SCIENCE FICTION FUTURES AND THE OCEAN AS HISTORY: LITERATURE, DIAspORA, AND THE PACIFIC WAR

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Abstract

Science Fiction Futures and the Ocean as History:
Literature, Diaspora, and the Pacific War

This dissertation traces a kind of literary “origin” to the Pacific War by analyzing the mass circulation of emergent science fiction — written in both the United States and Japan — that prophesied the perils of war in the Pacific from the late-nineteenth century on. Through an analysis of both canonical and minoritized works by writers including Ursula Le Guin, Abe Kobo, Lafcadio Hearn, Percival Lowell, Toshio Mori, Alfred Mahan, Hector Bywater, Sato Kojiro, Juliet Kono, E. Lily Yu, Robert Heinlein, Homer Lea, John Okada, Hiroshi Kashiwagi, and in dialogue with the growing field of science fiction cultural studies, I develop a problematic that has been implicit within the representation of “aliens” within literature and cultural theory. I show how science fiction, since its emergence, has actively negotiated with the conditions of diaspora as a modern formation, here seen in a particular context of the Nikkei in America, deemed “enemy-alien” by science fiction and Executive Order alike.

Through an analysis of the dialogues between future war writers on both sides of the Pacific, I trace a pre-history to the language of the Japanese American incarceration, specifically the designation of “enemy-alien” deployed against
communities across the western hemisphere to justify military targeting, “internment,” and subsequent diasporizations as “test subjects” for the U.S. war-effort. Thus, I show how early representations of the “alien from another world” can be read as foreshadowing the impossible conditions imposed upon Japanese American communities upon the start of the Pacific War.

Yet an analysis of the historic intersections between science fiction and Asian American representation also helps us to recognize the ways in which Japanese American and Chinese American writers in diaspora, however ambivalently, have experimented with the tropes and themes of science fiction as a means to contest, and reimagine, their historic conditions of alienation. While pre-war science fiction reveals the mystifications of print capitalist circulation across the Pacific, post-war science fiction by Asian American writers can help us imagine the possibilities of a future no longer contained by the contradictions of diaspora in a globalizing universe.
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Introduction

Science Fiction and the Perils of Prophecy:

Literature, Diasporic “Aliens,” and the “Origins” of the Pacific War

This dissertation traces a kind of literary “origin” to the “Pacific War” by analyzing the archive of science fiction future-war texts that prophesied the perils of war in the Pacific from the late-nineteenth century on. While Japan’s first strike at Pearl Harbor, as with its decisive defeat precipitated by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are now mainstays of the contemporary imagination, repeated in countless works of culture across genre and form, the war between the United States and Japan was also one of the most anxiously anticipated conflicts of literary modernity. The pre-war science fiction archive of future war speculation, although generally cast to the margins of literary and cultural studies, are vital to a deeper understanding of the literary genre’s historical emergence, as well as a critical understanding of the relationship between literature and modern war.

My project examines the way in which writers and geo-strategic military thinkers in industrializing, imperial nations took up the science fiction sub-genre of “future war” as a means to apprehend a crisis of territoriality in an era where borders between nations and peoples were dramatically shifting under the pressures of technological innovation, international imperialism, globalizing capital, unprecedented
migration of “aliens” from Asia, but also the transpacific eruption of what Benedict Anderson called “print capitalist” nationalism in both the U.S. and Japan. Thus, I study the archive of Pacific War speculation as it informed the “emergence of science fiction” (Rieder 16), in both the United States and Japan.

Not only did the international circulation of future war narratives function proleptically, that is, as a grave form of foreshadowing, in the decades prior to Japan’s strike at Pearl Harbor, the tradition also prefigured the emergent contours of a globalizing world through the representation of “aliens” upon the literary terrain of future war. As I argue, it is from the science fiction of the Pacific War that the trope of the “alien from another world” derives many of its most salient features, and thus can be read as foreshadowing the impossible conditions of the Japanese American incarceration during World War II.

**Future War Apprehensions and the Emergence of Science Fiction**

My analysis follows Samuel Delaney’s insight that science fiction is never simply “about the future,” but is rather a “tool to help you think about the present, a present that is always changing” (*Starboard Wine* 13). Rather than posit a simple logic of determinism between “the war” and the archive of literary prophesy written beforehand, or rehearse debates about who fired first shots, fictional or otherwise, I am interested in the ways in which future-war writing, along with the emergence of science fiction literature more generally, reveals a shifting apprehension of “reality”
during the years prior to the Pacific War’s official declaration. In my argument, future war narratives prophesying the perils of war are best read as proleptic. That is, science fiction functioned as a grave form of foreshadowing that bled the line between “reality” and fiction, indeed, between war and peace, during the years prior to the Pacific War’s official outbreak.

This suggested by Lafcadio Hearn in his last book as the “Interpreter of Japan,” The Romance of the Milky Way (1905). Writing from Tokyo in the middle of the Russo-Japanese War, Hearn depicts the eruption of a mass culture industry dedicated to Japan’s war pursuits, quoting a contemporary haiku to illustrate the strange reality-effects that mass printing seemed to have on a wartime society: Gōgwai no/Tabi teki mikata/ Goké ga fuè. Or in translation, “As extras circulate the widows of foes and friends increase in multitude.” (The Romance of the Milky Way 184 my translation). Of course, Hearn’s haiku speaks to the tragedy of death in war, of the growing “multitude” of “widows of foes and friends” on both sides of the Russo-Japanese conflict. At the same time, the poem can be read as a commentary on the impact of mass media on the apprehensions of “reality,” as seen through the eruption of future war representation in Japan.

Revealing, as the “Great Japanese Empire” was emerging as one of the preeminent powers in the world through militarism, colonialism, and “alien” assimilation, the impact of the future war imagination was also being apprehended in the United States. This is suggested by Ferdinand Grautoff in his future-war novel
Banzai (1908), in which he depicts the “pre-war” conditions in the Pacific with a seeming paradox in which “The thunder of canon could be heard in the air long before the guns were loaded” (x). As one of many future-war narratives that adapted the narrative formula of future-war devised by George Tomkyn’s Chesney “The Battle of Dorking” (1871) in response to political tensions between the United States and Japan, Grautoff attempts to assess the (mis-)apprehension of canon fire to an innate predilection to war between nations; but his image arguably suggests something even more dramatic than the drive to darwinian struggle. As he notes, even though actual war between the United States and Japan had not yet commenced, its impacts had already been apprehended, “heard in the air long before the guns were loaded.” This suggests not just that the anticipation of war had warped the apprehension of “reality,” but that the fictions of war were functioning in the place of war’s actuality.

This is also what the American philosopher, William James, who wrote in 1910 that, “Every up-to-date dictionary should say that ‘peace’ and ‘war’ mean the same thing, now in posse, now in actu” (“The Moral Equivalent of War”). James’ essay is of relevance for the way it grapples with an emergent condition in which the rise of militarism across the globe was leading to a condition in which the potentialities (posse) and actualities (actu) of war were increasingly misrecognized. James, an avowed “pacifist,” points to the institutionalization of military-industrial rivalries as one source of this shifting apprehension, suggesting that “the intensely
sharp preparation for war by the nations is the real war, permanent, unceasing” (“The Moral Equivalent of War”).

But James also registers the increased geopolitical tensions in the Pacific at the end of the first decade, namely the first of several “war scares” between the United States and Japan; James’ is also wary of the way in which mass publishing industries seemed to be capitalizing on tensions between nations by encouraging the literary form which sought to predict the nature and outcome of that future conflict -- future war science fiction. James sources are H.G. Wells, author of *War of the Worlds* (1898) but also Homer Lea, whose international sensation, *The Valor of Ignorance* (1909) made the self-fashioning “general” a central figure within the future war tradition for science fiction writers and military thinker on both sides of the Pacific.

As I show, a critical attention to the impact of future war circulation in the pre-Pacific War years may offer a means to analyze the impacts of science fiction’s emergence across the “print capitalist” (Anderson) markets of the Pacific. While Lea’s text, which foretells of an imminent Japanese invasion of the United States, was intended to rouse his American readers to military preparation in the wake of the Japanese victory over Russia, in Japanese translation, the text was interpreted as an encouragement for Japan to further its expansionary ambitions. In fact, Lea’s Japanese publisher, Hakubunkan, marketed the book as “excellent reading matter for all Oriental men with red blood in their veins” (Luce xxxi).
As articulated in Benedict Anderson’s comparative history of the modern nation, *Imagined Communities*, the problematic of “print capitalism” suggests that the rise of mass publishing technologies offered a means for modern nations to shape the contours of their respective “imagined communities” through the publication and dissemination of nationalist media. Anderson writes in response to the “uncomfortable anomaly for Marxist theory” (3), namely, the global emergence of the nation-state form. For my purposes, his problematic of “print capitalism” can be read as facilitating a dual critique: while it foregrounds the central role of the mass printing, and later, mass culture industries, on the production of nationalist ideologies, it also raises questions about the circulation of literary narratives and forms between national communities.

For while Lea’s future war was poorly received by American readers, selling only 18,000 copies total, his incredible “success” as an author in Japan suggests an even more important lesson than the specific future he envisioned. In addition to his phenomenal sales in Japanese translation — 100,000 copies and twenty four printings, in the first month — Lea became a major source for science fiction writers in Japan who adapted and responded to the future narratives written by American writers.

As I argue, the function of print capitalism in the production of modern nationalisms can also be read as an international phenomenon: the archive of “Pacific War” speculation reveals the way in which nationalism was reinforced from both
within and without by the circulation of literature, and by the anticipation of war between “East” and “West.” Through translations and adaptations of texts and forms, science fiction offered a means for writers and military-strategists on both sides of the Pacific to engage their literary “mirrors” during the years prior to Pearl Harbor. In effect, however, the circulation of science fiction between Pacific rivals also precipitated conditions of militarization between the two nations in the pre-war years, and in the process, foreshadowed a perilous future for the “alien” communities at the “front lines” of the war.

Specifically, my study foregrounds the imperiled positionality of Japanese diasporic “aliens” caught “between two empires,” to borrow Eichiro Azuma’s framing of pre-war Japanese American history. Cast as “alien” invaders in yellow peril science fiction, but also as “heroes” of Japanese future war following the translation of Homer Lea, I examine the ways in which transpacific science fiction can be read as establishing a grave “pre-history” to the “alien enemy” designation used to target and forcibly remove Japanese communities from the West Coast following Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066. In this way, I argue that the emergence of science fiction can be read as foreshadowing the wartime internment of the Japanese American community.

**Science Fiction’s Emergence and the Invention of the “Pacific War”**
The term “Pacific War” has emerged into common usage in the post-World War II years to denote the war between the United States and Japan from 1941-1945. As it is conventionally narrated, the war begins on Dec. 7 1941, when Japan attacks U.S. naval forces stationed at Pearl Harbor, and ends on Sept. 2, 1945, following the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs in early August.

Studies focused on war memory and historiography reveal the archive of Pacific War to be discrepant, uneven, and unstable as a discursive terrain. The Pacific War, although largely waged by Japan and the United States, ultimately involved more peoples and countries than just the U.S. and Japan. Battles were fought throughout the Asian continent and the Pacific Islands, battles which impacted colonized peoples under both regimes. Insofar as the Pacific War can be read as conjuring an unproblematized “Pacific Rim” binary, its usage must be regarded with critical suspension.

Even within U.S.-Japan studies, the term itself, “Pacific War,” is also a site of contestation. Ienaga Saburo designates the years 1931-1945 as the period in which Japan was at war, and thus names the war according to his periodization. In this view, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki may have punctuated Japan’s wartime, but its war began in China in 1931. When translated into English, however, Ienaga’s “Fifteen Year War” was translated as “The Pacific War,” even though the United States was not involved until 1941. This choice on the part of the publisher

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suggests the way in which the memory and historiography of the war has been framed by the U.S. victory. While this is understandable from a perspective of national publishing, it suggests that the term “Pacific War” is fraught by contradictions.

My study on literature and the Pacific War, based on my positionality as a U.S. citizen and scholar at an American university, is implicated in this critique. But I hope to unsettle some of the dominant historiographic tendencies in scholarly and popular discourse on “the war” by considering the Pacific War to be a subject of science fiction, that is, not just a subject of history, but of a historicized future. In fact, the signifier “Pacific War” emerges from the science fiction tradition of future war writing: Hector Bywater’s *The Great Pacific War of 1931* (1925) is to my knowledge the first recorded usage of the term.

But my dialogues with Pacific War historiography ultimately serves to reinforce my analysis of literature, specifically the historical “emergence of science fiction” from the particular vantage points of modern literature in the United States and Japan. Thus, I follow John Rieder’s analysis of the genre’s history, *Colonialism and the Emergence of Science Fiction* (2008). Rather than consider science fiction history in terms of hard and fast definitions, Rieder’s approach historicizes the genre as it comes into increased recognizability from the late nineteenth century on. He writes, “the emergence of science fiction is the long, winding path leading from certain narratives that disrupt realist conventions in the mid to late nineteenth century, to ones that assume science fiction conventions in the 1930’s” (16). Thus, “the
emergence of science fiction is both the historical process of the coalescence of a set of narrative innovations and expectations into a coherent generic category, and, necessarily, a shift that takes place in the entire system of genres (Rieder 18). In other words, science fiction’s emergence marks a historic period in which literary innovations eventually became readerly expectations; as a result of its emergence as a recognizable genre of writing, “science fiction” changed of literature in the world.

While literary criticism has historically regarded science fiction to be a Euro-American phenomenon, by studying the archive of future war speculation in both the United States and Japan, I show how the “prophecy of the Pacific War” can be read a major component of science fiction’s global emergence, one which continues to inform the contemporary imagination of the genre across the fiction of “East” and “West.” Just as the Pacific, following the Hegelian trajectory of westward expansion², has long been associated with notions of futurity, the Pacific was also a central topos within the emergence of science fiction -- for it was the stage for what was anticipated to be the most spectacular war in human history.

While my dissertation focuses solely on the literary representation — rather than the experiential reality — of modern war, I do propose that the emergence of science fiction in both the United States and Japan can be read as providing a kind of “advanced script” (Lye 103) for both sides of the war. Not only did the prophecies of

Pacific War function as a grave form of foreshadowing in the decades prior to Japan’s strike at Pearl Harbor, they also prefigured the emergent contours of a globalizing world through the science fictional apprehension of “aliens” upon the terrain of future-Pacific War. During the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the “alien from another world” came into view as one of modernity’s primary figures, an emergence traceable to Well’s narrative of Martian invasion, but also geo-strategic and legal discourses on territoriality, national and racial borders, and the future of war in a globalizing world.

**Science Fiction, Dialogism, and Modern War: Heinlein and Bakhtin**

The connection between literature and modern war was first suggested in science fiction criticism by a foundational figure in the field, Robert A. Heinlein, the “Dean of Science Fiction.” In his essay, “Science Fiction: Its Nature, Virtues, and Faults,” first delivered in 1957 at a University of Chicago, and later published in, *Science Fiction Novel: Imagination and Social Criticism* (1969), Heinlein reflects on the increased recognition of science fiction as a genre in the post-war, 1950’s era, observing, “The term ‘science fiction’ is now a part of the language, as common as the neologism ‘guided missile’” (18). On the surface, his remark seems only to assess the common usage of “science fiction” in everyday language in the 1950’s by likening it to neologisms prompted by new military technologies. But Heinlein’s essay actually posits a more problematic relationship between “science fiction” and “guided
missiles,” one in which science fiction is figured as the origin of the deadly neologism.

Heinlein’s essay, widely regarded as one of the first major works of science fiction criticism, asks whether science fiction can be read as a form of modern prophecy by examining the genre’s influence on the history of technology, society, and war. Following the lead of editors like Gernsback, who first codified science fiction as a literature of “prophetic vision,” as well as Heinlein’s collaborator, John Campbell, the language of “prophecy” offers Heinlein a means to conceptualize the significance -- and even, the “superiority” -- of science fiction as a modern genre of literature. In contradistinction to genres like fantasy, which for Heinlein present narratives that are “impossible,” science fiction is distinctive insofar as it embodies “the scientific method itself” (30) in its predictions of the world of the future. Thus, Heinlein argues that science fiction is actually “more realistic than most historical and contemporary scene-fiction,” (30). From Heinlein’s perspective, the impact of “science fiction” is evidenced by the supposedly “endless” string of technologies imagined by science fiction writers that were later realized. He writes:

Much has been made of the ‘successful prophecies’ of science fiction — the electric light, the telephone, the airplane, the submarine, the periscope, tanks, flame throwers, A-bombs, television, the automobile, guided missiles, robot aircraft, totalitarian government, radar — the list is endless.

(32)
Writing in a particular, “post-war” moment where technologies once predicted by science fiction writers were becoming a part of everyday reality, Heinlein lists a supposedly unending procession of inventions that can be read as the products of science fiction “prophecies.” Most prominent are the “super weapons” — once the stuff of fiction — that later found their place on the battlefields of the modern wars, a list that includes the neologism “guide missile.” Heinlein further suggests a social impact of science fiction “prophecies” in his reference to emergent modes of totalitarianism, suggesting a link between militariam and emergent modes of governmentality. Heinlein’s argument plays with and against the mystifying nature of prophetic discourses, both disassociating science fiction from connotations of “crystal balls,” but ultimately affirming science fiction’s function as a literature which guides the course of “progress” through practices of extrapolation and prediction, or “realistic speculation,” based on extant scientific thinking.

In this sense, Heinlein substantiates Gernsback’s earlier vision of a literature that would influence “progress” by inspiring the science, technology, and society of the future, but revealing, he also places a decidedly militarist bent on science fiction’s social impact: by situting the “guided missile” within a lineage of “successful prophecies,” he in fact suggests science fiction to be the source of the “guided missile.” In other words, Heinlein suggests literary neologism both to be a kind of material invention, but also a guiding force in history.
Although many of the writers I discuss in this dissertation, from “sea power Prophet” Alfred Mahan, Lea, Hector Bywater, to Heinlein, have been read as having “successfully prophesied” some of the inventions, and perhaps even, the course of events in history, rather than approaching science fiction for their articulations of the simple future form — “what we will do” — as in Heinlein’s theory of extrapolation, I hope to bring a historicized approach to questions of “the future” by highlighting the ways in which prophecy in literature functions both as a grave form of foreshadowing, but also an active “dialogical” negotiation with textual and social contradictions at play in their respective literary moments, a notion I borrow from Mikhail Bakhtin.

In other words, the question of futurity in literary representation can be reconsidered by examining the nature of novelistic discourse. Ironically, although Heinlein’s essay was first published in the first collection of critical works dedicated specifically to The Science Fiction Novel, Heinlein’s theory of “realistic speculation” fails to consider the formal context within which the literary extrapolations are articulated — that is, the particular “problematicalness” (31) found in novelistic discourse that Mikhail Bakhtin identified as dialogism.

Bakhtin’s theorization of the discrepant temporalities at work in fiction can illuminate the problematic of “prophecy” in science fiction and future war narratives. Revealingly, Bakhtin also turns to the question of prophecy in literature, but he does so as a way to conceptualize the distinctiveness of the novel (in contrast to “epics”) as
a emergent form. He writes: “The novel might wish to prophesize facts, to predict and influence the real future, the future of the author and his readers. But the novel has a new and quite specific problematicalness” (30). At once, Baktin apprehends the question of prophecy in terms of the desires of self-fashioning prophets, but at the same time, he foregrounds the medium of the novel in its impact on the message of the “prophet.” Bakhtin describers this problematicalness in terms of a reflexive, critical, changing-same within the discourse of the novel, for “characteristic for it is an eternal re-thinking and re-evaluating.” From perspective, the prophet’s desire to determine the future is complicated by the distinct “problematicalness” that characterizes the novelistic form — that is, the novel’s tendency “to ponder and justify” the past, even as it envisions the future.

Bakhtin’s dialogic theory suggests how the future emerges in literature in ways that are markedly different from the notion advanced by Heinlein. Although Heinlein theory of prophetic extrapolation relies on a “simple future” construction — “what we will do” — Bakhtin points to the imagination of history as the nexus of the world futurity. As a result of discursive struggle, the “center of activity that ponders and justifies the past is transferred to the future” (30). In foregrounding a “center of activity” within novels that “ponders and justifies the past,” Bakhtin’s dialogical approach suggests that the science fiction future will always remains rooted in the dynamicisms of language and the contestations over history. Baktin’s theory of reading the dialogic interplay between “alien words” (276) as they emerge into
discourse gives us a method whereby we might recover the historicity of emergent articulations like “science fiction,” the “Pacific War,” and as we shall see, “diaspora” as part of the critical lexicon.

Overview of Critical Trends in Science Fiction Cultural Studies

Following Heinlein have been several generations of science fiction scholars who have continued to examine the relationship between literature and modern war. These critics reveal the way in which the extreme forms of violence inflicted upon the pages of science fiction narratives can be read as reflecting the impact of militarism and militarization as part of modern national culture. Cynthia Enloe has described “militarism” as an “ideology,” one that is animated by “socio-political” process of “militarization,” whereby “the roots of militarism are driven deep down into the soil of a society” (104). Scholarship on the future-war form confirms a long link between the science fiction archive and ideologies and practices of modern war, demonstrating that militarization is not simply a matter of driving military values into the soil, but also across the seas, as well as into interplanetary space.

I.F. Clarke, in his ground-breaking study, *Voices Prophesying War: Future-Wars 1763-3749* (1992), has explored the way in which future-war narratives functioned in late-nineteenth century letters as “the most favored means of presenting arguments for or against new political alliances, changes in the organization of equipment of armies, technological innovations in naval vessels, or even schemes of
colonial expansion (1). Defining the formula as “a predictive epic on the victory or defeat of a nation species in the international struggle to survive” (37), Clarke reads the literature for its propagandistic attributes, making a case for complicity between militarism, literary writers (who were often soldiers and sailors themselves), and the events leading to World War I (1914-1918). Tracing the form’s emergence to the string of “Battle of Dorking” adaptations in the wake of Chesney’s “The Battle of Dorking.” Clarke’s analysis makes a compelling case for the socio-political connection between future war writing and militarization by demonstrating how the form functioned to naturalize the ideologies and institutions of modern militarism, in particular the modern navy.

Bruce Franklin’s War Stars: The Superweapon and the America Imagination (1988) analyzes the cultural history of “super-weapon” trope in science fiction and political discourse from the late-19th century to the end of the cold war era. Franklin’s study also suggests a link whereby future-war texts can be read as impacting attitudes and policies of the nation, meaning that “American fantasies about super weapons are not primarily fantasies at all…when they shape the thinking of adventures and leaders and common people they become material force” (War Stars 5). Thus, Franklin posits an ideological function in the relationship between science fiction literature and militarization, where future-war fantasies about weapons are read to shape the contours of the nation’s imagination.
Interestingly, the connection between literature and modern war is seen in the analysis of science fiction history in Japan. Although “SF” history in Japan cannot be reduced to an Anglo-American inheritance, as Yokota Junya has argued (SF Koten), the historical confluences between science fiction and militarism in Japan suggest a deep resonances with the emergence of science fiction in England and America. For instance, in her analysis of the image of “super-weapons” in Japan during the pre-war years, scholar Maika Naoko has argued for a correlation between science fiction writing disseminated in Japanese mass media and social attitudes regarding nuclear weapons. She notes that, “before the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the atomic bomb was thought of in a generally positive manner. The Japanese people envisioned atomic energy as a scientific dream, even hope” (“The Image of the Atomic Bomb in Japan Before Hiroshima” 130).

Tracing a genealogy starting in the 1920’s to the Bikini Atoll bombing of 1954, Nakao explores how ideas about atomic energy and atomic weapons were imported from overseas and promulgate via science fiction and popular science writing. Contrary to historical views that hold that “scientists, specifically physicists, are responsible for creating the atomic bomb,” (“The Image of the Atomic Bomb in Japan Before Hiroshima”) Nakao argues that, at least initially, the people who did the most to stoke interest in atomic power in Japan were literary and popular writers like Unno Juza.
Owen Giffiths’ article, “Militarizing Japan: Patriotism, Profit, and Children’s Print Media, 1894-1925,” explores the connection between future-war writing in Japan, particularly as it relates to representations of children in the years leading to Japan’s wars in Asia and the Pacific. As he argues:

From the 1890s onward, tales of martial glory, sacrifice, patriotism, and foreign perfidy drove a significant segment of children’s print media, functioning as didactic vehicles for inculcating the essential tropes of what would become the “patriotic cannon” to generations of boys and girls. Long before the ubiquitous “human bullets” (nikudan), suicide bombers (kamikaze), and the “one hundred million” (ichioku) of the Pacific War, adult writers and publishers working from a variety of motives nourished the latent national spirit of Japanese children with a steady diet of martial imagery.

(“Militarizing Japan”)

As Griffith argues, works like Miyazaki Ichiu’s 1922 novel, Nichibei Miraisen (The Future War between Japan and America), reveal “the manner in which adults transmitted their fears, aspirations, and values to children and the role of Japan’s print media in that process” (“Militarizing Japan”). Like critics of the American future-war canon, Griffith and Maika establish a link between literature and the socio-politics of militarization.

As scholars have begun to reveal, both the American and Japanese traditions of future-war writing display many similar qualities, not least of which is a common
socio-political investment in the militarization of their respective countries and a common function as popular propaganda for military preparedness and war. These works reveal that science fiction’s global emergence functioned as a discrepant space of racial and gendered formation, colonial power, and militarism across the turbulent waters of international geo-politics from the nineteenth century on.

Scholars of American science fiction have also revealed the way in which the genre engaged, and reenforced, the forms of racism endemic to modern colonialism. For instance, Patrick Sharp’s *Savage Perils: Racial Frontiers and Nuclear Apocalypse in American Culture* (2007) tracks the way in which frontier ideology and inherited European assumptions about white superiority gave rise to a science fictional imagination that relied on a techno-darwinist imagination to endorse American imperialism. Rieder also echoes Sharp in emphasizing the degree to which “evolutionary theory in anthropology, both profoundly intertwined colonial ideology and history, are especially important to early science fiction from the mid-19th century on” (2). Rieder’s analysis explores the way in which the political context of western colonialism in the late-nineteenth century served as a point of reference for foundational figures of the genre: “when Verne, Wells, and others wrote voyages underground, under the sea, and into the heavens for the readers of the age of imperialism, the otherworldliness of the colonies provided a new kind of legibility and significance to an ancient plot” (Rieder 6).
Previous science fiction scholarship also reveals the way in which science fiction encounters with “aliens” from extra-territorial space offer an angle into questions regarding the racialized context of national identity formation from the nineteenth century on. Indeed, as American future-war fiction emerged, it pioneered many of its “alien” tropes in the body of literary speculation dedicated to the perils of conflict with people from foreign nations. As Franklin argues, “future-war fiction that emerged as a body of literature in the 1880s turned America’s colonial history inside out, establishing what was to become a conventional pattern: the invasion of defenseless America by aliens from across the seas” (War Stars 21). Franklin remarks that immigrants and racial minorities were often the targets of scapegoating via discourses of foreign invasion; he writes that future war authors “often perceived the victims of domestic oppression — Chinese “coolies,” blacks, Indians, European immigrants — as these foreigners’ confederates treacherously lurking inside the nation” (War Stars 21). In other words, science fiction writing promoted a climate of racial hostility towards minority communities, a point I will return to.

Following Franklin, Mike Davis’ Ecologies of Fear (1992) traces a “taxonomy of disaster fiction” (282) in Los Angeles from the nineteenth-century to the late 20th century, concluding that “the abiding hysteria of Los Angeles disaster fiction…is rooted in racial anxiety” (281). Tracing a genealogy of anxiety from the emergence of future war narratives of the late nineteenth-century, Davis argues that “growing fears of social revolution and of the ‘rising tide of color’ accompanied increasing anxieties
over the inevitability of future world wars between the imperialist powers” (287). Not only does Davis suggest that the “alien” remains an abiding figure around which the “deepest animating fears of our culture” (282) are projected, but also that, historically, the emergence of the “alien” as a figure is related to the anticipation of war in the Pacific.

Tatsumi Takayuki’s *Full Metal Apache: Transactions Between Cyberpunk Japan and Avant-Pop America* (2006), emphasizes the significance of visuality in the racialized representations of aliens in early science fiction: “the signifier of color, whether yellow or black or red — or even white — functioned as the most viable metaphor in the characterization of aliens” (70). Patricia Kerslake, in *Science Fiction and Empire* (2011), has analyzed how the poetics of alien othering can take on a militarized dimension: “Once clearly identified as aggressive, or implacable, or too ‘different’ to coexist peacefully with an enlightened humanity, then the Other becomes a legitimate target (19).

John Cheng’s *Astounding Wonder: Science Fiction in the Interwar America* (2012), extends the analysis of aliens and race into the “Gernsback Years,” the period in which the genre emerged as a codified form between the two World Wars. Cheng explores how the figurations of aliens allowed for negotiations of racial anxieties. The troping of aliens, at least in the U.S. tradition, was increasingly associated with the figure of the “Asian” in science fiction of the inter-war period: “Asians were the foes who brought out the best in science fiction’s heroes” (Cheng 158). Although Cheng’s
analysis does not foreclose a larger consideration of science fiction within a broader view of America’s racialized landscape, his insights are useful in relation to the particular concerns of my study on science fiction history in the Pacific. Commenting on the specificity of yellow peril representation in American science fiction, Cheng argues that:

Science fiction’s racial tropes allowed not only direct expression of contemporary racial anxieties but indirect expression of other larger anxieties as well. Because the idea of race expressed social and political concerns about natural difference, it served as a powerful means for science fiction to represent the tensions within its reconfiguration of nature, science, society, and change…Asians more aptly fulfilled the requirements for science fiction’s anxieties.

(158)

Cheng’s analysis suggests a complex terrain of negotiations projected onto the racialized figure of the alien/asian. In its “reconfiguration of nature, science, society, and change” science fiction relied on the figure of the alien/asian as an indirect metaphor for larger tensions between nation and nature and history as a result of increased engagements with science and technology.

Relatedly, Stephen Sohn and others have shown how an attention to “techno-orientalism” helps us to think of yellow peril science fiction in terms of racial and
technological representation. In “Alien/Asian: Imaging the Racial Future” (2008), Sohn argues that

In its multiply inflected significations, the alien stands as a convenient metaphor for the experiences of Asian Americans, which range from the extraterrestrial being who seem to speak in a strange, yet familiar, accented English to migrant subjects excluded from legislative enfranchisement. In this respect, the Alien/Asian does invoke conceptions of its homonymic counterparts, alienation and alien-nation” (6).

Sohn suggests that, in contrast to “traditional Orientalism” where “the East often is configured as backwards, anti-progressive, and primitive” (8), a reading of modern Orientalism should also account for the “techno-orientalist,” or futuristic, representation of Asians in science fiction. The Alien/Asian helps us to think of racial representation both in terms of racial and national borders -- or “alien-nation” -- but also, necessarily, economic exploitation, or “alienation.”

Reading Orientalism in the Wake of Wells

In 1931, a young reader of science fiction, Howard Lowe, of New York, sent a letter to the editor of Amazing Stories, a discrepant, ambivalent, but still in many ways remarkable document marking one of many historic intersections between Asian American writing and science fiction. In the letter, Lowe praises the “wonderful and amazing magazine” that has “filled every dull moment for about a year and a
half” (Amazing Stories 477). As we see, Lowe claims a sense of belonging in the project of science fiction: “our magazine is the best of its kind on the market. I don’t mean maybe!” (Amazing Stories 477)

And yet, although Lowe’s enthusiasm for science fiction is clear, he also offers the editor a bit of constructive criticism, framed self-reflexively from his particular vantage point as reader: “I am only a boy of thirteen and Chinese. I am most interested in your stories containing Chinamen as villains” (Amazing Stories 477). Sensitive to a tendency within early science fiction to promote a certain poetics of othering through its representation of asians, Lowe entreats writers and editors of the nascent genre to find alternatives to such representational practices: “please don’t always pick on them. I am sure others would do” (Amazing Stories 477). Lowe’s remarks suggest that the tendency for early science fiction to “pick on” Asians in literature had very real consequences.

But Lowe takes his critique one step further in his recommendations for the genre. Although he praises Gernsback’s artists for their “fine drawings,” he ads that he would “like to see drawing in the future with different looking Martians” (Amazing Stories 477). John Cheng observes that “Lowe’s letter is revealing not only for his desire for less human Martians and fewer Chinese villains but also for his juxtaposition of his concerns” (147). As Lowe writes, the magazine’s “artists always draw Martians almost like human beings…they seem to always have two eyes, two arms, a body, and two legs like us earthlings” (Amazing Stories 477). Thereby,
Lowe’s letter suggests a complex positioning where Martians are juxtaposed against “us earthlings,” yet paradoxically, extraterrestrials are represented as morphologically too similar to humans. Although “aliens” are often associated with a kind of radical alterity, it is the resemblances between Martians and human beings that is Lowe’s cause for concern.

We might read Lowe’s letter as a call for science fiction to reach its “full potential” (Cheng 147) by moving beyond its conventions and finding new modes of expression. Perhaps in which case, Lowe’s desire to see more extreme forms of extraterrestriality can be read as a kind of utopian longing for worldly belonging; that is, the young reader’s call for greater distance and morphological dissemblance between Martians and human beings may suggest the a desire for a perspective whereby a vision of the human race, “us earthlings” may finally be realized.

Yet Lowe’s analysis also suggest the way in which extraterrestrial representation functioned as a site of ambivalence and anxiety, particular for a young Asian American reader. In the language of post-colonial theory, Martians are (like “Chinaman”) “almost the same but not quite†” (Bhabha 86). Thus, from Lowe’s particular perspective, his position is doubly fraught: Lowe can participate in the othering of Martians by identifying as an “earthling,” but he seems all too aware that he himself is being positioned precariously. Perhaps Lowe’s critique is best understood as a commentary on how arbitrarily — and yet so easily — earthlings of the same fundamental morphology can other one another. Thus it is most significant
as an index of an era where logics of racial and spatial proximity were at once deeply uncertain, but also, increasingly overdetermined by a violent vision of the future.

Lowé’s letter is arguably a forerunner of contemporary critiques in both Asian American and science fiction studies, specifically as it relates to the tradition of American orientalism, along with the construction of Asia — and eventually, Asian Americans — within the U.S. global imaginary. On one level, my analysis follow’s Tatsumi’s suggestion of the “pre-Wellsian, post-Wellsian” (“Preface” xiv) shift in science fiction representation, in which the future war narrative — historically cast between nations — took on increasingly globalized, inter-planetary valences, and the diasporic “alien” emerged as a prime trope for the representation of racial alterity, more often than not within the context of future war. On other level, I examine the question of “alien” representation in dialogue with discourses in Asian American studies, specifically, the analysis “Asiatic” representation within the future war, yellow peril archive — the “ancestors of today’s stereotypical Asian Americans” (Lye 11).

Whereas Lye’s analysis of the “personification of the alien” (6) ultimately serves to foreshadow the post-war vision of U.S.-led globalization across the “Pacific Rim,” my approach follows an alternative trajectory by foregrounding the generic context of science fiction in its intersection with militarization. This dissertation, then, represents a search for a new language to help explain the condition of diaspora for Nikkei communities between empires by analyzing the way in which science fiction
can be read as foreshadowing the “enemy-alien” language used to incarcerate Japanese diasporics in the Western hemisphere.

I argue that a historicized approach to “alien” representation in science fiction also reveals the way in which science fiction literature is in many respect in dialogue with many of the prominent features in diaspora theory, critical race, and cultural studies. This is not simply out of hope that Nikkei diasporic discourse might do more to enter into comparative dialogue with other diasporic formations, but also because the emergence of “diaspora” within the critical lexicon is related to the very predicament that my dissertation examines, that is, the emergence of science fiction and the literary “origins” of the Pacific War.

**Diaspora in a Globalizing Universe: Or, “Ethnographies of the Future”**

“Diaspora” is a Greek word, derived from verb *diasperio*, “to disperse.” As defined by James Clifford, diasporas are “distinct versions of the modern, transnational, intercultural experience” (Diasporas” 319). As Stephane Dufoix has explained in his study, *Diasporas* (2003), although historically associated with migrant Jewish communities:

The current use of the word, contradictory though it may be, raises issues about the voluntary or involuntary migration of people; the maintenance or the re-creation of identification with a country or a land of origin; and the

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3 I borrow this phrase from Jim Clifford’s essay, “Diasporas.”
existence of communities that claim their attachment to a place or, to the contrary, to their spatially free-floating existence.

Some scholars explore diaspora as a resistant, potentially liberating cultural formation, one where collective ties to ancestral homes can inform the struggles of minority communities for survival; as Clifford writes, diasporic articulation offers “forms of community consciousness and solidarity that maintain identifications outside the national time/space in order to live inside, with a difference” (“Diasporas” 308).

Other scholars reveal diaspora to be a far more contested and discrepant process. Examining Chinese communities in Indonesia, Ian Ang explores how the diasporic conditions within the Indonesian nation foment an ambivalent positionality vis-a-vis both state and diasporic homeland, a condition in which identity is “not a luxury, but a necessity” (*Indonesia on My Mind* 72). Benedict Anderson, in *The Spectre of Comparison* (1998), has analyzed how displacement from an ancestral home can produce a “long distance nationalism” that exacerbates the exclusivist and, often times, racist ideologies now long associated with modern nationalism.

Scholarly studies of diaspora in recent years have taken on an ecological inflection, as the ocean has come to the fore as a privileged space in cultural studies discourse. As Elizabeth DeLoughrey explains, “The use of aquatic metaphors, a maritime grammar of the “peoples of the sea,” helps us to recognize the importance
of the ocean in the transnational imaginary and in diaspora theory in general” (30). Building on vast and diverse tradition of writing, music, and other cultural production informed by particular, historically specific relations to the global seas, the cultural studies turn to diasporic oceans has opened important angles into the workings of globalization, the lasting effects of colonialism, the traumas of wars, but also the nature of transcultural connections created through oceanic crossing.

For instance, Paul Gilroy’s *The Black Atlantic* (1998), challenges the assumptions of nationally confined, essentialist articulations of cultural and racial identity by tracing the countercultural routes connecting groups of people shaped by the modern trans-Atlantic slave trade. Although generally conceived as mutually distinct and historically opposed, Gilroy argues that identities like European, African, American or African American —are in fact mutually constitutive in ways generally unacknowledged (15-17). Similarly, Iain Chambers’ *Mediterranean Crossings* (2008) reads the “liquid materiality” (5) of the sea as a means to refigure the (post-)colonial Mediterranean as a site teeming with blurred identities, alternative histories, and counter-hegemonic sites of culture. Edouard Glissant has articulated a *Poetics of Relation* (1997) through an oceanic, archipelagic imaginary inspired by a logic of errantry and the specificities of history and geography of the Caribbean. Similarly, Tongan/Fijian writer Epeli Hau’ofa deploys the “nation-shattering expansiveness” of the ocean and a revived vision of Pacific Islander epistemologies as a means to reconfigure the dominant geo-imaginary of the Pacific in his celebrated essay, “Our
Sea of Islands” (1993). In contrast to the image of Oceania as belittled, isolated states in a distant sea, Hau’ofa posits a Oceanian diaspora practicing “world-enlargement” (30) across the globe.

Yet the emergence of the diasporic ocean as a genre in cultural studies is not without its critics. In her comparative study of Caribbean and Pacific Islander literatures, Deloughrey raises a provocative link between diasporic invocations of the ocean and militarism, arguing that “historicizing the grammar of diaspora demonstrates how the sea is historically and imaginatively territorialized” (30). Deloughery points out how diasporic invocations of transoceanic connection can easily replicate the masculinist rhetoric of nationalism, suggesting that the contemporary critical interest in the sea may be an after-effect of the history of oceanic territorialization witnessed during World War II and after. She writes:

I want to suggest that the rise in naturalized images of transoceanic diaspora derives from increased maritime territorialism. The modern tendency to incorporate and internalize fluid transnational spaces…may suggest less about an attempt to transcend the boundaries of the ethnic nation-state than the desire to imaginatively integrate the nation’s new maritime territory.

(Deloughrey 30)

Deloughery’s critique challenges masculinist invocations of blood ties with the sea, suggesting “imperial narratives of Anglo-Saxon diaspora” (29) to be unacknowledged genealogical source for some of the contemporary diasporic discourse; she therefore
problematizes “diaspora” as a concept that might be connected to the territorial legacy of trans-oceanic militarization.

In this way, Deloughery’s analysis intersects with interventions from Harry Harootunian’s “Some Thoughts on Comparability and the Space-Time Problem” (2005), again around the problems “diaspora” as a critical concept. Through an allusion to Gene Roddenbury’s Star Trek series, “Space — the Final Frontier,” Harootunian questions whether the critical “strategies that have led to the considerations of diasporic bodies and their movements crossing borders, in-between states exhibiting hybrid combinations, the inside and outside, and newer, enlarged bounded entities such as globe and empire” (24) might be read as symptomatic of a certain “spatial ambition” (26) which, as Harootunian suggests, cultural studies has unwittingly inherited from the area studies model of scholarship.

Harootunian explores the influence of militarization and colonialism on the formation of Area Studies, an academic discipline whose emergence was precipitated by military necessity for knowledge about geo-strategic regions, and whose founding figures were trained in wartime. Recalling an “immense sleight of hand” (26) at work in the formation of Area Studies in the United States following the wake of World War II, Harootunian notes that, while “new area and regional programs” were organized “to supply the new national security state with useful information and knowledge about America’s enemies and potential trouble spots around the
globe” (26) they also functioned to reorganize prior geo-political and cultural formations.

As a result, until the “explosion of colonial and post-colonial studies, area studies had successfully displaced the fact that much of the world it studied had been dominated by imperial and colonial powers (26). Arguably, this “sleight of hand” was of particular relevance in regards to the reorganization of territories and peoples in Asia/Pacific, peoples and places that were incorporated as part of the “Great Japanese Empire,” that is both the “Japanese,” but also those who were formerly “Japanese” as colonial subjects; in its victory, the U.S. redrew the borders of an empire which was becoming increasingly heterogenous through expansion and “alien” assimilation⁴.

