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Publication Date
2017

Peer reviewed
The Wielding Influence of Political Networks: Representation in Majority-Latino Districts

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Abstract: Latino-majority congressional districts are far more likely to elect Latino representatives to Congress than majority-white districts. However, not all majority-Latino districts do so. This paper addresses this question and it investigates how the level of influence of political parties and interest groups in majority-Latino districts substantially shape Latino representation to the U.S. House of Representatives. I rely on five case studies and a dataset of candidates to open congressional races with a Latino population plurality from 2004-2014. The evidence indicates that groups and political networks are critical for Latino/a candidate recruitment, the organization of resources in a congressional district, the deployment of campaign resources on behalf of certain candidates and the eventual success of Latino candidates. The findings suggest that Latino descriptive and substantive representation are shaped by the wielding influence of political parties and interest groups.

Keywords: Latina/o candidates, representation, majority-minority districts, political parties, open-seats.
Introduction

Despite being a majority-Latino district, with a 77% Latino population, Texas’ 29th congressional district is currently represented by Rep. Gene Green (D), a non-Latino. Rep. Greene was elected to this district as it became an open-seat in 1992. Greene finished second in a 5-way Democratic primary, behind City Councilman Ben Reyes. However, in the general election, Greene defeated Reyes by 180 votes. Since then, Rep. Greene has won re-election and no Latino candidate has been able to successfully unseat him.

On the other hand, Illinois’ 4th congressional district, whose constituency is 70% Latino, is currently represented by Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D). In 1992, Gutierrez won a four-way primary in this newly-drawn district. He moved on to successfully defeat his Republican opponent, and he has won re-election every cycle since he entered office. The tale of these two majority-Latino districts begs an important question. How are some majority-Latino districts, like Illinois’ 4th, able to successfully elect a Latino to Congress, and congressional districts such as Texas’ 29th unable to do so?

Most of the literature on Latino representation focuses on the role of voters and candidate characteristics. As such, this body of scholarship holds that demographics in majority-minority districts are largely responsible for the manifestation of co-ethnic descriptive representation (Lublin 1999; Branton 2009; Casellas 2011; Preuhs and Juenke 2011). However, largely understudied in this scholarship is the role of political parties and interest groups. While there is a long-established literature that examines the role of groups, parties and elites in determining candidate emergence (Herrnson 1988; Herrnson and Gimpel 1995; Cohen et al. 2008), little is known about how the activities of groups and political networks specifically shape Latino
representation in majority-minority districts. Much less is known about the potential link between political network activity and Latino substantive representation.

This paper examines how political networks and groups influence Latino representation. Specifically, the paper investigates the puzzle of why some majority-Latino congressional districts attain Latino descriptive representation while others do not, and it examines the role of political networks in yielding representation in these specific districts. The paper argues that political network activity mediates the relationship between Latino population and co-ethnic political representation. Political networks actively recruit candidates in these majority-Latino districts and provide access to important resources that eventually allow the candidates to successfully campaign to their co-ethnic constituents. The paper argues that variation in organization, involvement, and support from political networks explain why some majority-Latino districts are successful at electing co-ethnic representatives and others are not. As such, the paper argues that group activity is critical for yielding Latino descriptive representation. The paper also investigates how political networks matter for how elected representatives that emerge from a majority-Latino district, either Latino or non-Latino, substantively represent their constituents. The paper relies on qualitative evidence from five case studies and an original dataset of all candidates running for open-seats in districts with a Latino population plurality.

The paper finds that in recruiting and sponsoring candidates, organized networks determine whether Latino candidates are successful in their runs for office—or make runs at all–. Political networks are extremely influential in narrowing down candidate fields when non-Latinos are suspected to run, and even when the presence of too many Latinos in a race might undercut one other. Political parties and interest groups provide critical financial resources that appear to be much more important to succeeding in a majority-Latino open-seat than other types
of financial support. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that groups and parties provide effective campaign resources to Latino candidates if these groups are active in the district and support the candidacies of Latinos. Lastly, the evidence suggests that in selecting and influencing the prospects of some Latino candidates over others, political networks also shape the policy agenda that is prioritized by the candidates that win office. The paper builds on emerging research that examines the role of parties and political networks in shaping minority representation.

**Latino representation in majority-Latino districts**

Studies have found that descriptive representation largely operates as theoretically expected: larger minority populations are more likely to elect minority office holders (Canon 1999; Lublin 1999; Branton 2009; Casellas 2011; Preuhs and Juenke 2011). As a result, majority-minority districts have been critically important for the success of Latinos winning elected office (Lublin 1997; Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Michelson 2010; Casellas 2011; Preuhs and Juenke 2011).

However, despite the known influence of demographics for Latino descriptive representation, majority-Latino districts are not always able to elect co-ethnic representatives. This suggests that the role of demographics might be overstated and that there are understudied factors also shaping Latino descriptive representation, which scholars have recently begun to explore. Juenke and Shah (2015) find that population in majority-Latino districts is not the sole determinant of Latino electoral success. Their findings reveal that Latino descriptive representation is greatly shaped by candidate supply, indicating that candidate strategizing is a significant determinant of when Latinos become candidates (Juenke and Shah 2015).

These recent findings challenge the traditional take on majority-minority districts and voter-driven theories of representation that have historically focused on the demand side. As
these recent findings suggest, Latino representation also depends on the evaluation of future prospects by Latino candidates and possibly other pre-emergence factors such as the activity of political parties and groups also working from the supply side.

**Political parties and groups on candidate emergence and success**

Accordingly, the literature on candidate emergence has established that the prospects of candidates are directly influenced by the efforts of parties and party elites (Herrnson 1988; Kazee and Thornberry 1990; Herrnson and Gimpel 1995; Cohen et al. 2008). Elites and parties recruit candidates to run for office (Kazee and Thornberry 1990; Kazee 1994; Maestas, Maisel, and Stone 2005; Broockman 2014) and sometimes dissuading certain candidates from running (Canon 1999; Sanbonmatsu 2006).

