive chapter of this dissertation aims to unpack Schegloff’s (2007a: 15) reference to “the measure of progressivity” by arguing that progressivity must be conceptualized as a scalar phenomenon. That is, rather than yes-progressivity vs. no-progressivity (i.e., as a binary or dichotomous variable), participants in interaction can be seen to orient to the existence of a continuum from more-progressivity to less-progressivity. Moreover, in addition to being better aligned with participants’ own understanding of this feature of interaction, it is demonstrated that such an analytic reconceptualization provides an important new dimension on which to examine various practices deployed in naturally occurring talk, as we equip ourselves with a means to ask not only whether a turn is moving forward vs. backward, but also how much.

The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the inextricable links between intersubjectivity and progressivity as accountably scalar phenomena.

Taken together, the chapters of this dissertation argue that intersubjectivity, progressivity, and accountability must be conceptualized as collaboratively constructed features of interaction that are achieved on a moment-by-moment basis, in and through the details of quotidian conduct. Exploration of such practices therefore sheds important light on the ground-level means through which we negotiate and maintain social life with one another.
The dissertation of Chase Wesley Raymond is approved.

Steven E. Clayman

Tanya Jean Stivers

Sandra A. Thompson

John Heritage, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2016
To my family and friends

...whose love and support has kept me sane!
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Writing a dissertation can be quite the isolating experience. You spend much of your time locked away, thinking about how to weave ideas together, come up with a coherent analysis, and get it down on paper. Then you hand it over to your committee in the hopes that they think it is as utterly brilliant and awe-inspiring as you yourself think it is! But alas, revisions must always be made, and so you quickly find yourself locked away again, working through pages of feedback to prepare a new draft.

This dissertation is the second that I’ve written. I therefore must begin by thanking my family—especially my parents—and my friends. These individuals put up with my being in a state of ‘dissertating’ for years, and just when they thought I’d finally be done and return to being a normal human being upon completion of the Linguistics dissertation in 2014…BAM! I started another one! As a result, over these years in graduate school, I’ve missed parties and family get-togethers due to writing deadlines; I’ve forgotten birthdays and holidays due to being too wrapped up in my own world. And yet, through it all, my family and friends have supported me, and for that I am eternally grateful. As I emerge from this second (and, to be sure, final!) dissertating cocoon, I am looking forward to paying them back for all that they have given me over these years in graduate school.

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simply could not have asked for a better role model. If the guidance I provide to my future students is half as good as the guidance he has provided me, I will consider that a great success. Frankly, though, I’m not quite sure how I feel about moving on and getting my own office, as I’ve very much enjoyed sharing his! But not to worry, John, you haven’t seen the last of me—This isn’t Goodbye; it’s just Toodle pip!

Steve’s initial lectures in *Talk and Social Institutions*, co-taught with John, were what first attracted me to Conversation Analysis. He was also the co-chair of my Linguistics M.A. thesis on 911 calls, and has read countless drafts of other papers for me since then. Working with Steve over the years has taught me to think—and write—more clearly and concisely. I’m looking forward to our future collaborations, and more weekend walks in the Hollywood Hills when I’m in town!

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An earlier version of Chapter 4 was presented at the 4th International Conference on Conversation Analysis (ICCA-14 at UCLA). I thank the audience members for their comments.
In addition to feedback from the members of my committee on written versions of this chapter, Anna Lindström also commented on an earlier draft, and Marja-Leena Sorjonen commented on more versions than I can count! Their very detailed critiques have improved the chapter in innumerable ways. This chapter will appear in a forthcoming John Benjamins volume titled *Turn-Initial Particles across Languages*, edited by John Heritage and Marja-Leena Sorjonen.

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VITA

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**Dissertation**

1 Introduction: Intersubjectivity, Progressivity, and Accountability

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This dissertation takes as its substantive focus two features of social interaction that are of paramount concern to interactants—intersubjectivity and progressivity. The first of these, intersubjectivity, refers to a state of ‘shared understanding’ between participants in talk; while the second, progressivity, refers to the forward-moving nature of interaction. In short, humans want to understand one another when engaging in talk, and they also want to complete (in a timely manner) whatever it is they’re doing with that talk so that they can move on to the next thing. The phenomena discussed in the chapters of this dissertation are concerned with the interaction between these two fundamental features of conversation, and how accountable participants hold themselves and one another in dealing with them.

In deciding how best to introduce these concepts in a preliminary chapter, I was drawn to the famous ‘breaching experiments’ of Harold Garfinkel. In one case, experimenters were instructed to abandon commonsense understandings of an interlocutor’s assertions and consistently request clarification (i.e., initiate repair) in search of greater specificity. The following, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, are the reports from two of the experimenters:
(1) [Garfinkel 1967: 42]
01 Friend: “I had a flat tire.”
02 Experimenter: “What do you mean, you had a flat tire?”
03 Friend: “What do you mean, 'what do you mean?'
04 A flat tire is a flat tire!”

(2) [Garfinkel 1967: 43]
01 Husband: “I’m so tired.”
02 Experimenter: “How are you tired? Physically, mentally or just bored?”
03 Husband: “I don’t know, I guess physically, mainly.”
04 Experimenter: “You mean that your muscles ache or your bones?”
05 Husband: “I guess so. Don’t be so technical.”

((After more watching))
06 Husband: “All these old movies have the same kind of old iron
07 bedstead in them.”
08 Experimenter: “What do you mean? Do you mean all old movies, or
09 some of them, or just the ones you have seen?”
10 Husband: “What’s the matter with you? You know what I mean.”
11 Experimenter: “I wish you would be more specific.”
12 Husband: “You know what I mean! Drop dead!”

Garfinkel’s aim with this (and other similar) experiments was to illustrate just how much background, ‘typified’ knowledge interactants usually bring with them into interaction (Schütz 1962: 14; see also Cicourel 1972: 254-6). When these experimenters (purposefully) failed to maintain the “reciprocity of perspectives”—that is, when they stopped using their background knowledge of what ‘flat tires’, for instance, generally are—then interlocutors get very upset, and very quickly!

But in addition to revealing the amount of ‘typified’ knowledge participants normatively use in the achievement of intersubjectivity in interaction, Garfinkel’s experiment also indirectly demonstrates the link between intersubjectivity and progressivity. If I get a flat tire from driving over a nail, I possess firsthand knowledge of that experience—how I came to discover it, the sound it made as I drove over it, what the pattern of grooves looks like on my tires and where exactly the nail poked through, how big the nail was, how deflated the tire became, and an infinite number of other features that constitute my having experienced this event firsthand. In order for you and I to
achieve a true, perfect state of intersubjectivity with regard to this event, I would have to somehow transfer all of this knowledge to you. Such a feat would, of course, be impossible: You didn’t experience it, and you didn’t experience it from my perspective, and so our ‘shared’ understanding of the event I’m telling you about will be unavoidably imperfect. Nonetheless, the more detail I provide about the experience, the closer we get to that level of truly shared understanding. And thus a decision must be made: When do I stop giving you details? At what point do I say, this level of intersubjectivity is “good enough” (Garfinkel 1967: 8)?

In Garfinkel’s experiment, then, we can see how, at certain moments in interaction, “progressivity is pitted against intersubjectivity” (Heritage 2009: 308). Participants routinely must negotiate between (a) securing a certain level of shared understanding, and (b) progressing forward with the business of the talk, whatever it may be (see Heritage 2007). As we begin to investigate how these phenomena interact with one another, we quickly find ourselves asking a range of very fundamental questions, including: How is it that participants negotiate a level of intersubjectivity that is “good enough” (Garfinkel 1967: 8) to be able to move on with the talk, how do they achieve a rate of talk that sufficiently “embodies” progressivity (Schegloff 2007a: 15), and how accountable do they hold themselves and one another for doing so?

In this dissertation, I aim to unpack some of these issues by looking through the lens of turn design. Drew (2013: 132) writes that “turn design refers to how a speaker constructs a turn-at-talk—what is selected or what goes into ‘building’ a turn to do the action it is designed to do, in such a way as to be understood as doing that action (which is the accountability of a turn’s design)” (emphasis in original). The specific turn design features that are of interest in each chapter will be unpacked in due course, and each chapter will provide a more detailed background that is relevant to the specific topic under analysis therein. In these introductory comments, then, I will
limit myself to briefly outlining the more overarching theoretical foundation that ties them together.

1.2 INTERSUBJECTIVITY AS AN INTERACTIONAL ACHIEVEMENT

The study of intersubjectivity has long been of interest to social scientists. A crucial shift in the conceptualization of intersubjectivity came with the theory of social action developed by Alfred Schütz (1962). Schütz moved beyond earlier treatments (of intersubjectivity) to argue that there is no guarantee of intersubjectivity in interaction. That is, shared understanding has no other foundation than that social actors work to make it happen. And as Garfinkel (e.g., 1960, 1967, 1974) then demonstrated, interactants engage in this work collaboratively, “trusting” (1963) one another to uphold this fundamental social contract.¹

Advocating the study of sense-making at the ground level of everyday interaction, Garfinkel (1967: 1) writes that the objective of the ethnomethodological paradigm is:

to treat practical activities, practical circumstances, and practical sociological reasoning as topics of empirical study, and by paying to the most commonplace activities of daily life the attention usually accorded extraordinary events, seek to learn about them as phenomena in their own right. [The] central recommendation is that the activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with members’ procedures for making those settings ‘account-able’. The ‘reflexive,’ or ‘incarnate’ character of accounting practices and accounts makes up the crux of that recommendation.

This crucial methodological principle centers around the ‘documentary method of interpretation’ (Garfinkel 1967: ch. 3). The actual appearance of the action itself is what everyday interactants are using for their own interpretations, so those actions should be the ‘documents’ that researchers use and analyze as well. In other words, humans, as social beings, are engaging in their own processes of “practical sociological reasoning”, performing “taken for granted” sociology on a

¹ Regarding just how far back to go into the history of the development of a theory of action, I had to draw the line at some point. Nonetheless, one cannot forget George Herbert Mead’s (1932) social behaviorism. Specifically with regard to language, he writes: “We want to approach language not from the standpoint of inner meanings to be expressed, but in its larger context of co-operation in the group taking place by means of signals and gestures. Meaning appears within that process” (6). Even Mead, then, was already explicitly characterizing the use of language as a social act which is accomplished with some other or others.
daily basis as they go about achieving sense-making—and that is where Garfinkel argues we must
dedicate our attention (1967: 8).

This “reflexive” nature of “account-ability” can be illustrated with the simple example of
one person waving ‘hello’ to another who, in turn, returns the wave (Heritage 1984b): The second
waver displays her understanding of the first wave, by doing a wave in return. Although quite a
simple, everyday occurrence, a complex array of presuppositions and understandings is
nonetheless built into the exchange, including the recipient’s understanding of the first waver’s
action as doing some form of greeting, the first waver’s beliefs about the second waver being a
potential greeting-recipient, and so on. Moreover, this argument is not one of invariance or simple
statistical regularity, but rather a social norm: Interactants hold one another normatively
accountable for these moves in interaction. Indeed, the most striking forms of evidence for the
existence of such structure in interaction comes in participants’ orientations to the “official
absences” (Schegloff 1968: 1083) when a second action is not forthcoming. For example, if one
speaker greets another, and the greeting is not returned, the first speaker (privately or publicly)
‘explains away’ the case of non-compliance—e.g., the second speaker did not see/hear the
greeting, his/her mind was somewhere else, s/he is angry with the first speaker, etc. So rather than
constituting evidence against the accountability of these norms, such deviant cases in effect are
the exceptions that prove the socio-normative structure of rule (Heritage 1984b).

Conversation Analysis offers a theory and method that effectively weave together the
perspective of Garfinkel with that of Erving Goffman (e.g., 1983), who advocated the study of
talk-in-interaction as an institutionalized social domain in its own right, thereby bringing the
detailed study of conversation to the analytic forefront (Heritage 1984b; Heritage & Stivers 2013;

---

2 See Schegloff (1968) for a related discussion of failures to respond to summonses.
Maynard 2013b). As Heritage and Atkinson (1984: 11) observe: Talk-in-interaction is “an organization which is implemented on a turn-by-turn basis, and through which a context of *publicly displayed* and *continuously updated intersubjective understandings* is systematically sustained” (my emphasis). This is because each new turn proposes a “local, here-and-now ‘definition of the situation’ to which subsequent talk will be oriented” (Heritage 1984b: 256), and thus sequences of actions—like the greetings just described—provide participants with a “proof procedure” (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974: 729) for the establishment, maintenance, and correction of understanding: Each turn-at-talk reveals its speaker’s analysis of the talk that came prior, while simultaneously creating the sequential context in which a subsequent turn will be produced and interpreted. In this sense, turns are both “context-shaped” and “context-renewing” (Heritage 1984b: 242).

1.3 INCORPORATING PROGRESSIVITY INTO INTERSUBJECTIVITY

The phenomenon of progressivity—the forward-moving nature of turns-at-talk—is intimately related to the issue of intersubjectivity. Because interlocutors do not have firsthand access to each others’ minds, their so-called ‘shared’ understanding of each other and of the world is unavoidably imperfect (Schütz 1962, 1967 [1932]). As a result, they must negotiate a level of intersubjectivity that is, as Garfinkel (1967: 8) describes it, “adequate-for-all-practical-purposes” or “good enough”.

What this means, in practice, is settling for intersubjective imperfection in the service of moving on with the business of the talk at hand. As we saw in the examples from Garfinkel above, by assimilating *my* flat tire to a more generalized class of ‘flat tires’, I am unavoidably sacrificing or discounting the infinite number of details that make *my specific* flat tire unique.
Yet despite this intersubjective imperfection, it must be underscored that we can and do understand one another. How is this so?

Shared understanding derives in large part from the amount of background knowledge that conversationalists bring with them into interaction. Consider another of Garfinkel’s experiments—the ‘conversation clarification experiment’ (1967: 38-40)—in which students were asked to report common conversations: On the left-hand side of the paper, they wrote what they and their co-participants actually said, and on the right-hand side of the paper, they clarified what they and their co-participants understood that they were talking about. The following is one experimenter’s report of an exchange between he and his wife:

(3) [Garfinkel 1967: 38–39]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conversation</th>
<th>Clarification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband: Dana succeeded in putting a penny in a parking meter today without being picked up.</td>
<td>This afternoon as I was bringing Dana, our four-year-old son, home from the nursery school, he succeeded in reaching high enough to put a penny in a parking meter when we parked in a meter zone, whereas before he had always had to be picked up to reach that high.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife: Did you take him to the record store?</td>
<td>Since he put a penny in a meter that means you stopped while he was with you. I know that you stopped at the record store either on the way to get him or on the way back. Was it on the way back, so that he was with you or did you stop there on the way to get him and somewhere else on the way back?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband: No, to the shoe repair shop.</td>
<td>No, I stopped at the record store on the way to get him and stopped at the shoe repair shop on the way home when he was with me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife: What for?</td>
<td>I know of one reason why you might have stopped at the shoe repair shop. Why did you in fact?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband: I got some new laces for my shoes.</td>
<td>As you will remember I broke a shoe lace on one of my brown oxfords the other day so I stopped to get some new laces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife: Your loafers need new heels badly.</td>
<td>Something else you could have gotten that I was thinking of. You could have taken in your black loafers which need heels badly. You’d better get them taken care of pretty soon.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this simple exchange of just six turns back-and-forth, we see (on the right-hand side of the page) just how much information is left unspoken. Nonetheless, this is unproblematic for the participants, who make sense of the exchange without difficulty.

The preference for progressivity (Heritage 2007, 2013b, 2015, frth.; Sacks 1987 [1973], 1992; Schegloff 1979b, 2006, 2007a; Stivers & Robinson 2006) can therefore be seen to interact with intersubjectivity in two important ways. First, the flat tire example illustrates how these concepts can be “pitted against” one another (Heritage 2009: 308): Are the participants going to keep initiating repair to give more and more details about the flat tire, at the cost of moving on to the next thing? Or are they going to just let it suffice that one commonsensically knows ‘in general’ what flat tires are like, setting aside the infinite number of minute details that make this particular flat tire unique, in the service of getting on with the business of the talk? Second, in the more recent example between the husband and wife, we see the participants’ expectation that the other party in the interaction will apply background knowledge and make a range of inferences in order to understand the exchange. Thus the husband does not take the time to spell out in words, for example, that Dana used to not be able to reach the parking meter; rather, he expects that his wife will bring this relevant knowledge to bear on the interpretation of his news announcement (or infer it if she did not know it beforehand). The result of this “seen but unnoticed” (Garfinkel 1967: 42) work between the interactants is that the talk can progress onward at a normative rate, with a level of shared understanding that is “good enough” for what the participants are doing together at that moment.
1.4 INCORPORATING ACCOUNTABILITY INTO INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND PROGRESSIVITY

In describing the phenomenon of progressivity in interaction, Schegloff (2007a: 14-15) writes:

In articulating a turn-constructional unit, each element—each word, for example—should come next after the one before; in fact, at a smaller level of granularity, each syllable—indeed, each sound—should come next after the one before it. So also with the several turn-constructional units that compose a multi-unit turn; so also with the consecutive turns that compose a spate of talk; so also with the turns that compose a sequence, etc. Moving from some element to a hearably-next-one with nothing intervening is the embodiment of, and the measure of, progressivity. Should something intervene between some element and what is hearable as a/the next one due—should something violate or interfere with their contiguity, whether next sound, next word, or next turn—it will be heard as qualifying the progressivity of the talk, and will be examined for its import, for what understanding should be accorded it (my emphasis).

Schegloff’s description clearly points to the accountability of the link between progressivity and intersubjectivity that we have been discussing. When progressivity is “qualified” in some way, participants ask ‘why that now?’ (Schegloff & Sacks 1973); that is, what am I meant to be understanding from this compromised rate of forward-movement? In this way, interactants are seen to be holding themselves and one another accountable for the progressivity of talk—both by enacting modifications to it that are designedly produced ‘for cause’, as well as by working to interpret deviations from normative progressivity for their cause, “for what understanding should be accorded [them]”.

The granularity of Schegloff’s description—“next sound, next word”—now brings us back to the issue of turn design. Recall the description offered by Drew (2013: 132): “Turn design refers to how a speaker constructs a turn-at-talk—what is selected or what goes into ‘building’ a turn to do the action it is designed to do, in such a way as to be understood as doing that action (which is the accountability of a turn’s design)” (emphasis in original). If repair is initiated on the design of a turn (either by self or other), then progressivity is unambiguously qualified, as we saw in our first two examples from Garfinkel. But progressivity can likewise be qualified by the inclusion of
‘additional’ elements in turns-at-talk. For example, following a question, does the recipient immediately produce the answer proper? Or is the progressivity of the question-answer sequence “marked” (Heritage 2013b, 2015) by including a turn-initial particle or other element before provision of the answer—e.g., oh, well, look, listen, uhm, an address term, a repeat, etc. (Bolden 2009; Clayman 2013; Heritage 1998, 2013b, 2015, frth.; Scheglof & Lerner 2009; Sidnell 2007; Thompson, Fox & Couper-Kuhlen 2015; see also Heritage & Sorjonen, eds., frth.). Similarly, does a speaker design his/her turn to be “marked” (Levinson 2000) by expanding the verb phrase from [SUBJECT + MAIN VERB] to [SUBJECT + do + MAIN VERB], as in The kids do eat cake (cf. The kids eat cake). In each of these cases, the normative progressivity of the talk is qualified in some way in the service of some interactional aim, which hearers will, as Scheglof and Drew’s definitions clearly assert, endeavor to understand. In this way we see how members of the social world invariably “treat one another as morally and socially accountable for their actions” (Heritage 1988: 144), with even the most minute elements of turn construction being no exception. The design of turns-at-talk thus grants us crucial insight into the inextricable links between intersubjectivity, progressivity, and accountability in interaction.

1.5 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS

Each of the four substantive chapters that make up this dissertation approaches the relationship between intersubjectivity, progressivity, and accountability, through the lens of turn design. Below I outline the specific questions motivating each chapter, and summarize the arguments developed therein.
1.5.1 Chapter 2:

Indexing a Contrast: The Do-Construction in English-Language Conversation

This chapter reports on the structure and interactional use of what I term the ‘do-construction’ in English-language conversation. These are, as mentioned above, utterances such as The kids do eat cake (cf. The kids eat cake). How are such turns designed (syntactically and prosodically), where are they produced, and what interactional work do they accomplish?

A collection of 237 cases reveals that the do-construction can be seen in a variety of sequential positions, and in conjunction with a range of social actions. Nonetheless, what binds this diversity of cases together is the use of the do-construction to introduce content into the interaction in a way that actively orients to a contrastive understanding.

After establishing the contrastive work that this resource accomplishes as a general feature of turn design, I then consider how the use of the do-construction can be seen to be relevant to particular sequences of action, focusing specifically on marked confirmations/disconfirmations (Heritage & Raymond 2005, 2012; Raymond 2003; Raymond & Heritage 2006; Stivers 2005; Stivers & Enfield 2010). I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between the grammatical construction analyzed here and ‘embedded other-correction’ (Jefferson 1987), as well as comment on some related resources for indexing contrasts in English.

1.5.2 Chapter 3:

On the Accountability of Commonsense Inferences:

Updating Intersubjectivity with the English Do-Construction

Chapter 3 reports on a subset of the do-construction cases from Chapter 2. Recall from our discussion above that it is the moment-by-moment collaborative production of talk which constitutes the means “through which a context of publically displayed and continuously updated
intersubjective understanding is systematically sustained” (Heritage & Atkinson 1984: 11, my emphasis; Schegloff 1992). It is precisely this issue of continuously “updating” intersubjectivity with which Chapter 3 is concerned.

In the subset of cases analyzed here, the contrast indexed through use of the do-construction is not with the content proper of a prior utterance or sequence of utterances, but rather with a potential implication thereof. That is, this grammatical construction is routinely mobilized to index contrasts not only with explicit or otherwise demonstrated understandings (as in the majority of the cases in Chapter 2), but also with possible ambiguities and potential misapprehensions that might be gleaned from prior talk. Through the use of the do-construction in such contexts, speakers can be seen to be actively holding themselves accountable for the commonsense inferences (Garfinkel 1967; Schütz 1962) that prior talk may have generated, while simultaneously working to refine and shore up the shared understanding being developed with their hearers. This particular turn design thus offers us a case study in how grammar, specifically, can be deployed in turn-by-turn talk in the service of achieving an “updated intersubjective understanding” with recipients. The chapter concludes with a discussion of where and how this particular practice fits in with other operations that exist in what Schegloff (1982: 91) has referred to as “the organizational domain of repair”, as well as comments on the relationship of such operations to accountability, commonsensicality, and normativity in interaction.

1.5.3 Chapter 4:

_Bueno-, Pues-, and Bueno-Pues-Prefacing in Spanish Conversation_

Chapter 4 takes as its point of departure the distinction between “unmarked” and “marked” progressivity across turns within a sequence (Heritage 2013b, 2015, frth.), examining two turn-
initial particles in Spanish: *bueno* (usually translated into English as ‘well’, but also as ‘okay’, ‘fine’, or ‘(al)right’) and *pues* (usually translated into English as ‘well’).

In responsive position, both *bueno* and *pues* have been argued to accomplish similar interactional work to that of *well*-prefacing in English—either as the explicit objective of the overall analysis (e.g., Cuenca 2008; García Vizcaíno & Martínez-Cabeza 2005; Stenström 2006) or implicitly in analyzing an excerpt (e.g., Serrano 1999: 120; Travis 2006). In addition, prior pragmatic, discourse-analytic, and politeness-based analyses have routinely used the same terminology to describe the functions of *bueno* and *pues*, thereby tacitly suggesting that their deployment is interchangeable (e.g., Bauhr 1994: 118-120; Briz Gómez 1998: 175; Cortés Rodríguez 1991: 108; García Vizcaíno 2005: 58; Landone 2009: 246; Llorente Arcocha 1996: 213-218; Pons Bordería 2003: 229-234; Portolés Lázaro 2001: 128-129; Serrano 1995: 13; Travis 1998, 2006: 233). Thus my aim in this chapter is to investigate whether these two items function identically in responsive turns, or whether an explicit teasing apart of the two is possible. In doing so, this exercise seeks to enrich our understanding of turn-initial position more generally by exemplifying how languages can manage the division of interactional labor between particles used to launch responsive utterances.

Specifically, the chapter argues that both *bueno* and *pues* preface some “unexpectedness” to come in the responsive turn, but a different sort of “unexpectedness” is foreshadowed by each particle. I demonstrate that *bueno*-prefaced turns do not overtly problematize the prior utterance, but rather accept its terms before departing from them, and thereby acquiesce to the prior turn’s design (albeit a marked form of acquiescence compared to a turn that is not qualified with a turn-initial particle; see Heritage 2013b, 2015, frth.; Schegloff 2007a: 14-15). *Pues*-prefaced responses, on the other hand, are directly addressed to the prior turn, but they cast that prior turn’s action or
design as problematic in some way. That is, rather than acquiescing to the terms of the first-position utterance (as with *bueno*), *pues*-prefaced responses target and problematize some aspect of the prior turn, thereby noticeably ‘pushing back’ on, for example, its presuppositions or epistemic stance. In this way, *pues*-prefacing is also a harbinger of “unexpectedness”, but, contrary to the case of *bueno*, the unexpectedness of *pues* derives from the second speaker’s comparatively on-record registration of difficulty with the terms set for response by the prior turn, as opposed to his/her tacit acceptance thereof.

1.5.4  **Chapter 5:**

**A Scalar View of Progressivity in Interaction**

The final substantive chapter of this dissertation aims to unpack Schegloff’s (2007a: 15) reference to “the measure of progressivity” by arguing that progressivity must be conceptualized as a *scalar* phenomenon. That is, rather than *yes*-progressivity vs. *no*-progressivity, participants in interaction can be seen to orient to the existence of a *continuum* from *more*-progressivity to *less*-progressivity. Moreover, in addition to being better aligned with participants’ own understanding of this feature of interaction, it is demonstrated that such an analytic reconceptualization provides an important new dimension on which to examine various practices deployed in naturally occurring talk, as we equip ourselves with a means to ask not only *if* a turn is moving forward vs. backward, but also *how much*.

To construct this argument, I draw on research from analysts working on a range of interactional phenomena. In some of these studies, progressivity is discussed by the authors as a specific issue of interest, while in others, its relevance is only implicit. While certainly not intended to be an exhaustive catalog, my objective in this chapter is to bring progressivity to the analytic forefront by demonstrating how a very diverse array of practices can be situated on a common
continuum. I illustrate how participants can be seen to orient in various ways to moment-by-moment adjustments in the progressivity of the talk—actively designing actions to be more or less progressivity-retardant, or more or less progressivity-accelerant, supporting or sanctioning interlocutors’ attempts at hindering or expediting progressivity, and so on. This chapter is therefore intended to make a theoretical contribution to the discipline, arguing that the progressivity of interaction—be it normative, hindered (to whatever degree), or expedited (to whatever degree)—is a collaboratively constructed, accountable, interactional achievement that is constituted by participants’ contributions to the talk.

1.6 SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

Tomasello and colleagues (2005: 275) write that “human beings are the world’s experts at mind reading…at discerning what others are perceiving, intending, desiring, knowing, and believing”. Yet while this is true, there is a substantial amount of work that goes into having one’s perceptions, intentions, desires, knowledge, and beliefs understood in the particular way(s) that one is aiming for. To again quote Garfinkel: “The big question is not whether actors understand each other or not. The fact is that they do understand each other, that they will understand each other, but the catch is that they will understand each other regardless of how they would be understood” (Garfinkel 1952: 367). And so humans have to work—and indeed we do work—to be understood in the specific ways that we want to be understood. By examining different features of turn design, this dissertation investigates a range of “account-able” “members’ resources” (Garfinkel 1967) that are mobilized by participants to accomplish this on a moment-by-moment basis in social interaction.
2 Indexing a Contrast: The Do-Construction in English Conversation

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter reports on the structure and interactional use of what I term the ‘do-construction’ in English-language conversation—that is, utterances such as The kids do eat cake (cf. The kids eat cake). The argument developed here is that, at its core, the do-construction is used in interaction to index a contrast with a prior understanding. As will be shown, this prior understanding can be overtly demonstrated or merely presumed, and it may be the understanding of the speaker him/herself, or that of the recipient. Similarly, the do-construction can be seen in a variety of sequential positions, and in conjunction with a range of social actions. Nonetheless, what binds this diversity of cases together is the use of the do-construction to introduce content into the interaction in a way that actively orients to a contrastive understanding.

I begin by offering a morphosyntactic and prosodic description of how the do-construction is produced by speakers in naturally occurring conversation. Following this, I provide evidence that this grammatical resource is consistently used to mark a contrast, moving from the most overt to the more nuanced cases. After establishing the contrastive work that this resource accomplishes as a general feature of turn design, we will then consider how the use of the do-construction can be seen to be relevant to sequences of action, focusing specifically on marked confirmations/disconfirmations (Heritage & Raymond 2005, 2012; Raymond 2003; Raymond & Heritage 2006; Stivers 2005; Stivers & Enfield 2010). I conclude with a discussion of the
relationship between the grammatical construction analyzed here and ‘embedded other-correction’ (Jefferson 1987), as well as comment on some related resources for indexing contrasts in English.

The present analysis is based off of a total of 237 cases of the do-construction, culled from large corpora of naturally occurring interactions, including ordinary conversation as well as institutional talk. Data are from both American and British dialects of English. Audio of some of the examples included here is publically available via TalkBank (MacWhinney 2007).

## 2.2 The Format of the Do-Construction

The do-construction is marked (see Levinson 2000) at two levels of linguistic structure—morphosyntactically and prosodically—which combine to generate the particular contrastive nature of the grammatical formulation. I will describe each of these in turn.

### 2.2.1 Morphosyntax

The word *do* has a variety of uses in Modern English. In addition to being just a ‘regular’ lexical verb (e.g., *They do laundry on Sundays*), *do* serves as a dummy auxiliary in the formation of interrogatives (1), in negation (2), and in ellipses (3).¹

1. *Does* Jane like Mark?
2. Jane *did* not see him.
3. Bill saw him, and Jane *did* too.

The linguistics literature refers to *do* in these grammatical capacities as ‘periphrastic *do*’, ‘*do*-insertion’, or ‘*do*-support’. As seen in the above examples (1)-(3), just as when functioning as a regular verb, periphrastic *do* is conjugated with tense/aspect/mood morphology; we are therefore interested not only in instances of *do* itself, but also *does* and *did*.

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¹ Interestingly, this began in the 14th century, when post-verbal negation (e.g., *she saw not*) slowly became replaced by *do*-periphrasis between the subject and the negation (e.g., *she did not see*) (Ellegard 1953).
Use of periphrastic *do* in Modern English is also possible in non-interrogative, non-negation, and non-elliptical contexts as well. In such cases, the verb phrase is morphosyntactically ‘expanded’, so to speak, from `[MAIN VERB]` to `[do + MAIN VERB]`, with *do* again being conjugated accordingly. For instance: *I faxed them a letter* can be expanded to *I did fax them a letter*. In Table 2.1 below, utterances in the left column (taken from naturally occurring interaction) can be seen as marked versions of the hypothetical unexpanded verb phrases of the utterances in the right column. I will refer to these expanded, declarative formulations as instances of the ‘*do*-construction’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expanded</th>
<th>Unexpanded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“But I <strong>did get</strong> letters off to . . .”</td>
<td>“But I <strong>got</strong> letters off to . . .”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I <strong>do think</strong> that…”</td>
<td>“I <strong>think</strong> that…”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Well I <strong>did talk</strong> to Danny . . .”</td>
<td>“Well I <strong>talked</strong> to Danny . . .”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I <strong>did fax</strong> them a letter”</td>
<td>“I <strong>faxed</strong> them a letter”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“He <strong>does still write</strong> plays”</td>
<td>“He <strong>still writes</strong> plays”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.1: Examples of the do-construction in English**

Note also, as illustrated in the final example in Table 2.1, that additional material (e.g., adverbs like “still”) can occur in these expanded verb phrases as well.

Summarizing the use of this construction, Kallel (2002: 166) writes that “the use of auxiliary *do* in un-inverted affirmative declaratives [such as those in the left column of Table 2.1] is limited to emphatic contexts” (see similar descriptions in Breitbarth, De Clercq & Haegeman 2013; Grimshaw 2013; Quirk, et al. 1975; Wilder 2013). Indeed, the expanded cases in Table 2.1 are generally perceived as in some way emphatic when compared to their unexpanded counterparts. In an attempt to explicate what is meant by “emphasis” in this description, researchers canonically offer an invented sentence that includes a contradiction, such as: *They said*
I hadn’t paid but I paid (Grimshaw 2013). Nonetheless, when, where, and why this “emphasis” is deemed relevant at any given point in discourse—in addition to what, specifically, is meant by “emphasis”—is left unspecified in the literature. As will be illustrated, examining the use of this construction in naturally occurring interaction will allow us to unpack this notion at a more precise level of detail.

2.2.2 Prosody

An additional feature of the production of the do-construction in naturally occurring talk, which parallels the “emphatic” characterization of the morphosyntax alone, is contrastive stress. While related phenomena have been studied with other linguistic methods (e.g., Bolinger 1961, 1978; Gussenhoven 1984; Höhle 1992; Ladd 2008; Lohnstein 2015), a detailed prosodic analysis of contrastive stress has thus far eluded conversation-analytic inquiries. Nonetheless, contrastive stress as a participants’ resource is certainly no stranger to analyses of talk-in-interaction where researchers have noted its import for the production and interpretation of action (e.g., Couper-Kuhlen 1984; Ogden 2006; Schegloff 1998; Walker 2013).