“Diaspora” Under the Shadow of the Pacific War

As we shall see, my approach to diaspora theory follows DeLoughery and Harootunian’s emphasis on the spatiotemporalities in writing and in literary circulation, or what Bakhtin called the “chronotope.” For they make us aware that cultural studies discourses on diaspora may also be replicating certain elements of the geo-strategic model in its emphasis on the spatiality of diaspora, that is, in its privileging of space over time in cultural analysis. Harootunian echoes Deloughery’s “tidalectic” analysis by arguing that a deeper consideration of “spatiotemporality,” — the inseparability of space from time — may offer a critical method to fulfill Area

⁴ See Lori Watt’s When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan. (Harvard University Press, 2010).
Studies’ failed promise to provide a frame by which cultural comparison might be a source of mutual empowerment.

By positing the history and literature of the Nikkei as an archive for “diasporic” analysis, I am, of course, assuming that Nikkei communities can function as an object of comparison with other diasporic communities. Thus, I must take a risk, for some may feel that my appropriation of diaspora theory is inappropriate in the case of the Nikkei, just as some may feel that my appropriation of Derek Walcott’s trope of the sea-as-history in my project’s title -- from which studies of the “Black Atlantic” have derived inspiration -- is inappropriate.

It is true, that, if forced into a discursive condition of sound-byte exchange, or “check-the-box” identity politics — Jewish diaspora, Chinese diaspora, African diaspora, Armenian diaspora, Greek diaspora, Nikkei diaspora, etc. — then “diaspora” as a term can easily function to obfuscate differences and discrepancies both between and within diasporizing communities. In which case, diaspora will become a critically meaningless term. But if given room to breathe, “diaspora” as a formation can be both critical and capacious. As a paradigm, diasporic roots and routes, including those of the Nikkei, across the spacetime of nations allow us to observe the contradictions of nineteenth and twentieth century geo-politics from the unique perspectives of a “intercultural, transnational, modern” (Clifford 319) communities.
As we shall see, while it is true that the Nikkei do not share the same historical experiences as some of modernity’s other diasporas — statelessness, slavery, genocide, etc. — it is also true that there are ways in the Nikkei are themselves historically distinct. For in the Nikkei case, diasporic conceptions of “community consciousness and solidarity” via perceived ties to Japan have been historically fraught by the geo-political terrain across which the diasporic histories of the Nikkei have emerged. As a community whose history is rooted in the late-nineteenth century, early twentieth century migration from Japan — the period in which Japan itself emerged as an empire — the history of Nikkei articulation has been haunted both by the shifting status of “Japan” as an imperial signifier, but in the case of Japanese Americans in the United States, the predicament of being caught between empires. In this way, the Nikkei have had a unique set of spatiotemporal conditions as one of modernity’s diasporas. Even so, it is possible that the contradictory conditions of life between empires may come to resonate for future diasporas, in which case, the history of the Nikkei diaspora may offer a useful comparative model.

What Deloughery and Harootunian both intimate, and what I argue, is that the confusion in diaspora discourse between articulations of “transoceanic diaspora” and “transoceanic empire” can be read as an echo of the history of militarization and war in the Pacific. As I suggest, “diaspora” as a discourse may be haunted by the contradictions of race, nation, and global spatiality that were emerging in the pre-war
years as a result of the continued expansion of the “Great Japanese Empire,” a course which led to Japan’s attack at Pearl Harbor. Up until the end of the Pacific War, Japan was one of the world’s most powerful transoceanic, imperialist nations; but this expansive Japan was also where the emergent Nikkei, by definition, derived their diasporic origins (at least for the issei). What I’m suggesting is that the problems that are being apprehended in cultural studies regarding the “spatial ambitions” of diaspora writing are not only related, but are also, in some ways, rooted in the perilous conditions precipitated by the oceanic expansion of “Japan” from the late-nineteenth century on, but also by the contraction of “Japan” following its defeat in the war. If so, then the Pacific War may haunt us in ways that we are only beginning to understand.

While the pre-history of the “enemy-alien” incarceration during the Pacific War reveals that “diaspora” -- as a modern condition rooted in the existence of warring nation-states -- will never be a utopian condition, more importantly, we see that the contradictions faced by Nikkei between empires were the very conditions which haunted the emergence of “diaspora” within the critical lexicon. As Dufoix has explored, starting in the 1930’s, definitions of diaspora shifted emphasis away from religious associations — that is, with Jewish communities and with apocalyptic Christians — and has been increasingly associated with national, racial, and ethnic groups negotiating varying conditions of uprooting from their nation or culture. According to DuFoix, this shift began in 1931, when the American Encyclopedia of
Social Sciences defined diaspora for the first time as “a nation or a part of a nation separate from its own state territory and dispersed among other nations but preserving its national culture” (qtd in 17). As this suggests, Dubnov appropriates a term that denoted migrant or imperiled religious groups and situates it within the language of nation-states. Diasporas are represented as a “nation or part of a nation” that is outside “its own state territory,” thus they are associated with a kind of territorial crisis: implicitly, diasporas are suggested to be threats to the borders of territorial sovereignty, for their formation is characterized by spatial and temporal overlap between nations and cultures.

We can further trace the emergence of diaspora in its modern association in relation to discourses of both “race relations” in the years leading to the Pacific War. In 1937, sociologist Robert Park built upon Dubnov’s definition in an attempt to figure the status of communities of “Asiatic origin” living around the world. Park’s essay, “The Nature of Race Relations,” specifically his reference to the “people of Asiatic origin living in the diaspora” (28) marks a major moment in the term’s historical transition. As Dufoix’s notes, through Park, diaspora comes to denote “not merely the condition but the place of dispersion of peoples” (28); in his usage, Park affirms Dubnov’s association with diasporas and territoriality, but also situates the concept as an index of what the sociologist calls “race relations.”

My reading of Park’s essay is interested in the way the text marks an implicit intersection with science fiction, a literature that was emerging into increased
visibility following Gernsback’s codification in 1926. However unwittingly, as Park assesses the territorial and geo-political conditions of “diaspora” in 1939, Park’s text reveals a conflation between diaspora’s critical emergence and the tropes and themes of yellow peril, future war literature. What’s most revealing about Park’s deployment of the figure of “asiatic diaspora” is the scale of humanity that the term allows him to adopt, suggested by another usage in his essay: the “between 16,000,000 and 17,000,000 people of Asiatic origin living in the diaspora” (28). For Park, diaspora becomes useful as a way to represent “Asiatics” both as an indeterminate monolith, but also as an unprecedented immensity. Similar to Mahan’s oceanic trope of “teeming multitudes” of Asia (as we shall see in Ch. 2), Park’s figure of “Orientals in this diaspora” (29) is comprised of a vague conglomeration of Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Indians displaced throughout the world from their “Asiatic origin.” His vision of the “Asiatic diaspora” is comprised of communities who, “because of racial or language differences, have not been wholly assimilated or regard themselves in any sense as alien in the country in which they live” (39). Arguably “diaspora” functioned as a means to figure what was by 1937 a common trope of yellow peril literature: as a sociologized figuration of the “horde.”

Dufoix suggests that Park’s turn to “diaspora” was inspired by the figure of the migrant Jew, who represented a “kind of model of a person caught between two cultures” (18). This may be true, but Dufoix analysis ignores the late-1930’s context in which Park writes — that is, the historical conditions that made the term useful in a
new context. I speculate that Park adapts Dubnov’s definition of “diaspora” because it offered a means to conceptualize a certain apprehension of a racial and territorial crisis that was, in his time, still unfolding. That is, the context of Park’s essay is overshadowed by the continued expansion of Imperial Japan and the specter of war between Japan and the United States: his vision of “Asiatic diaspora” is plotted on a geo-political map whose borders are unstable, across “parts of the world including China, which have become, or are in a process of incorporation in, the Japanese Empire” (29 emphasis added). Not only does Parks’ usage further suggests diasporas to be transgressive, indeterminate, and potentially contested entities from the vantage point of nation sovereignty and racial identity, arguably Park’s figuration of an “Asiatic diaspora” in 1939 functioned distinctly as a means to express the biopolitical indeterminacy of “Asiatic” populations abroad — including, but not limited to, diasporic Japanese communities — during a time when the “Great Japanese Empire” was itself expanding through war and “alien” assimilation.

Although Park also believed in the possibility of assimilation between national and diasporic communities, in this instance, Park’s association of Asians in diaspora with “alien” representation intersects with important trends in science fiction writing. As John Cheng has analyzed, in the decades prior to World War I, “‘alien’ connoted difference; it did not denote creatures from outer space or other worlds” (174). In other words, “alien” was primarily used as an adjective, rather than as a noun. Yet this figuration begins to shift with science fiction of the interwar years, the time of Park’s
writing, when “aliens” increasingly became associated with Asians in science fiction and legal discourse. Arguably, Park’s theory of diaspora as a community of people existing “as alien in the country in which they live” follows this trend in that it collapses the distinction between alien as an adjective and alien as a noun. Thus, both the context of Park’s writing, as with its science fictional association between Asian and aliens, suggests a connection between diaspora’s emergence and the territorial crisis apprehended in the prophecies of Pacific War.

In other words, the emergence of “diaspora” can be read as the critical translation of discourses on “aliens” within science fiction and military strategic speculation, the focus of this dissertation. As a result, we see that diaspora has, from its initial iteration in criticism, been a way of talking about the “alien from another world”; moreover, “diaspora,” as a term, is haunted by the modern rise of Japan as an empire, as were the “Nikkei” in the United States and elsewhere. The problem with the science fictionality of Park’s diasporic vision is that it foreshadowed perilous conditions for the communities that he tried to represent, that is, the “aliens” at the borderland of a coming war. As we shall see, this was the position for Japanese and other Asian Americans as foreshadowed by science fiction’s emergence as well.

The literary archive of the Nikkei diaspora — which includes the science fiction of future war — can offer us a critical perspective whereby we can begin to reassess the haunted history of “diaspora,” along with the legacy of the Pacific War. By analyzing the spatio-temporalities of Nikkei diaspora in terms of the historic
confusion between “transoceanic empire” and “transoceanic diaspora” in the Pacific, we can begin to think about the incarceration, and subsequent diasporizations, of the Nikkei during the war. Yet this pre-history of the “alien” of the Pacific War can only be read in terms of another kind of transoceanic circulation — namely science fiction’s emergence across the print capitalist markets of the Pacific. Thus, although it may seem paradoxical that a scholar interested in the representational history of a small, canonically marginalized community like Japanese Americans would also claim the need to work across the realist/speculative terrain of science fiction, I do so because the archival prehistory of the Pacific War reveals that the Nikkei “alien” has been one of the most prominent figures within the emergence of science fiction, and following it, the theorization of diaspora as modern formation.

Chapter Summary

My first chapter, “Far Out Worlds: American Orientalism, Alienation, and the Speculative Dialogues Of Percival Lowell and Lafcadio Hearn” attempts to reassess the legacy of American Orientalism through an analysis of the “alien” objects in the speculative dialogues of Percival Lowell and Lafcadio Hearn. Although both Lowell and Hearn are known as two of the most prominent American writers of their generation to live in Japan and write about the “Far East,” I show how their dialogue extended beyond “the Orient,” to include the emergence of science fiction and the planet Mars as an object of speculation and reflection.
While Lowell was widely recognized as the foremost American orientalist of his generation after the publication of *The Soul of the Far East* (1888), his abrupt field-switch following Giovanni Sciaparelli’s discovery of “canali” on the surface of Mars stands as one of the most infamous quests in literary and astronomical history. As I explore, Lowell’s orientalist desires for a “mirror” whereby he might “realize humanity” (*The Soul of the Far East* 4) may have informed his (mis)apprehensions of life on the surface of the Martian planet. While ultimately disproven by future generations, Lowell’s *Mars* (1895), in which he presented his case for the existence of an advanced Martian civilization, both provided the speculative material for an emergent science fiction imagination, also marked a dialogue between Lowell and Hearn across “oriental” and “Martian” objects.

I analyze the science fictional dialogues between two of America’s most prominent orientalist as a way of breathing life into the study of Hearn as a diasporic literary figure of the late-nineteenth century whose relevance to world literature has yet to be realized. While Hearn is generally read within the tradition of folkloric studies, that is, as an “orientalist” of “old Japan,” I study Hearn’s speculative methods as they develop in discrepant connection to the emergence of science fiction, beginning first with his American writings in the 1880s, then by following his dialogue with Lowell until his final writings, *Kwaidan* (1905) and *The Romance of the Milky Way* (1905). My analysis will develop a critical allegory for the orientalist by exploring the paradox that while Lowell and Hearn’s apprehensions and
misapprehensions of Asians and “aliens” can be read as expressions of the “style of thought” (2) Edward Said called “Orientalism,” simultaneously, their speculations on “other worlds” functioned as a means to contest the alienating powers of capitalist modernity and mass culture, however ambivalently. Thereby, I establish the conceptual thematic of “mirrors” and “monsters” (of course, following Mary Shelley), one that I will use across my readings of the science fiction of the Pacific War.

My second chapter, “Alien-Nation: Science Fiction, Sea Power, and the ‘Alien’ in the Pacific War,” traces a pre-history to the language and conceptualization of the Japanese American incarceration as “enemy-aliens” through an examination of the historic intersections of science fiction and the tradition of geo-strategic writing associated with “sea power prophet” Alfred Mahan. My analysis traces a literary continuum between science fiction writers and naval geo-strategists who speculated on the possibilities and perils of war in the Pacific, from the late-nineteenth century futurological writings of “prophet” Alfred Mahan, to Homer Lea’s, The Valor of Ignorance (1909), to Hector Bywater’s The Great Pacific War of 1931 (1925), and finally The Day After Tomorrow (1941), one of the early works of Robert Heinlein.

As I will argue in this chapter, not only does the archive of future war in the Pacific reveal the long history of intersection between science fiction writing and military strategic thinking, but it also reveals an important genealogy of “alien” representation within both science fiction and the historical imagination of the Pacific
War. As the diasporic “alien” shifts in its associations across the writings of Mahan, Lea, Bywater, and Heinlein — from the oceanic horde threading to overflow the American continent, to Japanese immigrant/insurgents waiting for attack orders, to finally, the multiracial, Japanese American soldier, who, although loyal to the United States, must prove his loyalty as a “test subject” for racial weaponry against a “Pan-Asian” enemy — American science fiction can be read as foreshadowing the impossible conditions imposed upon Japanese Americans upon the start of the Pacific War, as well as allegorizing the contradictions of American nationalism that had been emerging from the late-nineteenth century on.

My third chapter, “What Lies Beneath: Japanese Literary Modernity, Transpacific Racial Form, and the Science Fiction of ‘Nation’ Across Shifting Seas,” examines the global emergence of science fiction in relation to the crisis of territoriality precipitated by the expansion of “Japan” in the modern period, and eventually Japan’s war with the United States. By considering the emergence of science fiction in Japan in its relation to its transpacific “mirror,” I explore the way in which science fiction has functioned, as in the U.S. case, as a mode by which “Japan” could negotiate with the “outer limits” (Morris-Suzuki) of the nation, whether in the context of Japanese imperialism at sea, the representation of Japanese diasporic communities abroad, the “post-racial” dream of the “Great Japanese Empire,” or under the U.S.-led post-war “Pacific Rim.”
While contemporary myths of national homogeneity emphasize the racial purity of the Japanese people, I consider the global implications of the Japanese Empire’s failed attempts to achieve a “postcolonial, multiethnic nation-state and empire” (Fujitani) by promoting what Oguma Eiji has called the “mixed nation” (Oguma) theory of Japanese national identity. While always in competition with discourses espousing racial and cultural purity, Oguma shows that the dominant national discourse within the Japanese Empire from 1880 until the end of the Pacific War posited that Japan’s past — and consequently, the empire’s future — was the product of racial and cultural amalgamation from populations in Asia, the Pacific Islands, the indigenous Ainu, Europe, and beyond.

From the first Japanese translations of Jules Verne’s *20,000 Leagues Under the Sea* in 1884, to imperialist appropriations Verne’s oceanic premise, to the tradition of *Nichibei Miraisen* (Japanese-American Future War) narratives written Japanese military strategists in response to American writers, to the prominent representation of the “Japanese diaspora” during the pre-war years, I read the emergence of the science fiction genre in Japan in synch with nationalist discourses of the “mixed nation.” The “post-racial” ideology of the “Great Japanese Empire,” while initially modeled on the dream of America as a land of multiracial harmony, enabled the “Great Japanese Empire’s strategic disavowal of racism” (Fujitani) vis-a-vis the United States, but also therefore created pressure on the United States to counter Japan as a geo-strategic mirror. Thus, I explore the implications of how the “monster” fashioned itself in
apprehension, and misapprehension, of its “mirror” in the pre-Pacific War years, but also how we might learn to read race in the wake of the Pacific War.

My final chapter, “Urashima Taro Narratives Across Diasporic Time: Theorizing the Intersections of Nikkei Literature and Science Fiction,” examines the intersections of Nikkei diaspora writing and science fiction through an analysis of Nikkei Urashima Taro narratives in the wake of the Pacific War. By exploring the emergence of Urashima Taro narratives in modern literature across the genres of contemporary science fiction and Asian American literature, from Ursula Le Guin’s A Fisherman of the Inland Sea, or Another Story (1994), to John Okada’s No-No Boy (1956), Hiroshi Kashiwagi’s Starting From Loomis (2013), Juliet Kono’s Hilo Rains (1988), then finally to science fiction in E. Lily Yu’s “The Urashima Effect” (2013), I extend my analysis of diaspora theory, science fiction, and the Pacific War by examining a “prototypical story” that has resonated across generations of diasporic Nikkei with As a narrative that has resonated across generations of Nikkei with “aesthetic pleasure and yet racial, political, national, and existential questions that haunt and empower Nikkei still” (Sumida 45).

I read modern adaptations of Urashima Taro as offering an approach to the diasporic histories of a people who, as Karen Tei Yamashita suggests, frequently seem to find themselves “on the move,” often times under contradictory conditions that were not of their making. Just as diasporic discourse “articulates, or bends together, both roots and routes” (Clifford 308), I examine the ways in which Einstein’s notion
of “time-dilation” — the phenomenon where movement through spacetime can be experienced discrepantly by different observers depending on their relative pace of travel and proximity to gravitational masses — has functioned metaphorically in literature as a means to represent the unique spatiotemporal conditions of Nikkei diaspora in the wake of the Pacific War. The emergence of Urashima Taro narratives in contemporary science fiction offers an alternative angle whereby we might reexamine the emergence of science fiction and the Pacific War — from the perspective of the “alien who returns.”

Conclusion

This dissertation represents a search for new ways to think about the representation of diaspora, and about bringing two historically discrepant literary traditions -- science fiction and Asian American literature -- into dialogue around issues in Nikkei history and the Pacific War between the United States and Japan. I offer a kind of pre-history to the language of the Japanese American incarceration through an analysis of the science fiction of the Pacific War, specifically the designation of “enemy-alien” deployed against Japanese diasporic communities across the western hemisphere. I do so in the hope that, in the future, the “alien” diasporas of the world might have better parts to play then the one that was foreshadowed in the emergence of science fiction.

Thus, I end my dissertation with a reading of Toshio Mori’s short story, “Sweet Potato” (1940), written at the conclusion of the World’s Fair on Treasure
Island upon the eve of the Pacific War. While it may seem paradoxical that as writer like Mori, who is generally read as representative of the ethnic authenticity for a small Asian American community, could translate into the context of the globalizing universe of science fiction, as my dissertation demonstrates, whether in the form of pre-war “aliens,” wartime “test subjects,” or in the post-war period, “test pilots,” Japanese Americans have, arguably, long been a kind of “star” within the science fiction genre, however ambivalently.

Yet Mori’s narrative, which ponders the future of his nisei generation under the shadow of the Pacific War, is an undeniable example of a moment in which the “alien” claimed its place as part of the human future. For Mori’s science fiction gestures towards a coming “Pacific Community” that was markedly different from the grave future that loomed on the Pacific horizon, and in doing so, may help us imagine a future no longer contained by the contradictions of diaspora in a globalizing universe.
Chapter 1

Far Out Worlds:
American Orientalism, Alienation, and the Speculative Dialogues of Percival Lowell and Lafcadio Hearn

That Mars seems to be inhabited is not the last, but the first word on the subject.

Percival Lowell

Mars

Gōgwai no
Tabi teki mikata
Goké ga fuè.

As extras circulate the widows of foes and friends increase in multitude.

Lafcadio Hearn

The Romance of the Milky Way
(my translation)

This chapter will examine the legacy of American Orientalism through an analysis of the “alien” objects in the speculative writings of Percival Lowell and Lafcadio Hearn. Although both Lowell and Hearn are known as two of the most prominent writers of their generation to live in Japan and write about the “Far East,” I
show how their dialogue extended beyond “the Orient,” to include the emergence of
science fiction and the planet Mars as an object of speculation and reflection. My
analysis will develop a critical allegory for the orientalist by exploring the paradox
that while Lowell and Hearn’s apprehensions and misapprehensions of Asians and
“aliens” can be read as expressions of the “style of thought” (2) Edward Said called
“Orientalism,” simultaneously, their speculations on “other worlds” functioned as a
means to contest the alienating powers of capitalist modernity and mass culture,
however ambivalently. Taken together, the dialogue between Lowell and Hearn
reveals a continuum of thinking on two of science fiction’s most prominent objects of
speculation, along with the dream of a decidedly different kind of future than the
“War of the Worlds” model that erupted in the wake of H.G. Wells’ tale of Martian
invasion.

While Lowell’s *The Soul of the Far East* (1884) established him as the
authoritative American orientalist of his generation, and though Lowell’s
astronomical speculations on the existence of Pluto proved accurate, Lowell is
equally infamous for his false claims to advanced life on Mars in the late-nineteenth
century, *Mars* (1895). While Lowell’s claims ignited the emergent science fiction
imagination, from H.G. Wells, Hugo Gernsback, and beyond, my analysis explores
the ways in which Lowell’s posture as an orientalist may have influenced his
misapprehensions as an aspiring “Martianist.” For just as the English translation of
the astronomical studies of Giovanni Schiaparelli — from “canali” to “canals” (rather
than “channels” or “groves”) — led Lowell to see the surface features of Mars to be a
global network of canals, Lowell’s speculations also reflect the anxieties of a turn-of-
the-century era that was encountering its own form of emergent globalization.

More importantly, Lowell’s writings across “oriental” and “Martian” objects
offer a critical point of reference for the speculative writings of Lafcadio Hearn, a
figure, I argue, whose relevance to world literature remains unrealized. Although as
an “orientalist,” Hearn is generally championed for his work to preserve the literary
and folkloric heritage of “Old Japan,” I show how Hearn’s literary project can be
illuminated by considering Hearn’s dialogue with Lowell, as well as Hearn’s
discrepant intersections with emergent science fiction. This is seen from his early
future war narrative written while a newspaper editor in the United States, “The
Conquest of the United States” (1880), his early writing in Japan, specifically his “A
Dream of a Summer’s Day” (1895) as well as his infamous prediction in “The Future
in the Far East” (1894), to his final writings as Japan’s interpreter, Kwaidan (1904)
and The Romance of the Milky Way (1904). I analyze Hearn’s work as offering an
angle into modern Japanese culture and history from the first Sino-Japanese War
(1894-5) to the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), along with the emergence of
science fiction in Japan.

As with Lowell, Hearn’s speculations on the figures of orientals and Martians
can be read as a response to the alienations wrought by capitalist modernity; but
significantly, just as the homogenization of capitalist space and time naturalized the
hemispheric divisions that sustained the myths of modern Orientalism, Hearn’s orientalist apprehensions also functioned to mystify, and ultimately undermine, the concerted materialist critique of Western, and increasingly, Japanese modernity, that Hearn attempted as a diasporic writer in Japan.

Thus, my analysis hopes to develop new ways of reading Hearn by addressing some of the most startling contradictions associated with the writer, namely, that Hearn, the great “Interpreter of Japan,” may also be the literary origin of the Pacific War (at least among American writers). While Hearn is a legendary figure both for his immense impact on the Japanese literary and intellectual world, and for introducing Japanese culture to western audiences, as Tatsumi claims, “Hearn must also be credited with predicting the conflict between Japan and the West” (*Full Metal Apache* 80). While this claim may be true, it is not the whole story. As I show, what may be more significant is the implication of Hearn’s having facilitated the emergence of the future war form in Japan through his prediction on “The Future of the Far East” (1894) — just as he, paradoxically, may have been trying to save his orientalized object from the onslaught of capitalist modernity.

**Percival Lowell, American Orientalism, and the “Alien” in Japan**

Although the critical connection between Asians, “aliens,” and literature may now seem commonplace, it is important to note that arguably it was Hearn who first sensed the “strange” (*The Life and Letters of Lafcadio Hearn* Vol. 3 218) continuum
developing in the literature of his time. In a letter to Yrjo Hirn, written in 1902, Hearn reveals his fascination with the unconventional arc developing in the Boston Brahmin’s work, writing, “It is strange that Lowell should have written the very best book in the English language on the old Japanese life and character, and the most startling astronomical book of the period — “Mars” — more interesting than any romance.” (The Life and Letters of Lafcadio Hearn Vol. 3 218). Although merely suggestive, Hearn’s remarks speak to an emergent problematic regarding the connection, and conflation, between Asians and “aliens” from the late-nineteenth century on; further, the fact that Hearn’s remarks connect “the best book on old Japanese life” and the “most startling astronomical book of the period,” suggest that the alien/asian connection is fundamentally a question of literature, one that is “more interesting than any romance.”

With modernists Amy Lowell and James Lowell among his influential literati family, Percival Lowell’s writings as a poet, an ethnographer, and as an astronomer have, perhaps understandably, received less critical attention. Yet as I contend, part of this reason is because while his writings on “the East” brought him acclaim, and although his speculations on the existence of the planet Pluto proved accurate, his arguments for the existence of advanced life on Mars — while igniting the literary imagination of his time — were eventually proven incorrect.

5 The initials designated to the planet Pluto, “PL,” were chosen in Percival Lowell’s honor.
From our present, Lowell’s theories about advanced civilization on Mars, while once considered science, are meaningful only as science fiction. Although contested during his time, and eventually disproven by future generations of telescopes and astronomers, the circulation of Lowell’s writing as part of the “print capitalist” (Anderson 44) markets of the world had a major impact on the emergence of the science fiction genre, providing scientific and speculative material for future generations of writers and readers.

Of course, one important genealogy that follows Lowell is the War of the Worlds (1897) narrative, that is, not just the vision of Martian invasion written by Well’s based on Lowell’s Mars, but the string of adaptations, appropriations, and alternative conceptualizations of “world war” that followed in Well’s wake. This includes the geo-strategic writings of Alfred Mahan (see ch. 2), much of yellow peril literature in America, and the science fictional apprehensions of Japanese writers like Unno Juza during the rise of Japan’s empire (see ch. 3). Thus, my analysis adds context to Tatsumi’s suggestion of a “pre-wellsian, post wellsian shift” (“Preface” xiv) in science fiction insofar as Lowell’s writing served as speculative material for H.G. Wells and others, and even as inspiration for a young Hugo Gernback in Luxenborg, who committed himself to science, literature, and eventually, “scientifiction” in the United States after learning of Lowell’s claim to advanced life on Mars.
I will consider the way in which Lowell’s posture as an orientalist, may have influenced his misapprehensions as an aspiring “Martianist.” Lowell, unlike Hearn, was raised in privilege, born a member of a prominent Boston family. Yet Lowell would pursue the privileges and unique experiences offered by the life of an orientalist following his graduation from Harvard. Lowell traveled to Asia first as a foreign secretary and counsellor for a special diplomatic mission on behalf of the Korean government to the United States in 1883. As Lowell remarked, he is one of the few Americans to have “entered my native land as a foreigner” (xv Chosŏn), that is, as a representative of Korea. This suggests that Orientalism afforded Lowell the unique (and potentially transformative) privilege of encountering, but also speaking on behalf of, the “oriental” other. Yet insofar as Lowell’s work as an orientalist was occasioned by his role in geo-political dealings, we can also say that the tradition of American Orientalism also involved the arbitration of borders, and hierarchies, both within Asia, as well as between “East” and “West.”

**Orientalist Jetlag and Space-Time Homogenization**

As I argue, Lowell’s writings reveal the decisive impact of the hemispheric construct dividing “West” from “East,” the fiction of the one hundred and eightieth meridian across which the trans-Pacific traveler must warp. In other words, modern notions of Western and Eastern (or Oriental) hemispheres are rooted in the arbitrary system of longitudinal measurement, which homogenized capitalist space and time in the world.
The one hundred and eightieth meridian, Lowell writes, “is not only imaginary; it has not even an astronomical reason for its existence” (Chosôn 1). Unlike latitudinal measurements, which are based upon the rotation of the equator, longitude, although a “purely and entirely an arbitrary convention...its position is exceeding importance for mankind” (Chosôn 1).

As analyzed by Deloughery, “Longitude, particularly the zero-degree meridian at Greenwich, is a political construct, created to protect colonial trade and based on the difference in time between a British ships’s departure and arrival point” (55 emphasis in original). While historically derived from the history of maritime trade, British colonialism, and practices of trans-Atlantic slavery⁶, the Greenwich meridian was universalized at the International Greenwich Meridian Conference in Washington D.C. in 1884, the year of Lowell’s first publication on the “Far East.” As Lowell’s writing reveals, the universalization of capitalist time through the standardization of Greenwich as the “prime meridian” has a particular significance on the apprehension of space and time for the trans-Pacific traveler.

Significantly, Lowell, as an orientalist, can also be read as one of the early ethnographers of the hemispheric imaginaries rooted in the emergence of the Greenwich meridian, which not only standardized global time, but also naturalized

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⁶ As Deloughery writes, “A nautical measurement first calculated by the English clockmaker John Harrison in 1762, longitude is constructed almost exclusively in terms of time. In fact, Harrison’s transatlantic crossing along the well-worn slave routes to Jamaica enabled him to establish precise chronometry, contributing to the global homogenization of time-space and its transportability though the proliferation of pocket watches” (55).
the civilization divide between East and West in the Pacific at the one-hundred and eightyeth meridian. As Lowell explains, the Pacific meridian has a unique function within the world system as a border which mediates two discrepant temporalities. He writes,

It (the line) sets, not the time of day merely, but the day itself. At the line two days meet. There, though time flows ceaselessly on, occurs that unnatural yet unavoidable jump of twenty-four hours; and no one is there to be startled by the fact,—no one to be perplexed in trying to reconcile the two incongruities, continuous time and discontinuous day. There is nothing but the ocean.

(Chosôn 1)

Lowell describes the meridian as a marker for an irreconcilable paradox of time flowing “ceaselessly on,” and yet at the line “two days meet.” Although designed to homogenize time, the westerly traveler, as Lowell explains, actually loses a day “into the depths of the Pacific Ocean” (3). Those crossing the Pacific meridian, then, are subject to the defining temporal paradox of modernity (commonly called “jet lag”). As Lowell describes, “We fall asleep one night in the new world to awake on the after-morrow's morning in the old. The day that knows no to-morrow — was yesterday” (Chosôn 3).

But if Lowell’s descriptions of unsettling nature of trans-Pacific temporality sound romanticized, it is because the “arbitrary convention” of global longitude can be read as the sustaining myth of his Orientalism. Arguably, the establishment of the
Greenwich meridian also naturalized the perceived division between hemispheres. Thus, the International Date Line is “of exceeding importance to mankind” (Lowell Chosön 1) not just for its homogenization of space-time, but because it reified the division between “West” and “East,” along with the “New World” and the “Old World.”

Although originally derived from British forms of oceanic domination and measurement, the hemispheric divide naturalized by the one hundred eightieth meridian created a unique condition for geopolitics in the Pacific. The fact that both American and Japanese representatives came together to adopt the longitudinal divide established at Greenwich should suggest something of the complex forms of complicity and collusion at work in geo-politics and economics. Yet in naturalizing a hemispheric divide in the Pacific, the fiction of the one hundred eightieth meridian also reified the globalizing imaginaries marshaled on both sides of the Pacific War.

In its modern formation, we see that Lowell’s Orientalism is already a kind of “techno-orientalism7,” particularly the strand of capitalist alienation that Sohn associates with the term. Lowell’s techno-orientalist vision reveals how the modern construction of the East/West divide is a rooted in the global proliferation of clocks and the fiction of what Benjamin called “homogenous empty time” (263), the dominant temporality of global modernity. For this reason, we must read “Far East”

Orientalism, or more broadly, Asiatic racialization, as one of the most perceptible, and pernicious, forms of dehumanization (whether it is practiced by Americans or Japanese\textsuperscript{8}). In other words, the fiction of hemispheric division in the Pacific is itself rooted in the deeper myths of modernity, made manifest by the apprehensions of the traveler who crosses the International Date Line. Thus, we can read the (mis)apprehensions of the jet-lagged orientalist as symptoms of the mystifying effects of capitalist modernity.

**Orientalist Apprehensions**

After his experiences as a Korean representative, Lowell moved to Japan, where he lived for ten years, producing during that time the first major works by an American writer on the subject of Korea, Japan, and the orientalist category of “the Far East,” including *Chosôn: The Land of the Morning Calm* (1886), *Noto: An Unexplored Corner of Japan* (1891) *Occult Japan, or the Way of the Gods* (1894), as well his most well know work, *The Soul of the Far East*, (1888), one of the books that inspired Hearn to journey to Japan.

As Lowell explains, Japan offered something of a paradise for orientalists looking to find material to analyze in the name of western science. As an object, Japan’s allure was two fold: “Japan is still very much of an undiscovered country to

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Japan is scientifically an undiscovered country even to the Japanese (*Occult Japan* 4). Lowell’s metaphor comparing Japan to an “undiscovered country” relies on the post-Columbian maritime narrative of “alien contact.” It also rhetorically establishes scientific study as its own kind of historical marker, one occasioned by the orientalist’s arrival. Finally, Lowell’s claim that Japan is an “undiscovered country even to the Japanese” (while dubious with the context of his 1894 publication, as Hearn will suggest) reveals a belief that Japan, as an oriental specimen, is untainted by science or modernity. Thus, he inscribes his oriental objects with a kind of objective “purity,” for the Japanese are a prescientific people, both to western orientalists, but also to the Japanese themselves.

Lowell’s naive belief in the authenticity of his object allows him to imagine something akin to what Said called “the Orientalist stage,” a mode of knowledge production “which comes to “exert a three-way force, on the Orient, on the Orientalist, and on the Western ‘consumer’ of Orientalism (67). Through discourse and circulation, the oriental object functions to naturalize distinctions between East and West, object and interpreter, as well as object and Western consumer. For Said, “The Orient is thus Orientalized, a process that not only marks the Orient as the province of the Orientalist but also forces the uninitiated Western reader to accept Orientalist codifications as the *true* Orient” (67 emphasis in original). What Lowell adds to the practice of orientalist staging is the idea that the oriental object functions as a *mirror* for the West. That is, in staging the East/West encounter, Lowell’s
Orientalism promoted the “Far-East” as a mirror by which the West can regard itself in new ways, and thus as a unique object of consumption. He writes:

It is because the Far-East holds up the mirror to our civilization, — a mirror that like all mirrors gives up back left for right, — because by her very oddities, as they strike us at first, we truly learn to criticize, to examine, and realize our own way of doing things, that she is so interesting. It is in this that her great attraction lies. It is for this that men have gone to Japan intending to stay for weeks, and have tarried for years.

(Chosôn 137 emphasis added )

By presenting an inverted mirror for “our civilization,” the (feminine) oriental object functions to unsettle the perspective of the (masculine) Western observer. This effect produces the possibility of self-reflective insight, revealing to the orientalist the nature of the world he comes from. Yet the orientalist stages his East/West encounter, ultimately, as a kind of narcissistic self-reevaluation. The orientalist, in other words, “tarries” in Japan so as to better understand himself. He then offers this experience to readers for their consumption and reflection.

Ironically, Lowell seems to find no contradiction in his desire to use the East so as to “realize humanity” (The Soul of the East 4). Rather, Lowell regarded Orientalism as a utopian calling. For the fact that the world seems divided also presents the possibility of a universalized humanity. Lowell describes this process through another technological metaphor, writing, “regarding, then, the Far Oriental as
a man, and not simply as a phenomenon, we discover in his peculiar point of view a 
new importance,—the possibility of using it stereoptically” (The Soul of the East 4). 
While Orientalism is often criticized for its stereotypical representations, Lowell 
actually attempted to conceptualize his orientalist practice stereoptically. Lowell 
refers to the process by which two photographs of the same object, taken at different 
angles, can be transposed to create a sense of depth (early “3D” technology). When 
the oriental object is captured, “his mind-photograph of the world can be placed side 
by side with ours, and the two pictures combined will yield results beyond what either 
alone could possibly have afforded” (The Soul of the East 4). Likening the image of 
East/West humanity to a kind techno-racial prism-effect, through acts of transposition 
and layering, Lowell writes that when “East” and “West” are “harmonized, they will 
help us to realize humanity” (The Soul of the East 4).

Although the utopian aspirations that informed early orientalist studies of Asia 
are worth taking seriously, it is nonetheless undeniable that Lowell’s vision of a future 
humanity suggests an uneven, discrepant vision of a “harmonized” world. This is 
suggested by Lowell’s possessive phrasing: for just as the orient exists to help the 
West understand itself better, “they” also exist to “help us realize humanity” (The Soul 
of the East 4). Furthermore, the ambivalence and unevenness in Lowell’s 
apprehensions suggest the inevitable ironies, misrecognitions, and mystifications 
conditioned by his Orientalism. Following Lowell’s metaphor of the oriental
“mirror,” we can see the ways in which Lowell’s actual apprehensions while in Japan reveal much about the great confusions conditioned by his orientalist posture.

This is suggested by the way Lowell deploys the fiction of hemispheric division between East and Wests so as to illustrate the peculiar qualities of the “oriental” mind. He writes that,

If personal experience has definitely convinced him that the inhabitants of that under side of our planet do not adhere to it head downwards, like flies on a ceiling, they still appear quite as antipodal, mentally considered…for to the mind's eye their world is one huge, comical antithesis of our own.

*(The Soul of the East 1)*

Lowell identifies an unsettling “inversion” in which the orientalized object is conjured as a mirror for the western observer. He writes, “Like us, indeed, and yet so unlike are they that we seem, as we gaze at them, to be viewing our own humanity in some mirth-provoking mirror of the mind,—a mirror that shows us our own familiar thoughts, but all turned wrong side out” *(The Soul of the East 3)*. Indeed, Lowell’s Orientalism seems to have cast him into a condition similar to the colonial ambivalence analyzed by Homi Bhabha, where the oriental marks the anxiety of encounter with an object that is “almost the same but not quite” (127). Of course, Lowell finds the mirroring effect a source of delight, yet it is also a source of anxiety. For when regarding the mirror of the oriental object, “humor holds the glass, and we
become the sport of our own reflections” (*The Soul of the East* 3). Thus, the orientalist finds that his observations may be tainted by his very own perspective.

In his last writings on Japan, Lowell seems to have resigned to the failure of his orientalist project, for he has learned that, “the farther the foreigner goes, the more he perceives the ideas in the two hemispheres to be fundamentally diverse” (*Occult Japan* 14). In other words, orientalist mirroring seemed to lead only to a deeper recognition of incommensurability and mutual confusion. Thus, Lowell seems to question whether the East/West divide can ever be reconciled.

**Martian Apprehensions and the Imagination of Other Worlds**

Lowell responded by switching fields — to astronomy. Just as Lowell was emerging as the foremost American orientalist of his generation, he was also beginning his search for extra-terrestrial life in the cosmos, specifically on Mars. Lowell learned of Italian astronomer Giovanni Schiaparelli’s discovery of “canali” on Mars while living in Japan. Although Schiaparelli’s usage of the word could be read as denoting the presence of arbitrary “channels” or “grooves” on the surface of the Martian planet, the text that Lowell read translated “canali” as “canals,” suggesting purposivity. Lowell stuck with this translation for the rest of his life.

As the translation of “canali” led Lowell to believe, the presence of canals on Mars suggested the work of a highly advanced species. When Lowell learned of Schiaparelli’s retirement from astronomy (due to failing eyesight) Lowell decided to
abandon his studies of Asia and devote himself to the work that remained in Schiaparelli’s wake, namely the search for the species that created the canals of Mars. Lowell left Japan to establish the Lowell Astronomical Observatory in Flagstaff, Arizona in 1894. From his Flagstaff observatory, Lowell believed that he had found evidence for the existence of an advanced species living on Mars. And yet, while Lowell’s search for “aliens” allowed him to keep alive his dream to realize a universal humanity, his (mis)apprehensions of Martian life suggest that his astronomical speculations may have replicated the problems conditioned by his Orientalism.

The following year, Lowell began presenting his evidence for the existence of extraterrestrial life in the universe, writing, “that Mars seems inhabited is the first, not the last, word on the subject” (Mars 211). Lowell’s writings on Mars including, Mars (1895), Mars and Its Canals (1906), and Mars As the Abode of Life (1908). For Lowell, Mars, although literally a world away, is “our nearest neighbor in space” (Mars 2). Further, Martians are “of our own cosmic kin” (Mars 2). As with his East/West comparative humanism, Lowell romanticizes the calling to astronomical study, for it allows him to imagine the universe to be a single cosmic family.

With the latest telescopic technology, and with his knowledge of astrophysics and mathematics, Lowell outlined a vision of a “planet wide” (Mars 235) system of canals on Mars. The Martians canals, Lowell speculated, were designed to facilitate the flow of water about the arid planet. Thus, “the evidence of handicraft, if such it be, points to a highly intelligent mind behind it” (Mars 234). From his perspective,
Lowell believed that the canals of Mars evidenced the work of “beings who are in advance of, not behind us, in the journey of life” (Mars 235).