Scholars of political parties and interest groups have also established the important role that these actors play in yielding representation for women and other groups (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Strolovitch 2008). Research in this area indicates that parties and elites are instrumental in the recruitment—and non-recruitment—of women to elected office (Niven 1998; Fox and Lawless 2010; Crowder-Meyer 2013). Based on these findings, we would expect that similar patterns would occur for racial and ethnic minority candidates. However, little work has investigated how political elites and interest groups shape the emergence and success of African American and Latino candidates (Moncrief, Squire, and Jewell 2001; Casellas 2011; Ocampo and Ray 2015).

Casellas points out that active party elites have been critical to increasing Latino representation by recruiting Latinos to run in open-seats or against weak incumbents (Casellas 2011). This research also characterizes the efforts of the Republican party to support Latinos in white-majority districts. However, the nature of the recruitment processes for Latino candidates
is largely underspecified. Even though prior findings indicate that parties and groups could matter for Latino representation, it is unclear exactly how or when such support matters. Hence, this paper investigates how political network and group activity is consequential in the emergence and electoral success of Latino candidates in majority-Latino open-seats.

Existent research provides little insight on what group activity and party elite involvement means for minority substantive representation. Given that these actors have a direct influence over candidate recruitment (Maestas, Maisel, and Stone 2005; Crowder-Meyer 2013; Broockman 2014) and resource deployment (Desmarais, La Raja, and Kowal 2015), we can expect that these actors also have clout over which issues are prioritized by the winning candidate. However, due to our limited knowledge on how political networks influence Latino representation, we also lack an understanding of how group and elite interests could influence the type of substantive representation that Latino elected officials provide.

Scholars of minority substantive representation have looked at voting patterns and other behaviors of Latinos already in elected office to determine how their presence in the legislature leads to substantive representation (Canon 1999; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Lublin 1997; Kerr and Miller 1997; Casellas 2007; Minta 2009; Juenke and Preuhs 2012; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014). Considerable research suggests that Latino elected officials represent their co-ethnic constituents through varying legislative mechanisms. Some of these include racial oversight hearings (Minta 2009), chairing hearings and addressing issues of housing, civil rights, and social welfare (Ellis and Wilson 2013), prioritizing Latino issues in committees and co-sponsoring bills tied to Latino interests (Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014).

Despite the robust literature on minority and Latino substantive representation, we know little about how parties, elites, groups and political networks active in the recruitment phase can
influence Latino substantive representation. Previous work on Latino substantive representation has predominantly looked at the behaviors taken by legislators themselves and has not investigated how political networks can influence the behaviors of Latinos once in elected office. This paper sheds light on what group and political network activity means for Latino substantive representation.

**Theoretical Framework**

In order to understand what political network activity suggests for Latino representation in majority-Latino districts, I rely on the group-centric theory from which I extend my argument and testable hypotheses. The group-centric theory proposes that party coalitions and their networks are key to the electoral prospects of candidates because they determine if and when representation can be achieved. The theory argues that groups are largely influential in recruiting candidates and working behind their candidacy (Cohen et al. 2008; Masket 2009; Bawn et al. 2012). The theory further proposes that group networks matter for winning elections because they provide critical resources that candidates depend on to be successful (Cohen et al. 2008; Bawn et al. 2012; Desmarais, La Raja, and Kowal 2015).

The group-centric theory suggests that coalitions and networks made up of policy demanders support candidates conditional on how faithful the candidates are to the policy agenda or preferences of the demanders (Cohen et al. 2008; Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009; Masket 2009; Bawn et al. 2012; Broockman 2014). These policy demanders might be formal organizations or might also be what Masket (2009) calls IPOs (informal party organizations) consisting of political insiders, legislative leaders, interest groups, activists, among others. Under this theory, policy demanders and their networks screen, select, support and elect candidates to Congress, primarily in open-seats. The networks are selective in their vetting processes and at
times discourage candidates from running (Sanbonmatsu 2006; Fox and Lawless 2010; Masket 2009). As a result, the organized and visible presence of these networks in a particular district is crucial for candidates’ emergence. The recruitment activities of these political networks are equally consequential given that the groups have clout as to which individuals become candidates and which ones to do not.

In addition to being critical for ensuring that certain candidates run in a primary, the group-centric theory also posits that networks are vastly important for candidate success. Support from political networks facilitates access to necessary resources to deploy a successful campaign (Masket 2009; Herrnson 2009; Desmarais, La Raja, and Kowal 2015). Assistance from political networks includes financial contributions, coordinated expenditures and independent expenditures (Herrnson 2009). Resources from political networks also come in the form of endorsements, door knockers, pollsters, ad makers, and volunteers (Masket 2009; Bawn et al. 2012; Ocampo and Ray 2016). If announced candidates lack support from established political networks, then their chances of winning are weaker compared to those who do have this support.

Relying on this theory, I argue that it has serious implications for Latino representation, at least descriptively, but potentially substantively. I argue that in places where networks are not well organized or active, it cannot be expected that Latino candidates will manifest despite there being a large Latino population, or a high demand for these candidates. This is particularly important as it challenges the traditional understanding of majority-Latino districts (Lublin 1997; Michelson 2010; Preuhs and Juenke 2011), which suggests that a sizable Latino population in a district will yield Latino descriptive representation. I posit that political networks and groups mediate the relationship between Latino constituency and Latino descriptive representation. If political organizations are present and active, we can expect that they will strongly influence
Latino candidate emergence and success based on the literature (Masket 2009; Bawn et al. 2012; Ocampo and Ray 2016). I hypothesize that Latino descriptive representation in majority-Latino districts will largely be a function of the activities that political networks engage in on behalf of their chosen candidate. As suggested by the extant literature on candidate emergence, I hypothesize that political networks and groups will have a direct influence on which Latino and non-Latino candidates run for office in these majority-Latino districts. Active groups in each district should be closely involved in the recruitment and negative recruitment of candidates. Moreover, I expect to find that the specific access to resources provided by these political networks should be of great importance for the prospects of the candidates in the districts and for achieving Latino descriptive representation.