Following previous researchers, I will use the term contrastive stress to refer to a marked shift in amplitude, pitch, and/or duration on a specific part of the turn which thereby draws the recipient’s attention to that particular element in the utterance for some interactional purpose. For instance, in a constructed example such as The house isn’t blue, it’s red, contrastive stress can help target the two colors that are in contrast. Of particular relevance to the present study is what Höhle (1992) calls ‘verum focus’, which occurs on verbs and complementizers in German. Using invented data, Höhle argues that such a stress pattern is broadly associated with emphasizing the truth of the proposition it takes scope over. Interestingly, English glosses of this phenomenon in
German frequently include a *do*-construction, such as *Karl hat den Hund gefüttert* (‘Carl *did* feed the dog’) (see also Lohnstein 2015).

Although a detailed analysis of contrastive stress in and of itself lies outside the aims and scope of the present chapter, it is nonetheless crucial to note that the grammatical construction under examination here is routinely produced with a shift up in pitch on the *do*, occasionally co-occurring with increased loudness and/or lengthening as well. For instance, the pitch track in Figure 2.1 illustrates the pitch peak on “did” that is produced in the first case to be analyzed below: “Yes I *did* talk to Count,” (line 10 of example (4)).

Figure produced using Praat (Boersma & Weenink 2014).

---

2 That pitch is routinely used to mark prosodic stress in this construction, while increased loudness and lengthening occur only occasionally, makes sense given perceptual experiments which, Cruttenden (1997: 13) describes, “have clearly shown that, in English at any rate, the three features (pitch, length and loudness) form a scale of importance in bringing syllables into prominence, pitch being the most efficacious, and loudness the least so”.

3 Figure produced using Praat (Boersma & Weenink 2014).
In this example, following “I”, there is an upward shift in pitch on the “did”. This pitch peak interrupts the gradual ‘downdrift’ (Yip 2002: 148) or ‘catathesis’ (Beckman & Pierrehumbert 1986: 272) over the course of the utterance, which has been reported to be the pattern for unmarked declarative statements in English (and several other languages). This stress serves to draw attention to the element being prosodically marked, potentially emphasizing its truth value to the extent that Höhle’s (1992) analysis can be applied cross-linguistically (see Gutzmann & Miró 2008) and to naturally occurring data.

While in some cases the pitch peak (and amplitude up-shift) are greater than in others, marked prosodic features are nonetheless routinely present on the do, as will be reflected in the transcripts that follow. Thus when I refer here to ‘the do-construction’, I mean to refer to this combination of morphosyntactic and prosodic markedness.

2.3 THE DO-CONSTRUCTION AS AN INDEX OF CONTRAST

Now that the linguistic format of the do-construction has been described, we move on to look at where this structure occurs, and what it serves to accomplish, in naturally occurring interaction. This section will illustrate that, across a range of sequential positions and in conjunction with a range of social actions, the core function of the do-construction is to index a contrast.

We will begin by considering cases in which speakers grammatically establish a contrast with their own prior talk. In these instances, by designing new content as contrastive, speakers actively orient to the understanding that their prior talk is expected to have established in their

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4 Culicover (2008: 35, footnote 26) claims that the construction is possible with unstressed do, offering examples such as: My point…and I do have one…, where stress is on the main verb as opposed to the do. Interestingly, though, as Wilder (2013: 145, footnote 11) notes, schwa pronunciation of do in such cases is still impossible, thereby suggesting that the do must retain some prosodic prominence in the do-construction. In the dataset assembled for the present study, no completely unstressed cases of do are found. That is, even in cases where the main verb is stressed, there is still notable prosodic prominence on the do as well (see, e.g., case (9) below).
recipients. Speakers can thus be seen to be holding themselves accountable\textsuperscript{5} (in the sense of Garfinkel 1967) for the talk they have produced thus far, marking for their hearers that something contrastive with that talk is now being produced.

Case (4) below includes a same-turn self-repair (see Schegloff 2013) in which the repair solution is as contrastive as possible with the trouble source; that is, its polar opposite.\textsuperscript{6} Here, in response to musician Dan’s story launch (lines 5-7), Bob provides confirmation that he is aware that someone known in common to the pair (named “Conti” or “Count”) visited Dan last year. Bob immediately expands his responsive turn by explaining that although he is aware of Count’s visit, he hasn’t spoken to him. In the midst of this expansion, however, Bob initiates self-repair, that he “\texttt{did}”, in fact, talk to him. The repaired TCU is built with a \textit{do}-construction.

\begin{quote}
\textbf{(4) Count’s visit}

01 Bob: So your chops are u:p.
02 Dan: We’ll no.=They’re not u:p.=
03 =But I’m playing.=It’s: I just it’s v:ery hard
04 to get my chops back in form.=
05 =but I’m gonna try,=I’ll tell ya what’s ha:ppening.
06 .hGGh Ah::: F:First of all you kne:w tha:t
07 we had Conti here last ye:ar,
08 Bob: \texttt{-} .hhh (.)(Yea:h.=but I haven’t- talked to hi=}
09 Dan: \texttt{|or-}
10 Bob: \texttt{-} \textbf{Yes I did talk to Count,=yeah .}(.) \texttt{[Mhm}
11 Dan: \texttt{|Whad’e say.}
\end{quote}

In this case, the informational content of the repair solution is plainly contrastive with that of the trouble source—i.e., talking to Count vs. \textit{not} talking to Count. Through deployment of the \textit{do}-construction, Bob orients to the fact that, based on the information presented thus far—that is, up until the initiation of repair at the end of line 8—Dan will understand that Bob has \textit{not} spoken to

\textsuperscript{5} For recent work on accountability in interaction, see studies included in the volume edited by Robinson (2016).

\textsuperscript{6} On repair more generally, see Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977). See also more recent treatments in, for instance, Fox, Hayashi and Jasperson (1996), Hayashi, Raymond, and Sidnell, eds. (2013), and Schegloff (1987, 1992, 2000).
Count. To repair this misspeaking and the incorrect understanding that it will have caused in the mind of the speaker, Bob marks the repair solution both morphosyntactically as well as prosodically by way of the *do*-construction, combined with an initial reference form in subsequent position\(^7\) (Fox 1987; Schegloff 1996a) and a repeat of the confirming interjection: “Yes I did talk to Count,=yeah.”. The repaired version of this information in line 10 is thus grammatically designed such that it agentively delivers the correction *as* contrastive, thereby orienting to the recipient’s presumed understanding *at that precise moment* in the ongoing talk.

Consider another self-initiated self-repair case in (5). Here, in response to Betty’s pre-telling line 1, Carla offers a candidate possibility for how it is that Betty got her phone number: “Yeh talked ta Linda.” (line 6). Betty initially responds to this B-event statement (Labov & Fanshel 1977: 100) with an emphatic “No:: no::” before cutting off to initiate a same-turn repair. As in the prior repair example, the subsequent repaired formulation contains a *do*-construction.

\[(5)\] Talk to Linda

\begin{verbatim}
01 Bet:  I'ws so gla- you know=how [I have your number:, \\
02 Car:    [((sneeze))]
03 Bet:  .hh I [s- I- \\
04 Car:       [I was wondering [about that. \\
05 Bet:                        [hhheh heh heh [heh \\
06 Car:                              [Yeh talked ta Linda. \\
07 Bet:  -> No:: no::= Well:, (. ) I did talk to Linda but,= \\
08 =she didn’t give- (. ) well actually she wasn’t there \\
09 the day I called, (. ) I talked to Ralph. \\
10 .hh But (. ) uhm (0.2) .tch=The last time I was in Honduras, \\
11 which (. ) is (. ) nearing: (. ) two years, . . .
\end{verbatim}

In this specific sequential environment, Carla’s disconfirming “No:: no::” response to “Yeh talked to Linda.” is potentially ambiguous: It may be heard by the recipient as either (i) a statement that Betty has not talked to Linda (at all), or (ii) that regardless of whether or not Betty has talked to

\(^7\) This marked reference form may enhance the reparative operation underway by indexing ‘firstness’ or ‘newness’ (cf. Raymond & Heritage 2006: 693-694).
Linda, Linda did not give her Carla’s phone number. Of course we know from how the talk progresses that (ii) is the correct interpretation; but what is crucial here is that it is in the context of this potential ambiguity of understanding (of the disconfirmation) that repair is initiated. The use of the do-construction in the repair solution indexes the potentially contrastive nature of this new information in light of the “No:: no::” that came just prior. We thus have a grammatical window into how Betty understands that Carla might be understanding the state of affairs being presented at this moment in the talk, with the introduction of potentially contrastive content into the interaction being morphosyntactically and prosodically marked as such.

Case (6) below similarly illustrates the contrastive nature of the do-construction with a speaker’s own prior talk, but this time from outside the context of repair. Here, Nancy has been describing to Emma how she was recently introduced to a potential romantic interest, described as “just a real nice fellow” (line 8). Following Emma’s assessment in lines 3/6, Nancy begins to bring her telling to a close by restating that “nothing may come of it” (line 7), meaning that the man in question may never call despite his promise to do so. Immediately following this, she continues and presents the contrastive possibility, complete with two do-constructions: “nif I: did have a .hhhh chance'r if’e does ca::ll;…” (lines 10-11).

(6) NB:II:4, pg. 9-10

01 Nan: I: *ITHEN RILLY KNOW WUT TUH S*AY ↑*I wz ↑s*o flustered
02 Emm: [“Oh:: ] well° ]GEUD] I'M GLAD YIH f]↑ound [somebuddy ee]gn
03 Nan: [↑yuḥknow,° ]
04 Nan: Yeeah.[h
05 Emm: [go ou[t'n h]ave fun] with] [.snff:: [mghh-mghh]
06 Nan: -> [S:o: ] e z I] sa];y [nothin:ga ma:y [come of i]t
07 Emm: but e.-he wz [jist a(r)] a ri:l ni:ce:: (. ) fellow=
08 Nan: [*Mm hm?° ]
09 Emm: -> =en I'm sure thet ( . ) nif I: did have a .hhhh chance'r if'e
10 Nan: does ca::ll; h ahm (.2) en since he made it such a pointed
11 Emm: effort tuh: get my number he probably wi:ll, .hh.h[h hh
12 Emm: [*Mm:[hm:,° ]
13 Nan: [Ah::, ]
Contrasting with the possibility that “nothing may come of it” is the possibility that Nancy does “have a chance” and that the man in question “does call” (lines 10-11). Thus, just as in the self-repair cases, here a speaker grammatically designs her turn in a way that orients to its being contrastive with content from the speaker’s own prior talk. Nonetheless, while the prior examples indexed a contrast as part of a ‘correction’ of the speaker’s prior talk, here we see the contrast used as part of the speaker’s transition from describing a hypothetical outcome that is less happy to one that is more hopeful.

Speakers can also use the *do*-construction to mark a contrast with their interlocutors’ prior talk or other behavior. Given that turns-at-talk (or lack thereof) are taken to reveal speakers’ understanding of the interaction thus far (as well as their understandings of their recipient and the world more generally) (Heritage 1984b; Heritage & Atkinson 1984; Schegloff 1992), when a contrast is indexed with such an understanding, it can serve to enact an other-correction of it. This is seen in example (7) below where Samantha is describing her flightpath home to San Francisco from Hong Kong. From the beginning of this excerpt through line 14, the participants are assessing Tokyo as a place to have a layover. Despite Dolly’s attempts to minimize the negative aspects of having such a layover (lines 5, 8, 11-12/14), Samantha asserts that it is “annoying” that she does not have a direct flight (lines 15-17). The particular formulations used here—“I _have to go through Tokyo.” and “I can’t just fly from Hong Kong _h#me.”—are then shown to be interpreted in a certain way by Tom through his later uses of the *do*-construction (lines 24 and 34).
Tom expresses his surprise (line 23) that Samantha is not taking a direct flight, given that “They do have rout-”, presumably going toward a description of routes that “do” exist. Although this assertion is cut off before it reaches completion, note that it is designed as contrastive with what he takes to be Samantha’s understanding of the world.

After clarifying what the specific flight destination is (lines 24-28), and after Samantha fails to provide a prompt account in line 32 (see Raymond & Stivers 2016), Tom produces an
additional *do*-construction, this time brought to completion with “United\(^8\) **does** have that.” (line 34). By asserting this information as contrastive via the use of the *do*-constructions, Tom reveals what he takes Samantha’s understanding of the existence of flightpaths to be, while simultaneously attempting an other-correction of that understanding. In this case, however, Tom’s interpretation of Samantha’s earlier complaints (lines 15-17) turns out to be incorrect: Samantha was already aware of the existence of the direct flight path, but she was unable to purchase such a ticket as the flights were already booked (line 33). Thus, information that was formulated as contrastive with Samantha’s understanding of the world was, in fact, not contrastive with it. Indeed, Samantha’s demonstration of her prior knowledge of direct flights through the provision of an account, in addition to showing an orientation to her earlier complaints as accountable actions, may have been designed to block Tom’s forthcoming other-correction turn. Nonetheless, this is unsuccessful as Tom’s line 34 occurs in overlap. Following the overlap, Tom produces a change-of-state token (Heritage 1984a) and repetitive registration (Goldberg 1975) (“Oh=it’s full.=I see.”; line 36), thereby illustrating that his prior *do*-construction turns were indeed meant as other-correction, as opposed to mere innocent informing.

Another other-correction case is seen in (8), where what is corrected is April’s presupposition that Clara will be able to recognize the name and description of someone named “Rick Clancy”. In beginning to introduce this individual for an upcoming telling, April asserts that “You probably even remember him.”, immediately adding the declaratively formatted “You remember our friend Rick (.) Clancy:” (lines 1-2).\(^9\) Given that Clara has yet to display any recognition of this name, April goes on to provide a continuous list of descriptions of Rick—

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\(^8\) “United” is the name of an airline company.

\(^9\) As this is a dyadic interaction, April is unambiguously directing her turns to Clara, not some other third party.
including his profession, a physical attribute, and a character trait (lines 2-3/5)—in the hopes of getting Clara to recognize the referent. This attempt, however, is unsuccessful (line 7).

(8) **Rick Clancy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apr:</th>
<th>Apr:</th>
<th>Cla:</th>
<th>Cla:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You probably even remember him. &lt;You remember our friend Rick (.). Clancy: = he’s a judge, = he has white hair, = he’s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[m : : : ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Just absolutely] &lt;CHarm&gt; ing guy.</td>
<td>.hh</td>
<td>[I’m not sure that I do remember,</td>
<td>Oh. An’ he always- (.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He w’s part a’thuh biking group,</td>
<td>Oh:</td>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>.tch= .hh &lt;And either he had,&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[”kay,”</td>
<td>I: think he had a Ba::d Bike accident. = Uhm: [ ,</td>
<td>[Really?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the launch of this sequence, in lines 1-2, the declarative design of April’s turns reveals her expectation that Clara will be able to recognize the referent in question (Heritage 2012b). That is, April is merely requesting confirmation of something that she presumes Clara to already know, in this case as a pre- to be able to launch a telling about Rick (see Terasaki 2004 [1976]). By indexing a contrast in her response in line 7, Clara’s *do*-construction orients to her interlocutor’s demonstrated presupposition that she will be able to recognize the referent, while simultaneously indexing a contrast with and disconfirming that presupposition. This practice diverges from simple disconfirmation, asserting Clara’s epistemic rights over her own ‘territory of knowledge’ from second position by resisting the terms established by April’s turn design (Heritage & Raymond 2005, 2012; Raymond & Heritage 2006; Stivers 2005; cf. Kamio 1997), a point to which we will return later. April receipts this other-correction turn with a change-of-state “Oh.”, suggesting that Clara’s utterance did indeed run counter to her expectations.
One final example of this sort, where a speaker’s *do*-construction addresses an interlocutor’s prior behavior, is seen in (9). In this case it is the interlocutor’s lack of uptake that provides the impetus for the production of the *do*-construction. Here, Karen has just finished telling Shirley a story about having been stung by a jellyfish while on vacation in Florida. The events of this telling are provided as an account for Karen’s current fear of going into the ocean, because one can’t see jellyfish approaching in the water (lines 5/7). Shirley affiliates with this fear by enthusiastically upgrading to “↑You can’t see anythi::ng.” in overlap in line 8, before offering the specific hypothetical case of a shark approaching. In response to a lack of timely uptake from Karen (lines 11-13)\(^\text{10}\), Shirley addresses what may be at issue for her recipient, namely that the just-mentioned idea of a shark encounter might “sound ridiculous” to her. She then contrasts this potential understanding with “But it does happen her:e.” (line 15).

(9) Jellyfish

01 Kar: An’ ev(h)er since then I’m like (.) I am not going
02 i(h) Nass(h)at w(h)ater.=
03 =heh heh [heh heh heh heh
04 Shi: [Yeah::.. I don’t like it.
05 Kar: Cuz you can’t see >>if it’s a<< stupid jellyfish,=
06 Shi: [↑NO::..=
07 Kar: ={I mean they’re clear. }
08 Shi: ={↑You can’t see anyi::ng.
09 Kar: {(sniff)}=
10 Shi: -> =An’ what if a shark came up,
11 -> whe-yë-m-n::, Yer in the waves. .hhh
12 -> (0.2)
13 Kar: -> Yea:::h.
14 Shi: -> {I know it sounds ridiculous,
15 Shi: -> But it does happen her:e.
16 (.)
17 Kar: 0(h)h:[: . <Really:?>
18 Shi: [(]
19 Shi: ↑Oh ↑yea:::h.
20 (1.0)
21 Shi: So:- hh[h I don’t kno-
22 Kar: {You mean ther- e- yer not- Yer not exaggerating?

\(^{10}\) The increment (Ford, Fox & Thompson 2002) added in line 11, provided after the pragmatic and prosodic completion of line 10, is arguably already an orientation to a lack of timely response by Karen.
In this case, there is an explicit orientation to what the *do*-construction speaker believes her recipient might be thinking. (And given Karen’s later question in line 22, it appears that Shirley was likely correct in interpreting Karen’s lack of uptake as indicative of doubt that a shark attack could actually happen.) In response to the lack of uptake, Shirley attempts to target and correct this inapposite (from her perspective) understanding with the *do*-construction in lines 14-15, which receives a surprise-intoned change-of-state token plus newsmark in line 17 (Jefferson 1981: 62-66; Heritage 1984a; Thompson, Fox & Couper-Kuhlen 2015: 80-82). This is confirmed with an *oh*-prefaced confirmation in line 19 (Heritage 1998).

The *do*-construction can also appear in first position—that is, in a position that does not directly address prior talk or other observable behavior by either the speaker or the recipient of the *do*-construction turn. In such cases, speakers can nonetheless be heard to be indexing a contrast, namely with some unstated presupposition about or understanding of a specific context or situation.

Such cases—where nothing has been overtly stated but where a contrast is nonetheless indexed via the *do*-construction—have been previously described in the context of medical interactions. In reporting on pediatric encounters, Stivers (2002) writes that, while in some cases doctors use this practice to confirm a parent’s *overt* candidate diagnosis,\(^\text{11}\) in other cases, the *do*-construction can be produced in response to “symptoms-only” problem presentations (328, footnote 16; see also Stivers 2000, 2007). The analysis presented here accounts for why a problem presentation that does not make any mention of ear pain, for example, would receive a diagnosis formulated with a *do*-construction—e.g., “Actually she does have an ear infection” (2002: 328,

\(^{11}\) We will discuss (dis)confirmation cases specifically in the next section.
footnote 16)—given the presumably contrastive nature of such a diagnosis in a context where ear pain was not referenced.

To provide a fieldnote account of the *do*-construction in true first position, consider the following example (10). After my first two weeks in Nijmegen, where I would be a Visiting Scientist at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics for the next few months, a Nijmegen-native friend took me for the first time to the large supermarket chain called Albert Heijn. Completely spontaneously—that is, not arising out of any prior discussion—the following exchange took place upon my seeing sliced roast beef for sale at the deli counter:

(10) FN:CWR

01 Chase:  -> **Oh, they do have roast beef here.**
02 Friend:  ((laughs)) Of course!
03 Chase:   Well I haven’t seen any!

Seeing cooked, sliced roast beef for sale was a surprise to me, as I had not seen it at any of the other markets I had been to (line 3); and thus I had come to the conclusion that it was not a regular staple in the Netherlands. My use of a *do*-construction in this first-position noticing indexes the counter-to-expectations nature of the information in the assertion, which is heard as contrasting with my own prior understanding of roast beef availability.\(^{12}\) My friend’s laughter, followed by an “Of course!” response, shows that the turn was indeed understood as indexing a contrast with the presupposition that roast beef wouldn’t be available, by depicting such a presupposition as inconceivable (Stivers 2011). In third position (line 3), I then provide an account for why my original *do*-construction noticing was delivered as a contrast.

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\(^{12}\) One can imagine that, without the *do*-construction, the turn might have been heard as a suggestion or proposal to buy some roast beef, as opposed to a noticing through the indexation of a contrast with the speaker’s own presuppositions about its availability. With the *do*-construction, however, such alternative action ascriptions would be strange, if not impossible, without a particular prior sequential context.
One final case of this sort is seen in (11), taken from a corpus of calls in which a reviewing
doctor contacts attending pediatricians over the phone to conduct prospective utilization reviews
for tympanostomy (Heritage, Boyd & Kleinman 2001; Kleinman, Boyd & Heritage 1997). As seen
in the following extract, taken from the very beginning of one such call, Dr. Clancy self-identifies
and gives the reason for the call, and then immediately asserts “an’ we do record these messages
so you’ll hear a beep from time t’ time.” (lines 3-5).

(11) P2.1 #1205

01 Dr.C: Oh hi, Doctor Marcus?=This is Doctor Clancy callin:g
02 uhm (0.2) I’m calling on behalf of the:
03 -> uh=insurance company for:: uh David-Laconte an'
04 -> we do record these messages so you'll hear a beep from
time t' time. .hh[h uh= (. ) °°c- c-°° u:h could you . . .
06 Dr.M: [Yes,

As in the previous ethnographic case, here nothing has been overtly stated to the contrary of the
information provided in the do-construction. Nonetheless, the do-construction indexes a contrast
with what Dr. Marcus may presuppose about the nature of their telephone call: While it would be
reasonable and commonsensical (Garfinkel 1967; Schütz 1962; see also Chapter 3) for him to
believe that a telephone call would not be recorded, this one in fact will be, and Dr. Clancy’s do-
construction orients to the likely contrastive nature of that informing action.

The do-constructions presented in this section were diverse in terms of, for example, whose
understanding is being contrasted with, where that understanding emerged, as well as how.
Nonetheless, across this diversity of cases, it was shown that the core meaning of the do-
construction is to index a contrast with a prior understanding. That is, speakers mobilizing a do-
construction are understood to be “publicly and accountably” (Garfinkel 1967) marking their
turns—both morphosyntactically and prosodically—such that they are interpreted in context as
contrasts by recipients.
2.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR ACTION

In light of the argument that the *do*-construction serves to index a contrast, we now ask how this resource can come to bear on participants’ formation and ascription of action in interaction. First we will consider a case in which the *lack* of a *do*-construction is seen to contribute to the speaker’s overarching project. Then, in an effort to more specifically link the present analysis to prior research on this and related phenomena, we will consider the *do*-construction in a particular action environment, namely marked confirmations and disconfirmations. The objective of this section as a whole, then, is to illustrate the precise import that grammatically indexing a contrast can have for how actions are designed and understood by participants in context.

2.4.1 To use, or not to use, the *do*-construction

Extract (12) is taken from an after-hours call to a doctor. Here a wife has called to report that her husband is suddenly experiencing “th'most awful stomach pains, and sickness,” (line 6). From the onset of the problem presentation—and indeed before the problem itself is even presented—this caller paints the picture of her husband as extremely healthy: He has “been perfectly fit for (. ) you know, ages,” (lines 2-3). This stance continues as the participants enter into the history taking phase of the call, with the caller citing that “he is (th'most) regular person.=You know he's never constipated, or anything like that.” (lines 39-40), and confirming the doctor’s “He’s normally quite well.” with the upgraded “Very.” (lines 42-43) (Stivers 2005; Stivers & Hayashi 2010). The turn of interest here—the caller’s lines 47-48—is then produced in the context of these repeated claims as to the husband’s general healthfulness.

(12) Doctor’s Emergency Calls, Tape 2, Side 2, Call 2 (-)

How can I help.

S. Well—(0.3) all of a sudden yesterday evening, having been perfectly fit for (. ) you know, ages, [.hh

[Yes, My husband was taken
ill: (wi') th'most awful stomach pains, and sickness, [Ye:s,

Doc: Does he had any problems in the past, with 'is stomach?

Clr: -No:.

Doc: <Um-or: u[w-

Clr: [(Mean) he is (th'most) regular person.=You know he's never constipated, or anything like [that.

Doc: -No.

Clr: [(Mean) he is (th'most) regular person.=You know he's never constipated, or anything like [that.

Doc: >Yes.< .h He's normally quite well.

Clr: Very.

Doc: Generally.

Clr: (Yeah)/(Ye-es)

Doc: ((sniff)) (No[t ( )-)

Clr: --> [He has- does have uh- slight (. ) he takes some

--> (. ) heart pills. h .h=

Doc: =Right.=

Clr: ==(He's)/(been) taking them for nine years, b't 'e's very

active, it doesn't seem to affect him,

As a whole, lines 47-48 might be best analyzed as related to the practice of ‘repair after next turn’ (Schegloff 1992; see also the following Chapter 3). What we are interested in here, however, is the particular design that the utterance takes, specifically the self-repairs that occur within it.

Taking into consideration the analysis presented in this chapter, the initial repair to include the do-construction—from “He has-” to “does have uh- slight” (line 47)—is perhaps unsurprising: Given the stated-and-agreed-upon status of her husband’s healthfulness across the interaction thus far, the fact that he actually has a heart condition is indeed contrastive. The caller’s repair to include the do-construction constitutes an orientation to the doctor’s in-the-moment understanding of the husband, which has developed over the course of the call, while simultaneously working to amend that understanding. But in this case, such a contrastive amendment would risk undermining the stance that the caller has worked to convey from the onset of the interaction, namely that her husband is normally a perfectly healthy individual. This may also explain the cut-off on the indefinite article “uh-” and the addition of “slight”, as ways of minimizing the health problem that she is about to mention. But this formulation too is abandoned in favor of a completely restarted
TCU that does not include a do-construction and which thus does not grammatically index a contrast with the caller’s repeated prior assertions of her husband’s healthfulness. This new, non-contrastive design is undoubtedly better fitted to the caller’s overall stance, as its grammar no longer risks undermining the work she has done over the previous several turns; and indeed she delivers this as her final, on-record version of the informing. It is also noteworthy that this last self-repair shifts from a formulation that is on its way toward citing a health problem (“He has does have uh- slight” arrhythmia, for instance), to a formulation that references the solution (“He takes some (. ) heart pills”; lines 47-48), thereby avoiding explicit mention of her husband as having a heart condition. Furthermore, following the provision of this information about taking heart medication, the caller continues expressing her positive stance of her husband’s health in her next turn with “b’t ’e’s very active, it doesn’t seem to affect him,” (line 51).

In this case, then, we are provided with an additional sort of evidence of the work that the do-construction does in interaction—from the deviant case of a speaker’s demonstrated avoidance of its use. That is, not using the do-construction when invoking a contrast may serve as a resource for grammatically minimizing the contrastive nature of the utterance, in the same way as using the do-construction can work to actively underscore a turn’s contrastiveness.

2.4.2 Non-sequentially relevant confirmations

One particular sequential environment in which the do-construction is routinely observed is in the context of modified repeats, identified by Stivers (2005) as second-position repetitional utterances that consist of an expanded auxiliary or copula that is prosodically stressed. Stivers analyzes such sequences and argues that “modified repeats work to undermine the first speaker’s default ownership and rights over the claim and instead assert the primacy of the second speaker’s rights to make the statement” (131). This is shown to be the case because second speakers are
providing confirmation in a sequential context where confirmation was not conditionally relevant (see Stivers & Rossano 2010).

An example of the sort of cases Stivers was interested in, taken from the present dataset, is seen in (13) below. Here, after expressing a lack of desire to call her parents later on that evening (data not shown), Iliana positively assesses having been able to talk to Sandra on the phone for so long (lines 1-2/4). In line 4, Iliana makes the claim that having had this opportunity to chat “Rocks.”, which Sandra confirms with an interjection plus the modified repeat “It does ro:ck.” (line 5).

(13) It rocks

01 Ili: ↑↑↑M::: ((excited squeak))
02 But I got you.=hh=’n for such a long time.
03 San: heh=what?= 
04 Ili: -> =Rocks.
05 San: -> .hh [Yea:h. ] i- It does ro:ck.
06 Ili: [>(<)]
07 Ili: .tch=’ow did this happ en to you.

In cases such as this, Stivers argues that the second speaker (here, Sandra) “is doing confirmation by reasserting the claim and underscoring it as an assertion,” thereby working to present herself as “having primary rights to make this claim as evidenced by the redoing of the claim” (137). Stivers’s analysis of the do-construction in this particular sequential environment finds common ground with the position-independent account of the do-construction developed here, as a grammatical resource for indexing contrasts more generally in interaction. Here, Sandra’s use of the do-construction indexes a contrast with Iliana’s implicit claim to have primary rights to positively assess the conversation between the two friends. Indexing this contrast in rights is part of how Sandra accomplishes the affiliative action of this second assessment, using the agency of
the response form to present herself as not simply ‘agreeing just to agree’ (Heritage 2002b; Stivers 2005).  

A similar example is found in case (14) in which Emma is complaining about her husband, Bud, to her sister, Lottie. Emma describes how she and Bud have been disagreeing, with Bud undermining her opinions on various things: “if I DON’T LIKE SOMETHING I’M WRONG” (lines 3-4). In overlap with Lottie’s affiliation with this line of complaining (line 7), Emma provides a specific instance in which she stated her love of the name ‘Cameron’, which Bud apparently tried to dismiss with “oh it's uh'z'z yer DA:D'S NAME.” (line 11). Emma and Lottie then collaboratively reject Bud’s reported claim.

(14) NB:IV:04

01 Emm:  .hh ↑Jis STAY DOWN HERE all week long. Thez no reason a'go
02 bah-.hhh EN if I (stay up'n) I don' like the apar'tment then
03 .hhh it's wrong en ih-if I DON'T LIKE SOMETHING I'M
04 WRONG.
05 (0.2)
06 Emm:  [Yih'know ] .hhhh
07 Lot:  [Ye : a :)h. Yeh yih can' ixpr[ess yer own o]pinion. ]
08 Emm:  -> [I c a n' u]En ah love] the
09 -> NAME CA:M'R*un.
10 (.)
11 Emm:  -> AN'ee siz oh it's uhc'z'z yer DA:D'S NAME. I s'd I ↑love
12 -> the name Cam'r'n weth↑it wz my fā[ther↑'r ]
13 Lot:  -> [Hey we A]WEEZ DID love
14 -> it.
15 Emm:  .h ↑I loved it.
16 Lot:  Ye∶a[h.
17 Emm:  [B't jis cz it's yer DA:D'S name..hh My: ↑God I love
18 the name whether I: ever ↑had a da∶d named Cam'r'n.
19 Lot:  .h SO ↑WHAT IF YIH LOVED IH BIHCUZ IH WZ YER FA:THER.
20 Emm:  °R*i:ght.° So WUT.h.h↑ ((viciously))
21 (0.3)

Bud’s reported speech is presented as having been a claim that Emma only likes the name ‘Cameron’ because it was her father’s name, and by extension, that if it had not been her father’s

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13 Of course, indexing epistemic or experiential primacy can also be used toward disaffiliative ends.
name, she would not like it. In Emma’s account of their discussion, Bud uses this in an attempt to
dismiss her positive assessment of the name as somehow biased and therefore illegitimate. She
begins to quote her own response back to him as “I s’d I love the name Cam’n weth’it wz my father
’r”, undoubtedly going toward “whether it was my father’s name or not”, but she is overlapped by
Lottie’s emphatic “Hey we AWEEZ did love it.” (lines 13-14). Lottie’s do-construction is
deployed here to emphatically support the legitimacy of Emma’s assessment of the name in
question: The turn-initial disjunctive “Hey”, the shift to inclusive “we”, and the adverb “AWEEZ”
combine with the do-construction to disengage Lottie’s agreement “from the taint of being
produced merely ‘in agreement with’ or ‘in conformity with’ the first speaker’s opinion” (Heritage
2002b: 219). Lottie’s second-position utterance thus indexes a contrast with the implicit claim that
knowledge of this assessment (and its account) was something she did not have prior to Emma’s
just telling her, and in making this contrast, she unambiguously takes Emma’s side in the reported
argument with Bud.14

2.4.3 Sequentially relevant confirmations and disconfirmations

Such an analysis of the do-construction can also be expanded to cases where
(dis)confirmation is indeed relevant, such as in response to polar questions. Polar questions not
only make relevant an answer, but they also set the terms for those answers by embodying
presuppositions, conveying an epistemic stance, and incorporating preferences (Heritage 2010;
Heritage & Clayman 2010; cf. Sacks 1987 [1973]). Answerers then have range of resources at
their disposal with which to push back on these terms from second position, including, for example,
repetitions (Heritage & Raymond 2012; Raymond 2003), prefices like Oh (Heritage 1998) and

14 Despite the agreement between the two, there is nonetheless a bit of an epistemic battle across this sequence over
the terms of who is agreeing with whom. This is seen in Emma’s repetitional line 15 (note also the shift back to
the first-person singular “I”), which Lottie then receiptes with a minimal interjection (see Heritage & Raymond
2005; Raymond & Heritage 2006).
Well (Heritage 2015; cf. Schegloff & Lerner 2009; see also Chapter 4), and marked interjections like Of course (Stivers 2011). Here we see that, by establishing a contrast with the terms of the question, the do-construction, as part of an expanded repetitional answer, can perform similar interactional work that resists the question’s design.