Was it Lowell’s desire as an orientalist-turned-Martianist that led him to (mis)perceive the canals as artificial constructions, to view the surface of the planet as containing “truly wonderful mathematical fitness” (Mars 208-209) when in fact there was nothing of the sort? At this point in my research, I can only speculate to what degree Lowell’s mistranslation of Schiaparelli’s “canali” may have led him to misapprehend the planet’s features. It is, nonetheless, an appropriate explanation for a writer whose first object of study proved to be a source of consternation and confusion. Thus, as with his Orientalism, Lowell’s discourse on “Martian folk” can be read as a means “to criticize, to examine, and realize our own way of doing things” on planet earth (Chosôn 137). Yet as we have seen, such a practice is also prone to misapprehension.

**Martian Folk and the Human Future**

What is clear is that Lowell’s orientalist desires to find a mirror so as to “realize humanity” also resonates with his speculations on human/Martian comparativity, as Mars becomes Lowell’s model for the future of the human planet. Yet Lowell begins by raising a logical qualification, preempting the temptation to anthropomorphize Martians by assuming that “that extra-terrestrial life means extra-terrestrial human life” (Mars 6). Lowell attempts to illustrate the problem of conceptualizing life in the
universe, revealing, through a reference to Japan. Lowell recalls an anecdote about an “innocent globetrotter to a friend of mine in Japan once, a connoisseur of Japanese painting, upon being told that the Japanese pictures were exceedingly fine. ‘What!’ the globe-trotter exclaimed in surprise, ‘do the Japanese have pictures,— real pictures, I mean, in gilt frames?’” (Mars 6). Lowell uses the example of the unseasoned globetrotter as a way of commenting on the tendency to transpose one’s own cultural frames so as to make the other intelligible. But implicitly, Lowell utilizes the perceived “alienness” of the Japanese as his comparative reference point for the problem of conceptualizing “Martian beings” (Mars 6).

Revealingly, his speculations on Martian “beings” replicate the narrative of civilizational and racial dynamics that Lowell first imagines between “East” and “West.” Although Lowell warns his reader that “to talk of Martian beings is not to mean Martian men” (Mars 6), he also cannot avoid the inevitable comparison with humanity, particularly from his “objective” frame of reference as a while American male.

Lowell’s speculations are facilitated through a discussion on Martian technology. He writes that “quite possibly, such Martian folk are possessed of inventions of which we have not dreamed” (Mars 209). This fact is evidenced by the canals that supplied water to the entire planet. Yet the social implications of Lowell’s speculations are what is most revealing. The Martian mind, Lowell speculates, must be a “mind certainly of considerably more comprehensiveness than that which
presides\textsuperscript{9} over the various departments of our own public works” (\textit{Mars} 235). Further, the planetary unity suggested by the network of canals indicates to Lowell that “party politics…have had no part in them” (\textit{Mars} 235). As we see, Lowell uses a comparison with his fictional Martians to comment upon trends in American politics, divided by the problems of “local labor, women's suffrage, and Eastern questions” (\textit{Mars} 129). Lowell identifies gendered, economic, and political questions as modern anxieties that the Martians seem to have transcended, for their canals suggests that they have united in providing the basic needs of water throughout their world. But this romantic vision (while foreshadowing the plot of H.G. Well’s colonial satire in \textit{The War of the Worlds}), also points to the danger of ecological devastation. Martian unity was the response to the harsh ecological conditions of their planet, in which the way to “procure water enough to support life would be the great communal problem of the day” (\textit{Mars} 129).

Importantly, because Mars represents an “older world,” it therefore offers Lowell’s human earth a model for the future. Just as Martians have left political strife behind, their “electrophones and kinetoscopes are things of a bygone past, preserved with veneration in museums as relics of the clumsy contrivances of the simple childhood of their kind” (\textit{Mars} 235). Lowell speculates on a future in which the cutting-edge technologies of his time have become “relics” of a “bygone past.” While Lowell’s image suggests a subversion of western techno-darwinism through the imagination of a species far advanced than “our world,” he also implicitly plots

\textsuperscript{9} Arguably, Lowell takes a swipe at Grover Cleveland, the president of the United States.
humanity on a course that follows the Martians, towards a future that will transcend the modernity of his time, a future “of which we have not dreamed” (Mars 235).

**Haunted Mirrors and the Alien/Asian Legacy**

As my readings have suggested, the problematic of East/West comparison conditioned by Lowell’s Orientalism also continued over into his writings on Mars. This includes, most of all, the logic of mirroring. The fact that the structure of Lowell’s Orientalism was also projectable at Mars establishes a context from which the “War of the Worlds” narrative would become ubiquitous in science fiction and geo-strategy, and East/West mirroring would take on an increasingly militarized dimension against “aliens” and enemy nations (see Ch. 2). Within the context of Lowell’s work, however, rather than read the logic of mirroring militaristically, we can also acknowledge a kind of utopian desire for mutual transformation as a result of the “alien” encounter, however uneven the conditions of imagination may have been.

Although Lowell’s science turned out to be fiction, it is significant as science fiction insofar as Lowell’s apprehensions of Mars were clearly rooted in the anxieties of his era as well as the material conditions of his late-nineteenth century moment. Lowell’s gesture towards human/Martian comparativity, as well as his speculations on Mars as a model for human futurity, reveal the ways in which the “alien,” as with the “oriental,” can be read as symptoms of an earthly world going through its own form of globalization.
And yet, as with his orientalist quest for “other-world manifestations” (Occult Japan 14), Lowell concludes his cosmic search unsatisfied: for the astronomer “learns that…he will probably never find his double anywhere” (Mars 212). Lowell’s reference to man’s search for “his double” returns us his earlier metaphor of the “oriental” mirror. Just as the “orient” was an illusion, as the astronomer learns, man’s “double” is equally illusory. Rather, humans will have to learn to live in a universe in which “resemblant though diverse details are inevitably to be expected in the host of orbs around him,” and that he may “discover any number of cousins scattered through space” (Mars 212). Thus, Lowell foreshadows a future in which humanity will need a mode of interpretation beyond Orientalism.

The Interpreter of Japan

I now turn to the speculative writings of Lafcadio Hearn, who emerged as the “Interpreter of Japan” in the wake of Lowell. I trace Hearn’s dialogue with Lowell over the course of his writings, along with his intersection with science fiction, as a way to highlight an alternative approach to his writing and speculative method. While Hearn may not be reducible to hard and fast generic distinctions, a consideration of the science fictional elements in his work offer a largely unexplored angle into Hearn’s literary project while living in Japan and writing about the country (ostensibly at least). Just as Hearn himself is said to have appeared “like one in touch with some unearthly presence” (xiv The Romance of the Milky Way), that is, like a
kind of “alien,” it should not be surprising that “alien” themes would resonate so profoundly for Hearn. As I argue, a critical attention to his science fictional dialogues with Lowell across “oriental” and “Martian” objects can clarify his both his literary method as well as his concerted materialist critique of Western (and Japanese) modernity; but also, I read Hearn’s misapprehensions as attesting to the mystifying powers of the orientalist tradition within which he writes.

Hearn’s writings in the United States during the 1870’s and 1880’s reveal some of the important science fictional elements emerging in his work, strands that Hearn returns to while living in Japan. While working as a newspaper reporter and editor in the south, Hearn became known for his ethnographic writings on minority communities and the undercurrents within American society, topics which included voodoo, chinatowns, and even the Filipino seafarer community who settled in the bayous of Louisiana, the first Asian American community in the United States. Also significant, Hearn consistently wrote about emerging sciences and technologies like electricity, telegraphy, print mediums, and photography.

The extent to which Hearn was in dialogue with science fiction as it emerged is suggested by his future war narrative, “The Conquest of the United States” (1880). Although Pierton Dooner’s yellow peril novel, The Last Days of the Republic (1880), is often periodized as the first future war in the United States (Clarke 42), interestingly, Hearn also wrote a future war in the same year in the March 31 edition of the The Item. Hearn references Chesney’s narrative at the center of a literary
eruption he terms the “prophetic romance of the period” (Buying Christmas Toys and Other Essays 97), writing “our readers have doubtless read of the Battle of Dorking, and other prophetic romances of the period. Such essays being more or less in vogue we have decided to follow suit with a chapter of history supposed to be written in 1889” (Buying Christmas Toys and Other Essays 97). The narrative both suggests Hearn’s willingness to pander to literary fads “more or less in vogue,” but also that Hearn can be read as as both anticipating, and to some degree, subverting elements of the science fiction imagination, even as they were just coming into shape.

In the “The Conquest of the United States” (1880) Hearn plots a complete destruction of the American union at the hands of the British Empire. Hearn’s U.S. Meets its defeat after the arrival of an armada of technologically advanced “monsters of the English fleet” (Buying Christmas Toys and Other Essays 98). These “monsters” proceed to crush the “rotten American navy” (Buying Christmas Toys and Other Essays 99). Whereas Hearn is generally associated with romantic tradition of oceanic revery, in this piece, Hearn seems more interested in what Alfred Mahan would call sea power a decade later. With “vast ironclads wielding 100-ton guns, and christened with dismal or terrible names, such as Devastation, Vengeance, Fury, Thunderer, Destroyer…” (Buying Christmas Toys and Other Essays 98) appearing off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the Americans are overwhelmed by the superiority of

10 Although in 1880, we are still many decades away from Gernsback’s codification in 1926, revealingly, Hearn’s description of the new literature emerging during his time already includes the elements of “romance” fiction and “prophetic vision” that Gernsback would later highlight.
British sea power. The U.S. is dealt a series of blows leading to the destruction of its major cities, along with the occupation of its waterways and territories.

   The most remarkable feature of “The Conquest of America” is Hearn’s emphasis on navalism. Hearn’s repeated reference to the “rotten navy” of the United States can be read as an underscoring the need for naval build-up, that is, as an assertion for the development of a technologically advanced modern fleet. Hearn’s future “chapter in history” (Buying Christmas Toys and Other Essays 97), set nine years from his 1880 moment, suggests that Hearn was uncannily prescient of political movements to come over the course of the coming decade. At the same time, Hearn’s future vision subverts the Anglo-American solidarity that Mahan would cite as the basis of sea power’s function. This choice may symptomatic of Hearn’s own ambivalences with Victorian culture, but whereas Dooner targeted Chinese immigrants as future enemies, it is revealing that the writer would suggest England to remain America’s future foe, even one hundred years after the American revolution.

   Insofar as Hearn removes many of the elements established by Chesney’s prototype (the narratorial device of the “volunteer” who speaks from the distant future, the tropes of demonization deployed against the “alien” invaders, etc.) Hearn’s try at the future war form can only be read as half-hearted. Yet it is nonetheless fascinating that Hearn, like many writers in his time, decided to experiment with the future war form as a means to explore questions of geo-political futurity in literature.
“A Dream of a Summer Day”

Hearn’s early experiment with the future war form serves as an important marker for his work in Japan, and for his “prediction of Japan’s war with the West” (Tatsumi Full Metal Apache 80). In 1890, Hearn traveled to Yokohama, Japan in 1890, inspired by Lowell’s The Soul of the East along with his encounters with Japanese and Chinese book arts. Hearn hoped to encounter and write about the culture of “Old Japan,” a culture that was thought to be rapidly vanishing with the advent of Japanese modernization. Hearn supported himself working first as a teacher in Kumamoto, then as an author on articles and books on the archipelagic nation, and eventually as a professor at Tokyo Imperial University, where he taught and influenced future generations of Japan’s writers and scholars. Hearn writings from 1890 until his death in 1904 earned him the reputation of “Japan’s Interpreter for the West.”

Yet Hearn’s writings, as we have already begun to see, were very much in synch with the emergence of science fiction. This is true even for his writings in Japan. This is suggested by one of Hearn’s early speculative writings in Japan, an auto-ethnographic story entitled, “A Dream of a Summer’s Day” (1895). In the year in which Lowell began to publish his Martian research, Hearn captures something of the life of a diasporic “alien” in Japan in his adaptation of the legend of Urashima Taro — the fisherman who undergoes time-dilation on his journey to a magical world underwater, but learns upon his return that three days underwater were three hundred years back home. Just as the fantasitical premise of Urashima Taro’s journey
resonates with what Einstein called “temporal relativity” (see. Ch. 4), it also corresponds with what science fiction writers would call a “time travel” narrative. Although based on British Japanologist Basil Chamberlain Hall illustrated version for children, Hearn’s is arguably the first (meta-)literary adaptation that seeks to comprehend the mysteries of the narrative within a modern context. Thus, Hearn sets the stage for science fictional adaptations of the narrative in the years to come (see ch. 4).

For Hearn, part of the mystery of Urashima Taro is its magical association with the sea, one that resonates with his own affinity for the oceanic medium. He writes, “Every summer when I find myself on the coast…it (the Urashima Taro story) haunts me most persistently” (*Out of the East* 3). As we learn, the narrative evokes within Hearn a personal memory — “of this life or of some life before” (20) — of a “place and a magical time” long lost to him. On an autobiographical level, Hearn’s engagement with the Urashima Taro narrative evokes his nostalgia for childhood, just as it enacts his remembrances of Greece, his separation from his parents after their divorce, a break that precipitated his life of wandering. In other words, there is also something to the premise of spatiotemporal dislocation that resonates with Hearns own life as a diasporizing writer, who over the course of his life moved from Greece, to Ireland, to America, the Caribbean, and then Japan, where he died an ambivalent citizen of the “Great Japanese Empire.”
Diaspora as Science Fiction

But Hearn’s version also suggests questions of literature, Orientalism, and of Japanese literary in its increasingly international circulation as part of modernity. He shows how a writer in diaspora can draw inspiration and insight from their “alien” encounters. Hearn’s particular retelling of the Urashima Taro story is inspired by a chance visit to a country inn named after the hero of the narrative, a place Hearn calls his “paradise” (*Out of the East* 1). Fleeing the Europeanized port hotels with “modern improvements,” Hearn fantasizes that he is alive within the tale, and that his discovery of the “House of Urashima” may offer a source of “redemption from all the sorrows of the nineteenth century” (*Out of the East* 1). Here, Hearn reveals his orientalist desire that “Old Japan” might save him from Western modernity.

Presented as if a “dream-within-a-dream,” Hearn’s meta-literary experiment with the Urashima Taro narrative negotiates multiple layers of performative adaptation: weaving commentary on the textual tradition of Urashima Taro narratives, with performative readings on the power of Chamerlain’s illustrated translation, mixed with reflections on his own “Urashima Taro-like” existence. For Hearn, the mysteries of Urashima Taro are linked to the power of literature, as the “text of the little book (Chamberlain’s version) suddenly shrinks away as you read, and faint blue ripplings flood the page” (*Out of the East* 6-7). In Hearn’s metaphor, encountering the narrative is like submerging through a portal. Through acts of narrative, we can travel to another place and time long ago.
Over the course of his piece, Hearn moves through the story, mining its plot for allegorical insight — just as he continues his fantasy of riding through a magical world beneath the sea. Building on a suggestion from within the *Kojiki*, Hearn questions whether the Urashima Taro narrative speaks to a desire for immortality. For the protagonist journeys to an “island where summer never dies” (*Out of the East* 6), a mythological destination also imagined within the Greek and Taoist tradition as Elysium and Horai, respectively. But the deeper he delves, the more his proposed “moral of the story seemed less satisfactory…because by drinking too deeply of life (as Taro did) we do not become young (*Out of the East* 26). Thus, Hearn ends his version with the Urashima Taro narrative still a mystery, with more questions than he can answer.

Although I will return to Urashima Taro in my last chapter on Nikkei literature and science fiction, what is important for my study of Hearn is that he cannot reconcile his romantic desire for an unchanging oriental paradise and the modernizing world around him. While he came looking for the “Old Japan” described by Lowell, Hearn’s fantasy of chirping maidens and rickshaws manned by sea creatures is disrupted by “the proof of the (Meiji) era in a line of telegraph poles reaching out of sight (*Out of the East* 14-15). In this context, his fantasy of riding underwater is disrupted by another kind of oceanic emergence, namely the arrival of capitalist modernity in Japan. Thus, Hearn is broken from the spell of his revery by the recognition of the labor of his “kurumaya” driver, who must run through the
scorching summer heat so that Hearn might entertain his Urashima Taro fantasy. More than another exoticized glimpse of a western orientalist, Hearn’s version of the Urashima Taro narrative consciously performs the tensions between the discrepant temporalities evoked by his encounter with the narrative, against the sense of historical rupture brought by Western modernity.

But “A Dream of a Summer’s Day” also captures something of the inspiration that Hearn felt while first encountering Japan, as suggested by his final gesture in the narrative: Hearn chooses to pay his rickshaw driver the full fare, even though his driver cannot complete the journey for which he was contracted. Hearn does so, he tells his driver, “because I am afraid of the gods” (Out of the East 27). This, of course, can be interpreted as part of Hearn’s orientalist fantasy, of his desire to please the “Daughter of the Dragon King” (Out of the East 27) in hope that he might have his dream of “Old Japan.” It can also be interpreted uni-nationally, that is, as gesture of a man who has decided to “become Japanese” by adopting the gods of the East. Yet as I have attempted to suggest, it may be best to read Hearn diasporically — for in adopting the ancestral narratives of Japan, Hearn has reconnected himself to his polytheistic roots in Greece. In this respect, Hearn sets up my examination in Urashima Taro narratives, science fiction, and Nikkei diaspora literature in my final chapter.

“The Future of the Far East”
Next, I analyze an essay entitled “The Future in the Far East,” also an early writing from Hearn’s time in Japan. Hearn wrote the piece as a speech for his students and colleagues at Kumamoto High School in 1894. I examine his prediction as a way to emphasize the dramatic changes that would take place in Hearn’s view over the course of the following decade, including, the changes that were taking place in Japan during the period in which he wrote. Hearn’s vision of the future is relevant both for his apprehensions of present conditions, but also for how his epic misapprehensions of the future reveal the extent to which he was influenced, and in dialogue with, dominant currents in geo-politics and literature. We have seen part of this connection in his adaptation of Chesney. Now we see his intersection with literature of the yellow peril through his prediction of an even greater future conflict, yet paradoxically, directed towards a Japanese audience.

Hearn utilizes a series of contradictory perspectives in crafting his vision of the future. Having adopted the frame of the “Far East” in his remarks on futurity, Hearn must work within the techno-orientalist convention of the East/West hemispheric divide. But Hearn also declares his desire to speak from the “standpoint of the Western philosopher, and therefore, not about Japan alone, or the Far East alone, but about the whole human race” (“The Future in the Far East”). Assuming the posture of both “Western philosopher” and orientalist, Hearn attempts to offer a vision of the distant future that is extrapolated from the “present conditions” of his moment in 1894, one in which the “Whole World” (“The Future in the Far East”) is
the object of his philosophical speculation. However vexed his condition may be, we see that Hearn shares in Lowell’s desire for a way to conceptualize humanity, or the “whole human race.”

Although Hearn writes at the beginning of 1894, a year in which China and Japan would go to war, the fact that Hearn frames the future in terms of a hemispheric divides means that he sees an even greater struggle on the horizon, a vision reminiscent of another Harpers writer that was growing in prominence at the time of his writing, Alfred Mahan. Hearn points to the Pacific as a kind of testing ground for a global struggle in the making, between the “Far West” and the “Far East,” that is, the Americas, specifically the United States, and the “Far East,” for which he designates Japan and China. Situating Japan and China on the defensive end of Western encroachment, Hearn depicts a perilous condition where the empires of the world are scrambling for territory and resources to uphold Western standard of living. Hearn writes:

Continually the population increases; and continually faster ships are built, and new commercial undertakings are begun, and new colonies are established. The West is forced, by her new necessities, to compel all countries to help her to live. Already her industrial civilization has spread round the world; and the pressure of it is being felt today on the shores of China and of Japan.

(“The Future in the Far East”)
Hearn paints a picture of the world caught in an endless spin of consumption, population growth, technological innovation, globalizing capital, colonialism, and emigration. Yet his world is also divided by an imperialist binary in which the West must “compel all countries to help her live,” a “pressure...being felt today on the shores of China and Japan” (“The Future in the Far East”). As a result, Hearn declares, “China and Japan must compete with the West in order to defend themselves” (“The Future in the Far East” emphasis in original).

**Racial Economism, Diaspora, and the Yellow Peril**

At the same time, while Hearn seems quite sympathetic to his “Far East” audience in Japan, paradoxically, he also reveals himself to be both a promoter of yellow peril discourse. This is seen in his historical narration of the Western encroachment into Asia, and the resulting flood of diasporic Asians flooding throughout the world. He writes, “when the West attempted to force its gates, a dynamic power of inexhaustible and almost inconceivable magnitude was set in motion. The Orient also began to expand” (“The Future in the Far East”). In other words, the encroachment of the “West” has created a monster, a monolith of “dynamic power of inexhaustible and almost inconceivable magnitude” (“The Future in the Far East”). Hearn’s vision reads like a techno-orientalist nightmare insofar as he warns that “if it (the ‘Orient’) adopts the machinery of the West to help its expansion, then the West will have to face such a danger as was never even dreamed of fifty years ago” (“The Future in the Far East”).
East”). With the “Whole World” in play, he asks, “Which will give way, Far West or Far East?” (“The Future in the Far East”)

One irreconcilable paradox in Hearn’s work is that although he was an admirer and promoter of Chinese literature and mythology, he also tended to demonize Chinese diasporic communities. In addition to confusing diasporization with a form of nationalist imperialism (recalling my introduction), his representation of Chinese communities tends towards what Collene Lye has called the “economism of Asiatic racial form” (102). This is seen in Hearn’s representation of the Chinese diaspora. Revealingly, Hearn points to California as the front line of economic struggle, writing, “America was the first country to take fright. In California, it was found that no one could compete with the Chinese. They absorbed commerce, they monopolized trade, they drove labor-competitors out of the market” (“The Future in the Far East”). According to Lye, racial representation in Yellow Peril literature “referred not to persons but to a host of modernity’s dehumanizing effects” (11). While’s Hearn is actually trying to decry the problems created by finance capitalism, his “Asiatic economism” relies on the language of anti-Chinese racism so as to make
his critique. His yellow perilism links “Chinese” with the rise of consumer and monopoly capitalism and the dispossession of (white) labor\(^{11}\).

While ironically foreshadowing the fate of Japanese diasporics, Hearn’s apprehension of Chinese peril is clearly a misapprehension. Importantly, the details of Hearn’s racist representation of Chinese power has no cultural or national content. Rather, Chinese communities diasporizing throughout the world seem to be masters in the arena of economic competition. For “the West discovered that the Chinese were not simply equals in trade and commerce, but superiors, and very dangerous rivals, even in what is called the highest form of financial cooperation” (“The Future in the Far East”). In sum, Hearn’s dystopian vision of the Chinese diaspora as a monolith of master-capitalists spreading beyond China reveals how the alienation of Asians can be read, in some cases, as symptomatic of the alienation produced by the globalizing forces of capitalist modernity, as Lye has suggested.

Yet paradoxically, Hearn’s vision is obviously an attempt at a materialist critique aimed at the West. Importantly, Hearn both demonizes and glorifies his orientalized object as he mounts his critique of Western globalization and the consumer cultures of Europe and America. For Hearn’s prediction is that, “riches may

\(^{11}\) It bares mentioning that Hearn’s racial economism is also a naturalist economism. He writes, “Nature is a great economist. She makes no mistakes” (“The Future in the Far East”). Hearn illustrates this point by referencing the dinosaurs of the jurassic age, “In natural history, you have read about extinct animals…it is quite certain some of these disappeared simply because of the costliness of their existence. The time came when the earth could not support them” (“The Future in the Far East”). Hearn’s trope of “costliness” is the lynch pin of his naturalist economism. In other words, Hearn translates the language of Darwinism and gives it a social inflection by linking the extinction of animals to a discourse on over-consumption.
be, in the future, a source of weakness” (“The Future in the Far East”). For Hearn, the future is one in which the most “costly races” (“The Future in the Far East”) are imperiled. Thus, he concludes, “assuredly in the future competition between West and East, the races most patient, most economical, most simple in their habits will win” (“The Future in the Far East”). In this way, Hearn’s yellow peril Orientalism can nonetheless be read as a misguided attempt to critique the dehumanizations of capitalist modernity. Simply put, Hearn predicts a victory of the “Far East” because “they” can produce more and live on less.

Although Hearn’s imagery seems to foreshadow a future military menace in “the Orient,” he actually argues (perhaps naively) that “it is not by war that the future of races will be decided” (“The Future in the Far East”). Rather, “it is by industrial and scientific competition” (“The Future in the Far East”). Hearn seems to see Japan leading China towards this end. Although Hearn identifies China’s strength in industry and commerce, he also subordinates China to Japan in that “the commercial sort of intelligence is not, however, the highest. The highest is the scientific intelligence. China has never given any proof of capacity in this direction. But another Oriental race has, Japan” (“The Future in the Far East”). In this way, Hearn ingratiates himself before his Japanese audience, writing:

The successes achieved abroad in Germany, in America, and elsewhere by Japanese men of science have been quite enough to prove that the highest
capacity is there. It may be still to a great extent potential undeveloped; but its
development is a mere question of time. And the time will not be long.

(“The Future in the Far East”)

Whereas Lowell described the Japanese as a pre-scientific nation, Hearn praises the
remarkable abilities demonstrated by “Japanese men of science” as evidence that the
“Far East” can “compete…in the intellectual battle of races.” Hearn’s vision of a
future Japan as a mecca of scientific learning also suggests an imperialist positioning
of Japan over China, as “Japan has proven herself able to compete with the West in
the highest departments of intellectual progress” (“The Future in the Far East”),
whereas China had yet to do so at the time.

In his call for China and Japan to “compete with the West in order to defend
themselves,” could Hearn have been anticipating, or advocating for, “Japan’s conflict
with the West,” perhaps even, a Japanese-led empire in the “Far East”? Why Hearn
was moved to offer such a vision to his students and colleagues, or how his essay was
received by future readers, remains unclear. It is important to note, however, that as
Hearn informs his audience in Japan, while the “future is for the Far East,” it is only
“as far as China is concerned” (“The Future in the Far East”).

Already in 1894, we see the beginnings of Hearn's ambivalence regarding
Japan, the nation he adopted and for which served as an interpreter. For Hearn, while
the Japanese have shown great promise in the area of scientific learning, a “possible
danger” lurked on the nation’s horizon — “imported ideas of luxury” (“The Future in the Far East”). He writes,

In the case of Japan, I think, there is a possible danger, the danger of abandoning the old, simple, healthy, natural, sober, honest way of living. I think Japan will be strong as long as she preserves her simplicity. I think she will become weak if she adopts imported ideas of luxury.

(“The Future in the Far East”)

Paradoxically, Hearn’s desire for the preservation of “old Japan” is both materialist and orientalist. As with China, he uses the Japanese as objects in a critique intended for Western ideas of luxury, that is, of consumerism and mass culture. If Japan were able to resist such notions, it “will be strong” (“The Future in the Far East”); conveniently, however, it will also keep alive his dream to encounter the “old world” that he hoped to write about. Further, Hearn cannot escape the orientalist irony that by introducing the future war narrative to his Japanese audience, Hearn’s writing actually evidences the very phenomenon of global modernity that he hoped to subvert. That is, his speculations arguably function to facilitate the emergence of science fiction in Japan, a fact that will haunt him in the years to come.

Hearn’s “The Future in the Far East” is ironical at best insofar as China and Japan would be at war (on Korean territory) by the time his essay was first published six months later. It does, however, reveal the way in which Hearn can be read in deep dialogue with many of the most prominent intellectual, political, and literary
movements of his time. The fact that Hearn deploys the language of the yellow peril, while before a Japanese audience, so as to argue for “poverty,” “patience” and “simplicity” as strategic virtues, suggests something of the absurdity of the tradition of future-oriented speculation that was growing in prominence by the late-nineteenth century; and yet, Hearn’s “anti-capitalist future war” reveals much about the uniqueness of Hearn’s perspective in Japan, however contradictory (and racist) it sometimes may be. Even his “prediction of Japan’s war with the West” reveals his subversive instincts in relation to emergent science fiction conventions.

**Alienation and the Ant Subversion: Kwaidan**

Hearn’s dialogue with Lowell across “alien” objects becomes explicit in Hearn’s final writings on Japan, *Kwaidan: Stories and Studies of Strange Things* (1904) and *The Romance of the Milky Way* (1904). Not only does Hearn ponder the implications of Lowell’s thesis on the “Elder planet” (*Kwaidan* 239) in a “post-Wellsian” era in which which “alien” figures were circulating, he also arguably subverts the dominant figuration of “aliens” in the service of his materialist critique, as my reading of the final chapter of *Kwaidan*, “Ants,” will suggest. Although *Kwaidan* is generally regarded as a collection of Japanese ghost stories, it concludes with a section of “Insect Studies,” and with a turn to science fiction.

Whereas Hearn’s speculative practices were generally situated at the “intersection of two world cultures” (Tatsumi 84), his final insect study at the end of
Kwaidan attempts to ad a “another world” by which to view both “East” and “West” — “Ants.” Beginning his piece with a poetic musing on a colony of ants the morning after a typhoon, who have somehow returned to their “triumphant toil” (Kwaidan 216) even through the world around them has been destroyed. Hearn remarks at how “they have weathered the storm in some unimaginable way, while great trees were being uprooted and houses blown to fragments, and roads washed out of existence” (Kwaidan 216). This leads Hearn into a reflection on the the moral, social, and civilizational achievements of the ants as a reflection upon human society.

Although the connection between insects and Martians may not be readily apparent, I argue that Hearn is attempting to subvert the emergent “alien” paradigm — and thus, implicitly, the “War of the Worlds” model — by considering the perspective of “another world” already inhabiting planet earth, “Ants.” Just as Lowell used “Orientals” and “Martians” as mirrors for white, western man, Hearn adapts, but also subverts the orientalist strategy by using the ant world so as to mount a critique of human modernity. Hearn writes: “For the same reason that it is considered wicked, in sundry circles, to speak of a non-Christian people having produced a civilization ethically superior to our own, certain persons will not be pleased by what I am going to say about ants” (Kwaidan 219). Not only does his move unsettle racist discourses of civilizational superiority, but it also challenges the logic of human superiority over the creaturely inhabitants of the earth.
Adapting a fantastical premise derived from Chinese mythology, that he can “listen to the conversation of the ants” (Kwaidan 241) with the help of the “Fairy of Science” (Kwaidan 222), Hearn works through biological, social, philological, and mythological sources. He offers a vision of ant achievements that would rival any human community, writing:

I hope my reader is aware that ants practice horticulture and agriculture; that they are skillful in the cultivation of mushrooms; that they have domesticated five hundred and eighty-four different kinds of animals; that they make tunnels through solid rock; that they know how to provide against atmospheric changes which might endanger the health of their children; and that, for insects, their longevity is exceptional, — members of the more highly evolved species living for a considerable number of years.

(Kwaidan 222)

As a species, ants have evolved practices of learning, industry, child-rearing, and inter-species relations (including, perhaps, the domestication of humans?); ants have demonstrated an ability to survive and thrive across a time-frame far surpassing any human civilization or nation. Thus, Hearn adopts the ant world as a comparative device, but also as a model for the human future. As we see, Hearn has appropriated, but also subverted, the orientalist method that Lowell used in his depiction of both Japan and Mars.
Hearn muses on the ideographic resonance between Chinese characters and western science, noting the affinities between the ideograph for ant (螻), and the highly evolved ethical sensibilities that biologists have observed in the ant species. Hearn adds to the scientific research an ideographic analysis of the Chinese character for ant: “an interesting fact in this connection is that the Japanese word for ant, *ari*, is represented by an ideograph formed of the character for "insect" combined with the character signifying ‘moral rectitude’” (*Kwaidan* 223). Just as Hearn’s scientific sources from the west suggest the remarkably altruism of ants, Hearn points out how the ideographic tradition in Asia also designate ants to be creatures with an evolved sense of “propriety” towards fellow members of their species. Remarkably, ants seem to be “a society of which every member is born so absolutely unselfish, and so energetically good, that moral training could signify, even for its youngest, neither more nor less than waste of precious time” (*Kwaidan* 233).

Here, we can sense that Hearn’s dialogue is with Lowell. For he seems to be analogizing the sense of Ant propriety to the sense of planetary unity that Lowell imagined Mars to have achieved. The point of comparison, either way, is a humanity that seems hopelessly divided. We see, then, that Hearn’s implicit question is a utopian one: can the human world ever come together out of a sense of solidarity with their fellow human-species, just as the Ant and Martian worlds seem to have have?

**The “Coming Race”**
Whereas the Orientalist tradition of Lowell and Hearn have generally approached the East/West hemispheric divide in racial terms, at the end of *Kwaidan*, having dialogized his speculative materials, Hearn, significantly, shifts his attention to gender. Hearn speculates that the unconventional gender structure of ants, as well as the remarkable physiological diversity within ant species, has been the key to their success as a species. As Hearn remarks, males, being “useless as workers or fighters” (*Kwaidan* 230) have been reduced to “necessary Evils” (*Kwaidan* 229), existing only for the purpose of providing reproductive material. Rather, ants live as part of a matriarchal collective. As followers of the “Mothers-Elect” (*Kwaidan* 230), or queen-ants, “females, rather than males…have been evolutionally specialized into soldiery and laborers.” Ant females are also morphologically diverse, that is, “it is difficult, at first sight, to believe them of the same race” (*Kwaidan* 228). And yet workers and warriors, free from all reproductive labor, are united as an armed “military force” when defending themselves against the “enemies of the state” (*Kwaidan* 228). Of course, Hearn is committing anthropomorphism through his analogy between ants and geopolitics. When compared to the nation-state form, Hearn’s ants, to use a metaphor from the *Star Trek* universe, are like the “Borg.” They exist as part of a totalitarian hive; and yet, for that reason, they are also selfless, living only for the benefit of the collective.

Although Hearn turns to science fiction, it is not to imagine future forms of governmentality, Rather, Hearn is interested in the possibility of morphological
transformation of the human body — specifically as a means to transcend the binary of male and female. He thus draws evolutionary inspiration from the morphology of ants as a model for a “Coming Race” (*Kwaidan* 238) of humans. Hearn asks what would happen if humanity genetically engineered a new “majority of beings of neither sex” (*Kwaidan*), asking:

If it be legitimate to believe in a future humanity to which the pleasure of mutual beneficence will represent the whole joy of life, would it not also be legitimate to imagine other transformations, physical and moral, which the facts of insect-biology have proved to be within the range of evolutilonal possibility?  

(*Kwaidan* 237)

Hearn’s vision of the “Coming Race” (*Kwaidan* 238) enacts the contradictions of science fiction insofar as Hearn relies on a hypothetical technology derived from scientific modernity, even as he works to subvert that very modernity. Yet he asks, “supposing that such a discovery were made, and that the human race should decide to arrest the development of sex in the majority of its young…might not the result be an eventual state of polymorphism, like that of ants?” (*Kwaidan* 238). Hearn suggests that humanity might address its social problem, particularly, its economic problems, through sexual polymorphism — by creating “higher types” (*Kwaidan* 238) that are neither male nor female.
In some respects, Hearn’s vision can be read as dystopian insofar as he postulates future sciences that will facilitate genetic engineering and polymorphism in human physiology. Further, Hearn’s vision can be read as a form of eugenics in that it is intended to produce “higher types” of humans. But insofar as Hearn’s vision of a future comprised by a “majority of beings of neither sex” (Kwaidan 238) works to imagine alternatives to the gendered division of labor being practiced in his time, Hearn can also be read as a queer/feminist. Thus, Hearn’s attempt to disrupt the male/female binary is a clear forerunner to the experiments of science fiction writers like Samuel Delaney, who imagined sexless “jumpers” in “Aye, and Gomorrah” (1967) or Ursula Le Guin’s sex-neutral Gethenians in The Left Hand of Darkness (1969).

Furthermore, although he does not elaborate, Hearn plots a future race developing from practices of “feminine rather than masculine evolution” (Kwaidan 260). While merely suggestive, Hearn’s image of a “Coming Race” may resonate with analysis of the estranging powers of the “alien” to destabilize dominant regimes of gender, a point that resonates with feminist approaches to science fiction criticism. For the purposes of my reading, Hearn’s speculations on ants and the human future reveal how Lowell’s writing, as with the problematic of “aliens from other worlds,” remained a prominent feature of Hearn’s thought and aesthetic mode. Hearn concludes by making his dialogue with Lowell explicit, suggesting that “elder

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worlds” may already have the “power to produce offspring restricted to a cast morphologically differentiated, in unimaginable ways, from the rest of the species” (*Kwaidan* 239). Interestingly, then, “Ants,” along with “orientals” and “Martians” must be included as part of a collective of objects that Hearn experiments with over the course of his writing. Hearn’s study of “Ants” further evidences his original approach to materialist representation insofar as his subversion of the emergent trope of the “alien from another world” functions to underscore his search for “some means of solving economic problems” (*Kwaidan* 238) in human society.

**The Romance of the Milky Way**

Lowell is also a prominent figure in *The Romance of the Milky Way*, Hearn’s final writings in Japan. The fact that Hearn opens the book with a narrative on the mythology and culture of *Tanabata*, the Chinese legend of the star-crossed weaver of the milky way, suggests already a science fictional context for Hearn’s last works on life in Japan. As Hearn tells us, “the charm of the ancient tale sometimes descends upon me, out of the scintillant sky,—to make me forget the monstrous facts of science, and the stupendous horror of Space” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 48). As with prior works, Hearn begins with the juxtaposition of his orientalist wonder with the brutal realities of his material condition — the “monstrous facts of science,” the “horror of Space”; yet this must also include the material conditions of capitalist modernity, from which Hearn and Lowell turned to Orientalism for solace.
Hearn writes a chapter entitled “‘Ultimate Questions,’” in which he meditates on the nature of cosmos, the limitations of earthly scientific knowledge, and the implications of Lowell’s Martian thesis within his present conjuncture. He writes, Mr. Percival Lowell's astonishing book, "Mars," sets one to thinking about the results of beings able to hold communication with the habitants of an older and a wiser world,—some race of beings more highly evolved than we, both intellectually and morally, and able to interpret a thousand mysteries that still baffle our science.

*(The Romance of the Milky Way 122)*

Whereas Lowell pointed to the limitless possibilities of “alien” encounters with optimism, Hearn laments the limitations of human morality, mortality, and the limitations of human science in the face of all that is unknown. With the specter of an incomprehensibly advanced Martian civilization looming, Hearn is apprehensive as to whether humans could actually “comprehend the method, even could we borrow the results” *(The Romance of the Milky Way (122)* of Martian learning. In other words, could humanity even comprehend the “alien” knowledges of another world considering the epistemological, perceptual, and moral limitations of mankind?

Hearn’s apprehensions regarding the prospects of Martian encounter are revealing only insofar as they enact the profound ambivalence Hearn felt towards capitalist, Western, and increasingly, Japanese modernity. On the one hand, Hearn would like to consider that possibilities of “alien” encounters with hope, writing, “I
fancy that if the power of holding intellectual converse with other worlds could now serve us, we should presently obtain it” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 123). On the other hand, Hearn’s fears that contact with “alien” knowledges could prove devastating for humanity considering the “present moral condition of mankind” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 122). He asks, “would not the sudden advent of larger knowledge from some elder planet prove for us…nothing less than a catastrophe?” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 122). While Hearn’s speculations on a new type of “ether-telegraphy” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 123) are suggestive, his interests in the prospect of “holding intellectual converse” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 122) with aliens is overshadowed by his apprehension of the apocalyptic consequences which may ensue, including, he wonders, “the extinction of the human species?” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 122) While Hearn spent so much of his life searching for “alien” encounters, at the end of his writing, Hearn recoils at the implications of such as meeting. In other words, the mirror of “other worlds,” rather than being a source of insight and allure, had become a source of anxiety and alienation.

“A Letter From Japan”

I suggest that Hearn’s final chapter in the *The Romance of the Milky Way*, “A Letter From Japan,” may offer a clue as to Hearn’s ambivalence. Hearn’s unaddressed letter, written a month before his death in 1904, is his final piece of writing at the
“Interpret of Japan.” Not only does the letter returns us to Hearn’s critique of capitalist modernity across his speculative writings, it also reveals much about the mystifications and grave ironies of the orientalist tradition within which he is associated. For Hearn himself witnesses the uncanny return of his orientalist future war of 1894, now in the form of science fiction mass culture emerging in Japan.

Written six months into the Russo-Japanese War, Hearn writes that while the “world is fully informed” of “what her fleets and her armies are doing,” little is known of “what her people are doing at home” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 182). Although Hearn saw Japan as facing “the supreme crisis in her national life” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 182) in its conflict with Russia, as war raged on the Korean peninsula, paradoxically, he observes that “The life of Tokyo has been, to outward seeming, hardly more affected by the events of the war than the life of nature beyond it, where the flowers are blooming and the butterflies hovering as in other summers” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 183). From his “quiet suburb” of Tokyo, “it is difficult to imagine that, a few hundred miles away, there is being carried on one of the most tremendous wars of modern times…you could almost persuade yourself that the whole story of the war is an evil dream” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 184).

Hearn’s sense that “the whole story of the war” might be an “evil dream” suggests a dramatic change in Japan. He speculates that the reaction of the Japanese public to the war reveals “something more than the Spartan discipline of the
race” *(The Romance of the Milky Way* 184). He cites a contemporary haiku to illustrate:

Gōgwai no

Tabi teki mikata

Goké ga fuè

As Hearn translates, “Each time that an extra is circulated the widows of foes and friends have increased in multitude” *(The Romance of the Milky Way* 184). Of course, the poem speaks to the death and suffering wrought by war, of the growing “multitude” of widows of “foes” and “friends” on both sides of the conflict. But arguably, just as the image is a commentary on the tragedy of death in modern war, it can also be read as an allegory for the impact of nationalist “print capitalism” (Anderson 44), mass media, but also the emergence of science fiction as part of Japanese wartime society.