I also hypothesize that the activities and clout of political networks should have influence over substantive representation. The literature on interest groups and party networks suggests that groups vet and recruit candidates who are “like them” to have champions for issues that are important to them (Bawn et al. 2012). Relying on this proposition from the group-centric theory, I expect to find that Latino and non-Latino candidates that emerge in these majority-Latino districts based on support from certain political networks will be agents of the policy demanders that recruited and supported them. In other words, the candidates that emerge should prioritize and advocate on behalf of issues that their group supporters consider to be important. While the literature has found that Latino candidates substantively represent their constituents through formal and informal behaviors (Minta 2009; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014) no work has investigated what role groups and elites play in shaping Latino substantive representation. This paper extends prior work in this area and argues that political network activity shapes the type of
substantive representation of the winning candidates in these majority-Latino districts, given how influential the groups are to the success of some candidates over others.

**Data and Method**

The paper relies on quantitative and qualitative data on congressional contests that had a substantive Latino population. The study focuses particularly on open-seats given that these primaries are less safe and more competitive compared to contests where incumbents are present (Schantz 1980; Grau 1981; Hogan 2003). As Gaddie and Bullock (2000) argue, the study of open-seats is essentially “where the action is.” These scholars contend that open-seats present us with the opportunity of investigating electoral dynamics beyond the incumbency factor. Two-thirds of Members of Congress enter the U.S. House through an open-seat (Gaddie and Bullock 2000). Their work also shows that most of the switches in party control happen in open-seats, and these contests feature a more even distribution of vote shares and campaign costs (Gaddie and Bullock 2000). Additional findings indicate that open-seat races are, by far, the most important gateway into Congress for potential candidates, since challenges to incumbent Members of Congress are less common (Boatright 2013). Furthermore, Bawn et al. (2012) argue that party nominations in open-seats are the “natural focus” of interest groups, activists and donors. These political actors can actively participate in open-seat elections without being hampered by the advantage that incumbents generally have.

The qualitative data comes from five case studies in four congressional districts. These data consist of semi-structured interviews (n=41) with activists, candidates, campaign staff, current and former elected officials, local journalists, and close observers of local politics. The data was collected over multiple field visits to each congressional district, from August 2013 until May 2015. Four interviews were conducted in Washington, D.C. with prominent leaders of
national interest groups. Key individuals and organizations were first identified through public listings in local newspapers, government and non-government publications, and online sources. A snowball sampling methodology was then implemented to obtain access to political elites and other participants who would have otherwise been difficult to reach or were unidentifiable from public sources.  

The case studies include California’s 41st (CA-41) in 2012, California’s 31st (CA-31) in the 2012 and 2014 cycles, California’s 35th (CA-35) in 2014, and Arizona’s 7th (AZ-7) in the 2014 election. There were a total of 48 open-seats for the U.S. House of Representatives in the 2014 electoral cycle, where there was no incumbent running and all candidates had a fair chance of winning. Only 3 of these open-seats were in districts with a majority-Latino population. These were AZ-7 (65%), CA-31 (51%) and CA-35 (67%). Hence, the case studies for 2014 were selected with the criteria that they were open-seats and also Latino-majority districts.

Given that the paper specifically investigates why Latino candidates emerge in some majority-Latino districts and not in others, it was also important to account for variation in whether or not Latino representation was achieved. Two additional cases were selected to match this criterion. These were districts that had a substantial Latino population but no Latino Member of Congress. These were CA-41 in the 2012 cycle, –an open-seat that elected an Asian American– and CA-31, also in the 2012 election cycle, –an open-seat that elected a white representative–. It was important to hold constant at the very minimum one congressional district for comparison purposes between two electoral cycles, so the selection of CA-31 in both 2012 and 2014 was imperative towards this aim. Variation in these case studies is key since previous literature tells us that Latinos emerge in primaries in congressional districts with large Latino populations and political networks are active in open-seats.
Findings and Analysis

Overview of Case Studies

I. CA-31, 2012

The district covers the southwestern part of San Bernardino county, encompassing portions of Rancho Cucamonga, Rialto, Bryn Mawr and the cities of San Bernardino, Colton, Redlands and Loma Linda. Rep. Jerry Lewis (R), who had formerly represented a large portion of this area, opted for not seeking re-election after the California’s non-partisan redistricting commission re-drew the Congressional lines in 2011. This majority-Latino open-seat was presented with the opportunity of electing a Latino candidate in the 2012 cycle. Four Democratic candidates emerged. However, the leading Democrat, Mayor Pete Aguilar, unsuccessfully placed third in the top-two primary where Republicans Gary Miller and Bob Dutton moved to compete against each other in the general election. Consequently, this majority-Latino district elected Gary Miller, a non-Latino to Congress.

II. CA-31, 2014

After the 2012 debacle of failing to elect a Latino to Congress, Democrats and political elites pledged to reclaim the seat from Republicans. As it will be detailed in the section to follow, a coalition of Democratic groups, unions, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic party, gathered early in 2013 to coordinate behind Aguilar’s candidacy. Other groups such as EMILY’s list had begun their recruitment process and had visited the district to seek out a potential female candidate to challenge Rep. Miller.² Almost a year later, in February of 2014, Rep. Gary Miller (R) announced that he would retire, leaving this majority-Latino district open once again.

III. CA-41, 2012
The 41st congressional district was a newly drawn district in 2012. This district is located in the western portion of Riverside county, and it includes the city of Riverside and the towns of Moreno Valley and Perris. Mark Takano (D), an openly-gay Japanese-American from the city of Riverside, announced his candidacy in mid-2011. Takano was elected to the Riverside Community College Board of Trustees in 1990 and he was re-elected again in 1995, 1999, 2004 and 2008. Takano had made an unsuccessful bid to Congress in 1992. However, in his 2012 run, Takano garnered substantive support from labor unions, LGBT organizations and Asian American groups and won the primary and the general election. Despite CA-41 having a Latino population that reached close to 56%, no Latino candidate entered the race. As the following section details, two prominent Latinos could have run but did not due to a lack of political organizations and networks that could have supported their candidacies.