In cases (15) and (16), the questioners design their questions with declarative morphosyntax, indexing a shallow epistemic gradient (Heritage 2012b). In addition, through the incorporation of negation, they are tilted toward a no-response. Nonetheless, in each case, the answer is actually affirmative.

(15) Italy

01 Bet: -> How(a)- How are yo:u doing.<Yeh didn:(t)
02 Nan: [n- end up going to Italy: (‘sad’ tone))
03 Nan: [.tch
04 Nan: (0.2)
05 Nan: -> We:ll I di: d go tuh Ita#ly.=
06 Bet: =You DI::I:D!
07 Nan: Yeah. I could[n’t send you: (.) I could]n’t=
08 Bet: [ <W:o: n d e r f u l.> ]
09 Nan: =send you a postcard because I was s:uch an idiot . . .

(16) CD Exchange

01 Lin: -> Yea:::h Waidaminit.=You d(h)on’t l(h)ike hi:m?
02 Jor: -> Wha- I ↑do like him.
03 Lin: (0.2)
04 Lin: -> Because if you don’ like him= I’ll swi[.tch.
05 Jor: -> ↑I ↑do like him!

Each of these questions addresses something clearly in the answerer’s epistemic and experiential domain—in (15), the answerer’s recent travel, and in (16), the answerer’s musical preferences. Thus their being designed declaratively, and in a way that will be disconfirmed, renders them particularly inapposite from the answerers’ perspective. In this sequential context, the use of the do-construction exerts agency beyond a typical (unexpanded) repetitional answer by indexing a
contrast with the terms and constraints established by the questions—especially polarity in the case of disconfirmations such as these.

But the *do*-construction is not only used to resist such strongly *no*-preferring polar questions; it can also be mobilized to push back on a question’s basic presupposition of askability—that is, the presupposition that both *yes* and *no* are conceivable answers (see Stivers 2011). In (17), Margaret’s pre-telling in lines 6/8 presents it as uncertain whether or not her sister, Rachel, is aware that their parents have had an offer to buy their home (see Terasaki 2004 [1976]). The rising intonation of the turn, combined with its ‘my side’ characteristics, solicits confirmation or disconfirmation from Rachel as to ‘her side’ (Heritage 2012a, 2012b; Pomerantz 1980; Stivers & Rossano 2010). Rachel’s *do*-construction response invokes a contrast with the question’s inherent presupposition that she might *not* be aware of this news, thereby confirming that only one answer is possible, and even going on to specifically account for how and why she possesses this knowledge (lines 9-10/11).

(17) Letter from Mummy

01 Mar: I had ah=m .tch letter from mummy #yesterday#:,
02 Rac: ↑Oh: [what‘id she sa:y. ]
03 Mar: [She wrote some kinda] (0.2) interesting stuff.
04 Rac: ↓Oh: real[y],
05 Mar: ↑‘bout Todd—Just a little bi:t.
06 Mar: → .hh[h I’ono if she told you that or no:t=
07 Rac: [Yea:h,=whad—
08 Mar: → =about how they had an offer on their house and stuff?
09 Rac: → **Yea:h.=She did tell me they had an offer.=
10      → =Cuz I called her to talk to her about the— (.)
11 Mar: [Yea:h.
12 Rac: → [↓cost a the ↓plane tickets].

When the *do*-construction occurs in such (dis)confirmation-relevant contexts, a type of agentive, marked (dis)confirmation from second position is produced, just as we saw above in non-confirmation-relevant contexts. I argue that, in addition to diverging from type-conformity (Heritage & Raymond 2012; Raymond 2003; Stivers 2010), such turns accomplish the markedness
of their (dis)confirmation by indexing a contrast with the design of, and terms established by, the first-position utterance.

2.5 DISCUSSION

2.5.1 Marked (Dis)confirmation, Other-Correction, and “Emphasis”

Providing (dis)confirmation with a *do*-construction—either in a context where it has been solicited, or in one where it has not—seems to be a practice that is intimately related to the phenomenon of other-correction (see Jefferson 1987). Turns-at-talk are taken to reveal speakers’ understanding of the interaction thus far, as well as their understandings of their recipient and the world more generally. Thus, as we have seen in a variety of the cases discussed here, when a speaker grammatically orients to that understanding in indexing a contrast with it, such a move constitutes an agentive action that can work to correct the recipient’s previously displayed understanding.

In the specific context of providing marked (dis)confirmation via the *do*-construction, what is at issue are the *terms* set forth by the prior turn, as Heritage and Raymond (2005) and Stivers (2005) have previously observed to be of crucial importance to participants in their studies of related phenomena. I argue that these terms are what the *do*-construction targets and attempts to other-correct through the indexation of a contrast. Although this form of other-correction may be more “embedded” than, for example, the case of a lexical replacement, the phenomenon of correcting some feature of another’s prior talk such that the ‘doing’ of correction does not become the business of the talk—that is, in Jefferson’s words, in a way that is “off the conversational surface” (1987: 100, footnote 4)—remains constant. Conceptualized in this way, we see another set of ways in which ‘error correction’ can be used as an interactional resource (cf. Jefferson 1974,
1987), while simultaneously expanding our understanding of what participants can orient to as ‘errors’.

Furthermore, the present analysis, combined with Stivers’s earlier observation that physicians can use the do-construction to provide confirmation of parents’ candidate diagnoses (2005: 156, footnote 8; see also 2007: 46), sheds light on the “emphasis” or “assertiveness” that the do-construction has been reported to convey (e.g., Kallel 2002; Wilder 2013). The do-construction can be conceptualized as invoking a contrast with the stance (be it implicit or explicit) that the truth value of the do-construction utterance has thus far been, or might otherwise be, conceived of as ambiguous, hypothesized, unknown, or potentially still open for debate. The assertiveness of do-construction is then derived from the speaker’s grammatically indexed contrast with this stance, agentively asserting the truth value of the proposition (cf. Höhle 1992) by confirming that no alternatives are possible.

Consider one final case (18) in which the assertive emphasis of the do-construction is particularly evident. Here, Pat’s house burned down the day prior and Penny is calling to check in on her. In response to Penny’s asking how she is, Pat claims to be feeling “much bettih” in line 15, reasserted as “a LO:T better” in lines 19-20. She then goes on to explain that the reason she is feeling better is due to the fact that all of the family pets have now been found and are safe (data not shown). Following this, she comments that she has not yet seen the damage for herself, so the situation is “more real” for her husband (Brad), who has visited the house twice, than it is for her (lines 42-51). At this point Penny makes a move toward closing the call by saying “.hhh I don't wanna, (0.3) .t .hhh I don' wanna make yih taːlk cuz I don'wanche tuh,”, later completed with “upset yerself’ll ov'r agaiːn,” (lines 52-53/55-56). Patty interdicts this account for call closure with
an overt “mNo”, followed by a repaired do-construction: “I f- I really do feel a lot better.” (line 54).

(18) House burning

09 Pat: Penny?
10 Pen: .khh-HHI[:
11 Pat: [Hi:. How are you. hh [(hh)
12 Pen: [I'm awri:ght that's w't
13 I hhwz gun(h)uh a:sk you:.
14 (0.2)
15 Pat: -> Um, pretty-g-I'm much betti:h this aftihnoo:n.[(th’n) I wa:s=
16 Pen: [ Y e:h, ]
17 Pat: =Yeah.
18 Pen: [Yeah.
19 Pat: -> [I wiz bad (la-st i-) night’n this morning (b't )/(though) I
20 -> feel m- really a LO:T better right now. hhhhh=
21 Pen: =( O/ )/(.hh-) Yea:h,
22 Pat: Yeah.=
23 Pat: =See fir[st of all we thou:ght (=) that one a'th'cats wz=

(19 lines omitted))

32 Pat: Brad's goin' up there now in about en- I d'know
33 en hou:r er soi,
34 Pen: Uh huh.
35 Pat: E::n, hh I don'know, I just I guess I ruh-I really haven' been up there tuh see it=Brad's b'n up there _twice uhready
36 so it's more real fuh (yoU)/(him).
37 Pen: .HH-Yea:h.
38 (0.2)
39 Pat: En it's not tuh you.Sure.(Oka:y.
40 Pat: [(Sure)/(mmmh)
41 Pen: -> .hhh I don't wanna, (0.3) .t .hhh I don' wanna make yih
42 -> ta:lk czu I don'wanche tuh,*
43 (*<->**=1.3)
44 Pat: -> mNo I f-I really do feel a lot [better. I feel like]
45 Pen: *[ upset yerself ] 'll
46 ov'r agai:n,
47 Pat: hhh hi-u-last night I wz- all night, I wz up all night
48 yihknow yih jist c-couldn'T sleep'n th'n:, I slept this
49 morning'n evrything en th'n evr- the sun came ou:t'n hhI
50 started feeling better'n [.hhh
51 Pen: [Yeah.

Here, Penny’s lines 52-53 effectively disregard Pat’s earlier claims to be feeling “a LO:T better” (lines 19-20) by presupposing that continuing to talk will be emotionally difficult for Pat. In response, Pat indexes a contrast with this presupposition to emphatically re-claim that she is indeed feeling better. To do this, she abandons what was presumably going toward “I f(eel a lot better)”
in favor of “I really do feel a lot better.”, a do-construction with the intensifier “really” (line 54). By agentively invoking this contrast through an other-correction of Penny’s understanding, Pat emphasizes her original claim in the context of it being disattended to, thereby reasserting rights over her own feelings. Note that Penny does not bring her initial utterance to completion for a full 1.3 seconds, during which time Pat produces her “mNo I f-I really do feel a lot” in the clear. Following this launch of response by Pat, the end of Penny’s turn is then designed such that it now actively attends to Pat’s emphatic claim to be feeling better at the present moment in time: “…upset yerself ’ll ov'r again,” (lines 55-56).

Such an analysis of the do-construction broadens our understanding of its purported emphasis and assertiveness, which we have seen is not limited to complete 180-degree contradictions or “polarity emphasis” (Breithbarth, De Clercq & Haegeman 2013), but can also index other sorts of contrasts as well (see also Chapter 3). Investigation of this phenomenon thereby allows us to ground our analytic conceptualization of emphasis in the perspectives and practices of participants themselves—that is, through the analysis of grammar as it is produced in naturally occurring interaction.

2.5.2 Related Contrastive Resources in English

Taking English as an example, the ability to index a contrast appears to be an important feature of grammar. Here I have focused specifically on the do-construction, which I argue accomplishes this work through markedness at the morphosyntactic and prosodic levels. As we have seen, the do-construction is a pervasive grammatical construction that can index a contrast in a range of sequential positions and in pursuit of a variety of ultimate interactional objectives.

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15 This may also work to counteract the interpretation that Pat is rejecting Penny’s offer to bring the call to a close merely as a socially preferable action.
Yet this is not the only resource that English grammar provides its speakers for indexing contrasts. In addition to *do*, Stivers (2005) illustrates how other copulas and auxiliaries can be expanded and stressed to assert primary rights from second position (e.g., “It would be hard tuh-tuh bike (. ) up on your hill.” responded to with “Well it would be.”, pp. 141; or “‘n the children’re lovely.” responded to with “↑Oh yes.=They ↑are lovely::”; pp. 144). The above analysis of the *do*-construction cases in modified repeats—as indexing a contrast with the first speaker’s implicit claim to rights—can clearly be extended to these other copulas where *do* is grammatically not an option due to the presence of another auxiliary or copula (e.g., *will*, *would*, *could*, *be*, etc.).

In addition to the morphosyntactic and prosodic levels, various lexical items have been argued to invoke contrasts. Most notably, Clift (2001) investigates the use of the syntactically flexible particle *actually* as (at its most general) a marker of contrast and revision. In the case of TCU-final *actually* in informings, for instance, speakers “[propos[e] a contrast between what they claim and a prior claim made, or thereby understood to have been made, by another party” (265). Similar arguments might be made for other lexical indexes of contrast, such as contrastive conjunctions like *but* and *though* (see Mazeland & Huiskes 2001 on Dutch *maar* ‘but’; see also case (9) above).

Although it is noteworthy that none of the 47 cases of *actually* reproduced in Clift (2001) include a *do*-construction, the two resources can indeed co-occur (e.g., “Actually she does have an ear infection”; Stivers 2002: 328, footnote 16). In the present corpus of *do*-constructions, *actually* occurs in only one instance, combined also with contrastive *but*: “But I mean the fact that he- he *actually did* get an academic position, that- that’s ah-”, which, although abandoned, is undoubtedly on its way to asserting just how incredible and unexpected it is that one would be able to get a job in academia, as the rest of the sequence makes clear. This suggests that speakers may ‘stack’
various contrastive markers available in the grammar—prosodic, morphosyntactic, and lexical—to index either a contrast that is designed to be more contrastive, or perhaps a contrast that is of a specific ‘sort’. The deployment of such resources constitutes an example of what Clift (2001: 265) calls “performed intersubjectivity”, which is supported by the present analysis of the do-construction, and which future research will continue to disentangle (see also Edwards 1999: 138).

Research in cognitive psychology may provide additional corroborating evidence for these claims from an independent theoretical framework. It has been shown that speakers are more likely to syntactically reduce phrases that are less information-dense (Jaeger 2010; Levy & Jaeger 2007): For example, the decision to include or not include the complementizer or relativizer that in utterance such as My boss thinks (that) I am absolutely crazy, or This is the friend (that) I told you about, respectively (see also Fox & Thompson 2007; Thompson 2002; Thompson & Mulac 1991). Jaeger’s (2010) model, based on spontaneous speech,

correctly predicts that speakers should prefer to produce complementizer that whenever the complement clause onset would otherwise carry too much information, because inserting the complementizer spreads part of the information that would otherwise be carried by the complement clause onset over more words and hence over more linguistic signal. More generally, speakers should show a preference to produce optional linguistic forms whenever this reduces the information density of upcoming (or possibly even past) material that would otherwise have high information density (53-54).

Given that, from a cognitive processing perspective, contrastive informational content is likely more information-dense than non-contrastive informational content, it follows that non-reduced or ‘marked’ syntactic formulations—such as a do-construction and/or a particle like actually—may be more preferable in terms of both the production and successful comprehension of contrastive utterances. We thus may have an account for why these particular sorts of grammatical structures have developed to be used for these particular communicative aims in human social interaction.
2.6 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has argued that the core meaning of the do-construction is to index a contrast with a prior understanding. As the examples analyzed here have illustrated, such contrasts can occur very locally (e.g., in instances of same-turn self-repair), or they can occur at a greater distance (e.g., with respect some prior turn). In addition, the contrast can be with an understanding that has been overtly stated (e.g., through a prior assertion), or which has been conveyed through more tacit means (e.g., through the design of a prior utterance). Nonetheless, what holds constant across these cases is that the speaker designs his/her turn such that it displays an orientation to the contrastive nature of its content.

The analysis also posited that indexing certain kinds of contrasts may be understood in context as a form of embedded other-correction, thereby expanding our conceptualization of the sorts of things participants seek to ‘correct’ through the deployment of grammatical resources in interaction. In this view, concepts such as ‘assertiveness’, ‘agency’, and ‘emphasis’ are reconceptualized as more concrete, identifiable “members’ resources” (Garfinkel 1967), which are enacted grammatically in the collaborative construction of talk-in-interaction. In sum, then, the specific construction analyzed here provides a case study in how inextricably linked grammar is, not only to participants’ goals for action, but also to the specific terms of those actions within sequences of naturally occurring talk.
3 On the Accountability of Commonsense Inferences: Updating Intersubjectivity with the *Do*-Construction

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Intersubjectivity—shared understanding between social actors—is a primary concern for co-participants engaging in interaction (see, e.g., Clark 1996; Garfinkel 1962, 1963, 1967; Heritage 1984a, 1984b, 2005, 2007; Schegloff 1991a, 1992; Schütz 1962): Naturally, speakers and hearers want both to *understand*, as well as to *be understood by*, one another. The trouble is, however, that interlocutors of course do not have firsthand access to each others’ minds; and so our so-called ‘shared’ understanding of each other and of the world is unavoidably imperfect (Schütz 1962, 1967 [1932]). Nonetheless, the level of intersubjectivity that we do have with one another is, as Garfinkel (1967: 8) describes it, “adequate-for-all-practical-purposes” or “good enough”.

One question that naturally arises from this observation is the following: How is it that co-participants in interaction actually *achieve* this “adequate” level of intersubjectivity with one another, such that they can successfully inhabit—and sustain (Pollner 1975, 1987)—a common perception of reality in which to conduct social life? That is, how is it that “the very possibility of a world known in common, that transcends the views of individual actors” (Hayashi, Raymond & Sidnell 2013: 29) is transformed from a mere possibility into an accomplished reality in moment-by-moment social interaction?
According to Heritage and Atkinson (1984), “it is through [the] turn-by-turn character of talk that the participants display their understandings of the state of talk for one another” (11). This is because each new turn proposes a “local, here-and-now ‘definition of the situation’ to which subsequent talk will be oriented” (Heritage 1984b: 256), and thus sequences of actions provide participants with a “proof procedure” (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974: 729) for the establishment, maintenance, and correction of understanding. In other words, it is the moment-by-moment collaborative production of talk which constitutes the means “through which a context of publically displayed and continuously updated intersubjective understanding is systematically sustained” (Heritage & Atkinson 1984: 11, my emphasis; Schegloff 1992). It is precisely this issue of continuously “updating” intersubjectivity with which the present chapter is concerned.

In analyzing a collection of 237 instances of what I have termed the ‘do-construction’ in English conversation (i.e., *The kids do eat cake*; cf. *The kids eat cake*), an interesting repair-like practice emerged. In this subset of cases, the contrast indexed through use of the *do*-construction (see Chapter 2) is not with the content proper of a prior utterance or sequence of utterances, but rather with a *potential implication thereof*. That is, this grammatical construction is routinely mobilized to index contrasts not only with explicit or otherwise demonstrated understandings (as we saw in much of the previous chapter), but also with *possible* ambiguities and *potential* misapprehensions that might be gleaned from prior talk. Through the use of the *do*-construction in such contexts, speakers can be seen to be actively holding themselves accountable for the commonsense inferences (Garfinkel 1967; Schütz 1962) that prior talk may have generated, while simultaneously working to refine and shore up the ‘shared understanding’ being developed with their hearers. This particular turn design thus offers us a case study in how grammar, specifically,

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1 The issue of ‘classic’ cases of repair (e.g., Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977) vs. “repair-like” operations (e.g., Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson 2005) will be taken up in the Discussion section.
can be deployed in turn-by-turn talk in the service of achieving an “updated intersubjective understanding” with recipients.

In what follows, I begin by reviewing just a handful of the mechanics involved in repair (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977), in an effort to illustrate some of the ways in which intersubjectivity can be collaboratively produced, managed, and maintained in turn-by-turn talk. I then briefly review the specific grammatical construction under analysis here: the *do*-construction in English conversation. The majority of the chapter is then dedicated to the examination of examples of the *do*-construction in episodes of naturally occurring conversation, focusing on what this particular resource can tell us about the relationship between grammar, intersubjectivity, and repair. I conclude with a discussion of where and how this particular practice fits in with other operations that exist in what Schegloff (1982: 91) has referred to as “the organizational domain of repair”, as well as comment on the relationship of such operations to accountability, commonsensicality, and normativity in interaction.

3.2 INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND REPAIR

One window into the ways in which interactants collaboratively achieve intersubjectivity in interaction is through examination of moments where intersubjectivity breaks down. Such moments are routinely addressed through the mechanics of repair, used to fix problems of hearing, speaking, or understanding (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977). For example, when a turn-at-talk is produced, a recipient can initiate repair to overtly indicate that s/he has not heard or

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2 Audio of some of the cases examined here is publically available via TalkBank (MacWhinney 2007).

3 The domain of repair is far more extensive than can be reviewed in a single section. For more comprehensive overviews (of various different sorts) of repair, see, for example: Dingemanse and Enfield (2015), Fox, et al. (2009); Hayashi, Raymond, and Sidnell (eds.) (2013), Kitzinger (2013), and Schegloff (1979, 1987, 1991a, 2000, frth.).
understood what was said. This is seen in Excerpt (1) below in which Jenny informs Ida that her (Jenny’s) son David is home.

(1) [Rah:2:7] [Standardized Orthography]

01 Jen:  David's h0:me?
02             (0.5)
03 Ida:  -- You:r ↑David.
04 Jen:  [Yes m]m
05 Ida:  [Oh:].
06             (.)
07 Ida:  An'- is he a↑ri:ght?=
08 Jen:  =Oh ee z fi:ne 'ee: .hh . .

Here, Ida initiates repair on Jenny’s reference to David with “You:r ↑David.” in line 3. The offer of a candidate understanding, produced with period intonation, engenders a relatively flat epistemic gradient (Heritage 2012b) in requesting confirmation of this understanding. Following Jenny’s confirmation in line 4, the sequence is closed with Ida’s change-of-state token “Oh:.” (Heritage 1984a). Thus here the interactants experienced a momentary hitch in intersubjectivity concerning a reference, and the mechanics of repair provided a means to quickly resolve this hitch and reengage the progressivity of the talk.

It is noteworthy that both speakers and hearers can be seen to orient to the ‘size’ of an intersubjective lapse (Dingemanse & Enfield 2015; Dingemanse, et al. 2015; Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977). In the above case, Ida’s production of a candidate understanding (“You:r ↑David.”) reveals that she did in fact hear and understand the prior turn correctly, and so Jenny is able to provide simply an interjection answer in the next turn. One level less “specific”—in terms of “the amount of information they contain about the communicative trouble and the possible solution” (Dingemanse, et al. 2015: 5)—from the provision of candidate hearings are class-specific instances of repair. In the Spanish example (2) below, a husband interdicts his wife’s telling to initiate such a repair in line 3.
In line 1, the wife announces that three family friends are traveling to Mexico. Her husband then initiates repair in line 3 with the class-specific adónde (‘to where’) left in an in-situ position, repeating the syntactic structure from his interlocutor’s line 1. This tells his interlocutor that it was only the place name within the prepositional phrase that was problematic for him, the tacit claim being that there was no issue with hearing or understanding who was going on the trip, for example, or the fact that what they were doing was ‘going’. And indeed, in the repair solution, his wife does not repeat her entire turn from line 1, but rather just the prepositional phrase, stressing the place name: A México (‘to Mexico.’; line 4). Thus the format of the initiation of repair displays not only what was not understood from the trouble-source turn, but also what was understood; and providers of repair solutions can calibrate their repair solutions taking into consideration this precise level of understanding.

Of course it follows that some other-initiations of repair claim a complete lack of hearing or understanding of the prior turn. This is seen in cases of ‘open’-class repair (Drew 1997), such as in (3) when Gordon produces “Pod’n?” in response to Eve’s asking “W’t time then.” (lines 6-7).
In this case, contrary to the prior two examples, Gordon’s “Pod’n?” in line 7 betrays no understanding of the prior turn, offering neither a candidate hearing nor a class-specific question form. In response, then, Eve reproduces all of the informational content from her prior utterance (line 9), as opposed to just a single item from within it. Such an initiation of repair is thus an effective means of “getting ‘the same thing’ said” again (Schegloff 2004: 95). It is therefore evident, in how other-repair is both initiated and resolved, that participants orient to just how much of an intersubjective lapse has emerged in the talk. And indeed, recent research (Dingemanse & Enfield 2015; Dingemanse, et al. 2015) has shown that these repair mechanisms—and even some of the linguistic formats used to implement them (Dingemanse, Blythe & Dirksmeyer 2014; Enfield, et al. 2013)—appear to be quite universal cross-linguistically and cross-culturally.

Of particular relevance to the phenomenon under investigation in the present study, as we will see, is a specific location of repair, called ‘repair after next turn’ (Schegloff 1992). Such cases illustrate how a second turn reveals its speaker’s interpretation of the first turn, after which the speaker of the first turn can repair that interpretation in third position. Consider example (4) in which the press relations officer in a Civil Defense headquarters is asking the chief engineer for information to be distributed to the media.

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4 The turn-final “then”, however, is omitted. See Schegloff (2004) on the dispensability of such items.
(4) [Schegloff 1992: 1303]

01 Anne: Which ones are closed, an' which ones are open.
02 Zack: Most of 'em. This, this, [this, this ((pointing))]
03 Anne: -> [I don't mean on the shelters,]
04 Anne: -> I mean on the roads.
05 Zack: Oh!

Here, through his answer turn in line 2, Zack reveals his understanding of Anne’s question from line 1, an understanding that turns out to be incorrect. In response to this, in third position, Anne then corrects Zack’s misunderstanding of her first-position utterance: “I don’t mean on the shelters, I mean on the roads” (lines 3-4). This is then receipted with the change-of-state token “Oh!” in line 5.

Schegloff (1992) argues that, in instances of repair after next turn, the loss of intersubjectivity is detected and “set aright by realigning and meshing the parties’ understandings and immediately embodying them in a succession of actions that, in effect, replaces an earlier succession and that resumes the interaction’s course of action” (1325). It is in this sense that repair after next turn constitutes the “last structurally provided defense of intersubjectivity in conversation” because, after third and fourth position, “there is no systematic provision for catching divergent understanding” (1325).

3.3 THE DO-CONSTRUCTION AS INDEXING A CONTRAST

Before looking at how the specific construction under investigation here relates to some of the mechanisms of repair, as just described, let us reintroduce the construction itself.

In the previous chapter, I argued that the do-construction in English, by way of its morphosyntactic and prosodic markedness (see Levinson 2000), serves to index a contrast with a prior understanding of a given state of affairs. This can be done in a variety of sequential positions, and in conjunction with a range of social actions; but across this diversity of cases, the do-construction maintains its core meaning as an indexation of a contrast.
Consider example (5). Here, in launching a telling, Dan produces a B-event statement in lines 6-7 (Labov & Fanshel 1977: 100). This turn solicits confirmation from Bob that he was aware that a mutual friend (“Count”, nicknamed “Conti”) had visited Dan last year (Heritage 2012a, 2012b). Bob provides confirmation with “Yea:h,” before immediately expanding to explain that he hasn’t spoken to him. In the midst of this expansion, however, Bob initiates self-repair to correct that he “dijd”, in fact, talk to him. The repaired TCU is built with a do-construction.

(5) Count’s visit

01 Bob: So your chops are u:p.
02 Dan: We’ll no.=They’re not u:p.=
03 =But I’m playing.=It’s: I just it’s v:ery hard
04 to get my chops back in form.=
05 =but I’m gonna try,=I’ll tell ya what’s ha:ppening.
06 .h:hh Ah:: F:Irst of all you kne:w that
07 we had Conti here last year,
08 Bob: -> .h:hh (.) [Yea:h.=but I haven’t- talked to hi=–
09 Dan: | or-
10 Bob: -> =Yes I did talk to Count,=yeah. (.) [Mhm
11 Dan: | Whad’e say.

In this case, the informational content of the repair solution is plainly contrastive with that of the trouble source—i.e., talking to Count vs. not talking to Count. Bob orients to and indexes the contrastive nature of this repaired content grammatically through the use of a do-construction. Building the repaired TCU with a do-construction thus facilitates the maintenance of intersubjectivity at a moment where it might otherwise be in jeopardy.

Another example, this time from outside the context of self-repair, is seen in excerpt (6). Here, Nancy designs her question in lines 1-2 with declarative morphosyntax, thereby indexing a shallow epistemic gradient (Heritage 2012b), as well as with negative polarity which prefers a negative response. This combination reveals Beth’s understanding of Nancy’s vacation experience as not including a trip to Italy, which is produced with a prosodic contour that might best be glossed as sad. This understanding of Nancy’s state of affairs, however, turns out to be incorrect.
Following a pause, Nancy disconfirms Beth’s question with a *well*-prefaced (Heritage 2015) repetitional answer that is built with a *do*-construction. While an unexpanded repetition would have asserted Nancy’s primary epistemic and experiential rights over this information from second position (Heritage & Raymond 2012), it was argued in Chapter 2 that the deployment of the *do*-construction exerts additional agency by indexing a contrast with the terms and constraints established by the question, thereby providing a genre of additionally marked confirmation or disconfirmation in such sequential contexts.

While the sequential position, accompanying action, and specific target of the *do*-construction vary, what binds the diversity of *do*-constructions together is their use to introduce new content into the interaction in a way that actively orients to a contrastive, in-the-moment understanding.

### 3.4 UPDATING INTERSUBJECTIVITY WITH THE *DO*-CONSTRUCTION

The overview in Chapter 2 focused primarily on *do*-constructions that indexed contrasts with overtly claimed or otherwise demonstrated understandings, as seen in the two examples in the previous section. In this chapter, we will consider a specific subset of cases in which a contrast is not established with the specific content of, for example, a prior turn-at-talk, or a misunderstanding which a prior turn-at-talk has revealed, but rather a *possible* implication or a *possible* misunderstanding that might in principle arise from prior talk. That is, speakers routinely
use the *do*-construction as a ‘repair-like’ practice (Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson 2005) to address potential ambiguities or misapprehensions that their recipients may have gleaned from prior talk. As we will see, the examples that follow are intimately related to Schegloff’s ‘repairs after next turn’, described above, but the cases discussed below are distinct in that they are not part of “a succession of actions that, in effect, replaces an earlier succession” (Schegloff 1992: 1325). Rather, I aim to show that the *do*-construction works to “update” (Heritage & Atkinson 1984: 11) the recipient’s understanding by specifying a particular understanding over other possible, commonsensical (Garfinkel 1962, 1967; Schütz 1962), contrastive interpretations, thereby achieving a more precise state of intersubjectivity between the interlocutors without actually retracting something that was done prior. In this way, speakers can be seen to actively work to ‘lock in’ their interlocutors’ understanding to precisely how they want the situation being described to be understood. That interactants routinely fix possible ambiguities and potential misapprehensions—in addition to the more overt interactional problems described in much of Chapter 2 and in previous research on repair—further expands our understanding of the collaborative achievement of intersubjectivity in interaction, as well as our conceptualization of the sorts of accountability to which speakers hold themselves in moment-by-moment talk.

Consider case (7) in which Cindy is talking to Don, who is on a trip. In the context of discussing Don’s potential plans to go mountain biking, Don characterizes a bike as “not a mountain bike” (line 21), to which he adds “anyway” in the repaired formulation (line 23). Cindy responds by citing Don’s letters as evidence to provide a negative assessment of the bike in lines 24-25/27, which receives interjacent laughter from Don in line 26. It is in this environment that Don adds “Did go up a mountain on it” in line 28, with the *do*-construction preserved in the
repaired version following Cindy’s ‘open’-class repair initiation “Huh?”: “I did go up a mountain,” (line 31).

(7) Mountain bike

01 Cin: But yer gonna go mountain biking?
02 (0.5)
03 Don: Maybe.
04 Cin: That would be fun.
05 Don: [(                    )]
06 Cin: [Does he have a mountain] bike for you_
07 (0.3)
08 Don: "Yeah." oo
09 Cin: Does he?
10 (.)
11 Don: W’ll:: apparently: cuz he offered.=
12 Cin: =Cuz he offered.=yeah. >An he-< I would imagine
13 that he would know that you’re not traveling around
14 with your bicycle. .h[hh
15 Don: [Right.=
16 Cin: =And that you don’t get to keep the-yours as a souvenir.
17 (0.3)
18 Don: "Right."
19 Cin: Or anything [fun like that.
20 Don: --> [It’s not a mountain bike. Hah [hah hah
21 Cin: [Huh?
22 Don: --> It’s not a mountain bike anyway.
23 Cin: No. An- ye- in: some a yer letters
24 it sounds like yeh wouldn’t (. ) really wanna
25 Don: heh heh [heh
26 Cin: [keep it rea#lly: # (just [a:- )
27 Don: --> [Did go up a mountain on it.
28 Don: [but-
29 Cin: [Huh?
30 Don: -- > I did go up a mountain,
31 Cin: .hhh [well not on it.==with it.
32 Cin: [Oh.
33 Don: Pushing it.=heh heh
34 Cin: D’you have legs of steel?
35 (0.5)
36 Don: No.==I have knees of pain.
37 Cin: You have kne(h)es of p(h)a(h)i(h)n=heh heh

Upon production of “It’s not a mountain bike.” (line 21), various commonsensical inferences can be made in the mind of the hearer, one of which is that, because the bike in question is not a mountain bike, it has likely not been used to go up mountains. What the subsequent do-construction does, then, is target that specific inference and index a contrast with it, as depicted in the simplified schematic in Figure 3.1.
Don: “It’s not a mountain bike.”

Cin: This bike’s tires are probably narrower than those of a mountain bike.  
This bike’s tires probably don’t have lugs for traction.  
This bike probably has no rear suspension.  
This bike probably has a lightweight (e.g. aluminum) frame.  
This bike probably has dropped/curled handlebars  
This bike has probably not been used on mountains.  
Etc.

Don: “Did go up a mountain on it.”