**Consuming the Future**

Although Hearn dreamed of a Japan that would retain the simplicity of its old ways, and of a future that might be decided through means other than war, at the end of his life, Hearn encounters a national public that has not only embraced militarism, but was also producing a consumer culture dedicated to the nation’s military exploits. He writes, “To enumerate even a tenth of the various articles ornamented with designs inspired by the war—articles such as combs, clasps, fans, brooches, card-cases,
purses—would require a volume” (The Romance of the Milky Way 192). In addition, Hearn notices in the Japanese public a “strange capacity to find, in the world-stirring events of the hour, the same amusement that they would find in watching a melodrama” (The Romance of the Milky Way 209). He writes:

The public seems to view the events of the war as they would watch the scenes of a popular play…everywhere the theatres are producing war dramas; the newspapers and magazines are publishing war stories and novels; the cinematograph exhibits the monstrous methods of modern warfare; and numberless industries are turning out objects of art or utility designed to commemorate the Japanese triumphs.

(The Romance of the Milky Way 185)

In the early twentieth century, an era in which Admiral Dewey was a spokesperson for soap products, and Williams James would warn that “‘war’ and ‘peace’ mean the same thing” (“The Moral Equivalent of War”), Hearn witnesses the eruption of a mass culture industry in Japan dedicated to the representation and consumption of war. Most significantly, Hearn apprehends the way in which emergent representational technologies have enhanced the encounter with “reality,” writing, “the inexorable truth of the photograph, and the sketches of the war correspondent” (The Romance of the Milky Way 191) have made the “monstrous methods of modern warfare” (The Romance of the Milky Way 185) visible in ways never before seen. New medias could represent “the vividness and violence of
fact” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 191), but also package such representations for public consumption. At the same time, Hearn suggests that the intensified realism of wartime mass culture — war reports, war dramas, war novels, war drawings, war photographs, etc. — was also functioning to distort the apprehension of “reality.”

This is suggested by Hearn comments on the remarkable “play-impulse” that seems ubiquitous across generations and socio-economic status as a result of the war. Rich and poor, children and soldier alike, were enacting their nation’s battles, either vicariously, or virtually. Hearn writes that “war toys are innumerable,” from battleships, to card games, to clothing and accessory lines. Hearn illustrates the logic of the war industry as it plays itself out in a newly released children’s card game, which features the vessels of both the Japanese and Russian navies:

The winner in this game destroys his "captures" by tearing the cards taken.

But the shops keep packages of each class of warship cards in stock; and when all the destroyers or cruisers of one country have been put *hors de combat*, the defeated party can purchase new vessels abroad. One torpedo boat costs about one farthing; but five torpedo boats can be bought for a penny.

(*The Romance of the Milky Way* 198)

In sum, the rules of the war game require that naval pieces be played and expended so that more cards must be bought. And yet, even “children of the poorest classes make their own war toys,” transforming “a tub of water” into “Port Arthur” (*The Romance of the Milky Way* 200) so that they may entertain the glories of war. Although Hearn
once romanticized the Japanese propensity for playfulness, his description of the play industry leaves him mystified and disconcerted. Hearn grows exasperated as he describes a new line of baby dresses, adorned “entirely with war pictures,” crying, “the unspeakable pity of things!" (The Romance of the Milky Way 197)

**Orientalist Ironies and the Emergence of Science Fiction**

But perhaps Hearn’s apprehensions of the growing militarization of Japanese culture also reveal something of his misapprehensions as an orientalist. This is seen in his description, and analysis, of the strange temporality shared between events of the war, and their representation in print. He writes,

Almost immediately after the beginning of hostilities, thousands of "war pictures" -- mostly cheap lithographs—were published. The drawing and coloring were better than those of the prints issued at the time of the war with China; but the details were to a great extent imaginary,—altogether imaginary as to the appearance of Russian troops. The most startling things were pictures

13 Hearn writes, “The strangest things that I have seen in this line of production were silk dresses for baby girls,—figured stuffs which, when looked at from a little distance, appeared incomparably pretty, owing to the masterly juxtaposition of tints and colors. On closer inspection the charming design proved to be composed entirely of war pictures,—or, rather, fragments of pictures, blended into one astonishing combination: naval battles; burning warships; submarine mines exploding; torpedo boats attacking; charges of Cossacks repulsed by Japanese infantry; artillery rushing into position; storming of forts; long lines of soldiery advancing through mist. Here were colors of blood and fire, tints of morning haze and evening glow, noon-blue and starred night-purple, sea-gray and field-green,—most wonderful thing!... I suppose that the child of a military or naval officer might, without impropriety, be clad in such a robe. But then—the unspeakable pity of things!” (The Romance of the Milky Way 197-198)
of Russian defeats in Korea, published before a single military engagement
had taken place. Some of the earlier pictures have now been realized in grim
fact.

(The Romance of the Milky Way 190)

Hearn’s perspective captures, but also distorts, a kind of science fictionality emerging
in Japanese mass culture at the beginning of the twentieth century. Hearn perceives,
but also misapprehends, the way in which science, technology, and industry have
aligned in Japan in the promotion of war, and how the generic form he helped
introduced was being naturalized as part of Japan’s national and economic life.

In a way, Frankenstein encounters his monster, for Hearn must write of a
nation consuming its future by acting out the literary form that he helped introduce
with his prediction of “The Future of the Far East” ten years earlier. Although
Japanese science fiction was already emerging through translations of Jules Verne,
and adaptations of Verne by Yano Ryukei and Oshikawa Shunro, Hearn must also be
credited as a figure haunting over the emergence of science fiction as part of modern
Japanese culture.

As Hearn perceived, the emergent tradition of Japanese “War pictures” were
fantastical not just in the racial depiction of the Russian enemy, but also in their
representation of time. Rather than recording the “reality” of history after the fact,
mass depictions of war seemed to prefigure the “grim facts” of history before the
actually happened. Arguably, what Hearn encounters is an emergent visual
imagination that was replicating the literary paradigm of future war established by Chesney. And yet, Hearn’s analysis of the “drawings of anticipation” (The Romance of the Milky Way 191) actually replicates his fatal misapprehensions as an orientalist. For as he questions the “propriety and the wisdom of…pictorially predicting victory, and easy victory to boot” (The Romance of the Milky Way (190-191), his explanation of future war culture enacts the misapprehension conditioned by his orientalist posture. As he explains: “I am told that the custom of so doing (depicting future war) is an old one” (The Romance of the Milky Way 191 my emphasis). Rather than recognize his own place within the circulation of narrative and meaning, Hearn preempts such an possibility. Although Hearn holds to his orientalist fantasy to the last — “that Old Japan is still able to confer honors worth dying for” (The Romance of the Milky Way 207) — as a result, he cannot reconcile the materiality of culture as it was erupting around him.

In the end, Hearn can only resign to the failures of his interpretive project. For just as Lowell would comment on the incommensurability and mutual confusion produced by his own orientalist mirroring, Hearn, at the end of his life, similarly realizes that his orientalized object has eluded him, for admits that, “even by the foreign peoples that have been most closely in contact with her, the capacities of the Japanese remain unguessed” (The Romance of the Milky Way 209).

Allegories for the Orientalist
Insofar as Hearn’s writings as an orientalist can be read as facilitating the emergence of future war science fiction in Japan, his work also can be read as evidencing the destructive effects of the very capitalist modernity from which he tried to flee. Thus, in the end, he must be understood as a tragic figure, at least during the context of his life time. And yet, as I have tried to show, Hearn’s subversive intersections with the emergence of science fiction, far from being a coincidence, formed a core component of his speculative practice. Although Hearn may be creditable for having “predicted Japan’s war with the West,” what is more significant is that his literary project worked to render the hemispheric binaries of his “Pacific War” prediction obsolete.

Hearn’s dialogue with Lowell across the continuum of Asians and “aliens” reveals an important genealogy for the grave (mis)apprehensions of a period in which the “War of the Worlds” model would become ubiquitous as a mode of apprehending the future of nations and races. Although the literary tradition of American Orientalism remains a discrepant archive, one which includes the intersections of science fiction and military-strategic speculation in the wake of Wells (as I explore in the following chapter), it was also a project that American writers pursued out of a dream of an-other world than the modernity of their time.

Hearn died before the Japanese Empire would emerge as one of the preeminent powers in the world following its victory over Russia, its first war with a western nation. Yet as a diasporic writer associated with the tradition of American Orientalism, his vision of Japan at war is an ominous foreshadowing of Pacific
politics in the years to come. Within this context, perhaps we cannot not blame
Frankenstein for recoiling when his mirror becomes his monster.
Chapter 2

Alien-Nation:

Science Fiction, Sea Power, and the “Alien” in the Pacific War

This chapter examines the historic intersections of science fiction and the tradition of geo-strategic writing associated with “sea power prophet” Alfred Mahan. I analyze the archive of “Pacific War” speculation written in the United States that circulated on both sides of the Pacific from the late-nineteenth century on. Not only did the future war tradition function proleptically, that is, as a grave form of foreshadowing, in the decades prior to Japan’s strike at Pearl Harbor, it also prefigured the emergent contours of a globalizing world through the representation of “aliens” upon the literary terrain of future war. Thus, my analysis explores the ways in which the emergence of science fiction can be read in relation to the practice of geo-strategic speculation in the Pacific, but also how the science fiction of the Pacific War can elucidate the “alien from another world” as it emerged as a prime trope of genre.

My analysis traces a literary continuum between science fiction writers and naval geo-strategists who speculated on the possibilities and perils of war in the Pacific, from the late-nineteenth century futurological writings of “prophet” Alfred Mahan, to Homer Lea’s, The Valor of Ignorance (1909), to Hector Bywater’s The
Great Pacific War of 1931 (1925), and finally The Day After Tomorrow (1941), one of the early novels of Robert A. Heinlein. When surveyed from its initial iterations in the late-nineteenth century, to Heinlein’s early writings in Amazing Science Fiction Stories in the year prior to Japan’s attack at Pearl Harbor, the archive of science fiction in the United States that prophesied the perils of the “Pacific War” can be read as indexing a particular kind of historical “conjuncture,” to use a notion from Stuart Hall, “a period during which the different social, political, economic and ideological contradictions that are at work in society come together to give it a specific and distinctive shape” (“Interpreting the Crisis”). As science fiction came into increased recognizability, I argue that the genre can be read in apprehension of an emergent conjuncture in which science, technology, and globalizing capital were altering the relative pace and proximity of modern life, and where borders between nations and races seemed increasingly fluid. Paradoxically, the science fiction of the Pacific War reveals the apprehension of the Pacific — the largest of the world’s oceans — as if it were perilously shrinking. I examine the ways in which representations of “Asiatic Aliens” can be read as symptomatic of a spatio-temporal crisis precipitated by vying forms of globalization, militarization, but also unprecedented diasporization of “aliens” between nations.

As with my first chapter, my analysis ads context to Tatsumi’s suggestion of the “pre-Wellsian, post-Wellsian” (“Preface” xiv) shift in science fiction, in which the future war narrative — historically cast between nations — took on increasingly
globalized, inter-planetary valences following the publication Well’s fiction of Martian invasion, and the “alien” emerged as a prime trope for the representation of race. Well’s tropes of Martian invaders resonated profoundly with other prominent discourses on “aliens,” namely with the tradition of “Yellow Peril” literature and the history of “alien exclusion” in the United States. As we shall see, in the case of the Pacific, representations of worlds at war and tropes of hemispheric division were mutually reinforcing.

In addition, I examine the question of “alien” representation in dialogue with discourses in Asian American studies, specifically, the analysis “Asiatic” representation within American literature — the “ancestors of today’s stereotypical Asian Americans” (Lye 11). In *America’s Asia: Racial Form and American Literature, 1893-1945* (2006), Lye identifies a connection between “alien” discourses in literature and the political context informing the Asian exclusionist policies in the United States, including the forced removal of Japanese from the west coast upon the start of war. Thus, the “alien” apprehensions of military leaders (and science fiction writers) led to a unique spatiality for how the divisions of the Pacific War were conceptualized. As Lye writes, “the racial war in the Pacific was comprised of two fronts: a military front between armed combatants in the southwestern Pacific, and a home front waged against thousands of civilians” (104 emphasis added). In other words, the spatial contours of the Pacific War were imagined simultaneously in terms of a naval war, but also a “home front” within American society, one that precipitated
the militarization of the entire U.S. West Coast, along with the forced removal of some-120,000 Japanese ancestry — deemed “alien enemies” by Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 — even though the majority were American citizens.

Although Lye seems aware of the ways in which “fantastic fiction seems to have provided an advanced script for the U.S. Government’s warfare psychology” (103) during the war,” the emphasis of her analysis is on the “economism of Asiatic racial form” (113). As a result, her argument serves to foreshadow the imagination of “model economic characters” (11) of the post-war “Pacific Rim.” While this is valid, her tracing of the “alien’s” passage from Asiatic to Asian American relies on the centrality of the “home front” in the Pacific War, that is, of the “internment camps” as a final act of an era characterized by exclusionary policies directed against people from Asia. But here, her thesis that “the evacuation was motivated by business competition” (Lye 113) — while suggesting the need for further study — fails to adequately account for the “alien” as a geo-strategic problem, or for that matter, as a trope of science fiction, a literary tradition that actually goes unmarked within her study. Rather than read “the difficulty of establishing economic causation for anti-Japanese measures” as further evidence of “the epistemological effect of the economism of Asiatic racial form” (Lye 113) — an argument which replicates the dubious logic deployed against Asians in the yellow peril tradition — perhaps we can regard science fiction as offering an alternative angle into the material
and epistemological conditions of the internment, by foregrounding the
“personification of the alien” (Lye 6) within the context of militarism and the history
of war in the Pacific.

As I will argue in this chapter, not only does the archive of future war in the
Pacific reveal the long history of intersection between science fiction writing and
military strategic thinking, but it also reveals an important genealogy of “alien”
representation within both science fiction and the historical imagination of the Pacific
War. As the diasporic “alien” shifts in its associations across the writings of Mahan,
Lea, Bywater, and Heinlein — from the oceanic horde threading to overflow the
American continent, to Japanese immigrant/insurgents waiting for attack orders, to
finally, the multiracial, Japanese American soldier, who, although loyal to the United
States, must prove his loyalty by serving as a “test subject” for racial weaponry —
American science fiction can be read as foreshadowing the impossible conditions
imposed upon Japanese Americans upon the start of the Pacific War, but also as it
relates to the contradictions of American nationalism that had been emerging from the
late-nineteenth century on.

**Sea Power and Other Science Fictions**

Thus, I turn to still understudied topos within science fiction criticism, the ecological
space of the Pacific, and to the pages of science fiction and the minds of military
thinkers. To begin, I analyze the futurological, geo-strategic writings of admiral,
historian, and sea power “prophet” Alfred Mahan. Although it may seem unconventional to analyze the writings of a historian and military strategist within the context of science fiction history, they are deeply related.

Critics of Mahan tend to paint the admiral as a romantic whose fascination with naval history evidenced his profound misapprehension of the dramatic changes unfolding in modern society. The German philosopher Carl Schmitt, for instance, dismisses Mahan’s figuration of sea power as a advocating for an antiquated mode of spatiality meant to “conserve an outdated aging tradition in an utterly new situation” (qtd. in Connery “Ideologies of Land and Sea” 192). As I show, the common critical tendency to focus on Mahan’s historical writings has elided analysis of the futurological orientation of much of his writing.

Although *The Influence of Sea Power on History* (1890) brought Mahan international acclaim, prompting a global turn towards navalism among aspiring imperial powers, Mahan’s literary reputation as a “prophet” was based not just on his writings on European naval history, or his service in the navy, but for his geo-strategic speculations on the future. Mahan, in fact, was a prominent voice as part of an era in which science fiction was emerging, and discourses on futurity were in vogue. Although his predictions were based on principles derived from naval history, his imaginings as a geo-strategists also required that Mahan venture into “the fantastic sphere familiarized to us by Mr. Edward Bellamy and others” (“Prospect and Retrospect” 14), that is, onto the imaginative terrain of the future and the generic
practices of science fiction. Not only does Mahan make mention to the futuristic, proto-science fictional writings of “Bellamy and others,” but he also likens his practice of “indulging in forecasts” (Prospect and Retrospect 14) about the future of world politics to the “fantastical” literature that was emerging at the time. This suggest not just the possibility that Mahan himself was a consumer of science fiction, and that his geo-strategic imagination was actively in dialogue with the genre as it came into formation.

Indeed, the connection between Mahan and science fiction is further apparent when we consider the historical context shared both by several of the fantastic canon’s most important works, along with Mahan’s navalist paradigm he called “sea power.” As described in his memoir, From Sail to Steam: Recollections on Naval Life (1907), the theory of sea power came to Mahan in a vision while a young sailor in 1870. Recalling the year both for its “marked and decisive influence on history,” as well as a “turning-point” (From Sail To Steam 264) in his own life as an officer in the United States Navy. Mahan points to two major political events of the year — the fall of the papal monarchy and the Franco-Prussian War (1879-1871) — as signaling not just as a transition of political power, but also the emergence of a new mode in the expression of power. Describing this shift in terms of an “impression which was transmitted rapidly through the world of European civilization, till in the Farther East it reached Japan,” Mahan posits a new “reign of organized and disciplined force,” an
emergent mode in the conception and conduct of war, whose “full effect and function
men in the future dimly discern” (*From Sail to Steam* 267).

Similarly, as I.F. Clarke has shown, the Franco-Prussian war also played a
pivotal role in the emergence of science fiction. He writes, “the period of 1870-1
represents a grand climacteric in international affairs and in the complex of the
popular notions about progress and evolution that are behind the emergence of the
tale of the future as a major literary device” (Clarke 51). We see a similar impact of
the post-1870 conjuncture within the history of science fiction’s emergence: both’s on
Jules Verne’s *20,000 Leagues Under the Seas* (1870) and on Chesney’s “The Battle of
Dorking” (1871) where written in response to the war. Although Verne’s Nemo is an
iconic anti-colonial, anti-nationalist icon, the author’s service in the French Coast
Guard during the war provides the context for Verne’s writing. Further, Chesney, an
officer in the British Army, exploited the outcome of the same war in his short story
for *Blackwood*, which foretells the imminent invasion of a ill-prepared England by an
ascendant Prussian Empire. With “The Battle of Dorking,” Chesney established the
future war as a recognizable form. Paradoxically, the very same war that inspired
Verne to write his transnational vision of Nemo and Nautilus also inspired the
emergence of the future-war form, suggesting how the utopian impulses associated
with science fiction were quickly co-opted within the context of a warring state
system.
Shrinking the Pacific

When we consider the history of science fiction in relation to Mahan’s imagination of futurity under sea power, we see that Mahan’s thought as a military-strategist was in synch with the genre as it was emerging. This is seen not just in Mahan’s allusions to major writers in the science fiction canon, from Bellamy, Verne, to Wells, but also the strategist’s profound intersection with writers of the yellow peril tradition — evidenced both in Mahan’s anxieties over the status of national and racial borders in a “shrinking Pacific,” as well as his depiction of “aliens” from Asia threatening to flood American territories.

In 1890, the same year that Mahan published *The Influence of Sea Power On History*, Mahan wrote an essay for *The Atlantic*, “The United States Looking Outward,” in which he predicted an “approaching change in the thoughts and policy of Americans as to their relations with the world outside their own borders” (“The United States Looking Outward”). The future as envisioned by Mahan at the opening of his writing career is one where “monsters of the deep” (“The United States Looking Outward”) would hold dominion over the seas, where battleships would direct the course of history by policing the sea lanes and deciding the fate of empires in decisive battle. Arguably, Mahan’s trope derives it meaning less from mid-nineteenth century works like Melville’s *Moby-Dick* than the science fictional rearticulations of the “sea monster” in the wake of Jule’s Verne’s *20,000 Leagues*
In his first of many futurological texts, Mahan argues for a national imagination “radically distinct” from past policy of international isolationism, asking whether U.S. interests overseas can be conceptualized as “exterior to our own borders” (“The United States Looking Outward”). Informed both by the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine, but also the great opportunity presented to the United States by trade and expansion, Mahan began the work of linking his historical studies of naval warfare with a future vision of how the United States could assert its place on the world stage — both by “looking outward,” but also by re-conceptualizing its notion of national borders beyond its “sea frontier.” Three years before Fredrick Jackson Turner, in “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” (1893) announced his much cited “frontier thesis,” effectively declaring the American frontier closed, Mahan was offering a vision of how the notion of frontier could be extended over the space of the sea through the mode of militarization he called sea power. In doing so, Mahan outlines a conception of borders no longer rooted in geography, but in the potentiality to impose national power in the world, irrespective of terrestrial demarcations.

Yet as Mahan looks outward, he sees a geo-political terrain in which imperial powers were competing for territorial possessions and resources. Commenting on the evolutionary stakes of rivalries enfolding over the Hawaiian and Samoan Islands,
Mahan writes: “all around us now is strife; ‘the struggle of life,’ ‘the race of life,’ are phrases so familiar that we do not feel their significance till we stop to think about them. Everywhere nation is arrayed against nation; our own no less than others” (“The United States Looking Outward”). We see the influence of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer in Mahan’s apprehension of the ubiquity of international rivalries over territories, a condition in which the “laws of nature” (“The United States Looking Outward”) dictate that only the strong are said to survive. As we see, Mahan assumes natural evolution and natural progress to be one and the same. Thus, the struggle between races over the territories of the world is also figured in temporal terms, as in a competitive “race” between nations. Wavering between optimistic postures regarding overseas expansion, with perilous apprehensions of the territorial struggles unfolding around him, Mahan’s first venture upon the “fantastic” terrain of the future establishes many of the central themes that he would develop over the course of career as the “prophet” of sea power.

As Mahan’s career progressed, and world politics evolved under his strategic influence, we see a shifting apprehension of global space and time as result of new sciences and technologies, a theme which further suggests his confluence with the science fiction imagination. Although far from a simple racist, Mahan’s perilous association of aliens can be read as a symptomatic of a crisis of territoriality in a shrinking world. Not surprisingly, Mahan deploys an oceanic tropology as a way of illustrating his case for sea power against “aliens,” but in contrast to the maritime
representation of the Pacific as a sublime immensity, Mahan’s geo-strategic apprehension images the Pacific as it were too small.

Here, we see the beginnings of an apprehension that Mahan would share with future-war writers who followed him: the sense that the ocean — and with it, the world — was shrinking. In 1897, as the United States looked to war with Spain and overseas expansion in Hawai‘i, Mahan began to articulate a vision of the future in an essay entitled, “A Twentieth Century Outlook” (1897). In the piece, Mahan explores the impact of innovations in maritime technologies on the relative sense of proximity in modern life: “The sea, now as always the great means of communication between nations, is traversed with a rapidity and a certainty that have minimized distances” (“A Twentieth Century Outlook”). With the connectivity afforded by the sea intensified as a result of technological progress, the world was being effectively shrunk, meaning that events overseas, once regarded as too distant for concern, “now happen at our doors and closely affect us” (Mahan “A Twentieth Century Outlook”).

Mahan’s apprehensions of a shifting sense of pace and proximity would have a profound impact as how he, as a geo-strategist, would conceptualize the world. He writes: “The vast increase in the rapidity of communication, has multiplied and strengthen the bonds knitting the interests of nations to one another, til the whole now forms an articulated system, not only of prodigious size and activity but of excessive sensitiveness, unequaled in former ages” (Retrospect and Prospect). We might think of Mahan’s notion of the world as an “articulated system” — a historical entity
“unequaled” both in its immensity and its intensity — as an early invocation of the historical formation we now call “globalization.” Thus, Mahan begins to articulate the shape of an emergent conjuncture marked by a new sense of global space-time, along with an “excessive sensitiveness” unknown in previous eras.

Sea Power and the “Alien” Peril

Counterbalancing Mahan’s optimism regarding an expansive American posture in the world is his increasing dis-ease over issues of race, immigration, and the status of the global color line. From Mahan’s apprehension, the shifting chronotopes of a globalizing world were also omens of future peril, for a shrinking world as meant that the divergent nations and races of the world into closer contact: “proximity…is a fruitful source of political friction, but proximity is the characteristic of the age” (147). Thus, Mahan’s future-outlook posits a paradoxical condition where increased contact between the peoples of the world is assumed to be a source of “political friction,” but also as an inevitability. It is within this shifting context that the “alien” becomes of a prominent figure within Mahan’s imagination of the future.

Mahan first cries peril against Chinese immigrants in Hawai‘i in the years before the U.S. overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, but soon redirects his apprehension towards Japanese immigrants in the wake of Japan’s imperial ascension. As Asada has argued, Mahan’s thought consistently “linked sea power in the Pacific to the problem of Japanese immigration” (Asada). For as Mahan believed, should the
U.S. “open the doors to immigration…all the west of the Rocky Mountains would become Japanese or Asiatic” (qtd. in Asada 18). In this respect, Mahan’s thought is symptomatic of the way in which “transnational migration became increasingly associated with international politics, as part of the development of a global order of competitive nation-states” (Ngai 11). From a literary perspective, it is revealing that Mahan imagined the association between sea power strategy and immigration through a trope of science fiction — the “alien.” Ultimately, Mahan relied on the figure of the “vast outside masses of aliens” (“Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion”) as a means to justify his vision of American sea power in the world. However paradoxical it may seem, sea power was conceptualized as a form of border policing against the supposed threat of “aliens.”

In Mahan’s metaphor, the “vast outside masses of aliens” are ascribed a range of spatial associations, each a harbinger of threat to the nation: “aliens” are figured as “vast,” that is, in terms of their physical immensity, but also their incompressibility; “aliens” are also posited as “masses,” that is, as multiple and multitudinous; but Mahan also tropes the “alien” as an element always on the “outside” of national and racial borders — that is, as a signifier for foreignness and alterity. Naturalizing an “instinctive shudder” shared by white men who face the threat of “alien” invasion, Mahan points to the perils of race war looming on the “horizon of the future,” and sea power as the only means to ward the flood of color. He writes:
Our Pacific slope, and the Pacific colonies of Great Britain, with an instinctive shudder have felt the threat, which able Europeans have seen in the teeming multitudes of central and northern Asia; while their overflow into the Pacific movement, which indeed may never come, but whose possibility, in existing conditions, looms large upon the horizon of the future, and against which the only barrier will be the warlike spirit of the representatives of civilization.

Whate'er betide, Sea Power will play in those days the leading part which it has in all history, and the United States by her geographical position must be one of the frontiers from which, as from a base of operations, the Sea Power of the civilized world will energize.

(“Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion”)

Mahan works through a series of oceanic metaphors in his depiction of the future, one extrapolated from his apprehension of “existing conditions” in the late-nineteenth century. Over the course of the passage, he constructs the territory west of the Rocky Mountains as a contested space of future war, assuming territorial demarcations at coastlines ineffectual in warding an “overflow into the Pacific movement.” Further, he adapts the orientalist trope of “the horde” into an oceanic figure of “multitudes” from Asia, “teeming” like the sea, threatening to flood onto British and American territory. His final oceanic metaphor conjures the sea in association with history, “whate’er betide,” as he plots the United States at the imperiled vanguard of “the civilized world,” and casts “Sea Power” in the “leading part” in the coming drama.
Decisive Battle Doctrine and the Ends of Future War

As the twentieth century neared, Mahan’s vision of peril grew more extreme, and conclusive. In the same year that Wells published *The War of the Worlds*, Mahan offers a similar vision of global war in his essay, “A Twentieth Century Outlook” (1897), yet he casts “Eastern civilization” in the role of “Martian” antagonists. Not only does he plot a coming contest between “Eastern” and “Western” civilization on a planetary scale, but he also declares that the matter will be “settled decisively.” Mahan writes:

> It appears to him that in the ebb and flow of human affairs, under those mysterious impulses the origin of which is sought by some in a personal Providence, by some in laws not yet fully understood, we stand at the opening of a period when the question is to be *settled decisively*, though the issue may be long delayed, whether Eastern or Western civilization is to dominate throughout the earth and to control its future.

(“A Twentieth Century Outlook”)

Moved by the influence of “mysterious impulses” that he cannot fully comprehend, Mahan assumes the third-person voice of a prophet, wavering between discourses of religion, or “Providence,” and natural science, or “laws not yet fully understood.” Leaving out questions of North and South, of regions and diasporas, of linguistic and cultural polyphony, of difference within national, regional, and local formations,
Mahan draws a hemispheric divide between “Eastern or Western civilization,” and declares his moment the “opening of a period when the question is to be settled decisively…whether Eastern or Western civilization is to dominate throughout the earth and to control its future.” Mahan’s future war is not just a racial or civilizational war, it is world war, one plotted as decisive in its impact on the future of the earth.

In his prediction of war between “Eastern” and “Western” civilizations, Mahan highlights another major point of intersection with future war science fiction, namely the logic of decisive battle and its relation to conventional narrative structure. Present throughout Mahan’s writings on sea power, the doctrine of “decisive battle” can be read as both a major principle guiding geo-strategic paradigms between naval powers, including the United States and Japan; but also, the logic of decisive battle can be understood as decidedly literary, that is, in fulfillment of the traditional requirements of narrative. In Mahan’s conception of future war at sea, naval fleets, concentrated around their battleships, would engage in decisive battle over control of the sea. Thus, naval war was promised to be relatively quick, yet also certain to deliver to a spectacle of global proportions. Figured with the language of Aristotelean “three-act structure,” we might say that the decisive battle — usually featuring a “super weapon” — is the final plot point (peripeteia) that turns future war narratives to their resolution.

Mahan’s “Twentieth Century Outlook” leaves it to the geo-strategists and writers of the future to fill in the details of his prediction; but in his grave forecast,
Mahan also leaves open a logical fallacy that will haunt science fiction writers, like Bywater and Heinlein, in the years following: this is seen, ironically, in the oceanic metaphor of “ebb and flow” from which the “decisive battle” is said to emerge. For if history is said to “ebb and flow,” and if “human affairs” exist in a state of perpetual flux, how can the question of global dominance — or even war itself — ever be “settled decisively?” I will leave the question of decisive resolutions in literature and war open for the time being.

Although orientalists like Lowell and Hearn initially apprehended the perceived hemispheric divide as inspiration for a universalized humanity, for Mahan, “East” and “West” mirror each other as future enemies in a future struggle for global dominance. As we see, the “War of the Worlds” paradigm became the dominant metaphor of the military-strategic imagination in the Pacific, following Mahan. Thus, the effect of orientalist “mirroring,” took on a militarized dimension.

**Homer Lea and the Future-History of War: The Valor of Ignorance**

Having explored Mahan’s connection to the emergence of science fiction, I now examine the way in which science fiction writers also wrote in dialogue with Mahan and his theories of geo-strategy. I examine The Valor of Ignorance, a future war narrative by Homer Lea. The Valor of Ignorance extends my analysis of “Asiatic representation” in science fiction of the pre-war years, offering another example of
how the figuration of “aliens” emerged as a response to the same territorial crisis apprehended by both the military strategic and science fiction traditions.

When yellow peril writers began to shift their apprehensions away from Chinese immigrants, to target Japanese immigrants, they did so both in response to emergence of the Japanese empire — particularly in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War — but also within the context of an ongoing controversies regarding the treatment of Japanese diasporic communities. This transition in anti-Asiatic future war writing began, as Rieder has noted, with John Henry Palmer’s The Invasion of New York, or How Hawaii was Annexed (1897). While Mahan pointed to the perils posed by China in his call for Hawai‘i’s annexation, Palmer uses the vision of an ascendant Japan, along with the popularity of discourses of “evolution and destiny” (Rieder), in his propagandizing for military invasion and annexation of the Hawaiian archipelago.

Within the specific genealogy of U.S.-Japan future wars, Palmer was followed by a string of texts a decade later that cried peril in response to Japan’s victory over Russia, including Ferdinand Grautoff’s Banzai (1908), Roy Norton’s The Vanishing Fleets (1908), and later Jack London’s Goliah (1910). Indeed, as part of an era characterized by the emergence of “mass journalism, mass literacy, and the mass emotions of extreme nationalism” (Clarke 57), where admirals and writers alike utilized burgeoning print capitalist markets hoping to sway opinion and policy, Lea’s The Valor of Ignorance circulated as part of a literary climate already saturated by
narratives of future war between the United States and Japan. Although primarily a self-fashioning “General,” the circulation history of The Valor of Ignorance, along with Lea’s influence on many of the most prominent military leaders and literati in the United States, Japan, and Republican China suggest him to be one of most significant “paper warriors” (Clarke) of his generation.

Frankenstein and Other Military Monsters

In many respects, we see that Lea’s vision was in deep consort with the ideas espoused by Mahan. Not only does Lea reference the Admiral’s writings in his text, but The Valor of Ignorance can also be read as a literal depiction of the national peril that Mahan predicted — with the apocalyptic image of the “Asiatic flood” taking form as Japanese soldiers overtaking the “Pacific Slope” of the United States. Lea’s future war is framed as a polemic against voices in American society who, lost in the “valor of ignorance,” deny the law of war governing the life of nations.

As with the military strategic tradition, Lea’s triumphalist rhetoric regarding the powers of militarized science is also concomitant with a shifting apprehension of space and time in the world, or as Lea writes, “man's inventive genius in the means of transportation and communication has reduced the size of the world” (95). As a result of this dramatic spatiotemporal shift, Lea declares a crisis, writing, “there are no longer oceans nor deserts nor abysses behind and beyond which nations of men can live secure” (95); rather, “the peoples of the whole world are now elbowed together
with all their racial antipathies and convergent ambitions to struggle and war” (95). Paradoxically, the perception of global shrinkage seemed to precipitate war on global proportions.

Lea illustrates this future-peril in his depiction of the growing ambition of the “samurai of Nippon,” having incorporated Western science and technology into their martial ways: “To such small space has science relegated this vast sea (the Pacific) that the fleets of Japan could be scattered over it and yet be as much under the control of the commanding admiral in Tokio as though they were a small fleet within the vision of his eye” (204). As with Mahan, Lea apprehends the way in which developments in science and technology have altered the apprehension of space and time, producing a precarious condition in which international struggle enfolds on an ever-shrinking terrain.

As with Mahan, Lea turns to both implicit and explicit allusions to the emergent science fiction canon as a way of figuring the conditions of future war, specifically, the “Vernian” trope of “sea monsters.” But more than just another science fictional exaltation of scientific and technological progress, Lea also inscribes a logic of racial competition in writing: “never have the gods of all the tribes put upon the seas such monsters as man now sends over them...” (213). In the era that Theodore Roosevelt’s sent the “Great White Fleet” overseas in display of American military splendor, Lea’s troping on the “sea-borne juggernauts” associates technological
advancement with white, Western civilizational ascension over the primitive “tribes,” but also over their “gods.”

Lea’s perilous generalizations also rely allusion to Shelley’s *Frankenstein: Or A Modern Prometheus* (1818). For just as technology can be seen as a precipitating a shrinking world, technology itself becomes a threat: for “the very machines that the ingenuity of man has contrived have become in themselves monstrous consumers. The inanimate has been given teeth and bowels and a hunger that knoweth not satiety” (Lea 105). Of course, the image of machines becoming “themselves monstrous consumers” suggests the ravages of modernity and of industrial capitalism; but Lea’s representation is interesting insofar as it links the mechanizations of an industrializing, globalizing world back to the “Frankenstein” creators who gave the “monsters” their life. That is, as “man and nations of men go on struggling even more madly and deliriously to gain new lands whither their engines may whistle and scream in Frankenstein delight,” so to is the “inanimate” given life by the interminable rhythms of industrialization and war, but also the masculinist “delight” of man’s ascension to the godly. Arguably, Lea’s depiction of men and monsters conjoined by “Frankenstein delight” suggests the way in which “the cult of technology very naturally transforms itself into the cult of nationalistic ideology (Tatsumi vi).”

More than a simply call for a standing army, *The Valor of Ignorance* is call for the permanent establishment of a “military system” (55) at the heart of American
national life, composed of professionalized soldiers “more scientifically trained than lawyers, doctors or engineers” (47). That is, Lea envisions a permanent armed forces charged with the utilization of all human knowledge in the service of the nation. As Lea writes, “to the science of war belongs, or is utilized in one way or another, every science and invention of mankind” (93). Although Lea’s time is devoid of phrases like the “military industrial complex,” in pointing society towards a hyper-technologized future organized under the imperatives of a military-state, Lea presents a future where the institutions, practices, and knowledges devoted to war making will achieve a logic that justifies itself.

Lea and the Alien Peril

As with Mahan, Lea calls for militarization not just in response to imperial Japan’s ascendency, but also in relation to the perception of threat posed by “aliens” already on U.S. territory. Thus, Lea’s final intersection with science fiction both foregrounds the contested nature of national, racial, and territorial borders, as well as foreshadows the “second front” of the Pacific War.

Although Lea was a friend to Chinese American publisher Ng Poon Chew, and active with efforts to promote modernization and democracy in China, Lea is nonetheless unequivocal in his opposition to citizenship or equal status for Asians as part of U.S. society. He writes, “what has occurred to the Chinese will and is now being done be directed against the Japanese” (180). Noting the rise of Anti-Japanese
(and Korean) associations from Seattle to Los Angeles in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, Lea posits that “Anti-Japanese sentiment…permeates the entire social and political fabric of the West” (182), a sentiment Lea shares.

Revealingly, Lea turns to the figure of the alien as a way to illustrate the “Asiatic problem” in its relation to American democracy, writing: “a republic all participate in the government, and it is only a question of numerical superiority for an element *alien in race, alien in aspiration, and alien to the spirit of the government* to completely supplant the race that founded the republic” (25 emphasis added). In this quote, Lea reveals another layer to his anti-Asian anxieties, one involving the question of democratic participation for non-whites in American life. Repeatedly, Lea deploys the “alien” signifier as a way to emphasises the inalienable foreignness of Japanese and other “Asiatics.” But revealingly, Lea identifies the porous nature of American democracy as the greatest threat to racial hierarchy.

Yet within the context of future war, we see that the “alien” also possesses a militarized dimension. Lea points to Hawai‘i and other West Coast states as sites where a silent invasion is already taking place, writing: “Japanese immigration into Hawai‘i has been political rather than economic” (248). In contrast to the “primarily economic themes” that Lye reads in early “Asiatic” representation, revealingly, Lea’s strategic apprehension posits Japanese immigration as primarily “political” in motivation — that is, as a tactic of future war. Citing population statistics focusing on Japanese males of military age, Lea targets the “90,123 Japanese male adults” (343)
who have crossed American borders since the late-nineteenth century as a monolithic threat. Furthermore, Lea suggests that the movements of Japanese across borders have been a careful orchestrated effort to insert soldiers of the Japanese Empire onto U.S. territory in preparation for war.

Lea’s peril is most pronounced in his depiction of Japanese presence in Hawai‘i, for he suggests that “the military occupation of Hawaii” was already “tentatively accomplished” at the time of his writing. Thus, upon the start of his future war, the “solitary American battalion” on Oahu, undermanned and ill-prepared, meet its doom at the hands of Japanese residents on the island; as Lea depicts: “Within twenty-four hours after a declaration of war the solitary American battalion that stands guard over these islands will disappear” (250-251).

**Perilous Circulations**

Although Lea has been subject to the “well-merited ridicule of informed critics (Bywater vi) for his depiction of the Japanese invasion of the West Coast, when tracing the international circulation of Lea’s text following its initial publication, we see the way in which future war circulation functioned across borders in the years leading to the Pacific War. Thus, there is one final reading we can develop involving the nature of “print capitalism” within a international context, that is, how Lea was re-interpreted and recirculated in Japan and the United States, both before, and after, the start of war.
Although *The Valor of Ignorance* had only one printing in the United States, selling just 18,000 copies (Luce xxx), Lea’s incredible “success” as an author in Japan is important, for it suggests some of the proleptic poetics of the future war form as it circulated as part of trans-Pacific literary and political discourse. *The Valor of Ignorance* was translated into Japanese just two years after its American publication by Ike Ukichi under the *Nichibei Senso* (The War Between the United States and Japan), selling 100,000 copies in the first month, and going through twenty-four printings. As described by its Japanese publisher, Hakubunkan, Lea’s narrative made for “Excellent reading matter for all Oriental men with red blood in their veins” (qtd. in Luce xxxi). If read in relation to a Japanese reading public, Lea’s text seems to encourage the martial aspirations of Japanese militarism by providing another future war fantasy of imperial conquest.

Not surprisingly, Lea also offered inspiration for Japan’s emergent future war (*Mirai senso*) writers: Miyazaki Ichiu’s *Nichi Bei Miraisen (The Future-War Between the United States and Japan)*, serialized in *Shonen Kurabu (Boy’s Club)* starting in 1922, credits Lea’s depiction of a Japanese invasion of the Philippines as source material for his own Philippines-based battle, but also reverses the military dynamics of the war by depicting an invasion by technologically advanced American military. As analyzed by Griffins, Lea’s text was influential for future war writers in Japan insofar as it “articulated a theoretical position that aligned precisely with how the world actually operated in their eyes” (“Militarizing Japan”). Miyazaki’s own
affirmation of martial values suggest a growing convergence, and even, dialogue across nationalist lines as part of a burgeoning global print market. Lea is also a major source for the writings of Sato Kojiro, a Japanese army general who turned to U.S.-Japan future war writing in his retirement, as I explore in the next chapter.

Furthermore, Lea can be read as influencing the thinking of American military leaders as they prepared for the exigencies of war, as well as a function in the role of a kind of “prophet” for Americans trying to reconcile the new realities of life as part of an enfolding world war, two points suggested by playwright, journalist, and politician, Clare Luce. Writing in her introduction to The Valor of Ignorance’s second (American) reprinting in 1942 — following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor — Luce reveals that she first learned of Homer Lea while dining with Douglas MacArthur’s staff during a visit to Manila in early October of 1941, who at the time were “racing against time” (x) to prepare for war with Japan. Although War Plan Orange is generally recognized as the governing strategy for U.S. Forces in anticipation for war with Japan, Luce suggests the way in which Lea’s fiction also influenced military leaders in their planning for future conflict. As Luce learned, Lea’s text had ascended to the status of “military gospel” (ix) for MacArthur and his staff, many of whom studied the text during their military training, as well as consulted Lea’s depiction of a Japanese invasion in the Philippines.