IV. CA-35, 2014

The district is located in California’s Inland Empire but also encompasses a portion of the county of Los Angeles. The district includes the cities of Pomona, Ontario, Fontana and Rialto. Former Congresswoman Gloria Negrete McLeod (D) was elected in 2012 after beating former Congressman Joe Baca (D). After the redistricting of 2010, Rep. Baca was left with the decision to run in the 31st district—a much more competitive district that only encompassed 39% of his original district—or run in the 35th district, which included 61% of his former constituency. Joe Baca opted for running in the 35th district against Negrete McLeod. Negrete McLeod garnered strong elite support from Latinas in Congress as well as backing from New York Mayor Bloomberg’s super PAC (Barone et al. 2013) and won the contest. After only serving one term, Rep. Gloria Negrete McLeod opted for not seeking re-election in 2014, leaving the seat open.

V. AZ-7, 2014
This district is located in Maricopa county and it encompasses parts of Phoenix and Glendale. Rep. Ed Pastor was elected in 1991 and was serving his 11th term in Congress when he announced in February of 2014 that he would not seek another term. He was the first Latino Congressman from Arizona. When Pastor announced his retirement, then state Representative Ruben Gallego (D) was the first to announce. Others hastily followed and announced that they would be running. However, by the primary, many of the candidates had been dissuaded by elites and had dropped out, leaving Maricopa County supervisor Mary Rose Wilcox as the only other contender against Ruben Gallego.

The activities of political networks and influence over Latino descriptive representation

No Latino candidate emerged to run for CA-41 in 2012. Mark Takano was the only Democrat and his main contender in the top-two primary was John Tavaglione, a Republican. The California apportionment of 2002 was bipartisan gerrymandering effort that configured districts to ensure that either party dominated in each district. This was beneficial to incumbent legislators but posed a problem for representation in areas where demographics had been changing, such as Riverside county. Democrats in Riverside county were unable to attain local or state-level legislative offices in the 2000s and the springboard offices for what would be the 2012 U.S. House open-seat were only non-partisan local offices. As a result, the only office from which two potential Latinos could have emerged was the Board of Trustees of Riverside Community College (RCC). The two potential candidates were Mary Figueroa and Jose Medina. Jose Medina was politically ambitious but had already been considering running for the State Assembly. The new apportionment of 2012 by the non-partisan Citizens Redistricting Commission opened the opportunity for Medina to run for a State Assembly seat in the 61st district and he was successful.
The primary reason as to why no Latino was able to emerge out of a district with a 56% Latino population, and particularly why Mary Figueroa was been recruited to run, was because of the limited influence of existent Latino community organizations. Figueroa had strong ties to local organizations but none were well-established networks particularly active in nomination politics. She was one of the best placed Democrats to run and despite affiliations with non-profit and community organizations, these organizations were not in a position to support her candidacy. As one local Latino leader described, “the Latino community is not as coordinated as it should be in order to put those individuals forward that need to go forward...and it kind of goes along with the fact that the Latino community is not just one community.” Even though it was evident that the Latino community was burgeoning in Riverside county, Latino community organizations were not equipped to run candidates for Congress.

Mark Takano, the Democrat that did run, garnered substantial support, predominantly from the Democratic party establishment, local and national unions. While Takano was on the RCC Board of Trustees, he pursued several pro-union policies. Amidst new boundaries, Takano’s former connections to the most established Democratic support in the district — the unions and the Democratic party — helped him raise money, run a campaign and deploy an operation that would eventually lead him to become the first LGBT person of color in Congress representing a majority-Latino district.

In 2012, Democratic groups in CA-31, one of the neighboring districts, were fragmented and uncoordinated. Such fragmentation paved the way for four candidates to emerge: Pete Aguilar, the mayor of Redlands, CA, Rita Ramirez Dean, a community college trustee, non-profit founder Renea Wickman and attorney Justin Kim. Political activity during this cycle reveals that the Democratic party and other involved groups failed to coordinate and diminish
how “the democratic ticket was split.” As one local activist points out, “[Pete] not only had the support of the Democratic Party ... he basically was the Democratic ticket,” but without coordinated efforts to dissuade the other three democrats in the race, Aguilar lost. Aguilar came in third and was shy of 1,376 votes from advancing out of the primary. Miller (R) and Dutton (R) moved onto the general election. Despite having a majority-Latino constituency and the expectation that a Latino would succeed (Branton 2009), CA-31 ended up electing Rep. Gary Miller (R) in the November election. This resulted in the representation of this majority-Latino district by a Congressman who was just slightly to the left of conservative Rep. Steve King (IA-R).8

Further evidence from CA-31 suggests that by 2014, Democratic activists, unions and party leaders worked in a coordinated effort to avoid the manifestation of multiple Democratic candidates.9 As one local party leader pointed out, the Democratic network pledged that Pete Aguilar would be the candidate they would support in the primary. The national party and national unions also declared their support for Pete Aguilar.10 EMILY’s List was involved in vetting and recruiting Eloise Gomez Reyes11. Evidence from multiple interviews and primary sources also indicates that the DCCC actively discouraged candidates from running. Those discouraged included Danny Tillman and Eloise Gomez-Reyes.12 These efforts were indicative of political network activity that was more coordinated and sought to negatively recruit other Latino and minority candidates that could potentially harm Aguilar’s chances.

The DCCC, the party and the unions played a pivotal role in Pete Aguilar’s success in CA-31. As one observer suggested, “[Unions] are where the Democratic stronghold is. [They] translate into volunteers. It translates into feet on the street. They know how to mobilize.”13 As a result, backing of local and national unions meant that Pete had large financial and personnel
support. The DCCC was actively involved in polling and providing consulting services to Aguilar’s campaign. A revealing poll conducted a few weeks prior to the primary suggested that, “Leslie Gooch (R) [was] making the runoff in Election Day, and [the DCCC] saw [the two Republicans] Paul Chabot in first place and Leslie Gooch in second place.”14 As this consultant explained, “after the poll, the DCCC actively spent $100K in the district in less than two weeks to beat Leslie Gooch.”15 As a result, Pete Aguilar came in second in the top-two primary, barely edging past Leslie Gooch by 200 votes. The political network support that Aguilar received in the primary was crucial to his success. Aguilar moved onto the general election, where he competed against Republican Paul Chabot. After a hard-fought 2014 general election, he won and was elected to represent this majority-Latino district.