**FIGURE 3.1: Schematic of Excerpt (7)**

The *do*-construction in line 28, as well as the repaired version in line 31, are plainly designed to be understood as contrastive with lines 21 and 23. Indeed, the lack of an overt “I” subject in the first version of the turn (line 28) constitutes an attempt to establish continuity with and resume the prior assertion (Oh 2005, 2006). Note, though, that there has not been an overt claim that Don did not use the bike to go up a mountain; and thus the contrast indexed here is not a move to diametrically oppose the content of those prior turns (cf. case (5) above: I haven’t talked to Count → Yes I did talk to Count). Nonetheless, Don’s use of the *do*-construction reveals his orientation to what Cindy might take lines 21 and 23 to mean, namely that because the bike in question is not a mountain bike, he has not used it on a mountain. But such an understanding, if adopted by Cindy and allowed to stand, would be a misapprehension of the situation from Don’s perspective. He therefore amends—but does not “replace” (Schegloff 1992: 1325)—the
description of his experience with the bike, producing a turn that grammatically indexes a contrast by way of the *do*-construction. That is, the original description of the bike in question as “not a mountain bike” still stands—it is still *not* a mountain bike. Nonetheless, one of the inferences that might have been commonsensically drawn from such a description has been modified through the *do*-construction turn. The *do*-construction thus reveals Don’s orientation to his recipient’s presumed here-and-now understanding based on the prior utterance, while simultaneously “updating” that understanding. The turn is ultimately receipted with “Oh.” (line 33), indicating that the turn was informative, and hence that this information was indeed new and unexpected for the recipient. This is then followed by overt topicalization of what the use of a non-mountain bike to go up a mountain would entail, in the form of a joking sequence (lines 35-38, and beyond the data shown here).

There are two further points to draw out from this example (and the others like it to follow). First, and perhaps most obviously given previous research on repair and repair-like formulations, it is noteworthy that the adjustment of this inference was *important enough* for this speaker that he deployed a turn-at-talk to address it. Across the present collection, *do*-construction speakers may contribute to a variety of interactional aims through their mobilization of this resource, including what often appears to be a basic issue of intersubjective accuracy—that is, ‘getting the record straight’. Moreover, following their production, *do*-construction turns can be taken up by recipients in a variety of unforeseeable ways (in the specific case (7) above, it turns into a joking sequence), and/or themselves be subsequently repaired as the sequence progresses (lines 32/34). Nonetheless, as with all cases of repair, even when the precise import of the repair is not completely discernible to us as analysts, it was nonetheless deemed relevant by the speaker at that moment in the interaction.
Second, such *do*-construction turns provide us with profound insight into what a speaker *thinks a hearer is thinking*. This is because, as described above, this subset of *do*-constructions does not index a contrast with something that has been overtly stated or publically demonstrated, but rather with something that *might be inferred* from prior talk. Moreover, these are not simply analysts’ invented inferences. On the contrary, a speaker’s use of the *do*-construction demonstrates that—from the participants’ perspective—an inference to the contrary is commonsensical (in the sense of Schütz and Garfinkel) and therefore likely at this moment in the ongoing talk. The use of the construction reveals speakers to be holding themselves accountable for these inferences that are presumed to have been generated in the mind of the hearer, by endeavoring to adjust them. That is, this new information is *produced as* an ‘update’ in that it is *grammatically fitted* to the recipient’s in-the-moment, *presumed-to-be-inferred* understanding, as part of an effort to *amend* that understanding and thereby increase the level of intersubjectivity with the recipient. Thus here we are provided with a concrete, grammatical index of the achievement of socially shared cognition in interaction (see, e.g., Heritage 2005; Schegloff 1991a).

With this analysis in mind, let us consider some additional examples of this sort of intersubjective updating. In case (8), Caroline describes to Denise how the shortness of her vacation in Milwaukee prevented her from visiting a family that the two have been discussing. She states this in line 5, and then restates it in line 7 as “I didn’t ev’n have a chance to see th’m.”. The upgrade to include the negative polarity item “ev’n” reinforces the speaker’s claim by depicting “seeing” the family as a minimal or basic form of interaction with them—and even *that* was not possible. In the next TCU, latched to the prior, Caroline produces a *do*-construction which works to address a potential misapprehension that might be gleaned from these prior claims.
(8) See vs. call

01 Car: My summer vacation,
02 (0.3) tch .hh (.) uhm (.) tch=was so short.
03 in Milwauke(h)e.
04 Den: [Mmhm]
05 Car: -> That I missed (.) seeing that family.
06 Den: Oh[:]. Mmhm, [mhm, _
07 Car: -> [.hh ] I didn’t even have a chance to see th’m.=
08 Car: -> I did call Terry and talk to her fer: Just a short time,= .hhh
09 Den: [“Uh “huh”
10 Car: [But there was no: way, (.) of getting: uhm to see her,
11 Den: Uh huh,

Caroline’s informings about having had a short vacation, and as a result having been unable “even” to “see” the family in question, might be understood by Denise as implying a lack of communication altogether with the family. To safeguard against this potential inapposite inference, the latched *do*-construction works to ‘lock in’ the correct interpretation for the interlocutor by orienting to its likely contrastive nature given her prior turns: “I did call Terry and talk to her fer: Just a short time,” (line 8). In this case, and many others, latching the *do*-construction TCU in this way reflects the preference for same-turn self-repair (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977) in that the speaker ‘hurries’ to remedy the potential hitch in intersubjectivity before it can deflect the informing. The additional contrastive stress in this case on the verb “call” also works to contrast this activity with the prior-stated activity of seeing. Thus, just as in the mountain bike case, here the *do*-construction does not replace the prior assertion—Caroline still did not see the family in question (cf. line 10)—, but rather the turn adjusts precisely how that assertion is to be understood. Crucially, Caroline’s use of the marked construction to do this reveals what she believes to likely be one of Denise’s inferences, based on her (Caroline’s) line 7. She specifies a particular understanding in the mind of the interlocutor to the exclusion of this other possible interpretation, thereby “updating” the level of intersubjectivity between the participants.
Prior to case (9) below, Richard has expressed interest in the study-abroad language program of which Marissa is the assistant director. This almost interview-style (Button 1992) phone call finds him asking Marissa for various details about the program and its design, many of which he can be heard to be writing down. Here, he inquires about the program’s duration, and Marissa provides an extended response, explaining that the program is designed to last for four weeks (line 2), but that it is flexible enough to accommodate students who come on a week-by-week basis (lines 3-4).

(9) Study abroad

01 Rich: How long is e- is the program.
02 Mari: .hhh It’s designed to last four weeks,
03 bu::t Students can come by the _week._=
04 =if They wish.=we advise
05 .hh if they do come by the week,
06 that they try to come at the beginning of >the session<
07 so they don’t have instructional ga:ps.
08 .hh >y’know< when#: For example if the class
09 is going on three weeks an’ then we suddenly
10 have a student arrive,
11 .hhh the en::d of the second or third week,
12 (. ) it can be:: (0.2) a little bit difficult
13 and that student will (0.2) enter into a class
14 that’s been in session already two or three weeks.
15 -> .hhh uh:m _We frequently though (. ) do have students
16 -> who don’t arrive at the beginning,
17 because their: (. ) their schedules don’t allo:w them
18 to have (. ) ya know.=conformity to our- our schedule,
19 .hhh A:nd they– they do it.

The first do-construction in this response—“if they do come by the week,” (line 5)—indexes a contrast with the just-prior description of the program’s normative four-week schedule, as seen in some of the cases in Chapter 2. It is the second do-construction—“We frequently though (. ) do have students who don’t arrive at the beginning,” (lines 15-16)—that is of interest to our discussion here. This turn is not contrastive with any explicit prior claim that most students arrive at the beginning of a session. Nonetheless, given Marissa’s description of the staff’s active advice to arrive at the beginning of a session (lines 4-7), as well as her description of the downsides
associated with arriving late (lines 8-14), Richard may infer that student arrivals at times other than at the beginning of a session are interdicted or otherwise a rare occurrence. Marissa counters this potential inference through the *do*-construction, combined here with the contrastive “though” as well. Again, as seen in the prior cases, the previously asserted staff advice and downsides of arriving to a session late still stand and are not retracted by the *do*-construction. Rather, the contrast invoked by the *do*-construction turn addresses a potential misapprehension that the recipient may have developed based on the talk thus far.⁵

Consider another example in (10) below. Here Miriam and Adam are discussing Miriam’s upcoming trip to Germany to attend a wedding. Adam currently resides in Germany, and Miriam has family and friends who live there as well, so she is describing where she will be going, whom she will be seeing, and so on, during her trip. Prior to this excerpt, Miriam has only made reference to “my relatives in Bonn”, without any specification as to which relatives these are. In lines 1-5/7 below, she re-indexes this reference with “those relatives”, now eliding the specifics of their location with an *or*-prefaced repair that minimizes the reparative nature of the correction to cast Bonn as an essentially correct place reference formulation (Lerner & Kitzinger 2015): “Bonn: er (. ) wherever my- (0.5) those relatives are.” (line 3). She subsequently revises this place reference in lines 12/14-16/18 with an *actually* formulation (Clift 2001): “They’ve actually mo:ved,=They don’t live in Bonn now they live in:, (0.3) uh::m (. ) Ba:d Neuenahr⁶::”, the “now” serving to pivot between where the family members don’t live and where they do live (Clayman & Raymond 2015).

⁵ In addition, this example illustrates that use of the *do*-construction in the context described here is not restricted solely to cases where overt negation is present in the turn that the *do*-construction turn is targeting (as it was in examples (7) and (8)). See also case (11) below.

⁶ Bad Neuenahr is about a 30-minute drive from Bonn.
The target utterance is Miriam’s later “.hh An’ then my cousin:, She still does live in Bonn.” (lines 21-22).

(10) Bonn

01 Mir: An’ we could see each other:,  
02 -> and then I’ll go Monday:, .hhh do:wn to:,=hh  
03 -> Bonn: er (.) wherever my- (0.5) those relatives are.=  
04 =cuz I haven’t seen my uncle:,  
05 in like three or four ye:ars.=an’ he’s just=  
06 Ada: =[Uh huh,  
07 Mir: =[turning _eighty. h[hh An’ I liked him a lot.  
08 Ada: [In Bad Münstereifel.  
09 Mir: .hhhh Yeah th- I- they’ll- I guess it’ll be summer  
10 so’th’ll be in Bad Münstereifel.  
11 (..)  
12 Mir: -> They’ve actually mo:ved,=  
13 Ada: [mmhm,  
14 Mir: -> =They don’t live in Bonn now they live in:,  
15 -> (0.3) uh::m (.) Ba:d Neuenahr:::  
16 which is [I guess  
17 Ada: [Bad Neuenahr,=yeah,  
18 Mir: -> Yeah=just a little bit #down.#  
19 -> But I[: ] I think they’ll be in Münstereifel?  
20 Ada: [Right,]  
21 Mir: -> .hh An’ then my cousin:,  
22 -> She still does live in Bonn,=so I’ll, (.)  
23 get to see her,  
24 Then I’ll zi[p off to Berlin.=hhh  
25 Ada: [m-  
26 Ada: Mmmhm,  
27 Mir: .hhh to:=hh go to this wedding an’ . . .

In lines 9-12/14-16, Miriam states that some unspecified “they”s—a locally subsequent reference form for “those relatives” (line 3)—no longer live in Bonn. The living situation of her cousin, however, contrasts with that of these other family members. Orienting to the potential scalar implicatures involved in the understanding of her assertions thus far, Miriam works to disaggregate her cousin from the others, syntactically fronting “my cousin,” in its own intonational phrase and with an accented first syllable, and subsequently mobilizing a do-construction: “She still does live in Bonn.”. Here, then, while Miriam never explicitly mentioned her cousin’s whereabouts and thus is not invoking a contrast with an overt prior statement to that effect, she nonetheless reveals what she takes to be Adam’s possible understanding of her family’s location based on the talk thus far,
addressing this potential ambiguity by updating Adam’s understanding. As in the prior cases, the earlier assertion—in this case, that some members of Miriam’s family no longer live in Bonn—is still true. That is, that content is not oriented to as a trouble source that must be ‘retracted’ or ‘replaced’ by a do-construction turn. Rather the contrast indexed by the do-construction works to lock in a particular understanding in the mind of the recipient, with the delivery of this new information about the cousin grammatically packaged such that it displays an orientation to the interlocutor’s presumed in-the-moment understanding of the family members’ living situation given the talk thus far.

One final case is seen in (11), in which Mary is seeking advice from Alan as to what to give a mutual friend for his birthday. Prior to this segment, Mary has proposed giving him a plant, which Alan has repeatedly and noticeably not endorsed. We enter the interaction at the end of a collaboratively constructed joking sequence in which Mary aligns with Alan’s opinion that a plant would be a ridiculous gift by citing the example of giving him a “Wandering Jew” (a particular sort of plant). Mary uses direct reported speech to enact the friend’s hypothetical reaction to receiving the plant as a gift: “(You jih) see ‘is face, .hh ‘Wuddiyuh givin’ me this fo:r,’” (lines 179/181). Alan’s well-prefaced turn (Heritage 2015) then moves away from the joking nature of the prior sequence to explain that the plant might not be such a silly gift after all given that “he does have a liddle piece a' Charlie. Y'know Wandering umm Creeping Charlie?” (lines 183-4), which is another type of plant.

(11) KAMUNSKY_3

179 Mar:  (You jih) see ‘is face, [.hh “Wuddiyuh givin’ me this=
180 Ala: [eh- .hhh wee- gupff .hhhh= 
181 Mar: =fo:r,=”]=
182 Ala: =hhhhhh]=
183 Ala: -> =Well you could give ‘im he does have a,=a liddle piece
184 -> a' **Charlie. Y'know Wandering umm Creeping Charlie?**
185 (0.2)
186 Ala: Bud it’s kinda kicking it.
In this case, Alan abandons the first TCU (“Well you could give ’im”…a Creeping Charlie) in favor of providing Mary with some background information regarding the friend’s experience with plants. In contrast with what Mary may have inferred from Alan’s prior lack of enthusiasm for the idea of a plant as a gift, as well as from the just-prior collaborative joking sequence, this friend “does have” a certain kind of plant. Despite not having explicitly claimed anything to the contrary in prior talk, this new information is nonetheless grammatically packaged such that it orients to what Mary is presumed to understand about the friend’s relationship with plants at this moment in the talk, by indexing a contrast with that likely understanding. Given that the friend does have a plant, and moreover that the plant in question is “ kinda kicking it.” (i.e., dying) (line 186), the idea of getting him a new one as a birthday gift might not be such a laughable idea after all. Indeed, as the sequence continues past the data shown here, this proposal is agreed upon and a Creeping Charlie is ultimately endorsed as an appropriate gift for the friend.

3.5 DISCUSSION

3.5.1 On Repair and ‘Repair-like’ Constructions

Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977) define the domain of repair as the set of practices that participants use to interrupt the ongoing course of action in order to attend to possible troubles in speaking, hearing or understanding. Schegloff (2007a: xiv) later writes that these practices exist so “that the interaction does not freeze in its place when trouble arises, that intersubjectivity is maintained or restored, and that the turn and sequence and activity can progress to possible completion”.

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Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to distinguish the *do*-construction cases analyzed here from other sorts of repair, especially ‘repair after next turn’ (Schegloff 1992). Specifically, I have argued that the *do*-construction works not to “retract” or “replace” the informational content of a prior turn, but rather to *amend or modify* some of the inferences that a recipient *might* have gleaned from that prior talk. That is, in addition to the more overtly demonstrated interactional problems described in previous research on repair (recall examples (1)-(4), for instance), here we see that interactants can also mobilize specific grammatical structures to fix *possible* ambiguities and *potential* misapprehensions from the interaction thus far. This expands our understanding of the larger “organizational domain of repair” (Schegloff 1982: 91) by providing concrete evidence in support of Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks’s original assertion that “nothing is, in principle, excludable from the class ‘reparable’” (1977: 363).

Through its divergence from an unmarked (i.e., non-*do*-construction) turn design, the *do*-construction provides new information in a slightly ‘backward-looking’ fashion, thereby diverging from turns that embody “perfect progressivity” (Heritage 2007: 279). I argue that the *do*-construction thus constitutes an example of a grammatical structure that has emerged in this particular interactional environment and sedimented into the routine “repair-like” (Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson 2005) practice examined here (see Hopper 1987, 1998). Such an analysis finds common ground with recent research on other repair and repair-like practices such as *or*-prefacing (Lerner & Kitzinger 2015), *I-mean*-prefacing (Maynard 2013a), and concessive repair (Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson 2005), each of which has been analyzed as distinct from ‘classic’ cases of repair (see, e.g., Schegloff 2013) due to their attempt at *preserving* some element(s) of the putative ‘trouble source’, as opposed to *replacing* it completely with the repair ‘solution’. The present study contributes to this body of research by demonstrating that these sorts of reparative operations can
be implemented through the morphosyntactic and prosodic levels of linguistic structure in addition to, for example, the lexical level.

Given the body of research that attests to the universality of repair operations (e.g., Dingemanse & Enfield 2015; Dingemanse, et al. 2015; Fox, Hayashi & Jasperson 1996; Fox, Maschler & Uhmann 2010; Hayashi 1994; Hayashi, Raymond & Sidnell, eds., 2013), as well as the universality of pragmatic contexts (Levinson 2000), the reparative work of the English do-construction should be found cross-linguistically as well, similarly implemented through turn designs that are in some way marked in the grammar of the specific language in question. This is another area for future research. One potential cross-linguistic example is found in Hogeweg’s (2009) examination of the Dutch particle wel, in which the author describes cases where the particle is used to address an assumption that could be inferred from prior talk in the interaction. In one example, a daughter is describing her dissatisfaction with a paper she turned in at school, citing various things she could have done better. She then states (12) below:

(12) Ik had wel best wel veel bronnen  
I have WEL quite WEL many sources  
‘I did have quite a lot of sources’

About this turn, which is glossed in English with a do-construction, Hogeweg (2009: 525) writes: “The aforementioned quality of the paper could suggest that she did not have a lot of sources or at least makes that a more plausible option than the contrary. Wel is used as a reaction to that expectation” (see also Seuren, Huiskes & Koole 2016: example 5). The contrastive nature of this grammatical resource (which can also be combined with prosodic prominence; Hogeweg 2009: 523) thus appears to share common ‘repair-like’ ground with the do-construction in English, addressing and amending a likely, commonsensical inference based on prior talk.
3.5.2 On Accountability and Commonsense Knowledge

Garfinkel (1967: 75) writes that “the study of commonsense knowledge and commonsense activities consists of treating as problematic phenomena the actual methods whereby members of a society, doing sociology, lay or professional, make the social structures of everyday activities observable”. I posit that the routine use of grammatical resources such as the do-construction can shed new light on Garfinkel’s notion of public and observable accountability in interaction, by providing concrete evidence of orientations to commonsense knowledge in the design of turns-at-talk.

Shared commonsense knowledge is part of what constitutes membership in a given community (Berger & Luckmann 1967; Schütz 1962), and we depend on this same knowledge in order to produce our own actions as well as interpret the actions of others (Garfinkel 1962, 1967). Take, for instance, one of Garfinkel’s famous breaching experiments in which experimenters were instructed to abandon commonsense understandings of an interlocutor’s assertions and consistently request clarification (i.e., greater specificity). The following are two reported exchanges from experimenters:

(13) [Garfinkel 1967: 42]

01 Friend: “I had a flat tire.”
02 Experimenter: “What do you mean, you had a flat tire?”
03 Friend: “What do you mean, 'what do you mean'?
04 A flat tire is a flat tire!”

(14) [Garfinkel 1967: 43]

01 Husband: “I’m so tired.”
02 Experimenter: “How are you tired? Physically, mentally or just bored?”
03 Husband: “I don't know, I guess physically, mainly.”
04 Experimenter: “You mean that your muscles ache or your bones?”
05 Husband: “I guess so. Don't be so technical.”
Garfinkel’s aim with this (and other similar) experiments was to illustrate just how much background, ‘typified’ knowledge interactants usually bring with them into interaction (Schütz 1962: 14; see also Cicourel 1972: 254-6). When these experimenters (purposefully) failed to maintain the “reciprocity of perspectives”—that is, when they stopped using their background knowledge of what ‘flat tires’, for instance, generally are—then interlocutors get very upset, and very quickly! Garfinkel used this to evidence the moral dimension of accountability to which social actors hold one another when engaging in interaction: Speakers depend on background knowledge to get their meanings across, and they morally expect and “trust” (1963) recipients to work to utilize that background knowledge in interpreting actions.

Yet while commonsense understandings routinely serve to create and maintain intersubjectivity between co-participants, what we have seen in the excerpts analyzed in this chapter is that they can sometimes run counter to a speaker’s objectives. That is, potential inferences gleaned from prior talk can actually, on occasion, risk jeopardizing the evolving state of intersubjectivity in lieu of promoting it. When this might transpire, speakers have linguistic means to address the issue—excluding the inapposite inferences and ‘locking in’ the correct understanding in the mind of the recipient. Just as in Garfinkel’s flat tire example, then, a recipient is expected to make certain inferences when a bike is described as “not a mountain bike” (example (7)), as ‘non-mountain bikes’ constitute a ‘typified object’ that possesses certain attributes. But given the inappositeness of a particular one of those commonsense inferences in this specific
instance, the inference must be addressed. And it must be addressed in a way that still preserves the original description, and the various other pieces of background knowledge that the recipient is bringing to bear on the interpretation of the utterance and its action. It is in this environment that a particularized, repair-like resource like the do-construction finds its utility—not to “replace”, but to “update”.

There is an additional outcome of this routine interactional resource which merits discussion. At face value, one might assume that such moments in interaction challenge or otherwise disturb our perception of a shared reality—that is, that such turns-at-talk work to undermine the commonsensicality of the particular inference in question. But this is not the case. Rather, in addition to whatever else these turns are doing in the unfolding sequence of actions, these moments in talk work to legitimize a recipient’s background knowledge and commonsense inferences through the very act of setting them aside. Such an action demonstrates that, from at least one participant’s perspective, the inference in question relevantly needed to be done away with, meaning that the normativity of the inference was strong enough such that a speaker held him/herself morally accountable for addressing it and setting it aright. The result is that interactants do not experience any sort of ‘reality disjuncture’ (Pollner 1975, 1987) when they are told that a non-mountain bike was used to go up a mountain; nor do they redefine the typified objects of ‘mountain bikes’ and ‘non-mountain bikes’ (see Heritage 1987: 246-7, 2009, 2011a; cf. Wittgenstein 1953). On the contrary, these deviations from the expected, commonsensical norm are interactionally built and oriented to as just that—deviations. That is, it’s perfectly acceptable, legitimate, and reasonable for one to potentially be inferring $X$, but in this particular case, the situation is actually $Y$. As opposed to chipping away at our conception of what is shared, commonsensical, background knowledge, then, these moments actually help us to reaffirm and
reconstitute what is (and what should be) accountably shared and commonsensical about the world—at the ground level of turn-by-turn talk.

Early in his career, Garfinkel made the observation that “The big question is not whether actors understand each other or not. The fact is that they do understand each other, that they will understand each other, but the catch is that they will understand each other regardless of how they would be understood” (1952: 367). What that means in practice is that co-participants in talk will actively work not just to ‘be understood’, but to be understood in some particular way. And, as we have seen here, part of what this work can entail is ensuring that one is not being understood in some particular, alternative way, with the resources of grammar constituting one concrete means through which this achievement is realized in interaction.

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7 Note the parallel with Goffman’s notion of ‘taking a line’ in “On Facework” (1955): “Regardless of whether a person intends to take a line, he will find that he has done so in effect. The other participants will assume that he has more or less willfully taken a stand, so that if he is to deal with their response to him he must take into consideration the impression they have possibly formed of him” (233).
4 Bueno-, Pues-, and Bueno-Pues-Prefacing in Spanish Conversation

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The Spanish language provides its speakers with a wide range of marcardores de discurso or ‘discourse markers’ which can appear in turn-initial position. Although a conversation-analytic framework has only recently been employed in examining these items (see, e.g., Raymond 2015; Vázquez Carranza 2013, 2014), the study of turn-initial particles is certainly not foreign to Spanish-language philologists and linguists who have long been interested in documenting the strategies interlocutors use to structure and organize their talk.

The present study examines two particles in Spanish: bueno (usually translated into English as ‘well’, but also as ‘okay’, ‘fine’, or ‘(al)right’) and pues (usually translated into English as ‘well’). Before beginning to be used as a particle, bueno, derived from Latin bonus, was an adjective and adverb meaning ‘good’, a denotation and usage which is still preserved in Modern Spanish alongside its use as a particle (Real Academia Española 2001). Pues, derived from Latin post (‘after’), is typically categorized as a conjunction meaning ‘so’ or ‘because’, as in Juan lo va a comprar, pues lo necesita (‘Juan is going to buy it, because he needs it’) (ibid.). Nonetheless, in Modern Spanish, this conjunction usage is largely nonexistent in speech, appearing only in formal writing, while its use as a discourse marker is pervasive in everyday spoken interaction (Páez Urdenta 1982; cf. Vázquez Carranza 2013).
While *bueno* and *pues* can occur in a variety of sequential positions, here we focus on their use as turn-initial prefaces in responsive utterances. In this sequential position, both *bueno* and *pues* have been argued to accomplish similar interactional work to that of *well*-prefacing in English—either as the explicit objective of the overall analysis (e.g., Cuenca 2008; García Vizcaíno & Martínez-Cabeza 2005; Stenström 2006) or implicitly in analyzing an excerpt (e.g., Serrano 1999: 120; Travis 2006).

In addition to equating both of these items to English *well*, prior pragmatic, discourse-analytic, and politeness-based analyses have routinely used the same terminology to describe the functions of *bueno* and *pues*, thereby tacitly suggesting that their deployment is interchangeable. For example, Landone (2009: 264) writes that “*Bueno*, in short, introduces an answer which is distinct from the expected one” (see also Bauhr 1994: 118-120; Cortés Rodríguez 1991: 108). The preface then serves to mark or “soften the illocutionary force of a threatening act” (García Vizcaíno 2005: 58) such as a forthcoming disagreement/dispreferred response (Pons Bordería 2003: 229-234). Travis (2006: 233) uses similar language in contending that “*bueno* is used to soften responses that are not what would be expected (or desired) from the surrounding context, such as comments that do not concord with prior discourse, statements that disagree with what someone else has said…or answers that do not fully respond to a question” (Travis 2006: 233; see also 1998). These observations about *bueno* share much common ground with claims made for *well*-prefacing in English (Heritage 2015, frth.; Schegloff & Lerner 2009; Thompson, Fox & Couper-Kuhlen 2015: 34-35).

Yet a variety of authors maintain that *pues*, too, is indicative of a responsive turn that “will differ from what is expected” (Serrano 1995: 13). Similarly, Briz Gómez (1998: 175) and Llorente

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1 All translations from Spanish are the author’s.
Arcocha (1996) describe *pues* as an indicator of dispreferred responses more generally: With *pues*, “the speaker takes the less expected, more negative, or less cooperative option, perhaps to soften the effect that that decision might have” (Llorente Arcocha 1996: 213-218; see also Portolés Lázaro 2001: 128-129).

While not intended to be exhaustive, **Table 4.1**, largely compiled from Landone’s (2009) detailed overview of previous research on Spanish discourse markers, illustrates the extensive amount of overlap that exists in the literature describing the functions of *bueno* and *pues* in responsive turns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similar to English well</th>
<th>BUENO</th>
<th>PUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serrano (1999)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>García Vizcaíno &amp; Martínez Cabeza (2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dispreferred**

- **Disconfirmation**
  - Briz Gómez (1998: 212)
  - Haverkate (1994: 30)
  - Martín Zorraquino & Portolés Lázaro (1999: 4166, 4176)
  - Pons Bordería (2003: 229, 234)
  - Serrano (1999: 123-4)
  - Travis (2006: 233)

- **Disagreement**
  - Briz Gómez (1998: 175)
  - Briz & Hidalgo (1988: 133)
  - Cuadrado (1994: 47)
  - Vázquez Carranza (2013)

- **Opposition**
  - Cuadrado (1994: 47)
  - Portolés Lázaro (1989: 125-6, 130)

- **etc.**

**Unexpected**

- Bauhr (1994: 118-20)
- Landone (2009: 259)
- Serrano (1999: 121-4)
- Travis (2006: 233-4)
- Serrano (1995: 13)

**Accepting/Starting the turn**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Accepting/Starting the turn”</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>García Vizcaíno &amp; Martínez Cabeza (2005: 86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martín Zorraquino (1994: 410)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serrano (1999: 118-21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travis (1998: 271-3)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Token Agreement**

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<th>(Token) Agreement</th>
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**Table 4.1: Previous Studies of Bueno and Pues in Spanish**
In sum, then, previous research on *bueno* and *pues* presents us with a pair of second-position turn prefaces, both of which are claimed to be similar to English *well*, are apparently indicative of “unexpected” and “dispreferred” turns, and work to “soften” the force of such dispreferred actions. The overlapping descriptions of these two turn-initial particles thus provide a concrete example of Aijmer’s (2002: 23) observation that “there is always a risk that the core function (or functions) proposed for a DP [discourse particle] is too broad and therefore does not show how a DP is distinct from other DPs in the same field”. Here our aim is to investigate whether these two items function identically in responsive turns, or whether an explicit teasing apart of the two is possible. Such an exercise not only will allow us to more systematically unpack the notions of ‘unexpectedness’ and ‘softening’ in a more structural way (see Schegloff 1996b), but also enrich our understanding of turn-initial position more generally by exemplifying how languages can manage the division of interactional labor between particles used to launch responsive utterances.

4.2 DISTINGUISHING *BUENO* FROM *PUES*

In his famous work on variation in sentence structure, Dwight Bolinger (1972: 71) writes that:

> There are situations where the speaker is constrained by a grammatical rule, and there are situations where he chooses according to his meaning…; but there are no situations in the system where ‘it makes no difference’ which way you go. This is just another way of saying that every contrast a language permits to survive is relevant, some time or other.

With regard to the two particles under consideration here, Bolinger’s observation, as well as Sacks’s (1992) fundamental notion of “order at all points”, invite us to question whether *bueno* and *pues* are, as the terminology of prior studies suggests, identical in their usage, or whether each preface is used to perform distinct interactional work. That is, if both *bueno* and *pues* preface turns that are “unexpected” or “dispreferred”, for instance, perhaps these turns are “unexpected” or “dispreferred” in different ways. Rather than providing a listing of the individual functions of each
particle, our objective is to seek the “highest level of generalization” (Evans & Levinson 2009) that can distinguish bueno from pues, without over-generalizing to the point at which the two appear identical.

Here I argue that both bueno and pues project some “unexpectedness” to come in the responsive turn, but a different sort of “unexpectedness” is foreshadowed by each particle. I will demonstrate that bueno-prefaced turns do not overtly problematize the prior utterance, but rather accept its terms before departing from them, and thereby acquiesce to the prior turn’s design (albeit with a marked form of acquiescence compared to a turn that is not qualified with a turn-initial particle [Heritage 2013b, 2015; see also Schegloff 2007a: 14-15]). Bueno thus serves to indicate a shift at the level of alignment, markedly ‘bracketing off’ the prior turn in the service of launching a new, self-attentive action that will typically require multiple TCUs to complete (cf. Heritage 2015, this volume; Heritage & Clayman 2010: 109-110). The use of bueno as a shift-implicative item in other sequential contexts (Landone 2009: 265; Ocampo 2006) parallels this function in responsive turns in that the particle is used to preface utterances that, I will argue, depart from the expectations for action that the previous turn established, and in this sense are sequence-structurally disaligned (cf. Stivers 2008).

Consider the following canonical case of a bueno-prefaced responsive turn. Here, Ramiro (the friend of co-present Diana) asks Samuel what part of California he is from, and Samuel produces a bueno-prefaced answer.

(1) F12.100B.35, 8:00

01  Ram:  De- de:- de- de:: De qué:-
        from from from from what
        From fro:m- from- fro::m From wha:t-

02  De qué área vienes de California.<Y’sé=
        from what area come.2S of C  I know.1S
        From what area do you come from in California.<I’know=  

78
Diana es de San Diego. pero [tú eh:] that D is from S D but you
th:st .hh Diana is from San Diego. =but you eh:

Diana: [°Sí.° 
°Yeah.°

Sam: Bueno =yo: (0.2) soy de: (. ) Los Ángeles=
PRT I am from L A
Bueno =I: (0.2) a:m fro::m (. ) Los Angeles=

=aquí en la área, =vivo en: Compton?
here in the area live.1S in C
=here in the area, =I live in: Compton?

Sam:

Pero: uh:m (. ) .tch ( . ) Vamos a movernos también?
but go.1P to move.INF-ourselves also
Bu::t uh::m (. ) .tch ( . ) We’re going to move also?

a la Valle de San Fernando?
to the valley of S F
to the San Fernando Valley?

Ram: Mhm,

Sam: A s-la ciudad de Northridge. =muy pronto. =
to the city of N very soon
To s-the city of Northridge. =very soon. =

=Mi papá compró una casa. =
my dad bought.3S a house
=My dad bought a house. =

Dia: =[De veras.
of truth =Really.

Sam: =[Sí.
=Yeah.

Samuel’s bueno-prefaced answer casts Ramiro’s question as a legitimate action that was appropriately formulated and reasonably askable. Subsequently, however, the answer is expanded into a description of where Samuel will move next. In this instance, bueno conveys that the forthcoming response will not be a simple place reference, but rather will involve something more that will take additional TCUs to complete. Indeed, despite Samuel having provided a pragmatically, syntactically, and intonationally complete answer in lines 5-6, his interlocutors
withhold receipt of the answer (line 7), thereby orienting to the fact that additional talk has been projected by the preface. Samuel then goes on to use his answer space to produce additional information about his living situation—not only where he is from in general (Los Angeles) and what part of Los Angeles (Compton), but also where his family is planning to move *muy pronto* (‘very soon’) (lines 8-9/11-12).\(^2\) In this case, then, the *bueno*-prefaced utterance does not problematize Ramiro’s turn, but rather projects that the answer-to-come will be more and different, and in this sense unexpected compared with what the question asked for.