It is for that reason that Luce worked to bring Lea back into the public eye after Japan’s attack, suggesting the way in which early future wars in the Pacific
functioned as a primary reference point for prominent Americans when the war actually began. Although Luce admits Lea’s inability to anticipate the rise of “air power,” Luce nonetheless posits Lea’s narrative a kind of “prophecy-fulfilled.” Moreover, Luce embraces Lea’s naturalization of war — that “War and peace are forever indivisible” (xxxviii) — but also marshals his early twentieth century future war narrative in construction of a futurity beyond the present war with Japan. Luce ascribes Lea an unusual form of “shelf-life” in positing that “Lea wrote not in terms of decades but of centuries” (xxxv). Yet interestingly, Luce recasts the context of *The Valor of Ignorance*, not simply beyond the post-Russo-Japanese War era, but even beyond her present moment of 1942, beyond the Pacific War and the “multiple Armegeddons” (xv) confronting the United States at the time of her writing. Thus, “it is not as a gloomy forecast of defeat in 1942 that Lea should be read” (xv). Rather, Luce reads Lea as speaking of a future war after their present conflicts with Japan and Germany, that is, “as a still timely warning of the Trials to come after Victory” (xxxviii).

**Hector Bywater and *The Great Pacific War of 1931***

The next text I analyze is Hector Bywater’s *The Great Pacific War of 1931* (1925), another future war iteration that has been associated with prophetic discourses on the Pacific War. Not only did Bywater coin the term “Pacific War,” he is said to have “published a plan that accurately predicted the entire course of the Pacific
War” (Honan xxi). Writings on Bywater suggest that The Great Pacific War of 1931, written in response to the Washington Naval Conference of 1921, influenced the course of military strategy in both the U.S. and Japan; William Honan, Bywater’s biographer, cites both a dramatic revision in War Plan Orange in the years after the novel’s publication, as well as a possible influence on the strategic thinking of Japanese navalist Yamamoto Isoroku, who devised the plan for Japan’s attack at Pearl Harbor. Significantly, Bywater also reveals himself in dialogue Mahan and Lea, citing both writers (albeit in Lea’ case disparagingly), as sources for his version of the Pacific War. In this way, Bywater’s novel helps us further trace the genealogy of future war and the intersections of science fiction and military strategic thought into the 1920’s and beyond.

Like Lea, Bywater might be described as a “paper warrior” par excellence: born a British national, Bywater’s trans-Atlantic childhood and prominent family connections enabled a life and career in the United States as Naval correspondent for the New York Herald, the Baltimore Sun, and eventually the New York Times, including coverage of the Russo-Japanese War. Bywater also used his international experiences to work with British secret service against Germany, and actively dialogued within military-strategic circles. By the time of The Great Pacific War of 1931’s publication, Bywater was widely “recognized as the successor to Admiral Alfred Mahan as the world’s leading authority on naval theory and practice” (Honan xiv).
Bywater’s influence on Japanese navalist, Yamamoto Isoroku, is another significant element to his connection to the Pacific War. Yamamoto had studied Bywater’s writings while a student at the Naval War College in Japan, and the two eventually met and discussed naval strategy during Yamamoto’s tenure as a Naval Attache in Washington. Honan suggests that Yamamoto was so influenced by Bywater’s ideas that he modeled Japan’s war strategy in the vein of Bywater. Furthermore, Honan points to rumors about Bywater’s death, specifically speculations of journalist E.A. Harwood, that Yamamoto had Bywater assassinated in 1940 so as to deprive American and British forces of Bywater’s strategic mind. Although unsubstantiated as claims, as rumors, they are revealing insofar as they further stoke the mythologies of Bywater’s prophecy of the Pacific War (245-250). Yet, they also evidence the profound connection between science fiction and military-strategic thinking as the genre emerged.

But like other science fiction narratives of “prophetic vision,” it is as much the publication history of The Great Pacific War of 1931, as well as the propaganda campaign promoted by publishers and critical discourse, that have sustained this mythology around Bywater as the inventor of the “Pacific War.” For instance, although originally published in the 1925, the novel was reissued in 1942, with an alternative subtitle: a historic prophecy now being fulfilled. This “industry reading” of Bywater as a “prophet” was further solidified by subsequent reprints, in which the narrative is advertised as “The Incredible Book That Predicted Pearl Harbor,” the
version I read when I first encountered the novel. Thus, just as Lafcadio Hearn had sensed the way in which mass culture in Japan had aligned itself with its nation’s war effort, the history of Bywater’s book suggests a comparable dynamic in publishing in the United States.

**Bywater and the Invention of “Pacific War”**

Although Bywater’s significance as a writer who inhabited the intersections of science fiction and military strategy is undeniable, a close analysis of Bywater’s text, along with a consideration of its circulation as part of discourse on the Pacific War, reveals a more complicated picture of the novel’s impact, one dealing less with the prophetic features of the novel, and more with the proleptic features of the narrative. Furthermore, when we consider the discrepancies between Bywater’s depiction and the dominant historical narratives of the Pacific War, we see the way in which Bywater’s text further evidences the apprehension of territorial crisis in the Pacific, and also indexes the central function of aliens across the contested fronts of the Pacific War.

To begin, I consider the two claims for which Bywater’s “prophecy” is most frequently championed: that he invented the strategy of “island hopping,” and that he drew the blueprint for what became the Battle of Midway. Bywater develop his approach to Pacific strategy playing Fredrick Jane’s *Naval War Game*, and by reenacting famous naval battles with his self-made collection of model warships in
the Keston Pond near his family’s home in Bromley, England (Visions of Infamy 116). Created in 1899 as a means to educate players, from children to military officers, on the features of modern ships and their strategic usages, Jane’s Naval War Game was designed so as to “allow the working out of any particular tactical theories under conditions as nearly as possible resembling real war in miniature” (Visions of Infamy 116). With his personally-crafted fleet of intricate “toys,” Bywater also extrapolated on the course of future wars, and through this process devised the strategy of island hopping, one which would help the Americans win the war. The image of Bywater lording over his Pacific pond, plotting the course of future wars as if it were child’s play, suggests a continuity between his text and the tradition of Pacific War science fiction— for it illustrates the way in which the military-strategic imagination “shrank the Pacific” in its apprehension of future war.

Bywater framed his novel in part as a response to Franklin Delano Roosevelt and other contemporaries (like Sato, as we shall see in the next chapter) who denied the possibility of war with Japan due to the geographical barriers posed by the immensity of the Pacific. Bywater writes:

It is often averred that war between the United States and Japan is out of the question, if only because the respective fleets, divided as they are by thousands of miles of ocean…could never get sufficiently close to engage.

(v)
Again, like strategists and future war writers before him, Bywater apprehends the contingency of war with Japan in terms of a shifting sense of oceanic scale. Contrary to claims that the Pacific was far too large to make a naval war possible, as Bywater aims to illustrate, “means might still be found of establishing conflict between the main belligerent forces and thus forcing matters to a decisive issue” (v). That is, although the Pacific represented “an area the immensity of which has never been parallel in former wars” (98), it remained too small to keep rivals apart. As we see, Bywater is clearly working within a Mahanian paradigm of “decisive battle.” Bywater aims to deliver on Mahan’s earlier vision, and consider the implications of his future war experiment.

In the war that Bywater extrapolates, Japanese militarists, looking to redirect national attention away from a staggering economy, and fearful of the rise of civic unrest and growing communist sentiment, set their country on course for expansion and war with the United States, their primary competitor for domination in the Pacific. After launching an invasion of the Chinese mainland, Japan proceeds with a devastating first wave of assaults against U.S. forces in the region. After losing the Philippines, and an “alarming insurgency in the Hawaiian group,” the U.S. is able to regroup and launch a gradual counter-offensive, slowly retaking lost positions by pursing a series of naval, amphibious, and air assaults, that is, by using the various Pacific Islands as “stepping-stone(s).” Having intercepted Japanese communications detailing the location of the Japanese armada, the U.S. Navy is able to force a
“decisive battle” that destroys the Japanese fleet in what becomes known as the greatest naval battle in history, or The Great Pacific War of 1931.

Following Mahan’s doctrine, Bywater’s narrative assumed that a “decisive battle” would function to prove the naval superiority of one side and thus reestablish supremacy of the seas under one flag; thus, Bywater shows how decisive battle might be won, providing an arguably brilliant extrapolation from the “balance of power” established at the Washington Naval Conference; even Clarke posits that The Great Pacific War of 1931 “stands out as a worthy survivor” (139) within the tradition of future war literature in its realistic depiction of future warfare. If mapped onto the historical battles of the Pacific War, it would seem that Bywater both illustrates the theory of “island-hopping” and predicts the “Battle of Midway.” But if the Pacific War had followed “the script,” then the U.S. victory at Midway should have ended the war; when in fact, the Pacific War only intensified in the wake of the naval battle. Furthermore, Bywater plots his decisive battle on the island of Truk, rather than Midway (which is part of the Hawaiian chain of islands). When set alongside the battles fought during the war, we see that Bywater’s “prophecy” actually falls short of the “entire course.”

We also encounter instructive discrepancies when we consider the claim that Bywater “predicted Pearl Harbor.” Again, for all of the extrapolations that did prove accurate, an attack like the strike on Dec. 9 1941 was not one of them. Like Lea’s text, Bywater’s narrative functioned as something of a reference point in discourse.
following the Pearl Harbor strike; retired General Oba Yahei, writing in the *Nichi Nichi* newspaper, commented that the Pearl Harbor attack had exceeded the expectations of “even Hector Bywater” (qtd in Honan 274). This suggests both Bywater’s prominence in Japanese public discourse, but also that Bywater’s prediction at Pearl Harbor proved inaccurate.

If we examine the course of the war as Bywater imagined it, the Japanese “sneak attack” in Hawai‘i comes not by air or sea, but from the “aliens” already on the island. Although Bywater ridicules Lea for his depiction of a Japanese invasion of the West Coast, his depiction of an “alarming insurrection” (221) perpetuated by Japanese already living in Hawai‘i reveals that Bywater was in deep agreement with both Lea and Mahan’s thinking regarding the perils posed by “aliens” from Japan. In Bywater’s depiction, U.S. forces in Hawai‘i are overrun by the “thousands of able-bodied aliens with rifles...in a country which is at war with their own” (222). Like future war writers before him, Bywater adopts the trope of the “alien,” shifting Lea’s adjectival usage back to Mahan’s original conception of the “vast outside masses.” What Bywater clarifies is the military dimension through which the “alien” was conceptualized, as the “vast multitude” of Hawai‘i Japanese, “organized on military lines” (222), take control of downtown Oahu and Pearl Harbor.

Bywater adds context to his depiction by noting how the “the contingency that now developed (the ‘insurrection’) had been a source of anxiety to the authorities before the war” (221). Citing the long-standing “immigration controversy” (v) as a
prime concern in military and political circles, Bywater also makes mention of several plans that had been considered in the event of war, including a “concentration camp” on the island of Niihau, or “transferring the entire population en bloc to the United States” (221). Insofar as Bywater predicts that “it is only a question of time and opportunity before an explosion takes place” (221-222), it is clear that the author concurs with the military suspicion of “aliens.” Although the U.S. military eventually retakes Hawai‘i as part of its counter-offensive, the most lasting damage done is arguably to the image to the Japanese American as part of American society.

**Bywater on the Origins and Ends of the Pacific War**

If we look beyond Bywater’s false-prediction at Pearl Harbor, to the actual “origins” of the war as he depicts them, not only to we encounter further discrepancies between reality and fiction, we also see that the very breakdown of meaning itself may be a precipitating factor of war. Having established the Japanese as poised for war, Bywater offers them the opportunity they are looking for. Although the fact that Japanese militarists take the bait is not surprising, it is nonetheless revealing that the cause of the war, the event that precipitated the start of conflict, was not an actual attack on either side, but a piece of writing that circulated across the world. As Bywater narrates it:

> A New York paper stated, with an air of authority, that all American warships in the Atlantic had received urgent orders to pass through the Panama Canal
and join up with the Pacific Fleet at Hawai‘i, from whence the combined force would make a cruise to the Philippines. This report was instantly contradicted by the Navy department and an official communiqué but the mischief was done.

Here, Bywater highlights the unstable flow of (mis-)information across the Pacific, seen in the unexplained time lag between the news article’s publication, the instantaneous contradiction via official Navy department communiqué, and the choice on the part of Japanese leaders to leave the official denial unacknowledged for three days. Whether it was the stylistic “air of authority” with which the New York paper reported the order, or the semantic confusion between a few ships and a whole fleet, Japanese leaders already intent on war with the United States get the provocation they are looking for. In fact, as Bywater plots it, “the mischief” was actually at work on both sides: not only do the Japanese exploit the gaps between the message and its reception to justify their war plan, but as we later learn, the entirety of the American Atlantic fleet was actually on route to the Philippines in preparation for a defense of American territories.

While this plotting is revealing, it is not Bywater’s whole point: although Mahan would posit that “communications dominate war; broadly considered, they are the most important single element in strategy,” Bywater suggest the need to theorize “communications” not simply within the ranks of the military or government; rather, Bywater suggest the need to theorize the impact of a third element -- the impact of
print capitalist circulation on geo-politics. For his narrative reveals the fact that “truth” itself becomes the first casualty of war.

**Robert Heinlein and *The Day After Tomorrow*: From “Navy Man” to Science Fiction Writer**

The final text I analyze is Robert A. Heinlein’s *The Day After Tomorrow* (1941), a novel which brings my genealogy of future-Pacific War science fiction to the eve of war with Japan. Of all the author’s I discuss in this chapter, Heinlein is the most readily associated with canonical conceptions of science fiction in the United States. After all, Heinlein is the “Dean of Science Fiction,” both because of his preeminence as part of the genre’s post-war “Golden Age,” as well as for his efforts to raise science fiction writing to a higher level of popular and critical esteem as an early theorist of the genre. As assessed by Bruce Franklin, Heinlein is “certainly our most popular author of science fiction, easily the most controversial, and perhaps the most influential” (*Robert A Heinlein: America as Science Fiction* 3). Although not the typical future-Pacific War in so far as it features no ostensible naval combat, I show how Heinlein’s *The Day After Tomorrow* can be read as inheriting of many of the central themes in the archive of Pacific War science fiction, including the changing status of conceptions of nationalism, race, territoriality, and warfare. Finally, Heinlein allows us to trace the shifting representation of “Asiatics” within American science fiction writing, seen in his characterization of Franklin Roosevelt Mitsui.
Heinlein also further evidences the profound connections between science fiction and militarism, having trained as a naval officer at the institution founded in large part by Mahan. In this respect, Heinlein reveals many of the continuities between his mid-twentieth century moment and Mahan’s nineteenth century apprehensions; at the same time, the fact that Heinlein’s studies as a naval cadet involved not just the traditional maritime disciplines of sailing, navigation, sea power strategy and geopolitics, but also astronomy, engineering, aeronautics, and ballistics, suggests the changing nature of war (and fiction) during his time. Heinlein thus marks a post-Washington Naval Conference era in which air craft carriers, aerial bombers, long-range missiles and other “super weapons” — once the stuff of science fiction — were becoming realities of modern war.

After graduating the academy in 1929, Heinlein served in the navy for six years, first aboard the U.S.S. Lexington, the Navy’s first aircraft carrier, and then aboard the U.S.S. Roper. But after contracting tuberculosis, Heinlein had to leave the navy after just six years of service. And with the loss of his military life, he had to adjust to life as a civilian in the middle of the Great Depression. Heinlein’s first pursuit was politics in California, including participation in Upton Sinclair’s socialist End Poverty in California (EPIC) movement, and even a run for the state legislature as a Democrat.

We can read the specter of the “Pacific War” as it loomed over Heinlein, both in his naval education, as well as his science fiction, as he came of age. As a young
man, Heinlein recalled his grandfather warning him on the eve of World War I that conflict with Japan was coming (although, ironically, the U.S. and Japan were allied during the war). As a student at Annapolis, war with Japan was treated as an inevitability, and actively modeled as part of naval education.

The fact that Heinlein’s formative years coincided with the Gernsback codification in 1926, and with the proliferation of “pulp fiction” under the generic banner of science fiction, means that Heinlein, as an enthusiastic young reader, was immersed in an emergent tradition that continually deployed tropes of Yellow Peril in relation to the shifting terrain of geo-politics in Asia/Pacific.

By the end of the 1930’s, Heinlein turned to writing as way to make a living, and thus introduced himself to John Campbell, editor of Amazing Science Fiction, as a “fan of science fiction for 20 years” (Expanded Universe). By the start of the war, Heinlein had emerged as science fiction’s most popular author, in large part because of the publication of The Day After Tomorrow, which ran in the January, February, and March editions of Amazing Science Fiction Stories in 1941.

**Pan-Asian Invaders and the “Mixed Raced” Peril**

Within the future war paradigm, The Day After Tomorrow begins in the “post-Apocalypse” scenario, with a technologically advanced force of “Pan-Asian” invaders having overrun the United States and assumed control of the continent. All is lost save for a small group of scientists and soldiers hidden in the Colorado Rockies, who
believe they can take sub-atomic weaponry to the next level. Heinlein agreed to write
the novel at Campbell’s behest, based on an premise that the editor had been
developing throughout the late-1930’s. Thus, *The Day After Tomorrow* marks one of
their most intimate collaborations.

In his introduction to the novel’s first installment, in a editorial entitled
“Invention,” Campbell leaves little question as to the context and political stakes with
which the future war narrative engages: a conflict between “two totally alien cultures”
in which scientific invention will play a decisive part (6). Campbell’s editorial is
revealing insofar as it situates the novel in dialogue with the geo-political question of
how “to win a war,” that is, with the tropes of “alien” contact functioning in
constitutive relation with a discourse of “super weapons”: “any science-fiction addict
can assure you that the way to win a war is to invent a new weapon” (5).

But *The Day After Tomorrow* is more than a typical “super weapon” narrative.
Although Heinlein espoused a great variety of political and social views over the
course of his life, as Franklin has observed, *The Day After Tomorrow* is one of
Heinlein’s most blatantly racist works. Yet in his apprehensions of his enemy mirror,
Heinlein’s representation of race offers an angle to “what lies beneath” the science
fiction archive of the Pacific War (as I explore in the next chapter), but also the fate of
the “alien” within U.S. society.

On the most obvious level, we see the commonplace dehumanization of the
enemy through racial epithet, for instance, in the militarized syntax first deployed
against American Indians, soon to become mantra against “Japs” during the Pacific War: “A good PanAsian was a dead PanAsian” (25). But interestingly, Heinlein recalled working “to reslant it (the narrative) to remove racist aspects of the original story line” (Expanded Universe). That is, Heinlein viewed his task as having to “reslant” what he saw as the racist premise of Campbell’s future war. Patterson suggests that Heinlein chose to “shift” the representation of race “away from Victorian-era racial politics to emphasize cultural anthropology, psychology, and sociology” and “blur the racial lines in the story by including a Japanese-American among the good guys” (“Introduction”). Although such a creative choice can be read as highlighting the arbitrariness of racial borders, a closer look at the ambivalences and anxieties around issues of “mixed raced…American Asiatics,” including those fighting for the American resistance, suggests that Heinlein’s attempt to “reslant” the story may actually function to affirm the anxieties derived from late-nineteenth century racial divisions, even as he updates them into the language of futuristic sciences. Even more, Heinlein’s representation of race reveals an anticipation both of the political context of an “increasingly borderless world” in the mid-twentieth century, as Lye has explored, but also an interesting apprehension of the nature of his “mirror” as the war loomed on the Pacific horizon.

In Heinlein’s future, following a mutually imposed “Nonintercourse Act,” plotted around the time of Heinlein’s writing, East and West completely disengage, ending all immigration, communication, and commerce across the Pacific. If read as a
political allegory on the history of Heinlein’s moment, *The Day After Tomorrow* could easily be read as thematizing the histories and discourses on U.S.-Japan relations in the years prior, for as Heinlein writes, “the seeds of this (the war) are way back in the nineteenth century” (25). — that is, back to the arrival of Mathew Perry and his “Black Ships.” The “Nonintercourse Act” is reminiscent of the Tokugawa-imposed era of seclusion (*sakoku*), but also anti-Alien laws passed in the United States from the late-19th century until 1924, when the “National Origins Act” barred immigration from Asia entirely; in addition, the ascension of Pan-Asia could suggest memories of the first Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. Thus, Heinlein can be read as an extrapolating on earlier visions of Asiatic peril, but also in apprehension of actual discourses on “Pan-Asianism” espoused by Japanese imperialism under the banner of a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

But Heinlein goes even further than prior iterations of the Pacific War, beyond even Japanese imperialist rhetoric of the late-1930’s, through his depiction of a Pan-Asian Empire that grows by “amalgamating” (24) India, and then, eventually “digesting” (26) soviet Russia. As Heinlein writes: “as a result of the Nonintercourse Act we had our backs turned . . . leaving America to face a system even stranger to western ways of thinking than had been the Soviet system it displaced” (26). Although Heinlein is vague on the historical processes that produce twenty-first century Pan-Asianism, his depiction serves to emphasize both the alienness of the Pan-Asians, a people “even stranger” than the communists of Russia.
Interestingly, Heinlein codes the particular foreignness of “Pan-Asians” in terms of their racial, cultural, and political hybridity. The Pan-Asians are described as a “mixed race, strong, proud, and prolific” (26). Thus, Heinlein recasts the traditional dynamics of the yellow peril into the language of “race-mixing” by positing Pan-Asian racial and cultural hybridity in implicit contrast with white American racial purity. Echoing Jack London’s malthusian-inflected yellow perilism, Heinlein’s mid-twentieth century science fiction emphasizes the threat posed by the “prolificness” of Pan-Asian “intercourse.” Yet for Heinlein, this vision of a mongrelizing world is a source of anxiety and moral decay, producing a Pan-Asian people who possess none of the “virtues” of their former nationalities, and only the “vices” (26). Thus, Heinlein seems to affirm the nineteenth century belief that “race mixing” would lead to degeneration.

I argue that the Pan-Asian backstory can also be read as anticipating the coming of a borderless world insofar as it can be read as commenting on the futilities of Asian exclusion, or “non-intercourse,” as a geo-strategic paradigm between nations. Thus, we see the influence of writers like Lea, Bywater, and Mahan, and that Heinlein is in dialogue with the very themes, tropes, and problematics that the future war tradition in the Pacific had articulated — including the crisis of borders articulated through the figuration of “aliens” upon the terrain of future war.

Indeed, Heinlein may articulating an interesting kind of anxiety over the very strategic principles that he learned while in the Navy. For in his 1941 moment,
Heinlein envisions a future in which the two guiding principals of sea power strategy — “alien” exclusion and military build up in the Pacific — ultimately proved futile as a means to ward the Pan-Asian flood. Heinlein writes, “We met the Asiatic threat by the Nonintercourse Act and by big West coast defenses — so they came at us over the north pole!” (136). In other words, in spite of the “Non-intercourse” act, and the buttressing of the Pacific border, Pan-Asian invaders simply found another way — bypassing Pacific fortifications, along with traditional conceptions of naval strategy, altogether.

Furthermore, Heinlein calls to question Mahan’s doctrine of “decisive battle,” as suggested by the reference to the American resistance’s efforts to “defeat the PanAsians decisively” (136 emphasis added). Although “decisive war” is a core tenant of Mahan’s navalist philosophy, interestingly, Heinlein actually suggests that the logic of “decisive battle” may itself be the cause of America’s troubles: “We got into this jam by thinking that we could settle things once and for always…life is dynamic and can’t be made static” (136). Although Heinlein substitutes the terms, he nonetheless questions the Aristotelean logic of Mahan’s “decisive battle,” a central doctrine, as we have seen, that guided the imagination of the Pacific War and conventional literature alike.

With our consideration of the science fiction that foreshadowed the Pacific War, we have seen the apprehension of a globalizing world in the narratives of future war that represented the Pacific as if it were perilously small. Heinlein’s iteration is
interesting insofar as it updates the apprehension of territorial crisis within the changing conditions of his 1941 moment, specifically the sense of a borderless world that Lye foregrounds as the context for the production of the model minority in American literature. Arguably, Heinlein’s science fiction can be read in apprehension of this emergent sense of global space in the vision of a mixed raced, Pan Asian foe, as with his suggestion that the classic themes of Pacific War science fiction and military strategy were growing obsolete. In this way, Heinlein’s text can be read in apprehension of “the sense of an increasingly borderless world,” a condition which, in Lye’s analysis, “pointed to the waning possibilities of imagining complete alien exclusion” (200). Thus, Heinlein foreshadows an increasingly inclusive posture of the United States towards Asians.

But there is another reading that is also possible: which is that while Heinlein’s representation of the “Pan-Asian” empire can read as a phantasmagoria of the worst fears articulated within the yellow peril imagination, it can also be read as a “realistic” geo-political extrapolation, or future-mirroring, of the Japanese Empire’s rhetoric of inclusivity within the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Read within the context of Heinlein’s military background, the author knows his future enemy in the Pacific War and can be read as mirroring the enemy’s ideology in his future extrapolation. While such a possibility may jar dominant narratives of racial history in the Pacific, in contrast to ideologies that the Japanese have always believed themselves to be a “pure race,” as Oguma and others have shown, imperialist...
discourse in the “Great Japanese Empire,” however contradictorily, was based on a “mixed nation” ideology, meaning that the Japanese were a racially and cultural heterogenous people who has long assimilated “aliens” into the “Japanese National Family.” Thus, in retrospect, Heinlein apprehensions may offer a clue into “what lies beneath” the history of transpacific racial form in Pacific War science fiction, as I explore in the next chapter.

From “Alien” to “American Asiatic”

For my purposes here, however, it is enough to posit a dual context -- of globalizing desires from within the United States, but also the necessary strategic mirroring of the “Pan-Asian” enemy -- which will allow us to contextualize Heinlein’s choice to include a “Japanese-American as one of the good guys” (“Introduction”). However ambivalently, The Day After Tomorrow does mark a major shift in American science fiction in that a Japanese American (who is also a Asian/Hawaiian/American) is for the first time positioned in a role other than “enemy-alien.”

As Heinlein writes, “Franklin Roosevelt Mitsui was as American as Will Rogers, and much more American than that English aristocrat, George Washington” (27). In contrast to the trope of “Japanese-as-aliens,” that is, as always aligned with the enemy, Frank Mitsui is in possession of an American-style, post-Asiatic individuality, along with a backstory that reads like a multi-cultural “American Dream.” Mitsui descends from multiple generations of intermarriage
between Japanese, Chinese, Hawaiian, and white Americans: his Japanese grandfather and Chinese-Hawaiian grandmother met in Hawai‘i, and later moved to Los Angeles where they raised “little yellow children that knew neither Chinese nor Japanese, nor cared” (27); his family history also involves the seeming inclusion at prominent American institutions, for instance, the University of Southern California, where Frank’s father met his Chinese American but “mostly white” mother; Mitsui’s backstory also involves the seeming full-participation of Frank and his family in the American way of life, including land ownership and family-run nurseries and farms. Before the war, in fact, Frank himself was the “boss” of a successful family-owned farm in California, and was busy raising a “swarm of brown kids” with his “brown” wife. In this respect, Mitsui seems the very “model economic character” (11) that Lye reads in the emergence of post-Asiatic model minority.

But Frank Mitsui also represents something more than a typical “Japanese-American.” For as a descendant of a “wahini,” or native-Hawaiian, grandmother, along with Chinese and white Americans, Mitsui can be read as a science fictional version of the Pan-Pacific Hapa, perhaps even a post-war foreshadowing of James Michener’s figure of the “Golden Man,” said to herald the future in a U.S.-led Pacific. Yet ambivalently, Mitsui, as a racial associated with hybridity, is also an embodiment of the “Pan-Asian” enemy.

Although “mixed race” Asian American characters are commonly represented as a “face” of the post-racial future, as a subject of science fiction, Mitsui is actually
depicted as a man without a future, or as Heinlein writes, “Frank was damned two ways: there was no hope for him” (28-29). As a man who as “as American as Will Rogers,” Mitsui represents a way of life that is antithetical to Pan-Asian civilization. Thus, in Heinlein’s plotting, “the empire has no use for American Asiatics…with a cold logic they where being hunted down and killed” (28). Mitsui witnesses his wife and children killed by the Pan-Asians, and joins the American resistance to avenge their deaths.

While this aligns Mitsui with the American cause, as an “American Asiatic,” Mitsui is not a free or equal subject within the American “Citidel.” Rather, Mitsui is the subject of suspicion, regulation, interrogation, monitoring, and medication. Although multiracial, and in possession of white relatives, his “yellow” phenotypical features function to mark him in opposition to white, and thus as an object of suspicious and antagonism for his fellow soldiers.

Part of Mitsui’s reversal of fortune is facilitated by Jeff Thomas, who worked as a field hand on Frank’s family farm before the war. But Thomas becomes Mitsui’s superior within the military. While Thomas initially vouches for his former boss upon Mitsui’s arrival, later in the novel, Thomas becomes the facilitator of Mitsui’s alienation, as he encourages his superiors to continue their “truth serum” induced interrogation by suggesting that the man he knew for years “might be a ringer” (84) for the Pan-Asian empire.
It is important to note that Mitsui’s background as a farmer and land-owner suggests a connection to 1930’s discourses on the “Japanese problem” in California, a time in which Heinlein himself worked in California state politics. Although set in the future, the most revealing connection between the novel’s future context and the social context in which Heinlein writes is the fact that American society seemed to be going through a depression before the “Pan-Asians” invaded. His American resistance is composed of soldiers and scientists, but also former migratory workers, field hands like Thomas, whites who lived in “hobo jungles” (24) and endured the hardships of poverty. That Heinlein plots Mitsui’s reversal at the hands of a former employee suggests an element of class struggle underpinning the novel’s conception of racial war.

Test Subject

At first, Frank works for the American cause in a non-combative role, doing clerical duties and running the kitchen as Ardmore and Calhoun — a soldier and a scientist, respectively — collaborate with a small team of scientists working to devise a weapon and military plan. Yet as the narrative develops, we see that Mitsui becomes more than just an object of military suspicion — he becomes an object of scientific experimentation. Frank’s fate is ultimately tied to the “super weapon” around which the narrative is organized, and the exigencies of the military body charged with defeating the Pan-Asians. As we learn, the American scientists have developed a new
device based on a science fictional premise adapted from Einstein’s “general field theory.” In a future where atomic bombs are just the beginning of sub-atomic militarization, American scientists have achieved a level of “atomic control” (Campbell 5) that promises to revolutionize modern technology and change the direction of the war.

Based on the fictional premise of divergent sub-atomic “frequencies” dividing the races of the world, the American resistance develops a new weapon: “they can tune it to discriminate by races, knock over all the Asiatics in a group and not touch the white men, and vice versa” (35). Commenting on the novel’s production, Heinlein recalled the problem that he “didn’t really believe the pseudoscientific rationale” of Campbell’s racial weapon, so he “worked especially hard to make it sound realistic” (Expanded Universe). If so, the realism of the narrative is arguably established at the expense of Mitsui, for as the weapon develops from the theories of scientists, or “just on paper so far” (34), to a real weapon able to defeat the Pan-Asians, it does so because American military scientists are able to “test it on Mitsui” (35). Although Heinlein leaves the pain and terrors endured by Mitsui largely offstage within the novel, as the only American with “Mongolian blood” (34) in the military, the cost of national belonging is his submission to “test experimentation” (34) so that the super-weapon can be realized.

Frank Mitsui survives his ordeal, but in the process he also marks the passage of the Japanese-as-alien to a Japanese American-as-model minority by serving as a
test subject for the American war cause. This suggests that, for Japanese Americans like Mitsui — whose closest historical counterpart would be the Nisei — the conditions of Asian American emergence as a “legitimate ethnic identity” (Lye 203) are fraught by the logic of military exigency, in which an “American Asiatic” like Frank Mitsui must become a subject for testing and experimentation so that the U.S. might win the war. For although a notion like “Japanese American-as-test-subject” may seem a dramatic departure from the “alien” representation depicted in earlier Pacific War iterations, when considered as a trope of science fiction, it is, in fact, a continuity. For just as the “alien,” upon first contact, often becomes the “test subject” of cutting-edge science, the trope of the “alien-as-test-subject” can be read as an allegory on the fate of Japanese American communities upon the start of war, as West Coast populations were incarcerated, and the model minority was forcibly modeled through a logic of testing, assimilation, and coerced diasporization as “projectiles of democracy” (James 62).

It is, of course, a cruel irony that Heinlein would choose as the proto-Japanese American’s namesake the man who would soon be signing Executive Order 9066. In the aftermath of Roosevelt’s order, Japanese communities on the west coast, regardless of citizenship status, were declared “enemy-aliens” subject to removal, and thus became the sole target in the “home front” of the Pacific War. Yet, “paradoxically, the suspension of the civil rights of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent occasioned the concerted production of the unassimilable alien as a model
American” (Lye 200). Further, through military service and as translators, Japanese Americans were to serve as “special agents of Americanization…as middlemen useful to U.S. geopolitical interests” (Lye 200). Thus, the internment can be read as an effort on the part of the U.S. Government, as Brian Hayashi has suggested, to “democratize the enemy,” meaning not just the assimilation of the “alien” into American life, but also the preparation of a strategy for the post-war occupation of Japan, in which Japanese Americans were to serve as facilitators for democratization in Japan and Asia. Although a far milder form of racial experimentation than imagined by Heinlein, this form of “concerted production” (Lye 200) meant that Japanese Americans were arguably subject, while incarcerated, to a kind of testing: testing in the form of loyalty questionnaires, testing as informants for social scientists, testing in the imperative to prove their loyalties on the battlefields of Europe and the Pacific, testing in their post-war charge to be “model minorities,” and beyond.

Whereas American naturalism prefigured a borderless world through the promotion of “model economic characters” (Lye 11) of the Pacific Rim, the roots of the “model minority” in science fiction trace a graver genealogy for the emergent-Japanese American, or for that matter, perhaps even the multiracial Asia/Pacific/American under a globalizing U.S. empire. Although we see evidence of the inseparability of race and class (not to mention gender and sexuality) in Heinlein’s contradictory representation of future war, Heinlein’s conception of the “American Asiatic” as a “test subject” is not reducible to a discourse of Asian Americans as
“model economic subjects” (Lye 11). Indeed, in an era where Asian American cultural identity is said to be divided between the binaries of “good subjects” and “bad subjects,” the science fictional trope of “test subject” may offer a different conceptualization on the history of the “model minority” — a stereotype based not just on economic success, but also, ironically, academic aptitude.

For as test subjects, we remain rooted in the textual and material conditions of the internment, as well as the intersections of science fiction and war as the conditions through which “legitimate ethnic identities and the U.S. nation-form were now hegemonically aligned” (Lye 203). In this respect, the image of Frank Mitsui, the “test subject” of American radioactive weaponry, suggests science fiction to be functioning as a grave form of foreshadowing for both the “Golden Men” of the Pacific Rim and the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki alike.

**Coda: Science Fiction on the Eve of War**

Although Heinlein’s writing, military service, and influence on the science fiction world evidences a long and continuing intersection between the literary genre and modes and ideologies of militarization, it remains equally true that Heinlein’s life and writing “embodies the contradictions that have been developing in our society ever since the Depression flowed into the Second World War” (Franklin) — a fact seen in his treatment of the “alien-as-test-subject.”

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Importantly, Heinlein leaves future readers with a note of caution, as well as a final contradiction, seen in the crisis of command which emerges from within the American resistance, even as the Americans attain their victory with their racial “super-weapon.” Taking an advantage of a loophole of religious tolerance in the Pan-Asian occupation strategy, the resistance creates a new religion said to worship the “super colossal god Mota” — the god of white men. Armed with the power of “Mota” (read ananymically as Atom), the military coordinates via “temples” run by “priests,” and Heinlein’s resistance wins by enacting an elaborate charade designed to both demoralize but ultimately destroy the Pan-Asian occupation. As with his anxious apprehension of a multiracial future, Heinlein’s fantasy of a racial religion comprised of pious brethren suggests the anxieties and ambiguities of a globalizing moment characterized by the inevitable erosion of whiteness as a stable category of national identification.

Although it is telling that Heinlein seems to re-entrench in race and fortify white masculine American identity in apprehension of a borderless, mongrelized world, what may be more revealing is the transformation of the scientist, Calhoun, as a result of his military command: for Calhoun comes to believe that he himself is the fictional god “Mota,” and proposes that post-war America abandon its democracy in favor of a military dictatorship. Some have suggested that Heinlein was attempting to parody his editor Campbell in his depiction of the the colonel’s mental demise. While this may be true, it may be even more suggestive to consider whether or not
Calhoun’s religious madness may be an incarnation of the “prophet” of sea power, Mahan, who as a figure can be read as haunting Heinlein’s early writings.

In the end, it is Frank Mitsui who saves the day, stopping Calhoun and saving America from a post-democratic future — even as it costs Mitsui his life. The fact that Heinlein gestures towards a future world in which “test subjects” will play a decisive role is undoubtably a harbinger of contradictory times to come. Yet in addition, it may also be a sign of a critical apprehension emerging from within science fiction of the Pacific War, as I explore in the following chapters.
Chapter 3

What Lies Beneath¹⁵:

Japanese Literary Modernity, Transpacific Racial Form, and the Science Fictions of “Nation” Across Shifting Seas

This chapter examines the global emergence of science fiction in relation to the crisis of territoriality precipitated by the expansion of “Japan” in the modern period, an expansion that ended as a result of war Japan’s war with the United States. By considering the emergence of science fiction in Japan in its relation to its transpacific mirror, I explore the way in which science fiction has functioned, as in the U.S. case, as a mode by which Japanese literature negotiated with the “outer limits” (Morris-Suzuki “Rethinking ‘Japan’: Frontiers and Minorities in Modern Japan” 3) of the nation, whether in the context of Japanese imperialism at sea, the representation of Japanese diasporic communities abroad, the “post-racial” dream of the “Great Japanese Empire,” or under the U.S.-led post-war “Pacific Rim.”

My analysis of Japanese science fiction explores the way in which the literary genre, since its emergence in the late-nineteenth century, has continued to register the contestations around the shifting borders which have defined Japan as a modern nation. Thus, I read science fiction in Japan as an index for what Teresa Morris-

¹⁵ I borrow this phrasing from Charles Olson’s study of Melville’s Moby-Dick, *Call Me Ishmael.* (San Francisco Calif.: City Lights Books, 1947).
Suzuki has described in terms of the shifting territorial demarcations which have defined “Japan” over time, or as she writes:

We could see “Japan” as the name that is given to one part of a very long chain of islands, extending from Sakhalin and Kamchatka in the north towards the Philippines in the south…the outer limits of that section of that long chain of islands defined as ‘Japan’ have changed over time.

(“Rethinking ‘Japan’: Frontiers and Minorities in Modern Japan” 3)

Morris-Suzuki’s framework suggests that “Japan” can be read as the name of a particular kind of territorial crisis, or in oceanic terms, that the status of the nation’s borders have been historically fluid.

In modern times, the expansion and contraction of Japan’s borders are rooted in Japanese imperialism, in Japan’s pursuit for Asia/Pacific domination, but also in Japan’s total defeat in the Pacific War. While “the historiography of Japan imperialism has to date been concerned almost exclusively with terra firma” (Tsutsui 22), a critical emphasis on the oceanic nature of the Japanese empire reveals that, as Japan’s borders expanded in the modern period to include “alien” peoples in new colonial territories, discourses on Japanese identity also reflected the geo-strategic necessities of an aspiring global empire in ways that may be surprising considering the contemporary myth of Japanese homogeneity.

As I explore, part of the great confusions created by the emergence of the “Great Japanese Empire,” namely the believe that Japanese in the western hemisphere
were automatically “enemy-aliens,” can be assessed if approached from the literary paradigm suggested by Anderson’s “print capitalism.” I trace the circulations of the texts and tropes of science fiction as they emerged as part of Japan’s print capitalist modernity. From the first translations of 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea, to imperialist appropriations Verne’s oceanic premise, to the tradition of Nichibei Miraisen (Japanese-American Future War) narratives written Japanese military strategists in response to their American “mirrors,” to the prominent representation of the “Japanese diaspora” during the pre and post-war years, I explore the implications of the fact that Japanese science fiction evidences, and to a degree, substantiates the pervasive suspicion of “aliens” in American writing.

While rooted in the premise of Japanese modernity, the emergence of science fiction in Japan, as with the discrepant histories of the “Great Japanese Empire,” cannot be understood in isolation from the emergence of science fiction in the larger world, or from Japan’s apprehensions and misapprehension of the United States. While Japanese writers consistently imagined a future in which Japan would fight against the United States, they also imagined that future in dialogue with their transpacific counterparts. The language of the science fiction future, paradoxically, offered a common language that enabled Japanese writers a means of engaging their counterparts in America across international literary markets.

As a result, I argue that we can analyze some of the ways in which the “monster” fashioned itself in apprehension, and misapprehension, of its “mirror”
during the pre-Pacific War years. While contemporary myths of national homogeneity emphasize the racial purity of the Japanese people over history, I consider the global implications of the Japanese Empire’s failed attempts to achieve a “postcolonial, multiethnic nation-state and empire” (Fujitani) by imagining the history and future of the Japan as a “mixed nation” (Oguma). While the idea that the “Great Japanese Empire” could have attempted to fashion a heterogenous empire may seem counterintuitive considering contemporary remembrances of the war, we will recall that this is precisely the apprehensions of Robert Heinlein, who represented Japan as a future empire of “mixed raced Pan-Asians” in his 1941 future war, *The Day After Tomorrow*.