In the CA-35 case study, the data reveals that unions also played an important role in Norma Torres’ congressional campaign and overall candidacy. As multiple sources recalled, the local unions had been supportive of her when she began her political career in the Pomona City Council. A local activist in Pomona credited the unions with making Torres the politician that she became as she was sponsored by the unions to make her first run for the City Council. As this source suggested,

Norma won by 40 votes when she ran against Willie E. White. It was evident that she was union person. She was a 9-1-1 operator. She was for AFSCME, for all of them in fact. If you run for office and belong to a union, you are set. Her main union was AFSCME.16

Torres ascended into political office by way of the unions, and the data suggests that had it not been for Torres’ union relationship she would have not entered the political pipeline that eventually allowed her to become a candidate in CA-35. Given how prominent and decisive union activity is in CA-35, no other candidate came close to the stature of Norma Torres in the congressional race. The second leading Democratic candidate, Christina Gagnier, only received
15% of the vote in the primary and was overshadowed again in the general by Torres’ 27-point margin. In all, the unions recruited Norma Torres, helped her win local-level office and continued to support her as she made a successful run for federal office.17

In the AZ-7 case study, the data indicate a similar pattern. Organized group support also played an important role in defining the candidate field. When former Rep. Ed Pastor announced that he would retire, three candidates announced their candidacies. Ruben Gallego, a then Arizona State Representative and army veteran, quickly garnered support from local unions, local businesses, the youth, veterans and national donor networks. Mary Rose Wilcox, a Maricopa County Supervisor also entered the race with the support of local business owners, and a network of established grassroots activists, referred by several interview subjects as the “old guard.” Steve Gallardo, the third candidate, served in the Arizona House of Representatives from 2003-2009 and later served in the State Senate. He received initial support from AFSCME and LGBT groups.

Various activists, union members and local leaders reported that concern grew among their political networks. As they saw it, one candidate could draw support away from another one and hurt the chances of a given group’s preferred candidate. Among those who were the most concerned were the unions and the network supporting Ruben Gallego, since Steve Gallardo presented a potential threat.18 The UFCW as well as other influencers took it upon themselves to negatively recruit Steve Gallardo and attempted to convince him to run for the vacant Maricopa County Supervisor seat instead. When asked if Steve Gallardo had been discouraged by anyone, one political elite explained,

I was one of them, yes there were quite a few of us that said this [the Maricopa County Supervisor seat] is a good opportunity. You’re not gonna win the congressional race with the way you haven’t been able to raise any money and we
need someone like you to run for the Board of Supervisors so think about it seriously. This is what I said to him.\textsuperscript{19}

A union leader confirmed that UFCW was forceful in their talking points. The union assured Steve Gallardo that they would fully back him and run his canvassing operation for the Maricopa County Supervisor seat.\textsuperscript{20} Steve Gallardo dropped out of the congressional race and ran for Maricopa’s County Board of Supervisors instead. It is evident that political actors in this district worked to ensure that fewer Latino candidates were in the field to enhance other candidates’ chances of winning. In AZ-7, the Democratic party and a network of political influencers further ensured that only Latino candidates ran for this majority-Latino seat. The groups and various political elites coordinated to prevent Congresswoman Kyrsten Sinema, representing Arizona’s 9th congressional district, from switching districts. These combined efforts amounted to financial contributions and other commitments.\textsuperscript{21} If Rep. Sinema had switched to run in the 7th district, this would have presented a serious threat to any other Latino candidate.\textsuperscript{22} Sinema’s campaign funds of over $1 million dollars would have been difficult to compete against, and all other Latino candidates would have had a very difficult –perhaps impossible– time challenging her in the primary.\textsuperscript{23}

As the candidate field dwindled in AZ-7, the evidence continued to suggest that through massive campaign support, the unions were crucial to Ruben Gallego’s success. Large union support, particularly from the UFCW, meant that,

in a low propensity voting district and in a district where there is not going to be millions of dollars involved [they –UFCW members– are] going to be knocking on doors, and convincing the voter. [They are] going to follow-up and collect the ballots, which is still legal to do here in Arizona. 30 days before the election the ballots go out by the county so at that point you can go to the house and knock on the door and say “I am so and so, I would like to ask you if you have turned in your ballot yet, oh you haven’t? well I can pick it up and take it to where it needs to go. I can help you fill out the ballot.” So, there is some coaching involved. This is a very intense operation.\textsuperscript{24}
As the data indicate, the outcome of AZ-7 was shaped by the unions, the overall coordination of groups, and the influential resources and support to deploy large campaign operations. All these components allowed Ruben Gallego to garner the most votes in the primary and ultimately represent this majority-Latino district in Congress. Evidence from the case studies suggests that group activity shaped the electoral prospects of all candidates in these majority-Latino districts. In the form of positive (Kazee 1994; Maestas, Maisel, and Stone 2005; Broockman 2014) and negative recruitment, (Canon 1999; T. Kazee 1994; Sanbonmatsu 2006) political networks had strong influence on who ran and did not run for these majority-Latino open-seats. Additionally, by providing significant campaign resources, access to donors, and activists (Desmarais, La Raja, and Kowal 2015), political networks were instrumental to Latino representation in the case studies.

**Group influence on substantive representation**

The case studies suggest that there is an additional mechanism by which groups and parties influence representation in majority-Latino districts, which consists of vetting certain candidates in ways that matter for substantive representation. The candidates that were screened, supported and later emerged successful in each of the case studies, whether they were Latino or not, prioritized different issues. This had a direct influence on the type of substantive representation that their constituents would receive.

Despite being a majority-Latino district, whose population was 52% immigrant, CA-31 elected Rep. Gary Miller (R) in 2012. He was a representative with an anti-immigrant agenda. Gary Miller had a conservative voting record since he had been a Member of Congress formerly representing California’s 42nd and 41st congressional districts. He was one of the earliest members of the Tea Party Caucuses in 2010 (Barone et al. 2013). Rep. Miller had previously
voted in support of building a fence along the border, providing government services in English only, ending birthright citizenship, and was a co-sponsor of the Border Protection, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act (HR 4437). As noted earlier, the failed coordination of Democratic groups in 2012 allowed Miller to gain office and represent this majority-Latino district. His previous record on immigration, an issue of great importance to his Latino constituents, is evidence that his presence in Congress had seriously negative implications for the substantive representation of his Latino constituents during his term.