I argue that *pues*-prefaced responses, on the other hand, are directly addressed to the prior turn, but they cast that prior turn’s action or design as problematic in some way. That is, rather than acquiescing to the terms of the first-position utterance (as with *bueno*), *pues*-prefaced responses target and problematize some aspect of the prior turn, thereby noticeably ‘pushing back’ on, for example, its presuppositions or epistemic stance. In this way, *pues*-prefacing is also a harbinger of “unexpectedness”, but, contrary to the case of *bueno*, the unexpectedness of *pues* derives from the the second speaker’s comparatively on-record registration of difficulty with the terms set for response by the prior turn, as opposed to his/her tacit acceptance thereof.

Extract (2) provides two illustrations of *pues*-prefaced responses to questions. This segment begins when Ann, having finished relaying a story that she read for a literature class (about a romantic relationship between an older man and a younger girl), poses the *wh*-question seen in line 1, subsequently specifying two alternatives in line 2.

---

\(^2\) It is interesting to note that San Diego, where Diana and Ramiro are from, is a relatively affluent area compared to Compton, where Samuel is from. Given that Ramiro and Samuel are meeting for the first time, Samuel’s extended response here may be (at least partially) motivated by membership categorization concerns—working to secure an interactional space to assert that he too will soon be residing in relatively more affluent area, namely the San Fernando Valley. My thanks to Anna Lindström for sharing this observation.
Am.Cha, 7:00

01 Ann:  Y luego entonces qui-Quién es el perverso. 
and later then who is the pervert
And so then wh-Who is the pervert.

02 La niña? o el señor.
the girl or the man
The girl? or the man.

03 Ron:  Pues ninguno.
PRT neither
Pues neither.

04 Ann:  CÓmo- Cómo el señor no va a ser perverso.= 
how how the man no go.3S to be.INF pervert
HOw- How is the man not going to be the pervert.=

05 Ron:  =[que él-
=that he
[that he-

06 Ann:  =[a él le gustó que la niña
=to him him liked.3S that the girl
=he liked it when the girl

07 Ann:  se (le vaya ) subida encima:.
self him went.SUB mounted on-top
would (go) and be mounted on to:p of him.

08 Ron:  >Pues< dices que- (tiene) su esposa está gorda?
PRT say.2S that has.3S his wife is fat
>Pues< you say that- (he has) his wife is fat?

09 Ann:  HAH HAH hah hah

10 (0.3)

11 Ann:  No está gorda.=Está llenita.
no is fat is full.DIM
She’s not fat.=She’s curvy.

The design of Ann’s question in lines 1-2 presupposes that Ron will consider someone to be a pervert, specified to either the girl or the man in the second TCU. Nonetheless, Ron’s pues-prefaced response problematizes the question as posed. The pues preface here serves as an alert to the questioner that the response to come will not acquiesce to the terms that have been set forth. The ninguno (‘neither’) response then reveals that it was specifically the presuppositions conveyed within the questioning turn that were problematic.
In an expansion sequence, Ann challenges Ron’s response with an additional question: *Cómo* Cómo el señor no va a ser pervert. (‘How is the man not going to be the pervert.; lines 4/6-7). As a negative question-word interrogative, the design of this question heavily presupposes that the man is the pervert of the story (see Heritage 2002a), a stance which is further accounted for by the fact that it was he who *le gustó que la niña se (le vaya) subida encima*: (‘liked it when the girl would (go) and be mounted on to:p of him.’; lines 6-7). Again, though, Ron resists the claim that this piece of evidence would necessarily render the man a pervert: His *pues*-prefaced response pushes back on the prior turn, reminding the teller that the man’s wife was *gorda* (‘fat’), the implication being that the man in the story could not be blamed for wanting someone else to be ‘mounted on to:p of him’. Ann takes up this response as a joke, with laughter in line 9, before proposing an amending to Ron’s characterization of the wife’s weight in line 11.

In what follows, I provide evidence in support of this distinction between *bueno* and *pues* through analysis of a variety of excerpts of naturally occurring conversation. I begin with *bueno*, then move on to *pues*, and then illustrate how their individual discursive meanings can be mobilized in tandem to create the compound preface *bueno-pues*. A total of 348 cases (62 *bueno*, 265 *pues*, 21 *bueno-pues*) were culled from a larger corpus of naturally occurring interaction amongst speakers of Central and South American varieties of Spanish (~200 hours), including both ordinary and institutional (emergency service, medicine, news interview) talk. With the exception of one example (4), taken from an emergency service telephone call, all cases reproduced in this chapter are drawn from video-recorded interactions.

**4.3 BUENO-PREFACING**

A *bueno*-prefaced turn launches a new action that markedly departs from the agenda of the previous turn in the service of pursuing the second speaker’s own project or perspective. In this
sense, the \textit{bueno}-prefaced turn ‘moves on’ or ‘moves away’ from the agenda of the prior turn (Heritage 2015 on English \textit{well}). This is illustrated in example (3) below in which \textit{bueno} functions as shift implicative (Beach 1993; Jefferson 1983). Here, three friends (Lourdes, Juana, and Gomero) are conversing while Lourdes prepares dinner for the group. This excerpt finds them finishing up a discussion about what sorts of food are linked to various health problems. In line 5, Lourdes’s \textit{bueno}-prefaced announcement moves on from this discussion as she informs the others that dinner is almost ready.

(3) KiCam.p5.7:45\textsuperscript{3}

\textbf{01} Gom: Con:: el azúcar,=creo que es la diabetes.
with the sugar think.1S that is the diabetes
\textit{With:: sugar,=I think it’s diabetes.}

\textbf{02} Lou: Y la sal?
and the salt
\textit{And salt?}

\textbf{03} Gom: Y la sal,=no sé.
and the salt no know.1S
\textit{And salt,=I don’t know.}

\textbf{04} (0.5)

\textbf{05} Lou: \textit{Bueno} las voy a calentar,=°y ya.°
PRT them go.1S to heat.INF and already
\textit{Bueno I’m gonna heat them ((the tortillas)) up,=°and that’s it.°}

After Gomero observes, in line 1, that diabetes is linked to sugar intake, Lourdes inquires about health problems caused by salt (line 2). Rather than take up Gomero’s non-answer response (line 3) to her question and thereby continue discussion of health issues, Lourdes moves away from this topic after a half-second silence with her \textit{bueno}-prefaced line 5, namely an announcement that clearly implies that dinner is almost ready.\textsuperscript{4} Inasmuch as Gomero’s non-answer may itself be topic-

\textsuperscript{3} Subject pronouns are included in the English translations for readability; however, Spanish does not require overtly pronounced subjects (see discussion of this phenomenon in naturally-occurring interaction in Raymond 2015). See the morphological gloss (second line) for use of overt vs. non-overt subject pronouns.

\textsuperscript{4} Tortillas are quickly heated and are routinely prepared as the last item before serving a meal.
closing implicative (cf. Keevallik 2011), Lourdes’s new action may be understood as a cooperative one. What is essential to note for our purposes here, though, is that the bueno preface effectively ‘brackets off’ the just-prior sequence by projecting Lourdes’s launch of something new as opposed to keeping the question-answer sequence open by problematizing Gomero’s line 3 and/or pursuing an answer to her question from line 2 (Stivers & Robinson 2006).

Bueno-prefaced responsive turns, although often not as disjunct in terms of topic or activity, as in the prior case, are nonetheless parallel to such shift-implicative cases in that they depart from the agenda of the prior turn without problematizing what came before. As seen in the first example where Samuel was asked where he was from, turn-initial bueno in response to questions is acquiescent in that it does not explicitly problematize the askability, design, or terms set up by the question. Nonetheless, even while not directly problematizing such aspects of questions as their topical agenda, presuppositions, or polarity, bueno-prefaced responses foreshadow a marked movement away from the expectations established by the questioning turn. Bueno thus serves an alert to the questioner that, in order to respond to the question as it has been asked, the answerer must depart from its structural expectations, which typically means producing self-attentive responses that involve multiple TCUs (Heritage 2015) and/or that are in some way “non-straightforward” (Schegloff & Lerner 2009).

The work that bueno-prefacing does in foreshadowing complex, self-attentive or ‘my side’ (Heritage 2015) responses to questions sheds light on why, in assembling a collection of such turns, it was noted that several instances appeared in the context of institutions: In institutional talk, interlocutors must work within the “special and particular constraints” (Drew & Heritage 1992: 22) of the interaction to introduce their perspectives, topics, and opinions into the discourse. This is frequently accomplished through bueno-prefaced responses to questions from institutional
representatives, such as emergency service call-takers (excerpt (4)) and news interviewers (excerpt (5)).

(4) 911 Problem Presentation (Raymond 2016a)

01 911: Buenos días. (. ) Cuál es su emergencia?  
      Good days what is your emergency
      
02  

03 CLR: -> Bueno mirá: e- Yo te e- Yo: te digo:. ( .)  
      PRT look.IMP um I you um I you tell.1S  
      Bueno look: um- I’ll you um- I’ll tell you.

04 (. ) Yo vengo de Nueva York.  
      I come.1S from N Y
      (. ) I’ve come from New York.

05 (1.0) Y:: (0.5) Vengo hace poco que:  
      and come.1S makes.3S little that
      (1.0) A::nd (0.5) I came only a short time ago

06 (. ) y resulta que:  
      and results.3S that
      (. ) and it turns out that

07 (0.3) hay un hombre que me amenazó de muerte,  
      there is a man that threatened my life
      (0.3) there is a man that threatened my life

(5) News Interview (Raymond 2016b: 273-274)

20 IR:  >Cómo termina siendo candidato de Acción Popu↑lar?<  
        how end.2S being candidate of action popular
        >How do you end up being the candidate for Acción Popu↑lar?<

21 IE:  .hhhhhh Bueno en primer lugar,  
        Bueno in first place
        .hhhhhh Bueno first and foremost,

22 Yo quiero destacar (. ) que la peruanidad,  
      I want.1S stress.INF that the peruvian-ity
      I want to stress (. ) that being Peruvian,
      
23 es casi:: (. ) pues una cuestión consustancial.=  
      is almost pues a question consubstantial
      is almo::st (. ) like a consubstantial question.=

24 =viene en el corazón. . .  
      comes.3S in the heart
      =it lies in the heart. . .
In excerpt (4), in response to the 911-operator’s initial *wh*-question in line 1, the caller launches his problem presentation with a *bueno*-prefaced turn in line 3 to dislocate what is immediately forthcoming from the prior questioning turn. Here, the caller projects his intent to present his problem to this ‘telling question’ (Fox & Thompson 2010) as a narrative (Heritage 2015; Heritage & Clayman 2010: 109-110). As this caller does indeed have an emergency situation, the issue is not with the presuppositions of the question, but rather with the basic need for multiple TCUs to provide an adequate response.

In Excerpt (5), the interviewee takes advantage of the answer space provided by the interviewer’s question to put forth his point of view about what it takes to be Peruvian. The *bueno* preface therefore not only signals multiple TCUs to come, but also a “non-straightforward” answer (Schegloff & Lerner 2009) to the interviewer’s question, which, after all, invited a telling as to how he came to be the Acción Popular political party’s candidate for office, not an explanation of what it means to be Peruvian. In cases such as these, then, second speakers use *bueno*-prefacing not to problematize the design or action of the prior question, but rather as a means to launch extended and often self-attentive (Heritage 2015: 95-98) turns from responsive position.

This analysis of *bueno* in response to questions can also account for the occurrence of the particle in response to a variety of other actions as well. Consider example (6) in which two friends (Laura and Tomás) are engaged in a philosophical debate about the relationship between having power and being respected. In lines 1-4, Laura offers her point of view, and in lines 5-7, Tomás offers his.

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5 Note that the caller produces an additional turn-initial particle in this case, a *mira*- (‘look’) preface (see Sidnell 2007 on *look*-prefacing in English), thereby further dislocating what is to come from the prior turn. These two turn-initial particles must occur in this order, forming a ‘linear syntax’ (Hakulinen 1993) in the same way as *Bueno-pues*-prefacing, discussed in the final section of this chapter.
(6) Mig.All.p2.vid3, 1:00

01 Lau: Porque tú puedes ser-
       because you can.2S be.INF
       Because you can be-

02 Te-Puedes tener todo el poder del mundo.
       you-can.2S have.INF all the power of-the world
       Yo-You can have all of the power in the world.

03 Pero no- que no significa
       but no that no signifies
       But no- (it's that) that doesn’t mean

04 que alguien te va a respetar.
       that someone you goes to respect.INF
       that someone is going to respect you.

05 Tom: Oh= Bueno para mí:.
       PRT PRT for me
       Oh=Bueno for me:.

06 e-te van a- e-va- tienes el poder porq-
       you-go.3P to- e-go.3S- have.2S the power bec-
       e-they going a- e-go- you have the power bec-

07 porque te respetan.
       because you respect.3P
       because they respect you.

08 Lau: N:ó:.
       N:ó:.

09 (0.3)

10 Uh::m No tiene- No tiene nada que ver.=
       no has no has nothing that see.INF
       Uh::m It doesn’t ha- It doesn’t have anything to do with that=

11 =Por- >Por lo menos< para mí no:.
       for for it least for me no
       =For- >At least< for me it doesn’t.

12 Para mí no.
       for me no
       For me it doesn’t.

In response to Laura’s position, Tomás launches an oh- and bueno-prefaced second assessment (Heritage 2002b) in which he describes his contrasting point of view: Oh=Bueno para mí:...
(‘Oh=Bueno for me:…’; line 5). Here Tomás does not overtly question Laura’s opinion as to the relationship between power and respect, nor does he comment or invite any further expansion on
it. On the contrary, as seen in previous examples, the bueno preface ‘brackets off’ Laura’s point of view and projects Tomás’s intent to move in a new, self-attentive direction in which he will offer his own perspective on the issue. In this way, consonant with previous research (e.g., Travis 1998, 2006), the bueno preface may also convey partial acceptance (at least tacitly) that Laura is entitled to her own opinion, which is further supported by the explicit construction of Tomás’s turn-proper as a contrast in personal point of view: para mí: (‘for me:’; line 5). Nonetheless, the turn-initial oh-preface conveys the stance that Tomás’s “own point of view is the basic framework from which the issue is to be considered” (Heritage 2002b: 198; 1998: 291-296), and thus here both oh and bueno work collaboratively to prioritize Tomás’s perspective over that of Laura. Note also that this use of bueno parallels Heritage’s (2015, this volume) analysis of well in English as preacing “my side” turns, often implicated in offering a difference of perspective. While the bueno-prefaced turn expressing Tomás’s point of view (lines 5-7) tacitly acknowledges Laura’s right to her own opinion, Laura’s subsequent response is not launched in the same way. Rather, she immediately and overtly disagrees with Tomás’s understanding of the power-respect relationship (lines 8-10), mitigating this disagreement to a difference of perspective only later through the latched increment >Por lo menos< para mí no: (‘>at least< for me it doesn’t.’; lines 11-12).

A similar case is seen in (7) below in which María and Alejandro are discussing their parents’ child-rearing styles (with Juan, also co-present). At the beginning of this excerpt, María claims that a parent who is agresivo (‘aggressive’) is fundamentally different than a parent who simply is de carácter fuerte (‘has a strong personality’) (lines 1/3/5). She presents her personal experience in lines 6/8, and Alejandro responds by presenting his own in lines 9-11.
(7) Mig.All.vid3, 6:09

01 Mar:    Una cosa es de ser de carácter fuerte:\,: one thing is of be.INF of character strong
One thing is to have a strong personality:\,;

02 Ale:                              [0 sea no-
or be.SUB no
That is no-

03 Mar:    Y otra cosa es de ser agresiva(h)or(h): [hah hah hah
And another thing is of be.INF aggressive
hah hah hah

04 Jua:                              [Ajá. Ajá.

05 Mar:    Son dos cosas muy diferentes.: They are two very different
They are two very different things.:\=

06 =.hh >Porque mi mamá tenía las dos. because my mom had the two
Cuz my mom had both.

07 (0.3) ((Alejandro looks down))

08 Y yo-yo sé diferenciar: de- de una a la otra. and I I know.1S differentiate.INF of of one to the other
And I-I know how to differentiate one from the other.

09 Ale:    >Bueno al contrario mi mamá sí tenía carácter=
PRT to-the contrary my mom yes had character
>Bueno on the contrary my mom did have character=

10 =Era enojona para todo, was quick-tempered for everything
She was quick-tempered about everything,

11 =hhh Pero no sabía: así que< No me decía::, but no knew.3S so that no me said.3S
hhh But she didn’t know: like< She wouldn’t say::,

12 ↑O:kei p-Tienes que hac-No=no <exigía>. =Me entiendes? okay have.2S that do no no demanded.3S me understand.2S
↑O:kay p-You have to-No=She didn’t <demanda>.=You understand?

13 Mar:    Oh:::
PRT
Oh:::

Just as we saw in the previous example, here Alejandro does not problematize or seek to unpack
María’s explanation of her own experience and perspective by inviting expansion, commenting
on, or challenging it. Indeed, in this instance, it would be inappropriate (if not impossible) for
Alejandro to claim that María’s mother actually did not have both a strong and aggressive personality, and/or to claim that, as a result, María actually does not know how to distinguish between these two character traits. Alejandro’s bueno preface is therefore acquiescent to María’s entitlement to assert her own opinion as it markedly shifts to an assertion of his own contrastive experience and “my side” perspective: >Bueno al contrario mi< mamá... (‘Bueno on the contrary my< mother...’; line 9). This contrastive point of view on the topic at hand is then receipted with María’s elongated change-of-state token Oh::: in line 13 (Heritage 1984a).

As illustrated in the cases analyzed in this section, bueno-prefacing in responsive utterances tacitly accepts the legitimacy of the first action—including its design—while at the same time alerting the recipient that what is immediately to follow will diverge somewhat from expectations. With this marked form of acquiescence to the prior turn, second speakers effectively ‘bracket off’ the prior turn from what is to come, in the service of acquiring the interactional space necessary to prioritize their own, routinely multi-TCU project or perspective.

4.4 PUES-PREFACING

As opposed to acquiescing to the terms of a prior turn, as we saw in the case of bueno-prefacing, pues-prefaced responses cast the prior turn’s action or design as in some way problematic, and thereby actively do not acquiesce to it. Turn-initial pues in responsive utterances thereby markedly ‘pushes back’ on the prior turn by indexing the speaker’s difficulty in accepting either the social action of the first speaker’s turn, or the terms established in the formulation of that action.

First actions such as questions and assessments inherently set terms for their responses (Sacks 1987 [1973]). In the case of first assessments, for instance, Heritage (2002b: 200) observes that they “index or embody a first speaker’s claim to what might be termed ‘epistemic authority’
about an issue relative to a second or to ‘know better’ about it or have some priority in rights to evaluate it” (cf. Raymond & Heritage 2006). Second speakers—e.g., question recipients, second assessors—can then either acquiesce to the terms set forth by the prior turn, or, alternatively, they can resist them. Vázquez Carranza (2013) discusses *pues*-prefaced responses to such first actions and convincingly illustrates that the particle can be used to index epistemic independence—casting the first assessment as obvious, indicating the obviousness of a response to a question, and/or challenging the relevance of the question altogether.

Take case (8) below, in which Dad is finishing a description of how his company was able to fix a leak at a construction site after their major competitor had failed to do so on three separate occasions. Although Dad concludes with an expression of modesty in lines 1-4, Mom asserts that *hay que reconocer que cuando las cosas las hacen mal, (0.3) Están mal* (‘one has to recognize that when they ((the competitor company)) do things incorrectly, (0.3) they’re incorrect’; lines 6-9). It is in response to this negative assessment of the competitor company’s practices (and implicit positive assessment of Dad’s company’s abilities) that Dad produces a *pues*-prefaced agreement (line 10).

(8) F12.100B.27-7, 27:40

01 Dad:    >O sea< No: >voy a decir< que:: or be.SUB no go.1S to say.INF that >So< I: ‘m >not gonna say< that

02 Nunca .hhh decir que eres tú: (.) que lo hizo.= never say.INF that are.2S you that it did.3S

03 =Simplemente nos quedó bien el trabajo, simply us became.3S well the work

04 y ya "está allí." and already is there

05 Dau:    Mmmhm.
Mom: No no pero también hay que reconocer que=
No no but also there is that recognize.

=cuando las cosas las hacen mal,
when the things them do incorrectly

=when they do things incorrectly,

Mom: Están mal. =
are incorrect.

They’re incorrect. =

Dad: Pues sí. E[so sí.

PRT yes that yes

Pues yeah. That’s true.

Mom: [Si fueron tres veces . . .

if went three times

If they went three times . . .

In this case, Dad’s pues-prefaced confirmation resists the authoritative stance conveyed by Mom’s lines 6-9 and claims the knowledgeable high ground over the issue: His company, his construction site, his experience with this specific competitor, and so on. Similar to oh-prefacing in English conversation, then, the pues-preface in this agreement sequence works to effectively disengage the “second speaker’s expression of opinion from the taint of being produced merely ‘in agreement with’ or ‘in conformity with’ the first speaker’s opinion” (Heritage 2002b: 219). The second TCU of Dad’s response—Eso sí (‘That’s true’)—further asserts Dad’s rights from second position by providing an additional form of marked confirmation (Heritage & Raymond 2012; Raymond 2015; Stivers 2005).

Similar use of pues-prefacing as a marker of epistemic resistance occurs in Excerpt (9) below in response to an announcement as well as in response to a question. Here, a different Mom and Dad are talking on a Monday about an upcoming event that will be held out of town the following week. Dad comments, in line 1, that if he had Thursday off from work, he would leave on Wednesday. This receives an ah- and pues-prefaced agreement from Mom in line 2, a response
that, in turn, invites agreement from Dad via the turn-final tag question verdad? (‘right?’). Dad’s agreement in line 3 is also prefaced with pues.

(9) Di.Gar-9, 18:35

01 Dad:  Si descansara este jueves, me iría el miércoles.  
        If rested.SUB.1S this Thursday  me go.COND.1S the Wednesday  
        If I had this Thursday off,=I would leave on Wednesday.

02 Mom:  Ah pues sí: ‘edad?
        Ah pues yeah: right?

03 Dad:  Pues sí.
        Pues yeah.

04   (0.3)

05 Dad:  "Sí."  
        "Yeah."

06 Mom:  Y la otra semana no descansa.
        And the other week no rest.2S
        And the following week you don’t have off ((from work)).

07 Dad:  ((small lateral head shake))

08 Mom:  Ya es cuando descansa el fin de semana.
        already is when rest.2S the end of week
        That’s when you have the weekend off.

09 Dad:  Mm hm.

As seen in the previous example (8), here Mom’s line 2 conveys that Dad’s announcement has not provided her with any information to which she did not already have access. As Vázquez Carranza (2013) notes, pues sí in cases such as these not only demonstrates agreement, “but also implies that the judgment is indisputably obvious” (290), a stance which is further conveyed through the turn-initial ah (Heritage 1984a, 2002b). Invited to respond by Mom’s tag question, Dad does exactly the same; after all, Mom has just asked him to agree with an announcement that he himself initially put forth about his own life. His pues-prefaced response therefore resists the design of this question and exerts his epistemic rights from second position.
While a first turn may indeed be judged by a recipient as epistemically problematic, as in cases (8) and (9) and those examined by Vázquez Carranza, this is only one of a variety of features of turn design that *pues*-prefaced responses can problematize. Questions, for example, not only convey an epistemic stance and make relevant an answer, but also set topical and action agendas, embody presuppositions, and incorporate preferences (Heritage 2010; Heritage & Clayman 2010); and *pues*-prefaced turns can be mobilized to resist any one or combination of these features of question design (recall example (2) above). Turn-initial *pues* must therefore be conceived of as a more general alert of a prior turn’s inappropriateness, invoking an ‘indexical field’ (Eckert 2008) of potential motivations for the preface’s deployment which are specified by the particular context of its use.

Consider case (10). Prior to this segment, Dad has been describing the multitude of resources that companies larger than his are able to offer their employees. This leads his daughter, Ana, to then ask the question reproduced in lines 1-5, the grammatical design of which reveals her point of view that such resources would logically render larger companies *mejor* (‘better’; line 1) employers.

(10) Companies

01 Dau:    Pero entonces que no sería mejor,
            *that no be.COND.3S better*
            *But then wouldn’t it be better,*

02       (0.2)

03       *ir a trabajar en una de es°as compañías?°*
            *go.INF to work.INF in one of those companies*
            *to go to work at one of th°ose companies? °*

04       (0.5)

05       Porque es más grande?
            *because is more large*
            *because it’s bigger?*
06 Dad: **Pues:** si es mejor: y no porque te pagan menos.
PRo yes is better and no because you pay.3P less
**Pues:** yes it is better: and no because they pay you less.

07 Dau: Oh:::
then be.COND.3S
Oh::: then *(it would be)*°° . .

The daughter’s negative interrogative in lines 1-5 is *yes*-preferring, bordering on an assertion (Heritage 2002a), undoubtedly based on the positive description of larger companies that her father has just provided. Dad’s *pues* preface in response, however, is an alert that the stance that the question conveys is in some way inapposite. The first piece of the response proper in line 6—*sí es mejor: y no* (*‘yes it is better: and it’s not’*)—overtly resists the prior turn’s inherent presupposition that the resources Dad has been describing are the *only* factors involved in making a company an unambiguously “better” place to work. As we see in the second clause of line 6, from Dad’s point of view, jumping to such a conclusion was inappropriate given the fact that larger companies *te pagan menos* (*‘pay you less’*), thereby citing specific evidence as to why this particular presupposition (conveyed through the design of the questioning turn) was inaccurate.

Consider an additional example of this sort in which a variety of features of a question’s design are resisted, including its epistemic stance, presuppositions, and polarity. Here, Jorge and Armando are negatively assessing the business practices of two friends, Luis and Claudio. Jorge’s question in line 1 inquires as to the financial stability of the two, namely whether they are in debt. This receives a *pues*-prefaced response from Armando in line 2.

(11) F.12.100B.30-12, 26:00

01 Jor: Entonces están endeudados.=no?
then are.3P indebted no
So they are in debt.=no?

(0.7)

02

03 Arm: >**Pues** el Luis=el< ese güey, (0.2) n:o.
PRT the L the that guy no
>**Pues** Luis=the< that guy, (0.2) n:o.
Jorge’s question is syntactically designed with a relatively shallow epistemic gradient through the use of a [declarative + tag] format (Heritage 2010; Raymond 2015). This design is built for an affirmative response, setting up expectations that Armando will confirm that Luis and Claudio are, in fact, in debt. Furthermore, the question morphologically conflates Luis and Claudio’s financial situations through third-person plural marking on the verb and the plural form of the adjective—*están endeudados* (‘are in debt’) (cf. singular verb and adjective: *está endeudado* [‘is in debt’])—thereby presupposing that both individuals share the same financial status. As opposed to simply acquiescing to these various terms set forth by this question’s design, Armando’s *pues*-prefaced response in line 3 resists them. The isolation of Luis specifically in the turn-proper works to disentangle Luis’s financial status from that of Claudio, which simultaneously resists the presuppositions, epistemic stance, and grammatical preference of the initial question. Indeed, Jorge orients to this resistance in a concessive turn in line 4.

An additional environment in which *pues*-prefacing is common in responses to questions is in combination with non-answer responses such as *No sé* (‘I don’t know’) (see Heritage 1984b: ch. 8; Keevallik 2011; Stivers & Robinson 2006). Such responsive turns resist the questioner’s basic presupposition that his/her interlocutor will be able to provide an answer to the question. This is seen in the following excerpt (12) in which Pam tells Leticia about an advertisement that

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6 *Digamos* is frequently used in this dialect in reparative operations.
she discovered in a magazine. Although Pam seems to have difficulty finding the right formulation to launch the topic (lines 1-4), it turns out that the advertisement in question has been placed by a political party that is hiring temporary workers during an upcoming election. Pam will eventually indicate that she is interested in one of these temporary positions, but not before Leticia seeks clarification as to when the elections are taking place.

(12) Fl2.100B.28, 11:45

01 Pam: Sí te dije que encontré una clase aquí?= Did I tell you that I found a class here?

02 =Digo un este:: (.) para hacer: (.) para llenar este:: say.1S a um for do.INF for fill-out.INF this

03 &=I mean a um:: (.) to do: (.) to fill out um::

04 ((taps page twice and passes it to Leticia))

05 Pam: Para las elecciones? for the elections

06 For the elections?

07 (0.3)

08 Let: <Para las elecciones de[:]> for the elections of

09 <For the elections i::n>

10 Pam: [e- En marzo. i- in March. i- In March.

11 (0.3)

12 Let: En marzo habrá elecciones? in march there-will-be elections

13 Pam: Pues no sé= PRT no know.1S

14 Pues I don’t know=

15 =pero allí dic[e que habrá= but there says.3S that there-will-be

16 =but there it says that there’ll be=

17 (s)ecciones en marz(hhh)o. (s)elections in marz(hhh)o.

18 =s)elections in Ma(hhh)rch.
14 ????: =hah hah hah

15 Let: O(hh)h:::

16 Pam: Pero te pagan ciento cincuenta dólares la hora.  
but you pay.3P hundred fifty dollars the hour  
But they pay you one hundred fifty dollars per hour.

17 Let: Oh sí:?
  oh yes
  Oh yeah:?

Although Pam has had prior access to the magazine that says that the elections begin in March  
(now in Leticia’s hands), the *pues* preface precedes the remainder of the turn that disclaims the 
knowledgeable status that Leticia’s question attempts to assign her (Heritage 2012b), forming an 
alert that the question is problematic from the answerer’s point of view. Immediately following 
this, Pam explains that her understanding of election season is based on the information included  
in the advertisement (lines 11/13). Following this sequence of clarifying when the elections are  
happening, Pam is able to return to her announcement in line 16 with the conjunction *pero* (‘but’), 
explaining that she is interested in the position being advertised because the pay is quite good.

Similar difficulty with the basic presupposition of an interlocutor’s ability to provide an 
answer is also seen in *pues*-prefaced responses to *wh*-questions. Consider the following case (13).

(13) F12.100B.21-9

01 Eri: Cómo está el internship.  
how is the internship
  How is the internship.

02 Ana: .hhhh *Pues* apenas empecé:#:::  
PRT just started.1S  
.hhhh *Pues* I just started:#:::d

03 (0.5)

04 uh::m "empecé:" =no-Anteayer.  
uhmm started.1S no day-before-yesterday  
uh::m "I started:d"=no-The day before yesterday.
05 Eri: Ya [s- Ya te corrieron? ((smile))
already s- already you ran.3P
Have they fired you yet? ((smile))

06 Ana: [e-

07 Ana: NO::. Todavía tch (.) ((smile))
no still
NO::. They tch (.) ((smile))

08 £Todavía no me conocen.
still no me know.3P
£They still don’t know me.

The design of Eric’s how-question in line 1 presupposes that Ana will be able to provide an answer. Ana’s pues-prefaced response, however, resists this presupposition of answerability and provides an account for why she is unable to straightforwardly comply with this request for information: She has just begun the internship, and thus does not yet have enough experience from which to assess it.

As with bueno, the analysis of pues offered here—as designedly not acquiescent to the formulation, terms, or overall action of the prior turn—accounts for a wide range of responsive utterance types beyond simply responses to questions. Take excerpt (14), for instance, in which Donna and Sam have been describing to Ray a recent game that they played with some other (unnamed) individuals. Who exactly participated in the game, and how Donna and Sam know them, has not been specified; some participants have been referred to as living on the same dormitory floor as Donna and Sam (e.g., line 2), while others have not. In line 7, Ray seeks confirmation of his understanding of the game as having been played with desconocidos y con: (‘strangers and with:’). This request for confirmation is confirmed before it reaches completion, by both Sam and Donna (lines 8 and 9). In response, Ray produces a change-of-state token (line 10) and explains that he had previously thought that the game had been played with amigos (‘friends’; line 12). Ray’s turns thereby actively claim a newfound understanding of the situation
being described by his interlocutors: The game in question was not played with friends, but rather with dormitory floormates and even strangers. As opposed to tacitly acquiescing to this assertion of understanding, Donna and Sam’s simultaneous *pues*-prefaced responses (lines 14 and 15) problematize the mutual exclusiveness that Ray’s declarative statement effectively established between dormitory floormates and friends.