In this chapter, I pick up that clue by exploring the transnational implications of the emergence of science fiction in Japan from the late-nineteenth century by reading the genre in synch with a “mixed nation” discourse that sought to imagine the expansion of the Japanese Empire in terms of a history of hybrid raciality, and of a future destiny to assimilate the “aliens” of the world into the “national family” (*kokutai*). I therefore consider the implications of what Tak Fujitani has called the “Japanese Empire’s strategic disavowal of racism” (Fujitani), not because modern Japan ever came close to the dream of a “post-racial world order,” but because its epic failures can also be read as a commentary on the fraught racial history of its mirror, and may therefore suggest a submerged history of transpacific racial form that we have only begun to understand.
Borderland Japan and the Order of Columbus

When Japanese writers incorporated the emergent conventions of science fiction into the nation’s literary vocabulary, they did so aware of the unique positionally associated with their archipelagic nation, one in which Japan was already posited as a kind of science fiction. This is suggested by Abe Kobo in the inaugural issue of SF Magazine (SF Magajin) in 1960, in which he celebrated the emergence of “SF” by declaring that “the science fiction novel (in Japan) represents a discovery on the order of Columbus” (qtd. in Bolton 340). A year after publishing Inter Ice Age 4 (1959) — generally considered the first “SF” novel in Japan — Abe likens the emergence of the science fiction novel to Columbus’ “discovery” of the “new world.” Abe posit the impulse to science fiction as emerging from the “poetry produced by the collision of an extremely rational hypothesis with the irrational passion of fantasy” (qdt. in Bolton 340). In other words, Abe suggests that science fiction is a borderland genre — a space of hybridizing tension between the “rational” and the “irrational,” the known and the unknown, even between fiction and poetry. For Abe, science fiction, as fiction, was a space of “dialogical” experimentation, as Bolton’s Bakhtinian analysis of Abe has demonstrated.

But if we look beyond Abe’s theory in the abstract, and register the context of Japan’s post-war literary world, we can infer from Abe’s reference to the “discovery” of Columbus something of a historical framing for the genre’s arrival in Japan, one
which, as we shall see, dates back to the Meiji Restoration (1880-1912) and the emergence of Japanese modernity. Not only does Abe suggest the sea to be a prime topos within the genre’s history, he may also be suggesting a unique kind of positionally for Japan in relation to the history of the genre.

As Abe is aware, science fiction was emerging in Japan well before the post-war “discovery” of the science fiction novel and the inauguration of magazine’s dedicated to “SF.” Yet through his reference to Columbus, Abe suggest that science fiction, along with western modernity, has long relied on a mythology of “Japan” as an object associated with “the East,” the implications of which Japanese intellectuals grappled with as it imagined Japanese modernity.

In the wake of Perry’s forced “opening” of Japan in 1854, national discourse in Japan came to utilize the spatial category of “bunmei no iki,” meaning the “region or borderland of civilization” (Howland 8), as a way of articulating Japan’s relative position within the larger world. In other words, the “spatial expression iki” (Howland 8) designated that Japan was located at the “borderland on its way to becoming westernized space” (Howland 8) and thus behind Western nations in terms of its developmental “stage or level of civilization” (Howland 8). Although the notion of Japan as an “iki” nation also resonated in terms of Japan’s historic relation to China, that is, with Japan at the edge of a China-centric world, after Perry’s arrival, “the West” came to signify the world’s center, and western notions of historical progress the global standard of international and interracial comparison.
Indeed, this is the very positionally suggested for Japan within the narrative tradition “on the order of Columbus.” Abe’s allusion to the Italian explorer suggests that science fiction is historically rooted in the “Age of Discovery,” that is, the history of maritime travel, “first contact,” and the rise of “the West” as a cultural and political center of the world. At the same time, although Columbus’ “discovery” of the “New World” is generally narrated in relation to a Euro-American conception of world history, Abe’s reference reminds us that the intent of Columbus’ journey was to find a route of Asia and to the “noble island” that Marco Polo had called “Chipangu,” a place that was said to be “most fertile in gold, pearls, and precious stones” (9).

Although the vision of “Chipangu” that lured Columbus to the sea was clearly more fiction than fact, the myth of the “Japan” has been figured prominently both within western maritime literatures as well as proto-science fiction alike. For instance, the plot of Jonathan Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels* (1726), a novel celebrated for its proto-science fictional elements, includes journeys to fantastical lands and encounters with humanoid creatures; but tellingly, Swift plots Gulliver’s oceanic journey not just to fictional lands like “Laputa, Balnibarbi, Luggnagg, and Glubbdubdrib,” but to “Laputa, Balnibarbi, Luggnagg, and Glubbdubdrib, and Japan” (emphasis added). Similarly, Herman Melville, in *Moby-Dick* (1851), relies on a quasi-science fictional image of “float milky-ways of coral isles, and low-lying, endless, unknown Archipelagoes, and impenetrable Japans” in his depiction of the Pacific as the “tide beating heart of the earth” (367). Further, the “Japan seas” (102) are also prominent in
Verne’s *Twentieth Thousand Leagues Under the Sea*. In a way, the emergence of science fiction always included Japan as an entity at the borderlands, sometimes as a narrative telos, sometimes as a multiplicity (as suggested by Melville and Verne’s pluralizations, “Japans” and “Japan seas”), but always ambivalently, and at the edge of known space. While the emergence of science fiction in Japan cannot be understood in isolation from the science fiction of the West, Abe’s reference reminds us that the science fiction of the West has also imagined itself vis-a-vis a myth of “Japan.”

**Japanese Modernity and the Emergence of Science Fiction**

While the inauguration of the first post-war magazines specifically devoted to science fiction, *Hiyakawa’s SF*, *Uchujin* (Cosmic Dust), and *SF Magajin* are an important period in the emergence of the genre, as Yokota Juya has shown, “the history of Japanese SF is surprisingly old, and doesn’t lag behind the overseas SF in advanced countries” (295 my translation). Yokota’s project as an early anthologist and critic of Japan’s SF tradition seeks to counter critical assessments that reduce Japanese science fiction to an inheritance from “overseas Anglo-American-centric SF” (*beiei chushin no kaigai SF* my translation 295). In addition to premodern narratives that contain science fictional elements — from the Urashima Taro (see ch. 4) to the Kaguya-hime story³ — the emergence of science fiction is evidenced in modern Japanese literature from the Meiji Era on.
While Yokota’s concerns are understandable, and while Japan’s premodern narrative tradition does, like many world traditions, offer important examples of proto-science fiction, insofar as we must understand science fiction as rooted in the project of Japanese modernity, ultimately, we must understand the way in which Japanese writers who experimented with science fiction were always in dialogue with writers of other countries. Science fiction emerged in Japan through processes of translation, adaptation, and appropriation of the texts, tropes, and forms of the emergent genre; Japan’s print capitalist markets — one of modernity’s most prolific — facilitated the emergence of the genre in response to the political and cultural conditions and aspirations of modern Japan. That is, science fiction offered as a language to figure the contours of Japanese nationalism and modern notions of futurity. As a result, the genre functioned as a space of negotiation and transformation for “the imagined community.”

With the Meiji Restoration in 1880, a “sea change” occurred, both in the Japan’s geo-spatial orientation, but also in the nature of Japanese national identity. We can trace this trajectory across the importation, and adaptation, of emergent science fiction in the West, a literature which resonated with the profound changes that were happening in modernizing Japan. As described by I.F. Clarke, “The new literature of the future was the imaginative and adaptive response of a society that had learned to think in terms of origins, growth, and evolutionary advances” (48). It should not be surprising, then, that science fictional narratives were a prominent feature of
discourses on Japanese modernity, which was conceptualized by Meiji oligarchs in terms of the scientific and military pursuit of “civilization and enlightenment” (bunmei kaika) on par with Western nations.

Although the “origins” of modern Japanese literature are generally ascribed to Tsubouchi Shoyo’s theory of “The Modern Novel” (1880) — which set the literary standard of modern Japanese literature in alignment with Emile Zola’s theory of naturalism — Japan’s modern literary tradition also possesses its own historical engagement with the seminal texts and prominent themes of science fiction, again from France, starting with Inoue Tsutomu’s translation of Jules Verne’s 20 Leagues Under the Seas (Kaitei Nimanryū) in 1884. The translation and subsequent adaptations of Verne’s premise of Nemo and the Nautilus are significant, for Verne’s ground breaking novel gave Japanese readers a vision of how the outside world was imagining the problems, dangers, but also the possibilities being anticipated by the new “literature of the future” (Clarke 48) as it was beginning to emerge.

Of course, Verne’s novel is about the figure of Nemo, the “post-colonial captain” who hates all nations. But geopolitically, the novel features the topography of the Pacific and anticipates an ascendant America in the world, featuring a U.S. Navy that steams across the Pacific in the hunt for the “sea monster.” Thus, 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea also provided Japanese writers a narrative that resonated with the context of modernizing Japan, one which they could adapt in the service of the nation’s imperial imaginary. As we shall see, the emergence of science fiction in
Japan ultimately provides another example of how the transnational aspirations unleashed by Verne’s narrative were easily coopted into the system of warring states and the imperialist ambitions of a single nation. The trope of a nautilus-like super-submarine, along with the figure of the charismatic captain, became the defining narrative of the most popular (proto-) science fiction written in Japan from 1890 on, as many scholars have observed.

Yet these works, which also include future wars written by Japan’s own military leaders, also enact the contradictions of suggested within Verne’s novel. Insofar as the tradition of “Japanese Nemos” attest to the Japanese Empire’s sensitivity to the subordinated racial position of Japanese in the world, in a way, Verne’s narrative can be read as inspiring Japan’s fight for racial equality vis-à-vis its Pacific mirror. But insofar as science fiction functioned to bolster the expansionist ideologies of “Japan” as a globalizing nation and empire, and even facilitate the Japanese empire’s “strategic disavowal of racism” (Fujitani), we can read the contradictions of the “post-colonial captain” in Japan’s failure to ever live up to its grandiose rhetoric of “Pan-Asian brotherhood.”

“Japanese Nemos” and the Rise of Japanese Sea Power

Yano Ryukei’s *The Tale of the Floating Fortress (Ukishiro Monogatari)*, published in 1890, was the first, but certainly not the last, work of Japanese literature to appropriate the narrative of Nemo and a *Nautilus*-like “super-weapon.” In Yano’s
version, a group of Japanese “south seas adventurers” proceed on an voyage after discovering an abandoned vessel, one equipped with futuristic technology and unprecedented destructive power. From a political point of view, Yano’s text suggests how the emergence of science fiction in Japan helped to articulate the imperial spirit burgeoning in the newly formed nation; thus, Yano’s text can be read as a charge for Japan to take its place on the world stage by challenging European and American claims to the seas.

In the novel, the protagonist, Kamii Seitaro, joins the Ukishiro crew under the helm of Captain Sakura. Early in the story, Sakura makes his ambitions clear, declaring his plans to “open up a giant territory tens of times the size of Japan and offer it to the Emperor…” (Qtd in Griffiths). Over the course of the story, the crew proceeds to overcome a tribe of cannibals, fight off a Dutch ship, subdue a group of south-sea islanders, before dashing off to Madagascar in an attempt to claim one of the last uncolonized islands in the world. Narratologically, The Tale of the Floating Fortress clearly appropriates the “imperial adventure” narrative of the West, yet re-situates the premise within a geopolitical context of Japan as an aspiring colonial nation.

Japanese adaptations of Verne are, on one level, obviously misreadings of the narrative. At the same time, works like Yano’s can be read as an allegory for Japan’s shifting sense of geo-spatiality as a result of its encounter with modernity. During the Edo-period, cartographers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries relied on
“the image of tenka, ‘the world under heaven,’ an image borrowed from China, according to which the realm didn’t really have a clearly defined border around it” (Morris-Suzuki 5). In comparison with burgeoning naval empires in the west, for Japanese of the Tokugawa era, “the body of water to which the early modern Europeans referred as the ‘Mare Pacificum’ was incomprehensibly vast.” (Yonemoto 171).

Yonemoto has explored the way in which modern Japan adopted, and adapted, the geo-political, social construction of the Euro-American Pacific. Following the example first of Britain, the world’s foremost naval power for several centuries prior, but later inspired by the theories of Mahan, Japan refashioned itself in the mold of a modern maritime power. Japan’s determination to compete on the imperial stage was predicated on the internalization of a spatial imaginary inherited from the west, including the “freedom of the open seas” (mare liberum) construction of Hugo Grotius, as Tsutsui has shown. Thus, the Pacific “became Japan's conduit to an Asia-centered regional sphere of influence” (Yonemoto 184), and the Japan became a naval empire.

Consequently, Japan, as a modern state, became aware of its national borders in a way like never before. We see this both in historiographical and political writings advocating for Japanese expansion. As Meiji historian Kume Kunitake wrote in his A History of Imperial Defense (1889):
Just as the ocean waves are rarely still, the hundreds and thousands of years of a country's expansionary and contracting tendencies are not fixed. When prosperous, we annex others; when weakened, we are invaded by others, form alliances, or are divided. Neither can mountains or rivers constrain, nor can ocean separate. Because it is obvious that this [law] shines on the history of all countries, Japan, too, should be included.

(qtd. in Tanaka 71)

In contrast to the Edo-era sensibility of Japan as a borderless realm, Kume imagines Japanese history as defined by the fluctuations of Japan’s territories, that is, by the expansion or contraction of Japan’s borderlands. Revealing, while Morri-Suzuki argues that the expansion and contraction of “Japan’s” borders are evidence for their artificiality, Kume understands the movements of borders as a “natural” part of the life of a nation.

Kume was a member of the Iwakura Mission in 1871, a two-year voyage that was Japan’s first diplomatic mission since the arrival of Perry. His writings in 1889 show how he had clearly internalized not just the climate of international antagonism abroad, but also the construction of the ocean prevalent amongst imperial powers. While Kume treats the category of the nation ahistorically, Kume also naturalizes a “law” governing the life of nations during his time — that national borders are fluid, especially for an aspiring archipelagic empire defined by its territorial possessions. In the process, Kume situates Japan within a larger context of warring states. He does so
in a time in which the nation was beginning to reverse decades of extraterritorial concessions to western powers (a point I return to), and pursuing its own course of expansionism through colonialism and war.

In 1890, the same year that Mahan published *The Influence of Sea Power on History* and “The United States Looking Outward,” Shiga Shigetaka, also argued that Japan also needed to extend its oceanic frontier. What’s revealing about Shiga’s figure is the way in which it translates the Tenka ideology, where borders are unclear, into a mode of imperial expansionism where borders define the nation. In order to cultivate the “expeditionary spirit” necessary to build a country committed to colonialism, Shiga wrote that, in honor of Emperor Jimmu’s mythological accession, Japan’s navy should “ceremonially increase the territory of the Japanese empire, even if it only be in small measure,” writing,

> Our naval vessels...should sail to a still unclaimed island, occupy it, and hoist the Rising Sun. If there is not an island, rocks and stones will do...not only would such a program have direct value as practical experience for our navy, but it would excite an expeditionary spirit in the demoralized Japanese race.

(Qtd in Peattie 9)

Figuring the navy’s central role in the expansion of the nation’s borders, Shiga connects the projection of sea power to the revitalization of the “demoralized Japanese race.” In other words, he connects the militarization of the state to the invigoration of Japanese national, racial, and masculine identity.
Revealingly, the tradition of Nemo adaptations in Japan also articulated the
geo-political imaginary in synch with Kume and Shiga. Yano’s imperialist *Tale of the
Floating Castle*, in addition to being what seems to be the first work of proto-science
fiction to foreshadow Japan’s conflict with nations from the West, illustrates the
spatial transformations taking place as part of Japanese modernity, namely the
emergence of Japan as an colonial and military empire. While Nemo sought a global
existence without nations, the “Japanese Nemo” aspires to “take this entire earth as
our stage” (47) for the glory of Japan and the Japanese Emperor.

Yano’s appropriation of the science fictional context imagined by Verne
offered writers like Yano a means to translate pre-modern notions of “samurai-
identity” into a modern context of global imperialism. Arguably, Yano’s attempt to
repackage indigenous notions of samurai identity into a futuristic guise speak both to
a racial and gendered ideology in which sought to promote militant Japanese
manhood as a national ideal. This is suggested by Yano’s contrast between a
monolithic “Western race” — privileged globally — with the “Japanese race” who
“cower in fear and move stealthily about” (qtd in Griffiths) confined by their national
borders. As Captain Sakura states, “the Western race carries out its exploits
throughout the entire earth while the Japanese people carry out their exploits within
their own country” (qtd in Griffiths). Yano’s fantasy of an imperialist project, then,
also speaks to Shigetaka’s call to invigorate the “demoralized Japanese race” through
militarism and expansion. With the help of science fiction, the demoralized “samurai” of Japan might “take the whole earth as our stage” and strut their stuff.

**Japan’s “Fathers of SF”**

The two “fathers of science fiction” (*SF no chichi*) of the genres pre-war emergence science are generally regarded to be Oshikawa Shunro and Unno Juza. As writers, they were in deep dialogue with the genre as it emerged outside of Japan. Oshikawa emerged as a star in Japan’s literary world in 1900 with the publication of *A Mysterious Story of Island Adventure: Undersea Warship* (*Kaitō Bōken Kitan: Kaitei Gunkan*) (1900). Although still a college student, Oshikawa’s debut novel established him as a prominent voice in Japan’s clamor for trans-oceanic militarization at the turn of the century. Thus, like Yano, much of Oshikawa Shunro’s writing can be read in the wake of Inoue’s translation of *20,000 Leagues Under the Sea*, but also in relation to Japan’s project of dominion over the seas.

Whereas Yano’s version of Nemo is Captain Sakura, Oshikawa’s is Captain Sakuragi. Thus he recycles the nationalist symbol of the “cherry blossom” in his image of the Nemo-like inventor and navalist who has built an ultimate weapon on a secluded island in the Indian Ocean. Sakuragi has created a submarine, the *Denkōsen* (“Lightning Ship”), a ship that can also serve as an undersea ram. Oshikawa casts his shipwrecked protagonist into the crew of of the *Denkōsen* as it prepares for a future war between “East” and “West.” Again, while Oshikawa appropriates Nemo’s
antagonism towards Western powers, he also misconstrues Nemo’s politics in the serve of the nation. *Kaitei gunkan* became a six-novel series published between 1900 and 1907, which features battles between Sakuragi and his crew and forces from nations including the United States, Russia, France, and England. In 1910, Oshikawa published an article in *Boken Sekai* (Adventure World) in which he predicted a protracted era of struggle between world powers, “an age of Enlightened warring states” (qt. in Griffiths). Ironically, although Oshikawa was a fan of Theodore Roosevelt, baseball, and American martial values, he nonetheless signals the United States as a future enemy.

Unno Juza’s writing is also an important source for science fiction’s emergence. His work also involves Japan’s navalism. Although Juza’s early works suggest a critical attention to the forces of militarism and consumerism in Japanese society, as he emerged into prominence as a writer and proponent of the “science novel” (*kagaku shosetsu*), Juza increasingly became a proponent of Japanese militarism. While not called science fiction, or the Japanese version “SF” (*esuefu*) Juza advocation for the “science novel” (*kagaku shosetsu*) in Japan reveals him to be in dialogue with the emergent genre (which itself began in Gernsback’s mind as “scientifiction).

Juza is also a prominent figure in Japan’s “super weapon” discourse, as Naoko Maika has explored. In the 1937, Juza hosted a symposium of writers and scientists, “War is Instinct!” (*Senso Wa Hon Da!*), around the question of whether literature and
scientists might collaborate to design weapons for the nation’s war effort. Juza, as an engineer-turned-science fiction writer, makes for an interesting trans-Pacific counterpart to Robert Heinlein, who also had substantial training in engineering in the naval academy. While Juza was not educated by military service, he was eventually drafted to run the Navy’s propaganda bureau in the late-1930s, where he served during the Pacific War by writing non-fiction and future war stories involving naval and space war content. Juza’s appropriation of the Wellsian Martian invasion trope in the 1930’s reveals that the “War of the Worlds” paradigm was also a part of Japan’s nationalist imaginings, yet with a twist: as Juza warns his reader, “Just as the appearance of America’s Black Ships (amerika no kurofune) surprised many Japanese Black Ships from the cosmos (daiuchu no kurufune) might suddenly appear” (“Note on Mars Corp”).

**Military-Strategic Science Fiction and The Nichi-Bei Sen (U.S.-Japan Future War) Tradition**

As we have begun to see, the emergence of science fiction in Japan, as with Japan’s turn to navalism and imperialism, is not reducible to an American inheritance. And yet, the shadow of the United States looms large over the history of Japanese modernity, both because it was the American navy that forcibly “opened” Japan, but also because the United States was the rising power in the world, and thus Japan’s presumptive rival. As Juza’s quote suggests, while Martian invasion was a possibility
associated with a future threat, the point of historical reference was the arrival of Perry.

Although the idea of Japanese sea power did not originate with Mahan, Mahan’s ideas added fuel to the fire. As Mahan remarked with pride, “more of my works have been done into Japanese then to any other one tongue” (From Sail to Steam 303). Asada argues that the circulation of Mahan’s texts within Japan’s naval leadership led the Japanese Navy and the U.S. Navy to “think alike, projecting a mirror image between the two navies” (27). In addition to offering an example of American strategic thinking, perhaps more importantly, Mahan offered a model as a military-professional-turned-writer. Revealingly, many of Japan’s most prominent military strategic thinkers — both navy and army — turned to future war writing in their later years. As we shall see, the life of the military-strategist-turned-writer, as well as the practice of future war speculation, while facilitating the grave confusions of the era, also functioned as a common language across print capitalist markets, and thus across the “imagined communities” of the Pacific.

Japan designated the United States as its official “hypothetical enemy” (Asada 36) when the “First Imperial Defensive Policy” was approved in 1907 after Japan’s defeat of the Russian Empire, but also in anticipation of conflict with the United States resulting from the segregation of nisei school children in San Francisco schools. Thus, the orientalist paradigm of mirroring (while initially suggesting the
hope of a common humanity) became a mutual condition of militarization between the United States and Japan.

Although the logic of military mirroring institutionalized future war speculation on both sides of the Pacific, when approached as a literary condition, we see that the genre offered a shared space of dialogue between the countries. As authors, Japanese military figures imagined their future wars both against, but also always in conversation with, their trans-Pacific mirrors writing in the United States.

Sato Kojiro’s *If Japan and America Fight* (*Nichibei moshi tatakawaba* 1921), along with his *Fantasy of Japanese-American War* (*Nichi-bei senso yume monogatari* 1921) are two of most important, and revealing, works of “Pacific War” speculation to emerge out of military circles in Japan. Although Sato’s first text, for the most part, reads as a hardened historical analysis of a retired army general, the second, released later in the year, reveals Sato’s wildest dreams as a science fiction writer. Taken together, they trace a continuum of science fictional and military-strategic speculation, one that further substantiates the degree to which the “*nichibei-sen*” (Japanese-American future war) tradition of science fiction was a transpacific “co-production,” that is, written in dialogue across international print markets.

In addition to providing an army-centric view of future war, Sato’s text also reveals a diverse genealogy of sources as a Japanese military strategist. In addition to citing western writers, Sato also cites and discusses the ideas of Sun-tzu, the Chinese military philosopher, and posits military examples derived from the military history
of Asia and Japan. Specifically, Sato derives his lessons from the failed Mongol invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281 and from the Russo-Japanese War. Although Sato’s military strategic thought, then, would not be reducible to a Mahanian or an American inheritance, strictly speaking, at the same time, Sato’s text remains readable for its engagement with writers like Lea and Bywater, who are, not surprisingly, his transpacific interlocutors. Although Bywater had yet to write *The Great Pacific War of 1931*, his journalistic writings, along with Lea’s *The Valor of Ignorance*, are among Sato’s core sources. Further, the imagination of America has everything to do with Sato’s imagination of Japan’s future, the next chapter in Japanese history, a future that was modeled based on an engagement, and possible war with, the United States. In Sato’s first text, he imagines Japan to be on the defensive; thus, Sato questions whether or not war will happen, the causes for such a future war, and what will happen to Japan as a result.

An undeniable context for Sato’s writing is another “war scare” which lead to the convening of the Washington Naval Conference in November of 1921, also called the Washington Disarmament Conference. The conference was convened to deescalated tensions between the United States, Japan, and England, and therefore sought to establish a “balance of power” that could prevent the outbreak of war in the Pacific. And yet, because of its pre-Washington Naval Conference bias, Sato’s foray into speculative writing give us an angle into the era in which Japanese militarist were
claiming *casus belli* based on the problems of race and economic relations which persistently plagued U.S.-Japan relations in the pre-war period.

Sato’s writing can also be read in relation to Japan’s failed attempt to include a “Racial Equality Proposal” in the Covenant of the League of Nations, a proposal that was denied at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Japan fought with the United States and Britain in World War I, and thus played a prominent role at the League of Nations convention. In addition to securing the protectorship of Germany’s former Micronesian territories for itself, Japan pushed for an amendment to the League of Nations charter. The proposed text read:

> The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all alien nationals of states, members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.

(Qtd. in Shimazu 20)

Of course, as an empire devoted to “beating a Japanese self-identity” (Oguma 113) into the people of the Asia/Pacific region, it is doubtful that Japan could have lived up to its proposition of global “racial equality.” As we shall see, within the context of our supposedly “post-racial” times, perhaps the biggest lesson left to us in the wake of the Japanese Empire is the way in which the disavowal of racism can function to obfuscate other forms of discrimination and oppression. For in that the same year in
which the Japanese government would propose “racial equality” as a “basic principle” to be practiced by all nations, it would also violently suppress the Korean peoples’ fight for freedom and equality in the “March First” movement.

Of course, then, the language must be contained as an extension of Japan’s self-interests as a nation and aspiring power. That is, the clause may have been intended to ensure that Japanese diasporic communities abroad, especially in the United States, would be treated as equals by their white American counterparts, a central concern for the Japanese government and media, as we shall see.

And yet, the language of the proposal does not specify Japan or the Japanese diaspora. Even if the welfare of Japanese in America was the strategic goal, the proposal contained no mention of national or racial particularity. Rather, the language of the “Racial Equality Amendment” would have, if adopted, functioned to establish a “basic principle” which would, at least in theory, have apply to all the nations and “alien nationals” of the league; while still contained by the international system of competitive states, the proposal would have served to protect -- at least in theory -- all diasporic “aliens” in the world, with “no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.” While this gesture deserves a mention in the history of transpacific racial form, what matters is that, because the proposal was blocked by Anglo-American powers, the incident provided another example of the fraught nature of race relations between Japan and the West, and therefore
precipitated the claims of Japanese militarists who argued that war with the United States was the only way to gain parity with the West.

This is seen in Sato’s parable on U.S.-Japan relations, a narrative which articulates a clearly biased, but nonetheless revealing, apprehension of the precipitating factors which have brought the U.S. and Japan to the brink of war during his time. Sato writes, “The Japanese American controversy today is like a verbal quarrel across a big river” (207). Sato acknowledges the often violent nature of discourse exchanged across the Pacific, even as he adds to the clamor. Through his metaphor of the “big river” between the United States and Japan, Sato reimagines the East/West binary in a way that is rhetorically advantageous, that is, in terms of generational and racial antagonism between the “Old World” and the “New World.” He writes:

On this side of the river live a goodly old couple…But on the other side of the river live brawny ruffians, who day and night scold the talk harsh to the gentle old couple on this side, and accuse them of invading the land belonging to other people and stealing.

(207)

Cleverly, Sato’s parable of elder abuse turns the West/East, New World/Old World binary into a rhetorical strength, as he casts an innocent “old couple,” content in their ways, who have been forced to “comply with the demands of the ruffians” (207). Of course, Sato aims to depict Japan as the victim of American aggression, as the “old
couple” has been reduced to “abject sub-servincy (sic) and are now reduced to a condition of not being able to conduct their own living” (207). Sato’s narrative, of course, rhetorically situates Japan on the defensive, and while Sato castigates U.S. encroachment into Asia as a form of economic imperialism, he conveniently ignores Japan’s own expansion and exploitation of resources in the wake of World War I.

But Sato’s allegory of capitalist exploitation also takes on a racial dimension, involving the treatment of Japanese in America, namely the segregation of Japanese children in San Francisco schools and the Alien Land Laws of 1913 and 1920, which prohibited Japanese, among other “aliens” from Asia, from owning agricultural land. For the “ruffians,” Sato writes, “are cruelly treating the grandsons and granddaughters of the old couple who live on their own side of the river (207). Sato’s phrasing is revealing for its ambiguity: for the “grandsons and granddaughters,” as descendants of the “old couple,” remain connected to the “national family.” In fact, many of the nisei were registered in Japan’s koseki, or national family registry, and thus had dual citizenship. And yet, Sato understands that they are on “their own side of the river” (207). They are American, and America is theirs, however “cruelly” (207) they are treated. At the same time, their grandparents cannot help but be indignant when the Japanese in California are subordinated based on race, for even though they are Japanese abroad, they are still racial representatives of the Japanese nation.
As a result of this condition, the grandparents of Japan grow angry when their grandchildren are belittled, for discrimination against Japanese in California is also a slight against “an Empire which had never once submitted to the insult of a foreign nation for 3,000 years of her history” (Sato 211). Sato imagines the “old couple” rising up in arms: for “they cannot bear to hear of the maltreatment of their grandsons and grand daughters and also to be persecuted in the problem of living” (208). Sato thus posits economics and race relations as the central questions of U.S.-Japan relations. Ominously, Sato’s future war parable, like the science fiction in the United States, targets the “Japanese diaspora” at the “front line” of the racial struggle for parity between Americans and Japanese, a point I will return to.

Sato’s final image of the elderly couple rising up against Americans is, of course, a warning against those who aspire to invade the Japanese archipelago. He believes that Japan’s people will fight to the death to thwart an invasion; he also believes that Japan was, because of its archipelagic status, impossible to invade. A final point of ironical insight involves Sato’s prediction that “the ruffians who try to cross the river are drowned midway (208). Revealingly, Sato’s parable plots the land and seas of “Japan,” along with the Pacific Ocean itself, as the ultimate protectors of the Japanese. On one level, Sato doubts that America could mobilize a force which could cross the Pacific, unless “by means of the progress of science they may be able to devise a way of subduing nature which made the geographical position of the Empire impregnable” (212), a means that he cannot specify from his present time.
Thus, Sato’s “ruffians,” who “drown midway,” do so because he believes the sheer size of the Pacific will make a successful American invasion impossible (recall Bywater).

Even more, Sato seems to have the faith that “Japan” has “nature” on its side. He derives this lesson from the mythology of the “kamikaze” (divine winds), which are said to have aided Japan in thwarting the Mongol invasion and in its victory against Russia. Thus, Sato naturalization of the Japanese nation sustains the faith that the territories of Japan, both land and sea, will protect the Japanese people from American invaders when the time comes. This theme, then, may be the core continuity between pre-war and post-war science fiction, and may explain why the dominant themes of post-war Japanese science fiction, from Abe’s Inter-Ice 4, to Komatsu’s Japan Sinks, not to mention the first Godzilla film, Gojira (1954), reflect on the war in terms of an incongruity between nation and nature through the vision of ecological devastation.

Science Fiction Futures and the Racial Tsunami

Although Sato’s If Japan and American Fight ignores Japan’s own imperialist practices, and is obviously biased and mystified by his rhetoric of imperiled grandparents who are saved by the sea, his posture of self defense goes through a revealing change in his future war narrative published later in the year. He imagines Japan on the offensive in his Fantasy of a Japanese-American War. While Sato’s
innocent “old couple” was “not so depraved as to stoop to reply to the aspersions of the ruffians” (207), Sato himself had no problem indulging in the literary fad of future war forecasting, as well as continuing his dialogue with his fellow writers on the other side of the Pacific.

Although an army general, Sato imagines a scenario where the Japanese fleet lures the U.S. Navy to Midway. Four years before Bywater would depict his decisive battle at Truk, the retired army general ominously plots an “decisive victory” at Midway, which enables a Japanese invasion and occupation of Hawaii and then San Francisco. California becomes home to Japanese air bases, from which Japan launches air raids over the Rocky Mountains. But Sato takes Lea’s premise to new terrain, as Japan’s invasion of the United States reaches its narrative climax with the bombing of the Brooklyn Bridge, and the image of Japanese soldiers descending from the sky in futuristic dirigibles upon the Woolworth building, a move which forces Washington to sue for peace.

While Sato’s novel has been described as an “uncanny forerunner to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s ill-fated plan twenty-one years later” (Stephan 60), it may not be appropriate to read Sato’s text as a de facto military plan, as with his first publication. Its ominous naval content not withstanding, Sato’s Fantasy (Monogatari) of a Japanese-American War, as suggested by its title, is to be read in terms of its fantastic representation. Sato’s show of Japanese techno-splendor, marked by the dramatic descent of Japanese super-troopers into New York, recalls J.H. Palmer’s The Invasion
of New York; or, How Hawaii Was Annexed (1897), the first American science fiction to depict war with Japan. I want to read Sato’s future war fantasy as a kind of counter to “Yellow Peril” discourse in the United States. Not only does he update the premises of Palmer and Lea, he also seems intent on illustrating what Lothrop Stoddard called The Rising Tide of Color (1920).

While Sato’s allusions reveal him to be an avid consumer of science fiction, they also suggest something of how the “monster” fashioned itself in relation to its “mirror.” For Sato’s highly fantastical science fiction also contains an equally fantastical representation of race relations, one in which Japan’s invasion of the United States inspires the revolt of African Americans, Jews, Mexicans, and even German Americans. Sato even casts actual figures from contemporary international politics, like the Pan-Africanist Marcus Garvey, who leads an army of ten million “blacks,” united behind Japan.

Although Langston Hughes probably said it best when he wrote that “Japanese imperialism is as bad as any other,” Hughes also seemed to understand something of the Japan’s case against the West in adding, “but the Japanese do not draw the color line” (qtd. in Taketani). The question of what to do with Sato’s seeming desire that Japan might lead a racial revolt brings us to a problematic identified by Fujitani, of the impact of the “Japanese Empire’s strategic disavowal of racism” (Race for Empire) directed against its Pacific rivals, including its repeated challenges to the “color line” in the years before the war. Although the idea that
Japanese writers might dream of their empire at the helm of a racial revolt against “white world supremacy” (Stoddard) may be surprising considering contemporary imagines of Japan as a homogenous nation, Sato’s vision is arguably consistent with the Japanese Empire’s heterogenous racial imaginary. While Sato’s future wars are clearly an attempt to strategically castigate the U.S. as a racist enemy, a closer look at the history of discourse on the shifting status of Japan’s borders reveals that his future war can also be read as an allegory for a nation that aspired to a “postcolonial, multiethnic nation-state and empire” (Fujitani) and did so in apprehension, and misapprehension, of it transpacific mirror, as I will now explore.

**Modern Japanese Identity and the “Mixed Nation” Discourse**

Although we are still learning of the horrors committed in the name of the Japanese Empire, learning to read the grave disconnects between rhetoric and reality under Japan’s imperial regime is one of the tasks we face when reading race in the wake of the Pacific War. Sato’s dream of “Japanese Nemos” leading a “rising tide of color” (Stoddard) can be read in line with a pre-Pacific War racial ideology characterized by the belief that the Japanese Empire was a “mixed nation” whose history and destiny was to be an amalgamation of many races and cultures. While this does not mean that there was no discrimination in the Japanese Empire, in contrast to John Dower’s thesis that the Japanese of the Pacific War believed themselves to be a racially homogenous, or “pure” people, scholarship increasingly suggests that, from
the era of the Meiji Restoration until the end of the Pacific War, the dominant
discourses on the origins and futures of the Japanese nation corresponded with what
Oguma calls the “mixed nation theory” of Japanese nationalism. Following Oguma
and Morris-Suzuki, Fujitani argues that,

Japan’s ambition for a postcolonial, multiethnic nation-state and empire was
one key factor forcing into retreat the discourse on the Japanese people as a
pure race, while official discourses increasingly emphasized shared racial
lineages with others…or even rejected explicit racial thinking and the
symbolism of blood altogether.

(Fujitani)

While always in tension with ideologies espousing the “purity” of the Japanese, the
“Great Japanese Empire,” supposedly united under the Japanese emperor as part of
the “Japanese National Family” (kokutai), was believed to be a historically hybrid
nation composed of multiple racial and cultural influxes from Asia, Polynesia, the
indigenous Ainu and Taiwanese, Europe, and beyond.

In A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-Images, Oguma argues that the “mixed
nation theory” (29) emerged in response to the geopolitical condition of
extraterritoriality following in the wake of Perry, but also based on the dream that the
United States was a “melting pot” of racial and cultural harmony. Just as Perry, in a
strategic act of “yellow face” (Murphy), presented the United States as a nation in
which black color guards adorned the commanding officer, and white and black
sailors performed together in racial minstrelsy, Japan’s identity as a “mixed nation” was fashioned in response to U.S. military overtures, but also on the paradoxical impression that America was a land of racial equality.

As Oguma suggests, the discourse of Japan as a “mixed nation” emerged in response to extraterritorial agreements signed with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, and Russia in 1858. This political reality of foreign settlements on Japanese territory prompted a debate on “mixed residence” as a way to abolish foreign settlements in Japan. Some writers, like Taguchi Ukichi, argued that the extra-territorial agreements might be reversed if Japan welcomed foreigners and Japanese to live together. Proponents of mixed residence argued that by welcoming foreigners to live amongst Japanese, and intermarry with Japanese, Japan might obviate the threat of western colonialism, but also benefit as a nation. Thus, Taguchi asks, “Why do we debate the difference in bloodlines? I want foreigners to live freely among us, and contribute both to an increase in the Japanese population and to our material prosperity. This is what happened in the USA. There is nothing to fear from this” (Qtd in Oguma 20). Paradoxically, although Taguchi idealizes the U.S. as a model of interracial harmony, his theory is also a response to the geopolitical reality of foreign presence precipitated by Perry’s arrival. Either way, Japan’s future as a “mixed nation” was modeled on an idea that America was a hybrid nation.

Taguchi was a historian, economist, editor of a magazine called Shikai (The Ocean of History). As Taguchi argued, mixed residence was a way to preempt the
possibility that western extraterritoriality was only a prelude to colonization. In 1889, he writes, “What I worry about is that the extraterritorial settlements might expand (at the expense of Japanese territory) in step with trade, and that the foreigners will join together and depressed us of political power as happened in the East Indies” (qtd. in Oguma 20). In other words, with increased trade, will the western nations want more territory from Japan, as they have in their relations with other Asia/Pacific countries? Paradoxically, Taguchi relies on a fantasy of the U.S. as a multiracial society as a way to counteract the threat posed by extraterritoriality, the geopolitical condition occasioned by the arrival of Perry and his “Black Ships.”

Just as Taguchi imagines a future in which foreigners and Japanese will live together, he envisions a history of Japanese national identity that is already comprised of many racial and cultural communities. In 1879, in an article entitled “On Mixed Residence in the Interior” (Naichi zakkyoron), Taguchi wrote that:

Some insist that the Japanese are united because they homogenous, but the reality is very different. In ancient times, we had the immigrants from Korea and China and, in the modern era, we had the descendants of Dutch immigrants.

(qtd. in Oguma 19)

In the same era that Kume would imagine the borders of Japan to be as fluid as the sea, mixed nation theorists like Taguchi established a discourse which enabled its “strategic disavowal of racism” (Fujitani) through the extension of the “mixed nation
theory” (Oguma 29) into the expansive world of the Japanese Empire. According to Oguma, at stake in the “mixed residence” debate were “two conceptions of state, or two types of nationalism — about whether the best way of maintaining the independence of Japan would be to give precedence to maintaining the homogeneity of the Japanese nation by confining the Japanese to their home islands, or to go out into the world and assimilate alien nations (Oguma 29). As foreshadowed by Yano’s adaptation of Verne, “the people of the Great Japanese Empire began to define themselves as a superior nation capable of moving out into the world, rather than an inferior race who sphere of activity was limited to the Japanese archipelago” (Oguma 29-30). While science fiction marked the extension of the Japanese borderland, the mixed nation school of thought provided an intellectual architecture by which modern Japan imagined itself as a historic amalgamation of various races and cultures. Thus, the debate on “mixed residence,” along with the idea that Japan had long been a “mixed nation,” foreshadowed Japan’s geo-political posture of expansion and incorporation of “alien” peoples.

Not surprisingly, then, mixed nation theories are also seen at the forefront of Japan’s conceptualization of war. As anthropologist Tsuboi Shougorou wrote in 1905, “many people say that the Japanese will win (against Russia) because of our racial homogeneity, but this is wrong. I would like to stress the opposite: Japan will win because of her heterogeneity” (Qtd in Oguma 57). For Tsuboi, “since the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese…who include the Ainu and native Taiwanese, are fighting
together in war and creating a single history” (61-62). According to Oguma, the literature of the “nissen dousoron,” a theory which posits that the “Japanese' and the Koreans share a common ancestor” (Oguma 64) — even in the imperial line — can be read as a symptom of a “mixed nation” colonial discourse that sought to refashion Japanese racial history according to the aspirations of the empire, most of all by satiating the need for more future soldiers for imperial Japan. From a military perspective, the “shared history” of the “mixed nation” also came to include Okinawans, Koreans, Pacific Islanders, Chinese (and in Sato’s fantasy, African Americans, Jews, Mexicans, German Americans, and beyond).