Whereas descriptive representation had been achieved in CA-35 in 2014, some activists and residents questioned Rep. Norma Torres’ policy priorities and allegiances. A local activist in the district argued,

Norma, what she really did do is that she has championed union causes. She was always supported the unionization of the local hospital. If you talk to City Hall people who know her record, they will tell you that she is one of the most conservative Democrats around here, but she takes care of the unions because she knows that is her bread and butter. But she has been horrible on issues of immigration. This is where the immigrant community, us, we get really mad at her, because you don’t go on Univision, and call people “illegal”. Although she is Guatemalan, I don’t think she has that affinity. Rigoberta Menchu even denounced her, because we were having issues with the checkpoints and she didn’t have the guts to tell the police or act on our behalf.25

Rep. Torres was described as a strategic politician who would vote with the party on certain issues. It was evident that she would be a champion of union causes but was not going to prioritize other issues such as immigration reform.

In AZ-7, a similar pattern emerged. Interest group members, local activists and elites described three of the early candidates as politicians who had different affinities, would prioritize distinct agendas if elected. A leader of a local union explained some of the differences between Steve Gallardo, the candidate who was dissuaded from running, and Ruben Gallego, the eventual winner,
At 11 o’clock Sen. Steve Gallardo was marching with the postal workers in Ruben’s district because there was a rally last week at the Staples. Sen. Steve Gallardo was there and at the exact same time Ruben Gallego was getting an award from the Chamber of Commerce. We know that indicates not being a very good advocate. [Ruben’s] whole model is all about business.26

The behavior exhibited by both candidates, is suggestive of distinct models of representation. Sen. Gallardo was described as a true community activist. On the other hand, Ruben Gallego was characterized as a strategic politician who at times prioritized fostering business relationships over overseeing important community struggles. Further evidence suggests that the third candidate, Mary Rose Wilcox, would also provide a different type of representation if elected to the U.S. House. One local elite elaborated on the key differences between the candidates in the AZ-7 open-seat contest,

The major area of difference [between the three candidates] is on immigration. If you ask all three, Ruben is gonna stay there. He knows the issue very well and is going to stay there. Mary Rose Wilcox, on the other hand, has been arrested by the Sheriff [Joe Arpaio], she’s been an activist. It is a different reality when someone’s daughter has been deported down in Nogales and you’re trying to find her. Mary Rose Wilcox talks about it, about stopping the deportations in a very different way than Ruben Gallego does. Ruben is one of the most ‘Democratic party confidants,’ he will tow the party line to a greater degree. But Mary Rose Wilcox she is definitely further left.27

In AZ-7, the three candidates would have provided very different types of representation due to their varying styles of legislating and advocating. This case study provides evidence of how political network activity can influence substantive representation. As the previous section noted, the groups involved in this district played a pivotal role in determining the field of candidates and providing resources to preferred candidates. In turn, by helping elect a specific candidate, the groups directly influenced who won and how certain issues would be advocated for. The candidates had different trajectories as politicians, gave preference to some issues over others and would eventually come to prioritize advocacy of divergent issues in Congress.
Financial group support and Latino candidate success

Taken together, the case studies demonstrate that variation in level of involvement of political networks shape the path of Latinos in majority-Latino districts and the type of representation that these candidates might eventually put forth. Evidence from the case studies suggests that these patterns might hold in other majority-Latino districts beyond those where interviews were conducted. However, despite the rich in-depth empirical data offered by the case studies, it is difficult to assess with the case studies alone how generalizable the findings are beyond the 2012 and 2014 election cycles and the congressional contests studied. To more broadly investigate if the patterns uncovered in the case studies hold elsewhere, the paper analyses a dataset of Latino and non-Latino candidates running in all open- seats from 2004-2014. This dataset includes the universe of congressional districts that were open-seats with a Latino population plurality of at least 15%. It encompasses 367 candidates and 46 congressional contests. 51 of these candidates are of Latino ethnicity. The quantitative analysis that follows provides an important avenue to ensure that the findings uncovered in the case studies are not only due to case selection. As such, the statistical analysis aims to further strengthen the qualitative findings that political networks and groups are critical for Latino candidate emerge and success.

The dataset includes primary vote share for each of the candidates in the contests, obtained from the Federal Election Commission website. These data were used to create a variable of whether individuals won in any given contest. The dataset also includes the partisan voting index (PVI), capturing an absolute measure of how partisan a congressional district is. The ethnicity of the primary winners, if they ended up becoming elected officials, was obtained from the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) yearly
directories. Those who were not successful in their runs and did not appear in the NALEO directories were researched through other biographical sources such as Ballotpedia and LexisNexis.

As the case studies imply, support from political networks of interest groups and parties are critically important for the success of Latino candidates in majority-Latino open-seats. The case studies have shown evidence of the strong relationship between political network activity and Latino candidate emergence and success. To test for the plausibility of the hypothesis more broadly, I rely on financial contributions from parties and committees running in these contests as a proxy of political network support. As evidence from the case studies suggests, political networks support candidates by providing them with various types of resources, including money. Similarly, recent scholarship indicates that “political contributions by organizations provide a robust measure of the intensity of support for candidates” (Desmarais, La Raja, and Kowal 2015, 195) by these very same groups. Following this work, I utilize the measure of financial contributions by organizations to investigate group-level or political network support for all candidates in majority-Latino contests. These data come from the Federal Election Commission and include individual, party and committee contributions as well as candidate self-contributions. The group contributions variable combines contributions from the party and committees.