(14) F12.100B.35-3, 4:24

01 Sam: La agarró bien rápido una::
her grabbed.3S well fast one

02 de las que vive en- [en nuestro mismo piso? of those that lives on- on our same floor

03 Don: [Sí::.
Yeah::.

04 Ray: Oh sí?
PRT yes

05 Sam: Mmhm,

06 Don: [Pero-
but

07 Ray: [OH so era con desconocidos y co[n:]=
PRT so was with unknowns and with

08 Sam: [Sí.]=
Yeah.=

09 Don: =Sí.=
=Yeah.=

10 Ray: =Oh::[:]=

11 Sam: [Sí.
Yeah.

12 Ray: =Yo pensé que era con ami:go:[s.
I thought.1S that was with friends

13 Sam: [m-
14 Sam:  Ah [pues:::]  
        PRT     PRT  
        Ah    pues:::]

15 Don:  [Pues somos amigo::s!  
        PRT   are-1P friends  
        Pues we are frie::nds!  

16 Sam:  S- En el mismo pis[o::] Nos conocemos todos.  on the same floor ourselves know.1P all  
        S- On the same floo::r We all know each other 

17 Ray:   [Ah::: okei okei.  
        Ah::: okay okay. 

Here, the use of *pues* in turn-initial position in Sam and Donna’s responses serves as an alert that Ray’s B-event statement in line 7 (Labov & Fanshel 1977: 100) will not be confirmed or acquiesced to as-is, but rather is problematic in some way. Sam’s use of a turn-initial *ah* also serves to resist the appositeness of Ray’s prior claim (Heritage 1984a, 1998). Moreover, the turns-proper of both respondents (lines 15 and 16) then go on to cite evidence that corrects the incorrect presupposition conveyed through the design of Ray’s turn: Their *floormates* are *friends* as well.

In excerpts (15) and (16), it is not merely the design of the turn that is judged as inappposite by recipients, but rather the action as a whole that the turn was meant to implement. In (15), Alejandra claims that she has a higher grade point average than Marco. When Marco disagrees, Alejandra suggests that they make a wager of $100, paid to the individual who has the higher average at the end of the present academic term (data not shown). Nancy, co-present in the interaction, subsequently offers to serve as a witness to the wager, which Alejandra enthusiastically accepts in line 1. Alejandra then produces an outloud complaint that she does not have her cellular phone with her and therefore cannot video-record the official signing of a makeshift contract, including the fact that Nancy was indeed present to bear witness to the event (line 4-6). This complaint receives a *pues*-prefaced response from Marco in line 7.
Marco’s *pues*-prefaced turn in line 7 casts Alejandra’s prior complaint as ill-founded, and the *pues*-preface foreshadows the resistance to come. In this specific case, the inappositeness of Alejandra’s turn derives from the fact that the interaction is already being video-recorded by the researcher; video evidence of the wager being signed will thus already exist, so there is no need for Alejandra to record it herself. Moreover, Marco’s turn may also be resisting the insinuation embedded in this complaint, namely that he is the sort of person who would renege on his word and deny having made the wager if he ends up losing, thus necessitating the use of video evidence. Alejandra’s turn is therefore potentially problematic from Marco’s perspective for multiple reasons, any one or combination of which may provide the impetus for Marco’s non-acquiescent *pues*-prefaced response.

The *pues*-prefaced response in excerpt (16) similarly problematizes the action appositeness of the prior turn. Here Gloria, declaring that she is full, offers Kevin the last piece of pizza from
her plate. Following a prosodically heightened and smile-voiced ‘thank you’ in line 1, Gloria produces a single laugh token and a ‘you’re welcome’ response in line 2. In overlap, though, Keven announces, with similar joke-like prosody to that of line 1, ↑Te quiero:::.=esposa::: (‘↑I love you:::.=wi::fe.’; line 3). (These individuals are not actually married, but call one another husband and wife as terms of endearment.) After a brief silence, Gloria’s pues-prefaced Pues tú me la £compra:::.£ (‘Pues you £bought£ it for me’; line 5) casts this expression of love/thankfulness as an overbuilt and inapposite action for this moment in the interaction.

(16) Cei, 46:45

01 Kev: ↑£Gra::cia:::.£= thank-you ↑£Tha::nk You:::.£=

02 Glo: ={HEH de nada. of nothing =HEH you’re welcome.

03 Kev: ={↑Te quiero:::.=esposa::: you love.is wife =↑I love you:::.=wi::fe.

04 (0.3)

05 Glo: heh=Pues tú me la £compra:::.£ PRT you me it bought.2S heh=Pues you lbought£ it for me.

06 Kev: (((bites pizza))

07 Kev: ((laughs [through nose while biting pizza])

08 Glo: ['.hh hah hah hah

09 (0.3)

10 Kev: ↓↓Así es::: (mock ‘macho’ tone) like-that is ↓↓That’s ri:ght. (mock ‘macho’ tone)

With her pues-prefaced response, Gloria takes the stance that it is unnecessary for Kevin to be so thankful for her generosity given that it was he who bought the pizza for her in the first place.
Rather than accepting the legitimacy of his action and providing a reciprocal *I love you* turn, then, her response resists the prior by problematizing its appositeness for this moment in the talk.

In sum, then, across these various responsive actions, *pues* serves as an alert to the recipient that the design of the prior turn will be resisted. Be it the prior turn’s overall action appositeness, or more specific characteristics such as, for example, the turn’s presuppositions or epistemic stance, *pues* indexes the second speaker’s inability or unwillingness to acquiesce to the terms established by the first speaker’s utterance, and therefore an inability or unwillingness to move on without first addressing those terms.

### 4.5 Bueno-Pues-Prefacing

Thus far we have examined *bueno* and *pues* as independent turn-initial particles, each of which prefacing some forthcoming “unexpectedness” in the turn-proper. I have argued that *bueno*-prefacing functions primarily at the level of alignment, markedly acquiescing to the design of the prior turn while developing a response that departs from its agenda in the service of pursuing the second speaker’s own project or perspective. *Pues*-prefaced responses, by contrast, respond directly to the prior turn, and are in this sense sequence-structurally aligned to it, but they resist the action or design of that turn as opposed to tacitly accepting it. These two turn-initial resources—and the types of unexpectedness they deal with—are not mutually exclusive, however. This is evidenced by responsive utterances in which both particles are mobilized as prefaces in the same intonational contour, creating the compound turn-initial particle *bueno-pues*.

In the *bueno-pues* compound preface, I argue that each particle retains its primary interactional function as has been described here, but their tandem deployment is used to indicate trouble at the level of *sequences* of action. Consider excerpt (17) below in which Denise has been jokingly explaining to a friend how her sisters, Ivette and Jimena, were very mean to her when
they were young. Ivette, also present in the interaction, disagrees with the categorization of her behavior as “mean” by arguing that Denise was quite cruel to her as well. Denise then offers up an additional piece of evidence in line 1 in an effort to illustrate her sister’s ‘superior meanness’. It is in this sequential context that Ivette produces a bueno-pues-prefaced turn in response (lines 3-4).

(17) F12.100B.04, 0:30

01 Den: Les gustaba correearme y:: (. ) aventarme lodo. 
  them liked.3S chase.INF-me and throw.INF-me mud 
  They used to like to chase me around and (. ) throw mud at me.

02 Den: heh [heh heh

03 Ive: [.h Bueno=pues sí. 
  PRT PRT yes 
  Bueno=pues yeah.

04 Porque y-yo creo que te lo merecías. =eh? 
  because I think.1S that you it deserved.2S eh 
  Because I think that you deserved it.=eh?

05 Den: ((wide eyes; open mouth: 0.3 seconds))

04 Den: <Yo n(h)o hi(h)ce n(h)ada:(h): hah hah> 
  I no did.1S nothing 
  <I didn’t do anything hah hah>

Denise’s turn in line 1 aimed to provide specific evidence (chasing and mud-throwing) that would classify Ivette as the crueler sister. Ivette’s bueno-pues-prefaced utterance in response accepts that there was indeed chasing and mud-throwing, however it simultaneously categorizes as inapposite the implicit presupposition—and overall argument of Denise’s turn—that such activities would inherently render Ivette the meaner sister. Indeed, as we saw in the case of many of the pues-prefaced turns above, the responsive turn goes on to explicate why the just-mentioned chasing and mud-throwing were (from Ivette’s point of view) legitimate activities, namely that Denise ‘deserved it’ (line 4). And thus Denise’s initial announcement—although acquiesced to as accurate—is portrayed as irrelevant to the sisterly debate by failing to accomplish the action for which it was deployed.
In *bueno-pues*-prefaced utterances, then, the *bueno* component accepts the prior turn as indeed accurate but foreshadows forthcoming structural unexpectedness, while the *pues* component specifies that this structural unexpectedness will be used to challenge the relevance or applicability of that accuracy to the turn’s intended action within the sequence-in-progress. In other words, *bueno-pues*-prefaced responses convey that while the propositional content of the prior turn may be valid or legitimate, its action import within the ongoing sequence is not. It is this combination of a second speaker’s desire to index *acquiescence* to one aspect of the prior turn (*bueno*), with a lack of acquiescence to another aspect (*pues*), that provides the impetus to consecutively deploy both particles as *bueno-pues*.

This analysis parallels work on ‘yes-but’-prefaces in German and Danish in that they do not directly oppose the prior utterance, but rather “challenge the relevance of something which was implied by [it]” (Steensig & Asmuß 2005: 369). It is relevant to note that, when occurring as a compound turn-initial item, with a single prosodic contour, only the ordering *bueno-pues* occurs in the present dataset—not *pues-bueno*.7 Consonant with the ‘linear syntax’ (Hakulinen 1993) observed in the German and Danish data (and in English; Pomerantz 1984), then, speakers mobilizing the *bueno-pues* preface in responsive position in Spanish prioritize tacit acceptance of the prior turn before subsequent problematization.8

Consider one additional example of *bueno-pues*-prefacing, this time from a news interview context. Here, the interviewee is a candidate for congress who, as part of his platform, is proposing to use certain governmental funds to pay for a real estate project he is developing. In lines 1-3, the

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7 It cannot go without mention that *pues* can indeed be followed by *bueno*; however, in all such cases in the present dataset, the result is not a single, prosodically continuous, turn-initial preface. Rather, these instances appear to be composed of a turn-initial *pues* (in one prosodic contour) followed by a turn-final *bueno* (in another contour), often used to mark sequence closure.

8 On the issue of temporality in real-time language use, see also Goodwin (2002), Hopper (1992), and Deppermann and Günthner, eds., (2015).
interviewer issues a challenge to this proposal, claiming that the funds that the interviewee proposes to use cannot be allocated in such a manner and can instead be used only to pay for servicios públicos (‘public services’; line 1). It is in this environment that the interviewee produces a bueno-pues-prefaced response (lines 77-80).

(18) (Raymond 2016)

74 PAL: Los arbitrios se aplican para pagar servicios públicos. The judgments self apply.3P for pay.INF services public
75 Y solamente pueden ser cobrados= And they can only be charged=
76 =por el servicio que se pres[te efectivamente. =for the service that self borrow.3S effectively
77 ALE: [Bueno=pues tal vez Perhaps what I should say to you then
78 ALE: Tal vez lo que debo decirle entonces Perhaps what I should say to you then
79 es que hay un impuesto sobre los bienes inmuebles, it there-is a tax on the goods property
80 que re[ca- that cau-
81 PAL: [Se llama- Se llama impuesto <predial>. self calls.3S self calls.3S tax property

As in the case of (17) above, the initial bueno acquiesces to the accuracy of the interviewer’s description of the allocation of governmental funds. The pues component of the preface then immediately foreshadows an upcoming challenge to the relevance of this information to what he is proposing. That is, the interviewee does not problematize the interviewer’s explanation of the proper/legal allocation of funds, but he does characterize this explanation (albeit accurate) as
insufficient grounds on which to undermine his campaign proposal. The remainder of the interviewee’s turn then aims to address the technical aspect of where the funds are coming from in an attempt to reestablish the legitimacy of his proposal to use monies from it.

4.6 DISCUSSION: A CROSS-LINGUISTIC AND CROSS-DIALECTAL PERSPECTIVE ON ‘ORDER AT ALL POINTS’

In his analysis of *well*-prefacing in English, Heritage (2015: 88) argues that “*well* functions as a *generalized* procedural alert that the turn it prefaces will privilege its speaker’s perspectives, interests, or project relative to the expectations for action established in the prior turn or sequence” (my emphasis). Indeed, as Heritage documents, *well* routinely prefaces turns that are dispreferred, rejecting, indirect, non-straightforward, transformative, approximate, resistant, topic-shifting, topic-closing, self-attentive, and/or that will incorporate multiple TCUs (cf. Davidson 1984; Pomerantz 1984; Sacks 1987 [1973]; Schegloff & Lerner 2009). Thus, in English, *well*-prefacing appears to have “developed a branching set of contexts of use that, while both procedurally coherent and learnable, are nonetheless difficult to bring under a coherent functional description” (Heritage 2015: 101).

Comparing this description of *well* to *bueno* and *pues* (and also *bueno-pues*), examined here, we observe a particle-based division of labor in Spanish that is not present in English. Despite the literature’s conflation in its analytic descriptions of Spanish *bueno* and *pues*, including implicit and explicit correlations to English *well*, speakers of Spanish are seen to be distinguishing between responsive utterances that are acquiescent to the terms of the prior action while launching a structurally unexpected turn in response (*bueno*-prefaced), vs. those that are designedly resistant to the terms of the prior utterance, targeting and problematizing some aspect thereof (*pues*-prefaced). That is, while *well* is mobilized as a “*general* procedural alert” in English talk-in-
interaction, the precise impetus for the departure from expectations becomes relevant in the selection of turn-initial particle(s) in second position in Spanish.

The existence of this sort of division of labor is not unique to Spanish. In addition to Steensig and Asmuß’s (2005) study of German and Danish, described earlier, Niemi (2015) analyzes describes two ‘yeah but’ formats in Finnish—*nii mut* and *joo mut*—and argues that the former engages with the line of action set up by the prior turn while the latter disengages from it. Cross-linguistic comparison of turn-initial particles thus allows us to tease apart interactional distinctions which are relevant in some languages/dialects but which may be conflated—and consequently less readily observable—in others.

In the Latin American dialects of Spanish represented in the data for the present study, *bueno* and *pues* can be said to cover a certain pragmatic ‘scope’. Other dialects of Spanish (e.g., Peninsular), however, use *bien* (‘well’) and *muy bien* (‘very well’) as turn-initial items of divergence in addition to *bueno* and *pues* (Blas Arroyo 2011; Fuentes Rodríguez 1993). Such an array of options invites a variety of future inquiries: In such dialects, do the functions of *bueno* and *pues* remain intact while *bien* performs distinct interactional work that is neither acquiescent nor non-acquiescent, for example? Or is the scope of *bueno* and *pues* narrowed and the division of labor redistributed given the availability of *bien* and *muy bien* as options? The same questions can be asked of compound prefaces given that Peninsular Spanish data also reveals the use of *pues-bien* in addition to *bueno-pues* (Fuentes Rodríguez 1993). Furthermore, the pragmatics of such turn-initial items has been shown to vary in situations of language and dialect contact, such as in Andean Spanish (Zavala 2001) and Spanish in the United States (Raymond 2014, 2015). Thus, cross-linguistically and cross-dialectally, the pragmatic scope of a pair of turn-initial items like *bueno* and *pues* may be collapsed into a single particle in one language/dialect or separated into a
multitude of particles in other languages and dialects. It is through comparative research on the systematic mobilization of these resources, then, that we are able to investigate more deeply the range of possible options available for use in talk-in-interaction.

There is another, perhaps slightly less obvious, advantage to the cross-linguistic study of phenomena like turn-initial particles, which exist at the intersection of turn and sequence. It may be tempting to take an analysis such as the one put forth here, and claim that languages like Spanish (and also German, Danish, and Finnish), with their multiple options, are able to make distinctions in interaction that other languages with fewer options do not or cannot. Such a claim, however, would challenge the basic analytic assumption that all languages have equal expressive power to deal with the same basic human social needs (see the Pragmatics Universals Hypothesis; Levinson 2000). Thus cross-linguistic work of this sort inspires a second set of inquiries: If there does not exist a set of turn-initial particles in one language which themselves accomplish the Spanish-like distinctions seen here, what resources are available and mobilized to accomplish that same work, and how are these resources ordered systemically in different languages? Furthermore, what can that tell us about the relationship between turn-initial particles and those other resources as tools for social action in interaction? It is through this cross-linguistic perspective on Sacks’s (1992) fundamental notion of “order at all points” that we will arrive at an ever more detailed understanding of talk-in-interaction as a fundamentally human social phenomenon.
5 A Scalar View of Progressivity in Interaction

5.1 INTRODUCTION: THE PREFERENCE FOR PROGRESSIVITY

When participants engage in social interaction, there exists a demonstrable orientation to the forward-moving nature of turns-at-talk—both of turns as a whole, as well as of the various elements within turns. That is, there is a preference for progressivity in interaction (Heritage 2007, 2013b; Sacks 1987 [1973], 1992; Schegloff 1979b, 2006, 2007a; Stivers & Robinson 2006).

Schegloff (2007a: 14-15) describes this phenomenon as follows:

In articulating a turn-constructional unit, each element—each word, for example—should come next after the one before; in fact, at a smaller level of granularity, each syllable—indeed, each sound—should come next after the one before it. So also with the several turn-constructional units that compose a multi-unit turn; so also with the consecutive turns that compose a spate of talk; so also with the turns that compose a sequence, etc. Moving from some element to a hearably-next-one with nothing intervening is the embodiment of, and the measure of, progressivity. Should something intervene between some element and what is hearable as a/the next one due—should something violate or interfere with their contiguity, whether next sound, next word, or next turn—it will be heard as qualifying the progressivity of the talk, and will be examined for its import, for what understanding should be accorded it (my emphasis).

To briefly illustrate what is meant by the notion of progressivity, consider the following exchange between friends, Hyla and Nancy. Here, Nancy is inquiring about Hyla’s new love interest.

(1) [HG:II:25]

| 01 Nan: | .hhh Dz he ‘av ‘iz own apa:rt[mint?] |
| 02 Hyl: | [.hhhh] Yea:h,= |
| 03 Nan: | =Oh:, |
| 04     | (1.0) |
| 05 Nan: | How didju git ‘iz number, |
| 06     | (.) |
| 07 Hyl: | I(h) (.) c(h)alled inerma[nt]n San |
| 08     | Fr’ncissc(h)|uh! |
| 09 Nan: | [Oh:::] |
In this example, Nancy requests information in line 1, Hyla provides that information in line 2, and Nancy indexes her receipt of the information in line 3 via the change-of-state token *Oh* (Heritage 1984a). This is followed by another Question-Answer-*Oh* sequence in lines 5-9, with the addition of Nancy’s assessment of the manner in which Hyla acquired the phone number in line 11—“Very clever.” Across this stretch of talk, then, we see the embodiment of progressivity in that each new turn produces an action that advances the sequences- and larger activity-in-progress forward.

The overarching pressure for progressivity is so significant that it can be seen to supersede various other preferences that govern interaction. For instance, a preference exists for references to persons to be formulated minimally and recognitionally, with recognition trumping minimization (Sacks & Schegloff 2007 [1979]). But progressivity can be oriented to as a superordinate preference in that attempting to secure recognition of the referent can be abandoned in favor of moving on with the action, sequence, and activity at hand (Heritage 2007). This is seen in extract (2) below in which, upon failing to secure an understanding of who Doctor Nelson is—either by name (line 5) or by description (line 7)—Lottie moves to a non-recognitional reference form in line 9 in the service of progressing her response to Emma’s line 2.

(2) [NB IV:14:10]

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| 01 | Lot: | So I'm goin up uh hhh Mondee too:. An' uh, | 02 | Emm: | W-w uh how [long is 'e gonna be gone. | 03 | Lot: | [Yihknow. | 04 | Lot: | hhhh God I don'know, he doesn' know either I mean, hhh if it- | 05 |   | uh, we talk'tuh Doctor Nelson | 06 |   | yihknow this, s-doct- | 07 |   | yihknow from uh Glendale? | 08 |   | (0.2) | 09 | Lot: | -> This friend'v a:rs,= | 10 | Emm: | =Mhmm,
Given the lack of uptake from Emma (lines 6-8), Lottie shifts to a non-recognitional “This friend’s a:rs,” in line 9, which her interlocutor immediately receipts with a latched continuer, and the response-in-progress moves onward.

To provide another example of progressivity’s status in relation to other preferences, Stivers and Robinson (2006) have shown that progressivity trumps the preference for a response by the selected next speaker (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974) in that other, non-selected co-participants will provide answers when they are not forthcoming from selected speakers. This is seen in (3) below where Luke answers a question directed at Bates after Bates fails to produce an answer.

(3) SNS 51:36 [Stivers & Robinson 2006: 382]

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<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Stu:</td>
<td>Bates ha- have you heard the PhD story.</td>
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<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Luk:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bates’s heard it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>St?:</td>
<td></td>
<td>(&quot;Yeah.&quot;)/(0.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Bat:</td>
<td>Yieahp,</td>
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As Stivers and Robinson note, this answer effectively blocks Stuart’s offer to tell a story, thereby constituting a dispreferred action. Thus we see the preference for progressivity toward possible closure of the sequence “over a preference for the selected next speaker to respond, even if that means producing a dispreferred SPP” (382).

Progressivity does have an enemy, however. The principal threat to the progressivity of turn-by-turn talk are initiations of repair, used to address problems of hearing, speaking, or understanding (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977). “Within the matrix of repair practices,” Heritage (2009: 308) writes, “progressivity is pitted against intersubjectivity” in that participants must negotiate between (a) securing a certain level of shared understanding, and (b) moving on with the business of the talk (see Heritage 2007). By initiating repair, an interactant is said to halt
the progressivity of the turn- or sequence-in-progress, which can then be reengaged once the repair solution is provided. Consider case (4) below in which Ilene uses an ‘open’ class repair initiator “Hmm:?” (Drew 1997) to initiate repair on Jean’s line 1.

(4) [Drew 1997: 71]

01 Jean: Ev’body else is well.
02 (0.4)
03 Ilene: -> Hmm?:
04 Jean: -> [( ) thehr a:ll we:ll,
05 Ilene: -> Oh yes yes ther fi:ne.

Following Jean’s line 1, there is a brief pause, after which Ilene overtly initiates repair. This turn, rather than moving the interaction forward, is backward-looking in that it problematizes something that came before, thereby preventing (albeit momentarily) the sequence initiated in line 1 from being brought to completion. After Jean redoes her utterance in line 4, then, progressivity is reengaged as Ilene provides the information solicited by Jean’s B-event statement, which successfully closes the sequence (Heritage 2012a, 2012b; cf. Labov & Fanshel 1977: 100-101).

Progressivity is likewise argued to be suspended in instances of self-initiated self-repair (for an overview, see Schegloff 2013). The following extract (5) contains two aborted TCUs (in lines 9 and 10), before a solution is ultimately provided in line 11.

(5) [Schegloff 2013: 53]

01 Shr: Who w’s the girl that was outside
02 (his door¿)/(the store¿)
03 (0.8)
04 Mrk: Debbie.
05 (0.8)
06 Shr: Who’s Debbie.
07 Mrk: *(Katz.)
08 (0.7)
09 Mrk: -> She’s jus’ that girl thet: uh:, (0.2)
10 -> .hh I met her through uh:m:, (1.0)
11 -> I met ‘er in Westwood.=I (caught that-) (.)
12 ‘Member I wenttuh see the premie:r of (0.3)
13 Lost Horizon\] [( )
14 Shr: [I DID’N KNOW YOU did,=
Here, Mark abandons what he starts in line 9 and redoes it as the revised version in line 10. Then he abandons the line 10 version in favor of the version in line 11. With each repair, the speaker halts the forward-movement of the interaction by ‘jumping backward’ to redo something done prior, attempting to replace the earlier formulation with what he deems to be a better design. Schegloff (2007a: xiv) writes that these sorts of mechanisms for repair exist such “that the interaction does not freeze in its place when trouble arises, that intersubjectivity is maintained or restored, and that the turn and sequence and activity can progress to possible completion”.

Perhaps in part due to the language used to define and describe repair operations—as moments where progressivity is halted1, stopped2, suspended3, broken4, etc.—, progressivity has largely come to be conceptualized in studies of interaction as a binary feature of talk, a ‘dichotomous variable’ of sorts: A given turn, for instance, either embodies progressivity or it doesn’t. An utterance that provides an answer to a question demonstrates progressivity; an utterance that initiates repair on the question doesn’t.

Here, however, I aim to unpack Schegloff’s (2007a: 15) reference to “the measure of progressivity” by arguing that progressivity must be conceptualized as a scalar phenomenon. That is, rather than yes-progressivity vs. no-progressivity, participants in interaction can be seen to orient to the existence of a continuum from more-progressivity to less-progressivity. Moreover, in addition to being better aligned with participants’ own understanding of this feature of interaction, it will be demonstrated that such an analytic reconceptualization provides an important new

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4 E.g., Lerner (2004: 252), inter alia.
dimension on which to examine various practices deployed in naturally occurring talk, as we equip ourselves with a means to ask not only if a turn is moving forward vs. backward, but also how much. Such an analysis finds common ground with other recent scalar reconceptualizations of interactional phenomena, such as: (i) conditional relevance and the mobilization of response (Stivers & Rossano 2010; cf. Schegloff 1968; Schegloff & Sacks 1973), (ii) the entitlement-contingency cline of request formulations (Curl & Drew 2008), (iii) the epistemic gradient component of question design (Heritage 2012a, 2012b), (iv) the multiple competing principles involved in selecting from amongst other-repair initiation options (Dingemanse & Enfield 2015; Dingemanse, et al. 2015; Drew 1997; Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977; cf. Clark & Schaefer 1987), and (iv) continua related to recruiting the assistance of others (Kendrick & Drew 2016; Rossi 2014), amongst others.

To construct this argument, I draw on research from analysts working on a range of interactional phenomena. In some of these studies, progressivity is discussed by the authors as a specific issue of interest, while in others, its relevance is only implicit. While certainly not intended to be an exhaustive list, my objective here is to bring progressivity to the analytic forefront by demonstrating how a very diverse array of practices can be situated on a common continuum. This chapter is therefore intended to make a theoretical contribution to the discipline, illustrating that a scalar view of progressivity, grounded in the concrete practices of participants, provides an added analytic dimension that can be used both to recognize similarities between seemingly unrelated practices, as well as to disentangle differences amongst seemingly identical practices, used in talk-in-interaction.
5.2 ‘CLASSIC’ CASES OF REPAIR

Let us begin by considering a few ‘classic’ cases of repair. Due to space considerations, we will limit our discussion to instances of (primarily same-turn) self-repair, but the present analysis can surely be extended to other sorts of repair as well (see, e.g., footnote 6).

Schegloff (2013) summarizes same-turn self-repair as being comprised of ten operations: Replacing, inserting, deleting, searching, parenthesizing, aborting, sequence-jumping, recycling, reformatting, and reordering. An example of replacing is seen in (6) below in which the verb phrase “tuh sell” is replaced with “tuh buy”:

(6) SBL

01  Bee:  ... then more people will show up. Cuz they
02    -> won’t feel obligated tuh sell. Tuh buy.

In this case, Bee has apparently misspoken and used the incorrect verb at the end of her TCU. Upon recognizing this as a trouble source, she redoes that part of the turn, replacing the verb within the verb phrase.

Consider also the syntactic reformatting example (7), in which Leslie redesigns her declarative “But you were- (out)”, in favor of the interrogative version “were you o\_u\_it?” (line 2).

(7) Field SO88(II):1:3:1 [Drew 2013: 133]

01  Les:  .hhhh I RANG you up-(.) ah: think it wz la:s’ night.
02    -> But you were- (. ) u\_were you o\_u\_it? Or: was it the night
03    before perhaps.

Compared to the first version of the turn, Leslie’s repaired formulation of the question indexes a steeper epistemic gradient that no longer presumes access to Hal and his life (Heritage 2012a, 2012b). In this sense, the new version is designedly more “cautious...since all she may know is that Hal did not answer the phone” (Drew 2013: 133; cf. Pomerantz 1980). Such self-repairs
frequently demonstrate interactants’ orientations to epistemic and experiential “territories” (Heritage 2011b; Kamio 1997) more generally, which we can see reflected here in the details of turn design.

For reasons that will become clear shortly, these sorts of repairs, I will argue, are relatively unmarked. That is, in the same way that unmarked person reference forms convey that “nothing but referring is being done” (Schegloff 1996a: 439), such unmarked reparative designs are formulated to convey that nothing but redoing is being done. Of course I do not mean to suggest that such replacements are done arbitrarily or are unimportant to speakers and to their goals for action. Rather, what I mean is that, through their unmarked design, they do not endeavor to shape in any way the default hindering effect that the reparative action will have on the progressivity of the talk.

But self-repairs can be designed such that their effect on the progressivity of the interaction is amplified or diminished from this normative default. Consider another syntactic reformatting example (8) below, which at first glance may look identical to the previous case (7). Just as in (7), here the speaker redesigns her declarative “Well Beth didn’t (e.g., have to wait…)” in favor of an interrogative formulation “didn’t Beth get to work…” (lines 12-13). The crucial difference that I wish to highlight, however, is the role of “didn’t”, which serves here as a pivot between the trouble source and the repair solution.

(8) Virginia

01 MOM: Well: -Beth (.) spends her own money on her clothes.
02 (0.7)
03 VIR: <Well if I got more money °I could spend my own
04 money.
05 MOM: [But Beth works.
06 VIR: Wull why can’t I::?
07 MOM: Beh- oh:, Vuhginia, we've been through this. When
08 you’re old enough you ca:n work in the store.
09 (0.2)
Similar to the prior example, here Virginia’s repair attempts to redo something that was initially launched in a different way, replacing the version she deems inapposite with one she sees as a better fit for her interactional aims (on negative interrogatives, see Heritage 2002a). In this instance, though, the repair space is comparatively diminished as it is only upon production of the second “Beth” that the Janus-faced character of “didn’t” can be recognized. That is, here an element from the trouble source is repurposed such that it becomes part of the repair solution. The result is that the speaker has effectively already begun to provide the repair solution seemingly before she has even initiated repair. Example (7) might have been done similarly, as But you [were] you out? (cf. “But you [.] were you out?”, as it was actually produced). And so while (7) and (8) are both instances of self-initiated, same-turn, self-repair, example (8) is comparatively less progressivity-halting than example (7), as it is only retroactively that the hearer can recognize that progressivity was ever retarded.

Efforts to minimize the progressivity-retarding nature of repair operations have recently been illuminated by Lerner and Kitzinger (2015) in their study of repair prefaces, where they focus on self-initiated repairs prefaced with the conjunction or. The authors argue that “although or-prefaced repairs do substitute one formulation for another, the or-preface shows that the trouble source formulation is not being discarded altogether, thereby mitigating the reparative character of the repair operation” (58). Consider the following case (9), taken from a grandmother’s call to a helpline to announce a positive outcome for her daughter and the daughter’s new baby since the prior call.
(9) [Lerner & Kitzinger 2015: 70]

01 Clr: The baby put on four ounces so she was allowed "home!"
02 Clt: Uh- put on four ounces when.
03 Clr: --> **or [ninety grams]**. Which I think is about four ounces
04 Clt: [Since when. ]
05 Clr: Uhm: well between birth ‘n: (.)
06 Clt: _Ah that’s lovely:."

About this extract, Lerner and Kitzinger write the following: “Given that she is merely converting units, the circumstances furnish an occasion for designing the repair in a way that retains a connection with the trouble source…and the or-preface explicitly casts a relationship between repair solution and trouble source that indicates this” (2015: 70). Or-prefacing, the authors argue, is therefore “a way to indicate that both formulations are appropriate in their own way” (ibid.). Although backward-looking in the sense that it ‘redoes’ something that was already said prior, the progressivity-hindering nature of the operation has effectively been blurred or masked through the specific formulation used to do the repair. Compared to the unmarked repair formulations in (6) and (7), then, such a design engenders a **less halting effect** on the progressivity of the talk by casting the or-prefaced information as an addition or a modification rather than an outright replacement.

We have seen that, through practices such as pivots and or-prefacing, repairs can be designed such that their hindrance on the progressivity of the talk is minimized; but there are also formulations that work to exacerbate the progressivity-retardant nature of reparative operations. For instance, rather than moving directly on from the trouble source to the repair solution, a speaker can repeat the trouble source before the solution, as seen in (10):

(10) TG

01 Bee: --> nYeeah, .hh **This feller** I have- {(nn)/(iv-)}
02 --> "felluh"; **this main.** (0.2) t! hhh
03 He ha::(s)- uff-eh-who-who I have
04 fer Linguistics is really too much,
Here, Bee replaces the noun *feller* with *man* in line 2, but only after quoting herself saying “felluh”, pronounced the second time with greater word-final /r/-lessness, which for these speakers of New York English may serve to momentarily index trait(s) ideologically taken to be associated with members of a lower socioeconomic status (Eckert 2008; Labov 1966). Then, after producing the repair solution in its own intonational phrase, she pauses and does a little laugh before moving on with her telling. Of course *this* design to do *this* repair accomplishes important interactional work, not the least of which is highlighting the apparent ridiculousness (from Bee’s perspective) of the original *feller* formulation. But what is relevant for our purposes here is that, in this case, an entire additional action—some sort of jocular reported speech—has been *produced within* and therefore *expanded* the repair space. As such, the progressivity of the talk—that is, the forward movement of the original telling sequence-in-progress—is *more severely retarded* here than in the case of the other repairs seen thus far in this section. Bee’s launch of the story is *further delayed* by designing her repair in this way than it would have been if she had simply moved directly from *feller* to *man* (e.g., *This feller I have- {(nn)/(iv-)} This ma:n I have fer Linguistics...*). In contrast to ‘just replacing’ as in the case of unmarked repairs, or minimizing the reparative operation as in the case of pivots or *or-*prefacing, by repeating the trouble source, the speaker “*highlights* the fact that she is dismissing it in favor of a replacement” (Lerner & Kitzinger 2015: 68), which I posit is accomplished through an amplified retarding of progressivity.