However contradictorily, the “mixed residence” discourse gave the Japanese Empire a language of the future for an aspiring “multi-national, post-colonial” empire. Ideologically, however, we can read the “mixed nation” discourse as providing the Japanese Empire a language that enabled a “strategic disavowal of racism,” a posture which often included the rejection of “explicit racial thinking and the symbolism of blood altogether” (Fujitani). While national discourse sought to justify Japan’s empire by emphasizing the heterogeneity of the Japanese, the grandiose claims to the rare assimilative power of the Japanese nation produced a condition in which, as Yonemoto has argued, the “seemingly inclusive ideals of ‘same culture, same race’…facilitated a reality of often harsh exploitation of human and natural resources” (184). Moreover, Japan’s inclusive rhetoric of “Asian brotherhood” ignored the status of colonial women altogether, who were therefore doubly
persecuted under Japan’s imperial regime. In the case of Korean culture, traditions of matriarchal inheritance were destroyed completely. Therefore, the theories of Japan as a “mixed nation,” while romantic in their “post-racial” aspirations, also functioned to obfuscate the fundamentally uneven, often times brutal conditions for colonial subjects of the Japanese empire.

The operative word is *strategic*. Fujitani’s analysis helps us think of “race” as a strategic category, both in terms of its deployment, as well as its disavowal. Thus, Sato’s fantasy of Japan leading a “rising tide of color” is compromised from the outset by Japan’s military agenda. Again, we encounter the contradictions of the “Japanese Nemo,” where the disconnect between rhetoric and reality reveals the dream of trans-national racial equality to be, in fact, the dream of one nation. Moreover, we hear an echo of the “post-colonial captain’s” own contradictions, for although Nemo claims to oppose all nations, he pursues his war by running the Nautilus as a tyrant.

While Oguma reveals the significance of the “mixed nation” discourse, his analysis also helps us understand the profound disconnect between rhetoric and reality, for “in practice, it meant that any alien people could be converted into ‘Japanese’ by beating a Japanese self-identity into them” (113). This meant the unrelenting imposition of the Japanese language, of Japanese names, and Japanese cultural traditions upon Japan’s colonial subjects. As in the case of minority communities in America, the people of Asia/Pacific became “test subjects” of the
Japanese empire, for they were forced, as individuals, to make “choices, but under conditions that were not of their own choosing” (Fujitani). Regardless of race, being “Japanese” from the Meiji Era until the end of the Pacific War meant inclusion in the national registry, speaking Japanese, working as part of the empire’s economy, fighting for Japan’s war cause, and worshiping the Japanese emperor.

Lording over the hybrid populace was a national kokutai system, the ideology and system of Nation-as-Family, whose head was Father/Emperor. The Japanese imperial system might be thought of as a kind of cosmic confucianism, in which the: The Great Japanese Empire…was an ever-expanding ie (family), centered around the ‘family head,’ the unbroken lines of Emperors, where the ‘elder brother’ accepted and assimilated the ‘younger brothers’ and ‘newcomers,’ and where all were given specific roles to by within the ie. When verbalized, this was expressed as ‘the world is a single family, mankind are all brothers,’ a phrase that at first seemed attractive. However, it included no awareness of discrimination.

(Oguma 339)

As Oguma reminds us, the particular “imagined community” of modern Japan was based on the anti-modern, paternalistic institution of dynastic succession, as many of the global empires of the period were. While is a place where the Japanese and U.S. systems diverged, Oguma’s analysis of the “family ideology” of the Japanese Empire suggest a comparable dynamic with British-style colonial oppression, in which the
unequal relations between sovereign and subjects was replicated in the racial relations in England’s colonies. In this respect, perhaps Japan also reflects its secondary mirror in the Pacific War, the British Empire.

While Japanese colonial discourse could profess to a belief in racial equality between all nations -- “the world is a single family” -- Japanese colonialism nonetheless sustained a discourses and practices of superiority and inequality using cultural, ethnic, and linguistic markers. As Morris-Suzuki has show, categories of “culture” and “ethnicity,” or minzoku (ethnos), provided the language of discrimination under Japanese imperial rule. Thus, while Sato’s imperiled grandparents can strategically disavow racism, we see that Sato’s use of the term “ruffian” is actually an epithet intended to denigrate Americans for their comparative lack of cultural sophistication. This also partially explains why the Japanese government could encourage intermarriage, assimilation, and even extended the right to vote to colonial subjects of the male gender in 1925, but in 1926, in the wake of the Great Kanto Earthquake, Koreans could be slaughtered by government-facilitated mob-violence for “un-Japanese” pronunciations of the Japanese syllabary. For it was “recognizable cultural markers of difference” (Re-Inventing Japan 105), not necessarily racial difference, that informed the discriminatory logic of the Japanese Empire.

While the Japanese empire may at times seem a universe away from U.S. political history, the dialogue between the two countries finally reveals that Japan’s
project of “alien” assimilation was also inspired by misreadings of racial politics in America. This is seen in the way in which Japan’s treatment of indigenous and colonial subjects mirrored the missionary zeal of America’s attempts to assimilate indigenous and colonial populations. Oguma explores how the writings of Uchimura Kanzou, specifically, “The Education of Native Americans” (“Amerika Dojin no Kyouiku” 1895), may have influenced Japan’s own project of assimilating Ainu. Uchimura discusses the impact of photographs that he had seen while studying abroad in the United States. These images juxtaposed American Indians in their “pre-civilized” state, and then after the “education” by Christian missionaries, who, as Uchimura describes, “had their (the Indians) hair cut, provided them with civilised (sic) clothes, strictly prohibited them from using their native language, and gave them suitable jobs and made them lead clean, orderly lives” (qtd in Oguma 61). The striking contrast in the photographs, Uchimura explains, “fully demonstrate how much their new environment civilised them” (61).

While Dower has connected Pacific War discourse to the violence of war committed against the American Indians — “a good Indian/Jap is a dead Indian/Jap” (a phrase we saw with Heinlein) — Oguma’s argument on the “mixed nation” offers an alternative approach to transpacific racial form. Here we find another example of how the techno-orientalist conditions promoted racialization based on an ideologized (mis)apprehension of technology. Of course, Uchimura sees what he wants to see, that is, evidence of how Japan might appropriate the “civilizing”
methods of the West for Japan’s own mission as an empire. Of course, what lies in the

gaps of Uchimura’s misapprehensions of indigenous photography is the suffering of

the “test subject,” whether in the form of a modeled American, or a modeled

Japanese. But what Uchimura misses is the allegory of his own nation’s dramatic

transformations in response to the pressures of modernity, of the jarring juxtapositions

and hybridizations produced under Japanese modernity. This means that what lies

beneath the forgotten history of the “mixed nation” of the “Great Japanese Empire” is

not the fact that Japan ever came close to realizing a great model of a “post-racial

world,” but that Japan’s brutal failures as an empire\textsuperscript{16} can be read as a commentary on

America’s own fraught history of race relations.

Within this context, I want to read Sato’s choice to include a cameo for

Lothrop Stoddard, the author of \textit{The Rising Tide of Color}, at the end of his fantasy of

Japan’s victory over the United States. Not only does Sato attempt to imagine

Stoddard’s vision of peril, he also ensures that “Frankenstein” meets his “monster,”

for he casts Stoddard as a delegate from the “white world” at the post-war

negotiations, so that Stoddard might witness the passing of “white world supremacy”

\footnote{\textsuperscript{16} In a longer version, I would like to do an analysis of Yumeno Kyusaku’s \textit{Dogra Magra (Dogura Magura)}, a 1930’s text that explores the context of scientific testing on Japan’s imperial subjects. The Japan of the 1930’s was not the Japan of the 1920’s, something that my analysis thus far has not adequately explored. Yumeno’s life and narrative are a recent discovery for me. A highly complex, modernist science fiction, \textit{Dogra Magra} is a kind of Frankenstein narrative dealing with Japan’s relations with China, but also the questions of “mixed nation” hybrid identity that I discuss here. While I hope to include more analysis of Japan’s relations with China in future iterations of the project, for now see Stefan Tanaka’s excellent examination \textit{Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History} (University of California Press, 1995).}
into history. Of course, this scene further suggests the absurdity of the science fiction future being written at the time, for not only were the authors of trans-Pacific each others sources, they also themselves became characters in future war fictions! This suggests the function of international print capitalism, for as speculations of future war circulated in the pre-war years, the archive of the Pacific War fed on itself. But Sato’s choice to stage the “orientalist mirror” in response to Stoddard’s *The Rising Tide of Color* suggests something more. For in casting him as a character, Sato makes Stoddard into a Frankenstein figure, one who must encounter the peril that he prophesied.

**Reading Race in the Wake of the Pacific War**

While Japan’s colonial practices never lived up to the grandiose dream of a “post-colonial empire and nation,” it is also clear that the Japanese Empire was a key factor that forced the issue of race onto the global table, as seen by its proposal at the Paris Peace Conference. Thus, the question remains as to the international impact of Japanese imperial discourse on changes in race relations beyond Japan. While shifts in racial policy may seem solely a national problem, that is, a question of the “imagined community” in all its internal negotiations, Fujitani suggests the need to theorize the rise of the Japanese Empire as an influence looming over changes in racial discourse and policy in the United States. As such, there may be a footnote in the history of transpacific racial form for the tradition of “Japanese Nemos” after all.
As I have explored, the “Japanese Empire” fashioned its identity as a “mixed nation” based on the racial history both with and within the United States, but also as a way to attain a tactical advantage over their American mirrors. In the case of the Japanese Empire, the desire to “personify the alien” — while necessitating the uneven conditions for minorities as “test subject” — can be read both as a symptom of a globalizing empire, as Lye has shown, but also, paradoxically, as a strategic response to international pressures and to the exigencies of war. Insofar as Japan conceptualized itself as a “mixed nation” in apprehension, and misapprehension, of the United States as a “mixed nation,” why wouldn’t the “orientalist effect” echo in reverse? For as Fujitani writes, “paralleling and incited by the Japanese empire's strategic disavowal of racism, U.S. leadership increasingly came to denounce racism out of an awareness that such gestures were necessary to further U.S. interests in regions inhabited by those they often called the ‘yellow’ and ‘brown’ peoples” (Fujitani). In other words, the decision to incorporate the “alien” in the U.S. was influenced by the strategic necessity to counter Japan’s strategic disavowal of racism.

If so, part of America’s turn towards a posture of racial inclusivity towards “aliens” may been precipitated not just by the growing recognition of America’s own future interests in Asia, but also out of the strategic necessity to counter Japan’s claims that the U.S. was a racist empire. While the two nations that finally met on the battlefields of the Pacific War both re-presented themselves as racially inclusive
global empires, the implication of Fujitani’s analysis is that Japan, in beating the U.S. to the “post-racial punch,” may have foreshadowed changes in racial policy, and perhaps even, science fiction in the U.S. Even so, the fundamental question that shaped this encounter was whether or not the America was a land of multiracial equality, or whether or not the early theorists of the “mixed nation” were mistaken in their apprehensions.

While the U.S.-led breakup of the Japanese Empire in the wake of the Pacific War functioned to redraw the borders of Asia/Pacific, and suppress discourses of the “mixed nation” as a remnant of imperial ideology, ironically, Robert Heinlein’s apprehensions in early 1941 of the Japanese Empire as a futuristic “mixed raced” empire of “Pan-Asians” helps us recover something of this history. Although Heinlein’s representation of a future in which the Japanese Empire expanded to include China, Russia, and India was clearly unrealistic within his present context of 1941, as a literary extrapolation, it can nonetheless be traced back to Heinlein’s apprehensions of his enemy, and to the pre-war discourses on Japanese national identity and the espousal of “Pan-Asian Brotherhood” within the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” After all, we can assume that he knew the Japanese Empire well based on his training at Annapolis in the post-Washington Naval Conference era, the period in which U.S.-Japan relations deteriorated further.

But this may also explain something of the pressures informing Heinlein’s choice to reimagine the “Asiatic alien” into the “American Asiatic.” This would mean
that Heinlein’s inclusion of Franklin Roosevelt Mitsui — as a “test subject” — can be read as a necessary strategic counter to the vision of empire promoted by his “mixed race” mirror, a nation that was already making its various “aliens” of the Asia/Pacific region into the “test subjects” of empire. Although more research on the question is needed, just as Japan modeled its racial discourse on the precedents, and pressures, of its mirror, it makes sense that the U.S. would do the same, something that Heinlein’s novel also suggests.

What this suggests is a way of reading race in the wake of the Pacific War, an analysis which must include the lingering aftershocks of the Japanese Empire, but also “what lies beneath” the forgotten histories of the war: for Japan’s war with the West, as with the oceanic imperialism of Japanese modernity, may have foreshadowed emerges in global racial politics -- and, perhaps even, American science fiction -- in ways that we are only beginning to realize. But this is not because the “Great Japanese Empire” ever realized anything close to a great model for a “post-racial” world, but because its rise forced the U.S. to take a hard look in the “mirror,” and reexamine itself from the eyes of its “monster.”

“Was Not So Good”: Fukunaga’s Nichibei-sen Miraiki and the “Local” Response in Hawaii

Although we have seen the way in which the subordination of Japanese citizens and their nisei children in America were at the heart of Japan’s casu belli with the U.S.,
and have explored some of the implications of Japan’s fantasy of a “post-racial” empire, we have not yet touched upon the representation of Japanese diasporic collaboration with Japan’s imperialist imaginings. This problem, while speaking to cultural studies debates involving the confusion between “transoceanic diaspora” and “transoceanic imperialism” (as I explored in my introduction), can arguably be clarified through an attention to the history of literary diasporizations -- that is, of the circulation of texts, tropes, and ideas across the Pacific. Insofar as our attention to the transpacific circulation of science fiction has revealed a deep dialogue between Pacific mirrors, it is important to analyze a final feature of Pacific War speculation, regarding the grave confusions created by the circulation of future war narratives.

As we have begun to see, on both sides of the Pacific War, science fiction figures the Nikkei at the front lines; what’s more, Japanese and American military writers are in ominous agreement about what side of the future the (proto-)Japanese American community will fall: whereas Mahan, Lea, and Bywater cast Japanese diasporics in the role of the “enemy-alien,” Oto Yoshikatsu’s 1914 If Japan and American Fight (Nichi Bei Moshi Kaisenba), Sato Kojiro’s two texts, and Fukunaga Kyosuke’s Account of the Future War Between Japan and America (Nichibei Sen Miraiki 1933) all cast the Nikkei as future heroes for the cause of the “Great Japanese Empire.”

The implication is that while the circulation of science fiction functioned as a common space for military writers on both sides of the Pacific, their dialogues also
created perilous conditions for the communities caught between empires. This is seen in the publication, circulation, and reception of Fukunaga’s *An Account of the Future Japanese-American War*. Fukunaga was also a naval officer who in his retirement turned to writing. His narrative, prefaced with forwards by two of Japan’s most prominent military strategists, Vice Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa, chief the Japanese Imperial Navy, and Admiral Kato Kanji, Fukunaga’s narrative, in addition to being a record on Japanese strategic thinking in the 1930’s, is also significant in that the text was at the center of an international scandal in which local Japanese in Hawaii were targeted as pawns in a war game.

Opening with the text, “The inevitable has come! (kitarubeki monoga kita qtd in Bisher), Fukunaga’s future war is revealing for the way it targets Hawaii as a land rich in commodities, but also plentiful in potential collaborators in the Japanese population on the island. As Fukunaga writes, “Hawaii? Hmmm. Yeah, where they got bananas, pineapple, sugar, and where there’s more Japanese than people from any other country (Qtd in Stephan 61). Speaking of the Japanese living in Hawaii, who at the time comprised one-third of the islands’ population, Fukunaga writes, “You know, they’d be a real help. If we could stir them up, we could hit the Americans from inside as well as outside” (qtd. In Stephen 61).

As described by Bisher, the publication and circulation of Fukunaga’s narrative was nothing less than a “literary bombshell that would reverberate from Honolulu to Washington and Tokyo.” *Nichibei-sen Miraiki* was initially released as a
free supplement within the January 1934 edition of *Hinode* (Sunrise). The cover of *Nichibei-sen Miraiki* features an ominous image depicting a “United States warship firing broadside as the silhouette of a distant destroyer slipped across an ominous horizon” (Bisher). Although the navalist Suematsu seems to innocently muse that “it would be simply splendid if the war turned out as Fukunaga imagines,” Bisher’s article for *Honolulu Magazine*, “The Warning Shot” (2012) shows how the publication and circulation of the novella in *Hinode* — one of the most popular magazines to circulated both in Japan and throughout the Japanese diaspora — may have been an actual military tactic intended to target local Japanese in Hawaii. While passing as a marketing ploy for Shinchosha’s *Hinode*, it was also a attempt to disseminate Japanese imperial propaganda which “might seduce Hawaiian Nikkei to treason” (Bisher).

As with their involuntary representation in science fiction, the Nikkei became targets of Japanese military plotting. That is why it is so significant that the publication history of Fukugana’s narrative reveals a rare moment of clarity within a pre-war period where the circulation of science fiction across international print capitalist markets continued to blur distinctions between war and peace, reality and fiction, but in the process stoke suspicions over “aliens” and the coming war. Revealingly, it is from Nikkei in Hawaii that the voices of reason and restraint emerged.
Upon the text’s arrival in Hawaii in 1933, the “Japanese-Americans were more indignant about the novelette than their Caucasian neighbors” (Bisher). This suggests the way in which the local community in Hawaii felt a deep investment in the future of Japanese-American relations, and that they seemed to sense the grave implications of future war narratives — after all, it was a literary tradition in which they were figured most prominently. As reported by the *Hawaii Hochi*, a bilingual newspaper run by local journalists, “The first complaint…came from local Japanese merchants who had read copies of the story and were afraid that it would be construed as an unfriendly gesture towards America” (qtd. In Bisher). When the first shipment of copies arrived aboard the *SS President Taft*, George Kojima, a book store owner in Honolulu, brought them to the attention of a U.S. Custom’s officer, who was also a Nikkei. Kojima was concerned that the text “was not so good” (qtd. in Bisher) for distribution.

The nisei Customs officer translated the text with the help of his wife, and then brought it to the attention of his superiors. The Hawaii office of Customs soon ordered that copies of the supplement be seized, as their circulation might be “detrimental to Japanese-American relations” (qtd. in Bisher), not to mention Japanese American’s themselves, something that Kojima and the unnamed Custom’s officer seem to have sensed. Of course, the publishing world in the U.S. still maintained an active circulation of yellow peril images, but the story of Fukunaga’s reception in the United States marks an important moment within the history of
science fiction’s pre-war circulation in that it suggests the working of more “level-headed” thinking.

Kojima’s remark — that Fukunaga’s narrative “was not so good” — can be read as an expression of local-pidgin, and thus as a certain kind of poetry of place: not only is the language a commentary on the narrative’s lack of literary merit, but also that the circulation of the text could have perilous consequences that were unforeseeable, particularly for the Japanese American community caught between empires. While American future war depicted Japanese Americans as “enemy aliens,” Fukugawa’s techno-thriller cast the Japanese in American as heroes in his prediction of Japanese victory over the United States. If such a narrative entered into circulation, would the readerly hearts of Nikkei be stirred by the story? Would the Japanese in Hawaii be viewed as “guilty by consumption,” something suggested by the awkward wording of the Hawaii Hochi article. While not an act of censorship, Kojima’s decision to alert customs, and eventually collect and refund the copies he sold, while against his monetary interest as a book seller, prioritized the welfare of the community targeted as pawns in Fukunaga’s war game. His act also suggests a certain wisdom that his peers in the publishing industry on both sides of the Pacific seemed to lack at the time, for one cannot ever predicted the future impacts of literature once it has entered into global circulation.

At the same time, it is telling that the efforts of local Nikkei in Hawaii to keep Fukunaga’s text out of local circulation ultimately led to even greater publicity for the
narrative. Insofar as the incident, according to an Army intelligence officer at Fort Shafter, was “the first time that such a seizure of Japanese publications has been made” (Bisher), it inevitably drew the attention of military personnel, press, and politicians in both Tokyo and Washington. Maj. Edward F. Witsell, one of the few Japanese linguists in the U.S. Army, recommended that “the Army Chief of Staff read a few choice passages ‘of military interest’ in the novelette, starting with a description of Japan’s rapid thrusts at Guam, the Philippines and Hawaii” (Bisher). The Tokyo correspondent of the London Herald reported on the story, followed by a front page article by the Hearst-owned Washington Herald with a photo of Vice Admiral Suetsugu and the headline, “Text Shows Intent to Strike First Blows at Our Bases in Philippines and Hawaii” (qtd. In Bisher). The Washington Herald then published a translation of Fukunaga’s narrative a few days later. As a result, Fukunaga received more international attention as an author, but so did his plot to seduce the Nikkei to join Japan’s imperial cause.

**Science Fiction and the Perils of Prophecy**

While the belief that Japanese diasporic communities posed an “alien” threat was a consistent feature of military strategic speculation and yellow peril literature, texts like Fukunaga’s had as much, if not more, of a damning effect on the future of the Japanese American community. Just as future war narratives like Lea’s can be read as confirming a vision of “how the world operated” (Griffiths) for Japanese science
fiction writers, Japanese future war writers equally reflected the ideologies and assumptions of their American counterparts in their respective texts.

This is why retrospective claims that attempt to justify the internment, like, “the military’s instincts about the dangers during the first half of 1942 were correct” (Stephan 4), while supportable with text, are nonetheless misleading, for they themselves enact the mystifications condition by the historic circulation of future war across international markets. Anderson’s “print capitalism” paradigm — when viewed as a international phenomenon — highlights the circulation of textual sources across “imagined communities,” and that as literature circulated across international borders, it also marked the process by which borders between nations become militarized, in a way, strengthened on both sides. Thus, the perils of science fiction prophecy are less about who fired first shots, literary or otherwise, than about the mutual conditions created by the circulation of future narratives. This is realizable only when we consider the fact that while science fiction seems to have provided an “advanced script” (Lye 103) for both sides of the Pacific War, it did so because both sides confirmed the ideologies of their military mirror.

This being the case, science fiction also inevitably produced perilous conditions for the communities caught at the borders “between two empires” (Azuma), one in which a multiplicity of complex choices were made, under conditions that were not of their making. There are literary texts which depict or solicit Nisei sympathies with Japan’s imperialist cause. Some are even written by the
small community of Nisei who were in Japan while Japan was at war with China in the 1930’s, and even after war had begun with the United States. Their story, which in some cases includes service in the Japanese military during the Pacific War, has yet to be adequately told. Yet this still suggests the way in which communities who were targeted at the “front lines” of the war were imperiled. For whether in the form of “national heroes” of an expanding Japan, or “enemy aliens” at war with the U.S. -- the disaporic Nikkei was the “test subject” of the future in the Pacific.

Although Stephen’s speculations on the possibilities of Japanese American collaboration with Japan’s plans for the “conquest of Hawaii” trace a genealogy of future war writing on both sides of the Pacific, as we have seen, writers in Japanese were always in dialogue with writers in America, something Stephen’s analysis fails to adequately account for. Thus, Stephen’s faith in “military instincts” fails to consider the way in which the pervasive suspicion of the “alien” in America was actually an effect of the mystifications produced by print capitalist circulation both within, and between, nations, rather than being based on a “realist” apprehension of conditions.

When we recall the remarkable “success” that Lea and Mahan (not to mention Lafcadio Hearn) had as translated authors in the Japanese reading market, it is just as

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17 Hanuma Tesaki was a Hawaii-born nisei who went to Japan in the late-1930’s, and served in Japan’s military in the second Sino-Japanese War. His literary writings, including Long the Imperial Way and The Mountain Remains, would be an excellent place to begin such a project. Also, the experience of Japanese American musicians in Japan during the imperial period, as explored by George Yoshida’s Reminiscing in Swingtime.
reasonable to conclude that they are the likely sources for the idea to target Japanese communities in Hawaii as future collaborators. Japan’s print market and mass culture industries was, after all, one of the most prolific “imagined communities” of modernity; arguably, American writers like Hearn, Lea, and even Mahan, were more “successful” literary figures in Japan than they ever were in the United States. How, then, can we ever determine the literary origins of the “Pacific War”? On what side will the “test subjects” of the future fall? Do we face the mirror, or do we face the monster? Are they not the very questions conditioned by the fiction of the East/West divide?

**After the War**

The enduring fiction of the East/West hemispheric divide creates a final series of question: while Japan’s attack at Pearl Harbor is certain, and while the surrendering ceremony aboard the USS Missouri precipitated by the atomic bombs was decisive, is it possible that the “origins” and “ends” of the “Pacific War” have remained open to repetition? If the Battleship Yamato was sunk on route to Okinawa, why does it travel through the cosmos in the anime *Star Blazers (Uchu Yamato Senkan)*? Why does Abe Kobo, in *Inter-Ice Age 4* (1952), imagine a future Japanese government that responds to ecological devastation by creating a hybrid species of “aquans,” who forever leave the land of the Japan to live beneath the sea? Why does Komatsu Sakkyo, in *Japan Sinks* (1980), imagine an earthquake so powerful that it sinks the Japanese
archipelago, sending the surviving Japanese into diaspora to live mixed amongst the peoples of the world? Why does Godzilla’s roar, along with the many aftershocks of the Pacific War, continue to resonate so profoundly in memory and in representation, so many years after the war between the U.S. and Japan concluded?

While my analysis of the emergence of science fiction in Japan can offers some clues as to “Japan’s” continued ambivalence as part of the science fiction world, I cannot answer all of these questions here. What I will do is propose the topic of my final chapter, the historic intersections of Nikkei literature and science fiction, as a place where we can begin to consider the status of the “Pacific War” within the contemporary imagination. After all, however unwittingly, Japanese Americans have been ambivalent “stars” of the science fiction genre. It is time to finally consider the voice of the “alien” as part of the science fiction future, and so I turn to an analysis of Urashima Taro narratives across diasporic time.
Chapter 4

Urashima Taro Narratives Across Diasporic Time: Theorizing the Intersections of Nikkei Literature and Science Fiction

This chapter examines the intersections of Nikkei diaspora writing and science fiction through an analysis of Nikkei Urashima Taro narratives in Japanese American literature as well as contemporary speculative fiction. By tracing a continuum of literary adaptations of the folk legend across science fiction and Asian American literature, I extend my analysis of diaspora theory, literature, and the Pacific War into the post-war period. I examine the ways in which the Urashima Taro narrative premise of “time-dilation” has functioned as a means to figure the unique spatiotemporalities of diaspora under the shadows of international geo-politics and in the wake of the war between the United States and Japan.

In tracing Urashima Taro narratives across diasporic time, I pursue an approach to science fiction literature that differs from my proceeding chapters on the emergence of the genre in the pre-war period. While we have seen the way in which science fiction was easily coopted in the service of the nation-state, as in the case of the U.S. And Japanese nationalist traditions (see chapters two and three), in this last chapter I focus on the ways in which science fiction has also been attendant to the “chronotopes” (Bakhtin) of diasporizing peoples, including (but not limited to), the
Nikkei in the United States. By exploring the emergence of Urashima Taro narratives in modern literature across the generic contests of contemporary science fiction and Asian American literature, from Ursula Le Guin’s *A Fisherman of the Inland Sea, or Another Story* (1994), to John Okada’s *No-No Boy* (1956), Hiroshi Kashiwagi’s *Starting From Loomis* (2013), Juliet Kono's *Hilo Rains* (1988), then to E. Lily Yu’s “The Urashima Effect” (2013), I extend my analysis of diaspora theory, science fiction, and the Pacific War by tracing a continuum of transnational adaptations of the Asian folktale since the end of the Pacific War until our contemporary time.

While the idea that the historical experience of a small, ethnic/diasporic Asian American community could translate into the context of a globalizing, science fiction universe may seem paradoxical, as my dissertation has thus far explored, whether in the form of pre-war “aliens,” wartime “test subjects,” or in the post-war case, “test pilots,” Japanese Americans have, arguably, long been a kind of “star” within the science fiction genre, however ambivalently. The emergence of Urashima Taro narratives in contemporary science fiction, however, offers an alternative angle whereby we might reexamine the science fictional context of Nikkei emergence from something closer to a “community perspective”; for the narrative has resonated across Japanese American generations with “aesthetic pleasure and yet with racial, political, national, and existential questions that haunt and empower Nikkei still” (Sumida 45).

As a concept denoting communities with ancestral ties to Japan, the post-war emergence of “Nikkei” as a compliment to generational identifications derived from
immigration history — issei (“first generation”), nisei (“second generation”), sansei (“third generation”), and so on — coincides with the increased visibility of discourses of diaspora; but as revealed by the Nikkei case, diasporic conceptions of “community consciousness and solidarity” (Clifford) via ties to Japan have been consistently fraught by the geo-political terrain across which the diasporic histories of the Nikkei have enfolded, most of all by the rise of “Japan” as an imperial signifier, but also by a yellow peril discourse in American that sought to exclude “Asiatics” from American life through practices of alienation. Indeed, as my reading of Robert Park’s “The Nature of Race Relations” in my introduction suggested, the emergence of the term “diaspora” within the critical lexicon is itself haunted, both by the perilous apprehensions of the “Asiatic diaspora,” which included the Nikkei, the shadow of the “Great Japanese Empire,” but also the emergence of science fiction as a recognizable genre of literature.

While utopian invocations of the “modern, intercultural, transnational experience” emphasize the way in which diasporic “identifications outside the national time/space” have empowered communities struggling to “live inside, with a difference” (Clifford “Diasporas” 308), the case of Nikkei history suggests a more complicated condition. For the very perception that Nikkei were spatially and temporally “alien” to the America nation — and that they were appropriated by Japanese imperial “family discourse” — meant that the diasporic conditions of transpacific modernity were impossible to inhabit, especially when the war long
prophesied became a bloody reality. From the first migration of Japanese into the world as laborers, students, picture brides, and, in many cases, Meiji-era nationalists, to subsequent diasporizations precipitated by the Pacific War, to the internment and forcible modeling of “alien test subjects” into American “projectiles of democracy” — or as we see in the post-war form, “test pilots” — in the words of Karen Tei Yamashita, the Nikkei are a people who repeatedly seem to find themselves “on the move” (Cycle K Cycles), often times under contradictory conditions that were not of their making.

Thus, the continuum of Urashima Taro narratives across Japanese American literature and science fiction offers a way to theorize the predicament of diaspora as a “prototypical story” (Sumida) for the historical experience of Nikkei. Not only has science fiction long been a language to explore the questions and contradictions that have haunted and empowered “alien” diasporic communities across the Pacific, but as we shall see, science fiction has also offered a means for Nikkei writers themselves to contest, and reimagine, their historical experience of alienation. In line with diaspora theorists like Clifford have observed the way in which diasporic discourse “articulates, or bends together, both roots and routes” (308), I examine the ways in which Einstein’s notion of “time-dilation” — the phenomenon where movement through spacetime can be experienced discrepantly by different observers depending on their relative pace of travel and proximity to gravitational masses — has functioned metaphorically in literature as a means to represent the condition of
diaspora in response to the traumas of history in the wake of the Pacific War. In tracing Nikkei Urashima Taro narratives across diasporic time, we can hear the voice of the “alien who returns.” Thus, I warp to the Hainish Universe of Ursula Le Guin, and the science fiction of the fisherman from the inland sea.

Nikkei Urashima Taros in a Globalizing Universe

Ursula Le Guin’s science fiction novella, *A Fisherman of the Inland Sea: Or Another Story*, begins with the narrator, Hideo Tiokunan’n, professing his intent to account for the paradoxical. Although Hideo is of the future, his problem deals with his past. Although he is an aging farming on the distant planet of “O,” he also claims to be a “Mobile of the Ecumen” (Le Guin 159), a privileged traveler and scientist of the galaxy. And so Hideo must account for the seemingly impossible, of his double-life lived in more than one place and time. Like his diasporic mother before him, who left her “nation of Terra” (Le Guin 161) — effectively severing her spatio-temporal ties to her family and home world — Hideo chose to leave the world of “O,” where he is only a “half-Terran,” and where he was developed a unique sets of relations within the filial unit, having fallen in love with his “sister germane,” Isidiri, who although not his biological kin, would constitute a “taboo” matching as dictated by “O” custom. Hideo must therefore account for the paradox that while he departed his home world many years ago to travel a globalizing universe, his journey into the future somehow brought him back to the moment of his departure. Even though his
rapid aging and illegitimate relations have made him the stuff of village gossip, Hideo would like to report his findings as one who has known the perils of spacetime dilation, even though time-warping technologies have yet to be invented.

Thus, Le Guin begins her version where the Urashima Taro narrative generally ends: not with despair and death — but with life — and a narrative. As Le Guin suggests, Urashima Taro’s story actually begins not with his journey to a fantastical world, but with the moment that he decides to explain his unique predicament. Thus his condition of articulation is complex, but also, decidedly literary: for as a one who claims to be a time-traveler, Hideo faces the challenge of authorial reliability. Although Hideo knows that “story is the only boat for sailing on the river of time,” he also understands that “in the great rapids and winding shallows, no story is safe” (159).

In order to make himself understood, Hideo begins with another story, a remnant of a place and time long ago, a narrative which has continued to resonate across the galaxy across generations of travelers, one that has become his own. Hideo tells the story of Urashima Taro, the fisherman from the inland sea, who traveled to a fantastical world, but learns upon returning that what was just three days underwater, was in fact three hundred years back home in Urashima.

While Le Guin’s A Fisherman of the Inland Sea is set at the margins of her Hainish Cycle — an alternative universe series which includes her classics The Left Hand of Darkness (1969), The Dispossessed (1974), The Word for the World is Forest
(1976), and *The Day Before the Revolution* (1974) — her novella is clearly a science fiction adaptation of the legend of Urashima Taro. Although echoes of Urashima Taro’s fantastic journey can be heard throughout the world literary tradition, from the Irish legend of Oisin to Washington Irving’s “Rip Van Winkle,” Urashima Taro narratives emerge in text at the margins of the Japanese literary canon. Both the *Kojiki* (712) and *Nihonshoki* (720), two foundational texts of Japanese literary and national life, make reference to a fisherman who left his village of Urashima for the sea in 477 A.D., only to return in 825 A.D. to learn that the world he knew was long gone.

As the folktale is conventionally plotted, the Urashima Taro journey involves a fisherman, who, in saving the life of a sea turtle, is later rewarded with a journey to a magical world deep beneath the ocean — the “Palace of the Dragon King” (Ryūgū-jō). Urashima Taro spends three days underwater, falling in love with the Dragon King’s daughter, Otohime. Here, Urashima Taro intersects with some of the most prominent figures in Japanese mythology: Ryujin, considered the tutelary deity of the Sea, and Otohime, the sea princess, who is said to be grandmother of the mythological first “Japanese emperor.” But here the fantastic adventure takes a tragic turn, for Urashima Taro begins to miss his family in Urashima, and decides he must leave return. Otohime presents Urashima Taro with a “tabebako,” a magical box that can transport him back to her palace as long as it remains unopened; but when he
returns to Urashima, and learns that three hundred years have past in his absence, he opens the box, and withers into dust.

According to Nancy Yomogida, the Urashima Taro narrative has acquired a diversity of allegorical and symbolic resonances as it moved from the oral tradition into various textual forms from ancient times until the present (7). Over the centuries, the Urashima Taro narrative has been adapted across oral, textual, graphic, filmic, and even digital forms; yet significantly, its narrative elements and interpretation has remained in flux, resonating across traditional gendered, generational, and national distinctions. Some versions, like the Man'yōshū (795), feature a gender-neutral protagonist, “Urashima-ko,” or “child of Urashima,” rather than the masculine specific “Taro.” Further, if we consider the literary adaptations of Urashima Taro, we see characters ranging from children to the elderly cast as the protagonist, along with versions with more than one Urashima Taro character.

Although the Urashima Taro narrative can be read as invoking confucian themes of filial devotion, along with buddhistic themes of karmic return (Yomogida 7), the narrative also resonates across modern themes, as suggested by late-nineteenth century adaptations of the folktale by anglophone writers like Basil Chamberlain Hain and Yei Theodora Ozaki, who wrote versions for children, as well Lafcadio Hearn’s “A Dream of a Summer’s Day,” the first modern adaptation of the narrative. As I explored in my first chapter. Hearn sensed something special in the Urashima Taro narrative, for it seemed to him “a story which had lived for a thousand years,
gaining fresher charm with the passing of every century” (19). As he speculated, the
Urashima Taro narrative could only have survived by virtue of some truth in it” (19).
For Hearn believed that the narrative spoke to “something real in one’s life, or in the
lives of one’s ancestors” (19-20). And yet, as we recall, the deeper Hearn delved into
the “oriental” tale, the more it mystified him, “But what truth?” (20).

Nikkei Diaspora and the Cosmic Context

Yet as I suggested, if we can learn to read Hearn as a diasporic writer, then both his
life, and his writings, can be read as resonating with Urashima Taro’s experience of
spatiotemporal rupture. His sense of an “ancestral morality” (19) conjured by the
narrative was a diasporic response to the “empty, homogenous” temporality of
capitalist modernity. Further, Hearn was unaware of the paradigm shifting work of
one of his contemporaries, Albert Einstein, who would redefine the nature of cosmic
spacetime with his writings on temporal relativity.

In this way, Hearn’s modern adaptation in the late-nineteenth century
foreshadow’s the narrative’s emergence in science fiction one hundred years later, yet
it would be another kind of unconventional “Japanese” in a globalizing universe. Just
as Hearn, sensed the narrative seemed to be “gaining charm with the passing of every
century,” Le Guin’s adaptation breathes new life into the narrative by setting the
Urashima Taro journey within the context of cosmic space travel, and by sending the
narrative itself into diaspora through outer space.
In a twist on the classic science fiction trope of the “alien,” Le Guin considers the point of view of the child whose mother “came from another world” (*A Fisherman of the Inland Sea* 162). Hideo’s Urashima Taro’s story is received from his mother, Isako, who left her “nation of Terra” (*A Fisherman of the Inland Sea* 161) bearing a tale found within the “Annals of the Emperors” (*A Fisherman of the Inland Sea* 161). Yet Urashima Taro also becomes his own, as he chooses to follow his Urashima Taro-mother as a “Mobile of the Ecumen,” the travelers of the galaxy who have “cut all ties to all homes…only touching different worlds at different moments and then off again into an endless future with no past” (*A Fisherman of the Inland Sea* 167). In her narrative of the mobile, Le Guin suggests something of the “truth” that Hearn intimated one hundred years earlier insofar as she uses the Urashima Taro premise to dialogue with the Albert Einstein’s theories of spacetime.

As Einstein speculated, spacetime, rather than being “empty” or “homogenous,” as in Benjamin’s theorization of capitalist temporality, was actually relative to the observer, and could dilate based on the relative pace of travelers, or from their proximity to gravitational masses (like planets or black holes). While Einstein posited that nothing could travel faster than light, if traveling at a fast enough rate — or in Le Guin’s universe, with NAFAL technology (Nearly As Fast As Light) — the clocks of travelers would cease to record time at the same pace as the people left behind on earth. Interestingly, just as modernity was universalizing capitalist time with the global Greenwich meridian and the fiction of the East/West divide (see ch. 226).
Einstein was leading a revolution in physics that suggested a far more complicated conception of the universe. He called this effect time-dilation, or temporal relativity. Temporal relativity is why astronauts who live on the international space station are measured to age at a slower rate than we gravity-bound earthlings. Temporal relativity is why Urashima Taro’s journey to a magical world could theoretically be experienced as three days from his perspective, while three hundred years passed for the people of Urashima. Temporal relativity is why the choice to be a “mobile,” who lives “only touching different worlds at different moments,” meant that Hideo’s mother, and later, Hideo himself, fell out-of-synch with the world(s) they knew. But for this reason, Einstein’s theorizations of spacetime resonate metaphorically with the modern condition of diaspora, as Le Guin Urashima Taro adaptation suggests.

Although set in a distant future, on a planet on the other side of the galaxy, Le Guin’s science fiction is in clear dialogue with the modern themes of diaspora, including the “racial, political, national, and existential questions that haunt and empower Nikkei still” (Sumida 45). Le Guin’s ambiguous reference equating Japan to Isako’s “nation of Terra,” along with the reference to the narrative’s origins within the “Annals of the Emperors,” raises themes of nationalism, even the history of Japanese imperialism, even within the distant future context of the Hainish Universe.

Le Guin’s narrative of generations of intergalactic Urashima Taro’s resonates with Sumida’s reading of the intergenerational narrative as a “prototypical story” for
the historical experience of the Nikkei in America. According to Sumida, the issei brought the narrative in the oral form, teaching it to their nisei children; for Sumida, the story offered a way to narrativize their journey to the “undersea world of America” (Sumida 45). Japan, as we have seen, was itself going to through dramatic transformations during the period in which Japanese immigration across the Pacific began. To equate the underwater world of “Ryūgū-jiō” (Dragon Castle) with their journey to the United States, the issei Urashima Taro evokes themes of pioneerism, the romance of travel and opportunity, the dream of new lives in new lands, perhaps even the kind of colonial spirit that we saw in the tradition of the “Japanese Nemos.” For many of the issei, particularly the first generation of Japanese students to study in American, did so inspired by the charge of Fukuzawa Ryūkichi, to acquire knowledge and wealth that might be useful in the modernization of Japan.

Yet this reading, as with Japanese imperialist appropriations of diasporizing Japanese, emphasizes the spatiality and raciality of diaspora. Returning to Sato’s metaphor of the Pacific river, the Japanese abroad, as racial descendants of Japan, and in some cases as members of the national registry, remained ideologically connected to the imperium; that is, they were a part of the conception of the “Great Japanese Empire,” even though they were outside Japan’s borders, and in the case of the nisei in America, citizens of the U.S. No matter how far away they may travel, or how “Japan” itself might shift in signification, the Japanese diaspora always remains “Japanese,” at least by this logic of race and space.
Both Le Guin and Sumida, however, suggest the way in which the Urashima Taro narrative, with its premise of time-dilation, reveals a necessary temporal consideration as part of diaspora’s emergence. For just as Harootunian argued for a more capacious understanding of the “crucial spatiotemporal relationship” (“Some Thoughts on Comparability and the Space-Time Problem”) when addressing the legacy of “Area Studies,” a reading of Nikkei history following the Urashima Taro paradigm suggests that diaspora remains a discrepant formation as part of international modernity.