Latino candidates received on average $103,241 from committees and $610 from parties. Non-Latino candidates receive on average $49,558 and $1,569 from interest groups and parties respectively. On average, Latino candidates rely on $103,900 from the combined group support (parties and interest groups) and non-Latino candidates relied on average on $51,128. Table 2 provides summary statistics that further compare the contributions of Latino and non-Latino
candidates. Overall, the chance that any observed candidate in the dataset wins an open-seat primary in a majority-Latino district, if they announce candidacy, is 25%. This is much lower than the chance of winning general elections, where candidates have a 50% chance of winning. Out of all candidates we observe in the dataset, Latinos appear to have a 3% chance of winning the primary in a majority-Latino open-seat. These figures suggest that succeeding in a primary is difficult and rates of success are much lower for Latinos.

To test for the influence of political network support on the success of Latino candidates running in open-seats, I run a logit model where the dependent variable is if the candidate wins the primary (1 if they win, 0 otherwise). The covariates include individual and group-level contributions where the excluded category is candidate self-contributions. The model also accounts for candidate demographics such as age and gender, and Latino voting age population in the district. The model controls for electoral cycle and district partisanship. The point estimates and standard errors for this logistic model are shown on table 3. In order to substantively interpret the influence of group-level support on Latino candidate success, I calculate and plot predicted probabilities of success as a function of hypothetical levels of group and individual level contributions (King 1998; King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). In these simulations, all other covariates are held at their means.

Figure 1 plots the predicted probability of a Latino candidate winning an open-seat primary, obtained through simulation, for all hypothetical values of group contributions shares that range from 0 to 1. The rug at the top and bottom of figure 1 plot the true observed contribution shares. The top rug corresponds to the share of group contributions and the bottom to the individual contribution shares. The figure shows a strong positive relationship between group contributions and candidate success. Figure 1 shows that as the share of contributions
coming from groups increases, the probability of a Latino candidate winning a primary increases. To interpret these findings, we interpret them as a probability of a Latino candidate winning a primary given the value of group contributions, while holding all other variables at the mean. For example, a Latino candidate who receives 75% of contributions from groups is 69 percentage points \([95\% \text{ confidence interval (CI)} = [54.8, 83.8]]\) more likely to win the primary than their counterparts with lower shares of group-level contributions. As the graph suggests, Latino candidates who receive the highest share of group contributions have an 84% predicted probability of winning the primary compared to those receiving the lowest share of group contributions, who have a 14% predicted probability of winning. This overall change in the predicted probability of winning is quite large given that Latino candidates who receive the highest group level contributions are about 70 percentage points more likely to win the primary than a hypothetical candidate who receives the lowest value of group contributions. This change in the predicted probability of success is large and is associated with a change in five times the likelihood of winning.\(^3\)

The findings suggest that the positive relationship that group-level support has on electoral success is quite meaningful as it substantially increases the chances of Latino candidates winning their respective primary. Overall, these findings are consistent with the findings from the case studies where groups also play a critical role in the success of Latino candidates through various forms of support. The results here demonstrate that the wielding influence of political networks is observed when analyzing data across all electoral cycles and all congressional races. The quantitative findings, in conjunction with evidence from the case studies, are indicative of the pivotal role that groups and parties play in the electoral success of Latino candidates in majority-Latino districts.
Discussion

The presence of a large Latino constituency in a majority-Latino district is not enough to ensure Latino descriptive representation. While majority-minority districts do increase the likelihood that minority representatives achieve elected office (Canon 1999; Lublin 1999), it is not always the case that these districts can elect a co-ethnic candidate. This paper presents an explanation to this puzzle. It shows that the prospects of Latinos when running for Congress in majority-Latino districts are strongly tied to the activities of organized groups and parties, and the cooperation—or lack thereof—among these political networks.

There are several mechanisms through which groups influence whether Latino candidates emerge and succeed in an open-seat in a majority-Latino district. First, political networks vet Latino candidates in majority-Latino districts and thus have an impact on who enters a race. Second, they are critical in narrowing down candidate fields when certain announced Latino and non-Latino candidates might weaken the chances of one another. To this aim, political networks discourage Latino and non-Latino candidates out of a race by providing attractive incentives. Lastly, political networks provide substantial financial and other campaign-related resources to ensure that their chosen candidate succeeds. As the paper finds, financial support from groups in these political networks is very influential for the overall success of Latino candidates in majority open-seats.

This paper has serious implications for scholarship on Latino representation, and minority representation more generally, as it provides evidence of how political networks are fundamental agents in the process of achieving minority descriptive representation. A long-established literature on minority representation has focused on the size of the Latino population and majority-minority districts as important factors that yield Latino electoral success (Lublin 1997;
However, despite having some of these characteristics in place, Latinos may not attain descriptive representation. That is because, as the findings here indicate, the electoral success of Latinos is intricately tied to the political networks in their districts and the support they receive from these networks. The in-depth qualitative findings allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which political networks operate in majority-Latino districts and how they mediate the relationship between minority demographics and electoral success.

Existent work has shown that party elites recruit women and minorities to run for office (Niven 1998; Fox and Lawless 2010; Casellas 2011; Crowder-Meyer 2013). Specifically, Casellas (2011) finds that Latinos are recruited to run in open-seats or against weak incumbents. This paper expands on these findings by highlighting how recruitment of Latino candidates in majority-Latino open-seat contests occurs as a concerted effort between existent and emerging political networks in order to enhance the chances of their preferred candidate. The findings here also provide evidence of how negative recruitment of Latinos and non-Latinos unfolds through attractive electoral and monetary incentives.

The findings in this paper further extend recent work by Juenke (2014) and Juenke and Shah (2015) and contribute to our understanding of supply-side determinants of minority representation. In particular, the findings showcase how actors working from the supply side, namely political networks, can influence minority descriptive representation. As prior work has shown, candidate strategizing matters for the eventual supply of Latino candidates. In addition, this paper demonstrates that political elites, groups and their networks also influence the candidate supply.
As the paper has shown, political network group activity also has implications for Latino substantive representation. Latino and non-Latino candidates in each of the case studies exhibited different priorities and affinities towards certain issues. In directly influencing who enters and wins an open-seat in a majority-Latino district, parties and interest groups determine the type of advocacy that constituents will eventually receive. Even if districts achieve Latino descriptive representation, substantive representation will depend on which candidate was vetted, what issues the candidate prioritizes and which group or network the newly elected representative reciprocates to. As such, these findings extend our understanding of how policy demanders active in nomination politics, as theorized in Cohen et al. (2008; S. Masket 2009; Bawn et al. 2012) can influence the substantive representation of racial and ethnic minorities.