Different repair prefaces can also work to exacerbate the progressivity-hindering nature of reparative operations. Lerner and Kitzinger (2015) provide an example of a *well-*prefaced repair, arguing that such a preface draws attention to the repair as “more than merely a pro forma change” (68). Heritage and Moreno (in prep.) make a similar claim in their analysis of several hundred *well-*prefaced repairs, one of which is reproduced in (11) below. Here Mum is telling Leslie that
she is having her kitchen re-painted because she “coudn’t abide” (i.e., didn’t like) how the walls looked before (line 63). She overtly rejects “the emulsion” as an accurate description of the prior wall treatment in line 67, launching an alternative description with “It wz a:-:-:-”. After failing to come up with a suitable alternative, she decides that emulsion may be an appropriate description after all, prefacing her repair solution with well: “we'll yes a sort've emulsion.” (line 68).

(11) Field 1.1

63 Mum: I coudn't I: coudn't abide what I has o:n: las'ti:[me,
64 Les: [What
65 Mum: didyuh have o:n: =Eh: we'll:, a sort of a (1.0) a sort of a (0.6) well
66 -> ( ) (1.3) not the e\_ulsion. It wz a:-:-:-
67 -> (.) we'll yes a sort've e\_ulsion.
68 (0.5)
69 Mum: Bu[t u]h-
70 Les: [Oh:-]
71 (0.3)
72 Mum: A sort've: uh:m: (0.5) vinyl emulsion.

Given that Mum had just claimed overtly that it was “not the e\_ulsion” and gone on to project a distinct description, she prefaches her repair solution in a way that emphasizes that repair is taking place (see Clift 2001 on marking similar sorts of repairs with the particle actually; see also Chapters 2 and 3). Thus the well-preface, followed by the affirmative “yes” which contrasts with the negation in the trouble source, expands the repair space and effectively exacerbates the progressivity-hindering nature of the reparative operation.

Multiple practices can also be combined to further retard the progressivity of talk. For instance, Heritage and Moreno (in prep.) estimate that somewhere between one-third and one-half of all well-prefaced repairs repeat the trouble source with negation before providing the repair solution. Such a ‘stacking’ of resources further underscores that repair is taking place by further delaying the forward-movement of the talk. This is seen in example (12) below.
Upon claiming that he went up a mountain on this particular bike, Don finds it necessary to modify that description. To effect this replacement, he produces a well-preface, overtly rejects his earlier formulation with “not on it”, and then provides an alternative description “with it”, which is subsequently modified with “pushing it.” (lines 32/34). Thus while the prior well-prefaced repair case (11) indexed a greater hitch in progressivity compared to an unmarked repair, in this well-prefaced repair case (12) progressivity is even further retarded through the overt rejection of the trouble source (in its own intonational phrase) before providing the repair solution. Such a move works to draw the hearer’s attention to the fact that the speaker was not going up the mountain on his bike in regular fashion (i.e., riding it), as may be expected (see Chapter 3), but was pushing it instead. That this distinction be apparent to Cindy is crucial in order for Don’s comedic announcement to be a success. And thus we can see that, in this instance, Don hinders the progressivity of the delivery of his announcement to such a great degree in the service of increasing the likelihood that his announcement will be understood accurately and responded to appropriately upon its completion. We will return to discussion of why a speaker might design utterances with more or less hindrance of progressivity in a later section.
If we take the (certainly non-exhaustive) list of repair practices discussed in this section, we can begin to create a spectrum of progressivity within the domain of repair formulations, as seen in Figure 5.1. In this figure, the normative rate of progressivity which we saw illustrated in example (1) exists to the right of the practices on this spectrum, as all of the operations listed here fall short—to varying degrees, as I have shown—of that level of unmarked, turn-by-turn progressivity.

![Figure 5.1: A Scalar View of Progressivity within the Domain of Repair](image)

In all of the cases examined in this section, progressivity became ‘halted’ in some fashion. But here we have seen that participants are concerned not only with whether progressivity is ‘halted’, but also by how much.\(^5\) A speaker may seek to more significantly retard the forward-looking motion of the talk in order to, for instance, make sure his/her interlocutor realizes how ridiculous the speaker thinks the trouble source was as a first formulation (e.g., (10)), or in the service of ensuring that a forthcoming announcement will be properly understood (e.g., (13)); or

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\(^5\) Note that repair after next turn (Schegloff 1992) might be viewed, in this framework, as even more halting of progressivity than all of the operations discussed here. This is because, in instances of repair after next turn, the loss of intersubjectivity is detected and “set aright by realigning and meshing the parties’ understandings and immediately embodying them in a succession of actions that, in effect, replaces an earlier succession and that resumes the interaction’s course of action” (Schegloff 1992: 1325). Thus repairs after next turn jump backward to a greater degree, dealing with an entire succession of actions, as opposed to just a (piece of a) single TCU.
s/he may endeavor to provide an alternative formulation in a way that does not replace the first formulation altogether, but simply modifies it, thereby masking the degree of ‘redoing’ and therefore the degree of progressivity hindrance (e.g., (9)). In each case, though, we can see that speakers are designing their self-repairs in accordance with interactional aims that are in part accomplished by just how much the progressivity of the talk is being retarded.

5.3 INCREMENTS AS REPAIR-LIKE

We saw in the previous section that a scalar view of progressivity allows us to extend beyond the simple ‘repair vs. not repair’ binary, into more nuanced understandings of the practices used to do repair, and the effects those practices have on the progressivity-hindering nature of reparative operations. In this section, I will illustrate how a continuum of progressivity similarly allows us to more concretely conceptualize how increments (Ford, Fox & Thompson 2002; Ford & Thompson 1996; Schegloff 1996b; Tanaka 1999; Walker 2007: 2218) are related to, but also distinct from, the more ‘classic’ cases of repair, just described. Increments are not typically considered instances of repair, and yet nonetheless unambiguously fall short of the sort of straight progressivity seen in extract (1). In this sense, they can be conceived of as, to borrow a term from Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2005), “repair-like”.

Ford, Fox, and Thompson (2002: 15) define increments as “non-main clause continuation[s] after a possible point of turn completion”, including adverbs and adverbial phrases/clauses, noun phrases, prepositional phrases, and relative clauses. Prior completion is

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6 While I have focused on self-repair here, parallel arguments can be made about other-correction, which can be done in ways that hinder progressivity to a greater or lesser degree (e.g., via ‘exposed’ vs. ‘embedded’ means; see Jefferson 1987).

7 Thompson, Fox, and Couper-Kuhlen (2015: Ch. 3) also discuss more and less ‘repair-like’ responses to informings. See specifically their Table 3.2 on page 62.

8 The specific repair-like practice described by Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2005)—‘concessive repair’—will be discussed in a later section.
conceived of in terms of the convergence of syntax (i.e., is the utterance syntactically/grammatically complete?), prosody (i.e., has the utterance been brought to a turn-final intonational contour?), and pragmatics (i.e., is the action complete in its local interactional sequence?). Here I focus on the subset of increments that Ford, Fox, and Thompson (2002) classify as *extensions*, which are frequently grammatically parasitic on the prior turn and work to “pursu[e] uptake by continuing the action of the just possibly-complete turn” (19; see also Ford 1993: ch. 5; Tanaka 1999: 87; cf. Pomerantz 1984).

Consider example (13) in which Leslie furnishes additional information in an attempt to clarify a person reference for Joyce. Leslie’s first formulation—“The young one:”—is produced in overlap, after which she produces “Missiz Baker’s daughter.” (line 4). Following a lack of timely uptake from Joyce in line 5, Leslie adds an increment in the form of a prepositional phrase that is parasitic on the prior unit: “Fr’m North Cadbury.” (line 6).

(13) Holt C85-4-Sale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>Overlap</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Joy: Which one is that. Is that the one that the dih- the:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Les: nu:rse, the district nur[se the]younger ]one</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>[T h e ]you:g o]ne: no; no</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>-&gt; hh Missiz Baker's daughter.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>-&gt; (0.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Les: -&gt; Fr'm North Cadbury[.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Joy: [hhh                   [↑Oh::::. Oh ↓oh oh:, hhh Oh ↑she</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>wants to join do[es she]?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Les: [Yes she did belong to Evvikridge.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Joy: ↑Oh:::[g r e a : t.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Les: [ h[ But it got ]very political over the:re</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Joy: Oh did it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this case, the formulation *Mrs. Baker’s daughter* is not ‘wrong’; it’s still true that the person in question is Mrs. Baker’s daughter, and so that TCU is not ‘repaired’ in the traditional sense. Nonetheless, that piece of information was apparently not enough for Joyce, and so Leslie provides an additional bit of information in search of demonstrated understanding from her recipient.
Compared to a fully-fledged *She's from North Cadbury*, which would have constituted a new TCU in and of itself, the increment version, *From North Cadbury*, is grammatically parasitic on the prior TCU, retroactively extending that prior turn by recompleting it (Tanaka 1999: 87), and thereby masking that there was a lack of uptake in the first place. In addition to increased intersubjectivity, the upshot of this retroactively extended turn may be face-affirmation for both parties: Leslie’s description was accurate and sufficient on the ‘first’ try, and Joyce understood the information on the ‘first’ try.

Pursuits of this sort are not canonically classified as instances of repair, presumably because they are not sufficiently progressivity-halting: They provide something ‘new’, adding to the prior as opposed to ‘redoing’ or ‘replacing’ it, and so they embody progressivity. Yet at the same time, they are responsive to a lack of uptake from the hearer, which might be due to a problem of understanding with the just-prior completed turn; and they effectively renew the relevance of response to the prior action by recompleting that action. Thus increments of this sort are not quite at the level of the unmarked, turn-by-turn progressivity that we saw in example (1), rather just shy of it. And yet nor do they halt progressivity to the degree that we saw in the ‘classic’ repair cases seen in the previous section. As such, this practice exists somewhere in between the various reparative operations we discussed above, and straight unmarked progressivity.

Consider another example in (14) in which Emma and Nancy are discussing the recent television coverage of the events following JFK’s assassination. Likely due to Emma’s rapid shift in topic (note the disjunctive *hey*-preface in line 12), her deictic “that” is apparently uninterpretable for Nancy. In pursuit of uptake, Emma produces one increment in line 15, and following an additional lack of uptake, a second increment in line 17. This second increment is then receipted

(14) NB:II:2:R

01 Nan: .t.hhh We'll I think it's sad that they
don't ah:, h allo.:w u-you know the fam'lies et least th'
03 _decen[cY of hav]ing s'm privacy._
04 Emm: [e e Y a h]
05 (0.4)
06 Emm: Yeah'n the church yesterday thih .hhhh fla:shin the ca:m'ras
07 on um when theh w'r there yihknow went in tuy pr:a:y and
08 an' (. ) ↑Go:d g-
09 (. )
10 Emm: [J a h-]
11 Nan: [Ah thi]nk iss ↑terrible.=
12 Emm: =.hh ↑Jackie looked up!, h Hey that wz the same spot we
13 took off fer Ho:nuhlulu
14 → (0.3)
15 Emm: → Where they puut. him o:n,
16 → (0.6)
17 Emm: → et that chartered pla:[ce,
18 Nan: ↑[Oh: ri↑ll]y?
19 Emm: ↑[y:::Ye:::ah,]
20 Nan: ↑Oh: fer heaven sa:[kes.
21 Emm: ↑[ExA:ly it says on West Imperial
22 Booleva:rd in : u h ]
23 Nan: ↑[**Mm hm]**

As in the previous example, the original formulation (lines 12-13) is not retracted upon production of the increments, and thus we are not in the traditional domain of repair and ‘replacement’. In addition, the same ‘sort’ of uptake (e.g., indicating newsworthiness) is due from Nancy in lines 14, 16, and 18. Compared to straight, unmarked progressivity, then, the progressivity of the sequence being launched by Emma is nonetheless retarded during the provision of these increments.

Increments need not provide completely new informational content; they can also simply reshape the terms established by the turns on which they are parasitic, still in search of uptake from a recipient. Consider example (15) below in which, following a 1.1-second lack of uptake to his request from line 1, Guy adds the increment “by any chance?” in line 3:
(15) NB:I:1:R

01 Guy: -> 'Av ↑you go(.)t uh: Seacliffs phone number?h
02 -> (1.1)
03 Guy: -> by any chance?
04 (0.3)
05 Jon: Yeeeha?
06 (2.6)
07 Jon: .k.hhh hIts uh:< (.).t.h FI VE THREE SIX:
08 (1.3)
09 Jon: Seven fi:ve seven fi:ve.
10 (1.9)
11 Guy: nA'ri',
12 (2.1)

Guy’s increment in line 3 renews the relevance of response to his initial question in line 1. In that sense, it does not launch a new sequence or make relevant a new or different action than that which was already solicited by line 1: A turn that will address the previous request for the phone number is still ‘due’ following the increment. The increment does, however, introduce cross-cutting preferences (Schegloff 2007a: 76-78) by way of its negative polarity item *any*, thereby relaxing the pressure for an affirmative response compared to the original version of the question in line 1 (Heritage, et al. 2007). Thus what we have is a constituent that adds something new in terms of design, thereby embodying progressivity, while simultaneously being formulated as parasitic on the speaker’s own prior utterance, retroactively “reinterpreting that unit as still in progress” both in terms of syntax and action (Ford, Fox & Thompson 2002: 25-26).

When speakers produce increments to pursue uptake from hearers, they effectively make a guess as to what the issue is that is causing the lack of response, thereby staving off a potential other-initiation of repair. For instance, in (13), Leslie surmises from Joyce’s lack up uptake that *Mrs. Baker’s daughter* was an insufficient description of the person in question, and so she goes on to provide additional information designed to remedy the issue her recipient is having. As we have reviewed, pursuits designed as increments continue the prior action by being grammatically parasitic on the prior turn. As such, they embody a greater degree of progressivity than the
operations canonically associated with repair (discussed in the prior section), and yet they do not reach the level of the unmarked, turn-by-turn progressivity that we saw in example (1). As in the previous figure, here in Figure 5.2, the normative rate of progressivity which we saw illustrated in example (1) exists to the right of the practices on this spectrum. Increments therefore fall somewhere in between the reparative operations discussed in the previous section, and that level of unmarked, turn-by-turn progressivity.

\[ \text{F} \text{IGURE 5.2: A Scalar View of the Progressivity of ‘Classic’ Repair vs. Increments} \]

5.4 EXPEDITED PROGRESSIVITY

Thus far I have focused on practices that retard progressivity in various ways, illustrating that a scalar view of progressivity allows us to situate repair and repair-like practices on a common continuum. But such a continuum is also analytically useful at its other pole, in cases where progressivity is not hindered, but rather expedited. In these cases, interactants can be seen to be skipping actions, sequences, and even whole phases, as they orient to some future action or activity.

Expedites progressivity has been most notably documented in institutional interactions wherein both parties are demonstrably oriented to a common end goal, and actively take steps to
get there as quickly as possible. For instance, in the following exchange (16), taken from Merritt (1976), the customer wants to buy a cup of coffee, and the clerk wants to sell a cup of coffee:

(16) [Merritt 1976: 325]

01 Customer: Do you have coffee to go?
02 Clerk: Cream and sugar? ((starts to pour coffee))
03 Customer: Cream only.
04 Clerk: Okay ((putting cream in))

As opposed to answering the customer’s yes/no interrogative from line 1 (e.g., with a type-conforming interjection response; Raymond 2003), the clerk responds by asking if the customer wants cream and sugar and begins to pour the coffee. In this sense, the participants have skipped both the second-pair part to the pre-request, as well as the base request sequence (e.g., Q: Can I have a cup please? A: Sure / ((coffee pour))), in the service of moving the activity forward.⁹

Similar cases are discussed in Levinson (1981) where the author argues that responses of this sort “are aimed not at what has been said, but at the broader motive, or higher level goal, that is seen to lie behind what has been said” (110). Consider example (17):

(17) [Levinson 1981: 110]

01 A: Is John there?
02 B: You can reach him at extension thirty-four sixty-two.

Levinson stresses the extremely pro-social nature of such exchanges, despite the divergence from type-conformity: “...B’s response is not an answer, and yet constitutes and eminently cooperative response on the understanding that the motive behind A’s question is A’s wanting to get in touch with John” (110; see also Pomerantz 2014). In more recent work on institutional talk, Lee (2011)

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⁹ Various contingencies surround the clerk’s ability to expedite progressivity in this specific way. For example, there is apparently only one coffee to choose from (cf., e.g., the customer needing to select between a light roast vs. a dark roast), there is apparently only one size cup on offer (cf. the customer having to select small, medium, or large), and so on. These contingencies are certainly relevant, and indeed have been taken up recently by Fox (2015). For the moment, I set these issues aside to focus simply on the progressivity-accelerating nature of the clerk’s move. We will, however, return to some of these contingencies in the discussion section.
has called this “responding at a higher level,” arguing that, with such responsive turns, “interactants prioritize activity progressivity over sequence type-conformity” (915).

If we compare the sort of activity progressivity seen in (16) and (17) to the unmarked progressivity of our earlier example (1), what we see here is that progressivity is being ‘sped up’ or expedited beyond that turn-by-turn default. In these two most recent cases, it is clear that a sequence or two has been elided or ‘jumped over’ in the service of arriving at some end goal.

There are also cases in which participants can be seen to jump over much more than just a few sequences. In the following case of an emergency service call, for instance, the fire department interdicts the caller’s problem presentation to provide a response to the problem:

(18) [Jefferson 1973: 57; see also Drew 2009]

01 Clr: Fire department,
02 FD: Out at the Fairview Food [mart there’s a-]
03 -> [Yes.
04 -> We’ve already got the uh call on that ma’am,

In this case, the call-taker’s turn—produced in interjacent overlap—can be seen to skip over not only the remainder of the caller’s problem presentation, but also the entire interrogative series that normally follows it, straight to providing a response to the problem. Here, then, the call-taker elides not just an adjacency pair or two, but rather the bulk of the normative phase structure of a call for emergency service (see Zimmerman 1992) in an effort to occasion call closure. Comparatively then, the progressivity of this interaction is even further expedited than in the previous two examples.

The ability for participants to expedite progressivity is not unique to institutional interaction. Conversational interactants can also speed up the progressivity of ordinary talk. Consider the case of call openings, which canonically move from identification and greetings, to reciprocal how-are-you sequences, to the first topic (Schegloff 1968). This is seen in (19) below:
Identification and greetings (lines 1-2), reciprocal how-are-yous (lines 3-8), and then the launch of the first topic in line 9.


01 Tom: Hello: Jas↓in
02 Jas: hHi: To↑:m
03 Tom: How‘r you:.  
04 Jas: I‘m ↓GREAT,=
05 Tom: =GOO:d.
06 (.)
07 Jas: How‘r ↑you:.
08 Tom: Pretty ↓goo:d,  
09 Jas: Hey we‘re havin a meetin:g Toosdee ni:ght,

Just as we saw in our first example (1), then, here in (19) we have another example of unmarked progressivity, this time from the beginning of a telephone call. Observe, though, how this normative structure can be ‘sped up’ in various ways in the following cases (20) through (22):

(20) NB:IV:12:R

01 Emm: How‘r you:.  
02 Ear: -> F:ine’ow‘r you Emma yih wan’talk tih Lottie?
03 (0.2)
04 Emm: Uh ya:h WELL ↑LI[sten she]‘s busy ah‘ll [call‘er.]
05 Ear: [He:re. ] [No: she]‘s right
06 he:re waitamin:it.
07 (0.3)

(21) NB:II:2

01 Nan: Hel↑lo:,  
02 Emm: .hh HI::.
03 (.)
04 Nan: Oh:’I::: ow a:re you Emmah:
05 Emm: -> FI:NE yer LINE‘S BEEN BUSY.
06 Nan: Yea:h (. ) my  u.-fuhh h-.hhhh my fa:ther‘s wife ca:lls me:,h
07 .hhhh So when she ca:lls me:::,h .hh I always talk fer a lo:ng
08 ti:me cz she c‘n afford it‘n I ca:n‘t.hhh[hhh]“huh”]
In (20), Earl launches a reciprocal *how-are-you* sequence in line 2, but rather than waiting for Emma’s response, immediately offers to pass the phone to his wife (Emma’s sister), Lottie. This action preempts a presumably forthcoming ‘switchboard request’ (Schegloff 1979a) from Emma.

In (21), Emma answers Nancy’s *how-are-you* in line 5, but completely elides the reciprocal *how-are-you* sequence, instead producing a B-event statement to solicit an account for why Nancy’s telephone line has been busy (Pomerantz 1980; Raymond & Stivers 2016).

In (22), both of the *how-are-you* sequences are elided altogether as Lottie responds to Emma’s greeting with “Well WHERE’VE YOU BEE:N.” (line 2). The *well*-preface (Heritage 2015) and increased volume combine with the placement of this turn in a slot where reciprocal *how-are-you* sequences canonically occur to create an “accusatory” question (Heritage 1998: 305). Heritage notes that these “more drastic pre-emptions tend to occur early and to involve questions that can attract *oh*-prefaced responses” (ibid.), which we see from Emma in this case (line 3).

In each of these examples (20)-(22), then, the normative structure of the call opening has been ‘sped up’, so to speak: The participants skipped over certain actions (and sequences of actions) in order to produce another action *earlier* than it would otherwise have been produced. And in each case, comparatively more talk was elided than in the prior: A single action in (20), a single sequence in (21), and two sequences in (22). As Schegloff (1986: 133) observes in analyzing such cases: “The participants may examine such preemptions, each case in its own terms and by
reference to its own particularities, to find what may have prompted a party who has preempted to preempt on that occasion, and to preempt to some particular degree, where ‘degree’ refers to the amount of ordinary opening business that has been preempted by initiating first topic or action sequence at a given point”. In this sense, the progressivity of these call openings has been expedited (to varying degrees) when compared to that of the canonical case (19), just as we saw occur in the various institutional cases analyzed prior.

Expedit ed progressivity can be visualized on the same continuum as used in the previous figures. Now, in Figure 5.3, the ‘normal’ rate of progressivity which we saw illustrated in examples (1) and (19) exists to the left of the practices on this spectrum, as the sorts of turns discussed in this section advance the progressivity of the talk faster than that default level. And even further to the left of unmarked progressivity, then, would be the various repair and repair-like practices discussed in previous sections.

![Figure 5.3: A Scalar View of Expedited Progressivity](image_url)

The arrow on the right end of this spectrum merits special mention: The progressivity of talk can be accelerated far beyond just the elision of a few turns or sequences. We saw this in the institutional example (18), in which the call-taker skipped over entire phases of the emergency
service call in an effort to quickly bring the call to a close. This is surely also possible in non-
institutional talk as well, although given the comparatively unrestricted nature of ordinary conversation, such extreme cases of expedited progressivity may be more difficult to detect. An ethnographic example that comes to mind, which is frequently parodied in romantic comedy films, is where a boyfriend or girlfriend will say to his/her partner, *We need to talk*, which is immediately responded to by the partner with something like *Oh my God, you’re breaking up with me, aren’t you?!* In such cases, presumably there would have been a substantial amount of talk between that preliminary action of requesting time to talk, and the later ‘base’ action of actually breaking up; and yet all of that talk—an unknown but potentially quite extensive number of sequences—is skipped over with such a response by the partner.

5.5 DISCUSSION: NEW QUESTIONS AND SOME HYPOTHESES

This study has argued in favor of a scalar view of progressivity in interaction. In presenting evidence for this claim, I illustrated how a seemingly unrelated variety of interactional practices can be situated on a common continuum. We began with some canonical instances of repair, moved to a practice that would not traditionally be categorized as repair but is nonetheless repair-like (increments), and ultimately ended with cases that are not reparative in any way. At first consideration, these operations may be thought to be completely distinct from one another—for example, some are repair and others aren’t; and indeed, this is how previous studies have viewed them. But here I have shown that this diverse array of practices can be conceptualized as existing on a common continuum that spans from *less*-progressivity to *more*-progressivity, or from more progressivity-*hindering* to more progressivity-*expediting*. This can be conceptualized visually as in Figure 5.4.
Through this scalar view of progressivity, we are thus able to recognize that these seemingly unrelated operations are, at least in this respect, two sides of the same coin, sharing more features in common with one another than has thus far been appreciated in the literature.

My aim in reconceptualizing progressivity more concretely as a scalar phenomenon has been to provide a theoretical contribution that can shine new light on familiar practices. With this foundation, we are now equipped with the means to ask a range of new questions, both in the discovery of new practices as well as in the reexamination of familiar ones. In what follows, I pose what I view as some of the key questions that might be asked with this scalar view of progressivity in mind, as well as provide some tentative answers and testable hypotheses. As each of these issues related to progressivity, action, and accountability is far too complex to tackle in a single chapter, it is my hope that this section will inspire future work in this area.
5.5.1 **Question 1:** How do we classify something as ‘repair’ (cf., e.g., ‘repair-like’)?

Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks’s (1977) original definition of repair is a very general one, meaning that the boundaries of the phenomenon are fuzzy (both for co-participants as well as for analysts). For example, what constitutes ‘trouble’? Is it only trouble that is a publically displayed reality, or can it also be simply a presumed or likely possibility? Can a speaker correct only what has actually been said, or can s/he also correct what might be understood, implied, or assumed from what has been said (see Chapter 3)? As we begin to ask ourselves these questions, we start to approach the edges of what constitutes the domain of ‘repair’, and also the interactional mechanisms through with repair is realized. Identifying these boundaries is an important issue, particularly given the status of repair vis-à-vis other action types (Schegloff 1979b, 1997).

It seems clear that Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks intended to include all of these possibilities within the domain of repair given their assertion that “nothing is, in principle, excludable from the class ‘reparable’” (363). Nonetheless, while such a view makes sense at a theoretical level, in practice it risks causing the boundaries of the phenomenon to unravel to a point at which it no longer provides us with any analytic traction. This further evidences the need for a more refined metric to judge what lies within—and what lies outside of—the “organizational domain of repair” (Schegloff 1982: 91).

A scalar view of progressivity provides one way to address this issue. One hypothesis, which is supported by the practices reviewed in this chapter, is that there is a ‘threshold’ of sorts with respect to progressivity-hindrance: Once a participant retards progressivity at that level or more, the interactants are operating within the domain of repair. But if progressivity is not hindered to a sufficient enough degree—i.e., not passing the threshold—then they are *approaching* repair but not quite there yet. Indeed, when researchers describe phenomena (some of which were/will
be reviewed in this chapter) as “repair-like” (Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson 2005), as “mitigating the reparative character of the repair” (Lerner & Kitzinger 2015: 58), as “boundary instances…of repair” (Maynard 2013a: 217; Schegloff 1997), and as “more virtual than real, more pragmatic than technical [repair]” (Maynard 2013a: 218), they appear to be dealing with this precise issue: Such practices certainly retard progressivity compared to the normative default, but not enough to strike us (and participants) as ‘true’ instances of repair. Other practices, however, clearly cross this threshold and are easily understood as canonical cases of repair. So where exactly, on the progressivity continuum, does this threshold lie?

5.5.2 Question 2: How (much) can the hindrance or acceleration of progressivity affect a turn’s action ascription?

On the more progressivity-hindering side of the spectrum, this question about action ascription\(^\text{10}\) is related to Question 1 on the boundaries of repair, and lies behind much of the discussion in Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2005), Lerner and Kitzinger (2015), and Maynard (2013a): Does a speaker want his/her turn to be understood as doing repair or not? In any single case, what is at stake if repair is understood to be taking place when the speaker doesn’t mean for it to be understood that way, or vice versa?

But this question is also relevant on the other side of the progressivity spectrum. Consider again the expedited call opening in (22), repeated below as (23).

(23) NB II:1:R

01 Emm: . . . morning.
02 Lot: -> Well WHERE’VE YOU BEEN.
03 Emm: . hhhh OH I’VE BEEN DOWN HERE,
04 (0.2)
05 Lot: I w’z down there over:: Memorial Day’n you weren’t
06 the:re.

\(^{10}\) For an overview of action formation and action ascription, see Levinson (2013).
However we want to classify Lottie’s line 2—“Well WHERE’VE YOU BEE:N.”—in terms of action (e.g., as an “accusatory question”; Heritage 1998: 305), we can now ask the following: How much of that action ascription comes from the design properties of the turn itself (e.g., \textit{well}-preface, raised volume), and how much of it comes from the fact that this turn embodies expedited progressivity? In other words, how is this action different by virtue of its occurring ‘early’, compared to if it had been produced with routine progressivity, as the normatively placed ‘first topic’ of the call? If, as Schegloff (1986: 133) argues, the recipient will aim to discover “what may have prompted a party who has preempted to preempt on that occasion, and to preempt to some particular degree,” then, in principle, we should be able to see orientations to this in the talk (e.g., the \textit{oh}-preface in Emma’s response; Heritage 1998).

The larger issue, then, is the following: Might a certain class of actions actually be defined by the earliness (or lateness, for that matter) of their occurrence, in progressivity terms—that is, by their accelerating or retarding effect on progressivity? It seems that this should be part of the “now” in CA’s omnirelevant inquiry \textit{Why that now?} (Schegloff & Sacks 1973: 299): What is this turn-at-talk doing, how is it composed, and how does its placement within the progression of the talk affect those features of its production and interpretation? Indeed, as noted in our discussion of Question 1, it seems that the action of repair is at least in part defined by having a certain degree of progressivity hindrance. On the other end of the spectrum, though, the research is less developed in this area.\footnote{Curl (2006), for example, illustrates that the syntactic design of offers reflects whether a problem is formulated explicitly or whether it is simply educed from previous talk. But this work, and other work like it, is not based in issues of progressivity as much as it is based in issues of sequentiality. These are of course related, but nonetheless distinct, phenomena.} More work on the ‘skipping’ of turns, sequences, and sequences of sequences is necessary to discover the import of such expedited progressivity to participants’ goals for action.
5.5.3 **Question 3:** Why might the ‘same’ practice or action be designed such that it hinders or expedites progressivity to a greater or lesser degree?

This question is related to Question 2, but with reverse directionality. To address this issue, let us consider a pair of concrete examples. The following two cases are instances of what Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2005) call ‘concessive repair’, which they classify as a repair-like practice. Following overstatements and exaggerations (see Drew 2003), concessive repair is used to downgrade or weaken the original claim by providing a revised formulation, while “at the same time preserve[ing] the essence of their initial description” (Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson 2005: 257). This practice, then, does not aim to completely replace what came before, but rather to modify it in some way (see also Jefferson 1974).

In the first case (24), Emma uses a categorical negative “I haven't had a piece a'meat.” to describe her eating habits (line 12). The concession is then made following a one-second gap: “Over et Bill's I had ta:cos Mondee ni:ght little bitta meat the*:re. B't not much.” (lines 14-15). Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson write that “in this way Emma can preserve her claim that she has not eaten meat recently, although it is no longer made as exclusively as before” (266).

(24) NB:IV:13:R:10

```
01 Lot:    I:'d uh leave off the meat.
02 Emm:    "I think I 'll try to haven't had a piece a'meat since I been down here.
04 (.)
05 Emm:    I don't think except 'when we eat out No ah din have any w'n I ate out with you:.
07 (1.0)
08 Emm:    .t [.h "Wh-oh]
09 Lot:    [No y o u] had a bawl a'soup,
10 Emm:    .t nYe:ah,
11 (0.2)
12 Emm:   -> I haven't had a piece a'meat:.
13 (1.0)
14 Emm:   -> Over et Bill's I had ta:cos Mondee ni:ght little bitta meat the*:re. B't not much.
15 => meat the*:re. B't not much.
16 Lot:    W:ah'ontoch [try it'n s[ee that] mi:ght h]elp it:=
17 Emm:    [.schnff ["Think I] wi:ll."]
```
Now contrast the above extract with another example of ‘concessive repair’, case (25) below. Here, two friends and co-teachers, Robin and Leslie, are discussing school issues. Specifically, Robin has been complaining about various problems she is experiencing. She presents the in-service training day the following day as an upshot given that she “c’n switch off.” (line 7), an idiomatic phrase meaning to not think/pay attention. As Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson note, however, “this behavior would hardly be compatible with the ethos of a professional teacher who is receiving in-service training” (263). And thus Robin offers the concession in line 8 which “lacks the connotations of inattentiveness” (ibid.): “Well. Not really switch off but you know. Relax.”.

(25) Holt: May 88:1:5

01 Les: e[You’re at home now yoursell:lf aren’t you?
02 Rob: Oh yes I[am.
03 Les: [Ye:s yes: yes.
04 Rob: Ye[!h!
05 Les: [Hm.t.h[hhhh
06 Rob: -> [I’m looking- yes. I’m just so glad it’s’n
07 Rob: -> in service train[ing day tomorrow so I c’n switch off.
08 => Well. Not really switch off but you kno[w. Rel[ax.↓
09 Les: [.hhh [[(Why) ] I
10 find they’re quite hard wo[rk somet(hh)ime[s hheh]↑ha ha↑↑
11 Rob: [[he h]a↑

If we compare these two cases, we see they both clearly follow the more general pattern that Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson identify and describe: An overstatement, followed by a concession, followed by a revised description. That is, as the authors argue, both of these constitute examples of the same repair-like practice, ‘concessive repair’.

But now let us consider specifically the issue of progressivity in each of these instances. In the first case (24), the concession and revised description in lines 14-15 appear to embody an almost normal rate of progressivity. Where exactly such a turn would sit on the progressivity spectrum is unimportant for the present purposes; what I want to highlight is that the same practice
in the second case (25) is, by comparison, clearly designed with features that are more progressivity-retardant. Following the initial “switch off” formulation, Robin produces a well-preface, followed by an overt negation and repetition of the trouble source, before the concessive repair “relax” is produced (lines 7-8). As discussed earlier, such practices greatly expand the repair space and effectively exacerbate the progressivity-hindering nature of the reparative operation. Compare this to case (24), which has none of these progressivity-hindering features, instead performing the concessive repair practice with more or less normative progressivity. Why might this be?