For while the image of the “underwater world of America” evokes the spirit of adventurism and opportunity, it also articulates a radical break in ones temporal relations, that is, from the space-time of the modern Japanese nation. As Sumida argues, the fact that the issei passed the narrative onto their children and grandchildren in America meant that they understood that they could never return to the Japan that they knew. This realization of temporal discrepancy is arguably implicit if we use Sato’s metaphor of the “river” as a temporal marker that divides the national histories of the U.S. and Japan. For as communities who are living on “their side of the river,” Japanese diasporics are inevitably connected the historical trajectories emerging in American life, temporalities which are discrepant from those in Japan.

Yet more importantly, Sumida’s argument implies that in the case of Nikkei history, the dispersal from Japan was only the first of many ensuing diasporizations, often times under conditions that were involuntary. As Sumida suggests, the issei
encountered a perilous double-bind, in which the dreams of issei in America were made impossible by a society which denied them full participation, prohibiting them from ownership of land, and rejecting them as “aliens ineligible for citizenship” with the *U.S. v Ozawa* in 1922. And yet, the issei Urashima Taros also knew that they could never return to the Japan they knew.

While this is where the folk tale ends, this is also where the story of the Nikkei Urashima Taro begins. As Sumida writes, when the war began, “the Issei of the West Coast became Urashima Taro *twice over*, first in leaving Japan, second in being forced from their West Coast towns and farms and returning four years later again as aliens, strangers, enemies” (45 emphasis added). Perhaps in this sense, the diasporic Issei can be read as doubly alienated, condemned to a life out of synch from both American and Japanese societies. This may be why, as we shall see, Le Guin attempts to conceptualize the history of diasporizations in Japanese American history in the paradoxical terms of “exile from exile” (“Otsuka Review”).

And yet, as Sumida shows, subsequent generations of Nikkei communities found themselves in Urashima Taro-like conditions as a result of the Pacific War, starting with the nisei: for although American citizens, they were incarcerated, like their “alien” parents, as “enemy-aliens” upon the start of war. Not only did the nisei go through their own traumatic displacement during the war, the ones who lived had to return to world that had changed drastically, bearing the burdens of years spent in concentration camps. Thus, Sumida writes that the Nisei, too, “were Urashima Taro,”
and with narrative, “those Nikkei who could remember or intuit the Japanese story found...how to narrate their awful experience of incarceration and alienation” (45). Revealingly, as plotted by Sumida, the emergence of the designation “Nikkei” is marked by the temporality of the Pacific War, specifically from the vantage point of the community that was incarcerated, as well as forcibly modeled into model minorities who serve the geo-strategic interests of the U.S. nation-state.

Diasporic elements in Le Guin’s science fiction also are seen in the tensions articulated around Hideo’s “half-Terran” (Le Guin 198) identity. For just as Park marked “mixed-raced” peoples in the “Asiatic diaspora” as indicators of “how extensive the diaspora is” (39), Hideo’s “unmistakable” (Le Guin 198) multiracial features function to mark him ambivalently in relation both to Terran identity, but also society on “O.” For Hideo is a child of a “foreign marriage” (Le Guin 167), and is thus always half-“alien.” Just as Park, in his original theorization, cast diaspora in opposition to imperialism and war, Le Guin includes in Isako’s Japanese/terran background the peril of a Terran stricken by pollution and destruction. By featuring a multiracial narrator who reflects on his life as a child of an “alien from another world,” Le Guin both invites reflection on immigrant history from the vantage of women18, as well as suggests a resonance with the historical Nisei, and other forms of hybridizing, dialogic identifications that emerged out of the literary traditions of

Indeed, the added fact that Hideo works to conceal his embarrassment over his incestual desires suggests a resonance with the interracial romance of the nineteenth century; even in a futuristic, inter-galactic context, the narratives of Nikkei diaspora remains rooted in the classic themes of the interracial romance of the nineteenth century, and thus in the fiction of the East/West divide. Not only might we read Hideo’s anxieties over his multiracial, illegitimate inalienability as motivating his desire for flight as a Mobile for the Ecumen, paradoxically, his ambivalence also suggests why, over the course of his travels, Urashima Taro learns that he always remained rooted to the home in which he was raised, even after his departure for the “Mobile” life, a point I will return to.

While my analysis of “alien” representation in science fiction of the pre-war years has foreshadowed the fate of Japanese Americans as “test subjects” during the war, Le Guin’s Urashima Taro narrative can be read as suggesting an alternative conceptualization, and that is a reading of Nikkei as “test pilots.” Nikkei figures as “test pilots,” then, can be read within the science fiction of Pacific modernity along a post-personification continuum of “test subjects.” While the positionality of the “test pilot” is always romanticizable, the underlying logic of “testing,” along with the transnational, inter-species history of “test subject” representation, suggests a deeply complex, ultimately ambivalent condition of diasporization for the Nikkei figure,
even in a *globalizing universe*. It is within this context that Le Guin’s subversion of Einstein’s laws becomes readable in relation to themes in Nikkei history.

As we learn, Hideo, after deciding to go off-planet to Ecumenical School, was chosen as a kind of “test-pilot” for the breakthroughs in temporal physics happening during his time. As he tells his mother, “This Churten (spacetime travel) business is too interesting. I want to be a part of it” (Le Guin 184). In a far-future context of technological change, a period where Le Guin’s Hainish universe achieves a means to supersede the “NAFAL” (Nearly As Fast As Light) technology that had defined relations across the galaxy, we see that Le Guin intends to experiment with a universe in which temporal relativity, or the “Urashima Effect” (Yu), might be overcome. And while the possibilities of human travel beyond the speed of light remained a far fetched fiction in Le Guin’s 1990’s moment, her Hainish universe seems to be going through its own kind of “globalization.”

Although anticipations of future technologies that will defy Einstein’s notions of space-time are not uncommon science fiction, the context within which Le Guin’s engagement with theories diasporic space-time occasions both metaliterary reflection, but also allegorical commentary on Nikkei history within the context of a globalizing universe — the context in which the “alien from another world” emerged as a major trope of science fiction modernity.

As we learn, although Le Guin’s Hainish universe relied on NAFAL technology (thus working within Einstein’s premise that nothing can travel faster than
the speed of light), Hideo lived during a time which emergent technologies promised to “shrink the galaxy — the universe” (*A Fisherman of the Inland Sea* 184). Echoing Lawson Inada’s satirical trope of “shrinking the Pacific,” but also the archive of transpacific military science fiction, Le Guin imaginers her Urashima Taro coming of age in a time in which “the universe” seemed on the verge of a radically altered sense spatio-temporal reality; for as Hideo explains to his mother, one “mobile” to another, “if we do learn to control the technology, you know, then travel will be nothing…A mile or a light-year will be the same. There will be no distance” (*A Fisherman of the Inland Sea* 170).

Interestingly, Hideo’s scientific adventure both obviates his filial guilt, “There’ll be no need for the kind of sacrifice you (his mother) made” (*A Fisherman of the Inland Sea* 184), but also promises an entirely altered universe all together, in which “Things will be different. Unimaginably different!” (Le Guin 170). When historicized in relation to an era marked by the emergence of the internet, a shifting sense of spacetime under the globalizing forces of capital, as Harvey and Connery have observed -- but also an era in Ellison Onizuka became the first Asian American in space -- we can read Le Guin’s narrative in diasporic condition of Nikkei, both within and against, forms of “globalization” which were still emerging during Le Guin’s time. Although envisioning a future moment where the “Hainish universe” looks towards the reality of complete spacetime erasure, Le Guin also foregrounds
the persistence of the material in her depiction of a future universe where mobility is still dependent on “money.”

Thus, while Hideo cannot help but romanticize the life of the “test pilot,” interestingly, Le Guin uses the narrative premise as a means to develop a language of “side-effects” for diasporics in a globalizing universe. As Hideo reports, his experiences traveling about the universe produced outcomes that were unexpected and unintended. The collapse of space and time while “churtening,” as Hideo recalls, is experienced as an “unnerving interlude” (*A Fisherman of the Inland Sea* 180), producing a condition where “one cannot think consecutively, read o’clock face, follow a story. Speech and movement become difficult or impossible” (*A Fisherman of the Inland Sea* 180). As Hideo learns, the experience of space-time dilation also impacts the ability to perceive and relate to others, who “appear as unreal half presences, inexplicably there or not there” (*A Fisherman of the Inland Sea* 180). Although reminiscent of Inada’s figure of the Nikkei who “hops” and “bops” about the Pacific, the musical terminology of Hideo’s Urashima Taro journey points to the gaps in experience, the “missed beats,” moments “skipped,” and “unnerving interludes” between points of travel.

Even in an era where technology and capital can promising instantaneity and connectivity, as experienced by their “test subjects,” the science of the future proves haunted by the lingering traces of the past, the “wrinkles,” “ghosts,” “creased messages,” and “double-fields,” where history disrupts the present in the form of the
un-narratable. If read allegorically, perhaps we see a commentary on the dizzying effects of globalization, where the supposed ease of transportation and communication produce effects of splitting, multiplicity, but also non-linear, seemingly inconsequential, ghostly ontologies. Even in diaspora, Hideo remains rooted by his choices — choice made but also not made — and thus his future proves haunted by the other lives he could have had, but not for his desire for diasporic flight.

Yet if we consider the specific context of Japanese American history in California, with which Le Guin herself, as a Bay Area native, shares a historical connection, we see that there is more at play within the globalizing universe of Nikkei Urashima Taros. For Le Guin’s choice to find a “happy ending” for Urashima Taro, while going against the narrative grain of the Japanese tradition, can also be read as revealing something of Le Guin’s desire as a white, American author who remembers that she “was 12 when ‘the Japanese disappeared’ from my town, Berkeley.” Yet for Le Guin, the “exile from exile” of the Japanese Americans is marked by her misapprehension of the event. She writes, “My unawareness, my incomprehension of the event at the time, has troubled and informed my mind for many years” (“Otsuka Review”). Le Guin’s childhood remembrance is marked ambivalently, not by her ability to apprehend “reality,” but by her “unawareness” and “incomprehension” of what had happened. Evoking an Urashima Taro-like logic both in her imagination of the incarceration, but also the haunting history of what she didn’t know “at the time,”
Le Guin situates her own limits reflexively “as a white American,” and acknowledges a certain burden still at play for her, “It's up to me…to deal with it now” (“Otsuka Review”).

Yet as a science fiction writer, perhaps we can see why Le Guin would offer a place for Nikkei characters like Isako, Hideo, along with diaporic narratives like Urashima Taro, at the margins of her distant Hainish universe. This may also be why Le Guin finds a way to give the story a “happy ending,” at least in literature: after eighteen years of education, travel, and scientific research as a “Mobile,” Hideo falls out of synch with his family after first departing from “O.” During his intermittent stops on home, he witnesses his younger siblings become older siblings, his mother grow old and frail, and Isidiri marry another. And yet, after watching his family age apart from him over the course of his 18-life-years spent as a Mobile, on Hideo’s final “churten” through the universe, Le Guin takes him back to where his journey started, to the day of his departures for Ecumenical school, just after the moment he learned that Isidiri also reciprocated his love. Hideo’s final attempt at time-dilation transports him back in time to the day he ruptured his temporal relations with his family, and he has the chance to make a different choice — to live and age with his family, and make Isidiri his mate. Urashima Taro gets the chance to return home and have the life he lost.

Le Guin’s final gesture to bring her Nikkei Urashima Taro back to his “Tiokunan’n” home may also indicate a desire that future Nikkei might do more to
rediscover their Pacific Island “roots” in the “melting pot” of the “Pacific community.” What is most clear is that in gesturing towards Nikkei figures as representative time-travelers in a globalizing universe, she also affirms the need to listen to the voices of the “witness,” or those who went to “those bitter desert and mountain prison-towns, where few of ‘us’ went even in imagination” (“Otsuka Review”). That is, she reorients her imagination to the gaps in her apprehension and to narratives of “those who returned” (“Otsuka Review”).

**Japanese American Literature in a Science Fiction Context**

I now turn to an analysis of allusions to Urashima Taro in Japanese American literature. As Sumida suggests, the Urashima Taro narratives has afforded Japanese American writers in the wake of the Pacific War a way to narrative the spatiotemporal particularities of their history of diasporization, one in which the initial dispersal of immigrants from Japan marked only the first of many diasporizations that occurred in the coming years. While folk narratives passed between generations may seem quaint as a subject of literary analysis, as I have explored, the historical conditions of Nikkei imagining, as with Nikkei versions of the Urashima Taro narrative, are actually readable as part of science fiction’s emergence. For as suggested by Seo Youn Chu’s reading of Korean American literature, the language of science fiction, however paradoxically, creates a condition in which “trauma’s other-worldly temporality…can become available for representation” (156). In this context, we can build on Sumida’s
groundbreaking essay on John Okada’s “No-No Boy and the Twisted Logic of Internment” (2007), and perhaps reconsider some of the “racial, political, national, and existential questions that haunt and empower Nikkei” (45) — both between, and perhaps even, beyond two empires.

Sumida suggests the figure of Ichiro in John Okada’s novel No-No Boy (1946) can be read as an example of a Nikkei Urashima Taro who is haunted as a result of choices made during the war. Although Sumida’s analysis focuses on Okada’s explicit allusion to “Momotaro” (Peach Boy), Sumida concludes by also suggesting that Okada develops a competing allusion to Urashima Taro in the opening of the novel. Sumida concludes his analysis of Okada’s novel by suggesting the possibility that Nikkei Urashima Taro narratives, “unlike the Japanese Urashima Taro,” may point to a different future for diasporics, for it “leads us to ask and to fathom, what if Urashima had lived, to have to deal with his return to his homeland a stranger and an alien, rather than perish in a heap of dust?” (45) In addition to borrowing from the language of science fiction, Sumida suggest the possibility that Nikkei narratives might point to alternative trajectories both beyond the narrative’s origins, but also to futures not contained by the framing between empires in a globalizing universe.

Thus, I want to consider what Okada, and other Nikkei writers, have said about their respective Urashima Taro journey’s. Ichiro returns to Seattle after four years in prison in Tule Lake out of synch with the world as a result of his dislocation and confinement as a “No-No Boy.” Although he returns to the Seattle of his
childhood, Ichiro is unable to establish familiar bearings, for he returns feeling like an “intruder in world in which he has no claim” (Okada 1). Thus, although *No-No Boy* has been championed as a novel of Asian American resistance, it can also be read as a kind of science fiction in that Ichiro’s narrative, like Le Guin’s *Urashima Taro*, begins at the moment when the “alien returns.”

As we see, Okada’s Ichiro, the *Urashima Taro* “No-No,” can be read as giving voice to a particular plight, one imposed upon the Nikkei when the United States and Japan finally went to war. As Okada writes,

> I wish with all my heart that I were Japanese or that I were American. I am neither and…I blame myself and I blame the world which is made up of many countries which fight with each other and kill and hate and destroy but not enough, so that they must kill and hate and destroy again and again and again.

(16)

The violent sense of repetition in the text suggests the way in which diasporic identity is imperiled when situated within an unstable geopolitical context of warring nations. Being that a Nikkei “No-No Boy” can claim neither Japanese or American, he can only blame the impossible condition of living somewhere in between, and blame his own inability to find an alternative. Yet Ichiro’s psychic trauma is not a result of his personal inability to embrace Japaneseness or Americanness, or both, it is that the conditions by which his diasporic identity emerged were conditions of war -- with
America and Japan cast into antagonistic postures along national, racial, and gendered lines. For Ichiro, the diasporic future seems to enact the traumatic repetitions conditioned by the future war frame. For can the war actually said to be over if the diasporic identity cannot help but apprehend the perils of a future in “a world made up of many countries” who “must kill and hate and destroy again and again and again” (Okada 16)?

In response to Ichiro’s question, I want to analyze another iteration of the urashima taro story written by Hiroshi Kashiwagi, who himself can be read, like the fictional Ichiro, as a kind of “Nikkei Urashima Taro No-No Boy.” In his memoir, Starting From Loomis and Other Stories (2013), Kashiwagi’s adapts the Urashima Taro narrative in a chapter entitled “Swimming in the American.” The narrative depicts Kashiwagi’s return to the Sacramento area from Tule Lake, where, like the fictional Ichiro, he had been confined throughout the war after having answer “No-No” to the government’s loyalty questionnaire.

Kashiwagi recalls returning to swim in the American River for the first time since his incarceration. There, Kashiwagi is forced to rescue a young nisei woman from drowning in the river’s waters, he writes:

Entangled, we went straight down into the American. As we descended, I remember saying to myself, “Hear we go.” I was completely relaxed, resigned to whatever was going to happen as we sank deeper beneath the river’s
surface. Strangely, it was an exhilarating feeling, like we were entering a totally new realm, like Urashima Taro...

(93)

What interests me about Kashiwagi’s version is the way it situates the Urashima Taro narrative into a new context from the vantage point of a “Nikkei No-No Boy.” In plotting his journey to the underwater world at this moment of return to the “American river” (itself forever changing, and sometimes treacherous) not only does Kashiwagi suggest the possibility of new beginnings for the Urashima protagonist, but also that “the camps” can be read as a kind of Urashima Taro “origin” for a writer who, over the course of his long life, has borne but also refigured the label of “No-No Boy” in his poetry, plays, fiction, and non-fiction. In his “relaxed, resigned” submersion into the river, Kashiwagi accepts his American transformation, but does so by embracing the literary charge to “return to Tule Lake” in both mind and body as a writer. But as Kashiwagi found his “voice,” he also found that “camp” also changed in meaning in the years that followed.

When see evidence of the psychic baggage carried by the “alien who returns” in Kashiwagi’s struggles to narrative his experiences as a “No-No Boy” on his own terms. His problem has been particularly pronounced in relation to other Japanese Americans, who of course had their own unique experiences during the war. As he writes, “Among Japanese Americans, the most common question upon meeting after
the war was, what camp were you in? Since camp was our shared experience, I suppose the question is a natural lead-in to conversation, but I dreaded it” (23).

Kashiwagi’s illustration of his thinking in response to possible reactions to his Tule Lake history are revealing. He writes, “I hated to lie so I always answered directly, ‘I was at Tule Lake.’ Think whatever you want; I did what I had to do. I’m not proud of it and I’m not ashamed of it...or am I? Or are you making me feel ashamed? (23). As we see, Kashiwagi gives us both his utterance, but also his thought process in preemption of his interlocutor’s response. Although Kashiwagi can state his history truthfully, the range of reactions inevitably return him to the trauma of the incarceration, where he must enact the range of confusions conditioned by the war, by his response to the loyalty questionnaire, and by the years spent incarcerated as a stateless subject at Tule Lake. Even within the Japanese American community, the historical discrepancies of “camp” experiences means that although Kashiwai might desire to leave his journey to Tule Lake behind him, “I did what I had to do. I’m not proud of it and I’m not ashamed....” the stain of “No-No Boy,” or “disloyal,” continues to haunt him through the perceptions of others, and by the sense of alienation from a historical narrative which posited Japanese Americans as model Americans. Kashiwagi’s example returns us to the meta-literary problem of Urashima Taro: of authorial reliability, of how or whether or not Kashiwagi can tell the truth of his life in a country that did not trust him, and do so in world in which, in Le Guin’s words, “no story is safe.”
Yet Kashiwagi’s writing — as with his work as an actor, an editor, and librarian — also shows how signifiers like “No-No Boy,” or “camp,” or “American,” can transition from terms connoting alienation and shame to a source of empowerment, perspective, and personal voice over time, a fact suggested by his allusion to the Urashima Taro narrative. As the “Poet Laureate” of Tule Lake, and as an American Book Award winner, Kashiwagi has claimed his place as one of the most committed consciences of his nisei generation. Thus, Kashiwagi’s writing suggests the makings of a Nikkei response to the “racial, political, national, and existential” (Sumida 45) questions evoked through allusion to the narrative, for while acts of diasporic narration of his Urashima Taro history may enact the contradictions imposed upon his generation as a result of the war, these are contradictions that Kashiwagi has learned to live with as he returned to Tule Lake in mind, body, and writing over the years.

**U rashima Taro Narratives and Diasporic Time**

The other prominent theme suggested by scholars of Nikkei Urashima Taros is the theme of inter-generationalism through narration. In other words, we see the ways in which story can bind generations across diasporic time not necessarily by ties of “blood,” but rather by the mutations of narrative code as the Urashima Taro story changes over time and place.
Poet and writer Juliet Kono, a sansei writer born in Hawaii during the war, adapts the Urashima Taro tale in *Hilo Rains* (1988) as a way to reflect on her place within the history of her immigrant family in Hawaii. In her short story, “Ojichan,” Kono recounts her memories of story-telling rituals shared between herself and her grandfather around the Urashima Taro story. Her grandfather’s version itself reveals the narrative to be in a process of diasporization, as suggested by mix of “pidginized” language through which he relate his version of the story. As Kono’s grandfather tells it:

Mukashi mukashi, Sanzen nen, get all same guru boy, Urashima Taro, wen save-u anno tetaru, no? From one all same no guru boy- san. Wakaru ka? …you sabe?…An’ tetaru, all same very, very hap-pi. Give-u boy san all kind presento”…Den one time, Urashima Taro go hissing no? And all same big-u tsunami come-u and wash-y Urashima Taro faraway.

(53)

As we learn, the value of her ojichan’s narrative is not its fidelity to the original, but like other Issei, the way in which he adapts the story into the context of his own life in Hawaii: his urashima taro is filled in with the details of his life on the island, memories of migration from Japan, plantation labor, but also the devastation wrought by “nature.” For Kono, this means the 1952 Hilo tsunami, but implicitly, this can also be read as a metaphor for the Pacific War.

Interestingly, Kono’s Issei ojichan actually echoes Hearn in interpreting the story in terms of the desire for immortality; but then the story must always end, and with it the dream of Urashima Taro’s adventure. The resulting echo is the recognition of human mortality, and that all travelers must eventually part ways.

Kono’s own coming of age is marked by her awareness that even if her ojichan “get(s) the story all wrong” (54), the act of telling the tale is meaningful, for it bonds grandfather to granddaughter, both in life and even after death. Kono thus suggest how the narrative of dislocation also functions to bind generations of Urashima Taro across time, even as it registers their eventual separation. At the end of the story, when the poet's grandfather takes ill, it is the Urashima Taro story which gives Kono the strength to support her family and honor her ancestors. On route to the local temple to summon a Buddhist monk for her dying grandfather, Kono herself becomes Urashima Taro, recalling how she “swam the concrete sea…imagining myself on the backs of Urashima Taro’s turtle transporting me deeper and deeper into the depths…” (56). Yet even after her grandfather’s passing, the echoes of the narrative continue, in the memories of her ojichan, in the world to come after his passing, in the mysteries of life itself.
Kono brings her coming-of-age narrative to a close with her narrator walking through the fields where he labored, looking for her departed grandfather. She wonders, “Where are you, Ojichan? At sea, riding the turtle perhaps? Or are you in the air, somewhere, flying as a bird?” (58) Then suddenly, Kono’s world transforms, with land and sea merging as:

The cane fields turned into a swaying green sea. The rice birds flew up and swirled around like fish. And I was riding Urashima Taro’s turtle once more—driving deeper and deeper into the green. Looking up, I waved at each bird flying by. I waved goodbye frantically. ‘Ojichan,’ I called out. ‘Ojiiichaaan!’

(58)

Kono’s narrative may appear a simple “bildungsroman,” but the generational relationship between grandfather and granddaughter, two urashima taro’s in one story, evokes a cyclical temporality. Thus, her adaptation of the Urashima Taro narrative reveals a more complicated exploration of both the discrepancies and continuities in diasporic communities over generations.

Of course, the particular history of “Nikkei” communities between empires means that historic articulation of “Nikkei family” — as ones who were former subjects of the Japanese emperor/father, but also the “test subjects” of Americanization — is a site of ambivalence, and thus necessary critical reflection. This will ultimately mean that the “test pilots” of the Pacific will have to learn to read race, and perhaps, conceptualize “community” differently, that is, not just within the
nostalgic intergenerational context of Americanization, but within the historical
context of transpacific modernity, and the geopolitical condition between empires. By
structuring her coming-of-age around the Urashima Taro narrative, and then using her
developing relationship with her “Ojisan” as a measure of her evolving awareness of
self, Kono’s example suggests that the technology of narrative offers the most
powerful means for Nikkei to define their future journeys, and that Nikkei “roots”
will lie in the dynamicisms of discourse as notions and conditions of diaspora change
over time.

The Future Between Empires

The literary continuum of Nikkei Urashima Taro narratives across ethnic/diasporic
literature and science fiction reveals the ways in which science fictional thinking
about diaspora can offer a contribution to thinking about the critical concept, one
which lays the foundation for future attempts at diasporic comparativity across Asian
American literatures and beyond. Although the history of the Nikkei suggests that
diaspora is far from a utopian condition, when situated critically, the diasporic
narration has been a source of understanding and empowerment for Nikkei writers, as
my Urashima Taro analysis has explored.

That being the case, we can be certain that the Nikkei Urashima Taro
narratives covered here will not be the last. For just as diaspora, as a modern
formation, Nikkei or otherwise, is a structural condition rooted in the existence of
nations, the emergence of “diaspora” from the maelstrom of modern war suggests that the “aliens” of modernity will continue to confront the contradictions of geopolitics and race in the future. This is suggested by E. Lily Yu’s recent science fictional adaptation of the Urashima Taro narrative, “The Urashima Effect” (2013).

Yu’s Urashima Taro is set in an era of late-twenty-first century space travel and, following Le Guin’s narrative, the language of post-Einsteinian theory of spacetime. Set in a near future where humanity has come together to launch a mission to a distant planet, the story begins with Leo Aoki waking aboard a space ship after having been frozen; he has been traveling through space near the speed of light for many years on route to Ryugu-jo — a planet discovered and named by his wife, Esther, after her favorite Nikkei story, Urashima Taro — as a representative of a collaboration between the United States and Japan. His wife Esther, was scheduled to depart two years after him.

Thus, Yu suggests a condition in which multiracial Japanese Americans are the “test pilots” of a future humanity. As we have seen, this is familiar science fiction terrain. For Yu suggests a future-moment where Japanese Americans like Leo and Esther — or as Yu describes them, “hyphenated Americans with a preponderance of Japanese in front of the dash” (Yu) — seem to be enjoying a reversal of the racial subordination of their ancestors. One might even say that their ethnic/diasporic identities helped rocket them to the front of the line: for they have the distinct
privilege of representing the whole earth, both simply because they are eminently capable scientists and astronauts, but also because they are diasporic Japanese.

Leo recovers from cryogenic freezing by getting himself physically fit and mentally sound, listening to the sixty hours of audio recordings made for him by family and friends to keep him “sane and functional” (Yu) while alone in space. With Esther’s launch two years after his, Leo knew that “It would be a long wait. He would land and build a suitable home and laboratory for them on the arid, glistening plains of Ryugu-jo. Then he would stand in his suit under the alien stars, looking for a brightening light” (Yu).

Esther’s recording begins with her retelling her husband the story of Urashima Taro, so “you would have time to calm down and clear your mind after awakening, and so that it would be easier for you to understand what I have to say” (Yu). As she informs her husband, “while you were asleep the U.S. and Japan came to the brink of war. Two cyber attacks on a dam and a power plant were traced back to Ichigaya, and three American citizens were arrested in Seattle. There is talk about rounding up those with Japanese blood again…” (Yu). The Ryogu-ji collaboration between the U.S. and Japan has been “scrapped as being too dangerous, given the rising tensions between the two countries” (Yu). But Leo’s rocket was launched by the U.S. unilaterally as an example of “unfaltering national courage in the face of threats and our gracious commitment to peacetime cooperation” (Yu). Leo, although an America, is launched as an example of “cooperation” (Yu) between nations, even as the U.S. and Japan
return to the bring of war, and “there is talk about rounding up those with Japanese blood again.” Although racially alienated, he is simultaneously appropriated as a reflection of an idealized America. What’s more, Esther’s flight has been cancelled all together.

Leo learns that he is now twelve point five light years from earth, and that in the three years he has traveled, thirteen have passed on earth; he also learns that Esther, whose flight funding was cut, is now forty-nine, while he is only thirty-six. Like Nikkei before him, he has fallen out of synch with the world that he knew as a result of a fantastical voyage, but also that the conditions of his diasporic journey -- the ongoing international relation between the United States and Japan -- was not of his making. Thus, Leo must come, as it were, another Urashima Taro of the globalizing universe. Although Yu seemed to elude to the possibilities of diaspora as a privileged formation, the plot twist of another U.S.-Japan “war scare” in the near future foregrounds the historic formation of Nikkei diaspora between empires as a determinative frame insofar as ours is a future still dominated by nations.

As Esther explains, she does not know who she will be that many years from now; she cannot offer him anything other than her love in her present moment. She explains to Leo that, if he chooses, he can refreeze himself and use his pod and remaining fuel to return to earth where everyone he knew will be out of synch with the world he knew. Or Leo can stay on Ryugu-jo, complete the experiments that he and Esther designed, send home the data that he has discovered, even if it will take a
long time for the people back on earth to get the message. If he does, he will never see another person again.

Following Le Guin, Yu allegorizes Einstein’s theories of the temporal relativity as a means to comment on the historical conditions of diaspora for Nikkei. Yu’s Nikkei future contains echoes of the familiar tropes within Japanese American historiography: of Issei immigrants making new lives in a new lands, “Pacific Citizen” heroes in the wake of victory, but also the plight of families torn apart when nations decide to war. Even within the context of science fiction, the narrative of “Nikkei Urashima Taro’s” suggests how diaspora, even when situated within a seemingly transnational universe, remains fraught by a history — and a conception of the future — dominated by geo-political rivalry, racism, and the shifting significations of “Japan” as a point of diasporic origin.

But Yu also suggests the contours of a more contemporary diasporic condition for Nikkei, both in her raising discrepancies between Leo, who is go-sei (or fifth generation), and Esther, who’s parents immigrated to the United States in the twenty-first century. Thus, her diasporic histories place her ancestors on the other side of the Pacific War, but also that she is associated with post-war conceptions of Japanese identity. In this way, Esther’s connections to Japan and more contemporary significations of Japaneseness point to emergent discrepancies within formations of Japanese diasporas. And yet, “The Urashima Effect” also includes the powerful
effects of narrative as a site where historical discrepancies might be negotiated and transformed.

For Yu leaves the reader a final diasporic gesture in Esther’s dual-promise to always watch the sky for Leo, but also to “grow roots” (Yu) for him should he choose to fly onward. She does so by telling him the story,

...about how your great-grandfather met your great-grandmother in Heart Mountain during the war. I will tell you about your family and the different places your parents grew up, and where your ancestors came from.

(Yu)

Her stories will ensure that he will not be “adrift and alone in the dark” (Yu). Rather, the Nikkei Urashima Taro “will know where you came from...and will know where you are going” (Yu “The Urashima Effect”). While there will be no easy way beyond contradiction for the Nikkei “aliens” of the future, they will, therefore, need their “roots,” and can find them in the Urashima Taro narratives of Pacific modernity, and in the history of intersection between Nikkei literature and science fiction.
Conclusion

Beyond “Test Subjects”:

Diasporic Science Fiction and the Transnational Future

This dissertation has been about finding a new way to think about Nikkei history, about building on the cultural studies theories of diaspora, and about bringing two historically discrepant literary traditions -- science fiction and Asian American literature -- into dialogue around issues in Pacific War historiography, specifically the backdrop of the wartime internment of Japanese Americans. I set out to find in the emergence of science fiction a pre-history to the language of the Japanese American incarceration, specifically the designation of “enemy-alien” deployed against communities across the western hemisphere to justify military targeting, forced removal, and the history of modeling as “projectiles for democracy” across the continuum of “test subjects” and “test pilots.” Yet if the Nikkei history can be read as an example, we need to imagine a future in which the “alien” diasporas of the world can have better parts to play in the future than the one plotted for Nikkei in the emergence of science fiction.

I therefore conclude my dissertation with a reading of Toshio Mori’s pre-war, proto-Nikkei science fiction, “The Sweet Potato” (1940). While the short story was published posthumously, its writing suggests an important moment in Asian American
literary history in which the context of the science fiction future provided a means for a diasporic writer like Mori to the future that was foreshadowed in science fiction.

With his reflections on the possibilities and perils facing Nikkei in the future against the science fictional backdrop of the Golden Gate International Exposition of 1940-41, Mori’s narrative suggests the ways in which the science fiction imagination, however ambivalently, served as a means by which ethnic, diasporic writers could contest their present conditions, as well as gesture toward the possibility of alternative futures. While Mori has generally be read in the vein of ethnic naturalism, I show how his text can be read as an example of the “alien” speaking back to an archive that had figured those like him quite prominently, and often times quite violently. Mori’s setting is an utopian island located within the San Francisco Bay, Treasure Island, created as an human-made appurtenance to Yerba Buena Island to feature a global celebration of peace and unity in the Pacific region.

The International Exposition was designed to celebrate the completion of the Oakland Bay Bridge and the Golden Gate Bridges. Like the 1915 Panama Pacific Exposition, the Golden Gate International Exhibition (ironically) professed to heralding a new era of peace and prosperity across the Pacific region. As described by UC Berkeley art historian, Eugen Neuhaus: “The Golden Gate International Exposition is a world on parade, gathered together to rejoice…and to expand both its practical and its romantic interest in the lands of the Pacific basin” (2). As one of the most extensive public works in California’s history, Treasure Island’s construction,
including its impressive array of art, architecture, and theatrical lighting, was
designed conjure the image of “an Art Deco Atlantis reborn from the sea” (Starr, ch. 13).

Of course, “Treasure Island” was also designed in association with literature, specifically Stevenson’s maritime classic of the same name; but in addition, the Golden Gate International Exposition was also clearly inspired by science fiction. This is seen in the remarks of journalist Chester Rowell, who situated the completion of the Golden Gate/Treasure Island project in terms of a historic opening in human history. In what should now be familiar rhetoric, Rowell points to Asia and the future meeting between “East and West” as “the great fact which distinguishes our generation and its successors from all that went before” (qtd. in Starr, ch. 13). But in his depiction, he deliberately deploys the classic conflation of orientalist and science fictional tropes, for: “Facing Eastward on the Western sea, dwells half the human race. Until now it has been to us a world apart, as if on another planet. Henceforward, forever, it is to be the other half of our world and a participant in our life” (qtd. in Starr, ch. 13). Rowe’s remarks both inscribe the familiar logic of the East/West hemispheric divide, but also the science fictional association of Asia with “alien” worlds.

Rowe’s vision on an interplanetary “imperial san francisco” — however absurd — inherits a long legacy of science fictional thinking in associating with international expositions. As Roger Luckhurst has argued, World’s Fairs, in addition
to promoting technological, scientific, and cultural innovation, have functioned increasingly since their nineteenth century inception as science fictional “laboratories” for globalization and the process David Harvey has called “space-time compression.” Luckhurst writes: “World’s fair sites were immersive spaces that represented and staged global encounters…in environments that were meant to map and orient a place for the domestic masses within an emergent global economy” (SF Studies). In Luckhurst’s argument, World’s Fairs promoted ideologies of capitalist globalization, but also massification, in environments “meant to map and orient” visitors as part of an emergent world economy.

Yet as Noriko Aso has explored, international expositions also served a regulatory function for an emergent international order throughout the “establishment and management, rather than the overcoming, of distinctions” (Public Properties 51) between nations and cultures. Aso writes: “Described by U.S. President William McKinley as the ‘time-keepers of progress,’ international expositions were staged to encourage “friendly rivalry” among nations to spur, through comparison, ‘high endeavor in all departments of human activity,’ with a particular emphasis on industrial invention (Public Properties 51). Thus, in addition to modeling future of consumptive habits in a globalizing modernity, Aso’s analysis suggests that international expositions also functioned to institutionalize “friendly rivalry” in the race for technological and industrial supremacy between nations. Ironically, as with so much of science fiction, just as world’s fairs explored the possibilities of global
unity, they also inscribed and policed political and racial borders. Just as they modeled visions of global consumerism, they also model futures fraught by uneven distribution of resources, and by nations that may someday war.

Yet as my analysis of “The Sweet Potato” will explore, Mori’s choice to examine questions of Nikkei futurity within the context of the world fair on Treasure Island in 1940, before the war, suggests an alternative perspective on the science fictional context of the world’s fair: specifically, the voices of communities negotiating the condition of diaspora caught between empires. In a way, Mori helps us imagine a vision of the global future from the perspective of the “alien.” Although it is telling that Mori would set his “The Sweet Potato” amidst a spectacle of seemingly epic proportions, as Lawson Inada observes, paradoxically, the story is actually “not so much one of action but reflection” (8).

Two friends, Hiro and Mori’s first-person narrator (based on the author himself), walk about the exposition grounds on the last day of the fair in 1940. Having attending the fair regularly all summer long, the two follow their usual routine of walking, talking, and perching themselves atop the Temple Pavilion. Rather than visit exhibits, their habit was the ponder the future of their community and “the problem of the second generation of Japanese ancestry” (99). As Mori’s narrator recalls it, every trip to Treasure Island would end with a debate regarding the future of the Nisei: “all summer long we had argued about ourselves” (99).
It is significant that Mori’s act of contemplation also includes a subversion of the militarized logic of the ariel view: rather than reducing people and spaces to targets of war, Mori’s perspective from up on the Temple grounds acknowledges a common predicament shared by all people at the fair, however seemingly insignificant. Yet at the same time, the image of Mori and Hiro surveying the scene sets them apart, at least temporarily, from the procession of wanders; this suggests that however universally the Nisei share in the human condition, their remains something particular to their experience, and to their position, in the world as “the second generation of Japanese ancestry” (99) in the United States. As Mori’s narrator explains, Hiro believes that the Nisei will, like their Issei parents, be indefinitely subordinated, condemned to a life of ghettoization and institutional exclusion. Mori, on the other hand, holds a more optimistic view than his companion, countering Hiro’s sense of resignation with a deep faith in the ability of his generation to ascend from their position of abjection: “‘You’re wrong, Hiro,’ I would say. ‘We’ll climb and make ourselves heard. We have something in us to express and we will be heard’” (99).

The narrative unfolds over the last day of the fair, when the two meet another unconventional pair of travelers, and, for a moment, glimpse a vision of community that could transform their collective conditions altogether. After following their usual routine of roaming and debating what’s to come, the two grow hungry, only to find restaurants everywhere filled with customers. They finally find a seat at the Japanese
Tearoom; Mori suggests a subtle critique of the logic of commodification in his depiction of Hiro growing uncomfortable at the ubiquitous site of “white people munching” (100) on treats from Japan.

Although they are relieved to find an empty table, once they sit down, a woman and her son, both white, sit and join them; the two proceed to introduce themselves to Mori and Hiro, *in Japanese*. The mother and son, we learn, had lived in Japan, where the mother, now elderly, taught English for a decade. In an ironic reversal of racialized divisions traditionally separating the two pairs, Mori presents his Nisei with characters who, although both white Americans, can also trace unconventional connections with Japan. In this way, although Mori raises questions of conflation between Nisei and Japan, he also offers a subtle picture of a diasporizing world where we can’t assume easy identifications along national, racial, or linguistic lines.

The mother tells a story of the aftermath of the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake, a narrative that shatters whatever ice remained between them. In the aftermath of the quake, in a time, the mother relates, where nobody had any food, it was the altruistic gestures of strangers that saved her family. As she remembers:

A Japanese family whom we did not know found a single sweet potato. There were four in the family but the father cut the potato in eight parts and gave each of us a cube. The four in my family were never more filled. I cannot
forget it. And afterwards a boy came along with a cup of sterilized water and we shared that too.

(101)

Of course, Mori’s anecdote on the aftermath of the Kanto earthquake is troubled by the imperial context of modern Japan. The incident recalls an ambivalent transpacific racial terrain in which Americans in Yokohama could be privileged, while Koreans could be persecuted throughout the country. And yet, within the purposes of Mori’s narrative, the anecdote serves to foreshadow the alternative ground of transpacific relations that emerges as a result of the encounter at Treasure Island. This alternative spacetime is the recognition of the ecological context that is shared both by the U.S. and Japan across the Pacific “Ring of Fire,” indeed, the geo-cosmic condition of planet earth. But this also involves the necessary opposition to consumptive practices of global “munching,” that is, the hope that the Japanese and American people might exchange more than commodities, meaning that they would learn to share, rather than compete for, natural resources.

Thus, following the story, the always pessimistic Hiro finds himself alive in a world whose spatiotemporal coordinates seem radically altered, as he “beamed and looked gaily about, losing all sense of time and place” (102). Mori closes with the ephemeral imagine of two pairs of diasporics, one second-generation Japanese American, the other white Americans who made Japan their home, now joined in an unconventional bond. As Mori depicts the scene, “the four of us sat there a long time
as if we had known one another a good many years. The people looked curiously at us, wondering what we had in common” (102).

As we see, Mori uses the science fictional setting of Treasure Island to imagine a diasporic response to the coming of the Pacific War. Although “The Sweet Potato” was written in 1940, before the actual outbreak of war between the United States and Japan, Mori’s story suggests a deep, uncanny awareness of the contradictions and dangers that his generation will face in the future. Inada reads in the “regret for the end of the fair” (8) both an elegy to “how life could be in the world, with peace and mutuality” (“Introduction” 2), but also a premonition the hard realities soon to befall his generation upon the start of the Pacific War.

And yet, within this context, it is undeniable that the “alien” claimed its place as part of the human future by recovering something of the utopian spirit that was present in the genre’s emergence. Mori’s Treasure Island story ends with the “Japanese question” that haunted his generation temporarily resolved, for his vision of a coming “Pacific Community” suggests a condition in which such a question would no longer be relevant. Thus, in the face of the coming war, the “alien” pointed us towards an alternative future in which diasporics from across the sea can feel a sense of historic community, and learn to relate to one another on more just, equal, and peaceful terms.
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