Building on the existing literature (Minta 2009; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014), this project presents new evidence of how political network activity yields varying levels of substantive representation. While district demographics and partisanship have been found to be predictors of Latino legislator behaviors (Wallace 2014), the findings suggest that political networks are also closely tied to specific issue prioritization of Latino representatives. Rouse (2013) finds that Arizona legislators have shown divergent ways of voicing opposition to SB1070, a 2010 law considered to be one of the strictest anti-immigration laws. The findings in this paper help us understand why some Latino legislators may choose to channel their opposition in different ways, and which factors influence the “intensity” of Latino legislator efforts toward certain issues over others (Minta 2009). This paper suggests that political networks influence Latino substantive representation in an indirect way by influencing the prospects of some Latino candidates who would be distinct advocates of Latino issues. However, it is highly plausible that
political networks may also influence the efforts of Latino legislators in a more direct way, which should be further investigated.

Further work is needed to continue to understand the role of political networks and interest groups on minority representation. This paper has primarily focused on Latino representation at the federal level, but future studies should examine how groups and party elites influence the prospects of minorities vying for elected office at varying levels as well as in districts that have changed demographically. Ultimately, this project aims to highlight how understudied factors working from the supply side are related to minority representation. As such, this analysis elucidates the importance of both qualitative and quantitative analysis in helping to uncover the role of political networks on representation in majority-Latino districts.
### Table 1: Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Winner</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Group Contribs.</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Indiv. Contribs.</td>
<td>0.770</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Self Contribs.</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>49.789</td>
<td>10.691</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Candidates</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino VAP</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVI</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>12.402</td>
<td>-33</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Contributions Received by Latino and non-Latino candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Latino</th>
<th></th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>St. Dev.</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>$271,454</td>
<td>$601,123</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$6,375,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Funding</td>
<td>$41,633</td>
<td>$349,151</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$5,992,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>$49,558</td>
<td>$118,233</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$1,020,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>$1,569</td>
<td>$6,793</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$98,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Grp.</td>
<td>$51,128</td>
<td>$120,334</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$1,020,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribs.</td>
<td>$365,089</td>
<td>$878,108</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$12,392,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The combined group contributions is a sum of committee and party contributions*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary Winner</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Primary Winner</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Group Contribs.</td>
<td>3.468*** (0.945)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Indiv. Contribs.</td>
<td>0.974 (0.792)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino candidate</td>
<td>-0.489 (0.452)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.010 (0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.008 (0.323)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino VAP</td>
<td>2.457 (1.993)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVI</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycle</td>
<td>-0.025 (0.041)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>47.239 (82.590)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>309</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-175.729</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akaike Inf. Crit.</td>
<td>369.458</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Figure 1

Note: Lines indicate predicted probability of a hypothetical Latino winning the primary as a function of contributions while holding all other variables at their means. The bands around the lines mark the uncertainty of the predicted probability with 95% c.i.
References


Ocampo, Angela X. and John L. Ray. 2015 “Many are Called but Few are Chosen: The Emergence of Latino Congressional Candidates.” Paper presented at the Western Political Science Association (WPSA) Annual Meeting, Las Vegas, NV. April 2-4, 2015


Author’s Note

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2015 American Political Science Association (APSA) Annual Meeting.
Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the Parties on the Ground team: Kathy Bawn, John Zaller, John Ray, Shawn Patterson and Knox Brown for their support and guidance. The author would also like to thank Matt Barreto, Lorrie Frasure-Yokley, Bryan Wilcox-Arthuleta, Sergio Garcia-Rios, Angie N. Ocampo and the anonymous reviewers for their insight and helpful comments.
Most of the interviews were conducted prior to the election. Each interview is cited using the name of district number of the interview and/or visit count.

1 CA-31-05 and DC-01


3 CA-41-03

One of the most notable policies that Takano championed was a project labor agreement that denied RCC contracts to non-union vendors. CA-41-01


5 CA-31-03

According to the DW-Nominate scores for legislators in the 113th Congress, Rep. Miller’s score was 0.608, whereas Rep. Steve King, one of the most conservative members of the House was 0.744. On the contrary, Rep. Grace Napolitano, who represented the neighboring 32nd Congressional district with a 62.2% Latino population, was on the opposite side of the spectrum, with a score of -0.504. The scores range from -1.0 to 1.0 (liberal to conservative).

6 CA-31-09


8 CA-31-08

Democrats again creating crowded field in 31st District race http://www.sbsun.com/government-and-politics/20130415/democrats-again-creating-crowded-field-in-31st-district-race “Tillman said higher-ups in the Democratic Party have discouraged him from running in 2014.” April 15, 2013. Another one of the interviewees indicated that the DCCC and other leaders both at the national and local level attempted to discourage Eloise Gomez-Reyes from running in the primary. CA-31-08

9 CA-31-03

10 CA-31-06

The poll conducted on May 13, 2014 showed that the Republicans were ahead in the primary and Aguilar could come close to losing. http://atr.rollcall.com/for-democrats-its-deja-vu-in-californias-31st-district/ CA-31-06

11 CA-35-03

12 CA-35-03


14 AZ-07-05 v2

15 AZ-07-03 v2

16 AZ-07-04 v2

Kyrsten Sinema: More work to be done for CD9

AZ-07-05 v1
CA-35-03
AZ-07-03 v1
AZ-07-07 v2


The rug helps contextualize and understand the marginal distribution of the variables as well as the plausibility of the simulations. The rug indicates that it is possible for Latinos to receive between 50% to all contributions from groups.

Extracting some observed candidates in the data help us understand the plausibility of the predicted probabilities. These indicate that the predicted probability line appears to fit the data well. For example, Rep. Norma Torres, who ran in 2014, received 96% of her contributions from groups. Rep. Torres won the primary and received 67% of the vote share. Similarly, Rep. Juan Vargas who ran in 2012, received 53% of his contributions from groups. Rep. Vargas was also successful and obtained 65% of the vote share in the primary.