In this pair of cases, identity issues and issues of face (Brown & Levinson 1987) seem to play an important role in how these concessive repairs are designed. In (24), Emma has embarked on a project, initially launched in lines 2-3, that she hasn’t had any meat. As Drew (2003: 928) observes, such “‘strong’ versions or claims are constructed to handle, and are fitted to, the contingencies of actions that speakers perform in the particular sequential environments in which those actions are produced. These claims are constructed to ‘work’ in terms of the requirements of actions in the slots in which they are done” (see also Jefferson 1985). In other words, this claim was “relevantly imprecise” or exaggerated (Drew 2003: 933). When it turns out that, in fact, she has had some meat, it risks undermining that larger campaign that she has maintained across the past several turns. Thus designing her concession and revised description in a way which minimizes the revisionary nature of the action is well suited for this speaker, at this moment; and a formulation that is minimally (if at all) hindering of the normative rate of progressivity may be one way to achieve the “essential correctness of [the] original report” (ibid.: 936) and save face.

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12 There is also the inclusion of you know in (25), which further expands the repair space. I’m not entirely sure what to make of it in this specific example, but see Clayman and Raymond (2015, in prep.) on related cases of you know.
In (25), however, the initial formulation *switch off*, with its connotations of inattentiveness, seems less crucial to Robin’s overarching project of describing the upshot of the in-service training day, but it *is* fundamentally at odds with what it means to be a professional teacher attending such an event.\(^\text{13}\) In this respect, she has “gone too far” with her complaining (Drew & Walker 2009). Given that an aspect of the speaker’s basic ‘presentation of self’ (Goffman 1959) is at stake here, it may be the case that she deems it necessary to draw more attention to the subsequent reparative operation; and a more progressivity-retardant version of the concessive repair practice may be the means to accomplish this. Indeed, as Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson describe, “Since Leslie in fact subsequently remarks (in overlap) that teaching training sessions are actually *quite hard work* (line 10), implying that ‘switching off’ might not be an adequate reaction to an in-service training day, Robin’s reformulation, anticipating a challenge, turns out *ex post facto* to be have been well motivated” (263).\(^\text{14}\)

5.5.4 **Question 4:** Are certain actions, or subsets of actions, routinely produced with certain effects on progressivity?

A scalar view of progressivity allows us to think more specifically about subclasses of actions that exist within a larger given action type. For example, we have the class of action known as *repair*. Within that we have *self*-repair. Such a classification describes all of the cases seen in

\(^\text{13}\) It also cannot go without underscoring that such repair practices provide a nuanced window into identity issues—e.g., claiming/ascribing the membership category of a ‘good’ teacher.

\(^\text{14}\) Another case of concessive repair discussed in Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2005) uses an *I-mean* preface (example 2). Maynard (2013a) argues that *I-mean* utterances “are indeed doing, or at least proposing to do, self-initiated repair, but in a way that is complicated and possibly virtual” (217). This is because “it is as if *I-mean*-prefaced utterances *propose* a problem in understanding and the original turn is a *putative* trouble source in its incompleteness” (218). Similar to the work of increments, then, this preface is argued to allow *I-mean* speakers to re-complete their complaining action in search of uptake. *I-mean* prefaced concessive repairs thus affect progressivity to a different degree than both the non-prefaced, near-normative progressivity case (24), as well as the [well-prefaced + negation + trouble source repeat] case (25), again inviting the question as to why the same practice of ‘concessive repair’ would be formulated in progressivity-distinct ways.
our first section, on ‘classic’ cases of repair. But now we are in a position to ask the following: 

Are certain sorts of self-repair regularly produced with certain levels of progressivity-hindrance?

One hypothesis is that stark, night-and-day contrasts may be routinely—and, perhaps, normatively—built with a greater hindrance of progressivity. This was seen in case (11), for instance, when the speaker outright rejects one description and then repairs to affirm that such a description is actually accurate: “no the emulsion. It wz a:ll yes a sort've emulsion.” (lines 67-68). Building off of Lerner and Kitzinger (2015) and Heritage and Moreno (in prep.), I argued that the well-preface, followed by the affirmative “yes” which contrasts with the negation in the trouble source, expands the repair space and effectively exacerbates the progressivity-hindering nature of the reparative operation. Might this be related specifically to the 180-degree contrastive nature of this specific repair? Several well-prefaced (and, in particular, well-prefaced + negation + repeat of trouble source) repairs seem to support such an analysis. And if this hypothesis is going down the right path, then are such contrastive repairs a relevant and identifiable subclass of repairs within the broader action category of self-repair?

It cannot go without mention that this is a particularly complex question to tackle given the reflexive nature of such practices. That is, an ostensibly minor revision can be made into something bigger by virtue of the repair formulation. For example, Heritage and Moreno (in prep.) have a case where a description of “cream” is self-repaired with “Well it's (. ) It's off white actually,”—the repair being formulated with a well-preface, a full clausal TCU, and a turn-final contrastive actually (Clift 2001). While the difference between cream and off-white might a priori be conceived of as minimal, here the speaker builds the two descriptions as extremely contrastive

Apology formulations have also been shown to have this reflexive nature: The offense that occasions the apology can be cast as bigger with a bigger apology format, or smaller with a smaller apology format. See Heritage and Raymond (2016).
with a quite progressivity-hindering design (cf. formulating the same repair with a comparatively less progressivity-hindering or-preface). Nonetheless, despite the difficulties that the reflexivity of practices may present us with, it is still worth considering whether certain actions, or subsets of actions, are routinely produced with a certain level of progressivity—be it more or less hindered, or more or less expedited. It also bears mention that such research would provide a nuanced perspective on the link between (a) the majority of research on repair, which has focused on the mechanics of reparative operations, and (b) more recent research that has specifically called for more attention to be paid to what interactants are actually doing, in terms of action, with their repairs (see Drew, Walker & Ogden 2013).

5.5.5 **Question 5:** How accountable are participants for accelerating or retarding the progressivity of talk?

Using the terminology of the present study, Levinson (1981) was primarily interested in cases of expedited progressivity. In summarizing his analysis of cases such as (16) and (17), where sequences are skipped over in favor of “activity progressivity” (Lee 2011), Levinson writes: “This in fact appears to be a very general phenomenon: Given an utterance which is merely the first in a sequence predicted by a hierarchical structure of goals, one is free to respond to any of those higher level goals” (112). I was particularly struck by the generality of this assertion. Is one really free to respond at any of those higher level goals? Can I really ‘skip to the finish line’ whenever I want to? This strikes me as unlikely, but at the very least it is a question worth pursuing empirically.

There are two issues that are relevant here which I wish to unpack. The first has to do with ability: **Is a respondent always able to identify larger goals?** In institutional interactions, given the “special and particular constraints” (Drew & Heritage 1992: 22) of the context, perhaps this is easier to do (and perhaps this is why studies involving expedited progressivity have focused
primarily on institutional settings; e.g., Fox 2015; Lee 2011; Merritt 1976). But in everyday, mundane conversation, such higher-level goals may be more difficult to discern, and therefore more difficult to respond to. Levinson’s language seems to presuppose that a respondent can do this ‘correctly’—that s/he can accurately predict where the first speaker is going and respond accordingly. We know, however, that intersubjectivity of this sort is never guaranteed in interaction; rather interactants must work to achieve it (Schütz 1962), and must do so collaboratively (Garfinkel 1963). All this is to say that respondents can try to expedite progressivity by addressing a higher-level goal, but they will sometimes get it wrong, thereby causing a potentially bigger—and accountable, sanctionable—interactional problem than if they had simply dealt with the first turn at face value, with a normative rate of progressivity.

Indeed, there are examples in the literature that show what can happen when a participant ‘gets it wrong’. For instance, Stivers (2004) looks at multiple sayings (e.g., “no no no”), which she argues communicates the stance “that the prior speaker has persisted unnecessarily in the prior course of action and should properly halt [that] course of action” (260). In some of her cases (e.g., examples 9 and 15), first speakers are pursuing uptake or initiating repair, thereby retarding progressivity of the talk to varying degrees (see above discussion); and recipients use multiple sayings to speed up progressivity and move on, in some instances even making the claim that retarding progressivity to any degree would have been unnecessary. In other words, the first speaker is pursuing a course of action that is slowing down the progressivity of the talk, and second speakers sanction the first speakers for doing so. Multiple sayings thus provide us with one resource through which we can see interactants holding one another accountable for the rate of progressivity of the talk.
Accountability is also a relevant concern at the other end of the progressivity spectrum. One can imagine the customer service example from Merritt (1976) unfolding quite differently if “Do you have coffee to go?” was meant not as a pre-request, but rather as a request for information to see if the questioner could bring a group of friends by the coffee shop later that day. Similarly, responding to “Is John there?” with “You can reach him at…” might receive a “No, I was just wondering if he was in the office today”.

Consider also the case of what Lerner (1996) has called ‘collaborative completions’. Collaborative completions constitute a form of expedited progressivity in that a recipient can provide a form of affiliation before it is relevantly due at a transition-relevance place.16 When this goes off smoothly, such accelerated progressivity allows participants to demonstrate intersubjectivity (in the sense of Sacks 1992) earlier than at the TRP. This is seen in (26) below:

(26) JS [Lerner 1996: 255]

01 Joe: oh hundreds of automobiles parked around there en
02 people walkin across the bridge you know? en all a’
03 -> these go:ddam people onna freeway [were stoppin-
04 Edith: -> [were rubbernecking

Here Edith’s collaborative completion affiliates with Joe’s complaint-in-progress, and is in that sense successful. In the following case (27), however, when Nancy attempts to collaboratively complete Hyla’s turn in line 4, she misjudges Hyla’s level of enthusiasm for the seeing the play that they have been discussing:

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16 Might collaborative completions be a particular (sub)class of action (e.g., a form of affiliation) that can only be accomplished with expedited progressivity, and therefore is defined by the effect it has on progressivity (cf. Question 2)? If the recipient waits until the TRP and provides his/her affiliation there, that seems to be a different sort (level?) of affiliation. I leave this hypothesis open for future research to test.
Following this interactional misfire, Nancy offers an upgraded assessment that seems intended to better match her interlocutor’s opinion about the play.

The accountability of these sorts of moves in interaction renders a cost-benefit analysis of retarding/expediting progressivity particularly apt: Given the risks involved in getting it wrong, there must be a large benefit to getting it right. One benefit may be the pro-social positive outcomes associated with such “eminently cooperative” (Levinson 1981: 110) interactional moves, which may make them worth the risk for participants (see Enfield & Levinson 2006; Levinson 2006; Schegloff 2006). Recent cross-linguistic research by Dingemanse, et al. (2015) and Dingemanse and Enfield (2015) has taken up the cost-benefit issue explicitly within the domain of other-initiated repair. The authors confirm the earlier claim by Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977) that speakers initiate repair on their interlocutors’ talk with the format that is the most specific possible in the context, thereby “minimizin[ing] cost for the addressee, and for the dyad as a social unit” (Dingemanse & Enfield 2015: 110). This is because, through the design of the repair initiation, the repair initiator “pays as much of the cost” as s/he can, rendering repair sequences “efficient and cost-conserving” (Dingemanse, et al. 2015: 9, 8). If we extend this claim

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17 The same cost-benefit question can be asked with regard to the first speaker designing his/her action such that will require unpacking: Given the costs associated with ‘under-saying’ (e.g., potential action ambiguity, potential hitch in intersubjectivity, etc.), any one of which may cause the first action to misfire and be unsuccessful, there must be some social benefit that renders such first actions worthwhile (Levinson 1981: 104; see Heritage 2013a on ‘over-supposing and under-telling’ vs. ‘under-supposing and over-telling’; see also Levinson 1987 on the ‘maxim of minimization’).

18 The authors refer to this as the ‘principle of conservation’.

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to the spectrum of practices used in self-initiated repair discussed here, we find a parallel preference for efficiency in realizing the repair. As such, self-repair formulations that are overbuilt and more progressivity-retardant can be conceptualized as engendering a greater cost to the speaker; and, as a result, they must be understood as being produced ‘for cause’. Re-invoking an earlier hypothesis, it may be that 180-degree contrasts are more “information-dense” (Jaeger 2010; Levy & Jaeger 2007) than other sorts of self-repairs. If this is the case, the cost of using such overbuilt practices (e.g., well-preface + negation + repeat of trouble source) may be paid by the speaker in the service of facilitating the hearer’s understanding, thereby displaying the same sort of “altruism” that Dingemanse and colleagues claim is at work in other-initiations of repair.19

There is a second, perhaps more fundamental issue that merits elucidation as well with regard to the accountability of expediting/retarding progressivity, particularly on the expedited side of the spectrum. Even if we set aside the issue of intersubjectivity and presume that you can accurately discern those higher-level motives, and that you could respond accordingly, the question remains: Should you? Levinson (1981: 112) stresses that, in the cases he examines, there are no “consequent repair mechanisms, sanctions, and so on…These are all eminently cooperative exchanges”. While I don’t dispute that they are cooperative, it’s not so clear to me that one always should jump to the finish line even if one could.

Consider one final case in (28) below. Here, Stan has called Joyce to request advice on where to buy two items, a pair of sandals and a hat. After listing the two items in lines 8-9, he

19 Who exactly is benefitting more from these practices is not always clear, and thus the claim that such moves in interaction are done “altruistically” is difficult to assess. In the earlier example (12), for instance, as we discussed, Don designs his repair with a progressivity-hindering formulation that emphasizes that repair is taking place (well-preface + negation + repeat of trouble source). On the one hand, this could be understood as an altruistic move, facilitating his interlocutor’s understanding of the repair he is making. However, this repair is also unambiguously self-serving in that it lays the groundwork for the affiliative uptake he will be looking for upon completion of his joke (i.e., laughter and appreciation). Thus it may be safer to construe costs and benefits as specifically local to the context in which the repairs are produced.
begins to unpack the first item (the sandals) in lines 11-12. In interjacent overlap in line 13, then, Joyce requests an account for why he needs a hat. Rather than providing an account, Stan sanctions her with “wait lemme finish” (line 14), and continues with his description of the sandals across lines 14-18. At this point, in line 19, Joyce begins to provide a recommendation of where to go and/or what to buy: “Why don't you go get some (.)”. Nonetheless, Stan interdicts this response, sequentially deleting it by continuing his prior project of unpacking the details about the items in question (initially launched in lines 8-9 and 11). It is noteworthy that he uses the same syntactic fronting of the item he is looking for in “fer the ha:t, I…” (line 20) as he did earlier with “The pair’a sandle:s I…” (line 11), suggesting that his project was to unpack each of these items in turn as part of his ‘preliminaries’ (Schegloff 1980) before soliciting the recommendation. It is not until later, in lines 48-49, that a recommendation of where to go to look for the items is actually brought to completion, following a renewed request for a recommendation from Stan (lines 41-43/45/47).

(28) Joyce & Stan

01 S: .hnhh Well the main reason I called ya up Jess was ta
02 as:k yer uh:: advice on two little matters:uh.
03 (0.4)
04 S: I might be goin' shopping either tomorrow er Saturday an' I'm
05 what I'm lookin' for is a couple a things.=>I thought maybe you
06 might have some< suggestions where I could find it.
07 J: O:kay,
08 S: First of all: I'm lookin' for: a: pair a sa:ndles:, (0.7) and a
09 hat.
10 (0.4)
11 S: The pair'a sandle:s I don't want anything fan:cy:, er: yihknow
12 (all that ge-) jus' something [that's comfta-
13 J: [Whaddayou need a ha:t for?
14 S: that's somethi(n):g wait lemme finish something~su- sound
15 something that's comforatable:, (0.5) not too expens:ive,
16 (0.3)
17 S: Something that's comforatable:, that a- that will la:st, and that
18 yihknow (0.8) looks: fairly decent, b't-=
19 J: -> =Why don't you go~get som:e (.)
20 S: -> And fer the ha:t, I'm lookin fer somethi:ng uh a little
21 different. Na- uh:f: not f: exactly funky but not (. ) a
22 r-regular type:a ·hnh >well yihknow I I< ha:ve that other hat I
23 wear. yihknow?
24 J: Yeah,
S:  And ↑I'd like another one too.↓I like hats[: yihknow they-=
J:  ↑Oh.
26  =Well don't tell Bernie but I got him a hat fer his birthday.
J:  .
.  .  ((13 lines omitted re: Bernie’s hat))
.  .
I:  .
41  S:  .hhhh Well where can I find something like that. Jess. I mean a
good hat. yihknow I don't care paying ten dollars er so er even
more.
42  J?:  [(pt)
43  S:  [Yihknow a ___ hat, [something that would look- something=
44  J:  [((sigh))
45  S:  =tha'I'd- u:[I'd have a variety 'a things ta loo:k at:,
46  J:  [Why don't __ [Why
don'tchoo: go into Westwoo:d, (0.4) and go to Bullocks.

This example thus illustrates an attempt by Joyce to ‘jump to the finish line’ (i.e., provide the recommendation), and Stan’s resistance to that move. He had launched a project of providing various details about the items he is looking for and noticeably worked to bring that project to completion, interdicting and sequentially deleting Joyce’s move that would have expedited the progressivity of the sequence-in-progress. In a sense, then, Joyce was oriented to “activity progressivity” (Lee 2011), but she was sanctioned for it.

In this case and in cases like it, negative face wants seem to play a large role in what transpires between the interactants: Speakers do not want to be impeded or to have their trajectories blocked. While a progressivity-expediting response may support a first speaker’s negative face at one level (by orienting to the first speaker’s end goal), it can constitute a threat to negative face at another level in that such a move effectively blocks the first speaker from proceeding down the step-by-step path that he had projected.

Thus I agree with Levinson and Lee that “responding at a higher level” can be oriented to as preferred in some instances: “Sometimes it is simply more efficient to say little and let one’s interlocutor do some inference, sometimes people do not want to be held totally accountable for what they contextually imply, and most generally there are social rules and motives (like politeness) that require indirection” (Levinson 1981: 104). However, other times it seems that
people want to be allowed to speak! Sometimes, and indeed I would go as far as to say oftentimes, interactants want the entirety of what they have to say out on the table before a response is issued. This strikes me as a close parallel to the preference for self-repair over other-repair (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977): A speaker has primary rights—a certain level of autonomy, as it were—over his/her own talk, and one’s interlocutors are meant to respect that. In sum, then, I would argue that one cannot always expedite progressivity and jump to the finish line, even if the finish line is projectable, which makes relevant future research on when such moves are the preferred course of action, and when they are dispreferred.

5.6 CONCLUSIONS

In developing this scalar view of progressivity, I have aimed both to complicate, as well as to begin to systematically unpack, the phenomenon of progressivity as a dimension of interaction meriting more detailed investigation in its own right. Situating a seemingly disparate set of practices on a common continuum allows us to pose new questions about how they relate to one another, as well as how they are linked to issues of action formulation/ascription and accountability. At the same time, it provides a framework that can be used to identify and describe other, yet-to-be-discovered interactional practices.

What Schegloff (2007a) describes in the definition of progressivity with which we began is a normative, default, base rate of progressivity: “Moving from some element to a hearably-next-one with nothing intervening” (14-15). But, as we have discussed here, this default rate of “perfect progressivity” (Heritage 2007: 279) can be hindered or accelerated to various degrees through a diverse set of practices, and in conjunction with a range of interactional aims. Moreover, participants can be seen to orient in various ways to these moment-by-moment adjustments in the progressivity of the talk—actively designing actions to be more or less progressivity-retardant, or
more or less progressivity-accelerant, supporting or sanctioning interlocutors’ attempts at hindering or expediting progressivity, and so on. Thus we must view the progressivity of interaction—be it normative, hindered (to whatever degree), or expedited (to whatever degree)—as a collaboratively constructed, accountable, interactional achievement that is constituted by participants’ contributions to the talk.
Some Concluding Remarks: Binaries, Scales, and Interactional Relevance

In this concluding chapter, my aim is to highlight a common theme that revealed itself across the distinct practices explored in this dissertation: The conceptualization of intersubjectivity and progressivity as scalar (as opposed to binary) phenomena, including how these two features of interaction interact with one another. In this respect, this discussion follows in the footsteps of a range of researchers who have called for reconceptualizing as scalar various phenomena that have largely been considered dichotomous (or categorical) variables in previous research, including: (i) conditional relevance and the mobilization of response (Stivers & Rossano 2010; cf. Schegloff 1968; Schegloff & Sacks 1973), (ii) the entitlement-contingency cline of request formulations (Curl & Drew 2008), (iii) the epistemic gradient component of question design (Heritage 2012a, 2012b), (iv) the multiple competing principles involved in selecting from amongst other-repair initiation options (Dingemanse & Enfield 2015; Dingemanse, et al. 2015; Drew 1997; Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977; cf. Clark & Schaefer 1987), and (iv) continua related to recruiting the assistance of others (Kendrick & Drew 2016; Rossi 2014), amongst others.

The issue of scalarity was most explicitly addressed in Chapter 5, where I argued in favor of a scalar view of progressivity. I posited that the issue for participants is not simply whether turns-at-talk embody progressivity or not, but rather how much: How much is the normative rate of progressivity being hindered or accelerated, and how does this level of progressivity-hindrance or progressivity-expediting contribute to participants’ interactional objectives? It was concluded
that progressivity must be viewed as a collaboratively constructed, accountable, interactional achievement (see Schegloff 1986) that is constituted by participants’ contributions to the talk.

A similar scalar argument can also be made for intersubjectivity, as was illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3 on the English do-construction. As we discussed, the issue is not simply whether interlocutors have ‘achieved intersubjectivity’ or not (i.e., as a dichotomous variable), but rather what level of intersubjectivity they have achieved. It was demonstrated that co-participants in talk actively work not just to ‘be understood’, but to be understood in some particular way or at some particular level. And, as was argued in detail in Chapter 3, this process can involve taking interactional steps to ensure that one is not being understood in some particular, alternative way.

While a scalar conceptualization of intersubjectivity is, in principle, already in existence in the conversation-analytic literature, the language that is routinely used in analyses—i.e., that intersubjectivity has, at one moment or another, ‘been achieved’—suggests a dichotomous conceptualization: Intersubjectivity either exists between the interlocutors, or it doesn’t. Nonetheless, the chapters in this dissertation have underscored that what participants are actually dealing with are levels of intersubjectivity. For example, in a case like (1) below, where Emma fails to demonstrate recognition of the referent, it’s not that Emma altogether abandons her search for intersubjectivity in favor of progressivity. Rather, she abandons a certain level of intersubjectivity (i.e., a shared understanding of the precise doctor in question, Dr. Nelson) and allows another, less precise level (i.e., a shared understanding that it was a friend) suffice in its place in favor of moving on with her response-in-progress (see Heritage 2007).
If intersubjectivity is, in at least one of its dimensions, a scalar phenomenon of this sort, then this invites the question as to when, exactly, certain levels of intersubjectivity are called for over others. One can easily imagine a case, for instance, where Lottie might insist that Emma recognize that it was Dr. Nelson who said this, and not just This friend of ours; and she might further retard the progressivity of the talk in search of this recognition. The issue that participants are dealing with, then, is the interactional relevance of distinct levels of intersubjectivity.

The concept of relevance is easily explained via the practices used for person reference. In his early work on Membership Categorization Devices (MCDs), Harvey Sacks (1992) observed that because individuals’ identities are so multi-faceted and complex, a fundamental task for speakers is the need to single out some aspect(s) of those identities in order to make reference to persons in talk. As Schegloff (1991b: 49-50) later summarized:

…the fact that someone is male, or is middle aged, or is white, or is Jewish is, by itself, no warrant for so referring to them, for the warrant of “correctness” would provide for use of any of the other reference forms as well. Some principle of relevance must underlie use of a reference form, and has to be adduced in order to provide for one rather than another of those ways of characterizing or categorizing some member (my emphasis).\(^1\)

For participants, the same issue of relevance can be seen to apply to intersubjectivity: You can understand me in a variety of ways—or, rather, at a variety of levels of precision—and any of

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\(^1\) For further discussion of the specific issue of relevance as it pertains to person reference, see Enfield and Stivers, eds., (2007), Schegloff (2007b) and Raymond (frth.-a, frth.-b).
those can be ‘correct’. Referring back to excerpt (1), whether Emma understands the person Lottie is referencing to be *Dr. Nelson* or simply *This friend of ours*, each one is a ‘correct’ understanding of the person Lottie will soon be quoting. The difference is that, with each formulation, a more or less precise level of intersubjectivity would be reached between the interlocutors (Schegloff 1972). More generally, then, when speakers design their talk to create a particular level of intersubjectivity, they invoke the relevance of that particular level of intersubjectivity to the task at hand.

The chapters in this dissertation have illustrated how inextricably linked these scalar views of intersubjectivity and progressivity are to one another. The *do*-construction in English, as a ‘marked’ grammatical form (Levinson 2000), momentarily retards progressivity in that an additional element “intervene[s] between some element and what is hearable as a/the next one due” (Schegloff 2007a:15)—i.e., between the subject and the main verb of the utterance (Chapters 2 and 3). Crucially, though, this method of qualifying the progressivity of the talk is done in the service of a particular intersubjective aim, namely communicating to the hearer that the turn should be understood as indexing a contrast with something prior. The same can be said of the analysis presented in Chapter 4, of the Spanish turn-initial particles *bueno* and *pués*. Both of these elements constitute forms of “marked progressivity” across turns within a sequence (Heritage 2013b, 2015, frth.), but each of them is produced by speakers ‘for cause’: With *bueno*, the speaker signals his/her acquiescence to the terms of the prior turn before departing from them, while with *pués*, the speaker casts the prior turn’s action or design as problematic in some way. Thus each of these turn-initial elements momentarily qualifies the progressivity of the talk at the first possible opportunity (Schegloff 1996b), but they do so in the service of getting the recipient to understand the upcoming turn in a particular way.
In mobilizing practices such as these, then, speakers embody a claim that progressivity is being *relevantly* adjusted, namely as part of an attempt to secure a particular understanding from the hearer. And this particular understanding, in turn, is itself claimed, *through the effect on progressivity used to achieve it*, to be interactionally *relevant*. The two phenomena—intersubjectivity and progressivity—are thus reflexively linked with one another through the concept of interactional relevance.

This discussion of relevance allows us to bring together two claims in the literature, with which all of the chapters in this dissertation have engaged. The first is Schegloff’s (2007a: 15) assertion that qualifying the progressivity of talk, by whatever means, “will be examined for its import, for what understanding should be accorded it”. The second is Heritage’s (2009: 308) observation that, at certain moments in interaction, “progressivity is pitted against intersubjectivity” given that participants must negotiate between (a) securing a certain level of shared understanding, and (b) progressing forward with the business of the talk, whatever it may be (Heritage 2007). At the intersection of these two claims is accountability: If you are going to qualify the progressivity of the talk, then it should serve some interactionally relevant aim. And if you are going to qualify the progressivity of the talk for more a more particularized or specific level of intersubjectivity, then that more precise level of intersubjectivity should be interactionally relevant as well. And indeed, interactants can be seen to hold themselves and one another accountable for deviations from this norm, as was particularly evident in cases examined in Chapters 3 and 5.

In considering a final example to include to illustrate the accountability of, and links between, levels of intersubjectivity and levels of progressivity, I was drawn to the stand-up comedy of the late George Carlin. Throughout his career, Carlin was intrigued by how people use language
with one another in everyday life. In one of my favorite segments, he pokes fun at people who, he says, “don’t know when to stop talking,” who insist on telling you stories about “things you’re not even remotely interested in!” In the following extract (2), Carlin mimics the voice of one of these individuals beginning to tell a story. What I’d like specifically to draw attention to, for the purposes of the present discussion, is just how long it takes for this imagined story-teller to get his story off the ground as he attempts to situate the events of the story precisely in time.

(2) George Carlin: It’s Bad for Ya (2008) [simplified transcript]²

01 Carlin: Did I tell you about my mom and dad?
02 (0.3) We’ll my mom and dad went on vacation
03 down to Mammoth Cave Kentucky.
04 Audience: ((laughs))
05 Carlin: –> This’s about (0.5) six years ago I think,
06 Audience: ((laughs))
07 Carlin: –> Seems like it was six=six-six years ago,
08 Audience: ((laughs))
09 Carlin: –> Six or seven,
10 –> Possibly seven.=could be,
11 Audience: ((laughs))
12 Carlin: [([‘yeah/y’know’]
13 Audience: ((laughs))
14 Carlin: –> Somewhere in there,=six=seven,=
15 –> =e-MORE than six, LESS than seven.
16 Audience: ((laughs))
17 Carlin: –> Let’s call it six and a ha:lf.
18 Audience: ((laughs))
19 Carlin: So my mom and dad went on vacation to
20 Mammoth Cave Kentucky,
21 And my dad found a big roc:k.
22 ↓ What he thought was a big roc:k,
23 Turns ou:t it was a <dinosaur tur:d!>
24 Audience: ((laughs))
25 Carlin: A <PETrified> dinosaur turd,<TWEnty seven pounder!
26 Audience: ((laughs))
27 Carlin: [([looking down quizzically)])
28 [ (3.0)
29 Carlin: –> ((looks up)) Y’know, now that I think of it,
30 –> It might’a been eight years ago.
31 Audience: ((laughs))
32 Carlin: –> That would’a been close to Y 2 K, wouldn’t it?
33 ((continues))

² Available for viewing at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eyWsFd9pqE. Transcript begins at 1:15.
Carlin’s hypothetical story-telling, as well as the audience’s reaction to it, aptly illustrates that a more exact temporal reference—achieved at the cost of progressivity—is accountable in terms of relevance. On the one hand, this imagined story-teller is aiming for precision with the imagined story-recipient: Exactly how many years ago was it that these events took place? He thus self-repairs (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977) his time references repeatedly across this excerpt in an attempt to secure a more precise level of shared understanding with his hearer. But of course this search for greater precision in terms of intersubjectivity comes at the cost of progressivity: The actual story itself—that is, progressing through the events of the telling—is put on hold while the teller moves from *six* years ago, to *six or seven* years ago, to *more than six but less than seven* years ago, to *six and a half* years ago, and so on. The humor of this beginning phase of the joke, which the audience clearly grasps, is that all the while, the hypothetical recipient of the story will be thinking *Just get on with it already! Six years, seven years – It doesn’t matter! I don’t have all day!* In this case, then, although a greater level of precision is indeed achieved with the hearer through the succession of self-repaired time references, the *interactional relevance* of that specific level of intersubjectivity is not apparent to the recipient of the story-telling. That is, the story-recipient attempts to examine the hindered progressivity “for its import, for what understanding should be accorded it” (Schegloff 2007a: 15), but comes up with nothing! Thus, in this example, the *cost* to progressivity outweighs the *benefit* to intersubjectivity, and the self-repairs are therefore accountable and sanctionable—or, in Carlin’s case, laughable—interactional moves.³

By examining different features of turn design, this dissertation has investigated a range of “account-able” “members’ resources” (Garfinkel 1967) that are mobilized by participants in the

³ Here we see this interactionally irrelevant (and therefore sanctionable) hindering of progressivity being done on the part of the first speaker (i.e., the story-teller). Second speakers too, though, can likewise hinder progressivity in search of greater intersubjectivity, as we saw in examples (1) and (2) in Chapter 1, taken from Garfinkel (1967: 42-43).
service of intersubjectivity, progressivity, and the interactional negotiation thereof. Each chapter argued, based on distinct forms of evidence, that intersubjectivity, progressivity, and accountability must be conceptualized as collaboratively constructed features of interaction that are achieved on a moment-by-moment basis, in and through the details of quotidian conduct. Exploration of such practices therefore sheds important light on the ground-level means through which we negotiate and maintain social life with one another.
Appendix: Transcription Conventions

Symbols used in the transcription of speech follow the conventions laid out in Jefferson (2004). The most frequently used symbols appear below:

? , , ; _ Punctuation is designed to capture intonation, not grammar: Question mark for fully rising terminal intonation; comma for slightly rising ‘continuing’ terminal intonation; period for fully falling terminal intonation; semicolon for mid-low falling terminal intonation; and underscore for flat/level intonation.

[ Left-side brackets indicate where overlapping talk (or other behavior) begins.

] Right-side brackets indicate where overlapping talk (or other behavior) ends (if detectable).

(0.5) Periods of silence, in seconds. The example here indicates a half-second silence.

(.) ‘Micropause’ (i.e. a silence less than two-tenths of a second).

: Lengthening of the segment just preceding, proportional to the number of colons.

word A dash indicates an abrupt cut off, usually a glottal stop.

word Underlining indicates stress or emphasis.

WORD Exceptionally loud speech relative to the surrounding talk.

°word° Speech lower in volume relative to the surrounding talk.

↑word Marked pitch rise.

↓word Marked pitch fall.

= ‘Latching’ between lines or turn-constructional units (i.e. no silence between them).

<word ‘Left push’ (i.e. the immediately following talk is ‘jump-started’).

>word< Speech delivered faster than the surrounding talk.
<word> Speech delivered slower than the surrounding talk.

hhh .hhh Hearable aspiration, proportional to the number of h’s. If preceded by a period, the aspiration is an in-breath. Aspiration internal to a word (e.g. laughter, sighing) is enclosed in parentheses.

( ) Talk too obscure to transcribe. Words or letters inside such parentheses indicate a best estimate of what is being said.

((looks)) Transcriptionist’s comments (e.g. for non-vocal behavior).

-> Arrows in the margin point to the lines of transcript relevant to the point being made in the text. Bolding is also used in the present article.
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